[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE GLOBAL THREAT TO FREE SPEECH
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 26, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-233 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey,
TOM COTTON, Arkansas Cochairman
STEVE DAINES, Montana ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TIM WALZ, Minnesota
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TED LIEU, California
GARY PETERS, Michigan
ANGUS KING, Maine
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Not yet appointed
Elyse B. Anderson, Staff Director
Paul B. Protic, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Statements
Page
Opening Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator from
Florida; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1
Statement of Hon. Christopher Smith, a U.S. Representative from
New Jersey; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 4
Cook, Sarah, Senior Research Analyst for East Asia and Editor,
China Media Bulletin, Freedom House............................ 6
Hamilton, Clive, Professor of Public Ethics, Charles Sturt
University (Australia) and author, ``Silent Invasion: China's
Influence in Australia''....................................... 8
Lantos Swett, Katrina, Ph.D., President, Lantos Foundation for
Human Rights & Justice......................................... 11
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Cook, Sarah...................................................... 37
Hamilton, Clive.................................................. 47
Lantos Swett, Katrina............................................ 51
Smith, Hon. Christopher.......................................... 53
Submissions for the Record
Letters from Members of the Internet Freedom Coalition to the
State Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and
Members of Congress, submitted by Katrina Lantos Swett......... 56
Letter from Senators Daines, Gardner, Kaine, Markey, Rubio, and
Warner, to Secretary of State Pompeo, submitted by Chairman
Rubio.......................................................... 85
Witness Biographies.............................................. 87
(iii)
DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE GLOBAL THREAT TO FREE SPEECH
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THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:03
a.m., in room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Senator
Marco Rubio, Chairman, presiding.
Present: Representative Smith, Cochairman, and Senator
Steve Daines.
Also Present: Sarah Cook, Senior Research Analyst for East
Asia and Editor, China Media Bulletin, Freedom House; Clive
Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University,
Canberra, and author, ``Silent Invasion, China's Influence in
Australia''; Katrina Lantos Swett, President, Lantos Foundation
for Human Rights & Justice.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chairman Rubio. Welcome to the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China. The title of this hearing is ``Digital
Authoritarianism and the Global Threat to Free Speech.''
We will have one panel testifying today. It will feature
Sarah Cook, who is the senior research analyst for East Asia
and editor of the China Media Bulletin, Freedom House; Clive
Hamilton, who is a professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt
University in Canberra, and author of ``Silent Invasion:
China's Influence in Australia''; and Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett,
president, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights & Justice.
I want to thank all of you for being here.
I understand that Professor Hamilton has a speaking
engagement at the State Department immediately following this
hearing, so once the testimony has concluded, commissioners
will take a few minutes to ask him any questions they have and
then we will return to the rest of the Q & A.
The topic, of course, of today's hearing is freedom of
expression and China's pervasive and unrelenting efforts to
stifle speech at home and now increasingly abroad. And so it's
timely and it's important.
We have long known of the Chinese Communist Party's massive
censorship regime and suppression of free speech and expression
within its own borders. The Commission's political prisoner
database testifies to the human toll of the Chinese Communist
Party's repression in this regard. But now the party is
increasingly exporting its authoritarianism abroad, trying to
suppress speech, stifle free inquiry, and seeking to control
narratives around the world.
America and other like-minded nations must contend with
this long arm of China and the growing threat it poses to our
open democratic systems.
With the conclusion of last month's 2018 National People's
Congress, the Chinese president and Communist Party general
secretary emerged newly empowered and emboldened, no longer
tethered by term limits, and overseeing a noteworthy expansion
of Communist Party control over every aspect of China. These
institutional developments reinforce his directives to Chinese
media outlets to exhibit absolute loyalty to the party and his
declaration in 2016 that all media must be surnamed ``Party''
and convey positive news about China in conformity with the
party's ideology.
China's vast censorship regime is without parallel. Freedom
House's 2017 ``Freedom on the Net'' report named China the
world's worst abuser of internet freedom for the third
consecutive year. And the Commission's most recent annual
report noted ``the increased tension and criminal prosecution
of citizen journalists who are a key source of information on
labor protests, petitioning the government for redress of
grievances, and other rights defense efforts.''
These detentions hinder the ability of those of us outside
of China to know what is happening inside the world's most
populous nation. Foreign journalists face restrictions and
harassment, including physical abuse, physical and online
surveillance, denying or threatening to deny reporters' visas,
restricting their access to certain areas of the country, and
harassment of sources and news assistants.
Restrictions on expression are not limited to journalists.
A State Department travel advisory that was issued in January
of this year warned of the following: ``Security personnel have
detained and/or deported U.S. citizens for sending private
electronic messages critical of the Chinese government.'' The
latter point underscores China's surveillance efforts, which
feature prominently in any discussion of government censorship
or curbs on free expression.
The Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region is an incubator of
sorts where authorities have pursued invasive and involuntary
collection of personal data that includes DNA and fingerprints
from individuals. And it has all been implemented--the
widespread use of facial recognition systems--all set against
the backdrop of the detention of thousands of Muslims in
political re-education centers.
Nationwide, the Chinese government is in the process of
implementing a social credit system which, if successful, will
track and compile data on every Chinese citizen and possibly
even rank them based on their behavior, including their online
speech. In fact, there was an open-source report yesterday
about an individual, the first one banned from traveling
because of his ``score'' or profile.
Made possible by the massive collection of citizens' data
and a growing network of hundreds of thousands of surveillance
cameras, as well as voice and facial recognition capabilities,
experts anticipate the system will be used to punish those
viewed insufficiently loyal to the Communist Party.
Any discussion of censorship and surveillance invariably
turns to technology. Foreign technology firms, many of them
household names here in America, are clamoring, begging to have
access to the vast Chinese market or, for those already there,
are increasingly willing to make Faustian bargains in pursuit
of their bottom line.
Consider, for example, Apple. In February, it transferred
its cloud data in China to servers inside of China that are run
by a state-owned Chinese firm in order to comply with last
year's cybersecurity law. And yet, we see its CEO at
international forums basically touting the great partnership
with China and thanking them for their openness while sometimes
being critical of our own country. And when this sort of
compliance to these sorts of laws leads to complicity and
rights abuses, it cannot simply be business as usual.
Look beyond China. It seems that not a week goes by without
some story of China's long arm threatening free and open
society, as Professor Hamilton can no doubt attest.
A key element in the Chinese government's long-arm efforts
is focused on information technology and the internet and
internet governance or sovereignty. They assert national
control of the internet and social media platforms, not only in
recent domestic cyber legislation and development plans, but
also at international gatherings.
Additionally, there are growing examples of attempts by the
Chinese government to guide, buy, or coerce political influence
and control discussion of what they deem sensitive topics.
China's Great Firewall, grave rights violations in ethnic
minority regions, arrests of citizen journalists and rights
lawyers, suppression of speech--these are the familiar markings
of an authoritarian one-party state. But to the extent that the
same authoritarian impulses animate the Chinese government and
Party's efforts abroad, including inside the United States, it
directly threatens our most deeply held values and our national
interests.
So I look forward to today's testimony. I regret that a
previously scheduled witness, Mr. Roy Jones, an American worker
who was fired from his job at Marriott for inadvertently
``liking'' a tweet posted by a pro-Tibet group, is unable to
join us.
His story, which has now been well documented, is a painful
and poignant reminder of the Chinese Communist Party's long
arm, of their ability to coerce and get witting or unwitting
cooperation from American corporations and companies who are
interested in protecting their market status in China, even if
it means firing an American worker the way Marriott did because
he ``liked'' a tweet or a post about Tibet.
There are very real costs involved if we fail to confront
China's pernicious authoritarianism at home and increasingly,
abroad. And if we fail to address it, Americans here at home
and those of us who love democracy and freedom around the
world, including many of our allies in Europe and Australia and
the Asia-Pacific region, could find ourselves living in a world
where we work somewhere or live somewhere where we cannot speak
freely without losing our job or some other benefit, because
who we work for or who controls us is not ourselves but a
foreign government that uses the leverage of access to its
market in order to reach here and impact one of our most
cherished principles.
At this time, I would like to recognize the Cochairman for
his comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Cochairman Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Rubio, and
thank you for your leadership and a very powerful statement and
for convening this extremely important and timely hearing.
China, as we all know, has the world's largest number of
internet users as well as the most sophisticated and aggressive
internet censorship and control regime.
I would remind my colleagues that back on February 15,
2006, I convened a hearing, the beginning of a series of
hearings. This one was called ``The Internet in China: Tool for
Freedom or Suppression?'' Well, the jury's in--it's not a tool
for freedom, it's a tool for suppression.
Yes, some people are able to communicate and bypass some of
the regulators, the people who are ubiquitous in trying to
uncover and to, unfortunately, hurt the human rights movement
there. But it has become, especially under Xi Jinping, a tool
for massive suppression.
The Chinese government spends $10 billion on maintaining
and improving their censorship apparatus. The U.S. Government
has an annual internet freedom budget of $55 million. And
Congress still has little idea as to how this money is being
spent. And I know Ms. Lantos Swett is shaking her head because
we and she have raised this issue so many times in the past.
Over the past year or so, Chinese companies were ordered to
close websites that hosted discussions on the military,
history, and international affairs, and crack down on illegal
VPNs. Apple was forced to remove VPNs from China's app store.
New regulations were announced restricting anonymity
online. And the Chinese government rolled out impressive new
censorship technologies censoring photos in one-to-one WeChat
discussions and disrupting WhatsApp.
Beijing has also deployed facial--as you pointed out, Mr.
Chairman--and voice recognition, artificial intelligence and
other surveillance technologies throughout the country but
particularly targeting the Uyghur ethnic minority where between
500,000 and a million Uyghurs have been detained arbitrarily.
The Chinese government and the Communist Party's attempt to
enforce and export a digital authoritarianism poses a direct
threat to Chinese rights defenders and ethnic minorities and
poses a direct challenge to the interests of the United States
and the free international community.
The U.S. must recognize that we are engaged in a battle of
ideas and a revitalized dictatorship--online, in the
marketplace, and elsewhere--and we need to up our competitive
strategies and our game to meet this very, very serious
challenge.
The administration's national security strategy says quite
clearly that the Chinese government and the Communist Party,
along with Russia, seek to ``challenge American power,
influence and interests, attempting to erode American security
and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free
and less fair, to grow their militaries and to control
information and data to repress their societies and expand
their influence. The Chinese government and Communist Party are
using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations,
and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed
their political and security agenda. China gathers and exploits
data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its
authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of
surveillance.''
The Chinese government and the Communist Party want to
shape a world that is antithetical to U.S. values and interests
and to export their economic, political and censorship models
globally.
In response, the U.S. and like-minded allies must stand
resolutely for freedom of religion, fairer and freer trade,
labor rights, an end to the coercive population control
programs, freedom of navigation, the rule of law and freedom of
expression, including online.
A coherent and engaged internet freedom strategy must be a
critical part of the U.S. diplomatic toolbox. This strategy
should have at its core a commitment to protect fundamental
freedoms, privacy, and promote the free flow of news and
information. But it is not a matter of just having a strategy--
it should be the right one. The Bush and Obama administrations
pursued cyber diplomacy, yet internet freedom has declined
around the world, privacy is increasingly under threat, and the
free flow of information has become more endangered.
The right strategy must start with some humility.
Cyberspace is a place to spread democratic ideals and a place
where criminals, extremists, corporations, traffickers, and
governments exploit vulnerabilities with impunity. Online
communication can convey our highest ideals and our worst
fears. It can shine a light on repression and be the source of
hatred, manipulation, fake news, coercion, and conflict. It can
bring people together or it can push us apart.
Despite all of this, I agree with the NSS's conclusion
which says, ``The internet is an American invention and it
should reflect our values as it continues to transform the
future for all nations and all generations. A strong,
defensible cyber infrastructure fosters economic growth,
protects our liberties and advances our national security.''
Central to a revitalized U.S. internet freedom strategy
should be a priority to open gaping holes in China's Great
Firewall. As we remember with Radio Free Europe years ago, it
was not soundproof. I remember those ads when I was a kid
growing up. Well, the Great Chinese Firewall can be penetrated,
but it has to be a very focused and aggressive and smart
strategy.
I am not confident that the policy of the Broadcasting
Board of Governors or the State Department has met that test at
all. I think there are certain goals we should prioritize in
our internet freedom strategy, which would include, one,
China's netizens require easy, reliable, and free access to
uncensored information through anticensorship technologies so
that anybody can freely access information regardless of their
technical ability. Reliable solutions should work all the time,
regardless of intensified crackdowns or major events like Party
congresses or the June 4th anniversary of Tiananmen Square.
Solutions should also present difficult choices for the
Chinese authorities. If the authorities want to disrupt these
solutions, then they must disrupt many online services which
they would normally be hesitant and unlikely to block.
Access to solutions should also come at no cost to Chinese
netizens. The Chinese authorities often block access to payment
providers, so even if Chinese can afford a circumvention
solution, they cannot get past the censorship by their payment
provider.
Holistic anticensorship solutions should be encouraged,
including not just technical circumvention but also
distribution of those tools--getting around Google Play being
blocked and censorship in the Apple app store--helping others
share anticensorship tools as well as content through messaging
apps, social networks, and QR codes.
These are just a few examples. I could say to my colleagues
that in years past, I introduced the Global Online Freedom Act.
We're going to be reintroducing that shortly, updated and
hopefully responsive. Unfortunately, it has been sent to
several committees. While we have gotten it out of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, in the past, Ways and Means and Financial
Services on the House side have been reluctant because of the
pressure coming from the industries that weren't for it.
I would note parenthetically as well that Google used to be
against it and then midstream a couple of years ago came out in
favor of it. So there is hope that we'll get some support
there. But above all, I think we just need to pass that or
something like it in the very near future.
I yield back and I thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
Let us begin with the panelists.
Ms. Cook, if you want to begin with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF SARAH COOK, SENIOR RESEARCH ANALYST FOR EAST ASIA
AND EDITOR, CHINA MEDIA BULLETIN, FREEDOM HOUSE
Ms. Cook. Chairman Rubio, Cochairman Smith, thank you for
inviting me. And it's really an honor to testify before you
today.
The number of internet users in China reached an estimated
772 million people as of the end of 2017. This figure puts the
issues we are discussing today in perspective. They affect a
group more than double the size of the population of the United
States.
