[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 1, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-27
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia, Vice Chair Jackie Speier, California
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Loretta Sanchez, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Henry Cuellar, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Kevin Gundersen, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Stephen Vina, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 3
Witness
Ms. Caryn A. Wagner, Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin, Assistant Commandant for Intelligence
and Criminal Investigation, U.S. Coast Guard................... 11
Mr. Daniel Johnson, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence,
U.S. Transportation Security Administration.................... 13
Mr. James Chaparro, Assistant Director for Intelligence, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement............................ 15
Ms. Susan Mitchell, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Intelligence and Operations Coordination, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection.............................................. 17
THE DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
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Wednesday, June 1, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Meehan, Cravaack, Quayle, Speier,
and Cuellar.
Mr. Meehan. The Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on
``The DHS Intelligence Enterprise--Its Past, Present, and
Future.'' I want to express my deep appreciation to each and
every one of you for coming forward today and your prepared
testimony.
We are dealing with the realities of Congress right now and
the vote schedule, so we are going to do our best to try to get
in as much as we can in the form of your direct testimony.
Ideally, we will be able to see what it takes with regard to
what should be a quick vote procession, and then I know I will
return and I suspect others. Hopefully we can ask if you would
stay for any questions that may arise on this very, very
important topic.
So I would like to welcome today's witnesses to discuss the
growth and future of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.
Before we begin today, I would like to take a moment to
send my heartfelt condolences to one of our subcommittee
members--I know that he is here today; I don't know if he is
going to be able to make the hearing--Billy Long from Missouri.
Representative Long represents Joplin, Missouri. I know
many of you who deal with homeland security are very well aware
of the devastation by that tornado last week. I know I speak
for all Members of the subcommittee when I say our thoughts and
prayers are with Billy and the people in his district and the
great people throughout Joplin in this difficult time.
As we all know, the Department was created in response to
the 9/11 attacks and consisted in the merging of 22 different
agencies. There has been great progress on solidifying our
homeland, but more work remains.
I have personal experience with the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise, having been sworn in as United States attorney for
the Eastern District just days after 9/11. I worked closely
with many of the DHS entities on a variety of issues during my
time in office.
With four terrorist attacks against our homeland since 9/
11, multiple disrupted plots, and dozens of individuals
indicted on terrorism charges, the threat to our homeland
remains at an all-time high and is more diverse than ever. Even
with the death of Osama bin Laden, we continue to face serious
threats from terrorist groups, who are attempting to deploy
foreigners and Americans to our homeland to conduct attacks.
In addition, today we face a significant threat from
radicalized individuals in the United States, including United
States citizens who have lived here their entire lives and yet
are still drawn to the ideology and conduct attacks. Most
notable among these include U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, Times
Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, and the New York City Subway
bomber Najibullah Zazi.
In today's 112th Congress, this subcommittee has been
threat-focused. Members have learned about the terrorist threat
from Yemen, Pakistan, and counterterrorism ramifications of
unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. Today, I look
forward to learning more about what the men and women in the
Department of Homeland Security, on the front lines, are doing
in this war against terrorism.
Our Customs and Border Patrol officers and Border Patrol
agents are charged with preventing foreign terrorists and
weapons from illegally entering the country. TSA officers are
tasked with preventing terrorists from boarding our aircraft,
which is the obsessive target of al-Qaeda since its inception.
In fact, both myself and Ranking Member Speier have major
international airports in our districts, so we know first-hand
the challenges facing aviation security.
The ICE agents are responsible for ensuring individuals who
remain in the country illegally are apprehended and removed.
The Coast Guard is tasked with protecting ports and other
critical infrastructure, including an oil refinery and other
critical assets in my own area, the Delaware River in my
district.
The men and women of DHS law enforcement, the boots-on-the-
ground operators, rely heavily on intelligence to help them do
their jobs, which includes everything from identifying
suspicious individuals to tracking hundreds of thousands of
shipping containers around the world. Ensuring a robust system
of collaboration, information sharing, and analytic excellence
across the Department Intelligence Enterprise is critical.
The DHS Intelligence Enterprise has developed and changed
dramatically over the years, and we are here today to
understand where we have been, where we are today, and where we
should be going. My hope is that this will be an in-depth
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise so that Members leave here with an
understanding of the positive developments, of which there have
been many, and a sense of the challenges that still remain.
Through the course of today's hearing, I also hope to learn
about the level of cooperation and coordination among the
component intelligence elements, how law enforcement and
intelligence information is being shared and fused to create
first-rate homeland security intelligence projects.
Just on a last note, Secretary Wagner, I know that you are
aware that I sent a letter to Secretary Napolitano, DNI
Clapper, and Attorney General Holder with various questions
regarding the treasure trove of intelligence gathered in the
UBL raid. I want to do everything to ensure this college
library of intelligence gets to the State and locals and on the
front lines of the operators of DHS. I look forward to
receiving a written response to that letter. But please let me
know how we can help you in any way in moving forward on that
important issue.
So I look forward today to hearing from today's witnesses.
I would like now to recognize the Ranking Minority Member
of the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from California, Ms.
Speier, for any statement she may have.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today on the Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise. I look forward to working with you to
continue the subcommittee's long history of oversight over the
critical mission to coordinate the intelligence and
information-sharing activities of the Department.
This enterprise brings together the intelligence
capabilities of the entire Department, from headquarters to the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis to analysts in the field
working on various components. We are here to examine the
progress that the Intelligence Enterprise has made since its
creation and to identify areas needing improvement.
Although we have come a long way to shore up intelligence
gaps within the Department, several incidents over the past few
years have revealed vulnerabilities and driven home the
importance of maturing the Intelligence Enterprise. Does DHS
have the funding it needs to continue building its intelligence
architecture? Does it have the buy-in from the intelligence
community and senior leadership across the Government?
The chief intelligence officer of the Department, Under
Secretary Caryn Wagner, leads the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.
I am pleased that she is with us today to discuss how the
enterprise is maturing.
Some challenges the chief intelligence officer and the
Intelligence Enterprise face appear deceptively simple, like
developing a common lexicon for all intelligence professionals
to use Department-wide.
Once you do that, please share that with us, because I, for
one, continue to be challenged by many of the acronyms.
Other challenges seem more complex, like bringing together
components with distinct and sometimes competing priorities to
serve the Department's large customer base.
To what extent is intelligence analysis and information
sharing a priority in each component? How is the Department
reducing duplication and redundancy of effort within DHS and
between DHS and other elements the intelligence community? How
much money should we be devoting to this, and can be it done
better and more efficiently?
I am looking forward to hearing from all of the
intelligence chiefs assembled here today to get answers to
these questions and to see how all of you work together in this
constrained budget environment to address the many threats to
our homeland security.
Documents combed through in the aftermath of the bin Laden
operation have underscored how critically important it is for
all the components, even with their unique missions, to work
together. Letters attributed to bin Laden and his lieutenants
have identified targets in major cities from coast to coast,
and we know al-Qaeda was looking at our rail, aviation, and
energy sectors.
Do we have the right policies in place to permit the
sharing of sensitive information while also protecting the
privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens? Do we have the
right technologies to allow the components to adequately
communicate with their partners within DHS and the intelligence
community, as well as State, local, and Tribal partners and the
private sector?
After this hearing, we expect to have a much better picture
of the accomplishments and current capabilities of the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise and, more importantly, how we can help
you address your critical needs and meet your goals in the
future.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for being here
today. While many of your accomplishments are designed to go
unnoticed, know we appreciate your tireless efforts to keep
America secure.
I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. I thank you, Ms. Speier.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have five distinguished witnesses before
us today on this very, very important topic. So let me remind
the witnesses that their entire written statement will appear
in the record. I hope you will allow us to understand the most
critical points of your testimony and do your best to try to
work with us on the time deadlines, as well.
Today's first witness is Under Secretary and Chief
Intelligence Officer Caryn Wagner from the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Under Secretary and CINT, we call it, Wagner--that is--how
do you--it is CINT? Okay. I just need to make sure--was
confirmed in her present post by the Senate in February 2010.
Before that, she led a storied and distinguished career as
a public servant, first as the signals intelligence and
electronic warfare officer in the United States Army and,
later, on the staffs of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
Director of National Intelligence.
Under Secretary Wagner also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree
in English and history from the College of William and Mary and
a Master of Science degree in Systems Management from the
University of Southern California.
