

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-30]

HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION  
—  
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE  
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS  
FOR U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND,  
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND  
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND**  
—

HEARING HELD  
MARCH 30, 2011



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**FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 30, 2011.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,  
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning. I am pleased to welcome Admiral James Stavridis, commander of U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe; General Douglas Fraser, commander of U.S. Southern Command; and Admiral James Winnefeld, commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and thank you for your many years of devoted service for our country.

Before we move to the matters at hand, I want to briefly address a big issue that is foremost in my mind and I am sure in the minds of my colleagues—Libya. The President has an obligation to clearly explain to Congress and the American people what his administration’s objectives and strategy are for our operations in Libya. He fulfilled this obligation in part on Monday night, but the full House will not have an opportunity to be briefed until this afternoon—12 days after the start of Operation Odyssey Dawn.

This committee will follow that up with a hearing tomorrow focused on Libya with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Admiral Stavridis, in his role as NATO’s [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is intimately involved in the campaign against the Qaddafi regime, particularly as command of the operation transitions to NATO.

Admiral, we are certainly interested in your views particularly as NATO assumes command of the military mission today, but I plan on reserving my questions on operations in Libya—and there are many—for this afternoon’s and tomorrow’s briefings.

Moving to the reason we are here today, Admiral Stavridis, I am concerned that the administration will seek to remove one or more Army brigade combat teams, or BCTs, from Europe for the sake of

efficiencies that neglect the operational importance of their mission.

I also want to highlight my concerns regarding the European phased adaptive approach. Missile defense is becoming a critical component of our relationship to our European allies, and we must ensure EUCOM [United States European Command] has the resources and flexibility to implement a robust defense.

Moving to SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command], General Fraser, in my mind the illicit trafficking threat is the greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of responsibility. It is also, I should add, one that requires close collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the table from NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command], as well as your interagency partners.

General Fraser, your written statement highlights opportunities and challenges resulting from the activities of extra-regional actors in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. China, Russia and Iran have been very active in Latin America through arms sales, personnel exchanges, investments and trade deals. In addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region are very troubling. The committee would benefit from your assessment of trends of the activities and influence of foreign actors in the Western Hemisphere.

Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is one of the foremost national security challenges directly impacting the U.S. homeland, and we need to treat it as such. I laud the heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and their public officials, who—and make no mistake about this—are risking their lives and the lives of their families in the war against these brutal criminal enterprises.

We need to support these heroes in this fight while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico. I look forward to hearing your assessment, Admiral, on the progress that is being made by the Mexican authorities and what NORTHCOM is doing to support them and build their capacity and capabilities.

Finally, the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution has resulted in the Missile Defense Agency spending \$324 million less than is anticipated for this fiscal year. Next fiscal year's request reduces the ground-based midcourse defense program by another 185 million. These are sizable cuts. We must understand how these cuts impact homeland missile defense effectiveness, modernization, operations and development.

Gentlemen, again, thank you for appearing before us today.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM  
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED  
SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming Admiral Winnefeld, General Fraser and Admiral Stavridis here.

Appreciate you gentlemen's service and your presence today.

My statement will be brief. I agree substantially with the issues that the chairman has raised and the ones we wish to hear in all three of your different commands. Obviously, in Southern Command we are interested in the drug trafficking, how things have progressed from Colombia and beyond other issues.

NORTHCOM, your work with Mexico on similar issues, getting an update on that would be important. And Libya is the issue that is in all of our minds, which I am sure you will hear a great deal.

I was joking that General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld, you are very lucky gentleman, because most of the questions will be focused on Admiral Stavridis and take a little pressure off you, I suspect. But we will try to keep you involved as well.

And also with European Command, we do not want to forget what is going on in Afghanistan, the role that NATO is playing there. I would be very curious to hear the Admiral's views on how that is progressing, how the support from our NATO allies is going in Afghanistan and where he sees that situation going.

And lastly, one issue that has not been raised, and I think it is particularly important in Europe, is the relationship there with Russia and with Turkey, the role those two countries play and how our relationship with each of them is going. So I would be curious to hear about that a little bit.

With that, I have a statement for the record that is more detailed, which I will submit, but I will yield back and look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will follow in the order I introduced—Admiral Stavridis, General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld.

**STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE**

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you very much to all the members of the committee for offering us an opportunity to come and talk with you about all the important issues that were raised, and I am sure many others.

I do have to point out if you get confused at any point in the hearing who the two fighter pilots at the table are, they are the two tall gentleman with full heads of hair. And, of course, I look at them both as potential donors in that regard. But it is a pleasure to be you here with two very distinguished colleagues, who are also very good friends.

I would, if I may, make the observation that when I first came before this committee 5 years ago, I started to get to know Rep. Gabby Giffords. And I just wanted to comment that she during my time at SOUTHCOM was a true friend, and certainly all of us are thinking about her.

Today, as always, it is a pleasure to be with you, as I mentioned. I do have a full statement for the record. If that could be entered, sir, I would appreciate it.

What I would like to talk about, and very briefly, are three key things that U.S. European Command is focused on in sort of a gen-

eral sense. One is military operations, one is partnering with our friends and allies, and the third is engaging with the interagency.

In terms of military operations, if I could, I will start with just a word about Afghanistan. And I will do this from my perspective as U.S. European Command Commander and make the point that today in Afghanistan we have about 98,000 U.S. troops. We have 45,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside of us. The vast majority—well over 80 percent—are from the European theater.

We also have from U.S. European Command 12,000 of our U.S. soldiers, who are forward deployed from Europe into Afghanistan and into Iraq as well. So from a military operational perspective at U.S. European Command, we are very much in the operational mode as we support those kinds of operations forward.

In terms of how I see Afghanistan—both the chairman and the ranking member mentioned this—I would say, much as you heard from David Petraeus, I am cautiously optimistic today about our progress. We have 49 troop contributing nations who stand with us, the largest coalition in modern history, perhaps in history. And today, I think, we see steady progress in the security sector.

And I would particularly point to gains in the south. While they are fragile, as General Petraeus has mentioned, I think that they are indicative of the very real possibility of our transition to Afghan-led security forces throughout Afghanistan by 2014. So from a U.S. European Command perspective, we will continue to support that effort. And again, I would say cautious optimism is my watchword on Afghanistan.

In terms of partnership with friends and allies, there are 51 nations with whom we have mil-to-mil, military-to-military relationships from U.S. European Command. And just as one example, last year we conducted 33 exercises, 50,000 people involved. And these exercises are the component that allows us to bring these friends and allies forward into real operations with us.

The interaction, the training, the coalition building that occurs as part of these partnerships, I believe, is fundamentally why we have 45,000 non-U.S. troops with us in Afghanistan today. And I know my geographic colleagues here would echo that building those kinds of relationships are part of conducting successful coalition operations today.

And then thirdly, I mentioned the interagency. At U.S. European Command, we try very hard to support the Department of State as they do diplomacy, to support AID [the U.S. Agency for International Development] as they do development. We want to be a good interagency partner.

Two quick examples. One is disaster response. Last year we were working to alleviate problems from wildfires both in Russia and in Israel. And this is an example of working with AID in that case.

Another partner is the Drug Enforcement Administration. We have a counter trafficking center. It is a very reduced version of what General Fraser operates out of JIATF [the Joint Interagency Task Force] South in Key West, to try and get at some of these trafficking challenges as they move through our region and come back to threaten the United States.



So those three things are the key areas in which we are engaged at the moment. As well, we are looking at ballistic missile threat and what we can do to develop the phased adaptive approach. We are looking at relations with Russia. We are looking at Israel and Turkey, important countries in our region. And we are also thinking about cyber and terrorism. So it is a very full plate for us at U.S. European Command.

I will close, Chairman and Ranking Member, with just a word about Libya. One is administrative, in a sense, to simply clarify my role in terms of operations in Libya. From a U.S. perspective, those are conducted by Africa Command, headed very ably by General Carter Ham, who many of you know.

My job from a U.S. perspective is to support General Ham and to move U.S. European Command forces forward for the coalition operations that have been conducted for the last 5 weeks.

In my NATO hat as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, I am essentially the operations officer for NATO. So in that hat we are now taking on this mission in Libya as it is transitioning today with flights over Libya, with the air tasking order generated by NATO, and taking on the important missions that were outlined under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for giving me an opportunity to lay out a few thoughts initially. I look forward to your questions. I would like to close by saying thank you to the Congress and thank you to this committee for your support to all of our men and women. We could not operate a single day without the support of this committee, and I thank each one of you personally, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

And without objection, each of your full statements will be introduced into the record.

General Fraser.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF,  
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

General FRASER. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member Smith, thank you also, and distinguished members of the committee.

It is my great pleasure and privilege to be here and have the opportunity to discuss United States Southern Command and our accomplishments over the past year, plus our future efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.

But first, before I continue, I would like to, as Admiral Stavridis did, recognize the absence of Congresswoman Giffords from this committee. As Admiral Stavridis said, she has been a stalwart supporter of United States Southern Command, of Air Forces Southern, and we wish her a speedy recovery.

I am also pleased to have my wife with me today. She is a great partner. She is a steadfast advocate for our military families, and she is a remarkable representative of United States Southern Command and all our military spouses throughout our armed forces.

[Applause.]

I am also pleased, as Admiral Stavridis mentioned also, to share a table with my friends and my counterparts. Admiral Stavridis, my predecessor, left a real legacy of interagency integration. He talked about that just a minute ago in European Command. That legacy remains in United States Southern Command and is a vital part of our organization.

Admiral Winnefeld and I have been working diligently to coordinate our respective activities in Mexico and the Central American region, as well as across our combatant command boundaries, to ensure that there is no disconnect and there is no seam in U.S. military engagement within the hemisphere.

Over the past year, United States Southern Command worked in close collaboration with other U.S. federal agencies and our international partners to respond to natural disasters like the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile and to address the ongoing threats to regional security as well.

This year, with the continued support of Congress, we will continue to promote United States' national and regional security interests through enduring partnerships. Much as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, partnerships and the building of partnerships remain a vital part of our mission and a vital role that we continue to pursue throughout the region.

But we are really focused on two direct issues, two direct challenges. One is the ever present nature of natural disasters within the region like those we witnessed last year and then, Chairman, as you and the ranking member mentioned, the ongoing threat posed by transnational criminal organizations and the illicit activities they pursue.

While we remain prepared to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations whenever the need arises, transnational criminal organizations represent the evolving challenge to regional and hemispheric security.

These transnational criminal organizations engage in illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, money and people across the porous borders throughout the region, into the United States, and also abroad into Africa and into Europe. They do not respect national sovereignty, laws, governments or human life.

Nowhere is this more evident than in Central America, which is besieged by gangs and transnational criminal organizations, who conduct illicit trafficking with near impunity. But the direct result of their activity is unprecedented levels of violence and an erosion of citizen safety. The northern triangle of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras is the deadliest zone in the world outside of war zones.

The newly formed Central American Citizens Security Partnership announced by President Obama last week builds upon the existing interagency efforts and leverages the capacities of partners such as Canada, Colombia and Mexico to help Central America respond to the challenges of organized crime, drug trafficking and violence. U.S. Southern Command will continue to support this effort.

In closing, I would also like to thank the committee for your support and funding the construction of our new headquarters in Miami. My good friend, Admiral Stavridis, had a large role to play

in that, and we are the beneficiary of all his hard work as well as yours.

This state-of-the-art building enhances our internal and external collaboration. It improves our ability to conduct interagency operations, and it raises the quality of life of our personnel. So on behalf of the men and women of United States Southern Command, thank you for your support.

And I would also like to close by thanking Congress and the members of this committee for your continued support of our men and women in uniform. Much like Admiral Stavridis said, we could not do our job without your constant support.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for your continued support.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the Appendix on page 131.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld.

**STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND**

Admiral WINNEFELD. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

I will echo my colleagues on at least two points. One is that I am delighted to be alongside these two fine gentlemen this morning, including my longtime friend, Admiral Jim Stavridis, and my very good friend and close partner, Doug Fraser, in the Western Hemisphere arena.

I also would like to echo their thoughts on the absence of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, who has been such a strong supporter of NORTHCOM and in particular NORAD [the North American Aerospace Defense Command] and our air sovereignty mission.

As the commander of U.S. NORTHCOM responsible for the defense of the United States and in the case of NORAD for the air defense of North America, it is my privilege to work with the talented team of men and women executing a uniquely diverse set of homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation missions in Colorado Springs.

Our daily efforts include countering terrorism and transnational criminal organizations, preparing to support our federal and state partners in the wake of a natural or man-made disaster, air defense against both external and internal threats, maritime and ballistic missile defense, and, of course, a growing focus on the Arctic.

I would like to highlight two of these areas in advance of our discussion this morning. First, the tragic events in Japan over the last several weeks highlight the importance of being prepared to respond to disasters, including those providing little or no notice, such as earthquakes, and those involving accidental or intentional release of harmful substances, as in Japan's case their release of radionuclides.

U.S. NORTHCOM plays a key role in our nation's response to these disasters, principally in support of FEMA's [the Federal

Emergency Management Agency's] role as the lead federal agency providing support to the affected states by bringing either additional capacity or additional capabilities to bear that our partners may lack.

Time is our enemy in these disasters, and we search every day for ways to become more agile to meet the needs of our partners.

We also stress our supporting role in these disasters, and I am pleased to be able to report to you that we have made considerable strides over the last year in achieving unity of command and control over state and federal military forces that might respond together in the wake of a disaster.

I can also report that NORTHCOM's relationship with the National Guard, who is such a capable partner and on whom I rely so much for my mission in several key areas, is superb.

The second area I would like to highlight is U.S. NORTHCOM's support to the ongoing struggle to disrupt and dismantle the transnational criminal organizations, otherwise known as TCOs, that are having such corrosive effects within our hemisphere. We work with law enforcement agencies within the United States and in conjunction with U.S. SOUTHCOM in support of the efforts of our partner nations in the hemisphere.

President Obama and President Calderón of Mexico have underscored our shared responsibilities as nations—on the U.S. side of the border to reduce drug consumption and the illicit flow of arms and money, and on the Mexican side to interdict drugs going north and to strengthen the rule of law so that criminals are put and kept in jail.

The Mexican government has displayed exemplary moral, physical and political courage in undertaking this important struggle, as you pointed out, Chairman McKeon, because they know this is about the future of Mexico. And I take my hat off to them for this.

The Mexican military has been asked by its civilian leadership to join with Mexican law enforcement agencies to support this struggle in the right way, respectful of Mexico's democratic ideals and the nation's commitment to the rule of law.

It has been a difficult struggle, as you pointed out. Since December 2006, 35,000 Mexicans have lost their lives in TCO-related violence. The criminality extends far beyond drugs to extortion, robbery, kidnapping and trafficking in persons.

I salute Mexico's police and security forces for their courage, skill and determination and for the progress they have made in building institutions like the federal police and in taking down over two dozen of the most wanted criminals in their country, progress for which they do not always get the credit they deserve.

Today the Mexican military is confronting concurrent challenges—how to counter a sophisticated, unconventional threat by integrating intelligence and operations, how to work jointly with each other and with their interagency partners, and how to fully inculcate respect for human rights into every operation.

We know this is hard, because we have been down the same road, and some days we are still on the same road. So I tell my capable Mexican partners that we don't know it all, we have made our own mistakes along the way, and we seek the kind of engagement that helps them benefit from our experience.

But while I always want to do more to help, I want to state publicly and very clearly that the first and most important principle we observe in this struggle is respect for Mexican sovereignty. We have much to offer, but Mexico is always, always in the lead in Mexico.

The Mexican government has a strategy. They have defined with us a substantive framework to guide our cooperation, and they have invited us to work with them to support their efforts. But, again, they are always in the lead in their country.

If together we can maintain our resolve, if we can be responsive to their requests, if we can work effectively together to support their operational progress, and if we can continue to make progress on our own side of the border, then we have a good chance of carrying the day against the TCOs. And if not, the corrosive effects of the TCOs will continue to pose a danger to the citizens of both of our nations.

I want to thank you, as my colleagues did, both the committee and a very capable staff for your steadfast support for our men and women, both in uniform and in civilian clothes, who work hard on these and many other difficult problems every single day.

Once again, thanks for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to our discussion.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld can be found in the Appendix on page 158.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral Stavridis? "Stavridis?" Boy, oh, boy. At last year's EUCOM posture hearing, you strongly advocated for retaining four Army combat teams, or BCTs, in Europe. You said that all four BCTs are required to enable both rotations in support of overseas contingency operations and building partnership capacity activities with our European allies.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review backed you up on this, but that final decision would be made pending a review. What is the status of the review? And when will the decision be announced? And do you still strongly support retaining all forward BCTs? And if not, what has changed? And what are the impacts if one or more BCTs is relocated?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Chairman.

First of all, to focus on what these BCTs do, brigade combat teams, I think they fulfill essentially four key functions. They provide reassurance. They provide deterrence. They are essential in our training process that we spoke of with our partners and allies in Europe. And as we can see today, they are very engaged in operations, again, 12,000 folks forward even as we speak.

In terms of the review, it is still ongoing. I think it is coming to a conclusion soon. And it is not simply focused, sir, on the BCTs. It is really a larger look at the overall structure in Europe, which as you know has decreased dramatically since the Cold War, coming down from some 400,000 total troops to about 80,000 today, a 75 percent decrease.

So we will see, I think, the results of a final look, which is being conducted at this point. All the inputs are in, and I think final decisions will be announced, I would guess, soon. But I don't have visibility as to when that final decision would come.

Overall, I am satisfied that my input and my voice has been heard through the process, and I am confident that I will be supportive of the result that comes out when it is announced.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Fraser, China, Russia and Iran have been extremely active in Latin America. Several left-leaning countries, such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, have forged ties with the anti-U.S. leaders in Libya, North Korea, and elsewhere. Alarming, Hezbollah and other radical groups appear to have a growing presence in the region.

How significant is the influence of non-Western Hemisphere actors in the region? And how would you assess our relationships in comparison? What can SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners do to maintain strong relationships in the region and counter foreign interferences?

General FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We see a growing influence, but it varies country by country, if you look at those external actors. But it is still primarily focused on political, diplomatic, and commercial relationships within all those countries. And that is a normal international process, if you will, and that in many cases, especially as we look at China, is a two-way street, where countries within the region are also looking to engage with China on a more robust basis.

Russia's focus primarily continues to be commercial and diplomatic, but there are also arms sales that they are continuing to pursue within the region. In most cases, that is providing opportunities for other countries as they look to modernize their forces within the region.

My biggest concern within the arms supplies that Russia is providing is the number of automatic weapons being provided to Venezuela and the potential that those could be used in other places, not that there is a connection to Venezuela, it is just the fact that they could find their ways into other hands.

Regarding Iran, very similar, if you will, primarily diplomatic and commercial, in many ways from our assessment, looking to limit their isolation in the international community and also support anti-U.S. and reduce U.S. influence not only within the region, but also in other parts of the globe.

Hezbollah and Hamas do have organizations resident in the region. I have not seen them growing in any capacity, and I see primarily any support that they are giving is financial support, principally back to parent organizations in the Middle East. I have not seen connections that go beyond that to date.

What are we doing about that? We continue to engage very robustly with our partner militaries throughout the region. We have very good military-to-military relations with all those partners within the region. The ones that we have minimal relations with today are primarily Venezuela and Bolivia, and that is more their choice than ours. We would like to continue to engage with them. They are choosing not to engage with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. And we are happy to have your wife here with you today.

You are more than welcome. Thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld, how are the Mexican security services doing in their fight against these viciously violent transnational communist—or criminal organizations? What is NORTHCOM doing to support them and build their capacity and capabilities, while maintaining an appropriate respect for our sovereign neighbor? Is there something more that this committee can do to help regarding either resources or statutory flexibility?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would say that it is important to understand, as we all do, that the Mexican security services are up against a very sophisticated, very ruthless, and very well financed threat, a series of threats, actually, several different organizations.

I did a check recently, and I think most of the assessments are that about \$40 billion flows across our border each year into Mexico to sustain these transnational criminal organizations. And even though they are not military forces, if you took that \$40 billion and ranked it among the world's militaries, it would come in in the top ten for the amount of money that is potentially supplying these organizations. So it is a well-financed threat, largely by our drug demand in the United States.

So the Mexican security forces, the security police, the military are up against a very, very sophisticated and a ruthless threat. I give them a great deal of credit, though, because they are undergoing some very difficult transformations.

They have taken a force that was a very conventional force, that candidly was mostly focused on support for natural disasters, and they are gradually transforming this—and I would say very successfully—into a force that is capable of very regular operations against this sophisticated threat.

It is a long journey. We have been on the same journey ourselves over the last 10 years. And it is difficult to transform. And they are doing a good job.

I would say that they have had some serious successes in the last 16 months or so. They have taken down 28 of the major criminals, lead criminals, inside Mexico. Most recently, their takedown of some of the people who were involved in the murder of Agent Zapata down in Mexico was actually a very sophisticated operation that was quite impressive by our standards. So I think they are coming a long way.

As in any struggle like this, things are probably going to get worse before they get better, and we are seeing that with the violence in Mexico, not only TCO-on-TCO violence, but violence that is basically an outgrowth of the fact that the Calderón administration has taken such a courageous stand against these organizations.

At NORTHCOM, we do everything we can to help our partners. We have great respect for their sovereignty. And in that light, I would leave it to the Mexican authorities to disclose any of the particular details of the support that we provide.

But in general, it is sharing the lessons learned that we have learned so hard over the last 10 years of similar struggles elsewhere in the world from which our Mexican partners can benefit. And I would include in that how you do planning, how you do special operations, and also how you carefully observe human rights.

We have a very good partnership with our friends in Mexico, and I have great respect for their efforts, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have two questions. The chairman actually covered a number of the questions that I was interested in. The first one is on actually behalf of Congresswoman Giffords. I am trying to ask her questions, get her issues in as the ranking member here until she is able to come back.

And I thank you, gentlemen, for your kind words on her behalf. She is doing much, much better, and we are all looking forward to her return.

And I was down in her district last week, down at Davis-Monthan and Fort Huachuca. And she has one specific question, as I think both the SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM people know, and that is about the Air and Space Operations Center.

The 612th is at Davis-Monthan, which is responsible, General Fraser, for the Southern Command. The 601st is in Florida and is responsible for the Northern Command. And the Air Force has made the decision and the military has made the decision to combine the two.

And there are a number of questions about that. I had the opportunity to spend some time down there and visit the center they have at Davis-Monthan. And it is very impressive. It is being updated as we speak and seems like a very capable center. And, obviously, they are worried about losing that, in terms of how that combination is going.

So a couple of questions about that. First of all, Congressman Giffords' staff has requested from the Air Force sort of an analysis of this issue. How is it going to work to combine two operation centers in that way? And what are the criteria that the Air Force and the two commands are going to be weighing to determine which one wins, if you will? She has not yet received that from the Air Force.

So if you could work with perhaps both of your commands with the Air Force to get that analysis of that to her office and to mine, that would be very helpful.

And then, second specific question on that—and it is for both of you, actually—what are the factors that you are weighing in terms of determining what the best place to do this would be? And then, also, how do you think it is going to work having two separate commands with the same operation center?

General FRASER. Ranking Member Smith, if I could start, it is a discussion that is still within the Air Force, and it really relies primarily within the Air Force, as they are working their way through to answer many of the questions that you are asking. The capability that is resident in Air Force South is very significant.

But I am also comfortable, as the Air Force works its way through this, that they understand our needs. And I have had that discussion with the chief of staff of the Air Force, as well as the commander of Air Combat Command, and they are working to make sure that our needs, not only when it comes time for crisis, but also as it supports our training and our exercise requirements,



that they are integrating those into their matrix as they determine how best to support this command.

The benefit, as I see also, though, is that Air Force South's staff will remain a part of Southern Command. It is not a combination completely of the two organizations. And as a result, we have an Air Force component that is focused and dedicated on continuing to build relationships with our partner Air Forces within the region.

So I don't have the specific analysis either. The Air Force is still working its way through that. I still understand that it will be a little bit of time before they come to an answer on that.

Mr. SMITH. It would be good to see that, because my concern, as I was down there—and forgive me, I am forgetting for the moment the general's name who runs the base—Lieutenant General Spears, who showed me around—they have incredible capability there.

I happened to be there when the President was down in the SOUTHCOM region, so they were showing me all that was involved in planning for that, all the technology and capability that they have there. It also has some flexibility to be a center for other, you know, contingencies, if those come up.

So I think it is an incredible capability that we would hate to lose after having built it, and I would be very, very interested in getting the criteria. You know, what is the Air Force weighing in terms of what they need in a joint operations center?

Because that is not clear at this point how they are going to put this together, and I and my staff have some concerns that criteria that might not be the most important from an operational standpoint, but could be from a budgetary standpoint, might be given higher priority than we would like, so I would love to see what the criteria are.

Admiral Winnefeld, if you had anything to add on that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir. We will work together to ask the Air Force to provide those criteria. They have their own criteria that they are using. And I don't have full visibility on those at the moment.

I would say that both of those air operations centers are very capable centers. The one at Tyndall Air Force Base, of course, which is the NORAD region operations center, is very capable and has excess capacity and that sort of thing as well.

The things that matter the most to me are that NORAD has a daily vibrant mission in which literally many time-critical decisions are made on a daily basis that affect the security of this country from both external and internal threats. So in any case, whichever way the decision falls, I would want to make sure there was minimal disruption in our ability to execute those daily decisions.

I would want to make—one of the things that is important to me is that my commander, whose base is there in Tyndall, is able to have rapid access to his air operations center in case he needs to be the one making those split-second decisions.

And it is very useful for me to have the National Guard, frankly, running that operations center, because they bring such an extended timeframe of deep experience that is embedded in that center over a course of years, rather than a constant inflow and outflow of people.

Having said that, I would tell you that General Fraser and I have discussed this. We are comfortable that either way this decision goes, we will be able to manage it and that we will work very closely together to bend over backwards to make sure that the other guy is supported, you know, whoever absorbs the other's center.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I appreciate it.

General FRASER. And, Congressman, if I might, I have had this similar discussion with General Schwartz, as well as General Fraser, the Commander of Air Force Combat Command. And I am confident that they understand our requirements and are working very diligently to meet those requirements as they look at this design.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I appreciate that. I will actually hold the other question that I had for the end. That took a little longer than I expected, so I will yield back to the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your long service to our country.

Our founding fathers were very well acquainted with the exercise of the king's army. And so it would be expected that they would want to preclude any such use of the army in the new country that they were establishing. And so it is no surprise what we find in the Constitution.

In Article I, Section 8, which describes the prerogatives of Congress, it says Congress shall have power to declare war, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions.

And then in Section 2 of the Constitution—Article II of the Constitution, where they define the responsibilities of the President, there is only one brief reference to the relationship of the President to the military, and that is in Section 2 of Article II.

And it says there the President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States. That calling into service is the prerogative of Congress, you note, from Article I of the Constitution.

In 1973, during the height of the Cold War, it was clear that there had to be some interpretation of the intent of our founding fathers, because Congress clearly would not have time to be convened to declare war, if we were attacked by the Soviet Union. And so our two houses drafted the War Powers Resolution.

And in it, it said it is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States. I see this as kind of a recapitulation of the Constitution of the United States.

But to make the intent of our founding fathers consistent with the reality of 1973, they said that the President could call our armed forces into combat under three circumstances: a declaration of war; specific statutory authorization; or, three, a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territory or possessions, or its armed forces—this third, of course, relevant to

the Cold War and the threat of a bolt out of the blue that everybody quite expected could happen then.

Then, Section 3 of that says the President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

Help me understand which of these three were invoked in committing our troops to the military and why no time was available to consult Congress when there was plenty of time to consult with the United Nations and the Arab League.

Do we now, in fact—and this isn't the first President, by the way, that—by the way, the War Powers Act was passed over the veto of the President. That means that more than two-thirds of the Senate and the House, supported by their constituents, believed that this ought to become the law of the land.

This isn't the first President to use the military, I think, in violation of the Constitution and of the War Powers Act. What is your understanding of which of these three circumstances, situations in the War Powers Act is relevant to our involvement in Libya?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Congressman, I have not analyzed that aspect of things. And I think, frankly, the question would be best referred to the Department of Defense and potentially to the White House. I mean, it sounds to me like it is an issue under discussion between the executive and the legislative branch.

My focus—if you are referring specifically to Libya—as a U.S. Combatant Commander, my job was to provide forces for General Carter Ham, who is the AFRICOM [United States Africa Command] commander, who then employed those forces. From a NATO perspective, I operate under a distinctly different chain of command, and the authorities would be completely different.

Mr. BARTLETT. Appreciate your response, and thank you very much.

Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. REYES.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for your service and for doing a great job in your respective positions, which at this point are vital and critical to our national security.

I was on a trip with the chairman and Congressman Kline. We visited Pakistan and Afghanistan and then stopped at NATO headquarters. And for the members, I would strongly recommend that, when you visit Afghanistan, you stop in NATO, because the admiral and the ambassador can really add to the visit and give you a good perspective on the critical role of NATO and the things that are going on.

I don't know if you want to comment.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would just very much echo that. And it is a very logical stopping point coming in or out of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan. We would love to have you and have a chance to show you how the alliance is engaged in this. And I thank you for mentioning that, sir.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

And for General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld, I just was part of a trip last week that went through—well, we went to Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico. And I would appreciate if you would comment—and I know, General Fraser, I think it was you that mentioned the triangle of concern, which includes Guatemala—if you would comment on the challenges that we are facing there.

Ambassador McFarland expressed his concern about the situation in Guatemala and the kinds of challenges that that government is facing as a result of the drug trafficking organizations now using it as a staging area and a transshipment area.

Panama as well is kind of the crossroads where those organizations decide which way they are going to bring narcotics into the U.S., whether the Caribbean through Mexico or along the Pacific.

So if both of you would comment on that, I would appreciate it. I think it would be very important to get your perspective.

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. Let me step back, if I could, for just a minute and then explain the issue as I see it. And it is a very nontraditional military requirement and concern, because it is an irregular force in a transnational criminal organization.

Our roles are very limited, but what we see from a cocaine standpoint—and I will talk specifically cocaine—the majority of cocaine is still produced in the northern part of South America in the Andean Ridge.

It transits up along the east and west coast of Central America and first makes its first stop somewhere along that isthmus—Panama, Costa Rica, some in Nicaragua, primarily right now in Honduras, about 40 percent of it, and then into Guatemala.

Once it arrives on land, then it continues to transit up through the isthmus of Central America into Mexico and then into the United States across the southwest border. We estimate that roughly about 60 to 65 percent of the cocaine that is produced transits that route.

How that manifests itself within Central America, then, is in increasing episodes of violence. And my best way to describe that is if we use U.N.-based figures, in Iraq last year the homicide rate or violent death rate was 14 per 100,000. In Guatemala last year it was 48 per 100,000. If you go to some specific cities, Guatemala City, it would approach 100. In Honduras it was 77 per 100,000. In El Salvador it was 68 per 100,000.

We continue to work with Northern Command, with our partner militaries and our interagency partners, because the real solution for this is an interagency—the Department of State has a Central American region security initiative working not only to support our militaries, but law enforcement as well as judiciary and bring up the capacities within those countries.

And it is us all working together on a regional basis that we will address that problem. And those are the efforts that we are taking on today.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would add, sir, that, you know, the complexities of that region are enormous, particularly the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border region, and General Fraser and I work very

closely on that region to understand the complexities and to look at the way ahead for addressing them.

I would say that my Mexican partners are very sophisticated. They are very aware of what is happening down there. They are approaching this strategically. They know that they need to get at that problem.

They have a capacity issue, for one thing. They do not have a huge military, and they have their hands full right now in the northeast in places like Ciudad Juárez and Monterrey, and they want to get that violence under control as best they can before they really open another front. And I respect them for that.

