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3 1604 018 748 188

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3 1604 010 265 868

United States Department of the Interior

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
P.O. Box 37127
Washington, D.C. 20013-7127

TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA

IN REPLY REFER TO:

H32 (413)

Dear Friends and Colleagues:

I am pleased to provide you the *Study of Civil War Sites in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia*, which was authorized by Public Law 101-628 and prepared by the National Park Service's **American Battlefield Protection Program**. Congress directed the National Park Service in 1990 to undertake this study because of the role played by the Shenandoah Valley during the Civil War and because of the need to learn the condition of these important sites.

The report tells us that many of the Valley's most important Civil War sites now face threats to their survival. We must act quickly because there is a critical opportunity to preserve these places so that future generations can visit them and learn firsthand how the Civil War shaped our country's future. This study helps us to understand and preserve the significant Civil War sites in the Shenandoah Valley. Among the study's valuable achievements are the identification of 15 battlefields and an assessment of threats to their integrity. Along with the text, we are pleased to make available a series of fold-out color maps that illustrate the boundaries and conditions of these historic sites. Please refer to page viii of the text for further information about the maps.

The earlier draft version of the report already has stimulated many battlefield preservation efforts in the Shenandoah Valley. For example, the Lord Fairfax Planning District Commission is compiling a cooperative battlefield preservation plan for five northern Shenandoah Valley counties based on the report's findings. Other private and public efforts have included land purchases, heritage tourism, land-use planning, and two improved battlefield-related museums.

We trust that this final version of the study will spur further battlefield preservation efforts in the Shenandoah Valley. Please share the report's important message with others.

Sincerely,

Roger G. Kennedy
Director, National Park Service

Enclosures

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MAP 1: SHENANDOAH VALLEY COUNTIES AND SURROUNDING STATES

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Shenandoah Valley Counties and Surrounding States

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

MAP 1: SHENANDOAH VALLEY COUNTIES AND SURROUNDING STATES

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MAP 2: SHENANDOAH VALLEY
RELIEF OF THE VALLEY

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Relief of the Valley



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MAP 2: SHENANDOAH VALLEY
RELIEF OF THE VALLEY

1980 Road Network

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

MAP 3: SHENANDOAH VALLEY
1980 ROAD NETWORK

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1980 Road Network

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Battlefield Study Areas

Independent Cities

Roads

MAP 3: SHENANDOAH VALLEY
1980 ROAD NETWORK

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**MAP 4: SHENANDOAH VALLEY
1973 LAND USE**

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MAP 4: SHENANDOAH VALLEY 1973 LAND USE

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1862 Road Network

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

MAP 5: SHENANDOAH VALLEY 1862 ROAD NETWORK

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1862 Road Network

Battlefield Study Areas

Independent Cities

Roads

MAP 5: SHENANDOAH VALLEY
1862 ROAD NETWORK

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Frequency of Military Conflict 1

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Second

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MAP 6: SHENANDOAH VALLEY FREQUENCY OF MILITARY CONFLICT 1861-1865

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Frequency of Military Conflict 1861 – 1865

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

MAP 6: SHENANDOAH VALLEY
FREQUENCY OF
MILITARY CONFLICT
1861-1865

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Jackson's Valley Campaign March 3 – Ju

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

MAP 7: JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN MARCH 3 – JUNE 17, 1862

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Jackson's Valley Campaign March 3 – June 17, 1862

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

MAP 7: JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN
MARCH 3 – JUNE 17, 1862

Gettysburg Campaign June 9 – 3

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**MAP 8: GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
JUNE 9 – 31, 1863**

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Gettysburg Campaign June 9 – 31, 1863

MAP 8: GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
JUNE 9 – 31, 1863

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Lynchburg Campaigns May – June

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MAP 9: LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS
MAY – JUNE 1864

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Lynchburg Campaigns May – June, 1864

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

MAP 9: LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGNS
MAY – JUNE 1864

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

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**MAP 10: EARLY'S CAMPAIGN
JUNE 23 – AUGUST 7, 1864**

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Early's Campaign June 23 – August 7, 1864



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Battlefield Study Areas
Independent Cities
Armed Conflicts

MAP 10: EARLY'S CAMPAIGN
JUNE 23 – AUGUST 7, 1864

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Sheridan's Valley Campaign August, 18

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Cedar Creek

Fisher's Hill (September 21–

Tom's Brook (October 9, 1



MAP 11: SHERIDAN'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN AUGUST 1864 – MARCH 1865

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Sheridan's Valley Campaign August, 1864 – March, 1865

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

Battlefield Study Areas
Independent Cities
Armed Conflicts

MAP 11: SHERIDAN'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN AUGUST 1864 – MARCH 1865

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MAP 12: FIRST KERNSTOWN
LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 12: FIRST KERNSTOWN
LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 13: FIRST KERNSTOWN
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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MAP 13: FIRST KERNSTOWN INTEGRITY – 1991 (Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 14: McDOWELL LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 14: McDOWELL LAND USE - 1991

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

MAP 15: McDOWELL INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 15: McDOWELL INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 16: FRONT ROYAL LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 16: FRONT ROYAL
LAND USE – 1991



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MAP 17: FRONT ROYAL INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 17: FRONT ROYAL
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 18: FIRST WINCHESTER LAND USE – 1991

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MAP 18: FIRST WINCHESTER LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 19: FIRST WINCHESTER
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 19: FIRST WINCHESTER
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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MAP 20: CROSS KEYS LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 20: CROSS KEYS LAND USE – 1991



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MAP 21: CROSS KEYS INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 21: CROSS KEYS INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)



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MAP 22: PORT REPUBLIC
LAND USE – 1991

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MAP 22: PORT REPUBLIC
LAND USE – 1991



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MAP 23: PORT REPUBLIC
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 23: PORT REPUBLIC
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 24: SECOND WINCHESTER LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 24: SECOND WINCHESTER LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 25: SECOND WINCHESTER INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 25: SECOND WINCHESTER INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)



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MAP 26: NEW MARKET LAND USE – 1991

I 29.2 C49/6



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MAP 26: NEW MARKET LAND USE – 1991



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MAP 27: NEW MARKET INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

D 28.2 C48/4



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MAP 27: NEW MARKET INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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MAP 28: PIEDMONT LAND USE – 1991

.48/B11



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MAP 28: PIEDMONT LAND USE - 1991

D 20.2 S81/5



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MAP 29: PIEDMONT INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

D 29.2 P68/1



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MAP 29: PIEDMONT INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 30: COOL SPRING LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 30: COOL SPRING LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 31: COOL SPRING INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 31: COOL SPRING INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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MAP 32: SECOND KERNSTOWN LAND USE – 1991



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MAP 32: SECOND KERNSTOWN LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 33: SECOND KERNSTOWN INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 33: SECOND KERNSTOWN
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

20.2 C49/6



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MAP 34: OPEQUON LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 34: OPEQUON LAND USE - 1991

J 29.2 C49/6



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MAP 35: OPEQUON INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 35: OPEQUON INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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MAP 36: FISHER'S HILL LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 36: FISHER'S HILL
LAND USE – 1991

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MAP 37: FISHER'S HILL INTEGRITY – 1991 (Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 37: FISHER'S HILL
INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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MAP 38: TOM'S BROOK LAND USE – 1991

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MAP 38: TOM'S BROOK LAND USE – 1991



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MAP 39: TOM'S BROOK INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 39: TOM'S BROOK INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 40: CEDAR CREEK LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 40: CEDAR CREEK LAND USE – 1991

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

MAP 41: CEDAR CREEK INTEGRITY – 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

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

MAP 41: CEDAR CREEK INTEGRITY - 1991
(Numbers keyed to battle phases)

FEDERAL PUBLICATION

STUDY OF

CIVIL WAR SITES IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY OF VIRGINIA

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PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 101-628

SEPTEMBER 1992

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
INTERAGENCY RESOURCES DIVISION

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This report was prepared under the overall direction of Lawrence E. Aten, Chief, Interagency Resources Division, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior.

Cover photo: Jacob Funk House by David W. Lowe

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study of Civil War sites in the Virginia part of the Shenandoah Valley was authorized by Public Law 101-628. It accomplishes the following tasks:

- Identifies significant Civil War sites;
- Establishes their relative importance;
- Determines their condition;
- Assesses threats to their integrity;
- Provides alternatives for their preservation and interpretation by Federal, State and local governments or by other public or private entities.

The time and funds available dictated a need to focus the study on major battlefields as the kind of historic sites under the greatest preservation pressures. While the Civil War certainly did not play out exclusively on battlefields, the latter are among the most dramatic sites conveying a very high level of meaning to Americans and are extremely vulnerable to development and visual intrusion. Action to preserve and interpret key battlefields can provide the conceptual structure around which to evaluate and preserve other sites, buildings, and structures significant to preserving a record of the Civil War in the Valley.

SIGNIFICANT SITES

The study examined battlefields in eight Virginia counties: Augusta, Clarke, Frederick, Highland, Page, Rockingham, Shenandoah, and Warren. Official war records document 326 armed conflict incidents in the Shenandoah Valley and this does not include many of the raids, ambushes, and partisan actions. As a result of historical analysis, the 326 notable armed conflicts were reduced to fifteen battle events of major significance. The battlefields selected for study were associated with Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862, the Gettysburg Campaign of 1863, and the decisive Lynchburg-Early-Sheridan Campaigns of 1864. These three campaigns, encompassing the fifteen individual sites, are the most significant events in the Valley's Civil War history.

The sites associated with these campaigns were: (1862) Cross Keys, Front Royal, First Kernstown, McDowell, Port Republic, First Winchester; (1863) Second Winchester; (1864) Cedar Creek, Cool Spring, Fisher's Hill, Second Kernstown, New Market, Opequon, Piedmont, and Tom's Brook.

The analysis of military campaigns as the historic context for the major battlefields in the Valley indicates that the 1862 and 1864 campaigns are of higher importance, although for different reasons, than the local events associated with the 1863 Gettysburg campaign. From the field survey and historical research, it further appears that both the 1862 Jackson campaign and the 1864 Lynchburg-Early-Sheridan campaigns, as represented by their fourteen associated sites, meet National Historic Landmark (NHL) criteria. Cedar Creek already is designated a National Historic Landmark, and Opequon may also individually meet NHL criteria. The other sites probably would not meet NHL criteria on their own (a key factor in considering potential additions to the National Park System), although they appear to qualify for the National Register of Historic Places. There is no clear line of historical argument that assures a credible relative ranking of individual battlefields based on significance other than for Cedar Creek and Opequon; however, both of these latter sites represent the same campaign with neither telling the whole story of its campaign.

As a result of field survey and research into the records of battle events, each site was documented as a study area, the entire area of activity involved in the battle event; and its incorporated core area, the area of principal armed conflict and other closely related activity such as command and control locations.

Taken together, the fifteen battlefield study areas in the Valley comprised 85,909 acres. The average size of the study areas was 5,727 acres and they ranged from 3,082 acres at Front Royal to 22,274 acres at Second Winchester. Battlefield core areas totaled 33,844 acres, with an average size of 2,415 acres. Core areas ranged from 944 acres at Front Royal to 6,252 acres at Cedar Creek. A table is enclosed with this Executive Summary listing all battlefields and their associated campaign context, their size, condition, and preservation risk.

CONDITION AND THREATS TO INTEGRITY

Integrity tells the current condition of the battlefield core area, and threats tell what to anticipate in the foreseeable future. Of the 85,909 acres of battlefield study areas 82% were determined to have generally good integrity. The primary losses of integrity have occurred in the lower (northern) Valley in the vicinity of the cities of Winchester and Front Royal. The battlefields of

McDowell, Piedmont, Port Republic, Cross Keys, Cool Spring, Cedar Creek, Fisher's Hill, First Kernstown and Tom's Brook were all found to be in fair to good condition. The battlefields of Second Kernstown and New Market were in poor to fair condition, Opequon and Front Royal were in poor condition, and First Winchester has been lost as a coherent battlefield site.

Threats to preservation of the fifteen battlefields under study come primarily from residential construction (threatening 12 sites), commercial development (threatening 7), highway construction (threatening 6) and industrial development (threatening 3 sites). Taken together, integrity and threats identify categories of risk to preservation. The following list of battlefield sites is the nearest approximation to a listing of current relative risk priority that is possible based on both historical and descriptive site analysis (1 is highest risk, 15 is lowest risk).

1. Front Royal (1862)
2. 1st Winchester (1862)
3. Opequon (1864)
4. 2nd Kernstown (1864)
5. 2nd Winchester (1863)
6. New Market (1864)
7. 1st Kernstown (1862)
8. Tom's Brook (1864)
9. Cool Spring (1864)
10. Fisher's Hill (1864)
11. Cedar Creek (1864)
12. Cross Keys (1862)
13. Port Republic (1862)
14. Piedmont (1864)
15. McDowell (1862)

RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE

This listing of sites based on the current risk to preservation leaves unanswered the public policy question of whether it is better to focus preservation efforts on sites nearly lost, or on sites where pristine historic landscapes remain well-preserved and the Civil War setting is evoked easily. There are arguments to be made for either approach but the question itself cannot be answered further through historical analysis. There are basically three choices that can be made.

A. The lowest risk, good condition sites often lend themselves to a high degree of protection and preservation with minimum costs and least disruption of local people while resulting in retention of exceptional quality historical sites. Sites in this category are Cross Keys (1862), Port Republic (1862), Piedmont (1864), and McDowell (1862).

B. The higher risk, poor condition sites generally would require higher costs and often more difficult resolution of competing interests. However, these sites represent historic events of great importance too, and if action is not taken imminently, there will not even be fragments remaining to commemorate the former existence of these battle locations. Sites in this category are Opequon (1864), First Winchester (1862), and Front Royal (1862).

C. There also are good reasons to choose sites under intermediate levels of risk as the primary preservation focus. For example, sites that are in good to fair condition but under moderate levels of threat; or, sites that are in poor to fair condition experiencing yet greater levels of threat. The rationale here is that good condition, low threat sites might survive longer without intervention, and that worthwhile preservation results can no longer be obtained from lost or poor condition sites under extreme threats given the extreme confrontational and other costs, while sites in the intermediate risk categories represent problems that still are manageable. Sites in the relatively LESS risky intermediate group are Cool Spring (1864), Fisher's Hill (1864), and Cedar Creek (1864). Sites in the relatively MORE risky intermediate group are First/Second Kernstown (1862/64), New Market (1864), Tom's Brook (1864), and Second Winchester (1863).

PRESERVATION ALTERNATIVES

Current information indicates that the Valley's population will grow by 18%, or by 63,150 people, over the next 30 years. Much of this growth will be in and around the cities of Winchester, Front Royal, and Harrisonburg. Associated with this growth will be the four principal sources of changing land use that will damage or destroy key historic sites: residential, commercial, highway, and industrial development.

One key to preserving Civil War sites is to assure that local governments have available to them information on the location and significance of such sites so that they are able to use their planning, zoning, and other powers to channel economic development in ways and places that do not bring harm to important resources. This report and its supporting data begins to serve that purpose.

Moreover, Civil War and other historic resources are a key part of the Valley's resource base for a heritage tourism component of economic development. The study determined the general prospects for heritage tourism in the Valley are broadly positive, although there should be targeted market research as part of designing a specific

battlefield protection and interpretation program in the Valley that would be structured to avoid undue intrusion on private property owners and retention of the rural Valley way of life. Nevertheless, protection of these fifteen major Civil War battlefield sites can be seen as not only an important national objective, but also as an important element of the local economy and, therefore, an added incentive to local governments to play a substantial role in protecting these sites.

Five approaches are available for protecting some or all of the fifteen major Civil War battlefields in the Virginia part of the Valley. Generally these actions would apply to core areas and selected parts of study areas of each site. A summary of the specific preservation potential at each site is given in Part Four of the main report. The alternative preservation approaches are the following:

1. No focused action but continue to let private and local government actions occur as they are now.

2. Enhanced public funding and technical assistance to State and local governments and to private owners for site preservation and interpretation.

3. Create one or more affiliated areas of the National Park System.

4. Acquire one or two sites for the National Park System as interpretive, technical assistance, and management focal points in conjunction with other battlefields under non-federal management.

5. Acquire selected parts of all fifteen significant battlefields for the National Park System.

Since the fifteen battlefields vary considerably in ownership, land use, integrity and threats, no single alternative is best suited to these sites. A balance must be achieved between preservation, the Valley lifestyle, and economic development; this suggests a regional approach and flexibility in how each site is treated. While alternatives 1 and 5, above, do not seem feasible or desirable, some combinations of 2, 3, and 4 would be appropriate if developed through a regional mechanism emphasizing: (a) stewardship through continued private ownership when current land use practices are compatible with battlefield preservation and interpretation; and (b) wide participation of local governments and property owners together with State and Federal agencies.

The Virginia Shenandoah Valley is the locale for tangible remains of some of the nation's major historic resources. Effective retention of most of these remains is an opportunity that still is available but one that must be handled by governments and the community working together in order to be successful, for this opportunity will only remain for a relatively short time.

Battles Ranked by Core Size (Campaign)	Field Rating	Study/Core Area Acres	Core Acres Retaining Integrity	Risk Priority (over ten-year span)
1. Cedar Creek (1864)	FAIR	15,607/6,252	5,601 (89%)	Low Moderate Risk
2. Opequon (1864)	POOR	11,670/4,914	2,321 (47%)	Highest Risk
3. 2nd Winchester (1863)	POOR	22,274/3,113	1,624 (47%)	High Moderate Risk
4. Fisher's Hill (1864)	FAIR	9,644/2,751	2,354 (86%)	Low Moderate Risk
5. Peidmont (1864)	GOOD	9,340/2,693	2,646 (98%)	Lowest Risk
6. New Market (1864)	POOR	5,611/2,261	1,527 (67%)	High Moderate Risk
7. McDowell (1862)	GOOD	4,539/2,258	2,258 (100%)	Lowest Risk
8. 2nd Kernstown (1864)	POOR	5,861/2,203	1,098 (49%)	High Moderate Risk
9. Cross Keys (1862)	GOOD	5,450/2,153	2,032 (94%)	Lowest Risk
10. Port Republic (1862)	GOOD	4,936/2,145	2,110 (98%)	Lowest Risk
11. Tom's Brook (1864)	FAIR	6,644/2,018	1,679 (83%)	High Moderate Risk
12. Cool Spring (1864)	FAIR	5,740/1,946	1,900 (97%)	Low Moderate Risk
13. 1st Kernstown (1862)	FAIR	4,029/1,554	1,097 (70%)	High Moderate Risk
14. Ist Winchester (1862)	LOST	4,041/1,393	302 (22%)	Highest Risk
15. Front Royal (1862)	POOR	3,082/944	316 (33%)	Highest Risk

Executive Summary Table
Summary of Battlefield Size, Integrity, and Risk Priority

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The Valley by David W. Lowe

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Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia

Part One
Overview

Introduction

In 1990, a study of Civil War sites in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia was authorized by Public Law 101-628. The study was to accomplish four tasks: identify significant Civil War sites and determine their condition, establish their relative importance, assess short and long term threats to their integrity, and provide alternatives for their preservation and interpretation by Federal, State, and local governments, or by other public or private entities.

The time and funds available to perform this study were not sufficient to cover all of the Shenandoah Valley's significant Civil War historic sites. Instead, the work focused on major battlefields as the kind of historic site under the greatest preservation pressures. While the Civil War certainly did not play out exclusively on battlefields, the latter are among the most dramatic sites; they convey a very high level of meaning to all Americans and are extremely vulnerable to development, highway construction, and visual intrusion. Moreover, effective action to preserve key battlefields and interpret military developments in the Valley can provide the conceptual structure around which to evaluate and preserve other sites, buildings, and structures significant to rounding out preservation and interpretation of the Civil War in the Valley.

To encompass both geographic and historic realities, the Shenandoah Valley study area was defined as comprising eight Virginia counties—Augusta, Clarke, Frederick, Highland, Page, Rockingham, Shenandoah, and Warren. The West Virginia counties of Jefferson and Berkeley, geographically and strategically part of the Valley, were excluded from the study by a provision of Public Law 101-628. Although none of the battlefields studied was in Page County, the transportation routes that traversed the Luray Valley influenced military strategy throughout the war. Highland County was included because of its association with Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign. Highland is less populated than the Valley proper and has not experienced the same level of growth and development. The counties of Frederick, Clarke, and Warren (with Jefferson and Berkeley counties, West Virginia) are considered the Lower Valley, while the remaining counties make up the Upper Valley.

The Shenandoah Valley's unique geographic, topographic, and economic features, and its military-strategic importance, influenced the conduct of the Civil War in Virginia and in the Main Eastern theater. Official records document 326 armed conflict incidents alone in the Shenandoah Valley and this does not include many of the raids, ambushes, and partisan actions that also comprised war in Valley. As a result of historical analysis to be described, this record of 326 notable armed conflicts was reduced to fifteen battle events of major significance. The battlefields selected for the study were associated with Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862, the Gettysburg Campaign of 1863, and the decisive campaigns of 1864. These battles were Cedar Creek, Cool Spring, Cross Keys, Fisher's Hill, Front Royal, First and Second Kernstown, McDowell, New Market, Opequon (Third Winchester), Piedmont, Port Republic, Tom's Brook, First and Second Winchester.

While assessing the integrity of these fifteen battlefields, many significant historic sites, such as houses, mills, and fords, were located, associated with the battles, and mapped. Throughout the study, numerous consultations took place among the study staff, the Department of Historic Resources and other State agencies, regional planning offices, local government bodies, preservation organizations, and local residents. An effort was made to keep these parties informed of the purposes and progress

of the study. At the conclusion, a draft version of the report was circulated to solicit responses, opinions, and advice. Many of the suggestions received during the public comment period have been incorporated into this report.

As identified by this study, battlefields are large historic landscapes, encompassing many public and private landowners and local jurisdictions. Because the fifteen battlefields vary considerably in terms of size, ownership patterns, land use, integrity and threats, this study concludes that no single preservation alternative is best suited to the preservation of all of the sites. A balance must be achieved between the common linkages among the battlefields, which suggests a regional approach, and the flexibility to treat each site in a manner most appropriate to it. Solutions that emphasize private ownership, especially when current land use practices are compatible with the preservation of the battlefields, should be considered wherever possible. It appears that a range of mutually supportive preservation and interpretation alternatives, not limited to the creation of one or more units of the National Park System, will be needed to achieve satisfactory results.

It is the recommendation of the study team that no preservation alternatives be selected and implemented without wide participation of local government and property owners. This recommendation is based on the diversity of these resources apparent during the survey, and on the basis of comments received on the draft study.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

Part One of the report provides an overview of the project and the study concepts, as well as a general discussion of growth and development in the Shenandoah Valley Region, and links these trends to a loss of battlefield resources.

Part Two presents the historic information compiled by the study team to provide a context for understanding the strategic significance of the Shenandoah Valley during the Civil War.

Part Three describes the battles themselves in some detail with an emphasis on linking battle events with local sites, features, and landmarks. The condition of the battlefields, surviving features, and the perceived level of threat are described.

Part Four describes the methodology used to conduct a field assessment of battlefield integrity and presents the results of the field survey and of the Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of land use patterns. Sites are classified by the degree of risk, and site-specific preservation scenarios are outlined.

Part Five presents the findings of an assessment of the potential for increasing heritage tourism in the Shenandoah Valley, suggesting that battlefield preservation could provide long-term economic benefits to the local economy.

Part Six presents the study's findings and examines alternatives for preservation.

Appendix A contains a bibliography of sources, including historic maps, used to produce this study. Samples of the forms used in the field survey are included in Appendix B. Appendix C displays the map layers compiled for the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) database.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Of particular value to this study has been the work of Ms. Maral Kalbian of the Frederick County Historical Society, who has been conducting an architectural survey of Frederick, Clarke, and Warren counties over the past several years. The extensive files of the architectural survey were generously made available to researchers for this study. These records are also filed at the State Historic Preservation Office in Richmond. It is hoped that this initial study will provide impetus for further research of this nature to document more fully the historic resources of the Valley.

Many people offered advice and assistance, and none should be slighted although they cannot all be mentioned. We thank Edwin C. Bearss and Jeffry Wert for their guidance and expertise in serving as the study's consulting historians. Acknowledgement is due Mr. Ben Ritter of Winchester's Handley Library, Mr. Roger Delauter and Dr. Brandon Beck of the Shenandoah Valley Civil War Foundation, Mr. Joseph Whitehorne of Lord Fairfax Community College, Mr. Michael Gore of Belle Grove, Ms. Kristen Sanders of the Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation, Mr. Garland Hudgins of Friends of the North Fork, Mr. Ed Merrell of New Market Battlefield Park, Brothers James Sommers and Benedict Simmonds of the Holy Cross Abbey at Cool Spring, Mr. Peter Svenson of Cross Keys, Mr. A. Wilson Greene and Dr. Gary Gallagher of the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites, and Ms. Nellie Flora and Mr. W. A. Shifflet, longtime

advocates of Piedmont battlefield. The assistance provided by Historian John Salmon of the Virginia Department of Historic Resources is particularly appreciated.

BATTLEFIELD SELECTION

The Shenandoah Valley was a battleground of armies. There, a long line of Union generals—Banks, Frémont, Shields, Milroy, Sigel—met disaster. There, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson confused and scattered his enemies. Richard "Old Bald Head" Ewell led his corps to a victory at Winchester so complete that it was "as if a second Jackson had come." Jubal A. Early directed the tattered remnants of Jackson's and Ewell's old divisions on a whirlwind campaign, until a Union general of different measure—"Little Phil"—applied the torch to the Valley to destroy its agricultural production. In *Struggle for the Shenandoah* (Kent State University Press, 1991), editor Gary W. Gallagher writes:

Few geographical regions associated with the Civil War inspire more dramatic images than the Shenandoah Valley. Some of the images are romantic, heavily charged with the gloss of improbable Southern triumph against long odds. The figure of Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson towers above all others of this type, waging a bold campaign that catapulted the dour Virginian to a lofty position as the most famous soldier in the Confederacy. Just behind Jackson's exploits in any catalog of memorable scenes from the Valley come the young men of the Virginia Military Institute, who achieved their own form of immortality when they fought and died to help win the Battle of New Market in May 1864. Cast in darker hues are Philip H. Sheridan and the Federal army that brought the agony of U. S. Grant's strategy of exhaustion to the Valley during the last autumn of the war. Sheridan and his men left a legacy of blackened ruin that served as graphic counterpoint to the storied lushness of the area. From beginning to end, the Valley bore witness to events that across more than a century and a quarter continue to evoke emotional responses from students of the war.

Fighting was more or less continuous over four years of Valley warfare, but the pivotal conflicts of the Valley have been identified and studied by historians. After consultation with Edwin C. Bearss, Chief Historian of the National Park Service, Jeffry Wert, author and consulting historian for the study, and other historians, fifteen of the Valley's most important battlefields, associated with campaigns in 1862, 1863, and 1864, were selected for field assessment (see Figure 1).

Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign is widely studied by modern military historians and strategists. The names of **Kernstown, McDowell, Front Royal, First Winchester, Cross Keys,** and **Port Republic,** are familiar to any student of this campaign. In 1863, Confederate victory at **Second Winchester** cleared the Valley of Union forces and opened the door for Robert E. Lee's second invasion of the North, which climaxed at Gettysburg. **New Market** and **Piedmont** resulted from Union incursions southward in May and June of 1864 in support of Ulysses S. Grant's Overland Campaign against Richmond. The battle of New Market was a rousing Confederate victory, but at Piedmont, roles were reversed. Outflanked and with their general killed, the Southerners fled from the field, opening the Upper Valley to "Black Dave" Hunter's army for the first time in the war. Jubal A. Early's Confederate army defeated Hunter at Lynchburg and marched north from Lynchburg in late June, invaded Maryland, and by mid-July threatened Washington. Early's return to the Valley resulted in the conflicts of **Cool Spring** and **Second Kernstown.** With the appointment of Philip H. Sheridan to command the Union army in the Valley, the conflict grew desperate. The battle of **Opequon** was hotly contested, but the Confederate army retired from the field. A few days later, the Confederate army was routed at **Fisher's Hill,** and Sheridan began implementing a "scorched earth" policy in the Valley that reached all the way from Staunton to Strasburg. **Tom's Brook** was the major cavalry battle of Sheridan's final campaign. Cedar Creek was a last gasp effort by Jubal Early to surprise the Union army and reverse his fortunes. He very nearly succeeded. Together, these fifteen battlefields represent the range of major conflicts that characterized warfare in the Valley in the years 1861-1865.

These events do not encompass all of the sites associated with the Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley. The historic towns that line the old Valley Turnpike (modern US 11) themselves may be justly proud of their role in history. The names of Newtown (Stephens City), Middletown, Strasburg, Woodstock, Edinburg, Mt. Jackson, Lacey Spring, Harrisonburg, Mt. Crawford, and Staunton, among others, are familiar to students of Civil War literature. A large number of historic antebellum structures survive in the Valley, many closely associated with lesser engagements or partisan activities. Many of these structures are specifically mentioned in battle

accounts or memoirs as serving as headquarters, refitting stations, or hospitals. The battle fought within the present limits of the City of Waynesboro on March 2, 1865, destroyed the remnants of the Confederate army and ended the struggle in the Valley. The City of Lexington offers many Civil War resources, including the Virginia Military Institute, the Stonewall Jackson House, and the grave of Stonewall Jackson.

Although much needed, a full inventory of these historic resources could not be attempted for the region, given the limited time and funds available. Instead, we have focused on major battlefields because they tend to be large landscapes, whose historic character is extremely vulnerable to development, highway construction, and visual intrusion. It is true that much has been lost to the ravages of time and neglect, but the resources that remain are rich and varied. Coordinated action could preserve many of these locations for the appreciation of future generations of Americans.

STUDY CONCEPTS

The Shenandoah Valley study proceeded in three stages: documentary research; field survey and verification; and mapping. During the field portion of the study, several problems emerged pertaining to the definition of a battlefield. The extent of a battlefield is not easily defined because there is not always a definite starting or stopping point. A battle is joined through the fluid motion of armies across the landscape, leading to encounter, confrontation, violent interaction, and disengagement. Before attempting to circumscribe a battlefield, it is essential to understand the size and nature of the opposing forces, the relevant military objectives, the importance of terrain to the direction and outcome of the battle, and to consider the interaction of military actions before, during, and after the battle. Due to these factors, some battles were confined to relatively small geographic areas, while others were large, sprawling affairs with military activities of various kinds directed over a large area.

The field evaluation form that was used, separated each battle into phases and attempted to capture the movements of forces across the landscape, rather than relying on the approach of most forms designed to evaluate a static, historic landscape. Important period features were identified from battle accounts and descriptions and were located on the map when these could be identified. These features, which included terrain features, roads, buildings and structures, and other place names, were referred to as *defining features* because when mapped they tend to define the extent of the battlefield on the landscape.

In each case, *battle* was judged to begin when hostile forces began responding to each other's presence and maneuvering to ensure confrontation. For purposes of mapping, a battlefield *study area* was drawn to encompass all important components of the conflict. These components might include approach routes, areas of troop concentrations, reserve positions, a commander's headquarters, signal stations or other important observation points, picket lines, battle lines, maneuver areas, assault areas, artillery positions, retreat routes, and places where the armies bivouacked before or after the fighting when these are nearby. The study area is viewed as providing a strategic context and geographic setting for understanding the conflict in question.

A *core area* was then identified for each battlefield. Core areas included those areas of confrontational deployment, heaviest fighting, and most severe casualties. In modern military parlance, this is known frankly as the "killing zone." Occasionally plotted as part of the core were sites which were important in shaping the ebb and flow of battle, even when fighting at these sites was minimal. These satellite areas might include river crossings, crossroads, signal stations, or other features that contributed to the battle's development and outcome.

Outlining study and core areas on the map is a subjective, but necessary, process, if we are to understand where and how these events occurred. In most cases, study and core outlines were drawn to follow the nearest physical feature, such as a road, creek, ravine, woods or ridge line. Further research will undoubtedly refine the study areas, but the adjustments should be slight and involve a reinterpretation of the importance or location of more peripheral battle events. The study team, historians, and other consulted parties are in agreement over the locations of the primary battle activities included in the core areas. As mapped on the USGS quadrants and reproduced in GIS format, each battlefield is contained by its study area and defined more closely by its core.

The study and core area outlines, as used here, do not constitute proposed park "boundaries." Boundaries for battlefield parks, whether national, State, or local, rarely coincide with the actual size of the battles, but rather

represent decisions to set aside specific land parcels as parks. Such decisions typically include factors in addition to the historic events, such as the National Park Service criteria for suitability and feasibility (see Part Six). These criteria can cover such considerations as availability of land, funding, management structure, local land use plans, or other priorities. Thus, most National Park System battlefields do not encompass all significant areas associated with a battle. As used here, study and core area outlines are an attempt to display the extent of the battle on the landscape based on historic sources. Management considerations are not addressed. The 15 battlefields are located to the west of the existing Shenandoah National Park. Front Royal and Port Republic have small portions of their study areas (112 and 85 acres respectively) in existing park ownership. Portions of these two battlefields (215 acres of Front Royal's study area, and 1,098 acres of Port Republic's study and core areas) are within the authorized boundaries of the park. The study areas of Piedmont and Cross Keys are relatively close to the authorized boundaries of the park, but GIS analysis has determined that the boundaries do not intersect. No management recommendations will be made by the National Park Service to include these areas within Shenandoah National Park.

Battlefields	Location	Campaign
First Kernstown	Frederick County, City of Winchester	Jackson 1862
McDowell	Highland County	Jackson 1862
Front Royal	Warren County	Jackson 1862
First Winchester	Frederick County, City of Winchester	Jackson 1862
Cross Keys	Rockingham County	Jackson 1862
Port Republic	Rockingham County	Jackson 1862
Second Winchester	Frederick County, City of Winchester	Gettysburg 1863
New Market	Shenandoah County	Lynchburg 1864
Piedmont	Augusta County	Lynchburg 1864
Cool Spring	Clarke County	Early 1864
Second Kernstown	Frederick County, City of Winchester	Early 1864
Opequon	Frederick County, City of Winchester	Sheridan 1864
Fisher's Hill	Shenandoah County	Sheridan 1864
Tom's Brook	Shenandoah County	Sheridan 1864
Cedar Creek	Frederick County Shenandoah County Warren County	Sheridan 1864

Figure 1. Shenandoah Valley Study Battlefields



Figure 2. The Shenandoah Valley, Jackson's 1862 Campaign
From *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*

BATTLEFIELD RESOURCES

A Civil War battle followed its own rules of logic based on: standard movements, deployments, and tactics; the range and capabilities of weaponry; and the advantages and obstacles of the terrain. How these elements came together on a field of battle, on the other hand, was unique. The battlefield is the landscape over which the armies contended. The outcome often relied upon the personalities of the commanders, the disposition and attitude of the troops, the celerity of movement, the supply of ammunition, food, or water, even, the weather. The road network, natural features such as watercourses, ridges and ravines, river fords and bridges, the location of a town, a church, mill, or farm house and its outbuildings, the pattern of open fields and woodlots separated by stone or rail fences—all these features, in large measure, defined the course of a battle.

All of these topographical and structural features, or survivals such as foundations or abandoned roadbeds, make up a major class of battlefield resources. If topographical features survive, a battlefield can be studied to answer important research questions about strategy and tactics. The location of an assault can be pinpointed, and, more importantly, a conclusion reached about why the assault succeeded or failed. The assaulting troops may have bogged down in a swamp at the base of the hill, for example. Or high ground to the west may have offered the ideal position for defending artillery. Little of this direct knowledge can be attained from books or battle reports.

Buildings and structures that were present at the time of the battle are an important battlefield resource. Often these buildings served as headquarters, bivouacs, sharpshooter havens, or field hospitals. Researchers can use deed information or verbal history to identify the inhabitants of houses at the time of the battle, in order to accurately locate battle events and check the accuracy of historic maps. Trenches and field fortifications are tangible artifacts of the passing of the armies and often can be used to precisely locate the opposing lines of battle.

In terms of understanding and interpreting history, it is important to note that many contemporary battle reports were often incomplete, flawed, or self-serving. Eyewitnesses sometimes differed so wildly that one cannot believe they are describing the same event. Many accounts need to be compared and carefully weighed. Often some small detail—a house site, a stone fence, spring, ravine, or hillock—holds the key to locating a unit's position. Only close study of the terrain can hope to reconcile such conflicting accounts. Military historians cannot understand or interpret a battle if the terrain has been drastically altered.

The concept of "battlefield as landscape" places battlefield preservation among the complex issues of regional planning, farmland preservation, viewshed and watershed protection, wildlife management, and the desire of many residents to preserve open space in general. As residents debate these issues and work to establish a viable direction for the future, they should consider battlefields as a valuable asset. A battlefield, despite the harsh memories that are often evoked, contributes to the distinct identity and character of a community. Battlefield preservation can establish a link with the nation's past and provide opportunities for attracting new businesses and visitors to the area. It is fair to say that, if it were not for their battlegrounds, few people outside of Virginia would know of the towns of Kernstown, Tom's Brook, Fisher's Hill, Piedmont, Port Republic, or McDowell. But the passing of history has changed that. For those who read history, these places are immortal.

ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND BATTLEFIELD BURIALS

A second important class of battlefield resources is archeological. Many battlefields, large and small, possess artifacts, soil strata, structural remains, or other features and combinations of features that enable archeologists to recover information on important historical questions. Patterns of military debris have been used at some sites to corroborate or amplify known information on the location and movements of individual units. Shell fragments can be used to identify the types of artillery engaged. A cluster of friction primer fuses can indicate the position of a single cannon and even suggest the number of rounds fired. Clusters of spent or dropped bullets can identify the locations of battle lines. A rifleman, for example, could easily fire his standard supply of sixty rounds of ammunition in an hour. This amounts to about four pounds of lead. A brigade of 2,400 riflemen could deliver 4.8 tons per hour. Although a battle may have lasted only a few hours, experience has shown that significant archeological evidence remains in the ground,

even if it has been farmed for the intervening 125 years. The thriving relic-hunting community can certainly attest to this fact. Despite a seeming abundance of remains, however, the archeological record of a battlefield, over time, can be seriously depleted by relic hunting.

Human remains are also an important part of the archeological record.

Many people feel that battlefields are hallowed ground, a sentiment expressed in President Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address:

> *We are met here on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of it as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But in a larger sense we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor will to add or detract.*

More than 3,600 soldiers perished on the fifteen battlefields studied, not including those who later died of their wounds. The dead were typically buried hastily, and many graves were poorly marked making later reinterment difficult. In 1865 and 1866, local residents were paid to disinter remains and bring them to the national cemeteries established for that purpose. Many bodies were found and removed to cemeteries at this time. Often, however, only portions of the remains were reinterred. Authorities paid for skulls and long bones, and other parts of the skeleton sometimes remained in the ground. Archeologists have uncovered Civil War burial pits on other battlefields where only the skulls were removed.

During the field survey, local residents related several anecdotes pertaining to accidentally unearthed burials at Piedmont, Fisher's Hill, and Cool Spring. No evidence was offered to corroborate these accounts (respondents were protecting their sources), but such remains have been occasionally unearthed elsewhere. Finding the remains of a soldier who was buried where he fell, or near a hospital or encampment site, would not be that unusual. Discovered bones have been "dropped off" occasionally at battlefield parks, who wished to see the bodies receive proper burial.

In 1988, for example, relic hunters unearthed the remains of four members of the Irish Brigade on private property adjacent to Antietam National Battlefield Park. The soldiers were later reinterred in the National Cemetery with full military honors. Stories are related in the relic-hunting community of bones discovered in the wake of bulldozers at development sites at Chantilly and Centreville, Virginia. In 1989, the remains of a Louisiana artilleryman were discovered at Brandy Station during an archeological survey. It is reasonable to assume that some burials are scattered over the fifteen battlefields studied, but the number cannot be estimated. Often the survival of such remains is dependent upon the acidity of the soil. If the acidity is high, bones can be almost totally dissolved, although buttons, belt buckles, or other evidence will survive. Although it would be incorrect to view these battlefields as vast cemeteries, it is probable that an unknown number of burials remain undiscovered at many of these sites.

The Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Reserve Officers Association, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy, among others, have expressed the opinion that the remains of Civil War veterans should be reburied in a national cemetery and accorded full military honors. In general, this is the policy followed when accidental disinterments are brought to the attention of authorities. Under Virginia law a permit is required for the archeological removal of human remains or associated artifacts from any unmarked human burial site on state, local, or privately owned land. For information on the permit process, contact the State Archeologist, Department of Historic Resources, 221 Governor Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219, telephone: 804-786-3143.

SURVEYING BATTLEFIELD RESOURCES

Before visiting the battlefields, the study's researchers examined documentary sources to establish a regional context to enable better understanding of how geography and topography influenced the strategies of conflict in the Valley. This research involved an examination of the settlement pattern and transportation network of the mid-nineteenth century. The Valley was a relatively densely settled and highly productive agricultural region. Understanding the historic framework, enabled the field surveyors to better determine the current condition of the battlefields.

Second, a historic or "campaign" context was established for each event to determine its relative importance. Primary and secondary source materials were consulted—particularly battle accounts compiled in *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* and historic maps held by the National Archives and the Library of Congress—to identify the location and extent of the battle "on the ground." The regional and campaign context are presented in Part Two of this report. A list of consulted sources may be found in Appendix A. The geo-strategy and historic campaign contexts are presented in Part Two.

For most of the fifteen battlefields studied, useful primary and secondary works exist to guide the researcher. Jackson's 1862 Campaign, for example, was extensively dissected immediately after the war by eminent military historians of the time, such as G.F.R. Henderson, or by actual participants, such as William Allan and Jedediah Hotchkiss. Since then, voluminous studies have been offered to interpret Jackson's triumph. The 1864 battles, on the other hand, although typically larger and more sanguinary than Jackson's affairs, are generally less written about. Two battlefields in particular—Piedmont and Tom's Brook—were found to have received insufficient treatment by secondary sources, and no reliable historic maps or sketches were discovered. For these battlefields, more intensive research was conducted into the primary accounts, such as diaries, memoirs, regimental histories, and local histories. Local guides provided the final word on several areas in question.

Of inestimable value were the maps and sketches produced by Jedediah Hotchkiss, a resident of Staunton who served as the topographic engineer for Confederate generals Thomas J. Jackson, Richard S. Ewell, and Jubal A. Early. Hotchkiss was a participant-observer of almost every major Valley battlefield and left behind an unparalleled cartographic record. Fully half of the Confederate maps contained in the *Official Military Atlas of the Civil War* were supplied by Hotchkiss. In Spring 1862, Stonewall Jackson asked him to "make me a map of the Valley." The resulting map, measuring three by eight feet, served as a blueprint for Jackson's 1862 campaign and subsequent Confederate operations in the Valley. The Union armies lacked a map of its equal until well into 1864. In addition to basic topography and watershed information, the Valley map traces more than 4,500 road segments, provides 230 historic place names, locates 260 mills, forges, schools, churches, tollhouses and other commercial and industrial structures, and identifies more than 1,000 farms by name of resident. Because of its pivotal importance, the Valley Map of Jedediah Hotchkiss was reduced to computerized format in its entirety. This computerized map will be housed at an appropriate facility in the Valley and made available to historical and genealogical researchers.

To supplement text and map records, every attempt was made to locate a knowledgeable local guide to accompany the research historian in the field. This was typically someone who had studied the battle, who lived in or was familiar with the area, and who had walked the battlefield many times. In the field, the researcher sought access to vantage points from which the ground could be examined and the action interpreted. Where permission was granted from landowners (most sites), the battlefield ground was walked. An evaluation form was completed for each site, breaking down the narrative action of each battle into phases that could be more closely associated with specific blocks of land (See Appendix B). An assessment was then made about the condition of each phase area relative to its described or probable appearance at the time of the Civil War. Historic structures were located on USGS maps, along with any survivals, such as field fortifications, old road beds, mill sites, building foundations, burial sites, or monuments. When a site visit was completed, the battlefield was then summarized across phases and rated according to its overall condition and perceived threats to its integrity. These summary forms with accompanying maps and photographs were reviewed for accuracy by Mr. Edwin Bearss and Mr. Jeffry Wert, the study's two consulting historians. These complete battlefield descriptions are included in Part Three.

Finally, the field maps were turned over to the NPS Interagency Resources Division's Cultural Resources GIS Facility for further analysis. The battlefield areas were entered into the computer along with other data that enabled an examination of land use within the battlefields. A separate, computer-based integrity rating scale was devised to compare the number of undeveloped acres with the amount of built-up land within the study and core areas. This computer evaluation was then used as a check for visual integrity evaluations made in the fields and discussed in Part Four.

GIS technology was used to produce the maps included in this report. The long-term advantage of using GIS is that a data base has now been created that can be updated to reflect future land use changes for the Valley's battlefields. Troop movements and surviving features can be added, along with National Register properties in the vicinity and other points of interest. The data can be married with the digitized Hotchkiss Valley map to show the sites of old homes and mills to guide archeologists and surveyors. Local planners can use the computer to evaluate proposals that may affect the battlefields, such as alternative routes for a new road to determine which will have the least impact on a core's integrity. The map layers compiled for the GIS data base are listed in Appendix C.

Several Valley counties currently have GIS capability, and plans are being developed to house the database developed in this study at a suitable Valley location, where it is accessible to local and regional planning agencies. For example, the GIS center at James Madison University in Harrisonburg has expressed an interest in serving as the repository for the data base. Using GIS to study the battlefields within the context of the Shenandoah Valley as a whole, offers tremendous potential as one tool for guiding future growth and development at the regional and county levels.

THREATS TO BATTLEFIELD RESOURCES

In many parts of the Valley, the 19th century lies close to the surface with merely a veneer of changes. The land is farmed, as it was a hundred years ago. Old houses, mills, and churches survive, or their foundations may be located. The new road network is congruent with the old. Paved county roads follow the winding courses of old farm roads. Small villages have grown into larger towns, yet preserve their core as a historic district. Most importantly, the scenic beauty of the Blue Ridge, North Mountain, and the Shenandoah River continues to enhance the quality of life of Valley residents and to attract hundreds of thousands of visitors per year. When one knows where to look, the Civil War history of the Shenandoah Valley is everywhere. This study shows that the integrity of the Valley's historic resources is generally high, but several significant battlefields have suffered severe degradation, and most are threatened in the near future. The causes of degradation are rooted in population growth and economic expansion. These trends were used to establish risk categories for the battlefields as described in Part Four.

POPULATION TRENDS

The Shenandoah Valley of Virginia has changed since the Civil War, but until recent decades, the rate of change has been relatively slow. Until well into the 1950s, agriculture remained the primary economic activity in the Valley, and although farming technology improved, residents continued to use the land much as their predecessors did—to grow crops and raise livestock. At the time of the Civil War, the Valley was already fairly densely inhabited, much of the land that could be farmed was being farmed, and the transportation network was firmly in place. The Valley's towns ranged in size from a few hundred inhabitants to a few thousand, with Winchester and Staunton being the largest towns in the region.

When examining the pattern of change in the Shenandoah Valley region as a whole, it is important to note three distinct battlefield clusters, comprising eleven of the fifteen battlefields studied: five in the vicinity of Winchester (three Winchesters, two Kernstowns); four near Strasburg at the head of Massanutten Mountain (Cedar Creek, Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, and Front Royal); and three south of Harrisonburg at the base of the Massanutten (Cross Keys, Port Republic, and Piedmont). In addition, ten of the fifteen battles were fought on or within a few miles of the Valley Turnpike, modern US rte 11 (Winchesters, Kernstowns, Cedar Creek, Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, New Market, Piedmont), underscoring the importance of this thoroughfare for the movement of troops. The same transportation routes and limiting geographic features that contributed to the meeting of Civil War armies in these strategic areas continue to influence population growth and density, and land use decisions in the twentieth century.

The Shenandoah Valley's population increased threefold from 107,660 in 1860 to 347,750 in 1990 (see Figure 3). Population growth in the Valley has not been uniform, but centered in and around the major cities. The population of Highland County, for example, has declined since the Civil War. In general, the population of the Lower (northern) Valley has increased more rapidly than that of the Upper (southern) Valley, growth that was partly linked to the explosive development of the Washington Metropolitan area in the 1980s. Winchester continued as the dominant city of the Lower Valley. The population density of surrounding Frederick County increased from 69 persons per square mile in 1970 to 110 in 1990 (See Figure 4), spurring much new residential and

commercial construction. The Front Royal area witnessed similar growth.

In the 1970s Harrisonburg emerged as the economic center of the Upper Valley. After decades of low growth, Harrisonburg's population nearly doubled between 1960 and 1990, making it the largest city of the region with a population of nearly 31,000. So far, this growth has had minimal impact on the nearby battlefields of Cross Keys, Port Republic, and Piedmont.

Current projections suggest that the population of Virginia will grow to 7,800,000 by the year 2020, an increase of more than 1,620,000 or 26 percent in the next 30 years. The population of the Valley will grow at a slower rate. Current projections suggest that the population will grow from 347,750 to 410,900 in 2020, an increase of 18 percent. Much of this growth will continue to be associated with the cities of Winchester, Front Royal, and Harrisonburg. Population densities for Frederick and Warren counties, in particular, will increase from 110 and 122 to 136 and 143 persons per square mile, respectively. Growth elsewhere in the Valley will be more uneven but undoubtedly will be concentrated along the interstate highways, as it is today.

While portions of the Valley's battlefields have been steadily eroded over the years by residential, industrial, and commercial activities, the most destructive event in the history of these battlefields was the construction of the interstate highway system in the 1960s. I-81, which runs the length of the Valley parallel to the old Valley Turnpike (US 11), intersects the study areas of First and Second Winchester, Opequon, Second Kernstown, Cedar Creek, Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, and New Market, and borders on the study area of First Kernstown. I-66 intersects the study areas of Front Royal and Cedar Creek. Ten of the fifteen battlefields selected for this study were degraded by interstate highway construction, several severely, e.g., the three Winchester battlefields and New Market. Only those battlefields that are not crossed by interstate highways received the highest condition ratings both on the field survey evaluation forms and in the GIS analysis. Residential and commercial development adjacent to interstate interchanges has multiplied the loss of integrity caused by highway construction. In the absence of a concerted effort to set aside battlefield lands along these highways, future growth and development will continue to damage these resources. Projects to widen the interstates or to add interchanges would have considerable impact on battlefield resources.

LOSS OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

Archivist Dallas Irvine observed that "the Civil War was a rural social war." It is true that warfare in the Shenandoah Valley was largely a rural affair, acted out upon the mid-19th century agrarian landscape. In Valley history, the full range of agricultural possibilities were represented, from large-scale plantation farming, which was prevalent in the Lower Valley, to small-scale homestead farming more common to the central region. The importance of agriculture to the history and economy of the Shenandoah Valley, and the fertility of its soils, deserve special consideration when determining the direction of long-term growth and development.

From the time of the Civil War to the present, preservation of the region's historic battlefields has depended largely upon the survival of the rural landscape and the continued strength of agriculture. According to the 1987 Federal Agricultural Census, the Shenandoah Valley (9.9 percent of Virginia's land area and less than 6 percent of its population) accounted for 17 percent of the State's agricultural land and 31 percent of the market value of agricultural products sold. Agriculture remains the principal economic activity for several counties, in particular, Shenandoah, Rockingham, and Augusta. Although modern farming techniques have thoroughly supplanted the old, the landscape in many areas retains the distinctive open pattern of croplands, pastures, and woodlots, that would not have been unfamiliar to a Civil War soldier. So long as this agricultural landscape survives, the battlefields can be considered "preserved," if not protected.

But there are clear indications that the rural landscape of the Valley is in decline, and in some places it has already disappeared. Between 1964 and 1987, the total acreage in farms in the region decreased from 1,302,946 to 1,060,056 acres, a decline of nearly 243,000 acres. This is comparable to removing all of the current agricultural land of Rockingham County from production. The amount of agricultural land dropped in all counties (see Figure 5), but these declines were most destructive (in terms of preserving open land) when coupled with higher rates of urban growth and increased population densities, e.g., Warren County (41% loss) and Frederick County (27% loss). In these counties, most of the lost agricultural lands were replaced by residential, commercial, or industrial developments.

Battlefield preservation is strongly linked to farmland preservation. While the effects of a loss of farmland on specific battlefields must be assessed site-by-site, it seems clear that the public cannot expect agricultural land uses to continue to preserve open land that conveniently coincides with the Valley's Civil War battlefields.

In many cases, agricultural use of battlefield land is synonymous with preserving the battlefields, since much of the land was farmed during the Civil War. Exceptions may be found in large scale agribusiness enterprises that erect massive sheds or factories. Still, if care were taken in situating new construction of this type within a battlefield landscape, the problem of overwhelming the viewshed could be minimized or avoided. Buildings could be placed below a ridge line or screened by trees. Establishing an agricultural preservation district also appears to be a viable approach to battlefield preservation. The Shenandoah Valley contains some of the richest farmland in the United States, land that should not be changed to commercial and residential uses without fully considering the farmer's role in the Valley's past and the nation's future.

The loss of battlefield resources is directly linked to population and land use trends. In many cases, county planners have lacked the documentation that might enable the preservation of significant parcels through zoning decisions that weigh historic and cultural resources with the need for new residential, commercial, and industrial construction. The 1990 Frederick County Comprehensive Plan was recently revised to include a new section that recognizes the importance of the county's Civil War sites. The revision notes that battlefields represent an important category of historic resources and that the dedication of open space to create battlefield parks would enhance public appreciation of these resources and promote educational and tourism goals. The plan adopted methods that allow property owners the option to participate in zoning or other regulatory decisions that would affect their historic properties.

