[Senate Hearing 112-193]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-193
A REVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY IN LIGHT OF THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS
ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
MARCH 30, 2011--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
TOM HARKIN, Iowa MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
PATTY MURRAY, Washington LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana MARK KIRK, Illinois
JACK REED, Rhode Island DANIEL COATS, Indiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROY BLUNT, Missouri
BEN NELSON, Nebraska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
JON TESTER, Montana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
Charles J. Houy, Staff Director
Bruce Evans, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
PATTY MURRAY, Washington LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
JACK REED, Rhode Island KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
TOM HARKIN, Iowa SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JON TESTER, Montana LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii (ex
officio)
Professional Staff
Doug Clapp
Roger Cockrell
Leland Cogliani
Carolyn E. Apostolou (Minority)
Tyler Owens (Minority)
Tom Craig (Minority)
LaShawnda Smith (Minority)
Administrative Support
Molly Barackman-Eder
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein.................... 1
Opening Statement of Senator Lamar Alexander..................... 3
Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg......................... 5
Statement of Hon. Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 5
Prepared Statement of........................................ 8
Statement of Dr. Peter B. Lyons, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy........................... 11
Prepared Statement of........................................ 13
Statement of Dr. Ernest J. Moniz, Professor of Physics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.......................... 28
Prepared Statement of........................................ 29
Fukushima and Directions for U.S. Nuclear Power.................. 29
Cost............................................................. 30
Relicensing...................................................... 31
Spent-fuel Management............................................ 32
Statement of William Levis, President and Chief Operating
Officer, PSEG Power............................................ 33
Prepared Statement of........................................ 35
U.S. Nuclear Powerplants Are Safe................................ 36
Safety is the U.S. Nuclear Energy Industry's Top Priority........ 36
The U.S. Nuclear Energy Industry Has a Long History of Continuous
Learning....................................................... 37
The U.S. Nuclear Energy Industry Has Already Taken Steps in
Response to Fukushima.......................................... 38
Statement of David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project
Union of Concerned Scientists.................................. 39
Prepared Statement of........................................ 41
Why Fukushima Made Me Stop Worrying and Love Nuclear Power....... 49
Additional Committee Questions................................... 50
Questions Submitted to Dr. Peter B. Lyons........................ 50
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu.................. 50
A REVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY IN LIGHT OF THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS
ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Feinstein, Lautenberg, Durbin, Alexander,
and Graham.
opening statement of senator dianne feinstein
Senator Feinstein. Good morning ladies and gentlemen. And
welcome to the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee's
Oversight Hearing of U.S. Nuclear Power Safety in the aftermath
of the Japanese nuclear disaster.
First, let me say, on behalf of the subcommittee, that our
thoughts are with the people of Japan who continue to suffer. I
spoke to Ambassador Fujisaki Saturday and conveyed my really
deep sympathy. I think for all of us who have been watching
this on television, day after day and through the horrors of
both the earthquake and the tsunami that we want to extend our
very best to the people of Japan and our deepest sympathy for
what is an enormous loss.
The 9.0 earthquake and resulting tsunami occurred 19 days
ago. As we speak, workers at the Daiichi nuclear site continue
their work to contain the situation with the reactors and
spent-fuel pools. They have been called national heroes and so
they should be.
It will be months before we know what happened and why. So
it is too early to call this a hearing about lessons learned
from the disaster in Japan. But we do know enough to start
asking some critical questions about nuclear energy policy in
our own country.
Last week I visited California's two nuclear power plants
with representatives from the United States Geological Survey
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant is near the city of San Luis Obispo, it is
one of the largest employers in the county. Four hundred and
twenty-four thousand people live within 50 miles. It employs
1,200 people. Further south, nearly 7.4 million people live
within 50 miles of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
near San Clemente.
I came away from those visits with some good news. I feel
much better about the safety precautions that are in place at
these nuclear plants. I was very impressed with the dedication,
the confidence and the professionalism of the large staffs that
run these facilities and the regulatory agents who guard
against risk.
But we need to reconfirm that these facilities are designed
to endure the threats we can foresee and prepared to respond to
scenarios we never imagined, that's why redundant systems, back
up systems and plans are so important.
Most significantly, I truly believe we must begin to
rethink how we manage spent fuel. Spent fuel must remain in
pools, and those are the pools that the firemen are pouring
water into in Japan, for at least 5 to 7 years at which time
these rods can be moved to safer, dry cask storage. However,
these pools often become de facto long-term storage, with fuel
assemblies re-racked, thus increasing the heat load of the
pools. In California, for instance, fuel removed from reactors
in 1984 is still cooling in wet, spent-fuel pools.
This process may have regulatory approval, but I have a
hard time understanding why the NRC has not mandated a more
rapid transfer of spent fuel to dry casks. Reports out of Japan
indicate there were no problems with the dry casks at Daiichi.
To me, that suggests that we should at least consider a policy
that would encourage quicker movement of spent fuel to dry cask
storage.
We must also consider what broader regulatory reforms may
be necessary, beginning with the review of the United States
power plant safety. I am very pleased that the NRC will
undertake both short term and long-term reviews of nuclear
plant safety. Chairmain Jaczko, I thank you very much for that.
This kind of self-reassessment is really appropriate. Today, I
hope we will get a more complete picture of what the NRC
intends to do with these reviews and how quickly you are likely
to act on any new safety regulations.
In addition to NRC's self-assessment, I think we should
take a look at some independent analysis of our nuclear power
plant safety, with specific attention to threat assessment and
the design parameters of our plants.
Japan has now suffered two earthquakes in the past 4 years
that were larger than the Japanese thought possible and each
devastated a nuclear power plant that was not designed to
endure a quake of that size. The lesson is that we need to
think carefully about whether our country has properly
estimated the threats to our nuclear facilities and designed
the facilities to endure them. An independent review of the
design basis for all U.S. plants, I believe, should be a
priority.
The nuclear R&D program currently funds work related to
existing plants, future reactor designs and waste issues. The
question becomes: Do we have the right focus and balance to
promote increased safety?
The spent fuel at Daiichi posed a significant problem,
contributing to at least one of the hydrogen explosions. So,
what can our R&D programs do to address issues of remaining
spent-fuel energy and hydrogen?
Funding constraints are already requiring programs to
rerank R&D priorities. Perhaps the events at Daiichi will also
contribute to that rethink.
It is clear that we lack a comprehensive national policy to
address the nuclear fuel cycle, including management of nuclear
waste. Creating more waste without a plan increases our risk
and exposes taxpayers to more payments from utilities.
This hearing is not focused on nuclear waste, but I think
it is hard to look at the other aspects of nuclear power and
not recognize our lack of appropriate, permanent, retrievable
storage.
So, we will be exploring these issues today. On our first
panel, we will hear from Greg Jaczko, the chairman of the NRC.
I have had the pleasure of meeting with him and look forward to
his testimony. We will also hear from Pete Lyons, the Acting
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy at the Department of
Energy (DOE).
Our second panel will include Dr. Ernie Moniz from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) who has a long
history in this area and is currently serving on the Blue
Ribbon Commission developing a long-term plan for nuclear
waste. We will also hear from William Levis, the president and
chief operating officer at PSEG Power. PSEG operates the same
reactor model as those at the Daiichi site. Our third witness
on the panel is Dave Lochbaum from the Union of Concerned
Scientists. Mr. Lochbaum has a long history inside and outside
the nuclear power industry. So we look forward to your
testimony.
Let me now turn to my distinguished ranking member, with
whom it's a great pleasure to work. We have actually worked
together in the prior session on the Interior, Environment, and
Related Agencies Subcommittee. And I think this is our first
hearing on this subcommittee.
So, I want you to know I very much look forward to working
with you in the same way we did on Interior.
opening statement of senator lamar alexander
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
that and thank you for hosting this hearing in a timely way and
having the witnesses here whom we ought to be hearing from--
people who know what they are talking about and are in charge
of the safety and usefulness of our nuclear program.
Those of us who support nuclear power as a part of the mix
of electricity generation in the United States, and for the
world, ought to be among the first to ask questions about what
can we learn from what happened in Japan, about the safety of
our own reactors: the 104 commercial reactors that we have in
the United States; those that are on the drawing board at the
NRC; and the large number of nuclear reactors in our nuclear
Navy which have been operating since the 1950s.
The questions I will be looking forward to hearing more
about are similar to those that Senator Feinstein mentioned.
What kind of safety enhancements have been made at our current
nuclear plants since they have been in operation? How will the
safety capabilities of the next generation of reactors improve
over reactors that are in service not just in the United
States, but around the world today? What about new
technologies? One of the most important things that the Federal
Government can do about clean energy is research. We have the
capacity for that.
I was in Great Britain for 3 days last week and they
reminded me that we are the ones with the national labs; we are
the ones with the great research universities. And if any
country is going to have advanced research in clean energy, it
ought to be the United States. We could do that for ourselves
and for the world. And nuclear power is one area where we could
do that.
The chairman has mentioned one area of advanced research,
which is improving the way we recycle used nuclear fuel.
Another would be research on small modular reactors (SMR). Can
we build 125 megawatt reactors or smaller reactors as a part of
our future? So those are the kinds of questions that I will be
looking for in this hearing.
I thank the chairman for reminding us of the scope of the
Japanese tragedy. It is important to put the entire event in
perspective in several ways. One way is to look at the size of
the quake and the size of the tsunami and the size of the
tragedy. There are hundreds of thousands of people, for
example, still homeless in Japan. And just like California, by
its proximity to the Pacific Ocean, Tennessee has an unusual
relationship with the people of Japan because over the years we
have become the State with the most Japanese manufacturing, and
we are home to many Japanese families and friends, so we have
felt this tragedy even more than we might otherwise have.
Another way to put this tragedy into perspective is to be
aware of the record of safety in the United States' nuclear
industry. The only deaths we have ever had in connection with
reactors in the United States happened in 1961 at a research
reactor, and that that kind of reactor isn't used anymore in
our country. The 104 civilian reactors we have in the United
States have never produced a fatality. The Navy ships that have
been powered by nuclear reactors since the 1950s have never
resulted in a fatality from a reactor accident.
And while we have heard a lot of comparisons with Three
Mile Island--the worst nuclear accident we have had in our
country, I suppose--no one was injured as a result, which many
people don't believe when I say it.
So the nuclear industry has a safety record in the United
States that is not surpassed by any other form of energy
production. We unfortunately have coal mines that blow up, gas
plants that blow up, and oil rigs that spill, all of which are
tragedies and we hope that we continue a good safety record in
our nuclear plants.
I think it is also important to keep in perspective what
our alternatives to nuclear energy are. Every form of energy we
have carries with it some risk. Again, in listening to those
talking in Great Britain this past week, they are going through
the same sort of analysis. But they have few alternatives.
Forty-five percent of their electricity comes from natural gas,
which costs twice as much as ours does. One-half of their
supply comes from Russia, and they are not sure that they want
to increase that to 80 percent. They are closing their coal
plants because of their climate change rules. And they know
that renewables can only provide a fraction of intermittent
electricity which takes up a lot of space for an island that
doesn't have very much space. So their only option is to build
more nuclear power plants, which is what Great Britain is
planning to do.
And as we look around the world, we see that nuclear power
provides 15 percent of the world's electricity, including 30
percent of Japan's electricity. There are 65 reactors currently
under construction worldwide, from Russia and China, to Brazil
and Korea; 20 percent of our electricity in the United States
comes from nuclear power; 70 percent of our clean electricity--
that is sulfur, nitrogen, mercury, and carbon-free--comes from
nuclear power. So it is hard for me to imagine how we have a
future in the United States without substantial expansion of
nuclear power, especially since some coal plants are going to
close and some nuclear power plants are going to close because
they are old.
So that makes this hearing on what we can learn about
safety even more important. I thank the chairman for holding
the hearing and I look forward to the testimony of the
witnesses.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator, for those
excellent comments.
Senator Lautenberg, welcome. Would you like to make a brief
statement?
statement of senator frank r. lautenberg
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. I'd like to make a longer one, but
I will make this brief, I think. Just to say, Madam Chairman,
this not only obviously is timely, but we are pleased to have
Mr. Jaczko here. I had the chance to meet with him yesterday
and I think we--the review we had was very productive and I
was--I will also attest to Mr. Jaczko's durability, not only
his engineering skill, because he came in from Japan and I
was--had to speak coming from New Jersey, so we welcome you
here again, to both witnesses. And I look forward to hearing
from them. And I thank you, Madam Chairman for having the
hearing.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Jaczko and Dr. Lyons, thank you both for being
here today, you have both been intimately involved with the
crisis and as Senator Lautenberg said, I understand you just
returned, Mr. Chairman, from Japan, so we would be most
interested in your observations and update on that situation.
But, I also want you to be looking forward and talk a little
bit about the issues the United States should consider in
learning from this event.
Your formal statements, gentlemen, will be made part of the
record, so please summarize, in your oral statement.
Mr. Chairman, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Jaczko. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member
Alexander and Senator Lautenberg.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your
subcommittee today to address the response of the NRC to these
tragic events that you have discussed, in Japan. And as you
have mentioned, I traveled to Japan over the past weekend and
just returned yesterday. And I want to be able to directly
convey a message of support to our Japanese counterparts. And I
had an opportunity to meet with senior Japanese Government and
TECPO officials and I consulted with the NRC team of experts
who are in Japan as part of our effort to assist the Japanese
response to dealing with the nuclear reactors. And I would note
that that is one small part of a broader United States effort
to provide assistance to the Japanese with regard to all of the
challenges they are facing as a result of this hurricane and
tsunami.
And as many of you have mentioned, I too would like to
reiterate my condolences and sympathy to all of those who have
been affected by the earthquake and the tsunami in Japan. Our
hearts go out to all of those who have been dealing with the
aftermath of these natural disasters and we are mindful of the
long and difficult road they will face in recovering.
Since Friday, March 11, when the earthquake and tsunami
struck, the NRC's headquarters operation center has been
operating on a 24-hour basis to monitor and analyze events at
nuclear power plants in Japan. Despite the very high level of
support being provided by our agency in response to those
events, we do continue to remain focused on our domestic
responsibilities and ultimately ensuring the safety and
security of the U.S. nuclear reactors.
In spite of the evolving situation, the long hours and the
intensity of efforts, the NRC staff has approached their
responsibilities with dedication, determination, and
professionalism and I am very proud of the work that they have
done and the work that they have done as part of a larger U.S.
Government effort.
On March 11, as you have mentioned, an earthquake hit Japan
resulting in the shutdown of more than 10 reactors in Japan.
The tsunami that followed appears to have caused the loss of
normal and emergency electric power to six units at the
Fukushima Daiichi site. After this event we began interacting
our Japanese regulatory counterparts and by the following
Monday we had dispatched a total of 11 NRC staff to Japan.
Now, as our discussion and understanding of the events
continued to unfold, at a certain point we gained a limited
amount of information that led us to believe that there was a
possibility of a further degradation in the conditions at the
reactor. Based on the information that we had, we looked at
that situation, relative to what we would do here in the United
States and we determined that if a similar situation were to
happen in the United States, we would be recommending a larger
evacuation out to approximately 50 miles. And I would stress
that that was based on limited information and was a
conservative and prudent decision that was made. So based on
that information we provided a recommendation to the United
States Government and the ambassador in Japan issued a notice
to American citizens in Japan to be advised to evacuate or to
relocate to 50 miles beyond the plant.
Here, domestically, we continue to support efforts to
monitor at nuclear power plants and through the Environmental
Protection Agency's system, we continue to monitor radiation
levels that would be seen in the United States. And I want to
stress and repeat that we do not believe that there is any
likelihood of levels of radiation in the United States that
could cause any kind of public health and safety concern.
Now I want to focus a little bit, with the remainder of my
opening remarks, on the reasons we believe we have a strong
regulatory program here in the United States. Since the
beginning of our regulatory program we have emphasized the
philosophy of defense in depth which recognizes that nuclear
reactors require the highest standards of design, construction,
oversight, and operation. And it really does not rely on any
one single layer of protection for public health and safety.
Designs for every reactor in this country take into account
site specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for
natural events, such as earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes,
floods, and tsunamis. There are multiple physical barriers to
radiation being released to the public in every reactor design.
And additionally, there are diverse and redundant safety
systems that are required to be maintained in operable
condition and frequently tested to ensure that the plant is
always in a high condition of readiness.
We are, however, a learning organization and we continue to
take advantage of the best-available information that we have
to refine and improve our system. And one of the most
significant changes that we made, after Three Mile Island in
1979, was an expansion of our resident inspector program, which
now has at least two full-time NRC inspectors at each site
where we have the ability to have unfettered access to the site
at any time.
We have also developed guidelines for severe accident
management to ensure that in the event, all of the things that
we think are possible to happen, if the event--if something
like--if something additionally were to happen, we have these
severe accident management guidelines in place to ensure that
we can deal promptly and in a systematic and methodical way
with the unique safety challenges that may be presented.
In addition, as a result of the events of September 11, we
identified important pieces of equipment that we require
licensees to have available and in place, as well as new
procedures and policies to help deal with the very severe type
of situation that you are seeing in Japan right now. And our
program of continuous improvement will also include lessons
learned from the events in Japan.
We have already begun enhancing inspection activities
through temporary instructions to our inspection staff,
including the resident inspectors and the inspectors in all of
our four regional offices. We have also issued an information
notice to licensees to make them aware of activities they
should undertake to verify that their capabilities to mitigate
conditions due to these severe types of accidents, including
the loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in
effect and operation.