We are working to see if there is any way that we can help them down there. And in fact, General Fraser and I, again, work closely together on that very, very complex region.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Admirals, General, thank you for your service. I share the concerns of Chairman McKeon and Congressman Bartlett over the new war that America is in in Libya, but today it is budget request. But we need to address the concerns of the American people concerning Libya, I think, as soon as possible.

Admiral Stavridis, there are success stories, and I appreciate you bringing up in Afghanistan that there are now 45,000 troops largely from NATO. And I have had the privilege of meeting with troops from Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. It is really encouraging to see this, and the American people need to know how we do have a 49-nation coalition of real troops involved from such remarkable places as Mongolia.

With that in mind, could you tell us what are the contributions of the troops? The American people need to know when there is success.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir. I would also throw out a couple of other interesting countries that are in this—Tonga, El Salvador, as well as all of our kind of traditional partners, and we are also in discussion with other nations. This really has become a global effort.

In addition to the 49 countries with troops there, there are actually a total of well over 80 countries that are contributing financially to develop Afghanistan.

In terms of what our partners are doing, the first thing I would mention is that they are taking casualties. They are in this fight. Tragically, we have lost about 1,400 of our fine young men and women in Afghanistan.

We have 98,000 U.S., 45,000 Allied, so two-to-one, you would expect the allies would have lost about 700 killed in action. The allies have lost 900 killed in action, so they are suffering casualties at a higher rate per capita than we are here in the United States in many instances.

They are also bringing very specific skills across a range of areas, and the one I would highlight for the committee today is training. If you think about how we are going to succeed in Afghanistan, I believe we will train our way to success.

We are beginning a transition this summer that will run through 2014, and I believe that the ability to make that transition is dependent on effective Afghan security forces. Today there are 275,000 of them.

They are being trained very much by the U.S., but also by our coalition partners, who bring discrete skill sets at everything ranging from orienteering to aircraft maintenance. And so this training effort, led by Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell—many of you have met with General Caldwell—is an area in which we are encouraging our allies to bring additional forces.

And here I would highlight both the Canadians and the Dutch have recently increased the numbers of troops that they are going to commit to the training mission. So that would be the one that I would particularly draw a line under, in addition to the work around the nation in the patrolling.

Finally, in a command-and-control sense, although we all know General Petraeus is our commander, his deputy is British, his chief of staff is French. As you look around Afghanistan to the leaders in each of the regional command areas, Kabul is commanded by a Turk. In the far west we see an Italian in command. In the north we see a German in command, in addition to U.S. commanders in the south and the east.

So in command and control, in casualties, in many discrete missions—I would highlight training in particular—I think the contributions of the allies are noteworthy and part of, I believe, my cautious optimism for success in Afghanistan.

Mr. WILSON. And for peace in the future, American forces working together, the interoperability, people need to know how positive this is going to be.

Another success I saw with Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo was to visit the new bases of MK [Mihail Kogalniceanu] Airbase in Romania, Novacella in Bulgaria, first time in the 1,225-year history of Bulgaria that they have invited a foreign military presence. What is the status of those bases?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Both of them are part of our training programs and are very effective for us to move rotational forces to engage with not only the troops of those nations, but other troops from Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans, so very much part of our training infrastructure in Europe in nations that are very supportive of our missions in Afghanistan, in Europe and in the alliance.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir.

Mr. WILSON. And appreciate all of your service.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

And, gentlemen, thank you so much for being here. Thank you for your service as well.

Admiral Stavridis, I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the concerns that we all feel in terms of our economic situation, but more particularly in terms of our European allies. Clearly, they

have been affected by the economy in their countries, and so there are demands put on them.

And I am wondering if you are worried at all about NATO's readiness due to any European cutbacks or of other allies.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would start, actually, with some good news, and then I will move to the bad news.

The good news is that our European allies, although they are, like the United States, going through economic challenges, they have great resources. The GDP [gross domestic product] of Europe is about \$14 trillion, very similar to that of the United States, so if you put United States' GDP and Europe's GDP together, about \$28 trillion to \$30 trillion, which is roughly half of the global GDP.

So the point is we are lucky that our close allies in Europe live in prosperous societies, who can contribute to defense.

Now, the bad news is that many of our allies are not meeting the NATO standard of spending at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. And so some are—the United Kingdom and France and Turkey and Greece—and a handful are, but the majority are not. So I am worried.

And I believe that we here in the United States, because we pay a much higher percentage of our GDP for our defense, need to be emphatic with our European allies that they should spend at least the minimum NATO 2 percent.

At the military-to-military level, I carry that message often, emphatically and very directly, frankly, not only to military counterparts, but also to political actors in each of the nations in the alliance.

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there a concern as well that the plate is just getting too full as well for NATO?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that is a concern everywhere today. And again, in my view a minimum spending goal of 2 percent is very reasonable, and one that, broadly speaking, the allies should be able to support.

So I will continue to press that emphatically. Secretary Gates pushes that very emphatically. Secretary Clinton pushes that very emphatically. And we are all leaning forward to make sure our allies do the right thing in this regard.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Could you turn for a second to the potential cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and any changes that you are seeing in terms of their military modernization efforts and how that is affecting the EUCOM environment, the AOR [area of responsibility]?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, ma'am, I can. In terms of where we are cooperating with Russia, there is actually a wide spectrum of activities, some of which you may not generally be aware of. One is piracy. Russia is operating ships off the coast of Africa that are working very closely with NATO and European Union ships, along with those of other nations.

Another area is counterterrorism. Russia has been subject to many terrible terrorist attacks, and we are cooperating with them in that regard. Counternarcotics, Russia has a very disturbing opium and heroin addiction problem, and we are in constant dia-

logue with them to try and see how we can work against the trafficking of heroin in particular, which comes from Afghanistan.

We also, as we know, recently signed an arms control agreement with Russia.

And then, finally, I would add——

Mrs. DAVIS. And I guess can you go on to the bad news?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yeah, as always, there are going to be areas where we don't agree with Russia. The situation in Georgia is one of those, for example, where we stand for the territorial integrity of Georgia.

But I think, on balance, overall, certainly compared to the Cold War—and, I would argue, compared to 3 or 4 years ago—these zones of cooperation are, in fact, in place and expanding. The one we are looking to and exploring is missile defense, and that is out in the future, but it is certainly part of the dialogue today between the United States and Russia.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much.

If I could just very quickly, Admiral Winnefeld, on the Merida Initiative, which we know is now not—well, I guess the initiative really ended in fiscal year 2010. And we now have another security assistance program beyond Merida. How important is that assistance?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think the Merida program is very, very important. And there has been some criticism lately that we haven't delivered fast enough. And part of that has to do with simple physics, and that is, if you are going to buy a helicopter, the helicopter is on an assembly line and it takes a while to get that helicopter built.

And I would also add, though, that Secretary Gates has accelerated, by the way, the program for some of these helicopters to Mexico, which I think is a very helpful step.

But helping our Mexican partners with equipment is one of many things that we would like to do with them, including sharing our experience over the last few years, things that we have learned. But the equipment is certainly important. Particularly mobility, helicopters, night-vision goggles, that sort of thing is really priceless to be able to help our partners with that kind of support.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and for your service. I appreciate your being here before us today and discussing these very important issues.

I wanted to echo what Mr. Wilson has said and our chairman about concerns of the operation in Libya. It is a mission that I am concerned as to whether or not its goals are clear. And also, I am a little concerned and believe it is unclear as to who we are supporting in this conflict.

But I know that is not, as Mr. Wilson had said, the subject matter of this hearing, and we are going to continue to pursue that issue later today. But I do think it does need to be acknowledged as the concerns of this committee as we go forward.



I would like to talk—Admiral Stavridis, you were talking about the issue of the drug trade, the effects of the problems in Russia. I appreciate that you and I last month had an opportunity to meet during my trip to NATO and in Brussels. I appreciate your discussions there about the drug trade.

So I would like to revisit that with you. General Petraeus has indicated that, you know, one-third to perhaps, you know, 40 percent of the Taliban's funding comes from the drug trade. So intuitively, we believe that if you can reduce the drug trade, we can reduce the money that buys weapons and explosives that fund the insurgency.

However, the to-do list of how we address this problem extends well beyond the Department of Defense. With your prior experience, I would like to know, you know, how do you believe that we are in doing in going after this problem? And are we hampered by Department of Defense or NATO limitations in counternarcotics missions?

And also, General Fraser, you know, there are differing viewpoints about whether the counter-drug strategy in the region has been successful as touted. From your perspective, what have been the successes, the challenges, and shortcomings of the regional counternarcotics efforts?

Admiral.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir. And thank you for your visit to NATO and for your work with the parliamentary assembly, as well.

I would start by putting some numbers on this. Afghanistan today produces about 80 percent to 90 percent of the world's poppy, which is then turned into opium and then ultimately into heroin, which is highly addictive.

In Russia alone last year, 30,000 young people between the ages of 16 and 24 died of heroin overdoses. There is a significant heroin problem throughout many other nations in Europe, and it flows across to the United States. So there is a human cost to this.

Secondly, as you alluded to, sir, Taliban financing comes out of this, probably \$100 million to \$200 million. And so that funding stream goes back and directly contributes to our losses in Afghanistan.

And then, thirdly, all along that route, there is corruption and there is crime, as the drugs move from Afghanistan through Central Asia, through the Baltics—correction, the Balkans—and into the user patterns both in Russia, Europe, and ultimately in the United States.

It is very similar to what I learned of about cocaine in the Americas. This, of course, is heroin.

What we are doing about it is to establish a counter-trafficking effort that is multi-agency, if you will, and really is there to support the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], as they take the lead on this.

But our ability to bring surveillance, to bring connectivity, to develop analysis, all of that muscularity that we have, similar to what Doug is doing at the Joint Interagency Task Force South, we are trying to do in U.S. European Command so that we can reduce these drug flows for all the reasons I just described.

It is a significant challenge, but we are starting to see some impact. And in fact, in Afghanistan, where we start this supply chain and we see Afghans in the lead, but NATO supporting, we have seen a reduction in the production of poppy and, therefore, of opium and heroin by about 20 percent over the last 2 years. So we are starting down the path.

In the end, in any problem like this, you have to attack the demand side, as well as the supply side in the transit zone. There is no silver bullet. You kind of have to go at all three of those, and we are attacking all three in an interagency way.

General FRASER. Congressman, my discussion is very similar, as you look at Latin America and the effort that we have had ongoing over a number of years to address the counter-drug issue. We have kind of grown that into a counter-illicit-activity issue, because we find they all are interrelated. It is drugs; it is weapons; it is finance, bulk cash, all those flowing back and forth.

We focused very significantly on Colombia, primarily because there was a terrorist issue there, also, with the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia], and it has now become a narcoterrorist issue, as they have now used narcoterrorism or narco capability to finance their capacity.

But if you look at Colombia today, where Colombia was 10 years ago, largely on the shoulders of the Colombians, there has been significant progress there. Homicides are down almost 50 percent. Kidnappings are down 90 percent. They are largely controlling their entire country, where there were pockets where they were not before. The aviation capacity that used to emanate out of Colombia into the United States has been removed. They have shifted to other places.

And if you look at the effort combined with JIATF South of working in the transit zones, along with our law enforcement partners who work with law enforcement throughout the region, the impact in the United States over the last 10 years is the price of cocaine has gone up 75 percent, the purity has gone down 30 percent. There is still a big demand problem in the United States, and it kills 38,000 people a year. It is an issue we need to address.

What have we not done—

The CHAIRMAN. If you have more, would you please get it to him on record?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 179.]

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are a little over time there.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, for Admiral Winnefeld, I am going to look north a little bit here. Last year, the Olympics were held in Vancouver, and NORTHCOM participated in Olympic coordination center activities for security issues. And I was curious. What operational lessons has NORTHCOM taken from that? And how are you continuing to support these northern border enforcement activities?

I note in your testimony it said 22 percent of available resources out of Joint Task Force North are devoted to the northern border. Can you talk about quickly—I have got a few other questions—

about those lessons? And then within the restrictions of Title 10, how are you continuing to support northern border enforcement?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Your first question, as far as the Olympics, I think we took a lot of good, solid lessons out of that, and I would be happy to provide some of those for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 177.]

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think most importantly was just the close cooperation that we have between U.S. Northern Command and Canada Command. My partner, Walt Semianiw, up there and I are very close. We have a Canadian-U.S. civil assistance plan, where U.S. military is able to support Canadian military and vice versa under the imprimatur of our two—State Department and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

So that was a very good news story. And it has really brought out lessons that we could potentially use in a future disaster, either in support of Canada or the U.S., so very positive.

In terms of the northern border, 4,000 miles of very difficult territory. Since 2008, we have provided about two events per year that are about 30 days per event. I think we spent around \$1.8 million or \$1.4 million over the last few years on that.

I would candidly tell you that, in that time, we have managed to assist in the apprehension of 181 pounds of marijuana, which is about the same amount that an ultra-light drops at any given night coming across the southern border.

At the same time, JTF [Joint Task Force] North has done exceptional work on the southern border. I think in a 2-month period from November through January, they assisted in the apprehension of around 17,000 pounds of marijuana and assisted in the apprehension of the suspects that killed Agent Terry on our side of the border.

So we have to consider this as an investment strategy. We do continue to support our interagency partners on the northern border with radar, ground sensors, and that sort of thing, and we will continue to do so.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, and I understand the balance that you have to meet, because clearly from the testimony and from questions here the issues on the southern border are much more difficult. But we live, you know, we live where we live and certainly want to—to the extent that you can continue supporting that cooperation, appreciate it.

But your testimony also covered the Arctic, and I was curious what you would do differently than the U.S. Coast Guard and what would you share with the U.S. Coast Guard. I also note in your testimony your commander's estimate is done, it sounds like, for the Arctic. Can you tell us where you are on that one and when we can expect something?

Admiral WINNEFELD. We are working very hard on a commander's estimate, really good progress. I really benefit, by the way, inside my command by having 125 Canadians there with an integrated staff. It not only allows me to benefit from their expertise in the Arctic, which is considerable, but it also enables me to have true transparency with my Canadian partners in that regard, so there is no suspicion going back and forth.

So we are making great progress on that. We have pretty much settled on the primary themes being defense, security and safety with international cooperation to peacefully open the Arctic, you know, to assist in that as best we can without militarizing the Arctic. I also have a partner at the end of the table in U.S. European Command, who has got a vested interest in things in the Arctic going well as well.

One of the interesting things that we will be approaching within our own process is the notion of working cooperatively with Canada so that we can ensure that the capabilities that we may invest in as the Arctic opens up are done in a complementary fashion rather than a redundant fashion so that we can both be more efficient. And I think that is a good news story. If we can carry that ball down the field, it would be very helpful.

And then in terms of our own internal U.S. military sorts of things, we work closely with the Coast Guard, and we work with the various services, in particular the Navy, who has had a very good positive effort and progress to study what the future needs are for the Navy in the Arctic.

And I think we have got some work ahead of us, frankly, what kind of capabilities we are going to need, but I think we have a good understanding of the gaps in capability that will become apparent as the Arctic opens.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, and I think the reason I bring that up is because, obviously, the Coast Guard does as well, has a good understanding of the gaps. To the extent that we are not being redundant among our own services, but rather investing together, I think will be better for the taxpayers.

Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank all of you for being here.

Admiral Winnefeld, I am concerned about the effects of budget constraints on the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] program. First of all, the 2011 budget requests reduce GMD funding by about \$185 million from the fiscal year 2011 for a total of about \$1.16 billion, which is obviously designed to sustain the 30 GBIs [Ground-Based Interceptors] that we have in Alaska and California, as well as the other GMD programs.

And I guess the first part of the question is are 30 GBIs enough, or is it time to reassess supply, given the potential need to do some additional testing?

I also understand that current 2011 budgets left the GMD program operating with a budget that is really \$324 million less than was anticipated for 2011. Part of that, I am sure, is the CR [Continuing Resolution] and some of the other challenges that you are dealing with, and I apologize for that on behalf of Congress.

And I know that there are some recent flight intercept test failures that are adding to the challenge. I guess I just want to make sure that we know that you have enough funds to successfully implement an effective GMD that will not fail when the rubber hits the road.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Thank you, sir, for that question. First of all, the funds, of course, go to the Missile Defense Agency, and I am the operator of that system, the trigger-puller, if you will. But it goes without saying that I would pay very close attention to the health and future of the ballistic missile defense system that we have.

Regarding the budget, I would say that my very good partner, General O'Reilly at the Missile Defense Agency—I believe he would say that most of those funding reductions are based on efficiencies and that it is just good work on the part of his internal staff to try to squeeze as much out of that——

Mr. FRANKS. I just met with him, and so that is part of the reason for the question.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Right. I would say that the 2012 budget is going to do some very important things for me. One, it is going to procure some additional radars, the AN/TPY-2 [Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance] radars that will give us more situational awareness forward. It will provide an East Coast communications node for us that will increase the accuracy of our missiles, and it is going to keep the GBI line open, which I think is very important to me, because it gives us more options for the future as we study these.

I would also add there is a good, robust intellectual effort going on within the Office of the Secretary of Defense led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that is bringing all the players together to look at what the future holds in case the threat starts to accelerate a little bit. And we are aware of the potential for that happening.

And I am pleased with what I have seen in that effort. I believe it is soon going to be briefed to the Secretary of Defense and that subsequent to that Congress would be briefed as well. But I am comfortable in my ability to defend the country from the current limited ballistic missile threats that I am charged with defending against.

I would echo your comments on the CR. That has some definite potential for slowing things down for General O'Reilly to include delays in component testing, delays in Navy ballistic missile defense ship modernization.

It delays some of the testing that we would like to do. It will delay the construction of Missile Field 2 in Fort Greely, and so on down the line. So if we can get beyond the CRs, I would be with you in that regard.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir.

Well, let me——

General Fraser, forgive me. I am going to skip over here and talk to Admiral Stavridis, if I could.

Recent evidence, Admiral, has emerged that the Iranian regime has released a video that suggests that they may escalate hostilities in an effort to fulfill this prophecy of Mahdi. And that includes, of course, destroying Israel and conquering Jerusalem.

And I understand that the X-Band Missile Defense Radar System there in Israel now is obviously interconnected with our U.S. theater missile defenses and that we have fire control. But I am

concerned that the budget constraints will prevent these systems from effectively mitigating on Iranian threats to the region.

So I guess the question here is how confident are you that our current missile defense network in that region can effectively mitigate an Iranian threat that seems to be increasing or even escalating? And what do you believe needs to be done additionally to ensure that we can protect key U.S. interests, including the State of Israel, from such a threat?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I do believe that as we look at the emerging ballistic missile threat from Iran and from other actors both in that region and elsewhere around the world, it is a threat for which we must be very mindful.

The cooperation we have with Israel in that regard is strong, and I believe it will continue. I had a chance to go see a missile defense exercise a year ago. I am going to another one this summer. It is a capability we work very closely on.

The good news is we are now bringing online, as you know, the European phased adaptive approach, and I will send you some material for the record that will cover that part of my answer. Thank you, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 179.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to begin with Admiral Winnefeld. In reading your testimony, I was taken by the reference to the National Guard. In our Readiness Subcommittee, we had talked about the National Guard sort of enhancing the forces when we get to the end strength issues.

You specifically mentioned that you have 40 as part of U.S. NORTHCOM. And I am also curious, given the fact that we have the issues of, of course, Article 10 and Title 32, how is it that you are able to do that? Because they are being utilized, or appear to be utilized, for issues regarding, really, our own defense, and there is, of course, as you know, through the Constitution and various other laws, that there are restrictions on what the military can do.

So if you can explain to me, because this is something that I have been very curious about, as we talked about it in Readiness, as to how do we get the National Guard working with the military.

And it is also interesting, because, you know, you are Navy and, of course, you don't really have any of that, and they are under the control of the governors and not Congress or the military. So if you could educate me on that, I would appreciate it.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sure. First of all, I want to stress that I am just very, very pleased with the relationship that I have with the National Guard, both personally with my counterpart, General Craig McKinley, and the adjutants general of the 54 states and territories and Washington, D.C. They are good friends. We are very close partners, and I think it is a very good news story.

I am also very pleased and proud with the dependence that I have on the National Guard for things that may surprise you. My missile defense trigger-pullers are all National Guardsmen from

Colorado or Alaska, tremendous capability in the air sovereignty alert piece with the Air Guard. And it goes on and on.

So it is important that I have National Guard representation in my headquarters, both culturally, technically, so we properly understand our relationship with the Guard and don't stray outside the lines while we use them. And the Guardsmen that are in my headquarters tend to be on Title 10 ADOS [Active Duty for Operational Support], that sort of thing.

And so we, obviously, have a raft of lawyers that make sure we are doing this properly and legally and that sort of thing and that they are associated in general with National Guard-related issues, which is where the legality comes in.

And I not only have, I think, it is 45 of them in my headquarters, but on any given day temporarily coming to the headquarters to do work and that sort of thing, I might have upwards of 100. And I am very proud of that fact.

It has really helped our headquarters in our understanding of our missions, many missions we have, and in particular the way that we would support the states in the wake of a disaster, working through FEMA. So I think it is a very good news story.

Ms. HANABUSA. Well, as an attorney, I have never heard of attorneys playing a critical role to keep people on.

Admiral WINNEFELD. We have 10,000 of them in the Department of Defense.

Ms. HANABUSA. Along the same lines, Admiral, you also mentioned the concept of transnational criminal organizations as a major focus. And I guess that has also triggered the interest in the National Guard component as well, because, you know, we don't usually traditionally view the military as somebody engaging transnational criminal, or TCOs, as you say.

Can you also explain to me how that is interfacing with the National Guard, if it does at all, because that seems to be more of a local state issue than a military one?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sure, that is a very good question. And in general, first, I would say that anything that we do regarding transnational criminal organizations, whether it be domestically or in support of our Mexican partners, is always in support of civilian agencies, in particular law enforcement. We don't take on any of those roles ourselves.

On the U.S. side of the border, we give considerable support on the active duty side using JTF North to our law enforcement partners, in particular Customs and Border Protection and ICE [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement] and those sorts of things.

When it comes to the National Guard and the recent deployment of National Guard to the border, that is completely outside of my responsibility, in the sense that they are brought under Title 32 active status. They work for the state governors in that status.

And by virtue of the fact that they are in Title 32, technically they can do law enforcement operations, although I don't believe they are. They are typically doing entry identification team support to the Border Patrol and that sort of thing.

So I have no command-and-control authority whatsoever over the National Guardsmen who have been sent to the border. I watch it,

of course. I keep in touch with my Guard partners on how it is going.

Ms. HANABUSA. But they are an integral part of your TCO operations?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The National Guardsmen who are deployed to the borders are not part of my counter TCO operations. They really work for the state governors and in turn work closely with the Customs and Border Protection team.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all three of you for your service to our country.

Admiral Stavridis, if I am saying it right, the Government Accountability Office has criticized EUCOM—European Command—and U.S. Army-Europe for its cost assessments regarding options for retaining four brigade combat teams in Europe, saying the analyses were, quote-unquote—“poorly documented, limited in scope and based on questionable assumptions.”

What have you done to correct this problem? Do you agree with the GAO [Government Accountability Office]? Will retention of three or four brigade combat teams in Europe add significant infrastructure sustainment costs? And what are the cost implications?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, this is an area in which there has been a great deal of analysis going both ways. And I would say that, first of all, I will provide you—because it is detailed and technical, and I would like to come back to you on the record and provide that in some measured way to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 180.]

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As a general proposition, I think over the last year we have become much closer in the way we viewed this as between Department of Army, EUCOM, GAO and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense], because OSD has really stepped up and led the study that the chairman asked me about earlier. So as a result of that study coming out, I think you will have an opportunity to see that we have brought this analysis together in a way that is sensible.

The root of the question is always, do you save money or do you spend more money when you forward deploy troops from CONUS [the Continental United States] or from a forward European Command platform, if you will? And so there has been some back and forth between the entities you mentioned, Congressman, in regard to everything from cost of shipping to moving, we would say, from fort to port and port to fort forward.

So I would say over the last year we have brought that analysis together, and it is reflected in the report that will come out shortly, and I will get you more of the technical detail and provide it to you.

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me ask a quick follow-up question in regard to that. If forces based in Europe are not committed to combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in your opinion, how many brigade combat teams should be forward-based in Europe?



Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I think that it is difficult to answer that question. And I would point here to the Libya operation, in the sense of we never know what is going to pop up. And, obviously, we are not sending ground troops to Libya. That is very clear. However, it is indicative of the potential for emergence of new tasking.

So the analysis that we have provided to the Department of Defense reflects the potential for change in the world. And the change can be good as we transition in Afghanistan and reduce it, and the change can potentially be bad, if we see an emergent mission somewhere.

Mr. COFFMAN. And do you believe that the operation right now in Libya has the appropriate force mix between U.S. and coalition forces?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do. And I would say that we today in NATO took over the mission, and we are reducing the U.S. component of it measurably. And I think you will see our allies increasingly engaged, and that is appropriate.

And the mix of forces is sea and air forces, since we are not going to use ground troops there. And certainly that is good, in the sense that it is different than the forces that we need in Afghanistan, a landlocked country. So I believe we are adequately resourced at the moment at NATO, and I believe that the balance between U.S. and coalition is appropriate.

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me just say one word for the record that the President said in his speech, I think, on Monday night that it took 8 years to do regime change in Iraq. Actually, it took 3 weeks to do regime change in Iraq. It took 8 years in the aftermath of that regime change, given the fact that there was then a humanitarian catastrophe and sectarian warfare that dragged the U.S. into it for 8 years.

General Fraser, could you speak a little bit about China and its growing influence in Latin America?

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman.

Today I see it primarily in the diplomatic and the commercial realm, really, and a two-way street, if you will. Many of the countries and nations within Latin America and the Caribbean are reaching out to China as they see that as an economic opportunity for them as well as China coming in and working within Latin America.

Outside of Asia, Latin America is the second destination for Chinese investment.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question for Admiral Winnefeld. Actually, I would like to make a statement, and I want to thank my colleague from Hawaii for bringing up the National Guard. We are, indeed, very proud of our National Guard in Guam. And I think if my statistics are right that, per capita, we have the largest number of National Guardsmen in the United States.

Is that correct?

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is a very good question. Because Guam lies outside of my area of responsibility, I have not paid attention. But I will certainly look into that for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 179.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, Congressman Wilson was with me when we heard those statistics.

Also, having just returned from a CODEL [Congressional Delegation] with Congressman Wilson and other members of the Armed Services Committee, we were shocked during a country briefing to hear that over 1 million people are addicted to drugs in Afghanistan. Is that a figure you have heard?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can take that question.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, ma'am, that is accurate. I will give you another one. In Russia today there are 1.5 million people addicted to heroin.

So this is part of this supply chain of poppy to opium to heroin that is moving largely from Afghanistan through the region and contributing to deleterious effects in corruption, in human cost, as you allude to, a very great challenge.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, we were truly shocked at some of the numbers that we heard.

Also, Admiral, I would like to ask you, you have often discussed the most effective method to national security is a whole-of-government approach.

You mentioned your efforts in great detail in your posture statement. Would you please describe to us what you have learned from this approach and if you still believe that this is the best path forward?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do believe in this very turbulent 21st century that we need to bring all elements of national capability together to solve security challenges, because so many of them are transnational, nontraditional problems that direct military activity will not solve.

We have to have Department of State, AID and Defense, the so-called three Ds, working together—defense, diplomacy and development. And I believe it is actually much larger than those three agencies.

We have talked a lot today about many other government agencies, from the Drug Enforcement Administration to the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] to the Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Department of Homeland Security, obviously.

We have to bring all of these elements of capability together to bear against the challenges that we have all talked about today, because they go across borders, they are nontraditional. And I believe that is a very important aspect of our security going forward.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I think my colleagues would agree with me, during our recent CODEL, we did find that, working together, all of these agencies were very important to our success.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much.

And I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.

And, gentlemen, it really is an honor to have you all here today. And, to Admiral Stavridis, I understand that we have transitioned the combat theater of operations to NATO control right now. My question is this. And having been on some NATO missions, I know that lots of times that CJMD, the combined joint manning document, lots of times has to be picked up ad hoc to be filled. So my question is, what percentage of the CJMD are we finding that the United States is going to have to fill with the NATO C-2 [Command and Control]?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. A couple of answers to that, and, first, Congressman, thank you for your service, as well.

Mr. WEST. Not a problem.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And obviously spent some time in NATO.

I would say that let us start with the command structure itself. Today the command elements are an Italian CAOC [Combined Air and Space Operations Center] and their operation center in Poggio Renatico, commanded by an Italian one-star. There is a three-star Italian admiral who is in charge of the arms embargo at Maritime Component Command-Naples; in Izmir, Turkey, the Air Component Command Center, headed by a three-star American with a three-star French deputy. And that flows up to the three-star Canadian general, who is heading up the joint task force embedded in Joint Forces Command-Naples.

Of that command structure, to pick one number, for example—but it is an important one—would be flag and general officers. In all of those entities, there are about 40 admirals and generals. Only five will be from the United States. The rest will be alliance officers.

Throughout the operation, I think the balance will be somewhere around 50–50 as we move forward. Over the last week or so, taking strike sorties as an example, they have been balanced about 50–50 between the alliance and the United States.

And then, finally, to take a third example, I think that we will see over the next couple of weeks as we move into this, we will see the strike part of this and the aviation combat air patrol will be filled largely by the allies, and the United States will shift to enablers—things like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, refueling, CSAR, combat search and rescue.

So I think the balance feels about right in terms of alliance, and I am confident that we will be able to fill the CJMD, CJSOR [Combined Joint Statement of Requirements] appropriately as we go forward.

Mr. WEST. Have you found yourself having to switch hats back and forth to task yourself as the EUCOM commander to—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is actually no, because the big change over the last 5 years was the stand-up of U.S. Africa Command. As you very well recall, Africa and Europe used to be part of one enormous combatant command, and I think the department very wisely, with the support of Congress, stood up Africa Command. So it really has been a transition from a U.S. commander, Carter Ham, General

Carter Ham, over to me as the NATO commander, and that is in progress today.

Mr. WEST. Very well.

To General Fraser and Admiral Winnefeld, first of all, thanks, and it is great to see both of you again.

General Fraser, it was great that your staff hosted me down there at your headquarters—a very beautiful, pristine headquarters and a very functional headquarters.

One of the concerns I have is—we have discussed before—with the TCOs. But we also do have a radical Islamic threat that we are starting to see—Central America, South America, and even creeping into Mexico.

We discussed while we were at your headquarters these new mini-submersibles that we are starting to see. Of course, today those mini-submersibles could be used by the TCOs for drugs, but what could they possibly be used for in the future?

When I go to the Border Patrol Web site, I see this category called “OTMs,” which stands for “Other Than Mexicans.” And I am sure every one of us know who fits into that category. So my big concern is, are we starting to see the age-old maxim of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”?

Is there an alliance that is somewhat growing in your two respective AORs between these TCOs and some of these radical Islamic non-state, non-uniformed belligerents? And how are we tracking it?

General FRASER. Congressman, thank you for that question.

There is a lot of complexity to the relations of the TCOs within the region. And even though extremist organizations are involved in illicit activity, I have not seen a connection between those two groups as they conduct their own illicit activities.

The one connection that we see growing is the area we term “special interest aliens,” and those are individuals coming from other parts outside of Latin America, who have and use the illicit trafficking routes within Latin America for entry into the United States. We are just seeing connections there. That is not necessarily connected to extremist organizations, but we are continuing to watch.

Mr. WEST. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. If you could give it to him for the record, that would be appreciated.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 180.]

