

SECRET SERVICE ON THE LINE: RESTORING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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SECRET SERVICE ON THE LINE: RESTORING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2012

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:31 a.m., in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Landrieu, Collins, Brown, Johnson, Portman, and Moran.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Good morning, and thanks to those who are here, particularly Director Mark Sullivan of the U.S. Secret Service agency, and Charles Edwards, the Acting Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Over its nearly 150-year history, the Secret Service has built an extraordinary reputation for selfless and skilled devotion to the important and dangerous work its agents do: Protecting the President of the United States and other high officials of our government, as well as foreign leaders who visit the United States.

That great reputation, was, sadly, stained last month when 11 Secret Service employees engaged in a night of heavy drinking in Cartagena, Colombia, which ended with them taking foreign national women back to their hotel rooms.

We have called this hearing as part of our Committee's responsibility to oversee the functions of the Federal Government, particularly those within the Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Secret Service.

There are three things we hope to accomplish today and in our Committee's ongoing investigation.

First, we want to get the facts about what precisely happened in Cartagena and where the Secret Service's own investigation of Cartagena stands today.

As has widely been reported, the misconduct involved 11 agents and officers who arrived in Cartagena the morning of Wednesday, April 11, and were off duty the rest of the day.

The men went out—in groups of two, three, and four—to four different nightclubs that evening. After considerable drinking, they returned to their rooms at the El Caribe Hotel with women they had met at the clubs—some of whom were prostitutes—and reg-

istered the women as overnight guests according to hotel rules. The Secret Service subsequently learned that another individual engaged in similar conduct in Cartagena, the night of Monday, April 9. All of the agents and officers held security clearances, and two were in supervisory positions.

If one of the agents had not argued with one of the women about how much he owed her, the world would never have known this sordid story.

But the world does know this sordid story, and that is why the Secret Service, the Inspector General (IG), and we must do everything we can to learn the truth, as best we can. Our purpose is not to diminish the U.S. Secret Service but, quite the contrary, to help restore its credibility which our Nation, indeed the continuity of our government, so clearly depends upon.

Second, as part of that search for truth and lessons to be learned, we need to know if there were warning signs that misconduct had become a pattern among traveling Secret Service agents, in the years before Cartagena, that should have been seen and stopped. It is hard for many people, including me, I will admit, to believe that on one night in April 2012, in Cartagena, Colombia, 12 Secret Service agents—there to protect the President—suddenly and spontaneously did something they or other agents had never done before, that is, go out in groups of two, three, or four to four different nightclubs or strip clubs, drink to excess, and then bring foreign national women back to their hotel rooms.

That lingering disbelief led our Committee to send a series of questions to the Secret Service to determine if there was any evidence in their records of patterns of previous misconduct. We have begun to review the agency's answers and have found individual cases of misconduct over the last 5 years that I would say are troubling, but do not yet find evidence at all sufficient to justify a conclusion of a pattern or culture of misconduct.

But the Secret Service disciplinary records, of course, only take us so far. They only include cases where misconduct was observed, charged, and/or adjudicated.

We can only know what the records of the Secret Service reveal and what others, including whistleblowers, come forward to tell us. Thus far, the Committee has received a relatively small number of calls from people outside; whistleblowers. But thus far they, too, have not provided evidence of a pattern of misconduct by Secret Service agents similar to what happened in Cartagena.

However, we have not concluded our oversight of this matter, nor has the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General. And, therefore, in this public forum, I would ask anyone who has information about the conduct of the Secret Service employees over the years that they believe is relevant to our investigation to contact our staff at the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee here at the U.S. Capitol.

Today's *Washington Post* reports, based on multiple anonymous sources that, "sexual encounters during official travel had been condoned under an unwritten code that allows what happens on the road to stay on the road." The article also contends that this tolerance was part of what was called the "Secret Circus"—a mock-

ing nickname the employees apparently use when large numbers of agents and officers arrive in a city.

One of the men implicated in Cartagena has told associates that a senior security supervisor had advised agents to follow loose guidelines when spending time with women they met on the road: One-night stands were permitted as long as the relationship ended when the agent left the country. This *Washington Post* article, which, again, I say was based on anonymous sources—though the article contends there were multiple sources—obviously encourages people's worse suspicions about a pattern of conduct existing within the Secret Service and needs a response from Director Sullivan, hopefully this morning.

In addition, as I mentioned, our initial review of the Secret Service agency's disciplinary records for the last 5 years, which is what we requested, shows some individual cases of misconduct which are troubling but are not evidence yet of a pattern of misconduct. These records do reveal 64 instances—again, over 5 years—in which allegations or complaints concerning sexual misconduct were made against employees of the Secret Service. Most of these complaints involved sending sexually explicit emails or sexually explicit material on a government computer, although three of the complaints involved charges of an inappropriate relationship with a foreign national woman, and one was a complaint of nonconsensual sexual intercourse. And, of course, either this morning or in our investigation, we would like the Secret Service response to those as we need to know more about them.

Thirty other cases over 5 years involved alcohol, almost all relating to driving while under the influence. I hasten to say that these complaints involve a very small percentage of the thousands of people who have worked at the U.S. Secret Service during the last 5 years. And I also want to say that discipline was imposed in most of the cases. Nonetheless, it is important for us to know how those complaints were handled and whether, looking back, they should have been warnings of worse to come.

We want to know what reforms the Secret Service is implementing to make sure that what happened in Cartagena never happens again.

I know Secret Service Director Sullivan has already made some changes, such as increasing the no alcohol before reporting for duty rule from 6 to 10 hours and banning foreign national women explicitly from hotel rooms.

But I also want to hear what the Secret Service is doing to encourage people to report egregious behavior when they see it—to ensure that no code of silence exists among agents and officers.

Finally, let me put this in a larger context. In the last several days, the Secret Service has been called on to provide protection for a large number of world leaders who were attending both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the G-8 summits in the United States. The presidential campaigns of 2012 are ongoing, and the Secret Service needs to protect the candidates and secure two large national conventions. And, of course, ultimately, and most importantly, the President and Vice President of the United States and their families need protection every day.

That is why the Cartagena scandal has to be dealt with head on and quickly. The credibility of the Secret Service is too important and its mission too critical to our country to leave any questions about Cartagena and what preceded it unanswered.

I want to personally thank Secret Service Director Sullivan for his cooperation with our investigation and also to thank him because he has worked very hard and fast since he learned of the crisis to investigate it and try to restore the credibility of the Secret Service.

Director Sullivan, I look forward to your testimony, as I do to yours, Inspector General Charles Edwards.

Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin my remarks today by stating my strong belief that the vast majority of the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service are professional, disciplined, dedicated, and courageous. They do a difficult job extraordinarily well.

The honorable conduct of the many true professionals of the Secret Service stands in stark contrast to the misconduct that occurred in Colombia last month on the eve of the President's visit there. The timing makes the appalling behavior all that much more troubling not only to me but also to the majority of Secret Service personnel both past and present.

I will not dwell on the details of the incident since they have already been so widely reported and I am sure will be discussed by Director Sullivan today. The behavior is morally repugnant, and I certainly do not want to downplay that fact. My concerns, however, go far beyond the morality of the agents' actions.

First of all, this reckless behavior could easily have compromised the individuals charged with the security of the President of the United States. And, second, the facts so far lead me to conclude that, while not at all representative of the majority of Secret Service personnel, this misconduct was almost certainly not an isolated incident. Let me discuss both of these concerns in a bit more detail.

It is basic "Counterintelligence 101" that Secret Service personnel and others holding sensitive positions of trust in the U.S. Government should avoid any situation that could provide a foreign intelligence, security service, or criminal gangs with the means of exerting coercion or blackmail. Yet two of the primary means of entrapment—sexual lures and alcohol—were both present here in abundance.

While the preliminary investigation has shown that none of these men had weapons or classified material in their hotel rooms, they still could easily have been drugged or kidnapped or had their liaisons with these foreign national women used to blackmail them, thereby compromising their effectiveness and potentially jeopardizing the President's security. They willingly made themselves potential targets not only for intelligence or security services, but also for groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or drug cartels.

There is absolutely no excuse for, or factor that can mitigate, such recklessness. The Secret Service, to its credit, has tightened

up its regulations and oversight to try to ensure that this never happens again.

Second, the facts suggest to me that this likely was not just a one-time incident.

If only one or two individuals out of the 160 male Secret Service personnel assigned to this mission had engaged in this type of serious misconduct, then I would think it was an aberration. But that was not the case; there were 12 individuals involved—12. That is 8 percent of the male Secret Service personnel in-country and 9 percent of those staying at a particular hotel.

Moreover, contrary to the conventional story line, this was not simply a single, organized group that went out for a night on the town together. Rather, these were individuals and small groups of two and three agents who went out at different times to different clubs, bars, and brothels, but who all ended up in compromising circumstances.

In addition, and perhaps most troubling, two of the participants were supervisors—one with 22 years of service and the other with 21 years. That surely sends a message to the rank-and-file that this kind of activity is somehow tolerated on the road.

The numbers involved, as well as the participation of two senior supervisors, lead me to believe that this was not a one-time event. Rather, the circumstances unfortunately suggest that different rules apply on the road, and they suggest an issue of culture.

And it may well be a culture that spans agencies. The Secret Service and the Department of Justice Inspector General are continuing to investigate yet another Secret Service agent and at least two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) personnel who entertained female foreign nationals in the Cartagena apartment of one of the DEA agents.

Moreover, the evidence thus far in that investigation suggests that was not a one-time incident.

And, of course, the original reports out of Colombia also alleged misconduct by about a dozen members of our Armed Forces.

Again, I want to emphasize that the vast majority of our law enforcement and military personnel are real heroes, and I deeply appreciate the dangers that those deployed overseas face every day. Given this apparent question of culture, however, I am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General will be examining the culture of the Secret Service to see if there is something systemic that led to these incidents. And the Director himself has convened a task force. I will follow these developments closely.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I do want to join you in recognizing that Director Sullivan and the Acting IG have acted in a forthright and open manner with this Committee over the past 6 weeks as we have attempted to better understand the ramifications and causes of this scandal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, for your opening statement.

Director Sullivan, we thank you for being here, and we would welcome your testimony at this time.

TESTIMONY OF MARK J. SULLIVAN,¹ DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the facts surrounding the misconduct of U.S. Secret Service employees in Cartagena, Colombia, the immediate actions taken by the agency to ensure the protective mission was not compromised, the results to date of the agency's internal investigation into this matter, and the actions that have been put into place thus far.

The last several weeks have been a difficult time for the U.S. Secret Service, and I would like to begin by talking about the outstanding men and women who serve in our organization. The overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in this agency exemplify our five core values of justice, duty, courage, honesty, and loyalty. On a daily basis, they are prepared to lay down their lives to protect others in service to their country. And it is precisely because of these longstanding values that the men and women of this agency are held to a higher standard.

Clearly, the misconduct that took place in Cartagena, Colombia, is not representative of these values or of the high ethical standards we demand from our nearly 7,000 employees. I am deeply disappointed and I apologize for the misconduct of these employees and the distraction that it has caused.

The men and women of the U.S. Secret Service are committed to continuing to live up to the standards that the President, the Congress, and the American people expect and deserve. From the beginning of this incident, we have strived to keep Members of Congress and our committees of jurisdiction up to date as information became available. While my written testimony provides an overview of our findings to date, I am committed to keeping you informed as our review continues.

Immediately upon learning of the allegations of misconduct, I directed Secret Service supervisory personnel in Cartagena to initiate an investigation and conduct preliminary interviews of any Secret Service employee alleged to be involved in this incident. Once the preliminary interviews had taken place, I ordered all 11 people alleged to be involved in misconduct to immediately return to the United States.

The prompt removal of these individuals enabled us to make necessary replacements and adjustments to the staffing plan in advance of the President's arrival in Cartagena. On Saturday, April 14, the morning after their return to the United States, these 11 individuals were interviewed by our Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), which acts as our agency's internal affairs component. At the conclusion of these interviews, all 11 individuals were placed on administrative leave, their security clearances were suspended, and all of their equipment was surrendered pending the outcome of this investigation. As the investigation progressed, a 12th person was implicated. At this point, administrative action has been taken relative to all 12 individuals.

¹ The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan appears in the Appendix on page 42.

In addition, during the course of our internal investigation, we had one individual self-report an incident unrelated to the misconduct that occurred at the El Caribe Hotel. This individual, too, has been placed on administrative leave pending the investigation and their clearance has been suspended.

During the course of the investigation, we confirmed that none of the 12 individuals had received a briefing regarding their protective assignment prior to the misconduct taking place. We also confirmed that none of the 12 individuals had any sensitive security documents, firearms, radios, or other security-related equipment in their hotel room.

Since the beginning of this investigation, we have been transparent and forthcoming with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG). I have instructed our Office of Professional Responsibility to cooperate fully with DHS Acting Inspector General Edwards as his office conducts its own comprehensive review of the matter.

As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, while the overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in our agency exemplify the highest standards of professionalism and integrity, I want to ensure that this type of misconduct that occurred in Cartagena, is not repeated. As a result, a number of enhancements to existing codes of conduct, in addition to some new policies, have been put in place as detailed in my written statement.

I have also established a Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group to look at the efficacy of our employment standards, background investigations, disciplinary actions, ethics training, and all related policies and procedures. Director John Berry from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Director Connie Patrick from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center are co-chairs of this group.

I am confident that this review will provide us with an objective perspective on our organizational practices, highlighting both areas where we excel and identifying areas where we may improve.

The U.S. Secret Service is an organization that maintains deep pride in the work it does on behalf of our Nation. Throughout our 147-year history, the agency has demanded service with honor and distinction by its agents, officers, and administrative professional and technical staff. All employees are expected to adhere to the highest standards of personal and professional integrity and recognize that the success of our agency's mission depends on the strong character and sound judgment of our people.

One of the greatest privileges I have is swearing in new agents and officers. It gives all of us a tremendous sense of pride to witness a new generation take that same oath we took many years ago. That pride comes for all of us from being part of a special organization with a history of dedicated people who serve our country honorably.

Over the past several weeks, we have been under intense scrutiny as a result of this incident. To see the agency's integrity called into question has not been easy. Through it all, the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service have demonstrated professionalism and integrity in their daily work.

Just this past weekend, the agency successfully completed security operations for the G-8 in Maryland and the NATO summit, which included the gathering of more than 40 world leaders from four continents, in the city of Chicago. Concurrent with these events, we continue the planning for similar large-scale security operations for the Republican National Convention in Tampa, Florida, and the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, later this summer. All of this comes on top of exceptional work carried out every day in field offices around the country and throughout the world.

Today, as I testify before you, the men and women of this organization are protecting world leaders, presidential candidates, former presidents, numerous embassies in Washington, DC, conducting criminal investigations, keeping American citizens and financial institutions safe from financial fraud, and preparing for the Presidential Inauguration. They are overall making a positive impact on their community.

I am grateful to them for what they do every single day, and my sincere hope is that they are not defined by the misconduct of a few but, rather, by the good work that they perform with character and integrity.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I will be more than happy to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director Sullivan.

And now the Acting Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, Charles Edwards.

**TESTIMONY OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS,¹ ACTING INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to update you on the Inspector General's actions to review and monitor the U.S. Secret Service's investigation of the incident in Cartagena, Colombia, involving Secret Service employees' interactions with Colombian nationals on April 11 and 12. Our role began almost immediately after the incident when, on April 13, Director Sullivan and I discussed the events. We have since remained in regular contact. Director Sullivan has repeatedly stated to me his commitment to conduct a thorough investigation. His actions so far have demonstrated that commitment, and the Secret Service has been completely transparent and cooperative with OIG inspectors and investigators since our team started its work.

On April 26, I instructed our Assistant IG for Inspections and the Acting Assistant IG for Investigations to review the Secret Service's handling of its internal investigation regarding the incident in Cartagena. The next day, our Assistant IG for Inspections and the Acting Deputy Assistant IG for Investigations met with officials from Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), which is conducting the internal investigation, and briefed them on the objectives of our review.

¹ The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards appears in the Appendix on page 50.

Our Assistant IG for Inspections has assembled a nine-person review team, led by a veteran chief inspector and augmented by three OIG criminal investigators.

On May 2, this team met with RES officials and began part one of our three-part review. In part one, we are evaluating the adequacy of Secret Service's response to the incident in Cartagena; the adequacy of the scope, methodology, and conclusions of its internal investigation; and the sufficiency of the corrective actions already implemented or planned.

We are in the process of interviewing Secret Service personnel responsible for coordinating the agency's response to the incident and conducting its investigation as well as personnel within the Office of the Director, the RES, those in charge of field operations, and the office responsible for security clearances.

We will review all records, documents, and other materials related to the Secret Service's internal investigation, including RES's standards for inspection and investigation. We will review protocols for advance teams, the Secret Service Code of Conduct, and disciplinary processes and records.

Our field work for part one of our review is currently taking place in Washington, DC. We have started meeting with RES staff members who interviewed the Secret Service employees who were in Cartagena at the time of the incident. We have also started reviewing the records that resulted from RES interviews of nearly 200 Secret Service employees who were associated with the President's visit, as well as 25 employees of the Hilton and El Caribe hotels in Cartagena.

Besides, we plan to interview Special Agent-in-Charge Paula Reid, who had on-site responsibility for the Secret Service's Cartagena detail. We also plan to interview Director Sullivan.

We will review the Secret Service's report on its internal investigation as soon as it becomes available. Contingent upon our receipt of that report, our goal is to complete the first phase of our review and report our findings by July 2.

Immediately thereafter, we will begin part two of our review, during which we will determine whether certain workplace conditions and issues have promoted a culture within the Secret Service that could have contributed to the Cartagena incident. We will examine the Secret Service's recruiting, vetting, and hiring practices. We will also examine the Secret Service's Equal Employment Opportunity and Merit System Protection Board cases, communications within the agency, its administration of awards and discipline, training, and any other programs that might cast light on the organizational culture of the Secret Service. This portion of our work will include site visits to the Miami and other field offices.

The third phase of our review will examine the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secret Service and our office. We will evaluate changes in both Secret Service and Office of Inspector General investigative capabilities since the MOU was created in 2003 and determine whether changes are necessary. It is likely that we will conduct this phase concurrently with phase two. We will report our findings on both phases two and three later this year.

Finally, I would like to stress that the value of the Secret Service's efforts to date in investigating its own employees should not be discounted. It has done a credible job of uncovering the facts and has taken swift and decisive action.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, and I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the Committee Members may have. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Edwards, for your testimony and for what you have been doing.

We will start with 7-minute rounds of questions for each of the Senators here.

Director Sullivan, you have told us that you were shocked by the behavior of the 12 agents in Cartagena, and I believe you were. And you have felt confident that their behavior was not a common occurrence within the ranks of the Secret Service.

I wanted to ask you, after reading the *Washington Post* story today, whether you have that same confidence. In other words, can you give us your first reaction to what is contained in that story? And, obviously, most damningly, "Current and former agency employees say that sexual encounters during official travel had been condoned under an unwritten code that allows what happens on the road to stay there."

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator. I absolutely feel the same way about the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service and the culture after reading that article. When I read that article, it cited numerous anonymous sources. I guess what I would ask is that if people do have information, I want them to come forward with that information, either to our Office of Professional Responsibility or to the DHS IG. But the thought or the notion that this type of behavior is condoned or authorized is just absurd, in my opinion. I have been an agent for 29 years now. I began my career for 7 years in Detroit. I was on the White House detail twice. I have worked for a lot of men and women in this organization. I never one time had any supervisor or any other agent tell me that this type of behavior is condoned. I know I have never told any of our employees that it is condoned.

So I feel as strongly now as I did before I read that article.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Edwards, let me ask you, because at least some significant part of the conclusions drawn—again, generally without attribution—in the *Washington Post* article today are based on conversations with some of the 12, perhaps all of the 12 agents involved in the Cartagena scandal. Are you intending to interview any or all of them about what happened?

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, sir. Yes, we are going to be interviewing all 12. In fact, this afternoon, we are going to be interviewing two of those individuals.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is very important and very encouraging news because obviously you are conducting a formal Inspector General investigation, and, therefore, if they repeat the allegations they have made to the newspaper, presumably you will find out whether they are credible or not and report to us and to the public as your investigation goes on.

Director Sullivan, let me ask you, with respect to your own investigation thus far and the individuals alleged to have behaved im-

properly, were they asked whether they had engaged in similar conduct on other occasions?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, they were.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And what was their answer?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Their answer was they had not.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. They had not. And just for the record, were they under oath when they were interrogated?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe they all gave a signed oath to that, but I will have to get back to you on that, Senator. I am not sure if they were under oath.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I would appreciate that.

I know they all were offered the opportunity to take a polygraph test, and it would be of interest to me whether during that test they were also asked whether they had ever been involved in similar behavior.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, and there are some—we did use every investigative tool we had, including polygraph interviews, talking to other people, looking at records, and thus far, we have not found that this type of behavior was exhibited by any of these individuals before.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Were the Secret Service personnel questioned during your own investigation asked whether they considered their conduct acceptable for some reason?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, this was a question an awful lot of us have asked ourselves over the last month and a half, and I believe when many of these people were interviewed, I do not think they could explain why they exhibited the behavior that they did.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. For instance, some people have tried to explain and understand why such risky, really irresponsible behavior would be carried out by Secret Service agents on assignment and have said perhaps they were influenced by the fact that prostitution was legal in Colombia. I take it that would not matter so far as the Secret Service is concerned because whether prostitution was legal or not—they, by their behavior, would run the risk of compromising the security of the President of the United States because who knows who they are with on those occasions.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator Lieberman, absolutely. You know, there is no excuse for that type of behavior from both a conduct perspective and from a national security perspective. That type of behavior was just reckless.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. Over the past 5 years, based on our review of the disciplinary records that we have so far gone over, which you provided to the Committee in response to our question, there appear to have been five cases that are directly relevant to what happened in Cartagena and, therefore, potentially noteworthy: Three allegations involving inappropriate or undocumented contact with a foreign national woman, one allegation of contact with a prostitute, and one allegation of nonconsensual sex.

Director Sullivan, are you aware of these cases? And if so, can you tell us what was involved and how the agency handled them?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe so, sir. First of all, any type of misconduct we take extremely seriously and we investigate it to the end limit. The one I believe you are talking about with the non-consensual sex was investigated by law enforcement, and after

doing an intense investigation on that, decided not to go forward with any charges on that one.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And may I ask, if it is appropriate, whether the complainant was somebody within the Secret Service, in other words, a fellow employee, or someone outside, a citizen?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Somebody who was outside the organization, Senator. The other three with the foreign national contact, again, all of those were investigated and the appropriate administrative action was taken on those three.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Did any of those have characteristics similar to what happened in Cartagena, that they were women or prostitutes that they picked up.

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, nothing to do with prostitution. I believe these were women that they had contact with, but nothing like this situation we are referring to now.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Were these long-term relationships, to the best of your understanding, or just people they met when they were on assignment in a foreign location?

Mr. SULLIVAN. At least one of them, I believe, Senator, was somebody who they had met and they continued with the contact via email.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And, finally, what about the one case that we have seen in the record of contact with a prostitute, which I gather occurred right here in Washington?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Back in 2008, an individual was involved with prostitution and was separated from our agency a month later.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Was that individual on duty at that time?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And I take it this was not somebody he met during the course of his work, but he was caught in a sting. Is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. As I understand it, he solicited an undercover police officer.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will continue to talk about those cases. Thanks for being so responsive. My time is up.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Sullivan, it is my understanding that all of the Secret Service personnel involved, with the possible exception of one agent who may have used another agent's name, registered the women at the hotel's front desk using their real names and using the women's real names. Is that accurate?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, it is, Senator.

Senator COLLINS. That fact made your investigation easier in terms of tracking down the women, but it also seems to reinforce the claim that this kind of conduct has been tolerated in the past. In other words, it suggests to me that the agents were so unconcerned about being caught or about the impropriety of their actions that they did not even seek to conceal it.

What is your reaction? Do you think that the fact that they followed the rules of the hotel in registering the women, they used their real names, they used the women's real names, suggests that they were not really worried about being caught?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I have tried to figure this out for a month and a half what would ever possess people to exhibit this type of behavior. Again, I will tell you that I do not think this is indicative of the overwhelming majority of our men and women, as you mentioned before, Senator. But I just think that between the alcohol—and, I do not know, the environment—these individuals did some really dumb things. And I just cannot explain why they would have done what they would do, but I will tell you that I do not believe they did it because they believed that this type of behavior would be tolerated. We have a zero tolerance for this type of behavior. But I cannot figure out why they did what they did.

Senator COLLINS. What troubles me about this is, again, I will go back to the fact that this was not a case where these 12 men together were out on the town in the same club bringing back women from that one source. They went out on the town in small groups, in some cases two or three or individually; yet each one of them comes back to the hotel, makes no attempt to conceal the fact that they are bringing foreign national women into the hotel, actually register them at the front desk, they do not try to conceal their actions in any way. That suggests to me that they were not worried about being caught, that they did not think there would be consequences if they were caught. Otherwise, wouldn't you expect that they would try to conceal their actions?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, when I was first apprised of this situation, I was dumbfounded—that people on an assignment protecting the President in a foreign country could have acted in this manner, it was a very easy decision for me to say we need to bring them back here. And, again, Senator, I have no excuse for those actions. All I can tell you is that we acted quickly and brought them back here and initiated our investigation.

Senator COLLINS. Let me turn to another but related issue. When you discovered what had happened, you updated some of the training manuals. In late April, you issued a directive that clearly says that the laws of this country apply to Secret Service personnel while abroad. And I give you credit for issuing that to make it crystal clear. But wasn't your guidance, as I look through your adjudication guidelines and the eligibility for access to classified information, isn't it already pretty clear in those guidelines that this kind of behavior would not be acceptable?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, absolutely. We put these new enhanced guidelines out. I have been accused of being draconian for putting them out, and maybe they are. I think, again, I go back to the overwhelming majority of our men and women. I do not think that our men and women need these guidelines because we have men and women of character and integrity. But what I wanted to make sure is even if there is one individual out there who just did not understand it, we wanted to make sure we reached these individuals.

But you are absolutely right. There are adjudicative guidelines out there. People are aware of what those adjudicative guidelines are. We are a professional organization. We travel around the world. Over the last 6 years, we have done 37,000 trips around the world, and we have had no situation like this one before. And, again, I am confident this is not a cultural issue, this is not a systemic issue with us. We make decisions every single day. Our em-

ployees make some really critical decisions that, again, the overwhelming majority of the time they make good decisions. On this particular trip, we had some individuals who made very bad decisions. That is why it is very important for us to have a strong Office of Professional Responsibility and to have a good relationship with the Inspector General, because when those individuals, which are in the minority, make bad decisions, when they make bad choices, when there is misconduct or misbehavior, we are going to act appropriately.

