[Senate Hearing 112-90]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-90
THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 30, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia MIKE LEE, Utah
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Dominguez, Jorge I., Ph.D., Antonio Madero Professor for the
Study of Mexico, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA............. 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Fisk, Daniel, Vice President for Policy and Strategic Planning,
International Republican Institute, Washington, DC............. 29
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Jacobson, Roberta, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard G. Lugar........................................... 45
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Reid, Michael, Americas Editor, The Economist, London, United
Kingdom........................................................ 17
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 2
(iii)
THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE AMERICAS
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Good morning. This hearing of the Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee will come to order. First of all, let
me apologize for starting a little late. We were on the phone
with the administration and unavoidably detained.
As we celebrate the 10th anniversary of the signing of the
OAS Inter-American Charter, I wanted to convene a hearing to
assess the progress of democracy in the hemisphere, to
highlight where it is strong and vibrant, as well as where
there remains progress to be made.
All the countries in the region save one adhere to a
democratic form of government. We celebrate that achievement
and we seek to further solidify the pillars of democracy: fair
and free elections, the independent operation of the
legislative and executive branches, an independent judiciary,
respect for civil society, and the ability of the press to
operate freely.
As we have made progress in our country during more than
200 years of constitutional rule, so has Latin America. Whereas
in the 1980s we saw dictatorial rule, the norm is now
competitive elections that are free and fair. We see transfers
of power and alternation in power between parties of the right
and the left. Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay have made great
strides in the quality of democracy over the past 30 years.
Chile, a country rated as not free in 1981 under the criteria
used by Freedom House, is today rated as free. Likewise, Brazil
and Uruguay, rated partly free in 1981, are rated as free
today.
In total, Freedom House today rates 22 countries as free
and 10 as partly free. So there is work to be done among the
countries that are partly free: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras, to mention a few. But in most
cases the trends are positive.
Of particular concern are those countries that are rated as
free, were rated as free in 1981, but are now only rated as
partially free, such as in Venezuela. Let me just mention a few
concerns of mine. One of those is the tendency toward
centralization of power. In 1980 the military of many countries
ruled under authoritarian rule, issuing decrees instead of
allowing for the elaboration of laws. Today the trend is toward
extension of term limits. We see that trend in Venezuela,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and recently in Paraguay. In Guatemala the
Presidential candidate took an unusual route to ensure her
eligibility for the President, divorcing her spouse, President
Colom, in order to, as she put it, marry her country. Perhaps
such a move is technically legal, but it clearly circumvents
the spirit of the law. Even Colombia passed a law to allow a
third term for its President, but the Supreme Court ruled it
unconstitutional.
A second concern is respect for civil society, the
independent voices of the citizenry, and the right to criticize
one's government without fear of reprisal. In some countries,
voices are physically constrained, whereas in others the effort
has become more opaque, using laws and regulations to
frustrate, constrain, and undermine the operation of civil
society by imposing barriers that prevent their registration,
their operations, or access to resources.
The most strident case in this regard except for Cuba is
Venezuela. In December 2010 the Venezuelan national assembly
passed legislation that restricts civil society organizations
that ``defend political rights,'' or ``monitor the performance
of public bodies'' from obtaining international funding. The
law is in direct violation of article 13 of the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights Defenders, which states explicitly
that ``everyone has the right, individually and in association
with others, to solicit, receive, and utilize resources for the
express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights.''
A third concern is that of freedom of expression. In
Central America, journalists that cover drug trafficking,
corruption, and organized crime face threats to their lives
that often result in self-censorship. In Argentina, government
attempts to control the press have masqueraded as regulatory
controls.
So today I hope to hear from our witnesses on what we are
doing and what we can do to preserve and deepen the gains that
have been made in the last 30 years and what we are doing to
foster strong democratic institutions, respect for civil
society and the media, to ensure that on the 20th anniversary
of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, all the nations of
our hemisphere will share in the political and economic
benefits that are derived from a vibrant democracy.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator
Rubio, for his remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding these hearings. These are important. A prosperous,
democratic, and stable Western Hemisphere is crucial to the
United States own safety and prosperity. It's in our national
interest and, quite frankly, in the interest of the world.
In that respect, there's a lot of good news to report, and
I think we'll hear that in the testimony today. Four nations
that I would single out specifically as examples of the promise
that the Western Hemisphere has in the 21st century: Colombia,
that overcame and is overcoming decades of violence, both
political and criminal, to stake a new future for itself and
continues on that path. We're all very excited about the
direction Colombia is headed, despite significant struggles,
and we hope, at least speaking for myself, that soon we will
have a free trade agreement with the people of Colombia that
will further strengthen these democratic institutions and
brighten their future.
Chile is another great example of a nation that continues
to prosper as it embraces market economics and stability in the
political realm; Brazil, that's emerging into not just a
regional power, but increasingly a global one, and that we hope
will continue to grow in that role and exercise its influence,
particularly its example to other nations in the region as to
how much promise there exists when you give your people freedom
and economic opportunities; and Mexico that, despite some real
significant struggles they're going through right now,
particularly with criminality, their democratic institutions
have taken root and we hope that they'll serve as an example to
the region.
There are some other stories, however, that are not nearly
as bright and they continue to be a blemish on the Western
Hemisphere and, quite frankly, sadden us. The first, of course,
is Venezuela, who today is governed by a clown, more
appropriate for a circus than as someone who governs a country.
It's sad. No. 1, he has illusions of grandeur. He views himself
as a world leader. He's not. He's increasingly irrelevant in
the region because his neighbors now recognize that he is a
clown.
But more importantly, I feel sorry for the people of
Venezuela because he's an embarrassment to that country, a
people that are a proud people, a people with a tremendous
amount of potential, a country with a tremendous amount of
wealth, really a nation that has an opportunity to be a leader
in the world, but is being held back by incompetent leadership,
and we hope that will change soon.
Nicaragua is run by a relic, someone who was in charge back
in the 1980s when I was in sixth grade and Madonna was just a
new artist coming on the scene. The guy's made a comeback, I
don't know how, and unfortunately Nicaragua is being held back
as well, and that's too bad because the people of Nicaragua
deserve better and can have better and I hope will have better.
Then Cuba, which is not just a repressive regime, it's
actually a Jurassic Park. It's run by a bunch of late 70, early
80-year-old men that are really basically relics of a bygone
era. They are not just tyrants; they're incompetent. They don't
know how to run an economy. They don't know how to run a
country. The result is that Cubans are successful everywhere in
the world except for one place, Cuba, and that's because of the
leaders they have, and we obviously hope to be a part of seeing
a change happen there sometime soon.
So there's a lot of good news in the Western Hemisphere.
There's at least four examples of bad news. We hope that that
will change and, God willing, that will be what the United
States can play a role in bringing about.
Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator.
With that, let me welcome Roberta Jacobson, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of the Western
Hemisphere. She has previously served as Director of the Office
of Policy, Planning, and Coordination for the Bureau, covering
such issues as civil-military relations, human rights,
counternarcotics, foreign assistance. Most recently, she served
as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Canada, Mexico, and NAFTA.
Outside of Washington, she's also served as the deputy chief of
mission in Peru.
We appreciate your long record of service in dealing with
issues in the hemisphere, are glad to have you here, and
recognize your New Jersey roots, which adds value. Somebody
raised their hand in the back there. And along the way, we
appreciate what you've done.
I ask you to synthesize your statement for about 5 minutes
or so. Your entire written statement will be included in the
record. With that, Madam Secretary, I'm happy to hear what you
have to say.
STATEMENT OF ROBERTA JACOBSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Rubio. I'm delighted to be here today. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear.
I'd like to start by saying that we share your assessment
of the important successes in many societies in Latin America
and the Caribbean that they are enjoying today. That success is
measurable in rising levels of political and personal freedom,
greater economic prosperity, and increased global integration.
These factors work together to generate vast opportunity. They
strengthen institutions. They have helped lift scores of
millions of people out of poverty in the last decade and in the
process brought forth huge pools of talent that are
transforming very diverse countries.
Yet there remain significant weaknesses in democratic
institutions in much of the hemisphere. So we must use this
opportunity to secure and deepen democratization in our
hemisphere. This requires active U.S. engagement, but it hinges
fundamentally on partnership with our democratic neighbors and
the actions of both governments and civil societies. The fact
that democratic values we seek to advance are shared ones,
embodied in instruments like you have mentioned, the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, strengthens our hand.
In some countries, democratic space is being rolled back
rather than expanded. Persistent government pressure on freedom
of expression, the criminalization of dissent, the centralizing
and controlling executive branch, and disrespect for the
legitimate and essential role of political minorities are our
principal concerns in this regard.
In other nations, persistent inequality or the insecurity
created by gangs and cartels threaten democratic gains, and
unfortunately Cuba remains a glaring exception to the region's
democratic convergence, as Secretary Clinton has emphasized.
I have mentioned in my statement, my longer statement, many
of the examples of leadership that we see throughout the
Americas, many of which you have already mentioned in your
review. We have seen veterans of Chile's democratic transition
go to Cairo to talk to democratic leaders there about advancing
reconciliation. Canadian Prime Minister Harper has made
advancing democratic gains in the Americas a core focus of his
foreign policy. Colombia is now working with Central American
nations to bolster citizen security, and there are others that
are mentioned in my remarks.
We're working with governments in the region, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, and others to address the
needs of vulnerable, traditionally marginalized groups--women,
indigenous people, people of African descent, young people,
LGBT persons, because we view the defense of these human and
civil rights as key to the advancement of the region as a
whole. And with the bipartisan support of Congress, we are
steadfast in our commitment to four linked citizen security
initiatives: The Merida Initiative, the Central America
Regional Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative.
Our programs there focus particularly on reinforcing the rule
of law and strengthening democratic institutions to bring
security and protection to all citizens.
Last week, Secretary Clinton led the U.S. delegation in
Guatemala at an international conference of support for the
Central American Strategic Security Strategy, which brought
together heads of state from Central America, Mexico, Colombia,
and many other leaders from around the region and the world.
Her participation and our efforts to harmonize our activities
with those of our partners also served to follow up on the
President's commitments during his March trip to Latin America.
She then went on to Jamaica to meet with the Foreign Ministers
from the Caribbean community and the Dominican Republic, where
she underscored the importance of partnership on citizen
security, the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas,
and efforts to engage diasporas on economic and democratic
development.
But we are also active in the face of challenges posed by
democratically elected leaders who seek to consolidate power in
the executive branch through extraconstitutional means. It is
not always easy to work positively with civil society when
governments seek to limit our presence. Because we respect the
rights of people in all societies to choose their futures, we
stand steadfast in our commitment to universal rights and
democratic freedom.
In Cuba, we have taken concerted steps to help the Cuban
people live the lives they choose and chart their own course,
and we will continue to support dissidents and civil society.
We are working to expand connections between our society and
Cuban society and open the way for support of Cubans who are
striking their own path.
We are particularly concerned about Venezuela, as President
Chavez continues to disrespect the legitimate role of
democratic institutions, restrict freedoms, including by
closing press outlets, and use the judiciary to persecute
political opponents.
In Nicaragua, the government has manipulated the courts and
Congress to concentrate power in the executive. We have pressed
the Nicaraguan Government to invite election observers and
coordinated with our international partners to try and enhance
prospects for free and fair elections, though we fear this
window is rapidly closing.
Other countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, are on
complicated trajectories and have limited the scope of our
bilateral relationship.
I also mention in my remarks the importance of the 10th
anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and
continuing our work with the OAS, as we have done most recently
and most successfully in Haiti's elections and in Honduras's
readmission to that body.
So this is the extremely varied backdrop to our intense
diplomatic engagement in the Americas, and I look forward to
working with you and your colleagues as we strive to make
irreversible democratic gains in our hemisphere.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roberta Jacobson
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for
the opportunity to appear before the committee today.
Mr. Chairman, I have heard you highlight the important success many
societies in Latin America and the Caribbean are enjoying today. We
share your assessment. That success is measureable in very tangible
ways: in rising levels of political and personal freedom, greater
economic prosperity, and increasing global integration. These factors
work together in remarkable synergy. They generate vast opportunity.
They strengthen institutions. They have helped lift scores of millions
of people out of poverty in the last decade--and in the process brought
forth huge new pools of talent and energy that are literally
transforming very diverse countries. It is difficult to imagine this
happening without the consolidation of democratic and market societies
in most of Latin America and the strengthening of democratic
institutions in much of the Caribbean over the last two decades.
Yet there remain significant weaknesses in democratic institutions
in much of the hemisphere, so instead of being complacent, we must use
this opportunity to secure and deepen democratization in our
hemisphere. This requires active U.S. engagement, but it hinges
fundamentally on partnership with our democratic partners and the
actions of both governments and vibrant civil societies in the region.
That the democratic values we seek to advance are shared ones embodied
in instruments like the Inter-American Democratic Charter, strengthens
our hand. Together we can build on the progress made in recent decades
and attack the challenges that remain.
I know I do not need to emphasize to anyone here that we have a
huge stake in the success of our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.
So, it follows logically that we have a powerful interest in
strengthening and expanding the factors that sustain that success. We
know this task is not finished--democratic governance is a constant
project.
In some countries democratic space is being rolled back rather than
expanded. Persistent government pressure on freedom of expression, the
criminalization of dissent, a centralizing and controlling executive
branch, and disrespect for the legitimate and essential role of
political minorities are our principal concerns in this regard. In
other nations, persistent inequality, or the insecurity created by
gangs and cartels, threatens democratic gains. Some countries present
elements of democratic advance in certain areas, retreat in others, and
remain under security-related stress. And, unfortunately, Cuba remains
a glaring exception to the region's democratic convergence, as
Secretary Clinton has emphasized. But the region's commitment to
democratic development, broadly put, is widespread and strong--and the
values that sustain democracy are rooted throughout the Americas.
I would like to review a few examples that may not regularly make
headlines but provide a sense of the scope of democratic leadership in
the Americas. Then I would like to talk briefly about what we see as
some of the biggest challenges.
In Brazil, strong democratic institutions have helped forge and
hold consensus on combining sound economic policies with vigorous
antipoverty programs that together have lifted more than 30 million
people out of poverty; Veterans of Chile's democratic transition were
quick to visit Cairo following the removal of President Mubarak to talk
about the importance of strong institutions, share lessons about
advancing reconciliation, and ensuring that democracy delivers results.
Mexico's skillful diplomacy brought the December 2010 U.N. Climate
Change Conference in Cancun to a successful conclusion. Colombia is now
working with Central American nations to bolster citizen security and
rule of law capacity. Uruguay's commitment to peace and security
extends beyond its borders as a recognized leader in U.N. peacekeeping
operations throughout the world. Canadian Prime Minister Harper has
made advancing democratic gains in the Americas a core focus of his
foreign policy agenda, and we are working closely with the Canadians on
these issues. The overwhelming majority of Caribbean nations have fair,
open elections, robust civil societies, and generally strong human
rights records, but continued economic weakness in some Caribbean
nations has hampered their ability to implement rule of law and
increases their vulnerability to crime.
We are working with governments in the region, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and others to address the needs of
vulnerable, traditionally marginalized groups--women, indigenous
peoples and people of African descent, youth, and LGBT persons--because
we view the defense of these human and civil rights as key to the
advancement of the region as a whole. Full democracy cannot be achieved
when more than half of the population does not enjoy the rights that
citizens are entitled to and cannot participate in the democratic
process.
With bipartisan support of Congress, we are steadfast in our
commitment to four coherent, interlinked citizen security initiatives
of the Obama administration: the Merida, Central American Regional
Security, Caribbean Basin Security, and Colombian Strategic Development
initiatives. These initiatives support regional efforts to bring
security to their people. Our programs focus particularly on
reinforcing the rule of law and strengthening democratic institutions
that can offer protections for all citizens.
Last week, Secretary Clinton led the U.S. delegation to the
International Conference of Support for the Central American Security
Strategy, in Guatemala. This conference brought together the heads of
state from Central America, Colombia, and Mexico, as well as other
partners such as Spain, the EU, the IDB and the World Bank, to advance
strategies for addressing the security crisis in Central America. The
Secretary's participation and our efforts to harmonize U.S. Government
security-related activities with those of our partners also served to
follow up on the President's commitments during his March trip to Latin
America. The Secretary also travelled to Jamaica to meet with Foreign
Ministers from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican
Republic, where she underscored the importance of our partnership on
citizen security under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI),
as well as the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas and
efforts to engage diasporas to advance economic and democratic
development.
We are, in short, a robust partner throughout the Americas in
support of fundamental building blocks of democracy: rights,
institutions, security. We are not complacent in the face of challenges
posed by democratically elected leaders who seek to consolidate power
in the executive branch through extra-constitutional means or by ruling
via majoritarianism at the expense of minority rights. These tactics
come in various forms, ranging from intricate legalistic maneuvers that
are nothing more than an abuse of the rule of law, to brute force,
intimidation, and arbitrary arrests.
A bedrock of democratic governance--media freedom--is also under
pressure from transnational criminal organizations. To counter
increased threats against reporters, the United States is working to
promote media security and freedom. In Mexico, we are supporting
``Cobertura Segura,'' a program that trains reporters to work in high-
threat environments, in cooperation with the International Center for
Journalists. In other nations it is governments that have restricted
freedom of expression; we are supporting civil society's efforts to
restore a voice to all people.
In the face of these serious challenges, we remain committed to
finding ways to work positively with civil society throughout the
Americas. It is not always easy to do so when governments seek to limit
our presence. Because we respect the rights of people in all societies
to choose their futures, we stand steadfast in our commitments to
universal rights and democratic freedoms.
In Honduras, we stood with other countries in the hemisphere and
agreed that an interruption of the constitutional order by force and
without due process of law was unacceptable. We are pleased that in the
wake of the Honduran elections and thanks to the efforts of the Lobo
government and mediation from OAS Member States, Honduras has restored
its democracy and returned to full membership in the OAS.
In Cuba, we have taken concerted steps to help the Cuban people
live the lives they choose and chart their own course independent of
the Cuban regime. That is why we are working to expand connections
between our society and Cuban society and open the way for meaningful
support of Cubans who are striking their own path, whether in civil
society or the private sector.
We are particularly concerned about Venezuela as President Chavez
continues to disrespect the legitimate role of democratic institutions,
restrict freedoms, including by closing some of the hemisphere's most
distinguished and durable press outlets, and uses the judiciary to
persecute political opponents and criminalize dissent. Grave economic
concerns, including the highest inflation in the hemisphere and an
abysmal security situation, while felt by all Venezuelans, impact the
poor and vulnerable most dramatically. In this difficult environment,
Venezuela faces important elections in 2012. We believe that the early
presence of a sufficient number of credible and well-trained
international observers will be important to the credibility of the
process.
In Nicaragua, the government has manipulated the courts and
congress to extend and concentrate power in the executive. We have
pressed the Nicaraguan Government to invite credible domestic and
international election observers and coordinated with international
partners to enhance prospects for free, fair, and transparent
elections, though we fear this window is rapidly closing. Other
countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, are on complicated trajectories
that have unfortunately limited the scope of our bilateral
relationship. In all of these cases, we continue to uphold our
commitment to fundamental democratic principles and to address threats
to democracy in the region in collaboration with our international
partners and regional institutions.
