[Senate Hearing 110-1183]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1183
OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION (TSA): EXAMINING THE TSA'S
EFFORTS AND PROGRESS ON H.R. 1, IMPLEMENTING
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 16, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 16, 2007................................. 1
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 35
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 40
Statement of Senator Lott........................................ 48
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 32
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 41
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 33
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 37
Witnesses
Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)............ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Hawley, Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'', Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Appendix
Letter, dated October 26, 2007, from Marshall S. Filler, Managing
Director and General Counsel, Aeronautical Repair Station
Association to Hon.
Daniel K. Inouye and Hon. Ted Stevens.......................... 51
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip''
Hawley by:
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 53
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 60
Hon. Trent Lott.............................................. 64
Hon. Ted Stevens............................................. 60
OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA):
EXAMINING THE TSA'S EFFORTS AND
PROGRESS ON H.R. 1, IMPLEMENTING
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L.
Dorgan, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. I call the hearing to order this morning.
Senator Inouye is unable to be with us. Senator Stevens will be
here in about 10 minutes. I'm Senator Dorgan. I'm joined by
Senator Smith, from Oregon. We will begin the hearing.
We very much appreciate the witnesses being present. This
is a full committee hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee,
an oversight hearing on the Transportation Security
Administration, examining TSA's efforts and progress on H.R. 1,
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007.
We have with us today the Honorable Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley,
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, and Ms. Cathleen
Berrick, the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues
in the GAO. We appreciate your attendance and your work, and we
will proceed by asking Mr. Hawley to present testimony, and
then we will hear from the GAO.
Let me ask whether we have any members that wish to make
any brief opening comments. I will put Senator Stevens'
statement in the record. Otherwise, we'll go to the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
The 9/11 bill included a number of significant transportation
security provisions in the surface sector modes as well as in aviation,
which has been TSA's primary area of focus.
Anchorage International Airport continues to be the number one
cargo airport in the U.S. based on cargo landed weight and the third
largest by cargo landed weight worldwide. In addition to our all cargo
operations, the airport is also a major transfer point for passenger
air cargo. The improved screening of passenger air cargo will provide a
higher level of safety and security to my constituents.
However, Alaska's economy will be severely impacted if the cargo
screening provision in the 9/11 bill is not instituted in a manner that
safeguards the flow of commerce.
I encourage TSA to work diligently and quickly to attain 100
percent screening of air cargo, within the bicameral agreed-upon
benchmarks that were set within the 9/11 bill.
It is essential TSA maximize the screening of cargo on commercial
personal aircraft without causing negative repercussions on the flow of
commerce.
Senator Smith. I have one, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Smith?
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. I want to thank our witnesses for being
here. It's been more than 6 years since the horrific morning of
9/11. On that day, we all woke up to the fact that there are
people in the world who want to do us harm. While we have made
notable progress in the last 6 years toward securing our
transportation systems, there is still a great deal of work,
obviously, to be done.
Recently, the GAO released a report detailing the progress
of the Department of Homeland Security in implementing its
mission and management responsibilities. The report found,
among other things, that, in the area of aviation and surface
transportation security, moderate progress has been made, while
there has been substantial progress in securing the maritime
environment. The 9/11 Commission bill, that was signed into law
this past summer, and the SAFE Port Act, that was enacted last
year, contained a number of mandates aimed at further
strengthening the security of our transportation system.
I look forward to hearing from our administrator, Assistant
Secretary Hawley, on his plans for implementing the portions of
the 9/11 Commission bill and the SAFE Port Act that fall to his
agency to carry out. I also look forward to hearing his plans
to address some of the issues raised by GAO in its progress
report.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Smith, thank you very much.
Let me just make a point on behalf of our Chairman and
other Members as well that there's an urgency to this issue.
Transportation security is very, very important. We know from
our last published National Intelligence Estimate, the
leadership of al Qaeda continues to plot additional attacks
against our homeland. In fact, the NIE says the most
significant threat to our country is al Qaeda and its
leadership. They are reconstituted, they are recreating
terrorist camps and plotting attacks against our homeland.
It seems to me the obligation for all of us is not to try
to figure out how to respond to attacks, but, rather, how to
prevent attacks, and that's why there's an urgency about this
issue of transportation security. We have passed a number of
pieces of legislation, as my colleague, Senator Smith,
indicated. There is, uneven progress on some of these issues.
In some cases, the money has been spent with not as much
progress as we would hope; in other cases, there has been some
significant strengthening and progress in these issues of
transportation security.
So, your willingness to come, Secretary Hawley, and
describe from your perspective what has happened is something
we welcome. And, Ms. Berrick, we appreciate, as always, the
work of the Government Accountability Office, and we are
anxious to receive your testimony, as well.
So, with that, Secretary Hawley, why don't you proceed.
Your entire statement will be made a part of the permanent
record, and you may summarize.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND S. ``KIP'' HAWLEY, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Hawley. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan. Good morning,
Senator Smith, Senator McCaskill. I am pleased to be here this
morning to talk about TSA's efforts to implement provisions
under the new law implementing recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007. I'm also pleased to join Cathy Berrick,
of the GAO, on the panel this morning.
First, I'd like to thank this Committee for its continued
support for TSA's mission and for your leadership in writing
the 9/11 implementation bill. I particularly appreciate this
Committee's detailed understanding of TSA's operational needs
and the Committee's focus on practical solutions to complex
problems.
The challenges of implementing all the provisions of the 9/
11 Act are formidable, but TSA is committed to achieve the
objectives of this Committee, the Congress, and the 9/11
Commission. With all that we have to do, as Senator Dorgan said
in his introductory remarks, we must keep our focus on the
highest-priority items, priorities informed and driven by the
current threat information.
Since last June, we have witnessed disrupted attacks in
London, Denmark, and Germany, as well as a completed attack on
Glasgow's airport in Scotland. There is no reason to think that
we are exempt from that kind of attack planning. The National
Intelligence Estimate, as Senator Dorgan mentioned, indicates
that, over the next 3 years, the threat will continue, with
terrorists attempting transportation sector attacks on a grand
scale. We know their focus is on using items easily available
in grocery- and hardware-store shelves. That means we cannot
rely on a checklist mentality, searching bags for a static list
of specific prohibited objects or becoming stuck in a
predictable, and therefore vulnerable, routine. We must use
security measures that are unpredictable, agile, and adaptable,
that put us one step ahead of evolving threats.
As I've said in previous meetings with this committee, TSA
has added layers of security and additional technology to our
airport operations. We have continued to provide more training
and real-threat testing to our front-line officers. Federal air
marshals move invisibly to protect Americans wherever they fly
around the globe. And VIPR teams deploy every week, including
this one, somewhere in the United States, to support State and
local security efforts everywhere in transportation. That is
our focus every day. It is on that base of daily operations
that we address the new requirements from the 9/11 legislation.
In prior hearings, we've discussed TWIC and Secure Flight.
We have discussed the challenges and opportunities of both
programs. After a great deal of work to strengthen the
foundations and build privacy protections into both programs, I
am pleased to report that TWIC and Secure Flight are back on
track and moving forward.
When I appeared before this committee in April, I said the
TWIC card was on its way. Today, TWIC is up and running. Over
the next 5 years, approximately a million individuals will use
a TWIC card, interoperable at 3,200 facilities and 10,000
vessels. Enrollments for TWIC are underway, as we speak, in
Delaware this morning. Already, we've had more than 1,000 pre-
enrollments online, and the pace will accelerate across the
ports through the end of calendar year 2007 and continue at
full speed through 2008.
When I spoke to you last January, we had a very direct
conversation about Secure Flight. I promised that we would
complete the rebaselining of the program, build in privacy
protections, and publish the rule. We have done those things,
and we are ready to go.
The rule for Secure Flight has been published, and, after a
public hearing in September that was available live on the
Internet, the comment period is open now. It closes next week,
and we expect to get the final rule out in spring of 2008.
Should the Congress choose to fully fund the program in
Fiscal Year 2008, we can begin testing in 2008.
I am mindful that, despite the progress that TSA has made
across the board, that there is still much to do, and I look
forward to our work together to further strengthen security
throughout our transportation network. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear. I would be happy to answer questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant
Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland
Security
Good morning, Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. I am pleased to speak with you
this morning to discuss the state of transportation security and the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to begin
implementation of the important bill that you just passed--the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub.
L. 110-53, (9/11 Act).
First, I would like to thank this Committee for the continued
support you have given TSA since its inception and to the Committee
staff for its professionalism and the hard work and cooperative spirit
they displayed in working with the Department of Homeland Security
(Department) and TSA to finalize the provisions of the 9/11 Act.
TSA appreciates that the 9/11 Act includes many provisions which we
sought as tools to provide better transportation security to the United
States. In particular, we are pleased that based on this Committee's
leadership, the 9/11 Act gives us the flexibility to craft a robust air
cargo security system that will provide security and an unimpeded flow
of commerce. We also appreciate that the 9/11 Act recognizes and
supports the expansive training that we are providing to our
Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce to move our security
outward from the static checkpoint. We very much needed authority to
establish an administrative process for civil enforcement of surface
transportation regulations and orders and you gave us that authority.
Additionally, you emphatically recognized the importance of our
integrated Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams (VIPR),
which provide a mobile surge of TSA resources in all modes of
transportation.
It is also important to understand the challenge that the 9/11 Act
places on TSA and our resources. Fully half of the many tasks required
of the Department by the 9/11 Act fall on TSA's shoulders. They affect
all aspects of transportation security, including strategic planning,
aviation security, rail security, security of public transit
facilities, pipelines, over-the-road buses, and trucking security. TSA
has a big task in continuing the implementation of the 9/11 Act and in
working with the many stakeholders in the transportation sector to
assure the level of security that Congress and the 9/11 Commission
envisioned. TSA will now need to integrate the many mandates in the 9/
11 Act into our current priorities and resources to enable key
initiatives to progress without delay while not losing focus on our
threat-based operations.
The current restriction on funding presents an immediate challenge
for TSA's efforts to implement certain requirements of the 9/11 Act. As
you know, we are operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR). The CR
presents additional financial challenges to TSA as we are limited in
our spending to a prescribed formula based on our Fiscal Year (FY) 2007
appropriations, and we are prohibited from initiating new programs or
projects that were not funded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. Placed in the
context of implementing the 9/11 Act, this situation creates
particularly difficult challenges.
Additionally, many of the rulemaking requirements mandated in the
9/11 Act do not adequately recognize the obligations that TSA must give
the many stakeholders affected by proposed regulations and the general
public an opportunity to be heard throughout the development process.
These requirements are time consuming but are time well spent to assure
that our regulations achieve their objective in a way that is
transparent to stakeholders and the public and does not adversely
affect travel and commerce.
TSA is actively working to implement the 9/11 Act and we are
assessing what resources are needed to continue the implementation. We
are working with our partners in the Department and other Federal
agencies toward those goals that require close cooperation to implement
inter-Departmental and inter-agency requirements.
Ongoing Threat
Before I discuss in greater detail the current and future efforts
of TSA to secure our Nation's transportation systems and fulfill the
requirements of the 9/11 Act, I believe it is important for me to
explain the context in which TSA operates and the direction TSA is
going to anticipate threats to transportation.
The effort to ensure the security of the transportation system
remains as important now as it ever has been in the past 6 years. The
National Intelligence Estimate on threats to the U.S. Homeland issued
in July 2007 confirmed publicly that the terrorist threat is real. This
threat is persistent and evolving. Terrorists maintain an undiminished
intent to attack the Homeland and show a continued effort to adapt and
improve their capabilities. They are innovative in overcoming security
obstacles. They are training to use improvised explosive devices (IED).
Terror groups continue to focus on prominent infrastructure targets
with the goal of producing mass casualties. We know they are working to
defeat us, and we must remain vigilant.
Keeping Ahead of Terrorists
TSA's security strategy is based on flexible, mobile, and
unpredictable methods. To counter the evolving threat and adaptive
capabilities of terrorists, we are staying ahead by rethinking the
entire screening process and changing the legacy systems that
originated in the 1970s. We are going on the offense to address current
threats. We are being proactive in an effort to stay ahead of the
threats. We, therefore, rely heavily upon intelligence.
Intelligence and information sharing are at the core of our overall
transportation security strategy. Building on the efforts of our
partners in the Intelligence Community (IC), we use intelligence and
analysis to prioritize our security activities. We begin each day with
briefings on the latest intelligence from the IC, and that information
drives our decisionmaking process both operationally and strategically.
In addition, we share intelligence as appropriate with our front-line
employees and stakeholders, enabling them to make informed security
decisions.
Sharing intelligence information with our stakeholders in surface
transportation is especially important as they are primarily
responsible for providing the direct staff and resources to secure
their respective transportation systems. Providing intelligence to
these stakeholders enables us to partner with them through our security
grant programs to apply resources in the most effective way possible.
We recognize that we cannot protect every person or all property
against every possible threat to the system. Given the nature of the
threats to aviation, we must manage risk consistent with what we
understand of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We will
prioritize our resources to protect against the high-threat, high-
consequence events.
Aviation Security
The discussion of aviation security almost always starts at the
familiar TSA security checkpoint. For the two million travelers a day
who fly, that is TSA to them. However, TSA looks at the checkpoint as
but a piece--an important piece--of a much larger picture. Therefore,
before discussing checkpoint issues, I would like to point out that TSA
looks at the entire transportation network in evaluating risk,
including threat information. A large part of TSA's work involves
working closely on a daily basis with the intelligence and law
enforcement communities and our global partners to try to stay ahead of
the current threat.
We have to be strong at the checkpoint, but also many other
places--including the back, front, and sides of the airport. Risk-based
security means that we take the whole picture into account and
implement selective and unpredictable security measures. We must first
deny the terrorist a stationary target where a planner can take the
time to map an attack with high odds of success. Nothing can be
uncovered, but likewise, we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that
fixed, robust security is impenetrable. Our security needs to play
offense, not just defense.
TSA is focusing beyond the physical checkpoint--to push our borders
out, so to speak--to look more at people and to identify those with
hostile intent or those conducting surveillance even if they are not
carrying a prohibited item. By spreading our layers of security
throughout the airport environment and elsewhere, we have multiple
opportunities to detect terrorists and leverage the capabilities of our
workforce, our partners, and our technology.