County Independent City	1860	1900	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2020 projected
Augusta	27,700	32,370	34,154	37,363	44,220	47,572	54,677	64,200
Clarke	7,160	7,927	7,074	7,942	8,102	9,965	12,101	13,300
Frederick	16,600	13,239	17,537	21,941	28,893	34,150	45,723	56,400
Highland	4,300	5,647	4,069	3,221	2,529	2,937	2,635	3,800
Page	8,100	13,794	15,152	15,572	16,581	19,401	21,690	25,000
Rockingham	23,400	33,527	35,079	40,485	47,890	52,054	57,482	73,400
Shenandoah	13,900	20,253	21,169	21,825	22,852	27,559	31,636	37,900
Warren	6,500	8,837	14,801	14,655	15,301	21,200	26,142	30,700
Harrisonburg	NA	NA	10,810	11,916	14,605	24,655	30,707	37,100
Staunton	NA	7,289	19,927	22,232	24,504	24,777	24,461	26,200
Waynesboro	NA	NA	12,357	15,694	16,707	18,563	18,549	18,300
Winchester	NA	5,161	13,841	15,110	14,643	20,217	21,947	24,600
Total Valley	107,660	148,044	205,970	227,956	256,827	303,050	347,750	410,900
Virginia	1,219,630	1,854,184	3,318,680	3,966,949	4,648,479	5,346,812	6,187,358	7,807,200

Statistics computed from federal census data. Projection from the *Virginia Statistical Abstract 1989*. N/A= not applicable. City statistics were grouped with the county in these years.

Figure 3. Population of Shenandoah Valley Virginia Counties and Independent Cities (1860-2020)

County	1860	1900	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2020
Augusta	28	33	35	38	45	49	56	66
Clarke	40	45	40	45	45	56	69	75
Frederick	40	32	42	53	69	82	110	136
Highland	10	13	10	7	6	7	6	9
Page	26	44	48	50	53	62	70	80
Rockingham	27	39	41	47	56	61	68	86
Shenandoah	27	39	41	42	44	54	62	74
Warren	30	41	69	68	71	98	122	143

Statistics computed from federal census data. Projection from the *Virginia Statistical Abstract 1989.*

Figure 4. Approximate Population Density Per Square Mile:
Shenandoah Valley Virginia Counties 1860-1990 (Projection for 2020)

County	Year	Land Area (Mi^2)	Total Land in Farms (Acres)	No. of Farms	Ave. Size (Acres)	% of Land in Farms
Augusta	1987	972	292,191	1,536	190	45
	1978		303,370	1,483	205	48
	1964		316,234	1,905	166	49
Clarke	1987	177	72,611	315	231	64
	1978		76,510	256	299	68
	1964		78,006	276	282	70
Frederick	1987	415	111,116	555	200	41
	1978		123,220	565	218	46
	1964		157,434	793	198	56
Highland	1987	416	94,880	303	313	36
	1978		107,787	329	328	40
	1964		137,497	432	318	52
Page	1987	311	67,250	489	138	34
	1978		70,245	448	148	35
	1964		94,223	742	127	46
Rockingham	1987	851	242,224	1,895	128	44
	1978		252,152	1,872	135	46
	1964		289,118	2,587	112	52
Shenandoah	1987	512	138,883	830	167	42
	1978		137,888	819	151	42
	1964		159,593	1,131	141	49
Warren	1987	214	40,901	223	183	30
	1978		54,933	225	244	40
	1964		70,841	298	238	51

Figure 5. Agricultural Land, Shenandoah Valley Virginia Counties
Statistics computed from Federal Agricultural Census data for 1964, 1978, and 1987.

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, PRESERVATION, AND PUBLIC ACCESS

Most of the battlefield land in the Valley is privately owned. Only two battlefields offer public access with interpretive facilities for visitors: New Market and Cedar Creek. Two hundred-eighty acres of the core area of the New Market battlefield are encompassed by the New Market Battlefield Park, owned and interpreted by the Virginia Military Institute. The National Trust and the Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation jointly administer about 400 acres of Belle Grove Mansion and the Cedar Creek battlefield core. The recently opened Hupp's Hill Battlefield Park and Study Center, also at Cedar Creek, interprets the role of the Valley in the Civil War and also preserves sections of reconstructed and original fieldworks on the property.

Limited public access to several other sites is provided by preservation groups that own battlefield land. A private, non-profit preservation organization, the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites (APCWS), holds 195 acres at Fisher's Hill, 7 acres at Port Republic, and more than 100 acres at McDowell. The private, non-profit Lee-Jackson Foundation owns 100 acres at Cross Keys and an additional 100 acres at McDowell, adjacent to the APCWS property. These groups allow public access to their properties, but entry points are neither marked nor advertised. This situation typically limits visitation of these properties to the organizations' members or to serious students of the war who come as part of a guided tour. Bus tours of the Shenandoah Valley battlefields are conducted periodically by the Smithsonian Institute, by Civil War Roundtables, and by the APCWS. Interpretation at these sites ranges from none to minimal.

About 170 acres of the First Kernstown core area are held by the Glen Burnie Trust, but access to this land is restricted. Twenty-one acres of the Tom's Brook battlefield core are encompassed by a county recreational park, but no interpretation of the battle is offered, and the site lacks a suitable vantage point from which to interpret the battle action. Seven acres surrounding the significant Civil War fortification, Star Fort, in Winchester, are owned by a private Civil War reenactment group, and visitation of this unmarked site is encouraged. Holy Cross Abbey owns two-thirds of the core area of Cool Spring battlefield and has pledged to preserve the property. The Abbey allows visitation with prior arrangement. At Piedmont, the northern half of the core area has been included in an agricultural preservation district that excludes non-agricultural development for seven years until 1998, when the district must be renewed. Visitation of this site is typically restricted to the public roads and an adequate driving tour of the area has not been published. A small portion of Cedar Creek and Fisher's Hill battlefields falls within holdings of the Shenandoah National Forest. Figure 6 summarizes the current state of public access, private ownership, and land protection.

Beyond these holdings and commitments, the remainder of the acreage of the Shenandoah Valley's battlefields is privately owned and unprotected by any formal designation or commitment. Access to private property at these sites is understandably discouraged under current arrangements. Local landowners repeatedly expressed their anger over relic hunters who trespassed and left a gate open for livestock to escape or a field full of unfilled holes. Landowners do not like to spend extra time keeping track of trespassers.

Many of the Valley's battlefields could be adequately interpreted from the public roads if interpretive materials were produced and disseminated. Some limited access to private property would certainly enhance the experience of visiting the battlefield in many cases and serve to attract more visitors.

Public access to battlefields is a complex issue that can be resolved only by negotiation between a responsible agent and private landowners. Landowners wish to maintain their privacy and security. Many, however, would allow limited or scheduled access to their property if concerns over liability and related matters could be resolved. In some cases, right-of-way easements could be purchased to allow visitors to follow a hiking trail across portions of a battlefield or to reach a vantage point from where the field could be studied. There are precedents for granting this type of access for hiking and nature trails in other States, notably Vermont, where landowners have expressed satisfaction with the Trails for Vermont program. Virginia law waives liability for persons who allow fox hunters on their property. These and other models could be studied for their applicability to Civil War battlefields. The more of these arrangements that can be contracted, the less need there may be at some sites for preservation interests to acquire land or easements to protect and interpret a battlefield. Federal and State governments could develop incentives to encourage landowner cooperation.

There is certainly a national constituency for battlefield landscape preservation. Based on comments received on the draft of this report, the local governments of Frederick and Highland Counties and the City of Winchester, as well as private preservation groups, would support the creation of a park at one or more sites in the Shenandoah Valley. It is the strong recommendation of the study team that whatever approach to preservation is taken, that local residents and elected officials be included as partners in the process, and that any land acquisition be from willing sellers.

Battlefields	Public Access	Interpretation	Ownership Type/ Number of Owners (core areas of high integrity only)	Core Acres Protected/ Holding Group
Cedar Creek	YES	FULL Visitor Center	PRIVATE/ Over 30	400/ National Trust, Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation
Cool Spring	YES, Appointment Only	NONE No Visitor Center	PRIVATE/ 6-10	1,200/Holy Cross Abbey by Cooperative Agreement
Cross Keys	YES, unmarked	Signage No Visitor Center	PRIVATE/ 11-20	100/ Lee-Jackson Foundation
Fisher's Hill	YES, unmarked	Signage No Visitor Center	PRIVATE/ 11-20	195/ APCWS 80/ Conservation Fund Easement
Front Royal	NONE	NONE	PRIVATE/ OVER 30	NONE
1st Kernstown	NONE, overlook	Signage	PRIVATE/ 6-10	170/ Glen Burnie Trust
2nd Kernstown	NONE, overlook	Signage	PRIVATE/ 6-10	NONE
McDowell	YES, unmarked	NONE No Visitor Center	PRIVATE/ 6-10	200/ APCWS, Lee-Jackson Foundation
New Market	YES	FULL Visitor Center	PRIVATE/ 11-20	280/ VMI New Market Battlefield Park
Opequon	NONE	Published Driving Tour	PRIVATE/ 6-10	7/ Star Fort Reenactment Group
Piedmont	NONE	NONE	PRIVATE/ 21-30	1,400/ County Agricultural Preservation District (7 Yrs.)
Port Republic	YES, limited	NONE No Visitor Center	PRIVATE/ 6-10	8/ APCWS
Tom's Brook	NONE	NONE	MIXED/ OVER 30	21/ County Recreational Park
1st Winchester	NONE	Published Driving Tour	PRIVATE/ 6-10	NONE
2nd Winchester	NONE	Published Driving Tour	PRIVATE/ 11-20	7/ Star Fort Reenactment Group
Acres currently protected				4,061

Figure 6. Battlefields, Showing Public Access, Estimated Number of Landowners, and Acres Currently Protected

SUMMARY

The decision to protect battlefield land and the decision of how much of a battlefield to set aside, are choices that hinge upon the community's goals as well as the Nation's. Where the concern was simply to recall an event to memory, then small parcels were typically set aside for the erection of a monument or interpretive markers. This approach was pursued often in the past, even for national parks, based on the "implicit preservation" of open land. In other words, an interpretive stop or trail was acquired and markers erected to describe the historical importance of what was expected to be rural landscape for the foreseeable future. Visitors to such sites often assumed that the landscape was somehow protected, when in actuality, the view was a free bonus. Returning years later, they are liable to be surprised and disturbed to see a housing subdivision or commercial strip where they expected to see a battlefield. In fact, residential developers have reversed the "free bonus" and can now charge top dollar for homes with a park in the back yard to serve the recreational needs of a limited number of residents. The assumptions underlying small parcel-commemoration have been undermined on all sides, and this condition will continue to generate crisis after crisis, as constituents recognize and respond with outrage to the loss of historic resources.

The most dramatic example of public outrage in recent years was the crusade to prevent a shopping mall from being built adjacent to Manassas National Battlefield Park, resulting in a costly Federal acquisition. But this is only one incident of many. The famous Cornfield at Antietam was only recently protected from development by a private foundation. A mile-long, "commemorative" strip of the Wilderness was recently degraded to serve as the median strip of a four-lane access road leading to a resort community. A thousand homes and a shopping center are planned for parcels adjacent to Gettysburg National Military Park. With the increased pace of land use change, the small parcel approach simply does not protect the resources and land where historically important events took place, nor does it allow adequate public access to enable appreciation of nationally significant events.

Whether the goals of battlefield preservation are to enable interpretation of the battlefield, in terms of understanding the terrain and military maneuvers, or, to attract visitors who are interested in experiencing a past event, or, to provide the opportunity for the general public to view locations important to our national experience and history, or, to set aside ground, as President Lincoln stated, that was consecrated by the men who struggled there to give life to the nation, it is clear that small parcel-commemoration is inadequate and should be abandoned except as a last resort, when it is necessary to prevent the memory of an event and its participants from fading entirely. The commitment to protect large tracts of battlefield land, on the other hand, implies a larger desire in the community to preserve open land for a variety of reasons—not just for historical significance—but also to maintain the rural character of an area, to encourage agriculture, to set aside natural areas, to protect watersheds, to provide recreational space, or to provide a historic attraction that is unique to the area.

Until now the preservation of battlefields in the Shenandoah Valley has depended almost exclusively on the small parcel-commemorative approach, in many cases, consisting simply of interpretive highway pull-offs along the right-of-way. Several private groups—primarily the Virginia Military Institute, the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites, the Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation, and the Lee-Jackson Foundation—have acted to protect larger parcels through acquisition funded by public donations. Mostly, preservation has relied upon the free bonus of open farm and natural lands and the coincidence of interests between landowners and preservationists—as shown by the establishment of the Piedmont agricultural preservation district and the preservation intent of the Holy Cross Abbey at Cool Spring. The pace of growth and development in the Valley and the incremental loss of farmland are undermining these assumptions of "implicit preservation." Individuals, who have shouldered the burden of preservation with little help or recognition from Local, State, or Federal governments, cannot keep pace with the loss of resources.

It remains then to determine approaches to battlefield protection that will preserve these historic resources and landscapes. The regional coordination of preservation and interpretation efforts, and a range of public and public-private partnerships, will be needed to address the unique needs and values of the individual sites. There is no blanket solution. In the sections that follow, we try to provide sufficient facts and analysis to inform the public policy choices that need to be made.

Shenandoah Valley	Entire Valley		Battlefield Study Areas	
Land Use / Land Cover	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
Built-up Land: Residential	110,876	4.5	7,989	9.3
Built-up Land: Commercial	9,855	0.4	1,374	1.6
Built-up Land: Industrial	2,463	0.1	773	0.9
Built-up Land: Transportation and Communications	12,319	0.5	1,374	1.6
Built-up Land: Other Urban	4,927	0.2	515	0.6
Agricultural Land: Cropland or Pasture	899,328	36.5	53,693	62
Agricultural Land: Orchards, Vineyards, Groves	17,247	0.7	687	0.8
Agricultural Land: Confined Feeding Operations	2,493	0.1	85	0.1
Forest Land: Deciduous Forest	1,259,060	51.1	12,370	14.4
Forest Land: Evergreen Forest	68,989	2.8	1,288	1.5
Forest Land: Mixed Forest	54,206	2.2	4,295	5.0
Water: Streams and Canals	4,927	0.2	515	0.6
Water: Reservoirs	2,463	0.1	0	0.0
Barren Land: Strip Mines, Quarries, Gravel Pits	2,463	0.1	429.55	0.5
Barren Land: Transitional Areas	9,855	0.4	0	0.0
Unidentified Land Use / Land Cover	2,463	0.1	515	0.6
Total (acres rounded)	2,463,915	100.0	85,909	100.0

TABLE A

1973 LAND USE / LAND COVER SHENANDOAH VALLEY

Part Two: Historic Context

Pritchard House, Kernstown by Ben Ritter

Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia

Part Two

Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley, The Historic Context

"The Crossroads of Our Being..."

Into little more than four years, from April 1861 to June 1865, were compressed the passions, the violence, the hopes, and the agonies of generations. More than 600,000 American soldiers of North and South died of battle or disease. Nearly 300,000 others were scarred by shot and shell but lived to return home at war's end, to begin their lives anew in a country now indissolubly united. The American Civil War, in the words of historian Shelby Foote, "was the crossroads of our being." Former Poet Laureate of the United States Robert Penn Warren once wrote:

The Civil War is, for the American imagination, the great single event of our history. Without too much wrenching, it may, in fact, be said to be American history. Before the Civil War we had no history in the deepest and most inward sense. There was, of course, the noble vision of the Founding Fathers articulated in the Declaration and the Constitution—the dream of freedom incarnated in a more perfect Union. But the Revolution did not create a nation except on paper; and too often in the following years the vision of the Founding Fathers, which men had suffered and died to validate, became merely a daydream of easy and automatic victories, a vulgar delusion of manifest destiny, a conviction of a people divinely chosen to live on milk and honey at small expense. The vision had not been finally submitted to the test of history. There was little awareness of the cost of having a history. The anguished scrutiny of the meaning of the vision in experience had not become a national reality. It became a reality, and we became a nation, only with the Civil War. The Civil War is our only "felt" history—history lived in the national imagination. This is not to say that the War is always, and by all men, felt in the same way. Quite the contrary. But this fact is an index to the very complexity, depth, and fundamental significance of the event. It is an overwhelming and vital image of human and national experience.

Fully one-third of the recorded events of armed conflict of the Civil War occurred in Virginia, where the proximity of Washington, D.C., and Richmond—capitals of the opposed camps—spurred campaign after campaign. The passing of the armies in Virginia left an indelible impression upon the American cultural landscape, endowing posterity with the resonance of such names as Manassas and Bull Run, Malvern Hill, Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg, Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg—and others less well rehearsed—Seven Pines, Gaines' Mill, Cedar Run, Chantilly, North Anna, and Yellow Tavern.

Few places associated with the Civil War in Virginia evoke more recognition or response among students of the time than the Shenandoah Valley, where a Southern VMI professor-turned-general named Thomas J. Jackson defeated three Northern armies in a single month. The battles of Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862 are known to students of the war, not only in the United States, but across the world. General Norman Schwarzkopf recently credited Jackson's campaign in a televised interview as one of the guiding lights behind his strategy in the Middle East. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the "Desert Fox," is said to have been well versed in Stonewall's maxims, and an apocryphal story has Rommel visiting the Valley and following in Jackson's footsteps. To this day, the U.S. Army regularly conducts "staff rides" in the Valley for its

officers, following the course of Jackson's famed "Foot Cavalry."

Less romantic, less well known than the 1862 campaign, but no less significant, were the events of the war's later years as the North tried to exorcise the ghost of Jackson and gain control of the Shenandoah Valley, Virginia's most important agricultural region. The war acquired a dark and desperate edge. In October 1864, Union general Philip Sheridan introduced total warfare to the Valley, a concept that Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman introduced in Mississippi and would bring to Georgia in November and December, during his "March to the Sea." In Sheridan's words: "I have destroyed over 2,000 barns, filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over 70 mills, filled with flour and wheat.... When this is completed, the Valley from Winchester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will have but little in it for man or beast." This bitter month became known to Valley residents as "The Burning."

Few regions in the United States have experienced the horrors of systematic destruction, and the memories are still close to the surface for many long-time Valley residents. Family histories are filled with stories that relate to the hardships of that time. It took a generation to repair the ravages of "The Burning" and another generation before life in the Valley returned to its pre-war condition. There can be found there today a fierce pride in ancestors who survived the war and who struggled to rebuild all that was lost.

Official chronologies record 326 incidents of armed conflict in the Shenandoah Valley during the Civil War: 6 battles, 21 engagements, 21 actions, and 278 skirmishes, on the average one conflict every 4-5 days (see Figure 7 and Map 6). This reckoning does not include many of the raids, ambushes, and partisan affairs that made warfare in the Valley a daily dance with death. More than half of the recorded armed conflicts occurred in the final year of the war. Map 6 shows how these events plot out in terms of frequency with the reddest areas showing most frequent fighting and the bluest areas showing least frequent fighting.

The total numbers of killed and wounded in these conflicts has never been tallied, nor do the records exist to allow it. Thousands more died in hospitals of disease than in battle. The Confederate and National Cemeteries at Winchester alone account for nearly 7,500 dead, and it is difficult to locate a city or private cemetery in the Valley that does not comment silently on the commitment and valor of the Valley's soldiers.

The history of the Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley bears witness to the devastation and waste of warfare, but more importantly, it underscores the irrepressible human will to survive, to rebuild, to carry on. Lessons which will continue to have relevance for generations to come. The historic events and the human players of the Valley—the heroic and the tragic alike—have contributed significantly to the texture of our American cultural heritage.

Figure 7. A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the Shenandoah Valley

Abstracted from "Chronological List of Battles, Actions, etc. in Which Troops of the Regular Army Have Engaged, 1903." Arrayed by Date, Event, Location, County.

04/ 18/ 61, Armory burned, Harpers Ferry, Jefferson
07/ 02/ 61, Engagement, Falling Waters, Berkeley
07/ 04/ 61, Skirmish, Harpers Ferry, Jefferson
07/ 15/ 61, Skirmish, near Bunker Hill, Berkeley
07/ 21/ 61, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
09/ 02/ 61, Skirmish, Beller's Mill, Jefferson
09/ 09/ 61, Skirmish, Shepherdstown, Jefferson
09/ 15/ 61, Skirmish, Pritchard's Mill, Jefferson
09/ 17/ 61, Skirmish near, Harpers Ferry, Jefferson
10/ 11/ 61, Skirmish, Harpers Ferry, Jefferson
10/ 16/ 61, Skirmish, Bolivar Heights, Jefferson
03/ 03/ 62, Skirmish, Martinsburg, Berkeley
03/ 05/ 62, Skirmish, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
03/ 07/ 62, Skirmish near, Winchester, Frederick
03/ 11/ 62, Skirmish, Stephenson's Depot, Frederick
03/ 18/ 62, Skirmish, Middletown, Frederick
03/ 19/ 62, Skirmish, Strasburg, Shenandoah
03/ 22/ 62, Skirmish, Kernstown, Frederick
03/ 23/ 62, Battle, Kernstown, Frederick
03/ 25/ 62, Skirmish, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
04/ 07/ 62, Skirmish, Columbia Furnace, Shenandoah
04/ 12/ 62, Skirmish, Monterey, Highland
04/ 16/ 62, Skirmish, Columbia Furnace, Shenandoah
04/ 17/ 62, Skirmish, Rude's Hill, Shenandoah
04/ 21/ 62, Skirmish, Monterey, Highland
04/ 24/ 62, Skirmish near, Harrisonburg, Rockingham
04/ 25/ 62, Skirmish near, Luray, Page
04/ 26/ 62, Skirmish, Keezletown Road, Rockingham
04/ 27/ 62, Skirmish, McGaheysville, Rockingham
05/ 05/ 62, Skirmish, Columbia Bridge, Page
05/ 06/ 62, Skirmish near, Harrisonburg, Rockingham
05/ 07/ 62, Skirmish, McDowell, Highland
05/ 07/ 62, Skirmish, Somerville Heights, Page
05/ 08/ 62, Engagement, McDowell, Highland
05/ 09/ 62, Skirmish, McDowell, Highland
05/ 12/ 62, Skirmish, Monterey, Highland
05/ 15/ 62, Skirmish, Linden, Warren
05/ 18/ 62, Skirmish, Woodstock, Shenandoah
05/ 19/ 62, Skirmish, South Fork Shenandoah, Page
05/ 21/ 62, Skirmish, Woodstock, Shenandoah
05/ 23/ 62, Action, Front Royal, Warren
05/ 23/ 62, Skirmish, Buckton Station, Warren
05/ 24/ 62, Skirmish, Linden, Warren
05/ 24/ 62, Skirmish, Strasburg, Shenandoah
05/ 24/ 62, Action, Newtown and Middletown, Frederick
05/ 24/ 62, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
05/ 25/ 62, Battle, Winchester, Frederick
05/ 28/ 62, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
05/ 30/ 62, Action, Front Royal, Warren
05/ 31/ 62, Skirmish near, Front Royal, Warren
06/ 01/ 62, Skirmish, Mt. Carmel Church, Shenandoah
06/ 02/ 62, Skirmish, Woodstock, Shenandoah
06/ 02/ 62, Skirmish, Strasburg, Shenandoah
06/ 02/ 62, Skirmish, Tom's Brook, Shenandoah
06/ 03/ 62, Skirmish, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
06/ 06/ 62, Action, Harrisonburg, Rockingham
06/ 06/ 62, Skirmish near, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
06/ 07/ 62, Skirmish near, Harrisonburg, Rockingham
06/ 08/ 62, Battle, Cross Keys, Rockingham
06/ 09/ 62, Engagement, Port Republic, Rockingham
06/ 13/ 62, Skirmish, New Market, Shenandoah
06/ 16/ 62, Skirmish near, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
06/ 18/ 62, Skirmish near, Winchester, Frederick
06/ 19/ 62, Skirmish near, Winchester, Frederick
07/ 01/ 62, Skirmish near, Fort Furnace, Shenandoah
07/ 15/ 62, Skirmish near, Middletown, Frederick
09/ 03/ 62, Skirmish near, Martinsburg, Berkeley
09/ 04/ 62, Skirmish, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
09/ 07/ 62, Skirmish, Darkesville, Berkeley
09/ 11/ 62, Skirmish near, Martinsburg, Berkeley
09/ 12-15/ 62, Siege, Harpers Ferry, Jefferson
09/ 19/ 62, Skirmish, Boteler's Ford, Jefferson
09/ 20/ 62, Action, Shepherdstown, Jefferson
09/ 22/ 62, Skirmish, Ashby Gap, Clarke
09/ 24/ 62, Skirmish, Luray, Page
10/ 16/ 62, Skirmish near, Kearneysville, Jefferson
10/ 17/ 62, Skirmish near, Kearneysville, Jefferson
10/ 20/ 62, Skirmish, Hedgesville, Berkeley
11/ 02/ 62, Skirmish, Castleman's Ferry, Clarke
11/ 03/ 62, Skirmish, Castleman's Ferry, Clarke
11/ 03/ 62, Skirmish, Ashby Gap, Clarke
11/ 06/ 62, Skirmish, Martinsburg, Berkeley
11/ 06/ 62, Skirmish, Manassas Gap, Warren
11/ 09/ 62, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson

11/ 22/ 62, Skirmish, Halltown, Jefferson
11/ 22/ 62, Skirmish, near, Winchester, Frederick
11/ 24/ 62, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
11/ 26/ 62, Skirmish, Cockrall's Mills, Jefferson
11/ 29/ 62, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
12/ 02/ 62, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
12/ 02/ 62, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
12/ 11/ 62, Skirmish, Darkesville, Berkeley
12/ 20/ 62, Skirmish, Halltown, Jefferson
12/ 21/ 62, Skirmish, Strasburg, Shenandoah
01/ 17/ 63, Skirmish, near Newtown, Frederick
02/ 06/ 63, Skirmish, Millwood, Clarke
02/ 12/ 63, Skirmish, near Charles Town, Jefferson
02/ 24/ 63, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
02/ 26/ 63, Skirmish, near Woodstock, Shenandoah
02/ 26/ 63, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
02/ 26/ 63, Skirmish, near Winchester, Frederick
03/ 19/ 63, Skirmish, near Winchester, Frederick
04/ 08/ 63, Skirmish, on Millwood Road, Clarke
04/ 13/ 63, Skirmish, Snicker's Ferry, Clarke
04/ 22/ 63, Skirmish, Fisher's Hill, Shenandoah
05/ 16/ 63, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
05/ 16/ 63, Skirmish, Berry's Ferry, Clarke
06/ 02/ 63, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
06/ 06/ 63, Skirmish, near Berryville, Clarke
06/ 12/ 63, Skirmish, Cedarville, Warren
06/ 12/ 63, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
06/ 12/ 63, Skirmish, Middletown, Frederick
06/ 13/ 63, Skirmish, Opequon Creek, Frederick
06/ 13/ 63, Skirmish, White Post, Clarke
06/ 13/ 63, Skirmish, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
06/ 13/ 63, Skirmish, Opequon Creek, Clarke
06/ 13/ 63, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
06/ 13-15/ 63, Engagement, Winchester, Frederick
06/ 14/ 63, Skirmish, Martinsburg, Berkeley
06/ 14/ 63, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
07/ 14/ 63, Skirmish, Harpers Ferry, Jefferson
07/ 14/ 63, Action, Falling Waters, Berkeley
07/ 15/ 63, Skirmish, Halltown, Jefferson
07/ 15/ 63, Skirmish, near Shepherdstown, Jefferson
07/ 16/ 63, Skirmish, Shanghai, Berkeley
07/ 16/ 63, Action, Shepherdstown, Jefferson
07/ 17/ 63, Skirmish, North Mountain Station, Berkeley
07/ 17/ 63, Skirmish, Snicker's Gap, Clarke/ Loudoun
07/ 18/ 63, Skirmish, near Hedgesville, Berkeley
07/ 19/ 63, Skirmish, near Martinsburg, Berkeley
07/ 20/ 63, Skirmish, near Berry's Ferry, Clarke
07/ 21/ 63, Skirmish, Manassas Gap, Warren
07/ 21/ 63, Skirmish, Chester Gap, Warren
07/ 22/ 63, Skirmish, Manassas Gap, Warren
07/ 22/ 63, Skirmish, Chester Gap, Warren
07/ 23/ 63, Action, Wapping Heights, Warren
07/ 23/ 63, Skirmish, near Chester Gap, Warren
08/ 02/ 63, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
08/ 05/ 63, Skirmish, Cold Spring Gap, Frederick
09/ 16/ 63, Skirmish, Smithfield, Jefferson
09/ 21/ 63, Skirmish, Fisher's Hill, Shenandoah
10/ 07/ 63, Skirmish, Summit Point, Jefferson
10/ 07/ 63, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
10/ 17/ 63, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
10/ 18/ 63, Skirmish, Berryville Pike, Clarke
10/ 18/ 63, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
11/ 16/ 63, Skirmish, Edinburg, Shenandoah
11/ 16/ 63, Skirmish, Woodstock, Shenandoah
11/ 16/ 63, Skirmish, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
12/ 12/ 63, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
12/ 13/ 63, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
02/ 02/ 64, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
02/ 11/ 64, Raid, B&O Railroad, Jefferson
02/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Front Royal, Warren
03/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, near Charles Town, Jefferson
03/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, Kabletown, Jefferson
04/ 02/ 64, Skirmish, Stony Creek, Shenandoah
04/ 08/ 64, Skirmish, Winchester, Frederick
04/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, near Middletown, Frederick
05/ 13/ 64, Skirmish, near New Market, Shenandoah
05/ 14/ 64, Skirmish, New Market, Shenandoah
05/ 14/ 64, Skirmish, Rude's Hill, Shenandoah
05/ 15/ 64, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
05/ 15/ 64, Engagement, New Market, Shenandoah
05/ 21/ 64, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
05/ 22/ 64, Skirmish, Front Royal, Warren
05/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, near Charles Town, Jefferson
05/ 29/ 64, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
05/ 30/ 64, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
06/ 05/ 64, Engagement, Piedmont, Augusta
06/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, Brownsburg, Rockbridge
06/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, Middlebrook, Augusta
06/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, Waynesborough, Augusta
06/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, near Kabletown, Jefferson
06/ 11/ 64, Skirmish, Lexington, Rockbridge
06/ 11/ 64, Skirmish, near Midway, Augusta
06/ 12/ 64, Skirmish, Cedar Creek, Frederick
06/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Smithfield, Jefferson

06/ 29/ 64, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
06/ 29/ 64, Skirmish, Duffield's Station, Jefferson
07/ 03/ 64, Skirmish, Leetown, Jefferson
07/ 03/ 64, Skirmish, Darkesville, Berkeley
07/ 03/ 64, Skirmish, Martinsburg, Berkeley
07/ 03/ 64, Skirmish, North Mountain, Berkeley
07/ 04/ 64, Skirmish, Bolivar Heights, Jefferson
07/ 17-18/ 64, Engagement, Cool Spring, Clarke
07/ 19/ 64, Skirmish, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
07/ 19/ 64, Skirmish, Darkesville, Berkeley
07/ 19/ 64, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
07/ 19/ 64, Engagement, Berry's Ferry, Clarke
07/ 19/ 64, Skirmish, Kabletown, Jefferson
07/ 20/ 64, Engagement, Rutherford's Farm, Frederick
07/ 22/ 64, Skirmish, near Berryville, Clarke
07/ 22/ 64, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
07/ 23/ 64, Skirmish, Kernstown, Frederick
07/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, Falling Waters, Berkeley
07/ 24/ 64, Engagement, Kernstown, Frederick
07/ 25/ 64, Skirmish, Martinsburg, Berkeley
07/ 25/ 64, Skirmish, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
07/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Falling Waters, Berkeley
07/ 27/ 64, Skirmish, Back Creek Bridge, Berkeley
07/ 30/ 64, Skirmish, near Shepherdstown, Jefferson
08/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, near Stone Chapel, Clarke
08/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, Berryville Road, Clarke
08/ 11/ 64, Action near, Newtown, Frederick
08/ 11/ 64, Action, Double Toll Gate, Frederick
08/ 11/ 64, Skirmish, near Winchester, Frederick
08/ 12/ 64, Skirmish, Cedar Creek, Frederick
08/ 13/ 64, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
08/ 14/ 64, Skirmish, near Strasburg, Shenandoah
08/ 15/ 64, Skirmish, near Charles Town, Jefferson
08/ 15/ 64, Skirmish, near Cedar Creek, Shenandoah
08/ 16/ 64, Engagement, Guard Hill, Warren
08/ 17/ 64, Engagement, Abrams Creek, Frederick
08/ 18/ 64, Skirmish, Opequon Creek, Clarke/Frederick
08/ 19/ 64, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
08/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Berryville, Clarke
08/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Opequon Creek, Clarke/Frederick
08/ 21/ 64, Skirmish, near Berryville, Clarke
08/ 21/ 64, Engagement, Summit Point, Jefferson
08/ 21/ 64, Skirmish, Middleway, Jefferson
08/ 21/ 64, Engagement, Cameron's Depot, Jefferson
08/ 22/ 64, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
08/ 23/ 64, Skirmish, Kearneysville, Jefferson
08/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, Halltown, Jefferson
08/ 25/ 64, Action, near Shepherdstown, Jefferson
08/ 25/ 64, Action, near Kearneysville, Jefferson
08/ 25/ 64, Skirmish, Halltown, Jefferson
08/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
08/ 26/ 64, Action, Halltown, Jefferson
08/ 27/ 64, Skirmish, Duffield's Station, Jefferson
08/ 28/ 64, Skirmish, Leetown, Jefferson
08/ 28/ 64, Skirmish, Smithfield, Jefferson
08/ 29/ 64, Engagement, Smithfield Crossing, Jefferson
08/ 29/ 64, Skirmish, near Charles Town, Jefferson
08/ 31/ 64, Skirmish, Martinsburg, Berkeley
09/ 01/ 64, Skirmish, Opequon Creek, Clarke/Frederick
09/ 02/ 64, Action, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
09/ 02/ 64, Skirmish, Darkesville, Berkeley
09/ 03/ 64, Action, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
09/ 03/ 64, Engagement, Berryville, Clarke
09/ 04/ 64, Engagement, Berryville, Clarke
09/ 05/ 64, Skirmish, Stephenson's Depot, Frederick
09/ 07/ 64, Skirmish, near Winchester, Frederick
09/ 07/ 64, Skirmish, near Brucetown, Frederick
09/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, Darkesville, Berkeley
09/ 13/ 64, Skirmish, Gilbert's Ford, Clarke / Frederick
09/ 13/ 64, Skirmish, Locke's Ford, Frederick / Clarke
09/ 13/ 64, Skirmish, Bunker Hill, Berkeley
09/ 13/ 64, Skirmish, Abrams Creek, Frederick
09/ 14/ 64, Skirmish, near Berryville, Clarke
09/ 15/ 64, Skirmish, Seiver's Ford, Clarke / Frederick
09/ 16/ 64, Skirmish, Snicker's Gap, Clarke/ Loudoun
09/ 18/ 64, Action, Martinsburg, Berkeley
09/ 19/ 64, Battle, Opequon Creek, Frederick
09/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Strasburg, Shenandoah
09/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Middletown, Frederick
09/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Cedarville, Warren
09/ 21/ 64, Skirmish, Fisher's Hill, Shenandoah
09/ 21/ 64, Skirmish, Front Royal, Warren
09/ 21/ 64, Skirmish, Strasburg, Shenandoah
09/ 22/ 64, Engagement, Milford, Page / Warren
09/ 22/ 64, Battle, Fisher's Hill, Shenandoah
09/ 23/ 64, Skirmish, Woodstock, Shenandoah
09/ 23/ 64, Skirmish, near Edinburg, Shenandoah
09/ 23/ 64, Skirmish, Front Royal, Warren
09/ 23/ 64, Skirmish, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
09/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, Forest Hill, Rockingham
09/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
09/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, near New Market, Rockingham
09/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, New Market, Shenandoah
09/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, Forest Hill, Shenandoah

09/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Weyer's Cave, Augusta
09/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Port Republic, Rockingham
09/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Port Republic, Rockingham
09/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Brown's Gap, Rockingham
09/ 27/ 64, Skirmish, Weyer's Cave, Augusta
09/ 27/ 64, Skirmish, Port Republic, Rockingham
09/ 28/ 64, Skirmish, Waynesborough, Augusta
09/ 28/ 64, Skirmish, Rockfish Gap, Augusta
09/ 28/ 64, Skirmish, Port Republic, Rockingham
10/ 02/ 64, Skirmish, Bridgewater, Rockingham
10/ 02/ 64, Skirmish, Mt. Crawford, Rockingham
10/ 03/ 64, Skirmish, Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
10/ 03/ 64, Skirmish, North River, Rockingham
10/ 04/ 64, Skirmish, North River, Rockingham
10/ 05/ 64, Skirmish, North River, Rockingham
10/ 06/ 64, Skirmish, near Brock's Gap, Rockingham
10/ 07/ 64, Skirmish, Columbia Furnace, Shenandoah
10/ 07/ 64, Skirmish, on Back Road, Shenandoah
10/ 08/ 64, Skirmish, Luray Valley, Page
10/ 08/ 64, Skirmish, Tom's Brook, Shenandoah
10/ 09/ 64, Engagement, Tom's Brook, Shenandoah
10/ 13/ 64, Engagement, Hupp's Hill, Frederick
10/ 13/ 64, Skirmish, Hupp's Hill, Shenandoah
10/ 14/ 64, Skirmish, Strasburg, Shenandoah
10/ 19/ 64, Battle, Cedar Creek, Frederick
10/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Fisher's Hill, Shenandoah
10/ 23/ 64, Skirmish, Dry Run, Warren
10/ 25/ 64, Skirmish, Milford, Page / Warren
10/ 26/ 64, Skirmish, Milford, Page / Warren
10/ 28/ 64, Skirmish, Newtown, Frederick
11/ 07/ 64, Skirmish, near Edinburg, Shenandoah
11/ 10/ 64, Skirmish, near Kernstown, Frederick
11/ 11/ 64, Skirmish, near Kernstown, Frederick
11/ 12/ 64, Action, Newtown, Frederick
11/ 12/ 64, Skirmish, Cedar Creek, Shenandoah
11/ 12/ 64, Action, Cedar Creek, Frederick
11/ 20/ 64, Skirmish, Kabletown, Jefferson
11/ 22/ 64, Action, Rude's Hill, Shenandoah
11/ 22/ 64, Skirmish, Front Royal, Warren
11/ 12/ 64, Action, Ninevah, Warren
11/ 24/ 64, Skirmish, Parkins Mill, Frederick
11/ 29/ 64, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
11/ 30/ 64, Skirmish, Snicker's Gap, Clarke/ Loudoun
11/ 30/ 64, Skirmish, Kabletown, Jefferson
12/ 21/ 64, Action, Lacey Springs, Rockingham
02/ 03/ 65, Skirmish, Charles Town, Jefferson
03/ 01/ 65, Skirmish, Mt. Crawford, Rockingham
03/ 02/ 65, Engagement, Waynesborough, Augusta
03/ 05/ 65, Skirmish, Harrisonburg, Rockingham
03/ 07/ 65, Skirmish, near Mount Jackson, Shenandoah
03/ 07/ 65, Skirmish, Rude's Hill, Shenandoah
03/ 13/ 65, Skirmish, near Charles Town, Jefferson
03/ 14/ 65, Skirmish, Woodstock, Shenandoah
03/ 21/ 65, Skirmish, near Fisher's Hill, Shenandoah

Map 5 shows the road network in the Lower and Middle Shenandoah Valley as represented on the Jedediah Hotchkiss Valley Map (1862-1863). Hotchkiss left the vicinity of Winchester uncompleted. The Hotchkiss map, measuring 3 feet by 8 feet, has been reduced to computerized format and will be available in a GIS computer database to be developed at an appropriate facility in the Shenandoah Valley.

Map 6 is a GIS product displaying the frequency of conflict in the Shenandoah Valley throughout four years of warfare. The reddest areas are those of most frequent conflict. The bluest areas are those of least frequent conflict. The 326 events catalogued in Figure 7 were used to produce this map. No attempt was made to weigh the events according to size or ferocity of the encounter. Notice the large cluster of events in the region south of Winchester, centered on the Valley "chokepoint" of Fisher's Hill at the head of Masanutten Mountain.

Geography and Strategic Importance of the Valley

The Shenandoah Valley is that portion of the Great Valley of Virginia that is drained by the Shenandoah River and its affluents. The Valley extends on a southwest to northeast bearing, from its headwaters north of Lexington to the Potomac River, a distance of about 140 miles. For convenience, the Valley can be said to extend from Lexington to the Potomac River, although the watershed in the immediate vicinity of Lexington drains south to the James River.

The Shenandoah Valley is bounded on the northwest by North Mountain, the first range of the Allegheny Mountains, and on the southeast by the Blue Ridge, which separates the Valley from the Piedmont region and coastal plain of eastern Virginia. The distance from Washington to the Blue Ridge at Snickers Gap is about fifty-five miles; from Richmond to the Blue Ridge is about a hundred. At its widest, the Valley is nearly twenty-five miles across. North of the Potomac River, the Valley continues into Maryland and Pennsylvania with a similar configuration, but there it is called the Cumberland Valley, and the Blue Ridge is named South Mountain.

The Shenandoah Valley encompasses two counties in West Virginia: Berkeley and Jefferson; and seven counties in Virginia: Frederick, Clarke, Warren, Shenandoah, Page, Rockingham, and Augusta. Highland County has been included in the study region because of its intimate association with Jackson's 1862 Campaign, even though it is beyond North Mountain. Berkeley, Jefferson, Frederick, Clarke, and Warren counties are referred to as the Lower (downstream) Valley; while the counties south of Strasburg are called the Upper Valley.

The Shenandoah Valley's unique feature is Massanutten Mountain, a complex ridge that extends for some fifty miles through its middle, from Strasburg southwest to Harrisonburg. Throughout its length, the Massanutten divides the Valley into two smaller valleys, the main or Strasburg Valley, which is drained by the North Fork Shenandoah River, and the narrower Page or Luray Valley, drained by the South Fork Shenandoah River. Just south of Strasburg, the main Valley is only about five miles across, while on the far side of the Massanutten, the Luray Valley funnels down to a width of less than a mile and a half at the town of Overall (antebellum Milford).

Streams and Rivers

From the general vicinity of Lexington, a series of small streams flows northerly; these combine to form the South River near Waynesboro, the Middle River near Staunton, and the North River near Bridgewater. The North and Middle rivers conjoin west of Grottoes, and the South River merges a few miles downstream at Port Republic to form the South Fork Shenandoah River. Port Republic marked the upstream limit for seasonal navigation of the river, hence its name. The South Fork flows down the Luray or Page Valley to Front Royal.

The North Fork Shenandoah River arises from the many small streams that spring from Shenandoah and North Mountain west and south of Timberville. The river's largest tributary—Smith Creek—joins near Rude's Hill at Mt. Jackson. Two other important tributaries join farther downstream—Stony Creek at Edinburg and Narrow Passage Creek near Woodstock. From here the river meanders northeast through a series of incised meanders, known as "Seven Bends." At Strasburg, the North Fork turns abruptly east across the head of the Massanutten, where it is joined by Cedar Creek. At Front Royal the North and South forks conjoin, forming the Shenandoah River proper, now several hundred yards wide. From Front Royal, the Shenandoah flows steadily to the northeast along the flank of the Blue Ridge to empty into the Potomac River at Harpers Ferry. At the time of the Civil War, locks on the Potomac River allowed access to the Chesapeake and Ohio (C&O) Canal, which carried canal boat traffic to Georgetown.

For the last forty miles of its journey to the Potomac, the Shenandoah River is paralleled on the west by a meandering, high-banked stream called Opequon Creek, or simply the Opequon (Oh-PECK-n) which arises in the vicinity of Winchester and drains the western portion of the Lower Valley, emptying into the Potomac River.

Valley Turnpikes, Roads, and Gaps

The Valley Map of cartographer Jedediah Hotchkiss (produced 1862-1863) reveals an intricate web of turnpikes and farm roads within the Valley, reflecting its densely settled agricultural character at the time of the Civil War. In most places, the modern network of State and county roads is congruent with the historic network. The primary historic Valley highways and roads are in use today. (See Maps 3 and 5.)

The major northeast-southwest thoroughfare of the Shenandoah Valley at the time of the Civil War was the Valley Turnpike, which extended from the Potomac River at Williamsport via Martinsburg, Winchester, Middletown, Strasburg, New Market, Harrisonburg, Staunton, and Fairfield to Lexington. This road is one of the oldest and most historic transportation routes in America. In prehistoric times, Indians followed buffalo herds along its route. Later it was referred to as the Warrior Trace. The first settlers entered the Valley from Maryland, crossed the Potomac River at Williamsport, Shepherdstown, and Harpers Ferry, and followed the road south. In the 18th century, it was part of the Great Wagon Road, which ran from Philadelphia to the back country of the Carolinas and the Cumberland Gap. When it was incorporated as the Valley Turnpike (a toll road) in the 19th century, it had already contributed mightily to the settlement of the American frontier. In the 20th century, first US 11 and then I-81 were laid out to follow its course.

In the 19th century, the Valley Turnpike was part of a fledgling State transportation network of turnpikes, local roads, railroads, and canals. It boasted a macadamized surface that enabled travel in wet weather. The army that controlled this road had the advantage of being able to move swiftly up or down the Valley, while its enemies bogged down on the muddy side roads. Not surprisingly, most of the Shenandoah Valley's battles and smaller engagements were fought somewhere along the Valley Turnpike. Two dirt roads ran parallel with the Turnpike for most of the distance between Winchester and Staunton, and these roads were used extensively in conjunction with troop movements along the Turnpike. The Back Road, which skirted the flank of Little North Mountain, was known for years as the Cattle Road after the herds that were once driven north along its route to market. The Middle Road traced a meandering course between the Back Road and the Valley Turnpike. These routes today are followed by paved county roads.

The placement of the major east-west routes through the Valley depended on the location of gaps through the Blue Ridge on the east and through the Alleghenies on the west. The Blue Ridge gaps were low and relatively numerous, while only a few natural gaps in the North Mountain of the Alleghenies allowed settlers to penetrate farther into the interior. Roads were built through these gaps to carry traffic into West Virginia and to the Ohio River. The modern road network utilizes many of these natural gaps.

Winchester was a vital transportation hub in the Lower Valley (see Figure 8). Including the Valley Turnpike (sometimes known as the Martinsburg Turnpike north of town), nine important roads or turnpikes radiated from the city. North of town, the Old Charles Town Road (rte. 761) diverged from the Valley Turnpike at Stephenson's Depot, leading to Harpers Ferry via Summit Point and Charles Town. The "Berryville" turnpike (modern VA 7 east) led through Snicker's Gap to Bluemont (antebellum Snickersville) where branches continued to the seaport of Alexandria via Leesburg (Leesburg and Snicker's Gap Turnpike, Leesburg and Alexandria Turnpike) and through Aldie (Snicker's Gap Turnpike) to Fairfax Courthouse on the Little River Turnpike. From Winchester, the Winchester and Berry's Ferry Turnpike (US 50 east) ran southeast through Ashby's Gap. The Front Royal and Gaines's Crossroads Turnpike (US 522 south) led south to the town of Front Royal. Middle Road (rte. 628) led south to Strasburg and Cedar Creek Grade or Cedar Creek Turnpike (rte. 622) led southwest to Cedar Creek Gap. The North Western Turnpike (US 50 west) left the Valley by Petticoat Gap on its way to Romney. Just beyond the gap, the Hardy and Winchester Turnpike (rte. 608 south) diverged southwest to Moorefield in Hardy County via Wardensville. The North Frederick Turnpike (US 522 north) led west and north to Hancock, Maryland.

Because of its strategic location in the Lower Valley, Winchester changed hands an estimated 72 times during the war, as the armies repeatedly advanced and receded. Five major battles (three at Winchester, two at Kernstown) and many smaller engagements (including Rutherford's Farm and Abrams Creek) were fought in the vicinity.

Front Royal, situated at the confluence of the North and South forks of the Shenandoah River at the head of the Massanutten, was a second important transportation node. In addition to the turnpikes leading north to Winchester and Berryville, roads ran west to intersect the Valley Turnpike at Strasburg (VA 55 west), east through Manassas Gap to join the Warrenton Turnpike at Gainesville (VA 55 east), and southeast through Chester Gap to Massie's Corner (US 522 south). The Luray and Front Royal Turnpike (US 340) led southwest through Page County along the course of the South Fork to Luray.

From Luray, the New Market and Sperryville Turnpike (US 211 east) crossed Thornton's Gap to Sperryville, where roads branched northeast to Warrenton and

southeast to Culpeper Courthouse. Heading west from Luray, the turnpike crossed Massanutten Mountain to New Market, from where it continued (VA 211 and 259) to Brock's Gap in Little North Mountain. The Luray Road (US 340) continued south to Waynesboro via Shenandoah, Elkton, and Port Republic.

Harrisonburg, situated on the Valley Turnpike near the base of Massanutten Mountain, was an important crossroads (See Figure 9). The Swift Run Gap Turnpike (US 33 east) passed along the base of the Massanutten via Elkton over Swift Run Gap to Gordonsville. From Harrisonburg, a road (US 33 west) led into the Alleghenies through Dry River Gap to Franklin, West Virginia. The Warm Springs Turnpike (VA 42) led southwest into Bath County. An important Blue Ridge crossing in this area, which led from Port Republic through Brown's Gap (rte. 663) to Charlottesville, no longer carries modern traffic.

From Harrisonburg, the Valley Turnpike (US 11 south) continued to Staunton where it intersected the major east-west thoroughfare of the Upper Valley—the "Parkersburg Road" (US 250). This road actually comprised three turnpikes on its course from central Virginia to Parkersburg, West Virginia. From Charlottesville, the Rivanna and Rockfish Gap Turnpike led to the gap where it entered the Staunton and Scottsville Turnpike, leading to the city. From Staunton west, the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike passed through Buffalo Gap to reach Parkersburg via McDowell and Monterey. Staunton's location at the intersections of the Valley Turnpike, the Parkersburg Road, and the Virginia Central Railroad, made it the most vital transportation center of the Upper Valley. It was an important supply and staging area for Confederate armies operating in the Valley until the summer and fall of 1864, when it was repeatedly ravaged by Union forces.

Deserving notice are several other Blue Ridge gaps, which are sometimes mentioned in historic accounts. Seven miles south of Harpers Ferry is Keyes Gap, crossed by VA 9 from Charles Town into Loudoun County. Six miles farther south is Gregory's or Wilson Gap, which is no longer in use. Between Chester Gap and Thornton's Gap above Luray, were two minor gaps, which are not in use today—Gravelly Spring and Beham's gaps. East of Waynesboro near Rockfish Gap is a cluster of little-used gaps—Turk's, Jarman's, and Beagle. Farther south are Howardsville Gap, Reed's Gap (rte. 664), and Indian or White's Gap (US 60 east), which carries the road from Lexington and eventually to Richmond.

Of these many gaps, Snickers, Ashby's, Manassas, Chester, Swift Run, Brown's, Thornton's, and Rockfish gaps are most often mentioned in Civil War literature.

VALLEY RAILROADS

Crucial for understanding military operations in the Shenandoah Valley were the railroads. By 1860, about 1,600 miles of railroads had been built in Virginia. The Baltimore & Ohio (B&O), Winchester & Potomac (W&P), and Manassas Gap railroads traversed the Lower Valley; while the Virginia Central served the Upper Valley. The most important of these railroads in terms of volume of traffic was the B&O Railroad, which ran from Baltimore to Wheeling, West Virginia, via Harpers Ferry, Martinsburg, and Grafton. The B&O served as a major east-west transportation artery for the North and remained in Federal hands on-and-off for most of the war.

As a vital rail, river, and canal junction, Harpers Ferry was occupied by the Confederacy early in the war and later served as Union general Philip H. Sheridan's principal base of operations for his 1864 campaign. The Confederates raided the B&O throughout the war at Harper's Ferry, Duffield's Depot, Martinsburg, and elsewhere. The B&O was severed repeatedly, but the North's ability to repair damage and keep the trains running outstripped the South's ability to disrupt the railroad. When West Virginia was admitted into the Union in 1863, the West Virginia Panhandle (Jefferson, Berkeley, and Morgan counties) was added to the new State in a bid to maintain control of the B&O Railroad, even though most of the citizens of those counties supported the Southern cause.

The W&P Railroad ran from Winchester to Harpers Ferry via Charles Town, a distance of 32 miles. Farther south, the Manassas Gap Railroad ran 78 miles from near Mt. Jackson via Strasburg, Front Royal, and Manassas Gap to Manassas Junction where it joined the Orange & Alexandria Railroad (O&A). Before the war, these railroads carried the produce of the Lower Valley to the markets of Baltimore and Washington. By 1862, both the W&P and the Manassas Gap had been thoroughly dismantled. The Union army made some attempt to repair these railroads in 1864 but abandoned the effort because of the activities of Col. John S. Mosby and his partisan rangers.

Serving the Upper Valley, the Virginia Central Railroad ran more than 195 miles from Jackson's River Depot near Covington to Richmond—via Buffalo Gap to

Staunton and via Rockfish Gap Tunnel to Charlottesville and beyond. Between Charlottesville and Gordonsville, the Virginia Central used the same tracks as the O&A, enabling connections to Lynchburg and points south, or Culpeper, Manassas, and Alexandria to the north. From Gordonsville, the Virginia Central continued east via Hanover Junction to Richmond. This railroad carried vital supplies from the Valley to the Confederate capital (with disruptions) well into 1864.

Although not geographically part of the Shenandoah Valley, Lynchburg served as a major rail and canal center, supply depot, and hospital complex for the Confederacy. Produce from the Upper Valley could be shipped there by road or stream and thence to Richmond on the James River Canal, the Southside Railroad, or the O&A Railroad via Charlottesville and Gordonsville. The Southside Railroad linked Richmond with the western Confederacy through its connections with the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad. The Southside Railroad continued to supply Richmond, with interruptions from Federal raiders, until the Battle of Five Forks (1 April 1865).

Figure 8. Historic Features of the Lower Valley



Figure 9. Historic Features of the Upper Valley

Overview of Military Strategy in the Shenandoah Valley

Throughout the Civil War, Confederate armies used the Shenandoah Valley as a natural corridor to invade or threaten invasion of the North. Because of its southwest-northeast orientation, Confederate armies marching down the Valley approached Washington and Baltimore, while Union armies marching up the Valley moved farther away from Richmond. The Blue Ridge served as a natural screen for the movement of troops. By defending the gaps with cavalry, Confederate armies could move swiftly north behind the protective wall of the Blue Ridge into Maryland and Pennsylvania; Gen. Robert E. Lee did this in the Gettysburg Campaign in 1863, as did Jubal Early in 1864. The Blue Ridge offered similar protection to Lee's army during its retreats from Antietam and Gettysburg.

