

**INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION
AND RETURN ACT OF 2011; GLOBAL ONLINE
FREEDOM ACT OF 2011; AND INTERNATIONAL
FOOD ASSISTANCE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2012**

MARKUP

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.R. 1940, H.R. 3605 and H.R. 4141

MARCH 27, 2012

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INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION AND RETURN ACT OF 2011; GLOBAL ONLINE FREEDOM ACT OF 2011; AND INTERNATIONAL FOOD ASSISTANCE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2012

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and I want to thank each and every one of you for being here.

Pursuant to notice, the subcommittee meets this afternoon to mark up H.R. 1940, now titled the Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2012; H.R. 3605, the Global Online Freedom Act of 2012; and H.R. 4141, now named the Donald M. Payne International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012.

[The information referred to follows:]

112TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1940

To ensure compliance with the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction by countries with which the United States enjoys reciprocal obligations, to establish procedures for the prompt return of children abducted to other countries, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 23, 2011

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself and Mr. WOLF) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Financial Services, the Judiciary, and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To ensure compliance with the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction by countries with which the United States enjoys reciprocal obligations, to establish procedures for the prompt return of children abducted to other countries, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “International Child
3 Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2011”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS; PURPOSES.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

6 (1) The Department of State’s Office of Chil-
7 dren’s Issues, which serves as the Central Authority
8 for the United States for the operation of 1980
9 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Inter-
10 national Child Abduction, is currently handling ap-
11 proximately 1,793 open cases involving more than
12 2,488 children abducted by a parent or legal guard-
13 ian from the United States to other countries. For
14 a variety of reasons reflecting the legal and factual
15 complexity of parental abduction cases and the sig-
16 nificant obstacles to recovery, only a percentage of
17 all cases are reported to the Department of State.

18 (2) In fiscal year 2010, the Central Authority
19 for the United States responded to cases involving
20 696 children abducted from the United States to
21 countries with which the United States enjoys recip-
22 rocal obligations under the Hague Convention, but
23 during that same time period only 360 children were
24 returned from Hague Convention countries to the
25 United States.

1 (3) The number of outgoing international child
2 abductions reported to the Central Authority for the
3 United States increased by about 60 percent since
4 2006.

5 (4) In evaluating the obstacles to recovering
6 children abducted from a parent in the United
7 States, the first difficulty is presented by countries
8 who are signatories to the Hague Convention, but
9 have not acted in compliance with the responsibilities
10 of the Convention. According to the Central Authority
11 for the United States, St. Kitts and Nevis
12 has not acted in compliance with the terms it agreed
13 to as a party to the Hague Convention, and Bermuda,
14 Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Mexico, Honduras,
15 and the Bahamas have demonstrated patterns
16 of noncompliance. The failure of these countries to
17 meet their obligations is found in the actions of their
18 designated central authorities, the performance of
19 their judiciaries, as reflected in the legal process and
20 decisions rendered to enforce or effectuate the
21 Hague Convention, or the ability and willingness of
22 law enforcement to insure the swift enforcement of
23 orders rendered pursuant to the Hague Convention.
24 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Costa Rica, France,
25 Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Ro-

1 mania, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and Tur-
2 key all failed to enforce return and access orders in
3 2010.

4 (5) The United States and other State Signato-
5 ries to the Hague Convention have expressed their
6 desire, through the Convention, “to protect children
7 internationally from the harmful effects of their
8 wrongful removal or retention and to establish pro-
9 cedures to ensure their prompt return to the State
10 of their habitual residence, as well as to secure pro-
11 tection for rights of access.”.

12 (6) In evaluating and assessing the problem of
13 the abduction of children from the United States,
14 the Central Authority for the United States in fiscal
15 year 2010 reported that it had been provided notice
16 of 384 cases of parental abductions involving 523
17 children taken from the United States to countries
18 with which the United States does not enjoy an
19 agreement related to the treatment of parental ab-
20 duction cases and that are not signatories to the
21 Hague Convention, currently including for abduc-
22 tions and access cases a cumulative total of 156 chil-
23 dren in Japan, 94 children in India, 60 children in
24 Brazil, and 29 children in Russia. The number of re-
25 ported cases likely represents an even smaller per-

1 centage of the total number of United States chil-
2 dren impacted as the process for the location and re-
3 covery of abducted children differs significantly with
4 each country, and there is currently no formal pro-
5 tocol for intervening in such cases.

6 (7) According to the Department of State's
7 April 2010 Report on Compliance with the Hague
8 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
9 Child Abduction, "parental child abduction jeopard-
10 izes the child and has substantial long-term con-
11 sequences for both the child and the left-behind par-
12 ent."

13 (8) Abducted children are at risk of serious
14 emotional and psychological problems and have been
15 found to experience anxiety, eating problems, night-
16 mares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive
17 behavior, resentment, guilt and fearfulness, and as
18 adults may struggle with identity issues, their own
19 personal relationships, and parenting.

20 (9) Left behind parents may encounter substan-
21 tial psychological, emotional, and financial problems,
22 and the majority have no means to generate the
23 enormous financial resources required to pursue in-
24 dividual civil or criminal remedies to attempt to se-
25 cure the return of their children, even if such rem-

1 edies were available or effective in foreign courts or
2 political systems. Left-behind parents also often have
3 to pursue child custody and other protective orders
4 through expensive litigation at home.

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that the United States should set a strong example
7 for other Hague Convention countries in the timely loca-
8 tion and return of children wrongly removed from and re-
9 tained in the United States.

10 (c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are to—

11 (1) protect United States children from the
12 harmful effects of international child abduction and
13 to protect the right of children to exercise parental
14 access with their parents in a safe and predictable
15 way, wherever located;

16 (2) provide parents, their advocates, and judges
17 the information they need to enhance the resolution
18 of family disputes through established legal proce-
19 dures, the tools for assessing the risk of wrongful re-
20 moval and retention of children, and the practical
21 means for overcoming obstacles to recovering ab-
22 ducted children;

23 (3) establish effective mechanisms to provide
24 assistance to and aggressive advocacy on behalf of
25 parents whose children have been abducted from the

1 United States to a foreign country, from a foreign
2 country to the United States, and on behalf of mili-
3 tary parents stationed abroad;

4 (4) promote an international consensus that the
5 best interests of children are of paramount impor-
6 tance in matters relating to their custody, and that
7 it is in the best interest of a child to have issues of
8 custody determined in the State of their habitual
9 residence immediately prior to the abduction;

10 (5) provide the necessary training for military
11 officials and training and assistance to military fam-
12 ilies to address the unique circumstances of the reso-
13 lution of child custody disputes which occur abroad,
14 or occur when a parent is serving abroad;

15 (6) facilitate the creation and effective imple-
16 mentation of international mechanisms, particularly
17 the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
18 International Child Abduction, to protect children
19 from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal
20 and retention; and

21 (7) facilitate the compliance of the United
22 States with reciprocal obligations contained in the
23 Hague Convention regarding children wrongfully re-
24 moved to or retained in the United States.

1 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) **AMBASSADOR AT LARGE.**—The term “Am-
4 bassador at Large” means the Ambassador at Large
5 for International Child Abductions appointed under
6 section 101.

7 (2) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—The term “Annual Re-
8 port” means the Annual Report on International
9 Child Abductions required under section 102.

10 (3) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
11 **TEES.**—Except as otherwise provided, the term “ap-
12 propriate congressional committees” means the
13 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
14 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
15 tions of the Senate.

16 (4) **CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR THE UNITED**
17 **STATES.**—The term “Central Authority for the
18 United States” has the meaning given such term in
19 article 6 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
20 International Child Abduction, done at The Hague
21 on October 25, 1980.

22 (5) **HAGUE CONVENTION.**—The term “Hague
23 Convention” means the Convention on the Civil As-
24 pects of International Child Abduction, done at The
25 Hague on October 25, 1980.

1 (6) HAGUE CONVENTION COMPLIANCE RE-
2 PORT.—The term “Hague Convention compliance
3 report” means the annual report on compliance with
4 the Hague Convention required to be submitted by
5 the Department of State to Congress under section
6 2803 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
7 turing Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 11611).

8 (7) HAGUE CONVENTION SIGNATORY.—The
9 term “Hague Convention signatory” means a coun-
10 try that has signed or acceded to the Convention
11 and with which the United States has entered into
12 a reciprocal agreement pursuant to the Convention.

13 (8) MOU.—The term “MOU” means a memo-
14 randum of understanding.

15 (9) MOU COUNTRY.—The term “MOU coun-
16 try” means a country or entity with which the
17 United States has entered into a memorandum of
18 understanding to resolve cases of international child
19 abduction. Such MOUs shall include—

20 (A) identification of a specific protocol de-
21 signed to establish and effectuate the urgent re-
22 turn of children abducted from the United
23 States not later than six weeks after the date
24 of the application for return of the child having

1 been received by the agency authorized for such
2 purposes;

3 (B) identification of a specific protocol for
4 the establishment and protection of the rights
5 of both interim and ongoing parental access be-
6 tween children and their parents;

7 (C) identification of an official entity with-
8 in the government possessing the authority to
9 facilitate the resolution of child abduction cases
10 in cooperation with the Office on International
11 Child Abductions and left-behind parents in the
12 United States;

13 (D) identification of the judicial or admin-
14 istrative agency possessing the authority to fa-
15 cilitate the prompt adjudication of a request for
16 the return of an abducted child to the United
17 States;

18 (E) identification of a law enforcement
19 agency and available mechanisms and proce-
20 dures to investigate and assist in the location,
21 protection, and retrieval of an abducted child
22 and to ensure the immediate enforcement of or-
23 ders entered by the court in the habitual resi-
24 dence to return an abducted child to the United
25 States;

1 (F) establishment of welfare and where-
2 abouts visits between a United States embassy
3 and a wrongfully removed or retained child; and

4 (G) additional requisite elements that shall
5 be satisfied and maintained for purposes of sec-
6 tion 201(b) as determined by the Secretary of
7 State.

8 (10) NONSIGNATORY COUNTRY.—The term
9 “nonsignatory country” means a country which is
10 neither a Hague Convention signatory nor a MOU
11 country to which a United States child has been ab-
12 ducted or in which a United States child remains
13 wrongfully retained.

14 (11) OFFICE.—The term “Office” means the
15 Office on International Child Abductions established
16 pursuant to section 101.

17 (12) PATTERN OF NONCOOPERATION.—The
18 term “pattern of noncooperation” means a national
19 government’s systemic failure, evidenced by the ex-
20 istence of ten or more parental child abduction cases
21 which, after having been properly prepared and
22 transmitted by the Central Authority for the United
23 States remain unresolved within its borders after 18
24 months or, where there are fewer than ten unre-
25 solved cases, any cases still unresolved after nine

1 months from the time of receipt and transmittal by
2 the Central Authority for the United States of a re-
3 quest to fulfill its international obligations with re-
4 spect to the prompt resolution of cases of child ab-
5 duction.

6 (13) RIGHTS OF ACCESS.—The term “rights of
7 access” means the rights of a parent and child to
8 enjoy reasonable unfettered contact both within and
9 outside the State of the child’s habitual residence.

10 (14) UNRESOLVED ABDUCTION CASE.—The
11 term “unresolved abduction case” means an abduc-
12 tion case which has been properly documented to es-
13 tablish that pursuant to the law of the State of ha-
14 bitual residence of a minor child, an international
15 abduction or wrongful retention of such child whose
16 habitual residence immediately prior to the abduc-
17 tion was the United States, remains unresolved more
18 than two months following the date of the receipt
19 and transmittal by the Central Authority for the
20 United States of the request for return of such child.

21 (15) UNRESOLVED ACCESS CASE.—The term
22 “unresolved access case” means an application for
23 the establishment of rights of parental access on ei-
24 ther an interim or permanent basis, or the request
25 for the enforcement of rights of parental access

1 (contact orders) which have been previously estab-
2 lished by a court of competent jurisdiction, which re-
3 main unresolved more than two months following the
4 date of the receipt and transmittal by the Central
5 Authority for the United States of a request for as-
6 sistance in the organization of rights of access.

7 **TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF**
8 **STATE ACTIVITIES**

9 **SEC. 101. OFFICE ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS;**
10 **AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR INTER-**
11 **NATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS.**

12 (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE.—There is estab-
13 lished within the Department of State an Office on Inter-
14 national Child Abductions that shall be headed by the Am-
15 bassador at Large for International Child Abductions ap-
16 pointed under subsection (b).

17 (b) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador at Large shall
18 be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
19 consent of the Senate.

20 (c) DUTIES.—The Ambassador at Large shall have
21 the following responsibilities:

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—The primary responsibility
23 of the Ambassador at Large shall be to—

1 (A) promote measures to prevent the inter-
2 national abduction of children from the United
3 States;

4 (B) advocate on behalf of children whose
5 habitual residence is the United States and who
6 have been abducted to another country;

7 (C) assist left-behind parents in the resolu-
8 tion of abduction or refusal of access cases; and

9 (D) advance mechanisms to prevent and
10 resolve cases of international child abduction
11 abroad.

12 (2) ADVISORY ROLE.—The Ambassador at
13 Large shall be a principal adviser to the President
14 and the Secretary of State regarding matters of
15 international child abduction and refusals of rights
16 of access, and shall make recommendations regard-
17 ing—

18 (A) the policies of the United States Gov-
19 ernment toward governments with a pattern of
20 noncooperation with respect to cases of inter-
21 national child abduction;

22 (B) coordination with other United States
23 agencies regarding criminal prosecutions,
24 Interpol assistance in the issuance of warrants
25 and alerts, pending cases, training for United

1 States forces, and the negotiation of agree-
2 ments to protect United States forces stationed
3 abroad;

4 (C) policies to address international child
5 abduction globally;

6 (D) the position of the United States Gov-
7 ernment on cases establishing the future func-
8 tioning of the Hague Convention in the country
9 at issue; and

10 (E) the position of the United States Gov-
11 ernment on a request to accept an accession to
12 the Hague Convention.

13 (3) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Subject to
14 the direction of the President and the Secretary of
15 State, the Ambassador at Large is authorized to
16 represent the United States in matters and cases
17 relevant to international child abduction and refusals
18 of rights to access in—

19 (A) contacts with foreign governments, the
20 World Organization for Cross-border Co-oper-
21 ation in Civil and Commercial Matters, the
22 Hague Conference on Private International
23 Law, and other international organizations of
24 which the United States is a member;

1 (B) multilateral conferences and meetings
2 relevant to international child abduction; and

3 (C) advocating accession to the Hague
4 Convention, or, where accession to the Hague
5 Convention is not possible, negotiating MOUs.

6 (4) REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Am-
7 bassador at Large shall have the reporting respon-
8 sibilities described in section 102.

9 (5) CASE FILE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND IN-
10 FORMATION PROTOCOL.—The Ambassador at Large
11 shall establish a case file management system within
12 the Office to ensure the maintenance of accurate,
13 complete, and timely information, to the extent
14 available, on all cases of international child abduc-
15 tion or refusal of access about which the Office is
16 notified, as well as a protocol for the receipt and up-
17 dating of such information with actions taken by the
18 Office and responses by the respective country, as
19 well as deadlines required by the Hague Convention
20 or the MOU at issue.

21 (6) UNIFORM CASE INTAKE PROCEDURES.—The
22 Ambassador at Large shall establish uniform case
23 intake procedures, which also make note of deadlines
24 for responses pursuant to the Hague Convention or
25 MOU, where applicable.

1 (7) CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES.—The Amba-
2 sador at Large, in cooperation with the Secretary of
3 State, shall ensure that a majority of the personnel
4 of the Office are composed of civil service employees
5 or members of the Service (as such term is described
6 in section 103 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980
7 (22 U.S.C. 3903)) who shall be permitted to remain
8 with the Office for at least four years.

9 (8) LEGAL ADVICE.—The Ambassador at Large
10 shall make available legal advice to case managers of
11 the Central Authority of the United States on an as-
12 needed basis to address country-specific legal issues
13 and to provide such case managers with information
14 that can be disseminated generally on questions fre-
15 quently asked by left behind parents.

16 (9) USER FRIENDLY RESOURCES.—The Amba-
17 sador at Large shall establish user-friendly re-
18 sources, including—

19 (A) a toll free number that goes directly to
20 the Office; and

21 (B) a language line for left behind parents
22 who do not speak English.

23 (10) ASSISTANCE TO JUDGES.—The Amba-
24 sador at Large shall—

1 (A) be responsible for producing and dis-
2 seminating a training course for United States
3 Federal and State judges likely to receive
4 Hague Convention cases; and

5 (B) retain not fewer than four specially
6 trained judges available on an as needed basis
7 to advise United States Federal and State
8 judges handling Hague Convention cases.

9 (d) FUNDING.—The Secretary of State shall provide
10 the Ambassador at Large with such funds as may be nec-
11 essary for—

- 12 (1) the hiring of staff for the Office;
13 (2) the conduct of investigations by the Office;
14 (3) the establishment of a case file management
15 system;
16 (4) the translation of case documents in cases
17 that may have systemic effect in the country in
18 question;
19 (5) the development of training materials; and
20 for
21 (6) necessary travel to carry out the provisions
22 of this section.

23 **SEC. 102. ANNUAL REPORT.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 31 of each
25 year or the first day thereafter on which the appropriate

1 House of Congress is in session, the Secretary of State,
2 with the assistance of the Ambassador at Large, shall sub-
3 mit to Congress an Annual Report on International Child
4 Abduction by providing detailed information with respect
5 to unresolved cases about which the Central Authority for
6 the United States has been notified. Each Annual Report
7 shall contain the following:

8 (1) HAGUE CONVENTION SIGNATORY COUN-
9 TRIES.—Information on the following:

10 (A) A current list of those countries with
11 which the United States has reciprocal obliga-
12 tions under the Hague Convention.

13 (B) A current list of those countries that
14 have requested the United States to accept
15 their accession to the Hague Convention.

16 (C) The number of pending cases of al-
17 leged abduction of or refusal of access to chil-
18 dren from the United States in each the coun-
19 tries referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B),
20 broken-out by type with date of original appli-
21 cation and country of detention.

22 (D) The proportion of cases of abduction
23 of or refusal of access to children from the
24 United States resolved in each country since the
25 advent of reciprocal Hague Convention obliga-

1 tions and the length of time each such case was
2 pending.

3 (E) For each pending unresolved case, in-
4 cluding the current reporting year and previous
5 years—

6 (i) the date of the alleged abduction
7 or wrongful retention;

8 (ii) the date any administrative or ju-
9 dicial application pursuant to the Hague
10 Convention was brought, if applicable;

11 (iii) detailed information about each
12 such case, including in the case of judicial
13 application having been filed, the court
14 handling the matter and the procedural
15 history, the specific actions taken by the
16 United States chief of mission in the coun-
17 try to which the child is alleged to have
18 been wrongfully removed or retained, and
19 the date of submission of documents re-
20 quired by the application process; and

21 (iv) detailed information and an as-
22 sessment of the lack of resolution about
23 each such case together with a determina-
24 tion of any systemic issues related to the
25 Hague Convention signatory country as

1 well as recommendation to enhance the
2 protocol for the improvement of the resolu-
3 tion of future cases.

4 (F) A description of the efforts of the Sec-
5 retary of State to encourage Hague Convention
6 signatory countries to facilitate the work within
7 such respective countries of nongovernmental
8 organizations that assist parents seeking the re-
9 turn of children under the Hague Convention.

10 (G) Whether a state of reciprocity no
11 longer exists between the United States and a
12 Hague Convention signatory country such that
13 United States parents, advocates, and judges
14 should, in assessing the risk of wrongful re-
15 moval or retention, require strong protective
16 and preventative measures.

17 (H) All reporting requirements contained
18 in the Hague Convention compliance report.

19 (2) MOU COUNTRIES.—Information on the fol-
20 lowing:

21 (A) A list of those countries that are MOU
22 countries.

23 (B) A description of the basic elements of
24 the memorandum of understanding entered into

1 with each country specified in subparagraph
2 (A).

3 (C) Whether each such country is moving
4 toward accession to the Hague Convention.

5 (D) The number of unresolved cases of
6 wrongful removal or retentions of or refusal of
7 access to children from the United States in
8 each such country.

9 (E) The proportion of cases of abduction
10 of or refusal of access to children from the
11 United States resolved in each such country
12 since the applicable MOU went into force.

13 (F) For each unresolved abduction or ac-
14 cess case—

15 (i) the date of the alleged abduction
16 or wrongful retention;

17 (ii) the date of any administrative or
18 judicial process that was brought seeking
19 the return of a minor child to the United
20 States, or brought seeking rights of access
21 to such child, and in the case of judicial
22 process, the court in which the matter has
23 been brought and the procedural history;

1 (iii) whether the protocols established
2 pursuant to the applicable MOU have been
3 followed;

4 (iv) detailed information about each
5 such case, including the specific actions
6 taken by the United States chief of mission
7 in the country to which the child is alleged
8 to have been wrongfully removed or re-
9 tained and actions by the Central Author-
10 ity for the United States;

11 (v) detailed information on and an as-
12 sessment of the lack of resolution as well
13 as a determination of any systemic issues
14 related to the MOU country with specific
15 attention regarding any failure of any of
16 the requisite elements of the MOU; and

17 (vi) recommendations to amend the
18 applicable MOU to improve the resolution
19 of cases and ameliorate any systemic
20 issues.

21 (3) NONSIGNATORY COUNTRIES.—Information
22 on the following:

23 (A) A list of those countries that are nei-
24 ther Hague Convention signatory countries nor
25 MOU countries.

1 (B) Information on efforts by the Depart-
2 ment of State to encourage each such nonsigna-
3 tory country to become a Hague Convention
4 signatory country or MOU country.

5 (C) For each unresolved abduction or ac-
6 cess case—

7 (i) the date of the alleged abduction
8 or wrongful retention;

9 (ii) the date of any administrative or
10 judicial process that was brought seeking
11 the return of a minor child to the United
12 States, or brought seeking rights of access
13 to such child, and in the case of judicial
14 process, the court in which the matter has
15 been brought and the procedural history;

16 (iii) detailed information about each
17 such case, including the specific actions
18 taken by the United States chief of mission
19 in the country to which the child is alleged
20 to have been wrongfully removed or re-
21 tained and any other action taken by the
22 Central Authority for the United States;

23 (iv) detailed information on and an
24 assessment of the reasons for the lack of
25 a resolution in each such case as well as a

1 review of the systemic issues in the host
2 country which may contribute to or en-
3 hance the wrongful removal or retention of
4 children; and

5 (v) recommendations for specific ac-
6 tions which may be taken by the United
7 States Government to improve the resolu-
8 tion of cases and ameliorate any systemic
9 issues.

10 (b) EXCEPTION.—Each Annual Report required
11 under this section may not include names of parties or
12 of minor children. Other potentially party-identifying in-
13 formation shall also be excluded in cases in which the par-
14 ent remaining in the United States or on a United States
15 military installation has submitted a request in writing to
16 the Central Authority for the United States that such in-
17 formation not be publicized. Information that is subject
18 to attorney-client privilege may be provided with an exe-
19 cuted waiver.

20 (c) ADDITIONAL THEMATIC SECTIONS.—Each An-
21 nual Report under this section shall also include—

22 (1) information on the number of unresolved
23 cases affecting parents who are members of the
24 Armed Forces and a summary of assistance offered
25 to such left behind parents;

1 (2) information on the use of airlines in inter-
2 national child abduction, including which airlines are
3 most commonly used in abduction, voluntary airline
4 practices to prevent international child abduction,
5 and recommendations for best airline practices; and
6 (3) information on actions taken by the Central
7 Authority for the United States to train domestic
8 and foreign judges in application of the Hague Con-
9 vention.

10 (d) STANDARDS AND ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of
11 State shall ensure that United States diplomatic and con-
12 sular missions abroad maintain a consistent reporting
13 standard with respect to cases of international child ab-
14 ductions from the United States to the country in which
15 each such mission is located, provide appropriate assist-
16 ance to parents from the United States who are visiting
17 such country to obtain the return, rights of access to, or
18 visitation rights with an abducted child, and remain in-
19 formed of developments in cases of children abducted from
20 the United States to the country in which such mission
21 is located.

22 (e) TERMINATION.—Upon publication of the first An-
23 nual Report required under this section, the requirement
24 for the Secretary of State to submit the Hague Convention

1 compliance report, in addition to the Annual Report, shall
 2 terminate.

3 **TITLE II—PRESIDENTIAL** 4 **ACTIONS**

5 **SEC. 201. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PAT-**
 6 **TERNS OF NONCOOPERATION IN CASES OF**
 7 **INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS.**

8 (a) RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUC-
 9 TIONS.—

10 (1) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It shall be the
 11 policy of the United States to—

12 (A) promote the best interest of children in
 13 matters relating to their custody or rights of
 14 access by protecting them internationally from
 15 the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
 16 retention;

17 (B) oppose practices or policies of the gov-
 18 ernments of foreign countries that fail to ensure
 19 children's prompt return to the United States
 20 in cases of international child abduction or the
 21 wrongful retention of a child, where the United
 22 States is the child's habitual residence imme-
 23 diately prior to such abduction, through the ac-
 24 tions described in subsection (b); and

1 (C) oppose practices or policies of the gov-
2 ernments of foreign countries that fail to ensure
3 children's continued contact with their parents
4 by providing for rights of access.

5 (2) REQUIREMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL AC-
6 TION.—Whenever the President determines that the
7 government of a foreign country has engaged in a
8 pattern of noncooperation, the President shall pro-
9 mote the resolution of the unresolved cases through
10 one or more of the actions described in section
11 204(a).

12 (b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES WITH PATTERNS
13 OF NONCOOPERATION IN CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
14 CHILD ABDUCTION.—

15 (1) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March
17 31 of each year, the President shall review the
18 status of unresolved cases in each foreign coun-
19 try to determine whether the government of
20 each such country has engaged in a pattern of
21 noncooperation during the preceding 12 months
22 or since the date of the last review of each such
23 country under this paragraph, whichever is
24 longer. The President shall designate each
25 country the government of which the President

1 has determined has engaged in a pattern of
2 noncooperation as a Country With a Pattern of
3 Noncooperation.

4 (B) BASIS OF REVIEW.—Each review con-
5 ducted under subparagraph (A) shall be based
6 upon information regarding government re-
7 sponses to unresolved cases of international
8 child abduction with respect to each such coun-
9 try, including the number of cases and the
10 length of time such cases have been pending, as
11 described in the latest Annual Report and on
12 any other evidence available with respect to
13 each such country.

14 (C) IMPLEMENTATION.—Any review under
15 subparagraph (A) of a country may take place
16 singly or jointly with the review of one or more
17 countries.

18 (2) DETERMINATIONS OF RESPONSIBLE PAR-
19 TIES.—For the government of each country des-
20 ignated as a Country With a Pattern of Noncoopera-
21 tion under paragraph (1)(A), the President shall
22 seek to determine the agency or instrumentality
23 thereof that is responsible for the pattern of non-
24 cooperation by such government in order to appro-

1 priately target Presidential actions under this sec-
 2 tion in response.

3 (3) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Whenever
 4 the President designates a country as a Country
 5 With a Pattern of Noncooperation under paragraph
 6 (1)(A), the President shall, as soon as practicable
 7 after such designation is made, transmit to the ap-
 8 propriate congressional committees information re-
 9 lating to—

10 (A) the designation of the country, signed
 11 by the President; and

12 (B) one or more of the Presidential actions
 13 described in paragraphs (10) through (16) of
 14 section 204(a) carried out against such country.

15 (c) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO A
 16 COUNTRY WITH A PATTERN OF NONCOOPERATION.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2),
 18 (3), and (4) with respect to each Country With a
 19 Pattern of Noncooperation designated under sub-
 20 section (b)(1)(A), the President shall, after the re-
 21 quirements of sections 202 and 203 have been satis-
 22 fied, but not later than 90 days (or 180 days in case
 23 of a delay under paragraph (2)) after the date of
 24 such designation of a country under such subsection,

1 carry out one or more of the following actions under
2 subparagraph (A) or (B):

3 (A) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—One or
4 more of the Presidential actions described in
5 paragraphs (10) through (16) of section 204(a).

6 (B) COMMENSURATE ACTIONS.—Commensurate
7 action in substitution to any action referred to in subparagraph (A).

