[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REBOOT: EXAMINING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 11, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-12
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
JEFF MILLER, Florida, Chairman
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida BOB FILNER, California, Ranking
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado CORRINE BROWN, Florida
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
BILL FLORES, Texas BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio JERRY McNERNEY, California
JEFF DENHAM, California JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan JOHN BARROW, Georgia
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas
Vacancy
Vacancy
Helen W. Tolar, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio, Chairman
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida JOE DONNELLY, Indiana, Ranking
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JERRY McNERNEY, California
DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee JOHN BARROW, Georgia
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan BOB FILNER, California
BILL FLORES, Texas
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs are also
published in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the
official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare
both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process
of converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
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further refined.
C O N T E N T S
__________
May 11, 2011
Page
Reboot: Examining the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Information Technology Strategy for the 21st Century........... 1
OPENING STATEMENTS
Chairman Bill Johnson............................................ 1
Prepared statement of Chairman Johnson....................... 23
Hon. Joe Donnelly, Ranking Democratic Member..................... 3
Prepared statement of Congressman Donnelly................... 24
WITNESSES
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs:
Hon. Roger W. Baker, Assistant Secretary for Information and
Technology, and Chief Information Officer, Office of
Information and Technology................................... 4
Prepared statement of Mr. Baker.............................. 24
Belinda J. Finn, Assistant Inspector General for Audits and
Evaluations, Office of Inspector General, Office of
Information and Technology................................... 14
Prepared statement of Ms. Finn............................... 31
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Joel C. Willemssen,
Managing Director, Information Technology.................... 16
Prepared statement of Mr. Willemssen......................... 36
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Post-Hearing Questions and Responses for the Record:
Hon. Bill Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, to Hon.
Eric K. Shinsek, Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs, letter dated May 16, 2011, and VA responses....... 48
Hon. Joe Donnelly, Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans'
Affairs to Hon. Roger W. Baker, Assistant Secretary for
Information and Technology and Chief Information Officer,
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, letter dated May 12,
2011, and VA responses..................................... 57
Hon. Joe Donnelly, Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans'
Affairs to Belinda J. Finn, Assistant Inspector General for
Audits and Evaluations, Office of Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, letter dated May 12, 2011,
and response from Hon. George J. Opfer, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, letter dated June 13,
2011....................................................... 59
Hon. Joe Donnelly, Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans'
Affairs to Joel Willemssen, Managing Director, Information
Technology, U.S. Government Accountability Office, letter
dated May 12, 2011, and response letter dated June 22, 2011 61
REBOOT: EXAMINING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
----------
WEDNESDAY, May 11, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 334, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bill Johnson
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Johnson, Roe, Donnelly, and
Barrow.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON
Mr. Johnson. Good morning. This hearing will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone to today's hearing entitled,
``Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st Century.''
With an information and technology (IT) budget exceeding $3
billion annually, it is reasonable for the American taxpayer to
expect the Office of Information and Technology (OI&T) at the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to effectively utilize
available technology and provide the highest quality support in
the Department's delivery of health care and benefits to our
Nation's veterans.
As we will hear from the witnesses on both panels today,
billions of dollars have been spent on IT at the VA. However,
veterans, the taxpayers, and Members of this Committee are left
to wonder what has resulted from these expenditures.
Have improvements been made? Certainly they have. Are the
improvements and advancements in VA IT over the last 10 years
on par with the amount of time and taxpayer dollars put into
the effort? Certainly not.
The witnesses on today's second panel will help illuminate
the magnitude of the money spent on IT over time. To name just
a few, $127 million over 9 years on an outpatient scheduling
system with none of the planned improvements in place;
suspension of the Strategic Asset Management or SAM Program
after failing to meet yet another milestone; and $70 million in
an overrun on a WiFi installation contract.
I also remain concerned that, as with past contracts and
efforts, VA is not thoroughly vetting cost and risk analysis
before undertaking new large IT projects.
While VA continues to push forward on cloud computing, its
own administration has not fully established the Federal
guidelines for information security in cloud computing.
In a health care environment such as VA's, I know that I
would not want my personally identifiable information floating
around in the cloud especially given a track record of data
breaches that is less than stellar.
We once again notice a history of poor acquisition and
contract management at VA, a theme this Subcommittee is
familiar with. Given the frequency of problems in IT contracts,
we know there must be a significant degree of inexperience
among the contracting staff, but we are also left to wonder
whether supervisors at OI&T either do not know or do not care
about these shortcomings.
When IT needs are not clearly defined at the beginning of
the process, it leads to cost increases and time delays down
the road. With an IT staff of over 7,000, I find it difficult
to believe that knowledgeable IT professionals are not helping
to create a well-defined request for proposal, a key element of
a viable contract.
When these contracts constantly have to be modified, it
results in greater cost to the taxpayer and a delay of improved
services to our veterans.
A crucial area for VA IT to meet expectations is the
establishment of the joint electronic health record or EHR with
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Yet, another overdue item
for our active-duty servicemembers and our veterans, the EHR
has been pursued separately by the two departments. The result
is billions of dollars spent, much of it duplicative, and no
joint EHR.
While I commend the secretaries of both departments for
finally committing this spring to cooperatively pursue this
endeavor, I have lingering concerns that mistakes made in
previous IT contracts could be repeated.
For example, after releasing a final Request for Proposal
(RFP) on an open-source custodial agent at the end of last
month, VA is only allowing a 3-week turnaround for proposals to
be submitted at the end of this week.
It is not rocket science. The capabilities to do what needs
to be done already exist. Hundreds of millions of dollars could
have been saved in previous years by simply having a robust IT
architecture and strategy in place.
When needs are clearly defined, protect veterans'
information, establish an electronic health record in
conjunction with DoD, and implement stringent oversight of
these and all undertakings in the Office of Information and
Technology, everybody benefits, the taxpayer and the veterans.
I fully understand the challenges of managing information
technology in a large organization because I have done so. What
I do not understand is why it has taken so long to get only so
far at VA.
The American people are watching and expect VA to take care
of our veterans as promised.
Again, I appreciate everyone's attendance at today's
hearing and I now yield to the Ranking Member for his opening
statement.
Mr. Donnelly.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Johnson appears on p.
23]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE DONNELLY
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Shinseki has often stated the need to transform
the VA to meet the changing needs of our warriors. A perfect
example of this was when the VA found themselves having to
process education claims manually due to the Legacy System
being unable to process these claims after the passage of the
recent historic GI Bill legislation.
For this reason, I find it important and critical that the
VA maintains an updated IT system that proves to be reliable
and can be manipulated as new software is incorporated through
the years ahead.
The VA has decided that using an open-source model will
provide a better outcome with lower risks and lower cost. Their
cooperation with the DoD on using open source is encouraging,
in part because this cooperation is essential. There is a
critical need to develop an interoperable electronic health
record system and because DoD has relied on open source in the
past.
Although there are multiple concerns on both sides of the
aisle, the VA has reassured us that open source provides
several benefits. But along with those benefits, making sure
that veterans' personal information remains secure is critical.
I also understand that contract management and weaknesses
have overshadowed VA's efforts to keep up with the VA's IT
infrastructure. Cost overruns, contract weaknesses, and unmet
project time frames are just a few examples of the implications
that can occur if there are no firm requirements in contracts.
Such was the case with the WiFi awarded contract to Catapult
Limited.
We must additionally find a way to reduce our reliance on
contracting out tasks that do not allow the Department to
develop internal expertise.
What I am concerned about is making sure that, first, the
VA IT has an interoperable model in place; second, best
practices should be in place from the private and public
sector; and, third, that new IT strategies have the best value
for our veterans.
Additionally, we must ensure we have a clear strategic plan
that will be for the entire course. We have too often canceled
a program or contract after many millions of hard-earned
taxpayer dollars have been spent.
Finally, I encourage the VA to keep us updated on your
efforts as we work jointly to give our veterans the 21st
Century relevant IT system that they deserve.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Congressman Donnelly appears on
p. 24.]
Mr. Johnson. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
And I welcome the first panel to the witness table. On this
panel today, we will hear testimony from the Honorable Roger W.
Baker, Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology and
Chief Information Officer (CIO) at the Department of Veterans
Affairs.
Assistant Secretary Baker is accompanied by Peter L. Levin,
Ph.D., Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Chief Technology
Officer (CTO) at the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Assistant Secretary Baker, your complete written statement
will be made a part of this hearing record and you are
recognized now for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER W. BAKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY, AND CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY PETER L. LEVIN,
PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY, AND CHIEF TECHNOLOGY
OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Donnelly, for inviting me to testify in front of this Committee
to discuss the Department of Veterans Affairs' information
technology strategy for the 21st Century.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify on our plans,
actions, and accomplishments on making VA's IT organization a
21st Century leader in the Federal Government.
As you said, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be accompanied
today by Dr. Peter Levin, the CTO for the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
I will be brief in my oral remarks. My written testimony
provides details on the transformation we have been working to
achieve in VA IT. And I believe the next panel will accurately
depict a few of the many challenges that we faced when I was
confirmed nearly 2 years ago.
Since that time, we have made substantial progress in the
areas of customer service and customer satisfaction, product
development, information security and privacy, financial
tracking, and operational metrics.
Most importantly, we know that we have made progress due to
the metrics that we now track and report in each of those
areas. We have begun to operate VA's IT organization like a
private-sector IT organization.
But we also clearly have a long way to go in achieving our
goal of being the best IT organization in government and
comparable with large scale private-sector IT shops.
While our metrics support our transformation, they also
expose areas where much more work is required. So let me just
touch on a few.
We must implement a technical reference manual or a TRM for
our architecture and the processes to govern the specifics of
what hardware and software is allowed to run in our expansive
IT infrastructure.
Today we have over 64,000 different software packages that
run on our desktop computers. Our visibility of the desktop
initiative has allowed us to see exactly what runs on each of
our desktop computers.
And I doubt that products such as Pinball Wizard have a
medical use.
We must reduce the number of servers we support. From my
private-sector experience, virtualization and elimination of
physical server count can produce substantial operational
savings.
And we must better define and rationalize our architecture
at all levels, including our network, our data centers, our
servers, our applications, our desktops, our help desk
architecture, our product and use of support architecture, and
at higher levels our medical business architecture, our
benefits business architecture, and our corporate business
architectures.
And we must ring efficiencies out of our application
support area by pursuing shutdown of redundant or unused
systems.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must find better ways to
communicate with and motivate our IT employees because it is
only through skilled and motivated employees that VA IT will
achieve our goal as we seek to build an IT organization that
can be compared with the best private-sector companies.
In closing, I would like to thank each of you again for
your continued support of our Nation's veterans, of the
Department of Veterans Affairs, and of VA IT. And thank you for
the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on the
important work we are undertaking to improve the results of
VA's IT investments.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears on p. 24]
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Baker.
We will now begin questioning and I will start off.
Does VA have an IT architecture that defines the blueprint
for each of the 16 initiatives that is linked to business
outcomes?
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do not believe I would tell you today we have a fully
documented detailed architecture in that relative to any part
of our organization. We have in the past had what I would call
a shelf-ware architecture in the organization, meeting
requirements, but not really guiding where we were going.
We have recently put one of our brightest folks in charge
of the architecture area to renovate that, Dr. Paul Tibbits. I
would say fortunately one of the first challenges Dr. Tibbits
had was to be a key player in achieving the joint common
electronic health record system with the Department of Defense.
Mr. Johnson. Let's go into that a little bit. Did I
understand you to say correctly, and correct me if I am wrong,
that you really do not have a complete architecture of VA's IT
environment?
Mr. Baker. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Johnson. That is correct. Is it your opinion that an
architecture that describes the VA business systems environment
would be a first and critical component of developing an IT
strategy?
Mr. Baker. No. Actually, Congressman, I would not. And it
goes back kind to the analogy of the alligators in the swamp.
There are a lot of alligators in the VA IT infrastructure.
As you know, we were consolidated as an IT organization
about 3 years ago. And a lot of the issues that we faced have
been along the lines of just getting the basic changing
analogies, blocking and tackling right inside the IT
organization.
Mr. Johnson. I can relate to that. I have done that in the
commercial world. But I also know that if you do not know where
you are going, any road will get you there.
How many systems do you have in VA in IT? How many systems
do you guys support?
Mr. Baker. Speaking from an application system perspective,
the best estimate I would give you is in the 400 to 500 range.
I know that we support approximately 300 of those in our Austin
Information Technology Center or the Corporate Data Center
Office. Most of our systems are going to be supported there and
then other systems throughout the organization. So I think 500
is a reasonable estimate.
Mr. Johnson. Do you have a lead integrator that is linking
the 16 initiatives and the associated projects to ensure
consistency, standardization, and that these systems are going
to talk to one another?
Mr. Baker. We do not have a contractor from that
perspective, no.
Mr. Johnson. Who is handling the integration effort?
Mr. Baker. We have a member of our architecture team
embedded with each of the major initiatives and we have the
major initiative lead from an IT perspective working together
to ensure that we are doing things that work together from the
major initiative perspective.
Mr. Johnson. Do you have a timeline for developing an IT
architecture?
Mr. Baker. I could not give you one off the top of my head
today, Congressman. I know Dr. Tibbits is working that right
now. And to be clear, there are many facets of the IT
architecture.
As I mentioned in my oral testimony, the first thing we are
working on right now is the technical reference manual,
something that then governs exactly what is allowed to run in
our infrastructure as, if you will, a baseline from there. We
are working on architectures in the areas of networks.
So, for example, we know where all of our circuits are. We
know what our basic architecture at the network level is. But
looking forward, we need a forward-looking network architecture
and not a backward-looking circuitry of an architecture.
Mr. Johnson. You and I certainly agree on that regard. I am
encouraged when you talk about virtualization because I have
undertaken massive virtualization programs in the commercial
world. And I can tell you that it brings tremendous benefits
and cost savings.
How many data centers does the VA have?
Mr. Baker. I believe that the report that we have given OMB
says, I think it is 62 at this point.
Mr. Johnson. What is your life cycle replacement process
for replacing the servers? How many servers do you have in
those data centers?
Mr. Baker. Right now the best number I have to give you and
we are trying to define between virtualized instances and
physical instances----
Mr. Johnson. Physical servers.
Mr. Baker. My problem is today I know the number 37,000.
Some of those are virtual on top, you know, multiple virtual on
top of a single physical.
Mr. Johnson. Well, we are going to come back to this
probably in a second round of questioning. I have some others.
But I am going to defer to my colleague, Mr. Donnelly, now to
ask his questions, but we will come back.
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In looking at the Catapult contract, when you say that the
acquisition team established a very aggressive timeline for the
acquisition process and 236 sites, 45 are done, the cost
overruns are staggering.
What was the decision framework used? I mean, how was that
done that you wound up in a contract where it was not fully
delineated, all the details were not there, all the information
to get this done? How do you jump off when it appears that not
every T was crossed?
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
That contract was awarded well before my time.
Mr. Donnelly. Well, I understand.
Mr. Baker. But as I looked at that contract, there are some
mitigating parts of that. One of the things that is clear is
that we, the government, underestimated the amount of concrete
and metal in our hospitals.
Our goal in that WiFi contract was to prepare the way for
advanced medical equipment that could be completely untethered
from the wall and so we looked to provide 100 percent coverage
and strong coverage for a WiFi signal inside of our hospitals.
It is fairly, I have to say, well-known physics that thick
concrete and metal structures will block the signal and require
more points of presence to accomplish that level of coverage.
My understanding is that that was the major cause of
escalation in that contract was the underestimate of the number
of points of presence that would be required in each facility.
From that perspective, that is a reasonable reason for the
contractor to increase the costs. We are asking them to do more
work. So we have done a better job of understanding from site
surveys and other studies that that was factually true. I
believe so. And that would lead to a more accurate contract
award at the time of award to the vendor.
Mr. Donnelly. The contract itself had an engineering change
request that permitted pricing modification.
I mean, is there a point where you say this is what we are
going to give you and those are the funds you get and we expect
you to do the job for those funds?
Mr. Baker. Yes. The problem there is that the contractor's
appropriate response then is, yes, and I will deliver exactly
what I contracted for for those dollars.
And so if you go into a facility and what we ask them to do
will give us 70 percent wireless coverage, it really does not
make sense to even wire the facility because then I could not
use those WiFi devices.
If a nurse is going to do bar code medication
administration with a WiFi device, but 30 percent----
Mr. Donnelly. Well, let me ask you this. As we sit here
today, we have 45 sites done, I think, out of 236?
Mr. Baker. The number I had in my head was about a third of
our major hospitals were done.
Mr. Donnelly. Okay. Are we even capable of giving specs for
a contract on this at this point? Do we know what a hundred
percent coverage would entail and could you get a fixed price
for something like that right now?
Mr. Baker. I believe so. We have stopped the previous
contract per the report and other advice provided. And we are
moving forward with the award of a new contract based on site
surveys done independently of the new contractor. We are going
to take the lessons learned from the previous contract and move
forward with a new contract. Specifically to your question, we
ought to be able to get a firm fixed price that we do not have
to issue change orders against from the vendor to accomplish
what we want to accomplish.
Mr. Donnelly. What kind of time frame are you looking at?
Mr. Baker. Congressman, I do not have that off the top of
my head, but I believe we could give you the detailed
acquisition schedule in a response after the hearing.
[The VA subsequently provided the following information:]
Target award date for the new Wi-Fi installation contract is
First Quarter FY 2012, and projected timeline to complete award
to all remaining VAMC sites is 12-18 months from award.
Mr. Donnelly. And one other question. Has the VA done an
analysis yet on long-term savings by using open source for the
joint electronic health record?
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, we have. And it goes down this path. We run one of the
best electronic health record systems in the country right now,
but we have proven that the normal methods available to the
government to improve that system are not going to keep it up
with the rate of improvement in the private sector.
We know from other folks' experience that in a number of
years, and I peg it at 5 to 10 years, if we do not
substantially improve VistA, my successor will be back here
asking for somewhere around $16 billion to replace VistA in the
hospitals. We must run a good electronic health record system
in the hospitals. The benefits from a health care standpoint
for veterans are outstanding and well proven.
Our move to open source is an attempt to use private-sector
methods to bring the private sector much more into how we
improve VistA and forestall or completely avoid having to pay a
massive bill to replace VistA. If we can improve VistA and the
costs for that incrementally are minimal, then we can avoid a
huge out-year expense to replace it.
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Donnelly.
Mr. Roe.
Mr. Roe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of
questions.
One, how big is this system when you look at DoD and how
many people are we covering and just how enormous is this
system?
Mr. Baker. My understanding of the metrics is that between
the two organizations, we have about 15 million annual patients
covered by the two electronic health record systems. Probably
between 15 and 20 million electronic health records inside the
two systems.
I believe each system individually is among the largest
health care organizations in the country. Both organizations
were out in front in adopting electronic health record systems.
So singly we are huge. Jointly we are massive.
Mr. Roe. Well, the next question is, where are we timeline-
wise? I have talked about this before, on getting this done
because I think it is absolutely essential that you do not have
two parallel massive systems that cannot talk to each other and
it is obvious they are not going to be able to talk to each
other? So where are we in that timeline?
Mr. Baker. Congressman, Secretaries Shinseki and Gates
absolutely agree with you. They have put us on a path to
achieve a single common electronic health record system. I
cannot get out in front of their communication relative to
their May 2nd meeting. I can tell you, though, that our
organizations have been working together for about 6 months.
The most important thing the two secretaries did was to
agree that no is not an answer. The answer is yes and our
organizations should figure out how to make that happen. That
has come together very nicely.
I really have to not go any further than that in order to
not get out in front of the secretaries, but we are very----
Mr. Roe. Let's get down a little bit more. When we had the
changeover, when Secretary Panetta will be there, I do not know
whether he has been brought up to speed or not. My concern is,
he is going to be drinking from a fire hose when he first gets
there. I mean, he really is.
And where is this priority? I do not want to sit here 2
years from now and we are having the same conversation because
we get lost. I mean, he is going to be looking at three wars, I
guess, now and all the other things that he is going to be
doing in his new shop. And it is the infrastructure just below
him to keep this ball rolling down the road.
Mr. Baker. I believe I could safely say that that concern
exactly 6 months ago from Secretary Shinseki's perspective is
what kind of lit this discussion off.
I believe our objective and what we will accomplish is to
have this nailed down before Secretary Gates leaves. We expect
that Secretary Panetta will also be interested in it. But I
know from the experiences Dr. Levin and I have had with working
with the DoD that this has moved well beyond Secretary Gates
into their organization at this point.
Mr. Roe. Good. I think that is essential because I think
once you get the momentum, it will happen.
Do you have any time frame that you can think of that this
could--I mean, is it a year, 2 years?
Mr. Baker. Congressman, I just have to not get out in front
of the secretaries on that one. I apologize. We are moving as
quickly as we can and very hard. I expect a communique from
them here in the next week or so that we will be able to give
you more information.
Mr. Roe. Okay. And I guess the other thing I would like to
know since we had the sort of loss of data, is this data stored
in secure servers off site? How is the data backed up, because
I know when we put our ERM in, that was a huge issue about
where the data is stored and if you have a crash, can you
operate your system? In other words, if it is down, what do you
do?
Mr. Baker. Let me start with the metrics. We have a very
good track record on availability of VistA systems. It is about
99.95 percent availability nationwide.
To the data question, the VistA systems today run in VA
data centers. In half of the country, we have achieved
consolidation of those systems into regional data centers. We
will have 11 or 12 hospitals supported from a single data
center. All the data is stored there and backed up there and
retained there. The local facility has a read-only version of
that data in case there is an outage to back up.
In the other half of our systems, the VistA systems
hospitals, the VistA systems still run in the hospital and they
back up locally there at their facilities.
Mr. Roe. Well, my time is up, but does DoD do the same
thing?
Mr. Baker. I am not familiar enough with DoD's setup to
really answer that question right now.
Mr. Roe. Okay. I yield back.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Roe.
I want to go back to something that came out of Mr.
Donnelly's questioning and correct me if I am wrong. He asked
you if you have a cost analysis, cost-benefit analysis for your
open-source decision.