Now, although we are confident about the safety of United
States nuclear power plants, our agency has a responsibility to
the American people to undertake a systematic and methodical
review in light of the events in Japan. On March 21, the NRC
established a senior level task force to conduct a
comprehensive review of our processes and regulations to
determine whether improvements to our regulatory system are
needed and to make recommendations to the NRC for its policy
direction. This will--the review will basically encompass two
pieces, there will be a short and then ultimately a longer-term
review that will incorporate the best-available information
that we have from Japan. And both of these reports will
ultimately be made available to the public.
So in summary, I believe we have a strong regulatory
program in place that looks at a wide variety of severe
physical and natural phenomenon. In addition to that, we have a
program in place to account for the things that we may not know
today. And ultimately we have required all our plants to have
equipment and procedures in place to deal with these very
severe types of accident scenarios, in the very unlikely event
that we were to see something like this develop here in the
United States.
prepared statement
So I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank
you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory B. Jaczko
Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
address the response of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to the recent tragic events in Japan. People across the country
and around the world who have been touched by the magnitude and scale
of this disaster are closely following the events in Japan and the
repercussions in this country and in other countries.
I traveled to Japan over the past weekend, and just returned
yesterday. I wanted to convey a message of support and cooperation to
our Japanese counterparts there and to assess the current situation. I
also met with senior Japanese Government and TEPCO officials, and
consulted with our NRC team of experts who are in Japan as part of our
assistance effort.
I would first like to reiterate my condolences to all those who
have been affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Our hearts
go out to all who have been dealing with the aftermath of these natural
disasters, and we are mindful of the long and difficult road they will
face in recovering. We know that the people of Japan are resilient and
strong, and we have every confidence that they will come through this
horrific time and move forward, with resolve, to rebuild their vibrant
country. Our agency stands together with the people of Japan at this
most difficult and challenging time.
The NRC is an independent agency, with approximately 4,000 staff.
We play a critically important role in protecting the American people
and the environment. Our agency sets the rules by which commercial
nuclear power plants operate, and nuclear materials are used in
thousands of academic, medical, and industrial settings in the United
States. We have at least two resident inspectors who work full-time at
every nuclear plant in the country, and we are proud to have world-
class scientists, engineers, and professionals representing nearly
every discipline.
Since Friday, March 11, when the earthquake and tsunami struck, the
NRC's headquarters 24-hour emergency operations center has been fully
activated, with staffing augmented to monitor and analyze events at
nuclear power plants in Japan. At the request of the Japanese
Government, and through the United States Agency for International
Development, the NRC sent a team of its technical experts to provide
on-the-ground support, and we have been in continual contact with them.
Within the United States, the NRC has been working closely with other
Federal agencies as part of our Government's response to the situation.
During these past several weeks, our staff has remained focused on
our essential safety and security mission. I want to recognize their
tireless efforts and their critical contributions to the United States
response to assist Japan. In spite of the evolving situation, the long
hours, and the intensity of efforts over the past week, NRC staff has
approached their responsibilities with dedication, determination and
professionalism, and I am incredibly proud of their efforts. The
American people also can be proud of the commitment and dedication
within the Federal workforce, which is exemplified by our staff every
day.
The NRC's primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate
protection of the public health and safety of the American people.
Toward that end, we have been very closely monitoring the activities in
Japan and reviewing all currently available information. Review of this
information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing
oversight, gives us confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate
safely. To date, there has been no reduction in the licensing or
oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S.
licensees.
Our agency has a long history of conservative regulatory
decisionmaking. We have been intelligently using risk insights to help
inform our regulatory process, and, for more than 35 years of civilian
nuclear power in this country, we have never stopped requiring
improvements to plant designs, and modifying our regulatory framework
as we learn from operating experience.
Despite the very high level of support being provided by the NRC in
response to the events in Japan, we continue to remain focused on our
domestic responsibilities.
I'd like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and
continuing response to the events in Japan. I then want to further
discuss the reasons for our continuing confidence in the safety of the
U.S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward for the NRC
in order to learn all the lessons we can, in light of these events.
On Friday, March 11, an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the
shutdown of more than 10 reactors. The ensuing tsunami appears to have
caused the loss of normal and emergency alternating current power to
the six unit Fukushima Daiichi site. It is those six units that have
received the majority of our attention since that time. Units 1, 2, and
3 were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units 4, 5, and 6
were in previously scheduled outages.
Shortly after 4 a.m. EDT on Friday, March 11, the NRC Emergency
Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the
earthquake and the potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into the
monitoring mode at our Emergency Operations Center, and the NRC's first
concern was possible impacts of the tsunami on U.S. plants and
radioactive materials on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, Alaska, and
U.S. territories in the Pacific. We were in communication with
licensees and NRC resident inspectors at Diablo Canyon Power Plant and
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California, and the radiation
control program directors for California, Washington, Oregon, and
Hawaii.
On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese
regulatory counterparts and dispatched two experts to Japan to help at
the United States Embassy in Tokyo. By Monday, March 14, we had
dispatched a total of 11 NRC staff to provide technical support to the
American Embassy and the Japanese Government. We have subsequently
rotated in additional staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in
Japan. The areas of focus for this team are:
--to assist the Japanese Government and respond to requests from our
Japanese regulatory counterparts; and
--to support the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. Government assistance
effort.
On Wednesday, March 16, we collaborated with other U.S. Government
agencies and decided to advise American citizens to evacuate within a
50-mile range around the plant. This decision was a prudent course of
action and would be consistent with what we would do under similar
circumstances in the United States. This evacuation range was
predicated on a combination of the information that we had available at
the time, which indicated the possibility that reactor cores and spent-
fuel pools may have been compromised, and hypothetical calculations of
the approximate activity available for release from one reactor and two
spent-fuel pools at a four-reactor site.
We have an extensive range of stakeholders with whom we have
ongoing interaction regarding the Japan situation, including the White
House, congressional staff, our State regulatory counterparts, a number
of other Federal agencies, and international regulatory bodies around
the world.
The NRC response in Japan and our emergency operations center
continue with the dedicated efforts of more than 250 NRC staff on a
rotating basis. The entire agency is coordinating and working together
in response to this event so that we can provide assistance to Japan
while continuing the vital activities necessary to fulfill our domestic
responsibilities.
It is important to note that the U.S. Government has an extensive
network of radiation monitors across this country. Monitoring at
nuclear power plants and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
system has not identified any radiation levels that effect public
health and safety in this country. In fact, natural background
radiation from sources such as rocks, the Sun, and buildings, is
100,000 times more than doses attributed to any level that has been
detected in the United States to date. Therefore, based on current
data, we feel confident that there is no reason for concern in the
United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan.
There are many factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor
safety. We have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the
United States, used a philosophy of ``Defense-in-Depth'', which
recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of
design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not rely on
any single layer of protection for public health and safety. Designs
for every individual reactor in this country take into account site-
specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for natural events,
such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as
they relate to that site.
There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor
design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety
systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and
frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of
readiness to respond to any situation.
We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous
operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement
for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a
wide range of situations, including most significantly, the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we have
significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency
operating procedures. We have addressed many human factors issues
regarding how control room employees operate the plant, added new
requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of
containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room
displays of the status of pumps and valves.
The NRC has a post-accident sampling system that enables the
monitoring of radioactive material release and possible fuel
degradation. One of the most significant changes after Three Mile
Island was an expansion of the Resident Inspector Program, which now
has at least two full-time NRC inspectors onsite at each nuclear power
plant. These inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees'
activities related to nuclear safety and security.
As a result of operating experience and ongoing research programs,
we have developed requirements for severe accident management
guidelines. These are components and procedures developed to ensure
that, in the event all of the above-described precautions failed and a
severe accident occurred, the plant would still protect public health
and safety. The requirements for severe accident management have been
in effect for many years and are frequently evaluated by the NRC
inspection program.
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified
important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a
significant fire or explosion at a plant, the NRC requires licensees to
have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures and
policies to help deal with a severe situation.
Our program of continuous improvement, based on operating
experience, will now include evaluation of the significant events in
Japan and what we can learn from them. We already have begun enhancing
inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection
staff, including the resident inspectors and the region-based
inspectors in our four regional offices, to look at licensees'
readiness to deal with both design-basis accidents and beyond-design-
basis accidents.
We have also issued an information notice to licensees to make them
aware of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities we believe
they should be engaged in to verify their readiness. It is expected
that licensees review the information related to their capabilities to
mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the
loss of significant operational and safety systems, to ensure that they
are in effect and operational.
During the past 20 years, there have been a number of new
rulemakings that have enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness
against some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. The ``station
blackout'' rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what
the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current
so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then
have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and
provide cooling to the core.
The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of
hydrogen generated for beyond-design-basis events and core damage.
There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment,
including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of
environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see
under a design-basis accident.
With regard to the type of containment design used by the most
heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water
Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s.
This program required installation of hardened vent systems for
containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the
automatic depressurization system.
A final factor that underpins our belief in the ongoing safety of
the U.S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and planning requirements
in place that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of
licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our
Federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration, these
activities include extensive interaction with State and local
governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic
basis.
Along with our confidence in the safety of United States nuclear
power plants, our agency has a responsibility to the American people to
undertake a systematic and methodical review of the safety of our
domestic facilities, in light of the natural disaster and the resulting
nuclear situation in Japan.
Examining all available information is an essential part of the
effort to analyze the event and understand its impact on Japan and its
implications for the United States. Our focus is always on keeping
nuclear plants and radioactive materials in this country safe and
secure.
On Monday, March 21, my colleagues at the NRC and I met to review
the status of the situation in Japan and identify the steps needed to
conduct that review. We consequently decided to establish a senior
level agency task force to conduct a comprehensive review of our
processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make
additional improvements to our regulatory system, and to make
recommendations to the NRC for its policy direction.
The review will be conducted in both a short-term and a longer-term
timeframe. The short-term review has already begun, and the task force
will brief the NRC at 30-, 60-, and 90-day intervals, to identify
potential or preliminary near-term operational or regulatory issues.
The task force then will undertake a longer-term review as soon as NRC
has sufficient information from the events in Japan. That longer-term
review will be completed in 6 months from the beginning of the
evaluation.
The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues
related to the event to identify additional potential research, generic
issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and
adjustments to the regulatory framework that may warrant action by the
NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, such as
emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons
learned to nonoperating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to
seek input from all key stakeholders during this process. A report with
appropriate recommendations will be provided to the NRC within 6 months
of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will
be made publicly available.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our
domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S.
licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate
safely. In light of the events in Japan, there will be a near-term
evaluation of their relevance to the United States fleet, and we are
continuing to gather the information necessary to take a longer, more
comprehensive and thorough look at the events in Japan and their
lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate
actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American
people.
Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the NRC, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you. I look forward to continuing to work with you to
advance the NRC's important safety mission.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Lyons.
STATEMENT OF DR. PETER B. LYONS, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
Mr. Lyons. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member
Alexander and Senator Lautenberg, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the nuclear accident
situation in Japan, the DOE's response and our research,
development and deployment programs relevant to nuclear safety.
I will leave discussion of the accident itself to my
written testimony and focus now on the DOE's response and our
ongoing RD&D programs.
To assist in the country's response, the National Nuclear
Security Administration's (NNSA) Nuclear Incident Team
Operations Center was promptly activated and has been
continuously staffed by both the NNSA and Office of Nuclear
Energy personnel since the accident. The focus of all DOE
activities has been to understand the accident progression and
offer advice and assistance to Japanese officials who have the
direct responsibility to manage the accident recovery.
The DOE has deployed about 40 people and more than 1,700
pounds of equipment, including NNSA's aerial measuring system
(AMS), and a number of consequent management response teams.
The AMS measures radiological contamination on the ground
deposited from transit of any released plumes. The AMS data,
taken now over a number of days, are consistent with reduced
levels of radiation compared to earlier measurements and show
no evidence of significant new releases, between March 19 and
March 29. In addition, NNSA has been modeling potential
transport of radioactive materials released from the plant,
utilizing the national atmospheric release advisory capability
at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
As Chairman Jaczko has also stated, we do not believe that
the radiation released by the plant poses a public health
danger in the United States, although certainly low levels,
trace levels of radioactivity attributable to the accident have
been observed here. The Office of Nuclear Energy has
established a nuclear energy response team to utilize the
capabilities of the DOE national laboratories in a wide range
of analyses. We are also working at the United States Embassy
in Tokyo, with NRC staff in Japan and in Rockville, Maryland
and with Japanese agencies and industry.
DOE and the NRC worked directly with the Institute for
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and the Nuclear Energy
Institute to encourage formation of an industry-led assistance
team. INPO is now leading this industry team deployed both in
Japan and at INPO headquarters in Atlanta. And in addition,
Secretary Chu and White House Science and Technology Advisor
John Holdren have reached out to laboratory directors and other
eminent scientists for technical advice. They are in touch with
them on a daily basis, as well as with an internal team of
scientists and engineers to analyze the situation, suggest new
approaches and evaluate potential solutions.
Now beyond our response to the accident, the research
development and deployment programs of my office are highly
relevant to future decisions about potential options for
nuclear power in the United States. Our proposed SMR program
will explore designs that offer safety advantages through
extensive use of passive systems. We are also conducting
research and development into high-temperature, gas-reactor
designs that offer inherent design safety features. Our light
water reactor (LWR) sustainability program is exploring whether
the lifetime of operating reactors can be extended with no
compromise in safety. Researching fuel cycles is also within my
office.
While we await guidance from the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's nuclear future, we are conducting research and
development into a broad range of options for the Nation's fuel
cycle, with careful attention to safety, environmental
protection, and nonproliferation.
Safety of future systems is really the key to all of our
programs. Selected research areas like fuel claddings that
cannot generate hydrogen in an accident or fuels that are
virtually impossible to melt have very obvious relevance. And
the new modeling and simulation hub which is based at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory will provide important new capabilities to
the nuclear industry, capabilities that can be used to assess
and improve the safety of existing reactors.
Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman recently stated that we view
nuclear energy as a very important compliment to the overall
portfolio we are trying to build for a clean energy future. The
programs of the Office of Nuclear Energy are focused on
assuring that the option for safe nuclear power remains open to
the Nation.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In conclusion, the earthquake and the resulting tsunami
brought tremendous devastation on Japan. At the DOE we are
making every effort to assist the Japanese people in their time
of need.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Peter B. Lyons
Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the nuclear accident situation in Japan and the Department
of Energy's (DOE) response.
Let me briefly recap our current understanding of events at the
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant with its six nuclear reactors,
albeit with many gaps in our knowledge. When the earthquake on March 11
struck, the three operating reactors (Units 1, 2, and 3) shut down in
accordance with operating procedures. Backup diesel generators started
per procedures to keep the water pumps and instrumentation operational.
But when the earthquake-generated tsunami struck, those backup power
generators were damaged.
Units 1, 2, and 3 used battery power to continue to run their
cooling pumps until the batteries were drained or the pumps failed. As
the reactor cores heated from radioactive decay, steam was produced.
The pressure buildup from that steam required venting, which released
some radioactive materials. It also lowered the water level in the
three reactor pressure vessels, reducing the cooling of the core. It
appears that all three reactor cores are damaged to unknown extents.
Additionally, as the fuel rod temperature increased, a reaction took
place between the zirconium fuel cladding and the water in the pressure
vessel, producing hydrogen. This hydrogen was vented along with the
steam and may have ignited at all three reactors. Substantial explosive
damage is visible at Units 1 and 3, presumably from these explosions.
An explosion may have damaged the containment structure at Unit 2.
Fission products have been released through these processes. Once
pumper units were brought in, seawater cooling was used for many days
until fresh water supplies were available.
Water levels at the spent-fuel pools are also of concern with some
reports that at least one was empty for some time. Depending on the
condition of the pools and the age of the fuel in the pool, the
cladding of the used fuel could ignite. Such a zirconium fire would be
very difficult to extinguish and could potentially lead to significant
releases. Seawater was also used to cool spent-fuel pools, until fresh
water supplies were obtained.
Current information suggests that the plants are in a slow recovery
from the accident. Long-term cooling of the reactors and pools is
essential during this period. A massive cleanup operation remains for
the future.
To assist in the United States' response, National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) Operations Center
was promptly activated and has been continuously staffed by NNSA and
Office of Nuclear Energy personnel since the accident. The focus of all
DOE activities, led by the operations center, has been to understand
the accident progression and offer advice and assistance to the
Japanese officials who have the direct responsibility to manage the
accident recovery.
The DOE has deployed about 40 people and more than 17,000 pounds of
equipment to Japan, including NNSA's Aerial Measuring System (AMS) and
Consequence Management Response Teams. The response teams on the ground
are utilizing their unique skills, expertise, and equipment to help
assess, survey, monitor, and sample ground areas for radiation. Since
arriving in Japan, the AMS team has collected and analyzed data
gathered from more than 40 hours of flights aboard Department of
Defense fixed wing and helicopter platforms. Sampling of airborne
radiological material, coupled with spectroscopic measurements by the
DOE team, have helped to determine that virtually all the material
studied to date is consistent with releases from operating reactors,
not the used fuel in the pools from which short-lived radioactive
materials have already decayed.