9 (2) AUTHORITY FOR DELAY OF PRESIDENTIAL
10 ACTIONS.—If, on or before the date that the President
11 is required to take action under paragraph (1)
12 with respect to a Country With a Pattern of Non-
13 cooperation, the President determines and certifies
14 to Congress that a single, additional period of time
15 not to exceed 90 days is necessary—

16 (A) for a continuation of negotiations that
17 have been commenced with the government of
18 such country to bring about a cessation of the
19 pattern of noncooperation by such country, or

20 (B)(i) for a review of corrective action
21 taken by such country after designation of such
22 country as a Country With a Pattern of Non-
23 cooperation, or

1 (ii) in anticipation that corrective action
2 will be taken by such country during such 90-
3 day period,
4 the President shall not be required to take such
5 action until the expiration of such period of
6 time.

7 (3) EXCEPTION FOR ONGOING PRESIDENTIAL
8 ACTION.—The President shall not be required to
9 take action under this paragraph (1) with respect to
10 a Country With a Pattern of Noncooperation if with
11 respect to such country the following apply:

12 (A) The President has taken action pursu-
13 ant to such paragraph in a preceding year.

14 (B) Such action is in effect at the time
15 such country is designated as a Country with a
16 Pattern of Noncooperation under subsection
17 (b)(1)(A).

18 (C) The President reports to Congress the
19 information described in paragraphs (1), (2),
20 (3), and (4) of section 203(a) regarding the ac-
21 tions in effect with respect to such country.

22 (D) At the time the President designates a
23 country as a Country With a Pattern of Non-
24 cooperation, if such country is already subject
25 to multiple, broad-based sanctions imposed in

1 significant part in response to human rights
2 abuses, and such sanctions are ongoing, the
3 President may determine that one or more of
4 such sanctions also satisfies the requirements of
5 this subsection. In a report to Congress pursu-
6 ant to paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of sec-
7 tion 203(a), the President shall specify the spe-
8 cific sanction or sanctions that the President
9 determines satisfy the requirements of this sub-
10 section. Such specified sanctions shall remain in
11 effect subject to section 208.

12 (d) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—A determination
13 under this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, that
14 a foreign country has engaged in a pattern of noncoopera-
15 tion shall not be construed to require the termination of
16 assistance or other activities with respect to such country
17 under any other provision of law, including section 116
18 or 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
19 2151(n) and 2304).

20 **SEC. 202. CONSULTATIONS.**

21 (a) **NOTIFICATION.**—

22 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in para-
23 graph (2), in accordance with existing law and regu-
24 lation, the Secretary of State shall notify in writing
25 the member of the House of Representatives rep-

1 resenting the district of a left behind parent when
2 such parent reports an international child abduction
3 to the Department of State. The Secretary shall
4 maintain a computerized data tracking system to
5 track and monitor such reported international child
6 abduction cases.

7 (2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not
8 apply if the left behind parent does not consent to
9 the notification described in such paragraph.

10 (b) DUTY TO CONSULT WITH FOREIGN GOVERN-
11 MENTS.—The President shall—

12 (1) request consultation with the government of
13 a country to which a child is alleged to have been
14 wrongfully removed or retained, regarding the pat-
15 tern of noncooperation giving rise to action under
16 section 204; and

17 (2) if agreed to, enter into such consultations,
18 privately or publicly.

19 (c) DUTY TO CONSULT WITH LEFT BEHIND PAR-
20 ENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.—The President shall con-
21 sult with left behind parents of children in the foreign
22 countries, or appropriate representatives or representative
23 groups of such parents, concerning the potential impact
24 of United States policies to promote the resolution of unre-
25 solved cases in countries described in subsection (a).

1 (d) DUTY TO CONSULT WITH OTHER UNITED
2 STATES INTERESTED PARTIES.—The President shall, as
3 appropriate, consult with other United States interested
4 parties regarding the potential impact of intended action
5 in countries described in subsection (a) on economic or
6 other interests of the United States.

7 **SEC. 203. REPORT TO CONGRESS.**

8 At such time as the President decides to take action
9 under section 204 in response to a country that the Presi-
10 dent has designated as a Country With a Pattern of Non-
11 cooperation and the President decides to take action under
12 paragraphs (10) through (16) of section 204, the Presi-
13 dent shall transmit to the appropriate congressional com-
14 mittees a report on the following:

15 (1) IDENTIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL AC-
16 TIONS.—An identification of the action or actions
17 described in paragraphs (10) through (16) of section
18 204 (or commensurate action in substitution there-
19 to) to be taken with respect to such country.

20 (2) DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATIONS.—A descrip-
21 tion of the unresolved cases of child abduction giving
22 rise to the action or actions to be taken by the
23 President.

1 (3) PURPOSE OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—A
2 description of the purpose of the Presidential action
3 or actions.

4 (4) EVALUATION.—

5 (A) DESCRIPTION.—An evaluation, in con-
6 sultation with the Secretary of State, the Am-
7 bassador at Large, the parties described in sub-
8 sections (c) and (d) of section 202, and other
9 parties the President determines appropriate,
10 of—

11 (i) the impact upon such unresolved
12 cases in such country;

13 (ii) the impact upon the government
14 of such country;

15 (iii) the impact upon the population of
16 such country; and

17 (iv) the impact upon the United
18 States economy and other interested par-
19 ties.

20 (B) AUTHORITY TO WITHHOLD DISCLO-
21 SURE.—The President may withhold part or all
22 of such evaluation from the public, if classified,
23 but shall provide the entire evaluation to Con-
24 gress.

1 (5) STATEMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS.—A state-
2 ment that noneconomic policy options designed to
3 bring about a resolution of the pattern of non-
4 cooperation in such country have reasonably been
5 exhausted, including the consultations required in
6 accordance with section 202.

7 **SEC. 204. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.**

8 (a) DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—Ex-
9 cept as provided in subsection (c), the President may take
10 the following actions with respect to a country that the
11 President has designated as a Country With a Pattern of
12 Noncooperation under section 201:

- 13 (1) A private demarche.
14 (2) An official public demarche.
15 (3) A statement of nonreciprocity under the
16 Hague Convention.
17 (4) A public condemnation.
18 (5) A public condemnation within one or more
19 multilateral fora.
20 (6) The delay or cancellation of one or more
21 scientific exchanges.
22 (7) The delay or cancellation of one or more
23 cultural exchanges.
24 (8) The denial of one or more working, official,
25 or state visits.

1 (9) The delay or cancellation of one or more
2 working, official, or state visits.

3 (10) The restriction of the number of visas
4 issued to nationals of such country pursuant to sub-
5 paragraphs (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of
6 the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
7 1101(a)(15)).

8 (11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension
9 of United States development assistance in accord-
10 ance with section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act
11 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n).

12 (12) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the
13 United States, the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
14 poration, or the Trade and Development Agency not
15 to approve the issuance of any (or a specified num-
16 ber of) guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit,
17 or participation in the extension of credit with re-
18 spect to such government or the agency or instru-
19 mentality of such government determined by the
20 President to be responsible for such pattern of non-
21 cooperation.

22 (13) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension
23 of United States security assistance in accordance
24 with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of
25 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304).

1 (14) In accordance with section 701 of the
2 International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 (22
3 U.S.C. 262d), directing the United States executive
4 directors of international financial institutions to op-
5 pose and vote against loans primarily benefitting the
6 such government or the agency or instrumentality of
7 such government determined by the President to be
8 responsible for such pattern of noncooperation.

9 (15) The denial, withdrawal, suspension, or lim-
10 itation of benefits provided pursuant to title V of the
11 Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461 et seq.), relat-
12 ing to the Generalized System of Preferences.

13 (16) Ordering the heads of the appropriate
14 United States agencies not to issue any (or a speci-
15 fied number of) specific licenses, and not to grant
16 any other specific authority (or a specified number
17 of authorities), to export any goods or technology to
18 such government or to the agency or instrumentality
19 of such government determined by the President to
20 be responsible for such pattern of noncooperation,
21 under—

22 (A) the Export Administration Act of
23 1979;

24 (B) the Arms Export Control Act;

25 (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

1 (D) any other statute that requires the
2 prior review and approval of the United States
3 Government as a condition for the export or re-
4 export of goods or services.

5 (17) Prohibiting any United States financial in-
6 stitution from making loans or providing credits to-
7 taling more than \$10,000,000 in any 12-month pe-
8 riod to such government or to the agency or instru-
9 mentality of such government or determined by the
10 President to be responsible for such pattern of non-
11 cooperation.

12 (18) Prohibiting the United States Government
13 from procuring, or entering into any contract for the
14 procurement of, any goods or services from such
15 government or from the agency or instrumentality of
16 such government determined by the President to be
17 responsible for such pattern of noncooperation.

18 (b) COMMENSURATE ACTION.—Except as provided in
19 subsection (c), the President may substitute any other ac-
20 tion authorized by law for any action described in para-
21 graphs (1) through (16) of subsection (a) if such action
22 is commensurate in effect to the action substituted and
23 if such action would further the purposes of this Act as
24 specified in section 2(c). The President shall seek to take
25 all appropriate and feasible actions authorized by law to

1 obtain the cessation of such pattern of noncooperation. If
2 commensurate action is taken under this subsection, the
3 President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional
4 committees a report on such action, together with an ex-
5 planation for taking such action.

6 (c) EXCEPTIONS.—Any action taken pursuant to sub-
7 section (a) or (b) may not prohibit or restrict the provision
8 to such country of medicine, medical equipment, or sup-
9 plies, food, or other humanitarian assistance.

10 **SEC. 205. EFFECTS ON EXISTING CONTRACTS.**

11 The President shall not be required to apply or main-
12 tain any action under this section 204—

13 (1) in the case of procurement of defense arti-
14 cles or defense services—

15 (A) under existing contracts or sub-
16 contracts, including the exercise of options for
17 production quantities, to satisfy requirements
18 essential to the national security of the United
19 States;

20 (B) if the President determines in writing
21 and transmits to Congress a report that the
22 government of a foreign country or the agency
23 or instrumentality of such government to which
24 such action would otherwise be applied is a sole
25 source supplier of such defense articles or serv-

1 ices, that such defense articles or services are
2 essential, and that alternative sources are not
3 readily or reasonably available; or

4 (C) if the President determines in writing
5 and transmits to Congress a report that such
6 defense articles or services are essential to the
7 national security of the United States under de-
8 fense co-production agreements; or

9 (2) to products or services provided under con-
10 tracts entered into before the date on which the
11 President publishes in the Federal Register notice of
12 such action in accordance with section 207.

13 **SEC. 206. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the
15 President may waive the application of any of the actions
16 described in paragraphs (10) through (16) of section
17 204(a) (or commensurate action in substitution thereto)
18 with respect to a country that the President has des-
19 ignated as a Country With a Pattern of Noncooperation
20 under section 201, if the President determines and so re-
21 ports to the appropriate congressional committees that—

22 (1) the government of such has satisfactorily
23 resolved the unresolved cases giving rise to the appli-
24 cation of any of such actions and—

1 (A) if such country is a Hague Convention
2 signatory country, such country has taken
3 measures to ensure future compliance with the
4 provisions of the Hague Convention;

5 (B) if such country is an MOU country,
6 such country has taken measures to ensure fu-
7 ture compliance with the provisions of the MOU
8 at issue; or

9 (C) if such country is a Nonsignatory
10 country at the time the abductions or retentions
11 resulting in the unresolved cases occurred, such
12 country has become a Hague Convention signa-
13 tory country or a MOU country;

14 (2) the exercise of such waiver authority would
15 further the purposes of this Act; or

16 (3) the important national interest of the
17 United States requires the exercise of such waiver
18 authority.

19 (b) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than
20 the date of the exercise of a waiver under subsection (a),
21 the President shall notify the appropriate congressional
22 committees of such waiver or the intention to exercise such
23 waiver, together with a detailed justification thereof.

1 **SEC. 207. PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the
3 President shall ensure publication in the Federal Register
4 of the following:

5 (1) DETERMINATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS,
6 AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES OF COUNTRIES
7 WITH PATTERNS OF NONCOOPERATION.—Any des-
8 ignation of a country that the President has des-
9 ignated as a Country With a Pattern of Noncoopera-
10 tion under section 201, together with, when applica-
11 ble and to the extent practicable, the identities of
12 agencies, instrumentalities, or officials determined to
13 be responsible for such pattern of noncooperation.

14 (2) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—A description of
15 any action under paragraphs (10) through (16) of
16 section 204(a) (or commensurate action in substi-
17 tution thereto) and the effective date of such action.

18 (3) DELAYS IN TRANSMITTAL OF PRESI-
19 DENTIAL ACTION REPORTS.—Any delay in trans-
20 mittal of a report required under in section 203.

21 (4) WAIVERS.—Any waiver issued under section
22 206.

23 (b) LIMITED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—The
24 President may limit publication of information under this
25 section in the same manner and to the same extent as

1 determinations described in section 654(c) of the Foreign
2 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2414(c)), if the Presi-
3 dent determines that the publication of such informa-
4 tion—

5 (1) would be harmful to the national security of
6 the United States; or

7 (2) would not further the purposes of this Act.

8 **SEC. 208. TERMINATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.**

9 Any action taken under this Act or any amendment
10 made by this Act with respect to a foreign country shall
11 terminate on the earlier of the following dates:

12 (1) Not later than two years after the effective
13 date of such action unless expressly reauthorized by
14 law.

15 (2) Upon the determination by the President, in
16 consultation with the Office, and certification to
17 Congress that the government of such country has
18 taken substantial and verifiable steps to correct the
19 pattern of noncooperation at issue that gave rise to
20 such action.

21 **SEC. 209. PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.**

22 No court shall have jurisdiction to review any Presi-
23 dential determination or agency action under this Act or
24 any amendment made by this Act.

1 **SEC. 210. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.**

2 (a) IMPLEMENTATION OF PROHIBITION ON ECO-
3 NOMIC ASSISTANCE.—Section 116(c) of the Foreign As-
4 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(c)) is amended—

5 (1) in matter preceding paragraph (1), by in-
6 serting “and in consultation with the Ambassador at
7 Large for International Child Abduction” after
8 “Freedom”;

9 (2) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking the period
10 at the end and inserting “; and”; and

11 (3) by adding at the end the following new
12 paragraph:

13 “(4) whether the government—

14 “(A) has engaged in a pattern of non-
15 cooperation regarding unresolved cases of al-
16 leged international child abduction or denial of
17 rights of access, as such terms are defined in
18 the International Child Abduction Prevention
19 Act of 2009; or

20 “(B) has failed to undertake serious and
21 sustained efforts to locate children allegedly ab-
22 ducted to the country when such efforts could
23 have been reasonably undertaken.”.

24 (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF PROHIBITION ON MILITARY
25 ASSISTANCE.—Section 502B(a)(4) of the Foreign Assist-

1 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or” at
2 the end;

3 (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period
4 at the end and inserting “; or”; and

5 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
6 paragraphs:

7 “(C) has engaged in a pattern of non-
8 cooperation regarding unresolved cases of al-
9 leged international child abduction or denial of
10 rights of access, as such terms are defined in
11 the International Child Abduction Protection
12 Act of 2009; or

13 “(D) has failed to undertake serious and
14 sustained efforts to locate children allegedly ab-
15 ducted to the country when such efforts could
16 have been reasonably undertaken.”.

17 (c) EXPANDED CONSULTATION.—Section 502B(b) of
18 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304(b))
19 is amended, in the first sentence, by inserting “and with
20 the assistance of the Ambassador at Large for Inter-
21 national Child Abduction,” after “the Ambassador at
22 Large for International Religious Freedom,”.

1 **SEC. 211. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE.**

2 Section 701 of the International Financial Institu-
3 tions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d) is amended by adding at the
4 end the following new subsection:

5 “(h) In determining whether the government of a
6 country engages in a pattern of gross violations of inter-
7 nationally recognized human rights, as described in sub-
8 section (a), the President shall give particular consider-
9 ation to whether such government—

10 “(1) has engaged in a pattern of noncoopera-
11 tion regarding unresolved cases of alleged inter-
12 national child abduction or denial of rights of access,
13 as such terms are defined in the International Child
14 Abduction Prevention Act of 2009; or

15 “(2) has failed to undertake serious and sus-
16 tained efforts to locate children allegedly abducted to
17 such country when such efforts could have been rea-
18 sonably undertaken.”.

19 **SEC. 212. AMENDMENT TO GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREF-**
20 **ERENCES ELIGIBILITY FOR GENERALIZED**
21 **SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES.**

22 Section 502(b)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
23 U.S.C. 2462(b)(2)) is amended—

24 (1) by inserting after subparagraph (H) the fol-
25 lowing new subparagraph:

1 “(I) Such country is a country with a pat-
 2 tern of noncooperation regarding unresolved
 3 cases of alleged international child abduction or
 4 denial of rights of access, as such terms are de-
 5 fined in the International Child Abduction Pre-
 6 vention Act of 2009.”; and

7 (2) in the flush left matter after subparagraph
 8 (I)—

9 (A) by striking “and (H)” and inserting
 10 “(H)”; and

11 (B) by inserting after “(D))” the following:
 12 “and (I)”.

13 **TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS** 14 **PROVISIONS**

15 **SEC. 301. AMENDMENT OF RESTRICTION FOR THE** 16 **ISSUANCE OF PASSPORTS FOR CHILDREN** 17 **UNDER AGE 14.**

18 Section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Admiral James W.
 19 Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization
 20 Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 is amended—

21 (1) in clause (ii), by striking “or” at the end;

22 (2) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the
 23 end and inserting “; or”; and

24 (3) by adding at the end the following new
 25 clause:

1 “(iv) in cases in which the child is liv-
2 ing outside the United States, such person
3 is a United States citizen, has joint cus-
4 tody over the child, and is executing the
5 application for issuance of a passport out-
6 side the United States.”.

7 **SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

8 There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as
9 may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2010 through
10 2013 to carry out this Act and the amendments made by
11 this Act.

112TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3605

To prevent United States businesses from cooperating with repressive governments in transforming the Internet into a tool of censorship and surveillance, to fulfill the responsibility of the United States Government to promote freedom of expression on the Internet, to restore public confidence in the integrity of United States businesses, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 8, 2011

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. WOLF, and Mr. McCOTTER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To prevent United States businesses from cooperating with repressive governments in transforming the Internet into a tool of censorship and surveillance, to fulfill the responsibility of the United States Government to promote freedom of expression on the Internet, to restore public confidence in the integrity of United States businesses, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
3 “Global Online Freedom Act of 2011”.

4 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
5 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.
- Sec. 4. Severability.

TITLE I—PROMOTION OF GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM

- Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 103. Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
- Sec. 104. Annual designation of Internet-restricting countries; report.
- Sec. 105. Report on trade-related issues or disputes due to government censorship or disruption of the Internet.

TITLE II—CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO PROTECT ONLINE FREEDOM

- Sec. 201. Disclosure of blocking and surveillance by Internet communications services companies.

TITLE III—EXPORT CONTROLS ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

- Sec. 301. Export controls on certain telecommunications equipment.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

- 8 (1) The political and economic benefits of the
9 Internet are important to advancing democracy and
10 freedom throughout the world, but the potential ben-
11 efits of this transformative technology are under at-
12 tack by authoritarian governments;
- 13 (2) A number of repressive foreign governments
14 block, restrict, otherwise control, and monitor the

1 Internet, effectively transforming the Internet into a
2 tool of censorship and surveillance.

3 (3) A number of United States businesses have
4 enabled repressive regimes to compromise the secu-
5 rity of Internet users engaged in peaceful discussion
6 of political, social, and religious issues and severely
7 limit their access to information and communication
8 channels by selling these governments or their
9 agents technology or training.

10 (4) A number of United States businesses have
11 provided repressive governments with information
12 about Internet users who were the company's clients
13 or were using the companies' products, that has led
14 to the arrest and imprisonment of the Internet
15 users.

16 (5) The actions of a number of United States
17 businesses in cooperating with the efforts of repres-
18 sive governments to transform the Internet into a
19 tool of censorship and surveillance have caused
20 Internet users in the United States and in foreign
21 countries to lose confidence in the integrity of
22 United States businesses.

23 (6) Information and communication technology
24 companies are to be commended for cooperating with
25 civil society organizations, academics, and investors

1 in founding the Global Network Initiative, in order
2 to provide direction and guidance to the Information
3 and Communications Technology companies and oth-
4 ers in protecting the free expression and privacy of
5 Internet users. Human rights due diligence by com-
6 panies makes a difference.

7 (7) The United States Government has a re-
8 sponsibility to protect freedom of expression on the
9 Internet, to prevent United States businesses from
10 directly and materially cooperating in human rights
11 abuses perpetrated by repressive foreign govern-
12 ments, and to restore public confidence in the integ-
13 rity of United States business.

14 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

15 In this Act:

16 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
17 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
18 mittees” means—

19 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
20 the Committee on Financial Services of the
21 House of Representatives; and

22 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
23 and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

24 (2) ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND OTHER
25 TITLE 18 DEFINITIONS.—The terms “electronic com-

1 munication”, “electronic communications system”,
2 “electronic storage”, and “contents” have the mean-
3 ings given such terms in section 2510 of title 18,
4 United States Code.

5 (3) FOREIGN OFFICIAL.—

6 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term “foreign offi-
7 cial” means—

8 (i) any officer or employee of a for-
9 eign government or of any department;
10 and

11 (ii) any person acting in an official ca-
12 pacity for or on behalf of, or acting under
13 color of law with the knowledge of, any
14 such government or such department,
15 agency, state-owned enterprise, or instru-
16 mentality.

17 (B) STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE.—For
18 purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “state-
19 owned enterprise” means a commercial entity in
20 which a foreign government owns or controls,
21 directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of
22 the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial
23 interest in such commercial entity.

1 (4) INTERNET.—The term “Internet” has the
2 meaning given the term in section 231(f) of the
3 Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(f)).

4 (5) INTERNET-RESTRICTING COUNTRY.—The
5 term “Internet-restricting country” means a country
6 designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to
7 section 104(a) of this Act.

8 (6) INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES.—
9 The term “Internet communications services”—

10 (A) means a method for providing commu-
11 nications services via the Internet, including
12 electronic mail, Internet telephony, online chat,
13 online text messaging, Internet bulletin boards,
14 or Web pages; and

15 (B)(i) includes providing Internet access;
16 but

17 (ii) does not include activities conducted by
18 a financial institution (as such term is defined
19 in section 5312 of title 31, United States Code)
20 that are financial in nature, even if such activi-
21 ties are conducted using the Internet.

22 (7) INTERNET CONTENT HOSTING SERVICE.—
23 The terms “Internet content hosting service” and
24 “content hosting service” mean a service that—

1 (A) stores, through electromagnetic or
2 other means, electronic data, such as the con-
3 tent of Web pages, electronic mail, documents,
4 images, audio and video files, online discussion
5 boards, or Web logs; and

6 (B) makes such data available via the
7 Internet.

8 (8) INTERNET SEARCH ENGINE.—The term
9 “Internet search engine” or “search engine” means
10 a service made available via the Internet that, on the
11 basis of a query consisting of terms, concepts, ques-
12 tions, or other data input by a user, searches infor-
13 mation available on the Internet and returns to the
14 user a means, such as a hyperlinked list of Uniform
15 Resource Identifiers, of locating, viewing, or
16 downloading information or data available on the
17 Internet relating to such query.

18 (9) LEGITIMATE FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT
19 PURPOSES.—

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term “legitimate
21 foreign law enforcement purpose” means for the
22 purpose of enforcement, investigation, or pros-
23 ecution by a foreign official based on a publicly
24 promulgated law of reasonable specificity that
25 proximately relates to the protection or pro-

1 motion of the health, safety, or morals of the
2 citizens of the jurisdiction of such official.

3 (B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For pur-
4 poses of this Act, the control, suppression, or
5 punishment of peaceful expression of political,
6 religious, or ideological opinion or belief shall
7 not be construed to constitute a legitimate for-
8 eign law enforcement purpose. Among expres-
9 sion that should be construed to be protected
10 against control, suppression, or punishment
11 when evaluating a foreign government’s claim
12 of a legitimate foreign law enforcement purpose
13 is expression protected by article 19 of the
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political
15 Rights.

16 (10) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMA-
17 TION.—The term “personally identifiable informa-
18 tion”—

19 (A) includes any information described in
20 section 2703(e)(2) of title 18, United States
21 Code; and

22 (B) does not include—

23 (i) any traffic data; or

1 (ii) any record of aggregate data
2 which cannot be used to identify particular
3 persons.

4 (11) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
5 USED TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN AN ACCOUNT.—
6 The term “personally identifiable information used
7 to establish or maintain an account” does not in-
8 clude—

9 (A) information collected in the course of
10 establishing or operating accounts for commu-
11 nications within a company;

12 (B) information collected in the course of
13 the purchase, sale, shipment, or distribution of
14 goods, including transactions for goods or serv-
15 ices utilizing the Internet, other than commu-
16 nication services on which a political, religious,
17 or ideological opinion or belief may be ex-
18 pressed; or

19 (C) personally identifiable information vol-
20 unteered in an electronic communication, other
21 than in a communication made in the course of
22 establishing an account for Internet commu-
23 nications services, such as an electronic mail
24 signature line or an electronic mail, on-line
25 video, or Web page in which the author volun-

1 tarily provides personally identifiable informa-
2 tion.

3 (12) SUBSTANTIAL RESTRICTIONS ON INTER-
4 NET FREEDOM.—The term “substantial restrictions
5 on Internet freedom” means actions that restrict or
6 punish the free availability of information via the
7 Internet for reasons other than legitimate foreign
8 law enforcement purposes, including—

9 (Δ) deliberately blocking, filtering, or cen-
10 soring information available via the Internet
11 based on the expression of political, religious, or
12 ideological opinion or belief, including by elec-
13 tronic mail; or

14 (B) persecuting, prosecuting, or otherwise
15 punishing an individual or group for posting or
16 transmitting peaceful political, religious, or ide-
17 ological opinion or belief via the Internet, in-
18 cluding by electronic mail.

19 (13) TRAFFIC DATA.—The term “traffic data”
20 means, with respect to an electronic communication,
21 any information contained in or relating to such
22 communication that is processed for the purpose of
23 the conveyance of the communication by an elec-
24 tronic communications system or for the billing
25 thereof, including any Internet Protocol address or

1 other means of identifying a location within an elec-
2 tronic communications system, but that cannot be
3 used to identify a particular person. Such term can-
4 not be used to include the contents of any electronic
5 communication.

6 (14) UNITED STATES BUSINESS.—The term
7 “United States business” means—

8 (A) any corporation, partnership, associa-
9 tion, joint-stock company, business trust, unin-
10 corporated organization, or sole proprietorship
11 that—

12 (i) has its principal place of business
13 in the United States; or

14 (ii) is organized under the laws of a
15 State of the United States or a territory,
16 possession, or commonwealth of the United
17 States; and

18 (B) any issuer of a security registered pur-
19 suant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange
20 Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l).

21 **SEC. 4. SEVERABILITY.**

22 If any provision of this Act, or the application of such
23 provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
24 the remainder of this Act, and the application of such pro-

1 vision to other persons not similarly situated or to other
2 circumstances, shall not be affected by such invalidation.

3 **TITLE I—PROMOTION OF**
4 **GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM**

5 **SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

6 It shall be the policy of the United States—

7 (1) to promote as a fundamental component of
8 United States foreign policy the right of every indi-
9 vidual to freedom of opinion and expression, includ-
10 ing the right to hold opinions, and to seek, receive,
11 and impart information and ideas through any
12 media and regardless of frontiers, without inter-
13 ference;

14 (2) to use all appropriate instruments of United
15 States influence, including diplomacy, trade policy,
16 and export controls, to support, promote, and
17 strengthen principles, practices, and values that pro-
18 mote the free flow of information without inter-
19 ference or discrimination, including through the
20 Internet and other electronic media; and

21 (3) to deter any United States business from
22 cooperating with officials of Internet-restricting
23 countries in effecting the political censorship of on-
24 line content.