And I understood you to say that you do; is that correct?
Mr. Baker. At this point, we do, Congressman, yes.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I am curious because in previous
conversations that we have had with you, Mr. Secretary, you
said you did not have that.
Mr. Baker. At that point in time, we did not. Based on----
Mr. Johnson. But, yet, you have already talked to the
industry about your decision to move to open source.
Did you have that cost analysis before you made that
decision? I mean, what good does a cost analysis, cost- benefit
analysis do if you are going to make the decision before you
get it?
Mr. Baker. Well, as I discussed, I cannot remember if you
and I had this discussion or if it has been with your staff,
the cost-benefit analysis on open source is pretty
straightforward.
Mr. Johnson. Can you provide that to us?
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. All right. We can get it this week?
Mr. Baker. Yes. We can provide it to you this afternoon.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. We would like to see that.
[The information provided to the Subcommittee staff was
inadequate.]
Mr. Johnson. Let me go back to the data centers question
again. You said you have 62 data centers, approximately 37,000
servers, correct?
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. I hate to drill down into some technology
stuff, but I have a method to my madness here. That equates to
596 physical servers per data center on the average. Does that
sound right to you?
Mr. Baker. I think to go back to the answer, the issue with
the 37,000 number that I just discovered this morning as I was
asking my staff is we think that some amount of that is
actually counting virtual instances, multiple virtual instances
that run on a single physical server.
Mr. Johnson. Yeah. So do you know how many physical servers
you have in your network?
Mr. Baker. Today I do not have that answer. Yesterday when
I prepared my testimony, I thought I had that answer for you.
[The VA subsequently provided the following information:]
As noted at the hearing, VA has around 37,000 virtual servers.
The number of physical servers is 12,235.
Mr. Johnson. See, an architecture would tell you that. And
the first step in managing an environment as complex as yours
is, as costly as the VA's is, that would be a very, very first
step because with virtualization, as you said, some
organizations are seeing anywhere from 50 to 70 percent
reductions in physical servers.
What is your life-cycle replacement strategy for servers?
Mr. Baker. It depends on the server type. In general, we
would like to replace them in the 4 to 6 year time frame. We
have some, for example, the database servers on the VistA
systems, that are well beyond that service period.
Mr. Johnson. How much on the average does a physical server
cost, the type that you guys use? And you may use multiple
types of servers, but as a general rule, do you have any idea?
Mr. Baker. The best number I have for you there, sir, is
about $10,000 each.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. All right. Let me go back. Do you have
any metrics to measure your progress along these 16
initiatives? Do you have any metrics that will tell you whether
or not you are achieving the goals? I mean----
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. You do?
Mr. Baker. Each and every one of the 16 major initiatives
has an operating plan agreed to with the Deputy Secretary. The
Deputy Secretary manages each of those initiatives on a monthly
basis to their operating plan. So we look at are they achieving
the milestones and results at the initiative level.
Underpinning that then are specific IT projects that are
managed to the milestones for those IT projects and whether
they are making those inside of the Program Management
Accountability System (PMAS).
Mr. Johnson. How many different functional areas does your
IT department support within VA? I mean, you have financial
applications, I am sure. You have various health applications.
What different functional areas?
In a manufacturing company, you would have operations, you
would have finance, you would have purchasing, you would have
all of those different things. What are the different
functional areas that your department supports?
Mr. Baker. So from an IT perspective, we look at our
customers inside the organization in three areas. There is the
health portfolio, there is the benefits portfolio, and there is
the corporate portfolio systems.
So in corporate would be human resources and finance, the
contract management system, those sort of things.
In the benefits portfolio would be each of the systems
necessary to support the various pieces of the business of the
Veterans Benefits Administration, so education, compensation
and pension, loan guarantee, and also national cemeteries with
their electronification.
And then in the health portfolio, the main items are the
automation systems in the hospitals, but there is also a
financial portfolio inside of health for their business office.
I think that is probably a fairly reasonable view of the
overall portfolio.
Mr. Johnson. And theoretically all of those systems pass
information back and forth one to another, right?
Mr. Baker. We sure wish they did a lot more of it, sir,
yes.
Mr. Johnson. Back to my concern about architecture. Is open
source on the multi-year program?
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. Okay.
Mr. Baker. As I understand the question.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Well, you know, I am going to sort of
summarize with this.
Mr. Donnelly, do you have any other questions?
Mr. Donnelly. No more questions.
Mr. Johnson. You know, I have heard your testimony this
morning, no architecture, no timeline for an architecture. When
asked by Dr. Roe if you have a timeline for EHR integration
with DoD, there is no timeline for that.
I am just really confused and concerned about how the
taxpayers' resources are being used and the level of support
that we are providing to our veterans.
You have some 7,000 people in the IT department within the
Veterans Administration. I am trying to equate that to my
experience.
I know in 1992, the United States Air Force's Software
Development Center had roughly 2,000 people to develop all of
the software, maintain that software for the entire portfolio
for the air force, everything from food service to dropping
bombs.
I just find it hard to believe that with an architecture
and an understanding of how these systems should be integrated
together that we could not find cost savings, resource
efficiencies. And I know you are nodding in agreement and some
of your testimony indicates that you want to get there.
Why is it taking so long? How long have you been there?
Mr. Baker. Next week will be 2 years.
Mr. Johnson. Why is it taking so long because you are not
the first that this committee has had these types of
discussions with? This seems to be an ongoing thing.
I told someone the other day I feel a little bit like a
greyhound at a dog track. We come out and then we chase these
rabbits around from one session of Congress to the next. We put
the rabbit up and then the next session, we bring the rabbit
out. We chase him around again and we get many of the same
answers over and over and over again.
I think the American people, I think America's veterans
deserve better than that.
Why is it taking so long to get our arms around
architecture, around common-sense business practices, around
project management, concepts like virtualization that has been
around for years now? Why is it taking so long, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Baker. Congressman, in a much longer discussion, I
would love to have that discussion, but----
Mr. Johnson. We have plenty of time. I mean, we have the
hearing room until noon to hear what your comments are.
Mr. Baker. Let me answer it this way. I do not believe that
I have established a reputation for sitting around. We
introduced PMAS, the Program Management Accountability System,
within 1 month of me----
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Secretary, I asked you very specific
questions around architecture, around common-sense project
management, business practices, things like cost-benefit
analyses coming out after the fact.
Why is it taking so long to get common-sense IT strategic
planning processes in place within the Veterans Administration?
Mr. Baker. The simple answer, Congressman, is that the
government clearly does not operate like a private-sector
organization. None of the disciplines that I think are
necessary for an IT organization existed inside of VA IT. The
way it had been run before I arrived was not in a way a
private-sector organization would be organized or run.
We have implemented strong financial disciplines. I pulled
$700 million out of VA IT and saved that money to spend it in
better places because, frankly, when I arrived, that money was
being wasted.
We have a good track record of focusing on it. I understand
your focus on architecture. I would like to get there. But the
problems we faced when we came in that you are about to hear
about from the next panel, failing $127 million programs like
replacement scheduling, had to be dealt with, had to be dealt
with soon so we did not continue to waste the taxpayers'
dollars.
Mr. Johnson. Well, you have got----
Mr. Baker. I agree with you on architecture, sir. I do not
disagree with you. I think our only difference is in the
perspective on what things are going to bite us hard first.
As we both know, a VistA system down in a hospital is
critical and I had to make certain that that would not occur. I
had to make certain that information loss was stemmed, that we
would not have issues in those areas.
I had to stop our failing IT programs that were wasting
hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayers' money.
I agree with you on architecture. I would love to get
there. I believe it is a matter of prioritization and just the
way that I look at an IT organization.
Mr. Johnson. I commend the fact that you recognize that
some of these problems exist. I mean, that part is encouraging.
I will leave you with this. I remain concerned that we do
not have an overall 30,000-foot view of the VA's IT
environment, how these systems interconnect, which system is
required to talk to another system, and how we are utilizing
the millions of dollars that are being spent on IT within VA,
and what we are doing with those 7,000 people.
I think the American taxpayer is asking for answers around
that. You well know, you hear it every day America is broke. We
have to find a way to do things better, to do things more cost
effectively.
And, you know, from my perspective, and I hear you say that
you recognize some of those, IT is one of the most costly
aspects of any organization's cost basis today, in today's
environment. There is no question about that. It is also the
place where the most savings can be recognized with sound,
common-sense best practices, those kinds of things.
And so I thank you for your testimony today. I am going to
encourage you to stay around----
Mr. Baker. We will be here.
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. And listen to the next panel. And
with that, you are excused. Thank you very much.
Mr. Baker. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I invite the second panel to the witness
table. On this panel today, we will be hearing testimony from
Belinda J. Finn, Assistant Inspector General for Audits and
Evaluations at the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG).
Ms. Finn is accompanied by Ms. Maureen T. Regan, Counselor
to the Inspector General at the VA Office of Inspector General.
We will also receive testimony in this panel from Joel
Willemssen.
Am I pronouncing that right?
Mr. Willemssen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Managing Director for Information
Technology at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Ladies and gentleman, your complete written testimony will
be made part of the hearing record. We will begin with Ms.
Finn.
You are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BELINDA J. FINN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY MAUREEN T.
REGAN, COUNSELOR TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; AND JOEL C.
WILLEMSSEN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
STATEMENT OF BELINDA J. FINN
Ms. Finn. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the OIG's findings regarding VA's
management of its information technology projects.
Ms. Maureen Regan, Counselor to the OIG, is also here
today.
Our testimony summarizes our recent work highlighting
issues regarding VA's IT governance and system developments.
During our audit of VA's IT capital investment management,
we examined VA's realignment of its IT program from a
decentralized to a centralized management structure.
We reported that the ad hoc manner in which the Office of
Information and Technology or OI&T managed the realignment had
resulted in an environment with inconsistent management
controls and inadequate oversight.
Further, in September 2009, we reported that VA needed to
manage its major IT development projects in a more disciplined
and consistent manner.
In general, VA's processes were adequate. However, OI&T had
not communicated them, complied with them, or enforced the
software development requirements.
Our audit work on several IT development projects has
identified problems with inadequate project and contract
management, staffing shortages, and lack of guidance. These
recurring themes have repeatedly hindered VA's IT development
success.
Our reports on the Financial and Logistics Integrated
Technology Enterprise Program, better known as FLITE, concluded
that program managers were repeating problems from the failed
CoreFLS Project. Specifically the FLITE Program managers did
not have requirements, plans, and controls to ensure the
achievement of cost, schedule, and performance goals, have
sufficient staff or clear roles and responsibilities, and
effectively identify and manage the risk associated with the
Strategic Asset Management Pilot Project.
OI&T has since suspended the Pilot Project for not meeting
user acceptance requirements.
Our report on the Post-9/11 GI Bill long-term solution
concluded that OI&T met schedule deadlines while sacrificing
cost and performance objectives. Lacking the management,
discipline, and processes for effective project development,
future long-term solution releases to meet mandates of the
revised GI Bill could meet the schedule, but at the expense of
cost and performance goals.
Our report on the Veterans Services Network Project,
VETSNET, concluded that, given the competing priorities, VA's
plans and schedule for migrating all programs to the new
system, the VETSNET System, were unclear.
Work to meet the original program objectives had been
extended by 5 years and at a cost of $308 million are more than
two times the projection from 2006.
OI&T has historically struggled to manage IT acquisition
contracts effectively. In response to a hotline complaint, we
reviewed a contract to install wireless networking services at
236 VA sites. We found the time frames to plan, solicit, and
award the contract were unreasonable.
VA had also issued a statement of objectives without enough
detail for vendors to submit reasonable proposals resulting in
escalating contracting costs and delayed network installation
nationwide.
In conclusion, the Department historically has struggled to
meet IT development cost, schedule, and performance objectives.
We are currently reviewing OI&T's new Program Management
Accountability System to assess the controls that are needed to
improve program oversight and ensure success in development
efforts.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to be
here today. Ms. Regan and I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you or other Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Finn appears on p. 31.]
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Finn.
Mr. Willemssen, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOEL C. WILLEMSSEN
Mr. Willemssen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Donnelly. Thank you for inviting us to testify today on VA's
management of information technology.
As requested, I will briefly summarize our statement.
Our work at VA over the last several years has shown that
the Department faces challenges in effectively managing IT.
Today I will cover three of those.
One, developing information systems; two, securing
information and systems; and, finally, working with the
Department of Defense to implement joint solutions.
Regarding developing systems, we have recently reported on
two important VA systems development projects. VA began work
more than a decade ago on the first project, an effort to
replace the Outpatient Appointment Scheduling System that the
Department said had long-standing limitations.
However, after spending an estimated $127 million over 9
years, VA had not implemented any of the project's planned
capabilities. The effort was hindered by weaknesses in several
key management disciplines such as acquisition planning,
requirements analysis, testing, progress reporting, risk
management, and oversight.
We made recommendations to VA in each of these areas to
improve future development of needed capabilities.
We also reviewed VA's development of a new system for
processing Post-9/11 GI Bill educational assistance benefits.
In this case, we found that VA had delivered initial key
automated capabilities and was, therefore, able to provide
regional processing offices with the capability to prepare
benefits claims.
However, we also identified areas for improvement and made
several recommendations to VA to further guide full development
and implementation of the entire system.
Let me next turn to a second major VA challenge,
information security. Long-standing weaknesses in security
controls have consistently been a material weakness at VA. We
and the VA OIG have issued numerous reports showing that these
weaknesses are pervasive and place VA's program and financial
data at risk.
Implementation of the many recommendations directed to VA
and a fully effective information security program are critical
to the Department reducing its security risks.
Finally, let me highlight the barriers that VA faces in
establishing shared electronic record capabilities with the
Department of Defense.
VA and DoD each have massive health care operations and
each spend large sums of money to separately develop and
operate electronic health record systems.
Earlier this year, we reported that due to barriers in
three key areas, VA and DoD lacked mechanisms for identifying
and implementing IT solutions to jointly address their common
health care system needs.
These barriers were, one, strategic planning that jointly
addressed requirements; two, enterprise architectures to guide
how they would move to an integrated set of systems; and,
three, investment management processes that would help ensure
that chosen solutions would meet the departments' common needs
and provide better value to the government as a whole.
We recommended several actions to the secretaries of
Veterans Affairs and Defense to overcome these barriers. Both
departments concurred with our recommendations and in March of
this year, the secretaries committed their respective
departments to pursue joint development of integrated
capabilities. Doing so can lead to better solutions at lower
cost.
That concludes a summary of my statement and I look forward
to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Willemssen appears on p.
36.]
Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Ms. Finn, you mentioned in your testimony that they have
adequate oversight processes, right? Did I understand that
right?
Ms. Finn. I believe what I referred to was that the
policies and procedures for system developments seemed adequate
in that they reflected the commonly accepted best business
practices for system developments.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. But, yet, you indicated that the problem
was with compliance with those processes?
Ms. Finn. Yes. The issue was compliance with those
processes and the implementation of them. To be specific, the
way they had been promulgated throughout the Department
sometimes gave managers the impression that they were just
guidance and, therefore, not something that they needed to
follow or should follow, but were suggestions.
Mr. Johnson. Did you see any evidence of any emphasis on
the compliance issue? I mean, did they have processes in place
to identify lack of compliance and mitigating action once they
discovered it?
Ms. Finn. Our audit work was about 2 years ago and at that
time, no, the process did not have a lot of structure and
discipline to it.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Mr. Willemssen, you mentioned three
areas, development of IT systems, security, and joint
integration.
Is it your opinion, and I thought you said so, I just want
to clarify, that an architecture that clearly indicated how all
of these different systems would fit together and a road map
for integrating them would be a major step in the right
direction to overcome those inadequacies?
Mr. Willemssen. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, absolutely
critical to doing so. And I understand the magnitude of what
the Chief Information Officer is facing. And given that
magnitude, he probably has to take it in doable bites and look
at the most critical functions and make sure he understands the
architecture of that. And most importantly, where does he want
to go.
Mr. Johnson. Okay.
Mr. Willemssen. And that is why we focused, for example, on
the VA and DoD area, that jointly, they need to figure out
where they want to go, figure out where they are, and then have
a transition plan to get from here to there. That is what is
currently missing.
We are encouraged, though, by the recent announcement that
the secretaries are committed to this, but you are right.
Constant oversight by your Committee among others will go a
long way to making sure that happens. Without that oversight,
things can fall by the wayside.
Mr. Johnson. Well, Ms. Finn mentioned compliance with
processes and you talked about the lack of an architecture.
Is it your sense that, Mr. Willemssen, inside the VA, do
they really have an understanding of the software development
life cycle and the major steps involved because you mentioned
development specifically? Did you find in your analysis that
there is understanding of the software development life cycle?
Mr. Willemssen. It is a mix. With the size of the
organization, there are elements that do understand the life
cycle. There are elements who clearly, for example, understand
the Software Engineering Institute's capability maturity model
and are striving to do as best as possible within the
parameters of the engineering disciplines within the model. But
that is not prevalent throughout the organization----
Mr. Johnson. Okay.
Mr. Willemssen [continuing]. So that when you are going
with any particular system development effort, it is somewhat
hit or miss and, therefore, the software development processes
may not be ingrained, but it may be ad hoc and chaotic. You may
get lucky and you may have a group that knows what they are
doing. On the other hand, you may not.
Mr. Johnson. Did you see any indication or evidence that
there is a formal program management or project management
certification program within the VA with how their IT projects
are run?
Mr. Willemssen. I do not recall that, but that is something
that Mr. Baker, I believe, is pushing very hard and that we
would be supportive of. But we have not done work specifically
on project management, but I think you are definitely on the
right topic there because it continually comes up in the
systems that we have reviewed.
Mr. Johnson. It goes back to what I said earlier. I mean,
if you do not know where you are going, any road will get you
there and so we end up with what we have.
We will probably come around for another second round of
questions to you folks. I appreciate it.
I will yield at this time to Mr. Donnelly.
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Willemssen, have you sat with the DoD and talked to
them about this issue and asked what their positions are and
what they plan to do?
Mr. Willemssen. We have. We have also done an in-depth
review of their AHLTA (Armed Forces Health Longitudinal
Technology Application) System which is their own health care
system. Again, I am encouraged by both secretaries committed to
do something because without that, you are going to want to
continue to go with your own Department's system.
Mr. Donnelly. What do you plan your continuing role to be
in making sure this progress continues to see that it is not
two home teams doing their own thing?
Mr. Willemssen. At this point, our plan would be to follow-
up on our outstanding recommendations that we made in our
February report in those three barrier areas that I mentioned.
And also before the hearing, Dr. Levin and I committed to
meeting within the next 2 weeks to get further understanding of
what is going on subsequent to the secretaries' commitment to
pursue this aggressively.
Mr. Donnelly. Do you have your own progress schedule for a
timeline on this integration and this coming together so we can
have a system that works across both departments and that work
seamlessly with one another?
Mr. Willemssen. We do not have a specific schedule other
than following up on the recommendations and providing periodic
progress reports to bodies such as this that provide oversight.
So if I were to come here a year from now and report the same
information, that would definitely say something.
Mr. Donnelly. Do you have any idea cost-wise if both groups
were on the same plan, following the same software and working
together so the records come over seamlessly from DoD to VA
that were able to track individuals, what kind of cost savings
that would result in?
Mr. Willemssen. We have not done the cost analysis. But
when you look at the billions that are planned to be spent on
each separately over the next many years, I think you can see
the opportunities for savings are significant. You overlay on
that plans that not only VA has but DoD and the rest of the
Federal Government to significantly consolidate the massive
number of data centers that are out there and you will have
again tremendous cost savings.
Mr. Donnelly. Ms. Finn, you have identified a number of
programs that there is a lack of sufficient or qualified IT
personnel.
What can be done to address this problem in your judgment?
Ms. Finn. This is the case I think where OI&T will have to
have a concerted strategy and an implementation plan to address
that issue.
When Mr. Baker first started and he and I first met, he
asked what do you think my biggest problem will be. And I said
system development without a question and he agreed. And he has
worked to address that.
I will be able to tell you a little more specifically about
what the Department needs to do later this year. We are
planning to do an audit of OI&T's human capital management and
we will probably be looking at their strategy and
implementation for increasing their expertise in program
management.
Mr. Donnelly. And one final question is, from your
perspective, what exactly has the VA done now to improve its
ability to manage IT projects and what do you think is the most
important thing they can do to improve that?
Ms. Finn. They have taken two actions. One is the use of
the Agile system development methodology which calls for
incremental functionality little bits at a time and that allows
a project to hopefully make better progress than the
traditional waterfall method that, you know, assumes you have
everything planned out before you start.
And the second is the Program Management Accountability
System, which is the oversight structure that OI&T uses to
monitor the progress of all their system development efforts in
the various projects.
PMAS was somewhat of a departure for VA in that it provides
an overarching look at system development. We have been doing
some work to actually look at the implementation of the PMAS
system and the discipline because, as you know, often the devil
is in the details as to how well the oversight is implemented.
And we will be issuing a report on that later this summer.
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Ms. Finn, you mentioned the Agile implementation
methodology. And I have used that myself and so I agree with
you that it is a good way especially on big projects.
However, you know, I am going to keep beating this horse
until we get someone's attention. Architecture, Agile works
well when you have a well-defined set of requirements, a well-
defined road map on where you are going to.
Is it your opinion that Agile works well in environments
where you really do not have that, where you do not know which
way you are going?
Ms. Finn. I do not think any software methodology can work
if you do not really have an end game in mind to know what you
are trying to develop. And I would think Agile has no more
advantage in that situation than the waterfall method.
Mr. Johnson. Sure. Okay.
Mr. Willemssen, the Ranking Member just started talking
about some staffing deficiencies.
Do you feel that the VA OI&T staffing of over 7,100 people
is appropriate and effective?
Mr. Willemssen. Appropriate? We have not done a detailed
analysis of all the staff, what their capabilities are, how
they are deployed, what they are working on, so I would not
venture a guess on that.
