[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TERRORISM AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-2
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Henry Cuellar, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Laura Richardson, California
Tim Walberg, Michigan Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Islands
Joe Walsh, Illinois Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Brian Higgins, New York
Ben Quayle, Arizona Jackie Speier, California
Scott Rigell, Virginia Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Mo Brooks, Alabama Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Thomas McDaniels, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for John S.
Pistole........................................................ 39
TERRORISM AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
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Thursday, February 10, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Lungren, Cravaack, Walsh,
Brooks, Jackson Lee, Thompson, Davis, Speier, and Richmond.
Mr. Rogers [presiding]. This meeting of the Homeland
Security Committee--Subcommittee on Transportation and Security
will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear
testimony from the administrator of the Transportation and
Security Administration, Mr. John Pistole, on his agency's
efforts to stop terrorists from carrying out attacks against
our Nation's transportation systems.
I would like to welcome everybody to this first
subcommittee meeting of the 112th Congress, and I want to thank
Mr. Pistole for joining us. I know it is going to be a very
informative effort.
I am pleased to be joined on the subcommittee by Ranking
Member Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, of Texas. The Ranking Member and
I have had a strong working relationship, and I look forward to
continuing that in this Congress to make TSA more effective in
concert with her.
The topic of this hearing is ``Terrorism and Transportation
Security.'' I would like to welcome our witness, TSA
Administrator John Pistole, and thank him for being here today.
We look forward to your testimony and greatly appreciate
your time.
Let me first state--first and foremost--that TSA is a
counterterrorism agency and it must maintain that mission as
its primary focus. If there are programs or offices within the
TSA that do not directly support that primary mission or could
operate more efficiently this subcommittee will look closely to
see where taxpayer dollars could be better spent at TSA to
achieve a greater level of security.
It is also important to state at the outset that regardless
of what other committees in the House may want you to believe,
this subcommittee is the subcommittee with primary jurisdiction
over all of TSA. In this role we plan to exercise vigorous
oversight of the agency and the security of all transportation
modes, including aviation, cargo, rail, mass transit, trucking,
and pipelines.
Where TSA is succeeding we should applaud them; where they
are struggling to address vulnerabilities or to work with
stakeholders we should help them find new solutions. We can all
make that the safe--we can all agree that the safe and secure
flow of passengers and commerce through all modes of
transportation is critical to our Nation's economy. TSA is
obviously a vital element to ensure this happens within a
framework that includes many stakeholders.
In many ways, post-9/11 security has been a series of
reactive tactics and strategies by the TSA. Existing practices
would benefit from a proactive, intelligence-based decision-
making process.
Mr. Pistole, we have discussed your interest in this area
and I look forward to strengthening these type of programs in
TSA. Also, at times TSA's efforts are seen to be
counterproductive to industry or lack coordination with
industry. I look forward to examining ways to bring the best
practices of the industry and TSA together for better security
and safer transit.
I want to emphasize that this subcommittee will examine how
TSA spends the tax dollars. Suffice it to say, as with any
large Government agency, there is waste at TSA. Over the last
few months there have been a series of high-profile media
stories on this issue.
I have met with GAO and the Department of Homeland Security
IG to discuss TSA's acquisitions and spending practices and
plan to hold hearings on this issue in the near future. I
believe we should not automatically separate National security
from fiscal security. I believe TSA and the taxpayers could
benefit from procurement and acquisition reforms and I plan to
pursue them.
Finally, it seems there is not a day that goes by that TSA
isn't in the news-making headlines. Believe me, in this
business we are in that can be both a good and a bad thing.
Just last Friday it was announced that TSA would allow its
employees to vote on a collective bargaining framework that
could lead to the unionization of TSA employees.
You and I spoke by phone Friday before the decision was
made public, and I continue to appreciate your willingness to
keep us informed before we read these type of things in the
newspapers.
With regard to collective bargaining rights for TSA
employees, I expressed my concern about it to you before and
will do so again today. Because of the potential impact of this
decision I am going to allow a lot of extra time for you to
fully explain your decision-making on collective bargaining
framework and for our Members to ask questions about it.
In sum, we must be vigilant against the terrorists focused
on attacking us, and specifically on attacks aimed at our
transportation systems. I have met with Administrator Pistole
on multiple occasions since becoming Chairman. I am very
pleased with the fact that he has significant law enforcement
and counterterrorism experience. I believe he is the right
person for the difficult job and look forward to working with
him on transportation security.
Mr. Pistole, thank you for your service for our Nation and
throughout your career, and thank you for taking time out of
your busy schedule to be with us today.
I now want to recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the lady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5
minutes for an opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good morning.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. I agree with you, we
want to thank Administrator Pistole for his long years of
service.
I am delighted to be joined this morning by the Ranking
Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, and
to acknowledge our new Members, Mr. Davis of Illinois, Ms.
Speier of California, and Mr. Richmond of Louisiana. We are
delighted to have the opportunity to serve the American people
on this particularly important committee.
So Mr. Chairman, let me first congratulate you on your
Chairmanship of the Transportation Security Subcommittee, and
let me say that I look forward to working with you, as we have
done before, during this Congress, and as we work together to
ensure that the Transportation Security Administration has the
tools and resources it needs to secure all modes of
transportation, including aviation, mass transit, passenger or
freight rail, highways, and pipelines; but additionally, to
make note of the fact that I think every American, Mr.
Chairman, has used the mode of transportation that we have
responsibility over at some point in their life. It is a large
and looming challenge to ensure the transportation modes of
this Nation, and I thank you for the opportunity to work with
you.
Let me also welcome, as I indicated again, the new Members
on both sides of the aisle, and I look forward to working with
all of them.
TSA's scope of responsibility is broad and its challenge in
securing transportation against terrorist attack is critical to
the Nation's overall homeland security efforts. Over the last 4
years, during my Chairmanship of this subcommittee, we
evaluated cargo security on passenger planes, passenger and
baggage screening technology and processes, security at foreign
repair stations, general aviation security, the Registered
Traveler program, and the administration of TSA's program for
surface transportation security.
Might I add that we introduced, along with Chairman
Thompson, a major transportation security legislative
initiative, H.R. 2200 of the last Congress, focused on the
growing professional development of our members of the TSA
team, and a number of other very important security reforms.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, we will have an opportunity to look
at that again and work together with you.
Mr. Chairman, I know from early discussions with you that
we share the same commitment to securing our Nation's
transportation systems.
To Administrator Pistole, I welcome you again to the
subcommittee and I look forward to your testimony. Since you
were confirmed nearly 8 months ago you have been presented with
myriad of challenges, from explosive ships from Yemen to
enhanced pat-down screenings at Thanksgiving, and through it
all you have shown leadership and determination in trying to
get it right in addressing threats and securing all
transportation modes.
I specifically remember engaging with you during the
transportation enhancement process during Thanksgiving and
Christmas, and actually going out to my airport and spending 3
days during the Thanksgiving holiday watching professional TSA
officers begin their work under very difficult circumstances.
We have commented on notice; we have commented on the
sensitivity of our particular traveling public, and I hope we
can work through those issues.
Recently you have made two critical decisions that I must
commend you for. First, I agree and support your decision not
to expand screening partnership program for airports to opt out
of using TSA screeners in order to contract with private
screening firms.
Why should we go back? We went forward after 9/11. There is
no reason, seemingly, to retrace those steps again. But we must
also ensure that we improve all of the procedures and processes
of the TSA.
As we look to mitigating the current and future threats to
aviation, as I said, let us not forget the past. On that
fateful day of September 11, 2001, four of the passenger
screening checkpoints transited by the 19 hijackers were
operated by three different security firms contracted by air
carriers at the three airports where the terrorists departed:
Boston Logan, Newark Liberty, and Washington Dulles. Citing
serious vulnerabilities with this process, Congress wisely
decided to Federalize the screening workforce, and this TSA
workforce has subsequently played a critical role as one of the
most important security layers for securing commercial
aviation.
With consistent, intelligence-based administration of TSA's
screening programs we have hardened aviation significantly
against terrorist attack, and although TSA has managed a small
group of SPP airports, including San Francisco, in the district
of our distinguished colleague from California, Ms. Speier, we
must be careful not to institute a system of hodgepodge
screening companies working at different airports across the
Nation, and I appreciate you looking at this carefully.
I also commend your decision to extend collective
bargaining rights to transportation security officers. Now,
just as it is with other security professionals at Customs and
Border Protection and the Federal Protective Service, TSOs will
have input on workplace and performance appraisals.
The Chairman of last Congress, Mr. Thompson, the Ranking
Member now, and I worked very hard on this issue. Just like
with those two agencies and countless other law enforcement
agencies across this Nation, this collective bargaining will in
no way negatively impact security, but in fact will improve the
morale and performance of our hardworking TSOs.
I know that the Chairman and I may disagree on some of
these issues, but I also know that we have a great deal in
common. We have already discussed the Moscow airport, and I
look forward to those hearings, particularly as we saw in the
last Congress the Mumbai attacks, there is certainly a lot for
us to deal with.
The Chairman and I have also discussed the importance of
continuing where we left off in the last Congress and focusing
on securing mass transit and other surface modes of
transportation. Again, recent history in Russia, Madrid, and
Spain have shown that surface transportation is a terrorist
target and we need to be prepared.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for your commitment to
working with this side of the aisle so that we can approach
these issues in a comprehensive manner. This is going to be a
good year, and I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I agree with the gentlelady. We are going to
have a great partnership and do some good work.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Full
Committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for a
statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, for holding this
important hearing. I also congratulate you on your Chairmanship
and I look forward to joining you and Ranking Member Jackson
Lee in evaluating critical transportation security issues
during the 112th Congress.
Additionally, I would like to welcome Mr. Pistole to his
first hearing in Congress. We have talked on a number of
occasions.
I absolutely join my colleagues in thanking you for the
outreach that you have done since you have been administrator
on keeping us informed. Please keep it up.
Also, let me say that your decision to grant collective
bargaining rights to the transportation security officers at
TSA is the right thing. As you know, I, along with
Representative Lowey and Ranking Member Jackson Lee, have been
championing collective bargaining rights for TSOs for several
years. As proven by the performance of other Federal security
officers, collective bargaining does not diminish our security;
in fact, I have written you and continue to believe collective
bargaining can improve workforce morale and productivity, and
this will positively impact TSA in fulfilling its mission to
secure our transportation system.
Too often, we have been inundated with TSOs concerning poor
workplace conditions, vague and inconsistent performance
appraisal processes, and ineffective training programs and
practices. Further, my top concern continues to be affording
TSOs the same benefits and personnel standards as other
employees in the Federal pay system, and I look forward to
continuing to work with you to implement this new collective
bargaining framework so that all the key issues are addressed.
Mr. Chairman, last Congress, in our oversight activities of
TSA's program, we held several hearings addressing critical
transportation security issues. I have taken particular
interest in the deployment of advanced imaging technology
machines at our Nation's airports and have urged TSA to
implement privacy and efficiency safeguards to accompany the
use of this technology.
I know you have heard these concerns and I look forward to
reviewing the new pilot program for the automated targeting
recognition software currently being tested, which should
reduce privacy concerns raised about the intrusive nature of
the AIT images. Once the testing of this new software to
accompany the AIT machines is complete I will call on the
Department to conduct an updated civil liberties impact
assessment on the new system. As I have said numerous times,
millions of taxpayers' dollars have been spent on this
technology and we need to be sure that it is deployed in a
risk-based manner and that TSA personnel are sufficiently
trained to harness this technology.