Travel Document Checking
We are placing specially trained TSOs at the front of the
checkpoint to review travel documents to find fraudulent identification
(IDs) and also to look at behavior. The 9/11 Commission recognized that
travel documents are akin to weapons for terrorists. We will make it
harder for dangerous people to use fraudulent documents and IDs by
raising the standard of inspection and providing additional equipment
for our TSOs to perform this function. We ask this Committee to fully
support the President's budget for this program so that TSA can make a
seamless transition from the airlines and continue the program with as
little disruption as possible to the flow of passenger screening.
Behavior Observation
We continue to expand the Screening Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program, which utilizes non-intrusive behavior
observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk
passengers. Individuals exhibiting specific observable behaviors may be
referred for additional screening at the checkpoint that may include
handwanding, pat down, or physical inspection of their carry-on
baggage. SPOT adds an element of unpredictability to the security
screening process that is easy for passengers to navigate but difficult
for terrorists to manipulate. It serves as an important additional
layer of security in the airport environment, requires no additional
specialized screening equipment, can easily be deployed to other modes
of transportation, and presents yet one more challenge for terrorists
attempting to defeat our security system. The SPOT program has already
added great value to our overall security system. For example, a
Behavior Detection Officer recently identified an individual at a
ticket counter carrying a loaded gun and more than 30 rounds of
ammunition.
Aviation Direct Access Screening Program
We continue to expand the Aviation Direct Access Screening
Program--deploying TSOs and Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs)
to locations throughout airports to screen airport employees, their
accessible property, and vehicles entering a direct access point to
secured areas of airports. The random screening at unexpected locations
is a valuable measure to increase the protection on the ``back side''
of airports.
This random and unpredictable screening allows airport workers to
perform their duties with minimal interruptions and keeps the aviation
industry operating. TSA's approach is both practical and effective.
Requiring 100 percent screening of all airport workers, even in a pilot
program, is contrary to this philosophy; it unnecessarily diverts
resources from higher risk operations without providing the
improvements in security that we need. We would like to continue to
work with the Committee to craft a pilot program that will test varying
methods of improving an airport worker screening program that will
offer better security.
This strategy of active, nimble, flexible security depends on the
quality of the people involved. TSA has had a major focus on improving
security by improving the capabilities of its people. Better recruiting
and hiring, better training, better incentive systems, career
progression opportunity, more involvement in decisions effecting the
workforce, and more recognition of the critical role played by our
people--these efforts all have a positive effect on the security result
TSA delivers. The success of all these programs in increasing the
layers of security would not be possible without the incredible effort,
professionalism, and dedication shown by TSA's workforce. Our highly
trained and highly motivated workforce--TSOs, TSIs, Federal Air
Marshals (FAMs), and other professionals--have proven to be a nimble,
adaptable workforce that can quickly adjust to counter an emerging
terrorist threat. In August of 2006, TSOs employed new standard
operating procedures within hours to deal with the threat identified as
part of the United Kingdom (UK) plot to blow up commercial aircraft
with liquid explosives. TSA has rapidly deployed FAMs to international
destinations to support its mission coverage based on new threats. We
are constantly reviewing and adjusting our procedures and strategies to
ensure our personnel are ahead of the next threat. TSA's workforce has
met every challenge in the past 5 years and I am confident they will
continue to do so.
Workforce Safety
Maintaining a healthy, able-bodied workforce is also critical to
TSA's mission. We improved workplace safety through a series of
aggressive initiatives, including nurse case managers, Optimization and
Safety Teams, automated injury claims filing process, involvement of
the National Advisory Council in planning and implementing the Safety
Week Campaign and other aspects of the Safety Program, deployment of
contract safety specialists to support TSA field operations, and speedy
investigations to correct safety problems. Through these programs, TSA
has reduced the rate for employees losing time from duty due to injury
by almost half from 11.56 per 100 employees in FY 2005 to 6.75 for the
3rd quarter of FY 2007.
New Technology
We are also adding significant new technology. A lesson from 9/11
is that we must be proactive--we must anticipate threats that continue
to grow in sophistication and complexity. This effort includes
leveraging the skills of our TSOs with new technology. This next
generation of technology will assist our TSOs in separating friend from
foe, increasing efficiency, and helping minimize the impact to
travelers and businesses:
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray. We will begin deploying AT
X-ray equipment for carry-on baggage. It provides TSOs with a
better capability to identify and detect threats through
improved imagery and analysis tools.
Checkpoint Automated Carry-On Explosives Detection Systems
(Auto-EDS). We are exploring Auto-EDS for inspecting carry-on
items. Auto-EDS may provide additional detection and automation
opportunities.
Whole Body Imagers. We are pilot testing whole body imagers,
such as the backscatter and millimeter wave technologies, to
quickly and safely screen passengers for prohibited items
without the need for physical contact on a voluntary basis.
Cast and Prosthesis Scanner. We are testing new cast and
prosthesis scanners to provide a safe, dignified, and non-
invasive way to identify potential threats and clear passengers
wearing casts, braces, and prosthetic devices.
Bottled Liquids Scanners. We have begun deploying liquids
scanning devices at checkpoints, and are now using a hand-held
liquids scanner for non-checkpoint screening locations.
New Explosives Detection Systems. We are evaluating several
new products that will greatly increase the speed of handling
and screening checked baggage, particularly when integrated
into an airport's baggage handling system, while reducing the
size of the footprint of the baggage screening location.
Improving Security By Improving the Security Experience
Despite the critical need for enhanced security measures, such as
the requirement to remove all shoes and the restrictions on liquids,
gels, and aerosols, we know we need to improve the checkpoint screening
process so it is less stressful for the traveling public.
Working with our stakeholders, we are pursuing programs and
processes that improve the security screening process. We are moving
from the legacy approach of simply looking for weapons to a more fluid
process focused on the goals of: (1) improving detection of explosives;
and (2) developing the capability to evaluate travel documents as well
as detect hostile intent or possible surveillance.
Looking Ahead in Aviation Security
Screening of Air Cargo
As you know, the 9/11 Act requires the establishment of a system
for industry to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft within 3 years. As we proceed toward enabling industry to meet
the cargo screening requirements, TSA will stress effective security
management of the air cargo supply chain. This process will require
substantial collaboration with stakeholders, specifically, U.S.-based
shippers, freight forwarders, and passenger air carriers. This
Committee was a leader in including key language in the bill that
authorizes TSA to develop and implement a program that will enable
shippers to screen cargo early in the supply chain using currently
approved screening methods and meeting additional stringent facility
and personnel security standards. This is a critical element in
enabling the improved security for air cargo on passenger aircraft that
Congress requires. I am grateful to the Committee for its recognition
that better screening occurs when shipments are screened and secured at
various points along the supply chain. Waiting until the freight is
dropped at the airport, often in large pallets, to begin screening
would result in less effective screening as well as defeat the whole
purpose of the air cargo system that strives to provide expeditious
delivery of goods from origin to destination. We are working closely
with all stakeholders within the air cargo supply chain and our initial
feedback has been very positive. The stakeholders clearly recognize the
need to achieve our country's heightened security requirements while
continuing the free flow of commerce upon which our economy relies. TSA
will build upon our established programs: air cargo security
regulations; Security Directives; the Known Shipper Management System;
and increased use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams
and Transportation Security Inspectors for Cargo.
In addition, the $80 million dollars appropriated to TSA this year
for air cargo security as part of the FY2007 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 110-28) will contribute to our increased
efforts through the hiring of at least 150 additional cargo inspectors
and expansion of the National Explosives Detection Canine Program by no
fewer than 170 teams.
Secure Flight
TSA has taken a significant step toward implementing the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and the requirement of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to enhance the
vetting of aviation passengers against terrorist watch lists. On August
23, 2007, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
proposing implementation of the Secure Flight program. Secure Flight,
if implemented as proposed, will bring the process of comparing
passenger names against the watch list, now performed by aircraft
operators, into the government, and will align domestic and
international passenger pre-screening. By establishing a more
consistent and effective watch list matching process, TSA will
strengthen a key layer of security and enhance its ability to stop
terrorists before they get to the passenger screening checkpoint. The
program is designed to better focus enhanced passenger screening
efforts on individuals likely to pose a threat to civil aviation, and
to facilitate the secure and efficient travel of the vast majority of
the traveling public by distinguishing them from individuals on the
watch list.
We have taken the time to build the Secure Flight program right,
and we believe that the NPRM and associated Privacy Act System of
Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment demonstrate that TSA has
built a program with the operational requirements necessary to enhance
aviation security while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of
the traveling public. The Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP)
is available for passengers who feel they have been improperly delayed
or prohibited from boarding an aircraft.
Over the next few months, TSA intends to begin a testing period
using data from aircraft operators that volunteer to participate.
During testing, air carriers will continue conducting watch list checks
for domestic flights, and TSA will compare the results of its watch
list matching with air carrier results to ensure the validity of the
Secure Flight system.
It is therefore extremely critical that Congress provide the
necessary funding for Secure Flight requested by the President in the
FY 2008 budget. Without the necessary funding, the program will have to
scale back benchmark testing with airlines, Secure Flight system to
airline system testing, parallel operations with airlines, and the
stand up of the Secure Flight Service Center or Secure Flight
Operations Center. In short, the program would have a system with no
ability to connect, communicate, or test with airlines for the purposes
of implementation. Important contract awards would be postponed. From a
schedule perspective, rollout of the Secure Flight program would be
severely delayed. An immediate concern is the significant budget
constraint imposed on the Secure Flight program due to the enactment of
the current CR. The restrictions on funding under the CR will inhibit
TSA's ability to implement this critical program to improve aviation
security and fulfill a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Now
that we have demonstrated major progress on the Secure Flight program
through the issuance of the NPRM and associated privacy documents, we
need your support to fund this vital program.
General Aviation
TSA is working closely with the general aviation (GA) community to
develop reasonable, feasible, and effective security for GA operations
while ensuring that these measures support continued operations and
increased growth of the industry.
TSA is also working with aircraft operators and Fixed Base
Operators directly to develop voluntary programs of verifying the
identification of passengers on board aircraft and maintaining facility
security in and around GA aircraft.
TSA is working closely with our interagency partners to improve GA
security. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently issued
a NPRM that will require GA operators to submit comprehensive manifest
data about passengers, crew, and flight information electronically to
CBP, as part of its Electronic Advance Passenger Information System (e-
APIS), at least 60 minutes before the aircraft departs for the United
States.
Currently, we only receive very basic information from GA aircraft
coming into the United States, such as who is and is not a U.S.
citizen. That is not enough. Having this information an hour before
departure will give CBP inspectors more time to fully pre-screen
travelers and crews and take necessary actions to resolve threats.
Surface Transportation Security
As the security framework for transportation continues to grow, TSA
is moving to apply many of the same tools to protect all modes of
transportation. TSA is building information sharing networks in surface
transportation. We work closely with stakeholders in these industries,
putting an emphasis on sharing intelligence, capacity, and technology
with that of other law enforcement, intelligence or other agencies at
every level of government.
When I appeared before this Committee in January, I explained TSA's
comprehensive strategy that we are applying across all transportation
networks, regardless of mode. Today, I want to focus on the last two
elements of our strategy: closing gaps; and developing enhanced
security systems.
Program Improvements
Freight Rail. Secretary Chertoff established the priority goal of
achieving a 50 percent drop in the objectively measured risk posed by
rail cars carrying toxic inhalation hazards (TIH) by the end of 2008.
To achieve this goal, TSA is implementing a multi-layered security
strategy which includes regulatory development, cooperative agreements,
and comprehensive risk-based programs.
On December 21, 2006, TSA published a proposed rule (NPRM) to
strengthen the security of the Nation's freight rail systems in high
threat urban areas (HTUA). The NPRM addressed shippers, carriers, and
receivers of TIHs and other security-sensitive materials by rail.
Proposed requirements include railcar location reporting within a
specific time period and the establishment of a secure chain of custody
in and through HTUAs. TSA also proposed requirements for designating
rail security coordinators and suspicious incident reporting by rail
mass transit, passenger rail, and all freight rail carriers. We intend
to publish this final rule by the end of the year.
Prior to publishing the NPRM, TSA separately reached an agreement
with the rail carrier industry to reduce the standstill time of
unattended TIH cars in HTUAs beginning in early 2007. To support this
effort, TSA is developing a comprehensive database to identify highest
priority risk reduction opportunities. Additionally, working in
conjunction with TSA, the Nation's rail carriers are developing site-
specific security plans focused on reducing the risk of TIH cars in
HTUAs.
In addition to reducing the risks to TIH in freight rail
transportation, TSA is working with rail carriers to raise the baseline
in security training. TSA is developing a training video that addresses
inspection of TIH rail cars, emphasizing the recognition of IEDs, as
well as general security awareness for rail employees. The video will
be available by the end of the year.
Passenger Transit Programs and Grants. TSA, in partnership with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Transit
Administration, leverages the Transit Security Grant Program funds to
focus on reducing risk and increasing security capabilities in State
and local transit systems with the most risk. We are continuing
research to expand our understanding of the vulnerabilities and the
consequences of terrorist attacks on our critical infrastructure,
applying the results as they are developed in immediate and phased
mitigation strategies. We have partnered with the National Laboratories
and affected passenger transit systems to complete assessments of the
Nation's 29 underwater transit tunnels and produce priorities for risk
mitigation. From the information gained, TSA developed action items
intended to elevate security, harden targets, and mitigate risk using
available resources and investment of grant funds.
A recent change to the Transit Security Grant Program supports the
ability of high-risk systems to field dedicated anti-terrorism teams
through cooperative funding of operational packages. This initiative
provides funding for the training and operations of teams specifically
deployed to engage in visible and covert activities to detect, disrupt,
and deter terrorist activities.
TSA trains and certifies explosives detection canine teams to
provide a mobile and flexible deterrence and detection capability to
passenger transit systems. Since late 2005, TSA's National Explosive
Detection Canine Team Program has partnered with passenger transit
systems to deploy some 60 explosives detection canine teams to 14 major
transit systems using a risk-based application of resources. More than
50 of these teams are currently in place, with the remaining force
projected for training, certification, and deployment in the coming
months.