1 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 It is the sense of the Congress that—

3 (1) the President should, through bilateral, and
4 where appropriate, multilateral activities, seek to ob-
5 tain the agreement of other countries to promote the
6 goals and objectives of this Act and to protect Inter-
7 net freedom; and

8 (2) to the extent that a United States business
9 empowers or assists any foreign government in its
10 efforts—

11 (A) to restrict online access to the Web
12 sites of the Voice of America, Radio Free Eu-
13 rope/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Al-Hurra,
14 Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, Radio Marti, TV
15 Marti, or other United States-supported Web
16 sites and online access to United States Govern-
17 ment reports such as the annual Country Re-
18 ports on Human Rights Practices, the annual
19 Reports on International Religious Freedom,
20 and the annual Trafficking in Human Persons
21 Reports, or

22 (B) to compromise the security of Internet
23 users, severely limit their access to information
24 and communication channels through censoring
25 of information or malicious attacks,

1 such business is working contrary to the foreign pol-
2 icy interests of the United States and is undercut-
3 ting United States taxpayer-funded efforts to pro-
4 mote freedom of information for all people, including
5 those in undemocratic and repressive societies.

6 **SEC. 103. ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS**
7 **PRACTICES.**

8 (a) REPORT RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASSIST-
9 ANCE.—Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
10 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end
11 the following new subsection:

12 “(g)(1) The report required by subsection (d) shall
13 include an assessment of the freedom of electronic infor-
14 mation in each foreign country. Such assessment shall
15 consist of the following:

16 “(A) An assessment of the general extent to
17 which Internet access is available to and used by
18 citizens in that country.

19 “(B) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
20 ernment authorities in that country attempt to filter,
21 censor, or otherwise block or remove Internet con-
22 tent, as well as a description of the means by which
23 such authorities attempt to block or remove pro-
24 tected speech.

1 “(C) A description of known instances in which
2 government authorities in that country have per-
3 secuted, prosecuted, or otherwise punished an indi-
4 vidual or group for the nonviolent expression of po-
5 litical, religious, or ideological opinion or belief via
6 the Internet, including electronic mail.

7 “(D) A description of known instances in which
8 government authorities in that country have sought
9 to collect, request, obtain, or disclose the personally
10 identifiable information of a person in connection
11 with that person’s nonviolent expression of political,
12 religious, or ideological opinion or belief, including
13 without limitation communication that would be pro-
14 tected by the International Covenant on Civil and
15 Political Rights.

16 “(2) In compiling data and making assessments for
17 the purposes of paragraph (1), United States diplomatic
18 mission personnel shall consult with human rights organi-
19 zations, technology and Internet companies, and other ap-
20 propriate nongovernmental organizations.

21 “(3) In this subsection, the term ‘Internet’ has the
22 meaning given the term in section 231(f) of the Commu-
23 nications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(f)).”.

24 (b) REPORT RELATING TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE.—
25 Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22

1 15 U.S.C. 2304) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
2 lowing new subsection:

3 “(j)(1) The report required by subsection (b) shall
4 include an assessment of the freedom of electronic infor-
5 mation in each foreign country. Such assessment shall
6 consist of the following:

7 “(A) An assessment of the general extent to
8 which Internet access is available to and used by
9 citizens in that country.

10 “(B) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
11 ernment authorities in that country attempt to filter,
12 censor, or otherwise block or remove Internet con-
13 tent, as well as a description of the means by which
14 such authorities attempt to block or remove pro-
15 tected speech.

16 “(C) A description of known instances in which
17 government authorities in that country have per-
18 secuted, prosecuted, or otherwise punished an indi-
19 vidual or group for the peaceful expression of polit-
20 ical, religious, or ideological opinion or belief via the
21 Internet, including electronic mail.

22 “(D) A description of known instances in which
23 government authorities in that country have sought
24 to collect, request, obtain, or disclose the personally
25 identifiable information of a person in connection

1 with that person's communication of ideas, facts, or
2 views where such communication would be protected
3 by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
4 Rights.

5 “(2) In compiling data and making assessments for
6 the purposes of paragraph (1), United States diplomatic
7 mission personnel shall consult with human rights organi-
8 zations, technology and Internet companies, and other ap-
9 propriate nongovernmental organizations.

10 “(3) In this subsection, the term ‘Internet’ has the
11 meaning given the term in section 231(f) of the Commu-
12 nications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(f)).”.

13 **SEC. 104. ANNUAL DESIGNATION OF INTERNET-RESTRICT-**
14 **ING COUNTRIES; REPORT.**

15 (a) DESIGNATION.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
18 nually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall des-
19 ignate Internet-restricting countries for purposes of
20 this Act.

21 (2) STANDARD.—A foreign country shall be
22 designated as an Internet-restricting country if the
23 Secretary of State, after consultation with the Sec-
24 retary of Commerce, determines, based on the review
25 of the evidence that the government of the country

1 is directly or indirectly responsible for a systematic
2 pattern of substantial restrictions on Internet free-
3 dom during any part of the preceding 1-year period.

4 (b) REPORT.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
7 nually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall trans-
8 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a
9 report that contains the following:

10 (A) The name of each foreign country that
11 at the time of the transmission of the report is
12 designated as an Internet-restricting country
13 under subsection (a).

14 (B) An identification of each government
15 agency and quasi-government organization re-
16 sponsible for the substantial restrictions on
17 Internet freedom in each foreign country des-
18 ignated as an Internet-restricting country under
19 subsection (a).

20 (C) A description of efforts by the United
21 States to counter the substantial restrictions on
22 Internet freedom referred to in subparagraph
23 (B).

24 (D) A description of the evidence used by
25 the Secretary of State to make the determina-

1 tions under subsection (a)(2) and any ongoing
2 multilateral discussions on freedom of speech
3 and the right to privacy referred to in such sub-
4 section.

5 (2) FORM.—The information required by para-
6 graph (1)(C) of the report may be provided in a
7 classified form if necessary.

8 (3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—All unclassified
9 portions of the report shall be made publicly avail-
10 able on the Internet Web site of the Department of
11 State.

12 **SEC. 105. REPORT ON TRADE-RELATED ISSUES OR DIS-**
13 **PUTES DUE TO GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP**
14 **OR DISRUPTION OF THE INTERNET.**

15 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
16 of the enactment of this Act, the United States Trade
17 Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State
18 and the Secretary of Commerce, shall transmit to the ap-
19 propriate congressional committees a report on—

20 (1) any trade-related issues or disputes that
21 arise due to government censorship or disruption of
22 the Internet among United States trade partners;
23 and

1 (2) efforts by the United States Government to
2 address the issues or disputes described in para-
3 graph (1) either bilaterally or multilaterally.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that the United States should pursue trade policies
6 that expand the information economy by—

7 (1) ensuring the free flow of information across
8 the entire global network;

9 (2) promoting stronger international trans-
10 parency rules; and

11 (3) ensuring fair and equal treatment of online
12 services regardless of country of origin.

13 **TITLE II—CORPORATE TRANS-**
14 **PARENCY AND ACCOUNT-**
15 **ABILITY TO PROTECT ONLINE**
16 **FREEDOM**

17 **SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF BLOCKING AND SURVEILLANCE**
18 **BY INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES**
19 **COMPANIES.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Securities Ex-
21 change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by add-
22 ing at the end the following:

23 “(r) DISCLOSURE OF BLOCKING AND SURVEILLANCE
24 BY INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES COMPA-
25 NIES.—

1 “(1) DISCLOSURE.—Each Internet communica-
2 tions services company that operates in an Internet-
3 restricting country shall include in the annual report
4 of the company information relating to the company,
5 any subsidiary of the company, and any entity under
6 the control of either of such companies, relating to
7 the following:

8 “(A) HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE.—
9 Internal company policies that address human
10 rights due diligence through a statement of pol-
11 icy that mirrors the Guidelines for Multi-
12 national Enterprises issued by the Organization
13 for Economic Co-operation and Development,
14 and whether such policy—

15 “(i) is approved at the most senior
16 level of the company;

17 “(ii) explicitly states the company’s
18 expectations of personnel, business part-
19 ners, and other parties directly linked to
20 its operations, products, or services;

21 “(iii) is publicly available and commu-
22 nicated internally and externally to all per-
23 sonnel, business partners, other relevant
24 partners, customers, and users;

1 “(iv) is reflected in operational poli-
2 cies and procedures necessary to embed it
3 through it throughout the company; and

4 “(v) is independently assessed by a
5 third party to demonstrate compliance in
6 practice, which should include—

7 “(I) whether the assessment was
8 conducted under the supervision of
9 any third party organization or multi-
10 stakeholder initiative;

11 “(II) a description of the assess-
12 ment process;

13 “(III) a description of measures
14 taken to ensure the assessor’s inde-
15 pendence; and

16 “(IV) inclusion of the assessor’s
17 public report.

18 “(B) NON-COMPLIANCE.—If the company’s
19 policy does not comply with any of the require-
20 ments of subclauses (I) through (IV) of sub-
21 paragraph (A)(v), an explanation of why the
22 company’s policy does not meet each such re-
23 quirement.

24 “(C) POLICIES PERTAINING TO THE COL-
25 LECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE IN-

1 FORMATION.—If the company collects or ob-
2 tains personally identifiable information, the
3 contents of wire or electronic communications
4 in electronic storage, or the contents of wire or
5 electronic communications in a remote com-
6 puting service on the Internet, the details of
7 any internal policies or procedures of the com-
8 pany that set out how the company will assess
9 and respond to requests by the governments of
10 Internet-restricting countries for disclosure of
11 such information or communications.

12 “(D) RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET SEARCH
13 ENGINES AND INTERNET CONTENT HOSTING
14 SERVICES.—If the company creates, provides,
15 or hosts an Internet search engine or an Inter-
16 net content hosting service, all steps taken to
17 provide users and customers with clear, promi-
18 nent, and timely notice when access to specific
19 content has been removed or blocked at the re-
20 quest of an Internet-restricting country.

21 “(2) AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION.—The
22 Commission shall make all information reported by
23 an issuer pursuant to this subsection available online
24 to the public.

25 “(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

1 “(A) INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS SERV-
2 ICES COMPANY.—The term ‘Internet commu-
3 nications services company’ means an issuer
4 that—

5 “(i) is required to file an annual re-
6 port with the Commission; and

7 “(ii)(I) provides electronic commu-
8 nications services or remote computing
9 services; or

10 “(II) is a domain name registrar, do-
11 main name registry, or other domain name
12 registration authority.

13 “(B) ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
14 SERVICES.—The term ‘electronic communica-
15 tions services’ has the meaning given such term
16 under section 2510(15) of title 18, United
17 States Code.

18 “(C) INTERNET-RESTRICTING COUNTRY.—
19 The term ‘Internet-restricting country’ has the
20 meaning given such term under section 3 of the
21 Global Online Freedom Act of 2011.

22 “(D) REMOTE COMPUTING SERVICES.—
23 The term ‘remote computing services’ has the
24 meaning given such term under section 1711(2)
25 of title 18, United States Code.”.

1 (b) RULEMAKING.—Not later than the end of the
 2 270-day period beginning on the date of the enactment
 3 of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall
 4 issue final rules to carry out section 13(r) of the Securities
 5 and Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (a).

6 **TITLE III—EXPORT CONTROLS**
 7 **ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNI-**
 8 **CATIONS EQUIPMENT**

9 **SEC. 301. EXPORT CONTROLS ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNI-**
 10 **CATIONS EQUIPMENT.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6 of the Export Adminis-
 12 tration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), as continued
 13 in effect under the International Emergency Economic
 14 Powers Act, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
 15 lowing:

16 “(t) CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP-
 17 MENT.—

18 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in consulta-
 19 tion with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
 20 Defense, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
 21 departments and agencies, shall establish and main-
 22 tain, as part of the list maintained under this sec-
 23 tion, a list of goods and technology that would serve
 24 the primary purpose of assisting, or be specifically
 25 configured to assist, a foreign government in acquir-

1 ing the capability to carry out censorship, surveil-
2 lance, or any other similar or related activity
3 through means of telecommunications, including the
4 Internet, the prohibition or licensing of which would
5 be effective in barring acquisition or enhancement of
6 such capability.

7 “(2) INTERNET-RESTRICTING COUNTRIES.—
8 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Sec-
9 retary shall prohibit the export of goods or tech-
10 nology on the list established under paragraph (1) to
11 a government end user in any Internet-restricting
12 country.

13 “(3) WAIVER.—The President may waive the
14 application of paragraph (2) with respect to export
15 of goods or technology on the list established under
16 paragraph (1) on a case-by-case basis if the Presi-
17 dent determines and certifies to Congress that it is
18 in the national interests of the United States to do
19 so.

20 “(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

21 “(A) the term ‘Internet-restricting country’
22 means a country designated by the Secretary of
23 State pursuant to section 104(a) of the Global
24 Online Freedom Act of 2011;

1 “(B) a ‘government end user’ in a country
2 is an end user that is a government of that
3 country, or of a political subdivision of that
4 country, or is an agency or instrumentality of
5 such a government; and

6 “(C) an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of a
7 government is an ‘agency or instrumentality of
8 a foreign state’, as defined in section 1603 of
9 title 28, United States Code.”.

10 (b) REGULATIONS.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
13 shall revise the Export Administration Regulations
14 and any other regulations necessary to carry out the
15 amendment made by subsection (a).

16 (2) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.—

17 In this subsection, the term “Export Administration
18 Regulations” means the Export Administration Reg-
19 ulations as maintained and amended under the au-
20 thority of the International Emergency Economic
21 Powers Act and codified, as of the date of the enact-
22 ment of this Act, in subchapter C of chapter VII of
23 title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

24 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 6(t) of the Export
25 Administration Act of 1979, as added by subsection (a),

1 shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
2 and shall apply with respect to the export of goods or tech-
3 nology on the list established under paragraph (1) of such
4 section on or after 1 year after the date of the enactment
5 of this Act.



112TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 4141

To direct the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to take appropriate actions to improve the nutritional quality, quality control, and cost effectiveness of United States food assistance, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 5, 2012

Mr. PAYNE (for himself, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. COHEN, and Ms. BASS of California) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Agriculture, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To direct the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to take appropriate actions to improve the nutritional quality, quality control, and cost effectiveness of United States food assistance, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “International Food As-
5 sistance Improvement Act of 2012”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) For more than 55 years the United States,
4 backed by the support of the American people, has
5 been committed to providing life-saving food assist-
6 ance to developing countries and vulnerable popu-
7 lations around the world.

8 (2) As the largest donor of international food
9 assistance, an essential tool in tackling malnutrition,
10 the United States can lead the way in improving
11 food aid quality to better target undernourished
12 women and children.

13 (3) The United States contributes over one-half
14 of all food aid supplies to alleviate hunger and sup-
15 port development and plays an important role in re-
16 sponding to emergency food aid needs and ensuring
17 global food security.

18 (4) Over the past decade, increasing food prices
19 and protracted humanitarian crises around the world
20 have made United States food assistance even more
21 critical and relevant. At the same time, these fac-
22 tors, combined with advancements in nutrition
23 science, as well as severe and ongoing fiscal con-
24 straints, have led to an increased demand by policy-
25 makers and program implementers for new specially
26 formulated and cost-effective products to meet the

1 nutritional needs of the world's most vulnerable pop-
2 ulations.

3 (5) While United States food assistance is effec-
4 tive in providing critical calories and nutrients to
5 millions of people during short-term emergencies,
6 the long-term impacts of these programs have also
7 been increasingly called into question for not meet-
8 ing the nutritional needs of recipient populations.

9 (6) Reducing maternal and child malnutrition,
10 especially in the critical 1,000 days between preg-
11 nancy and age 2, is a key priority of United States
12 global food security and health initiatives, including
13 food aid.

14 (7) Recent reports by the Government Account-
15 ability Office and the United States Agency for
16 International Development recommended over 35
17 changes to United States food aid products and pro-
18 grams to improve the nutritional quality, quality
19 control, and cost effectiveness of United States food
20 assistance.

21 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

22 It is the sense of Congress that—

23 (1) even in this time of fiscal austerity, the
24 American people support the United States Govern-
25 ment's historic commitment to providing life-saving

1 food assistance to the world's most vulnerable popu-
2 lations;

3 (2) high food prices, coupled with growing con-
4 straints on available resources for foreign assistance
5 require the United States Government to focus on
6 creating efficiencies, improving quality controls, and
7 maximizing cost-effectiveness and nutritional impact
8 of United States food assistance programs;

9 (3) improving maternal and child health with
10 supplemental nutrition products is a central objec-
11 tive of international food assistance programs; and

12 (4) the United States has shown considerable
13 leadership in meeting the nutrition needs of preg-
14 nant women and small children through the 1,000
15 Days Partnership to support the Scaling Up Nutri-
16 tion (SUN) movement.

17 **SEC. 4. PROVISION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES.**

18 Section 202(h) of the Food for Peace Act (7 U.S.C.
19 1722(h)) is amended by striking paragraph (1) and insert-
20 ing the following:

21 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator shall
22 use funds made available in fiscal year 2012 and
23 subsequent fiscal years to carry out this title to im-
24 prove the nutritional quality of United States food
25 assistance, particularly for vulnerable groups such as

1 pregnant and lactating mothers, children under the
2 age of five, with a focus on the cost-effective 1,000
3 days between pregnancy and age 2, when appropriate, and beneficiaries under the President's
4 Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief in Africa
5 (PEPFAR), including by—
6

7 “(A) adopting new specifications or improving existing specifications for micronutrient
8 fortified food aid products, based on the latest
9 developments in food and nutrition science;
10

11 “(B) strengthening necessary systems to
12 better assess the types and quality of agricultural commodities and products donated for
13 food assistance;
14

15 “(C) adjusting products and formulations,
16 including potential introduction of new
17 fortificants and products, as necessary to cost
18 effectively meet nutrient needs of target populations;
19

20 “(D) testing prototypes;

21 “(E) developing new program guidance to
22 facilitate improved matching of products to purposes having nutritional intent, including an
23 updated commodity reference guide and decision tools;
24
25

1 “(F) developing enhanced guidance, in co-
2 ordination with the Coordinator of United
3 States Government Activities to Combat HIV/
4 AIDS Globally and PEPFAR, to support the
5 allocation of food commodities and products for
6 nutrition support in HIV programming, using
7 standardized indicators of impact;

8 “(G) providing improved guidance to im-
9 plementing partners on how to address nutri-
10 tional deficiencies that emerge among recipients
11 for whom food assistance is the sole source of
12 diet in emergency programs that extend beyond
13 one year;

14 “(H) considering options for using United
15 States-produced food fortification packages, in-
16 cluding vitamin and mineral mixes, to fortify
17 local foods in recipient countries, as appro-
18 priate; and

19 “(I) evaluating, in appropriate program
20 settings and as necessary, the performance and
21 cost-effectiveness of new or modified specialized
22 food products and program approaches de-
23 signed to meet the nutritional needs of the most
24 vulnerable groups.”.

1 **SEC. 5. FOOD AID CONSULTATIVE GROUP.**

2 (a) **MEMBERSHIP.**—Section 205(b) of the Food for
3 Peace Act (7 U.S.C. 1725(b)) is amended—

4 (1) in paragraph (6), by striking “and” at the
5 end;

6 (2) in paragraph (7), by striking the period and
7 inserting “; and”; and

8 (3) by adding at the end the following:

9 “(8) nutrition science experts from academia
10 and nongovernmental organizations.”.

11 (b) **COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT.**—Section 205
12 of the Food for Peace Act (7 U.S.C. 1725) is amended—

13 (1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and
14 (f) as subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and

15 (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
16 lowing:

17 “(d) **COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT.**—

18 “(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Administrator shall
19 work within the Group to take the actions described
20 in paragraph (2) to increase coordination and over-
21 sight of food assistance programs established and
22 implemented under this Act, with a primary focus on
23 improving quality control and cost effectiveness.

24 “(2) **ACTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The actions re-
25ferred to in paragraph (1) are the following:

1 “(A) Explore and test options for improved
2 packaging and storage of products to improve
3 shelf life, promote recommended usage by in-
4 tended beneficiaries, and oversee field-testing of
5 products.

6 “(B) Work closely with the Department of
7 Agriculture, to undertake reforms in commodity
8 acquisition and supply chain management,
9 drawing on best commercial practices for ven-
10 dor selection, quality assurance standards, over-
11 all management of the supply chain, and audit-
12 ing of food aid commodity suppliers.

13 “(C) Develop mechanisms and partner-
14 ships to facilitate more private sector develop-
15 ment and innovation in food aid products, pack-
16 aging, and delivery in order to improve the cost-
17 effectiveness, nutritional quality, and overall ac-
18 ceptability of the product.

19 “(D) Provide guidance to implementing
20 partners on whether and how best to use food
21 aid commodities, such as new specialized food
22 products, including guidance on targeting strat-
23 egies to ensure that the products reach their in-
24 tended recipients.

1 “(E) As appropriate, work to strengthen
2 monitoring of commodity quality by identifying
3 and tracking key quality indicators to determine
4 the full extent of quality problems, including
5 emerging concerns.

6 “(F) Establish processes and system-wide
7 protocols for effective monitoring and evalua-
8 tion of impact, to inform improved program de-
9 sign and address improving cost-effectiveness.”.

10 **SEC. 6. STRATEGY AND REPORT.**

11 (a) STRATEGY.—The Administrator shall ensure that
12 any United States Government strategy relating to global
13 food security includes a description of how food assistance
14 programs carried out under the Food for Peace Act will
15 contribute to, and be integrated with, such strategy.

16 (b) REPORT.—The Administrator shall ensure that
17 comprehensive information regarding budgets and expend-
18 itures, monitoring and evaluation, policy, and coordination
19 of food assistance programs carried out under the Food
20 for Peace Act is included, as appropriate, in relevant re-
21 ports submitted to Congress pursuant to the Foreign As-
22 sistance Act of 1961 and Acts making appropriations for
23 the Department of State, foreign operations, and related
24 programs.

1 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) ADMINISTRATOR.—The term “Adminis-
4 trator” means the Administrator of the United
5 States Agency for International Development.

6 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
7 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
8 mittees” means—

9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
10 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
11 of Representatives; and

12 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
13 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
14 Senate.

15 **SEC. 8. FUNDING.**

16 Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this
17 Act shall be construed to authorize the appropriation of
18 amounts to carry out this Act or any amendment made
19 by this Act.

Mr. SMITH. As our members are aware, these measures enjoy strong bipartisan support. They have been the subject of extensive hearings, and in the case of the Global Outline Freedom Act, I first introduced that legislation back in 2006 after hearings with Google, Yahoo!, and others as well as with the administration.

In like manner, the International Child Abduction Act, now named after Sean and David Goldman, was first introduced in 2009. And in like manner, we had a number of hearings on that legislation, vetting language and working on best practices and what ought to be included, and that is what is before the members today.

Thus, it is the intent of the Chair to consider these bills en bloc, and by unanimous consent include the substitute amendments sent to each of you on Friday, and an additional amendment sent to you yesterday. All members have copies of those documents before them.

Then after we have concluded our expedited consideration of these bills and amendments, I will be glad to recognize first myself, then my good friend and colleague, Ranking Member Bass, and other members including the vice chair, Mr. Fortenberry, and Mr. Turner and others who will then make statements on each of the pieces of pending legislation before us.

All members are given leave to insert written remarks into the record should they choose to do so.

Seeing that a reporting quorum is present, without objection, the following measures which the members have before them are considered as read, shall be deemed adopted, and are hereby reported favorably to the full Committee on Foreign Affairs: H.R. 1940, the Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2012; the Smith amendment number 64 to H.R. 1940, the amendment in the nature of a substitute provided to your offices on Friday.

[The amendment referred to follows:]

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 1940
OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
3 “Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction
4 Prevention and Return Act of 2012”.

5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
6 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings; sense of Congress; purposes.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.

TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTIONS

- Sec. 101. Annual report.
- Sec. 102. Standards and assistance.
- Sec. 103. Memorandum of Understanding.
- Sec. 104. Notification of congressional representatives.

TITLE II—PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

- Sec. 201. Presidential actions in response to unresolved cases.
- Sec. 202. Presidential actions in response to patterns of noncooperation in cases of international child abductions.
- Sec. 203. Consultations.
- Sec. 204. Report to Congress.
- Sec. 205. Presidential actions.
- Sec. 206. Effects on existing contracts.
- Sec. 207. Presidential waiver.
- Sec. 208. Publication in Federal Register.
- Sec. 209. Termination of Presidential actions.
- Sec. 210. United States assistance.
- Sec. 211. Multilateral assistance.

Sec. 212. Amendment to generalized system of preferences eligibility for generalized system of preferences.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS; PURPOSES.**

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

3 (1) Sean Goldman, a United States citizen and
4 resident of New Jersey, was abducted from the
5 United States in 2004 and separated from his fa-
6 ther, David Goldman, who spent nearly six years
7 battling for the return of his son from Brazil before
8 Sean was finally returned to Mr. Goldman's custody
9 on December 24, 2009.

10 (2) The Department of State's Office of Chil-
11 dren's Issues, which serves as the Central Authority
12 of the United States for the purposes of the 1980
13 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Inter-
14 national Child Abduction, reported that, from fiscal
15 year 2008 through fiscal year 2010, it received
16 3,239 new requests for assistance in the return of
17 4,728 children to the United States from other
18 countries. For a variety of reasons reflecting the sig-
19 nificant obstacles to the recovery of abducted chil-
20 dren, as well as the legal and factual complexity in-
21 volving such cases, not all cases are reported to the
22 Central Authority of the United States.

23 (3) The number of outgoing international child
24 abductions reported to the Central Authority of the

1 United States has increased by about 60 percent
2 since 2006.

3 (4) Only about half of the children abducted
4 from the United States to countries with which the
5 United States enjoys reciprocal obligations under the
6 Hague Abduction Convention are returned to the
7 United States.

8 (5) The United States and Convention coun-
9 tries have expressed their desire, through the Hague
10 Abduction Convention, “to protect children inter-
11 nationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful
12 removal or retention and to establish procedures to
13 ensure their prompt return to the State of their ha-
14 bitual residence, as well as to secure protection for
15 rights of access.”.

16 (6) Compliance by the United States and Con-
17 vention countries depends on the actions of their
18 designated central authorities, the performance of
19 their judiciaries as reflected in the legal process and
20 decisions rendered to enforce or effectuate the
21 Hague Abduction Convention, and the ability and
22 willingness of their law enforcement to insure the
23 swift enforcement of orders rendered pursuant to the
24 Hague Abduction Convention.

1 (7) The Central Authority of the United States
2 reports that nearly 40 percent of abduction cases
3 and access cases involve children taken from the
4 United States to countries with which the United
5 States does not have Hague Abduction Convention
6 obligations or other agreements relating to the reso-
7 lution of abduction cases and access cases.

8 (8) According to the Department of State's
9 April 2010 Report on Compliance with the Hague
10 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
11 Child Abduction, "parental child abduction jeopard-
12 izes the child and has substantial long-term con-
13 sequences for both the child and the left-behind par-
14 ent."

15 (9) Abducted children are at risk of serious
16 emotional and psychological problems and have been
17 found to experience anxiety, eating problems, night-
18 mares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive
19 behavior, resentment, guilt and fearfulness, and as
20 adults may struggle with identity issues, personal re-
21 lationships, and parenting.

22 (10) Left-behind parents may encounter sub-
23 stantial psychological and emotional problems, and
24 few have the extraordinary financial resources nec-
25 essary to pursue individual civil or criminal remedies

1 in both the United States and a foreign country,
2 even where available, or to engage in repeated for-
3 eign travel to attempt to procure the return of their
4 children by evoking diplomatic and humanitarian
5 remedies.

6 (11) Left-behind parents who are military par-
7 ents may be unable to leave their military duties to
8 pursue multinational litigation or take leave to at-
9 tend multiple court proceedings, and foreign authori-
10 ties may not schedule proceedings to accommodate
11 such duties.

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that the United States should set a strong example
14 for Convention countries in the timely location and return
15 of abducted children in the United States whose habitual
16 residence is not the United States.

