[House Report 106-620]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 106-620
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001
_______
May 16, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 4392]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
The bill as reported............................................. 2
Purpose.......................................................... 6
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee
intent......................................................... 7
Scope of committee review........................................ 7
Committee findings and recommendations........................... 8
Areas of Special Interest........................................ 10
State Department Security Concerns........................... 10
Analyst Collocation.......................................... 14
Oversight of NSA Modernization............................... 15
Collaboration................................................ 17
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination......... 18
IC Communications Architect/Architecture..................... 19
State of Defense Human Intelligence.......................... 22
Military Pay and Civilian Pay................................ 23
NFIP Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs)........ 24
Reprogramming and Transfers Within CIA....................... 25
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)............ 27
Joint Military Intelligence Program.............................. 27
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities..................... 35
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported.............. 40
Title I--Intelligence Activities............................. 40
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations............. 40
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations....... 40
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments............... 40
Section 104--Community Management Account................ 40
Section 105--Transfer Authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence................................... 41
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System.......................................... 42
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations............. 42
Title III--General Provisions................................ 42
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and
Benefits Authorized by Law............................. 42
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence
Activities............................................. 42
Section 303--Sense of Congress on Intelligence Community
Contracting............................................ 42
Section 304--Authorization for Travel on any Common
Carrier for Certain Intelligence Collection Personnel.. 42
Section 305--Reports on Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions................................. 43
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................ 43
Section 401--Modifications to Central Intelligence
Agency's Central Services Program...................... 43
Section 402--Technical Corrections....................... 43
Title V--Department of Defense............................... 43
Section 501--Three-year Extension of Authority to Engage
in Commercial Activities as Security for Intelligence
Activities............................................. 43
Section 502--Contracting Authority for the National
Reconnaissance Office.................................. 44
Committee Position and Record Votes Taken........................ 44
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government
Reform......................................................... 45
Oversight Findings............................................... 45
Fiscal Year Cost Projections..................................... 45
Congressional Budget Office Estimates............................ 45
Committee Cost Estimates......................................... 48
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of
this Legislation............................................... 48
Changes to Existing Law.......................................... 48
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence community management account.
Sec. 105. Transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Authorization for travel on any common carrier for certain
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of
mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central
services program.
Sec. 402. Technical corrections.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Three-year extension of authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection activities.
Sec. 502. Contracting authority for the National Reconnaissance Office.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2001
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4392 of the One
Hundred Sixth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2001 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the
authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of
$144,231,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the
Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available
until September 30, 2002.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 356 full-time personnel as of September 30,
2001. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain
available until September 30, 2002.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there
are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2001, any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), $28,000,000 shall be available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds
provided for research, development, test, and evaluation
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2002, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2003.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The
Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the
activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. TRANSFER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Limitation on Delegation of Authority of Departments To Object to
Transfers.--Section 104(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-4(d)(2)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)'';
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and
(E) as clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively;
(3) in clause (v), as so redesignated, by striking ``the
Secretary or head'' and inserting ``subject to subparagraph
(B), the Secretary or head''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to object
to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be delegated by the
Secretary or head of the department involved.
``(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority to
object to such a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense,
but only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
``(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) shall
have no effect unless submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence
in writing.''.
(b) Limitation on Delegation of Duties of Director of Central
Intelligence.--Section 104(d)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(1)) is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(1)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority given the
Director under this subsection to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management.''.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2001 the sum of
$216,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the
intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security
interests of the United States and consistent with operational and
security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities,
and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a
manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated
as having been made in the United States.
SEC. 304. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection
personnel
``Sec. 116. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize travel on any
common carrier that, in the discretion of the Director, would by its
use maintain or enhance the protection of sources or methods of
intelligence collection or maintain or enhance the security of
personnel of the intelligence community carrying out intelligence
collection activities.
``(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--The Director may only delegate
the authority granted by this section to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director
for Operations.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National
Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 115 the following new item:
``Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence
collection personnel.''.
SEC. 305. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL
MUNITIONS.
Section 721(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (50 U.S.C. 2366) (Public Law 104-293, 110 Stat. 3474) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later than 6 months after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter,'' and
inserting ``Not later than March 1, 2001, and every March 1
thereafter,''; and
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``6 months'' and inserting
``year''.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S CENTRAL
SERVICES PROGRAM.
Section 21(c)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403u(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new
subparagraph:
``(F) Receipts from miscellaneous reimbursements from
individuals and receipts from the rental of property and
equipment to employees and detailees.''.
SEC. 402. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
(a) Reporting Requirement.--Section 17(d)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is amended--
(1) by adding ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (D);
(2) by striking subparagraph (E); and
(3) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (E).
(b) Terminology with respect to Government Agencies.--Section
17(e)(8) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403q(e)(8)) is amended by striking ``Federal'' each place it appears
and inserting ``Government''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES.
Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``December 31, 2000'' and inserting ``December 31, 2003''.
SEC. 502. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--The National Reconnaissance Office (``NRO'') shall
negotiate, write, and manage vehicle acquisition or launch contracts
that affect or bind the NRO and to which the United States is a party.
(b) Effective Date.--This section shall apply to any contract for NRO
vehicle acquisition or launch, as described in subsection (a), that is
negotiated, written, or executed after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(c) Retroactivity.--This section shall not apply to any contracts, as
described in subsection (a), in effect as of the date of the enactment
of this Act.
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for
(a) the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community
Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30,
2001 for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government and permit the
Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal Year 2001 for any intelligence
element up to two percent above the authorized levels,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $28 million for the National Drug
Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Authorize intelligence collection personnel of
the Intelligence Community to use any common carrier
for travel during the course of their intelligence
collection activities;
(5) Permit deposit of certain miscellaneous receipts
into the Central Intelligence Agency's Working Capital
Fund of the Central Services Program;
(6) Extend the Department of Defense's authority to
engage in commercial activities as security for
intelligence collection activities;
(7) Limit the authority of the National
Reconnaissance Office to use external contracting
offices to negotiate, write, and manage launch vehicle
acquisition and launch services contracts.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified Annex to this public report includes
the classified Schedule of Authorizations and its
associated language. The committee views the classified
Annex as an integral part of this legislation. The
classified Annex contains a thorough discussion of all
budget issues considered by the committee, which
underlies the funding authorization found in the
Schedule of Authorizations. The committee intends that
all intelligence programs and intelligence-related
activities discussed in the classified Annex to this
report be conducted in accord with the guidance and
limitations set forth as associate language therein.
The classified Schedule is incorporated directly into
this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill.
The classified Annex is available for review by all
Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of Rule XXIV of the House.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities (TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by:
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Department of State;
(6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the Department of
Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the
National Reconnaissance Office; and (10) the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA is a diverse array of
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Armed
Services Committee in the House of Representatives has joint
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs
comprising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support,
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP),
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program
(DSRP). As with TIARA programs, the Armed Services Committee in
the House of Representatives has joint oversight and
authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising the JMIP.
Committee Findings and Recommendations
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 2001 intelligence budget, carrying out its annual
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close
examination of intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.
The review reflected the Committee's continuing belief that
intelligence activities must be examined by program, as well as
by function. The committee held eleven committee budget-related
hearings, principally on a program level, including Covert
Action. A separate hearing was on support to military
operations. Likewise, a hearing was held addressing the
Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) overall budget
submission, the state of health of the Intelligence Community,
and to examine the DCI's views and plans for the future of
intelligence and the Intelligence Community. There were, in
addition, numerous individual briefings of Members and over 200
staff briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget
requests.
In the schedule of authorizations and the accompanying
explanatory language, the Committee has discussed numerous
specific matters related to the fiscal year 2001 budget. In the
following section, the Committee addresses several issues that
it believes are particularly important where it has been no
direct budgetary action.
Taken as a whole, the Committee's budgetary actions and
general provisions reflect the Committee's concern that the
United States is placing undue risks on its armed forces and
its national security interests by not redressing the many
crucial problems facing the Intelligence Community.
In the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) arena, poor
planning, infrastructure problems, extended requirements for
military force protection, and unexpected contingency
operations have all worked to take money from the ``front
line'' field officers, thus limiting our efforts to rebuild our
``eyes and ears'' around the globe.
In the area of imagery intelligence (IMINT),
despite the oversight committees' exhortations, we are still
faced with totally inadequate systems planning and investment
for the tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
(TPED) of the imagery collection capabilities we are building,
let alone the capabilities of other future collectors.
In the area of space-based collection,
unanticipated technical problems with some satellite programs
in development will likely cause scheduling delays and cost
increases. Moreover, an insufficient priority on developing
cutting-edge technologies ensures that the core mission of
space intelligence--to collect secrets--will continue to
languish and become increasing limited.
In the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, we continue to see extensive over-
utilization of very limited, but critical airborne assets, with
little relief in sight. While planning for deployment of new
ISR airborne capabilities into the theaters, the Department of
Defense has taken money from existing, supposedly
complementary, platforms to pay for future capabilities. The
result: our overall ISR capabilities and resources are
decreasing at a time when our military forces are relying on
them more and more.
The most serious, immediate problem is with
signals intelligence (SIGINT) resources. The January ``crash''
of National Security Agency (NSA) computers was not the result
of a terrorist attack or hacker gamesmanship. The problem
resulted from NSA's lack of resources for new infrastructure
needs, the mismanagement of outdated Information Technology
(IT) resources, and the lack of sufficient acquisition
processes and expertise. This should have come as a surprise to
no one. Indeed, the Committee has, for at least three years,
warned NSA and the Intelligence Community of concerns in these
areas. The Director of NSA has begun efforts to address these
issues, and his efforts have the Committee's support. Likewise,
the Committee has taken specific actions within this bill to
begin to address these issues.
The Committee's review of this year's budget request has
included testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), his senior leadership and the managers of individual
programs and agencies, as well as leaders from the Department
of Defense and the military services who use and rely on
intelligence systems and information on a daily basis. Their
message has been unanimous and crystal clear: there are not
enough intelligence resources to meet the immediate needs of
national security, let alone future needs.
For the past five years, the Committee and Congress have
sought to increase the ``top line,'' or overall funding level
for the Intelligence Community. These increases have ranged
from significant, to more modest amounts, such as that found in
this year's recommended authorization. Although Congress has
acted, it is the Administration's responsibility to build each
year a healthy intelligence budget that meets national security
needs. With this in mind, the Committee has also attempted to
prod the President, the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense to re-examine the basic process used
to put the yearly budget request together.
The United States cannot continue to use the same processes
to build the intelligence budgets of the 21st century that were
used in the Cold War. American interests have changed, new
threats have evolved and the priority placed on intelligence
and the role of the Intelligence Community has grown. For the
President and senior policymakers, intelligence often forms the
basis for key foreign policy strategies and decisions, and can
provide insights as to the effect of such decisions. At its
best, intelligence provides key indications and warning (I&W)
information that can direct attention to issues and areas
before crises occur, to allow for appropriate actions to
provide stability and, hopefully, deter or avoid conflict. Yet,
despite the need to supply this information, our intelligence
resources are primarily directed toward the most important
issues, leaving fewer resources for the critical I&W function,
especially in areas of the world that could erupt overnight.
For the military, intelligence is now the basis for and
organic to everything it does. HUMINT and SIGINT, in
particular, provide direct and immediate threat data to
personnel engaged in activities that risk their lives on a
daily basis: our ground forces in Kosovo, our pilots conducting
Northern and Southern Watch missions in Iraq, our troops on the
border between North and South Korea, our forces engaged in
counternarcotics operations in Latin America, and our Special
Operations personnel who must enter an area unannounced and
undetected, and require the friendly face of an intelligence
officer to give them ``ground truth.''
As these critical requirements have grown at a rapid pace,
the intelligence budget has become more and more inadequate,
with existing resources increasingly drawn off to meet day- to-
day tactical requirements. Global coverage and predictive,
strategic intelligence have, as a result, suffered. This
translates into the lack of warning of nuclear tests in India,
our inability to monitor key facilities suspected of producing
weapons of mass destruction because assets are focused on
crisis areas, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,
the extreme shortage of ISR assets in key areas of the world.