The Department has awarded roughly $18 billion to State and local
governments for programs and equipment that help to manage risk. In
passenger transit, the Transit Security Grant Program, which funded
$275 million in FY 2007, is the centerpiece of the Department's
interagency strategy to close gaps in operator security status and
baseline standards. The Department allocates those grants to enhance
capabilities in areas of weakness identified in the system security
assessments under the BASE program, with particular emphasis on
elevating security posture in six fundamental areas underpinning the
broader transit security strategy. These priority areas are protection
of underwater and underground infrastructure; protection of other high
consequence systems and assets; expanded random, unpredictable security
activities for deterrent and disruptive effect against terrorist
planning and reconnaissance; security training of frontline employees;
drills and exercises; and public outreach and awareness. Cooperative
efforts through the Regional Transit Security Working Groups in higher
risk areas secure agreement on risk-based priorities and security
enhancement solutions advanced by targeted application of grant funds.
Amtrak participates in these regional meetings. Additionally, TSA
engages directly with Amtrak to reach agreement on risk-based
priorities and the most effective use of grant funds for risk
mitigation and security enhancement.
An area security assessment indicated a need for a more focused
effort on security training for transit agency employees. Although an
extensive Federal security training program has been implemented since
9/11--including 17 security courses, more than 500 course
presentations, and more than 78,000 transit employees trained--the
assessment results indicate wide variations in the quality of transit
agencies' security training programs and an inadequate level of
refresher or follow-on training. Well-trained employees are a security
force multiplier for security efforts implemented by transit agencies.
To close the gap identified in the assessments, TSA produced a Mass
Transit Security Training Program that assists agencies in developing
and implementing more consistent training programs. The program aligns
substantive training areas with specific types of employees, which in
turn guides the development and execution of training programs. To
support actual delivery of training courses, the Transit Security Grant
Program offers a streamlined application process to fund the
instruction and overtime costs incurred by substitutions for employees
in training. This initiative significantly expands the volume and
quality of training for transit employees during 2007. TSA anticipates
maintaining this commitment in future years, as resources allow.
The collective effort in passenger transit security aims to build
security force multipliers in the rail and bus systems--the
capabilities of law enforcement and frontline employees and the
awareness of the traveling public--and to maximize regional
collaboration for the employment of the full range of available
resources in random, unpredictable applications for a deterrent effect.
Highway. TSA is working on a number of strategies to close gaps in
performance. We are currently considering a number of voluntary
incentive programs and regulatory options. Prior to the enactment of
the 9/11 Act, TSA was developing many programs and initiatives in
collaboration with industry within the context of implementing the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Transportation Systems Sector-
Specific Plan (TSSP), Highway and Motor Carrier Modal Annex.
These programs and initiatives include the following:
Training: The School Transportation Security Awareness Program,
Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Motor Carrier Security Self-
Assessment Program, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC) training course for commercial motor vehicle (CMV)
enforcement officers and security specialists, and Operation
Secure Transport Training Program for the over-the-road bus
industry were developed.
Standards/Guidelines: Security Standards are currently being
developed in collaboration with industry for the HAZMAT Motor
Carrier industry, the School Transportation Industry, the over-
the-road bus industry, and the Highway Infrastructure sector.
Information Sharing: The Highway and Motor Carrier sector
Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and Sector Coordinating
Council (SCC) have been developed and are actively meeting on a
regular basis. In addition, the Homeland Security Information
Network Highway portal, TSA Highway & Motor Carrier (HMC)
Webpage, internal TSA Highway and Motor monthly newsletter for
field personnel, and inclusion of security notes in industry
trade periodicals have been developed. The Highway and Motor
Carrier Industry Information and Analysis Center and Highway
Watch programs are active and continually processing reports
from highway operators and sharing information between industry
and TSA.
Domain Awareness: Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) are
conducted with organizations engaged in transportation by motor
vehicle, as well as those that maintain or operate key physical
assets within the highway transportation community, with a
current focus on the transportation of HAZMAT transported by
motor carriers. TSA is developing a pilot project for testing
the feasibility of tracking trucks carrying HAZMAT. This
practice will allow not only the continual tracking of truck
locations, but also hazardous load types in all 50 states. The
pilot includes the development of a set of protocols capable of
interfacing with existing truck tracking systems, State and
local government intelligence operations centers, and Federal
law enforcement agencies, as well as first responders. The
Integrated Intermodal Information System-Domestic Feasibility
Study focused on the transportation of Extremely Hazardous
Materials throughout the domestic transportation system.
Plans and Exercises: The Highway and Motor Carrier GCC
collaborated with the HMC SCC to create the Highway
Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Modal Annex to the
Transportation System Sector-Specific Plan. This document
describes how the goals and objectives of the transportation
sector will be achieved to protect the highway transportation
system.
Risk Management and Grants: The Highway Watch Program is a TSA
grant initiative that is administered by the American Trucking
Associations with an enrollment of nearly 500,000 driving
professionals to observe, assess, and report incidents to the
appropriate authorities that are potential terrorist
activities, accidents, disabled vehicles, hazardous road
conditions, or other highway incidents. In January 2006, TSA
initiated a CSR pilot program with the State of Missouri
Department of Transportation Motor Carriers Services Division
(MoDOT). 44 MoDOT officers were trained to conduct over 2,700
CSRs during their safety audits on trucking companies and their
equipment within Missouri. The HAZMAT Motor Carrier Security
Self-Assessment Training program focuses on transportation
security regulations and specific terrorist and criminal
threats to the HAZMAT motor carrier industry. It conducts
security assessments, produces security action items, and
reports procedures for security related incidents. The HMC
office is supporting the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program
in assessing which over-the-road motorcoaches qualify for
grants and how the grant funding can be used to enhance
motorcoach security. Additionally, in partnership with the
motorcoach industry, we developed training entitled ``Operation
Secure Transport'', which is specifically geared toward
passenger motor carrier operators.
Pipeline. TSA initiated a number of programs to assist pipeline
companies in their efforts to secure these vital systems. For example,
through the CSR Program, we compiled the best security practices
observed throughout the industry and established that pipeline
companies adopt a minimum of 70 percent of TSA pipeline security
guidelines.
TSA partnered with our counterparts in Natural Resources Canada
(NRCan) to hold an International Pipeline Security Forum. This event
provided an opportunity for pipeline companies, industry associations,
and government representatives to exchange security information and
best practices. We continue to work with NRCan on cross border pipeline
assessments in accordance with the Security and Prosperity Partnership
agreement.
Identifying a shortfall in security awareness training through the
CSR results, TSA developed a compact disc-based training program. Over
300 U.S. pipeline companies, representing approximately 61,000 industry
employees, have requested the CD and accompanying brochure.
Enhanced Systems of Security
The final part of our strategy is to enhance the systems of
security. As we take actions to close gaps, we also need to improve
security technology and practices that apply to multiple modes of
transportation.
Over this past summer we began to more broadly deploy VIPR teams in
aviation and surface transportation facilities. Comprised of TSOs,
TSIs, and FAMs, VIPR teams collaborate with local law enforcement
agencies to intensify the visible presence of security personnel at
various points throughout the transportation system. More than 100 VIPR
deployments have been conducted at key commuter and regional passenger
rail facilities, Amtrak stations, ferries, and airports. VIPR teams
have proven that TSA and our stakeholders can greatly improve security
by altering and enhancing security measures at transportation
facilities.
The Department is developing a number of screening techniques and
technologies which may be implemented or deployed quickly to systems
facing a specific threat, or in support of major events such as
National Special Security Events. Pilot programs to test these
technologies are already underway in several major American cities.
Mitigation of risk to underwater and underground infrastructure is
a top priority of the joint Department Science and Technology
Directorate and TSA research and development effort. Collaborative
efforts with particular systems as operational test beds advance
development of anomaly detection and explosives trace detection; smart
video surveillance; and integrated prevention and response actions by
security and law enforcement personnel. As one example, through the
Rail Security Pilot, the Department field tested the effectiveness of
explosives detection techniques and imaging technologies in partnership
with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Finally, we maintain mobile security equipment, which can fit into
two standard size shipping containers, for rapid deployment for use in
screening and detection at any major system in the country, should the
need arise.
In addition to technologies that may apply primarily to passenger
modes, TSA is working closely with a number of parties to develop
advanced railcar tracking systems with geofenced event-notification
capabilities. TSA is also cooperating in efforts to develop next
generation hazardous materials rail cars designed to better withstand
terrorist attacks and operating accidents.
TSA is working with selected hazardous material carriers to test
truck tracking and control technologies. We are also in the early
stages of security technology applications to the pipeline industry.
Two specific areas TSA is involved in are blast mitigation and unmanned
aerial surveillance vehicles.
In addition to our progress toward implementing the requirements of
the 9/11 Act, I am pleased to report to this Committee the success of
another milestone for TSA and the Department. Today, port workers,
longshoremen, truckers, and others at the port of Wilmington, Delaware
became the first workers in the Nation to begin enrollment in the DHS
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. This
program will ensure that any individual with unescorted access to
secure areas of port facilities and vessels received a thorough
background check and is not a security threat. TWIC will be one of the
world's most advanced, interoperable biometric credentialing programs
and is powered by state-of-the-art technologies. I would like to thank
our partners, the U.S. Coast Guard, and maritime stakeholders for their
valuable input, for making the launching of the TWIC program a reality.
Conclusion
Although the threats and challenges to the security of
transportation systems are numerous, so are the solutions and efforts
of TSA to continue to successfully carry out our mission. We will
continue to use our personnel, information, and technology in
innovative ways to stay ahead of the evolving threats and facilitate
passenger travel and the flow of commerce.
Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, thank you again for the
opportunity to testify today. I am happy to respond to the Committee's
questions.
Senator Dorgan. We're going to ask Ms. Berrick to present
her testimony from the Government Accountability Office, at
which point we will be able to ask questions of both witnesses.
Ms. Berrick, thank you very much for being here, and you
may proceed.
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Senator Dorgan, Vice Chairman
Stevens, and Members of the Committee, for inviting me here to
discuss GAO's work assessing TSA's progress in securing the
transportation network.
In August 2007, shortly after the Department of Homeland
Security's 4-year anniversary, we reported on DHS's progress in
satisfying its key mission and management functions, including
securing aviation and surface modes of transportation. We based
our assessment on over 400 reports and testimonies we've
completed, assessing DHS's operations, and, by determining
whether DHS generally achieved or generally did not achieve key
performance expectations set out for them by Congress, the
Administration, and the Department itself.
Overall, we reported that TSA has made moderate progress in
securing transportation systems. With respect to commercial
aviation, we found that TSA generally achieved about 70 percent
of the 24 performance expectations established for them. For
example, TSA has made significant progress in hiring,
deploying, training, and measuring the performance of its
aviation security workforce. These efforts include the
development of robust training programs for TSO's, including
enhanced explosives detection training and standards for
determining appropriate TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA
also made significant progress in balancing security and
efficiency in its checkpoint screening procedures and in
deploying checked baggage screening equipment. However, we
found that DHS and TSA have made less progress in securing
airport perimeters and access to restricted areas, deploying
technologies to detect explosives at checkpoints and to screen
air cargo, and fielding a system to prescreen airline
passengers against terrorist watch lists for domestic flights,
although progress is being made in all of these areas.
One of the most critical areas in which limited progress
has been made is in the deployment of technologies at airport
checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers and in their
carry-on bags. Although DHS is developing and testing these
technologies today, the Department reported that the extensive
deployment of new technologies at the checkpoint will not be
realized for another 2 years.
Regarding the security of surface modes of transportation,
we reported that TSA generally achieved about 60 percent of the
performance expectations established for them, or three of five
expectations, but their efforts, especially related to
commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure, are still
relatively in the early stages.
In terms of progress, DHS and TSA have developed an
approach for securing surface transportation modes through a
strategy, have conducted risk assessments of related assets,
and they have administered grant programs; however, TSA has not
determined whether it will issue standards for securing all
surface transportation modes, and is still defining what its
regulatory and oversight role will be for these modes.
We also found that, although TSA has made progress in
conducting compliance inspections of some systems, inspectors'
roles and missions have not yet been fully defined.
We also reported that a variety of cross-cutting issues
have affected DHS's and TSA's efforts in implementing its
mission and management functions. These include developing
results-oriented goals and measures to assess performance,
developing and integrating a risk-based approach to guide
investment decisions, and establishing effective frameworks and
mechanisms for sharing information and coordinating with
stakeholders. It will be important for the entire Department to
continue to address these issues as it moves forward.
In closing, TSA has made considerable progress in securing
the transportation network, especially related to commercial
aviation, and its efforts should be commended. However, the
agency still has work to do in some key areas, most especially
related to the deployment of technologies to screen for
explosives at checkpoints and in air cargo and more fully
defining its regulatory role in security for surface
transportation modes.
We are currently reviewing many of these key areas, and
will continue to report to this committee and others on the
results of our work.
This concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security
and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and
challenges in securing our Nation's transportation systems. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), originally established as
an agency within the Department of Transportation in 2001 but now a
component within DHS, is charged with securing the transportation
network while also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce.
TSA has primary responsibility for security in all modes of
transportation and since its inception has developed and implemented a
variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation and
surface modes of transportation, including passenger and freight rail,
mass transit, highways, commercial vehicles, and pipelines. Other DHS
components, Federal agencies, state and local governments, and the
private sector also play a role in transportation security. For
example, with respect to commercial aviation, the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has responsibility for conducting passenger
prescreening--in general, the matching of passenger information against
terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft's departure--for
international flights operating to or from the United States, as well
as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.
In addition, responsibility for securing rail and other surface modes
of transportation is shared among Federal, state, and local governments
and the private sector.