Senator COLLINS. I guess the point I was trying to make is, as I read these guidelines, it specifically refers to engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is legal in that country but illegal in the United States. So there is no doubt that officially this kind of behavior was already prohibited prior to your issuing the directive on April 27, correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Edwards, in just the few seconds I have left, are you conducting an independent investigation of what occurred in Colombia? Or are you simply reviewing the investigation that Director Sullivan and his staff are conducting?

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Senator. I am deeply troubled, just as you are, and we are doing a comprehensive review. In that what I mean is we are reviewing the investigation that is done by Secret Service. At the same time, we are also doing some independent interviews ourselves. We also want to talk to the people who are interviewing the personnel. We have done 23. We have also sat in on about six of the interviews that were conducted.

In order for us to get a comprehensive report—I do not have the personnel to go interview all 200 of them, but we are doing a random sampling of them to make sure that our review and investigation is independent and transparent.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is critical that the IG do a completely independent investigation, not just a review of the agency's investigation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. I agree with you. I know this will require a commitment of personnel by you, Mr. Edwards, but I think it is so important to get to the bottom of this event, to get to the truth of it so that we can find out exactly what happened. And the aim here is, of course, to restore confidence to the Secret Service, which most of whose members obviously deserve it by their work. So I agree with that.

The Members of the Committee, as is our custom, will be called in order of appearance, and in that regard, Senator Brown is next.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Sullivan, thank you. Mr. Edwards, thank you for attending.

Mr. Sullivan, listening to your testimony, you said you were not aware that this has happened before, and that is evidenced by some of the investigations you have done in your long history in the Secret Service. Is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator.

Senator BROWN. And you are still trying to figure it out, is something you also said. Is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. As far as figuring this type of behavior—

Senator BROWN. Yes, the most recent event.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. And you are making changes, doing ethics training, changing policy. Is that also correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. And you have said many times a majority of the folks serving in the agency—and I would agree—do wonderful work. They have many missions. They have served with great pride and resourcefulness over, I believe, 147 years of service. Is that also a fair statement?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator.

Senator BROWN. I know you have set out new guidelines, and you indicated on your own, you just said that they were draconian, as a matter of fact, and you hate to do them, but you feel it is necessary. And I would ask, do you also trust the men and women now that are serving, notwithstanding this individual incident? Do you trust them in their sacrifice and service in the job that they are doing right now?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. The reason I am asking these questions is because I know there is potentially a new policy to send a GS-15 supervisor from the Office of Professional Responsibility, which you indicated also that is a member of the internal affairs division of the agency, to go and basically baby-sit these agents when they are going overseas and doing their duty. So I am a little bit confused as to why we would be sending a \$155,000 additional person to basically baby-sit people that—you say this has not happened before, you have changed policy, you have made draconian changes, and you trust the men and women, yet we are going to be sending somebody to oversee that they are, in fact, following your policies. I am not quite sure how that makes financial sense, and re-establishes the so-called trust that you have in the agency. Could you answer that, please?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. And, again, I was accused of being draconian for putting these out, but we did feel that it was important to get these out.

As far as the GS-15 from the Office of Professional Responsibility going out, he or she will have an assignment. I have heard them referred to as a “baby-sitter.” They are not. They are there to be a working agent. However, one of the things we did find on this particular trip was that when we did have this situation we had to look at, the person we needed to rely on was the special agent in charge of the Miami Field Office, who did an outstanding job. And my preference would have been for her to continue to work on the upcoming visit. We do need to have supervision on these type of—

Senator BROWN. Yes, but you already have supervision. You have agents, you have agents in charge of agents, and you have other agents in charge of those. You already have a chain of command, and it seems like you are now going to insert an internal affairs person to basically—you can call it a “baby-sitter,” or you can call

it somebody just overseeing what is happening. I am just going on your testimony where you said you have made changes, you trust these people, this is an aberration, it is not something that habitually happened, you had no knowledge, and yet we are going to spend the time and effort and are going to take somebody away from doing another job to be there just in case something like this happens. I am wondering if you think it is a little bit overkill.

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, Senator, and maybe I am doing a bad job of explaining this. We have a group of agents who go out, and they are called a jump team. On this particular jump team, we had 53 agents. This jump team was led by two GS-14s who were two of the individuals who were involved in this incident.

What we have done now is we have replaced those two GS-14 supervisors with two GS-15 supervisors. One GS-15 is going to come from the field, more than likely will be a GS-15 special agent in charge of a field office, and then the other one will be a GS-15 from our Office of Professional Responsibility. They are not there to be a baby-sitter. They are going to have an assignment. But if a situation does come up, they will be there to resolve that situation.

Senator BROWN. Is this on every mission that we do now?

Mr. SULLIVAN. This will be for every foreign trip.

Senator BROWN. For every foreign trip. And how many foreign trips do we actually conduct per year?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I would have to give you the numbers for that.

Senator BROWN. Around, approximately? Is it 10? Is it 100? Is it 200 or 500? Give me just an approximation.

Mr. SULLIVAN. So far this year we have done about 200 trips or so, but this is only for a presidential or a vice presidential visit.

Senator BROWN. And how many of those?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I would have to get you the number.

Senator BROWN. If you could because, once again, you are restructuring—you are changing the entire structure, putting higher paid people, GS-15s in position. They should be doing the job regardless of the GS level that they are at. And then, changing and having someone there to oversee and be there, an agency that you trust, I am still not quite—

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I do trust our people, but we are talking about protecting the President here, and I believe supervision is very important. And, clearly, on this particular trip, supervision was lacking. And if we have to put GS-15s on a particular trip, then that is what we are going to do.

Senator BROWN. OK.

Mr. SULLIVAN. We are going to see how it goes, and if we believe we can go back to the way we had it before, we will do that. But the one thing I want to make clear, these people are not there to baby-sit, and these GS-15s from our Office of Professional Responsibility are going to be the individuals who are going to be giving an ethics briefing at the beginning of a trip and a Code of Conduct briefing on a trip.

Senator BROWN. How often do they get the ethics briefings?

Mr. SULLIVAN. They get those throughout their career during training, and there is an annual requirement—

Senator BROWN. So an annual ethics briefing, and how about polygraphs every 10 years, I understand?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No. They get a polygraph at the beginning of their career when they come on, and then after that we do 5-year background updates. Some of our individuals, depending on what type of position they hold, either internal or external to the organization, they get polygraphs throughout their career as well.

Senator BROWN. And what is the average, about every 5 or 10 years.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, not all of our employees get polygraphs every 5 years.

Senator BROWN. How about these particular individuals that would have been doing the job that they were doing? How often would they get a polygraph?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Unless they are in a specialized position where that was required, they would not have taken another polygraph once they got their initial polygraph.

Senator BROWN. So it could have been 10 or 20 years for some of these people.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. Do you think maybe we should review that policy and have folks—

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is part of what we are looking at now.

Senator BROWN. Do you think we would have actually found out about this if we did not have an argument regarding price?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I do think we would have, Senator.

Senator BROWN. How do you think we would have found out?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that somebody on this jump team would have reported that.

Senator BROWN. Well, if, in fact, you believe the *Washington Post* article, this is something that has been happening for quite a while, and yet you have never heard of it. We are getting two different stories. So I would hope that, Mr. Edwards, in your investigation we can find out what the truth is and deal with the people that are not adhering to the policy and deal with it accordingly. I agree with you, Mr. Sullivan. I think there are some amazing men and women serving in our Secret Service. You know, taking a bullet for the President is the ultimate form of sacrifice that an agent could make, and protecting our President and Vice President is the most important thing that any individual in our government can do, quite honestly. And I know there are some fine ones out there, and, unfortunately, I agree with the Chairman, the image is stained. And that is why I also appreciate your appearances before us and your efforts to be open and forthright. I thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, if I may, I would just like to respond back to the *Washington Post* article. Again, that referenced numerous anonymous sources there, and you had talked about waste and mismanagement earlier. You know, there was an allegation at the beginning of this about misconduct in El Salvador, and a lot of people took that and ran with it because it was reported on the news. I took that allegation very seriously, and I sent our Office of Professional Responsibility down to El Salvador for almost a week.

We spent thousands of dollars to send those people down there. We interviewed 28 to 30 people. We went to four hotels where our agents stayed. We talked to every hotel manager. We talked to every security director for those hotels. We talked to seven or eight of the contract drivers who our agents used. We talked to the police chief. We talked to the owner of a nightclub where this incident was alleged to have occurred. We were unable to prove any of these allegations. We spoke to the Regional Security Officer (RSO) who conducted his own investigation down there.

So all I would say is that when you read about it in the paper from an anonymous source, it is very difficult for us to investigate that type of an allegation. I would say, again, we would like to know who, when, where, and why, and the names of people, as well as who these people are who are condoning it. And I will just tell you, sir, that is not the organization I know that we would condone such behavior.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director. Thank you, Senator Brown. Senator Johnson, you are next.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Sullivan and Inspector General Edwards, thanks for testifying today.

First of all, I have great respect for the Secret Service, and this is an incredibly sad episode, and this hearing is all about how do you restore credibility. I am also sad to say—I agree with Senator Collins—based on the facts of this case, it is hard to believe that this is just a one-time occurrence. I wish I could believe that, but it is just hard to believe.

I have a couple of questions. Let us go back to the polygraphs that Senator Brown was asking about.

I think I heard you earlier say that the polygraphs were offered to these agents. Was that not a requirement?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I believe we ended up doing about 14 or 15 polygraphs.

Senator JOHNSON. But, again, was it not a requirement?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, they have the option to refuse a polygraph.

Senator JOHNSON. What kind of constraints did you find in your investigation? What constraints are there in trying to get to the facts of this based on just worker protections?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, sir, going back to the polygraph, in some cases, the polygraphs helped a couple of people keep their job, and those particular individuals who refused to take the polygraph, we were able to come up with other information that refuted what they were saying. So for us not giving a polygraph did not really impact the way this investigation was conducted because we were able to prove the allegation without using the polygraph.

Senator JOHNSON. Again, as we talked in our closed-door briefing, my concern is that additional information starts coming out, other stories come out month after month after month, and we need to get this behind us. I would imagine you have the exact same concern.

In your investigation, what are you doing to make sure that we do not hear of another instance 2 or 3 months out? Specifically,

what are you doing to ensure that does not occur other than just your belief that you have faith in your agents?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, sir, we put together this Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group with Director Berry and Director Patrick. The Inspector General is going to be taking a look at our investigation. Last June, a governmentwide Viewpoint survey, when asked if they would report an incident of unethical behavior, I believe nearly 60 percent of our employees responded that they would report it. We want to improve that number until it is 100 percent. We want to encourage our employees that if they see unethical behavior or misconduct, we want that to be reported to us.

Senator JOHNSON. Forty percent is a very high percentage that would not report. I guess that is my concern when you hear the story of "what is done on the road stays on the road." My guess is that within the Secret Service there is a pretty high level of esprit de corps, possibly even a code of silence. And so barring utilization of polygraphs that are required, how do you really get to the bottom of this?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I go back to leadership, that the leadership that we have on these trips, the leadership that we have in our organization, that they encourage our people and make sure that people know that there is not going to be retribution or that there is not going to be any negative impact for them to report this type of behavior.

Senator JOHNSON. But you had leadership on these trips, and these things occurred. So, again, how do we get to the bottom of it? Is there some mechanism where we can require polygraphs, I hate to say it, of the 7,000 members of the Secret Service to actually get this episode behind us.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, one of the things that we have looked at is, do we need to increase the use of polygraph. We have a very aggressive and a very good polygraph program. All of our agents are polygraphed when they first come on the job. We do 5-year updates for every single employee that we have. Every employee we have maintains a top security clearance. But we are taking a look at further use of polygraph.

Senator JOHNSON. What questions specifically in these types of episodes would be asked in a polygraph test?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is something we would have to take a look at. There would be two different polygraphs we are talking about here. There would be the national security polygraph and then there would be the character issue polygraph. And for each one there would be two or three relevant questions that would be looking for our polygraphers to ask the employees.

Senator JOHNSON. So in the polygraphs that were administered voluntarily, was a more general question asked or were only questions asked related to this specific episode? In other words, did you ask those individuals that were polygraphed, "Have you ever participated in this type of behavior in the past?"

Mr. SULLIVAN. That type of question I believe was asked in the pre-test, but, again, sir, I would be more than happy to get you answers to the exact questions that were asked.

Senator JOHNSON. I would like to know whether that question was asked and whether the question was also asked, not only

under oath but also in the polygraph, "Are you aware of any other type of behavior by somebody else within the service?"

Mr. SULLIVAN. We will be happy to get that for you.

Senator JOHNSON. To me, those are the types of questions that really do need to be asked almost universally if we are going to get to the bottom of this.

Mr. SULLIVAN. OK.

Senator JOHNSON. In terms of taking disciplinary action, up to and including discharge, do you feel constrained in your employment policies of actually being able to take the necessary steps?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. I believe we did a very swift and comprehensive investigation, and we took the appropriate action when we felt that we had enough information to take that action.

Also, not only in this type of an investigation but any investigation we do, when it comes to an employee, we want to make sure that we protect the rights that they have. But, again, we want to make sure that whatever decision we make is going to be the right one and it is one that cannot be refuted.

Senator JOHNSON. We have had a number of agents retire but now are trying to get back in the Secret Service or they are challenging the dismissal. What are the numbers and what is the status on that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right now, our numbers contradict what was in the *Washington Post* article. We have two employees who had originally said that they were going to resign that have now come back and said that they are going to challenge their resignations. And so now we will look to revoke their security clearance.

Senator JOHNSON. Well, I am basically out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Senator Portman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Collins, for holding the hearing and, more importantly, for being on top of this situation from the start. I know that you share the concern of our colleagues to be sure this is fully investigated and the necessary reforms are put into place. Thank you, Mr. Director, and the Acting IG for being here and for your testimony. And, Director Sullivan, thanks for your 29 years of service and for your willingness to take some swift actions and also to be transparent, as the Acting IG said, with him and to be honest with us up on the Hill as we have asked questions over these past few weeks.

As is the case with the Chairman, I am a former protectee, and I was in a Cabinet level role as U.S. Trade Representative on a number of foreign trips where I had Secret Service protection. And earlier, Director Sullivan, you talked about the five core values of the service: Justice, duty, courage, loyalty, and honesty. And I will say that my experience is that the men and women who protected me exemplified those values. And it is precisely because of my high regard for the character and professionalism of those men and women and for the importance of the Secret Service—and really its central role in the continuity of our very governmental system—

that I am so concerned about what happened and so deeply troubled by the incident that is the subject of this hearing today.

We all have a role to fully investigate this as a result, and we all have a role to be sure that this kind of risky and unprofessional behavior does not occur again by putting in place new protocols to try to restore the trust and confidence of the American people.

So my questions are really about, going forward, what do we do. Again, I think you took some appropriate, swift actions. I think it was appropriate to remove the Secret Service personnel from Colombia, as you did immediately. I think that some of the immediate actions you have taken with regard to this incident are appropriate. I have to agree with my colleagues that it may not be an isolated incident given the fact that there were supervisors involved among other aspects of this, and so I would like to talk about what should be done in the future.

I have been interested in the discussion today about the guidelines that are currently in place, and it is my view that either because they are specifically written or because they are understood, it is not as if there were not adequate guidelines. I will read you from a couple of your guidelines. One is the Code of Conduct, which says that the Secret Service employees shall not engage in amoral, notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the government. Standards of conduct also specify that the absence of a specific published standard of conduct covering an act tending to discredit an employee or department does not mean such an act is condoned. So even if it is not specifically identified in terms of what happened in Cartagena, certainly it would fall into this general category.

Also, under your rules of conduct with regard to security clearances, it says that "Contact with a foreign national, if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion, is inappropriate." The guidelines also warn "against conduct, especially while traveling outside the United States, which may make an individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, or country."

So it seems to me, you can write all the guidelines you want, but if the culture does not reinforce, again, the five core values we talked about and the integrity and professionalism that I certainly saw in my experience with the Secret Service, it will not be successful.

So we have talked a little bit about the Professional Reinforcement Working Group. It seems like that is a good step forward. What else would you recommend, Director Sullivan and IG Edwards, in terms of looking from to ensure that this kind of an incident never happens again?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator. One of the things we did was to look backwards. We looked at our discipline over the last 5½ years, and when I look at that, it is under 1 percent of our population is involved in some type of disciplinary action, and that just gives me reason to believe that this is not part of the culture, and being part of this organization for 29 years and never seeing anything like this before in my life, I just believe very strongly that this just is not part of our culture.

Senator PORTMAN. Director, how many personnel do you have?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Close to 7,000.

Senator PORTMAN. And on this jump team, there were 53 individuals, but how many U.S. Secret Service personnel were on the Cartagena trip in total?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We had about 200 people on the trip. At the time of this situation we had about 175 people who were in Cartagena.

Senator PORTMAN. And how many foreign trips had the Secret Service been involved with? You talked about over 200 this year alone.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, and over the past 7 years, we have done about 2,700 since—

Senator PORTMAN. Two thousand, seven hundred foreign trips?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Senator PORTMAN. And this kind of an incident has not been reported before?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. But, again, moving forward, I think that with the Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group, we are going to look at various areas. We have broken it up into three different areas. There is going to be a Subcommittee on Workforce Management, and we are going to take a look at how we hire, our performance management, accountability, discipline, and the security clearance process. We are also going to take a look at our operational environment and have the subcommittee look at our traditions, look at our operations, compare ourselves to other law enforcement and military organizations, take a look at the role of our high standards—that there is no margin of error within our culture—and look at our workforce programs, ombudsman programs, employee assistance program, and diversity program. And we are also going to take a look at our ethics communication training and professional development.

We do want to ensure that the men and women of this organization are not just better but the best, and that is the goal of that subcommittee.

Senator PORTMAN. Well, thank you, Director Sullivan. My time has now expired. Again, I appreciate your 29 years of distinguished service, and, Mr. Edwards, I appreciate the way you have worked seamlessly with the Secret Service. I know you have a lot of other responsibilities at the Department of Homeland Security, including other law enforcement responsibilities. I am sure some of the best practices there are also helpful, as the Director has said in part of this review. Thank you for your testimony today.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Portman, thank you. Senator Carper.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much.

Those of us who serve in the Senate are privileged to serve with a retired Navy admiral. His name is Barry Black. He is Chief of Chaplains, formerly from the Navy Marine Corps, and now the chaplain for the U.S. Senate. He oftentimes encourages those of us who are privileged to serve here to ask for wisdom, whatever our faith might be. And so we try to do that in different ways.

As I was thinking about this hearing and preparing for this hearing, I actually took a few minutes to go back and read one of the most famous passages in the New Testament, from the Book of John, and the setting is one that I think most people will recall, where a woman had been accused of adultery, and she was being surrounded by a group of men. The man involved in the adultery was nowhere to be seen, but she was surrounded by a group of men who held stones in their hands. And Jesus was close by, and the Pharisee said to Jesus, Look, what do you think should happen to this woman? And He was bending down, writing stuff in the dirt, and He just kind of ignored them. And after a while they said, Jesus, we are talking to you. What do you think should happen to this woman? The laws of Moses say that she should be stoned and her life taken from her as a result of her sins.

Jesus kept writing in the dirt, and all He said was, "Let those of you who are without sin cast the first stone." That is all He said. And one by one, the men holding the stones from oldest to youngest dropped their stones and walked away. And the woman was left there standing in the middle of this circle, and the only person still there was Jesus. And He said to her, "Woman, where are your accusers?" And she said, "They have gone away." And He said to her, "Your accusers have gone, and I am not going to accuse you either." But then He added, "Go and sin no more."

Nobody here is going to lose their life because of what they did down in Colombia. They have lost their jobs. They have lost their reputation. They have harmed the reputation of a wonderful agency.

How many men and women serve in the Secret Service today? Roughly how many?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, just under 7,000.

Senator CARPER. And if you go back in time, any idea how many tens of thousands might have served in the Secret Service?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Tens of thousands. I do not have the exact number, but a lot of people have come before us who we have built this organization upon.

Senator CARPER. One indiscretion of the nature that has been reported in Colombia, one indiscretion is one too many. Eleven or 12 are 11 or 12 too many. And the folks who have done these things have not just ruined their careers, they helped spoil the reputation of the tens of thousands of people who have served and continue to serve in the Secret Service.

Having said that, none of us is without sin, and the key here for us is to figure out what went wrong, to make sure that those who have misbehaved are punished, and then make sure that we have put in place the kind of policies and safeguards to ensure that this kind of thing does not happen again.

Are you convinced, Mr. Edwards, that is what we have done?

Mr. EDWARDS. Can you repeat your question again, sir?

Senator CARPER. The role here for us, and I think for you, and certainly for Mr. Sullivan, is to ensure that we have found out the facts, provided appropriate punishment for those who have misbehaved, and to put in place the policies and the safeguards to ensure that this kind of thing does not happen again. Are you satisfied with the steps that have been taken meet that test?

Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely, sir. I will make sure that we do a complete review and provide recommendations to Director Sullivan to implement and make sure that this never happens again.

Senator CARPER. What further needs to be done, and what is the appropriate role for the Congress?

Mr. EDWARDS. I owe it to the Secretary and to Congress for me to do an independent review and be transparent and accountable with the recommendations and report to you what else can be done. I am still in the process of doing my review, so I do not have any findings yet.

Senator CARPER. Mr. Sullivan, could you just respond to those questions as well, please?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. We cannot ignore what happened in Cartagena, but, again, I go back to the overwhelming men and women in this organization doing an outstanding job every single day. And my goal right now is to make sure that they know that we have confidence in them and that we believe in them and that we know that this is not indicative of their character.

What I would ask is that we continue to get your support, and I appreciate the complimentary things that you have said about our men and women today. We have a very challenging year that we are in the middle of right now. As I mentioned to you, we just finished up the NATO summit and the G-8. But I would ask for your continued support. I would ask for you to continue to believe in what this organization is all about. And I would ask that you just continue to believe in us and know that we are going to do everything we can do to make sure that we rebuild our reputation and do the right thing for the people that we protect and serve.

Senator CARPER. I will just close with this. You just mentioned "do the right thing," and some of the best guidance I ever received in my life is "to figure out the right thing to do and just do it." Just do it consistently, not the easy thing, not the expedient thing, but to do the right thing. And I would just say to you and Mr. Edwards in your capacity to ensure that you do the right thing.

The other thing I would say, all of us make mistakes. God knows I have. I am sure my colleagues have as well and will make others in the future. Having said that, some of the best advice I ever got was actually from my father who essentially said, talking about my work in life, he said, "If it is not perfect, just make it better." And everything I do I know I can do better, and I think that is true of the behavior of all of us and it is certainly with the behavior of folks who work and have worked and will work in the future at the Secret Service. If it is not perfect, make it better. That should be our goal.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Carper.

We will do a second round insofar as Members have additional questions.

Would either or both of you like to take a 5-minute break, or are you OK to go forward?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am fine, Senator.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks.

Inspector General, let me just ask you, if you have not said it already—maybe I missed it—generally speaking, what kind of time schedule are you putting yourself on? I know it is hard to do deadlines here, but you have three parts. Am I correct to say that your first focus is going to be the review and insofar as possible independent investigation of what happened in Cartagena?

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. The first part, I need to look at is the investigation, how it was done, the scope and methodology, the questions asked, whether it is closed-ended or open questions, and look at it; and now, after listening to you and Senator Collins, for me to go back and redo all of the 200. Originally, I was planning on getting this done by July 2, but I am going to go back and revisit that because I truly want to try to come up with an independent investigation on the first part.

The second part is looking at the culture. This misbehavior or this risky behavior, what is the cause for that? What is the type of corrective action that was taken? What kind of vetting process and ethics training was offered? So, to get an idea of that, I need to do a comprehensive inspection on that, and I plan to have that done by fall.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So at this point, it is fair to say that if you do the kind of independent investigation of Cartagena that we are talking about, you are probably not going to be able to do it by early July, but hopefully you will have it by the end of the summer? We are not holding you to that, but is that a reasonable goal?

Mr. EDWARDS. I am going to put all my additional resources and make sure that this is a top priority and get this done.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Edwards, in response to the questions that our Committee sent you, you indicated that you found in the IG case files some record of an incident, 10 years ago actually, where approximately five Secret Service agents were disciplined for partying, and here I am quoting, "partying with alcohol with underage females in their hotel rooms" while on assignment at the 2002 Olympics. And, of course, this is of significance as we try to determine whether there was further evidence of the kind of misconduct that occurred at Cartagena.

Do you know at this point whether this is a credible report?

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, sir. We received a hotline complaint on April 20. This was referring to the February 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. There were five Secret Service agents that were sent home after police responded and found them partying with alcohol with underage females in their hotel rooms while on assignment. This was investigated by the Secret Service at that time, and I think the outcome of that was many of them have left the agency now, but since we received a hotline complaint, I have an obligation to look into it. So we are looking into it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. This is important. This actually came in relatively recently over the hotline that you maintain, which is an Internet hotline?

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You might want to mention what the address is. Do you know it offhand?

Mr. EDWARDS. It is oig.dhs.gov.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you are beginning to investigate that. Director Sullivan, do you have awareness of that incident? I know you were not Director of the agency at that point.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, as far as I know, there were three individuals who were involved in that particular incident. I believe that those individuals were gone within a very short period of time after that incident. Again, I go back to the fact that it does not represent the overwhelming majority of our people, but like any allegation that comes to our attention, we are going to investigate it, and we are going to take the appropriate disciplinary action.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That leads me to ask this question. I assume from everything you have said that the seriousness of that behavior is not affected by the fact that it occurred within the United States as opposed to outside in Colombia, and it occurred presumably with young women who were not prostitutes, that the behavior was unacceptable for Secret Service personnel.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, again, as I understand the allegation, it was underage individuals, and that would bring into account the seriousness of the allegation.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In fact, probably in Utah it was a crime. I am not asking you to opine on that, but—

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. Senator, I have not looked at that case, and I would be more than happy to. And, again, we will cooperate fully with the IG.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So leave this case during the 2002 Olympics aside. Just to clarify, we are focused on these matters, unfortunately, because of what happened in Cartagena, Colombia, outside of the United States.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Am I correct in presuming that the Secret Service would be just as concerned if you found that agents on assignment somewhere here in the United States were bringing back women who were not foreign nationals but who they had just met somewhere to their rooms while on assignment protecting somebody?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. I think anything that is going to compromise our mission we are going to be concerned. And, again, if we receive an allegation of that, we are going to investigate. We want our people to live up to the standards of our organization. And this was just handed to me by staff. I guess these women in the Utah case were under the age of 21, not under the age of 18. I am not sure what, if any, State-specific legislation was there, but, again, I will be more than happy to get the particulars for you. But what I do know is that those employees were gone pretty quickly.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But just to make the point, the concern that we have expressed, Senator Collins quite explicitly, and what we are worried about is that an agent with the responsibility to protect the President and Vice President could be compromised by being involved in a casual sexual relationship while on assignment on the road. So, ultimately, it does not matter whether it happens in Cartagena, Colombia, or Chicago, Illinois. True?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me come to just a final question quickly. Senator Portman read from some of the Code of Conduct

for the Secret Service, and then the general rules more governmentwide, if you will, for anybody seeking a security clearance, and they are really quite explicit about what is expected. The security clearance rules caution against contact with a foreign national "if that contact create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion." The guidelines also warn "against conduct, especially while traveling outside the United States, which may make an individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country," and that is a really pretty high standard.