Intelligence should be the first line of defense, yet, it
is not treated as such. Remedying this situation, however, is
not a task that Congress can, or should, take on alone. Along
with a new approach to budgeting by the Administration, there
also must be a Community-wide effort actually to work as a
``community.''
Areas of Special Interest
state department security concerns
The Committee is deeply disturbed over the loss of a laptop
computer from the allegedly secure workspace of the Office of
Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State (INR). The
laptop contained highly classified compartmented information.
The State Department failed to notify the FBI about the
loss of the computer until March 22, 2000. On April 17, 2000,
an article appeared in the Washington Post detailing the
disappearance of the laptop. Prior to the news story, neither
the House, nor the Senate, intelligence committees were
notified of the loss and the potential compromise of highly
classified intelligence information, as required by Sec. 502(1)
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The delayed
notice (up to two months) to the FBI hindered the Bureau's
investigation. The Committee does not believe that the failure
by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency
to provide the required notification was justified.
The Committee is also troubled by a pattern of problems at
the Department of State regarding matters of security.
In February 1998, an unknown man in a tweed sport coat was
watched as he entered the ``secure'' area of the office of the
Executive Secretary, which is physically located within the
Secretary of State's office suite, and walked away with more
than a few documents containing Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) material. Although the FBI was advised in a
timely manner of that theft, the intelligence oversight
committees were notified by INR of the matter only after news
stories concerning the incident were published by Time magazine
and the Washington Post.
In September 1998, the State Department's Inspector General
documented a failure of the State Department to protect
classified intelligence information. State Department officials
have not responded fully to the Inspector General's
recommendations. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1999, Congress directed the Inspector General to
perform a review of the Department's procedures for protecting
intelligence information within headquarters. The Inspector
General was also asked to make recommendations based on her
findings to enhance security.
In September 1999, the intelligence committees received
that report. The Inspector General concluded that ``the
Department of State is substantially not in compliance with the
DCIDs (Director of Central Intelligence Directives) that govern
the handling of SCI.'' The Inspector General described a
situation where unescorted foreign visitors are permitted
access to the Department. Uncleared maintenance, repair, and
char force personnel were permitted unescorted access to areas
where classified intelligence information is handled,
processed, stored, and discussed.
Substantial security enhancements were recommended by the
Inspector General. Most significantly, the Inspector General
urged the implementation of a visitor escort policy. It was
noted in the September 1999 audit that although the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security published visitor escort requirements on
November 17, 1998, these were rescinded on November 23, 1998,
on the direct order of the Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs. By the time of the publication of the
Inspector General report, a new escort policy was in effect,
but the Committee has continuing concerns about its scope and
enforcement. Additionally, the Inspector General called for
better control mechanisms for intelligence information, noting
that the State Department was not in full compliance with the
applicable DCIDs regarding SCI material.
In December 1999, a Russian diplomat was arrested outside
the State Department in connection with the discovery of a
Russian bugging device in the chairrail of a seventh floor
conference room in the Main State building.
Were intelligence information not so important for the
State Department for the conduct of informed foreign policy,
the Committee would likely be advocating drastic measures
cutting off access to highly classified materials. After all,
the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information
jeopardizes lives of intelligence officers and assets and
compromise multi-billion dollar secret intelligence
capabilities. Nevertheless, the Committee is hopeful that
measured responses can accomplish the objective of improving
security practices at Main State and throughout the Department.
Serious and meaningful action, however, must be taken and
compliance with DCID procedures by State Department employees
and officials must be verified. Moreover, accountability for
security failures must be real.
In this regard, the Committee notes that on April 24, 2000,
Secretary Albright transferred responsibility for protection of
SCI material from INR to the Diplomatic Security Bureau, which
was suggested by the State Inspector General in September 1999.
This step, and others announced by the Secretary, may need to
be reviewed, but they are at least a recognition that a serious
situation exists at the State Department with respect to its
cavalier attitude toward security generally and particularly
toward intelligence information. It is unconscionable that, as
the Inspector General found, security of intelligence
information within INR was not a priority.
Although ample criticism can be directed toward State
Department officials, the Committee also notes that the DCI has
not exercised his authorities in this regard to his utmost. The
Committee finds it necessary to emphasize again that the DCI is
obligated under law to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure (50 U.S.C. Sec. 403-3(c)(6)) and,
further, is responsible for ensuring the establishment of
security and access standards for managing and handling foreign
intelligence systems, information, and products (Exec. Order
12333 Part 1.5(g) and (h), respectively). In this regard, the
Committee appreciates the DCI's recent commitment to form ``an
Agency task force to conduct a prompt and thorough inventory,
review, and risk-assessment of the information resident on the
missing laptop's hard-drive.'' (DCI letter to the Secretary of
State, 2 May 2000). Additionally, the Committee looks forward
tothe DCI's evaluation of ``the need for additional
improvements in the handling and accountability for classified
information, particularly Sensitive Compartmented Information, in the
Intelligence Community.'' The Committee fully expects the DCI to focus
considerable attention on the State Department, in this regard.
The Committee also expects the DCI, as part of this
evaluation, to review and make recommendations about the number
of positions at the State Department that require SCI-level
clearances and the appropriate number of SCI facilities (SCIF)
within the State Department. The Committee requests that the
DCI submit these recommendations to the Committee prior to
conference on this bill.
The Committee also requests that the DCI certify to the
Committee, in writing, that the State Department is in full
compliance with all of the DCIDs concerning information
security, counterintelligence measures, and personnel security,
as well as any executive orders, regulations, or policy
directives affecting the protection and handling of classified
intelligence information.
Pending the receipt of the DCI's report, including the
results of his review and recommendations, and receipt of the
certification of compliance with the DCIDs, the Committee
recommends a fence of a portion of those funds authorized to be
appropriated for INR's activities in this bill, and a fence of
a portion of those funds authorized to be appropriated by this
bill to the Office of the DCI. The Committee, likewise,
recommends that additional funding be transferred to the CIA to
help fund infrastructure needs associated with the detailing of
INR analysts to the Directorate of Intelligence of the CIA, and
to reimburse the Department of State for such analysts who will
be co-located at the CIA. For further elucidation of the issues
relating to the detailing and colocation of INR analysts, see
the budget language relating to the CIAP and the general
provisions section, supra. Finally, because of the attitudes
related to security procedures and awareness, as previously
described, and based on several Committee inquiries while
visiting diplomatic posts throughout the world, the Committee
is also taking steps to reorganize the management, operations
and security of diplomatic telecommunications. A discussion of
these steps can be found within the classified annex.
It should be noted that the Committee will be conducting an
investigation of security of classified intelligence
information at the Department of State. Indeed, the Committee
has engaged the services of a security and counter-intelligence
expert to assist in this investigation. The consultant and
other participants in the investigation will:
1. Undertake field inspection visits on behalf of the
Committee to those State Department components
responsible for counterintelligence, protection of
intelligence sources and methods, and related security
issues;
2. Review compliance by the State Department with
applicable laws, regulations, executive orders, and
policy guidance pertaining to counterintelligence,
protection of intelligence sources and methods, and
related security issues;
3. Interview personnel from the State Department and
other intelligence community elements concerning the
effectiveness of counterintelligence, protection of
intelligence sources and methods, and related security
issue reforms being implemented by the Department of
State;
4. Provide a written report on the materials,
measures, and capabilities currently available, and
planned to be made available, to the State Department
concerning counterintelligence, protection of
intelligence sources and methods, and related security
issues;
5. Provide a written report on the status of and
implementation of reforms concerning
counterintelligence, protection of intelligence sources
and methods, and related security issues at the
Department of State; and
6. Recommend to the Committee, in writing, any
additional measures that would improve
counterintelligence, protection of intelligence sources
and methods, and related security issues at the State
Department.
The Committee expects that the report of the investigation
will consider whether an intelligence information security
office (IISO) should be established within INR to manage
intelligence information security practices. Such an office
could perform the following functions: ensure compliance with
the DCIDs and all other laws, regulations, and executive orders
relating to the protection of intelligence information;
implement and enforce necessary control mechanisms relating to
access to classified intelligence information; undertake
counterintelligence measures that enhance the protection of the
intelligence information and the sources and methods of
intelligence collection, such as the implementation of
counterintelligence polygraph examinations; report in a timely
fashion to the appropriate government entities, including the
intelligence oversight committees, of any violation of security
measures that are designed to protect SCI material and sources
and methods. The office could report to the Secretary and the
DCI through the Assistant Secretary for INR and be comprised of
officers detailed from CIA, NSA, and the FBI, who are
experienced professionals with significant backgrounds in
security and counterintelligence matters.
The Committee looks forward to the conclusion in the report
on whether the creation of an IISO is useful or wise, and
whether, if created, it would be effective at improving what
has been characterized by the DCI and Secretary of State as a
``cultural attitude'' of disinterest in security within the
Department of State. Such an attitude has over time minimized
the importance of security, which is ``an inherent,
inextricable, and indispensable component of all jobs'' at the
Department of State (Secretary Albright at DoS, 3 May 2000).
The Secretary of State declared to the employees of the
Department of State on May 3, 2000, ``If you are not a
professional about security, you are a failure.'' The Committee
could not agree more strongly. Actions, however, will be the
true test of the Department's commitment to improve security, a
commitment to which the Secretary has personally associated
herself.
Analyst Collocation
All-source analysis is the sine qua non of intelligence
production. This category includes intelligence products that
have been written by analysts who have access to all available
intelligence information collected on a particular issue or
area, including human intelligence, imagery, signals
intelligence, open-source information, and any other data
collected through other specific technical programs or special
platforms. All-source intelligence can provide the highest
quality, most complete assessment of a situation for the
military commanders and policy makers who face critical
decisions.
Within the NFIP, all-source analysis is concentrated within
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence
Agency, although the National Intelligence Council, the
National Drug Intelligence Center, the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Department of
Energy all maintain all-source analysis capabilities. In
addition, many analysts at the so-called ``stovepipe''
agencies--such as the National Security Agency and the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency--perform many all-source analytical
functions, even if they are not classified specifically as
``all source analysts.''
The Committee has for many years promoted the concept of
Intelligence Community ``corporateness.'' In the 1996 study
IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, the Committee
recommended a more corporate, consolidated approach to
intelligence, and the reinforcement of the CIA's role as the
premier all-source analytical agency.
In order to foster a more corporate approach to all-source
analysis and to support the DCI's goals for developing new
analytic methods and investing in people and knowledge, the
Committee has transferred funds into the Central Intelligence
Agency Program for the collocation of analysts from State/INR
at CIA. These analysts are to be located within the CIA's DI on
a reimbursable basis.
The Committee also believes that the Community's all-source
capabilities and expertise may also be enhanced with the
collocation of NSA SIGINT analysts within the CIA's DI, in a
similar fashion to NIMA imagery analysts who are deployed there
today. Therefore, the Committee directs the DCI and the
Director, NSA, to study the concept of moving some NSA analysts
to the CIA's DI and to report to the Committee, prior to the
submission of the fiscal year 2002 budget request, on steps
that can be taken to effect this. The Committee would prefer
that such a program be implemented no later than in fiscal year
2002.
The Committee believes that all parties will benefit from
this collocation. The CIA's DI will benefit from the expertise
in SIGINT and diplomatic collection that the NSA and INR
analysts will bring with them. Likewise, the NSA and INR
analysts and analysis can draw upon the knowledge and resources
of the DI.
Oversight of NSA Modernization
As the Committee's own investigations clearly indicate, and
as the analyses of the DCI's Senior Acquisition Executive
(SAE), outside experts, and the new NSA Director confirm, NSA
is in very serious need of acquisition reform. Acquisition
problems, in fact, may prevent NSA from developing a good
modernization plan, implementing, properly estimating the cost
of modernization, and determining whether more money than
currently programmed is needed for the Agency and, if so, how
much.
