[Senate Hearing 110-1069]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1069
TRANSITIONING TO A NEXT GENERATION
HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT SYSTEM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE, AERONAUTICS, AND RELATED SCIENCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
March 28, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Margaret Spring, Democratic General Counsel
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director, and General Counsel
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Deputy Staff Director, and Chief
Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE, AERONAUTICS, AND RELATED SCIENCES
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota TRENT LOTT, Mississippi,
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 28, 2007................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 1
Witnesses
Dittemore, Ronald D., President, ATK Launch Systems Group........ 22
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Gerstenmaier, William H., Associate Administrator, Space
Operations, NASA............................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Horowitz, Scott J., Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems,
NASA........................................................... 38
Karas, John C., Vice President and General Manager, Human
Spaceflight, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company............. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Li, Allen, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, GAO.... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
McCulley, Michael J., President and CEO, United Space Alliance... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Walker, Johnny, Directing Business Representative, District Lodge
166, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers........................................................ 23
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Appendix
Hutchison, Kay Bailey, U.S. Senator from Texas, prepared
statement...................................................... 41
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey
Hutchison to:
Ronald D. Dittemore.......................................... 49
William H. Gerstenmaier...................................... 43
John C. Karas................................................ 47
Allen Li..................................................... 50
Johnny Walker................................................ 49
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye
to William H. Gerstenmaier..................................... 41
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to:
William H. Gerstenmaier...................................... 42
Johnny Walker................................................ 48
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to:
William H. Gerstenmaier...................................... 46
John C. Karas................................................ 47
TRANSITIONING TO A NEXT GENERATION HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related
Sciences,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. Thank you all for
being here. Thanks for all the interest, as evidenced by
everybody here in the hearing room today. We are going to have
to be a little flexible today, because they have called a
series of four votes, starting in just a couple of minutes.
I will try to keep us going as much as possible, with
Senator Hutchison coming back over. What we want to do is, to
really get some quality time talking to you.
Instead of the typical way, where you read a statement--we
are not going to do that. We are going to take your written
statements and put them in the record.
And save for the interruption that we are going to have
with the votes, what I want to do is just to have a
conversation with you about--the subject before us. And that is
the space program, and what we have to do to keep this gallant
little program that has been such an inspiration to the
American people on course, as we shift into a whole new arena,
with a new set of spacecraft, and as we continue the
construction of the International Space Station. As we try to
minimize the gap in human spaceflight, from when we shut down
the Space Shuttle, to when we start flying humans on the new
vehicle. And how do we do that?
If we are not launching humans, how do we do that and keep
that Space Station going up there as a laboratory. What are
going to be the geo-politics in 2015? Are the Russians still
going to be allied with us in 2015? I do not know the answer to
that. I hope so. But there is no certainty for that.
These are the kinds of things that we have to talk about.
We have a star-studded cast here today. Mr. Gerstenmaier, NASA
Associate Administrator for Space Operations; Mr. Li, GAO
Acquisition and Sourcing Management; Michael McCulley, Chief
Executive Officer of United Space Alliance; John Karas, Vice
President, Space Exploration, from Lockheed Martin; Ron
Dittemore, President of ATK; and Johnny Walker, the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
Well, sure enough, they just called the vote. Why don't you
go in no particular order, start to offer some of your thoughts
on this.
[Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Gerstenmaier.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, SPACE OPERATIONS,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Gerstenmaier. OK. I guess I will start a little bit. I
think this is a tremendously challenging time, as you laid out.
And I think the challenge in front of us is how to fly the
Shuttle safely for the remaining flights, through assembly of
the Space Station, to get the Space Station built, so we have a
national laboratory and research facility to go use. That is a
tremendous challenge in itself, to get that activity done. And
then at the same time, we need to start preparing and start
bringing online the Constellation systems. We have started a
lot of that work already. We have transferred a test stand at
Stennis over to the new program, to begin engine testing on
their side.
The firing room down in Florida. Firing room one has been
transferred over to exploration, to begin preparations for
their test flight in 2009. The Operations and Checkout Building
down in Florida has already been transitioned. So I think we
have been making pretty good progress overall. We recognize
that there is a lot of work in front of us. A lot of
challenges. Many of the questions that you brought up in your
opening statements we will address later, as we go through.
But, again, I think we have the right workforce to go do this.
We have the right contractor-NASA team that is working this
as a team, figuring out a way to make this go work. And we have
as good a plan as we can have at this point to go forward, with
plenty of challenges in front of us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:]
Prepared Statement of William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator,
Space Operations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss NASA's efforts as we
prepare for the Space Shuttle's retirement and work to develop the new
human space exploration vehicles. This ``transition'' provides us with
a unique opportunity to reinvent and revitalize NASA's human
spaceflight program and make it more efficient by focusing on the
evolution of our skilled workers and our facilities and infrastructure.
Never in the almost 50-year history of the agency has a task of this
magnitude been undertaken. The kind of sweeping changes that this
transition will bring can be daunting. But what I tell my workforce,
and what I truly believe, is this: ``We are not going out of business;
we are starting a new business.'' We have the unique opportunity to be
performing the most complicated space assembly activities ever
attempted, preparing the International Space Station (ISS) to become a
National Laboratory, and developing the systems that will be used for
human exploration of the solar system. These activities will require us
all to work together and provide leadership and focus, as many
activities compete with each other for time and resources. Performing
these activities successfully will inspire the next generation and
maintain our world leadership role in space. This is a great time to be
in the space business.
For the next 4 years, NASA's top priority is to safely fly the
remaining Shuttle flights to complete assembly of the International
Space Station (ISS). At the same time, the agency is preparing to bring
the new U.S. human spaceflight capabilities on-line soon thereafter.
With the retirement of the Shuttle in 2010, NASA will fundamentally
shift from the current primary focus on operations to one in which we
develop new systems, conduct research on the ISS, and re-establish the
capability for space exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit, with
the ultimate goal of returning to the Moon, going to Mars and beyond.
These are significant challenges, and we need help from Congress to
succeed, specifically by supporting the Vision for Space Exploration,
approving the President's FY 2008 budget for NASA at the requested
levels and approving the workforce transition and facilities management
tools in the legislative proposal that NASA recently submitted to
Congress. I appreciate the leadership of this subcommittee and the
Congress in enacting the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155);
this legislation is a good example of the support that you have already
provided.
An effective transition of workforce, facilities, and contractor
support from the Space Shuttle program to the new Constellation program
will be jeopardized by a prolonged gap between Shuttle operations and
the Initial Operating Capability of Orion and Ares, such as the gap
which developed between the Apollo-Soyuz program and the maiden flight
of the Space Shuttle. Our job as a leadership team is to actively
manage the gap, ensure that our workforce skills are rebalanced to meet
the evolved focus of the agency, and effectively communicate our
actions and goals to all of our stakeholders, most importantly our
employees.
Funding limitations and hardware development lead times will not
allow us to overlap Shuttle and Constellation capabilities. We know
there will be a gap--our job is to keep this gap to a minimum, and with
your help, this can be accomplished. I am often asked why NASA does not
just extend the Shuttle program to close the gap. The primary reason I
give is that the high fixed costs of the Shuttle program do not allow
that strategy to work. Extending the Shuttle program a year would cost
approximately $3-4 billion per year. These funds would come from
Constellation development and, consequently, would only extend the gap.
Another reason is that the Shuttle is an extremely complicated vehicle
to operate. Many systems interact with others. Consider the interaction
of foam from the tank on the Shuttle as an example. Safely operating
this complex vehicle is not easy. NASA has chosen to use the Shuttle
with this safety complexity for only those missions requiring the
Shuttle's unique capabilities. The assembly of the ISS, Hubble Space
Telescope servicing mission, and ISS spares carried on the logistics
flights all require the unique capability of the Shuttle. Once these
missions are complete, NASA needs to transition to the simpler and
safer Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) as soon as feasible. We
believe that human spaceflight is a strategic capability for this
Nation, and we recognize the important role NASA plays in ensuring the
U.S. maintains this capability.
Transition starts with phasing out the Space Shuttle and bringing
CEV online, continues with the research and testing that will take
place on the ISS as part of a National Laboratory, and includes using
the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to
demonstrate new capabilities for re-supply. As the Shuttle approaches
its retirement, the ISS Program intends to use alternative cargo and
crew transportation services from commercial industry. Once a
capability is demonstrated in Phase 1 of the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) Space Act Agreements, NASA plans to
purchase cargo delivery services competitively in Phase 2 and will
decide whether to pursue crew demonstrations. NASA will be in an almost
continual state of transition as development of one phase of
exploration transitions from development to operations. Consequently,
what we are establishing now is a transition framework that will serve
us through the decades ahead. NASA chose not to create a separate
program to manage transition, but instead utilize organizational
elements within the existing operating program and the future
exploration program. This structure ties transition directly to the
safe operation of our programs and allows for a framework for
transition to be established within NASA.
The goal of transition is to keep the U.S. space workforce fully
engaged and moving toward design and development of the new vehicles.
Our focus is on life-cycle cost and risk management of our workforce,
infrastructure, and facilities, including the necessary budget and
plans to execute the ambitious agenda at hand. Full funding of NASA's
FY 2008 budget request is critical to ensuring the gap between
retirement of the Space Shuttle and America's new human spaceflight
capability does not grow longer. If the gap in our human spaceflight
capability extends even further than already planned, I believe our
Nation may be ceding leadership in human spaceflight at a time when
other nations are outlining ambitious programs of their own.
NASA's transition planning activities emphasize three major themes:
1) safely flying out the Shuttle manifest; 2) closing out and
streamlining our facilities and infrastructure; and 3) reorienting our
workforce for future missions. We are heading in the right direction
and have a robust plan in place with the right people to execute it. We
have made great strides this past year and will maintain this momentum
as we continue to make substantial and rapid progress in carrying out
the challenging space operations and transition tasks ahead.
1. Safely Flying Out the Shuttle Manifest
While we look toward the future, we know we cannot lose sight of
the present. NASA is committed to safely flying the Shuttle through its
retirement in 2010 to complete construction of the ISS, which will
fulfill our commitments to our International Partners and enable us to
conduct exploration-focused research onboard. While there are
challenges ahead, we have a good, sound plan that places safety above
all else. As evidenced by the recent hail storm that caused damage to
the STS-117 External Tank, that plan may not go exactly the way we have
laid out, but we are prepared to continue working through it and to
adjust as needed. We will learn from these challenges and gain
experience necessary for future ventures to the Moon and Mars.
The Shuttle manifest calls for 13 assembly flights to the ISS, one
to service the Hubble Space Telescope. In addition, we could
potentially add 2 ISS logistics flights to the manifest if they are
needed and can be flown safely before the Shuttle's 2010 retirement. In
order to safely complete these missions, retention of our workforce,
with their skills and tremendous dedication, is critical. A recent
survey of Shuttle personnel across the NASA field centers clearly
demonstrates that we have highly-motivated people who want to stay for
the remainder of the program and see it succeed. As an Agency, we share
their pride in the program's accomplishments and are heartened by their
commitment to safety and mission success. As leaders we contribute to
this success by showing through our actions a strong commitment to
these activities, as well as the promise of exciting future endeavors.
2. Infrastructure and Facilities
The Shuttle program currently occupies over 600 facilities at both
government and contractor sites and has more than 900,000 pieces of
equipment. The estimated new acquisition value of these assets is
approximately $12 billion for equipment and approximately $5.7 billion
for facilities. This is a vast amount of resources that the American
people have invested in and entrusted us with. We are committed to
leveraging this investment by utilizing Shuttle infrastructure wherever
it makes sense in the Constellation programs. We have already made
progress in this respect. At NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida,
the Space Shuttle program has transitioned Firing Room 1 and the
Operations and Checkout Building to Constellation. Work is also
underway to transition Launch Complex 39B to eventually launch Ares and
Orion. At Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, the A1 Rocket Test
Stand, formerly used to test the Space Shuttle Main Engine, is now
testing engines for Constellation. And at Johnson Space Center, key
leaders in the ISS program have transitioned to senior management
positions in Exploration, bringing with them their technical and
programmatic expertise.
Since our new spacecraft designs are Shuttle-derived, we can build
on the existing infrastructure across the agency. However, many of our
key facilities and infrastructure elements are almost 50 years old in
areas prone to aggressive climate impacts and heavy operational
demands. As the transition to the next U.S. human spaceflight
capability progresses, we have the opportunity to streamline all
aspects of our business and provide more value to the American people.
We also are assessing our infrastructure to ensure that we have the
necessary foundation for the next 30 years of exploration activities.
3. Workforce
Guiding the agency's transition is the recognition of the critical
role played by our approximately 17,000-strong workforce. As the
Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Scott Horowitz likes to
say, ``When folks ask me how we go into space, they expect me to say
`Rockets and hardware,' but I think people make the Space Shuttle fly
not hardware.'' The men and women who work in the Space Shuttle program
are some of the Nation's most skilled, efficient, and committed
workers--qualities that the agency and Nation needs for its future
missions and must capitalize upon.
As mentioned earlier, the nature of the work these employees will
do will change as we transition from Shuttle operations to research and
development-focused activities like planning, design, testing and
verification for Constellation systems. We are striving to give our
employees opportunities to build on their existing skills by working on
the new exploration systems, so that when this development work comes
on-line, they can easily transition into new positions. Coupled with
newly gained skills, our workforce can take the skills honed in Shuttle
operations and apply them to the design of the next vehicle to make it
fly more efficiently. Preventing a prolonged gap between the last
Shuttle flight and the first Orion flight remains the single most
important factor in workforce transition. The longer the gap, the more
difficult it becomes to retain our needed workforce.
As the Constellation System Requirements Reviews are completed this
year, NASA will gain a much clearer understanding of the demands for
future workforce skills, which will form the foundation for making any
future decisions. Although we are proud of recent progress, we
acknowledge that more needs to be accomplished. These tasks include
matching available skills with future work, managing attrition,
retraining and hiring, and using temporary and term appointments to get
the flexibility to align our needs with our time-phased workload.
NASA remains committed to working with our industry, supplier, and
research partners to craft and implement strategies to minimize
disruption, upheaval, and economic impact, while maximizing support
vital for Shuttle missions and program requirements. As we move
forward, we know that clear communication and solid leadership will be
key to our success. I cannot stress one point enough--NASA recognizes
and values the dedication of its Shuttle workforce. The Agency in
return is dedicated to ensuring that those men and women have
challenging future work that capitalizes on their unique skills and
abilities. Make no mistake there will be changes for our workforce, but
if we provide leadership and focus, I am confident that this team will
respond. They have overcome difficult challenges in the past: Katrina,
hail storms, and the Columbia disaster. If we can give them a vision of
the future, they will help us to realize that future. This is the best
workforce in the world.
Conclusion
NASA has many transition challenges ahead of us, but we are on
track and making substantial progress in managing a fundamental shift
from operating spacecraft in orbit around the Earth to cutting-edge
research and development for space exploration that will push humanity
out of low-Earth orbit and across the solar system. This is an exciting
time for NASA and the Nation.
We need your continued support to accomplish this endeavor and to
ensure that the United States maintains its status as the world leader
in human space exploration. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
this important effort, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you may have.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Griffin told me that he felt like
that in order to get the gap, that is now up to 2015, with the
funding profile that there is now, back to 2013, a 3-year gap.
He would need an additional $400 million over and above the
President's request in 2008 and an additional $600 million in
2009 and 2010 over and above what is the expected President's
request. Tell me what you think.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think we would really like to
take that for the record and go put some analysis behind that,
and see how it really fits. I think conceptually those are the
right numbers. But there are lots of details that go behind
that. Even though the funding may be there, there may be
critical components on the critical path that we just cannot
get completed in time to make those schedules. So I think we
need a little bit of time to go sort through all that and see
how all that fits. And then see if it fits financially as well
as if it fits technically in that period that you just
described.
Senator Bill Nelson. It was $800 million in Fiscal Year
2009 and another $800 million, Fiscal Year 2010. Instead of
$600 million. So the White House could help us, if they would
request the increase instead of their increases coming way
underneath what the authorization bill calls for. But it is
what it is. And we are where we are. So either we are going to
give you all the resources with which to be able to narrow to a
3-year gap. Or it is going to be a 5-year gap.
Mr. McCulley, what would be some of the consequences of a
5-year gap down at the Cape?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. McCULLEY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, UNITED
SPACE ALLIANCE
Mr. McCulley. A tremendous loss of a critical national
resource in the workforce. Not in numbers so much as it is in
the skill sets that exist there. As you well know, and
certainly everybody on this panel knows, we are primarily ops.
Not development. Not design. Not manufacturing. And the skill
set is a unique skill set, whether it is in Houston or whether
it is in Florida, whether it is rendezvous and proximity
operations, or whether it is process and flight hardware, and
payloads, and the pads, and all those things.
An extended gap just makes it a larger problem for us to
figure out how to keep the skill set that the Nation needs to
operate the next vehicle.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCulley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. McCulley, President and CEO,
United Space Alliance
Chairman Nelson, Senator Hutchison, members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for providing me the opportunity to discuss the transition
from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation programs now underway in
America's human spaceflight program.
On behalf of the 10,000 employees of United Space Alliance and our
5,000 supplier employees across the Nation, I thank you for caring
about the future of these highly skilled workers and valuing the human
spaceflight community's contribution to the economic security of our
Nation.
Congress has always recognized the importance of investing in NASA
and its crucial role in advancing the Nation's scientific, economic and
security interests, as well as fostering the next generation of
America's scientists and engineers. NASA's benefits go well beyond just
the acquisition of space goods and services. NASA and its industry
partners develop critical technologies that broadly benefit our
society, spur the development and advancement of competitive
industries, and encourage young people to study disciplines that will
enable them to successfully enter the modern global economic workforce.
According to the Aerospace Industries Association, in 2006 U.S.
aerospace industry revenues topped $184 billion. Due to its
international competitiveness, our industry is one of the few that
carries a trade surplus--$52 billion last year. The level of exports by
our aerospace industry is almost three times the level of imports.
The transition from Shuttle to Constellation will have a ripple
effect throughout our industry and our national economy. The question
is whether that effect will be positive.
As NASA Administrator, Mike Griffin, has testified, the transition
will be a challenging and multi-tiered process that will touch every
aspect of human spaceflight operations. NASA is expected to finish
construction of the International Space Station by safely flying the
Shuttle while also bringing online the most diverse mix of space
vehicles to be developed, maintained and flown in more than a
generation: the Orion Crew Capsule, the Shuttle-derived Ares I Crew
Launch Vehicle (CLV), a Heavy Lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) known as
Ares V, the Lunar Lander, and other vehicles with varied cargo and
payload capabilities.
As you know, USA does not determine the budget or policy for the
NASA human spaceflight program, but rather, we implement in support of
our NASA customer. That said, I have been asked to comment on the
transition from current Shuttle operations to the next generation of
spaceflight vehicles.
``The Gap''
As currently defined, there will be a four or five-year gap between
the final Space Shuttle flight in September 2010, and the first planned
Ares I crew launch. During ``the gap,'' the United States, the
recognized leader in space exploration and human spaceflight, will be
dependent on Russia, ESA, Japan and the now-developmental COTS vehicles
for human and logistics transportation to the ISS and will be buying
services using U.S. taxpayer dollars.