What becomes of these guidelines, the Secret Service's own Code of Conduct and the general governmentwide rules for people who have security clearances? In other words, were the agents, including those involved in this misconduct in Cartagena, were they required to study these guidelines? Were they given training sessions in them? In other words, anybody in their right mind as a Secret Service agent, if they faced reality, would have known that what they were doing in Cartagena that night was just outrageously unacceptable and irresponsible. But assuming for a moment they weren't in their right mind, do you think they were adequately on notice of these rules of conduct that this behavior was unacceptable?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I do. We are talking about two different issues here. You have Codes of Conduct, and then you have the security clearance issue. I will talk about Code of Conduct first.

Code of Conduct with us starts from the recruitment process. From the very beginning when we hire somebody to come work for us, the first thing we talk to them about is character and integrity. That is part of our background investigation. That is part of the conversation that we have with the employee. That is part of our polygraph. That goes right through their initial training. From their first day on the job and through their orientation, we talk about our Codes of Conduct. That is also reinforced when they go through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. It is reinforced again when they go to our training facility in Beltsville, Maryland. About a week or two before the agent or officer graduation, I myself and the Deputy Director meet with each class for about an hour and a half. The first thing we talk about is character, and we tell these individuals that the thing that separated them from the others was their character and their integrity.

When they go back into their field office, they have to annually certify that they have read our Code of Conduct, that they understand our Code of Conduct, and that is done with their supervisor. And in between, as they go through the organization, they attend our various training classes, whether it is a supervisory training class or an in-service training class, or when they get into upper management, we continue to talk about our Code of Conduct.

As far as the security clearance issues, as you know, Senator, we have adjudicative guidelines where this is all spelled out. As a matter of fact, on the passport that we travel on, it is indicated on the passport that you will abide by the rules and regulations of the organization and of the United States.

So, Senator, I do believe that it is pretty clear, I think, to anybody in our organization. It is a common-sense thing to me and a moral thing to me that people understand what the expectation is.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that answer. I hope you will take a fresh look at it, notwithstanding everything you have said, to make sure that you are drilling all these values that are important to the Secret Service, that are on paper, that you have updated since Cartagena in a constructive way, so that the next time a Secret Service agent or group of them think about doing something like they did in Cartagena that night, that a light will go off in their heads and they will conclude the risk is too high. Probably in the short run, the memory of Cartagena and the dishonor brought on the agents there will be so fresh that this will not happen. But human nature being what it is, over a period of time—we need to have rules and procedures for drilling those rules into personnel that go on for a much longer period of time, to a time when what happened in Cartagena may not be as fresh in the minds of future Secret Service agents.

My time is well up. Senator COLLINS.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Sullivan, initially, you did not have information about these women. Initially, you did not know whether they were prostitutes or foreign agents or members of a terrorist group or working for a drug cartel. Is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator COLLINS. So was there a sweep done of the hotel rooms to see whether the women involved had planted any electronic surveillance equipment?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, one of the things we tell all of our people on a foreign trip is never trust that your room is safe. We did not do any type of a sweep on any of these rooms that were used by these agents and officers.

Senator COLLINS. I would understand that there was no sweep before the incident, but when you first learned of the incident, was there any order given to do a sweep of the rooms that the women had been in?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Other than a visual sweep, there was no type of electronic sweep that was made. There was a visual sweep. People went through the rooms. But as far as any type of electronic sweep, Senator, there was not.

Senator COLLINS. Have you now been able to definitively conclude that the women were not associated with foreign agents, that they did not work for drug cartels, that they were not involved in human trafficking, that they were not working for FARC, for example, or other terrorist groups?

Mr. SULLIVAN. One of the first things we did, Senator, was to get the names of all the women. We had their country identification number. We provided those names and identifiers to some of our various partners out there who could verify for us if there was any connection with any type of criminal activity or criminal organization as well as any type of intelligence concerns that we may have. All of the information that we have received back has concluded that there was no connection either from an intelligence perspective or a criminal perspective.

We have also been able to interview, I believe, all but two women. I think we have interviewed nine or ten of the women, working with the local police in Colombia and, again, that, from all appearances in those interviews, has backed up the information that we have been able to derive from these checks we have done.

Senator COLLINS. It is somewhat ironic that we can be relieved that the women for the most part were simply prostitutes. That is a rather strange thing for us to take comfort in in this case, but obviously, it would have been more troubling if they were foreign agents or associated with drug cartels or other criminal gangs.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator. Again, our investigation has pretty much confirmed that these women did not know who these individuals were, and were not aware that they worked for the Secret Service.

Senator COLLINS. I want to return to an exchange that you had with Senator Johnson. I believe during that exchange you referred to a governmentwide survey that asked certain Federal employees whether they would report ethical misconduct. Did I understand correctly that you said that 60 percent of the Secret Service personnel who were interviewed for this survey said that they would report ethical misconduct and 40 percent, approximately, said they would not?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, Senator, I think it was something like 58 or 60 percent said they would. I think there was about 18 or 19 percent who said they would not. And then I think there might have been the remaining percentage who just were indifferent towards it.

Senator COLLINS. Doesn't that suggest a broader problem?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I think that is a number that we need to raise up. I think that is something that we need to work on. I do not know if that presents a problem. I want to look at that. That is part of the theme that I have talked to Director Berry from OPM about because I would like to see that number increase.

Senator COLLINS. From my perspective, when you combine the facts of this case, the fact that the agents made no attempt to conceal their identities or the fact that they were bringing these women back to their hotel rooms, a survey in which fewer than 60 percent of the Secret Service personnel said that they would report ethical misconduct, the fact that this was not, as I said in my opening statement, a group of individuals who just got swept up into a situation but, rather, smaller groups who engaged in the same kinds of misconduct, to me that just spells a broader problem with culture in the agency. And I say that with the greatest respect for the vast majority of people working for the Secret Service who do extraordinary work and so courageously. But that does not mean that there is not a problem.

So my final question to you today is: If I finally become successful in convincing you that there is a broader problem here with culture or with unacceptable behavior being condoned when agents are on the road, what actions would you take to address this problem that you are not taking now? How would you change the culture of an agency?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I am hoping that I can convince you that it is not a cultural issue.

Senator COLLINS. I know, but——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, Senator I look at the number of cases—one of the things I know as the Director is that on any given day, I potentially am going to have an employee who is going to get into some type of an incident. It might be a serious one. It might not be a big one at all. But, again, I just keep going back to under 1 percent of our investigations have some type of misconduct. But that is why I do feel very optimistic about this Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group. We have over 45 senior executives throughout the Federal Government, from the military, from other law enforcement, and from non-law enforcement—I do want to be very open with them, I want to be transparent, and I want them to take a hard look at us. But, again, it is my opinion that the overwhelming majority of the men and women of this organization are part of a great culture.

I think the thing that makes our organization what it is is our culture. I think that we have a culture of hard-working people that are committed, that work hard every single day. And, when I was out at the NATO summit in Chicago, Senator, I walked around and I must have talked to a couple hundred agents out there. And I can tell you that there is nobody who is more disappointed by this behavior, who is more upset with this behavior, than our men and women. But I have 100 percent confidence in our men and women, and I just do not think that this is something that is systemic within this organization.

Senator COLLINS. Are there any additional actions that you would be taking if you felt that there was a systemic problem?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, again, I think that we would have more training. I think training is a big thing, and I think you can never do enough training, and training is something that we try to be very proactive with. But I think we just need to continually drill into our people what the result is going to be of a bad decision. And, quite frankly, Senator, I do think that the action we have taken for these bad decisions, I think that sends a pretty strong message to the men and women of this organization that this will not be tolerated.

Senator COLLINS. I know I promised you that was my last question, but I do have just one final question. You stated earlier that you feel that this incident in Colombia would have become public even if there had not been the dispute over money. What is your basis for feeling that the incident would have become public, particularly in light of this survey?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We had almost 200 people there, and, again, it just goes back to how confident I am in the men and women of our organization. And we are talking about a pretty significant event here. We are talking about 11 individuals, now 12 individuals, who took part in this misconduct. And I just believe—and I have a lot of faith in our men and women—that somebody would have reported this misconduct because this just goes beyond the pale. And I truly do believe that they would have made a complaint either to our Office of Professional Responsibility or to the DHS IG.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins.

So I understand, if I can put it this way, that both your own faith in the Secret Service, which is a result of your own experience—I know you have been an extraordinary Secret Service agent and leader yourself. What happened in Cartagena happened. You do not have to have the suspicions that most others have that it is hard to believe that this was the only case. But to some extent, I think while you maintain your faith in the Secret Service, going forward I think you have to assume that it was not the only case. What I believe you are trying to do is to put in place rules and procedures to make sure to the best of your human ability that it never happens again. And I was thinking about a slogan that we talk about a lot in the field of domestic counterterrorism, which started in New York, “See Something, Say Something.”

This is not easy. Those numbers that you mentioned, Senator Collins, point to about a little less than 60 percent saying they would definitely report misconduct by a fellow Secret Service employee, there is a natural tendency in organizations either not to want to get your colleagues in trouble or in a sense to not want to get yourself involved in a controversy. But in the end, as we saw here, what suffers is a great organization. And I just hope all the personnel of the Secret Service have learned that and that you will try to put in place rules and procedures that will continue to telegraph that message for years and years after you and others leave the agency.

As Senator Portman mentioned, I was a protectee during the 2000 presidential campaign. I had nothing but the highest regard and really gratitude for the Secret Service details that were with me and my family. They were people of honor, of great discipline. They were so obviously committed to protecting our safety and security.

And so like you, I think, when this story came out, I was just heartbroken. And then I was angry at the people who did this. And I think we have to preserve those feelings and not be at all defensive here, because this is like a wound to a body and we have to get in it, find out what happened, clean it out, let it heal, and then make sure that you particularly put in place rules and procedures that will make sure that this great body, if I can continue the metaphor, will never be subject to being wounded again in this way.

I appreciate very much the presence and the testimony of both of you. I appreciate what you have done, both of you, since this incident became public. The Committee is going to continue to conduct its own investigation and work with both of you to make sure that we achieve the objectives that I know we all have, which is to restore total public trust and confidence in the Secret Service agency so that it can fulfill its critical missions at the highest levels of honor and excellence, which has been the norm over its history. We want it to be the norm in the years ahead.

Senator Collins, would you like to add anything?

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Sullivan, in reflecting on the many conversations that we have had and listening to you today, I cannot help but think that because you personally are such an outstanding individual, completely ethical, dedicated, courageous, everything we would want the head of the Secret Service to be, and because in your ca-

reer you did not happen to see this kind of behavior, that it is very difficult for you to accept that this happened. And I urge you to try to put that aside because if there is a problem, if the *Washington Post* story today is correct, you cannot be confident that this has not happened before and that it will not happen again, unless a very clear message is sent that the rules are not different when agents are on the road. They are exactly the same rules that apply in their home towns. And I think that is a very important message for you to send regardless of your sense of disbelief that this could have happened.

And I just want to close my remarks today by thanking the brave men and women of the Secret Service, of law enforcement, and of the military who do put their lives on the line for us and who do perform such dangerous jobs so extraordinarily well in the vast majority of cases. But if we ignore or downplay what happened here, it can be like a cancer. It can spread and cause the entire agency to be tarnished, if you will.

So I hope that you will continue not only your no-holds-barred investigation and the disciplinary actions which are so clearly warranted in this case, but that you will also take a really hard look at what procedural changes and training changes need to be made, because I continue to believe that the problem is broader than you believe it to be. But I thank you for your leadership and your cooperation.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins.

Director, did you want to add something?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Chairman, Senator, again thank you very much for your time, and I just want to make sure that—I hope I have not given you the impression that this is something that we have not taken seriously or that I am going to ignore. This cannot be ignored. And hopefully everyone has seen with the action that we have taken that we will not tolerate this type of behavior. And as I said, moving forward, I do want to take a hard look at our organization, and that is why I have been so aggressive with bringing in these outsiders. I know this is something that internally, we may not be the best individuals to do it and that we do need to bring outside people in to take a look at our organization. And as I said before, we are not looking to just be better; we are looking to be the best. But I do believe in the men and women of this organization. I do believe that they, too, want to make us not only better but the best. I appreciate your support, and I look forward to continuing to work with you on this, and I value the relationship. Also, I value the opportunity that we have had to be able to talk to you about this both here and offline.

But I will tell you that this is a great organization with great people, and if there are any issues we need to resolve, we are going to resolve them.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Mr. Edwards, do you want to add anything?

Mr. EDWARDS. Chairman, I want to give you my commitment that we are going to do a comprehensive review and an independent investigation and report back to you on the findings and recommendations as soon as possible.

I just want to repeat the Web site for our hotline. It is oig.dhs.gov, and we also have an 800 number. It is 800-323-8603, both anonymous and people with their names can submit their allegations or any issues, and we will respond accordingly.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. Thank you. The record of this hearing will remain open for 15 days for any additional questions and statements.

With that, again I thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Chairman Joseph I. Lieberman, ID-Conn.

Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph I. Lieberman
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
Washington, DC
May 23, 2012

Good Morning. Over its nearly 150 year history, the Secret Service has built an extraordinary reputation for selfless and skilled devotion to the important and dangerous work its agents do – protecting the President and other high officials of our government.

That reputation was sadly stained last month when 11 Secret Service employees engaged in a night of heavy drinking in Cartagena, Colombia, which ended with them taking foreign women back to their hotel rooms.

We have called this hearing as part of our Committee's responsibility to oversee the functions of the federal government, particularly those within the Department of Homeland Security, including the United States Secret Service.

There are three things we hope to accomplish at this hearing, and in our Committee's broader investigation.

First, we want to get the facts about what precisely happened in Cartagena and where the Secret Service's investigation of Cartagena stands today.

As has widely been reported, the misconduct involved 11 agents and officers who arrived in Cartagena the morning of Wednesday, April 11, and were off-duty the rest of that day.

The men went out – in groups of two, three, and four – to four different nightclubs that evening. After considerable drinking, they returned to their rooms at the El Caribe Hotel with women they had met at the clubs – some of whom were prostitutes – and registered the women as overnight guests per hotel rules. The Secret Service subsequently learned that another individual engaged in similar conduct in Cartagena the night of Monday, April 9. All of the agents and officers held security clearances and two were in supervisory positions.

If one of the agents had not argued with one of the women about how much he owed her, the world would never have known this sordid story.

But the world does now know this sordid story and that is why the Secret Service, the Inspector General, and we must learn the truth – as best we can – not to diminish the US Secret Service, but to restore its credibility which the continuity of our government so clearly depends upon.

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Second, as part of that search for truth and lessons to be learned, we need to know if there were warning signs that misconduct had become a pattern among travelling Secret Service agents in the years before Cartagena that should have been seen and stopped. It is hard for many people, including me, to believe that on one night in April 2012, in Cartagena, Colombia, 11 Secret Service agents – there to protect the President – suddenly and spontaneously did something they or other agents had never done before – that is to say, gone in groups of two, three, or four to four different nightclubs or strip joints and drink to excess and bring foreign national women back to their hotel rooms.

That lingering disbelief led our Committee to send a series of questions to the Secret Service to determine if there was any evidence in their records of patterns of previous misconduct. We have begun to review the Agency's answers and found individual cases of misconduct over the last 5 years that are troubling, but do not yet contain sufficient evidence of a pattern of misconduct or a culture of misconduct.

But disciplinary records only take us so far. They only include cases where misconduct was observed, charged, and adjudicated.

We can only know what the records of the Secret Service reveal, and what whistleblowers, and others who come forward tell us. Thus far, we have received as whistleblower calls, but they have not provided evidence of a pattern of misconduct by Secret Service agents similar to Cartagena.

We have not concluded our oversight of this matter, nor has the DHS Inspector General. And therefore, I would ask anyone who has information about the conduct of the Secret Service agents over the years that they believe is relevant to our investigation to contact our staff at the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee here at the U.S. Capitol.

Today's Washington Post reports based on multiple anonymous sources that "sexual encounters during official travel had been condoned under an unwritten code that allows what happens on the road to stay on the road." They also contend that this tolerance is part of the "Secret Circus" – a mocking nickname the employees use when large numbers of agents and officers arrive in a city.

One of the implicated men has told associates that a senior security supervisor had advised agents to follow loose guidelines when spending time with women they met on the road: one night stands were permitted as long as the relationship ended when the agent left the country.

In addition, our initial review of the agency's disciplinary records over the last 5 years reveals 64 instances in which allegations or complaints concerning sexual misconduct were made against employees of the Secret Service. Most of these involved sending sexually explicit emails or sexually explicit material on a government computer although three involved charges of an inappropriate relationship with a foreign national, and one was a complaint of nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Thirty other cases involved alcohol, almost all relating to driving while under the influence. I hasten to say that these complaints involve a very small percentage of the thousands of people who have worked at the US Secret Service during the last five years. Nonetheless, it is important for us to know how those complaints were handled and whether, looking back, they should have been warnings of worse to come.

Third, I want to know what reforms the Secret Service is implementing to make sure what happened in Cartagena never happens again.

I know Secret Service Director Sullivan has already made some changes, such as increasing the no-alcohol before reporting for duty from six to 10 hours, and banning foreign nationals from hotel rooms, except for official counterparts.

But I also want to hear what the Secret Service is doing to encourage people to report egregious behavior when they see it – to ensure that no code of silence exists among Secret Service agents and officers.

In recent days, the Secret Service provided protection for world leaders at both the G8 and NATO summits. The Presidential campaigns are in full swing, and the Secret Service needs to protect the candidates and secure the two national conventions. And the President and Vice President need protection every day.

That's why the Cartagena scandal has to be dealt with head on and quickly. The credibility of the Secret Service is too important and its mission too critical to our country to leave any questions about Cartagena and what preceded it unanswered.

I want to thank Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan for his cooperation in our investigation. I know he has worked hard and fast since he learned of this crisis to investigate it and restore the credibility of the Secret Service.

Director Sullivan, I look forward to your testimony, as I do to yours Inspector General Edwards.

STATEMENT OF
SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS-----
HSGAC HEARING ON US SECRET SERVICE
MAY 23, 2012

Mr. Chairman, let me begin my remarks by stating my strong belief that the vast majority of the men and women of the US Secret Service are professional, disciplined, dedicated, and courageous. They do an extraordinarily difficult job extraordinarily well.

The honorable conduct of the many true professionals of the Service stands in stark contrast to the misconduct that occurred in Colombia last month, on the eve of the President's visit there. The timing makes the appalling behavior all the more troubling not only to me but also to the majority of Secret Service personnel past and present.

I will not dwell on the details of the incident since they have already been so widely reported and I'm sure will be discussed by Director Sullivan. The behavior is morally repugnant, and I certainly do not want to downplay that fact. My concerns, however, go beyond the morality of the agents' actions.

First, this reckless behavior could easily have compromised individuals charged with the security of the President of the United States. And second, the facts so far lead me to conclude that, while not at all representative of the majority of Secret Service personnel, this misconduct was almost certainly not an isolated incident. Let me discuss both of these concerns in more detail.

It is basic "Counter-intelligence 101" that Secret Service personnel and others holding sensitive positions of trust in the U.S. government should avoid any situation that could provide a foreign intelligence or security service or criminal gangs with the means of exerting coercion or blackmail. Yet, two of the primary means of entrapment -- sexual lures and alcohol -- were both present here in abundance.

While the preliminary investigation has shown that none of these men had weapons or classified material in their hotel rooms, they still could easily have been drugged or kidnapped, or had their liaisons with these foreign nationals used to blackmail them, thereby compromising their effectiveness and potentially jeopardizing the President's security. They willingly made themselves potential targets not only for intelligence or security services, but also for groups like the FARC or drug cartels.

There is absolutely no excuse for, or factor that can mitigate, such recklessness. The Service has tightened up its regulations and oversight to try to ensure that this never happens again.

Second, Mr. Chairman, the facts suggest to me that this likely was not just a one-time incident.

If only one or two individuals out of the 160 male Secret Service personnel assigned to this mission had engaged in this type of serious misconduct, then I'd think this was an aberration. But that's not the case; there were 12 individuals involved . . . 12. That's eight percent of the male Secret Service personnel in-country, and nine percent of those staying at the *Caribe* Hotel.

Moreover, contrary to the conventional story line, this was not simply a single, organized group that went out for a night on the town together. These were individuals and small groups of two and three -- 11 individuals from the *Caribe* and one from the Hilton -- that went out at different times to different clubs, bars, and brothels, but who all ended up in similar circumstances.

In addition, two of the participants were supervisors -- one with 22 years of service and the other with 21 -- and both married. That surely sends a message to the rank and file that this kind of activity is tolerated on the road.

The numbers involved, as well as the participation of two senior supervisors, lead me to believe that this was not a one-time event. Rather, the circumstances unfortunately suggest an issue of culture.

And it may well be that it's a culture that spans agencies. The Secret Service and the Department of Justice Inspector General are continuing to investigate yet another Secret Service Agent and at least two DEA personnel who entertained female foreign nationals in the Cartagena apartment of one of the DEA agents.

Moreover, the evidence thus far suggests that this was not a one-time incident.

And, of course, the original reports out of Colombia also alleged misconduct by about a dozen members of our armed forces.

Again, I want to stress that the vast majority of our law enforcement and military personnel are real heroes -- and I deeply appreciate the dangers that those deployed overseas face every day. Given this apparent question of culture, however, I am pleased that the DHS Inspector General will be examining the culture of the Secret Service to see if there is something systemic that led to the Colombian incidents. The IG will look at hiring, training, and similar components, including the administration of discipline -- to see if the Service follows its own rules and applies them uniformly to all Agents. I will follow this investigation closely.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Director Sullivan and the Acting IG for their willingness to deal openly and directly with this Committee over the past six weeks as we have attempted to better understand the ramifications of this scandal. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing.



FOR RELEASE: May 23, 2012
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**U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL
 AFFAIRS**

HEARING: "Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence"

WASHINGTON - Today, Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, joined the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing, "*Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence*."

His statement follows:

The Secret Service has a long tradition of protecting the President, Members of the Cabinet, and visiting dignitaries with honor and distinction. Last month, however, the reckless and inexplicable behavior of a handful of agents in Cartagena, Colombia, left many Americans terribly disappointed in these agents and raised serious questions about the integrity of this critical agency. Today's hearing will provide an opportunity for the Secret Service to describe the steps it is taking to restore our nation's trust and confidence in this storied agency and prevent these types of incidents from occurring moving forward.

Few can doubt the sacrifices the brave men and women of the Secret Service make each day, but there is absolutely no excuse for the poor decisions that were made in Columbia. The misbehavior of the agents not only tarnished the image of the agency and the United States, it could have put lives and our national security at risk. With the vast array of threats our nation's leaders face and the presidential election in full swing, there is no room for error or misbehavior.

The incident that we are examining today raises many questions about the culture of the Secret Service, other possible instances of misconduct, and the policies governing the overseas travel of agents. Although the Secret Service did take immediate action to investigate the incident and hold those responsible accountable, the agency must also take a hard look at its policies and culture to ensure that there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent this type of activity from ever happening again. There must be better protocols established so we can be confident that our agents are always setting a positive example and acting with the highest integrity when they are representing the United States at home and abroad.

I look forward to hearing from Director Sullivan about the corrective actions he plans to implement to ensure the safety and security of our nation's leaders. I am also interested to hear from the Acting Inspector General about their comprehensive review of the investigation and what steps need to be taken to prevent this type of misconduct from occurring moving forward. Although I share our nation's disappointment in the Secret Service agents who acted inappropriately, I am hopeful that Director Sullivan and the Inspector General will take the steps needed to right this ship.

I would like to thank Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins for calling this hearing, and I look forward to working with them on the Committee's continued oversight of the Secret Service.

**Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
May 23, 2012**

I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for calling this very important hearing.

We hold federal law enforcement and military personnel to a high standard of professionalism and ethical behavior. This is particularly applicable for those charged with protecting our nation's highest officials and representing our country and its people abroad.

The alleged actions by members of the United States Secret Service and the United States military are a gross violation of the public trust. Although I am concerned with the reputational effects of this incident, I believe the agency is taking this matter seriously. I have spoken with Director Sullivan on several occasions since this unfortunate event occurred and look forward to hearing from Acting Inspector General Edwards. I am glad that both the Secret Service and the DHS OIG are vigorously engaged and attempting to learn from this incident. I believe that it is important that this hearing remain prospective.

As Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, which has jurisdiction over funding for the U.S. Secret Service, I recognize the important role and respectable history of this agency.

Yesterday, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out the FY13 bill for DHS which included 4.3 million above the requested amount for the U.S. Secret Service Domestic Field Operations.

My committee report acknowledged the swift and decisive response by the Director to immediately address the situation, conduct a thorough investigation, and take appropriate disciplinary action against the individuals involved. It is important that this unfortunate incident serve as a learning experience.

I will continue to monitor the Directors efforts related to this issue. Director Sullivan and Acting Inspector General Edwards, I appreciate you both being here to discuss your agency's probe into this incident and for sharing investigation findings with this committee.



**Hearing before the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate**

Statement for the Record

**Mark Sullivan
Director
United States Secret Service**

May 23, 2012

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the facts of the misconduct that occurred in Cartagena, Colombia, the immediate actions taken, the results of our internal investigation and the corrective actions that have been implemented.

The Secret Service is an organization that maintains deep pride in the work it does on behalf of this nation. Throughout our long and proud 147 year history, the Secret Service has demanded service with honor and distinction by its officers, agents and administrative staff. All must adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, ethics and recognize that our agency's capacity to carry out our mission depends on the character and judgment of all of our employees.