17 (c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are to—

18 (1) protect children whose habitual residence is
19 the United States from the harmful effects of abduc-
20 tion and to protect the right of abducted children to
21 exercise access with their parents in a safe and pre-
22 dictable manner, wherever the child is located, while
23 an abduction case is pending;

24 (2) provide left-behind parents, including mili-
25 tary parents, their advocates, and judges the infor-

1 mation they need to enhance the resolution of abduction
2 tion cases and access cases through established legal
3 procedures, the tools for assessing the risk of abduction
4 and denial of rights of access, and the practical
5 means for overcoming obstacles to recovering an abducted
6 child;

7 (3) establish measured, effective, and predictable
8 able actions to be undertaken by the President on
9 behalf of abducted children whose habitual residence
10 is the United States at the time of the abduction;

11 (4) promote an international consensus that it
12 is in the best interest of children to have any issues
13 related to their care and custody determined in the
14 country of their habitual residence;

15 (5) provide the necessary training for officials
16 of the United States Armed Forces and the Department
17 of Defense to establish policies and provide
18 services to military parents that address the unique
19 circumstances of abductions and violations of rights
20 of access that may occur with regard to military dependent
21 children; and

22 (6) encourage the effective implementation of
23 international mechanisms, particularly those established
24 pursuant to the Hague Abduction Convention,
25 to achieve reciprocity in the resolution of abductions

1 and to protect children from the harmful effects of
2 an abduction.

3 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

4 In this Act:

5 (1) **ABDUCTED CHILD.**—The term “abducted
6 child” means a child who is the victim of an abduction.
7 tion.

8 (2) **ABDUCTION.**—The term “abduction”
9 means—

10 (A) the alleged wrongful removal of a child
11 from the child’s country of habitual residence;

12 (B) the alleged wrongful retention of a
13 child outside the child’s country of habitual residence; or
14 idence; or

15 (C) the alleged wrongful removal or retention
16 of a military dependent child from the exercise of rights of custody of a military parent.

17 (3) **ABDUCTION CASE.**—The term “abduction
18 case” means a case involving an application filed
19 with the Central Authority of the United States by
20 a left-behind parent for the resolution of an abduction.
21 tion.
22

23 (4) **ACCESS CASE.**—The term “access case”
24 means a case involving an application filed with the

1 Central Authority of the United States by a left-be-
2 hind parent for the establishment of rights of access.

3 (5) ANNUAL REPORT.—The term “Annual Re-
4 port” means the Annual Report on International
5 Child Abduction required under section 101.

6 (6) APPLICATION.—The term “application”
7 means—

8 (A) in the case of a Convention country,
9 the application required pursuant to article 8 of
10 the Hague Abduction Convention;

11 (B) in the case of an MOU country, the
12 formal document required pursuant to the pro-
13 visions of the applicable MOU to request the re-
14 turn of an abducted child or to request rights
15 of access, as applicable; and

16 (C) in the case of a nonsignatory country,
17 the formal request by the Central Authority of
18 the United States to the Central Authority of
19 such country requesting the return of an ab-
20 ducted child or for rights of access to an ab-
21 ducted child.

22 (7) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
23 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
24 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of

1 the House of Representatives and the Committee on
2 Foreign Relations of the Senate.

3 (8) CENTRAL AUTHORITY.—The term “Central
4 Authority” means—

5 (A) in the case of a Convention country,
6 the meaning given such term in article 6 of the
7 Hague Abduction Convention;

8 (B) in the case of an MOU country, the of-
9 ficial entity designated by the government of
10 the MOU country within the applicable MOU
11 pursuant to section 103(b)(1) to discharge the
12 duties imposed on the entity in such MOU; and

13 (C) in the case of a nonsignatory country,
14 the foreign ministry of such country.

15 (9) CHILD.—The term “child” means an indi-
16 vidual who has not attained the age of 16.

17 (10) CONVENTION COUNTRY.—The term “Con-
18 vention country” means a country other than the
19 United States that has signed or acceded to the
20 Hague Abduction Convention and with respect to
21 which the United States has entered into a recip-
22 rocal agreement pursuant to the Hague Abduction
23 Convention.

24 (11) HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION.—The
25 term “Hague Abduction Convention” means the

1 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
2 Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25,
3 1980.

4 (12) LEFT-BEHIND PARENT.—The term “left-
5 behind parent” means—

6 (A) regarding an abduction, an individual
7 or entity, either individually or jointly, who al-
8 leges that an abduction has occurred that is in
9 breach of rights of custody—

10 (i) attributed to such individual or en-
11 tity, as applicable; and

12 (ii) exercised at the time of the abduc-
13 tion or that would have been exercised but
14 for the abduction; and

15 (B) regarding rights of access, an indi-
16 vidual with rights of custody who is requesting
17 establishment of rights of access or who alleges
18 that rights of access are being denied.

19 (13) LEGAL RESIDENCE.—The term “legal resi-
20 dence” means the congressional district and State in
21 which an individual either is residing, or if an indi-
22 vidual is residing temporarily outside the United
23 States, the congressional district and State to which
24 the individual intends to return.

1 (14) MILITARY DEPENDENT CHILD.—The term
2 “military dependent child” means a child whose ha-
3 bitual residence is the United States according to
4 United States law even though the child is residing
5 outside the United States with a military parent.

6 (15) MILITARY PARENT.—The term “military
7 parent” means an individual who has rights of cus-
8 tody over a child and who is serving outside the
9 United States as a member of the United States
10 Armed Forces.

11 (16) MOU.—The term “MOU” means a memo-
12 randum of understanding between the United States
13 and a country that is not a Convention country to
14 resolve abduction cases and rights of access cases in
15 accordance with section 104.

16 (17) MOU COUNTRY.—The term “MOU coun-
17 try” means a country with respect to which the
18 United States has entered into an MOU.

19 (18) NONSIGNATORY COUNTRY.—The term
20 “nonsignatory country” means a country that is nei-
21 ther a Convention country nor an MOU country.

22 (19) PATTERN OF NONCOOPERATION.—

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term “pattern of
24 noncooperation” means the persistent failure—

1 (i) of a Convention country to imple-
2 ment and abide by the provisions of the
3 Hague Abduction Convention;

4 (ii) of an MOU Country to implement
5 and abide by the provisions of the applica-
6 ble MOU; and

7 (iii) of a nonsignatory country to co-
8 operate with the United States to expedi-
9 tiously resolve abduction cases and access
10 cases within a reasonable period of time.

11 (B) CRITERIA.—Such persistent failure
12 may be evidenced by one or more of the fol-
13 lowing criteria:

14 (i) The existence of 10 or more unre-
15 solved cases.

16 (ii) The failure of the Central Author-
17 ity of the country to fulfill its responsibil-
18 ities pursuant to the Hague Abduction
19 Convention or the MOU, as applicable, or
20 in the case of a nonsignatory country, the
21 repeated failure of the Central Authority of
22 the country to cooperate with the Central
23 Authority of the United States to resolve
24 unresolved cases.

1 (iii) The failure of the judicial or ad-
2 ministrative branch, as applicable, of the
3 national government of the country to im-
4 plement the Hague Abduction Convention
5 or the MOU, as applicable, or in the case
6 of a nonsignatory country, the failure of
7 the appropriate judicial or administrative
8 branch of the national government of the
9 country to expeditiously deliberate and
10 render a decision in abduction cases and
11 access cases.

12 (iv) The failure of law enforcement to
13 locate abducted children or to enforce re-
14 turn orders or determinations of rights of
15 access rendered by the judicial or adminis-
16 trative authorities of the national govern-
17 ment of the country in abduction cases or
18 access cases.

19 (20) RIGHTS OF ACCESS.—The term “rights of
20 access” means the rights of contact between a child
21 and a left-behind parent that may arise—

22 (A) as a provisional measure while an ab-
23 duction case is pending; and

24 (B) by operation of law or by reason of ju-
25 dicial or administrative determination or by

1 agreement having legal effect under the law of
2 the country in which the child is located.

3 (21) RIGHTS OF CUSTODY.—The term “rights
4 of custody” means rights of care and custody of an
5 abducted child, including the right to determine the
6 place of residence of an abducted child—

7 (A) attributed to an individual or entity,
8 either individually or jointly, and

9 (B) arising by operation of law or by rea-
10 son of a judicial or administrative decision, or
11 by reason of an agreement having legal effect,
12 under the law of the country in which the child was
13 an habitual resident immediately before the abduc-
14 tion.

15 (22) UNRESOLVED ABDUCTION CASE.—

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subpara-
17 graph (B), the term “unresolved abduction
18 case” means an abduction case that remains
19 unresolved for a period that exceeds 6 weeks
20 after the date on which the application for re-
21 turn of the child is submitted for determination
22 to the judicial or administrative authority, as
23 applicable, in the country in which the child is
24 located.

1 (B) RESOLUTION OF CASE.—An abduction
2 case shall be considered to be resolved if—

3 (i) the child is returned to the country
4 of habitual residence, pursuant to the
5 Hague Abduction Convention or MOU, if
6 applicable;

7 (ii) a final determination is made by
8 the appropriate administrative or judicial
9 entity in the country in which the child is
10 located that, pursuant to the Hague Ab-
11 duction Convention or the MOU, if appli-
12 cable, the child will not be returned to the
13 country of habitual residence; or

14 (iii) the child attains the age of 16.

15 (23) UNRESOLVED ACCESS CASE.—

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subpara-
17 graph (B), the term “unresolved access case”
18 means an access case that remains unresolved
19 for a period that exceeds 6 weeks after the date
20 on which the application for the establishment
21 of rights of access is submitted to the judicial
22 or administrative authority, as applicable, in the
23 country in which the child is located.

24 (B) RESOLUTION OF CASE.—An access
25 case shall be considered to be resolved if—

1 (i) rights of access are established for
2 the left-behind parent and such parent is
3 allowed access to the child in accordance
4 with such rights;

5 (ii) a final determination is made by
6 the appropriate administrative or judicial
7 entity in the country in which the child is
8 located that the left-behind parent does not
9 have rights of access; or

10 (iii) the abduction case related to the
11 unresolved access case is resolved.

12 (24) UNRESOLVED CASES.—The term “unre-
13 solved cases” means unresolved abduction cases and
14 unresolved access cases.

15 **TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF**
16 **STATE ACTIONS**

17 **SEC. 101. ANNUAL REPORT.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 31 of each
19 year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
20 priate congressional committees an Annual Report on
21 International Child Abduction.

22 (b) CONTENTS.—Each Annual Report shall, with re-
23 spect to the preceding year, include the following:

24 (1) For each country with respect to which
25 there was 1 or more abduction cases:

1 (A) Whether the country is a Convention
2 country, an MOU country, or a nonsignatory
3 country.

4 (B) The number of abduction cases and
5 the number of rights of access cases, respec-
6 tively, reported.

7 (C) The number of abduction cases and
8 the number of access cases, respectively, that
9 are pending.

10 (D)(i) The number of abduction cases and
11 the number of access cases, respectively, that
12 were pending at any point for more than 90
13 days after the date on which the Central Au-
14 thority of the United States transmitted the ap-
15 plication for each such case to the Central Au-
16 thority of such country, and were not submitted
17 by the Central Authority to the judicial or ad-
18 ministrative authority, as applicable, of such
19 country within the 90-day period.

20 (ii) The reason for the delay in submission
21 of each case identified in clause (i) by the Cen-
22 tral Authority of such country to the judicial or
23 administrative authority.

24 (E) The number of unresolved abduction
25 cases and unresolved access cases, respectively,

1 and the length of time each case has been pend-
2 ing.

3 (F) The number of unresolved cases in
4 which law enforcement has failed to locate the
5 abducted child or to enforce a return order or
6 determinations of rights of access rendered by
7 the judicial or administrative authorities of
8 such country.

9 (G) The median time required for resolu-
10 tion of abduction cases and access cases, re-
11 spectively, to be measured from the date on
12 which the application with respect to the abduc-
13 tion case or access case is transmitted by the
14 Central Authority of the United States to the
15 Central Authority of such country to the date
16 on which the abduction case or access case is
17 resolved.

18 (H) The percentage of the total number of
19 abduction cases and access cases, respectively,
20 resolved.

21 (I) Detailed information about each case
22 described in subparagraph (C) and on actions
23 taken by the Department of State to resolve
24 such case, including the specific actions taken

1 by the United States chief of mission in such
2 country.

3 (J) Recommendations to improve resolu-
4 tion of abduction cases and access cases.

5 (2) A list of Convention countries and MOU
6 countries that have failed to comply with any of
7 their obligations under the Hague Abduction Con-
8 vention or the MOU, as applicable, with respect to
9 the resolution of abduction cases and access cases.

10 (3) A list of countries demonstrating a pattern
11 of noncooperation.

12 (4)(A) Information on efforts by the Secretary
13 of State to encourage other countries to become sig-
14 natories to the Hague Abduction Convention or to
15 enter into an MOU.

16 (B) The efforts referred to in subparagraph (A)
17 shall include efforts to address pending abduction
18 cases and access cases in such country.

19 (5) A description of the efforts of the Secretary
20 of State to encourage Convention countries and
21 MOU countries to facilitate the work of nongovern-
22 mental organizations within their respective coun-
23 tries that assist left-behind parents.

24 (c) EXCEPTION.—The Annual Report shall not in-
25 clude—

1 (1) the names of left-behind parents or children
2 involved in abduction cases or access cases; or

3 (2) information that may identify a party in-
4 volved in an abduction case or access case unless the
5 party stipulates in writing to the Central Authority
6 of the United States that such information may be
7 included in the Annual Report.

8 (d) ADDITIONAL THEMATIC SECTIONS.—Each An-
9 nual Report shall also include—

10 (1) information on the number of unresolved
11 cases affecting left-behind parents who are military
12 parents and a summary of assistance offered to such
13 left-behind parents;

14 (2) information on the use of airlines in abduc-
15 tions, including which airlines have been utilized to
16 carry out an abduction, voluntary airline practices to
17 prevent abductions, and recommendations for best
18 airline practices to prevent abductions;

19 (3) information on actions taken by the Central
20 Authority of the United States to train domestic
21 judges in application of the Hague Abduction Con-
22 vention; and

23 (4) information on actions taken by the Central
24 Authority of the United States to train United
25 States Armed Forces legal assistance personnel,

1 military chaplains, and military family support cen-
2 ter personnel about abductions, the risk of loss of
3 access to children, and the legal frameworks avail-
4 able to resolve such cases.

5 (e) REPEAL OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION COMPLI-
6 ANCE REPORT.—Section 2803 of the Foreign Affairs Re-
7 form and Restructuring Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 11611)
8 is repealed.

9 **SEC. 102. STANDARDS AND ASSISTANCE.**

10 The Secretary of State shall ensure that United
11 States diplomatic and consular missions abroad—

12 (1) maintain a consistent reporting standard
13 with respect to abduction cases and access cases in-
14 volving abducted children in the country in which
15 such mission is located for purposes of the Annual
16 Report;

17 (2) designate at least one official in each such
18 mission to assist left-behind parents from the United
19 States who are visiting such country to resolve cases
20 involving an abduction or rights of access; and

21 (3) monitor developments in cases involving ab-
22 ducted children in the country in which such mission
23 is located.

1 **SEC. 103. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall seek
3 to enter into an MOU with every country that is not a
4 Convention country.

5 (b) MOU PROVISIONS.—An MOU shall include, with
6 respect to the applicable MOU country—

7 (1) identification of the Central Authority;

8 (2) a protocol to identify, locate, and effectuate
9 the return of an abducted child identified in an ab-
10 duction case not later than 6 weeks after the appli-
11 cation with respect to the abduction case has been
12 submitted to the judicial or administrative authority,
13 as applicable, of the country in which the abducted
14 child is located;

15 (3) a protocol for the establishment and protec-
16 tion of the rights of access;

17 (4) identification of the judicial or administra-
18 tive authority that will promptly adjudicate abduc-
19 tion cases and access cases;

20 (5) identification of a law enforcement agency
21 and available law enforcement mechanisms and pro-
22 cedures to ensure the immediate enforcement of an
23 order issued by the authority identified pursuant to
24 paragraph (4) to return an abducted child to a left-
25 behind parent, including by—

1 (A) conducting an investigation to ascer-
2 tain the location of the abducted child;

3 (B) providing protection to the abducted
4 child after such child is located; and

5 (C) retrieving the abducted child and mak-
6 ing the appropriate arrangements for such child
7 to be returned to the country of habitual resi-
8 dence;

9 (6) a protocol to establish periodic visits be-
10 tween a United States embassy or consular official
11 and an abducted child to allow the official to ascer-
12 tain the child's location and welfare; and

13 (7) such other provisions as determined to be
14 appropriate by the Secretary of State.

15 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this Act shall be
17 construed to prohibit the United States from pro-
18 posing and entering into a memorandum of under-
19 standing with a Convention country to further clar-
20 ify the reciprocal obligations of the United States
21 and the Convention country under the Hague Ab-
22 duction Convention.

23 (2) TREATMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF CONVEN-
24 TION COUNTRY.—In those instances in which there
25 is a memorandum of understanding as described in

1 paragraph (1), the obligations of the Convention
2 country under such memorandum shall be consid-
3 ered to be obligations of such country under the
4 Hague Abduction Convention for purposes of this
5 Act.

6 **SEC. 104. NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENT-**
7 **ATIVES.**

8 (a) NOTIFICATION.—Except as provided in sub-
9 section (b), the Secretary of State shall notify in writing
10 the Member of Congress and Senators representing the
11 legal residence of a left-behind parent when such parent
12 reports an abduction to the Central Authority of the
13 United States.

14 (b) EXCEPTION.—The notification requirement under
15 subsection (a) shall not apply if the left-behind parent
16 does not consent to the notification described in such sub-
17 section.

18 (c) MEMBER OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this sec-
19 tion, the term “Member of Congress” means a Represent-
20 ative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
21 Congress.

1 **TITLE II—PRESIDENTIAL**
2 **ACTIONS**

3 **SEC. 201. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO UNRE-**
4 **SOLVED CASES.**

5 (a) RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUC-
6 TIONS.—

7 (1) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It shall be the
8 policy of the United States to—

9 (A) promote the best interest of children
10 abducted from the United States by estab-
11 lishing legal rights and procedures for their
12 prompt return and by promoting such rights
13 and procedures through actions that ensure the
14 enforcement of reciprocal international obliga-
15 tions; and

16 (B) recognize the international character
17 of the Hague Abduction Convention, and the
18 need for reciprocity pursuant to and the uni-
19 form international interpretation of the Hague
20 Abduction Convention, by promoting the timely
21 resolution of abduction cases and access cases
22 through 1 or more of the actions described in
23 section 205.

24 (2) REQUIREMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL AC-
25 TION.—Whenever the President determines that the

1 government of a foreign country has failed to resolve
2 an unresolved abduction case or unresolved access
3 case, the President shall oppose such failure through
4 one or more of the actions described in subsection
5 (b).

6 (b) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2)
8 and (3), the President, in consultation with the Sec-
9 retary of State, shall, as expeditiously as practicable
10 in response to the failure described in subsection (a)
11 by the government of a foreign country, take 1 or
12 more of the actions described in paragraphs (1)
13 through (17) of section 205(a) (or commensurate ac-
14 tion as provided in section 205(b)) with respect to
15 such country.

16 (2) DEADLINE FOR ACTIONS.—

17 (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
18 subparagraph (B), not later than March 31 of
19 each year, the President shall take 1 or more
20 of the actions described in paragraphs (1)
21 through (17) of section 205(a) (or commensu-
22 rate action as provided in section 205(b)) with
23 respect to each foreign country the government
24 of which has failed to resolve an unresolved ab-

1 duction case or access case that is pending as
2 of such date.

3 (B) EXCEPTION.—In the case of an action
4 under any of paragraphs (10) through (17) of
5 section 205(a) (or commensurate action as pro-
6 vided in section 205(b))—

7 (i) the action may only be taken after
8 the requirements of sections 203 and 204
9 have been satisfied; and

10 (ii) the March 31 deadline to take the
11 action shall not apply.

12 (3) AUTHORITY FOR DELAY OF PRESIDENTIAL
13 ACTIONS.—The President may delay action de-
14 scribed in any of the paragraphs (10) through (17)
15 of section 205(a) (or commensurate action as pro-
16 vided in section 205(b)), as required under para-
17 graph (2), if the President determines and certifies
18 to the appropriate congressional committees that a
19 single, additional period of time, not to exceed 90
20 days, is necessary—

21 (A) for a continuation of negotiations that
22 have been commenced with the country to re-
23 solve the unresolved case; or

1 (B) in anticipation that the case will be re-
2 solved by such country during such 90 day pe-
3 riod.

4 (c) IMPLEMENTATION.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out subsection
6 (b), the President shall—

7 (A) take 1 or more actions that most ap-
8 propriately respond to the nature and severity
9 of the failure to resolve the unresolved cases;
10 and

11 (B) seek to the fullest extent possible to
12 target action as narrowly as practicable with re-
13 spect to the agencies or instrumentalities of the
14 foreign government that are responsible for
15 such failures.

16 (2) GUIDELINES FOR PRESIDENTIAL AC-
17 TIONS.—In addition to the guidelines under para-
18 graph (1), the President, in determining whether to
19 take 1 or more actions under paragraphs (10)
20 through (17) of section 205(a) (or commensurate ac-
21 tion as provided in section 205(b)), shall seek to
22 minimize any adverse impact on—

23 (A) the population of the country whose
24 government is targeted by the action or actions;
25 and

1 (B) the humanitarian activities of United
2 States and foreign nongovernmental organiza-
3 tions in the country.

4 **SEC. 202. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PAT-**
5 **TERNS OF NONCOOPERATION IN CASES OF**
6 **INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS.**

7 (a) RESPONSE TO A PATTERN OF NONCOOPERA-
8 TION.—

9 (1) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It shall be the
10 policy of the United States to—

11 (A) oppose institutional or other systemic
12 failures of foreign governments to fulfill their
13 obligations pursuant to the Hague Abduction
14 Convention or MOU, as applicable, to resolve
15 abduction cases and access cases; and

16 (B) promote reciprocity pursuant to and
17 compliance with the Hague Abduction Conven-
18 tion by Convention countries and compliance
19 with the applicable MOU by MOU countries.

20 (2) REQUIREMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL AC-
21 TION.—Whenever the President determines that the
22 government of a foreign country has engaged in a
23 pattern of noncooperation, the President shall pro-
24 mote the resolution of the unresolved cases through

1 one or more of the actions described in subsection
2 (c).

3 (b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES WITH PATTERNS
4 OF NONCOOPERATION IN CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
5 CHILD ABDUCTION.—

6 (1) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

7 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March
8 31 of each year, the President shall review the
9 status of abduction cases and access cases in
10 each foreign country to determine whether the
11 government of such country has engaged in a
12 pattern of noncooperation during the preceding
13 12 months or since the date of the last review
14 of such country under this subparagraph,
15 whichever period is longer. The President shall
16 designate each country the government of which
17 has engaged in a pattern of noncooperation as
18 a Country With a Pattern of Noncooperation.

19 (B) BASIS OF REVIEW.—Each review con-
20 ducted under subparagraph (A) shall be based
21 upon information contained in the latest Annual
22 Report and on any other evidence available.

23 (2) DETERMINATIONS OF RESPONSIBLE PAR-
24 TIES.—For the government of each country des-
25 ignated as a Country With a Pattern of Noncoopera-

1 tion under paragraph (1)(A), the President shall
2 seek to determine the agencies or instrumentalities
3 of such government that are responsible for the pat-
4 tern of noncooperation by such government in order
5 to appropriately target actions under this section in
6 response.

7 (3) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Whenever
8 the President designates a country as a Country
9 With a Pattern of Noncooperation under paragraph
10 (1)(A), the President shall, as soon as practicable
11 after such designation is made, transmit to the ap-
12 propriate congressional committees—

13 (A) the designation of the country, signed
14 by the President; and

15 (B) the identification, if any, of responsible
16 agencies or instrumentalities determined under
17 paragraph (2).

18 (c) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO A
19 COUNTRY WITH A PATTERN OF NONCOOPERATION.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2)
21 and (3) with respect to each Country With a Pattern
22 of Noncooperation designated under subsection
23 (b)(1)(A), the President shall, after the require-
24 ments of sections 203 and 204 have been satisfied,
25 but not later than 90 days (or 180 days in case of

1 a delay under paragraph (2)) after the date of such
2 designation of the country under such subsection,
3 take 1 or more of the actions under paragraphs (10)
4 through (17) of section 205(a) (or commensurate ac-
5 tion as provided in section 205(b)).

6 (2) AUTHORITY FOR DELAY OF PRESIDENTIAL
7 ACTIONS.—If, on or before the date that the Presi-
8 dent is required to take action under paragraph (1),
9 the President determines and certifies to the appro-
10 priate congressional committees that a single, addi-
11 tional period of time not to exceed 90 days is nec-
12 essary—

13 (A) for a continuation of negotiations that
14 have been commenced with the government of
15 such country to bring about a cessation of the
16 pattern of noncooperation by such country, or

17 (B) for a review of corrective action taken
18 by such country after designation of such coun-
19 try as a Country With a Pattern of Non-
20 cooperation under subsection (b)(1)(A) or in
21 anticipation that corrective action will be taken
22 by such country during such 90-day period,
23 the President shall not be required to take such ac-
24 tion until the expiration of such period of time.

1 (3) EXCEPTION FOR ONGOING PRESIDENTIAL
2 ACTION.—

3 (Λ) IN GENERAL.—The President shall not
4 be required to take action under paragraph (1)
5 with respect to a Country With a Pattern of
6 Noncooperation if—

7 (i) the President has taken action
8 pursuant to paragraph (1) with respect to
9 such country in a preceding year, such ac-
10 tion is in effect at the time such country
11 is designated as a Country with a Pattern
12 of Noncooperation under subsection
13 (b)(1)(A), and the President submits to
14 the appropriate congressional committees
15 the information described in section 204
16 regarding the actions in effect with respect
17 to such country; or

18 (ii) subject to subparagraph (B), the
19 President determines that such country is
20 subject to multiple, broad-based sanctions
21 imposed in significant part in response to
22 human rights abuses and that such sanc-
23 tions also satisfy the requirements of this
24 subsection.

1 (B) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.—If the
2 President makes a determination under sub-
3 paragraph (A)(ii)—

4 (i) the report under section 204 and,
5 as applicable, the publication in the Fed-
6 eral Register under section 208, shall
7 specify the specific sanction or sanctions
8 that the President has determined satisfy
9 the requirements of this subsection; and

10 (ii) such sanctions shall remain in ef-
11 fect subject to section 209.

12 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—A determination
13 under this section that a foreign country has engaged in
14 a pattern of noncooperation shall not be construed to re-
15 quire the termination of assistance or other activities with
16 respect to such country under any other provision of law,
17 including section 116 or 502B of the Foreign Assistance
18 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151(n) or 2304).

19 **SEC. 203. CONSULTATIONS.**

20 (a) DUTY TO CONSULT WITH FOREIGN GOVERN-
21 MENTS.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—As soon as practicable after
23 the President makes a determination under section
24 201 in response to failures to resolve unresolved
25 cases and the President decides to take action under

1 paragraphs (10) through (17) of section 205(a) (or
2 commensurate action as provided in section 205(b))
3 with respect to that country, or not later than 90
4 days after the President designates a country as a
5 Country With a Pattern of Noncooperation pursuant
6 to section 201(b)(1)(A), the President shall—

7 (A) request consultation with the govern-
8 ment of such country regarding the failures giv-
9 ing rise to designation of that country as a
10 Country With a Pattern of Noncooperation re-
11 garding the pattern of noncooperation or to ac-
12 tion under section 201; and

13 (B) if agreed to, enter into such consulta-
14 tions with such country, privately or publicly.

15 (2) DUTY TO CONSULT WITH LEFT-BEHIND
16 PARENTS.—The President shall consult with left-be-
17 hind parents who have an abduction case involving
18 a child located in the country referenced in para-
19 graph (1)(A), or designated representatives or rep-
20 resentative groups of such left-behind parents, dur-
21 ing the course of the consultations conducted pursu-
22 ant to paragraph (1) concerning the potential impact
23 of such consultations on the resolution of such cases.