My testimony today will focus on: (1) the progress TSA, and other
DHS components have made in securing the Nation's aviation and surface
transportation systems, and (2) challenges which have impeded DHS's
(and, as they relate to transportation security, TSA) efforts to
implement its mission and management functions. My comments are based
on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the security of the
Nation's aviation and surface transportation systems, including an
August 2007 report that highlights the progress DHS has made in
implementing its mission and management functions.\1\ In this report,
we reviewed the extent to which DHS has taken actions to achieve
performance expectations in each of its mission and management areas
that we identified from legislation, Homeland Security Presidential
Directives, and DHS strategic planning documents. Based primarily on
our past work, we made a determination regarding whether DHS generally
achieved or generally did not achieve the key elements of each
performance expectation. An assessment of ``generally achieved''
indicates that DHS has taken sufficient actions to satisfy most
elements of the expectation; however, an assessment of ``generally
achieved'' does not signify that no further action is required of DHS
or that functions covered by the expectation cannot be further improved
or enhanced. Conversely, an assessment of ``generally not achieved''
indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most elements
of the performance expectation. In determining the department's overall
level of progress in achieving performance expectations in each of its
mission and management areas, we concluded whether the department had
made limited, modest, moderate, or substantial progress.\2\ These
assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they intended to
reflect, the extent to which actions by DHS and its components have
made the Nation more secure. We conducted our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary
Within DHS, TSA is the agency with primary responsibility for
securing the transportation sector and has undertaken a number of
initiatives to strengthen the security of the Nation's commercial
aviation and surface transportation systems. In large part, these
efforts have been driven by legislative mandates designed to strengthen
the security of commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. In August 2007, we reported that DHS had made
moderate progress in securing the aviation and surface transportation
networks, but that more work remains.\3\ Specifically, of the 24
performance expectations we identified for DHS in the area of aviation
security, we reported that it has generally achieved 17 of these
expectations and has generally not achieved 7 expectations. With regard
to the security of surface modes of transportation, we reported that
DHS generally achieved three performance expectations and has generally
not achieved two others.
DHS, primarily through TSA, has made progress in many areas related
to securing commercial aviation and surface modes of transportation,
and their efforts should be commended. Meeting statutory mandates to
screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage alone was
a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA initially hired and deployed a
Federal workforce of over 50,000 passenger and checked baggage
screeners, and installed equipment at the Nation's more than 400
commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked
baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by law. TSA has
since turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening
passenger prescreening--in general, the matching of passenger
information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft's
departure; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the
transportation security officer (TSO)--formerly known as screener--
workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying
more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving
domestic air cargo security. In addition to TSA, CBP has also taken
steps to strengthen passenger prescreening for passengers on
international flights operating to or from the United States, as well
as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.
DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has also taken actions
to research and develop aviation security technologies. With regard to
surface transportation modes, TSA has taken steps to develop a
strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight
rail, commercial vehicles, highways, and pipelines; establish security
standards for certain transportation modes; and conduct threat,
criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation
assets, particularly passenger and freight rail. TSA also hired and
deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of passenger
and freight rail systems. DHS also developed and administered grant
programs for various surface transportation modes.
While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the
transportation network, DHS still faces a number of key challenges that
need to be addressed to meet expectations set out for them by Congress,
the Administration, and the Department itself. For example, regarding
commercial aviation, TSA has faced challenges in developing and
implementing its passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight,
and has not yet completed development efforts. As planned, this program
would initially assume from air carriers the responsibility for
matching information on airline passengers traveling domestically
against terrorists watch lists. In addition, while TSA has taken
actions to enhance perimeter security at airports, these actions may
not be sufficient to provide for effective security. TSA has also begun
efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies,
such as biometric identification systems. However, TSA has not
developed a plan for implementing such new technologies to meet the
security needs of individual airports and the commercial airport system
as a whole. Further, TSA has not yet deployed checkpoint technologies
to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and
implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. With regard to
surface transportation security, while TSA has initiated efforts to
develop security standards for surface transportation modes, these
efforts have been limited to passenger and freight rail, and have not
addressed commercial vehicle or highway infrastructure, including
bridges and tunnels. TSA has yet to provide a rationale or explanation
for why standards may not be needed for these modes. Moreover, although
TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of some
surface transportation systems, inspectors' roles and missions have not
been fully defined.
A variety of cross-cutting issues have affected DHS's and, as they
relate to transportation security, TSA's efforts in implementing its
mission and management functions. These key issues include agency
transformation, strategic planning and results management, risk
management, information sharing, and stakeholder coordination. In
working toward transforming the department into an effective and
efficient organization, DHS and its components have not always been
transparent which has affected our ability to perform our oversight
responsibilities in a timely manner. They have also not always
implemented effective strategic planning efforts, fully developed
performance measures, or put into place structures to help ensure that
they are managing for results. In addition, DHS and its components can
more fully adopt and apply a risk management approach in implementing
its security mission and core management functions.\4\ They could also
better share information with Federal agencies, state and local
governments and private sector entities, and more fully coordinate
their activities with key stakeholders.
Background
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in
November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation.\5\ TSA's aviation security mission includes
strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport
areas; hiring and training a screening workforce; prescreening
passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers,
baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports nation-wide,
among other responsibilities. While TSA has operational responsibility
for physically screening passengers and their baggage, TSA exercises
regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for the security of airports
and air cargo. Specifically, airports, air carriers, and other entities
are required to implement security measures in accordance with TSA-
issued security requirements, against which TSA evaluates their
compliance efforts.
TSA also oversees air carriers' efforts to prescreen passengers--in
general, the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch
lists prior to an aircraft's departure--and plans to take over
operational responsibility for this function with the implementation of
its Secure Flight program initially for passengers traveling
domestically. CBP also has responsibility for prescreening airline
passengers on international flights departing from and bound for the
United States,\6\ while DHS's Science and Technology Directorate is
responsible for researching and developing technologies to secure the
transportation sector.
TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes
with Federal, state, and local governments and the private sector.
TSA's security mission includes establishing security standards and
conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes,
including passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and
commercial vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency's Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface
transportation operators and state and local governments, and in
conjunction with certain grants the National Protection and Programs
Directorate conducts risk assessments of surface transportation
facilities. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
have responsibilities for establishing standards for passenger rail
safety and security. In addition, public and private sector
transportation operators are responsible for implementing security
measures for their systems. For example, the primary responsibility for
securing passenger rail systems rests with the passenger rail
operators. Passenger rail operators, which can be public or private
entities, are responsible for administering and managing passenger rail
activities and services, including security.
DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation's Aviation and Surface
Transportation Systems, but More Work Remains
DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken numerous
initiatives to strengthen the security of the Nation's aviation and
surface transportation systems. In large part, these efforts have been
guided by legislative mandates designed to strengthen the security of
commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
These efforts have also been affected by events external to the
department, including the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to blow up
commercial aircraft bound from London to the United States, and the
2004 Madrid and 2005 London train bombings. While progress has been
made in many areas with respect to securing the transportation network,
we found that the department can strengthen its efforts in some key
areas outlined by the Congress, the Administration, and the department
itself. Specifically, regarding commercial aviation, we reported that
DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations in this area,
and has generally not achieved 7 expectations. Regarding the security
of surface transportation modes, we reported that DHS has generally
achieved three performance expectations and has generally not achieved
two others. We identified these performance expectations through
reviews of key legislation, Homeland Security Presidential Directives,
and DHS strategic planning documents.
Aviation Security
Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its efforts on
aviation security and has developed and implemented a variety of
programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. For example, TSA
has undertaken efforts to hire, train and deploy a screening workforce;
and screen passengers, baggage, and cargo. Although TSA has taken
important actions to strengthen aviation security, the agency has faced
difficulties in implementing an advanced, government-run passenger
prescreening program for domestic flights, and in developing and
implementing technology to screen passengers at security checkpoints
and cargo placed on aircraft, among other areas. As shown in table 1,
we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS in the area of
aviation security, and found that overall, DHS has made moderate
progress in meeting these expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS
has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and has generally
not achieved 7 performance expectations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1.--Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation Security
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessment
-----------------------------------------------------
Performance expectation Generally Generally not No assessment
achieved achieved made
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation security strategic approach
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implement a strategic approach for aviation security 3
functions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airport perimeter security and access controls
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish standards and procedures for effective airport 3
perimeter security
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish standards and procedures to effectively control 3
access to airport secured areas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish procedures for implementing biometric identifier 3
systems for airport secured areas access control
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ensure the screening of airport employees against 3
terrorist watch lists
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation security workforce
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hire and deploy a federal screening workforce 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop standards for determining aviation security 3
staffing at airports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish standards for training and testing the 3
performance of airport screener staff
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish a program and requirements to allow eligible 3
airports to use a private screening workforce
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train and deploy federal air marshals on high-risk flights 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish standards for training flight and cabin crews 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish a program to allow authorized flight deck 3
officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist
or criminal acts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger prescreening
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish policies and procedures to ensure that 3
individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk
or threat to security are identified and subjected to
appropriate action
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop and implement an advanced prescreening system to 3
allow DHS to compare domestic passenger information to
the Selectee List and No Fly List
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop and implement an international passenger 3
prescreening process to compare passenger information to
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Checkpoint screening
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop and implement processes and procedures for 3
physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop and test checkpoint technologies to address 3
vulnerabilities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deploy checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Checked Baggage screening
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS) and explosive 3
trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage
for explosives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage screening 3
equipment at airports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursue the deployment and use of in-line baggage screening 3
equipment at airports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air cargo security
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop a plan for air cargo security 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop and implement procedures to screen air cargo 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop and implement technologies to screen air cargo 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 17 7 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis.
Aviation Security Strategic Approach. We concluded that DHS has
generally achieved this performance expectation. In our past work, we
reported that TSA identified and implemented a wide range of
initiatives to strengthen the security of key components of the
commercial aviation system. These components are interconnected and
each is critical to the overall security of commercial aviation.\7\ \8\
More recently, in March 2007, TSA released its National Strategy on
Aviation Security and six supporting plans that provided more detailed
strategic planning guidance in the areas of systems security;
operational threat response; systems recovery; domain surveillance; and
intelligence integration and domestic and international outreach.
According to TSA officials, an Interagency Implementation Working Group
was established under TSA leadership in January 2007 to initiate
implementation efforts for the 112 actions outlined in the supporting
plans.
Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. We concluded that
DHS has generally achieved one, and has generally not achieved three,
of the performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has
taken action to ensure the screening of airport employees against
terrorist watch lists by requiring airport operators to compare
applicants' names against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. However, in
June 2004, we reported that although TSA had begun evaluating
commercial airport perimeter and access control security through
regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of selected access
procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected airports, TSA had
not determined how the results of these evaluations could be used to
make improvements to the Nation's airport system as a whole. We further
reported that although TSA had begun evaluating the controls that limit
access into secured airport areas, it had not completed actions to
ensure that all airport workers in these areas were vetted prior to
being hired and trained.\9\ More recently, in March 2007, the DHS
Office of Inspector General, based on the results of its access control
testing at 14 domestic airports across the Nation, made various
recommendations to enhance the overall effectiveness of controls that
limit access to airport secured areas.\10\ In March through July 2007,
DHS provided us with updated information on procedures, plans, and
other efforts it had implemented to secure airport perimeters and
strengthen access controls, including a description of its Aviation
Direct Access Screening Program. This program provides for TSOs to
randomly screen airport and airline employees and employees' property
and vehicles as they enter the secured areas of airports for the
presence of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other items of
interest as well as improper airport identification. However, DHS did
not provide us with evidence that these actions provide for effective
airport perimeter security, nor information on how the actions
addressed all relevant requirements established by law and in our prior
recommendations.
Regarding procedures for implementing biometric identification
systems, we reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing
new technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports and
the commercial airport system as a whole.\11\ In December 2004 and
September 2006, we reported on the status of the development and
testing of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program
(TWIC) \12\--DHS's effort to develop biometric access control systems
to verify the identity of individuals accessing secure transportation
areas. Our 2004 report identified challenges that TSA faced in
developing regulations and a comprehensive plan for managing the
program, as well as several factors that caused TSA to miss initial
deadlines for issuing TWIC cards. In our September 2006 report, we
identified the challenges that TSA encountered during TWIC program
testing, and several problems related to contract planning and
oversight. Specifically, we reported that DHS and industry stakeholders
faced difficult challenges in ensuring that biometric access control
technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment where
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program is being
initially tested. In October 2007, we testified that TSA had made
progress in implementing the program and addressing our recommendations
regarding contract planning and oversight and coordination with
stakeholders. For example, TSA reported that it added staff with
program and contract management expertise to help oversee the contract
and developed plans for conducting public outreach and education
efforts.\13\ However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will
implement a biometric identification system for access controls at
commercial airports. We have initiated ongoing work to further assess
DHS's efforts to establish procedures for implementing biometric
identifier systems for airport secured areas access control.
Aviation Security Workforce. We concluded that DHS has generally
achieved all 7 performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA
has hired and deployed a Federal screening workforce at over 400
commercial airports nationwide, and has developed standards for
determining TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA also established
numerous programs to train and test the performance of its TSO
workforce, although we reported that improvements in these efforts can
be made. Among other efforts, in December 2005, TSA reported completing
enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000 TSOs, and
increased its use of covert testing to assess vulnerabilities of
existing screening systems. TSA also established the Screening
Partnership Program which allows eligible airports to apply to TSA to
use a private screening workforce. In addition, TSA has trained and
deployed Federal air marshals on high-risk flights; established
standards for training flight and cabin crews; and established a
Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow
authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any
terrorist or criminal acts. Related to flight and cabin crew training,
TSA revised its guidance and standards to include additional training
elements required by law and to improve the organization and clarity of
the training. TSA also increased its efforts to measure the performance
of its TSO workforce through recertification testing and other
measures.