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to follow up on a couple of things that you have touched on. The chairman began by asking about force structure in Europe and the study that is going on. But I think a lot of us here at home question about why we have so many military folks still in Europe.

And you touched briefly on the cost aspect of this. But can you discuss a little bit the operational advantages to having forces deployed in Europe should they be needed in a Libya-like situation or elsewhere in the Middle East or North Africa? How big a deal is that, to have those forces that far in advance?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think it is a very important advantage having our forces forward in Europe. As I mentioned, we have come down a long way since the Cold War, appropriately, from 400,000 down to about 80,000 today. Those 80,000 I think contribute in at least three very distinct and obvious ways.

You touched on the first, which is geography. I think that as we look forward into this turbulent 21st century, I think the possibility of continuing U.S. engagement forward in the region in which we are involved today is fairly high. And as a result, having forces that are forward gives us geographic immediacy in terms of response.

And with Libya, for example, the U.S. Air Force, which is still very strong in Europe, had jets, helicopters, refuelers all based there that could immediately be chopped to Africa Command and be on-station. So I think that first advantage of geography is very crucial.

A second one is that interaction of our troops with all of the European partners, where we learn from each other. And I think that is an advantage that we tend to overlook at times. But being able to operate so frequently together in so many different places in and around Europe, including our crown jewel training range, Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr in Germany, as well as the new bases in the east, is a second real advantage—that kind of continuous engagement.

And then thirdly, the presence of the United States there is what encourages our allies to come forward and operate with us. Because we operate with them, we live with them, it creates an environment in which we can generate 45,000 non-U.S. troops for Afghanistan. We can generate today—for example, off of Libya, there are 40 ships operating, only about 12 from the United States, the rest from our European allies. Why is that? Because we are embedded with them and operate with them.

So I would say geography, mutual training and the benefits of that, and finally the ability to leverage these forces forward are three very strong advantages.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me ask you about one other thing. You mentioned today NATO takes over the Libyan operation. Are the rules of engagement clear? I think we all assume that if an airplane gets up in the sky, a Libyan airplane, it will be shot down. If a tank moves, it seems like the tank is taken out. But it is not clear to me, if there are a group of Libyan government soldiers massing together, what our reaction is to that.

And so I guess my question is, are the rules of engagement clear? What can you tell us about them? And in a NATO context, are they determined by the least common denominator? Or who sets them?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Terrific question. I think we should probably not discuss specifics of rules of engagement because of classification. I will provide you the actual rules of engagement.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 177.]

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And I think you will be struck as you see how similar they are to U.S. normal unilateral rules of engagement in format, in style, and in fact in intent and use of terminology,

anywhere from “hostile act” to “hostile intent” to “penetration of technical area,” et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

And this goes back to your previous question of an advantage. We have worked together so long with these allies that we are fairly close in our tactics, techniques, procedures and, yes, our rules of engagement.

In terms of how they are generated, they come up from the operators. The first set of rules of engagement were generated from the operational commander, who is heading this operation down in Naples. They come into my headquarters. They are very carefully vetted by my operational international NATO team. And then they go up to the North Atlantic Council, and they are approved there. All that flowed very smoothly in this process.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gibson.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank the distinguished panelists for being here and also for your leadership for our servicemen and women.

I guess first a comment, and it is conveyed with the deepest and most profound respect for my colleagues and the panelists. But, you know, on the issue of the forward presence and some of the virtues that have been put forward today, I guess it would be precisely my point that I am concerned about us being forever or aggressively being involved in operations overseas.

I have opposed the actions in Libya. I think we have so much on the plate right now that we need to do to bring closure with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan. We are certainly involved in a global challenge from extremist networks that are designed to protect our cherished way of life.

And as we bring those operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to a closure and look to perfect and to neutralize, perfect our counterterrorism operations and neutralize the extremist threats and learn from the past, I don’t want to see us get involved, as much as I am empathetic with those who want to live free.

So I guess I would respectfully disagree that we get added benefit from forward presence. And when asked that we consider the fact that while these are worthy goals—reassurance, deterrence, training and engaging in operations—I am not convinced that that must be so with forward presence. I think you can also do these things using joint exercises going forward. I just wanted to make that comment.

The question I have is actually for Admiral Winnefeld, and I must say right up front that I am critical of some of the expansions in our federal government over the last decade as it relates to protecting our way of life. I just wanted to say that up front because I am going to ask you the question with regard to the whole-of-government, Department of Defense, Northern Command and Department of Homeland Security.

Can you perhaps provide some clarity on unity of effort? Who is in charge with regard to border security, counterterrorism operations here, cyber defense and response to natural disaster? Who is in charge?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Thank you for your question, sir.

First, I would say that we have a very good whole-of-government synergistic relationship with our various partners inside the federal government, to include the Department of Homeland Security and also inside DOD [the Department of Defense]. In general, I find myself, unless I am pulling the trigger for a ballistic missile defense or some sort of air-breathing threat to North America, that most of what I do is in support of my partners.

So in the event of a disaster, for example, there are capabilities that the Department of Defense can bring to bear that we would use other places as well, potentially overseas in a contingency or something like that, that are either very specific capabilities that are in short supply among our partners inside government, or they are capacities—just sheer numbers of people that can respond to a disaster, who are well trained, disciplined, you know, as your experience in the military would probably inform you, where we can assist our partners.

And we have very carefully drawn rules and limitations and processes and procedures by which we provide that support. So my very good partner in the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Craig Fugate, is in the lead in the federal response to a disaster in support of the various states. If he needs my support, he will—there is a process in place—the Stafford Act, Economy Act, where he can provide a mission assignment to me, and we will respond according to the Secretary of Defense's willingness to do that. So that is just one small example.

Regarding the cyber piece, I would, of course, defer to Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command in that regard, but they have struck a very good relationship with Department of Homeland Security in terms of what the way ahead is for supporting this country in the event of a cyber attack that could be fairly debilitating.

So I would want to assure you that we do have minimal redundancies, that we have appropriate procedures and rules in place where we can work closely together as a whole-of-government.

Mr. GIBSON. I appreciate the comments and know that every day you are giving everything you have to protect us, and we are just incredibly proud. I would just say that I think that there were other ways that we could have aligned our organizations that I think would have been more effective, but for now I will just yield back. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you.

General Fraser, you mentioned earlier with respect to Mr. Coffman's comments relevant to China's activities in Venezuela, and clearly the numbers show that it is commercial, but in your statement you talk about military arms sales to Venezuela, Russian. They had portable weapons, automatic weapons, the AK-47 deal they made with Chavez and also, I guess, sales to Bolivia.

Can you talk to us somewhat about our visibility as to what Chavez is doing with respect to those relationships? Fold into that the Iranian work and Russian work with Chavez in terms of at least talking about a nuclear power program within Venezuela and how

that might morph into something else that is more threatening to us than just his bluster.

Interesting comment made the other day about wanting, I guess, Venezuelans to eat less every day to reduce their caloric intake. I didn't realize that was such a strategic threat to Venezuela, but maybe it is, to talk about how he is—give me some thoughts about the military aspects of what China and Russia are doing in Venezuela and South America in general.

General FRASER. Thank you very much for that question, Congressman. If I look broadly across the region and look at China, it is very much focused on commercial and diplomatic efforts. They do have military programs not just with Venezuela, but with many of the countries in the region, where they are inviting individuals to come attend courses within China.

They are also looking to establish closer military-to-military relationships with partners in the region. And they are beginning to sell more weapons, the K-8. It is a light attack aircraft and a trainer that they are selling to Venezuela and that Bolivia is also looking at right now. I still see it very much in a commercial and diplomatic and in a business aspect.

Russia, I still see again very much focused in arms and also working to address both commercial and diplomatic efforts.

Do we have a lot of visibility? I don't have a lot of visibility into what all those agreements are. I see a number of agreements made. Those agreements tend to take a long time to come to fruition.

Specifically to your question on Iran and the issue with nuclear power, there was an agreement that Venezuela and Iran signed, but subsequent to the concerns in Japan over the Fukushima reactor site, at least the statements from President Chavez are that he has put a hold on any future development of nuclear power.

Mr. CONAWAY. We have had a change in the presidency in Colombia. You mentioned the great work the Colombians did led by their courageous President Uribe. Now with Santos do you see any changes in their focus on what successes Colombia has had with Plan Colombia and our involvement with the new Santos-led government?

General FRASER. I see President Santos continuing the great work that President Uribe did, and expanding it. He has reestablished diplomatic relations with Venezuela as well as Ecuador, and there are growing military as well as commercial and other relationships there. Across all his borders, he is working to expand that.

If you look within Colombia itself beyond Plan Colombia, it is now a consolidation plan, and he is even looking to put in place a broader plan, a \$240 billion effort over 4 years to expand the Colombian government's presence throughout the region.

In addition to that, he is reaching out beyond Colombia. He is helping support the Mexican military with training some helicopter pilots. He is involved in Central America. He is looking to see where they can provide their lessons to other partners and share their experiences.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General FRASER. So it is a very positive effort.



Mr. CONAWAY. The requirements—on page 22 of your statement, you talk about the needs that you have. Specific needs include manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, light detection and ranging technology, a variety of things. Does the 2012 budget request support acquisition of these capabilities for Southern Command?

General FRASER. These are capabilities that are existing broadly across the Department of Defense, so they are continuing to progress and provide those capabilities. And then we will work on a year-to-year basis on where the concerns and where their priorities are within the department to—

Mr. CONAWAY. So your 2012 budget request gives you access—I mean, these aren't new, but they give you the proper access to deploy these things in your AOR adequately.

General FRASER. As we look across the globe and you look at all the concerns that we have around the globe, within their priorities and within the concerns that we have, I have adequate access to those types of capability.

Is there opportunity for more? Yes, sir. But if we put it in context, I am comfortable with where we are.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

Thanks, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral Stavridis, General Fraser, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you, each of you, for the job you are doing. Please convey our thanks. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, all of us, I am sure, would ask you to convey our thanks to those that you command for the great job that they are doing. And thank you for your time here today.

This committee will now be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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# **A P P E N D I X**

MARCH 30, 2011

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 30, 2011

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**Statement of Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-California)**  
**House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests**  
**for U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, and**  
**U.S. Northern Command**  
**March 30, 2011**

Good morning. I am pleased to welcome Admiral James Stavridis, commander of U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe; General Douglas Fraser, commander of U.S. Southern Command; and Admiral James Winnefeld, commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service to our nation and thank you for joining us today.

Before we move to the matters at hand, I want to briefly address the big issue that is foremost in my mind and I’m sure in the minds of my colleagues: Libya. The President has an obligation to clearly explain to Congress and the American people what his Administration’s objectives and strategy are for our operations in Libya. He fulfilled this obligation in part on Monday night, but the full House will not have an opportunity to be briefed until this afternoon—twelve days after the start of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. This

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committee will follow that up with a hearing tomorrow focused on Libya, with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.

Admiral Stavridis, in his role as NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is intimately involved in the campaign against the Qaddafi regime, particularly as command of the operation transitions to NATO. Admiral, we are certainly interested in your views, particularly as NATO assumes command of the military mission today, but I plan on reserving my questions on operations in Libya—and there are many—for this afternoon’s briefing and tomorrow’s hearing.

Moving to the reason we are here today, Admiral Stavridis, I am concerned that the Administration will seek to remove one or more Army Brigade Combat Teams—or BCTs—from Europe for the sake of “efficiencies” that neglect the operational importance of their mission. I also want to highlight my concerns regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Missile defense is becoming a critical component of our relationship to our European allies, and we must ensure EUCOM has the resources and flexibility to implement a robust defense.

Moving to SOUTHCOM, General Fraser, in my mind the illicit trafficking threat is the greatest challenge we face in your geographic



area of responsibility. It is also—I should add—one that requires close collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the table from NORTHCOM, as well as your interagency partners. General Fraser, your written statement highlights opportunities and challenges resulting from the activities of extra-regional actors in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. China, Russia, and Iran have been very active in Latin America, through arms sales, personnel exchanges, investments, and trade deals. In addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region are very troubling. The committee would benefit from your assessment of trends in the activities and influence of foreign actors in the western hemisphere.

Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is one of the foremost national security challenges directly impacting the U.S. homeland, and we need to treat it as such. I laud the heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and public officials, who—make no mistake—are risking their lives and the lives of their families in a war against these brutal criminal enterprises. We need to support these heroes in their fight—while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico. I look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress being made by Mexican authorities, and what NORTHCOM is doing to support them and build their capacity and capabilities.

Finally, the FY2011 Continuing Resolution has resulted in the Missile Defense Agency spending \$324 million less than it anticipated for this fiscal year. Next fiscal year's request reduces the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program by another \$185 million. These are sizeable cuts, and we must understand how these cuts impact homeland missile defense effectiveness, modernization, operations, and development.

Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us today.

**Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-Washington)**  
**House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests**  
**for U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, and**  
**U.S. Northern Command**  
**March 30, 2011**

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming Admiral Winnefeld, General Fraser, and Admiral Stavridis. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for your respective commands.

In no specific order, I would like to engage in a discussion about the challenges all of the commands here today face and what Congress can do to support your efforts.

First, let me address U.S. European Command. The U.S. European Command remains an essential part of U.S. and international security. Admiral Stavridis, I realize much of your attention has been focused on addressing the situation in Libya. While our Committee will hear in more detail about operations in Libya tomorrow, I'd like to hear more specifically today about the European Command's key contribution to this effort, what you expect in the weeks and months ahead, and about EUCOM's partnership with NATO in this context.

I am also interested in your assessment of EUCOM's contribution to the war in Afghanistan, and how it might evolve in the next few years as the President prepares to withdraw troops.

Looking beyond U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Libya, the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran remain among the gravest threats to U.S. and international security. In this context, the initial phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe (EPAA) begins this year. I'd like your thoughts on what the planned implementation of the EPAA means in terms of requirements and necessary resources for EUCOM.

Last, I'd like to hear your insights regarding two key countries, Russia and Turkey. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, EUCOM plays a critical role in preserving stability in Europe and strengthening cooperation with Russia. EUCOM is also uniquely placed to help identify what role Turkey plays in terms of regional and international security challenges, and to help manage the US-Turkey relationship. I look forward to discussing this.

Next, I look forward to hearing from General Fraser regarding your important issues at SOUTHCOM. We had a good meeting earlier this month and I want to hear more about your thoughts on the non-traditional threats in the region, the rising violence and instability in

Central America, our military-to-military cooperation in the area, and your counternarcotics duties.

I am particularly concerned about the instability in the region around Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras and your thoughts on how to apply the lessons we have learned in Colombia and Mexico to these countries. Please let us know the resources you require regarding all these issues. I am going to Guantanamo Bay soon and appreciate the efforts we are making to continue the safe, humane, and transparent treatment of the detainees. Resolving the future status of the Guantanamo detainees remains a priority for me.

Last but not least, is NORTHCOM. I look forward to hearing about progress on countering threats on our Southern border, and how we are working with Mexico to address these threats. We focus a lot of our attention on the Southern border but I'd also like to hear your views on some of the challenges on our Northern land borders.

I'd also like to hear your thoughts about what global warming and increased access to the Arctic mean for national security, how NORTHCOM, in partnership with EUCOM, is addressing this challenge and whether you have the resources you need.

Again, thank you all for your time and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

TESTIMONY OF

ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, UNITED STATES NAVY  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
BEFORE THE 112TH CONGRESS, 2011



*United States*  
**European Command**  
*"Stronger Together"*



*INTRODUCTION*

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to share with you the successes achieved and the challenges being faced by the men and women of both the United States European Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Allied Command Operations since I last appeared before you. I have now been at the helm of these Commands for almost two years and am happy to report we continue to make progress and develop stronger partnerships for our shared security. The most important activities and initiatives contained in these pages are those in which we work together with our allies and partners to build capacity to ensure U.S. security in the European theater and, thus, defend our homeland forward.

The United States and Europe are inextricably linked—politically as allies and partners in diplomacy. Additionally, the European Union and U.S. economies account for about half the global economy. The two economies are interdependent to a high degree. The United States and the European Union are each other's top trading partners. In 2009, the European Union exported \$280 billion in goods to the United States, and imported \$220 billion in goods from the United States.

The most important ties for our command, of course, are those between our militaries. U.S. military traditions grew out of European ones. We have learned from each other, often in



*European immigrants entering the U.S. through Ellis Island*

the demanding circumstances of combat, and we have consistently found ways to become partners and then allies. For the greater part of a century, U.S. soldiers have shared battlefields with their European counterparts – from the Argonne Forest to the sands of Normandy to the mountains of Afghanistan. With respect to mutual and global security perspectives, Europeans are superb partners.



### ***MISSION & VISION***

The mission of the U.S. European Command is to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward.

We strive to be an agile security organization able to conduct full spectrum activities as part of whole of government solutions to secure enduring stability in Europe and Eurasia.

- Our area of focus covers roughly one-fifth of the planet, including all of Europe, large portions of Asia, parts of the Middle East and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans.
- We are responsible for U.S. military relations with NATO and 51 countries on two continents with a total population of close to one billion people.
- We direct the operation of more than 80,000 military personnel across 10.7 million square miles of land and 13 million square miles of ocean.
- We are responsible for maintaining the quality of life, including health care and schools, for approximately 130,000 Department of Defense family members living in Europe.

## **European Command**

### **Mission**

U.S. European Command conducts military operations, international military engagement and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the homeland forward.

### **Vision**

An agile security organization with a “whole of government” approach seeking to support enduring stability and peace in Europe and Eurasia.

### **Themes**

- Ready forces provide regional security.
- Mutual security challenges require cooperative solutions.
- EUCOM is committed to enduring partnerships.

### **Motto**

***“Stronger Together”***

### *Progress*

U.S. European Command has achieved progress through proactive initiatives and by responding to challenges and opportunities that arose over the past year.

*European Command's Support to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.* European Command's activities to support ISAF operations are extensive and effective. At any given time, approximately 80% of the non-U.S. countries deployed to Afghanistan are from the European theater. EUCOM's support to ISAF is largely focused on preparing these partner nations for deployment to Afghanistan. This includes dispatching mobile planning teams to assess partner nation equipment and training requirements and working with the country to develop a comprehensive pre-deployment plan.

These requirements may include provision of equipment such as up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAP), and pre-deployment training to counter improvised explosive devices, build Observer Mentor Liaison Teams, and provide Expeditionary Intelligence Training courses tailored to the complex Afghan counterinsurgency environment. The Command also works closely with our partner nations to fill critical National Training Mission-Afghanistan training requirements.




*Combat training for Afghan National Security Forces*

In quantitative terms, since I last appeared before this committee, European Command has dispatched over 20 mobile planning teams and conducted three Observer Mentor Liaison Team rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, which included 16 countries and 1,045 personnel and conducted eight Expeditionary Intelligence Training courses in which we have trained 230 personnel from



*International Security Assistance Force non-commissioned officers (NCO) raise their right hands and repeat the charge of the NCO during an NCO induction ceremony in Afghanistan*

14 countries. We have also trained over 1,860 soldiers from 15 countries to counter the threats posed by improvised explosive devices, and trained two Polish Brigades and two Georgian battalions for deployment to Afghanistan. On the logistics side, we have moved 487 tons of



*U.S. Army Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team get ready to engage enemy combatants*

equipment through Europe to Afghanistan over the Northern Distribution Network. In FY10, we coordinated use of the Department of Defense Lift and Sustain Program to provide non-reimbursable air and sealift to move 14,897 passengers and 4,206 tons of cargo for 13 contributing nations, who would have otherwise been unable to move equipment and personnel to Afghanistan. Also, we are able to support partner movements through our active involvement in two major European military transportation consortiums. U.S. European Command also coordinates and schedules the United States' allocation of 1,000 flight hours in

the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), comprised of three cooperatively shared Hungarian registered and certified C-17 aircraft.

*Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Training.* A growth area for European Command this fiscal year is counter-improvised explosive device training, where we plan to train as many as 5,000 partner nation soldiers during this fiscal year.

*Assuring Access.* U.S. European Command plays a critical role in assuring that the United States continues to enjoy access within and beyond European Command's area of focus. Our mature basing footprint includes several locations that are used in support of U.S. Transportation Command's en-route strategy which has proven to be vital in supporting recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Well-established relationships with partner nations further complement our access capability.

*Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises.* The most intensive form of peacetime interaction with our allies and partners occurs in the conduct of joint exercises. European Command maintained a robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program last year, executing 33 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S., allied, and partner nation personnel from 40 nations. The exercises focused on preparing partner nations for ongoing coalition operations including the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, enhancing NATO interoperability, and improving our military capability and interoperability with Israel.

*Exercises in the Baltics, Balkans, and Caucasus.* In support of NATO, European Command provided forces for nine NATO and NATO Partnership for Peace events in the Baltics. United States Naval Forces Europe also executed Exercise BALTIC OPERATIONS, a long-standing multinational maritime exercise which included 12 nations focused on maritime interdiction

and amphibious interoperability. Addressing the Balkans, two major exercises, IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 10 and COMBINED ENDEAVOR 10, bolstered partner capabilities and eased regional tensions. Of particular note, European Command conducted JACKAL STONE 10, a Field Training Exercise in Poland and numerous other locations throughout the world, in cooperation with Special Operations Command. This event involved more than seven nations and approximately 1,100 partner nation Special Operation Forces personnel. JACKAL STONE, along with other Special Operations exercises and Joint Combined Exchange Training events in over 25 countries, directly supports U.S. and partner Special Operations Forces' readiness and capabilities for U.S., NATO, and European Union missions ranging from counter terrorism to high-intensity conflict.

*ARCTIC ZEPHYR.* ARCTIC ZEPHYR is a multi-phased exercise, convening initially as a table-top event and projected ultimately to culminate in a multinational search-and-rescue field exercise. In support of U.S. policy and strategy on Arctic issues, the long term goals of ARCTIC ZEPHYR are to maintain an understanding of the legal, commercial, and political ramifications of the changing Arctic environment and to strengthen relationships with other Arctic nations. This is one of the areas where European Command finds common ground and opportunities for cooperation with Russia.

*AUSTERE CHALLENGE.* U.S. European Command Headquarters continues to successfully execute the AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise series, the premier joint force headquarters exercise in the European theater. AUSTERE CHALLENGE 10 forged ahead into new territory when it expanded to train two Joint Task Force Headquarters simultaneously while incorporating a French-led Joint Force Air Component as well as French and Polish

Brigade Headquarters response cells, all firsts in European theater training. The benefits of combined, multiple Joint Task Force exercises are clear: challenge the Headquarters and component staffs; reinforce the U.S. position of seeking multi-national solutions; train as we fight; and identify the strengths and limitations of U.S. and coalition interoperability capabilities.

A major advance during AUSTERE CHALLENGE 10 was the establishment of an enduring computer network for future training events and real world operations. European Command planners identified and established the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System as the most capable network for expansion to support Coalition Task Force operations with NATO partners. More importantly, this system is being used at the Joint Multinational Training Center at Grafenwoehr, Germany, by U.S. and coalition forces preparing for deployment to Afghanistan.

AUSTERE CHALLENGE 11 will venture back into the full spectrum, major combat operations arena. Participation will expand outside the theater and there will be a heavy focus on operating in the challenging cyberspace. The 34th Infantry Division Headquarters, from the Minnesota Army National Guard, will provide the Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander, and French and Polish Land Forces will participate for a second year to operate as Mechanized Brigade Headquarters response cells. We continue building partner capacity by soliciting participation from partner nations around the European theater.

*COMBINED ENDEAVOR.* During COMBINED ENDEAVOR 10, our premier communications and electronics interoperability exercise, delegates came together from 40 nations (24 NATO and 16 Partnership for Peace countries) to strengthen partnerships, increase communication interoperability, and enhance the capabilities and capacities of partner nations.



*American and Italian technicians work to establish network connections during exercise Combined Endeavor 2010*

This marked COMBINED ENDEAVOR's 16th year building partnerships and featured the participation of Iraq and Afghanistan as observer nations. Both nations committed to increased involvement and a dedication to interoperability between their national forces and NATO/Partnership for Peace nations.

COMBINED ENDEAVOR continues to build bridges across Europe and Eurasia and supported the preparation of coalition forces for regional and global operations. In particular, Canada and the United Kingdom tested and trained on the command and control systems they will be using during their upcoming deployments to Afghanistan, and validated operational functionality and interoperability with the same partners with whom they will operate downrange.

Additionally, two new training events were incorporated into COMBINED ENDEAVOR. CYBER ENDEAVOR leveraged the 102d Information Warfare Squadron, from the Rhode Island Air National Guard, to focus on improving the information assurance competencies and network defenses of our European partners, while SHAPE held Exercise STEADFAST COBALT to focus on command, control, communications, and computers in preparation for NATO Response Force deployment and to maximize interoperability with other European nations.

**FLEXIBLE LEADER.** This year's FLEXIBLE LEADER table-top exercise and senior leader seminar leveraged lessons learned from the Haitian earthquake disaster, and helped validate newly revised plans which European Command planners have written for comparable contingencies. Extensive representation was present from several U.S. Embassy staffs, other U.S.

government agencies, and European Command's Service components. FLEXIBLE LEADER highlighted the extensive work and progress that has been accomplished in foreign consequence management and humanitarian assistance planning, and also identified many courses of action that will improve European Command's ability to respond to a crisis situation quickly and effectively.

*Patriots to Poland.* As stated in the August 2008 Declaration on Strategic Cooperation, and in an effort to strengthen the important strategic partnership between the Republic of Poland and the United States, the U.S. performs quarterly rotations of Patriot Batteries to Poland, enhancing U.S.-Poland air and missile defense cooperation. These rotations continue to familiarize Polish Armed Forces with the Patriot Missile System and have permitted U.S. Forces to share related tactics, techniques, and procedures on missile defense. Of benefit to both U.S. and Polish forces, U.S. Patriot crews have improved their individual tasks and crew drills including operations during deployment, rail activities, and missile transport, storage, and security. Since May 2010, there have been three rotations to Poland for training and exercise purposes only. Although initially focused on one location—Morąg, Poland—the last rotation took place in Toruń, Poland. A fourth deployment is currently underway.

*State Partnership Program.* The State Partnership Program accounts for 45% of European Command's military-to-military engagement. Founded in 1993, the State Partnership Program was originally designed to link National Guard states and territories with former Soviet bloc countries for the purpose of fostering mutual interests and establishing long-term relationships across all levels of society. European Command currently benefits from twenty-one partnerships, we are currently finalizing the protocols for a State Partnership Program with Kosovo, and there





*Hungarian army Sgt. Major Laszlo Pasztercsak instructs U.S. Army Sgt. Mika Putz, of Bismarck, N.D., in the use of the AK63D rifle during a State Partnership Program multinational marksmanship event at Camp Bondsteel*

is potential for one or two more partnerships over the next couple years. The true value of this program is the enduring relationships that have been built over time, as many of European Command's state partnerships are approaching their twenty-year anniversaries. Perhaps the greatest example of how critical these relationships are is that, in 2010, National Guard personnel deployed to Afghanistan

together with five partner nations as members of Observer Mentor Liaison Teams and other forces training and fighting side-by-side.

**European Command Organization.** U.S. European Command Headquarters takes a "whole of society" approach to maintaining security and stability while shaping existing structures to adjust to the security environment. These changes will be accompanied by a 15% manpower reduction as we eliminate lower priority missions and identify missions in which European Command can prudently accept additional risk. At the same time, we are increasing emphasis on emerging mission sets such as ballistic missile defense, military partnering, counter-trafficking, and cyberspace. To further embrace a "whole of society" approach to the security environment, the Command is expanding its J9 directorate to focus on interagency partnering and the use of whole of government/society solutions to strategic challenges. Additionally, European Command has internally resourced a J7 directorate to provide independent assessments and analyses of strategic and operational processes and products. The Command has also internally resourced a Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC)-Europe to focus on the critical counter-trafficking mission across the theater.

We have also established a Military Partnering Center of Excellence to accelerate our efforts to expand the Command's international military partnering engagement activities. The Center will be a virtual, web-based partnering hub for U.S. and European partners to share best practices and lessons learned through military partnering collaboration, networking, and information sharing. The Center will reside on a public web portal linked to existing Department of Defense centers of excellence, most notably the Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, as well as to educational and partnering organizations like the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. We plan to have the Center fully operational by Summer 2011.

*Russia Fire Fighting.* U.S. European Command also continues to stand ready to provide theater-wide rapid response capabilities for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response missions. This past August, under conditions of severe drought and in the midst of one of the hottest summers on record, a series of destructive wildfires broke out across Russia, prompting President Medvedev to declare a state of emergency in several areas. In response to Russia's request, and in coordination with the U.S. Department of State, EUCOM planners, logisticians, and airmen rapidly identified and airlifted over 36 tons of valuable firefighting supplies and equipment on four U.S. Air Forces in Europe C-130 cargo aircraft to assist Russia in their emergent response to this destructive event. It is precisely this kind of rapid and agile response capability—to a neighboring nation in need—that illustrates the "Smart Power" combination of military capacity and in-stride diplomacy uniquely available to the nation's leadership from its overseas Combatant Commands.

*Israel Fire Fighting.* Similarly, this past December, a series of wildfires broke out across Israel threatening to engulf lives, homes, critical infrastructure, and valuable natural resources. At Israel's request, and in coordination with the State Department, European Command planners, logisticians, and operators rapidly dispatched five C-130 cargo planes loaded with 60 tons of critical fire-retardant materials necessary to extinguish the blaze. This effort—led by U.S. Air Forces in Europe—played an important role in the international response to Israel in its time of need, and supported our enduring mission to support and promote regional stability and security. It serves as yet another example of our ability to work together to support each other in times of crisis, demonstrating the value of cooperation among neighbors, allies, and partners, as well as the enduring strength of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

*Efficiencies.* While striving to achieve our mission and vision, we are very mindful of today's economic realities. This is why, in support of the Secretary of Defense Efficiencies Initiative, European Command has taken concrete steps to streamline our operations and move toward a more efficient and effective organization. The Command will retain traditional J-staff codes because of their applicability across the Defense Department. However, we are also executing an internal staff rebalance without incurring any growth and leading to a 15% decrease in required manning and budget. We have been taking a close look at all permanent billets and essential mission sets to ensure proper alignment and distribution of resources, and are actively seeking areas where efficiencies may be gained.

*"We must find ways to operate government more efficiently and at a lower cost to taxpayers. Secretary Gates understands the tough economic and fiscal situation facing our nation and I support his efforts in doing everything possible to make every tax-payer dollar count."*

*Sen. John McCain, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on DOD efficiencies initiatives, September 2010*

We have focused our mission sets to accommodate our envisioned security environment, based on an analysis of strategic guidance, to include the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Global Employment of the Force. Areas in which we believe we can harvest efficiencies, either through the focusing of missions or by willingness to prudently accept increased mission risk include: personnel management; General/Flag Officer and Senior Executive Service numbers and seniority; General/Flag Officer support; information technology; experimentation; planning, programming, and budgeting system participation; intelligence support; and logistics support. All decisions will be made with careful consideration of their effect on mission readiness.

*EUCOM Components*

Except when conducting joint operations or participating in joint exercises, European Command forces are assigned to, trained, and equipped by our Service-specific headquarters. U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR), U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provide the forces for all military-to-military engagements with our partner nations, provide a deterrence function in the region, and serve as deployable units for contingency operations. Understanding these commands is the key to understanding European Command, as they conduct the majority of our day-to-day activities.



*U.S. Army in Europe*  
*Heidelberg, Germany*

*Introduction and Overview.* With 42,000 active-duty and reserve service members operating from six enduring Army communities, the U.S. Army in Europe serves as the key coordinator of activities by theater-assigned and rotational ground forces. The integration of these forces across the full spectrum of operations places responsibilities on the Army in Europe ranging from the tactical and operational to the strategic level. With V Corps' intermediate tactical headquarters capability deployed in support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts in Afghanistan, the Army in Europe directly oversees capacity building activities throughout European Command's area of focus, including efforts in support of U.S. Africa Command. It also maintains critical logistical lead component duties in support of NATO's Kosovo operations. The Army in Europe translates strategic directives from the Command and the Department of the Army into executable tactical orders for subordinate units, including planning for and executing key tasks in support of our European partners and Israel.