The Secret Service has five core values: justice, duty, courage, honesty and loyalty. The overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in this agency exemplify these values. On a daily basis, they are prepared to lay down their lives to protect others in service to their country. It is precisely because of these long standing core values that the men and women of this agency are held to a higher standard. This standard is one that our colleagues in the law enforcement community and the American people have come to expect. Clearly, the misconduct that took place on April 11, 2012, in Cartagena, Colombia is not representative of these values or of the high ethical standards we demand from our almost 7,000 employees.

SYNOPSIS OF INVESTIGATION

From the beginning of this incident, I have continually briefed Members of this Committee and other Congressional committees and Members on the facts in this matter in an effort to be as transparent as possible. The information provided in this testimony provides an overview of the findings to date and we will continue to keep you informed as our review continues.

Immediately upon learning of the allegations of misconduct in Colombia, I instructed Secret Service supervisory personnel in Cartagena to initiate a review of the hotel records and conduct preliminary interviews of any employees alleged to be involved in misconduct. Preliminary findings indicated twelve Secret Service employees were allegedly involved in misconduct. Subsequent information obtained ultimately cleared one of those individuals of any misconduct and that individual remained in Cartagena.

Once the initial interviews had taken place, I ordered that all individuals alleged to have been involved in misconduct immediately return to the United States on Friday, April 13, 2012, and report to the Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) on Saturday, April 14, 2012, to be interviewed. Subsequent to the interviews conducted by RES, all the employees alleged to have been involved with misconduct were placed on administrative leave, their security clearances were suspended, and all Secret Service issued equipment was surrendered.

The immediate removal of these individuals from Cartagena allowed sufficient time for the Secret Service to make necessary adjustments to the security plan.

Working with the Assistant Director of our Office of Protective Operations (OPO), the Assistant Director of our Office of Investigations (INV) and senior supervisory personnel in Cartagena, we ensured the logistical staffing changes had no negative impact on the overall operational security plan for the Summit of Americas, scheduled to begin Friday evening, April 13, 2012, and end on Sunday, April 15, 2012.

I received a comprehensive briefing from the senior supervisory personnel in Cartagena, AD INV and AD OPO concerning the additional personnel that would be brought into Cartagena to replace those individuals who had returned to the United States and other logistical alterations that had been made. After receiving the security operation briefing, I was confident that the staffing changes would not impact our protective mission. The security plan was extremely thorough and comprehensive, and no aspect of the security plan was compromised due to the misconduct. From Friday, April 13 to Sunday, April 15, no negative security related incidents occurred during the Summit of Americas.

By Friday, May 4, 2012 we had interviewed over 220 individuals in three weeks. During the course of this investigation, it was confirmed that Secret Service personnel were scheduled to receive their protective briefing on Thursday, April 12, 2012, concerning their upcoming assignments. Thus, at the time the misconduct occurred, none of the individuals involved in misconduct had received any specific protective information, sensitive security documents, firearms, radios or other security related equipment in their hotel rooms.

Additionally, during the course of our internal investigation we had one individual self report an incident, unrelated to the misconduct that occurred at the El Caribe hotel on Wednesday night April 11, 2012. This individual has been placed on administrative leave pending a full investigation into that matter.

We recognized the potential compromise related to the type of behavior engaged in by these employees in Cartagena. We reached out to the intelligence community as well to cast as wide a net as possible in determining if there was any type of breach in operational security as a result of the incident. No adverse information was found as a result of these inquiries.

There were approximately 200 Secret Service personnel in Cartagena, Colombia when the misconduct occurred. Ultimately, nine were found to have been involved in serious misconduct and three individuals were ultimately cleared of the most serious allegations.

In the midst of our internal investigation, allegations were made that similar misconduct may have occurred in other foreign countries on previous protective assignments. Specifically, allegations were made that Secret Service personnel had been involved in misconduct in San Salvador, El Salvador in March 2011. Although, no case of similar misconduct had been reported to our RES, I directed Secret Service Inspectors to travel to San Salvador, El Salvador to conduct a thorough investigation of the allegations made. After several days in San Salvador and conducting 28 interviews with hotel managers and employees, individuals from the U.S. Department of State, other government agencies and contract employees assigned to assist the Secret Service with the visit, no evidence was found to substantiate the allegations.

During our investigation in San Salvador several hotel managers and employees were interviewed, along with individuals from the U.S. Department of State and other government agencies. During those interviews, none of the 28 people interviewed had any personal knowledge, records or any other information to indicate that Secret Service personnel had been involved in misconduct while in San Salvador, El Salvador in March of 2011.

Additionally, while Secret Service Inspectors were in San Salvador they interviewed the owner of a business where purportedly Secret Service personnel had been involved in misconduct. The owner of the business provided a sworn written statement that he had no knowledge or any other information that any Secret Service personnel had been to his business or information about misconduct by Secret Service personnel. This individual informed Secret Service Inspectors that at no time had he told anyone that Secret Service personnel had ever been to his place of business.

I can assure this Committee that the Secret Service is committed to investigate any allegation of misconduct where witnesses are willing to come forward with facts, provide information, be interviewed and assist Secret Service Inspectors. If anyone has personal knowledge concerning misconduct by a Secret Service employee, I request that they contact our RES office directly or the Department of Homeland Security – Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG).

From the onset of our internal investigation the Secret Service has been cooperating fully with the DHS-OIG. During the course of our investigation the Secret Service met with and provided numerous briefings and documents to the DHS-OIG concerning all investigative developments. The Secret Service is committed to fully cooperating with the DHS-OIG investigation and assisting in any way possible.

STANDARDS OF CONDUCT / ETHICS TRAINING

The Secret Service regularly provides ethics and standards of conduct training to our employees throughout their careers. Below is a list of training courses and programs where this information is covered.

- Orientation for all new employees
- Special Agent Recruit Training Course
- Uniformed Division Officer Recruit Training Course
- Seminar for First Line Supervisors
- Emerging Leaders Seminar
- Seminar for Mid-Level Managers
- Emerging Executives Seminar
- Ethics in Law Enforcement
- Elicitation Briefing

This training is reinforced yearly with each Secret Service employee certifying on a Secret Service form (SSF) 3218 ("Annual Employee Certification"), that they have read and reviewed agency policies, to include the Secret Service's "Standards of Conduct."

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:**ENHANCED CODES OF CONDUCT / NEW POLICIES**

While the overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in this agency exemplify the highest standards of professionalism and integrity, we wanted to ensure that the type of misconduct that occurred in Cartagena, Colombia is not repeated. Therefore, on April 27, 2012, several codes of conduct were enhanced, along with a few new policies.

- All laws of the United States shall apply to Secret Service personnel while abroad.

Standards of conduct briefings will be conducted for all protective visits, events and NSSEs, as well as prior to Secret Service personnel traveling aboard military aircraft prior to departure for a foreign country.
- The U.S. Department of State Regional Security Officer will work with the Secret Service advance team to provide intensified country-specific briefings immediately upon arrival in a foreign country. The briefings will update personnel on safety issues, off-limit zones and off-limit establishments for Secret Service personnel, and any country-specific rules imposed by the Ambassador.
- Foreign nationals, excluding hotel staff and official law enforcement counterparts, are prohibited from all Secret Service personnel hotel rooms.
- Patronization of non-reputable establishments is prohibited.
- Alcohol may only be consumed in moderate amounts while off-duty on a TDY assignment and alcohol use is prohibited within 10 hours of reporting for duty.
- Alcohol may not be consumed at the protectee hotel once the protective visit has begun.

The following measures relate to foreign car plane staffing:

- Car planes will now be staffed with two GS-15 supervisors - one from the Office of Professional Responsibility and one from the field.
- The car plane supervisors will be responsible for briefing the standards of conduct expectations prior to departure to the destination country, as well as for enforcing these standards while in the foreign country.
- All personnel traveling will have to have completed relevant on-line ethics training in order to be eligible for protective travel.

- The Security Clearance Division will intensify country-specific briefings covering all pertinent topics prior to departure for the destination country.

PROFESSIONALISM REINFORCEMENT WORKING GROUP

In April 2012, I established the Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG). The PRWG will conduct a comprehensive review of the Secret Service's professional standards of conduct. This process will include evaluation of policy related to employment standards and background investigation; patterns of discipline related to misconduct; ethics training; and all law, policies, procedures and practices related to the same. Director John Berry of the Office of Personnel Management and Director Connie Patrick of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center will Co-Chair the PRWG.

The PRWG will:

- 1) Collect and analyze comprehensive information across broad categories related to organizational performance and accountability;
- 2) Benchmark against best practices; and
- 3) Prepare an action plan with recommendations for reinforcing professional conduct.

To assist the working group in completing its review, Secret Service personnel will serve as subject matter experts and will represent a cross section of the agency.

I am confident that this review will provide the Secret Service with an objective perspective on our practices, highlighting both areas in which we excel and identify areas in which we can continue to improve.

WORK ETHIC OF THE SECRET SERVICE

Over the past few weeks there have been questions about the culture of the Secret Service. Through the finite lens of the misconduct that occurred on April 11, 2012, I can understand how that question could be asked, but if you examine what the men and women of the Secret Service accomplish every day - I would submit to you that the officers, agents and administrative, professional and technical staff of the Secret Service are among the most dedicated, hardest working, self-sacrificing employees within the federal government. They spend countless days, and at times, weeks, away from their families, routinely working multiple shifts each day and frequently transitioning between their protective and investigatory responsibilities.

I'd like to take this opportunity to tell you about some of the Secret Service's significant accomplishments this year and give you some examples of the hard work of our Secret Service Special Agents and Uniformed Division Officers.

PROTECTION

Although we are only half way through the fiscal year, the Secret Service has worked diligently on multiple trips and events. Thus far in FY 2012, the Secret Service has successfully developed and executed security plans for 3,174 domestic protective trips and 236 foreign protective trips. Over the past five years, the Secret Service has conducted over 33,728 domestic protective trips and 2,414 foreign protective trips. These protective missions are successfully accomplished because of the dedication, hard work and sacrifices of the men and women of the Secret Service.

This past November, we successfully developed and executed our security plan for the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation conference (APEC) in Honolulu, Hawaii. As this event had been designated as a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service was the lead federal agency responsible for the security planning of this event. During the APEC, we were responsible for the safety and security of thirty-six protectees. Throughout this event, no security issues arose.

Later that same month, the Secret Service began protection for its first Presidential Candidate of the 2012 Presidential Campaign. Since November 2011, the Secret Service has provided protection to four Presidential Candidates. We were well-prepared to initiate the protection, as we had campaign details trained and assembled.

This past weekend, the Secret Service successfully provided security for two significant events with heads of state attending from more than forty countries at the G8 Summit at Camp David in Maryland and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago, Illinois. In partnership with the local police departments from Chicago and the National Capital Region, and our other law enforcement partners, the Secret Service established a comprehensive security plan to keep the President, visiting heads of state and the public safe.

As I appear before you today, planning for the upcoming Democratic National Convention and Republican National Convention has been well underway for the past ten months. Each of these events has been designated as an NSSE. The Secret Service coordinators for these events have established an Executive Steering Committee with their respective law enforcement partners and emergency medical partners.

Additionally, security plans are now being developed for the upcoming Presidential Debates and Vice-Presidential Debate this fall. Lastly, planning for the 57th Presidential Inauguration has also begun with our law enforcement partners in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area.

INVESTIGATIONS

Over the past five years, the Secret Service has investigated over 17,000 protective intelligence threat cases around the world.

In the investigative arena, the Secret Service keeps American citizens safe from a variety of financial fraud schemes.

Thus far in FY 2012, we have arrested over 3,000 for identity theft, mortgage fraud, cyber crimes and 1,500 for the manufacturing and passing of counterfeit currency. From FY 2007 to the present, we have arrested over 30,000 criminals for various financial and cyber crimes.

In FY 2011 investigations of financial crimes prevented \$5.6 billion in potential losses and cyber crime investigations prevented an additional \$1.6 billion in potential losses. Domestically in FY 2011 \$7.5 million dollars of counterfeit U.S. currency was seized before entering public circulation; abroad, \$63.6 million was seized.

CAREER DEMANDS OF A SECRET SERVICE AGENT

Another significant challenge that specifically affects the special agent population of the Secret Service is the requirement to geographically relocate several times during their career.

Agents begin their career assigned to a field office conducting criminal investigations and working temporary protective assignments. After approximately six to eight years, the agent will likely be required to transfer to the Washington, D.C. area for a permanent protective assignment on the Presidential Protective Division (PPD) or the Vice-Presidential Protective Division (VPPD). Some agents are transferred to a Former President's Protective Detail in other geographic locations to fulfill their protective assignment requirement.

Agents serve on a permanent protective detail for approximately four to five years. During this assignment, agents live their lives week to week, depending on the schedule of their protectee.

Additionally, agents rotate shifts every two weeks – from day shift, to afternoons to the midnight shift. In addition to the rotating schedules, there is a constant requirement for personnel to travel on an “advance team” several days or weeks in advance for an upcoming protective trip or for the actual trip itself.

The constant travel and shift work associated with our protective mission, the long hours conducting surveillance, and the dangers associated with executing a search warrant and working undercover are daily challenges that law enforcement officers and special agents face.

Whether it is in conjunction with our investigative mission or our protective mission, the men and women of the Secret Service work tirelessly everyday to protect the citizens of this country from financial frauds and to ensure the safety of our nation's leaders. Clearly, the misconduct that took place on April 11, 2012 in Cartagena, Colombia is not representative of our core values or the high ethical standards we demand. Although this misconduct was an aberration, the Secret Service is committed to learning from this incident and has taken the necessary corrective measures to ensure that it will never occur again.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Committee and I would be glad to address any additional questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS

ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

"SECRET SERVICE ON THE LINE: RESTORING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE"

May 23, 2012



Good morning Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Committee:

I want to bring you up to date on the Office of Inspector General's (DHS OIG) plans to review and monitor the Secret Service's investigation of the April 11-12, 2012, incident in Cartagena, Colombia, involving Secret Service employees' interaction with Colombian nationals. Our role began almost immediately after the incident, when, on April 13, 2012, Director Sullivan and I discussed the events. We have since remained in regular contact. Director Sullivan and I met in person on May 1, 2012, and again on May 4, 2012. Director Sullivan has repeatedly stated to me his commitment to conduct a complete and thorough investigation. His actions so far have demonstrated that commitment.

Since our team started its work, the Secret Service has been completely transparent and cooperative with our inspectors and investigators. We have high regard for the effort the Secret Service has put forth thus far.

On April 26, 2012, I instructed our Assistant Inspector General (AIG) for Inspections and the Acting AIG for Investigations to review the Secret Service's handling of its internal investigation regarding the incident in Cartagena. On April 27, 2012, our Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Acting Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investigations met with officials from Secret Service's Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), which is conducting the internal investigation. At that meeting, we described the objectives of our review and learned more about the incident and the Secret Service's efforts as of that date. On April 30, 2012, our Assistant Inspector General for Inspections assembled a six-person team, led by a GS-15 Chief Inspector. That team is augmented by two investigators from our Office of Investigations.

On May 2, 2012, our team met with RES officials to begin what we envision as a three-part review. The first part has three overarching objectives. We will evaluate 1) the adequacy of Secret Service's response to the incident in Cartagena; 2) the adequacy of the scope, methodology, and the conclusions of its investigation; and, 3) the sufficiency of the corrective action(s) already implemented, as well as planned corrective action(s).

We plan to interview USSS personnel responsible for coordinating the agency's response to the incident and conducting its investigation. OIG investigators will participate in the interviews. We will interview personnel within the Office of the Director, the RES, those in charge of field operations, and USSS' office responsible for security clearances.

We will review all records, documents, and other materials related to the USSS investigation, including RES' standards for inspection/investigation. We will review protocols for advance teams, the USSS Code of Conduct, and disciplinary processes and records.

Our fieldwork concerning USSS' response to and investigation of, the incident will occur in Washington, DC. Here are some of the key questions we will address:

- What guidance/support has USSS leadership provided to its investigators?
- Who conducted interviews, how were they conducted, and who has the USSS interviewed?

- How many and what type polygraphs has USSS conducted, and how has information obtained benefitted the investigation?
- Did investigators conduct consistent, thorough interviews?
- Are there any specific rules agents must follow when operating in other countries? If so, what are they?
- What is the extent of supervisory oversight of advance teams?
- What actions or types of behavior does the USSS consider to be serious misconduct?
- How was that information used to determine administrative action, including revocation of security clearances? What was the threshold, i.e., behavior for termination versus lesser punishment? Who was the reviewing official for deciding administrative action?
- Is there a culture within the USSS that may have allowed this incident to occur?
- Have similar 'infractions' been reported in the past? What was their disposition?

We have already begun meeting with the RES staff members who interviewed the Secret Service employees who were in Cartagena at the time of the incident to learn more about the interviewers' methodology, their instructions from Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility management, and their interview tools.

We have also begun to review the notes that resulted from interviews of nearly 200 Secret Service employees who were associated with the incident, as well as 25 employees of the Hilton and El Caribe hotels in Cartagena.

We plan to interview Special Agent-in-Charge Paula Reid, who had on-site responsibility for the Secret Service's Cartagena detail. We also plan to interview Director Sullivan.

We will review the Secret Service's report on its internal investigation as soon as it becomes available. Contingent upon our receipt of that report, our goal is to complete the first phase of our review and report our findings by July 2, 2012.

Immediately after we issue that report, we will begin phase two of our review, during which we will determine whether certain workplace conditions and issues have promoted a culture within the Secret Service that could have contributed to the Cartagena incident. We will examine the Secret Service's recruiting, vetting and hiring practices. We will also examine Secret Service Equal Employment Opportunity and Merit System Protection Board cases, communications within the agency, its administration of awards and discipline, training, and any other programs or functions that might cast light on the organizational culture of the Secret Service. This portion of our work will include site visits to the Miami Field Office and other field offices.

The third phase of our review will examine the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secret Service and our office. Our goal here is evaluate changes in both Secret Service and Office of Inspector General investigative capabilities since the MOU was created in 2003 and determine whether changes are necessary. It is likely that we will conduct this phase concurrently with phase two. We will report our findings on both phases later this year.

I want to stress that the Secret Service's efforts to date in investigating its own employees should not be discounted. It has done credible job of uncovering the facts and, where appropriate, it has taken swift and decisive action.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the members of the Committee might have.



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May 18, 2012

Honorable Joseph Lieberman
 Chairman
 Committee on Homeland Security
 & Governmental Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Honorable Susan Collins
 Ranking Member
 Committee on Homeland Security
 & Governmental Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510

Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins,

The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA) is the leading non-partisan, non-profit fraternal organization representing the working federal law enforcement officer. Among its membership are Agents of the United States Secret Service.

With a 145 year proud history, the Secret Service is one of our oldest federal law enforcement agencies. From its post-Civil War mission of suppressing the rampant counterfeiting of US currency to its recent transition into the Department of Homeland Security, and among other missions, providing protection for the President of the United States and others within a new asymmetrical threat matrix, the Service and its Agents have always answered the call and excelled at any mission tasked to them.

In a post-9/11 world, with shrinking budgets and our national debt impacting federal law enforcement operations, the Secret Service and its Agent adapted, were innovative and performed their missions with less than a yearly one percent funding increase through most of the last decade. Despite all, the Agents of the Secret Service got the job done.

Over the past few weeks, the unfortunate allegations of misconduct by a few in Columbia have overshadowed the historic successes and impact the Secret Service and its Agents have left on American history. Most of this has been lost in a media circus that focused more on throwing things at the wall and seeing what stuck, than the facts.


From the moment the story emerged, FLEOA encouraged Congress, the news media and Director Sullivan to trust the integrity of a thorough investigation and follow the sacred due process of law. While Director Sullivan and certain leaders in Congress have done an admirable job following this, others succumbed to the news media court of rumor. This undermines the integrity of due process and the sanctity of our legal system.

In fact, when the allegations first emerged, Director Sullivan took immediate action and appropriately referred the matter for independent investigation. He made no effort to minimize the severity of the allegations, and he did not attempt to conceal the matter. Instead, he engaged FLEOA and its attorneys in a professional manner, and committed himself to the due process of law. In spite of any reporter's sensational, baseless notion that this represents the Service's culture, the opposite holds true. FLEOA felt that from the beginning, the security risks were

overblown and only used to generate headlines, which have been confirmed by the results of the investigation.

FLEOA would like to remind the distinguished members of your committee of the continued selfless sacrifice of Secret Service agents and officers, and their united unwavering commitment to risking their lives in defense of our President and our great nation. The allegations of misconduct have not undefined the legacy of honor that the Service continues to exude.

Faternally,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jon Adler".

National President

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Mark J. Sullivan
From Senator Susan M. Collins**

**“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
May 23, 2012**

Question#:	1
Topic:	background checks
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: Director Sullivan, you testified that background checks of the female Colombian nationals involved with the Secret Service personnel did not reveal any connection to criminal or terrorist organizations. In furtherance of our investigation, please provide written responses to the questions below. To the extent possible, please provide your answers to these questions in an unclassified form. If your responses contain classified information, please provide that information in a separate classified annex.

What checks were run on these Colombian nationals?

Response: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) ran checks through the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS) and also provided the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) with the information. We were advised that EPIC checked criminal histories based on available ID numbers and U.S. border crossing information on all of the individuals and all checks had negative results. We were further advised that the Colombian National Police conducted checks of the Colombian National Health Registry, the National Identification Card database, and open source internet searches. The Colombian National Police also conducted criminal history searches and reported negative results.

The Secret Service requested that another Federal Government entity run the appropriate record checks on the Colombian national women.

Question: What agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. or foreign governments assisted with the checks?

Response: The Secret Service requested assistance from the DEA, the Colombian National Police, and another Federal Government agency.

Question#:	1
Topic:	background checks
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: Describe in detail any negative or derogatory information returned through the checks, regardless of whether that information was ultimately deemed relevant to the investigation.

Response: Record checks requested through another Federal Government agency developed derogatory information possibly concerning one of the women. This information consisted of an allegation that was loosely based on a similar name with limited identifiers. The Federal Government agency that conducted the name checks could not substantiate the accuracy of the allegation or that the allegation relates to the same individuals. This information is classified and is not owned by the Secret Service.

The Secret Service has recently received permission from another Federal Government agency to release the information to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Secret Service is currently in the process of preparing the documents for transmission to this Committee. The Secret Service anticipates delivering the material during the week of July 23, 2012.

Question: What steps did the USSS take to either confirm or resolve any negative or derogatory information returned through the checks?

Response: The Secret Service's assessment of this record was based on the personal interview of the subject, the fact that the name was similar, the specific contents of the record, the age of the record, the lack of criminal history for this individual, the lack of matching personal identifiers, and the fact that the agency providing the information could not confirm that the individual is the same individual that is listed in their records.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Mark J. Sullivan
From Senator Claire McCaskill**

**“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
May 23, 2012**

Question#:	1
Topic:	root causes
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: It is time to look at some of the root causes of this incident so the Secret Service can move forward, promote a strong ethical organizational culture, and regain the trust of the American people. You suggested in your testimony that less than 60% of Secret Service personnel would come forward if they saw ethical misconduct. I hope that is not indicative of a broader culture that turns a blind eye to wrongdoing. Employees need to feel empowered to report wrongdoing, whether it involves ethical misconduct or instances of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Can you describe specifically what the Secret Service has done, and is doing now, to promote a culture of accountability and to empower employees to come forward when they see wrongdoing?

Response: The Secret Service regularly provides ethics and standards of conduct training to its employees throughout their careers. This training is reinforced yearly with each Secret Service employee certifying on a Secret Service form (SSF) 3218 (“Annual Employee Certification”), that they have read and reviewed agency policies, to include the Secret Service’s “Standards of Conduct.”

Additionally, a course entitled “Ethics in Law Enforcement” was held on May 2-3, 2012, for one hundred senior managers. Two additional “Ethics in Law Enforcement” courses are scheduled for June 26-27, 2012 and July 23-24, 2012. The participants for the June course will consist of mid level managers (GS - 14 special agents and lieutenants from the Uniformed Division Officer ranks). The July course will consist of junior tenured agents (GS 7 - 13 special agents and sergeants from the Uniformed Division Officer ranks). The Secret Service is considering hosting another ethics course in August of 2012 for an additional 100 employees, but due to the staffing demands of the RNC and DNC this may not be logistically possible.

Question#:	1
Topic:	root causes
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

At the end of April 2012, Director Sullivan established the Professional Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG) to examine the Secret Service's hiring, training, policies and procedures and to review how it incorporates its professional standards of conduct into each of those areas. The purpose of this group is to identify best practices in each area from other federal law enforcement agencies, other federal agencies, and the Department of Defense to make recommendations as to how the Secret Service can ensure that its standards of excellence are upheld by every employee. The members of the PRWG include Senior Executive Service employees from several federal law enforcement agencies, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Office of Personnel Management and the U.S. Department of Defense. Specifically, the Committee is co-chaired by Director John Berry, from the Office of Personnel Management, and Director Connie Patrick, from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

The Secret Service continues to reaffirm its commitment to ensuring a work environment free from all forms of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. In an official message, the Director of the Secret Service encouraged every employee to report concerns and misconduct to the Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility, to maintain a professional work environment that reflects the Secret Service's high ethical standards. Employees are able to report concerns in a number of ways.

Question: What has agency leadership communicated to supervisors and employees?

Response: Since the incident in Cartagena, Colombia, the Director and the Deputy Director of the Secret Service have maintained an open line of communication with Secret Service supervisors and employees. Collectively, they have issued six official messages to address morale, keep employees informed of ongoing events, ethical standards expected, and enhanced internal policies.

Please see the attached official messages dated:

April 16, 2012, 11:55 AM
 April 27, 2012, 3:19 PM
 April 27, 2012, 4:05 PM
 May 24, 2012, 3:55 PM
 May 29, 2012, 5:38 PM
 June 8, 2012, 1:39 PM

Furthermore, the Director had conducted multiple "town hall" meetings, in order to reinforce an open dialogue between supervisors and employees on any issue, and encourage all employees to come forward to better the organization. These meetings will continue on an aggressive schedule.

The Director has also met with senior leadership (Special Agents in Charge) during a conference, and will meet with the 100 individuals that attended the "Ethics in Law Enforcement" training on May 2-3, 2012, to lead a comprehensive discussion on the Secret Service's culture.