We also have had many conversations about TSA's need to
work collaboratively with other agencies and stakeholders. I
hope you continue to strengthen the agency's relationships with
stakeholders, particularly in the area of cargo security and
cargo screening technology.
Last but just as importantly, I would like to stress the
importance of adequately addressing threats within the surface
transportation community. It is imperative that TSA share with
Congress the shortcomings in resources available to address
threats across surface and mass transportation modes. I look
forward to learning more about the specific steps TSA has taken
to focus resources toward surface and mass transportation modes
of transportation at today's hearing.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Other Members of the committee are advised that their
opening statement may be submitted for the record. Now we are
very pleased to have the distinguished guest with us today on
this important topic.
We will remind you, Mr. Pistole, that your entire statement
will be submitted for the record, and you are now recognized
for 5 minutes to summarize it.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Rogers,
and Ranking Member Jackson Lee.
Ranking Member Thompson, good to see you.
To the new Members of the subcommittee, welcome to the
subcommittee.
I am also pleased to be here today to discuss with you the
Transportation and Security Administration, our operations, our
mission, and the terrorism threat that our country faces, and
of course the men and women of TSA confront every day.
TSA, of course, was created in November 2001 with a
compelling mandate to prevent terrorist attacks like 9/11 from
happening again. So began the not-yet 10-year history of this
organization of dedicated men and women. As Secretary
Napolitano and Director Leiter testified yesterday, ``We face a
determined enemy which constantly evolves its tactics and
techniques, and as we have seen the threat is real.''
TSA plays a critical role in protecting the Nation's
transportation network as part of the U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence community counterterrorism efforts. It is our
responsibility to stay ahead of the terrorist threat through
risk-based, intelligence-driven security measures. With our
partners here and abroad we utilize a layered, interconnected
system that gives us the best opportunity of detecting and
deterring threats, as we saw with the Yemen cargo plot.
So two of the best tools we employ in our effort to combat
terrorists are accurate, timely intelligence and partnerships.
One of my first initiatives at TSA last summer was to expand
security clearance to a greater number of TSA employees in the
field. This ensures that our explosive experts, our supervisory
TSOs, or transportation security officers, Federal air
marshals, and behavior detection officers have the information
they need to better confront those who would do us harm.
Another key tool is partnerships with other National
security agencies and foreign counterparts, State and local law
enforcement agencies, the business community--especially
airlines and air cargo carriers--and of course, the American
people. We have seen, going to back to Christmas day 2009 and
the air cargo plot I mentioned, that concealment and design of
explosives are being done in ways that challenge not only our
social norms but our detection capabilities. We have expanded
the use of swabbing for explosive trace detection, enhanced our
pat-down procedures, and will continue deploying advanced
imaging technology.
We are always seeking the proper balance between security
and privacy. In that regard, I am pleased to report that we
have begun field testing of the Automatic Target Recognition,
ATR, software for our AIT machines, currently being field
tested in Las Vegas, Atlanta, and Washington National airports.
This software could eventually eliminate the need for TSA
to review passenger images. Instead, a generic icon would
highlight the areas that require additional screening, thereby
addressing the privacy issues that have been raised.
Even with the best technology, an engaged and empowered
workforce is vital, and so that is last week--my decision that
our security officers, the TSOs, will have the right to vote
for or against union representation in a fair and transparent
process consistent with the FLRA order. I also laid out
specific terms for a limited, clearly defined framework
consistent with TSA's security mission should TSOs elect a
union. This framework, which is unique in the U.S. Government,
preserves TSA's capability and flexibility to respond to
evolving threats.
Let me state clearly: TSA's priority is the safety and
security of the traveling public--all 628 million of them in
2009 and again in 2010. As administrator I am committed to
evolving TSA into a more agile, high-performing organization
that can meet the security threats of today and the future.
As I mentioned earlier, TSA's ability to push out
intelligence information to our front-line workforce and
quickly change procedures based on threat and intelligence is
paramount to effective security--all factors, along with cost,
in my decision to not expand the privatized screening program
beyond the 16 current airports absent clear and compelling
reasons. Going forward, I believe we in TSA must use more of a
risk-based approach to the checkpoint of the future using
common sense informed by intelligence rather than a one size
fits all approach for passenger screening.
With that, I look forward to working with this subcommittee
as we develop and implement the security solutions to help
mitigate a dynamic and changing threat landscape.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
February 10, 2011
Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you and this subcommittee today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSA's mission is to
prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation system to terrorism. In meeting this mission, TSA's goal
at all times is to maximize transportation protection and security in
response to the evolving terrorist threat while protecting passengers'
privacy and facilitating the flow of legal commerce.
In the aviation domain, TSA has implemented an effective and
dynamic security system consisting of multiple layers of risk-based
measures, working in concert with our international, Federal, State,
local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. Our security
approach begins well before a traveler arrives at an airport, with our
intelligence and law enforcement partners working to detect, deter, and
prevent terrorist plots before they happen, and continues all the way
through the flight, providing security throughout a passenger's trip--
not just at screening checkpoints.
In the surface arena, we continue to work with our partners to
reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen resilience against a terrorist
attack. We are working to direct grants to the most at-risk transit
properties. Our Surface Security Inspectors are assisting with the
development of specific security programs. And our Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams are being deployed in thousands of
mass transit, maritime, and highway security initiatives.
Despite all our efforts and advances in intelligence, technology,
and screening processes, the threat to the U.S. transportation sector
remains high. We face a committed enemy who continues to collect its
own intelligence against our security measures, seeking to exploit
vulnerabilities in the system. As a result, we must continue to work to
stay ahead of this constantly evolving threat.
a persistent threat to civil aviation
For more than two decades, al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations have sought to do harm to this country, and many of their
plots against the United States have focused on the aviation system. It
is clear that terrorist intent to strike at American targets has not
diminished. We have continued to watch the threat evolve from checked
baggage to hand baggage to non-metallic devices hidden on the body to
air cargo. Non-metallic explosive devices are now the foremost threat
to passenger airlines and it is imperative we maintain and enhance our
capability to detect these threats.
One of the most salient public examples of the on-going terrorist
threat is the bombing plot by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which
resulted in the December 25, 2009, alleged attempt by Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab to blow up an American airplane over the United States
using a non-metallic explosive device that was not and could not have
been discovered by a metal detector. Also, in October 2010, al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula attempted to destroy two airplanes in flight
using artfully concealed explosive devices hidden in cargo that
highlighted the need to strengthen security across the international
supply chain.
I firmly believe our best defense against these and other terrorist
threats remains a risk-based, layered security approach that utilizes a
range of measures both seen and unseen. This approach includes using
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and pat-downs to enhance and
supplement the efforts of law enforcement, intelligence, and terrorist
watchlist checks, strengthening supply chain security, and increasing
international collaboration.
deploying advanced imaging technology
After analyzing the latest intelligence and studying available
technologies and other processes, TSA determined that AIT is the most
effective method to detect both metallic and non-metallic threat items
concealed on passengers while maintaining efficient checkpoint
screening operations. Our work with AIT began over 3 years ago, and has
included testing and evaluation in both the laboratory and in airports.
AIT represents the very latest in passenger screening technological
advancement and addresses a broad range of threats. TSA tested and
piloted the use of AIT at several airports around the country prior to
the December 2009 attempted attack, and as a consequence, the agency
was able to accelerate deployment of AIT following the incident to
enable us to quickly and effectively detect metallic and non-metallic
threats. Our extensive experience with AIT has made us the world leader
in its implementation in the transportation environment.
According to TSA statistics, approximately 1 percent of passengers
selected for AIT screening have opted out of AIT screening. Moreover,
independent polls reflect that the traveling public supports these
measures--for example, a recent CBS poll found four in five people
approve of the use of AIT for screening, and a recent Gallup poll
reported 78 percent of air travelers approve of the use of AIT at U.S.
airports.
AIT is a Safe and Reliable Screening Technology
AIT machines are safe, efficient, and have built-in safeguards to
protect passenger privacy. TSA requires its technology to comply with
consensus-based scientific safety standards administered by the Health
Physics Society and accredited by the American National Standards
Institute.
The radiation dose from backscatter AIT machines has been
independently evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory, all of which have affirmed that
the systems comply with established standards for safety. Public
versions of our safety testing reports are available on TSA's website
at www.tsa.gov.
A single screening using backscatter technology produces a
radiation dose equivalent to approximately 2 minutes of flying on an
airplane at altitude. Millimeter wave technology does not emit ionizing
radiation and instead uses radio frequency energy. The energy projected
by these units is a fraction of other commercially approved radio
frequency devices, such as cell phones, two-way radios, and blue tooth
devices.
TSA is Committed to Protecting Passenger Privacy
TSA has strict safeguards to protect passenger privacy and ensure
anonymity. TSA's AIT machines deployed at airports do not store or
print passenger images, and images are maintained on the monitor only
for as long as it takes to resolve any anomalies. Images from TSA
screening operations have not been and are not retained for any
purpose. Additionally, the officer reviewing the image is unable to see
the individual undergoing screening, and the officer screening the
passenger cannot see the image--the image is completely disassociated
with the passenger. Furthermore, AIT machines do not produce
photographic quality images that would permit recognition of the person
screened. TSA also applies facial blurs to both the millimeter wave and
backscatter technologies.
The Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has conducted a Privacy Impact Assessment of the AIT machines and
updated those assessments as the program has developed. The full
results of that assessment are available to the public on the Privacy
Office's website at www.dhs.gov/privacy. TSA's screening protocols
ensure that such screening does not unreasonably intrude on a
passenger's reasonable expectation of privacy in the airport
environment and that the public's privacy concerns related to AIT
screening are adequately addressed.
Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) To Further Address Privacy Concerns
While we are rapidly deploying AIT machines to U.S. airports, we
also are exploring enhancements to this technology to further address
privacy issues. To that end, we are field testing auto-detection
software, referred to as Automatic Target Recognition (ATR), which
enhances passenger privacy by eliminating passenger-specific images and
instead highlights the area with a detected anomaly on a generic
outline of a person. Pat downs used to resolve such anomalies will be
limited to the areas of the body displaying an alarm unless the number
of anomalies is sufficient to require a full-body pat down. If no
anomalies are detected, the screen displays the word ``OK'' with no
icon.
As with current AIT software, ATR-enabled units deployed at
airports are not capable of storing or printing the generic image. This
software eliminates the need for a remotely located TSO to view
passenger images in a separate room because no actual image of the
passenger is produced, reducing associated staffing and construction
costs. ATR software represents a substantial step forward in addressing
passenger privacy concerns, while maintaining TSA-established standards
for detection. TSA plans to continually update and test enhanced
versions of the software in order to ensure technology with the highest
detection standards is in use.
employing effective pat-downs
TSA operates in a high-threat environment. Terrorists look for gaps
or exceptions to exploit. They are studying our security measures and
will exploit our social norms to their advantage. The device used in
the December 25, 2009, bombing attempt illustrates this fact; it was
cleverly constructed and intentionally hidden on a very sensitive part
of the individual's body to avert detection by officials in Amsterdam.
As a result, the lives of almost 300 passengers and crew were put at
risk. My responsibility as TSA Administrator is to put in place
reasonable security measures to counteract this and other types of
threats.
Upon joining TSA in July 2010, I looked at the agency's efforts to
address the threat posed by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's bombing attempt
on December 25, 2009. I also considered several reports from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), DHS's Office of Inspector
General (IG), and TSA's Office of Inspection, all of whom have
performed a significant amount of covert testing of TSA's operations.