I know that members of this committee and other Members of Congress
recognize that a lengthy gap will jeopardize our global leadership in
space and are seeking ways to make ``the gap'' as short as possible.
Russia, China, India, Japan, and European nations are investing in
human space exploration. In order to maintain our leadership, Americans
must work together to shorten ``the gap'' to the least time possible or
to eliminate it altogether.
I believe a fundamental step in minimizing this gap is to ensure
that the current programs' relevant assets, infrastructure, experience,
and employee skills are effectively migrated to future programs. Our
success as a combined government-industry partnership in addressing
this migration will be the key to the efficiency, reliability, safety
and overall success of the new programs.
We should remember the impact of the gap between Apollo and
Shuttle, not only on local economies (Florida, Texas, California,
etc.), but also on our national interest, was severe. NASA had planned
for a two-year gap, but it turned into a six-year gap. For all the
reasons eloquently stated by NASA Administrator, Mike Griffin, we do
not wish to repeat that experience. We learned that without a focused
and detailed transition plan, entire national capabilities and human
capital assets can be lost--some for an entire generation. When the gap
between programs is minimal, as was the case between Gemini and Apollo,
crafting a bridge between programs is not as challenging. When the gap
is large, as was the case between Apollo and Shuttle, the loss is
damaging for our Nation's economy and technological competitiveness. If
we fail, future generations will suffer. Our Nation cannot afford to
repeat the mistakes made during the 1970's.
ISS Completion
NASA has defined 15 additional missions to be flown by September
2010, to complete ISS assembly and provide required logistic support.
NASA also has planned one mission for repair and servicing of the
Hubble Space Telescope. Mike Griffin has made it clear that safe
operation of the Space Shuttle to achieve these 16 flights is NASA's
top priority. This will require adequate NASA top line funding levels
in each of the remaining years of Shuttle operation.
Currently, funding for the Constellation program, which includes
the new Ares and Orion projects, is not adequate. NASA's recent
announcement that the first crewed flight of Ares I will be delayed is
a clear indication that ``the gap'' in America's human spaceflight
programs is growing. This also sends a signal that additional funding
will be required to stem that growth and, if possible, to accelerate
development of the Constellation family of vehicles, in order to
shorten ``the gap'' as much as possible.
I recognize the role that political, technical and budget factors
must play in determining our approach to achieving ultimate success,
and that each factor impacts the others. It is inescapable that a FY 07
budget shortfall will impact technical decisions. A reprioritization of
NASA programs by Congress will require a shifting of budget resources
from some programs to others. Technical issues can impact both
political and budget decisions. We were all reminded that there are
factors beyond our control, when a freak hailstorm recently damaged the
Shuttle's external fuel tank. That said, these factors can be managed
in balance, a balance that will be determined by the policy and budget
decisions you make.
The critical issue is not whether we are technically up to the
task. The critical issue is whether resources will be provided to
accomplish these tasks.
In my opinion, it's ``gut-check'' time. The Administration needs to
step up and support the Vision with a request for adequate funding
levels for NASA. After all, Congress and the President made the Vision
for Space Exploration law when the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 was
enacted.
Since the Vision was announced in January 2004, several funding
problems have been brought to light. The NASA FY 2005 projected budget
run out for FY 2008 was $18 billion. Now NASA's budget request is $17.3
billion. The costs to retire and transition Shuttle in the original FY
2005 budget request were underestimated for FY 08-10 by $2.4 billion,
while the costs to support Space Station were underestimated by $1.4
billion for that period. Coupled with the unanticipated costs of
Return-to-Flight (estimated to be $2.4 billion) and the addition of a
Hubble servicing mission, NASA has been forced to absorb about $9
billion. To accommodate these shortfalls, NASA has had to cut some
programs and slow the development of others.
As you know, NASA's top line request represents just \6/10\ of 1
percent of the Nation's budget and is $1.4 billion less than the
Congressionally authorized level this subcommittee approved, and which
was signed into law by President Bush. The FY 2007 budget was reduced
by about $700 million due to the Joint Resolution, despite the Senate's
leadership in increasing the top line by $1.1 billion in the reported
appropriations bill for FY 2007. Now, neither the FY 2007, nor FY 2008,
budgets are adequate to achieve the policy goals established in the
Vision.
Please let me take this opportunity to thank you once again for
your leadership in supporting a top line increase for NASA's budget
during your deliberations on both the authorization and appropriations
bills.
The Mikulski-Hutchison Amendment, which proposed to increase the
NASA FY 2007 top line, would have helped restore the much-needed
resources and help shorten ``the gap.'' Unfortunately, that amendment
was never enacted into law and the FY 2008 budget request for NASA does
not reflect the real needs of the agency.
President Bush set, and bipartisan majorities in both Houses of
Congress approved, the Vision policy goals. After spending billions of
the taxpayers' hard-earned dollars, the ISS is finally close to
completion. This national asset is ready to start producing results
that will positively impact us here on Earth. It therefore remains a
responsible policy decision to finish the ISS and meet our
international obligations, as well as our obligations to U.S.
scientists and researchers who have long been waiting for this unique
national laboratory to be open for business.
I understand that members of this committee, as well as members of
the Committee on Appropriations, are proposing a ``Space Summit'' be
held with President Bush to discuss both the budgetary and policy
issues associated with the Vision. Clearly, the importance of the
challenge we face warrants every constructive effort.
The Challenge: Continuity and Change
The primary challenge we face today stems from the need to maintain
our human access to space for continued research, discovery, global
economic competitiveness and national security, while at the same time
closing out the Shuttle program.
These twin tasks are straining NASA's resources in what is clearly
a difficult budgetary environment.
Four years ago, this subcommittee heard members of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report that the NASA human
spaceflight program, in general, and the Space Shuttle program, in
particular, had been starved of necessary funding for nearly a decade.
But the CAIB did not stop there; it also reported that the burdens of
meeting the schedule for construction and completion of the ISS were
leading the Shuttle program to the brink of its safe capabilities.
Today, 4 years later, we are confident that the Shuttle is as safe a
vehicle as it can possibly be, but we remain concerned about the ever-
increasing pressures on NASA's top line budget.
We are once again seeing budget strains across the agency. It is a
fact that the NASA budgets prepared and approved before the Columbia
tragedy were never revised to accommodate the cost of recovery from the
accident or the upgrades mandated by the CAIB for Return-to-Flight.
And now, we have the additional factor of transition from Shuttle
to Ares/Orion. As the stockpiles of Shuttle-unique hardware reach
sufficient levels to support the remaining missions, contracts are not
being renewed and the production and manufacturing of many ``Shuttle-
only'' elements are being terminated. These capabilities, once shut
down, are costly, or impossible, to restore. Although the Shuttle's
final flight is more than 3 years away, many suppliers are exiting the
Shuttle program now. We must have a plan in place, soon, and the funds
to implement it, if we are to retain skills and apply years of
experience to the new missions of exploration.
USA Transition Planning
At United Space Alliance, we have conducted, and will continue to
conduct, research into human capital management strategies and options,
and we plan to take aggressive measures to help narrow ``the gap''
through retention of the right skill mix and experience base. Our
planning activities are taking into consideration lessons learned from
previous programs that implemented terminations and transitions.
However, we recognize the Shuttle transition will be the most complex
undertaking to date.
The Shuttle program must remain safe and fully operational during
its close-out, while transitioning personnel and hardware to the new
exploration programs. In the programs benchmarked by our transition
planning teams, we found, not surprisingly, that successful transitions
involved early identification of critical skills required for
retention, retraining requirements, financial incentives, and most
importantly, an overarching clear and concise transition roadmap
approved up-front by the government and industry partners, which
addressed both human capital and hardware. We also found that accurate
and regular communication with the workforce was critical to keeping
employees focused on their present jobs, while allowing them to prepare
and train for the challenges of new work.
Clearly, USA has a major stake in assuring that the transition
process is seamless and successful. For a decade, we have served as the
NASA prime contractor for Shuttle operations as well as ground support
and mission operations for the ISS. Our challenge is how to best manage
this transition and ensure the safety of ongoing Space Shuttle and
Space Station operations.
A Critical National Asset
As I stated earlier, I believe the most crucial element for
successful transition from Shuttle to the new exploration program is
the retention of the current contractor workforce, with its unique
skills and unrivaled knowledge of virtually every aspect of space
operations. This workforce is essential both to the ongoing safety and
success of final Shuttle operations and on the startup of the new
exploration programs. Our extensive experience in integrating Shuttle
payloads of all kinds will be critical to the successful processing of
the different mix of spacecraft that will come on line. The current
workforce's knowledge of maintaining a fleet of both human-rated
spacecraft and rockets is the only baseline of experience that can be
considered pertinent to supporting multiple kinds of Constellation
missions. Skills in developing mission manifests, designing EVA and
training schedules identifying and addressing flight plan issues and
crew equipment, processing and testing spacecraft, and operating and
maintaining ground systems, are crucial to planning and executing the
low-Earth orbit and lunar exploration missions of the Constellation
program.
USA is pursuing a number of options for preserving and developing
this irreplaceable national asset for the future. Skills retention is
the prime objective of a company-wide initiative that involves
workforce training and development, flexible utilization of skills for
early Constellation work, retention training for managers and retention
incentives for employees. As we evaluate and prioritize our workforce
skills, our process will allow us to identify those mission operations
and training skills that will be unique to exploring the surface of the
Moon, as well as establishing the initial lunar outposts. Above all,
Constellation must have a long-range acquisition strategy so that all
contractors and suppliers can plan for competitive procurements and
project which skills and assets will be needed and when.
We must also plan for the retirement or transition of physical
assets. While NASA has identified the major issues facing the
industrial base, the ability to engage in transition planning for both
hardware and human assets is being hampered by inadequate funding. The
Administration has acknowledged the need for a smooth and seamless
transition, but as far as I can tell, plans have not been completed for
providing NASA the necessary funds to ensure success.
Investing in Our Future
NASA has made large investments in new safety procedures and
technologies, to implement the recommendations of the CAIB report.
Furthermore, NASA experienced hurricane damage to facilities in 2004
and 2005, that were estimated to cost more to repair than what Congress
provided in the supplementals. The cuts to NASA's budget sustained as a
result of the FY 2007 Continuing Resolution are serious and will have
serious consequences. As I noted, the FY 2008 request does not take
those cuts into account.
Administrator Griffin stated, in a letter to Congress, estimated
total cost for NASA's Shuttle Return-to-Flight. These funds have been
used, among other purposes, to build and deploy foam refinements and
tests, to make new cameras and tile inspection sensors, and to develop
new repair and inspection technologies, such as the 50-foot inspection
boom that has been on prominent display following the return to flight
after the Columbia accident. Other new costs include systems
engineering and integration, additional workforce, and the new NASA
Engineering and Safety Center and Independent Technical Authority.
None of these costs were supported with requests for additional
funds; each had to be absorbed by NASA's other budgeted activities,
thus adding even more pressure to an already austere budget. This makes
little sense to me, at a time when we, as a nation, are seeking to
enhance our technological competitive capabilities--something in which
NASA's programs have historically played a prominent, even preeminent
role.
Conclusion
To be sure, there are difficult days ahead in this transition
effort. It is essential that we commit our very best efforts to
continuing this Nation's tradition of excellence and leadership in
space technology and exploration. We have traveled this road twice
before in NASA's history. The transitions from Gemini to Apollo, and
Apollo to Shuttle, were challenges that tested our commitment and
resolve. If we apply the lessons we've learned from these previous
transitions, we will avoid many of the difficulties our predecessors
encountered along the way. And, most importantly, if we apply the
experience gained from the decades of Shuttle and Station operations to
the new Constellation program, we will build on knowledge we have
gained from our inspiring work in building our permanently-inhabited
laboratory in space.
I want to thank the Subcommittee, again, for this opportunity to
come before you today, and I am pleased to answer any questions that
you may have.
Senator Bill Nelson. And part of it will be, thanks to the
proposal by the successful contractor, part of it will be
absorbed in the assembly of the new vehicle down at the space
center. Which not only makes good sense in helping retain skill
sets, but it also adds an extra set of eyes.
You have the launch team right there next to the assembly
team. So you have extra eyes on the problem, and communication,
in order to increase the safety of the construction. That will
help some. What do you think about that, Mr. Karas?
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. KARAS, VICE PRESIDENT
AND GENERAL MANAGER, HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT,
LOCKHEED MARTIN SPACE SYSTEMS COMPANY
Mr. Karas. Well, I think that is correct Mr. Chairman, I
think you are exactly right. It allows us to utilize the
workforce that is there. The experienced workforce and a second
set of eyes, but also the efficiency, as you mentioned, to help
reduce overall ops costs. Because we have manufacturing there.
And as you know, the O&C will be doing manufacturing, final
test assembly, launch recovery and refurbishment down there.
And we are looking for other opportunities to utilize the
workforce down at the Cape, such as putting logistics down
there. And there are some other opportunities where there might
be other test lab capabilities.
So we are looking to expand our footprint down at the Cape,
to help alleviate that problem as best we can.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Karas follows:]
Prepared Statement of John C. Karas, Vice President and General
Manager, Human Spaceflight, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hutchison and distinguished
Committee members.
I am honored to appear before you today to discuss a critical
process of transition that lies before us in the next several years. We
should all work together to understand the impact that such a
transition will have on key NASA Centers, their employees, their
contractors and their communities. Our collective skill in negotiating
that transition will determine whether or not America retains its hard-
earned mantle of leadership in space science and exploration.
There is a concern that budget pressures may threaten our ability
to execute a smooth and timely transition from Space Shuttle operations
to a fully developed system of new launch and exploration vehicles. If
key schedule milestones are to be met, it is important that all of us
in industry and in the government reach agreement on a number of
issues. Many of these issues are a product of the tension between long-
term budget uncertainties and program technical, schedule, and cost
performance.
Working closely together, NASA and the Lockheed Martin Orion team
have sought to identify the key ingredients of a successful program and
to ensure that they remain part of the recipe. We have imposed rigorous
cost controls in order to keep the overall program within the budget
constraints set by Congress.
While there are differences of opinion about some elements of the
way forward, there is substantial agreement about the priorities: safe
and successful fly-out of the Shuttle; and safe, successful, smooth,
and affordable transition from Shuttle to the next-generation human
spaceflight system. Although Lockheed Martin is now responsible for
development of Orion, we also have a vested interest in the successful
fly-out of the Shuttle. Not only are we a parent company of United
Space Alliance, the company responsible for Shuttle operations, but we
also build the External Tank, providing support to the Shuttle program
in Texas, Florida, and Louisiana. We're as committed at the front end
as we are at the back end.
As we contemplate next steps, the NASA/industry team must accept an
important reality: there will be an uncomfortable gap between the last
Shuttle flight and the first Orion flight. The march of time and the
pressure of budget realities virtually guarantee it. Our job is to
minimize the gap, develop work-around strategies and execute our
development plan as flawlessly as possible.
Some of the work will have to be done serially, some of it will
overlap, and some of it will be done in parallel. An example of
parallel tasks is the need to continue flying the Shuttle safely while
we develop its replacement. In order to do so successfully, we must
continue to inspire, motivate and reward the Shuttle workforce while at
the same time identifying, recruiting and retaining the new skills and
workers that Orion will require.
Similarly, NASA and its prime contractors must provide a
programmatic and technical roadmap to key suppliers, one that
encourages them to invest in future capabilities while continuing to
produce defect-free support for existing systems.
The workforce and the supplier base are both particularly
vulnerable to gaps in development, production and operations schedules.
Once the pipeline of projects begins to run dry, individuals and
businesses begin to head for the exits. As tribal knowledge fades and
spare parts dwindle, the risks to existing programs mount and the
possibility of new ones diminishes.
Lockheed Martin has recent experience with this kind of dilemma. We
have served as the prime contractor on numerous spacecraft development
and operations programs that have completed their life-cycle over the
past 50 years, repeatedly facing the challenges of transitioning
skilled workforce and facilities across programs. During the
transitional phases of the Titan and Atlas space booster programs, we
gained valuable insight into the most productive ways to achieve
mission success while making changes in workforce, facilities and
processes.
In 1993, Martin Marietta Corporation bought General Dynamics Space
Systems Division, and in the mid-1990s, moved the Atlas operations from
San Diego to Denver. This involved the relocation of people and
tooling, the construction of facilities and the seamless hand-off of
work-in-progress between two sets of workers hundreds of miles apart.
During this transition and workforce relocation, our launch
operations team was able to conduct 12 successful Atlas missions.
Furthermore, all of the Atlas hardware built during the transition
passed inspection and flew successfully on subsequent missions. At the
same time, we developed new Atlas variants, incorporating a planned set
of improvements, and significantly reduced operations costs. This
evolutionary process inspired the Atlas workforce to remain with the
program through the challenges of relocation and uncertainty. NASA is
off to a good start in much the same way, with the development of
Orion, Ares I, Ares V, and the Earth Departure Stage.
As the prospect of downsizing and skill mix adjustments loom in the
close-out of Shuttle operations, lessons that we learned at the end of
the Titan program are also applicable. In its final years of operation,
Titan IV was called upon to launch some of this Nation's most important
national security payloads. It was vitally important to maintain a
dedicated, skilled workforce as we reached the last missions of the
program. Through a combination of re-training and Mission Success
incentives, we achieved 100 percent Mission Success through the end of
the Titan IV program. Many of the highly-skilled employees that
remained on the program to the end are now valued members of the
Lockheed Martin Orion team.
What are the keys to success? Good planning, obsessive attention to
detail, and most importantly, good change managers to lead during this
time of uncertainty.
One element that both the Atlas transition and the Titan close-out
had in common was the sense of continuity. The workforce in each case
was given clear, honest information about the road ahead. They knew the
role that they would play, the importance of the mission, the outlines
of the plan, and the arrangements that would protect their jobs or
provide for follow-on opportunities. No one had to fear the future.
If the Shuttle-to-Constellation transition is to enjoy the same
level of success, we will need to provide the NASA and contractor
workforce with a similar sense of continuity. We will need to
communicate our plans for them and for their workplaces. And we will
need to take visible steps to mitigate transition-related impacts on
job stability.
While the NASA/industry team must develop and execute this
transition plan, Congress plays an important role as well. Assured
funding and consistent program authorization are key ingredients in
providing continuity in program planning. To this end, we commend this
committee for your last authorization bill, and urge full support for
your FY 08 NASA Authorization.
But it is unlikely that the pressures on Congress will abate
anytime soon. Yet there are measures that can be taken to ``smooth out
the oscillations'' as we engineers might say. For example, in bidding
for the Orion program, the Lockheed Martin team focused on what we call
the ``Southern Crescent'' approach. Since we knew that low cost would
be a crucial element of a winning proposal, we sought to identify cost
mitigators that would not jeopardize mission success. The location,
condition and particular strengths of the NASA Centers became a key
consideration in the proposed siting of Orion work. We fashioned a
proposal that leveraged the pre-existing skilled workforce and
facilities, the willingness of local communities to invest in the
retention of key enterprises, and the logistical advantages conferred
by geography. The presence of unique facilities, experienced workers
and supportive communities at each NASA Center provided a ``win-win''
solution.