From: DIR
To: USA
Cc: DIR
Subject: 175.044 Incident in Cartagena, Colombia
Date: Monday, April 16, 2012 11:55:38 AM

//Routine//

From: Headquarters (Director) File: 175.044

To: All Employees

Subj: Incident in Cartagena, Colombia

By now most of you are aware of the incident which occurred in Cartagena, Colombia. Our agency moved in a swift, decisive manner immediately after this incident was brought to our attention. The personnel involved have been placed on administrative leave, which allows for the opportunity to conduct a full, thorough and fair investigation.

The United States Secret Service has a long, respected history of operating with the very highest levels of professional and ethical behavior. The overwhelming majority of the men and women in the Secret Service live up to these standards every moment of every day. I am extraordinarily proud of you for that and I am honored to serve with you. It is because of this and other vital aspects of our charter that an "overwhelming majority" is insufficient.

Our job, our mission, our responsibility is to the President, the American people and the individuals we are entrusted to protect. This is not just a matter of honor, although that is critical. It is imperative, as part of our sworn duties, to always act both personally and professionally in a manner that recognizes the seriousness and consequence of our mission. I know virtually every single one of you do that on a daily basis. As we move forward in the wake of this embarrassing incident, it is my hope that each of us will be steadfast in our efforts to ensure that our performance and behavior mirror the oath we have sworn to uphold.

I am grateful to all of you for your continued focus and commitment to our mission.

Headquarters (Director) Sullivan

From: DIR
To: USA
Cc: DIR
Subject: 200.010 Personal and Professional Conduct
Date: Friday, April 27, 2012 4:05:38 PM

//Immediate//

From: Headquarters (Deputy Director) File: 200.010

To: All Employees

Subj: Personal and Professional Conduct

Each point of the Secret Service star represents one of the agency's five core values: justice, duty, courage, honesty and loyalty. These values should resonate with each man and woman in our organization. The building block – the very foundation – of these values is our personal and professional code of conduct.

To that end, you are expected to always conduct yourselves in a manner that reflects credit on you, the Secret Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and – most importantly – the United States Government and the citizens that we serve.

Employee responsibilities and conduct are outlined in PER-05, and social media standards of conduct are outlined in PAF-08(02). You certify that you are aware of these policies each year at the mid-year review by signing the SSF 3218, which is placed in your Employee Performance File.

Although "Employee Responsibilities and Conduct" and "Social Media Standards of Conduct" are thorough and comprehensive, they cannot address every situation that our employees will face as we execute our dual-missions throughout the world. The absence of a specific, published standard of conduct covering an act or behavior does not mean that the act is condoned, is permissible, or will not call for – and result in – corrective or disciplinary action.

The inherent respect conferred upon you as a Secret Service employee carries with it the responsibility – in both your personal and professional life – to always conduct yourself in a manner that reflects the highest standards of the United States Government. Although managers have an explicit role to prevent and address issues of misconduct, all employees have a continuing obligation to confront expected abuses or perceived misconduct. In short, consider your conduct through the lens of the past several weeks.

In the days ahead, I remind all employees that it is your responsibility to familiarize yourself with the referenced policy sections pertaining to conduct.

At the request of the Director, the senior leadership has developed and require the following enhanced standards of conduct effective immediately.

1. Standards of conduct briefings will be conducted for all protective visits, events and NSSEs, as well as prior to foreign air plane departures.
2. The U.S. Department of State Regional Security Officer will work with the USSS advance team to provide intensified country-specific briefings upon arrival in a foreign country. The briefings will update personnel on safety issues, off-limit zones and off-limit establishments for USSS personnel, and any country-specific rules imposed by the Ambassador.
3. Foreign nationals, excluding hotel staff and official counterparts, are prohibited in your hotel room.
4. Patronization of non-reputable establishments is prohibited.

5. Alcohol may only be consumed in moderate amounts while off-duty on a TDY assignment and alcohol use is prohibited within 10 hours of reporting for duty.

6. Alcohol may not be consumed at the protectee hotel once the protective visit has begun.

The following measures relating to foreign car plane staffing are effective immediately.

1. Car planes will be staffed with two GS-15 supervisors – one from the Office of Professional Responsibility and one from the field.

2. The car plane supervisors will be responsible for briefing the standards of conduct expectations prior to departure to the destination country, as well as for enforcing these standards while in the foreign country.

3. All personnel traveling will have to have completed relevant LMS-based ethics training in order to be eligible for protective travel.

4. The Security Clearance Division will intensify country-specific briefings covering all pertinent topics prior to departure for the destination country.

5. Laws of the United States shall apply to Secret Service personnel while abroad.

Headquarters (Deputy Director) Smith

From: DIR
To: USA
Cc: DIR
Subject: 175.044 Message from the Director
Date: Friday, April 27, 2012 3:18:55 PM

//IMMEDIATE//

From: Headquarters (Director) File: 175.044

To: All Employees

Subj: Message from the Director

Over the past two weeks, the Secret Service has been subjected to intense scrutiny as a result of the serious allegations of employee misconduct in Colombia. I know it has been a difficult time for you, the exceptional men and women of this agency. You should all take pride that your efforts have helped make the Secret Service into one of the finest law enforcement organizations in the world. To see the agency's integrity called into question is painful for all of us and our families. As difficult as this has been, we must embrace this opportunity to ensure events such as these do not reoccur.

Despite the difficulties, of the past two weeks, you have demonstrated unwavering commitment and character by keeping your focus on the successful accomplishment of our critically important mission. I am honored to work with people who will not allow these events, or any other challenge, to deter them from carrying out this agency's extraordinarily important, and extremely difficult responsibilities.

The Secret Service has established a tradition of excellence over our 147 year history. All of us count the day we joined this outstanding organization as one of the proudest days of our lives. These recent events have not diminished this agency's remarkable achievements. You have been, and remain, the best of the best.

I have complete confidence that you will continue to maintain these high standards as we enter a very busy operational period. I ask each of you to view the upcoming months as an opportunity to continue to demonstrate your professionalism, integrity, and true character. Your actions, and the superb quality of your daily work, will reaffirm your oath to faithfully serve the President and the people of our country.

During this extremely difficult time for our agency, we have received strong support from so many. That support is directly derived from a reputation built on your sacrifice and commitment and the sacrifice and commitment of those who came before us. We will surely continue to earn that support and repair our reputation based on how we conduct ourselves from this day forward. It is an honor and a privilege to serve with you. Stay strong, hold your head high, and remain proud of yourselves and this agency.

Headquarters (Director) Sullivan

From: DIR
To: USA
Cc: DIR
Subject: 175.040 Professional Reinforcement
Date: Thursday, May 24, 2012 3:55:20 PM

//Routine//

From: Headquarters (Director) File: 175.040
 To: All Employees
 Subj: Professionalism Reinforcement

The Secret Service has an established reputation of excellence, built upon the service and sacrifice of our workforce. We are known for our high standards and dedication to mission. However, recent events have raised serious questions regarding our culture and the professional standards that guide our work and conduct. Such questions require a thorough and transparent review.

As highlighted in my Congressional testimony on May 23, 2012, I have initiated the formation of a Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG). The PRWG will conduct an objective and comprehensive review of our agency's values and professional standards of conduct. This process will include an evaluation of policy related to employment standards and background investigations; patterns of discipline related to misconduct; ethics training; and all law, policies, procedures and practices related to the same. The PRWG will undergo the following process to facilitate this:

1. Collect and analyze comprehensive information across broad categories related to organizational performance and accountability.
2. Benchmark against best practices.
3. Prepare an action plan with recommendations for reinforcing professional conduct.

I have asked Director John Berry of the Office of Personnel Management and Director Connie Patrick of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to serve as co-chairs. The membership of this PRWG will bring together a number of senior level executives with unique law enforcement and government expertise to this review process.

To assist the working group in completing its review, Secret Service personnel will serve as subject matter experts and will represent a cross section of our agency. As the working group begins its review, members of the group will be contacting Secret Service employees. I ask each of you to fully assist them in their efforts. Your cooperation and participation is critical to the success of this important process.

I am confident that this review will provide the Secret Service with an objective perspective on our practices; highlighting both the areas in which we excel and identifying any areas in which we need to improve. The results of this review will be shared in future official messages.

I thank each of you for the work you do in service to our country every day, and for your efforts to support this important process.

Headquarters (Director) Sullivan

From: DIR
To: USA
Subject: 200.010 Update on Professional Reinforcement Initiatives
Date: Friday, June 08, 2012 1:39:41 PM

//Immediate//

From: Headquarters (Director) **File:** 200.010
To: All Employees
Subject: Update on Professional Reinforcement Initiatives

Reference is made to all previous messages listed below addressing the incident in Cartagena, Colombia, as well as my testimony to Congress on May 23, 2012.

- * 175.044 Incident in Cartagena, Colombia - 4/16/2012
- * 175.044 Message from the Director - 4/27/2012
- * 200.010 Personal and Professional Conduct - 4/27/2012
- * 175.040 Professional Reinforcement - 5/24/2012
- * 234.000 Ethics in Law Enforcement - 4/27/2012
- * 120.111 Supervisory Cultural Diversity and Inclusion Training - 5/21/2012

This message will serve to further update all employees on initiatives and related activities on this and other mission related areas.

Both in public comments, and in private meetings with members of Congress and others, I have and will continue to emphasize the established reputation of excellence and character exhibited by our personnel as we carry out our dual mission. Although the agency's culture has been called into question, I know that the overwhelming majority of our employees exhibit the highest of standards each and every day.

The question of culture, however, cannot be ignored. Therefore, in addition to the communications listed above, we will continue to address the concerns raised in the wake of the Colombia incident in a number of ways.

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been tasked by Congress to initiate a review of the matter. In addition to investigating the circumstances surrounding this specific incident, OIG will conduct an independent inquiry to determine whether this incident is indicative of broader cultural issues within the organization. In furtherance of our cooperation with the OIG, today each of you will receive an e-mail from DHS/Acting Inspector General Charles Edwards regarding their inquiry.

The Professional Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG) met on May 10, 2012 at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). During this initial meeting three Sub-groups were designated to facilitate the assessment process: (1) Workforce Management; (2) Operational Environment; and (3) Ethics Communications and Training. These Sub-groups are meeting and sharing organizational information including employment policies, management of security clearances, misconduct and adverse actions, and professional conduct and ethics training. As stated in the original message, the PRWG will provide the Secret Service with an objective perspective on our practices; highlighting both the areas in which we excel and identifying any areas in which we need to improve.

On June 20th, we will invite to headquarters all 100 employees who participated in the U.S. Secret Service/Johns Hopkins University Ethics in Law Enforcement course held May 2-3 at the Rowley Training Center. This is intended to be a town hall meeting to discuss the results of the two-day session. We have scheduled two additional 100-person Ethics in Law Enforcement courses with Johns Hopkins

University in the coming weeks. Additionally, beginning in July, the Secret Service will be hosted by the Anti-Defamation League for one-day training sessions regarding law enforcement and society. The course fosters a deepened commitment to serve and protect all people, regardless of racial, ethnic or nationality differences. An official message will be sent in the near future with information on this and subsequent courses.

Also this month, members of the executive staff and I began meeting with headquarters divisions and traveling to field offices to speak directly with personnel to reaffirm the Secret Service's commitment to our enhanced programs and procedures.

Our job, our mission, our responsibility is to the President, the American people and the individuals we are entrusted to protect. It is imperative, as part of our sworn duties, to always act both personally and professionally in a manner that recognizes the seriousness and consequence of our mission. As we move forward in the wake of this incident, it is my hope that each of us will be steadfast in our efforts to ensure that our performance and behavior mirror the oath we have sworn to uphold. I would ask everyone to make it your personal duty to work toward maintaining our great tradition of professionalism, integrity and service.

Be mindful of the footsteps in which you are following. Remember the men and women who have served this agency for 147 years, and who have dedicated themselves to our mission, our duty and each other. Our reputation - as an agency and as individuals - is a reflection not only of their sacrifice, but of all those who have come before you, just as your actions will reflect upon the agency from this point forward.

I am grateful to all of you for your continued focus and commitment to our mission.

Headquarters (Director) Sullivan

United States Secret Service
Directives System

Manual : Administrative
RO : FMD

Section : FMD-08(02)
Date : 01/18/2008

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**United States Secret Service
Directives System**

Manual : Administrative
RO : FMD

Section : FMD-08(02)
Date : 12/22/2010

From: FMD
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2010 4:14 PM
To: USA
Subject: DCP#: A 2010-30, A 2010-31, A 2010-32 (Corrected Copy), Issuance of Advances and Payment of SSF 1164s - Clarification of New Procedures

//ROUTINE//

*****CORRECTED COPY*****

CORRECTION: **Removal of second message: Subject: Discontinuance of Third Party Drafts - New Procedures**

FROM: Headquarters (AD-Administration)
TO: All Supervisors and Holders of the Administrative Manual
SUBJECT: Issuance of Advances and Payment of SSF 1164s - Clarification of New Procedures

This directive should be reproduced locally and filed in front of the following sections:

FMD-08(02) - DCP#: A 2010-30
FMD-08(04) - DCP#: A 2010-31
FMD-09(02) - DCP#: A 2010-32

This directive is in effect until superseded.

Reference is made to the official message dated November 23, 2010, "Discontinuance of Third Party Drafts - New Procedures". The following are provided as additional clarification and are effective December 17, 2010.

ISSUANCE OF TRAVEL ADVANCES/TRAVEL ADVANCES FOR INVITATIONAL TRAVELERS

Employees, and sponsors of invitational travel, will continue to prepare a SF 1038, Advance of Funds Application and Account and appropriately route it as delineated in the above mentioned message. The office cashier will input the information from the SF 1038 into TOPS by selecting the responsibility USSS Advances/1164 Cashier and choosing the Advances screen.

When entering the advance into TOPS the cashier must choose the correct/current site for the employee or invitational traveler. The current site for an invitational traveler is generally readily identified but an employee may be listed with multiple sites which include different addresses and bank information. The correct/current employee site can be identified by the address, but it is suggested that the cashier confirm the correct address and bank information with the employee if there are multiple sites listed. FMD is working to clear all expired employee sites so that the cashier will only see the current site. It is anticipated that this effort will be completed in January 2011. FMD will continue to maintain and deactivate sites as they change.

Manual : Administrative
RO : FMD

Section : FMD-08(02)
Date : 12/22/2010

In instances where TOPS has multiple employees with similar names, the cashier can determine the correct site by matching the social security number on the SF 1038 to the social security number on the screen.

If the cashier identifies that the bank information in TOPS is incorrect, or if an advance is requested for a new employee who is not yet established in TOPS, the office should contact FMD and provide the following information via email to vendors.employees@uss.s.dhs.gov:

1. Requestor (your) Name and Phone Number:
2. Employee Name:
3. Employee Site Address (Street/City/State/Zip code):
4. Tax Payer Identification (SSN):
5. Vendor Type - USSS Employee
6. ACH Banking Information:
 - o Bank Name
 - o Bank Address (Street/City/State/Zip code)
 - o ABA routing number
 - o Account number
 - o Type of Account - (checking or savings)

FMD will promptly correct or create the employee in TOPS so that an advance may be issued. Note: Employee addresses and bank information are updated bi-weekly through an interface with the Master Personnel System (MPS).

If the cashier inadvertently chooses a site for the wrong employee (e.g., employees have similar name) and the advance of funds is sent to the wrong bank account, the cashier must promptly notify the employee who inadvertently received the advance of the error. The notification should be by email with a cc to FMD (financialpayments@uss.s.dhs.gov). FMD will work to either reverse the transaction, or to collect the funds back from the employee who should not have received them.

When entering an advance into TOPS a PO Number is provided. The cashier must annotate the PO Number (e.g., AV110114240) and date in block 13 (Cash Payment Received) of the SF 1038.

All processed SF 1038s for employees must be filed in Administrative file number 400.130, "Travel Advances - Current Employees".

All processed SF 1038s for invitational travelers must be filed in Administrative file number 400.100, "Invitational Travel (Domestic and Foreign)".

Questions regarding travel advances should be directed to the Financial Payments Branch, Financial Management Division on 202-406-5228.

REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENDITURES ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The office cashier will input the information from the SSF 1164 into TOPS by selecting the responsibility USSS Advances/1164 Cashier and choosing the 1164 Payment screen in TOPS.

Manual : Administrative
RO : FMD

Section : FMD-08(02)
Date : 12/22/2010

When entering the SSF 1164 into TOPS the cashier must choose the correct/current site for the employee. The correct/current employee site can be identified by the address, but it is suggested that the cashier confirm the correct address and bank information with the employee if there are multiple sites listed.

In instances where TOPS has multiple employees with similar names, the cashier can determine the correct site by matching the social security number on the SF 1038 to the Tax ID number/social security number on the screen. Due to the cost associated with processing a SSF 1164, employees should consolidate claims that total less than \$25.00. If at the end of a 3 month period the consolidated claim is still less than \$25.00, it may be submitted for reimbursement.

When entering a SSF 1164 into TOPS a PO Number is provided. The cashier must annotate the PO Number (e.g., AV110114240) and date in block 10 (TOPS PO Number) of the SSF 1164.

All processed SSF 1164s must be filed in Administrative file number 303.020, "Disbursements".

Questions regarding SSF 1164 reimbursements should be directed to the Financial Payments Branch, Financial Management Division on 202-406-5232.

FINAL CLOSE OUT OF THIRD PARTY DRAFTS

**No third party drafts may be issued after December 16, 2010. ** All issued third party drafts must also be recorded in TOPS by close of business December 16, 2010. The third party draft screens will be shut down as of close of December 16, 2010.

Cashiers should inform recipients of a draft that they should deposit it no later than December 20, 2010 to ensure that it has sufficient time to clear the banking system. Drafts cashed after this date may be returned for insufficient funds.

Unused third party drafts may be destroyed and disposed of locally. An email should be sent from the cashier to cashmanagement@ussf.dhs.gov, with a cc to the office SAIC/RAIC, stating the specific draft numbers destroyed. This email should be sent no later than December 31, 2010.

Questions regarding third party drafts may be addressed to the Certification & Post Audit Branch at (202) 406-9423.

Headquarters (Administration)

Mullen/Merritt

United States Secret Service
Directives System

Manual : Administrative
RO : FMD

Section : FMD-08(02)
Date : 11/23/2010

From: FMD
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2010 9:21 AM
To: USA
Subject: Discontinuance of Third Party Drafts - New Procedures

//ROUTINE//

FROM: Headquarters (AD - Administration)
TO: All Supervisors and Holders of the Administrative Manual
SUBJECT: Discontinuance of Third Party Drafts - New Procedures

This directive should be reproduced locally and filed in front of the following sections:

FMD-08(02) - DCP#: A 2010-25
FMD-08(04) - DCP#: A 2010-26
FMD-09(02) - DCP#: A 2010-27
PCS-01 - DCP#: PCS 2010-05
PCS-05 - DCP#: PCS 2010-06

This directive is in effect until superseded.

Reference is made to the official message dated November 18, 2010, "Discontinuance of Third Party Drafts". As the result of the discontinuance of third party drafts, the following new procedures are effective December 17, 2010.

ISSUANCE OF TRAVEL ADVANCES

Reference section FMD-09(02) of the Administrative Manual. Procedures regarding the issuance of travel advances, to include the application and approval of advances, remain the same with the exception that advances will now be issued by direct deposit to the same bank account that the employee receives their salary payment deposit. Employees will continue to prepare a SF 1038, Advance of Funds Application and Account and submit it to their supervisor for approval. Before approving an advance, the approving official will check the employee's travel account using the TOPS Employee Advance Statement V2, Advance Account Activity Detail Report supplied by the employee and compare it to the balance on the SF 1038 in the field "BALANCE DUE U.S. FROM PREVIOUS ADVANCE". This field must be completed before the office cashier will process the advance. The office cashier will input the information from the SF 1038 into TOPS by selecting the responsibility USSS Advances/1164 Cashier and choosing the Advances screen. Entry into this screen will result in a direct deposit to the employee's bank account within 3 days. For information regarding completion of the Advances/1164 Payments screens, refer to the User Guide entitled "Entering Advances/1164 Payments" available through the TOPS web page on the intranet. To access the user guide, go to the TOPS web page and under Oracle Financials, click on Advances/1164 Payments and then under User Guides. The User Guide will also be available in the What's New section for 45 days.

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Headquarters offices that do not have a cashier and currently receive advances from the Relocation and Travel Services Branch, FMD may continue to hand-carry their advances to 950 H Street, Suite 6300 for issuance. Advances will be processed and a direct deposit to the employee's bank account will be made within 3 days. Offices are encouraged to establish a cashier by sending an e-mail with the requested cashier's name through the office approving official to cashmanagement@usss.dhs.gov.

Questions regarding travel advances should be directed to the Financial Payments Branch, Financial Management Division on 202-406-5228. Questions regarding use of the screen should be directed to the TOPS helpdesk on 202-406-9999.

TRAVEL ADVANCES FOR INVITATIONAL TRAVELERS

Reference section FMD-08(02) of the Administrative Manual for information regarding the issuance of travel advances for invitational travelers. The Chief, Financial Payments Branch, FMD must authorize and sign a SF 1038, Advance of Funds Application and Account form, prior to travel. The Secret Service employee who is the sponsor for the travel must ensure that the following information is included in block 9d of the submitted SF 1038:

- Name of invitational traveler's bank
- ABA number for invitational traveler's bank
- Invitational traveler's account number at the bank

Using the information from the submitted SF 1038, The Financial Payments Branch will establish the invitational traveler in TOPS. Once the submitted SF 1038 is approved by the Chief, Financial Payments Branch, it will be returned to the sponsor. The office cashier will input the information from the SF 1038 into TOPS by selecting the responsibility USSS Advances/1164 Cashier and choosing the Advances screen. Entry into this screen will result in a direct deposit to the invitational traveler's bank account within 3 days. For information regarding completion of the Advances/1164 Payments screens, refer to the User Guide entitled "Entering Advances/1164 Payments" available through the TOPS web page on the intranet. To access the user guide, go to the TOPS web page and under Oracle Financials, click on Advances/1164 Payments and then under User Guides.

Generally, an advance will only be authorized for 80% of the estimated travel expenses. The remaining amount owed to the invitational traveler will then be reimbursed via direct deposit to the provided bank account upon receipt of an approved travel voucher.

For invitational travelers who do not have a United States bank the advance of funds should be coordinated with the Financial Payments Branch, Financial Management Division.

Questions regarding travel advances for invitational travelers should be directed to the Financial Payments Branch, Financial Management Division on 202-406-5228. Questions regarding use of the screen should be directed to the TOPS helpdesk on 202-406-9999.

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PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) ADVANCES

Reference the PCS manual sections PCS-01 and PCS-05. Procedures regarding the issuance of PCS advances remain unchanged with the exception that the SF 1038 will not be returned to the employee for the issuance of a third party draft. Upon approving the advance, the Relocation and Travel Branch will process the advance and a direct deposit will be made to the employee's bank account within 3 days. The direct deposit will be sent to the same bank account that the employee receives their salary payment deposit. Questions regarding PCS advances should be directed to the Relocation and Travel Services Branch, Financial Management Division on 202-406-5683.

REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENDITURES ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Reference section FMD-08(04) of the Administrative Manual. Claims for reimbursement for expenditures on official business should continue to be submitted on SSF 1164, Claim for Reimbursement for Expenditures on Official Business. Employees should continue to route SSF 1164s to their supervisor for approval before submitting them to their office cashier. The office cashier will input the information from the SSF 1164 into TOPS by selecting the responsibility USSS Advances/1164 Cashier and choosing the 1164 Payment screen in TOPS. Entry into this screen will result in a direct deposit to the employee's bank account within 3 days. For information regarding completion of a TOPS USSS Advances/1164 Cashier screen, refer to the User Guide entitled "Entering Advances/1164 Payments" available through the TOPS web page on the intranet. To access the user guide, go to the TOPS web page and under Oracle Financials, click on Advances/1164 Payments and then under User Guides. The User Guide will also be available in the What's New section for 45 days.

Due to the cost associated with processing a SSF 1164, employees should consolidate claims that total less than \$25.00. If at the end of a 3 month period the consolidated claim is still less than \$25.00, it may be submitted for reimbursement.

Headquarters offices that do not have a cashier and currently receive SSF 1164 reimbursements from the Relocation and Travel Services Branch, FMD may continue to hand-carry their SSF 1164 to 950 H Street, Suite 6300 for issuance. Reimbursements will be processed and a direct deposit to the employee's bank account will be made within 3 days. Offices are encouraged to establish a cashier by sending an e-mail with the requested cashier's name through the office approving official to cashmanagement@uss.s.dhs.gov.

Questions regarding SSF 1164 reimbursements should be directed to the Financial Payments Branch, Financial Management Division on 202-406-5232. Questions regarding use of the screen should be directed to the TOPS helpdesk on 202-406-9999.

CONFIDENTIAL FUND INCREASES

The impact of the discontinuance of third party drafts on temporary increases to Imprest and Confidential Funds will be the subject of a separate official message.

Questions regarding Confidential Fund increases should be addressed to the Certification & Post Audit Branch, Financial Management Division on 202-406-9423.

Headquarters (Administration)

Mullen/Merritt

United States Secret Service
Directives SystemManual : Administrative
RO : FMDSection : FMD-08(02
Date : 01/18/2008

Subject: Travel Authority

To: All Supervisors and All Manual Holders of the Administrative Manual**Filing Instructions:**

- Remove and destroy FMD-08(02), Travel Authority Table of Contents (dated 04/20/2007) in its entirety and replace with the attached revised Table of Contents.
- Remove and destroy section FMD-08(02), Travel Authority, (dated 04/20/2007) in its entirety and replace with the attached revised section.
- File this Policy Memorandum in front of this section.
- This directive is in effect until superseded.

Impact Statement: This directive has been updated to advise that the Logistics Resource Center (LRC) has the responsibility for monitoring adherence to the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) and Secret Service policy regarding travel, and that deviations from official business travel require prior authorization from the SAIC/RAIC/Division Chief, in conjunction with the SAIC, LRC. Also to clarify that the official message authorizing travel must be attached to the travel voucher submitted by the traveler.

Mandatory Review: The Responsible Office will review all policy contained in this section in its entirety by or before December 2010.

Questions regarding this policy should be directed to the Financial Management Division, at 202-406-5937.