The AMS measures radiological contamination on the ground deposited
from transit of any release plumes. We are sharing the results of these
measurements with Japanese officials. In addition, AMS data are
available on the DOE Web site.
As of March 19, 2011, all AMS measurements beyond 2.5 miles from
the reactor were below 30 millirem per hour. Elevated readings have
been observed within about 25 miles of the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant and a distinctive pattern to the ground deposition is
readily observable with an area of higher contamination extending to
the northwest of the plant. The AMS was grounded by weather for several
days and flew again on March 24. The new data are consistent with
reduced levels of radiation compared to the earlier measurements and
show no evidence of significant new releases between March 19 and 24.
In addition, the NNSA has been performing in-country and long-
distance modeling of potential plume movement using the National
Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC) at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. The NRC supplies the hypothetical source terms for
these NARAC calculations.
The Office of Nuclear Energy has established a Nuclear Energy
Response Team (NERT). The purpose of this team is threefold:
--Provide expert analysis on reactor conditions to DOE leadership
from reported information and investigate discrepancies or
conflicting reports.
--Support the NIT Operations Center with analysis or additional
information as needed.
--Coordinate analysis activities at the DOE national laboratories in
support of the above.
The NERT consists of eight sub-teams organized by major systems of
the reactor (e.g., cooling, electrical power, reactor vessel) that
meets twice daily.
The Office of Nuclear Energy has staff in Japan working directly
with NRC's staff in Japan and with the Japanese agencies and industry.
We also have a representative at the NRC operations center in
Rockville. The Office of Nuclear Energy is also in contact with the GE-
Hitachi command centers.
DOE and NRC have worked with the Institute for Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO) and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to encourage
formation of an industry assistance team. INPO is now leading this
industry team, deployed both in Japan and at INPO headquarters in
Atlanta. Members of the NERT are in regular contact with the INPO
teams.
In addition, Secretary Chu and White House Science and Technology
Advisor John Holdren have jointly set up an informal group of experts
on reactor safety and accident mitigation from inside and outside the
Government. The group has a daily teleconference in which the newest
information is discussed and the individual members convey their
thoughts about the most promising approaches to the Secretary and Dr.
Holdren.
Beyond our response to the accident, the research, development, and
deployment programs of the Office of Nuclear Energy are highly relevant
to future decisions about the potential options for nuclear power in
the United States. Our proposed Small Modular Reactor program will
explore designs that offer safety advantages through extensive use of
passive systems. We are also conducting research and development into
high-temperature, gas-reactor designs that offer inherent safety
features. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program is exploring
whether the lifetime of operating reactors can be extended with no
compromise in safety.
The Office of Nuclear Energy also performs research on fuel cycles.
We are conducting R&D into a broad range of options for the Nation's
fuel cycle with careful attention to safety, environmental protection,
and nonproliferation. In addition, our cross-cutting research into
areas like advanced materials and instrumentation is exploring
technologies that could enable future safety enhancements, like fuel
claddings that cannot generate hydrogen in an accident or fuels that
are virtually impossible to melt. And the new Modeling and Simulation
Hub, based at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, will provide new
capabilities to the nuclear industry, capabilities that can be used to
assess and improve the safety of existing reactors.
I fully concur with the statement made by Deputy Secretary Poneman
at a White House briefing on March 14 that: ``We view nuclear energy as
a very important component to the overall portfolio we are trying to
build for a clean energy future.'' The programs of the Office of
Nuclear Energy are focused on assuring that the option for safe nuclear
power remains open to the Nation.
In conclusion, the earthquake and resulting tsunami have visited
tremendous devastation on Japan. Those of us at the DOE are making
every effort to assist the Japanese people in their time of need.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. And we will proceed
to the questions.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with you. The ranking
member mentioned there are 104 operating nuclear power reactors
at 65 sites in our country. I understand there are 48 dry cask
storage facilities in the United States. If my numbers are
accurate, does this mean that there are 17 reactor sites with
no dry cask storage option?
Mr. Jaczko. If your numbers are correct there are some
sites that have not yet gone to dry cask storage. We
anticipate, in time, that most sites will eventually move in
that direction.
Senator Feinstein. So the fuel rods just remain in the
spent-fuel pools?
Mr. Jaczko. Correct. And for those sites that have not gone
to dry cask storage, they remain in the pools. And these pools
are very robust structures that are designed to deal with the
kinds of natural phenomenon that we designed the entire reactor
site to. It is very thick, reinforced concrete structures,
generally about 4- to 5-feet thick walls with very thick
floors, so they provide, we think, a very robust protection for
the fuel.
Senator Feinstein. Let me ask this. What are the regulatory
requirements relative to spent fuel? They can just sit forever
in spent-fuel pools?
Mr. Jaczko. The way our requirements are based is we have
requirements about the minimum amount of time that the fuel
would need to be in the pool. So generally we think about 5
years or so is a reasonable timeframe for the fuel to need to
be in the pool, simply because it is very physically hot, so
it--that heat needs to dissipate and that needs to happen in
the pool itself.
Senator Feinstein. Do you have a maximum time?
Mr. Jaczko. We don't have a maximum time, but we do analyze
the fuel that is in the pool. And if, as new fuel were to be
added to the pool, that goes through a very rigorous analysis
to ensure that that can be done safely and securely.
Senator Feinstein. So one wouldn't be surprised, in these
plants, to see fuel in those spent-fuel pools for decades?
Mr. Jaczko. That is possible, certainly. Many sites have
begun to move, as you indicated, their fuel out of the pools
into dry cask storage. Generally, what the utilities like to do
is reserve some amount of space in the pool to be able to take
the fuel that is in the reactor at any time and move that into
a pool. So that tends to be the condition at which if they lose
that ability to have that extra space, then they will usually
move to dry cask storage to store the fuel.
Senator Feinstein. Well, in the two plants I looked at,
with respect to the dry casks, the casks at one plant were
standing outside and the casks at the other plant were in a
water-resistant building. Are there any standards for dry cask
storage?
Mr. Jaczko. We--the dry cask storage systems are required
to be certified by the NRC to, again, meet very rigorous
standards for dealing with natural phenomenon and as well as
ensuring the safety of the fuel itself. So there are basically
two types of systems that are generally used, and I think you
saw examples of those two types at Diablo Canyon and San
Onofre. So we have approved those and again, they meet our high
standards for natural phenomenon, for ensuring that the fuel
will stay sufficiently cool and that we won't have any type of
nuclear reaction in the fuel itself.
Senator Feinstein. Why aren't there better standards for
spent-fuel pools? You have good standards for the reactor, but,
it seems to me, not for the spent fuel.
Mr. Jaczko. Well, the spent-fuel pools are considered
safety significant systems. So they meet a lot of the same
standards that the reactor itself would have to meet. For
instance, the spent-fuel pools themselves are required to
withstand the natural phenomenon like earthquakes and tsunamis
that could impact the reactor itself. They are required--the
spent fuel is required to be able to deal with these severe
accidents. It is also required to be able to deal with the
possibility of any type of nuclear reaction happening in the
pool itself. So there are very high standards and they're very
comparable to the reactors themselves.
Senator Feinstein. Well, didn't Japan have similar
standards? Yet, the spent-fuel pools could not withstand the
tsunami and the earthquake.
Mr. Jaczko. At this point we don't know exactly what
contributed to the situation with the spent-fuel pools in
Japan. It's unclear whether that was a direct result of the
earthquake itself or whether there was subsequent actions, such
as the hydrogen explosions that occurred, that created a more
difficult situation with the spent-fuel pools. But, I would
add, from what we do know right now, there are six spent-fuel
pools in Japan and we believe with a good level of confidence
that certainly the spent-fuel pool for unit one has operated
normally without any particular challenge, the unit pool--the
unit two pool as well has operated fine. The challenges we're
seeing are really with units 3 and 4. But units 5 and 6 also
were operating in a stable way at this time. So we haven't seen
challenges with all the pools in Japan, just a small subset.
Senator Feinstein. Was it cracks in the superstructure of
the pool itself that caused the two to fail?
Mr. Jaczko. Right now we don't know for sure what the
situation is. We believe it is possible that there was perhaps
a leak in the unit 3 pool and that perhaps there were some
other challenges with the unit 4 pool. But again, we don't know
at this point whether that was the result of the earthquake and
the tsunami or some of the subsequent events that happened. So
those are the kinds of things we will be looking at as we
embark on our short term and our longer term to analyze that.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Jaczko,
continuing the chairman's comments, most of the problems we
read and hear about in Japan from the reactors comes basically
from the inability to cool some of the used fuel rods. Is that
right?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think it is--there are really two
issues that we are looking at. One is ensuring the continued
cooling of the reactors themselves and then maintaining the
cooling in the pool, so both of those issues are important.
Senator Lautenberg. Cooling--it is a cooling issue?
Mr. Jaczko. It is a cooling issue for us.
Senator Alexander. When we talk about storing all the spent
nuclear fuel in the United States produced in the last 35
years, by my mathematics, roughly speaking, it would fit on a
single football field 20 feet deep. Is that right?
Mr. Jaczko. I believe I have seen estimates like that. I
think that is approximately correct.
Senator Alexander. And today that spent nuclear fuel is
stored on the site where the nuclear reactor is, according to
your rules and regulations. How long can that be safely stored
there?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, right now the NRC recently affirmed a
decision we have made over the years that we call our waste
confidence decision. And in that decision we look at what the
long-term impacts, ultimately the long-term environmental
impacts are from that spent fuel. And right now we believe that
for at least a hundred years that fuel can be stored with very
little impacts to health and safety or to the environment.
In addition, as part of that decision the NRC asked the
staff at the agency to go out and take a look to really see if
you are to go out 2 or 3 or 400 years if there are any safety
issues that could arise that would present a challenge to the
kind of approach we have right now for dealing with spent fuel.
So right now we believe that this is material that can be
stored safely and securely in either the spent-fuel pools
themselves or in dry cask storage.
Senator Alexander. So what you are saying is that most of
the reactor problems we have been reading about in Japan have
to do with the cooling of used nuclear fuel or spent fuel, and
that in the United States, the amount of material we have
produced over the last 35 years which is currently stored in
pools or dry casks at various sites, would only fill a football
field 20-feet deep.
Mr. Jaczko. Sixty-five sites.
Senator Alexander. And it is your estimate or the NRC's
estimate that it can be safely stored there for up to 100
years?
Mr. Jaczko. That is our assessment right now. Yes.
Senator Alexander. Now, I want to compliment the President.
When he started his administration I was afraid he was going to
lead us on a national windmill policy instead of a national
energy policy. But his attitude toward nuclear power, in my
opinion, has been thoughtful and balanced, including through
this crisis. He has appointed excellent people to your NRC. Dr.
Chu has been a strong appointment. He has recommended loan
guarantees for the first new nuclear plants and more important,
or equally important, he has a distinguished panel looking at
the future of used nuclear fuel.
And I want to ask you to comment on that, you or Mr. Lyons.
As I understand it, while we can safely store used nuclear
fuel onsite for 100 years, what the President and others are
suggesting is that we research a better way to store it. That
might include reducing its volume by 70, 80, or 90 percent,
making it that much smaller, finding ways that plutonium isn't
separated from it, recycling it or using it over and over
again. So the bottom line is that we are comfortable with being
able to store it in its current form and location for up to 100
years, but over the next 10 to 20 years we will be looking for
a better way to recycle and reuse it, and that is what we're
hoping to find from the recommendations of the President's
commission.
Am I approximately right in that or what comments would you
add?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I would defer to Secretary Lyons
probably--he can best answer that question, I think.
Mr. Lyons. Well, Senator Alexander, as you note, the
mission of the Blue Ribbon Commission is to explore a wide
range of options for management of used fuel, the back end of
the fuel cycle. And certainly at the DOE we are eagerly
awaiting their reports and their suggestions and guidance. The
interim report of that group is due by July 29, final report by
January of next year. And we anticipate that that will provide
important guidance to the range of R&D programs that we have at
the DOE.
Now while we are awaiting that report, we do maintain a
broad spectrum of research ranging from the once through cycle
that the country has now and understanding how that could be
improved or sustained, all the way to different options
including the reprocessing that you're describing. And we view
our goal as providing a set of options to the American people,
certainly guided by the output of the Blue Ribbon Commission
that can lead to a long-term sustainable policy for used fuel
management in the country.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank
you both for your excellent testimony.
Dr. Jaczko, do we have a better regulatory system than
Japan? Is there a difference in the two systems?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think every country that has nuclear
power takes a different approach to dealing with the safety of
the reactors in their country. I think we have a system that is
well-suited to dealing with the safety of the reactors in this
country. It is a system, as I said, that relies on multiple
layers of protection and it incorporates a strong basis in
technical information. And we have a very strong presence of
inspectors at the reactor sites. So we think that this provides
a very strong system to ensure the safety of plants in the
United States.
Senator Lautenberg. We, in our conversation yesterday we
discussed a total review of all plants in America and I think
that your time target was 90 days. Is that correct?
Mr. Jaczko. We are looking at a short-term review in 90
days and that will be followed by a much longer-term review as
we get more detailed information from Japan.
Senator Lautenberg. So we can be assured that the problems
that we saw in Japan will have a review of possibility here in
our--with our plants here in the country?
Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely. That is the focus of these reviews.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, the--you know, we have the oldest
plant, commercial plant in America, built in 1969. The Fukiama
plants I think were built in 1971. Is that--am I correct?
Mr. Jaczko. Yes.
Senator Lautenberg. Is there any question about age of
facility that might have--that contributed to the difficulty
there?
Mr. Jaczko. At this point we don't know what the exact
causes of the situation in Japan are. But again, if we look at
the situation for the U.S. reactors, all the reactors that we
have that are of a similar type have undergone modifications
and improvements to deal with the kinds of situations that we
are seeing in Japan.
For instance, it has been known, since the late 1980s and
early 1990s that the accumulation of hydrogen presents a
significant challenge. So the reactors of this type in
particular were modified to ensure that they could better
mitigate or reduce the likelihood of that type of hydrogen
explosion. So we think we have a program, or we have a program
that addresses these issues, but we will do these comprehensive
reviews to ensure that there isn't any information that we have
missed and that can better enhance the safety.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Jaczko, can we say, without fear of
contradiction that our plants in New Jersey are updated, able
to deal with any malfunction of the operation there? Because in
April 2009, I am sure you recollect--April 2009, August 2009--
we had low level tritium leaks. Now tritium is a fairly
dangerous material and what assurance can I give the people in
the surrounding area that: we did or did not find any health
consequences of the tritium leaks; were there examinations
called for in the area and did we find anything that--within
the--those families that there--they have to be concerned
about?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, with regard to the tritium leaks we
believe that that is not an acceptable situation for any power
reactor in the United States to have that kind of a leak. With
regard to the Oyster Creek leak, we did not see any indication
of any risk to public health and safety as a result of those
particular leaks. And in fact, the facility has made
significant modifications to dramatically reduce the likelihood
of something like that happening in the future.
And I would add that those leaks were not in systems that
directly affect the ability of the reactor to deal with
accidents and errors or to ensure that the reactor itself or
the spent-fuel pools continue to function safely and securely.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman and thank you
again witnesses.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg. I assume the record will remain open?
Senator Feinstein. It will remain open.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thanks a lot. And it is an honor to be part
of our subcommittee. Thank you, Madam Chair and Senator
Alexander.
And so, if my memory serves me, it was--Three Mile Island
was 1979? Is that correct?
Mr. Jaczko. Correct.
Senator Durbin. And I would say, for 32 years the nuclear
power industry has really been stymied, frozen in place with
virtually no major expansion across the United States in the
heels--on the heels of that controversy.
And I am wondering now if the same thing is going to happen
as a result of Japan. Whether there will be serious questions
raised about operations and about design and about nuclear
waste that will once again cause this industry to stop, reflect
and probably slow down any plans to advance.
I also understand the economics of energies. I have been
told that natural gas electric power creation is a much cheaper
alternative and obviously safer in many respects. So that seems
to be the general view of the out--what I see coming as an
outgrowth of the Japanese tragedy.
We had a hearing last week in Illinois, because we are so
nuclear power dependent, one-half of our electricity is
generated by the nuclear power, we have 11 generators and 4 of
them are exactly the same design as Fukushima. And
representatives of your agency came, as did State and local and
private sector and we had a long conversation about many
things, including the nuclear waste onsite, spent nuclear fuel
rods onsite in Illinois, 7,200 tons worth of those nuclear--
pardon me, spent nuclear fuel rods.
We talked about many different things and we talked about
Yucca Mountain. And I recall from my college, the ``Myth of
Sisyphus'' pushing that boulder up the hill and barely getting
to the top and it rolls back to the bottom. And now we realize
that the name of that hill is Yucca Mountain. It appears that
we keep rolling this boulder up close to the top and never
quite reach it.
And I don't know ultimately whether this, I think it is $90
billion current estimate of investment in Yucca Mountain will
ever take place, and if it does it is probably 10 years over
the horizon when the decision is made. And I have to ask and
bring up a question which came up at our hearing. What about
the situation with reprocessing? There was a time when we took
a national position on it to try and be an example to the
world, not to reprocess and create an opportunity to use
plutonium for the development of weapons. But I think what is
happening or what I see today is that two of our major allies
in the world, Britain and France, France in particular, have
decided that reprocessing is not only okay, it is a great
commercial investment and they are receiving the waste from
other countries and reprocessing it, dramatically reducing the
size of the remaining radioactive challenge.