NSA was obviously extremely successful for many decades
against Cold War foes. The telecommunications sectors of these
adversaries, however, tended to evolve relatively slowly, and
older forms of communication were rarely, if ever, discarded
altogether. The U.S. SIGINT enterprise successfully attacked
these threats with a decentralized resource management and
allocation process; decentralized, distributed tasking and
processing; and sometimes with large development programs
involving industry. During the 1980's budget increases, NSA
decided to build up its in-house government scientists and
engineers and the Agency now seems to believe that in-house
talent can address the rapidly evolving signals environment
better than outsiders can. Budget problems and processes also
contributed to the proliferation of small independent
activities, and this evolution accentuated the traditional high
degree of local program autonomy, with virtually no effort to
integrate systems across the SIGINT architecture. The culture
demanded compartmentation, valued hands-on technical work, and
encouraged in-house prototyping. It placed little value on
program management, contracting development work to industry,
and the associated systems engineering skills.
Today, an entirely new orientation is required. NSA now
faces new, more robust challenges, thanks to the explosion of
the technology and telecommunications industries. Each type of
communication--radio, satellite, microwave, cellular, cable--is
becoming connected to all the others. Each new type of traffic
shows up on every type of communication. Unfortunately, as the
global network has become more integrated, NSA's culture has
evolved so that it is seemingly incapable of responding in an
integrated fashion.
To tackle this target, NSA cannot remain split into
multiple, separate collection ``stovepipes.'' It cannot afford
to allow multiple subcomponents to decide what capabilities to
build, because the result today can be wasteful duplication and
crippling gaps in capability. NSA must be organized and
operated as a single, cohesive enterprise, within a common
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination framework.
Building this new system is, by definition, a major undertaking
that requires careful preparation. NSA must overcome its
instinct to try to solve all its problems at once, by launching
out with a series of development efforts without first doing
the laborious work of defining requirements and developing an
architecture, end-to-end program planning, life-cycle costing,
and developing an acquisition strategy. NSA's modernization
must result in a highly integrated system, and will require a
very sophisticated systems engineering and program management
capability--the like of which NSA has not experienced in a very
long time, if ever. The acquisition model used by NSA must
include spiral development to manage risk and keep up with the
rapidly changing signals environment. NSA must also take a hard
look at the extent to which a relatively small number of
governmentengineers, however talented, can be expected to keep
up with the massive and dynamic commercial industry.
In summary, it seems clear to the Committee that NSA must
prepare itself for complex, prioritized, carefully timed and
integrated systems acquisitions that, in aggregate, rival the
complexity of programs commonly managed by the NRO, the Defense
Department, and commercial industry. NSA must quickly and
effectively position itself to make ruthlessly honest
assessments about in-house development versus contracting out.
This effort will require a very well thought out acquisition
plan, so that capabilities can be developed, delivered, and
integrated as quickly and effectively as possible. The Agency
must rapidly enhance its program management and systems
engineering skills and heed the dictates of these disciplines,
including looking at options to contract out for these skills.
The Committee believes that the NSA Director and other
elements of the Agency grasp these imperatives. General Hayden
has already taken some initial but important steps to implement
them. The Committee does not underestimate the complexity and
sheer magnitude of the problems involved in remaking an insular
institution that has always prided itself, with reason, on its
ability to get the job done its own way.
Due to the formidable nature of this problem and the
potential costs required, and given the stakes involved for the
nation's security, the Committee believes that a structure of
competent external oversight must be brought to bear on NSA's
modernization program. The Committee requests that the DCI's
SAE prepare and report to the congressional intelligence and
defense committees, a plan for review, approval and continued
monitoring of NSA's integrated modernization program. This plan
should incorporate the views and recommendations of the
Independent Architecture Panel, which should advise on the
appropriate acquisition model, and the SAE should participate
in relevant panel deliberations. The Committee expects this
oversight to include review of requirements definition,
architecture, cost estimates, acquisition strategy (including
the role of industry), and program milestones. The Committee
believes that such standing oversight should be tailored to
NSA's needs and should be streamlined to a degree commensurate
with NSA's demonstrated competence and internal controls. The
acquisition model selected should enable rapid, perhaps
sequential, fielding of the integrated architecture, bearing in
mind the shortcomings in NSA's current development methodology.
Given the fast turnover in technology, the Committee believes
that proven commercial model could provide the basis for NSA's
approach. This report is requested by November 1, 2000.
This external oversight serves two major purposes. One, it
can help to force NSA to come to grips with its challenges and
actually make the reforms that most agree are necessary.
And two, with such an oversight structure in place,
Congress and the Executive Branch leadership can allocate
scarce resources to NSA with more confidence that funds will be
expended effectively.
collaboration
The Committee is frustrated with the Intelligence
Community's funereal pace in the area of electronic
collaboration. In startling testimony, the DCI stated flatly
that collaboration, which is one of the major thrusts of his
strategic intent, is being stymied by the parochial interests
of the intelligence agencies.
The Committee understands that there are real security
issues that must be resolved before the DCI's goal of
unfettered collaboration across the Intelligence Community can
be achieved. However, the Committee agrees with the DCI and his
senior advisor for intelligence production, that these security
issues are being used as an excuse for inaction. In fact, the
agencies' torpor seems to be due more to fears about sharing
information and the possibility of relinquishing some
bureaucratic control over the intelligence production process.
In all probability, another factor is the disregard
organizations habitually display for techniques and systems
that were invented or sponsored by others.
The Committee notes that DIA has a very successful and
capable collaboration system embedded in the Joint Intelligence
Virtual Architecture (JIVA) that is being fielded within the
defense intelligence community. A National Intelligence Council
study from two years ago all but endorsed this system as a
Community standard, and all analyses since clearly indicate
that JIVA is the best of breed and mature and affordable enough
for proliferation across the rest of the Intelligence
Community. JIVA is based on COTS tools, and is structured to
ensure that the government can always shift to the best
commercial product and reap the benefits of commercial
investment and competition.
The Committee does not have confidence that the current
approach of attempting to engineer ``interoperability'' between
disparate systems will produce more than minimal capabilities.
In fact, the Community's current concept of waiting and working
towards a ``standard-based interoperability,'' in the
Committee's view, ignores the realities of commercial
technology and its pace of development. As a result of these
attitudes, the Committee doubts that universal standards can be
developed using the current approach.
The Committee is even less impressed with arguments
promoting long-term operational use of the CVW system built
upon tools developed by the Mitre Corporation. Its president
has indicated clearly that Mitre's product is not suitable for
an operational capability, certainly not on an enterprise-wide
basis.
Based on these factors, the Committee has taken specific
actions that can be found in the classified annex. The JIVA
program manager is encouraged to pursue all reasonable means to
meet the special needs of each customer, based on these
actions, and to explore all avenues for incorporating all the
best commercial tools within the JIVA suite, to provide
customers, on a cost-effective basis, with as many choices as
possible for collaboration tools to meet their needs, and to
seek every possible means to reduce the cost of virtual
collaboration. The JIVA program manager also needs to explore
with industry ideas to overcome legitimate security issues and
to enable management to retain appropriate control over the
activities of subordinates and thequality of products. In this
regard, the Committee notes that new business models, such as so-
called application service provider schemes, might indeed provide means
to allow users to use multiple tools, as they see fit, while at the
same time greatly reducing enterprise-wide costs, security risks, and
the erosion of management controls over analyst interactions.
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
directed the DCI and the Secretary of Defense to restructure
the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) satellite program by
reducing the number of satellites in the planned constellation.
Congress directed this action because ample testimony,
briefings, and reports showed that current plans for improving
imagery tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
(TPED) fell far short of the planned expansion of collection
capacity, from both aircraft and satellites. The report
accompanying the Act pointed out that it would be a waste of
the taxpayers' money to buy expensive satellites whose product
could not be fully utilized. The report indicated that the
intelligence committees would reconsider the requirement to
restructure the FIA program based on the administration's
budget planning for TPED as reflected in the fiscal year 2001
amendment to the fiscal year 2000 Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), and in preliminary plans for the new fiscal year 2002
FYDP.
The administration has, indeed, added funding to the
current FYDP in the fiscal year 2001 budget request. The
Committee agrees that this figure represents a substantial
investment. However, it is well short of the range of necessary
investment reported to Congress by the administration both last
year and in testimony this year. Moreover, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense testified that, despite general acknowledgment of
the need for greater TPED investment, it will be difficult for
the administration to come up with the money, owing to
competing priorities within the military services and the
Intelligence Community. In addition, the Deputy Secretary noted
that the last budget of an outgoing administration can be
expected to lack some rigor, and that in the last analysis it
will be up to the new President and his team to resolve
difficult issues. A final complicating factor is the DCI's
reticence about additional major investment in imagery TPED.
The DCI and his senior staff have expressed concern about
competing priorities, NIMA's ability to manage a large and
complex systems acquisition, the share of the TPED funding
burden that should be assigned to the intelligence community
vice the rest of the defense budget, and whether the TPED
requirements are, as yet, adequately defined.
With respect to NIMA's acquisition management capabilities,
the DCI's Senior Acquisition Executive, in conjunction with
staff from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, have
concluded that NIMA has a solid plan and foundation in place to
remedy its weaknesses, and that, if this plan is faithfully
executed, NIMA should be able to manage the TPED modernization
program effectively. Executing such a plan, however, is no
small task as NIMA does not now have the expertise required,
and hiring this expertise will require significant effort and
some changes to legislation.
The Committee expects that the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense will ensure that imagery TPED funding requirements will
be a priority issue for their joint review in the IPRG and EDRB
processes. The Committee expects also to be informed of the
administration's intentions with respect to TPED funding in the
fiscal year 2002 FYDP prior to conference. Finally, the
Committee hopes that the new administration will take note of
the seriousness of the TPED issue, and will place a priority on
increased investments in this, and other, areas.
IC communications architect/architecture
The Committee continues to be frustrated by the lack of a
coherent, cohesive, and productive approach to solving the
Intelligence Community's (IC) systems interoperability and
communications problems. It is clear that the IC's office of
Chief Information Officer has not been able to force the
disparate IC organizations to work together to develop a
communications architecture plan that provides for a truly
integrated communications network that relies on commercial
industry infrastructure, protocols and enforced standards.
The Committee believes the importance of a networked and
interoperable IC cannot be overstated. Every function of
intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation and
dissemination (TPED) relies on communications. The IC must have
a communications architecture that provides the basis for
inter-IC collaboration and the framework from which
intelligence consumers, such as the Department of Defense, can
seamlessly ``reach into'' the community for intelligence
support to their missions. The Committee believes that the IC
must rapidly adopt commercial systems and technologies to
create a common interoperable wide-area information transport
network to meet all Community needs.
Clearly, before the Community can bring together the
various IC organizations into such a network, a professional
communications architect must be designated and assigned. This
architect must be provided with the necessary resources and
authorities to design, construct and enforce the standards of
an IC communications network. Such an architect's
responsibilities should include providing the Community with a
detailed communications architecture plan, complete with
transmission and interoperability standards, within which each
IC organization must operate.
The Committee believes that the resulting network must
integrate all IC organizations and provide the physical and
virtual framework for the IC to conduct its various
intelligence missions and interface with its external
customers. The Committee further believes that the architect
should determine whether the existing Advanced
Telecommunications Network (ATN) is compatible with the future
network architecture and whether it should be established
quickly as a common initial communications baseline for all
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agencies. However,
the Committee believes that the Intelligence Community
Communications Architect (ICCA) should devise the most cost and
performance effective communicationsnetwork possible, using
commercial telecommunications infrastructures where possible and
logical. In this regard, the Committee urges the ICCA to examine
outsourcing the ATN network.
The Committee's recommendations are based on the impressive
work done by the Defense Science Board task force on DoD
communications. Their report of February 2000, concludes that
existing and future military communications will be incapable
of meeting DoD customer needs and makes a case that the
government should rapidly and competitively outsource its
communications to commercial service providers, laying the
foundation for full interoperability and improving capabilities
enormously. The task force report contends that the commercial
sector is rapidly converging to a fully integrated,
interoperable, multi-media (voice, data, video, etc.) network
based on Internet Protocols (IP). The implication is that
packet-switching technology and protocols will soon enable
high-quality real-time services (such as voice and video) and
thereby eliminate the need for any vestiges of point-to-point
circuit- switched technology. In the words of the task force,
``the shift from a point-to-point to a common-user
infrastructure has become more aggressive. As the Internet
provides services to support both real-time and non-real-time
applications, the convergence of our national and international
telecommunications infrastructure to a common-user, packet-
switched, dynamically shared network of networks will
accelerate.''
