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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. PACIFIC
COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA**
—

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**FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
AND U.S. FORCES KOREA**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2011.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Good morning.

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2012 President's Budget Request for the U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM] and U.S. Forces Korea [USFK].

I welcome our witnesses, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Bob Willard, and Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General Skip Sharp. Thank you both for being with us. It is a pleasure to see you again.

I am sure you are much happier here than in the Pacific.

Just kidding.

First, on behalf of this entire committee, please allow me to express my heartfelt sorrow to the people of Japan for the terrible disaster which struck unexpectedly on March 11th. Japan is not only an esteemed trading partner, but the military alliance of our two nations forms the cornerstone of our mutual security in the Pacific.

Admiral Willard, please convey to your counterparts in the government of Japan that the U.S. Congress stands by them and offers our support to continue to help its citizens rebuild and recover.

In preparing for this hearing, I noted with amazement that the physical damage from the earthquake and tsunami is currently estimated at \$250 billion to \$309 billion. That is more than 350 percent higher than Hurricane Katrina.

Admiral Willard, please let us know what type of assistance the U.S. military has been able to offer Japan, what additional help they may need, and what the status of U.S. personnel and their families is right now.

Apart from Japan, however, our witnesses have responsibility for one of the most geographically and ethnically dispersed regions of

the globe, which will present some of the greatest opportunities and challenges to our national security in the coming decades.

In its 2011 edition of *The Military Balance*, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, or IISS, drew ominous conclusions about global developments in defense policy and our Armed Forces.

The IISS head, Dr. John Chipman, warned, "The United States, in the next few years it is going to have to make some very significant decisions on what it does."

The IISS highlighted the contrast between defense cuts in the West and booming military spending and arms acquisitions in Asia and the Middle East, concluding, "there is persuasive evidence that a global redistribution of military power is under way."

In particular, the rapidly expanding military power of China continues to overshadow other Asian states' military efforts and creates unease among American allies in the region.

The report further observes that "the Korean Peninsula is now as dangerous a place as it has been at any time since the end of the Korean War in 1953," given the "imminent and possibly unclear leadership succession" in North Korea and that country's aggression towards the South.

In this context, it has never been more important to ensure that our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training, equipment, and authorities they need to instill confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to respond decisively to any contingency that may arise.

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you for your many years of service. Thank you to those who serve with you.

Please express to them our sincere appreciation for all that they are doing.

We look forward to your testimony.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome Admiral Willard, General Sharp. I appreciate your work on behalf of our country. You are in a very, very important region.

I also want to begin by joining in the chairman's comments about the terrible tragedy in Japan and the impact there, to pass along our best wishes to a very strong partner and a very strong nation, during a very difficult time.

And also, to thank the Pacific Command for all of their work, to help with that disaster you have done an amazing job and shown, I think, once again, what the reach of the U.S. military can do in terms of humanitarian, in terms of being able to help people when they need it most, throughout the world, you have been a fine example of that in Japan, though I know the challenges remain great.

So, thank you for your service on that.

More broadly speaking, I think the Pacific Command covers a very vitally important region.

There are many challenges in that region, but I think also there are great opportunities.

Some of the larger, strongest economies in the world are there, as well as a lot of others that are emerging. These are some of the central emerging markets in the world and a positive relationship between the United States and these countries can be critical towards our economic growth, towards our economic opportunities and certainly towards creating a more stable world. And I appreciate both of your work to try to make that happen.

Obviously, in the region, beyond Japan, is a central partner. China is a critical, critical country. And building a more positive relationship with them, I think, is very important as we go forward, and also very difficult, because our interests do not always coincide. But I still believe that what we have in common outweighs what is different and I think with strong leadership, we can build positive partnerships so that, hopefully, as we go forward, China works with us occasionally to help the stability of the region and the stability of the world, for that matter.

So, the relationship with China is critical; anxious to hear what you gentlemen's take is on where that is at.

And then lastly, of course, is North Korea itself. I agree with what the chairman said, very volatile area, very dangerous and seemingly getting more so every day. So, I look forward to your testimony about how we manage that very difficult challenge to regional and global stability.

With that, I yield back and I look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Both of your testimonies will be included, completely, in the record. We look forward to hearing what you have to say.

Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman McKeon.

And, Mr. Chairman, in order to accommodate the committee's questions sooner, I will keep my remarks here brief and, as you have already suggested, ask that my full statement be included for the record.

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and discuss the United States Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific region.

I would like to extend our best wishes to Representative Giffords for a speedy recovery. As a Navy spouse, she is a key member of our military family and our thoughts and prayers remain with her and with her family.

I would like to begin by recognizing my wife, Donna, who has been at my side for 37 years. She is an outstanding ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men and women of our military and their families. She recently accompanied me to Japan where she met with service spouses and then traveled into the

tsunami-stricken region to visit a shelter for 1,200 displaced Japanese survivors.

On that note, I would like to begin by offering our deepest sympathy for the people of Japan who have been affected by an unprecedented confluence of earthquakes, tsunamis and consequent nuclear accidents.

In the midst of tragedy, the people of northern Honshu have demonstrated remarkable courage and resolve. Their ability to endure, to assist one another through hardship, to clean up their communities and recover their lives should be an inspiration for us all.

The devastation Donna and I have observed from the 11th of March natural disasters was staggering. And the significance of the continuing nuclear crisis adds a level of disaster response complexity and urgency that is without peer.

U.S. Pacific Command remains fully committed to supporting response efforts by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. I established a joint support force in Japan, whose mission includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, including support to the Japanese defense forces who are spearheading the Fukushima nuclear accident response.

At the same time, we are guarding the safety of U.S. service personnel and their families, whether they are operating in direct support for the relief effort or carrying out their normal duties at their home bases.

A second PACOM joint task force planned and executed the voluntary departure of spouses and dependents, and maintains a follow-on departure plan, should it be required.

The level of cooperation and collaboration between the service men and women of the United States and Japan has been remarkable, and the job they are doing together is inspiring.

Worthy of special recognition is General Oriki, Japan's Chief of the Joint Staff, for his exceptional leadership of nearly 100,000 Japanese service members who are engaged in this effort.

Our ability to quickly and effectively support their work is testimony to the maturity and strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

No doubt, Japan will emerge from this terrible combination of disasters a stronger nation. Our hopes and prayers continue to go out to the Japanese people.

Natural disasters are but one of the many challenges facing the United States Pacific Command throughout the Asia-Pacific. This vast region that covers half the earth is unique both in its size and diversity and the importance to the future of every other nation in the world.

Containing the great populations, economies and militaries along with more than \$5 trillion of seaborne commerce per year, this region has been and will continue to be of utmost importance to the United States.

The United States Pacific Command's role is to oversee its security and to help to keep the peace both in our Nation's interests and in the interests of our five treaty allies and many regional partners.

The security environment is never static. Rather, it is characterized by a dynamic range of 36 nations, whose varying personalities and influence more or less affect the neighborhood.

Each of our four sub-regions—Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania—contain unique challenges and challenges that test our collective commitment to security and peace.

Yet, in the face of actors such as North Korea, transnational extremist organizations such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, and uncertainties created by a rapidly expanding and assertive Chinese military, multilateral organizations such as ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], the East Asia Summit, and bonds between the United States, its allies and partners serve to moderate the challenges, deter the challengers and provide forums for advancing the collective security of the Asia-Pacific region.

Overall, the prospects for continued peace, economic growth and advancing security cooperation in the region remain promising.

We are repeatedly reminded that only through the U.S.'s ability and willingness to underwrite the security through our continuous presence, extended deterrence and protection of the global commons upon which the region's livelihood depends, will regional peace and security endure.

Every day, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians work to advance security in the Asia-Pacific. Their success has long been enabled by this committee's sustained support. You have provided the service men and women of USPACOM with the most technically advanced military systems in the world and a quality of life worthy of the contributions of this All-Volunteer Force.

On behalf of the more than 330,000 men and women of United States Pacific Command, thank you and thank you for this opportunity to testify on our defense posture in this most critical region of the world.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Sharp.

**STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER "SKIP" SHARP, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA**

General SHARP. Chairman McKeon, Representative Smith and other distinguished members of this committee; I welcome this opportunity to discuss the current state of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea and to answer your questions.

I also want to thank this committee for its support for our service members, Department of Defense civilians, and family members that are all working together in the Republic of Korea.

The Republic of Korea, a strong and enduring ally, is located in Northeast Asia, where the world's largest militaries and economies reside. The Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance ensures security and stability in Northeast Asia.

The Republic of Korea is also a great global security partner with a PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] in Afghanistan, anti-pi-

racy operations off the coast of Somalia and several U.N. peace-keeping operations around the world and they are assisting in tackling proliferation.

Most importantly, the Republic of Korea and the U.S. alliance continues to face a North Korea that threatens both regional and global security and peace.

Last year, the Republic of Korea was the victim of two unprovoked attacks by North Korea. On 26th March, 2010, a North Korean submarine attacked the Republic of Korea naval ship, the *Cheonan*. And on 23rd November, 2010, a North Korea artillery barrage on the Republic of Korea island of Yeonpyeong-do.

These brutal attacks resulted in the death of 48 South Korean service members and 2 civilians and numerous other casualties.

The command's mission is to deter North Korean provocations and aggressions and if deterrence fails, to fight and win.

In support of this mission, forces are maintained on the Korean Peninsula and operate closely with our South Korean allies.

The command's first priority is to prepare to fight and win. Maintaining a combined "fight tonight" readiness is a key reason why U.S. forces are stationed alongside their Korean counterparts in the defense of the Republic of Korea.

The alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula.

Maintaining this preparedness is accomplished through the development and continual refinement of our bilateral plans to deter and defeat aggression, while maintaining an ability to respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the Korean Peninsula.

Successful execution of these bilateral plans will require a well-trained force; three annual, joint, combined and interagency exercises, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve and Full Legal Service, key enablers for maintaining the combined command's "fight tonight" readiness, while also preparing for the future transition of wartime operational controls.

The second priority of the command, to strengthen the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance, supports the June 2009 United States-Republic of Korea Joint Presidential Vision Statement. A strong alliance better deters North Korea's provocative acts and promotes peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole.

Last year, President Obama agreed to the Republic of Korea President Lee Myung-bak's request to adjust the timing of the transition of wartime operational control from April 2012 to December of 2015.

He also agreed to develop a plan to better synchronize all of the ongoing transformation initiatives, of which OPCON [operational control] transition is just one of the elements.

Called "Strategic Alliance 2015," this plan was affirmed and signed by the United States Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and the then Republic of Korea Minister of Defense, Minister Kim Tae-young, at the 42nd security consultant meeting in October of 2010.

Strategic Alliance 2015 synchronizes multiple U.S. and Republic of Korea transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive

and flexible capabilities to deter and to defeat aggression, should it occur.

Key elements of Strategic Alliance 2015 include refining and approving combined defense plans, defining and developing the new organizational structures and capabilities required by the Republic of Korea to lead the war fight, implementing more realistic exercises based upon the North Korean threat of today and tomorrow, preparing for the transition of wartime operational control in 2015 and consolidating U.S. military forces in the Republic of Korea onto two enduring hubs, under the Yongsan Relocation Program and the Land Partnership Program.

This repositioning of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea improves force readiness and quality of life, my third priority. It realizes stationing efficiencies and signals the continued American commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and engagement in the region more broadly.

Restationing also enhances force protection and survivability.

Finally, normalizing tours in Korea was reinforced in October of 2010, when Secretary of Defense Gates directed the U.S. Forces Korea into services to proceed with full tour normalization as affordable.

As a force multiplier, tour normalization keeps trained and ready military personnel in place for a longer period of time. It improves readiness, combat capability, lowers turbulence in units and reduces the stress placed on troops, units and families.

In closing, the men and women assigned to United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea remain committed and stand ready. Our ongoing efforts to implement Strategic Alliance 2015, the Yongsan Relocation and Land Partnership Program and tour normalization demonstrate a long-term U.S. commitment to not only security for the Republic of Korea, but for the broader region of Northeast Asia as well.

I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Department of Defense civilians and their families serving in the great nation of the Republic of Korea. And your support for them is truly appreciated.

This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral Willard, the IISS Report I mentioned in my opening statement is just the latest analysis that suggests there is unease among American allies in the Pacific. What do you hear about perceptions of the United States in this region and this growing disparity between the growth of China's military and plans to cut defense spending in the United States due to budgetary pressures?

And what more can the U.S. military do to bolster confidence in our allies and deter future aggression in the region?

Admiral WILLARD. Yes. Thank you, Chairman McKeon.

The general perception, I think, within the Asia-Pacific and, especially among Southeast Asian nations, when I took command a year and a half ago, was of uncertainty regarding U.S. commitment to the region overall and frankly uncertainty regarding our pres-

ence in the region and whether or not, as a consequence of the wars in the Middle East, that had been diminished.

We have made a concerted effort, and I think Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates' commitment to the region and statements made in Vietnam and Singapore, throughout 2010, helped to reinforce and re-establish the United States' commitment to the Asia-Pacific.

The presence of our forces has been made more noticeable.

Interestingly, in this region of the world, for many of these nations, in order to know that we are present, we have to tell them and so part of that message has been shared.

But I think that our allies in the region, in particular, and Australia, to point out one, have been vocal regarding their desire to help enhance U.S. presence throughout the region, and especially in Southeast Asia, in and around the South China Sea, by making overtures to the United States to team more broadly with them and perhaps enable a rotational force presence from regions closer to that particular area.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Sharp, do you agree with the IISS assessment that the Korean Peninsula is now as dangerous a place as it has been any time since the end of the Korean War in 1953? And how do the South Koreans view their relationship with the U.S. today?

The South Koreans have made significant strides in developing a robust military capability, in light of the existential threat they face from the north. This growth in capability has enabled the United States to reduce its presence on the peninsula, somewhat.

Please explain how tour normalization will help you increase readiness, even with a smaller force. What else do you need in terms of facilities and family services to achieve these goals?

General SHARP. Sir, thank you.

If you look at, back, over last year, the two attacks that I named and then look forward over the next couple of years, I believe that there are some real challenges from North Korea that we have to be prepared to deter and if deterrence does not work, be prepared to respond to.

And as North Korea works through the succession that they are ongoing now, as North Korea tries to become, as Kim Jong-Il has claimed, to be a great and powerful nation in 2012, I do worry that there are additional attacks and provocations that are being considered within North Korea.

We call on North Korea, that those are not necessary and we are working very hard with the Republic of Korea to deter any future provocations, but be prepared if deterrence does not work.

The way that we are working through that, as you said, is to make sure that the alliance is as strong as it can be right now and we are of one voice and one set of actions in order to be able to prepare for North Korea.

We have 28,500 troops in North Korea at this time and it has been that way for the last several years under Secretary Gates and President Obama's leadership. They have said that force level will be sustained for the foreseeable future.

And I believe that is about the right force level for Korea to do what we need to deter and to respond across a wide range of possible scenarios from North Korea.

U.S., specifically, help toward normalization has helped increase the alliance together and increase our readiness. And we have moved from, in the summer of 2008, about 1,700 command-sponsored families to the point now where we have over 4,100 command-sponsored families in Korea.

All of those forces have moved from a force where you would rotate one year at a time to troops that are now there for 2 and 3 years. You can imagine the increase in unit capability, unit cohesion if you don't have to train new soldiers every year.

I have seen, just in that short period of time, a great increase of readiness of our units, a great, stronger desire within units to make differences within units. If you stay there one year at a time, you can stand on your head for a year. You really don't focus on the long-term good for units and the overall strength that your unit needs to be.

So as we move forward and toward normalization and as I said in my opening statement, I and the services owe to Secretary Gates an affordable plan to be able to move, where all of our families can come to Korea and Korea can become a tour, just like Germany, just like Japan, where you are there for 2 and 3 years at a time, really focusing on not only your unit, but also improving relationships on a personal basis within the Republic of Korea.

That plan is going to the Secretary over the next month or so. He will then make decisions on how to move forward, based upon the budget and the importance of this initiative and that will be presented to you all on the budget that comes forward next January.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ranking Member Smith.

Or, Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. I don't think I look like Smith.

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first I would like to say that as a representative from Guam, I too join the rest of the world in sending our deepest sympathies to the people of Japan.

The people of Guam, in their generosity, have organized many fundraising drives on the island and at last count, when I was home, we have raised several millions of dollars.

Admiral Willard and General Sharp, thank you for your testimonies this morning. And Admiral, for your information, with all the increased activities going on in Guam now, we are still afloat.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. My first question is for you, Admiral. Can you describe what progress the U.S. and Japan are making toward achieving tangible progress? Tangible progress is often portrayed as the time when we can move a single Marine off Okinawa to Guam.

But I do know, in reality, much must be achieved before tangible progress can be realized. MILCON [military construction] on Guam

must continue to achieve slow and steady progress, so in due course, a Marine can move to fully functioning facilities on Guam.

So, what are some of the immediate and medium-term steps that must be taken to achieve tangible progress in Okinawa?

And further, Admiral, can you describe how this year's military construction budget for Guam achieves our commitment to the Guam international agreement?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.

The progress toward the Futenma Replacement Facility [FRF] that occupied so much of our time with the Japanese last year, we think has begun to move forward this year, as a consequence of both Prime Minister Kan's commitment to seeing this forward, to the conclusion of the local elections in Okinawa that took place last fall, and most importantly the continued effort on the part of both the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] and the Ministry of Defense in Guam to continue their dialogue, through working groups, in order to accomplish what we need to, to move FRF forward.

And we are progressing toward the signed commitment by the governor of Okinawa to begin to make the actual contracting and movement of soil for the first time in the FRF location.

I think there are some issues to finalize with regard to runway configuration and so forth, some items that we have talked about in the past. But we feel that progress is being made.

I think the overall budgetary commitment on the part of the Government of Japan toward Guam remains strong. They continue to carry a considerable amount forward for Guam, DPRI [Defense Policy Review Initiatives] issues. And as you and I have discussed, previously, they have continued to make overtures that despite the crisis that is currently ongoing in Japan that they will be able to continue to proceed with the tenets of DPRI, of which Futenma Replacement Facility and the movement of 8,000 Marines to Guam is only one of 19 actions that DPRI contains.

So, I feel confident that progress, tangible progress, is in fact being made. There are uncertainties, unquestionably, as a consequence of what else Japan is contending with now and the scope of that disaster in terms of financial impact to Japan. But with the commitments that you have heard and that I have seen from the Japanese and the continued progress that we have seen being made, at least in dialogue, if not in actual construction, I am confident that we will continue to progress towards the tenets of the defense review initiative.

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral, I also—the second part of that question is how about this year's military construction budget on our part?

Admiral WILLARD. I will have an opportunity next week to discuss our military construction budget before the MILCON committee. And we intend to discuss Guam initiatives in particular.

I remain concerned that there be sufficient commitment within the MILCON budget to proceed with the infrastructure development in particular, attendant to the Marine Corps facilities as they have been described.

So, the infrastructure in and around the area south of Andersen Air Force Base, Finegayan and the infrastructure needed on the defense posts themselves in the area of Andersen Air Force Base,

both very critical to precede the development of housing and other military construction that comes later.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Admiral.

And my next question is for General Sharp. General, I believe we share a common mission of layered defense against potential North Korean aggression. In Guam, we are poised to host the development of a ballistic missile defense system that will be a key component of strategic deterrence in the Pacific.

What other elements of defense do you see as necessary to demonstrate U.S. resolve in the Pacific theater? And how else should the administration and the military illustrate that regardless of events taking place around the world today, we are still committed to assured access for us and our allies to, and freedom of maneuver within, the Pacific global commons?

And I once heard a general officer recently at a hearing who was stationed in Korea state that he felt more comfortable when the B-52s or the B-2s were stationed in Guam. So do you share that sentiment?

And can you explain the role of long-range strike on the Korean Peninsula?

General SHARP. Thank you. I can answer from a Korean Peninsula perspective and then the broader—the Pacific perspective and I am sure Admiral Willard would like to comment on that.

Within Korea, we are working very hard to make sure that our missile defense both the Republic of Korea and the U.S. alliance are strong and prepared for what North Korea could throw at it. And so the Republic of Korea is moving forward, buying and employing more radars and command-and-control systems for their Patriots, which they have recently bought.

They just launched the third Aegis ship.

We are working in concert with them to establish a good system within the Republic of Korea for missile defense in order to protect the valuable assets that we would need if we have to go a war fight there.

The deterrent value that comes from the B-52 and other systems that Admiral Willard would send to the fight in Korea is a huge—more than just a deterrent value, it is critical for our war fight and it is key component in order to be able to take down long-range systems, to include missiles that would be coming towards South Korea.

But that is from a Korean perspective of what we are working together to be able to do. I don't know if you want to add any comment?

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral.

Admiral WILLARD. I would just comment that among five treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific region, the Republic of Korea is certainly an important one.

The systems at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, specifically the B-52s and B-2s, as you have mentioned, are an element of the extended deterrents that the United States affords our allies and partners in the region.

And certainly their ability to respond to contingency on the Korean Peninsula is an important part of why they are there.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question, one more.

This is for you, Admiral Willard. We have had some significant achievements in progress in reducing the capabilities of extremists in the southern Philippines, thanks to a number of initiatives with the Philippine military, including the State Partnership Program.

Are there any lessons in this anti-insurgency strategy in the Philippines that we could utilize in Afghanistan?

Admiral WILLARD. I think that is a good question.

The southern Philippines has been a relative success, we believe. Over the past half dozen years, the 400 or 500 special operators that Pacific Command has maintained in the southern Philippines have done a credible job in working with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in order to defeat and contain Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah extremists that were operating there.

And we think we are at a point where planning can commence for a next phase.

So in general, we consider this to have been successful.

I think one of the key comparisons between the southern Philippines and Afghanistan has been the role that the Armed Forces of the Philippines have played in the lead of this counterterrorism effort.

And when you consider the work that is ongoing in Afghanistan, in order to build up the Afghani security forces and Afghan police forces, in order to make them as self-sufficient and accomplished as the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been, it points to the need for that work to continue.

So, I think the idea of our Armed Forces being in support of a self-sufficient host-nation armed force that can conduct the counterterrorism in the lead is the lesson that we have derived from our success in the Philippines.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I would like you to take two questions for the record, if you would, because I think that at the table, you may not have the consultation necessary to formulate an adequate answer.

The first for Admiral Willard, the Chinese, as you know, are buying oil reserves all over the world. We use 25 percent of the world's oil. We produce—we have only 2 percent of the world's reserves. We import about two-thirds of what we are using and yet we are buying no oil reserves anywhere in the world.

You might note that at the same time, the Chinese are aggressively building a blue-water navy.

Why this difference in our national strategies, relative to the purchase of oil? And how should this instruct us for our future planning?

General Sharp, there is a nuclear detonation above the atmosphere in—over Korea. The North Koreans, in a panic, call and say, gee, I am sorry that bird got away from us, but we detonated it in the atmosphere so it wouldn't produce any harm.

Of course, it will produce a huge electromagnetic pulse.

How much of your warfighting capability will be decremented by this as compared to the North Koreans? And what will be the effect of that on our warfighting capability?

I would like to read a couple of brief paragraphs from an op ed piece in the April 4th commentary in the Washington Times. It is called "Dear Leader to Dead Duck." And it is ostensibly written by Kim Jong-Il and he is admonishing Qadhafi as to his failures.