Is that thinking from the Carter administration really
appropriate today? Are we not in a world that has accepted
reprocessing? Shouldn't we be looking at it ourselves as an
alternative to a $90 billion Yucca Mountain investment that
might come online 10 years from now?
Mr. Jaczko. Well I, Senator I will briefly answer from the
NRC's perspective and Dr. Lyons probably can give you a better
answer to that question. We are currently doing work to develop
an infrastructure to support a reprocessing facility in this
country. That activity is at a probably a medium-to-low-level
priority in the agency, because of what we see from the
commercial sector about interest in the immediate development
or deployment of a reprocessing facility, but there certainly
is discussion right now and perhaps Dr. Lyons can provide more
information on that.
Senator Durbin. Before you go any further, let me stop you.
You said there is a lack of interest in the commercial sector?
Wouldn't this be our Government responsibility?
Mr. Jaczko. It is certainly possible that it could be a
Government responsibility, but it could also be a private
sector development of a private reprocessing facility to do
that.
Senator Durbin. But is it your belief that the private
sector in nuclear power believes that maintaining these pools
across the United States is a viable alternative?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, certainly from the agency's perspective
we think that that can be done safely and securely. The
ultimate decisions about how to manage that spent fuel are
really decisions for the Federal Government and the private
sector itself about how long term they want to maintain that.
For instance, some utilities move more fuel more quickly
into dry cask storage; others leave it in pools----
Senator Durbin. If I remember the debate on this, the push
for Yucca Mountain came from the private sector. And the
argument was, ``We don't want to be responsible any longer for
the spent nuclear fuel rods and the danger associated with
them. We want the Federal Government to accept the
responsibility, we believe it is theirs, and build Yucca
Mountain.'' So you are saying when it comes to reprocessing
though, they are not interested in that development?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think there is some interest right now.
I would say it is--as with any type of fuel, there is an
industry that provides fuel for the reactors; there are
economic considerations that go into whether or not
reprocessing is the most effective way to provide that fuel.
And I think in many ways that is what is driving the commercial
side, in terms of their interest in reprocessing or no
reprocessing. It is a cost issue in many ways right now.
Senator Durbin. I am over time, but Dr. Lyons, if you would
like to respond.
Mr. Lyons. Well, my response would be very lengthy. You
asked many, many questions, sir and maybe I can come back to it
in subsequent rounds. But, just to answer a few of your
questions. You started with, ``Will the incidents in Japan
impact growth here on nuclear power?" Personally, I think that
the review that the NRC will be conducting, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has announced there will be
international reviews where the international community will
compare lessons learned, I think all of those factors will come
together to help understand, and certainly for the NRC, to
decide whether any regulatory changes are required that may
impact the progression of nuclear power in the country.
You alluded to, and I certainly agree, that the very low
price of natural gas, the absence of any value placed on carbon
certainly tends to favor approaches to new power like natural
gas. And I think that impacts any of the clean energy
solutions.
I can launch into a discussion on reprocessing and I'd like
to do that, but we are way over the time, so I will leave it up
to you folks as to whether I should proceed.
Senator Durbin. This is my first hearing in the
subcommittee and I don't want to abuse the privilege.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. This has
been very interesting. I want to thank you.
I do want to move on, but I just want to say something. Mr.
Chairman, you said that spent fuel could be stored safely and
securely for 100 years either in spent fuel pools or dry casks.
I am amazed that storing it in these pools for that period of
time, while these pools are being racked and reracked now, with
more and more of them in the pools. You know when the design
basis of these plants was put into effect a lot of the threats
weren't present. You know, we didn't worry about a terrorist
bomb at our nuclear power plants as we do today. You have got
all these spent fuel rods, very hot against some of them that
have cooled off somewhat.
I always thought that dry casks were the best kind of long-
term storage. And to me 100 years is long-term storage.
Mr. Jaczko. Well, there is--I think this is very much an
issue that the NRC is going to take a look at again, I think
without a doubt, as part of this short-term and long-term
review. But the information we have right now shows that both
of these methodologies are equally safe for a very long period
of time. What--obviously if you are getting to 60, 70 years of
spent-fuel pool storage, that likely would not happen because
that long period of time the reactor has likely been shut down
and undergoing a period of decommissioning. And that would
involve taking the fuel out of the pools and putting it in dry
cask storage. So, in that longer-term scenario you would likely
see most of the fuel being moved into dry cask at that point.
And as the fuel does get cooler the likelihood of the very
severe type of accident from a spent fuel gets reduced
significantly. The concern is that you have a fire essentially
and it releases a lot of radioactive material from the spent-
fuel pools. As the fuel ages, the likelihood of that fire
reduces dramatically.
Senator Feinstein. But you are adding new rods all the
time.
Mr. Jaczko. As part of the process we have required the
licensees, when they add new fuel that they add it in such a
way that they balance the various--they distribute the hot fuel
in such a way that it really reduces the likelihood of this
type of fire. So you--they move and shuffle all of the fuel
each time so that you always have hot fuel that is surrounded
by much cooler fuel to reduce the likelihood of these kinds of
challenges.
But again, as you really play out the much longer term, 60,
70, 80 years, we would envision that at that point most fuel
begins to move out of the pools and into dry cask storage. It
is--of course the hot fuel will always have to spend some
amount of time in the pools, just to cool off to the point
where it can be moved. But again, I--this is something that I
am very confident we will be looking at as part of both the
short-term and the long-term review.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Jaczko. Sure.
Senator Feinstein. Did you have anything you want to say or
a question to ask?
Senator Alexander. I wonder if Dr. Lyons agrees, from the
point of view of the DOE, that used nuclear fuel can be safely
stored onsite for up to 100 years.
Mr. Lyons. I was on the NRC when that question was reviewed
and I was part of the decision that evaluated that information.
This was before my current job. Yes, I do agree.
However, just as additional information, through the R&D
program at the DOE, we also will be pursuing a program designed
to understand what may be the lifetime limiting--or the life
limiting aspects of how long dry casks can be safely used. So
that will be another contribution to this overall discussion of
the longevity of dry cask storage.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much gentlemen. This was
very helpful and we appreciate it. Thank you for being here.
Oh, I'm sorry. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. I--if I can just do one followup question,
because when I raised the issue of reprocessing I thought the
chairman's allusion was to the economics of it. And can any--
can either of you speak to the economics of reprocessing and
deriving some sort of fuel source from that and dramatically
reducing the waste that is left behind, as opposed to the
current cost of cooling pools, casks and ultimate national
repository?
Mr. Lyons. Senator Durbin, if I may. I indicated that we do
have research programs that span the gamut of different options
for the back end of the fuel cycle and that certainly includes
the reprocessing that you are addressing. In addition, the Blue
Ribbon Commission will be providing guidance on this.
As far as the economics, I have never seen a study that
claimed that it was less expensive to use reprocessing. There
may be other reasons why one would want to reprocess, but I am
certainly not aware of any study which says that reprocessing
would be a lower-cost option, nor am I aware of any utility in
this country that is pushing to move toward reprocessing. There
certainly are companies for whom that is their product and
would be very interested.
Yes, also you mentioned the situation in France and Japan.
Let me just note that part of our research is designed to
understand some of the limitations on particularly the approach
that is used in Japan, the PUREX approach, which we would not
utilize in this country from a number of different
perspectives, including a nonproliferation concern and
including environmental concerns.
Senator Durbin. So, if I can for a second, but correct me
if I'm wrong, I understood, during the debate on Yucca Mountain
that it was agreed that the ultimate responsibility for storing
this nuclear waste was to be borne by the government taxpayers.
Mr. Lyons. That is correct. That is the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act and the Amendments Act.
Senator Durbin. And so when you say that the commercial
private sector does not support reprocessing, it would seem to
me that we ought to be asking, from the taxpayer's viewpoint,
whether that is an economic alternative if we are ever to build
Yucca Mountain and transport the--all the waste in America to
that site.
Mr. Lyons. Well, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also requires
that there be a fee levied on all nuclear power use that is
intended to cover the costs of whatever back end, whatever
disposition system is to be used. So whatever the costs of that
will be, and currently there is a one mil per kilowatt hour
assessment on nuclear power, that is intended to cover the back
end. To the extent perhaps additional funds would be required
for other back end systems that would be passed along.
Senator Durbin. My last question, I am sorry Madam Chair,
but taking the current French approach on reprocessing, are you
saying that we have done an economic model to compare the cost
of reprocessing against the cost of a national repository?
Mr. Lyons. There have been a number of such models. I
certainly can't characterize all of them quickly, but I am
quite sure that the majority, if not all of them would say that
a repository, I am not saying economic, but a repository
approach probably is a lower cost. But there may be other
reasons, and this is part of the Blue Ribbon Commission review,
there may be other reasons that would drive one toward some
form of reprocessing. I believe it would be different than what
is used in France.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could perhaps clarify my
reference to the economics. The economic comparison that I am
referring to is the cost of fuel that would come directly from
uranium that is mined in the ground as opposed to the cost of
fuel that would come from reprocessed uranium. That is the
economic comparison that I was referring to. And in that case
right now the price of uranium generally favors the naturally
mined uranium as a source of fuel. So that was the economic
comparison I was referring to.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. I just--Madam Chairman, your indulgence
please for a question that I have that has puzzled me since you
testified at an earlier hearing, Dr. Jaczko.
The NRC requires evacuation plans only for areas within 10
miles of a plant, but the United States Government has warned
Americans in Japan to stay at least 50 miles away from the
damaged reactors there and the ships were turned around, I
think it was at 60 miles. When I asked you at the previous
hearing what you thought was a safe distance, I think that the
response that you gave me was 20 miles. Can we clear this up?
And why not require the same kind of evacuation plan to address
the same distance here at home?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, Senator, this is likely an issue we will
be looking at as part of our short-term and long-term reviews,
but the 10-mile distance in the United States is the distance
at which we develop preplanned and prepared evacuation plans.
So it is based on an event that would happen in a very short
period of time for which you would not have the ability to
develop additional planning for evacuations beyond a certain
distance. There is always the possibility that if an event were
to develop like it has in Japan, that additional protective
actions could be required beyond 10 miles. But the requirements
we have in place are for those--the preplanning that needs to
be done so that if you got an event that happened and developed
very quickly, you wouldn't have to take the time then to
develop the evacuation plans, they are already developed and
ready to go as soon as that event happens.
But of course as the events in Japan show, that it was
something that happened over a course of many, many days before
we got to the point at which we looked at information that
indicated you could have to go to a great distance. So far the
data coming out of the plant continues to show that the safe
distance there is approximately 20 miles.
So there is the work that we do to preplan, which right now
we believe 10 miles is sufficient. But that is not necessarily
the end of any protective action. You could take additional
action beyond that if necessary.
Mr. Lautenberg. We look forward to hearing from you on kind
of a continuing basis to find out what a good conclusion is
that you come to. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
We've been joined by Senator Graham. Would you like to make
a statement or ask questions?
Senator Graham. Just ask questions would be great.
Senator Feinstein. Go right ahead.
Senator Graham. Thank you. I am honored to be on the
subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman, do you believe the nuclear power industry in
the United States is well-regulated and generally safe?
Mr. Jaczko. I certainly, as the chairman of the NRC,
believe it is well-regulated.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. Jaczko. And we do believe we have a strong program to
ensure protection of public health and safety.
Senator Graham. Would you advise the Congress to continue
to pursue nuclear power as part of energy production in this
country?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, decisions ultimately about what to do
with nuclear power really are beyond our, really our
responsibility.
Senator Graham. Just as a citizen, would you like to see
America have more nuclear power in the future?
Mr. Jaczko. I, as a citizen, would like to see nuclear
power that is safe and secure and that is fundamentally my job
as chairman of the NRC.
Senator Graham. And do you believe that the nuclear power
plants that we are talking about constructing in the future are
more modern and safer?
Mr. Jaczko. Certainly the plants that are under
consideration have enhanced design and enhanced safety features
that at least on--at the design stage and on paper seem to
indicate that they would have an inherent safety advantage over
the existing plants.
Senator Graham. One of the benefits----
Mr. Jaczko. But I want to stress, if I could, that we
believe the plants that are in existence today do meet our
requirements for safety and security and the new plants could
potentially have some additional enhancements over that.
Senator Graham. It is like new cars have things that old
cars don't have, but we still drive older cars. I have an older
car and I feel safe in it. I will buy a newer car and may be
even safer, I guess.
At the end of the day, one of the big impediments--the
benefit of nuclear power is it creates good jobs, in my view,
and it doesn't emit pollutants in the air. Is that your
understanding? I wonder if it is----
Mr. Jaczko. Well, again we--you know, the focus for the
agency is really to make sure that the nuclear power that is in
this country is safe and secure. And we continue to have a
program, we think, that ensures that.
Senator Graham. If I called it ``clean energy'' would you
agree?
Mr. Jaczko. You know, I tend to not like to get into----
Senator Graham. I see.
Mr. Jaczko [continuing]. Discussions about those kind of
things.
Senator Graham. Let's talk about spent fuel. Can we talk
about that?
Mr. Jaczko. Sure.
Senator Graham. Because I think--I didn't hear his
question, but Senator Durbin is making a point about what
should we do with spent fuel. I have always been a fan of the
French reprocessing system, but quite frankly Secretary Chu has
convinced me, and I think he is one of the best Secretary of
Energy that we have ever had since I have been in the Congress.
I like him a lot, incredibly smart. He has convinced me that if
we will be patient, maybe in the next decade plus there will be
new technologies developed on the spent-fuel reprocessing front
that would be worth waiting on. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think again from the NRC perspective--
--
Senator Graham. Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Jaczko [continuing]. We would just want to make sure
that spent fuel can be stored safely and securely----
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. Jaczko [continuing]. Until then. And we think that is
the case right now.
Senator Graham. Okay. Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Let me start, Senator Graham, by heartily
agreeing with my boss, Secretary Chu.
Senator Graham. Both of you all are very smart. I like it.
Mr. Lyons. But we--yes, we are very interested in exploring
a wide range of options on the back end of the fuel cycle and
putting it----
Senator Graham. So you think it would be beneficial for the
country not to duplicate the French system right now?
Mr. Lyons. The French system uses the so-called PUREX
process. They have certainly made some improvements in it over
the years, but we do have some issues related to possible
proliferation from that cycle as well as environmental issues.
We think that with research we can do substantially better and
that is the research that Secretary Chu is leading, through my
office.
Senator Graham. Is shutting Yucca Mountain down helpful to
our nuclear waste problem or harmful?
Mr. Lyons. Let me answer in this way, Senator. I came to
the Department after the decision had been made and I heartily
agreed with the Secretary that Yucca Mountain is not a workable
solution, because I believe that the equation needs both a
technical and a local support. As a resident of Nevada for many
years I saw the lack of local support. I do think it is
possible, and certainly the Blue Ribbon Commission is working
toward approaches that may not only provide interesting
technical options, but I hope can be done in ways, like it has
been done in many international venues, with strong, local
support.
Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you. I think that is the key to
this is probably local political support more than anything
else.
But we will just move on right quickly to MOX
fuel. Can you tell us what MOX--did MOX
fuel in any way contribute to the disaster in Japan?
Mr. Lyons. No.
Senator Graham. We have a program to create MOX
fuel in America that would take plutonium weapons and convert
them into plowshares; it is called The MOX Program
at Savannah River, South Carolina. Do you support that?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, sir. That is not through my program,
however, yes, I am well aware of the program. And that is
through NNSA, the defense----
Senator Graham. If I could just indulge my colleagues a
moment. There are 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium
that are in excess of our defense needs here and the equivalent
amount in Russia. And these are literally nuclear weapons. And
there is a process called MOX where you can take the
weapon and dilute it down and create commercial fuel. You are
literally taking a sword and turning it into a plowshare. And
that program is going on in South Carolina at the Savannah
River site.
And I just want to thank the administration for being
supportive of the program. And there are some things being said
in the House about the MOX Program I would like to
get straight. Again, do you believe that producing
MOX fuel here in America makes sense, it is overall
safe and do you recommend we continue to do so?
Mr. Lyons. Well again sir, when we cross to safety I need
to pass it back to Greg. I certainly understand the
nonproliferation aspects of this. And----
Senator Graham. It is huge, isn't it?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. It is huge. I mean you are literally taking
weapons grade plutonium off the market and doing something
constructive with it.
Mr. Chairman, do you support the MOX Program?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, we have done very thorough analyses of
the use of MOX fuel and right now we--all the
information we have indicates that it can be used safely.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
Gentlemen, thank you so much. We will proceed to the next
panel.
I would ask the witnesses to come forward as quickly as you
can and staff to change the name cards.
We will begin with Dr. Moniz of MIT. Thank you, sir, for
being here. The clock will run in 5-minute allocations. We
review your written statements so if you could summarize and we
can have a more informal discussion I think that would be most
useful.
You have heard the prior panel. We would be interested on
your reactions and reflections.
STATEMENT OF DR. ERNEST J. MONIZ, PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS,
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Moniz. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Alexander, thanks
again--thanks for the opportunity to present and discuss some
views on the development of nuclear power in the United States
in the wake of the Fukushima events.
I must start by emphasizing that my testimony is purely my
personal view, not the view of PCAST, the Blue Ribbon
Commission or MIT.