When the need arose, Confederate defenders could hold the gaps in reverse against a Union army operating in the Valley. By withdrawing to the Blue Ridge near Brown's Gap to protect Charlottesville and eastern Virginia, the Confederates could threaten the flank and rear of any Union forces intent on penetrating the Upper Valley. The western gaps in the Allegheny chain were defended by Confederates against sporadic Union feints and incursions from West Virginia.

On the whole, Confederate armies succeeded in preventing deep Union penetration of the Upper Valley until late in the war, and Valley geography cooperated with the defense. Where the Massanutten Mountain rises abruptly between Front Royal and Strasburg, the width of the Valley is greatly decreased. With strong infantry at Fisher's Hill in the main valley south of Strasburg and cavalry at Overall (antebellum Milford) in the Luray Valley, a Confederate general could effectively hold the Upper Valley against a numerically superior enemy. Fisher's Hill astride the Valley Turnpike was an important strategic "choke point" throughout the war.

If Confederate generals chose to withdraw up the Valley Turnpike from Fisher's Hill, any pursuing Union general was forced to split his forces at the Massanutten in order to cover an advance up both the main and the Luray valleys. Once divided, he could not again reunite his forces for more than fifty miles because of the intervening mountain. Only a single rough road crossed the Massanutten—running from New Market to Luray through the New Market Gap.

Stonewall Jackson used Massanutten Mountain to screen his offensive movements in the 1862 Valley Campaign. Crossing from New Market to the Luray Valley in May, he advanced on Front Royal and then on Winchester, forcing the Union army, then at Strasburg, into abrupt withdrawal. Later in the campaign, he prevented two Union columns advancing against him up the main and Luray valleys from reuniting and defeated each separately in the climax of his campaign at the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic.

The Shenandoah Valley was referred to as the "Granary of Virginia." It was the richest agricultural region in Virginia, and its abundance supplied the Confederate cause. Because a large number of the inhabitants of Frederick, Shenandoah, Rockingham, and Augusta counties were pacifist Quakers or Dunkers who refused to fight in the war, the Valley continued to produce horses, grains, and livestock even after other portions of Virginia were made barren by the flight of slaves or the enlistment and conscription of the farmers. As the war continued, the City of Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia, pinned down in the trenches at Richmond and Petersburg, came to depend more heavily on produce shipped from the Valley on the Virginia Central Railroad. Capturing the supply depot of Staunton and severing this railroad became a major objective of the Union armies in 1864.

As the war progressed, Lynchburg, too, became an important objective of Union campaigns in the Valley. In 1864, several expeditions—up the Valley from Winchester, and north from Bulls Gap, Tennessee—were devised to capture Lynchburg, but the city remained in Confederate hands until the end of the war.

For the Union, defending the vulnerable B&O Railroad and the line of the Potomac River were essential considerations for any operations in the Shenandoah Valley. Because of implicit threats against Washington, a small Confederate army in the Valley could pin down three to five times its number in Union defenders, threaten vital Union transportation and communication lines, and carry the war to the North, if opportunity presented itself.

As the war dragged on, the Shenandoah Valley increased in importance to the Southern cause, and correspondingly it became more urgent that the Northern armies succeed there after dramatic failures in 1862, 1863, and May 1864. Ultimately, the Northern army was forced to lay waste to the agricultural abundance of the Valley in order to destroy support for the Southern war effort.

VALLEY CAMPAIGNS 1861-1865

ACTIONS IN 1861

After the bombardment of Fort Sumter, South Carolina, and President Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers, Virginia seceded on April 17, 1861. At once, Virginia State militia moved to secure the railroad assets, musket factories, and the Federal armory and arsenal at Harpers Ferry. Although Union forces attempted to burn the facilities, most of the rifle-musket manufacturing equipment was salvaged and shipped south to bolster the Confederate ordnance effort. Former VMI professor Thomas J. Jackson assumed command of a newly formed brigade at Harpers Ferry in the spring and moved to consolidate Confederate strength in the area. In July 1861, Confederate reinforcements traveled from the Shenandoah Valley to Manassas Junction on the Manassas Gap Railroad to reach the fighting at Bull Run, marking the first time in modern warfare that troops were moved by train to a battlefield. On the battlefield of Manassas, Jackson earned the sobriquet "Stonewall."

Although the remainder of the year saw sporadic skirmishing and an engagement at Falling Waters along the Potomac River, most of the fighting during the summer and fall of 1861 occurred farther to the west. During this time, Confederate forces gradually lost political and military control of the counties that would later be incorporated into the new state of West Virginia. In winter 1861-1862, Jackson conducted a campaign against Union forces at Romney, West Virginia.

JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN (MARCH-JUNE 1862)

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862 is one of the most studied campaigns of military history. This campaign demonstrates how a numerically inferior force can defeat larger forces by fast movement, surprise attack, and intelligent use of the terrain. In March 1862, as a Federal force under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks began to advance cautiously up the Valley, General Jackson retreated to Mount Jackson where he could defend the Valley Turnpike. His task was two-fold—to prevent deep penetration into the Valley and to tie down as many opposing forces as possible. When he learned that Banks was ready to detach part of his force to assist the Army of the Potomac then being concentrated on the Peninsula to threaten Richmond, Jackson marched down the Turnpike and fought a battle at **Kernstown** on March 23. Although defeated, Jackson's aggressive move convinced Washington that Confederate forces in the Valley posed a real threat to Washington, and Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, with his army preparing to move on Richmond, was denied reinforcements at a critical moment in the Peninsular Campaign.

In late April, Jackson left part of his enlarged command under Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell to confront Banks and marched with about 9,000 men through Staunton to meet a second Union army under Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, whose vanguard approached on the Parkersburg Road from western Virginia. Banks was convinced that Jackson was leaving the Valley to join the Confederate army at Richmond. But on May 8, Jackson turned up to defeat two brigades of Frémont's force, under Brig. Gens. Robert Milroy and Robert Schenck, at **McDowell**. He then marched swiftly back to unite with Ewell against Banks. On May 23, Jackson overran a detached Union force at **Front Royal** and advanced toward Winchester, threatening to cut off the Union army that was concentrated around Strasburg. After a running battle on the 24th along the Valley Turnpike from Middletown to Newtown (Stephens City), Banks made a stand on the heights south of **Winchester**. On May 25, Jackson attacked and overwhelmed the Union defenders, who broke and fled in a panic to the Potomac River. Banks was reinforced and again started up the Valley Turnpike, intending to link up with Brig. Gen. James Shields's Union division near Strasburg. Shields's division spearheaded the march of Irwin McDowell's corps recalled from Fredericksburg, while Frémont's army converged on Strasburg from the west. Jackson withdrew, narrowly avoiding being cut off from his line of retreat by these converging columns.

The Union armies now began a two-prong offensive against Jackson. Frémont's troops advanced up the Valley Turnpike while Shields's column marched up the Luray Road along the South Fork. At this point nearly 25,000 men were being brought to bear on Jackson's 17,000. Jackson's cavalry commander, Brig. Gen. Turner Ashby was killed while fighting a rear guard action near Harrisonburg on June 6.

Jackson concentrated his forces near the bridge at Port Republic, situating himself between the two Union columns that were separated by the mountain and the rain-swollen Shenandoah South Fork. On June 8, Frémont attacked Ewell's division at Cross Keys but was

driven back. The next morning (June 9), Jackson with his remaining force attacked Shields east and north of Port Republic, while Ewell withdrew from Frémont's front burning the bridge behind him. Ewell joined with Jackson to defeat Shields. Both Union forces retreated, freeing Jackson's army to reinforce the Confederate army at Richmond.

In five weeks, Jackson's army had marched more than 650 miles and inflicted more than 7,000 casualties, at a cost of only 2,500. More importantly, Jackson's campaign had tied up Union forces three times his strength. Jackson's victories infused new hope and enthusiasm for the Confederate cause, and materially contributed to the defeat of McClellan's campaign against Richmond. (See Map 7, showing incidents of conflict and battlefield study areas associated with the Jackson's 1862 campaign.)

LEE'S MARYLAND CAMPAIGN (SEPTEMBER 1862)

After decisively defeating the Union Army of Virginia under Maj. Gen. John Pope at Second Manassas (August 28-30) and fighting a drawn battle at Chantilly (September 1), General Lee invaded Maryland. Lee's advance was one arm of a great Confederate offensive that extended along a thousand-mile front from Tidewater Virginia to the Indian Territory in the west.

Lee's Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac north of Leesburg and concentrated at Frederick, Maryland, on September 9. While there, Lee learned that Pope had been removed from command, and McClellan again had assumed overall control. He also discovered that Union garrisons in the Lower Shenandoah Valley at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry had not withdrawn as had been anticipated. Lee could not continue his invasion with these troops sitting on his supply line. He audaciously divided his army and prepared to move deeper into the North while simultaneously investing **Harpers Ferry**.

In the next few days, Jackson's "Foot Cavalry" marched via Williamsport and Martinsburg to approach Harpers Ferry from the west. Three other divisions occupied the heights to the north and east of the town, surrounding the defenders. Lee left a division of infantry and the cavalry to hold the South Mountain passes in the face of any Union advance. The plan unfolded flawlessly until a copy of Lee's orders outlining the movements fell into Union hands. McClellan then advanced from Frederick, hoping to defeat the Confederate army in detail.

The US army wrested control of the South Mountain passes, but on September 15, 12,000 Union soldiers at Harpers Ferry surrendered to Jackson, even as McClellan moved west to confront Lee at Sharpsburg. At dawn on September 17, the Union army launched a powerful assault on Lee's left flank that began the bloodiest day in American military history. Although outnumbered two-to-one, Lee battled McClellan's army to a standstill. In one day's fighting, the two armies suffered a combined total of more than 23,000 casualties (killed, wounded, missing, captured). In spite of crippling casualties, Lee continued to face McClellan throughout the 18th, while skirmishing. After dark, Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac to the safety of the Shenandoah Valley. When McClellan failed to pursue Lee's army, President Lincoln relieved him of command.

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN (JUNE-JULY 1863)

Union defeats at Fredericksburg in December 1862 and Chancellorsville in May 1863 gave General Lee the initiative, and he moved again to invade the North. After the cavalry battle at Brandy Station on June 9, Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which included Stonewall Jackson's old command, was assigned the task of clearing Union forces out of the Valley. This he accomplished at **Second Winchester** (June 13-15), defeating (and nearly destroying) a Union division under Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy. With cavalry holding the Shenandoah Valley gaps, the Confederate army marched behind the screening Blue Ridge into Maryland and then penetrated deep into Pennsylvania.

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade replaced Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac and brought the invading Confederate army to battle at the crossroads town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on July 1. After two days of fierce fighting in which Union forces were driven back, General Lee attempted to break the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. The Pickett-Pettigrew Assault, or "Pickett's Charge" as it is known, was bloodily repulsed, and General Lee was forced to retreat on July 4, the same day that Confederate forces surrendered to Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Vicksburg. The battle of Gettysburg, the most sanguinary battle of the war, resulted in more than 50,000 casualties and a loss of Confederate manpower that could not be replaced.

The Confederate army reached the rain-swollen

Potomac River at Williamsport on July 6 but could not recross until the 14th, when it returned to the Shenandoah Valley. During the retreat, Confederate forces defended the passes of the Blue Ridge, allowing Lee's defeated army to withdraw with little molestation. Meade's Army of the Potomac came close to penetrating Lee's defensive screen only once—at Manassas Gap east of Front Royal on July 23. But the inability of the Federal army to coordinate their attacks allowed the Confederate army to escape to the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse. (See Map 8, showing incidents of conflict and battlefield study areas associated with the the 1863 Gettysburg campaign.)

LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGN (MAY-JUNE 1864)

In March 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant assumed overall command of the Union armies, east and west. In May, he ordered Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel to cooperate with the Army of the Potomac's spring offensive by advancing up the Valley to disrupt Confederate communications at Staunton and Charlottesville. On May 15, while Grant and Lee were locked in desperate combat at Spotsylvania Courthouse, Sigel made contact with a Confederate force under former vice president of the United States John C. Breckinridge at New Market. Sigel was defeated and retreated rapidly beyond Strasburg, crossing Cedar Creek by dusk on May 16. Grant then replaced Sigel with Maj. Gen. David "Black Dave" Hunter, who was given the task of cutting the Virginia Central Railroad.

In the meantime, Breckinridge's division had been called east to reinforce the Army of Northern Virginia at Hanover Junction, and Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones assumed command of the remaining Confederate forces in the Valley. On June 5, Hunter crushed the smaller Confederate army at Piedmont, killing Jones and taking nearly 1,000 prisoners. The disorganized Confederates could do nothing to delay Hunter's advance to Staunton, where he was joined by reinforcements marching from West Virginia.

From Staunton, Hunter continued south, sporadically destroying mills, barns, and public buildings, and condoning widespread looting by his troops. On June 11, Hunter swept aside a small cavalry force and occupied Lexington, where he burned the Virginia Military Institute and the home of former Virginia Governor John Letcher. Hunter's successes forced Lee to return Breckinridge and to send the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia under Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early to the defense of Lynchburg. Sending Early to the Valley was a desperate decision that restricted Lee's ability to undertake offensive operations against Grant on the Richmond-Petersburg front.

On the afternoon of June 17, Hunter's army reached the outskirts of Lynchburg, even as Early's vanguard began to arrive by rail from Charlottesville. After a brief, but fierce engagement, Hunter retreated into West Virginia. Early pursued for two days, but then returned to the Valley and started his troops north to the Potomac River. (See Map 9, showing incidents of conflict and battlefield study areas associated with the 1864 Lynchburg campaigns.)

EARLY'S MARYLAND CAMPAIGN (JUNE-AUGUST 1864)

Hunter's retreat left the Shenandoah Valley virtually undefended, and Early moved swiftly north, reaching Winchester by July 2. General Sigel, commanding a reserve division, withdrew to Maryland Heights at Harpers Ferry, offering little resistance. On July 4, Early confronted Sigel but then determined to turn the position by crossing the Potomac and moving over South Mountain to Frederick, Maryland. On July 9, Early defeated a hastily organized Union force under Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace at the Monocacy River. Wallace retreated toward Baltimore, leaving open the road to Washington, but his defeat had bought valuable time.

On the afternoon of July 11, Early's command, numbering no more than 12,000 infantry, demonstrated before the Washington fortifications, which were weakly manned by garrison troops. Veteran reinforcements (VI and XIX Corps), diverted from Grant's army to meet the threat on the capital, began arriving at mid-day, and by July 12, fully manned the Washington entrenchments. After a brief demonstration at Fort Stevens, Early called off an attack on the capital. The Confederate army withdrew that night, recrossed the Potomac River at White's Ford and reentered the Valley by Snickers Gap. Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright, commanding the pursuing Union army, attempted to bring Early to bay.

On July 18, a Union division crossed the Shenandoah River west of Snickers Gap but was thrown back at the battle of Cool Spring. Union cavalry were turned back at Berry's Ferry, nine miles farther south, the next day. On July 20, Union Brig. Gen. William Averell's mounted command, backed by infantry, moved south from Martinsburg on the Valley Turnpike and attacked the

infantry division of Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur at Rutherford's Farm near Winchester and routed it. In response to this setback and converging movements, Early withdrew to Fisher's Hill south of Strasburg.

Early's withdrawal convinced Wright that he had accomplished his task of driving off the Confederate invaders. He therefore ordered the VI and XIX Corps to return to Alexandria, where they would board transports to join the Army of the Potomac. Wright left Crook with three small infantry divisions and a cavalry division at Winchester to cover the Valley.

Under a standing directive to prevent Union reinforcements from reaching Grant, Early was quick to take advantage of Wright's departure. He attacked and routed Crook's command at Second Kernstown on July 24, and pressed the retreating Union forces closely. When Crook retreated toward Harpers Ferry, Early sent his cavalry to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to exact tribute or burn the city. The citizens refused to comply, and McCausland's cavalry burned the center of the town in retaliation for Hunter's excesses in the Valley. (See Map 10, showing incidents of conflict and battlefield study areas associated with Early's 1864 campaign in the Valley only.)

SHERIDAN'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN (AUGUST 1864-MARCH 1865)

Early's threat to Washington, Crook's defeat at Second Kernstown, and the burning of Chambersburg, forced Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant move decisively to end the Confederate threat in the lower Shenandoah Valley. Grant returned the VI and XIX Corps to the Valley, reinforced by two divisions of cavalry, and consolidated the various military districts of the region under Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, who assumed command of the Middle Military District at Harpers Ferry on August 7.

Early deployed his forces to defend the approaches to Winchester, while Sheridan moved his army, now 50,000 strong, south via Berryville with the goal of cutting the Valley Turnpike. On August 11, Confederate cavalry and infantry turned back Union cavalry at Double Toll Gate in sporadic, day-long fighting, preventing this maneuver.

Lee was quick to reinforce success and sent Maj. Gen. Joseph Kershaw's infantry division of the First Corps, Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, and an artillery battalion, under overall command of Lt. Gen. Richard Anderson, to join Early. On August 16, Union cavalry encountered this force advancing through Front Royal, and in a sharp engagement at Guard Hill, Brig. Gen. George A. Custer's brigade captured more than 300 Confederates.

Sheridan had been ordered to move cautiously and avoid a defeat, particularly if Early were reinforced from the Petersburg line. Uncertain of Early's and Anderson's combined strength, Sheridan withdrew to a defensive line near Charles Town to cover the Potomac River crossings and Harpers Ferry. Early's forces routed the Union rear guard at Abrams Creek at Winchester on August 17 and pressed north on the Valley Turnpike to Bunker Hill. Judging Sheridan's performance thus far, General Early considered him a "timid" commander.

On August 21, Early and Anderson launched a converging attack against Sheridan. As Early struck the main body of Union infantry at Cameron's Depot, Anderson moved north from Berryville against Sheridan's cavalry at Summit Point. Results of the fighting were inconclusive, but Sheridan continued to withdraw. The next day, Early advanced boldly on Charles Town, panicking a portion of the retreating Union army, but by late afternoon, Sheridan had retreated into formidable entrenchments at Halltown, south of Harpers Ferry, where he was beyond attack.

Early then attempted another incursion into Maryland, hoping by this maneuver to maintain the initiative. Leaving Anderson with Kershaw's division entrenched in front of Sheridan at Halltown, he directed the rest of the army north toward Shepherdstown. On August 25, two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry intercepted Early's advance, but the Confederate infantry drove them back to the Potomac River in a series of actions along Kearneysville-Shepherdstown Road. Early's intentions were revealed, however, and on August 26, Sheridan's infantry attacked and overran a portion of the Confederate entrenchments at Halltown, forcing Anderson and Kershaw to withdraw to Stephenson's Depot. Early abandoned his raid and returned south, establishing a defensive line on the west bank of Opequon Creek from Bunker Hill to Stephenson's Depot.

On August 29, Union cavalry forded the Opequon at Smithfield Crossing (Middleway) but were swiftly driven back across the creek and beyond the hamlet by Confederate infantry. Union infantry of the VI Corps then advanced and regained the line of the Opequon. This was one more in a series of thrusts and parries that characterized this phase of the campaign, known to the soldiers as the "mimic war."

On September 2-3, Averell's cavalry division rode south from Martinsburg and struck the Confederate left flank at Bunker Hill, defeating the Confederate cavalry but being driven back by infantry. Meanwhile, Sheridan concentrated his infantry near Berryville. On the afternoon of September 3, Anderson's command encountered and attacked elements of Crook's corps (Army of West Virginia) at Berryville but was repulsed. Early brought his entire army up on the 4th, but found Sheridan's position at Berryville too strongly entrenched to attack. Early again withdrew to the Opequon line.

On September 15, Anderson with Kershaw's division and an artillery battalion left the Winchester area to return to Lee's army at Petersburg and by the 18th had reached the Virginia Piedmont. Early spread out his remaining divisions from Winchester to Martinsburg, where he once more cut the B&O Railroad. When Sheridan learned of Anderson's departure and the raid on Martinsburg, he determined to attack at once while the Confederate army was scattered.

On September 19, Sheridan advanced his army on the Berryville Turnpike, precipitating the battle of Opequon. By forced marches, Early concentrated his army in time to intercept Sheridan's main blow. The battle raged all day on the hills east and north of Winchester. Early's veterans decimated two divisions of the XIX Corps and a VI Corps division in fighting in the Middle Field and near the Dinkle Barn. Confederate division commander Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes and Union division commander Brig. Gen. David A. Russell were killed within a few hundred yards of one another in the heat of the fighting. Late in the afternoon a flanking movement by Crook's corps and the Union cavalry finally broke Early's overextended line north of town. Opequon was a do-or-die effort on the part of both armies, resulting in nearly 9,000 casualties.

Sheridan's victory was decisive but incomplete; Early retreated twenty miles south to his entrenchments at **Fisher's Hill** and Sheridan followed. Preliminary skirmishing on the 21st showed that a frontal assault would be costly, so Sheridan resorted to a flanking movement on September 22. Hidden from the Confederate signal station on Massanutten Mountain by the dense forest, Crook's two divisions marched along the shoulder of Little North Mountain to get behind the Confederate lines. In late afternoon, Crook's soldiers fell on Early's left flank and rear "like an avalanche," throwing the Confederate army into panicked retreat. At Milford (Overall) in the Luray Valley on the same day Confederate cavalry prevented two divisions of Union cavalry from reaching Luray and passing New Market Gap to intercept Early's defeated army as it withdrew up the Valley.

Early retreated to Rockfish Gap near Waynesboro, opening the Valley to Union depredations and what became known as "The Burning" or "Red October." Sheridan thought he had destroyed Early's army, but Kershaw's division and another brigade of cavalry were returned to the Valley, nearly making up the losses suffered at Opequon and Fisher's Hill. After convincing Grant that he could proceed no farther than Staunton, Sheridan withdrew down the Valley systematically burning mills, barns, and public buildings, destroying or carrying away the forage, grain, and livestock. During this portion of the campaign, Confederate partisan groups under John S. Mosby and Harry Gilmor increased their activities against Union supply lines in the Lower Valley.

Early followed Sheridan's withdrawal, sending his cavalry under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser to harass the Union rear guard. Angered by Rosser's constant skirmishing, Sheridan ordered his commander of cavalry, Maj. Gen. Alfred T. Torbert, to "whip the enemy or get whipped yourself." On October 9, Torbert unleashed the divisions of his young generals, Wesley Merritt and George Custer, on the Confederate cavalry, routing it at **Tom's Brook**. In the melee that followed, victorious Union troopers chased the Confederates twenty miles up the pike and eight miles up the Back Road, in what came to be known as the "Woodstock Races." The morale and efficiency of the Confederate cavalry were seriously impaired for the rest of the war.

On October 13, Early reoccupied Fisher's Hill and pushed through Strasburg to Hupp's Hill where he engaged a portion of Sheridan's army. When Sheridan realized the proximity of Early's forces, he recalled the VI Corps, which had again been dispatched to join Grant. On October 19, at dawn, after an unparalleled night march, Confederate infantry directed by Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon surprised and overwhelmed the soldiers of Crook's corps in their camps at **Cedar Creek**. The XIX Corps suffered a like fate as the rest of Early's army joined the attack. Only the VI Corps maintained its order as it withdrew beyond Middletown, providing a screen behind which the other corps could regroup.

Sheridan, who was absent when the attack began, arrived on the field from Winchester and immediately

began to organize a counterattack, saying "if I had been with you this morning, boys, this would not have happened." In late afternoon, the Union army launched a coordinated counterattack that drove the Confederates back across Cedar Creek. Sheridan's leadership turned the tide, transforming Early's stunning morning victory into afternoon disaster. Early retreated up the Valley under sharp criticism of his generalship, while President Abraham Lincoln rode the momentum of Sheridan's victories in the Valley and Sherman's successes in the Atlanta campaign to re-election in November. A campaign slogan of the time duly noted that the "Early" bird had gotten its "Phil."

Early attempted a last offensive in mid-November, advancing to Middletown. But his weakened cavalry was defeated by Union cavalry at Newtown (Stephens City) and Ninevah, forcing him to withdraw his infantry. The Union cavalry now so overpowered his own that Early could not maneuver offensively against Sheridan. On November 22, the cavalry fought at Rude's Hill, and on December 12, a second Union cavalry raid was turned back at Lacey Springs, ending active operations for the winter season. The winter was disastrous for the Confederate army, which was no longer able to sustain itself on the produce of the devastated Valley. Cavalry and infantry were returned to Lee's army at Petersburg or dispersed to feed and forage for themselves.

Riding through sleet on March 2, 1865, Custer's and Brig. Gen. Thomas Devin's cavalry divisions advanced from Staunton, arriving near Waynesboro in the early afternoon. There, they found Early's small army, consisting of a remnant of Brig. Gen. Gabriel Wharton's division and some artillery units. Early presented a brave front although the South River was to his rear, but in a few hours, the war for the Shenandoah Valley was over. Early's army fled before the Union cavalry, scattering up the mountainside. Early escaped with a few of his aides, riding away from his last battle with no forces left to contest Union control of the Shenandoah Valley.

With the Confederate threat in the Valley eliminated, General Sheridan led his cavalry overland to Petersburg to participate in the final campaign of the war in Virginia. On April 9, 1865, after collapse of the Petersburg lines and a harried retreat, General Robert E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse. (See Map 11, showing incidents of conflict and battlefield study areas associated with Sheridan's campaign, 1864-1865.)

Note on Valley Generals. According to *Civil War Generals*, compiled by James Spencer, the Shenandoah Valley produced eight brigadier generals, six who fought for the Confederacy and two for the Union: John D. Imboden (C/Staunton), James W. Denver (U/Winchester), John R. Jones (C/Harrisonburg), Thomas Jordan (C/Luray), Richard L. Page (C/Clarke County), Alexander W. Reynolds (C/Clarke County), John D. Stevenson (U/Staunton), and James A. Walker (C/Mt. Sidney). Of 117 generals who were killed in battle, 50 died on Virginia battlefields, 7 in the Valley: Brig. Gen. Turner Ashby (C/Harrisonburg/June 1862), Brig. Gen. Daniel D. Bidwell (U/Cedar Creek/Oct. 1864), Brig. Gen. Archibald C. Godwin (C/Opequon/Sept. 1864), Brig. Gen. William "Grumble" Jones (C/Piedmont/June 1864), Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur (C/Cedar Creek/Oct. 1864), Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes (C/Opequon/Sept. 1864), and Brig. Gen. David A. Russell (U/Opequon/Sept. 1864). Col. George S. Patton, grandfather of Gen. George S. "Blood and Guts" Patton of World War II fame, was killed commanding a Confederate brigade at Opequon on September 19, 1864. He is buried in Stonewall Cemetery, Winchester.

VALLEY BATTLEFIELDS: THE MAGNITUDE OF CONFLICT

All of the conflicts selected for inclusion in the Shenandoah Valley Study have been referred to by historians as battles, but the range of comparison among these battles is so large that use of the term "battle" to describe all equally could be questioned. The nineteenth- and early twentieth-century archivists who compiled the *Official Records*, and other event lists and chronologies used a ranking system of "battle," "engagement," and "action" based on the command structure of the forces engaged (typically the Union forces engaged). Rather than providing guidance as to the size and intensity of an encounter, these terms tell us only that: a battle was directed by the ranking general of the military district and involved the bulk of the forces under his command; an engagement might be directed by a subordinate leader or involve only a portion of the armies in the field; an action was a conflict, typically limited in scope, that could not be easily labeled a battle or an engagement. This early ranking system was not designed to describe or interpret events but to award appropriate plaudits to the commanding officers and the units involved.

Figure 10 portrays a range of comparison among the battlefields selected for the Shenandoah Valley Study, ranking them according to the relative size of the forces engaged and indicating their traditional ranking of battle (B), engagement (E), or action (A). The figures provided are the best approximations that can be offered, considering the uneven reliability of the sources. Confederate strengths, in particular, are often only estimated since many Confederate records were lost. Also, the full forces of one army or the other were not always brought to the field and were not all engaged. The number of troops on the field and actively engaged must be estimated, and existing estimates often differ widely.

A second way to compare battles is to rank the number of fatalities incurred at each. More deaths in a conflict typically equated to determined, close-quarters fighting. Battles of maneuver and surprise, on the other hand, often resulted in lower numbers of fatalities and higher numbers of captured and missing. Figure 11 shows the Shenandoah Valley battlefields ranked according to the approximate number of fatalities.

A third way to compare the battles is to rank attrition (total killed, wounded, captured, and missing) of the a forces engaged, a useful measure of a battle's influence on the progress of its campaign. High attrition rates incurred by one side or the other in a single battle might cripple its force and compel a retreat. In many cases, higher than average attrition rates resulted from a disastrous rout by one side or the other with large numbers of prisoners falling into enemy hands. Figure 12 provides a ranking by estimating the combined attrition of the forces engaged.

The battles of Opequon and Cedar Creek stand out in terms of size, fatalities, and attrition. Although the size of Confederate armies in the Valley remained surprisingly consistent from 1862 to 1864, averaging 16,000-24,000 men, the size of the Union armies increased dramatically under Sheridan's command in 1864, to nearly 40,000. At Opequon, Sheridan outnumbered Early 2.6 to 1, and both armies were fully engaged. Together, Opequon and Cedar Creek accounted for nearly 52 percent of the fatalities of the fifteen battles and 43 percent of the combined attrition. Considering that these two battles were fought only a month apart, the toll, in the context of Valley warfare, is staggering.

In the six representative battles of Jackson's 1862 Campaign, the Confederate army inflicted 393 fatalities at a cost of 367 dead (total 760). This ratio is near parity. Looking at attrition, the tally diverges more dramatically. The Union armies suffered about 6,400 casualties compared to Confederate losses of 2,745 (total 9,145). Many of the surplus Union casualties were prisoners taken at First Winchester and Front Royal.

In the six representative battles of the Early-Sheridan 1864 campaign, the Confederate army inflicted 1,587 fatalities at a cost of 776 dead (total 2,363), a two-to-one ratio. Overall, however, the Union armies closed the gap somewhat, suffering about 12,890 casualties compared to Confederate losses of 9,130 (total 22,020), a ratio of about three-to-two. These figures provide a useful comparison of scale between the 1862 and 1864 campaigns.

Numbers engaged, fatalities, and attrition rates are indicators of how intensely a battle was fought. Yet these indicators tend to obscure the strategic significance of some of the smaller conflicts. While it is true that the larger battles achieved significance by sheer firepower and weight of numbers, the significance of a battle is best determined by its campaign context, a context that must be carefully assessed as to its influence on regional and national events. Often it was the battle that was not fought or the conflict cheaply won, that determined the course of

a campaign and the ultimate strategic and political outcome. Thus a battle, such as Front Royal, which was won at little cost to Stonewall Jackson, attains a heightened importance when examined in light of his strategy of flanking the main Union army at Strasburg. Jackson's tactical loss at First Kernstown, for example, achieved strategic success by diverting thousands of Union soldiers as reinforcements to the Valley. Future historians will continue to debate the relative significance of these events.

It will require the greatest watchfulness, the greatest promptness, and the most untiring energy on your part to arrest the progress of the enemy in the present tide of success. I have given you all I can.

—Gen. Robert E. Lee to Lt. Gen. Jubal Early, Autumn 1864

If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah to remain a barren waste.

—Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan, Autumn 1864

Battlefield	Approx. Numbers Engaged CS	Approx. Numbers Engaged US	Total Engaged	Dyer Rank*	Campaign
1. Opequon	15,200	39,236	54,436	B	Sheridan 1864
2. Cedar Creek	15,265	31,944	47,209	B	Sheridan 1864
3. Fisher's Hill	9,500	29,444	38,944	B	Sheridan 1864
4. Second Kernstown	14,000	10,000	24,000	E	Early 1864
5. First Winchester	16,000	6,500	22,500	B	Jackson 1862
6. Second Winchester	12,500	7,000	19,500	E	Gettysburg 1863
7. Cross Keys	5,800	11,500	17,300	B	Jackson 1862
8. Piedmont	5,500	8,500	14,000	E	Lynchburg 1864
9. Cool Spring	8,000	5,000	13,000	E	Early 1864
10. First Kernstown	3,400	8,500	11,900	B	Jackson 1862
11. New Market	4,090	6,275	10,365	E	Lynchburg 1864
12. Tom's Brook	4,000	6,300	10,300	E	Sheridan 1864
13. McDowell	6,000	4,000	10,000	E	Jackson 1862
14. Port Republic	6,000	3,500	9,500	E	Jackson 1862
15. Front Royal	3,000	1,063	4,063	A	Jackson 1862

* B, Battle; E, Engagement; A, Action. Statistics for Jackson's Campaign derived from Allan and Henderson; New Market, Davis; Second Winchester, Grunder and Beck; Cool Spring, Meaney; Piedmont, Brice; Second Kernstown, Lossing; all others, *Official Records, Armies.*

Figure 10. Battles Ranked by Estimated Number of Troops Engaged

Battle	CS Fatalities	US Fatalities	Total Fatalities
1. Cedar Creek	320	644	964
2. Opequon	226	697	923
3. Piedmont	100	150	250
4. Second Kernstown	100	120	220
5. First Kernstown	80	103	183
6. Cross Keys	42	125	167
7. Port Republic	88	67	155
8. New Market	50	96	146
9. Cool Spring	80	65	145
10. Second Winchester	47	95	142
11. First Winchester	68	38	106
12. McDowell	71	28	99
13. Fisher's Hill	30	52	82
14. Front Royal	18	32	50
15. Tom's Brook	20	9	29
Totals	1,340	2,321	3,661

Statistics for Jackson's Campaign derived from Allan and Henderson; New Market, Davis; Second Winchester, Grunder and Beck; Cool Spring, Meaney; Piedmont, Brice; Second Kernstown, Lossing; all others, *Official Records, Armies.*

Figure 11. Battles Ranked by Estimated Number of Fatalities

Battlefield	Combined Attrition	CS Attrition	US Attrition	Numbers Engaged	Percent Attrition
1. Opequon	8,629	3,611	5,018	54,436	16
2. Cedar Creek	8,575	2,910	5,665	47,209	18
3. Second Winchester	4,709	266	4,443	19,500	24
4. First Winchester	3,400	400	3,000	22,500	15
5. Piedmont	2,375	1,500	875	14,000	17
6. Port Republic	1,818	816	1,002	9,500	19
7. Second Kernstown	1,800	600	1,200	24,000	8
8. Fisher's Hill	1,763	1,235	528	38,944	5
9. New Market	1,381	540	841	10,365	13
10. First Kernstown	1,293	725	568	10,000	13
11. Front Royal	960	56	904	4,000	24
12. Cross Keys	951	287	664	17,300	6
13. Cool Spring	819	397	422	13,000	6
14. McDowell	717	461	256	10,000	7
15. Tom's Brook	407	350	57	10,300	4
Totals/Average	39,597	14,154	25,443	N/A	13

Statistics for Jackson's Campaign derived from Allan and Henderson; New Market, Davis; Second Winchester, Grunder and Beck; Cool Spring, Meaney; Piedmont, Brice; Second Kernstown, Lossing; all others, *Official Records, Armies.*

Figure 12. Battles Ranked by Estimated Combined Attrition

Part Three: Battlefields

w Market Battlefield Park by David W. Lowe

1ST KERNSTOWN

tone Wall at First Kernstown by Patrice Gilbert

Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia

Part Three
Shenandoah Valley Battlefields

Part Three addresses each of the battlefields in chronological order, summarizing the battle's statistics, size, and significance. The battle action is described in phases. Important events are linked with features that can be located on the ground. The current condition of the battlefield is assessed in narrative form, and perceived threats to the sites are summarized in detail. Also included for each site is a list of features that were mentioned in battle accounts, including place names, topographical features, standing structures and buildings, ruins, sites of lost features, and archeological sites. The battle phases are keyed roughly to the numbers on the battlefield integrity maps.

FIRST KERNSTOWN (23 March 1862)

County: Frederick, VA and City of Winchester.

General Location: West of US 11 (Valley Pike) and N. of Hoge Run; Rte. 37 (4-lane bypass) bisects the area of heaviest fighting along Sand Ridge.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 4,029/1,554 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 56/71 percent; Fair/Fair

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Fair

USGS Quadrants: Winchester, Stephens City

Campaign: Jackson's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson; *[u]* Col. Nathan Kimball, commanding Brig. Gen. James Shields' division.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Jackson's infantry division of three brigades (Garnett, Burks, and Fulkerson), 27 guns, and a cavalry contingent under Col. Turner Ashby; total strength did not exceed about 3,600-3,800, of which most were engaged; *[u]* One infantry division of three brigades (Kimball, Sullivan, and Tyler), 24 guns, and 16 companies of cavalry under Broadhead; total force between 8,500 and 9,000, three-fourths of which were brought into action.

Casualties: *[c]* 718 (80k/375w/263mc); *[u]* 590 (118k/450w/22mc).

Significance: This battle is considered by many historians as the opening conflict of the famous Valley Campaign of 1862. It was the only battle recorded as "lost" by Stonewall Jackson, but in many ways he gained as much by losing as by winning. After the battle, President Lincoln was disturbed by Jackson's potential threat to Washington and redirected more than 35,000 men to defend approaches from the Valley before the campaign was finished. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's army was deprived of these reinforcements, which he claimed would have enabled him to take Richmond during his Peninsular campaign. Because of this redeployment of Federal troops, First Kernstown is considered one of the decisive engagements of 1862.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Prelude: Acting on faulty intelligence that suggested that his small army outnumbered the Federal forces at Winchester, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson moved to strike his opponents and prevent US reinforcements from leaving the Valley to aid McClellan's army on the Peninsula. The division of Brig. Gen. James Shields in fact outnumbered Jackson more than two-to-one. On the afternoon of 22 March, Ashby's cavalry and horse artillery skirmished with US forces near Kernstown. General Shields was wounded in this affair, his arm broken by a shell fragment, and divisional command devolved to Col. Nathan Kimball.

Phase One. Skirmishing at Kernstown: At dawn Kimball moved against Ashby's advance on the Valley Pike north of Kernstown. Sullivan's and a portion of Kimball's US brigades advanced, straddling the pike, and pushed Ashby south of Hoge's Run, taking possession of Pritchard's Hill. Ashby's troopers formed a new defensive line, which was later supported by infantry and maintained throughout the battle. Jenks' US battery unlimbered on Pritchard's Hill and responded to Ashby's artillery in position near the Opequon Church. About 1100 hours, Jackson's infantry began to concentrate south of Kernstown. It was soon evident to Kimball that Jackson's army was arriving on the field. Kimball consolidated his position and awaited reinforcements.

Phase Two. CS Flank Movement: By 1400 hours, Jackson's infantry was on the field, massed south of Kernstown. Jackson launched a feint toward Kimball's main position along the Pike with a portion of Burks' brigade, but this was to disguise a flanking movement to his left along Sand Ridge. Jackson directed Fulkerson's and Garnett's brigades to the ridge, leaving Burks to support Ashby. Confederate artillery (3 batteries) were positioned on the eastern face of the ridge and engaged US batteries on Pritchard's Hill. Fulkerson advanced on the left, seizing an east-west stone fence on the Glass farm under fire. Garnett came up on Fulkerson's right, extending the CS battle line from Opequon Creek east across the front of the ridge, then bending back south to cover the artillery. A regiment was deployed across the Middle Road to maintain a connection between the CS flanks. Recognizing the threat to his right, Kimball moved Tyler's brigade forward from its reserve position near the toll gate at the intersection of the Valley Pike and Cedar Creek Grade to confront Fulkerson and Garnett. As the artillery duel continued, skirmishers closed and the fighting began to heat up.

Phase Three. US Assault on Sand Ridge: At 1600 hours, Tyler deployed his five regiments (about 3,000 men) and attacked the CS position on Sand Ridge, supported by his batteries on Pritchard's Hill and a small cavalry force on his far right flank. Several attempts to turn the CS left flank were repulsed with heavy casualties. Tyler now focused his attention on the CS center on the crest of the ridge. Recognizing that Ashby's activity on the Valley Pike was a demonstration only, Colonel Kimball marched his brigade and part of Sullivan's (about 3,000) to the right, joining with Tyler to assault the CS center and right on Sand Ridge. Garnett's outnumbered brigade lacked the protection of a stone fence like Fulkerson's and soon began to fall back. Jackson dispatched two regiments to the support of Garnett but before they arrived, Garnett ordered a withdrawal, believing his position untenable. This movement opened Fulkerson's right flank to a heavy fire and he too retired. The retreat soon became badly disorganized. The CS artillery kept US forces in the open ground east of Sand Ridge at bay, firing canister, but no fire could be brought to bear along the wooded ridge itself. The Union advance along the crest forced the guns to retire.

Phase Four. Rear Guard Action: Jackson deployed two regiments (5VA and 42VA) across the ridge to slow the US advance. Several regiment-sized attacks were repulsed, and for a brief time fighting was fierce and hand-to-hand. According to Henderson, colors of the 5th Ohio changed hands six times. A body of US cavalry advanced south along the road (rte. 621), but were checked by Funston's cavalry. Darkness ended the fighting.

Phase Five. CS Retreat: Jackson withdrew along "Stone Lane" past the Magill House and south along the Valley Pike. Ashby remained with the cavalry at Bartonsville, while the infantry went on to Newtown (Stephens City). Jackson slept in the corner of a rail fence near Bartonsville. US forces did not pursue.

Current Condition of the Battlefield

The core area of the battlefield where the major Union attacks occurred is bisected by the four-lane rte. 37-bypass, but the western and eastern portions of the field are in relatively pristine condition. The western portion, scene of the most intense fighting, is the Glass property, site of the 1840s Glass House (in the same family). The property preserves all of the original land contours and remnants of stone fences that figured prominently in the battle. Part of the property is farmed as it was during the Civil War, but the woodland along Sand Ridge is more extensive now than at the time of the battle. To the east is Pritchard's Hill and the Pritchard-Grim property. Pritchard's Hill served as a Union artillery strongpoint during First Kernstown and was the center of fighting for Second Kernstown. This property from rte. 628 to the historic Opequon Church and north of rte. 652 is also in very good condition. The area of skirmishing on the morning of the battle along the Valley Pike (US 11) has been claimed by industrial, commercial, and residential developments and is lost. Little remains of the original hamlet of Kernstown other than Hoge's Ordinary, which has been renovated into office space. The area where the rear guard action was fought on Sand Ridge is occupied by a housing development. The importance of this ground is enhanced by its significance in two major Shenandoah Valley campaigns.

Perception of Threats to Battlefield

Land east of US 11 along the railroad tracks has been developed for a large-scale industrial/business park. Route 11 is zoned commercial/industrial and has been densely developed from south of Kernstown to the Winchester city limits, causing concern over potential development plans west of US 11. A county planning official noted, however, that watershed and ground water considerations make development in the Pritchard's Hill and Sand Ridge areas less desirable. These factors would need to be considered before any development plans would be approved. Residential development is encroaching on the northern part of Pritchard's Hill. For the present, a large portion of this land remains in private ownership and has been altered little since the Civil War. The Glass property has been placed in the Glen Burnie Trust and Pritchard-Grim farm and adjacent portions of Pritchard's Hill are owned by the Charles Hardy Grim Estate.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

Bartonsville Mill
Cedar Creek Grade
Front Royal Road
Glass House
Hoge's Ordinary
Hoge's Run
Kernstown
Magill House*
Middle Road
Old Town Winchester
Opequon Church and Cemetery
Pritchard House
Pritchard's Hill
Sand Ridge
Springdale
Stone Lane
Stone Walls
Toll Gate (site of)
Valley Pike

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	1,782.85	44.25	454.48	29.25
Agricultural Land	2,091.88	51.92	965.69	62.15
Forest Land	154.31	3.83	133.63	8.60
Total	4,029.04	100.00	1,553.80	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	2,245.39	55.73	1,097.29	70.62
Lost Integrity	1,783.66	44.27	61.39	29.38
Level of Integrity	Fair		Fair	

TABLE 1

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
FIRST KERNSTOWN BATTLEFIELD

McDowell

i w from Sitlington Hill by David W. Lowe

McDOWELL (8 May 1862)

County: Highland, VA

General Location: Rte. 250 east of McDowell, between Bull Pasture River and Sitlington's Hill.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 4,539/2,258 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 100/100 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Good

USGS Quadrants: McDowell, Monterey SE, West Augusta

Campaign: Jackson's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson, Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson;
[u] Brig. Gen. R.C. Schenck, Brig. Gen. R. Milroy.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Johnson's brigade (six regts.) and Taliaferro's (3 regts.), about 6,000 engaged. *[u]* Two brigades (Milroy and Schenck), about 6,500. Milroy attacked Sitlington's Hill with 2,250.

Casualties: *[c]* about 500 k/w/m (12GA suffered about 175 k/w/m); *[u]* about 260 k/w/m.

Significance: Some historians consider the battle of McDowell the beginning of "Stonewall" Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign, while others prefer to include First Kernstown, Stonewall's only defeat. The battle of McDowell is studied today by military historians for several reasons. At the tactical level, it can be argued that the US forces achieved a draw. Milroy's "spoiling attack" surprised Jackson, seized the initiative, and inflicted heavier casualties, but did not drive the Confederates from their position. Historians derive lessons about use of terrain, small unit tactics and leadership, and overexuberance under fire (12th Georgia). At the strategic level, the battle of McDowell and the resultant withdrawal of the US army was an important victory for the South. The battle demonstrated Jackson's strategy of concentrating his forces against a numerically inferior foe, while denying his enemies the chance to concentrate against him. Jackson rode the momentum of his strategic win at McDowell to victory at Front Royal (23 May) and First Winchester (25 May).

Description of the Battle

Phase One. CS Advance on Parkersburg Turnpike (7 May): Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's columns departed West View and Staunton on the morning of 7 May, marching west along the Parkersburg turnpike. Elements of Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson's brigade composed the vanguard. At mid-afternoon, Union pickets were encountered at Rodgers' tollgate, where the pike crosses Ramsey's Draft. The Union force, which consisted of portions of three regiments (3WV, 32OH, 75OH) under overall command of Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy, withdrew hastily, abandoning their baggage at the tollgate and retreating to the crest of Shenandoah Mountain.

At Rodgers', Johnson and Jackson conferred. The Confederate force split into two columns to envelope the US holding position on Shenandoah Mountain. Milroy ordered his force to withdraw and concentrate at McDowell, where he hoped to receive reinforcements. Milroy also positioned a section of artillery on Shaw's Ridge to impede Johnson's descent from the crest of Shenandoah Mountain. These guns were soon withdrawn with their supports to McDowell. By dusk, Johnson's advance regiments reached Shaw's Fork where they encamped. Because of the narrow roads and few camp sites, Jackson's army was stretched 8-10 miles back along the pike with its rear guard at Dry Branch Gap. Jackson established his headquarters at Rodgers' tollgate. During the night, Milroy withdrew behind the Bullpasture River to McDowell, establishing headquarters in the Hull House.

Phase Two. CS Advance to Sitlington's Hill (8 May): Starting at dawn of 8 May, the Confederate advance crossed Shaw's Ridge, descended to the Cowpasture River at Wilson's House, and ascended Bullpasture Mountain. The advance was unopposed. Reaching the crest of the ridge, Jackson and Jedediah Hotchkiss conducted a reconnaissance of the Union position at McDowell from a rocky spur right of the road. Johnson continued with the advance to the base of Sitlington's Hill. Expecting a roadblock ahead, he diverged from the road into a steep

narrow ravine that leads to the top of the hill. After driving away Union skirmishers, Johnson deployed his infantry along the long, sinuous crest of the hill. Jackson asked his staff to find a way to place artillery on the hill and to search for a way to flank the Union position to the north.

Phase Three. Deployment of US Forces: About 1000 hours, Brig. Gen. Robert Schenck arrived after a forced march from Franklin. Being senior to Milroy, Schenck assumed overall command of the Union force at McDowell with headquarters at the Hull House. He deployed his artillery, consisting of 18 guns on Cemetery Hill and near the McDowell Presbyterian Church to defend the bridge over the Bullpasture River. He deployed his infantry in line from McDowell south along the river for about 800 yards. He placed one regiment (2WV) on Hull's Hill, west of the river and overlooking the pike. Three companies of cavalry covered the left flank on the road to the north of the village.

Phase Four. US Attack on Sitlington's Hill: Schenck and Milroy sent out skirmishers to contest the base of Sitlington's Hill along the river. As CS forces on the crest of the hill increased in numbers, Schenck and Milroy conferred. Union scouts reported that the Confederates were attempting to bring artillery to the crest of the hill which would make the US position on the bottomland at McDowell untenable. In absence of an aggressive CS advance, Schenck and Milroy attempted a spoiling attack. Milroy advanced his brigade (25OH, 32OH, 75OH, 3WV) and the 82nd Ohio of Schenck's brigade, about 2,300 men. About 1500 hours Milroy personally led the attacking force, which crossed the bridge and proceeded up the ravines that cut the western slope of the hill.

In the meantime, Jackson had been content to hold the crest of the hill while searching for a route for a flanking movement to the north. He declined to send artillery up the hill because of the difficulty of withdrawing the pieces in the face of an attack. Union artillerymen on Cemetery Hill elevated their pieces by digging deep trenches in the ground for the gun trails and began firing at the Confederates in support of the advancing infantry. Schenck also had a six-pounder hauled by hand to the crest of Hull's Hill to fire on the CS right flank above the turnpike (some accounts say a section of guns, another says a whole battery). The Union line advanced resolutely up the steep slopes and closed on the Confederate position. The conflict became "fierce and sanguinary."

The 3rd West Virginia advanced along the turnpike in an attempt to turn the CS right. Jackson reinforced his right on the hill with two regiments and covered the turnpike with the 21st Virginia. The 12th Georgia at the center and slightly in advance of the main CS line on the hill crest bore the brunt of the Union attack and suffered heavy casualties. The fighting continued for four hours as the Union attackers attempted to pierce the center of the CS line and then to envelope its left flank. Nine CS regiments were engaged, opposing five US regiments in the fight for Sitlington's Hill. At dusk the Union attackers withdrew to McDowell.

Phase Five. Union Withdrawal (9 May): At dark US forces withdrew from Sitlington's Hill and recrossed to McDowell, carrying their wounded from the field. About 0200 hours of 9 May, Schenck and Milroy ordered a general retreat along the turnpike toward Franklin. The 73rd Ohio held their skirmish line along the river until near dawn when they withdrew and acted as rear guard for the retreating column. Ten men of the regiment were inadvertently left behind and captured. Shortly after the Federals retired, the Confederates entered McDowell. Schenck established a holding position on 9 May (north of modern intersection of rte. 629 and US 220) but only minor skirmishing resulted. For nearly a week, Jackson pursued the retreating Union army almost to Franklin before commencing a return march to the Valley on 15 May.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The battlefield of McDowell retains the highest integrity of all of the Shenandoah Valley battlefields surveyed; this is due to its location and the rugged nature of the ground, which precludes almost any land use other than agriculture or woodland. Highland County retains a low population density (fewer residents now than at the time of the battle) and a distinct rural character. In general, the landscape consists of narrow river valleys which are farmed and high ridge lines which are mostly forested with interspersed pastureland. The line of Jackson's advance along rte. 250 passes through the George Washington National Forest, which ends at the Cowpasture River. The core of the battlefield on Sitlington's Hill is owned and preserved by the Association

for the Preservation of Civil War Sites (APCWS) and the Lee-Jackson Foundation. Together the two groups own more than 200 acres bounded by rte. 250 on the east and north, including the ravine used by CS troops to reach the summit and main areas of attack and defense. A single individual owns the remaining portions of Sitlington's Hill. A hiking trail on APCWS property leads to the crest of Sitlington's Hill, providing unmarked access for visitors.

The village of McDowell retains much character, including many historic structures: a renovated mill next to the bridge, Presbyterian Church (used as a field hospital by both sides), and the Hull House (Federal headquarters). The general store and other structures appear to date from about 1900. Hull's Hill north of rte. 250 is privately owned; its crest is maintained as pastureland as at the time of the battle, while its slopes and base are heavily wooded.

Perception of Threats to Battlefield

The general perception is that the battlefield of McDowell was substantially preserved by the recent APCWS acquisition of about 100 acres on Sitlington's Hill. The county's economy is sluggish, compared with that of the Shenandoah Valley proper, and little development of any kind is present. The county prides itself on its annual Highland Maple Festival, which attracts thousands of visitors every spring. Local residents are content that "their battlefield" is in one piece, and many expressed the desire that more tourists could be attracted to McDowell to visit it. The Hull House is currently occupied seasonally and the structure appears in good condition.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield

Bullpasture River
Cedar Knob
Cemetery Hill
Crab Run
Fort Johnson
Hull House
Hull's Hill
Mill Site
Old Town McDowell
Parkersburg Road
Presbyterian Church
Rodger's Tollgate (site of)
Shaws Ridge
Shenandoah Mountain
Sitlington Hill
UDC Battle Monument
Warm Springs Road
Wilson House (site of)

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	163.40	3.60	164.85	7.30
Agricultural Land	1,116.59	24.60	494.53	21.90
Forest Land	3,258.99	71.80	1,598.77	70.80
Total	4,538.98	100.00	2,258.15	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	4,538.98	100.00	2,258.15	100.00
Lost Integrity	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Level of Integrity	Good		Good	

TABLE 2

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
McDOWELL BATTLEFIELD

Front Royal

Guard Hill by David W. Lowe

FRONT ROYAL (23 MAY 1862)

County: Warren, VA

General Location: Along US 340/522 from Limeton through Front Royal, Guard Hill, and Cedarville. Old Buckton Depot.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 3,082/944 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 48/33 percent; Poor/Poor

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Poor

USGS Quadrants: Bentonville, Front Royal, Strasburg

Campaign: Jackson's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson; *[u]* Col. J. R. Kenly.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Jackson's and Ewell's divisions and three regiments of cavalry, about 16,500, 48 guns; only about 3,000 were actively engaged at Front Royal; *[u]* Reinforced regiment under Col. J. R. Kenly, about 1,063 and two guns.