Passenger Prescreening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved
one, and has not generally achieved two, of the performance
expectations in this area. For example, TSA established policies and
procedures to ensure that individuals known to pose, or suspected of
posing, a risk or threat to security are identified and subjected to
appropriate action. Specifically, TSA requires that air carriers check
all passengers against the Selectee List, which identifies individuals
that represent a higher than normal security risk and therefore require
additional security screening, and the No Fly List, which identifies
individuals who are not allowed to fly.\14\ However, TSA has faced a
number of challenges in developing and implementing an advanced
prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, which will allow TSA to
take over the matching of passenger information against the No Fly and
Selectee lists from air carriers, as required by law.\15\ In 2006, we
reported that TSA had not conducted critical activities in accordance
with best practices for large-scale information technology programs and
had not followed a disciplined life cycle approach in developing Secure
Flight.\16\ In March 2007, DHS reported that as a result of its
rebaselining efforts, more effective government controls were developed
to implement Secure Flight and that TSA was following a more
disciplined development process. DHS further reported that it plans to
begin parallel operations with the first group of domestic air carriers
during Fiscal Year 2009 and to take over full responsibility for watch
list matching in Fiscal Year 2010. We are continuing to assess TSA's
efforts in developing and implementing the Secure Flight program. We
have also reported that DHS has not yet implemented enhancements to its
passenger prescreening process for passengers on international flights
departing from and bound for the United States.\17\ Although CBP
recently issued a final rule that will require air carriers to provide
passenger information to CBP prior to a flight's departure so that CBP
can compare passenger information to the terrorist watch lists before a
flight takes off, this requirement is not scheduled to take effect
until February 2008. In addition, while DHS plans to align its
international and domestic passenger prescreening programs under TSA,
full implementation of an integrated system will not occur for several
years.
Checkpoint Screening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved
two, and has not generally achieved one, of the performance
expectations in this area. For example, we reported that TSA has
developed processes and procedures for screening passengers at security
checkpoints and has worked to balance security needs with efficiency
and customer service considerations.\18\ More specifically, in April
2007, we reported that modifications to standard operating procedures
were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level
officials and program-level staff, as well as threat information and
the results of covert testing. However, we found that TSA's data
collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether
proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their
intended purpose. We also reported that DHS and its component agencies
have taken steps to improve the screening of passengers to address new
and emerging threats. For example, TSA established two recent
initiatives intended to strengthen the passenger checkpoint screening
process: (1) the Screening Passenger by Observation Technique program,
which is a behavior observation and analysis program designed to
provide TSA with a nonintrusive means of identifying potentially high-
risk individuals; and (2) the Travel Document Checker program which
replaces current travel document checkers with TSOs who have access to
sensitive security information on the threats facing the aviation
industry and check for fraudulent documents. However, we found that
while TSA has developed and tested checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities that may be exploited by identified threats such as
improvised explosive devices, it has not yet effectively deployed such
technologies. In July 2006, TSA reported that it installed 97
explosives trace portal machines--which use puffs of air to dislodge
and detect trace amounts of explosives on persons--at 37 airports.
However, DHS identified problems with these machines and has halted
their deployment. TSA is also developing backscatter technology, which
identifies explosives, plastics and metals, giving them shape and form
and allowing them to be visually interpreted.\19\ However, limited
progress has been made in fielding this technology at passenger
screening checkpoints. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), enacted in August 2007,
restates and amends a requirement that DHS issue a strategic plan for
deploying explosive detection equipment at airport checkpoints and
requires DHS to expedite research and development efforts to protect
passenger aircraft from explosives devices.\20\ We are currently
reviewing DHS and TSA's efforts to develop, test and deploy airport
checkpoint technologies.\21\
Checked Baggage Screening. We concluded that DHS has generally
achieved all three performance expectations in this area. Specifically,
from November 2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about
1,600 Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace
Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at
over 400 commercial airports.\22\ In response to mandates to field the
equipment quickly and to account for limitations in airport design, TSA
generally placed this equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in
airport lobbies--to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage
for explosives.\23\ Based in part on our previous recommendations, TSA
later developed a plan to integrate EDS and ETD machines in-line with
airport baggage conveyor systems. The installation of in-line systems
can result in considerable savings to TSA through the reduction of TSOs
needed to operate the equipment, as well as increased security. Despite
delays in the widespread deployment of in-line systems due to the high
upfront capital investment required, TSA is pursuing the installation
of these systems and is seeking creative financing solutions to fund
their deployment. In March 2007, DHS reported that it is working with
airport and air carrier stakeholders to improve checked baggage
screening solutions to enhance security and free up lobby space at
airports. The installation of in-line baggage screening systems
continues to be an issue of congressional concern. For example, the 9/
11 Commission Act reiterates a requirement that DHS submit a cost-
sharing study along with a plan and schedule for implementing
provisions of the study, and requires TSA to establish a prioritization
schedule for airport improvement projects such as the installation of
in-line baggage screening systems.\24\
Air Cargo Security. We reported that TSA has generally achieved
two, and has not generally achieved one, of the performance
expectations in this area. Specifically, TSA has developed a strategic
plan for domestic air cargo security and has taken actions to use risk
management principles to guide investment decisions related to air
cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country, referred to
as inbound air cargo, but these actions are not yet complete. For
example, TSA plans to assess inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and
critical assets--two crucial elements of a risk-based management
approach--but has not yet established a methodology or time-frame for
how and when these assessments will be completed.\25\ TSA has also
developed and implemented procedures to screen domestic and inbound air
cargo. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased
the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air carrier
and indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements.
However, we also reported that TSA exempted certain cargo from random
inspection because it did not view the exempted cargo as posing a
significant security risk, although air cargo stakeholders noted that
such exemptions may create potential security risks and vulnerabilities
since shippers may know how to package their cargo to avoid
inspection.\26\ In part based on a recommendation we made, TSA is
evaluating existing exemptions to determine whether they pose a
security risk, and has removed some exemptions that were previously
allowed. The 9/11 Commission Act requires, no later than 3 years after
its enactment, that DHS have a system in place to screen 100 percent of
cargo transported on passenger aircraft.\27\ Although TSA has taken
action to develop plans for securing air cargo and establishing and
implementing procedures to screen air cargo, DHS has not yet developed
and implemented screening technologies. DHS is pursuing multiple
technologies to automate the detection of explosives in the types and
quantities that would cause catastrophic damage to an aircraft in
flight. However, TSA acknowledged that full development of these
technologies may take 5 to 7 years. In April 2007, we reported that TSA
and DHS's S&T Directorate were in the early stages of evaluating and
piloting available aviation security technologies to determine their
applicability to the domestic air cargo environment. We further
reported that although TSA anticipates completing its pilot tests by
2008, it has not yet established time frames for when it might
implement these methods or technologies for the inbound air cargo
system.\28\
Surface Transportation Security
Although TSA has devoted the vast majority of its resources to
securing commercial aviation and to meeting related statutory
requirements, it has more recently increased its focus on the security
of surface modes of transportation. However, these efforts are still
largely in the early stages. International events such as the March
2004 Madrid and July 2005 London train bombings, have, in part,
contributed to this increased focus. Specifically, TSA and other DHS
components have developed an approach for securing surface modes of
transportation, have taken steps to conduct risk assessments of surface
transportation assets; and have administered related grant programs.
However, TSA has not issued standards for securing all surface
transportation modes, and is still defining what its regulatory role
will be. Moreover, although TSA has made progress in conducting
compliance inspections of some surface transportation systems,
inspectors' roles and missions have not been fully defined. As shown in
table 2, we identified five performance expectations for DHS in the
area of surface transportation security and found that, overall, DHS
primarily through the efforts of TSA has made moderate progress in
meeting these expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has
generally achieved three performance expectations and has generally not
achieved two performance expectations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Surface Transportation Security
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessment
-----------------------------------------------------
Performance expectation Generally Generally not No assessment
achieved achieved made
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop and adopt a strategic approach for implementing 3
surface transportation security functions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments 3
of surface transportation assets
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue standards for securing surface transportation modes 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conduct compliance inspections for surface transportation 3
systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administer grant programs for surface transportation 3
security
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3 2 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis.
Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions. We
concluded that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation.
In May 2007, DHS issued the sector-specific plan for transportation
systems and supporting annexes for surface transportation modes, and
reported taking actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the
plan. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan and its
supporting modal implementation plans and appendixes establish a
strategic approach for securing surface transportation modes based on
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and Executive Order 13416,
Strengthening Surface Transportation Security. The Transportation
Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security framework that is
intended to enable sector stakeholders to make effective and
appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation decisions.
During the course of our work assessing freight rail, commercial
vehicles, and highway infrastructure security, we identified that TSA
has begun to implement some of the security initiatives outlined in the
sector-specific plan and supporting modal plans. While DHS has issued a
strategy for securing all transportation modes, and has demonstrated
that it has begun to take actions to implement the goals and objectives
outlined in the strategy, we have not yet analyzed the overall quality
of the plan or supporting modal annexes, the extent to which efforts
outlined in the plan and annexes have been implemented, or the
effectiveness of identified security initiatives. In addition, we
recognize that the acceptance of DHS's approach by Federal, state and
local, and private sector stakeholders is crucial to its successful
implementation. We also have not assessed the extent to which the plan
and supporting modal annexes were coordinated with or adopted by these
stakeholders. We will continue to assess DHS's efforts to implement its
strategy for securing surface transportation modes as part of our
ongoing reviews of mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial
vehicle, and highway infrastructure security.
Threat, Criticality and Vulnerability Assessments. We reported that
DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation. TSA has taken
actions to conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments
of surface transportation assets, particularly for mass transit,
passenger rail, and freight rail, but we have not yet reviewed the
quality of many of these assessments. TSA uses threat assessments and
information as part of its surface transportation security efforts. For
example, TSA has conducted threat assessments of mass transit,
passenger rail, and freight rail transportation modes. TSA has also
conducted assessments of the vulnerabilities associated with surface
transportation assets, to varying degrees, for most surface modes of
transportation. For freight rail, for example, we found that TSA has
conducted vulnerability assessments of High Threat Urban Area rail
corridors where toxic inhalation hazard shipments are transported.
However, TSA's vulnerability assessment efforts are still ongoing and
in some instances, are in the early stages, particularly for commercial
vehicles and highway infrastructure. With regard to criticality
assessments, DHS has conducted such assessments for some surface
transportation modes. For example, TSA has conducted Corporate Security
Reviews with 38 state Department of Transportation highway programs. In
addition, the National Protection and Programs Directorate's Office of
Infrastructure Protection conducts highway infrastructure assessments
that look at critical highway infrastructure assets. We testified in
January 2007 that TSA had reported completing an overall threat
assessment for mass transit and passenger and freight rail modes, and
had conducted criticality assessments of nearly 700 passenger rail
stations. In addition, we further reported that the Grant Programs
Directorate developed and implemented a risk assessment tool to help
passenger rail operators better respond to terrorist attacks and
prioritize security measures. We will continue to review threat,
criticality and vulnerability assessments conducted by TSA and other
DHS components for surface modes of transportation during our ongoing
work assessing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, highway
infrastructure, and commercial vehicle security.\29\
Issuance of Security Standards. We found that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. TSA has taken actions to develop
and issue security standards for mass transit, passenger rail, and
freight rail modes. However, TSA did not provide us with evidence of
its efforts to develop and issue security standards for all surface
transportation modes, or provided a rationale or explanation why
standards may not be needed for other modes. Specifically, TSA has
developed and issued security directives, security action items--
recommended measures for passenger rail and mass transit operators to
implement in their security programs to improve both security and
emergency preparedness, and a proposed rule in December 2006 on
passenger and freight rail security requirements.\30\ In April 2007,
DHS reported that TSA uses field activities to assess compliance with
security directives and implementation of noncompulsory security
standards and protective measures with the objective of a broad-based
enhancement of passenger rail and rail transit security. TSA also
reported that in its December 2006 notice of proposed rulemaking on new
security measures for freight rail carriers, it proposed requirements
designed to ensure 100 percent positive handoff of toxic inhalation
hazard shipments that enter high threat urban areas, as well as
security protocols for custody transfers of toxic inhalation hazard
rail cars in high-threat urban areas. TSA also reported that its High
Threat Urban Area rail corridor assessments supported the development
of the Recommended Security Action Items for the Rail Transportation of
Toxic Inhalation Materials issued by DHS and the Department of
Transportation in June 2006.
Compliance Inspections. We concluded that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. TSA has made progress in
conducting compliance inspections, particularly in hiring and deploying
inspectors, but inspectors' roles and missions have not yet been fully
defined. TSA officials have reported that the agency has hired 100
surface transportation inspectors whose stated mission is to, among
other duties, monitor and enforce compliance with TSA's rail security
directives. However, some mass transit and passenger rail operators
have expressed confusion and concern about the role of TSA inspectors
and the potential that these inspections could duplicate other Federal
and state rail inspections. In March and April 2007, with respect to
freight rail, TSA reported visiting terminal and railroad yards to
measure implementation of 7 of 24 DHS recommended security action items
for the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard materials. Through
its Surface Transportation Security Inspection program, TSA reported
that its inspectors conduct inspections of key facilities for rail and
transit systems to assess transit systems' implementation of core
transit security fundamentals and comprehensive security action items;
conduct examinations of stakeholder operations, including compliance
with security directives; identify security gaps; and develop effective
practices. Although TSA has deployed inspectors to conduct compliance
inspections and carry out other security activities in the mass
transit, passenger rail, and freight rail modes, TSA did not provide us
with evidence that it has conducted compliance inspections for other
surface transportation modes or information on whether the department
believes compliance inspections are needed for other modes.
The 9/11 Commission Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA
to employ additional surface transportation inspectors and requires
that surface transportation inspectors have relevant transportation
experience and appropriate security and inspection qualifications.\31\
The Act also requires DHS to consult periodically with surface
transportation entities on the inspectors' duties, responsibilities,
authorities, and mission. We will continue to assess TSA's inspection
efforts during our ongoing work.\32\
Grant Programs. We reported that DHS generally achieved this
performance expectation. More specifically, DHS has developed and
administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes.