Alongside this increased access to internet services,
China's ruling Communist Party has developed a robust apparatus
of censorship, manipulation, and surveillance. Although this
system has long been the most multilayered and sophisticated
control apparatus in the world, recent years have seen new
waves of tightening.
Over the past year and particularly since a new
cybersecurity law came into effect last June, online censorship
and surveillance have expanded dramatically alongside
increasing arrests of Chinese citizens, particularly for
content shared on the mobile instant messaging platform WeChat.
Technical and regulatory innovation and experimentation is
constantly under way. It is thus worth considering what the
costs are of this tightening for various actors inside and
outside China.
Well, for Chinese netizens, the space for ordinary Chinese
to obtain and share information on a wide range of political
and even apolitical topics has noticeably shrunk. The risk of
punishment for even facetious comments deemed unacceptable to
the authorities has risen. These shifts affect hundreds of
millions of users in China.
For target populations, like activists or members of
religious and ethnic minorities, the consequences are
especially dire. Numerous lawyers, bloggers, Tibetan monks,
Uyghur Muslims, Christians, and Falun Gong practitioners have
been jailed for sharing, downloading, or accessing information
online or via their mobile phones.
For Chinese tech companies--well, Chinese technology
companies try to serve their customers, but they are also
required to monitor and delete massive amounts of user-
generated content in an ever-changing and arbitrary regulatory
environment.
Over the past month, popular applications providing news or
enabling the sharing of humorous content to tens of millions of
users have been suspended or shut down for failing to
``rectify'' their content sufficiently. These apps are now
planning to hire thousands more internal censors.
For foreign tech firms, as you know, many of the world's
top technology and social media companies are restricted from
providing services to Chinese users. Foreign companies that do
operate in China or work with Chinese firms are forced to
comply with censorship demands.
LinkedIn restricts users from accessing profiles or posts
by people outside China that contain politically sensitive
information. Apple removed more than 600 applications from its
mobile phone store that enabled Chinese users to access blocked
websites.
But foreign companies are also increasingly at risk of
being complicit in politicized arrests or violations of user
privacy. It's not only Apple that has transferred users' data
to servers in China under data localization provisions in the
cybersecurity law. Evernote is another U.S. company that has
done so, in its case not with a company that is owned by the
government, but with Tencent, which has been known to pass
information to police in the past.
Airbnb China recently alerted its hosts that it ``may
disclose your information to Chinese government agencies
without further notice to you.''
And one of the biggest investors in the artificial
intelligence firm SenseTime, which provides facial recognition
to local police and at least one prison in China, is none other
than U.S. chipmaker Qualcomm.
Now for the Communist Party. Now, the Communist Party is
leading the drive for increased internet controls to protect
its hold on power, shield itself from criticism, and stop
organized political opposition. But this project also comes
with costs for the party in terms of legitimacy and even the
effectiveness of censorship efforts.
A new academic study found that after Instagram was blocked
in 2014, users were more motivated to seek out tools to
circumvent censorship and reach the platform. But along the
way, they encountered a wide array of censored content they
might not otherwise have seen.
More broadly, with each announcement of new restrictions
that negatively affect millions of users, signs of public
backlash are evident. The constitutional changes enacted last
month that removed term limits for President Xi Jinping are a
case in point. The sheer scale of censorship points to a
sizeable contingent of Chinese citizens who disagreed with the
move, and much of the dissent emerged in the form of ridicule
aimed directly at Xi.
The situation provoked many Chinese citizens who might
otherwise consider themselves apolitical to begin expressing
their worries about China's direction and looking for ways
around censorship.
Despite these costs and periodic concessions to public
outcry, it is hard to imagine any voluntary loosening of
restrictions in the coming years. On the contrary, we are
likely to see more tightening, more government demands for
companies' cooperation, and more arrests of innocent users.
The international community should be ready to respond to
these trends. There are recommendations specifically for the
U.S. Government included in my written testimony. But despite
the Chinese government's ever-escalating efforts to censor and
monitor internet use, steps by the United States and others can
have a real impact.
And I would like to conclude with a quotation from an
anonymous Chinese reader of our China Media Bulletin. ``I am a
lower-class worker in Chinese society and I don't speak
English. An independent Chinese media like you that does in-
depth reports about the situation in China gives me a better
understanding of China's current situation and future
development. I think the flow of information and freedom of
speech are very important to China's future development. Birds
in cages long to fly. Even if we can't fly out now, hearing the
chirping of birds outside can still give us hope and faith.''
Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Mr. Hamilton, thank you for
being here.
Mr. Hamilton. Thanks, Chairman Rubio, Cochairman Smith----
Chairman Rubio. Can you press the button for the
microphone, please? Thank you.
Mr. Hamilton. This one?
Chairman Rubio. There we go.
STATEMENT OF CLIVE HAMILTON, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC ETHICS,
CHARLES STURT UNIVERSITY, CANBERRA, AND AUTHOR, ``SILENT
INVASION: CHINA'S INFLUENCE IN AUSTRALIA''
Mr. Hamilton. Thanks, Chairman Rubio and Cochairman Smith.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before the
Commission.
Australia, as perhaps you know, is at the forefront of
Beijing's influence and interference efforts, with a view to
breaking Australia away from the American alliance. If it can
achieve that--so what happens in Australia is of crucial
importance to us all.
Last November, as the finished manuscript of my book
``Silent Invasion'' was about to go to the typesetter, my
publisher, Allen & Unwin, notified me that it was pulling the
book. The CEO wrote saying that, based on advice it had
received, the company was reacting to ``potential threats to
the book and the company from possible action by Beijing.'' He
went on to write, ``The most serious of these threats was the
very high chance of a vexatious defamation action against Allen
& Unwin and possibly against you personally as well.''
The company's defamation lawyer had pointed out that it
would not be possible to make further textual changes to the
book that would protect the company from vexatious legal
actions by Beijing's proxies in Australia, legal actions that
would tie up the company in expensive legal action for months
or even longer. The company had been spooked by recent
defamation actions taken against major news organizations by
so-called ``whales,'' a reference, I believe, to legal action
taken by Chau Chak Wing, a Chinese-Australian billionaire
resident in Guangdong, and Huang Xiangmo, a wealthy Chinese
citizen residing in Sydney.
Australia's domestic intelligence agency, ASIO, has warned
the major political parties that they should not accept
donations from these men because of their suspected links to
the Chinese Communist Party.
The defamation actions launched by these billionaires have
had a chilling effect on reporting by news outlets in Australia
and now on the book publishing industry. And I note that an
editorial in The People's Daily a couple of months ago in
effect endorsed the use of lawfare abroad, another instance of
the Chinese Communist Party exploiting the institutions of
democracy to undermine democracy.
Allen & Unwin's decision to drop ``Silent Invasion'' was a
deeply worrying affirmation of the argument of the book. No
actual threats were made to the publisher, which, in a way, is
more disturbing. The shadow cast by Beijing over Australia is
now dark enough to frighten a respected publisher out of
publishing a book critical of the Chinese Communist Party.
The shadow has also frightened off the rest of the
publishing industry. Even though the spiking of the book
attracted headlines around the world, none of the major
publishers showed any interest in publishing what would be
``Silent Invasion.''
I worry about the message that has now been sent to China
scholars in Australia. The message is: If you write a book
critical of the Chinese Communist Party, you will have trouble
finding a publisher. Already, China scholars have told me that
they censor themselves in order not to jeopardize their visas
to do research in China and so protect their careers.
Recently, we have seen major Western publishers compromise
academic freedom by censoring their publications at the
insistence of Beijing. They did so to maintain access to the
Chinese market. In the ``Silent Invasion'' case, the fear was
not about what the CCP could do in China--cut off access to
markets--but what the CCP could do in Australia--sponsor legal
actions.
The spiking of ``Silent Invasion'' represents perhaps the
starkest attack on academic freedom in Australia in recent
times. It attracted intense media interest and strong support
from the public. However, throughout the saga, one sector
remained silent: the universities.
No representative organization or prominent vice
chancellor, that is, president of the university, made any kind
of statement supporting me, a professor apparently being
targeted by a powerful foreign state because of his work. Yet
three months later, in March of this year, in a submission to a
parliamentary inquiry into the proposed new foreign
interference laws, Universities Australia, the peak body
representing universities in Australia, complained about the
threat posed by the new laws to academic freedom. These are
laws designed explicitly to prevent foreign powers from
suppressing free speech in my country.
Australian universities are now so closely tied into
monetary flows and research links with China that they have
forgotten the founding principles of the Western university and
none more so, I might add, than the University of Sydney.
In my written statement I've outlined Beijing's attempts to
intimidate me and punish those associated with ``Silent
Invasion's launch, notably Mr. John Hu, a prominent Chinese-
Australian citizen who helped the Sydney launch of the book.
The condemnations of me and my book are but a small part of a
much larger strategy to emerge in recent times. Beijing is
ramping up its rhetoric against Australia in a calibrated
campaign of psychological warfare.
Last week, the PLA navy challenged three Australian
warships sailing through the South China Sea simply for being
there, for being in open international waters. Beijing has
scaled up its threats of economic harm unless Australia changes
its anti-China policy. This psychological warfare is but stage
one, with real punishments to follow, if needed.
So, for Australia, this is what pushback feels like, at
least in its early stages. When Australia stands up for its
independence and democratic values and tells Beijing it will no
longer tolerate interference in our domestic affairs, we expect
it to react.
For some in Australia, a mere expression of displeasure by
the CCP is enough for them to buckle at the knees. There is no
shortage of Beijing sympathizers and appeasers among
Australia's elite, calling on Australian politicians, scholars,
and commentators to tone down their rhetoric, as if the current
strain in the relationship between the two nations were our
fault rather than due to Beijing's campaign of subversion,
cyber intrusion and harassment on the high seas. Former Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd has recently joined in this blame-shifting
with his criticisms of the Turnbull government for standing up
to Beijing.
The next two years in Australia are vital. At present, the
political will exists to respond to the CCP's influence and
interference operations, notably through the new foreign
interference legislation now before Parliament.
The CCP is mobilizing its proxies. And some among the
elites are fighting back on its behalf. Business leaders are
saying we must do nothing to upset Beijing. Elements of the
Australian Labor Party, now in opposition, are attempting to
have the proposed new laws blocked. And Beijing-friendly
intellectuals and commentators are writing articles and open
letters saying that there is no problem and that the criticisms
of the CCP are in fact driven by racism.
So the situation hangs in the balance. If we fail now to
put up defenses against the CCP's subversion, then the
opportunity will probably not arise again because the influence
in the party will have penetrated too deeply.
Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Dr. Lantos Swett, thank you for
being here.
STATEMENT OF KATRINA LANTOS SWETT, PRESIDENT, LANTOS FOUNDATION
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & JUSTICE
Ms. Lantos Swett. Thank you. Good morning. I want to thank
Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith for the invitation to
participate in this hearing. And I want to commend you both for
convening a hearing on such an important topic.
I would ask that my full testimony, including relevant
correspondence between the Internet Freedom Coalition that I am
part of, and the State Department, BBG, and members of
Congress, be included as part of the hearing record.
The French have a wonderful saying, ``Plus ca change, plus
c'est la meme chose,'' the more things change, the more they
remain the same. I could not help but think of this phrase as I
prepared my remarks for today's hearing.
Over 10 years ago, my late father, Tom Lantos, then
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, held a hearing
that crystallized the sad truth about the devastating moral
compromises so many major companies and countries, including,
at times, our own, are willing to make in order to appease the
Chinese government and gain access to its vast markets.
And I think perhaps that, Congressman Smith, you might have
been at that hearing with my father.
At that time, the chief executive of Yahoo, Jerry Yang, was
in my father's crosshairs that day over his company's
cooperation in giving up the identity of a dissident
journalist, Shi Tao, to the Chinese authorities. After Yahoo
disclosed his identity to the government, Mr. Shi was sentenced
to prison for 10 years for the crime of engaging in pro-
democracy activities.
As these high-tech billionaires and technological whiz kids
sat before him, my father, who came to this country as a
penniless Holocaust survivor from Hungary, said, ``While
technologically and financially you are giants, morally you are
pygmies.''
On that memorable occasion, Jerry Yang felt so ``called
out'' by my father's words that he actually turned around and
publicly bowed in apology to Mr. Shi's weeping mother, who was
seated behind him. It was a dramatic moment, to be sure, but
most of the episodes of cowardly kowtowing and quiet
collaboration with the bullies, the censors, and the
persecutors within the Chinese Communist Party occur without
public comment or scrutiny.
Furthermore, as today's hearing demonstrates, China is not
content with censoring and controlling its own citizens. It is
using the immense power of its financial resources to reach
every corner of the world in an effort to intimidate
businesses, universities, publishers, hotel chains, religious
institutions, human rights and democracy activists, and even
governments.
It pains me to have to say this, but right now, China is
succeeding in this effort to a shocking degree. Even more
shocking, later in my remarks I will expose why I feel our
government is doing far too little in the way of internet
freedom to truly help the people of China and those imprisoned
in other repressive regimes around the world.
One of my fellow witnesses this morning, Mr. Hamilton, has
had personal experience with the long arm of the Chinese
government and their intimidation, and his testimony is a
cautionary and chilling tale.
Just as my father did back in 2007, we must use the power
of public naming and shaming to try and restrain the worst
impulses of businesses, other organizations, individuals, and
even our own government agencies who seem all too willing to
sell their precious birthright of free speech and democracy for
a mess of Chinese pottage.
To be clear, I think we all recognize that the internet is
not an unalloyed good when it comes to spreading ideas and
expanding the borders of freedom and democracy. As Shakespeare
memorably penned, ``The web of our life is of a mingled yarn,
good and ill together.''
It is analogous to our intricate system of modern
transportation. While we recognize that it contributes to
pollution, congestion, disrupts the environment and, of course,
makes possible terrible accidents involving injuries and
fatalities, nonetheless, it is the indispensable circulatory
system that makes possible our modern world of travel and
commerce.
Similarly, the internet, despite its ability to spread
hate, disrupt elections, and propagate fake news, is
indispensable to our modern system of global communication. And
as such, it is central to freedom of expression everywhere in
the world.
That is why there was so much enthusiasm and energy eight
years ago when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
delivered a landmark speech on internet freedom. I was sitting
in the audience that day and felt the surge of optimism as our
nation's top diplomat laid out a robust vision of America's
central role in tearing down what Secretary Clinton referred to
as ``the Berlin Wall of our digital age.''