Casualties: *[c]* 50 k/w/m; *[u]* 904 (32k/122w/750 captured).

Significance: Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson's decisive victory over a small Union force at Front Royal on 23 May 1862, forced the main Union Army at Strasburg under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks into abrupt retreat. Jackson deceived Banks into believing that the CS army was in the main Valley near Harrisonburg; instead he had marched swiftly north to New Market and crossed Massanutten via New Market Gap to Luray. The advance to Front Royal placed Jackson in position to move directly on Winchester in the rear of the Union army. On 24 May, Banks retreated down the Valley Pike to Winchester, harassed by CS cavalry and artillery at Middletown and Newtown (Stephens City), setting the stage for the battle of First Winchester the following day.

The action at Front Royal demonstrated Jackson's use of Valley topography and mobility to unite his own forces while dividing those of his enemies. At a minimal cost, he forced the withdrawal of a large Union army by striking at its flank and threatening its rear. The confusion engendered by Jackson's appearance at Front Royal and the hasty Union retreat from Strasburg to Winchester contributed materially to the defeat of Banks' army at First Winchester on 25 May. Jackson used his cavalry to good advantage at Front Royal, to sever US communications east and west, and to strike the final blow at Cedarville.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Prelude: On 21 May 1862, the US army under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, numbering about 9,000 men, was concentrated in the vicinity of Strasburg with two companies of infantry at Buckton Depot. Col. J. R. Kenly commanded 1,063 men and two guns at Front Royal. CS cavalry under Col. Turner Ashby confronted Banks near Strasburg, but then withdrew to join the main army which crossed Massanutten Mountain via New Market Gap to reach Luray.

On 22 May, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's Army of the Valley (about 16,500 men) advanced along the muddy Luray Road to within ten miles of Front Royal. Jackson's headquarters were at Cedar Point. Colonel Thomas Munford's cavalry regiment was sent east to close off Manassas Gap and cut communication between Front Royal and Washington.

Phase One. CS Advance: On the morning of 23 May, the vanguard of Jackson's army reached Spangler's crossroads (present day Limeton). Here the CS cavalry under colonels Ashby and Flournoy diverged west to cross the South Fork Shenandoah at McCoy's Ford. The infantry continued to Asbury Chapel and right onto a cross road to reach Gooney Manor Road. Following this road, they approached Front Royal from the south, bypassing Federal pickets stationed near the river on the Luray Road one mile south of the courthouse. After minor skirmishing the Federals withdrew.

Phase Two. Deployment of Forces: Jackson's leading brigade, Taylor's, deployed on Prospect Hill and along the ridge to the east. The 1st Maryland and Wheat's Louisiana battalion were thrown out in advance, entering the town

and clearing it of US skirmishers. Col. J. R. Kenly, in command of US forces, withdrew his force to Camp (Richards') Hill, supported by a section of artillery. The US line extended in an arc from the South Fork to Happy Creek, defending the South Fork bridge. Kenly's artillery opened fire and slowed the CS advance. Kenly's headquarters were in the Vanoort House.

Phase Three. US Defense of Camp Hill: The Confederate infantry advanced through town, deploying into line of battle under an accurate artillery fire. A CS flanking column moved to the east, crossing Happy Creek in an attempt to force US withdrawal without a frontal assault. After a long delay because of the muddy roads, a battery of rifled artillery was deployed on or near Prospect Hill to counter the Union guns on Camp Hill.

Phase Four. Skirmish at Buckton Depot: In the meantime, after crossing the South Fork at McCoy's Ford, Ashby's and Lt. Col. Flournoy's (6VA) cavalry rode via Bell's Mill and Waterlick Station to reach the US outpost at Buckton Depot. Ashby made a mounted assault, which cost him several of his best officers before the US defenders surrendered. Ashby cut the telegraph lines, severing communication between the main US army at Strasburg and the detached force at Front Royal. He then divided the cavalry, sending Flournoy's regiment east toward Riverton to threaten Kenly's rear. Ashby remained at Buckton Depot astride the railroad to prevent reinforcements from being sent to Front Royal.

Phase Five. US Retreat: On discovering that Confederate cavalry was approaching from the west, Col. Kenly abandoned his position on Camp Hill, retreated across the South and North Fork bridges, and attempted to burn them. He positioned part of his command at Guard Hill, while the Confederates ran forward to douse the flames, saving the bridges. While CS infantry repaired the bridges for a crossing, Flournoy's cavalry arrived at Riverton and forded the river, pressing Kenly's forces closely. As soon as the CS infantry crossed, the US position could be flanked by a column moving along the river. Kenly chose to continue his withdrawal, his outmatched cavalry fighting a rear guard action against Flournoy's 6th Virginia Cavalry.

Phase Six. US Surrender: Kenly withdrew along the Winchester turnpike beyond Cedarville with Flournoy's cavalry in close pursuit. General Jackson rode ahead with the cavalry, as CS infantry began to cross the rivers. At the Thomas McKay House, one mile north of Cedarville, Kenly turned to make a stand, deploying on the heights on both sides of the pike. Flournoy's cavalry swept around the US flanks, causing panic. Kenly fell wounded, and the US defense collapsed. More than 700 US soldiers threw down their weapons and surrendered.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Many terrain features associated with this battle have been overwhelmed by the growth of the City of Front Royal. At the time of the battle, Front Royal was a small village of several streets clustered around the courthouse. Troops maneuvered among the buildings and on open ground, south, east, and north of the village, areas which have now been urbanized. Loss of integrity is most obvious when attempting to understand maneuvers in and around Camp (Richardson's) Hill. It is difficult to find a vantage point to understand the terrain advantage of the US position there. Camp Hill itself, site of Kenly's defense, is densely residential (Warren Park subdivision). Open ground east of Camp Hill and Happy Creek would enable some understanding of CS flanking maneuvers although access is restricted.

The massive reshaping of Guard Hill, due to road-widening and quarrying, and heavy construction north to I-66 is an obvious loss. The current "gap" in Guard Hill for US 340/522 is largely a modern cut. Large industrial structures, including the DuPont Automotive plant, have been constructed in the vicinity of Cedarville on ground maneuvered over in the closing phase of the battle.

In spite of these losses, several features, primarily architectural, remain by which the flow of the battle may be interpreted. The hamlet of Spangler's Crossroads (Limeton) and the road to McCoy's Ford enable an understanding of CS cavalry movements, preparatory to the battle. The roads from McCoy's Ford to Buckton Depot taken by the CS cavalry pass through a scenic rural countryside. The site of Buckton Depot (and a depot building, vintage uncertain), the site of Ashby's skirmish, can be located. Asbury Chapel marks where the CS infantry diverged from Luray Road to reach Gooney Manor Road. Gooney Manor Road passes through a scenic landscape until near the entrance to Skyline Drive at Front Royal, where there is dense development.

In the town of Front Royal, Prospect Hill Cemetery maintains open ground where the CS left flank first

deployed and where artillery was positioned. The cemetery offers a good vantage point for understanding the terrain and tactical movements. Monuments to Mosby's men and to the Warren Rifles are in Prospect Hill Cemetery. In a general sense, the Front Royal old town can be considered a supporting resource, although the district is not listed in the National Register. The Warren Rifles museum interprets the role of Warren County residents in the Civil War. A historic marker and a Confederate monument stand in front of the courthouse. The estate of Rose Hill, a beautiful old home, is specifically mentioned in several battle accounts.

The South and North Fork bridge sites can be located. Riverside Farm (c. 1850) at Riverton preserves about 150 acres of open farmland and a segment of the original alignment of the Front Royal-Winchester turnpike. (Stonewall Jackson is said to have slept on the porch here on the night after the battle.) The hamlet of Riverton dates primarily from the 1880s. The old Guard House stands on the hill to the west of the new road cut. The Robert and Jacob McKay houses (late 1700s) and the old store (c. 1860) at Cedarville provide some sense of historic character in spite of encroaching residential development. The Thomas McKay House where US forces surrendered stands one mile north of Cedarville (currently an antique store). A large industrial building adjacent to the house degrades the setting.

Perception of Threats to Battlefield

In terms of terrain, battlefield ground within the city limits of Front Royal has been lost. The Riverton Corporation controls access to Guard Hill along the river. Heavy quarrying is occurring on the northern and eastern slopes of the hill and on land adjacent to the river. Highway widening has increased the size of the Guard Hill gap and is reshaping the ground. Plans being discussed to build a second span over the North Fork would further degrade this area of low integrity. Riverside Farm is the last area of open farmland at Riverton. The flood plain of the North Fork is currently agricultural land. An I-66 interchange has spurred commercial and industrial development north of Guard Hill on the road to Cedarville. The area north of Cedarville and east of US 340 is an expanding industrial park, currently encroaching on the US surrender area. Adjacent to this industrial park is an "Inland Port" complex centered on a railroad terminal.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

Asbury Chapel
Bell's Mill (site of)
Belle Boyd House
Buckton Depot (site of)
Carson's Ford
Cedarville
Cedarville Baptist Church
Cedarville Store
County Courthouse
Crooked Run
Gooney Manor Road
Guard Hill
Guard House
Happy Creek
Jacob McKay House
Limeton (Spangler's Crossroads)
Manassas Gap Railroad
McCoy's Ford
Mrs. King House (site of*)
North Fork Bridge Site
Old Luray Road
Old Town Front Royal
Old Winchester Pike
Prospect Hill Cemetery
Richardson's (Camp) Hill
Riverside Farm
Robert McKay House
Rose Hill
South Fork Bridge Site
Thomas McKay House
Vanoort House (site of)
Waterlick Station (site of)

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	1,492.35	51.51	626.64	66.36
Agricultural Land	772.91	24.54	217.09	22.99
Forest Land	577.95	18.35	83.38	8.83
Water: Streams and Canals	164.41	5.22	15.20	1.61
Barren Land: Strip Mines, Quarries, Gravel Pits	11.97	0.38	1.98	0.21
Total	3,149.59	100.00	944.29	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	1,515.59	48.12	315.68	33.43
Lost Integrity	1,634.02	51.88	628.62	66.57
Level of Integrity	Poor		Poor	

TABLE 3

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
FRONT ROYAL BATTLEFIELD

1ST WINCHESTER

First Winchester by David W. Lowe

FIRST WINCHESTER (25 May 1862)

County: Frederick, VA and City of Winchester

General Location: US forces held heights S of town, including Bower's and Camp Hill; CS forces advanced N along US 11 and along rte. 522.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 4,041/1,393 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 28/22 percent; Poor/Lost

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Lost

USGS Quadrants: Winchester

Campaign: Jackson's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson; *[u]* Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Jackson's division of three brigades (Winder, Campbell, Taliaferro) and Ewell's division of four brigades (Taylor, Trimble, Elzey, Scott), three regiments of cavalry, and 11 batteries (48 guns), about 16,000; *[u]* Banks's command of two brigades of infantry (Donelly, Gordon), two regiments of mixed cavalry, and three batteries (16 guns), about 6,500.

Casualties: *[c]* 400 (68k/329w/3m); *[u]* 2,019 (62k/243w/1,714m&c).

Significance: First Winchester was a major victory in General Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign. On the tactical level, the battle displays considerable finesse, particularly on the part of Ewell's division on the Front Royal Pike. Brig. Gen. Taylor's attack on Bower's Hill is considered a model brigade maneuver by military historians. The ultimate significance of Jackson's victory at Winchester was its strategic impact. Union plans for a convergence on Richmond were disrupted by Jackson's audacity, and thousands of Union reinforcements were diverted to the Valley and the defense of Washington.

Description of the Battle

Prelude: May 24, 1862, was a disastrous day for Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks. Learning that the Confederates had taken Front Royal and were closing on Winchester, Banks ordered a hasty retreat down the Valley Pike from Strasburg. His columns were attacked at Middletown and again at Newtown (Stephens City) by the converging forces of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. The Confederates took many US prisoners and captured so many wagons and stores that they later nicknamed the Union general "Commissary Banks." Jackson pressed the pursuit for most of the night and allowed his exhausted soldiers but a few hours sleep before dawn.

Phase One. US Deployment at Winchester: Banks now deployed at Winchester to slow the CS pursuit. He had two brigades of infantry under Donelly and Gordon, a mixed brigade of cavalry under Hatch, and 16 guns. Gordon's brigade was placed on the US right on Bower's Hill with its left flank at the Valley Pike, supported by a battery of artillery. The center of the line (Camp Hill) was held by the cavalry supported by two guns. Donelly's brigade was placed in a crescent on the left to cover the Front Royal and Millwood roads with the rest of the artillery. At earliest light the CS skirmish line advanced in force driving the US pickets back to their main line of battle.

Phase Two. CS Advance on Front Royal Pike: During the night, the advance of Maj. Gen. Richard Ewell's division (four brigades) reached Buffalo Lick. At dawn, he deployed his brigades astride the Front Royal Pike and advanced against the Union left flank. His leading regiments (in particular the 21st North Carolina) came under heavy fire from US forces deployed behind stone fences and were repulsed. CS forces regrouped and brought up artillery. After about an hour, they again advanced, this time sending regiments to either side of the high ground to enfilade the Union position. Donelly (US) withdrew his brigade to a position closer to town with his right flank anchored on Camp Hill. Trimble's brigade (CS) then attempted a flanking movement to the right beyond the Millwood Road. This movement threatened the US left and rear. This movement, in conjunction with Confederate maneuvers on the left beyond the Valley Pike, caused the Union line to collapse in this sector.

Phase Three. CS Advance on Valley Pike: In conjunction with Ewell's advance on the Front Royal Pike, Jackson advanced the Stonewall Brigade on the Valley Pike at early dawn in a heavy fog. At Jackson's command, the brigade swept over a hill to the left of the pike, driving off the US skirmishers who held it. Jackson quickly placed a section of artillery on the hill to engage US artillery on Bower's Hill at a range of less than half a mile. Union sharpshooters along Abrams Creek began picking off the cannoneers. In response, Banks moved his artillery farther to the right to enfilade the CS artillery and heavily reinforced his right flank with infantry. Jackson brought up the rest of his artillery and a duel ensued with the Union guns on Bower's Hill. It now appeared that the Union forces were preparing to turn the Confederate left.

To counter this threat, Jackson deployed Taylor's Louisiana brigade, reinforced by two regiments of Taliaferro's, to the left along Abrams Creek. Taylor marched under fire to a position overlapping the Union right and then attacked Bower's Hill. The Confederate assault swept irresistibly forward over the crest in the face of determined resistance. The Union right flank collapsed, even as the left flank was being pressured by Ewell. Union soldiers began streaming back into town.

Phase Four. US Retreat: With the collapse of both flanks, Union forces retreated through the streets of Winchester and north on the Valley Pike. Confederate pursuit was lethargic, as the troops were exhausted from the non-stop marching of the previous week. Nevertheless, many Union prisoners fell into Confederate hands. Ashby's cavalry was disorganized from the actions of 24 May and did not pursue until Banks had already reached the Potomac River.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The battlefield of First Winchester has been lost as a coherent landscape to the growth of the city of Winchester. Most of the core area has been developed for residences on Bower's Hill, along US 11, and around the intersection of I-81 and rte. 50. US Artillery positions have been built upon and vantage points lost. According to a county planning official 1,600 new residences have been approved for construction at the base of Bower's Hill along Abrams Creek. Access to Battery Hill (Hill 819) north of Cedar Creek Grade, west of US 11 and south of railroad tracks, would offer an interesting vantage point, although access is restricted. This site overlooks the field over which Taylor's Louisiana brigade marched to assault Bower's Hill, just south of the water tower. This same ground was fought over during the first day's fighting at Second Winchester when this hill served as a CS artillery position.

Willow Lawn, circa 1765, is set back from the road behind an industrial building, west of US 11 and north of the railroad. Parkins Mill on US 11 at Abrams Creek (burned in 1864 and rebuilt after the war). All historic structures are surrounded by modern buildings. The Winchester Historic District protects many buildings of Civil War vintage and offers a focal point for visitors. Beck and Grunder's "Three Battles of Winchester" provides a driving tour of the battlefield with stops at Camp Hill, Milltown, Williamsburg Heights, and Bower's Hill.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO BATTLEFIELD

The core area of the First Winchester battlefield has largely been lost and, according to a county planning official, 1600 additional houses are planned for this area in the immediate future. This will eliminate the remaining core area of First Winchester and decrease the size of the remaining core area of Second Winchester.

IDENTIFIED SITES AND FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BATTLEFIELD (UNSURVEYED*)

Abram's Creek
Abram's Delight
Battery Hill
Bower's Hill
Camp Hill
Cedar Creek Grade
Jonathan Smith House
Keckley Mills
Middle Road
Milltown
Old Town Winchester
Parkin's Mill
Pritchard's Hill
Tollgate (site of)
Valley Pike
Willow Lawn*

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	3,127.7	38.09	677.41	48.56
Agricultural Land	797.38	19.73	264.11	18.96
Forest Land	116.39	0.05	48.06	0.00
Total	4,041.47	100.00	1,392.98	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	1,1,34.44	28.07	312.16	22.41
Lost Integrity	2,907.04	71.93	1,080.81	77.59
Level of Integrity	Poor		Lost	

TABLE 4

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
FIRST WINCHESTER BATTLEFIELD

Cross Keys

Cross Keys by David W. Lowe

CROSS KEYS (8 JUNE 1862)

County: Rockingham, VA

General Location: South of rtes. 659 and 276, crossroads of Cross Keys, including the village of Port Republic.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 5,450/2,153 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 94/94 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Good

USGS Quadrant(s): Harrisonburg, Grottoes

Campaign: Jackson's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, Brig. Gen. Richard Ewell, Brig. Gen. Isaac Trimble; *[u]* Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Three of four brigades of Ewell's division (Trimble, Elzey, Steuart) and Patton's brigade, about 8,500 engaged; *[u]* Blenker's infantry division (three brigades), three attached brigades (Cluseret, Milroy, Schenck), Bayard's cavalry, and nine batteries, about 11,500 men.

Total Casualties: *[c]* 287 (42k/230w/15m); *[u]* 664 (114k/443w/127m).

Significance: The battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic were the decisive victories of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign. At Cross Keys, one of Jackson's divisions beat back the army of Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont approaching from Harrisonburg, while elements of a second division held back the vanguard of Brig. Gen. James Shields' division advancing toward Port Republic on the Luray Road. During the night of 8-9 June, Jackson withdrew from in front of Frémont and at dawn attacked two of Shields's four brigades (commanded by Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler), precipitating the battle of Port Republic. Frémont reached the vicinity too late to aid Tyler, who was badly beaten. With the retreat of both US armies, Jackson was freed to join the CS army commanded by General Robert E. Lee in the Seven Days' Battles against McClellan's army before Richmond.

In addition to its importance in Jackson's overall strategy of defeating two separated armies in detail, Cross Keys provides interesting lessons at the tactical level. By deft maneuver and clever use of the terrain, Confederate Brig. Gen. Isaac Trimble shattered a larger US force and stalled Frémont's attack. The ground where this tactical action occurred is pristine and enables understanding of this phase of the conflict.

Description of the Battle

Prelude: The hamlet of Port Republic lies on a neck of land between the North and South rivers at the point where they conjoin. On 6-7 June 1862, the army of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, numbering about 16,000, bivouacked north of Port Republic, Ewell's division along the banks of Mill Creek near Goods Mill, and Winder's division on the north bank of North River near the bridge. One regiment (15AL) was left to block the roads at Union Church. Jackson's headquarters were in Madison Hall, the home of Dr. Kemper, at Port Republic. The army trains were parked nearby.

Two US columns converged on Jackson's position. The army of Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, about 15,000 strong, moved south on the Valley Pike and reached the vicinity of Harrisonburg on 6 June. The division of General Shields, about 10,000 strong, advanced south from Front Royal in the Luray (Page) Valley, but was badly strung out because of the muddy Luray Road. At Port Republic, Jackson possessed the last intact bridge on the North River and the fords on the South River by which Frémont and Shields could unite. Jackson determined to check Frémont's advance at Mill Creek, while meeting Shields on the east bank of the North Fork. A CS signal station on Massanutten monitored US progress.

Phase One. Skirmishing at Cross Keys Tavern: Late in the day on 7 June, Frémont's advance guard encountered Jackson's pickets near Cross Keys Tavern. A few shots were fired and the US cavalry fell back onto their main body, which was approaching. Darkness prevented further developments.

Phase Two. Surprise Raid on Port Republic: Colonel Samuel Carroll at the head of a regiment of cavalry,

supported by a battery and a brigade of infantry, was sent ahead by Shields to secure the North River Bridge at Port Republic. Shortly after dawn (8 June), Carroll scattered the CS pickets, forded the South River, and dashed into Port Republic. Jackson and his staff raced down the main street from headquarters and across the bridge, narrowly eluding capture (two members of his staff were captured). Carroll deployed one gun aimed at the bridge and brought up another. Jackson directed the defense, ordering Poague's battery to unlimber on the north bank. Carrington brought up a gun from the vicinity of Madison Hall to rake the Main St. The 37VA Infantry charged across the bridge to drive the US cavalry out of the town. Carroll retreated in confusion, losing his two guns, before his infantry could come within range. Three CS batteries unlimbered on the bluffs east of Port Republic on the north bank of the South Fork and fired on the retreating Federals. Carroll retired several miles north on the Luray Road. Jackson stationed Taliaferro's brigade in Port Republic and positioned the Stonewall Brigade near Bogota with the artillery to prevent any further surprises.

Phase Three. US Deployment: Meanwhile, Frémont, with Cluseret's brigade in the lead, renewed his advance from the vicinity of Harrisonburg. After driving away the CS skirmishers, Cluseret reached and deployed his right flank along the Keezletown Road near Union Church. One by one, the US brigades came into line: Schenck on Cluseret's right, Milroy on his left, and Stahel on the far left, his left flank near Congers Creek. Bohlen's and Koltes' brigades were held in reserve near the center of the line. A regiment of US cavalry moved south on the road to secure the right flank. Batteries were brought to the front.

Phase Four. CS Deployment: Gen. Richard Ewell deployed his infantry division (CS) behind Mill Creek, Trimble's brigade on the right across the Port Republic Road, Elzey's in the center along the high bluffs. Ewell concentrated his artillery (4 batteries) at the center of the line. As US troops deployed along Keezletown Road, Trimble advanced his brigade a quarter of a mile to Victory Hill and deployed Courtenay's (Latimer's) battery on a hill to his left supported by the 21NC Regiment. The 15AL, which had been skirmishing near Union Church, rejoined the brigade. Trimble held his regiments out of sight behind the crest of the hill.

Phase Five. US Attack and Repulse: Frémont determined to advance his battle line with the evident intention of developing the CS position, assumed to be behind Mill Creek. This maneuver required an elaborate right wheel. Stahel's brigade on the far left had the farthest distance to cover and advanced first. Milroy moved forward on Stahel's right and rear. US batteries were advanced with infantry lines south of Keezletown Road and engaged CS batteries. Stahel appeared oblivious to Trimble's advanced position. His battle line passed down into the valley, crossed the run, and began climbing Victory Hill. At a distance of "sixty paces," Trimble's infantry stood up and delivered a devastating volley. Stahel's brigade recoiled in confusion with heavy casualties. The Union brigade regrouped on the height opposite Victory Hill but made no effort to renew their assault.

Phase Six. Trimble's Flanking Attacks: Stahel did not renew his attack but brought up a battery (Buell's) to support his position. Trimble moved the 15AL by the right flank and up a ravine to get on the battery's left. In the meantime, Ewell sent two regiments (13VA and 25VA) along the ridge to Trimble's right, attracting a severe fire from the US battery. With a shout, the 15AL emerged from their ravine and began to climb the hill toward the battery, precipitating a melé. Trimble advanced his other two regiments (16MS on left and 21GA on right) from their position on Victory Hill, forcing back the US line. The US battery limbered hastily and withdrew, saving its guns. A US regiment counter-attacked briefly striking the left flank of the 16MS but was forced back in desperate fighting.

Phase Seven. US Withdrawal to Keezletown Road: Trimble continued advancing up the ravine on the CS right, outflanking successive US positions. In the meantime, Milroy advanced on Stahel's right supported by artillery. Milroy's line came within rifle-musket range of the CS center behind Mill Creek and opened fire. US batteries continued to engage CS batteries in an artillery duel. Bohlen advanced on the far US left to stiffen Stahel's crumbling defense. Milroy's left flank was endangered by Stahel's retreat, and Frémont ordered him to withdraw. Jackson brought Taylor's brigade forward to support Ewell if needed, but Taylor remained in reserve on the Port Republic Road near the Dunker Church.

Phase Eight. US Attacks on the Right: Seemingly paralyzed by the decimation of Stahel's brigade on his left, Frémont was unable to mount a coordinated attack. He ordered Schenck's brigade forward to find the CS left flank south of Union Church. Ewell reinforced his left with elements of Elzey's brigade. Severe firing erupted along the line but quickly died down. CS brigadiers Elzey and Steuart were wounded in this exchange. Frémont withdrew his force to Keezletown Road, placing his artillery on the heights to his rear (Oak Ridge). Artillery firing continued. At dusk, Trimble pushed his battle line forward to within a quarter mile of the US position, anticipating a night assault. CS accounts describe the US soldiers going into camp, lighting fires and making coffee. Ewell ordered Trimble to withdraw without making the attack.

Current Condition of the Battlefield

The battlefield of Cross Keys is largely intact, and the landscape retains a marked similarity to its Civil War-era appearance. Land use is primarily agricultural with some residential housing along the main roads. New houses on large lots have been built along the CS defensive line behind Mill (Black Anchor) Creek. Several historic structures in the vicinity remain: the Union Church (Ruritan Hall) and cemetery, an antebellum house adjacent to the cemetery, and the old Cross Keys Tavern behind the farm bureau co-op, an old house across from the farm bureau, and the Widow Haugh House adjacent to Lee-Jackson parcel. The Widow Haugh House resident points out repaired damage to the roof and interior walls of the house caused by a US solid shot.

The Lee-Jackson Foundation owns 100 acres on Victory Hill, scene of Trimble's maneuvers and some of the most severe fighting. The road network appears to have been altered somewhat but historic maps are not accurate enough to allow reconstruction. The landscape is very hilly and cut with deep ravines making further assessment of small-scale features difficult without gaining access to perhaps a dozen private farms.

The town of Port Republic is listed in the National Register as a historic district. The UDC has erected a small monument near the intersection of rtes.276 south of rte. 659. One small section of the original road bed of the Port Republic Road may be seen just south of Victory Hill School along rte. 659. Several old structures remain in the hamlet of Goods Mill, which played a peripheral role in the battle.

Perception of Threats to Battlefield

Developmental pressures from the vicinity of Harrisonburg have spread south into the vicinity of Cross Keys in recent years, although the study area has not yet been impacted. Several large parcels of land are or will soon be for sale. Although the market is currently soft (1991), there is some fear, according to a local landowner, that these tracts will be bought by developers and subdivided. A county planning official stated that the dramatic growth of the City of Harrisonburg during the 1980s has slowed, thus easing developmental pressures south of the city. The growth rate for the City of Harrisonburg is expected to stabilize for the 1990s. Several very large poultry sheds have been built in the immediate vicinity, and although these are not technically "permanent," they can quickly overwhelm a viewshed if prominently placed.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

Black Anchor Creek and Heights
Brick House*
Cross Keys Battle Monument
Cross Keys Tavern
Keezletown Road
Kempers or Kyle's Mill (site of*)
Longs Hill
Massanutten Peak
Mill Creek
Oak Ridge
Port Republic
Port Republic Road
Trimble's Ravine
Union Church Cemetery
Union Church (site of)
Victory Hill
Widow Haugh House

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	359.71	6.6	120.56	5.6
Agricultural Land	4,883.37	89.6	2,032.25	94.4
Forest Land	207.11	3.8	0.00	0.0
Total	5,450.19	100.00	2,152.81	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	5,143.34	94.37	2,032.47	94.41
Lost Integrity	306.85	5.63	120.34	5.59
Level of Integrity	Good		Good	

TABLE 5

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
CROSS KEYS BATTLEFIELD

Port Republic

Port Republic by David W. Lowe

PORT REPUBLIC (9 June 1862)

County: Rockingham, VA

General Location: N. of rte. 659, S. of rte. 708, between South Fork Shenandoah and state rte. 340. Village of Port Republic.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 4,936/2,145 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 94/98 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Good

USGS Quadrants: Grottoes

Campaign: Jackson's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson; *[u]* Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Jackson's and Ewell's divisions, about 6,000 engaged; *[u]* Two brigades of Shields's division (Tyler and Carroll), about 3,500.

Casualties: *[c]* 816 (88k/535w/34m); *[u]* 1,002 (67k/361w/574m&c).

Significance: The battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic were the culmination of "Stonewall" Jackson's Valley Campaign in which Jackson maneuvered to defeat superior Union forces by surprise, swift marching, and concentration of force. In May and June, Jackson's Army of the Valley, which never exceeded 17,000 men, inflicted more than 7,000 casualties on his opponents at a cost of only 2,500 of his own men, and tied up Union forces three times its strength. Jackson's victories infused new hope in the Confederate cause and contributed to the defeat of McClellan's campaign against Richmond. The battle of Port Republic was a fierce contest between two equally determined foes and was the most costly battle fought by the Army of the Valley during its campaign. At its conclusion, Union forces withdrew down the Valley, freeing Jackson's command to go to the aid of the CS army facing Maj. Gen. George McClellan's army in front of Richmond.

Description of the Battle

Phase One. Dispositions of the Armies: During the night of 8-9 June 1862, Winder's "Stonewall" Brigade was withdrawn from its forward position near Bogota and rejoined Jackson's division at Port Republic. CS pioneers built a bridge of wagons across the South River at Port Republic. Winder's brigade was assigned the task of spearheading the assault against US forces south of the river. Trimble's brigade and elements of Patton's were left to delay Frémont's forces at Cross Keys, while the rest of Ewell's division marched to Port Republic to be in position to support Winder's attack.

Phase Two. US Deployment: Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler's brigade joined Col. Samuel Carroll's brigade north of Lewiston on the Luray Road. The rest of Shields's division was strung out along the muddy roads back to Luray. General Tyler, in command on the field, advanced at dawn of 9 June to the vicinity of Lewiston. He anchored the left of his line on a battery positioned on the Lewiston Coaling, extending his infantry west along Lewiston Lane (present day rte. 708) to the South Fork near the site of Lewis' Mill. The right and center were supported by artillery (16 guns in all).

Phase Three. CS Advance on the Left and Center: Winder's brigade crossed the river by 0500 hours and deployed to attack east across the bottomland. Winder sent two regiments (2VA and 4VA) into the woods to flank the US line and assault the Coaling. When the main CS battle line advanced, it came under heavy fire from the US artillery and was soon pinned down. CS batteries were brought forward onto the plain but were outgunned and forced to seek safer positions. Ewell's brigades were hurried forward to cross the river. Seeing the strength of the US artillery at the Coaling, Jackson sent Taylor's brigade to the right into the woods to support the flanking column that was attempting to advance through the thick underbrush.

Phase Four. US Counterattack: Winder's brigade renewed its assault on the US right and center, taking heavy casualties. General Tyler moved two regiments from the Coaling to his right and launched a counterat-

tack, driving CS forces back nearly half a mile. While this was occurring, the first CS regiments probed the defenses of the Coaling but were repulsed.

Phase Five. Fighting at the Coaling: Finding resistance more fierce than anticipated, Jackson ordered the last of Ewell's forces still north of Port Republic to cross the rivers and burn the North Fork bridge. These reinforcements began to reach Winder, strengthening his line and stopping the US counterattack. Taylor's brigade reached a position in the woods across from the Coaling and launched a fierce attack, which carried the hill, capturing five guns. Tyler immediately responded with a counterattack, using his reserves. These regiments, in hand-to-hand fighting, retook the position. Taylor shifted a regiment to the far right to outflank the US battle line. The CS attack again surged forward to capture the Coaling. Five captured guns were turned against the rest of the Union line. With the loss of the Coaling, the Union position along Lewiston Lane became untenable, and Tyler ordered a withdrawal about 1030 hours. Jackson ordered a general advance.

Phase Six. Tyler's Retreat/Frémont's Advance: Taliaferro's fresh CS brigade arrived from Port Republic and pressed the retreating Federals for several miles north along the Luray Road, taking several hundred prisoners. The Confederate army was left in possession of the field. Shortly after noon, Frémont's army began to deploy on the north bank of the South Fork, too late to aid Tyler's defeated command. Frémont deployed artillery on the high bluffs to harass the CS forces. Jackson gradually withdrew along a narrow road through the woods and concentrated his army in the vicinity of Mt. Vernon Furnace. Jackson expected Frémont to cross the river and attack him on the following day, but during the night Frémont withdrew toward Harrisonburg.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The setting of Port Republic battlefield, along the South Fork Shenandoah River at the base of the forested Blue Ridge, is very scenic. From some locations the base of Massanutten Mountain can be seen to the north. The core of the battlefield of Port Republic extends from the village of Port Republic east to rte. 708, which approximately traces the main US battle line. The old Luray-Port Republic Road followed rte. 955 north from the village until joining present day US 340. (US 340 south of this intersection is not historic.) The ford over South River where Jackson built his "wagon bridge" is located just west of the confluence of the South and North rivers and can be reached by a dirt road off rte. 955. The North River bridge was at the end of rte. 1601. Frémont's batteries were deployed along the north bank of the South Fork, south of Lawyer's Road, in the battle's last phase.

The main CS assaults of General Winder were carried out on the bottomland between rtes. 955, 708, and the river. The land remains agricultural and retains a strong similarity to its Civil War appearance, except for the railroad which was not there at the time of the battle (built 1892). The railroad artificially divides the battlefield but does not particularly intrude upon most viewsheds.

The Coaling, which was the key to the US defense, is located just northeast of the intersection of US 340 and rte. 708. The Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites (APCWS) owns about 8 acres of the Coaling, acquired from the Lee-Jackson Foundation. An 1880s house sits atop the Coaling where US batteries were deployed. Access to this property is encouraged but unmarked.

The village of Port Republic is listed as a historic district in the National Register. Several historic structures remain in the area, including Lynnwood, Bogota, Frank Kemper House in Port Republic, and others. The Dr. Kemper house at the west edge of town, which served as Jackson's headquarters, is no longer extant. The ruin of Mt. Vernon Furnace in the area where Jackson's army bivouacked after the battle is situated in Shenandoah National Park along rte. 659. A driving tour of Port Republic could be laid out to view the battlefield with stops at the village, at the railroad (rte. 708), and the Coaling. Because of the terrain, Port Republic can be interpreted from public roads. The portion of the Coaling preserved by APCWS allows an expanded interpretation of the battle. The areas of major infantry fighting along the river are in private hands, but the logic of the respective positions can be understood for the most part from public roads.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO THE BATTLEFIELD:

The bottomland south of the South Fork in the core area of the battlefield is owned by two or three large landowners. Several years ago the county denied one of the landowners a petition to establish a gravel quarry,

partly because of concerns for maintaining battlefield integrity. Continuing integrity of the landscape is dependent upon landowners continuing to farm their properties.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

Baugher House (site of*)
Bogota
Brown's Gap Road
Coaling
Deep Run
Dr. Kemper House (site of)
Frank Kemper House
Jackson's Prayer Tree
John Lewis House (site of)
Lawyer's Road
Lewis' Mill (site of)
Lewiston (site of)
Luray Road
Lynwood
Mt. Vernon Furnace (ruin)
New Haven
Pirky's Ford
Port Republic Battle Monument
Port Republic
South Fork Bridge Site
South River
Wagon Bridge Site
Yost House (site of*)

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	360.31	7.3	90.08	4.2
Agricultural Land	3,252.70	65.5	1,574.18	73.4
Rangeland: Shrub and Brush Rangeland	19.74	0.4	0.00	0.0
Forest Land	1,303.05	26.4	480.40	22.4
Total	4,935.81	100.00	2,144.66	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	4,627.32	93.75	2,110.13	98.39
Lost Integrity	308.49	6.25	34.53	1.61
Level of Integrity		Good		Good

TABLE 6

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
PORT REPUBLIC BATTLEFIELD

2ND WINCHESTER

tar Fort by Ben Ritter

SECOND WINCHESTER (13-15 JUNE 1863)

County: Frederick VA, and City of Winchester

General Location: Valley Pike (US 11 at Abrams Creek), Apple Pie Ridge and "Louisiana Heights" W of town, West Fort, Fort Milroy, and Star Fort; S. of present day Stephenson's (US 11 S of 761).

Size of Study/Core Areas: 22,274/3,113 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 48/52 percent; Poor/Fair

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Poor

USGS Quadrants: Winchester, Stephenson

Campaign: Gettysburg Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell; *[u]* Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Second Corps ANV, two divisions (Early and Johnson), about 12,500; *[u]* Three infantry brigades (Elliott, Ely, McReynolds), numbering about 7,000.

Casualties: *[c]* 269 (47k/219w/3m); *[u]* 4,443 (95k/373w/3,975m&c).

Significance: After the Battle of Brandy Station (9 June 1863), Gen. Robert E. Lee launched his plan for a second invasion of the north. He ordered the Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, under Maj. Gen. Richard Ewell to attack the US force at Winchester and clear the Lower Valley of Union opposition. In the resulting three-day battle (13-15 June), Ewell's corps defeated, routed, and nearly destroyed a US division under Maj. Gen. Robert Milroy. This victory (the apogee of Ewell's career) offered high hopes for the success of Lee's second invasion of the North, hopes that were dashed on the battlefield of Gettysburg in July. In the words of Confederate artillerist Maj. Robert Stiles, "This battle of Winchester ... was one of the most perfect pieces of work the Army of Northern Virginia ever did." The battle was won by deft flanking maneuvers and underscores the inadequacy of relying on entrenchments when confronted by a mobile attacking force.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Prelude (12 June): On 12 June 1863, the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia under Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, three divisions nearly 19,000 strong, entered the Valley at Chester Gap and pressed on to Front Royal. Two divisions under Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early and Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson continued north on the Valley Pike and the Front Royal Road to converge on the Union defenders of Winchester under Maj. Gen. Robert Milroy. Despite the superior forces that were rumored to be approaching, Milroy was confident that the strength of his fortifications would enable him to repel the Confederates or withstand a siege. The ridges west of town were heavily fortified and consisted of trenches linking central strong points or "forts". The strongest of these were Fort Milroy and Star Fort. West Fort, a redoubt of six guns, featured prominently in the action.

Phase One. US Dispositions (13 June): On 13 June, Milroy advanced elements of Elliott's brigade to Pritchard's Hill at Kernstown and sent elements of Ely's brigade to intercept any advance on the Front Royal Pike. McReynolds brigade was at Berryville.

Phase Two. CS Advance on Front Royal Pike (13 June): Edward Johnson's Division of four brigades (Steuart, Williams, Walker, Jones) advanced on the Front Royal Pike driving back Union pickets. Approaching the intersection of Millwood Road about 1400 hours, Johnson deployed and swept forward, driving Union skirmishers from behind stone fences. US troops withdrew to high ground north of Abrams Creek under cover of a battery and the heavy guns of Fort Milroy. Johnson brought up a battery and engaged Union field artillery, driving several pieces from the field. The CS guns lacked the range to reply to Fort Milroy's guns and eventually were forced to withdraw. Johnson's advance was stalled, and he awaited the arrival of Early's division to the west on the Valley Pike.

Phase Three. CS Advance on Valley Pike (13 June): Early's division of four brigades (Hays, Smith, Avery,

Gordon) marched toward Winchester on the Valley Pike in conjunction with Johnson's division on the Front Royal Road. Late afternoon, Early's column reached the outskirts of Kernstown and drove back the US skirmish line encountered at Pritchard's Hill. US forces retreated to Cedar Creek Grade and briefly counterattacked, but Early extended his line to the west, out-flanking successive Union positions. US cavalry attacked several times up the Valley Pike to ease pressure on the infantry. Eventually, the Union force retreated north of Abrams Creek under cover of the heavy guns from Bower's Hill and Fort Milroy.

Phase Four. Milroy Withdraws into the Forts (13 June): After dark Milroy concentrated his forces inside a triangle defined by Fort Milroy, Star Fort, and West Fort. McReynolds' brigade reached Fort Milroy after marching a round-about route from Berryville, harassed by Confederate cavalry. Milroy's soldiers had fought well during the previous afternoon, and he was confident that he could withstand renewed Confederate assaults in the morning. In the meantime, Ewell ordered his third division under Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes to advance on Martinsburg via Berryville to cut off Milroy's retreat in that direction.

Phase Five. Early's Flank March (14 June): At dawn of 14 June, one of Early's brigades (Gordon) swept forward to capture Bower's Hill with little resistance. Johnson extended his line to the right against very light opposition; there was fitful skirmishing in the streets of Winchester. Early and Ewell conferred on Bower's Hill and decided on a flanking strategy. Gordon's brigade and two batteries were left on Bower's Hill, while Early led his three other brigades back to Cedar Creek Grade, west beyond Apple Pie Ridge where it was out of view of US fortifications, then north over Cloverdale Plantation to Walnut Grove. His column was accompanied by 20 guns. While Early made this march, Johnson advanced a line of skirmishers on the right to occupy the Federals' attention. The CS batteries on Bower's Hill opened up, touching off a duel with the Union guns in Fort Milroy. By mid-afternoon, Early's force had gained a position opposite West Fort on Apple Pie Ridge. Eight guns were positioned on the Brierly Farm northwest of the fort, while 12 guns were placed in an orchard southwest of the fort. By this time the field had quieted, and the US forces believed that the Confederates had been repulsed from Winchester.

Phase Six. Attack on West Fort (14 June): About 1800 hours, Early's artillery opened fire on West Fort. The twenty guns fired for 45 minutes, while Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays stealthily advanced his Louisiana brigade through the corn and wheat fields at the base of Apple Pie Ridge. On command, the brigade rushed forward across 300 yards of open fields and swept upward into the works. After a brief hand-to-hand struggle, US defenders abandoned the works, retreating to Fort Milroy. Hays was supported in the attack by two brigades (Smith and Avery). Early consolidated his line on West Fort Ridge, but darkness prevented further gains. An artillery duel continued until long after dark. After the battle, Ewell christened West Fort Ridge as "Louisiana Heights" in honor of Hays's brigade.

Phase Seven. Johnson's Flank March (14-15 June): Ewell assumed that Milroy would retreat during the night and ordered Johnson to prevent his escape by cutting the Charles Town Road. About 2100 hours, Johnson (with Steuart's and Williams's brigades and 8 guns) marched north to Berryville Pike and west to Jordan Springs Road, where he turned north toward Stephenson's Depot. About midnight, the Stonewall brigade disengaged and joined the rear of the column, leaving one brigade (Jones) astride the Berryville Pike east of town.

Phase Eight. US Withdrawal (14-15 June): After conferring with his officers, Milroy made the decision to try to "cut their way through" to Harpers Ferry on the old Charles Town Road. All of the cannons were spiked and their carriages destroyed. Shortly after midnight, the Union soldiers left their works so quietly that Early's Confederates did not know they were gone until morning. The column massed in the low ground between Star Fort and Fort Milroy, then moved down the railroad and the Valley Pike toward the Charles Town crossroad, just south of Stephenson's Depot.

Phase Nine. US Surrender at Stephenson's Depot (15 June): Near dawn, Johnson's skirmishers encountered the head of Milroy's retreating column near the intersection of the Valley Pike and old Charles Town road. Milroy faced his column to the right on the pike and prepared to fight his way out of a "murderous trap." Johnson deployed his regiments along Milburn Road as they came up and advanced to the railroad and placed two guns on either

side of the Charles Town Road railroad bridge. The rest of the artillery was deployed on the heights east of Milburn Road. As it grew light, US forces made several desperate but uncoordinated attacks against the bridge and railroad embankment. The Confederates were being steadily reinforced and repulsed each attempt. The Stonewall brigade now came up in line of battle north of the road and advanced to cut the Valley Pike. This was the final blow; Union regiments hoisted the white flag. Between 2,500 and 3,000 surrendered. Milroy and his staff, and other small units escaped to the west. (Note: US casualty figures for Second Winchester vary widely. This is explained by the fact that about two thousand Union soldiers not belonging to Milroy's command were in field hospitals in the city and were often added to the number of captured and missing. Milroy, of course, played down his losses.)

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Contrary to popular perception, Second Winchester is not a "lost" battlefield. Because of the wide-ranging Confederate maneuvers involved, the battlefield covers a great deal of ground, but the major fighting and casualties occurred at five locations: Pritchard's Hill; the intersection of Millwood and Front Royal pikes (interchange 82 of I-81); Abrams Creek and Bower's Hill; Apple Pie Ridge and West Fort; and Stephenson's Depot. Three of these locations retain high levels of integrity: Pritchard's Hill, Apple Pie Ridge and West Fort, and Stephenson's Depot. The parcel of ground at Pritchard's Hill figured prominently in both battles of Kernstown and in the rear guard actions of Opequon. The parcel of ground at Stephenson's Depot figured in cavalry actions during the battle of Opequon and in the engagement of Rutherford's Farm (20 July 1864). Although the field over which the Louisiana Brigade attacked West Fort has been divided by the rte. 37 bypass, the terrain is still intact and adds to the interpretation of the battle.

Central to understanding the Union ring of fortifications at Winchester are Fort Milroy, Star Fort, and West Fort. Of these, Star Fort is well preserved, while remnants survive of Fort Milroy and West Fort. Portions of related entrenchments survive on ridges north and west of Winchester, although the extent of survivals has not been measured. The view from Star Fort is essential for understanding the US position at Second Winchester. Access to Fort Milroy and creation of a viewshed among trees would enhance the ability to interpret the Union situation.

The routes of CS flanking maneuvers (Early to the west and Johnson to the east) can be followed. Early's route traverses well preserved rural tracts north from Cedar Creek Grade along Apple Pie Ridge. The exact route can only be followed on foot across private property. Johnson's route crosses a portion of the Opequon battlefield and follows rural roads past Jordan Spring to the intersection of rtes. 761 and 11 near Stephenson. Much of this course is through scenic farmland, although the density of housing along segments of these roads is increasing. Driving this route offers an appreciation of CS strategy and of the final action at Stephenson's Depot.

Many historic structures associated with the battle remain in and around the city of Winchester, including Taylor's Hotel which served as the US headquarters, and Cloverdale and Walnut Grove, which were passed by Early's flank march.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO BATTLEFIELD

The city of Winchester has grown up around the US defensive position, which was anchored by West Fort, Star Fort, Fort Milroy, and connecting entrenchments. In most cases, however, the ridge crests have been the last to develop as residential tracts have filled the valleys. As a result, Star Fort is well preserved; portions of Fort Milroy remain; and traces of West Fort can be located. Recently, housing has been built along West Fort Ridge ("Louisiana Heights") destroying or otherwise segmenting surviving earthworks. The northern portion of Fort Milroy was recently purchased for the purpose of development; the southern portion is owned by National Fruit Products. Seven acres of Star Fort are owned by a local preservation group, but the surrounding 50 acres are zoned commercial/business and are currently for sale; portions of earthworks at Star Fort are in need of stabilization; grounds would need to be cleared, planted with grass, and maintained to expand visitation and interpretation. Commercial and industrial development along rte. 522 intrudes somewhat on the viewshed.

Of the five main engagement areas, Bower's Hill is a housing subdivision and site of a high school, elementary school, and water tower. A degraded portion of the field (also fought over during First Winchester) remains along railroad tracks west of US 11, but this land is scheduled for high density residential development. Johnson's position

on June 13-14 at the intersection of Front Royal and Millwood pikes lies beneath I-81 interchange #82. Land contours have been extensively altered and viewsheds blocked by dense commercial/industrial development in the vicinity. These two segments for most interpretive activities have been lost.

Pritchard's Hill is privately owned and remains in a relatively pristine state. The land between Pritchard's Hill and Bower's Hill has already been densely developed for residential and commercial purposes. The Apple Pie Ridge-West Fort parcel across which the Louisiana brigade attacked West Fort is bisected by rte. 37-bypass but is visually well preserved, maintained as pasture and apple orchards. Two historic stone houses survive adjacent to the highway, which runs through a ravine and is not particularly intrusive to the view from Apple Pie Ridge. An excellent vantage point for understanding this phase exists just south of the intersection of rtes. 522 and 679.

The area south of Stephenson's Depot, site of the massive US surrender, is by far the best preserved parcel of Second Winchester. Except for power lines and towers, the land retains its Civil War appearance. This parcel covers much of the ground where the battle culminated, where the most desperate fighting occurred, and where nearly 3,000 Union soldiers surrendered; its significance should not be underestimated. The parcel is owned by a local developer, but is not currently serviced by sewage lines.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

Abrams Creek
Abrams Delight
Apple Pie Ridge
Battery Hill
Battery Heights
Berryville Pike
Bower's Hill
Camp Hill
Cedar Creek Grade
Cloverdale*
Collier Redoubt
Entrenchments
Fort Milroy
Front Royal Pike
Jonathan Smith House
Jordan Springs
Keckley Mills
Kernstown
Louisiana Heights
Middle Road
Milburn Cemetery
Milburn Road
Milltown
National Cemetery
Northwestern Pike
Old Charles Town Road
Old Town Winchester
Parkin's Mill
Pritchard's Hill
Star Fort
Stephenson's Depot
Stine's Chapel (site of)
Stone Houses
Stonewall Cemetery
Taylor's Hotel
Tidball's Spring
Tollgate (site of)
Valley Pike
West Fort
Walnut Grove*
Willow Lawn*
Winchester & Potomac Railroad

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	6,662.24	29.91	1,037.99	33.34
Agricultural Land	8,136.80	36.53	1,528.66	49.10
Forest Land	525.67	2.36	7.16	0.23
Barren Land: Strip Mines, Quarries, Gravel Pits	135.87	0.61	0.00	0.0
Total	15,460.5	69.41	2,573.81	82.67
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	10,722.8	48.14	1,624.24	52.17
Lost Integrity	11,551.4	51.86	1,489.12	47.83
Level of Integrity	Poor		Fair	

TABLE 7

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
SECOND WINCHESTER BATTLEFIELD

New Market

ew North from Shirley's Hill by David W. Lowe

NEW MARKET (15 MAY 1864)

County: Shenandoah, VA

General Location: Vicinity of town of New Market, near intersection of I-81 and rte. 211. Battle lines extended from Shenandoah on west to Smith Creek on east. Action extended from Shirley's Hill in the south to Rude's Hill in the north.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 5,611/2,261 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 74/67 percent; Fair/Fair

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Poor

USGS Quadrants: New Market

Campaign: Lynchburg Campaign (Sigel)

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge; *[u]* Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Two infantry brigades (Echols and Wharton), VMI cadet battalion, Imboden's cavalry brigade, and several batteries, totaling about 5,335, 4,087 of which were engaged; *[u]* One infantry division under Sullivan (two brigades: Moor and Thoburn), cavalry division under Stahel (two brigades: Tibbits and Wynkoop), and five batteries of artillery, totaling 8,940 of which 6,275 were engaged.

Casualties: *[c]* 540 (50k/480w/10m); *[u]* 841 (96k/520w/225m).

Significance: As part of his 1864 spring offensive, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant ordered Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel to advance south along the Valley Pike to destroy the railroad at Staunton and then to move on the rail complex at Lynchburg. Although outnumbered, Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, former senator and vice president of the US, was able to concentrate scattered CS forces to meet Sigel's army near New Market. Sigel was decisively defeated on 15 May 1864, and the Valley remained in Confederate hands until Maj. Gen. David Hunter renewed the US offensive on 26 May. The battle of New Market is noted for the participation of a battalion of VMI cadets, who distinguished themselves in combat beside veteran troops.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Phase One. Cavalry Actions: On 14 May 1864, Union cavalry under Quinn (mainly 1st NY Cav Lincoln) advanced south on the Valley Pike from Mt. Jackson, driving CS cavalry (18VA) under Imboden across Meem's Bottom and beyond Rude's Hill, where defense stiffened. Reinforced by a brigade of infantry under Moor, and Wynkoop's cavalry brigade, US forces again advanced with Imboden withdrawing to New Market. CS cavalry, fighting dismounted supported Imboden and established a line south of New Market behind Shirley's Hill. The CS line stretched thinly from Shirley's Hill to Smith Creek. Federals continued to advance, launching two attacks about 2000 and 2200 hours, both of which were repulsed. After dark, Imboden withdrew farther to the south, after successfully retarding Sigel's advance.

Phase Two. CS Advance: After midnight, Breckinridge brought most of his command north along the Valley Pike from near Lacey Spring. By 0600 hours, 15 May, Breckinridge reached the Shenandoah County line. He halted near here to reconnoiter and about 0800 hours sent his cavalry and artillery forward to harass the US force under Moor at New Market. CS artillery unlimbered and fired from Shirley's Hill. Moor established his line along the old River Road with artillery on Manor's Hill and in St. Matthews (currently the Lutheran) cemetery. The rest of Sigel's infantry was spread out along the pike as far north as Edinburg. Brig. Gen. Julius Stahel arrived about 0830 and ordered Moor to withdraw some of his troops to Bushong's Hill. While Breckinridge waited on the rest of his infantry to reach the field, US guns at the cemetery and CS guns on Shirley's Hill exchanged fire.

Phase Three. US Deployment/ Initial CS Attacks: About 1100 hours, Sigel arrived on the battlefield and established temporary headquarters at the Rice House. After reviewing Moor's dispositions he ordered his line withdrawn to a stronger position on Bushong's Hill, stretching between a bend in the North Fork and Smith's Creek. Sigel brought up 14 guns to support his position, leaving DuPont's battery at Rude's Hill awaiting orders. He placed cavalry

on his left flank between the Valley Pike and Smith's Creek. Breckinridge deployed on both sides of the Pike and advanced his infantry in force, driving back US skirmishers. Imboden crossed Smith's Creek with his cavalry and attempted to outflank Sigel by moving north along the east bank. By 1230, Sigel had withdrawn entirely from the town of New Market. The 18CT and 123OH resisted the CS advance on Manor's Hill before joining the main battle line at Bushong's.