Under Secretary Wagner, you are now recognized to summarize
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
Members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you
today to discuss the DHS Intelligence Enterprise in the company
of some of my key colleagues from the Homeland Security
Intelligence Council. I view this hearing as a valuable
opportunity for us all to update you on how we increasingly
operate as a partnership to provide the best possible
intelligence support to the Department, the intelligence
community, and our many and varied external customers.
Let me start with a few definitions since this can get
confusing. I think you already have it, but the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise consists of all elements of the
Department that are engaged in directing, collecting,
reporting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating
intelligence and information in support of the Department's
many missions, as outlined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review.
The Homeland Security Intelligence Council, or HSIC,
acronym No. 2, is basically the board of directors of the
Intelligence Enterprise. It is comprised of the heads of the
intelligence elements of the components and other key members
of the Intelligence Enterprise, such as the National Protection
and Programs Directorate, which is responsible for
infrastructure protection and cybersecurity.
I chair the HSIC in my role as the chief intelligence
officer, or CINT, for the Department, a role that was created
in 2005 and formalized in legislation in the implementing
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. As the CINT
and as chair of the HSIC, I am responsible for overseeing the
Intelligence Enterprise and performing a few key functions:
First, reviewing the intelligence budgets of the components
to ensure that they are adequate and not duplicative and
advocating for component intelligence needs within the larger
Department budget bill; second, identifying areas where the
enterprise would benefit from standardized policies, practices,
and procedures, and working with the HSIC members to develop
and implement them; and, third, leveraging the expertise of the
HSIC members to collectively address crosscutting intelligence
topics and issues in support of Department missions.
To speak very briefly to each of these functions, I
recently received the fiscal year 2013 budget briefings from
the key components, and I am working on crafting my response
and my input to the Secretary for the Department's resource
allocation plan. Because I wear another hat--in addition to
Under Secretary for Intelligence and CINT, I am also the
Department's information-sharing executive--I have the
opportunity to weigh in on both the information-sharing and
intelligence portfolios as part of the budget build. As you
know, those two portfolios are closely related.
The review process allows me to identify and act on
capability gaps. As an example, in the fiscal year 2012 budget
request that is currently on the Hill, I have put an initiative
in there to provide additional personnel for U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, a member of the HSIC who is not with
us today, to assist them in reviewing the voluminous holdings
of immigration data in response to a growing number of requests
from law enforcement and National security queries.
As for the standardized policies and processes, I want to
highlight just a couple of those. First is our collective
effort to standardize and improve our Homeland Security
Intelligence Reports, or HIRs. After much discussion and
examination of the varying processes across the enterprise, we
developed a phased approach for transitioning to an enterprise
process that will standardize thresholds, time lines, and
training, and streamline the review and clearance process while
ensuring compliance with all existing laws and policies.
Improving HIR production across the board is important
because HIRs are our primary method for getting the information
that we gather in the course of performing our many missions to
our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence
communities, who can then use them in support of their own
missions. You may hear more about HIR reporting from Mr.
Chaparro because ICE is an enterprise best practice in terms of
HIR reporting.
We are also using the HSIC to develop a Department-wide
counterintelligence strategy--something that, unfortunately, we
were lacking in the past. We have created a counterintelligence
working group under the HSIC which is made up of the
Department's CI representatives. In some cases, these
representatives are the first ever in their components. So this
group is going to report back to the HSIC on the strategy and
develop plans for phased implementation of a new CI strategy
across the Department.
Another area where we are developing an enterprise approach
is production management. As Congresswoman Speier asked, we are
frequently asked about duplication and redundancy in the
Department. It is, in fact, hard to have too much duplication
because the missions of the various components are so distinct.
But in the area particularly of CT threat, we definitely do
need to coordinate and deconflict our efforts.
So we produced our first program of analysis in 2010, which
laid out our 17 key intelligence questions and the planned
analysis and production in response to those questions. The
first one was drafted by I&A and coordinated with the
components, but it was largely an I&A document. The second one
that we are kicking off now is intended to be a true enterprise
document, developed collaboratively from the beginning, and
articulating who is going to produce what on the full range of
Department missions and threats to homeland security.
Finally, a couple of examples in the area of collaborative
focus on specific intelligence issues. Without going into
classified details, we have put teams together on an ad-hoc
basis to focus on things like spikes in the apprehension of
specific groups along the border arriving without
documentation, to try to figure out why and how they have
arrived at the border and what their origins and motivations
are. We had a very successful working group that focused on
capabilities and gaps in discovering tunnels under the
Southwest border. We have also put together a group to red team
terrorist tactics, in cooperation with our interagency
partners, as a way of ensuring that we and our State and local
partners were planning for and implementing the most effective
protective measures.
The bottom line is that the HSIC and the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise are force multipliers. We all do a better job when
we work together, and we are getting better at working
together. We also take it to the next level and work closely
with our interagency partners, particularly at NCTC and FBI.
Finally, I would just say, if you forgive my analogy,
homeland security is a team sport, and I am pleased to be here
with my colleagues and teammates to answer your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Wagner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Caryn A. Wagner
June 1, 2011
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss my role as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) and the collaborative efforts of the
DHS Intelligence Enterprise.
DHS is a complex organization with a broad, diverse set of
missions. Intelligence is an important supporting factor in most, if
not all, of these missions. Departmental intelligence programs,
projects, activities, and personnel--including the intelligence
elements of our seven key operational components, as well as the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)--make up the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise (IE). I&A is charged with ensuring that intelligence from
the DHS IE is analyzed, fused, and coordinated to support the full
range of DHS missions and functions, as well as the Department's
external partners. The operational components, most of which predate
the creation of the Department, have intelligence elements that provide
support tailored to their specialized functions and contribute
information and expertise in support of the Department's broader
mission set.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 made the then-Assistant Secretary
for Information Analysis responsible for establishing intelligence
collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination priorities,
policies, processes, standards, guidelines, and procedures for the
intelligence components of the Department. As part of the Department's
2005 Second Stage Review, the Assistant Secretary was designated as the
DHS Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) to accomplish that mandate. The
Assistant Secretary was subsequently elevated to Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis (U/SIA) by the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which also strengthened the
influence of the CINT role.
The CINT is responsible for leading and managing the activities of
the DHS IE, and furthering a unified, coordinated, and integrated
intelligence program for the Department. One of the CINT's first
leadership actions was to develop Management Directive (MD) 8110, which
delineates the CINT's authorities to oversee, define, and evaluate the
Department's intelligence activities and services. As a result of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the
heads of DHS intelligence components are required to advise and
coordinate with the CINT to support the mission of the Department.
The CINT provides planning and programmatic guidance to the IE,
conducts programmatic reviews, and provides formal input to the
Secretary regarding intelligence-related budget requests from the
Components. The CINT's planning and programmatic guidance focuses
Departmental resources and efforts toward priority intelligence and
information-sharing needs to expand enterprise capabilities, develop
capacity, and improve intelligence support to the DHS IE. In 2012, the
CINT focus areas are training, secure connectivity, and collaboration
across the IE.
To ensure the DHS IE works together to support the DHS mission, the
CINT regularly engages with the Components through weekly secure video
teleconferences (SVTCs) to coordinate on threat reporting and planned
production. Perhaps the most important and successful integration
mechanism the CINT employs, however, is the Homeland Security
Intelligence Council (HSIC).
The HSIC was created in 2005 to serve as the DHS IE's decision-
making and implementation oversight body. The HSIC is composed of the
heads of DHS's intelligence components. HSIC members provide advice and
assistance; coordinate the implementation of programs; and report to
the CINT on intelligence matters related to: (a) Strategy and policy,
(b) leadership and coordination, (c) training and career development,
(d) budget, management, and implementation, and (e) evaluation and
feedback. The HSIC is empowered to establish subordinate boards and
working groups to accomplish its oversight and program coordination
responsibilities.
The HSIC meets monthly to discuss current issues, receive
strategic-level information briefings, and provide guidance. This forum
provides a regular opportunity for HSIC members to inform and solicit
feedback from their counterparts on new initiatives and to provide
updates on existing programs. Subordinate working groups provide
periodic updates on their progress and accomplishments.
HSIC working groups are established as needed to address the
dynamic requirements of the DHS IE. Chaired by the members of the DHS
IE, the working groups are charged with developing action plans based
on guidance from HSIC. Working groups can be short- or long-term, and
focus on systemic and programmatic issues or on substantive
intelligence topics. For example, the HSIC helped develop specific
questions for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers to ask
certain types of travelers or border crossers, and to identify
intelligence and technology gaps to support counter-tunnel
investigations and operations. In addition to coordinating the monthly
HSIC meeting and following up on HSIC working group programs and
activities, the CINT staff collects input from the DHS IE for
compilation into two reference tools, the Intelligence Enterprise
Catalog (IEC) and the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities
Framework (HSIPF).