One of the most significant findings of the covert testing was that
pat-downs were not thorough enough. The results of this repeated covert
testing taken with the latest intelligence led to the conclusion that
TSA needed to modify its pat-down procedures.
TSA will continue to work with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties and the DHS Privacy Office to ensure that TSA's pat-
down procedures do not unduly impinge upon passengers' rights and
liberties, and we will regularly reassess screening procedures to
ensure they are set at an appropriate level to mitigate threats while
protecting the passengers' privacy.
implementing secure flight
As of November 23, 2010, TSA's Secure Flight program became fully
operational for all covered flights operating to, from, and within the
United States, fulfilling a key 9/11 Commission recommendation and
increasing security by having TSA, rather than airlines, screen every
passenger against the latest intelligence before a boarding pass is
issued. Since its implementation, Secure Flight has demonstrated the
value of uniform, consistent watch list matching through improved
identification of matches. Continuous Secure Flight vetting begins 72
hours in advance of flight and continues until the flight departs,
consistently providing insight into potential threats and enabling TSA
to plan field efforts to counter any threat accordingly.
Collectively, there are 202 aircraft operators using Secure Flight,
representing 100 percent of all aircraft operators covered by the
Secure Flight Final Rule.
advancing air cargo security
TSA also continues to take aggressive action to improve the
security of air cargo throughout the global air cargo network. In
response to the October 2010 attempted bombings of cargo aircraft bound
for the United States, TSA has issued security requirements restricting
the transport of printer and toner cartridges, prohibiting elevated
risk cargo from transport on passenger aircraft, requiring other cargo
to undergo screening, and establishing requirements for handling
international mail. In January 2011, TSA issued a proposed air carrier
security program change to increase security measures for air cargo,
most notably, to require 100 percent screening of inbound international
cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 31, 2011. TSA
expects to finalize the programs in Spring 2011 after evaluating
industry comments.
Additionally, as part of the DHS Air Cargo Security Working Group
established by Secretary Napolitano, TSA is taking a leadership role in
partnering with industry and other Federal Government partners to
develop strategies to strengthen air cargo security while facilitating
the flow of commerce. TSA is also working closely with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection and the air cargo industry to receive and process
pre-departure, advanced air cargo information from shippers earlier
than is currently required so that we can increase the focus of our
screening resources on high-threat cargo.
reducing surface transportation vulnerabilities
The Transportation Security Administration works with its partners
in securing the surface transportation networks of the United States,
working closely with transit agencies and State and local officials to
assist them in defining and meeting their security requirements. The
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) is a vital tool by which we
enable and empower transit agency security providers to improve their
practices. TSA works closely with the FEMA Grants Program Division to
apply funding to projects with the most effective risk mitigation to
the most at-risk transit properties. In 2010, the TSGP provided $273.4
million to the transit industry and a total of $1.6 billion since 2006.
Similar, but smaller grant programs have supported freight rail, over-
the-road bus, and trucking programs.
TSA Surface Inspectors engage in all surface modes with activities
ranging from inspecting rail yards and hazmat conveyances for
regulatory compliance to assisting in the development of security and
incident management plans. In the transit mode, the Surface Security
Inspector program improves security by conducting field visits to
assess the baseline of security and subsequently developing action
plans and assisting properties and agencies to improve their specific
security programs. One such security program is the deployment of
explosives detection canines, which are provided both through TSGP
grant funding and appropriated TSA funds. TSA and the Department's
Science and Technology Directorate are also partnering with Auburn
University's well-regarded canine program to enhance the effectiveness
of explosives detection canine teams used by TSA in protecting aviation
and surface transportation by developing additional detection
techniques and we welcome the opportunity to further brief the
subcommittee on these efforts.
TSA's VIPR teams are designed to enhance security by working in
mass transit, aviation, rail, and other transportation modes alongside
local law enforcement agencies during specific times or events. VIPR
teams are comprised of personnel with expertise in inspection, behavior
detection, security screening, and law enforcement, and enhance TSA's
ability to leverage a variety of resources quickly to increase security
in any mode of transportation anywhere in the country. A component of
TSA's nimble, unpredictable approach to security, TSA enhanced surface
transportation security by conducting over 3,750 VIPR operations in
2010 in the various modes of surface transportation. VIPR operational
plans are developed with a risk-based methodology, in conjunction with
local transportation security stakeholders, and conducted jointly by
TSA, local law enforcement, and transportation security resources.
twic program advancements
In the last 2 years, over 1.6 million workers have enrolled in the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The
TWIC program includes a comprehensive security threat assessment, and
the issuance of biometric credentials, which are now required to enter
maritime facilities. TSA has processed 50,000 appeals and waiver
requests, and continues to improve the adjudication process to shorten
the time it takes to complete the security threat assessment process.
After working through many challenges, TSA is concluding the TWIC
Reader Pilot Program, wrapping up formal data collection, and working
on the report to Congress. We continue to coordinate these efforts with
the U.S. Coast Guard to ensure a high level of security and operational
effectiveness.
enhancing international cooperation
The U.S. Government fully recognizes that it takes a concerted,
global effort to protect the world's interconnected transportation
networks. The security of U.S. civil aviation is intimately connected
to the security of international civil aviation system writ large, and
is directly affected by efforts that extend beyond our borders. For
that reason, Secretary Napolitano and I have embarked on an aggressive
outreach initiative to enhance civil aviation security standards and
practices worldwide.
Immediately following the attempted bombing of a U.S.-bound
Northwest Airlines flight on December 25, 2009, Secretary Napolitano
began working with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
on an unprecedented global initiative to strengthen the international
aviation system against the evolving threats posed by terrorists,
working in multilateral and bilateral contexts with governments as well
as industry. Secretary Napolitano has participated in regional aviation
security summits in Europe, South America, the Caribbean, Asia, and the
Middle East, bringing about historic consensus with her international
colleagues to strengthen the civil aviation system through improved
information sharing, cooperation on technological development and
enhanced aviation security standards.
These efforts culminated at the ICAO Triennial Assembly in October
2010, where the Assembly adopted the Declaration on Aviation Security,
which highlights the commitment of the international community to
collaborate in the effort to enhance aviation security at the
international level. The extraordinary global collaboration
demonstrated by the nearly 190 ICAO countries during the ICAO General
Assembly in Montreal has helped to advance international security
standards, broaden existing cooperation mechanisms and information
exchange, and encourage the use of technology in the aviation security
environment.
Specifically, following the Assembly, the ICAO Council adopted
Amendment 12 to Annex 17 to the International Convention on Civil
Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention), which governs
international civil aviation security. These amendments will tighten
the existing international standards to account for new and emerging
threats, and also establish enhanced standards for air cargo security.
TSA will continue its work to further enhance international security
standards vis-a-vis evolving threats and risk of unlawful interference
with civil aviation.
Further, throughout 2010, DHS and TSA played a significant role in
developing the ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy, also
adopted at the ICAO Assembly in October 2010, which sets the course for
ICAO's aviation security efforts over the next 6 years. This strategy
establishes seven key focus areas, which are built upon DHS/TSA's
strategic goals for the enhancement of international aviation. These
include addressing new and emerging threats; promoting innovative,
effective and efficient security approaches; promoting the sharing of
information amongst member states to raise awareness of threats and
security trends relevant to civil aviation operations; promoting global
compliance and establishing sustainable aviation security oversight;
improving human factors and security culture; promoting the development
of mutual recognition for aviation security processes; and emphasizing
the importance of security.
Lastly, senior DHS leadership from the Private Sector Office, TSA
and CBP began collaboratively engaging with the aviation industry in a
dialogue about security changes, a practice that we will continue
regularly this year.
Continuing Engagement
TSA is actively involved in various bilateral Transportation and
Aviation Security Working Groups, and is an active participant in
regional and multilateral organizations such as the G8, the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Quadrilateral Group on Transportation
Security, and the ICAO Regional Offices. Furthermore, TSA has been
actively reaching out to other regional organizations such as the Latin
American Civil Aviation Conference, the Arab Civil Aviation Conference,
the Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services, and the
African Civil Aviation Conference and the African Union. Through these
forums, TSA is able to encourage and assist in the enhancement of
international aviation security standards and practices, and to better
understand the legal, political, cultural, geographic, and operational
issues that may affect our foreign partners' ability to address certain
aviation security. Finally, this past November, TSA hosted an
international policy summit on AIT at TSA's Systems Integration
Facility, which brought together key policy makers and experts from
over 30 countries and 11 industry associations to discuss and exchange
views on AIT. Discussions centered on legal, policy, privacy,
operational, and health, safety and science aspects of AIT and the
deployment of such screening capability at airports in different
locations around the world.
TSA, in conjunction with the Department of State, is also working
with foreign governments to gain their acceptance of Federal Air
Marshals on international flights to and from more countries. This
expansion of covered flights will further enhance aviation security for
passengers and aircraft.
conclusion
I want to thank the subcommittee for its continued assistance to
TSA and for the opportunity to discuss these important issues of
transportation security. I am pleased to answer any questions you might
have.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, Mr. Pistole. We know you are very
busy and we very much appreciate your making yourself available
today to work with us on this topic.
I would like to recognize myself now for 5 minutes for
questions.
Recently I had a meeting with railroad industry and they
expressed a couple of concerns that they would like help with.
One was they would like more specific information--more
concrete and specific information--on the current threats that
TSA is aware of and to work with them to deal with those
threats. The other was they would like to have more of a mutual
relationship with TSA to establish goals that both you and the
industry feel like would most effectively deal with the threat.
So could you tell me what, if anything, you have been
working on to address those two areas, the communication of
threat information as well as setting of goals with the rail
industry?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, since I started last July we have been looking at not
only the pushing of the intelligence out to the TSA workforce
but those partners who--in industry--who are ultimately
responsible for implementing the safeguards that need to be in
effect. I have met with both executives and security officers
from the freight rail and the passenger rail area and there are
several good developments.
I am clearly committed to working in a partnership to
providing the latest intelligence--of course, it is usually
strategic intelligence; there may be a threat to, for example,
Amtrak over the Northeast corridor, or there may be something
about terrorists such as in Madrid or London or Moscow or
Mumbai, you know, want to attack a rail without any tactical,
actionable intelligence. But we are pushing out intelligence in
a classified setting and unclassified, as appropriate, on both
strategic and tactical.
One very positive development on your second point about
the working toward mutual goals is in the area of toxic
inhalation hazards that are carried on freight rail through
downtown areas, major metropolitan areas including Washington,
DC. Really because of the partnership and the initiative of the
freight industry handling these toxic inhalation hazards, there
has been a 90 percent reduction over the last 2 years in the
threat to some of these urban areas. That was done based on the
initiative of the industry with assistance from us through some
grants and things like that. So there is a partnership, and
that is what I am committed to doing.
Mr. Rogers. So there are not limits, then, on your ability
to communicate the threat with them?
Mr. Pistole. No. It is just a question of--obviously if it
comes from other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community we
get information from them in the form of what is disseminable,
and of course they always want to protect sources and methods--
--
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. So they may not say, ``This is an
intercept from this communication from this person,'' but they
will say, ``We have intelligence''--and for example, not
related to freight or rail, but on December 23 we received
credible intelligence that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
was considering using PETN, the same type of explosive in the
Christmas day, the underwear bomber, and--and in the cargo
plot--that same type of explosive in thermoses.
So they would wrap the PETN around the inner liner of the
thermos, and so we pushed that information out literally the
same day that we received it to U.S. carriers. So it is that
type of actionable intelligence that we are always trying to
do.
So the security officers were doing enhanced screening of
thermoses from that day on. That continues.