Phase Four. Bushong's Hill: About 1400 hours, Breckinridge launched an all-out assault against the US position on Bushong's Hill, using the 26VA, 30VA, 51VA, and 62VA. The 62nd Virginia suffered more than 50 percent casualties. When the CS attack stalled under heavy small arms and artillery fire, the VMI battalion was ordered to fill the gap in the line near the Bushong House. About 1445 hours, the US cavalry under Stahel attacked up the Valley Pike, riding into massed artillery which Breckinridge had shifted east from Shirley's Hill. Stahel was repulsed with heavy casualties. About 1500 hours, Sigel directed a confused counterattack, which was soon repulsed. CS sharpshooters began picking off Union gunners on Bushong's Hill north of the farm, and Sigel ordered the batteries withdrawn. When the artillery fire slackened, Breckinridge ordered a general advance and swept the Union line off Bushong's Hill. In this assault, the VMI cadets captured a gun and many men of the 34MA. To the east near the Valley Pike, elements of the 34MA and 54PA continued to resist, covering the Union retreat. These regiments were eventually driven back, and the Union forces began a general retreat.

Phase Five. Rear Guard Actions: On his own initiative, Capt. Henry DuPont (US) brought up his battery to cover the retreat. He unlimbered first near the Harshburger House, then withdrew his pieces rearward en echelon as the Confederates advanced. Sigel fell back to his supports at the Cedar Grove Dunker Church and cemetery and organized a holding action, while his confused troops reorganized. DuPont's artillery continued to slow the pursuit. About 1630 hours, Breckinridge ordered a halt to regroup confronting the US line at Cedar Grove Church. Imboden's cavalry returned from their fruitless effort to get in rear of Sigel's army to burn the Meem's Bottom Bridge across the North Fork (the creeks were swollen with rainfall). An artillery duel continued until about 1700 hours. Breckinridge was unable to organize another attack and, by 1900 hours, the Union army escaped across the North Fork and burned the bridge. Sigel retreated down the Valley Pike rapidly, leaving his badly wounded at Mt. Jackson. He arrived at Strasburg on the following day.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The Virginia Military Institute owns battlefield land and operates a museum and visitor center. New Market is one of two Valley battlefields that currently has facilities for visitors, the other being Cedar Creek.

The New Market Battlefield Historical Park was established by VMI in 1967. The Hall of Valor was constructed on the battlefield and opened in 1970. The park contains about 280 acres: 24 acres of Shirley's Hill (recently acquired), about 40 acres east of I-81 around the Pennsylvania monument, and about 215 acres at the Hall of Valor parcel adjacent to the steep bluffs overlooking the North Fork Shenandoah River. The park protects and preserves about ten percent of the core area of the New Market battlefield, but this includes several areas of the most severe infantry fighting. The cavalry field, east of US 11 to Smith's Creek, remains farmland. The village of New Market is listed in the National Register as a historic district.

In spite a degree of the protection afforded by the battlefield park, the field survey integrity of the battlefield was rated low, due to the fragmented nature of the park and the prominent positioning of I-81, which is the most obtrusive feature. I-81 bisects the battlefield and battlefield park, and interchange 67 of I-81 empties at the base of Manor's and Shirley's Hill. The park is limited in its ability to interpret its separate parcels at Shirley's Hill, Bushong's Hill, and at the Pennsylvania monument.

Two monuments were erected by veterans on the New Market battlefield and these are contained within the VMI battlefield park. The Missouri (Woodson) monument near the Bushong House commemorates the role of Co. A, 1st Missouri cavalry that fought in the battle. The second monument commemorates the role of the 54th Regiment Pennsylvania infantry, located directly east of Bushong's Hill but separated from the main park by I-81.

North on US 11 between New Market and the Pennsylvania Monument parcel there is light commercial and residential development, although this strip development is less dense than that south of town. New construc-

tion has occurred on Manor's Hill on ground associated with the opening phases of the battle along the access road to the battlefield park (rte. 619) north of rte. 211. This includes a large Day's Inn Motel and the New Market Battlefield Military Museum. The exhibits of the Military Museum cover all American wars with special emphasis on the Civil War. Monuments on the grounds were erected by the museum.

The vicinity of Rude's Hill, Meem's Bottom, Mt. Airy, and the Cedar Grove Church is prime agricultural land that preserves the rural-historic integrity of this area. Meem's Bottom and Rude's Hill were the scene of many armed encounters during the war because these features formed a "choke point" on the Valley Turnpike. Confederate cavalry defended the North Fork Shenandoah River crossing and used Rude's Hill as an observation post. The well preserved estate, Mt. Airy, served as a way station for Confederate staff officers and partisans, including Henry Kyd Douglas and Harry Gilmor. Although not included directly in the battlefield study area, Meem's Bottom and Mt. Airy should be considered supporting resources.

Perception of Threats to Battlefield

The battlefield park is divided into at least four separate parcels. The I-81 interchange has spawned a commercial strip that physically and visually separates the northern and southern portions of the main field of action. The interstate itself divides the battlefield east and west. The view from Shirley's Hill to the Lutheran (St. Matthews) Cemetery looks directly over a commercial strip and the large signs that are typical along interstates. A large motel complex has been constructed between St. Matthews Cemetery and the interstate highway. Two parcels of land at the base of Shirley's Hill along rte. 211 (about 5 acres) are zoned commercial. New construction at these sites would further degrade the important view from Shirley's Hill. New residential construction north of town along US 11 in the vicinity of the Pennsylvania momument has continued the process of fragmentation.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

54th PA Monument
Bushong Farm and Orchard
Bushong's Mill (site of)
Cedar Grove Church and Cemetery
Harper-Rice House (site of*)
Harshburger House (site of*)
Indian Hollow
J. B. Strayer House (site of*)
Manor's Hill
Meem's Bottom
Mt. Airy
Neff's Mill (mill race)
North Fork Bridge Site
Old Church Road
Old Town New Market
Rice House
Rude House
Rude's Hill
Shirley's Hill
Sigel's Hill
Smith Creek Crossing
St. Matthews Church (site of)
St. Matthews Cemetery
Valley Pike
Williamson's Hill
Woodson Monument
Zirkle's Mill (site of*)

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	1,618.21	128.84	931.80	41.22
Agricultural Land	3,715.61	66.22	1,528.66	49.10
Forest Land	222.76	3.97	207.07	9.16
Barren Land: Strip Mines, Quarries, Gravel Pits	54.43	0.97	45.21	2.00
Total	5,611.01	100.00	2,260.58	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	4,182.45	74.54	1,527.25	67.56
Lost Integrity	1,428.56	25.46	733.33	32.44
Level of Integrity	Fair		Fair	

TABLE 8

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
NEW MARKET BATTLEFIELD

PIEDMONT

View from Sheep Hill by David W. Lowe

PIEDMONT (5 JUNE 1864)

County: Augusta, VA

General Location: Near village of Piedmont, crossing of rtes. 608 & 778; Piedmont is four miles east of the Valley pike, and seven miles southwest of Port Republic.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 9,340/2,693 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 97/98 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Good

USGS Quadrants: Grottoes, Crimora, Fort Defiance

Campaign: Lynchburg Campaign (Hunter)

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones; *[u]* Maj. Gen. David Hunter.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Two infantry brigades (Jones and Browne), home guards, and cavalry under Imboden and Vaughn, about 5,500; *[u]* Sullivan's division (two brigades under Moor and Thoburn), Stahel's cavalry division, and artillery under DuPont, about 8,500.

Casualties: *[c]* about 1,500 (100k/500w/900m&c); *[u]* 875 (150k/650w/75m).

Significance: On 5 June 1864, the US army of General David Hunter crushed the smaller Confederate army at Piedmont, killing the CS commander (General "Grumble" Jones) and taking nearly 1,000 prisoners. Piedmont was an unmitigated disaster for CS arms in the Valley. The disorganized Confederates could do nothing to delay Hunter's advance to Staunton, where he was reinforced by Brig. Gen. George Crook's Army of West Virginia marching from the west. United, the US forces moved on Lynchburg. Hearing of Jones' defeat, Gen. Robert E. Lee first rushed J. C. Breckinridge's division back to Rockfish Gap (7 June) and then detached the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia under Lt. Gen. Jubal Early to confront Hunter at Lynchburg (12 June). This detachment severely limited Lee's ability to undertake defensive-offensive operations on the Richmond-Petersburg lines and served to open up the Shenandoah Valley as a second front in the 1864 fighting in Virginia.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Phase One. Cavalry Action at Mt. Meridian: Shortly after dawn, 5 June 1864, US cavalry advanced on the Staunton Road and met CS cavalry under Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden at Mt. Meridian. The US troopers were driven back until reinforced and again advanced to Mt. Meridian, supporting their attack with ten field pieces. The Confederates responded with two guns. Imboden continued to delay the US advance, while gradually retiring. US cavalry incurred about 100 casualties in the morning's action. Fighting occurred around Bonny Doon. In the wake of the cavalry, US infantry marched south from Port Republic.

Phase Two. CS Deployment at Piedmont: General "Grumble" Jones deployed his army in an "L" anchored on a bend of Middle River facing north and bending south along the ridge line. He placed his two veteran brigades (under Col. Beuhring Jones and Col. William H. Browne) on the left and center behind barricades of fence rails. His reserves, which consisted of home guards, were drawn up in the woods just south and west of Piedmont. Vaughn's cavalry brigade was in position along the Cross Road (present day rte. 778) east of Piedmont. His line was supported by artillery. Jones made his headquarters in a tent in the yard of the modern McDonald House. (Imboden's cavalry brigade after the morning's delaying action withdrew behind Polecat Draft near Round Hill.)

Phase Three. US Advance to Piedmont: About 1000 hours, US cavalry drove the CS troopers back to the main infantry line at Piedmont and then withdrew out of cannon range to await the arrival of their infantry and artillery. Moor's brigade arrived first and deployed to the right of the road into the river bend. They were fired on by CS skirmishers. Thoburn's brigade deployed to the left of the road in the vicinity of the Shaver House. DuPont arrayed his artillery battalion on the heights confronting the CS position. Hunter made his headquarters in the Shaver House. One brigade of US cavalry was held in reserve.

Phase Four. US Attacks on the Right: DuPont massed 22 guns against the angle in the CS line, eventually forcing two batteries to retire and take up a position closer to Piedmont village. Shortly after noon, elements of Moor's brigade (18CT) assaulted the hill to their right front, driving out the CS skirmishers. Supported by a regiment of Thoburn's brigade, Moor's entire line advanced, driving back the advanced CS line on the northern brow of the ridge. Jones withdrew his infantry to barricades along Walker's Lane, reinforced his left to meet the US charges, and launched a counterattack. Fighting swayed back and forth across the fields. Hunter now reinforced Moor with Wynkoop's cavalry brigade, fighting dismounted, and renewed his attack.

Phase Five. US Attack on the Left: While fighting raged on the right, Col. Thoburn led three regiments through a ravine and woods on the left and attacked across the Givens Run Valley. Mid-afternoon, he charged directly into a gap in the CS line that was opened when Jones reinforced his left flank. CS reserves were advancing to fill the gap but Thoburn's regiment reached the crest first, and a savage, hand-to-hand mel*e erupted. About this time, Gen. Jones was killed, and the CS defense came unraveled. Inexplicably, the CS cavalry (Vaughn) witnessed Thoburn's attack but did not advance.

Phase Six. CS Rout: Pressed on the front and rear, Confederate soldiers went streaming over the steep bluffs behind to wade and swim the river. All order was lost. A nasty skirmish was fought over possession of the ford to the rear of the Col. Crawford House. Stahel's US cavalry division advanced on the far left to close in on the village by the Cross Road. They were met by Vaughn's and Imboden's cavalry who at last came into play to act as rear guard. Some CS units attempted to stand near the Middle River Church and at New Hope, and US pursuit gradually slackened. The CS army lost about 900 captured.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Piedmont battlefield is located on the Middle River in an area of great scenic beauty. The battle is readily interpreted from public roads with minimal access to private lanes and farm roads. The landscape in much of the area is similar to its appearance at the time of the battle with some intrusions, most notably the Wampler-Longacre experimental poultry farm. This farm, with about a dozen very large barns, is situated just behind a major US artillery position and is visible from several parts of the field. One of the best views of the CS position is from this farm, although access is restricted. The site of the major US attacks on the right is in very good condition. Site of Thoburn's attack on the left along Givens Run is in good condition. There are considerably fewer trees along the river now than at the time of the battle. Round Hill was a CS signal station and anchored the far right flank of the CS cavalry.

The Shaver House, which was General Hunter's headquarters, is owned by the same family as at the time of the battle. Various other historic structures remain, including the Finley House, Crawford House, David Beard House (Belmont), Mt. Horeb Church, and the old Garber barn; Bonnie Doon and Givens House in Mt. Meridian. Grand Caverns (Weyer's Cave) is nearby at Grottoes. "Jackson's Prayer Tree" is located just north of Mt. Meridian. Local landowners say that Jackson conducted a prayer meeting here in June 1862. Jackson's headquarters were in the woods near here. There is strong anecdotal evidence among local landowners that burials have been unearthed on Piedmont battlefield.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO THE BATTLEFIELD

Much of the northern half of the battlefield, scene of the most severe fighting, has been placed in a county agricultural preservation district, which restricts non-agricultural development for seven years. Several property owners in the core area refused to participate in the voluntary district. Long-time residents state that they desire to "keep farming forever" and express concern that the government might take their land to make a national park. The agricultural district allows intensive poultry farming similar to the Wampler-Longacre farm, although densities of these barns are limited by disease considerations and may already be close to maximum density. The southern end of the field around the villages of Piedmont and New Hope has attracted some new residential construction and is served by county sewage lines. New construction along rte. 778 east of Piedmont or on rte. 608 between Mt. Meridian and Piedmont would tend to degrade the battlefield's high integrity. Round Hill is a distinctive feature of the area, dominating views from many parts of the battlefield.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

Beard House*
Bonnie Doon
Col. Crawford House
Crawford's Ford
Cross Road
East Road
Garber House (site of*)
Garber's Hill
Given's Run Valley
Givens Mill (site of*)
Humbert House (site of*)
Jackson's Prayer Tree
Jacob Miller House
McColley House (site of*)
Middle River
Mt. Meridian
New Hope
Piedmont
Rockfish Road
Round Hill
S. B. Finley House
Shaver House
Sheep Hill
US Battery Heights
W. L. Finley House (ruin)

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	317.55	3.40	105.03	3.90
Agricultural Land	7,938.63	85.00	2,550.27	94.70
Forest Land	1,083.39	11.60	37.70	1.40
Total	9,339.56	100.00	2,693.00	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	9,059.37	97.00	2,646.14	98.26
Lost Integrity	280.19	3.00	46.86	1.74
Level of Integrity	Good		Good	

TABLE 9

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
PIEDMONT BATTLEFIELD

Cool Spring

iew of Main Ford by David W. Lowe

COOL SPRING (18 JULY 1864)

County: Clarke, VA

General Location: Along Shenandoah River from above crossing of rte. 7 north to Parker Island on west bank (present monastery grounds) and east bank (Shenandoah Retreat and golf course).

Size of Study/Core Areas: 5,740/1,946 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 97/97 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Fair

USGS Quadrants: Bluemont, Ashby Gap, Round Hill, Berryville

Campaign: Early's Maryland Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Lt. Gen. Jubal Early, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes *[u]* Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright, Brig. Gen. George Crook, Col. Joseph Thoburn.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Three infantry divisions under Gordon, Wharton, and Rodes, about 8,000, and at least 3 batteries; *[u]* Three infantry brigades of Crook's Corps (about 3,250 men), supported by batteries and a division of the VI Corps, about 5,000 engaged.

Casualties: *[c]* 397 (80k/300w/17m); *[u]* 422 (65k/301w/56m).

Significance: In the first weeks of July 1864, Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early raided Maryland with an army of about 14,000 men, defeated a US force at the battle of Monocacy (9 July), and marched on Washington D.C. Confronted there on 12 July by US veterans diverted from the Army of the Potomac, Early retreated, crossing the Potomac River at White's Ferry and the Blue Ridge at Snickers Gap. Elements of three US corps (about 25,000 men) under overall command of Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright pursued and met Early's rear guard at the Shenandoah River crossing of Snickers Ferry near the farm of Cool Spring. Although brief in duration, the battle of Cool Spring was desperately fought, checking US pursuit for several days. The battle of Cool Spring (also known as Snickers Ferry or Parker's Ford) is representative of the division-sized engagements that occurred almost weekly throughout the remainder of the 1864 Valley Campaign, including Rutherford's Farm (20 July), Guard Hill (16 August), Abrams Creek (17 August), Cameron's Depot and Summit Point (21 August), Smithfield Crossing (29 August), and Berryville (3-4 September). These encounters led up to the decisive battle of Opequon (Third Winchester) on 19 September.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Phase One. Skirmishing at Snickers Ford (17 July): On the afternoon of 17 July 1864, the US cavalry division of Alfred Duffié reached Snickers Ford and attempted to force a crossing of the Shenandoah River. Two regiments of CS infantry supported by two pieces of artillery positioned on North Hill overlooking the ford repulsed the attempt. US cavalry then tried to cross at Shepherd's Ford about two miles south but were repulsed by CS cavalry of Vaughn's brigade. During the night, Duffié continued south along the river, leaving a smaller force to picket the fords. On the morning of 18 July, US cavalry pickets, supported by Mulligan's brigade of infantry (Crook's corps) again attempted a crossing at Snickers Ford but were repulsed.

Phase Two. Advance of US Infantry (18 July): Col. Thoburn's division of Crook's Corps, followed by the VI Corps arrived on the Berryville Pike (current rte. 7) from their bivouac near Purcellville. Union generals Wright, Emory, and Crook conferred on River Hill, where they established a signal station and brought up a battery of artillery. It was assumed that General Early's CS army was in retreat to Winchester and that the ford was defended only by cavalry. Because the attempted crossing at Snickers Ford in the morning had been unsuccessful, the US commanders decided to cross a division one mile downstream. The infantry diverged from the main road onto a rocky cart road that led to Judge Parker's house, mill, and ford. The intervening hills disguised the movement from the CS pickets on the west bank of the river.

Phase Three. River Crossing (18 July): About 1500 hours, Thoburn's 3,250 infantrymen forced CS skirmishers back

from Parker's Ford and crossed the shallow river at a number of places across and between the islands. Once on the west bank, US skirmishers fanned out across the Cool Spring farm, while the main body deployed along a rise about 100 yards from the river in the midst of a large wheatfield. Commands regrouped after the crossing and prepared to move south to uncover Snickers Ford. Captured Confederates, however, revealed that the island fords had been defended by infantry and that Early's army was nearby. Thoburn alerted his superiors on River Hill (by signal flag and courier) and awaited further instructions. He was told that he would be supported by a division of the VI Corps, which had begun to arrive on the east bank near the Parker House.

Phase Four. CS Response (18 July): In response to Thoburn's crossing (or in anticipation of it) Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon's division advanced along the Berryville Pike from its bivouac at Webbtown. Gordon deployed along the river bluffs north and south of North Hill. Simultaneously, Brig. Gen. Gabriel Wharton's division moved toward Cool Spring from its bivouac near Wickliffe Church. Wharton deployed in line of battle and advanced on Cool Spring forcing back the US skirmishers to their main line near the river. Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes's division was farther north at Gaylord but was set in motion to come up on the left of Wharton. Skirmishing extended along Wharton's and Gordon's fronts.

Phase Five. Rodes's Flank Attack (18 July): Colonel Thoburn was now aware of his precarious position but hoped to hold out until reinforced or withdrawn after dark. Rodes's division arrived from Wickliffe Church, moving through ravines and behind the grove at Westwood which concealed the movement of the troops until they were within striking distance of Thoburn's contracted line. Rodes deployed to Wharton's left, his line bending in an arc almost at right angles to the river and the US right flank. About 1800 hours Rodes threw his division forward on a compact front, surprising and crushing the US right.

Thoburn sent the 116th Ohio to reinforce his right as both sides struggled for possession of a stone fence that bisected the wheatfield. A second CS attack drove US forces back to another stone fence along the river bank. There, they held out against a third desperate CS attack that came near to driving them into the river. Three batteries of Union artillery came into play from the heights on the east bank. A division of the VI Corps deployed on the east bank and engaged in sharpshooting, but it was not sent across the river. Three batteries of CS artillery supported Rodes's attack. Colonel Owens, commanding a CS brigade was mortally wounded. The bulk of the almost 850 casualties of the battle occurred at this time and littered the wheatfield.

Phase Six. US Withdrawal (18 July): The Union line held out until dark, then began to recross the river unmolested by CS infantry. An artillery duel broke out across the river. US and CS batteries fired at each others' positions, guided by the flashes of discharge and explosion. When US infantry was safely on the east bank, the artillery fire tapered off, ending about 2100 hours. Later CS skirmishers advanced to the river, finding the Union line abandoned. CS units spread out across the field to tend to the wounded of both sides. General Crook was angered that Thoburn's command had been left to their own devices without being reinforced by the VI Corps, which was at hand.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The setting of Cool Spring battlefield at the base of the Blue Ridge and on both banks of the Shenandoah River is very scenic. The combination of rural condition and standing historic structures invokes a strong historic atmosphere. The core area of the battlefield (where infantry attacks occurred) is private property owned by Holy Cross Abbey. Buildings have been added on abbey grounds and Cool Spring mansion has been enlarged, but these additions, although visually intrusive, do not interfere with interpretation of the battle. The recently constructed Abbey Retreat House sits astride the CS battle line and overlooks the main battlefield. The wheatfield and river bank where the major infantry fighting occurred are in pristine condition. The abbey does accommodate visitors to the battlefield with prior arrangement.

US approach routes along rte. 7 from Snickers Gap have been altered but not so that the strategy of movement is lost. US staging and deployment areas on the east bank in the vicinity of the Parker House are private property owned by Golf Links, Inc. Approaches to the fords here were recontoured for a previous golf course, which has been out of business for some years. US artillery positions on the bluffs overlooking the river have been developed

for a low-density housing project (Shenandoah Retreat). Access to this portion of the battlefield is restricted due to private ownership.

The general area contains many Civil War-era structures, including the Judge Parker House (judge who sentenced John Brown), North Hill, Riverside farm and tenant house, the old Snickers House, Waterloo, Cool Spring, and Wickliffe Church, besides other historic estates within a radius of several miles—Audley, Auburn, Clermont. These structures reveal the plantation-style settlement pattern characteristic of this part of the Shenandoah Valley. Remains of Westwood House near the Abbey can be located. Remnants of stone fences used in the battle remain or old alignments can be traced. Access roads to fords can be traced on the east and west banks.

The field surveyor rated this field fair, while GIS rated it good. The field surveyor made deductions for the fourlane highway bridge, the recontoured ground on the east bank, housing on battery heights, and the modern retreat house which dominates many views from inside the core.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO BATTLEFIELD

The east bank of the battlefield is occupied by the Shenandoah Retreat development and a former golf course. These areas were used for US staging and deployment in preparation of crossing the river and for the Union artillery positions. The area was under fire from Confederate batteries. It is uncertain how the planned redevelopment of the golf course by Golf Links, Inc., would impact battlefield integrity. The east bank has already been substantially recontoured for the previous golf course upstream from the Parker House.

There has a long-standing controversy in the county among those who wish to redevelop the golf course and those who oppose further development in the area. Golf Links did receive zoning from the county to go ahead with redevelopment, but as yet major construction has not begun. A spokesman for the Holy Cross Abbey has suggested that the monastery might be forced to relocate to a more secluded place in response to the "loss of privacy" caused by encroaching development. Residents of Shenandoah Retreat, on the other hand, have complained in the past about loud, raucous drinking parties along the river when the golf course was closed. As a result, many residents support redevelopment of the golf course. (It should be noted that public access to the Shenandoah River in this area is very restricted.) A spokesman for Golf Links, Inc., said that the owners were interested in incorporating a display and a possible walking trail into the new golf course design to help interpret the battle of Cool Spring. The Judge Parker House (with existing additions) will serve as the club house for the golf course, if redevelopment proceeds.

At least two new housing tracts, featuring large houses on one- to three-acre lots have appeared along rte. 7 west of North Hill in the last several years. Although these tracts are not within the battlefield study area, they are representative of the type of development that is occurring in this area.

IDENTIFIED SITES AND FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BATTLEFIELD (UNSURVEYED*)

Berry's Ferry
Berryville Pike
Big Hill
Castleman's Ferry House
Champe Shepherd's Mill (site of*)
Cool Spring House
Cool Spring Run
Fairview Mill (site of*)
Frankford
Front Royal-Charles Town Pike
Gaylord
Glenwood
Island Fords
Judge Parker House "Retreat"
North Hill
Old River Road (traces)
Parker's Ford
Parker's Hole
Parker's Island
Parker's Mill (site of)
River Hill
Riverside Farm
Riverside Tenant House
Shepherd's Mill (site of*)
Snicker House
Snicker's Ford
Snicker's Gap
Stone Walls (traces)
UDC Cool Spring Battle Monument
US Battery Heights
Waterloo
Webbtown
Westwood (ruin)
Westwood Grove
Westwood Run
Wheat Spring Branch
Wickliffe Church

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	178.26	3.10	61.19	3.12
Agricultural Land	2,960.72	51.49	1094.19	55.79
Forest Land	2,235.06	38.87	660.36	33.67
Water: Streams and Rivers	376.06	6.54	145.53	7.42
Total	5,750.10	100.00	1,961.27	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	5,571.85	96.90	1,899.88	96.87
Lost Integrity	178.25	3.10	61.39	3.13
Level of Integrity	Good		Good	

TABLE 10

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
COOL SPRING BATTLEFIELD

2ND KERNSTOWN

Opequon Church from Pritchard House by Ben Ritter

SECOND KERNSTOWN (24 JULY 1864)

County: Frederick, VA and City of Winchester

General Location: US 11 (Valley Pike) and Hoge Run; Old Opequon Church is approximate center of the field; Pritchard's Hill.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 5,861/2,203 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 50/52 percent; Poor/Fair

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Poor

USGS Quadrants: Winchester, Stephens City

Campaign: Early's Maryland Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Lt. Gen. Jubal Early; *[u]* Brig. Gen. George Crook.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Four infantry divisions (Gordon, Rodes, Ramseur, and Breckinridge/Wharton), four brigades of cavalry, and artillery, totalling about 13,000; *[u]* Three infantry divisions (Thoburn, Duval, and Mulligan), two cavalry divisions (Averell and Duffié), and three batteries of artillery, numbering about 10,000.

Casualties: *[c]* unreported, est. 600 (100k/500w); *[u]* about 1,200 (120k/600w/480m&c).

Significance: In late June and early July 1864, Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early's Confederate army used the strategic Shenandoah Valley corridor to terrorize Maryland, defeat a Union army at Monocacy, and march on Washington, D.C. Only the diversion of reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac, bogged down in the trenches before Petersburg, turned back the invasion. Early returned to the Valley and achieved a decisive victory over George Crook's command at Second Kernstown on 24 July. He subsequently sent cavalry to burn Chambersburg, Pennsylvania on 30 July. These disasters forced Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to take immediate action to solve the Valley problem. The VI Corps and elements of the XIX Corps were returned to the Valley and united with Crook's corps (called the Army of West Virginia). Additional cavalry units were diverted to the Valley. More importantly, Grant unified the various military districts of the region into the Middle Military District and appointed Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan as overall commander. Sheridan took command of the newly christened Army of the Shenandoah on 7 August at Harpers Ferry. Sheridan's leadership and his strongly reinforced army turned the tide against Confederate power in the Shenandoah Valley.

Rutherford B. Hayes, later president of the United States, commanded a brigade during the battle on the left of the US line. John C. Breckinridge, former senator and vice president of the United States, commanded the Confederate division that confronted Hayes.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Phase One. Skirmishing at Kernstown (23 July): On the afternoon of 23 July 1864, CS cavalry advanced aggressively down the Valley Pike, driving US cavalry from Newtown (Stephens City) to Kernstown. Brig. Gen. George Crook directed Duval's infantry division to deploy across the pike and clear the town of Confederates, which they did with little difficulty. Crook then withdrew his infantry to Winchester behind Abrams Creek, leaving a brigade of cavalry to picket Kernstown. The CS army encamped in the vicinity of Strasburg with headquarters at the Kendricks' House: Ramseur at Capon Grade, Rodes at Fisher's Mill, Wharton and Gordon on Hupp's Hill. The CS cavalry withdrew to the vicinity of Newtown.

Phase Two. Advance of CS Infantry (24 July): At first light, the CS infantry left their encampments near Strasburg and advanced down the Valley Pike. At Bartonsville, Ramseur's division was directed west on side roads to the Middle Road. Gordon, Wharton, and Rodes continued ahead on the pike. Early sent two columns of cavalry to the east and west on a wide-ranging maneuver to converge on Winchester and the Federal rear. Cavalry led the advance down the pike, coming up against the main US force at Kernstown about 1000 hours. About noon, the vanguard of the CS infantry reached Kernstown. Gordon deployed to the left of the Valley Pike, Wharton to the right. Ramseur deployed across the Middle Road at Mrs. Massie's house. Rodes moved east from the Pike, following a ravine.

Phase Three. US Deployment on Pritchard's Hill: Crook received information that Early's army was approaching and brought two of his three divisions into line just north of Hoge's Run at Kernstown. Mulligan's division held the US center behind a stone fence at the Pritchard House, supported by Capt. Henry DuPont's artillery massed on Pritchard's Hill to his rear. Duval's two brigades were separated and posted on Mulligan's flanks with Hayes' brigade extending the US line east of the Valley Pike. A strong skirmish line was posted near Opequon Church. Thoburn's division was held in reserve on Pritchard's Hill to the right rear of the main US line. Cavalry protected both flanks.

Phase Four. CS Attack on Center: About noon, Gordon's division advanced in line west of the pike, driving back the skirmishers and closing with the main US line in the vicinity of Opequon Church. Mulligan's division counter-attacked, supported by Hayes on his left and took possession of the churchyard. Soldiers sheltered there from the intense firing behind stone fences and headstones in the cemetery. Gordon regrouped and again advanced, compelling Mulligan to fall back 250 yards to the stone fence along Pritchard's Lane. Gordon reached Opequon Church but could make no further headway. CS artillery was brought up south of the church to engage US artillery on Pritchard's Hill. One of Wharton's brigades came into line on Gordon's right. Crook repositioned his forces. Duval's right flank brigade was moved west, astride Middle Road. Thoburn's division was brought forward to fill the gap between Mulligan and Duval. Elements of Duffié's cavalry supported the right flank on the Middle Road and picketed Cedar Creek Grade to the west.

Phase Five. CS Attack on Left: Ramseur's division came into line from the Middle Road on Gordon's left and advanced. Gordon shifted a brigade to the open ground west of Opequon Church and advanced against Thoburn in conjunction with Ramseur. Without orders Gordon's brigade attacked and dislodged US troops sheltering behind two stone fences. Thoburn withdrew to the base of Pritchard's Hill, bending his line back to the north and exposing Mulligan's right flank. Ramseur advanced in force, wheeling right to confront Thoburn's line and bringing a heavy enfilade fire against Mulligan's line.

Phase Six. CS Attack on Right: Wharton's division moved along the ridge east of the Pike to threaten the US left flank held by Hayes. Elements of Averell's cavalry division were in position to delay this maneuver but withdrew without engaging. In conjunction with Ramseur's advance on the CS left, Wharton attacked about 1500 hours and quickly turned the US left. Hayes retreated to the stone walls that lined the Valley Pike and rallied his brigade, facing east at right angles to the center held by Mulligan.

Phase Seven. US Retreat: Three CS divisions now moved in concert to envelope the US center. Mulligan's division was under fire from three directions. While trying to direct the defense, Mulligan himself was pierced by five mini* balls and fell mortally wounded. "Lay me down and save the colors!" he snapped at the officers who tried to assist him. The US center collapsed, and soldiers began streaming to the rear. Hayes' brigade stood long enough on the crest of Pritchard's Hill to allow the US artillery to escape. Elements of Duffié's cavalry made a brief counter-attack along the Middle Road, buying time for Thoburn's division to retire in relatively good order.

Phase Eight. Rear Guard Actions: A brigade of Thoburn's division made a stand near the toll gate at the intersection of the Valley Pike and Cedar Creek Grade, while the rest of Crook's infantry retreated through the streets of Winchester. Rodes' division, in the meantime, crossed from the Valley Pike to the Front Royal Road and marched north to cut off the Federal retreat, meeting only light opposition from the US cavalry. Rodes followed the Federal forces north to Stephenson's Depot, taking hundreds of prisoners until darkness ended the pursuit. The CS cavalry did not advance as Early expected. The disorganized Federal army retreated to Bunker Hill where it regrouped. Crook continued the retreat before dawn and eventually reached the Potomac River on 27 July. For a few days after the battle, Federal prisoners were held in Star Fort.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The core of the battlefield, the US center and goal of decisive CS assaults, is Pritchard's Hill and the Pritchard Farm, owned by the Charles Hardy Grim Estate. The "Pritchard-Grim" property (roughly from rte. 652 to Pritchard's Hill and from rte. 628 to the historic Opequon Church, about 200 acres) is agricultural land that retains a marked similarity to its Civil War appearance. The property features a fine brick antebellum structure (Pritchard House), a frame tenant house, and several

outbuildings that date from the time of the battle. Col. James Mulligan, commander of the Union center, was wounded in front of and died in the Pritchard House two days after the battle. The stone fence defended by Mulligan's infantry still runs along Pritchard's Lane. CS forces attacked across the open meadow south of the house. Pritchard's Hill served as a Union artillery strongpoint and was assaulted directly during the battle's closing phases.

Opequon Church was the focal point of initial fighting; the original building was destroyed during the war but rebuilt in 1896. Union accounts describe firing from behind tombstones in the cemetery. An adjacent parcel (bounded by rte. 37, Cedar Creek Grade, and Middle Road to the Winchester city limits) is primarily agricultural with some new residences along Middle Road and Cedar Creek Grade. This land, about 275 acres, was significant during First Kernstown, and was the location of the US far right at Second Kernstown, anchored on Sand Ridge until turned by Ramseur's advance. Of about 2,200 acres of battlefield core, excluding Rodes' pursuit and cavalry actions, an estimated 625 acres of contiguous open ground remains.

Ramseur's deployment area on Middle Road is bisected by the four-lane rte. 37-bypass. Gordon's deployment area is occupied by an industrial building and a housing subdivision. The area where Wharton made his decisive flanking movement and attack Rutherford B. Hayes' brigade is occupied by a high density industrial park along US 11 and the railroad corridor. Dense industrial and commercial development characterizes the land adjacent to and east of US 11. The Pritchard-Grim property and Pritchard's Hill are the last portions of open ground south of the Winchester city limits.

Most historic buildings of old Kernstown have been lost, with the notable exception of Hoge's Ordinary or Beemer's Tavern, which has been renovated into office space and anchors a five-acre office-commercial development. Taylor provides a useful drawing of this structure in his sketchbook. The Frederick County Historical Society has recently erected new interpretive signs and a map adjacent to Opequon Church, making the action more comprehensible to visitors.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO THE BATTLEFIELD

Land east of US 11 (Valley Pike) along the railroad tracks has been developed for a large-scale industrial/business park. Route 11 is zoned commercial/industrial and has been densely developed from south of Kernstown to the Winchester city limits, causing concern over potential development plans west of the highway. A new business/office park was recently constructed near the entrance to the Opequon Church with Hoge's Ordinary as its center piece.

A county planning official noted, however, that watershed and ground water considerations make development in the Pritchard's Hill and Sand Ridge areas less desirable. These factors would need to be considered before any development plans would be approved. Residential development is encroaching on the northern part of Pritchard's Hill. For the present, a large portion of this land remains in private ownership and has been altered little since the Civil War. The Pritchard-Grim farm and adjacent portions of Pritchard's Hill are owned by the Charles Hardy Grim Estate.

IDENTIFIED SITES AND FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BATTLEFIELD (UNSURVEYED*)

Bartonsville Mill
Buffalo Lick Run
Cedar Creek Grade
Front Royal Road
Glass House
Hoge's Ordinary
Hoge's Run
Kernstown
Magill House*
Middle Road
Old Town Winchester
Opequon Church and Cemetery
Pritchard House
Pritchard's Hill
Pritchard's Lane
Sand Ridge
Springdale
Stephenson's Depot
Stone Lane
Stone Walls
Tollgate (site of)
Valley Pike

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	2,837.23	48.41	1,105.3	50.17
Agricultural Land	2,799.71	47.77	1,090.54	49.5
Forest Land	223.89	3.82	7.27	0.33
Total	**5,860.83**	**100.00**	**2,203.12**	**100.00**
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	3,025.94	51.63	1,098.03	49.84
Lost Integrity	2,830.78	48.30	1,105.08	50.16
Level of Integrity	Fair		Poor	

TABLE 11

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
SECOND KERNSTOWN BATTLEFIELD

Opequon

Hackwood House by Patrice Gilbert

OPEQUON OR THIRD WINCHESTER (19 SEPTEMBER 1864)

County: Frederick, VA and City of Winchester

General Location: Area east of Winchester from I-81 along Berryville Pike (VA 7) to Opequon Creek. Also combat north of Red Bud Run W to US11. Stephenson's Depot. Star Fort. Collier Redoubt.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 11,670/4,914 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 54/47 percent; Fair/Poor

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Poor

USGS Quadrants: Winchester, Stephenson

Campaign: Sheridan's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Lt. Gen. Jubal Early; *[u]* Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Four divisions (Gordon, Rodes, Ramseur, Breckinridge/Wharton), two cavalry divisions (Fitz Lee, Lomax), about 15,200; *[u]* Three infantry corps (Wright, Emory, Crook), cavalry corps (Torbert), about 39,236.

Casualties: *[c]* 3,611 (226k/1,567w/1,818m&c); *[u]* 5,018 (697k/3,983w/338m).

Significance: Opequon or Third Winchester (fought 19 September 1864) was the largest and most desperately contested battle of the Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley, resulting in more than 9,000 casualties. The battle was a turning point of the war in the Valley, marking the rise of Sheridan and the decline of Confederate power. Sheridan defeated the Confederate army again three days later at Fisher's Hill (22 September), forcing it to retreat up the Valley to near Waynesboro. The CS army of Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early suffered about 23 percent casualties. Casualties for the larger Union army under Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan exceeded 5,000, nearly 20 percent. The Union XIX Corps sustained 40 percent casualties (2,074 men) and lost every regimental commander during its assaults on the Middle Field and Second Woods. The most severe fighting and casualties occurred in the large parcel east of I-81, north of rte. 7, west of rte. 656, and south of rte. 661. The Middle Field ranks with some of the most sanguinary fields of the Civil War, witnessing more than 3,000 casualties. CS general Robert E. Rodes and US general D. A. Russell were both killed within a few hundred yards of the Dinkle Barn site at the entrance to Winchester Mall.

Description of the Battle

Phase One. US Advance (19 September): Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan's army advanced from the vicinity of Berryville on the Winchester-Berryville Pike about 0200 hours, 19 September 1864. At earliest light, Brig. Gen. James Wilson's cavalry division crossed the Opequon at Spout Spring and advanced through a defile known as Berryville Canyon, followed by the US infantry (VI Corps, XIX Corps, and Crook's corps). At the canyon's mouth the cavalry met the first elements of Maj. Gen. Stephen Ramseur's CS division and drove them back on their supports. Johnston's brigade deployed across the pike and held back the Union advance, while the rest of the division came into line to cover the Berryville Pike and Senseny Road farther to the south. The US cavalry launched several mounted and dismounted charges, driving the CS infantry back about 150 yards to the vicinity of the Dinkle Barn. Here Ramseur stiffened his defense with artillery, and the US cavalry withdrew as its infantry began to deploy. Wilson's division moved to cover the US left flank where it remained for the rest of the battle.

Phase Two. Cavalry Action: About 0200 hours Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's cavalry division of three brigades (Custer, Devin, Lowell) advanced toward Seiver's and Locke's fords from the vicinity of Berryville. Their crossings were resisted by Brig. Gen. John McCausland's cavalry brigade dismounted behind barricades. The Reserve brigade (Lowell) pushed across at Seiver's Ford against fitful opposition. Custer's brigade met heavier resistance at Locke's Ford and made several mounted charges before securing a foothold on the western bank. By 0800 hours both wings were across the creek, but the cavalry did not advance for several hours. About 1030 hours, McCausland's skirmishers withdrew, and Merritt's division moved cautiously forward. Waiting for them was

Wharton's infantry division about a mile west of the fords, deployed across the roads in woods and behind stone fences. About 1100 hours, the US cavalry began testing the CS defenses with skirmishers and artillery. Custer launched one mounted attack but was quickly repulsed. About noon, Sheridan's main infantry attack was underway, and Wharton's division withdrew to cover the CS left flank on the Valley Pike north of Winchester. Merritt continued forward along Charles Town Road. Custer followed the line of the Winchester & Potomac Railroad. About 1400 hours Merritt's division converged with Averell's cavalry division on the Valley Pike near Stephenson's Depot. (See phase seven.)

Phase Three. Deployment of US Infantry: In the meantime, the Union infantry bogged down in the narrow confines of Berryville Canyon, dashing Sheridan's hopes of quickly taking Winchester and defeating the CS army in detail. Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright's VI Corps of three divisions (Getty, Ricketts, Russell) emerged from the canyon in order. Getty's division deployed south of the pike with its left flank resting on Abrams Creek. Ricketts' division formed north of the pike on Getty's right and extending to Redbud Run. Russell's division was held in reserve. The XIX Corps of two divisions (Dwight and Grover) did not begin crossing until after 0900 hours and eventually deployed north of the pike into the First Woods, connecting with Ricketts' right. Sheridan established his headquarters near the Berryville Pike, probably south of the road on the Eversole Farm. As the US infantry deployed, the CS batteries opened a furious fire from behind the Dinkle Barn. Union batteries swung into action on both sides of the pike to engage the CS guns.

In the meantime, Lt. Gen. Jubal Early concentrated his scattered divisions. Rodes' division, marching from near Stephenson's Depot, deployed to the left and rear of Ramseur's division in the West Woods. Gordon's division extended the line across the Hackwood Farm to Redbud Run. Wharton's infantry and Fitz Lee's cavalry division drew a line across the Valley Pike north of town near Stephenson's Depot. CS batteries deployed on high ground along Baker Lane north and south of the West Woods, and north of Redbud Run. Skirmishing continued along Ramseur's front.

Phase Four. Fighting in Middle Field: At 1140 hours, a US signal gun boomed and Grover's division of four brigades (Birge, Molineux, Sharpe, and Shunk) launched its attack from the First Woods across Middle Field toward the Second Woods behind which Gordon's division waited. CS horse artillery north of Redbud Run played havoc with the flanks of Grover's attacking line. Birge's brigade reached the woods, driving back skirmishers, but then came up against Gordon's main line and were staggered. Sharpe's brigade came up on Birge's left, and the fighting became desperate. The Confederate line broke, falling back across the Hackwood property. Seven CS cannon in the Hackwood Lane fired canister pointblank into the US attackers, throwing them back. Gordon now launched a counterattack with two brigades, driving Birge and Sharpe out of the Second Woods and back across Middle Field. Grover ordered Molineux to advance and plug the gap that had opened between Birge and Sharpe. The firing was so intense that Molineux's flanks seemed to "melt away." Shunk's brigade was thrown forward to bolster the wavering Union line, coming in on Molineux's right rear. Shunk closed to within sixty yards of the CS line in the Second Woods. The two lines delivered pointblank volleys into each others' ranks. Gordon again counterattacked, and the Union attack collapsed. The wreckage of Grover's division went streaming back across the Middle Field to the safety of the First Woods. The CS horse battery (Breathed) north of Redbud Run again worked execution among the retreating division. Every regimental commander in Grover's division was killed or wounded; casualties totaled nearly 1,500. Beal's brigade of Dwight's division deployed in the treeline at the east end of the Middle Field and advanced into "that basin of Hell" to stem the retreat. Gordon's men waiting along the treeline of the Second Woods laid down a murderous fire. The Union brigade did not reach within 200 yards of the Second Woods before being pinned down. They expended all of their ammunition before retreating back to the First Woods. The 114th New York suffered casualties of 60 percent (188 of 350 effectives). McMillan's brigade, personally directed by Corps commander Maj. Gen. William Emory, advanced. They reached a shallow ravine about 200 yards from the Second Woods, where two regiments (8VT and 12CT) clung on for nearly two hours. By 1300 hours, the main thrust of the XIX Corps attack was blunted and its ranks decimated. By 1400 hours, firing on this end of the field sputtered out from sheer exhaustion.

Phase Five. Fighting Near Dinkle Barn: At 1140 in conjunction with the XIX Corps' advance on the right, Getty's and Ricketts's divisions of the VI Corps launched their attack against Ramseur's line, which was positioned on high ground, stretching from the Dinkle Barn south behind Abrams Creek. Ricketts' division on the right was ordered to guide its attack on the Berryville Pike, which takes a sharp jog to the left in front of the Dinkle Barn. As they advanced, a gap widened between the VI Corps and the XIX Corps on the far right. Keifer's and Emerson's brigades ruptured the Confederate center at the Dinkle Barn and moved to capture a battery of artillery in front of the West Woods. Ramseur's left flank now gave way and Confederates began to drift back toward Winchester.

Phase Six. Rodes's Counterattack: Just as Ramseur's left flank gave way from the Union attacks, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes brought his division forward from its protected position in the West Woods. About 1330 he launched a devastating counterattack into the gap that had opened between the VI and XIX Corps. Battle's Alabama brigade "came out of the woods like a whirlwind," crushing Ricketts's division, which formed the right flank of the VI Corps. About this time, General Rodes was killed by shrapnel. He fell somewhere along the woods line. Union soldiers streamed back along the Berryville Pike, while two US batteries astride the pike tried to slow the CS assault. From his command post on Eversole's Hill, Sheridan and Wright witnessed the disaster. Sheridan immediately committed his reserves to stave off certain defeat; this was David A. Russell's division of three brigades (Campbell, Upton, and Edwards). Campbell advanced his brigade astride the Berryville Pike with Edwards' brigade to his right. General Russell, directing these maneuvers, was mortally wounded. The two brigades struck Battle's attackers head-on and stalled them in the ravine from which they had emerged and drove them back on their supports at the edge of the West Woods—the rest of Rodes' division. Upton's brigade came in on Edwards' right advancing from the edge of the Second Woods. The two divisions—Rodes' and Russell's—closed, exchanging murderous volleys. Upton's impetuous charge stopped the CS counterattack and drove it back into the West Woods. Russell's division was then withdrawn out of range to regroup. Wright called Upton's attack the turning point of the battle.

Phase Seven. Cavalry Action: Concurrent with the above events, there was cavalry fighting along the Valley Pike north of Winchester. About 0500 hrs. the Union cavalry division of William Averell crossed the Opequon near Darkesville and moved to the Valley Pike, steadily pushing back the 23rd Virginia Cavalry, which fought a delaying action back to Bunker Hill. There the 23VA were reinforced by the 62nd Virginia mounted infantry.

About 10 o'clock, Union cavalry attacked at Bunker Hill, forcing the CS cavalry to retire. Averell continued pushing south on the pike to link up with Merritt's division about 1400 hours, near Stephenson's Depot. South of the old Charles Town road, the Confederate cavalry units were stiffened by Smith's infantry brigade (Wharton's Division). About 1330, Devin's brigade arrived on the road to the depot. About one mile south of the depot, it encountered McCausland's brigade drawn up in line of battle and attacked, driving the Confederates back in confusion. The 23VA cavalry and the 62VA mounted infantry attacked the Union flank disrupting the charge. McCausland and Smith retired one mile to the lightly entrenched line at near Collier Redoubt where they were reinforced by Fitz Lee's two brigades (Wickham and Payne) and Wharton's infantry division. Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee fell wounded, during the fighting south of Stephenson's Depot. The Union cavalry deployed five brigades in line of battle, stretching from the railroad west toward the ridge near the intersection of the Valley Pike and Welltown Road.

Phase Eight. Crook's Flank Attack: About 1300 hours, Sheridan directed Crook's corps of two divisions (Thoburn and Duval) to advance from its reserve position near Spout Spring. The divisions marched to near the "Factory" on Redbud Run, where they split up. Thoburn's division moved west on the south bank of Redbud into the First Woods to relieve the XIX Corps. Duval's division crossed the run and turned west accompanied by the artillery of Capt. Henry DuPont. Duval's division deployed near the Huntsberry House. DuPont unlimbered 18 guns on what has been named DuPont Hill, opposite Gordon's flank in the Second Woods and opened fire. Crook now ordered Duval's division forward into a "wall of flame." They swept across Redbud Run at the Hackwood House, turning Gordon's flank and advancing against Wharton's line, stretching from Collier Redoubt east. About this time, Thoburn's division

charged out of the First Woods into the Middle Field. This two-pronged assault forced Gordon to abandon the Second Woods and align himself with Breckinridge to his left rear. The CS line was now drawn into a compact L-shape, anchored by cavalry at Star Fort. Wharton's division faced north. Gordon's division made the turn of the L and Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions extended the line south to Abrams Creek.

Phase Nine. Collapse of CS Line: With the success of Crook's attack on the right, Sheridan ordered a general advance against the constricted CS position on the plateau just north and east of the town. The Confederates were posted behind stone fences, rail barricades, and in shallow earthworks constructed in 1862. They could retreat no farther without losing organization in the streets of Winchester. As the Union advance closed from east and north, firing became fierce and desperate. The massed artillery of both sides fired case shot and canister. General Sheridan rode forward to the battle lines to urge his troops forward. About 1530 hours, as the infantry fighting reached a crescendo, Averell and Merritt advanced their cavalry divisions astride the Valley Pike, first at a walk and then at a thundering gallop. They swept over the CS line at Collier Redoubt driving back the CS cavalry on the low ground below Star Fort. Schoonmaker's brigade of Averell's division repeatedly attacked Munford's cavalry at Star Fort, eventually overrunning the work. The CS infantry withdrew to another line about 150 yards to the rear but the damage was done. The sound of Union cavalry pounding in their rear spread panic all along the Confederate line, and soldiers began streaming to the rear and "whirling through Winchester." Wharton's and Gordon's divisions seemed to disintegrate. Seven Federal horseman captured Confederate battle flags, each earning a Medal of Honor. Rodes's division (commanded now by Grimes) performed the difficult maneuver of "changing front" to the north to stop the onrushing US cavalry. Early's army retreated in disorder.

Phase Ten. Rear Guard Actions: General Early fashioned a defensive line at Kernstown (probably at Pritchard's Hill and behind Hoge's Run) which saved his wagons and most of his artillery. Cavalry and elements of the VI Corps probed this makeshift CS defense as night fell, but the US forces were too disorganized by success to mount an effective pursuit. After dark, the CS army withdrew up the Valley Pike to Fisher's Hill south of Strasburg. Gen. Sheridan established his headquarters in Winchester at the home of Lloyd Logan. Casualties were so severe that nearly every sizeable structure in Winchester served as a hospital after the battle.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The Opequon battlefield is large and sprawling, covering thousands of acres east and north of Winchester. In general, much of the battlefield has been greatly degraded or destroyed by the expanding urban environs of Winchester, but several significant parcels currently remain, perhaps 800-900 acres: these include the Cavalry Field north of Collier Redoubt, the Hackwood Estate, northern half of Middle Field and First Woods adjacent to Redbud Run, and the heights (including DuPont's Hill) north of Redbud Run. Together, these parcels form a block of battlefield core that retains a high degree of integrity.

Many historic structures remain in the vicinity, including Hackwood; Spout Spring (Wood House) on rte. 7 adjacent to a sewage treatment plant; an old house, mill site, and a dye house where rte. 656 crosses Redbud Run; an old log house where rte. 659 crosses Redbud Run; Brumley House; Valley Mill Farm; Jordan Springs; Tanquary House; and others. The Hackwood Estate dates from 1777 and is a historic treasure in its own right. Preservation of this house and parcel alone would allow substantial interpretation of the battle of Opequon.

Other parcels, such as the Opequon Crossing and Spout Spring, Seiver's and Locke's fords, and the Second Winchester parcel at Stephenson's Depot (which was scene of cavalry actions during this battle) would expand interpretation. Star Fort and Collier Redoubt appear protected, although without sufficient buffers.

Although hemmed in by development and severely degraded, the Dinkle Barn site adjacent to the I-81 entrance ramp off rte. 7 is key to understanding the attack of the VI Corps and Rodes' counterattack. A portion of the ravine down which Rodes attacked is intact northeast of I-81 interchange in front of the Dinkle Barn site at the entrance of Winchester Mall. The battery heights west of I-81 are being developed for business, industrial, and residential uses. The last surviving parcel of West Woods (adjacent to I-81) is currently being bulldozed for townhouses.

The Hastings marker is the only monument erected on the battlefield that remains. It is enclosed by an iron fence and sits next to the road in the midst of Fort Collier Business/Industrial Park east of Collier Redoubt. Nearby are the remains of old stone fences and an old farm lane defended by CS troops in the battle's later phases.

Perception of Threats to Battlefield

Threats are immediate and of large order. If continued as planned, the residential development of Caleb Heights and associated development would destroy the last remaining intact parcels of the infantry fighting at the battle of Opequon. According to county-approved plans, construction would occupy most of the area south of Redbud Run with more than 600 single family homes, townhouses, and a commercial strip. A connector road would be pushed through from the north, separating Hackwood and DuPont's Hill. As of this writing, construction has not begun and has been held up by financial transactions.

The Hackwood House and property (144 acres) was recently offered for auction but the sale was postponed. This property could potentially be subdivided. Regency Lakes subdivision was built several years ago on southern portions of Middle Field and First Woods. Further phases of housing development, if constructed, would cover the last portion of Second Woods, "Rodes' Ravine," and another segment of the First Woods. Star Fort itself is owned by a Civil War reenactment group but the surrounding 50-acres is for sale and zoned commercial/industrial.