Under these circumstances, the Army in Europe provides key tactical and operational forces, to include full spectrum combat units and strategic enablers, for global employment. As the U.S. military land component provider on the continent, the Army in Europe leads the ground effort in building partner capacity in support of global requirements. These efforts continue to be instrumental in supporting the ISAF Commander's requirement for improving the effectiveness of coalition ground force deployments, by training and preparing U.S. and European forces for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

*Major Accomplishments.* With over 25% of its assigned forces deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army in Europe continued to support the Secretary of Defense's commitment to improving the capacity of coalition partners and allies by conducting a robust training and exercise program designed to build partner capacity and increase coalition interoperability.

*Building Partner Capacity.* In 2010, the Army in Europe provided 755 soldiers from ten nations with life-saving drivers' training on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. It trained an additional 422 soldiers from nine nations to counter improvised explosive devices. Supporting U.S. national security objectives, this training enabled the Command to prepare full-spectrum capable forces for global employment while improving partners' and allies' survivability and effectiveness during deployments. Additionally, in support of the ISAF Commander's top priority to train Afghan soldiers and police, the Army in Europe trained 50 Operational Mentor-Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Police Mentor-Liaison Teams (POMLT) for deployment to Afghanistan.

Critically, the U.S. Army in Europe has worked to advance defense institutional transformation. One example of this was its assistance to Romania in the development of the country's tactical, operational, and strategic military doctrine. The Army in Europe also promoted U.S./partner interoperability through its joint exercises and exchange programs, recently having conducted leader exchange programs with Israel in the areas of aviation, ground maneuver, training, reconnaissance, and military intelligence. Additionally, the Army in Europe enhanced capacity for maintaining regional stability—evidenced by its support to Poland—executing the first three Patriots-to-Poland rotations.



*Croatian and Minnesota National Guard soldiers prepare to clear a room during an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team training exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center*

Both on and off the continent, the Army in Europe planned for and exercised ground capabilities to support key NATO partners and Israel in defending against potential threats. It has worked with Israel to significantly improve their ballistic missile early warning capability and has enhanced bilateral air and missile defense training exercises in coordination with

our partner. In addition to this assurance to allies and deterrence of potential aggressors, its ability to provide foreign consequence management and foreign humanitarian assistance ensured that the Army in Europe was, and continues to remain, prepared to support the United States' Article IV and V commitments to our NATO partners. Finally, as part of the larger U.S. efforts to reset our relations with Russia, U.S. Army in Europe included Russian military leaders as observers for three major exercises.

*Exercises.* Exercises continue to enhance the pre-deployment training of U.S. and coalition forces for current contingency operations, and serve to prepare these same forces for future coalition operations. This past year, the U.S. Army in Europe participated in 21 major exercises (including three mission rehearsal exercises) conducted in 11 countries with 28 participating nations. Among these exercises was JUNIPER FALCON 11, an Israeli-led Joint Task Force-level exercise focused on improving Israeli Defense Force command and control and logistical capacity. Supporting America's continuing partnership with Turkey, COOPERATIVE RESOLVE 10 was a battalion-level Command Post Exercise conducted in Turkey meant to



enhance interoperability. As a final highlight, RAPID TRIDENT 10 was a peacekeeping exercise involving 16 countries conducted in Ukraine to support its NATO interoperability goals through NATO's Annual National Program.

*Humanitarian Assistance.* As part of our Humanitarian Assistance program, the Command also provided enabling support to U.S. Africa Command for MEDFLAG 10, a medical skills exchange exercise conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo by U.S. and African militaries.

*Way Ahead.* The U.S. Army in Europe will provide combat power to support global operations while at the same time continuing to build partner capacity. Together, these efforts will help advance the long-term process of defense institutional transformation of U.S. partners and allies. As the Army in Europe trains and prepares for deployment alongside coalition partners in the coming year, it will continue to foster the residual effects of increased training effectiveness among friendly militaries—from improvement in counterinsurgency operations and incorporation of interagency concerns, to the updating of U.S./NATO interoperability doctrine. Specifically, in support of the President's introduction of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the U.S. Army in Europe will train with and provide assistance to European forces to ensure their ability to defend against ballistic missile threats. As part of a separate mission, the U.S. Army in Europe will provide similar assistance to Israel through bilateral agreements. As a whole, the engagements by the Army in Europe will continue to focus on improving relations, enhancing interoperability, focusing on mission success of both in- and out-of-area operations, and ensuring access to facilities and infrastructure throughout the theater.

*"Where possible, our strategy is to employ indirect approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces."*

*Secretary of Defense Robert Gates*

***Marine Forces Europe***  
***Stuttgart, Germany***

***Introduction and Overview.*** In 2010, Marine Forces Europe, with approximately 150 personnel assigned, focused on building partner capacity through combined activities and utilizing expeditionary forces to reassure allies, deter potential adversaries, and remain ready to respond rapidly to crises in the region. The U.S. Marine Corps' expeditionary nature drives Marine Forces Europe to a primary orientation on security cooperation activities with our newest NATO allies and partners in the Caucasus, Black Sea, Balkan, and Baltic regions.

***Major Accomplishments.*** With only a small service component headquarters, Marine Forces Europe very effectively leveraged the capabilities of the Marine Corps in support of European Command objectives. Marine Forces Europe's activities focused on building partner capacity to contribute to collective security in Europe and out-of-area operations, such as support to the International Security Assistance Force, through targeted security cooperation and combined exercises.

***Building Partner Capacity.*** Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force: This U.S. Marine Corps-led joint program is successfully training and deploying Georgian infantry battalions to fight alongside NATO forces in the volatile Helmand Province in Afghanistan. Through an intense partnering concept with the Marines, the Georgian Armed Forces have significantly increased their institutional capacity to plan and conduct training for units preparing to operate in a full spectrum counter-insurgency environment.


***USMC Black Sea Rotational Force:*** During the summer of 2009, the U.S. Marine Corps provided a Special Purpose Marine Air—Ground Task Force to conduct security cooperation in support of European Command's theater objectives. Forward deployed and operating out of the temporary Task Force East facilities at MK Airfield in Romania and the Novo Selo Training

Area in Bulgaria, the Black Sea Rotational Force conducted numerous and diverse targeted multi-national security cooperation activities with 12 partner and allied nations in the Black Sea, Balkans, and Caucasus regions to enhance partner military capabilities, expand U.S. and NATO access to strategic regions, and promote regional stability.

*Exercises.* In 2010, Marine Forces Europe, in coordination with U.S. Naval Forces Europe, effectively reassured allies and deterred potential adversaries by exercising combined maritime expeditionary capabilities and improving European Command's and NATO's ability to rapidly deploy and assemble expeditionary forces in the region during several historic exercises. In total, Marine Forces Europe participated in 13 exercises to include joint, multilateral, and bilateral exercises in 2010.

COLD RESPONSE 10 was a Norwegian-hosted 14-nation exercise conducted north of the Arctic Circle and focused on maritime/amphibious operations and interoperability. U.S. Marines, under the Tactical Control of the United Kingdom's 45 Commando Battalion of the Royal Marines and embarked on Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship Johan De Witt, participated in a brigade-sized beach assault.

As part of BALTIC OPERATIONS 10, U.S. Marine and U.S. Navy forces, along with our Baltic State allies, conducted both a Maritime-Prepositioning Force offload and onward movement of combat equipment in Ventspils, Latvia, and a combined amphibious landing in Estonia during this European Command-sponsored Partnership for Peace Exercise. The overwhelmingly positive response



*U.S. Marines amphibious assault vehicles embarked aboard the USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) depart the well deck during the start of a simulated amphibious assault. The combined U.S., Estonian amphibious landing was part of a demonstration of the interoperability between the two forces.*

by our Baltic allies once again validated the unique and critical role of Maritime-Prepositioning Forces' ability to rapidly respond to crises and support our allies.

*Humanitarian Assistance.* As part of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program—Norway, Marine Forces Europe works with the Norwegian Defense Staff, European Command, and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, to develop and refine plans that enhance access to prepositioned equipment ashore for U.S./NATO operations and crisis response, Theater Security Cooperation, and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief.

*Way Ahead.* Although it achieved successes with its current force posture, Marine Forces Europe will continue to seek greater Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit presence to satisfy the consistent demand by global core partners such as the United Kingdom and France for bilateral combined-arms and amphibious training. This type of training has largely been absent in the European Command theater since 2003. Resuming a sustained presence in the European Command region would serve to deter adversaries and assure allies and partners of our commitment to stability in Europe.

Marine Forces Europe will continue to build partner capacity in theater through ongoing support to the Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force and the Black Sea Rotational Force, deploying in 2011 to support scheduled engagement and security cooperation activities with 14 partner nations. The Black Sea Rotational Force is expanding its activities to include preparing partner nations for deployment to Afghanistan and conducting Non-Commissioned Officer development.

***U.S. Naval Forces Europe***  
*Naples, Italy*

*Introduction and Overview.* With approximately 8,000 active-duty and reserve services members operating from four main installations supporting rotational air, surface, submarine and expeditionary forces, U.S. Naval Forces Europe conducts the full range of maritime operations and Theater Security Cooperation in concert with NATO, coalition, joint, interagency and other partners in Europe. Naval Forces Europe continues to perform Navy Component Commander functions which support day-to-day fleet operations and Joint Maritime Commander/Joint Task Force Commander missions in support of European Command. Its presence not only strengthens relationships with enduring allies, it also develops maritime capabilities with emerging partners, particularly in the European Command's southern and eastern regions. Naval Forces Europe is enhancing maritime security in these regions through the development of maritime domain awareness, trained professionals, maritime infrastructure, response capabilities, regional integration, and a comprehensive approach for planning and execution.

*Major Accomplishments.* In 2010, Naval Forces Europe met all warfighter mission requirements and maintained certification as Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, Europe. Additionally, the component focused energy and resources on Theater Security Cooperation activities to enhance interoperability between allies and the maritime capabilities of partner nations. These activities developed partner capacity through multiple events, exercises, and operations in order to promote maritime domain awareness, security, and sea control. Always ready to respond to crises in the European theater, Naval Forces Europe also contributed to global efforts, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and anti-piracy operations off the coast

of Africa by delivering trained forces, strengthening international relations, and increasing the efficiency of our interactions with our allies and partners.

*Theater Submarine Operations.* The stable presence and patrolling of U.S. Submarine Forces in the European theater defends U.S. national security forward, even as it enhances the security of our allies and key partners. Our submariners are engaging in vital missions that contribute directly to European Command's core missions of transatlantic security and building partnership capacity. U.S. submariners have fully leveraged deployment time in theater, honing their skills and contributing to the Command's capacity to conduct critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, undersea dominance, close proximity strike, high-value unit protection, and free and unfettered access to the vital sea lines of communication. In building our partners' capacity, European Command has also facilitated the participation of Allied submarines, submariners, and associated staff in a vigorous series of theater Anti-Submarine Warfare exercises with U.S. submarines, exercises that all parties have leveraged to improve their warfighting proficiency and – importantly – their interoperability.

These factors and opportunities are increasingly important as we observe a highly capable Russian submarine fleet whose pace, scope, and sophistication have risen dramatically in recent years. The Russian Navy has four new classes of submarines in development or near delivery. The next-generation KILO-class submarine—the ST. PETERSBURG class—is nearing completion. Available for export, it represents a significant improvement in both capability and quieting. The European Command area of focus is also the stage for the most sensitive Russian submarine operations and advanced weapons testing. Just this past October, Russian submarines



*Members of the visit, board, search, and seizure team from the guided-missile destroyer USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) return to Forrest Sherman after participating in a boarding training exercise during BALTOPS OPERATIONS*

successfully fired three submarine-launched ballistic missiles over a period of two days. These operations reveal a renewed Russian focus on the undersea arena.

*Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.* Naval Forces Europe expanded European Command's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in support of allies through Operation NOMAD SHADOW, Operation SPRING OFFENSIVE, and the first-ever ship-based Unmanned Aerial Vehicle missions in the Black Sea. It also expanded the capability of naval bases in Rota, Spain, and Sigonella, Italy, to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in support of both the European

and Africa Commands.

*Building Partner Capacity.* Partnership and security cooperation events conducted by Naval Forces Europe include:

*Eurasia Partnership Capstone.* Naval Forces Europe's flagship initiative throughout the Black and Caspian Sea regions was designed to integrate disparate regional efforts by all maritime partners into a global maritime partnership for Eurasia. This year's October event drew 110 senior enlisted and junior officer attendees from nine partner nations: Azerbaijan; Bulgaria; Georgia; Greece; Lithuania; Malta; Poland; Romania; and Ukraine. Courses were held at the Maltese Navy Training Facilities. Topics included: maritime interdiction operations; visit, board, search, and seizure procedures; search and rescue procedures; maritime law; and environmental protection.

USNS GRAPPLE. In August, a Navy auxiliary salvage ship and embedded Mobile Diving and Salvage Company removed and scuttled six sunken and decaying patrol boats in Sarandë, Albania. These boats were towed to another location near the harbor and used to make an artificial reef, which is expected to boost the local economy through tourism. More importantly, the pier at the auxiliary naval base is now clear and can be handed over for use by the local fishing fleet, reducing unnecessary defense overhead involved with support of this area.

*Exercises.* In 2010, Naval Forces Europe participated in nine Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises and numerous NATO and European Command exercises. BALTIC OPERATIONS 10 involved 11 European and NATO nations (including Russia), 32 ships, 200 vehicles, and over 3,000 personnel across a 1,000-square kilometer operating area in the Baltic Sea region. This annual exercise promotes mutual understanding, cooperation, confidence, and interoperability among forces and personnel of participating nations. SEA BREEZE 10 was co-hosted by Ukraine and the United States, involving 11 European nations, 24 ships, 13 aircraft, and over 2000 personnel across the Black Sea and Ukraine. This exercise enhanced the maritime capability of Black Sea and Partnership for Peace nations by exercising collective maritime safety, security, and stability actions. BREEZE 10 was co-hosted by the Bulgarian Navy, involved six European nations, and culminated in the NATO Response Force certification of Bulgarian and Romanian ships.

*Humanitarian Assistance.* Naval Forces Europe provided platforms, personnel, and resources to support Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief for Russian wildfires, the Ethiopian Airlines crash off the coast of Lebanon, and flooding in Portugal and Albania. The U.S. Navy routinely provides foreign humanitarian assistance in times of crisis, in cooperation and collaboration with many nations around the world.




*Way Ahead.* While responding to crises in the European theater will take precedence over all other activities in 2011, Naval Forces Europe will also continue to build the maritime capacity of our allies, as well as new and emerging partners in a cost-effective and responsible manner with the desire of advancing all parties toward full interoperability and participation with our forces. Naval Forces Europe will continue to improve information assurance and cyber system security of Command and Control/Information Systems. Interoperability with NATO Allies and achievement of NATO standards by new NATO partners, including preparing STRIKFORNATO for the NATO Response Force 2012 rotation, will be important goals. The ballistic missile defense capability, both afloat and ashore, will continue to develop and expand. Our forces will focus on the priorities of maritime safety, security, cooperation, and crisis response with the overall goal of advancing U.S. interests in the region.

***U.S. Air Forces in Europe***  
***Ramstein Air Base, Germany***

*Introduction and Overview.* With just under 26,000 active-duty, guard, and reserve service members operating from five main operating bases supporting nine wings and many geographically separated locations, U.S. Air Forces in Europe is a key force provider of forward-based, full-spectrum airpower in support of European Command and Defense Department objectives. This posture enables simultaneous support to ongoing global operations, ensures global strategic access, assures allies, deters aggression, and remains the key to building partnerships.

*Major Accomplishments.* During 2010, Air Forces in Europe supported ongoing contingency operations and worked daily with our NATO allies and partners to ensure security in the European theater and defend our homeland forward. Supporting contingency operations, 2,800 Air Forces in Europe personnel were deployed at any given time throughout 2010. In Afghanistan, our fighters flew 23,500 combat hours, representing 39% of the total U.S. Air Force fighter hours flown. In addition, one of two Control and Reporting Centers assigned to Air Forces in Europe was continuously deployed, providing constant air battle management and control. We contributed vital data links for world-wide communications, unmanned aerial system command and control, intelligence collection, and space operations. U.S. Air Forces in Europe supported the treatment and movement of over 12,000 patients to and from Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Finally, Air Forces in Europe continued to maintain critical en route infrastructure. This system of bases supported global air operations to three geographic combatant command theaters and smooth transit of over two-thirds of air mobility missions.

Supporting contingency operations at the same rate as U.S.-based forces, Air Forces in Europe simultaneously conducted European Command operational requirements. In addition



*A Polish Air Force F-16 receives fuel from a US Air Force KC-135 over the skies of Latvia during a NATO Baltic Air Sovereignty Training event*

to flying Combat Air Patrols in support of NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission, Air Forces in Europe continue to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in the greater Levant region, as well as participate in the Georgia Deployment Program.

In support of the Phased Adaptive

Approach for Missile Defense in Europe, U.S.

Air Forces in Europe led a U.S. and NATO

Ballistic Missile Defense Task Force. This Task Force developed a concept of operations which significantly contributed to NATO's recent decision to adopt this critical mission. U.S. Air Forces in Europe began laying the foundation for ballistic missile defense integrated command and control architecture in line with NATO Summit agreements, and led U.S. and NATO data-sharing integration efforts, which resulted in the development of clear strategic ballistic missile defense requirements and a demonstrated capability to exchange information between U.S. and NATO systems.

***Building Partner Capacity.*** When not supporting combat operations, U.S. Air Forces in Europe units serve in a permanent role of building partnerships and partner capacity. In 2010, Air Forces in Europe conducted 767 building partnership engagements with 39 participant nations. Two-thirds of these events contributed to partner interoperability for Afghanistan

operations. Nearly 100 events in the Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania focused on interoperability of NATO standards and equipment. As a result, these particular events fostered effective mobility operations and ensured strategic access to ranges, airspace, and airfields.

In Poland, Air Forces in Europe units helped develop capability to deploy and employ Polish F-16 and C-130 aircraft. Air Forces in Europe conducted numerous tactical exchanges with Polish F-16 and C-130 pilots, providing training in all manner of combat and air mobility operations. As a result of these efforts, the Polish Air Force is advancing towards its goal of passing its first NATO Tactical Evaluation in 2011.

In Romania, U.S. Air Forces in Europe units assisted Romanian units across the full spectrum of air mobility operations. Both nations jointly exercised tactics and procedures to improve airfield planning and operations, combat search and rescue, and aircrew management procedures to improve Romanian air capabilities. As a result, the Romanian military is now a self-deployable force using its C-130s to move to, and conduct operations in, Afghanistan.

Our engagement efforts also highlight the intrinsic value of non-commissioned officer development. Each of our in-country engagements highlights the need for empowered junior officers and non-commissioned officers, who serve as the backbone of effective military operations.

These efforts serve to improve the defensive development of our allies and partners, and directly improve interoperability of forces engaged in combat. U.S. Air Forces in Europe trained with 28 nations to provide over 100 Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, highly-trained Airmen providing the key link between airborne assets and supported ground combat units. As a result, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers from 15 nations now fight alongside their American

counterparts in Afghanistan. Furthermore, training at U.S. Air Forces in Europe's Warrior Preparation Center provides tangible and continued assurance of the U.S. commitment to allied security while developing capabilities actively employed in International Security Assistance Force operations.

*Exercises.* In 2010, U.S. Air Forces in Europe participated in 60 Joint Chiefs of Staff, NATO, and European Command exercises. Ten nations, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine, exercised to develop peace support operations, provide medical training, and foster interoperability. Likewise, 40 nations from North America, Europe, and the Middle East exercised to improve computer network and communication capabilities necessary for effective responses to natural disasters. During Exercise BRILLIANT ARDENT, 60 aircraft from six nations, operating from bases in Germany, the Czech Republic, France, Poland, and the United Kingdom, validated the responsiveness and capabilities of the NATO Response Force.

*Humanitarian Assistance.* U.S. Air Forces in Europe answered the call for assistance several times in 2010 with humanitarian airlift. This summer, we delivered over 36 tons of equipment to fight wildfires in Russia. In December, we airlifted 60 tons of fire retardant materials for wildfire relief near Haifa, Israel. In one of our building partnership capacity success stories, the Heavy Airlift Wing at Papa Air Base, Hungary, executed several humanitarian relief missions. During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, Heavy Airlift Wing C-17s delivered 34 Swedish aid workers and 135 tons of aid to Haiti. In July, following the devastating flooding in Pakistan, the Heavy Airlift Wing delivered over 42 tons of medical supplies to Karachi, Pakistan. In April, the Wing repatriated the remains of the victims from the Polish air tragedy near Smolensk, Russia. Through continued training and commitment, the 12 nations of the C-17 Heavy Airlift Wing flew over 2,800 mishap-free hours in its second year of existence.

*Way Ahead.* As we move forward into 2011, U.S. Air Forces in Europe will continue its focus on operating efficiently and effectively, maximizing its strategic location to support current operations while simultaneously expanding its building partnership portfolio. The Command will continue to support the President's Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe. Working closely with NATO, Air Forces in Europe will deliver an Operational Level Concept, develop requirements for effective information sharing with allies, and establish the necessary venues for effective education and training in this mission area critical for the security of the United States, our allies, and partners.

*U.S. Special Operations Command Europe*  
*Stuttgart, Germany*

*Introduction and Overview.* Special Operations Command Europe is a joint command comprised of more than 1,500 active-duty and reserve personnel operating from two main forward-deployed locations: Stuttgart, Germany and Mildenhall, England. It has three assigned components: 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne); Naval Special Warfare Unit-2; and the 352d Special Operations Group. Special Operations Command Europe continues to contribute significantly to the development of partner special operations forces and stands ready to defend against transnational threats and rapidly respond to unforeseen contingencies within the European theater.

*Major Accomplishments.* In 2010, Special Operations Command Europe remained heavily engaged, conducting 25 joint combined exchange training events, six bilateral training activities, 46 Partnership Development Program events, and two bilateral counter-narcoterrorism training events. The Command augmented this effort with numerous key leader engagements and staff visits to further develop partner special operations forces' organizational, institutional, and staff capabilities. Finally, Special Operations Command Europe deployed special operations forces company-sized elements to both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as smaller Joint Planning and Advisory Teams and staff augmentation to support partner special operations forces in Afghanistan. Focus areas for 2010 included building partnerships, supporting operations in Afghanistan, and countering transnational threats, all of which directly support European Command's core mission of international military and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the homeland forward.

*Building Partner Capacity.* The Command's effort to build partnerships focused on enhancing allied and partner special operations forces' interoperability and validating capabilities through the Partner Development Program and multilateral special operations exercises. The Partner Development Program is focused on training partner and allied special operations forces in military assistance operations and is a proven strategy for building the capacity of allied and partner special operations forces capacity, primarily for the International Security Assistance Force. With adequate sustainment, it will also provide long-term special operations forces' capacity for future conflicts and out-of-area operations. Since its inception in 2007, and its initial funding as a program of record in 2009, European special operations forces' participation in the International Security Assistance Force has increased nearly 500%. Poland, Romania, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic have increased their investment and commitment of special operations forces in Afghanistan with exceptional results. With military assistance being the primary special operations mission in Afghanistan today, and the continued focus on developing Afghan security forces, participation in this program will likely remain an important mission in the future.

Over the past year, the Partner Development Program has also focused on increasing collective special operations force rotary-wing aviation capacity among our allies and partners. Special operations force rotary-wing assets, deployed in support of the International Security Assistance Force, will continue to be a high-demand requirement for future contingency operations. Training allied and partner aircrews and helping to upgrade their airframes, such as the MI-17, is an efficient solution for increasing rotary-wing capacity and capability to



support contingency operations. For example, the cost to upgrade five MI-17s and train the crews and maintenance personnel to the basic standard required to support special operations forces is roughly equal to the cost of one new U.S. CH-47G helicopter, not including training or maintenance. Additional helicopter capacity is not only efficient; it also decreases the deaths and serious injuries caused by improvised explosive devices, by limiting road movements and increasing medical evacuation capacity. Thus, additional helicopter capacity could lead to potential increased troop contributions among these nations.

While successful, the Partner Development Program has not reached its full potential. The program is hampered by cumbersome resourcing processes. Lack of focused special operations forces resourcing to create a strategic capability makes it difficult to build enduring special operations forces capacity.

*Exercises.* Special Operations Command Europe supported the annual international theater-wide special operations forces capstone exercise, JACKAL STONE 10. This year's exercise was hosted by Poland and Lithuania and brought together approximately 1,100 special operations forces service members from seven nations: Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Latvia, Croatia, Romania, and the United States. As a key element of the Partnership Development Program, JACKAL STONE provides special operations forces the opportunity to train together and build mutual respect while sharing doctrinal concepts, training concepts, and various tactics, techniques, and procedures.



*Coalition special forces wait for the MH-47G Chinook to land so they can extract their high value target during the opening ceremony for Jackal Stone 10*

*Support Operations in Afghanistan.* Since 2007, Special Operations Command Europe has supported the International Security Assistance Force through the continued deployment of a U.S. Army Special Forces Company and three U.S. Navy SEAL Joint Planning and Advisory Teams, which deploy and operate with our partner special operations forces. We also continue to provide staff officers as rotational augmentees to the NATO Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell, a strategic element for building interoperability among partner special operations forces.

*Way Ahead.* Looking to 2011 and beyond, Special Operations Command Europe will continue to increase allied and partner special operations forces' capabilities and capacity, both on the ground and in the air. It will seek to increase strategic understanding and partnerships as the European Distributed Special Operations Forces Network develops. Special Operations Command Europe will also continue its close partnership with the NATO Special Operations Headquarters and its International Security Assistance Force partners. Support and enablement of International Security Assistance Force's special operations forces will continue to be a high priority, as will efforts to counter transnational threats in order to protect our homeland.

### *CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES*

In a theater as large and dynamic as U.S. European Command's, the opportunities to initiate positive change are abundant, as are the ways in which security can regress unless we remain alert and attentive to negative trends. Every challenge in the region presents an opportunity for engagement and cooperation.

*Afghanistan.* Of the 49 nations besides the United States that have contributed 45,000 forces to the International Security Assistance Force, approximately 80% of them (37 nations) come from the European theater. Together, these 37 nations have contributed nearly a third of the military personnel serving in Afghanistan. And they have suffered, with hundreds killed in action. Supporting the International Security Assistance Force has given European Command the opportunity to deepen its relationships with our allies and partners, using our expertise and experience to inculcate an expeditionary mindset and train deploying partner nation forces in irregular warfare.

The contributions and sacrifice of Eurasian and European nations in Afghanistan have demonstrated the credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness of our international military cooperation. The scale of allied and partner force contributions to the International Security Assistance Force has allowed the hand-over of significant responsibility for regional operations to coalition partners. NATO's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team program directly supports the development of the Afghan National Army, and the Police Operational Mentoring

*"Having Afghans lead these operations is the Taliban's worst nightmare, because it gives the lie to the Taliban propaganda that portrays Western troops as hostile occupiers. Afghans themselves will be more effective than our troops in winning the trust of the Afghan people."*

*Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, at the Council on Foreign Relations, October 2010*

and Liaison Teams program supports the expansion of the Afghan National Police. Under these programs, European allies and partners are currently providing approximately 50% of the number of teams required to train Afghanistan's security forces.

Additionally, at any point in time, there are approximately 10,000 U.S. personnel, assigned to European Command, that are deployed to Afghanistan making vital contributions on a daily basis. However, within the European theater itself, European Command's focus is to support other nations as they seek to contribute to security and stability efforts in Afghanistan.

Many nations are making particularly large force contributions and have suffered high casualty rates relative to their populations. Our partners understand the importance of this mission, and they are willing to send their sons and daughters in harm's way alongside our own to bring peace, security, and prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Within the European theater itself, European Command lends whatever support it can to these nations as they seek to contribute to security and stability efforts in Afghanistan. Within the framework of contributing to international efforts in Afghanistan, and within the boundaries and authorities set by law, regulation, and international agreements, this support involves providing training, equipment, logistical assistance, and personnel augmentation.


*The Balkans.* The United States' continuing support to NATO's Kosovo Force and Operation JOINT GUARDIAN helps maintain stability in Kosovo and advances security progress alongside our NATO and European Union partners. European Command has participated in NATO operations in Kosovo since 1999. European Command supports Kosovo Force through our land component, U.S. Army in Europe, and leverages National Guard Bureau forces to source mentors and advisors for Task Force Falcon (Multinational Task Force-East),

Regional Mentoring and Liaison Teams, NATO Training Teams, and elements of the Kosovo Force Headquarters, as well as to augment the Kosovo Force Military-Civilian Advisory Division. NATO presence was reduced from a peak of 14,000 in 1999 to 10,000 in January 2010, when it began reductions to a strength of 5,000. Kosovo remains stable and secure, as demonstrated in the peaceful conduct of elections in December 2010.

European Command has played a significant role in Bosnia's progress since the 1995 implementation of the Dayton Accords. At the height of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in 1996, more than 20,000 U.S. service members served in Bosnia. The September 2009 deactivation of Task Force Dayton, the last U.S. entity operating in Bosnia, marked a significant milestone for European Command. Less than forty U.S. personnel now remain in Bosnia assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo and the United States Balkans National Support Element. European Command continues building partnership capacity with Bosnia through focused security cooperation initiatives, to include International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and the State Partnership Program with Maryland's Army National Guard.

In a show of its increasing capacity, Bosnia assumed a key leadership role during European Command's 2009 COMBINED ENDEAVOR exercise, involving 40 countries and 1,200 personnel. European Command remains focused on Bosnia's defense reform efforts and its entry into NATO, so that Bosnia can finally prosper, contribute more fully to coalition operations, and complete its path to Euro-Atlantic integration. Due to progress made, Bosnia was able to consistently contribute to the coalition efforts in Iraq between 2005 and 2008, and now has over 50 personnel deployed to ISAF. Despite some remaining challenges, we have achieved quite a lot given what was happening in Bosnia just 15 years ago.

*Russia.* The complexities of establishing and maintaining a military-to-military relationship with Russia are many. On one hand, there are many areas of potential cooperation and partnership, including Afghanistan, arms control, counterterrorism, counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, and missile defense. Continued open dialogue can lead to additional opportunities for cooperation and openness, such as European Command's response to assist Russia during last year's wildfires. On the



*Admiral James Stavridis, SACEUR, during an Honor Guard Ceremony in Moscow, Russia.*

other hand, some of our allies and friends in the region remain concerned about Russian actions, including the conflict in Georgia in the summer of 2008 and Russia's continuing suspension of implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

Working with Russia is about balance and seeking to find the potential for cooperation, while maintaining an open and honest dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including where we disagree. While a great deal of engagement with Russia is handled by either the State Department, in the diplomatic realm; or directly by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we at European Command are ready to pursue military-to-military communication, engagement, and even joint training and operations with Russia, where and when appropriate.

In 2009, for example, European Command authored a framework document to resume military-to-military cooperation with Russia in an equal, pragmatic, transparent, and mutually beneficial manner. The framework not only addresses crisis response and consequence management operations, but also seeks to promote interaction and ensure mutual support in

conducting counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations; peacekeeping missions; ballistic missile defense; and search and rescue. This framework document, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of Defense at the 2009 Presidential Summit in Moscow, began to rebuild a structure for our bilateral defense



*Russian amphibious ship, the RFS Kaliningrad, sailing alongside the USS Mount Whitney as parts of the BALTIC OPERATIONS exercises in the Baltic Sea*

relationship that allows wide-ranging and candid engagement on all issues of concern. This effort is then supported by European Command's lead in developing the annual military-to-military work plan, which defines the events and activities that we aim to accomplish together over the next year.