The task force argues that this single dominant internet is
robust and redundant, and that adequate security can be
achieved through the application of modern information security
technology and the use of virtual private networks.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DCI to create and
staff the position of IC Communications Architect (ICCA),
providing this individual direction to determine whether and
how the IC should implement the DSB's commercial communications
recommendations. The DCI is to provide the necessary formal
governance authorities to the ICCA to plan the IC
communications network and its associated commercially based
standards and protocols. The ICCA is authorized to create a
professional communications team.
No later than six months after the enactment of this act,
no funds for wide area communications shall be obligated or
expended by any program manager without the approval of the
ICCA. A formal IC network design and plan to achieve such will
be provided to the Congress not later than February 1, 2002.
Although the Committee is not prepared, at this time, to
direct the DCI to empower the ICCA with specific
responsibilities and authorities, it requests the DCI to
provide the Committee with his recommendations for such, prior
to conference on the fiscal year 2001 bill. The Committee
believes the ICCA, at a minimum, should:
1. Have complete authority and control over expenditures
for any and all NFIP communications infrastructures to ensure
the coordinated development and maintenance of an integrated IC
communications network. The ICCA should, to the maximum extent
possible, work with and include all tactical intelligence
entities in the development of the IC communications
infrastructure.
2. Have complete authority and control over policies for
any and all Intelligence Community information management
policies, relating to the wide area network.
3. Maintain and update the IC's communications
architectural plan. The Architect should direct the commercial
teams to develop the initial architecture in close coordination
with the NIMA TPED Pre-Acquisition activities and with the CIA
(see related text in the classified annex), but should ensure
the network solution satisfies the broader SIGINT, MASINT, and
other intelligence related communications requirements.
4. Address the Information Management requirements for the
community and include a plan for implementation.
5. Develop and implement central control authorities,
management structures, processes, and mechanisms that ensure
authorities and control can be effectively maintained. This
should include execution of commercial communications contracts
for the common good of the community.
6. Develop governing policies, promulgate guidance, and
ensure compliance with an IC Information Management System. The
Architect should have the requisite authorities to carry out
these duties for all aspects of Information Management for the
network and should ensure information can be efficiently
exchanged and that collaboration is enabled, etc.
7. Establish a senior advisory board that includes
representatives of ASD/C3I, CMS, CIO Executive Council, NSSA,
NRO, NIMA, NSA, DIA, and CIA to ensure all communications
network requirements are considered.
8. Establish a team to review expenditures for
communications between and among all intelligence community
facilities. These funds will be identified for consolidation
and centralized execution.
9. Develop a centralized process for requirements
development and programmatic planning for the community.
The Committee believes this issue is a critical one and
will monitor efforts in this area closely. Additional details
related to this issue can be found in the classified annex.
State of Defense Human Intelligence
The Defense HUMINT Service was established in 1995,
consolidating almost all Department of Defense human
intelligence activities--both clandestine and overt--into a
single service. Five years later, DHS has progressed beyond the
``growing pains'' stage and can be considered an established,
if not yet mature, organization.
Overall, the Committee finds that the state of defense
HUMINT is ``acceptable'' and improving. The Committee agrees
with the authors of the recently released ``Clapper Study''*
that DHS has overcome many organizational and resource-related
hurdles to become greater than the sum of its parts--although
there are still many problems and challenges facing defense
HUMINT that the Intelligence Community must address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Office of the Secretary of Defense, Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (OSD/C31) Review of Defense Human
Intellligence, March 2000. Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper (USAF, Ret.) led
the study team.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the positive side, DHS has provided a single point of
planning and coordination for almost all clandestine defense
HUMINT. Several years ago, the Committee issued a study (IC21:
Intelligence Community in the 21st Century) that included a
recommendation to consolidate all U.S. clandestine human
intelligence--including clandestine defense HUMINT--into a
single Clandestine Service. Neither CIA nor DoD has taken the
initiative to create such an organization, but the Committee
has noticed a gradually improving level of cooperation between
the operational elements of CIA and DHS--particularly among
officers in the field.
The Committee believes, however, that in order to maintain
a viable defense human intelligence collection activity (not to
mention improve its performance), a host of current and future
problems must be resolved. Included in this list are issues
specific to DHS and DoD that were addressed in the Clapper
Study--the Committee believes that these are currently being
addressed by the appropriate elements within DoD--and the
Committee will continue to follow the progress made on the 75
individual recommendations.
Further, the Committee believes there are several issues
falling outside the sole jurisdiction of DHS and DoD that the
Intelligence Community must address in order to ensure defense
HUMINT viability.
The first of these is the level of support defense HUMINT
provides to the military. As the testimony of the unified
command J-2's before the Committee earlier this year indicates,
human intelligence is highly valued, but HUMINT coverage is
nonexistent or in short supply in many areas of the world where
the United States may find it necessary to deploy troops.
Efforts to enhance HUMINT coverage are steps in the right
direction, but, as testimony demonstrates, it's just a start.
The Committee believes that the need for additional DHS
resources can be better articulated and defended. At a time
when some in Congress are questioning the need for new DAOs and
the coverage they will provide, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and other seniors in
the Intelligence Community must provide the leadership that has
been lacking to this point.
Finally, the Committee believes that there needs to be a
long-term strategic plan for defense human intelligence, and
that this must be part of the overall Intelligence Community
strategic plan for HUMINT. On one level, this involves DHS and
DIA working with the Secretary of Defense, the unified
commands, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the Director of
Central Intelligence and the CIA's Deputy Director for
Operations must fulfill their own responsibilities for
leadership of the Intelligence Community and U.S. HUMINT,
respectively, and working with the Director of DHS develop a
strategic plan for HUMINT that fully incorporates the
requirements and collection capabilities of defense human
intelligence.
Military Pay and Civilian Pay
The fiscal year 2001 budget request for the NFIP includes
requests for military and civilian pay that are grossly
misleading.
Military pay costs are based on a specific authorized
strength. However, the actual fill rate of these billets has
reached unacceptable levels, and the forecast is for continued
decline. The Committee has examined in detail the fill rates in
two accounts: the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP),
and the Consolidated Cryptographic Program (CCP). In the GDIP,
the March 2000 reported fill rate was 85.6 percent--a
significant decline from the 1998 level (94.2 percent). In the
CCP, the March 2000 reported fill rate was 88 percent, and the
actual assigned rate was 81 percent. The costs to the programs
of these empty billets--which must still be paid for--is
significant.
In both accounts, the percentage of filled billets will
continue to decline due to decisions by the services to fill
joint billets at substantially the same level as regular
service positions. National-level intelligence agencies draw a
significant portion of their military support from joint
billets--billets the services had previously filled at a higher
level. The Committee is under no illusions that the
intelligence community is alone in bearing the impact of hollow
personnel authorizations--finding the Army, Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force personnel to staff authorized positions is a
serious problem for the services themselves and all of the
defense-related organizations they support.
The Committee can accept--has accepted in the past--that
authorized military positions within the NFIP will always
outnumber the actual personnel that fill them. An average fill
rate of 90 percent or above is a risk that can be managed. The
Committee will not accept fill rates that are moving to the 75
percent level, or lower, across the Intelligence Community.
In response to the current problem (and the future trend)
in this area, the Director of Central Intelligence has directed
those intelligence programs with large numbers of military
personnel to look at converting military billets into civilian
billets where that is feasible. Although this action may be
necessary to address the immediate crisis, the Committee is
concerned about its long-term impact on the Intelligence
Community.
One problem associated with lowering the percentage of
military positions within the NFIP is the resulting loss of
military knowledge and lines of communication (both official
and unofficial). Any erosion in these areas will only lead to
intelligence gaps and future failures.
A second problem with the proposed remedy is the civilian
system itself. The Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit and
retain civilian personnel--especially in this economy. Add to
this the fact that the existing intelligence workforce is now
crowded at the top of the government grade scale, the rising
costs of the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) and
health insurance--and the result is a bill for civilian pay
that is approaching (or in some cases, exceeding) 50 percent of
the total budget. This trend in civilian pay is not
sustainable.
The Committee believes that a long-term effort is required
to address this problem. Therefore, in order to assist its
oversight in this area the Committee has requested a report
from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management on: (1) the scope of the current problems in the
NFIP associated with military and civilian personnel
structures; (2) the future trends for both; (3) all possible
remedies; and (4) the pros and cons of each. This report is due
no later than 1 January 2001.
nfip congressional budget justification books (cbjb s)
The Committee has become increasingly frustrated with the
lack of detail provided in the project descriptions in the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) CBJBs. Further,
the Committee believes that the financial management practices
at some NFIP agencies are so inadequate that specific project-
level financial information is not even well known corporately.
For example, in preparation for the budget authorization, the
Committee had to, once again ask representatives from CIA and
NSA to provide additional programmatic information on their
systems development activities--basic information that
apparently was not readily available.
If NFIP agencies are unable to provide detailed financial
data for the congressional oversight process, the Committee
questions whether they have the detail necessary to make sound
investment decisions. Clearly, the NFIP agencies need greater
insight into their financial obligations and the capabilities
that they are developing. NSA's baseline activity, for example,
identified many areas of duplicative development, as well as
lack of investment in key strategic areas. Yet, due to the lack
of detail, the CBJB did not provide this information. The
Committee notes that, at least at some agencies, internal
financial management practices seriously complicate this
process (see item on Reprogramming and Transfers). Yearly
submission of a more detailed description of systems
development activities and their associated budget will benefit
congressional oversight, the DCI budget management process, and
internal agency investment processes. The Committee believes
the NFIP CBJBs should more closely mirror the level of detail
provided in the Joint Military Intelligence Program
Congressional Justification Books and in the Department of
Defense Justification of Estimates documents.
The Committee, therefore, expects a change to the format
and content of the NFIP budget submission. Specifically, the
Committee wants all future NFIP CBJBs to provide the following
information on each project valued at $1.0 million or more
(including systems developed by government personnel):
project mission description and budget item
justification;
key performance characteristics and
requirements;
organizations providing management
oversight;
customers and products associated with the
project;
contract information;
budget breakout by program element number
(RDT&E, Procurement, O&M) for the two proceeding fiscal
years, the budget year, the FYDP, and cost to complete;
civilian and military manpower numbers and
costs;
program highlights/planned program by type
of funding (RDT&E, Procurement, O&M) for the two
preceding years, the budget year, and one year beyond
the budget year;
project budgetary change summary and
explanation;
related program funding summary; and,
the project milestone schedule.
reprogramming and transfers within cia
This year, during the course of the Committee's oversight
of CIA stations and bases overseas, significant and deleterious
movements of money from activities at stations and bases for
initiatives at CIA headquarters were discovered. The cumulative
impact of these actions substantially changed the intent and
the effect of the budget for fiscal year 2000 as enacted.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),
which created CIA, imposed restrictions upon the movement of
appropriated funds within and between intelligence accounts.
The Committee is concerned that the practices of CIA may not
comply with the letter or the spiritof the Act. The Committee
notes that similar problems also are evident in other NFIP programs;
however, the impact seems to be most pervasive within the CIA,
especially in terms of the effect on ``core'' mission.
Reprogramming
For movement of funds from one intelligence activity to
another within an account, section 504(a)(3) (50 U.S.C.
414(a)(3)) of the National Security Act requires that:
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher priority
intelligence or intelligence-related activity;
(B) the need for funds for such activity is based on
unforeseen requirements; and
(C) the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney General, as
appropriate, has notified the appropriate congressional
committees of the intent to make such funds available
for such activity.
The movement of money from one activity to another within
an intelligence account has been made subject to some
accommodation between the agencies and Congress. Heretofore,
for example, Congress has allowed the reprogramming of money
below a certain dollar threshold to proceed without formal
notification to Congress. The agencies, in turn, have solicited
the approval of Congress for certain reprogrammings that
involve matters of specific congressional interest. On
occasion, furthermore, Congress has exercised its discretion to
approve the reprogramming of funds under circumstances that do
not meet the strict requirements of section 504. Unlike the
agencies, which are bound by the terms of that section,
Congress has constitutional authority for exercising such
discretion.