The IEC contains information on DHS IE assets, capabilities, and
resources around the country and the globe. While not yet
comprehensive, it serves as a useful reference point for the CINT and
DHS IE when making decisions related to resource planning and current
operations. The HSIPF aggregates the DHS IE's intelligence priorities
for the CINT to help the HSIC make informed IE-wide planning decisions.
It serves much the same purpose for the DHS IE as the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) does for the National
intelligence community. We continually refine the HSIPF to ensure it
accurately captures DHS IE priorities and aligns most effectively with
the NIPF.
As post-9/11 operational necessity drove DHS' formation from
disparate legacy agencies, complex new departmental responsibilities
obliged us to work together in enterprise fashion and forge a
collaborative OneDHS intelligence culture. The DHS IE leaders
represented on the HSIC have contributed their operational component
experience and perspective to shape innovative intelligence methods in
support of Departmental policy, programs, and operational needs. The
following initiatives and programs are outgrowths of the cooperative,
collegial spirit of the DHS IE as embodied in the HSIC.
dhs terrorism task force (dttf)
The acting CINT stood up the DHS Terrorism Task Force (DTTF) to
bring together representatives from across the DHS IE to rapidly
disseminate information, garner feedback and/or solicit input to
strategic-level issues.
The DTTF, which is led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), ensures that all information resident in each of the Components'
unique systems is identified and shared within the Department and the
IC. The DTTF hosts a weekly SVTC to discuss current intelligence and
threat updates, ensuring that the DHS IE is operating in unity to
achieve the Department's mission.
The DHS Watchlisting Cell (WLC) was established within I&A in
October 2010 to serve as the focal point for Department-wide watchlist
nominations to the National Counterterrorism Center and the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB). The WLC reached full operational capability
on January 31, 2011. The WLC was placed in the DTTF to leverage
established channels of communication with the Components and because
of the time-sensitive aspect of watchlisting.
The WLC is an improved construct to fulfill requirements directed
by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, which states that every
department or agency in the Executive branch must have a mechanism in
place to nominate for watchlisting all identifying and/or derogatory
information on known or suspected terrorists in its possession. The WLC
leverages intelligence and operations elements throughout DHS to ensure
that all nominations are comprehensive; transmitted in a timely,
coordinated, and standardized manner; and meet established criteria for
submission to NCTC.
homeland intelligence reporting
In 2010, the HSIC established the Homeland Security Intelligence
Report Working Group (HIRWG) to evaluate and optimize the production,
review, and publication process of the Department's intelligence
reports. Until the establishment of the working group, there was no
DHS-wide policy for intelligence reports addressing component-specific
limitations, statutory obligations, mission-specific needs, or
production prioritization methods. DHS IE components noted that
reporting thresholds were being applied inconsistently or subjectively,
often hampering reporting time lines, production rates, and
collaborative efforts. Additionally, there were no standardized or
written processes for the writing, production, submission, or clearance
of intelligence reports. Through a phased approach, the HIR-WG
completed a comprehensive review of the existing HIR program,
processes, and policies gathered from existing documentation, working
group meetings, interviews, and surveys. Additionally, the HIR-WG
examined the efficiency and effectiveness of the current operating
models, the review and clearance process, reporting thresholds and
definitions. Subsequent findings have led to the formation of 13
recommendations designed to establish training/certification,
dissemination, auditing, and reporting threshold standards across the
DHS IE. These improvements championed by the HSIC help to guarantee
that our internal and external stakeholders receive key threat
information in a timely manner, while ensuring compliance with all
applicable laws and policies. Intelligence reports are our primary
vehicle for communicating information collected by the DHS IE to the
broader intelligence community for incorporation into all-source
products.
ctab and ntas
The Counterterrorism Advisory Board (CTAB) is the Department's
mechanism for coordinating and integrating all aspects--intelligence,
operations, and policy--of its counterterrorism mission, which spans
operational components and headquarters elements. The Secretary
appoints a Coordinator for Counterterrorism to chair the CTAB--
currently the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs
Directorate--while the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis/
CINT and Assistant Secretary for Policy are vice-chairs. The CTAB is
also responsible for recommending to the Secretary that an alert be
issued under the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS). The CINT,
working with the DHS IE, is responsible for monitoring threats to the
homeland to determine if it reaches a level of specificity that might
merit convening the CTAB to discuss issuing such an alert. When that
happens, the CINT will consult both internally and externally to the
Department before recommending that the CTAB be convened. The HSIC will
serve as the mechanism for ensuring that key components are fully
involved in the threat recommendation to the CTAB.
counterintelligence working group
The HSIC Subcommittee on Counterintelligence (the CI Working Group
or CI-WG) supports the development of CI policies and procedures across
the Department. Component representatives meet monthly to identify
those areas requiring immediate attention and to establish necessary
DHS-wide CI policy, instructions, and procedures. By integrating the
analytical and operational elements of DHS's CI Program, the CI-WG
postures the Department to effectively identify, understand, and
counter foreign intelligence activities.
The Secretary has directed I&A to lead the Department's
counterintelligence program. The CIWG is working in concert with the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence to establish a CI-
focused Insider Threat Program, which includes an IT-enabled audit/
monitoring capability, and is standardizing CI awareness training. The
CI-WG has also developed a CI Program Directive, codifying the
Secretary's decision to consolidate the Department's CI effort, and
drafted a CI Implementing Instruction and CI Security Classification
Guide. These documents will further help integrate Component efforts
and execute an effective CI program across the Department.
intelligence career force management board
The Intelligence Career Force Management Board (ICFMB) is comprised
of both human capital and professional development personnel from
across the DHS IE. Charged with providing strategic direction and
guidance in managing the DHS intelligence workforce, the board
successfully produced a plan of action to address the Department's high
intelligence workforce turnover rates, uneven training, and lack of
career development tools. The plan of action includes 11 initiatives
aimed at reenergizing and refocusing the workforce through the
establishment of cross-component career paths, common hiring standards,
integrated training and training resources for common functions, and
shared career development tools. These initiatives continue to support
and move the DHS IE closer to its vision of a unified, diverse, agile,
responsive, trained, and mission-ready DHS IE workforce, capable of
supporting the many missions and operations of the Department, as well
as the Department's State, local, Tribal, territorial, private sector,
and intelligence community customers.
Currently, the Board is working to complete a DHS IE curriculum
assessment, which will provide a 3-year outlook on course offerings,
training requirements, and required resources for DHS IE leadership
planning and budgeting purposes. The Board is also developing a
baseline GS-0132 job description and a standard, anonymous exit
interview that will give managers across the DHS IE greater insight
into how, as an enterprise, we can strengthen our workforce.
the future of the dhs ie
The next frontier for the DHS IE is to begin to undertake
enterprise-wide planning. This year will mark the first time the entire
DHS IE will collaborate to produce a single Program of Analysis, which
will help to ensure that, with respect to analytical efforts,
redundancies are avoided, opportunities for collaboration are
identified from the outset, and any overlap is carefully considered in
light of the different approaches each Component may choose to take on
a specific issue. The goal is to ensure that the DHS IE expends its
intelligence resources in an effective and efficient manner and that
all mission requirements are adequately covered. Also, as recommended
by CBP, we are currently exploring the feasibility of a Departmental
intelligence doctrine.
The development and acquisition of new intelligence tools and
systems is an area for additional collaboration. We are making great
strides retrofitting existing databases and networks to interoperate
across the DHS IE; the next step is to more closely coordinate our
planning for new systems to ensure they are built from the ground up to
be more collaborative.
conclusion
Since the establishment of the DHS CINT, Departmental intelligence
integration and efficiency has continuously improved, providing
increasingly unified intelligence support to the DHS mission. Key to
these improvements has been the HSIC, which serves as the main unifying
and integrating body of the DHS IE. Using this forum, senior
intelligence leaders from across the Department have worked to educate
each other on the individual intelligence component missions and
functions to better identify areas of improvement and opportunities for
cooperation. The HSIC allows the DHS IE to synergize our missions,
especially in the areas of counterterrorism and border security.
Working with our partners in the intelligence community, the CINT leads
and manages the activities of the DHS IE, and furthers a unified,
coordinated, and integrated intelligence program for the Department. It
is through the collaborative efforts of the DHS IE that we leverage our
collective strengths and proactively provide intelligence that supports
the Department's mission to secure the homeland. This partnership is a
valuable asset that we must vigilantly cultivate and promote to ensure
its success.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I would
be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Under Secretary Wagner, for your
testimony.