In working the bilateral military-to-military relationship with Russia, however, European Command will work with NATO and other partners to implement an integrated and inclusive security cooperation architecture beneficial to all participants that does not come at the expense of our allies and partners.

*Israel.* The political/military environment in which Israel exists is volatile and uncertain. Israel faces frequently voiced threats from Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, and others in the region. Iran's aggressiveness and negative rhetoric could also pose serious security challenges to the region broadly, to the United States, and to other allies. In addition, conflicts such as the Lebanese conflict of 2006, the Gaza hostilities of 2008, or the cross-border shooting in August 2010 with Lebanon, could erupt at any moment. Conflict could result from instigation by Iran or its proxies, notably Hezbollah, or from miscalculation.

European Command's engagement with Israel continues to strengthen our relationship with this key regional ally. We conduct multiple Headquarters and Component-level theater security cooperation events annually with Israel and chair four bilateral, biennial conferences spanning planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability. The United States and Israel routinely conduct training exercises that build partnership and work toward regional stability. This exercise portfolio includes eight major recurring exercises. The continued success of the exercise program improves interoperability, understanding, and cooperation between the Israeli Defense Force and U.S. military forces. European Command leadership and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring, personal, and direct relationships with their counterparts in the Israel Defense Force.

*Turkey.* Turkey remains a strong ally and partner in the region and continues to grow in importance in the Middle East and Eurasia regions. Turkey will continue to play an important role in the fight against extremism, maintaining regional security and access, deterring common threats, and supporting NATO out-of-area operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo. As our presence in Iraq draws down, Turkey's concern with possible volatility on their border



*Ukrainian marine 1st and 2nd divisions stormed the beaches of Tenida island from amphibious assault ships and helicopters to simulate landing on an island over run by pirates during a combined and joint maritime exercise in the Black Sea*

may grow, driving them to play a larger role in regional stability. We have continued to develop new and productive ways to increase our engagement with Turkey in military-to-military areas, and as part of U.S. interagency efforts to help this important and centrally-located ally face the challenges posed by 21st century threats.



As part of that effort, Special Operations Command Europe continues to engage in a highly productive program of tactical exchanges and training events with Turkish Special Forces, and has focused part of this outreach program to develop, enhance, and convey lessons learned by U.S. Special Operations Forces over the past eight years in the effective fusion of intelligence, operations, and interagency coordination.

Also this year, European Command initiated Exercise COOPERATIVE RESOLVE, a new bilateral exercise between U.S. Army in Europe forces and Turkey Land Forces Command, focused at the battalion-level to share best practices and emerging concepts for command post operations, command and control functions, and other associated tactics, training, and procedures.

On another front, European Command's new Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC)-Europe, an information-sharing, internally-resourced collaborative enterprise, is working closely with our Turkish partners to assist and enhance the capabilities of Turkish agencies to combat illicit trafficking and terrorism, two often-interrelated and interdependent activities that threaten the security of our partners, our theater, and our homeland.

Finally, European Command continues its highly successful Turkish/U.S. officer exchange program in which each country selects a group of promising, young field-grade officers for travel and exposure to each other's military headquarters and facilities, building vital relationships on a personal level that will continue to pay dividends as these officers progress to higher ranks and greater levels of responsibility.

*Terrorism in Europe.* Our contribution to the ever-evolving fight against transnational and indigenous terrorism continues to be one focused on intelligence sharing and partner-building. Across Europe, the threat of terrorist attack and the presence of terrorist support networks remains a serious concern. Violent-minded extremists seek to exploit vulnerabilities to radicalize local populations and logistically support jihadist war-zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The European continent remains a priority target for directed attacks from al-Qaida and allied terrorist groups who believe that lethal attacks will weaken the resolve of our partner nations to continue supporting the International Security Assistance Force.

The terrorist attack in Stockholm on December 11, 2010 and the late-December arrests of terrorist suspects in the United Kingdom and Denmark, among others, are indicative of a continuing threat.

The threat from al-Qaida associated elements remains high, particularly in Germany, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. Notably a recent study by the Danish Institute for International Studies found that between 2004 and 2008, 84% of terrorists detained in Europe had a Western upbringing, and only 28% had links to foreign militant groups. This is indicative of the rise of “home-grown”, self-motivated terrorists who, despite their exposure to Western values, chose to learn jihad over the internet and act without direct guidance by al-Qaida senior leadership.

European countries continue to improve their capacity to counter the terrorist threat by strengthening counterterrorism legislation, expanding international cooperation, and successfully prosecuting and jailing terrorist actors. To support this progress, European Command increases intelligence sharing at every opportunity. For instance, one of our projects disseminates

evidence and information obtained by coalition allies on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan to International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) member countries' police forces worldwide in order to strengthen their counterterrorism efforts. This project has assisted investigations in more than 70 countries.

*Ballistic Missile Threat.* There is an existing and expanding threat from ballistic missiles to the European Command's area of focus. The continued development of missile technologies by states such as Iran and Syria, coupled with the transfer of rocket and missile capabilities and technologies to non-state actors such as Hizbollah, present the most significant combination of capability and intent into realized threat to European Command's interests in Europe and the Levant. Iran in particular, with its growing inventory of ballistic missiles, views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter, intimidate and retaliate against forces in the Middle East, Southeastern Europe, and Central Asia.

*Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).* Nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist or violent extremist would represent a grave threat to the United States and our allies. The threat of a deliberate attack with a biological weapon, or the spread of nuclear weapons programs are threats that have far-reaching, destabilizing consequences. Al-Qaida and other groups aspire to incorporate weapons of mass destruction into their attacks. Special nuclear materials and the majority of the world's nuclear weapons are located in the European Command area of focus.

To succeed in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their precursor materials, we must pursue a vigorous, comprehensive strategy sustained by a whole-of-government approach and strong international partnerships. The security of the weapons and

these materials is a significant aspect of the Command's efforts to counter WMD. We must support partner and allied efforts to build capacity that detects and interdicts the movement of WMD materials, facilitates information-sharing arrangements, and, if an attack occurs, ensures a swift effective response that includes consequence management. Recent concerns over attacks in Europe truly underscore the importance of working with our partners and allies to prevent a catastrophic attack involving weapons of mass destruction on their soil and our homeland.

*"Whether it is ensuring our capabilities for strategic missile defense, which provides assurance to allies and deterrence to adversaries, or making the necessary investments in defending against cyber attacks; we must be able to look towards the future and see likely security challenges that we will face and meet them head on."*

*Chairman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, House Committee on Armed Services*

**Cyber Security.** Cyber security is a vital function for European Command, and we have made progress in securing our part of cyberspace during the past year. We have joined the efforts of other combatant commands, including the leadership of the U.S. Strategic Command and its sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command is a great step forward for the Department and all combatant commands. We are exploring the paths to more closely fuse our internal efforts in cyberspace, and have named a Cyber Integrator on our Headquarters Staff to build on our established Cyber Fusion Center. As the number and sophistication of attempts to penetrate our network increase daily, we must continue to meet that threat with innovation and expertise because we cannot afford more manpower.

As we gain operational experience in cyberspace, we look for opportunities to provide bridges between industry, academia, government, and our military partners with the goal of increasing mutual awareness and security. There are many challenges in this new domain and

several of our friends throughout Europe have been the subject of cyber harassment (disruption of cyberspace functions) coincident with international disputes. As we look for answers and solutions to the evolving challenges in cyberspace, we synchronize frequently with our partners at various exercises and conferences, to include Exercise COMBINED ENDEAVOR 10, which brought together forty nations focused on enhancing common awareness, building common understanding, and developing operational trust, as well as a 2011 European Cyber Conference Symposium hosted at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. We have several other visits and exercises planned in 2011.

As we move forward, we are looking to leverage our existing European Union and NATO relationships in concert with the newly formed U.S. Cyber Command to increase our shared security. With NATO's desire to develop an infrastructure to meet the cyber security threat with a coordinated combined response, we are moving forward now to lay the groundwork for what we anticipate will be our role in this combined action.

*The Arctic.* The Arctic maritime domain is changing, and nations are responding by enacting policies to address anticipated challenges in the region. From environmental impacts to commercial enterprise, the prospect of unprecedented access to natural resources and Northern shipping routes has raised related security concerns. Promoting regional stability in the Arctic is European Command's primary objective for the Arctic. This is best accomplished through the use of open international forums to ensure stable, predictable management of the Arctic area.

In areas of safety, security, resource management, and conflict resolution, we support multinational governance and the international rule of law. Development of peaceful and successful maritime domain awareness is essential, not only to the security of the region, but



*U.S. Submarine surfacing in the Arctic*

also to the safety of the mariners, workers, and tourists who will populate this vast expanse.

European Command is committed to a future that includes collaboration with our partners, NATO members, and Russia on international search and rescue exercises, Arctic training, and transparent operations and diplomacy that fully

respect territorial claims.

Addressing environmental security in the Arctic region will require close cooperation with a wide range of Arctic stakeholders. Of particular note, we see Russia as a key potential partner in this area; one with substantial capabilities to respond to unforeseen emergencies and a clear willingness to protect the region from environmental disasters. We look forward to working with Russia and our other Arctic partners as we seek areas of mutual interest.

*Energy Security.* Our strategic national interests are served by fostering global economic development. A growing and open global economy enables the growth of the American economy, and that growth forms the backbone of our national security. Most of our major European partners are heavily dependent upon foreign energy sources for their oil and natural gas. This reliance can have a destabilizing effect on European economic development. Russia is one of the most important suppliers of crude oil and natural gas to Europe, accounting for 33% of oil imports and 40% of gas imports (87% for Italy; 81% for Spain; 61% for Germany; and 51% for France). Russia's energy leverage represents a key factor in European and Eurasian energy security. Europe will continue to need Russian energy, as supplies from Russia are useful

alternatives to reliance on the Persian Gulf for hydrocarbons and the pipeline infrastructure to transport it is already in place.

European Command supports State Department objectives regarding European energy security, and we work with our interagency partners, NATO allies, and partner nations to support these objectives: diversification of energy transportation routes in Europe; greater intra-Europe integration of existing supply systems; the development of new, renewable, and alternative energy sources in Eurasia; and demand-side efforts to promote energy efficiency. Within European Command, we are proposing a joint concept for energy security to achieve these same objectives, ensure access, and decrease vulnerabilities within our own forces. Our J9 Interagency Partnering Directorate continues to employ a whole-of-government approach to collaborate with our partners and like-minded allies to develop frameworks for addressing major energy security issues.

*"Our relationship with our European allies remains the cornerstone for U.S. engagement with the world and a catalyst for international action."*

*National Strategy, May 2010*

*INITIATIVES*

Effective pursuit of U.S., allied, and partner interests depends ultimately on our ability to innovate and find new and better ways of achieving our objectives.

*Support to NATO, especially in Afghanistan.* Today, European Command's largest contributions to support NATO lie in our efforts to train and equip partner nations to deploy alongside our own troops in Afghanistan. We have multiple lines of effort to support these activities.

*Joint Multi-National Readiness Center.* The Joint Multi-National Readiness Center supports European Command and Central Command operations by providing pre-deployment training to Europe-based U.S. forces and NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams slated for deployment to Afghanistan. Currently, the Center provides enduring observer/controller support to the United States Security Coordinator Israel to train the Palestinian National Security Forces. Joint Multi-National Readiness Center observer/controllers were also instrumental in the successful pre-deployment training of the Jordanian 2nd Ranger Battalion for operations in support of Afghanistan's national elections. We have trained almost 4,000 soldiers to date and, through these efforts, European Command has enabled partner nations to make significant contributions to operations in Afghanistan.

*Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force.* Marine Forces Europe directly supports the Republic of Georgia's two-year program to deploy Georgian forces alongside U.S. Marine Forces to Afghanistan. The Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force will deploy four rotations of a Georgian battalion with a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Afghanistan. As capabilities improve, Georgian forces





*Georgian soldiers from the 31st Battalion establish security during a cordon and search scenario as they train for an upcoming deployment in support of International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan*


will be able to operate independently. By using Georgian shadow instructors, Marine Forces Europe will create a Georgian training group that will largely take over the Partnership Training Program by their fourth rotation. Over this past year, this program trained two battalions that deployed to Afghanistan.

**Interoperability.** EUCOM has significantly enhanced the ability to communicate with NATO and NATO member nations at the SECRET level. The U.S. Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) network is used for planning, exercising, and operating with our NATO partners in this theater. We exercised that capability in AUSTERE CHALLENGE 10, JACKAL STONE 10, and a NATO Cyber Defense Exercise. As we leverage these opportunities to hone our ability to work together, we will continue to determine the capability requirements and develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure that U.S. BICES meets our NATO interoperability needs.

In another area, the United States became a full participating member in the Military Engineering Center of Excellence. Through this body, our engineers have the opportunity to develop interoperability and relationships with engineer forces at all levels of command. We are able to provide expertise to other NATO countries and help them prepare for NATO operations. Through these engagements, our nation also benefits by learning new engineering methods, and gains access to the resources of the Center of Excellence.

*Ballistic Missile Defense.* The concentrated efforts by our adversaries to illicitly procure ballistic missile technology, develop increasingly sophisticated missiles, and actively refine their abilities to employ those missiles against friends and allies have not abated.

As we work to provide defenses for our deployed forces, families, friends and allies, European Command continues the extensive and active cooperation necessary to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Missile Defense. Together with our partners in the Department of State,



*A Standard Missile - 3 (SM-3) is launched from the USS Hopper (DDG 70) in a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) test in conjunction with the U.S. Navy*

Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, and many others we are fully supporting the coordinated international engagement of the United States.

Our coordinated efforts are bearing fruit, with NATO declaring at the Lisbon Summit that it will develop a missile defense capability to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces. NATO reiterated its longstanding invitation for Russia to cooperate with the Alliance in this endeavor. We are also working with Poland and Romania who have agreed to host elements of our missile defense systems. As part of these efforts, European Command is working with both the Missile Defense Agency and the Commander, Naval Installations Command, to ensure that facility infrastructure will be ready to go when the system is activated.

In order to provide for Communication, Collaboration, Coordination and, potentially, Command and Control of U.S. and NATO Missile Defense forces, European Command's J6

directorates have aggressively deployed U.S. BICES (NATO SECRET) workstations throughout European Command's Headquarters and our Service components. These workstations are supported by theater collaboration services for secure voice, chat, and information-sharing as well as the Battle Command Systems—providing U.S. and NATO forces with all the tools necessary to execute this mission successfully. This spring, European Command will add U.S. ships afloat to the U.S. BICES architecture, further integrating our sensors, shooters and platforms within theater.

At the same time, European Command is preparing for the arrival of the initial assets that will operationalize the European Phased Adaptive Approach. As we work together with our partners and allies to field an operational capability this year, I maintain my firm belief that the capabilities delivered will serve as a catalyst to develop a cooperative solution with our allies and partners in the region.

*Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center.* This past August, European Command stood up the Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC) to support interagency efforts across the theater to counter the growing transnational trafficking threat. Transnational trafficking is a multi-faceted U.S. national security concern which has potential to undermine U.S. and international efforts to protect public health and ensure regional security. Transnational organized criminal activity contributes to weakening the rule of law, and fosters other forms of illicit activity such as terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, weapons trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking and piracy. Left unchecked, this activity can continue to spread and metastasize, threatening the stability and legitimacy of key states, as well as the U.S. homeland.


European Command's trafficking center will complement the State Department's interagency programs and assist the international community and European national efforts to build self-sufficient border management skills, competencies, and capacity among partner nations. The vision is that we will stand up a truly international, interagency organization focused on counter-trafficking. Though loosely modeled on Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South in Key West, our trafficking center will have important differences. Unlike JIATF-South, the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center will not directly participate in detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations on land or at sea. Instead, it will provide depth and capacity to our interagency partners and, by doing so, will provide another layer to regional security and the defense of our homeland. European Command is also leveraging opportunities to link U.S. Government agencies through information systems by building a common, user-friendly information technology portfolio that facilitates information-sharing and cross-cooperation. We are developing agreements on information-sharing standards with partner military, police, and civilian organizations to support counter-trafficking and exploitation activities. Our main focus will initially be on counter-narcotics, but will ultimately integrate other aspects of the transnational trafficking threat. No additional resources are needed to stand up the JICTC, and we plan to be fully operational by September 2011.

*Whole-of-Government/Whole-of-Society Approach.* Interagency partnering remains the heart of the enterprise for this Command, and is critical to how we approach security challenges in our theater. Building on the interagency cooperation that presently exists at our U.S. Embassy Country Teams, we have also grown the interagency presence at European Command to best effect interagency collaboration at the regional/operational level.

Since I last addressed you, we have welcomed additional representatives to European Command Headquarters from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration who wish to coordinate their activities with the U.S. military. This is in addition to representatives already in place at the headquarters from the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Additionally, we are actively working with the U.S. Agency for International Development to once again secure their representation at European Command. Finally, the Department of Justice will soon add their prosecutorial and rule of law expertise to our team as, together, we seek to build partner capacity in Europe and Eurasia and, in so doing, better defend our homeland forward.

We have also introduced the U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) into our COMBINED ENDEAVOR exercise. This infusion of interagency participation facilitates cross-cooperation, coordination, and information sharing between the Departments of Defense and State in the context of whole-of-government operations within the European theater. This reinforces the Command's commitment to building stronger partner capacity, not only among our internal U.S. government agencies, but also with NATO and European partner government agencies as well. We look to integrate with both U.S. interagency organizations and those of NATO and our partner nations by coupling the U.S. whole-of-government approach with the comprehensive approach functions of our partners.

We have also established a J9 Interagency Partnering Directorate, the first new directorate at European Command since 1967. In addition to working with interagency partners, it also engages and collaborates with international and non-governmental organizations, academia,



*Public Private Cooperation.* European Command has begun work to leverage the expertise and other assets of the private sector to achieve its objectives as well as support the efforts of NATO Allied Command Operations. We are currently working with private businesses as well as non-profit non-governmental entities. For example, in collaboration with Central Command, we organized a public-private workshop on further development of the Northern Distribution Network and the potential for building a “silk road,” or commercial transportation network for commerce between Europe and Eurasia through Afghanistan. The participants included officials from the U.S. Transportation Command, Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Agency for International Development, the Asian Development Bank, the International Road Union, the National Defense Transportation Association, and other business executives, who agreed on recommendations for further action on

developing and implementing a silk road strategy as a component of the U.S. transition strategy for Afghanistan. We are also looking at ways to incorporate this kind of collaboration for issues like cyber security, assessments, and humanitarian assistance.

*Humanitarian Assistance Programs.* European Command's Humanitarian Assistance programs directly benefit the nations where they are executed, and consist of: the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program; the Humanitarian Assistance-Other Program; and the Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property. Projects funded through these resources complement U.S. Agency for International Development efforts, enhance regional security cooperation, and advance U.S. interests throughout the region. They also bolster a country's own capability to respond to disasters, thereby diminishing the need for future U.S. involvement, and provide an example of the value of a military in times of peace.

While the European Command Humanitarian Assistance budget is relatively small, it has a disproportionately high and positive impact. Last year, the command executed \$17 million in Humanitarian Assistance Project funding for 145 security assistance related projects across 18 countries. One example of a Humanitarian Assistance project that was carried out in an interagency and public-private manner to gain efficiencies and maximize impact was our contribution to a nursing school in Georgia. We contributed through training to the construction of the facility, while Emory University staffed it and the U.S. Agency for International Development equipped it.

Another example was European Command's partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development, an engaged non-governmental organization, and the Albanian Ministry of Health in an integrated effort to establish telemedicine capabilities throughout


Albania. This past December, six of 14 telemedicine centers were connected to enhance basic health care, disaster management and emergency response across the country. While European Command training assisted in renovation of the facilities, the impact of the combined effort provides a higher level of health care and continued medical education nationwide.

*"Innovation distinguishes between a leader and a follower."  
Steve Jobs, Co-founder and CEO of Apple*

**Innovation.** Implementing new ideas and innovations is vital to achieving success in today's complex and adaptive security environment. Indeed, success may well be determined in our labs, think tanks, and centers of innovation. The original discovery, development, and rapid implementation of technology and ideas are imperative for staying ahead of our adversaries who are continuously adapting and innovating as well.

Acting as a catalyst and accelerant, and working in close collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, the U.S. Interagency, industry, and our partner nations, our Innovation Cell has achieved tangible results in furthering unique and innovative technologies. Results include discovery and enhancement of a unique human detection technology, a cross-domain solution for collaboration with our allies, and acceleration of a system to support space-based wireless internet access to remote regions. Each of these successes has been achieved by partnering with and leveraging the unique technologies of our allies. The Command has enabled access and connected unique partner nation technologies to counter improvised explosive devices, piracy, and smuggling. Future innovative projects planned are in the realm of information technologies to support population-centric counterinsurgency tools.





*The Rosetta Stone and books that U.S. European Command has featured in its Command reading list, a project designed to enhance cultural understanding*

#### *Cultural Understanding and Language Study.*

I have often talked about the power that comes from understanding a country's culture. At European Command, we are always trying to find ways to increase our understanding of European culture throughout our organization as we continue the important work of building and strengthening our relationships with partner

nations. One example is our Next Generation Advisory Panel, a body of up-and-coming civilian leaders from several European countries with whom we engage on a regular basis to seek their unique perspective on a variety of issues. Another is our Notable Author Series, which brings prolific writers and thinkers to the Command whose books add important historical context into an open forum for engagement and discussion with our staff. Our Academic Outreach Division recently brought an expert on Russian and Central European security issues to the Command as part of the European Command Forum for International Affairs Speaker Series. Additionally, European Command's Strategic Languages Program has joined our headquarters in Stuttgart with the Defense Language Institute in order to provide foreign language training for our staff members.

***OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE***

None of the activities described in these pages would be possible without the people that make up U.S. European Command. We have a responsibility to our people and their families to ensure the readiness and health of our force and provide quality of life support to the families. Being stationed overseas presents unique challenges and opportunities for our force. Maintaining a balanced and efficient overseas force posture, however, is critical to the defense of the United States.


***Deployment, Behavioral Health, and Compassionate Fatigue and Family Support.***

Protracted combat operations and multiple deployments have, as you know, placed significant stress on our service members and their families. Several organizations and studies within the Department have identified an urgent need for sustained behavioral health services to support these warriors and their family members. As we continue to maintain mission readiness, it is imperative that our dedicated military men and women, and their families, have access to these vital programs and services without stovepipes in a stigma-free environment. A 360-degree review of these programs, with an analysis of the connection between at-risk indicators and catalysts, is needed to eliminate gaps in support. The goal is alignment of focused caregiver teams with corresponding indicator data systems to ensure the health of our force and family. We will also continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a working definition for resilience, while determining initial measures for baseline assessments to address at-risk indicators.

Additionally, we must also care for our vital caregiver teams. Last year, I testified on the state of European Command's community caregivers, who themselves have shown signs

of stress, burn-out, and compassion fatigue. At that time, I briefed you on our comprehensive compassion fatigue program, entitled “Providing Outreach While Enhancing Readiness—Caring for the Caregiver,” which focuses on providing caregivers with tools and strategies to prevent and mitigate the risk of stress, burn-out, and compassion fatigue. 2010 was the first year of execution for this initiative; one we plan to continue and one that is showing promising results. Lastly, we continue to support ongoing efforts to improve complex care management and the medical portion of the disability evaluation process, which will result in improvement of wounded, ill, and injured warrior benefits.

*Theater Infrastructure.* Thanks to strong and continued Congressional support, previous annual military construction authorizations and appropriations have enabled European Command to address a balanced mix of our most pressing mission, mission support, quality of life, and housing requirements. The goal of our fiscal year 2012 military construction program is to support ongoing force posture initiatives, consolidation efforts, and infrastructure recapitalization projects including the Kaiserslautern Military Community (KMC) Medical



*A surgical team from Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, operates on a Soldier injured in combat operations*

Facilities Recapitalization and Consolidation project. As always, when there are opportunities to leverage NATO common funded investments, we do so. And where required, we pre-finance our projects to reserve a future opportunity to recapture a portion of our investments through the NATO Security Investment Program. At enduring locations,

we continue to sustain and recapitalize our infrastructure through responsible use of both the Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization program and the military construction program. At non-enduring locations, we are optimizing use of all available resources to ensure these installations remain fully mission effective until the installations are removed from the inventory. To that end, European Command's footprint currently includes approximately 350 distinct real estate sites (ranging in size from small unmanned communication sites to Ramstein Air Base), which collectively make up the present Command footprint, down from 1,200 during the Cold War. Anticipated changes, some of which are planned within enduring installations, will result in the return of approximately 100 of these sites to host nations soon. We are constantly reviewing requirements across the current and new mission, quality of life, and agency portfolios to work towards joint solutions where appropriate. European Command's future requirements will appear in our Theater Posture Plan and military construction requests. The sites are all tax and rent free and receive much host nation support.

We are pleased that the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) is planning and executing a \$2.1 billion investment into DoDEA's Europe school infrastructure that has been in need of support for many years. Many of our schools are converted barracks from the 1950's and will benefit tremendously from this investment. At the end of this seven-year program, all failed or failing infrastructure will be recapitalized, providing concrete proof of our priority to take care of our people and their families. Additionally, we will continue to address and pursue improvements to our military family housing and barracks/dormitories in the 2012 military construction program to improve the living conditions of our families.

*Force Posture.* The presence of U.S. forces in the European theater serves many important functions. It fosters relationships and deepens partnerships with individual countries as well as an entire region of significant importance to U.S. global strategic interests, as evidenced by the overwhelming number of ISAF troop-contributing nations that come from this theater. This continuous presence and partnership allows European Command to train alongside our allies and partners to build their capacity as well as our own, and increase interoperability. U.S. forces stationed in Europe today act to assure our allies even as they deter and dissuade our adversaries, and are the most visible indication of the ongoing U.S. commitment to the NATO Alliance. European Command's footprint also enables the projection of U.S. power globally. Sites and installations in Europe provide superb power projection facilities for the support of coalition operations and overseas contingency operations.

As we consider U.S. presence overseas, we must consider the security environment in which we are currently operating. As the post-Cold War security environment changed, the size of our forces saw a corresponding change. The number of active-duty U.S. personnel in Europe has gone from over 400,000 during the Cold War to approximately 80,000 today. With ongoing activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, we assess that we should maintain our asset levels to maintain our current levels of effort in the immediate future, to include deployment rotations and partner training schedules. As our engagement requirements change, we will also look to adjust our asset levels. As the Secretary of Defense has said, "Based on our review, it is clear we have excess force structure in Europe. We are looking closely at alternative courses of action, but none would be implemented before 2015 or without consulting our NATO allies." In doing so, we not only look at pure numbers of troops when examining force posture, but also at capabilities and force

mix. As the mission in Afghanistan begins to draw down, we may begin to reduce in the area of combat troops. However, as our ballistic missile defense mission develops in the near future, we will also evaluate the force posture needs associated with that growing mission.

There are five significant force posture initiatives that European Command is undertaking to support building the capability and capacity of partner nations in Europe, increase expeditionary capability from Europe, support other combatant commands, and achieve basing efficiencies.

The first initiative is in direct support of the EPAA. The EPAA is the U.S. voluntary national contribution to NATO missile defense. This will be an integral component of NATO's mission to provide full protection and coverage for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces as well as enhance the defense of the U.S. homeland.

The second initiative is an Unmanned Aerial Systems Center of Excellence at Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy. The synergistic impact of combining U.S. Air Force Global Hawks, U.S. Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, and NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance unmanned aerial systems programs at one location within close proximity to three geographic combatant commands is a prime example of how the European Command is maximizing our efficiency within the European Theater.

The third initiative is the timely stationing of the Joint Strike Fighter into theater. The proper timing of the Joint Strike Fighter bed-down ensures that the U.S. maintains its leadership role within the NATO Alliance.

The fourth initiative is developing a U.S. Transportation Command requirement for a Black Sea/Caucasus en-route location to further U.S. expeditionary capability. The European

Command will meet this requirement while maximizing our basing efficiencies.

The final initiative, is providing direct support to U.S. Africa Command, which is located in Europe. The European Command, because of our global strategic location, is properly positioned for other combatant commands and interagency partners to leverage our resources.

We consider it our responsibility to maximize efficiency in the theater.

*NATO/SHAPE*

*"Europe and North America have known more than six decades of peace and stability. But this has not come for free. It has required political vision and courage. It has required an enormous, sustained investment – in both political and financial terms – to defend not just our territories, but also our values. And it has required – above all – strong transatlantic solidarity."*


*NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Speech given at NATO Lisbon Summit, November 2010*

NATO has been the anchor of Trans-Atlantic security for more than 60 years, ensuring the security of its members, enhancing peace and stability throughout Europe, and countering threats across the globe. In November of 2010, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance approved a new NATO Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit and mandated a series of actions to modernize and enhance the Alliance's capability to address the complex challenges of this era. The Summit was a pivotal event in the Alliance's history, framing its future and demonstrating the political will of its members to strengthen our individual and collective readiness and capabilities for the full range of security challenges.

*New Strategic Concept.* NATO's new Strategic Concept, the first in ten years, is titled "Active Engagement, Modern Defense". The Strategic Concept reconfirmed the bond between all members to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our populations. It committed the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts, and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union (EU). It offers NATO's partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute. It restates the Alliance's firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of



membership, because enlargement contributes to the goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace. The Strategic Concept also commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient, and flexible Alliance. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the fundamental purpose of



*NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen unveiling the new Strategic Concept at the NATO Lisbon Summit*

the NATO Alliance and defines three core tasks for the Alliance: Collective Defense; Security through Crisis Management; and Cooperative Security through Partnership.

*Collective Defense.* On Collective Defense, the new Strategic Concept reaffirms the Alliance's core mission of mutual defense as set out in Article V of the Washington Treaty. This Article V commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole. The Strategic Concept mandates the maintenance of Alliance Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, and reaffirms deterrence as a core element of our overall strategy. The Alliance also agreed to pursue missile defense as a core element of Alliance defense and deterrence.

*Crisis Management.* Concerning Crisis Management, the new Strategic Concept commits the Alliance's unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises—before, during, and after conflicts. It recognizes that crises and conflicts beyond NATO's borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. The Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration highlight the importance of a "Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management."

NATO will engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security before they escalate into conflicts, to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security, and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

A modernized and comprehensive approach to crisis management will involve engaging actively with other international actors before, during, and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning, and conduct of crisis management activities. It also requires a capability to monitor and analyze the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts. The role accorded to Crisis Management in the Strategic Concept also reaffirms NATO's unique and essential role as a transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of its members as set out in Article IV of the Washington Treaty.

*Cooperative Security and Partnership.* With respect to Cooperative Security and Partnership, NATO's new strategic concept recognizes that the Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. This concept mandates NATO to engage actively to enhance international security: through partnership with relevant countries



*The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group crew spells out NATO on the deck*

and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards. In particular, the Strategic Concept highlights the importance of enhancing collaboration with the European Union and United Nations. It also stresses the priority accorded to forging a true, strategic partnership with Russia. In particular, the Alliance will pursue cooperation with Russia in the sphere of Missile Defense as well as enhance our cooperation in counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and ongoing International Security Assistance Force operations.

In Lisbon, the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit Declaration contained many taskings related to implementing, or operationalizing, the new Strategic Concept. In particular, Crisis Management, Comprehensive Approach, Partnership, and Missile Defense will be focus areas for NATO Headquarters, Allied Command Operations, and Allied Command Transformation. The Lisbon Summit also tasked continued reforms for NATO in many spheres related to reducing costs and delivering efficiencies and effectiveness. NATO will continue to implement these important Lisbon decisions simultaneously and we will continue to conduct operations of high importance to our collective security.