Remember, I am the daughter of the only member of Congress
who personally experienced the horrors of living under fascism
of the right, the Nazis, and the totalitarianism of the left,
the Communists. It is in my DNA to resist these authoritarian
efforts to control free, uncensored access to knowledge. And
I'm pretty sure, Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith, that it
is in your DNA, too.
The year after that speech, the Lantos Foundation played a
leading role in redirecting a good part of our government's
spending on internet freedom to the BBG. Prior to that, almost
all funding was inside the State Department, and frankly, it
led to situations where China was able to deftly use the U.S.'s
efforts to open the internet and circumvent their ``Great
Firewall'' as a diplomatic bargaining tool.
Clearly, as a human rights organization, we believe that
access to the internet is a modern human right that should not
be bargained away, so we sought a ``safer'' home for the
funding and felt the BBG had enough independence to play a
leading role in opening the internet across the globe.
In the early years of this adjustment in the way our
government funded anti-censorship tools, internet freedom
initiatives were not perfect, but our government was funding a
number of technologies to provide open access and we were
moving in the right direction.
Today, it pains me to sit before you and express my deep
disappointment and frustration with the actual results and the
current commitment of our country's internet freedom policy. I
have heard it said that if China herself had been in charge of
America's internet freedom policy, it could hardly have been
more favorable to China's interests. That is an extraordinarily
harsh assessment, perhaps harsher than I myself would subscribe
to, but let me tell you why I think it is not far off the mark.
Perhaps the single most stunning example of the lengths to
which China will go to create an information prison is the
``Great Firewall,'' a massive government censorship apparatus
that has been estimated to cost billions of dollars annually
and to employ some 2 million people to police the internet use
of its citizens. For this reason, many of us have long believed
that firewall circumvention technologies must be a key
component of any effective internet freedom strategy.
Since 2011, the Lantos Foundation, as part of a broad
internet freedom coalition, has urged Congress to direct the
State Department through DRL and the BBG to provide robust
funding to field-tested, scalable circumvention technologies.
Recognizing that these technologies have the potential to
provide safe and uncensored access to the internet for
literally hundreds of millions of people in China and in other
closed societies, Congress has responded.
In every recent appropriations bill, Congress has included
language directing that not less than $50 million be spent to
fund internet freedom programs, including, specifically,
firewall circumvention technology. This simply has not
happened. Call it willful ignorance, call it bureaucratic
intransigence and obfuscation, call it what you will, but, in
my view, both the State Department and the BBG have failed to
faithfully implement the clearly expressed intent of Congress,
that significant resources be dedicated to these large-scale
firewall circumvention technologies, the ones China fears most.
They have funded freedom festivals and training and small-
scale technologies that are more directed to driving traffic to
their own platforms, in the case of the BBG, than giving free,
unfettered access to the vast world of the internet for the
hundreds of millions of people trapped behind the digital
curtain. They fund privacy and security apps that are very
important for safety while on the net, but they forget that
many cannot even access the internet.
Meanwhile, some of the most effective, proven technologies,
the ones China fears the most, technologies that provide
unfettered access to all, have received only modest funding and
have had curious barriers placed in their paths, making it
difficult, if not impossible to qualify for different grant
proposals.
The cost to U.S. interests of these failures at the BBG and
DRL were on vivid display during January of this year when
protests broke out in Iran. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians
took to the streets to protest economic hardship and the
oppressive rule of the theocratic dictators. Among other
repressive responses to this popular uprising, the Iranian
government acted to block access to the internet. Sadly,
because the BBG had earlier cut off all funding to some of the
most effective circumvention technologies, our ability to help
provide access to the outside world for those brave Iranians
was greatly limited.
Only a single U.S. government-funded large-scale
circumvention technology was available at this moment of
crisis. I consider this an inexcusable dereliction of duty.
Certainly, the single for-profit vendor who was funded at the
time did valuable work, but how many more people could have
been helped had the BBG done the job Congress directed them to
do?
I confess I am baffled by the failure of both the State
Department and the BBG to faithfully execute the directives
that Congress has given them. When I have met with
representatives at both agencies, they reassure me of their
deep commitment to the goal of broadening access to internet
freedom and of the intensity of their efforts to do so. The
rhetoric is pleasant enough, but their words are not matched by
their deeds.
When our coalition has attempted to drill down and get real
facts about where they are directing their resources and why
they are not funding proven technologies, we are most often met
with obfuscation, opacity, and unfulfilled promises.
During the midst of the Iranian protests, I met with the
top leadership at the BBG and they personally pledged to me at
that time that within three to four weeks at most, funding
would be granted for technologies that could make access
available to vastly increased numbers of users around the
world. More than three months have passed since those meetings,
and not only has no funding been approved, but the latest
indications are that no funding will be approved. In fact, they
just now issued a letter saying they will be issuing no funding
at this time.
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the
bureaucrats at DRL and the BBG are relying on what they think
is Congress's inadequate attention span and limited expertise
to get away with this pattern of ignoring your clearly
expressed intent. What arrogance!
I am hoping and praying that you will prove them wrong.
This issue, internet firewall circumvention, desperately
needs champions in Congress. We need leaders who will be
vigilant and vigorous in demanding accountability from the
agencies responsible for executing our government's internet
freedom policies, leaders who will not be beguiled by soothing
words and, rather than accept heartfelt protestations of good
intentions, will demand results.
Above all, we need leaders who know that we must not pacify
the oppressors but instead fortify and strengthen the brave
dissidents and ordinary Chinese citizens who are risking
everything in their pursuit of freedom.
In other words, we need leaders who are not moral pygmies,
but rather moral giants. I know that both of you are that kind
of leader. And the Lantos Foundation, along with our internet
freedom coalition partners, stands ready to assist you in any
way possible.
Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you all for being here. As promised,
we are going to start with Professor Hamilton.
Let me just set the stage briefly because people watch this
issue and I think it's important to understand this context so
they understand why it is that we are focusing on this issue.
You know, 25, 30 years ago as China began to emerge as a
participant in the global economy, the widespread conventional
wisdom was that the more prosperous they became, the more they
would behave like a democracy and be open to some of the ideas
and notions of the West and certainly of freedom of expression
and the like.
But they knew that history, too. They knew, they understood
that as nations became more prosperous, their people demanded
more political liberties, and so they have figured out a way to
craft a system, given the sheer volume and size of their
economy, to basically have a Communist Party at the center of
their daily lives, a central, powerful government that--by the
way, they link back to its thousands of years of history as
part of their values and their success--but allowing free
market activity, though not identical to ours.
In essence, if you are a prosperous Chinese corporation,
you may be independently owned, but when the government comes
calling, you're going to do what they tell you, even if you
don't want to do it, or you will be charged with corruption or
you won't be in business for long.
In that context, they view the world, they view these
things like notions of freedom of expression and speech not
just as a threat. Their number-one priority, above everything
else, is to maintain the Communist Party in charge. They view
all these principles in the West and all these things that
we're talking about as threats to that.
But broader than that, they don't view it as their rules.
They didn't write these rules, so why should they follow them?
And they're trying to redraw all the global order along the
principles that they argue for. And you start to see that
exercise itself. They are beginning now to link their economic
influence and power to their political gains and goals.
And we hear your story, Professor Hamilton, and we start
thinking, boy, that's far-fetched, it sounds like a movie. We
really aren't that far from that happening here in the United
States if you start to think about it. Perhaps it's already
happened, just not--and we certainly know that an individual
working for the Marriott hotel was fired because he ``liked'' a
tweet, which he says he did by mistake, by the way; but he was
fired for that. We wish he could have testified here today.
That said, a couple things I would point to. And the first
is, just to be abundantly clear, you had an opportunity to
publish a book and ran into impediments because publishers came
to you and basically said I know we have a contract, but we're
not going to go forward because, number one, they are going to
get really rich billionaires acting as agents of the Chinese
government to sue us and tie us up in courts here in Australia.
And number two, we're worried about what it might imply to our
access as a company, beyond your book, to that 1 billion-plus
population market that they have.
And you have seen that play out now in academia as well
where you have university presses and even others here in the
United States where you have speeches canceled because
universities have a program over there and they feel that they
are going to pull the plug on that and/or on the lucrative
business of attracting Chinese students to travel and study
here at exorbitant tuition rates. All those things are
threatened, they feel those things are threatened, if they
publish a book or they invite a speaker on campus.
That is clearly what you have experienced and what we've
seen replicated here. Is that an accurate description?
Mr. Hamilton. Yes, indeed, Senator, it is. I would point
out that, as I said in my testimony, the disturbing thing about
the spiking of ``Silent Invasion'' was not that Allen & Unwin
felt that its market in China would be threatened, because it
doesn't have a market in China, but that the CCP would
interfere in Australian domestic politics through the use of
the legal system to stop Australians hearing from another
Australian about a concern, a threat to our democratic values.
That was the most disturbing aspect of it.
And as I have tried to stress in my statement to the
Commission, universities are exceptionally important because
intellectuals, academic scholars, they set the tone, they are
the experts on whom we rely for information about China and the
meaning of what's happening.
And now that in Australian universities, as in universities
around the world, but particularly in Australian universities--
because the number of Chinese students at Australian
universities is proportionately five times higher than in the
United States, and so the financial dependency is very heavy
indeed. And money can buy silence. Money can buy compliance.
And one thing that has disturbed me tremendously in the
writing of this book and even more so since publication is the
way in which the defenders of fundamental democratic rights,
particularly the right to free speech, can be bought off. I
mean, of course, they don't see it that way. They have all
sorts of excuses and arguments about, We have to balance the
various interests of the university.
As I've said to those who have argued this to me, who've
tried to persuade me not to criticize their university too
heavily in my book, I said, well, no, it is not a question of
trading off academic freedom against income from China. You
know, academic freedom trumps other factors. You are not a
commercial enterprise, and even if you were we would expect you
to have an attachment to basic democratic values.
And yet the commercialization of universities in Australia
has been so strong and they have become so heavily dependent,
not only on money from Chinese students but from a whole
network of research and other relationships with Chinese
universities, that the senior executives of those institutions
are always worrying about what might happen on their campuses
that could jeopardize that relationship. And I think this is
deeply concerning for the future of the Western university if
we are going to maintain that unique institution.
Chairman Rubio. Well, again, I am certainly not an expert
on the Australian laws, but I do know we come from a common-law
tradition, so there is probably something similar to what I am
about to cite.
And your case, as you outline it, is something that I hope
we will examine in Federal law here in the United States
because I think it falls within the context of something called
intentional interference with a business agreement or
intentional interference with a contractual relation. The
elements of it--I have pulled them up here just to make sure--
here are the elements, and I think you fulfill every single one
of them.
The existence of a contractual relationship or a
beneficial business relationship between two parties--that
could be a job with a company or, in your case, a contract with
a publisher.
Knowledge of that relationship by a third party--
obviously, the Chinese government and/or its agents where it
had knowledge.
Intent of the third party--in this case, the
Chinese government and others--to induce a party to the
relationship to breach the relationship.
The lack of any privilege on the part of the third
party to induce such a breach. In essence, there is no
privilege for them to be able to do that. It's not like they
are violating a contract with them, they are simply doing it
because they want to silence your voice.
The contractual relationship is breached and
damage to the party against whom the breach occurs.
I mean, it seems to me as if--I don't know if there is a
similar statute under Australian law--but it seems to me that
the case you've described fits these criteria. And it would be
interesting to examine--I confess I haven't done so before this
hearing today--how such a scenario, if it played out in the
United States, whether it's an employee that worked somewhere
and is fired because of that interference or whether it's a
book deal or a speech for compensation or the like--if in fact
there is evidence and someone can go to court and prove that
actions on behalf of a government and/or its agents caused a
breach in that sort of contract, whether there shouldn't be a
cause of action and damages. And if you cannot collect against
the Chinese government, then collect against the party that you
had the contract with and who violated it out of fear.
And again, I think some of the things that get people's
attention is when suddenly there is a civil cause of action for
this. And this is going to require a lot more work and I have
got to think about it, but we cannot allow this to continue as
far as our laws here are concerned.
And I for one intend to look at and see whether or not
there are changes to be made in Federal law so that if what
happened to you happens to someone here, whether it's a book
deal or employment at Marriott, and then is fired by
interference, that person now has a cause of action to pursue
against the employer or the book contractor if they can't
collect against the Chinese government, and maybe both.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, it could be a very powerful counter-use
of the legal system to resist this kind of intimidation.
There have been cases in Australia where Australians of
Taiwanese heritage have been fired from their jobs because when
their bosses asked them if they supported Taiwanese
independence they said yes--and they were fired. And this is
clearly contrary to employment law in Australia. You can't fire
someone for their political opinions. And yet, the situation is
such that no one has taken it upon themselves to defend these
people. So it's clearly contrary to employment law.
The difficulty in the case of my book is that one would
need to be able to demonstrate in a court of law that a
litigant against Allen & Unwin who might be mentioned in the
book was acting on behalf of a foreign power for political
reasons rather than out of a genuine concern for the damage to
their reputation.
I suspect that if the new foreign interference law is
passed in Parliament--and it should be, although, I mean, it is
likely to be, albeit with some amendments--then we will find
that the intelligence agencies in collaboration with the
Australian Federal Police, the enforcement body that would be
responsible for enforcing the laws, would be able to--sorry,
the intelligence agency ASIO would be able to provide its
secret intelligence information establishing those links
between a litigant and the Chinese Communist Party, which would
be a basis under the new foreign interference laws for a
prosecution. And those acts of foreign interference, which are
there defined, carry very heavy penalties indeed.
And so many of us are looking forward, not only to the
passage of the legislation, but the first prosecutions under
the new laws because we feel as though that will be a watershed
in which the intelligence agencies and the law enforcement
agencies come together to make an example of Beijing's proxies
attempting to undermine the democratic rights of Australians,
including the right to free speech by publishing a book like
this.
Chairman Rubio. Well, my final point before I turn it over
to the Cochair--and I thank you for being here. I really want
what you've said here today to be heard by the State
Department.
Two final points. One, it's amazing what people admit to
and/or what you can find under subpoena or what they admit to
when they're under oath and facing perjury. And so, again,
that's why I think the legal system is created--for protecting
people.
The other is something you mentioned, how one of the
reactions now has been to cite this as xenophobic measures and
the like.