Fukushima has reopened the global discussion about the
future of nuclear power, but we clearly don't know how this
debate will end. However, I think some outcomes are a very good
bet. The cost of doing business at nuclear reactors will go up;
the expected relicensing of 40-year-old nuclear plants for
another 20 years will face additional scrutiny. These plants,
like those at Fukushima, rely to a large extent on active
safety systems rather than the passive safety systems built
into the new designs. And the third, the options for the entire
spent-fuel management system I expect will be re-evaluated.
Let me selectively address a few of these issues. First
cost. Currently operating plants would certainly face a very
expensive proposition to retrofit if design threats are
elevated substantially. This calls for a plant-by-plant review,
of course including specific circumstances, like seismic. In
many cases however, perhaps most, I expect the design basis
threats are likely to be deemed sufficiently conservative and
remain unchanged.
The regulatory decisions about safety requirements can be
assisted by application of new capabilities, among them the
kind of advanced modeling and simulation tools being developed
at DOE's first innovation hub at Oak Ridge, and I might say,
with major MIT engagement. Other types of retrofits could be
more easily absorbed into normal operations such as
transitioning the silicon-carbide fuel cladding to get higher-
safety margins. I believe that the slow pace of this indicates,
historically, an R&D program poorly aligned with strategic
priorities, but the DOE current roadmap I think is a big step
in the right direction.
Now new nuclear power plants are already challenged, let's
face it, by high capital costs and increased costs--capital or
operating--could tip the balance for many projects, depending
on many financing and cost recovery factors. Now reducing the
financial risk premium for nuclear power is a major objective
of government support for first mover plants, principally
through the loan guarantee program. Fukushima clearly does not
help in this regard.
An entirely different approach to new plants lies with SMRs
and these could be a powerful way to address the cost issue by
moving us from economies of scale to economies of
manufacturing. But I do want to say, and I am very enthusiastic
about these, but I do want to say there is a catch-22 that
these economies of manufacture can only be realized,
presumably, if we have a sufficient stream of orders for a
greatly winnowed down set of technology options and that will
be a complex interplay of government and the many proponents of
and customers for the currently contending numerous SMR
designs.
Prior to Fukushima the administration submitted a budget
for 2012 that would have greatly enhanced the level of activity
for bringing SMRs to market. I believe that program is modest,
but sensible and deserves support.
Second, relicensing decisions of the NRC will almost
certainly experience some delay. If the anticipated life
extensions are not realized at any appreciable degree, we have
to face the issue of replacing potentially tens of thousands of
megawatts of nonemitting generation. It is not an immediate
problem, because of our natural gas situation, but if we want
to have those zero emission options for 2020, it is an
immediate challenge to develop them. And I do want to
emphasize, among those options we must retain next-generation
nuclear plants with advanced safety systems, including SMRs.
Third, spent-fuel management, the Fukushima problems with
spent-fuel pools co-located with reactors will undoubtedly lead
to a re-evaluation of spent-fuel management strategy. Our
reports at MIT have advocated, well before this, we should be
moving, in any case, to consolidated spent-fuel storage. This
has many drives, among them resolution of the Federal liability
issues for not moving spent fuel away from reactors. And I
believe that the Congress should allow use of the waste fund
for development of consolidated storage.
PREPARED STATEMENT
But eventually the spent fuel must go to a repository. My
view is--my recommendation in the end is that consolidated
spent fuel dry cask storage be established as soon as possible,
as I discussed, and that a geological repository be established
as soon as possible for defense high-level waste and spent
fuel. That is, I would argue going back, re-evaluating the
1980s decision of commingling defense and civilian waste,
separate them. Because I believe, for many reasons, we can move
much faster toward a defense waste repository which would in
turn develop tremendous amounts of knowledge and experience for
an ensuing civilian waste repository.
Thank you and I look forward to the discussion.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ernest J. Moniz
fukushima and directions for u.s. nuclear power
Chairman Feinstein, Senator Alexander, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present and discuss
views on the development of nuclear power in the United States in the
wake of the Fukushima events. I must start by emphasizing that this
testimony represents my personal views, not those of the President's
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future, or my home institution,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Fukushima has reopened the global discussion about the future of
nuclear power. Several factors had led many countries to consider
expanding their nuclear capacity, reversing phaseouts, or initiating
new nuclear programs. These factors include a very good safety and
reliability record for the last decades, increasing concern about the
risks of climate change, and a concomitant recognition that enormous
amounts of additional electric generating capacity will be needed
without increasing greenhouse gas and other polluting emissions.
Exactly how the new debate will end is unclear and will remain so for
some time, as the events and responses in Japan are investigated and
fully understood, and as safety systems, operating procedures,
regulatory oversight, emergency response plans, design basis threats,
and spent-fuel management are re-examined by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) for currently operating United States reactors.
Nevertheless, some outcomes are a good bet:
--The cost of doing business at nuclear reactors will go up,
reflecting factors as diverse as new requirements for onsite
spent-fuel management to measures needed to address possible
elevated design basis threats.
--The expected relicensing of 40-year-old nuclear plants for another
20 years of operation will face additional scrutiny, taking
more time than expected. Indeed some of the license extensions
already granted for more than 60 of the 104 plants operating in
the United States could be revisited. These plants, like those
at Fukushima, rely to a large extent on active safety systems
in case of accidents or natural disasters, rather than the
passive safety systems built into the new designs.
--Options for the entire spent-fuel management system--onsite
storage, consolidated long-term storage, geological disposal--
will be re-evaluated. This will be based both on what we learn
from the Fukushima investigations about the spent-fuel behavior
under accident conditions to a broader imperative to
rationalize our overall SNF management system.
The consequences of such outcomes could be very significant for
nuclear power and for the entire energy system. We shall selectively
address some of the associated issues.
cost
Currently operating nuclear plants would face an expensive
proposition to retrofit if design threats are elevated substantially.
On the positive side, nuclear power plants have low-operating and fuel
costs compared with coal and natural gas plants, and the owners might
be able to absorb reasonable costs. However, the business decisions
would be on a plant-by-plant basis depending on the design basis threat
assigned to the plant's specific circumstances (e.g., seismic). In many
cases, perhaps most, the design basis threats are likely to be deemed
sufficiently conservative and remain unchanged. The regulatory
decisions about safety requirements can be assisted by application of
new capabilities, such as advanced large-scale modeling and simulation.
The first of DOE's innovation hubs, located at Oak Ridge (with MIT as a
major partner) is dedicated to developing related computational tools
over the next several years.
Other types of retrofits could be more easily absorbed into normal
operations. For example, there has long been a discussion of
transitioning to silicon-carbide fuel cladding in order to gain higher
safety margins and other operational benefits as well. The cladding can
be formed into the same size and shape as zircaloy cladding used in
currently operating reactors, but has much less reactivity with steam
(this was the source of the hydrogen in the Fukushima loss-of-coolant
situation). But, long after this was proposed and investigated, we are
still several years from evaluation in commercial reactors, and
widespread adoption will take many more years. This timetable reflects
a history of underfunded R&D programs that have been poorly aligned
with strategic priorities. Last year's DOE R&D roadmap is a step in the
right direction.
New nuclear power plants are already challenged by high capital
costs, and increased capital and operating costs could tip the balance
for many projects, depending on many financing and cost recovery
factors. The costs are illustrated in the table showing levelized
electricity costs for new plant construction. This is taken from a 2010
MIT report on the Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Today's natural gas
prices are in the $4-$5/MBtu range, making natural gas plants much more
economical with respect to both capital requirements and levelized
electricity cost. However, we have been through many significant
excursions in natural gas prices over the last decade, resulting in
caution about committing to only one fuel source. The generation
portfolio decisions are likely to be different in different parts of
the country according to the integrated resource planning methodology
of public utility commissions, the availability of infrastructure, the
ability to incorporate costs into a rate base, generation portfolio
standards, and State/regional carbon dioxide emissions requirements.
COSTS OF ELECTRIC GENERATION ALTERNATIVES
[2007 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Levelized cost of electricity (cents/kW)
Overnight cost Fuel cost ($/ -----------------------------------------------
($/kW) MBtu) $25/ton-CO2 Same cost of
Base case price capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear......................... 4,000 0.67 8.4 8.4 6.6
Coal............................ 2,300 2.60 6.2 8.3 ..............
Gas............................. 850 4/7/10 4.2/6.5/8.7 5.1/7.4/9.6 ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modest carbon dioxide emissions charges would make nuclear
competitive with coal. A major factor is the cost of capital, which
hits nuclear power plant construction particularly hard because of the
high capital costs and the longer construction times that are typically
required. Reducing the financing risk premium for nuclear power is a
major objective of Government support for ``first mover'' nuclear power
plants, principally through the loan guarantee program first put in
place in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The events of Fukushima clearly
do not help in this regard.
An entirely different approach to new nuclear power plant
construction lies with small modular reactors (SMRs). This could be a
powerful way to address the cost issue. SMRs come in a variety of
proposed forms, some based on the same underlying light water reactor
(LWR) technology that is used in almost all nuclear plants today, while
others are based on gas- or metal-cooled designs. They range in size
from 10 to 300 megawatts. None have been through a licensing procedure
at the NRC, and this is a time consuming process for any new nuclear
technology--especially those that are farther away from the NRC's
established experience and procedures.
A major advantage of SMRs is that their small size compared with
LWRs (whose size is typically 1,000 megawatts and now going up to 1,600
megawatts) means that the total capital cost is more in the $1 billion
range rather than a significant multiple of that. Capacity can be built
up with smaller bites, and this may lead to more favorable financing
terms--a major consideration for high capital cost projects that take
years to license and build. Still, the SMR must come in with a cost
that is also competitive with LWRs on a unit basis; that is, the cost
per installed Megawatt must be comparable or less. The LWRs have been
driven to larger and larger size in order to realize economies of
scale. The SMRs may be able to overcome this trend by having factory
construction of the SMR or at least of its major components, presumably
with economies of manufacturing, the ability to train and retain a
skilled workforce at manufacturing locations, quality assurance,
continuous improvement, and only fairly simple construction onsite. The
catch-22 is that the economies of manufacture will presumably be
realizable only if there is a sufficiently reliable stream of orders to
keep the manufacturing lines busy, and this in turn is unlikely unless
the large number of designs is winnowed down fairly early in the game.
Reaching the n-th plant for a small number of reactor types is likely
to require a complex interplay between Government support and
proponents of the many contending SMR designs.
A 2020 SMR option will be available only if we start now, and even
then it will be tight. Prior to Fukushima, the Obama administration
submitted to the Congress a proposed 2012 budget that would greatly
enhance the level of activity in bringing SMRs to market. LWR-based
technology options would be advanced toward licensing, and other SMR
technologies would be supported for the remaining R&D needed to have
them follow in the licensing queue. The program is modest, but
sensible. Obviously the Federal budget deficit makes it difficult to
start any new programs, but a hiatus in creating new clean energy
options--be it nuclear SMRs or renewables or advanced batteries--will
have us looking back in 10 years lamenting the lack of a technology
portfolio needed to meet our energy and environmental needs
economically or to compete in the global market.
relicensing
Relicensing decisions at the NRC will almost certainly experience
some delay. A measured approach is appropriate since the NRC is
constantly monitoring plant operations and safety margins; the 40 year
licensing period does not represent any particular milestone with
regard to the reactor systems themselves.
If the anticipated life extensions are not realized to any
appreciable degree, we will be faced with replacing tens of thousands
of Megawatts of nonemitting generation. For the United States, this is
not an immediate problem since the end of the original 40-year reactor
operating periods will not be reached for most plants for a while, and
we have both substantially underutilized natural gas generation and
lots of natural gas. Natural gas does have emissions, but far less than
coal, and will serve as a bridge to a very low emissions future.
However, the challenge of developing and demonstrating ``no-emissions''
options for 2020 and beyond is immediate, given the significant
timeline from R&D to regulatory approval to market.
Next-generation nuclear plants with advanced passive safety systems
are among those options. This includes, but is not limited to, SMRs.
The fact remains that nuclear power is the ``emission-free'' baseload
generation technology that is, in principle, scalable without problems
of variability and intermittency. Clearly, a rigorous design
certification and licensing process will be needed to assure public
confidence.
spent-fuel management
The Fukushima problems with spent-fuel pools co-located with the
reactors will undoubtedly lead to a re-evaluation of spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) management strategy. There is no need to act precipitously, but
the fact is that our overall waste disposal system is fundamentally
broken and needs re-examination in any case (as is being done by the
Blue Ribbon Commission).
The MIT ``The Future of Nuclear Power'' report in 2003 and the MIT
Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle summary report in 2010 called for
consolidated spent-fuel storage (these reports can be accessed at
web.mit.edu/mitei). There are many reasons for this quite independent
of the Fukushima experience. The 2010 report made a recommendation (pg
xi):
``Planning for long-term managed storage of spent nuclear fuel--for
about a century--should be an integral part of nuclear fuel cycle
design. While managed storage is believed to be safe for these periods,
an R&D program should be devoted to confirm and extend the safe storage
and transport period.
``The possibility of storage for a century, which is longer than
the anticipated operating lifetimes of nuclear reactors, suggests that
the United States should move toward centralized SNF storage sites--
starting with decommissioned reactor sites and in support of a long-
term SNF management strategy.''
The consolidated storage recommendation has many drivers:
--The SNF would be stored in dry casks. There is no need for the SNF
to be located at the reactor site, as the operational
requirements are quite different; for example, the reactor
needs access to large amounts of cooling water, while the SNF
storage system does not.
--Issues such as the Federal liability for not moving SNF from
reactor sites would be resolved.
--A degree of opposition to expanding nuclear power would be
addressed by moving the fuel to a consolidated secure location,
most likely under Federal control (this does not rule out
privately developed sites under NRC license).
--While the risks of cascading failures are extremely small, the
Fukushima incident showed that the probability is not zero. The
spent fuel, which contains considerable radioactivity and needs
cooling, would be mostly removed from the reactor site in case
of a major accident or natural disaster (the SNF recently
removed from the reactor core would still need some cooling
time in a pool).
--``Densification'' of spent fuel in pools beyond the original design
density should not be necessary.
The Congress should allow use of the waste fund for development of
consolidated storage.
Eventually, the SNF, or the high-level waste (HLW) that would
result from a future decision to reprocess, would need to go to a
geological repository. Indeed, the intermediate step of consolidated
dry-cask storage could be eliminated if a repository were in place to
accept the SNF. However, there is still a debate about whether SNF is a
waste or a valuable energy resource to be harvested by reprocessing.
The uncertainty has multiple origins. One is that the trajectory of
nuclear power deployment is not clear. If nuclear power does not grow,
it is unlikely that reprocessing will be attractive. However, even if
nuclear power does grow, it is not obvious that reprocessing is the
preferred path; for example, a new generation of recycling reactors
might be started with enriched uranium rather than plutonium recovered
from reprocessing. This uncertainty argues for maintaining options by
committing to century-scale consolidated storage for commercial SNF, as
recommended above, while pursuing geological repository development in
parallel. The arduous and time-consuming process needed to establish
and utilize one or more geological repositories for the growing amount
of power reactor SNF calls for renewed commitment even as consolidated
storage is established. These are core results of the MIT analysis of
fuel cycle options.
Going beyond those studies, I suggest that the decision to co-
mingle defense and civilian nuclear wastes should be revisited. The
conditions today are much different from when the co-mingling decision
was put forward in 1985. In particular, the timeline for establishing a
commercial spent-fuel repository is evidently much longer than
anticipated at that time.
--The defense wastes are small compared with civilian wastes and are
essentially bounded (there is a small amount of additional SNF
each year from the naval nuclear propulsion program).
--Much of the waste is very old and therefore relatively cool.
--There is no argument about a possible energy value; all agree that
it is waste to be disposed of, so there is no need to preserve
options through longer-term storage.
--There are agreements with the affected States to remove the fuel,
and these are important for continuing nuclear defense missions
at these sites.
--A separate defense repository, while still subject to NRC
licensing, would have simpler finances going forward, although
a reconciliation would be needed with the civilian program that
recognized the defense financial contributions to the
development of Yucca Mountain.
--Responsibility would reside with the DOE as a Government function
to dispose of waste generated in an inherently governmental
enterprise--the development of nuclear weapons.
--At the same time, a future commercial SNF/HLW repository would not
have the complication of dealing with national defense HLW and
SNF.
The recommendation is that consolidated SNF dry-cask storage be
established as soon as possible at one or a few sites for commercial
power reactor fuel and that a geological repository be established as
soon as possible for defense HLW/SNF. A commercial repository would be
pursued in parallel, but most likely in a longer timeframe given the
current realities. The defense waste repository would provide
invaluable knowledge and experience for the civilian waste repository.
In summary, while it is too early to understand the causes and full
implications of the Fukushima events, it is not too early to start
thinking about the cost, relicensing, and SNF management issues that
will inevitably arise and influence the future of nuclear power. These
deliberations should be carried out in a measured way.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present these views. I look
forward to a discussion.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Dr. Moniz.
Mr. Levis.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM LEVIS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
OPERATING OFFICER, PSEG POWER
Mr. Levis. Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is William Levis; I am the president and chief
operating officer of PSEG Power which is a subsidiary of Public
Service Enterprise Group headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.
PSEG Power is a merchant generating company and owns
approximately 14,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity.
We own 100 percent of the Hope Creek Nuclear Station, 57
percent of the Salem Nuclear Station and 50 percent of the
Peach Bottom Station.