However, some industry stakeholders have raised concerns regarding
DHS's current grant process, such as time delays and other barriers in
the provision of grant funding. We have not yet assessed DHS's
provision of grant funding or the extent to which DHS monitors the use
of the funds. In March 2007, we reported that the DHS Office of Grants
and Training, now called the Grant Programs Directorate, has used
various programs to fund passenger rail security since 2003.\33\
Through the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program, the Grant
Programs Directorate has provided grants to urban areas to help enhance
their overall security and preparedness level to prevent, respond to,
and recover from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs Directorate used
Fiscal Year 2005, 2006, and 2007 appropriations to build on the work
under way through the Urban Area Security Initiative program, and
create and administer new programs focused specifically on
transportation security, including the Transit Security Grant Program
and the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. The 9/11
Commission Act requires DHS to establish grant programs for security
improvements in the public transportation, passenger and freight rail,
and over-the-road bus modes and requires DHS to take certain actions in
implementing the grant programs.\34\ For example, the Act requires that
DHS determine the requirements for grant recipients and establish the
priorities for which grant funding may be used, and it requires that
DHS and DOT determine the most effective and efficient way to
distribute grant funds, authorizing DHS to transfer funds to DOT for
the purpose of disbursement. We will be assessing grants distributed
for mass transit and passenger rail as part of our ongoing work.\35\
Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS's Efforts in Implementing Its
Mission and Management Functions
Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut
across DHS's mission and core management functions. These issues have
impeded the department's progress since its inception and will continue
as DHS moves forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work
to strengthen each of its mission and core management functions, to
include transportation security, it is equally important that these key
issues be addressed from a comprehensive, department-wide perspective
to help ensure that the department has the structure and processes in
place to effectively address the threats and vulnerabilities that face
the Nation. These issues include: (1) transforming and integrating
DHS's management functions; (2) establishing baseline performance goals
and measures and engaging in effective strategic planning efforts; (3)
applying and strengthening a risk management approach for implementing
missions and making resource allocation decisions; (4) sharing
information with key stakeholders; and (5) coordinating and partnering
with Federal, state and local, and private sector agencies. We have
made numerous recommendations to DHS and its components to strengthen
these efforts, and the department has made progress in implementing
some of these recommendations.
DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform
into a fully functioning department. We designated DHS's implementation
and transformation as high-risk in part because failure to effectively
address this challenge could have serious consequences for our security
and economy. DHS continues to face challenges in key areas including
acquisition, financial, human capital, and information technology
management. This array of management and programmatic challenges
continues to limit DHS' ability to effectively and efficiently carry
out its mission. In addition, transparency plays an important role in
helping to ensure effective and efficient transformation efforts. We
have reported that DHS has not made its management or operational
decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it is
effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of
dollars in funding it receives annually. More specifically, in April
2007, we testified that we have encountered access issues during
numerous engagements at DHS, including significant delays in obtaining
requested documents that have affected our ability to do our work in a
timely manner.\36\ The Secretary of DHS and the Under Secretary for
Management have stated their desire to work with us to resolve access
issues and to provide greater transparency. It will be important for
DHS and its components to become more transparent and minimize
recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and
operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess
its efforts.
In addition, DHS has not always implemented effective strategic
planning efforts and has not yet fully developed performance measures
or put into place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing
for results. We have identified strategic planning as one of the
critical success factors for new organizations, and reported that DHS
as well as TSA and other component efforts in this area have been
mixed. For example, with regards to TSA's efforts to secure air cargo,
we reported that TSA completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November
2003 that outlined a threat-based risk management approach to securing
the Nation's domestic air cargo system, and that this plan identified
strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air cargo
security based on risk, cost, and deadlines. However, we reported that
TSA had not developed a similar strategy for addressing the security of
inbound air cargo--cargo transported into the United States from
foreign countries, including how best to partner with CBP and
international air cargo stakeholders. In another example, we reported
that TSA had not yet developed outcome-based performance measures for
its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs,
such as the percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as
a result of TSA's on-site assistance and recommendations, to identify
any aspects of these programs that may need attention. We recommended
that DHS direct TSA and CBP to develop a risk-based strategy, including
specific goals and objectives, for securing air cargo; \37\ and develop
outcome-based performance measures for its foreign airport assessment
and air carrier inspection programs.\38\ DHS generally concurred with
GAO's recommendations.
DHS has also not fully adopted and applied a risk management
approach in implementing its mission and core management functions.
Risk management has been widely supported by the President and Congress
as an approach for allocating resources to the highest priority
homeland security investments, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security have made it a
centerpiece of DHS and TSA policy. Several DHS component agencies and
TSA have worked toward integrating risk-based decisionmaking into their
security efforts, but we reported that these efforts can be
strengthened. For example, TSA has incorporated certain risk management
principles into securing air cargo, but has not completed assessments
of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets--two crucial elements
of a risk-based approach without which TSA may not be able to
appropriately focus its resources on the most critical security needs.
TSA has also incorporated risk-based decisionmaking when making
modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures, to include
modifying procedures based on intelligence information and
vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport
checkpoints. However, in April 2007 we reported that TSA's analyses
that supported screening procedural changes could be strengthened. For
example, TSA officials based their decision to revise the prohibited
items list to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto
aircraft based on their review of threat information--which indicated
that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system--so
that TSOs could concentrate on higher threat items.\39\ However, TSA
officials did not conduct the analysis necessary to help them determine
whether this screening change would affect TSO's ability to focus on
higher-risk threats.\40\
We have further reported that opportunities exist to enhance the
effectiveness of information sharing among Federal agencies, state and
local governments, and private sector entities. In August 2003, we
reported that efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing
need to be strengthened, and in 2005, we designated information sharing
for homeland security as high-risk.\41\ In January 2005, we reported
that the Nation still lacked an implemented set of government-wide
policies and processes for sharing terrorism-related information, but
DHS has issued a strategy on how it will put in place the overall
framework, policies, and architecture for sharing information with all
critical partners--actions that we and others have recommended.\42\ DHS
has taken some steps to implement its information sharing
responsibilities. States and localities are also creating their own
information ``fusion'' centers, some with DHS support. With respect to
transportation security, the importance of information sharing was
recently highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Act which requires DHS to
establish a plan to promote the sharing of transportation security
information among DHS and Federal, state and local agencies, tribal
governments, and appropriate private entities.\43\ The Act also
requires that DHS provide timely threat information to carriers and
operators that are preparing and submitting a vulnerability assessment
and security plan, including an assessment of the most likely methods
that could be used by terrorists to exploit weaknesses in their
security.\44\
In addition to providing Federal leadership with respect to
homeland security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the
activities of key stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this
regard. To secure the nation, DHS must form effective and sustained
partnerships between legacy component agencies and a range of other
entities, including other Federal agencies, state and local
governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and international
partners. We have reported that successful partnering and coordination
involves collaborating and consulting with stakeholders to develop and
agree on goals, strategies, and roles to achieve a common purpose;
identify resource needs; establish a means to operate across agency
boundaries, such as compatible procedures, measures, data, and systems;
and agree upon and document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report
to the public on the results of joint efforts.\45\ We have found that
the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and
between the levels of government, and with the private sector, are
evolving and need to be clarified. For example, we reported that
opportunities exists for TSA to work with foreign governments and
industry to identify best practices for securing passenger rail, and
air cargo, and recommended that TSA systematically compile and analyze
information on practices used abroad to identify those that may
strengthen the department's overall security efforts.\46\ Further,
regarding efforts to respond to in-flight security threats, which
depending on the nature of the threat could involve more than 15
Federal agencies and agency components, we recommended that DHS and
other departments document and share their respective coordination and
communication strategies and response procedures.\47\ In September
2005, we reported that TSA did not effectively involve private sector
stakeholders in its decisionmaking process for developing security
standards for passenger rail assets.\48\ We recommended that DHS
develop security standards that reflect industry best practices and can
be measured, monitored, and enforced by TSA rail inspectors and, if
appropriate, rail asset owners. DHS agreed with these recommendations.
In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act includes provisions designed to
improve coordination with stakeholders. For example, the Act requires
DHS and the Department of Transportation to develop an annex to the
Memorandum of Understanding between the two departments governing the
specific roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments in
addressing motor carrier transportation security matters, including the
processes the departments will follow to promote communications and
efficiency, and avoid duplication of effort.\49\ The Act also requires
DHS in consultation with the Department of Transportation to establish
a program to provide appropriate information that DHS has gathered or
developed on the performance, use, and testing of technologies that may
be used to enhance surface transportation security to surface
transportation entities.\50\
Concluding Observations
The magnitude of DHS's and more specifically TSA's responsibilities
in securing the Nation's transportation system is significant, and we
commend the department on the work it has done and is currently doing
to secure this network. Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA
plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that its programs and
initiatives operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the
almost 6 years since its creation, TSA has had to undertake its
critical mission while also establishing and forming a new agency. At
the same time, a variety of factors, including threats to and attacks
on transportation systems around the world, as well as new legislative
requirements, have led the agency to reassess its priorities and
reallocate resources to address key events, and to respond to emerging
threats. Although TSA has made considerable progress in addressing key
aspects of commercial aviation security, more work remains in the areas
of checkpoint and air cargo technology, airport security, and passenger
prescreening. Further, although TSA has more recently taken actions in
a number of areas to help secure surface modes of transportation, its
efforts are still largely in the early stage, and the nature of its
regulatory role, and relationship with transportation operators, is
still being defined. As DHS, TSA, and other components move forward, it
will be important for the department to work to address the challenges
that have affected its operations thus far, including developing
results-oriented goals and measures to assess performance; developing
and implementing a risk-based approach to guide resource decisions; and
establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing
information and coordinating with homeland security partners. A well-
managed, high-performing department is essential to meeting the
significant challenge of securing the transportation network. As DHS,
TSA, and other components continue to evolve, implement their programs,
and integrate their functions, we will continue to review their
progress and performance and provide information to Congress and the
public on these efforts.
Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee may
have at this time.
Endnotes
\1\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, D.C.: August 2007); GAO, Department of Homeland Security:
Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,
GAO-07-1081T (Washington, D.C.: September 2007); and GAO, Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and
Management Functions, GAO-07-1240T (Washington, D.C.: September 2007).
\2\ Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25
percent or less of the identified performance expectations. Modest
progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 25
percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance
expectations. Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally
achieve more than 50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified
performance expectations. Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions
to generally achieve more than 75 percent of the identified performance
expectations.
\3\ GAO-07-454.
\4\ A risk management approach entails a continuous process of
managing risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic
goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives,
selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring
those initiatives.
\5\ Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
\6\ Currently, air carriers departing the United States are
required to transmit passenger manifest information to CBP no later
than 15 minutes prior to departure but, for flights bound for the
United States, air carriers are not required to transmit the
information until 15 minutes after the flight's departure (in general,
after the aircraft is in flight). See 19 C.F.R. 122.49a, 122.75a. In
a final rule published in the Federal Register on August 23, 2007, CBP
established a requirement for all air carriers to either transmit the
passenger manifest information to CBP no later than 30 minutes prior to
the securing of the aircraft doors (that is, prior to the flight being
airborne), or transmit manifest information on an individual basis as
each passenger checks in for the flight up to but no later than the
securing of the aircraft. See 72 Fed. Reg. 48320 (Aug. 23, 2007). This
requirement is to take effect on February 19, 2008.
\7\ For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements
Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain,
GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
\8\ For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security:
Transportation Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a
Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but
Challenges Remain, GAO-06-597T, (Washington, D.C.: April 2006) and GAO,
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-04-728
(Washington, D.C.: June 2004).
\9\ GAO-06-597T and GAO-04-728.
\10\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Audit of Access to Airport Secured Areas (Unclassified Summary), OIG-
07-35 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007).
\11\ GAO-06-597T and GAO-04-728.
\12\ GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and
Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106
(Washington, D.C.: December 2004), and Transportation Security: DHS
Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2006).
\13\ GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and
Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106
(Washington, D.C.: December 2004), and Transportation Security: DHS
Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2006).
\14\ In accordance with TSA-issued security requirements,
passengers on the No Fly List are denied boarding passes and are not
permitted to fly unless cleared by law enforcement officers. Similarly,
passengers who are on the Selectee List are issued boarding passes, and
they and their baggage undergo additional security measures.
\15\ See 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(C).
\16\ GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
\17\ GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning
to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T
(Washington, D.C.: February 2007) and GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts
to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, but
Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-346 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2007).
\18\ For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Risk,
Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline Passenger
Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed
Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007);
GAO, Aviation Security: TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has
Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the
Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive, GAO-07-623R
(Washington, D.C.: April 2007); GAO, Airport Passenger Screening:
Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining,
GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: September 2003); and GAO, Aviation
Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening,
but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
\19\ GAO-06-371T.
\20\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1607, 1610, 121 Stat. 266, 483-85
(2007).
\21\ For more information, see GAO-06-371T.
\22\ Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to
detect characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage
as it moves along a conveyor belt. Explosive trace detection (ETD)
works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators
collect samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an
object that TSOs determine to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the
ETD machine, which then chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any
traces of explosive materials.
\23\ For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: TSA
Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: July 2006), GAO-06-371T,
and GAO-07-448T.
\24\ See Pub. L. No. 110-88. 1603-04, 121 Stat. at 480-81.
\25\ For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Federal
Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76,
(Washington, D.C.: October 2005) and GAO, Aviation Security: Federal
Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and
Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
\26\ GAO-06-76.
\27\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602, 121 Stat. at 477-79. This
provision defines screening as a physical examination or non-intrusive
method of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation
security that includes the use of technology, procedures, personnel, or
other methods to provide a level of security commensurate with the
level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage.
Methods such as solely performing a review of information about the
contents of cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper of the cargo,
including whether a known shipper is registered in TSA's known shipper
database, do not constitute screening under this provision.
\28\ GAO-07-660.
\29\ For more information, see GAO-06-181T; GAO, Passenger Rail
Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide
Security Efforts, GAO-07-225T (Washington, D.C.: January 2007); and
GAO-06-181T.
\30\ See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006).
\31\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1304, 121 Stat. at 393-94.
\32\ For more information, see GAO-07-225T; GAO-06-181T; and GAO,
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.:
October 2005).
\33\ GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced
Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts GAO-07-
583T (Washington, D.C.: March 2007).
\34\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1406, 1513, 1532, 121 Stat. at 405-
08, 433-35, 457-60.
\35\ For more information, see GAO-06-181T and GAO-07-583T.
\36\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO
Access to Information on Programs and Activities, GAO-07-700T,
(Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
\37\ GAO-07-660.
\38\ GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These
Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-729 (Washington, D.C.: May 11,
2007).
\39\ GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer
Concerns, GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007).
\40\ GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer
Concerns Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but
Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved,
GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007).
\41\ GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing
Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 2003, and
GAO, HIGH-RISK SERIES: An Update GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).
\42\ GAO-07-454.
\43\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1203, 121 Stat. at 383-86.