"The imperialists call us both crazy men, but there is a difference. They fear my craziness, not yours. This time last year, our glorious North Korean military forces struck like a hammer and sank a warship belonging to the puppet regime below our southern border. What did the imperialist forces do? Nothing. A few months later, we shelled the territory, right in the middle of their war-game practices. What did they do this time? Again, nothing."

"You, on the other hand, have not raised a hand against these sniveling hypocrites for many years. You played ball with them, as they like to say. You allowed the yellow wind of capitalism to blow through your country. You invited the giant capitalist bloodsucker BP to siphon off your people's birthright for its own profit, all so fat capitalists can ride around in luxury vehicles."

"Oh, what a mistake it was to give away your weapons of mass destruction."

And it goes on.

And my question is, how much of the world sees it this way?

General SHARP. Sir, I believe that—I can talk for the Republic of Korea and our alliance there, is that we do believe that North Korea is continuing to develop their nuclear weapons.

Kim Jong-Il has said that. He has said the importance of that to him; that he will—his plan is to continue to do that. I do not believe that he will give that up.

What we worked to do is to be able to deter future attacks that will come out of North Korea, like the two that are mentioned in those articles.

The Republic of Korea and the U.S. since then have made great progress in strengthening the defenses for the types of provocations that North Korea has and could do in the future.

We are working very hard to have appropriate plans in place to not only deter, but be prepared for a strong response against North Korea.

I think that from a South Korean perspective, the attack on YP-do, Yeonpyeong-do, on the 23rd of November changed the Republic of Korea. At that time, the Republic of Korea, everybody across the nation was watching that attack live on their handheld devices.

It was clear evidence that North Korea was willing to attack the Republic of Korea and kill civilians. And that changed the Republic of Korea's view that if North Korea does attack again, a very, very strong response, proportionate, but strong response, in self-defense will be going back towards North Korea.

There was a response on the 23rd of November, a fairly rapid response that went back as far as artillery, back towards the source of the provocation.

Since then, a lot of work has been done to really determine what is the appropriate response and the accuracy of that for future types of provocations.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much and I look forward to your written responses to my questions for the record. Thank you very much.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, I want to thank you both for your attendance here today and most especially for your service to our Nation.

Let me begin by also thanking the sailors and marines who have assisted with the recovery effort in Japan. They are obviously—Japan is one of our Nation's most important friends and allies in the region and, clearly as a sign of respect and a sign of how important that friendship is, that we send our best and brightest young men and women to their aid in their time of their national need.

Gentlemen, I want to discuss several topics right now that are of personal interest to me around two strategic issues vis-a-vis our military posture in the region.

Over the past 10 years, China has made significant investments in their ability to project regional sea power, specifically a rapid increase in the size of their submarine fleet.

In the U.S., we have begun the process of doubling our production rate for the superior *Virginia*-class submarine. However, we still face the near-term challenge of a declining fleet.

So Admiral Willard, can you please discuss some of the importance of the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific and China's decision to increase its seapower projection capabilities?

Admiral WILLARD. I think, unquestionably, China has made tremendous investment in its maritime capabilities across the board, to include the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy. And we have no doubt that they have aspirations to make that a blue-water navy that is deployable around the world and they are demonstrating that today, with anti-piracy operations in and near the Gulf of Aden. And they demonstrated it, to a lesser extent, by moving some of their surface fleet into the Mediterranean Sea during the Libya crisis in order to assist in evacuating Chinese citizens.

So, they are expanding their fleet, patrolling more, penetrating the first island chain and extending their operations further into the Pacific on a fairly steady pace.

The importance of United States submarines to the Asia-Pacific can't be overstated. The submarines afford us both a covert and highly capable platform from which to characterize the undersea environment and to help to dominate that domain.

The increased production of the *Virginia*-class submarine, I think, was a critical national decision for the United States and a very important one for the naval forces. And I think an important one, at the end of the day, for U.S. Pacific Command.

And there is no question that within that PLA Navy expansion, they have placed great emphasis on an expanding submarine force in their own right. And we endeavored to watch that development, that dimension of the PLA Navy development, very closely.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral.

The second issue I wanted to discuss was the threat to the U.S. and our allies from ballistic missile attack. The North Korean government has proven time and again its willingness to dangerously push the line of what is acceptable behavior in the region.

Given their interest in developing missile technology and nuclear capabilities, it is vitally important to retain a serious missile defense capability in the region. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, could you both please discuss our regional defense—missile defense capabilities and their importance, not only to our own forces, but to the long-term security of our regional allies?

In addition, what challenges do we face, relying on shipborne systems and is there any discussion of utilizing more land-based systems, such as those proposed under the President's European phased adaptive approach [PAA]?

Admiral WILLARD. I will begin if I may, to say that we place great emphasis on what I would cast as a growing ballistic missile defense capability in the Pacific.

There have been a number of investments, both on the command and control side of missile defense as well as on the platform and weapons side of missile defense.

Our Aegis fleet continues to grow in terms of its capacities to provide for missile defense and the production line of standard missiles that our missile defense capable continues to produce.

That said, for the United States, recalling when ballistic missile defense became a serious commitment, we continue to grow the capacities that are required to contend with the potential threats from sites such as North Korea.

We currently believe that we have an adequate missile defense capability to contend with what we believe to be North Korea's threat that is posed to the region and to the United States.

We continue to work with allies and partners to see their interest in developing their own missile defense capabilities. As you are aware, the Japanese are investing substantially there. And as General Sharp has already mentioned, the Korean Peninsula is investing both in land-based and considerations for sea-based tracking, if not ballistic missile defense capabilities.

So this is a growing capability in the Asia-Pacific and a growing capability, as you are aware, elsewhere. And yes, we are considering the land-based systems that complement our sea-based systems, such that we are not overly reliant on any particular domain, but rather we have the defense and depth that we think BMD [ballistic missile defense] demands.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral and General, thank you for your service to our country and you have both done great jobs in helping to keep us free.

And, Admiral, I particularly appreciate you mentioning your wife, Donna. We know oftentimes our spouses have greater sacrifices than we do. They just don't get to wear the medals. So we appreciate you mentioning that.

Admiral, you have been great at talking about all the needs that we have in the Pacific and we thank you for that.

In today's world, with all the gag orders we see coming from the Pentagon and the prescreening that is going on, oftentimes don't know what you can say and what you can't say, and so the best we can do is throw out the questions we think we need to ask for the defense of the country and then you can either answer it or glance off of it.

But one of the things that I have been concerned about for years is the growing modernization we see with the Chinese military. It is unprecedented, I think, in terms of its speed and the depth that we have seen.

And every time we ask about it, we always get the same response. Well, we don't want a conflict with China.

None of us want a conflict with China.

I don't think they want a conflict with us.

Yet if you read all of their white papers, if you study their literature, if you listen to their comments, everything they do is focused upon us. Their modeling has our carriers in their modeling. They look at our weapons systems to defend against our weapon systems.

If we don't ask the same questions, we are not being smart. We are being foolish.

And so when you look at our strategy, they always come down to a number of things, but at the end, it is how long we can withstand an intensified conflict.

If you look at some of their literature, they don't feel that we can take a body blow and keep going for a long period of time.

My question for you, this morning, is with the resources you have under your command, if we did have an intense conflict that were to develop, none of us want it, but if it were to develop with the Chinese, given their growing modernization, how long could we sustain that kind of conflict?

Admiral WILLARD. I think the question is a fair one. I think the question is a very difficult one to answer when you consider the vast number of scenarios that we may be discussing here in terms of any contingency the United States Armed Forces would face, depending on its intensity and the way in which we would choose to deal with it.

There are obviously methods where United States Armed Forces, together with the whole of government, can approach a problem, not necessarily in the form of attrition warfare, in the way that we have classically contended, at times, in the past.

So, how symmetrical, how asymmetrical, we would choose to approach a conflict matters and ultimately is part of the answer to your question.

I think when you look around the world at what the United States has contended with, in the Middle East, 10 years of warfare and we remain pretty resilient and committed to finishing the warfare that is currently ongoing in Afghanistan.

And at the same time, we are able to flex to issues like Libya.

Or, in my case, flex to a large-scale disaster response in Japan.

And continue to conduct an exercise series across the Asia-Pacific, albeit, at a somewhat diminished rate. But nonetheless, we meet our commitments throughout the region.

There is capacity in the Asia-Pacific that sometimes belies, I think, the assumptions made regarding both the combat power and the power to sustain operations there.

I am confident that I have got the force structure right now postured forward and available to me to do the work that I need to do, to include a next contingency, should I need to confront one.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. And, General, thank you for what you are doing.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to change the focus a little bit here and go Down Under.

First, Admiral Willard, you mentioned New Zealand and Australia in your written testimony and New Zealand's contributions to supporting our common interests in a variety of ways around the globe.

With regards to Australia, this is—I understand a discussion going on with the Force Posture Review with Australia and it is in discussion stage and I was curious about PACOM's role and your assessment of the progress of these discussions and the focus of these discussions?

Admiral WILLARD. Yes. Thank you.

The Australians have been extremely forward-leaning in their overtures to the United States Government and to the Department of Defense to consider whether or not increasing our level of involvement with their armed forces, taking advantage of some of the existing capacities in Australia would lend to an improved Pacific Command posture, particularly in accessing Southeast Asia and the South China Sea region.

And we have taken a hard look at that. I, myself, visited Australia and nearly circumnavigated the continent. In viewing areas in northern Australia, the prospects of an improving force posture in those directions are very appealing.

I think that those ongoing between the United States Government and Australia Government, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Ministry of Defense in Australia will likely lead to fruitful opportunities for us to provide for rotational forces in and out of Australia in the future. At least I am hopeful for that.

As Secretary Gates made very clear, ultimately he will make a proposal into the U.S. interagency and beyond his recommendation. It will become a United States Government decision at the end of the day, with the Australian Government, obviously, in the ultimate discussion.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks.

And General Sharp, I sense you had some things to say with regards to Mr. Langevin's comments on regional missile defense and I had some questions about it too. So, I will give you the opportunity to sort of build on what Admiral Willard said, with regard to Mr. Langevin's question.

But just with regards to the regional aspect of missile defense and how ROK [Republic of Korea] would fit into that?

General SHARP. That is right. Thank you for the opportunity to say that.

Just real quickly, also, on New Zealand and Australia, they are both, of course, key countries within the United Nations [U.N.] Command in the Military Armistice Commission, and last year were key components in the investigations of both of the attacks on North Korea, and participate in our exercises. So they are very important to my command also and what they would do for U.N. sending states and work very closely with that part of the alliance also.

The only thing I was going to mention, in addition, on ballistic missile defense, is I think on a good defense, you also need a very strong offense. And to be able to have the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] type of assets, to be able to look into North Korea, to see what they are doing, I think what north—what the Republic of Korea is doing now to buy a Global Hawk, what we have done in order to be able to synchronize our ISR assets help in a ballistic missile, overall, architecture also.

And then finally, on the proliferation side, PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative] is a big element to get nations to be able to work together to not allow proliferation of missiles out of North Korea, that type of technology to include nuclear technology and the Republic of Korea, being a member of the PSI group now, and recently hosting a large conference and exercise along those line are other things that are being done in order to be able to help stop both the use and the proliferation of missile technology and nuclear capability.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. And then just quickly, I will see how quickly you can answer this question.

In your testimony, you mentioned tour normalization as, I think, as affordable, perhaps. Does that indicate the budget is not big enough for tour normalization? Or how is that progressing?

General SHARP. As I said, we are at the point now where we have reached about our capacity for all of the facilities that we have to bring families there now.

And the limiting factor, to be honest, is schools and the building of more schools will be the next that go up.

As Secretary Gates has said on several occasions, the goal is to be able to move to full tour normalization. But that costs money in order to be able to build the schools, to be able to build the apartments in order to be able to do that.

And that is what we yield back to Secretary Gates. What is affordable? Over what time period in order to be able to complete this very important initiative, so that, I mean, today, as we sit here, there are 7,000 families that are separated for a year because we don't have the infrastructure in Korea to be able to afford to bring them.

Secretary Gates has directed that we work to be able to do that at an affordable pace. As I said, in my opening earlier, that is what we owe him back over the next several months, so he can give direction to the service forces as they build their POMs [Program Objectives Memoranda] for submission next year.

Mr. THORNBERRY [presiding]. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service. You certainly have an incredibly important area of the world as we look to the threats that are emerging.

As we look to the threats that are emerging from North Korea and also from Iran, we turn to our issues of discussing missile defense and I would appreciate if you could discuss how the missile defense mission and the multi-mission capability of the Aegis ballistic missile defense ships are affecting the overall force structure requirements for the Aegis fleet.

In particular, can you describe how operational considerations, such as the need for additional ships, for force protection, influence PACOM's overall missile defense force structure requirements, recognizing that an Aegis ship is going to need assistance, while it is providing missile defense capability?

And according to a Defense News article in June of 2010, they stated that U.S. Aegis radar readiness plunges and indicated that it is in the worst shape ever, raising questions about the service fleets' ability to take on a high-profile new mission next year, defending Europe from ballistic missiles.

Could you please discuss any Aegis readiness concerns that you may have and how it may impact the Navy's ability to meet missile defense mission requirements?

Admiral.

Admiral WILLARD. I will start with the second question first, if I may, and discuss the readiness piece.

With the exception of all of our ships being steamed at a very high pace, and by and large they have been for the last decade, while we have been occupied in wars elsewhere and moving forces around a great deal, also maintaining our forward presence in the Asia-Pacific, there are not overarching concerns about Aegis readiness in my fleet.

So, as far as Pacific Command is concerned, the readiness of the Aegis fleet, in terms of conducting its ballistic missile defense mission or any of its other multi-mission tasks, is not a concern for me.

With regard to the multi-mission role of Aegis, and its self-protection capability, these are very competent platforms. As you allude, they have about a half a dozen missions that they contribute to, to include the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission that was previously mentioned, but also an air defense mission, a surface defense mission, an undersea warfare mission and so on.

So they are contributing to a great deal at any time when they are at sea.

The ballistic missile defense capabilities that they have are limited only by virtue of the capability of the missile systems that they are employing.

So as we see advances in the SM-3 system and larger envelopes, the freedom of action that the ships will have to operate at extended ranges away from ballistic missile sites where they can also perform that function will increase.

So, over time, the freedom of action of ships committed to ballistic missile defense will improve as they also perform their other functions.

I would have to understand the scenario you described to say that they themselves have to be protected while they are conducting BMD. The——

Mr. TURNER. Well, certainly they have needs for additional systems.

I mean, but that does provide some demand on your overall ship force structure.

Admiral WILLARD. Well, we operate in a variety of modes, you know, with other ships, sometimes singly. These ships, again, are pretty self-sufficient.

So to understand the conditions under which they would be operating in a surface action group or in a larger carrier strike group as opposed to independently is something that is probably worth discussion.

But, by and large, these ships are self-sufficient and, as you suggest, multi-role. To the maximum extent possible, we intend to keep them that way.

As the ballistic missile defense missile systems continue to improve, the freedom of action to have these ships located at extreme distances from the ballistic missile threat sites will continue to improve as well.

Mr. TURNER. I look forward to having additional conversations about that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Kissell.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General and Admiral, for being here.

Mrs. Willard, thank you especially for your service. When we consider our military personnel, their families are front and foremost, also, with our considerations.

General, we had talked about and you had mentioned earlier that South Korea has stated that, you know, if there are any provocations from North Korea they will respond in kind, and greater.

In your opinion, how much of an impression can they make on North Korea? Can they—I am not asking for specifics, but, also, you all discussed this and is there any concern that they might overreact to provocation?

General SHARP. Thank you. South Korea has a very strong military force that continues to grow stronger every day.

In fact, they recently just published their new defense reform plan based upon a lot of lessons learned out of 2010 and are really focusing on the ability to be a more joint type of force that is optimized towards the North Korea threat that we see for today and in the future.

Without getting into classified session, I have reviewed the plans that the Republic of Korea, and we have worked together on for a variety of different types of provocations.

They are strong, appropriate and meet the test of self-defense. I am confident in General Han, the Republic of Korea's chairman—who is a chairman for the Republic of Korea, and Minister Kim's capability to make sure that they, the South Koreans, do not unnecessarily escalate.

What North Korea will do is up to North Korea. But I am absolutely confident that South Korea has the controls that the re-

sponse that goes back will be firm, but it will not force an uncontrolled escalation from a South Korean perspective.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir.

Admiral, we had hearings in the previous Congress. At one point in time, our ships as they were in international waters, were being, for lack of a better word, harassed by the Chinese fishing boats, whatever.

We had trouble just simply making our way through the waters without, you know, fear of hitting other boats. You know, memory doesn't serve perfectly, but there were a couple of points where, you know, we did have interaction with some of these other ships.

But I don't hear about that so much now at all. What is the status of that?

Are they continuing to harass our movements in international waters? Or what is this relationship now?

Admiral WILLARD. From the standpoint of the Chinese maritime activities in and around the East China Sea and South China Sea, Yellow Sea regions where we sometimes operate, we have not had confrontations with the PLA Navy or with their maritime security forces since the incidents that you allude to.

The Chinese do continue to shadow some of our ships as they conduct their missions in international waters that are proximate to China.

The confrontations that have occurred have occurred with our partners and allies in the region. You are, no doubt, aware of the incidents that occurred with the Japanese over the Senkakus and confrontations continue to persist in the South China Sea, most recently, with a Philippine ship that was operating there.

So we continue to observe for, watch over, the maritime activities across the board that are occurring in the Southeast Asia region and East Asia region in order to ascertain where confrontations or conflict could emanate.

But, to date, this year, there have been no confrontations with our forces.

Mr. KISSELL. Admiral, at one time, these confrontations were to the point where we had a hearing about it to talk about it; and, now that has been withdrawn is there a particular reason that you might know that they pulled back there? Or was it just recognizing that maybe that wasn't the best policy?

Or just why do you think maybe that was negated in terms of what they are doing in terms of the relationship with us?

Admiral WILLARD. Well, I think probably two things. One, I think the assertions made last year by the United States, in particular, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, very strong statements within the ASEAN and the Shangri-La Dialogue series I think had an effect.

I think the fact that the ASEAN nations themselves coalesced, marshaled around one another to protest the very assertive actions that we were seeing out of the Chinese over various maritime activities in the South China Sea.

I think for those reasons they have at least tactically withdrawn from any confrontations.

But, as well, we have resumed military-to-military relations with China. We at U.S. Pacific Command hosted a military maritime

consultative agreement round of talks with them which has to do with maritime safety and air safety.

And as you know, there had been visits in both directions with the President Hu's visit that had been preceded by Secretary Gates' visit to China.

I think any time that the military-to-military relationship is ongoing and continuous, that the likelihood of confrontation such as you suggest is diminished.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you so much for joining us today. I enjoyed seeing you there at Newport News at the USS *California* ceremony there.

Mrs. Willard, thank you so much for your effort there as the ship's sponsor. That was a great, great day.

Admiral Willard, I did want to speak a little bit about what is going on with China's efforts to modernize their naval forces. As we know, there are some significant issues there.

They are expanding their capability both with carriers and with other elements of their navy in being able to project sea power across the world.

They are on the road to, I think, creating a fairly capable navy. As we know, they certainly have the quantity elements that begin to create some concern for us. They are working on the quality side of things.

Right now, they are looking at it from a littoral zone issue as far as creating that force. But they are also projecting force out and beyond those particular areas and with a focus to, I think, go well beyond the littoral zone around China.

As you know, just this past year, we have seen a Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa, also in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

So, that tells me that they are on track to do a little bit more than just protecting their shipping lanes and their littoral areas.

In going back and looking historically about how the development of navies have occurred, I would like to go back to historian Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and his idea about sea power.

And of course, he projected this structure that nations go forthwith to be able to project sea power. As you know, at the end of the 19th century, he wrote pretty eloquently about that.

In the years to come, Japan, the U.S., Germany and Britain all followed that. I think they have been pretty successful in projecting that particular seapower force.

I want to ask you a question. That is, from their efforts in sustaining and executing sustained power projection through a navy—and, granted, they have got a ways to go—but in the 21st century with the pace at which they are pursuing this, how do you see that as a challenge to our naval and air forces there at the Pacific Command?

And where do you think that we need to be in order to make sure that we are countering that in that particular region in addition to

all the other places where we are pulled to as we have humanitarian efforts that we are called to in that region?

Let me ask you in your estimation where you see the Chinese future projection of naval power as a challenge and concern there for Pacific Command.

Admiral WILLARD. I think, unquestionably, the Chinese have aspirations to expand their naval presence and are expanding their naval presence.

Your summary, I think, was a very good one in terms of where they are operating today. We have no illusions that they don't desire to operate further into the Pacific and likely into the Indian Ocean region as well.

I think they are learning to sustain their forces elsewhere. It takes time and training and persistence to understand how to sustain forces logistically when they are underway for long periods of time.

They have done an incredible job with their counter-piracy effort. And I think, as a consequence, they are rolling the lessons learned back into their other naval activities.

Most of their naval presence is in patrol activities in the Bohai, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea region and will likely continue to be there for the foreseeable future as they explore their ability to conduct business elsewhere.

In terms of concerns for Pacific Command, I think as long as we remain uncertain regarding future Chinese intent, either with their naval forces or any of their military forces, it is important that we take the necessary steps and make the necessary investments to pace those changes as we see them occur and be able to contend with any possibility of something other than a constructive Chinese navy or a constructive Chinese military in the region.

That said, through the mil-to-mil dialogue that is currently occurring and, I think, with patience and persistence on the part of the United States in trying to work with China, that at the end of the day, we may see a Chinese military, including a Chinese navy, that is contributing to the broader security of the region and not, instead, contending it.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Hanabusa.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Aloha, Admiral and Mrs. Willard.

Welcome, General and Admiral. Thank you for testifying.

My question is, first, with the Admiral. Admiral Willard, especially for those of us in Hawaii, we are watching what is going on in Japan very critically.

But we also do know that prior to this there were issues regarding the Democratic party and when they took over the Japanese Government and what the relationships would be with us.

I think we were just getting to the point where we were getting a better understanding and then the tsunami and, of course, the earthquake tsunami and now the problems with the Fukushima-Daiichi has emerged.

First, can you explain to me how important a role Japan plays as our ally in the Pacific area?

Secondly, with what we have now experienced in all these different chains of events—and let's not also forget the constitution of Japan, which has limitations as to their military ability, what are we going to have to do, at least in the short term, to compensate for what is going on in Japan, assuming that their military role, with us, is critical?

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, thank you very much, Congresswoman.

We hear the alliance between the United States and Japan often referred to as cornerstone. I think that probably understates the importance of the alliance between the United States and Japan.

In Northeast Asia, the ability to maintain a forward force presence in Japan affords us access into the Asia-Pacific region that otherwise would be very difficult to achieve.

I think that it is a mutually beneficial alliance. I think the Japanese military, as a consequence of U.S. presence, has grown to be formidable and capable and, as you have already witnessed, extremely interoperable with our forces.

I think the combination of the forward forces in Japan and the forward forces on the Korean Peninsula afford the United States an unprecedented deterrent forward in Northeast Asia that could be regarded as extended beyond that.

So, you can't understate the importance of the alliance, in general.

In the short term, the Japanese defense forces are committed to assisting in saving Northern Honshu and their nation from the confluence of disasters that they have experienced.

At the same time, they remain a very accomplished force. They are continuing to conduct their military business in the region, notwithstanding the 100,000 or so ground forces that are committed to helping in Northern Honshu.

I think that at the conclusion of this, as we finish the work of disaster response and humanitarian relief and turn it back over to agencies and the Government of Japan to administer to their people, you will see the U.S.-Japan alliance stronger as a consequence of the support that we have provided and the work that we have done together.