I appreciate your invitation to testify at today's hearing
to discuss the status of the U.S. nuclear energy industry and
the implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident on nuclear
energy in the United States. I am testifying today on behalf of
the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear energy industry's
Washington based policy organization.
My remarks today will cover four points. First, U.S.
nuclear power plants are safe. Second, safety is the U.S.
nuclear energy industry's top priority. Third, the U.S. nuclear
energy industry has a long history of continuous learning from
operational events; we will do the same as a result of the
Fukushima event. And fourth, the U.S. nuclear energy industry
has already taken proactive steps to verify and validate our
readiness to manage extreme events. We took these steps early
without waiting for clarity on the sequence of failures of
Fukushima.
Regarding the first point, U.S. nuclear power plants are
safe. They are designed and operated conservatively to manage
the maximum credible challenges appropriate to each nuclear
plant site. U.S. nuclear power plants have also demonstrated
their ability to maintain safety through extreme conditions,
including floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters.
U.S. nuclear reactors are designed to withstand
earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, tornados, and other
natural events equal to the most significant historical event
or maximum projected event, plus added margin for conservatism
without any breach of safety systems.
Regarding the second point, safety is the nuclear energy's
industry's top priority and complacency about safety
performance is not tolerated. We know we operate in an
unforgiving environment where the penalties for mistakes are
high and where credibility and public confidence, once lost,
are difficult to recover. All the safety related metrics
tracked by industry and the NRC demonstrate high levels of
excellence. Forced outage rates, unplanned safety system
actuations, worker radiation exposures, events with safety
implications, and lost-time accident rates have all trended
down year over year for a number of years.
Regarding the third point, the U.S. nuclear industry
routinely incorporates lessons learned from operating
experience into its reactor designs and operations. I could
point to many, many examples of improvements made to the U.S.
nuclear power plants over the years in response to lessons
learned from operational events over the last 40 years. Let me
just list a few.
In the 1970s concerns were raised about the ability of
Boiling Water Mark 1 containments to maintain its design during
an event where steam is vented to the torus. Subsequently,
every United States operator with a Mark 1 containment
implemented modifications to dissipate energy released to the
suppression pool and installed stringent supports to
accommodate loads that could be generated.
In 1988, the NRC concluded that additional Station Blackout
(SBO), regulatory requirements were justified and issued the
Station Blackout Rule to provide further assurance that a loss
of both offsite and onsite emergency AC power systems would not
adversely impact public health and safety. The SBO Rule was
based on several planned, specific probabilistic safety
studies, operating experience and reliability, accident
sequence, and consequent analysis completed between 1975 and
1988.
And third, since the terrorist events of September 11,
2001, U.S. nuclear plant operators identified other beyond
design basis vulnerabilities. As a result, U.S. nuclear plant
designs and operating practices since 9/11 are designed to
mitigate severe accident scenarios such as aircraft impact,
which includes the complete loss of offsite power and all
onsite emergency power sources and loss of large areas of
plant. The industry developed additional methods and procedures
to provide cooling to the reactor and the used fuel pool and
staged additional equipment at all U.S. nuclear power plant
sites to ensure that the plants were equipped to deal with
extreme events and nuclear plant operation staffs are trained
to manage them.
Regarding the final point, the United States nuclear
industry has already started an assessment of events in Japan
and is taking steps to ensure that United States reactors could
respond to events that may challenge safe operation of the
facilities. These actions include: verifying each plant's
capability to manage severe accident scenarios developed after
9/11 that I previously described; verifying each plant's
capability to manage a total loss of offsite power; verifying
the capability to mitigate flooding and the impact of floods on
systems inside and outside the plant and performing walk downs
and inspections of important equipment needed to respond
successfully to extreme events like fires and floods.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In conclusion, Madam Chairman, it will be some time before
we understand the precise sequence of what happened at
Fukushima, before we have a complete analysis of how the
reactors performed, how equipment and fuel performed, how the
operators performed. As we learn from this tragic event,
however, you can rest assured that we will internalize those
lessons and incorporate them into our designs and training and
operating procedures.
This concludes my oral testimony, Madam Chairman, and I
look forward to answering questions that the committee may
have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Levis
Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is William Levis. I am president and chief operating
officer of PSEG Power which is a subsidiary of Public Service
Enterprise Group, headquartered in Newark, New Jersey. PSEG Power is a
merchant generating company and owns approximately 14,000 megawatts of
electric generating capacity. We own 100 percent of the Hope Creek
nuclear generating station, 57 percent of the Salem nuclear station,
and 50 percent of the Peach Bottom nuclear station. PSEG Power operates
Salem and Hope Creek; Exelon operates Peach Bottom. Salem consists of
two pressurized water reactors; Hope Creek is a single boiling water
reactor; the Peach Bottom station has two boiling water reactors.
I appreciate your invitation to testify at today's hearing to
discuss the status of the U.S. nuclear energy industry and the
implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident on nuclear energy in the
United States. I am testifying today on behalf of the Nuclear Energy
Institute, the nuclear energy industry's Washington-based policy
organization. NEI members include all companies licensed to operate
commercial nuclear powerplants in the United States, nuclear plant
designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication
facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and
individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.
My remarks will cover four major points:
First, U.S. nuclear powerplants are safe.
Second, safety is the U.S. nuclear energy industry's top priority.
Third, the U.S. nuclear energy industry has a long history, over
several decades, of continuous learning from operational events, and we
have incorporated lessons learned into our nuclear plant designs and
our operating practices and training. We will do the same as a result
of the Fukushima accident.
And fourth, the U.S. nuclear energy industry has already taken pro-
active steps to verify and validate our readiness to manage extreme
events. We took these steps early--without waiting for clarity on the
sequence of failures at Fukushima.
Before I address these four points, however, let me note that the
U.S. nuclear energy industry works very hard not to grow complacent
about safety. This is not always easy when our 104 nuclear powerplants
are operating well, with an average capacity factor above 90 percent
for the last 10 years. Similarly, we cannot be complacent about the
accident at Fukushima. I cannot tell you at this moment whether or not
we will discover previously unknown vulnerabilities at America's
nuclear powerplants, but I am quite confident that we will learn
important lessons from Fukushima and identify additional steps we can
and will take to further improve the margin of safety at our nuclear
plants.
u.s. nuclear powerplants are safe
That said, we do believe U.S. nuclear powerplants are safe. They
are designed and operated conservatively to manage the maximum credible
challenges appropriate to each nuclear power plant site. U.S. nuclear
powerplants have also demonstrated their ability to maintain safety
through extreme conditions, including floods and hurricanes and other
natural disasters.
I can think of no better summary of the status of U.S. nuclear
powerplants than the one delivered by President Obama to the American
people on March 17. Mr. Obama said: ``Our nuclear powerplants have
undergone exhaustive study, and have been declared safe for any number
of extreme contingencies. But when we see a crisis like the one in
Japan, we have a responsibility to learn from this event, and to draw
from those lessons.''
We invest heavily in our operating plants to ensure safe, reliable
operation. The U.S. nuclear energy industry invested approximately $6.5
billion in 2009 in our 104 operating plants--to replace steam
generators, reactor vessel heads and other equipment and in other
capital projects.
U.S. nuclear reactors are designed to withstand earthquakes,
tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, tornadoes and other natural events equal
to the most significant historical event or the maximum projected
event, plus an added margin for conservatism, without any breach of
safety systems. We have many, many examples of U.S. nuclear powerplants
achieving safe shutdown during extreme events where offsite power was
lost. During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for example, the Waterford
nuclear power plant in Louisiana shut down safely, lost all offsite
power, and maintained safe shutdown on emergency diesel generators for
3\1/2\ days until grid power was restored.
For earthquakes, nuclear plants are designed and constructed to
withstand the maximum projected earthquake that could occur in its
area, with additional margin added. Plant earthquake-induced ground
motion is developed using a wide range of data and review of the
impacts of historical earthquakes up to 200 miles away. Those
earthquakes within 25 miles are studied in great detail. This research
is used to determine the maximum potential earthquake that could affect
the site. Each reactor is built to withstand the respective strongest
earthquake; for example, a site that features clay over bedrock will
respond differently during an earthquake than a hard-rock site.
It is important not to extrapolate earthquake and tsunami data from
one location of the world to another when evaluating these natural
hazards. These catastrophic natural events are very region- and
location-specific, based on tectonic and geological fault line
locations. The Tohoku earthquake that struck the Fukushima nuclear
power plant occurred on a ``subduction zone,'' the type of tectonic
region that produces earthquakes of the largest magnitude. A subduction
zone is a tectonic plate boundary where one tectonic plate is pushed
under another plate. Subduction zone earthquakes are also required to
produce the kind of massive tsunami seen in Japan.
In the continental United States, the only subduction zone is the
Cascadia subduction zone which lies off the coast of northern
California, Oregon, and Washington. In an assessment released last
week, the California Coastal Commission concluded that a ``nuclear
emergency such as is occurring in Japan is extremely unlikely at the
State's two operating nuclear powerplants. The combination of strong
ground motion and massive tsunami that occurred in Japan cannot be
generated by faults near the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and
the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.''
safety is the u.s. nuclear energy industry's top priority
This leads to my second point: Safety is the U.S. nuclear energy
industry's top priority, and complacence about safety performance is
not tolerated.
We know we operate in an unforgiving environment where the
penalties for mistakes are high and where credibility and public
confidence, once lost, are difficult to recover.
All of the safety-related metrics tracked by industry and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) demonstrate high levels of
excellence. Forced outage rates, unplanned safety system actuations,
worker radiation exposures, events with safety implications, and lost-
time accident rates have all trended down, year over year, for a number
of years.
We can have confidence in nuclear plant safety based on those
indicators, but we should derive even greater confidence from the
process that produces those indicators, from the institutions we have
created to share best practices, to establish standards of excellence
and to implement programs that hold us to those standards.
After the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, the nuclear industry
created the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). In INPO, the
nuclear industry--unique among American industries--has established an
independent form of self-regulation through peer review and peer
pressure. In fact, the President's Oil Spill Commission, in its report
on the Deepwater Horizon accident, identified INPO as the model for
self-regulation by the offshore oil and gas industry.
INPO is empowered to establish performance objectives and criteria,
and nuclear operating companies are obligated to implement improvements
in response to INPO findings and recommendations. At its headquarters
in Atlanta, INPO has some 350 people monitoring nuclear plant
operations and management on a daily basis. INPO evaluates every U.S.
nuclear plant every 2 years, and deploys training teams to provide
assistance to companies in specific areas identified as needing
improvement during an evaluation.
INPO provides management and leadership development programs, and
manages the National Academy of Nuclear Training, which conducts formal
training and accreditation programs for those responsible for reactor
operation and maintenance.
Among its many activities, INPO maintains an industrywide database
called Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX)--for --and
all companies are required to report equipment problems into EPIX. EPIX
catalogues equipment problems and shows, for example, expected mean
time between failures, which allows the industry to schedule predictive
and preventive maintenance, replacing equipment before it fails,
avoiding possible challenges to plant safety. INPO also maintains a
system called Nuclear Network that allows companies to report and share
information about operating events, to ensure that an unexpected event
at one reactor is telegraphed to all, to ensure that an event at one
plant is not repeated elsewhere, to ensure high levels of vigilance and
readiness.
It may not be obvious to the outside world, but we have an enormous
self-interest in safe operations. We preserve and enhance the asset
value of our 104 operating plants first and foremost by maintaining
focus on safety. Safety is the basis for regulatory confidence, and for
political and public support of this technology.
the u.s. nuclear energy industry has a long history of continuous
learning
My third point: The U.S. industry routinely incorporates lessons
learned from operating experience into its reactor designs and
operations. U.S. nuclear powerplants have implemented numerous plant
and procedural improvements over the past 30 years. Some of these
improvements have been designed to mitigate severe natural and plant-
centered events similar to those experienced at the Fukushima nuclear
power plant. In addition, the equipment and procedures could be used to
mitigate other severe abnormal events. The type of events include a
complete and sustained loss of AC power, a sustained loss of vital
cooling water pumps, major fires and explosions that would prevent
access to critical equipment, hydrogen control and venting, and loss of
multiple safety systems.
Starting in the 1990s, U.S. nuclear powerplants developed
guidelines to manage and mitigate these severe events that are beyond
the normal design specifications. Plants evaluated site-specific
vulnerabilities and implemented plant and procedural improvements to
further improve safety. These severe accident management guidelines
were developed in response to probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs),
which identified several high-risk accident sequences. These guidelines
provide operators and emergency managers with pre-determined strategies
to mitigate these events The strategies focus on protecting the
containment as it assumes the fuel clad and reactor cooling system are
lost.
I could point to many, many examples of improvements made to U.S.
nuclear powerplants over the years in response to lessons learned from
operational events. Let me list just a few:
--In the 1970s, concerns were raised about the ability of the BWR
Mark I containment to maintain its design during an event when
steam is vented to the torus. Subsequently, every U.S. Operator
with a Mark I containment implemented modifications to
dissipate energy released to the suppression pool and stringent
supports to accommodate loads that could be generated.
--As a result of the Three Mile Island accident, the industry made
significant improvements to control room configuration and
operator training. After that accident, which underscored the
need for information to be better displayed in control rooms,
all U.S. nuclear powerplants installed safety parameter display
systems. A safety parameter display system collects and
displays critical safety information at a workstation in the
control room and other locations in the plant. Information on
the status of key conditions, such as reactor core cooling, is
displayed in a clear format on a computer screen. The
information displayed enables the nuclear plant operators to
assess plant conditions rapidly and take corrective actions.
Before the accident at Three Mile Island, many U.S. nuclear
powerplants trained their operators on generic simulators
located offsite. Today, every U.S. nuclear reactor has a
reactor-specific simulator onsite, with one shift of operators
always in training. Finally, our current emergency preparedness
programs grew from the lessons we learned at TMI and we now
routinely drill with our State and local emergency management
agencies to ensure we can appropriately communicate with the
public during emergencies.
--In 1988, the NRC concluded that additional Station Black Out (SBO)
regulatory requirements were justified and issued the Station
Black Out rule (10 CFR 50.63) to provide further assurance that
a loss of both offsite and onsite emergency AC power systems
would not adversely affect public health and safety. The SBO
rule was based on several plant-specific probabilistic safety
studies; operating experience; and reliability, accident
sequence, and consequence analyses completed between 1975 and
1988.
--Since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, U.S. nuclear
plant operators identified other beyond-design-basis
vulnerabilities. As a result, U.S. nuclear plant designs and
operating practices since 9/11 are designed to mitigate severe
accident scenarios such as aircraft impact, which include the
complete loss of offsite power and all onsite emergency power
sources and loss of large areas of the plant. The industry
developed additional methods and procedures to provide cooling
to the reactor and the spent-fuel pool, and staged additional
equipment at all U.S. nuclear power plant sites to ensure that
the plants are equipped to deal with extreme events and nuclear
plant operations staff are trained to manage them.
the u.s. nuclear energy industry has already taken steps in response to
fukushima
The United States nuclear energy industry has already started an
assessment of the events in Japan and is taking steps to ensure that
United States reactors could respond to events that may challenge safe
operation of the facilities. These actions include:
--Verifying each plant's capability to manage major challenges, such
as aircraft impacts and losses of large areas of the plant due
to natural events, fires or explosions. Specific actions
include testing and inspecting equipment required to mitigate
these events, and verifying that qualifications of operators
and support staff required to implement them are current.
--Verifying each plant's capability to manage a total loss of offsite
power. This will require verification that all required
materials are adequate and properly staged and that procedures
are in place, and focusing operator training on these extreme
events.
--Verifying the capability to mitigate flooding and the impact of
floods on systems inside and outside the plant. Specific
actions include verifying required materials and equipment are
properly located to protect them from flood.
--Performing walk-downs and inspection of important equipment needed
to respond successfully to extreme events like fires and
floods. This work will include analysis to identify any
potential that equipment functions could be lost during seismic
events appropriate for the site, and development of strategies
to mitigate any potential vulnerabilities.
Until we understand clearly what has occurred at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear powerplants, and any consequences, it is difficult to
speculate about the long-term impact on the U.S. nuclear energy
program. The U.S. nuclear industry, NRC, the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations, the World Association of Nuclear Operators and other expert
organizations in the United States and around the world will conduct
detailed reviews of the accident, identify lessons learned (both in
terms of plant operation and design), and we will incorporate those
lessons learned into the design and operation of U.S. nuclear
powerplants. When we fully understand the facts surrounding the event
in Japan, we will use those insights to make nuclear energy even safer.
In the long-term, we believe that the U.S. nuclear energy
enterprise is built on a strong foundation:
--Reactor designs and operating practices that incorporate a defense-
in-depth approach and multiple levels of redundant systems;
--A strong, independent regulatory infrastructure, which includes
continuous assessment of every U.S. reactor by the NRC, with
independent inspectors permanently onsite and additional
oversight from NRC regional offices and headquarters;
--A transparent regulatory process that provides for public
participation in licensing decisions; and
--A continuing and systematic process to identify lessons learned
from operating experience and to incorporate those lessons.
In conclusion, Madam Chairman, let me leave you with a short-term
and a longer-term perspective.
In the short term, all of us involved with the production of
electricity from nuclear energy in the United States stand in awe of
the commitment and determination of our colleagues in Japan, as they
struggle to bring these crippled reactors to safe shutdown.