\44\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1512(d)(2), 1531(d)(2), 121 Stat.
at 430, 455.
\45\ GAO-07-660.
\46\ GAO-07-660 and GAO-05-851.
\47\ GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to
In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be
Strengthened, GAO-07-891R (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
\48\ GAO-05-851.
\49\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1541, 121 Stat. at 469.
\50\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1305, 121 Stat. at 394-95.
Senator Dorgan. Ms. Berrick, thank you very much.
Mr. Hawley, let me ask you a couple of questions, first,
about the Government Accountability Office assessment. One of
the things they concluded is that the perimeter security at
airports is probably not sufficient, and the plans, at this
point, may not be sufficient. All of us who go to airports
understand the security inside the airport terminal. We go
through it. We watch it. We experience it. But the security
with respect to the perimeter of the airport is also very, very
important. Tell us your assessment of what you are doing in
that area, and what the progress has been.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. The--every airport has its own
security plan that is tailored for their particular
circumstances, and that does include perimeter security. So,
first of all, there is perimeter security in place that is
inspected by us and owned and operated by the airports
themselves. So, the commentary in the report was, I believe, in
part, based on some pilot tests that were done and the
criticism was, ``Hey, you've tested some of this stuff, but
it's not widely deployed.'' And I would agree that more can be
done. And it is a partnership that we have with the airports. I
think, it is--it is important, as you noted, the security
everybody sees at the front of the airport, it really extends
to the perimeter and everything inside the perimeter. And I
think--I view those as equally important, because if we just
set up a strong perimeter, and don't have security that
operates on the inside against, perhaps, the insider threat,
that that's not a good thing. So, we need to have all of that
covered, and that is what we're doing.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Hawley, let me ask about the issue of
an award made to BearingPoint in 2004, which you're familiar
with, to do a pilot project to provide transportation security
credentials to 75,000 workers at various ports, airports, train
stations, transportation sites. My understanding is that, by
mid-2006, some $26 million had been spent, and there were only
4,000 workers in this whole matrix that had cards. Then, in
2007, TSA awarded a $70 million contract to Lockheed Martin to
provide credentials to 850,000 individuals. Deployment had been
expected in March of this year, but apparently a botched
transfer of data from BearingPoint to Lockheed further delayed
that.
I ask this question because I was involved, some while ago,
in the issue of recruiting for screeners at airports, and we
found out that the company that did that had actually had
recruiting sessions at the Waldorf Astoria, in New York, at
very expensive ski resorts, and so on. And that company, of
course, was taken to task for that, but I think there was
pretty sloppy oversight of that company. Tell me about this
circumstance, where we provide a contract to BearingPoint,
didn't get the performance; now we provide a contract to
Lockheed Martin, they couldn't transfer the data. Tell me about
what's happening. And the reason I ask----
Mr. Hawley. Well----
Senator Dorgan.--the question, is because credentialing
people at these critical sites--airports, train stations, and
so on--is really important. You've got to know who's there and
who has access.
Mr. Hawley. Right. And the problems you mentioned have been
solved, and it's--we refer to is as the TWIC program,
Transportation Worker Identification Credential. And it's
rolling out--in fact, today is the first day they're actually
physically enrolling transportation workers at the Port of
Wilmington, Delaware. And the issue there at the transition was
essentially a technological issue of migrating systems so that
they would interact with our other vetting systems for aviation
and the other modes. And there--we were concerned that, if
there was a problem with that integration, it would not only
slow down the TWIC part, but would hurt the rest of our
vetting. So, we took that slowly and carefully, but it is now
resolved. That's--that was a lot of the concern that everybody
had, frankly, this spring. But now Lockheed Martin is in place,
those issues are behind us, and cards are being issued as we
speak.
Senator Dorgan. And you feel there is ample and proper
oversight by the agency?
Mr. Hawley. There is. The security measures--and this also
is--a GAO report was critical of a lot of the pieces behind the
TWIC program; and those, we did address, have addressed, and I
believe they are resolved, at this point.
Senator Dorgan. The GAO report was critical of the
oversight and management.
Ms. Berrick, what is your assessment, having looked at all
of this, with respect to rail security? Has rail security been
given short shrift? You know, all of us understand what happens
when you get on an airplane. And we also understand how little
of that occurs when you try to get on Amtrak or a passenger
train. Has rail security been given short shrift here?
Ms. Berrick. I think, compared to all surface modes of
transportation, TSA and DHS have placed more of a focus on
passenger rail and mass transit, because, based on intelligence
information, they view that as a risk-based decision, focusing
on the area--the areas of surface transportation modes where
they should be spending their time. So, they've issued security
directives for passenger rail, they've issued security action
items. They've hired inspectors to follow up on these
requirements and work with rail operators to strengthen
security. We identified areas where they could do additional
work. For example, we reported that inspectors' roles haven't
been fully defined. Rail operators aren't completely certain
whether or not the security directives are mandatory or
voluntary. There can be increased communication between TSA and
the rail operators. But we found that they have put more and
more focus on it, and they're continuing to do that.
Senator Dorgan. Ms. Berrick, thank you very much.
I indicated, at the start, before some members were here,
that Senator Inouye is not able to be at the hearing, and
Senator Stevens will chair in his absence.
Senator Stevens, did you wish to go in order of arrival?
Senator Stevens. Yes. The Senator----
Senator Dorgan. All right.
Senator Stevens.--was ahead of me.
Senator Dorgan. All right. Senator Smith, McCaskill,
Stevens, Snowe, and Klobuchar would be the order of arrival.
Senator Stevens. Right, OK. Thanks.
Senator Dorgan. And I have to be over on the floor of the
Senate, so Senator Stevens will recognize those Senators.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Smith?
Senator Stevens [presiding]. Senator Smith?
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Stevens--Senator Dorgan,
as well.
Mr. Hawley, in my opening statement I referred to the
testimony of the Government Accountability Office that quotes,
``While TSA initiated efforts to develop security standards for
surface transportation modes, these efforts have been limited
to passenger and freight rail, and have not addressed
commercial vehicles or highway infrastructure, including
bridges and tunnels.'' How do you respond to that statement? Is
that an accurate statement, in your view?
Mr. Hawley. Well, on the highway side, we've done--we've
worked with the individual states and the trucking community,
basically, and are--have started with the hazardous materials
drivers, those who have the hazardous materials endorsement,
and we do full checks on those people. So, that is in place
today, and it really is adding layers as we go. I think the
bridges and tunnels would be a very high priority, and that is
something that we work on with the states and also other
elements of DHS. And the question of exactly what the
regulatory scheme is, beyond what we have in place for
hazardous materials, would be the next step, and we are looking
at the vetting--basically, watch list checking against the CDL
holders, those who have commercial driver's license. We also
have a ``See Something, Say Something'' program that is good
for reporting of suspicious incidents.
Senator Smith. I understand from your reports, that roughly
three-quarters of your budget goes toward aviation. That must
be in response to the threat levels that you hear, or is it for
some other reason that that's the preponderance?
Mr. Hawley. It is for another reason. And the reason is
that the economic model that we use for aviation is--the
Federal Government actually does the operation of it; whereas,
in the other modes it's done by State and local and private
sector. It's a shared responsibility everywhere, but the bulk
of our budget comes from paying the officers who work in the
airports.
Senator Smith. And do you see that shifting, over time,
more to surface transportation?
Mr. Hawley. No. No. I think that that's the economic
model----
Senator Smith. It's just a function of the State and
Federal responsibilities.
Mr. Hawley. Correct.
Senator Smith. OK. I'm curious, in 2004-2005 we saw
terrorists attack train systems in Madrid and London, England,
and I wonder, if we have similar threats, why our focus hasn't
been more on the rail system.
Mr. Hawley. Well, I--the focus is on the rail system more
than, perhaps, it appears. And you will see that in the transit
communities with our pairing with local law enforcement and
providing them the technology. And we do VIPR teams with them.
But, most importantly, for both rail and transit rail, is the
employee training, and we've seen a major shift to something
that--in working with the Congress--what we've done is shift
the priority of the grant money to front-line training, which
we think has an immediate application to stop terrorist
attacks. And so, that's on the passenger rail side. On the
freight rail side, we have an agreement that's in place that's
already reduced the amount of toxic material that is standing
unattended in high-threat urban areas. And we're doing a
regulation now to back that up, but we've already seen the
improvement.
Senator Smith. One final question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hawley, it's been interesting to follow TSA since 9/11,
and the different kinds of technologies employed, and it seems
to be getting better and better and more efficient all the
time. And I'm wondering, as you look into the future, what is
the best technology for providing security to the American
people that you see?
Mr. Hawley. The best technology is the human brain, because
we're fighting an enemy who, when we put in place something
that is rigid, will figure a way to go around it. So, we always
have to have the human element to not allow them--they have
unlimited time to plan--not allow them the ability to plan a
perfect attack. But, I think, the technology we're testing now
in Phoenix to detect explosives on the body, I think that is--
that has been a concern of all of ours, and that's now getting
in place; and the privacy aspects of that are critical, and
looking forward to the public debate as we roll that out.
I think the explosive detection for baggage is moving along
pretty well, but the main--the big bonus will be when we have
stand-off explosive detection, to be able to--as people go
through a lobby area, be able to detect it without forcing them
to go through a bottleneck.
Senator Smith. Very good. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hawley, in December of 2001, according to the IG at the
Department of Transportation, a senior aircraft technician at a
foreign repair station in Singapore was found to be a member of
the terrorist organization al Qaeda. Based on interviews with
the repair station personnel, the IG determined that this
technician had photographed U.S. aircraft as potential targets
for a terrorist attack. That was in December of 2001. That was
one of several different facts that the IG revealed in a
scathing report concerning foreign repair stations and security
issues. There are foreign repair stations located at a minimum
of five countries that have been identified by the U.S. State
Department as terrorist safe havens.
Now, as a result of this report, Congress took it very
seriously and passed a law, and said, in that law, by 2004, you
had to promulgate a rule concerning foreign repair stations and
the auditing and inspection of foreign repair stations for the
safety of the flying public. By 2000--18 months later, you were
supposed to be auditing all these foreign repair stations.
I have here a draft of the rule that was supposed to be
finished in 2004. This draft was finished in 2005. And nothing
has happened.
Now, I know, if we determined there was a member of al
Qaeda that was traveling on one of our airplanes by one of the
systems we have in place--there would be an outcry. What I
can't figure out is why there is no sense of urgency about
foreign repair stations, especially in light of the fact that
we have, now, noncertified foreign repair stations that are
doing significant work. And, by the way, all of these airplanes
have the right to leave these foreign repair stations, some
which are in countries we've designated as terrorist safe
havens, and go directly to an airport and pick up passengers.
There's no requirement they come back to be looked at again by
people here in the United States or by any of our systems here
in the United States. I think it is a disaster waiting to
happen, and I would like an explanation as to why your agency
has been unable to promulgate a rule that Congress said had to
be done by 2004, and this is 2007.
Mr. Hawley. I can speak to what has happened recently. I
was not with TSA at that time, and I, frankly, don't have any
background into what happened there. I think--I know what's
happening now, which is, in the 9/11 bill, there is a
requirement for us to put out a rulemaking, and then follow it
up in 6 months with inspections. And we intend to do that. The
regulation is working its way through the process, and that
will kick out when it goes through the review process. And I
can't exactly predict--except that it is being worked on. And
as far as the current vulnerability, that is something that we
look at, with what happens in other countries and people's
access to the transportation infrastructure, including
aviation. And, as you know, there are layers that are in place,
so it is not completely uncovered. It's part of the layer and
risk management that we look at. And we take the--clearly, the
requirement put forth by the Congress to make this happen, and
we will make this happen.
Senator McCaskill. Well, there is a rule that was drafted,
and a former employee got it to us, and nothing's happened with
it. And, I gotta tell ya, as you well know, right now there is
no rule even requiring background checks. When you've got
perimeter security issues at many of these foreign repair
stations, certified and noncertified, I would hate to have
happen what could happen, and that is, with all the effort and
time we're taking checking everyone's suitcases and wanding
everyone's knee replacements, that we've got terrorists working
under the hoods of these airplanes in foreign countries, and we
are basically twiddling our thumbs since the Congress mandated
this, back in 2003. I just hope that you leave this hearing
with a sense of urgency about the issue of foreign repair
stations.
I've got some other questions about airport screenings I'd
like to address if we get a chance for another around of
questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you. I'm sure there will be another
round, Senator.
Senator Snowe?
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hawley, I'd like to follow up on the issue of
commercial airline cargo and what is the status. I noted, in
the GAO report, that one of the significant failures, at this
point, is the inability to develop and implement the
technologies necessary. For too long, this has--cargo loophole
has been insufficiently addressed by the Department, and,
despite the ramping-up of efforts with the passage of the 9/11
Commission recommendations by this committee last year, and by
the Congress, clearly this is a major issue and flaw in the
process. And I would like to hear what you intend to provide
for an update on this, and why we can't close the gap. I know
we've got the Known Shipper Program, but, again, that does not
require extensive screening of the cargo under the Known
Shipper Program, similar to what, you know, individuals, you
know, have to comply with when they're going through screening
at the airports. And certainly this provides another gaping
hole in our system. And, frankly, it's gone on for far too
long.
Mr. Hawley. The report that you mention was a snapshot in
time, looking backwards over a year ago. And we've been--
Secretary Chertoff has a very high priority of mine, as well
as--I have my own priority to do this--to meet those issues.
And we've done exactly that. The--there was a category of
freight called ``exempted freight,'' and we've gone in and
required various security measures on that. We've added the
equivalent of 100 canine teams to focus on the cargo that
previously had not been inspected. So, that's--that is now
happening everywhere.
At the 250 smallest airports, they get exactly the same
screening as we give for checked baggage. And the 9/11 bill
that we're talking about here puts in place--I--and I would
really compliment this committee to work with us on practical
solutions, a step up from where we are, and we intend to meet
the requirements under that deadline.
We also have the canine--170 canine teams were put in
through the recent appropriation supplemental for air cargo.
So, we've--we have been driven on the issue of closing any
vulnerabilities that may have existed on air cargo, and I think
the picture today is significantly different than it was when
that report was written--significantly better.