1 **SEC. 204. REPORT TO CONGRESS.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), not
3 later than 90 days after the President makes a determina-
4 tion under section 201 in response to failures to resolve
5 unresolved cases and the President decides to take action
6 under paragraphs (10) through (17) of section 205(a) (or
7 commensurate action as provided in section 205(b)) with
8 respect to that country, or not later than 90 days after
9 the President designates a country as a Country With a
10 Pattern of Noncooperation pursuant to section
11 202(b)(1)(A), the President shall transmit to the appro-
12 priate congressional committees a report on the following:

13 (1) IDENTIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL AC-
14 TIONS.—An identification of the action or actions
15 described in section 205(a) (or commensurate action
16 as provided in section 205(b)) to be taken with re-
17 spect to such country.

18 (2) DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATIONS.—A descrip-
19 tion of the failure to resolve an unresolved case or
20 the pattern of noncooperation, as applicable, giving
21 rise to the action or actions to be taken by the
22 President.

23 (3) PURPOSE OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—A
24 description of the purpose of the action or actions.

25 (4) EVALUATION.—

1 (A) DESCRIPTION.—An evaluation, in con-
2 sultation with the Secretary of State, the par-
3 ties described in section 203(b), and other par-
4 ties the President determines appropriate, of
5 the anticipated impact of the Presidential ac-
6 tion upon—

7 (i) pending abduction cases in such
8 country;

9 (ii) the government of such country;

10 (iii) the population of such country;

11 (iv) the United States economy;

12 (v) other interested parties; and

13 (vi) if such country is a Convention
14 country or an MOU country, the reciprocal
15 fulfillment of obligations pursuant to such
16 Convention or applicable MOU, as applica-
17 ble.

18 (B) FORM.—The evaluation under sub-
19 paragraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassi-
20 fied form, but may contain a classified annex if
21 necessary.

22 (5) STATEMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS.—A state-
23 ment that noneconomic policy options designed to
24 resolve the unresolved case or bring about the ces-
25 sation of the pattern of noncooperation have reason-

1 ably been exhausted, including the consultations re-
2 quired in section 203.

3 (b) DELAY IN TRANSMITTAL OF REPORT.—If, on or
4 before the date that the President is required to submit
5 a report under subsection (a) to the appropriate congres-
6 sional committees, the President determines and certifies
7 to such committees that a single, additional period of time
8 not to exceed 90 days is necessary pursuant to section
9 202(c)(2), the President shall not be required to submit
10 the report to such committees until the expiration of such
11 period of time.

12 **SEC. 205. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.**

13 (a) DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—Ex-
14 cept as provided in subsection (c), the Presidential actions
15 referred to in this subsection are the following:

- 16 (1) A private demarche.
- 17 (2) An official public demarche.
- 18 (3) A public condemnation.
- 19 (4) A public condemnation within one or more
20 multilateral fora.
- 21 (5) The delay or cancellation of one or more
22 scientific exchanges.
- 23 (6) The delay or cancellation of one or more
24 cultural exchanges.

1 (7) The denial of one or more working, official,
2 or state visits.

3 (8) The delay or cancellation of one or more
4 working, official, or state visits.

5 (9) The restriction of the number of visas
6 issued to nationals of such country pursuant to sub-
7 paragraphs (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of
8 the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
9 1101(a)(15)).

10 (10) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension
11 of United States development assistance in accord-
12 ance with section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act
13 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n).

14 (11) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the
15 United States, the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
16 poration, or the Trade and Development Agency not
17 to approve the issuance of any (or a specified num-
18 ber of) guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit,
19 or participations in the extension of credit with re-
20 spect to such government or the agency or instru-
21 mentality of such government determined by the
22 President to be responsible for such unresolved case
23 or pattern of noncooperation, as applicable.

24 (12) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension
25 of United States security assistance in accordance

1 with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of
2 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304).

3 (13) In accordance with section 701 of the
4 International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 (22
5 U.S.C. 262d), directing the United States executive
6 directors of international financial institutions to op-
7 pose and vote against loans primarily benefitting
8 such government or the agency or instrumentality of
9 such government determined by the President to be
10 responsible for such unresolved case or pattern of
11 noncooperation, as applicable.

12 (14) The denial, withdrawal, suspension, or lim-
13 itation of benefits provided pursuant to title V of the
14 Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461 et seq.), relat-
15 ing to the Generalized System of Preferences.

16 (15) Ordering the heads of the appropriate
17 United States agencies not to issue any (or a speci-
18 fied number of) specific licenses, and not to grant
19 any other specific authority (or a specified number
20 of authorities), to export any goods or technology to
21 such government or to the agency or instrumentality
22 of such government determined by the President to
23 be responsible for such unresolved case or pattern of
24 noncooperation, as applicable, under—

1 (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979
2 (as continued in effect under the International
3 Emergency Economic Powers Act);

4 (B) the Arms Export Control Act;

5 (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

6 (D) any other statute that requires the
7 prior review and approval of the United States
8 Government as a condition for the export or re-
9 export of goods or services.

10 (16) Prohibiting any United States financial in-
11 stitution from making loans or providing credits to-
12 taling more than \$10,000,000 in any 12-month pe-
13 riod to such government or to the agency or instru-
14 mentality of such government determined by the
15 President to be responsible for such unresolved case
16 or pattern of noncooperation, as applicable.

17 (17) Prohibiting the United States Government
18 from procuring, or entering into any contract for the
19 procurement of, any goods or services from such
20 government or from the agency or instrumentality of
21 such government determined by the President to be
22 responsible for such unresolved case or pattern of
23 noncooperation, as applicable.

24 (b) COMMENSURATE ACTION.—Except as provided in
25 subsection (c), the President may substitute any other ac-

1 tion authorized by law for any action described in sub-
2 section (a) if such action is commensurate in effect to the
3 action substituted and if such action would further the
4 purposes of this Act as specified in section 2(c). The Presi-
5 dent shall seek to take all appropriate and feasible actions
6 authorized by law to resolve the unresolved case or to ob-
7 tain the cessation of such pattern of noncooperation, as
8 applicable. If commensurate action is taken under this
9 subsection, the President shall transmit to the appropriate
10 congressional committees a report on such action, together
11 with an explanation for taking such action.

12 (c) EXCEPTIONS.—Any action taken pursuant to sub-
13 section (a) or (b) may not prohibit or restrict the provision
14 of medicine, medical equipment or supplies, food, or other
15 life-saving humanitarian assistance.

16 **SEC. 206. EFFECTS ON EXISTING CONTRACTS.**

17 The President shall not be required to apply or main-
18 tain any action under section 205—

19 (1) in the case of procurement of defense arti-
20 cles or defense services—

21 (A) under existing contracts or sub-
22 contracts, including the exercise of options for
23 production quantities, to satisfy requirements
24 essential to the national security of the United
25 States;

1 (B) if the President determines in writing
2 and transmits to the appropriate congressional
3 committees a report that the government or the
4 agency or instrumentality of such government
5 to which such action would otherwise be applied
6 is a sole source supplier of such defense articles
7 or services, that such defense articles or serv-
8 ices are essential, and that alternative sources
9 are not readily or reasonably available; or

10 (C) if the President determines in writing
11 and transmits to the appropriate congressional
12 committees a report that such defense articles
13 or services are essential to the national security
14 of the United States under defense co-produc-
15 tion agreements; or

16 (2) to products or services provided under con-
17 tracts entered into before the date on which the
18 President publishes in the Federal Register notice of
19 such action in accordance with section 208.

20 **SEC. 207. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the
22 President may waive the application of any of the actions
23 described in paragraphs (10) through (17) of section
24 205(a) (or commensurate action as provided in section
25 205(b)) with respect to a country, if the President deter-

1 mines and so reports to the appropriate congressional
2 committees that—

3 (1) the government of such country has satis-
4 factorily resolved any abduction cases or access cases
5 giving rise to the application of any of such actions
6 and—

7 (A) if such country is a Convention coun-
8 try, such country has taken measures to ensure
9 future compliance with the provisions of the
10 Hague Abduction Convention;

11 (B) if such country is an MOU country,
12 such country has taken measures to ensure fu-
13 ture compliance with the provisions of the MOU
14 at issue; or

15 (C) if such country was a nonsignatory
16 country at the time the abductions or denials of
17 rights of access resulting in the abduction cases
18 or access cases occurred, such country has be-
19 come a Convention country or an MOU coun-
20 try;

21 (2) the exercise of such waiver authority would
22 further the purposes of this Act; or

23 (3) the important national interest of the
24 United States requires the exercise of such waiver
25 authority.

1 (b) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than
2 the date of the exercise of a waiver under subsection (a),
3 the President shall notify the appropriate congressional
4 committees of such waiver or the intention to exercise such
5 waiver, together with a detailed justification thereof.

6 **SEC. 208. PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the
8 President shall ensure publication in the Federal Register
9 of the following:

10 (1) DETERMINATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS,
11 AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES OF COUNTRIES
12 WITH PATTERNS OF NONCOOPERATION.—Any des-
13 ignation of a country that the President has des-
14 ignated as a Country With a Pattern of Noncoopera-
15 tion under section 202(b)(1), together with, when
16 applicable and to the extent practicable, the identi-
17 ties of agencies or instrumentalities determined to be
18 responsible for such pattern of noncooperation.

19 (2) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.—A description of
20 any action under paragraphs (10) through (17) of
21 section 205(a) (or commensurate action as provided
22 in section 205(b)) and the effective date of such ac-
23 tion.

1 (3) DELAYS IN TRANSMITTAL OF PRESI-
2 DENTIAL ACTION REPORTS.—Any delay in trans-
3 mittal of a report required under section 204.

4 (4) WAIVERS.—Any waiver issued under section
5 207.

6 (b) LIMITED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—The
7 President may limit publication of information under this
8 section in the same manner and to the same extent as
9 the President may limit the publication of findings and
10 determinations described in section 654(c) of the Foreign
11 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2414(c)), if the Presi-
12 dent determines that the publication of such informa-
13 tion—

14 (1) would be harmful to the national security of
15 the United States; or

16 (2) would not further the purposes of this Act.

17 **SEC. 209. TERMINATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS.**

18 Any action taken under this Act or any amendment
19 made by this Act with respect to a foreign country shall
20 terminate on the earlier of the following 2 dates:

21 (1) Not later than two years after the effective
22 date of such action unless expressly reauthorized by
23 law.

24 (2) The date on which the President transmits
25 to Congress a certification containing a determina-

1 tion of the President that the government of such
2 country has resolved any unresolved case or has
3 taken substantial and verifiable steps to correct the
4 pattern of noncooperation at issue, as applicable,
5 that gave rise to such action.

6 **SEC. 210. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.**

7 (a) IMPLEMENTATION OF PROHIBITION ON ECO-
8 NOMIC ASSISTANCE.—Section 116(c) of the Foreign As-
9 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(c)) is amended—

10 (1) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” at the
11 end;

12 (2) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking the period
13 at the end and inserting “; and”; and

14 (3) by adding at the end the following new
15 paragraph:

16 “(4) whether the government has engaged in a
17 pattern of noncooperation regarding abduction cases
18 or access cases, as such terms are defined in the
19 Sean and David Goldman International Child Ab-
20 duction Prevention and Return Act of 2012.”.

21 (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF PROHIBITION ON SECU-
22 RITY ASSISTANCE.—Section 502B(a)(4) of the Foreign
23 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304(a)(4)) is amend-
24 ed—

1 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or” at
2 the end;

3 (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period
4 at the end and inserting “; or”; and

5 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
6 paragraph:

7 “(C) has engaged in a pattern of non-
8 cooperation regarding abduction cases or access
9 cases, as such terms are defined in the Sean
10 and David Goldman International Child Abduc-
11 tion Prevention and Return Act of 2012.”.

12 **SEC. 211. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE.**

13 Section 701 of the International Financial Institu-
14 tions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d) is amended—

15 (1) by redesignating the second subsection (g)
16 (as added by Public Law 105–292) as subsection
17 (h); and

18 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
19 section:

20 “(i) In determining whether the government of a
21 country engages in a pattern of gross violations of inter-
22 nationally recognized human rights, as described in sub-
23 section (a), the President shall give particular consider-
24 ation to whether such government has engaged in a pat-
25 tern of noncooperation regarding abduction cases or ac-

1 cess cases, as such terms are defined in the Sean and
 2 David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention
 3 and Return Act of 2012.”.

4 **SEC. 212. AMENDMENT TO GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREF-**
 5 **ERENCES ELIGIBILITY FOR GENERALIZED**
 6 **SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES.**

7 Section 502(b)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
 8 U.S.C. 2462(b)(2)) is amended—

9 (1) by inserting after subparagraph (H) the fol-
 10 lowing new subparagraph:

11 “(I) Such country is a country with a pat-
 12 tern of noncooperation regarding abduction
 13 cases or access cases, as such terms are defined
 14 in the Sean and David Goldman International
 15 Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of
 16 2012.”; and

17 (2) in the flush left matter after subparagraph
 18 (I) (as added by paragraph (1) of this section)—

19 (A) by striking “and (H)” and inserting
 20 “(II)”; and

21 (B) by inserting after “(D))” the following:
 22 “and (I)”.



Mr. SMITH. H.R. 3605, the Global Online Freedom Act of 2012, the Smith amendment number 69 to H.R. 3605, the amendment in the nature of a substitute provided also to your offices on Friday. [The amendment referred to follows:]

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 3605
OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
3 “Global Online Freedom Act of 2012”.

4 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
5 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.
- Sec. 4. Severability.

TITLE I—PROMOTION OF GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM

- Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 103. Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
- Sec. 104. Annual designation of Internet-restricting countries; report.
- Sec. 105. Report on trade-related issues or disputes due to government censorship or disruption of the Internet.

**TITLE II—CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO
PROTECT ONLINE FREEDOM**

- Sec. 201. Disclosure of human rights due diligence.

**TITLE III—EXPORT CONTROLS ON CERTAIN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT**

- Sec. 301. Export controls on certain telecommunications equipment.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The political and economic benefits of the
2 Internet are important to advancing democracy and
3 freedom throughout the world, but the potential ben-
4 efits of this transformative technology are under at-
5 tack by authoritarian governments.

6 (2) A number of repressive foreign governments
7 block, restrict, otherwise control, and monitor the
8 Internet, effectively transforming the Internet into a
9 tool of censorship and surveillance.

10 (3) A number of United States businesses have
11 enabled repressive regimes to compromise the secu-
12 rity of Internet users engaged in peaceful discussion
13 of political, social, and religious issues and severely
14 limit their access to information and communication
15 channels by selling these governments or their
16 agents technology or training.

17 (4) A number of United States businesses have
18 provided repressive governments with information
19 about Internet users who were the company's clients
20 or were using the companies' products, that has led
21 to the arrest and imprisonment of the Internet
22 users.

23 (5) The actions of a number of United States
24 businesses in cooperating with the efforts of repres-
25 sive governments to transform the Internet into a

1 tool of censorship and surveillance have caused
2 Internet users in the United States and in foreign
3 countries to lose confidence in the integrity of
4 United States businesses.

5 (6) Information and communication technology
6 companies are to be commended for cooperating with
7 civil society organizations, academics, and investors
8 in founding the Global Network Initiative, in order
9 to provide direction and guidance to the information
10 and communications technology companies and oth-
11 ers in protecting the free expression and privacy of
12 Internet users. Human rights due diligence by com-
13 panies makes a difference.

14 (7) The United States Government has a re-
15 sponsibility to protect freedom of expression on the
16 Internet, to prevent United States businesses from
17 directly and materially cooperating in human rights
18 abuses perpetrated by repressive foreign govern-
19 ments, and to restore public confidence in the integ-
20 rity of United States business.

21 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this Act:

23 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
25 mittees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
2 the Committee on Financial Services of the
3 House of Representatives; and

4 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

6 (2) FOREIGN OFFICIAL.—The term “foreign of-
7 ficial” means—

8 (A) any officer or employee of a foreign
9 government or of any department; and

10 (B) any person acting in an official capac-
11 ity for or on behalf of, or acting under color of
12 law with the knowledge of, any such govern-
13 ment or such department, agency, state-owned
14 enterprise, or instrumentality.

15 (3) INTERNET.—The term “Internet” has the
16 meaning given the term in section 231(e)(3) of the
17 Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3)).

18 (4) INTERNET-RESTRICTING COUNTRY.—The
19 term “Internet-restricting country” means a country
20 designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to
21 section 104(a) of this Act.

22 (5) LEGITIMATE FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT
23 PURPOSE.—

24 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term “legitimate
25 foreign law enforcement purpose” means for the

1 purpose of enforcement, investigation, or pros-
2 ecution by a foreign official based on a publicly
3 promulgated law of reasonable specificity that
4 proximately relates to the protection or pro-
5 motion of the health, safety, or morals of the
6 citizens of the jurisdiction of such official.

7 (B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For pur-
8 poses of this Act, the control, suppression, or
9 punishment of peaceful expression of political,
10 religious, or ideological opinion or belief shall
11 not be construed to constitute a legitimate for-
12 eign law enforcement purpose. Among expres-
13 sion that should be construed to be protected
14 against control, suppression, or punishment
15 when evaluating a foreign government’s claim
16 of a legitimate foreign law enforcement purpose
17 is expression protected by article 19 of the
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political
19 Rights.

20 (C) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—No provi-
21 sion under this Act shall be construed to affect
22 a country’s ability to adopt measures designed
23 to combat infringement of intellectual property.

24 (6) SUBSTANTIAL RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET
25 FREEDOM.—The term “substantial restrictions on

1 Internet freedom” means actions that restrict or
2 punish the free availability of information via the
3 Internet for reasons other than legitimate foreign
4 law enforcement purposes, including—

5 (A) deliberately blocking, filtering, or cen-
6 soring information available via the Internet
7 based on the expression of political, religious, or
8 ideological opinion or belief, including by elec-
9 tronic mail; or

10 (B) persecuting, prosecuting, or otherwise
11 punishing an individual or group for posting or
12 transmitting peaceful political, religious, or ide-
13 ological opinion or belief via the Internet, in-
14 cluding by electronic mail.

15 (7) UNITED STATES BUSINESS.—The term
16 “United States business” means—

17 (A) any corporation, partnership, associa-
18 tion, joint-stock company, business trust, unin-
19 corporated organization, or sole proprietorship
20 that—

21 (i) has its principal place of business
22 in the United States; or

23 (ii) is organized under the laws of a
24 State of the United States or a territory,

1 possession, or commonwealth of the United
2 States; and

3 (B) any issuer of a security registered pur-
4 suant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange
5 Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l).

6 **SEC. 4. SEVERABILITY.**

7 If any provision of this Act, or the application of such
8 provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
9 the remainder of this Act, and the application of such pro-
10 vision to other persons not similarly situated or to other
11 circumstances, shall not be affected by such invalidation.

12 **TITLE I—PROMOTION OF**
13 **GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM**

14 **SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

15 It shall be the policy of the United States—

16 (1) to promote as a fundamental component of
17 United States foreign policy the right of every indi-
18 vidual to freedom of opinion and expression, includ-
19 ing the right to hold opinions, and to seek, receive,
20 and impart information and ideas through any
21 media and regardless of frontiers, without inter-
22 ference;

23 (2) to use all appropriate instruments of United
24 States influence, including diplomacy, trade policy,
25 and export controls, to support, promote, and

1 strengthen principles, practices, and values that pro-
2 mote the free flow of information without inter-
3 ference or discrimination, including through the
4 Internet and other electronic media; and

5 (3) to deter any United States business from
6 cooperating with officials of Internet-restricting
7 countries in effecting the political censorship of on-
8 line content.

9 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

10 It is the sense of the Congress that—

11 (1) the President should, through bilateral, and
12 where appropriate, multilateral activities, seek to ob-
13 tain the agreement of other countries to promote the
14 goals and objectives of this Act and to protect Inter-
15 net freedom; and

16 (2) to the extent possible in every country in
17 which they operate, United States businesses should
18 work to—

19 (A) ensure access to the Web sites of the
20 Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio
21 Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Al-Hurra, Radio
22 Sawa, Radio Farda, Radio Marti, TV Marti, or
23 other United States-supported Web sites and
24 online access to United States Government re-
25 ports such as the annual Country Reports on

1 Human Rights Practices, the annual Reports
2 on International Religious Freedom, and the
3 annual Trafficking in Human Persons Reports;
4 and

5 (B) promote the security of Internet users
6 and expand their access to information and
7 communication channels by limiting censorship
8 of protected political and religious speech and
9 information.

10 **SEC. 103. ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS**
11 **PRACTICES.**

12 (a) REPORT RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASSIST-
13 ANCE.—Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
14 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end
15 the following new subsection:

16 “(g)(1) The report required by subsection (d) shall
17 include an assessment of freedom of expression with re-
18 spect to electronic information in each foreign country.
19 Such assessment shall consist of the following:

20 “(A) An assessment of the general extent to
21 which Internet access is available to and used by
22 citizens in that country.

23 “(B) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
24 ernment authorities in that country attempt to filter,
25 censor, or otherwise block or remove nonviolent ex-

1 pression of political or religious opinion or belief via
2 the Internet, including electronic mail, as well as a
3 description of the means by which such authorities
4 attempt to block or remove protected speech.

5 “(C) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
6 ernment authorities in that country have persecuted,
7 prosecuted, or otherwise punished an individual or
8 group for the nonviolent expression of political, reli-
9 gious, or ideological opinion or belief via the Inter-
10 net, including electronic mail.

11 “(D) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
12 ernment authorities in that country have sought to
13 collect, request, obtain, or disclose the personally
14 identifiable information of a person in connection
15 with that person’s nonviolent expression of political,
16 religious, or ideological opinion or belief, including
17 without limitation communication that would be pro-
18 tected by the International Covenant on Civil and
19 Political Rights.

20 “(E) An assessment of the extent to which wire
21 communications and electronic communications are
22 illicitly monitored in that country.

23 “(2) In compiling data and making assessments for
24 the purposes of paragraph (1), United States diplomatic
25 mission personnel shall consult with human rights organi-

1 zations, technology and Internet companies, and other ap-
2 propriate nongovernmental organizations.

3 “(3) In this subsection—

4 “(A) the term ‘electronic communication’ has
5 the meaning given the term in section 2510 of title
6 18, United State Code;

7 “(B) the term ‘Internet’ has the meaning given
8 the term in section 231(e)(3) of the Communications
9 Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3));

10 “(C) the term ‘personally identifiable informa-
11 tion’ means data in a form that identifies a par-
12 ticular person; and

13 “(D) the term ‘wire communication’ has the
14 meaning given the term in section 2510 of title 18,
15 United State Code.”.

16 (b) REPORT RELATING TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE.—
17 Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
18 15 U.S.C. 2304) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
19 lowing new subsection:

20 “(j)(1) The report required by subsection (b) shall
21 include an assessment of freedom of expression with re-
22 spect to electronic information in each foreign country.
23 Such assessment shall consist of the following:

1 “(A) An assessment of the general extent to
2 which Internet access is available to and used by
3 citizens in that country.

4 “(B) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
5 ernment authorities in that country attempt to filter,
6 censor, or otherwise block or remove nonviolent ex-
7 pression of political or religious opinion or belief via
8 the Internet, including electronic mail, as well as a
9 description of the means by which such authorities
10 attempt to block or remove protected speech.

11 “(C) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
12 ernment authorities in that country have persecuted,
13 prosecuted, or otherwise punished an individual or
14 group for the peaceful expression of political, reli-
15 gious, or ideological opinion or belief via the Inter-
16 net, including electronic mail.

17 “(D) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
18 ernment authorities in that country have sought to
19 collect, request, obtain, or disclose the personally
20 identifiable information of a person in connection
21 with that person’s communication of ideas, facts, or
22 views where such communication would be protected
23 by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
24 Rights.

1 “(E) An assessment of the extent to which wire
2 communications and electronic communications are
3 illicitly monitored in that country.

4 “(2) In compiling data and making assessments for
5 the purposes of paragraph (1), United States diplomatic
6 mission personnel shall consult with human rights organi-
7 zations, technology and Internet companies, and other ap-
8 propriate nongovernmental organizations.

9 “(3) In this subsection—

10 “(A) the term ‘electronic communication’ has
11 the meaning given the term in section 2510 of title
12 18, United State Code;

13 “(B) the term ‘Internet’ has the meaning given
14 the term in section 231(c)(3) of the Communications
15 Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3));

16 “(C) the term ‘personally identifiable informa-
17 tion’ means data in a form that identifies a par-
18 ticular person; and

19 “(D) the term ‘wire communication’ has the
20 meaning given the term in section 2510 of title 18,
21 United State Code.”.

22 **SEC. 104. ANNUAL DESIGNATION OF INTERNET-RESTRICT-**
23 **ING COUNTRIES; REPORT.**

24 (a) DESIGNATION.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
2 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
3 nually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall des-
4 ignate Internet-restricting countries for purposes of
5 this Act.

6 (2) STANDARD.—A foreign country shall be
7 designated as an Internet-restricting country if the
8 Secretary of State, after consultation with the Sec-
9 retary of Commerce, determines, based on the review
10 of the evidence that the government of the country
11 is directly or indirectly responsible for a systematic
12 pattern of substantial restrictions on Internet free-
13 dom during any part of the preceding 1-year period.
14 (b) REPORT.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
17 nually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall trans-
18 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a
19 report that contains the following:

20 (A) The name of each foreign country that
21 at the time of the transmission of the report is
22 designated as an Internet-restricting country
23 under subsection (a).

24 (B) An identification of each government
25 agency and quasi-government organization re-

1 sponsible for the substantial restrictions on
2 Internet freedom in each foreign country des-
3 ignated as an Internet-restricting country under
4 subsection (a).

5 (C) A description of efforts by the United
6 States to counter the substantial restrictions on
7 Internet freedom referred to in subparagraph
8 (B), including a description and details of pro-
9 grams funded under any other provision of law
10 with the purpose of promoting Internet free-
11 dom.

12 (D) A description of the evidence used by
13 the Secretary of State to make the determina-
14 tions under subsection (a)(2).

15 (2) FORM.—The information required by para-
16 graph (1)(C) may be provided in a classified form if
17 necessary.

18 (3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—All unclassified
19 portions of the report shall be made publicly avail-
20 able on the Internet Web site of the Department of
21 State.

1 **SEC. 105. REPORT ON TRADE-RELATED ISSUES OR DIS-**
2 **PUTES DUE TO GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP**
3 **OR DISRUPTION OF THE INTERNET.**

4 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
5 of the enactment of this Act, the United States Trade
6 Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State
7 and the Secretary of Commerce, shall transmit to the ap-
8 propriate congressional committees a report on—

9 (1) any trade-related issues or disputes that
10 arise due to government censorship or disruption of
11 the Internet among United States trade partners;
12 and

13 (2) efforts by the United States Government to
14 address the issues or disputes described in para-
15 graph (1) either bilaterally or multilaterally.

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that the United States should pursue trade policies
18 that expand the information economy by—

19 (1) ensuring the free flow of information across
20 the entire global network;

21 (2) promoting stronger international trans-
22 parency rules; and

23 (3) ensuring fair and equal treatment of online
24 services regardless of country of origin.

1 **TITLE II—CORPORATE TRANS-**
2 **PARENCY AND ACCOUNT-**
3 **ABILITY TO PROTECT ONLINE**
4 **FREEDOM**

5 **SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Securities Ex-
7 change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by add-
8 ing at the end the following:

9 “(r) DISCLOSURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILI-
10 GENCE.—

11 “(1) DISCLOSURE.—Except as provided in
12 paragraph (3), each Internet communications service
13 company that operates in an Internet-restricting
14 country shall include in the annual report of the
15 company information relating to the company, any
16 subsidiary of the company, and any entity under the
17 control of either of such companies, relating to the
18 following:

19 “(A) HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE.—
20 Company policies applicable to the company’s
21 internal operations that address human rights
22 due diligence through a statement of policy that
23 is consistent with applicable provisions of the
24 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises issued

1 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation
2 and Development, and whether such policy—

3 “(i) is approved at the most senior
4 level of the company;

5 “(ii) explicitly states the company’s
6 expectations of personnel, business part-
7 ners, and other parties under the control
8 of the company, products, or services;

9 “(iii) is publicly available and commu-
10 nicated internally and externally to all per-
11 sonnel, business partners, other relevant
12 partners, customers, and users;

13 “(iv) is reflected in operational poli-
14 cies and procedures necessary to embed it
15 throughout the company; and

16 “(v) is independently assessed by a
17 third party to demonstrate compliance in
18 practice, which should include—

19 “(I) whether the assessment was
20 conducted under the supervision of
21 any third party organization or multi-
22 stakeholder initiative;

23 “(II) a description of the assess-
24 ment process;

1 “(III) a description of measures
2 taken to ensure the assessor’s inde-
3 pendence; and

4 “(IV) inclusion of the assessor’s
5 public report.