In the longer term, it will be some time before we understand the
precise sequence of what happened at Fukushima, before we have a
complete analysis of how the reactor performed, how equipment and fuel
performed, how the operators performed. As we learn from this tragic
event, however, you may rest assured that we will internalize those
lessons and incorporate them into our designs and training and
operating procedures.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Levis.
Mr. Lochbaum.
STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY
PROJECT UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Mr. Lochbaum. Good morning, Madam Chairman and Ranking
Member Alexander. I appreciate this opportunity to travel up
here from Chattanooga, Tennessee to provide my testimony today.
Among the many challenges workers faced at Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Plant was a need to provide cooling for
radiated fuel in seven onsite spent-fuel pools. Irradiated fuel
is curious material. When inside the core of an operating
reactor irradiated fuel is so hazardous that the plant has an
array of emergency systems whose sole purpose is to protect the
fuel from damage by overheating.
Some of these emergency systems feature motor-driven pumps,
while some feature stream-driven pumps. These emergency core
cooling systems can be powered by the electrical grid, by the
emergency diesel generators and in some cases by onsite
batteries. The diversity and redundancy of these emergency core
cooling systems provides high, but not absolute, assurance that
the irradiated fuel will be adequately cooled. If the highly
reliable emergency core cooling systems fail, the irradiated
fuel in the reactor core is encased within strong concrete
walls, 4- to 5-feet thick. This structure provides additional
assurance that the public is protected.
After being discharged from the reactor core the irradiated
fuel awaits transfer to a Federal repository which does not
exist. The United States has spent more than $10 million--$10
billion on a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.
DOE faces an immense engineering challenge siting a repository
because that location must isolate the irradiated fuel from the
environment for at least 10,000 years into the future or merely
42 times longer than we have been in the United States of
America.
Between these two dangerous endpoints irradiated fuel sits
in temporary spent-fuel pools with almost no protection. For
unfathomable reasons, irradiated fuel is considered benign
after it is taken out of the reactor, but before it is placed
in a repository. Today tens of thousands of irradiated fuel
sits in spent-fuel pools across America. At many sites near--
there is nearly 10 times as much irradiated fuel in a spent-
fuel pool as in reactor core. These pools are not cooled by an
array of highly reliable emergency systems, not powered by the
grid, diesel generators or batteries. Instead the pools are
cooled by one regular system, sometimes backed up by one
alternate make up system.
The spent-fuel pools are not housed within robust concrete
containment structures designed to protect the public from the
radioactivity they contain. Instead the pools are often housed
in buildings with sheet metal siding like that in a Sears
storage shed. I have nothing against the quality of Sears
storage sheds, but they are not suitable for nuclear waste
storage.
The irrefutable bottom line is that we have utterly failed
to proper manage the risk from irradiated fuel stored at our
Nation's nuclear power plants. We can and must do better.
There are two readily available measures to better manage
that risk. First, accelerate the transfer of spent fuel from
the pools to dry cask storage. And second upgrade the emergency
procedures for spent-fuel pool accidents. Currently, we fill
the pools to capacity and put the overflow into dry cask. This
keeps the pools nearly filled with irradiated fuel, maintaining
the risk about as high as you can achieve. A better strategy
would be to reduce the inventory of irradiated fuel stored in
spent-fuel pools, to only that amount discharged from the
reactor in the last 5 or 6 years.
Less irradiated fuels in the pools results in a lower heat
load in the pools, the lower heat load gives workers more time
to recover cooling or re-establish the water inventory reducing
the likelihood of fuel damage. And if fuel is damaged, for
whatever reason, having less of it in the pools means the
radioactive cloud emitted from that pool is much, much smaller,
posing much less harm to people down wind.
Following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, the
reactor owner significantly upgraded emergency procedures.
Prior to that accident the procedures and training relied on
the operators diagnosing what had happened and taking steps to
mitigate that accident. If the miss--if the operators
misdiagnosed the accident, those procedures could actually
direct them to take the wrong steps for the accident they
actually faced. The revamped Emergency Procedures Guide, the
operators response to abnormally high pressure or an unusual
low water level, without undue regard for what caused those
abnormal conditions, this--these upgraded emergency procedures
and training are significant improvements over the pre-TMI
days.
But, no comparable procedures and training would help the
operators respond to spent-fuel pool accidents. It is
imperative that comparable emergency procedures be provided for
spent-fuel pool accidents to derive the same safety benefits
that we derive from improved procedures for reactor core
accidents.
Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, I'm certainly not a nuclear expert, you are far
more so. The first time I'd been in a nuclear plant was this
past week. I visited the two in California, and spent the whole
day doing it. What jumps right out at you is the difference
between the containment of the core, the location of that
spent-fuel pool and the dry cask situation.
Here's the question. There is a major study, apparently, by
Bob Alvarez at the Nuclear Policy Institute for Policy Studies
on the use of dry cask storage at nuclear power plants. He
contends that dry cask has the potential to reduce the overall
risk associated with reactor storage of spent fuel. So let me
ask each of you, from your viewpoint, why does industry
practice appear to be to keep the spent fuel in pool much
longer than the required 5 to 7 years? Why wouldn't they move
it aggressively to dry cask?
Dr. Moniz.
Dr. Moniz. Thank you, Madam Chairman. First, I think at a
very high level what I would say is that from the history of
our nuclear power program I would say the storage, storage of
spent fuel, between if you like the reactor and the presumed
repository has been an afterthought. It has not really been
part of our serious policy discussion about fuel cycle design.
As a result, I think what one sees are in some sense, what may
be very logical to a plant operator, operational decisions. So
as David said, the dry cask storage is viewed more as the
overflow when the pool can't handle any more densification. So
I think what we need to do is to stand back, really ask what is
our whole integrated system about storage and disposal. And
that is exactly what I would call for. In fact, I think the
move to dry cask is essential, furthermore for a set of
reasons, I believe we should really start thinking hard about
consolidated storage, presumably at Federal reservations to
solve a host of problems.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I agree with you.
Mr. Levis.
Mr. Levis. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And certainly the
topic of used fuel and how we should dispose of it is I think
one worthy of significant discussion. And I would not
characterize the industry having a reluctance of putting used
fuel bundles into cask storage; I would say one of the
impactable items is really a lack of a national strategy and
policy on what we are going to do with it.
And if I could just offer one thought in that particular
area, we want to limit the number of times we have to handle
used fuel and so we want to be able to take it out of the pool
once, put it into cask and have it be able to go where it can
go. Not all casks are designed for transportation, for example.
So if in fact our policy is going to be to store it onsite
there for a long period of time, we want to make sure we have
casks that can do that. If our policy is to put it in a cask
that can be transported, we want to make sure it can be in a
cask that can do that.
So, you know, we were essentially planning for what we
believe the direction of the country was headed. And it is not
a reluctance to do this; we know how to do it. I would ask, if
we want to speed that process up, that we consider things like
supply chain availability and these sorts of things and making
sure we have the, you know, the training and qualification for
the people that need, you know, to do this sort of activity.
But, I wouldn't characterize it as reluctance, you know, on our
part to do it, but rather lacking what the national plan is and
how we can develop our plan to match up with that.
Senator Feinstein. Are you saying you believe, as an
operator, we would be better off with a Federal policy that
essentially set the handling of waste?
That we should have either regional repositories or a
national repository?
Mr. Levis. Yes, what I was referring to, Madam Chairman, is
what is the ultimate disposition of the used fuel, where will
it go and what the most efficient way to get it there is.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Lochbaum.
Mr. Lochbaum. I would agree with the point that spent-fuel
storage onsite was an afterthought. And I as think I agree with
the industry position that it has been a shifting thought. The
Federal Government keeps saying that we will take spent fuel on
such and such a date and then that date slips by quite a bit.
So it is difficult to base a decision on how best to store
spent fuel onsite when the parameters keep shifting year to
year. So I think I agree with Bill Levis that it has not been
reluctance, it has been that shifting paradigm that keeps
causing problems.
Senator Feinstein. Dr. Moniz.
Dr. Moniz. May I just add a point, because again I totally
agree with Bill. It is again, it is the absence of a system
that allows rational decisions. As Bill mentioned something
that is very important, we don't have a consistent policy on
these--literally just on things of sizes of casks, which is
quite important.
But, if I may go back, you invited comments on the earlier
panel, just to comment on the issue of the 100-year storage
which Chairman Jaczko mentioned.
We think that there is a good case to be made for the
integrity of 100-year storage, but the reality is it is based
on extraordinarily skimpy database. And this is an example of
the kind of R&D priority that we should have been having and I
think now is being revived, pre-Fukushima, now it will be even
more important.
And this gets to Bill's point about handling the fuel.
While it may be that the fuel can be contained for 100 years,
say in dry cask storage, but what about when you move it then?
Will movement compromise integrity? These are the kinds of
issues we need to have a system view of. And, I would say this
is one of the many reasons why I personally favor consolidated
storage, because if you bring this fuel together and there
aren't any issues you can have, at that site, the
infrastructure to deal with those problems and the spent fuel,
if there are any after 80, 90, or 100 years.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Dr. Moniz, if the Nation can't agree on
a single repository, what makes you think it can agree on more
than one for consolidated sites?
Dr. Moniz. Thank you, Senator Alexander. First of all, I
want to stress that the consolidated storage sites I am talking
about are not necessarily repositories.
Senator Alexander. Well, but they are places where you
would haul the spent fuel for storage.
Dr. Moniz. That is correct, so----
Senator Alexander. So you would have the same issues of
local support, wouldn't you?
Dr. Moniz. Certainly and by the way, and I strongly support
the idea that we should--we have to find public support in
regions to move things. Now, I think having a dry cask storage
facility is different from a repository. I don't claim it is
easy; I am not Pollyannaish about it. It is tough.
Senator Alexander. Yes, I know.
Dr. Moniz. But also, I just inferred, for example, such a
location would have, for example, a substantial research and
testing infrastructure----
Senator Alexander. Yes.
Dr. Moniz [continuing]. Around the spent fuel, that is the
kind of design that we need, I believe.
Senator Alexander. Yes. Would you agree that Dr. Chu's plan
and the attitude of others is that we could safely store our
used nuclear fuel onsite, while for the next 10 or 20 years we
develop aggressive R&D to try and find a better way to use and
recycle nuclear fuel? Do you think that is both wise and safe
to do?
Dr. Moniz. Yes, sir. First, I would say that we don't see
any large differentiator, technically, on safety or security or
costs of distributed storage versus centralized storage. There
are other system reasons why I prefer the centralized storage.
Now----
Senator Alexander. But what my question really is, while we
do the R&D to get to that point----
Dr. Moniz. Yes, now on the----
Senator Alexander [continuing]. Is it safe to store it
onsite?
Dr. Moniz. Yes, it is. And now on terms of the R&D program,
in our report last year we put forward exactly that kind of a
program. And I should add, it is based upon something that
Secretary Lyons inferred, that we do not believe that current
reprocessing approaches, frankly, have merit, but we need to
develop, possibly, more-advanced approaches.
Senator Alexander. I want to ask you two more questions.
The first is about radiation. We see on television news that
trace amounts of radiation have been discovered in the United
States as the result of the Japanese accident, yet testimony in
the previous panel was we shouldn't worry about that. Why is
that true?
Dr. Moniz. Well, I will give a brief answer; maybe David
will have more specifics on it. The information I have received
is that the measurements in this country, including in my home
State, are orders of magnitude below what are considered to be
levels of concern.
Senator Alexander. Well, is it true that every day we
receive some radiation naturally from----
Dr. Moniz. Yes, sir. In the United States the average
citizen received about 300 millirem per year, which is let's
say one-half of a CAT scan.
Senator Alexander. And maybe another 300 from other----
Dr. Moniz. Yes, and----
Senator Alexander [continuing]. From CAT scans and----
Dr. Moniz. On average, yes.
Senator Alexander. And that it poses no harm for a person
to receive 500 millirems----
Dr. Moniz. Well, that is getting into an area which I am
certainly not an expert. There is a lot of argument going on
about so-called linear hypotheses and collective doses to the
public. But my view is that it seems to be essentially no harm.
Senator Alexander. Let me conclude with a question that you
are an expert on. You mentioned the work that MIT and Oak Ridge
are doing in modeling nuclear power plants. As I understand it,
that is based upon the supercomputing capacity there and the
R&D capacity there that this subcommittee and this Congress and
this President are asked to fund on an annual basis. How
important is the United States' ability to be among the leaders
in the world in supercomputing to such programs as you are
working on today to help us understand how to keep nuclear
power plants safe?
Dr. Moniz. A large-scale modeling and simulation applied to
complex engineered systems is something the DOE, first of all,
has been a leader in for a long time. It is something the
country really should lead for very important, I believe,
impacts on our manufacturing capability, our regulatory
capability, those are the things that we are trying to do with
this initial hub focused on LWR simulation.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
You heard me ask the chairman about the option of an
independent assessment of nuclear safety in our country. Say
the National Academy of Science put together an assessment in
light of what has happened at Daiichi and Daini and compared
pressured water versus boiling water reactors, spent-fuel pools
stored at reactor sites right now forever, because there is no
other plan, and some in dry casks. Do you believe such an
assessment would be a good idea?
Let me begin with you Mr. Lochbaum, what do you think of
that idea?
Mr. Lochbaum. Well, an independent assessment is never a
bad thing, but I think equally important or more important
would be--the NRC is going to undertake the 90-day review and
then a longer-term review. And they are going to come up with a
lot of lessons learned that will be informed by what the work
the IAEA is doing and the work that the industry is doing and
the work that the independent assessment would do. I think it
is vitally important for the Senate or the Congress more
broadly, to look at the results from the NRC's review, what
they have identified and their schedule for implementing that.
If they need more budget in order to make some of those
things happen on a timelier basis that needs to happen. Because
the best plan in the world doesn't really help anybody until it
is implemented. So I think the NRC will come up with a good
list of things to do to make our plants less vulnerable to that
kind of thing and it is important that they get to the end of
that effort as quickly as possible. So I think the Congress can
help the NRC set its priorities and get there as expeditiously
as possible.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Levis.
Mr. Levis. Madam Chairman, the industry will be looking at
their own assessment of this event, you know, coordinated
through INPO in concert with the World Association of Nuclear
Operators and obviously the NRC will do its review
independently. You know, we are committed to the absolute
safety of our plants, we welcome any and all assessments and
certainly an independent assessment would be fine, just to make
sure we got it right.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you.
Dr. Moniz.
Dr. Moniz. I would agree. I think it is--it would be
unrealistic to think that we could move forward, frankly,
without some kind of major assessment and I believe an
independent assessment will be called for. What that means
exactly, independent and who would be the independent body, is
not entirely clear, in my view.
Senator Feinstein. Well, would the National Academy of
Science (NAS) be able to put that kind of body together, which
is what they generally do when they look at something.
Dr. Moniz. Yes, I think the NAS is certainly an option.
Sometimes they move more slowly than one would like, but I
think if they--in my view perhaps with a strong connection to
an outstanding technical group, like INPO for example, could be
a good way of putting together a review.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, anything else, Senator
Alexander.
Senator Alexander. No. I'd like to thank the witnesses for
very helpful statements that you made and thank the chairman
for looking into this. As I said at the beginning, it is very
important that we talk about nuclear power. You know, nuclear
power is such a complex mechanical operation that it makes
sensational television news whenever there is a problem. Even
though hundreds of thousands of people in Japan are homeless
and a thousand bodies washed up on a beach one day, the news
most days was about what was happening at the nuclear reactors.
And I think it is important that as a country we simply
learn how to honestly ask questions and continuously improve
what we are doing. At the same time, lots of people die every
year from the pollution from coal plants that isn't collected
in pollution control systems and from other forms of energy
production. So I think it is important that we keep this all in
perspective and we recognize that the safety record for the
generation of nuclear power in the United States really
couldn't be better, in terms of harm to people. It can always
be improved. There are important lessons from Three Mile
Island, but I have not heard anyone yet contradict my statement
that no one was injured at Three Mile Island.
So this is helpful testimony and I think, Madam Chairman,
the most important thing we can do is advance the research on
used nuclear fuel, on SMRs, on any other safety enhancements
that might be recommended that would continue to help us
produce large amounts of reliable, low-cost, clean electricity
of which I think nuclear power is an important component.
Senator Feinstein. Well, thank you, Senator.
Of course, I come from a State that is in the ring of fire.
The ring of fire has had some very big earthquakes around it.
One of the things I learned from the USGS was that a section of
the sea bottom, as large as the State of Maryland, moved in a
subduction under the plate and that was what launched the
tsunami which was just amazing for me to hear. I think no one
ever thought, in the design process, that that kind of thing
would happen.
Let me ask, do each of you have a last thought for us?
Anything you would like to say and then we will conclude
rapidly.
Mr. Levis.
Mr. Levis. I think the point that you make about what is it
that we don't know is obviously something we challenge
ourselves with every day, which is really the reason why
these--some of these procedures that we refer to as severe
accident management guides were developed, you know, a little
over a decade ago, so that we could respond, you know, to the
consequence of the event, versus trying to figure out what the
event is. That means if the heat sink is lost, what would you
do? If you lost emergency AC power what would you do?
So you know, we think--we ask ourselves continually those
what if questions and what have we missed here. And I am sure
there will be some significant learning out of here that we can
apply to our plant designs and operating practices so we can
improve the safety of our facilities.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you. I was with the CEO
of Southern California Edison and he said the same thing you
did that what we know is what we know and we have to challenge
people with what we don't know. I very much agree with that.