While our teammate, Orbital is working closely with Langley
Research Center on the Launch Abort System and we are working with
Glenn Research Center on the Orion Service Module, we and our teammates
have located our crew capsule development activities near the southern
NASA Centers. This strategy enables us to leverage the invaluable,
recent human spaceflight experience, both within NASA and among the
many NASA suppliers in the communities. Lockheed Martin's Orion Project
Office and our design and development team are located near JSC in
Texas. We are building the Orion structure at the Michoud Assembly
Facility in Louisiana. Orion cable harnesses and ground support
equipment are being developed and built at Stennis in Mississippi. And
Orion final assembly, test, and launch operations will all take place
at KSC in Florida. As part of this continuing strategy, we are already
working as a subcontractor on the Commercial Orbital Transportation
System at Michoud and on the Ares I-1 Avionics Integration contract at
Marshall Space Flight Center. Lockheed Martin and our Orion teammates
Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell and United Space Alliance, are busy with
important roles on Shuttle at JSC and KSC. These contracts provide us
with unique insight into the dimensions of the workforce transition
challenge and facilitate a smoother transition for our second-tier
suppliers. We are already identifying opportunities for crossover
employment and retraining that can be an element of our workforce
utilization strategy.
As we face this transition challenge, care must be taken to keep
the promise of these Centers and not squander the institutional and
individual competence that has been built up over the years. It is
important to ensure clear, open communication with the workforce and
the community. The NASA workforce and their community supporters are
mature and realistic. If dealt with in a forthright fashion, they will
want to stay on the team and be a part of NASA's future. As we strive
to meet strict cost standards, it only makes sense to avail ourselves
of existing skills, experienced workers and already-capitalized
facilities. To further enable a smooth transition, we must ensure that
NASA's premier facilities are maintained and that obsolete facilities
are retired. We encourage expanding NASA's Enhanced Use Lease authority
to guarantee the most efficient use of NASA's human spaceflight
facilities.
To assure successful transition, there must be more than just good
intentions. Reliable close-out schedules, retraining opportunities and
``bridging'' work on other projects are ways in which to preserve
workforce loyalty and performance. The Orion team and the NASA Centers
are committed to using best practices in managing the human spaceflight
transition.
Some of these best practices are proven human resources techniques:
skills assessment and inventory, career and vocational counseling, job
tracking and database management, skills refreshment and retention,
incentive programs, community outreach and local economic development
partnerships.
Even with the most effective transition strategies, there will be
some inevitable attrition of the workforce. The demographics ensure
that we are on the threshold of a significant surge in retirements. Two
imperatives arise from this fact: one, knowledge capture and retention
must be accomplished proactively through mentoring programs, exit
interviews and archiving; second, recruitment must be synchronized and
integrated with attrition projections to ensure continuity and
knowledge transfer. Performance metrics must be carefully monitored to
anticipate and mitigate performance variances in this critical
transition period.
Skill mix is one of the most delicate issues that industry must
confront. Many find it hard to understand that a contractor could be
laying some people off while hiring others at the same time. This
process, essential for the health and vitality of the industrial base,
can have harsh human consequences. To some extent, retraining and
rotational assignments can reduce the need for skill-mix job actions.
But the transition from Shuttle to Orion, and the transition from Orion
development to Orion operations, will necessarily entail some skill mix
adjustments.
We expect to deal with this challenge, in part, through effective
community relations. We at Lockheed Martin and our industry teammates
have established highly effective relationships with universities,
four-year and community colleges, job counselors and State and local
government officials. Working with local economic development
organizations, we have forged partnerships with the University of
Houston, the University of Texas/El Paso, the University of Central
Florida, Brevard Community College and a host of other institutions. In
the past, workers found themselves adrift without a lifeline when
layoffs occurred. Today, with the help of enlightened managers, these
community partnerships can provide a more transitional process,
combining severance packages, retraining funds, resume preparation and
job counseling that often return workers back to the workforce with
little or no disruption. While it is in our interest to retain and
retrain proven workers, we must also streamline our operations and find
new, more efficient ways to accomplish our mission.
Change presents both risk and opportunity. I have spoken of the
risks of an ill-conceived transition process for human spaceflight. But
the opportunities are well worth remembering. We must encourage a new
generation to take up the exciting challenge of space exploration.
Powered by new technology, imagination, and Jolt Cola, the next space
adventurers will need our help to gain a foothold in the future. At
this point, we are finding that recent engineering graduates are
clamoring to work on the Orion program. This is a refreshing change,
since a decade ago, graduates were leaving the space industry in favor
of the exciting opportunities offered by the dot-coms. Congress can
maintain this momentum by assuring a sustained investment in people,
facilities and technology.
America's most insightful philosopher, Yogi Berra, is reputed to
have said ``Making predictions is difficult, especially about the
future.'' While I can't predict exactly how the Vision for Space
Exploration will turn out, let me say that I am confident in the
feasibility of our plan, the competence of our workforce, the maturity
of our technology and goodness of our objective. Given the necessary
resources, a stable budget, and the continued support of the Congress,
I have no doubt of our ultimate success.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide my statement on this
important topic. Lockheed Martin appreciates the Committee's interest
in maintaining United States leadership in space exploration. We look
forward to continuing to work closely with you on these important
issues and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Li. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, Mr. Li?
STATEMENT OF ALLEN LI, DIRECTOR,
ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GAO
Mr. Li. I recognize the importance all these changes that
are going to be required in transitioning the workforce. In
your discussion about the gap, I think that it needs to be said
that providing additional money may not be the only solution
and the only way in which, perhaps, we can minimize the gap.
At issue is the confidence in which we know that the budget
levels at which we have right now can bring that spacecraft
within that time-frame. Everything has to go well. Even with
the confidence level that we have right now, it is not certain
that we are going to be able to hit 2014 with those budget
numbers.
And technology, as I indicated in my prepared statement,
there are issues with regards to systems development that
without proper knowledge, you just cannot hit those particular
milestones. You cannot rush the process. The knowledge needs to
be achieved before you can go to production. And that is pretty
much our message.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Li follows:]
Prepared Statement of Allen Li, Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Management, GAO
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the challenges faced by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in transitioning
from the Space Shuttle to the next generation of human spaceflight
systems. In 2004, the President established a new exploration policy--A
Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. Space
Exploration (Vision)--which calls for the retirement of the Space
Shuttle and the development of a new family of exploration systems.
NASA's implementation of the Vision is expected to cost hundreds of
billions of dollars. A NASA effort of this size and scope has not been
seen since the end of the Apollo program and the start of the Space
Shuttle program more than 3 decades ago. The transition includes a
massive transfer of people, hardware, and infrastructure. Although NASA
has in place many processes, policies, procedures, and support systems
to carry out this effort, successful transition will depend on
thoughtful execution and effective oversight.
The need for NASA to implement the Vision in a fiscally prudent and
effective manner cannot be overemphasized given the competing fiscal
demands facing the Federal Government and an already troubling funding
profile projected for human spaceflight activities. We have issued a
number of reports that touch on various aspects of retiring the Space
Shuttle and transitioning its assets and people to exploration
activities. These reports have questioned the affordability of the
exploration program, NASA's acquisition strategy for the development of
new space vehicles, agency-wide contract management, and workforce
planning for current and future agency needs. We also have an ongoing
body of work being performed at the request of the House Committee on
Science and Technology regarding effective management of the industrial
base, development of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, and the logistical
support needed by the International Space Station (ISS). In addition,
at the request of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, we are
reviewing NASA's ability to attract and retain a skilled workforce. My
statement today will focus on the overarching challenges that NASA
faces in transitioning from the Shuttle to the next generation of human
spaceflight systems and will discuss our prior work on Shuttle
workforce and development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, one of
the agency's complex programs. I will also discuss areas where we have
related ongoing work.
This testimony is based on work conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary
NASA faces numerous challenges as it transitions from the Space
Shuttle program to the next generation of human spaceflight systems. We
have undertaken a body of work over the past 3 years that has
highlighted two of these challenges--sustaining the Shuttle workforce
and developing new systems. Sustaining the Shuttle workforce through
retirement and ensuring that the workforce is available to support
future exploration activities presents an enormous challenge for NASA.
In 2005, we reported that NASA has made limited progress toward
developing a detailed strategy to retain a critically skilled workforce
for Shuttle operations. We recommended that the agency begin
identifying the Shuttle program's future workforce needs. NASA has
recognized that Shuttle workforce management and critical skills
retention will be a major challenge and has taken action to address
this issue. In 2006, we reported that NASA's acquisition strategy for
the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle was risky because it committed the
Government to a long-term contract before establishing a sound business
case. We recommended that NASA modify the current Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle acquisition strategy to ensure that the agency does
not commit itself to a long-term contractual obligation prior to
establishing a sound business case. Although it initially disagreed
with our recommendation, NASA subsequently revised its acquisition
strategy to address some of the concerns we raised.
We are currently conducting a body of work relating to the
transition, including NASA's management of the supplier base,
development of the Crew Launch Vehicle, and logistical support of the
Space Station. Our work to date has also identified other issues that
NASA will face during the transition, including disposing of property
and equipment, completing environmental clean up, managing the overall
workforce, and integrating financial information into how NASA does
business. Each area contains its own set of unique challenges, but they
are all critical to NASA's overall transition effort and will require
significant management attention.
Background
The President's Vision for Space Exploration for NASA announced in
2004 calls for the retirement of the Shuttle upon completion of the ISS
and the creation of new vehicles for human spaceflight that will allow
a return to the Moon by 2020 and voyages to Mars and points beyond. The
Shuttle manifest currently consists of 16 flights--15 to complete
assembly and integration of the ISS and a servicing mission \1\ to the
Hubble Space Telescope. The first new space vehicles currently are
targeted to begin operating no later than 2014--thereby creating a
potential gap in U.S. human spaceflight. Congress has voiced concern
over the United States not having continuous access to space. NASA has
made it a priority to minimize the gap to the extent possible.
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\1\ The servicing mission includes installing the Cosmic Origins
Spectrograph and Wide Field Camera 3, installing a refurbished Fine
Guidance Sensor that replaces one degrading unit of the three already
onboard, and an attempt will also be made to repair the Space Telescope
Imaging Spectrograph, which stopped working in 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA has begun planning for the retirement of the Shuttle,
scheduled for 2010, by identifying best practices in closing facilities
and the transitioning of capabilities. Specifically, NASA has conducted
a number of benchmarking studies of previous closures and realignment
of large programs, including the Titan IV rocket fly-out, the F/A-18 C/
D fighter production close, and the Navy Base Realignment and Closure
activities. The benchmarking efforts have highlighted to NASA the
importance of having a plan, effective communication, human capital
management, and effective program management tools. NASA's benchmarking
effort also showed that closing and transitioning facilities,
equipment, and people is expensive and time consuming. Among the
lessons learned is that, historically, it has taken 3.5 years to close
down an installation and another 3 years to complete the transition of
the property. NASA's Office of the Inspector General has recently
reviewed NASA's plan for the Space Shuttle transition and recommended,
among other improvements, that the two affected space directorates
finalize and implement the Human Space Flight Transition Plan.\2\
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\2\ NASA Office of Inspector General. NASA's Plan for Space Shuttle
Transition Could Be Improved by Following Project Management
Guidelines, IG-07-005, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2007).
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Development of the Orion crew capsule, Ares I launch vehicle, and
other exploration systems needed to implement the Vision is dependent
on a ``go as you can afford to pay'' approach, wherein lower-priority
efforts will be deferred, descoped, or discontinued to allow NASA to
stay within its available budget profile. In recent testimony, the NASA
Administrator said that the cost associated with returning the Shuttle
to flight, continued Shuttle operations, and recent budget reductions
had the combined effect of increasing the gap by delaying the first
manned Orion test flight by 6 months.
In an effort to address the gap in U.S. capability to resupply the
Space Station following retirement of the Shuttle, NASA is investing in
commercial space transportation services. NASA's expectation is that by
acquiring domestic orbital transportation services it will be able to
send cargo and, in the future, transport crews to the ISS in a cost-
effective manner. NASA refers to this as the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services project. The project is in the early stages of
development. Should these commercial services prove to be unreliable or
more costly than anticipated, NASA will need to purchase space
transportation from its International Partners to meet obligations to
the ISS until the new Orion spacecraft become operational.
NASA Faces Significant Challenges in Retiring the Space Shuttle Program
and Transitioning to Exploration Activities
We have undertaken a substantial body of work over the past 3 years
that has highlighted the significant challenges that NASA will face as
it retires the Shuttle and transitions to exploration activities. One
key challenge is sustaining the Shuttle workforce through the
retirement of the Shuttle while ensuring that a viable workforce is
available to support future activities. Another key challenge will be
developing the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle within cost, schedule,
and performance goals. Additionally, our ongoing work has identified a
number of other areas that may present challenges during the transition
period. Some of these challenges include managing the supplier base to
ensure its continued viability, developing the Ares I Crew Launch
Vehicle, and completing and supporting the Space Station.
Maintaining a Skilled Workforce
The Space Shuttle program's workforce is critical to the success of
the Vision. The Shuttle workforce currently consists of approximately
2,000 civil service and 15,000 contractor personnel, including a large
number of engineers and scientists. In 2005, we reported that NASA had
made limited progress toward developing a detailed strategy for
sustaining a critically skilled Shuttle workforce to support Space
Shuttle operations. We reported that significant delays in implementing
a strategy to sustain the Shuttle workforce would likely lead to larger
problems, such as funding and failure to meet NASA program schedules.
Accordingly, we concluded that timely action to address workforce
issues is critical given their potential impact on NASA-wide goals such
as closing the gap in human spaceflight.
When we performed our work several factors hampered the ability of
the Space Shuttle program to develop a detailed long-term strategy for
sustaining the critically skilled workforce necessary to support safe
Space Shuttle operations through retirement. For example, at that time,
the program's focus was on returning the Shuttle to flight, and other
efforts such as determining workforce requirements were delayed. In our
report, we recommended that NASA begin identifying the Space Shuttle
program's future workforce needs based upon various future scenarios.
Scenario planning could better enable NASA to develop strategies for
meeting future needs. NASA concurred with our recommendation. It has
acknowledged that Shuttle workforce management and critical skills
retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it progresses
toward retirement of the Space Shuttle and has taken action to address
this issue. For example, since we made our recommendation, NASA has
developed an agencywide strategic human capital plan and developed
workforce analysis tools to assist it in identifying critical skills
needs. NASA has also developed a human capital plan specifically for
sustaining the Shuttle workforce through the retirement and, then
transitioning the workforce.
Additionally, in March 2006, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, and NASA asked the
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assist the agency
in planning for the Space Shuttle's retirement and transition to future
exploration activities. In February 2007, a NAPA panel recommended that
the Space Shuttle program adopt a RAND model for projecting a core
workforce because of its emphasis on ``long-term scheduling
projections, quantification of core competencies and proficiencies, and
analysis of overlapping mission needs.'' \3\ Under the RAND model, an
organization maintains a core capability for any competency that will
be needed in the future. According to NAPA, this model is useful where
a given expertise is not immediately required, but is likely to be
needed in the future--in this case, for the Orion Crew Exploration
Vehicle.
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\3\ NAPA also recommended that NASA adopt scenario planning into
its agencywide workforce planning processes and use the results to
inform decisionmaking.
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Developing New Exploration Systems
In July 2006, we reported that NASA's acquisition strategy for the
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle placed the project at risk of
significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls
because it committed the Government to a long-term contract before
establishing a sound business case.\4\ Our past work has shown that
developing a sound business case--one that matches requirements to
available and reasonably expected resources before committing to a new
product development effort--reduces risk and increases the likelihood
of successful outcomes.\5\ For a program to increase its chances of
success, high levels of knowledge should be demonstrated before
significant commitments are made (i.e., they should be following a
knowledge-based approach to product development).
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\4\ GAO, NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space
Exploration Program Requires More Knowledge, GAO-06-817R (Washington,
D.C.: July 17, 2006).
\5\ Examples of our best practices reports include GAO, Best
Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve Weapon
Acquisition, GAO-04-386SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2004); Space
Acquisitions: Committing Prematurely to the Transformational Satellite
Program Elevates Risks for Poor Cost, Schedule, and Performance
Outcomes, GAO-04-71R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 2003); Best Practices:
Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition
Outcomes, GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002); and Best
Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better
Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001).
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At the time of our report, NASA had yet to develop key elements of
a sound business case, including well-defined requirements, mature
technology, a preliminary design, and firm cost estimates that would
support its plans for making a long-term commitment. Without such
knowledge, NASA cannot predict with any confidence how much the program
will cost, what technologies will or will not be available to meet
performance expectations, and when the vehicle will be ready for use.
NASA acknowledged that it would not have these elements in place until
the project's Preliminary Design Review scheduled for Fiscal Year 2008.
As a result, we recommended that the NASA Administrator modify the
agency's acquisition strategy for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle to
ensure that the agency does not commit itself, and in turn the Federal
Government, to a long-term contractual obligation prior to establishing
a sound business case at the project's Preliminary Design Review.
Although it initially disagreed with our recommendation, NASA
subsequently took steps to address some of the concerns we raised.
Specifically, NASA modified its acquisition strategy for the Orion
project and changed the production and sustainment portions of the
contract into options. The agency will decide whether to exercise these
options after the project's Critical Design Review in 2009. While these
changes are in line with our recommendation and a step in a positive
direction, we continue to believe NASA's acquisition strategy is risky
because it does not fully conform to a knowledge-based acquisition
approach. Attempting to close that gap by pushing forward development
of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle without first obtaining the
requisite knowledge at key points could very well result in the
production of a system that not only does not meet expectations but
ends up costing more and actually increases the gap.
Since we last testified on this subject in September 2006,\6\ NASA
has successfully completed its first major milestone for the Orion
project. It has completed the Systems Requirements Review.\7\ This was
a major step toward obtaining the information critical for making
informed decisions. According to NASA's Orion contracting officer, NASA
is also in the process of renegotiating the Orion contract to extend
the Initial Operational Capability date of the system to 2014. Further,
while this change will increase contract costs, the increase has
already been accounted for in the Orion budget because the agency has
been planning the change for over a year. In addition, risks associated
with schedule, cost, and weight continue to be identified for the Orion
project.
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\6\ GAO, NASA: Sound Management and Oversight Key to Addressing
Crew Exploration Vehicle Project Risks, GAO-06-1127T (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 28, 2006).
\7\ According to NASA's Systems Engineering Procedural Requirements
(NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 7123.1), the SRR examines the
functional and performance requirements defined for the system and the
preliminary program or project plan and ensures that the requirements
and the selected concept will satisfy the mission.