It's interesting. I didn't get there, but I just did an
interview a few minutes ago with a major news outlet talking
about Confucius Institutes. And one of the questions in there
was, isn't this just scaremongering? As if to imply this is
anticommunist scaremongering, and perhaps you can see how that
could be extended. It is one of the arguments that some of the
schools that continue to fight us on Confucius Institutes are
making.
It's an absurd one since this Commission every year
publishes long lists of Chinese citizens who are detained,
since much of the information that we get about what's
happening are abuses against Chinese citizens.
And then as far as scaremongering is concerned, I think if
there has been a positive development on this front, it is that
just in the last six to eight months there is a growing
awareness across the whole of government about the scale and
the scope of what we are up against here.
And it has not yet--and we are going to get to Dr. Lantos
Swett in a moment--but it has not yet potentially translated
all the way there, but we are on our way there. And we are
going to make it a part--and we are going to talk about that in
a moment.
But thank you for being here.
I want to go to the Cochair.
Cochairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I will just first direct my questions and then later on go
to our other two distinguished witnesses.
Let me just say, Professor Hamilton, thank you for your
very clear testimony and your leadership. I mean, it is so
absolutely needed. You are rare and it's so great to have your
voice here at this Commission today.
You know, the shameful complicity and the cowardice of many
in our academic community, some of the biggest and most
prestigious universities, not just in this country, but around
the world, is not new.
I would remind my colleagues that back in 1979, a guy by
the name of Steven Mosher, who was with Stanford, spent a full
year, went to Guangdong, published a book called ``Broken
Earth''--and I have read it because I was elected along with
Frank Wolf, who is here today--in 1980, the same year Ronald
Reagan got elected. And it had a profound impact in exposing
the barbarity of the one-child-per-couple policy, forced
abortion.
And for anyone who does not think that the consequences
have been lifelong, the Washington Post just did a piece a few
days ago called ``Too Many Men'' and pointed out that there are
the missing girls, that we have raised in this Commission over
and over again. Last year, we documented some 62 million
missing females exterminated through sex-selection abortion in
part because of the child/boy preference coupled with a child
limitation imposed by the government.
But Mosher broke that story and Stanford, to its
everlasting shame, threw him out of the university. The Wall
Street Journal did a piece called ``Stanford Morality''--
immorality is what it really was--and they defended Steven
Mosher and said, how could they?
Now, the Chinese government threatened Stanford and said
if, in the future, people want to come here and do their work,
they might find it a lot harder to have access. But where is,
as you said, Professor, the academic freedom, the idea of
robust inquiry so that you leave no stone unturned in telling
the unfettered truth?
Stanford brought shame to itself and we're seeing the
consequences of what they and so many others, including some in
the human rights community, have done over the years in
disregarding that issue, but also being willing, as the good
chairman said, you know, the Confucius Centers. We have a GAO
report that will be coming out soon. We have had a number of
hearings on it, both in the Commission and in my Subcommittee
on Human Rights. NYU and others who all have a presence in
China get huge amounts of money from the government. If you
think that doesn't stifle free speech and academic inquiry,
I'll sell you the Brooklyn Bridge.
And I know you would think that.
So maybe you can--my belief is that this is still getting
worse. You know, that goes back to 1979 with Stanford. 1980,
1981, 1982, we have seen this grow. And now it's even worse.
All over Europe, Confucius Centers are all over Africa. I just
had a hearing on that, myself and my Africa, Global Health, and
Global Human Rights Committee. It's happening everywhere. They
want to transform the world. And what they want as their vision
is a totalitarian dictatorship where the people serve the
government and not the other way around and they do so with
huge amounts of repression.
So if you could respond to that, how it's getting worse. It
has not gotten better, it's only gotten worse.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, thank you, Congressman. It is indeed
getting worse and it's getting worse because of the growing
confidence of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
Communist Party rulers there and President Xi Jinping's
determination to see the fulfillment of his China dream, the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, which has a benign
interpretation, but I think those of us who understand the more
hawkish attitudes of the dominant factions within the Chinese
Communist Party see that as effectively a blueprint for global
domination.
I think now we can say with reasonable confidence that in
their quiet moments the CCP leaders envisage that the PRC in 20
or 30 years' time will be the dominant global power. And when
that happens, we should all be afraid because they have no
respect for basic democratic rights that we cherish so much.
But as you have indicated, Congressman, and which I
strongly endorse and have detailed in ``Silent Invasion,'' they
can only get away with it if they have collaborators in Western
countries like the United States and Australia, if they can buy
off substantial segments of the elite who are willing to forgo
essential democratic rights, such as free speech, in pursuit of
other objectives.
And as I indicated, one of the things that has disturbed me
most in the process of writing this book, and then watching
subsequently after it has come out, is the truly tenuous
commitment of some of my nation's leaders to the concept of
free speech. It seems to be a tradeable commodity for those
people.
And it's only when some of us are willing to take a risk.
And, you know, in the case of, I think, all of us, it is often
a personal risk to our own security and our own employment to
say, no, we believe that free speech and other democratic
rights come before all else.
And it has been--it was Senator Rubio who alluded to this--
very disturbing to see the way in which some Australian
opinionmakers, including some of my own academic colleagues,
have turned on me and people like me as being motivated by
xenophobia. I actually have a very good record on antiracism
over the decades in Australia. I come from the political left,
which makes it more difficult for them.
But I tell you what--this book was launched in Sydney by
Chinese Australians, a group of Chinese Australians, the
Australian Values Alliance, who came to my country to escape
the clutches of Beijing. They went to Australia to enjoy the
privileges and freedom of a democratic nation.
But they live in fear because they know that the Chinese
Communist Party has its agents all across Australian society
who will punish them, which happened to Mr. John Hu, whom I
mentioned, the Chinese Australian who helped launch this book,
who, a week after he helped organize that launch event, arrived
in Shanghai with his 80-year-old mother in order to scatter his
father's ashes because he grew up in Shanghai. He was detained
at the airport and put on the next plane back to Australia. And
when he asked why, they said, You know why you are being
detained; you're getting off lightly. If we allowed you into
the country and then detained you, then you would really be in
trouble.
This doesn't send a new message to Chinese Australians.
This is a message they all understand. If they step out of
line, if they criticize the Chinese Communist Party or act in a
way which the party perceives as against its interests, they
will be punished. And that is a tragedy.
Cochairman Smith. I do know you have to go. But I'll just
conclude with this comment. You know, the concern that we have
is not just with universities, as you would expect,
organizations. I mean, Chairman Rubio and I and this Commission
fought very hard with the ABA when Teng Biao, his manuscript,
which originally was going to be published by the American Bar
Association, they reneged on that.
We raised it repeatedly. We asked them to come and testify,
to hold them to account. They did, however, allow Gao
Zhisheng's manuscript to be published, so that's a good thing.
But why does it take pressure with a group like the ABA that
should be walking point and not backpedaling because of
pressure?
The other point is that the business community in this
country has always been easy pickings. I'll never forget--and
this has bipartisan complicity written all over it. Under Bush
Sr., we had the problem where they thought that MFN was okay
for the People's Republic of China. We had Tiananmen Square, of
course.
And then Bill Clinton talked tough and said, Let's do an
executive order, lays out markers. And then one year later--Mr.
Wolf, who's here with us today, and I worked very hard on
this--one year later, he completely reneged, he ripped up his
executive order and gave MFN in May of 1994 with no human
rights conditionality. And the Chinese looked at us and said,
They care more about profits than they do about human rights.
And that was a game-changer in the negative for the world, but
especially for the Chinese people.
We have been trying ever since--ever since--to do our best
to reclaim all of that lost ground, which subsequent
presidents--Obama, Bush W.--did not, in my opinion, in any way
faithfully promote the human rights of the people of China.
This Commission will continue to try.
I'm looking forward to reading your book. I haven't read it
yet. But I thank you so much for your contribution and for your
leadership.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Thank you for being here. We
appreciate it very much.
Dr. Lantos Swett, I will start with you on this one. And I
think your testimony is very compelling.
I, too, am concerned about the lack of more progress on
breaking down internet firewalls. And I did want to share with
you--we received late last night a letter from the CEO and
director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Mr. Lansing,
and here's what he cites--and I wanted to give you a chance to
respond. Because I don't know if you have even seen the letter.
Ms. Lantos Swett. I have not.
Chairman Rubio. It says, ``In fiscal year 2017, Congress
appropriated $50.5 million to promote internet freedom
globally.''
And then ``BBG receives approximately a quarter of these
funds, $15 million. The law makes clear that BBG funds should
be available for tools and techniques to securely develop and
distribute BBG digital content, facilitate audience access to
such content on websites that are censored and coordinate the
distribution of BBG digital content to targeted regional
audiences and to promote and distribute such tools and
techniques, including digital security techniques. To meet our
statutory mandate, our annual appropriations act requires that
BBG's primary goal in funding these technologies is to secure
safe and secure access to BBG content.''
And it goes on to say ``a significant secondary benefit is
that once users reach a BBG platform, they then have means to
access the internet writ large.''
So I just wanted to give you a chance to respond to that.
The fundamental argument he is making is they only get $15
million and it is primarily supposed to be to open up access to
BBG content, not to the internet at large.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Well, it's my understanding that that
provision was added into only the most recent appropriations
bill. That is new language that was inserted, it is my
understanding, through the intense lobbying efforts of BBG. And
while I have no objection to the BBG wanting to promote access
to their content, I think that it is a very flimsy excuse for
not funding technologies that enable vast numbers of people to
access the internet freely.
I know of a number of other, sort of circumvention tool
providers who would be quite happy to structure their
technologies so that the first place they land is a BBG landing
page. And then from there, they are able to go into the wide
internet.
But I think--and this is the bottom line--they are spending
not $15 million on firewall circumvention technologies, they
are spending a small fraction of that, it is my understanding,
and this is where I hope that your Commission and that you as
individual leaders in Congress can drill down and compel them
to give you the answers. Because our internet freedom coalition
gets, you know, frankly, blocked and diverted and stymied and
sort of pushed off when we try to drill down and get the actual
answers.
But it is my understanding that of that $15 million, less
than $3 million is actually being given in grants to vendors
who are doing the work that Congress wants to see done. They
are expending it in a variety of ways, as I indicated in my
testimony, for small-scale research and development, small-
scale tools, VPNs, which are important, but do not have the
ability to resist the large-scale attacks launched by China or
other repressive regimes.
And at the end of the day, the numbers simply aren't there.
And it is more than a little disingenuous for BBG to come back
and say, Well, we are required by law only to promote our
content, when that is a new provision in the law inserted there
by the BBG. You know, it's sort of a different version of the
person who throws themselves on the mercy of the court as an
orphan when they are being charged with the murder of their
parents.
BBG sought that provision in the latest appropriations
bill. It has not been there previously.
I don't have a huge objection to the notion of wanting to
encourage people to access BBG content, but I am a little
troubled by the idea that we use internet freedom dollars that
Congress has appropriated to force them to read only the
material produced by the BBG. It somehow doesn't sit right with
this notion of free access. And I think, you know, I don't want
to pick a fight with the BBG. I love much of what the BBG does.
As I mentioned, my father, you know, grew up first
suffering under the depredations of the Nazis during the
Holocaust, and then experienced what it was to live under
communism. Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, Voice of
America, Radio Marti, these are valuable services. I want the
BBG to continue doing that.
But it is also a reality that increasingly people are
seeking out information digitally on the internet. They are not
restricted and nor should they be restricted to, sort of, the
information that we are providing through those mechanisms.
So I would say--and again, you know, some of my language I
know is tough, but I feel so passionate about this because
we've been so frustrated and so stymied for so long and there
is no good explanation as to why that should be the case. So be
very careful when they show you numbers or when they come back
with a seemingly very reasonable response. Compel them to
provide the actual facts behind the matter.
And I would really encourage you and your staffs--talk to
the developers of these circumvention technologies. Find out
from them, What is the problem? What are you being told? Why
are you being cut off from funding?
Right now, BBG is funding one technology, to the best of my
knowledge. It happens to be a commercial technology, not one
developed by dissidents, not one being offered free of charge,
but a commercial technology.
There should be--you know, let a thousand flowers bloom,
was that Mao's phrase? If we were doing what we should be
doing, if we were offering on an annual basis not $15 million,
but $30 million or $50 million, as Congress has indicated, as
funding for this kind of technology, you wouldn't have a
handful of five or six or seven developers, most of whom are on
the verge of shutting down because they have no funding. These
are dissidents who are providing this at no financial benefit
to themselves in order to help their brethren and their sisters
left behind in China. And they cannot stay alive as their
funding is cut off.
If we were doing 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 million dollars of
grant funding for these kinds of groups, we wouldn't have five,
four of which are struggling to stay alive. We'd have 25 or 30
or more--and that's what we want.
Chairman Rubio. Well, just a couple of points. One, to the
broader issue of BBG and the like, we have to understand these
entities were--the world has changed much since they were
created.
The one I am most familiar with, of course, are the Martis,
TV and Radio. And these were set up in a time when we had
limited--three major networks and a handful of local, state,
and national newspapers. Today, you literally are overwhelmed
with news. I mean, there's just so much content.
And so one of the things I have begun to argue--this is
among our top priorities. I happen to be both on the
Subcommittee on Appropriations that deals with this budget and
on the Foreign Relations Committee. So I'm all over this. And
it's a big priority on two fronts. The first is the question of
whether or not we should continue to be primarily content
providers and producers versus access providers and producers.
And I do think I want us to become more access producers.
Now, as far as whether or not we can deal with that
language that they fought to get in there, it's very simple,
that could just be the splash page that you go up--the BBG site
could just be the site that comes up when you go on and then
you could go from there.
But the notion that you have argued, that what we want to
be able to do is have multiple technologies, as many as
possible available, so that people all over the world--this is
not just China--people all over the world will be able to
circumvent government censorship to get accurate news and
information--and to connect with one another. To have access to
social media that allows them to connect with one another is
invaluable.
I have often said that the Castro regime in Cuba has been
able to hold on despite embargoes and the Cold War and
everything else. The one thing they cannot survive is an open
and free internet. Because once Cubans are able to talk to each
other, they are able to organize action and also it lowers
barriers of entry to free enterprise and the like. And so I'm a
big believer in that and to continue to move in that direction,
but we are dealing here with entrenched bureaucracies.