I would say that based on my almost 20 years off and on of
evaluating VA IT there are pockets of excellence and there are
pockets where much additional work is needed. So it is hard to
generalize.
I think what the Inspector General's representative said
here about taking a look at the human capital function within
IT and seeing what kind of capabilities, what kind of
certifications, what kind of project management discipline,
that makes a lot of sense.
And I think Mr. Baker would probably welcome such a review.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Shifting back just a little bit and
either of you can respond to this question, what would prevent
VA OI&T from fully implementing the information security
program required under the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)?
Ms. Finn. Big question there. No single thing comes to
mind. Of course, we do review the information security posture
annually under the requirements of FISMA. In fact, our report
on 2010 should be available fairly soon.
The biggest obstacle that I see is, and Mr. Baker may have
a different thought on this, is VA's decentralized nature in
that even with a centralized OI&T, a centralized information
technology organization, you still need to have consistent
implementation and disciplines out at many facilities.
Your security is only as good as, you know, as each
individual location. And it is a very cumbersome process to
identify all of the issues and have the command and control
structure needed from Washington to make sure all of the fixes
are made and updated because information security is a daily
requirement. You have to keep your patches. You have to keep
your passwords.
So it is the decentralized nature I believe is the big
challenge and just the fact that you have to keep up with it
every day in that environment.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Do you think developing technologies
such as cloud computing and open source, even though the U.S.
Chief Information Officer has cited security concerns, do you
have concerns about pursuing that given the security issues
that we have already talked about?
Ms. Finn. Of course I have concerns. I was reading the
Office of Management and Budget's strategies yesterday about
cloud computing and I noted that they talked about establishing
Federal clouds hopefully to provide better security That gives
me a little more comfort than just going out to the commercial
area. But I think even that environment will require a lot of
monitoring and controls to ensure that it is secure.
At VA, of course, we deal with a lot of personal
information and so we want to make absolutely certain that it
is secure.
Mr. Willemssen. If I may, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Johnson. Absolutely.
Mr. Willemssen [continuing]. I would echo that issue. We
issued a report last year on the Federal Government's plans to
move forward with cloud computing. We were especially concerned
at that time at the lack of guidance addressing the security
ramifications of going to the cloud.
Since that time, there has been some guidance disseminated,
but for an organization that has much sensitive data, you have
to make that move very carefully and with a lot of controls in
place with the provider of the service.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Willemssen, we talked a little bit about,
and I agree with you, it is encouraging to see that the
secretaries of the departments have committed to moving forward
with this joint development integration.
Can you explain to us why you think it took VA and DoD
until March of this year to finally come to that commitment to
joint development of that electronic health system?
Mr. Willemssen. Growing pressure to do so. I think the
frustration was getting too high. And I think that frustration
was starting to boil over and I think both departments began to
recognize that they had to do something, especially given again
what you said earlier.
We are a country that does not have a lot of excess funds
to spend and you see the amount of money going into the health
systems for DoD and VA and it looks like an easy opportunity to
save some money and, oh, by the way, have better service to our
servicemen and women and veterans. So this looks like an easy
thing to do.
It is the institutional and cultural resistance
historically to doing it. That is why I think unless you have
somebody at the secretary level driving this, it is going to be
very difficult to accomplish because of those institutional and
cultural barriers.
Mr. Johnson. Yeah. Well, tough question here. What is your
confidence level that, I mean, if they did not do this on their
own out of their own capacity to see the need for it and they
had to wait until there was so much pressure to do so, what is
your confidence level that the departments are going to work
well together and specifically how do you view the influence of
each department over the Integrated Program Office in terms of
moving the ball up the field and making progress because I
still remain concerned about no timelines?
I have yet to see, maybe it exists, but I have yet to see a
project management or a program management plan that says who
is committed to do what tactically.
Mr. Willemssen. Absolutely. I agree with you. That is what
we are looking for too. And I think if the secretaries'
communique, as was mentioned earlier, is going to come out a
week from now, those are the kind of details that we want to
see and then hold the departments accountable to the details in
that communique.
Mr. Johnson. Yeah. We will be watching for that very
closely as well. It should reveal some specificity around how
we are going to pursue this. It is the right thing to do for
America's veterans. It is the right thing to do for the
taxpayers.
With that, do either of you have any closing comments
before we wrap up?
Mr. Willemssen. No, sir. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Well, my thanks to you then for
joining us today. I appreciate your testimony.
Ms. Regan, you did not get a chance to say anything.
Anything on your mind?
Ms. Regan. No. I am fine. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Well, you are now excused.
I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative
days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous
material. And seeing as I am not going to object to my own
motion, that is so ordered.
I want to thank all Members and witnesses for their
participation in today's hearing and business meeting.
This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Johnson, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Good morning. This hearing will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone to today's hearing ``Reboot: Examining
VA's IT Strategy for the 21st Century.''
With an information technology budget exceeding three billion
dollars annually, it is reasonable for the American taxpayer to expect
the Office of Information and Technology at VA to effectively utilize
available technology and provide the highest quality support in the
Department's delivery of health care and benefits to veterans.
As we will hear from the witnesses on both panels today, billions
of dollars have been spent on IT at VA. However, veterans, the
taxpayers, and Members of this Committee are left to wonder what has
resulted from these expenditures. Have improvements been made?
Certainly. Are the improvements and advancements in VA IT over the last
10 years on par with the amount of time and taxpayer dollars put into
the effort? Certainly not.
The witnesses on today's second panel will help illuminate the
magnitude of the money spent on IT over time. To name a few: $127
million over 9 years on an outpatient scheduling system, with none of
the planned improvements in place; suspension of the Strategic Asset
Management, or ``SAM'' program, after failing to meet yet another
milestone; and a $70 million overrun on a Wi-Fi installation contract.
I also remain concerned that, as with past contracts and efforts,
VA is not thoroughly vetting cost and risk analysis before undertaking
new, large IT projects.
While VA continues to push forward on cloud computing, its own
Administration has not fully established the Federal guidelines for
information security in cloud computing. In a health care environment
such as VA's, I know that I would not want my personally identifiable
information floating around in the ``cloud'', especially given a track
record of data breaches that is less than stellar.
We once again notice a history of poor acquisition and contract
management at VA, a theme this Subcommittee is familiar with. Given the
frequency of problems in IT contracts, we know there must be a
significant degree of inexperience among the contracting staff, but we
are also left to wonder whether supervisors in OI&T either don't know
or don't care about these shortcomings. When IT needs are not clearly
defined at the beginning of the process, it leads to cost increases and
time delays down the road.
With an IT staff of over seven thousand, I find it difficult to
believe that knowledgeable IT professionals are not helping to create
well-defined Requests for Proposal, a key element of a viable contract.
When these contracts constantly have to be modified, it results in
greater cost to the taxpayers and a delay of improved services to
veterans.
A crucial area for VA IT to meet expectations is the establishment
of the joint Electronic Health Record, or ``EHR'', with DoD. Yet
another overdue item for our active duty servicemembers and our
veterans, the EHR has been pursued separately by the two departments.
The result is billions of dollars spent, much of it duplicative, and no
joint EHR. While I commend the Secretaries of both departments for
finally committing this spring to cooperatively pursue this endeavor, I
have lingering concerns that mistakes made in previous IT contracts
could be repeated.
For example, after releasing a final RFP on an Open Source
custodial agent at the end of last month, VA is only allowing a 3-week
turnaround for proposals to be submitted at the end of this week.
It's not rocket science. The capabilities to do what needs to be
done already exist. Hundreds of millions of dollars could have been
saved in previous years by simply having a robust IT architecture and
strategy in place. The needs are clearly defined: protect veterans'
information, establish an electronic health record in conjunction with
DoD, and implement stringent oversight of these and all undertakings in
the Office of Information and Technology. I fully understand the
challenges of managing information technology in a large organization.
What I do not understand is why it has taken so long to get only so far
at VA. The American people are watching, and expect VA to take care of
our veterans as promised.
I appreciate everyone's attendance at this hearing and I now yield
the Ranking Member for an opening statement.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Donnelly, Ranking
Democratic Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
We often criticize the VA for their inefficient and outdated IT
systems. A perfect example of this was when the VA found themselves
having to process education claim manually due to the legacy system
being unable to process education claims after the passage of a modern
education program. For this reason, I find it important and critical
that the VA maintains and updated IT system that proves to be reliable
and can be manipulated as new software is incorporated through the
years ahead.
The VA has decided that using Open Source model will provide a
better outcome, with lower risks and lower cost. Their cooperation with
the DoD on using Open Source is encouraging, in part because this
cooperation is essential, there is a critical need to develop and
electronic health record system, and because DoD has relied on Open
Source in the past. Although there are multiple concerns that both the
majority and the minority might share, the VA has reassured us that
Open Source provides several benefits. But along with those benefits,
making sure that veteran's personal information remains secure is
critical.
I also understand that contract management and weaknesses have
overshadowed VA's efforts to keep up with the VA's IT infrastructure.
Cost overruns, contract weaknesses, and unmet project time frames are
just a few examples of the implications that can occur if there are no
firm requirements in contracts, such was the case with the Wi-Fi
awarded contract to Catapult, Ltd.
What I am concerned about is making sure that first, the VA IT has
an interoperable model in place; second, best practices should be in
place from the private and public sector; and third, that new IT
strategies have the best value for our veterans.
Finally, I encourage the VA to keep staff updated on your efforts.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Roger W. Baker, Assistant Secretary
for Information and Technology and Chief Executive Officer,
Office of Information and Technology, U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs
Introduction
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Donnelly, Members of the
Subcommittee: thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the
Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Information Technology (IT)
strategy for the 21st Century. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
VA's plans, actions, and accomplishments that will position VA's IT
organization as a 21st Century leader in the Federal Government.
I am pleased to be accompanied today by Peter Levin, Ph.D., VA's
Chief Technology Officer.
Through Secretary Shinseki's leadership, the VA continues to focus
on the strategic goals VA established 2 years ago to transform VA into
an innovative, 21st Century organization that is people-centric,
results-driven, and forward-looking. These strategic goals seek to
reverse ineffective decision-making, systematic inefficiency, and poor
business practices in order to improve quality and accessibility to VA
health care, benefits, and services; increase veteran satisfaction;
raise readiness to serve and protect in a time of crisis; and improve
VA internal management systems to successfully perform our mission. The
Office of Information and Technology (OI&T), which I am honored to
lead, proudly support our strategic goals as we rapidly deliver
technology to transform VA.
The VA IT enterprise is a massive single, consolidated network with
152 hospitals, 791 community-based outpatient clinics (CBOC), 57
benefits processing offices, and 131 cemeteries and 33 soldier's lots
and monument sites. Our OI&T workforce numbers over 7,100, serving over
300,000 VA employees and more than 10 million veterans. Within our $3.1
billion FY 2011 budget, OI&T manages a technology profile of over
314,000 desktop computers, 30,000 laptops, 18,000 blackberries and
mobile devices, and 448,000 email accounts. These figures describe an
IT enterprise that is certainly one of the largest consolidated IT
organizations in the world.
Disciplines for 21st Century Information Technology
Managing an organization of this size and scope requires
disciplined management and processes. To instill those disciplines, VA
implemented five major focus areas immediately after my confirmation.
These five areas--customer service, product delivery, information
security, operational metrics, and financial reporting--continue to
guide our efforts in a disciplined and measurable way.
1. Customer Service
OI&T continues to build upon our excellent relationships with VA's
Administrations (Veterans Health, Veterans Benefits, and National
Cemeteries). We have worked hard to set a tone of cooperation that has
made it possible for us to effectively address many complex problems at
the second largest agency in the Federal Government. Thanks to my
partners, Dr. Robert Petzel, Under Secretary for Health, Mr. Michael
Walcoff, Acting Under Secretary for Benefits, and Mr. Steve Muro,
Acting Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs, that same cooperative
approach continues to spread throughout VA.
2. Product Delivery
IT is an enabler to the implementation of the Secretary's 16
Transformational Initiatives, which cannot be executed without newly
developed IT products. These initiatives are key to improving VA's
services to Veterans, and IT investments have allowed us to deliver
products or plan for on-time delivery of the following programs:
Successful, on-time delivery of the critical GI Bill
project. VA successfully converted all processing of new Post-
9/11 GI Bill claims to the Long Term Solution (LTS) prior to
the commencement of the Fall 2010 enrollment process. Since
installation, processing with the new system has been
excellent, with no significant ``bugs'' encountered. The
Veterans Benefits Administration claims processors like the new
system and find it easier and more efficient to use. By
dramatically changing its development processes, adopting the
Agile methodology for this project, VA also dramatically
changed its system development results;
Veterans Benefits Management System (VBMS), in which
IT provides Veterans Benefits Administration the enabling
technology to break the claims backlog;
The Blue Button program, in which IT provides the
systems and information security to allow Veterans to download
their currently available personal health information from
their MyHealtheVet account, allowing them to share their
personal health information with doctors outside the VA;
The eBenefits portal (a joint DoD and VA service),
which is evolving to a ``one-stop shop'' for benefit
applications, benefits information and access to personal
information such as official military personnel documents;
Veterans Relationship Management (VRM), in which IT
will provide the capability to improve Veterans access to VA
services and benefits through phone, web and email systems
enabling easier and more effective communications; and
The Pharmacy Reengineering program that replaces
existing pharmacy software modules with new technology that
will enhance Pharmacy services, improve customer service and
enhance patient safety.
As these examples illustrate, IT plays a pivotal role in the
transformation of VA into a 21st Century organization as envisioned by
the President and Secretary Shinseki.
3. Information Security
Ensuring the security of the large VA network and devices is vital.
We have made substantial progress in information security since the
challenges experienced in 2006 by instituting controls that now provide
for remote access to VA resources for employees and selected business
partners, and implementing a sound security strategy to facilitate
secure data exchange with Department of Defense and private-sector
health care organizations, and facilitating access to electronic health
records for our veterans over the Internet. These efforts are
instrumental in making the administration's vision towards a virtual
lifetime health record possible.
We have already made great strides with some efforts that will be
discussed in greater detail below, including: visibility to the desktop
to ensure compliance with security policies; visibility to every
network device; strong user authentication; and medical device
isolation architecture. It is vital to us that veterans feel confident
that we are doing everything we can to secure their private
information.
4. Operational Metrics
Our operations organization provides excellent service to our
hospitals, benefits offices, and cemeteries. We now measure and publish
key metrics that tell us how we are doing. Beginning in June of 2009,
we started at the core, measuring network availability (which averages
99.99 percent), Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology
Architecture (VistA) system availability (99.95 percent), and help desk
wait times. We have expanded these measurements to include a list of
nearly 167 metrics covering aspects of our network, our service
provision and our system/application provisioning that help us
understand what works well and what does not. The ability to measure
these key processes and adjust accordingly is central to continuous
operational improvement--a hallmark of a mature operation and essential
to any 21st Century IT organization.
As an example, we recently completed our second enterprise-wide
customer satisfaction survey, using the American Customer Satisfaction
Index methodology, which allows us to compare our results to those of
like organizations throughout government and industry. Our primary
purpose in conducting this survey is to understand and address the
issues that affect user satisfaction with IT services at each of our
facilities. We showed substantial progress between the two surveys,
increasing our satisfaction score from 67 to 71. For comparison
purposes, our near-term target is to achieve a rating of 75, which
would indicate we are in the top half of the ratings for similar
organizations globally. VA also uses the ACSI Survey tool to monitor
satisfaction with the award winning My HealtheVet Personal Health
Record portal and our scores in this area (75) benchmark well with the
E-Government Index (75).
5. Financial
Finally, we created a detailed financial plan for OI&T in both 2010
and 2011, known as the Prioritized Operating Plan. This plan has two
main purposes. First, it creates a vehicle for us to agree, with our
customers, on what the high priority IT services and projects are, and
allocate our resources to ensure success on the most important items.
It also allows us to communicate, clearly and objectively, which
projects and services will and will not be accomplished. Second, it
allows us to track our expenditures, from plan to budget to spend to
results, and know the business purpose for spending each dollar and
then track the results we expect to obtain from the expenditure. For
2011, that plan is over 1400 lines long.
VA IT is a Leader in Federal IT
Our efforts in the five focus areas have produced results across
the board-- results that are seen every day by each of our customers,
from a VA employee at a hospital, benefits office, or cemetery, to the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and to our most important customer, the
American Veteran. VA IT is a leader in the Federal Government, and is
transforming itself into a 21st Century IT leader by implementing
innovative approaches to improve our results.
Our goal is to be the best IT organization in the Federal
Government, and comparable to large private-sector organizations.
Achieving that goal means being a leader, and being a leader requires
more than being good. It requires defining a path in advance of others,
and boldly moving forward on that path. To that end, I will highlight a
few areas where VA IT is, today, clearly leading the way for the
Federal Government.
OMB's 25 point plan
VA has been an early and rapid adopter of the elements of Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) 25 point plan for improving Federal IT.
In fact, VA began pursuing many of the initiatives outlined in the 25
point plan while the plan was being formulated. Consequently, VA was
uniquely positioned to support the creation of many of the initiatives
and become an ``early adopter.'' For example, VA had already begun work
on Data Center Consolidation, and was able to provide insight and
lessons learned on the process for many other Federal agency
participants.
Another initiative in which VA is ahead of the curve is in cloud
computing, which we expect to increase efficiency through secure remote
access to files and programs. For example, we have a large-scale,
successful cloud program in the Post-9/11 GI Bill, with another
starting development for VBMS.
Finally, the VA adapted a key component of our Program Management
Accountability System (PMAS), the ``strike'' meeting to become an early
adopter of the program's intervention meetings OMB calls ``Techstats.''
Due to VA's forward thinking, implementation of many of the initiatives
outlined in the 25 Point plan was seamless and fit within the plan's
structures.
Transparency
VA IT has been a leader in meeting the transparency goals of this
administration. One key component of our transparency efforts are the
monthly meetings I hold with the staff of the House and Senate
Veterans' Affairs Committees. As you know, these meetings serve as an
opportunity for VA to inform Congress about IT progress and issues at
VA. Through these meetings we have developed a constant dialog that
helps keep Congress informed and opens lines of communication.
VA IT is also providing transparency into our development progress.
Every increment of every development project is reported in the PMAS
Dashboard, which I will discuss in more detail below, which is tied to
the OMB dashboard. This gives OMB, Congress, and the public a clear
view into VA's IT program management progress.
VA's privacy breach report, discussed below, is another great
example of VA's leadership in transparency. Our efforts to present to
Congress and the public our data breaches each month has had the effect
of limiting the number of breaches that have occurred, and helped our
information security staff to better identify potential risks. In
addition, the breach report is discussed on a teleconference with the
media to ensure an even greater level of transparency.
Shortly after the President's January 21, 2009 Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Memorandum, VA publicized and implemented the
Attorney General's FOIA Guidelines throughout the agency by prominently
publishing access links on the VA's FOIA Web site at http://
www.foia.va.gov/. VA's Chief Information Officer and VA's Under
Secretary for Health appeared in a video directed to all VA FOIA
Officers to discuss the importance of FOIA and the implementation of
the President's FOIA guidelines by ensuring any releasable items are
rapidly made available to the public without requiring a FOIA request.
VA has actively improved transparency by routinely posting information
about VA Data Breaches. Other offices have also followed the lead and
ensured transparency, i.e., VA Office of Finance (OF) posts information
regarding VA purchase card holders (credit card) transaction data,
First Class and Business Class Travel Reports, VA Civil Service
Employee holiday pay data, Unclaimed Moneys Accounts data, VA's FY 2012
President's Budget Submission, and VA's FY 2010 Highlights for the
Citizen (Summary of Performance and Financial Information). High level
contract award data is also posted without a formal request. VA's
ASPIRE for Quality Initiative, a VA-wide program designed to document
key measures of health care quality posts outcome information for acute
care services, intensive care units, outpatient services, safety and
process measures, and indicators of how successful each VA Medical
Center has been in meeting its quality goals.
PMAS
In June of 2009, VA introduced the Program Management
Accountability System (PMAS). The PMAS process has transformed product
delivery at the VA. Before the implementation of PMAS, approximately
283 development projects at VA met their milestone dates an estimated
30 percent of the time. This is an estimate, as IT development projects
simply were not tracked to their committed dates prior to PMAS. Today,
VA has 107 active development projects, tracked in real-time through a
project database and dashboard, that are meeting their milestone dates
approximately 75 percent of the time. I know of no other Chief
Information Officer (CIO), government or private sector, who has this
level of insight into such a large portfolio of development projects.
VA is a true trailblazer in product delivery, as I can assure you that
most IT development organizations, public or private sector, would be
ecstatic with meeting 75 percent of their committed milestones.
PMAS is important for two reasons. Most importantly, we are able to
deliver on the transformational capabilities VA requires. PMAS also
ensures we meet this administration's goal of ensuring that every
taxpayer dollar is well spent. In 2010, VA had a cost avoidance of
nearly $200 million by eliminating poorly performing projects and
restructuring many others to lower risk, reduce spend rates, and
implement incremental development project plans.
PMAS helps VA manage our contracts better by ensuring that proper
planning is done prior to beginning development on an increment. That
includes having the contracting officer and counsel as part of the
Integrated Project Team during the planning phase. During the planning
phase of a project, the work is broken into increments that deliver
capability to the customer in 6 months or less. As soon as the first
increment is planned in sufficient detail, the project can begin
development on that increment while continuing to plan future
increments. By using PMAS criteria, we ensure that we have good plans
and necessary resources in place before a project increment goes
active. Once the project is active, it will receive a strike whenever
an increment milestone is missed. A project can receive no more than
three strikes before it is stopped and forced to re-evaluate the
requirement and the plan. While project failures can still occur, we
manage the timeline and work so closely that projects cannot fail for
years on end before being stopped.
Agile development
A primary driver of our success under PMAS has been the adoption of
incremental development. Every project at VA, without exception, must
deliver functionality to its users at least every 6 months. Several of
our most important projects, including the GI Bill and VBMS, have
adopted Agile development methodologies. Whereas PMAS addresses the
planning and management aspects of short, incremental delivery, the
Agile development methodology provides the technical management
guidance of how to turn project requirements into working software
quickly and in collaboration with the customer.