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As we have previously testified, sound project management and
oversight will be key to addressing the risks that remain for the Orion
project as it proceeds with its acquisition approach. To help mitigate
the risks, we have recommended in the past that NASA have in place
markers (i.e., criteria) to assist decisionmakers in their monitoring
of the project at key junctures in the development process. Such
markers are needed to provide assurance that projects are proceeding
with and decisions are being based upon the appropriate level of
knowledge and can help to lessen project risks. NASA has recently
issued its updated program and project management requirements for
flight systems in response to our recommendation. Changes to the
policy,\8\ including the incorporation of key decision points
throughout the project development life-cycle, should provide an avenue
for decisionmakers to reassess project decisions at key points in the
development process to ensure that continued investment is appropriate.
However, it should be noted that implementation of the policy in a
disciplined manner will ensure success, not the existence of the policy
itself.
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\8\ NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5D establishes the
requirements by which NASA will formulate and implement spaceflight
programs and projects. NPR 7120.5D became effective on March 6, 2007,
and supersedes the previous version of the document, NPR 7120.5C, for
spaceflight programs and projects.
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Currently, we are evaluating the development of NASA's latest
human-rated launch vehicle--the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. When
completed, the Ares I vehicle will be capable of delivering the Orion
spacecraft to low-Earth orbit for ISS missions and for exploration
missions to the Moon. As initially conceived by NASA in the Exploration
Systems Architecture Study completed in 2005, the Ares I design would
rely on the existing solid rocket boosters and main engines from the
Space Shuttle as major components of its two stages. The current design
for the Ares I, however, diverges from the initial design set forth in
the architecture study and now includes elements from the Apollo-era
Saturn V launch vehicle. Current plans are for Ares I to evolve the
solid rocket boosters from the Space Shuttle program from four segments
to five segments and to build a new upper-stage engine based on an
original Saturn V design. NASA maintains that these changes are
necessary to increase commonality between the Ares I and the planned
Ares V cargo launch vehicle and to reduce overall development costs for
implementing the Vision. As NASA's design for the Ares I continues to
evolve, careful planning and coordination between the Orion and Ares I
development teams will be critical to ensuring that current
developmental efforts result in hardware that satisfies the future
requirements of these systems. Subsequently, any development problems
on either of these systems could result in increasing the gap.
Our ongoing work is aimed at assessing whether NASA's acquisition
strategy for Ares I reflects the effect of changes to the Ares I design
incorporated since the Ares I was first conceived in the Exploration
Systems Architecture Study as a Shuttle-derived alternative. Also, we
are evaluating the extent to which NASA's Ares I acquisition strategy
incorporates knowledge-based concepts designed to minimize technical
and programmatic risk.
The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares I Crew Launch
Vehicle are the first in a series of new systems to be developed in
support of exploration activities. NASA's careful management of these
projects must preclude historical instances of cost and schedule
growth. Indeed, while NASA has had many successes in the exploration of
space, such as landing the Pathfinder and Exploration Rovers on Mars,
NASA has also experienced its share of unsuccessful missions,
unforeseen cost overruns, and difficulty bringing a number of projects
to completion. For example, NASA has made several attempts to build a
second generation of reusable human spaceflight vehicle to replace the
Space Shuttle, such as the National Aero-Space Plane, the X-33 and X-
34, and the Space Launch Initiative, that never accomplished its
objective of fielding a new reusable space vehicle. We estimate that
these unsuccessful development efforts have cost approximately $4.8
billion since the 1980s. The high cost of these unsuccessful efforts
and the potential costs of implementing the Vision make it important
that NASA achieve success in developing new systems for its new
exploration program.
Managing the Supplier Base Throughout Retirement and Transition
NASA's plans to retire the Shuttle have the potential to greatly
impact the supplier base that has been supporting that program for the
last several decades, as well as mold the future supplier base needed
for its exploration program. Over the next few years, NASA will be
making decisions about its supplier base needs, including which
suppliers will be required for the remainder of the Space Shuttle
program, which will no longer be required for the program, and which
will be needed to support exploration efforts. One concern is that NASA
will be unable to sustain suppliers necessary to support the
exploration program during the period between the Shuttle's retirement
and resumption of human spaceflight. Also of concern is that those
suppliers determined by NASA as not needed for the exploration program
will prematurely end their services, thus jeopardizing the safe and
efficient completion of Shuttle activities. In addition, issues such as
obsolescence--already being experienced by some Shuttle projects--could
have an impact on the exploration program given the planned use of
heritage hardware for some components of the Constellation projects. In
an attempt to address these potential issues, NASA has been developing
and implementing plans and processes to manage the transition of its
supplier base.
We are in the process of assessing how well NASA is positioning
itself to effectively manage its supplier base to ensure both
sustainment of the Space Shuttle program through its scheduled
retirement in 2010 and successful transition to planned exploration
activities.
Providing Logistical Support to the International Space Station
The Shuttle is uniquely suited for transporting crew and cargo to
and from the ISS. However, with scheduled retirement of the Shuttle in
2010, NASA and its International Partners will be challenged to fully
support ISS operations until 2014, when the new crew exploration
vehicle is scheduled to come on line. To fill this gap, NASA plans to
rely on its International Partners and commercial services to provide
ISS logistics and crew rotation.
Two recent studies have raised serious concerns about whether
future ISS operations can be continuously supported. A 2006 report by
the National Research Council noted that the capabilities, schedules,
and funding requirements for NASA, International Partners, and
commercial cargo and crew vehicles were not yet firm enough to give the
panel confidence that ISS exploration mission objectives have a high
likelihood of being fulfilled.\9\ A February 2007 report by the
International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force, which was
required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2005,\10\ noted that the
transition from the Space Shuttle to post-Shuttle systems for
logistical support to the ISS will require careful planning and phasing
of new capabilities. Specifically, care must be taken to ensure
adequate logistics and spares are provided to maintain a viable
station.\11\ The task force report went on to say that if a commitment
is made to an emerging logistics delivery capability and the capability
does not materialize, then logistical support to the ISS could be lost
for some time, seriously decreasing the utility of the Space Station
and possibly resulting in its abandonment.
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\9\ Review of NASA Plans for the International Space Station,
National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 2006.
\10\ Pub. L. 109-155, 802, 804 (2005).
\11\ Final Report of the International Space Station Independent
Safety Task Force, February 2007.
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We are reviewing NASA's plans for meeting ISS logistics and
maintenance requirements after the Shuttle retires, identifying the
main risks to meeting ISS logistics and maintenance requirements, and
assessing NASA's plans for addressing the risks.
Disposing of Property and Equipment
NASA has not developed a comprehensive cost estimate for
transitioning or disposing of Space Shuttle program facilities and
equipment. This poses a financial risk to the agency. As NASA executes
the remaining missions needed to complete the assembly of and provide
support for the ISS, it will simultaneously begin the process of
disposing of Shuttle facilities and hardware that the Space Shuttle
program will no longer need, or, transitioning such facilities and
hardware to the other NASA programs.\12\ As the ninth largest Federal
Government property holder, NASA owns more than 100,000 acres, as well
as over 3,000 buildings and 3,000 other structures totaling over 44
million square feet. Currently, the Space Shuttle program uses 654
facilities valued in excess of $5 billion. The Space Shuttle program
also manages equipment dispersed across government and its contractors
valued at more than $12 billion. NASA is in the process of evaluating
its Space Shuttle program facilities and equipment requirements and
identifying existing facilities and equipment that will no longer be
needed to support Shuttle operations. Constellation and other NASA
programs will determine whether they need any of the facilities or
equipment released by the Space Shuttle program. According to NASA
officials, assessments currently project that only 70 to 80 of the
existing facilities are needed to support the development or operation
of future exploration systems. In cases where facilities or equipment
are no longer required by the Space Shuttle program, no other use is
identified, or it is selected for disposal, it will transition to the
resident NASA field center for disposition.
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\12\ Facilities refers to real property such as land, buildings and
other structures that cannot be readily moved, and equipment refers to
personal property that could be transported elsewhere with relative
ease.
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It is worth noting that even before the retirement of the Shuttle,
over 10 percent of NASA's facilities are underutilized or not utilized
at all. One option NASA has is to lease underutilized facilities in
exchange for cash and/or in-kind consideration, such as improvement of
NASA's facilities or the provision of services to NASA. As directed by
the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, we recently reported on NASA's
Enhanced Use-Leasing Program.\13\ Congress authorized NASA to employ
enhanced-use leasing at two demonstration centers. This allowed the
agency to retain the proceeds from leasing out underutilized real
property and to accept in-kind consideration in lieu of cash for rent.
The Act allows NASA to deposit the net proceeds (i.e., net of leasing
costs) in a no-year capital account to use later for maintenance,
capital revitalization, and improvement of the facilities, albeit only
at the demonstration centers--Ames Research Center and Kennedy Space
Center. However, unlike other agencies with enhanced-use leasing
authority, NASA is not authorized to lease back the property during the
term of the lease. Furthermore, we found that the agency does not have
adequate controls in place to ensure accountability and transparency
and to protect the Government. We recommended that the NASA
Administrator develop an agency-wide enhanced use leasing policy that
establishes controls and processes to ensure accountability and protect
the Government's interests including developing mechanisms to keep the
Congress fully informed of the agency's enhanced use leasing activity.
NASA concurred with our recommendations. After not receiving additional
authority in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, the agency is again
requesting that the Congress extend enhanced use leasing authority to
at least six NASA centers. NASA currently has other leasing
authorities, but they require the agency to return to the U.S. Treasury
any amounts exceeding cost. Further, NASA has indicated that it is
preparing a package of legislative and administrative tools to help in
the transition from the Space Shuttle program to the Constellation
program. For example, in addition to requesting authority for increased
use of enhanced use leasing, a NASA official informed us that one tool
the agency might consider pursuing is the ability to keep the funds
within NASA from the sale of facilities and equipment, rather than
returning such funds to the Treasury.
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\13\ Pub. L. 109-155, 710 (2005) and GAO, NASA: Enhanced Use
Leasing Program Needs Additional Controls, GAO-07-306R (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 1, 2007).
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Completing Environmental Clean Up
NASA does not have a comprehensive estimate of the environmental
clean up costs associated with the transition and disposal of Space
Shuttle program facilities and equipment. The agency must comply with
Federal and state environmental laws and regulations, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended,\14\ the
Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended,\15\ and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, as amended,\16\ in identifying and mitigating the
environmental concerns. Although NASA has an approach for identifying
environmental risks, in our report on major challenges facing the
Nation in the 21st century, we pointed out that progress in cleaning up
sites frequently does not meet expected time-frames and the costs
dramatically exceed available funding levels.\17\ For example, it cost
the Titan IV program approximately $300 million over 6 years on
cleaning facilities, equipment, and tools. At this time, the extent of
the Space Shuttle program's environmental liabilities is not yet fully
known. Paying for this liability may require a significant future
outflow of funds at the same time that NASA will be facing many other
competing demands for its limited dollars, such as development of
Orion, Ares I, and other exploration projects.
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\14\ 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.
\15\ 42 U.S.C. 6901, et seq.
\16\ 42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq.
\17\ GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the
Federal Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
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Positioning the Science, Engineering, and Technical Workforce
As it moves away from flying the Shuttle, the NASA acknowledges
that it must realign where necessary and plan for a workforce that will
not be quite as large. NASA projects fewer resources will be required
for operating and sustaining hardware, especially during vehicle
processing and launch operations. The reduction in reusability of
future space systems will also result in less refurbishing. In
addition, as new space systems are designed, emphasis will shift to
personnel with skills in systems development and engineering, program
management and systems integration. Unfortunately, these skills will be
in high demand at a time when other Federal agencies and the private
sector have similar needs.
NASA projects that by Fiscal Year 2012 the total number of
personnel needed to meet its strategic goals will decrease from 18,100
to 17,000. The agency is taking advantage of the flexibilities outlined
in the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 \18\ to attract highly qualified
candidates, however, continued buy-outs and the threat of a reduction
in force have created a feeling of instability among the science and
engineering workforce. NASA's senior leaders recognize the need for an
effective workforce strategy in achieving mission success. NASA has a
strategic human capital plan, but more work is needed in workforce
planning and deployment. In addition, NASA's transition to full cost
accounting in Fiscal Year 2004 resulted in a number of its centers
experiencing less than Full Time Equivalent utilization, a situation
referred to by NASA as ``uncovered capacity.'' The Administrator has
committed to operating and maintaining 10 centers and transferred work
to those centers with identified uncovered capacity.
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\18\ Pub. L. 108-201.
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We are examining whether several Federal agencies, including NASA,
are taking sufficient steps to address their workforce challenges in a
timely and comprehensive manner, while sustaining focus on its mission
and programmatic goals. Specifically, we are assessing the extent to
which NASA's human capital framework is aligned with its strategic
mission and programmatic goals; whether NASA is effectively recruiting,
developing, and retaining critically skilled staff; and what internal
or external challenges NASA faces in achieving its workforce needs. As
noted earlier, NAPA recently completed a study that made
recommendations to NASA on how to achieve a flexible and scalable
workforce by integrating its acquisition and workforce planning
processes.
Transforming the Way Financial Information Is Used
Since 1990, GAO has designated NASA's contract management as high
risk principally because NASA has lacked a modern financial management
system that can provide accurate and reliable information on contract
spending and has placed little emphasis on product performance, cost
controls, and program outcomes.\19\ NASA has made progress toward
implementing disciplined project management processes, but it has made
only limited progress in certain areas such as reengineering NASA's
contractor cost reporting process. As we reported, the current
Integrated Enterprise Management Program does not provide the cost
information that program managers and cost estimators need to develop
credible estimates and compare budgeted and actual cost with the work
performed on the contract. NASA plans to spend billions of dollars to
develop a number of new capabilities, supporting technologies, and
facilities that are critical to enabling space exploration missions.
The development of such capabilities will be largely dependent on NASA
contractors--on which NASA spends about 85 percent of its annual
budget. Because of such a large reliance on contractors to achieve its
mission, it is imperative that NASA be able to track costs and the
means to integrate financial decisionmaking with scientific and
technical leadership by providing decisionmakers accurate information.
To its credit, NASA is working to improve business processes and
integrating disparate systems in order to improve efficiencies, reduce
redundant systems, and improve business information available to the
acquisition community and mission support organizations. However, more
effort will be needed to make the cultural transformation a reality.
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\19\GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2007).
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Concluding Observations
The Vision for Space Exploration puts NASA on a bold new mission.
Implementing the Vision over the coming decades will require hundreds
of billions of dollars and a sustained commitment from multiple
Administrations and Congresses over the length of the program. How well
NASA overcomes the transition challenges that we and others have
identified will not only have an effect on NASA's ability to
effectively manage the gap in the U.S. human access to space, but also
will affect the agency's ability to secure a sound foundation of
support for the President's space exploration policy. Consequently, it
is incumbent upon NASA to ensure that these challenges are being
addressed in a way that establishes accountability and transparency to
the effort.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am being advised by the people who
should know, Mr. Gerstenmaier's outfit, that with that funding
profile they can hit those milestones. Are you saying something
different?
Mr. Li. What I am saying is that the basis on which they
have made that particular statement is based upon a confidence
level of 65 percent. That is what the Administrator indicated
about 2 weeks ago.
What that means is that there is only a certainty of 65
percent. What I believe this particular Subcommittee and the
rest of the Congress, perhaps, can ask NASA, is to follow their
own rules, and say if you went to 70 percent, which many of
their programs are at, if you had to achieve 70 percent
confidence level, what is that delta in terms of dollars that
are needed? And then the Congress would be better informed as
to what those impacts would be.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK. We will look at that. Would
somebody tell me how many minutes I have left to vote? Sorry
for the interruption, but this is a part of our lives. And we
have not figured out how to clone ourselves yet to be in two
places at once.
Mr. Dittemore, you are doing the rockets on which this
spacecraft is going to sit. Give us your perspective on this.
STATEMENT OF RONALD D. DITTEMORE, PRESIDENT,
ATK LAUNCH SYSTEMS GROUP
Mr. Dittemore. I think NASA has made some extremely smart
moves. Number one, they have gone a long way toward mitigating
many of our technical, our skills, our processing, and even our
costs risk by utilizing proven technologies that already exist.
What we are talking about now is going the extra step to
make sure we do not lose a skill set that may be perishable
over an extended gap. I think that these early moves to utilize
that proven technology will pay benefits long into the future,
because they are retaining skills, precious skills that would
otherwise be off the program. And they are doing that today. So
I think that is a great first step.
I totally believe that we need to minimize the gap. Any
extension of the gap is only going to exacerbate a transition
issue. And so I am going to urge you and everybody else that we
really need to provide the necessary resources, stable
resources, so that NASA and industry can join together and put
a plan together that is executable and provides for the safety
of the astronauts, as we fly-out the Shuttle program, and as we
transition to the next program.
So I think we are starting out on a very good path. Now we
are talking about how do we continue that and execute it to the
finish line.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dittemore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald D. Dittemore, President,
ATK Launch Systems Group
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss transitioning to a next
generation human spaceflight system.
I, along with many of my colleagues, am a product of the first
great vision to land a man on the Moon and return safely to Earth. The
excitement of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo captivated our attention and
stirred our imaginations. As a direct result of this excitement,
Aerospace engineering became my particular field of study and I was
extremely fortunate to have a tremendous career with NASA for over 26
years.
I am pleased to address the issue of transition from the Space
Shuttle to the new Ares/Orion launch system. It is an important issue
facing us today as we approach a crossroads where the transition
between space transportation systems will be critical in our ability to
maintain skills and experience while training a new generation of space
scientists, engineers, and processing workforce.
But before I address the transition from the Space Shuttle to the
new Ares launch transportation system, it is worth reviewing previous
experience with transitions of this magnitude, particularly the
transition from the Apollo program and Saturn V launch vehicle to the
Space Shuttle transportation system. After the Apollo Moon landings
ended in 1972, several small transitions, or ``soft landings''
occurred. Significant workforce reductions occurred both within the
NASA civil service workforce and private industry. Follow-on programs
did not need the levels of workforce that were required during the
buildup to support the Moon landings of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
A leaner NASA and a leaner industry were the result.
During this transitional phase, NASA developed and operated its
first Space Station, Skylab. And after Skylab's three missions were
completed an international cooperative mission between the United
States and Russia, Apollo/Soyuz, was conducted. These missions
constituted ``soft landings'' where critical skills and experience were
retained as workforce reductions and attrition occurred.
Fast-forwarding 30 years to 2007, the lessons of the Apollo/Shuttle
transition are applicable today as NASA transitions from Shuttle to
Ares I/Orion. Actions taken have already resulted in several ``soft
landings'' where critical skills and experience are being directly
applied to new program development. Many of the technical, skill,
processing, and cost challenges have been mitigated through the
utilization of proven Shuttle derived capabilities for the foundation
of the Ares I launch vehicle. Critical industry skill and experience
are being retained in the development of the Ares I systems.
Additionally, an Ares I test flight program is being developed that
bridges the gap between the last Shuttle flight and the start of Ares I
operational capability, utilizing the talents across industry and
NASA's field centers. These test flights provide an avenue of
transition where critical skills and experience are captured and
retained.
And just as the Skylab Space Station provided a bridge between
Apollo and Shuttle for the retention of critical skills, I believe that
the operation of the International Space Station through at least the
middle of the next decade is necessary to provide a similar bridge
between the Space Shuttle and future lunar missions.