And yet, the hemisphere continues to come together to resolve
shared challenges. As we near the 10th anniversary of the signing of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter on that fateful day in 2001, we
are reminded that the Organization of American States, while by no
means a perfect institution, remains a relevant body for hemispheric
nations to address regional problems. The OAS was instrumental in
helping to ensure that the elections in Haiti were representative of
the will of the Haitian people. Honduras' recent readmission to that
body after the democratic order had been interrupted is a testament to
the region's capacity for constructive multilateral engagement.
This is the extremely varied backdrop to our intense diplomatic
engagement in the Americas. We are steadfast in our principles,
reliable in our partnerships, and clear eyed about our interests. We
also recognize that each nation's citizens are the primary and
indispensable protagonists in their countries' political development.
We seek cooperation throughout the hemisphere to achieve greater
prosperity and security. And we share your vision that effective
democratic institutions and respect for basic rights are both
fundamental and critical to these goals. I look forward to working with
you and your colleagues as we strive to make irreversible democratic
gains in our hemisphere.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
So let me start off. Perhaps one of the greatest and least
commented on threats to democracy goes beyond elections.
Elections are one element of a democracy, but without all the
other aspects of what we would consider a democratic country--
independent branches of government, a judiciary that is honest,
and a legal system that is transparent, that observes the rule
of law--those are all elements that make up what a democracy is
all about, ensuring that you cannot manipulate a constitution
to be able to stay in power, which increasingly is a reality in
the hemisphere.
But maybe one of the least commented on threats to
democracy in Latin America is the silencing of civil society.
The power of civil society to turn the political view and to
expose what some would prefer to be hidden makes them a target.
That repression is not always as vivid as we may see in a
country like Cuba, but the harassment of an activist, discrete
forms of rules and regulations that control the ability of
civil society organizations to function, to receive funding, to
operate peacefully within their country for change, is in my
mind under siege. Venezuela is a great example of that.
How closely does the Department follow this issue and in
your view which are the most difficult countries for civil
society organizations to operate in?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that was an
extremely eloquent review of the critical importance of civil
society in democracies. Without civil society activists able to
work freely, one really can't talk about fully functioning
democracies. We've made it very clear that we think that that
includes all kinds of civil society groups, from opposition
political parties to an independent press, a functioning,
transparent, fair judiciary, and the ability for folks to
organize around any subject and present their views to their
government and be heard.
So we think that we pay a lot of attention to civil
society. It is a huge part of what we do in the State
Department, engaging with civil society. The Secretary has made
that a key part of her platform, engaging in townhall meetings,
making sure that she talks about the voices in civil society
that need to be heard, as well as speaking with governments
about their views.
I think throughout the hemisphere you have different
situations in different countries and it's difficult for me to
say precisely which countries might be those in which we have
the greatest concern. But certainly we have been outspoken in
our concerns about the difficulty of civil society acting and
organizing in Venezuela, in Nicaragua. We have concerns about
the ability of the press to operate freely in many countries in
the hemisphere, either because those freedoms may be impinged
upon by governments or, frankly, because those freedoms are
impinged upon by criminal organizations threatening
journalists. We know that the hemisphere has become a dangerous
place for journalists.
So we believe that there are lots of things that we need to
do as a whole in the hemisphere to try and advance civil
society.
Senator Menendez. Let me pursue that a bit more with you.
So you say the Department pays a lot of attention to this and I
hear that the Secretary is engaging civil society in
conversations, townhall meetings. Those are all desirable, but
what more are we willing to do to help civil society in the
hemisphere, to empower them to have the ability to try to
perfect democracies in their countries or, in the absence of a
democracy, to try to help them create a democracy?
Ms. Jacobson. I think there are a number of ways in which
we can help support civil society. One is the bully pulpit and
the Secretary uses that, but that's only one. Another is
engaging with organizations in programs that we have. Our
democracy programs have increased, especially in the citizen
security initiatives, the four that I mentioned, where a good
deal of our attention is now not only on improving governmental
institutions to make them fairer, more open, stronger, to
resist corruption, but also in working with nongovernmental
community organizations, civil society, in resisting both
criminal organizations and being able to channel their views to
governments.
I think the other thing that's critically important is the
use
of new technologies and new media, making sure that we are
enabling citizen activists to speak out. The alliance of youth
movements that we've promoted throughout the hemisphere works
extensively with young people in organizations that are
community-based and use digital media to get their message out.
So it is a combination of some of the more traditional
forms of assistance, programming and assistance through our
foreign assistance budget, but also exchange programs,
educational programs, new media.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me be a little bit more direct.
It seems to me that there was a time in our country when we
were very aggressive about promoting democracy throughout the
world, and we were very engaged and did not let the pushback of
authoritarian governments deter us from pursuing that. It seems
to me that in some places in the world we're doing that. I read
an interesting article about the Internet in a briefcase and
how we are traveling in different places to help societies
access it so they can unlock their potential to communicate,
inform each other and inform themselves about what's happening
in the rest of the world.
Yet when it comes to places like Cuba, where instead of
actively engaging in helping civil society be able to have the
wherewithal that we want in other parts of the world such as
the Arab world and Iran, we have this reticence, and there are
some who would in essence undermine the very purpose of our
democracy and civil society programs in a country that is
clearly by all standards the most oppressive in the entire
western hemisphere.
So I think that entities and governments, particularly
authoritarian governments, in the hemisphere are clearly going
to push back, whether it's against the National Endowment for
Democracy, IRI, or our own programs, and that cannot be the
basis upon which we abandon the rigor that I as the chairman of
this committee want to see in this hemisphere when it comes to
helping civil society.
I'm hoping that the administration and the State Department
will be more vigorously engaged in helping civil society,
regardless of the pushback we get from the Chavezes, from the
Eva Moraleses, or from the Castro regime, because otherwise, if
we respond to the pushback, then they will have achieved their
goal and we will have not had the wherewithal to help those who
risk their liberty and sometimes their lives to create greater
democracy within this hemisphere.
It is an enormous value to us as a country. It's not only
about doing the right thing. Democracies are less likely to
create armed conflict against other democracies. They are more
likely to permit the type of economies that can help grow and
help their citizens prosper and create greater demands by their
citizens within civil society.
So I hope we will change course and move more aggressively
ahead on the areas that I see as concerns in terms of our
democracy programs in this hemisphere.
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that's
exactly right. What I was referring to in my opening remarks,
we face challenges in implementing those programs of bringing
information to people, ensuring they have access to that
information. But those challenges should not deter us from
upholding the principles that we completely agree with and
trying to ensure that people do have greater access to that
information, are able to both project their voices outward and
receive the voices of people around the hemisphere and around
the world.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate that we face challenges, and
we had challenges in Poland and we had challenges in what was
Czechoslovakia before it became the Czech Republic, and in
other places in Eastern Europe, and we did not let those
challenges deter us from our vigorous engagement in democracy
programs. So I think I've made my point with that.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Secretary Jacobson, for being
with us this morning and for your statement. I wanted to talk
about something that we don't talk about often enough. I think
it's relevant to all of this conversation. It's trafficking in
persons. The report in 2010 just came out on Monday. It
designates Cuba as a tier 3 country for failing to adhere to
minimum antihuman trafficking standards.
As you know, U.S. law prohibits funding for officials or
employees of tier 3 governments to participate in educational
and cultural exchange programs until such government complies
with minimum antihuman trafficking standards or makes
significant efforts to comply with those standards. It's
obviously not the direction we're headed with regard to these
sorts of programs with Cuba.
I guess my question is, how is the administration's
exchange process with Cuba in compliance with these legal
restrictions, and if they're not--and I think that this has
been waived--what's the calculation there? Because I'm deeply--
aside from the political realities of what's happening in Cuba,
this trafficking in persons issue is a major one around the
world and the fact that Cuba is one of the countries that
refuses to comply with it and in fact is a significant player
in trafficking in persons in terms of its government
unwillingness to participate should be troubling outside of the
political realm of this.
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator. In our exchange programs
and efforts to try and undertake exchange programs in Cuba, our
goal is to work with civil society. As you reflected in the
comment, the reference to the anti-TIP, that refers to
exchanges that might involve government members. That's not the
case in Cuba. We try to do programming to bring people to the
United States who are nongovernmental, to have exchanges that
are people to people, civil society-focused.
That's where we will continue to place our effort, on civil
society and on people to people. It is indeed unfortunate that
we have not seen cooperation on trafficking in persons issues,
which are a serious problem throughout the hemisphere.
Senator Rubio. In terms of the calculation, what goes into
the calculation that somehow we should waive those requirements
when it comes to Cuba, that we perhaps wouldn't do with some of
the other tier 3 countries? What's the cost-benefit analysis of
having done that?
Ms. Jacobson. Sir, I'm not aware that we've waived the
requirements for Cuba in terms of exchange programs. I'd have
to get greater information or specificity on that?
Senator Rubio. The exchange programs we have with Cuba now
violate--are they not in contradiction with what the law says
we should not be doing with countries that are in the tier 3?
Ms. Jacobson. The exchange programs that we have, such as
they are, with Cuba I believe focus on civil society. But I
would have to get back to you in further detail as to whether
there are any government officials involved.
Senator Rubio. We'll talk about that more further. But the
reality of it is that it did require--as the report outlines,
all the full sanctions available for countries that fall under
tier 3 are not applied to Cuba, and it's outlined in the
report. I apologize for not--I probably should have previewed
that question with you earlier because you have a broad array
of issues that you had to be prepared for. So we'll talk more
about that in the future.
But I just wanted to make the marker out there. That's an
issue we're very interested in in general and we're interested
to know why somehow on Cuba we went in a different direction.
Two quick questions. On Venezuela, in the elections last
year there is now legitimate, although, sadly, a little bit
divided and severely restricted, opposition's presence in the
Parliament. I was interested if the State Department has
thought about any programs or is pursuing any programs to help
Venezuelan parliamentarians share experiences and know-how with
their counterparts in some of the other, more established
democracies in the region or around the world?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator. We have programs in
Venezuela that are directed at, in a nonpartisan fashion,
trying to work on democratic processes, opening up democratic
space. I would need to check and find out if we have specific
programs for parliamentarians. I'm not aware of whether or not
we do in Venezuela. We do that in some countries.
But overall, our general goal is to work on democratic
leadership, and that may include any members of opposition
political parties and indeed members of any political parties
that are democratically based in Venezuela. We want to work on
the processes of government. They're nonpartisan. They're not
pro or antigovernment
per se.
We too noted the opposition's presence in the Parliament
and there are important issues that they are taking up at this
time that deserve our attention.
[Addition written information from Ms. Jacobson concerning
the above question of Senator Rubio follows:]
Currently, we do not have a parliamentary exchange program in
Venezuela. For several years after the 2002 coup, select Members of
Congress and Venezuelan parliamentarians--bipartisan delegations from
both nations--met as the so-called ``Boston Group,'' to share
experiences and enhance dialogue. The Department had no formal role in
that group but remained in close contact with its members. The Boston
Group fell into disuse after 2005, but there apparently is some
interest in reinvigorating it.
USAID programming in Venezuela, as well as in other countries, aims
to improve dialogue among diverse political actors. Those programs are
nonpartisan and open to all political persuasions. We can arrange a
private briefing on our USAID programs in Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. Just--it's not as a criticism. Just to
highlight it, I think it's a positive development that there is
an emerging opposition--we needn't call it ``opposition''--
minority party in Venezuela that is in opposition to the
policies of the government, who have a legitimate voice on
behalf of the people of Venezuela, and we should explore,
whether it's through nongovernmental organizations, the State
Department or otherwise, in a way that doesn't undermine them,
by the way, because oftentimes that's what they've done, is
undermine minority parties by saying they're somehow being
controlled by the United States; but empower them with the
ability to be a more effective minority party, point out the
abuses and the bad policies, because apart from all of the
abuses and all the ridiculous acts on the part of the leaders
of that country, of President Chavez, he's also incompetent. I
think part of being the minority party and the opposition party
in that Parliament is being able to point to his policy
failures and how Venezuela could be doing so much better if it
went in a different direction.
The last question involves Guatemala. I'm in receipt of a
letter--it's dated May 24--from the Guatemalan Supreme
Elections Tribunal. What they ask for basically is they're
requesting international observers for the upcoming
Presidential elections. You may not--you may be or may not be
aware of--we'll certainly share this and I think maybe other
Senators may have gotten this letter as well.
But basically, they're asking us to participate as a group
of international observers for their upcoming elections on
September 11, 2011. Are you aware of this request, and if so is
the State Department prepared to ask the participation of U.S.
organizations under this request?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator. We obviously strongly
support the work of the TSE, the electoral tribunal, and we've
made it very clear that we're concerned about some pressures
and threats that they've been under, and that it's very, very
important that those elections be carried out in a free and
fair way. We will be working with others, both within Guatemala
and outside and in the hemisphere, to ensure that they are
observed as much as possible, and we're certainly part of that
conversation.
Senator Rubio. Just to close the loop on it, because I want
to answer this letter that they wrote me, are you aware of or
can we talk later at some point when you can check into it even
deeper about whether the State Department would be willing to
actively solicit American organizations to participate as
international observers in their elections?
I think they're probably sending this all over the world.
They're looking for international electoral supervision. But I
would encourage the State Department to be helpful in bringing
about two or three organizations here in the United States that
would be willing to go to Guatemala and observe the elections.
I would encourage you to take a part in that. We can talk more
about that after.
Thank you.
Ms. Jacobson. Absolutely. Thank you.
[The written information from Ms. Jacobson follows:]
The U.S. Mission to the Organization of the American States (OAS)
is contributing $200,000 to support the OAS' 2011 Guatemala Electoral
Observation Mission. In addition, USAID has a Cooperative Agreement
with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for elections support
(approximately $1,000,000 in USAID funds). The two main activities of
the agreement are a quick count on election day and training/technical
support to the national observers network.
USAID also has an agreement with the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems through the Consortium for Elections and Political
Process Strengthening that supports an elections Web site with
information for voters, electoral registry operations, technical/
administrative strengthening of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and
other areas to promote free and fair elections in Guatemala.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
I just have one or two other questions. It's interesting to
note that the TSC actually just disqualified--I hadn't seen
that press report; my staff showed me--the former first lady
from running. So I guess they are taking some very courageous
positions. We'll see if they can continue to withstand it.
In my view, freedom of the press is under attack in several
countries in Latin America, in some cases by governments, in
other cases by the threat of violence from private actors.
Venezuela threatens those who criticize the government.
Argentina has attempted to control the print stock of a
newspaper critical to the government. In Honduras and Mexico,
the lives of journalists who dare to report on drug trafficking
activities or government corruption or authoritarian rule are
at stake.
What priority does the Department and our missions place on
supporting independent journalists and providing them with the
space to share their views and publicize their opinions? Do our
missions intercede in helping those independent journalists?
Ms. Jacobson. They do, Senator. This is an extremely high
priority for us and we're extremely concerned about some of the
trends that you've outlined. It takes different forms in
different places. In Mexico, for example, we have a program
called Cobertura Segura, which works with NGOs at the
University of Guadelajara, and which trains journalists in how
to avoid the kinds of pressure and dangers that criminal
organizations put on independent, fair reporting.
In places like Honduras, we have helped the government set
up a special task force that is focusing on some of the crimes
that have been committed against journalists, among other
groups.
In places where we have seen governmental pressure on
independent journalism, we have certainly spoken out. We have
ensured that we have robust exchange and international visitor
programs for independent journalists, so that they can share
their experiences, so that they can learn from other
journalists, both around the hemisphere and in the United
States.
So there are a variety of ways. At the OAS General Assembly
this spring there were two resolutions passed, one on freedom
of expression, one on freedom of assembly. Not always easy to
get those issues focused on. We have given monetary
contributions to the OAS's rapporteur on freedom of expression
because we think her work is critically important in this area.
So there are a variety of means that we use to try and
promote and protect the vibrant media in these countries, and
we will continue to do so.
Senator Menendez. My final question is, How can we work
with the OAS to strengthen its resolve in pursuing enforcement
of its Inter-American Democratic Charter?
Ms. Jacobson. I think, Senator, it's an excellent question,
and I think that we have to----
Senator Menendez. I only ask excellent questions. Just
kidding. [Laughter.]
Ms. Jacobson. Indeed.
Senator Menendez. We have to have fun here along the way.
Ms. Jacobson. What we do with the OAS basically is to try
and support with allies in the hemisphere the engagement of
that organization through its members individually, but most
importantly collectively at times, because when we work
together we can have enormous effect. I think that's why I used
the Haiti and the Honduras examples as ones where the region
came together as a whole to act on concerns and threats that
were seen to democratic processes.
It is not always easy for us to get that kind of consensus
to work in all areas, and I think that we have to continue to
both refer to the charter itself and to make the charter real
through programs and actions by the OAS that bring that charter
to life, if you will, in individual cases. We certainly have
seen over the years that the OAS has been able to act and been
able to reverse in many ways threats to democracy, beginning
really with the situation in Peru and the Windsor commitment
out of the OAS General Assembly years ago in that case.
But it has not always been an even path and there have been
times when there are threats to democracy that have not been
responded to as strenuously as we would like them to be. So it
is a work in progress and we will continue to engage with the
special rapporteurs, with the specialized bodies of the OAS who
implement parts of that, and with member states as the 10th
anniversary approaches to strengthen and highlight those parts
of the democratic charter that still need implementation.
Senator Rubio. Just a brief statement and I want to get
your impression on it. This may shock you, but as an American
in politics--I think the same is true in the Western
Hemisphere--sometimes people run for office and they say
certain things for domestic consumption in their countries, and
then they win the election and they have to govern and they
become incredibly pragmatic. I think we see that throughout the
region as well.
I think we saw that in Brazil, where President Lula when he
had to run he had ascribed to some political theories in the
past, but once he began to govern didn't fully embrace, and in
fact took his nation down the road, a much more pragmatic road
economically, certainly politically, and the result is that
Brazil today is on the verge of becoming a global power, which
is a very good development for the region and a very good
development for our partnership with them, hopefully.
So I watch with great interest what happened in Peru, a
nation that has really begun to progress economically as well
and just had an election. There was some rhetoric, particularly
in the past, but the new President stated his intentions with
respect to Peru's democratic institutions--well, first he
distanced himself from statements, including his previous
support for, for example, some of the policies followed by
Chavez and others, and he praised Brazil as a model for the
kind of economic policies he'd like to see his country continue
to pursue.
Do you have any impressions you could share with us on the
future of Peru? Because I hope that they're on the verge of
joining that list that I outlined earlier--Brazil, Colombia,
Panama, hopefully Mexico if they can be successful in the
challenges that they face, and others, Chile, that are headed
in the right direction economically, and of course with their
democratic institutions.
What are your general impressions about the hope there and,
more importantly, the hope of our engagement with Peru in a
very positive way?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator. Another excellent
question.
Senator Rubio. I got it from the chairman. [Laughter.]