And I would add one more point. In terms of the State
Department, I do not believe it is helpful when we have someone
as our acting secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs and now the nominee--which I hope will not
continue--who I think is unfriendly to these efforts, and not
just this effort, but the broader efforts that we're discussing
here today. And that's another matter which is a top priority
of ours and that we are working on as well. So you have my
commitment on that to make this thing work.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Congressman.
Cochairman Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you. I'll be very brief. And I thank you again.
Let me just ask you, if I could, on an issue, Dr. Lantos
Swett--I know the Lantos Foundation recently joined the Uyghur
community in protesting in front of the Chinese embassy to ask
about information about family members in the Autonomous Region
who have disappeared and many are believed to be in re-
education camps or even worse. Among those family members are
the relatives of six Radio Free Asia journalists based in
Washington and family members of Rebiya Kadeer. I'm wondering,
did you get any response back from the embassy from that?
Ms. Lantos Swett. No, we did not get any response back from
the embassy, but I must tell you it was a very moving
experience for me. We stood there in the rain with over a
hundred members of the Uyghur community. And what was most
heartbreaking was person after person came to me with pictures
of their relatives, their uncles, their aunts, their parents,
their spouses, their children. It was truly heartbreaking.
And I think this is--and I want to commend you, Congressman
Smith, and you, Senator Rubio, because I know you have written
about this yourselves--this is the most massive incarceration
of a minority population in the modern era, you know, certainly
since the Second World War. It is staggering. It is absolutely
staggering. And it just passes by.
And if I may, it speaks to, I think, a broader problem that
I as a human rights activist feel we are dealing with when we
are contending with China, and that is that everybody gives
China a pass. China does things that are so outrageous and does
them on such a scale and the world sort of ``tsks'' and moves
on, moves on to the deals, moves on to the business, moves on
to the commerce.
And it is wrong. It is morally wrong, but it is also
dangerous because--and I think you referenced this, Senator
Rubio, as did you, Congressman--they are very consciously
trying to say to a whole lot of other countries out there, We
have a different model, we have another way and we are ready
and we are loaded to challenge the United States as the model
for the world going forward, and we are going to use our
incredible, sort of, economic might and every tool at our
disposal to put this alternate model out there.
You know, I mentioned that my father was a Holocaust
survivor from Hungary. It wasn't that long ago that Hungary--
Hungary, a country in the very center of Europe--spoke about
wanting to pursue a model of illiberal democracy.
Well, that's a pretty disturbing kind of language to hear
from the heart of Europe. And we could look at lots of other
examples.
If we do not confront China on the ways in which it is
trampling the international standards related to human rights
and democracy and free access to information, to say nothing of
the way in which they may be abusing the international
financial and economic system--if we do not challenge them,
they will continue down this road of saying to a very troubled
and very chaotic world, we have another way, we have a way
that, yeah, maybe it can lead to greater prosperity, yes, maybe
it can achieve the laudable goal of bringing large numbers of
people out of poverty, but at a price. And it is a price we
should not be willing to pay.
I referenced that biblical story of selling a birthright
for a mess of pottage. Our birthright, our values, our profound
commitment to our fundamental freedoms, they are what make our
society worth defending. They are for us individually what make
life worth living.
And what a shame it would be, and what a shameful thing it
would be were we to not be vigilant in standing up against this
effort to, as I say, sell our precious human rights birthright
for a mess of economic pottage.
Cochairman Smith. Last year, a Chinese student's
commencement speech at the University of Maryland--she praised
the fresh air of free speech found in the United States and was
praising that, and that went viral. She and her parents in
China, however, were subsequently targets of harassment.
How can our universities do a much better job in protecting
these students? Because self-censorship, it seems to me, will
become, has already become, the norm. I think it becomes even
more so where everybody just, you know, gags themselves because
why deal with all of that consequence?
And then, obviously, the messages of the dictatorship
become even more profound in the hearts and minds of their own
people. So they do not come here and get liberated and find a
whole new--I mean, I know a number of people studying in Europe
right now who tell me that the government, you know, feels they
own these Chinese students. They monitor them, they keep track
of them, and at any university anywhere in Europe, same way
here. What should our universities do to say, hey, you are
free, at least when you are here, and to push back with the
Chinese government on how they are mistreating their students
who happen to be Chinese?
Ms. Cook. Well, I would actually say I think one of the
first things would actually be for the U.S. government to take
action. A lot of this intimidation comes directly from Chinese
diplomatic missions. These Chinese embassy officials have also
been known to intimidate Chinese journalists here, intimidate
advertisers, people who advertise in the Chinese community with
media that are considered critical of the Chinese government.
And that may go to Senator Rubio's question earlier about, you
know, third-party interference and certain contractual
agreements.
I only know about this anecdotally, but I certainly know
that it has happened, where people, advertisers, have been
pressured by Chinese officials to withdraw advertising from
critical news outlets. There was at least one case I wrote
about in testimony I'd given to the USCC last year where an RCN
executive was threatened by Chinese officials. I believe he was
actually of Indian origin and there was some kind of pressure
applied to him when he was trying to arrange for New Tang
Dynasty Television to be aired in the Washington, DC area.
Again, I don't know if that was before there was a contract or
after a contract.
But, you know, in conversations with other democracy
activists here in the United States, it just seems like the
Chinese embassy and consular officials are becoming more
arrogant and more aggressive. And so I think that's something
to perhaps take up with the State Department when these
incidents happen.
If you were to declare just one Chinese official persona
non grata for these kinds of violations and, you know--and
today when the Chinese government has talked about, Do not
interfere in our internal affairs, but here they are
interfering in our internal affairs--or some other kind of
diplomatic demarche, I think that would send a very strong
signal. And that's something that I think the U.S. government
is wholly in the right position to do, and I think that that
would actually counter some of the pressure on Chinese
students.
For universities there are a number of different things. I
mean, one of the challenges is that often, for example, for
Chinese student associations, the charters in Chinese are very
different than what it says in English. And so, you know, there
are university administrators who may not be aware of certain
things that are happening in the Chinese student community.
With more media coverage of this, I think they should be more
aware.
And there would be various--you know, I'm not an expert on
student affairs--but various steps that could be taken to make
sure Chinese students know about counseling services, about
legal services, about other forms of support at a university so
that when something like this happens, the students feel that
there is someone at the university they can go and talk to
about this.
And then for the university to be equipped to also know
with regard to, whether it is members of Congress who are aware
of this or whether it's others within the State Department or
the U.S. Government, of who they should turn to, because a lot
of these universities themselves don't know.
But to the extent that the universities are made aware of
what would be the best ways for them, who they should contact
and any strong diplomatic response that can come from the U.S.
Government to this interference, and then for students to know
that they have a resource at the universities.
I would just, you know, if it's all right to comment on
this issue, on the circumvention tools and some experiences
we've had disseminating the China Media Bulletin in Chinese. We
actually work with a number of tools who help, you know, post
it on their landing pages. And it's quite effective in terms of
informing Chinese readers, who are coming to these pages, of
these options. And I know that a lot of the content from BBG,
in some cases because it is especially popular, is also on
those landing pages.
But one of the challenges that happens in this realm, you
know, and I would say it would happen in China, but also in
places like Iran, there's a certain dynamism as certain events
unfold and as authorities shift their resources to blocking
certain tools, to removing VPNs.
And so one recommendation I would urge considering is that,
besides a certain amount of set funding for a diversity of
tools, because that allows more flexibility in response, that
if one tool gets blocked and users go somewhere else, it is
supported, but some type of rapid response fund for emergency
moments, for moments of political crisis.
I have seen from the tool developers, it spikes. I mean,
and in China, you know, it can range from--you know, it does
not have to be mass protests like you saw in Iran. In China, it
was when Bo Xilai's chief of police fled to the U.S. embassy--a
spike. Chen Guangcheng fled to the U.S. embassy--a spike.
Things like this example with regard to Instagram. Instagram
gets blocked during the protests in Hong Kong--a spike, people
want to access beyond.
And so some kind of rapid response that would allow a quick
stream of funding to be released to the tools that can
demonstrate that, look, we are getting more demand, we are
getting more requests from China or from Iran. I think that
might be a way to also be able to respond quickly to the
dynamism.
And it has so much, you know, it has so many implications.
It is not just about people being able to access information;
this is how people post information, this is how they post
videos.
And these tools developers, it's not just about the number
of users, it is also about the bandwidth they are able to
supply. If they are only able to supply people with enough to
read a couple of news articles, that's not really enough. If
you have a YouTube video of something, a policeman beating up a
protester, you can't upload that if you don't have enough
bandwidth, if your circumvention tool developer doesn't have
enough bandwidth. And those kinds of videos become so
important, both internationally, but also domestically.
And so I think that's where, again, at these particularly
critical political moments, that's when we should be better set
up to be able to infuse the tools that can demonstrate that
they are in demand in order to meet the supply. Because
otherwise, I know from some of the developers with regard to
what happened in Iran, they could have helped millions more
people, but they just didn't have enough money and, therefore,
not enough bandwidth.
Ms. Lantos Swett. If I can just--I think that's a really
excellent suggestion, that idea of sort of an emergency fund
that can be rapidly deployed as situations arise.
But I did want to respond to one part of your question,
Congressman Smith, because, of course, at the end of the day,
we cannot entirely protect, we can't basically protect people
in China or in any other country where they are being brutally
repressed. And we know that the progress of freedom requires
courage, it requires people in extraordinarily difficult
circumstances who are willing to put their safety, their well-
being on the line.
What is inspiring to me again and again and again is how
many people in societies are willing to do that, but they are
not willing to do it if it appears hopeless. And that is one
reason why countries like China are so eager to create this
information prison, to cut people off from the knowledge of
what their fellow citizens are doing, of what's happening
outside, of the criticism of their government, of what's
happened in the past, of all of that information, because that
sort of knowledge is where people find the courage and the
strength to say no, I will not put up with this. I am going to
take a stand. I am willing to take this risk.
They are inspired when they know about, you know, the story
of Liu Xiaobo or Chen Guangcheng or Gao Zhisheng, some of the
other extraordinary people who are sacrificing so much. And
that's why information, as you said, Senator Rubio, the free
sharing of information among people within a country as well as
with those outside, is the thing they fear the most.
So we can't protect them, but we can give them enough
access to what is really happening that they are strengthened
and emboldened.
You know, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was adopted, Eleanor Roosevelt had a wonderful phrase. And I
won't be able to quote it perfectly, but she said that she
hoped that through a curious grapevine, news of this document,
this extraordinary document that laid out this breathtaking
bill of rights for all people everywhere simply by virtue of
being human, that through a curious grapevine it would find its
way through walls and barbed wire to people in imprisoned
nations.
I love that notion of a curious grapevine and the internet
is a great big curious grapevine. And we need to open it up for
those who do not have free access to it.
Cochairman Smith. I thank you both for that answer.
And, you know, I'll never forget--very briefly--when Frank
Wolf, who was here earlier, and I, were in Perm Camp 35 in the
1980s, filled to overflowing with political prisoners, they all
knew the Helsinki Final Act and could quote it verbatim. There
they are being tortured, abused, starving, I mean, they had
almost no--they were all gaunt beyond words, and yet they can
quote different--so it gave hope, just like you said with the
Universal Declaration.
So, you know, it says in the Bible without hope the people
perish, and I think hopefully we can bring some hope and some
tangible assistance to these individuals. Thank you.
Ms. Lantos Swett. Thank you.
Cochairman Smith. Appreciate it.
Chairman Rubio. Senator Daines.
Senator Daines. Chairman Rubio, thank you. And thanks for
holding this important hearing. And thanks to the witnesses for
coming here today and providing perspective and expertise on a
very important topic.
You know, I spent more than half a decade working in China.
In fact, I had two children born in Hong Kong. I've led CODELs
to China the last three years, just came back three weeks ago
in fact. I've had a chance to travel across the country. I have
taken delegations to Urumqi and seen the prominent Uyghur-
Muslim population. I have visited Tibet with a group, seen the
Buddhist monks. In fact, just recently we were in Dandong there
on the Yalu River in a part of China that doesn't get a lot of
attention, visits, and to see what is going on, certainly on
the North Korean border.
It's critically important, I believe, that we, as a nation
that was founded on freedom and the rule of law, are clear-eyed
about the challenges and the opportunities that China brings,
especially in its relationship with the United States, a
relationship I see as perhaps the most important and
consequential relationship between any two countries in the
21st century.
Ms. Cook, in your testimony, you highlight the recent
developments where the Chinese government removed Bibles from
e-commerce websites in China. I was very aware of that when
that happened, saw that. And while the sale or distribution of
Bibles has always been restricted in China, I think this serves
as yet another example of the hollowness of the claims the
government is making of respecting religious freedom.
You indicate that the removal of President Xi's term limits
and other actions have resulted in some level of increased
dissent. Have you seen any other similar responses to the
removal of Bibles from e-commerce sites from the Christian
community in China?
And the second part of that question is, what are the
prospects that this restriction might cause Chinese Christians,
who have otherwise been apolitical, to become more engaged?
Ms. Cook. Thank you, Senator. I have to admit I haven't had
an opportunity to look closely at the particular reaction to
that beyond, I think, some of the comments by people in the
United States who are in regular touch with Christians there.
But another research report that I wrote that was published
last year was actually about religious revival, repression, and
resistance in China. And in general, what we found across
religious groups, including in the Christian community, is that
it is precisely these kinds of actions by the government to
believers, places of worship and leaders of Christians who, you
know, don't necessarily belong to the underground church
movement, but are, you know, worshipping at or leading state-
approved churches, that does bring a backlash, that actually
begins to blur the line more between the underground church
movement and the state-sanctioned church movement.
And one of the things that you see is that, in general, as
the Chinese government, in terms of various regulatory moves,
squeezes the space for the spread of Christianity and other
religions as well, more people are seeking out alternative
opportunities. So, for example, with regard to leadership
training, they limit the number of people who can go study at
seminaries, so you have people actually studying through radio
station opportunities based out of Hong Kong, through online
courses.
And so I think something like this restriction on being
able to purchase Bibles may very well, though I haven't had a
chance to see specific data, have the exact effect of this
Instagram example from 2014 where a new academic study found
that when there were protests happening in Hong Kong, the
Chinese government blocked Instagram and more people jumped the
firewall to seek out information, to seek out the platform and
came across all kinds of other uncensored information.