You will see a Japanese defense force that will emerge from this stronger for having experienced it.

Mrs. HANABUSA. So, Admiral, you don't believe that the change in the political party structure is going to interfere with our future relationship with Japan?

Admiral WILLARD. I think that there were fits and starts as the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan] administration assumed control of the Japanese Government. We saw that with one prime minister that ultimately departed in the midst of the Futenma Replacement Facility debate that was ongoing.

Prime Minister Kan has enumerated many times his commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance. I think he remains a strong proponent.

I think after what has been witnessed following this regretful disaster in Japan, he will remain a strong advocate of the alliance and our way forward.

So, right now, I am encouraged by the government's position with regard to alliance matters and the United States military and support to it in general.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Mahalo, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Admiral WILLARD. Mahalo.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Sharp, I have a cousin under your command over there right now. My wife's cousin has been over there.

And just a question on the Korea issue; the people in South Korea and North Korea, is there a general desire that that be a unified country? Or do you believe that that leadership is in the way of the unification?

Or do you believe that even with different leadership we would still see a South Korea and a North Korea?

General SHARP. Sir, from the people of the Republic of Korea from South Korea from the president on down, there is a strong desire for a peaceful unification over time. There is no doubt in my mind about that.

From a North Korean perspective, I think Kim Jong-Il focuses on regime survival, under any terms, in council and his continued development of nuclear capability and these provocative acts in order to be able to have his regime survive.

Mr. SCOTT. So when the mortality tables catch him, is that going to be an opportunity there for the peace and unification of Korea? Is that—

General SHARP. Sir, as you know, you know, Kim Jong-Un is his youngest son; we believe we see indications that he may be becoming groomed to be the successor.

Now, what he does as he becomes the leadership in North Korea is yet to be seen. Obviously, we call upon him and whoever succeeds, you know, the succession process, within Kim Jong-Il, within the regime, to take advantage of that opportunity to be able to care more about their people and care more about human rights and dignity. But we don't see the indications of that happening, to be quite blunt.

That is why we as a Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance are working very hard to make sure that we are prepared for a North Korea of the future that could potentially continue the types of acts that we have seen over the last couple of years and that continue to work to develop nuclear weapons.

Again, there is another path that North Korea could take. But we have not seen indications that they are willing or ready or able to do that.

Mr. SCOTT. Are other countries, in your opinion, working to nudge them down that path, to encourage that path? Or do you think that they are standing in the way of that path?

General SHARP. I think that if you look at, really, the entire world, after the actions that North Korea took, not only last year, and the condemnation that they got from the United Nations, but also in previous years after the Taepodong launch, which was in direct violation of United Nations Security Council [UNSC] and the

nuclear test, the world has called on North Korea to change their ways.

But, as I said before, we don't see any action from North Korea headed in that direction at this time.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Willard, the nation's 17th Joint STARS [Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] aircrafts are based out of my district, Robins Air Force Base.

With everything going on, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, I mean, if something did start, if we got into an action with North Korea, would we have the ISR capabilities that we need?

Or is that an area that we are stretched thin and with all the actions that are occurring around the world right now?

Admiral WILLARD. Well, I would answer it in two ways. First of all, the ISR capabilities on the Korean Peninsula are probably as robust as they are anywhere in our military and consistently are maintained as such because we are in armistice and because we are constantly deterring the North.

So, General Sharp enjoys, you know, a capability and, frankly, a priority and commitment from the United States in order to meet his surveillance needs.

That has only been improved upon and has gained more focus since the events last year and, particularly, since the crisis on the Korean Peninsula on December 20th of last year.

When you consider the way in which we invest in our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, where, at large, during peacetime we kind of spread those capabilities around to the various combatant commands to meet all of our requirements, whether they are space-based or air-breathers or ground-based sensor systems.

Whenever we go to war, or whenever a contingency erupts somewhere in the world, we tend to bias those capabilities toward that contingency.

So, for 10 years, we have given over many of those capabilities to the Middle East wars that have been fought. When something like Libya erupts, ISR goes in that direction.

Frankly, when Japan and natural disasters occurred, ISR came in our direction in order to meet the demand signal of trying to characterize the Fukushima plants and the area that was affected by the natural disaster.

So, we share in those assets, and they tend to move around wherever they are in demand.

General SHARP. If I may just add to that from a coalition perspective, we work very hard in Korea to take advantage of the capabilities not only of U.S. ISR, but the Republic of Korea ISR.

So, we have a combined intel center with analysts from both the Republic of Korea and the United States that have been working this problem on the Korean side for years and years.

It is not just about airborne, it is, again, all of the different components of intel to make sure that we are getting a full picture of what is going on inside North Korea.

So it is the U.S. assets that combine with the Republic of Korea and the tactics, techniques and procedures that we learned over the years give us that robust capability that we really need.

And coalitions like what we have with the Republic of Korea are key to be able to do that in our part of the world and, really, around the world.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, both.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the witnesses for their service and their testimony.

It is almost exactly a year ago to the day when the *Cheonan* was attacked by North Korean mini-sub. The forensic evidence is indisputable in terms of the analysis that was done.

Frankly, the denial of that evidence by the Chinese Government, even to some degree the Russian evaluation of this, I mean, frankly, when I listen to your answer, General, about the sort of international isolation of Korea in terms of its actions the last few years, I mean, frankly, in terms of at least the *Cheonan*, that really hasn't been the case.

In terms of the mil-to-mil relationships, which you have been talking about with China, Admiral Willard, I mean, frankly, that is pretty discouraging because, I mean, that action just falls so outside any acceptable norm in terms of international law and, certainly, protection of sea lanes.

I mean, can you update us at least in terms of whether or not you think there is any hope that we are going to get that international consensus about how, again, they violated, really, every level of law and decency in terms of what that attack represented.

Admiral WILLARD. Are you referring to China—

Mr. COURTNEY. Yes.

Admiral WILLARD [continuing]. Russia not acknowledging the—

Mr. COURTNEY. Correct.

Admiral WILLARD [continuing]. International investigation report and so forth?

Mr. COURTNEY. Yes.

Admiral WILLARD. Unquestionably, there has been alignment on the part of both China and to, as you suggest, to a somewhat lesser extent, Russia, to moderate any condemnation of North Korea's actions last year.

And that was disappointing. But it is important to realize that the PRC [People's Republic of China] remains an ally of North Korea. They maintain a mutual defense treaty together.

The longstanding philosophy of the PRC has been one of non-interference and a very strong desire for status quo or maintenance of just a stable condition on the Korean Peninsula regardless of the provocation that may have caused a disruption.

We saw evidence of that replay itself last year. It is nothing new.

It is an area in which the U.S. view and Chinese view are highly divergent. It is an area that I think between our two governments continues to need work, to your point.

Mr. COURTNEY. I think that is a good answer. I just would say that, in this case, I mean, what we are really talking about just isn't about, sir, non-intervention. But it is really about denial of the truth about what happened there.

I mean, that is what, again, in my opinion just raises a series of questions about, you know, how healthy the relationship is with the Chinese Government and military.

I have only got about a minute and a half.

I guess a follow-on question to that incident, you know, by all sort of press and public accounts, I mean, there clearly was a problem there for the Chinese Navy—excuse me—the South Korean Navy in terms of being able to detect these mini-sub in very shallow waters.

You know, we have talked a lot about sea-based deterrents.

I mean, if there is, it sort of raises a question about whether or not sonar capability is a problem in terms of making sure that we are going to have, you know, robust, sea-based deterrents if there are all these mini-sub that are being able to sort of hide in the noise of shallow waters.

I wonder if you can sort of comment on whether or not you feel confident that we are okay and frankly, do we need to do more to help the South Korean Navy to deal with that issue?

Admiral WILLARD. To your last point, we are doing more to help the South Korean Navy with their ASW [anti-submarine warfare] readiness and preparedness.

The U.S. 7th Fleet has a long-term goal and a series of milestones to accomplish that. So we continue to train with the ROK Navy in earnest to ensure that our readiness is maintained at a very high level.

But I think, to your first point, it is important to recognize that what occurred with *Cheonan* was an unprovoked, surprise attack, unexpected, typical of the provocations that we have experienced by Kim Jong-Il in the past.

So this was a sneak attack, as you suggest, by a mini-sub with a torpedo in a shallow-water area when the relationship between the two militaries and the relationship on the water that particular night, you know, would not have caused their sonar men or anyone else in the military to have expected an egregious attack such as occurred. So very difficult to ever predict or imagine preventing an unprovoked surprise attack, one-off, such as occurred with *Cheonan*.

But I think, to your point, that there is certainly a view inward that has been taken by the ROK Navy. We will continue to support, and General Sharp will oversee, and that is the improvement of readiness and elimination of vulnerabilities across the board to the extent that we can among both—across both sides, U.S. and Republic of Korea.

General SHARP. And the Republic of Korea has not just stood idly by. They have aggressively gone after changes to their tactics, techniques and procedures out in the Northwest Island area in order to be able to counter that type of threat from the future.

If you look in their defense reform, what they plan on buying and positioning out to take the sub threat and to be able to reduce their vulnerabilities, they are putting it against that, also.

As Admiral Willard said, we work very aggressively in some anti-sub warfare exercises in order to be able to have the strongest both deterrent but then preparation if North Korea decides to continue that in the future.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Sharp, Admiral Willard, thank you for your service to our country.

General Sharp, first of all, I appreciate your time yesterday and the information you shared with me on the great job the men and women of U.S. Forces Korea do on a daily basis.

General, I understand that the Republic of Korea will assume wartime operational control in 2015. Are you confident their forces are ready to assume this role, and if not, what action must be taken to ensure they become ready?

General SHARP. Thank you, sir. I did very much enjoy visiting with you yesterday afternoon.

I am absolutely confident that by 1 December, 2015, the Republic of Korea will be ready to take operational control and leadership of a future war fight.

We are working very hard with the Republic of Korea as part of, as I said in my opening statement, the Strategic Alliance 2015 Agreement that was signed by the Secretary and the Minister last October to ensure that readiness.

Let me highlight just a couple important points that are in that agreement. And it also includes the milestones in order to be able to make sure that this event will occur and that, actually, the alliance will be stronger because of it.

First off, we are working with the Republic of Korea to develop what are the capabilities they need in order to be able to lead the war fight after 2015 and—ensuring that once that that is agreed that that is in their budget they are bought, organized, trained and equipped with those capabilities.

Secondly, we are revising our war plans to account for the fact that the Republic of Korea JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] will be in the lead of the war fight across the full range of the different war plans that we have. Those will be complete by December 2015.

We will then take and exercise all of those war plans in our two annual theater-level exercises that we will have multiple times between now and 2015.

Then the last thing I will say is that the professionalism and the capability of the Republic of Korea military is outstanding.

I have seen over the last 3 years the capability, the decision-making ability, the willingness and the ability to be able to make sure that we are one team as an alliance between Combined Forces Command and the ROK chairman staff, which will be in the lead of the war fight, and increase enormously as a result of all these provocations that we talked about.

So, yes, sir, I am confident that the Republic of Korea will be ready to lead the defense of their own country while maintaining the full commitment that the United States has as part of the alliance, not reducing our force and commitment. But they will be ready for the leadership role in 2015.

Mr. COFFMAN. General Sharp, I know in our discussion yesterday that you felt that any reduction in the 28,500 U.S. military personnel on the peninsula would be the wrong message.

But let me ask this question, that I understand that the intention of the Department of Defense was to draw down manpower at U.S. Forces Korea to 20,000, but that in 2008 the decision was changed to maintain manpower at 28,500.

What would be the impact on operational readiness and the overall effectiveness of your command if this level was brought down to 20,000?

General SHARP. Sir, as you correctly stated, when Secretary Gates came and looked at the path that we were on to move to 20,000, at that time, my predecessor, General Bell, came to say we need to stop at where we are right now, which at the time was 28,500.

I agree with that assessment, and Secretary Gates and President Obama, for that matter, have stated that that will be the level that we continue at in the future.

To reduce from that level would critically reduce our capabilities in the very beginning part of a war fight to receive forces that come in to reinforce, to help with the NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] in order to be able to get our family members and U.S. citizens out there; to reduce—on the Air Force side would reduce our capability to rapidly strike into North Korea with the long-range artillery; 28,500 is the right amount for the war plans that we have in place now and will have for the next several years.

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you think that after 2015 when the South Koreans take operational control that the numbers should be reexamined?

General SHARP. Sir, I think 28,500, looking at the war plans and how we are currently working through what they will look like after OPCON transition in 2015, the current number, 28,500, I believe is the right number to maintain for that war fight and in the future.

Again, the main thing that changes after OPCON transition is the leadership of the war fight. How we physically maneuver forces on the ground, who has the responsibility for different aspects of the war fight, for the most part stays the same.

So again, we always evaluate this when we go through different analyses of our war fights and what the capability of the Republic of Korea is and what the threat from North Korea is.

But from what I see right now, 28,500 is the right number for after OPCON transition also.

Mr. FRANKS [presiding]. Mr. Garamendi is now recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Admiral, to you, your men and women in your command, the work that you are doing in Japan dealing with the disaster there is extremely important. And, I think, really represents the very best of America. We thank you for that and thank all of them that are involved, some in a very dangerous situation.

In response to a question maybe 15, 20 minutes ago, you had, and this may be the end of the queries, you mentioned communications with China and the military-to-military communications.

Could you expand on that, the current status, your goals, how you see that developing?

I agree with what you said very briefly before. It is extremely important; if you could cover that, please.

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, thank you.

Well, first of all, the commitment that we have and what we believe is the right future between the United States Armed Forces and the Chinese military is that we achieve, maintain and sustain a continuous military-to-military dialogue at the highest levels and some level of exchange and contributing to trust-building at other levels within our respective militaries.

We have done, or have been very challenged in seeing that achieved.

As you know, our mil-to-mil relationship with the Chinese has been characterized by fits and starts often due to disagreements between our two nations.

We went through nearly a year of hiatus last year as a consequence of the last round of Taiwan arms sales, though we have been episodically selling defense articles and services to Taiwan for the last 30 years.

So, China gets a vote in this. But we have attempted to convince them and discuss with them the importance of these two, very consequential militaries in the Western Pacific having the ability to discuss both areas in which we converge and areas of difference.

I think that is the most important thing. We are currently back in a mil-to-mil sequence, but one that is relatively modest.

I would offer, you know, the promises that, ultimately, the mil-to-mil relationship will be one that we have envisioned, you know, probably not entirely achievable.

But, rather, some modicum of that right now would satisfy me that we are headed in the right direction.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. At any time, have we cut off the discussions?

Admiral WILLARD. With the Chinese?

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes.

Admiral WILLARD. Not in my experience, no.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. One further question; the flow of oil seems to be a lot about all that we are talking here.

Could you briefly discuss the Chinese view of the flow of oil from the Middle East to China and the role of the American Navy in that?

Admiral WILLARD. Well, the United States Navy for more than a century has been providing security on the high seas and in the Asia-Pacific region both in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

Given the importance of Middle East oil to our allies and friends in the regions, ourselves and to include the Chinese, the United States has been providing safety on those sea lines of communication ranging back to tanker wars, if you will recall in the 1980s, where we were protecting the tanker ships exiting the Persian Gulf.

The Chinese have been insatiable consumers of many resources, oil included. They regard the flow of oil as a national security concern, I think, from the Middle East.

They have built both port structures, and they are establishing pipelines into Western China from locations on the Indian Ocean

side in order to relieve the amount of strain on the sea lines of communication themselves.

Nonetheless, choke points like the Strait of Malacca remain crucial. I think we all regard its security and safety as critically important.

The nations that guard the security of the strait is very important to both us as well as to the Chinese.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Finally, in 10 seconds, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the Navy for its enthusiasm to look for other sources of fuel besides carbon oil, in other words, advanced biofuels.

Admiral WILLARD. We hope to have a carrier strike group operating on advanced biofuels very shortly.

Mr. GARAMENDI. You are to be commended.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRANKS. I am going to go ahead and ask my questions now, gentlemen.

Thank you for both being here. I appreciate your service so very much.

This is a sort of a follow-on related to a couple of earlier questions, Mr. Bartlett's question, Ms. Bordallo's question. Mr. Bartlett pointed out the incontrovertible reality that when a nation becomes a nuclear-armed nation that our diplomacy is radically altered.

To that point, it occurs to me that we need to be very aware of how much North Korea is cooperating with other nations or potentially passing on nuclear technology to other rogue nations like Iran.

We know there has been a lot of discussion between the two countries and work between the two countries related to their missile technology.

It appears that Iran is now beyond even North Korea's capability in missile technology.

So tell me, if you can, what our ability and our actions are related to preventing North Korea from sharing nuclear technology with other rogue nations.

I will let you both take a look at it.

General SHARP. Sir, as you know, there are several Security Council resolutions which require other nations to, on the proliferation side, to work very hard to make sure North Korea is not proliferating any nuclear missile technology.

We have seen in the past—you know, we know the assistance that North Korea gave to Syria several years ago for the nuclear plant that they were building there.

We have seen on some of the missile proliferation things where countries have stopped some shipments recently because of proliferation.

The specific nuclear exchanges and information flow between North Korea and Iran I think we would have to take into a classified session to go into depth on that, sir.

Mr. FRANKS. But we are working on it is what you are saying. Yes.

Well, let me just shift gears, then, because I don't want to take us in the wrong direction.

There were recent reports that North Korea is nearing the completion of an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] type of weapon. I under-

stand that they are using a lot of old Soviet-style jamming capabilities to jam the South Korean GPS [Global Positioning System] and that South Korea believes that that is a wake-up call that this may be a tactic that North Korea will use more and more in terms of their jamming capabilities.

If they are already working on an EMP weapon, do you have any indication that they might be working on some sort of intentional mechanical electromagnetic interference, some type of device based EMP jamming capability?

And what about this EMP weapon that they talk about, an EMP bomb as it were? I am told that it is made to detonate at 25 miles up, which is a conflict in my mind since most effective EMP weapons would be higher and the 25 miles would be within the atmosphere.

It occurs to me that that would be a suppression of the EMP emission itself.

Do you know where they are on their EMP capability in terms of weaponizing in either device-based or any sort of a nuclear explosive—or a nuclear warhead-based EMP?

General SHARP. Sir, unfortunately, on the EMP side, we are going to need to take that into a classified session.

I can say on the GPS jamming side we have seen North Korea's use of GPS jammers up on the Northwest part of the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea government has called on North Korea to stop that jamming.

Mr. FRANKS. Do you think it portends a widening of a particular tactic? Do you think they intend to develop their jamming capability, either EMP or radiofrequency or otherwise?

General SHARP. Sir, I think North Korea has continued to develop a lot of different capabilities in the asymmetric threat capability way.

I think it is one of the ways, it is where they have been putting their money between ballistic missile capability, nuclear and special operating forces to asymmetrically try to force change in South Korea to send messages to other audiences, the United States, in particular, that they are a nation that cannot be challenged.

I think they look for many different ways to do that.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, last question, gentlemen; I always try to ask the question; what is the most important, the most significant challenge that we face that needs to be addressed from North Korea?

If you can do it at the 50,000-foot level where it doesn't enter into any sort of classified concern and maybe let you both take a shot at it.

Admiral Willard, sir, I will start with you on this one.

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, I think the most significant is nuclearization and the development of ballistic missile delivery systems that have now reached the point of being intercontinental.

So, we are obviously concerned by that development. A denuclearized North Korea is both the commitment that the international community has made and an imperative, I think, given the nature of this regime.

General SHARP. I agree with Admiral Willard. I will say it in a slightly different way.

The status quo is no longer acceptable. The status quo, I think, that the world sometimes sees in North Korea and says, "let's just return to the status quo," is a status quo that killed many Republic of Korea citizens and service members last year.

It is a status quo that has launched ballistic missiles in contravention with U.N. Security Council resolutions. It is a status quo that has continued to develop nuclear weapons.

I think at the 50,000-foot level for the world and all of the leadership of the world to understand status quo is no longer acceptable because where it is heading is not acceptable to the world.

To force change in North Korea is the number one challenge that we and the world have for the future.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, General, I don't know if it impresses you, but I agree with you. Thank you, sir.

Thank you both.

Mr. Runyan is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you for your service to this country. Thanks for being here today.

Admiral, I just wanted to thank you for your response to Mr. Turner's question earlier about the Aegis missile defense system.

That is actually manufactured in my backyard, and I am sure those men and women that work to create that system and maintain it would appreciate those kind words.

But as far as you were talking earlier, and we were talking about terrorism threats around the world.

You were talking how you were complimenting the Philippines for their active duty and their preparedness for it.

You know, as far as your command engaging with other international partners in Southeast Asia, do you think you have the appropriate level of funding and/or the authorities to make sure that, you know, is upheld in that region?

Admiral WILLARD. Are you referring to counterterrorism in particular?

Mr. RUNYAN. Yes.

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, thank you. It is a great question.

In South Asia, to use a different location as an example, we are endeavoring to work with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and the nation of India to contain Lashkar-e Tayyiba, a Pakistani-based extremist organization that is already established in South Asia and was responsible for the attack in Mumbai.

In order to accomplish that, we have been working very closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in ensuring that we have adequate resources, including authorities to be able to accomplish that mission.

To date, in the way that support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines was developed, we have had the authorities commensurate with the mission that we were on.

As we attempt to build capacities in other nations, it is important that we continue to identify shortfalls both in authorities and shortfalls in resources to be able to build the capacities in these partner nations such that they can become increasingly self-suffi-

cient in dealing with the extremist organizations that are present there.

So, that is currently our focus in Bangladesh and Nepal and, to a lesser extent, Sri Lanka and the Maldives right now.

We are operating within authorities that are adequate, I would offer. And we are constantly seeking increased authorities to give us more latitude in order to be less episodic and more continuous in our efforts to build the capacities with, through, and by these partner nations.

Mr. RUNYAN. To what extent have relations improved between China and Taiwan and its impact on the strait?

Admiral WILLARD. I think the, you know, the evolution throughout the Ma administration with regard to Taiwan-mainland China relations, has been one of constant improvement. I mean, we have been encouraged by the relationships that have existed.

I would offer that there is an election on Taiwan scheduled for 2012. And that is worth watching over, given the fact that this administration will soon be, you know, coming to an end and a reelection process will then be unfolding.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, gentlemen, and I yield to Mr. Conaway for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen.

Obviously, I am the only thing that stands between you and getting out of here.

Admiral Willard, this doesn't fall under your responsibility, but the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] requires an annual assessment of Chinese military capabilities, strategies and intentions due March 1st of each year, still not here, as of the 6th of April.

Your command, I suspect, would have a chance to look at it and have some influence on that. Have you had a chance to look at that this year's version?

Admiral WILLARD. You are referring to the NDAA?

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, the NDAA's requirement that the OSD provide us, the committee, with a report on China's military capacities, locations and those kinds of things that is due March 1st of each year—

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, sir. I would offer that we have been in continuous dialogue with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on all issues pertaining to China and China's military.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I understand. But, particularly, with the report itself, apparently it hasn't risen to your level in terms of—

Admiral WILLARD. It has not risen to my personal level.

Mr. CONAWAY. Is it something that you and your team used, last year's report? I mean, do you use that data or that information in the report for anything?

Admiral WILLARD. Certainly. We definitely consume it and add it to the portfolio of China knowledge that we will then carry on with for the remainder of the year.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, well, obviously, the NDAA and other pieces of legislation require this in different reports.