The Shenandoah Valley Civil War Foundation, a local preservation group, has negotiated to preserve a small portion of the Second Woods area as a park if development proceeds. The developer, Top of Virginia Corporation, has agreed to set aside 63 acres in the area adjacent to Hackwood as a commemorative park. A forty-acre parcel of Middle Field next to Redbud Run is privately owned; the owner has stated in the past that he will not develop it.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

Baker House (site of)
Berryville Canyon
Berryville Pike
Brumley House
Burnt Factory Farm
C. Wood's Mill (site of*)
Carter House
Cleridge Farm
(Opequon Inn)
Collier Redoubt
Dinkle Barn (site of)
DuPont's Hill
Eversole House (site of)
First Woods
Greenwood Church
Hackwood
Hackwood Lane
Hasting's Monument
Hoffmann House (site of*)
Huntsberry House (site of)
I. Wood House
Jordan Springs
Locke's Ford
Milburn Cemetery
Middle Field
Morgan's Mill (ruin)
National Cemetery
Old Town Winchester
Opequon Crossing
Ravine up which Rodes attacked
Red Bud Mill (site of*)
Rutherford House (site of)
Second Woods
Seiver's Ford
Spout Spring (Wood House)
Star Fort
Stephenson's Depot (site of)
Stonewall Cemetery
Tanquery's Ford
Thomas McCann House
Valley Mill Farm
Valley Pike
West Woods
Wood's Mill (site of*)
Wright's Ford

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	6,149.06	45.22	2,382.65	45.05
Agricultural Land	5,386.21	39.61	2,011.90	38.04
Forest Land	1,678.01	12.34	484.46	9.16
Unidentified Land Use / Land Cover	384.83	2.83	409.89	7.75
Total	13,598.1	100.00	5,288.90	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	7,285.86	53.58	2,321.18	47.24
Lost Integrity	6,312.24	46.42	2,592.42	52.76
Level of Integrity	Fair		Poor	

TABLE 12

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
OPEQUON BATTLEFIELD

Fisher's Hill

Tumbling Run and Mill by Charles Moseley

FISHER'S HILL (21-22 SEPTEMBER 1864)

County: Shenandoah, VA

General Location: On heights north and south of rte. 601 and Tumbling Run from the river to the Back Road; hamlet of Fisher's Hill is marked on contemporary maps.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 9,644/2,751 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 89/85 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Fair

USGS Quadrants: Tom's Brook, Strasburg, Mountain Falls, Middletown

Campaign: Sheridan's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early; *[u]* Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Four infantry divisions (Wharton, Gordon, Pegram, Ramseur), one cavalry division (Lomax), about 9,500; *[u]* Three infantry corps (Wright, Emory, Crook), Averell's cavalry division, about 29,444.

Casualties: *[c]* 1,235 (30k/210w/995m&c); *[u]* 528 (52k/457w/19m).

Significance: Lt. Gen. Jubal Early was "outgeneraled" by Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan at Fisher's Hill. Although the casualty figures were not high, this battle was a masterpiece of maneuver and surprise. Sheridan's flanking attack brought Crook's corps to the left rear of Early's position on Fisher's Hill and threw the CS army into a panic. Confederate defeat at Fisher's Hill (on the heels of defeat at Opequon) opened the Shenandoah Valley to a US advance that reached beyond Staunton. When Sheridan withdrew during the first part of October, his army systematically burned mills, barns, crops, and forage, and ran off livestock. By implementing this strategy of "total warfare," Sheridan felt that he accomplished the primary objective of his campaign—to deprive the Confederacy of the agricultural abundance of the Valley.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Phase One. CS Dispositions (19-20 September): After its crushing defeat at Winchester on 19 September 1864, the CS army withdrew to Fisher's Hill. The US army pursued as far as Hupp's Hill on 20 September and massed near Strasburg. The Confederate position at Fisher's Hill was a strong one, particularly at the center and on the right flank. Wharton's division, on the Confederate right flank, entrenched along the high bluff overlooking Miller's bottom extended to the left to cover the Valley Pike (old alignment). Gordon's division deployed from the Valley Pike across Manassas Gap Railroad to near the Middle Road above the hamlet of Fisher's Hill. Pegram's division (formerly Ramseur's) was to Gordon's left, and Ramseur's division (formerly Rodes's) extended the line west to a high hill south of Tumbling Run South Fork (referred to a "Ramseur's Hill" in this report). The CS cavalry under Lomax extended the main line northwest to and beyond the Back Road. Lomax's position was held with little more than a skirmish line.

To mask these deployments, Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early placed a strong skirmish line on the hills north of Tumbling Run (Quarry Hill, Flint Hill, School House Hill). General Early had his headquarters at the Widow Funkhouser house on the Valley Pike. Confederate signal stations on Massanutten (Signal Knob) and Round Hill offered wide-ranging views of any Union moves against this line. Early's artillery commanded all approaches along the pike, the railroad, and the Middle Road. The advanced CS positions north of Tumbling Run were not supported by artillery. A brigade of CS cavalry and a battery of horse artillery were placed on Sandy Hook east of the North Fork Shenandoah.

Phase Two. US Advance (21 September): About noon, 21 September, Sheridan advanced his army south and west from Strasburg, massing the bulk of the VI Corps in a horseshoe opposite the CS right center on the plateau north of Flint Hill, its left at the Manassas Gap railroad. The XIX Corps, weakened from the battle of Opequon, was placed on the US left east of the railroad with a skirmish line extending back through Strasburg to cover the fords over the Shenandoah North Fork and the road to Front Royal. The line of these two corps was entrenched. Crook's corps (nominally the Army of West Virginia) was held in reserve and out of sight of Signal Knob "in the timber near Strasburg." Wright (VI Corps) established his

headquarters in the Amos Stickley House (near the intersection of rte. 757 and I-81). Averell's cavalry division covered the Back Road. The rest of Sheridan's cavalry was sent via Buckton Ford and Front Royal to advance up the Luray (Page) Valley. Sheridan established headquarters at the George Hupp House just north of Strasburg.

Phase Three. Capture of Flint Hill (21 September): As US soldiers entrenched their new position, skirmishing heated up. Sheridan and Wright surveyed the land but could see little of the main CS line because of two intervening hills, called "Flint Hill." These hills were defended by a reinforced skirmish line barricaded behind "hog" or "bull pens" (U-shaped barricades made of fence rails that sheltered three men). Sheridan ordered Wright to take the hills so that he would have an "unobstructed view." Two regiments (126OH and 139PA) advanced but were thrown back. Reinforced by a third regiment, they tried again without success. The First Brigade/Second Division (five New York and Pennsylvania regiments) was brought into battle line and swept forward under command of Col. J. M. Warner (formerly commander of the Vermont brigade). The hills fell quickly. General Wright described this movement as "of the greatest importance to the operations of the next day, as it gave us a view of the enemy's line and afforded excellent positions for artillery, of which we availed ourselves in the more important struggle of the 22nd." Warner's men threw up rifle pits and bivouacked on the hills within rifle-musket range of the main CS line south of Tumbling Run.

Phase Four. US Battle Line Advanced (21-22 September): During the night, Sheridan extended his line westward with Ricketts division on the far right, Getty next, and Wheaton connecting with the XIX Corps at the railroad. After sunrise, Crook's corps was brought forward, following ravines and staying in timber to be out of sight of the CS signal stations. Shortly before noon, Ricketts division (VI Corps) moved to possess the heights overlooking the North Fork of Tumbling Run, while Averell's cavalry division advanced on the Back Road to establish a connection with Ricketts's right flank. Keifer's brigade assaulted and carried the two hills south of the run (School House Ridge), driving CS skirmishers back on their main line. Union skirmishers were pushed to within range of the CS works and began laying down a steady fire. Ricketts formed his division behind the crest of the hills and awaited Crook's attack.

In the meantime, about 1215 hours, Emory (XIX Corps) rushed Quarry Hill on the left with a brigade and seized the CS rifle-pits there. His men immediately reversed the entrenchments, giving the Union army an unbroken line of rifle pits, extending from Quarry Hill across Flint Hill, confronting the main CS line on Fisher's Hill at a range of about 500 yards; skirmishing erupted along the line. US batteries were brought up, and an artillery duel erupted in the vicinity of the village of Fisher's Hill. Skirmishing continued until about 1600 hours.

Phase Five. Crook's Flank Attack (22 September): During the morning Gen. George Crook moved his two divisions (about 5,000 men) to the base of Little North Mountain beyond St. Stephens Church, unseen by the Confederate signal station on Massanutten Mountain. About 1400 hours, Sheridan directed him to commence a flanking movement along the shoulder of the mountain. Crook formed his corps in two parallel columns and marched south until more than half of the command was beyond the Confederate left flank, which was held by Lomax's cavalry division. Crook encountered only scattered fire from a few surprised pickets.

About 1600 hours, Crook ordered his columns to face left and to charge. The soldiers charged down the side of the mountain, shouting at the tops of their lungs. The CS cavalry took to their horses and scattered. In their rush down the hill, Crook's divisions lost all order; a mass of men funneled through the ravine of the Middle Fork of Tumbling Run past the Barbe House and closed on the Confederate infantry on "Ramseur's Hill." A second mass funneled to the right along an old road that penetrated to the rear of the Confederate positions. Grimes's brigade of North Carolinians held out against Crook's onslaught until Ricketts ordered his division forward. Hearing, more than seeing, that they were flanked, CS defenders along the remainder of the line began abandoning their entrenchments. Battle's CS brigade was sent to the left to confront Crook but was misdirected into a ravine and missed the fighting altogether. Sheridan advanced his other divisions, the men attacking generally up the ravines. Early's army was soon in full flight, abandoning equipment and 14 artillery pieces that could not be extricated from the works.

Phase Six. Rear Guard Action at Prospect Hill (22 September): The CS army was a shambles but attempted to collect itself at the base of Round Hill on the Valley Pike. Generals Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram and staff officers established a rear guard of artillery and infantry at Prospect Hill and held off the disorganized Union pursuit. During this action, Col. Alexander "Sandie" Pendleton, Stonewall Jackson's favorite staff officer, was wounded; he died the following day in Woodstock. The CS army retreated to Narrow Passage, and the wagon train went on to Mt. Jackson. Darkness and confusion among the Union victors prevented effective pursuit.

During the fighting at Fisher's Hill, a CS cavalry division turned back the Union cavalry at Milford (present day Overall) in the Luray Valley, preventing an attempt to gain Early's rear by crossing the gap to New Market. Sheridan remarked that if his cavalry had been successful, he could have captured Early's army.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The excellent state of preservation and the existing rural character make the study of this battlefield pleasant as well as informative. The battlefield can be interpreted mostly from public roads using about four vantage points, although the best-preserved Confederate entrenchments are on private property. The hamlet of Fisher's Hill retains a historic appearance that includes an old mill (Keller's Mill) and other structures of Civil War vintage. Rte. 601 from rte. 623 (Back Road) to US 11 (Valley Pike) is a pristine rural landscape, except for a short stretch of trailers and a few modern houses west of but out of sight of "Ramseur's Hill." I-81 is conducted over rte. 623 with no interchange and is not intrusive at ground level but becomes intrusive if one climbs the hills adjacent to it.

In 1990, the Association for Preservation of Civil War Sites (APCWS) acquired about 195 acres of land west of and adjacent to I-81 and north and south of rte. 601. (The parcel of land south of rte. 601 is referred to as "Ramseur's Hill" in this report.) This was where the Confederate infantry met Crook's flank attack from the west and the assault of Ricketts' division from the north. The parcel of APCWS land north of rte. 601 was the scene of preparatory skirmishing and a staging area for Ricketts' division. Access to Ramseur's Hill provides an important vantage point for understanding and interpreting the battle. Traces of Confederate entrenchments remain on the hill. This area, although critically important in understanding the action, is visually degraded by I-81.

A vantage point slightly north of the intersection of rtes. 639 and 757 allows interpretation of opening phases of the battle and offers views of Flint Hill (actually two hills, separated by rte. 757) assaulted on 21 September. The Emanuel Evangelical Church above the hamlet of Fisher's Hill offers a sweeping panorama of the CS positions south of Tumbling Run.

Many historic structures, including the Eastep and Barbe houses, a brick house (S. Funkhouser house) at the base of Ramseur's Hill, Keller's Mill, Stickley's Mill, and the Miller House are along rte. 601 in Tumbling Run valley. The Widow Funkhouser House site, Early's headquarters, is on US 11 (vintage of current house was not determined). Stone fences remain near the shell of the Jacob Funk house and barn, built by one of the county's first residents in the mid-1700s.

Sections of the fieldworks on Fisher's Hill are extant with some segments in a good state of preservation. Portions were bulldozed years ago where the entrenchments extended across pastureland, although in some cases shallow traces remain. Works overlooking the old bed of the Valley Pike are in good condition. The line of entrenchments should be professionally surveyed. Near the intersection of rtes. 11 and 601 the abutments of the old stone Valley Pike bridge remain. The old road trace climbs the face of the hill and in places is supported by stone retaining walls.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO BATTLEFIELD

New construction activity in the area has been slight. Several local landowners have erected modern houses for themselves or their families along rte. 601. There is a large trailer park along US 11 but behind Fisher's Hill, where it is not particularly intrusive. Several new homes have been built at the base of Flint Hill and in the vicinity of the intersection of rtes. 639 and 757, degrading the ability to interpret the battle's initial phases. There is a short strip of modern housing along rte. 757 south of Fisher's Hill. Based on interviews with several local landowners, there was general approval of the recent APCWS acquisition and a strong consensus that new development in the area should be excluded. The major visual intrusion in the battlefield is I-81, which prompted the field surveyor to lower the integrity rating from good to fair. Any future move to widen I-81 or to provide an interchange would severely impact the battlefield's integrity.

IDENTIFIED SITES AND FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BATTLEFIELD (UNSURVEYED*)

A. Funkhouser House (site of*)
Back Road
Barbe House
Eastep House
Entrenchments
Fisher's Hill
Fisher's Mill*
Flint Hill
Fort Banks (site of)
Hupp House
I. Piper House (site of*)
Jacob Funk House and Barn (ruin)
Keller's Mill
Locust Grove School (site of)
Manassas Gap Railroad
Middle Road
Miller House
Miller's Bottom
Mt. Hebron Church
Newell House (site of*)
Old Town Strasburg
Picnic Ground
Prospect Hill
Quarry Hill
Ramseur's Hill
Round Hill
S. Funkhouser House
Signal Knob
Spangler's Mill
St. Stephens Church
Stage Road
Stone Bridge Site (ruin)
Tumbling Run
Valley Pike
Widow Funkhouser House (site of)

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	1,088.24	11.13	327.61	11.91
Agricultural Land	5,685.67	58.15	1,373.46	49.93
Forest Land	2,876.57	29.42	980.66	35.65
Barren Land: Strip Mines, Quarries, Gravel Pits	127.11	1.30	69.04	2.51
Total	9,777.59	100.00	2,750.77	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	8,678.59	88.76	2,354.11	85.58
Lost Integrity	1,099.00	11.24	396.66	14.42
Level of Integrity	Good		Good	

TABLE 13

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
FISHER'S HILL BATTLEFIELD

Tom's Brook

Round Hill by David W. Lowe

TOM'S BROOK (9 OCTOBER 1864)

County: Shenandoah, VA

General Location: Valley Pike (US11) at Tom's Brook and Jordon Run, I-81, Back Road (rte. 623) at Tom's Brook.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 6,644/2,018 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 83/83 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Fair

USGS Quadrants: Tom's Brook, Woodstock

Campaign: Sheridan's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. Thomas Rosser, Maj. Gen. Lunsford Lomax; *[u]* Brig. Gen. Alfred Torbert.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Two cavalry divisions (Rosser and Lomax) about 3,500; *[u]* Two cavalry divisions (Merritt and Custer), about 6,300.

Casualties: *[c]* 350 (20k/50w/280m&c); *[u]* 57 (10k/47w).

Significance: Tom's Brook was a battle of strategy and maneuver that pitted cavalry against cavalry. The CS cavalry were eager for revenge against the US cavalry, which had been burning barns and mills in the Valley for the previous week. On 9 October 1864, however, Sheridan ordered his cavalry to "whip" the enemy or get whipped themselves. In the resulting conflict, the US troopers routed the CS cavalry, impairing its morale and efficiency for the remainder of the campaign. The CS flight was referred to by Valley residents and victorious Union troopers as the "Woodstock Races." The fighting on the Back Road at Spiker's Hill pitted two former West Point roommates against one another—Tom Rosser and George Armstrong Custer. Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan watched the battle unfold, reputedly from the summit of Round Hill.

Description of the Battle

Phase One. Disposition of Forces: On 8 October 1864, the Confederate Cavalry under overall command of Maj. Gen. Thomas Rosser harried the withdrawing US cavalry on the Valley Pike and the Back Road, fighting a brisk skirmish along Tom's Brook near the Back Road. The CS cavalry were enraged by the destruction of the Valley they had witnessed in the last week and were attempting to arrest further destruction. Rosser had been dispatched to the Valley from Petersburg to command the CS cavalry and had generally been hailed by the local populace as the "Savior of the Valley." At dark, Rosser halted his division of three brigades (about 2,500 men) on the Back Road in the vicinity of Spiker's Hill and pushed skirmishers beyond Tom's Brook to Mt. Olive. The Middle Road was covered by a force of observation of unknown size. Maj. Gen. Lunsford Lomax's Division of two brigades and a battery of horse artillery (about 1,000 men) bivouacked on both sides of the Valley Pike behind Jordon Run just south of the hamlet of Tom's Brook.

Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's US cavalry division (about 3,500 men) under overall command of Brig. Gen. Alfred Torbert encamped at the base of Round Hill. Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer's division of two brigades (about 2,500), bivouacked "behind Tumbling Run" northeast of Mt. Olive on the Back Road. Upset by Rosser's aggressive tactics of the previous days, army commander Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan ordered Torbert to move at daylight of 9 October and "whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped himself."

Phase Two. US Advance on Valley Pike: Torbert planned to bring an overwhelming force against Rosser's division on the Back Road while holding Lomax's division at bay with a reinforced brigade on the Valley Pike. Lomax's main battle line was deployed behind Jordon Run on both sides of the Valley Pike, supported by six guns. His front line was dismounted, while he maintained a strong mounted reserve on the pike.

At dawn, Lowell's brigade (Merritt) advanced to Tom's Brook on the Pike, deployed, and pushed forward "one-quarter of a mile" where it found Lomax's main line, dismounted behind Jordon Run. The CS line was supported by six guns placed on either side of the Valley Pike and a strong mounted reserve. While Lowell was engaged, Kidd's brigade rode north along Tom's Brook to connect and cooperate with Custer. Devin's brigade

followed but veered off on the Harrisville Road (or overland) and advanced to the vicinity of St. Johns Church, maintaining a connection with the force on the Valley Pike and at the same time extending a skirmish line to connect with the Kidd's brigade on the right.

Phase Three. Custer's Advance/ Fighting on Back Road: Rosser dismounted most of his troopers behind Tom's Brook at the base of Spiker's Hill behind stone fences and rudimentary fieldworks (his brigades from left to right, Munford, Payne, and the Laurel brigade). Rosser's six guns unlimbered along the crest of Spiker's Hill slightly behind a second line of barricades. A mounted reserve was maintained on the ridge; the right was extended toward the Middle Road with mounted skirmishers.

Advancing beyond Mt. Olive, Custer pushed forward three regiments of dismounted skirmishers against the main CS position. Three other regiments and Wells' brigade were kept mounted and maneuvered for position behind the skirmish line. A battery of artillery unlimbered on the hill in front of present-day St. Matthews (or Sand Ridge) Church and engaged the Confederate artillery on Spiker's Hill. When Kidd's brigade made contact with Custer's left, Custer extended his right flank along the shoulder of Little North Mountain, supporting the movement with a battery. Kidd deployed over the hill, driving Rosser's skirmishers before him, and unlimbered another battery to enfilade the CS position. The Confederate line was gradually forced back into a horseshoe around the front of Spiker's Hill. A regiment of US cavalry (probably of Devin's brigade), moving on the Middle Road from Harrisville arrived on a hill overlooking Sand Ridge Road (intersection of Middle Road) and to the right and rear of Rosser's main force. Reacting to this threat, Rosser ordered a withdrawal. His men raced to mount their horses. At this point, Wells brigade attacked Spiker's Hill up the Back Road, taking few casualties. At the crest, Wells encountered Munford's brigade and a mounted mel*e ensued. Rosser's force retreated, partly down Back Road to Pugh's Run, partly on Sand Ridge and Middle roads toward Woodstock. Custer's and Kidd's troopers pursued. General Sheridan is said to have watched the action from Round Hill, where there was a US signal station during the battle.

Phase Four. Fighting on the Valley Pike: In the meantime, fighting continued along the Valley Pike. Lowell's brigade drove CS pickets back to Jordon Run and deployed on both sides of the pike. The 1st Michigan (Kidd's brigade) supported Lowell's right flank, while Devin's brigade moved farther to the right along the Middle Road beyond St. Johns Church. As Devin maneuvered, Lomax counterattacked down the Valley Pike, driving the Reserve brigade back to Tom's Brook. Lowell, in turn, attacked until stopped by artillery, At last, Devin reached a position from which to operate against the flanks of both Lomax and Rosser. He advanced the 9NY and other elements against Lomax's left and rear (probably down current rte. 657), making Lomax's position untenable. The Confederates began to retreat up the pike toward Woodstock.

Phase Five. Rear Guard Action at Pugh's Run: Rosser retreated, losing at least two of his guns at Spiker's Hill. Munford's brigade attempted a stand behind Pugh's Run on the Back Road, but this position was quickly breached. The CS cavalry continued to retreat to Columbia Furnace, losing the rest of its artillery and all of its wagons. Perhaps 150 CS prisoners were captured during this phase of the retreat.

Phase Six. Rear Guard Action at Woodstock: Lomax retreated up the Valley Pike to Woodstock, where he was joined by a confused portion of Rosser's command. The forces attempted to stand behind Pugh's Run but were soon scattered. Union troopers pressed forward, driving the CS cavalry to Mt. Jackson. Lomax lost five pieces of artillery and his rolling stock during this rout—two pieces at Woodstock, two at Edinburg, and the fifth beyond Stony Creek. The Union cavalry retired to the vicinity of Woodstock where it bivouacked for the night.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The focal points of action were Spiker's Hill where the Back Road crosses Tom's Brook, and the area southwest of the village of Tom's Brook along US 11 (Valley Pike) between Tom's Brook and Jordon Run. The network of roads between US 11 and Spiker's Hill played a shaping role in the unfolding Union strategy.

Several vantage points and viewsheds are essential for interpreting the battle: a) view from Round Hill where there was a US signal station at the time of the battle; b) Sand Ridge Church Hill, which allows interpretation from Custer's line and provides a panorama from Round Hill to Little North Mountain; and c) from Spiker's Hill where

Rosser concentrated his command. If viewsheds from these three points could be preserved, the battlefield could be interpreted and would retain a high degree of historic integrity and rural setting. Many historic structures remain in the vicinity, including the Peter Muhlenburg Farm (County Alms House) at Maurertown and the Thornton house which served as a stage stop on the Back Road. A 21-acre parcel of Lomax's position across the Valley Turnpike (US 11) has been preserved as a county recreation park. The park offers no interpretation of the battle.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO BATTLEFIELD

Almost all of the battlefield of Tom's Brook is privately owned. There are several immediate threats to the integrity of the above-mentioned viewsheds. A parcel on the summit of Spiker's Hill may be subdivided; survey work has been conducted but as of this writing construction has not begun. Construction of more houses on Spiker's Hill would degrade the viewshed's current high integrity. The area where the Reserve brigade attempted to turn Lomax's left flank was recently threatened by possible subdivision of the Heischmann property (about 150 acres). This property was auctioned in parcels but a local resident acquired the entire property and plans to continue farming.

The viewshed from Round Hill may be threatened by development adjacent to the I-81 interchange where there is currently a truck stop complex with peripheral commercial enterprises. The interchange has spurred residential development along rte. 642, south of the truck stop. A portion of land is currently being developed as a subdivision where the Middle Road (rte. 642) crosses Tom's Brook. The I-81 interchange will certainly continue to stimulate further residential development in this area.

An L-shaped section of property south of the Truck Stop and I-81 along rte. 651 (about 250 acres) is owned by a local developer who has sought to rezone the property for industrial/commercial/business. Initial requests for rezoning were denied because of concerns over water quality. The impact of development of this section of land on the viewshed from Round Hill should be evaluated; the property near the intersection of rte. 651 and US 11 was part of Merritt's division bivouac area the night before the battle.

The strip along US 11 south of the village of Tom's Brook has been developed for a trailer court and other residential housing; a commercial/residential strip runs the rest of the way into the town of Tom's Brook. The right flank of Lomax's line along rte. 650 is lined with trailers and houses, making interpretation difficult. Lomax's bivouac and HQ area in the vicinity of the Peter Muhlenburg Farm (County Alms House) is managed by the county. Efforts to preserve the rural character of the cross roads between Back Road and the Valley Pike (rtes. 653, 655, 657, and 642), which were used as routes of maneuver by the US cavalry, would enhance the battlefield setting.

IDENTIFIED SITES AND FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BATTLEFIELD (UNSURVEYED*)

Back Road
Baker's Store
Crabill House*
Frieden Church (site of)
Harrisville
Heischmann Farm
Jordon Run
Locke House*
Middle Road
Mt. Hebron Church
Mt. Olive
Muhlenburg Farm
Old Mill Sites
Old Town Tom's Brook
Pugh's Run
Round Hill
Sand Ridge Road
Sawmill Valley
Spiker's Ridge
St. Johns Church (site)
St. Matthews Church Hill
Thornton Farm (Stage Road Inn)
Tom's Brook
Turnpike Toll House (Maurertown)
Valley Pike
Woodstock Road

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	1,076.33	16.20	336.87	16.69
Agricultural Land	4,114.01	61.92	1,314.80	65.14
Forest Land	1,345.42	20.25	349.19	17.3
Barren Land: Strip Mines, Quarries, Gravel Pits	49.17	0.74	0.00	0.0
Unidentified Land Use / Land Cover	59.13	0.89	17.56	0.87
Total	6,644.06	100.00	2,018.42	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	5,508.60	82.91	1,678.72	83.17
Lost Integrity	1,135.47	17.09	339.70	16.83
Level of Integrity	Good		Good	

TABLE 14

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
TOM'S BROOK BATTLEFIELD

Cedar Creek

Belle Grove by David W. Lowe

CEDAR CREEK (19 OCTOBER 1864)

Counties: Frederick, Warren, Shenandoah

General Location: Along US 11, Cedar Creek to Middletown; Belle Grove is a focal point. CS march began from Fisher's Hill.

Size of Study/Core Areas: 15,607/6,252 acres

GIS Integrity of Study/Core Areas: 89/89 percent; Good/Good

Field Assessment of Study Area Integrity: Fair

USGS Quadrants: Tom's Brook, Strasburg, Mountain Falls, Middletown

Campaign: Sheridan's Valley Campaign

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early; *[u]* Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan, Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright.

Forces Engaged: *[c]* Five infantry divisions (Gordon, Wharton, Ramseur, Pegram, Kershaw), two cavalry divisions, about 15,265; *[u]* Three infantry corps (Wright, Emory, Crook), two cavalry divisions (Merritt and Custer), numbering 31,944.

Casualties: *[c]* 2,910 (320k/1,540w/1,050m); *[u]* 5,665 (644k/3,430w/1,591m)

Significance: The battle of Cedar Creek dealt the crushing blow to the Confederacy in the Shenandoah Valley and, together with William T. Sherman's successes in the Atlanta Campaign, spurred the reelection of President Abraham Lincoln. The battle can be ranked in size and intensity with the battle of Opequon (Third Winchester) and both are included among the major battles of the Civil War. The Confederate surprise attack at Cedar Creek is considered one of the most daring and successful maneuvers of its kind and is studied by military theorists today. It was a feat "unduplicated" during the Civil War. General Sheridan's arrival on the field of battle to rally his broken troops passed into American verse and folklore as "Sheridan's Ride," and offers a dramatic example of the effect of charismatic leadership. Rarely have the scales of victory and disaster swung to such extremes during battle: the morning's brilliant Confederate success was transformed into a Union victory by day's end.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Phase One. US Dispositions Behind Cedar Creek: The Union Army of the Shenandoah, about 32,000 men under Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, encamped on the heights above Cedar Creek from near Middle Marsh Brook to south of the Valley Turnpike. On the night of October 18-19, General Sheridan was at Winchester, returning from a conference in Washington, D.C. In his absence, Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright, commander of the VI Corps, was left in command of the army, his headquarters at Belle Grove, south of Middletown. The army comprised three infantry corps (Wright's VI, Maj. Gen. William Emory's XIX, and Brig. Gen. George Crook's Army of West Virginia), and a cavalry corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Alfred Torbert. The VI Corps was on the far right of the Union infantry on the hills north of Meadow Brook. Torbert's cavalry (Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's Division), encamped near Nieswander's Fort. Brig. Gen. George A. Custer's division covered the Back Road and the Cedar Creek crossings in the vicinity of Hite's Chapel. The XIX Corps occupied the bluffs above Cedar Creek, extending from Meadow Brook to the Valley Pike bridge. Crook's corps and an attached "provisional" division under Brig. Gen. John Howard Kitching were bivouacked south and east of the Valley Pike. The vast trains of the army were parked on level ground west of Belle Grove near the pike. Two of the three corps erected entrenchments. The Union left flank was considered protected by the North Fork Shenandoah River and the rough ground in front of the Massanutten and was lightly picketed by cavalry. Other elements of US cavalry covered Buckton Ford and the roads from Front Royal.

Phase Two. CS Approach and Preparations for Battle: On 17 October 1864, Maj. Gen. John Gordon and topographical engineer Jedediah Hotchkiss climbed to Signal Knob on the Massanutten to survey the Union position behind Cedar Creek. While there, they formulated a daring plan to turn the Union left flank, which Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early approved. After dark on 18 October, the plan was set in motion. Gordon's, Ramseur's, and

Pegram's divisions, (Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia) under overall command of Gordon, marched from their entrenchments and crossed the North Fork east of Fisher's Hill. They followed a narrow path along the face of the Massanutten, often in single file, and along the Manassas Gap railroad to a spot opposite McInturff's and Colonel Bowman's fords. After surprising and capturing the pickets, the divisions recrossed the North Fork, passing north on a farm lane, past Col. Bowman's House "Long Meadow," to the vicinity of the Cooley House, where they faced to the left to form a line of battle beyond the left flank of Crook's corps. Gordon's column was in position by 0400 hours.

In the meantime, Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions accompanied by the army's artillery, advanced down the pike, by Spangler's Mill and through Strasburg. Kershaw's column, accompanied by Gen. Early, diverged to the right on the road to Bowman's Mill Ford, where it prepared for the dawn attack. Wharton continued on the pike past the George Hupp House to Hupp's Hill, where he deployed. The CS artillery massed on the Valley Pike south of Strasburg to await developments at the front. In conjunction with these maneuvers, Brig. Gen. Thomas Rosser's cavalry division advanced on the Back Road to Cupp's Ford. Brig. Gen. Lunsford Lomax's cavalry division was ordered to advance on the Front Royal-Winchester Road and then cross over to the Valley Pike in the vicinity of Newtown (Stephens City). Lomax did not advance as directed.

Phase Three. Surprise Attack on US Left Flank: Before dawn a heavy fog descended on the area. At precisely 0500, Kershaw's division fired a thunderous volley and rushed the entrenchments of Thoburn's division (Crook), overrunning them. Gordon's force began to advance and a few minutes later smashed into Brig. Gen. Rutherford B. Hayes' division (Crook) and Kitching's provisional division. Hayes' veterans attempted a stand which soon evaporated as Confederates closed in on both flanks of the disorganized units. Union soldiers, surprised in their camps, streamed rearward. At the sound of firing, Wharton's division advanced to the creek and deployed, awaiting further developments. The CS artillery raced to the front and opened fire on the XIX Corps from the heights overlooking Cedar Creek. A detachment of CS cavalry with Gordon attempted to reach Belle Grove, where they expected to capture Sheridan.

By 0530, mobs of stragglers from Crook's and Kitching's commands streamed west across the Valley Pike, confirming the scope of the disaster. Emory withdrew the units that covered the turnpike bridge and attempted to form a defensive line parallel with the pike. As he did so, Wharton's division crossed Cedar Creek at Stickley's Mill and rushed the heights, capturing 7 guns. Only desperate action enabled the rest of the US artillery to escape. Colonel Thomas Wilde's brigade (Crook's corps) went into line just east of the pike to contest the CS attack. General Wright directed their advance personally and was painfully wounded in the chin. A second US brigade under Col. Stephen Thomas (XIX Corps) advanced to high ground about 200 yards east of the pike and fired volley after volley into the fog, suffering heavy casualties. The stand of these brigades bought time for the Union trains parked near Belle Grove to escape to the north. The advanced US units were steadily driven back to Belle Grove. Crook's corps and Kitching's command were shattered and out of the fighting for the rest of the day.

Phase Four. VI Corps and XIX Corps Resistance: The VI Corps deployed to meet the approaching assault. While elements of the XIX Corps reorganized on Red Hill, Ricketts's Division (VI Corps) formed a line of battle anchored on Cedar Creek and fought an isolated battle against Kershaw's division which furiously attacked their line. Wheaton's Division (VI Corps) advanced to high ground in the fields north of Belle Grove Mansion, where they were assaulted by Gordon. The fog burned off and for the first time the opposing forces could see one another clearly. CS batteries were brought to bear against the US line. Kershaw assaulted repeatedly but was repulsed. Gradually, all US forces in the area withdrew and retreated northeast along Middle Marsh Brook.

Phase Five. Getty's Defense of Cemetery Hill: While fighting raged to his right, Maj. Gen. George Getty maneuvered his division (VI Corps) toward Middletown, seeking to extend the Union line to cover the Valley Pike. When US forces on the right began to withdraw, however, Getty established a defensive salient on Cemetery Hill, supported by artillery. General Early concentrated against Getty's position, launching disjointed attacks with elements of four different divisions which were successively repulsed with heavy casualties in the area near the

Sperry House and the Ridings House. The CS artillery massed along the Valley Pike and concentrated a deadly fire on Cemetery Hill. After about an hour, Getty withdrew to join the rest of the army which was rallying, first along the Old Forge Road and then in a salient across the Valley Pike. Getty's stand broke the momentum of the CS assaults and enabled other US units to withdraw north of the cemetery to regroup.

In the meantime, Custer's division, after throwing back Rosser's feeble attempt to gain the US rear, joined Merritt on the far left of the Union line, east of the pike and north of Middletown. This concentration of cavalry threatened Early's right flank and forced him to redeploy heavy force in this area.

Phase Six. Sheridan Arrives/ US Army Regroups: About 1030, Sheridan arrived on the field after riding from Winchester. He established his command post near the Valley Pike (vicinity of the Dinges Farm) and began to reorganize his forces. The VI Corps was deployed on the left, adjacent to the Valley Pike, with the XIX Corps on the right. Crook's disorganized command was placed in reserve along the pike. In a dramatic moment, Sheridan rode along the front of the reestablished battle line. The men responded with a tremendous cheer. As skirmishing continued, Sheridan placed a cavalry division on each of his flanks, Merritt on the left and Custer on the right. About 1500, he prepared to launch a counterattack.

Phase Seven. CS Line Advances to Miller's Mill Road: After the US withdrawal from Cemetery Hill, Early advanced to occupy the hill and called a halt to regroup. He placed his divisions in a line about two and a half miles long, just north of Middletown, and pushed Ramseur and Kershaw forward to Miller's Mill Road. The CS divisions from left to right were: Gordon, Kershaw, Ramseur, Pegram, Wharton. As the afternoon wore on, skirmishing continued and several probes were made of the newly reestablished US line, but no serious fighting developed. Early appeared convinced that he had won the battle and that US forces would retreat after dark.

Phase Eight. Cavalry Maneuvers/Collapse of CS Left: About 1500 hours, Merritt advanced on the Union left, putting pressure on the CS right flank north of Middletown. Heavy US skirmish lines forced CS skirmishers back on their main line along the Miller's Mill Road and west. Custer maneuvered into position on the US right flank, confronting Gordon's men near Middle Marsh Brook. About 1530 Custer's division of cavalry and elements of the XIX Corps advanced against the CS left flank (Gordon and Kershaw), which was hanging in the air. Custer continued extending west beyond Middle Marsh Brook, thinning the CS line. He then launched a powerful attack that overran and scattered Gordon's division. The Confederate line now began to unravel from west to east, putting additional pressure on Ramseur's command at the center.

Phase Nine. Union Counterattack: At 1600 Sheridan ordered a general advance which led to fierce fighting along the front. Ramseur's division at the Confederate center near Miller's Mill bore the brunt of the attacks and repulsed several, in spite of the withdrawal of Kershaw and Gordon on his left. Fighting raged around the D. J. Miller House and mill until Ramseur fell mortally wounded. Then CS resistance in this area began to collapse. CS forces along the pike retreated hastily, although in fairly good order, up the Valley Pike toward the Union camps they had captured in the morning. Delaying actions fought by artillery and infantry units kept pursuing Union forces at bay. Merritt pressed forward with his division, pursuing closely as Confederates retreated across Cedar Creek.

Phase Ten. CS Retreat to Fisher's Hill: Custer's division advanced south along Middle Marsh Brook, gaining the rear of the Confederate army. As the CS rout continued, Custer crossed Cedar Creek at Hottel's Mill Ford and joined Merritt's division on Hupp's Hill at dusk about 1830. The cavalry advanced, pursuing the Confederates back along the Valley Pike. The bridge near Spangler's Mill collapsed causing Early to lose most of his artillery and many wagons. The cavalry pursuit continued after dark, ending at Fisher's Hill. The US cavalry captured 43 cannons, more than 200 wagons, and many prisoners. The Confederates lost at least ten battle flags, which symbolized the progressive disintegration of the army.

CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

In spite of the damage wrought by interstate highway construction, encroaching development in the vicinity of Middletown, and a large-scale quarry along Middle Marsh Brook, the integrity of Cedar Creek battlefield is high. The

battlefield core is very large, extending from Hupp's Hill to rte. 633 north of Middletown, and from the North Fork Shenandoah to Middle Marsh Brook. The study area encompasses the initial Confederate position at Fisher's Hill.

Beginning with surviving entrenchments on Fisher's Hill, the line of Gordon's flank march can be traced along the base of Massanutten through a pristine natural landscape. The fords where Confederate infantry crossed the North Fork can be located and waded. The Col. Bowman and Cooley houses, which figured prominently in the Confederate deployment, are there and in good condition. Union entrenchments remain on Hupp's Hill and along Cedar Creek. Belle Grove (Sheridan's headquarters) is preserved by the National Trust. Two hundred-fifty-eight acres of the surrounding fields are held by the National Trust and the Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation (CCBF). An additional 100 acres adjacent to Cedar Creek in the vicinity of Bowman's Fort has recently been donated to the National Trust/CCBF. Cedar Creek Battlefield is registered as a National Historic Landmark. The acreage included within the landmark boundaries fairly accurately reflects the size of the battlefield's core area. The CCBF is currently raising funds to renovate the historic Heater House.

The view from Getty's position on Cemetery Hill remains scenic in spite of new townhouse construction at the base of the hill. The Historic District of Middletown is a contributing resource. The D. J. Miller House and the McDaniel House, where Ramseur was mortally wounded, stand. Undisturbed fields to the north and east witnessed the counterattack directed by Sheridan late in the day, although new construction has begun that may impact upon this area. These and related parcels allow in-depth interpretation of the battle.

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO THE BATTLEFIELD

In recent years, the pace of subdivision and new construction in the area has stepped up. An industrial/business park was built along US 11 south of Middletown (ironically, on the very ground labelled "Cedar Creek Battlefield" on the USGS quadrant). This industrial park currently consists of three large, but low-profile buildings, south of the Victorian house called Montvue. On this crest Confederate artillery massed against Cemetery Hill and General Early established his command post, during the battle. These buildings are visible from many parts of the battlefield. Construction northeast of Belle Grove along rte. 624 would tend to degrade the viewshed of the land preserved by the National Trust and CCBF. A modern house is currently under construction in this area.

The area between Cemetery Hill and Old Town Middletown has filled in with townhouses and apartments in the past few years. Residential development has also occurred and continues adjacent to the I-81 interchange (#77). New construction of several large homes on 3-5 acre lots began in early 1991 and is ongoing south of rte. 634 and west of the Miller-McDaniel Farm (ground has being recontoured). This area saw severe fighting in later phases of the battle. Of all residential construction, this new development is potentially the most damaging to battlefield integrity, because it establishes a foothold in the rural landscape west of town. Other construction has been more or less associated with the existing town. Lord Fairfax College and the new elementary school were built north of town, along US 11, on ground separating the two final battle lines of the armies and fought over by Wesley Merritt's cavalrymen and Gabriel Wharton's, John Pegram's, and William Wofford's infantrymen.

The quarries along Cedar Creek and Middle Marsh Brook are large-scale operations that are gradually working northeast along the valley. It appears that the quarry company owns land all the way to rte. 627 and possibly beyond. If continued north another half mile, this quarrying will eradicate the ruins of 18th-century Nieswander's Fort, site of Merritt's bivouac and George A. Custer's decisive flanking attack against John B. Gordon. The quarry works are visually intrusive from various parts of the battlefield.

The battlefield south of the junction of interstate highways I-66 and I-81 does not seem immediately in jeopardy because there is no interchange and access to the area is restricted to four county roads. This block of land retains very high rural/historic integrity and contains the Colonel Bowman and Cooley houses.

Identified Sites and Features Associated with the Battlefield (unsurveyed*)

8th Vermont Monument
19th Corps Entrenchments
128th New York Monument
Belle Grove
Bowman's Fort
Bowman's Mill (site of)
Bowman's Mill Ford
Buckton Ford
Cedar Creek
Cedar Creek Crossing
Clover House at Mine Bank Ford*
Col. Bowman's Ford
Collapsed Bridge Site
Cooley House
Crook's Entrenchments (traces)
Cupp's Ford
Entrenchments
Fisher's Hill
Fisher's Mill*
G. A. Hupp House (site of*)
George Hupp House
Heater House
Hottel's Mill (site of*)
Hupp's Ford
Hupp's Hill
Long Meadow (Col. Bowman House)
Lowell Monument
Manassas Gap Railroad
McInturff House (ruin)
McInturff's Ford
Meadow Brook
Middle Marsh Brook
Middletown Cemetery
Miller House
Miller's Mill (ruin)
Miller-Kendricks Structures
Nieswander's Fort
North Fork Shenandoah River
Old Front Royal Road
Old Town Strasburg
Old Town Middletown
Ramseur Monument
Red Hill
Signal Knob
Fort Banks (site of)
Spangler's Mill
Sperry House (site of*)
Stickley House
Stickley's Mill (ruin)
Stone Bridge (ruin)
Stone House
Sunnyside
Thoburn's Redoubt
Valley Turnpike
Walton House
Widow Funkhouser House (site of)
Wm. Dinges Farm*

	Study Area		Core Area	
	Acres	Percent	Acres	Percent
LAND USE / LAND COVER				
Built-up Land	1,649.63	10.48	662.43	10.56
Agricultural Land	9,508.95	60.41	4,158.95	66.3
Forest Land	4,284.61	27.22	1,407.02	22.43
Barren Land: Strip Mines, Quarries, Gravel Pits	297.50	1.89	44.54	0.71
Total	15,740.69	100.00	6,272.94	100.00
GIS ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY				
Retained Integrity	13,976.17	88.79	5,601.10	89.29
Lost Integrity	1,764.53	11.21	671.83	10.71
Level of Integrity	Good		Good	

TABLE 15

1991 LAND USE / LAND COVER
CEDAR CREEK BATTLEFIELD

I was returning by a shorter route when I came suddenly on a "Jessie Scout" in the narrow lane that led out to Griffith's factory. I had taken the precaution to put around my neck a white handkerchief, leaving a long end hanging down over the shoulder, the badge by which the "Jessies" distinguished each other. Those "Jessie Scouts" were a body of men dressed in Confederate uniforms, organized by General Fremont. The fellow rode up cautiously, his pistol drawn, but I pretended to be unconcerned, showing no disposition to draw mine. He rode a noble dapple gray, and stopped when our horses's heads were nearly together. "Where are you going?" said he. "Going into town," replied I, quietly, but in a firm voice. He then inquired where I belonged, and I answered, "To the same crowd you do—to Captain Purdy's scouts."

"Why I don't remember seeing you, though I hav'nt been detailed long myself." "That is just my case," I replied.

He then asked what regiment I was detailed from. I told him from the 12th Pennsylvania, Captain Fenner's company F. This satisfied him; he put up his pistol; and, as I rode up alongside, I noticed a pair of handcuffs looped over the small strap that holds the saddle-pocket to the flap. I asked what he was going to do with the "ruffles." He replied, "There is a Reb out at old Griffith's, and I am going after him." "Let me look at them," said I; and, as he stooped to take them off, I quickly drew my sabre...

—Colonel Harry Gilmor, *Four Years in the Saddle*, 1866.

Part Four: Integrity, Threat, Risk

View from Hospital Hill, Cool Spring by David W. Lowe

Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia

Part Four

Battlefield Integrity, Threat, Risk, and Relative Significance

Part Four describes the integrity of the fifteen battlefields as determined by both field survey and GIS techniques, discusses the level of threat to each of the sites, and classifies them by categories of risk. Possible preservation and interpretation scenarios are described for the battlefields, and a time frame for preservation action is offered.

Field Survey of Battlefield Integrity

The fifteen battlefields were examined by the field surveyor and rated in terms of their perceived similarity to the Civil War landscape. Although time has not stopped at any of these sites, the currently existing features of the rural landscape were used as a baseline. A distinction was made between changes to the landscape wrought by crop cycles; woodland succession or less dense, single family residential growth; and abrupt changes caused by the introduction of a radically non-historic land use practice, such as the construction of new, non-historic roads and high density housing developments, or the recontouring of the ground.

In most cases, farming or new woodland cover preserves all historic ground contours and enables interpretation of the battlefield, even when a specific viewshed might be obscured. Single family dwellings on large lots were usually not deemed intrusive if the balance of surrounding rural land was maintained. The presence of historic structures, ruins, or other survivals, such as earthworks and stone fences, was weighed against the presence of modern structures or other alterations and in many cases boosted the rating of specific battlefield parcels. Historic districts listed in the National Register of Historic Places, such as Winchester and New Market were considered a reinforcement of integrity, since these areas tend to maintain the street grid, scale, and mass of the Civil War era.

With each modern addition to or alteration of the historic landscape, the condition of a battlefield is eroded and the ability to understand and interpret a site is degraded. While a battlefield's study area can absorb some degree of alteration (depending on the site), the loss of core area acreage inhibits the interpretation of essential battlefield events and at some imprecise point prohibits interpretation altogether. Although some level of interpretation can occur on smaller parcels of land, preservation of the land where the battle took place enables a fuller understanding of events.

The ratings derived from the field-survey evaluation forms apply generally to the entire study area of a battlefield. A "Good" rating denotes that the appearance of the site is essentially unchanged from the historic period with respect to terrain, land use, road network, and mass and scale of buildings. "Fair" describes a site where the primary geographical, topographical, or structural features are largely intact with some changes. "Poor" denotes a site where the primary geographical, topographical, or structural features have been altered, as by road construction, or other changes of land use. "Lost" denotes a site that has "changed beyond recognition," meaning that a resident of the time returning to the site today presumably would not recognize his surroundings.

A larger study area tended to lower the overall rating of a battlefield because of the greater likelihood of intrusions—visual and physical—even though essential core parcels were substantially intact. With a smaller study area, on the other hand, the effects of land use alterations tended to be amplified and more immediately communicated to the battlefield core.

Battlefield	Integrity Assessment		County/City
McDowell (1862)	4.6	GOOD	Highland
Cross Keys (1862)	4.25	GOOD	Rockingham
Piedmont (1864)	4.2	GOOD	Augusta
Port Republic (1862)	4.1	GOOD	Rockingham
Cool Spring (1864)	3.7	FAIR	Clarke
Fisher's Hill (1864)	3.5	FAIR	Shenandoah
Tom's Brook (1864)	3.2	FAIR	Shenandoah
Cedar Creek (1864)	3.1	FAIR	Frederick Warren Shenandoah
First Kernstown (1864)	3.0	POOR-to-FAIR	Frederick Winchester
Second Winchester (1863)	2.9	POOR	Frederick Winchester
Second Kernstown (1864)	2.6	POOR	Frederick Winchester
New Market (1864)	2.6	POOR	Shenandoah
Front Royal (1862)	2.5	POOR	Warren
Opequon (1864)	2.3	POOR	Frederick Winchester
First Winchester (1862)	1.25	LOST	Frederick Winchester

Figure 13. Field-Survey Ranking of Battlefield Integrity

4-5 GOOD (Similar to CW Appearance), 3-4 FAIR (Somewhat Altered), 2-3 POOR (Decidedly Altered), 1-2 LOST (Changed Beyond Recognition)

Only those battlefields with few large-scale additions or alterations in both study and core areas received the highest marks. These were McDowell, Cross Keys, Piedmont, and Port Republic. Battlefields with some alterations or intrusions (most often interstate highways), yet retaining relatively high core integrity were Cool Spring, Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, Cedar Creek, and First Kernstown.

Battlefields deemed to have suffered a significant loss of integrity due to alterations, intrusions, and fragmentation were Second Kernstown, Second Winchester, Front Royal, New Market, Opequon, and First Winchester. Of these sites, Front Royal and First Winchester have suffered most, because of the relatively small sizes of the study and core areas. These battlefields have been highly fragmented and essential core areas and defining features lost to the point and where interpretation of the battle events is severely inhibited. Except for a single valley and forested hill, the core area of First Winchester has been assimilated into the City of Winchester, with additional new construction planned.

In spite of integrity loss, important core parcels remain for the battlefields of First and Second Kernstown, Second Winchester, and Opequon. In the case of Opequon, surviving core parcels total more than 900 contiguous acres. Even First Winchester, rated as lost retains several small parcels that would enable commemoration of the battle.

Figure 13 summarizes the findings of the field-survey evaluation forms.

GIS ANALYSIS OF BATTLEFIELD INTEGRITY

The field survey form rated battlefield integrity through the eyes of the survey team. While these observations are valuable in terms of how the battlefield landscapes are perceived subjectively, for the purposes of this study it was deemed important to find a more objective measure of the loss or retention of integrity. For this we turned to the Cultural Resources GIS Facility for a computer analysis of land use within the battlefield study and core areas. Computer mapping and analysis software, collectively known as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) were used in this study to create a mosaic map by combining many different modern and historic maps; to document study and core areas, to assess current land uses within defined areas; and to calculate statistics for land parcels.

The battlefield study and core areas were reduced to a computer format to enable various comparisons. The average size of study areas of the fifteen battlefields was 5,727 acres, ranging from 3,082 acres at Front Royal to 22,274 acres at Second Winchester. The size of the Front Royal study area accurately reflects the smaller numbers of troops engaged and their restricted deployment along the main roads. Second Winchester, on the other hand, involved a larger force, a network of Union entrenchments, two sweeping flank marches by Confederate forces that literally encircled the town of Winchester, and three days of fighting and maneuvering. The study areas of the Valley's two major battles (in terms of forces engaged and casualties) at Opequon and Cedar Creek were 11,670 acres and 15,607 acres respectively.

Because the study areas of several battlefields overlap, the total acreage for the study areas of the fifteen battlefields was 85,909 acres, 3.4 percent of the area of the Shenandoah Valley under consideration. Battlefield core areas ranged in size from 944 acres at Front Royal to 6,252 acres at Cedar Creek. The mean size of the core areas was 2,415 acres. Total acreage included in the battlefield core areas was 33,844 acres, 1.4 percent of the Valley's land area.

Figure 14 presents the integrity of the battlefields as determined by the GIS analysis. The percentage of built-up lands was computed for the battlefield study and core areas, using available 1973 land use data. These figures were then updated by on-site field inspections. In general, built-up lands, new roads, and quarries were subtracted from study and core area acreage, to achieve an integrity rating. One exception was built-up areas that were residential at the time of the Civil War and that still retain a similar scale and density, such as the old towns of Winchester, New Market, and McDowell. These districts were felt to support battlefield integrity. Retention of 75-100 percent natural and agricultural lands rated "Good," 50-74 percent rated "Fair," 25-49 percent rated "Poor," and less than 25 percent rated "Lost." As presented, the GIS analysis reflects the relative integrity of the battlefields as of 1991.

Figure 15 compares the findings of the field survey with the GIS integrity assessment. The field surveyors were more critical of visual intrusions, particularly of highways, bridges, powerlines, and construction within

Battlefield	Size of Study /Core Areas	Integrity of Study Areas	Integrity of Core Area
McDowell	4,539/2,258	100% (Good)	100% (Good)
Port Republic	4,936/2,145	94% (Good)	98% (Good)
Cool Spring	5,740/1,946	97% (Good)	97% (Good)
Cross Keys	5,450/2,153	94% (Good)	94% (Good)
Piedmont	9,340/2,693	94% (Good)	94% (Good)
Cedar Creek	15,607/6,252	89% (Good)	89% (Good)
Fisher's Hill	9,644/2,751	89% (Good)	85% (Good)
Tom's Brook	6,644/2,018	83% (Good)	83% (Good)
First Kernstown	4,029/1,554	56% (Fair)	71% (Fair)
New Market	5,611/2,261	74% (Fair)	68% (Fair)
Second Kernstown	5,861/2,203	50% (Poor to Fair)	52% (Fair)
Second Winchester	22,274/3,113	48% (Poor)	52% (Fair)
Opequon	11,670/4,914	54% (Fair)	47% (Poor)
Front Royal	3,082/944	48% (Poor)	33% (Poor)
First Winchester	4,041/1,393	28% (Poor)	22% (Lost)

Figure 14. GIS Ranking of Battlefield Integrity

ASSESSMENT OF CORE INTEGRITY	GIS Rating GOOD (75-100%)	GIS Rating FAIR (50-75%)	GIS Rating POOR (25-50%)	GIS Rating LOST (0-25%)
Field Survey Rating GOOD Similar to CW Appearance	McDowell Cross Keys Piedmont Port Republic			
Field Survey Rating FAIR Somewhat Altered	Cedar Creek Fisher's Hill Cool Spring Tom's Brook	1st Kernstown		
Field Survey Rating POOR Decidedly Altered		2nd Winchester 2nd Kernstown New Market	Opequon Front Royal	
Field Survey Rating LOST Changed Beyond Recognition				1st Winchester

Figure 15. Battlefield Core Areas: Comparison of Field Survey and GIS Integrity Assessments

the battlefield cores. Four battlefields ranked good by GIS were ranked fair by the field survey team: Cedar Creek, Fisher's Hill, Cool Spring, and Tom's Brook. Four battlefields ranked fair by the GIS methodology, were ranked poor by the field survey: Second Winchester, Second Kernstown, and New Market. Both methods agreed on the good integrity of McDowell, Cross Keys, Piedmont, and Port Republic, on the fair integrity of First Kernstown, on the poor integrity of Opequon and Front Royal, and the lost condition of First Winchester. Although the integrity ranking derived through GIS differed in these instances from the field survey rating, both methods cluster the battlefields similarly toward the top and bottom of the scale. The GIS method generates a gross ratio between land of high and low integrity and does not measure many visual intrusions that are apparent in the field. A minor intrusion in terms of acreage might appear as a major visual intrusion, depending on the location and setting. In this sense, the computer is more forgiving than the critical observer. This reference data is crucial, however, for obtaining a more objective view of the current status of the battlefields. Where the GIS rating is considerably higher than the field survey rating, perhaps, visual intrusions could be removed or masked to improve integrity. The GIS assessment will provide a reference point for monitoring further loss of integrity.