*"All of the things that we've been working on for the last two years came to fruition in an extraordinary way in Lisbon."*

*Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, November 2010*

**NATO-European Union Relations.** The European Union is another potential partner for NATO in its Comprehensive Approach and, although slight, some progress has been made in the areas of cooperation and coordination between these two entities. In land operations, tactical

coordination continues and, in Afghanistan in particular, there has been a growing willingness on both sides (International Security Assistance Force and European Union Police Mission Afghanistan) to coordinate efforts. This will hopefully lead to a more complementary approach, combining resources and capabilities to build Afghan National Security Forces' capacity. In the fight against piracy, NATO and the European Union have agreed to share tactical information for increased situational awareness and synergy. There have been other examples of tactical cooperation such as a recent incident during which an EU ship refuelled a NATO ship at sea. This common use of logistics support is an area that offers potential for further cooperation between the European Union and NATO.

*Afghanistan.* NATO's operation in Afghanistan continues to provide the Alliance a catalyst for change to ensure timely and relevant support to our combat forces. America's Allies in NATO have shared the risks, costs, and burdens of this mission from the beginning. They have contributed to the International Security Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Forces and have made significant non-military contributions as well.

The situation in Afghanistan today is complicated and deeply challenging, as external



*Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army personnel receive technical training on night vision goggles and thermal cameras by a Turkish officer*

pressures are balanced with internal recovery from 30 years of warfare. As we proceed in this campaign, the successful transition of security responsibilities remains the key issue. Much has been achieved in the past 12-18 months. The troop surge of 30,000 U.S. and 10,000 allied troops has had a significant impact on the ground,

especially in southern Afghanistan. More importantly, the restructuring of the headquarters, including the activation of the ISAF Joint Command and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, have provided the ISAF Commander the leadership capacity to implement a counterinsurgency campaign focused on securing the Afghan population, developing the Afghan National Security Forces, and engaging the Afghan Government as a catalyst of change. We have largely halted the expansion of the insurgency, and are beginning to show signs of progress toward Afghan security self-reliance. These strategy reviews and increased attention on Afghanistan are welcomed by our allies and partners as we move forward. Our allies have already contributed a great deal to this war, fighting, bleeding, and dying side-by-side with our own troops.

There are four areas in which we must succeed in order to win in Afghanistan, and some progress has been made across all four. The first is to achieve synergy between our civilian and military efforts. To help accomplish this, NATO has reinforced the Senior Civilian Representative position with Ambassador Mark Sedwill. His efforts, in parallel with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, have shown exceptional progress in governance and development. Ambassador Sedwill and his team are providing the necessary balance to the military work being done by General David Petraeus, the Commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Senior Civilian Representative's efforts cannot be taken in isolation. Additional civilian expertise is still required to mentor, coach, and guide the Afghan government to take active visible steps to show that it is stamping out corruption, improving efficiency, and delivering necessary services to its people effectively.

The second area critical to the Afghanistan counterinsurgency effort is that the Afghans themselves must be at the center of this effort. In this aspect, the restructuring of the headquarters and the Senior Civilian Representative have provided the leadership capacity to engage appropriate Afghan leaders and move towards independence. The Afghan people, through village and district elders and shuras, have begun to assume responsibility for the well-being of their country and are showing growing confidence in their own government's ability to provide basic security and services without corruption and tribal favoritism.

A third important key to success in Afghanistan is effective strategic communication. A continuous flow of information that serves to bolster our actions is essential to assuring the Afghans, as well as our enemies, that the United States and our allies are committed to a secure and stable Afghanistan. We have work to do, but are improving.

Fourth and finally, as has been reaffirmed time after time by the Alliance, the most important role that the military can play in Afghanistan is to increase the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through training and mentoring so that they may be able to take lead responsibility for securing their country. This is—and remains—the top resourcing priority in Afghanistan. Although the progress of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the increase in capacity and capability of the ANSF has been described as miraculous, trainers and mentors are still needed. Progress has been exceptional. And watching the enthusiasm as record numbers of recruits train at the Kabul Military Training Center definitely perpetuates optimism.

Recent polls have shown positive indications that progress is being made in Afghanistan. Almost 60% of Afghans believe their country is heading in the right direction.<sup>1</sup> Afghans are 83% confident that the Afghan National Army can provide security in their area and 75% confident in the Afghan National Police<sup>2</sup>. Thousands of insurgents are being captured or killed and hundreds of improvised explosive devices have been recovered. These are all indicators that validate our effort to put the Afghan people at the center of the equation in Afghanistan. We need to continue giving the Afghan people hope that they are not destined to live under the yoke of tyranny, and offer them every opportunity to live in a future Afghanistan worthy of their sacrifices.

*Kosovo.* Today, approximately 8,000 troops, including 800 MS soldiers, from NATO's Kosovo Force are deployed in Kosovo, working alongside local authorities to increase self-reliance in a multi-ethnic environment. The Allies decision to continue force reductions while developing internal security forces is the best declaration of this safe and secure environment. Operations remains challenging as tensions have potential to flare quickly but, by March 2011, planned force levels will be reduced to about 5,000 as five sites of historical and political importance have already transferred from Allied security to local authorities without incident. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008, the Alliance reaffirmed that the Kosovo Force shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO and the Kosovo Force will continue to work with the authorities and assist the United Nations, European Union, and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the further development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic, and peaceful Kosovo.

<sup>1</sup> The Brookings Institution, The Afghanistan Index. <http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx>, 31 August 2010. 36.

<sup>2</sup> The International Council on Security and Development (ICoSD), Afghanistan: The Relationship Gap. July 2010. 14.

*NATO and Iraq.* At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies agreed to be part of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), which to date has trained over 14,000 Iraqi security sector personnel. NTM-I is involved in police training, establishing and mentoring Iraq's military academies, and facilitating substantial equipment donations and regular out-of-country training hosted by NATO Allies. All NATO Allies contribute to the training effort through deployment of trainers, provision of equipment, or NATO's financial contribution. The Government of Iraq regularly praises NTM-I, and continues to request its continuation and expansion.

*ACTIVE ENDEAVOR.* Under Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity. The operation evolved from NATO's immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, and, in view of its success, is continuing. As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role in the intervening years, the experience that NATO has accrued in ACTIVE ENDEAVOR has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO forces have hailed over 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded 155 suspect ships.

By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO's presence in these waters has benefited all shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those participating in the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue.



*Supporting the African Union.* Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent. Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for African Union peacekeepers. Following renewed African Union requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of six months on several occasions. NATO also continues to work with the African Union in identifying further areas where NATO could support the African Standby Force. NATO's continuing support to the African Union is a testament to the Alliance's commitment to building partnerships and supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

*OCEAN SHIELD.* Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO beginning in 2008 to protect World Food Program deliveries, Operation OCEAN SHIELD is focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved in August 2009 by the North Atlantic Council, the current operation, working with almost 40 ships from allies and partners in the context of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, continues to contribute to international efforts to combat area piracy. This operation challenges normal



*Danish warship, HDMS Esbern Snare, stops and boards a suspected pirate vessel in the Gulf of Aden as part of Operation OCEAN SHIELD*


paradigms, with information-sharing and coordination as the keys to success. These operating forces, from four different task forces under different mandates, have had an impact coordinating efforts through NATO's shared awareness and de-confliction efforts. These efforts, along with the commercial shipping industry's strong encouragement of best

management practices, have forced changes in the way the pirates operate; they have adapted by moving farther out into the Indian Ocean, and we must adapt accordingly. Although piracy in

the Gulf of Aden has been somewhat reduced, the overall number of hijackings has increased, as have the number of hostages held by the pirates. It is clear that, a longer-term strategy to build regional counter-piracy capacity is required, including clarification in international law of jurisdiction for pirates apprehended in international waters, as well as responsibility for their trial and incarceration if found guilty. This is under discussion among the allies.

*NATO Special Operations Forces.* The U.S.-led NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) Coordination Centre was officially rechristened and activated as the NATO Special Operations Headquarters in November 2010. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, projected to be fully operational in 2012, has already had a significant impact coordinating, supporting, training, and enabling functions for NATO SOF, and it continues to develop Alliance crisis response options. The evolution of this headquarters will better synchronize special operations forces across the Alliance, enhance NATO SOF unity of effort, and provide Allied special operation forces with a multi-national out-of-area command and control capability.

The NATO Special Operations Headquarters Communications Network underpins allied and partner SOF collaboration by providing an unprecedented vehicle for command, control, communications, and intelligence-sharing for networked operations. The Headquarters' Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell, in Kabul, Afghanistan, demonstrates this operational



*NATO SOF Forces conduct nighttime training*

impact among allied and partner special operations forces. This stakeholder-run enterprise, manned by 40 personnel from 11 nations and several agencies, focuses on garnering information from a multitude of allied and partner sources, and fusing that information with operational

requirements to produce and disseminate actionable intelligence to ISAF SOF Special Operations Task Groups and our Afghan partners.

The NATO Special Operations Headquarters is building enduring operational capabilities, collaborative policies and procedures, and networked command, control, and communications mechanisms among NATO special operations forces. Collaborative training and exercises reinforce this framework to ensure allied and partner special operations forces are interoperable in order to operate more effectively in designated combined operations well into the future.

*NATO Non-Commissioned Officer Initiatives.* The first ever NATO Non-Commissioned Officer Bilateral Strategic Command Strategy and Recommended Non-Commissioned Officer Guidelines was published in October 2010. This first examination of Alliance-wide Non-Commissioned Officer Corps utilization defines critical gaps based on listed assumptions and implications, and delivers recommendations on how best to address them. It also outlines desired leadership qualities required in a multi-national environment, addresses NATO non-commissioned officer education, and explores the use of Command Senior Enlisted Leaders to assist the Commander in the professional development of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps in order to better meet the demands of working in the NATO Alliance. Additionally, our Command's Senior Enlisted Leaders have led NATO efforts to assist partner nations with Non-Commissioned Officer reform in several countries this year through their involvement with initial assessments. We are working to tie these NATO initiatives into European Command's theater campaign plan to assist our partners with their Non-Commissioned Officer transformation. We believe these efforts will result in the more effective use of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps—an essential component to achieving success in a multi-national environment.

### CONCLUSION

*"This reflects an enduring truth of American foreign policy – our relationship with our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and a catalyst for global cooperation... Neither Europe nor the United States can confront the challenges of our time without the other."*

*President Barack Obama, New York Times, November 2010*

The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of European Command and Allied Command Operations contribute to our national security everyday through their professional engagement with our allies and partners across the European theater. As we look forward to continued success, I ask for your continued support of these extraordinary men and women and their families to ensure they receive the care and benefits they deserve.


Operationally, we will continue to seek and use flexible authorities and funding mechanisms to build the capacity of those partner nations willing to contribute to current operations. This has become increasingly important because of the surge of activities in Afghanistan and the need to get our allies and partners more involved. Your continued support for authorities like NDAA Section 1206, Foreign Military Financing, the International Military Education and Training program, and Coalition Readiness Support Program has been pivotal in addressing our strategic needs in the European theater, not only for partner-nation forces deploying to Afghanistan, but for all of our other allies to help build partner capacity. These programs allow us to provide them with equipment and training necessary to achieve interoperability with our own forces, and better prepare them to handle the responsibilities to which they commit their forces.

Furthermore, our efforts to fulfill this short-term task of building enduring capability are vital to ensuring the long-term stability and security of Europe. In addition to increasing the contributions of our allies and partners to operations outside Europe, building partner

capacity allows us to make significant progress toward achieving European Command's strategic objectives. For example, we have been able to conduct security sector reform assessments in Albania, an interagency effort critical to integrating Balkan countries into the European community. We also have numerous programs targeted at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction throughout the theater such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. But we cannot stop there. We are also supportive of efforts to pool State and Defense resources for the purpose of funding more robust, comprehensive security sector assistance programs to respond to emergent challenges and opportunities, as originally proposed by Secretary Gates. This would greatly aid our efforts to ensure interoperable, deployable NATO forces. Realizing the vision of the Lisbon Summit, a NATO with robust interoperable Article V and expeditionary capabilities requires U.S. support with training and equipment for newer NATO allies and partners. With greater flexibility, these authorities can achieve greater strategic goals in support of our theater and national objectives.

European Command and Allied Command Operations continue to serve as a transatlantic bridge that unites the United States and our partners in Europe. We are building and strengthening relations with our European partners that will help ensure the security of the United States at home and abroad. As President Barack Obama said at the recent NATO Summit, "Our relationship with our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and a catalyst for global cooperation." Indeed, we are truly

***"STRONGER TOGETHER".***



## United States Navy Biography

### Admiral James G. Stavridis Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander, United States European Command

Admiral Stavridis assumed duties as commander of European Command and as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in early summer 2009.

Stavridis is a 1976 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a native of South Florida.

A Surface Warfare officer, he commanded the Destroyer USS *Barry* (DDG 52) from 1993-1995, completing UN/NATO deployments to Haiti and Bosnia, and a combat cruise to the Arabian Gulf. Barry won the Battenberg Cup as the top ship in the Atlantic Fleet under his command.

In 1998, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 21 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf, winning the Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

From 2002-2004, he commanded *Enterprise* Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat operations in the Arabian Gulf in support of both Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

From 2006-2009, he commanded U.S. Southern Command in Miami, focused on Latin America and the Caribbean.

Ashore, he has served as a strategic and long range planner on the staffs of the chief of Naval Operations and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also served as the executive assistant to the secretary of the Navy and the senior military assistant to the secretary of Defense.

Stavridis earned a PhD and MALD from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in International Relations in 1984, where he won the Gullion Prize as outstanding student. He is also a distinguished graduate of both the National and Naval War Colleges.

He holds various decorations and awards, including two awards of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal and five awards of the Legion of Merit. He is author or co-author of several books on naval ship handling and leadership, including *Command at Sea*, *Destroyer Captain*, and *Partnership for the Americas* about Latin America.



Reprinted 2 November 2010

**POSTURE STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL DOUGLAS M. FRASER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND**

**BEFORE THE 112TH CONGRESS**

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**March 30, 2011**



### Introduction

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss United States Southern Command's accomplishments and future efforts in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Over the past year, we worked in close collaboration with U.S. Government agencies and our partner nations to respond to the unprecedented natural disaster in Haiti and to the ongoing threats to regional security. This year, with the support of Congress, we will build on our accomplishments and continue to foster close cooperation and engagement throughout the region. We will also continue to evolve as a joint and interagency organization that promotes U.S. national and regional security interests through enduring partnerships.

These partnerships are not only enduring; they are essential. U.S. Southern Command envisions sustaining a shared partnership for the Americas; all nations working together to address problems of mutual concern. Under this vision, each exercise, program, and operation we conduct in the region augments the training of our joint forces, improves our ability to work with partner armed forces, and enhances the capabilities of our partners to confront regional security challenges. In addition, our programs directly integrate with and support other U.S. Government agencies' efforts to enhance citizen safety, democratic governance, and economic prosperity. We also continuously coordinate our programs with other U.S. government departments and agencies. Our response to the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti demonstrated the effectiveness of these efforts.

Before continuing, I would like to thank Congress for funding the construction of U.S. Southern Command's new headquarters in Miami. This state-of-the-art building ensures that we are fully prepared to accomplish our mission: we are *ready to conduct joint and combined full-*



*spectrum military operations and to support whole-of-government efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation.* The new headquarters enhances internal and external collaboration, improves our ability to conduct operations, and raises quality of life for assigned personnel. Our integrated, interagency headquarters significantly enhances our collaborative approach in working to achieve our strategic objectives in the region.

### **Regional Context**

#### *Positive Trends*

Latin America and the Caribbean are comprised of a multitude of cultures, languages, heritages, and histories. The United States is connected to this region by more than physical proximity; increasing travel and trade ensure our countries remain connected culturally, socially, and economically.<sup>i</sup> We are also connected by many shared values and a commitment to democratic ideals. The majority of countries throughout the region seek to consolidate the democratic, security, and economic progress achieved in recent years. U.S. Southern Command endeavors to support our partner nations in these efforts through enduring engagement and continued collaboration.

The region's recent history is characterized by sustained economic growth that benefits Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. Over the past 12 years, U.S. trade with countries in the region grew at a faster rate than with China or the European Union. Although trade with Latin American and Caribbean economies still makes up a small percentage of overall U.S. trading activity (8.3 percent of all U. S. trading activity in 2009), this share grew by 15.3 percent over the past fourteen years.<sup>ii</sup> Economic indicators throughout the region have been

generally positive: growth rates averaged 3.4 percent per year over the past decade and regional GDP grew 6 percent in 2010,<sup>iii</sup> due in large part to strong economies in South America.

This significant economic growth has allowed some of our regional partners to invest in social and educational programs designed to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. Both poverty and extreme poverty in the region fell by 3 percent from 2009 to 2010.<sup>iv</sup> Income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean is exhibiting some signs of lowering, thanks in part to targeted social investments.<sup>v</sup> In 2003, the Brazilian government launched “Bolsa Familia,” which provides income support to poor families. In return, families commit to keeping their children in school and taking them for regular health checks.<sup>vi</sup> As of 2008, Bolsa Familia has reached 46 million people<sup>vii</sup> and has contributed to the improvement of income distribution in Brazil, resulting in the lowest levels of income inequality in the country’s recent history.<sup>lviii</sup> Chile’s strong economic performance in the past decade has permitted the government to invest heavily in hospitals, housing, education and pension reform.<sup>ix</sup> Between 1990 and 2000, poverty rates were reduced from 40% of the population to 20%; the 2009 poverty figure is currently 11.5%.<sup>x, xi</sup>

Sustained economic growth and positive social developments have been nurtured by a strong regional commitment to democracy. In the past decade, there have been numerous free and fair national elections resulting in peaceful transfers of power. Across the region, more than 60 percent of people surveyed prefer democratic governance to any other political system.<sup>xii</sup> Regional militaries have also made great strides improving professionalism, subordinating to civilian rule and respecting human rights.

<sup>i</sup> Brazil’s 2010 Gini coefficient=0.55

<sup>2</sup> According to the Latinobarometro 2010: regionally, 15 percent of respondents support an authoritarian system; 23 percent did not know or were indifferent. In comparison, the USAID-sponsored AmericasBarometer survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project indicates 70 percent support for democracy in countries surveyed in 2010 ([www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org)).

*Challenges to Regional Security*

Despite these positive economic, social, and political gains, several threats to security and stability in the region remain. Natural disasters wreak havoc and create humanitarian crises; social exclusion and poverty remain pervasive; and threats to democratic consolidation persist. As you know, the Americas, our common home, is vulnerable to many forms of natural disasters: hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, and floods are regular occurrences. Although the region was largely spared from the ravages of hurricanes this past year, it was devastated by two major earthquakes and experienced significant flooding. Inevitably, the region will be impacted by additional natural disasters in the coming year.

While improving in some countries, poverty remains an ongoing challenge, particularly in Central America.<sup>xiii</sup> In many countries, poverty is difficult to reduce because of restraints on social mobility due to race and social class.<sup>xiv</sup> This social stagnation creates openings for criminal organizations to recruit new members who see crime as an opportunity for socio-economic advancement. Positive change in social mobility is slowly occurring, but not at a rate that will significantly reduce the influence of criminal organizations in the short term.

While many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean continue consolidating their democracies, some governments have hollowed out democratic institutions and eroded constitutional checks and balances—the key ingredients essential for a functioning democratic system. These undemocratic measures go against the shared values of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Though the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead agencies in supporting democracy and good governance initiatives to address such measures, U.S. Southern Command engages with the armed forces in

the region to promote professionalization, respect for human rights, and subordination to democratically-elected governments.

While natural disasters, social inequalities, and undemocratic tendencies undermine regional stability, threats to citizen safety and border security represent broad concerns across the region. Weak institutions, inadequate support for the rule of law and lack of independent judiciaries limits accountability for corrupt government officials, business leaders, and criminals. In too many countries, less than 5 percent of all violent crimes are prosecuted.<sup>xv</sup> Widespread impunity undermines state institutions and provides safe haven for Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) to operate in an environment of lawlessness. An estimated \$100 billion per year in illicit goods—drugs, weapons, counterfeit products—and an estimated 100,000 humans are trafficked through porous borders throughout the region.<sup>xvi, xvii</sup>

Violence is an inherent aspect of illicit activity; it is no coincidence that the countries in Latin America with the highest rates of violence are besieged by TCOs and criminal gangs. TCOs and supporting criminal elements exploit weak institutions and corrupt officials to conduct their illicit operations with impunity. As a result, insecurity is a fact of life for many of the citizens in the region. In recent years, the Central American corridor has seen a dramatic increase in illicit trafficking and brutal violence and is now the most violent region in the world outside of active war zones.<sup>xviii</sup> This is due, in part, to success in stemming illicit trafficking elsewhere in the region, which has pushed their activities into Central America. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean increased from 19.9 per 100,000 people in 2003 to 32.6 per 100,000 people in 2008 (the U.S.

murder rate is 5.0 per 100,000 people).<sup>six</sup> <sup>3</sup> Much of the violence related to TCOs is connected to the protection of trafficking routes and internal power struggles, but the criminality associated with the illegal drug trade and TCO activities increases the level of related crimes, including kidnapping, murder, money laundering, and firearms trafficking, the majority of which go unpunished.

Confronting the threat posed by TCOs to citizen safety requires coordinated diplomatic, law enforcement, and military cooperation among countries in the region. In countering this threat, Department of Defense efforts are aligned and coordinated with our interagency partners. We focus our efforts on the *consequences* of security challenges in the region, and support our interagency and international partners in confronting the *causes* of these challenges. U.S. Southern Command strongly supports increased Congressional funding to our interagency partners—including USAID and the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security—to strengthen regional civilian law enforcement agencies and judiciaries. We will continue to improve our collaboration with international and interagency colleagues to combine our efforts to disrupt and reduce transnational threats to the United States and regional security.

#### *Extra-Regional Actors in the Region*

As the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean develop, they look beyond the hemisphere for trading partners, diplomatic support, and sources of aid, leading to increased activity in the hemisphere by various extra-regional state actors. U.S. Southern Command views this activity as both an opportunity and a challenge. We have a long history of regional security

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<sup>3</sup> Comparing homicide rates puts the magnitude and deterioration of citizen insecurity in Latin America into perspective: in 2010, the homicide rate in Afghanistan was 8.6 per 100,000; 13.7 in Iraq; 71.0 in El Salvador; and 77.0 in Honduras. Sources (multiple): United Nations Mission to Afghanistan; Iraq Body Count; and National Civilian Police figures.

cooperation with the armed forces of countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and Spain, and we also work with Canada on many issues related to hemispheric security. Additionally, we welcome activities by other countries when they are conducive to regional security and stability. However, as evident in the following observations, objectives for such activities are difficult to discern.

For example, China has engaged with Latin American militaries through high-level personnel exchanges<sup>4</sup> and arms sales. In summer 2010, China sold 18 K-8 light attack and training aircraft worth millions to Venezuela. Earlier significant arms transfer agreements include air surveillance radars to Venezuela and Ecuador, as well as K-8 aircraft to Bolivia. Additionally, China has become one of the largest providers of investment and trade in the region. With a large appetite for the natural resources needed to supply its manufacturing sector, China's imports of raw materials from the region reached \$41 billion in 2009.<sup>xx</sup> The region is now also the second-largest destination for Chinese investments, which extend to local manufacturing as well as resource extraction.<sup>xxi, xxii</sup>

Although not a significant investor in the region, Russia has also found markets for arms sales in Latin America and the Caribbean. From 2002-2009, arms transfer agreements between Russia and Latin America increased several fold, peaking at \$5 billion in sales in 2009.<sup>xxiii</sup> However, overall military spending remains low in Central and South America, and we expect some specific incidences of Russian arms and equipment sales to enhance the region's ability to counter TCOs<sup>5</sup>. In other cases, though, these sales have the potential to undermine regional stability. My principal concern with Russian arms in the region is the large number of man-portable air defence systems and automatic weapons sold to Venezuela, and the potential they

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<sup>4</sup> At least 12 in 2010

<sup>5</sup> For example, Peru's purchase of 8 Russian-made helicopters in July 2010 to conduct counter illicit trafficking operations.

could reach the hands of organizations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Beyond arms sales, Russia is also participating in infrastructure development programs. For example, in 2010 Russia agreed to assist Argentina—as well as Venezuela—with nuclear energy programs. Russia is also widening its influence in the region by expanding diplomatic activities beyond its traditional allies of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

Finally, Iran continues expanding regional ties to support its own diplomatic goal of reducing the impact of international sanctions connected with its nuclear program. While much of Iran's engagement in the region has been with Venezuela and Bolivia, it has nearly doubled the number of embassies in the region in the past decade<sup>6</sup> and hosted three regional heads of state in 2010.<sup>7</sup> Currently, Iranian engagement with Venezuela appears to be based on shared interests: avoiding international isolation; access to military and petroleum technologies; and the reduction of U.S. influence. Together with our interagency partners, U.S. Southern Command will continue to monitor Iranian activity in the region consistent with law and policy to ensure that U.S. laws and international sanctions are respected, and that our existing partnerships remain strong and well-functioning.

In addition to extra-regional state actors, members of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) from the Middle East remain active in Latin America and the Caribbean and constitute a potential threat. Hezbollah supporters continue to raise funds within the region to finance their worldwide activities. Several entities affiliated with Islamic extremism are increasing efforts to recruit adherents in the region, and we continue to monitor this situation closely. Additionally, we deploy military information and civil affairs teams to under-governed spaces to help our regional partners to hinder these recruitment efforts and counter VEO propaganda.

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<sup>6</sup> Iran had six embassies in the AOR in 2005 and ten in 2010.

<sup>7</sup> The Presidents of Bolivia, Guyana, and Venezuela.

**Focus Areas**

As we look to the future, United States Southern Command will continue supporting whole-of-government efforts that enhance the United States' role as an enduring partner of choice in the region. We will continue to do our part to sustain a region of secure, stable, and prosperous partner nations that work cooperatively to address shared challenges. In this regard, we will focus in three key areas: countering TCOs and illicit trafficking; providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief; and supporting peacekeeping operations.

*Counter Illicit Trafficking*

TCOs and the illicit trafficking they conduct continue to be the primary threat to regional security. These groups construct flexible, resilient networks which use multiple paths to support illicit activity. In countering this international threat, working with our partners, we must attack TCOs in a broad, coordinated manner, to include demand reduction; eradication and regulation of source materials; suppression of money laundering; interdiction of the illicit shipments as they transit to the United States and other end-user countries; and ultimately the disruption and dismantling of TCOs operating in the region. However, TCOs are increasingly sophisticated and have proven resilient and adaptive to attempts to disrupt their operations. They are innovative; to minimize and avoid detection and interdiction by U.S. and regional authorities, criminal organizations have begun using self-propelled fully submersibles to conduct illicit trafficking from South America to Central America and Mexico. These submersibles, built in the jungles of western Colombia and Ecuador, provide TCOs with a multi-ton, long-range cargo capacity. They are hard to detect and difficult to intercept. U.S. Southern Command is working with our



interagency partners, the military services, and our partner nations' armed forces to counter this evolving threat.

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) in Key West, Florida is the center of U.S. maritime interdiction efforts in the Caribbean Basin and eastern Pacific. Using information from law enforcement, JIATF-South detects and monitors suspect aircraft and maritime vessels, and then provides this information to international and interagency partners who have the authority to interdict illicit shipments and arrest members of TCOs. This past year, JIATF-South and our international and interagency partners were directly responsible for interdicting 142 metric tons of cocaine, 3,419 pounds of marijuana, and 309 arrests, denying TCOs \$2.8 billion in revenue.

JIATF-South's collaborative, interagency approach serves as the model for our partnerships with other combatant commands and U.S. Government agencies. U.S. Southern Command works directly with U.S. Northern Command to synchronize Department of Defense operations in the Western Hemisphere, prevent TCOs from exploiting seams in our AORs, and coordinate the employment of our combined resources. Specifically, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command are coordinating counter-TCO actions with Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico to enhance our combined efforts to reduce trafficking along their borders. In addition, U.S. Southern Command coordinates counter-TCO activities with our other partners throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean.

Active engagement with our partner nations is a key component to effectively counter transnational criminal activities. U.S. Southern Command supports U.S. Government security initiatives in Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean. Our ongoing strategic partnership with Colombia—undertaken within the framework of the Colombian Strategic Development

Initiative (CSDI) originally developed by the U.S. Embassy in Bogota—serves as a model for integrated collaboration. CSDI aligns the U.S. government support to Colombia with the Colombian government’s National Consolidation Plan, a whole-of-government effort to expand state presence and services in targeted areas where poverty, violence, illicit crop cultivation, and drug trafficking have historically converged. Colombia has suffered from decades of violence and instability as narco-terrorist groups, financing their activities through drug trafficking, waged an insurgency against the government. While challenges remain, the security situation today in Colombia is drastically different, thanks in large part to the sustained efforts of the Government of Colombia, supported by Plan Colombia and its corresponding U.S. Government-sponsored initiatives. Since August 2002, more than 54,000 combatants from Colombia’s illegal armed groups have demobilized. Of these, 58 percent demobilized collectively as a result of an agreement between the Government of Colombia and the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The FARC’s strength has declined from over 18,000 in 2002 to around 8,000 today and its territorial control has decreased significantly. The successes of Plan Colombia and Colombia’s own democratic security initiatives resulted in the acceleration of economic development; security and stability have helped Colombia achieve annual growth rates averaging 4 percent.<sup>xxiv</sup>

U.S. Southern Command’s role in supporting the execution of Plan Colombia and its corresponding programs and initiatives involved equipping and training the Colombian armed forces; the sharing of technical expertise; and the facilitation of technology transfers. The armed forces of Colombia continue to yield positive results. In 2010, with the support of the U.S. Embassy country team and U.S. Southern Command, the Colombian armed forces planned and executed a string of operational successes, including eliminating Victor Julio Suarez Rojas, also

known as “Mono Jojoy” (the FARC’s long-time military leader and fourth in command) and 15 other high-ranking FARC members. I ask for continued Congressional support for Colombia; your support has resulted in a valuable and reliable partner directly involved in countering illicit trafficking and promoting regional stability. As noted in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, while Colombia’s gains have been impressive, they are reversible, and we value continued Congressional support to CSDI and other initiatives.<sup>xxv</sup>

Our focus on countering transnational criminal organizations and their illicit trafficking activities extends beyond Colombia to include Central America and the Caribbean. In support of the U.S. Government’s two sub-regional initiatives to improve citizen safety—the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)—U.S. Southern Command will continue to support interagency efforts to interdict illicit trafficking in international waters and airspace. Through Theater Security Cooperation activities, we will continue to enhance the capacity and capability of our partner militaries to operate within their respective territories and to support bilateral and multilateral counter illicit trafficking operations.

With its porous borders, lack of surveillance capabilities, and under-governed areas, Central America has become the TCOs’ preferred transit zone to the United States. TCOs support and use a spectrum of destabilizing activities to conduct their operations, to include corruption, intimidation, extortion, kidnapping, targeted violence, and terror tactics. Confronting this spectrum requires a sophisticated, orchestrated strategy that both guides efforts to meet current challenges as well as sets a framework for disrupting future TCO adaptations.

Our current plan to counter the trafficking threat in Central America is to support U.S. interagency efforts and help build self-sustaining regional military capacity to increase the cost and consequences to TCOs of using the Central American transit zone. Under initiatives like Enduring Friendship, we facilitated the procurement of maritime interdiction assets and command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities for Central American and Caribbean Basin countries<sup>8</sup>. To strengthen international borders, we are facilitating technology transfers that support Department of Homeland Security training that is improving our partners' ability to detect and interdict illicit shipments at international crossings. We are also providing training and equipment to partner nations' ground forces to strengthen their capacity to respond to TCO-related events requiring a military response.