It means someone has to do it and in this age of trying to cut costs we are looking for those that have a meaningful impact to the

way you run your business, but then also give us an insight into how you run your business and how it is done and how that—so we do the oversight.

Admiral WILLARD. Understand.

Mr. CONAWAY. So if you wouldn't mind, next time you bump into Secretary Mabus, just say, "Hey, by the way, the committee is asking about that report," one more time because we think it is reported.

If you look through the list of things that we ask to be assessed, it would appear to be the exact same things that you would need to think about day in and day out as to how you run PACOM.

General Sharp, good to see you again. I went over there one time with former Chairman Skelton. It was a great trip.

As you are coming towards the command-sponsored tours increase in Korea, are you concerned at all about the incidences on the economy where, you know, people do stupid stuff from time to time, not necessarily the things that happened in Okinawa that helped drive some of the changes there?

Have you had enough experience now to know that our kids and their kids can get along and that this doesn't become sort of a problem with the Koreans?

General SHARP. Sir, I am very satisfied. We watch, of course, our incident rates very, very closely as we have more service members and family members over there.

Korea is an extremely safe place to live. It is a great place for our service members and their families to be there because of the love that the Korean people have and the respect that they have for U.S. forces there.

There was a recent poll that just came out from the State Department that said, when asked to the people of the Republic of Korea, "What is the importance of U.S. forces on the peninsula," over 87% said, "Important," or, "Very important."

So the incidents, there is always one or two, we do take the appropriate action to be able to take care there. But I am very proud of our service members and their families.

They understand they are ambassadors of the United States to the Republic of Korea. They are living up to that responsibility.

Mr. CONAWAY. That is good to hear because we do want to be good guests, even though we are there to help them and protect them from a lot of bad stuff.

So, gentlemen, thank you for your service. Thanks for being here this morning.

I will yield back.

General SHARP. Thank you.

Mr. FRANKS. Well thank you, Mr. Conaway.

As it happens, he has left an extra minute. Therefore, Mr. Larsen here has a final question.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Conaway.

Admiral Willard, last year, I was out at PACOM and visited with the Pacific Fleet and Army. I think I met with the Marines and Air Force just talking about building partner capacity projects. I think the assessment was that things were going very well.

But the question I have for you is how you think the dollar flow works. Does it work well enough? Do they have the right authorities to use relative to the things that we have done here developing 1206 and 1208 in addition to the other grab bag of tools that exist in the Federal budget for you all to do this effort?

Can you give me an assessment about that? Not about how well the project is going, but on how the budgets work and if you have the authorities?

Or should it be fewer barriers between these accounts? Does the flexibility help or not help? Can you talk about that a little bit?

Admiral WILLARD. For the past several years, we have been, I think, all pushing to streamline these instruments that allow us to work with our partners throughout the world.

I say we. Collectively, all the combatant commanders, I think, have been very interested in having ready access to the tools that we have come to rely on and that enable that work to occur, whether that is 1206 funding, IMET [International Military Education & Training], foreign military financing [FMF], foreign military sales [FMS].

I mean, these are items that are crucial with regard to the relations that we have with the many partners throughout the Asia-Pacific; 36 nations, 34 of which have militaries or security forces that we are working alongside.

So the less the impediments and difficulties with regard to administering to these instruments, the better.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. As a principle, that is great.

Any particular problems that you or your folks have faced?

Admiral WILLARD. I guess I would offer that coming from the customer base——

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Admiral WILLARD [continuing]. At times, the inability of FMS to be as responsive as it needs to be is probably the biggest criticism that we receive.

There are many, many requests to be educated in and work more closely, be trained inside the United States. So, for those reasons, our IMET funding is crucial.

But, at the end of the day, I think delays, and complexity of process with regard to the exchange of materials with our partners, is the one most serious complaint that we hear.

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Great, great.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRANKS. Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming to this committee. We have no way to express to you our gratitude.

We do our best, but we know that you are the ones that carry the load of freedom on your back. The Nation owes you beyond any ability it might articulate.

Thank you very much.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. FRANKS. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 6, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 6, 2011

**Statement of Howard P. “Buck” McKeon,
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services**
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests for
U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea
April 6, 2011

Good morning. The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request for U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. I welcome our witnesses, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Bob Willard, and the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General Skip Sharp. Thank you both for being with us. It’s a pleasure to see you again.

First, on behalf of this entire Committee, please allow me to express my heartfelt sorrow to the people of Japan for the terrible disaster which struck unexpectedly on March 11. Japan is not only an esteemed trading partner, but the military alliance of our two nations forms the cornerstone of our mutual security in the Pacific. Admiral Willard, please convey to your counterparts in the government of Japan that the U.S. Congress stands by them and offers our support to help its citizens rebuild and recover.

In preparing for this hearing, I noted with amazement that the physical damage from the earthquake and tsunami is currently estimated at \$250 billion to \$309 billion. That’s more than 350 percent higher than Hurricane Katrina. Admiral Willard, please let us know what type of assistance the U.S. military has been able to offer Japan, what additional help they may need, and what the status of U.S. personnel and their families is right now.

Apart from Japan, however, our witnesses have responsibility for one of the most geographically and ethnically dispersed regions of the globe, which will present some of the greatest opportunities and challenges to our national security in the coming decades. In its 2011 edition of *The Military Balance*, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), drew ominous conclusions about global developments in defense policy and armed forces.

The IISS head, Dr. John Chipman, warned, “The United States ... in the next few years it is going to have to make some very significant decisions on what it does.” IISS highlighted the contrast between defense cuts in the West and booming military spending and arms acquisitions in Asia and the Middle East concluding

“there is persuasive evidence that a global redistribution of military power is under way.” In particular, the rapidly expanding military power of China continues to overshadow other Asian states’ military efforts and create unease among American allies in the region.

The report further observes that “the Korean peninsula is now as dangerous a place as it has been at any time since the end of the Korean War in 1953,” given the “imminent and possibly unclear leadership succession” in North Korea and that countries aggression toward the South.

In this context, it has never been more important to ensure that our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training, equipment, and the authorities they need to instill confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to respond decisively to any contingency that may arise.

**Statement of Adam Smith,
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests for U.S.
Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea
Wednesday, April 6, 2011**

I would like to extend a warm welcome to Admiral Willard and to General Sharp, and I would like to thank each of them for making a long journey to be here with us today. We are fortunate to receive their expert testimony, as we have a variety of important matters to discuss.

The United States Pacific Command's area of responsibility is a veritable tapestry that is enriched by a diversity of peoples, traditions, and cultures; and much of the growth and prosperity that is enjoyed in that vast portion of the world can be traced to productive relationships between the United States and our many partners in the region. Without question, our servicemen and women serving within the U.S. Pacific Command play a crucial role in bolstering these relationships in a variety of ways. We certainly owe them our gratitude.

I would like to specifically commend those servicemen and women who are presently assisting our Japanese friends in remedying the traumatic effects of a truly epic natural disaster; and, above all, I wish to express our deep admiration for, and extend our full support to, the Japanese people, as they endeavor to prevail over the precarious situation on the island of Honshu. I also wish to acknowledge those service personnel whose daily efforts help maintain the truce on the Korean peninsula. Their efforts serve as a shining example of how courage and commitment help in providing stability and in promoting peaceful progress across the region.

I do not wish to suggest, however, that the Pacific region does not have its challenges. Unfortunately, the North Korean regime continues to present a threat to the international community, just as it continues to abuse its long-suffering populace. It is especially troubling that the North Korean leadership insists on resorting to bellicosity, brinksmanship, and open provocation in an entirely counter-productive manner. As a result, maintaining our strong alliance with the Republic of Korea will remain a national security priority, and I welcome your assessments of how we might improve conditions on the peninsula.

Although we already engage in constructive discourse, improvements in our security relationship with an emerging China should also be prioritized. I am particularly interested in your views on how we might promote transparency and communicate more effectively in our military-to-military contacts with the Chinese to agreeably mitigate concerns and to assist in perpetuating stable and productive multi-lateral cooperation in the region. I am also interested in learning how we might develop our security relationship with India. Clearly, India's burgeoning productivity and influence will support its increasing role in promoting stability in the Pacific and across other regions. These are just two examples among a whole host of relationships that must be actively cultivated within PACOM's area of responsibility.

Transnational threats, such as violent extremism, cyber-threats, and illicit trafficking in persons, narcotics, and weapons are shared menaces. So are the harmful effects of disease, malnourishment, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural disaster. The more we can do to minimize territorial disputes and other international tensions through peaceful and productive interactions among our many partners, the more we can accomplish in countering these threats. An inclusive and interactive approach is the key to further realizing the immense potential for prosperity in the region.

The United States will have to continue to lead by its example and to offer assurances through its forward military presence in the region. I am very interested to learn more about how the U.S. Pacific Command's embrace of a flexible force posture will prove effective in meeting security challenges now and in the future.

How may the United States further its existing relationships in the region and maximize its assets in locations like Japan, South Korea, and Guam? How might the United States cultivate new relationships and opportunities for cooperative engagement in the region? How might we achieve our goals in the region in the most cost-effective manner? Most importantly, how might the Congress provide your commands with the resources appropriate to their needs?

I look forward to receiving your testimony and to continuing our dialogue on these and other important issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

06 APRIL 2011

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Introduction

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Today is my second testimony as the Commander of USPACOM. Since the 2010 hearings, much has happened in this increasingly important region. I have travelled throughout the Asia-Pacific visiting a dozen different countries—some multiple times—and gained valuable insight into the extensive contributions by our regional Allies and partners.

What follows is my assessment of the strategic environment and the role of USPACOM forces assigned throughout the region. Included in this testimony is a discussion of the military construction (MILCON) programs that enable these forces to perform their mission effectively while sustaining the quality of life our servicemen and women deserve.

Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific

The USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is vital to U.S. national interests. It spans half the earth and is home to more than three billion people living in three dozen nations—five of which are allied with the U.S. and many more of which are important economic and security partners. The region contains the world's three largest economies, and almost one-third (over \$1 trillion) of U.S. two-way trade in goods and services is with nations in the region. Moreover, much of the world's trade and energy that fuels the world economy moves on Asia's sea and air lines of communication.

The vastness of the region makes permanent and rotational U.S. force presence essential to enabling security and strategic deterrence throughout the region while protecting and defending the homeland. Military construction provides necessary facilities for new weapon systems, supports the Services' evolution to become more efficient and effective, offers warfighters and their families quality-of-life facilities while at home, and renovates existing facilities that are beyond their useful lives. Thus the MILCON projects in this testimony enhance

the capabilities of USPACOM forces that underpin security in this increasingly important and dynamic region.

While the region remains relatively secure and stable, the strategic environment also includes traditional and asymmetric challenges that drive the need for forward presence and the subsequent MILCON recommendations in this testimony. Sustaining the conditions that have underpinned unprecedented prosperity for over six decades remains challenging for a variety of reasons, including the following:

- The threat to the United States and its allies posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies, and its potential for instability
- Transnational violent extremist organizations (VEOs) undermine stability and threaten traditional Allies and emerging partners
- China's significant military modernization associated with its unclear intent
- Territorial disputes, and increasingly assertive actions to resolve them, present the potential for conflict and instability
- Increasingly persistent and sophisticated cyber threats that challenge unencumbered operations.
- Transnational criminal activity—to include piracy and trafficking in narcotics and persons—that rejects the rule of law and challenges international order
- Humanitarian crises such as pandemics and famines, as well as natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanoes
- Environmental degradation caused by poor resource management, the pillaging of natural resources, and disputes over resource sovereignty

Despite these many challenges, the region remains one of immense opportunity for peaceful growth, cooperation, and prosperity. Realizing such opportunity relies upon continued

U.S. ability and willingness to underwrite security, extend deterrence, and protect the global commons upon which the region's livelihood depends. U.S. military strength, presence, and engagement provide the means to ensure security and peace and avoid confrontation and conflict. Secretary of Defense Gates emphasized this point in Singapore in June 2010: "The strength of the U.S. commitment and deterrent power will be expressed through the continued forward presence of substantial U.S. forces in the region."

USPACOM thus embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture. In concert with other government agencies, this posture is designed to simultaneously hedge against traditional and asymmetric challenges as well as advance alliance and partner-nation relationships. Extensive analyses clearly indicate a need to build an integrated posture framework that prioritizes adjustments by maximizing strength, balancing and biasing disposition, and sustaining readiness in all sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania).

Regional Force Posture Assessment. Broadly, the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific enjoys freedom of action, numerous dependable Allies and partners, and ready access to theater forces (e.g., Hawaii, Guam, and Japan) as well as to global and continental (especially West coast and Alaska garrisoned) forces. Other existing posture strengths include the collocation of command elements in Hawaii, pre-positioned stocks, maintenance support, and several distributed, forward sub-commands.

Current force posture throughout the Asia-Pacific remains heavily influenced by post-World War II- and Cold War-era basing and infrastructure. While maintaining access and capabilities in Northeast Asia remains essential, attaining better access to and support from Allied and partner nations in South and Southeast Asia is increasingly important. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen stated in the 2011 National Military Strategy, "our

presence and alliance commitments remain the key to preserving stability in Northeast Asia, [and] we must also invest new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia.”

USPACOM strives to continuously optimize its force posture to meet emerging 21st-century conventional and asymmetric threats. Nevertheless, forward forces remain potentially vulnerable to cyber attack on networks and logistics systems. Also, growing anti-access and area-denial challenges make joint capabilities and cooperation imperative; further development of the Air-Sea Battle concept will establish a better institutionalized method to address this threat.

Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia is a complex region with distinct challenges and a wealth of opportunities to positively influence the security environment. It contains many of the most significant economies and militaries in the Asia-Pacific and the world, including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and Russia. Strong U.S. presence, basing, access, and support in this important sub-region serves to not only protect the homeland but also furthers U.S. interests regarding Allies, partners, extended deterrence, and treaty obligations.

Northeast Asia is home to North Korea, one of the most likely and persistent threats to the U.S. and its Allies. This nation presents a multifaceted problem set for the U.S.-ROK Alliance, the region, and the international community. In addition to the conventional threat it poses to the ROK, its nuclear program, missile development, proliferation activities, provoke-bargain-cheat cycles, add to North Korea's capacity to disturb peace and stability throughout the region and globally.

Japan and the ROK are strong U.S. Allies that host U.S. forces, enjoy U.S. extended deterrence, and stand with the U.S. in containing North Korea's aggression and meeting other regional and global security challenges.

Japan. Rapid response in the Asia-Pacific region hinges on flexibility and forward basing of military forces. Despite some recent deliberation related to U.S. basing realignment in Japan, the military relationship and the overall Alliance remain strong. As the Alliance enters its 51st year, it endures as relevant and as a key component of security in Northeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific. The U.S. and Japan continue to share similar security interests; therefore continued collaboration is vital to address challenges that include DPRK, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and support for freedom of action in the maritime domain as well as in space and cyberspace.

Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). To transform and realign U.S. forces in Japan, the Government of Japan (GOJ) and the U.S. Government agreed in 2005 to implement changes that would allow USPACOM forces to adapt to the changing regional and global security environment. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) remains a key transformation goal of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and USPACOM remains committed to its implementation. Major realignment elements include relocating two U.S. air bases from urbanized to rural areas, co-locating U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities, deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments, and improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces.

DPRI implementation, in large measure, is on track due to the significant contributions provided by the GOJ. The issue lacking progress and most familiar to members of Congress is the development of a Futenma Replacement Facility and the subsequent move of approximately 8,000 Marines to Guam. While this lack of progress is disappointing, it does not undermine the ability of USPACOM to maintain trained and ready forces in the region or to fulfill U.S. treaty obligations to Japan. Meanwhile, U.S. forces will continue to operate from the existing facility at Futenma Marine Corps Air Station while USPACOM works with Department of Defense leadership and the Japanese to find a solution acceptable to both nations.

Guam. Like the Okinawa-based Marines, Guam-based forces offer the response and deterrence required to enhance security to meet U.S. interests and fulfill commitments to regional U.S. Allies. Per the original agreement, U.S. MILCON funds will also contribute to the facility and infrastructure construction costs on Guam to support the relocating Marines and their dependents. In addition, investments will be needed to improve off-base Guam infrastructure, such as roads and bridges critical to the successful movement of materiel to the planned Marine Corps installation.

The FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act did not include \$320 million for three projects that were submitted in the President's Budget that support the move of Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The reasons for not funding the three priorities are explained in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on the Armed Services. Currently, the U.S. and Japanese governments continue to reaffirm agreements and provide associated funding, including the second Japanese funding increment of \$498 million to support the move of Marines to Guam.

Also, recent approval of the Programmatic Agreement in the National Historic Preservation Act Section 106 process will enable DPRI-related construction to begin. Therefore, for FY2012 the Marines are resubmitting requests for North Ramp Utilities improvement and Finegayan Water Utilities & Site Preparation for a total of \$156 million to support U.S. contribution to the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. The Finegayan project was reduced by \$70 million to include only the water distribution infrastructure. The funding for these projects is critical to the success of the DPRI roadmap and an important signal of U.S. commitment to treaty obligations with Japan.

The Republic of Korea. The U.S.-ROK Alliance remains strong and is critical to U.S. strategy and military force posture in Northeast Asia and the region. This Alliance is also transforming to ensure it matures as an effective contributor to Peninsula and regional security.

Current initiatives are underpinned by the transition of military wartime operational control of the ROK to its own forces during peacetime and war by the end of 2015. Overall, this transformation effort is designed to improve responsiveness to an evolving peninsular, regional, and global security environment. To this end, the transformation must ensure U.S. forces, which are stationed on the Korean Peninsula to deter North Korea's aggression and respond to North Korea's hostility, are also accessible for regional and global employment. Further, the transformation will ultimately support the ROK military's continued development of extra-peninsular capabilities and capacities, and enable additional contributions like those seen recently in the Gulf of Aden combating piracy, providing peacekeeping forces to Haiti and Lebanon, and in Afghanistan leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team.

USPACOM posture transformation in the ROK entails multiple efforts. Projects for the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan include relocating U.S. troops out of downtown Seoul, returning the majority of Yongsan Army Garrison to the ROK government, and consolidating U.S. forces into two primary hubs south of Seoul. This effort sustains a strong U.S. combat presence on the Peninsula while reducing force presence in major urban centers like Seoul. Of note, this realignment is funded largely by the ROK, but MILCON funds are needed for some facility construction and infrastructure developments. While the Services are not submitting MILCON projects related to transformation in FY2012, additional, important projects will be submitted in future fiscal years.

Trilateral Cooperation. Trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan also continues to improve. Building on longstanding efforts to enhance policy coordination and strategic dialogue among the three countries, Secretary Clinton met with Foreign Ministers Maehara and Kim here in Washington on December 6, 2010, to discuss ways to address enduring and emerging challenges. When the devastating earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, the ROK demonstrated unprecedented support by immediately dispatching rescue

teams and sending emergency supplies. That said, there are outstanding political, military, and historical impediments to the Japan-ROK relationship that must be overcome. The shared values and common interests, as well as the financial resources, logistical capabilities, and planning potential to address complex contingencies throughout the region, make expanding this trilateral partnership a worthy effort. Encouraging steps are also apparent in the burgeoning trilateral relationships between the U.S., Japan, and Australia, and between the U.S., Japan, and India.

The People's Republic of China (PRC). China's rise will largely define the Asia-Pacific environment in the 21st century. As noted in the 2010 National Security Strategy, "We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. More broadly, we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises."

In support of this broader national strategy toward China, forward-postured USPACOM forces are focused on deterrence and reassurance missions as they apply to China and U.S. allies and security partners in the region. In addition, USPACOM's interactions with China assist the Administration's broader goals by contributing to an overall military-to-military relationship that is healthy, stable, reliable and continuous. Such a relationship is important to avoid misperception, miscommunication, and miscalculation while it expands opportunities for cooperation where our security interests overlap. However, our military relationship with China continues to suffer from an on-again/off-again cycle of interactions which limits its ability to accomplish the above tasks. China suspended bilateral military relations following our arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010 and restarted them in fall 2010. We look forward to continuing

the progress made in recent months which includes Secretary Gates' successful visit in January of this year.

China's Military Modernization Program. Beginning in the mid-1990s, China's peacetime military modernization program has progressed at a rapid rate. While force modernization is understandable in light of China's growing regional and global roles and accompanying requirements, the scope and pace of its modernization without clarity on China's ultimate goals remains troubling. For example, China continues to accelerate its offensive air and missile developments without corresponding public clarification about how these forces will be utilized. Of particular concern is the expanding inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles (which include anti-ship capability) and the development of modern, fourth- and fifth-generation stealthy combat aircraft. In conjunction, China is pursuing counter-space and -cyber capabilities that can be used to not only disrupt U.S. military operations, but also to threaten the space- and cyber-based information infrastructure that enables international communications and commerce.

Absent clarification from China, its military modernization efforts hold significant implications for regional stability. The region is developing its own conclusions about why the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to expand its ability to project power outside China's borders, and to range both U.S. forces and U.S. Allies and partners in the region with new anti-access and area-denial weaponry. Of growing concern is China's maritime behavior. China's recent official statements and actions in what Beijing calls its "near seas" represent a direct challenge to accepted interpretations of international law and established international norms. While China does not make legal claims to this entire body of water, it does seek to restrict or exclude foreign, in particular, U.S., military maritime and air activities in the "near seas" - an area that roughly corresponds to the maritime area from the Chinese mainland out to the "first island chain" (described, generally, as a line through Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and Indonesia)

and including the Bohai Gulf, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. Chinese naval and maritime law enforcement vessels have been assertive in recent years in trying to advance China's territorial claims in the South China and East China Seas which has resulted U.S. partners and allies in East Asia seeking additional support and reassurance to balance and curb the Chinese behavior. Many of China's maritime policy statements and claims stand in contrast to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The U.S. has consistently sought the appropriate balance between the interests of countries in controlling activities off their coasts with the interests of all countries in protecting freedom of navigation. China has questioned whether a non-party may assert such rights under UNCLOS, a baseless argument but one that would be removed if the U.S. was a party to UNCLOS.

The current situation in the Taiwan Strait remains stable as tensions have declined in recent years; however, the Taiwan issue remains a challenge to long-term regional stability. China refuses to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan question. As China's military modernization proceeds, the cross-Strait military balance continues to shift in the mainland's favor. U.S. policy in support of a peaceful resolution remains consistent and clear. We are committed to our one-China policy, based on the three U.S.-China communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. We do not support Taiwan independence, and would oppose unilateral changes, by either side, to the status quo.

Russia. Russia's Pacific armed forces have not re-emerged from their post-Cold War decline. Moscow is nonetheless attempting to reassert influence in the region through increased naval and strategic air force operations, cyberspace activities, and arms sales to the region's emerging and rising nations. That said, USPACOM enjoys a relatively positive military-to-military relationship with Russia, especially between each country's Pacific Fleets.

Mongolia. Mongolia endures as a small but strong partner in Northeast Asia. It continues to demonstrate support for U.S. regional and global policy objectives—especially

those linked to the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative and security operations in Afghanistan—while managing positive relations with neighbors China and Russia.