This year, unfortunately, various CIA officials have
attempted to assert that the substantive requirements of
section 504 may not apply to reprogrammings below the monetary
threshold for notification to Congress; that the exercise of
congressional discretion in certain reprogrammings has somehow
excused CIA from compliance with section 504 in its own
movements of money; and that the plain meaning of the terms
``unforeseen requirements'' and ``higher priority'' is beyond
the ken of those in CIA charged with moving money. These
assertions threaten to disrupt the system for compliance with
section 504 that, until recently, had appeared to work easily
and well. These assertions also challenge the ability of
Congress to oversee the execution of an intelligence budget as
enacted. They invite a strong, corrective response.
The Committee has asked CIA's Inspector General to
investigate whether CIA has complied with section 504 in its
reprogramming practices and procedures. In the meantime, to
provide additional clarification in this matter, the Committee
notes that (a) at no time has Congress authorized the CIA or
any other intelligence agency to ignore the requirements of
section 504 that a reprogramming be for a higher priority
activity and that it be based upon unforeseen requirements; (b)
at no time has Congress designated the movement of money within
the agencies as an ``internal'' matter beyond congressional
oversight authority; and (c) Congress remains responsible for
ensuring that appropriated funds are executed by the
intelligence agencies in a manner that is effective and lawful.
Transfers
The National Security Act also restricts the movement of
appropriated funds between intelligence accounts. To transfer
funds between accounts within the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, section 104(d) of that Act requires, among other
things, that
(A) the funds * * * are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority intelligence
activity; and
(B) the need for funds * * * for such activity is
based on unforeseen requirements * * *.
Like reprogramming under section 504, transfers also
require notice to Congress. The requirements for transfers,
like those for reprogramming, provide some check on the
movement of money and some means of ensuring that Congress is
aware of what movements take place. The procedures for
transfers under section 104(d) have, until recently, worked
easily and well.
This year, the Intelligence Community attempted to transfer
funds to CIA and to another agency under standards other than
those of section 104(d). The Committee received first notice of
the proposed transfer as a part of the general budget request
for fiscal year 2001. In a subsequent letter, the Community
Management Staff described the transfers as necessary for
various ``high priority'' activities and requested that the
Committee ``formally endorse'' the transfer in its report on
the authorization bill for fiscal year 2001. Nowhere in these
communications, or in briefings on the transfer, was there a
basis provided for concluding, as required under section
104(d), that these transfers are in response to unforeseen
requirements. There was also no evidence provided that the
additional, procedural requirements of section 104(d) have been
satisfied.
The circumstances of this particular transfer are
complicated and unique. Some of this movement of money, for
example, may actually be a reprogramming under section 504 and
not a transfer. As already noted, however, the National
Security Act provides standards for the movement of funds
within and between intelligence accounts. The standards for
transfer, like those for reprogramming, facilitate
congressional oversight. Their abrogation in this case is
unjustified. For these reasons, and on substantive grounds, the
Committee has not approved this movement of money.
defense advanced research projects agency (darpa)
In response to a question from the Committee, the
Department of Defense stated ``it may be appropriate to
reexamine the reporting of selected DARPA projects under JMIP
or TIARA, so as to gain a better understanding of impending
technologies and their possible impacts on current programs. We
would need to do an evaluation to see what has changed and
whether this would be beneficial to all users.''
The Committee agrees with this position and requests the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence) to conduct such an evaluation
and report back to the defense and intelligence committees no
later than December 1, 2000. If the Department decides that it
is appropriate to report DARPA intelligence-related projects
within the JMIP or TIARA accounts, the Committee asks these be
appropriately identified in the fiscal year 2002 intelligence
budget request.
Joint Military Intelligence Program
RC-135 and U-2 operations and maintenance: No budgetary change
The budget request contained a total of $373.1 million for
operations and maintenance of the RC-135 and U-2 aircraft
fleets.
The committee is concerned that funding for many
Intelligence Community programs, including intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft are regularly
transferred from the programs for which funds were authorized
and appropriated to fund shortfalls in other programs, often
not related to ISR requirements. The committee understands the
theater and functional Commanders in Chief have stated that
their number one shortfall is in ISR aircraft and systems. The
committee is concerned that transferring funding, particularly
O&M funding, from ISR aircraft to fund non-intelligence
programs exacerbates the CINCs' ISR shortfalls.
Therefore the committee designates the RC-135 and U-2
programs as congressional interest items.
Commercial off-the-shelf-receiver development: +$1.0 million
The budget request included $95.7 million in PE 35885G for
development of tactical cryptologic systems.
The committee is concerned by the lack of a true commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) signals intelligence (SIGINT) receiver
that is based on open-architecture standards established by the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the 6U Versa
Module Europa (VME) backplane. The Department of Defense has
stated that all future signals intelligence systems will be
COTS based. However, most SIGINT developments the Department is
pursuing are based wholly, or in part, on custom approaches
that are not interchangeable at the board level. The committee
is further concerned that use of these customized approaches
discourages competition, minimizes the impetus to utilize the
COTS marketplace, reduces the industrial base and forces more
expensive solutions.
The committee is aware of a small business development that
has produced a true COTS receiver solution for several Defense
Cryptologic Program needs. The committee notes that this
solution is cost-effective and based completely on ANSI and VME
standards, thereby allowing for true ``plug and play'' use
between systems. The committee also notes that the Joint SIGINT
Avionics Program Office has sought to use this technology as a
commercial replacement for one of its custom applications.
However, there is no funding in the budget request to pursue or
procure this commercial solution.
The committee is aware of another innovative small business
development using emerging commercial silicon germanium
technology and supports rapid application of this leading-edge
commercial technology for defense applications.
Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of
$97.7 million in PE 35885G, an increase of $1.0 million for
development of the COTS VME receiver technology for SIGINT
applications, and an increase of $1.0 million for development
of commercial silicon germanium integrated circuits for defense
and intelligence applications.
Eagle vision commercial imagery: +$6.0 million
The budget request contained $10.0 million in operations
and maintenance, defense-wide, for the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) to purchase commercial data.
The committee notes the successful Air Force operation of
the Eagle Vision commercial imagery ground station, which has
resulted in timely, unclassified imagery support to the theater
commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Much of this imagery has been
unique and could not be provided by other technical means due
to higher priorities. The committee believes that there are
insufficient funds to meet the CINCs' commercial image and
mapping needs and, therefore, recommends $16.0 million in
operations and maintenance, defense-wide, an increase of $6.0
million, for purchasing Eagle Vision commercial imagery.
Defense airborne reconnaissance program (DARP), line 56: +$78.1 million
The budget request contained $165.5 million for various RC-
135 and U-2 aircraft modifications but included no funds for
RC-135 trainer aircraft, an updated C-135 operational flight
trainer, RC-135 global air traffic management (GATM) upgrades,
or the theater airborne warning system (TAWS) for the RC-135
Rivet Joint (RJ).
The committee notes that the theater and functional
commanders-in-chief (CINCs) have repeatedly testified that
their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
requirements, particularly those met by ISR aircraft such as
the RC-135 and U-2, are not being satisfied due to the limited
number of these aircraft. The committee understands that the
Air Force does not havea dedicated RC-135 aircrew training
aircraft and that this deficiency contributes to the limited number of
aircraft available to meet CINC requirements. To increase the
availability of RC-135 mission aircraft to the CINCs, the committee
recommends an increase of $44.0 million to modify two C-135 aircraft
into an RC-135 trainer aircraft configuration.
The current C-135 operational flight trainer (OFT I) is the
aircraft simulation training device for the RC-, OC-, WC-, and
TC-135 pilots at Offutt Air Force Base. The committee
understands that OFT I is obsolete due to its outdated engine
and aircraft avionics configurations, and that an OFT II would
provide training for aircrews to operate the re-engined and
updated avionics C-135 model aircraft. The committee notes that
the Air Force Chief of Staff has included the procurement of
OFT II among his top five unfunded requirements for fiscal year
2001. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $6.5
million for OFT II and $2.5 million to equip OFT II with motion
simulation thereby improving aircrew training and readiness on
the various C-135 aircraft models.
RC-135 GATM upgrades include: interference resistant
navigational receivers, global positioning system upgrades, a
traffic collision and avoidance system, radios to permit
reduced vertical separation between aircraft during Atlantic
Ocean transit, cockpit voice recorders, and flight management
system upgrades. The committee understands that, without these
upgrades, RC-135 aircraft will be restricted from flying the
most direct and fuel-efficient ocean routes and altitudes, will
be subject to critical landing-phase navigational radio
interference, and will not be equipped with the Secretary of
Defense-directed safety modifications until after fiscal year
2005. To meet these vital needs, the committee notes that the
Air Force Chief of Staff has included RC-135 GATM upgrades
among his unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2001, and
consequently, recommends an increase of $28.4 million for this
purpose.
The TAWS significantly improves the accuracy of ballistic
missile warning on RC-135 RJ, a tactical reconnaissance
aircraft. In its report on H.R. 1401 (H. Rept. 106-162) for
fiscal year 2000, the committee recommended an increase of
$17.3 million for the RC-135 RJ TAWS and believes that
continued integration of these suites is critical to tactical
missile defense warning. Therefore, the committee recommends an
increase of $10.0 million for continued procurement and
installation of TAWS suites on the RC-135 RJ aircraft.
To consolidate RC-135 modifications in DARP, line 56, and
U-2 modifications in DARP, line 80, the committee recommends a
transfer of the $5.1 million budgeted for RC-135 aircraft
modifications in DARP, line 80 into this budget line; and a
transfer of the $18.3 million budgeted for U-2 aircraft
modifications in this line into DARP, line 80. This transfer
results in a $13.2 million decrease to this line and an
increase of $13.2 million in DARP, line 80.
In total, the committee recommends $243.7 million for DARP,
line 56, an increase of $78.1 million for RC-135 modifications.
Finally, the committee is concerned about the Department of
the Air Force's budget plan for the RC-135's joint signals
intelligence avionics family (JSAF) upgrades and notes that the
request would budget for a single JSAF suite for the RC-135 but
that additional suites are not planned until fiscal year 2005.
Without full and continuous funding for this upgrade, the
committee understands the first system, if installed onto the
RC-135, would result in a unique RC-135 aircraft configuration
which would increase unit support costs for that aircraft.
Accordingly, the committee believes the new JSAF system should
continue development and testing in the RC-135 systems
integration laboratory and on the U-2 aircraft until the
Department of the Air Force budgets to upgrade all 16 RC-135
aircraft.
Rivet joint mission trainer: +$15.5 million
The budget request contained $12.8 million for RC-135
equipment procurement but included no funds to provide an
enhanced field exportable training system (EFETS). The
committee understands that the procurement of an EFETS would
improve training and readiness by allowing RC-135 crews at
forward operating bases to use existing post-mission ground
data processing system equipment to function as a Rivet Joint
Missions Trainer (RJMT). Since procurement of an additional
RJMT for these forward locations would not be required, the
committee notes that EFETS would save the Air Force $27.4
million. The committee notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff
has included $15.5 million for the EFETS among his top five
unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2001.
Consequently, the committee recommends $28.3 million, an
increase of $15.5 million for procurement of an EFETS.
Army tactical unmanned aerial vehicles: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $29.4 million in PE 35204A for
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV).
The committee notes that the Army just completed a
successful competitive selection for an off-the-shelf TUAV. The
committee notes that the Army will place increasing reliance on
its TUAV and needs to field the best possible system including
sensors.
The committee recommends authorization of $33.4 million in
PE 35204A, an increase of $4.0 million for preplanned product
improvements and sensor development.
Marine corps dragon warrior unmanned aerial vehicle: +$5.0 million
The budget request contained no funding in PE 35204M for
Marine Corps close range tactical unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV).
The committee notes that the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (MCWL) is developing the Dragon Warrior, a low cost,
small UAV that combines the speed of a fixed-wing UAV with some
operational characteristics of a rotary wing UAV. The committee
is aware that Dragon Warrior is being developed to carry a
variety of payloads that are currently being examined by the
MCWL to provide the Marine Corps with a highly flexible, close
range reconnaissance capability that will enlarge the area of
influence of a small expeditionary force.