However, the limited capabilities of Central American states have allowed Mexican TCOs to establish convenient points of entry for illegal drugs coming from South America. Nearly all cocaine destined for the U.S. crosses the Guatemala-Mexico border. The expansion of Mexican TCOs into Central America has created even more violence and crime, and a significant decline in citizen safety. Focusing specifically on this vulnerable Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border area, we are engaged in planning with our U.S. Northern Command, interagency, and partner nation colleagues, and are on solid footing towards developing a regional operations capability among these three countries.

With Caribbean Basin countries, we want to reduce the ability of TCOs to expand their operations. To achieve this goal, we will support CBSI and leverage existing regional initiatives

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<sup>8</sup> Enduring Friendship countries include: Dominican Republic, Bahamas (funding provided in FY06 when they were in the U. S. Southern Command AOR), Jamaica, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Belize. Enduring Friendship was expanded into the Eastern Caribbean under the "Secure Seas" rubric providing funding to the Regional Security System HQ, Barbados, Grenada, Antigua & Barbuda, St Kitts & Nevis, Dominica, St Vincent & the Grenadines, St Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname, and Guyana.

in the Caribbean Basin like the Caribbean Community and the Regional Security System in the Eastern Caribbean to build capacity to conduct aerial and maritime surveillance and interdict illicit trafficking.

*Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)*

HA/DR consists of two separate but complementary missions. Humanitarian assistance provides support for basic human needs—food, water, shelter, and sanitation—to populations temporarily or chronically underserved. Disaster relief reduces the human suffering associated with natural disasters which cause the disruption of normal transportation and commerce and destroy infrastructure. Our annual humanitarian and civic assistance exercises provide valuable training for U.S. military medical, engineering, and combat support personnel, while complementing the Department of State and USAID’s goal of advancing community development and hemispheric prosperity. Disaster relief activities go beyond deploying our own forces when disaster strikes. We also seek to improve our partner nations’ capacity to conduct disaster relief operations within their own borders, and when possible, outside their borders. We envision a region in which mutual assistance is the norm.

Our annual training exercises in the Caribbean Basin and Central America help improve our ability to conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance at both the tactical and operational levels. In 2010, we conducted 76 medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs), resulting in the treatment of 276,827 patients throughout the region. During our annual engineering exercises—NEW HORIZONS and BEYOND THE HORIZONS—our forces built or renovated ten schools, six health centers, six sanitation facilities, two police stations, and seven water wells in communities in Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. These exercises also helped increase response capabilities of the participating partner

nations; during the course of the training, our forces provided valuable training to first responders and disaster managers in the host countries.

Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras provides regional support for responding to natural disasters and supporting counter drug operations with our partners in Central America and the Caribbean. In 2010, JTF-B medical personnel conducted four Medical Capability Projects in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, treating 6,981 patients and also supported relief efforts in Haiti and in Guatemala after the eruption of the Pacaya volcano and the landfall of Tropical Storm Agatha. I thank Congress for its continued support of JTF-B, especially for the appropriation of funds to support construction of new barracks at Soto Cano.

Unquestionably, the most significant 2010 HA/DR operation for U. S. Southern Command was Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti. The situation after the January 12<sup>th</sup> earthquake was grim: over 230,000 people killed, 300,000 wounded, and one million people displaced in our hemisphere's poorest country. Critical infrastructure, including the Port-au-Prince airport and seaport, was destroyed or unserviceable. Thirteen of fifteen government ministries were destroyed, crippling the Haitian government's ability to respond.

We established Joint Task Force-Haiti in support of USAID, the lead federal agency for the disaster response effort. Our response was immediate: within hours the airport was re-opened; within days maritime transportation was reestablished, allowing the influx of food, water, and medical supplies. U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines provided critical rescue, medical, and relief supply distribution support for the Haitian people. During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, U.S. forces delivered 2.3 million meals, 17 million pounds of bulk food, 2.6 million bottles of water, and almost 150,000 pounds of medical supplies. In addition,

Department of Defense medical personnel—operating on the ground as well as onboard USNS COMFORT—treated almost 10,000 patients, and conducted 1,025 surgeries and 343 medical evacuations. In partnership with non-governmental organizations and the private sector, U.S. Southern Command coordinated both the delivery of additional relief supplies worth \$36.2 million and the integration of 200 civilian medical specialists and translators into our relief efforts.

JTF-Haiti completed its mission on May 15<sup>th</sup>, but the end of our operation did not signify the end of our support to Haiti. Instead, we transitioned to a smaller mission consisting of targeted humanitarian and civic assistance exercises. As part of NEW HORIZONS HAITI 2010, approximately 500 personnel—mainly from the Louisiana National Guard—deployed to Haiti from June to September 2010. Engineers completed thirteen projects, building schools, improving wells, and constructing sanitation facilities. Medical forces conducted ten MEDRETES and established clinics that each served four to five thousand patients. Equally noteworthy, the exercise involved forces from another country in the region. Belize—partnering with the Louisiana National Guard under the State Partnership Program—deployed an engineer company to assist with reconstruction efforts. This example of regional collaboration represents the type of capability we actively seek to build and sustain throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Our commitment to Haiti is ongoing. As Haiti rebuilds, U.S. Southern Command will continue to conduct annual humanitarian and civil assistance exercises and respond to lingering effects of the devastating earthquake, as well as other humanitarian challenges.

U.S. Southern Command also supported U.S. Government disaster relief efforts in Chile following a devastating 8.8 magnitude earthquake on February 27<sup>th</sup> 2010. In support of USAID, approximately 150 U. S. military personnel deployed to Chile and worked with local and

international responders to deliver 300,000 pounds of relief supplies. Working with Chilean counterparts, a U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Medical Support team treated more than 300 patients. U.S. Southern Command also partnered with the private sector, which donated \$1.2 million in transportation assistance to ship 40,000 meals-ready-to-eat to Chile. It is important to note that Chile possessed the internal capacity to effectively respond to the disaster, requiring limited assistance from the U.S. and other nations. This epitomizes the type of capability we seek to promote with our other regional partners.

Finally, during hurricane season in the Caribbean Basin, U.S. Southern Command remains prepared to assist any partner nation in the region affected by a tropical cyclone. We design our annual maritime deployment, CONTINUING PROMISE, to conduct humanitarian assistance in the Caribbean Basin while maintaining readiness to respond to disaster relief efforts, if requested. This past year, USS IWO JIMA—with a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force of approximately 500 Marines, 128 NGO personnel, and 44 partner nation personnel embarked—deployed to the Caribbean Basin between July and November. During eight port visits, U.S. medical personnel treated 45,517 patients and performed 329 surgeries; dental personnel treated 15,472 patients; and veterinarians treated 26,969 animals. Engineers completed 23 projects over the course of the deployment. In late October, when Hurricane Tomas was forecast to strike Haiti with Category 3 strength, U.S. Southern Command diverted USS IWO JIMA from a scheduled port visit in Suriname to a safe location near Hispaniola as part of U.S. Government response preparations. Following landfall of the storm, USS IWO JIMA moved into the area quickly and U.S. Marine helicopters conducted several damage assessment flights. Fortunately, Hurricane Tomas only struck a glancing blow to southwestern



Haiti, and relief organizations already on the ground were able to respond to the minimal damage caused by the hurricane.

#### *Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)*

Our partner nations exhibit a tremendous capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations in the region and around the globe. During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, U.S. Southern Command drew on the strengths of our South American regional partners who comprised the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Led by a Brazilian general officer, peacekeepers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay were on the ground when the earthquake occurred and were instrumental in maintaining security and leading the initial response. MINUSTAH continues to play an invaluable role in Haiti through the on-going efforts of our hemispheric partners. U.S. Southern Command also supports peacekeeping efforts through our partnership in the Department of State's Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Joining with nine countries in the region, we develop or enhance national training capabilities and equip potential peacekeeping units for deployment of U.N. Peace Support Operations.<sup>9</sup> We conduct the annual PKO Americas exercise, which is designed to improve partner nation capacity to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations. In the coming year, we will continue to support GPOI and our regional partners who take the lead in peacekeeping operations.

### **Enduring Engagement**

#### *Military-to-Military*

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<sup>9</sup> GPOI countries: Belize, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Dominican Republic. Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador are pending diplomatic agreements.

Building partner nation capacity and enhancing interoperability is at the core of everything we do in our AOR. In implementing this strategy, we facilitate exchanges, seminars, and training exercises throughout the region with our partner militaries. A cornerstone of our engagement strategy is the International Military Education and Training program, which provides professional development for foreign military officers and senior enlisted personnel from Latin America and the Caribbean. Each year, U.S. Southern Command helps send approximately 5,000 students from the AOR to attend U.S. military training programs across the Department of Defense, to include the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Inter-American Defense College, and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. Our goal is to encourage our partner nation militaries to promote institutional professionalism within the context of democratic governance. These programs are vital to building and sustaining relations with our partners throughout the region.

Our training and education programs also promote respect for human rights with our military partners. These programs remain important across the region, but hold particular relevance in the few countries whose militaries are being asked by their governments to assist local police forces in supporting and enhancing internal security. U.S. Southern Command's programs support our military partners in preparing to assume these roles and help them provide clear instructions to their soldiers to support and respect human rights. Our human rights programs and initiatives remain an important aspect of our engagement throughout the region.

Our engagement strategy is reinforced through our Foreign Military Interaction (FMI) exercise program. Every year U.S. Southern Command sponsors seven military exercises specifically designed to facilitate interoperability, build capabilities, and provide venues to share best practices among the military and security forces in the region. Our largest multinational

exercise, PANAMAX 2010, brought together eighteen nations from the Western Hemisphere to train for the defense of the Panama Canal<sup>10</sup>. Other key FMI exercises in the region include TRADEWINDS, FUERZAS COMANDO, and UNITAS. These exercises provide a venue for participating militaries to train together and maintain security and stability within the region.

#### *Interagency*

Very few threats in the region require a conventional military response; as a result, the predominant security challenges we face are best addressed through the coordinated efforts of many U.S. government agencies. U.S. Southern Command headquarters is organized to support this coordination and collaboration; 27 representatives from 12 different agencies are embedded throughout our structure. This integration is both efficient and effective, allowing us to combine resources, perspectives, and expertise to collectively address issues in the region. Our interagency partners contribute to the development of strategic plans and participate in our joint exercises and operations, a cooperation that is critical to our success in the region. We continue to seek innovative ways to orchestrate our efforts across the U.S. Government to maximize our results.

#### **Requirements**

In order to successfully achieve our strategic objectives in the region, U.S. Southern Command has identified requirements in two key areas: *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance* and *Foreign Military Sales*.

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<sup>10</sup> PANAMAX participants: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) are critical enablers of U.S. Southern Command's operations. Effective countering of illicit trafficking operations is contingent upon our ability to detect and monitor illegal activities. As demonstrated during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, ISR is also valuable for supporting HA/DR operations. ISR components—such as improved imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and management tools, and biometrics—will improve our ability to synthesize a common operating picture to better support our operations in the region.

An additional source of valuable regional insight is information available and disseminated on the Internet. Social media and social networks provide opportunities for increased regional awareness and improved collaboration with our partners. U.S. Southern Command is improving our ability to analyze social media sources such as Twitter and blogs so we can identify regional trends early and accurately. When appropriate, we are also seeking to improve and expand the use of the All Partners Access Network, an online community that promotes collaboration among governmental and non-governmental organizations during exercises and operations.

We continue to work with the defense industry and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to identify promising technologies that match our requirements. Specific needs include: flexible, persistent manned and unmanned aerial vehicles; light detection and ranging technologies for foliage penetration; fast and flexible unmanned surface craft to support maritime domain awareness; acoustic and electronic sensor technologies to detect semi- and fully-submersible craft; commercial satellite radars with the ability to detect high-speed watercraft; next generation Over-the-Horizon radars; non-electro-optical imagery which enables change

detection; and the associated Tasking, Collection, Processing, and Dissemination architecture. Individually and collectively, all of these technologies enable our operations and represent opportunities to develop regional capabilities.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) are key components in the security assistance the U.S. Government provides our partner nations. The goal of these programs is to increase partner nation capability and capacity to help us address threats to security and stability. Ideally, FMS would be an efficient process to rapidly support and enhance partner nation capabilities and deliver products that are tailored and appropriate for a nation's requirement. Unfortunately, the current program is inflexible and does not allow for efficient coordination within the interagency community. An improved FMS program would increase interoperability, strengthen military and economic ties, and maximize the efficient use of resources. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has begun reforms that represent a promising start to addressing the inadequacies of the current FMS system. We also support efforts to pool State and Defense resources for the purpose of funding more robust and comprehensive security sector assistance programs to respond to emergent challenges and opportunities. These and other improvements are necessary to effectively develop a comprehensive, integrated security assistance program.

### **Conclusion**

U.S. Southern Command is committed to being a trusted, reliable partner of choice in the region. Our success will depend on our ability to engage effectively and transparently with regional militaries, partner nation governments, and our interagency partners. We actively work with the countries in our AOR to build enduring, mutually beneficial partnerships that address

our shared security concerns: violence and instability caused by TCOs and illicit trafficking, and the repercussions of natural disasters. Each training exercise and operation in the region is designed to increase partner nation capabilities to help us confront these challenges; we envision a region that is capable and willing to share the responsibility of hemispheric security and stability. Although we have experienced successes, we remain vigilant for evolving threats; watchful for new opportunities; and willing to engage with our partners to enhance our international, interagency, and public-private relationships.

None of the progress we made this year would be possible without the dedication and hard work of our military and civilian personnel, the support of their families, and the cooperation by the men and women from our partner agencies who serve alongside us. I thank Congress again for your continued support to all the dedicated professionals at U.S. Southern Command as we serve together to accomplish our mission.

DOUGLAS M. FRASER

General, U. S. Air Force

<sup>i</sup> U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Travel and Tourism Industries. *2009 Market Profile: Central America, 2009 Market Profile: South America, 2009 Market Profile: Caribbean, and 2009 United States Resident Travel Abroad*. From 2002-2009, travel from the AOR to the U. S. increased by 32 percent and from the U. S. to the AOR by 41 percent.

<sup>ii</sup> Hornbeck, J.F. (2010). *U.S. Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues*. Congressional Research Services: June 25, 2010.

<sup>iii</sup> The Economic Commission for Latin America (2010). *Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010*. Available online at: <http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/prensa/noticias/comunicados/9/41979/P41979.xml&xsl=/prensa/tpl-i/p6f.xsl&base=/tpl-i/top-bottom.xsl>

<sup>iv</sup> The Economic Commission for Latin America (2010). *Social Panorama of Latin America 2010*. Santiago, Chile: November 2010.

<sup>v</sup> United Nations Development Programme. *2010 Human Development Report*. Available online at: [http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR\\_2010\\_EN\\_Complete\\_reprint.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf)

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<sup>vii</sup> MDS (Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome) (2009). *Programas de Transferencia Condicionada de Renda: o caso do Bolsa Família*. Presentation made in the Employment and Social Policies Committee of the ILO Governing Body, March (Geneva). Cited in ILO Report (referenced above).

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**General Douglas Fraser**  
**Commander, U.S. Southern Command**



General Douglas Fraser comes to U.S. Southern Command from U.S. Pacific Command, where he served as the Deputy Commander from 2008-2009. He is a 1975 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and a native of Colorado. He spent three years of high school in Bogota, Colombia, graduating from Colegio Nueva Granada in 1971.

General Fraser has commanded operational units across the U.S. Air Force, including the 12th Fighter Squadron at Kadena Air Base, Japan, the 366th Operations Group at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho and the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska from 2000-2002.

Following his time at the 3rd Wing, he commanded the Space Warfare Center at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado and four distinct commands while serving his second time in Alaska, including Alaskan Command, the Alaskan North American Defense Region, Joint Task Force Alaska, and Eleventh Air Force at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.

General Fraser's staff assignments include Aide to the 12th Air Force Commander, action officer for Air Force's Directorate of Programs and Resources, the Air Force Chief of Staff's Action Group, and analysis assistant in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements. He also served as the Director of the Chief of Staff's Air Force Operations Group from 1996-1997, as the Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command from 1999-2000, and was the Director of Air and Space Operations for Air Force Space Command from 2003-2005.

General Fraser's operational flying assignments include Bitburg Air Base, Germany; Luke Air Force Base, Arizona; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; Kadena Air Base, Japan; Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. He is a command pilot with more than 2,800 flying hours, primarily in the F-15A/B/C/D, the F-15E and the F-16.

General Fraser graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science. He earned a Masters Degree in Political Science from Auburn University in 1987. He is also a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, National War College, and the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course.

His decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters and the Legion of Merit.



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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF  
ADMIRAL JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., U.S. NAVY  
COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND  
AND  
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND  
BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
30 MARCH 2011

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts on the missions and focus areas of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Let me begin by saying how impressed I am by the talented cadre of professionals—from the active and reserve components of all Services of the U.S. military, DOD civilians, our Canadian partners, and representatives from 68 different civilian organizations—who work in and about my headquarters in Colorado Springs each and every day. It is truly humbling to work with such a great team.

I'm also very encouraged by the strong partnership we have with the National Guard: they are essential to operational success across the full spectrum of our missions. We have over 40 full-time National Guard positions in USNORTHCOM, including my Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Frank Grass, from the Missouri Army National Guard, and on any given day, the number of Guardsmen in our headquarters is around one hundred. The Army National Guard provides the bulk of personnel for air defense capabilities protecting our Nation's capital. In addition, they provide all of the manning at our Ground-Based Interceptor sites in support of missile defense. They are also currently developing additional capabilities to take on a much larger role in support of consequence management in the aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack. And finally, the Air National Guard provides the majority of NORAD's operational force for Air Sovereignty Alert missions. Simply said, we could not do our missions without the National Guard, and I'm very pleased with the positive trajectory of our relationship.

We in North America face a changing world that presents us with many challenges. These include violent extremists, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue nations,

traditional competitor states, transnational criminal organizations, insecurity within the global commons, economic distress, natural disasters, emerging infectious diseases, and the effects of climate change. Each of these challenges poses a potential threat to the United States, Canada, and our regional partners and is pertinent to the missions of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Fortunately, we also enjoy great strengths and are presented with opportunities born of our nations' ideals, ideas, and resources and those of our partners. Today I will describe how we plan to capitalize on these opportunities to overcome the challenges we face.

The mission statements for USNORTHCOM and NORAD reflect the language in the *Unified Command Plan* and the *NORAD Agreement*.

**USNORTHCOM Mission:** United States Northern Command conducts homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests.

**NORAD Mission:** North American Aerospace Defense Command conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America.

Accomplishing these missions demands a diverse array of disciplines and activities within my headquarters. Accordingly, and in order to assist me in allocating my two commands' time and resources, I have grouped our activities into the following eight focus areas:

**Counterterrorism and Force Protection.** Because violent extremists present a threat that currently exhibits both the capability and the intent to attack our nation, Counterterrorism and Force Protection continue to be a vital focus area for USNORTHCOM and NORAD.

Within the confines of our borders, current laws, policies, and democratic traditions and practices properly restrict most counterterrorism activities to civil authorities. As a result, USNORTHCOM's principal role is to synchronize joint force protection and ensure military

infrastructure across our area of responsibility is properly postured to mitigate and prevent potential terrorist attacks. However, we are fully aligned within the federal government's counterterrorism network and play a supporting role—assisting with information sharing and remaining prepared to supply military-unique capabilities or to enhance civilian capacity when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

To help prevent acts of terrorism, we are working to improve information sharing to better position ourselves to preemptively detect and protect against these threats, particularly in regard to our military bases and other infrastructure. We are fully implementing the relevant recommendations of the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood, and have made progress over the last year in our ability to rapidly disseminate threat information to DOD installations when required. In the wake of a terrorist event, we are prepared to support civil authorities, as directed, to assist in mitigating the consequences.

**Countering Transnational Criminal Organizations.** The United States and Mexico—and many of our other Western Hemisphere partners—are confronting serious security and public health challenges driven by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) responsible for illicit trafficking of drugs, human beings, money, and weapons.

The facts are daunting. Over 34,000 Mexicans have lost their lives in the last four years, including a dozen mayors in 2010. Murder, kidnapping, extortion, and other crimes have intimidated large segments of the Mexican populace, primarily, but not exclusively, along our shared border. In some areas, the TCOs have muzzled the media and chased away businesses.

Meanwhile, on the U.S. side of the border, the Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that Mexican TCOs operate in over 230 U.S. cities. Each year illicit, drug-related deaths number in the thousands, and treatment center admissions and emergency treatment facility visits both

exceed a million. The annual direct cost for treatment, prevention, interdiction, and local law enforcement of drug abuse exceeds \$52 billion. These and other consequences of drug abuse, including lost productivity, the impact on the criminal justice system, and the environmental impact resulting from the production of illicit drugs are estimated to cost our nation nearly \$181 billion annually.

The TCOs are vicious, well-financed and heavily armed, due in no small part to cash and weapons smuggled across our southern border. They have diversified their businesses and are increasingly sophisticated in their methods. By fighting one another and the government for the impunity to pursue their illicit trade, the TCOs are confronting Mexico with a complex, but not unprecedented, blend of trafficking activities and challenging security problems. I am profoundly impressed by the determination and courage of the Mexican Government, the various Mexican security forces, and the Mexican people in taking on this challenge. They know this is about the long-term future of their country.

The complex challenges associated with defeating the TCOs and the abundant opportunities for progress all underscore the vital importance of our close relationship with Mexico. In my ten months as the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I have observed the Mexican security forces work with increasing effectiveness against the TCOs, gradually achieving success in unraveling these organized crime networks. The Mexican Army and Navy have been drawn into this struggle due to the severe threat it poses to Mexico's security and prosperity, and are working hard to overcome several important challenges. First, they must operate under the legal restrictions to which any democratic nation's military must adhere when operating within its own territory. Second, they are temporarily transforming from a traditional force to one that can be called upon to confront threats from domestic criminal enterprises. Third, they are working hard

to build interagency teamwork, with budding indications of success. Finally, and despite a very information-savvy adversary, they are determined to respect human rights during their operations, and have been eager to gain insights from our own hard-earned lessons in this area. None of these challenges are foreign to our own military. And the fact that many of the families of these security forces reside in the same areas where TCO violence is greatest only heightens the respect we have for our Mexican partners.

In keeping with U.S. Government policy and the law, we are working closely with the country team in Mexico City and other key stakeholders to assist the Mexican Government in defeating the TCOs. Building on the momentum established by our civilian leadership, the Mexican and U.S. militaries have forged a cooperative relationship based upon mutual respect, professionalism, and reciprocity. With all our partners, we have stressed the many dimensions of the solution—including building strong and resilient communities, forming more robust judicial institutions, establishing a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Border, and directly disrupting the TCOs themselves. Regarding the latter, we are working with our Mexican military partners to enhance their materiel capability and capacity, as well as sharing our own operational insights. In so doing, we carefully emphasize the sovereignty, dignity, and capability of a proud Mexican nation, which recently celebrated 200 years of independence.

Another important partner in this effort is the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), which provides an effective mechanism to build relationships with militaries throughout the hemisphere and to influence a positive trajectory on human rights. In June and December, I participated in the WHINSEC Board of Visitors meetings, and I have been impressed by the quality of WHINSEC's faculty and students and the foundation of respect for human rights upon which its various curricula rest. In FY10, there were 108 Mexican students at

WHINSEC and I would like to see that number grow. Moreover, it is an important message both to and from Mexico that WHINSEC's Assistant Commandant is a Mexican officer.

USNORTHCOM also provides a considerable amount of support to our interagency partners operating on the U.S. side of the border. Such support includes construction of personnel barriers, roads, and bridges; air and ground transportation; intelligence support; and training in and fusion of intelligence and operations. We have begun to combine the intelligence assets at Joint Task Force North in El Paso, Texas with the interagency El Paso Intelligence Center to enable greater unity of effort. We are working closely with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to share some of our lessons learned from ten years of countering a different irregular threat overseas, including a close partnership in CBP's Tucson Sector. Additionally, over the past year we employed multiple sensors, including radar, forward-looking infrared, as well as manned and unmanned aerial surveillance in support of the U.S. Border Patrol's counternarcotics operations on both the northern and southern borders.

In support of our northern border, last year Joint Task Force North dedicated 22% of its available resources to supporting law enforcement agencies in securing the northern border. Our support in this region included eight operational missions that provided aerial reconnaissance, ground-based radar, and ground-based sensor support; eight mobile training teams that taught targeting and intelligence courses; and one intelligence analyst who provided intelligence expertise.

From a southern border perspective, recently the aerial reconnaissance support we provided under existing counterdrug authorities assisted in the apprehension of the suspected killers of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. From November 2010 to January 2011, this platform assisted in the interdiction of 17,000 pounds of marijuana.



**Defense Support of Civil Authorities.** The complexity of our nation's response to natural and man-made disasters presents ample challenges and opportunities for improvement. We can respond relatively quickly to events with available DOD capability—when called upon by civil authorities. We are looking for ways to eliminate barriers to speed, enhance cooperation with our mission partners, and lean forward with Governors and the National Guard to advance understanding and teamwork.

With our National Guard partners, we are successfully exploring new ways to close an historical gap in philosophy regarding command and control of federal forces operating in support of a state in the wake of a disaster. Over the past year, together we made significant progress on an initiative, supported by the Secretary of Defense and the Council of Governors, to prepare “dual status commanders” to achieve true unity of effort between state and federal military forces in response to a natural or man-made Stafford Act incident or Economy Act event. This initiative is transforming the way we do business together. I look forward to the next National Level Exercise this spring, in which we will have the opportunity to thoroughly examine the progress we have made over the last year in unity of effort using a New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake scenario.

As a signal of our deepening relationship, USNORTHCOM for the first time hosted Adjutants General from 54 U.S. states and territories attending the National Guard Bureau Senior Leader Conference in October 2010. The conference focused on improving understanding, fostering relationships, and furthering collaboration between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard.

In addition, I have had the honor of participating in two Council of Governors meetings. The bipartisan Council of Governors was directed by Congress in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and established by President Obama by Executive Order on 11 January 2010 to advise the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, and the White House Homeland Security Council on matters related to the National Guard and civil support missions. These meetings have proved to be a key forum for progress in ensuring unity of effort in responding quickly in the event of disasters or other emergencies that affect the American people.

As a Combatant Commander, I am a strong advocate for the Reserve Component. I firmly believe our nation needs a strong and well-equipped Guard and Reserve force. As such, I urge Congress to fully fund the Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget request for Reserve and National Guard capabilities for both federal and non-federal roles.

We continue to tighten our already-close relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with frequent senior leader exchanges and planning efforts. I also recently directed establishment within my staff of a cadre of Regional Desk Officers charged with working with the Defense Coordinating Officers associated with each FEMA Region, as well as a host of other partners, to bring better understanding and coordination of disaster planning between my headquarters and the various state and federal agencies.

Finally, we are closely examining the role USNORTHCOM would play in response to a cyber attack in order to synchronize our efforts with U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command. We view our role as assisting the lead federal agency in mitigating the physical effects of such an event, while staying close to our partners working in the cyber domain.

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management.**

Managing the aftermath of a CBRN event would be exceptionally challenging due to the

potential scope of an event, the specialized skills required, and the general lack of knowledge among our population of the relative hazards associated with such an incident. USNORTHCOM has a key leadership role in ensuring our nation is prepared to succeed in this mission area. The Quadrennial Defense Review directed a transition to a CBRN Consequence Management Enterprise with more responsibility resident within the National Guard, more lifesaving capability, and faster response times. I am convinced this is the right path for this capability, which will be in high demand if such an event ever occurs. USNORTHCOM and our ground component command, U.S. Army North, are working closely with the National Guard Bureau and the Joint Staff to assist in making the new enterprise operational. The first two state Homeland Response Forces and the federal Defense CBRN Response Force, or DCRF, will stand up this fiscal year. While we collectively have much work to do to bring this project to fruition, I am pleased to report that together with our partners we have leveraged excellent teamwork across the board in this effort, and are committed to ensuring a smooth transition from existing to planned capability in this area.

**Maritime Warning and Control.** We remain concerned with potential threats in the maritime environment—whether presented by nation-states, extremists, or a natural event. Moreover, opportunities abound for shared awareness and control and much remains to be done to both clarify and energize NORAD’s mission area of Maritime Warning.

One of our key projects this year is to strengthen our day-to-day maritime competency relationships for USNORTHCOM and NORAD to enable improved planning, maritime domain awareness, training, theater security cooperation, and execution of homeland defense and security operations—and to do so without requiring additional investment.

**Aerospace Warning and Control.** This continually evolving mission is NORAD’s

central focus, and it maintains the same importance to the United States and Canada that it has for over 52 years. It's a real privilege to have 122 Canadians in my headquarters as part of a team that reflects the overall vitality of the relationship between our two nations.

We continue to challenge our assumptions in this arena to ensure we are accounting for potential changes in threats before they occur, while offering our two nations our best thinking on how to execute this mission as efficiently as possible.

We view this problem as a spectrum of potential threats with varying capabilities and intentions. Despite recent improvements in U.S.-Russian relations that reflect a dramatically reduced likelihood of conflict, we maintain our vigilance regarding the high-end threat to the United States and Canada because of enduring and continually improving Russian capability. However, our principal concern remains potential extremist intent to again use civil aircraft, ranging from commercial airliners to general aviation aircraft to ultra-lights, as a means for employing terrorist tactics. While we have made tremendous progress in our efforts to ensure a 9/11-type of event can never occur again, the threat continues to search for ways to exploit potential vulnerabilities. Accordingly, we search every day for new ways to improve our tactics, techniques, procedures, and technical capability to enable us to execute the detect-assess-engage sequence as effectively as possible.

To do so, we need the right capability in the right place at the right time. We are analyzing our future Air Sovereignty Alert requirements and sharing this analysis with the leadership of the U.S. Air Force and the Air National Guard. We are focusing our analytical effort on exactly what our Air Sovereignty Alert force is intended to protect, against what types of threats, under what conditions, and at what cost. As part of this effort, we are identifying capability gaps to the Joint Staff and the Services that we believe are required to defend against an evolving threat and

contributing to an examination of means by which some of these gaps, which remain classified, might be filled. In addition, we are preparing a Report to Congress on the Air Sovereignty Alert mission as directed by Section 333 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2011.

We also need to ensure we have the right capacity to execute the Air Sovereignty Alert mission—not too much and not too little. Given the recently announced slip in the F-35 program, NORAD is working closely with and counting on the Air Force to ensure we have adequate resources to sustain our mission. This is critical because seven of our Air Sovereignty Alert sites fly older model F-16s, which are currently scheduled to reach the end of their service life between 2020 and 2023.

Another area we are watching closely is the pace of wind farm development. Increases in the number of wind farms raise the likelihood that radar signals vital to our ability to protect the national airspace will be obstructed. We believe enabling the construction of alternative energy sources and conducting our national air defense mission are not mutually exclusive as long as we exercise due diligence in assessing the impact of potential projects. To this end, we have developed a more mature process for evaluating the impact of wind farms on national security. Multi-departmental cooperation is required to develop the policy, technical solutions, and future surveillance infrastructure that will provide both national security and renewable energy at the same time.