Northeast Asia Force Posture Assessment. Strategic deterrence in the USPACOM AOR is concentrated in Northeast Asia where the great majority of U.S. force posture is based. Although the overall combined strength in this sub-region is formidable, there remain areas of concern such as ballistic missile defense and regional contingency support. While both the U.S. and its Northeast Asian Allies and partners have invested in the technical capabilities required to mount effective defenses against ballistic missile attack, the broader missile defense of the region remains problematic, especially in response to a large-scale attack. Further, while Taiwan's military strength is currently sufficient to deter full-scale amphibious or air assault by China, Taiwan's ability to maintain that capability will hinge, in large measure, on whether Taiwan continuously invests in upgraded systems. Lastly, while U.S. military posture in the Asia-Pacific has traditionally focused on the sea, undersea, air, and land domains, the modern realities of warfare demand that it defend against challenges to operate freely in the space and cyberspace.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is a diverse sub-region, rich in natural resources, and strategically located at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is host to a mix of democratic and authoritarian governments, prosperity and poverty, disparate military capabilities, and significant human capital potential. Prospects for continued development, increased security, and regional integration are promising, but the sub-region presents significant security challenges. China's increasing engagement in this sub-region—which, in many cases, is aimed at supplanting U.S. influence—as well as its expansive claims to, and growing assertiveness in, the South China Sea are two notable challenges. Southeast Asia is also home to transnational challenges and threats that include violent extremism, piracy, refugee migrations, and

transnational crime such as narcotics and human trafficking. Additionally, this sub-region is particularly susceptible to natural disasters such as typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and tsunamis.

The myriad of challenges faced by U.S. Allies and partners in Southeast Asia converge with U.S. interests; therefore strengthening defense partnerships is important to regional security. To further military interoperability and build regional capacity to respond to these challenges, the establishment of foundational information, logistics, and technology exchange agreements with these Allies and partners is important.

In response to the growing threat posed by VEOs, USPACOM supports improving the CT capabilities with security assistance programs, executed in partnership with the Department of State and embassy country teams, designed to build host-nation capacity and capability. Foreign Military Financing—the program for funding the acquisition of U.S. military materiel, services, and training that support regional stability goals—has been particularly important to supporting partners engaged in combating violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. Additionally, International Military Education and Training funding has been very valuable to establishing the network of relationships that underpin cooperative success and access to leadership in Southeast Asia.

Philippines. The U.S. and the Philippines share democratic values, a long and unique history, and a desire to contribute to regional security. Underpinned by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S.-Philippines Alliance remains important to U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. A significant effort in the Philippines is conducted by Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). This task force operates in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the VEO threat posed mainly by the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamaia in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago Region. The task force has enjoyed significant success advising, training, exercising with, and informing the AFP, and contributed to

the killing or capture of a significant portion of VEO leadership, the denial of safe havens to extremists, and the enhancement of quality of life for local populations. USPACOM engages in many other ways with the Philippines—to include the Joint Staff-sponsored Exercise BALIKATAN—to help shape the AFP into a force capable of responding to various natural disasters as well as border and self-defense (particularly important regarding maritime security and sea lines of communications).

Thailand. Thailand is an important Southeast Asian Ally and engagement partner, with whom USPACOM intends to further strengthen and broaden the Alliance. The U.S. and Thailand have worked together to bolster regional stability and security through cooperation on humanitarian and disaster relief, peacekeeping training, and counter-proliferation. This past year, the United States and Thailand partnered to deploy two Thai naval vessels, with U.S. Navy personnel aboard, to join Combined Task Force-151 combating piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Royal Thai Army, working with the United States, also deployed a full battalion of peacekeepers to Darfur to assist with UN humanitarian relief operations. Our relationship has even broken new ground in the field of public health, where U.S. and Thai military medical professionals have worked to combat infectious diseases from malaria to HIV. Further, U.S. forces benefit from our mutually beneficial relationship with Thailand, which allows access and engagement in an important geo-strategic location. Further the broad access granted to U.S. Forces to logistical facilities, ports, airfields and training areas is crucial to enabling regional force projection and contingency response. The premier Exercise COBRA GOLD is a Thailand-hosted USPACOM multilateral exercise that includes seven participating nations (U.S., Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and observers from over 15 additional nations. COBRA GOLD is just one of many military exercises that we co-host with the Thais, each of which bolsters unique capabilities within our forces and develops key areas of interoperability with our Thai allies and other partners.

Singapore. The U.S.-Singapore relationship has matured significantly in the past six years and contributes in many ways to enhanced regional security. In 2005, Singapore and the U.S. advanced the relationship with the signing the Strategic Framework Agreement that identifies the two nations as “Major Security Cooperation Partners.” Singapore hosts transiting U.S. Navy ships and deployed personnel, works with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and plays a leading role in the multi-national, counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden.

Indonesia. The relationship between USPACOM and Indonesia—the world’s fourth most populous nation, third largest democracy, and largest Muslim-majority country—continues to mature. Following a decade of political and economic reform, Indonesia has emerged as a vibrant democracy, increasingly confident about its leadership role in Southeast Asia and the developing world, particularly in disaster risk reduction, HA/DR, and peacekeeping operations. Indonesia, along with Japan, recently demonstrated its leadership role in building regional capacity for humanitarian assistance by co-hosting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise.

After years of limited engagement with the Indonesian Armed Forces, an increase in transparency and pace of institutional reforms have recently provided impetus to renew, advance, and broaden the U.S.-Indonesia military-to-military relationship. In recognition of Indonesia’s pledges to protect human rights and advance military accountability, in July 2010, Secretary Gates noted that after a 12-year hiatus, the U.S. intends to begin a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Indonesian Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) within the limits of U.S. law.

Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Timor-Leste. The U.S. has extensive interests across the rest of Southeast Asia, and USPACOM seeks to continue maturing military relations with Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Brunei, and Timor-Leste. Malaysia maintains a strong leadership role in the region especially combating terrorism and

enhancing maritime security. Military relations with Vietnam continue to grow in areas such as disaster management, conflict resolution, personnel recovery, medical capability, and trafficking in persons. Cambodia is emerging as a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the region, and activities with Laos, Brunei and Timor-Leste have expanded over the past year.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Focused efforts by the President and Secretaries Clinton and Gates have set the conditions for increased security cooperation with ASEAN. Accordingly, USPACOM now actively seeks opportunities to support ASEAN initiatives that complement developing coordinated, multilateral approaches to maintaining regional security. ASEAN and USPACOM have several convergent interests that include humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, maritime security, terrorism, and peacekeeping. With an evolved scope and influence, ASEAN and its offshoots (ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, and the East Asia Summit) offer a framework to guide regional efforts to secure the commons and underpin cooperation across governmental institutions.

Burma. Burma presents a number of challenges to regional security, including violence between Burmese military forces and various domestic ethnic armies which sparks significant, refugee flows into Thailand; a maritime border dispute with Bangladesh, narcotics and human trafficking, and the potential for rapid spread of pandemic disease. Of increasing concern is Burma's role in regional weapons proliferation, evidenced by increasing defense cooperation and procurement from the North Korea, in violation of several UNSCRs. In addition, Burma's government continues to rule without respect for democracy or basic human rights. The U.S.-Burma military-to-military relationship remains suspended as a matter of U.S. policy and public law.

Engagement Programs. Two significant engagement programs USPACOM employs are PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP and PACIFIC ANGEL. They are designed to enhance regional stability by building partner-nation resiliency; focus on growing multilateral capacities and

capabilities in the areas of consequence management, civic assistance, and HA/DR. In 2010, U.S. Naval Ship *MERCY*, with personnel from ten nations, successfully accomplished this mission during a five-month deployment to Vietnam, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and Indonesia. The mission treated over 110,000 patients, conducted scores of community relations projects, and completed many engineering and infrastructure projects. In 2011 PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP will return to Oceania aboard *USS CLEVELAND*. PACIFIC ANGEL, meanwhile, utilizing C-17 aircraft, cared for tens of thousands of patients and completed several medical and civic action projects in the Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

Southeast Asia Force Posture Assessment. U.S. force posture in Southeast Asia is achieved almost entirely with deployed U.S. forces, which is a costly and inefficient way to achieve presence and conduct the requisite security and influence activities. Singapore, which allows a modest mix of U.S. service capabilities, is the only exception in the region.

Expanding U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia is a mid- to long-term prospect. In general, the Philippines remains restrictive regarding U.S. military access, except for JSOTF-P CT support which operates at the invitation of the Philippine government. Thailand has permitted consistent access to its military facilities for transient and exercise-related operations, but any additional force presence would require thorough discussions with our Thai allies.

South Asia

The South Asian sub-region is dominated by India, an emerging U.S. strategic partner, and also includes Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. While there are prospects for enduring peace and prosperity, this sub-region is challenged by historical animosity between India and Pakistan, contested borders between India and China, and transnational threats that include terrorism, WMD proliferation, piracy, and narcotics trafficking. The sub-region is also prone to a wide array of natural disasters and lacks the resources and

capabilities to effectively respond. This is exacerbated by the absence of a strong multilateral security structure.

The encroachment of piracy emanating from Somalia into the USPACOM AOR in South Asia is a growing concern. This issue poses a particular threat to the vast sea lines of communication that span the Indian Ocean. As a result of this expanding problem, USPACOM seeks to partner with India to counter this threat.

India. In July 2010 at the Asia Society, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Flournoy characterized the U.S.-India relationship as follows: "This bond is grounded in common democratic values and converging interests that make India and U.S. natural partners. The U.S. and India have an overarching shared interest in promoting global stability and security." Given the numerous areas where U.S. and Indian interests converge, plus many shared national values, a strong India-U.S. partnership is important to future South Asian security.

Cooperation is especially noteworthy in the areas of counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime security. The recent removal of Indian defense- and space-related industries from the U.S. Entity List not only recognizes India's record of responsible stewardship of sensitive technologies but further enables bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual interests.

Nevertheless, India's historic leadership of the non-alignment movement and desire to maintain strategic autonomy somewhat constrain cooperation at a level USPACOM desires. The U.S.-India relationship remains challenged by a degree of suspicion fueled by Cold War-influenced perceptions, complicated Indian political and bureaucratic processes, and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Relations with both India and Pakistan are vital to U.S. national interests and cannot be addressed in isolation. To that end, the leadership and staffs of United States Central

Command and USPACOM continue to engage in order to ensure a coordinated strategic approach that best meets U.S. interests.

Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The U.S. has extensive interests throughout the rest of South Asia. USPACOM is working to advance relations with Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Collectively, these countries are important collaborators with the U.S. for combating terrorism and transnational criminal activity. South Asia is susceptible to natural disasters, but these nations lack the national resources and capacity to respond and therefore require significant assistance from the international community to respond to such contingencies. Toward that end, USPACOM is working with South Asian militaries to build capacity so that they may better address the challenges in their sub-region.

USPACOM is helping the Maldives address the growing threat from Somali piracy and transnational crime. In Nepal, USPACOM's focus is humanitarian assistance and efforts to support the peaceful integration of members of the Maoist People's Liberation Army into the Nepalese security forces. Bangladesh continues to partner with the U.S. to enhance regional security, and USPACOM has initiated multiple programs to improve Bangladesh's civil-military trust, transparency, and cooperation. Engagement with Sri Lanka is limited to humanitarian assistance until allegations of human rights abuses are resolved.

Violent Extremism. Violent extremism is among the most pervasive and urgent challenges in South Asia. VEOs are associated with a wide-range of activities, which include supporting insurgencies that seek political autonomy and fomenting conflict between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan as a means of spreading radical Islamic ideology. Consequently, USPACOM continues to expand its relationships with host-nation militaries and CT agencies to increase regional capacities to counter this threat.

Responding to VEOs requires a comprehensive and cooperative CT strategy focused on developing CT capacity with India and other South Asian partners, particularly regarding the

threat posed by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). LeT involvement in the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India, validates India's concerns regarding terrorist threats originating from outside India. Significantly, LeT deliberately targets westerners and specifically engages coalition forces in Afghanistan. USPACOM is keenly aware of the threat posed by this terrorist organization and continues to develop a coordinated multi-national and U.S. interagency approach to address this global threat.

South Asia Force Posture Assessment. USPACOM force posture in South Asia is relatively limited, even though this sub-region is significant and faces various challenges. The only continuous U.S. force presence in the region is at Diego Garcia. These forces are primarily prepositioned ships used for rapid response but are not typically used for routine training or engagement. For the most part, U.S. military engagement in South Asia is achieved with transient and deployed forces and PACOM Augmentation Teams (PATs); however, plans are underway to expand these teams to assist host nations in their counterterrorism efforts.

Oceania

U.S. Ally Australia and, to a lesser extent New Zealand, are the most prominent forces in Oceania. The sub-region's challenges are generally associated with numerous Pacific island countries spread across the South Pacific. In concert with other U.S. Government agencies, Allies, and partners, USPACOM seeks an Oceania sub-region that cooperates and collaborates to solve regional and international security challenges, maintains capable security or defense forces that abide by international norms, and effectively manages resources. USPACOM strives to maximize Maritime Domain Awareness and information sharing, assists with the development of responsive decision-making architectures, contributes to improved maritime interdiction capabilities, and cooperates to ensure the existence of, and adherence to, appropriate legal authorities.

Oceania's economies are largely reliant on fishing and other natural resources, and tourism. These Pacific island countries are also vulnerable to illegal activities such as illicit drug trade, human and weapons trafficking, smuggling of goods, illegal fishing, and other transnational crimes related to under-governed spaces within the maritime domain. Sub-region national capacity to conduct surveillance and police respective exclusive economic zones is uniformly limited.

A coordinated effort to assist with sub-regional challenges is the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. Under this program, U.S. Navy vessels already transiting the region embark U.S. Coast Guard shipriders to support maritime domain awareness and information sharing between the Coast Guard and five Pacific island countries (Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Tonga, and Kiribati). PACOM and the Coast Guard are currently reviewing the possibility of embarking law enforcement representatives from these six Pacific island countries.

Natural disasters are frequent and challenge domestic and regional HA/DR capacities and require coordinated international response assistance. In that vein, the 2011 PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission will deliver assistance to the people of the Micronesia, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste.

Australia. The U.S.-Australia alliance, which marks its 60th anniversary this year, comprises the most significant partnership in the Oceania sub-region, and indeed one of the most significant in the entire Asia-Pacific. Australia remains a resolute, capable Ally that is firmly committed to enhancing global and regional security -- it is the largest non-NATO contributor of forces to the coalition efforts in Afghanistan -- and to providing assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia is significant to the entire AOR; its stature throughout the region is expanding in multiple ways. An especially promising relationship is developing

between Australia, Japan, and the U.S., which will advance multilateral security efforts throughout the region.

Australia values advancing defense cooperation with the U.S., particularly through training events and acquisition programs. This year, TALISMAN SABRE—a large-scale, biennial, combined-arms exercise that focuses on strengthening U.S.-Australia military-to-military capability—will occur with the participation of over 20,000 U.S. and Australian military personnel. U.S. and Australian militaries also collaborate extensively in areas such as information sharing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; HA/DR; and most recently space and cyber security.

New Zealand. New Zealand is also a recognized leader in Oceania. Our two nations share many security concerns such as terrorism, maritime security, transnational crime, and proliferation of WMD. While New Zealand's nuclear policies preclude a formal resumption of our alliance, we have close defense cooperation and information sharing with New Zealand, and value New Zealand's contribution of its forces to security operations throughout the Asia-Pacific as well as Afghanistan. New Zealand remains active in security initiatives, from stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, to operations in Korea, Sudan, and throughout the Middle East. New Zealand has also contributed its multi-role maritime patrol vessel to regional, multilateral HA/DR operations. Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force supports National Science Foundation efforts in Antarctica by serving as the primary staging area for the multinational Operation DEEP FREEZE.

Compact Nations. USPACOM partners with three Compact Nations: the Federated States of Micronesia, The Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. U.S. obligations to these nations under the Compacts of Free Association are met through implementation of Homeland Defense planning and preparation. The Compacts provide these nations with critical economic assistance. In return, the U.S. gains strategically important

access. With this access of authority and responsibility, the United States is entitled to the exclusive use of these nations and retains the right to deny access to the military forces of other nations.

Oceania Force Posture Assessment. Current U.S. military force posture in Oceania is limited, but it includes facilities in the Marshall Islands, joint facilities in Australia, and operations by occasional transiting or deployed forces. Due to the sub-region's geography, U.S. force presence is largely limited to maritime forces and occasional HA/DR efforts. Australia is supportive of extensive visitation and engagement by U.S. forces and has recently indicated an interest in doing more to facilitate USPACOM regional posture. The U.S. and Australia are considering forms of access, supply support, joint training, and rotational presence.

Exercise and Engagement Programs

In order to maintain ready forces and to plan, train, and exercise to accomplish the full range of military contingencies, USPACOM requires annual Congressional support for its Joint Training and Exercise Program (JTEP). This essential program is comprised of 18 major exercises and involves joint military forces, interagency activities, and 27 of 36 USPACOM partner nations. JTEP is funded by the Combatant Command Exercise and Engagement Program Fund, more commonly known as CE2, which directly influences USPACOM's ability to conduct directed and opportunity-based Joint training exercises and theater security engagement events in the Pacific region. Thus, Congressional support for the CE2 program plays a vital role in maintaining security not only in the USPACOM AOR, but in Combatant Commands worldwide. USPACOM also supports improving and enabling realistic joint training through the Pacific Joint Training Strategy. The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is used to conduct training and to support joint exercises and mission rehearsals.

A new interagency program is the Global Security Contingency Fund, which will provide an integrated State and Defense capacity-building tool for Allies and partners. By joining

resources of both Departments, the U.S. can more effectively and efficiently align priorities and integrate planning to enhance U.S. Ally and partner capabilities.

Military Construction Sustainment

MILCON is another important enabler of ready forces in the Pacific. Because of the MILCON Subcommittee's support in the past, the USPACOM MILCON program continues to meet transformation, operational readiness, and quality-of-life requirements. Military construction projects for readiness and quality of life are discussed below. The two other significant MILCON programs—DPRI and ROK transformation—are included in the previous Japan and ROK sections, respectively.

Readiness. In addition to the MILCON required to implement transformation initiatives in the Pacific, USPACOM Service Components continue efforts to sustain readiness at their major installations (i.e., those facilities with a military-civilian population of more than 2,500 personnel). For FY2012, the Service Components in the Pacific seek a total of \$1.6 billion to sustain the readiness capabilities of their installations. The items included below are the significant MILCON requests for FY2012.

U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). USARPAC maintains ten major installations throughout the Pacific, including those in Alaska, Hawaii, ROK, and Japan. MILCON funds will help ensure USARPAC soldiers are trained and equipped to enable full spectrum operations. Thus USARPAC seeks \$297 million for FY2012 readiness-related MILCON programs, of which \$114 million is requested for an aviation task force hangar at Ft. Wainwright, Alaska. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, requires \$78 million for phase two of an engineer brigade complex and for tactical vehicle parking. Wheeler Army Airfield in Hawaii requires \$73 million to complete the first phase of a combat aviation brigade complex. Schofield Barracks in Hawaii requires a \$32 million military vehicle wash facility.

U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). PACFLT manages five major naval facilities throughout the AOR and has operational forces at several installations on the West coast of the U.S. mainland. PACFLT installations provide vital forward presence for the world's largest fleet, including the homeport of the only forward-deployed aircraft carrier (in Japan). Readiness MILCON requirements total \$229 million in FY2012. Two naval bases in Washington State require \$160 million in support of the strategic weapons facility. California's requirement totals \$77 million at the naval bases in Coronado and Ventura County for an aircraft maintenance facility and aircrew training facility, respectively. Finally, a \$10 million electrical upgrade and a \$7 million electronics shop conversion in Hawaii are essential for PACFLT's readiness requirements in FY2012.

U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Nine major PACAF installations are located in the region, stretching from Alaska through Hawaii and Guam to Japan and Korea. This web of air bases provides USPACOM integrated expeditionary Air Force capabilities to conduct their many peacetime and wartime missions. The Air Force continues its plan to make Guam the hub for strike and refueling assets in the Asia-Pacific and requests \$212 million for FY2012. Guam has also been building projects to establish the Pacific Regional Training Center and seeks \$29 million to continue this effort.

U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC). MARFORPAC manages nine major installations located in Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Japan. MARFORPAC installations in the Asia-Pacific provide the launching point for forward deployed combat ready Marine forces both ashore and afloat. MILCON projects supporting MARFORPAC readiness is expected to cost \$788 million. Vehicle Maintenance, a Mountain Warfare Training Center and Land Expansion will cost \$44 million in 29 Palms, California. Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, requires \$162 million for two aircraft maintenance hangars and infrastructure improvements. A total of \$287 million for construction at Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, California, is requested to

include projects to support the arrival of the MV-22 and a \$29 million Infantry Squad battle Course Defense Range. Finally, \$57 million will be used to construct an airfield operations complex at Marine Corps Base Hawaii.

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The vastness of the Pacific AOR increases the importance of providing and sustaining sufficient forward-based logistics infrastructure. The services and materiel that DLA provides to the Pacific is a critical enabler. DLA requests \$105 million for readiness related projects. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii requests \$14 million to upgrade refueling truck parking and to reconfigure a warehouse to operate more effectively, which will result in long-term cost savings. Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, requests \$17 million to upgrade a rail line to improve refueling capabilities. Naval Base Coronado, California, needs \$22 million to replace fuel storage tanks and pipelines. The fourth increment of funding to replace a fuel storage facility at Naval Base Point Loma, California, requires \$27 million.

Quality of Life. Quality of Life for active duty soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and their dependents continues to be a key enabler and retention factor for these Americans serving overseas—often thousands of miles and many time zones away from family and loved ones. In FY2012, \$620 million will ensure adequate housing, medical, education, family support, and recreation opportunities are provided to these men, women, and their families. The following include the significant projects:

Bachelor Housing. In FY2012, USPACOM requests \$254 million for five barracks projects. Specifically, the Air Force plans to construct barracks in Osan, Korea, and Eielson Air Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, worth \$165 million. The Army requests \$89 million for new barracks at Camp Henry and Camp Carroll in Korea.

Family Housing. USPACOM Service components have made tremendous strides using MILCON and the Military Family Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) to renovate and replace

antiquated housing throughout USPACOM. While MHPI has accelerated the pace of modernization, MILCON is still required overseas in Japan and Korea since privatization is not authorized in these foreign countries.

In FY2012, USPACOM requests \$113 million for family housing. Specifics for each Component are as follows: PACAF seeks \$45 million to improve over 1,300 homes at Misawa and Kadena Air Bases in Japan. The Navy requests \$45 million to improve 219 homes at Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo Naval Bases in Japan. MARFORPAC requests \$23 million to completely renovate 76 homes at Iwakuni Air Station in Japan.

Medical. Providing outstanding medical care in high-quality facilities continues to be an important priority. Although no medical projects are being submitted in the USPACOM AOR due to more pressing needs in other areas, several non-MILCON-level projects will be executed in FY2012. Additionally, a comprehensive medical needs assessment for all services in Hawaii is currently being conducted to better enable joint planning of future projects.

Family Support and Recreation. The Army requests \$26 million in Hawaii to expand an existing fitness center and build a new pool and \$18 million for a new Child Development Center for elementary school children. The Marine Corps seeks \$19 million for a multi-use recreational field and \$24 million for a child development center at 29 Palms, California. The Navy asks for \$47 million to build a new fitness center at Naval Base Coronado, California.

USPACOM Organizations

The following units uniquely contribute to the USPACOM mission:

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). The PACOM JIOC is the central hub for intelligence across the theater, responsible for managing intelligence requirements at the strategic level and providing operational support to Components and Subordinate Commands. The size and complexity of the Asia-Pacific demand a federated intelligence approach, leveraging the intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance contributions of all USPACOM intelligence enterprises. The JIOC also partners with the offices of the Director of National Intelligence, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and national and allied intelligence agencies and centers. In addition to traditional sources and methods, open source Intelligence is an area that can provide critical insights and understanding with modest, targeted resources.