Our next witness will be Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin of the
United States Coast Guard.
The assistant commandant for intelligence and criminal
investigations, Rear Admiral Atkin previously served as
assistant commandant for operational policy and planning. He
has also held the post of acting assistant commandant for
marine safety, security, and stewardship.
As an admiral in the Coast Guard, he additionally served as
special assistant to the President and senior director for
transborder security on the National Security Staff and first
commander of the U.S. Coast Guard Deployable Operations Group,
following a number of operational assignments throughout the
United States.
He is a graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy
with a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematical sciences and
also holds a Master of Science in management science from the
University of Miami.
I also understand you may have a little interest in how the
Coast Guard lacrosse program is doing this year.
Well, Rear Admiral Atkin, you are now recognized to
summarize your testimony for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS ATKIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Atkin. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide testimony on the Coast Guard
Intelligence Enterprise and how we work closely with our DHS
Homeland Security Intelligence Council partners, the DHS
Intelligence and Analysis staff, the Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the
Transportation Security Administration.
As you said already, I am Rear Admiral Tom Atkin. I am the
assistant commandant for intelligence and criminal
investigations.
The Coast Guard is the lead U.S. agency for maritime
homeland security. We are the largest maritime law enforcement
agency in the country, and we are an intelligence community
member. We are on watch 24 hours a day. No other department or
agency has the authorities or jurisdiction like the Coast Guard
that allows us to touch the maritime domain in every area.
For more than 220 years, the Coast Guard has safeguarded
the Nation's maritime interests on our rivers, in our ports,
along the coastal regions, on the high seas, and around the
world. We protect those on the sea, we protect America from
threats delivered by the sea, and we protect the sea itself.
The Coast Guard's persistent presence in the maritime
domain, due to our diverse mission sets and broad legal
authorities, allows us to fill a unique niche within the
intelligence community. As a member of the Armed Forces, the
Coast Guard is at the intersection between homeland security
and National defense. As a Federal law enforcement agency and a
National intelligence community member, the Coast Guard is also
positioned as a bridge between these two important groups.
Because of our unique access, our emphasis, and our
expertise in the maritime domain, an area where other U.S.
Government agencies are typically not present, we collect and
report intelligence that not only supports our missions but
supports the National security objectives.
In August 2010, the motor vessel Sunsea, a 188-foot
stateless bulk cargo carrier, crossed the Pacific carrying 492
illegal Sri Lankan migrants en route to Canada. As the vessel
transited the Pacific, the Coast Guard Intelligence Enterprise
played a key role by enabling Coast Guard operational and
tactical commanders to closely monitor the case, prepare
contingency plans, and effectively position response forces in
the event the ship attempted to reach a port in the United
States or conditions on board deteriorated and an at-sea
interception was required.
This vessel was of particular concern because the smugglers
included members of the terrorist group Tamil Tigers.
Working with our international, Federal, and State
partners, including the Department of Defense, we monitored the
vessel's movements, especially as it approached U.S. territory.
We leveraged and integrated capabilities with our National
intelligence and law enforcement counterparts. We analyzed
similar past cases to make boarding teams aware of the
conditions and the responses they might encounter if they were
given the order to interdict the vessel. We assessed the
potential threat posed by the crew and passengers. At any time,
this vessel could have turned into a major search-and-rescue
case or a significant interdiction event.
The vessel was ultimately intercepted by Canadian forces
off the coast of British Columbia. We provided effective,
timely, accurate, and usable intelligence to ensure our forces
were well-informed and ready to take action. This example
highlights our unique maritime expertise, allowing us to lead
and assist our law enforcement National intelligence and
international partners to identify a potential threat and work
toward a positive solution to protect our Nation.
To support homeland security, the Coast Guard screens
ships, crews, and passengers for all vessels required to submit
a 96-hour advance notice of arrivals to a U.S. port. In 2010,
we screened more than 257,000 ships and 71.2 million people.
We work closely with Customs and Border Protection to
utilize their automated targeting system, which enables real-
time database checks and allows us to more easily identify
suspected entities engaged in nefarious activities within the
maritime domain. Our collaboration with CBP has been so
successful that, earlier this year, we moved most of our
screening effort to the National Targeting Center to better
integrate our efforts with interagency personnel performing
similar duties.
Following screening, any informations on persons discovered
with possible terrorism links are shared with other DHS
components, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence
community.
I have only scratched the surface describing the broad
capabilities and diverse relationships that define the Coast
Guard Intelligence Enterprise. In our intelligence pursuits,
the Coast Guard draws on our long and rich maritime history and
experiences that result from our unique status as an armed
service, a law enforcement agency, a Federal regulator, and a
National intelligence community member.
Each of the components that form the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise brings something different to the table. We have
made great strides in our collaboration through the Homeland
Security Intelligence Council under the leadership of Secretary
Wagner. We all understand that we are strongest when we stand
together. We have worked to make significant progress in
aligning our capabilities toward a common purpose: Defending
the safety and security of the American people.
Thank you for inviting me here to discuss the Coast Guard
Intelligence Enterprise, DHS, and the HSIC. I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Rear Admiral Atkin, for your
testimony.
Our next witness is Mr. Daniel Johnson, the assistant
administrator for intelligence at the Transportation Safety
Administration.
Mr. Johnson began as assistant administrator for
intelligence earlier this year and, prior to that, served in
the United States Air Force. With 26 years' experience at the
Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Agency, most recently as wing and mission commander, he stands
as leader on National and theater ISR operations and is a
seasoned staff officer.
He also worked at the Pentagon on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as deputy director for joint requirements, oversight council,
and targets.
That must be quite a business card, when you have something
like that.
In that role, he provided intelligence support to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Johnson graduated from the Air War College at Maxwell
Air Force Base in Alabama with a Master of Strategic Studies,
received a Master of Public Administration from the University
of Oklahoma, and a Bachelor's degree in public administration
and policy from Eastern Connecticut State University.
Mr. Johnson, you are now recognized to summarize your
testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL JOHNSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to
be before you today to discuss the role of the Transportation
Security Administration within the larger scope of the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise.
Since coming on board this January, I have had the
opportunity and privilege to work closely with Under Secretary
Wagner and my colleagues at the United States Coast Guard,
Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, improving our internal and external collaboration
and information sharing.
As the assistant administrator for intelligence for TSA, I
oversee three primary mission threads: Indications and warning;
predictive analysis; and incident response. In accordance with
the transportation security authorities, the TSA Office of
Intelligence can receive, assess, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence information for transportation security purposes
that helps protect the 1.7 million passengers per day that use
civil aviation, the 47,000 miles of highways, the 147 million
maritime ferry passengers per year, the 29 million passengers
per day that use mass transit, the 1.6 million tons per year
traveled by freight rail, and then, last, over 2.5 million
miles of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines.
In my role as the head of intel for TSA, I am often asked
what keeps me up at night. The answer is the global threats
with a regional focus, coming primarily from al-Qaeda and its
affiliate groups, who continue to pose a serious threat to
transportation security.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, continues to
threaten U.S. interests abroad and in the homeland. In
particular, the group is fixated on aviation as a means to
inspire fear and economically cripple the United States and
Western interests. Through four editions of Inspire magazine,
AQAP has referenced the October 2010 cargo plot, wrote about
Abdulmutallab's heroism and sacrifice as the Christmas day
bomber, and even featured an article of how to make a bomb in
the kitchen.
Additionally, in light of the successful Osama bin Laden
roll-up, we continue to track seized material being exploited
from his compound in Abbottabad and monitor existing
transportation threat streams from al-Qaeda and its affiliates
who may seek to accelerate existing plots, prove their mettle,
and/or legitimize their causes.
TSA stakeholders include the passengers that are out there
every day, field operations, and key critical infrastructure
security owners and operators. Our mission is to provide them
with the highest-confidence threat reporting on the various
modes of transportation. In order to do this, we must work
closely with the Homeland Security Intelligence Council to form
an internal and external bench that enables collaboration and
transparency for all our reporting.
Over the past 6 months, I have reached out to the HSIC
team, along with the intel and law enforcement communities, to
internally collaborate on various threat assessments, along
with reaching out externally and leveraging existing analysis
being done by partners at the National Counterterrorism Center,
the sector government coordination councils, fusion centers,
private trade associations, and the National Joint Terrorism
Task Force.
Additionally, under the leadership of Under Secretary
Wagner, we have worked closely with DHS I&A on professional
development and training. Within my office, we have created a
development path that ranges from new hires to seasoned
analysts that enables a continuous career progression.