The committee recommends authorization of $5.0 million in
PE 35204M, an increase of $5.0 million, for Dragon Warrior.
Manned reconnaissance systems: +$8.0 million
The budget request contained $27.5 million in PE 35207N for
manned reconnaissance systems, including $25.3 million for the
development of the Shared airborne reconnaissance pod (SHARP)
electro-optic system and technologies.
The committee has fully supported the SHARP program to
dramatically increase real-time tactical reconnaissance
capabilities. The committee is aware of commercial developments
in large focal length optics that will increase standoff ranges
for tactical reconnaissance systems and developments in EO
framing processing techniques that will provide for real-time
precision strike targeting. The committee is also aware that
emerging solid-state shutter technology can replace existing
mechanical focal plane shutters to increase further existing
and future EO camera performance and reliability while reducing
operations and maintenance costs. The committee believes this
technology should be incorporated into all SHARP camera
applications.
Therefore, the committee recommends $35.5 million in PE
35207N, an increase of $5.0 million for long-range optical
sensor technology and precision strike improvements, and $3.0
million for development of a solid-state shutter mechanism that
can be retrofitted on current and built into future framing
array cameras.
F-18 Shared airborne reconnaissance pod: +$18.0 million
The budget request contained $248.1 million in PE 24136N
for continued development of capabilities for the F/A-18
aircraft.
The committee has supported the Shared Airborne
Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) efforts to provide the F/A-18
aircraft with an enhanced tactical reconnaissance capability
that will also be applicable to other combat aircraft. The
committee notes the recent successful demonstration of the
SHARP risk-mitigation project for the F-14 Tactical Airborne
Reconnaissance Podded System (TARPS) Completely Digital (CD)
system that was employed by the battle group U.S.S. John F.
Kennedy. This demonstration clearly indicated the force
multiplying capability provided by real-time imagery system and
the committee supports continuation of this effort.
The committee is concerned, however, that the funding
requested for SHARP is insufficient to support completion of
sensors for the fiscal year 2003 initial operational capability
(IOC). The committee notes that this shortfall in funding
results in an increase in cost of tactical reconnaissance
support by extending use of the less capable F-14 TARPS.
Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $266.1
million in PE 24136N, an increase of $18.0 million for the
development of the SHARP F-18 tactical reconnaissance
capability to maintain the current IOC.
Global hawk: $12.0 million tuck
The budget request contained $109.2 million in PE 35205F
for endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), including $103.2
for continued development of the Global Hawk UAV.
The committee supports the Global Hawk development and
believes that this air vehicle has the potential for providing
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to
military customers, complementing the current U-2 operations.
The committee notes that due to a crash of one air vehicle,
and a runway accident of another, there are no electro-optic/
infra-red (EO/IR) sensors to continue test and evaluation of
the UAV. The committee believes it is important to procure
sensor sets to replace those lost to the accidents. Further,
the committee is aware of unobligated and unexpended funding
from prior year endurance UAV appropriations that can be used
to purchase replacement sensors and continue the Global Hawk
engineering and development in fiscal year 2001.
Further, the committee is aware of new generation radar
technologies that could vastly increase Global Hawk synthetic
aperture radar (SAR) imaging and moving target indicator (MTI)
capabilities at comparable costs to the current sensors. The
committee is also aware of digital recording devices that offer
superior performance and reliability over current devices. With
respect to SAR and MTI capabilities, current state-of-the-art
active electronically steered array (AESA) antenna developments
offer a two-fold increase in range, resolution, and revisit
performance over the current Global Hawk radar. Further, the
cost of these new radars appears to be comparable to the
current phased array radars. In terms of recording systems for
high volume imagery sensors such as those on the Global Hawk,
solid state devices have a major reliability advantage over
current tape recording devices. They have no moving parts, nor
do they require a tape that must be threaded around capstans.
The cost of solid state recording devices is dramatically
decreasing while the data recording rates and density are
increasing. The committee believes that such devices should be
integrated into the Global Hawk at the earliest opportunity.
Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $109.2
million in PE 35205F for endurance UAVs. Of the amount
authorized, the committee directs the $12.0 million be used
specifically for purchasing two EO/IR replacement sensors for
the Global Hawk aircraft. Further, the committee directs that
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence provide a report to the defense
and intelligence committees assessing the utility of developing
and integrating modular AESA radars and solid state recording
devices on the Global Hawk. This report should be provided no
later than 1 February 2001.
Multifunction self-aligned gate active array antenna: +$7.0 million
The budget request contained $113.1 million in PE 35204N
for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, but included no funding
to continue development of the multi-function self-aligned gate
(MSAG).
The committee is aware that the MSAG technology
successfully demonstrated ability to transmit and receive full-
motion video and communication. This new form of antenna, with
no moving parts, offers reduced life-cycle costs and enables
production of light, conformal, multi-beam antennas for
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV) and associated
systems.
The committee recommends authorization of $126.1 million,
an increase of $7.0 million to construct and test a line-of-
sight array for the tactical control system.
Multi-link antenna system: +$2.0 million
The budget request contained no funding in PE 35207F for
manned reconnaissance systems, including exploitation
technologies for RC-135 aircraft.
In the ``National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000,'' Congress provided funding for development and
evaluation of the multi-function, self-aligned gate (MSAG)
active array antenna technology on the RC-135 aircraft. The
conferees were convinced that an MSAG application, called
Multi-link Active System (MLAS), has the potential for
satisfying several RC-135 antenna deficiencies, and also has
the potential for reducing the size and number of antennas for
many other applications. In fact, the committee is aware that
the Department of Defense has determined that the potential for
this technology has merited funding through an advanced concept
technology demonstration.
The committee is aware that the fiscal year 2000 funding
was insufficient to complete the fabrication, installation and
evaluation of an MLAS antenna on an RC-135. Therefore, the
committee recommends an authorization of $2.0 million in PE
35207F for this purpose.
Defense airborne reconnaissance program (DARP), line 80: +$34.2 million
The budget request contained $98.4 million in DARP, line
80, for various U-2 and RC-135 aircraft modifications,
including $1.8 million for Senior Year Electro-optic
Reconnaissance System (SYERS) spares and $17.0 million for a
Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics Family (JSAF) suite for the
U-2. The request did not include any funds for additional U-2ST
trainer aircraft.
SYERS is an electro-optic camera system that provides real-
time imagery to national decision-makers and tactical forces.
The committee understands that initial deployment spares for
the SYERS upgrade are underfunded in the budget request by $3.0
million, and recommends an increase of this amount.
The JSAF provides an upgraded collection capability for the
U-2S. The committee understands that the budget request is
insufficient to procure an entire JSAF suite and required
spares and cabling. Accordingly, the committee recommends an
increase of $8.0 million for this purpose.
The U-2ST is a two-seat trainer version of the single-seat
U-2S reconnaissance aircraft. The committee understands that
there are only four U-2STs, and that without an additional U-
2ST, the U-2S pilot production rate does not meet requirements
to solve an existing U-2S pilot shortage. The committee notes
that the Air Force Chief of Staff has included an additional U-
2ST among his top five unfunded requirements in fiscal year
2001, and accordingly, recommends an increase of $10.0 million
to convert a U-2S into a U-2ST aircraft.
Including transfers between DARP lines 56 and 80 for the
RC-135 and U-2 respectively, the committee recommends $132.6
million, an increase of $34.2 million, for U-2 modifications.
Predator: +$12.0 million
The budget request contained $22.1 million for procurement
of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system.
The committee understands that the Air Force is
experiencing vanishing vendor problems with some of the current
hardware in the Predator ground station and that there is a
requirement to control multiple Predator aircraft
simultaneously from a single ground station. The committee is
also aware that there are required air vehicle reliability and
maintainability upgrades that have not been funded.
Consequently, the committee recommends $32.1 million for
the Predator, an increase of $12.0 million for upgrading the
current ground stations with commercial hardware, for
integrating the capability to control multiple UAVs
simultaneously and for improving air vehicle reliability and
maintainability.
Finally, the committee is aware that a jointly funded
effort between the contractor and NASA has developed a turbo-
prop variant of the Predator, to be followed by a jet-powered
variant. Both of these Predator-B variants use the current
Predator ground station, avionics, datalink, and control
software, but provide major performance improvements over the
current aircraft, including a maximum speed in excess of 200
knots, and a service ceiling to 45,000 feet. While the current
Predator has clearly proven its military worth, given these
performance factors, a Predator-B would appear to satisfy many
niche missions for which the current vehicle is not well-
suited. The committee believes that a Predator-B would be a
valuable addition to the Predator fleet, and that a mix of
Predator-A and -B aircraft would cost effectively satisfy all
Predator mission requirements. Therefore, the committee
requests the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct an
assessment of the utility of a Predator-B aircraft, including
the benefits or problems of operating a mixed Predator fleet.
The committee requests the Secretary report his findings to the
defense and intelligence committees before the submission of
the fiscal year 2002 budget request.
Defense space reconnaissance program: -$7.1 million
The budget requested contained $45.1 million in PE 35159F
for various projects within the Defense Space Reconnaissance
program (DSRP).
The committee recommends an authorization of $38.0 million,
a decrease of $7.1 million. This reduction is taken without
prejudice.
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
Cryptologic skills training: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $1.3 million in operations and
maintenance, Army, for conducting cryptologic and language
skills training at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC).
The committee is aware of a unique Korean language training
program developed in-house at the USAIC. The committee believes
this computer-based tool has the potential of providing
critical language maintenance training for many language
specialists, and it believes this effort should be expanded to
other languages.
Consequently, the committee recommends $5.3 million in
operations and maintenance, Army, an increase of $4.0 million,
for continued development of this language training program
into the service's seven core language requirements. The
committee also recommends that this program be provided to the
other services for language training maintenance.
Common ground station: -$7.9 million
The budget request contained $17.9 million in PE 64770A for
continued development of the Army's Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station,
including $2.0 million to develop the Army's Distributed Common
Ground Station (DCGS-A) and $5.9 million to develop a next
generation wide-band datalink to provide connectivity to the
JSTARS.
The committee notes that the DCGS-A development effort
duplicates a similar effort being conducted within the Army's
Tactical Exploitation of National Systems program, a funded
program. Further, the committee notes the Air Force has not yet
determined the next generation JSTARS datalink and will not do
so until at least fiscal year 2002, thus making the Army's
development activities for such communications connectivity
premature.
For these reasons, the committee recommends $10.0 million
in PE 64770A, a decrease of $7.9 million, to the common ground
station program.
Guardrail common sensor: +$2.0 million
The budget request contained $11.3 million in PE 23744A for
continued development and modification of the Army's Guardrail
Common Sensor aircraft and ground stations.
The committee notes that the Guardrail System 2 was
recently delivered to the Army after nearly ten years of
modification. Unfortunately, this system was returned without
being upgraded with the ability to disseminate tactical
intelligence information via the Tactical Information Broadcast
Service (TIBS). TIBS is the baseline for the Integrated
Broadcast Service that is the DoD-mandated world-wide tactical
intelligence dissemination service.
The committee recommends $13.3 million in PE 23744A, an
increase of $2.0 million to install the TIBS capability in this
Guardrail system.
Semi-automated imagery processor: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $57.4 million in PE 64766A,
including funding for development of the Semi-automated imagery
processor (SAIP).
The SAIP will provide imagery analysts with an automated
target recognition assistance capability, providing critical
relief for a low-density imagery analyst resources.
The committee recommends authorization of $61.4 million in
PE 64766A, an increase of $4.0 million for continued
development and fielding of the SAIP.
Defense foreign language program: +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $61.9 million in operations
and maintenance, Army, for the Defense Language Institute
(DLI).
The committee is very supportive of the DLI training
efforts to provide high quality linguists for the growing
requirement of many agencies and services but believes that its
language laboratories are in need of technical upgrades, to
include new equipment and access to the internet. The committee
is aware of local area Marine Corps self-help efforts that have
done similar upgrades very cost effectively. The committee
believes the Army should call on this USMC self-help assistance
to upgrade the DLI language laboratories.