Paul D. Irving
AD - Administration

DCP#: A 2008-07

**United States Secret Service
Directives System**

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Date : 01/18/2008

TRAVEL AUTHORITY

Consolidated Travel Authorization

Employees of the United States Secret Service who are traveling on behalf of the Secret Service are authorized to do so, via the Consolidated Travel Authorization (CTA) or other travel authorizations, under the direction of the SAIC, RAIC, or Division Chief of the area to which they are assigned, or under the direction of others to whom authority has been delegated by Delegation of Authority No. 2, Travel; No. 56, First-Class Air Accommodations; No. 57, Use of Non-Contract Air Carriers; and No. 101-25, Use of Cash to Procure Emergency Transportation Services to travel within and beyond the limits of the continental United States in the performance of official duties. Expenses may be reimbursed as provided in these administrative regulations of the Secret Service. The Logistics Resource Center (LRC) has the responsibility for monitoring adherence to the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) and Secret Service policy regarding travel under the CTA or other travel authorizations and the delegations of authority.

The CTA does not cover the authorization of travel for training, travel for conferences, travel incident to change in post of duty (POD), travel assignments involving duty for extended periods at temporary duty stations (including training), invitational travel, employee/spouse travel paid by a non-Federal source, or travel in connection with home leave for employees and families stationed outside the continental United States. A separate travel authorization will be required for these actions. Authorization numbers for training assignments, conferences and in-service training will be the date of the official message authorizing travel. Conferences which are considered only information sharing in nature and require travel will necessitate prior approval from the traveler's appropriate Assistant Director. For travel not authorized by the CTA, the official messages authorizing travel must be attached to the travel voucher submitted by the traveler. All other authorization numbers will be individually assigned by the Office of Administration's LRC. The regulations controlling the issuance of the Secret Service CTA are contained in the following:

Federal Travel Regulation (FTR: 41 CFR 301-304)

Civilian Personnel Per Diem Bulletin (DOD)

Standardized Regulations-Government Civilians, Foreign Areas (DOS)

Travel under the CTA is authorized on an annual basis.

Employee Obligation

Per the General Services Administration (GSA), an employee traveling on official business is expected to exercise the same care when incurring expenses that a prudent person would exercise if traveling on personal business. Excess costs, circuitous routes, delays, luxury accommodations and services unnecessary or unjustified in the performance of official business are not acceptable. Employees will be responsible for excess costs and any additional expenses incurred for personal preference or convenience.

Deviations from official business travel require prior authorization from the SAIC/RAIC/Division Chief, in conjunction with the SAIC, LRC. The employee is responsible for providing a cost comparison memo (see ADM-06(02) for a sample memo). This memo must be approved prior to start of any travel and contain the approval of the employee's SAIC/RAIC/Division Chief in addition to the SAIC, LRC approval. The employee is not eligible for reimbursement of any travel expenses if this prior approval is not granted.

Reimbursable travel expenses are confined to those expenses essential to the transaction of official business.

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Invitational Travel Authorization (Non-Secret Service Employees)

Allowable Expenses

Allowable expenses include transportation charges, lodging, and meals and incidentals based on the rates and limitations set forth in section FMD-08(05), Per Diem Basis Travel. The invitational traveler's airline ticket must be obtained by the office requesting the travel through the Secret Service contracted Travel Management Center (SatoTravel, as of the last revision date of this policy). Upon completion of travel, the invitational traveler will submit a SSF 3200, Travel Voucher Worksheet - Per Diem, to the requesting office to be approved and then forwarded to the Financial Management Division (FMD) for reimbursement. Specific procedures are outlined below.

Pre-Employment Interview Travel Authority

FTR 301-1.3 authorizes the payment of pre-employment interview travel expenses. This rule applies to all persons being considered for employment, both prospective candidates for Federal employment and current employees of the Federal government.

Travel Authorization Request Procedures

Supervisors who wish to bring an individual to Headquarters from outside the metropolitan Washington, DC area for a pre-employment interview should coordinate this process with the Personnel Division. The Personnel Division will determine whether the individual is eligible for payment of pre-employment travel expenses. Once a determination has been made, a SSF 4000, Invitational Travel Request/Authorization for Non-Employees form from the originating office's Assistant Director or Chief Counsel should be forwarded to the SAIC, LRC through the Chief, Personnel Division, and must include the name of the traveler, date(s) of travel, purpose of travel, vacancy announcement title and number, and the origin and destination of travel.

LRC will complete the authorization citing the authorization number, per diem, lodging rates and other pertinent information needed for the traveler to voucher their expenses to the Secret Service. Authorization will then be sent to the Assistant Director of Administration for signature and final approval. Expenses should be vouchered directly to the U.S. Secret Service by the traveler as soon as the travel is complete. This completed authorization will be attached to the travel voucher.

Note: To be approved, the SSF 4000 requires the signature of the Assistant Director of Administration or their designate.

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All Other Invitational Travel Authorizations

Occasionally, the Secret Service requires the services of non-Secret Service employees (e.g., experts in various fields, witnesses, persons conducting or participating in on-the-job training). Their travel and per diem expenses may be authorized by a SSF 4000 in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 5751(a), 5703 and 5704, and the FTR.

Please note that while contractors are generally eligible to receive government rates for lodging, auto rental and Amtrak, they are not eligible to receive the government airfare rate. See "Cost-reimbursable Contractors" in section FMD-08(04), Methods of Transportation for more information. Contractors are only entitled to receive the lowest commercial airfare rate available. The term contractor means (a) working under a cost reimbursement contract and (b) working for the government at specific sites under special arrangements with the contracting agency and which are wholly federally funded (e.g., Government-Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO), Federally Funded Research and Development (FFRDC), or Management and Operating (M&O) contracts).

All invitational travel requests must be approved by the originating office's Assistant Director or Chief Counsel; forwarded to the Assistant Director of Administration; through the SAIC, LRC; and include the name(s) and title(s) of the traveler(s), organization(s) of the traveler(s), whether or not the traveler(s) is a contractor, date(s) of travel, purpose of travel, and type of travel and/or per diem required to include origin and destination of travel. All elements of the approval process should be accomplished prior to the onset of travel. **Note: The originating office is required to complete fields 1-3, and 5-7 on the SSF 4000; (field 4 "Authorized Rates" will be completed by the LRC). Additionally, a brief statement describing how the invitational travel will assist the Secret Service in its mission must be included in block 3, "Purpose of Travel".** The SSF 4000 authorization will then be sent to the Assistant Director of Administration for signature and final approval. Upon final approval, the LRC will assign an authorization number (this completed authorization will be attached to the SSF 3200 as mentioned later in this section).

Issuance of Advances to Invitational Travelers

Under special circumstances, the invitational traveler may require or request an advance of funds. The Chief, Financial Payments Branch, FMD must authorize and sign a SF 1038, Advance of Funds Application and Account form, prior to travel. Generally, an advance will only be authorized for 80% of the estimated travel expenses. The remaining amount owed to the invitational traveler will then be reimbursed via Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) upon receipt of an approved travel voucher.

Preparation/Submission of the Invitational Travel Voucher (SSF 3200)

Prior to traveling the invitational traveler should be informed that a travel voucher will be required to account for the advance that was issued and/or to initiate reimbursement for their travel related expenses. The sponsor should inform the invitational traveler that all lodging claims and all other expenditures of \$40.00 or more require a receipt. In addition the invitational traveler is required to complete a SF 3881, ACH Vendor/Miscellaneous Payment Enrollment form. The information on the SF 3881 allows the Secret Service to pay the invitational traveler by EFT. The Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, (Public Law 104-134) mandates the use of EFT for all payments made by federal agencies, with the exception of federal tax refunds.

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There may be instances in which an invitational traveler may not be able to receive an Automated Clearing House (ACH) payment, i.e., a foreign traveler. Such instances will be reviewed on a case by case basis.

The invitational traveler should be informed that failure to submit a travel voucher will result in an action to collect any advance that was issued to them. In cases in which a voucher is not submitted the sponsor will be contacted and requested to obtain a travel voucher or to initiate action to collect the advance.

Upon completion of the travel, the sponsor of the invitational travel must work with the invitational traveler to prepare a SSF 3200. Generally, the invitational traveler is not familiar with the Secret Service SSF 3200. If this is the case, then the sponsor will be expected to provide the necessary assistance to the invitational traveler so that the SSF 3200 will be properly prepared and submitted. If additional guidance is needed, then FMD should be contacted for assistance.

The SSF 3200 along with required receipts, a copy of the SSF 4000, and the SF 3881 must be submitted to the supervisor in the sponsoring office for review and approval. Upon approval the SSF 3200 with supporting documentation to include the SF 3881 must be submitted to the LRC. The LRC coordinates all Invitational Travel Requests and the submission of travel vouchers by invitational travelers. After ensuring the invitational travel was authorized and that the submitted documentation is proper, the LRC will forward the SSF 3200, along with the authorizing SSF 4000 and the SF 3881 to FMD for processing.

When processing the invitational traveler's voucher, FMD will first apply the voucher reimbursement against any outstanding advance. The balance owed to the invitational traveler will then be reimbursed to the invitational traveler via EFT. In instances when the submitted travel voucher does not clear the outstanding travel advance, the LRC will contact the sponsor to collect the outstanding advance account balance.

Unauthorized Invitational Travel

The authority for non-Secret Service employees to travel must be approved via a SSF 4000 prior to the commencement of travel. Any invitational travel that has not been approved through the completion of a SSF 4000 is considered an unauthorized obligation and must be ratified. The request for ratification should be submitted via memorandum to the Assistant Director of Administration through the appropriate Assistant Director. The items to be addressed are:

1. All relevant documents and facts relating to why the travel occurred without proper authorization;
2. A statement indicating what corrective action has been taken to preclude a recurrence;
3. A statement that unauthorized personnel will refrain from making any representations or commitments to any vendor;
4. A certification that only the Government and no other individual benefited from the unauthorized obligation;
5. A justification for the ratification in lieu of a settlement between the invitational traveler and the individual making the unauthorized obligation;
6. The name of the specific individual who made the unauthorized obligation and whether the individual is a repeat offender; and
7. The original documents such as a hotel bill or an airline ticket and a statement that the goods or services were received.

Upon ratification by the Assistant Director of Administration, the LRC will assign an authorization number.

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Reimbursable Invitational Travel

Foreign Nationals, on behalf of the Secret Service, are invited to travel and participate in investigative training seminars. Prior to these participants traveling, a reimbursable agreement must be prepared stating the terms and conditions, and signed by the Assistant Director of Investigations or their designee and the Assistant Director of Administration. The appropriate approving officials, from the requesting agency, must also sign this reimbursable agreement. Note: All traveling participants must be vetted (i.e., free from any criminal activity).

See "All Other Invitational Travel Authorization," in this section, for information regarding the SSF 4000.

Billing Reimbursable Invitational Travel

Upon notification from the program office/manager, the Accounting Branch, FMD, will bill the requesting agency based on the terms and conditions included in the reimbursable agreement.

Travel of USSS Employees by Invitation of Other Federal Agencies

On occasion, a Secret Service employee is invited to travel on behalf of another agency in order to provide a specific service (i.e., expert witness, expert in various fields, participate in an investigation, conduct or participate in training). The Secret Service's participation in this type of travel can be on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis to the agency.

Non-Reimbursable

Prior to travel, the employee must obtain the following:

- a copy of the authorizing memorandum from their SAIC/RAIC; and
- a copy of the form requesting travel provided by the requesting agency.

Copies of the memorandum and travel request should be submitted with the employee's travel voucher.

Reimbursable

Prior to travel, the employee needs to obtain a memorandum from the agency requesting the travel.

The memorandum should state that the traveler will be reimbursed for their services and give the approximate dates of travel.

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To ensure proper reimbursement, the employee will follow one of the following procedures:

1. Submit a travel voucher directly to the requesting agency for processing. Reimbursement will be made by the requesting agency directly to the employee for travel expenses. If this procedure is used, a Secret Service travel voucher should **not** be submitted to the Employee Travel Claims Section (ETCS), Financial Payments Branch, FMD, for processing; or
2. Submit a SSF 3200 to the Accounting Branch, FMD, with the proper attachments (receipts: hotel, food, cab, etc.) for processing. The Accounting Branch will make a photocopy of the travel voucher and the attachments and give the original to the ETCS, FMD. ETCS will use this travel voucher to reimburse the employee. The following attachments should also be sent to the Accounting Branch, FMD:
 - a copy of the form(s) provided by the other agency requesting the services and providing for reimbursement;
 - a copy of the authorizing memorandum from the SAIC/RAIC.

The Accounting Branch, FMD, will then use their copy of the travel voucher and the attachments to apply for reimbursement from the other agency. Both sections receiving a copy of the voucher ensures that the employee and the Secret Service will be reimbursed.

Recurring Reimbursement

If the Secret Service's participation is recurring or for an extended time period, a reimbursable agreement should be prepared. For information regarding reimbursable agreements (i.e., the Secret Service is being reimbursed), contact the Accounting Branch, FMD at 202-406-5130. The reimbursable agreement authorization must be prepared prior to travel.

Upon completion of travel, the employee will submit a travel voucher with the proper attachments to the Accounting Branch, FMD. The Accounting Branch will make a copy in order to apply for reimbursement from the requesting agency. The original voucher will be given to the ETCS for processing.

Travel Acceptance Authority

Through the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Congress has authorized all agencies to accept reimbursements from non-Federal sources in connection with their employees' official travel to meetings and similar functions.

The GSA has subsequently issued regulations (FTR: 41 CFR 304) which implement this authority and will be used to interpret or resolve any questions. Under this authority, the Secret Service may, under certain circumstances, accept travel reimbursements offered by non-Federal sources if the travel involves attendance at meetings or such similar events as conferences, seminars, speaking engagements, and training courses. It does not apply to gifts of travel for events required to carry out the Secret Service's statutory and regulatory functions, such as investigations, audits, inspections, site visits, and protective activities. Both cash and in kind gifts (e.g., transportation, lodging, per diem, etc.) may be accepted under this authority. Payment in kind is defined as goods or services provided in lieu of funds paid to an agency by check or similar instrument for travel, subsistence, and related expenses. An employee may not solicit payment from a non-Federal source; however, after receipt of an invitation from a non-Federal source to attend a meeting or similar function, the employee may inform the non-Federal source of this authority.

The act also provides authority for the U. S. Secret Service to accept payments in connection with the attendance of an accompanying spouse in certain circumstances.

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Conditions for Acceptance of Payments for Employee Travel

As the approving official, the originating office's Assistant Director or Chief Counsel, or appropriately, the Deputy Director or Director, will make a determination on whether to approve acceptance of such payment based on the following criteria documented in Part A of the SSF 3358, Acceptance of Payment from a non-Federal Source for Employee/Accompanying Spouse Travel:

1. **Payment must be for attendance at a meeting or similar function.** Meeting or similar function is defined as a conference, seminar, speaking engagement, training course, or similar event that takes place away from the employee's official duty station. While the definition of meeting or similar function does encompass a "training course," it excludes promotional vendor training or other meetings held for the primary purpose of marketing the non-Federal source's product.
2. **Payment must be for travel related to an employee's official duties under an official travel authorization.** The approving official must determine that the travel relates to an employee's official duties. Both the nature of the meeting or similar function and the official duties of the employee must be examined.
3. **Payment must be from a non-Federal source that is not disqualified on conflict of interest grounds.** The approving official must determine that the payment is from a non-Federal source that is not disqualified on conflict of interest grounds. A non-Federal source can be any person or entity other than the Federal government. The definition includes any individual, private or commercial entity, nonprofit organization or association, and extends to any state, local or foreign government. Normally, it is expected that the non-Federal sponsor of the meeting or similar function will be the source of the payments, or at least a non-Federal source with an interest in the subject matter of the event. However, payments may be accepted from a non-Federal source that does not have an interest in the subject matter of the meeting or similar function as long as the payment is in kind and consists of the types of services the non-Federal source generally provides, e.g., air passenger transportation services provided by a commercial airline. Payments can be accepted from more than one non-Federal source in connection with a single event.

If the prospective non-Federal source of payments has interests that may be affected substantially by the performance or nonperformance of the employee's duties, it is a conflicting non-Federal source. In this case, the approving official must determine whether the agency's interest in the employee's attendance at or participation in the event outweighs concern that acceptance of the payment may, or may reasonably appear to, influence improperly the employee in the performance of their official duties.

Conditions for Acceptance of Payments for Accompanying Spouse

Payments for travel for an accompanying spouse may be accepted when it is determined that the spouse's presence at the meeting or similar event will support the Secret Service's mission or substantially assist the traveling employee in carrying out their duties through attendance at, or participation in, a meeting or similar function. **Such a determination will be made only on infrequent occasions when it can be convincingly demonstrated that the spouse's travel meets the regulatory criteria outlined below.** Acceptance of a payment in connection with an employee's attendance at an event is not a condition precedent to the acceptance of a payment in connection with the spouse's attendance.

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The approving official must make three advance determinations before a payment can be accepted for an accompanying spouse. These determinations must be documented in Part A under Spouse Travel on the SSF 3358, as follows:

1. The employee must be attending the same meeting or similar function in an official capacity.
2. The spouse's presence will support the mission of the Secret Service or substantially assist the employee in carrying out their duties through attendance at, or participation in, the meeting or similar function. This determination will be based on documentation, e.g., meeting or seminar pamphlets, or other documentation outlining the purpose of the event.
3. If the prospective non-Federal source is a conflicting source as to the employee, the act requires that the authorizing official determine that the Secret Service's interest in the accompanying spouse's attendance at, or participation in, the event outweighs concern that acceptance of the payment may, or may reasonably appear to, improperly influence the employee in the performance of their official duties.

Request for Approval of Payment Offer of Employee/Spouse Travel from a Non-Federal Source

Requests for approval of employee travel where a non-Federal source offers to reimburse the Secret Service will be initiated using SSF 3358, describing the following information:

1. amount and method of payment (cash or in kind);
2. name of the person or entity making the payment;
3. name of the employee and/or spouse, if applicable, who will travel;
4. nature of the meeting or similar function;
5. time and place of the travel; and
6. nature of the expenses.

The requesting supervisor should complete and sign Part A of the SSF 3358, and submit it 10 days prior to the beginning of the meeting or similar function to the originating office's Assistant Director or Chief Counsel, or appropriately, the Deputy Director or Director.

Advance Determination and Legal Review

The advance determination required of approving officials must include the findings that 1) the proposed travel is in the Secret Service's interest, and 2) any actual or apparent conflict is outweighed by such interest. **Where the approving official denies the request, the matter is conclusively settled.**

Where a source is found to be a conflicting non-Federal source, the approving official shall consider all relevant factors in determining whether to accept payment, including the importance of the travel for the Secret Service, the nature and sensitivity of any pending matter affecting the interests of the conflicting non-Federal source, the significance of the employee's role in any such matter, the purpose of the meeting or similar function, the identity of other expected participants, and the value and character of the travel benefits offered by the conflicting non-Federal source. This determination will be documented in Part B of the SSF 3358.

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When a determination has been made that payment may be accepted from the non-Federal source for employee and/or spouse travel, the SSF 3358 and any supporting documentation will be submitted to the Chief Counsel for legal review and concurrence. The Chief Counsel will mark **CONCUR** or **DO NOT CONCUR** in Part C of the SSF 3358. If the request is marked **CONCUR**, it will be forwarded to the Assistant Director of Administration for approval (Part D of the SSF 3358) and assignment of an official travel authorization number. If Chief Counsel does not concur, it will be returned to the approving official.

Official Travel Authorization

Upon receipt of the SSF 3358, the Assistant Director of Administration will sign it and forward it to FMD for assignment of an official travel authorization number. This number will be noted in Part D of the SSF 3358. FMD will retain a copy of the form and forward the original to the requesting official.

Method of Payment and Acceptance

Cash Payment

The Secret Service may accept payment for travel, subsistence and related expenses in the form of a check or similar instrument made payable to the U.S. Secret Service. If payment is authorized, the employee or spouse may receive the payment on the Secret Service's behalf, but must submit it as soon as practicable for credit to the Secret Service's appropriation. An employee or spouse **is not authorized** to receive cash, a check or a similar instrument **made payable to the traveler**.

Payment in Kind

The Secret Service may accept payment in kind. Payment in kind is defined as goods or services provided in lieu of funds paid to an agency by check or similar instrument for travel, subsistence, and related expenses. As a practical matter, payments in kind must be received on behalf of the Secret Service by the employee or spouse, e.g., the traveler receives the dinner or seat on the plane.

Expenses Authorized to be Accepted by the USSS

The Secret Service may accept the types of expenses that are payable under the FTR. Payments accepted under this authority are not always subject to the maximum rates otherwise prescribed in the FTR. For example, the Secret Service could accept a check from a non-Federal source that covers the cost of a hotel room, even though that cost exceeds the lodgings portion of the applicable lodgings plus per diem rate. The only limitation with respect to our ability to accept payments in excess of applicable maximum rates is that the accommodation or benefit must be comparable in value to that offered to, or purchased by, other similarly situated individuals attending the meeting or similar function.

Manual : Administrative
RO : FMD

Section : FMD-08(02)
Date : 01/18/2008

Conference or training fees which cannot be paid under the applicable FTR and which are provided in kind and made available to all attendees incident to and for use at the meeting or similar function may be accepted by the Secret Service. Non-reimbursable benefits other than conference or training fees must be provided by the sponsor of the event, be provided in kind, and be incident to or for use at the event in order to qualify for acceptance by the Secret Service.

Questions regarding the FTR should be directed to the ETCS, Financial Payments Branch, FMD.

Reimbursement to Employee or Spouse

Each employee or spouse on whose behalf a payment has been accepted under this authority must file a SSF 3200, noting the official travel authorization number and date assigned by FMD in block 4 in place of the CTA number. Each employee or spouse will be reimbursed for expenditures in accordance with the FTR or similar provisions of the Foreign Affairs Manual and the Joint Federal Travel Regulations.

For purposes of filing a travel claim, payments in kind for otherwise reimbursable expenses (such as transportation or lodging) are treated as if furnished by the Government. Payments in kind are goods or services provided in lieu of funds paid to an agency by check or similar instrument for travel, subsistence and related expenses. The ETCS, Financial Payments Branch, FMD, will make necessary adjustments to ensure that the employee or spouse is not reimbursed for benefits paid in kind.

The employee or spouse may be reimbursed for the full amount of their expenditure even if that amount exceeds applicable maximum rates when the Secret Service receives full payment from a non-Federal source for the expenditure.

In the event the non-Federal source submits a check for only a portion of a particular type of expense, the traveler will be reimbursed for that amount or the amount authorized under the applicable travel regulation, whichever is greater.

Reports to the Office of Government Ethics

The Ethics Reform Act requires that payments totaling more than \$250 for a particular event accepted under this authority be reported on a semiannual basis to the Office of Government Ethics. The Secret Service shall submit this report to the Department of Homeland Security, Departmental Offices, on May 1 for payments in the preceding period beginning on October 1 and ending on March 31, and on November 1 for payments in the preceding period beginning on April 1 and ending on September 30. Negative reports are required in writing.

This report shall specify the:

1. amount and method of payment;
2. name of the person or entity making the payment;
3. name of the employee (and spouse, if applicable) who has traveled;
4. nature of the meeting or similar function;
5. time and place of travel;
6. nature of the expenses; and
7. copies of all documentation containing the justifications.

The compilation of this report will be the responsibility of FMD. FMD will forward the report via the Assistant Director of Administration, to the Chief Counsel for review prior to submission.

Reimbursement of Expenses while on Official Government Business

Pertinent Sections from the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR)

§301-2.2 What travel expenses may my agency pay?

Your agency may pay only those expenses essential to the transaction of official business, which include:

- (a) Transportation expenses as provided in Part 301-10 of this chapter;
- (b) Per diem expenses as provided in Part 301-11 of this chapter;
- (c) Miscellaneous expenses as provided in Part 301-12 of this chapter; and
- (d) Travel expenses of an employee with special needs as provided in Part 301-13 of this chapter.

§301-2.3 What standard of care must I use in incurring travel expenses?

You must exercise the same care in incurring expenses that a prudent person would exercise if traveling on personal business.

§301-2.4 For what travel expenses am I responsible?

You are responsible for expenses over the reimbursement limits established in this chapter. Your agency will not pay for excess costs resulting from circuitous routes, delays, or luxury accommodations or services unnecessary or unjustified in the performance of official business.

§301-12.1 What miscellaneous expenses are reimbursable?

When the following items have been authorized or approved by your agency, they will be reimbursed as a miscellaneous expense. Taxes for reimbursable lodging are deemed approved when lodging is authorized. Examples of such expenses include, but are not limited to the following:

General expenses	Fees to obtain money	Special expenses of foreign travel
Baggage expenses as described in <u>§301-12.2</u>	Fees for travelers checks	Commissions on conversion of foreign currency
Services of guides, interpreters, drivers	Fees for money orders	Passport and/or visa fees, including fees for a physical examination if one is required to obtain a passport and/or visa and such examination could not be obtained at a Government facility.
Services of an attendant as described in <u>§301-13.3</u>	Fees for certified checks	Reimbursement for such fees may include travel and transportation costs to the passport/visa issuing office if located outside the local commuting area of the employee's official station and the traveler's presence at that office is mandatory.
Use of computers, printers, faxing machines, and scanners	Transaction fees for use of automated teller machines (ATMs)—Government contractor-issued charge card	Costs of photographs for passports and visas
Services of typists, data processors, or stenographers		Foreign country exit fees
Storage of property used on official business		Costs of birth, health, and identity certificates
Hire of conference center room or hotel room for official business		Charges for inoculations that cannot be obtained through a Federal dispensary
Official telephone calls/service (see note). Faxes, telegrams, cablegrams, or radiograms		
Lodging taxes as prescribed in <u>§301-11.27</u>		
Laundry, cleaning and pressing of clothing expenses as prescribed in <u>§301-11.31</u>		
Energy surcharge and lodging resort fee(s) (when such fee(s) is/are not optional)		

Note to §301-12.1: You should use Government provided services for all official communications. When they are not available, commercial services may be used. Reimbursement may be authorized or approved by your agency.

§301-52.8 May my agency disallow payment of a claimed item?

Yes, if you do not:

- (a) Provide proper itemization of an expense;
- (b) Provide receipt or other documentation required to support your claim; and
- (c) Claim an expense which is not authorized.

§301-52.9 What will my agency do when it disallows an expense?

Your agency will disallow your claim for that expense, issue you a notice of disallowance, and pay your claim for those items which are not disallowed.

§301-70.1 How must we administer the authorization and payment of travel expenses?