6 “(B) NON-COMPLIANCE.—If the company’s
7 policy does not comply with any of the require-
8 ments of clauses (i) through (iv) of subpara-
9 graph (A), an explanation of why the company’s
10 policy does not meet each such requirement.

11 “(C) POLICIES PERTAINING TO DISCLO-
12 SURE OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMA-
13 TION.—If the company collects or obtains per-
14 sonally identifiable information, the contents of
15 wire communications or electronic communica-
16 tions in electronic storage, or the contents of
17 wire communications or electronic communica-
18 tions in a remote computing service on the
19 Internet, a summary of any internal policies or
20 procedures of the company that set out how the
21 company will assess and respond to requests by
22 the governments of Internet-restricting coun-
23 tries for disclosure of such personally identifi-
24 able information or communications.

1 “(D) RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET SEARCH
2 ENGINES AND INTERNET CONTENT HOSTING
3 SERVICES.—If the company creates, provides,
4 or hosts an Internet search engine or an Inter-
5 net content hosting service, all steps taken to
6 provide users and customers with clear, promi-
7 nent, and timely notice when access to specific
8 content has been removed or blocked at the re-
9 quest of an Internet-restricting country.

10 “(2) AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION.—The
11 Commission shall make all information reported by
12 an issuer pursuant to this subsection available online
13 to the public.

14 “(3) SAFE HARBOR.—

15 “(A) IN GENERAL.—An Internet commu-
16 nications service company that operates in an
17 Internet-restricting country shall not be re-
18 quired to include in the annual report of the
19 company information described in paragraph
20 (1) if the company includes in the annual re-
21 port of the company a certification of the Glob-
22 al Network Initiative or a multi-stakeholder ini-
23 tiative described in subparagraph (B) that the
24 company participates in good standing in the

1 Global Network Initiative or the multi-stake-
2 holder initiative (as the case may be).

3 “(B) MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVE.—
4 A multi-stakeholder initiative referred to in sub-
5 paragraph (A) is an initiative that—

6 “(i) is composed of civil society orga-
7 nizations, including human rights organi-
8 zations and Internet communications serv-
9 ice companies;

10 “(ii) promotes the rule of law and the
11 adoption of laws, policies, and practices
12 that protect, respect, and fulfill freedom of
13 expression and privacy; and

14 “(iii) requires each company partici-
15 pating in the initiative to undergo assess-
16 ments by an independent third party de-
17 scribed in subparagraph (C) of the com-
18 pany’s compliance with the standards de-
19 scribed in clause (ii).

20 “(C) INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY.—An
21 independent third party referred to in subpara-
22 graph (B)(iii) is an entity accredited by the
23 multi-stakeholder initiative to conduct assess-
24 ments based on criteria that include—

1 “(i) general expertise in legal and
2 human rights standards; and

3 “(ii) specific expertise in global busi-
4 ness processes relating to information and
5 communication technology, including oper-
6 ations, product development cycles, market
7 segments and industry relationships, infor-
8 mation technology privacy, safety, and se-
9 curity standards, data retention systems,
10 and database forensics.

11 “(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

12 “(A) ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND
13 OTHER TITLE 18 DEFINITIONS.—The terms
14 ‘electronic communication’, ‘electronic commu-
15 nication service’, ‘electronic storage’, ‘wire com-
16 munication’, and ‘contents’ have the meanings
17 given such terms in section 2510 of title 18,
18 United States Code.

19 “(B) INTERNET.—The term ‘Internet’ has
20 the meaning given the term in section 231(e)(3)
21 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.
22 231(e)(3)).

23 “(C) INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS SERV-
24 ICE COMPANY.—The term ‘Internet communica-
25 tions service company’ means an issuer that—

1 “(i) is required to file an annual re-
2 port with the Commission; and

3 “(ii)(I) provides electronic commu-
4 nication services or remote computing serv-
5 ices, but does not include—

6 “(aa) businesses that provide
7 such services as an ancillary service to
8 the provision of lodging, transpor-
9 tation, or food services; or

10 “(bb) activities conducted by a fi-
11 nancial institution (as such term is
12 defined in section 5312 of title 31,
13 United States Code) that are financial
14 in nature, even if such activities are
15 conducted using the Internet; or

16 “(II) is a domain name registrar, do-
17 main name registry, or other domain name
18 registration authority.

19 “(D) INTERNET CONTENT HOSTING SERV-
20 ICE.—The term ‘Internet content hosting serv-
21 ice’ means a service that—

22 “(i) stores, through electromagnetic or
23 other means, electronic data, such as the
24 content of Web pages, electronic mail, doc-

1 uments, images, audio and video files, on-
2 line discussion boards, or Web logs; and

3 “(ii) makes such data available via the
4 Internet.

5 “(E) INTERNET-RESTRICTING COUNTRY.—
6 The term ‘Internet-restricting country’ has the
7 meaning given such term under section 3 of the
8 Global Online Freedom Act of 2012.

9 “(F) INTERNET SEARCH ENGINE.—The
10 term ‘Internet search engine’ means a service
11 made available via the Internet that, on the
12 basis of a query consisting of terms, concepts,
13 questions, or other data input by a user,
14 searches information available on the Internet
15 and returns to the user a link to or other
16 means of locating, viewing, or downloading in-
17 formation or data available on the Internet re-
18 lating to such query.

19 “(G) PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFOR-
20 MATION.—The term ‘personally identifiable in-
21 formation’ means data in a form that identifies
22 a particular person.

23 “(H) REMOTE COMPUTING SERVICE.—The
24 term ‘remote computing service’ has the mean-

1 ing given such term under section 2711(2) of
2 title 18, United States Code.”.

3 (b) RULEMAKING.—Not later than the end of the
4 270-day period beginning on the date of the enactment
5 of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall
6 issue final rules to carry out section 13(r) of the Securities
7 and Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (a).

8 **TITLE III—EXPORT CONTROLS**
9 **ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNI-**
10 **CATIONS EQUIPMENT**

11 **SEC. 301. EXPORT CONTROLS ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNI-**
12 **CATIONS EQUIPMENT.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6 of the Export Adminis-
14 tration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), as continued
15 in effect under the International Emergency Economic
16 Powers Act, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
17 lowing:

18 “(t) CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP-
19 MENT.—

20 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in consulta-
21 tion with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
22 Defense, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
23 departments and agencies, shall establish and main-
24 tain, as part of the list maintained under this sec-
25 tion, a list of goods and technology that would serve

1 the primary purpose of assisting, or be specifically
2 configured to assist, a foreign government in acquir-
3 ing the capability to carry out censorship, surveil-
4 lance, or any other similar or related activity
5 through means of telecommunications, including the
6 Internet, the prohibition or licensing of which would
7 be effective in barring acquisition or enhancement of
8 such capability.

9 “(2) INTERNET-RESTRICTING COUNTRIES.—
10 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Sec-
11 retary shall prohibit the export of goods or tech-
12 nology on the list established under paragraph (1) to
13 a government end user in any Internet-restricting
14 country.

15 “(3) WAIVER.—The President may waive the
16 application of paragraph (2) with respect to export
17 of goods or technology on the list established under
18 paragraph (1) on a case-by-case basis if the Presi-
19 dent determines and certifies to Congress that it is
20 in the national interests of the United States to do
21 so.

22 “(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

23 “(A) the term ‘Internet’ has the meaning
24 given the term in section 231(e)(3) of the Com-
25 munications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3));

1 “(B) the term ‘Internet-restricting coun-
2 try’ means a country designated by the Sec-
3 retary of State pursuant to section 104(a) of
4 the Global Online Freedom Act of 2012;

5 “(C) a ‘government end user’ in a coun-
6 try—

7 “(i) is an end user that is a govern-
8 ment of that country, or of a political sub-
9 division of that country, or is an agency or
10 instrumentality of such a government; and

11 “(ii) includes a telecommunications or
12 Internet service provider that is wholly or
13 partially owned by a government of that
14 country; and

15 “(D) an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of a
16 government is an ‘agency or instrumentality of
17 a foreign state’, as defined in section 1603 of
18 title 28, United States Code.”.

19 (b) REGULATIONS.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
22 shall revise the Export Administration Regulations
23 and any other regulations necessary to carry out the
24 amendment made by subsection (a).

1 (2) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.—

2 In this subsection, the term “Export Administration
3 Regulations” means the Export Administration Reg-
4 ulations as maintained and amended under the au-
5 thority of the International Emergency Economic
6 Powers Act and codified, as of the date of the enact-
7 ment of this Act, in subchapter C of chapter VII of
8 title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

9 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 6(t) of the Export
10 Administration Act of 1979, as added by subsection (a),
11 shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
12 and shall apply with respect to the export of goods or tech-
13 nology on the list established under paragraph (1) of such
14 section on or after 1 year after the date of the enactment
15 of this Act.



Mr. SMITH. And H.R. 4141, the International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012, and the Bass amendment, number 35 to H.R. 4141 which is the amendment sent to your offices on Monday, which adds our good friend and now deceased member, Donald Payne's name to the title of that legislation.

[The amendment referred to follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4141

OFFERED BY MS. BASS OF CALIFORNIA

Strike section 1 and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

- 2 This Act may be cited as the “Donald M. Payne
3 International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012”.



Mr. SMITH. Hearing no objection, it is so ordered. The amendments and bills are adopted and without objection the staff is directed to make technical and conforming changes.

I now would like to recognize myself to speak to H.R. 1940, as amended. I want to thank my colleagues on the subcommittee for supporting this legislation, and for your input as we crafted its various provisions in H.R. 1940, the Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction and Prevention and Return Act of 2012.

It was David Goldman's unrelenting effort to bring his son Sean home from Brazil that first alerted me to the epidemic of international parental child abduction in this country. According to the U.S. State Department, between 2008 and 2010, bereaved parents left behind like David Goldman reported over 3,200 abduction cases involving more than 4,700 children.

I had the privilege of joining David in his fight to return Sean, and experienced firsthand the maddening obstacles encountered by left-behind parents even in countries that have signed the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. Foreign courts, endless appeals to run out the clock, exploitation of the safeguards in the Convention and prejudice against foreigners.

As David has told this subcommittee in numerous hearings that I've chaired on the subject, for the 5½ years of that battle, he lived, and this is his quote: “In a world of despondency and desperation with a searing pain throughout my entire being.” He went on to say, “Everywhere I turned I saw the image of my abducted child.”

I am pleased to see David Goldman is in the audience today and submit this bill in his honor, and in honor of his formerly abducted son, Sean. And, frankly, it's in honor of all of the parents, and

there are several others in the audience today, and their abducted children for whom the Hague Convention has been a long and bitter disappointment.

My bill, H.R. 1940, as amended, will encourage effective implementation of the Hague Abduction Convention, and create strong incentives for compliance and disincentives for non-compliance by countries that currently enable abductors and perpetuate child abuse through weak Convention implementation.

H.R. 1940, as amended, is also for the left-behind parents and bereaved children who have been taken to countries that are not party to the Hague Convention. Parents like Michael Elias, a combat-injured Iraq veteran from New Jersey whose ex-wife used her Japanese consulate connections to abduct little Jade and Michael, Jr. after the New Jersey court had ordered surrender of passports and joint custody.

Ms. Nakamura flagrantly disregarded those valid court orders telling Michael Elias, and I quote her, "My country, Japan, will protect me." Sadly, she was right. Although Japan is reportedly prosecuting her for abusing her consulate connections, they will not return the children.

At a hearing last May, Michael Elias told this subcommittee that as a father who no longer has his children to hold in his arms, "I cannot deal with the sorrow so I will try my best to stay strong and keep fighting for their return. All my hopes and dreams for their future now lie in the hands of others." He continued, "I am begging our Government to help not only my family but hundreds of others, heartbroken families as well, to demand the return of our American children who are being held in Japan."

U.S. Navy Commander Paul Toland, who is here with us with some of the left-behind dads from Japan whose children are in Japan, also knows firsthand the pain suffered by all of the left-behind parents. His daughter, Erica Toland, was living with Paul and his wife in Navy housing in Yokohama, Japan, when Etsuko took Erica in 2003 and never returned. Tragically, his wife passed away in 2007, and yet Commander Toland has continually been denied access to his daughter.

We have, in the past, had hearings with some of the other left-behind parents and we will include in this record some of their testimonies, and we're planning in about a month to 6 weeks' time yet another hearing to hear firsthand from those families and from those left-behind parents of the plight that they face, the obstacles they encounter with our U.S. Department of State and the Office of Children's Issues in the hope that finally they will get their children home.

According to the Office of Children's Issues at the State Department, there are more than 111 American children being held in Japan, others say it's much higher than that, against the will of their American parent. More than 40 others are not allowed access to their American parent. Japan has yet to issue and enforce any court order for the return of a single American child abducted to Japan. I look forward to the day, and I believe that day will happen soon, when these kids are brought home. And I do believe H.R. 1940, as amended, takes us a step closer.

International parental child abduction rips children from their homes and lives, takes them to a foreign land and alienates them from a left-behind parent who loves them and who they have a right to know. Their childhood is disrupted, or sometimes is in hiding, as the taking parent seeks to evade the law, or to conjure illegal cover for their abusive actions. Abducted children often lose their relationship with their mom or their dad, half of their identity, and half of their culture.

They are at risk of serious emotional and psychological problems, and may experience anxiety, eating problems, nightmares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior, resentment, guilt, and fearfulness. As adults they may struggle with identity issues, their own personal relationships, and parenting.

All of this has been chronicled over and over again, and is one of the main reasons why the Hague Convention was adopted back in 1980 in the first place. The body of evidence has only exploded over the years since.

Parental child abduction is child abuse. Too many families have been waiting too long for the return of their children. Our current system with its endless delays and lack of proper accountability has failed far too many. It is time for the approach that backs our demands for adherence to international obligations with penalties, and makes clear to foes and friends alike that our children are our top priority.

The amendment that was just approved by unanimous consent will achieve this goal by giving the President important tools to motivate other countries to quickly respond to applications for an abducted child's return. For even one case that has been pending for over 6 weeks in a foreign country's judicial system the President may choose to at least issue a private demarche or take more serious actions commensurate with the gravity of the case.

If a country has 10 or more cases of children abducted from the U.S., pursuant to this legislation, and those cases are not being resolved in a timely manner, or the entity responsible for working with the U.S., the central authority, or the judiciary, or the law enforcement, are persistently failing to fulfill their obligations, the President can take measured, effective, and predictable actions to aggressively advocate for our children's return. Such actions range from denial of certain assistance to prohibiting the procurement of certain goods or services from the government or instrumentality responsible for the pattern of non-cooperation.

Of course, the President is directed to consult with the government concerned and report to Congress when contemplating serious actions. The President is also provided with certain waiver authorities that take into account the important national interests of the U.S. However, the expectation is that the President will use all tools necessary to bring our children home in a timely manner, and that the President will have to explain the minority of cases where a delineated tool cannot be used. And I will put into the record, and it's in the legislation, all 17 of the prescribed actions that the President can take, and they are serious.

We patterned it after lessons learned from the international—the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 which I authored, and the legislation called the International Religious Freedom Act

which I helped get passed. It was authored by my good friend and colleague, Frank Wolf, prescribing specific actions to be taken against governments that show this non-cooperation, or a pattern of non-cooperation.

I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, for comments she might have on the child abduction legislation.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just have to say as this is my first subcommittee hearing as ranking member that I can't not begin by expressing again my sadness for the loss of our colleague, Representative Payne, but I am thankful for the opportunity to serve as ranking member, and to serve alongside of you and your leadership that you've had for so many years on these issues.

It's fitting that during this first subcommittee meeting after the loss of our friend and colleague that we're going to consider several measures aimed at protecting the most vulnerable among us, children, the disenfranchised, and the hungry, whom Representative Payne fought to protect throughout his career.

Representative Payne was a leader on international human rights issues, and especially concerned with protecting the rights of children and young people. And I, of course, want to commend you, Chairman Smith, for your dedication to promoting adherence to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, for encouraging nations to adopt the Convention, and for consistently pursuing justice for our children.

Last year you convened two subcommittee hearings on international child abduction, and during the first of those hearings we all heard the heartbreaking stories of parents whose children were abducted to a foreign country.

David Goldman, who is here today, Mr. Goldman, I have to tell you that I watched your story for years on TV, and I never had any idea, of course, that I would wind up serving in Congress and having an opportunity to meet you. I just really can't imagine what it was like, what you went through. And I'm very happy that you're reunited with your son, and really want to congratulate you for your leadership in helping to bring that about, Mr. Chairman.

I know the Elias family is represented by the grandmother that is here. Thank you for attending today, and also over the time you have shared your story with us.

This legislation that is offered by Chairman Smith would finally give proper due diligence to this often neglected crisis by creating an Office on International Child Abductions within the State Department, and by expanding the President's authority to act decisively to bring these children home.

The community that I represent in Los Angeles has also been impacted by this horrific crime. Several of my constituents have reached out to me and told me about their children that have been abducted. There's one family that we've been working with for quite a while whose child was abducted to Japan, so I appreciate you bringing forward this bill and I look forward to continuing to support the efforts until all the children are returned home. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass, thank you so very much, and welcome to the subcommittee. And as both you and I and so many others who

were at Don Payne's funeral know, it was a huge loss to the Congress, and a great friend especially of those who are suffering the ravages of famine and natural disasters on the continent of Africa. But welcome to the subcommittee as ranking member, I look forward to working with you.

I'd like to now yield to the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Fortenberry.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your important leadership on this and so many other issues. What more important function can our Government undertake than to prevent the abduction of American children?

Thousands of children have been subjected to this abuse. Thousands of children have been treated as international pawns. Think of the thousands of children who lie silently in their beds except for the crying that can perhaps not be heard by anyone but themselves.

A child's pain should know no international boundary, and a child's suffering is enough due to the separation of their family unit. So, I want to thank you, Mr. Smith, for your important leadership.

International child abduction is too common, and past legal and diplomatic barriers have been too high for the families who have had to suffer through this problem. Establishing the Office of the International Child Abductions within the State Department, I'm hopeful, may impart a focused and whole of government approach to returning abducted children to the United States and preventing more families from the heartbreak and difficulties that this has caused. Thank you for your leadership.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes the former U.S. Attorney from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino.

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. As a prosecutor for 18 years I've had the unfortunate task of dealing with issues that are such heartbreaking issues as child abduction from a domestic perspective and from an international perspective. And I can only thank the chairman for holding this hearing, putting this legislation together, that will really put some teeth into the laws that The Hague should have implemented a long time ago. So, the chairman and, of course, the parents out here and the parents that aren't here, and the children that have been abducted have my total support, and that is a commitment. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes Mr. Turner from New York.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I was reminded of something in another life. I ran an entertainment company, a woman named Cathy Mahone came in to sell her television rights which ultimately was a TV movie called "Rescue My Child." And her 8-year old daughter was abducted following a divorce, and falsely sent to Jordan. And failing to get any satisfaction from the State Department or through the courts, she took some extralegal methods and hired what were called consultants at the time, ex-military people, who literally went in and re-kidnaped the child and got her out.

This extralegal method has pretty much closed down. The principals of the company were a little tired of going to jail and getting shot at and all the other things that they had to endure over the

years. I'm hoping what we've done today will be a legal step that will facilitate this, and I applaud you for it. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Turner, thank you so very much. The Chair recognizes a woman who happens to be both a lawyer and a nurse, and has been, like the other members of this subcommittee, tenacious in combating human rights, Ms. Ann Marie Buerkle.

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just want to echo my colleagues' thoughts to you. Thank you for your leadership on this extremely important issue.

We sat through, several months ago, a hearing about child abduction and listened to the anguished testimony of parents who had lost their children, so this piece of legislation will, as my colleague said, put teeth into what the Hague Convention should be doing.

It's the right thing to do. As a mother of six children, I can only imagine the pain that you've all felt by having your child abducted, so we are so pleased to be able to work with you to get this passed. Thank you so much.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank my good friends and colleagues. I just want to note before we move on to the Global Online Freedom Act, unless my colleagues have anything further to say, and you mentioned this, Mr. Turner, the importance of the media, television and print, all media, but to bring the message forward to sensitize and mobilize people. I would be remiss if I didn't note that Dateline did a tremendous public service for David and every other left-behind parent, and Meredith Vieira is here, and Benita Noel. Benita was the producer and was with David throughout that process. Meredith carried frequently, almost every day in some cases, vital information as to what was happening in real time, and what a difference that made. And then got it all together for various Dateline specials. And not only did it help David Goldman and Sean get reunited, and Sean repatriated to the U.S. with his dad, but I do believe it has helped all the other left-behind parents.

And this is still a festering sore when it comes to issues. The pain that these men and women suffer is beyond words to describe, and yet they continually push hard. Thank you for amplifying their concerns in such a magnificent way.

Any further comments on that legislation? If not, I now will move to the consideration of the debate on H.R. 3605, the Global Online Freedom Act.

In December, I introduced H.R. 3605 which was an updating of the Global Online Freedom Act that I first introduced, as I mentioned earlier, back in 2006. The response to the growing global use of the Internet as a tool of censorship and surveillance as a means of capturing, apprehending the best and the brightest in dictatorship countries all over the world, including especially in China.

Members might recall back in 2006 we had our first hearing on this issue in this subcommittee, and I swore in all of the leaders from Google, Yahoo!, Cisco, and Microsoft, and the answers that they gave at that time were very unavailing. They didn't want to tell us what they were doing in places like China, but we persisted, we wrote legislation, the Global Online Freedom Act, and today we have a refined, and I think, an even more effective draft of legisla-

tion that moves to the committee to try to combat this misuse of the Internet.

The threat to human rights is very serious. Reporters Without Borders just released its Internet enemies list, the names of the countries that violate their citizens' online freedoms. The reports tell us that China, Vietnam, and Iran are the world's biggest prisons for netizens. Other countries are not lagging far behind.

For example, the Government of Pakistan recently announced a public bid for companies to help them build their own version of China's Great Firewall. The public outcry caused the government to withdraw the bid but I'm skeptical that plans for the firewall are actually scrapped. Likely this procurement has simply been moved behind the scenes and out of public scrutiny.

Sadly, it's through the assistance of Western companies and technologies that this—and this includes American companies and technology, that governments like Iran, China, and Syria, and many others are transforming the Internet into a weapon of mass surveillance.

Just as we jealously guard our media freedoms and our personal freedoms, and would be horrified if American companies sold newspaper censorship services abroad, we also need to ensure that our companies and our capital markets are not censoring the Internet abroad. The Internet holds great promise, but also because it can be censored and surveilled, the potential of great peril.

The Global Online Freedom Act is designed to help ensure that U.S. companies are not complicit in repression of human rights. We need to move now to ensure that fundamental freedoms are protected. First, the Global Online Freedom Act requires the State Department to beef up its reporting on Internet freedom in the annual Country Reports for Human Rights Practices, and to identify by name what we call Internet restricting countries.

This country designation will be useful not only in a diplomatic context in helping to advance Internet freedom through naming and shaming countries, but will also provide U.S. technology companies with the information they need to make good business decisions in difficult foreign markets.

Second, the bill requires Internet companies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges to disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission how they conduct their human rights due diligence, including with regards to the collection and sharing of personally identifiable information with repressive countries, and the steps they take to notify users when they remove content or block access to content.

This provision of the bill will help democratic activists and human rights offenders to hold Internet companies accountable by creating a new transparency standard for Internet companies. And while we certainly want to hold U.S. companies accountable, this provision will also require foreign Internet service companies that are listed here in the United States, including big name Chinese companies such as Baidu, Sohu, and Sina to report this information, as well.

And, finally, in response to the numerous reports we've all seen in the papers recently on U.S. technology being used to track down or conduct surveillance of activists through the Internet or mobile

devices, this bill will prohibit the export of hardware or software that could be used for surveillance, tracking, and blocking, and the like, to the governments of Internet restricting countries.

Current export control laws do not take into account the human rights impact of these exports and, therefore, do not create any incentive for U.S. companies to evaluate their role in assisting repressive regimes.

This section will not only help stop the sale of these items to repressive governments, but will create an important foreign policy stance for the United States that will help insure that dissidents abroad know that we are on their side and that U.S. businesses are not profiting from this repression.

The export control law is long overdue. Right now the State Department spends millions of dollars to develop and deploy circumvention tools and other technologies to help dissidents get information and to communicate safely. Truly, it is absurd for us to allow U.S. companies to export blocking and surveillance technologies to these countries only to have the State Department then spend money to help dissidents get around those same technologies.

What we do here in the United States is critically important to achieving our goals, and I believe that this legislation will send a strong message to companies that they have a unique role to play in preserving online freedom, and that we send an even stronger message to repressive governments that the Internet should not become a tool of repression. I yield to the ranking member, Ms. Bass.

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Free speech has long been a hallmark of a healthy democracy and a free society. For over 2 billion people worldwide, the Internet and new communication technologies have become unprecedented tools for expanding their ability to speak and receive information, participate in political and democratic processes, and share knowledge and ideas.

For over a year now we have witnessed what has been dubbed the Arab Spring. In countries throughout the Arab world via the Internet and social networking, citizens have communicated, organized, and raised awareness of their plights under repressive regimes. Sites such as Facebook and Twitter have played a major role in these uprisings.

Whatever you may think about the outcome of those movements, one thing is clear; the long suspected power of the Internet to bring about political change has been confirmed, and that is very positive. The prevalence of these uprisings has caused governments to enact stricter policies against political dissent and further restrict access to information and online networking tools.

As Representative Payne repeated in our hearing on this topic last December, former President Clinton once said that, "Trying to control the Internet would be like trying to nail Jello to the wall." Unfortunately, there are regimes around the world that are attempting to do just that, and some with relative success.

Yet determined to share their stories, protestors and bloggers living in these countries are still finding ways to access the Internet because of the technologies made available by companies like Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, Twitter, and others. For example, in

Syria where there is extremely limited freedom of the press and unconscionable repression, activists are using an iPhone application to disseminate news and online information about their protest against Assad.

The bill also requires U.S. listed Internet communication providers to report on their human rights due diligence with regard to foreign policies on Internet privacy and repression.

While I support the overall goal of the bill, I hope that we can continue to refine the language at the full committee such it does not adversely impact U.S. companies that are providing a tremendous service to many people across the globe who have no other way to see beyond their borders, shed light on their plights, and mobilize their communities for change. But as the chairman pointed out, as a perfect example of a U.S. company that would export technology that would block access and then we provide funding so that they can go around it is exactly the type of abuse that we want to get at.

So, that said, I commend you, Chairman Smith, for your leadership on this issue.

Mr. SMITH. Vice Chairman Fortenberry.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

American leadership and innovation was responsible for the remarkable technological breakthrough known as the Internet which spurred the advent of globalization and this unprecedented industrial revolution of our new century. It has become a way of life since then.

Globalization, of course, carries marvelous potential for progress to benefit mankind, but it also involves unprecedented risk and challenges, including the challenge of applying fundamental principles to the use of new, and vibrant, and transformative technologies.

U.S. companies operating around the world are routinely required to abide by local laws of the countries in which they operate just as foreign countries are required to abide by U.S. law.

Mr. Chairman, I recall the hearing which you held on this topic in the 109th Congress, and at that time the fundamental question we addressed there still applies today; whether U.S. companies have an obligation to comport themselves in a manner consistent with the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights when local laws overseas conflict with the basic foundational principles upon which our laws are based.

The Global Online Freedom Act seeks to integrate these foundational human rights principles into the complexities of our participation in the vast global technology marketplace. So, I urge my colleagues and thank you, as well, Mr. Chairman, to continue to support this thoughtfully developed measure. And, again, thank you for your tireless efforts in this regard.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Fortenberry, thank you very much for your comments and for your leadership, as well.

I'd just like to point out that the Global Online Freedom Act has had a broad, broad amount of support. This morning we received—we just received a letter of support from Yahoo!, Freedom House, Amnesty International, and I know T. Kumar is here, and thank you for your support, as well as helping us to put it together,

Human Rights Watch, Access, and a group letter signed by 13 leading human rights organizations all in support of the Global Online Freedom Act. Without objection, those letters will be made a part of the record.