Ms. Jacobson. I think it's a terrific example. And you've
mentioned all of the countries, frankly--many of the countries;
I shouldn't leave out others perhaps--where we have really
positive relations, where countries are really moving ahead on
reducing inequality, increasing social inclusion, strengthening
democracies and their economies. That's precisely what we'd
like to see with Peru and to see that continue.
Our view of President Humala's election is that we want to
have the best possible relationship with him. We have
congratulated him, obviously, on his victory and said that we
look forward to working with him. We have enormously important
interests with Peru--continuing to work on counternarcotics
issues, continuing to help with economic strengthening,
ensuring that that economic prosperity reaches further,
frankly, than it has thus far.
We really want to have precisely the relationship that
you've outlined, a very positive partnership with Peru, and
we're optimistic about that.
Senator Menendez. With that, let me thank you very much for
your testimony and your responses to our questions. We look
forward to continuing to work with you in the days ahead. Thank
you, Madam Secretary.
Let me introduce the next panel and ask them to come up as
I introduce them: Michael Reid is the Americas Editor at The
Economist, and a columnist in Latin American media, such as
Valor Economico in Brazil and Poder in Mexico. He has become
one of the world's leading authorities on the political,
social, and business cultures of Latin America. As a journalist
who has been covering the region for a quarter century, he has
sought to shed light on what many still consider a forgotten
continent. And we welcome him to the committee.
Dr. Jorge Dominguez is the Antonio Madero Professor for the
Study of Mexico, Vice Provost for International Affairs, and
Special Advisor for International Studies to the Dean of the
Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and chairman of the Harvard
Academy for International and Area Studies. I hope you get paid
for each one of those, doctor.
He is the author or coauthor of various books, among them
``Consolidating Mexico's Democracy,'' ``Constructing Democratic
Governance in Latin America.'' We appreciate your willingness
to interrupt a family visit in order to be with us today and
look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Dan Fisk is the vice president for Policy and Strategic
Planning for the International Republican Institute. In his
varied career, Mr. Fisk has served as Special Assistant to the
President, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Affairs
at the National Security Council. At the State Department he
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs, as well as a former senior staff
member and associate counsel for this committee. We welcome you
back, Dan, to the committee for your testimony.
Again, let me invite each of you to make about 5-minute
statements. Your full statements will be included in the
record, and we'll start with you, Mr. Reid.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL REID, AMERICAS EDITOR, THE ECONOMIST,
LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Reid. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senator Rubio.
Thank you very much indeed for the invitation to appear before
you today. As an observer of Latin America who hails from the
other side of the pond, I take it as a rare honor. So I thank
you very much indeed.
Mr. Chairman, Latin America has never been as democratic as
it is today. With one notable exception, Cuba, every country
enjoys formally democratic government. Over the past decade the
region's democracies have been strengthened by much
socioeconomic progress. Faster economic growth means that some
40 million Latin Americans left poverty between 2002 and 2008.
Most countries successfully navigated the world financial
crisis and the past 2 years have seen a strong economic
recovery and the resumption of the fall in poverty.
Income inequality is declining, too, and that matters
greatly because the extreme inequality that has long scarred
Latin America has had a series of negative consequences,
reducing economic growth, increasing political instability, and
forming fertile ground for populism.
These positive trends are achievements of democracy. Social
safety nets are much improved. Conditional cash transfer
programs now cover around 110 million of the poorest Latin
Americans. That's one in five of the total. The steady
expansion in years of schooling in the region has also helped
reduce inequality. And Latin America is seeing an expansion of
the middle class and a growing sense of citizenship.
This progress is bringing greater political stability.
Between 1998 and 2005, eight elected Presidents were ousted
before the end of their term. Since then this has happened in
only one case, that of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras.
But clearly the region's democracies still face many
difficulties. Sustaining socioeconomic progress and generating
equality of opportunity requires raising the rate of
productivity growth and improving the poor quality of public
education. Crime and citizen insecurity are now the most
serious public concerns in the region, having displaced
economic worries. Outside conventional war zones, Latin America
is the most violent region on Earth. Criminal organizations
challenge the writ of the state. The prevalence of violent
crime is both consequence and cause of the relative weakness of
the rule of law in many Latin American countries.
Despite some attempts at reform, judiciaries remain
ineffective and sometimes corrupt, and the same goes for police
forces, and prisons are all too often overcrowded, violent
spaces.
Last, in a handful of countries the practice of democracy
has been undermine by elected autocrats. To widely varying
degrees, elected leaders in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Argentina have hollowed out democracy,
eviscerating checks and balances, and threatening civil and
political freedoms and the private sector. And one might add
that organized crime poses similar threats in Mexico and parts
of Central America.
For the most part, elected autocrats have been able to
concentrate power because they are popular, because they have a
rapport with poorer voters who have previously felt
unrepresented. The legitimacy of these leaders ultimately
derives from the ballot box and that is their Achilles heel.
Even if President Chavez is restored to vigorous health in
Venezuela, the opposition has a good chance of winning next
year's Presidential election.
Chavezmo as a continental project has been in retreat for
several years. Victory in the ideological conflict of the past
decade, that I have referred to as the battle for Latin
America's soul elsewhere, has gone to the democratic reformers,
such as Brazil's Dilma Rousseff. That is because chavismo has
demonstrably failed. Despite high oil prices, Venezuela's
economy has lagged others in South America in the past 2 years
and other countries are overhauling it in social indicators. It
is symptomatic that Ollanta Humala, Peru's President-elect, now
professes himself to be a sympathizer of Brazil's policies
rather than the chavista he was in 2006.
Mr. Chairman, the United States still enjoys considerable
influence in Latin America. In my opinion it can best deploy it
by supporting the governments in the region that are its
friends, that show respect for the everyday practice of
democracy, and an obvious example would be the swift approval
of the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia.
The most effective means of weakening elected autocracy are
in my view multilateral regional diplomacy, working with
partner governments in the region, and the succoring of civil
society organizations such as those that are bravely standing
up for civil and political freedoms across the region.
Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Reid
Mr. Chairman Menendez and other members of the subcommittee, thank
you for inviting me to appear before the subcommittee, an invitation
for which as a British observer of Latin America I feel particularly
honoured.
Latin America has never been as democratic as it is today. With one
notable exception, Cuba, every country enjoys formally democratic
government. Over the past decade the region's democracies have been
strengthened by much socioeconomic progress. But clearly they still
face many difficulties and challenges. In a small minority of
countries, elected autocrats have hollowed out democracy, eviscerating
checks and balances and threatening civil and political freedoms. More
broadly, the region's democratic governments have much work to do to
ensure the rule of law and the security of their citizens, and to
provide equality of opportunity and the public goods required to
sustain rapid economic growth. Democracy also faces narrower political
problems, such as the weakness of parties, a new tendency toward
political dynasticism and seemingly widespread corruption, much of it
related to party and campaign financing. Nevertheless the balance sheet
of the past decade is positive: democracy is putting down stronger
roots in Latin America and bringing with it greater political
stability. Between 1998 and 2005 eight elected Presidents were ousted
before the end of their term. Since then, this has happened in only one
case, that of Manual Zelaya in Honduras, when a conflict of powers
ended in a coup.
(1) The economic and political evolution of Latin America
Unlike many other parts of the developing world, Latin America has
a tradition of constitutional rule dating back almost two centuries,
albeit one that was imperfect and often truncated. But the current
period of democracy, dating from the demise of dictatorships across
much of the region during the debt crisis of the 1980s, is in my view
qualitatively different from those that went before. The pendulum
between dictatorship and democracy that marked much of the 20th century
in Latin America has stopped. With the granting of the vote to
illiterates, and the reform of electoral authorities, almost everywhere
universal and effective suffrage has been achieved. Decentralisation,
though not problem-free, has deepened democracy. And urbanisation and
socioeconomic progress have generated more active and inclusive
citizenship, although this remains a work in progress.
Although a few countries possess older democracies, in much of
Latin America the retreat of dictatorship coincided with--and was
partly a result of--the debt crisis of the 1980s and the death throes
of economic policies of statist protectionism. Democracy brought
promarket economic reform, but inherited widespread poverty and extreme
inequality of income. The initial fruits of reform were relatively
disappointing, in part because of adverse conditions in the world
economy. Poverty fell only moderately and inequality increased, partly
because of the failure to implement an adequate social safety-net and
partly because of the one-off impact of radical and unilateral trade
opening.
The region's democracies were subjected to a severe stress-test
during a lost half decade of economic stagnation and recession between
1998 and 2002, when unemployment rose, real incomes fell and progress
in reducing poverty was halted. As noted, some countries saw political
instability; and more generally, public support for democracy waned.
The ``Washington Consensus'' became a damaged brand.
In these circumstances, the political alternation that is normal in
democracies brought a number of governments of the centre-left to
power, ending two decades of dominance by the centre-right. In itself,
that represented an important democratic breakthrough: electoral
victories by the left had often been thwarted by military intervention
during the cold war. Several of the new Presidents were born in
poverty, and are not members of traditional ``white'' elites: their
election gave a more inclusive character to democracies. Several of
these governments, notably Brazil's, have pursued generally moderate,
social-democratic policies, maintaining economic and financial
stability and respecting constitutional restraints on executive power.
But other elected leaders of the left, especially Venezuela's Hugo
Chavez, have established personalist regimes and imposed a much greater
degree of state control over the economy.
The past decade has been a good one for many of the region's
economies. Those in South America especially have benefited from
sustained high prices for their commodity exports induced by the
industrialisation of China and India. In the 5 years to mid-2008,
economic growth in Latin America averaged a creditable 5.5 percent a
year. Thanks to much better economic policies, continued demand from
Asia and timely support from multilateral financial institutions, the
region navigated the world financial crisis successfully, with most
countries suffering only a brief recession of varying severity but no
structural damage. A vigorous recovery saw growth of 6 percent in the
region last year, moderating to around 5 percent this year. Whereas 44
percent of Latin Americans were officially counted as living in poverty
in 2002, that number fell to 32 percent in 2010. Income inequality is
falling, too. That matters, because Latin America has long been scarred
by extreme inequality, which has had a series of negative consequences,
reducing economic growth, increasing political instability and forming
fertile ground for populism. Data for 2002-10 shows income inequality
decreasing in 16 out of 17 countries, with the GINI coefficient falling
on average by almost 3 points.\1\ The region's democracies have built
much better social safety-nets, including conditional cash transfer
programmes which now cover around 110m of the poorest Latin Americans.
The gradual but steady increase in the years of schooling of those
entering the workforce also seems to have helped to reduce income
inequality. At the same time, low inflation and financial stability is
stimulating the growth of credit and home ownership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Leonardo Gasparini and Nora Lustig. ``The Rise and Fall of
Income Inequality in Latin America'' Cedlas. Available at http://
cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/esp/documentos-de-trabajo.php.
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The fall in poverty has prompted much triumphalism about the rise
of a ``new middle class,'' now held by some to form a majority of the
population in Brazil. In fact, many of these people can more accurately
be described as lower middle class or working poor and their situation
remains fragile. A more realistic estimate by a team at the Brookings
Institution reckons that 36.3 percent of Latin Americans were middle
class in 2005.\2\ But the point is that a process is under way in which
many people have disposable income for the first time; and their
children are usually much better educated than they are. Across much of
the region improvements in living standards are palpable in better
housing and the expansion of shopping centres and modern retailing. In
many places, this has been matched by an improvement in public
facilities, such as transport and telecommunications, parks and sports
facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Mauricio Cardenas, Homi Kharas, and Camila Henao, ``Latin
America's Global Middle Class,'' Brookings Institution, April 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This trend of socioeconomic progress is favourable for the
permanence of democracy in Latin America. Indeed, it has generated a
greater sense of democratic citizenship. But the progress needs to be
sustained and intensified. In particular, the poor quality of public
education continues to impede equality of opportunity. The region has
made strides in expanding educational coverage, but it will take many
years for most Latin Americna countries to catch up. Of the bigger
countries, only in Chile has a majority of the workforce at least
completed secondary education (though the same applies in Costa Rica
and Uruguay). The second, even bigger, problem is that Latin Americans
don't learn enough in school. The eight Latin American countries that
were among the 65 countries (or parts of them) that took part in the
latest PISA international tests of secondary-school performance in 2009
all came in the bottom third.\3\ In Panama and Peru, the worst
performers, nearly a third of 15-year-olds tested were close to being
functionally illiterate. Visit a state school almost anywhere in Latin
America and it is not hard to see why: the teachers are themselves
often poorly educated and trained; the problem of teacher absenteeism
is chronic; and the school day may well be short because of the need to
accommodate two or three shifts. But the story now is of improvement,
from a low base. In the 2009 PISA tests Peru, Chile, and Brazil all
registered significant improvements compared with their performance in
2000; Mexico did to a limited extent. In all those countries there is
now a public debate about the importance of improving the quality of
public education. Increasingly, teachers are being required to submit
to evaluations; educational testing has been introduced; and teachers
pay is being linked to their school's improvement. Opinion polls show
that parents tend to be complacent about school performance, but civil-
society pressure groups are working to change that.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ OECD, PISA 2009 Results at www.oecd.org/edu/pisa/2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) The difficulties in establishing the rule of law
Another important trend is less favourable for democracy: the rise
of organised, violent crime. Crime is now the most serious public
concern in the region, having displaced economic worries, according to
regional polls by Latinobarometro. With reason: outside conventional
war zones, Latin America is the most violent region on earth. Worst are
the three countries of Central America's northern triangle, Jamaica and
Venezuela; murder rates per head of population in Honduras and El
Salvador are more than 10 times higher than in the United States. Four
and a half years in to President Calderon's crackdown on the drug
mafias, the level of violence in Mexico continues to rise. It is not an
exaggeration to say that the writ of the state does not run, or
certainly not in uncontested fashion, in parts of Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, and Colombia, as well as inside prisons in many countries.
This problem is in part externally generated, by the failure of
prohibition to reduce substantially demand for illegal drugs in the
United States and Europe, and by the failure of the United States to
prevent the export of small arms or take more effective action against
money-laundering. The committee should not underestimate the extent to
which the United States is seen as part of the problem, rather than
part of the solution, of violent crime in Latin America. But clearly
the spread, prevalence, and intensification of violent crime is also
both consequence, and cause, of the relative weakness of the rule of
law in many Latin American countries. Despite some attempts at reform,
judiciaries remain ineffective and sometimes corrupt; the same goes for
police forces; and prisons are all too often overcrowded, violent
spaces. The result is a terrifying level of impunity, with 9 murders
out of 10 going unpunished in Mexico and Central America's northern
triangle.
But some countries have managed to achieve significant reductions
in violence. In Colombia, the absolute number of homicides has almost
halved since 2002; the rate per 100,000 people has fallen from 70 to 34
over the period, and is now below the rate in Venezuela. That is
something for which U.S. aid can take considerable credit, combined
with the efforts of Colombians. In Brazil, Sao Paulo state, and more
recently Rio de Janeiro, have seen steady falls in violent crime,
principally because of better policing.
As well as better policing and more effective courts, in the medium
term controlling organised crime requires providing more and better
legal opportunities for young Latin Americans. The weakness of the rule
of law is also manifest in the scale of the informal economy in Latin
America, which employs roughly half the labour force. Another such
manifestation is the prevalence of corruption. As well as the
squandering of public resources, the perception of corruption can
generate disillusion with democratic institutions, and provides fodder
for populist attacks on representative democracy.
The growth of violent crime has posed an acute threat to media
freedoms in some countries, especially in Mexico and Central America,
as was the case in Colombia in the 1990s. Drug-related violence has
made Mexico one of the world's most dangerous countries for the press,
according to the Committee for the Protection of Journalists. Thirteen
Mexican journalists have been killed since the beginning of 2010, at
least three in direct reprisal for their work. The committee is
investigating to determine whether the other deaths were related to the
journalists' work
(3) The practice of elective autocracy
In a handful of countries elected leaders have chosen to rule in a
more or less autocratic manner. Such rulers have not always been of the
left: Peru's Alberto Fujimori was a conservative elected autocrat. But
over the past decade, a small group of leftist leaders have behaved to
a greater or lesser extent as elected autocrats.
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez is the archetype. He has systematically
concentrated power in his own hands and neutered independent
institutions. He has done this by means of a new constitution; the
packing of the judiciary and of other institutions of state, bending
the rules to ensure that they are occupied by loyalists; and frequent
recourse to rule by decree. He has also considerably expanded the role
of the state in economy, often in violation of the property rights
guaranteed by the 1999 Constitution, a document he himself inspired.
According to Fedecamaras, the main private-sector organisation, almost
400 companies have been nationalised since Mr. Chavez became president
in 1999 and late 2010, most of them in 2009 and 2010. Some 3 million
hectares of farmland have also been taken over. In most cases,
compensation has not been paid. President Chavez has also done his best
to neutralise the growing strength of the opposition. He has done this
first by eviscerating the powers and resources of local government;
and, second, by rewriting the electoral law to eliminate proportional
representation (in violation of the constitution) in the election for
the National Assembly and gerrymandering the electoral districts, so
that although the opposition won a narrow majority of the popular vote
in last September's legislative election it ended up with only 67 of
the 165 seats. In addition, the government has used its nominees in the
offices of Comptroller General and Attorney General to harass legally
some opposition leaders, selectively disqualify them from standing as
candidates or filing criminal charges against them, often of
corruption. Whether or not such charges have legal merit, they have
been levied in a politically partisan manner. President Chavez's
government has also taken several steps to curb media freedom. These
have included the nonrenewal of the broadcasting licence of RCTV,
previously the most popular television station, and those of a number
of radio stations. Media owners have been the target of law suits and
journalists have often faced harassment, including physical attacks by
chavista mobs. It should be noted that some media played into the
government's hand by adopting a highly partisan stance, usurping the
role that should more properly be played in a democracy by opposition
political parties. In addition, the opposition allowed the president to
turn the National Assembly into a rubber stamp by boycotting the 2005
legislative election.
The main reason that President Chavez has been able to concentrate
such power is because he has been remarkably popular, at least since
2004, despite his government's mismanagement of the economy, of
infrastructure and many other matters. That is in part because
sustained high oil prices have given the government a windfall which
has been spent on the poorer Venezuelans who make up his political
base. It is also because of his rapport with many poorer Venezuelans
who identify with him as ``one of us.'' He has persuaded them of his
political narrative, according to which they owe their poverty to U.S.
imperialism, the ``oligarchy'' and past ``neo-liberalism,'' even if
this does not bear serious historical scrutiny. Thus, in 2006 President
Chavez won a fresh Presidential term with 63 percent of the vote. Even
though the government's economic mismanagement meant that Venezuela has
suffered 2 years of recession from which it has only emerged this year,
polls suggest that Chavez continues to enjoy support from between 40
percent and 50 percent of the population.