Agile development is important to the VA because it encourages
continuous input from our customers. In agile projects, all the
development priorities are set by the customer, which ensures that the
work is performed in the order of importance. To increase the
likelihood of success, large projects are broken down into small but
valuable increments, each of which could potentially be a candidate for
release. This is consistent with our PMAS delivery requirements.
Lastly, agile development requires continuous quality assurance
throughout the entire development effort, further ensuring high quality
deliverables.
Agile software development methodologies are an effective means of
improving the predictability, quality, and transparency of software
products and their development. At the core of Agile is the iterative
work process. Business problems are broken down into small increments
of delivery that are tangible products that can be reviewed and
verified regularly by business stakeholders. By constantly
incorporating feedback, the software that is essential to solving the
business problem is created in partnership with stakeholders and any
miscommunications, revisions, or changes in business needs can be
accommodated quickly and with little rework. The quality of software is
kept high throughout the development process as the product in
development is kept as close to a production-ready state as possible
with each release increment. In addition, prior to the start of each
increment, business stakeholders and the development team agree upon
which features or requirements are to be satisfied during that
increment thus ensuring that the most important work is completed
first.
Contrary to popular belief, the successful Agile program requires
great rigor as it is essentially a process based on statistical
analysis. Every work product (software or otherwise) is defined, broken
down and estimated. As work progresses, these work products are
carefully tracked on a daily basis and results of progress are
published to the team and stakeholders (and any other authorized,
interested party) to provide complete transparency. The result of this
hyper-transparency is that problems in the development process are
identified early and changes, regardless of their origin, can be
accommodated quickly and efficiently.
Information Security
To vastly improve our information security posture, we have
achieved the goal of providing visibility to every desktop on the
network. Visibility to the desktop allows the CIO and our Information
Security Team the ability to see, for every machine on the network,
what software is installed, whether security policies are met and what
vulnerabilities exist--that's more than 314,000 desktops and more than
30,000 laptops reviewed for issues each day. We are easily able to
identify outliers and enforce compliance on computers that do not meet
our network security requirements.
In our continued effort to further enhance our security posture, we
will gain visibility to all servers in the VA environment and implement
a strong authentication solution for system administrators by September
2011. In addition to gaining visibility to the server computing domain,
VA will take the additional step of gaining increased visibility of
network infrastructure devices. Strong authentication coupled with
visibility all the way down to the end user desktop is first-rate for
an organization the size of VA and stands to be the one of the largest
deployments ever made of security and network management software in a
centralized and consolidated network environment. When completed, the
VA will have unmatched near real time security situational awareness of
its computing resources, consisting of more than three quarters of a
million devices.
We have also achieved full implementation of our medical device
isolation architecture, which is essential to mitigating security
vulnerabilities in our medical devices. The isolation architecture
allows us to localize virus outbreaks in populations where providing
protection proves more difficult for equipment such as medical devices,
by using virtual local area networks and access control lists. These
technologies allow us to easily identify threats and vulnerabilities
and quarantine them to prevent viruses from spreading across the VA
network.
Our achievements on visibility to the desktop and our medical
device isolation architecture put us well ahead of most Federal
organizations, and on par with well managed private-sector
organizations. Our ability to provide immediate response to
vulnerabilities and threats within our enterprise, as well as enacting
a proactive approach to centralized monitoring, reporting, compliance
validation and providing maximum service availability, is quickly
establishing VA as a model of excellence for the rest of the Federal
Government.
Protecting Personal Private Information
While we have made important strides in reducing the number of data
breaches that occur, VA has led the way in both responding to
incidents, and providing transparency when reporting data breaches. Our
Incident Resolution Team compiles a comprehensive report detailing
every reported data breach on a daily and weekly basis. The reports are
then discussed with the Data Breach Core Team which is made up of
representatives from the Office of General Counsel, Veterans Health
Administration, Veterans Benefit Administration, National Cemetery
Administration and VA Central Office staff offices. At the end of each
month, our Incident Resolution Team compiles a comprehensive report
detailing every reported data breach, the circumstances of the breach,
the number of Veterans affected, the steps taken to remedy the
situation, and any pertinent follow-up information. This information is
submitted to Congress, and is also posted publicly on the VA Web site.
After its publication, I hold a press conference to discuss the
breaches in an open, transparent manner. The number of facilities and
the complex IT environments at VA present unique security and privacy
challenges. VA's Incident Resolution Team consistently monitors and
responds to every privacy or security event, no matter if it deals with
one Veteran or thousands. The team members are considered experts in
their field, and have assisted other government agencies individually
and spoken at Federal IT and privacy events.
VLER
In April 2009, President Obama charged the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of Veterans Affairs to create a Virtual Lifetime Electronic
Record (VLER) to bring together the plethora of systems. This was done
in order to create a seamless way for servicemembers, Veterans and
those who support and care for them to access and manage benefits and
care from the day they enter military service and throughout their
lives. VLER itself is not a ``system'', but rather a business and
technical redesign initiative that establishes the interoperability and
communication environment necessary for DoD, VA and other public and
private partners to securely exchange information. The result will
improve health, benefits delivery and personnel activities by enabling
providers to easily access the information they need. In this way, VLER
is enabling health care and benefit providers to proactively deliver
the full continuum of services and benefits Veterans have earned
through several capability areas that are brought on-line in a measured
approach.
The VLER initiative ensures doctrine, policies, organizational
structures, personnel training and IT solutions converge to create an
environment of information transparency that improves the quality of
life for Veterans and servicemembers. The benefits of VLER are already
being felt by Veterans and servicemembers around the country in many
different ways.
VLER is now being used to support the exchange of health care
information between DoD, VA and private health care providers in San
Diego, CA; Hampton Roads and Richmond, VA; and Spokane, WA; and
Asheville, NC areas. The capability delivered at these pilot sites will
become more robust over time and expand to include six additional
regions throughout the country by the end of this fiscal year. In 2012,
we will leverage the tools and lessons learned in these 11 areas to
provide this clinical encounter support to health care providers who
care for Veterans throughout the entire United States.
VLER and the further expansion of the eBenefits portal will empower
Veterans and servicemembers by enabling them to access their
information, including health care records; benefit applications,
benefits information, and other personal information through an
interactive web portal. The eBenefits portal is a rapidly growing joint
VA/Department of Defense (DoD) service with more than 278,000
registered users as of March 31, 2011. As VLER continues to mature, it
will enable the eBenefits portal to provide servicemembers and Veterans
more capabilities, including accessing their official military
personnel documents, viewing the status of their disability
compensation claim, updating direct deposit information for certain
benefits, and obtaining a VA guaranteed home loan Certificate of
Eligibility. The eBenefits portal effectively bridges the conversion
from active duty to Veteran status by allowing servicemembers to retain
the same login information they had as an active duty participant. This
simple change is critical as it realizes the goal for the VA to be
Veteran-centric.
VLER will provide on-line access to all eligibility information,
``Notice of Death'' reporting, and enhanced support of final honors and
memorial benefits under the National Cemetery Administration. Redesign
and modernization of cemetery IT systems will include great
collaboration with the Department of Defense.
VLER should reduce the cost of the delivery of services, increases
efficiency of operations, reduces cycle times for benefits delivery,
contributes to the elimination of homelessness, reduces claims backlogs
by delivering information sharing capabilities, increases access to
benefits by connecting data owners and data users; and, increases the
quality and effectiveness of services provided to Veterans and
servicemembers. There are certainly obstacles to achieving these lofty
goals, but we are optimistic that VLER is making progress to meet the
President's vision for the future.
Open Source
The VistA Electronic Health Record (EHR) system is a proven and
essential element of VA's ability to provide Veterans with high quality
health care and control health care costs. In part because of VistA,
VHA has excelled in the last 15 years in both areas. Independent
studies have pegged the rate of return on VA's investments in VistA at
about $2 returned for every dollar invested.
While the current VistA EHR system meets or exceeds the
capabilities currently available from commercial EHR vendors, low
investment in VistA over the last decade has eroded its standing from
the once-clear clear market leader to being merely competitive. While
VA clinicians express strong support and preference for VistA as a
clinical tool, they are also vocal and unanimous in calling for us to
re-invigorate the innovation that made VistA the best EHR system
available.
Clearly, the private sector must play a role in that innovation.
The size of private-sector investment and the rate of innovation in the
commercial EHR sector far exceeds the government's ability to produce
timely, cost-effective EHR products.
VA estimates the cost of replacing VistA with an existing
commercial package at $16 billion, based both on VA-commissioned
independent validation exercise and on the real-world experiences of
Kaiser Permanente. Published reports say that Kaiser spent $4 billion
implementing a commercial off-the-shelf EHR system in their 36
hospitals and supporting facilities. Based on size of VA relative to
Kaiser (VA has 153 hospitals), $16 billion is a reasonable estimate.
To avoid those costs, and to find a way to involve the private
sector in modernizing VistA, the VA is turning to Open Source. Open
source software (OSS) began as the ``free software'' initiative in the
early 1980's, though the word free in this context is ambiguous. In
this case, it should be thought of as free speech. EHR users from
across the community are free to comment and contribute to the
evolution of the code base, and VA is free to accept or reject any of
those contributions.
In practice, Open Source has proven to be a powerful method of
producing production quality software. Market leading products such as
Unix, Linux, Netscape, Mozilla, Apache, and many others are the result
of Open Source software approaches. And while key product elements such
as licensing, cost, security, etc. are different with an Open Source
product, they are neither better nor worse. Open source methodologies
have been proven many times in high-reliability production environments
in the private sector to deliver products that meet or exceed the
quality and robustness of proprietary and Government off the Shelf
(GOTS) products.
VA has spent more than a year conducting a very deliberative
process to examine the implications of Open Source for VistA. We have
seen two substantial studies on the topic contributed by the private
sector and academia. We have consulted with hundreds of organizations,
and thousands of individuals. We have conducted three Requests for
Information (RFIs), and received numerous papers, emails, and comments.
Our path forward with Open Source has been broadly advised and highly
transparent, and is certainly much the better for it.
VA expects that the rate of innovation and improvement in VistA can
be increased without increasing our current budget by better involving
the private sector (and true private-sector practices) in both the
governance and development of the VistA system through Open Source. To
that end, we have released a Request for Proposal to establish an Open
Source ``Custodial Agent,'' to run the Open Source community. Our
estimate of the costs of establishing the Custodial Agent are less than
$10 million per year.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, over the last 2 years, VA's IT organization has made
many significant improvements and had many successes, but there are
numerous challenges ahead. We are solidly on the path that we must
follow to achieve our ultimate goal of being a leader in Federal IT.
But I believe it prudent to reiterate the words from my confirmation
testimony that are still true today: ``There is no easy path, no simple
answer, and no short-cut solution to creating a strong IT capability at
VA. Achieving this will require hard work, disciplined management, and
honest communications.'' Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Donnelly, and
Members of this Subcommittee, I am committed to continuing that work.
Thank you for your continued support of Veterans, their families and
survivors, of VA, and of our efforts to transform VA IT. My colleague
and I are prepared to answer any questions you and other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
Prepared Statement of Belinda J. Finn, Assistant Inspector
General for Audits and Evaluations, Office of Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) findings
regarding the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) management of its
information technology (IT) projects. I am accompanied today by Maureen
T. Regan, Counselor to the Inspector General.
BACKGROUND
The use of IT is critical to VA providing a range of benefits and
services to veterans, from medical care to compensation and pensions.
If managed effectively, IT capital investments can significantly
enhance operations to support the delivery of VA benefits and services.
However, when VA does not properly plan and manage its IT
investments, they can become costly, risky, and counterproductive. As
we have reported, IT management at VA is a longstanding high-risk area.
Historically, VA has experienced significant challenges in managing its
IT investments, including cost overruns, schedule slippages,
performance problems, and in some cases, complete project failures.
Some of VA's most costly failures have involved management of major IT
system development projects awarded to contractor organizations.
IT GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
In 2009, we provided an overarching view of VA's structure and
process for IT investment management (Audit of VA's Management of
Information Technology Capital Investments, May 29, 2009). As part of
the audit, we examined VA's realignment of its IT program from a
decentralized to a centralized management structure. The realignment
was to provide greater accountability and control over VA resources by
centralizing IT operations under the management of the Chief
Information Officer (CIO) and standardizing operations using new
processes based on industry best practices--goals that have only
partially been fulfilled.
We reported that the ad hoc manner in which the Office of
Information and Technology (OI&T) managed the realignment inadvertently
resulted in an environment with inconsistent management controls and
inadequate oversight. Although we conducted this audit more than 2
years after VA centralized its IT program, senior OI&T officials were
still working to develop policies and procedures needed to effectively
manage IT investments in a centralized environment. For example, OI&T
had not clearly defined the roles of IT governance boards responsible
for facilitating budget oversight and IT project management.
Further, in September 2009, we reported that VA needed to better
manage its major IT development projects, valued at that time at over
$3.4 billion, in a more disciplined and consistent manner (Audit of
VA's System Development Life Cycle Process, September 30, 2009). In
general, we found that VA's System Development Life Cycle (SDLC)
processes were adequate and comparable to Federal standards. However,
OI&T did not communicate, comply with, or enforce its mandatory
software development requirements. OI&T did not ensure that required
independent milestone reviews of VA's IT projects were conducted to
identify and address system development and implementation issues. Once
again, we attributed these management lapses to OI&T centralizing IT
operations in an ad hoc manner, leaving little assurance that VA was
making appropriate investment decisions and best use of available
resources. Moreover, VA increased the risk that its IT projects would
not meet cost, schedule, and performance goals, adversely affecting
VA's ability to timely and adequately provide veterans health services
and benefits.
These audits demonstrated that OI&T needed to implement effective
centralized management controls over VA's IT investments. Specifically,
we recommended that OI&T develop and issue a directive that
communicated the mandatory requirements of VA's SDLC process across the
Department. We also recommended that OI&T implement controls to conduct
continuous monitoring and enforce disciplined performance and quality
reviews of the major programs and projects in VA's IT investment
portfolio. Although OI&T concurred with recommendations and provided
acceptable plans of actions, OI&T's implementation of the corrective
actions is still ongoing. For example, OI&T is reviewing for approval
the draft governance board charters and plans to issue a VA directive
mandating Program Management Accountability System (PMAS) compliance
once version 3.0 of the guide is developed. PMAS is VA's new IT
management approach that focuses on achieving schedule objectives while
the scope of functionality provided remains flexible.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT SHORTFALLS
Over the past 2 years, our audit work on several IT system
development projects has identified themes as to why VA has continued
to fall short in its IT project management. These issues include
inadequate project and contract management, staffing shortages, lack of
guidance, and poor risk management--issues that have repeatedly
hindered the success of IT major development projects undertaken by
OI&T.
VA's Replacement Scheduling Application
In August 2009, we reported that the Replacement Scheduling
Application (RSA) project failed because of ineffective planning and
oversight (Review of the Award and Administration of Task Orders Issued
by the Department of Veterans Affairs for the Replacement Scheduling
Application Development Program, August 26, 2009). RSA was a multi-year
project to replace the system the Veterans Health Administration used
to schedule medical appointments for VA patients. Lacking defined
requirements, an IT architecture, and a properly executed acquisition
plan, RSA was at significant risk of failure from the start. We
suggested that VA needed experienced personnel to plan and manage the
development and implementation of complex IT projects effectively. A
similar suggestion was made in an earlier report in June 2009, where we
noted that VA needed to place greater emphasis on training VA personnel
to manage IT enterprise development projects rather than continuing to
rely primarily on external organizations and contractors to manage
these projects. We believe this condition still exists today and until
corrected, VA will struggle to overcome challenges managing its IT
investments. (Review of Interagency Agreement between the Department of
Veterans Affairs and Department of Navy, Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center (SPAWAR), June 4, 2009.) We also suggested that a system
to monitor and identify problems affecting the progress of projects
could support VA's leadership in making effective and timely decisions
to either redirect or terminate troubled projects. PMAS is currently
the Department's approach to implementing this suggestion.
Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise
In September 2005, VA began developing the Financial and Logistics
Integrated Technology Enterprise (FLITE) program to address the
longstanding need for an integrated financial management system. As a
successor to the failed Core Financial and Logistics System (CoreFLS),
FLITE was a multi-year development effort comprised of three
components: an Integrated Financial Accounting System (IFAS), Strategic
Asset Management (SAM), and a Data Warehouse. However, as we reported
in September 2009, program managers did not fully incorporate lessons
learned from the failed CoreFLS program to increase the probability of
success in FLITE development (Audit of FLITE Program Management's
Implementation of Lessons Learned, September 16, 2009). For example,
critical FLITE program functions were not fully staffed, non-FLITE
expenditures were improperly funded through the FLITE program, and
contract awards did not comply with competition requirements. We
recommended that FLITE program managers develop written procedures to
manage and monitor lessons learned and expedite actions to ensure full
staffing of the FLITE program.
Audit of the FLITE Strategic Asset Management Pilot Project
Our report on the SAM pilot project disclosed that FLITE program
managers did not take well-timed actions to ensure VA achieved cost,
schedule, and performance goals. Further, the contractor did not
provide acceptable deliverables in a timely manner (Audit of the FLITE
Strategic Asset Management Pilot Project, September 14, 2010). Once
again, we identified instances where FLITE program managers could have
avoided mistakes by paying closer attention to lessons learned from the
CoreFLS effort.
Specifically, FLITE program managers:
Awarded a task order on April 21, 2009, to General
Dynamics for implementation of the SAM pilot project, even
though the FLITE program suffered from a known shortage of
legacy system programmers critical to integration efforts
required to make FLITE a success.
Did not clearly define FLITE program and SAM pilot
project roles and responsibilities, resulting in confusion and
unclear communications between VA and General Dynamics.
Contractor personnel indicated that they received directions
and guidance from multiple sources. One of their biggest
obstacles was trying to overcome the lack of one clear voice
for VA's FLITE program.
Did not ensure that the solicitation for the SAM
pilot project clearly described VA's requirements for SAM end-
user training. As such, VA contractually agreed to a training
solution that did not meet its expectations. General Dynamics
subsequently revised its training approach to meet VA's needs,
but at a total cost of $1,090,175, which was more than a 300
percent increase from the original $244,451 training cost.
Did not always effectively identify and manage risks
associated with the SAM pilot project even though inadequate
risk management had also been a problem with the failed
CoreFLS. Specifically, FLITE program managers did not take
steps early on to ensure that the contractor participated in
the risk management process and that the Risk Control Review
Board adequately mitigated risks before closing them.
Because of such issues, in early 2010 VA was considering extending
the SAM pilot project by 17 months (from 12 to 29 months), potentially
more than doubling the original contract cost of $8 million. We
recommended that VA establish stronger program management controls to
facilitate achieving cost, schedule, and performance goals, as well as
mitigating risks related to the successful accomplishment of the SAM
pilot project. (SAM was suspended in March 2011 for not meeting user
requirements. Further details are discussed below.)
Review of Alleged Improper Program Management within the FLITE
Strategic Asset Management Pilot Project
This report, in response to a hotline allegation, disclosed that
FLITE program managers needed to improve their overall management of
the SAM pilot project (Review of Alleged Improper Program Management
within the FLITE Strategic Asset Management Pilot Project, September 7,
2010). FLITE program managers did not develop written procedures that
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, provide timely guidance to
program and contract staff, or foster an effective working environment
within the FLITE program. FLITE program managers also did not ensure
certain elements considered necessary for a successful software
development effort, such as ``to be'' and architectural models were
included as project deliverables in the FLITE program. In general, we
recommended that VA strengthen project management controls to improve
the SAM pilot, beta, and national deployment projects.
New Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on financial
systems IT projects, issued on June 28, 2010, also had a major impact
on the FLITE program. OMB issued the guidance because large-scale
financial system modernization efforts undertaken by Federal agencies
have historically led to complex project management requirements that
are difficult to manage. Moreover, by the time the lengthy projects are
finished, they are technologically obsolete. Consequently, OMB directed
all Chief Financial Officer Act agencies immediately to halt the
issuance of new procurements for financial system projects until it
approves new project plans developed by the agencies. In July 2010,
VA's Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology announced
termination of the IFAS and Data Warehouse portions of FLITE. In March
2011, the SAM pilot project, the final component of the FLITE program,
was suspended just weeks before it was scheduled for deployment. SAM
had received its ``third strike'' in the PMAS review process for
failing user acceptance testing, which indicated that SAM was not ready
for live operation. As of March 2011, program managers estimated
obligations of about $126 million for the FLITE program; of that
amount, the SAM project represented approximately $40 million.
GI Bill Long Term Solution
In September 2010, we reported that OI&T's plan for deployment of
the GI Bill Long Term Solution (LTS) was effective in part (Audit of
VA's Implementation of the Post-9/11 GI Bill Long Term Solution,
September 30, 2010). LTS is a fully automated claims processing system
that utilizes a rules-based engine to process Post-9/11 GI Bill Chapter
33 veterans' education benefits.
OI&T developed and deployed both LTS Releases 1 and 2 on time.
Lacking the management discipline and processes necessary to control
performance and cost in project development, OI&T has relied upon PMAS
to achieve project scheduling goals. With this schedule-driven
strategy, OI&T has been able to satisfy users and incrementally move VA
forward in providing automated support for education benefits
processing under the Post-9/11 GI Bill.
However, OI&T's achievement of the time frames for LTS Releases 1
and 2 required that VA sacrifice much of the system functionality
promised. Specifically, due to unanticipated complexities in developing
the system, OI&T deployed Release 1 as a ``pilot'' to approximately 16
claims examiners, with the functionality to handle only 15 percent of
the Chapter 33 education claims that the Veterans Benefits
Administration anticipated processing. Release 2 caught up on the
functionality postponed from Release 1, while providing the capability
to process 95 percent of all Chapter 33 education claims. However, due
to data structure and quality issues that still had to be overcome,
users could not make use of all of the functionality provided through
Release 2 and were able to process only 30 percent of all Chapter 33
education claims. In addition to these performance issues, OI&T did not
have processes in place to track actual LTS project costs.