We now move for debate purposes to the third bill, H.R. 4141, as amended, the newly named Donald M. Payne, and thank you, Ms. Bass, for naming it so out of deep respect for our deceased colleague, the Donald M. Payne International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012.

This bill was originally introduced—and still it's his bill—by Mr. Payne before he passed away on March 6th. The bill is based on important recommendations that had been made by the Government Accountability Office in a report that they issued in May 2011 on “Better Nutrition and Quality Control Can Further Improve U.S. Food Aid,” as well as other studies on the same subject funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

As the GAO pointed out in its report, the U.S. spent approximately \$1.5 billion on emergency food aid in Fiscal Year 2010 assisting nearly 46.5 million women, men, and children. In fact, the U.S. is the world's largest donor of international food assistance providing more than half of global food aid supplies. It's imperative that this assistance not only satisfy people's hunger, but that it meets their fundamental nutritional needs, as well.

The statistics of the prevalence and impact of under-nutrition are absolutely staggering. It is reported that 3.5 million children around the world die each year as a direct result of under-nutrition. Others who suffer from malnutrition are often debilitated for the rest of their lives. Children who do not receive adequate nutrition during the first 1,000 days of life, beginning with conception through their second birthday, suffer from stunted physical and cognitive development. They have increased risks of illness, not only in early life but also later as adults from such conditions as diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and cancers.

Mothers who are under-nourished are more often likely to have low birth weight babies leading to a multi-generational cycle of under-nutrition, and even disability.

Mr. Payne's H.R. 4141, which the subcommittee has just adopted, directs the Administrator of USAID to use currently available funds to improve the nutritional quality of U.S. food assistance, particularly for vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating mothers, children under the age of 5, and beneficiaries of the U.S. HIV/AIDS programming or PEPFAR.

Possible measures that may be taken include the adoption of new specifications for micronutrient fortified food aid products, strengthening assessment of the quality of food donations, and improving guidance to implementing partners on how to address nutrient deficiencies in certain age recipients.

H.R. 4141, as amended, will also include nutrition science experts in the Food Aid Consultative Group created by the Food for Peace Act. The bill calls on the administrator to work within this group to improve quality control and cost effectiveness of food assistance programs through increased coordination and oversight.

Finally, the USAID Administrator would need to ensure that food assistance programs carried out under the Food for Peace Act contribute to any U.S. global food security strategy.

Again, I want to thank Ms. Bass for offering the amendment to add Mr. Payne's name to this bill, which is truly a remarkable way to honor this wonderful man. Ms. Bass?

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for accepting the amendment and including this, because we really wanted to honor Representative Payne, and we thought this was a great way to do it, to change the name of the bill.

Malnutrition, as you mentioned, is the number one risk to health globally accounting for the deaths of 3.5 million children under 5 years old, and impairing hundreds of thousands of growing minds. This has profound consequences not only for the child's future, but also for the long-term health and development of families, communities, and societies.

The human and economic costs of malnutrition are enormous. Women, children, and the poor are, of course, the most hit. For over 55 years, the United States has been a world leader in international food aid delivering lifesaving calories to the most vulnerable of populations, often in conflict zones. However, while our efforts are great, the ongoing food crisis in the Horn of Africa is just one example of how the challenge is growing.

As revealed in recent reports, by the Government Accountability Office and Tufts University, there are a number of ways in which our food aid initiatives can and must be improved including increased nutritional quality, greater oversight and quality controls, and an enhanced value chain. This bill incorporates these recommendations and ensures that our food aid programs are smart, effective, and efficient.

The bill directs USAID to work with USDA and the Food Aid Consultative Group to adopt new specifications for food aid products, work to strengthen systems to better assess the types and quality of agricultural commodities and products, adjust products to cost-effectively meet nutritional needs, develop new program guidance to better target recipients, and provide improved guidance to implementing partners on how to adequately address nutritional deficiencies. It also would ensure that the food aid programs are integrated into our global food security strategy.

H.R. 4141 is a wonderful example of Congressman Payne's lifelong commitment to addressing the needs of the under-served, fostering innovation in humanitarian assistance, and advancing America's leadership across the globe. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass, thank you very much, and I look forward to working with you as the new Ranking Member.

Ms. BASS. Absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. And I would like to thank for the record all the members for their constructive help in crafting these bills as we take them to the full committee, and then on to the floor, and down to the President's desk.

Without objection the markup is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:14:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

SUBCOMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman

March 23, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN markup held by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights to be held in **Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at <http://www.hcfa.house.gov>):**

DATE: Tuesday, March 27, 2012

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

MARKUP OF: H.R. 1940, To ensure compliance with the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction by countries with which the United States enjoys reciprocal obligations, to establish procedures for the prompt return of children abducted to other countries, and for other purposes;

H.R. 3605, To prevent United States businesses from cooperating with repressive governments in transforming the Internet into a tool of censorship and surveillance, to fulfill the responsibility of the United States Government to promote freedom of expression on the Internet, to restore public confidence in the integrity of United States businesses, and for other purposes; and

H.R. 4141, To direct the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to take appropriate actions to improve the nutritional quality, quality control, and cost effectiveness of United States food assistance, and for other purposes.

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5921 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE MARKUP

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights MARKUP

Day Tuesday Date March 27, 2012 Room 2200 Rayburn

Starting Time 2:34 p.m. Ending Time 3:14 p.m.

Recesses 0 (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Chris Smith

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒

Executive (closed) Session ☐

Televised ☒

Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒

Stenographic Record ☒

BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)

H.R. 1940: Sean and David Goldman Internatioal Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2012

H.R. 3605: Global Online Freedom Act of 2012

H.R. 4141: Donald M. Payne International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

*Rep. Chris Smith, Rep. Robert Turner, Rep. Jeff Fortenberry, Rep. Karen Bass, Rep. Tom Marino,
Rep. Russ Carnahan, Rep. Ann Marie Buerkle*

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

Written statement of Ms. Edwards; Written statement of Mr. Bermudez; Written statement of Mr. Izzard; Written statement of Mr. Bover; Presidential actions that can be taken as set out by H.R. 1940; Statements in support of H.R. 3605

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

H.R. 1940 passed, as amended by Smith (NJ) #64, by unanimous consent

H.R. 3605 passed, as amended by Smith (NJ) #69, by unanimous consent

H.R. 4141 passed, as amended by Bass (CA) #35, by unanimous consent

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>
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TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 3:14 p.m.


Subcommittee Staff Director

THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL
HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Testimony of Sara Edwards

May 24, 2011

House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

My name is Sara Edwards and I am the mother of an adorable 3 year old boy, named Abdullah Eli. Thank you all for the opportunity today to share Eli's story. I miss my boy so much every day, but the chance to speak to you about my pain and struggle gives me the hope that someday very soon I will have him back in my arms. Eli loves to play race with his toy cars and trucks. He is a beautiful blonde-headed smile-factory of a boy. He also gives the most wonderful bear hugs, but I have not held him since March 4th 2010. That day, more than fourteen months ago Eli's father, my husband, Muhammed Kiraz, took Eli to Turkey for a family visit.

Muhammed and I met while we were both in college and we married in Kent, Ohio in 2003. Our son was born five years later in 2008, while I was in graduate school at The Pennsylvania State University. My family and parts of Muhammed's family lived in Northeast Ohio, so when Eli was 6 months old, we moved back there.

In January of 2010, after seven years of marriage, Muhammed and I separated. We drafted an informal shared parenting agreement to outline our intentions for raising Eli. I believed this document was a framework for us to work together as separated parents to achieve the best interests of our son. We acted under the plan, which called for equal custodial time of alternating weeks with Muhammed and I each visiting Eli two days a week during the other parents' visitation. We made bedtime phone calls every night regardless of which parents' week it was. I fully believed that Muhammed's participation meant he was committed to shared parenting like I was.

Therefore, when Muhammed wanted to go forward with a visit with Eli to see his family in Turkey, I did not object. I thought it would be good for Muhammed to have the support of his family during the separation. Muhammed provided me with the round trip travel itinerary of their tickets and also a signed, notarized statement promising to return with Eli. Muhammed and Eli were supposed to spend only two months in Turkey. But now 14 months later, Eli has still not come home.

Hindsight is 20/20. I now know that my husband felt he could not get what he wanted in the U.S. so he took our son to Turkey. There secured an unlawful custody ruling and divorce, and he did all he could to ensure that my side of the story would never be heard. I am here today to share my side of the story, and to speak for Eli.

I certainly did not want to be without my son for two months; I knew that I would miss him more than I had ever missed anything else, but I have always felt that it is important for our son to know his Turkish family and to have exposure to that half of his culture. I wanted to be fair. I myself had traveled to Turkey five times before Muhammed abducted Eli. I took Eli two of those times and each time we were there we stayed for two months. It all seemed routine. I drove them to the airport for their visit and I was there as they went through ticketing and security. I blew kisses and waved to Eli as Eli waved bye-bye from Muhammed shoulders. As I hold on to

that happy last look at him, I now realize that Muhammed actively deceived me and preyed on my trust from the moment we decided to separate.

For the first two weeks of their trip, I visited with Eli daily by web cam. While anxiously counting down the days to his return, I actually remember being glad to know that Eli would learn some Turkish words during his trip. Muhammed, however, had plans for something altogether different and on March 22, 2010, my nightmare began. Muhammed began making threats that he would only bring Eli back to Ohio if I would declare myself an unfit parent and give full custody of our son to him. I was in hell. He told me that he had already divorced me and that there was nothing I could do. I was shocked and devastated, but I thought his outbursts were just scare tactics to make me relinquish custody. On March 23, 2010, I contacted the Department of State, Office of Children's Issues; the American Embassy in Ankara, Turkey; and the Turkish Consulate in Chicago. I also began seeking advice from attorneys in Turkey and all over the United States.

It is now clear to me that Muhammed never intended to bring Eli home. Muhammed arrived in Turkey on March 6, 2010, and attended a divorce hearing on March 10, 2010. The domestic court of Nevşehir, Turkey granted full custody of our son to Muhammed on March 11, 2010. Muhammed got full custody and divorce in a domestic court in a country where we never resided. According to Turkish law, I should have been physically present for the divorce hearing. Not only was I not present, I was never informed of the case in any way, and I never had contact at all with the attorney, Hasan Unal, who supposedly represented me. I did not even have hard evidence that a divorce occurred until Muhammed filed the Turkish court's divorce and custody ruling through his Ohio attorney as evidence in the Ohio custody case.

To date, Muhammed continues to ignore the Summit County court order to return Eli to Ohio. The judge signed the order adopting our original Shared Parenting Plan in June of 2010, and Muhammed and I are still legally married in Ohio. My Turkish attorney submitted my Hague petition to the Turkish Central Authority on January 24, 2011. I learned that the Turkish authorities have investigated Muhammed and Eli's whereabouts and, just this month the Turkish Central Authority has opened a case on my behalf in Kayseri, Turkey domestic court for the return of my son. I await updates daily. I await updates desperately.

Over the past fourteen months, Muhammed has permitted me to visit with Eli by web cam, sometimes on a regular basis, but he also abruptly cuts off access for long periods with no warning. I schedule my daily life around the chance to speak to my only child, and my despair or elation turns upon Muhammed's whim. Eli no longer understands or speaks English and I struggle to keep up with him in Turkish, but I am so grateful to still have contact with him and maintain our bond. Eli was only 2 when Muhammed took him, and now at age 3 I see him growing and changing drastically with each visit. Every day I wonder if he is thinking about me and missing his mother the same way I am thinking about him and missing him. Muhammed threatens to take Eli to Syria, torturing me with the reality that each web cam visit could be the last time that I ever see Eli. My greatest fear is the real possibility that Eli will one day believe the lies that Muhammed has told; that I am a bad mother, that I abandoned him, that I did not want him.

The obstacles I face fighting the abduction of my son are great. I am essentially on my own to fight a court battle in a foreign country where I do not know the language or understand the culture. I have to be continually vigilant as I learn to maneuver this nightmare of uncertainty that accompanies fighting for my son. To date, I still do not know whether Eli has been issued a Turkish passport. No one can give me confirmation that Muhammed can be questioned if he tries to abscond with Eli from Turkey while the Hague investigation case is pending. No one can give me confirmation that Muhammed would be questioned if he returns to the US to renew his Legal Resident Status.

I love my son more than anything in this world and I am ready every minute to welcome Eli home. Thank you for this opportunity to share Eli's story. I personally ask each of you to commit now to do all that is in your power to restore the right of our children to have relationships with both of their parents.

Thank you.

Testimony of Carlos Bermudez
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
May 24, 2011

Issue of ICA and Mexico

Personal Story

My only son, Sage, was born May 14th, 2007. Like many parents, I had spent the months preceding his birth rearranging my priorities towards fatherhood, and anxiously awaiting his arrival. From the moment I first held him in my arms, I knew that being his father was now to be the most important role in my life. A few months after his birth, In October 2007, my wife Ana's dearest aunt Sylvia was dying of cancer. This unfortunate reality played out against the auspicious birth of Sage, and my marriage to his mother, Ana Belem. Estranged from her family and suffering from the idea that she might never see her Aunt before she died, my wife asked me to allow her to take our son to Mexico to see Sylvia before she died, and tell her family about our marriage and child. Although I offered to go along with her, she plead with me to let her go alone initially so she could talk to them before I got there, claiming that this would make the situation smoother because she knew how to handle her family. I was very reluctant, as Sage was only 5 months old, but she insisted they would be fine and that this was the best plan. We agreed that she would go alone for the first 2-3 weeks to give her time alone with her family, so that she could explain her previously unannounced marriage and child.

The trip was supposed to last two months, with her return from Mexico planned to coincide with the date we believed her green card would arrive to make her a legal US Resident. Leaving the country in the midst of changes in residency status is not without risk--Immigration does not allow applicants to do so without special permission. Whether knowingly or not, my wife falsely claimed, and convinced me, that if she requested this special permission it would be denied, and the proceedings to request would just delay the normal process making it even less likely that she'd make it to Mexico to see her aunt before she died.

Under these circumstances I notarized permission for my son to travel to Mexico for a "two month tourist visit." When the Green Card processing stalled for, to date, unexplained reasons, the two month visit extended to a total of four months, with my wife returning to the United States in March.

By staying behind in the United States, in deference to my wife's requests, I failed to effectively protect my son's right to be parented by his father. By not overtly publicly establishing, in Mexico, my ability and willingness to be father to my son, I implicitly abetted a series of events that would later lead to my son's abduction, and subsequent illegal retention from the country of his birth and paternal family. I pray my son will forgive me this error, though I shall never forgive myself for it. While trying to navigate the complexities of an international relationship, and to respect my wife's reported customs by allowing her to leave the country alone with

our son, I inadvertently enabled my wife to believe she could invent a completely false narrative of Sage's father, and of her life in the United States.

As one might expect, this four month separation from my wife and son was difficult. In particular, because it quickly became apparent that every conversation between my wife and I was initiated by me, and that my wife was not using any of the various cameras and communication media that I'd acquired and maintained at great expense, precisely to allow her to send pictures and videos and facilitate ongoing interaction between myself and our son over the internet.

Upon my wife's return from Mexico in March of 2008 I had serious reservations about the long term viability of our marriage, but believed that working to salvage the marriage was what was best for my son. Increasingly, there were signs that something was amiss with my wife. In spite of my efforts to understand and address what was happening, I was ultimately at a loss for what to do and was quietly, and thanklessly, maintaining a demanding work schedule to provide for my family. I tried not to read the writing that was, in hindsight, on the walls, and hoped that our problems would somehow work themselves out with time or keep long enough for me to be able to find the time and energy to deal with them effectively.

Time was not on my side. In June of 2008, my wife falsely claimed there was a "family emergency" in Tucson, AZ. The "emergency" involved her supposed cousin, a 12-year-old boy who had gone missing, and whose mother was an illegal alien who was scared to go to the authorities for fear of being deported. The missing boy had supposedly gone out with his uncle to McDonald's, where they believed he'd been picked up by the US Border Patrol. Although his mother was illegal the boy was born in the US. My wife's mother asked for her help, since she is licensed to practice law in Mexico and a legal US Resident. Despite great discomfort, I didn't object to my wife going to AZ with our son to see what she could do to help during this dire crisis. The only alternative I saw at that time was to take the time off at IBM to care for our son alone, while my wife went to help her endangered cousin. Being the sole provider for our family that, regrettably, did not seem feasible at the time.

Ana went to Arizona with our son for what was supposed to be a few days. Once there she turned off her phone, and via email, said that Sage had thrown it in the bath tub but she was "looking for another phone to call with". I spent nights in terror when I couldn't get a hold of my wife. Did something happen? Was my child suffering or in danger? Emotions any parent can relate to. The idea that my son might be in some kind of danger forced me to stop refusing to ask myself the hard questions about what was going on. As my uncertainty and fear grew, I began a frantic investigation into my wife's recent activity, plans and associations. She never seemed to find a phone, but for several weeks I continued to receive emails saying that she was "looking for a phone to call," and that she was still working to resolve the family emergency. Finally, I traced the originating IP address of her emails to find she wasn't in Arizona at all. She was in Mexico, and there began the investigation into why she had really gone to Mexico. I began to see what she was doing and what her intentions were. Although my wife has never endeavoured to explain to me why she did this, I have determined the following:

Before long, I would learn that my wife had been having a long-running affair with

one of the “friends” in her social group. This “friend,” amongst many others, had come to our house for a number of events we’d hosted there, including my wife’s baby shower and a cook-out for her birthday when my son was 4 months old. To be with this family friend, she quietly planned the abduction of our son to Nogales, Mexico, a border city and sister to Nogales, AZ. Over the course of weeks, while still in the U.S., she asked me to go to the Mexican Embassy to apply for a birth certificate for Sage so he could have dual citizenship. She gathered up all the documentation she could find of our life, such as the pictures and legal documents like our marriage certificate. She also took my passport, social security card, both copies of my birth certificate and the title to my car and flew to Tucson. The detailed story she’d told about the missing child was pure fiction used to abduct our own son.

There have since been 9 separate trials in Mexico with multiple still ongoing. The Mexican legal system allows for a large number of appeals, all of which can suspend enforcement of any decision to return an abducted child. Since September 2010, the family court judge has illegally suspended the new proceedings to have my son returned, claiming he is waiting for the superior court to give him original court documents from the first trial. The State Superior court claims that they are waiting for these files from the first level federal court even though it was the State Superior court that incorrectly sent them to the 2nd level federal court, who then incorrectly sent them to the 1st level federal court, who has been unresponsive to requests that they be returned to the 1st level family court so that the proceedings can commence. As you may have just gathered, the Mexican legal system is both maddeningly slow and at times, a bit confusing. It’s become very clear here that the claim being made by the 1st level family court that they cannot proceed without these “original documents” is patently false, since they have certified copies and have never even requested that the higher courts send them the documents they claim to need.

Mexico is amongst the world's most popular sources and destinations for international child abduction, while also being widely regarded as having one of the least effective systems of protecting and returning internationally abducted children within its borders.

Mexico signed on to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in 1991,[1] and the Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children. Since becoming party to the Hague Abduction Convention, the world's most recognized and utilized instrument for addressing international child abduction, Mexico has been repeatedly criticized for enjoying the benefit of having its treaty partners protect Mexico's own internationally abducted children, while also being consistently non-compliant in fulfilling its reciprocal obligations to protect and return children abducted to Mexico. To date its procedures for enforcing its treaty obligations are unpredictable and entirely ineffective. The Centre for International Family Law Studies in Cardiff, Wales, compared seven jurisdictions, including Mexico. The conclusion was that Mexico was by far the worst offender in its failure to return abducted children. In consideration of Mexico's history of noncompliance, as documented extensively over the past 11 years in the US State Department's annual compliance reports, Texas courts made a landmark decision finding Mexico's legal system ineffective and lacking legal mechanisms for the immediate and effective enforcement of child custody orders and, furthermore stating, Mexico posed a risk to

children's physical health and safety due to human rights violations committed against children, including child labor and a lack of child abuse laws. Ever-increasing travel warnings to Mexico for U.S. Citizens only further the risk to these children, and to their left-behind parents forced into litigations, and attempts to see their children, there.

Hague Convention

The Hague Convention is widely viewed as completely ineffective in Mexico, with the country being extensively cited as having problems with nearly every aspect of its implementation. Oftentimes, children can not be located for Convention proceedings to start, due to problems with law enforcement's performance. Law enforcement has reported an inability to locate children even when parents have reported giving them the children's exact address in Mexico. Although Mexico claims to provide free legal representation for victim parents, the provided representation is often completely unable to move the case forward and will only represent the parent during the natural trial, not during appeals. Parents who have been able to gain traction in Mexican courts have turned to private attorneys. Even when these attorneys have won favorable verdicts they are not enforced if the abductor files appeals, or amparos, which suspend enforcement of the decision until they've been adjudicated, frequently causing years of delays. In the unlikely event that children are located, legal proceedings commence, all appeals are heard and a final return order is issued, law enforcement issues can arise anew due to their inability to locate children yet again. A tragic example of this is the Combe-Rivas abduction where, after four years, the Mexican Supreme Court issued a final decision ordering the child's return in June 2009. To date, the decision remains unenforced due to an inability to locate the child.

Domestic family law

Mexican courts grant automatic custody of children below 7–12 years (depending on the state) to mothers unless they have been proven to be unfit. This maternal preference has been the subject of Constitutional challenges on the basis that the Mexican Constitution enshrines the equality of the sexes, but has been upheld on the grounds that the Constitution also protects the integrity of the family. Custody cases are also not immune to many of the problems found in Hague cases and, even if a custody decision were to be won it would not necessarily allow for the child to be taken back out of Mexico. In cases where taking the child back out of Mexico to the home country is sought, the decision can be subject to the same lack of enforceability pending the exhaustion of all appeals that plagues Hague Convention applications.

Corruption is an intrinsic part of the problem with international child abduction in Mexico,, and affects every other aspect of the issue from locating children and judicial decisions to enforcing court orders for repatriation in the rare cases where the obstacles of locating children and judicial noncompliance have been overcome. Parents of children abducted to Mexico have reported being asked for a "mordida" (literally "bite", ubiquitous slang for bribe in Mexico) in order for Mexican officials to do routine work.[8] Mexico bears the stigma of being considered one of the most corrupt countries in the hemisphere.

Criticism of the United States government's role

Child abduction to Mexico from the US is as much an American policy problem as it is a Mexican one.[citation needed]Inasmuch as Mexico is cited for failing to take appropriate measures to curb the international abduction of children, the US government is likewise criticized for not taking appropriate measures to protect American children or support American parents in their efforts to recover their internationally abducted children. The proximity and close relationship between the United States and Mexico makes the problems of one country the problems of both and, by extension, places the responsibility of addressing the problem on both countries. US officials recognize this, and have increasingly worked to assist Mexico by providing training and education to Mexican judges and law enforcement. This type of bilateral cooperation is part of a broadening recognition of the responsibility both nations share in addressing problems in the region, and is most notably demonstrated in the Mérida Initiative, the \$1.4 billion aid package to help Mexico interdict illicit drugs, arms and human trafficking.[43][44]

US State Department

American parents complain that they are essentially alone in dealing with foreign courts and legal systems. The US State Department has a virtual monopoly on information in such cases, but refuses to act as a vigorous advocate for left-behind American parents while also preventing the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children or anyone else from playing that role. State Department attorney Thomas Johnson remarked that when he reminded one senior State Department official with Child Abduction Convention responsibilities that she works for the American people, her immediate response was: "I don't work for the American people; I work for the Secretary of State", demonstrating the Department's inherent conflict of interest (i.e., a desire to maintain "good" bilateral foreign relations for their own sake that overrides assertive and effective advocacy on behalf of American citizens).

Dangerous Diplomacy

State's overriding desire to appease foreign governments and maintain "good relations" is having a conflict of interest between their responsibility to internationally abducted children as the designated United States Central Authority under the Hague Convention. This inherent conflict of interest between the two roles is magnified by what the book defines as the "culture of state", a culture characterized by extreme moral relativism, valuing process over substance and misplaced priorities that reward failures by promotions or high paying jobs "consulting" for the foreign government of the country that they'd previously been paid to advocate America's interests in.

Personal Experiences with US State Department

Upon being assigned a "caseworker" at the OCI at State, the first question I asked my caseworker at the State Dept was whether or not I should report my son's passport stolen since someone had suggested it as an option. He evaded the question and when I pressed for an answer he got angry and replied with deep sarcasm, asking me if the

passport had been stolen (which was exactly what I was asking him). That was the first of many signs that I needed to look elsewhere for help finding my son and the first moment I thought to myself, my God, they've put the DMV in charge of recovering my son. To my horror, I've come to appreciate, at great length, how accurate that initial impression was.

In the initial family court decision in Mexico, which resulted from what could more accurately be described as a debacle than a serious Hague proceeding, the judge denied my son's return to the US claiming that my wife hadn't been to the US since October of 2007 and that since I waited until June 2008 to file the Hague application, even though that would still be within one year, I must have consented to the abduction of my son or I wouldn't have waited so long. I submitted receipts and confirmation numbers for plane tickets that prove my wife was in the US until May of 2008 but the Mexican court claimed that these "private" documents could not be substantiated. I also submitted a vehicle title for a car my wife registered in NC, but the judge also held that it was possible she registered a North Carolina title, which is a public document, without ever coming to NC, and didn't seem to care that the address she wrote on the title was our address. In order to prove without a doubt in my appeal that my wife had returned to the US after a trip in October 2007, I requested that the US State Department obtain copies of her entry and exit records to the United States. In the Kafkaesque conversations that ensued I escalated this issue to the Abduction Unit Chief who told me that records were not always kept during land crossings between Mexico and the US. I repeatedly said that that was fine; I only wanted the records that actually did exist and had already given them the date, airline and number of a flight my wife had taken from Mexico into the US. State claimed that they could not give me this information about my wife because it violated her privacy. When I asked to then have the entry and exit records for my son, for whom I am the custodial parent, I was informed that this was not the role that the OCI typically played and that they aren't allowed to give legal advice and don't have the information I'm asking for. Furthermore, she said, the information I'm looking for would be of no use to me in my legal case since Mexico and the US share a land border that allows the fluid entry and exit of person's between the two countries, so proving she entered a country would not prove the date of the illegal abduction/retention. I informed OCI again that my wife claims to have not entered the US since October of 2007 and any evidence of entry proves she is lying, but couldn't help but wonder if, moments after she said they couldn't give me legal advice, she was giving me legal advice, so I asked her if she was a Mexican attorney, to which she replied that she was not, but then, why was she telling me that the information I was requesting was of no use to me in my appeal when my Mexican attorney is the one telling me to obtain this information? Furthermore, they said that OCI didn't have that information and asking them for it was like asking a plumber to fix my electrical. I told them that I felt it was more like asking a general contractor to work with the plumber and that I know the OCI has a working relationship with every other relevant US agency and that if I went to those agencies directly they would only tell me to work through the OCI. At various points OCI told me something to the effect, a decision was made in your case, sometimes including that the appeal is up to you and your attorney. The clear subtext of those statements was, we consider your case closed, we agree with the family courts decision, and we aren't going to get involved.

STATEMENT OF JOSHUA HANNUM IZZARD
c/o Whisperer Empirical Management LLC
P.O. Box 2827
Chicago, IL 60690

TESTIFYING AS THE PARENT OF AN AMERICAN CHILD
WRONGFULLY REMOVED FROM THE UNITED STATES AND
DETAINED IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
May 24, 2011

CONCERNING

INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL KIDNAPPING TO NON-HAGUE
COUNTRIES

TESTIMONY OF JOSHUA HANNUM IZZARD
PARENT OF ABDUCTED CHILD, MELISANDE IZZARD

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

May 24, 2011

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify today regarding the ongoing tragedy of International Parental Kidnapping.

I am Joshua Hannum Izzard, bereaved father and sole legal guardian of Melisande Izzard, my American born-and-raised daughter and only child, who was taken almost 8 months ago to Perm, Russia; whose voice I haven't heard since January. I have been living for nearly 8 months with a hole in my life, while some, like Mr. Tom Sylvester, of Cincinnati, Ohio, who testified in 2009, and his daughter, and others like them, have lived with that hole for years. Our great country must stop this constant bleeding of its most important resource, its citizens. As a nation we need to construct legal mechanisms to facilitate resolution of existing parental kidnappings and put in place effective preventative mechanisms to assure that our citizens are not subjected to the daily, unbearable sorrow that comes in the wake of an international parental kidnapping.