Similarly, we are on the ground floor of standing up our
counterintelligence section. This will enable us to work
closely with DHS on CI policies, instructions, and procedures.
I look forward to continue to work with our intelligence
partners to evolve the Intelligence Enterprise that not only
shares data but collaborates among headquarters and components
to enable higher confidence reporting to our stakeholders in
the field. Within TSA, once again, there are passengers, our
field operations, key infrastructure owners and operators.
Thank you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee,
and I am happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. I am grateful for your
testimony.
Our next witness is James Chaparro, who is the assistant
director of intelligence for the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.
Mr. Chaparro's public service includes 20 years'
experience, most recently as Deputy Under Secretary for
Operations in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Mr.
Chaparro also has served as the director of the Human Smuggling
and Trafficking Center, special agent in charge of the ICE
Denver field office, and held the position of interim director
of immigration interior enforcement for ICE, upon the creation
of DHS.
Before that time, Mr. Chaparro worked with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service as deputy assistant commissioner for
investigations, director of anti-smuggling, and assistant
district director for investigations and special agent.
Mr. Chaparro also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in
political science from California State University at Long
Beach.
Mr. Chaparro, you are now recognized to summarize your
testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JAMES CHAPARRO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Chaparro. Thank you.
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano
and Director Morton, I would like to thank you for the
opportunity to discuss ICE's efforts in supporting the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise. I hope to offer the subcommittee
somewhat of a unique perspective because I have had the
privilege--actually, the honor--of serving in leadership roles
in both I&A and ICE, one of the larger components of DHS.
ICE is uniquely positioned to advance the DHS mission. We
do this through intelligence production, through law
enforcement investigations focusing on terrorism, human
smuggling, human trafficking, financial crimes, trade fraud,
weapons proliferation, drug smuggling, illegal tunneling, and
other illicit activities, and also through the outstanding work
done in our Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations.
As the DHS component with the most expansive investigative
authorities, ICE has people assigned in over 200 U.S. cities
and in 70 offices in 48 countries around the world. ICE is both
a vital contributor to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and a
voracious consumer of its products and services.
The ICE intelligence program is structured along three
major lines. We have the headquarters office of intelligence;
we have field-based intelligence teams that support our field
offices directly; and then we also have intelligence liaisons,
who we have strategically placed with interagency partners
around the law enforcement and intelligence community.
Together, this combined approach really allows us to have
people who will help serve and make sure that we have the right
information going to the right people at the right time.
In her opening statement, Under Secretary Wagner provided
an expansive overview of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. I
would like to focus on how collaboration within that enterprise
is progressing from the ICE perspective.
The Homeland Security Intelligence Council, or HSIC, as
previously mentioned by my counterparts, in my opinion, serves
as an excellent venue to really coordinate on large strategic
initiatives as well as making sure that we are working together
on common threats.
For example, ICE has leveraged the HSIC to advance
important initiatives in the coordination of counter-tunnel
investigations and operations. We have worked on our
collaborative capabilities to determine and identify illicit
smuggling pathways bringing people and goods to the United
States illegally. Through our participation in the HSIC, ICE
facilitates a bi-directional information flow between our field
components, between our headquarters elements, and between our
external partners, both domestic and overseas.
ICE plays a critical role in support of the National
intelligence community, as well. ICE is the leading producer of
DHS Homeland Intelligence Reports, or HIRs, which provide
valuable intelligence reporting from ICE operations. We
disseminate those externally to our partners. So far in fiscal
year 2011, ICE has accounted for about 58 percent of the
Department's production of HIRs.
Perhaps more importantly, however, is the fact that 54
percent of those HIRs were evaluated by the customers as either
``high value'' or ``major significance,'' which is very, very
substantial in the intelligence world. The success rate of our
reporting of HIRs I think is a commitment not only to the
people producing them, but it is also a commitment to show that
ICE is really committed to making sure that we are putting out
our most valuable information so others can use it to
strengthen National security efforts.
ICE also has the leadership role in the DHS Threat Task
Force, or DTTF. This is an interagency DHS entity that sits in
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis that works to ensure
that DHS leadership maintains situational awareness on a
continually and rapidly evolving terrorist threat stream
picture. We do this through the enabling of counterterrorism
threat coordination and by producing sensitive intelligence
assessments. ICE's participation in the DTTF also helps serve
our needs at ICE because we are able to very rapidly glean
information held by other DHS intelligence components, other
DHS components, as well as the National intelligence community,
and share that with our special agents on the ground who are
working in JTTFs around the country to combat terrorist
threats.
ICE also plays an important role in the DHS information
sharing with our Federal, State, local, and international law
enforcement partners. We do this primarily through the Law
Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative, or LEISI. Since its
inception, the LEISI has entered into eight significant law
enforcement information-sharing agreements on behalf of the
Department of Homeland Security.
This includes an agreement recently signed with the
International Justice and Public Safety Network. This is an
important point because this will enable us to share
information with 785,000 State and local law enforcement
officers around the country. This is something that I am very
proud of, and I think it is an initiative that will really help
the boots on the ground, not just in the Federal community but
also in the State and local community.
The importance of integrating intelligence into our
investigations and operations cannot be overstated. Since 2006,
DHS has leveraged the Border Enforcement and Security Task
Forces, or BEST teams, which combine Federal, State, Tribal,
and local and foreign law enforcement intelligence and law
enforcement resources to synchronize efforts to combat existing
threats. ICE intelligence provides strategic and operational
support to the BEST teams, and we are working with I&A to
increase the overall support addressing threats to the
Southwest border, the Northern borders, as well as the maritime
borders.
ICE's Office of Intelligence also serves an important role
in coordinating oversight of ICE's intelligence functions, and
we serve as the primary conduit for the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise from ICE and also from ICE operations into the
intelligence community.
In a rapidly changing threat environment, however, we
cannot be complacent with our successes. We are moving forward
by increasing our strategic intelligence production----
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Chaparro, I am really--I actually am very
focused on your testimony, and I appreciate it. But I am going
to ask if what you can do is just sum it up very, very quickly
so I can get to Ms. Mitchell. We will try to get to Ms.
Mitchell, if she can do 5 minutes. Then that will allow us to
conclude this part. We will go do our votes and then get back
as quickly as we can.
Can you give me your concluding sense on this?
Mr. Chaparro. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
In sum, ICE is a valuable partner with the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise. We take great advantage of the services that are
provided by our partners. We utilize the information in our
day-to-day operations.
I look forward to answering any questions that committee
Members may have for me. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chaparro.
We would like to identify our final witness, Ms. Susan
Mitchell, the deputy assistant commissioner for the Office of
Intelligence and Operations Coordination at Customs and Border
Protection.
I hope you will allow me the privilege of not sharing the
same introduction as I did before, in the interest of time, but
allow you to get right to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN MITCHELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATION, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Ms. Mitchell. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a privilege
and honor to appear before you with my colleagues and to
discuss CBP, or Customs and Border Protection's intelligence
efforts and evolution.
First, I would like to just highlight that, with almost
60,000 employees, CBP makes up the largest law enforcement
organization in the Nation and has been given the
responsibility to protect the United States from terrorists,
weapons of mass effect, drug and human smugglers, agricultural
disease, among other threats, all while fostering our Nation's
economic security and competitiveness through facilitating
lawful international trade and travel.
CBP provides a layered defense along nearly 7,000 miles of
land border and along 95,000 miles of shoreline in partnership
with the U.S. Coast Guard.
At the core of CBP's mission is to detect and deter the
movement of foreign terrorists and terror-related materials
across the U.S. border. I will give you two quick examples that
highlight CBP's efforts on this front.
First, on December 14, 1999, CBP officers at Port Angeles,
Washington, prevented the entry into the United States of the
so-called millennium bomber, an Algerian al-Qaeda member named
Ahmed Ressam, who was transporting explosive materials and
plotting an attack on Los Angeles International Airport on New
Year's Eve and was identified by behavioral analysis detection
and physical examination of the vehicle he was driving.
More recently, as you mentioned earlier, on May 3, 2010,
CBP's National Targeting Center worked with CBP officers at JFK
Airport to apprehend the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad,
as he was attempting to flee the United States on a flight to
the Middle East.
Months earlier--and that really is the key--months earlier,
he had hit on several of our targeting rolls for Pakistan
travel. On that trip, he changed drastically from his normal
patterns of traveling with his family, staying and documenting
his stay at his home, versus the documents showing on this trip
a Motel 8, traveling alone, and changing his return, coming
back weeks after he originally booked his return flight. We
were the first to identify him as a certain level of concern
and fully document his travel and his admission interview.