Following Release 3 that allowed VA to automate input of college
enrollment information, OI&T deployed LTS Release 4 in accordance with
the original delivery schedule of December 2010. OI&T recently deployed
LTS Release 4.2 and has plans for two additional releases, tentatively
scheduled for June and November 2011, to accommodate recent revisions
to the Post-9/11 GI Bill. These LTS releases should provide
enhancements such as automated scheduling for future housing
allocations, and claims processing for licensing and certification and
national tests. Any delays in providing the promised functionality
could require continued manual processing, which could in turn delay
payment of GI Bill benefits to veterans.
In the absence of effective performance and cost controls, OI&T
runs the risk that future LTS releases may continue to meet schedule,
but at the expense of performance and cost project goals. We
recommended that OI&T improve LTS management by conducting periodic
independent reviews to help identify and address system development and
implementation issues as they arise. We also recommended that OI&T
adopt cost control processes and tools to ensure accountability for LTS
costs in accordance with Federal IT investment management requirements.
OI&T concurred with our recommendations and provided acceptable plans
of action, but implementation of corrective actions such as putting
independent oversight reviews into place is still ongoing.
Veterans Services Network
In February 2011, we reported that the Veterans Services Network
(VETSNET) program faces the continuing challenge of managing competing
requirements and new systems initiatives that have repeatedly changed
the scope and direction of the program (Audit of the Veterans Service
Network, February 11, 2001). Since 1996, VA has been working on this
effort to consolidate compensation and pension benefits processing into
a single replacement system. However, the repeated changes have
adversely impacted schedule, cost, and performance goals over the life
of VETSNET development. Given a loss of focus concerning the end goals
of the program, VA's plans and time frames for retiring the aging
Benefits Delivery Network and migrating all entitlement programs to the
VETSNET Corporate Database have become unclear. Work to meet original
program objectives has been extended by nearly 5 years. In 2009, VA
reported a revised cost estimate of $308 million through 2012, more
than two times an amount previously projected in 2006.
Further, frequently changing business requirements have
necessitated additional VETSNET software releases. Because software
change controls and testing have not been adequate to ensure proper
system functionality, software rework and rollback of installation
packages have been required to correct defects, and planned
functionality enhancements have been delayed. We recommended that VA
align resources and establish a schedule for accomplishing the original
goals of VETSNET in the near term. We also recommended that VA
implement improved processes to address software development
deficiencies.
IT ACQUISITION AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES
In response to a hotline complaint, we reviewed the contract
awarded to Catapult Technology, Ltd., for the installation of wireless
fidelity (Wi-Fi) services at 236 VA sites (Review of Allegations of
Acquisition Planning Weaknesses and Cost Overruns on the Contract
Awarded to Catapult Technology, Ltd., March 31, 2011). The complainant
made several allegations regarding the award and administration of the
contract. Our review substantiated all of the allegations except one,
and partially substantiated the remaining allegation.
We determined that the time frames established to plan, solicit,
and award the contract were unreasonable. VA did not establish firm
requirements and issued a Statement of Objectives that lacked the
detail needed for vendors to submit reasonable, firm fixed-price
proposals. Because of inadequate planning and incomplete information
regarding requirements, VA processed modifications that caused contract
costs to increase significantly; the current contract costs are
projected at $161.5 million, which is a $70.5 million (77 percent)
increase in contract costs.
VA processed modifications adding additional sites; however, the
contract had no provision that permitted VA to increase the number of
sites. We also determined that VA was improperly paying Catapult on a
milestone basis rather than on a completed site basis according to the
contract terms. This was not only inconsistent with the contract, it
was also inconsistent with the information provided to vendors during
solicitation. The Office of Acquisitions and Logistics concurred with
all our findings and recommendations and terminated the contract.
CONCLUSION
VA continues to rely on IT advancements to provide better services
to our Nation's veterans. Historically, VA has struggled to manage IT
developments that successfully deliver desired results within cost,
schedule, and performance objectives. OI&T recently implemented PMAS to
strengthen IT project management and improve the rate of success of
VA's IT projects. We are currently conducting an audit to determine
whether OI&T has planned and implemented PMAS with the management
controls needed for effective oversight of the Department's IT
initiatives. Specifically, we are examining PMAS data reliability,
project cost tracking, and guidance and processes for ensuring project
compliance with the oversight approach. Our audit results should
provide valuable information to VA and Congress as VA moves forward in
managing its technology investments. We expect to issue a final report
this summer.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Prepared Statement of Joel C. Willemssen, Managing Director,
Information Technology, U.S. Government Accountability Office
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: Department of Veterans Affairs
Faces Ongoing Management Challenges
GAO HIGHLIGHTS
Why GAO Did This Study
The use of information technology (IT) is crucial to helping the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) effectively serve the Nation's
veterans, and the department has expended billions of dollars annually
over the last several years to manage and secure its information
systems and assets. VA has, however, experienced challenges in managing
its IT. GAO has previously highlighted VA's weaknesses in managing and
securing its information systems and assets.
GAO was asked to testify on its past work on VA's weaknesses in
managing its IT resources, specifically in the areas of systems
development, information security, and collaboration with the
Department of Defense (DoD) on efforts to meet common health system
needs.
What GAO Recommends
In previous reports in recent years, GAO has made numerous
recommendations to VA aimed at improving the department's IT management
capabilities. These recommendations were focused on: improving two
projects to develop and implement new systems, strengthening
information security practices and ensuring that security issues are
adequately addressed, and overcoming barriers VA faces in collaborating
with DoD to jointly address the departments' common health care
business needs.
What GAO Found
Recently, GAO reported on two VA systems development projects that
have yielded mixed results. For its outpatient appointment scheduling
project, VA spent an estimated $127 million over 9 years and was unable
to implement any of the planned capabilities. The application software
project was hindered by weaknesses in several key management
disciplines, including acquisition planning, requirements analysis,
testing, progress reporting, risk management, and oversight. For its
Post-9/11 GI Bill educational benefits system, VA used a new
incremental software development approach and deployed the first two of
four releases of its long-term system solution by its planned dates,
thereby providing regional processing offices with key automated
capabilities to prepare original and amended benefits claims. However,
VA had areas for improvement, including establishing business
priorities, testing the new systems, and providing oversight.
Effective information security controls are essential to securing
the information systems and information on which VA depends to carry
out its mission. For over a decade, VA has faced long-standing
information security weaknesses as identified by GAO, VA's Office of
the Inspector General, VA's independent auditor, and the department
itself. The department continues to face challenges in maintaining its
information security controls over its systems and in fully
implementing the information security program required under the
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. These weaknesses
have left VA vulnerable to disruptions in critical operations, theft,
fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information.
VA and DoD operate two of the Nation's largest health care systems,
providing health care to 6 million veterans and 9.6 million active duty
servicemembers at estimated annual costs of about $48 billion and $49
billion, respectively. To provide this care, both departments rely on
electronic health record systems to create, maintain, and manage
patient health information. GAO reported earlier this year that VA
faced barriers in establishing shared electronic health record
capabilities with DoD in three key IT management areas--strategic
planning, enterprise architecture (i.e., a description of business
processes and supporting technologies), and IT investment management.
Specifically, the departments were unable to articulate explicit plans,
goals, and time frames for jointly addressing the health IT
requirements common to both departments' electronic health record
systems. Additionally, although VA and DoD took steps toward developing
and maintaining artifacts related to a joint health architecture, the
architecture was not sufficiently mature to guide the departments'
joint health IT modernization efforts. Lastly, VA and DoD did not have
a joint process for selecting IT investments based on criteria that
consider cost, benefit, schedule, and risk elements, which would help
to ensure that the chosen solution both meets the departments' common
health IT needs and provides better value and benefits to the
government as a whole. Subsequent to our report, the Secretaries of
Veterans Affairs and Defense agreed to pursue integrated electronic
health record capabilities.
__________
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be a part of today's dialogue with the Subcommittee
on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) actions to better manage
its information technology (IT) resources. The use of IT is crucial to
helping VA effectively serve the Nation's veterans and the department
has expended billions of dollars over the last several years to manage
and secure its information systems and assets--the department's budget
for IT now exceeds $3 billion annually.
VA has, however, experienced challenges in managing its IT
resources, as we have previously reported.\1\ As you requested, in my
testimony today, I will describe those challenges, specifically in the
areas of systems development, information security, and collaborating
with the Department of Defense (DoD) to jointly develop electronic
health record system capabilities.
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\1\ GAO, Electronic Health Records: DoD and VA Should Remove
Barriers and Improve Efforts to Meet Their Common System Needs, GAO-11-
265 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011); Information Technology: Veterans
Affairs Can Further Improve Its Development Process for Its New
Education Benefits System, GAO-11-115 (Washington, D.C.: December
2010); Information Security: Federal Guidance Needed to Address Control
Issues with Implementing Cloud Computing, GAO-10-513 (Washington, D.C.:
May 2010); Information Technology: Management Improvements Are
Essential to VA's Second Effort to Replace Its Outpatient Scheduling
System, GAO-10-579 (Washington, D.C.: May 2010); and Information
Security: Veterans Affairs Needs to Resolve Long-Standing Weaknesses,
GAO-10-727T (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2010).
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The information in my testimony is based primarily on our previous
work at VA. We also obtained and analyzed pertinent documentation to
determine the current status of selected department management efforts.
We conducted our work in support of this testimony during May 2011 in
the Washington, D.C., area. All work on which this testimony is based
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Background
VA's mission is to promote the health, welfare, and dignity of all
veterans in recognition of their service to the Nation by ensuring that
they receive medical care, benefits, social support, and lasting
memorials. According to information from the department, its employees
maintain the largest integrated health care system in the Nation for
more than 5 million patients at more than 1,500 sites of care, provide
compensation and pension benefits for nearly 4 million veterans and
beneficiaries, and maintain nearly 3 million gravesites at 163
properties. Over time, the use of IT has become increasingly important
to the department's efforts to provide these benefits and services to
veterans; VA relies on its IT systems for medical information and
records and for processing benefits claims, including compensation and
pension and education benefits. Further, VA is increasingly expected to
improve its service to veterans by sharing information with other
departments, especially DoD.
VA's fiscal year 2012 request for almost $3.2 billion in IT budget
authority indicates the range of the department's IT activities. For
example, the request includes:
about $1.4 billion to operate and maintain existing
infrastructure and systems;
approximately $650 million to develop new system
capabilities to support, for example, faster compensation and
pension claims processing, elimination of veteran homelessness,
and improvement of veteran mental health;
$68 million for information security activities; and
$915 million to fund about 7,000 IT personnel.
Our prior work has shown that success in managing IT depends, among
other things, on having and using effective system development
capabilities and having effective controls over information and
systems. We have issued several products on VA in important management
areas where the department faces challenges. My testimony today will
briefly summarize these products.
Recent System Development Projects Have Achieved Varied Degrees of
Success
Historically, VA has experienced significant IT development and
delivery difficulties. We recently reported on two important VA systems
development projects.\2\ The first project expended an estimated $127
million without delivering any of the planned capabilities. VA has
begun implementing capabilities from the second project, although we
identified opportunities for improvement.
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\2\ GAO-10-579 and GAO-11-115.
VA's Scheduling Replacement Project Was Hindered by Systems Development
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and Acquisition Weaknesses
To carry out VA's daily operations in providing care to veterans
and their families, the department relies on an outpatient appointment
scheduling system. However, according to the department, this current
scheduling system has had long-standing limitations that have impeded
its effectiveness. Consequently, VA began work on a replacement system
in 2000. However, after spending an estimated $127 million over 9
years, VA had not implemented any of the planned capabilities.
VA's efforts to successfully complete the Scheduling Replacement
Project were hindered by weaknesses in several key project management
disciplines and a lack of effective oversight. Specifically,
VA did not adequately plan its acquisition of the
scheduling application and did not obtain the benefits of
competition. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) required
preparation of acquisition plans \3\ that must address how
competition will be sought, promoted, and sustained.\4\ VA did
not develop an acquisition plan until May 2005, about 4 years
after the department first contracted for a new scheduling
system. Further, VA did not promote competition in contracting
for its scheduling system. Instead, VA issued task orders
against an existing contract that the department had in place
for acquiring services such as printing, computer maintenance,
and data entry. These weaknesses in VA's acquisition management
reflected the inexperience of the department's personnel in
administering major IT contracts. To address identified
shortcomings, we recommended that VA ensure that future
acquisition plans document how competition will be sought,
promoted, and sustained.
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\3\ See FAR, subpart 7.1. See also FAR 34.004.
\4\ See FAR 7.105 b(2).
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VA did not ensure that requirements were complete and
sufficiently detailed. Effective, disciplined practices for
defining requirements include analyzing requirements to ensure
that they are complete, verifiable, and sufficiently
detailed.\5\ For example, maintaining bidirectional
traceability from high-level operational requirements through
detailed low-level requirements to test cases is a disciplined
requirements management practice. However, VA did not
adequately define requirements. For example, in November 2007,
VA determined that performance requirements were missing and
that some requirements were not testable. Further, according to
project officials, some requirements were vague and open to
interpretation. Also, requirements for processing information
from other systems were missing. The incomplete and
insufficiently detailed requirements resulted in a system that
did not function as intended. In addition, VA did not ensure
that requirements were fully traceable. As early as October
2006, an internal review noted that the requirements did not
trace to business rules or to test cases. By not ensuring
requirements traceability, the department increased the risk
that the system could not be adequately tested and would not
function as intended. We therefore recommended that VA ensure
implementation of a requirements management plan that reflected
leading practices.
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\5\ See Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Capability
Maturity Model' Integration for Development, version 1.2
(Pittsburgh, Pa., August 2006), and Software Acquisition Capability
Maturity Model (SA-CMM) version 1.03, CMU/SEI-2002-TR-010 (Pittsburgh,
Pa., March 2002).
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VA's concurrent approach to performing system tests
increased risk. Best practices in system testing indicate that
testing activities should be performed incrementally, so that
problems and defects \6\ with software versions can be
discovered and corrected early. VA's guidance on conducting
tests is consistent with these practices and specifies four
test stages and associated criteria for progressing through the
stages.\7\ For example, defects categorized as critical, major,
and average severity identified in testing stage one are to be
resolved before testing in stage two is begun. Nonetheless, VA
took a high-risk approach to testing by performing tests
concurrently rather than incrementally. Scheduling project
officials told us that they ignored their own testing guidance
and performed concurrent testing at the direction of Office of
Enterprise Development senior management in an effort to
prevent project timelines from slipping. The first version to
undergo stage two testing had 370 defects that should have been
resolved before stage two testing was begun. Almost 2 years
after beginning stage two testing, 87 defects that should have
been resolved before stage two testing began had not been
fixed. As a result of a large number of defects that VA and the
contractor could not resolve, the contract was terminated. To
prevent these types of problems with future system development
efforts, we recommended that VA adhere to its own guidance for
system testing.
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\6\ Defects are system problems that require a resolution and can
be due to a failure to meet the system specifications.
\7\ According to VA testing documentation, these stages are (1)
testing within the VA development team, (2) testing services, (3) field
testing, and (4) final review and acceptance testing.
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VA's reporting based on earned value management data
was unreliable. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
VA policies require major projects to use earned value
management \8\ to measure and report progress. Earned value
management is a tool for measuring a project's progress by
comparing the value of work accomplished with the amount of
work expected to be accomplished. Such a comparison permits
actual performance to be evaluated and is based on variances
\9\ from the cost and schedule baselines. In January 2006, the
scheduling project began providing monthly reports to the
department's Chief Information Officer based on earned value
management data. However, the progress reports included
contradictory information about project performance.
Specifically, the reports featured stoplight indicators (green,
yellow, or red) that frequently were inconsistent with the
reports' narrative. For example, the June 2007 report
identified project cost and schedule performance as green,
despite the report noting that the project budget was being
increased by $3 million to accommodate schedule delays. This
inconsistent reporting continued until October 2008, when the
report began to show cost and schedule performance as red, the
actual state of the project. Further, the former program
manager noted that the department performed earned value
management for the scheduling project only to fulfill the OMB
requirement, and that the data were not used as the basis for
decision-making because doing so was not a part of the
department's culture. To address these weaknesses, we
recommended that VA ensure effective implementation of earned
value management.
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\8\ OMB issued policy guidance (M-05-23) to agency CIOs on
improving technology projects that includes requirements for reporting
performance to OMB using earned value management (August 2005).
\9\ Cost variances compare the value of the completed work (i.e.,
the earned value) with the actual cost of the work performed. Schedule
variances are also measured in dollars, but they compare the earned
value of the completed work with the value of the work that was
expected to be completed. Positive variances indicate that activities
cost less or are completed ahead of schedule. Negative variances
indicate activities cost more or are falling behind schedule.
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VA did not effectively identify, mitigate, and
communicate project risks. Federal guidance and best practices
advocate risk management.\10\ To be effective, risk management
activities should include identifying and prioritizing risks as
to their probability of occurrence and impact, documenting them
in an inventory, and developing and implementing appropriate
risk mitigation strategies. VA established a process for
managing the scheduling system project's risks that was
consistent with relevant best practices. Specifically, project
officials developed a risk management plan that defined five
phases--risk identification, risk analysis, risk response
planning, risk monitoring and control, and risk review.
However, the department did not take key project risks into
account. Senior project officials indicated that staff members
were often reluctant to raise risks or issues to leadership due
to the emphasis on keeping the project on schedule.
Accordingly, VA did not identify as risks (1) using a
noncompetitive acquisition approach, (2) conducting concurrent
testing and initiation of stage two testing with significant
defects, and (3) reporting unreliable project cost and schedule
performance information. Any one of these risks alone had the
potential to adversely impact the outcome of the project. The
three of them together dramatically increased the likelihood
that the project would not succeed. To improve management of
the project moving forward, we recommended that VA identify
risks related to the scheduling project and prepare plans and
strategies to mitigate them.
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\10\ OMB Circular A-130 (Nov. 30, 2000) and Carnegie Mellon
Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model Integration
for Development, version 1.2 (Pittsburgh, Pa., August 2006).
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VA's oversight boards did not take corrective actions
despite the department becoming aware of significant issues.
GAO and OMB guidance call for the use of institutional
management processes to control and oversee IT investments.\11\
Critical to these processes are milestone reviews that include
mechanisms to identify underperforming projects, so that timely
steps can be taken to address deficiencies. These reviews
should be conducted by a department-level investment review
board composed of senior executives. In this regard, VA's
Enterprise Information Board was established to provide
oversight of IT projects through in-process reviews when
projects experience problems. Similarly, the Programming and
Long-Term Issues Board is responsible for performing milestone
reviews and program management reviews of projects. However,
between June 2006 and May 2008, the department did not provide
oversight of the Scheduling Replacement Project, even though
the department had become aware that the project was having
difficulty meeting its schedule and performance goals.
According to the chairman of the Programming and Long-Term
Issues Board, it did not conduct reviews of the scheduling
project prior to June 2008 because it was focused on developing
the department's IT budget strategy. To address these
deficiencies, in June 2009, VA began establishing the Program
Management Accountability System to promote visibility into
troubled programs and allow the department to take corrective
actions. We recommended that VA ensure the policies and
procedures it was establishing were executed effectively.
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\11\ GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework
for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO-04-394G (Washington,
D.C.: March 2004) and OMB, Capital Programming Guide: Supplement to
Circular A-11, Part 7, Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital
Assets (Washington, D.C., June 2006).
In response to our report, VA concurred with our recommendations
and described its actions to address them. For example, the department
stated that it would work closely with contracting officers to ensure
future acquisition plans clearly identify an acquisition strategy that
promotes full and open competition. In addition, the department stated
that the Program Management Accountability System will provide near-
term visibility into troubled programs, allowing the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology to provide help
earlier and avoid long-term project failures.
In May 2011, VA's program manager stated that the department's
effort to develop a new outpatient scheduling system--now referred to
as 21st Century Medical Scheduling--consists largely of planning
activities, including the identification of requirements. However,
according to the manager, the project is not included in the
department's fiscal year 2012 budget request. As a result, the
department's plans for addressing the limitations that it had
identified in its current scheduling system are uncertain.
VA Has Partially Delivered New Education Benefits System Capabilities,
but Can Improve Its Development Process
In contrast to the scheduling system project failure, VA has begun
implementing a new system for processing a recently established
education benefit for veterans. The Post-9/11 GI Bill provides
educational assistance for veterans and members of the armed forces who
served on or after September 11, 2001. VA concluded that its existing
system and manual processes were insufficient to support the new
benefits. For instance, the system was not fully integrated with other
information systems such as VA's payments system, requiring claims
examiners to access as many as six different systems and manually input
claims data. Consequently, claims examiners reportedly took up to six
times longer to pay Post-9/11 GI Bill program claims than other VA
education benefit claims. The challenges associated with its processing
system contributed to a backlog of 51,000 claims in December 2009. In
response to this situation, the department began an initiative to
modernize its benefits processing capabilities. VA chose an incremental
development approach, referred to as Agile software development,\12\
which is intended to deliver functionality in short increments before
the system is fully deployed.
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\12\ Agile software development is not a set of tools or a single
methodology, but a philosophy based on selected values, such as, the
highest priority is to satisfy customers through early and continuous
delivery of valuable software; delivering working software frequently,
from a couple of weeks to a couple of months; and that working software
is the primary measure of progress. For more information on Agile
development, see http://www.agilealliance.org.
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In December 2010, we reported that VA had delivered key automated
capabilities used to process the new education benefits. Specifically,
it deployed the first two of four releases of its long-term system
solution by its planned dates, thereby providing regional processing
offices with key automated capabilities to prepare original and amended
benefits claims. Further, VA established Agile practices including a
cross-functional team that involves senior management, governance
boards, key stakeholders, and distinct Agile roles and began using
three other Agile practices--focusing on business priorities,
delivering functionality in short increments, and inspecting and
adapting the project.
However, to help guide the full development and implementation of
the new system, we reported that VA could make further improvements to
these practices in five areas.