Several interesting facts emerged from a regional analysis of the battlefield study areas. The study areas contain a higher proportion of agricultural land (63 percent) than is the case for the Valley as a whole (37 percent). Due to this, changes in agricultural patterns or loss of agricultural land tend to have a higher impact on the battlefields than on the overall Valley landscape. Forests make up more than 56 percent of the Valley's acreage but only about 21 percent of battlefield acreage. This is accounted for by the fact that the Valley's forests are more concentrated in the higher elevations, while battles typically were fought on lower, flatter ground. In addition, built-up lands are more concentrated in the battlefield study areas (14 percent) than in the Valley as a whole (6 percent), reflecting the location of battlefields on or near important towns and transportation nodes. A relatively high level of existing residential development within a battlefield study area indicates that further development in the vicinity is probable due to zoning and continued growth.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE BATTLEFIELDS

The study team was asked to prioritize the battlefields of the Shenandoah Valley in terms of their significance. There is no easy way to arrive at such an assessment through historical analysis alone. The richest understanding of individual major battles within the Valley is best achieved by viewing the battlefields together, in their interaction with one another within a campaign context. The battle events are so interdependent, due to geography and topography, that to consider one battlefield separately from those of which it is a part, is to miss a critical meaning of this unique aspect of the Civil War. How Stonewall Jackson manipulated these geographic realities remains a source of continuing fascination for military strategists. Viewed individually, Jackson's 1862 battles are dwarfed by the larger 1864 conflicts at Opequon and Cedar Creek. Yet Jackson's successful campaign profoundly shaped the early conduct of the war when the hopes of the Confederacy were high and its armies in the East seemed almost invincible. Jackson's campaign contributed materially to the defeat of Union armies in the Seven Days' Battles before Richmond by diverting large numbers of troops to protect Washington, D.C. Prioritizing by size, forces engaged, or casualties alone will not reflect adequately the significance of the individual events.

National Historic Landmark criteria are used by the National Park Service to evaluate cultural properties that possess exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting our heritage, and that possess a high degree of integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association. The following National Historic Landmark significance criteria apply to the Civil War sites in the Shenandoah Valley. A complete version of National Historic Landmark significance and integrity criteria may be found in Federal Regulations 36 CFR Part 65.

Battlefields that would meet the Landmark criteria are sites:

- That are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to, and are identified with, or that outstandingly represent, the broad national patterns of United States history and from which an understanding and appreciation of those patterns may be gained (Criterion 1); or
- That are associated importantly with the lives of persons

nationally significant in the history of the United States (Criterion 2); or

- That represent a significant, distinctive and exceptional entity whose components may lack individual distinction (Criterion 4).

When applied to Stonewall Jackson's 1862 Campaign, the above National Historic Landmark criteria stand up well. The battlefields of the Jackson campaign—First Kernstown, McDowell, Cross Keys, and Port Republic — are well documented as outstanding examples of the military strategy of Stonewall Jackson. These battlefields retain high integrity, the latter three being among the best preserved battlefields in the Valley. The battlefields of First Winchester and Front Royal may no longer meet the criteria for integrity and would not be eligible for Landmark status.

A case can be made for the national significance of Second Winchester within the context of the Gettysburg Campaign of 1863. The battle was not decisive in the campaign, yet the crushing victory achieved there may well have contributed to the aura of invincibility that the Confederate army carried with it to Gettysburg. This battlefield should be considered a valuable, supporting resource for understanding and interpreting the Gettysburg Campaign.

Turning to the 1864 Lynchburg campaigns of Sigel and Hunter, the national significance of the representative battlefields—New Market and Piedmont—is evident when viewed in context of General Grant's Overland Campaign. New Market Battlefield is currently listed in the National Register of Historic Places to commemorate the role of the Virginia Military Institute cadets and alumni in the battle. It also represents a failed attempt to accomplish what Union forces were able to do a month later at Piedmont. Piedmont ranks among the three bloodiest battles of the Valley, yet it is modest in size when compared to other major battles of the Civil War. Its significance within the context of Valley and Virginia warfare has been underrated, however. The Confederate defeat at Piedmont allowed General Hunter's army to penetrate as far as Lynchburg for the first time during the war and forced General Lee to detach nearly a third of his army to deal with this threat, materially influencing the direction of the campaigns for Richmond and Petersburg.

Early's and Sheridan's 1864 Valley campaigns initiated the largest and most costly events, in terms of casualties, forces engaged, and frequency of combat, in the history of Valley warfare. Early's invasion of Maryland, Union defeats at Cool Spring and Second Kernstown, and the subsequent burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, by Confederate raiders, led directly to the appointment of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan as overall commander of the Union armies in the Valley. Sheridan fielded the largest Union fighting force—the Army of the Shenandoah—to act in concert in the Valley. Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early, who learned his art at Stonewall Jackson's feet, conducted a masterful campaign with fewer men and resources than Jackson and came close to defeating Sheridan's much larger army at Opequon and again at Cedar Creek. Union successes at Opequon and Fisher's Hill led to "The Burning."

Indeed, the scope, size, and casualties of the battles of Opequon and Cedar Creek would rank in any list of significant battlefields of the Civil War. A strong case can be made that either or both of these battlefields can be considered nationally significant in their own right, although the campaign context offers the strongest evidence of significance. Cedar Creek Battlefield already is designated a National Historic Landmark and has retained a high degree of integrity, while Opequon has gone unrecognized, has deteriorated, and faces further fragmentation in the immediate future. Taken together, the battlefields of the Early-Sheridan campaigns—Cool Spring, Second Kernstown, Opequon, Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, and Cedar Creek—represent a unique and nationally significant chapter in the history of the Civil War.

Collectively, thirteen battlefields appear to meet National Historic Landmark criteria, excluding Front Royal and First Winchester. Of the largest Valley battlefields, Cedar Creek is already designated a National Historic Landmark, and Opequon might qualify on its own for National Historic Landmark designation, pending a full assessment of integrity. Both of these battlefields represent the same campaign but neither site tells the whole story of its campaign. The ability of other battlefields to warrant such NHL designation individually is problematic. Certainly these sites appear to qualify for listing in the National Register of Historic Places.

The National Park System Advisory Board, after reviewing the draft report, recommended listing all of the battlefields on the National Register. Review of this report by the Board was required under the legislation authorizing this report. Documentation prepared on these

battlefields for this study, as well as the resolution of the National Park System Advisory Board, will be provided to the Virginia State Historic Preservation Officer to initiate the nomination process. Since listing in the National Register of Historic Places usually is a process initiated through States, and for which owners are afforded by law the opportunity for input, this process would be the next appropriate step in recognizing the importance of these sites.

In conclusion, Jackson's 1862 Campaign is undoubtedly the most famous and most widely studied of the Valley campaigns. It was, however, not the longest, nor the largest, nor the most influential in terms of the war's outcome, nor the most costly in terms of either men or materiel. All of these "laurels" belong to the Early-Sheridan campaigns of 1864. Second Winchester attains its significance within the context of the Gettysburg Campaign of 1863, which amply demonstrates the Valley's strategic importance as an invasion corridor into the North. Civil War Veterans considered Gettysburg to be the pivotal battle of the Eastern theater, and sites associated with this campaign, such as Second Winchester, may justifiably share its significance. New Market and Piedmont attain significance within the context of Ulysses S.Grant's grand strategy to end the war by pushing his armies forward on all fronts.

No single battlefield can be singled out to represent the entire Shenandoah Valley Civil War period, since each represents one campaign (with the exception of the overlapping Kernstown battlefields). In addition, there is no clear line of historical argument that assures a credible ranking of battlefields within the individual campaigns, again, excepting Cedar Creek and Opequon, which stand out as the culmination of Early's and Sheridan's decisive confrontation. Cross Keys and Port Republic marked the culmination of the 1862 campaign, but Jackson's campaign itself is the story, and each of the individual battlefields tells but one episode.

Figure 16 summarizes the standards of comparison that have been developed in Parts Two and Four of this report. These rankings, combined with levels of threat and risk, and an assessment of the preservation potential for each site, may provide guidance for a regionally coordinated approach to preserving and interpreting as many of the battlefields as possible.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

From a ranking of the battlefields in terms of acreage, forces engaged, casualties, and fatalities, we turn to an assessment of the threats to each site. In Part Three, the perceived threats to each site were described in some detail. In this section we rank the sites in terms of relative threats and try to provide a sense of the time frame within which preservation activities must proceed. It is a tight schedule for many of the sites, which are in danger of slipping from poor to lost or from fair to poor condition within the next few years. If the current building recession continues, the fate of these sites may be prolonged for a few more years but not indefinitely. Many developers have placed their plans on hold, waiting to see how the market will develop. Land prices have declined somewhat in the high growth zones. Several battlefield parcels have been auctioned off for bankruptcy. In this climate, local governments seem more willing to consider alternative development scenarios, which include preserving battlefield sites in order to strengthen the tourism sector. If economic boom times return, however—and no preservation efforts have occurred in the meantime—then the integrity of many of the Valley's battlefields will decline rapidly, following the downward trend described below.

The assessment of threats to integrity was derived from a combination of factors, primarily the current integrity of the site, the number of landowners, known threats to specific core and study area parcels, current zoning (if any), the rate of population growth, and the amount of recent land use change in the vicinity. The threats assessment is meant to extrapolate from current trends and cannot be expected to foresee "catastrophic," that is, sudden and unexpected change.

In reality, someone could decide tomorrow to build a large residential subdivision in the heart of Piedmont or Cross Keys battlefields, but this would not be likely. Such a subdivision would be outside of Harrisonburg's current building zone and would presumably be unprofitable in the near future. The number of landowners would make a large development more difficult to assemble. The high integrity of both sites would tend to stand up longer against incremental land use change. Agriculture is still strong and viable in the vicinity, allowing farmers to hold on to their land and continue their livelihood. Opequon battlefield, on the other hand, is in poor condition; it is in the heart of Winchester's high growth area; it is zoned for

Battles Ranked by Core Size	Core Acres	Core Acres Retaining Integrity	Rank by Forces Engaged	Rank by Combined Attrition	Rank by Fatalities
1. Cedar Creek (1864)	6,252	5,601 (89%)	2	2	1
2. Opequon (1864)	4,914	2,321 (47%)	1	1	2
3. 2nd Winchester (1863)	3,113	1,624 (47%)	6	3	10
4. Fisher's Hill (1864)	2,751	2,354 (86%)	3	8	13
5. Piedmont (1864)	2,693	2,646 (98%)	8	5	3
6. New Market (1864)	2,261	1,527 (67%)	11	9	8
7. McDowell (1862)	2,258	2,258 (100%)	13	14	12
8. 2nd Kernstown (1864)	2,203	1,098 (49%)	4	7	4
9. Cross Keys (1862)	2,153	2,032 (94%)	7	12	6
10. Port Republic (1862)	2,145	2,110 (98%)	14	6	7
11. Tom's Brook (1864)	2,018	1,679 (83%)	12	15	15
12. Cool Spring (1864)	1,946	1,900 (97%)	9	13	9
13. 1st Kernstown (1862)	1,554	1,097 (70%)	10	10	5
14. 1st Winchester (1862)	1,393	302 (22%)	5	4	11
15. Front Royal (1862)	944	316 (33%)	15	11	14

Figure 16. Summary of Battlefield Size and Rankings

residential development; remaining core parcels are owned by fewer landowners, several of whom have plans for development; and several core parcels have recently been for sale. It is not difficult to predict the imminent loss of this battlefield's remaining resources without an immediate and strenuous effort to preserve them.

Five threat levels were assigned—very high, high, moderate, low, and very low—and these are defined below:

1. **Very High:** Rapidly changing land use in study area, core parcels immediately threatened, battlefield highly fragmented by large parcels of lost integrity, imminent loss of remaining resources.

2. **High:** Rapidly changing land use in study area, large core parcels threatened, portions of battlefield already lost, substantial loss of resources within ten years.

3. **Moderate:** Incremental change of land use in study area, battlefield largely intact with small core parcels lost or threatened, some resource loss within ten years probable.

4. **Low:** Land use in study area changing slowly, core parcels as yet unthreatened, battlefield intact, some resource loss within ten years possible.

5. **Very Low:** Land use in study area has not changed, core parcels preserved, battlefield intact, loss of resources within ten years improbable.

Figure 17 summarizes levels of threat for the fifteen battlefields. The threats to three sites —First Winchester, Opequon, and Front Royal— are considered very high. Threats to four sites —First and Second Kernstown, Second Winchester, and Tom's Brook— are rated high. New Market, Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek and Cool Spring are moderately threatened. Piedmont, Cross Keys, and Port Republic are experiencing low levels of threat, and McDowell, very low.

It can be seen that, in the absence of preservation efforts, the only battlefield that appears entirely secure within the foreseeable future is McDowell. Only McDowell is not significantly threatened by any form of land use change. The principal source of threats for all sites comes from expansion of residential development followed, in declining order of incidence, by commercial, highway, and industrial developments. Residential construction threatens twelve battlefields, commercial development threatens seven, highway construction threatens six, industrial and quarrying development threatens three.

RISK CLASSIFICATION

To further develop a priority list of battlefields, the level of threat was combined with the current integrity to classify each battlefield according to its "at risk" standing. Integrity describes the current condition of a battlefield. The level of threat suggests what to anticipate for the site in the foreseeable future. Combining present and potential conditions, produces an assessment of risk for each of the battlefields. The field survey ratings were used to classify sites. Although core areas are used for this classification, risks for the larger study areas are generally consistent with and follow those of the core areas. Figure 18 summarizes the risk classification for the fifteen battlefields as described below (threats 1-5, integrity A-D):

Highest Risk (A1, B1): lost or poor integrity with very high threat;

High Moderate (2B, 2C, 3B): poor to fair integrity with high or moderate threat;

Low Moderate (3C, 3D): fair to good integrity with moderate threat;

Lowest Risk (4D, 5D): good integrity with low or very low levels of threat.

Within each of the subcategories in the table, battlefields were ranked by relative size in core acreage in ascending order because it is assumed that, of two battlefields under similar threat, the smaller would be more quickly damaged by further loss of integrity. This order, moving down each column and from left to right, was then used to produce the risk priority ranking.

Sites with the highest risk are experiencing very high threats and already are in lost or poor condition as coherent battlefield landscapes. Any protection or interpretation at these sites will be limited to relatively small fragments and focused largely on commemoration. Limited potential remains to interpret the battle or to convey a realistic sense of the battle setting and the terrain and other military conditions experienced by the troop formations and their commanders. Such sites include Front Royal (1862), 1st Winchester (1862), and Opequon (1864).

Sites with the lowest risk are in good condition and experiencing low to very low levels of threats ranging from McDowell (1862) with no currently identified threats to very gradual expansion of residential construction at Cross Keys (1862), Port Republic (1862), and Piedmont (1864).

Level of Threat	Definition	Battlefields
1. Very High	Imminent loss of remaining resources	Front Royal First Winchester Opequon
2. High	Substantial loss of resources within ten years probable	Second Winchester Second Kernstown Tom's Brook First Kernstown
3. Moderate	Some loss of resources within ten years probable	Fisher's Hill New Market Cool Spring Cedar Creek
4. Low	Some loss of resources within ten years possible	Port Republic Cross Keys Piedmont
5. Very Low	Loss of resources within ten years improbable	McDowell

Figure 17. Level of Threat to the Valley's Battlefields

Protection of these sites can focus on ways to build community consensus in order to implement a long range landscape or agricultural preservation plan. Three of these sites represent Jackson's 1862 Campaign, including its culmination at Cross Keys and Port Republic.

The majority of battlefield sites are arrayed in intermediate or moderate risk situations which have been divided into "high moderate" and "low moderate" categories depending on the particular gravity of the integrity/threats combination. High moderate sites include First and Second Kernstown (1862/1864), Second Winchester (1863), New Market(1864), and Tom's Brook (1864). Low moderate sites include Fisher's Hill (1864), Cedar Creek (1864), and Cool Spring (1864). Many types and combinations of preservation and interpretive efforts may be appropriate to these sites, focusing on high moderate sites for the near term and low moderate sites for longer range plans.

PRESERVATION AND INTERPRETATION POTENTIAL

This section describes the preservation and interpretation scenarios for each of the battlefields, drawing upon the descriptions of condition and threat outlined in Part Three of this report, current land use practices, and upon comments received from individuals and local governments during the public comment period. These possibilities for preservation and interpretation are offered as guidance to the types of actions that could be pursued at each site within a regional preservation framework. Sites are discussed in order, from the most at risk to the least at risk.

1. Front Royal: Preservation and interpretation efforts for this battlefield would need to focus, first, on providing an adequate driving tour of the remaining resources. Many visitors could be encouraged to drive Stonewall Jackson's route from Limeton to Cedarville, if the route was marked and interpreted. Such a tour would pass through the center of town, tempting visitors to visit the city's museums and patronize its businesses. Interpretive signage at Prospect Hill Cemetery would enable an understanding of the battle areas covered over by the town of Front Royal. Access to the North and South Fork bridge sites would assist interpretation and might be acquired by public access easement. Public access by hiking trail to an overlook on the crest of Guard Hill could be sought by donation or by easement. The Thomas McKay House and US surrender site north of Cedarville would probably need to be acquired by purchase and considerable restoration work would be required to make the site attractive to visitors. (Even in its current condition, several hundred visitors stop there each year.) *Summary:* Potential for driving tour with several interpretive stops in an altered setting. The level of local government support for such an effort is unknown.

2. First Winchester: Although lost as a coherent landscape, enough remains of the battlefield to allow commemoration and some level of interpretation of the events. Bowers Hill, which was the focus of the Federal defense, remains a prominent landmark, despite residential development. The importance of this site could be appreciated by an overlook and interpretive shelter on the crest of the hill that lies west of and adjacent to US 11, north of rte. 622, and south of the abandoned Winchester and Western railroad spur. The abandoned spur line could be modified as a trail with interpretive signs along the way. This path parallels the course taken by the Louisiana brigade on its way to assault Bowers Hill. Easements could be sought to allow hikers to climb from the railroad to the hill crest and overlook. The site would retain interpretive value even if the planned residential construction for this area occurs. The developers of the site might benefit by a combined recreational and interpretive trail that serves residents, while at the same time allowing public appreciation of the battlefield site. *Summary:* Landscape preservation options are extremely limited. Potential exists for public-private interpretive/commemorative effort utilizing small parcels within a vastly altered setting.

3. Opequon: One of the largest and most significant battlefields of the Valley, a portion of its core—east of I-81, south of Redbud Road, west of rte. 656, and north of the residential and commercial development along VA 7—retains considerable integrity. The potential remains here for some form of larger scale landscape preservation, although currently much of the area is scheduled for residential development. Hackwood Estate, which was recently on the market, was a focal point of the battle and could be acquired by purchase. With Hackwood Estate alone, the battle could be interpreted, although this would fall short of landscape preservation. Adjacent lands in the First Woods and Middle Field sections (where from a third to half of the battle's fatalities were incurred) would



Figure 18. Risk Categories: Summary of Integrity and Threat

probably need to be acquired fee-simple. The properties' owners have expressed a previous willingness to sell. Redbud Run Valley, if protected by easements, could provide a scenic-natural corridor and wildlife refuge, of particular value if residential development in the area continues to fill in the available open space. The City of Winchester and Frederick County have expressed an interest in efforts to establish a visitor contact facility at this site. Such an effort would be expensive and may not be timely enough to prevent loss of remaining resources. *Summary:* Potential for preserving 200 to 900 acres of the core area exists through fee simple acquisition. Park establishment might be supported by local governments.

4. Second Kernstown: The key to interpreting Second Kernstown battlefield is Pritchard's Hill. Without this feature in its current setting, the battlefield would be lost. The view from Opequon Church (where there are currently interpretive signs) to Pritchard's Hill enables a full interpretation of the battle, making it essential that the intervening property be protected through zoning, easements, incentives, or some other arrangement suitable to the owners. *Summary:* This property displays potential for a battlefield park of manageable proportions. Local government officials have expressed interest in exploring the potential of a park at this site.

5. Second Winchester: The essential fieldwork, Star Fort, is critically endangered. Although about 7 acres of the fort area is currently preserved, the surrounding 50 acres is zoned commercial/industrial and would probably need to be acquired fee simple on the open market to preserve the viewshed. Some public access to Fort Milroy could probably be negotiated but restoration would be required. The viewshed from Apple Pie Ridge to West Fort (Louisiana Heights) could be protected by the purchase of easements. This would be an ideal site for an interpretive shelter and battle map. The land south of Stephenson's Depot (bounded by US 11, rte. 761, rte. 662, and rte. 838) is by far the best preserved part of the battlefield and holds great potential for interpretation. This parcel would probably need to acquired fee simple. *Summary:* Landscape preservation potential exists but at a limited number of sites. Significant parcels would need to be acquired soon—fee simple purchase—in order to prevent further deterioration of this battlefield.

6. New Market: The VMI New Market Battlefield Park could be enlarged by acquiring more land from willing sellers. This would expand the ability to protect and interpret the battlefield. A study should be conducted to determine if I-81 could be screened in some way to make it less intrusive without further disrupting the landscape contours. The existing battlefield park could serve as an access point for visitors who wish to see other Valley battlefields. *Summary:* Acquisition of property or easements from willing sellers would enhance the preserved portions of the battlefield. The battlefield park would require some form of assistance.

7. First Kernstown: Pritchard's Hill (See Second Kernstown) and Sand Ridge form the interpretive nuclei of the First Kernstown battlefield. Although bisected by the VA 37 bypass, these parcels are visually and strategically related. The Sand Ridge parcel cannot be adequately interpreted from the road. Access through easement or donation would be required. The Sand Ridge parcel has been placed in the Glen Burnie Trust. Some means should be found to provide further incentive to the owner to maintain the land in its current condition. *Summary:* If coupled with the parcel discussed under Second Kernstown, this property displays great potential for a park of manageable proportions. Park establishment might be supported by the local governments. Such a park could serve as an introduction to two major Valley campaigns.

8. Tom's Brook: This battlefield could be interpreted from the vantage point of Sand Ridge Church. Easements could be on Tom's Brook Valley and on the opposing portions of Spiker's Hill. An overlook could be established on the site where Custer rode out and doffed his hat to his opponent. A marked hiking trail, leading from North Mountain to the Massanutten Mountain already traverses the battlefield along the county roads. The viewshed from Spiker's Hill to the head of Massanutten Mountain is one of the most striking of the Valley and could be protected through easements and planning at the county level. Interpretive signs could be placed in the existing county park to describe fighting on the Valley Pike. Under current plans, it appears that Round Hill, a distinctive landmark, eventually may be encircled by commercial and industrial development, spawned by the interstate interchange. Efforts to preserve the rural character of sections of the cross roads between Back Road and the Valley Pike (rtes. 653, 655, 657, and 642), which were used as routes of maneuver by the US cavalry, would enhance the battlefield setting. *Summary:* Landscape preservation is possible and desirable but would require

easement protection for hundreds of acres. Fee simple acquisition might be required to preserve portions of the core areas. Acquisition of public access easements and an interpretive overlook at Spiker's Hill would be crucial.

9. Cool Spring: Much of the battlefield on the west bank of the river is owned by the Holy Cross Abbey, which has expressed a desire to maintain its high integrity. A golf course is scheduled for redevelopment on the east bank, and the historic Judge Parker House would serve as a club house. The owners might be willing to offer some public access to the fords and interpretive signage. Technical assistance could be offered in this endeavor. *Summary:* Potential exists for cooperation among private owners to reach a development/preservation compromise that would benefit all parties. Public access will probably continue to be limited to appointment.

10. Fisher's Hill: This site offers much potential for developing a creative solution to the private property-public access issue. Much of the battle can be interpreted from the roads with well-designed pull-offs and signage. With cooperation of landowners, a hiking trail could be designed to follow a portion of the surviving CS entrenchments, using the old bridge site and roadbed of the Valley Pike as an access point. This would require a footbridge over the creek, which could be gated to prevent unauthorized access. Easements given for the hiking trail could be modeled on the Trails for Vermont contract, which allows persons to use a trail only if they register, stay within bounds, and follow specified rules. Property owners could revoke right-of-way, if there are violations. The potential for private development of battlefield resources is significant: the old mill would be admirably suited as a museum and interpretive center; several period homes in the area could be developed as bed and breakfast inns. Private development of this type would need to be directed by the local landowners and supported by incentives. APCWS owns 195 acres of the battlefield, providing a suitable core for visitation. The conservation fund holds a protective easement on about 80 acres. *Summary:* Scenic valley. High potential for public-private battlefield development, utilizing creative public access techniques built around currently protected portion of battlefield core.

11. Cedar Creek: The National Trust and the Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation have made a good start in preserving portions of the battlefield around Belle Grove Mansion through private donations. Their efforts should be supported. Several adjacent parcels could be acquired immediately from willing sellers. The viability of agriculture is slipping at this end of Frederick County, and some means could be found to support farmers to retain as much land as possible in agricultural production. The landscape between Belle Grove and Cemetery Hill is most in danger of residential development, and hundreds of acres would need to be protected through purchase of easements in order to retain the high integrity of the currently preserved parcels. *Summary:* The landscape is largely intact with some intrusions. Retaining the integrity of currently preserved portions of the battlefield core will require fee simple acquisition of several large parcels and negotiated easements on hundreds of acres more. Because of the significance of this battle, this National Historic Landmark property displays potential for a Federal battlefield park. Park establishment would be supported at some level by the local governments. Because of the potential expense, vital portions of the battlefield north of Middletown might need to be given a lower priority for action.

12. Piedmont: This battlefield can be interpreted from the public roads with adequate signage, pull-offs, and interpretive materials. Farmers could be encouraged to continue the agricultural use of their property by some form of incentives. Local landowners organized to form a county agricultural preservation district that encompasses much of the battlefield. These landowners could be supported by tax or other incentives. A small, interpretive wayside with a battle map could be established near the angle of the Confederate line where "Grumble" Jones was killed. *Summary:* Landscape is largely intact. Minimal public access is needed. Easements would be required at specified interpretive stops and where necessary to protect battlefield land where agricultural incentives are not successful. Agricultural preservation incentives are recommended.

13. Cross Keys: Cross Keys offers a wonderful opportunity for landscape preservation, using the agricultural preservation district approach. The Lee-Jackson Foundation owns 100 acres of key ground on Victory Hill, allowing public access. This ground would need to be cleared of scrub and an unobtrusive, interpretive shelter put into place. Easements could be acquired, allowing public access to battle sites not visible from the roads. Restoration of the old Cross Keys Tavern by private groups should be supported and encouraged. *Summary:* The landscape is largely intact. Currently preserved land

could be secured by purchase of easements on adjacent parcels. Easements for public access would be required at several sites within the battlefield. There is potential for developing a battlefield hiking trail. Agricultural preservation incentives are recommended.

14. **Port Republic:** Port Republic battlefield can be viewed almost entirely from public roads with adequate signage and interpretive materials. APCWS owns about 8 acres at the Coaling site, allowing interpretation from this vantage point. The bottomland, where severe fighting occurred, is currently farmed. The railroad right-of-way across this ground could be used to provide public access if deemed necessary. Easements could be sought or incentives provided to continue agricultural use on this portion of the battlefield. The village of Port Republic is listed on the National Register, and the Society of Port Republic Preservationists has recently purchased the "Turner Ashby House" to serve as a museum and potential interpretive center for the town and battle. With adequate support, the site could serve as a public access point for the battles of Cross Keys, Port Republic, and Piedmont. *Summary:* Potential exists for public-private cooperation in preserving and interpreting three nearby battlefields. Landscape is largely intact. Agricultural preservation incentives are recommended.

15. **McDowell:** Pristine and scenic, the battlefield holds great potential for attracting visitors, who are interested in nature as well as history. The APCWS and the Lee-Jackson Foundation own about 200 acres of battlefield core, including the crest of Sitlington's Hill and a hiking trail to reach it. The view of the Valley is well worth the arduous climb. Currently, there is no on-site interpretation, and this would need to be expanded. An interpretive shelter in the town with several cannon (perhaps at the site of US batteries on Cemetery Hill) would encourage visitors. *Summary:* Landscape is largely preserved and protected. Interpretive assistance is required.

SUMMARY

Figure 19 provides a summary of risk categories and preservation tools and offers a suggested time frame for action. Threats to the integrity of the fifteen battlefields under study come primarily from residential construction (threatening 12 sites), commercial development (threatening 7), highway construction (threatening 6) and industrial development (threatening 3). Taken together, integrity and threats identify categories of risk to integrity. Combined with the significance of the respective campaigns, the following list of battlefield sites is the nearest approximation to a listing of current relative risk priority that is possible based on descriptive site analysis (1 is highest risk, 15 is lowest).

1. Front Royal (1862)
2. 1st Winchester (1862)
3. Opequon (1864)
4. 2nd Kernstown (1864)
5. 2nd Winchester (1863)
6. New Market (1864)
7. 1st Kernstown (1862)
8. Tom's Brook (1864)
9. Cool Spring (1864)
10. Fisher's Hill (1864)
11. Cedar Creek (1864)
12. Cross Keys (1862)
13. Port Republic (1862)
14. Piedmont (1864)
15. McDowell (1862)

Risk Category	Time Frame for Action*	Preservation Tools	Battlefields
HIGHEST RISK	Immediate Action Required	1. Fee-simple acquisition by land trust 2. Public/private commemorative efforts 3. Public access easements 4. Interpretive signs, shelters, materials	Front Royal 1st Winchester Opequon
HIGH MODERATE RISK	2-5 years	1. Fee-simple acquisition 2. Public access easements 3. Landscape preservation easements 4. Zoning 5. Support for private preservation efforts 6. Interpretive signs, shelters, materials	2nd Kernstown 2nd Winchester New Market 1st Kernstown Tom's Brook
LOW MODERATE RISK	5-10 years	1. Public access easements 2. Landscape preservation easements 3. Agricultural preservation efforts 4. Preservation tax incentives 5. Support for private preservation efforts 6. Interpretive signs, shelters, materials	Cool Spring Fisher's Hill Cedar Creek
LOWEST RISK	10-15 years	1. Landscape preservation easements 2. Agricultural preservation efforts 3. Preservation tax incentives 4. Support for private preservation efforts 5. Interpretive signs, shelters, materials	Cross Keys Port Republic Piedmont McDowell

Figure 19. Summary of Risk Categories and Preservation Tools

Time Frame for Action. These recommended time frames identify when preservation activities at the very latest should take place. Earlier efforts by local governments and private citizens are appropriate and should not be discouraged. Earlier efforts would undoubtedly be less costly and encourage more effective preservation regionwide.

Part Five: Heritage Tourism

Tour by Ed Bearss, Chief Historian, NPS by David W. Lowe

Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia

Part Five

The Potential for Developing Civil War-Related Tourism in the Shenandoah Valley

Heritage Tourism

Civil War-related attractions fall into a growing area of the tourism industry known as heritage tourism. Heritage tourism can be defined as "experiential tourism that provides for encounters with nature or feeling part of the history of a place." The concept of heritage tourism is not new. Organizations and academics have been practicing and promoting heritage tourism for years, but it has seen a resurgence. Increasing numbers of visitors are avoiding contrived tourist attractions and searching out places that evoke more "authentic" natural, cultural, and historic experiences.

The Shenandoah Valley has much to offer the heritage tourist, from Skyline Drive and the Shenandoah National Park, to vineyard tastings and tours, to caverns, old towns, and historic buildings, to more casual driving tours of the rural landscape. In the last decade, the number of bed and breakfast accommodations in the Valley has risen dramatically, catering to the desires mostly of urbanites who are eager to relax for the weekend in a scenic and historic setting.

Although it is impossible to pin down an exact number, thousands of visitors come to the Valley each year to visit Civil War sites. New Market Battlefield Park, for example, receives 45,000 to 65,000 visitors a year, while Belle Grove on Cedar Creek battlefield (the only other battlefield providing public access and interpretation) is visited by about 50,000 per year, a large portion attracted by their interest in the Civil War.

Several thousand come to the Valley just for Stonewall Jackson. They come for the essence of Stonewall, which is found on his battlefields. Seeking out Stonewall's battlefields is a difficult task because of limited public access, inadequate signage, lack of site-specific description and interpretation, and lack of direction, but many persist and are rewarded by the vistas of Cross Keys and Port Republic or the pristine qualities of McDowell.

Civil War history in the Valley is a largely untapped reservoir of riches in terms of heritage tourism. Its potential has not been adequately explored nor promoted. The present threat is that these sites will continue to go unrecognized and be gradually eaten away by loss of farmland and encroaching residential, commercial, and industrial development. There is no greater disappointment for a heritage tourist than to seek out a spot diligently and find its historic appearance significantly changed. He or she will move on, go elsewhere, seek out something more authentic.

Heritage Tourism Revenue Potential

Nationwide, tourism is among the three largest industries in 39 out of 50 states. (Sources of the statistical data are included in a separate report available from the National Park Service (Attn:413) upon request; ask for "Tourism in the Shenandoah Valley" prepared by John Packer, 1991.) It is the second largest employer in the country, providing jobs for about six million. Tourism is the largest business service export, the second largest employer following health services, and the third largest industry after food services and auto sales. Viewed nationally, tourism is a vital economic force.

In Virginia, tourism plays a major role in the economic vitality of the State. Tourism revenues have increased each year since 1975, with tourism dollars more than doubling from 1982 ($3.3 billion) to 1988 ($7.1 billion). The numbers speak for themselves.

In 1989, tourism generated more than $8 billion for the State economy including $204 million in State taxes and $124 million in local taxes. Tourism created 162,000 jobs statewide. Every dollar invested in tourism advertising returned $3.53 to State tax coffers. Tourist spending represented 18% of Virginia's retail business sales.

Most of these visitors come for the "must see" attractions. The following is a list of the top 20 destinations for Virginia travelers according to the Survey of Current Business, 1990 U.S. Department of Commerce (Valley destinations in boldface):

1.	**Blue Ridge Mountains**	30.3%
2.	Virginia Beach	29.9%
3.	Williamsburg	24.4%
4.	Richmond	23.1%
5.	Charlottesville	20.6%
6.	**Shenandoah** Valley	19.9%
7.	Norfolk	17.3%
8.	Busch Gardens	16.6%
9.	Kings Dominion	14.2%
10.	Alexandria	14.0%
11.	**Skyline Drive**	13.0%
12.	Roanoke	13.6%
13.	Jamestown	12.9%
14.	Natural Bridge	11.3%
15.	Petersburg	10.3%
16.	Abingdon	9.9%
17.	**Luray Caverns**	9.6%
18.	Fredericksburg	8.9%
19.	Chincoteague/Assateague	7.3%
20.	Mount Vernon	6.4%

As this list reveals, the Shenandoah Valley is already a major "must see" destination in the State, its attractions being primarily scenic and natural—the Blue Ridge, the Shenandoah Valley in general, Skyline Drive, and Luray Caverns.

Travel in Virginia (1988) reported significant economic benefits to the eight-county Shenandoah Valley study area. It is estimated that between 1.8 and 2.2 million people from all over the world visit the region each year. In 1988, tourism in the Valley generated $266.8 million in revenue, created nearly 5,900 jobs with a payroll of more than $60 million, generated State tax revenues of $9,579,000 and local tax revenues of $3,325,000.

The recently successful television advertising campaign conducted by Luray Caverns has attracted many new visitors to the area with its slogan: "Until you've seen Luray Caverns, you've just scratched Virginia's surface." Identifying, interpreting, and promoting nearby Civil War battlefields and related sites, such as New Market, New Market Gap, Cross Keys, Port Republic, Piedmont, Staunton, Harrisonburg and others, would certainly tempt many of these visitors to extend their stay in light of the fact that 83 percent are coming to Virginia to see historic attractions.

Beginning just prior to this Shenandoah Valley Study, a separate analysis was conducted for the National Park Service to evaluate the local revenue potential of one or more Civil War national park units in the valley. This report, "Distributional Economic Impacts of Civil War Battlefield Preservation Options," was prepared by Jay Sullivan and Daniel G. Johnson of the Department of Forstry, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The report was given limited public distribution in August 1991.

That report's general conclusion was that there is a significant local revenue potential in such a scenario. Unfortunately, that analysis did not have access to the detailed historical evaluations later developed for this present report, nor to the results of extensive consultation with local governments subsequently conducted, and so the limited data available were extrapolated to a hypothetical park scenario. Likewise, that report did not seek to consider other significant factors such as acquisition, development, and management costs. As a result, that report's specific findings are not used here other than to reinforce our general conclusion that there is a positive revenue potential to be gained from heritage tourism in the Valley.

THE VALLEY'S TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE

Does the Valley have the infrastructure to handle more visitors? There are currently no less than 15 facilities in the region catering to visitor needs, ranging from local chambers of commerce to visitor and welcome centers.

In the eight-counties, 181 establishments provide travellers with overnight accommodations, broken down

in terms of Hotels/Motels (113 with 6,557 rooms), Bed/Breakfasts (53 with 435 rooms), and Campgrounds (15 with 753 spaces). Annual average occupancy rates range from 60 to 65 percent, according to the "Commonwealth of Virginia Trend of Business Lodging Industry Reports (1990)." In brief, the lodging infrastructure is in place to support larger numbers of visitors, particularly off-season. Likewise, data indicate that the area has an adequate restaurant sector.

ATTITUDES OF COUNTY PLANNERS TOWARD DEVELOPING TOURISM

To estimate the attitudes of local planners and residents toward developing Civil War-related tourism in the region, the study team presented a questionnaire and conducted interviews with ten local planning officials, representing seven counties and three cities. Most of these planners stated that, along with a continued emphasis on agriculture, their localities were attempting to attract a blend of new businesses, primarily "clean industries," such as computer assembly firms and corporate headquarters. Most stated that attracting tourism is compatible with the localities' overall economic goals. Two county planners (Highland and Clarke counties) and a planner from the City of Winchester, stated that tourism was the major industry that they were working to develop.

All officials thought that the Valley could better capitalize on its Civil War battlefields but were divided on how this could best be accomplished. Issues of adequate signage and interpretive materials, public access versus private ownership, and conflicts with existing zoning, and other development plans were most often mentioned. All felt that a cooperative effort to promote tourism throughout the region would be more successful than the uncoordinated efforts of individual jurisdictions. Finally, all respondents expressed a moderate to high interest in pursuing efforts to develop a regional promotional effort, but were divided on whether this effort could be coordinated by an existing group or agency, or whether some new coordinating body should be developed.

THE POTENTIAL FOR STATE ASSISTANCE IN PROMOTING TOURISM

The State's Division of Tourism in Richmond is enthusiastic about the possibility of capitalizing on Shenandoah Valley Civil War battlefields. Civil War interest in Virginia has grown to the extent that it now merits serious attention in the division's marketing plans as well as research surveys. In 1990 the Division created a brochure, underwritten by the Mobil Corporation, to promote Civil War sites in Virginia during the PBS presentation of the Ken Burns documentary "The Civil War." This effort broke all previous records for a single promotion. The Division's London, England, office alone was inundated with 30,000 inquiries. Simultaneously, the division filled 40,000 domestic inquiries in three months. To handle this unprecedented response, an "800" telephone number was installed devoted strictly to the Civil War to handle the new influx of requests for information. The number provides inquirers with current information about State Civil War sites and Civil War-related events, such as reenactments.

The Division recently established a community planning office to aid localities in developing the initial phases of tourism. They expressed willingness to cooperate with counties and localities to develop a regional approach to promoting battlefields and Civil War sites in the Valley. In terms of advertising and promotion, the Division can offer non-financial assistance in the form of including the Valley in audio/video presentations, help in contacting travel writers, and inclusion in calendars and information services. Financial grants might be available in some areas for specific promotional projects.

CONCLUSION

It remains to be determined precisely how significantly heritage tourism could contribute to the economy of the Valley or how more effective promotion of these sites could be structured to avoid undue intrusion on private property owners. The statistics offered in this report, however, are broadly suggestive of positive benefit of heritage tourism to the Valley region, although they would need to be followed by more targeted market research when and if designing a specific battlefield protection and interpretation program in the Valley. The fact remains that most county planners in the region have expressed the desire to encourage heritage tourism and are currently examining ways to increase the numbers of visitors to their counties. With the continuing national interest in Civil War history and associated sites, the Civil War in the Valley would likely prove to be one of its major attractions.

Part Six: Alternatives

Turkey Barns, Port Republic and Cross Keys by David W. Lowe

Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia

Part Six

Alternatives to Preservation and Interpretation

Background

P.L. 101-628, which mandated the study of Civil War sites and structures in the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, calls for the National Park Service to "provide alternatives for the preservation and interpretation of such sites by Federal, State, and local governments, or other public or private entities, as may be appropriate. Such alternatives may include, but shall not be limited to, designation as units of the National Park System or as affiliated areas. The study shall examine methods and make recommendations to continue current land use practices, such as agriculture, where feasible."

The comparison which the National Park Service conducted, using the Jedediah Hotchkiss 1862 map of the Valley and modern USGS maps of the same area, indicates a remarkable level of overall integrity— the retention of the physical and visual qualities of the natural and manmade environment in the Valley present at the time of the Civil War, due not only to the unique topography of the region, but also to continued patterns of agricultural use. Because few systematic efforts have been made to preserve the Valley's battlefields, preservation of battlefield land to date, much of which was farmed at the time of the war, has depended largely on the stewardship of private landowners who have continued to farm the land. Many of the property names present on the Hotchkiss map are the names of family members still retaining ownership of these farms today, most noticeably in the Upper Valley.

The Shenandoah Valley has a vibrant, contemporary mixture of urban, agricultural, and forested landscape which represents evolving uses of land by a growing population. The landscape reflects this change in such forms as Interstate 81, which has developed as the Valley's major transportation corridor, and in the growth of modern cities such as Harrisonburg and Winchester. This is not a region that "time has forgotten," but rather one which has retained elements of the past into a contemporary future. The study indicates that change in the battlefield areas is intensified relative to change in other parts of the Valley, due to the location of these battlefields along major transportation routes both in the nineteenth century and the twentieth. There is greater change to the landscape where agricultural land has been converted to other uses, particularly in the Lower Valley, near Front Royal and Winchester. Most of the battlefields in this area have witnessed some residential, industrial, and commercial development. But many parcels of battlefield land remaining retain a high degree of integrity

Despite the overall good integrity of major battlefields in the Shenandoah Valley, some sites have deteriorated, and preservation possibilities are constrained. Earlier, in Part Four, an analysis of the relative importance was given for each battlefield based on historic significance, integrity, threats, and risks to preservation.

Preservation Priorities

The listing of risks to preservation (Figure 19) leaves unanswered the public policy question of whether it is better to focus preservation and protection efforts on sites nearly lost, or on sites where pristine landscape remains well-preserved and the Civil War setting is evoked easily. There are important arguments to be made for either approach.

The low risk, good condition sites often lend themselves to a high degree of protection and preservation with minimum costs and least disruption of local people while resulting in retention of the highest quality historic sites.

On the other hand, the high risk, poor condition sites generally would require higher costs and often more

difficult resolution of competing interests. However, these sites represent historic events of great importance, and if action is not taken soon, there will not even be site fragments remaining to commemorate the former existence of these battle locations, notwithstanding the fact that preservation opportunities may already be gone.

Similarly, there are good reasons to choose an intermediate category of risk as the primary focus — for example, sites that are in good-to-fair condition but under moderate levels of threat, or sites that are in poor-to-fair condition experiencing yet greater levels of threat. The rationale here is that sites in the intermediate risk categories represent problems that are manageable, while good condition, low threat sites can wait longer, and lost or poor condition sites under extreme threats may not be worth the cost,

The answer to which approach is preferable is not one the National Park Service can provide as a result of analysis. This is a policy choice that will depend to a large degree on which combination of the preservation alternatives outlined below is chosen, and on what sort of public consensus exists for protecting Shenandoah Valley Civil War battlefields.

ALTERNATIVES

The following alternatives are presented in order of increasing Federal involvement. Alternative I examines no increased action, that is, the continuation of the status quo in terms of existing preservation and interpretation activities of battlefield sites. Alternative II examines the possibility of mounting a local or regional effort, with or without assistance from the National Park Service, to preserve battlefield land for interpretation and tourism. Alternative III examines the potential of developing these sites as affiliated areas of the National Park System. Alternative IV examines the possibility of acquiring one or more specific battlefields, for incorporation into the National Park System. Alternative V examines the possibility of acquiring all fifteen battlefields for incorporation into the National Park System. Cost estimates for Alternatives I-V are presented in Figure 22, however, potential acquisition costs for land have not been estimated in the analysis due to the complexity of ownership and land use in the battlefields.

Although the historic significance of the Valley calls for a regional approach towards its preservation and interpretation, it is clear that a variety of owner interests, local government goals and objectives, current land use patterns, and varied levels of threat to the battlefields are present. This suggests an approach that would consider various combinations of the five alternatives. Such an approach could be implemented, based on need, owner interest, and other concerns. Indeed, property owners and preservation organizations, with input from local governments and the travel and tourism industry, have begun to meet to explore preservation strategies that reflect this approach.

Because historic preservation is most successful when the local community is supportive and has participated in the identification and implementation of preservation solutions. Selection of any of these alternatives should be accomplished after opportunities for public information and participation in the selection process have occurred. At this time, such consultation has not been extensive. The Valley Conservation Council, a non-profit conservation organization located in Staunton, Virginia, has stressed the need for public information on these issues and the formulation of long-term strategies for ensuring that private and local interests will be a major participant in the future.

I. NO ACTION, CONTINUATION OF STATUS QUO

An examination of current preservation and interpretive activities provides a base line for evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of other potential alternatives. Under this alternative, existing private and public efforts to preserve battlefields would continue without substantial changes. These programs include: Federal income tax deductions for donation of easements and credits for substantial rehabilitations of income generating certified historic structures; Federal and matching State funding through the Historic Preservation Fund, and Land and Water Conservation Fund; donation of easements through the State's open space and historic easement program, and additional State programs designed to encourage the retention of agricultural and forest lands.

This alternative may be more feasible in the Upper Valley and, specifically, in areas where agriculture remains a healthy industry. In Augusta County, several private property owners have indicated to NPS their desire to continue farming— a practice that is generally consistent with the historic character of the battlefields. Representatives of this county government also indicated their belief that local zoning efforts, especially the use of agricultural-

forest districts, were sufficient to preserve battlefields from incompatible land use development. The problem, however, is that zoning is ephemeral, and in rural areas re-zoning at the request of the land owners occurs as a matter of course. In addition, approximately 10 percent of core battlefield land distributed throughout the Valley is owned by non-profit organizations committed to its preservation. Several Valley organizations and property owners have stressed that Federal acquisition from private owners unwilling to sell their property would undermine community support for preservation of Civil War battlefields in the Valley. Although no additional expenditures of public funds would occur under this alternative, the result would be haphazard resource protection, interpretation, reduced heritage tourism potential, and, notably, potential reliance in the future on more costly preservation alternatives.

Alternative I could be used selectively in conjunction with the other alternatives presented in this study, so that enhanced preservation and interpretation efforts outlined in Alternatives II, III, IV, and V could be focused on critically threatened battlefields, and in areas where private and local government support is present.

II. Enhanced Public Funding and Technical Assistance to State and Local Governments and Private Owners For Battlefield Preservation and Interpretation

Alternative II includes increased preservation and interpretation for battlefield sites that would require Federal, State, and local action through a variety of assistance methods short of acquisition in fee. Perhaps more so in this alternative than in the others is the need for focus and coordination on three interdependent areas: preservation, interpretation, and promotion. Preservation of the sites is of primary importance, for without adequate protection, the historic battlefield resources will continue to slip away and their potential value for interpretation and visitation gradually will be lost. In order to increase visitation and public appreciation of these sites, it is necessary first to improve the infrastructure and materials available to interpret events for visitors. These three areas will be examined in turn.

i. **Preservation.** The pace of resource degradation in the Valley and the loss of agricultural acreage over the last two decades, especially in the northern part, reveals that continued dependence on the coincidence of interests between private landowners and public interest in historic preservation is no longer an adequate mechanism for ensuring protection of battlefield land. Lands that are currently protected, either by ownership, easements, or zoning, do not represent a large amount (10 percent) of core historical areas in the fifteen battlefields. Continuing degradation and loss of Civil War battlefield resources is expected to occur, particularly in the lower Valley, and areas immediately adjacent to interstate highways, where land use is shifting away from agriculture. Unlike the situation in Augusta County, local officials in Frederick and Clarke Counties, and the City of Winchester, have noted that reliance on local zoning will not be effective in protecting battlefield lands in their jurisdictions. The use of these resources for interpretation and tourism will diminish with time. Both market (economic) and non-market (personal benefit/enjoyment) benefits will decline.

Preservation methods under this alternative would need to focus on increasing the effectiveness of private methods of protection and developing methods that provide for public and private cooperation. To meet with success in the Valley, methods would need to be consistent with other community goals and be sufficiently flexible to assist a variety of specific needs. The types of activities that would be needed are presented in Figure 20. Many parts of battlefields—especially in the middle and upper Valley—are on privately owned agricultural land whose owners wish to continue that way of life. A program could be initiated—perhaps through the Historic Preservation Fund—whereby long-term (say 10-15holding years) battlefield protection contracts are entered into between a willing property owner and an appropriate governmental or non-profit entity. These contracts (modeled after the Countryside Stewardship program in England) would pay an owner an appropriate, market-derived stipend in return for the owner agreeing to maintain, restore, or enhance some battlefield amenity: clear or keep cleared a field that was open at the time of the battle, maintain a viewshed, provide limited access to some location, maintain a series of rail fences or other infrastructure such as a footpath or footbridge, an interpretive wayside or kiosk on or adjacent to their land, and so on. In this way, not only do owners retain their land and landuse, but they participate in and take responsibility for some part of the battlefield's preservation and presentability to the public while putting their participation on a business basis. Ten-year contracts between the government and landowners target specific areas and allow flexible guidelines to reflect individual owner and community needs.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

Goals

- ☐ Disseminate information on: this report, Civil War History in the Valley, future planning efforts

Activities

- ☐ Public meetings, workshops, conferences
- ☐ Exhibits, lectures, educational materials
- ☐ Public service announcements
- ☐ Videos
- ☐ Brochures, pamphlets, other printed materials

PRESERVATION PLANNING

Goals

- ☐ Find compatible land uses for battlefields and adjacent lands
- ☐ Preserve battlefield features and Civil War buildings and structures

Products

- ☐ Land use studies
- ☐ Condition assessments on earthworks and structures
- ☐ Feasibility and adaptive use studies
- ☐ Design guidelines for compatible new construction
- ☐ Acquisition and development grants

INTERPRETATION

Goals

- ☐ Develop methods for enhancing visitor experience at multiple sites
- ☐ Respect private property rights and ongoing land use activities

Products

- ☐ Driving and walking tours
- ☐ Marker systems
- ☐ Guidebooks
- ☐ Docent and guide training
- ☐ Visitor centers
- ☐ Living history exhibits and festivals

PROMOTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Goal

- ☐ Identify and encourage economic development that is compatible with preservation

Activities

- ☐ Cost benefit studies
- ☐ Marketing research
- ☐ Improved econometric models
- ☐ Develop effective tourism strategies

Figure 20. Preservation and Interpretation Activities for Battlefields in the Shenandoah Valley

Public support for such largely site maintenance or restoration technical assistance actions could come either through increased appropriations to existing joint Federal and State grant programs—the Historic Preservation Fund and the Land and Water Conservation Fund, or through new law to provide increased preservation and interpretation activities. Legislation may also be necessary to limit or remove liability from landowners who allow public access to battlefields. Similar law already exists in Virginia to protect landowners who allow fox hunting on their property and perhaps this approach can be adapted to historic site visitation.

Since economic considerations typically provide the basis for most decisions that result in changing land use and loss of battlefield land, the development of financial incentives to private owners to preserve battlefield lands may need to be considered. Strategies could include tax incentives to owners of battlefield land that do not subdivide property for new construction. Since local governments derive significant revenues through property taxes, Federal and State financial incentives to local governments that develop zoning and other land use ordinances compatible with battlefield preservation could also be considered. Modifications to estate taxes as in the proposed "Open Space Preservation Act" (HR2149, HR5469, S2957) is another key approach that would make retention of undeveloped or agricultural uses feasible for many owners.