After the attempted bombing, we then provided the FBI with
the keystone to link the phone number from the person who sold
the car to the actual suspect, providing the FBI with his name,
picture, and address. The phone then had been obtained and
documented during that arrival process months earlier. We then
posted a lookout in our system, while the former watch-listing
process was occurring. Sure enough, he hit in our targeting
systems when he attempted to flee the country.
Our targeting worked both on the inbound process and the
outbound attempt. We worked closely with our DHS partner TSA
and our local partners at JFK Airport to stop that departure,
as he had already boarded the flight. In this case, every
second mattered, and it highlighted the need for real-time
targeting and cooperation between Federal, State, and local
partners.
In the interest of time, I will discuss targeting more when
you get back. I just wanted to hit on--CBP's Office of
Intelligence and Operations Coordination was established in
2007, merging the former offices of Anti-Terrorism and
Intelligence, as well as components of the Office of Field
Operations, Border Patrol, and Information Technology. OIOC
serves as the coordinating facilitator that integrates and
leverages all CBP's diverse intelligence capabilities into a
single, cohesive Intelligence Enterprise to create that
intelligence-driven organization.
We support the agency's extended zone of security through
the use of a multilayered approach to address threats to our
borders, consisting of collecting advance traveler and cargo
information, the use of enhanced law enforcement technical
collection capabilities, and productive intelligence-sharing
relationships with Federal, State, and local/Tribal agencies
that also maintain a law enforcement presence at our border.
I will talk about targeting when you get back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Mitchell. Thank you kindly for
summarizing your testimony in that fashion.
So we have a series of three votes on the floor right now.
The subcommittee will stand in recess until 5 minutes following
the last vote in the series.
[Recess.]
Mr. Meehan. The committee will come to order.
I want to say thank you again for your patience. I thank
you for your testimony, as well.
So, at this point in time, what I would like to do is to
begin the questioning. I hope what we can do is do 5 minutes
for each of us, and then, at the conclusion, if we have some
remaining questions as well, because I think there is an awful
lot of material to go through.
So I will begin the questioning.
Under Secretary Wagner, I am very grateful for your being
here and for the role that you have undertaken in an agency in
which there has been a great deal of, not just collaboration
necessarily, but of course the role in which a number of
agencies have been put together in an effort for us to more
effectively and efficiently respond to the multiple challenges.
That is difficult at any point in time. When you are talking
about the sharing of intelligence across agencies, as well,
difficult. I think we have made a great deal of progress in
terms of breaking through some of the old stovepiping that
existed, as well as some of the agency's tendency to want to
hold on to, you know, their role and their information.
So I am grateful for the progress that has been made, but,
of course, we still live in a very active world in which
information flows and the threat is immediate. So I am
certainly aware that one of the challenges that each of us has
is the prioritization. Some elements of our infrastructure are
defended in-depth against attack; others, not quite so much. We
are always constantly worried about the ability of terrorists
to adapt to what we have to do, as well.
We are also quite aware that there were 12 homegrown-
inspired jihadist terrorist plots just in the last year. Two
attacks and 10 plots by American citizens--lawful, permanent
residents of the United States--were included in that. By
comparison, over 7 years from the 9/11 attacks, there were an
average of only about 2 such plots a year. So we are really in
a period of enhanced concern.
You discussed the Department of Homeland Security's Threat
Task Force, the DTTF, which is being brought to bear against,
you know, specific incidents or National security
investigations. I would really like to know what role that
group is playing now, in light of the information that we have
purportedly received from overseas and others with specific
threats against some of our infrastructure.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first just make clear that the name ``DTTF''
sometimes causes some confusion because it sounds suspiciously
like the FBI's JTTF, but they really do very different things.
The DHS Threat Task Force was created by my Principal
Deputy, who was then the Acting Under Secretary, in the wake of
the Zazi and Headley cases. As Jim Chaparro mentioned, it was
created largely as a way to pull together all of the disparate
pieces of information that were in the Department and all of
the expertise in the Department to make sure that the
Department leadership was up to speed on rapidly evolving
threats.
Since then, we have expanded the mission of the DTTF a
little bit to be sort of the focal point of following emerging
threats to the homeland and making sure that we have pulled all
the right strings, touched all the right data sets, have
reached out to our partners at FBI and the CTWatch and at NCTC
to make sure that we are all up to speed and that we are doing
what we need to do and everyone is on the same page. The DTTF
is actually staffed by a mixture of I&A and component people.
Currently, it is headed by someone from ICE.
We beefed up the DTTF recently, on a surge basis, to be the
focal point for dealing with the information that was flowing
from the exploitation of material captured during the UBL raid.
We appreciate the fact that we got extra people in from the
components to help us deal with that. We were using the DTTF to
be our focal point for reviewing that information and
determining when we needed to request tear lines, working in
partnership with FBI and NCTC, so that we could get information
out to our State and local customers.
Mr. Meehan. Are you satisfied that you are able to analyze
in this treasure trove of information, that you have the
capacity to be able to make some discretionary calls, but to be
able to distinguish from among that trove of information and
that there is a capacity to communicate that down appropriately
to the local level?
Ms. Wagner. Absolutely. I think I have rarely seen such a
good interagency effort on this, the task force that the CIA is
leading, on which we as a department have, I believe, seven
people participating who are linguists, who are helping with
the gisting and translating. There are people from all over the
community participating in that.
We pulled together a group to work the tear-line issue. I
am confident that we are getting the information that we need
that needs to be shared with our State and local partners and
with our critical infrastructure sectors. It has actually been
going relatively smoothly, considering the volume of
information.
We have been working jointly with the FBI to put out most
of the information that we have put out. We have put out
probably about 12, I think, joint intelligence bulletins at
various classifications levels and to various audiences--that
is, based on this information and in combination with other
information that is still coming in through regular
intelligence channels.
Mr. Meehan. Okay. Well, thank you. My time has expired, so,
at this point in time, I will turn to Ranking Member Speier for
questions she may have. Thank you.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony. As you were all speaking,
I was thinking once again that you really are the unsung heroes
who do this work, go unnoticed, and yet make sure that our
country is safer because of it. So, thank you.
Let me start by asking you, the House is presently
considering a $1 billion cut to the DHS budget. How will this
impact your specific intelligence functions within your
departments and agencies?
If you could just go right across the line as quickly as
you can, but make your points.
Ms. Wagner. I will start by saying that I think that we, my
office specifically, has fared reasonably well, and we are
appreciative of the mark that we received from the
appropriators. I will defer to the others on any issues that
they have.
Admiral Atkin. Thank you.
My understanding is our budget has fared fairly well, as
well, and that we aren't anticipating any major cuts at this
time. Certainly, any major cuts would have significant negative
impact on our ability to collect and report information.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. Ma'am, the same from TSA's perspective; we are
doing really well.
Mr. Chaparro. From the ICE perspective, I think that we are
doing well.
I would want to make sure that there are a couple of
critical pieces that are in there. One is, we had an
annualization of some positions for our Southwest border
supplemental. As you know, the work we are doing on the
Southwest border is critical. I would not want to see that
falter. So far, we are good, and I would like to hopefully keep
it that way.
Thank you.
Ms. Mitchell. CBP's intelligence capability actually also
fared well and received a small bump up for our targeting
capabilities, which--I think one of the things you heard today
is that the CBP targeting capabilities really do support all of
our partner agencies.
Ms. Speier. So the billion dollars is not from any of your
budgets?
Ms. Wagner. If I could just add one thing that is not
specifically an intelligence issue, but I think we are
concerned about potential cuts to the grants, because the FEMA
grant program is the source of a lot of funding for our State
and local partners. While that is not specifically in my
budget, we obviously are interested in ensuring that they
receive enough funding to continue to be active participants in
the homeland security enterprise.
Ms. Speier. Are any of your agencies involved with
reviewing the bin Laden treasure trove, as we tend to refer to
it?
You are all nodding your heads? So every one of you has a
role in reviewing the materials. Okay.
This is a diagram of this entity that you are all part of,
with Under Secretary Wagner in the middle. It is somewhat
confusing because there are straight lines and then there are
dotted lines. It is very difficult to bring 22-plus agencies
together under one roof that have been independent and have
everyone work well together. So I am sure there have been many
challenges, probably none of which you would like to discuss in
public.
But, as you have moved to adapt, I want to know whether or
not there are still areas that we should be aware of, in terms
of assisting you in unifying as a single agency?