We are also fostering a more collaborative relationship with the Russian Federation. In August 2010, NORAD and the Russian Federation completed an historic first—a cooperative three-day, live-fly exercise designed to establish clear communication processes that would allow our two forces to work together during a real crisis. The exercise, VIGILANT EAGLE,

was an international air terrorism scenario exercised over the Pacific Ocean consisting of forces from the United States and Russia responding to the simulated hijacking of a B-757 en route to and from the Far East. The exercise scenario created a situation that required both the Russian Air Force and NORAD to launch or divert fighter aircraft to investigate and follow a hijacked airliner, with a focus on shadowing and coordinated hand-off of monitored aircraft between fighters of our two nations. This exercise was an overwhelming success and has helped create an environment for further cooperative efforts.

**Missile Defense.** Several nations are developing the capacity to target North America with ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction in the belief those weapons will give them more freedom of action. Thus far, the United States is pacing the threat, but a lack of certainty of threat intentions and capabilities demands vigilance and agility. We focus on three imperatives in order to perform our missile defense mission:

- Execute the ballistic missile defense mission with precision using the existing Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) fleet located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and Fort Greely, Alaska
- Develop realistic training simulations and constantly train as we intend to fight
- Assist the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Strategic Command as they continue concurrent research and development activities to improve capability

I have gained increased confidence in the existing ballistic missile defense system's ability—including our sensors, weapons systems, and highly trained operators—to defend against current limited threats. Nonetheless, I would like to see a more robust and redundant architecture for sensor and command and control nodes. It is critical that we continue to ensure our sensor network provides adequate warning and targeting information, that we test the entire

system to verify its reliability and validate ongoing improvements, and that we remain vigilant to ensure our capabilities remain ahead of the evolving threat. Accordingly, I fully support the Department's recent decision to keep the GBI production line open until at least 2016, as well as consideration to procure additional GBIs in light of recent flight test results.

As we continue to monitor other nations' advancements in their long-range missile programs, I am optimistic the Administration's Phased Adaptive Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense will add another layer of defense for the homeland if future conceptual programs envisioned to support this approach materialize and mature. In the meantime, MDA has begun to demonstrate a 2-stage GBI capability that I believe could contribute to U.S. homeland defense if a more mature threat appears more rapidly than we had originally projected.

I remain alert to our ability to defend the nation against the potential future threat of cruise missiles and other less conventional forms of air attack from off our coasts. This is a complex problem space that is defined by: the spectrum of capabilities and intentions of potential threats; our ability to generate indications that these capabilities or intentions might be changing; and the costs, timelines, and capabilities of varying levels of potential defensive postures. Presently, we are aware of no threat possessing both capability and intent to conduct such an attack. However, we must remain vigilant and prepared to adjust our posture should a threat combination emerge that changes this equation. Clearly, a strong deterrence posture is one of our most important hedges against such a threat. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are drafting a Report to Congress on this issue as directed by the House Report to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (House Report 111-491).

**The Arctic.** The geopolitical importance of the Arctic has never been greater, because as far as we know, the natural environment in the Arctic in civilized times has never changed faster.

Up to 25% of the world's remaining undiscovered oil and natural gas deposits may lie beneath the Arctic ice cap. While most experts believe it will be some time before commercial Arctic shipping routes through the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route see a significant increase in volume, some countries and commercial interests are actively testing the waters and making plans to increase their activity. We have seen a marked increase in Arctic ecotourism, and its attendant safety concerns, including the grounding of a cruise ship in the Northwest Passage last summer.

Because these changes involve a complex mosaic of issues, challenges, and opportunities, and because a peaceful Arctic is central to the continued safety and security of the United States, I have elevated the Arctic to the status of a key focus area. We are crafting a Commander's Estimate on the Arctic for use within DOD, and my commands are examining how we can best support our interagency partners in this region with search and rescue assets, humanitarian assistance, disaster response capabilities, and support to law enforcement. We are also working hand-in-hand with Canada Command as a vital partner to produce a concept of operations regarding how we would partner in the Arctic to ensure our efforts are coordinated and that we pursue complementary rather than redundant capabilities in accordance with our respective national direction.

Regarding capabilities, we are maturing our understanding of our gaps in this unique environment. We face shortcomings in all-domain awareness, communications, infrastructure (to include a deepwater port), mobility (to include adequate national icebreaking capability), search and rescue enabling capabilities, Arctic Ocean charting, and the ability to observe and forecast Arctic environmental change.



The good news is that cooperation is on the rise in the Arctic, and we must continue that trajectory using the array of mechanisms available to us, such as the Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. I would like to add my voice to those of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations in urging the Senate to ratify the latter. Becoming party to the Convention would protect and advance U.S. interests in the Arctic by bolstering our national security, securing U.S. rights over extensive marine areas, and giving the United States a seat at the table when our vital interests are at stake—without abdicating any sovereignty.

**Conclusion.** It is a privilege to be the military commander charged with the diverse array of missions to protect our vital interests in our homeland, whether deterring or defeating a direct attack, or supporting civil authorities in disrupting and defeating TCOs, or supporting other civil authorities in responding to disasters.

You have a great team in USNORTHCOM and NORAD—Americans and Canadians serving side-by-side. We are proud to serve together and as we do, we remember the vital importance to both the United States and Canada of the NORAD partnership, as well as the broad spectrum of missions demanded of USNORTHCOM. We pledge to you—the U.S. Congress and the American and Canadian people—to give each one our best effort. Thank you.

## United States Navy Biography

### Admiral James A. "Sandy" Winnefeld, Jr. Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and Commander, United States Northern Command

Admiral Winnefeld graduated from the Georgia Institute of Technology and received his commission from the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps program. He subsequently served with three fighter squadrons flying the F-14 Tomcat and as an instructor at the Navy Fighter Weapons School.

Winnefeld's unit commands at sea include Fighter Squadron 211, USS *Cleveland* (LPD 7), and USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65). He led *Enterprise* through her 18th deployment, which included combat operations in Afghanistan in support of Operation *Enduring Freedom* immediately after the terrorist acts of Sept. 11, 2001. As commander, Carrier Strike Group Two/Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, he led Task Forces 50, 152, and 58 in support of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and maritime interception operations in the Arabian Gulf. His most recent command tour was as commander, United States 6th Fleet, commander NATO Allied Joint Command Lisbon, and commander Striking and Support Forces NATO.



His shore tours include service in the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3), as senior aide to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as executive assistant to the vice chief of naval operations. As a flag officer he served ashore as director, Warfare Programs and Transformational Concepts, United States Fleet Forces Command and as director of Joint Innovation and Experimentation at United States Joint Forces Command. He most recently served as the director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) on the Joint Staff.

Winnefeld's awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal, and five Battle Efficiency awards.

Updated: 26 July 2010

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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

MARCH 30, 2011

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## RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Admiral STAVRIDIS. On April 4, 2011 EUCOM representatives provided a copy of the then current NATO rules of engagement for Libya operations to Representative Thornberry's office. [See page 33.]

## RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Admiral WINNEFELD. Lessons from our support to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics (Operation PODIUM) pertain to Command and Control; Relationships and Interaction; Information Management; and Guiding Documents, Concept Plans (CONPLANs), and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).

### COMMAND AND CONTROL

- **Multiple Supported Commanders.** During the Olympics, there were two supported commanders: Commander, Canada Command (Canada COM) and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Although there were no fundamental doctrinal issues with multiple supported commanders and there were no issues with defining tasks during the actual operation, there were minor issues with planning, theater activation, theater deactivation and personnel administration that were complicated by the dual nature of the supported commanders.
- **Way Ahead.** In conjunction with the Secretary, Joint Staff (SJS), develop the standing Canadian Special Security Event framework, recommend modifications to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Command and Control Directive, and provide input for new CDS Initiating Directives to clearly identify roles, responsibilities, and missions for the supported commanders.
- **Tactical Control (TACON) of Forces.** There were concerns within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) regarding TACON of U.S. forces to the Canadian Forces (CF). Although the Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) clearly states that the host nation will have TACON over visiting forces, there were concerns stated during Operation PODIUM that were only resolved after long discussions.
- **Way Ahead.** One possible resolution of this issue is to have the signing authority for the CAP at the SecDef and CDS level, rather than, Commander, USNORTHCOM and Commander, Canada COM level. This could also be an issue to be resolved by Permanent Joint Board on Defense.
- **Common Operating Picture (COP)—Tracking of Forces.** There appears to be different expectations within USNORTHCOM and Canada COM as to the COP. Forces within Canada are not equipped with a Situational Awareness System (Blue Force Tracker). Therefore, the level of fidelity available to and requested by Commander, Canada COM may be less than what is available to Commander, USNORTHCOM.
- **Way Ahead.** A clear understanding of what a COP means to each of the nations is required for the CAP. Although this will often be commander dependent, it will still establish a baseline of understanding from which planning and information management requirements can be developed.

### RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTION

- **Medical Overall.** There are a significant number of hurdles that need to be overcome for medical personnel, pharmaceuticals and counter-measures to be employed cross-border. These issues should continue to be addressed through both governments' medical services so that the employment of medical personnel, pharmaceuticals and counter-measures can be expedited through a clearly defined process.
- **Way Ahead.**
  - **Patient Regulation.** To achieve maximum benefit should patient regulation be required within Canada, a more robust patient regulation system should be developed. Canada could either modify the existing U.S. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) or develop a de novo Canadian

- system. Either system should be compatible with the U.S. system to facilitate moving patients across the border should that be required.
- **Reciprocal Licensing.** Refine three courses of action and determine best course: continue current practice of emergency waiving of licensure at the state and provincial level; seek pre-approval for military and NDMS personnel based on credentialing processes currently used for these personnel; or, build on existing provincial/state cross border public health agreements to ease reciprocity of licensure.
  - **Cross Border.** Overall, the preparation for U.S. forces to come across the border into Canada was well coordinated. However, there may be a difference between deliberate planning of crossing operations and crisis planning. Several issues still need to be further investigated with regards to border crossing.
  - **Way Ahead.**
    - The Visiting Forces Act (VFA) and Status of Forces Act (SOFA) should be validated for contingency operations (not just exercises and training).
    - The issue of servicemembers with criminal records needs to be examined and if the requirement to pre-screen these members exists, this should be captured in the CAP.

#### INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

- **Canadian Communications Systems Network (CSNI) Effectiveness of Access for the United States.** CSNI was chosen for Operation PODIUM because it is the main Canadian secure system and the system is widely available within NORAD and USNORTHCOM. Other terminals were added as required (Washington State and Joint Task Force Civil Support) to ensure even greater connectivity. However, there are significant challenges to using CSNI in the United States.
- **Way Ahead.**
  - We should continue to pursue the initiative to allow interoperability between CSNI and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, particularly in terms of email between the commands.
  - When Law Enforcement Agencies are involved, more planning and greater effort will be required to develop an Information Management (IM) plan that recognizes law enforcement sensitivities, but doesn't create a military "firewall" for information.
- **Sharing of Lessons Learned.** Canada and the United States have different software systems for capturing lessons learned and these systems do not talk to each other. In addition, there is no formalized process for the three commands to sharing lessons learned.
  - **Way Ahead.** A formalized "knowledge sharing" process for sharing lessons learned should be developed for the commands.

#### GUIDING DOCUMENTS, CONPLANS, AND MOUs

- **Guiding Documents, CONPLANS and MOUs.** In general, the guiding documents that are in place worked for Operation PODIUM. However, several of these documents should be modified or re-examined in light of some of the lessons learned during the operation.
- **CAP.** The CAP should
  - Include a detailed IM plan to provide a baseline for future security events.
  - Document processes that are in place so that medical requirements can be expedited.
  - Contain a legal annex that identifies key differences between operating in the United States and in Canada, and highlights key legal authority documents like the SOFA and VFA.
  - Include a financial annex to provide a framework for fiscal reimbursement and dispensation.
- **SOFA and VFA.** Both of these documents were used extensively by military and interagency organizations to support the deployment of U.S. forces across the border. Applicability of the VFA and SOFA needs to be confirmed prior to the commencement of any particular operation.
- **CF CDS C2 Directive and CDS Initiating Directives.** The CF CDS C2 Directive should be revisited with the SJS to clarify some of the relationships between NORAD and Canada COM, especially during special security events. Since dual supported commanders for operations will likely not disappear, a more detailed understanding of the linkages during planning, theater activation/deactivation and personnel administration is required. [See page 23.]

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER**

General FRASER. What we have not done yet, and what we are working to do, is to ensure a regional, integrated counterdrug strategy—connecting our efforts in Colombia, the Andean ridge, Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and the U.S. The problems Mexico is facing are implicitly connected to the cocaine production in the Andean region; that cocaine is trafficked through the Central American corridor, through Mexico, and into the U.S. or abroad to the rest of the world. As an example, USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM are actively working together to ensure there is no seam between our commands, focusing in particular on strengthening border security along Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. To be truly impactful, our counter-narcotics strategy needs to be coordinated in concert with our partner nations, taking into account their capabilities, resources, and particular concerns as well as with our interagency partners, such as Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, under the lead of the Department of State, to ensure an integrated and comprehensive strategy.

In spite of continued regional successes, many challenges continue to exist. We are actively working to promote information sharing among countries in the region to better coordinate our counter drug strategy. Regional security initiatives like the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) are designed to build partner nation capability, which USSOUTHCOM actively supports through our engagement and security cooperation activities in the region. We envision a region that is capable and willing to help address security threats that affect all nations in this hemisphere.

Recent world economic challenges, as well as other security challenges, have resulted in limitations on available resources. This has resulted in a void of assets which otherwise would have the potential to disrupt roughly 66% of the actionable intelligence driven cases. In contrast, transnational criminal organizations adapt quickly to effective counter measures and have significant financial resources. The recent confirmation that these organizations use submarines, called Self-Propelled Fully Submersibles, underscores the technology and resources available to these organizations.

There is no silver bullet. Through the engagement efforts of U.S. Southern Command, regional cooperation will continue to evolve and strengthen. [See page 22.]

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO**

Admiral WINNEFELD. Ma'am, you are correct. Guam has the highest per capita National Guard membership in the nation with 1500+ Guardsmen for 180,800 persons. [See page 30.]

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS**

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) occupies a great deal of our attention in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) theater, and EUCOM is working with our partners in the State Department, Missile Defense Agency, Services, and Components to ensure we implement and operationalize EPAA to defend U.S. forces and interests in Europe.

For Phase 1, the USS MONTEREY, a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser, is already in theater, laying the foundation for Phase 1 and the transition to operational capability. This ship represents the first asset deployed under the EPAA as well as the intercept capability planned for Phase 1. To enhance this capability, EUCOM is supporting the State Department's basing negotiations for the AN/TPY-2 radar and working closely with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Army Europe to ensure deployment as soon as possible once negotiations are complete.

For Phase 2, EUCOM is fully supporting negotiations led by the State Department to establish basing and agreements necessary for the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. We will work closely with the U.S. Navy and the Missile Defense Agency as the Aegis Ashore development program continues.

For Phase 3, EUCOM is working with a key ally, Poland, to lay the groundwork and define the terms and conditions necessary for the eventual construction of an Aegis Ashore facility in that country.

Finally, EUCOM and our Component staffs continue to work with our NATO counterparts to develop the procedures and define the systems we will use to achieve the missile defense language outlined in the goals of the Lisbon Summit. [See page 26.]

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN**

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report, which concurred with the report's two recommendations, and has taken remedial action on both fronts. I also support DoD's response to the report's conclusion, which reads: "Although the Department concurs with the specific report recommendations, the Department nonetheless takes issue with a report conclusion that 'Keeping more Army forces in Europe than originally planned would result in significant additional costs...' (page 3). This report does not consider the full cost of the CONUS basing alternative, including the cost to build new infrastructure in CONUS, or the cost to rotate units from CONUS to Europe on temporary deployments to maintain a forward presence. Because it ignores these costs, the conclusion of the report is unfounded."

At U.S. European Command (EUCOM), we understand the importance of developing a defined process and establishing a clear methodology for evaluating force posture alternatives. To that end, my team—working in concert with the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, U.S. Army, and U.S. government inter-agency representatives—has taken definitive steps to institute and ensure proper, balanced, and transparent analysis. Those steps include: 1) the codification of OSD guidance, specific cost/benefit criteria (political/military, operational, force structure/force management, and costs), and defined posture processes in an updated EUCOM posture planning instruction; 2) a clear definition and delineation of the roles and responsibilities of EUCOM Headquarters' two posture planning bodies, the EUCOM Posture Executive Council (EPEC) and the EUCOM Posture Implementation Team (EPIT), into EUCOM's latest Theater Posture Plan; 3) the wider inclusion of inter-agency representatives into EUCOM's theater posture planning efforts; and 4) continued coordination with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the supporting Services to include known installation operations and maintenance (O&M) costs into force posture considerations. I am confident that these steps will help address and remediate the issues raised in the GAO report.

Post-hearing Note: Finally, I support the Department's decision, announced on April 8, 2011, to retain three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe, as well as DoD's conclusion that this decision "will enhance and rebalance the U.S. force posture in Europe to make it more capable, more effective, and better aligned with current and future security challenges." On specific questions of cost with respect to the BCT decision, I would respectfully refer you to the Director of OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the Department of the Army, who remain the governmental agencies responsible for final cost analysis and evaluation. [See page 28.]

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WEST**

General FRASER. There are no confirmed links between Latin American Trans National Criminal Organizations and Islamic Radical Groups. However, there are several familial clans of Lebanese descent involved in illegal activity, to include drug trafficking and the laundering of drug proceeds throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. These clans have publically been associated with Hizballah. They typically operate within the Free Trade Zones in the region and use the permissive environment to facilitate their activities. In addition, supporters and sympathizers of Lebanese Hizballah in Latin America reportedly move multi-hundred kilogram quantities of cocaine to Europe and the Middle East each year. We assess that Hizballah receives tens of millions of dollars annually from supporters in Latin America involved in drug trafficking. [See page 32.]



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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

MARCH 30, 2011

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### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. Last month we discussed the NATO Deterrence Review. I get the sense that this review may jump right to “how” we deter and not examine “who” or “what” we’re trying to deter.

a) How do you conduct a deterrence review without first identifying “who” or “what” we’re deterring?

b) Also, Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons; the U.S. has a few hundred. Is it in our national security interest to unilaterally reduce or withdraw our U.S. nuclear forces in Europe?

c) What role do nuclear weapons play in the NATO Alliance?

d) What role do U.S. nuclear forces in Europe play?

Admiral STAVRIDIS.

a) I am assured that it will be a thorough and complete review—taking into account all the evolving changes and factors in the current and foreseeable security environment. It will help determine the appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces that NATO will need to deter and defend against threats to the Alliance and its member states.

b) The United States Government has repeatedly stated we will consult with our NATO Allies on reduction or withdrawal of nuclear forces and will not take unilateral action. I strongly support that policy.

c) The NATO Strategic Concept preface states “as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” It further points out that deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO’s overall strategy. To reiterate Secretary Clinton, nuclear weapons play a role in the NATO Alliance by providing a “safe, secure, and effective deterrent.”

d) U.S. nuclear forces provide the resources necessary to maintain NATO’s nuclear deterrent. Additionally, NATO views the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those provided by the United States, as the supreme guarantee of the allies’ security.

Mr. TURNER. Your [written] testimony points to the extraordinary “leverage” Russia holds over oil and gas supplies for Europe—and that Russia has occasionally shut off the gas. What is your assessment of the impacts on NATO and the stability of Europe resulting from this energy dependence relationship?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Russia has a minimal ability to directly impact NATO missions through its oil leverage, with the notable exception of the fuel received for NATO operations at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, which is purchased directly from a Russian company. Our engagement strategy, implemented largely through the NATO–Russia Council, has begun building a relationship that will encompass refined petroleum interoperability and help define opportunities for participating in joint exercises and, possibly, other military operations. Additionally, NATO recently stood up an Energy Security Challenges Division whose purpose is to study and prepare to deal with energy security threats to the Alliance.

The world oil markets are flexible and would respond to counter any imbalances caused by Russian shut-offs. By cutting oil shipments to Europe, some price increases would occur, but refineries would continue to purchase oil from other sources.

The NATO Alliance has a very limited reliance on natural gas for its operations and facility maintenance. During recent shut-offs, most of the reduction was made up from other sources and available reserves. However, these same shutoffs caused considerable hardship in eastern European countries, to include some NATO members, who depend on Russia for natural gas. Effects included the loss of residential heating and the closures of factories and businesses. However, as long as these shut-offs remain temporary, and are not carried out during the coldest part of the year, they are not likely to lead to regional instability. These cut-offs also served as a wake-up call to countries, most of whom are now taking steps to diversify their energy supplies with liquid natural gas (LNG), build more infrastructure, and liberalize their markets in order to reduce their dependence on Russian gas.

Finally, with over 50% of the Russian government's revenue coming from oil and gas sales, the Kremlin cannot afford to cut off gas or oil supplies for an extended period of time.

Mr. TURNER. Senior military officials have said that in the event of a ballistic missile attack, countries like Iran would probably launch multiple missiles in an effort to overwhelm our defenses. Is it true that the more ground based interceptors Northern Command has at its disposal, the higher the probability of intercepting a missile headed for the U.S. homeland?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I'm comfortable in USNORTHCOM's ability to defend the country from the current set of limited ballistic missile threats. Our current shot doctrine—the number of Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) we fire per threat—is based on our best understanding of the capabilities of the Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Missile System. The GMD system was fielded using a spiral development concept and as such we have repeatedly evaluated the right number of GBIs to shoot. As we develop more robust capabilities and field them following the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report, we will again reevaluate the right number and types of interceptors we need to defeat incoming threats. Our understanding of the number of threats that rogue nations like North Korea or Iran may be able to simultaneously launch indicates we currently have sufficient GBIs to handle those threats. The ongoing efforts to develop the Hedge Strategy for the PAA will give us more insight to verify the right number and mix of interceptors. As such, more GBIs could be part of an enhanced solution countering additional numbers of threat ballistic missiles.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS

Ms. GIFFORDS. As part of the recent DoD efficiencies initiative the Air Force proposed consolidating Air Force Southern Command's 612 Air and Space Operations Center with the 601st AOC based in Florida. The 612th as mentioned is aligned with Gen Fraser's Southern Command and the 601st is aligned with ADM Winnefeld's Northern Command. Please answer the following questions that reference this proposed consolidation:

1. What inputs have your respective commands had on the consolidation recommendation?

2. Discuss the importance of a dedicated Air Component to your Combatant Command's capability to execute daily operations.

2a. What is the impact to your Command of a disruption to Air and Space Operation Center's mission capacity?

General FRASER.

1. The consolidated AOC basing criteria and concept of operations (CONOPs) analysis are currently being developed by the Air Force. I have discussed USSOUTHCOM's requirements for Air Force support directly with the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Commander of Air Combat Command. I am confident the Air Force will execute the consolidation in a way that will support SOUTHCOM requirements.

2. As a Combatant Commander, the Air Component provides me with the command and control and situational awareness to conduct flexible air operations in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

2a. With respect to the Air Operations Center, the disruption/impact of consolidation should be minimal to daily operations. Ultimately, mandated tasks will be completed and operations will continue. The operational and tactical details will have to be worked out by AFSOUTH and AFNORTH once the Air Force makes the decision on where to consolidate.

Ms. GIFFORDS. The Congresswoman's staff requested the Air Force provide a detailed concept of operations that describes how 1 AOC would support two distinct Air Component Commanders. Thus far this report has not been forthcoming.

Is it possible for 2 Combatant Commands to execute Air, Space and Cyber operations from the same operations center?

If so please describe how this would work.

Would it require two distinct Air Component Commanders and staffs?

General FRASER. The consolidated AOC basing criteria and concept of operations (CONOPs) analysis are currently being developed by the Air Force. I have discussed USSOUTHCOM's requirements for Air Force support directly with the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Commander of Air Combat Command. I am confident the Air Force will execute the consolidation in a way that will support SOUTHCOM requirements.

As a Combatant Commander, the Air Component provides me with the command and control and situational awareness to conduct flexible air operations in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. With respect to the Air Operations Center, the disruption/impact of consolidation should be minimal to daily operations. Ultimately, mandated tasks will be completed and operations will continue. The operational and tactical details will have to be worked out by AFSOUTH and AFNORTH once the Air Force makes the decision on where to consolidate.

Ms. GIFFORDS. As part of the recent DoD efficiencies initiative the Air Force proposed consolidating Air Force Southern Command's 612 Air and Space Operations Center with the 601st AOC based in Florida. The 612th as mentioned is aligned with Gen Fraser's Southern Command and the 601st is aligned with ADM Winnefeld's Northern Command.

Admiral WINNEFELD. USNORTHCOM and NORAD have provided informal input on critical aspects of the consolidation to Air Combat Command (ACC) as they work on a draft "Component Numbered Air Force Multi-Theater Air and Space Operations Center" Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Specifically, the USNORTHCOM and NORAD staffs have highlighted areas that need to be addressed in order for a consolidated Air Operations Center (AOC) to support all USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions. In addition, we ensured that ACC clearly understands that any changes to Canadian mission sets, personnel, and location that are identified in the NORAD Agreement will need to be coordinated with and approved by the Government of Canada due to Canadian Forces being assigned to NORAD.

USNORTHCOM has one Air Component (Air Forces Northern) that executes missions such as support for federal and state authorities in the wake of a disaster. NORAD shares the same AOC for its Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) (other AOCs support the Alaska and Canada NORAD Regions). Given the importance of homeland defense, a dedicated Air Component Commander and forces have been vested with the appropriate authorities and they have been provided the required training to best protect our homeland. It is important to me, given the dynamic nature of NORAD operations in particular, that my CONR Commander be co-located with the AOC that supports him.

The impact of a disruption on the AOC would largely depend on the length of time and the reasons for a disruption. Alternate Command Center locations and procedures currently in place could mitigate potential temporary degradation to our missions. Inevitably there will be some disruption during any amalgamation of an AOC capability. However, I'm confident that my staff and the AOC staffs will be able to work through these issues to ensure that any disruption is minimized or averted.

Ms. GIFFORDS. The Congresswoman's staff requested the Air Force provide a detailed concept of operations that describes how 1 AOC would support two distinct Air Component Commanders. Thus far this report has not been forthcoming. Is it possible for 2 Combatant Commands to execute Air, Space and Cyber operations from the same operations center?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Even though I am dual-hatted as the Commander for both commands, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have distinct mission sets. The 601st AOC at Tyndall Air Force Base is a "tailored" AOC that is manned by both U.S. DOD personnel and Canadian Forces. It is also configured to support the missions of both commands. Thus, Air, Space and Cyber operations for both USNORTHCOM and NORAD are already being conducted from the same operations center. Folding USSOUTHCOM's air component missions into this AOC would eventually constitute support for a third command.

I believe it is possible for two Combatant Commands and NORAD to execute Air, Space, and Cyber operations from the same operations center. Indeed, for contingencies that occur near the boundary between the USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM Areas of Responsibility (as occurred in Haiti), there are useful synergies to be derived from such an arrangement. Air Combat Command (ACC) is developing a Concept of Operations to outline their vision of how this would work. USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and NORAD will review ACC's proposed consolidated AOC construct to determine any impact to operations.

#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

Mr. CONAWAY. Are you providing military training, intelligence training, etc. to the Mexican military?

Admiral WINNEFELD. At the request of the Mexican military, we share lessons learned and conduct subject matter expert exchanges on a wide range of topics to assist them in their efforts to disrupt Transnational Criminal Organizations. These topics include planning, intelligence fusion, tactical operations and human rights.

Over the next year, we have planned approximately 250 individual subject matter expert information exchange events with our Mexican military partners. As an example, our Asymmetrical Conflict Executive Seminars provide insights into operational planning to counter an irregular warfare threat, while also reinforcing the adherence to human rights principles.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within EUCOM's area of responsibility?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The USCG is an active and critical interagency partner for U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and I benefit tremendously from the presence of a USCG liaison officer on my staff to facilitate communications with USCG Headquarters and coordinate theater-wide Coast Guard-type security assistance.

Major USCG operations in the region are somewhat limited based on the high level of professional development among the peer maritime services of most western European countries. Many of our European allies already conduct development efforts with less capable central and eastern European coast guard-like organizations.

As the USCG is resource-constrained with respect to out-of-hemisphere (OOH) assets, the last USCG deployment to EUCOM was USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716), which provided humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.

The USCG also maintains a permanent 28-man Marine Safety unit in The Netherlands to execute U.S. flagged vessel administration, port state control, international port security program, international outreach/engagement, and environmental stewardship. Other permanent or semi-permanent USCG presence includes maritime advisors in Albania and Georgia, an exchange helicopter pilot in the United Kingdom, two liaison officers with U.S. Naval Forces Europe (in Italy), and an attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Malta.

The USCG maintains a robust International Training Division in Virginia that deploys small, highly effective training teams throughout the world, covering everything from maritime law enforcement to outboard engine maintenance. At any given time, there are two to four teams conducting such training within the EUCOM theater. The USCG also hosts approximately 20 European naval personnel per year for resident training at U.S. training facilities. These efforts are funded through the International Military Education and Training program.

I foresee a growing role for the USCG within EUCOM, particularly in the Arctic over the next 10 to 40 years. I am working closely with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and our Arctic partners to ensure the USCG and EUCOM are well-positioned to manage the maritime development of that region.

Finally, the USCG's Seventeenth District in Alaska maintains an important and very positive relationship with the Russian Federation's Border Guard Service in the Pacific. While this effort falls mostly within NORTHCOM's purview, I maintain visibility of those activities.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of "Smart Power" at EUCOM?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Smart power describes how U.S. European Command (EUCOM) combines elements of our core military mission and operations with other collaborative engagement activities and initiatives to maximize our resources, potential, and positive effects in the protection of U.S. interests at minimal cost to the U.S. taxpayer. EUCOM uses smart power to bring all elements of national power to bear on the interconnected, complex, and dynamic problem sets we face in the 21st century. By blending multiple aspects of national influence, we seek to improve our relationships and effectiveness with partners, allies, even potential adversaries.

At EUCOM, we strive to leverage our military capability with in-stride diplomacy at every opportunity. This is one of the reasons why I appointed a Civilian Deputy Commander at EUCOM Headquarters who, as a U.S. Ambassador, brings extensive and unique diplomatic expertise, insight, and skills to all we do at EUCOM. Her contributions add an invaluable lens through which we view, plan, and execute our many initiatives, engagements, and operations. In addition, given the increasing complexity of the modern security environment, I am convinced of the need for, and have taken active measures to incorporate, a whole-of-government approach to many of the challenges we face at EUCOM. Upon assuming command, I directed the creation of a separate and distinct Interagency Partnering Directorate at EUCOM Headquarters—on par with our Intelligence, Operations, and Strategy & Plans Directorates—which includes representatives from seven non-DoD departments and agencies. These fully integrated EUCOM team members are empowered to engage, coordinate, and collaborate across the EUCOM enterprise, bringing a

unique perspective to our Combatant Command's operations and responsibilities and ensuring unity-of-effort across the full spectrum of national security issues. In addition, we maintain Offices of Defense Cooperation in thirty-eight countries across the theater.

One recent example of smart power was EUCOM's coordination and execution of military airlift to bring over thirty tons of desperately needed fire-fighting equipment to Russia during the wildfires that raged across that country last summer. We provided similar assistance to Israel as it faced its wildfires last year as well.

Finally, smart power also requires that we understand the breadth of the challenges we face every day. For that reason, I have instituted several programs designed to broaden our collective perspective for, as I tell my team often, "no one of us is as smart as all of us working together." Those programs include a European Partnership Outreach Program, reaching out to influential Europeans in their capital cities; a EUCOM Public-Private Outreach division, engaging and leveraging the private sector to find innovative solutions to theater challenges; a Next Generation Advisory Panel, which serves as a forum to share ideas with young, professional, up-and-coming Europeans; a "Distinguished Authors" series at EUCOM Headquarters, which exposes my staff to distinguished thinkers in the national security and international relations arenas; a foreign language training program; and multiple social networking initiatives to take advantage of the unique and rapidly expanding connectivity available through cyberspace.