1. Business priorities. To ensure business priorities are a
focus, a project starts with a vision that contains, among
other things, a purpose, goals, metrics, and constraints. In
addition, it should be traceable to requirements. VA
established a vision that captured the project purpose and
goals; however, it had not established metrics for the
project's goals or prioritized project constraints. Department
officials stated that project documentation was evolving and
they intended to improve their processes based on lessons
learned; however, until it identified metrics and constraints,
the department did not have the means to compare the projected
performance with the actual results. We recommended that VA
establish performance measures for goals and identify
constraints to provide better clarity in the vision and
expectations of the project.
2. Traceability. VA had also established a plan that
identified how to maintain requirements traceability within an
Agile environment; however, the traceability was not always
maintained between legislation, policy, business rules, and
test cases. We recommended that VA establish bidirectional
traceability between requirements and legislation, policies,
and business rules.
3. Definition of ``done.'' To aid in delivering functionality
in short increments, defining what constitutes completed work
and testing functionality is critical.\13\ However, VA had not
established criteria for work that was considered ``done'' at
all levels of the project. Program officials stated that each
development team had its own definition of ``done'' and agreed
that they needed to provide a standard definition across all
teams. Without a mutual agreement for what constitutes ``done''
at each level, the resulting confusion can lead to inconsistent
quality. We therefore recommended that VA define the conditions
that must be present to consider work ``done'' in adherence
with agency policy and guidance.
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\13\ One of the key Agile principles is that the delivery of
completed software be defined, commonly referred to as the definition
of ``done.'' This is critical to the development process to help ensure
that, among other things, testing has been adequately performed and the
required documentation has been developed.
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4. Testing. While the department had established an
incremental testing approach, the quality of unit and
functional testing performed during Release 2 was inadequate in
10 of the 20 segments of system functionality we reviewed.
Program officials stated that they placed higher priority on
user acceptance testing at the end of a release and relied on
users to identify defects that were not detected during unit
and functional testing. Without improved testing quality, the
department risks deploying future releases that contain defects
that may require rework. To reduce defects and rework to fix
them, we recommended that VA improve the adequacy of the unit
and functional testing processes.
5. Oversight. In order for projects to be effectively
inspected and adapted, management must have tools to provide
effective oversight. For Agile development, progress and the
amount of work remaining can be reflected in a burn-down chart,
which depicts how factors such as the rate at which work is
completed (velocity) and changes in overall product scope
affect the project over time. While VA had an oversight tool
that showed the percentage of work completed to reflect project
status at the end of each iteration, it did not depict the
velocity of the work completed and the changes to scope over
time. We therefore recommended that VA implement an oversight
tool to clearly communicate velocity and the changes to project
scope over time.
VA concurred with three of our five recommendations. It did not
concur with our recommendation that it implement an oversight tool to
clearly communicate velocity. However, without this level of visibility
in its reporting, management and the development teams may not have all
the information they need to fully understand project status. VA also
did not concur with our recommendation to improve the adequacy of the
unit and functional testing processes to reduce the amount of system
rework. However, without increased focus on the quality of testing
early in the development process, VA risks delaying functionality and/
or deploying functionality with unknown defects that could require
future rework that may be costly and ultimately impede the claims
examiners' ability to process claims efficiently.
In early May 2011, we reported that the implementation of remaining
capabilities is behind schedule and additional modifications are
needed.\14\ According to VA officials, system enhancements such as
automatic verification of the length of service were delayed because of
complexities with systems integration and converting data from the
interim system. Additionally, recent legislative changes to the program
required VA to modify the system and its deployment schedule. For
instance, VA will need to modify its system to reflect changes to the
way tuition and fees are calculated--an enhancement that officials
described as difficult to implement. Because of these delays, final
deployment of the system is now scheduled for the end of 2011--a year
later than planned.
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\14\ GAO, Veterans' Education Benefits: Enhanced Guidance and
Collaboration Could Improve Administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill
Program, GAO-11-356R (Washington, D.C.: May 2011).
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VA Continues To Face Information Security Challenges
Effective information security controls \15\ are essential to
securing the information systems and information on which VA depends to
carry out its mission. Without proper safeguards, the department's
systems are vulnerable to individuals and groups with malicious intent
who can intrude and use their access to obtain sensitive information,
commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other
computer systems and networks. The consequence of weak information
security controls was illustrated by VA's May 2006 announcement that
computer equipment containing personal information on veterans and
active duty military personnel had been stolen. Further, over the last
few years, VA has reported an increasing number of security incidents
and events. Specifically, each year during fiscal years 2007 through
2009, the department reported a higher number of incidents and the
highest number of incidents in comparison to 23 other major Federal
agencies.
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\15\ Information system general controls affect the overall
effectiveness and security of computer operations and are not unique to
specific computer applications. These controls include security
management, configuration management, operating procedures, software
security features, and physical protections designed to ensure that
access to data is appropriately restricted, that only authorized
changes to computer programs are made, that incompatible computer-
related duties are segregated, and that backup and recovery plans are
adequate to ensure the continuity of operations.
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To help protect against threats to Federal systems, the Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) sets forth a
comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information
security controls over information resources that support Federal
operations and assets. The framework creates a cycle of risk management
activities necessary for an effective security program. In order to
ensure the implementation of this framework, FISMA assigns specific
responsibilities to OMB, agency heads, chief information officers,
inspectors general, and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), in particular requiring chief information officers
and inspectors general to submit annual reports to OMB.
In addition, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits, Health Care,
and Information Technology Act of 2006.\16\ Under the act, VA's Chief
Information Officer is responsible for establishing, maintaining, and
monitoring departmentwide information security policies, procedures,
control techniques, training, and inspection requirements as elements
of the department's information security program. It also reinforced
the need for VA to establish and carry out the responsibilities
outlined in FISMA, and included provisions to further protect veterans
and servicemembers from the misuse of their sensitive personal
information and to inform Congress regarding security incidents
involving the loss of that information.
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\16\ Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-461, 120 Stat. 3403, 3450 (Dec. 22, 2006).
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Weaknesses in Security Controls Have Placed VA's Systems at Risk
Information security has been a long-standing challenge for the
department, as we have previously reported. In 2010, for the 14th year
in a row, VA's independent auditor reported that inadequate information
system controls over financial systems constituted a material
weakness.\17\ Among 24 major Federal agencies, VA was one of eight
agencies in fiscal year 2010 to report such a material weakness.
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\17\ A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or
combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a
remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the financial
statements will not be prevented or detected by the entity's internal
control.
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VA's independent auditor stated that, while the department
continued to make steady progress, IT security and control weaknesses
remained pervasive and placed VA's program and financial data at risk.
The auditor noted the following weaknesses:
Passwords for key VA network domains and financial
applications were not consistently configured to comply with
agency policy.
Testing of contingency plans for financial management
systems at selected facilities was not routinely performed and
documented to meet the requirements of VA policy.
Many IT security control deficiencies were not
analyzed and remediated across the agency and a large backlog
of deficiencies remained in the VA plan of action and
milestones system. In addition, previous plans of action and
milestones were closed without sufficient and documented
support for the closure.
In addition, VA has consistently had weaknesses in major
information security control areas. As shown in table 1, for fiscal
years 2007 through 2010, deficiencies were reported in each of the five
major categories of information security access controls \18\ as
defined in our Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual.\19\
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\18\ Access controls ensure that only authorized individuals can
read, alter, or delete data; configuration management controls provide
assurance that only authorized software programs are implemented;
segregation of duties reduces the risk that one individual can
independently perform inappropriate actions without detection;
continuity of operations planning provides for the prevention of
significant disruptions of computer-dependent operations; and an
agencywide information security program provides the framework for
ensuring that risks are understood and that effective controls are
selected and properly implemented.
\19\ GAO, Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual
(FISCAM), GAO-09-232G (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009).
Table 1: Control Weaknesses for Fiscal Years 2007-2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security control category 2007 2008 2009 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Access control >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Configuration management >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Segregation of duties >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contingency planning >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security management >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis based on VA and Inspector General reports.
In fiscal year 2010, for the 11th year in a row, the VA's Office of
Inspector General designated VA's information security program and
system security controls as a major management challenge for the
department. Of 24 major Federal agencies, the department was 1 of 23 to
have information security designated as a major management challenge.
The Office of Inspector General noted that the department had made
progress in implementing components of an agencywide information
security program, but nevertheless continued to identify major IT
security deficiencies in the annual information security program
audits. To assist the department in improving its information security,
the Office of Inspector General made recommendations for strengthening
access controls, configuration management, change management, and
service continuity. Effective implementation of these recommendations
could help VA to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to
computerized networks and systems and help ensure that only authorized
individuals can read, alter, or delete data.
In March 2010, we reported \20\ that Federal agencies, including
VA, had made limited progress in implementing the Federal Desktop Core
Configuration (FDCC) initiative to standardize settings on
workstations.\21\ We determined that VA had implemented certain
requirements of the initiative, such as documenting deviations from the
standardized set of configuration settings for Windows workstations and
putting a policy in place to officially approve these deviations.
However, VA had not fully implemented several key requirements. For
example, the department had not included language in contracts to
ensure that new acquisitions address the settings and that products of
IT providers operate effectively using them. Additionally, VA had not
obtained a NIST-validated tool to monitor implementation of
standardized workstation configuration settings. To improve the
department's implementation of the initiative, we made four
recommendations: (1) complete implementation of VA's baseline set of
configuration settings, (2) acquire and deploy a tool to monitor
compliance with FDCC, (3) develop, document, and implement a policy to
monitor compliance, and (4) ensure that FDCC settings are included in
new acquisitions and that products operate effectively using these
settings. VA concurred and has addressed the recommendation to ensure
settings are included in new acquisitions. The department intends to
implement the remaining recommendations in the future.
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\20\ GAO, Information Security: Agencies Need to Implement Federal
Desktop Core Configuration Requirements, GAO-10-202 (Washington, D.C.:
March 12, 2010).
\21\ In March 2007, OMB launched the FDCC initiative to standardize
and strengthen information security at Federal agencies. Under the
initiative, agencies were to implement a standardized set of
configuration settings on workstations with Microsoft Windows XP or
Vista operating systems. OMB intended that by implementing the
initiative, agencies would establish a baseline level of information
security, reduce threats and vulnerabilities, and improve protection of
information and related assets.
VA's Uneven Implementation of FISMA Has Limited the Effectiveness of
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Security Efforts
FISMA requires each agency, including agencies with national
security systems, to develop, document, and implement an agencywide
information security program to provide security for the information
and information systems that support the operations and assets of the
agency, including those provided or managed by another agency,
contractor, or other source. As part of its oversight responsibilities,
OMB requires agencies to report on specific performance measures,
including the percentage of:
employees and contractors receiving IT security
awareness training and those who have significant security
responsibilities and have received specialized security
training,
systems whose controls were tested and evaluated,
have tested contingency plans, and are certified and
accredited.\22\
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\22\ Certification is a comprehensive assessment of management,
operational, and technical security controls in an information system,
made in support of security accreditation, to determine the extent to
which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended,
and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security
requirements for the system. Accreditation is the official management
decision to authorize operation of an information system and to
explicitly accept the risk to agency operations based on implementation
of controls.
Since fiscal year 2006, VA's progress in fully implementing the
information security program required under FISMA and following the
policies issued by OMB has been mixed. For example, from 2006 to 2009,
the department reported a dramatic increase in the percentage of
systems for which a contingency plan was tested in accordance with OMB
policy. However, during the same period, it reported decreases in both
the percentage of employees who had received security awareness
training and the percentage of employees with significant security
responsibilities who had received specialized security training. These
decreases in the percentage of individuals who had received information
security training could limit the ability of VA to effectively
implement security measures.
For fiscal year 2009, in comparison to 23 other major Federal
agencies, VA's efforts to implement these information security control
activities were equal to or higher in some areas and lower in others.
For example, VA reported equal or higher percentages than other Federal
agencies in the number of systems for which security controls had been
tested and reviewed in the past year, the number of systems for which
contingency plans had been tested in accordance with OMB policy, and
the number of systems that had been certified and accredited. However,
VA reported lower percentages of individuals who received security
awareness training and lower percentages of individuals with
significant security responsibilities who received specialized security
training.
Cloud Computing Presents Opportunities but Poses IT Security Challenges
Cloud computing is an emerging form of computing that relies on
Internet-based services and resources to provide computing services to
customers, while freeing them from the burden and costs of maintaining
the underlying infrastructure. Examples of cloud computing include Web-
based e-mail applications and common business applications that are
accessed online through a browser, instead of through a local computer.
The President's budget has identified the adoption of cloud computing
in the Federal Government as a way to more efficiently use the billions
of dollars spent annually on IT. However, as we reported in May
2010,\23\ Federal guidance and processes that specifically address
information security for cloud computing had not yet been developed,
and those cloud computing programs that have been implemented may not
have effective information security controls in place.
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\23\ GAO-10-513.
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As we reported, cloud computing can both increase and decrease the
security of information systems in Federal agencies. Potential
information security benefits include those related to the use of
virtualization, such as faster deployment of patches, and from
economies of scale, such as potentially reduced costs for disaster
recovery. Risks include dependence on the security practices and
assurances of the provider, dependence on the provider, and concerns
related to sharing computing resources. However, these risks may vary
based on the cloud deployment model. Private clouds may have a lower
threat exposure than public clouds, but evaluating this risk requires
an examination of the specific security controls in place for the
cloud's implementation. We made recommendations to OMB, the General
Services Administration, and NIST to assist agencies in identifying
uses of cloud computing and necessary security measures, selecting and
acquiring cloud computing products and services, and implementing
appropriate information security controls when using cloud computing.
VA Faces Barriers To Establishing Shared Electronic Health Record
Capabilities With DoD
VA and DoD have two of the Nation's largest health care operations,
providing health care to 6 million veterans and 9.6 million active duty
servicemembers and their beneficiaries at estimated annual costs of
about $48 billion and $49 billion, respectively. Although the results
of a 2008 study found that more than 97 percent of functional
requirements for an inpatient electronic health record system are
common to both departments, the departments have spent large sums of
money to separately develop and operate electronic health record
systems. Furthermore, the departments have each begun multimillion
dollar modernizations of their electronic health record systems.
Specifically, VA reported spending almost $600 million from 2001 to
2007 on eight projects as part of its Veterans Health Information
Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) modernization. In April
2008, VA estimated an $11 billion total cost to complete the
modernization by 2018. For its part, DoD has obligated approximately $2
billion over the 13-year life of its Armed Forces Health Longitudinal
Technology Application (AHLTA) and requested $302 million in fiscal
year 2011 funds for a new system.
Additionally, VA and DoD are working to establish the Virtual
Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER), which is intended to facilitate the
sharing of electronic medical, benefits, and administrative information
between the departments. VLER is further intended to expand the
departments' health information sharing capabilities by enabling access
to private-sector health data. The departments are also developing
joint IT capabilities for the James A. Lovell Federal Health Care
Center (FHCC) in North Chicago, Illinois. The FHCC is to be the first
VA/DoD medical facility operated under a single line of authority to
manage and deliver medical and dental care for veterans, new Naval
recruits, active duty military personnel, retirees, and dependents.
In February 2011, we reported that VA and DoD lacked mechanisms for
identifying and implementing efficient and effective IT solutions to
jointly address their common health care system needs as a result of
barriers in three key IT management areas--strategic planning,
enterprise architecture, and investment management.
Strategic planning: The departments were unable to
articulate explicit plans, goals, and time frames for jointly
addressing the health IT requirements common to both
departments' electronic health record systems. For example,
VA's and DoD's joint strategic plan did not discuss how or when
the departments propose to identify and develop joint health IT
solutions, and department officials did not determine whether
the IT capabilities developed for the FHCC could or would be
implemented at other VA and DoD medical facilities.
Enterprise architecture: Although VA and DoD had
taken steps toward developing and maintaining artifacts related
to a joint health architecture (i.e., a description of business
processes and supporting technologies), the architecture was
not sufficiently mature to guide the departments' joint health
IT modernization efforts. For example, the departments did not
define how they intended to transition from their current
architecture to a planned future state.
Investment management: VA and DoD did not establish a
joint process for selecting IT investments based on criteria
that consider cost, benefit, schedule, and risk elements, which
would help to ensure that a chosen solution both meets the
departments' common health IT needs and provides better value
and benefits to the government as a whole.
These barriers resulted in part from VA's and DoD's decision to
focus on developing VLER, modernizing their separate electronic health
record systems, and developing IT capabilities for FHCC, rather than
determining the most efficient and effective approach to jointly
addressing their common requirements. Because VA and DoD continued to
pursue their existing health information sharing efforts without fully
establishing the key IT management capabilities described, they may
have missed opportunities to successfully deploy joint solutions to
address their common health care business needs.
VA's and DoD's experiences in developing VLER and IT capabilities
for FHCC offered important lessons to improve the departments'
management of these ongoing efforts. Specifically, the departments can
improve the likelihood of successfully meeting their goal to implement
VLER nationwide by the end of 2012 by developing an approved plan that
is consistent with effective IT project management principles. Also, VA
and DoD can improve their continuing effort to develop and implement
new IT system capabilities for FHCC by developing a plan that defines
the project's scope, estimated cost, and schedule in accordance with
established best practices. Unless VA and DoD address these lessons,
the departments will jeopardize their ability to deliver expected
capabilities to support their joint health IT needs.
We recommended several actions that the Secretaries of Veterans
Affairs and Defense could take to overcome barriers that the
departments face in modernizing their electronic health record systems
to jointly address their common health care business needs, including
the following:
Revise the departments' joint strategic plan to
include information discussing their electronic health record
system modernization efforts and how those efforts will address
the departments' common health care business needs.
Further develop the departments' joint health
architecture to include their planned future state and
transition plan from their current state to the next generation
of electronic health record capabilities.
Define and implement a process, including criteria
that considers costs, benefits, schedule, and risks, for
identifying and selecting joint IT investments to meet the
departments' common health care business needs.
We also recommended that the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and
Defense strengthen their ongoing efforts to establish VLER and the
joint IT system capabilities for FHCC by developing plans that include
scope definition, cost and schedule estimation, and project plan
documentation and approval.
Both departments concurred with our recommendations and on March
17, 2011, the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense committed
their respective departments to pursue joint development and
acquisition of integrated electronic health record capabilities.
In summary, effective IT management is critical to the performance
of VA's mission. However, the department faces challenges in key areas,
including systems development, information security, and collaboration
with DoD. Until VA fully addresses these and implements key
recommendations, the department will likely continue to (1) deliver
system capabilities later than expected; (2) expose its computer
systems and sensitive information (including personal information of
veterans and their beneficiaries) to an unnecessary and increased risk
of unauthorized use, disclosure, tampering, theft, and destruction; and
(3) not provide efficient and effective joint DoD/VA solutions to meet
the needs of our Nation's veterans.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement today. I would be pleased
to answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments
If you have questions concerning this statement, please contact
Joel C. Willemssen, Managing Director, Information Technology Team, at
(202) 512-6253 or [email protected]; or Valerie C. Melvin, Director,
Information Management and Human Capital Issues, at (202) 512-6304 or
[email protected]. Other individuals who made key contributions include
Mark Bird, Assistant Director; Mike Alexander; Nancy Glover; Paul
Middleton; and Glenn Spiegel.
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Washington, DC.
May 16, 2011
The Honorable Eric K. Shinseki
Secretary
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In reference to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
hearing entitled ``Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st
Century'' that took place on May 11, 2011, I would appreciate it if you
could answer the enclosed hearing questions by the close of business on
June 20, 2011.
In an effort to reduce printing costs, the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs, in cooperation with the Joint Committee on Printing, is
implementing some formatting changes for materials for all full
Committee and Subcommittee hearings. Therefore, it would be appreciated
if you could provide your answers consecutively and single-spaced. In
addition, please restate the question in its entirety before the
answer.
Due to the delay in receiving mail, please provide your response to
Diane Kirkland at [email protected]. If you have any
questions, please call 202-225-3527.
Sincerely,
Bill Johnson
Chairman
EG/dk
__________
Questions for the Record
House Committee on Veterans Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Chairman Bill Johnson
``Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st Century''
May 11, 2011
Question 1: Does the VA OI&T have an Enterprise Architecture partner to
help realize the benefits of each of the 16 Major Initiatives
linked to business outcomes.
Response: Yes, the Office of Information and Technology (OI&T)
Office of Architecture and Strategy uses several partner companies in
its work on the Major Initiatives to ensure they are well planned and
coordinated. The business sponsor of each major initiative identifies
the business goals and objectives they intend to achieve. These
outcomes are reviewed and approved by the Deputy Secretary, then
monitored on a monthly basis by Office of Policy and Planning (OPP)
through Operational Management Reviews. OI&T is building an effective
working relationship with the Business Architects in Veterans Health
Administration (VHA), Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and
National Cemetery Administration (NCA) to create more explicit
Enterprise Architecture (EA) artifacts that link in more detail to the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Strategic Plan. In turn the Plan
links to the Major Initiatives and to OI&T initiatives and the OI&T
spend plan. VA is strengthening our approach to using EA to promote
mission effectiveness and stewardship of funds.
Question 2: Is Cloud Computing on the multi-year program? What is
the desired time frame for its implementation and what are the deciding
factors for that time frame?
Response: Cloud computing is not a specific program line item;
rather, VA has adopted the direction of the Federal Chief Information
Officer (CIO) and has begun implementing a ``Cloud First'' strategy
with any new OI&T initiatives. Agencies are now required to deploy
technology projects to cloud-based solutions whenever a secure,
reliable, cost-effective cloud option exists. Cloud is increasingly
tightly woven into all new VA initiatives.
VA has established criteria for Cloud projects within our
enterprise data centers based on storage, processor load and
application design.
At this time, we are implementing a private Cloud based in our data
centers that provides secure OI&T operations for VA internal systems as
well as pursuing commercial Cloud hosting opportunities for VA systems
that do not require the same level of security.
The deciding factors in our time frame for deployment include:
Security. Data that contains patient or Veteran
financial data obviously requires greater security than, for
example, Web sites listing information on obtaining VA
services.