Venezuela is in many ways an autocracy, but it is not a
totalitarian state. To a significant extent, it retains an open
society. Some television channels remain nonpartisan, while several
important newspapers support the opposition. Civil-society groups play
a vital role in monitoring and criticising the government. And unlike
the Castros in Cuba, President Chavez owes his legitimacy to the ballot
box. Although the President has abused state resources in election
campaigns, until now there is no conclusive evidence that the vote
count has been fraudulent in Venezuela. Provided it remains united, the
opposition has a real chance of winning the Presidential election due
at the end of next year (that chance will clearly increase should the
President's health remain in doubt). While there are fears in some
quarter that Chavez would not accept electoral defeat, he would have
little support within the region for any attempt to cling to power in
those circumstances). And all the polling evidence suggests that the
vast majority of people on both sides of Venezuela's political divide
consider themselves to be democrats.
Of the other countries in Chavez's anti-American ALBA block,
Nicaragua is the most complete autocracy (Cuba apart). By manipulation
of the judiciary and the electoral authority, President Daniel Ortega
has got himself on the ballot for this year's Presidential election, in
violation of the constitution. There are strong reasons for believing
that the municipal election in 2008 was not free and fair. Two
opposition parties were disqualified from the ballot, and independent
election observers were refused accreditation to monitor the count. The
country's leading investigative journalist, Carlos Fernando Chamorro,
has faced harassment. However, if Ortega wins in November's vote, it
will be because he is more popular than the unimpressive and divided
opposition.
Some of these things apply in Bolivia and Ecuador. As in Venezuela,
both Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador have
concentrated power in their own hands through the device of a new
constitution. In Bolivia, the government has taken effective control of
the judiciary. Some opponents have suffered harassment. Media
organisations say that a law against racism has on occasions resulted
in self-censorship. But there can be no doubt that the arrival in Evo
Morales in power gave a more inclusive character to Bolivian democracy.
Morales remains popular, but less so than he was mainly because of the
government's handling of some economic issues. In Ecuador, opposition
concerns about the working of democracy focus on the recent narrow
approval in a referendum of government proposals that would give it
greater control over the judiciary and the media. In addition, the
government has used the defamation law to harass some journalists. To a
much lesser extent, there are concerns about the concentration of power
in the executive in Argentina. The governments of the Kirchners have
exercised extraordinary powers over the distribution of revenues to the
provinces; they have nationalised the private pension system, and used
its equity investments to place directors on the boards of private
companies; and taken a series of measures to disadvantage media groups
that are hostile to the government. Yet once again, if President
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner wins a second term in the Presidential
election in October it will be because of the popularity rapid economic
growth has bestowed upon her and the public sympathy she has derived
from her bereavement.
(4) Civil society and political change
The committee should note that President Chavez enjoys far less
influence in Latin America today than he did 5 years ago. That is
partly because he honoured only some of his promises of largesse. It is
partly because his verbal aggression against the United States is far
less effective with President Obama, who is widely popular among Latin
Americans, in the White House. But it is mainly because Venezuela under
his stewardship has performed poorly in recent years. Its economy
contracted by 3.3 percent in 2009 and 1.6 percent in 2010 according to
the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; that
compares badly with regional average contraction of 1.9 percent in 2009
and growth of 6 percent in 2010. Venezuela has also performed less well
on social progress: for example, between 2005 and 2009 Peru, which has
pursued free-market economic policies, climbed 24 places in the United
Nations Human Development Report, and now ranks ahead of Venezuela. It
is striking that Ollanta Humala, the victor of Peru's Presidential
election, now professes himself to be a sympathiser of Brazil's
political approach, rather than that of Venezuela, which he favoured
when a candidate at the last election in 2006. In addition, the
difficulties of Cuba's regime have further undermined the appeal of
atavistic communism.
The political hegemony of the left in Latin America has had
positive consequences for democracy in some countries, and negative
ones in others. That hegemony has owed much to the commodity boom,
which has financed redistributive social policies and allowed
incumbents of all political stripes to achieve and retain popular
approval. A more uncertain outlook for the world economy suggests that
Latin American Presidents may find life harder in the coming decade
than they did in the last one. Future economic difficulties may
increase popular discontent in the region, but they will also place a
premium on sound economic policies.
The polling evidence suggests that roughly half of Latin Americans
have remained convinced democrats through the ups and downs of the
economic cycle, with only a small minority favouring authoritarian
government. However, Latin America's long history of natural-resource
abundance combined with extreme inequality and relative
underdevelopment means that the populist gene remains part of its body
politic. And the prevalence of crime and corruption can add to the
appeal of authoritarian political leaders. Nevertheless, as Latin
American societies become less poor and less unequal, the social
foundations of democracy ought to become stronger. Over the past decade
the region has seen an ideological conflict, between democratic
reformism and autocratic populism. In my view, that battle is now
clearly being won by the democratic reformists. Political hegemony in
Latin America is increasingly to be found in the centre ground.
The decline in Chavez's influence shows the wisdom of those in this
country who argued that the best policy towards Venezuela's verbal
provocations of the United States was to ignore them. The United States
still enjoys considerable influence in Latin America. In my view it can
best deploy it through close and constructive relations with the
governments in the region that show respect for the everyday practice
of democracy (an obvious example would be swift approval of the free-
trade agreement with Colombia). Multilateral regional diplomacy and
succouring civil-society organisations have shown themselves to be the
most effective means of supporting democracies that have come under
pressure from elected autocracy. Everything suggests that this will
continue to be the case for the next few years.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Dr. Dominguez.
STATEMENT OF JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, PH.D., ANTONIO MADERO
PROFESSOR FOR THE STUDY OF MEXICO, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
CAMBRIDGE, MA
Dr. Dominguez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Rubio. It's an honor to be here. In my remarks, I
concentrate on a point that my colleague Michael Reid just
made, namely, that most Latin Americans today live under
constitutional democratic government. That is why I spend some
time in my written text on Brazil and Mexico, because that is
where most Latin Americans live.
I was delighted to hear Senator Rubio's earlier comment
comparing Brazil and Peru, because that is in fact how my
testimony begins. I look at the example of Brazil's 2002
Presidential election to indicate very much the key points
Senator Rubio emphasized: the key role of the constitutional
transfer of power from government to opposition, the shift of
the political views of the candidate who wins the Presidency,
Lula, in significant ways departing from his past--a candidate
who had been described as a rabblerouser and a radical in the
past--the fundamental continuity between the policies, economic
and social policies, of the outgoing government and the
incoming government, and the themes, Mr. Chairman, that you
emphasized of a vigorous civil society.
In your previous questioning, of Secretary Jacobson, both
of you also asked about international factors. Brazil's 2002
Presidential election is a very good example of the benign role
of the international community, including the U.S. Government
at the time. Because Lula was perceived as a radical
rabblerouser, there was panic in international bond markets,
which also adversely affected the exchange rate. It was the
timely and effective intervention of the International Monetary
Fund and the Bush administration at the time that helped to
stabilize those economic circumstances, enabled Brazil to have
a good election, and, surprising as it may seem for a
conservative Republican U.S. President and a self-professed
democratic socialist in Brazil, for the two countries to have a
good partnership in the years that followed.
It is in that context that I look with hope, yet admittedly
not more than that at the Peruvian election, where President-
elect Ollanta Humala has indicated similarly a shift of views
and even imported Brazilian advisors to try to make this more
credible, while bearing in mind as well that Lula and Humala
are not the same. Lula never led a military rebellion; Humala
did. Lula had never associated his own views with those of Hugo
Chavez and Humala did, again as my colleague Michael Reid had
indicated.
I pay attention to the Mexico 2000 election for other
reasons: the role of the mass media that interests you and this
committee; the role of the electoral institution, which is
equally crucial; the role of the incumbent President and the
political parties at the time. Let me highlight why I do so. On
the opposition side, which is one of the lessons I draw for
Venezuela, it was essential for the long-running opposition
party, the Partido Accion Nacional, the PAN, to believe that it
could win and therefore not to shrink away from contesting
elections, not doing what the Venezuelan opposition did in
December 2005, namely, to abstain and enable Chavez's political
forces to win every seat in the national Parliament.
To believe that you can win also means that you believe you
can challenge electoral fraud, admittedly with the cooperation
of others, which is the next point that I want to make. The
Mexico 2000 Presidential election was one of many where
international and domestic election observers were important.
It included the NDI and the IRI. We, fellow witnesses, were
chatting before about that election before this session
started. As we look ahead at Latin American elections, there is
an important role for the international community in such
election observation.
On the international side, in Mexico 2000 the Clinton
administration had effectively signaled, along with Wall Street
and other international financial markets, that the key was a
good election, not whether Candidate A or Candidate B were to
win it, and that was effectively communicated.
Next, I simply want to underline my agreement with the
themes that both of you, Senator Menendez and Senator Rubio,
have indicated with regard to Venezuela. The issues there are
not just whether one in general agrees or disagrees with Hugo
Chavez, but the politicization of the electoral institutions,
the aggressive intimidation of the press, including the
shutdown of independent mass media organizations, the
aggressive undercutting of the rights of civil society both
under international human rights conventions and Venezuela's
own constitution, the intimidation of opposition political
leaders, including potential Presidential candidates, and the
abuse of executive decree powers.
It is, as you noted in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman,
about to be the 10th anniversary of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. It remains a viable, valid, and I hope more
effective document, difficult as it is, appropriate as it is,
to coordinate U.S. policies and the work of our allies and
friends through a multilateral institution that is at times
cumbersome, but it is the most effective path that we have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dominguez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jorge I. Dominguez
Rabble-rouser. Radical. Left-winger. Threat to prosperity.
Dangerous socialist. These and other adjectives were used to describe
Luiz Inacio ``Lula'' da Silva from his appearance in the late 1970s on
Brazil's national political stage until his first election as President
of Brazil in 2002. During the 2002 Presidential campaign, domestic and
international markets continued to view Lula as a grave threat.
Interest rates spiked on Brazilian bonds; there was also exchange-rate
turmoil.
In retrospect, Brazil's 2002 Presidential election was a watershed
in the history of democratic and market consolidation in Brazil. It
demonstrated the effectiveness of Brazil's constitutional order through
the public formulation and expression of opposing views and the fair
and effective operation of its electoral institutions under the rule of
law. It featured the role of parties, civil society, and a free mass
media.
It was the first time in 40 years that one popularly elected
Brazilian President passed the sash of office to another.
It completed the process of incorporation of all Brazilian
social classes into the political process.
It passed political power from the governing party to the
opposition party.
The election was hotly contested, and there was free,
vigorous mass media coverage and broad and deep engagement from
civil society and political parties.
Lula signaled transparently during his 2002 campaign that he
and his party had changed their views and would henceforth
``hug'' the political center.
Lula and his party went on to fulfill the promises made
during the campaign, including significant continuity, with
plausible policy adjustments, of the market-oriented economic
policies as well as the social policies of his predecessor.
Brazilian citizens and their leaders constructed this democratic
transition and consolidation. International factors were secondary, but
not insignificant. During the 2002 Presidential campaign, the Brazilian
Government required support from the International Monetary Fund to
stabilize the economy and calm international bond and exchange-rate
markets. During the campaign, Lula publicly endorsed the IMF
stabilization plan and promised to implement it upon his election as
President, which he did. The U.S. Government supported the agreement
between the IMF and Brazil. Indeed, it is no hyperbole that the IMF and
the Bush administration contributed to Lula's election as President of
Brazil and, in that way, contributed as well to the consolidation of
Brazil's democracy and prosperity.
Democratic politics is, therefore, built at home, but it is easier
to build it with a supportive international community.
This experience may be pertinent to an assessment of Peru's
President-elect Ollanta Humala. As had been the case with Lula during
his 2002 Presidential campaign, Humala made it clear during his 2011
Presidential campaign that his own views had changed, declaring that he
wished to emulate Lula's experience, including through the importation
of Brazilian campaign advisors. True enough, the pre-Presidential
political biographies of Lula and Humala are quite different. Humala
once helped to lead a military rebellion; Lula never did. Lula founded,
shaped, and led a political party; Humala's political appeal has
remained personalistic. Humala's previous Presidential campaign had
sought to emulate Chavez, not Lula. Yet, recent Peruvian history has
witnessed an uninterrupted string of Presidents who moderate their
policies upon their installation in office. Humala has a historic
opportunity now to implement the social policies that Peru has long
needed and for which it finally has the economic resources.
Now, consider Mexico. It was 11 p.m. on July 2, 2000. The
television networks, broadcasting from the Federal Electoral Institute
(IFE), turned their cameras on the Institute's president, who was about
to give the preliminary results of the voting in Mexico's 2000
Presidential election. Speaking in a rushed monotone, he reported on
the ``quick counts'' and other technical means of verifying the voting
in advance of the complete count. He referred to statistical
significance or the lack thereof of these various tests, making the
dramatic appear dull; he concluded on the cautious note that Vicente
Fox, the candidate of an opposition party, Partido Accion Nacional
(PAN), seemed ahead.
With a break that lasted only seconds, the television networks
turned their cameras on President Ernesto Zedillo at his Presidential
office in Los Pinos. Zedillo, dressed formally for this occasion, was
wearing the tricolor Presidential sash across his chest. Behind him
were two icons of republican Mexico. One was a gigantic flag of Mexico.
The other was a portrait of the 19th-century President Benito Juarez.
Zedillo spoke deliberately, pausing for effect and clear public
understanding. He noted that the audience had just heard the
preliminary results from the IFE president. Without hesitation, he
boldly congratulated Vicente Fox on his election as President of Mexico
and pledged that his administration would cooperate fully during the
upcoming 5-month transition period. He called upon his party, the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), to be proud of a long
record of accomplishment in the transformation of Mexico and, in that
spirit, to support the election outcome.
Again with a short break lasting only seconds, the television
cameras next turned their lights on the PRI headquarters, specifically
on the party's Presidential candidate, Francisco Labastida. All PRI
leaders looked stunned. Some in the crowd shed tears. Then someone was
sufficiently inspired to start singing the national anthem, and others
joined in. The special transmission in its three parts lasted about 10
minutes. It would be followed with images of Fox supporters celebrating
in downtown Mexico City and elsewhere as the evening wore on.
This account illustrates five key changes in Mexican national
politics that have endured.
Television and radio were the means to communicate the
remarkable transfer of political power that had just occurred.
The constitutional reorganization of Mexico's electoral
institutions proved essential to permit and enact a free
election.
Free, professional public opinion polling and the associated
technical work of academics was an important instrument for
this transition.
The leadership of the outgoing President was essential to
impart confidence that the election outcome would be respected.
Both the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
and the long-lived opposition party, the National Action Party
(PAN) had changed to make a free, fair hotly contested election
possible.
The slow process of transition toward democracy in Mexico, and the
prior experience of democratic transition in the 1980s in Brazil,
greatly facilitated and contributed to the experiences of democratic
consolidation in both countries in the 2000s.
In Mexico's case as well, Mexican citizens and their leaders
constructed democratization, yet international factors played a
supportive role. In Mexico, the clear message from international
financial markets was to hold a good election, not to place bets for
one candidate and against the other. On election eve, only the
candidates from the PRI and the PAN had a reasonable chance of winning.
Wall Street, London, Hong Kong, the Clinton administration, and other
governments conveyed the same message: Let the election be free and
fair--either candidate would govern Mexico as an international good
partner.
The construction of Mexico's democratic transition had also
required that opposition leaders and their supporters should shed the
self-paralyzing expectation that the long-ruling party would commit
electoral fraud and abuse. This is a pertinent experience from Mexico's
near-past to today's circumstances in Venezuela. One must believe in
the possibility of winning in order to be able to win.
Mexico's 2000 Presidential election, as had been the case in its
1994 and 1997 national elections, featured as well a significant number
of international and especially domestic civil society observers.
Domestic and transnational civil society thus played a significant
role, including among them the International Republican Institute and
the National Democratic Institute. Election observation, in Mexico and
elsewhere, is an important contributor of the international community
to democratic practice.
Most Latin Americans live in Brazil and Mexico. Most Latin
Americans, therefore, experience democratic governance, market-oriented
economic policies, more effective social policies, open political party
contestation, free mass media, and have ample opportunity to
participate in civil society organizations. The principal story in
their respective processes of democratization was written at home,
though in each case a benign international environment was a helpful
secondary consideration.
The U.S. Government, under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush, as had been the case as well under Presidents George H.W. Bush
and Jimmy Carter and during the second term of President Ronald
Reagan's administration, contributed to these democratic processes
through a combination of self-restraint and timely yet modest positive
inducements. Transnational civil and political society played a
generally constructive role as well. The political effect of
international markets was benign in Mexico but it made the democratic
process temporarily more difficult in Brazil.
A similar story regarding the national construction of democratic
processes and a supportive role for the international community,
including the United States, can be told with regard to Chile in 1990;
Uruguay in 2004 when the first President from the Left, the Frente
Amplio's Tabare Vazquez, was elected President; or the Dominican
Republic in 1978 and 1994-96. Domestic and international election
observation was also crucial in these pivotal elections in Chile and
the Dominican Republic.
There is, however, a quite different sequence for the relationship
between domestic and international factors as they may affect the start
of democratization. A cataclysmic international event may reshape
structures and incentives to foster a democratic transition. This was
the impact of the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet
Union in Europe. It was the starting point for the democratization of
former Communist Eastern Europe. The end of the cold war helped also to
bring to an end the wars swirling in Central American countries in the
1980s, with peace and democratization in Nicaragua in 1990, El Salvador
in 1992, and Guatemala in 1996. Domestic and international election
observers were essential in these Central American transitions. Defeat
at war is another cataclysmic event; it contributed to democratization
in Greece in the early 1970s and in Argentina in the early 1980s. These
are, to be sure, unusual, and infrequent events.
The same framework for analysis sheds light on Venezuela, which is
the most noteworthy example in the Western Hemisphere of a departure
from constitutional liberal democracy, the concentration of
disproportionate power in the hands of the President, the imposition of
constraints on the mass media and civil society organizations, and
frustrated international initiatives.
Venezuelan voters have repeatedly elected Hugo Chavez President of
Venezuela. Unlike Mexicans in 2000 or Brazilians in 2002, Venezuelans
have yet to vote the incumbent or his party out of office. In various
plebiscites, Venezuelans have also supported a number of constitutional
changes that have greatly strengthened Presidential powers in
Venezuela. In the December 2007 plebiscite, however, Venezuelan
citizens defeated Chavez-proposed constitutional amendments that would
have dramatically strengthened Presidential powers even more and
weakened nearly all means to hold the executive accountable. Voters
stopped the worst outcome but have acquiesced in other constitutional
changes that have weakened the constitutional bases for democracy.
The weakening of democratic institutions in Venezuela has not,
alas, been caused by Chavez alone. In 1998 and subsequent elections,
Venezuelan voters also abandoned the two major political parties, the
social democrats and Christian democrats (Accion Democratica and COPEI)
that had shaped democratic practice in Venezuela since the 1940s. In
advance of the December 2005 legislative elections for the National
Assembly, opposition leaders decided to boycott the elections in the
hope that their failure to participate would discredit the result. The
main effect was that Chavez's partisans won every seat and left the
opposition without a voice in the National Assembly. This is also why I
referred to Mexico's opposition experience, above, in thinking about
Venezuela's opposition.