But there is no doubt that the transition from the 25-plus year
Space Shuttle program to the new Ares I transportation system will be a
significant challenge. Resources must be allocated to allow for a safe
and executable transition, providing for the safety of our astronauts
as the Shuttle program comes to a close and enabling the execution of
these ``soft landings'' as I have described. Increasing the gap between
Shuttle and Ares I exacerbates the transition. The gap, in my opinion,
should be minimized and resources allocated to ensure this occurs.
As industry, small and large, across this country step up to the
challenge, we have the opportunity to drive down cost and to realign
contracts to be much more efficient. And although this transition
period will be challenging, it also presents a gateway to new
opportunity as the end-state vision associated with Ares I begins to
evolve. People will change badges; people will step up to the challenge
of being retrained; and people will aggressively seek new positions of
growth provided by an expanding vision.
With a safer, more economical launch system come increased
opportunities. Instead of servicing only one program, the Kennedy Space
Center has the potential to be the spaceport of the future for a
variety of missions--Ares I NASA missions to low-Earth orbit, potential
Ares I commercial applications, and providing services and
infrastructure for a growing Commercial Orbital Transportation System
(COTS) that NASA is facilitating. The evolution of the space industry
is continuing and Ares I opens up potential new opportunities for
industry to develop. The opportunity exists for the transition of
workforce skills and experience at the KSC to support a broader KSC
role.
It is also evident that the KSC launch site is becoming an
extension of the manufacturing centers where Ares I launch vehicle
element refurbishment and assembly and Orion spacecraft assembly are
major activities in addition to integrated vehicle processing and
launch/recovery operations. The KSC workforce will have opportunities
to transition from Shuttle contracts to Ares I contracts to support
these Ares I/Orion assembly activities.
As we continue to pursue The Vision for Space Exploration and
transition to a new space transportation system, a new generation of
scientists and engineers will be inspired, as was my generation 30
years ago. The transition that I have addressed will certainly be a
challenge, but it also represents significant opportunities for the
future. With the necessary resources, I am confident that NASA and
industry will rise to the challenge and safely guide us to the next
great adventure.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am going to give you a list of
Senators I want you to talk to.
[Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Walker, of course your folks are
the greatest launch team in the world, without exception. I am
sure there are some stirrings down there at home. Folks are
uncertain.
STATEMENT OF JOHNNY WALKER, DIRECTING BUSINESS
REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT LODGE 166, INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS
Mr. Walker. I cannot do anything but reflect what these
gentlemen are telling you here today, that we--we lived through
the Apollo--end of the Apollo program, and waited for the
Shuttle program to come along. And it was pretty devastating.
Certainly, the launch team is nervous. All the folks from
the Cape are nervous just wondering what is going to be there
for the future.
I am just--just in reflecting and saying, to us, it is to
push along today the best we possibly can, fund it, fund the
program, so that we do not have this break in the team concept,
and not make the mistakes that we made in the past.
But certainly, I think my main mission here today was to
tell you that the workforce is nervous. And I would love to
see, actually, that we share a little bit more information with
the launch team and with the folks there at the Cape. A little
more than what we have been.
I think, certainly, if they know things like this are going
on, that it will be better for morale. Knowing that we are
trying to save and trying to utilize the stuff that we
currently have, and reflecting on that.
We are going to be emptying out facilities when the--come
the end of this program. This great program that we have been a
part of. And I would love to see this try to bring in the work
to maintain this workforce that we currently have here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Johnny Walker, Directing Business Representative,
District Lodge 166, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Johnny Walker and I
serve as Directing Business Representative for District Lodge 166 of
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. As
the largest union at the Kennedy Space Center, we represent over 2,500
hourly men and women who play a critical role in preparing, launching,
and maintaining our Nation's only human launch vehicle, the Space
Shuttle. I come before you today to give voice to the growing concerns
of our members and the communities they live in regarding the extended
gap between the end of the Space Shuttle program and the beginning of
the new Ares/Orion manned vehicle systems.
Our members have been involved with the space program at Cape
Canaveral since 1955 and have participated in every human launch event.
While contractors have come and gone, we have stayed, providing a
knowledge-base and skill continuity critical to the safety and success
of our Nation's space program.
IAM members function as launch operation technicians, mission
schedulers, inspectors, ground support technicians, safety support
specialists, test conductor operators, air traffic control specialists,
and logistic specialists. Additionally, we are plumbers, pipe fitters,
sheet metal workers, welders, industrial electricians, crane operators,
as well as heavy equipment, crawler, and support services mechanics and
operators. Other support occupations include power generator equipment
operators, air conditioning mechanics, linemen, alarm technicians,
asbestos abatement/insulators, and excavation permit inspectors. Many
of these jobs require a journeyman's license or other certification and
are not easily replaceable.
Last March, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin, in testimony before
the House Appropriations Committee, stated that he recalled ``. . . the
damage done to our Nation's space program by the loss of critical
expertise in human spaceflight following the cessation of Apollo and
then 6 years later the effort to recreate it during the Shuttle era.''
I too recall that time: the layoffs, the disruption in human lives, and
the devastating impact on our communities. For some it meant losing
their homes. For others it meant picking up and moving away in search
of dependable work. For those of us who remained, moral suffered as our
co-workers, friends, and neighbors left.
When the Shuttle program finally began to move forward, many of the
skilled workers, both hourly and salaried, who possessed intimate
knowledge of key operations, were gone. NASA contractors were then
forced to recruit nationwide and bring in new people unfamiliar with
NASA systems. This was an expensive and time consuming process.
I fear now that NASA will repeat the mistakes of the past. The
cessation of the Titan program in 2005 resulted in the layoff of 250
highly skilled employees familiar with complex missile systems. With
little hope of future employment at the Kennedy Space Center most left
the Cape in search of new work--a possible harbinger of things to come
in 2010 when the Shuttle program ends. If nothing changes, I believe
that the potential impact from a gap in programs will be even worse
than it was in the 1970s because today's workers at the Cape have had
more training and possess higher skill levels than those from a
generation ago.
NASA has indicated that the staffing levels for the Ares/Orion
systems will be dramatically lower than are currently needed for the
Space Shuttle program. Employment at the Kennedy Space Center for the
Ares/Orion launch systems is projected to drop to approximately 9,500
from the present level of 15,000 employees. However, if the funding
levels remain as currently projected, employment levels could be
significantly lower. Given these dire scenarios, NASA must answer some
critical questions:
What will NASA do for the displaced workers? Will they be
offered some form of transition assistance? What type of
severance package will they be offered? How long will health
care benefits be covered?
What is the plan for the workforce that remains? What will
be the schedule for the new work that will be needed for the
new Ares/Orion manned vehicle systems? What will be the skill
mix for that new work? What new training will be required? How
will NASA communicate these changes?
Perhaps most importantly, what is being done to bring in new
work to prevent layoffs and preserve the skill base at the
Kennedy Space Center? For example, why not utilize the existing
personnel and facilities for the manufacture and assembly of
the Ares/Orion launch vehicles?
The GAO, in a May 2005 report on workforce issues related to the
retirement of the Space Shuttle, stated that NASA should follow what it
calls a ``human capital management approach'' in planning the
transition to the Ares/Orion systems. While we concur with the report's
focus on workforce issues, we must strongly insist that this planning
process include not only senior NASA and contractor management, but
also the participation of front-line hourly and salaried workers and
their union representatives. Working together we have a much greater
chance of achieving a beneficial transition for workers, our
communities, the contractors, and NASA. Such a successful transition
will be key to accomplishing NASA's critical mission.
As China doubles its investment in space exploration, deploys
satellite destroying weaponry, and makes plans for a manned lunar
expedition, we cannot, as a nation, pretend that we can get by on the
cheap with a nickel and dime space effort. It is both a matter of our
national defense and global technological leadership that we provide
the necessary funds for a vital and productive space program. To that
end, we must first begin by fully funding the NASA Authorization Act of
2005 and by making up the funding gap that resulted from the Continuing
Resolution for Fiscal Year 2007. It is my understanding that this will
require approximately $1.7 billion, slightly less than what we are
spending per week in Iraq.
From the end of the Space Shuttle program in 2010 until the launch
of the first manned Orion vehicle, currently projected to be in 2015,
the United States will be without a human launch vehicle. For the
Nation that first put a man on the Moon to be at the mercy and whims of
foreign nations for its human space travel needs is simply
unacceptable. We must do better and find the necessary funds to move up
the Orion launch date. This will greatly enhance our ability to
stabilize the workforce and maintain the critical skill base at the
Kennedy Space Center.
Mr. Chairman, I know that I speak for all of the dedicated men and
women at the Cape, both hourly and salaried, in thanking you, the
Ranking Member, and the members of this subcommittee from both sides of
the aisle for your tireless efforts to preserve the preeminence of our
Nation's space program.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify today and look forward
to your questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want you to know, Mr. Walker, Dr.
Griffin, who I think is doing a very good job, I feel that he
is personally committed, and I think he would tell you this
himself. Obviously there is going to be some loss of
employment, because if you are not launching humans, and you
are not launching the vehicle, you need less in terms of
workforce.
You can minimize it not only with things that we just
talked about, such as the assembly team, but you can minimize
it by bringing other projects into the Kennedy Space Center in
order to keep, what Mr. McCulley was talking about, a lot of
those skill sets tuned up and working so that they are not
dispersed and gone. I believe I have that commitment from him.
I think he would share that with any of you.
What I am going to do is recess the Committee. I am going
to run and vote. And I will get back here just as quick as I
can and we will resume. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Please pardon the interruption, but
there was nothing we could do about it. Whenever they say it is
a 10-minute vote, well, of course, that is always a 15- or 20-
minute vote. So anyway, we are back.
We had gone through some preliminaries. Is there anything
anybody wants to offer for the record? Of course, each of your
statements will be printed in the record. So we have the value
of that. If any of you have any statements you would like to
make, I want to give you the opportunity. Otherwise, we will
just get right on into some questions.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, bring us up to date on the status of
Atlantis and STS-117. And how that is going to affect the rest
of the manifest.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. OK. Right now, as we speak, we have a
team in Florida that is busily repairing the tank. And I can
tell you that this is probably one of the best activities I
have ever seen in the human spaceflight area.
We have Lockheed Martin, who manufactures the tank for us
and we have United Space Alliance, who does the processing at
the Cape. And those two contractor organizations are working
together better than I have ever seen two contractor
organizations work.
The teaming, and the spirit, and the cooperation of the
folks that are working on this tank is phenomenal. They are
passing engineering back and forth. They are making progress
every day on repairing the tank. And they are doing just a
great job.
They have passed data back and forth. They are actually
mocking up the spray area in New Orleans, so the technicians
can practice spraying in New Orleans. And they will actually go
spray some foam on the tank in Florida then to finish it up and
complete. We still do not know which tank we will use for STS-
117. We are letting the work kind of drive the activity. We are
not picking a launch date and then forcing the work to fit into
that launch date. We are going to let the work drive the
schedule to where it needs to be.
If we need to, we can switch the external tanks. The new
tank will be shipping from New Orleans either on Sunday or
Monday, or this coming Sunday or next Monday. It will be in
Florida several days earlier than we had planned. And, again,
the Lockheed team has done a great job of getting that tank
ready.
We will make a decision around April 10, like we have
talked about before, which tank we will use. We can still
potentially make the May launch window, if we use this tank. If
we do not, we will be in the June time-frame.
Either one of those launch windows allows us to fly-out the
remaining flights needed for Space Station assembly. It turns
out, by the end of 2008, or the first part of 2009, the ripple
of this delay will have settled out, and we will be back on
track again. So we will still have the same margin we have
today to complete any assembly flights. So we do not see this
as a big impact to us downstream.
So, again, progress is going extremely well. It is a
tribute to this workforce that they understand the work that
needs to be done. The engineering staff. The technicians. It is
just phenomenal. And that is the same workforce we want to use
during this transition period.
Senator Bill Nelson. Will there be some slippage for the
rest of 2007?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes. There will be some slippage through
the rest of 2007. And a little bit into 2008. And then by kind
of the end of 2008, first part of 2009, that slippage will
pretty much have damped out. So you will see the flights move a
little bit.
We have a manifest option out there that moves a whole
bunch of flights around. That is just a planning manifest. So
if you see that on a website somewhere that somebody has
posted, it looks like everything in the world has moved. It
really has not. This is a planning exercise that we put out to
the team to take a look at, to try to find an optimum way to go
through this period.
It is a pretty complicated assembly sequence, because it
not only relies on the Shuttle being ready to fly, but we need
to look at what activity needs to be completed onboard the
Space Station. And sometimes the Space Station activities pace
the Shuttle flights.
So in some cases, the Shuttle may be ready to fly before
the Space Station is ready to receive it. So it is a pretty
integrated schedule scenario that is more complicated than we
have had in the past. So we put this planning manifest out for
folks to look at. So it looks like we are maybe more unstable
than we really are, but to treat that as just a planning
manifest, and we will have around April 10 or so, maybe April
15, we will have the plan laid out for the remainder of the
year.
Senator Bill Nelson. To Mr. McCulley and Mr. Dittemore, how
are you going to ensure that you have an experienced and
sufficient staff on the Shuttle program, while at the same
time, starting to shift over? And, how do you keep them from
being distracted from the new program?
Mr. Dittemore. It might be a little easier for me than it
is for Mike. As I mentioned to you earlier, Senator, our basis
for the first stage of the Ares I launch vehicle is basically
the reusable solid rocket motors that we build today for
Shuttle. Instead of a four segment, it is going to be a five
segment motor.
Those decisions by NASA a year or a year-and-a-half ago
really kicked off the transition, from my viewpoint. Much of
our workforce that manufactures these solid rocket motors will
be used for both the four segment and Shuttle motor transition
over into the five segment motor for Ares.
In fact, we believe we will save NASA a significant amount
of money because of the synergy that will exist and the synergy
opportunities between the two programs. So from a manufacturing
standpoint, we have laid in plans right now for our suppliers
and our direct labor to transition over into the Ares I launch
vehicle.
I also think that as NASA develops their test flight
program at the end of this decade, that test flight program is
planned to bridge the last Shuttle flight, all the way to the
first operational flight for the Ares I launch vehicle.
And because of that test flight program, we also believe
that we will retain significant numbers of skill-sets that can
be applied, not only at the home plant for manufacturing, but
also at the Cape, for assembly and launch and recovery
operations.
So I think those ingredients or those soft-landing types of
activities that NASA has put in place help us tremendously in
retaining our skills.
Mr. McCulley. Two years ago I was at this table, and you
asked me a very similar question. And Mike Griffin had been at
the table, I think, an hour or so before me, and you had asked
a similar question. And Mike, in fact--Mr. Li, you would
remember this--Mike said that in the follow-up contracts, which
we now have on contract, he was going to require us to have a
capital management plan or a human capital plan in there.
Since that time--of course, there are now real contracts
and real work. And in particular, we are a sub to Lockheed
Martin on the Ares vehicle. And we are a sub to ATK on the Ares
I. We are doing work on the demo flight. And so there are a
number of areas where we are involved in the follow-on programs
with folks that are really Shuttle guys, and have been Shuttle
guys all along.
In addition, as you are acutely aware in Florida, Steve
Kohler now, from Space Florida, the business development group,
or economic development group, we are looking at opportunities
that are out there that would allow us to fill that gap with,
perhaps, other work and other businesses.
We have not done a really good job over the years of sort
of bragging outside of this immediate family about our
capabilities, either in Houston or in Florida. We are doing
more of that now to sort of show the world out there that we
can do more.
We have done some concrete things in the company, in our
human resources world. Bill Gerstenmaier and his team and my
team just recently completed the contract negotiations that
takes us out through 2010, with some options. And we put some
provisions in there that were very difficult to get through,
having to do with a number of provisions that deal with
employees and how you manage those employees. That is the
capital management plan.
Bill and his team, and our folks, worked extremely well
together, and got that on contract, which gives us some of the
tools to use to manage through this transition, this gap again.
Mr. Li. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address the civil
servant side of things, because I understand these plans that
both these two gentlemen have in place make a lot of sense. But
I am really worried about the issue that we have not been able
to hire some folks for a while.
We have a situation now in the science and engineering
workforce, civil servant workforce in NASA. They have an
average age of 46 years. And then if you take a look at the
next--well, we are talking about people that are very, very
young. We need to find ways not only to energize folks coming
out of school to want to come work for NASA, but this is also
happening at the same time, Mr. Chairman, as you well know,
that private industry and other Federal agencies, like Homeland
Security, are going to be looking for that type of expertise.
We are talking about expertise in program management,
systems engineering, systems integration. So I think that is
something on which we need to keep our eye on the ball.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Gerstenmaier, just to nail down
points from an previous conversation, right now you are
looking, if nothing else changes, at March 2015 for the launch
of the Ares/Orion.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. That is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. I will speak for Senator Hutchison,
who cannot be here. She and I are both going to try to get the
funding, as I discussed earlier, and move that date back. For
many, many reasons.
Do not think that it is just my parochial hat, which
clearly is a hat that I wear. It is also my national hat.
Because, as I said, we do not know what the world's politics
are going to be like. You have a multi-billion dollar
investment up there that we want to utilize as a laboratory,
and we have to have access to it.
Speaking of that, tell us about cuts. Why can NASA and the
Air Force not help those folks out? They have been trying to
get permission, you all extended a contract, you want to take
cargo up there, and this is an American vehicle. And then
trying to get permission to launch from what is the eastern
test range, on one of the abandoned Titan paths.
Why has that been sitting still for two years?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I will have to take that for the record.
We have worked with them. I do not know the specifics of why it
has been sitting there. I can provide an answer to you for the
record. But I do not have that directly in front of me.
[The information referred to follows:]
SpaceX Applied to the United States Air Force (USAF) 45th Space
Wing regarding use of a launch complex at Cape Canaveral to launch the
Falcon 9 vehicle. NASA is not directly involved in the negotiations
between SpaceX and USAF. The 45th Space Wing completed its application
analysis and provided a recommendation to General Kevin P. Chilton,
USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command.
According to the USAF, on April 18, 2007, Dr. Sega, Under Secretary
of the Air Force, and General Chilton recommended that SpaceX be
granted a five-year nonexclusive license for SLC-40. Dr. Sega and
General Chilton briefed Senator Nelson on April 18, 2007, regarding the
recommendation.
But we are supporting them from a development standpoint,
and we have provided the $500 million in funding for them to go
through. That is being managed by Scott Horowitz and the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, where they have
certain milestones that they need to make. We have the
demonstration flights scheduled. We are doing the planning for
where those demonstration flights will occur, and when they
occur. We are working with them.
We are also looking for the future follow-on contracts,
where we will actually go purchase services to deliver cargo to
the Space Station. We are starting that activity, to flow that
in. And out of that work would follow the launch pad
discussions. I know there has been some discussions about that.