And my sense would be that, actually, this can have a
counterproductive effect for the Chinese government, because
instead of Christians purchasing Bibles on the Alibaba platform
and other e-commerce platforms that are above ground, now
you'll have more people seeking out circumvention tools,
seeking out other ways of obtaining Bibles that will encourage
them to maybe look more broadly at other forms of information.
Senator Daines. I think one of the other statistics that
might be surprising to many in the United States is, if you
look at the top 10 internet companies in the world, five of
them are now Chinese. Look at the top six internet companies in
the world, three of them are Chinese.
The U.S. still is number one, measured by revenues, but
we've got Chinese internet companies now that are exceeding
market caps of $500 billion. We've got Amazon and Google
Alphabet, there's one and two, but then you get to JD.com,
Alibaba, Tencent. And it's, I think, pretty eye-opening.
So when we see this censorship of Bibles in e-commerce,
these aren't just small backwater companies, these are huge,
leading, top-five companies in the world related to e-commerce
and can have a profound impact, certainly on not only China,
but, frankly, extending their influence around the world.
Ms. Cook. Absolutely.
Senator Daines. I want to shift gears to Dr. Lantos Swett.
In your testimony, you raised the fact that China is not
satisfied with simply censoring its own population, but also is
seeking to influence speech and actions abroad, whether it's
the self-censorship of scholars, foreign publishers,
businesses, or sometimes academic journals related to doing
work in or about China.
What are the long-term effects of such actions? And what
could be done to maintain academic integrity and the principle
of free expression in the face of such pressures?
Ms. Lantos Swett. Well, I think the long-term implications
are obviously very, very disturbing. And I think that we have
to do a better job of sort of shining a very unflattering light
on those institutions that are increasingly compromising their
own commitment to, as Mr. Hamilton said, the founding
principles of the Western university in order to ease their
access to China, whether it's access for their scholars,
whether it's access to their wealthy, full-tuition-paying
students, whether it's access to business opportunities.
At the moment, these insidious, sort of, infiltrations of
Chinese censorship influences into some of our most cherished
institutions are not yet widespread, but it is spreading.
And I think, you know, frankly, it's something that the
Congress needs to think about. I don't know whether this would
be appropriate and within the brief of this Commission, but I
think it would be fascinating to have a hearing with some of
the university presidents whose universities have major
programs that involve China and ask them some of the tough
questions about the compromises they have been making.
I think it was before you joined us, Congressman Daines,
but Clive Hamilton spoke about what he was more fearful of,
which is the self-censorship, not the obvious, evident, seen
hand of China, but the decision by institutions and
organizations to preemptively censor themselves, to
preemptively make decisions that avoid the issue ever arising
because they think that that sort of hides it from public
scrutiny. I think in many ways he's right, that that is almost
the graver threat.
I did want to say one thing, if I may, about the issue of
religious freedom in China. I previously had the great
privilege of serving as the chair of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom. And obviously, China is a
world-class abuser of religious freedom rights.
And I agree with Sarah that their efforts in that regard
run the risk of backfiring, but I also think there, too, we
have an area where our government has not spoken out
assertively, proactively enough about the importance of
defending religious freedom in China. The reality is that so
often when it comes to human rights causes, the most
significant weapon we have to wield is the voice of our top
leadership. It still has an influence.
And I am concerned that this administration does not seem
to have a particularly active sense of the role that defending
human rights and defending fundamental freedoms should play in
a whole-of-government approach to advancing our interests,
whether it be in relation to China or other countries.
So we need to lean forward, we need to understand that when
we play from our strengths, we win. And what are our greatest
strengths? It is not our economic might, it is not our military
might. They are indispensable, they are awe-inspiring, but they
are not our greatest strength. Because guess what? Other
countries, other adversaries, if you will, of ours have great
economic strength, have great military might.
What has distinguished us, what has made us extraordinary
in the world was the way that we grew from values, profound
values. And that's where our strength came from. And I would
like to see us remember that and integrate these principles and
these tools in a whole-of-government approach in every aspect
of our foreign policy.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Dr. Lantos Swett.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rubio. Well, I thank you both for being here. I
appreciate the time you have given us. I think this has been an
informative hearing. I think from it we take a number of ideas,
particularly the expansion and ensuring that we can get in
there and figure out, number one, is $15 million enough? And
number two, is the $15 million, why isn't all of it, if it's
not, being spent on broader access to additional tools that are
constantly being reinvented as governments figure out how to
block those? And number three, the ability and contingencies to
surge up if, for example, what happened in Iran were to happen
again. It is a time where we know there will be high demand by
people to find out in the news what's actually going on. And
there may be times where we might be able to surge access.
I would also say that, in some particular parts of the
world, and this probably applies a lot less to China, but just
since we are talking about that concept, you know, one of the
things, there are places where the internet itself is
nonexistent or denied to people. And I know for a fact that
satellite technology is used in remote parts of the world and
in other places to provide people content, access to the
internet. Why can't that be used to apply access to a free
internet, for example, on the island of Cuba where the
government doesn't want them to have access to the internet?
And so in that case, it isn't just--what is blocking
internet access is not just the firewall, it is the fact that
it literally does not exist, and when it does it is very
expensive. So there is a lot to work on in terms of the
information flow.
And then just in terms of the long arm--I mean, one of the
functions of this Commission is to raise awareness. I still
think that what we have discussed here today has been reported,
but the vast majority of people are just largely unaware of
what is happening. And if we take what happened in Australia,
we can begin to see the edges of it occurring here.
We are so used to living in a world where we had all the
leverage and all the influence, that the notion that it somehow
has been turned back on us, and it isn't just attacking our
economic interests but our basic fundamental principles, is
just lost on people. And we cannot allow that to continue.
And we need to look for creative ways to go about it. Some
real good suggestions here, some of which we have already begun
to work on, some of which the authorities already exist under
Global Magnitsky to go after individuals responsible for these
sorts of activities, but then also potentially causes of action
against people who lose contracts or are fired because of
interference by a foreign government, not just China. And I
think companies like Marriott and others would be, I think,
very reticent or be more careful about how they would approach
this.
As I close, I wanted to read from something here that was
in our opening memo because I thought it was stark in
comparison to the apology that Congressman Lantos was able to
get years ago. I have it here in the notes. And it goes back
to--this is a statement from the chief of Marriott, Arne
Sorenson. And this has to do--when the Chinese authorities
blocked Marriott International's websites and apps for a week
in China because they listed Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, and
Taiwan as separate countries in a customer survey. They
demanded an apology and they demanded that they seriously deal
with the people responsible. And it was as a result of some of
this that we saw some of these actions.
But Marriott issued a formal apology, unlike the one issued
to the mother of that gentleman who was jailed. They issued a
formal apology. Here is what Marriott's chief, Arne Sorenson,
said. ``We don't support anyone who subverts the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of China and we do not intend in any
way to encourage or incite any such people or groups. We
recognize the severity of the situation and sincerely
apologize.''
Well, again, I would say to you that there are people
living in Taiwan who have a very different, a strong difference
of opinion with Mr. Sorenson and with the Communist Party about
sovereignty and territorial integrity. And so this is an
American company benefiting from the freedom and the
opportunities in this nation, who come up here and lobby for
tax cuts and deregulation, everything that benefits them,
basically openly apologizing and firing an American in order to
be able to continue to operate in that marketplace.
We see this trend repeated over and over and over and over
again. And when I read about the CEO of Apple at an internet
conference, an internet freedom conference in China talking
about, on the one hand, attacking a rival for selling off data
and information and on the other hand turning over the entire
cloud in China to a government server, the hypocrisy is
unbelievable. Unbelievable.
And yet, somehow, they get away with this. They are held up
as these heroes. And we need to continue to call that out and
shame it for what it is. You cannot be representing yourself
here in this country as a defender of freedom and openness and
yet complicit and accomplices of repressive regimes under the
guise of, We have to follow their laws because their markets
require it. It goes to show that the bottom line and the
ability to look good in front of shareholders and return
profits is more important than the supposed universal values
that these companies have no problem touting here at home where
they have the freedom to do so without retribution--and all we
can do is talk about it.
We are going to continue to do that. We are not going to
allow what happened in Australia to happen here. I promise you
that. And we are going to help Australia deal with it as well.
So I thank you, because what you have provided us here
today is invaluable. And I am grateful for the time you have
given us, for your insight. We look forward to continuing to
work with you.
The record for the hearing will remain open for 48 hours.
Dr. Lantos Swett, the totality of your prepared statement
will be entered into our record without objection.
And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m. the hearing was concluded.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Clive Hamilton
My background is not in China studies but in politics and public
policy. I decided to write ``Silent Invasion: China's Influence in
Australia'' in 2016 when it became obvious from newspaper reports that
interference by the Chinese Communist Party in Australian politics is a
serious issue that demands greater public awareness. Conversations with
China experts soon established that the threat is more serious and
deep-rooted than I had realised. Nevertheless, the scale and nature of
the threat is one lay people need to understand. Since publication of
``Silent Invasion'' on February 26th of this year, it has become clear
to me that many Australians have had an intimation that something is
wrong and want it explained to them.
When I formulated the idea of the book, Allen & Unwin, a highly
respected independent publisher that had published eight previous books
by me, could immediately see its importance and commercial appeal and
we soon signed a contract. However, last November, as the finished
manuscript was about to go to typesetting, Allen & Unwin notified me
that it would not proceed with publication. The CEO wrote saying that,
based on advice it had received, the company was reacting to
``potential threats to the book and the company from possible action by
Beijing.'' He went on to write: ``The most serious of these threats was
the very high chance of a vexatious defamation action against Allen &
Unwin, and possibly against you personally as well.''
The company's defamation lawyer had pointed out that it would not
be possible to make textual changes to the book that would protect the
company from vexatious legal actions by Beijing's proxies in Australia,
legal actions that would tie up the company in expensive legal action
for months or longer. Compared to those of the United States,
Australia's defamation laws favor the litigant.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Australian journalists hold important information about the
activities and Communist Party links of agents of influence in
Australia that cannot be published without significant legal risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allen & Unwin believed that in addition to punitive legal actions,
Beijing may retaliate by shutting down the company's website with
denial-of-service cyberattacks and by blocking access to printeries in
China, where many books are printed.
Why was Allen & Unwin so nervous? The company had been spooked by
recent (and still current) defamation actions taken against major news
organisations by ``whales,'' a reference, I believe, to legal action
taken by Chau Chak Wing, a Chinese-Australian billionaire resident in
Guangdong, and Huang Xiangmo, a wealthy Chinese citizen residing in
Sydney. (Both are discussed in ``Silent Invasion.'') Australia's
domestic intelligence agency, the Australian Security Intelligence
Organization (ASIO), has warned the major political parties that they
should not accept donations from these men because of their suspected
links to the Chinese Communist Party.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Nick McKenzie, Chris Uhlmann, Richard Baker, Daniel Flitton,
``ASIO warns parties that taking China cash could compromise
Australia,'' Sydney Morning Herald, June 5, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chau Chak Wing claims that he was defamed in a 2016 story published
in the Sydney Morning Herald and again in 2017 in a ``Four Corners''
television documentary program produced by the ABC and Fairfax
(publisher of the Sydney Morning Herald). In their defense against Chau
Chak Wing's statement of claim, the ABC and Fairfax Media told the
court there are reasonable grounds to believe that Chau Chak Wing
``betrayed his country, Australia, in order to serve the interests of a
foreign power, China, and the Chinese Communist Party by engaging in
espionage on their behalf.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Clive Hamilton, ``Silent Invasion,'' p. 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Huang Xiangmo was for several years the president of the Australian
Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China, the peak
United Front body in Australia, and in 2017 was at the center of the
political scandal that led to the resignation of Senator Sam Dastyari.
The Prime Minister has described Mr. Huang as ``an agent of a foreign
country.'' \4\ He took legal action against the Herald-Sun newspaper (a
News Corp outlet).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Peter Hartcher, `` `Icebreakers': How Beijing seeks to
influence the West,'' Sydney Morning Herald, December 5, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is difficult to know whether the defamation actions launched by
these billionaires had political motives, but there is little doubt
that they have had a chilling effect on reporting by news outlets in
Australia, and now on the book publishing industry. It's worth noting
that in December 2017 an editorial in the People's Daily in effect
endorsed the use of lawfare abroad, another instance of the Chinese
Communist Party exploiting the institutions of democracy to undermine
democracy.
Allen & Unwin's decision to drop ``Silent Invasion'' citing fear of
reprisals from Beijing was a spectacular vindication of the argument of
the book. No actual threats were made to the publisher, which in a way
is more disturbing. The shadow cast by Beijing over Australia is now
dark enough to frighten a respected publisher out of publishing a book
critical of the Chinese Communist Party. (It's worth remembering that
for all the opprobrium heaped upon it, Allen & Unwin is a victim too.)
My dismay was compounded as I realised that the shadow and Allen &
Unwin's fear of it had frightened off the rest of the publishing
industry. Big publishers like Penguin, HarperCollins, and Hachette did
not come knocking on my door, even though the spiking of the book had
attracted headlines around the world.
I worry about the message that has now been sent to China scholars:
``If you write a book critical of the CCP you will have trouble finding
a publisher, so censor yourself or play safe and write about Ming
dynasty architecture.'' China scholars have told me that they censor
themselves in order not to jeopardise their visas to do research in
China, and so protect their careers.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Phila Sui, ``What's the `dirty secret' of Western academics who
self-censor work on China?,'' South China Morning Post, April 21, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two independent publishers did express strong interest in ``Silent
Invasion'' but pulled out, citing the same fear of payback. One was
Melbourne University Press, the nation's most prominent university
publisher, a company of the University of Melbourne, by some measures
Australia's top-ranked university. Its Board took the unusual step of
overruling its chief executive on a publishing decision. Sources close
to MUP have told me that a factor in the Board's decision was the
anxiety of senior university executives about the potential impact of
publication on the university's lucrative revenue flows from Chinese
students.
Clearly, the situation is dire when a university press will not
publish a scholarly book about the Chinese Communist Party for fear of
punishment by the Party. Along with other instances of universities
sacrificing intellectual freedom to ingratiate themselves with Beijing
(detailed in the media and in my book), it is no exaggeration to say
that Australian universities now tiptoe over eggshells to avoid any
action that may offend Party bosses in China.