The Venezuelan opposition has demonstrated renewed signs of life
and much better strategic sense in recent years, winning nearly half of
the votes in the most recent national legislative election and
undertaking the work necessary to choose a single unity candidate in
time for December 2012 Presidential election to contest Chavez's
expected bid for reelection.
Whatever anyone's assessment may be regarding the behavior of
voters or opposition leaders, there are appropriate reasons for concern
regarding the following issues in Venezuela:
The extent of partisan politicization of electoral
institutions, which raises doubts about the fairness of the
election process.
The severe constraints on freedom of the press and the
systematic attempt to undercut unfairly the public expression
of views critical of the government.
The comparably severe constraints on civil society
organizations that demonstrate independence from the
government, both those entities that had long existed (unions,
business federations) and other that emerged in response to the
Chavez government.
The arrest, or induced exile, of significant opposition
leaders, including the major potential opposition presidential
candidates for 2012.
The use of executive decree powers both to enact policies
that should have emerged from the normal legislative process as
well as to implement these antidemocratic practices.
In such a context, the impact of the international community has
been frustrating and frustrated. In the early years of the past decade,
the Organization of American States (OAS) sought to protect the public
space for fair elections. The role of the OAS was positive in this
regard; voters continued to support Chavez, however. In the early years
of the past decade, U.S. Government officials adopted a publicly
confrontational approach toward Chavez. No doubt many of those
criticisms were accurate, and understandable, but they backfired. They
made it easier for Chavez to consolidate his core political support and
to blame the United States for both the failed 2002 coup attempt to
overthrow him and other difficulties. The prolonged rise in the
international price of petroleum, which characterized the entire past
decade until late 2008, enormously increased President Chavez's
capacity to build support at home and abroad.
The decision of the Bush administration in its second term,
continued under President Obama, to tone down public confrontation with
Chavez and better coordinate policies with Venezuela's neighbors has
deprived Chavez of the ease of exporting blame but it has also not had
much impact one way or another on Venezuela's slow march toward
autocracy.
Constitutional democracy and the rule of law are valuable in
themselves. They may also contribute significantly to prosperity.
Autocrats may promise policies that domestic and international
investors like, but those policies are credible only for the duration
of the autocrat's rule. In constitutional liberal democracies as they
have been evolving in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Colombia, among
others, policies change as different Presidents and political parties
take their turn at governing but the fundamental rules of
constitutionality--and the framework of fundamental economic rules,
therefore--persist over time. The credibility of promises to investors
under such democratic circumstances is much higher and effective. Such
credibility helps to explain why these four countries have out-
performed their own economic histories under democratic rule.
Venezuela, in contrast, has suffered from lack of domestic and
international investment, and from capital flight, for a variety of
reasons, but one of them is that President Chavez's promises and
policies are time limited--they may last while he is President but it
is unclear, even doubtful, that they would outlive his Presidency.
Democratic constitutionalism serves prosperity in other ways.
Voters, the national legislature, and the mass media may hold the
executive accountable, and such informational transparency makes it
more likely that errors would be corrected. Voters may, in democratic
elections, defeat incumbents, thereby making an even sharper
correction. Under effective interparty competition and legislative
oversight, the likelihood of abuse of power declines. These elements,
too, help to distinguish between the poor quality of governance in
Venezuela and the better quality of governance in the region's
constitutional democracies.
Democracy and prosperity do not always go hand in hand. It is
possible to have one without the other, and Latin America's political
and economic history is an apt example of such past disjunctions.
Today, however, the region's governments cluster in ways unlike during
most of the region's history. Today, the more effective constitutional
democracies have also the better prospects for prosperity, and the
countries with sound economic policies are also those where democratic
practice is stronger. On the positive side, this is a ``virtuous'' or
reinforcing path about which there is much to celebrate. On the
negative side, it is a worrisome path that may lead to further abuse
and poor performance.
In both instances, Latin Americans have constructed their own
history. It is our task from afar to provide the supportive environment
that helps to foster democratic practices, stand with their citizens
vigilant for the respect of rights enshrined in international treaties,
and be ready to support the principles of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, under the auspices of the Organization of American States--a
Charter, signed on the fateful day, September 11, 2011, whose
principles were valid then as well as today.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Fisk.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL FISK, VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY AND
STRATEGIC PLANNING, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Fisk. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio, thank you for
the opportunity to present some observations from the
perspective of a nongovernmental organization involved in
democracy promotion. The International Republican Institute has
implemented programs in Latin America for more than 25 years.
We currently are in 11 countries.
With this year representing the 10th anniversary of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, this hearing provides a
useful reminder that U.S. interests are fundamentally connected
to the state of democracy in the Americas. Let me join the
chorus in terms of the good news. Over the past 30 years, we
have witnessed throughout the region the broad acceptance of
elections and other democratic practices as the means to select
leaders and legitimize governmental authority.
The fact is that more of the region's citizens are today
participating in the political and economic decisionmaking of
their respective countries than ever before.
Now, this is not to argue that some form of democratic
perfection has descended upon the hemisphere. Rather, it is to
note that the acceptance of democratic practices are now a
foundation of citizen expectations throughout the region,
regardless whether individual leaders genuinely support or
fully implement such practices.
There are exceptions and challenges to this general
positive growth of democracy. Uncontrolled crime and
authoritarian populism I would identify as the two most
significant challenges.
The role of constitutional order and the rule of law are
fundamental to a country's democratic health. But these terms
can also be misleading, as in the case of Cuba, as you two
gentlemen have made reference. That nation has a constitutional
order and a body of laws, yet remains the antidemocratic
outlier in the hemisphere.
The deepening of democracy requires a constitutional order
that protects the rights of individuals, provides for the
responsible division of governmental authority, and promotes
respect for the rule of law. However, over the past decade we
have seen instances where constitutional changes have
undermined democratic institutions and instead concentrated
power in a single office or person.
Constitutional order, like the rule of law, should be
neutral, not an enshrinement of any particular political
tendency. It should include constraints on governmental action,
not just limit the range of citizen behavior. As for the rule
of law, too many countries still suffer from an arbitrary
application of the law, not from a lack of laws. In some
instances the law is dysfunctional by design, generally by the
design of a small segment of the population who seeks to
empower and enrich itself at the expense of others. This I
think is at the core of authoritarian populism.
Weak institutions, including civil society structures, and
attacks on journalists and a free media also contribute to a
situation of democratic uncertainty. Regardless of the past
reasons for this stage of affairs, democratic practice remains
most successful where there are competing centers of
governmental authority, where civil society has an opportunity
to meaningfully engage decisionmakers, and where the media can
vigorously report on the actions of those in office.
As we've discussed here earlier, today's Venezuela is the
region's poster country for the challenges that confront the
consolidation of a democratic society. While Mr. Chavez's rise
to power 12 years ago represented popular disapproval of
government run by wealthy elites, his government, however, has
manipulated an independent judicial system, eliminated any
sense of a predictable rule of law, and eviscerated the
responsibilities of other independent bodies, including the
national legislature.
Worrisome is that we have seen elements of this model
copied in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and we share the
open question on what happens with Peru. But by comparison
there is Colombia, where a popular President with an 80-percent
approval rating stepped down when a proposed third term in
office was deemed unconstitutional by an independent judicial
body. A free competitive election chose his successor.
Democracy is about more than a leader's approval rating and
Alvaro Uribe understood that and respected that.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, we should keep in mind that many
in the hemisphere want our help in building and strengthening
democratic institutions and practices. Such assistance is not a
matter of imposing U.S. structures and values. Each country has
to develop its own path. However, as partners in this
experiment called democracy we can and should respond to those
seeking to learn from other's experiences and not only from the
North American experience. More importantly in my view, by
supporting those who favor freedom and democracy we are
contributing to the betterment of all who live in this
hemisphere.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fisk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel W. Fisk
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present some
observations on ``the state of democracy in the Americas'' from the
perspective of a nongovernmental organization involved in democracy
promotion. The International Republican Institute (IRI) has implemented
democracy programs in Latin America for more than 25 years. Currently,
we work in 11 countries in Latin America.
We are all aware that the vast majority of attention in the foreign
policy arena is currently--and rightly--focused on the historic events
taking place in the Middle East, the continuing efforts in Afghanistan
to stabilize that country's situation, and the ongoing challenges of
rebuilding in Iraq and addressing other aspects of the war against
terrorism.
With the 10th anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter
on the horizon, this hearing provides a useful reminder of the
importance to the United States of our Western Hemisphere neighborhood.
As members of this subcommittee know well, this hemisphere remains
critical to any efforts by the United States to create jobs, to become
less energy dependent on unstable suppliers, to address the challenge
of illegal drugs and associated criminal activities and violence, and
to maintain our overall national security. The state of democracy in
the Americas is fundamentally connected to all of these U.S. interests
and to the future betterment of the human condition throughout this
hemisphere.
Before addressing the specific questions outlined in the
Subcommittee's invitation to testify today, it is important to remember
that the overall ``democratic trend line'' in the Americas is one of
notable achievement during the last 30 years. It is fair to describe
the region as generally democratic, with some notable exceptions, of
course. During this time:
We have witnessed the acceptance of elections as a regular
exercise to select leaders and legitimize--or attempt to
legitimize--governmental authority.
We have witnessed the broad rejection of military
dictatorships and of an overt political role for militaries.
And we have generally seen advances in respect for human
rights, as well as the opportunities for citizens to better
their lives in health, education, and economic status.
The fact is that more citizens are today participating in the
political and economic decisionmaking processes of their respective
countries than ever before.
This is not to argue that ``democratic perfection'' has descended
upon this hemisphere. Rather, it is to note that the acceptance of
certain values and processes are now at the base of citizen
expectations throughout the region, regardless whether individual
leaders genuinely support or fully implement such practices.
In part this acceptance has historical roots. While the long-term
record of this hemisphere's politics is mixed, there is a democratic or
reform legacy beyond that of the United States and Canada. For
instance, the democratic footprint in many Caribbean nations is all-
too-often overlooked. The commitment to democratic practices remains
strong and has served those nations well, even if some only received
their formal independence in the 1960s.
In Costa Rica, Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, Panama, and Chile,
despite periods of civil conflict or authoritarian rule, reform
undercurrents have endured. In other countries in the region over the
last 30 years, we have seen conditions change, in some instances with
external support, resulting in an embrace of democratic norms and
processes, albeit with continuing challenges. Examples include Mexico,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Paraguay, and Brazil.
Are these countries examples of perfectly fine-tuned democracies?
Certainly not--and most would say that our own democracy is still
seeking to fulfill its ideals. However, what we see in many of these
democratic transition ``success stories'' is an appreciation for--and
value placed upon--democratic institutions and broader citizen
participation.
This hemispheric embrace was memorialized in September 2001--
ironically, on September 11--when the 34 active member countries of the
Organization of American States (OAS) unanimously approved the Inter-
American Democratic Charter. In the words of the Charter, ``the peoples
of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an
obligation to promote and defend it'' (Article 1).
Adherence to the objectives of the Charter remains uneven.
Regardless, it remains the normative standard for this hemisphere and
should be the measure by which countries are evaluated.
Obviously, there are exceptions and challenges to the general,
positive growth of democracy in the region. As noted in the 2011 report
of Freedom House, Freedom in the World, ``uncontrolled crime and
authoritarian populism'' are threats to the region's democratic
progress. IRI sees the presence and/or effects of these threats in a
number of countries in which we work, and countries where institutions
are weak, corruption is rife, and citizens do not have confidence in
the authorities are especially vulnerable to the consequences of
uncontrolled crime or authoritarian populism, or both, as we are seeing
in Venezuela, for example.
The issues, then, at the heart of this hearing--the rule of law,
constitutional order, concentration of power, and the role of civil
society and a free press--are elements in deterring and reversing these
threats.
The role of constitutional order and rule of law are fundamental.
But these terms can also be misleading, as in the case of Cuba. That
nation has a ``constitutional order,'' at least to the extent that it
operates, in name, under a so-called constitutional document and a body
of laws, but both are used to cloak a totalitarian structure with a
veil of legitimacy. Cuba remains the hemisphere's antidemocratic
outlier, even when placed side by side with today's Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Ecuador, or Bolivia.
Constitutional order also is subject to manipulation. There have
been a variety of constitutional reforms and challenges to
constitutional order over the past decade, from Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Ecuador to Colombia. In some instances, constitutional changes,
approved and legitimized by popular plebiscites, have undermined
democratic institutions, transparency and accountability, allowing for
the concentration of power in a single office or person. For example,
most recently, Ecuador held a referendum that consolidated the power of
the President over the judiciary and the media.
If there is good news in these processes, it has been in the
participation of large numbers of citizens; the bad news is the
significant erosion of the checks and balances essential to democratic
governance that has been masked by feel-good measures, such as shorter
work hours or other perceived benefits, or by issues that distract
voters from the sponsor's wider political agenda. Again Ecuador's
recent referendum offers an example: in its constitutional referendum,
the most widely publicized question had to do with the proposal to curb
casinos.
Whereas a persistent challenge has been the treatment of
constitutions as ``multiple choice'' documents--with leaders
determining which provisions to respect and which to ignore--the region
has recently seen constitutional amendments that result in the transfer
of authority to a single officeholder who wields arbitrary authority
and is not constrained by the country's constitution. In effect, the
constitution has become the basis for the exercise of authoritarian
power over facets of everyday life.
The deepening of democracy requires a constitutional order that
protects the rights of individuals, provides for the responsible
division of governmental authority, and promotes respect for the rule
of law. Constitutional order, like the rule of law, should be neutral,
not an enshrinement of any particular political tendency. It and the
law should include rules or principles that constrain governmental
action, not just limit the range of citizen behavior.
As for the rule of law, several countries in the Americas have
experienced the arbitrary application of the law, not a lack of laws.
In too many instances, the law is dysfunctional by design--generally
the design of a small segment of the population which seeks to benefit
and enrich itself at the expense of others. This, in many ways, is at
the heart of today's authoritarian populism: the arbitrary manipulation
of the law with the objective of consolidated political power under the
guise of ``participatory democracy.''
In part, this situation has evolved as a result of weak or fragile
institutions, including weak civil society structures. In a number of
countries, the governmental structural underpinnings of a President,
Cabinet Minister or legislator are wholly reflective of the
personality, not some free-standing structure. The need goes further
than the existence of an apolitical civil service--which is sorely
needed in many countries. As a former State Department colleague once
put it, in Latin America, you can talk about presidents but not
presidencies, ministers but not ministries. Often the structure, to the
extent there is one, exists as a reflection of the personality, being
little more than a shell which is filled by the appointments of the
next occupant, not as an independent institution focused on the
national interest.
This institutional weakness is also seen in other branches of
government, including the institutions that should be a counterweight
to concentrated executive power, including national legislatures and
judiciaries. Departmental and municipal governments also often suffer
from a reliance on the national executive for resources, and the same
has been found to occur with other independent bodies, such as national
election commissions. Sometimes the institutional weakness of these
other governmental entities is exacerbated by the constitutional
division of power; sometimes it is the consequence of neglect or the
malignancy of corruption.
Some observers have ascribed this situation to the caudillo
(``strongman'') tradition in Latin America: the blurring of
governmental authority in one central figure. This situation also has
generated a persistent debate on ``presidentialism'' versus
``parliamentarism'' in Latin America. Regardless of the historic basis
for power being centralized in one person, or one's views on
presidencies versus parliaments, democratic practice remains most
successful where there are competing centers of governmental authority,
where civil society has the opportunity to meaningfully engage
decisionmakers, and where the media can vigorously report on the
actions of those in power.
It is for these reasons that IRI sees significant value in
developing and strengthening the multiple elements that are fundamental
to democratic governance, from national legislative bodies, including
those in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru, and political parties to local or
municipal governments, civil society organizations, and a robust media.
Today's Venezuela is the poster country for the challenges that
confront the consolidation of genuine democratic practices and norms.
In Venezuela there is clearly a sense of ``democratic right and
wrong'' among the people, but the institutions in that country are
fragile and earlier governments failed to meet the needs or
expectations of a significant segment of the population. This situation
has allowed one man--Hugo Chavez--and his allies to tip the balance of
power in his direction by manipulating the once-independent judicial
system, eliminating any sense of predictable rule of law, and
eviscerating the checks and balances that should be provided by the
national legislature. Through the consolidation of power in the
executive, Mr. Chavez has been able to seize private property and
wealth, obstruct national-level political opposition, punish a free
media, harass civil society, and perpetuate his own power through self-
serving so-called ``constitutional reforms'' and plebiscites.
While Mr. Chavez's rise 12 years ago represented a popular
disapproval of self-interested government run by wealthy elites--his
remaining in power represents a virus to which several countries in the
region have fallen victim. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua can
certainly be included in that grouping. Presidents Morales and Correa,
respectively, have copied President Chavez's blueprint for
consolidating powers under the guise of ``popular'' and
``participatory'' mechanisms. Nicaragua's President, Daniel Ortega, has
used Mr. Chavez's money--the use of which is not subject to
accountability by any Nicaraguan--to exert influence over the media and
other sectors of society and government in an effort to perpetuate his
hold on power. In November, Mr. Ortega will attempt to extend his hold
on power through scheduled national elections. Already there are
concerns by many Nicaraguans that the electoral field is tilted in Mr.
Ortega's favor.
By contrast, there is the experience of Colombia. As the 2010
Presidential election cycle approached in Colombia, a segment of the
citizenry voiced a desire for Alvaro Uribe to run for, and serve, an
unprecedented third term in office. To do so, the Colombian
Constitution would have needed to be amended via a popular referendum.
However, in one of the strongest pieces of evidence that democratic
institutions and order have come a long way in Colombia, the country's
highest court ruled that a referendum was unconstitutional. As a
result, Colombia's President--with an 80-percent approval rating--ended
his term in office. A free, competitive election selected his
successor.
Mr. Chairman, I will close with two general points: first, we
cannot continue to confuse elections with effective or democratic
governance. As I noted earlier, the region has embraced elections on a
regular and recurring basis. However, it still struggles with
governance. Too often, we have given significant attention to an
election and then turned away, thinking that the job is largely done. A
fair, transparent election merits commendation. However, it does not
change a dysfunctional governmental structure; it does not overcome the
endemic challenges to the maintenance of a democratic polity. We have
learned this lesson in a number of countries.
Yes, the United States has attempted to assist countries in post-
election/post-transition situations. At the same time, this attention
has had its deficiencies--not intentionally but because we often
consider governance as little more than a technical problem to be
addressed. Our programs tend to shy away from helping democratically
elected officials with the small ``p'' political aspects of governing,
which involves continuing interaction between officials and citizens--
an interaction that is at the core of democratic governance.
This type of assistance must include more than the provision of
technical tools. It may be useful to have software to track a country's
budget or cases in its court system; but such software is irrelevant to
the average citizen if services cannot be delivered, if bureaucrats and
judges perform based on graft, or if citizens' views are ignored by
decisionmakers as policies are being developed and implemented.
Such assistance is not a matter of imposing U.S. structures on
Latin America. Each country has to develop its own path. As partners in
this experiment called democracy, we can respond to those seeking to
learn from the experiences of others, and not only from the North
American experience. There are many models of successful democratic
development.