I just do not know the specifics. And for the record, we will
find out what the holdup has been with the Air Force, or with
NASA, or where that sits.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is it not clearly in the interest of
the country that we have a vehicle to enable us to get cargo up
to the International Space Station, until we get our Orion and
Ares ready to go and have a vehicle that would be less
expensive to operate.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. The Commercial Orbital Transportation
System is something that we need. It is in our plans. It is the
way we try to bridge the first portion of this gap between
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. It is in there. We do not
have enough capability to launch the assets.
We need the Space Station. The Commercial Orbital
Transportation System is necessary. It is mandatory. We
reserved cargo for them to go fly. We put plans together. We
have funding in our budget to go do that activity. So we are
moving out on all those aspects. And I will get you an answer
on the launch pad discussion.
Senator Bill Nelson. They have not proven their system yet,
but assuming that they do, the only other way that we have of
getting cargo up there, under the present plan, is the Russian
Progress vehicle. Is that correct?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. This year, we are going to launch a
European cargo carrying vehicle, called the Automated Transfer
Vehicle. It should fly this fall on an Ariane spacecraft. That
is another International Partner vehicle. But it can also carry
cargo to the crew, as well as water and propellant.
Then in July of 2009, a Japanese H-2 transfer vehicle comes
online. Again, that will be able to carry both pressurized
cargo, things that fly inside a pressurized volume, as well as
external cargo on the outside. And that is scheduled for 2009.
The new Commercial Orbital Transportation Systems, they are
coming online. They will use some of the sensors and some of
the equipment that are being developed for the Automated
Transfer Vehicle and also the H-2 transfer vehicle. So we are
getting some commonality of those components, and making them
available to the commercial sector, so they can ease their task
of them coming up and docking with the Space Station.
Senator Bill Nelson. Have either of those other two
vehicles been flight tested and proven?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. No. They are not flight tested or proven.
In fact, the Automated Transfer Vehicle that flies this year,
it will dock with the station, but there will be effectively a
16-day checkout before it comes up and docks with the station.
During those 16 days, we will do collision avoidance maneuvers
with it. We will make sure that it flies the way we
anticipated. We will make sure the software works during that
kind of checkout period.
You can think of it, as it comes closer and closer to
docking, and then we back out, until we gain confidence in that
vehicle, then when it passes its final check, like a flight
test, then we can take it on into docking.
But at this point, none of those vehicles are proven. They
are still in the development cycle. So that tells us that there
is a lot of work in front of us of doing this rendezvous prox-
ops activity. And that the Automated Transfer Vehicle, the
physical hardware has been around for probably more than a
year. The physical hardware has been ready.
It has taken a long time to get the software checked out
and get it ready to go work. And I think our Commercial Orbital
Transportation folks will have that same problem. We may see
their hardware ready, but they are not ready from a flight
software standpoint. And that may be more of a driver to them
than is apparent today.
So we factored some of that into our thinking. But we are
really counting on them. And we are going to do what we can to
make sure that they are successful.
Senator Bill Nelson. Where does the Japanese vehicle launch
from?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It launches from Tanegashima, Japan. That
is their launch site.
Senator Bill Nelson. It sounds like it is clearly in NASA's
interest that you have another competitor that would be able to
have access to the Space Station. And if your answer is that
the Air Force is holding this up, then we need to have a little
prayer session with the Air Force. If you would get back to us,
I would appreciate it.
Tell me, Mr. McCulley, in the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, they determined that inadequate funding
was a contributing factor to that accident. You pointed out
that the NASA budget has taken some hits in the past few years,
as many of us up here have. And you state, ``The Fiscal Year
2008 budget does not reflect the real needs of the agency.''
Can you elaborate?
Mr. McCulley. Post-Challenger, during that--I have had the
unfortunate experience of living through a return to flight
twice. The funding profile that was provided the agency after
Challenger included moneys to recognize--that recognized the
additional expense associated with return to flight.
After Columbia, we took on all this work. We did the same
things that we had to do before. Redesign. Rework. Rebuild. And
then you had the hurricanes on top of that in 2004 and 2005.
And as near as I can tell, as far as I can see, there has not
been money put in.
So the agency has been asked to take on this new program,
continue to fly safely with the old program. Continue to serve
the Space Station. And to do it on essentially what I--from my
knowledge, a flat budget.
Now I do not do policy and I do not do budgets. I am an
implementer with my customer. But my observation is that they
do not have enough money to do what they have been asked to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. To all of you, can the facilities, the
technologies, and the personnel, be in place to support an
expedited schedule, to move this thing back from March of 2015?
What are the long poles in each of your schedules? Mr.
Gerstenmaier, why don't you try that?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think in my opening remarks,
when asked, I said we would go back and we would look at the
critical path, to see where things fit, to see what technology
things are there. And we will get you an answer on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
It is not easy to estimate the savings in development costs that
would be achieved by accelerating the CEV Initial Operational
Capability (IOC). The cost of certain design, development, test, and
evaluation (DDT&E) functions depends on how long a project requires
those functions, and these additional costs are not insensitive to
schedule. NASA's parametric estimates of savings below are based solely
on the cost of staff for these functions multiplied by the number of
months saved.
Completing development work on all Constellation systems to support
IOC earlier than 2015 would avoid DDT&E costs associated with less
efficient phasing of development activities and stretching the critical
path while sustaining personnel involved in the early development.
Parametrically derived estimates using design data known at this
time (one year prior to Preliminary Design Review) indicate that by
advancing IOC to 2014 and avoiding these inefficiencies, our net
estimated savings would be approximately $350 million. However, this
would require additional funds for development: $350 million in FY 2009
and an additional $400 million in FY 2010, for a total of $750 million.
Advancing IOC to 2013 to avoid these inefficiencies would result in
a net savings of approximately $800 million. However, this would
require additional funds for development: $400 million in FY 2008, and
an additional $1.6 billion spread over FY 2009 to FY 2010, for a total
of $2 billion.
I know one item that stands out is the J2X engine that is
on our current critical path. We need to look at that J2X
engine development and make sure that by getting additional
funds, we can actually pull that back and it fits from an
overall standpoint. But that is one item that I can say today
that we will look at.
But we will take it for the record to go look and see if
there are any other items that sit out there, that are sitting
just behind J2X and the critical path that we would want to
talk about.
From a facilities standpoint, I think we are in pretty good
shape overall. We still have some pad stuff that we need to
watch. We have to keep one launch pad around to keep a rescue
Shuttle available for the Hubble repair mission. So we were
unable to turn that launch pad over to Constellation as early
as we would like. We need to keep that launch pad in a Shuttle-
ready configuration, to launch a contingency flight, if
required for the Hubble mission.
So we have a little bit of extra work there to do with
Constellation. I do not see that as a showstopper. It could
potentially impact the test flight, the first Ares four-segment
test flight that we had planned. But we will watch that.
From a personnel standpoint, I think we have the resources
to go on that. We have enabled some of our workforce, as Mike
McCulley talked about, to actually begin working on some of
these new activities. So they essentially have two charge
codes. Which is very good.
So they can begin working on some of the new activities.
Then if we have a Shuttle problem, we still have the ability to
grab that workforce back to pull them back, to help us with
that. So I think from a workforce standpoint, we have a pretty
solid and robust plan.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Karas, what are the long poles in
your tent?
Mr. Karas. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I think Mr.
Gerstenmaier and the NASA team have done a great job. We have
some excellent facilities, as you know, out of Florida, and the
O&C, and activities at the Cape. So I think that is good.
The personnel we are getting, because we are transitioning
now, are good. I think technology-wise, in our systems, we bid
very high, you know, technology readiness levels in CEV. So I
do not worry about that as much as integration and systems
engineering issues.
For example, our number one risk on the critical path is
the launch-abort system. And you may ask, ``Well, that is a
smaller rocket. How does that drive you?'' Well, we have some
very difficult but, good safety requirements to meet, which
drive the size of that vehicle and the launch-abort system,
which in turn drives the environment and the qualification
testing. And the next thing you know, you are up against
schedule. So it is those kinds of issues that we have to work
through.
So I do not see any real technology drivers, other than
human spaceflight is challenging and noble work. And there are
a lot of things that we have to go do. And I think you end up
with a schedule driven by integration and test.
Of course, on the other hand, we would all like to see the
gap minimized. But on the other hand, we cannot rush human
spaceflight, and we want to get all the tests right. So it is
really all about the continuity of the workforce and
maintaining the workforce--not making the gap any bigger, but
making sure that those people are available, and the
integration is done as early as possible.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Walker, do you think we understand
the impact of the transition on NASA and the contractor
workforce during that gap?
Mr. Walker. The main thing I want to comment on is that
beyond a shadow of a doubt, the talent is there. No doubt about
it. I think the aspects of the unknown at this point in time,
not having a surefire plan to where we are heading, or it being
presented to the launch team, or the, you know, folks at the
Cape.
I think the uncertainty, we need to make sure the morale is
where it needs to be, as far as the personnel goes. I think
those are the--you know, coming from us, from the employees
themselves, I think that is the main concern that is on their
mind at this point in time.
I just also wanted to comment, not trying to change the
subject, but comment at this point in time about relying on
foreign countries for our program. This program has been part
of this Nation. It has been the heart of this, as far as I am
concerned. I have been in this program since--about 29, 30
years.
The people out there are very proud of it. But I just
really find it difficult that we are relying on foreign folks
to put our program in place for us. I think it is our
responsibility to do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Amen. Let us talk about the Space
Station during this gap period. Other than, Mr. Gerstenmaier,
what you have already shared with us with regard to the
logistics, and some of the vehicles that you talked about, with
regard to crew rotation, is there anything else we should know
about how you keep operations going on the ISS during the gap?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think the only thing I would add is
that we have done quite a bit of work at looking at what
happens when the Shuttle goes away. Because our original plan
for the Space Station was to essentially bring spares down from
the Space Station, repair them in the depot, and then take that
spare component back up to the Space Station.
When we lose the Shuttle, we lose the ability to return
large amounts of cargo to the ground. So we are in the process
now of redesigning that sparing philosophy, where it is more of
a disposable sparing philosophy.
So as a component fails, we will just fly a new one up from
the ground. So we are going to have to reestablish some new
supply lines to get that sparing in place.
We are doing that, looking forward to exploration. So if we
have to build a new electronics box, we are trying to look at,
could we do something in combination with the exploration group
that they are going to need. So we do not build a unique
replacement for a station that is not consistent with what
exploration needs.
That also allows us to check that hardware out,
essentially, and test it on orbit, and make sure it works in
the space environment before exploration needs it. So we are
kind of going through kind of component by component, seeing
what we can do to help get a synergy between what exploration
needs and what we need to replace to help with that supply line
that goes forward.
Mr. Li. Mr. Chairman, one of the issues on the Space
Station that many folks have been talking about is, if 2010--
and it is the date at which we will retire the fleet. There are
two flights in 2010. The last two flights are, in essence,
bringing up pre-positioning spares.
If those flights do not come to fruition, that will have
severe consequences on what the life of the station will be.
And, therefore, the research that we are going to be able to
conduct will be curtailed. And that is a very important point
to raise.
Senator Bill Nelson. It is. And thank you for raising it.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, let me ask you, setting aside the cuts,
what do you see in the progress--the Japanese HTV and the
European ATV? What percentage of the cargo, during the gap,
would be carried up by each of those?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. The way we have allocated it now is it is
on a yearly basis. On a yearly basis--we are in the process of
procuring in 2010, 4.2 metric tons of cargo from the Russians,
to be carried on a series of Progress vehicles throughout that
year. That does not all come up on one vehicle. It gets spread
on several Progress vehicles throughout that year.
In that same year, 2010, we have 4.9 metric tons available
for the Commercial Orbital Transportation System. So we have
more cargo available to be carried by our commercial system
than we have given to the partners, in that respect, by the 4.2
versus the 4.9.
As part of their commitment to the Space Station, both the
Europeans and the Japanese provide us these launch vehicles. So
the Automated Transfer Vehicle and the HTV vehicle, those are
their payment in kind for us launching their modules to orbit
and operating them on orbit.
So we are not purchasing those services from either the
Europeans or from the Japanese. Those are provided to us as
part of the basic agreement of the Space Station. We will have
basically one of those vehicles each year. We will have one ATV
vehicle and one HTV vehicle per year during that time-frame.
But, again, we are not purchasing those. Those are part of
their commitment for us providing the launch of their modules
and operations of their modules.
So the difference is, as you go back to the numbers, 4.2
versus 4.9. So we have basically more cargo available for the
Commercial Orbital Transportation System than we do for what we
are purchasing from the Russians in the initial phase.
Senator Bill Nelson. How much are we going to pay the
Russians for those vehicles?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. For now----
Senator Bill Nelson. During that period of what you have
planned now as the gap, 2010 to 2015.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We are only permitted now to purchase
Russian vehicles through December 2011. We have legislation
that does not allow us to purchase Russian vehicles beyond
January 1, 2012. So between now and 2011, we have--we have
purchased transportation, habitation, and the cargo services.
The value of all that contracting is about $700 million.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is that for the period of time from
2010 to 2011?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It actually goes back to 2009 through
2011. That period.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am trying to figure out what it is
going to cost during the gap.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, by accelerating the IOC date,
considerable savings could be achieved in the overall life-
cycle costs of the Constellation program. How much savings
could be gained by moving the launch up? My question is for
2014, from March of 2015. And then I am going to ask you for
2013.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. OK. For the 2013 answer, that one is
similar to the one you asked before. We would like to take that
one for the record, because it may be more than just a funding
issue. We need to go look at the hardware pieces, and make sure
that there is not some other thing that sticks out there that
causes a problem that no matter how much money we get, it may
not be physically possible to move up to 2013. We do not think
so, but we want to go confirm that, so we need some time to go
work that.
For the 2014 answer, to move the 6-months forward, the
development savings is about $1.1 billion. Then the costs to do
that would be $750 million. To advance it from, essentially,
March, up into September. So a net savings of $350 million,
from just a development standpoint. And that is from 2015, to
September 2014.
Senator Bill Nelson. So a net of $350 million is what you
save.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. In development.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. When you factor in what you
would save on the purchase of Russian vehicles, is all that
calculated in there?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. That is not calculated in there. We need
to go look at that. Because, again, there will be some costs
associated with flying CEV, from an operational standpoint,
that will offset some of the savings that we gain by not having
to pay for the Russian vehicles. And we need to go do that
calculation.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, that was the question I asked of
Dr. Griffin. And I wanted to get all that on the table, so that
we are talking apples to apples. If we move it back two years
by spending more money now in the development cycle what is it
going to end up saving us down the line? Not even to speak of
lessening our reliability on all these foreign systems.
I thought you all were going to be prepared to give us that
answer today. So when could we expect that?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We can get you an answer in 2 weeks.
[The information referred to follows:]
Compared to existing Russian assets, the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program is intended to result in more
affordable, U.S. crew and cargo delivery capability to the
International Space Station. If U.S. commercial services are
unavailable or unaffordable post-Shuttle retirement in 2010, services
from Russia, other International Partners, and the Orion/Ares I vehicle
would be used. The estimated marginal cost of an Orion/Ares I flight is
approximately $40 million per seat, while a seat on a Soyuz flight in
2014 is expected to cost approximately $37 million based on inflating
the currently contracted seat cost. While this price difference is
negligible, NASA believes national priorities rather than comparative
costs between Soyuz and Orion drive the decision both to pursue COTS
and to prevent further slippage of the Orion/Ares I IOC. A shorter
transition from Shuttle to a new U.S. spaceflight capability will also
meet U.S. policy objectives spelled out in the Vision for Space
Exploration and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 109-155).
Senator Nelson. All right. We will have another hearing at
some point in the future, so we can get all of that out on the
table. You obviously see where I am going. I would not like to
have to pay Russia for access to space. Not even to speak of
all the uncertainties there. And at the same time, cut American
jobs, and cut all that expertise, and all that corporate
memory.
Let us go on to something else. Achieving an on-time launch
of an Ares/Orion system will depend, in large part, on all of
these technical programmatic issues and financial management.
Mr. Li, I am going to ask you this.
The Government Accountability Office released a report last
year critical of NASA's acquisition strategy for the Orion
vehicle. I understand that NASA has since made some changes in
the Orion contract. Would you bring us up to date on that
status?
Mr. Li. Certainly, sir. Thank you for that question. The
issue that we had a disagreement about related to the fact that
NASA wanted to write a contract and provide that contract to go
all the way through production and sustainment.
We disagreed with that approach, and felt that they had
insufficient knowledge to be able to make that commitment for
the country. As a result of some discussions that we had
subsequent to our report, NASA changed their acquisition
strategy, and instead of having one single contract, had one
contract with the development and test, and put production and
sustainment as options. They will wait until they have further
information, until they will write those contracts for what
they call schedule B and C.
We are still concerned, however, Mr. Chairman, about the
fact that they have gone a little bit farther than we would
like, because we do not think they have the knowledge. And that
particular knowledge, there has been discussion about the fact,
is the business case that GAO is talking about.
When we talk about a business case, we are talking about an
issue where the requirements are well understood. We are
talking about a situation where there are good cost estimates.
And we are talking about where technology is mature.
The issue that--and Mr. Karas mentioned this in terms of
technology readiness levels. This is a unit of measure that
actually NASA has developed and now is also being used by the
Department of Defense.
The issue is not only the maturity of individual components
or subsystems. The issue is the integration of those particular
systems. That is where things fall flat. In terms of cost, that
is also an area where--when we have cost overruns, that has
been an area where that has shown up.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Karas, do you
want to comment on that?
Mr. Karas. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Well, I think since
before the phase one CEV contract finished and before CEV
proposals went in, I think, at least from a contractor
standpoint, we worked really hard on, I will say our cost
estimating and our technology maturity.
And since then, we have had at least one or two design
cycles, two design cycles, with NASA, at JSC, and I believe
that our requirements are maturing. We have had a System
Requirements Review (SRR), and have closed another design
cycle. And we are rolling all those into new cost estimates.
So I think our design maturity level is increasing. I think
that we have a really good set of cost estimates, a good plan,
that we are working on. And I agree with Mr. Li when he talks
about integration. And I think any large program of this
magnitude has those things to work through.
I think we have an excellent partnership with NASA, with
what we are working on. And the fact that we have collocated
with NASA in our work, not only in Florida, for final assembly,
but in Texas, as far as the engineering, to work side by side
with NASA to try to mitigate those issues.
I think we are off to a great start. And, of course, every
year we have to earn our stripes and our wings. And I think, if
anything, the requirements and cost estimates are maturing and
getting better all the time.
So I think those are things that we always have to worry
about with guarded optimism, but I think the situation is as
good as I have seen in any NASA program that I have been
associated with.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I do not think there is anything that I
would add specifically. Scott Horowitz manages the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate, and he follows this activity a lot
closer than myself. So I would ask if Scott has anything that
he would like to add, that he could mention that now. Scott?
STATEMENT OF SCOTT J. HOROWITZ,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, EXPLORATION SYSTEMS,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Horowitz. Thanks. Yes, sir. As Mr. Li mentions, you
know, we always worry about requirements stability. If you want
a program to succeed in your requirements stability, use known
technologies, and have stability in budget and programming.