I was in Rome, Italy when Tatiana Ivleva, my decade-long partner, the love of my life and wife of five years, the mother of my daughter, called to inform me that she and my little blue-eyed angel were in Russia and would never return, that I would never see my daughter again. In shock, I nearly collapsed on the street. I wrote the first of many letters for my daughter while flying home, speeding westward away from her to Chicago. My heart seemed a thread being unraveled across the world, my life unwinding as the distance between us grew.

At home I opened the door to our Chicago apartment overlooking Lake Michigan. Desolation overwhelmed me as the golden afternoon light filtering through the dead silence of our living room gently touched on the semicircle of my daughter's favorite toys, left exactly as she had been playing with them. No joyous "Daddy's home, hurrah!" Only silence, thundering silence.

Initial denial became steely resolve to protect my child, who now lives in grave danger; to bring her back to her loving, lawful home. Since the kidnapping my offers of compromise and reconciliation have gone unanswered, court orders and decisions ignored, and requests to at least have phone calls with my daughter unheeded. A local arrest warrant has been issued for Tatiana. The FBI, INTERPOL, the Chicago PD, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), State Department, and Congressmen's offices are all involved. I have given interviews to US and Russian media, each time imploring Tatiana to simply speak with me, to negotiate a solution.

Melisande was torn away from me and everyone and everything she had known from birth, in one cruel, selfish instant by her mother Tatiana, and maternal grandmother, Galina and abruptly plunged into a strange world of darkness, mental illness, and danger. Tatiana's own signed statements declare that she immediately moved in with her high school boyfriend in Russia, an abusive individual named Andrey Medvedev, with whom, it has been proven, she had been having an extramarital relationship for some time prior to the kidnapping. Mr. Medvedev is a violent alcoholic, with numerous citations for public intoxication, drunk driving (for which he lost his license), and physical violence, offences ranging from assaulting a bar employee to terrorizing neighbors with his drunken rages and loud music, to purported accusations of child molestation. Both his former wife and a long-time live-in partner report that his inability to control himself when drinking was a primary cause of the breakup of their relationships. He is reportedly a devoted adherent of a cult which advocates the use of psychoactive drugs, engaging in ritualistic sexual behavior, forcing women to submit to dominant males, and isolating themselves from society. This is what my ex-wife has done. Despite not working, Tatiana attended only two hearings before signing over her full power of attorney regarding all aspects of our divorce, including Melisande's upbringing and custody, to a violent alcoholic whose decisions will impact my daughter's life forever.

The role of the Russian Consulate in the abduction itself and the ensuing legal processes has seen Russia make a joke of its own laws and flaunt its impunity to the international community. To accomplish the abduction, Tatiana turned to the Russian Consulate in Washington D.C., for help. What she said is unknown, but she was issued a one-time Russian Repatriation Certificate with our American daughter's name written on

it. This document allowed her to abduct our daughter, a US Citizen, from US soil and transport her directly to a non-Hague country. Imagine the situation: two nervous Russian women with a bewildered 2-year-old US citizen in tow passing through security and boarding a foreign-bound commercial flight at one of America's busiest airports, without passports, without the signed permission of the father.

Tatiana wrote to thank Russian diplomats Nikolay Teoglot and Ekaterina Polozkova for the certificate shortly after the kidnapping; this note is in the possession of the FBI. To reiterate: TSA officials accepted a travel document in lieu of a passport. The airline they flew with required no further checks as to why and how these individuals were boarding an international flight with no passports and no written permission from the other parent. At that very moment the father was happily scouting shops in Rome for presents to bring back to his beloved family. Diplomatic abuse and lack of exit controls and effective screening procedures made this abduction possible.

My daughter is half-Russian. I have many close friends in Russia. Sadly, it is a country in which not only International Laws and Human Rights are frequently violated, but one which does not follow the letter of its own law. Consider the fact that since July 2003, Russia has unilaterally refused to observe its duties under the 1965 Hague Service Convention. It will not serve its citizens with divorce papers from the US, yet it allows its citizens to argue in court that they were not served properly because the papers were not delivered by Hague Service Convention through the Ministry of Justice.

Despite this I was able to satisfy both American and Russian process service requirements and went on to win the American custody case when we were divorced on Dec. 29th, 2010. I proceeded to legalize the divorce decision at the Russian Consulate in Washington D.C., and this decision was affirmed by the Russian Government's Vital Records Office in Moscow, who stated that the American divorce was valid in Russia from the moment on Dec. 29th, 2010 that it went into effect. Now... prepare yourselves to enter a bizarre no-man's land of lawlessness and intrigue.

Provincial Russian Judge Olga Sherbakova, being in possession of the properly served American divorce petition and divorce decision (translated into Russian), allowed Tatiana to initiate a divorce suit with me as respondent. The first hearing was on January 20th, 2011, nearly a month after we were divorced with a decision that the Russian State already considered valid. Maxim Lvlev, Tatiana's brother, as former head of the legal department of the Perm Duma (Senate) is a person with deep political, judicial, and intelligence service connections. Within days a media smear campaign including primetime specials vilifying me was undertaken. The media campaign included public statements and letters by politicians Pavel Mikov and Ilya Neustroev both violated Russian constitutional law regarding separation of the political and judicial systems. They both approached judges – they themselves publicly declared so – and requested an expedited outcome in favor of the Russian mother. Politician Neustroev, Tatiana's brother's former superior, runs a live blog, in which he immediately published an entry about my family titled, "I am Against America". I then received serious threats against my life, so serious that I won't travel to Perm, lending 'credibility' to my former wife's publicized statement that I don't care enough about my daughter to visit her.

Please note, Mr. Chairman, there is never mention of the welfare of my daughter; rather, it's Russia against America and my daughter a disposable political pawn. The process leading up to my "second divorce" from my only wife on March 24th, 2011, was fraught with bias. Legal infractions were numerous. The presiding Judge met in private with Tatiana's side. Evidence was mysteriously introduced into the court clerk's files. Decisions consisting of several typed pages were ready within minutes or even seconds of the conclusion of each hearing, suggesting that the complete text had been prepared before the hearing had commenced. At one hearing, it was claimed that 2½ year old Melisande had said she did not wish to Skype with me, and it was argued that it would constitute child abuse to enforce Skype visitation – this argument was upheld by the courts. It was stated that I was currently in Perm, Russia, plotting a Rambo-like attempt to bring Melisande home, and was therefore forbidden to travel with Melisande. My passport proves that I have not travelled outside of the United States since I was in Rome. Russian Immigration and Border Control or the Consulate could confirm that I have not had a Russian visa, without which it is impossible to travel there, since 2007.

On March 24th, 2011, I was divorced from a person that Russia had acknowledged I was not married to, hadn't been for the preceding three months. During the hearing, 20 procedural norms of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) and Civil Code (CC) were broken. Tatiana was awarded full custody and another divorce as well as child support which, if applied by Russian standards, would require a local father to pay 80% of his income. A complete list of these violations is available upon request, but here is a quick sampling in order of their breaking: 113, 6, 9, 415, 220, 71, 163, 62, 67, 61, 215, 55, and 139. By violating existing laws a Russian court proceeded with 'legal' processes resulting in this decision. I was never served with any court documents, nor allowed to give testimony or present statements from scores of witnesses. My ex-wife's only witness, Mrs. Kseniya Vorontsova, gave fallacious, mendacious testimony against me. I was not given time for translation of the documents. My lawyer was denied or given delayed access to case materials. My legalized Russian court decision and Russian governmental proof that I was already divorced were not taken into consideration. A higher court process was ignored by a lower court. Courts refused to accept and register official evidence. The case was tried in a court which had no jurisdiction, no argument or proof presented that an American child could be under that court's jurisdiction. My daughter and I were denied (and continue to be denied) contact with each other during the course of the proceedings, explicitly violating Russian law.

So grievous were the violations that ten days ago an Appellate Court in Russia upheld my viewpoint, overturning the lower court's decision in its entirety, and sending the case back to a lower court to be retried by a different judge. My ex-wife and I may soon have the singular distinction of having been married once but divorced three times.

Mr. Chairman, I contend that my daughter and I have the inalienable right to a full and loving parental/child relationship. The Russian Consulate's, courts', and government's assistance to Ms. Ivleva and Mr. Medvedev have facilitated violation of my daughter's and my right to that most basic human relationship, eroding the foundations of law, international diplomacy, and of the most important element of society, the family. The alienation that is likely beginning now will have lifelong consequences for Melisande and me and for Melisande's entire family in the US. I can't imagine doing to Melisande what is being done to her. I deplore my family's tragedy being politicized. I appeal to Russia to look beyond political one-upmanship and to acknowledge that a horrible injustice is being done to a little girl who needs her father, and to a father and family that love her little golden head, sparkling eyes and joyous laugh.

Americans must take a decisive stance on defending our own citizens, our own inalienable rights to the most basic of relationships and bonds that a person has – those between children and their parents. I pray that our testimonies might lead to legislation which would unite all bereaved parties, which would prevent similar situations for other parents and children who might suffer due to selfish decisions of one or the other parent. Intervention by government agencies whose hands are tied by incomplete or non-existent laws and enforcement mechanisms can lead to one eventuality and one alone – in non-Hague cases and many Hague cases of child abduction, physical possession of the child spells complete control of the situation and of the other parent. This situation must be remedied for our children's future. Thank you.



May 19, 2011

The Honorable Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
2206 Rayburn H.O.B.
Washington, DC 20515-0918

Re: Colin Bower - Written Testimony
US House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights
Hearing on "International Child Abduction: Broken Laws and Bereaved Lives"
Room 2203 Rayburn House Office Building
May 24, 2011, 2.00 pm edt

Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Honorable Committee Members,

Thank you for inviting me to testify today.

In sum, my children, American citizens, were kidnapped and are being held illegally by Egypt, in Egypt. Meanwhile, the United States rewards Egypt by giving them billions of dollars in aid. This is wrong, and I call for a cessation of any aid to Egypt from the United States until they return my sons.

It is instructive to have some background information on the kidnapping of Noor and Ramsay Bower, my two sons, and then I will speak about several areas I believe should be addressed going forward to protect and honor the lives of our children, their rights, and human rights generally.

My two sons, Noor and Ramsay Bower, now aged 10 and 8, were kidnapped to Egypt in August 2009 by their mother, Mirvat el Nady. The kidnapping took place 8 months after the final Massachusetts divorce judgment - which declared me as the boys' sole legal custodian - was rendered.

In light of Mirvat el Nady's condition (outlined in H Res 193), I had always assumed the parenting responsibilities for my boys. I woke up every day with my boys, fed them, clothed them, ensured they got to school or an activity, scheduled and brought them to their play dates and parties, bathed them, read to them, and put them to bed. I changed jobs in order to simultaneously support my family financially and act as a de facto single parent. After the divorce, I remained their sole legal and primary custodial parent.

What I think of and worry about most is Noor and Ramsay's present safety and future quality of life. I wonder what they are being taught, as I believe this will materially determine what they think and what choices they will ultimately have in life. Their futures are being impacted each day they remain parented by an unfit mother who remains supported and enabled by the el Nady family, from the abduction to their ongoing support of parental alienation and child abuse, both financially (through their family company Egybelg) and otherwise. My boys are being forced to hide from the rest of the world, and I can't begin to understand what this must be like for them.



There are several notable issues involved in this tragedy.

- **This is not a custody battle** - There was a 20 month court case in Boston completed in December 2008, in which both parties participated fully from start to finish, including Mirvat el Nady being represented by six separate high powered US divorce attorneys.
- **This is a federal crime** - The FBI issued a federal warrant for the arrest of Mirvat el Nady, including the issuance of an Interpol red notice.
- **This involves national security** - Mirvat el Nady obtained Egyptian passports for the children in false last names. Passport fraud is an extraditable offense under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the US and Egypt, as false passports by definition are used to commit crimes in other countries - just as in this case.
- **This is child abuse** - The US Supreme court and other international bodies deem both child abduction and parental alienation child abuse. The fact that Mirvat el Nady was found to be a long term addict of schedule 2 narcotics and incapable of anticipating the boys' needs is yet another level of child abuse of and imperilment for the boys.
- **This is a state sponsored crime** - The Egyptian government issued false passports, indirectly owns the airline that ignored obvious flags by letting Mirvat el Nady kidnap the boys to Egypt, and provided el Nady security through the State Security Agency (now defunct for being corrupt). The Egyptian government shut down streets for Mirvat el Nady to travel, something they don't do for the highest level politicians.

There are many things we can do immediately to protect our children and basic human rights. Because time is limited, I will focus on five.

First, before receiving the US\$2bn de facto aid package announced in President Obama's speech last week, Egypt must demonstrate through action its commitment to human rights. Even the people of Egypt, who will either benefit or suffer from this aid, have spoken about the need to make sure this money doesn't simply continue the power structure that existed under the now defunct Mubarak regime. By fact and definition, my children's rights are and have been abused for the past 21 months. Before receiving aid, I call on the US government to ensure that the new Egyptian government is protecting human rights, not violating them, and demonstrates this through the return of Noor and Ramsay.

Second, before receiving aid, we need to ensure that the MLAT is being enforced by our partners, and appropriate extradition is being carried out. This is a national security issue, and one that impacts the very safety of US citizens. We should not provide aid to countries that have enabled crimes to be committed in our country, against our citizens, and who do not implement conditions of the MLAT. Any agreement can be signed, but if it is not enforced, it is worse than having no treaty at all, as it allows purveyors of deceit to fly under a false cloak of legitimacy.

Third, before they receive aid, we need countries to agree to recognize and mirror existing probate orders involving custody decisions reached in residential jurisdictions where both parties were active participants and legally represented. The country harboring the fugitive should issue a mirror order consistent with the existing order in the country of the children's primary residence.

Fourth, I call on the Republican party to stop the moratorium on Resolutions being heard this Congress, and make available the ability of House Resolutions to be heard on the floor, including and notably H Res




103, which is bi-partisan and involves the lives of my two little boys. Alternatively, I ask for exceptions to be made in cases crucial to the lives of American children, including my boys and others in a similar situation. I ask that both parties stand together to send a strong message to Egypt that we support the Egyptian people's goal of attaining democracy and human rights by ensuring their new government acts in concert with these values before receiving the financial backing of the United States. Given the relevant facts, it is not a stretch to say that H Res 193, if acted upon, could very well save the lives of Noor and Ramsay.

Fifth, there must be further controls in place to protect against the unlawful removal of our children to foreign countries.

Committee members, I thank you for your invitation to speak today and for your consideration of this most important issue.

Best regards,


Colin Bower
Father of Noor and Ramsay Bower

Presidential actions that can be taken under Section 205(a) of H.R. 1940

- (1) A private demarche.
- (2) An official public demarche.
- (3) A public condemnation.
- (4) A public condemnation within one or more multilateral fora.
- (5) The delay or cancellation of one or more scientific exchanges.
- (6) The delay or cancellation of one or more cultural exchanges.
- (7) The denial of one or more working, official, or state visits.
- (8) The delay or cancellation of one or more working, official, or state visits.
- (9) The restriction of the number of student (including US Information Agency and vocational training programs) visas issued to nationals of such country.
- (10) The withdrawal, limitation or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
- (11) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of any (or a specified number of) guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to such government or the agency or instrumentality of such government determined by the President to be responsible for the unresolved case or patterns of noncooperation.
- (12) The withdrawal, limitation or suspension of United States security assistance in accordance with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act.
- (13) In accordance with the International Financial Institutions Act, directing the U.S. executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against loans primarily benefitting the government or the agency or instrumentality of the government determined by the President to be responsible for the unresolved case or pattern of noncooperation.
- (14) The denial, withdrawal, suspension, or limitation of benefits provided pursuant to title V of the Trade Act of 1974 relating to the Generalized System of Preferences.
- (15) Ordering the heads of the appropriate U.S. agencies not to issue any (or a specified number of) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a specified number of authorities), to export any goods or technology to the government or to the

agency or instrumentality of the government determined by the President to be responsible for the unresolved case or pattern of noncooperation, under:

- (A) The Export Administration Act of 1979;
- (B) The Arms Export Control Act;
- (C) The Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
- (D) Any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the U.S. Government as a condition for the export or re-export of goods or services.

- (16) Prohibiting any U.S. financial institution from making loans or providing credits totaling more than \$10 million in any 12-month period to the government or agency or instrumentality of the government determined by the President to be responsible for the unresolved case or pattern of noncooperation.
 - (17) Prohibiting the U.S. Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the government or the agency or instrumentality of the government determined by the President to be responsible for the unresolved case or pattern of noncooperation.
-



Representative Christopher Smith
 Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
 Committee on Foreign Affairs
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Smith:

Yahoo! is pleased to offer our support to the most recent (March, 2012) draft of the Global Online Freedom Act. We are grateful for your tireless efforts in working with us, human rights groups, academics and others to craft a reasoned, meaningful effort that will push all online companies to responsible engagement in countries around the world. In particular, the safe harbor in the bill for companies that join efforts like the Global Network Initiative (GNI) will go a long way to encouraging a wider group of companies to join us in efforts to develop responsible industry practices. Yahoo! is a co-founding member of GNI (www.globalnetworkinitiative.org), and has recently participated in the first ever third-party assessment of company implementation of GNI's principles, which GNI will feature in its annual report in April of 2012.

Issues of online freedom, privacy and responsibility are not easy. This past year has shown us the incredible power of the Internet to foster freedom, democracy and openness across the globe. And the Arab Spring was just one example of citizens using online tools to communicate with each other, learn, and organize. But with that great potential comes significant risks that cannot be ignored – risks, for instance, that governments will seek to turn the incredible positive power of the Internet against those same citizens. Internet companies have seen these risks firsthand, and Yahoo! has worked hard to minimize risks to our users as we enter new markets or make decisions about our business operations.

Yahoo! cares deeply about these issues, and has spent the last five years building a robust program to integrate human rights decision-making into our business operations. In addition to our work on the GNI, Yahoo!'s Business & Human Rights Program (BHRP) implements its mission through a number of core initiatives, including:

- Developing an accountability framework, designed to assess Yahoo!'s performance in meeting Yahoo!'s overall goals and operational steps relating to human rights issues;
- Developing guiding principles and operational guidelines, as well as employee training, which translate Yahoo!'s support for freedom of expression and user privacy into practical steps to be followed by employees;
- Conducting Human Rights Impact Assessments, which examine the human rights landscape in prospective markets, evaluate challenges to free expression and privacy that might result from



the proposed offering of services, and offer strategic approaches to protect the rights of Yahoo!'s users;

- Fostering internal and external stakeholder engagement with users, employees, civil society groups, government and shareholders to address the complex issues at the intersection of human rights and ICT;

- Creating a website and an e-mail alias to inform internal and external stakeholders about Yahoo!'s human rights initiatives and to elicit their feedback (<http://humanrights.yahoo.com/> and blurp@yahoo-inc.com);

- Launching and hosting the Yahoo! Business & Human Rights Summit (<http://ycorpblog.com/2009/05/07/a-summit-for-human-rights>), a stakeholder shared-learning forum about technology and free expression. (<http://www.yhumanrightsblog.com/blog/our-initiatives/business-human-rights-summit/>);

- Joining the Clinton Global Initiative and developing a commitment aligned with promoting and supporting free expression;

- Launching the Change Your World series in Cairo, an event created to shine the light on extraordinary women who are creating positive change in the world and identify areas where companies can use their technology and platforms to amplify women's voices. Yahoo! will host a Change Your World event in Washington DC on May 18, 2012, as well as an event in Brazil in November of 2012.

Our sincere hope is that other companies join us in these efforts, as we have found that good business and responsible behavior are not mutually exclusive at all. Indeed, we believe that dialogue between companies and civil society organizations can help us better understand how to do our jobs the right way – for us, and for our users.

We very much look forward to continuing to work with you on this important effort, and we again thank you for the thoughtful and balanced approach in this legislation.

Sincerely,



David Hantman
Deputy General Counsel & Vice President, Global Public Policy
Yahoo! Inc.



March 27, 2012

Dear Representative Smith:

We write in strong support of H.R. 3605, the Global Online Freedom Act of 2011. This bill is an important tool in preventing repressive governments from enlisting U.S. companies in their effort to transform the Internet into a tool of surveillance and repression.

The Internet is an incredible tool for communication, but as some governments have discovered, it is also an effective tool for censorship and oppression. Many repressive countries, including China and Iran, among others, are transforming the Internet into a powerful and effective tool to silence political and religious speech and to track down those who are fighting for freedom.

We have witnessed an increase in the arrests and detentions of bloggers, the blocking of websites, online intimidation and surveillance of peaceful political activists, and aggressive denial of service attacks against websites that promote the free flow of legitimate political and religious speech.

We value the promotion of Internet freedom because it derives from universal and cherished rights—the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. An open Internet gives people a platform from which to express their legitimate aspirations and to hold their governments accountable. We believe that people in every country deserve to be able to take part in building a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic society, and H.R. 3605 will help promote a more open and free Internet.

By moving quickly to pass the Global Online Freedom Act, the U.S. Congress can send a powerful message to dictators around the globe that we will not idly stand by while fundamental freedoms are eroded online. Thank you for introducing this important legislation and we look forward to supporting its passage.

Sincerely,

Initiatives for China

Beijing Spring

Yibao

New Hope Foundation

China Rights Network

The Alliance of the Guard of Canadian Values

Federation for a Democratic China

Uyghur American Association

Princeton China Initiative

China Truth Foundation

China Free Press

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: Mary McGuire in Washington, +1-202-747-7035

Freedom House Endorses Global Online Freedom Act

Washington – December 8, 2011 –

Freedom House supports the Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA) 2.0, which was introduced today in the U.S. Congress as H.R. 3605. The bill, which would hinder the ability of U.S. companies to sell surveillance and censorship technologies to repressive governments, is crucial to the promotion of global internet freedom.

"U.S. companies are reported to have sold technologies for monitoring digital communications and censoring online content to repressive governments in the Middle East and elsewhere," said Daniel Calingaert, vice president for policy and external relations at Freedom House. "GOFA is the first serious legislative proposal to stop sales of U.S. technology that is used to violate human rights."

The bill would prohibit exports of surveillance and censorship technologies to countries that restrict the internet. It would also require U.S. technology companies to disclose their policies for collecting and sharing personal data and for blocking access to online content.

"The explosive growth of social media and internet use generally is being met by increasingly sophisticated forms of repression," said Sanja Kelly, project director for *Freedom on the Net* at Freedom House. "More and more governments are eavesdropping on the communications of human rights activists and restricting internet users' access to information, such as independent news websites and peaceful online political discussions."

For more information, visit:

[Freedom on the Net 2011](#)[Foreign Policy: Hacking the Revolution](#)[Growing Challenges to Internet Freedom](#)

Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization that supports democratic change, monitors the status of freedom around the world, and advocates for democracy and human rights.

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efforts by the US government to protect internet freedom by giving the government new resources to keep the Internet open and give it new authority to ensure that certain technologies do not fall into the hands of repressive governments.

Finally, it would level the playing field for responsible businesses by ensuring that US trade negotiations protect freedom of expression and thereby allowing innovative companies to fairly compete, especially in countries where governments try to censor their products or services. These are modest, but critical steps needed to help keep the internet open.

By moving quickly to pass the Global Online Freedom Act, the U.S. Congress can send a powerful message to dictators around the globe that we will not idly stand by while fundamental freedoms are eroded online. Thank you for introducing this important legislation and we look forward to supporting its passage.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Arvind Ganesan', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Arvind Ganesan
Director, Business and Human Rights Division
Human Rights Watch



March 26, 2012

Honorable Christopher H. Smith
Member of Congress
US House of Representatives

Dear Representative Smith:

I write on behalf of the United States section of Amnesty International in strong support of H.R. 3605, the Global Online Freedom Act of 2011. We consider this bill to be an important tool in preventing repressive governments from enlisting U.S. companies in efforts to use the Internet as a tool of surveillance and repression.

The Internet is an incredible tool for communication, but as some governments have demonstrated, it can also be used for censorship and oppression. Many repressive governments, including those of China and Iran, among others, are attempting to transform the Internet into a tool to track down those who are fighting for freedom and to silence political and religious speech.

Amnesty International has documented arrests and detentions of bloggers, the blocking of websites, online intimidation and surveillance of peaceful political activists, and aggressive denial of service attacks against websites that promote the free flow of legitimate political and religious speech.

We value the promotion of Internet freedom because it derives from universal and cherished rights—the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. An open Internet gives people a platform from which to express their legitimate aspirations and to hold their governments accountable. We believe that people in every country deserve to be able to take part in building a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic society, and we consider a more open and free Internet to be an important tool that can be used to achieve this end.

By moving quickly to pass the Global Online Freedom Act, the U.S. Congress can send a powerful message around the globe that the United States will not idly stand by while fundamental freedoms are eroded online. Thank you for introducing this important legislation. We look forward to supporting its passage.

Sincerely,

T. Kumar
International Advocacy Director
Amnesty International USA



27 March 2012

Dear Representative Smith:

We write in support of H.R. 3605, the Global Online Freedom Act of 2011. This bill is an important tool in preventing repressive governments from enlisting U.S. companies in their efforts to transform the Internet into a tool of surveillance and repression.

The Internet is an extraordinary tool for communication, but as some governments have discovered, it is also an effective mechanism for censorship and oppression. Many countries, including China and Iran, among others, are transforming the Internet into a powerful and effective tool to silence political and religious speech and to track down those who are fighting for freedom. While such technologies were once limited to repressive states, this "worst practice" in curtailing the rights of users is spreading, from Thailand to India to Syria to Venezuela, as more governments seek out questionable censorship and surveillance programs.

We have witnessed an increase in the arrests and detentions of bloggers, the blocking of websites, online intimidation and surveillance of peaceful political activists, and aggressive denial of service attacks against websites that promote the free flow of political and religious speech and association.

While civil society has had some success through public campaigning, and the media has exposed the trade through thorough reporting, government efforts have been thwarted by the efforts of other governments who would use censorship and surveillance technologies to abuse their citizens' rights. However, it is clear that a more comprehensive and holistic regulatory approach is needed.

Critical to this effort is the bill's provisions requiring greater transparency in the companies that operate in this censorship and surveillance technology sector. **However we maintain two important reservations about the current draft of the bill.**

Firstly, while the draft of H.R. 3605 being introduced today (on March 27th, 2012) continues to improve on previous iterations, we urge Congress to demand this kind of accountability from all companies in the sector, while being mindful that the bill's provisions do not ensnare lightweight technologies that will actually help activists or sanction "dual use" technologies in onerous amounts of licensing procedures. Ill-conceived regulation may actually hurt activists while enabling their oppressors, as we have seen when governments "over sanction".

Secondly, we encourage Congress to engage a multistakeholder body comprised of relevant government officials, internet companies, and human rights organizations to



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assist in identifying which countries are "internet restrictive." The sanctions process in the United States has historically been prone to politicization, often placing certain countries in the 'bad' list, while turning a blind eye to other countries, which should be treated with equal suspicion. A multistakeholder body could instrumentally advise the US government both in terms of the countries and technologies should be sanctioned to achieve the greater realization of internet freedom and digital rights around the world. Having greater impartiality and uniformity from which to judge all countries, not just those designated as "internet restricting" and technologies would be a useful step forward.

By moving to pass the Global Online Freedom Act, the U.S. Congress can send a powerful message to governments around the globe that it will not idly stand by while fundamental freedoms are eroded online. Rightly, it should also require the U.S. government as a major customer of these technologies to push for greater vendor accountability and transparency.

We look forward to working with Congress to ensure that the effectiveness of any legislation is maximized while unintended consequences are avoided and thank Congressman Smith for his leadership on this important issue.

Sincerely,

Brett Solomon
Executive Director
Access | AccessNow.org

Access (<https://www.accessnow.org>) is a global movement for digital freedom premised on the belief that the realization of human rights in the 21st century is increasingly dependent on access to the internet and other forms of technology. For more information contact press@accessnow.org or call Blair at 202-503-6141