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). APCSS supports USPACOM multi-national security cooperation and capacity-building efforts through international executive education and tailored assistance programs that educate and connect key regional security practitioners. APCSS brings together military and interagency civilian representatives to identify cooperative solutions to security challenges. These communities of interest include vice presidents, ministers of defense and foreign affairs, chiefs of defense, and ambassadors.

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). JPAC's mission is to achieve the fullest possible accounting of all Americans missing as a result of past conflicts. JPAC successfully accomplished 75 investigation and recovery operations globally last year and is projected to execute 75 investigation and recovery operations in 2011. Expanded operations will begin in FY 2012 as JPAC begins the path to the congressionally mandated 200 annual identifications. Discussions between JPAC and the governments of India and the Philippines continue in an effort to resume investigation and recovery operations in those countries. Meanwhile, operations in North Korea and Burma remain suspended.

Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West). JIATF-West is the USPACOM Executive Agent for countering drug-related transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific. This unique mission provides intelligence support and partner-nation capacity building. JIATF-West currently supports U.S. law enforcement agencies through Task Force initiatives focused on

Iranian, Eurasian, and South Asian drug trafficking organizations that pose a regional and national security threat.

Conclusion

The preceding testimony outlines the Asia-Pacific strategic environment, addresses the optimal force posture in each of the four sub-regions, and outlines MILCON recommendations necessary to properly support USPACOM forces and their families. Among the many notable challenges are a belligerent DPRK and dangerous VEOs, which remain dangerous concerns for which the U.S. must be prepared. China's rapid military expansion coupled with its unclear intent poses a concern to the U.S. and many regional nations; however, opportunities for collaboration between the U.S. and China are also apparent. Overall the region remains ripe for peaceful growth, cooperation, and prosperity, due in large measure to mutual interests shared by our five regional U.S. treaty Allies and many more security partners. Longstanding support from the American people and Congress for the first-rate resources in use by the 330,000 men and women of U.S. Pacific Command enable these forces to protect and defend the homeland while advancing U.S. interests throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Robert F. Willard, USN
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command



Adm. Robert F. Willard is the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

Admiral Robert F. Willard is a Los Angeles native and a 1973 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He has a Master's Degree in Engineering Management from Old Dominion University and is an MIT Seminar XXI alumnus.

An F-14 aviator, Willard served in a variety of west coast fighter squadrons; VF-24, VF-124, VF-2, and VF-51 aboard the aircraft carriers USS Constellation, USS Ranger, USS Kitty Hawk and USS Carl Vinson. He was Operations Officer and Executive Officer of Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) and aerial coordinator for the movie. He later commanded the "Screaming Eagles" of Fighter Squadron 51.

Following nuclear-power training, Willard served as Executive Officer of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), commanded the amphibious flagship USS Tripoli (LPH 10) in the Persian Gulf during "Operation Vigilant Warrior" for which Tripoli received a Navy Unit Commendation and commanded the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).

As a Flag Officer, Willard twice served on the Joint Staff, was Deputy and Chief of Staff for U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, commanded Carrier Group Five aboard USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and commanded the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan. In March 2005, Willard became the 34th Vice Chief of Naval Operations; in May 2007, he assumed command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet; and on October 19, 2009, he became the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

Admiral Willard's decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit and various other awards.

**STATEMENT OF
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COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND;
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
6 APRIL 2011**



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I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to provide my statement to you. As the Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, United States (U.S.) – Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense Civilians, and their families, who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these outstanding men and women, I want to thank the Committee for support it has provided to American forces stationed in the ROK and the ongoing commitment it has made to improve the quality of life for Command personnel and their families. Sustained support from Congress has allowed us to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in turn, has promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to report on the state of affairs in Korea. Specifically, this statement will address the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, priorities of the commands that I lead, recent developments at UNC, and how programs and initiatives currently being implemented will strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance and America's presence in Asia.

The Korean Peninsula sits at the heart of Northeast Asia – a dynamic region whose global influence is growing and has significant national interests for the U.S.¹ The growing influence of Northeast Asia can be seen in diplomatic, military, and economic terms. In diplomatic terms, the ROK successfully hosted the Seoul G-20 Summit last year, the first time a G-20 Summit was conducted outside the West and in an Asian nation. The ROK will also host the 2012 Nuclear

¹ The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the following countries and special administrative regions: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan.

Security Summit. From a broader perspective, states in the region have assumed a more prominent role at a variety of international organizations and institutions. Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries when measured in terms of personnel as well as two nuclear powers (China and Russia).² The region contains 23% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse.³ In 2010, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies, where the region collectively accounted for 25.6% of global gross domestic product during that year.⁴ Countries in Northeast Asia accounted for 26.7% of U.S. trade in goods during 2010.⁵

While Northeast Asia's international influence is growing and it has become a major economic region, it is also a region characterized by uncertainty, fast-paced change, lingering historical animosities between states and peoples, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and in some cases struggles for regional hegemony. These characteristics have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for states in the region but for the international community as well. The ongoing security challenges posed by events in Northeast Asia can be exemplified by North Korea's unprovoked attacks on the ROK naval ship Cheonan in March 2010 and on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 as well as Pyongyang's continued pursuit of nuclear programs. By maintaining U.S. military forces in the ROK, a stabilizing presence is maintained that allows for the implementation of strategies that promotes

² In terms of number of personnel in the armed forces, the world's six largest militaries during the year 2010 were: China (2.28 million personnel); U.S. (1.58 million); India (1.32 million); North Korea (1.1 million); Russia (1.02 million); and the ROK (633,000). Personnel data obtained from *The Military Balance 2010*, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

³ Population percentage calculated with data obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*. Percentage is as of July 2010.

⁴ Country rankings based on gross domestic product measured at purchasing power parity and obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*.

⁵ Trade percentage was calculated with data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.

peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, contributing toward the de-escalation of security crises when they do occur. U.S. military forces in Korea are a long-term investment in regional peace and stability. The role played by these forces in Northeast Asia are particularly important because, unlike the case in Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union, there are no regional-based security institutions designed to prevent and resolve inter-state conflict.

U.S. force presence in Korea is also a vital part of maintaining security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty.⁶ An ongoing American military presence in the ROK helps set the conditions for the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner as well as peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. By having U.S. military forces forward-stationed in Korea, engagement is enhanced not only with this key alliance partner, but with other states and actors throughout Northeast Asia as well. A meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula is essential to meet treaty requirements with the ROK and to address security challenges posed by the dynamic, developing – but potentially unstable – region of Northeast Asia.

II. SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

ROK

The ROK was the victim of two unprovoked attacks by North Korea in the year 2010. The first attack occurred on 26 March and resulted in the sinking of a ROK naval ship (Cheonan) and the death of 46 sailors while the ship was patrolling off the west coast of Korea in the vicinity of Paengnyong Island. In the aftermath of the Cheonan tragedy, the ROK led a joint

⁶ The May 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies the security of allies as an enduring American interest.

civilian-military investigation group to determine the cause of the Cheonan's sinking that included the participation of experts from foreign governments. The group concluded that the Cheonan was sunk due to a torpedo launched by a North Korean submarine. This conclusion was assessed by a special investigative team from the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), which determined that North Korea's action constituted serious violations of the Armistice Agreement.⁷ UNCMAC's determination was endorsed by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.⁸

The second unprovoked attack occurred on 23 November 2010 when North Korea unleashed an artillery barrage on the island of Yeonpyeong. Firing approximately 170 rounds in total with about 80 shells hitting the island, this attack was particularly brutal because it struck not only military facilities but civilian areas as well. Two South Korean Marines and two civilians were killed during the barrage while 16 Marines and 52 civilians were wounded. An investigation into the attack conducted by an UNCMAC special investigation team, which was composed of representatives from nine countries and whose work was observed by representatives from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, reached the following key findings:

- North Korea's attack was a hostile act and an act of armed force against the ROK;
- The attack was a deliberate and premeditated action; and

⁷ Members of the UNCMAC special investigation team came from the countries of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, ROK, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

⁸ Established by the Armistice Agreement, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) acts as a neutral and impartial body between all parties to observe and report on compliance with the Armistice Agreement. Observers from the NNSC came from Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

- North Korea's failure to enforce a complete cessation of hostilities in Korea, execution of an armed attack against areas legitimately under military control of the Commander United Nations Command, and execution of an attack that caused considerable damage to military facilities and the destruction of civilian homes and property, constituted serious violations of the Armistice Agreement.⁹

In response to these unprovoked attacks by North Korea, the U.S. and ROK engaged in a series of combined military exercises designed to send Pyongyang a clear message that its irresponsible and belligerent behavior must stop and that both countries remain committed to enhancing their combined defense capabilities. The first exercise held in this series, a combined maritime and air readiness event held from 25-28 July 2010, was called *Invincible Spirit* and occurred in the seas east of the Korean Peninsula. The exercise conducted extensive training in the areas of anti-submarine warfare, battle group air defense, surface warfare training to include live fire exercises, and included a robust component of aircraft that flew a variety of missions in the skies over and around the ROK.

Invincible Spirit was followed by the *Ulchi Freedom Guardian* exercise held from 16-26 August 2010. This annual exercise, like all other training events conducted by the CFC, was designed to improve the U.S.-ROK Alliance's ability to defend the ROK. The exercise was focused on ensuring readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against a full range of provocations that could occur on the Korean Peninsula both now and in the future. It helped

⁹ Members of the UNCMAC special investigation team came from the countries of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. Observers from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission came from Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

teach, coach, and mentor Command personnel on staff and leadership decision-making processes.

Following *Ulchi Freedom Guardian* was a U.S.-ROK anti-submarine warfare exercise conducted from 27 September to 1 October 2010. Focused on practicing anti-submarine warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures, the exercise occurred in the waters west of the Korean Peninsula. This anti-submarine warfare exercise was followed by a U.S.-ROK naval and air training event from 28 November to 1 December 2010. Held in waters west of the Korean Peninsula, the exercise provided training in the areas of fleet protection, alerts/intercepts and defensive counter air/combat air patrols, air defense, surface warfare readiness, basic seamanship maneuvers, logistics sustainment, and communications. When viewed in their totality, the set of combined exercises conducted since North Korea's unprovoked attack on the Cheonan have been designed to demonstrate U.S. and ROK resolve to enhance their defense capabilities and readiness, improve force interoperability, and show U.S. commitment to regional security. It should be noted that our Korean partners and friends greatly appreciated the resolutions passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate expressing condolences to those killed and their families following North Korea's attacks on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island.¹⁰

NORTH KOREA

North Korea continues to threaten both regional and global peace and security. Over the past year, Pyongyang continued its two-pronged strategy of provocation and charm to achieve

¹⁰ In addition to the exercises discussed above, USFK sent a 19-person liaison officer team to observe the 20 December 2010 ROK live fire exercise at Yeonpyeong Island. The task of the liaison team was to advise and assist. The UNC/UNCMAC also sent an observation team to the 20 December live fire exercise to ensure that the event was defensive in nature and did not violate terms in the Armistice Agreement. The UNC/UNCMAC team was composed of members from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, United Kingdom, and the United States.

regime objectives with the ROK, the U.S., and the international community. This strategy included the Cheonan sinking, the attempted assassination of a high-profile defector, and the artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. Simultaneously, North Korea continued to develop its nuclear and long-range missile delivery capabilities, initiated construction of a light water reactor, and revealed the existence of a uranium enrichment program at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. Pyongyang continues its “military first” policy and maintains a massive, forward-deployed conventional force. Plans for succession of Kim Jong-il’s third son appear to be accelerating. Absent a commitment to institute fundamental, systematic reform – which appears unlikely in the near term – North Korea will remain a serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the U.S. and the international community.

Strategy, Goals, and Internal Dynamics

Kim Jong-il’s ultimate strategic goal is the survival of his regime. To achieve this end, the Kim Regime must maintain control over the population and prevent external powers from threatening its interests. As part of its “self-reliance” philosophy, Pyongyang’s foreign policy attempts to divide regional alliances and minimize external influence over its affairs. North Korea balances a reliance on Chinese support and patronage with a desire for maintaining independence. Concurrently, North Korea engages the U.S. with the likely goal of garnering financial, food, and energy assistance, as well as security guarantees. Internally, the regime maintains the facade of a significant external threat, primarily from the U.S., to maintain control and justify sacrifices associated with its “military first” policy.

A key component of this multi-dimensional strategy is North Korea's nuclear program. This program serves as a diplomatic tool, a means to capture international attention, a deterrent against regional interference, a point of domestic prestige, and a potential source of hard currency. This was exemplified by last year's light water reactor and uranium enrichment program announcements and public proclamations regarding plutonium reprocessing and weaponization. These efforts, along with development of a complementary missile delivery system, are paramount to regime survival. North Korea, which is assessed to have enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons, ultimately seeks international recognition as a de facto nuclear weapons state.

Another key element of North Korean strategy is to maintain a large conventional military force. Although aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive army and vast artillery forces continue to threaten the ROK. North Korea continues to focus on its asymmetric capabilities by sustaining and improving special operating forces and their insertion methods. Whether directed toward regional neighbors and U.S. sovereign territory, or as an export item, Pyongyang's missile capabilities remain a regional and global threat. Like its nuclear program, North Korea views its theater ballistic missile program as a source of international power and prestige, a strategic deterrent focused on the U.S., a means of exerting regional influence, and a source of hard currency. For these reasons, despite chronic and severe fiscal difficulties, North Korea continues to spend millions of dollars annually to develop and produce ballistic missiles, although missile sales have been hampered due to enhanced international sanctions. North Korea's inventory of ballistic missiles currently exceeds 800 airframes, which are capable of ranging targets from the ROK and Japan to Guam and the

Aleutian Islands. The regime continues to invest in research and development of an intercontinental ballistic missile capability that could threaten the continental U.S.

Domestically, Kim Jong-il remains in control despite reports of lingering health issues. Over the past year, there are indications that he has focused on setting the stage for his third and youngest son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor. In September 2010, Kim Jong-un was publically promoted to 4-star general in the North Korean People's Army and appointed as Vice Chairman of the Korean Workers Party Central Military Commission. Since then, the younger Kim has made several civil, military, and economic public appearances with his father. North Korea's ruling elite, whose position depends upon the status quo, appears unwavering in its loyalty to the Kim Regime and will likely support the succession process.

For most North Koreans outside major cities, life remains focused on survival in a poverty-stricken state. North Korea's annual domestic food production remains insufficient, with the country dependent upon Chinese and outside assistance to meet basic subsistence requirements. Despite this shortfall, Pyongyang continues to divert precious national resources from the civil sector to conventional and asymmetric military forces in support of the regime's military first policy.

Provocations and Posturing

The past year served as another unfortunate example of North Korea's strategy of alternating provocation with gestures of reconciliation. Early in the year, Pyongyang signaled renewed interest in reaching a peace agreement and returning to Six-Party Talks. During

ensuing dialogue, the North sought to restart Kumgang Mountain and Kaesong City tours; however, subsequent bilateral working-level talks made little progress.

When these negotiations failed, the North shifted to belligerence. In March, North Korea threatened to attack ROK and U.S. forces participating in the annual Key Resolve exercise, closely followed by the sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan on 26 March. Following this attack, Pyongyang announced plans to build a light water reactor on 30 March. While North Korea claims this reactor is for power production, experts believe the North's true motive is to produce highly enriched uranium for its nuclear weapons program.

April witnessed yet another spate of provocative acts. On the 21st, ROK authorities detained three North Korean assassins on a mission to assassinate North Korea's most senior defector, Hwang Jang-yop. Then, on 23 April, North Korea announced it would seize and freeze ROK government and private assets at the Kumgang Mountain resort.

Over the summer, North Korea's multiple attempts at dialogue failed due to the Kim Regime's refusal to acknowledge the Cheonan attack. The North turned to provocation once again, with threats made against U.S.-ROK military exercises, ROK loudspeakers along the Demilitarized Zone, and vessels and aircraft operating in waters and airspace along the Northern Limit Line. These threats were followed by a Korean Workers' Party meeting in October and official installment of Kim Jong-un to key high-level positions of leadership for future succession. There was a brief pause in tensions for family reunions at the Kumgang Mountain Resort from late October to early November; however, North Korea tried unsuccessfully to tie these reunions to increased aid and assistance to which the ROK government would not agree.

The provocation cycle continued in November with the North Korean announcement of a uranium enrichment program and the attack on Yeongpyeong Island.

Since the Yeongpyeong Island attack, North Korea has resumed its “charm campaign” in an attempt to obtain economic aid. Pyongyang has proposed Red Cross talks, engagement with major ROK political parties, military-to-military talks, and an appeal to many countries and non-governmental organizations for food aid. Inter-Korean military talks have not progressed beyond the colonel level as the North Korean People’s Army delegation walked out of negotiations.

North Korean Threat Outlook

I have two main concerns regarding the future of North Korea. My first concern is the potential for instability. The country’s disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, and malnourished populace could lead to a destabilizing situation that could unfold rapidly and unpredictably. My second concern is Pyongyang’s focus on developing its nuclear and missile capabilities. If left unchecked, North Korea will likely develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, which could threaten the U.S. and its allies. North Korea’s proliferation record exacerbates the threat that these programs pose to the international community.

Pyongyang will likely continue its attempts to entice and/or coerce the community of nations into providing aid and concessions. North Korea will also likely continue a strategy of heightening tensions to capture the world spotlight, re-establish its negotiating baseline, and gauge regional resolve. We must never be complacent about the danger that Pyongyang might

make a major miscalculation and launch an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK maintains a high level of readiness through the rigorous pursuit of three command priorities, as discussed in Section III below.

III. COMMAND PRIORITIES

The Command mission is to deter North Korean provocations and aggression and – if deterrence fails – to fight and win. This mission is accomplished through the employment of forward-stationed, agile, and well-trained forces that are located on the Korean Peninsula and operate together with our ROK ally. My Command vision is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are ready to fight and win. These commands lead, integrate, and direct all available forces during times of Armistice, crisis, and war.

In support of this mission and vision are three Command priorities. These priorities have remained constant over time and serve as the guiding principles for all key initiatives pursued. The three priorities are: 1) be prepared to fight and win; 2) strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance; and 3) improve the quality of life for service members, Department of Defense (DoD) civilians, and their families. As Command initiatives are developed and implemented, they are executed in accordance with and in support of these three priorities. I will next address each of these priorities in order and discuss some key initiatives that are being pursued within them.

PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN

My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was

established in 1978. Maintaining “fight tonight” readiness is a key reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.

In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter provocations and aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the Korean Peninsula. Successful execution of these plans requires a well trained force that can execute tasks across the spectrum. Thus, warfighting skills are developed and maintained through the conduct of tough, realistic, combined, and interagency exercises.

In the past, the CFC and ROK military have almost exclusively focused training on defense against an all-out high intensity attack by North Korea. However, as the CFC has broadened the scope of its planning, it is also doing the same with respect to training and exercises. The CFC and ROK military now exercise one North Korean attack scenario and one limited attack/provocation/instability scenario per year. The CFC has also added considerable weapons of mass destruction elimination training into its exercise scenarios to fortify plans in

support of combined policy objectives. In addition, the CFC is increasing counter-provocation training with the ROK military, both in the regularly scheduled major theater exercises and in other training events throughout the year as well.

Three annual joint and combined exercises warrant special mention: Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle. Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve are computer-simulated theater command post exercises conducted by CFC that focuses on ensuring “fight tonight” readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against the full range of current and future provocations, attacks, and instability on the Korean Peninsula. In the future the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise will be used to support transition from a CFC-led command and control warfighting structure to one where the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) becomes the supported headquarters. Foal Eagle consists of a series of joint and combined unit level field training events that exercise ground maneuver, air, naval, expeditionary, and special operations capabilities. These events are conducted throughout the Korean Peninsula. Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle are supplemented throughout the year by a host of other challenging training activities that are designed to sustain Command readiness.

The ROK military’s capabilities and posture is a key component of our fight and win preparedness. Numbering 633,000 active duty personnel, it is a modern, mobile network centric warfare capable force that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps and the force as a whole has gained operational experience through deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, and participation in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations.

This battle tested force and its leaders understand the requirements for military readiness in addition to accomplishing tasks under adverse conditions.

Real world operational experience is continually supplemented by the conduct of a realistic and tough exercise program. In addition to participation in the Ulchi Freedom Guardian/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercises discussed above, other key training events include the annual Taegueuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises as well as a series of events that have been conducted in response to North Korea's recent attacks.¹¹ The ROK military's capabilities will only get better over time as it refines and implements its defense reform initiative. Designed to address the future security environment, it will develop an information and technology-intensive military force that can better address a comprehensive set of security threats to include North Korea's asymmetric capabilities and enhanced participation in operations sponsored by the international community.

STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

My second priority is to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance. As stated in the May 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, American alliances with key regional partners to include the ROK are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation for prosperity in the Asia-Pacific area.¹² This priority supports the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision statement that commits both

¹¹ Taegueuk is a command post exercise that reinforces operational capabilities of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and derives requirements for joint forces and unit structure development. Hoguk focuses on improving interoperability between the military branches and is a live-maneuver joint event. Finally, Hwarang is an integrated defense headquarters-led rear area training exercise that includes civilian, government, and military elements as participants.

¹² The document also notes that American national security depends on vibrant alliances and that these alliances are force multipliers (the effects of cooperation and coordination are greater than if states act alone). Secretary of State Clinton added during a 28 October 2010 speech on American engagement in the Asia-Pacific that U.S. bonds with regional allies to include the ROK remains the foundation for American strategic engagement in the region, describing the U.S.-ROK Alliance as a lynchpin of stability and security in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

nations to build an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world as a whole. A key feature of Alliance evolution is the transition of wartime operational control.

At the request of ROK President Lee Myung-bak President Obama agreed at the G20 Summit in June 2010 to adjust timing of the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from CFC to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The transition will now occur in December 2015. Under OPCON transition, the U.S. and ROK will disestablish CFC and stand up separate but complementary national commands consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty to focus on combined defense of the ROK. Once OPCON transition is completed, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will become the supported – or lead – command and the newly created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command. The ROK JCS will retain full control of ROK military forces while the KORCOM commander will have control over U.S. forces.

Although the U.S. and ROK were on track militarily for OPCON transition in 2012, the adjusted timeframe will provide the Alliance additional time to synchronize a variety of ongoing transformation initiatives of which OPCON transition is just one. As stated last June by President Obama during a joint press conference with ROK President Lee Myung-bak, the revised December 2015 transition date provides appropriate time to – within the existing security context – better manage OPCON transition because the U.S.-ROK Alliance is the lynchpin of security not only for the two countries but for the Pacific region as a whole. During this extended period of time the ROK will strengthen and reinforce its intelligence, operations planning and execution, and joint battlefield management capabilities. Indeed, the ROK is already in the process of procuring the equipment, conducting the training, and making the

organizational changes needed to lead the warfight. Until all these actions are completed, however, the U.S. will provide agreed upon bridging and enduring capabilities. By adjusting the date of OPCON transition to late 2015 the ROK has more time to field many of the critical systems that are part of its ongoing defense reform initiative.