Mr. Rogers. Tell me, shifting gears a little bit--Sheila
Jackson Lee, a little earlier, mentioned the airports, the
private--using private contractors and how you had made the
decision to cease that effort. Tell me about your thought
process of making that decision.
Mr. Pistole. So conceptually I see that the TSA should be a
Federal counterterrorism agency and we are best able to train,
to deploy, and execute on our mission as a Federal workforce.
That being said, with the 16 privatized airports I am always
open to new, innovative ideas and opportunities where we can
improve either in terms of our efficiencies in how we go about
doing things for better security or from a business efficiency
standpoint.
So some of the reporting was that I have killed the program
and it is no longer open. That is not true. But I do want to
see clear, compelling information or evidence that would
benefit--there has got to be a reason for making a change, and
if we went beyond the 16 in any large measure it would make it
more challenging in terms of how we do the immediate--the
flexibility and agility that I want as part of the Federalized
workforce.
Mr. Rogers. Why would it inhibit that flexibility?
Mr. Pistole. So, for example, the airports that were
mentioned--San Francisco, Kansas City, seven in Montana, and
Key West, and Roswell, and other places--I don't have
flexibility to move those individuals to another airport
because they are not employed by TSA, they are a private
contractor. So if there is--well, for example, a disaster like
Hurricane Katrina, that Congressman Richmond is very familiar
with, if we have something like--I could not take those for a
surge capacity to deal with that. Or if there is specific
intelligence about a particular airport I am limited; I can't
move those individuals.
If we have a change in how we go about our protocols, which
is with the enhanced pat-downs, it is just--it is a more
cumbersome process, frankly.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. My time is up.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas for 5
minutes for questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think
I would agree with Administrator Pistole on the importance of
the role of TSO officers as part of our fighting terrorism
team. I think the more we can enhance the training--skill
training--it is going to be enormously helpful.
The one point that I would make, and maybe in your remarks
you might comment on that: No. 1, terrorism doesn't make an
appointment; and No. 2, we have seen the franchising of
terrorism, meaning single individuals can be actors that show
up at airports anywhere around the world.
But let me ask a question you might incorporate that
because it has to do with the pat-down procedures and the AIT
machines and working with flight crews and pilots. In fact,
Section 1614 of the Implementing Recommendation 9/11 Commission
called for the implementation of a system to expedite flight
crews and pilots through security checkpoints. I think you know
yourself it has been a point of contention.
Where are you in evaluating that process and will the
system include a biometric component, as was piloted by TSA at
BWI? Will you focus on pilots and crew, including flight
attendants, as the legislation directed?
I know it was mentioned with Secretary Napolitano, there is
a Trusted Traveler program that many people are inquiring. This
is a very full question.
The other part of it is, I think the Chairman and I agree
on notice and keeping a dialogue. I mentioned to you that we
heard about changes in the enhanced process on a television--
local television--and it was concerned about that. Can you help
us as to why that leaked and why some of us, at least, were not
aware of that--certainly not the procedures, but at least the
fact that changes were coming?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Ranking Member Jackson Lee. So, to
your first point about terrorists not making appointments, that
is absolutely why we have the layers of security and why we do
random, unpredictable screening at different airports different
ways. We have behavior detection officers--the whole range and
panoply of options as part of the overall continuum for the
U.S. Government in terms of our counterterrorism strategy.
You are absolutely right. There are single individuals out
there who may be inspired by, whether it is Bin Laden, or
Awlaki, or some other terrorist, who is radicalized on the
internet and then may go and see how to make a bomb themselves
without ever communicating with anybody else, which is one of
the--obviously, the key opportunities to intercept that
information. So that is one of the key challenges, how do we go
about doing that?
That being said, I am very much interested, as I mentioned
in my opening statement, about using a risk-based approach,
using the information we already know about every passenger
through Secure Flight, so it is name, date of birth, and
gender, so we know whether or not they are on a watch list. But
then as far as a--some type of a trusted traveler program, if
individuals are willing to give us more information about
themselves so we could do, you know, criminal history check and
other checks then we might be able to afford them a different
type of security screening.
So I have several working groups on this. We are looking at
a number of different options. That is the reason why I decided
in November to change the screening of pilots, because using a
risk-based approach, since they are in charge of the aircraft--
frankly, I was not concerned if they had a prohibited item on
their person because they could put the flight down.
I worked Egyptair 990 crash Halloween night of 1999 when I
was with the FBI coming off JFK and crashed off the coast of
Rhode Island, where the co-pilot intentionally put the flight
down, killed 232 people. So it is not the physical screening
that is going to detect that; it is what is in the person's
head.
So we are working with the airlines and the pilots'
associations to expand the three projects that we had called
Crew Pass--whether it is Crew Pass or not I am agnostic to--but
to allow them to use an identity-based way of getting to their
flight as opposed to the physical screening. I talked to the
Flight Attendants Association also and we are still in
discussion about that and what that might mean.
So I am interested in expanding that to not only trusted
travelers but how we define those. So I would be glad--I would
like to discuss that further with the subcommittee as more time
is available.
Ms. Jackson Lee. One quick question--I don't know if we
have another opportunity: You have been meeting with
stakeholders on this 100 percent explosive screening mandate.
Question quickly is: Why are you doing that? Why do we need
that input? But more importantly, what happened to the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee that we asked about last year to
establish a security advisory committee on air cargo to look at
some of these issues?
Mr. Pistole. So the advisory committee has been--the
working group has been reinstated as of last month. Secretary
decided that, with Commission Alan Bersin from CBP and myself
as the co-chairs, and Douglas Smith from the Private Outreach
Office facilitating that. So that has been reinstituted. Thank
you for that suggestion and follow-up.
The outreach for the--in terms of the cargo is--basically,
I want to make sure that we don't dictate something to industry
that they are not capable of implementing without burdensome
cost to them or inability to comply, and so that is why we are
working very closely with--for example, in the freight area,
with UPS and FedEx. Post October 29 and the Yemen cargo plot we
are working very closely with them to say, ``Here is what makes
them--here is what we can do collaboratively in a
partnership,'' rather than us just dictating to them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have got other questions, Mr. Chairman,
but I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Yes. We will have another series, at least.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Walsh, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Pistole, thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for so quickly hosting an
important hearing like this.
Administrator Pistole, let me refer to just a couple broad
issues that you raised in your opening statement. You
emphasized a few times a risk-based approach to passenger
screening. This is obviously an issue that in the general
public often breeds confusion.
Explain, in basic or more complicated terms, what goes into
that risk-based approach for passenger screening.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman. So right now we are
not there. So we do use a one-size-fits-all approach, which I
don't think is either efficient or beneficial for the traveling
public or for security.
So what I would like to do is spend more time with those
that we assess, based on all the information available to us,
that may be a higher risk--clearly those on any watch list and
things like that--but do we have other information, either from
intelligence or information that has been volunteered to us by
the passenger or that we gleaned perhaps by the behavior
detection officer noticing something suspicious about a person.
So that is where we are moving to, and again, I will have
more information as this year goes on but I am committed to
doing something this year that would demonstrate a different
paradigm for how we go about doing passenger screening--who we
screen, how we screen them.
Mr. Walsh. It sounds like much of that will be based on
intelligence gathering.
Mr. Pistole. So, part of it will be. Again, it is
something--there are obviously privacy issues, civil liberty
issues that we want to be very attuned to. But if a frequent
traveler, for example, is willing to voluntarily provide
information like they do for other trusted traveler programs,
like Global Entry coming back into the United States, expedited
processes through customs, then yes, I am interested in doing
that and making sure that we can verify the identity of a
person and then make a risk-based judgment.
Again, we are not in the risk elimination business. We will
never eliminate risk; unless people stop flying that is not an
option. You know, people won't have car accidents, no guarantee
unless they stop driving. So we don't eliminate risk but we try
to mitigate risk in an informed fashion, and that is what I am
committed to doing.
Mr. Walsh. Leapfrogging to another issue, TSA created the
Screening Partnership Program. Airports can apply to have
checkpoint screening done by private contractors, currently
being done at 16 airports. In your estimation, why was this
partnership begun to begin with?
Mr. Pistole. So, as part of the enabling legislation of the
Aviation Transportation Security Act it was required that five
airports do a 2-year project to see whether that works.
Obviously some Members felt strongly that that should be an
option.
So that five was done from November 2002 to November 2004.
Then other airports applied and so we are at the 16, but there
just--there hasn't been--in fact, there have only been two
applications since I started on the job last year, one that
just came in last week after I announced my decision. So there
hasn't seemed to be that much interest in the program, and it
is--so that is where it is right now.
Mr. Walsh. Was the pilot program deemed successful?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Walsh. Okay. At the 16 airports where it is currently
being practiced is it fair to say that it is being fairly
successful at those as well?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Of course, they follow the exact
protocols, standard operating procedures that we have at the
other 435 or so airports around the country. They have to use
the same equipment, the same training, all those things. It is
just the actual individuals happen to work for a private
contractor rather than for TSA.
Mr. Walsh. The expansion beyond 16 airports, that has got
to come from the airports themselves? Airports apply for them?
Mr. Pistole. Sure. They apply and then we evaluate. So in
my announcement I am simply saying I want to see something
clear and compelling, something substantial that would make
sense to justify changing from what system is already working.
Mr. Walsh. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Full Committee, gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, I appreciate your frankness in responding to
the questions.
Let's look at air cargo for a moment. As you know, we
recently received notice that the Department has gone to 100
percent passenger cargo screening. Have there been any problems
relative to cargo being interrupted or not delivered on time
with the implementation of this 100 percent screening?
Mr. Pistole. No, Congressman. It has worked very
efficiently through a combination of certified cargo screening
facilities--about 1,200 of them around the United States--
coupled with the screening done at the airports.
Mr. Thompson. Well, and I think that is part of closing a
vulnerability loop that pretty much all of us identify.
Moving to another area, repair stations. I understand that
you are in the process of doing some rulemaking and it is--for
whatever reason we don't have it. Can you give us some idea
when some of the proposal-making will be completed?
Mr. Pistole. So, we have the domestic repair stations,
obviously, but you may be referring to the foreign repair
stations?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, foreign.
Mr. Pistole. On the foreign repair stations we work,
obviously, with FAA in terms of their certification of those
facilities as being qualified to the repair work, especially on
the, you know, on the U.S.-based carriers. So part of the
challenge is how do we validate that what they are doing meets
our standards in the United States?
So in certain countries, you know, their security protocols
and regimen are just not as thorough, and so that is part of
the challenge: How do we work with the host government, their
civil aviation authorities, and their cargo companies to give
us that highest level of confidence that when they are making
repairs to aircraft that there is not something nefarious also
taking place? Part of that is the screening of the mechanics
who work in those facilities.
So it is a logistical challenge for us to validate--to
inspect and validate all those foreign repair stations, so that
is part of the rulemaking. How can we do that in concert with
industry?
Mr. Thompson. So can you give us an idea when you----
Mr. Pistole. I will have to get back with you on that, sir.
I don't know off the top of my head.
Mr. Thompson. Well, and the reason I say it is I think we
have gone beyond the expected time on that. So if you could get
back to us we would appreciate it.
For the record, also, Mr. Chairman, I want to kind of share
with the committee relative to the collective bargaining issue,
there are already people who have collective bargaining rights
within the Department of Homeland Security--our Customs and
Border Protection Officers, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the Federal Protective Service.
But also, within the Federal Government we have the
Department of Defense Police, United States Capitol Police,
United States Park Police, United States Marshal Service,
Department of Veterans Affairs Police, as well as the United
States Mint Police.