Ms. Wagner. One of the areas that we, I think, still
struggle with as a department is in integrating our information
systems. As we came from a bunch of different places, we have a
lot of different legacy systems. The Department has a great
deal of data--travel data, immigration data, cyber data. A lot
of that data is resident in different little stovepipes.
So we are working very, very diligently with the components
and with the Department's chief information officer and then in
my capacity, as the information-sharing executive, to work
through how to do a better job internally of ensuring we have
appropriate access to our data and that we are not having to
redo functions multiple times, check individuals multiple times
against multiple databases because they are all more linked.
We have a ways to go before we get to that goal, and that
is something that we are still, you know, basically working on.
But I would offer anyone else the opportunity to comment,
if you are interested.
Mr. Chaparro. No, I agree with Under Secretary Wagner. I
think one of the biggest challenges we face is the vast volume
of data that we have to sift through in order to identify these
sometimes very vague or amorphous threats. Having the data
tools and the connectivity to be able to look at TSA data or to
be able to look at intelligence community data or travel data
and to able to do that in an integrated fashion I think is a
challenge that we all face day-to-day.
Ms. Speier. Anyone else?
Mr. Johnson. There is a tremendous amount of collaboration
that needs to occur, and you have to have those collaborative
tools that are out there. How many different documents we have
to go through every day and the analytical tools that could be
out there to help us provide diffused products and put them
into an analytic product at the end of the day could be very
helpful.
Admiral Atkin. In the essence of time, I will concur with
my colleagues.
Ms. Speier. Okay.
Ms. Mitchell. The only one point I would like to add is we
also need that ability to go from the high side to the unclass
side, as well. Our systems need to be able to do that.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ranking Member Speier.
At this point in time, I would like to recognize the
gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, also, to the witnesses, and thank you for your
service to the country. You are the unsung heroes. You are the
guys that don't get the medals or the ribbons, but we
appreciate all the things that you do and your troops do. So,
thank you very much for that.
My quick question is: Admiral, sir, could you please tell
me what keeps you up at night? What is the main threat to your
ability to do your job?
Admiral Atkin. Sir, as you know, right now we don't have
any imminent threat in the maritime domain. Being the new guy
on the block, I am still learning quite a bit about what the
intelligence community for the Coast Guard, the Intelligence
Enterprise, is working on.
But I think my biggest concern is two-fold. One, it is the
safeguarding of the Coast Guard personnel themselves. How do we
provide the right force protection for those folks and the
right intelligence support for that force protection? Then the
next piece would be those transnational threats, whether they
be criminal or terrorist organizations, and how they are trying
to get into the country and attack the American people.
So, not having a specific threat right now. It is really
trying to identify, working with the colleagues here in DHS but
across the intelligence community, to identify how they are
coming into the country and then how to stop that.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Admiral. I do feel your pain when
it comes to being the new guy on the block.
Mr. Johnson, according to TSA, how would--you have kind of
alluded to it in your opening testimony. Can you kind of
expound upon that a little bit?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. We had that closed-door session with
you a couple of months ago. It continues to be AQAP and threats
to aviation, followed closely by mass transit and different
threats that are out there that are being espoused from a
global threat perspective and providing a regional focus into
the United States.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you.
Mr. Chaparro, could you kind of allude to it also, as well?
Mr. Chaparro. The short answer is, my BlackBerry keeps me
up at night.
But all kidding aside, ICE has, you know, a very wide
breadth of things that we cover. It is the violence from drug
cartels, it is the pedophiles, it is the transnational criminal
organizations that we investigate, it is the threats in the
cyber world.
So I think there are many, many things that we have to
focus on in order to make sure that our citizens are safe. To
be honest, I wish it were only terrorism. But it is that and,
unfortunately, much, much more.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you for that. Thank you for being by
your BlackBerry.
Ms. Mitchell, could you expound, as well?
Ms. Mitchell. Sure. Thanks.
I think for CBP the biggest thing that we are concerned
with is kind of the unknowns. We believe we have a good handle
on identifying those that we know are bad, but to ensure that
our systems also have that predictive modeling capability that
allows us to pick up on those travel patterns that should be of
concern, kind of picking up on the clean skins.
Also, the impact of global security, that we are partnering
with a lot of the foreign governments to ensure that they are
picking up on that same thought process for targeting as we
have here.
Mr. Cravaack. Have you found the international community to
be assisting you on that quite a bit, or is it more of a
challenge?
Ms. Mitchell. I think, as they are finding that they,
themselves, are targets, as well, and we can show some success
stories in our targeting methodology, they are becoming much
more willing partners.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Wagner.
Ms. Wagner. I think, listening to what everyone else has
said, I think the one thing that keeps me up at night the most
is having there be an attack on the homeland and discovering
that we had data in the Department that was relevant to it.
That is why I focus so much of my efforts on trying to make
sure that we have the procedures in place to make sure that we
are tapping every piece of information that we have, so that I
hope never to be in that position.
Mr. Cravaack. I hope you never are, as well, ma'am.
Two years ago, Secretary Napolitano asked the I&A to
coordinate with the DHS in interaction with State and local
fusion centers, where--you know, a lot of the genesis comes
from the boots-on-the-ground level. I am from Minnesota.
Because of an alert pilot that was giving instruction to a guy
who wanted to take off in a 747--not know how to land, just
wanted to be able to fly the plane--that is how some critical
information could have flowed up the chain of command.
Would you just kind of please update us on that progress?
Ms. Wagner. I think we have made a great deal of progress
in the last few years in building a network of National fusion
centers that share information both upwards with the National
intelligence and law enforcement communities and sideways with
each other, which is a really important regional aspect of
this.
What we are trying to do, both in I&A--but I&A basically is
leading the efforts of the Department that includes all of the
component participation--is to provide information, training,
anything that we can do to help the fusion centers achieve a
level of ability to analyze their own information, report on
it, and understand what information is valuable to others so
that it can be effectively shared.
We have IOs, intelligence officers, out at all the fusion
centers. There is also component representation at many of
them. We provide training courses in writing, reporting,
protecting civil rights and civil liberties. I think that we
are seeing from most of the fusion centers improved levels of
situational awareness and products coming out of them. We have
a great interchange with them on a daily basis.
We are focusing on implementing, with the Department of
Justice, the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.
The fusion centers are a key element of that.
The Secretary has also been, as I am sure you are aware,
promoting the ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign. That
is a way for us and the fusion centers then to leverage the
American public to be on the lookout for information, behaviors
that might potentially allow us to detect and disrupt
activities.
So, between the ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign
and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative that
is feeding both us and the FBI's eGuardian system and just the
constant interaction that we have, I think we are in a very
good position to use those guys as the first line of defense in
detecting and deterring homegrown violent extremism.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you very much, ma'am.
I am over my time, sir. I apologize. I will yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Cravaack.
Now the Chairman would recognize the gentleman from Arizona
for 5 minutes of questioning, Mr. Quayle.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Under Secretary Wagner, we hear a lot about the need to
improve the level of information sharing between the various
Federal agencies, but we don't often hear about how that is
done within each individual department. So, at DHS, what are
you doing to improve kind of the intelligence collaboration and
information sharing within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise?
Ms. Wagner. Well, actually, we are doing multiple things,
because there is not a single silver bullet to solve
information sharing or communications.
So we start with the Homeland Security Intelligence Council
that we discussed earlier. These are some of the key members.
We meet regularly on a monthly basis in person, we have weekly
teleconferences to make sure that we are all on the same page
about the emerging threats and any other things that we are
trying to address collaboratively.
But, at the same time, we have multiple daily levels of
interaction. For example, these folks have representatives on
the DHS Threat Task Force, which is, again, keeping everybody
up to speed on emerging and evolving threats. Our analysts work
together on a daily basis to produce joint products, some of
which go in the Secretary's daily briefing book, many of which
are shared with our State and local partners and with the rest
of the intelligence community.
So it is multiple interactions across the board. We also
work closely on collection requirements, as well as on analysis
and on developing analytic tools.
So I can't even discuss all the levels of interaction there
are, but we have been trying to significantly improve the
cooperation and the communication, and I think we have made a
lot of progress.
Mr. Quayle. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chaparro, you said the drug cartel activities have been
keeping you up at night sometimes. What are we doing from an
intelligence standpoint to able to apprehend and to make sure
that we are not seeing these drug cartels continue to move
across our border?
Mr. Chaparro. I think, as we have seen the drug cartel
threat and violence evolve, particularly in Mexico but
elsewhere as well, I have seen a higher level of emphasis
placed by the larger intelligence community. I would say very
candidly that they are being very responsive to our requests
for information and support.