At the U.S.-ROK Foreign and Defense Minister's Meeting in July 2010 agreement was reached to develop a comprehensive Alliance transformation plan that includes and goes beyond merely OPCON transition. Called Strategic Alliance 2015, the plan was affirmed and signed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then ROK Defense Minister Kim Tae-young at the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting in October 2010. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan will synchronize multiple U.S. and ROK transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. Key elements of the comprehensive plan include: refining and improving combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational structures required for ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat of today and tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; and consolidating U.S. military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan.¹³

The goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct is to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and defeat future provocations against the ROK and fight and win on the Korean Peninsula should deterrence fail. While Alliance evolution will occur under Strategic

¹³ Annexes contained in the plan include: plans; organizations; capabilities and systems; exercises; force management and tour normalization; U.S. force relocation; strategic documents; strategic communications; milestones; and governance.

Alliance 2015, one thing that will not change and remain constant is U.S. commitment to ROK security and the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan as a whole synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure they are aligned and mutually supporting. It reaffirms U.S. commitment to ROK and regional security and better postures both nations to deter, counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and aggression. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan moves the U.S. and ROK toward building an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world, as called for in the June 2009 Presidential Joint Vision for the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

The military aspect of Alliance development will continue through the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation that were agreed to by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of Defense in October 2010. Established to direct the future course of the U.S.-ROK defense relationship, they are based on and serve to advance the June 2009 Joint Vision Statement and the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The guidelines are rooted in a bilateral commitment to provide mutual security and to build a comprehensive strategic Alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope, founded on common values and mutual trust. Under the guidelines the U.S. upholds a firm commitment to ROK defense by maintaining an American military presence on the Korean Peninsula that works with ROK forces to deter North Korean aggression. American commitment is demonstrated by an enduring force presence, the tour normalization initiative (discussed later), provision of bridging and enduring capabilities, the

supply of augmentation forces in contingencies, and the continued provision of extended deterrence.¹⁴

In order to meet the broad strategic vision of the Alliance, the defense guidelines specify that the U.S. and ROK will implement a set of enabling measures needed for an effective combined defense posture. These enabling measures are: to enhance intelligence and information sharing; strengthen operational planning; further develop capabilities to address the ballistic missile threat from North Korea; institutionalize an extended deterrence policy committee; enhance interoperability; enhance the combined exercise program; and to collaborate on lessons learned. The defense guidelines also recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global peace and stability. With this recognition in mind, the guidelines list measures that will be taken to strengthen the Alliance's role in enhancing regional and global security. These measures are: strengthening capabilities to contribute to regional and global peace and stability; supporting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials, technologies, and their means of delivery; enhancing bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defense relationships; strengthening cooperation for international security and peacekeeping efforts; and cooperating closely on other transnational and non-traditional security challenges.¹⁵ The defense guidelines recognize the importance of close

¹⁴ As stated in the Defense Guidelines, the U.S. remains committed to providing extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of its military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.

¹⁵ It should be noted that the ROK is already participating in about eight international peacekeeping operations and supporting disaster relief and recovery operations in Haiti, anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, and operates a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. The ROK established a 1,000 person International Peace Support Force military unit in 2010 that is capable of deploying to international peacekeeping operations within one-month of being ordered to do so. The ROK has also become an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). After endorsing the PSI principles in May 2009, the ROK organized the Eastern Endeavor PSI maritime interdiction exercise in October 2010, hosted the PSI Asia-Pacific Regional Workshop from 28-29 October 2010,

policy and strategic consultation between the U.S. and ROK for the enhancement of common interests and further development of the Alliance.

The ROK continues to provide financial and in-kind support to help offset the cost of stationing U.S. military forces on its territory. Known formally as burden sharing contributions, the annual value of these contributions is dictated by terms established in a five-year (2009-2013) Special Measures Agreement currently in effect. During calendar year 2011 the ROK will provide USFK with 812.5 billion won (\$743 million) of burden sharing support.¹⁶ This support will be distributed between three categories: labor (338.6 billion won; pays salaries and benefits of USFK's Korean national employees); logistics (140.6 billion won; covers logistic equipment, supplies, and services); and ROK Funded Construction (333.3 billion won; used for USFK's military construction and military construction-like requirements). Burden sharing contributions helps ensure that the Command maintains its fight tonight readiness and builds the infrastructure needed for a transformed and long-term U.S. military force presence in the ROK. Burden sharing expenditures also stimulate the ROK economy through the payment of wages to Korean national employees, Korean service contracts, and Korean construction contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that host USFK facilities. Future increases in the ROK burden sharing contribution through the year 2013 are tied to changes in the ROK consumer price index.

and joined the PSI's Operational Experts Group in November 2010. ROK President Lee Myung-bak stated during a Korean War anniversary speech on 28 September 2010 that Korean armed forces must "become one that contributes to the betterment of mankind, to global peace and stability, and prosperity."

¹⁶ U.S. dollar figure calculated by using a forecasted average 2011 Korean Won/\$U.S. exchange rate of 1,094. This forecasted exchange rate was obtained from the December 2010 monthly economic report published by the Korea Development Institute.

The Command's *Good Neighbor Program* continues to make great progress in strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance. The purpose of the program is to conduct community outreach events that engage and connect the Command with the local Korean community, government, media, business, and educational institutions in order to create understanding and appreciation for the mission of USFK. Good Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the role USFK plays on the Korean Peninsula. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another's cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships between members of the two communities.

Examples of events conducted by the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and security education programs which include tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of our host country. It also helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of USFK and the Korean communities that exist alongside USFK facilities. Some 2,595 events were conducted during the year 2010 with the participation of 146,543 local nationals. It is also noteworthy that the ROK Ministry of National Defense operates a similar program called *Friends Forever*. Having a purpose of strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance and nurturing friendships between Americans and Koreans, the program gives USFK personnel the opportunity to experience Korean culture by participating in various host-nation sponsored events and tours. Both the Good Neighbor Program and Friends Forever strengthen the Alliance at the professional and personal levels. While it is hard to empirically identify effects of the Good

Neighbor Program, opinion surveys done by the Department of State show that since the program was established in 2003, the percentage of Koreans that have a favorable opinion of the U.S. has increased from 47% to 74%. Additionally, the percentage of Koreans that believe USFK is important grew from 75% to 87%.

Finally, although not under the purview of USFK, the U.S. maintains a robust Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and a Defense Armaments Cooperation Program with the ROK that helps strengthen the Alliance. These programs promote interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces and thus create a more capable combined force. As of March 2011, the ROK has 587 active FMS cases that were valued in total at \$13.5 billion. During Fiscal Year 2010 the ROK purchased \$966.9 million in FMS, making it the 11th largest FMS buyer in that year. The ROK registered \$7.1 billion in FMS agreements over the 2002-2010 time period. FMS sales were augmented by a robust military training program. In 2009, the ROK paid to send 648 students to the U.S. for training in a variety of courses. Total expenditures by the ROK for FMS training were valued at \$60.7 million during the 2002-2009 timeframe.

IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE

Improving the quality of life for service members, DoD civilians, and their families is my third priority. My overall objective is to establish the infrastructure and operational climate that makes Korea the assignment of choice for DoD personnel. In order to achieve this objective and support this priority, the Command is currently implementing two key initiatives: the repositioning of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and tour normalization.

Repositioning of U.S. Forces in the ROK

The U.S. and ROK governments have agreed to consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in South Korea onto two enduring hubs south of the capital city Seoul. The relocation decision was prompted by two key factors. First, prior to the year 2005, the Command had 107 installations of various sizes in locations more or less where they had been when the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement went into effect. Second, the headquarters installation of U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Yongsan is located in the center of Seoul, a city of some 10 million people that is highly congested. Over the years this basing arrangement created a host of problems for USFK. These problems included civilian encroachment, declining quality of life for Command personnel due to aging and deteriorating facilities, and base locations that were no longer optimally located for the conduct of military operations today. All of these problems made it harder for the Command to train and maintain readiness.

The U.S.-ROK Alliance addressed these problems by developing two separate relocation plans for USFK. The first plan, called the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), will move most forces currently stationed in and around Seoul and Headquarters United Nations Command activities to USAG Humphreys (about 40 miles south of Seoul). The majority of costs associated with this relocation plan will be paid by the ROK. Under the YRP, however, a residual Command element remains in Seoul to facilitate communications and maintain relationships with the ROK government and other organizations and actors in the capital area. The second relocation plan, named the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), consolidates U.S. forces in locations north of Seoul to areas south of this capital city and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and

Camp Mujuk as well. Costs associated with the LPP will be shared between the ROK and U.S. Provisions in the LPP help ensure continued readiness by providing U.S. forces dedicated time on ROK training areas and ranges.

Forces being repositioned under the YRP and LPP will be moved onto two enduring hubs south of Seoul: a southwest hub and a southeast hub. The southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base and USAG Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of U.S. military force structure in Korea. This hub is already home to the headquarters of 7th Air Force and over time, as the repositioning plans are executed, will also house the future KORCOM, 8th Army Headquarters, and 2nd Infantry Division. The southeast hub will include USFK installations located in the cities of Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This hub will serve as the logistics distribution center and storage location for wartime and contingency prepositioned stocks. When completed, the two enduring hubs will be world-class installations that create a host of operational efficiencies and quality of life improvements for Command personnel. The hubs also increase force protection and survivability by moving a majority of personnel and equipment outside the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery.

The repositioning of U.S. forces in Korea will occur in two distinct phases: consolidation and relocation. Phase I – consolidation – is currently underway. The Command has returned 36 installations to the ROK so far, in the process giving over 12,000 acres of land back to the Korean people. In turn, the ROK has acquired about 2,300 acres of land around USAG Humphreys in order to support development and expansion of that hub. The ROK has so far granted 1,017 acres of this acquired land to the U.S. for garrison development. This initial land

grant allows the U.S.-ROK Alliance to begin planning, designing, and coordinating for the necessary construction. The remaining 1,300 acres of land will be granted as needed to support repositioning under the YRP and LPP. At the end of 2010, there were 24 projects under construction at USAG Humphreys, which had a combined value of \$1.3 billion. Facilities under construction included barracks, vehicle maintenance, family housing, an airfield hanger and operation building, fire stations, and upgrades to utility infrastructure. An additional \$3.5 billion worth of facilities and infrastructure were under planning and design. Phase I consolidation should not be viewed in any way as a lessening in U.S. commitment to ROK security – the current U.S. troop level in Korea (28,500) will be maintained, as affirmed in the October 2010 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué.

Phase II of repositioning will involve the movement of forces onto one of the two enduring hubs discussed above. Once this phase is completed, U.S. forces will utilize 48 separate sites (many of which are training ranges and ammunition depots), well below the 107 facilities maintained prior to the year 2005. Movement under the repositioning initiative will not reduce the Command's "fight tonight" readiness. Moves in the relocation plan will be packaged and executed in manageable components that will allow units to maintain their full spectrum of operational and support capabilities. Completion of the repositioning initiative will be of great benefit for the U.S.-ROK Alliance because it improves readiness and soldier quality of life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued American regional commitment, improves the combined capability to deter and defend against aggression directed at the ROK, improves command and control, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force protection and survivability.

Tour Normalization

The U.S. DoD approved an increase in the tour lengths for service members permanently assigned to the ROK in December 2008. As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD's long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea and change the status of U.S. forces in the ROK from being one of forward-deployed to one of being forward-stationed with family members. The decision to "normalize" tours in Korea was supplemented in October 2010 when the Secretary of Defense directed that USFK and the Services proceed with full tour normalization as affordable but not according to any specific timeline. Once completed, tour normalization will create an environment where most USFK service members are either on a three-year accompanied (with family members, also known as command sponsored) or a two-year unaccompanied tour (including those without dependents), a significant change from the current operational environment where the majority of Command military personnel serve on one-year unaccompanied assignments. This policy change better aligns USFK tour rotations with those practiced at other forward-stationed locations such as Europe and Japan.¹⁷

Initial implementation of the tour normalization initiative is currently under way. Since the year 2008, the number of families in Korea has increased from 1,600 to over 4,000 at the end of 2010, with an expectation that this figure will grow to 4,636 by the end of Fiscal Year 2011. Once tour normalization is completed all military personnel with dependents (about 14,000) assigned to the ROK will be able to be accompanied by their families. In order to effectively and fairly manage the distribution of command sponsored positions amongst Command personnel, a

¹⁷ It should be noted that in August 2009 the standard length of tour for USFK civilian personnel was also normalized. Civilians now serve an initial tour of 3-years in length, as opposed to the two-year tour that previously existed.

three-category position-based prioritized allocation system was established in November 2010, where the difference between categories is based upon factors such as the importance of a given position to mission accomplishment and continuity. The position-based allocation system improves force readiness by giving priority to those occupying key leadership billets or performing jobs that require critical and special skills and training. Expansion in the number of command sponsored families in Korea is directly tied to growth in the necessary infrastructure to support these families. Necessary infrastructure includes housing, medical facilities, and – in particular – schools.

Tour normalization provides a host of benefits. First and foremost, it improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained military personnel in place for longer periods of time, decreasing the annual turnover of Command personnel and thus lowering turbulence in the organizational environment and permanent change of station costs. About 85% of USFK service members currently rotate each year. By normalizing tours, force stability and continuity will be improved, allowing for the retention of trained and ready personnel and reducing the stress placed on troops, units, and military families that emanates from frequent rotations. Normalized tours promote the operation of sustainable personnel rotation rates that protect the force's long-term health and provide military families with greater clarity and predictability regarding service member deployments as called for in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. It will create a training and stationing environment in Korea similar to that faced by units located in Europe and Japan. In the process, the interoperability of U.S. and ROK forces will be improved and the cultural awareness of American military personnel serving in South Korea will be enhanced, thus strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

Tour normalization also improves the quality of life for Command personnel. By eliminating needless family separations (currently about 10,000 per year) and providing service members with facilities that meet modern DoD standards, readiness and troop morale will be improved. The initiative also signals a long-term U.S. commitment not only to security of the ROK – a key Alliance partner – but to the broader region of Northeast Asia as well. Although it will take time to build the appropriate infrastructure needed to support a larger number of family members in the ROK, the Command is dedicated to making full tour normalization a reality in South Korea. Now is the right time to effectuate tour normalization because of the ability to leverage off other Command transformation initiatives underway such as infrastructure being constructed under the YRP and LPP programs.

Although defense of the ROK is our number one priority and will never be compromised, given the lengthened time of tours under tour normalization, U.S. forces stationed in the ROK will become available to support regional exercises and global operations. Prior to tour normalization, providing this type of support was limited due to dwell time requirements and considerations related to repeated unaccompanied deployments. This aspect of tour normalization supports the Army Force Generation Model, reduces uncertainty for service members and their families, enables a more adaptive and flexible U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula, and provides a defense capability with long-term capacity for regional and global defense and security cooperation.¹⁸ It needs to be emphasized, however, that a more regionally and globally flexible U.S. force in South Korea will in no way jeopardize or lessen

¹⁸ This year 7th Air Force and 8th U.S. Army forces will participate in the exercises COBRA GOLD (Thailand) and BALIKITAN (Philippines). This is the first time that forces from 8th U.S. Army will participate in these two annual exercises.

U.S. commitment to defend the ROK. In its totality, our normalization will enhance force readiness, provide greater stability for military personnel and their families, improve quality of life, and demonstrate in no uncertain terms U.S. commitment to an enduring force presence in the ROK.

IV. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

The United Nations Command (UNC) continues to exercise its responsibilities for implementing and enforcing compliance with the Armistice Agreement. In this regard, the command's Military Armistice Commission conducted two key special investigations over the last year, one related to the March 2010 sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan and the other related to North Korea's artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. As discussed earlier, in both cases the Military Armistice Commission found that North Korea's unprovoked attacks constituted serious violations of the Armistice Agreement. The Commission's investigative work showed that until the Armistice Agreement is superseded by a peace agreement, the UNC will continue to faithfully execute its Armistice Agreement implementation mission and endeavor to resolve through negotiations violations of the Armistice Agreement.

The number of countries actively participating in UNC expanded during the year 2010. On 23 November of that year, the Republic of South Africa officially rejoined UNC, becoming the command's 16th active participating nation.¹⁹ The Republic of South Africa fought in defense of the ROK during the Korean War and its decision to become an active participant in UNC once again was most welcomed by the Command. Joining a ready-made coalition of now

¹⁹ The 16 UNC member countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

16 countries, South Africa stands firm with the other UNC nations to defend the ROK from aggression. The nations of UNC symbolize an international commitment to deter aggression against the ROK and the respect held for this nation as a key member of the international community.

The UNC continues to maintain a rear headquarters in Japan. Unique to that presence is a status of forces agreement that allows the UNC Commander to use seven UNC-flagged bases in Japan for the transit of UNC aircraft, vessels, equipment, and forces upon notification to the government of Japan. During 2010, four naval vessels and four aircraft called on ports in Japan under the auspices of the UNC. Almost 1,000 military personnel participated in these visits. The multi-national nature of the UNC rear headquarters is reflected in its leadership. Last year for the first time, a senior officer from Australia assumed command of the headquarters, while the deputy is an officer from Turkey.

V. SUMMARY

The Korean Peninsula sits at the heart of Northeast Asia, a dynamic region whose global influence is growing and has significant national interests for the U.S. North Korea's unprovoked attacks on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island last year and its nuclear programs show the ongoing security challenge posed by events in Northeast Asia and the threat North Korea remains to regional peace and stability. By maintaining a U.S. military force presence in the ROK, a stabilizing presence is maintained that allows for the implementation of strategies to de-escalate crises should they occur and thus promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. Forward-stationed U.S. military forces in the ROK

also create opportunities for enhanced American engagement with a key alliance partner as well as with other states and key actors throughout the region.

My three command priorities of being prepared to fight and win, strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and improving the quality of life for Command personnel are enduring and serve as guiding principles for all key initiatives pursued. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan – as a comprehensive plan for evolution of the military component of the U.S.-ROK Alliance – synchronizes American and Korean transformation efforts designed to build adaptive and flexible force capabilities to deter provocations and aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. The repositioning of U.S. forces in the ROK improves force readiness and soldier quality of life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued American commitment to defense of the ROK and engagement with the broader region, and enhances force protection and survivability. Tour normalization keeps trained and ready military personnel in place for longer periods of time, improving combat capability, lowering turbulence in the organizational environment, and reducing the stress placed on troops, units, and families.

I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, DoD Civilians, and their families serving our great nation in the ROK. Their selfless service promotes peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the broader region of Northeast Asia. Your support for them and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is greatly appreciated. I am certain you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the very best working, living, and training environment that can be provided, and that we should do everything in our power to provide it. Thank you.

Commander UNC/CFC/USFK

General Walter (Skip) Sharp



Executive Officer : 725-6001
Secretary : 723-7255

General Walter (Skip) Sharp was born in Morgantown, West Virginia while his father was fighting in the Korean War. As a child he moved among many cavalry posts until he went to the United States Military Academy in 1970. General Sharp graduated from West Point in 1974 and was commissioned an Armor officer. He has earned a Master of Science degree in Operations Research and System Analysis from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; and is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, the Field Artillery Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

General Sharp's command positions include armor Company Commander 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Squadron Commander 1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood Texas; Regimental Commander 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, Louisiana; Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Red Cloud, South Korea; and Division Commander, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He commanded troops in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and SFOR's Multinational Division (North) in Bosnia.

General Sharp has served in the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the Armor/Anti-Armor Special Task Force, and the Armored System Modernization Office at the Pentagon. He has had four assignments at the Pentagon on the Joint Staff. He was the Deputy Director, J5 for Western Hemisphere/Global Transnational Issues; the Vice Director, J8 for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment; the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5; and the Director of the Joint Staff.

General Sharp has been the Commander of UNC/CFC/USFK since 3 June 2008. His awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Bronze Star, and Legion of Merit.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 6, 2011

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. The Chinese have an extensive conventional missile capacity and range to strike many of our existing bases. a. How do you assess the adequacy of the U.S. military's capacity to withstand a Chinese air and missile assault on regional bases? b. What steps are being pursued to further strengthen regional bases' capacity to survive such an assault and continue or resume operation? c. How do our existing basing arrangements in South Korea, Japan and Guam serve to impede the growing Chinese extra-territorial ambitions?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. How does PACOM assess the adequacy of resources available to Department of Defense programs that seek to defend forward-deployed U.S. bases to include theater missile defense and early warning systems, hardened structures and hangers, air defense systems, and runway repair kits?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. Last week, China released its defense white paper. What new opportunities or concerns do you have as a result of this latest strategy publication?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. What are the implications of China's military modernization for PACOM's posture?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. What are the perceptions of regional allies with regard to the United States' global leadership and effectiveness as a deterrent against regional aggression?

Admiral WILLARD. With five of our nation's seven mutual defense treaties in the Asia-Pacific, we continue to work with our allies—Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines and Thailand—to strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance the security within the region.

Australia. Australia remains a steadfast ally who works tirelessly to enhance global and regional security and provide institutional assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia continues to lead the International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions to global security are evident by the recently increased force presence in Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider, Australia has committed to contribute to our effort to stabilize Afghanistan.

Australia emphasizes advancing interoperability and enhanced defense cooperation with the U.S. through well-coordinated acquisition and training programs. TALISMAN SABER 2009 (a biennial and bilateral exercise) saw unprecedented participation focusing on policies, tactics, hardware, logistics, and infrastructure. We are also collaborating to enhance our cooperation in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts.

Japan. Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of our strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and despite the recent rhetoric, it remains strong. The new political environment provides us an excellent opportunity to recognize the region's achievements enabled through the security provided by our Alliance. Japan remains a reliable partner in maintaining regional and global stability. In the spring and early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Ocean-based OEF refueling mission was recently ended, Japan remains engaged in the region by providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the next foreseeable future.

Japan contributes over \$4 billion in Host Nation Support (HNS) annually. Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since 2002, the Japan Self Defense Forces continue to interact bilaterally with the U.S., and trilaterally with the U.S. and our allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year

witnessed the completion of several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including the completion of a year-long study of contingency command and control relationships and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer.

Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes a major transformation.

The transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance will also help ROK better meet security challenges off the peninsula. The ROK maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom. Of particular interest is the development of trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan. Although policy issues currently prevent us from realizing its full potential, the shared values, financial resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address complex contingencies throughout the region make this a goal worthy of pursuing.

Republic of the Philippines (RP). The RP continues to be a key contributor in overseas contingency operations while simultaneously conducting a force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security operations, and developing a maritime security capability. These efforts support important U.S. regional initiatives and contribute to a stronger Philippine government capable of assuming a greater role in providing regional security.

In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), U.S. Pacific Command continues to support Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). Through an approved Defense Transformation program, the AFP, in accordance with its defense planning guidance, will manage those portions of PDR with end states beyond 2011 and provide a framework for the development of the programs necessary to transition from internal security operations to territorial defense by 2016.

Thailand. Thailand remains a critical ally and engagement partner. We appreciate Thailand's important global security contributions in the overseas contingency operations, counter-narcotics efforts, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, such as their upcoming deployment to Sudan. Co-hosted with Thailand, exercise COBRA GOLD remains the premier U.S. Pacific Command multilateral exercise with participants and observers from 26 countries.

The declining health of Thailand's King Bhumibol has elevated the issue of royal succession. The King, currently the world's longest reigning monarch (62 years), is beloved by the Thais. The eventual leadership succession, which will be a significant event in Thailand's history, has the potential to have a negative effect on the political environment and pose serious challenges for the Thai political and military leadership. This ally and partner is a key contributor to the regional security environment and will need our support in the years to come.