Applicability for Cloud deployment. Some
applications, because of heavy system requirements, do not lend
themselves to virtualization;
Application design. Older applications may be
candidates for Cloud, but this requires programming and testing
to ensure compatibility;
Budget. Moving to the Cloud involves funding to
deploy virtualized systems and storage, as well as for
regression testing and standardization of software;
Staffing. VA has a finite number of programmers and
operations staff available to provide testing of Cloud
services; and
Availability of secure, reliable, cost-effective
commercial services.
There are several VA applications which are in production in a
cloud-based architecture or have significant resources invested in
their completion. VA currently employs a hybrid private cloud (both off
and on premise) to deliver the Post-9/11 GI Bill application suite. The
Department continues to work through the technology required to support
the movement of 100,000 (approximately 20 percent) customer mailboxes
into a Federal cloud architecture, targeted to begin early in fiscal
fear 2012. VA has begun beta testing of a private cloud solution for
the technology to interface lab equipment with the Department's
electronic health care record. These are a few of the varied types of
applications which VA has determined were suited for a cloud-based
deployment.
Question 3: How has VA's return on investment (ROI) in IT
development over the last 5 years compared with private-sector
companies of comparable size?
Response: VA's IT ROI compares favorably with the private sector in
a number of areas. A recent independent study covering the 10-year
period between 1997 and 2007 found that VA's health IT investment was
$4 billion, while savings were more than $7 billion. This represents a
ROI of 75 percent. In comparison, a 2010 study of General Motors IT
investments anticipates an internal ROI of 70 percent.\1\ An earlier
study of Ford Motor Company's IT investment, on the ford.com Web site,
cites a ROI of 115 percent.\2\ While the studies' methodologies may
differ, the results indicate VA's IT ROI for VistA is similar to
comparably-sized private-sector companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 2010. General Motors Prepares for Future with Next Generation
Information Networks for Global Manufacturing Operations: On Track to
Achieve 166 percent ROI Over Five Years. Cisco Business Transformation
Series--Connected Manufacturing, page 9. Retrieved from http://
www.cisco.com/web/strategy/docs/manufacturing/Cisco-AutoCaseStudy-
GM.pdf.
\2\ 2002. ROI Profile: Microsoft Content Management Server
Ford.com. Nucleus Research Note 17, page 1. Retrieved from http://
nucleusresearch.com/library/microsoft-roi/c17.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, recognizing systemic issues in other areas of development,
VA introduced the Project Management Accountability System (PMAS) in
2009 to dramatically increase VA's success rate in meeting customer
software milestones. This success rate is now approximately 75 percent,
up from 30 percent (estimated, as no metrics were tracked at that time)
prior to PMAS implementation.
Question 4: Please describe in further detail how VA's IT
investment over the last 5 years has been in line with industry best
practices and where improvements can be made.
Response: Prior to the implementation of PMAS in 2009, VA IT
investments were not adequately tracked to provide viable answer to
this question. Since full implementation of PMAS in March of 2010, VA
IT projects have been delivered approximately 75 percent of the
customer facing milestones it set. This success rate is in line with
industry best practices.
Industry standards for managing IT investments focus largely on the
principles and criteria established by the Project Management
Institute, widely recognized as the credentialing authority for Project
Management Professionals (PMP). These industry standards are constantly
evolving. A common thread is the focus on measurable, performance-based
oversight techniques that ensure product delivery is completed within
budget, on schedule, and meets performance and functionality
expectations.
VA's PMAS is a performance-based project management discipline
mandated by VA's Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology for
all IT development projects. PMAS conforms to the core principles and
standards recognized and utilized by private industry, but PMAS is
specifically tailored to manage the unique investment, management, and
oversight challenges faced by public sector IT development projects.
PMAS establishes more rigorous controls than the industry standard
for ensuring that investments in IT projects meet project development
timelines and expectations for functionality. Specifically, PMAS uses
incremental product build techniques for IT projects, with delivery of
new functionality (tested and accepted by the customer) in cycles of 6
months or less. Projects managed under PMAS are tightly monitored and
subject to being halted when significant deviations to plans occur and
insufficient remediation plans are presented. PMAS requires that a
project be paused and re-evaluated at the point where it has
demonstrated trouble.
The use of metrics to monitor and assess performance for IT
development is another best practice and key strategy VA employs to
ensure resources are used effectively and project managers are held
accountable. When PMAS was implemented, we identified a requirement to
track, monitor, and report on the status of projects that fell under
the PMAS management discipline. As a result, the PMAS Dashboard was
developed and fielded. The purpose of the PMAS Dashboard is to track,
monitor, and report the status of PMAS managed IT projects--thereby
providing visibility into planned versus actual costs and schedules,
and to provide a disciplined management approach with the goal to
improve the rate of success of VA's IT projects. The status of every
active PMAS-managed project is reported to and reviewed by VA senior
management on a monthly basis. The implementation of PMAS and related
tools has resulted in the on-time delivery of customer-facing products
approximately 75 percent of the time, an increase from 30 percent on-
time prior to the implementation of PMAS.
PMAS also necessitates the use of VA's standardized development
processes. These processes are captured in ProPath, VA's IT process
asset library. Process standardization is widely accepted by industry
and advisory bodies as a means for improving delivery rate, resource
usage, and organizational success. While ProPath initially captured
only development practices, later versions of ProPath will capture all
aspects of the development lifecycle.
In addition to PMAS, VA adopted a new acquisition strategy to more
effectively use our IT resources. This new strategy for acquiring IT
services, Transformation Twenty-One Total Technology (T4), will assist
to consolidate our IT service requirements into 15 prime contracts
(seven of which have been reserved for Veteran-owned small businesses)
leveraging economies of scale to save both time and money and enable
greater oversight and accountability.
Question 5: Going forward, how will VA OI&T ensure IT contracts are
properly defined and written from RFI to RFP to Contract to
Implementation--in order to ensure more responsible use of taxpayers'
dollars?
Response: VA is using and now strengthening our Integrated Project
Team (IPT) process with the right personnel from the beginning of a
procurement/acquisition submission to implementation. VA has already
published the first IPT guide, and requires as part of PMAS policy,
that all projects must be managed under a cognizant IPT. IPT membership
is specified in policy, and must include a warranted contracting
officer and general counsel. OI&T, OPP, Office of Acquisition,
Logistics and Construction (OALC), and Office of General Counsel (OGC)
are collaborating in devising several mechanisms to strengthen IPTs.
The options under consideration include more training on IPT operation,
use of acquisition-trained facilitators for IPT for larger, high-
priority programs, and greater management visibility into assignment of
staff to IPTs. Customer engagement is required already in policy, but
could be strengthened as well to assure timely development of
requirements and real-time awareness of project issues that could
affect schedule of functionality. This is a teaming relationship with
the customer to properly define the requirement so that we are able to
design, develop, implement, and deploy the materiel solution needed by
the customer. (This is all part of the IPT and PMAS processes, and
recorded in ProPATH, the VA OI&T process asset library, which serves as
the basis for development of all courseware for OI&T staff training.)
To allow time for IPTs to operate properly and develop practical
acquisition strategies, VA is now accelerating the due date for
business requirements. For functional requirements for FY 12 projects,
the due date will be July 2011.
The following are the practices being utilized at the Technology
Acquisitions Center (TAC):
Customer Training--Training provided acquisition-related material
to OI&T personnel, covering essential topics such as market research,
performance work statements, cost estimates, and technical evaluations.
Each of these training units, along with `hands-on' workshops, were
intended to provide the customer with fundamental information that
would help them to better understand the acquisition process and
associated documentation, thereby resulting in better defined
requirements, streamlined processes, and reduced cycle time.
Document Templates--Templates were developed to guide the customer
in preparing acquisition plans, sole source justifications, and cost
benefit analysis, along with instructional procurement guidelines,
which helped customers understand what acquisition documents were
required based on the type of procurement and the dollar threshold. One
template found most useful was the Performance Work Statement (PWS)
template for services, which provided the preparer with detailed
guidance through the template. The PWS template has aided in the
preparation of requirements which were consistent, accurate, and
complete. The introduction of uniformity in the process provides
additional assurances that requirements would be more easily
understood, and thereby lessen ambiguities which could lead to
misinterpretation and undesirable performance.
IPTs and Lockdowns--Two highly effective practices that result in
better defined requirements--and ultimately better contracts--is
through the use of ``IPTs'' and ``Lockdowns.'' With roles and
responsibilities clearly defined in charters, acquisition and customers
work together as integral IPT members in the identification, refinement
and establishment of IT requirements and acquisition strategies. While
IPTs characterized the components of the partnership, the practice of
``lockdowns'' provide a real-time, collaborative working framework from
which the IPT could excel. With each lockdown session, the objective of
critical ``buy-in'' is achieved as hands-on IPT participants
collaboratively formulated business strategies, and established
acquisition planning goals, while also jointly developing high-quality
technical documentation.
Partnering with Industry--Receiving useful feedback from industry
is critical establishing requirements that are both accurate and
feasible. Reaching out to industry is a valuable investment of
resources, which in the end pays dividends to several beneficiaries.
Through ``Advanced Planning Briefings for Industry'' (APBI) and
``Industry Days,'' cross-communication between industry and the
government results in a mutual understanding of the needs and
capabilities of the two parties. More specifically, an Industry Day
conference allows industry to raise questions and present ideas for
Government consideration on a specific, pending requirement. Through
these give-and-take forums, the government is provided an opportunity
to best define, and refine, its requirements before a solicitation is
released.
Question 6: In the Catapult contract, VA OIG found that VA paid
Catapult on a milestone basis. This payment basis was inconsistent with
both the contract as well as the information provided to vendors during
solicitation. What mechanisms are or were in place to prevent blatant
disregard of contracting conditions established twice in writing? How
did those mechanisms fail twice in the case of this contract?
Response: OI&T is currently conducting an internal review of the
Catapult contract. We expect this review to be complete by mid-July,
and will plan to brief the Subcommittee when the review is complete.
Question 7: How does an individual or company access GSA's Schedule
70 in order to participate in VA's IT contracting process?
Response: There are over 4,000 companies currently on GSA's
Schedule 70. In order to participate in VA's IT contracting process
under GSA's Schedule 70, the individual or company must first obtain a
GSA Schedule 70 contract. The first step in the process is submitting
an offer in response to the IT Schedule 70 solicitation, which is made
available on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) Web site.
The individual or company would then submit an electronic offer via
GSA's eOffer electronic system. GSA would review the offer to ensure
compliance with the solicitation, and upon determination that the
offeror's prices were fair and reasonable, a GSA IT Schedule 70
contract would be awarded if it was in the best interest of the
government. To assist an individual or company, GSA has made available
the free online training courses, ``How to Become a Contractor--GSA
Schedules Program'' and ``How to Get on Schedule.'' These courses
provide prospective offerors with helpful information about how to
prepare an offer and the GSA Schedule 70 contract award process.
Question 8: In the absence of a final T4 award, is VA moving
forward with its IT projects? Is the contracting organization denying
the program managers alternative contracting vehicles in anticipation
of using T4?
Response: VA is, and will continue to move forward on all of its IT
projects. The VA's contracting organizations will continue to take into
consideration all available contractual vehicles in the development of
an acquisition strategy. This procedure will continue irrespective of
the T4 awards.
Question 9: What assurance can VA provide the Committee that VA
will use other contracting vehicles that are currently available in
order to move IT projects forward?
Response: Since January 1, 2011, OI&T has awarded 218 contracts
(through June 1, 2011) using various contracting vehicles. We will
continue to perform work while we await T4 award.
Question 10: What steps has VA taken to ensure success for the
Interagency Program Office (IPO) as ``the single point of
accountability'' as established in the FY 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act? How has VA defined ``single point of
accountability'' in writing to those involved with the IPO?
Response: VA will be utilizing the IPO as established by the FY
2008 National Defense Authorization Act. VA and DoD are currently
revising IPO's charter to empower the IPO to effectively manage the
implementation of the integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR).
Question 11: Please describe in further detail the cooperative
actions, below the Secretary level, between VA and DoD in implementing
iEHR.
Response: The Secretaries have designated the Deputy Chief
Management Officer (DoD) and the Assistant Secretary, Information and
Technology (VA) to lead the coordinated efforts of the two Departments
to establish the iEHR through a Senior Coordinating Group (SCG). The
Secretaries have charged the SCG with accomplishing the initial
objectives of the iEHR, including establishing governance, naming key
staff, and planning the implementation of the iEHR, including costing.
There are hundreds of VA and DoD staff working on accomplishing the
various taskings as assigned by the SCG.
Question 12: Please describe in further detail DoD's role in the
move toward Open Source and how that role has compared to VA's actions.
Response: Clearly, establishing an Open Source consortium, and
embracing private-sector participation in VistA, was initially driven
by VA. After considering the role that Open Source could play in
ensuring the long-term success of the iEHR, particularly in helping the
government better engage the private sector, DoD agrees with VA that
Open Source is a vital part of the path forward for the iEHR. To that
end, DoD is participating in both the selection of the Custodial Agent
(CA) and in the Board of Directors of the CA.
Question 13: The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), in its Internal Report 7622 (NISTIR 7622) published last year,
sets of supply chain risk management practices for Federal information
systems. Has VA applied these practices to its own IT projects? What
steps has VA taken to minimize supply chain risk for IT projects?
Response: VA OI&T minimizes supply chain risk management by
managing the security component of all software development and service
delivery work. OI&T does not outsource the security component when
purchasing products and services. OI&T has developed tight security
controls in line with the NIST recommendations, as well as FISMA
requirements, which allows us to provide the necessary standards to
manage supply chain risk.
Question 14: Has the IPO been utilized in any of these steps? If
so, which ones?
Response: As VA and DoD move forward with plans to strengthen the
IPO's charter, supply chain risk management best practices will be one
of the many factors considered.
Question 15: Please further explain VA's certainty in the Open
Source approach when, by VA's own admission, no cost analysis had been
done ahead of time. Other than a three-page document provided to the
Subcommittee after the May 11 hearing, what documentation explains in
detail the review of all alternatives before making a decision?
Response: The cost analysis for Open Source is short because the
analysis is simple. VA has proven that the EHR is a vital part of
effective heath care for Veterans. Our current EHR, VistA, while still
viable is no longer the market leader VA assesses the cost of replacing
VistA at its 153 hospitals and over 800 CBOCs at approximately $16
billion. If VA cannot find a way to move VistA forward at a rate that
keeps pace with the private sector, we must eventually ask the
taxpayers for the funding necessary to replace VistA. Our assessment is
that Open Source is a viable path, and perhaps the only viable path, to
allow VA to improve VistA at a much more rapid pace by involving the
private sector in both planning and implementing its path forward. As
DoD and VA move forward to establish the iEHR, the involvement of the
private sector is even more critical, which is one of the primary
reasons DoD has agreed with VA that Open Source should be part of our
overall iEHR plans.
VA has spent more than a year conducting a very deliberative
process to examine the implications of Open Source for VistA. We have
seen two substantial studies on the topic contributed by the private
sector and academia. We have consulted with hundreds of organizations,
and thousands of individuals about the pros and cons of the Open Source
approach. We have conducted three Requests for Information (RFIs), and
received numerous papers, emails, and comments. Our path forward with
Open Source has been broadly advised and is highly transparent.
Question 16: Please identify and explain the elements of VA's life-
cycle analysis of IT projects.
Response: IT projects are selected based on their relationship to
the VA Strategic Plan. The single IT authority at VA allows
comprehensive view of all VA IT investments and their prioritization
using a shared governance approach in concert with their respective
business sponsors. To create a lifecycle view of total cost of
ownership, VA is in the process of implementing IPTs for all projects,
which includes members with the knowledge of life cycle management, to
address all infrastructure components from data center to desktop, from
project initiation to close out and disposal.
Question 17: Please explain how VA applied the above life-cycle
analysis to Open-Source VistA prior to making the decision to move
forward on that project.
Response: VA senior leadership has determined that as a software
sourcing strategy, Open Source (OS) represents an approach that is very
likely to reduce development risk and strengthen development rigor,
promote innovation, promote cyber security, and make OS applications
more broadly available to the Nation through the entire life cycle of
each OS project. Open Source is a development strategy, and is not
itself a project with a life cycle--and, it is not a substitute for
life cycle management of total cost of ownership. The OS approach will
allow VA to address total cost of ownership for Open Source software,
including implementation, hosting, telecommunications, end-user
support, and project closeout.
Question 18: Is VA appropriately staffed with the knowledge and
experience level to build rigorous business cases based on
comprehensive cost benefit analyses and returns on investment in
information technology?
Response: While no organization is at a point where it has all of
the expertise and knowledge it needs, VA OI&T has made great strides
towards building an IT staff with the knowledge and skills required to
accomplish our mission. Through our Program/Project Manager training
courses, peer review process, techstat meetings, competency model, and
other training and guidance practices, OI&T has worked to develop tools
to improve the performance of our staff.
Question 19: Please describe OI&T's incorporation of Supply Chain
Risk Management by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in moving forward with Open Source software implementation.
Response: As discussed above, OI&T's Information Security
organization effectively and directly manages the security component of
software development, procurement, and implementation. We will continue
to employ these best practices in moving forward with the Open Source
software implementation.
Question 20: DoD is currently running pilot programs on
cybersecurity. Please explain VA's decision to move forward on large-
scale IT programs before these programs have concluded and the results
have been published.
Response: VA has determined that delay in pursuing its operational
requirements for critical programs such as Veterans Benefits Management
System (VBMS), Post-9/11 GI Bill, and VistA Open Source, should not be
delayed due to DoD's pilot programs. This assessment considered the
pressing needs to improve performance and service delivery to Veterans
as well as the status of each program. VA will ensure its cybersecurity
requirements are fully integrated into all projects and will maintain
close contact with DoD in order to consider the emerging outcomes of
their pilot programs.
Question 21: According to a number of industry white papers, Wi-Fi
has deficiencies as a real-Time Asset and Patient Tracking Solution and
ultimately will cost more to use this method than radio frequency
identification technology (RFID) for the same purpose. On June 17,
2010, VA (10N) placed a moratorium on Real Time Location systems
acquisition because a national contract was to be implemented during
that fiscal year. Is the moratorium still in place? If so, please
explain VA's recent submissions of two RFP's with language that
indicates Infra-red and Radio Frequency work-arounds while the
moratorium is in place?
Response: Real-Time Location Systems (RTLS) and radio frequency
identification (RFID) are closely related, and are overlapping
technologies used for identifying and locating items or people. RTLS is
the term used to describe those technologies that provide ``real-time''
location, regardless of whether radio frequencies are used or some
other technology, such as ultrasound or infra-red. RFID is the term
used to indicate that radio frequencies are being utilized, regardless
of whether the item is being located in real-time or not. Therefore,
some RTLS systems are also RFID systems, and some RFID systems are also
RTLS systems. They are not necessarily separate systems that compete
with one another. Rather, the terms offer differing ways of describing
these systems, either by describing the technologies employed or the
uses for the technologies. RFID is generally broken down into two
types: passive and active. Active RFID systems utilize a tag with a
battery, that beacons information at pre-set intervals. Passive RFID
systems utilize a ``tag'' (normally a sticker or label) that has no
battery, so relies on an external power source to ``excite'' it,
causing it to send out an identification message. Because passive RFID
tags only announce themselves when in the proximity of an exciter,
passive systems generally do not offer real-time location capabilities.
VA has a large number of business processes (use cases) that can
benefit from RTLS and/or RFID technologies. Some use cases lend
themselves to passive RFID, while others lend themselves to active
RFID/RTLS. An example of the former is folder accountability and
inventorying in VBA, while an example of the latter is real-time
location of mobile medical assets, such as EKG carts, infusion pumps,
or wheelchairs. Because VA has such a wide variety of use cases, it was
understood from the beginning that no single RFID/RTLS technology would
satisfy all of VA's needs. It is therefore VA's plan to procure an
appropriate technology to address each use case.
Even within active RFID, there are numerous technologies, each with
their own unique set of plusses and minuses. Wi-Fi is a radio frequency
(RF) based system utilizing the 2.4 GHz band. There are also RF based
systems utilizing the 900 MHz and 433 MHz bands. Additionally, there
are systems that utilize ultrasound (either alone or in combination
with an RF-based system) or an infra-red system in combination with an
RF-based system.
Prior to making the decision to utilize Wi-Fi for RTLS, when
possible, VA consulted with industry leaders such as Gartner. Gartner
indicated that Wi-Fi has the single largest market share, by far, in
the health care RTLS market space, (likely exceeding 60 percent) and
that when a properly configured WiFi network is already in place, it
makes sense to leverage the existing investment for location-based
services such as RTLS, rather than wiring and installing redundant
networks of transceivers, at great cost, for little or no benefit.
Cost, however, is not the only consideration. One of VA's major
concerns is interoperability and not being locked into a proprietary,
single-vendor solution. WiFi-based RTLS systems are the only standards-
based RTLS solution, being based on the international IEEE 802.11
standard. Other systems (notably, those based on 900 MHz, 433 MHz, and
ultrasound) are highly proprietary, meaning that one vendor's tags will
not work with any other vendor's transceivers, even if the same
frequency band is utilized. This creates two potentially dangerous
conditions for VA: the possibility of the single vendor going out of
business, and the possibility of the single vendor raising the cost of
the proprietary tags by an exorbitant amount. VA finds it more prudent
to employ technologies based on internationally-recognized standards,
where consumables (in this case, RTLS tags) are commodities, available
from multiple vendors.
Wi-Fi based RTLS systems currently have a spatial resolution of
approximately 7 meters at best, although as technology advances, this
is improving. For some purposes, it is sufficient to know where an item
is to within 7 meters accuracy. It is for those use cases only that VA
intends to utilize Wi-Fi alone. It is well understood that some use
cases in VA require pinpointing an item's location with greater
accuracy than 7 meters, and it is our intention to procure
complementary technologies (infra-red or ultrasound) in those cases.