It is a strain. I know that we have wars going on in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the intelligence community is stretched
very thin. But this is a threat this is very close to home, and
it impacts our communities tremendously.
So we are doing everything that we can possible from a law
enforcement perspective to bring the cartel members to justice
but also to make sure that information that is coming out of
our operations, as we understand the cartel structure--where
they are operating, how they are operating, how they are
communicating--we are making sure that we are passing that
information to the intelligence community to help them better
sharpen their focus, as well.
Mr. Quayle. What is the ability to work with your
counterparts on the Mexican side? Has that been fruitful? Have
you been able to glean a lot of information and have a fairly
good working relationship with them?
Mr. Chaparro. I have been in this business a long, long
time, and, in all honesty, I think the cooperation has never
been stronger. I think, for example, when Special Agent Jaime
Zapata was murdered in Mexico last February, the support that
we received from the Mexican government as well as the U.S. law
enforcement intelligence community was just unprecedented.
So, the cooperation is good. You can always build and make
things better, but I have never seen it as good as it is today.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Quayle.
I hope that I might ask just one more round of questions
myself, and the Ranking Member may have a few questions.
Ms. Wagner, this sort of may seem counterintuitive because
we spend a lot of time, in the intelligence field, trying to
develop as much information as we can on emerging threats,
which means we develop a lot of information about a lot of
things, a lot of people. You are building a sophisticated
network with fusion centers that are touching each and every
one of our communities, and we have a broad spectrum of
agencies that are simultaneously participating. So, within our
treasure trove of information, there is information about a lot
of people, including American citizens, among others.
You know, in my own State of Pennsylvania, before I was
elected, but I was very aware of information that was developed
by one of our entities that was let out into the mainstream to
the benefit of somebody that was really--it was a private
entity that took advantage of that intelligence information.
What are we doing to assure that the civil liberties and
privacy protections are in place so that we access information
appropriately but guard against inappropriate uses of that
information?
Ms. Wagner. Thank you for that question, because that is
something that we focus on a lot.
For all of us who are sort of intelligence activities, we
have intelligence oversight that is embedded in our
organizations. You know, it flows from the Executive Order 12-
333 and the guidelines within which we operate. So we have
pretty well-defined ways of training our people, of double-
checking to make sure that we are following the rules, and
periodically going through all of our reports and seeing how we
are doing.
For the National network of fusion centers, this is a new
world in which they are operating. So we have focused a lot of
time and effort and resources on training them to understand
the rules regarding privacy and civil rights and civil
liberties and Constitutionally-protected activities.
We have worked with them to ensure that every fusion center
has a privacy policy in place. We work with them to make sure
that those are adequate, that everyone who is in the fusion
center has been trained on what is in those policies, and that
those policies are being followed.
We work very closely with our civil rights and civil
liberties office to provide training teams out to the fusion
centers to make sure that they are fully trained on all the
same things that we all have grown up----
Mr. Meehan. Do they then take that and reach out, as well,
within their communities to local police and otherwise?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, they do. So I am confident that we are
very much leaning forward to build in protection of privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties at the front end of all of
our engagements with the fusion centers and in all of the
products that we are putting out.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you for that and for your work on that.
It is very, very vitally important, I think, as part of our
mission, and often overlooked.
Mr. Chaparro, you touched on a variety of things. As a
former United States attorney, I used to stay up at night
thinking about a lot of different issues and always, you know,
is there something we could be doing better?
You touched on one area in which agencies like yours might
be the only people that have an opportunity to reach out and be
a lifeline to some victims who live a horrible existence, and
these are these victims of human trafficking go and others who
are then put down into the system. How are we doing in that
battle?
Mr. Chaparro. I think that human trafficking is an area
where ICE has really stepped out in front to take a leadership
role in not only rescuing victims but aggressively going after
and prosecuting the horrific criminals that commit these
crimes.
But, equally important, we have victim witness assistance
coordinators in every single one of our field offices to ensure
that the victims of human trafficking are able to get the help
that they need in order to be able to recover.
Similarly, we are working very closely with the community
organizations, the nongovernmental organizations, and we are
working both domestically and overseas to combat human
trafficking.
Mr. Meehan. How about with our local police departments and
others? Because one of the things that used to be of concern to
me is that you would often have local police departments that
might come in, make an investigatory stop, look at somebody,
realize, ``Well, this is an immigration violation but not
necessarily worth my making an arrest for some particular
purpose,'' but they are looking past signals that may indicate
that there is something more going on.
Are we training local police to be able to identify the
signs, to ask the appropriate questions, and then to come back
to experts like you or partners?
Mr. Chaparro. Absolutely. A big part of our efforts is the
outreach that we do, including working in local human
trafficking task forces around the country so that, as local
authorities, as you said, identify signs that may be an
indicator, they know to ask the right question, they know to go
that step further. The outreach that we have is both in terms
of formal training as well as various conferences, passing out
brochures. Then there is no substitute for working hand-in-hand
on the local task forces so that they can really understand
what it is that they face.
Oftentimes, the signs are very hard to detect. The victims
are often very scared to come forward. It really takes a lot of
work sometimes to undercover these violations.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. My time has expired.
I will turn it to the Ranking Member, Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, have an abiding interest in the whole human sex-
trafficking issue, so much so that I convened a workforce
locally and have had the district attorneys, the U.S. attorney,
the FBI, local police, all part of a training. We have met now
five or six times. There was an all-day training just a couple
weeks ago.
But I will tell you this, that we really have just
scratched the surface. While we may on a Federal level make
resources within your jurisdiction available, we need to do
much, much more.
Just in the short time that we have been working on this
issue, our local DA has gone back and recognized that two
domestic violence complaints that came in on the same person
with different complainants turned out to be a sex trafficker.
It didn't dawn on him until he had started participating in
this program.
So I bring it up only because I think we need to do more. I
know that you are already taxed, but it is a horrific problem.
The sex trafficking of those under the age of 18 is somewhere
close to 300,000 in this country alone. So I hope that we can
see new initiatives come out from within your various agencies
to help in that regard, as well.
I have just one last question. It would appear, based on
what we have been able to glean from the information that bin
Laden had in his Abbottabad location, that rail was a very
interesting target for them. I happen to have traveled with my
daughter over spring break on a college tour along the East
Coast, and we did it by train. I thought about it a lot,
because I think the trains are incredibly porous. I don't know
what we have under way to try and address that issue, but I
think that it is just ripe for some kind of an attack that will
come from a lone wolf who is, you know, homebound right amongst
ourselves.
So if any of you have any thoughts that we would like to
share with us on what we can or should be doing relative to
rail, I would appreciate hearing it.
Ms. Wagner. I will just say one thing and then turn it over
to Dan, since it is a TSA issue, just to say that we have
obviously known, based on looking at events overseas, that rail
has been a target of interest to terrorists and al-Qaeda
affiliates if we just look at what has happened in London and
Madrid and Moscow.
So we have been publishing on the tactics and techniques
that have been used in these attacks on rail to our law
enforcement and public-sector partners to help them think
through the appropriate protective measures for some time.
But I will turn it over to Dan for any specifics.
Mr. Johnson. We have specific analysts that look at rail
specifically and also passenger rail, freight rail. They do
annual assessments, both at the classified and unclassified
level. It probably would be better if we went ahead and we had
a closed-door session and walked you through the classified
findings that we have within the rail assessments that we have
out there, especially in light of bin Laden's roll-up.
Ms. Wagner. We want you to feel confident that we have been
looking at this for quite a while.
Mr. Johnson. Absolutely.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I want to express my deep appreciation to
this very, very distinguished panel, first, for your patience;
second, for your excellent testimony and the preparation that
went into it; but, last and most importantly, for your service.
I think all of us appreciate that you are on the front line,
and you are on a front line in what is now a very precarious
time for our country. Yet, at the same time, you know, I don't
like to be alarmist because I think the work that you are doing
is making a big difference.
We have seen, over the course of the last year, an increase
in real threats to our Nation, but simultaneously, if you were
to have looked at this 10 years ago from September 11 and had
predicted what may have been, I think there are few who would
argue that we have not been vigilant and had some genuine
successes. But no one goes to sleep at night and says, ``Okay,
because tomorrow is another day, and I know it is not on my
watch.''
So I want to thank you for your work, but more important,
your service to our Nation.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions. I hope that if they do those that you will do your
best to be as responsive as can you in writing. The hearing
record will be open for 10 days.
So, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]