But also, the whole issue of security and whether or not
collective bargaining would compromise that security. I would
like to say that the two officers who brought down the shooter
at Fort Hood were members of the American Federation of
Government Employees Union.
So I think those two heroes deserve recognition, and just
as a sidebar, they were union members. So I think they did a
wonderful job, and I hope some of the concerns about collective
bargaining and belonging to a union can be put to rest because
of that.
I guess the only other issue, Mr. Administrator, you talked
a little bit about it, was implementing with our imaging
machines the new software. Can you give us how long the pilots
are expected to go before we can recognize the new results on
that?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Congressman. The testing began in Las
Vegas last week, Washington National, Reagan Airport, and
Atlanta Hartsfield this week, and we are doing between 45 and
60 days of field testing to assess whether the result that we
had in the lab will be commensurate with what we are actually
experiencing with real passengers, real screening. It is too
early to say, other than I know from Las Vegas it is going well
and we are working through some issues.
For example, an individual with a ponytail that may show up
as an anomaly that could be on the machine because it may be
slightly out of the algorithm that is normal, but that is
easily resolved with just a visual inspection. So it is part of
this training for the TSOs to say, ``Okay, how do we resolve
that?'' and then what it, of course, completely, I believe,
addresses the privacy issues that have been raised because it
is just that generic object, that icon of a person, which is
the same for every passenger, as opposed to individual with the
area highlighted with anomaly. So it is just a targeted pat-
down of that area which, again, also addresses the pat-down
issue that some people have concerns about.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from
Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A few questions with respect to collective bargaining: If
the TSOs elect to form a union, who would they be bargaining
with?
Mr. Pistole. So, under the construct of ATSA, the enabling
legislation, it gives TSA administration great discretion, so
it would be only National-level collective bargaining and it
would be with the headquarters component of TSA. So again, we
wouldn't have local collective bargaining, and it would only be
to processes and procedures as opposed to, you know, individual
airport issues. So it is at the National level.
Mr. Brooks. It would be with you ultimately?
Mr. Pistole. Perhaps ultimately, but hopefully there would
be, you know, there would be others who would be engaged on a
day-to-day basis.
Mr. Brooks. If I understand correctly, the collective
bargaining would be such things as performance management
process, awards and recognition, attendance management
guidelines and processes, and shift bids, and things of that
nature?
Mr. Pistole. Correct.
Mr. Brooks. How do we know that that won't be expanded at
some point in the future to include many other items?
Mr. Pistole. Because the enabling legislation gives the
administrator that sole discretion as to what can and cannot be
bargained about, and so it is basically like going through a
cafeteria menu and saying, ``I would like this, I would like
this, I would like this, I don't want that.'' So what is on the
tray right now are just those items that I believe do not
adversely affect security in any way. So I or a successor
administrator would have to agree to add things to that.
Mr. Brooks. So if you or your successor were to change the
scope of what the collective bargaining could be about then it
would be changed?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. What would the union's remedies be should they
disagree with the results of the collective bargaining?
Mr. Pistole. Again, under ATSA, because the broad
authorities, there is basically--the final decision rests with
the administrator and there is no appeal, if you will, from
that.
Mr. Brooks. Well, traditionally unions have--if collective
bargaining doesn't go as they wish they have, as you know,
exercised strike rights, and they have, as you know, exercised
work stoppages or work slowdowns. How do we have any assurances
that that would not happen in the United States and disrupt our
security at airport facilities?
Mr. Pistole. Again, Congressman, because of those unique
and broad authorities that ATSA gave the administrator none of
those possibilities are options. If any employee does not show
up for work then they would be disciplined. There are no issues
on that under the collective bargaining.
All those processes, all those employee engagement things
will remain in place. Obviously there is not work slowdown or
stoppage or strike that is allowed, and so an employee could be
fired for doing those things.
Mr. Brooks. Well, to some degree it seems that our country
visited this issue back in the early 1980s with the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, as you
probably recall. President Reagan ultimately had to fire all of
the PATCO employees en masse. Are you willing to do the same
thing should any of these TSO workers decide to exercise work
stoppage or work slowdown or strike should they disagree with
your determination of the collective bargaining process?
Mr. Pistole. Well, sure, Congressman. I mean, I won't allow
anything to happen that will adversely affect the security. So
if an individual or group of individuals are not performing
their duties as assigned then--we would go through the normal
process of discipline and perhaps termination.
Mr. Brooks. But you are, on the record, willing to
terminate en masse if need be, should these individuals
unionize and should they engage in work stoppages or slowdowns
of any sort?
Mr. Pistole. Well, I can't envision in this construct
because it is not traditional collective bargaining, so there
is no right to do that. So if an individual wants to risk
losing their job by not showing up or doing a work slowdown
then they would be subject to the normal disciplinary process,
which could ultimately result in termination.
Mr. Brooks. Well, the reason I bring up PATCO is they
really had no right to do what they were doing. Once Reagan
ordered them to return to work, they refused to return to work,
so they were terminated en masse.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Mr. Brooks. I am trying to get a clear yes or no answer
from you. If there is a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, should they engage in a work stoppage or slowdown,
or should they engage in a strike, are you willing to fire them
en masse? Yes or no?
Mr. Pistole. I am willing to, yes.
Mr. Brooks. All right, thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Think the gentleman yields back.
Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Davis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, let me just say straight out from the
beginning that I am in favor of TSA employees having the right
to organize. However, I also want to feel as safe and secure
and as protected when I travel, and I also want to feel that
the American public and all of the public who make use of our
transportation system can feel the same way.
I know that in your memorandum relative to collective
bargaining you stated that surveys have shown that TSA ranks
poorly in terms of employee morale. How important do you think
morale is in terms of service, and do you think that the
organization or the right to organize a union would have a
positive impact on morale-building?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman.
As you are aware, last year the OPM survey, in terms of
best places to work in the U.S. Government, TSA ranked 220 out
of 226 agencies, and during a number of town halls around the
country at airports listening to security officers, and then
their supervisors, and then the management and executives in
three separate sessions, what I found was a great deal of
frustration with the lack of uniformity and consistency in the
way we handle our personnel policies. So that was part of what
informed my decision and judgment to allow them to vote,
recognizing that 13,000 of the 47,000 or so are currently
paying union dues without collective bargaining.
So I think there is a lot of distraction among the
workforce with these personnel issues that could be improved
with better uniformity and consistency. So that is part of my
reason and rationale for allowing them to vote on whether they
want to have a union representing them.
Mr. Davis. I know that individuals are always concerned
about the possibility of public employees striking, or slowing
down the work, or in some way disrupting our normal flow of
activity. What are, perhaps, some of the ways that individuals
who have grievances or who are dissatisfied--what can they
actually expect to do to try to get those resolved?
Mr. Pistole. So, all of the existing processes and
protocols that we have in place will continue, and so then they
are encouraged to raise the issue first with their supervisor
and try to work through that, you know, on a, just a
partnership basis. If that doesn't work then depending on what
the issue is and their concern then they have other
opportunities to raise those. If collective bargaining is voted
on and a union is elected then they would be able to have that
representation at a hearing or whatever would come up as a
result of that issue.
Mr. Davis. Of course, I come from Chicago, where it is
obviously quite cold right now, and it is good to be from
there--that is, away from there. But we are also the
transportation hub for a region. As a matter of fact, there are
those who would suggest that we are the transportation center
of America, and that is because of our strategic location.
Much of that relates, though, also to surface
transportation. Are there any new thoughts, provisions,
guidelines that are being proposed to increase safety and
security related to surface transportation?
Mr. Pistole. So, we recognize that surface--particularly
trains, subways--are vulnerable and have been subjects of
multiple attacks around the world, as I mentioned earlier. The
challenge is, how do we shore up those defenses for an
individual getting either on a passenger train or a subway?
So we have done several things, partially through the
Transportation Security Grant Program, where, working with FEMA
and State and local authorities, we provided over $300 million
last year to a number of different transportation systems,
including some of those in Chicago, that use that money for
several things. One is training of officers; it may be used on
canine program and training; it may be such things as, even in
New York City, where last year they were able to hire 120 or so
officers in NYPD just for enhanced security in the subways.
There are over 450 subway stations in New York City. That was
money through the Grant Program.
We also have VIPR teams, or Visible Intermodal Protection
and Response teams, which are designed to be visible,
unpredictable deterrents to those, whether it is here at Union
Station, or Penn Station in Philly, or New York, or in Chicago,
and some of that is through grant money and it is all working
with State and locals. Because we recognize in TSA we can't be
all things in all places to all people at all times. We can't
protect against all threats, so we have to work through that
local partnership, whether State and local police, Amtrak
police, whoever it may be.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back.
My friend and colleague from California, Mr. Lungren, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Administrator Pistole, for your service--for
your service in the FBI and for your service now. Thank you for
taking some arrows on the issue of full body scanners when that
came up a little while ago--I meant a few months ago.
I would just like to ask you, though, about your decision
with respect to the Screening Partnership Program. You said
that Members of Congress, when they enacted the legislation,
wanted a pilot project. Pilot project was conducted. You said
that the results were good.
You then said, however, that you made a decision with
respect to granting collective bargaining rights to the
employees because you listened to them and you thought it would
be a good idea that they should vote. But you are denying the
airports in this country the right to vote. Airports--a number
of them--want to be involved in this, and you have basically
now raised the bar and so there has to be a compelling reason.
Do you have that same standard when you decided with respect to
collective bargaining--compelling reason?
Mr. Pistole. So, I think those are two distinguishable
issues, and----
Mr. Lungren. Well, my question is, was that standard the
one you used in collective bargaining--it had to be a
compelling reason for you to do it?
Mr. Pistole. No. I did not use the same standard.
Mr. Lungren. Well, I don't understand why you are doing it
in this case. You said the surge--you need the flexibility of
the surge, yet you then testified that only a couple of
airports have asked for it. There are 400 and some odd
airports. Are you saying adding two more would complicate your
situation with respect to flexibility for the surge so that you
couldn't accomplish your task?
Mr. Pistole. No. What I am saying is I didn't see a
compelling reason to add to the existing 16 that would be
reason to make a change from the existing approach of using
Federalized workforce in most airports.
Mr. Lungren. Yes. But when we passed the legislation we
wanted to see whether that would work. We didn't say there
would be a compelling reason to go further. I mean, the idea
was to have a pilot project to see if it would work. You told
us it worked, but now you are saying it has to be a compelling
reason.
I don't understand the bias against the private sector,
frankly, and that is what it appears to me to be. If you look
at the experience in San Francisco International Airport, which
has been outstanding, that airport provided competition to the
others. When this program first started one of the highest
rates of injury of the entire workforce in the Nation were
screeners.
The private employer in San Francisco decided that instead
of having all the screeners lift heavy baggage they would
actually get heavy baggage lifters and pay them at a different
rate. What happened? They didn't have the same injury rate that
the public sector did. Then the public sector saw that was a
good idea and they did that.
The idea of competition allows those kinds of things that
can happen. So I am trying to find out why you say you have to
have a compelling reason.
You talk about Katrina. How many private sector people
responded to Katrina? You are telling it that somehow because
these folks work for a company that makes a profit that that is
somehow different?
I mean, I am just trying to get this idea through my head
as to why you have this thought that we can't have private
screeners when airports are saying they would like that
alternative.
Mr. Pistole. Again, Congressman, I appreciate and I believe
I understand your concerns and I----
Mr. Lungren. I am sorry. I don't believe you do, based on
what you have said.