Further, the committee is aware of an unfunded DLI
initiative to provide better language training by issuing
laptop computers to students. These computers would be used to
provide language laboratory access to on-line language training
materials, allow ``after hours'' accessfrom the institute's
dormitories, and access to ``live'' world-wide foreign training
materials. The committee believes this is a worthwhile effort that
should be properly funded.
Therefore, the committee recommends $64.9 million in
operations and maintenance, Army, an increase of $3.0 million,
for the Defense Foreign Language Program. Of this amount, $1.0
million is for self-help upgrade of the language laboratories
and $2.0 million is for the laptop computer initiative.
Naval space surveillance: -$600 thousand
The budget request included $2.0 million in PE 35972N for
the Navy Space Surveillance network life extension activities.
The committee is aware of an accounting error that resulted
in a request for design concept activities that were actually
funded in fiscal year 2000. Therefore the committee recommends
1.4 million in PE 35972N, a decrement of $600,000.
Joint tactical terminal: +$ 6.0 million
The budget request contained $32 thousand for the Joint
Tactical Terminal (JTT).
The committee is fully supportive of the Navy's efforts to
field the JTT but is aware that the Navy has a shortfall in
purchasing the required number of terminals.
Accordingly, the committee recommends $6.0 million, an
increase of $6.0 million, to correct this deficiency.
F/A-18 reconnaissance capable: -$23.8 million
The budget request contained $212.6 million for F-18 series
aircraft, including $24.5 million for the procurement of the
Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS).
The committee is aware that 14 of the currently planned 18-
19 ATARS systems were purchased under low rate initial
production and that the remaining systems were to be purchased
with fiscal year 2000 funds after the completion of the
operational evaluation and milestone III decision. The
committee is also aware that ATARS did not pass its operational
evaluation and understands that this will preclude a
procurement of the final ATARS systems. This frees up the
unobligated and unexpended FY2000 funding.
Therefore, the committee recommends $185.1 million, a
decrease of $23.8 million, to be taken only from ATARS
procurement.
Tactical air reconnaissance podded system: +$7.0 million
The budget request contained $37.1 million in other
production charges, including $2.6 million for continuation of
the F-14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Podded System (TARPS)
camera system.
The committee is aware of the recent successful deployment
of the TARPS Completely Digital (CD) system with the U.S.S.
John F. Kennedy battle group. TARPS CD is being employed as a
risk mitigation effort for the Shared Airborne Reconnaissance
Pod (SHARP) development. SHARP is the future non-dedicated
reconnaissance system for naval tactical reconnaissance. The
committee commends the Navy for its successful integration of
TARPS CD and the demonstration of the force enhancement
capabilities of this a real-time tactical system.
The committee believes the Navy's successful risk-
mitigation efforts for electro-optical sensors provides a
sufficient confidence level to take the next step and move
toward integration of a commercial off-the-shelf synthetic
aperture radar (SAR) sensor to provide all-weather
reconnaissance. The committee is aware that several, small,
very high resolution SAR sensors are available to do non-
developmental test on TARPS CD. Since an all-weather
reconnaissance is a requirement for SHARP, the committee
believes completing risk mitigation on the TARPS CD is
appropriate and will not affect the current schedule for
fielding SHARP with an EO-only capability.
Therefore, the committee recommends $44.1 million, an
increase of $7.0 million for integrating and demonstrating
commercial SAR solutions into the TARPS CD.
Mobile electronic warfare support system: +$8.5 million
The budget request contained $96.2 million in PE 26313M,
including $449 thousand for improvements to the Marine Corps'
mobile electronic warfare support system (MEWSS).
The committee notes that the Marine Corps' MEWSS tactical
reconnaissance system was a cooperative effort with the U.S.
Army's ground based common sensor (GBCS) program. GBCS was
terminated for lack of performance and all residual equipment
was transferred to the Marine Corps for use in the MEWSS.
However, no funding was provided to cross-deck and integrate
GBCS components into the MEWSS vehicles or to maintain the
limited rate initial procurement items.
Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $104.7
million in PE 26313, an addition of $8.5 million specifically
for the purposes of transferring, integrating and maintaining
the equipment gained from GBCS.
Hyper-spectral imagery system: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $9.8 million in PE 27247F for
Air Force tactical exploitation of national capabilities
(TENCAP) projects.
Congress provides additional funding in fiscal year 2000
for continuing development of a hyper-spectral sensor for
application on Navy P-3 and Air Force unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV). The committee is aware that this initiative has resulted
in a joint effort to integrate and demonstrate a real-time
hyper-spectral sensor on a Predator UAV. The committee notes
that no funding was provided in the budget request to continue
this effort through demonstration. The committee believes that
a hyper-spectral sensor will drastically mitigate the problems
of detecting and targeting camouflaged targets that hampered
aerial targeting in past operations.
Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of
$13.8 million in PE 27247F, an addition of $4.0 million to
continue this demonstration with the goal of producing an
operational real-time hyper-spectral sensing system on UAVs and
other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.
Senior scout: +$8.2 million
The budget request contained $5.5 million for procurement
of intelligence communications equipment, including $2.0
million for procurement of spares and replacement equipment for
the Senior Scout tactical reconnaissance aircraft.
The committee is pleased that the Air Force has decided to
retain the Senior Scout reconnaissance capability to augment
the high demand/low density airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleets in the reserve
component. However, the committee is disturbed that the Air
Force has not added funding to upgrade the Senior Scout to more
effectively interoperate with other ISR aircraft and, more
importantly, the combat aircraft it supports.
Therefore, the committee recommends $13.7 million for
intelligence communications equipment, an increase of $8.2
million for Senior Scout collection and dissemination upgrades
and for the addition of a deployable ground data reduction
system.
Air force/national reconnaissance office (NRO) partnership: -$2.0
million
The budget request contained $3.4 million in PE 63856F for
the Air Force/NRO partnership.
The committee understands that $2.0 million of the funding
requested would be used for studies and analysis of synergies
between the Air Force and the NRO. The committee notes that the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Space, also serves as the
director of the NRO. The committee believes that coordination
between the two organizations is inherently institutionalized,
and should be a matter of routine.
The committee recommends $1.4 million in PE 63856F, a
reduction of $2.0 million.
Eagle vision: +$9.5 million
The budget request included no funds for procuring the
processing hardware necessary to complete the Eagle Vision 4
imagery system or to improve the Eagle Vision imagery ground
station's capability to receive and process new commercial
imagery sources.
Eagle Vision is a ground station that receives and
processes imagery from commercial remote sensing satellites.
The committee fully supports the Eagle Vision commercial
imagery initiative, which has provided unique, unclassified
imagery support to meet theater and service requirements that,
due to higher priorities, cannot be met by other technical
means. The committee believes that this initiative needs to be
fully funded to continue such support. Further, the committee
notes the recent successful launch and initial operations of
Ikonos II, the first high-resolution U.S. commercial imagery
satellite, and that two other U.S. firms are soon to launch
their own high-resolution imagery satellites. The committee
understands that the Eagle Vision ground station is currently
capable of receiving and processing relatively low-resolution
imagery from Canadian and French commercial satellites. It is,
however, not able to process imagery from the higher-resolution
U.S. systems in, or soon to be in orbit.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $5.0
million in other procurement, Air Force, line 39A, for
completing the Eagle Vision 4 processor installation and an
increase of $4.5 million in PE 27277F to integrate into the
Eagle Vision ground stations a receive and processing
capability necessary to exploit current and future U.S.
commercial satellite imaging systems.
Special operations tactical video system: +$2.0 million
The budget request contained $3.0 million in PE 116405BB
for Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence system
developments, including $100,000 for continued development of
the Special Operations Tactical Video System (SOTVS).
SOTVS is a congressional interest item funded in the fiscal
year 2000 budget. The committee notes that no commercial
solution to the SOF underwater camera requirements exists, and
that a dedicated research and development program is necessary
to satisfy this critical mission requirement. Therefore, the
committee is dismayed that the budget request is insufficient
to develop and procure a replacement to the aging cameras
currently in the inventory.
The committee recommends an authorization of $5.0 million
in this PE, an increase of $2.0 million to expedite the
development of the SOTVS camera.
Section-by-Section of the Bill
TITLE I.--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists those elements of the United States
Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related
activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year
2001.
Section 102--classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 incorporates by reference the classified
Schedule of Authorizations. That schedule sets forth the
specific amounts authorized to be appropriated for specific
intelligence and intelligence-related activities and personnel
ceilings for fiscal year 2001 for those United States
government elements listed in section 101. The details of the
Schedule are explained in the classified annex to this report.
The Schedule of Authorizations correlates to the President's
budget request, which was submitted to Congress in classified
form.
Section 103--personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2001, to exceed the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
intelligence community under section 102 by an amount not to
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings otherwise
applicable under section 102. The Director may exercise this
authority only when necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be
reported to the two intelligence committees of the Congress.
The committee emphasizes that the authority conferred by
section 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of
personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the
section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with
flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for
contingencies, and for overages caused by an imbalance between
hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The
committee does not expect the Director of Central Intelligence
to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed
levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations, except for the
satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs that are
consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in
this legislation. In no case is this authority to be used to
provide for positions otherwise denied by Congress.
Section 104--intelligence community management account
Section 104 details the amount and composition of the
Community Management Account (``CMA'') of the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) of section 104 authorizes appropriations in
the amount of $144,231,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the
staffing and administration of various components under the
CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for the
Advanced Research and Development Committee and the
Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program to remain
available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes 356 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2001 and provides that
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion
of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis, with certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes $28,000,000 of the amount
authorized for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made
available to the Attorney General through the DCI for the
National Drug Intelligence Center (``NDIC'') in Johnstown,
Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the Director of Central
Intelligence to transfer the $28,000,000 to the Department of
Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of
the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the
National Security Act. The NDIC is authorized $1,000,000 more
than the amount authorized for the funding of the NDIC for FY
2000. The Committee of Conference on the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directed that $1,000,000
of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the Attorney
General by the Act be made available to the Judicial Review
Commission on Foreign Asset Control, which was established in
section 810 of that Act. (P.L. 106-120). The additional
$1,000,000 authorized for Fiscal Year 2001 is intended to
replenish NDIC funding made available to the Commission.
Section 105--transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence
Section 105 amends section 104(d)(1) of the National
Security Act of 1947 to authorize the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) to transfer funds appropriated for a program
within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) to
another such program within the NFIP, with the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, unless the
Secretary of Defense, or other cabinet Secretary who has an
affected Intelligence Community element within his or her
department, submits a written objection to the transfer. The
Secretary of Defense may only delegate responsibility under
this provision to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The other
department heads are not authorized under this provision to
delegate the authority to object to any such transfer sought by
the DCI.
The current section 104(d)(1) limits the DCI's authority to
transfer funds and personnel to transfers where the Secretary
or head of the affected department does not object to such
transfer.The committee understands that in practice Defense
Department officials below the level of Secretary have taken action to
block transfers within the NFIP sought by the DCI. The committee
intends to end this practice and require higher-level involvement in
decisions that countermand the DCI's judgment on funding requirements
of NFIP programs. Just as the Secretary of Defense is limited in
delegating any authority to object to these transfers to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the DCI is limited in his authority to delegate
the transfer request authority only to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$216,000,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by this
Act for salary, pay, retirement and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental
amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation
or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations within the Act does not constitute authority for
the conduct of any intelligence activity that is precluded by
the Constitution or other laws of the United States.
Section 303--Sense of the Congress regarding intelligence community
contracting
Section 303 expresses the sense of Congress that the DCI
should continue to direct elements of the intelligence
community to award contracts in a manner that would maximize
the procurement of products produced in the United States, when
such action is compatible with the national security interests
of the United States, consistent with operational and security
concerns, and fiscally sound.
Section 304--authorization for travel on any common carrier for certain
intelligence collection personnel
Section 304 authorizes the DCI to permit intelligence
community employees, officers, or agents, carrying out
intelligence collection activities to utilize any common
carrier, either foreign or domestically owned or operated, in
limited circumstances, when flying directly to or from the
United States on official business. The federal government
currently requires, to the extent practicable, government
employees, officers, or agents, travelling directly to or from
the United States to utilize U.S. owned or operated common
carriers for such travel. The committee has found, however,
that from time to time it would reduce the risk of disclosure
of sources and methods of intelligence collection if the DCI
were authorized some flexibility with respect to this otherwise
well-founded requirement. The committee notes that situations
arise where the current requirement, and its inflexible
application, create unnecessary risks for intelligence
collection activities, including the risk of compromise of
sources and methods. The committee believes that the DCI should
be given some latitude to maintain or enhance the security of
intelligence collection operations and of the intelligence
collectors by waiving the requirement, on an as needed basis.