Mr. FORBES. How could potential developments in the U.S.-India security relationship provide for greater stability on the sub-continent and within the broader PACOM area of responsibility?

Admiral WILLARD. The United States and India are already in the process of developing our security relationship to address common threats in the maritime domain with the ultimate goal of extending this cooperation into other realms of mutual and global interest such as global transportation networks, space, and cyberspace. Providing for the security of these "global commons" will allow anyone and any country that uses them a better opportunity to pursue and achieve economic development that can foster an improved quality of life and better governance. A security relationship must also address the threats to stability from violent extremist organizations and other transnational threats. Economic development and responsible governance provides the foundation for greater stability on the sub-continent and within the broader PACOM area of responsibility and provides the bastion from which to successfully interdict existing threats to this stability.

The United States and India share the need for a secure maritime domain to transport the raw materials and finished manufactured goods that form the basis of our thriving market economies. The Indians have begun to recognize the importance that maritime forces play in ensuring freedom of navigation and protection of commerce and are now investing more to develop these capabilities. The United States, primarily through the United States Navy, has been promoting the concept of global maritime partnerships to share the burden of assuring maritime security along the vast sea lines of communication—essentially each nation contributing a small piece that when taken collectively becomes a potent stabilizing force. To this end, India has taken a more proactive role in policing the Eastern Arabian Sea and working in concert with United States Naval forces to detect, deter, and interdict pirates operating out of Somalia. We are sharing information and assisting the Indi-

ans in developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures to better accomplish this mission. As a result of these efforts, the Indian Navy has effectively halted the line of advance of pirate incidents emanating out of Somalia some 400 nm from their shores. This partnership and the ensuing stability it provides to the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean will directly benefit the Republic of the Maldives and allow them to focus limited resources to develop their tourist economy and for Sri Lanka to devote resources to rebuild maritime infrastructure following decades of civil war. Initial efforts to expand cooperation between the United States Coast Guard and the Indian Coast Guard are underway to improve maritime domain awareness along the Indian coastline in order to close off a potential line of attack from terrorists that operate out of the tribal areas in Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. This line of attack was used by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to enter India and carry out the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Another successful terrorist attack emanating from Pakistan would have serious and far reaching destabilizing effect on the region to include the potential of full scale war between two nuclear armed antagonists. In fact, a more robust, whole of government approach to counterterrorism cooperation is needed. The Department of Defense is doing its part through PACOM by assisting U.S. interagency partners to engage with India's counterterrorism forces to address security concerns that are common to most, if not all, South Asian countries.

This assistance is not confined to counterterrorism but also includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness. South Asia is the target of significant natural disasters—tsunamis, earthquakes, flooding, droughts, and tropical cyclones. Scientists assess that the frequency and severity of these natural disasters will increase due to the effects of global climate change and the history of these events over the past three decades bears this out. Cooperation between the United States and India to organize, train, and stockpile relief supplies for response to a natural disaster anywhere in the region can mitigate the impact of these disasters which can overwhelm an individual country's resources and lead to political unrest and violence.

India's economic rise over the past 20 years has put her in a position to be the benefactor for the other nations in South Asia. However historical animosities and mutual distrust are significant impediments to regional cooperation. A United States-India security relationship has the potential to break down these impediments and promote regional cooperation to overcome common security threats, both man-made and natural, and provide for greater stability that will have positive impacts within the region and globally.

The following are some examples of how India could increase its role in enhancing regional and global stability by partnering with the U.S.

1. **India establishes linkages** between its counter-piracy efforts and the combined operations already underway in the Indian Ocean Region (Combined Task Force 151, U.S. 5th Fleet's Shared Awareness and Deconfliction [SHADE] meetings, etc.), resulting in increased deterrence to piracy in the Indian Ocean Region. If India continues its aggressive stance with respect to piracy in the western Indian Ocean and chooses to cooperate more deeply with existing multi-national efforts, the cumulative effect of counter-piracy efforts in the region could be enhanced.

2. **India deepens and regularizes its information sharing efforts** with the U.S. on counterterrorism and other items of mutual interest. This could build greater confidence between law enforcement and military intelligence counterparts in both governments and mitigate risks and repercussions of possible future extremist attacks on India.

3. **India purchases an increasing number and variety of weapons systems from the U.S.** to meet its military requirements. Although India is likely to continue to seek diversity in its arms acquisitions, as evidenced by the recent non-selection of U.S. tenders in their Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition, successful U.S. weapons system sales and associated technology transfers (C-130J, P-8I, C-17, etc.) will significantly deepen the U.S.-India security partnership. The long-term effect of the military-military links established through these programs will be to strengthen India's defense capabilities and gradually increase alignment of defense and security policies and practices, making India a more effective security partner and more capable provider of security to the region.

Mr. FORBES. How important is the current SSGN platform to PACOM operations? a. Does PACOM have any concerns with the Navy's decision to not replace the SSGN after the de-commissioning of the current Ohio-class SSGNs? b. In addition to significant cruise missile strike capabilities, the SSGN platform has provided COCOM commanders with a significant amount of time on station, due to the two crew arrangement, as well as a significant capacity for SOF missions and equipment and versatility for other vital projects. Has PACOM assessed, or consulted with the

Navy in assessing, the number of Virginia class submarines that would be necessary to provide the equivalent capability of one Ohio class submarine to conduct vital missions in the PACOM AOR?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. Regarding the Navy and Air Force development of the AirSea battle concept: Has PACOM had significant input on its development? If yes, in what ways?

Admiral WILLARD. US Pacific Command is familiar with the Air Sea Battle concept development, however, we have had little input on its development. I anticipate being provided an opportunity to recommend changes to it.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. Can you describe what impact a continuing resolution would have on the commencement of a PACOM-led EIS to address broader training issues in the Pacific? a. Also, can you describe what this proposed EIS will evaluate once it commences? b. How will PACOM ensure the document takes a broad look at training requirements and balances the needs of all services? c. Also, what are some of the key training challenges in the Pacific and do we currently have an acceptable level of risk for all our services' training in the Pacific?

Admiral WILLARD. The continuing resolution did delay the solicitation and contract award to execute the Training in the Pacific EIS. However, with the recent approval of the FY11 budget, the solicitation for bids is expected to be released in mid-June with an estimated contract award in Aug 11.

The EIS will evaluate options and alternatives to improve DoD's training capabilities and mitigate training gaps in the Pacific AOR. Although the primary proposed option is to develop new training ranges and increase capabilities at existing ranges in the Marianas Islands Range Complex (MIRC), other options will be developed and assessed as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to ensure a complete and justifiable EIS.

The EIS will develop alternatives that meet requirements of all Service Components and especially develop training alternatives that can be utilized by multiple Services, such as combined use training ranges. While the level of risk related to current capabilities for DoD training in the Pacific is considered acceptable, it is prudent to explore additional training capabilities with this EIS to complement force posture realignment initiatives, such as the Marine relocation to Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. I am very proud of the operational efforts that the men and women in uniform have been providing to support relief efforts in Japan. What else can we in Guam do to aid in the endeavors to get the Japanese on the road to recovery and to a new state of normalcy? I know we are hosting many men and women in uniform and their dependents but is there anything else we can do to support rebuilding our very close Japanese allies?

Admiral WILLARD. Government to government provision of relief items is over. Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid Assistance funding ended with the conclusion of Operation TOMODACHI on May 31, 2011. Although US Forces Japan/Joint Support Force-Japan continues to monitor and support such things as consequence management for the Fukushima reactors, the majority of direct support has concluded.

The best way for the people of Guam to aid our Japanese allies is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are working in the affected areas. Information on identifying humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations for their efforts in Japan is available at www.usaid.gov, www.interaction.org or by calling the Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI) at 703-276-1914.

It is a common misperception among the public that all types of assistance are needed following a disaster. This often leads to spontaneous collections of unsolicited commodities and offers of volunteer services, which can impede relief efforts. Therefore, the U.S. Government encourages those who wish to help to make a cash donation to the humanitarian organization of their choice. Cash donations: allow disaster relief professionals to procure the exact commodities needed (often locally in the affected country); reduce the burden on resources that tend to be scarce in disaster settings (such as transportation routes, staff time, warehouse, space, etc.); can be transferred very quickly without transportation costs (which often outweigh the value of the donated commodities); support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. When an Aegis BMD ship (3.6.1 configuration currently fielded) is operating in a missile defense mode, what percentage of its radar energy is supporting missile defense versus other missions?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TURNER. What impact does that radar utilization have on the ship's ability to accomplish its other missions, including ship protection? Are there missions that the Aegis ship cannot support when it is in missile defense mode?

Admiral WILLARD. The BMD computer program is designed to "favor" use of resources for BMD applications when operating in BMD Engage or Surveillance Modes and will use 100 percent of the resources if required. There are no Aegis Weapon System design provisions which allow, for example, "setting aside" a certain percentage of resources to support any particular AAW self defense mission. Since radar resources are often "stretched thin" during BMD search mission operations such as Strategic Cueing, any concurrent Anti-Air or Anti-Surface missions will have to rely on "non-SPY" systems such as CIWS, the Gun Weapon System, or possibly NULKA. On the other hand, simulations have shown that it may be possible to conduct certain Anti-Air Warfare engagements using a very small percentage of SPY resources.

While there are scenarios where it is less than ideal and support both BMD and Anti-Warfare, the majority of the BMD CG and DDG missions can be conducted simultaneously and are dependent upon Joint Force availability and JFMCC stationing. The BMD ships are multi-mission and manned, trained and equipped to conduct the following missions in conjunction with one another:

- Command and Control
- Ballistic Missile Defense
- Anti-Air Warfare (to a lesser degree based upon above considerations)
- Anti-Surface Warfare
- Undersea Warfare
- Strike Warfare
- Naval Surface Fires Support
- Electronic Warfare¹

Mr. TURNER. Discuss how operational considerations affect Navy deployment and force structure requirements. For example, for a single Aegis BMD "shooter," how many additional ships are necessary to address the radar resource challenge?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TURNER. When the next Aegis BMD ship upgrade is fully fielded (4.0.1 configuration), what percentage of the ship's radar energy would be supporting missile defense versus other missions?

Admiral WILLARD. It depends on the situation. Aegis BMD ships are multi-mission capable ships which can perform the following missions: Limited Defense Operations (LDO)/Homeland Defense, regional missile defense (both organic and Launch on Remote), Measurement and Signal Intelligence (MASINT)/Non-Tactical Data Collection, Air Defense, Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Naval Gunfire Support, Strike Warfare, Maritime Interdiction/Security Operations, Information Operations, and Intelligence and Collection. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander will allocate Aegis assets, to include Aegis BMD assets, to accomplish his highest priority missions. These may or may not include BMD. SPY-1D radar usage is always determined by mission requirements.

The 4.0.1 configuration provides improved target discrimination and enhanced launch on remote tracking data. Coupled with the new SM-3 Block IB missile, the Aegis 4.0.1 system will provide longer range engagements of more advanced threat missiles.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HANABUSA

Mrs. HANABUSA. Given the geographic coverage of PACOM, are five aircraft carriers sufficient for the objectives of PACOM?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mrs. HANABUSA. What is the objective of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan?

¹ Aegis BMD 3.6.1 Capabilities and Limitations

General SHARP. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan synchronizes multiple U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. The plan's objective is to sustain and enhance the U.S.-ROK Alliance's combined defense posture and capabilities and to support the Alliance's future vision and bilateral defense priorities as stated in the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. Execution of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan ensures the effective synchronization of major elements of Alliance restructuring while maintaining a strong combined defense posture to deter or respond to the range of North Korean security challenges throughout the transition process. Key elements of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan include: refining and improving combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational structures required for ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat of today and tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; consolidating U.S. military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan; and force management. The goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct is to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and defeat future provocations against the ROK and fight and win on the Korean Peninsula should deterrence fail. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan as a whole synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure they are aligned and mutually supporting and better postures both nations to deter, counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and aggression.

Mrs. HANABUSA. At page 33 of your testimony you point to 107 bases to be reduced to two, how does this meet the objectives of the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan and/or the deterrence objective of the United States Military?

General SHARP. The U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments agreed to consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in the ROK onto installations south of the capital city Seoul. Prior to the year 2005, the Command had 107 installations in Korea. Once relocation is complete, the Command will utilize 49 sites, concentrated for the most part around two enduring hubs: a southwest hub and a southeast hub. The southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base and U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of U.S. military force structure in Korea. The southeast hub will include installations located in the cities of Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This hub will serve as the logistics distribution center and storage location for wartime and contingency prepositioned stocks.

The consolidation of forces onto two enduring hubs satisfies Strategic Alliance 2015 and Command deterrence objectives by improving warfighting capabilities in the following ways. First, the 2nd Infantry Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the Division's subordinate units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact amongst unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and infrastructure needed to support the Division. The unit is better postured to train and fight together.

Consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships between operational staffs of the 2nd Infantry Division and a future Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is better positioned to affect initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, and onward movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective command and control during execution of later phases/stages of conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility by posturing the division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position also shortens logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict that better postures the division for successful employment later.

Consolidation also enhances the execution of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). By reducing the dispersion of transportation assets, movement times are cut. By separating U.S. forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea's long-range artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of these forces is reduced and their survivability enhanced. A 2nd Infantry Division located at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades while not under the fire of North Korean long-range artillery. This factor supports the Division's preparation for combat activities. Finally, force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by improving soldier quality of life, realization of stationing efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force protection and survivability.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Given the present complement of the Republic of Korea forces, can it assume the control of leading the military alliance on the Korean peninsula?

General SHARP. By 1 December 2015, the ROK will be ready and capable of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance in defense of the ROK in wartime. In December 2015 wartime operational control (OPCON) will be transitioned from the Combined Forces Command to the Republic of Korea (ROK) Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under OPCON transition, the U.S. and ROK will disestablish Combined Forces Command and stand up separate but complementary national commands consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty that will focus on combined defense of the ROK. Once OPCON transition is completed, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff will become the supported—or lead—command, and the newly created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff will have full control of ROK military forces while the KORCOM commander will have control over U.S. forces.

The ROK military is a highly professional and competent force and will be capable of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime. Numbering over 633,000 active duty personnel, it ranks as the world's 6th largest military in terms of personnel and is a modern, mobile network centric warfare capable force that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily command of its forces. It has gained operational experience through recent deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Initiatives to enhance force capabilities, modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational structures and force management are being implemented as part of the ongoing "307" defense reform program.

ROK military force capability is supplemented through the conduct of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to participating in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the Taegeuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises derive requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-agency coordination. Thus, by 2015 the ROK will be ready and capable of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within Pacific Command's area of responsibility?

Admiral WILLARD. The U.S. Coast Guard executes its eleven statutory missions in the Pacific including: Search and Rescue; Marine Safety; Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security; Illegal Drug Interdiction; Undocumented Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; Other Law Enforcement; Marine Environmental Protection; Living Marine Resources; Aids to Navigation; and Ice Operations.

Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard supports the Pacific Command's Theater Campaign Plan by participating in Theater Security Cooperation and Capacity building activities with allies and partners in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility. Examples of such activities include: professional exchanges; mobile training teams; multi-lateral maritime surveillance operations; multi-lateral and bi-lateral exercises; humanitarian and civic assistance events, and bi-lateral ship rider operations with Pacific Island Nations. Most of the activities are conducted in conjunction with normal Coast Guard operations in the region. U.S. Coast Guard Theater Security Cooperation activities reach beyond normal military-to-military relations to a broader host nation maritime audience, including, but not limited to, law enforcement agencies, maritime administrations, and transport ministries. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard participates in the development of the Pacific Command's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan directed contingency plan development, providing apportioned forces to support contingency plans.

Finally, to meet Defense contingency planning and preparedness activities under its Defense Readiness mission, the U.S. Coast Guard provides Service-unique capabilities (e.g. ports, waterways, and coast security capabilities; maritime intercept capabilities) in support of Pacific Command's Operational Plans. U.S. Coast Guard planners support development of Operational Plans to employ, maintain, and sustain U.S. Coast Guard forces in support of homeland defense missions.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the relationship between U.S. Pacific Command and the Mongolian Armed Forces?

Admiral WILLARD. Mongolia is an enthusiastic U.S. partner that continues to support U.S. Northeast Asia regional objectives and coalition Afghanistan operations; however, Mongolia must balance engagement with the U.S. with their relationship with China and Russia. U.S. Pacific Command is committed to assisting Mongolian Armed Forces transform from a Soviet-era General Staff organization into a professional and competent “Napoleonic” or western styled Joint Staff structure. U.S. Pacific Command is assisting the Mongolian Armed Forces enhance their capability to fully participate in international peace support operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts. The Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) has contributed extensively to operations relative to its size and strength. Mongolia contributed over 1300 troops and ten troop rotations to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM from July 2003 until September 2008 when the United Nations Security Council Resolution expired. The Mongolians were also early contributors to our coalition in Afghanistan for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. The OEF support began in October 2003 with 21 members providing advanced artillery maintenance to the Afghan National Army. Recently, Mongolia committed to doubling the current troop strength in Afghanistan to 400 troops. Mongolia also hosts the annual multinational peace operations exercise KHAAN QUEST, which provides training and promotes positive military-to-military relations with the U.S. and regional peace support partners. U.S. Pacific Command Components U.S. Army Pacific and U.S. Marines Forces Pacific rotate co-hosting KHAAN QUEST with the Mongolian Armed Forces. This annual training occurs at the Five Hills Training Center. KHAAN QUEST is designed to improve multinational responses, effectiveness, interoperability and unity of efforts for peace support operations. This training is provided to meet UN standards for peace support operations. U.S. Pacific Command participates in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Asia Pacific Security Affairs-led Bilateral Consultative Council and the Executive Steering Committee meetings. These high level meetings underscore U.S. Pacific Command’s commitment to the Mongolian Defense Reform. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command regularly meets the General Chief of Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces for strategic dialogue and engagement.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within U.S. Forces Korea?
General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. PALAZZO. My district has seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most memorably Hurricane Katrina. Recently, we saw another example of the destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit by a major earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami.

Almost exactly one year ago, in your testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, you mentioned that “In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.” Following the recent devastation in Japan, could you comment on our military’s readiness to respond to natural disasters in the Pacific at this point?

Admiral WILLARD. In the wake of OPERATION TOMODACHI, USPACOM forces remain ready to provide Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) throughout the PACOM AOR. Operation TOMODACHI was unique due to both the scope and complexity of the three overlapping disasters, even more complex than the 2004–5 Southeast Asia Tsunami relief operation, Operation Unified Assistance. Unlike most other disasters, Operation Tomodachi involved the simultaneous execution of FHA, FCM, and Voluntary Authorized Departure (VAD) of American citizens in response to the combined effects of an 9.0 earthquake, catastrophic tsunami, and resultant nuclear disaster. Despite these challenges, PACOM forces responded quickly, adapting to the natural and man-made disaster while supporting our Japan ally.

Although we do not organize and train for FHA/HADR, the inherent capabilities and capacity of expeditionary military forces allow them to adapt and respond quickly and effectively in support of the Host Nation. Our ability to broadly task across available assigned forces provided flexibility and in large part mitigated the impact normally associated with the conduct of an operation of this scope. The assignment of rotational forces “*tailored*” for rapid response ensures our continued ability to respond to disasters, as well as mitigate the strain on force readiness.

Mr. PALAZZO. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our ability to respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region?

Admiral WILLARD. No. Participation in humanitarian missions are “as is” missions and provide valuable opportunities to conduct “real world” rapid planning, execution of critical military skills, and theater engagement. These missions provide benefits that are complementary to the execution of more traditional military missions. FHA and HA/DR are missions performed frequently by PACOM forces, while preparing to respond to more “traditional threats”. Although humanitarian missions place additional demands on our forces, our participation in humanitarian operations demonstrates to our Allies and Partners our commitment to the region and often create more receptive conditions for future engagements and relationships. The opportunity to respond to humanitarian mission in the AOR sends a strong message throughout the region, demonstrating our ability and willingness to respond rapidly across the AOR. Execution of humanitarian mission in addition to the execution of multiple scheduled conventional exercises contributes to our ability to rapidly execute where a conventional military response is required.

Mr. PALAZZO. Who pays for these humanitarian responses?

Admiral WILLARD. Humanitarian Responses are paid for through USAID/OFDA. They provide initial cost assessment through the Disaster Response Team (DART). Funding clearly outlines the support that will be provided by the PACOM and the tailored and scaled force vectored to the affected host nation.

Mr. PALAZZO. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at this point and where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology, manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the region?

Admiral WILLARD. Within Northeast Asia, North Korea has the most potential need for FHA/HADR arising from natural or manmade disasters. Disaster in this affected state would cause great concern because of ability to interact, visibility, and other concerns that naturally arise. Although disasters in China have occurred since 2009, The PRC remains reluctant to accept our offers of help, though we have provided mostly symbolic assistance in the past 2–3 years and typical requests are in the form of funding or spare parts for military hardware. Within Southeast Asia, we have seen significant improvement within the Philippines and their ability to respond to FHA over the past decade. Additional support is still required for Indonesia, but access is not always guaranteed, granted, or requested. As seen in 2007, Burma and associated relief is problematic. Lastly, within South Asia, current concern and planning is focused on Nepal due to its geographical isolation and recent predicative earthquake models that suggest potential 100-year earthquake on the scale of Haiti 2010. PACOM is assisting the Government of Nepal through our Embassy through planning to help mitigate potential disaster through leveraging regional neighbors, international and non-governmental organizations, and United Nations support. In conclusion, countries that have adversarial relationships with USG are the most problematic to support and provide FHA and HA/DR.

Mr. PALAZZO. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 billion dollars in goods from China, over double the imports of any other western nation. Do you believe that this U.S. consumer behavior is actually fueling China’s military buildup?

Admiral WILLARD. It is true that in 2009, according to China’s statistics, the U.S. imported \$221.4 billion merchandise goods from China; this supersedes, by more than four times, the next highest level of Chinese exports to a Western nation (Germany, \$49.9 billion). It is expected that some of the revenues that accrue to Chinese firms that sell goods to U.S. consumers comprise the firms’ net income which is taxed. These taxes are then available to fund Chinese Governmental operations—including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, based on PACOM analysis, we have determined that only a fraction of the sales revenue (between 60% and 80%) accrue to Chinese firms (many inputs to Chinese production are manufactured in other countries). Moreover, some unknown fraction of sales revenue comprises net income or profits. (Let us hazard a guess of say 25%.) Finally, China taxes corporate profits at a 25% rate. Consequently, we would estimate that about \$10 billion of the \$221 billion would be collected as corporate profits taxes.

We are ignoring here the taxes that are collected from Chinese citizens who helped produce the goods that the U.S. imported. But even if we assume that wages comprised 50% of the cost of goods sold, and assume a 25% tax rate, we would conclude that about \$20 billion of the \$221.4 billion would be collected in the form of income taxes. Therefore, a total of about \$30 billion in tax revenue might be available to disburse for PLA operations.

However, there is a flip side to the coin. What we know is that dollars, which are received via export sales, are often recycled by acquiring U.S. Treasury Securities. It is likely that much of the \$221.4 billion in sales were used to purchase U.S. Treasury Securities, which, in turn, helped finance U.S. Government operations. Some of the funds from Treasury sales may have very well been used to support U.S. Department of Defense operations.

Summary: It turns out then that it is likely that U.S. imports of Chinese goods serve to underwrite the cost of certain PLA operations. But it is equally likely that those same dollars find their way back into U.S. Governmental operations. It goes without saying that, if the first flow is halted, then so is the second.