Second, and related to the above, we should keep in mind that many
in this hemisphere want our help in the building and strengthening of
genuine democratic institutions and practices. The peoples of this
hemisphere ``get'' freedom and democracy. By supporting them, we are
contributing to the betterment of all who live in this hemisphere.
Senator Menendez. Thank you all for your very insightful
testimony.
Let me start by taking off where you just finished, Mr.
Fisk. What is the appropriate role for the United States in
helping civil society further promote democracy where it is not
as vibrant and strengthening it where it is?
What are the top two or three things the United States
should do?
Dr. Dominguez.
Dr. Dominguez. One effective instrument--and it speaks to
Senator Rubio's question of Secretary Jacobson--is election
observation. Election observation is a set of procedures, a set
of instruments, which has developed over a period of time. It
can be effective, it has been effective in a number of
entities. Some of it may be done by any civil society
organization in various countries, including the United States.
But some of it, which I would commend to both of you, is the
work that IRI and NDI have done over time; this is a specific
issue. In my own personal experience with election observation,
working with NDI and IRI has been unfailingly very rewarding
and I believe effective.
Let me give you a different example altogether. It may not
work, but just to think out loud. So beginning some years ago,
the state of Zacatecas in Mexico led the way, other entities
elsewhere in Mexico followed it accordingly, to try to harness
some of the remittances from Mexican citizens living in the
United States, not just to help individual family members, but
also to help to develop social objectives, community
objectives, and small civil society groups at the local level.
It developed eventually into what is often called the
three-for-one funding. For every dollar that comes from a
Mexican in the United States to a family and in a local Mexican
community, Mexican local and state and federal entities
contribute a dollar. The question is whether some of that could
be augmented or facilitated through the charitable features of
the U.S. Tax Code, to facilitate and to stimulate those kinds
of commitments where the bulk of resources would come, not from
the U.S. taxpayer, but from individual citizens who voluntarily
make these efforts and from governments in Mexico or other
Latin American countries. This would harness transnational
civil society, but for the purpose of assisting those in
particular communities.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Reid.
Mr. Reid. Mr. Chairman, I would say firstly it's important
to avoid kind of crude attempts at promoting regime change. I'm
struck--from outside, or exporting democracy from outside. I'm
struck by the kind of broad consensus that I think exists here
today that that is not the way forward, and I think that's
good.
Second, I would say that a lot of this work inevitably
falls not to the United States Government, but to other
institutions in American society, and particularly foundations
and NGOs. I do think that supporting media freedom, pressure
groups, and watchdogs throughout the hemisphere is absolutely
vital and they do an important job, and the more of that work
that is done the better.
I think Senator Rubio, if I remember rightly, mentioned the
idea of the United States supporting parliamentary visits by,
for example, Venezuelan parliamentarians to other, more robust
democracies in Latin America, and that strikes me as very
important, because I think that peer pressure at the end of the
day and taking the peers of Venezuela to be the other Latin
American countries I think is important.
Specifically, there is a specific event scheduled next
year, the Presidential election in Venezuela, which is of
supreme importance that it should be as free and fair as
possible. I think election observation may be difficult. It can
only be achieved through multilateral agreement.
I would note that I think there's been no conclusive proof
up until now that the electoral, the actual counting of voting,
has not been accurate in Venezuela, and it's important to
mobilize as much pressure as possible to ensure that that vote
is free and fair.
Senator Menendez. Let me just follow up on my question. You
mentioned regime change at the very beginning. Surely you don't
suggest that assisting civil society to promote greater
democracy, freedom of the press, and the right to organize, is
regime change?
Mr. Reid. I didn't mean to. Of course I don't think that's
the case. I think there's a distinction. But I think in the
past some elements within Venezuela, for example, attempted
unconstitutional regime change and, while they did not, I don't
think there's any proof they got support from the
administration here, they got support from some political
sectors here.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Fisk, IRI has had a robust Cuba
program for many years that supports civil society and conducts
unique polling on the views of Cubans on a variety of issues.
What do you think has worked? What can we do in places like
Cuba to help promote civil society and disseminate independent
voices both on and off the island?
Mr. Fisk. Mr. Chairman, I first of all believe that the
programs that have been implemented, while they've had their
bumps in the road in implementation, overall have overcome,
been able to overcome, a lot of the challenges presented by the
Cuban regime specifically.
In terms of continuing to make sure that we in terms of the
NGO world get information to the island, that we try to find
opportunities to get Cubans skills in terms of basic concepts
of democracy and also some basic organizational skills. In some
cases we're starting with very, very basics. In some cases it's
pens and paper. I know there's a lot of excitement about social
media and that's also a facet in terms of what IRI does. But I
think that the fundamentals are there in terms of how it works.
The problem, of course, we always run into is the fact that
the regime has a very effective security apparatus. The other
issue we have, frankly, in a forum like this is when we talk
about it it potentially calls attention to things or to people,
and you were right earlier to note that a lot of these
individuals have to make a very tough decision. A U.S. NGO can
always get up and leave a place. In Cuba it's even tougher than
others.
But I do think that in terms of the fundamentals of the
U.S. program as it exists, I think it's there. From our vantage
point, of course, we always see opportunities for more. But it
is a case in which I think that the committee from our
perspective, the committee should be assured that there are
things in motion and there are ways to get information--there
are ways to get these skills to people on the island.
Senator Menendez. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you to the panel.
Here's what I'd like to do, is kind of make a brief
statement on my views, something that's been on my mind for a
while. It's very topical. It's what we're talking about today.
And then get your impressions, your agreement, your
disagreement both. I'd prefer your agreement, but your honest
assessment.
A couple things. First of all, you have governments, and I
use Cuba as an example, that are not legitimate. In essence,
they do not have the consent of the people that they govern.
The only reason why they're in charge is because if you don't
agree with them they hit you on the head, they put you in jail,
they exile you, they torment you and your family, you have no
economic opportunities in the country in general, and
especially if you don't agree with the government.
They're illegitimate because they do not govern with the
consent of the governed. That's one thing. Put that aside for a
second. In those, I think it's very clear in my opinion where
the United States should be. We talked--the word ``regime
change'' was used. I would say to you that anywhere in the
world where there is an illegitimate government that doesn't
govern with the consent of the people that it governs, the
United States should be on the side of the people. And I think
Cuba is a prime example of that in the Western Hemisphere.
Then you have a second complication or a second issue we
face, and that is nations that have democratic institutions,
but perhaps leaders that are trying to undermine the democratic
institutions or policies that we don't like. That's really the
one I want to focus on right now. We're very proud of our
Republic in the United States and rightfully so, but it hasn't
been one throughout its history without challenges. We
certainly had a Civil War 100-some odd years ago over some of
the issues that faced our country.
But one of the things that makes us unique is the ability
to take on some very difficult issues in this country, very
divisive issues, within the context of the Republic. Richard
Nixon resigned, but imagine if he had ordered the Army to march
on the Capitol and prevent his impeachment if that was headed
in that direction.
In my own home State, in the year 2000 we had a very close
election that ultimately decided the election and the
Presidency of the United States. But when the Supreme Court
ruled, Vice President Gore accepted it and moved on. Imagine a
different scenario. It's far-fetched for us to think, but it
happens around the world, where the Supreme Court rules a
certain way and all of a sudden the President or whoever is in
charge orders the army into the street or the cancellation of
it or what have you, or the intimidation of the Supreme Court
on how to rule.
So those institutions by and large, even though we have
very heated disagreements in the United States, have allowed us
over time to solve some very contentious issues that other
countries have had to fight wars over and that have set these
nations back.
I was moved reading last night the testimony, the written
testimony of Mr. Dominguez. You talked about the election in
Mexico and how it was reported by the voting council, and
immediately the cameras cut to the President and then they cut
to the governing party that had been in charge forever and a
day and how they had to accept it, and how the people broke out
and started singing the national anthem of Mexico--a really
pivotal moment in that country's history.
Imagine how much worse off Mexico would be today, facing
the challenges it faces, if it didn't have this democratic
institution, fortified by these elections where power changes
hands, people aren't happy about it, but they agree with it.
So here's our challenge. From time to time throughout the
region there are going to be elections and the person who wins
may be somebody whose policies we don't like, not policies to
undermine the institutions, just their policies. We may not
like their rhetoric and we may not like some of the things
they've said in the past or promised to do in the future. But
they won an election. So the challenge there for us--and I'd
like to have your input on it--is how would you advise, on a
foreign policy perspective, the kinds of things we can do to
separate--and maybe there is no concrete steps we can take. But
how do we separate those two, between the fact that--it's not
that we don't like Hugo Chavez's policies, for example; it's
that in addition to being a danger to his neighbors and a bad
example to the world and an embarrassment to his people and his
country and a guy who's holding his country back and that's sad
for Venezuela, he also attempts to undermine democratic
institutions, maybe not by rigging votes, but certainly by
intimidating people, certainly by not creating a fair playing
field where both messages can get out and Venezuelans can make
an informed decision.
That's different from somebody who's running and saying
things we don't like, but ultimately is governing in an
effective way. So what is your suggestion to reach that level
of public policy maturity where we can distinguish between the
election of someone who we don't like what they stand for, but
they got legitimately elected, and the election of someone who
then uses that position to undermine democratic institutions?
Because we should be against that, but ultimately we've got to
deal with folks that are elected whose policies we may not like
at a given moment.
Mr. Reid. Senator, that was a very lucid exposition of the
issues. I think the answers are not easy. I think it's
important to stress that the construction of robust
representative democracies in Latin America is a learning
process for the societies themselves, and that was really what
I was trying to get at by suggesting that attempts at regime
change from outside would not be effective or helpful.
I think that in the case of Venezuela, I'm sure all of us
abhor the ways in which the institutions of representative
democracy have been weakened in Venezuela. But as you implied,
that has so far been done with the consent of the majority of
the people, and the narrative that the President has sold to
the people has that their problems have been as a result of
outside interventions.
We might rationally consider that to be a fantasy, but it
has had been quite effective. So in other words, I think it's
quite--outside influence is important, but it's important at
particular moments. It's likely to have much more leverage and
impact at a moment when the society itself is changing its
mind, changing its political mind. I think that process is
under way in Venezuela. It's not complete yet. I think it's
starting in Bolivia and in Ecuador.
I think Nicaragua is a slightly different case in that for
an opposition to win an election you have to have a reasonably
coherent and plausible opposition and a plausible candidate,
and I don't think that's the case in Nicaragua.
So while I think one has to wage the democratic war through
civil society, support for civil society institutions, I think
one has to also pick one's battles to an extent.
Dr. Dominguez. One theme that has come out both in your
questions and some of the comments from fellow witnesses is an
important element in all of these key political issues yet it
is very difficult to shape--it's easier to observe, but it's
more difficult to shape--and it's statesmanship. So Dan Fisk
referred to the statesmanship of President Uribe, who,
notwithstanding his popularity, accepted the decision of the
constitutional court and stepped down.
Senator Rubio, you just referred to the Mexico 2000
election, where President Zedillo, first time ever,
congratulated his opponent and presided over a peaceful
transition.
If I knew more how we could fashion such statesmanship, I
would feel much more confident about answering your question.
But I want to begin with a sense of humility that I cannot
fully address it, precisely because that element,
statesmanship, is important.
So a couple of examples. At the time the Brazil 2002
Presidential election, I could imagine there would be many
people in the city of Washington at the time who were very
nervous, just as there were many nervous Brazilians at the time
fearful that Lula might be elected President of Brazil. That's
why it was difficult. And yet it worked because there was the
willingness to give this political process a chance, to see how
Lula would govern.
To the great credit, not only of President Lula and
Brazilians in the first instance, but also of many others,
including the Bush administration at the time--I have no idea
what your views were, Dan, but you were an official at the
time--this worked very successfully. It really is one of the
accomplishments of which Brazilians, but also the international
community, should be proud.
That's the question that bears on thinking about Peru
today. I don't find myself in general in sympathy with
President-elect Humala's views, certainly not the early version
of President-elect Humala, but not even the more current
versions. But I would want to give him the same benefit of the
doubt that Brazilians gave to Lula, and that the international
community gave to Lula, to the case of President-elect Humala.
It's probably worth remembering that, when Chavez was first
elected President of Venezuela, he did not run on the platform
that he has implemented. He was, as Dan Fisk noted, very much
in opposition to the way Venezuela had been governed. He was
challenging both political parties and long-entrenched elites.
But he did not articulate at the time that he would be
undertaking the kinds of policies that have undermined the
media, and that have undermined journalists and civil society.
The difficulty--the real serious difficulty both for the
Venezuelan opposition and for anybody else, is that this Chavez
process has occurred very gradually. It was not a military
coup. It was not a sharp interruption. It was autocracy drop by
drop. It's much more difficult to respond to the gradual
installation of autocratic practices. And we have not, we
collectively, Venezuelans and the opposition or those of us who
may support them outside of Venezuela, have not done a very
good job at supporting a democratic process there. It's very
hard to do so when it happens little step by little step.
Mr. Fisk. If the committee will indulge me in stepping out
of my IRI role and taking on kind of from experiences, Senator,
I've actually, like a number of us who've served in positions
at various times, whether it's academically or in the
government specifically, have struggled with exactly the
question that you've presented. If someone has an answer that's
a definitive one, it would be useful to know.
Picking up on Jorge's comment, though, your counterpart
does make a difference. President Bush took the calculated risk
in the mind of the Bush administration to reach out to
President-elect Lula and then President Lula. It was more than
a ``trust but verify.'' You also had two leaders who understood
that their national interests--that they had more in common in
their national interests, shared more than separated us. That
is to both Presidents' credit in my view, and I'm by the way
personally pleased that President Obama and President Rousseff
have continued that path in terms of United States-Brazilian
relationships.
But it is more than a ``trust but verify'' circumstance. I
would argue that Mr. Chavez did not come into office with the
intent to be our friend or just to get along with us. I think
he had another agenda. This is, I think, also one of those
issues that the antidemocrats in the hemisphere learned in the
1980s they could not shoot their way into power, so that they
had to learn the democratic practices, but without adopting the
democratic ethos and internalizing it. They have done a very
good job and, again as Jorge mentioned, it is a matter that we
struggle with because, whether we like his policies or not,
President Chavez is President because he was elected. President
Ortega was elected. President Morales, elected. You go down the
list.
That is a dilemma for us, and one of the questions at the
base of your question is, in a democratic process can a people
basically vote themselves into subjugation, even though it's an
antidemocratic state at the end? There is no good policy
response.
But let me tie this back to the chairman's question about
the instruments. I do think this is a matter in which the
United States, both in terms of the executive branch, the
President, and this institution, need to be clear, need to be
very clear. There needs to be moral clarity in terms of where
this country is in terms of supporting small ``d'' democrats,
not only in the hemisphere, but around the world. Ambiguity in
my opinion works to the advantage of those who are opposed to
democracy or are misusing democratic means to promote their
ultimate ends. So that is one thing that's important.
Second, in the end U.S. civil society is a potent force.
It's been referenced earlier. There are a lot of, in this
hemisphere, a phenomenal amount of engagement between private
American citizens and private American groups with counterparts
in the hemisphere. There's a phenomenal interaction.
But when it comes to the political side, there is a very
small group that do this. I want to be careful because I don't
want to sound self-serving, but there is basically a very small
community that does this in this country in terms of the
outreach to civil society that strengthens them in terms of
their ability to organize and advocate on behalf--and again, it
doesn't make any difference whether the issue is education or
water or gender equality, violence against women, a number of
things. But there is a very small group that does that.
Again, the reality is that those of us who do this--and
I'll step back into my IRI role--is we have funders, and those
funders are predominantly the United States Government. So this
is not a plea for funding, but this is just the reality that we
exist in.
Then in terms of what the chairman and you, sir, have made
comments to, it is a matter of making sure that that support
continues to be there. Again, I think it's one part, the bully
pulpit. It's the moral suasion. Another, it's the very real
reality on the ground, and it spreads throughout. You asked
Secretary Jacobson about country teams, U.S. missions. That's
an important place as well for both of those elements to be.
So again, I'm kind of mixing my--wearing two hats here in
some ways, but hopefully that is a somewhat coherent answer to
your question.
Senator Menendez. A few out-of-body experiences in less
than 5 minutes, moving back and forth. But I think it was very
insightful.
I want to pick up on something you said and then ask one
question. Part of what you said, Mr. Fisk, I know it wasn't a
plea for funding. I do believe, however, that these engagements
of IRI and NDI are very important. Part of my concern, one of
the reasons I have been promoting for several years now a
social and economic development fund for the Americas is to
address the root cause of why people turn to the Chavezes of
the world. They turn because they are in deep economic straits.
Their governments prior to have not responded to their hopes,
dreams, and aspirations, and someone comes along who promises
the world and uses the rhetoric, gets elected, and then uses
their position of power to transform institutions to keep them
in power. They might continue to do some populist things,
though, as was observed, Venezuela is doing worse in terms of
its economy versus other parts of the hemisphere.
So it seems to me that one of the things in our national
interest and our national security interest--forget about being
a good neighbor, which is a desirable goal as well--is if as
part of our effort help strengthen the opportunities for
sustainable development efforts and education efforts in the
hemisphere, we give rise to a growing universe of citizens of
the hemisphere who right now sit below the poverty level, are
in pretty dire straits and very susceptible to what ultimately
ends up being an antidemocratic result. Hence your statement,
is it right to go ahead and vote yourself into subjugation at
the end of the day?
It seems to me that while this is in the national interest
of the United States in our own hemisphere, it only gets a
fraction of our overall international assistance, and is the
cause of many issues we debate in Congress, such as
undocumented immigration. People leave their countries as a
result of dire economic straits or civil unrest. Otherwise they
would stay. They're beautiful countries. So you want to stop
the tide of undocumented immigration? One part of the equations
is creating sustainable development and economic opportunities
for people in the hemisphere, that will ultimately lead to the
benefit of the United States in creating greater markets for
U.S. services and products.
You want to ensure that there isn't instability in the
hemisphere in terms of security or that Iran, China, and others
don't have a deeper foothold than they purport to have in order
to strengthen our relationship in that respect.
I hope we can work to create a connection here that says
that the work of IRI and NDI and some more robust efforts in
creating development opportunities to have a growing middle
class in the hemisphere is in the national interest and
security of the United States.
My question that I would be remiss if I didn't take
advantage of Dr. Dominguez's expertise here is on Mexico. It's
probably the country in the hemisphere we are most closely
intertwined with by geography, economic trade, security,
history, and people. And of course that country has in the past
5 years been challenged by drug trafficking organizations.
I looked at the Freedom House's report, ``The Authoritarian
Challenge to Democracy,'' where they drop Mexico's political
rating from free to partially free. I admire the President of
Mexico's efforts to take on the narcotics cartels, probably
more robustly than at any time in Mexico's history, and I
wonder, considering the challenges, is that a fair observation
of Mexico, one; and two, how do countries like Mexico, that are
fighting the narcotics challenge, balance the effort to create
security and at the same time make sure that their democratic
institutions don't become authoritarian to some degree in
response to the security challenge?