When we worked through the initial design of Orion, we had
two internal NASA designs that flesh out the requirements of
the mainstream team and then a smart buyer team. We also had
two contractor teams competing for the design.
And one of the things that gives you a really good feel
that you knew your high-level requirements--though they have
not changed, four people to the Moon, six people to the
station. If you laid all four models from all four teams on the
table, to the untrained observer, you could hardly tell a
difference. I mean the biggest change we have had in over a
year to the vehicle is that the size changed about half a
meter. That is the biggest change we have had.
So we have a lot of stability at the high level. We are
working as a team. We had advanced the design as far as NASA
could advance it on their own. We had to get a contractor
onboard to take the best ideas of the contractor world, the
best ideas of NASA, form a team to go solve all these
engineering problems that are being discussed. So it is not a
technology problem. It is really a group of people working
together doing good systems engineering. Thank you for your
time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, sir. Anything else that any of
you all would like to bring before the Committee? I am going to
submit some questions for the record on behalf of Senator
Hutchison. And if you all could respond to them. Is there
anything else you want to bring up? Mr. Walker?
Mr. Walker. Yes. I just wanted to make a couple of last
comments. During the Titan fly-out, when the Titan program flew
out, we had contingencies to keep the talent in place until the
end of mission. There is a GAO report out about the management,
the capital management program. And I just wanted to make sure
that there is consideration given to the front-line hourly and
salaried individuals, that they would be included in that.
If we are going to cut back, and it appears to me we are,
how do we take care of those folks who have dedicated their
lives to these programs? I think it is fair and it is just.
The other comment I wanted to make is, I also serve on
Space Board Florida, trying to bring in more commercial
business to help supplement some of these cutbacks that we are
going to do. During those discussions that we had, range safety
was an issue brought up. That we had to somehow streamline or
get rid of the red tape in some way, shape up range safety.
So that process, I believe, is currently going on, as far
as Space Florida is concerned. But yes, it is certainly a
problem that stands in our way of bringing in commercial--and
being competitive in that nature.
Senator Bill Nelson. And that has been going on for years.
Mr. Walker. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Your concerns about the workforce are
certainly acknowledged and shared. The ideal is to have as
little disruption of that workforce as is possible, that is,
otherwise, not taken by normal retirements. And I said ``normal
retirements.''
I want to get all these answers out on the table, as we are
going ahead. In the meantime, let me implore you. Senator
Hutchison and I cannot do this by ourselves. There are key
additional Senators and we are going to need to have their
help. And every one of you sitting at that table has a
relationship with those Senators.
I would appreciate it very much if you would give them the
value of your knowledge and your opinion, and if you would do
that personally with those Senators. This is a pretty important
deal to the future of the civilian space program. I would
appreciate it very much if you would make it a point, each one
of you, to do that.
Thank you very much. If there is no further business, the
meeting will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
I want to thank you Mr. Chairman, for convening this extremely
important hearing, and I join you in welcoming our very distinguished
panel.
I firmly believe that successfully making the transition from the
Space Shuttle to the next generation of U.S. human spaceflight is vital
to the economic well-being and security of our Nation.
I want to emphasize my reference to ``United States human
spaceflight,'' because we are in an era where the ability to launch
humans into space is no longer limited to just the United States and
Russia.
Already, China has joined that exclusive group of nations, and
others, such as India and the European Space Agency, are actively
exploring the development of independent human spaceflight
capabilities. Still other nations are expressing interest in doing so.
In an age of increasing global technological competitiveness, these
are significant developments, and they require the United States to be
aggressive and vigilant if we are going to maintain our long-standing
leadership in the area of human spaceflight.
I know that both of us, Mr. Chairman, remain very concerned about
the gap between the retirement of the Space Shuttle and its replacement
with the Ares I launch vehicle and the Orion crew spacecraft.
We have been told by NASA that, to a very great extent, the closing
of this gap is a matter of current funding levels, and the confidence
in future funding levels. I am committed, as I know you are, to trying
to address both of those concerns, and in seeking Administration
agreement and support to do so.
I am delighted that we have a panel of witnesses today who are
squarely at the pointed edge of the spear of ensuring U.S. human access
to space. I hope they will be able to tell us what specific things we
need to be aware of to ensure we do not take any missteps in moving
forward, and I look forward to receiving their statements and hearing
their responses to our questions.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Question 1. What are the savings in development costs by
accelerating IOC to 2014? To 2013?
Answer. It is not easy to estimate the savings in development costs
that would be achieved by accelerating the CEV Initial Operational
Capability (IOC). The cost of certain design, development, test, and
evaluation (DDT&E) functions depends on how long a project requires
those functions, and these additional costs are not insensitive to
schedule. NASA's parametric estimates of savings below are based solely
on the cost of staff for these functions multiplied by the number of
months saved.
Completing development work on all Constellation systems to support
IOC earlier than 2015 would avoid DDT&E costs associated with less
efficient phasing of development activities and stretching the critical
path while sustaining personnel involved in the early development.
Parametrically derived estimates using design data known at this
time (one year prior to Preliminary Design Review) indicate that by
advancing IOC to 2014 and avoiding these inefficiencies, our net
estimated savings would be approximately $350 million. However, this
would require additional funds for development: $350 million in FY 2009
and an additional $400 million in FY 2010, for a total of $750 million.
Advancing IOC to 2013 to avoid these inefficiencies would result in
a net savings of approximately $800 million. However, this would
require additional funds for development: $400 million in FY 2008, and
an additional $1.6 billion spread over FY 2009 to FY 2010, for a total
of $2 billion.
Question 2. What savings, if any, would we realize by not having to
use Russian assets?
Answer. Compared to existing Russian assets, the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program is intended to result in more
affordable, U.S. crew and cargo delivery capability to the
International Space Station. If U.S. commercial services are
unavailable or unaffordable, post-Shuttle retirement in 2010, services
from Russia, other International Partners, and the Orion/Ares I vehicle
would be used. The estimated marginal cost of an Orion/Ares I flight is
approximately $40 million per seat, while a seat on a Soyuz flight in
2014 is expected to cost approximately $37 million based on inflating
the currently contracted seat cost. While this price difference is
negligible, NASA believes national priorities rather than comparative
costs between Soyuz and Orion drive the decision both to pursue COTS
and to prevent further slippage of the Orion/Ares I IOC. A shorter
transition from Shuttle to a new U.S. spaceflight capability will also
meet U.S. policy objectives spelled out in the Vision for Space
Exploration and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155).
______
Response to Written Questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Question 1. What are the savings in development costs by
accelerating IOC to 2014? To 2013?
Answer. It is not easy to estimate the savings in development costs
that would be achieved by accelerating the CEV Initial Operational
Capability (IOC). The cost of certain design, development, test, and
evaluation (DDT&E) functions depends on how long a project requires
those functions, and these additional costs are not insensitive to
schedule. NASA's parametric estimates of savings below are based solely
on the cost of staff for these functions multiplied by the number of
months saved.
Completing development work on all Constellation systems to support
IOC earlier than 2015 would avoid DDT&E costs associated with less
efficient phasing of development activities and stretching the critical
path while sustaining personnel involved in the early development.
Parametrically derived estimates using design data known at this
time (one year prior to Preliminary Design Review) indicate that, by
advancing IOC to 2014 and avoiding these inefficiencies, our net
estimated savings would be approximately $350 million. However, this
would require additional funds for development: $350 million in FY 2009
and an additional $400 million in FY 2010, for a total of $750 million.
Advancing IOC to 2013 to avoid these inefficiencies would result in
a net savings of approximately $800 million. However, this would
require additional funds for development: $400 million in FY 2008, and
an additional $1.6 billion spread over FY 2009 to FY 2010, for a total
of $2 billion.
Question 2. What savings, if any, would we realize by not having to
use Russian assets?
Answer. Compared to existing Russian assets, the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program is intended to result in more
affordable, U.S. crew and cargo delivery capability to the
International Space Station. If U.S. commercial services are
unavailable or unaffordable post-Shuttle retirement in 2010, services
from Russia, other International Partners, and the Orion/Ares I vehicle
would be used. The estimated marginal cost of an Orion/Ares I flight is
approximately $40 million per seat, while a seat on a Soyuz flight in
2014 is expected to cost approximately $37 million based on inflating
the currently contracted seat cost. While this price difference is
negligible, NASA believes national priorities rather than comparative
costs between Soyuz and Orion drive the decision both to pursue COTS
and to prevent further slippage of the Orion/Ares I IOC. A shorter
transition from Shuttle to a new U.S. spaceflight capability will also
meet U.S. policy objectives spelled out in the Vision for Space
Exploration and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155).
______
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison
to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Question 1. Assuming you can avoid more severe hailstorms or other
weather-related damage, how confident are you that the remaining
Shuttle manifest can be completed before September of 2010?
Answer. NASA launched the Space Shuttle Atlantis STS-117 mission to
the International Space Station on June 8, 2007. STS-118 is currently
scheduled for launch on August 7, 2008. Endeavour rolled out of the
Orbiter Processing Facility to be mated to the external tank on July 2,
2008. By the end of 2008 or the first part of 2009, the ripple in the
manifest caused by the delay of this launch due to hail damage should
have settled out, and NASA should be back on track to complete the
manifest by the end of FY 2010. The Agency should still have the same
margin as today to complete any assembly flights and the Hubble
servicing mission.
Question 2. If, for whatever reason, you have not completed that
manifest by September of 2010, how will you ensure that the ISS will be
completed, as mandated by the Vision for Exploration--and the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005?
Answer. The Shuttle manifest calls for 13 assembly flights to the
International Space Station (ISS) and one to service the Hubble Space
Telescope. In addition, NASA may fly up to two additional ISS logistics
flights if they are deemed necessary and can be flown before the end of
2010. There is sufficient schedule margin in 2010 such that, if a
flight had to slip out of 2008 or 2009, it could still be flown before
September 2010. If there is an unforeseen event that leads to
insufficient schedule margin remaining in which to conduct any planned
missions, NASA will discuss the impacts with the International Partners
and develop a revised transportation plan. NASA has no plans to fly the
Shuttle after 2010, and indeed the Shuttle cannot fly after 2010
without causing major disruptions to the Exploration Program. Major
contracts and subcontracts are being terminated which make the option
of flying additional flights impractical. The basic assembly sequence
is ordered in a manner that flies the technically required flights
first and then flies the International Partner elements in the order
negotiated with all Partners. The last flights, including Node 3, are
important for the long-term health of ISS, but could be dropped if no
other alternatives exist.
Question 3. You do not yet have the Ares I Upper Stage under
contract, as you have indicated. What are the major schedule drivers
expected to be in that development? What are the prospects for
accelerating that development beyond what you currently envision?
Answer. The Upper Stage Production Request for Proposal (RFP)
issued on February 23, 2007, invited companies to bid on the work,
which includes helping NASA with design and then fabricating,
assembling, inspecting and delivering an integrated upper stage. Final
assembly will be at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans.
Proposals had to be submitted by April 13, 2007, and NASA expects to
award a contract at the end of August 2007. The winner of this
competitive solicitation will work alongside a NASA team that is
currently designing the upper stage. The NASA Upper Stage Design team
has been working since November 2005, and will continue to lead design
and integration work after the production contract is awarded for the
upper stage.
The NASA Upper Stage Design team's first priority is to take the
necessary time to properly and thoroughly develop requirements for the
upper stage design. The Design team held their System Requirements
Review on April 3, 2007, which verified that all requirements were
accurately defined and allocated down to the various subsystems of the
upper stage.
The major schedule drivers for the development of the upper stage
include the definition of the manufacturing and inspection process for
the common bulkhead design of the tanks, as well as the development of
long-lead components. The Design team is aggressively defining risk
mitigation plans for the common bulkhead manufacturing process in order
to preserve the current development schedule. In addition, the Design
team is trying to expedite the design and development phase by
initiating early development activities for selected long-lead
components, such as Main Propulsion System Pre-Valve, Roll Control
System Thrusters, and selected structural components. The next step is
to test the early-developed test components to anchor the design and
analysis models.
Prospects for acceleration of the upper stage development effort
will be evaluated after the production contract is awarded at the end
of August 2007.
Question 4. In your statement, you pose--and answer--the question
of extending Shuttle flights beyond 2010 to close the gap in U.S. human
spaceflight. Your answer was two-fold:
a. It would take $4 billion a year to continue Shuttle operations,
and that money would come from the Constellation development--causing
still further delay in Ares I and Orion.
b. The Space Shuttle is complex and difficult to fly safely.
The first part of your response assumes a level of funding
reflected in the current budget run-out. But if it was deemed a
sufficiently high priority to close that gap--and the necessary funds
were provided to cover its cost, then the remaining reason would be
that the Space Shuttle is difficult to fly safely. But we are flying it
now, nevertheless. Is it going to be that much harder after 2010?
Answer. There are three problems--in addition to the $4 billion per
year required-with flying the Shuttle beyond 2010. First, it is
difficult to retain the focus necessary from the workforce to fly
safely for multiple years with an uncertain future. Today we know how
many flights remain and the time duration. NASA can concentrate the
agency's efforts and remain focused for this fixed period. If we go
beyond 2010 with an uncertain end, it will be extremely difficult to
manage the closeout and fly safely. The second problem with flying
beyond 2010 is that the mission no longer requires the unique
capabilities of the Shuttle, and no longer justifies the risk of flying
a complicated vehicle such as the Shuttle. Prior to 2010, the focus is
on assembling the International Space Station and outfitting it for
research and sustained operations. This period requires the unique
capabilities of the Shuttle and warrants the complexity and risk of
Shuttle flights. Beyond 2010, the primary focus would be crew
transportation and logistic and scientific resupply. This does not
require the unique capabilities of the Shuttle and can be performed
simpler, less complicated and with a less expensive transportation
systems. Finally, flying the Shuttle past 2010 would cause major
disruptions to the Exploration Program, which is planning to use many
Shuttle resources.
Question 5. Your statement mentions completing the ISS will fulfill
our commitments to our International Partners and ``enable us to
conduct exploration-focused research onboard.'' What about non-
exploration-focused research, as required by law?
Answer. Section 204 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L.
109-155) directs the Agency to allocate at least 15 percent of the
funds budgeted for International Space Station (ISS) research to
ground-based, free-flyer, and ISS life and microgravity science
research that is not directly related to supporting the human
exploration program. NASA is fully complying with this direction as
outlined below.
1. Restoration of Cancelled Grants--NASA has restored 30 grants in
fundamental biological and physical sciences in the areas of
Combustion, Fluid physics, Materials science, Cell Science, Animal
Science, Cellular biotechnology, Plant biology, and Neuroscience.
2. Free Flyer Research--NASA has allocated resources toward
domestic and Russian free flyer research participation.
Domestic Free Flyers
Experiments completed on orbit
--GeneBox (Bigelow Genesis 1; 7/12/06): A non-deployable Technology
Demonstration testing satellite bus and payload technology
components of GeneSat-1.
--GeneSat-1 (Minotaur-1; 12/16/06): Technology Demonstration
validating autonomous, in-situ small (nanosatellite-class)
spacecraft capabilities to conduct an E. coli growth
experiment.
Approved for flight
--PharmaSat-1 (Launch ready 10/1/07): Microgravity effect on yeast
susceptibility to antifungal drugs in the space
environment.
--3 MicroSat Flights (2008-2011).
Russian Free Flyers
Approved for flight
--Foton M3 (Launch 9/2007): Four NASA sponsored bacteria, snails,
geckos and newts Russian collaboration experiments. Follow
on experiments for Foton M2 (5/31/05) collaborations.
Projects being considered for flight
--Bion M1 (Launch 9/2010): Determine immunological and other
effects of lengthy periods of weightlessness on rodents.
3. ISS Research--ISS Research has been completed or is planned in
Physical and Biological Sciences:
Biological Sciences
Experiments completed on orbit
--Leukin (13S; Inc. 13): Effects of spaceflight on the T-cell
component of the immune response.
--FIT (STS-121; Inc. 13): Immune response of Drosophila to
spaceflight; a model of the human system.
--TROPI (STS-121 and STS-115; Inc. 13 and 14): Plant responses to
light and fractional g using ESA's EMCS.
--Microbe (STS-115; Inc. 13): Virulence of opportunistic pathogens
determined following spaceflight.
--POEMS (Passive Observatories for Experimental Microbial
Systems)--(Increments 13 and 14): Mechanisms in the
development of virulence, pathogenicity, and anti-microbial
resistance in bacteria.
Approved for Flight (Manifested)
--SPEGIS (STS-118; Inc. 15): Spaceflight effects on Streptococcus
pneumoniae gene expression and virulence.
Under Development
--APEX--Cambium (Advanced Plant Experiments on Orbit)--Demonstrate
remote sensing biometric techniques for stress detection in
living organisms.
Physical Sciences
Experiments completed on orbit
--BCAT 3 (Binary Colloidal Alloy Test)--(Increment 13): Determine
phase separation rates and properties of model critical
fluid system.
Approved for Flight (Manifested)
--SHERE, hardware (Shear History Extensional Rheology Experiment)--
10A (Increment 15): Effect of preshear on the transient
evolution of microstructure and viscoelastic tensile
stresses for polymer solutions. Samples to be flown on
later flight.
--InSPACE-2 (Investigating the Structures of Paramagnetic
Aggregates) -10A (Increment 15): To study the gelation
transition in magneto-rheological fluids (MR) under steady
and pulsed magnetic fields.
--BCAT 4 (Binary Colloidal Alloy Test)--1J/A (Increment 16):
Determine phase separation rates and properties of model
critical fluid system.
--CSLM-2 (Coarsening in Solid-Liquid Mixtures-2)--15A (Increment
17): Determine the factors controlling the morphology of
solid-liquid mixtures during coarsening.
Projects under development
--SPICE (Smoke Point in CoFlow Experiment)--Improve the
understanding of soot emission from jet flames, by
measuring smoke-point properties of jet diffusion flames in
a co-flow environment.
--FLEX-2 (Flame Extinguishment Experiment)--The experiment will
assess the effectiveness of fire suppressants in
microgravity.
--CCF, International Agreement with the DLR (Capillary Channel
Flow)--Spacecraft fuel tanks that supply gas-free
propellant to thrusters directly through capillary vanes.
--ZBOT (Zero Boil-off Tank Experiment)--Will improve design of
long-term cryogenic storage tanks.
In summary, NASA is balancing its portfolio to meet the
requirements of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, pertaining to non-
exploration research. In addition, NASA is developing long-range plans
to utilize the ISS and free flyers beyond 2010. Non-exploration
payloads for ISS will use existing or soon to be delivered science
facilities and racks.
Question 6. You indicate that in addition to the 13 remaining ISS
assembly flights, there may be two additional ISS logistics flights--
``if needed.'' What determines whether or not they are needed? What are
the planned payloads for those flights?