Dr. Moniz or Mr. Lochbaum.
Mr. Lochbaum. I would just say as the--obviously the event
in Japan was tragic. Even if there were no lives lost from the
radiation that has been released from the damaged cores, that
was a multi-billion asset that became a multi-billion liability
very quickly. So we need to, both for the economic cost of that
accident, but also any human cost, we need to learn as much as
we have. If the industry is going to do it, the NRC is going to
do it and we--as tragic as the accident will be, it would be
shame on us if we don't reap the full benefits of lessons
learned from that.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Dr. Moniz.
Dr. Moniz. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Perhaps I could make a few comments about R&D programs,
that is obviously something under the direct purview of this
subcommittee and you will be considered it. Just a note, that
again last year we issued a report on the future of the nuclear
fuel cycle. I just wanted to note some of the areas that we
noted for R&D, viewing these as real gaps, historically, in the
program.
Life extension for LWRs and technologies, some new
technologies like fuel, cladding which we mentioned earlier,
for safety margins, advanced fuel development for a LWR. The
modeling and simulation is part of the way of verifying and
quantifying uncertainties--dry cask storage life extension--
other concepts include enhanced waste forms for storage and
disposal. What I emphasize is that this is way before
Fukushima, this was last year, that these kinds of technologies
which are about the work horse of our nuclear fleet, LWRs, has
been neglected and I believe this should be a very strong
priority for R&D.
We did have, in addition to this, something that Senator
Alexander referred to, which was also a program for the future
possible closed fuel cycles that might make sense for reasons
of waste management or resource extension. But our view as the
number one priority, strategic view is if nuclear power is to
play an important role in the next few decades it is these
things we need: the storage technologies, the new fuels, the
new cladding with better safety margins, et cetera. So I would
urge, in your consideration of the DOE budget, that these be
given a lot of attention. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. You make a lot of sense. Senator
Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Madam Chair, may I ask permission to
include in the record an article from The Guardian of London on
Sunday by one of the leading environmentalists in the country
which is headlined, ``Why Fukushima Made Me Stop Worrying and
Love Nuclear Power''. His comment was, ``Atomic energy has just
been subjected to one of the harshest possible tests and the
impact on people and the planet has been small. The crisis at
Fukushima has converted me to the cause of nuclear power.''
Senator Alexander. This is----
Senator Feinstein. Oh my goodness.
Senator Alexander. Well, the----
Senator Feinstein. The effect has been small?
Senator Alexander. Of the reactors.
Senator Feinstein. On the reactor.
Senator Alexander. Of the----
Senator Feinstein. But the affect on the country, on the
people, on the economy, on the sea bed is enormous.
Senator Alexander. The effect of the reactors. These are
his comments. But he reviews, in his article, that the disaster
would weigh more heavily, he said, if there were less harmful
alternatives. He goes through all the other ways of producing
energy and concludes atomic power has to be part of the mix.
And in any event, this is just one person who is an
environmentalist who had that unusual reaction to the disaster.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, we will put it in the record.
[The information follows:]
[From the guardian.co.uk, March 21, 2011]
Why Fukushima Made Me Stop Worrying and Love Nuclear Power
(By George Monbiot)
You will not be surprised to hear that the events in Japan have
changed my view of nuclear power. You will be surprised to hear how
they have changed it. As a result of the disaster at Fukushima, I am no
longer nuclear-neutral. I now support the technology.
A crappy old plant with inadequate safety features was hit by a
monster earthquake and a vast tsunami. The electricity supply failed,
knocking out the cooling system. The reactors began to explode and melt
down. The disaster exposed a familiar legacy of poor design and corner-
cutting. Yet, as far as we know, no one has yet received a lethal dose
of radiation.
Some greens have wildly exaggerated the dangers of radioactive
pollution. For a clearer view, look at the graphic published by
xkcd.com. It shows that the average total dose from the Three Mile
Island disaster for someone living within 10 miles of the plant was \1/
625\ of the maximum yearly amount permitted for U.S. radiation workers.
This, in turn, is half of the lowest 1-year dose clearly linked to an
increased cancer risk, which, in its turn, is \1/80\ of an invariably
fatal exposure. I'm not proposing complacency here. I am proposing
perspective.
If other forms of energy production caused no damage, these impacts
would weigh more heavily. But energy is like medicine: if there are no
side-effects, the chances are that it doesn't work.
Like most greens, I favour a major expansion of renewables. I can
also sympathise with the complaints of their opponents. It's not just
the onshore windfarms that bother people, but also the new grid
connections (pylons and power lines). As the proportion of renewable
electricity on the grid rises, more pumped storage will be needed to
keep the lights on. That means reservoirs on mountains: they aren't
popular, either.
The impacts and costs of renewables rise with the proportion of
power they supply, as the need for storage and redundancy increases. It
may well be the case (I have yet to see a comparative study) that up to
a certain grid penetration--50 percent or 70 percent, perhaps--
renewables have smaller carbon impacts than nuclear, while beyond that
point, nuclear has smaller impacts than renewables.
Like others, I have called for renewable power to be used both to
replace the electricity produced by fossil fuel and to expand the total
supply, displacing the oil used for transport and the gas used for
heating fuel. Are we also to demand that it replaces current nuclear
capacity? The more work we expect renewables to do, the greater the
impact on the landscape will be, and the tougher the task of public
persuasion.
But expanding the grid to connect people and industry to rich,
distant sources of ambient energy is also rejected by most of the
greens who complained about the blog post I wrote last week in which I
argued that nuclear remains safer than coal. What they want, they tell
me, is something quite different: we should power down and produce our
energy locally. Some have even called for the abandonment of the grid.
Their bucolic vision sounds lovely, until you read the small print.
At high latitudes like ours, most small-scale ambient power
production is a dead loss. Generating solar power in the UK involves a
spectacular waste of scarce resources. It's hopelessly inefficient and
poorly matched to the pattern of demand. Wind power in populated areas
is largely worthless. This is partly because we have built our
settlements in sheltered places; partly because turbulence caused by
the buildings interferes with the airflow and chews up the mechanism.
Micro-hydropower might work for a farmhouse in Wales, but it's not much
use in Birmingham.
And how do we drive our textile mills, brick kilns, blast furnaces
and electric railways--not to mention advanced industrial processes?
Rooftop solar panels? The moment you consider the demands of the whole
economy is the moment at which you fall out of love with local energy
production. A national (or, better still, international) grid is the
essential prerequisite for a largely renewable energy supply.
Some greens go even further: why waste renewable resources by
turning them into electricity? Why not use them to provide energy
directly? To answer this question, look at what happened in Britain
before the industrial revolution.
The damming and weiring of British rivers for watermills was small-
scale, renewable, picturesque and devastating. By blocking the rivers
and silting up the spawning beds, they helped bring to an end the
gigantic runs of migratory fish that were once among our great natural
spectacles and which fed much of Britain--wiping out sturgeon, lampreys
and shad, as well as most sea trout and salmon.
Traction was intimately linked with starvation. The more land that
was set aside for feeding draft animals for industry and transport, the
less was available for feeding humans. It was the 17th-century
equivalent of today's biofuels crisis. The same applied to heating
fuel. As EA Wrigley points out in his book Energy and the English
Industrial Revolution, the 11m tonnes of coal mined in England in 1800
produced as much energy as 11m acres of woodland (one-third of the land
surface) would have generated.
Before coal became widely available, wood was used not just for
heating homes, but also for industrial processes: if half the land
surface of Britain had been covered with woodland, Wrigley shows, we
could have made 1.25m tonnes of bar iron a year (a fraction of current
consumption) and nothing else. Even with a much lower population than
today's, manufactured goods in the land-based economy were the preserve
of the elite. Deep green energy production--decentralized, based on the
products of the land--is far more damaging to humanity than nuclear
meltdown.
But the energy source to which most economies will revert if they
shut down their nuclear plants is not wood, water, wind or sun, but
fossil fuel. On every measure (climate change, mining impact, local
pollution, industrial injury and death, even radioactive discharges)
coal is 100 times worse than nuclear power. Thanks to the expansion of
shale gas production, the impacts of natural gas are catching up fast.
Yes, I still loathe the liars who run the nuclear industry. Yes, I
would prefer to see the entire sector shut down, if there were harmless
alternatives. But there are no ideal solutions. Every energy technology
carries a cost; so does the absence of energy technologies. Atomic
energy has just been subjected to one of the harshest of possible
tests, and the impact on people and the planet has been small. The
crisis at Fukushima has converted me to the cause of nuclear power.
Senator Feinstein. It is unusual.
Your thoughts have been very helpful. I would just ask that
if you have other thoughts, please communicate them to this
subcommittee because Dr. Moniz is right, this R&D program is
directly under our jurisdiction and we certainly need to
consider the things that you mentioned and we will.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
At this time I would like to ask the members of the
subcommittee to please submit any questions they have for the
witnesses for inclusion in the record.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Dr. Peter B. Lyons
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Question. Can you please explain what a passive reactor is and why
it is or is not considered safer than the boiling water or pressurized
water reactors? For instance, it is my understanding that high-
temperature, gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) that are currently being
developed under the Department of Energy's (DOE) Next Generation
Nuclear Plant Program have natural safety features that ensure any
significant radiation could never be released to the public no matter
how serious the accident. Is this true and would you please describe
why these reactors are so safe? In addition, what is DOE doing to
promote the use of technology that utilizes a passive reactor?
Answer. The current fleet of reactors utilizes engineered safety
features characterized by redundant and diverse systems to deliver
cooling water to the reactor core and remove heat from the primary
containment. The new light water reactor (LWR) designs, including small
modular reactors, are even safer than the current fleet of reactors
since they make use of passive safety features that rely on natural
forces (such as gravity and natural circulation) rather than engineered
safety features and emergency power supplies. HTGRs move beyond these
passive safety features by incorporating additional inherent physical
characteristics that enhance safety. These features include the use of
advanced, coated particle fuel that retains the nuclear fission product
materials during all design basis and severe accidents. HTGR-coated
particle fuel operates at lower power densities (approximately 6 watts
per cubic centimeter) than typical LWR fuel (60-100 watts per cubic
centimeter) so that there is a reduced probability of core fuel damage
and radioactive fission product releases. During severe accidents the
HTGR reactor can be cooled passively without the use of active heat
transfer systems that rely on electrical power, operator actions, or
any active control systems. Some engineers have referred to these
plants as being inherently safe.
Question. What has and will the NRC do to ensure that our U.S.
reactors are safe and are prepared for the worst case scenario?
Answer. The NRC's efforts to assure safety of commercial nuclear
reactors begin with the licensing process. Each operating reactor in
the United States underwent a rigorous design review before receiving a
license. The applicants had to satisfy NRC safety requirements to
assure that the design of the reactors and the associated emergency
equipment, such as emergency cooling water pumps, would safely respond
to a variety of adverse events.
The NRC also licenses the reactor operators who provide the
immediate response to any plant event. There are significant training
and testing requirements for the operators, which include demonstrating
knowledge of the appropriate response to accidents. In addition, the
emergency planning requirements for power reactors are based on a
spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents.
On a day-to-day basis, inspections are done by onsite ``resident''
inspectors and visiting inspectors from the NRC's four regional offices
and the NRC's headquarters. These inspections are part of the NRC's
``Reactor Oversight Process'' and assess how the reactor and utility
staff perform in areas such as maintenance, engineering, operations,
security, radiation protection, and emergency planning. Through the
inspections, the NRC determines whether the licensee is operating in
accordance with its license and that the plant systems will be capable
of performing their safety functions in response to an event.
Following recent events in Japan, the NRC established a senior
level task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of NRC
processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make
additional improvements to our regulatory system and make
recommendations to the NRC for its policy direction. This task force
will also identify a framework and topics for a longer-term review and
assessment.
In addition, NRC inspectors are assessing licensee activities and
actions concerning readiness to respond to an event similar to the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant incident. To direct the inspections,
the NRC issued a Temporary Instruction (TI) on March 23, 2011 to its
inspectors. Using this guidance, the NRC's inspectors assessed the
licensee's capability to mitigate conditions that result from ``beyond
design basis'' events typically bounded by security threats, loss of
all onsite electricity (i.e. ``station blackout''), and flooding
events. On May 13, 2011, the NRC began issuing reports to the Nation's
104 operating nuclear power plants regarding inspections of the plants'
abilities to deal with power losses or damage to large areas of a
reactor site following extreme events. Our inspectors found all the
reactors would be kept safe even in the event their regular safety
systems were affected by these events, although a few plants have to do
a better job maintaining the necessary resources and procedures.
U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors have Emergency Operating
Procedures' (EOPs) to direct actions in response to events and plant
conditions. In response to an industry initiative in the 1990s, the
U.S. industry developed Severe Accident Management Guidelines'' (SAMGs)
to address situations beyond the EOPs. During the NRC's task force's
deliberations thus far, the importance of SAMGs has been highlighted.
Thus, the NRC issued on April 29, 2011, a new TI to confirm that the
SAMGs are available and being maintained, and determine the nature and
extent of licensee implementation of SAMG training.
Question. I know that 23 of the United States reactors are a
General Electric Mark 1 design, the same design as at the Fukushima
Daiichi facility in Japan. Yet, I believe each of these 23 facilities
has been retrofitted and modified to address venting and other concerns
with this reactor design. Can you please walk me through why the
modifications were needed at the U.S. facilities? Can you confirm that
all of these reactors have been modified? Does this make our reactors
safer than the reactors in Japan?
Answer. In the 1980s, the NRC staff completed a determination of
what actions should be taken to reduce the vulnerability of the
original Mark I containments to severe accident challenges. This work
is documented in NRC's Generic Letter 89-16. The Mark I containment has
a light-bulb shaped ``drywell'' in which the reactor pressure vessel is
located; below the drywell, there is a donut or torus-shaped
``wetwell'' partially filled with water (i.e., the ``suppression
pool''). There are pipes that connect the drywell to the suppression
pool. If there is damage to the reactor pressure vessel or piping
connected to it, the drywell will fill with steam and the resulting
pressure will force the steam into the suppression pool. The water in
the suppression pool will cool and condense the steam, thus reducing
the pressure in the containment drywell and wetwell. Even before the
installation of the hardened wetwell vents, the NRC staff recognized
that under emergency conditions the plant's operators might vent the
wetwell to avoid exceeding the maximum containment pressure limits.
However, the previous methods of venting used nonpressure retaining
pathways, and thus could have made vital areas of the plant
inaccessible and potentially unsafe during and after venting.
Therefore, the NRC directed the staff to pursue enhancements to the
Mark I containments, and in particular to approve installation of a
hardened wetwell vent for plants that elect to incorporate this
improvement. For the remaining plants, the staff was directed to
initiate plant-specific backfit analyses for each of the Mark I plants
to evaluate the efficacy of requiring the installation of hardened
wetwell vents.
Given a scenario of a long-term loss of decay heat removal, the
staff found that use of reliable containment venting and procedures
could reduce the chance of a core melt accident by a factor of 10, and
that the vent would also reduce the likelihood of a core melt accident
during other events like a station blackout. Hardened wetwell vents are
designed to allow operators to prevent containment failure by
controlled reduction of containment pressure during severe accidents.
Venting from the wetwell allows for significant reduction in the
release of radioactive airborne contamination by the scrubbing action
of the suppression pool water. The vent was designed to discharge away
from the secondary containment building, better supporting subsequent
operator actions there. The vent capability was also designed to allow
release of combustible gas (hydrogen resulting from the reaction of
fuel cladding with coolant at elevated temperatures) to prevent
containment failure.
No NRC orders were issued for installing a hardened wetwell vent,
and all modifications made were voluntary. Licensees were allowed to
justify not installing the hard pipe vent based on plant unique
configuration and circumstances. All 23 BWR Mark I plants either
installed the modification described in the generic letter (22 plants),
or justified use of existing plant safety features (1 plant).
Installation of the vent was designed to improve safety of the plants
in the United States.
Other improvements in these containment and safety systems were
also studied and implemented from the late 1970s through the 1990s,
including the strengthening of the wetwell, inerting of containment
during operations to prevent hydrogen explosions in the case of a core
damage accident, and installing larger suction strainers for emergency
cooling pumps.
The NRC does not currently have sufficient information about how
venting was, or was not, accomplished in Japan, thus we cannot yet
provide a comparison between the United States approach to venting and
the Japanese approach.
Question. I am told that in the upcoming year, 2 of the 5 NRC
Commissioners will be up for replacement. Given the events that have
taken place over the past month, and the number of U.S. nuclear
facilities that will need renewal licenses, can you please speak to the
importance of having a full panel as the NRC moves forward to tackle
these issues?
Answer. Commissioner Ostendorff's current term will end on June 30,
2011. He has been re-nominated by the President for a full-term; that
nomination is currently with the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee for consideration. Because Commissioner's terms are
staggered, the next term to end is Commissioner Svinicki's at the end
of June 2012. The NRC is designed to be a collegial body of five
responsible for policy formulation, rulemaking, adjudications, and
adjudicatory orders. The diversity of experience, knowledge, and
opinions among the Commissioners strengthens the formulation of agency
policy and the execution of our critical mission.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Feinstein. So thank you gentlemen, very much, for
the testimony. It is very helpful. And the hearing is recessed.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., Wednesday, March 30, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
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