If not for the courage and commitment to free speech of Sandy
Grant, the principal of Hardie Grant, ``Silent Invasion'' may well have
gone unpublished, which would have been a comprehensive victory for the
Chinese Communist Party.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In 1987 Sandy Grant was the publisher at Heinemann who defied
the British government to publish ``Spycatcher,'' an expose of MI6, by
Peter Wright. In the celebrated court case, won by the publisher,
Heinemann's barrister was a young Malcolm Turnbull.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# # # #
#
Recently, we have seen major Western publishers (Cambridge
University Press and Springer) compromise academic freedom by censoring
their publications at the insistence of Beijing. (CUP reversed its
decision after an outcry.) They did so to maintain access to the
Chinese market. In the ``Silent Invasion'' case the fear was not about
what the CCP could do in China (cut off access to markets) but what the
CCP could do in Australia (sponsor legal actions). As I detail in the
book, the tentacles of the Party now reach into all of the important
institutions in Australia.
The spiking of ``Silent Invasion'' represents perhaps the starkest
attack on academic freedom in recent Australian history. It attracted
intense media interest and strong support from the public. As I
searched for a publisher, some members of Parliament proposed
publishing the manuscript in Hansard, both as a statement in defence of
free speech and to give it legal protection under the laws of
parliamentary privilege.
However, throughout the saga one sector maintained a studied
silence--the universities. No representative organisation (notably,
Universities Australia and the Group of Eight) or prominent vice-
chancellor made any kind of statement supporting me, a professor
apparently being targeted by a powerful foreign state because of his
work. Yet three months later, in a submission to a parliamentary
inquiry into the proposed new foreign interference laws, Universities
Australia bleated about the threat posed by the new laws to academic
freedom. These are laws designed explicitly to prevent foreign powers
from suppressing free speech, yet the universities were concerned about
how they might harm the well-being of their international students and
jeopardize their research collaborations. These collaborations
presumably include the plethora of research links that Australian
universities have with Chinese scientists doing military-related
research in universities linked to the People's Liberation Army, a
phenomenon uncovered by my researcher Alex Joske and detailed in
newspaper articles by us and reprised in ``Silent Invasion.''
Australian universities are now so closely tied into monetary flows and
links with China that they have forgotten the founding principles of
the Western university.
The University of Sydney, for example, last year enrolled 25,000
international students, the majority from China. Numbers had doubled
over four years and last year generated Australian $752 million (US
$570 million) in revenue.\7\ The University of Sydney's Vice-
Chancellor, Dr. Michael Spence, has claimed there is no evidence for
Chinese government interference on his campus and labeled the mounting
warnings by the government, based largely on ASIO reports, as
``Sinophobic blatherings.'' \8\ Chau Chak Wing last year donated $15
million to the university, which will be used for a building named
after Chau at the university's front gates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Matt Wade, ``Degrees of risk: inside Sydney's extraordinary
international student boom,'' Sydney Morning Herald, March 2, 2018.
Compared to last year, enrollments from China at Australian
universities have surged by 18 percent in 2018, totaling 173,000 (Tim
Dodd, ``Chinese defy warnings and flock to Australian universities,''
The Australian, April 18, 2018).
\8\ Andrew Clark, ``Sydney Uni's Michael Spence lashes government
over `Sinophobic blatherings,' '' Australian Financial Review, January
28, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# # # #
#
Publication of ``Silent Invasion'' has prompted an intense and at
times rancorous debate within the community of China scholars in
Australia. Some 50 ``China scholars'' (many of whom have no expertise
in PRC politics) have signed an open letter in which they characterise
expressions of concern about PRC influence as ``the creation of a
racialised narrative of a vast official Chinese conspiracy.'' \9\ They
reject the proposed foreign interference laws because they ``see no
evidence . . . that China is exporting its political system to
Australia.'' Although no one has said that the CCP is exporting its
Leninist party governing system to Australia, the evidence from a range
of sources that the CCP is extending the operations of its influence
and propaganda system to Australia is now overwhelming.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://www.policyforum.net/an-open-letter-from-concerned-
scholars-of-china-and-the-
chinese-diaspora/. The organizer of the letter was Dr. David Brophy, a
lecturer at the University of Sydney, who had just written a scathing
review of ``Silent Invasion.'' He denounced it as a ``McCarthyist
manifesto'' and a ``paranoid tome'' that adds to ``our all-too-rich
library of Asian invasion fantasies.'' Many of his arguments and
expressions were reproduced in the letter.
\10\ This claim is all the more extraordinary when made by David
Brophy, whose work concentrates on the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, including
their brutal suppression. His writings suggest that his anti-
Americanism overwhelms his judgement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are none so blind as those who will not see. But why will
they not see what Beijing is doing in Australia? One can only
speculate. For the most part, I don't believe they have been captured
or are agents of any kind. They express their genuine convictions. They
see Communist Party rule through rose-tinted glasses because they
believe that, for all its faults, ``the Party has lifted 600 million
people out of poverty,'' \11\ or that the first priority must be to
shield people of Chinese heritage in Australia from xenophobia, or that
Australia's institutions are too robust to be influenced in the ways
suggested. For some, China is still seen through the lenses of a
romantic Maoism; for others a visceral anti-Americanism makes them
welcome a global challenger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ This claim, propagated by the CCP, is often repeated by
elites, notably former prime minister Paul Keating, perhaps the
foremost Australian apologist for CCP rule. Yet, as I write in ``Silent
Invasion,'' the Communist Party did not lift 600 million people out of
poverty; it kept 600 million people in poverty. It was only when the
CCP lifted its foot off the neck of the Chinese people and permitted
basic economic rights--the rights to own property, to set up a
business, to move one's residence, to work for whoever one liked--that
the Chinese people could lift themselves out of poverty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Global Times, the CCP's nationalistic tabloid, warmly welcomed
the intervention of these China scholars as proof that the debate over
CCP influence in Australia is only ``fanning the flames'' of racial
animosity.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ https://m.huanqiu.com/r/
MV8wXzExNzA5NjE0XzEzOF8xNTIyMjY3MjAw?pc_
url=http%3A%2F%2Fworld.huanqiu.com%2Fexclusive%2F2018-
03%2F11709614.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those who signed the open letter divided themselves sharply from
many other China scholars, some of whom composed a rival letter
rejecting their substantive claims. Those in the second group
``strongly believe that an open debate on the activities of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in this country is essential to intellectual
freedom, democratic rights, and national security.'' \13\ They reject
claims the debate is characterised by racism and note that it is led by
a number of Chinese-Australian scholars. The letter then describes the
kinds of subversive activities practiced in Australia by the CCP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-influence-australia-
maintaining-debate/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Predictably, the Global Times wrote that those who signed the
second letter are only stirring up trouble by supporting the
government's foreign interference legislation.
# # # #
#
In March, the Australian Values Alliance, a group of Chinese-
Australians opposed to Communist Party interference in Australia,
organised a launch event for ``Silent Invasion'' at NSW Parliament
House in Sydney. (It's not clear how those accusing me of stoking anti-
China sentiment explain away the enthusiastic support for the book from
some segments of the Chinese-Australian community.) The organisers'
WeChat messages were censored from Beijing. A week after the launch one
of the group's leaders, John Hu, was deported from China when he
arrived at Shanghai airport with his 80-year-old mother to scatter the
ashes of his father.\14\ He was told he was getting off lightly; it
would be much worse for him if he were allowed in and then taken into
custody. The message to Chinese Australians was unambiguous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-21/australian-outspoken-
about-communist-party-
denied-entry-to-china/9573830.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman was asked by a Global
Times journalist whether ``Silent Invasion'' was guilty of ``inventing
stories for malicious sensationalism, condemning the author for
poisoning Australia-China relations for achieving fame.'' \15\ She duly
trashed the book as ``slander'' and ``good for nothing.'' The Embassy
in Canberra issued a similar spray, calling the book ``racist bigotry''
and a ``malicious anti-China mentality.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Bill Birtles, ``China cites Australian critics to trash Clive
Hamilton's controversial new book'', ABC News online, March 2, 2018.
\16\ Phila Sui, ``What's the `dirty secret' of Western academics
who self-censor work on China?,'' South China Morning Post, April 21,
2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The condemnations of me and my book are but a small part of a much
larger strategy to emerge in recent times. Beijing is ramping up its
rhetoric against Australia in a calibrated campaign of psychological
warfare. Beijing knows that it cannot bully the United Sates_in the
current environment the consequences would be unpredictable and
probably counterproductive_so it is instead pressuring its allies. Last
week the PLA Navy challenged three Australian warships sailing through
the South China Sea, simply for being there. It has scaled up its
threats of economic harm unless Australia changes its ``anti-China''
path. This psychological warfare is only Stage 1, with real punishment
to follow if needed.
Yet there is no shortage of Beijing sympathisers and appeasers
among Australia's elite, calling on Australian politicians, scholars
and commentators to ``tone down the rhetoric,'' \17\ as if the current
strain in the relationship were our fault rather than Beijing's
campaign of subversion, cyber intrusions and harassment on the high
seas. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has recently echoed this view.
This self-criticism (reminiscent of the self-abasement sessions of the
Cultural Revolution) looks like the 21st century's version of
kowtowing. When China's Foreign Ministry calls for a return to ``mutual
trust,'' it means a return to compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Perhaps the leading exponent is mining billionaire Andrew
Forrest, who seems to be on a one-man mission to ``broker peace'' using
his top-level contacts in the Chinese Communist Party (see Michael
Smith, ``China ramps up anti-Australia talk as tensions surface,''
Australian Financial Review, April 21-22, 2018). It's not clear which
element of Australian society he has appointed himself to acting for.
In 2013 John Garnaut pointed out that Forrest had been targeted as a
potential agent of influence by a PLA Liaison Department operation. An
innocent abroad, Forrest's key contact in Beijing turned out to be a
lieutenant general in the PLA (``Chinese military woos big business,''
Sydney Morning Herald, May 23, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My New Zealand counterpart Professor Anne-Marie Brady has faced a
harder time, as she is virtually alone in exposing CCP influence
operations in that nation. In recent months both her office at the
University of Canterbury and her home have been burgled, with the
thieves ignoring valuables in favor of laptops and a passport.\18\ The
government has asked its intelligence service to investigate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Philip Matthews, ``PM to follow up break-in at house of
academic studying China's power,'' Stuff Politics, February 20, 2018.
Australia's foremost expert on United Front activity, Gerry Groot, has
suggested that the burglaries may have been the work of triads acting
on Beijing's instructions (Martin McKenzie-Murray, ``Inside China's
`united front,' '' The Saturday Paper, March 3, 2018). The Communist
Party's use of criminal gangs is well known in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exposes of United Front work, including Brady's and my own,
highlight something essential to understand about the CCP's foreign
influence and interference strategies. Their secretiveness and subtlety
lend them a high level of deniability. Beijing's strident and at times
hysterical public commentary can obscure this fact. Shining a light on
its tactics and activities makes it uncomfortable and liable to react
with fury.
# # # #
#
As a coda to this statement, it might be worth adding that after
the Allen & Unwin story broke in November and reinforced by news of the
Anne-Marie Brady burglaries in February, I have had to take extensive
measures to step up my personal security. The measures have been based
on advice from top-level law enforcement and surveillance experts. The
following are among the concerns and measures taken:
A suspicious stranger arrived outside my office building and sat
for some hours using what a surveillance expert later suggested may
have been a ``sniffer'' phone, a device capable of picking up Wi-Fi and
mobile transmissions. She also entered the building before suspicions
were aroused.
This incident and one or two others led to the installation of
CCTV cameras and a permanent ``lock-down'' of the office building.
Malware was found in ``every nook and cranny'' of my computers,
requiring a scrubbing of hard drives, reinstallation of operating
systems and adoption of advanced cyber protections.
People believed to be Chinese students were confronted after they
were caught checking the contents of my unmarked pigeon-hole in a
secure area of the National Library of Australia.
I have been provided with countersurveillance advice by experts,
and security guards have been provided at my public appearances.
I do not seek sympathy. But I am a citizen of a democratic nation
that prizes free speech. It offends me that as a result of exercising
my right to free speech by writing a book, it has been necessary to
take these steps to protect myself from an authoritarian foreign power.
______
Prepared Statement of Katrina Lantos Swett
Good morning. I want to thank Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith
for the invitation to participate in this hearing and I want to commend
you both for convening a hearing on such an important topic. I would
ask that my full testimony, including relevant correspondence between
the Internet Freedom Coalition and the State Department, BBG, and
Members of Congress be included as part of the hearing record.
The French have a wonderful saying, ``Plus ca change, plus c'est la
meme chose''; the more things change, the more they remain the same. I
could not help but think of this phrase as I prepared my remarks for
today's hearing.
Over ten years ago, my late father, Tom Lantos, then Chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, held a hearing that crystallized
the sad truth about the devastating moral compromises so many major
companies and countries, including at times, our own, are willing to
make in order to appease the Chinese government and gain access to its
vast markets.
The Chief Executive of Yahoo, Jerry Yang, was in my father's
crosshairs that day over his company's cooperation in giving up the
identity of a dissident journalist, Shi Tao, to the Chinese
authorities. After Yahoo disclosed his identity to the government, Mr.
Shi was sentenced to prison for 10 years for the crime of engaging in
pro-democracy activities. As these high tech billionaires and
technological whiz kids sat before him, my father, who came to this
country as a penniless Holocaust survivor from Hungary, said, ``While
technologically and financially you are giants, morally you are
pygmies.''
On that memorable occasion, Jerry Yang felt so ``called out'' by my
father's words that he actually turned around and publicly bowed in
apology to Mr. Shi's weeping mother, who was seated behind him. It was
a dramatic moment, to be sure, but most episodes of cowardly kowtowing
and quiet collaboration with the bullies, the censors, and the
persecutors of the Chinese Communist Party occur without public comment
or scrutiny. Furthermore, as today's hearing demonstrates, China is not
content with censoring and controlling its own citizens. It is using
the immense power of its financial resources to reach every corner of
the world in an effort to intimidate businesses, universities,
publishers, hotel chains, religious institutions, human rights
democracy activists, and even governments. It pains me to have to say
this, but right now, China is succeeding in this effort to a shocking
degree. Even more shocking, later in my remarks I will expose why I
feel our government is doing far too little in the way of Internet
freedom to truly help the people of China and other repressed regimes
around the world.