Answer. The two potential contingency flights to the International
Space Station (ISS) would largely carry ISS spares, possibly including:
external heat rejection system pump module assemblies (2 units); a
fluid hose rotary coupler; a nitrogen tank assembly; the control moment
gyroscope for non-propulsive attitude control; a spare special purpose
dexterous manipulator arm, a Mobile Transporter/Trailing Uptake System
Real Assembly and linear drive unit to support robotic maintenance; a
large Space to Ground antenna; a high pressure oxygen gas tank; and
nine electrical power components, including six batteries. The need for
these contingency flights must be continually assessed based on the
sparing needs of ISS, the ability of the Shuttle program to safely fly
the mission before 2010, and the availability of alternate carriers
capable of carrying some or all of the hardware. These are unique
hardware designed to be carried on the Shuttle and, before they can be
manifested, careful analysis must be addressed. The planning and
ordering of a carrier is also a key consideration. NASA is continuing
to look at creative means to provide sparing for ISS.
Question 7. Your statement mentions, on page 4, that ``key leaders
in the ISS program have transitioned to senior management positions in
Exploration.'' I was not aware we were trying to attract key leaders
away from ISS, which we plan to use--even in your own budget planning--
for another 10 years. Can you explain the impact to ISS of those
transfers?
Answer. NASA is not trying to attract key leaders away from the
International Space Station (ISS) program. Rather, NASA is using its
workforce in a manner to best support all Agency programs. This
approach benefits NASA and the individuals. It also allows NASA to grow
new leaders in the ISS program, which makes for a healthy workforce.
Several of the key Constellation program personnel have at one time or
another participated in the ISS program. In coordination between the
ISS program and the field centers, NASA is actively balancing the
personnel needs of the three human spaceflight programs: Space Shuttle,
ISS, and Constellation. As a result, the ISS program maintains a broad
depth of management, technical and operational expertise within the
program and in the supporting organizations.
Question 8. What are the ISS payloads that can only fly on the
Space Shuttle, without being greatly modified, that are no longer
included in the Shuttle manifest? What key research capabilities or ISS
infrastructure will be limited by those deletions?
Answer. The spares identified in response to Question 6 represent
very large orbital replacements units that can currently only be
delivered to the International Space Station (ISS) using the unique
capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Although these items are not
currently included in the Shuttle manifest, they could be delivered on
the two potential contingency flights that remain in preliminary
planning stage at this time. They could also potentially be carried on
future commercial or International Partner vehicles, although it is not
yet clear whether these future vehicles will be available or will have
the capability to launch all of these spares. In addition, two very
large research payloads, the Centrifuge Accommodations Module (CAM) and
Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) are no longer in the Shuttle
manifest. The CAM was originally designed to accommodate research in
fundamental biology and has since been determined as non-essential to
achieve exploration objectives, while the AMS is designed for research
in high-energy particle physics.
______
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Enhanced Use Lease Authority
Question 1. Mr. Karas suggests expanding NASA's enhanced use lease
(EUL) authority. The GAO recently recommended that NASA develop an
Agency-wide EUL policy and NASA agreed with this recommendation. This
Committee looks forward to receiving the EUL policy document. How would
expanding NASA's EUL authority help with the transition from Space
Shuttle to Orion?
Answer. Expansion of NASA's enhanced use lease (EUL) authority
facilitates NASA's ability to realign real property assets with NASA
missions. The experience at the two NASA EUL demonstration Centers
indicates that EUL has wide potential to support NASA changing
facilities needs in support of mission requirements. Expanded EUL
authority will support improved performance of NASA infrastructure by
positioning the Agency to recover asset values, improve facility
conditions, and thereby achieve improved mission effectiveness. EUL
will provide flexibility for the use of underutilized NASA facilities
and infrastructure by the contractors and other parties working with
NASA to develop Orion and other parts of the Constellation program. The
use of EUL will also allow retention of rent revenues for improvement
of other NASA facilities including those to be used in the development
of Orion.
SpaceX and Rocketplane Kistler--Human Flight Option D
Question 2. NASA is providing seed funding to SpaceX and
Rocketplane-Kistler to develop new rockets and spacecraft for
logistical support to ISS through the Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services. Both companies have proposed an ``Option D'' to qualify their
spacecraft for human flight. NASA has not yet exercised Option D with
either company. What are NASA's plans for exercising Option D?
Answer. NASA has pre-negotiated optional milestones and costs
associated with demonstrating a crew transportation capability,
Capability D, within each of our Partners' existing Space Act
Agreements (SAA). NASA can exercise this optional demonstration at any
time, but does not plan to do so until after a Partner successfully
demonstrates a viable orbital cargo transportation system, as defined
by completing all cargo transportation milestones defined in each
partner's Space Act Agreements. Any exercise of Capability D would also
depend on whether there is money available to cover payment of the
negotiated Capability D milestones.
Question 3. Has NASA performed a cost-benefit analysis for Option
D?
Answer. NASA has not performed a high fidelity cost-benefit
analysis for Capability D. However, NASA has conducted a cost trade
(SAA Capability D versus no Capability D) to evaluate the impacts to
International Space Station crew and cargo transportation budget
requirements should Capability D become available.
Question 4. Does NASA think that either company could have a human-
rated spacecraft ready by 2010?
Answer. No. As defined in the current Space Act Agreements, SpaceX
would conduct their final crew demonstration flight in April 2012,
based on a start date of December 2009. Likewise, Rocketplane-Kistler
would conduct their final crew demonstration flight in August 2012,
based on a start date of January 2009.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
John C. Karas
Question 1. Last year, Lockheed Martin entered into an agreement
with Bigelow Aerospace to study using human-rated Atlas V rockets for
space tourism. How long and how much money would it cost for Lockheed
Martin to human-rate the Atlas V?
Question 2. Do you think the Atlas V could be used to transport
crew to and from the International Space Station?
Question 3. If, yes, do you think that a human-rated Atlas V would
be cost competitive with the Orion/Ares launch vehicle?
Answer 1-3. Lockheed Martin is no longer responsible for
development of the Atlas V launch vehicle or Atlas V variants. It is
recommended that all questions regarding the Atlas V be directed to
United Launch Alliance (ULA), a newly formed company that is
responsible for development and sales of the Atlas V and Delta IV
launch vehicles. Lockheed Martin fully supports NASA in their approach
to developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, leveraging Shuttle
technology to effectively address U.S. needs to launch humans to space.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
John C. Karas
Question 1. Is it correct to say that there are no ``technical long
poles'' in the development of the Orion vehicle as presently designed
that would keep you from accelerating development of that vehicle?
Answer. Because the Orion vehicle requires minimal technology
development, leveraging recently matured technologies that have been
proven in other applications, we do not currently see any ``technical
long poles.'' However, the integration and systems engineering effort
in developing a human-rated spacecraft requires compliance with
rigorous standards and processes, including a comprehensive test
program. Success lies in our diligent management of integration,
processes, and coordination. This management task cannot be rushed
beyond the reasonably aggressive schedule that NASA has developed.
Working closely with NASA and barring any further erosion of NASA's
Exploration budget, we plan to deliver a vehicle in time to meet NASA's
schedule for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in March 2015.
Question 2. What is the earliest that you could deliver the Orion
spacecraft, given no budgetary constraints? What would be your estimate
of the cost difference to accomplish that, between what you now have
planned and what that would require?
Answer. Based on NASA's program formulation and systems assessments
addressing all elements necessary for a successful operational launch,
including the launch vehicle and ground infrastructure, and based on
the reality of budget constraints, the current NASA plan for IOC in
March 2015 is reasonable. NASA is responding to questions from your
Committee regarding cost differences to accelerate IOC. I respectfully
defer to NASA on responses to program cost questions.
Question 3. What is the last possible moment when your Michoud
facility would be capable of building a Space Shuttle external tank?
Answer. Critical skills will start to roll off the program
beginning in late 2007 and early 2008 as different work stations
complete their activities on the last External Tank. Given the
production cycle time required to build an ET, authority to build
additional tanks must be received in early summer 2007.
Question 4. Your statement speaks about the ``pipeline of
projects.'' Can you provide a specific description, from your company's
perspective, of the status of the Space Shuttle-related ``pipeline,''
in terms of what is needed to keep it flying? Is that pipeline already
running dry?
Answer. The suppliers for ET are being terminated now, so the
pipeline is already starting to run dry. Authority would be needed very
early this summer to maintain production capability.
Question 5. You mention, perhaps a little facetiously, the value of
``Jolt Cola'' in carrying forward with our next adventures in space.
What kind of ``jolt'' do you think is needed to ensure that the
political and budgetary support is both stable and adequate?
Answer. Due to the gap between retirement of the Shuttle in 2010
and Orion and Ares I operations in early 2015, we will be faced with
the challenge of maintaining a highly skilled and experienced
workforce. The future of U.S. ability to put humans in space is
dependent on our ability to retain our experienced workforce and
supplier base and excite the next generation of engineers, scientists,
and explorers. I believe it is ``jolting'' to consider the possibility
that the U.S. risks losing our leadership in human spaceflight if we
further delay operations of the next generation of human spaceflight
systems.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Johnny Walker
Question. Mr. Walker, what are your members being told to expect
during this transition period? Do we yet understand the impact of the
transition on the NASA and contractor workforce?
Answer. While I would not accuse NASA of being dishonest, there are
clearly many unanswered questions concerning the transition. Part of
this I believe comes from the unknowns regarding the scope of the
funding that will be available and the lack of a clearly developed
transition plan. Any transition plan must include labor and community
representatives, as well as contractors, in its development and
implementation. A jointly created communications plan will be a key
component of any transition plan.
The types of communication tools could be:
NASA Television
Center-wide Face-to-Face
Defined NASA office with responsibility for interfacing with
workforce
Develop hot line for employee questions
The open and honest sharing of information will allow us to
formulate an effective communications plan and to answer the question
``what will happen to me?'' that so many employees are asking.
If I may be of further assistance please contact me at any time.
Thank you for your assistance and support.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Johnny Walker
Question. In your statement you have expressed concern that the
mistakes made in the past regarding sustaining a viable talented
workforce may be about to be repeated in this next transition. What are
the key steps you believe NASA--and this Congress--should take to avoid
that?
Answer. First, Congress needs to adequately fund our space program.
This will signal our commitment to a dedicated and skilled workforce
that their efforts are understood and valued. The money required to
close the gap between the two programs is not significant in the grand
scheme of things. It would be my suggestion, as well as others, that
the only way to avoid a major impact to working families and our
communities, that support our great space program, is to close the gap
between the fly-out of the Space Shuttle and the launching of the new
Orion and Ares space systems.
I am also deeply concerned to learn that our transition plan
requires us to utilize foreign nations, such as, Russia, Japan and
European agencies, to supply and to launch manned vehicles (American
astronauts) to the Space Station. At a time when supporters of NASA
like yourself have to fight for the necessary funding to keep our space
program on track, I have ask what kind of support or funding are we to
give to foreign nations to provide the services that will be required
to keep the Space Station flying? Why not apply those funds to closing
the gap between the Shuttle and Orion/Ares programs? Also, we must
consider the cost in today's dollar terms versus 4 or 5 years from now.
During the fly-out of the Titan program, in order to keep a stable
workforce, and provide a stable transition to new jobs, there was an
incentive program put forward to engineering hourly and hourly
individuals to stay until fly-out. I would suggest that if we cannot
move right into the next program, this should be considered.
During this transition, communications between NASA, contractors,
and the workforce must be open, frequent, and honest. The planning
process for the transition must include all important stakeholders
including union and community representatives. We must jointly identify
the key challenges that we will face. Further, we also need to jointly
develop and implement the solutions to these challenges. It is
impossible to predict all of the problems that we will encounter, but
if we work together we will have a much better opportunity to
successfully manage a very difficult situation.
I appreciate your concern and your commitment and will offer any
assistance that you may need to help us move forward.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Ronald D. Dittemore
Question 1. You have referred to a series of ``plateaus'' that can
mitigate some of the transition challenges we are facing between the
Shuttle and Ares/Orion availability. What are the risks you see that
would cause those ``plateaus'' to crumble?
Answer. The ``plateaus'' that you refer to in the question are what
I call ``soft landings'' where critical skills are required to meet new
mission objectives. Additional missions and mission objectives were
provided in the post-Apollo era and are also being implemented today.
These added objectives or requirements are a very effective method to
maintain skill sets onboard as a bridge to the next generation of
spaceflight programs.
In the post-Apollo era the Skylab Program and Apollo-Soyuz Test
Project served as a bridge to the Space Shuttle. Similarly, an Ares I
test flight program is planned that bridges the gap between the last
Shuttle flight and the start of Ares I operational capability,
utilizing the talents across industry and NASA's field centers. These
test flights are absolutely necessary as a part of the Ares I
development program but they have the secondary benefit of providing an
avenue of transition where critical skills and experience are captured
and retained. Additionally, the continued operation of the
International Space Station provides the means to retain critical
mission management and operations skills at the Johnson Space Center
that will be directly applicable to future lunar missions.
The gap between operational programs represents a risk. Any
increase in the gap exacerbates transition risks. Increasing the number
and frequency of test flights using Ares I hardware and processes can
offset a portion of the risk. But it is absolutely clear that an
increase in the gap is a significant impact to the manufacturing as
well as the operations communities.
Question 2. What is the earliest that you could deliver the Ares I
launch vehicle, given no budgetary constraints? What would be your
estimate of the cost difference to accomplish that, between what you
now have planned and what that would require?
Answer. First, I must point out that since the Ares I Upper Stage
and Avionics procurements are still in the competitive phase, I can
only speak for the Ares I First Stage--which is under contract to ATK.
A more complete answer on the overall Ares I Launch Vehicle and Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle would have to come from NASA.
With that said, we are on schedule to conduct the Ares I-X test
flight, utilizing a modified four-segment Space Shuttle Solid Rocket
Booster with a fifth segment simulator, in April 2009. Also in April
2009, the first of five ground tests of the Ares I five-segment first
stage booster are schedule to begin and continue through 2011. Under
the plan that was laid out before the impact of the Continuing
Resolution, these ground tests were to lead to three test flights
without crews in 2012 and 2013--and the first human flights in 2014.
For us to stay on that schedule, we have to assume that there is a
satisfactory budgetary solution to account for the Continuing
Resolution impact.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Allen Li
Question 1. What role do you believe GAO can play in helping this
subcommittee and the Congress monitor and address the challenges you
have identified, and other witnesses have identified, in successfully
making the transition to the next generation of human spaceflight?
Answer. GAO is well positioned to provide the Subcommittee the
insight and foresight to complement the Subcommittee's oversight
responsibilities. We have performed work on NASA for the Congress for
many years. Our oversight work has focused on the acquisition and
development of space systems, Space Shuttle operations, financial
management, human capital and ensuring that NASA complies with
applicable laws and regulations, and guarding against fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement. Our work also provides important insight on
what programs, policies, and questions are working well and what best
practices can be shared to achieve successful program outcomes. To
assist with the Subcommittee's oversight responsibilities, we could
provide detailed analysis and information on a variety of transition
issues facing NASA such as:
the progress of the development and acquisition of the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares I Launch Vehicle,
the effect of the retirement of the Space Shuttle on the
workforce,
the Nation's ability to launch human spaceflight systems in
the future,
monitoring the viability of commercial companies to provide
cargo and crew rotation services to the Space Station, and the
organizational health of NASA centers.
We would be glad to meet with the Subcommittee to discuss your
specific needs, identify work being performed at the request of
Congressional Committees, and explore how GAO can be of assistance.
Question 2. In your statement, you mentioned NASA's agency-wide
Strategic Human Capital Plan? What is your assessment of it?
Answer. We are currently reviewing NASA's ability to attract and
retain a skilled workforce for the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia. As part of our work, we are reviewing the extent to which
NASA's human capital framework is aligned to its strategic mission,
outcomes, and programmatic goals. Studies by several organizations,
including GAO, have shown that successful organizations in both the
public and private sectors use strategic management approaches to
prepare their workforces to meet present and future mission
requirements. Strategic workforce planning specifically involves
systematic assessments of current and future human capital needs and
the development of long-term strategies to fill the gaps between an
agency's current and future workforce requirements. When our work is
completed, we will be able to update the Subcommittee on our views of
NASA's human capital management.
Question 3. Have you reviewed the Human Spaceflight Transition Plan
of July 2006 and the Shuttle Human Capital Plan submitted in April
2006? What is your assessment of these plans?
Answer. As part of our work on assessing how well NASA is
positioning itself to effectively manage its supplier base for
sustaining the Shuttle and transitioning to the planned exploration
activities for the House Committee on Science and Technology, we are
examining the Human Spaceflight Transition Plan, and other plans
related to the transition. It appears that NASA has in place many
processes, procedures, and support systems to carry out this
transition, and successful implementation will depend on thoughtful
execution and effective oversight. Although these plans provide an
overarching strategy for the agency, NASA has not developed a
comprehensive cost estimate for retiring the Space Shuttle and the
associated transition costs.
Competing demands within the agency, coupled with a declining
supply of Federal discretionary funds, means that NASA will undoubtedly
be operating in a constrained fiscal environment. Consequently, it is
imperative that NASA successfully manage its limited resources in order
to achieve successful outcomes. Regarding the Shuttle Human Capital
Plan, we are reviewing it and are not in a position to answer your
question at this time.
Question 4. With a selected date to retire the Shuttle and begin
the gap in U.S. human spaceflight capability, obviously the next key
issue is that date at which that gap will end, with the operations of
the replacement vehicles. Based on your studies, how confident do you
believe we can be in the projected dates for initial Ares I and Orion
initial operations?
Answer. NASA maintains a basic assumption that the risks in the
development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares I Crew
Launch Vehicle are minimal due to the use of heritage hardware and low-
risk technology. While this assumption seems logical on the surface, in
practice, this has not always been the case. Over the past decade, NASA
has experienced significant problems with several of its projects that
were operating under similar assumptions. Moreover, our work on best
practices in system development has found, all too often, that agencies
allow programs to proceed without developing key elements of a sound
business case. These elements include well-defined requirements, mature
technology, a preliminary design, and firm cost estimates. Without such
knowledge, NASA cannot predict with any confidence how much the program
will cost, what technologies will or will not be available to meet
performance expectations, and when the vehicle will be ready for use.
NASA has acknowledged that it will not have these elements in place for
the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle until the project's Preliminary
Design Review, which is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2008. As part of our
ongoing work for the House Committee on Science and Technology, we are
evaluating the extent to which NASA's Ares I acquisition strategy
incorporates knowledge-based concepts designed to minimize technical
and programmatic risk. We are concerned that NASA is using a similar
acquisition strategy to that used for Orion. Continued Congressional
oversight will be critical for ensuring that these projects stay within
cost and schedule goals.
Question 5. You indicate you are reviewing the needs and plans for
ISS logistics and maintenance support. What level of onboard research
activity are you using as a baseline for this review? Will you be
taking into account the possibility of expanded research operations
anticipated by implementation of the national laboratory designation of
the ISS?
Answer. To evaluate logistics necessary to support ISS research,
GAO is reviewing information from a variety of sources, including
NASA's Research and Utilization Plan for the International Space
Station, ISS User Operations Panel information, ISS Cargo Requirements
and Traffic Model summaries, and NASA integrated resupply requirements.
Our review should provide the Congress with information on whether
NASA's cargo and crew transportation strategy would support or
constrain expanded research opportunities for ISS operations as a
national laboratory.