Dr. Dominguez. I have great admiration for President
Calderon, given the extraordinarily difficult challenges that
he faces, and the work that he has been undertaking. I think it
is fair to say that if you or I were journalists in Mexico we
would feel intimidated, not by the President of Mexico or by
his government, neither by the Mexican Congress or the
executive, but by the threat that, if I as a journalist write a
story, I could be shot as well as by the fear engendered
through the personal experience of assassination and
intimidation of journalists in Mexico. This has become a very
severe issue.
Similarly, you probably saw the newspaper from Ciudad
Juarez on the border saying to criminal organizations: Tell us
what you want us to do; we will censor ourselves if need be. So
it's not just the actual acts of physical violence, but the
realization of an important element of the mass media that they
cannot do the job that they want to do and from which Mexico
would gain.
So it's one of those instances where, at the level of the
working journalist, it is true they are less free than they
were before. What is unusual about this case is that it happens
not as a result of the actions of the national government. This
is not Venezuela. This is not Hugo Chavez.
One of the things that I do find impressive, again
difficult as the situation is, is the sustained efforts of the
Mexican Government, not only to deploy force to combat those
that are committing crimes and assaulting ordinary citizens or
journalists and many others, but also to try to train both the
military and the police in the effective professional role of
law enforcement and the deployment of troops in ways that
Mexican security forces had not done in the past.
So, paradoxically, as Mexico's categorization has been
dropped to partially free, the security forces are more likely
to be respectful of human rights now than they were in the
past. I would give high marks to the role of the government as
it faces this situation, while at the same time recognizing
that, yes, it is true that the experience of the ability to
express freedom of the press, freedom of expression, has
declined.
Senator Rubio. I just want to first thank the panel. It's
been an excellent panel. I appreciate very much your input. I
was just telling the chairman how insightful this is.
I wanted to briefly run--I don't want to call it a
doctrine--a view of the region and see your perceptions of it.
I've kind of written it down here as we've discussed it. The
first is categorizing three different types of entities, the
governments that we run into in the region. The first are
tyrannies like Cuba, straight-up tyranny. This is a country
whose government is not legitimate. It oppresses its people.
The only reason why it's in charge in that country is because
its people are oppressed. The United States position toward
that should be that, you're not legitimate, the government, and
that we are going to--if we have a chance, we'll do everything
that we can to help your people bring about a change in these
countries within our national interests and our limitations.
The second are nations like Nicaragua and Venezuela, that
do have democratic institutions, but leaders that are trying to
undermine them. Our view of that is that when those efforts are
put in place, whether it's intimidating the media or
intimidating opposition or intimidating dissent, that we're
going to criticize you for it and we're going to call you out
for that. We're not going to interfere in your internal
affairs. We're not going to support things that may undermine
democratic institutions, because we're not going to add to your
problems and we're not going to contribute to them, but we're
also not going to celebrate and certainly not ignore when you
do things the undermine your democratic institutions.
By the way, the challenge there will be--we don't have that
problem now, but the challenge there historically has been,
well, what if the people undermining the democratic
institutions are pro-American or pro our view of the world, but
they're undermining democracy? So we'll have to have discipline
in order to have credibility with that.
Then the third is nations that have democratic institutions
and that respect them. Maybe from time to time those nations
don't vote the way we want them to at the United Nations, and
maybe they make some weird alliances that we don't fully
understand around the world, and we can criticize that. But
they are free, they are real republics and democracies. We
should celebrate that. And the price--or the benefit of that
should be strong relationships with the United States and the
ability to do business with them, and this is something we
should celebrate and encourage and show the region that, look,
we don't want to control your domestic or foreign policy; we'd
like to influence it, as you'd like to influence ours. But
ultimately, if you're committed to democratic institutions
we're going to celebrate that and we want to work with you on
that, and that really will strengthen our ties.
Kind of that view of the region as a way to go forward, I
don't know if you have any impressions on that?
Mr. Reid. Thank you. Just before addressing that question,
could I add something to Chairman Menendez's question about
Mexico? I lived in Mexico as a journalist for about 4 years in
the early 1990s and I would point out that when I lived there,
at least for the first 3 years, not a single media outlet in
Mexico City was free. So I think there's been a big change and
one should remember that context.
It is certainly true that there are serious threats to the
lives and liberties of journalists and media organizations in
Mexico today, but they tend to be concentrated in remote--in
areas away from the capital, as was the case in Colombia in the
1990s.
Just in terms of the security effort and its implications
for democracy, I do think it's crucial that Mexico moves faster
on building a serious police force or serious police forces,
because the historic achievement of the Mexican revolution was
to have taken the army out of politics. I think that--in
contrast to what was happening elsewhere in the region. I think
there is a danger that the longer that the army is involved in
the front line of the crackdown against drug trafficking
organizations, then the army risks becoming politicized and its
reputation tarnished. Indeed, we're starting to see signs of
kind of anomic violence in parts of Mexico that are actually
reminiscent of the revolution in some ways.
So I think that the task of strengthening police forces in
Mexico is absolutely vital and it's going too slowly in my
view. But that is a task for the Mexican Government, in which
obviously the United States can help in terms of looking at its
own drugs and firearms policy, which I know you've held a
hearing on recently.
Then just to turn to Senator Rubio's characterization, yes,
I think that's right, that somebody like Ollante Humala, whom
you mentioned before, is a man who has antidemocratic
antecedents, but has arrived in power through a democratic
process. The Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset said: ``I am
myself and my circumstances.'' I think that the way in which
Humala governs will depend a lot on his circumstances, and I
think the United States can contribute to those circumstances
being those of a strong underlying democracy in Peru by
engaging with him.
The only thing I'm troubled slightly by--and this is a long
discussion, perhaps, to get into at the end of this session.
But I think there is finally a process of change going on in
Cuba. I think it's started, because I think that the economic
changes that the government has announced, modest though they
are, hemmed in though they are by all kinds of restrictions, I
think for the first time they involve changes that the regime
will not be able to control. If indeed one in three Cubans is
going to be working in self-employment in an incipient private
sector in a few years time, then the fundamental contract that
the Castro brothers established with people on the island, that
they would forego their liberty in return for a series of the
necessities of daily life being provided for by the state,
that's gone, and Cuban society will start changing very
rapidly. I think other countries in Latin America will engage
with that, and at some time the United States will have to
think about in what way it could constructively engage with
that in order to achieve the outcome that I'm sure everybody
wants of a democratic and capitalist Cuba.
Dr. Dominguez. Just to comment on your characterization, I
think it's apt and it can give us clarity on a couple of
points. It is probably easier and more effective for the U.S.
Government to work with and support the countries that already
have constitutional democratic regimes than to deal with those
that understandably we'll worry about, but their situation is
harder to address.
So one connection then could well be to the idea that
Senator Menendez mentioned a moment ago, namely, his
longstanding interest in a fund for social and economic
development. The most successful antipoverty program certainly
in Latin America, but not just there, has been economic growth.
To be able to facilitate the kinds of economic growth that will
bring more people into the work force is an idea on which we
ought to focus firmly.
The second observation we've learned, which is why the word
``social'' is important in the name of Senator Menendez's
proposal, is that economic growth alone is probably not as
effective as economic growth with sensible, well-targeted
social policies. Michael in his opening remarks mentioned
conditional cash transfers. To give you a different context,
one of the reasons Humala was elected President of Peru is
that, for reasons that remain difficult for me to understand,
neither of the two most recent Presidents in Peru chose to use
the very impressive economic growth of Peru over the last
decade to invest in social policies, even when these proposals
were presented to them by their advisors.
So understanding the utility of economic growth and smart
social policies, which other Latin American countries have
undertaken, and focusing on supporting those who are doing good
work in these areas--I think that's a good road ahead.
Mr. Fisk. Senator, I would agree with your typology. I
would add, though, you've also got to remember that there's
going to be a government-to-government dynamic and there's
going to be a civil-society to civil-society dynamic in each of
the three categories you have of countries.
What I would encourage this subcommittee to keep in mind is
we tend at times to focus on the tyrannies and the democratic
countries at risk. We've got to remember there are still a lot
of countries that we would characterize or Freedom House, for
example, would characterize as fully free, but they're still
struggling. They've got a number of issues on the political
side, also on the socioeconomic side.
So it's understandable why we focus on a Cuba, on a
Venezuela, but we also have to focus on a Guatemala, for
example. We have to focus on a Paraguay. So those countries,
you don't want to see them moving into another column. That's
something to keep in mind.
Again, I would just put--again, this is from an NGO
perspective--though the instruments are there to help people
help themselves, ultimately the peoples of those countries have
to be the actors and have to make the decisions. But again, the
United States has a lot we can offer beyond trade agreements,
beyond rhetoric. There are instruments here. We have to have
the political will to do it and to deploy those, and that in
the end becomes the ultimate question.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you all very much. We have
taken a lot of your time. You've been very generous. It's been
very insightful. I think you will have helped the committee's
work moving forward. We appreciate your testimony.
The record will remain open for 3 days for members to ask
questions. If you receive them, we ask you to respond to them
as expeditiously as possible. With that, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson to
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. In a speech at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies on March 29, 2011, Under Secretary Judith McHale
discussed how Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela is open to using
social media to communicate with Latin American citizens. Specifically,
she stated, ``We are interested in applying social media to promote our
strategic objectives in the Americas.'' She outlined these objectives
as the four pillars of our regional partnership: ``protecting citizen
security; expanding economic opportunity and social inclusion; securing
our clean energy future; and supporting democratic, transparent, and
accountable institutions of governance.'' Similarly, in your testimony
today, you stated, ``We are, in short, a robust partner throughout the
Americas in support of fundamental building blocks of democracy:
rights, institutions, security.''
In what ways is social media being used to promote democracy
in Latin America? What are the existing programs as of June
2011? What plans are being developed to expand social media
programming in the region? Please provide examples of how
programs are currently deployed, and please give examples of
new innovative programs that will be coming on line in the
short term.
Answer. The Department of State uses digital media platforms to
advance our policy objectives in Latin America: citizen security,
strong democratic institutions, inclusive prosperity and opportunity,
and secure and clean energy. Though Internet and mobile penetration
vary widely across the Americas, the number of citizens accessing these
technologies is on the rise.
The technological mediums that we employ vary. WHA uses Embassy Web
sites, blogs, Facebook pages and local equivalents (e.g., Orkut in
Brazil), Twitter feeds, video streaming, and interactive Web chats to
expand our reach and sustain relationships with foreign audiences. WHA
increasingly uses mobile content developed by other State Department
bureaus and U.S. Embassies to reach individuals without access to
broadband Internet.
Digital platforms amplify policy messages and raise the profile of
official visits, including of President Obama and Secretary Clinton. In
their and other visits to the region, social media and Web technology--
across multiple language platforms--attract the largest possible
audience, thus helping us reach a wider, and often times younger,
audience.
For example, when President Obama visited Brazil in March 2011, we
invited all Brazilians to take part in his visit through a Web site
where they could provide their views about education, global
cooperation, the economy, and clean energy. The effort netted over
32,000 welcome messages for the President, 160,000 visits to
Obamabr.org, a Web site jointly designed by the Embassy and Office of
Innovative Engagement (OIE) specifically for the POTUS visit, and a net
gain of nearly 40,000 new fans and followers on the mission's social
media platforms.
Other examples include:
The use of specialized, targeted programming. U.S. Embassies have
used a Green Video Contest to engage social media audiences in
envisioning solutions to clean and sustainable development challenges.
One post hosted a Women's History Quiz to foster dialogue on women's
rights; another invited audiences to enter a photography competition in
honor of the U.N. International Year for People of African Descent.
The promotion of press and Internet freedom. As part of World Press
Freedom Day events, the Bureau of International Information Programs
(IIP) and WHA launched the WHA Enhanced Engagement series of Web chats
with a Spanish-language program on Violence against Journalists and
Freedom of Expression, on April 29.
Engaging with civil society. On February 16, 2011, the Secretary of
State spoke at the inaugural ``Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society''
at the Department of State, the first strategic dialogue with a group
other than a government. IIP's CO.NX global-cast of the event increased
direct contact with civil society across the world and linked global
changemakers to create conversations where none had previously existed.
Connecting exchange alumni for ongoing dialogue and support. The
Jovenes en Accion (Youth in Action) exchange program for at-risk
Mexican youth uses Facebook as an ongoing platform for virtual meetings
among the participants as they implement the community service projects
they designed while together. Embassy La Paz uses Facebook to create
face-to-face connections, using regular content updates and contests.
The Department of State encourages alumni of U.S. Government exchange
programs to connect with Americans, embassies, and exchange alumni
around the world via the Alumni.state.gov Web site.
Providing information about U.S. foreign policy and programs in the
region. The Department of State's @USAenEspanol, @USAenFrancais, and
@USAemPortugues Twitter accounts provide U.S. foreign policy news and
information in Spanish, French, and Portuguese. The accounts also offer
Q&A sessions with senior State Department officials. In addition, the
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs leverages the Department of
State's official blog, DipNote (blogs.state.gov), to tell its story. To
date, Western Hemisphere Affairs entries comprise approximately 10
percent of DipNote's 2011 content.
Encouraging entrepreneurial growth. On June 28, 2011, IIP also
launched an Entrepreneurial Facebook page--Iniciativa Emprende--to
promote entrepreneurship and innovative thinking in Spanish-speaking
Latin America. Using third-party content to highlight new trends,
ideas, challenges, and breakthroughs in the world of entrepreneurship,
the page seeks out young people in the Americas who want to build their
own businesses. The Web page attracted 5,000 users in its first 4
weeks. More than 90 percent of current fans are teenagers, evenly
distributed among Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. Link:
www.facebook.com/iniciativa.emprende.
Question. Please provide an assessment of the social media
ecosystem in the region. Accordingly, which countries is the State
Department targeting with its social media initiatives, and through
what methods is the State Department using social media in these
countries? Are any specific programs designed for the ALBA countries?
Does the State Department focus upon Internet users with broadband
access, mobile users, or both? Is the State Department partnering with
any companies like Twitter, Facebook, or Google to achieve its
strategic objectives in the region?
Answer. Social media platforms: As part of their public diplomacy
strategic plans, Embassies select a variety of communication methods to
engage audiences. To reach new audiences and to assist posts in their
outreach, the Bureau of International Information Programs offers
packages of complementary print, audio, video, and social media-ready
content in various formats, including mobile-friendly formats,
supplemented by Web chat or digital video conference programs,
speakers, and PowerPoint materials for presentations.
U.S. embassies design social media outreach specific to their host
country environments and U.S. foreign policy objectives. For example,
the U.S. Embassy in Venezuela uses the Embassy Web site, Facebook
(7,227 fans), Twitter (12,805 followers), and YouTube to engage a broad
audience on U.S. policy, democracy, and current events. The Embassy's
91 YouTube videos attracted 23,910 views in the first 6 months of 2011.
The Embassy also used its Web site, Facebook page, and the Department's
DipNote blog to expand the impact of its ``Beisbol y Amistad'' program,
which connected former Major League Baseball players and coaches with
underprivileged youth at 10 baseball coaching camps throughout
Venezuela, with a focus beyond baseball fundamentals to leadership,
teamwork, and the importance of a healthy lifestyle.
The Department of State welcomes ideas from U.S. technology
companies for advancing foreign policy goals. For example, in the
aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, a group of engineers from the
tech community launched a free SMS relief service to help the people of
Haiti. The text message program allowed people to text their location
and their needs to a free short-code: ``4636.'' In response to the
Haitian earthquake, Google worked with the U.S. Department of State to
create an online People Finder gadget so that people could submit
information about missing persons and to search the database. This same
tool was employed for subsequent earthquake responses in Chile, Japan,
and New Zealand. The Department organized a technology delegation to
Port-au-Prince for a short training course for Haitians on the use of
technologies to assist in citizen security. In addition, in Brazil,
Google launched the ``People Finder'' in partnership with the U.S.
mission. Google also helped the Embassy to stand up special Orkut (a
Google-owned social media site extremely popular in Brazil) and YouTube
pages for the March 2011 Presidential visit (the Mission Brazil Orkut
community was one of three in existence at the time). Orkut currently
has 7,476 members in the Embassy community. Link: http://www.orkut.com/
embaixadaeua
Question. Similarly, what content does the State Department create
and share via social media, and how does this content relate to its
democracy promotion goals? How many unique users access and share this
content with others? On average, how many unique users access State
Department generated material each month? What are the top three
countries that access State Department social media content? What
countries have the least access to State Department social media
content? Do any trends emerge regarding the user base that most
frequently accesses and shares State Department content? For example,
is there a clear geographic distribution of users between rural and
urban areas?
Answer. Department of State digital platforms explain U.S. foreign
policy, society, and values and seek to develop partnerships with
citizens in achieving shared goals: citizen security, strong democratic
institutions, inclusive economic prosperity, and clean and secure
energy. Content may be in the form of U.S. official statements and
speeches, visual-rich e-journals, videos, or two-way interactive Web
engagements led by U.S. leaders in government, academia, business, or
culture.
Figures on average monthly page views and visitors for the period
July 2010-July 2011 follow below, along with the countries that most
access Department social media. The Department of State is working on
strategies to capture the extent to which users of Department-generated
material share this content with others. Current data does not tell us
the distribution of users between urban and rural areas.
WHA Embassy and Consulate Web Sites
Page views--monthly average: 9,190,420
Visitors--monthly average: 1,295,194
International visits: 73.57%
IIP Digital (launched on April 1, 2011)
Page views--monthly average: 130,704
Visitors--monthly average: 71,163
International visits: 69.93%
23 percent of page views related to Democracy Theme
America.gov (Note: America.gov transition to IIP Digital on April 1,
2011, and was archived on that date.)
Page views--monthly average: 1,667,684
Visitors--monthly average: 925,288
International visits: 63.52%
6 percent of Page Views related to Democracy Theme
IIP content created on Democracy Theme
English: 2406 documents
Spanish: 357 documents
Top Countries accessing all Department social media
Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil
WHA countries with the largest Facebook fan bases
Dominican Republic: 58,789
Argentina: 48,470
Bolivia: 39,854
Brazil *: 38,205
Paraguay: 34,891
Mexico: 21,500
Peru: 21,254
* Counting Orkut (popular social media site) fans of the U.S. Embassy
Brazil, Brazil's total would be 45,679 (37,227 Facebook fans + 7,474
fans Orkut).
The country with the least access to Department of State online
content is Cuba, because of connectivity cost, availability, and
government censorship of online content.
Question. Are you aware of any countries in the Western Hemisphere
that actively censor State Department produced content, and if so,
which countries censor or block access to this information? What steps,
if any, have been taken to circumvent this censorship?
Answer. The Government of Cuba controls media within its borders,
does not recognize independent journalists, and provides for freedom of
speech and of the media only insofar as they ``conform to the aims of
socialist society.'' Cuban law prohibits distribution of printed
material from foreign sources that are considered
``counterrevolutionary'' or critical of the government. Foreign
newspapers and magazines are generally unavailable, and Cuba has the
lowest Internet penetration rate in the hemisphere. Some hotels
catering to foreigners offer unfettered Internet access, but its cost
makes it inaccessible to many Cubans.