The committee expects that such a waiver will not be routine,
but that this provision will be invoked from time to time with
positive results.
Section 305--reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons
of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions
Section 305 amends section 721(a) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-293, 110 Stat.
3474). Section 721(a) required that an unclassified report on
the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass
destruction and advanced conventional munitions be submitted to
Congress every 6 months. This section would require a report to
be submitted on an annual basis. This will give the public the
benefit of a full year of substantive reporting, rather than a
half year, which sometimes can result in an incomplete view of
the activity. The committee will continue to receive classified
briefings and intelligence reporting on an on-going basis.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401--modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's Central
Services Program
Section 401 permits the deposit into the Central Service
Program's Working Capital Fund of the receipts from the
miscellaneous reimbursements of individuals and the rental of
property and equipment to employees and detailees.
Section 402--technical corrections
Section 402 makes technical amendments to section 17 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Section 402(a) strikes
subparagraph (E) of section 17(d)(1), which directs the CIA
Inspector General to report to the intelligence committees
those occasions where his office was constrained from obtaining
documentary evidence during the course of a CIA IG
investigation due to the lack of subpoena authority. The CIA IG
was granted subpoena authority to obtain documentary evidence
in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
(P.L.105-107). Thus, the reporting requirement in subparagraph
(E) has been superceded by subsequent legislation.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501--three year extension of authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection activities
This section amends section 431(a) of title 10, United
States Code, which expire on December 31, 2000. Section 431(a)
permits the Department of Defense to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection activities.
This section extends this authority until December 31, 2003.
Section 502--contracting authority for the National Reconnaissance
Office
Section 502 directs the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) to negotiate, write, and manage all future vehicle
acquisition or launch contracts that affect or bind the NRO and
to which the United States is a party.
The committee has been very frustrated with aspects of the
NRO's launch program, particularly with Titan IV production.
Consistently, this program has been excessively over-funded and
has resulted in large amounts of funds available for
reprogramming. The committee has had considerable difficulty
holding the organization accountable for better program
planning because the NRO has had launch vehicle and launch
services contracts written and managed by non-NRO contracting
offices. As a result, the NRO does not have sufficient
management responsibility for those contracts to be responsive
to congressional concerns, or to take necessary corrective
actions.
The NRO IG recently completed an investigation that
identified the vehicle acquisition and launch services type of
contract, and the relationship between the external contracting
office and the NRO, as the main factors contributing to the
over-funding problem. The committee notes that a re-negotiation
of the contract structure is being considered that would remove
a penalty for future launch failures, despite the NRO IG's
recommendation.
Section 502 will require that the NRO contract for vehicle
acquisition and launch services directly with launch service
providers. The committee recognizes the need for the NRO to
work closely with outside contracting offices in many areas,
for example, to develop standard interfaces and quality control
process procedures. The committee believes that NRO's use of
external contracting offices to negotiate, write, and manage
vehicle acquisition and launch contracts does not provide the
NRO, nor the committee sufficient insight into the contracting
process. Additionally, more direct control by the NRO over its
vehicle acquisition and launch contracts is expected to
increase the accountability for such projects within the NRO.
Committee Position and Record Votes Taken
On May 10, 2000, in open session, a quorum being present,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded
vote of 12 ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 4392, as
amended by an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered
by Chairman Goss. By that vote, the committee ordered the bill
reported favorably to the House, with an amendment. On that
vote, the Members present recorded their votes as follows: Mr.
Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. McCollum--aye; Mr. Castle--aye; Mr.
Boehlert--aye; Mr. Bass--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr. LaHood--
aye; Ms. Wilson--aye; Mr. Dixon--aye; Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr.
Condit--aye; Mr. Roemer--aye.
During consideration of the bill, Mr. Roemer offered an
amendment to the legislative provisions. The amendment would
have directed the President to disclose annually the aggregate
appropriation for the Intelligence Community for the previous
fiscal year. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
rejected Mr. Roemer's amendment by a vote of 5 ayes to 11 noes,
a quorum being present. On that vote, the Members present
recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Lewis--no; McCollum--no; Mr. Castle--no; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr.
Bass--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Ms. Wilson--no; Mr.
Dixon--aye; Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr. Bishop--no; Mr. Sisisky--no;
Mr. Condit--aye; Mr. Roemer--aye; Mr. Hastings--aye.
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives, the committee is not subject to this
requirement; therefore, the committee has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject of this bill.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee held eleven
hearings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R.
4392. Testimony was taken from the Director of Central
Intelligence; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management; the Director of the National Security
Agency; the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Executive
Director, and the Deputy Directors of the Operations,
Intelligence, Administration, Science and Technology
Directorates of the Central Intelligence Agency; the Director
of the National Reconnaissance Office; and the Director of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency; and various other
knowledgeable witnesses from the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of State regarding
the activities and plans of the intelligence community covered
by the provisions and authorizations, both classified and
unclassified, of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001. The bill, as reported by the committee, reflects
conclusions reached by the committee in light of this oversight
activity.
Fiscal Year Cost Projections
The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 2001 and
the five years following, if the amounts authorized are
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified
annex and are in accordance with those of the executive branch.
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) and (3) of rule XIII of
the Rules of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to
sections 308 and 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
the committee submits the following estimate prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 11, 2000.
Mr. Dan L. Crippen,
Director Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Crippen: In compliance with the Rules of the House
of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate of
H.R. 4392, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001,'' pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of the bill as
approved by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on May 10, 2000.
As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in
the very near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited
response to this request by the CBO's staff. Should you have
any questions related to this request, please contact Patrick
B. Murray, the Committee's Chief Counsel. Thank you in advance
for your assistance with this request.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss, Chairman.
Attachment.
------
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 12, 2000.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4392, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Suinta
D'Monte.
Sincerely,
Barry B. Anderson
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
H.R. 4392--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
Summary: H.R. 4392 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2001 for intelligence activities of the United
States government, the Intelligence Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing the bill would cost $144 million over the 2001-
2005 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts.
The bill would affect direct spending by insignificant amounts;
thus, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. H.R. 4392 contains
no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect
the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 4392 is
shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary
information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because
parts are classified as a level above clearances held by CBO
employees. For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that the
bill will be enacted by October 1, 2000, and that the
authorized amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2001.
Estimated outlays are based on historical spending patterns.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community
Management:
Budget Authority \1\........................................ 157 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 135 47 9 3 0 0
Proposed Changes:
Authorization Level......................................... 0 144 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 0 89 43 9 3 0
Spending Under H.R. 4392 for Intelligence Community Management:
Authorization Level \1\..................................... 157 144 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 135 136 53 12 3 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 2000 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
Spending subject to appropriation
The bill would authorize appropriations of $144 million for
the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds the
coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management of
the intelligence agencies. Section 501 would extend through
December 31, 2003, a program that allows the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection. CBO does not have the
necessary information to estimate the budgetary impact of this
provision.
Direct spending
The bill would authorize $216 million for CIARDS to cover
retirement costs attributable to military service and various
unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered
mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the
same as assumed in the CBO baseline. Section 401 would expand a
program that authorizes the CIA to provide goods and services
on a reimbursable basis by allowing the agency to rent property
and equipment to its employees and those on detail from other
agencies. CBO estimates that the costs of providing those
services would be offset by the reimbursement and that this
provision would have an insignificant net impact each year and
no net budgetary impact over the long run.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO
estimates that the net change in outlays that are subject to
pay-as-you-go procedures would be insignificant for each year.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 4392
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state,
local, or tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Sunita D'Monte; Impact
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Leo Lex; and Impact on
the Private Sector: Eric Labs.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Committee Cost Estimates
The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of This
Legislation
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of
the United States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress
shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States; * *
*''; ``to raise and support Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and
maintain a Navy; * * *'' and ``to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''
Therefore, pursuant to such authority, Congress is empowered to
enact this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence
collection personnel.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 104. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Transfer of Funds or Personnel Within the National
Foreign Intelligence Program.--(1)(A) In addition to any other
authorities available under law for such purposes, the Director
of Central Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, may transfer funds
appropriated for a program within the National Foreign
Intelligence Program to another such program and, in accordance
with procedures to be developed by the Director and the heads
of affected departments and agencies, may transfer personnel
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to
another such element for periods up to a year.
(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority
given the Director under this subsection to the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence for Community Management.
(2)(A) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under
this subsection only if--
[(A)] (i) the funds or personnel are being
transferred to an activity that is a higher priority
intelligence activity;
[(B)] (ii) the need for funds or personnel for such
activity is based on unforeseen requirements;
[(C)] (iii) the transfer does not involve a transfer
of funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the
Central Intelligence Agency;
[(D)] (iv) the transfer does not involve a transfer
of funds or personnel from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and
[(E)] (v) [the Secretary or head] subject to
subparagraph (B), the Secretary or head of the
department which contains the affected element or
elements of the intelligence community does not object
to such transfer.
(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to
object to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be
delegated by the Secretary or head of the department involved.
(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority
to object to such a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary
of Defense, but only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v)
shall have no effect unless submitted to the Director of
Central Intelligence in writing.
* * * * * * *
travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection
personnel
Sec. 116. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Director of Central Intelligence may
authorize travel on any common carrier that, in the discretion
of the Director, would by its use maintain or enhance the
protection of sources or methods of intelligence collection or
maintain or enhance the security of personnel of the
intelligence community carrying out intelligence collection
activities.
(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--The Director may only
delegate the authority granted by this section to the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, or with respect to employees
of the Central Intelligence Agency the Director may delegate
such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 721 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
SEC. 721. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL
MUNITIONS.
(a) Reports.--[Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter,] Not
later than March 1, 2001, and every March 1 thereafter, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a
report on--
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the
preceding [6 months] year of dual-use and other
technology useful for the development or production of
weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons,
chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced
conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by
such countries.
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) The Inspector General shall,
not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and
submit to the Director of Central Intelligence a classified
semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office
during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending
December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively.
Within thirty days of receipt of such reports, the Director
shall transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with
any comments he may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a
minimum, include a list of the title or subject of each
inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the
reporting period and--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(D) a certification that the Inspector General has
had full and direct access to all information relevant
to the performance of his functions; and
[(E) a description of all cases occurring during the
reporting period where the Inspector General could not
obtain documentary evidence relevant to any inspection,
audit, or investigation due to his lack of authority to
subpoena such information; and]
[(F)] (E) such recommendations as the Inspector
General may wish to make concerning legislation to
promote economy and efficiency in the administration of
programs and operations undertaken by the Agency, and
to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such
programs and operations.
* * * * * * *
(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(8) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector
General may request such information or assistance as may be
necessary for carrying out his duties and responsibilities from
any [Federal] Government agency. Upon request of the Inspector
General for such information or assistance, the head of the
[Federal] Government agency involved shall, insofar as is
practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory
restriction or regulation of the [Federal] Government agency
concerned, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
* * * * * * *
central services program
Sec. 21. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Central Services Working Capital Fund.--(1) There is
established a fund to be known as the Central Services Working
Capital Fund (in this section referred to as the ``Fund''). The
purpose of the Fund is to provide sums for activities under the
program.
(2) There shall be deposited in the Fund the following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(F) Receipts from miscellaneous reimbursements from
individuals and receipts from the rental of property
and equipment to employees and detailees.
[(F)] (G) Such other amounts as the Director is
authorized to deposit in or transfer to the Fund.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 431 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
Sec. 431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for
intelligence collection activities
(a) Authority.--The Secretary of Defense, subject to the
provisions of this subchapter, may authorize the conduct of
those commercial activities necessary to provide security for
authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken
by the Department of Defense. No commercial activity may be
initiated pursuant to this subchapter after [December 31, 2000]
December 31, 2003.
* * * * * * *