This is not a work-around for a flawed system. Use of hybrid systems is
a common strategy employed by RTLS vendors and customers to leverage
the benefits of Wi-Fi, yet augment it (where necessary) to provide
finer spatial resolution than could be achieved by Wi-Fi alone. It
should be noted that other RF-based systems (e.g. 433 and 900 MHz) also
require these same complementary technologies to enhance spatial
resolution for certain use cases.
Given the promise that RFID and RTLS systems have for VA
operations, multiple VA entities have identified the need for these
systems and had begun to procure them. Unfortunately, this was being
done in an uncoordinated fashion, with no technical standards and no
thought to interoperability. If these systems are to be maximally
useful, they must be able to exchange data and be able to aggregate
data at a national level. Commonality is also required in order to
support higher quality, more efficiency, and less costly. This was the
impetus behind the moratorium. It was designed to afford VA the
opportunity to devise a technical strategy for RFID/RTLS so that
taxpayer dollars would be used wisely.
The RTLS/RFID moratorium is still in place, while VA crafts a
national RFP and awards an intended indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity (IDIQ) contract to satisfy all RTLS/RFID needs. Although
significant market research has been done, and is continuing, the
extremely large scope of the RTLS initiative made it prudent to perform
several technology demonstrations. The two RFPs cited are part of VA's
carefully controlled technology demonstrations. Veterans Integrated
Service Networks (VISNs) 10 and 11 have been given permission to
procure RTLS/RFID systems, in very specific configurations, prior to
award of the national IDIQ contract. It is hoped that the lessons
learned from these technology demonstrations will aid us in the
implementation and use of RTLS/RFIS systems nationally, and help shape
future technology choices.
Question 22: The National Project Management Office (PMO) for Real
Time Location Systems (RTLS) is touted as the Center of Excellence for
those systems, yet, contrary to industry standard, it is pursuing
802.11 technology for location services despite known limitations of
802.11 for that purpose. Please explain in detail the reason for using
802.11 and the reasons for not using Infra-red and Radio Frequency
methodologies, two technologies generally regarded as better suited for
location services and other uses.
Response: VA performed extensive market research on the various
technologies, including consulting with the firm generally considered
to be the leader in information technology (IT) consulting, Gartner. It
is VA's understanding that Wi-Fi based RTLS systems command the lion's
share of the market for health care RTLS--over 50 percent. That would
make it very much the ``industry standard.'' Additionally, it is not
VA's intention to use Wi-Fi systems alone, except where it meets the
business need. Whenever a greater spatial resolution is needed than Wi-
Fi alone can provide, VA intends to use Wi-Fi along with a
complementary technology, such as infra-red or ultrasound. Part of VA's
motivation for performing the technology demonstrations in VISNs 10 and
11 is to generate first-hand knowledge of the benefits and
disadvantages of each of the major RTLS technologies in a VA
environment, so that we need not rely on information from external
sources that may or may not be relevant to VA.
VA is not aware of any compelling data to suggest that a hybrid
system utilizing Wi-Fi and a complementary technology (when necessary)
is inferior to other RTLS technologies on the market.
Question 23: How does VA OI&T address Wi-Fi's incompatibility with
existing structures that result in a need for more access points to
triangulate tags and higher long-run costs compared to other
technologies?
Response: The need for additional access points is primarily
related to the desire to support voice over Wi-Fi (VoWiFi). The number
of additional Wi-Fi- access points needed to support RTLS (as compared
to VoWiFi) is small--estimated to be an additional 10 percent or less.
It is hard to understand how a non-WiFi RTLS system could demonstrate
lower long-term costs than a WiFi-based RTLS system, when an
organization already has a WiFi infrastructure in place capable of
providing location-based services. Implementing a non-WiFi RTLS system
would require pulling cable for hundreds of additional transceivers per
facility, purchasing and installing those transceivers, potentially
running electrical connections for those transceivers, and then
providing ongoing support and maintenance for the non-WiFi RTLS
transceivers (in addition to the WiFi access points that would still be
needed for other business purposes). WiFi-based tags can be moderately
more costly than non-WiFi tags, (perhaps $50 per tag instead of $40)
but the number of RTLS tags per facility would need to be huge in order
to make up the excess cost (up front and ongoing) associated with the
non-WiFi infrastructure. It should also be noted that with a WiFi-based
RTLS system, any device that already has WiFi built in does not need a
tag, since its existing WiFi radio acts as an RTLS tag. In addition to
devices like laptops, tablets, and smart phones, more and more medical
devices now come equipped with WiFi radios, further saving on RTLS tag
costs.
Question 24: Are additional technologies necessary to achieve
better accuracy in location and tracking services, at a minimum, and if
so, are additional infrastructures needed?
Response: As discussed more fully in question 21, WiFi suffices for
some of VA's many RTLS use cases, while for others, it does not. Where
a use case demands greater spatial resolution than WiFi alone can
provide, VA intends to utilize complementary technologies, such as
ultrasound or infra-red, on an as-needed basis.
Question 25: Does VA utilize RFID/RTLS technology that provides
multiple uses on the same infrastructure?
Response: VA currently has only very limited deployment of RTLS.
However, the plan, as currently envisioned, allows us to leverage the
same infrastructure (WiFi) for multiple business purposes, including
wireless data (Bar Code Medication Administration [BCMA], bedside
nursing admissions, bedside progress notes, etc) and voice (wireless
WiFi-based phones).
Question 26: How do these Wi-Fi solutions track objects outside the
building using the same infrastructure versus other technologies that
have both indoor and outdoor solutions built-in?
Response: None of the initial use cases for VHA involve tracking
items outdoors. WiFi can be utilized for outdoor use cases, when the
item will remain on campus. If inter-facility location-finding is
needed, some other technology, such as GPS, would likely be utilized.
Question 27: How does VA OI&T deal with the latency in Wi-Fi
between when a message is sent and received, potentially triggering
alarms and, for example, locking a door before a patient is able to
exit?
Response: There is no industry consensus on whether WiFi is slower
or has greater latency than competing systems, but OI&T does not
believe this to be an issue. However, if latency issues were a concern,
quality of service controls could be instituted to ensure that RTLS
traffic would get priority.
Question 28: Do VA's Wi-Fi solutions send encrypted data vulnerable
to a security breach?
Response: The VA Wi-Fi utilizes equipment that is FIPS 140-2
Certified (mandated by FISMA and VA Handbook 6500) and is configured to
follow the associated FIPS 140-2 Security Policy as well as following
NIST Special Publication 800-97: Establishing Wireless Robust Security
Networks. The system is based on 802.11i WPA2/AES security protocols
which utilize FIPS 140-2 certified cryptographic modules.
Question 29: How do these solutions keep running if there is an
issue with the Wi-Fi infrastructure or access points at any given time?
Response: The Wi-Fi Infrastructure is setup and configured to
survive single component failure at the controller in the N+1 design
model. The access points (AP) are deployed and configured in a way in
which the system self heals. That is, the infrastructure will see an AP
``drop off'' and will increase signal strength in surrounding APs to
cover the deficiency automatically.
Question 30: How will the cost of batteries in Wi-Fi tags affect
long-term usage and cost versus other low-power consumption
technologies?
Response: Our market research indicates that battery life with
WiFi-based tags will be comparable to that seen in other active RTLS
tags. By adjusting the beacon rate, a battery life of 2 years or more
should be attainable. Necessary beacon rate will vary by use case.
Question 31: How will interface from Wi-Fi in everyday devices
carried by people in facilities affect the tracking of tags in any VA
facility?
Response: Although this has been raised as a concern, at least 60
percent of the health care RTLS market utilizes WiFi-based systems, and
interference from other WiFi devices has not been shown to be a
significant problem.
Question 32: VA OI&T currently has a workforce of over 7,100
people. Please outline the growth of that staff over the last 2 years
as well as anticipated future growth.
Response: At the beginning of FY 2009, OI&T staff count was 6,645.
The current (as of April) staff count is 7,101. OI&T's planned end-of-
FY 2011 staff count is 7,271. We are not requesting a staffing increase
as part of our FY 2012 budget.
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Washington, DC.
May 12, 2011
The Honorable Roger W. Baker
Assistant Secretary for Information
Technology and Chief Information Officer
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420
Dear Secretary Baker:
I would like to request your response to the enclosed questions for
the record and deliverable I am submitting in reference to our House
Committee on Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations hearing on Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the
21st Century on May 11, 2011. Please answer the enclosed hearing
questions and deliverables by no later than Wednesday, June 22, 2011.
In an effort to reduce printing costs, the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs, in cooperation with the Joint Committee on Printing, is
implementing some formatting changes for material for all full
Committee and Subcommittee hearings. Therefore, it would be appreciated
if you could provide your answers consecutively on letter size paper,
single-spaced. In addition, please restate the question in its entirety
before the answer.
Due to the delay in receiving mail, please provide your response to
Ms. Orfa Torres by fax at (202) 225-2034. If you have any questions,
please call (202) 225-9756.
Sincerely,
Joe Donnelly
Ranking Member
MH/ot
__________
Questions for the Record
House Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Ranking Member Joe Donnelly
``Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st Century''
May 11, 2011
Question 1: What are we doing to convert the many contracted IT
staff positions to Full Time Employee (FTE) positions within the VA?
Response: The Office of Information and Technology (OI&T) is
already positioning itself to recruit, retain, and train staff to have
needed specialized skills through the use of our staff competency
models, which are currently under development. These models will also
be deployed to help ensure that VA has the continuously strong, capable
leadership corps that it needs, and that leaders have the skills and
proficiency to lead people and progress. However, in instances where
specialized knowledge is needed for short duration, OI&T will continue
to use contracted services, which provides a more cost-effective
alternative to hiring full-time career Federal employees.
Question 2: According to the VA OIG's recent report on the contract
awarded to Catapult, their findings concluded that information provided
to the vendor was unreliable. The documents proved to be incomplete or
reliable, and the VA was aware of this. Why did VA continue with the
procurement process knowing documents were incomplete or unreliable?
Response: OI&T is currently conducting an internal review of the
Catapult contract. We expect this review to be complete by mid-July,
and would appreciate the opportunity to provide a brief on our findings
when the review is complete.
Question 3: The VA OIG was unable to determine if Catapult was in
compliance with the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR), because the
VA did not request documentation on the subcontractors to ensure
compliance with the FAR provision. Why would the VA not request or have
this documentation available?
Response: VA wants to clarify that we believe this question refers
to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report discussion of possible
non-compliance with FAR 52.219-27, which requires that specific minimum
percentages of the labor cost be paid to the employees of the vendor or
of another Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB)*. The
OIG Report refers only to the 50 percent minimum level; the
installation of WiFi networks may well fall into the category of
``Construction by special trades contractors'' which specifies a 25
percent minimum level. We are aware that Catapult has stated in writing
that they are in compliance with the FAR; we are not aware of what
specific data they may have provided to the OIG to verify compliance.
*The following minimum percentages are specified by FAR 52.219-27:
1. Services (except construction), at least 50 percent of the
cost of personnel for contract performance will be spent for
employees of the concern or employees of other service-disabled
Veteran-owned small business concerns;
2. Supplies (other than acquisition from a nonmanufacturer of
the supplies), at least 50 percent of the cost of
manufacturing, excluding the cost of materials, will be
performed by the concern or other service-disabled Veteran-
owned small business concerns;
3. General construction, at least 15 percent of the cost of
the contract performance incurred for personnel will be spent
on the concern's employees or the employees of other service-
disabled Veteran-owned small business concerns; or
4. Construction by special trade contractors, at least 25
percent of the cost of the contract performance incurred for
personnel will be spent on the concern's employees or the
employees of other service-disabled Veteran-owned small
business concerns.
As stated above,OI&T is currently conducting an internal review of
the Catapult contract. We expect this review to be complete by mid-
July, and would appreciate the opportunity to provide a brief on our
findings when the review is complete.
Question 4: In your response to the Committee on the letter we sent
on March 25th inquiring about Open Source, you said that DoD's
participation in Open Source VistA is not essential. Can you elaborate
on this?
Response: This question is now moot, as DoD has joined VA in
support of the Open Source approach. Had DoD not joined in the Open
Source approach, VA would have used to the Open Source approach to
develop and accomplish the changes necessary to VistA to move it
towards compliance with the integrated EHR (iEHR) architecture as
defined by VA and DoD. While this is still the plan, both DoD and VA
expect that the Open Source will be a viable way of identifying,
selecting, and implementing modules of the iEHR that we jointly
identify.
Question 5: What is being done to balance the needs of IT security,
while still having a common sense approach to meet needs of employees
and veterans? (example: still do not have wireless Internet in VA
facilities because of security fears, even though the public hospitals
all have them)
Response: Because of past events, VA clearly holds itself to a
higher standard than previous years for information security and
information protection. OI&T is working hard to strike a balance
between our information security needs and convenient network use,
while providing the tools and access needed by employees and Veterans.
OI&T's information security team has developed strong information
security controls on the wireless networks currently online in the
hospitals with this capability. For medical centers without wireless
access, the current concern is resolving conflicts with wireless
medical devices, as well as the physical impediments to wireless access
in large medical centers.
OI&T and VHA are currently piloting a program by a third party
vendor to provide wireless Internet access in the lobby and waiting
areas of medical centers for Veterans to use.
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Washington, DC.
May 12, 2011
Ms. Belinda J. Finn
Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Evaluations
Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
801 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Dear Ms. Finn:
I would like to request your response to the enclosed questions for
the record I am submitting in reference to our House Committee on
Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing
on Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st Century on May 11,
2011. Please answer the enclosed hearing questions and deliverables by
no later than Wednesday, June 22, 2011.
In an effort to reduce printing costs, the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs, in cooperation with the Joint Committee on Printing, is
implementing some formatting changes for material for all full
Committee and Subcommittee hearings. Therefore, it would be appreciated
if you could provide your answers consecutively on letter size paper,
single-spaced. In addition, please restate the question in its entirety
before the answer.
Due to the delay in receiving mail, please provide your response to
Ms. Orfa Torres by fax at (202) 225-2034. If you have any questions,
please call (202) 225-9756.
Sincerely,
Joe Donnelly
Ranking Member
MH/ot
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Washington, DC.
June 13, 2011
The Honorable Joe Donnelly
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Congressman Donnelly:
This is in response to your May 12, 2011, letter following the May
11, 2011, hearing on Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st
Century. Enclosed are our responses to the additional hearing
questions.
Thank you for your interest in the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Sincerely,
GEORGE J. OPFER
Inspector General
Enclosure
__________
Questions for the Record from the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
United States House of Representatives
Hearing on
Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st Century
Question 1: From a VA OIG perspective, what steps has VA taken to
improve its ability to manage information technology (IT) projects?
Response: VA's Office of Information and Technology (OI&T)
recognized that it has issues with its program management abilities to
ensure that IT development efforts are successful. To manage this
shortfall, OI&T established the Project Management Accountability
System (PMAS), a performance based management discipline that requires
frequent delivery (at least every 6 months) of IT functionality. PMAS
is currently schedule-driven, allowing for flexibility in project scope
and functionality to ensure the schedule can be met. Under PMAS, three
consecutive failures (``3 strikes'') to meet a scheduled project
deliverable will result in a project being ``paused.'' At the
``paused'' stage, the project is assessed to determine if it should be
continued or terminated. PMAS also includes a red flag process which
allows anyone associated with a project to elevate project-related
issues to senior level officials so that they can take corrective
actions quickly.
Further, OI&T is emphasizing Agile versus a traditional software
development methodology, in which a project moves sequentially through
concept, design, testing, and implementation phases. Agile is an
iterative and incremental software development methodology that allows
for requirements and solutions to evolve through team collaboration and
interaction. Agile is intended to accomplish the following:
Emphasize teamwork.
Promote a disciplined project management process that
encourages frequent inspection and adaptation by breaking tasks
into small increments with minimal planning.
Complement PMAS' requirement for frequent delivery of
deployable IT system functionality.
Question 2: Can you explain the purpose of your current PMAS audit?
Response: We are assessing whether OI&T has taken appropriate steps
in implementing PMAS. Our audit will determine whether:
An adequate plan was in place for PMAS
implementation.
Resources are available and assigned to carry out
PMAS.
PMAS staff roles and responsibilities have been
defined.
PMAS Dashboard data for monitoring project status and
progress are reliable.
Controls such as oversight reviews, cost tracking
mechanisms, and step-by-step guidance are in place to ensure
projects are not only meeting schedule, but also cost and
performance goals.
These areas reflect issues we have historically identified in other
audits of OI&T system development initiatives.
Question 3: Do you see problems with PMAS' incremental delivery and
managing development projects to schedule?
Yes. Stakeholders have expressed concerns about disrupted
operations when they do not receive planned functionality on time and
the time it may take to produce all the required functionality under
the incremental delivery approach. Further, the potential exists that
once functionality is fully delivered it may be obsolete.
For example, we reported, in our audit of the Post-9/11 GI Bill
Long Term Solution (LTS), that managing a project primarily to schedule
may be at the risk of performance and cost (Audit of VA's
Implementation of the Post-9/11 GI Bill Long Term Solution, September
30, 2010). During certain phases of LTS development, the project met
schedule, but did not provide the originally intended functionality.
The project did not receive a strike even though the functionality
delivered was significantly less than planned.
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Washington, DC.
May 12, 2011
Mr. Joel Willemssen
Managing Director, Information Technology
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Government Accountability Office
441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
Dear Mr. Willemssen:
I would like to request your response to the enclosed question for
the record I am submitting in reference to our House Committee on
Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing
on Reboot: Examining VA's IT Strategy for the 21st Century on May 11,
2011. Please answer the enclosed hearing questions and deliverables by
no later than Wednesday, June 22, 2011.
In an effort to reduce printing costs, the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs, in cooperation with the Joint Committee on Printing, is
implementing some formatting changes for material for all full
Committee and Subcommittee hearings. Therefore, it would be appreciated
if you could provide your answers consecutively on letter size paper,
single-spaced. In addition, please restate the question in its entirety
before the answer.
Due to the delay in receiving mail, please provide your response to
Ms. Orfa Torres by fax at (202) 225-2034. If you have any questions,
please call (202) 225-9756.
Sincerely,
Joe Donnelly
Ranking Member
MH/ot
__________
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC.
June 22, 2011
The Honorable Joe Donnelly
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
House of Representatives
Subject: Reboot: Examining the Department of Veterans Affairs
Information Technology Strategy for the 21st Century
This letter responds to your recent question related to our May 11,
2011, testimony on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) ongoing
information technology (IT) management challenges.\1\ At that hearing,
we discussed VA's weaknesses in managing its IT resources, particularly
in the areas of systems development, information security, and
collaboration with the Department of Defense (DoD) on efforts to meet
common health system needs. Your question, along with our response,
follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Information Technology: Department of Veterans Affairs
Faces Ongoing Management Challenges, GAO-11-663T (Washington, D.C.: May
11, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In your opinion, what specific actions does the VA IT office need
to focus on to capitalize on current technologies available?
VA can take a number of specific actions to capitalize on available
IT. As discussed in our prior reports and summarized in our recent
testimony,\2\ the following actions could help VA address challenges in
improving system development, strengthening information security, and
increasing collaboration with DoD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO-11-663T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improve system development: VA has historically experienced
significant IT system development difficulties and can improve two
projects that have yielded mixed results. For its outpatient
appointment scheduling project, which spent an estimated $127 million
over 9 years without implementing any of the planned capabilities, the
department can improve its acquisition plans, identify complete system
requirements, adhere to system testing guidance, increase earned value
management data reliability, manage project risks, and provide
effective oversight.\3\ Additionally, although VA has partially
delivered new system capabilities to process education benefits
provided under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, the department can improve its
effort to complete the system. In particular, to guide the full
development and implementation of the new system, VA can create project
performance measures, establish traceability between system
requirements and legislation, define criteria for what constitutes the
system being ``done,'' improve system testing, and implement a project
oversight tool.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Information Technology: Management Improvements Are
Essential to VA's Second Effort to Replace Its Outpatient Scheduling
System, GAO-10-579 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthen information security: Effective information security is
essential to securing the systems and information on which VA depends
to carry out its mission. Without proper safeguards, the department's
systems are vulnerable to individuals and groups with malicious intent
who can intrude and use their access to obtain sensitive information,
commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other
computer systems and networks. In recent years, VA has reported an
increasing number of security incidents and events. The department can
improve its security posture by implementing the recommendations of its
Office of Inspector General for strengthening access controls,
configuration management, change management, and service continuity.
Also, the department can fully implement the requirements of the
Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) initiative, including
implementing a baseline set of configuration settings, acquiring and
deploying an FDCC compliance tool, and implementing a policy to monitor
compliance.\4\ Additionally, VA should ensure that any use of cloud
computing that the department undertakes includes implementation of
appropriate information security controls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Information Security: Agencies Need to Implement Federal
Desktop Core Configuration Requirements, GAO-10-202 (Washington, D.C.:
March 12, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increase collaboration with DoD: VA and DoD have two of the
Nation's largest health care operations, providing health care to 6
million veterans and 9.6 million active duty servicemembers and their
beneficiaries at estimated annual costs of about $48 billion and $49
billion, respectively. Although the results of a 2008 study found that
more than 97 percent of functional requirements for an inpatient
electronic health record system are common to both departments, VA and
DoD face barriers to identifying and implementing efficient and
effective IT solutions to jointly address their common health care
system needs. Thus, we have recommended several actions that VA can
take, in conjunction with DoD, to overcome the barriers they face as
they modernize their electronic health record systems. We specifically
recommended that the departments improve their strategic planning,
further develop their joint health architecture, and define and
implement a process for identifying and selecting joint IT
investments.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Electronic Health Records: DoD and VA Should Remove
Barriers and Improve Efforts to Meet Their Common System Needs, GAO-11-
265 (Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, these actions are intended to address the challenges VA
faces in improving system development, strengthening information
security, and increasing collaboration with DoD and could help the
department better capitalize on IT.
To respond to this question, we relied on previously reported
information, as well as information collected through follow-up with
the department. The work supporting these reports was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Should you or your office have any questions on matters discussed
in this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-6253 or
[email protected].
Sincerely yours,
Joel C. Willemssen
Managing Director, Information Technology