The Department seeks to enhance the free flow of information to,
from, and within Cuba. In 2010, the U.S. Interest Section (USINT)
offered 16,347 Internet sessions to the Cuban public, including human
rights activists and independent journalists, through two Internet
resource centers. USINT provides daily news and information to Cubans
in a variety of print and electronic formats. Over 500 independent
journalists have participated in basic journalism training offered at
USINT. USINT regularly offers basic computer skills and blogging
classes, supports over 100 independent libraries in Havana and the
provinces, and runs weekly onsite English courses.
At this time there are no other countries in the Western Hemisphere
that actively censor State Department content.
Question. What is the State Department's budget for social media
outreach in Latin America as a whole, and how many specific initiatives
are included in this budget? What are these specific initiatives, and
how much funding do they receive? Which countries are allocated the
most money and for what reason? How does the State Department determine
how much money a country receives?
Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs (WHA) supports social media primarily through its human
resources. A recent field survey, conducted by the Office of the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, counted 72 Foreign
Service officers and 114 locally employed staff overseas engaging with
foreign publics through social media. Their efforts amount to more than
1,300 hours of work each week or the equivalent of 33 full-time
positions. There are two Washington-based full-time positions devoted
to social media in WHA.
WHA does not allot funds to countries specifically for social media
outreach. Our embassies and consulates use their program funds to cover
the costs of telecommunication or multimedia production and editing.
Occasionally, the Department supports an advertising campaign to raise
the profile of digital outreach. WHA occasionally pays for added
bandwidth capacity for streaming video at event venues and for
simultaneous translations.
The Bureau of International Information Programs provides technical
support for digital outreach and Web site hosting, as well as content
in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French.
Question. With regard to technological connectivity, what is the
State Department's primary focus in Latin America? Is more money
currently being spent to promote access and provide infrastructure like
broadband, or is money being allocated to promote an increased user
base? Of the infrastructural projects for which money is being
allocated, what are the main priorities (broadband access, cell phone
towers, etc)? Are infrastructure building projects focused more upon
rural and under connected areas, or do they focus upon strengthening
existing infrastructure in urban areas?
Answer. The Department of State's policy goals are to promote
policy and regulatory reform for the development of competitive
communications markets that would allow for the increased deployment
of, and access to, innovative information and communications
technologies.
At this time the Department of State does not allocate money for
any infrastructure projects. Currently, the only active support to
build infrastructure is run by USAID in Haiti where a broadband network
is in place and is being expanded to reach more rural areas.
USAID is also working on the Global Broadband and Innovations
Program for improving access and connectivity. This initiative is in
the beginning stages in Colombia.
Question. Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico lead Latin America with high
connectivity, mobile subscriptions, and absolute internet users. Brazil
has the largest absolute mobile subscriptions in the region, and almost
90 percent of the country has a mobile phone. With approximately 76
million Internet users, it also has the highest total number of
Internet users in the region, and a relatively large percentage of the
population (approximately 40 percent) uses the Internet. Colombia and
Mexico share similarly high overall connectivity, yet when one compares
these statistics to the United States or Europe, one discerns the
extent to which improvements can be made in these countries. Even
though these countries are regional leaders with regard to
connectivity, what steps are being taken to improve their connectivity?
Additionally, in what ways has the State Department used social media
to communicate with these countries? How does it measure the success of
its initiatives, and do you see any immediate areas that can be
improved?
Answer. To improve connectivity within and between other countries
in the region, the Department of State promotes awareness of benefits
of digital inclusion and shares the best practices for using technology
to achieve inclusive economic prosperity, citizen security, strong
democratic institutions, and sustainable growth. For example, our
embassies engage civil society, educators, journalists, public
servants, and business contacts in dialogue on how social media have
improved transparency, efficiency, and performance in U.S. schools,
business, and government. Social media allows the Department to engage
with new and expanded audiences, beyond the socioeconomic elite. In the
social media space, authority is determined not by one's income,
societal status, or political connections, but rather by the breadth
and depth of one's networks. Particularly in the case of youth who use
social media as a way to connect with their peers, the Department is
able to build and engage individuals through a networked, many-to-many
model of communication. What previously would have been impossible or
prohibitively resource-intensive--directly communicating with tens of
thousands of foreign citizens on an ongoing basis--is now commonplace.
Social media, as we have seen most recently in the Arab Spring
revolutions, can help give a voice to the voiceless and provide a forum
for coordinating collective action for the common good. By engaging in
these spaces, the Department is able to tap previously unaddressed
audiences both as targets of communication but also as subjects of
dynamic, people-powered movements to effect positive change in their
societies.
The U.S. Embassy in Bogota uses the Embassy Web site, Facebook
page, YouTube channel, and Twitter feed to attract and retain social
media users to encourage understanding and support for U.S. culture,
government programs, policy, and goals. For example, during Black
History Month in February 2011, the Embassy ran a comprehensive series
of content, trivia contests, a Twitter-based video chat with Afro-
Colombian baseball player Edgar Renteria, and promoted various
activities and events. As a result, the Embassy attracted more than
1,000 new Twitter followers.
One measure of Embassy Bogota's online engagement success is its
steadily expanding online audience. Since January 2011, Embassy
Bogota's Facebook followers have increased from approximately 4,000 to
nearly 5,900, and Twitter followers number more than 10,000.
Embassy Bogota is also working with various agencies to increase
the use of SMS technology to reach the 94 percent of Colombians who own
a cell phone. The Public Affairs Section, together with USAID, is
working with the NGO community and private sector to connect landmine
victims with community health providers in rural areas via mobile
phone, as well as to extend judicial services via SMS in at-risk
neighborhoods. The Embassy is also working with SOUTHCOM to develop an
SMS messaging system to support counter-recruitment and demobilization
messaging targeted at rural populations with a large FARC presence.
The U.S. mission in Brazil has focused on building strong
partnerships with local social media influencers to grow its robust
social media communities (now at nearly 38,000 Facebook fans, more than
7,000 Orkut fans, and nearly 12,000 Twitter followers). The mission
cooperates with Government of Brazil social media practitioners to
create joint communication plans for bilateral events and initiatives,
with Brazilian media figures whose Twitter followings number in the
millions in support of Cultural Section programming, and with Brazilian
NGOs in support of social equality.
The U.S. mission in Mexico uses a variety of electronic tools to
communicate with Mexican audiences. In addition to the Embassy Web
site, each of the nine consulates has its own Web site, two ``Virtual
Presence Post'' Web sites cover southern regions of Mexico, and many
consulates employ one or more social media tool as well. Embassy Mexico
City's Web site has received more than 1,200,000 page views since April
1, 2011, with a monthly average of 330,411 page views. Embassy Mexico
City also maintains a largely policy-oriented Spanish-language Mission
Blog, featuring both Embassy-generated content and content from other
U.S. Government agencies and principals (of which the most recent was
Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero's
essay on open government).
Since July 2009, the Embassy has maintained a Twitter account
(currently with 3,346 followers and growing at a rate of about 10
followers per day), to draw attention to Embassy news and to circulate
content from the Web site and blog to other audiences. The U.S. Embassy
in Mexico's Facebook account currently has 6,410 fans, up from 2,600 in
November 2010, and recently featured a journalist-created video focused
on media freedom in the Americas. When Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton visited Mexico in January 2011, Facebook fans posed questions
to the Secretary and received online responses from the Secretary,
covering economic integration and the benefits of free trade, the
importance of intercultural academic exchange, and the role of women in
government. The consulates in Ciudad Juarez, Guadalajara, Hermosillo,
Matamoros, Monterrey, Nogales, and Tijuana each have Facebook accounts,
as does the Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City, for an additional
15,070 fans, and a grand total nationwide of almost 21,500.
The Embassy's Public Affairs Section produces original video
content highlighting, for example, English Access language scholarships
for underprivileged youth, Embassy-sponsored cultural exchange events,
and joint U.S.-Mexican scholarships for young Mexican indigenous
leaders. Links to these videos on the Embassy's YouTube site are
distributed via the Web site and various social media platforms. The
most recent video, highlighting the Access program in the state of
Puebla, received 1,700 views in just 2 weeks. An Embassy-produced
YouTube video explaining changes to the visa application procedure has
been viewed 78,880 times in 6 months. The Embassy's new Flickr page is
nearly ready for launch, and will feature photos of all types of
Embassy events.
The State Department worked in collaboration with Alliance of Youth
Movements (AYM) to host a 2-day summit in Mexico City in October 2009.
AYM Mexico City brought together approximately 100 young digital
activists from across the globe to connect with U.S.-based
technologists and share their work to engage citizens in their own
countries through technology. AYM Mexico City allowed participants to
share best practices on digital engagement and political activism,
including: a Facebook effort by a young Indian boy to remember the
victims of the Mumbai terrorist attacks; a Twitter-based effort to give
Moldovan citizens a voice against their former government; and
innovative mobile and online engagement efforts to provide a voice for
Mexican citizens against narcoviolence. State continues to work with
AYM (now known as Movements.org) personnel to identify and connect with
activists in particular regions. We have also sent out Movements.org
personnel to various countries through our speakers program.
In 2010, WHA partnered with the Secretary's Senior Advisor for
Innovation to lead a delegation of technology experts to Mexico to
identify innovative methods to address violence in the border region. A
key deliverable of the delegation was the creation of an anonymous
crime reporting service in Ciudad Juarez. Working with the Government
of Mexico, telecommunications companies, and civil society
organizations, a State Department team developed a technical solution
for a ``tipline'' compatible with Mexican telecommunications
infrastructure to permit citizens to make anonymous phone calls to the
police from any telephone. The technology offers safety and confidence
to a local community accustomed to witnessing cartel infiltration in
the local police force. It permits a reformed law enforcement system to
gain access to valuable information while rebuilding the trust between
the police and the citizenry. The technical system has been installed
and is currently in a testing phase. It will be implemented by Mexican
law enforcement this year alongside a concerted effort at public
education and community engagement. The Juarez implementation is a
pilot project, and the Government of Mexico plans to scale up a
successful model to other cities.
Question. While information and communications technology data is
more limited for developing countries, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti stand
out as three of the least connected countries in the region in terms of
Internet users, mobile phone subscriptions, secure Internet servers,
and broadband access. Nicaragua lags in both mobile subscriptions and
Internet users as it has the lowest percentage of Internet users in the
region. Cuba has the lowest broadband access, and the lowest percentage
of mobile phone subscriptions. Similarly, no broadband data is
available for Haiti, and Haiti has a low percentage of Internet users
and mobile phone subscriptions. How does the State Department reach out
to countries with low connectivity? Is social media programming an
option with these critical nations, or are State Department initiatives
more focused on providing technological infrastructure? If the latter,
in what areas is the State Department focusing funding with regard to
building infrastructure? Have these endeavors been successful thus far?
Answer. Although Haiti has low Internet penetration, the Red Cross
estimates that more than 85 percent of Haitians use mobile phones.
Partnering with local cell phone providers as well as the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, the Department of State and USAID maximized
the widespread use of mobile phones and SMS texting to connect voters
in the most recent elections, as well as to assist Haitians with mobile
banking. As reconstruction efforts continue, access to Internet cafes
or home-based Internet service will slowly increase. Private sector
businesses are already working to increase Internet connectivity.
In Nicaragua, despite increases in private and public investment in
the last decade, Internet access remains among the lowest in Latin
America and the Caribbean. According to the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), Nicaragua has 3.5 Internet users per 100
inhabitants, or approximately 210,000 users. A 2003-07 World Bank
telecommunications project contributed to expand Internet access to 104
of Nicaragua's most remote communities by bringing Internet connection
to small entrepreneurs and local government offices and by establishing
one public Internet access center in each of these communities.
State programming has focused on social media training for
journalists through ECA speaker programs. State is also supporting
technological infrastructure improvements and training, including the
use of social media, to independent Nicaraguan radio stations through
DRL funding channeled through IRI. USAID promotes Internet access
through small infrastructure upgrades and the provision of equipment to
key NGOs and in municipal public information offices, including health
programs. USAID also has trained civil society groups in the use of
social media and promotes its use as a vehicle for development
messages.
In Cuba, the U.S. Interest Section (USINT) offers free Internet
access to Cubans. Social media are among the platforms USINT employs to
connect with the Cuban people and to promote the free flow of
information to, from, and within Cuba. The Department of State has
actively supported the administration's goal of increasing
telecommunications connections to Cuba so that individual Cuban
citizens may have greater access to information. Numerous U.S.-based
communications companies have consulted with the Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Industry and Security to use the expanded general licenses
for providing satellite and undersea cable connections to Cuba.
Question. Many opportunities for democracy promotion exist in Latin
America in countries like Venezuela and Cuba. However, when using
social media, different approaches must be used for each country to
reflect its connectivity and user base. Venezuela, for example,
represents a key target for social media initiatives because of its
high percentage of Internet users, mobile phone subscriptions, and
Twitter users. Cuba, on the other hand, lags behind with regard to
connectivity indicators. What efforts are you undertaking, if any, to
promote democracy in Cuba through social media? Are you unable to do so
because of the lack of infrastructure there?
Answer. The Government of Cuba controls media within its borders,
does not recognize independent journalists, and provides for freedom of
speech and of the media only insofar as they ``conform to the aims of
socialist society.'' Cuban law prohibits distribution of printed
material from foreign sources that are considered
``counterrevolutionary'' or critical of the government. Foreign
newspapers and magazines are generally unavailable and Cuba has the
lowest Internet penetration rate in the hemisphere. Some hotels
catering to foreigners offer unfettered Internet access, but its cost
makes it inaccessible to many Cubans.
The Department seeks to enhance the free flow of information to,
from, and within Cuba to support the Cuban people's desire to freely
determine their future and reduce their dependence on the Cuban state
by exposing Cubans to American life and American democratic values. In
2010, the U.S. Interest Section (USINT) offered 16,347 Internet
sessions to the Cuban public, including human rights activists and
independent journalists, through two Internet resource centers. USINT
provides daily news and information to Cubans in a variety of print and
electronic formats. Over 500 independent journalists have participated
in basic journalism training offered at USINT. USINT regularly offers
basic computer skills and blogging classes, supports over 100
independent libraries in Havana and the provinces, and runs weekly
onsite English courses.
Question. In November 2010, the State Department held its first
TechCamp in Santiago, Chile, to allow technology experts to discuss
with community groups and NGOs ways to empower grassroots movements
through technology. Are any similar programs being planned for the
future? If so, where would these seminars take place, and what goals
would they seek to accomplish?
Answer. TechCamps are a part of Secretary Clinton's Civil Society
2.0 initiative to build capacity by providing training on tech-based
tools. TechCamps are 2-day events in which Department of State
personnel convene civil society organizations, technology experts, and
representatives from the private sector to provide case studies of
successful technology tool applications and training to NGOs to to
increase their impact.
The Department is actively exploring a TechCamp in conjunction with
a Digital Inclusion conference that the Uruguayan Government may host
in the fall. The Digital Inclusion conference aims to promote more
effective access to and usage of information and communication
technologies to expand educational opportunities under the Pathways to
Prosperity initiative in this Hemisphere.
Question. What new initiatives, if any, are you undertaking in the
region to promote democracy through the use of social media? What
countries is the State Department targeting specifically with these
efforts? What forms of social media are prioritized?
Answer. Through social media, the Department of State promotes
democracy by stimulating conversations with foreign publics on formal
democratic institutions and the linked issues that reinforce them.
Modern connection technologies provide U.S. Government officials with
opportunities to engage with foreign publics to discuss the shared
interests that are at the heart of U.S. foreign policy objectives in
the region. The Department also provides training and support to enable
citizens of countries in the Western Hemisphere to use new technologies
as a means to express their aspirations for constructive change to
government officials and fellow citizens in their countries.
These dialogues amplify the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
(WHA) strategic goals of expanded economic opportunity for all, the
safety of the hemisphere's citizens, social equity among all peoples of
the Americas, and clean and secure energy.
On June 4, 2011, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs, Michael Hammer, responded to questions in Spanish on the
@USAenEspanol Twitter account. Recently, the Department disseminated
subtitled versions of Secretary Clinton's ``It Gets Better'' video on
YouTube, calling attention to the need to stop bullying and offer
support to sexual and gender minorities.
During his July 14 ``Conversations with America'' Web chat hosted
on the Department's DipNote blog, former Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, discussed the
process of building and strengthening democratic institutions. He
tweeted excerpts from then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Roberta
Jacobson's June 30 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on ``Democracy in the Americas.''
On the WHA Facebook page and other social media platforms, the
Department promoted the Open Government Partnership, spreading
awareness of an opportunity for countries to act in a multilateral
setting with civil society partners to create more open and accountable
governments.
To address foreign publics on racial and social inclusion, the
Department's DipNote blog has featured a series of posts to promote
discussion and offer resources for the U.N. International Year for
People of African Descent, including one entry on a Racial Ethnicity
and Social Inclusion program. The program's Web chat attracted
participants from around the world, creating a space to discuss
educational, political, and communal opportunities to include people of
African descent in democratic processes.
Citizen security remains a salient concern. When citizens do not
feel safe to vote, conduct business, or even travel in their countries,
democracy cannot function. Working with the U.S. Embassy in Mexico,
Mexican mobile providers, and the Mexican Government, the Office of the
Secretary's Senior Advisor for Innovation is developing a secure
tipline available to residents in Juarez, Mexico, to help overcome the
challenge of personal security. WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Julissa
Reynoso addressed security issues important to Central American
countries in her July 15 ``State Department Live'' Web chat with
journalists. Deputy Assistant Secretary Fabiola Rodriguez-Ciampoli
moderated a Web chat on freedom of the press and violence against
journalists in which the panelists answered questions from journalism
students from several countries in the region, including El Salvador
and Guatemala.
Finally, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has
programs that support media training in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela,
and Ecuador; these programs address the use and impact of social media,
along with traditional topics such as independent journalism,
investigative reporting, and overcoming self-censorship.
Question. As you continue to move forward with these initiatives,
where do you see areas for improvement? How can you work with Congress
to achieve your goals in the region, and ideally, what form of
assistance would prove most helpful? In the future, would more
congressional funding be needed, and if so, how much? What role, if
any, would public-private partnerships play?
Answer. In accordance with the Department's Strategic Framework for
Public Diplomacy, the Bureau of International Information Programs
(IIP) has created and is staffing an audience research unit to
integrate in-depth market research within the Department of State's
public diplomacy apparatus to target content more precisely--especially
social media content--to national and subnational audiences overseas.
IIP is preparing to launch a 6-month pilot program to create a proof of
concept for the use of powerful social media analytical and management
tools to identify trends emerging from social media chatter and
influential members of social media networks, among other market
intelligence innovations.
Through the Secretary's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review (QDDR) process, we are investigating the possibility of
recruiting industry experts in the application of connection
technologies both to engage foreign audiences and to generate
innovative tech-driven solutions to foreign policy problems. These
experts would have regionally focused portfolios and work across the
Department and with USAID to coordinate the development of strategies
for the successful deployment of connection technologies as tools of
public diplomacy, economic development, and the promotion of civil
society.