When administering the authorization and payment of travel expenses, you—

- (a) Must limit the authorization and payment of travel expenses to travel that is necessary to accomplish your mission in the most economical and effective manner, under rules stated throughout this chapter;
- (b) Should give consideration to budget constraints, adherence to travel policies, and reasonableness of expenses;
- (c) Should always consider alternatives, including teleconferencing, prior to authorizing travel; and
- (d) Must require employees to use the ETS to process travel authorizations and claims for travel expenses once you migrate to the ETS, but no later than September 30, 2006, unless an exception has been granted under §§301-73.102 or 301-73.104 of this chapter.

Subpart D—Policies and Procedures Relating to Miscellaneous Expenses**§301-70.300 How should we administer the authorization and payment of miscellaneous expenses?**

You should limit payment of miscellaneous expenses to only those expenses that are necessary and in the interest of the Government.

§301-70.301 What governing policies must we establish for payment of miscellaneous expenses?

You must establish policies and procedures governing:

- (a) Who will determine when excess baggage is necessary for official travel;
- (b) When you will pay for communications services, including whether you will pay for a telephone call to the employee's home or place where the employee's dependent children are;
- (c) Who will determine if other miscellaneous expenses are appropriate for reimbursement in connection with official travel.

§301-71.205 Under what circumstances may we disallow a claim for an expense?

If the employee:

- (a) Does not properly itemize his/her expenses;
- (b) Does not provide required receipts or other documentation to support the claim; or
- (c) Claims an expense which is not authorized.

§301-71.206 What must we do if we disallow a travel claim?

You must:

- (a) Pay the employee the amount of the travel claim which is not in dispute;
- (b) Notify the employee that the claim was disallowed with a detailed explanation of why; and
- (c) Tell the employee how to appeal the disallowance if he/she desires an appeal, and your process and schedule for deciding the appeal.

From: DIR
To: USA
Cc: DIR
Subject: 200.070 Prevention of Discrimination and Harassment within the Secret Service
Date: Tuesday, May 29, 2012 5:38:02 PM

//Routine//

From: Headquarters (Director) File: 200.070

To: All Employees

Subj: Prevention of Discrimination and Harassment within the Secret Service

This is to reaffirm the Secret Service's commitment to providing equal employment opportunity and a work environment free from all forms of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation for engaging in protected activity. This assurance extends to all employees, applicants for employment and person dealing with the Secret Service on official business, regardless of their race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, genetic information, sexual orientation and parental status. Sexual Harassment is a form of sex discrimination and is prohibited.

Discrimination and harassment is always damaging to an organization. The Secret Service endorses a zero tolerance policy toward discrimination, harassment and retaliation. The Secret Service is dedicated to ensuring the fulfillment of this policy in all aspects of employment. Every employee in the Secret Service is responsible for ensuring that the workplace is free of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, and is expected to avoid any behavior or conduct that could reasonably be interpreted as such.

Harassment based upon a person's protected status is a form of discrimination and is also unlawful. While it is not possible to list all circumstances that may be prohibited discrimination or harassment, some examples of conduct that may violate the Secret Service Non-Discrimination and Harassment Policy include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Inappropriate or derogatory comments, slurs, jokes, remarks, rumors, or epithets;
- Displaying objects, cartoons, pictures or posters of a derogatory or discriminatory nature;
- Differential treatment that is based on the individual's membership in one of the protected classes described above;
- Implementation of employment selection procedures, (i.e. hiring, merit promotions, work assignments, disciplinary/adverse actions, etc) and/or personnel processes based on prohibited discrimination;
- Electronically writing, transmitting, or forwarding material of a discriminatory and/or offensive nature; and
- Engaging in reprisals or threats against anyone who opposes discriminatory, harassing or offensive behavior.

Managers and supervisors at all levels must be vigilant in ensuring that this policy is enforced. As employees of the Secret Service, it is imperative that all employees understand the importance of enforcing this policy.

In this commitment, we must continue to build on the professionalism that has become a trademark within the Secret Service as we carry out our dual mission of protection and investigations.

Therefore, I am asking every employee to join me in committing to ensuring a work environment free from all forms of discrimination. We must take it upon ourselves to report concerns and maintain a professional work environment that reflects our organization's high caliber. On those occasions when there is a question of discrimination or harassment, we must actively support the enforcement of violations of the non-discrimination policy. In doing so, each of us demonstrates not only a basic respect for fellow employees, but also a commitment to the success of the Secret Service.

If you have any questions regarding the non-discrimination policy, please refer to the Human Resources and Training Manual sections HRT-04 (01) and HRT-04 (06) or contact the Office of Equal Opportunity, at 202-406-5540, via TTY at 202-406-9805 or via email at equal.opportunity@ussc.dhs.gov. The agency's confidential Harassment Hotline number in Washington, DC is 202-406-9800 and outside of the Washington, DC area is 1-800-420-5558.

Headquarters (Director) Sullivan

Question#:	2
Topic:	ethical
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: Quite often, knowing what is ethical just takes common sense, but training can help heighten awareness of ethical conduct and of obligations to report wrongdoing. You referred to annual ethics training in your testimony. What training do Secret Service employees receive on ethics and standards of conduct, including standards of conduct related to maintaining a security clearance?

Response: Below you will find information on the relevant training courses and programs: Ethics and standards of conduct are covered to varying degrees in all of the below mentioned training courses.

- New Employee Orientation Program
- Special Agent Recruit Training Course
- Uniformed Division Officer Recruit Training Course
- Seminar for First Line Supervisors
- Emerging Leaders Seminar
- Seminar for Mid-level managers
- Emerging Executives Seminar
- Ethics in Law Enforcement
- Elicitation Briefing

Additionally, the below courses are traditionally conducted twice a year by Office of Personnel Management contracted instructors.

- Seminar for Mid-Level Managers
- Emerging Executives Seminar
- Antietam Leadership Experience
- Strategic Thinking/Gettysburg Staff Ride

The below online training course offered via the Learning Management System (LMS) was initiated in June 2012:

- Making Decisions Ethically

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COURSES:

New Employee Orientation Program

This program is designed to prepare new Secret Service employees, within their first six months of employment, to understand the organization and their role within the organization. Topics covered will help them to understand organizational processes and procedures. Presenters in the course cover standards of conduct, travel vouchers, drug deterrence, Operational Security, Ombudsman and Diversity Management, Equal Employment Opportunity rules and regulations and Government and Public Affairs representatives.

Special Agent Recruit Training Course

Having completed basic criminal investigator training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), this course provides agency specific training in the areas of physical protection and criminal investigation. Additionally, this course contains advanced firearms, control tactics and physical fitness training.

Uniformed Division Officer Recruit Training Course

Having completed basic police training program at the FLETC, this course provides agency specific training in physical protection and patrol procedures. The recruits receive advanced training in firearms, control tactics and physical fitness training.

Seminar for First-Line Supervisors

First-line supervisors are tasked with overseeing the day-to-day operations of their departments, offices, or branches. Participants for this course may include GS-9 through GS-14 in a variety of series and Uniformed Division Sergeants. In the special agent series (GS-1811), this is currently restricted to GS-14.

The overall seminar goal is to prepare new supervisors making the transition into a leadership role with the essential skills to develop the competencies essential to this position.

The Seminar for First-Line Supervisor course is a mandatory training course, within the first eleven months of promotion. It is the responsibility of the applicable manager to ensure that all employees promoted to a first line supervisory position complete this

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training within the first eleven months of the employee's new assignment. Exceptions to this requirement will be made on a case-to-case basis by the applicable Assistant Director's Offices. When granting an exception, the official(s) should present clear and compelling evidence why the candidate should be exempt from training while still meeting the agency and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations and Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) accreditation requirements.

Emerging Leaders Seminar

This course is designed for individuals who perform various levels of supervisory functions in the workplace. Emerging leaders may be identified by their supervisors or may be self-identified as someone interested in being developed for a formal supervisory position.

Topics covered in this course include: communication, problem solving, teamwork, an introduction to leadership, and the individual's role as an emerging leader. The course introduces the challenges and rewards of formal supervisory leadership. By addressing the responsibilities, complexities, and resources available to supervisors; non-supervisory employees can better understand the commitment involved in choosing to be a supervisor. Their effectiveness depends on how well they understand how teams operate, the nature of conflict in organizations, how to solve problems in groups, how to influence and negotiate, and how to plan.

Participants are involved in class exercises, small-group activities, personal and group assessments, group presentations, and directed study to maximize their learning experience.

Either the Management and Executive Development Institute (MEDI) course: Emerging Leaders Seminar or On-Line Basics of Supervision is required for any GS-1811 to be promotion eligible to the GS-14 position or comparable series (First-Line Supervisor).

Seminar for Mid-Level Managers

Members of this group routinely supervise the work of other supervisors. They may have input on policy and decision-making efforts within the Secret Service, but their focus is primarily within their area of responsibility. Grade levels include GS-11 through GS-15 in a variety of series, and Uniformed Division Lieutenants and Captains. In the GS-1811 series, this is predominantly GS-15.

Mandatory training for this group includes the completion of the Seminar for Mid-Level Managers. The seminar goal is to provide managers with tools which enhance their

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capabilities as mid-level managers and to further develop the competencies commensurate with this position.

Emerging Executives Seminar

Emerging executives include, but are not limited to, those in the Senior Executive Service (SES) candidate development process and/or those in positions requiring their assistance in the development of policy, budget formulation, strategy, direction or significant change within the organization. This group may include GS-15 in any series to include GS-1811, Uniformed Division Inspectors and above. Select GS-14 and Uniformed Division Captains can also be included in this group.

The goal of the Emerging Executives Seminar course is to explore relevant and topical political, social, economic, and cultural issues affecting government decision makers today, particularly those decision makers in the Secret Service. These executives are expected to have developed all prior competencies and develop the competencies expected at this level.

Ethics in Law Enforcement

The Ethics in Law Enforcement course of instruction provides Secret Service employees with an introduction to professional ethics and methods for sustaining and assessing integrity within individuals, units, and the organization as a whole. At the end of this course, the participants will be able to: describe and apply the components of ethical decision making; define key elements of trustworthiness; identify positive and negative forces that influence individual and professional ethics; infuse ethical standards into personal and professional decision making processes; identify laws, activities, and people that influence the ethics and integrity within the Secret Service.

Elicitation Briefing

Elicitation briefings have been provided to the vast majority of Presidential Protective Division, Vice Presidential Protective Division, Uniformed Division, Liaison Division, and Secret Service Headquarters personnel.

It discusses processes of elicitation that are used by Foreign Intelligence and Security Services, terrorist, criminal entities, etc., to subtly extract information from their targets, and then countermeasures to defend from becoming a target.

Online Basics of Supervision

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This online course is designed for any individual who is considering moving into a leadership position and/or becoming a supervisor. Modules of this course include such topics as: leadership, communications, generational issues, and work/life balance with problem solving and teamwork embedded in the modules. The topics are combined to help the individual recognize the responsibilities, complexities, and issues facing a supervisor. Individuals can self-register for the course and complete it at any time.

Executive Development Program

The Executive Development Program (EDP) is a two-year course of study conducted at the James J. Rowley Training Center (RTC) for Washington, D.C. based personnel. The EDP focuses on developing and enhancing leadership skills that concentrate on relevant issues facing the agency, nation, and the world. Participants are selected by the Executive Review Board (ERB) in conjunction with an accredited university. At the conclusion of the program, participants may be eligible for a Master's Degree.

Applicants must continue in the Department of Homeland Security for two years subsequent to graduation, in accordance with Title 5, U.S.C. 410.508 (Agreement to Continue in Service). Violation of this agreement could result in reimbursement of tuition and fees by the participant.

General Employee Development Curriculum

Core competencies exist that are beneficial to every employee in an organization. These competencies include interpersonal skills, oral communication, integrity/honesty, written communication, continual learning, and public service motivation, and are addressed by general employee development courses. The Secret Service encourages its employees to take advantage of developmental training.

The following classes are offered as developmental courses. Course offerings include, but are not limited to:

- Antietam Leadership Experience
- New Employee Orientation Program
- Ethics in Law Enforcement
- Staff Ride

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United States Secret Service Course Offerings FY2012				
Course	Professional Responsibility Topic	Audience	Duration	Delivery Method
Ethics in Law Enforcement	Ethics, Morals, and Integrity	All Employees	16 hours	Instructor led classroom based Contractor – Johns Hopkins University
Emerging Leaders Seminar	Leadership values incorporated throughout course	All Employees	32 hours	Instructor led classroom based – Secret Service instructor
Online Basics of Supervision	Leadership values incorporated throughout course	All Employees	12 hours	Online
Seminar for First Line Supervisors	Leadership values incorporated throughout course	All First Line Supervisors	40 hours	Instructor led classroom based – Secret Service instructor
New Employee Orientation Program	Leadership values incorporated throughout course	All New Employees	Not Applicable Scheduled for August 14-16, 2012	Instructor led classroom based – Secret Service instructor
-Special Agent Recruit Training Course	Leadership values incorporated throughout course	Law Enforcement	1,200 hours	Instructor led classroom based – Secret Service instructor
-Uniformed Division Officer Recruit	Leadership values incorporated	Law Enforcement	1,040 hours	Instructor led classroom based – Secret

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Training Course	throughout course			Service instructor
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A Culture of Privacy Awareness

The success of our mission at DHS relies on the support and trust of the public. Since the nature of our mission requires the analysis of information, one essential part of establishing and maintaining public trust is the protection of the personal information we use within our daily duties. The Privacy Act governs how agencies (in the executive branch of federal government) gather, maintain, and disseminate personal information. Fair Information Practices (FIPs) have long governed the collection, use, and maintenance of personal information. The Privacy Act essentially implements these FIPs guidelines, but specifically applies to records kept about individual U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents in a system of records.

Counter Intelligence Awareness

The objective of this training is to define counter intelligence (CI), understand that you are a potential target, know the mission of CI as well as state your personal awareness, responsibilities, and your personal reporting requirements.

DHS No Fear Act

This training will familiarize the employee with the No Fear Act and how it relates to DHS employees. The training will provide an understanding of the basic provisions of the No Fear Act; define the Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower laws; and understand the rights and remedies.

SCI Refresher

The SCI Refresher Course provides policy and guidance on the handling and safeguarding of classified information.

Official Espionage References: Title 18-U.S. Code - Espionage & Foreign Relations

Report these incidences to SCD:

- Charged with or a party to any security violation;
- Engagement in outside activities which could cause conflict of interest;

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- Suspected attempt of a foreign intelligence activity to establish contact; and
- Attempts to obtain classified or sensitive information.

Foreign Intelligence Threat: Practice good judgment, discretion, and common sense.

Supervisory Drug-Free Workplace Training

Interpret the different components of the policy, implement the policy, and recognize workplace problems.

The Reason Why Diversity Matters

This course builds a foundation for collaboration and shared professional opportunities. It focuses on the importance of education on the population and their differences and the personal commitment to embrace diversity.

Ethical Decision Making

This course studies the intuitive understanding of right and wrong and the difficulty in explaining poor decision making. Further, this course provides the conceptual framework for discussing ethics and the tool kit required for making ethical decisions.

United States Secret Service FY2012 Required Online Training Courses		
Course Title	Audience	Requirement
A Culture of Privacy Awareness	All Employees	Annual
Basic Records Management	All Employees	Initial (Part of 4 year curricula)
Counter Intelligence Awareness	All Employees	Annual
DHS No Fear Act	All Employees	Biennial
Electronic Records Management	All Employees	Initial (Part of 4 year curricula)
IT Security Awareness	All Employees	Annual
SCI Refresher	SCI Clearance (Assigned)	Annual

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	by SCD)	
Supervisory Drug-Free Workplace Training	All Supervisors	Annual
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Line Officer Training Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement	Annual
The Reason Why Diversity Matters	All Supervisors	Biennial
Making Decisions Ethically	All Employees	Initial

SECRET SERVICE TRAINING/BRIEFINGS SECURITY CLEARANCE NEXUS

The Security Clearance Division (SCD) develops, coordinates, implements, and oversees security policies, programs, training, and standards to protect and safeguard U.S. Secret Service personnel, property, facilities, and information. As part of its mission, SCD coordinates, adjudicates, certifies, recertifies, suspends, and revokes Top Secret clearance and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access for agency employees.

Based on the reporting requirements included in Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4 published in July, 1998, SCD developed and implemented SCD-02(01), Special Security Clearances Requirements and Reporting. This manual section mandated employees to report to the Chief, SCD, in writing and when feasible, in advance of activities, conduct or employment that could conflict with their ability to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or counterintelligence threats. In addition, employees are requested to report this information to their supervisors and to report known information concerning other Secret Service employees. For a list of reportable areas, please refer to attached SCD-02(01).

In 2007, SCD and the Secret Service's Information Resource Management Division (IRMD) developed the Foreign Travel Database (FTD) to ensure SCD was aware of where and when Secret Service employees were traveling outside of the United States. In addition to using this information for accountability purposes, SCD used this information to ensure accurate employee reporting during the five-year periodic reinvestigation

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process. SCD-02(01) was then amended to include instructions on how to report foreign travel.

On August 15, 2008, in response to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Management Directive (MD) 11052, "Internal Security Program", dated October 12, 2004, the Secret Service's Counterintelligence Branch (CIB) was established. MD 11052 mandated DHS components to develop "defensive activities," in the form of CI efforts, to mitigate the operational activities of adversaries. Defensive activities, as defined by MD 11052 include: activities relating to personnel, physical, document, and communications security, such as training and awareness, foreign travel/contact, foreign visitor management, and other related activities.

CIB's mission is to conduct defensive activities to detect, deter, and prevent adversaries (foreign intelligence and security services (FISS), terrorists, and criminal enterprises) efforts to penetrate the Secret Service and to exploit sensitive information, operations, programs, personnel, and resources. In accordance with Intelligence Community (IC) and DHS MD's, and with SCD-02(01), CIB established three primary pillars of operation: **Foreign Travel, Foreign Contacts, and CI Training and Awareness.** These pillars are designed to broaden the awareness of employees, enabling them to recognize and report suspicious behaviors in regard to the adversarial exploitation of Secret Service sensitive information, operations, programs, personnel and resources.

Foreign Travel – Secret Service employees who possess Top Secret clearances, in addition to those who have been indoctrinated into SCI, must report to SCD in a timely manner/as soon as the facts or activities are known in regard to their official and unofficial foreign travel. This can be completed through the Secret Service's foreign travel database located on the Security Clearance Division's intranet page. Once received, the Security Clearance Division's Counterintelligence Branch (CIB) will review the entries and an e-mail will be sent to the employee advising of whether or not their foreign travel warrants a defensive counterintelligence (CI) briefing. If the travel does not warrant a defensive CI briefing, CIB will provide the employee an unclassified State Department crime and safety report on the respective country being visited. If, however, the travel does warrant a defensive CI briefing, CIB will provide a classified briefing to the employee. In most instances of professional foreign travel (protective details) where there is a CI threat, CIB personnel meet and brief employees at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. The briefings are held one hour prior to the car plane departure and are done either in a secured area of the passenger terminal or on the car plane itself. In any event, CIB recommends to all employees to use sound judgment when in a foreign country, and to report any suspicious incidents to CIB upon their return to the United States.

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Additionally, CIB, in coordination with the Secret Service's International Programs Division, provides Permanent Change of Station (PCS) briefings to support both the employee and their families prior to the relocation to foreign field offices, and for employees operating for extended periods of time overseas. Employees will receive a combination of classified and unclassified information in their briefings, whereas the spouse's briefings will consist of unclassified information on their country of travel, general CI awareness, and elicitation. These briefings are intended to help mitigate foreign intelligence collection by bringing awareness to employees regarding the CI threat. Proper reporting procedures and safe traveling trips are also included in this briefing.

Foreign Contacts – This pillar is made up of both Foreign Visitor and Foreign Relationship reporting requirements. DHS MD 11052 and SCD-02(01) both require Secret Service employees to report all foreign visitors to Secret Service facilities to CIB for vetting prior to entry. Relationships with foreign nationals must be reported to CIB when they are outside the scope of an employee's professional duties and of a personal association, characterized by ties of kinship, affection, or obligation. Once the contact's information is run through a variety of Intelligence Community databases to determine any terrorist, criminal, or intelligence affiliations, CIB informs the employee of any derogatory information developed, and provides any potential vulnerabilities associated with the relationship.

CI Training and Awareness – This pillar is made up of three levels of CI training which are available to all employees. Each successive level of training is geared toward meeting the needs of increased risk and vulnerabilities. Level training is the CI Awareness course available to all Secret Service employees via the on-line Learning Management System. This training consists of an overview of what CI is and provides information and awareness to enhance the knowledge of Secret Service employees regarding the threat that Foreign Intelligence and Security Services pose to Secret Service employees and their families. On September 30, 2009, the CI Awareness Training was made an annual requirement of all Secret Service employees.

Level 2 training is more in-depth and involves current and relevant information for employees who fall under the following conditions: employees with assignments in foreign offices, employees who have increased contact with foreign nationals due to the nature of their duties, and employees who have reported personal or official travel to a medium or high CI threat level country.

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Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Level 3 training is for employees who are determined to be “high risk” by definition of Intelligence Community Directive 704. A “high risk” may exist when an individual’s immediate family, cohabitants, or other persons to whom he/she is bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not U.S. citizens. These situations create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information and make employees vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a FISS, terrorist organization, or criminal entity. Custom tailored training is also available upon request.

The Secret Service Operations Security Program (OPSEC)

In 2009, the Secret Service OPSEC Program transferred from the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) to the newly created Counterintelligence Branch of Security Clearance Division. This move was beneficial because OPSEC and Counterintelligence share mutually supporting roles of increasing awareness to adversarial exploitation of Secret Service sensitive information, operations, programs, personnel and resources.

The mission of the OPSEC Program is to train and educate all Secret Service personnel on proper OPSEC procedures to prevent the inadvertent compromise of classified and/or unclassified, but sensitive information regarding Secret Service operations and personnel.

Secret Service Manual section OPSEC - 01 establishes the Operations Security Program, provides policy, assigns responsibilities, and implements National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 298. OPSEC applies to all organizational elements of the Secret Service.

The OPSEC Program provides a one hour block of instruction at RTC for all new Special Agent and new Uniform Division classes, Fourth Shift classes (PPD/VPD), and Special Officer classes. The OPSEC Program also provides briefings for new employees assigned to Secret Service Headquarters (New Employee Orientation), the Lead Advance Seminars for PPD, as well as for the Advance Seminars conducted by PID.

Each brief identifies adversaries motivated to obtain and exploit Secret Service information. The briefing advises employees of the constant threat to our information while conducting operations in foreign countries; and because of this concern all employees must adequately protect our sensitive information to deny adversaries what they need to exploit our operations and/or employees.

The Program routinely provides the Secret Service with official messages regarding relevant threats and makes recommendations to minimize or mitigate those threats to

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information compromise. Below are several OPSEC Alerts that have been provided with relevant excerpts from those messages:

Security Risks Associated with Social Networking Sites (3/25/2010)

Social networking websites are both an OPSEC and Counterintelligence (CI) concern because critical and/or personal information may inadvertently be disclosed on these sites. You must be careful regarding any information you provide about yourself, your organization, or your family.

Recommendations provided in this message include:

- Do not openly associate yourself with the Secret Service, and do not advertise weaknesses, vulnerabilities, or loopholes in Secret Service systems or capabilities.
- Do not promote your personal or professional importance in your profile(s) or posting.
- Do not provide details regarding your work associates/colleagues, official position, duties, or training.
- Only post information you are comfortable with anyone seeing, to include photos.
- Be aware of what privacy settings are available. Evaluate your own settings and consider customizing them to limit the people who are allowed to contact you on these sites.

Security risks associated with Social Networking Sites (Non-Fraternization) (3/5/2012)

Social networking websites are an OPSEC and Counterintelligence concern because of the amount of personal information made available to adversaries and because of the potential for employees to develop ill advised online relationships.

As users of social media, we are targets of hackers, criminals, predators, and others who want to use our information to harm us and our families. As U.S. Government employees, we are targets of online threats from the Intelligence and Security Services of foreign countries that not only want to exploit our personal data, but also attempt to develop relationships to expose what we know, who we know, and what we do.

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Employees should understand that establishing and continuing a sympathetic association with an individual whose interests may be contrary to the interests of the U.S. Government may ultimately call into question the employee's suitability to hold a security clearance.

With the Counterintelligence Branch, the OPSEC Program has produced a new OPSEC/CI Program Handbook (attached) which outlines both the OPSEC and Counterintelligence threat to employees. The handbook explains the history of OPSEC, why practicing OPSEC is important, and reminds all employees of their responsibilities to protect sensitive information as part of their standard security practices.

In addition, the following brochures have been created and made available to all employees: What OPSEC Means to You, Elicitation, Computer Security at Home, Identity Theft, and OPSEC for Employees and their Families.

OPSEC emphasizes that on or off duty, practice OPSEC to deny our adversaries the information they seek.

Other Training:

- Counterintelligence (CI) Awareness – Required annually by all employees (conducted via Secret Service on-line Learning Management System)

Overview of counterintelligence provides information and awareness regarding the threat Foreign Intelligence and Security Services pose to Secret Service employees and their families.

- Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Refresher Briefing – Required annually by all employees who have been indoctrinated into SCI (conducted via Secret Service on-line Learning Management System)

Overview of Executive Orders and other policies regarding classified information; rules and responsibilities of SCI holder and security awareness training

- Elicitation Briefing – Provided to the vast majority of Presidential Protective Division, Vice Presidential Protective Division, Uniformed Division, Liaison Division, and Secret Service Headquarters personnel.

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It discusses processes of elicitation that are used by Foreign Intelligence and Security Services, terrorist, criminal entities, etc., to subtly extract information from their targets, and then countermeasures to defend from becoming a target.

In addition, SCD has recently completed the development of the “Secret Service Annual Security Refresher Training” course. This course will be an annual, mandatory course for all Secret Service employees and will be available on-line in approximately July, 2012. The course is a 59-slide PowerPoint presentation designed to reinforce the information originally provided to all Secret Service employees when they initially received their Top Secret indoctrination. It provides a refresher on many topics that a clearance holder should be familiar with such as handling, safeguarding, reproducing, transmitting, and disposing of national security information (NSI). The course also covers classification authority, proper marking of classified material, **clearance holder reporting responsibilities**, and penalties for mishandling of NSI.

SCD also briefs new Secret Service employees on CI, OPSEC, and their reporting responsibilities, as outlined in SCD-02(01), Special Security Clearances Requirements and Reporting, during the New Employee Orientation Program for administrative, professional, and technical positions, and for Special Agent and Uniformed Division Officer positions, during their 17-week training. At the time of their periodic reinvestigation for recertification of a Top Secret security clearance, employees are provided a copy of SCD-02(01), Special Security Clearances Requirements and Reporting, and requested to review.