Mr. Pistole. Okay. So I hear your concerns. I think if we
look at, from the perspective of what happened prior to 9/11
with private screeners there was obviously compelling----
Mr. Lungren. That is completely different.
Mr. Pistole. Well, with private screeners versus Federal
screeners I believe there should be a Federalized workforce----
Mr. Lungren. Okay, you have answered it then. You believe
in a Federalized workforce.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. I am sorry. I mentioned that in my
comments before you were here, so----
Mr. Lungren. No, so you believe in a Federalized
workforce----
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Rather than one that has private
folks working at the direction those----
Mr. Pistole. That is exactly right. That is what I
testified to earlier; I guess it was before you came in. So
that is my philosophical approach. I believe it should be a
Federalized counterterrorism workforce but I----
Mr. Lungren. Have you worked in the private sector?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. I practiced law before I became an FBI
agent.
Mr. Lungren. Is there something about the private sector
that makes them unable to participate in the security of this
country?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely not.
Mr. Lungren. Well, I am astounded, frankly, that you would
say that, particularly since that is contrary to what the
Congress indicated they wanted done. They wanted a pilot
project to see if it works. It has worked and you have said
under--in your testimony it has worked. But despite that, you
say we should not allow it to go further because you believe it
ought to be a Federalized workforce.
Mr. Pistole. I am saying I am open to the possibility and
that is why I continue the 16, and if an airport comes in and
can demonstrate there is a compelling reason to change because
they can do things better then I am open to that. I am not
ruling that out, Congressman.
Mr. Lungren. What is your bias against private sector
people being involved in the security--85 percent of our
critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. Are you
suggesting we need to Federalize 85 percent of the critical
infrastructure of this country because somehow only Federal
workers can do the job?
Mr. Pistole. So we have had just the two airports come in
since I have been the administrator requesting this, and there
hasn't been a rush to knock down the door to have airports
submit application to do this----
Mr. Lungren. Would you believe that they might be
discouraged by your comments?
Mr. Pistole. I am just saying up until the time of my
announcement there--well, actually there had only been one, and
then one came in after the announcement, I think to try to just
demonstrate----
Mr. Lungren. Hardly encouraging, is it--what you have said
so far?
Mr. Pistole. I don't know how they would take it, but----
Mr. Lungren. Well, I know how they would take it. They
would say that you have said that it ought to be a Federal
screeners workforce, that you have to find a compelling reason,
which means you have given them a higher bar, and you have
given all sorts of reasons that you believe it is going to
interfere in your flexibility to respond to a potential
disaster. Frankly, I don't understand what you say.
Philosophically I disagree with you. I think the Congress
disagreed with you. Frankly, I am very disappointed because I
think you are basically saying you are going to set a standard
that is not in the law because you have, for whatever reason--
for believing that those in the private sector can't do as good
a job as those in the public sector, and I am sorry to hear
that.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman yields back.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana,
Mr. Richmond, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, just very quickly, can you touch for me on
rail security? I know it is probably in many districts, but our
rail lines go through neighborhoods, they are close to schools,
they are close to big sporting venues and a number of other
things, and my--one of my concerns has always been what happens
if the rail line is used as a weapon? They share bridges with
our automobiles many times, so can you touch on that for me?
Mr. Pistole. Sure, Congressman. I share that concern,
recognizing the vulnerabilities and the access to rail that is
not necessarily associated with aviation. As I mentioned, with
the attacks around the world against rail--particularly
passenger rail--and also just the partnership that we have both
with freight and passenger rail in terms of their actions that
they can take without Government regulation but just to say it
just makes good business sense for us to reduce our risk.
The example I gave about the 90 percent reduction in the
toxic inhalation hazard risk through urban areas by industry's
own initiative, that is an ideal model for me where industry
does that voluntarily. It is not a regulation; it is because it
is good business sense. So we would closely with, whether it is
the Amtrak police, or other rail police, addressed the security
chiefs of all the major rails, both freight and passenger, at
several different settings. What we hope to ensure is that
partnership where we are pushing out intelligence so that they
can make informed judgments as to what actions they should take
to protect their rail.
Mr. Richmond. My last question would just be a general
question on the future of the TWIC card and the program. Where
are we and where are we headed with this?
Mr. Pistole. So, we have about 1.8 million TWIC cards at
this point. I could check on that number to make sure, but I
think that is right. It is--not where I would like it to be. It
has taken longer than it should and there have not been
successes that I would like to see in terms of trying to ensure
the best possible safety of ports by those who have access to
the most critical areas.
I am focused on that and want to make some improvements in
both the timing and the roll-out. It has taken too long,
frankly.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you for your time.
I will yield back the remainder of mine.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman yields back.
Speaking of cold weather, Mr. Davis, our next questioner is
from Minnesota, so we can get colder than Illinois.
The gentleman, Mr. Cravaack, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and in my hometown
it was 31 degrees below zero this morning. I love Minnesota. I
do. Good for ice fishing right now.
Thank you. I appreciate you coming here today, sir.
Appreciate your service to this country. I do have a couple--
being an airline pilot, the machines that I walk through
routinely always seem to grab my interest.
Last week the TSA began testing new software known as the
Automated Target Recognition. This is used to current--is the
current advanced imaging technology, AIT, machines. The new
software will enhance passenger privacy by eliminating the
passenger-specific images instead of the auto-detect potential
threat items on generic outline of a passenger instead of the
very vivid images that we have seen all over.
The TSA is conducting a pilot of the new software at Las
Vegas International Airport, Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta
International Airport, and Washington Reagan Airport as well.
Have we gotten any feedback from passengers regarding this
program so far?
Mr. Pistole. Just from Las Vegas, Congressman. Welcome to
the committee. It is something that we are getting positive
feedback because the passenger actually sees the image now,
along with the security officer, as opposed to a separate
security officer seeing it. So I think it gives the passengers
greater confidence.
If there is something, for example, on the right hip then
they can say, ``Oh, yeah. I forgot to take my handkerchief out
of my pocket,'' or something, as opposed to, you know, a
complete pat-down or something to try to resolve that anomaly.
So it has actually increased the through-put some, and thus so
far so good.
Mr. Cravaack. Yes. TSA should be commended for listening to
the public on that, so that is great.
My concern is, though, can this technology make sure it can
see any size of any object on the passenger from the top of his
head, tip of his toes, full screen, without getting into
detail?
Mr. Pistole. So, I appreciate that last caveat. There are
challenges, and obviously the Christmas day bomber presented
one of those challenges, so that is why we are field testing
this. It is actually the same equipment, just a different
depiction of the image.
So we have--we believe it is the best available technology
to detect those types of nonmetallic bombs, such as
Abdulmutallab had on Christmas day. But it is not foolproof. I
mean, there is no 100 percent guarantee silver bullet here. It
is just the best technology available today and we are always
trying to improve that.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. Currently the new software is being
tested for millimeter wave AIT machines, and when do you expect
the software to be piloted with backscatter AIT machines?
Mr. Pistole. So, the manufacturer is working on the auto-
detect function and the algorithms for that and we are thinking
that will be later this summer with lab testing and then field
testing in the fall probably.
Mr. Cravaack. Obviously if the pilot project does go well
do you plan to put the use of the machines in every one of our
airports, or do we have the--obviously the funding is--
obviously will be key there.
Mr. Pistole. Funding is a key, yes. As much as the budget
will allow we would convert the existing--it is a simple 2-hour
conversion so it is minimal cost. So it is, you know, as soon
as we are able to do that, assuming we get the good results we
are hoping for.
Mr. Cravaack. Excellent. Thank you very much, sir, for your
time.
I yield back, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman yields back.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for a second series of
questions.
Currently transportation workers carry a number of
different identification credentials. Among these, but not
limited to this, are the TWIC card, which we have already
talked about, commercial driver's license, hazardous material
endorsement, and the Free and Secure Trade card. These
credentials all have a separate application process and require
separate background checks, many of which are redundant.
Stakeholders in the transportation industry continue to
express their strong concern to me that we need to address
these redundancies. Can you tell me what you can do to give
them some relief?
Mr. Pistole. Thank, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I agree with you,
and I agree with industry that there are too many cards with
too many applications for too little return on that process.
I don't have much in terms of positive news on that.
Obviously it is larger than just TSA or even the Department,
and so working through a number of areas on universal rule of
having, ideally, one card that would give access. The question
is, if it is a person who has access to a port then what are
the applications there if they don't need access to an airport,
if they don't need access to a commercial driver's license with
a HAZMAT endorsement.
There are different applications for different people;
there are very few people who would have all of those needs of
access, such as a sensitive area of the airport. So there is
some basis for it, but I think it has become much too
cumbersome and I just look forward to working with you and the
committee on trying to streamline those processes.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I am glad you offered that comment,
because one of the other things that I am doing with the
various sectors of the transportation industry is inviting them
to give me proposed rule changes, whether it is a regulation
that, you know, they find is redundant or it is just overly
burdensome. I would urge you to--we would tender those to you
to consider us working to get rid of redundant, unnecessary
rules.
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Mr. Rogers. I don't know if you have had anybody in your
Department looking at existing regulations, things that you
could streamline, but if you have I would urge you to do that
because it is becoming problematic for a lot of the different
sectors.
My colleagues on the committee would be disappointed in me
if I didn't bring up canines, so I am going to do that. As you
know, I am a zealous advocate for the use of canine explosive
detection assets, and I would like for you to tell us--you
mentioned earlier the use of those. Tell me where you are with
that sector of your layered security.
Mr. Pistole. So, I am a big proponent, not surprisingly, of
the canine program both in the actual detection of explosives
but also as a deterrent effect to those possible terrorists who
might be deterred by the presence of a canine and handler,
regardless of whether that canine is actually a bomb-sniffing
dog or not.
I am also very heartened by the initiative through Auburn
University in terms of the Vapor Wake technology. The ability
for a dog trained properly to not just hit on the package, or
the backpack, or whatever may be containing the explosives, but
can pick up the vapor from that as somebody has walked through.
So, for example, in Moscow the question would have been if
there had been a Vapor Wake-trained dog in that area, even
after the person walked through, that dog would have likely
been able to pick up on something like that.
So it is something that I am very interested in. Appreciate
your support in terms of what we are doing at Auburn, and we
have a number of additional opportunities to deploy those dogs
as the budget will allow.
Mr. Rogers. Well, and that is what I am hoping we are going
to see in the President's budget next week. I know the
Secretary has expressed her desire to see those assets more
utilized within various sectors of our security system.
As you know, the facility that you have at Lackland is what
is the money that has been suggested by the Secretary is spent
to expand that facility. It is going to be at its maximum
capacity. It is only going to generate 275 things a year. We
are going to have to have a second site at least for the
production of those assets as well as their training.
So I am hoping that you are working with the Secretary to
that end and I can assure you I want to be a partner because we
need those in every airport; we need them in every rail
station. They are just a very low-cost, very effective asset.
My time is up.
I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas for another
series of questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Pistole, I, too, add my appreciation for the
time spent with us today. I am going to give some bullet
questions, not aimed at you. But in any event, if I can get
some quick answers I would appreciate it.
You need to answer the original question that I had about
the notice to us, Members, Ranking Member, at that time
Chairwoman on the changes that occurred back then, but let me
skip and not go all the way back to November, but the changes
that occurred in the immediate last 2 or 3 weeks that I called
about and saw first on our local TV program that changes were
coming to the enhanced process, and it was aired on our local
station in Houston. I would like to have better communication,
and so if you would answer that when I give you these series of
questions.