Regulatory methods, such as zoning or historic preservation ordinances, require less funding than grant and financial incentive programs but may pose significant difficulties in gaining widespread public support at the local level. In rural areas, as in much of the Shenandoah Valley, zoning and land use controls are typically less restrictive than in urban areas, and consequently, are less likely to be effective for preserving historic battlefields. Therefore, it may not be realistic to expect the Commonwealth of Virginia and the local governments in the Valley to enact land use ordinances that would favor preservation of battlefields over the capability of private owners to develop property to its highest and best use. However, technical and financial assistance from State and Federal sources to local governments in return for enactment of compatible land use ordinances may be appropriate in some cases. State and local government financing methods such as a tax on tourism-related services, in which the tax revenues are applied to the purchase of development rights or to fund other preservation and interpretation activities that are directly related to heritage tourism, may be a more viable State and local contribution to Federally-funded activities.

At a minimum, it is desirable for all local governments in the Valley to follow the example of Augusta County and incorporate detailed information on the location, significance, and condition of historic sites in their local comprehensive plan. The ability, through this means, to alert any potential developer — public or private — to the existence of important historic sites is one of the most feasible and valuable ways to avoid unmanageable future conflicts.

ii. **Interpretation.** Battlefields are not without their own economic attractions. An estimated several thousand people visit these battlefields each year despite the lack of interpretive facilities, signage, and public access. This small but steady visitation by military historians, history buffs, genealogists, and Civil War enthusiasts will continue indefinitely providing that the historic resources remain in good condition. If these resources are degraded and diverted to other uses, visitation will stop. On the other hand, there is evidence that enhancing facilities, signage, and public access, devising useful interpretive materials, and preparing a unified marketing strategy for the Valley's Civil War resources, would increase the drawing power of these sites and thus provide a stronger economic incentive for preserving and interpreting battlefield land.

Many local jurisdictions, county and city, expressed a great interest in promoting the tourism potential of Civil War sites in the Valley, particularly in light of a national resurgence of interest in the Civil War, spurred by commemorative reenactments, the PBS series "The Civil War," and related developments. Most counties in the Valley see tourism as an increasingly important potential source of revenue. It is not clear, however, what form Civil War heritage tourism in the Valley would take, considering the current level of restricted access to many of these sites and the understandable concerns of landowners to maintain their security and privacy. Nor is it apparent to what extent local property owners, businesses, and governments wish to control the use of historic properties toward such ends.

In order to enhance the interpretation of the role of the Shenandoah Valley in the Civil War, an effort could be mounted, perhaps assisted by the National Park Service, to develop a preliminary interpretive plan for the region. To

focus and coordinate interpretive activities over the next five years, a clearinghouse could be established to enhance the public appreciation of Shenandoah Valley Civil War sites. This clearinghouse could prepare and disseminate interpretive materials and generally encourage interpretive and commemorative activities at Civil War sites in the region. The clearinghouse could provide technical assistance to support State and local interpretive efforts, and monitor the progress of such efforts.

iii. Promotion. State and local governments, chambers of commerce, private property owners, and representatives of the Valley tourism industry could work together to incorporate Civil War sites into regional and county economic development plans to develop heritage tourism. A specific economic benefits analysis could be conducted to generate concrete data regarding the market potential for the sites as tourist attractions. A plan could be developed to coordinate regionwide the activities of visitor centers, museums, and other facilities, and encourage bus tours, weekend packages, and other options to enhance the visitation of Civil War sites, along with other attractions in the Valley. A schedule of Civil War related events could be developed and publicized to stimulate wider interest in the Valley sites, leading to enhanced local community participation in and increased visitation of commemorative and recreational events.

IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE II

The potential complexity of Alternative II suggests regional coordination would be necessary. Several options could be considered:

1.A new agency or board composed of representatives from local government, property owners, local preservation groups, and the Virginia Department of Historic Resources could be formed to develop priorities and implement preservation and interpretation activities.

2.A new agency or board composed of representatives of existing planning or government organizations, tourism and business groups, and preservation organizations could be formed to examine the economic effects of preservation and interpretation activities.

3.A regional office of a State agency such as the Virginia Department of Historic Resources could be established in the Valley. This State organization, with expertise in preservation planning, administering Federal and State grant programs, and easements, could implement many technical assistance activities.

4.An existing regional organization such as a regional planning authority or an interested private organization could take a lead role in coordinating preservation and interpretation of battlefield sites.

Implementing Alternative II may be appropriate in areas where public information, additional planning, and enhanced funding for technical assistance have been identified as necessary first steps in preserving and interpreting battlefields. The National Park Service found little regional coordination in sharing planning data, although various Federal, local, and regional agencies, and James Madison University, expressed willingness to coordinate data collection efforts. Alternative II will require a multi-year commitment for technical assistance and funding to develop a public consensus, set priorities for preservation and interpretation efforts, and implement the activities. Recognition that such planning is necessary is evident in the comments from various local governments on preservation and interpretation needs. Representatives of several Valley preservation organizations, and counties such as Rockingham, Clarke, and Shenandoah, stated in their written comments on the draft study that a variety of methods, requiring Federal expertise and financial assistance, would be needed to implement immediate and long term solutions. Reliance on local government efforts through zoning and other local regulatory methods was not viewed as sufficient, or appropriate, in light of the national significance of these properties.

Implementation of Alternative II could occur in conjunction with Alternatives I, III, and IV. Strategies in Alternative II would work best where private and local cooperative efforts are determined by the local government as preferred solutions, as pre-planning prior to any Congressional implementation of Alternatives III and IV, or to reinforce preservation and interpretation of areas surrounding a unit of the National Park System.

Should Alternative II be implemented, Congress may wish to ask the National Park Service, or some other appropriate party or organization, to report at a later time on the progress of preservation efforts in the Valley. Such a report would reassess those battlefields that have received technical assistance and update information on the desirability for the incorporation of any or all of the Shenandoah Valley Civil War battlefields or related sites as units or affiliated areas of the National Park System. Such a report would also assess the level of resources and funding needed to ensure that NPS standards for affiliated areas would be met.

III. CREATION OF ONE OR MORE AFFILIATED AREAS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM

Affiliated area status is a mechanism for recognition of nationally significant areas managed by others consistent with standards that apply to the National Park System. These areas are sometimes eligible for receiving technical and financial assistance, but this assistance is limited to carrying out a cooperative management agreement with the National Park Service. In 1990, the National Park Service submitted to Congress, pursuant to P.L. 100-336, a report on criteria for affiliated areas of the National Park System. In this present report, the NPS criteria recommended for such areas (national significance, suitability, and feasibility, are being applied for purposes of analyzing Shenandoah Valley sites. A property proposed for acquisition as an affiliated area of the National Park System should meet the same criteria for significance that are applied to a potential national park unit (see Figure 21). The criteria for suitability and feasibility, however, are different for affiliated area status, and are outlined in the discussion below.

When applying the criteria for national significance the study shows that the Shenandoah Valley represents a unique geographic and historic resource; that it possesses tremendous scenic beauty and exceptional potential for interpreting aspects of the Civil War that are currently not represented in the park system; that opportunities for recreation are already aptly demonstrated by the Valley's active tourism industry, by activities in Shenandoah National Park, and by canoeing and fishing in the region's rivers and streams; and that many portions of the Valley retain a high degree of historic, rural, and scenic integrity.

While it is clear that the Shenandoah Valley region, with its significant battlefield areas, needs special recognition and technical assistance beyond what is currently available, there is no existing mechanism for ensuring a cooperative arrangement between landowners and the National Park Service that would assure long-term protection of the resources. In the absence of such an arrangement, the other requirements applicable to National Park System units—contributions from other sources, and the continuation of standards for maintenance, operations, and financial accountability—cannot be applied. This is not to say that some arrangement would not be possible in the future as a follow up to the technical assistance activities described under Alternative II.

There is currently no regional agency which serves to coordinate planning between the State level and local jurisdictions or to facilitate activities in support of the preservation and interpretation of Civil War sites in the Valley. Local planning officials were asked about the need for such an entity at a meeting held in August 1991, and those present agreed that it was essential. Some favored enhanced responsibilities given to an existing agency, such as the two planning districts which serve the Valley—the Lord Fairfax Planning District and the Central Shenandoah Planning District. Others suggested the possibility of establishing a regional office of the Virginia Department of Historic Resources in the Valley to coordinate a regional effort. Others felt that no existing agency could adequately meet these added responsibilities. All agreed, however, that some mechanism needs to be created, if possible with Federal assistance, to implement the process. Written comments on the draft report also reflected these concerns. However, representatives of Warren County, where Cedar Creek battlefield is located, did not provide comments on the draft report, or participate in the August 1991 NPS / local government meeting on preservation alternatives. (Although the Lord Fairfax Planning Commission, representing Warren County, among others, has participated regularly in the preparation of this report and in recent preservation efforts. Warren county has participated in these regional planning efforts.) The controversial related lands study for Shenandoah National Park, occuring simultaneously with this report, may have resulted in misunderstandings that the two reports were the same. The controversy surrounding the related lands study for the park may influence the nature of comments received from the public and private citizens on this report, and for preservation efforts in the Valley for this sites.

The Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites and other locally based preservation groups, such as the Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation and the Shenandoah Valley Civil War Foundation, have expressed interest in exploring a cooperative arrangement with the National Park Service for incorporating their landholdings as parks or as affiliated areas. Without the demonstrated support of local governments and residents, however, leading to a more widespread, community-based planning and preservation effort, such arrangements alone would be inadequate and premature, considering the size and significance of the resources.

I. National Significance (NPS and Affiliated Area)

1. It is an outstanding example of a particular type of resource.

2. It possesses exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the natural or cultural themes of our Nation's heritage.

3. It offers superlative opportunities for recreation, for public use and enjoyment, or for scientific study.

4. It retains a high degree of integrity as a true, accurate, and relatively unspoiled example of the resource.

IIa. Suitability and Feasibility (Affiliated Areas Only)

5. It must need some special recognition or technical assistance beyond what is available through existing NPS programs in order to ensure its preservation and interpretation to the public, and

6. It must be demonstrated that a cooperative arrangement with the National Park Service and contributions from other sources will be adequate to assure long-term protection of the resources, and

7. It must be demonstrated that a continued standard of maintenance, operations, public service, and financial accountability consistent with requirements applicable to National Park System units will occur.

IIb. Suitability and Feasibility (NPS units only)

8. It represents a natural or cultural theme, or type of recreational resource that is not already adequately represented in the National Park System, or is not comparably represented and protected for public enjoyment by another land-managing entity.

9. It must be of sufficient size and appropriate configuration to ensure long-term protection of the resources and to accommodate public use.

10. It must have potential for efficient administration at a reasonable cost. Important feasibility factors include land ownership, acquisition costs, access, threats to the resource, and staff or development requirements.

Figure 21. Criteria for Parklands
Properties proposed for incorporation into the National Park System or Affiliated Area
Status must meet the Criteria for National Significance, Suitability, and Feasibility.

ALTERNATIVE IV. ACQUISITION OF SELECTED BATTLEFIELDS FOR A UNIT OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM WITH SATELLITE AREAS

Consideration could be given to creating a park unit of one or more selected battlefield sites. These battlefields would become regional focal points for preserving and interpreting other non-Federally owned battlefields at the local level through strategies discussed in Alternative II.

NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

The battlefields identified in this study collectively appear to meet criteria for national significance. The study shows that the Shenandoah Valley represents a unique geographic and historic resource; that it possesses tremendous scenic beauty and exceptional potential for interpreting aspects of the Civil War that are currently not represented in the National Park System; that opportunities for recreation are already aptly demonstrated by the Valley's active tourism industry, by activities in Shenandoah National Park, and by canoeing and fishing in the region's rivers and streams; and that many portions of the Valley retain a high degree of historic, rural, and scenic integrity.

Careful consideration is needed under this alternative to select battlefields that ensure adequate representation of the Shenandoah Valley Civil War period. Selection of one or more sites from each of the major campaigns; selection of two sites, one from the lower Valley and one from the upper Valley, are two approaches. This alternative does not eliminate Federal commitment to implement programs and activities beyond acquisition and park operating expenses. In fact, such activities would be necessary in order to meet criterion 3 for national significance. The ability to provide "superlative opportunities for recreation, public use and enjoyment, or for scientific study," as the criterion states, would be diminished as the number of battlefields preserved, either through NPS acquisition, as recipients of Federal funding, or through coordinated non-Federal means are decreased.

SUITABILITY AND FEASIBILITY

The strategic role of the Shenandoah Valley as a region during the Civil War, Stonewall Jackson's 1862 Campaign and the Early-Sheridan 1864 campaigns, are not currently represented in the National Park System. Less than 4% of the land area of battlefield sites in the Valley are under long-term protected ownership. This appears to meet criterion 5 for suitability.

Sufficient size and appropriate configuration are difficult to evaluate at this time since specific sites have not been selected. However, the risk priorities can be used as a guide to making these selections. Additional guidance can be given in evaluating acquisition strategies. It is commonly recognized that less land is needed to interpret battlefields, thus satisfying the public use criterion, than to preserve the battlefields. The criteria, however, require both. Acquisition of limited acreage under this alternative for interpretive purposes is not sufficient to ensure long-term protection of the battlefields identified in this study. At the very least, acquisition of selected sites must be performed in conjunction with long term protection strategies that address preservation of all battlefield core areas in order to meet criterion 3. Criteria 9 and 10, which address feasibility, speak directly to these issues. Is it feasible to administer selected battlefield sites, which represent a portion of the nationally significant battlefield resources in the Valley, with long-term preservation less secure for the remaining sites? While technical assistance is an integral part of this alternative, ownership, and community sentiment changes over time. Administration of a park unit of limited battlefield land, without adequate long term community and owner support, may result in Federal expenditures to protect a fragment of land that does not adequately represent or protect the resource. This would most probably occur if an adequate program of technical assistance does not take place.

In summary, this alternative provides a less costly approach than full acquisition of all battlefield sites, but it carries inherent risks that should be anticipated in any authorization. This approach would require less direct Federal involvement in managing the areas and would allow flexibility in approaches to other sites. To be successful in maintaining the regional "picture" of the war, this approach would have to include a Federal commitment beyond the acquisition and operation of the park unit. In addition, specific commitment from local jurisdictions to work with the National Park Service in prioritizing preservation would also be necessary, as stated in Alternative II.

The advantage of Alternative IV would be its provision for protection in perpetuity for some battlefield land in areas where it is consistent with local community goals

and where property owners are supportive. This strategy appears to have support from the City of Winchester, Frederick and Highland counties, and several of the organizations that commented on the draft report. Other counties, such as Rockingham and Shenandoah, have suggested that NPS acquisition of properties in core areas may be appropriate in conjunction with other forms of technical and financial assistance outlined in Alternative II. However, these counties pointed out that further analysis of public sentiment and of the economic benefits of preservation was needed.

The disadvantages in this alternative would be the potential for preservation concentration on a limited amount of battlefield land and the potential neglect of the others. This may be true especially if the site has a large core area itself, such as Cedar Creek. Without an adequate technical assistance component for the remaining battlefields, it is possible that designation of one or two sites as parks could create a hierarchy which would stimulate competition rather than cooperation among sites in the region. Since the authorization and implementation process can take years, creation of a park unit may not occur in time to save critically threatened battlefield lands unless interim protection alternatives also take place. Perhaps most importantly, the absence of adequate technical assistance and specific funding to secure preservation of non-Federally owned battlefield lands may ultimately place the Federal government in a position of advocating local preservation goals without the ability to influence public policy decisions. Without sufficient support beyond the funds necessary for the management of the park unit, Federal advocacy of preservation and interpretation outside the park boundaries may be viewed as contrary to the local community goals, or as inappropriate intervention into private and local government decision making.

ALTERNATIVE V: ACQUISITION OF FIFTEEN BATTLEFIELDS AS A UNIT OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM

NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

As stated previously, the battlefields identified in the study collectively appear to meet criteria for national significance. The study shows that the Shenandoah Valley represents a unique geographic and historic resource; that it possesses tremendous scenic beauty and exceptional potential for interpreting aspects of the Civil War that are currently not represented in the National Park System; that opportunities for recreation are already aptly demonstrated by the Valley's active tourism industry, by activities in Shenandoah National Park, and by canoeing and fishing in the region's rivers and streams; and that many portions of the Valley retain a high degree of historic, rural, and scenic integrity.

SUITABILITY

As stated in the previous alternative, the strategic role of the Shenandoah Valley as a region during the Civil War, Stonewall Jackson's 1862 Campaign, and the Early-Sheridan 1864 campaigns, are not currently represented in the National Park System. The Shenandoah National Park provides natural and recreational opportunities but is not an effective or appropriate resource for systematically interpreting the events of the Civil War, even though many of the important Blue Ridge gaps that shaped so much of the fighting in this region are within its boundaries, including Chester, Thornton, Fishers, Browns, and Swift Run gaps.

Currently, only the battlefields of New Market and Cedar Creek offer public access and some degree of interpretation for portions of these sites. New Market Battlefield Park, owned by the Virginia Military Institute, offers interpretation of the war and battle at its Hall of Valor museum. The privately owned New Market Battlefield Military Museum, located on a portion of the battlefield, exhibits Civil War memorabilia. Belle Grove (at Cedar Creek) is a National Trust for Historic Preservation property, with adjacent holdings by a private, non-profit organization, the Cedar Creek Battlefield Foundation. The Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites (APCWS), a private, non-profit preservation organization, owns property at and allows public access to portions of the McDowell, Fisher's Hill, and Port Republic battlefields. Another non-profit, the Lee-Jackson Foundation, owns property at McDowell and Cross Keys. A Winchester-based Civil War re-enactment group owns acreage that allows public access to Star Fort. Due to the budgets of these organizations, the size of land holdings and the amount of interpretation offered on-site are limited. Although the Holy Cross Abbey preserves much of the Cool Spring battlefield and allows some visitation,

preservation of this site is due more to coincidence of intent than to acquisition for preservation purposes. Similarly, many private holdings, especially for agricultural use, currently preserve battlefield land through coincidence of purpose, but these coincidences can change unless steps are taken to reinforce current land use. When compared with the number, size, and significance of the Civil War sites in the Shenandoah Valley, these holdings by private groups are insufficient in themselves to preserve any of the fifteen battlefields. In summary, it appears criterion 1 for national significance has been met, the battlefields are suitable for acquisition, based on their historic significance, lack of representation in the system, and lack of other protection strategies or opportunities for public benefit already in place.

FEASIBILITY

The protection of the Shenandoah Valley region, its geographic, topographic and economic features which were historically important in the conduct of the Civil War, is a large task. Decision making with regard to development and change in the Valley remains in the hands of State and local governments. Planning decisions made at this level have already affected change not only in the region as a whole, but on the battlefield lands themselves. Urban development has destroyed portions of battlefields in Winchester, Frederick County, and Front Royal, in particular.

Is it feasible, however, to consider the creation of a unit of the National Park System, composed of discontiguous sites, from the battlefield areas alone? First, major road developments initiated by the Federal government, such as Interstates 81 and 66, have already bisected and in a measure degraded many battlefield areas. The study shows that First Winchester and Front Royal have had major integrity losses. Of the remaining battlefields, four have been decidedly altered, mostly by urban development. This leaves nine battlefields with a range of fair to good integrity. This means that the total resource has already experienced impact and is likely to continue to do so unless preservation solutions are sufficiently comprehensive.

Second, the nature of land ownership in the region is complex. The total number of owners on the fifteen battlefields may reach several hundred. Some rural battlefield areas are owned by more than 30 parties, with a range of uses. Publicly-owned areas, as parks or facilities such as sewage treatment plants, are present. Some owners and elected officials of Augusta County have expressed objection to the creation of a national park. Creating a unit of the National Park System through fee simple acquisition and/or purchase of easements on this much land with this many land owners would be complex, controversial, and long-term.

Third, acquisition costs for the battlefield areas, which are large cultural landscapes, would be high. While fee acquisition might not be necessary in every case, since many of the battlefields can be appreciated through a driving tour with some minimal access, easements or other preservation measures would be necessary in order to ensure continued compatible use at sites with high integrity. Without these easements, the integrity losses experienced now in the Winchester and Front Royal areas would be repeated in time over much of the Valley.

Fourth, the management structure for interpretation, preservation, and administration of a battlefield park of discontiguous areas could not be as efficient as a single, contiguous unit, due to the distance between areas and the number of local governments. This model would be even more complex, given the much greater distance and lack of a protected unifying resource (such as a river, canal or other land-based resource) over the length of the region.

Finally, the size of Federal holdings in the region and State should be considered. The Shenandoah National Park, Blue Ridge Parkway, and George Washington National Forest encompass many thousands of acres along both sides of the Valley. While these land holdings offer many benefits to local residents in terms of watershed and viewshed protection, recreational opportunities, and tourist attractions, there may be strong local resistance against further expansion of significantly large Federal holdings in some areas of the region. Acquiring parcels of high integrity of all of the Valley's battlefields could conceivably add 10,000 - 30,000 acres of battlefield land to the Federal holdings in the State.

In summary, it appears this alternative does not meet feasibility criteria based on the size, configuration, complexity and diversity of ownership and community sentiments, and costs necessary to acquire and administer a park of this size and discontiguous configuration.

COST ESTIMATES FOR PRESERVATION ALTERNATIVES

National Park Service policy generally is not to provide cost estimates for alternatives that do not meet all criteria

for inclusion in the National Park System, or where insufficient information precludes making firm assessments. Nevertheless, in response to comments on the draft report, rough cost estimates of non-acquisition activities associated with the alternatives are offerred; there were insufficient study funds available to estimate acquisition costs for each alternative.

Although the more feasible alternatives presented in this study stress cooperation between Federal and non-Federal entities, information gathered during this study, in particular comments from local governments and organizations in the Valley, strongly indicates that Federal monies will represent the major funding source for each of the alternatives. State and local in-kind services, local legislation, and private cooperative efforts represent a more realistic, non-Federal contribution than funding.

Cost estimates presented in this study, which are exclusive of acquisition costs, are for purposes of generally comparing the alternatives, they are not meant to be firm predictions of the costs of implementing the alternatives.

Technical assistance activities appear in Alternatives II, III and IV. Costs for these activities may not differ significantly between these alternatives. Costs for Alternative III may feasibly be less than Alternative II because affiliated area status assumes a level of protection has already been achieved. Alternatives IV and V represent the most expensive long term preservation alternatives because planning and operating expenses of NPS units represent a Federal expense not required in Alternatives I-III.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, Alternative I (no action) consigns many of these important sites to eventual oblivion—"a death of a thousand cuts"—an alternative that seems to be unacceptable to most individuals who commented on this report. The four remaining alternatives presented in this report suggest that a wide range of preservation and interpretation solutions may be possible at various locations in the Valley, while also allowing individual owners and local governments the option not to participate.

Despite the obstacles outlined in Alternatives IV and V, creation of a National Park unit at all or selected battlefields has significant supporters. Highland and Frederick counties, the City of Winchester, and several national and regional organizations have encouraged a Federal role in the Valley beyond technical assistance and funding. In some cases, acquisition of core battlefields at all or selected sites was identified as the preferred solution; in others, the suggested NPS role appears to be construction of a visitor's center at one or more locations in the Valley. Many of these organizations and local governments were not dissuaded by the potentially difficult management of a park composed of several discontiguous sites, or NPS analysis that the national significance of the Valley battlefields as a whole would require substantial land acquisition, rather than identification of "representative" sites or limited land parcels. Examples of NPS park units similar to these proposed models were identified, such as Richmond National Battlefield Park.

There appears to be significant interest in striving for new park models, or adoption of management techniques similar to the NPS participation in the Lakawanna Heritage Valley Plan in Pennsylvania. After review of this report, the National Park System Advisory Board supported Federal, regional, and local coordination, specifically recommending that the Service play a role in planning and interpretation within a Partnership Park or National Heritage Corridor framework. Overall, the need to develop innovative and flexible solutions to protection and management was stressed by many who commented on the study report. They stressed using the combined advantages of the private and public sectors, in particular, approaches (modeled after the Countryside Stewardship program in England) that involve property owners in a contractual relationship to be responsible for maintaining some historic resource amenity on their land. Such approaches could be tested as an economical alternative to a local, State, or Federal park unit.

In the end, new solutions must respect the integrity of the National Park System by only creating units that are of the highest resource quality, rather than fragments or resources that lack sufficient integrity, national significance, and interpretive potential. The National Park Service, however, can be an effective partner with the State, local, and private sectors in collaborating on practical solutions to protecting and presenting to the American people the crucial elements of their history that occurred at fifteen battlefields in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia.

Alternative I No Action Continuation of Status Quo	Alternative II Enhanced Technical Assistance	Alternative III Affiliated Area Status	Alternative IV NPS Unit-Selected Sites	Alternative V NPS Unit-All Sites
	TOTAL COSTS $350,000 PLUS Acquisition Costs (Non-NPS)	TOTAL COSTS $300,000-$500,000 PLUS Acquisition Costs (Non-NPS)	TOTAL COSTS $1.4 Million PLUS Acquisition Costs	TOTAL COSTS *$5.4 million PLUS Acquisition Costs
	Operating Expenses $100,000 Per Annum 5-10 Years	Operating Expenses $100,000 Per Annum 5-10 Years		
	Technical Assistance Funding $250,000 Per Annum 5-10 Years	Planning Expenses $200,000- $400,000 Per Annum 5-10 Years	Technical Assistance (Non-NPS battlefields) $250,000 Per Annum 5-10 years	*Projected operating expenses will increase as acreage also increases.
			First Year NPS Operating Expenses $350,000	First Year NPS Operating Expenses $350,000
			Planning Expenses (GMP, Brochure, etc.) $888,500	Planning Expenses (GMP, Brochure, etc.) $888,500
			Visitors Contact & Administrative Facility 2,000 square feet	Visitors Contact & Administrative Facility 13,000 square feet
			$1 Million	$4.25 Million

Figure 22. Federal Cost Estimates for Alternatives II-V

Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia

Appendix A

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Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia



Appendix B

Sample Survey Forms

SHENANDOAH VALLEY STUDY
BATTLEFIELD SUMMARY SHEET (Version Four)

BATTLEFIELD: FRONT ROYAL **Number of Phases:** 6

Campaign: Jackson's Valley Campaign
Date of Battle: 23 May 1862 (Friday; first light 3:30 a.m., last light 8:20 p.m.)
County: Warren VA
General Location: Front Royal, Guard Hill, Cedarville, US 340/522
USGS Quadrant(s): Bentonville, Front Royal, Strasburg

Principal Commanders: *[c]* Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson, Brig. Gen. Richard Taylor, Col. Turner Ashby, Col. Flournoy; *[u]* Col. J.R. Kenly
Forces Engaged: *[c]* Jackson's command consisted of his and Ewell's divisions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, about 16,500, and 11 batteries of 48 guns; only about 3,000 were actively engaged at Front Royal; *[u]* Augmented regiment under Col. J. R. Kenly, about 1,000 and two guns.
Casualties: *[c]* 50 k/w/m; *[u]* 904 (32k/122w/750 captured).

Summary of Battle Phases:

Phase of Battle Attached Sheet #	1	2	3	4	5	6
Unit of Maneuver (1-4)	4	2	2	1	2	2
Intensity of Engagement (1-8)	2	2	3/4	5	4	5
Level of Casualties (1-5)	2	2	2	3	2	5
Current Land Use (Use abbreviations)	RF F/N F/W CA H/V SR	HD R HD C	HD R HD C	RF F/W CA H/V SR	RF F/W CA H/V CS IS	F/W CA H/V IP O
Landscape Similar to CW Era? (1-5)	4	4	2	1	2	3
Level of Threat (1-4)	2	4	4	1	4	2
Interpreted From? PR, PL, PPO	PR PL	PR	PR	PR	PR	PR

1. Importance/Significance of Battle (in context of campaign/war): Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson's decisive victory over a small Union force at Front Royal on 23 May 1862, forced the main Union Army at Strasburg under Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Banks into abrupt retreat. Jackson deceived Banks into believing that the Confederate army was in the main Valley near Harrisonburg; instead he had marched swiftly north to New Market and crossed Massanutten via New Market Gap to Luray. The advance to Front Royal placed Jackson in position to move directly on Winchester in the rear of the Union army. On 24 May, Banks retreated down the Valley Pike to Winchester, harassed by CS cavalry and artillery at Middletown and Newtown (Stephens City), setting the stage for the battle of First Winchester the following day.

The battle of Front Royal demonstrated Jackson's use of Valley topography and mobility to unite his own forces while dividing those of his enemies. At a minimal cost, he forced the withdrawal of a large Union army by striking at its flank and threatening its rear. The confusion engendered by the by Jackson's appearance at Front Royal and the hasty Union retreat to Winchester contributed materially to the defeat of Banks' army at First Winchester on 25 May. Jackson used his cavalry to good advantage at Front Royal, to severe US communications east and west, and to strike the final blow at Cedarville.

2. Description of Existing Battlefield Condition: Most terrain features associated with this battle have been overwhelmed by residential growth focused on the town of Front Royal. At the time of the battle Front Royal was a small village of several streets clustered around the courthouse. Troops maneuvered among the buildings and on open ground east of the village. Camp (Richards') Hill, site of Kenly's defense, is densely residential (Warren Park subdivision). CS infantry deployed in "open meadows" currently in the heart of town. The vicinity of Guard Hill has been significantly recontoured by ongoing highway construction and by extensive quarrying along the river. The current "gap" in Guard Hill for US 340/522 is largely a modern cut. Large industrial structures, including the DuPont Automotive plant, have been constructed in the vicinity of Cedarville on ground maneuvered over in the closing phase of the battle. The county airport (Inland Port) is fueling industrial development in this area.

In spite of these losses, several features, primarily architectural, remain by which the flow of the battle may be interpreted. The hamlet of Spangler's Crossroads (Limeton) and the road to McCoy's Ford enables an understanding of CS cavalry movements. The roads from McCoy's Ford to Buckton Depot pass through a scenic rural countryside. The site of Buckton Depot (and a depot building, vintage uncertain), site of Ashby's skirmish, can be located. Asbury Chapel marks the site where the CS infantry diverged from Luray Road to reach Gooney Manor Road. Prospect Hill Cemetery maintains open ground where CS left flank first deployed and where artillery was positioned. The South and North Fork bridge sites can be reliably located. Riverside Farm (c. 1850) at Riverton preserves about 150 acres of open farmland and a segment of the original line of the Front Royal-Winchester turnpike. The old Guard House stands on the hill to the west of the new road cut. The Robert and Jacob McKay houses (late 1700s) and the old store (c. 1860) at Cedarville provide some sense of historic character in spite of encroaching residential development and a trailer court. The Thomas McKay house where US forces surrendered stands one mile north of Cedarville

(currently an antique store). In a general sense, the Front Royal old town could be considered a contributing resource. The hamlet of Riverton dates primarily from the 1880s.

Loss of integrity is most obvious when attempting to understand maneuvers in and around Camp (Richards') Hill. It is difficult to find a vantage point to understand the terrain advantage of the US position there. Prospect Hill Cemetery provides perhaps the only vantage point for understanding the lay of the ground from the Confederate viewpoint. Open ground east of Happy Creek allows some understanding of CS flanking maneuvers although access is difficult. The massive reshaping of Guard Hill and heavy construction north to I-66 is the most obvious loss. This impacts ground fought over during the engagement of Guard Hill in August 1864.

3. Perception of Threats to Battlefield: In terms of terrain, battlefield ground within the city limits of Front Royal has been lost. The Riverton Corporation controls access to Guard Hill along the river. Heavy quarrying is occurring on the northern and eastern slopes and land adjacent to the river. Highway widening has increased the size of the Guard Hill gap and is reshaping the ground. Riverside Farm is under a great deal of pressure to develop; it is the last area of open farmland at Riverton. The flood plain of the North Fork is farmed. Residential development in outlying areas is spotty and may or may not threaten surviving structures and open ground. The area north of Cedarville and east of US 340 is an expanding industrial park, encroaching on the US surrender area.

4. Describe physical remains on battlefield, e.g., structures, road beds, stone fences, entrenchments, monuments erected by veterans, other monuments, etc.: Structures: Asbury Chapel, Buckton Depot (vintage uncertain), Prospect Hill Cemetery, Courthouse, Belle Boyd Cottage, Rose Hill, Camp Hill mansion (post war?), Rose Hill, Riverside Farm, Jacob and Robert McKay houses in Cedarville, Thomas McKay house. Remains of bridge abutments can be seen at North and South Fork bridge sites. Line of old Front Royal-Winchester pike passes Riverside Farm at Riverton. Monuments to Mosby's men and to the Warren Rifles are in Prospect Hill Cemetery. Historic marker and Confederate monument at courthouse.

5. Were dead buried on battlefield? Is there evidence that bodies were reinterred after the war? Is there evidence (anecdotal or other) that burials remain on battlefield? The number of deaths was low. Confederate dead were removed to cemeteries or returned to their homes after the battle. Disposition of Union dead uncertain. Fatalities from the engagement of Guard Hill (August 16, 1864) were higher (an estimated 40-60), and these bodies were almost certainly buried on the field, north of Guard Hill or near Cedarville. Disposition of remains afterwards is uncertain.

6. Discussion of current zoning and land use options (position of local planning experts and county officials toward preservation or compatible land use): Core areas of the battlefield in and around Front Royal have been built upon or are otherwise zoned commercial, industrial, or residential.

7. Preservation options suggested by or discussed with local landowners or other individuals: There appears to be little emphasis on preserving ground associated with the battle of Front Royal or engagement of Guard Hill. Most consider the battlefield lost.

Attachments: _X_Maps _X_Photos _X_Bibliography _X_Additional Materials
Date Surveyed: 5-3-1991
Surveyed By: D. W. Lowe

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Maps: *Atlas* 5:5, "Sketch of Lt. Col. Parham of 29PA." not in scale. Hotchkiss map of "Shenandoah, Page, Warren Counties," Archives G188, shows roads, fords, general features, some residences of vicinity south of Front Royal. "Historic Sites of Warren County," Warren County Bicentennial Commission. Shows general positions of twenty historic structures in the county.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY STUDY
BATTLE PHASE SHEET (Version Four)

BATTLEFIELD: FRONT ROYAL **PHASE #:** 1

Date of Phase: 23 May 1862
Approximate Time/ Duration: Morning
Phase of Battle: Jackson's Advance on Front Royal
Troops Involved:
Confederate: X Cavalry X Artillery X Infantry
Union: Cavalry Artillery Infantry

Level of Maneuver:
(1) Regiments (200-500)
(2) Brigades (500-2000)
(3) Divisions (2000-6000)
X (4) Corps (More than 6000)

Intensity of Engagement:
(1) Maneuver Only (Bivouac, Marching, Shifting for position)
X (2) Skirmishing (Sporadic firing)
(3) Battle Lines Advanced (Volleys exchanged, stand-off firing)
(4) Artillery Duel (Battery and counterbattery fire)
(5) Determined Assault (Battle lines close, colors advanced)
(6) Repeated Attacks (Attack repulsed and renewed, counterattacks)
(7) Lines Intermingled (Attack pierces defense, some hand-to-hand)
(8) Intensive close quarters fighting (Sustained Hand-to-Hand)

Level of Casualties per numbers involved (approximate):
(1) None (0%)
X (2) Few (1-2%)
(3) Light (5%)
(4) Moderate (10%)
(5) Heavy (More than 15%)

Brief Description of Phase: On May 21, the US army under Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Banks, numbering about 9,000 men, was concentrated in the vicinity of Strasburg with two companies of infantry at Buckton Depot. Col. J. R. Kenly commanded 1000 men and 2 guns at Front Royal. CS cavalry under Col. Turner Ashby confronted Banks near Strasburg, but during the night withdrew to join the main army which had crossed the Massanutten via New Market Gap to reach Luray.

On May 22, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's Army of the Valley (about 16,500 men) advanced along the muddy Luray Road to within ten miles of Front Royal. Jackson's headquarters were at Cedar Point. Col. Thomas Munford's cavalry regiment was sent east to

close off Manassas Gap and cut communication between Front Royal and Washington.

On the morning of 23 May, the vanguard of Jackson's army reached Spangler's crossroads (present day Limeton). Here the CS cavalry under Cols. Ashby and Flournoy diverged west to cross the South Fork Shenandoah at McCoy's Ford. The infantry continued to Asbury Chapel and right onto a cross road to reach Gooney Manor Road. Following the road, they approached Front Royal from the south, bypassing Federal pickets stationed on the Luray Road one mile south of the courthouse. After minor skirmishing the Federals withdrew.

Location of Events: Limeton, intersection of rt. 670 and US 340. Rt. 670 west, left on Point Road leads to McCoy's Ford. US 340, 2.5 miles north to Asbury Chapel. East on rt. 607 to rt. 649 (Gooney Manor Road). North to vicinity of intersection with US 340.

Current Land Usage (check all that apply):
X **Riverfront (RF)**
X **Forest/Natural (F/N)**
X **Fields/Woodlots (F/W)**
X **Conventional Agriculture (CA)**
Intensive/Commercial Agriculture (ICA)
X **Hamlet/Village (H/V)** Limeton
X **Strip Residential (SR)**
High Density Residential (HDR)
Commercial Strip (CS)
High Density Commercial (HDC)
Industrial Sites (IS)
Industrial Park (IP)
Other (O) Explain:

Similarity of landscape to Civil War period:
(1) Changed Beyond Recognition (Parcel developed, land recontoured)
(2) Decidedly Altered (Changes predominate, loss of essential features)
(3) Somewhat Altered (Some changes, some essential features intact)
X **(4) Similar (Retains all essential features)**
(5) Very Similar (Largely unchanged)

If similar, How? Describe features/elements that contribute to interpretation of battle phase: McCoy's Ford may still be located but the access road has been gated. Asbury Chapel remains. Old road from Asbury Chapel to Gooney Manor Road (rt.607) is gravel and retains much historic character. Several old houses near intersection of 607 and 649. Shenandoah National Park preserves landscape east of rt. 649. Path taken by Ashby over Massanutten is uncertain.

If altered, How? Describe features/elements that intrude or detract from interpretation of battle phase: Residential density increases as one approaches Front Royal. Housing

development near intersection of rts. 649 and US 340.

Assess the level of threats to ground associated with this phase:
(1) Low (Little developmental/industrial activity in vicinity)
X **(2) Moderate (Strong activity in vicinity)**
(3) High (Ground immediately threatened)
(4) Lost (Irreversible changes)

Battle phase can be interpreted from:
X **Public Roads (PR)**
X **Private Lanes (PL)** Road to McCoy's Ford
Private Property Only (PPO)

Notes and Additional Information: The old Luray Road continued along the river from Riverside to Front Royal and entered the town from the southwest on Luray Avenue. Belle Boyd's role in providing information to Stonewall Jackson is considered a romantic story with only a minimal basis in fact. On 30 May, Union forces reentered the town, recaptured many supplies, and arrested the famous Confederate "spy."

SHENANDOAH VALLEY STUDY
BATTLE PHASE SHEET (Version Four)

BATTLEFIELD: FRONT ROYAL **PHASE #:** 2

Date of Phase: 23 May 1862
Approximate Time/ Duration: Noon until about 1400 hours
Phase of Battle: CS Deployment/ US Skirmishers Driven Back
Troops Involved:

Confederate:	**Cavalry**	**X Artillery**	**X Infantry**
Union:	**X Cavalry**	**X Artillery**	**X Infantry**

Level of Maneuver:
(1) Regiments (200-500)
X (2) Brigades (500-2000)
(3) Divisions (2000-6000)
(4) Corps (More than 6000)

Intensity of Engagement:
(1) Maneuver Only (Bivouac, Marching, Shifting for position)
X (2) Skirmishing (Sporadic firing)
(3) Battle Lines Advanced (Volleys exchanged, stand-off firing)
(4) Artillery Duel (Battery and counterbattery fire)
(5) Determined Assault (Battle lines close, colors advanced)
(6) Repeated Attacks (Attack repulsed and renewed, counterattacks)
(7) Lines Intermingled (Attack pierces defense, some hand-to-hand)
(8) Intensive close quarters fighting (Sustained Hand-to-Hand)

Level of Casualties per numbers involved (approximate):
(1) None (0%)
X (2) Few (1-2%)
(3) Light (5%)
(4) Moderate (10%)
(5) Heavy (More than 15%)

Brief Description of Phase: Jackson's leading brigade, Taylor's deployed on Prospect Hill and along the ridge to the east. The 1st Maryland and Wheaton's battalion were thrown out in advance, entering the town and clearing it of US skirmishers. Col. J. R. Kenly, in command of US forces, withdrew his force to Camp (Richards') Hill supported by a section of artillery. The US line extended in an arc from the South Fork to Happy Creek, defending the South Fork bridge. Kenly's artillery opened fire and slowed the CS advance. Kenly's headquarters were in the Vannort House.

Location of Events: Prospect Hill Cemetery (Prospect Street) and Steele Street parallel CS deployment. North on US 340 past courthouse, through town. Where US 340 veers sharply to the left, the old turnpike continued north along Royal Avenue to the river. Area is occupied by Warren Park subdivision.

Current Land Usage (check all that apply):

- **Riverfront (RF)**
- **Forest/Natural (F/N)**
- **Fields/Woodlots (F/W)**
- **Conventional Agriculture (CA)**
- **Intensive/Commercial Agriculture (ICA)**
- **Hamlet/Village (H/V)**
- **Strip Residential (SR)**
- X **High Density Residential (HDR)**
- **Commercial Strip (CS)**
- X **High Density Commercial (HDC)**
- **Industrial Sites (IS)**
- **Industrial Park (IP)**
- **Other (O) Explain:**

Similarity of landscape to Civil War period:

- X **(1) Changed Beyond Recognition (Parcel developed, land recontoured)**
- **(2) Decidedly Altered (Changes predominate, loss of essential features)**
- **(3) Somewhat Altered (Some changes, some essential features intact)**
- **(4) Similar (Retains all essential features)**
- **(5) Very Similar (Largely unchanged)**

If similar, How? Describe features/elements that contribute to interpretation of battle phase: Prospect Hill Cemetery is last open ground in area of CS deployment. Courthouse, Old Town Front Royal, civil war monuments on Prospect Hill and at courthouse. Belle Boyd House.

If altered, How? Describe features/elements that intrude or detract from interpretation of battle phase: The town of Front Royal has grown immensely since the time of the Civil War, filling the basin between the mountain and the river. Extensive commercial development along US 340.

Assess the level of threats to ground associated with this phase:

- **(1) Low (Little developmental/industrial activity in vicinity)**
- **(2) Moderate (Strong activity in vicinity)**
- **(3) High (Ground immediately threatened)**
- X **(4) Lost (Irreversible changes)**

Battle phase can be interpreted from:

X **Public Roads (PR)**
Private Lanes (PL)
Private Property Only (PPO)

Notes and Additional Information: Monuments to Mosby's men and the Warren Rifles with soldiers' graves in Prospect Hill Cemetery. Historic marker and monument at the courthouse.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY STUDY
FEATURES TO BE MAPPED

Battlefield FISHER'S HILL

No.	Feature to be Mapped	USGS Quadrant	Grid#	Source	Code
FH1	FORMER ALIGNMENT OF VALLEY PIKE	TOM'S BROOK	J3	1,2	----
FH2	SITE of STONE BRIDGE ABUTMENTS REMAINING		K3	1,3	=
FH3	MILLER HOUSE		k3	1,4	5
FH4	FISHER'S MILL		J3	1,5,3	5
FH5	EARLY'S HQ WIDOW FUNKHOUSER HOUSE		J4	1,4,5	5
FH6	JACOB FUNK HOUSE (1700's) & BARN		I3	1,2,4,5	5
FH7	MILLER'S BOTTOM		K3	4	—
FH8	QUARRY HILL		K2	4	—
FH9	FLINT HILLS		J2	1	5
FH10	OLD RAILROAD DEPOT		J2	1	5
FH11	Emmanuel Church ⊗		J2	1	5
FH12	VANTAGE PT. TO VIEW FLINT HILLS ⊗		J1	1	⊗
FH13	KELLER'S MILL		J2	1,4	5
FH14	OLD TOWN FISHER'S MILL		J2	1	
FH15	BARBE HOUSE CW Hospital		G1	1,4	5
FH16	EASTEP HOUSE		G1	1,4	5
FH17	OLD BRICK HOUSE (FOR SALE) C.1840-50	OLD S. Funkhouser House	H2	1,4,9	5
FH18	TENANT HOUSE		H2	1,4	5
FH19	"TWO HILLS"		H1-I2	1,6	"Two Hills"

SOURCES

1. FIELD SURVEY
2. SHERIDAN MAP G166-1
3. TAYLOR SKETCH BOOK
4. Personal communication: Garland Hudgins / Ralph Foster
5. Hotchkiss Map Atlas 82:11
6. Official Records
7. PC: Larry Allaman-g
8. USGS
9. Gillespie Map 99:2
10.
11.
12.

NOTES

FH 37
Surviving Trenches
——— DEEP
- - - - - - - FAINT
. . . . . GONE

5 = OLD STRUCTURE

(2)

SHENANDOAH VALLEY STUDY
FEATURES TO BE MAPPED

Battlefield FISHER'S HILL

No.	Feature to be Mapped	USGS Quadrant	Grid#	Source	Code
FH20	"RAMSEUR'S HILL"	TOM'S BROOK	H2	7	"Ramseur's Hill"
FH21	PLATFORM TREE / SIGNAL STATION		H2	1,7	
FH22	ROUND HILL CS SIGNAL STATION		G5	6	
FH23	PROSPECT HILL		H5	1,4	Prospect Hill
FH24	Site of LOCUST GROVE CHURCH / SCHOOL		I4	5	
FH25	FRAVEL PROPERTY		J3	1,4	FRAVEL
FH26	VAUGHN PROPERTY		J3	1,4	VAUGHAN
FH27	PICNIC GROUND		J3	1,4	PICNIC GROUND
FH28	APCWS PROPERTY approx. boundaries.		H2-I2	4,7	[redacted]
FH29	SITE OF A. FUNKHOUSER unsurveyed		G2	5	
FH30	SITE of I. Piper unsurveyed		G2	5	
FH31	OLD ROAD BED Still visible in woods		G2-H3	5,7	
FH32	STAGE ROAD		K2	rt. 639	
FH33	MIDDLE RD.		J2	2,5	rt. 757
FH34	OLD ROAD BED		H1-J2	2,5,8,	
FH35	MT. HEBRON CHURCH		F3	1,5	
FH37	ENTRENCHMENTS		G1-K3	2,9,1,4	
FH36	Manassas Gap R.R.		K1-H5	1,8	

SOURCES

1. FIELD SURVEY
2. SHERIDAN MAP G166-1
3. TAYLOR SKETCHBOOK
4. P.C.: Hudgins / FOSTER
5. Hotchkiss Map B2:11
6. Official Records
7. P.C.: Larry Allamong USGS
8.
9. Gillespie Map: Atlas 99:2
10.
11.
12.

NOTES

Civil War Sites In the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia



Appendix C

GIS Map Database

GIS Map Database

Map Layer		Description
natl.register	augusta.nr clarke.nr frederick.nr highland.nr page.nr rockingham.nr shenandoah.nr warren.nr winchester.nr staunton.nr waynesboro.nr harrisonburg.nr	**Theme:** National Register Property Boundaries for districts, buildings, structures, objects, and sites listed on the National Register of Historic Places. **Original Source:** National Register nomination forms prepared by various Federal, state, local, and private entities. **Source Date:** date entered on the National Register of Historic Places **Original Scale:** 1:24000 **Original Resolution:** 12 sq. meters **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** National Register Information System, NPS, Interagency Resources Division. **Input method:** Manually digitized from USGS 7.5 minute quadrangle maps using GRASS digit program.
landuse.73		**Theme:** Land use/land cover data showing types of urban or built-up land, agricultural land, rangeland, forest land, water, wetland, barren land, tundra, and perennial snow or ice. **Original Source:** Geographic Information Retrieval and Analysis System (GIRAS), USGS **Source Date:** 1970-1973 **Original Scale:** 1:250,000 **Original Resolution:** 90 sq. meters **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** Commonwealth of Virginia, Council on the Environment **Input method:** ARC/Info export Optional-dlg ASCII data files on diskettes were imported into GRASS using import.to.vect **Notes:** Additional editing was required to remove quadrangle boundary lines and relabel polygons

Map Layer	Description
hotchkiss.roads hotchkiss.buildings hotchkiss.railroads hotchkiss.names	**Themes:** 1862 Map of the Valley. This historic map contains data on the Shenandoah Valley's historic road network, buildings classified by function: church, school, mill, etc., historic railroads, and historic place names including cultural and natural features. **Original Source:** 1862 Map of the Valley produced by Jedediah Hotchkiss for CSA Gen. Thomas J. Jackson **Source Date:** 1862 **Original Scale:** 1:99,400 **Original Projection:** Rectangular projection system **Original Meridian:** 0 degree longitude at Old Naval Observatory **Original Coordinate System:** Latitude and Longitude **Provided by:** Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division **Input method:** Original map [get precise dimensions cm] was photographed as 8 X 10 inches negatives in three sections. Photo-negatives were enlarged 300 percent and printed on clear stable mylar. Map separates were made for roads, buildings, railroads, and place names. Alignments between USGS 1:100,000 primary and secondary roads and roads appearing on the Hotchkiss map allowed the placement of known coordinate points onto the historic map. The map separates were then manually digitized using the coordinate points as registration points in the GRASS digit program. **Notes:** The digitized Hotchkiss maps for roads, buildings, railroads, and places names were checked against their modern counterparts. The historic map features are generally 250 meters off. Assistance provided by the USGS, Eastern Mapping Center, Cartometrics Unit 3, especially Dr. John Snyder.

MAP LAYER		DESCRIPTION
roads	roads.primary roads.secondary roads.connector	**Theme:** Primary, secondary, and connector road data coded by route number. **Original Source:** Geographic Information Retrieval and Analysis System (GIRAS), USGS **Source Date:** 1990 **Original Scale:** 1:100,000 **Original Resolution:** **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** James Madison University, Microcomputing Resource Center **Input method:** ARC/Info export dlg-optional ASCII data files on diskettes were imported into GRASS using import.to.vect
valley.counties		**Theme:** County boundaries **Original Source:** Geographic Information Retrieval and Analysis System (GIRAS), USGS **Source Date:** 1990 **Original Scale:** 1:24,000 **Original Resolution:**12 sq. meters **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** James Madison University, Microcomputing Resource Center **Input method:** ARC/Info export dlg-optional ASCII data files on diskettes were imported into GRASS using import.to.vect

Map Layer		Description
mc	mc.area	**Themes:** Boundaries for each battlefield's study area and core. The study area for each battlefield is that area which encompasses all of the battlefields areal features: staging areas, engagement areas, skirmish areas, holding action areas, bivouac areas, and troop reserve areas; sites: command posts, signal stations, hospitals, event sites (e.g. place where a general was mortally wounded), observation posts, markers, and monuments; movements: approaches to battlefield, retreats or withdrawals from the battlefield, flanking movements, attack movements, and pursuit movements; and positions: picket lines, skirmish lines, battle lines, regroup positions, artillery positions, entrenched troop positions, and unentrenched troop positions. The above features are included within a battlefield whenever they are involved in a hostile action with an opposing force or whenever they are involved in an action or reaction generated by an opposing force in immediate proximity to each other. The core area for each battlefield is that area which encompasses all of the critical phases defined for the battle. Battles have been divided into phases reflecting the progress of the battle. Phases cover the convergence and deployment of opposing forces, the development and execution of the battle, and the disengagement and withdrawal of these forces. The core area of the battlefield encompass those phases that had tactical importance to the battle, constituted the most intense fighting during the battle, or involved decisive moments or turning points of the battle. **Original Source:** Composite of information including primary and secondary documentation: military maps, diaries, Official Records, and fields surveys of each battlefield conducted in 1991. **Source Date:** various: 1861-1991 **Original Scale:** 1:24,000 **Original Resolution:**12 sq. meters **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** Research staff of the NPS, IRD, American Battlefield Protection Program. **Input method:** Composite information gleaned from the above sources were projected onto USGS 7.5 minute Topographic Quadrangle Maps using the types of features defined above. Field survey related these features to existing terrain and current land use to determine their condition and location. Study area and core boundaries were drawn encompassing the appropriate features and phases. The boundary generally followed the nearest road or stream. Study area and core boundaries were then manually digitized from USGS 7.5 minute quadrangles using GRASS digit.
	c.core	
cc	cc.area	
	cc.core	
fh	fh.area	
	fh.core	
cs	cs.area	
	cs.core	
op	op.area	
	op.core	
fr	fr.area	
	fr.core	
tb	tb.area	
	tb.core	
w2	w2.area	
	w2.core	
w1	w1.area	
	w1.core	
k1	k1.area	
	k1.core	
k2	k2.area	
	k2.core	
nm	nm.area	
	nm.core	
pi	pi.area	
	pi.core	
ck	ck.area	
	ck.core	
pr	pr.area	
	pr.core	

MAP LAYER	DESCRIPTION
tributaries	**Theme:** Tributaries including rivers and streams expect those areas covered by water bodies. **Original Source:** Geographic Information Retrieval and Analysis System (GIRAS), USGS **Source Date:** 1990 **Original Scale:** 1:100,000 **Original Resolution:** **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** James Madison University, Microcomputing Resource Center **Input method:** ARC/Info export dlg-optional ASCII data files on diskettes were imported into GRASS using import.to.vect **Note:** Tributary data is organized by USGS 30 X 30 Minute Quadrangles.
water.bodies	**Theme:** Water bodies including reservoirs, streams, rivers, lakes, ponds, impoundment, marshes, wetlands etc. **Original Source:** Geographic Information Retrieval and Analysis System (GIRAS), USGS **Source Date:** 1990 **Original Scale:** 1:100,000 **Original Resolution:** sq. meters **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** James Madison University, Microcomputing Resource Center **Input method:** ARC/Info export dlg-optional ASCII data files on diskettes were imported into GRASS using import.to.vect.

Map Layer	Description
elevation	**Theme:** Digital Elevation Model (DEM) are digital records of terrain elevations for ground positions at regularly spaced horizontal intervals. **Original Source:** Defense Mapping Agency **Source Date:** 1990 **Original Scale:** 1:250,000 **Original Resolution:** 90 sq. meters **Original Coordinate System:** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) System **Provided by:** Earth Resources Information Center, USGS **Input method:** Data imported from 9 track magnetic tape into GRASS using MdmaUSGSread, Mrot90, and Mimport.ll