Two of my fellow witnesses this morning have had personal
experiences with the long arm of Chinese government intimidation and
their testimony is a cautionary and chilling tale. Just as my father
did back in 2007, we must use the power of public naming and shaming to
try and restrain the worst impulses of businesses, other organizations,
individuals, and even our own government agencies who seem all too
willing to sell their precious birthright of free speech and democracy
for a mess of Chinese pottage.
To be clear, I think we all recognize that the Internet is not an
unalloyed good when it comes to spreading ideas and expanding the
borders of freedom and democracy. As Shakespeare so memorably penned,
``The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together.'' It
is analogous to our intricate system of modern transportation. While we
recognize that it contributes to pollution, congestion, disrupts the
environment, and of course, makes possible terrible accidents involving
injuries and fatalities; nonetheless, it is the indispensable
circulatory system that makes possible our modern world of travel and
commerce. Similarly, the Internet, despite its ability to spread hate,
disrupt elections, and propagate fake news, is indispensable to our
modern system of global communication. And as such, it is central to
freedom of expression everywhere in the world.
That is why there was so much enthusiasm and energy eight years ago
when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a landmark
speech on Internet freedom. I was sitting in the audience that day and
felt the surge of optimism as our nation's top diplomat laid out a
robust vision of America's central role in tearing down what Secretary
Clinton referred to as ``the Berlin Wall of our digital age.''
Remember, I am the daughter of the only member of Congress who
personally experienced the horrors of living under fascism of the
right, the Nazis, and the totalitarianism of the left, the Communists.
It is in my DNA to resist these authoritarian efforts to control free,
uncensored access to knowledge and I'm pretty sure, Senator Rubio and
Congressman Smith, that it is in your DNA too.
The year after that speech, the Lantos Foundation played a leading
role in redirecting a good part of our government's spending on
Internet freedom to the BBG. Prior to that, almost all funding was
inside the State Department, and frankly, it led to situations where
China was able to deftly use the U.S.'s efforts to open the Internet
and circumvent their ``Great Firewall'' as a diplomatic bargaining
tool. Clearly, as a human rights organization, we believe that access
to the Internet is a modern human right that should not be bargained
away, so we sought a ``safer'' home for the funding and felt the BBG
had enough independence to play a leading role in opening the Internet
across the globe.
In the early years of this adjustment in the way our government
funded anti-censorship tools, Internet freedom initiatives were not
perfect, but our government was funding a number of technologies to
provide open access and we were moving in the right direction. Today,
it pains me to have to sit before you and express my deep
disappointment and frustration with the actual results and current
commitment of our country's Internet freedom policy. I've heard it said
that if China herself had been in charge of America's Internet freedom
policy, it could hardly have been more favorable to China's interests.
That is an extraordinarily harsh assessment, perhaps harsher than I
myself would subscribe to, but let me tell you why I think it is not
far off the mark.
Perhaps the single most stunning example of the lengths to which
China will go to create an information prison is the ``Great
Firewall,'' a massive government censorship apparatus that has been
estimated to cost billions of dollars annually and to employ some two
million people to police the Internet use of its citizens (Foreign
Policy Magazine, July 2017). For this reason, many of us have long
believed that firewall circumvention technologies must be a key
component of any effective Internet freedom strategy. Since 2011 the
Lantos Foundation, as part of a broad Internet freedom coalition, has
urged Congress to direct the State Department through DRL and the BBG
to provide robust funding to field-tested, scalable circumvention
technologies. Recognizing that these technologies have the potential to
provide safe and uncensored access to the Internet for literally
hundreds of millions of people in China and in other closed societies
around the world, Congress has responded. In every recent appropriation
bill, Congress has included language directing that not less than $50
million be spent to fund Internet freedom programs including
specifically, firewall circumvention technology. This simply has not
happened. Call it willful ignorance, call it bureaucratic intransigence
and obfuscation, call it what you will, but in my view, both the State
Department and the BBG have failed to faithfully implement the clearly
expressed intent of Congress, that significant resources be dedicated
to these large-scale firewall circumvention technologies that China
most fears. They have funded freedom festivals and trainings and small-
scale technologies that are more directed to driving traffic to their
own platforms (in the case of the BBG) than giving free, unfettered
access to the vast world of the Internet for the hundreds of millions
of people trapped behind the digital curtain. They fund privacy and
security apps that are very important for safety while on the Internet,
but they forget that many cannot even access the Internet. Meanwhile,
some of the most effective, proven technologies, the ones China fears
the most, technologies that provide unfettered access to all, have
received only modest funding and have had curious barriers placed in
their paths, making it difficult, if not impossible to qualify for the
different grant proposals.
The cost to U.S. interests of these failures at BBG and DRL were on
vivid display during January of this year when protests broke out in
Iran. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the streets to protest
economic hardship and the oppressive rule of the theocratic dictators.
Among other repressive responses to this popular uprising, the Iranian
government acted to block access to the Internet. Sadly, because the
BBG had earlier cut off all funding to some of the most effective
circumvention technologies, our ability to help provide access to the
outside world for those brave Iranians was greatly limited. Only a
single U.S. government-funded large-scale circumvention technology was
available at this moment of crisis. I consider this an inexcusable
dereliction of duty.
I confess--I am baffled by the failure of both the State Department
and the BBG to faithfully execute the directives that Congress has
given them. When I have met with representatives at both agencies, they
reassured me of their deep commitment to the goal of broadening access
to Internet freedom and of the intensity of their efforts to do so. The
rhetoric is pleasant enough, but their words are not matched by their
deeds. When our coalition has attempted to drill down and get real
facts about where they are directing their resources and why they are
not funding proven technologies, we are most often met with
obfuscation, opacity, and unfulfilled promises. During the midst of the
Iranian protests, I met with the top leadership at the BBG and they
personally pledged to me that within three to four weeks at the most,
funding would be granted for technologies that could make access
available to vastly increased numbers of users around the world. More
than three months have passed since those meetings, and not only has no
funding been approved, but the latest indications are that no
additional funding will be granted for the foreseeable future. To say
that our Internet freedom coalition is frustrated by this pattern would
be an understatement.
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the bureaucrats at
DRL and the BBG are relying on what they think is Congress's inadequate
attention span and limited expertise to get away with this pattern of
ignoring Congress's clearly expressed intent when it comes to funding
robust firewall circumvention technologies. What arrogance! I am hoping
and praying that you will prove them wrong.
This issue, Internet firewall circumvention, desperately needs
champions in the Congress. We need leaders who will be vigilant and
vigorous in demanding accountability from the agencies responsible for
executing our government's Internet freedom policies; leaders who will
not be beguiled by soothing words, and rather than accept heartfelt
protestations of good intentions, will demand results. Above all, we
need leaders who know that we must not pacify the oppressors but
instead fortify and strengthen the brave dissidents and ordinary
Chinese citizens who are risking everything in their pursuit of
freedom. In other words, we need leaders who are not moral pygmies, but
rather moral giants. I know that both of you are the kind of leaders we
need. The Lantos Foundation, along with our Internet freedom coalition
partners, stand ready to assist you in any way possible.
Thank you.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher Smith
China has the world's largest number of internet users as well as
the world's most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and
control regime. The Chinese government, under the leadership of Xi
Jinping, views digital controls as necessary for its political
stability and control of core digital technologies as necessary for its
economic future.
The Chinese government spends $10 billion on maintaining and
improving their censorship apparatus. The U.S. government has an annual
internet freedom budget of $55 million and Congress still has little
idea how this money is spent.
Over the past year or so, Chinese companies were ordered to close
websites that hosted discussions on the military, history, and
international affairs, and crack down on ``illegal'' VPNs (in response,
Apple was forced to remove VPNs from the China app store). New
regulations were announced restricting anonymity online and the Chinese
government rolled out impressive new censorship technologies, censoring
photos in one-to-one WeChat discussions and disrupting WhatsApp.
Beijing has also deployed facial and voice recognition, artificial
intelligence, and other surveillance technologies throughout the
country, but particularly targeting the Uyghur ethnic minority, where
between 500,000 and 1 million Uyghurs have been detained arbitrarily.
The Chinese government and Communist Party's attempts to enforce
and export a digital authoritarianism pose a direct threat to Chinese
rights defenders and ethnic minorities and pose a direct challenge to
the interests of the U.S. and the international community.
The U.S. must recognize that we are engaged in a battle of ideas
with a revitalized authoritarianism--online, in the marketplace, and
elsewhere--and we need to up our ``competitive game'' to meet the
challenge.
The Administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) says quite
clearly that the Chinese government and Communist Party (along with
Russia) seek to ``challenge American power, influence, and interests,
attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are
determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their
militaries, and to control information and data to repress their
societies and expand their influence.''
The NSS also states that ``China is using economic inducements and
penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to
persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. . . .
China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads
features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use
of surveillance.''
The Chinese government and Communist Party want to shape a world
antithetical to U.S. values and interests and to export their economic,
political, and censorship models globally.
In response, the U.S. and like-minded allies must stand resolutely
for freedom of religion, fairer and freer trade, labor rights, freedom
of navigation, the rule of law and freedom of expression--including
online.
A coherent and engaged internet freedom strategy must be a critical
part of the U.S. diplomatic toolbox. This strategy should have at its
core a commitment to protect fundamental freedoms and privacy, and
promote the free flow of news and information.
But it is not a matter of just having a strategy--it should be the
right one. The Bush and Obama Administrations pursued cyber diplomacy,
yet internet freedom has declined around the world, privacy is
increasingly under threat, and the free flow of information has become
more endangered.
The right strategy must start with some humility. Cyberspace is a
place to spread democratic ideals and a place where criminals,
extremists, corporations, traffickers, and governments exploit
vulnerabilities with impunity. Online communication can convey our
highest ideals and our worst fears. It can shine a light on repression
and be the source of hatred, manipulation, fake news, coercion, and
conflict. It can bring people together or push us apart.
Despite all this, I agree with the NSS's conclusion which says,
``The Internet is an American invention, and it should reflect our
values as it continues to transform the future for all nations and all
generations. A strong, defensible cyber infrastructure fosters economic
growth, protects our liberties, and advances our national security.''
Central to a revitalized U.S. internet freedom strategy should be a
priority to open gaping holes in China's Great Firewall. I'm just not
confident that this is the policy of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors or the State Department right now.
I think there are certain goals we should prioritize in our
internet freedom strategy regarding China:
(1) China's netizens require easy, reliable, and free access to
uncensored information through anti-censorship technologies, so
that anybody can freely access information regardless of their
technical ability. Reliable solutions should work all the time,
regardless of intensified crackdowns or major events (Party
Congress, June 4th anniversary) taking place in-country.
(2) Solutions should also present difficult choices for the
Chinese authorities. If the authorities want to disrupt these
solutions, then they must disrupt many online services which
they would normally be hesitant and unlikely to block.
(3) Access to solutions should also come at no cost to Chinese
netizens. The Chinese authorities often block access to payment
providers, so even if Chinese can afford a circumvention
solution, they cannot get past censorship by their payment
provider.
(4) Holistic anti-censorship solutions should be encouraged,
including not just technical circumvention but also
distribution of those tools (getting around Google Play being
blocked, and censorship in the Apple App Store) as well as
helping users share anti-censorship tools, as well as content,
through messaging apps, social networks, and QR codes.
These are just a few starting principles. I am open to a
conversation about these goals with experts and allies. But given the
stakes and possible outcomes, moving quickly to fund and distribute
anti-censorship technologies should be a priority.
The future safety and prosperity of our grandchildren--in the U.S.
and China alike--may very well depend on ``open, interoperable
communications online, with minimal barriers to the global exchange of
information, data, ideas, and services.''
Submissions for the Record
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Letters Submitted by Katrina Lantos Swett
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Letter Submitted by Hon. Marco Rubio
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Witness Biographies
Sarah Cook, Senior Research Analyst for East Asia and Director of
the China Media Bulletin, Freedom House
Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom
House. She directs the China Media Bulletin, a monthly digest in
English and Chinese providing news and analysis on media freedom
developments related to China. Cook is also the author of several Asian
country reports for Freedom House's annual publications, as well as
three special reports about China: The Battle for China's Spirit
(2017), The Politburo's Predicament (2015), and The Long Shadow of
Chinese Censorship (2013). Her comments and writings have appeared on
CNN, in the Wall Street Journal, in Foreign Policy, and before the U.S.
Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Before joining Freedom
House, Ms. Cook co-edited the English translation of ``A China More
Just,'' a memoir by prominent rights attorney Gao Zhisheng, and was
twice a delegate to the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting
in Geneva for an NGO working on religious freedom in China. She
received a B.A. in International Relations from Pomona College, and as
a Marshall Scholar, completed Master's degrees in Politics and
International Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies in
London.
Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics, Charles Sturt
University (Australia), and author, ``Silent Invasion: China's
Influence in Australia''
Clive Hamilton is an Australian public intellectual and author. He
founded, and for 14 years directed, Australia's leading progressive
think tank, the Australia Institute. He has held a number of visiting
academic appointments, including at Yale University, the University of
Oxford, and University College London. He is the author of a number of
books, including ``Requiem for a Species,'' ``Earthmasters,'' and
``Growth Fetish.'' His controversial book, ``Silent Invasion: China's
Influence in Australia,'' was published in February 2018. His articles
have appeared in the New York Times, The Guardian, Scientific American,
and Nature.
Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D., President, Lantos Foundation for Human
Rights & Justice
Katrina Lantos Swett serves as President of the Lantos Foundation
for Human Rights & Justice, established in 2008 to continue the legacy
of her father, the late Congressman Tom Lantos, who served as Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and was a co-founder of the
Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Under her leadership, the Lantos
Foundation has rapidly become a distinguished and respected voice on
key human rights concerns ranging from advancing the rule of law
globally and fighting for internet freedom in closed societies to
combating the persistent and growing threat of anti-Semitism and
Holocaust denial. Dr. Lantos Swett is the former Chair and Vice-Chair
of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF) and teaches Human Rights and American Foreign Policy at Tufts
University. She currently serves as Co-Chair of the Board of the
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and the Budapest-based
Tom Lantos Institute. Dr. Lantos Swett also serves on the Advisory
Board of UN Watch, the annual Anne Frank Award and Lecture, the Warren
B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership, and Public Policy, and the
Brigham Young University Law School. Lantos Swett has a B.A. in
political science from Yale University, a J.D. degree from the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and a Ph.D. in
history from the University of Southern Denmark.