First of all, I want to reinforce and thank you. I think
your thought processes on the SPP were thoughtful, and I think
it is important to acknowledge, again, that you found that
security operations at airports with private screeners cost the
Government more money--and we are cost-conscious but we don't
want to be cheap on security, and I think that is important.
I also believe, as I asked my earlier question, that it is
important that we have an integrated system of Federal
screeners that allow the agency to quickly react to terrorists
and threats in a more secure way. I also believe the connection
of intelligence is so very important and I want to congratulate
you for getting the high number of security-cleared
individuals.
Might I also specifically note appreciation for Colonel
Testa. That is in my jurisdiction and she has done a great job.
Let me publicly say on the record, Colonel Testa, I look
forward to touring the cargo space. You have been inviting me,
and I hope to be there shortly.
But I want to follow up very quickly, and these--now these
are the quick questions: Status report on the TSA repair
station. We have been working on that--repair station security.
We have been working on that a long time, and if I can just get
a one or two update.
On the international front, after Yemen we rushed overseas
to establish the--and also after the Christmas day bomber
incident--the last point of departures in foreign countries,
and I would like to know what we have done, you know, what
about our agreements, how we in Congress can be helpful, what
tools or resources would help you to achieve increased
passenger baggage and cargo security at foreign airports? I
know some of those are international agreements, but we need to
know how we can ramp it up and move a little bit more faster.
I have always been concerned in making sure that America
and the American Government--the Federal Government--looks like
America, and I know my friends agree with me. So I am very much
interested in a targeted, forceful, meaningful approach to
diversify the executive and non-executive levels and TSA, and
working with people from diverse backgrounds--I asked that
question of the Secretary--including people of the different
faiths, religions, particularly the Muslim community.
I am also interested in homegrown outreach for Hispanics,
African Americans, Asians, and Native Americans, and of course,
in Texas, Anglo Americans--a diverse workforce that reflects
everyone. So I am hoping someone was writing those questions
down, if I can get some bullet answers from you, again,
quickly. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Madam.
I wasn't sure whether you wanted those bullet answers right
now or----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes. I really want----
Mr. Pistole. So, let me--on air cargo, with Yemen. I was in
Yemen 5 days after the plot was uncovered and worked with the
Yemeni authorities, the country team, very briefly, fully
engaged with industry to ensure that any cargo coming from
Yemen, once we lifted the cargo hold, which we put into effect
immediately, would have the best screening possible. We are
still continuing that process and can give you further
updated----
Ms. Jackson Lee. In writing--but are you working fast on
these international agreements? That is what I am talking----
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Of course, working with ICAO, the
International Civil Aviation Organization, World Customs
Organization, International Maritime----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Repair station?
Mr. Pistole. Repair stations: As I mentioned earlier, I
don't have specific dates. I will have to get back to you on
that on those proposed----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very important.
Mr. Chairman, as you well know it, this whole idea of what
happens when airplanes are exposed overseas and need repairs is
a key issue that a good colleague, the gentleman from Rhode
Island, had begun working on. So we really need an extensive
answer on that. Maybe you----
Mr. Pistole. I will get that to you.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Briefing.
Mr. Pistole. Diversity, I think you know TSA has one of the
most diverse workforces not only in DHS but in the Federal
Government and--figures on that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me get that in writing because you say
that all the time and what you are talking about is TSO
officers and I am talking about at the Executive level. That is
extremely important and I want to speak with the Chairman on
this professional development issue.
When I travel through what I hear is bright, intelligent
folk with no place to go. So we need to sort of get an
understanding of how we advance their--give them the
opportunity to be professionals and move forward. So I really
want to ensure that.
You have never gotten to me about this notice situation
about hearing things on the television as opposed to both the
Chairman and myself being able to hear----
Mr. Pistole. Right. I apologize for that, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, if there was something--I am drawing a blank on
what that was----
Ms. Jackson Lee. What it was is what we are talking about,
the AIT. Our news reported, before I even knew anything about
it, that you were changing.
Mr. Pistole. For the ATR testing?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. Okay.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is now 2011, and I am not going back
to November.
Mr. Pistole. Right. Okay. So, obviously I want to keep you
and the Chairman fully informed, and when I don't do that then
that is on me to do a better job. So I should do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would appreciate it. I just want to say,
it is not only the Chairman that mentions canines. He has been
a leader on this issue and I look forward to you really,
hopefully, pumping that up with good, talented, healthy animals
that really are a great asset.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we will be able to visit, again, as we
have done in the past. With that, I thank you for your
indulgence and I think I will yield back at this moment. Thank
you.
Mr. Rogers. Gentlelady yields back.
Gentleman from Minnesota is recognized for a second series
of questions.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Understanding that--being in the military and also being an
airline pilot I understand there is a best way to go about
things is layers of security because there is, quite frankly,
there are layers of threats. There are not silver bullets, as
you said. It starts basically from when a person purchases a
ticket, to when they arrive at the airport, to when they check
in their bags, or not, to when they go through a screening
point, to when they actually go on board the aircraft.
So in recent terrorist attacks in the Moscow airport,
unfortunately this was conducted in a non-secure area, and that
is why these threats--these layers of security are so
important. I was just wondering what your thoughts are. Has the
TSA increased security for the non-secure areas? One of the
things that I think are promising, especially I have gone
through it several times myself, is through human intelligence,
human interaction we can discern a lot of these threats before
they actually enter a, you know, more of a secure area. So I
was just wondering what your thoughts are----
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Couldn't agree more, Congressman.
I believe strongly in behavior detection, the observation
of individuals, and we have a number of officers trained in
that regard. I would like to increase that in terms of the
training and the capabilities, basically to upgrade that even
more because I think that has a good return on investment.
As far as the non-secure areas of the airport, such as in
Moscow, we work closely with the airport police in all the
major airports, you know, the 28 largest airports, and then, of
course, the smaller airports, which may or may not have a
dedicated police force. So we try to do that in conjunction
with them, recognizing their law enforcement authorities and
their ability to protect and deter somebody coming in from the
curb side, although our behavior detection officers are in
the--outside of the sterile area, in the non-secure area,
looking for people going to checkpoints, it is much an
opportunity, I think, for the airport police and others to
detect in conjunction with us.
So given our responsibilities, particularly at the
checkpoint and beyond, and then of course the Federal air
marshals and things like that on the flights, I look forward to
working with the subcommittee on additional things we can do.
So there is a whole range of things that we can do and I have
outlined that in a paper to the Secretary and we have provided
information to the Russian authorities who asked, ``Well, what
can you do in terms of things such as vehicle checkpoints?''
LAX, Los Angeles International, from time to time they will
do random vehicle checkpoints before you ever get to the curb.
That is something that can be done.
You can have more VIPR teams walking and just, again, it is
a visible, unpredictable deterrence. There is a whole range of
opportunities, basically just limited by what the resources
are, you know, the budget and things like that.
Mr. Cravaack. I couldn't agree with you more. Because of
the layer of threats we need layers of detection and
intervention as well.
Mr. Pistole. Agreed. Good way to present it.
Mr. Cravaack. Also, following your confirmation hearing you
commented on the shift from airplanes to ground transportation
and you viewed that--against rail and subways are equally
important, and I couldn't agree more as well. I wouldn't want
your job.
As the threats against aviation are important we also have
to take a look at our ground transportation, and the resources
allocated to the aviation security efforts account for roughly
80 percent of the TSA's budget. Do you see that moving at all,
or----
Mr. Pistole. Obviously working with this committee and the
rest of Congress, very interested in the opportunities that we
would have to do more in surface transportation because I
believe there are some vulnerabilities there that are just
inherent in the construct of being able to get on a train
without any security screening.
Again, we do VIPR teams in some high-profile places,
whether it is Union Station, Penn Station, New York, and things
like that, but just the nature of the system means more
vulnerables. The rails themselves are vulnerable in certain
respects, and I could go into a lot of detail from that
perspective.
So I agree, more could and should be done. It is a question
of, at this point, do we take something away from aviation
security to address that, and I am reluctant to do that given
terrorist interest in--continuing interest in aviation plots.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
I have just one last question, and it is generic. I don't
expect too much detail, but what keeps you awake at night?
Mr. Pistole. The unknown that--and this is based on my
nearly 27 years at the FBI--the unknown that somebody we have
not identified being able to do something and we miss it.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
I yield back the rest of my time.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman yields back.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Speier, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chairman, if you would just yield, let me
welcome Ms. Speier to the committee and thank her for her
leadership.
We announced earlier and we knew you were detained.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to the Ranking Member.
I was actually in Oversight and Government Reform so I
snuck out of that committee to come and say hello to Mr.
Pistole. I would like to explore the issue of foreign repair
operations. You know, we are struggling with how we can create
more jobs in this country and meanwhile some of our carriers
are off-shoring the repair work of, you know, many of their
facilities.
So we have mechanics that are now out of work. That is one
issue.
But the more crushing issue, and the one that I think you
are going to be most concerned about, is the fact that in a
briefing that I received just last week the security at these
foreign locations is very, very little. I was shown pictures of
how they actually, you know, check people in, and it is, you
know, basically with a card that you can pick up anywhere. It
wouldn't take a rocket scientist to get one of those cards to
get into the area to stow away a bomb or some bio warfare that
could create serious problems for us.
So No. 1, what steps are you taking to beef up the security
that these airlines are evidently not pursuing in these foreign
venues? Second, is there some thought to bringing these jobs
back to the United States so we can have a greater sense of
security and more jobs here in the homeland?
Mr. Pistole. So, thank you, Congresswoman, and welcome to
the committee--subcommittee.
Yes, clearly the issue of the foreign repair stations is
significant. I won't address the job issue too much because I
am focused on the security aspects. But clearly the carriers,
at times, need those repair stations based on whatever has
happened in terms of maintenance or repairs that are needed.
You have precisely identified what the challenges are.
There is a great inconsistency around the world as to the
security of those locations, as you were briefed on last week.
Our challenge is how we can go about inspecting those with any
sense of assurance and confidence that they are doing what they
should be doing in terms of screening the employees, the
mechanics who work there. Are they screening the material that
they bring in so there is not something bad in there that they
are actually putting on a plane that would not be found,
whether it is a cargo bomb or something else?
So our challenge is, we simply don't have the resources to
do what I would want to offer to the American people and the
airlines as a high level of confidence in the security of those
operations. So we work with the host governments, with the
civil aviation authorities, bilaterally. We also work through
ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, which sets
minimum standards.
But it really comes down to how do we trust but verify? So
we have to have some amount of trust in our foreign partners,
but the question of verification and validation and it is what
they are doing, and I can't give you a PODS report on that
today to say, ``Yes, every single foreign repair station meets
the standards that we would like to see here in the United
States.'' So that is something that we are working on but it is
just not there yet.
Ms. Speier. Well, let's not even talk about foreign
carriers. Let's talk about U.S. carriers who have off-shored
their mechanical repair work in El Salvador and around the
world. I mean, we do have some authority over them, do we not?
Mr. Pistole. Sure, yes----
Ms. Speier. This is United Airlines that I am speaking of
right now.
Mr. Pistole. Okay. Yes. So obviously we work with United,
we work with the facilities that were the foreign repair
stations to basically assess whether their standards are up to
ours, and if they are not then we can say, ``You are not
allowed to do that repair work.'' So it is incumbent upon not
only the repair station but the airline and the host government
and to the aviation authority to ensure that is the case.