Question: Can you describe in greater detail the initial training requirements for Secret Service personnel, and what refresher training is required? What type of training do Secret Service personnel receive, how long is it, and how is it delivered?

Response: Each employee of the Secret Service is sworn-in under oath on their Entry on Duty (EOD) date. This includes a comprehensive one hour, face-to-face briefing at Secret Service Headquarters or Field Offices on 5 C.F.R. Part 2635– Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch and regulations promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301, Employee Rules of Conduct. The briefing is also provided during a new employee’s orientation and during the Special Agent Introductory Training Course (SAITC), the Uniformed Division Introductory Training Course (UDITC), as well as for ancillary personnel in the Mixed Basic Training Course (MBTC) and the New Employee Orientation Course. Employees are required to sign a code of conduct document which in turn is reviewed and signed each and every year thereafter by the employee and their immediate supervisor.

Question#:	2
Topic:	ethical
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

The Secret Service James J. Rowley Training Center (RTC) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides the Secret Service's ethics and code of conduct instruction. The Legal Ethics Lesson Plan and Minimum Standards of Conduct are taught in the SAITC, UDITC, as well as in the MBTC. The RTC issues additional standards to trainees, Standards of Performance and the Student Code of Conduct. Further, the RTC provides its instructors the Instructor Code of Conduct to include required dimensions of suitability and non-fraternization policy at the RTC. The standards and code of conduct are administered to instructors and students upon assignment to RTC. Each student and instructor confirms their understanding by signing and certifying they have read, understand, and accept its implications.

Additionally, an instructor is required to complete and pass the Essentials of instruction course, which includes an ethics lesson.

Question: Who performs or delivers this training, and how often? Is the work done by contractors?

Response: Initial and continued educational training is led by the certified instructors and professional development staff of the James J. Rowley Training Center to include: Academic Process Branch, Employee Development Section, Administrative Officers, Course Coordinators and supervisory level GS-14 and GS-15 personnel. In addition to the courses offered via a classroom setting, Secret Service employees are offered on-line training, including ethical and standards of conduct training, via the Learning Management System (LMS).

After initial orientation, ethics and standards of conduct specific training is taught via face-to-face instructor led and multiple online LMS courses. The instructor led Emerging Leaders Seminar (40 hours) and Seminar for First Line Supervisors (32 hours) courses are offered approximately four times a year. These two courses, consisting of 24 participants each, are taught by Secret Service Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) certified instructors.

The Ethics in Law Enforcement Course (16 hours) is instructor led face-to-face training taught by Johns Hopkins University contractors. It is traditionally offered twice a year. In FY2012, it was offered May 2-3, and will be conducted again June 26-27 and July 24-25. On-line LMS courses, many of which are DHS mandated, are offered throughout the year and consist of eleven (11) courses which are required for either annual or biennial successful completion.

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Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: What percentage of employees has completed such training? What percentage of supervisors?

Response: Thus far in FY 2012 all Secret Service employees have completed their initial orientation sessions. It is anticipated that 100% of new supervisors, those with less than 11 months supervisory experience, will have completed the required supervisory course Seminar for First Line Supervisors (40 hours) by August 2012. Additionally, as of April 2012, over 75% of all Secret Service employees have successfully completed their required on-line training courses via the LMS.

In addition to the above FY12 data, 100 supervisory personnel completed the Ethics in Law Enforcement Training Course (16 hours) initially conducted in May 2012 and taught by professional contractors from Johns Hopkins University. Additional Ethics in Law Enforcement Training Courses are being offered on June 26-27, 2012 and again on July 24-25, 2012. The June and July courses are scheduled to have 100 participants in each class. The total Secret Service personnel expected to complete the Ethics in Law Enforcement Course, by August 2012, will consist of approximately 200 supervisory personnel and 100 non-supervisory personnel.

Question: Does this training also cover any ethical obligations of Secret Service employees to come forward when they see wrongdoing?

Response: Yes. From the on-set in the Secret Service orientation course for new employees; or our basic training programs for our law enforcement personnel as well as our civilian staff, training incorporates classroom and on-line courses which are all encompassing and dedicated to maintaining the highest level of ethics and standards in the law enforcement arena.

Numerous required training courses are accomplished, while being provided in the classroom setting, which promote the high standards set by the Secret Service. These include the following Seminars: Emerging Leaders, First Line Supervisors, Mid-Level Managers, Emerging Leaders, Emerging Executives, and the Executive Development Program. Additionally, contracted courses by our OPM partners include the Antietam Leadership Experience and the Strategic Thinking/Gettysburg Staff Ride. All of the above have proven to educate our personnel and enrich their overall understanding of the standards set for Secret Service personnel relating to ethical conduct and professional responsibilities.

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Topic:	ethical
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

The Office of Human Resources and Training (HRT), in May 2012, conducted a course specifically dedicated to ethics in law enforcement. The Ethics in Law Enforcement Course covers individual ethical and moral responsibilities as well as employee personal and professional conduct. It includes an introduction to professional ethics and methods for sustaining and assessing integrity within individuals, units, and the organization as a whole. Upon conclusion, employees can describe and apply components of ethical decision making, define key elements of trustworthiness, identify positive and negative forces that influence individual and professional ethics, infuse ethical standards into personal and professional decision making processes; identify laws, activities and people that influence the ethics and integrity within the Secret Service.

Through the Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) and the Office of Government and Public Affairs (GPA), the Secret Service further encourages and reinforces the highest ethical standards required by personnel of the Secret Service, through specific briefings, notifications, and continual education.

As part of the Director's initiative, several important protective related travel requirements have recently been introduced specific to ethics and standards of conduct. Specifically, all Secret Service personnel travelling overseas must complete the Making Decisions Ethically Course (2.5) via LMS on-line training prior to protective travel. Also, a GS-15 Supervisor from the RES will be responsible for briefing the standards of conduct expectations prior to departure to a foreign country, as well as for enforcing these standards while in the foreign country. Further, the Security Clearance Division (SCD) will intensify country-specific briefings covering all pertinent topics prior to departure for the destination country.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Mark J. Sullivan
From Senator Thomas R. Carper**

**“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
May 23, 2012**

Question#:	3
Topic:	incident
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: The incident in Cartagena, Colombia raises many questions about the culture of the Secret Service, other possible instances of misconduct, and the policies governing the actions of agents on overseas travel. Please describe the agency’s policies and procedures on the use of government per diem when agents are on foreign travel? Are there any restrictions on items that can be purchased through the use of government per diem and what kinds of expense records are required to be reported by agents on foreign travel? What changes, if any, have you implemented since the incident in Columbia with respect to use of government per diem?

Response: Secret Service policies and procedures on the use of per diem are governed by the Federal travel regulations contained in 41 D.F.R. Parts 300-304 and specifically temporary duty travel rules address in Part 301.

The Administrator of General Services promulgates the FTR to: (a) interpret statutory and other policy requirements in a manner that balances the need to ensure that official travel is conducted in a responsible manner with the need to minimize administrative costs, and (b) communicate the resulting policies in a clear manner to federal agencies and employees.

Below are the applicable sections from the FTR that address reimbursement of expenses in connection with official travel. Specifically sections 301-2.3 and 301-2.4 address the standard of care expected of an employee and the expenses that the agency will not pay.

The Secret Service Administrative Manual sections FMD-08, FMD-09, FMD-11, and FMD-13, address reimbursement of expenses while on a travel assignment and the use of government funds. These policies mirror the FTR which enumerates the travel and relocation policy for all Title 5 Executive Agency employees.

Question#:	3
Topic:	incident
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Section FMD-08(02) addresses the employee's obligation when travelling on official business. It states:

"Excess costs, circuitous routes, delays, luxury accommodations, and services unnecessary or unjustified in the performance of official business are not acceptable. Employees will be responsible for excess costs and any additional expenses incurred for personal preference or convenience. Reimbursable travel expenses are confined to those expenses essential to the transaction of official business."

Also, please see the following attachments for further information: Secret Service Administrative Manual, section FMD-08(02) Reimbursement of Expenses while on Official Government Business: Pertinent Sections from the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR).

Question#:	4
Topic:	Columbia
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: The Secret Service's immediate response to the incident in Columbia, which included bringing the agents home immediately, interviewing them, and suspending their security clearances, was a critical step in minimizing any potential threats to national security. But now, we must look forward and ensure that there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent this type of activity from ever happening again. I understand you have already implemented a number of policy changes with respect to contact with foreign nationals, alcohol consumption, and other activities dealing with travel, but what type of oversight will the Secret Service perform to ensure its agents are following the new rules?

Response: Most recently, the Secret Service updated the Human Resources Training Manual, section PER-05(05) on April 27, 2012, and will continue to examine existing policies for possible further enhancements.

Specifically, the Secret Service implemented the following enhancements:

- Standards of conduct briefings will be conducted for all protective visits, events and NSSEs, as well as prior to foreign car plane departures.
- The U.S. Department of State Regional Security Officer will work with the Secret Service advance team to provide intensified country-specific briefings upon arrival in a foreign country.
- The briefings will update personnel on safety issues, off-limit zones and off-limit establishments for Secret Service personnel, and any country-specific rules imposed by the Ambassador.
- Foreign nationals, excluding hotel staff and official law enforcement counterparts, are prohibited in hotel rooms.
- Patronization of non-reputable establishments is prohibited.
- Alcohol may only be consumed in moderate amounts while off-duty on a TDY assignment and alcohol use is prohibited within 10 hours of reporting for duty.
- Alcohol may not be consumed at the protectee hotel once the protective visit has begun.
- Car planes will be staffed with two GS-15 supervisors - one from the Office of Professional Responsibility and one from the field, who will be responsible for briefing the standards of conduct expectations prior to departure to the destination country, as well as for enforcing these standards while in the foreign country.
- All personnel traveling will have to have completed relevant on-line ethics training in order to be eligible for protective travel.

Question#:	4
Topic:	Columbia
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

- The Security Clearance Division will intensify country-specific briefings covering all pertinent topics prior to departure for the destination country.
- Laws of the United States shall apply to Secret Service personnel while abroad.

The two GS-15 supervisors that will be assigned to foreign Presidential and Vice-Presidential trips will provide an ethics briefing to all Secret Service personnel prior to departure for the trip. In addition to their specific assignments during the trips, these two individuals will also be there to monitor and ensure that all Secret Service employees are adhering to all Secret Service policies.

Additionally, the Secret Service Chief Counsel is conferring with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Personnel Management to research the implementation of random national security polygraphs. If it is determined that the Secret Service has the legal authority to issue random national security polygraphs, this new policy will be implemented as another tool to ensure that employees are adhering to all policies.

Furthermore, the Secret Service regularly provides ethics and standards of conduct training to its employees throughout their careers. This training is reinforced yearly with each Secret Service employee certifying on a Secret Service form (SSF) 3218 ("Annual Employee Certification"), that they have read and reviewed agency policies, to include the Secret Service's "Standards of Conduct."

Additionally, a course entitled "Ethics in Law Enforcement" was held on May 2-3, 2012, for one hundred senior level managers. Two additional "Ethics in Law Enforcement" courses are scheduled for June 26-27, 2012 and July 23-24, 2012. The participants for the June course will consist of mid-level managers (GS 14 special agents and Lieutenants from the Uniformed Division Officer ranks). The July course will consist of junior tenured agents and Officers (GS 7-13 and Sergeants from the Uniformed Division Officer ranks). The Secret Service is considering hosting another ethics course in August of 2012 for an additional 100 employees, but due to the staffing demands of the RNC and DNC this may be not logistically possible.

At the end of April 2012, Director Sullivan established the Professional Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG) to examine the Secret Service's hiring, training, policies and procedures and to review how it incorporates its professional standards of conduct into each of those areas. The purpose of this group is to identify best practices in each area from other federal law enforcement agencies, other federal agencies, and the Department of Defense to make recommendations as to how the Secret Service can ensure that its standards of excellence are upheld by every employee. The members of the PRWG include Senior Executive Service employees from several federal law enforcement agencies, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Office of Personnel Management and the U.S. Department of Defense. Specifically, the Committee is co-chaired by Director John Berry, from the Office of Personnel Management, and Director Connie Patrick, from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Question#:	5
Topic:	polygraphs
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: What is the current Secret Service policy and practice for polygraphs for agents and employees of the Secret Service? Are there “specific-incident” or random polygraph examination practices or policies? Does the Secret Service have any plans to change the existing agent polygraph or suitability policies and practices? Please provide a detailed break out of the costs associated with polygraphs as they are currently used at the Secret Service?

Response: Special Agent and Uniformed Division positions, among other positions at the United States Secret Service (Secret Service), require a polygraph examination in the course of the initial background and hiring process. While these examinations are considered voluntary, an applicant’s refusal to submit to the examination will render the applicant ineligible for employment for failing to meet the employment requirements.

Additionally, the Secret Service Chief Counsel is conferring with the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Personnel Management to research the implementation of random national security polygraphs. If it is determined that the Secret Service has the legal authority to issue random national security polygraphs, this new policy will be implemented as another tool to ensure that employees are adhering to all policies.

The Secret Service Inspection Division’s internal operating procedures provide that polygraph examinations may be used in administrative investigations. However, such examinations are voluntary, as there is no mechanism for enforcing or taking action against an employee in the face of a refusal to take the examination. Relevant caselaw suggests that no adverse inference can be drawn from a refusal to undergo a polygraph examination. See Dr. Gary Reynolds v. Dept. of Justice, 2009 MSPB LEXIS 5949 (September 11, 2009) (citing Meir v. Dept. of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247 (1980); Debra L. Rethaber v. Depart. of Veterans Affairs, 2006 MSPB LEXIS 2750 (June 7, 2006); and Roberto M. Uscanga v. Dept. of Homeland Security, 2005 MSPB LEXIS 449 (January 3, 2005).

During the course of an administrative inquiry that relates to a potential security clearance violation, an employee may be requested to submit to a polygraph examination in order to assist in making a determination regarding the employee’s continued eligibility for a Top Secret security clearance. In such situations, an employee’s refusal to submit to the polygraph examination may be considered when assessing the “whole person” and in adjudicating whether an individual meets the standards for access to

Question#:	5
Topic:	polygraphs
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

classified information under Executive Orders 10450 and 12968 and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information. In such situations, an employee's refusal to submit to a polygraph examination is not the sole basis for an adverse security clearance determination or adverse action stemming there from.

The Secret Service Office of Chief Counsel is conferring with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of General Counsel and the Office of Personnel Management to research the implementation of random national security polygraphs. If it is determined that the Secret Service has the legal authority to issue random national security polygraphs, this new policy will be implemented as another tool to ensure that employees are adhering to all policies.

Personnel Costs for Polygraphs:

In 2011 (Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 31, 2011), the Secret Service Polygraph Program conducted approximately 2,109 (1,674 applicant exams; 435 criminal exams). Due of the nature of the polygraph, examiners cannot control the length of an examination. However, an examination generally takes between 4 – 6 hours to complete.

Given an average of 5 hours per exam with an hourly pay rate of \$45.51 (1811 GS-13, step 3) the approximate man hour/salary cost per exam would be 5 man hours x \$45.51 = \$227.55.

For 2011, the costs associated with polygraphs, is approximately \$480,000.00

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Mark J. Sullivan
From Senator Thomas R. Carper**

**“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
May 23, 2012**

Question#:	6
Topic:	human trafficking
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Scott P. Brown
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: I have been a strong advocate in combating human trafficking, particularly through my support of the Reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. How can we guarantee that our own U.S. government personnel uphold the highest standards of conduct to ensure that our government is not contributing to the demand for commercial sex that provides fertile ground for sex trafficking around the world?

Response: In order to ensure that what occurred in Colombia is not repeated, the Secret Service put into place a number of enhancements to existing codes of conduct. On April 27, 2012, the Secret Service implemented the following enhancements:

- Standards of conduct briefings will be conducted for all protective visits, events and NSSEs, as well as prior to foreign car plane departures.
- The U.S. Department of State Regional Security Officer will work with the Secret Service advance team to provide intensified country-specific briefings upon arrival in a foreign country.
- The briefings will update personnel on safety issues, off-limit zones and off-limit establishments for Secret Service personnel, and any country-specific rules imposed by the Ambassador.
- Foreign nationals, excluding hotel staff and official law enforcement counterparts, are prohibited in hotel rooms.
- Patronization of non-reputable establishments is prohibited.
- Alcohol may only be consumed in moderate amounts while off-duty on a TDY assignment and alcohol use is prohibited within 10 hours of reporting for duty.
- Alcohol may not be consumed at the protectee hotel once the protective visit has begun.
- Car planes will be staffed with two GS-15 supervisors - one from the Office of Professional Responsibility and one from the field, who will be responsible for briefing the standards of conduct expectations prior to departure to the destination country, as well as for enforcing these standards while in the foreign country.

Question#:	6
Topic:	human trafficking
Hearing:	Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence
Primary:	The Honorable Scott P. Brown
Committee:	HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

- All personnel traveling will have to have completed relevant on-line ethics training in order to be eligible for protective travel.
- The Security Clearance Division will intensify country-specific briefings covering all pertinent topics prior to departure for the destination country.
- Laws of the United States shall apply to Secret Service personnel while abroad.

The Secret Service also regularly provides ethics and standards of conduct training to its employees throughout their careers.

This training is reinforced yearly with each Secret Service employee certifying on a Secret Service form (SSF) 3218 ("Annual Employee Certification"), that they have read and reviewed agency policies, to include the Secret Service's "Standards of Conduct."

Additionally, to reinforce strong ethical standards a course entitled "Ethics in Law Enforcement" was held on May 2-3, 2012, for one hundred senior level managers. Two additional "Ethics in Law Enforcement" courses are scheduled for June 26-27, 2012 and July 23-24, 2012. The participants for the June course will consist of mid level managers (GS -14 special agents and Lieutenants from the Uniformed Division Officer ranks). The July course will consist of junior tenured agents and Officers (GS 7-13 and Sergeants from the Uniformed Division Officer ranks). The Secret Service is considering hosting another ethics course in August of 2012 for an additional 100 employees, but due to the staffing demands of the RNC and DNC this may be not logistically possible.

At the end of April 2012, the Secret Service established the Professional Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG) to examine the Secret Service's hiring, training, policies and procedures and to review how it incorporates its professional standards of conduct into each of those areas. The purpose of this group is to identify best practices in each area from other federal law enforcement agencies, other federal agencies, and the Department of Defense to make recommendations as to how the Secret Service can ensure that its standards of excellence are upheld by every employee. The members of the PRWG include Senior Executive Service employees from several federal law enforcement agencies, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Office of Personnel Management and the U.S. Department of Defense. Specifically, the Committee is co-chaired by Director John Berry, from the Office of Personnel Management, and Director Connie Patrick, from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Through the above mentioned Secret Service enhanced policies, ethics training courses and a thorough review of our current policies by the PRWG, a strong message is being sent to every Secret Service employee that will demand high ethical and moral standards. Collectively, these policies and training courses will deter Secret Service personnel from participating in any activity that supports human trafficking.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Charles K. Edwards
From Senator Thomas R. Carper**

**“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
May 23, 2012**

1. The Inspector General has a very important role to play in ensuring integrity and accountability at the Department of Homeland Security and all of its components. Can you discuss the Inspector General’s previous work on the Secret Service and whether any of the recommendations you have made in the past would have addressed some of the misconduct and mismanagement that occurred in Columbia? Has the Inspector General reported on, or are you currently aware of, any similar misconduct in other components of the Department of Homeland Security? If so, please describe each occurrence.

Since 2005, we have issued five reports that focused exclusively on Secret Services activities, programs, processes, or responsibilities. Below is a brief summary of those reports:

DHS/U.S. Secret Service FY 2009 Antideficiency Act Violation – OIG Report Number 11-94 – In FY 2009, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) obligated funds more than 10 percent in excess of available appropriations to cover a presidential candidate protection budget shortfall before submitting a reprogramming request to the Department for congressional approval. As you know, Component agencies are required to submit such requests to DHS before any reprogramming decisions are made, as DHS must notify Congress 15 days prior to their implementation. Because the request was not submitted before the funds were obligated, the funds USSS obligated to cover its presidential candidate protection costs were not legally available for this purpose, thereby violating the *Antideficiency Act* (ADA). We determined that USSS’ former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) was responsible for the ADA violation reported by the Government Accountability Office. However, we found no evidence that the former CFO acted with any knowledge or willful intent to violate the law.

U.S. Secret Service’s Information Modernization Effort – OIG Report Number-11-56 – The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) has made progress in implementing its modernization program, but faces challenges to reach its stated objectives. Although the Secret Service has an Information Technology Strategic Plan, they did not update the plan to guide its modernization program, address its system weaknesses, or integrate with DHS’ technology direction. The USSS also did not sufficiently report and track system weaknesses because of limited staff. With insufficient staff, the initial modernization program schedule was not realistic. The USSS is addressing these issues by obtaining additional staff and adjusting its program schedule.

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security – OIG Report Number -10-04 – Our review focused on two issues: (1) the adequacy of security at the events described in a January 30, 2009, *Washington Post* article and (2) how well the Secret Service managed its after-action review of the concerns cited in the article. The

article described ticket-sharing practices that the political hosts of inaugural events have discretion to allow, rather than deficiencies in physical screening measures that the Secret Service uses to provide security. The article also described other permitted activities, such as bringing a camera without live batteries through screening or posing for photographs near presidential vehicles. We evaluated the article's concerns that screened guests mingled with the public, but determined that Secret Service security measures were not readily identifiable to inaugural participants. We determined that the Secret Service after-action review was prompt and thorough, and designed to identify security planning and implementation weaknesses. We also concluded that the Secret Service risk assessments and security plans for the events described in the article were reasonable.

Improved Security Required For U. S. Secret Service Networks – OIG Report Number-05-38 – The Secret Service does not have a comprehensive security testing program to evaluate the effectiveness of controls implemented on its networks. Furthermore, the Secret Service has not developed policy and procedures that require security testing be performed periodically throughout its networks.

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical United States Secret Service Database – OIG Report Number-05-37 – Our objective was to determine whether the Secret Service had implemented adequate and effective controls over sensitive data contained in its Secret Service Web (SSWeb) system, which houses sensitive information concerning protective operations.

The recommendations that resulted from these reports did not foreshadow the misconduct in Colombia.

We have not reported on nor are we aware of similar misconduct committed elsewhere in DHS.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Charles K. Edwards
From Senator Claire McCaskill**

**“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
May 23, 2012**

1. You mentioned in your testimony that you will investigate ethics training at the Secret Service. Based on what you know now, broadly speaking:

- a.) What training is provided to employees and supervisors, both within the Secret Service and across DHS, on ethics and standards of conduct?

We have not fully determined the extent of training the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) provides to employees and supervisors on ethics and standards of conduct. We will identify such training, with an emphasis on training that is most relevant to the misbehavior that occurred in Cartagena. For example, we are reviewing applicable USSS' miscellaneous standards concerning personal and professional conduct. Most of these standards are not specifically described under the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, Codified in 5 C.F.R. Part 2635. Those standards cover areas such as basic obligations, gifts, outside employment, and conflicting financial interests.

- b.) What additional training is provided on standards of conduct related to maintaining a security clearance?

We have collected information regarding USSS' training on foreign travel, foreign contacts, and counter intelligence and awareness. We are in the process of analyzing this information as well as identifying what training the Secret Service provides in these areas.

- c.) Does this training also cover ethical obligations of DHS employees to come forward when they see wrongdoing?

5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11) requires that employees disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities. We will determine whether the Secret Service's standards concerning personal and professional conduct or any related training requires employees to report wrongdoing.

2. Would you recommend broader, better training in this area, either for Secret Service employees or DHS employees generally? If so, what would you recommend? And if not, why do you believe the training DHS employees already receive is sufficient?

We do not have any recommendations yet concerning how well the Secret Service trains its employees on professional standards of conduct or maintaining a security clearance. After

we have completed our investigation of the incident in Cartagena, and our evaluation of the Secret Service's investigation of the incident, we plan to examine the culture within the Secret Service, including the administration of related training. Whether existing training in the area of personal and professional conduct is sufficient for all DHS employees is beyond the scope of this review.

3. Are you looking into potential patterns of misbehavior in other parts of DHS, such as other operational components, or other employees with security clearances?

Presently, we do not have any ongoing reviews of other DHS components similar to our review of the Secret Service. We process all allegations of misbehavior that we receive through the OIG Hotline. We investigate that information when it involves potentially criminal behavior by a DHS employee or employees. Other information concerning misbehavior, particularly when there is a perceived pattern of misbehavior, may be referred to one of our other offices, such as our Office of Inspections, for review.

4. I was troubled by Director Sullivan's suggestion that less than 60% of Secret Service personnel would report ethical misconduct. I hope that is not indicative of a broader culture, either in the Secret Service or other parts of DHS, of a willingness to turn a blind eye to wrongdoing. As you know, employees need to feel empowered to report wrongdoing, whether it involves ethical misconduct or instances of waste, fraud, or abuse.

- a.) Based on your observations as Acting Inspector General, do you believe DHS promotes a culture of accountability and empowers employees to come forward when they see wrongdoing?

During my tenure as Acting Inspector General, I have discussed this very concern with component heads, and know that they feel strongly about holding their employees accountable. For example, in response to our recommendations, we saw firsthand actions taken by the Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service to promote a culture of accountability. Director Sullivan testified that he does not condone the misbehavior that that occurred in Cartagena, and believes that someone else would have reported it had the situation been different. In part two of our review, we will assess the extent that Secret Service employees feel that they are empowered to report wrongdoing.

- b.) If not, have you made recommendations to DHS as to how they can better promote a working environment that embraces employees who raise concerns of wrongdoing?

We have made such recommendations, please see section a. We will continue to monitor DHS to promote a working environment for employees who raise concerns of wrongdoing.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Charles K. Edwards
From Senator Scott P. Brown**

**“Secret Service on the Line: Restoring Trust and Confidence”
May 23, 2012**

1. I have been a strong advocate in combating human trafficking, particularly through my support of the Reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. How can we guarantee that our own U.S. government personnel uphold the highest standards of conduct to ensure that our government is not contributing to the demand for commercial sex that provides fertile ground for sex trafficking around the world?

The incident involving Secret Service personnel in Cartagena, Colombia, serves as a reminder that every Federal department, agency, or entity cannot take for granted the responsibility of upholding the highest standards of conduct for their personnel. Federal agencies with personnel traveling or stationed overseas must establish and adhere to standards of conduct, and ensure personnel may report any situations when those standards are violated. As part of our inquiry, we will determine whether the USSS has in place, and has effectively administered, standards of conduct for its employees.