My concern, as much, in being able to, as I mentioned, to
validate what they are doing----
Ms. Speier. Well, I guess what I am asking you then is I
want you to assess the security in El Salvador at the repair
facility that United runs there because it appears to be just
incomplete and lax. If you do not have authority to force them
to beef-up their security there then we need to make sure you
have that authority and then any other penalties that should be
imposed.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, ma'am. That is obviously something
we do in conjunction with the FAA in terms of their
certification of those repairs facilities, so it is a
partnership with FAA.
Ms. Speier. So you will report back to the committee and
me?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Mr. Rogers. Gentlelady yields back.
The Chairman now recognizes gentleman from California for a
second series of questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Administrator, earlier I mentioned that I thank you for
taking the arrows on the issue of advanced imaging, or we used
to call them full body scanners. I would like to ask you about
that.
For years I have suggested we just have an ``I don't care''
line. For those of us who don't care we get in a line and go
through that and have the full body scanner, and if people have
a concern they can go through the regular one. As a recipient
of an artificial hip and an artificial knee I get a chance to
get up close and personal with your screeners every time I fly,
and if you want anybody to testify as to the newly aggressive
enhanced pat-downs I can testify to that.
I am very strongly in support of getting these enhanced
imaging--the various types of advanced imaging facilities out
there. I was wondering, what has been the decision-making as to
which airports have it and which do not? For instance,
everybody talks about Reagan. I had the chance to go through
Reagan one time, and believe me, that was a much better
experience than having the pat-down.
When I fly in and out of Dulles, which seems to be a pretty
important airport for this National capital region, and they
have just completed a new terminal; they have just completed a
new entire floor for people going through the screening
process. Yet I have not seen a single enhanced image piece of
equipment there.
Is there a reason why, in this National region--we don't
have any at Dulles but----
Mr. Pistole. So, it may have been a while since you
traveled through there. We do have----
Mr. Lungren. Yesterday--3 days ago.
Mr. Pistole. Okay. Yes, we do have AIT at Dulles. I don't
know the exact number.
So it has been in the process the last several months being
deployed, so it may just be that checkpoint. I am not sure----
Mr. Lungren. Well, I would love to find it because I will
use it.
Well, I guess my bigger question is, how do we decide which
airports get them as we are moving them on? It seems to me from
your public statement you are committed to that and----
Mr. Pistole. I am.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. You believe in them----
Mr. Pistole. I do.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. And you believe now that we can
even do a better job of assuring people of their privacy
concerns----
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Even though I believe we have
done a pretty good job in the past----
Mr. Pistole. I think we have also.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. But what is the process for
deciding? Is that an airport request, or----
Mr. Pistole. Yes. So it is several factors, and one is the
airport authority's configuration, their readiness, basically,
to--because the machines do take up more real estate, more
space than the walk-through metal detectors. So in some
airports we actually have to reconfigure the checkpoint, and so
those airports, just speaking generally now--generally those
airports that have the space and the capability and the
interest and willingness to take those machines, that is where
we went first, and then those that we--where we have to do
build-out, there are costs involved--to the Federal Government,
to the airport, to the airlines, all those issues make it more
complicated so it is a longer process.
But eventually, you know, we have got 2,200 checkpoints
around the country. You know, the budget doesn't allow----
Mr. Lungren. Right.
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. For every checkpoint, but many of
those are very small airports.
Mr. Lungren. Now that I recall, it was when I left
Sacramento I did not. When I went through the one at Dulles
2\1/2\ weeks ago and I set off the detector and I went through
the pat-down, and after I got the pat-down they said, ``You
should have asked for the machine,'' no one told me there was a
machine.
Mr. Pistole. Okay.
Mr. Lungren. It might be helpful that they give an
opportunity for people to use the machine if they want to get
the machines----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. But I would be happy to testify
for anybody as to the less-invasive privacy aspects of going
through one of your new pieces of equipment as opposed to
having the pat-down because your people are doing a very, very
good job of that.
Let me go and talk to you about the secure traveler
program. Are we checking for things or are we checking for
people?
Mr. Pistole. So, right now we are checking for prohibited
items, but where I want to move to is assessing the person, and
that is what I was talking about earlier in terms of using more
of a intelligence, risk-based approach. So clearly I think
there are many opportunities, which I would like to go into
detail with the subcommittee at a later date----
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Mr. Pistole. I am still working internally, but I think
there are some very good options that we will see later this
year.
Mr. Lungren. For several years a number of us have been
arguing that it makes no sense to make the pilots go through it
when they control the aircraft later on.
Mr. Pistole. That is why I changed that policy in
November----
Mr. Lungren. Right. I know it is politically incorrect to
think you would treat Members of Congress any differently and I
appreciate that. But I would just posit a question: If you have
a group of people who are permitted, under the laws of the
United States, to have the highest classified briefing you can
possibly have--that just seems strange to me that we are--maybe
you have some intelligence you will share with us later that
finds that Members of Congress are a suspect class, but all I
can say is your people do a very good job of making sure that I
know that they do a thorough examination of me every time I go
through----
Mr. Pistole. I appreciate that, and I will note,
Congressman, that I just had a briefing by GAO, who does all
kinds of covert testing and beats us every time because of
their innovative techniques and things, but they said that this
most recent test they did in January they found it to be the
most thorough and the best. So I think the subcommittee would
be interested in some of these ways forward that we can use a
risk-based approach and taking more what we know about the
person--doing some pre-screening, basically--to go to more of
an identity-based screening as opposed to the full physical
screening----
Mr. Lungren. Well, your folks have done a very good job on
every test I have made. Every time I have forgotten hair spray
they have gotten it, and I have had to throw it out, so I
appreciate that.
Mr. Pistole. So we have 16 AIT at Dulles now, so yes, it is
being deployed.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman yields back.
I have no further questions and the Ranking Member has told
me she has no further questions so we will close the hearing.
I want to thank you for your time and your answers. I want
to thank the Members for their questions. We will hold the
hearing open for 10 days. Members may have written questions
they want to submit to you and we would ask that you get those
back in a timely manner.
As you know, I have already given you four questions from
the AAAE----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. I would urge your timely response to those. I
hope that you will work in a collaborative effort with them to
address your concerns and theirs as well as the other sectors
of transportation we talked about here today.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for John S. Pistole
Question 1a. Section 1614 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act'' called for the implementation of a system to
expedite flight crews--pilots and flight attendants--through security
checkpoints. In addition to TSA's own piloting of access control
technology and a processes, there are some air carriers and airports
that are testing proprietary systems for expedited crew access to
sterile areas. Where is TSA in evaluating the implementation of Section
1614, and, in this vein, has TSA looked at proprietary systems proposed
by air carriers to expedite crews at specific airports?
Answer. The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) and
the Air Transport Association (ATA) recently received approval from TSA
to test a new crewmember screening system. This enhanced identity and
employment verification system for crewmembers will make airport
checkpoint screening more efficient for both TSA and the participating
crewmembers.
This new system is the outgrowth of an existing program. In 2007,
ALPA presented to TSA the first version of an alternate screening
method called the Crew Personnel Advanced Screening System (CrewPASS).
CrewPASS has been used successfully at three East Coast airports for
almost 3 years. This enhanced process leverages current technology to
provide an efficient and cost-effective solution.
Once fully implemented, any TSA-regulated U.S. airline that wishes
to connect to this enhanced system will be able to do so, and any
airline pilot employed by one of those carriers will be able to
participate in the program. Testing is projected to begin at a limited
number of airports later this year. The tests will run for
approximately 90 days and, if successful, will expand to additional
U.S. airports.
Implementation of this system is an example of an innovative
partnership between TSA and its stakeholders. It is the culmination of
on-going discussions precipitated by an earlier TSA announcement of its
intent to modify checkpoint screening procedures for crewmembers while
it developed a crewmember identity verification system.
Question 1b. Will TSA-certified crew access systems include a
biometric component as was piloted by TSA at BWI airport?
Answer. Following the successful testing of the ALPA/ATA proposed
system, TSA will review options regarding incorporation of a biometric
component.
Question 1c. Will TSA only focus on pilots or all crew, including
flight attendants, as the legislation directed?
Answer. The ALPA/ATA proposed system is initially limited to
flightdeck crewmembers because a secure database of other crewmembers
does not currently exist. At the conclusion of this 90-day pilot, TSA
will evaluate the program and determine appropriate next steps.
Question 1d. Will TSA have a role in the implementation of a
Trusted Traveler program, such as Registered Traveler?
Answer. TSA Administrator John S. Pistole is committed to ensuring
TSA operates as a risk-based, intelligence-driven agency. TSA is
continuing to evaluate alternative security protocols for passengers
that could result in expedited screening for low-risk populations,
while maintaining high security standards. However, the feasibility and
utility of any such protocols would need to be fully evaluated and
vetted prior to eventual pilot testing and possible implementation.
Question 2. As TSA meets with air carriers and other stakeholders
in order to obtain feedback from industry in meeting the statutory
requirement that cargo on in-bound passenger aircraft be screened for
explosives, please update the committee on the status of the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee (ASAC). Will the ASAC be used a forum for
stakeholder input on aviation security matters in 2011?
Answer. During the Secretary's efficiency review of the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) advisory committees, charter renewal
actions were placed on hold and the charter for the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) subsequently expired on April 3, 2010. The
review re-affirmed the need for the ASAC, and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is in the process of re-establishing the
committee. It is anticipated that the ASAC will meet in 2011 to provide
advice and recommendations for improving aviation security measures.
Question 3. In 2009, TSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
repair station security. When will this rulemaking be finalized for
repair station security and has TSA engaged with stakeholders,
including labor unions, since the issuance of the NPRM, in crafting a
final regulation?
Answer. Due to the complexity of this particular rulemaking, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not have a firm date
for publication of the Final Rule; however, we anticipate publication
to occur well within calendar year 2011.
For the last several years, TSA has been working to implement a
regulation for the inspection of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-
certificated repair stations located inside and outside of the United
States. Throughout the rulemaking process, TSA has engaged the repair
station operators and associations through meetings and site visits,
and has incorporated their input into the Final Rule.
In addition, TSA has conducted public review sessions in the United
Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Arlington, VA, where representatives from
more than 90 industry stakeholder associations were provided with the
opportunity to review the proposed Aircraft Repair Station Security
Program.
Since issuing the NPRM in 2009, TSA has not engaged in any direct
discussions with labor unions. However, comments submitted by the
Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO and Transport Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO were addressed and considered in crafting the Final
Rule.
Question 4. According to media reports, in November 2010, Delvonte
Tisdale allegedly stowed away on an aircraft that departed Charlotte
Douglas International Airport (CLT). Has TSA investigated how a
perimeter breach at CLT could have occurred with respect to this
incident? Has the Federal Security Director at CLT re-evaluated and
assessed airfield access controls in the wake of the Tisdale incident?
Has headquarters TSA evaluated security operations at CLT in the wake
of the Tisdale incident?
Answer. In the wake of the November 2010 incident involving the
death of Delvonte Tisdale, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) conducted a thorough investigation into potential security issues
at Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT). Most recently, on
March 13-14, 2011, a TSA Headquarters-directed team, made up of both
field and Headquarters regulatory/compliance-based personnel, arrived
at CLT to conduct a security assessment of the perimeter and its
overall integrity. This assessment included a review of CLT-secured
areas such as the airport ramp and taxi areas near the terminal; the
air operations area (AOA), including the airport runway and perimeter
areas; access control measures; cargo facilities; and the terminal.
Additionally, the investigation consisted of a comprehensive review of
the 2006 and 2010 Joint Vulnerability Assessments, the CLT Airport
Security Program, and other databases and documents; these reviews were
followed by physical inspections during both daylight and evening
hours.