Senator Snowe. So, what is the percentage of air cargo that
is now currently screened? And is it done on the--is it
conducted under the Known Shipper Program? And is that cargo
actually screened?
Mr. Hawley. The--I know exactly what you're asking, and, in
the new law, it says, explicitly, ``You can't use the Known
Shipper Program to meet the requirements that we're saying.''
It says, ``You get 18 months to get 50 percent, and then, at
the end of 3 years, you've got to be 100 percent, and you can't
count Known Shipper.'' So, it's very clear on what is required.
It defines ``screening,'' it defines what the system is
required to do, the timeline. And I think it is workable. And,
again, I would thank the Committee for working with us to get
something that is workable and we will do it.
Senator Snowe. I know the Inspector General report in
August indicated that there were a dearth of screeners for
cargo. So, what is the ratio of cargo screeners to airports?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we don't assign our officers to the cargo
side. The--where we do that is with either the law enforcement
officer paired with a canine, our security inspectors--and
we've got about 1,000--and then the airlines themselves have to
do screening.
Senator Snowe. And so--but what is--so, what's the actual
number, though? I mean, isn't that something that you ought to
be concerned about?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we use our transportation security
officers for screening people, and we do have them go in the
back of the airport, including cargo, to do checks on the
people working there. But the actual screening is not done by
those officers, it's done either by the canine teams, who are
not TSOs, our inspectors, or airline personnel.
Senator Snowe. Ms. Berrick, can you comment on Mr. Hawley's
response to cargo screening? Because this is a critical issue,
and a major gap in our system that obviously needs to be
rectified. And what would you--in response to his--the answer
with respect to the timeline for achieving it?
Ms. Berrick. Sure. GAO actually looked at two aspects of
air cargo. One was cargo domestically transported to the United
States, and we also looked at cargo from foreign countries
coming into the United States. One point we made was that, for
domestic air cargo security, TSA does have a lot of actions
underway and are moving in the right direction to strengthen
cargo security. We had a number of recommendations and things
they can be doing, more.
In terms of inbound air cargo coming into the United
States, that's much more in the early stages, in terms of both
TSA and CBP ensuring the security of this cargo.
But, I think, probably the most important points we made in
our report was that foreign countries that also secure their
cargo were using some measures that potentially could be used
in the United States. For example, some countries have a more
robust program to verify indirect air carriers, freight
forwarders who consolidate cargo. And they over--they're pretty
rigorous in their oversight over these entities, which isn't
currently happening in the United States. Also, some foreign
countries have extra security procedures at airports where
cargo is stored, or they have guards monitoring the cargo.
People have to be physically screened if they go into the
facility. Here in the United States, the cargo is on the
airport grounds, which has its own security program, but it
doesn't have that extra layer of security.
Also, some other countries are using technologies to screen
cargo--radiation detection monitors. They're also using large
X-ray machines to screen a portion of air cargo. And other
countries are also, similar to TSA, working to increase the
amount of cargo that they screen. And, in fact, some view the
United States--the risk of shipping cargo to the United States
as higher, so some countries actually do additional security
screening for cargo that's bound for the United States.
But I think that the lessons from our report--a good lesson
is the fact that other countries do have mechanisms in place to
strengthen cargo screening, and some of these, potentially,
could be considered and may be applied in the United States.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar?
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, Senator. Thank you.
Five years ago, the 9/11 Commission provided Congress and
the American people with a clear assessment of the need to
reform our approaches for security. And I believe that TSA was
created in 2001--is that correct?--has done some good work. But
I think of, the assessment that you received in 2005, when ten
members of the 9/11 Commission issued a report card that found
that the TSA was either failing or providing unsatisfactory
progress in a number of key areas. And my questions are really
to follow up on Senator Snowe, first, about the cargo
screening, and if you think that the 100 percent goal is
possible to meet. And I want to clear the record that you did
say we would meet the goals of the 9/11 Commission
recommendation bill--I think that's 50 percent of all air cargo
carried on commercial airplanes screened within 18 months, all
commercial air cargo screened within 3 years. Is that correct?
Mr. Hawley. That is correct. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Klobuchar. And so, do you think it's possible to
get to 100 percent?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar. How do we do that?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. And I think Ms. Berrick, in her answer to
Senator Snowe, outlined a lot of the tools that we're going to
use. And we have followed, very closely, the work with our
international partners, and some of those programs are, we
feel, capable of being implemented here, and some of the
technology that Ms. Berrick mentioned, that we're not currently
using, could be configured to use in cargo. So, we are working
through that right now, and I--this committee was instrumental
in making it such that we are, in fact, going to be able to do
it, and get the real screening that doesn't rely on the so-
called Known Shipper Program, that is real screening in the way
we all know we mean it. And I think the other important piece
is that--with our international partners--that, as we align
with them--we are in frequent conversation with our partners
around the world to have a unified security measure, that, as
we meet those deadlines, it would be a similar security blanket
for our trading partners, as well.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Berrick, I had some questions about the GAO report on
the passenger screening. I know that the GAO found the lack of
a standardized process for all airlines when they look at
cleared lists for passengers, and that they've contributed to
delays--could you talk a little bit about that and what those
problems are? I know the Secure Flight Program can't become
operational until you certify that the TSA has satisfied the
requirements. What are the barriers to getting that satisfied
and how do we fix this?
Ms. Berrick. Sure. In terms of the current process, the
prescreening of passengers--the way it works is, air carriers
match passenger information against the terrorist watch list
that TSA supplies to them to determine if there are any high-
risk passengers that shouldn't be allowed on a flight. The
problem with the current process is that air carriers all do it
a little bit differently. Some may have really rigorous methods
for doing name-matching, others may use a manual process. So,
theoretically, you could be on one flight with one carrier and
not be a match, get on the plane with no problem; you could be
with another carrier, and be a match, because your name sounds
similar to someone that's on the terrorist watch list. So, with
the development of Secure Flight, if Secure Flight operates as
intended, it should correct that problem, because the
government will be taking over the function, they'll be doing
the name-matching consistently, they'll be using a more robust
methodology to match passenger information. And it also
provides a security benefit, in that the government won't have
to provide the terrorist watch list to the private sector,
because right now, again, the carriers are receiving this--some
carriers contract out with foreign countries, and the foreign
countries are actually doing the name-matching. So, obviously,
there are concerns there.
Secure Flight, in the past we've reported that the reason
the program has had problems--again, this is in the past--was
that TSA wasn't following a disciplined development process.
There is--TSA even has procedures on how you go about
developing systems like this. And, in the need that they felt
to implement the program quickly, some of those requirements
were bypassed. Since that time, TSA has stood down and
rebaselined their program consistent with GAO's
recommendations. They've taken a lot of positive action to help
ensure Secure Flight's success, including following more
disciplined processes, bringing in people with the appropriate
skills.
We're still looking at Secure Flight. And, in fact, we're
going to be reporting, in response to the 9/11 Act, in January
of 2008 on what our assessment is of TSA's progress. Right now
it's too early for us to conclude whether----
Senator Klobuchar. Do you know how long it will take to get
it certified, and what the timetable is?
Ms. Berrick. Well, one of the things we've been asked in
the 9/11 mandate was to look at TSA's time-frame for fielding
the program to determine whether or not we think it's
reasonable. So, that's one of the things we'll report in
January. We don't have an answer yet on that.
Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Hawley, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Hawley. I think that's a good summation. And I think we
now have got the program in good shape. The rule is out. We've
had the public comment. We're going to be closing off public
comment and writing the final rule, and then the various
certifications. We're about a third of the way through from our
end, of that work. And it will come down to the funding level
for FY08 as to exactly how fast the program progresses.
Senator Klobuchar. Ms. Berrick, back to the issues you
raised about the privacy concerns. So, the actual names of the
people on this list are going to foreign governments, or what's
happening?
Ms. Berrick. In some cases, under the current process, air
carriers who do, again, the matching, they'll contract out and
have a contractor do the matching. In some cases, they have
done that with companies located in foreign countries. So, that
has happened. The majority of carriers don't do that, but some
have.
Senator Klobuchar. Should the Congress take seriously the
reports that airlines have supplied DHS with substantial
information on passengers without their knowing it, some of
these privacy concerns that have been raised?
Ms. Berrick. We haven't looked at privacy with respect to
the current process. We are looking at that as a part of Secure
Flight.
In the past, we have reported that there were some
problems, in terms of TSA reporting how they're using passenger
data during testing of the Secure Flight program. Since that
time, in our work with TSA, we've found that they've built in
more privacy safeguards into the program--again, that are
positive. The recent privacy notice that they've implemented
has contained information that, in fact, GAO recommended. So,
we think they're moving in the right direction. But, again, in
terms of Secure Flight protecting privacy, it's too early for
us, at this point to draw any conclusions, but we will be
talking about that in our January report.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Senator Thune?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding the hearing.
And thank you, our panelists, for being here today and
providing some testimony in what is very valuable input on
TSA's progress toward carrying out the important piece of
legislation that was passed, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
We've got about 9 billion, I think, passengers each year
that use mass transit, about a 2 million a day that fly on the
airlines, and so, obviously, we have a lot of citizens who
depend and--upon accessible, affordable, and efficient travel,
both for commerce and leisure, and that--the same things that,
you know, we're concerned about, in terms of our vulnerability
to terrorist attacks, our--those things, even though we've got
safeguards and everything in place, continue to be a concern to
a lot of people who travel. And, obviously, we want to make--
take every precaution, but try and do it in a way that provides
as much ease and convenience for people that are traveling as
possible.
One question I have with regard to that, Mr. Hawley, is,
can the TSA implement the provisions of the 9/11 Act, while, at
the same time, making the airline passenger prescreening
process more efficient and passenger friendly?
Mr. Hawley. I think that the parts in the 9/11 Commission
implementation bill that relate to passenger screening will put
us in the right direction. In other words, the Secure Flight,
the watch list matching, those programs, I think, will have an
immediate--when Secure Flight is up, will have an immediate,
positive, enormous effect by eliminating the people who are not
on the watch list, who are somehow told that they are, or think
that they are; and, when that issue goes away, I think it will
elevate the spirit of the traveling public, as well as protect
the security of the list. So, we've got some technology that we
need to roll out, that we have already started rolling out for
passenger checkpoints, and so, all of those things are going to
go toward decluttering the checkpoint, calming the environment
down so it's not as much of a crush, and that gives us better
security, it also gives a better experience.
Senator Thune. How close are we to using some of the
biometric identifiers? You talked about technology. How far out
is that? And are these short-term or long-term objectives for
TSA?
Mr. Hawley. The ones I mentioned are short-term, immediate-
term, and they're happening now.
Senator Thune. Right.
Mr. Hawley. On the biometrics, it's--one of the criticisms
in the GAO report is that we haven't deployed the biometrics in
the airport environment. So, that clearly is the next piece for
us. We've got the--in the port environment, the TWIC card is
being--enrollments are going on now, so that is the
sophisticated biometric. The standards are set, and we're
working with the airport community to get the--the difficulty
is the interoperable card so that, as required in the 9/11
bill, when we're talking about flight crews, that there be
interoperability from airport to airport. So, it's much easier
to do one airport, but a--but it's much more complicated to
have the one issued here work at the other. So, that's the
problem that we're working through. But I think you put your
finger on it, that's--that is a critical next step in aviation
security.
Senator Thune. What--how--and what--when you say ``short-
term,'' what--``long-term time frame,'' what is the time-frame
on that, would you say?
Mr. Hawley. The biometrics have been much more difficult to
implement than any of us expected. And TWIC, as everybody
knows, has taken longer than any of us would have liked. And it
come--it is the most sophisticated interoperable biometric
system in the world. And so, expanding that into the aviation
environment is not trivial, but I think we've solved most of
the problems. We now have to figure out, ``OK, how do we--how
do we actually implement it? And how do we make the back end
connect to our watch-list-checking in a way that allows us to
process it all smoothly?''
Senator Thune. Is the interoperability that you referred
to, and being able to integrate this on all the airports around
the country, the limitation on that, is that a technology
limitation or a funding limitation? Is it a--is it a matter of
not having enough money to make that----
Mr. Hawley. It's first the--it's first the technology and
the operational integration from the point--it's not--nothing
needs to be invented, but fitting the pieces together is the
difficult part, and then the money--we'll have a big debate
about the money. But I think all of us agree it has to happen,
and the airports have been a great partner in it, and we'll
work that out.
Senator Thune. Thanks.
Ms. Berrick, some of the critics of the U.S. aviation
security policy argue that there has been too much emphasis
given to previous attack scenarios, and--for example,
hijackings, luggage bombs, those sorts of things. Do you agree
with that assessment?
Ms. Berrick. I----
Senator Thune. And why, or why not, I guess is----
Ms. Berrick. Yes. It--well, in most of our work we look at
to what extent TSA is using threat information--current threat
information to drive their decisions. And generally we're
finding that they do do that. And, of course, they consider
past threats and try to mitigate those. They also look forward:
What are the current threats, and where should we be moving,
you know, in the next 5 to 10 years? So, generally, we've seen
that they've done that. Related to making risk-based decisions,
the area where we've probably identified they could do more
work is related to doing vulnerability assessments on how
vulnerable are we against these various threats? But they've
done vulnerability assessments in a lot of different areas.
We've reported that we think we can--they can strengthen their
efforts to look at how vulnerable we are. But, pretty
consistently, in almost all of our work, we've found that TSA
has incorporated threat information--and, again, not just past
threat information, but looking forward--to help drive their
decisions and priorities.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very much for
conducting this hearing. We have lots of questions about the
inability of--a major government agency unable to meet a
deadline. And it's a consistent problem, it seems to me,
especially with DHS. I know there are lots of loyal,
hardworking people there who want to get the job done right,
they know that it's an enormous responsibility. But yet, a
deadline for dealing with the security of bridges and tunnels
in New York/New Jersey region. There is an amendment that I
authored, the Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security appropriations
legislation, and they were supposed to report by March 1, 2007.
And I ask you, Mr. Hawley, what's the status of that report?
Mr. Hawley. The report is complete, and I believe it is
undergoing--it's a classified report, and it is undergoing
clearance. But I should also say that anything developed from
that report, we've discussed with the appropriate officials in
the appropriate regions, so that there--so that we're not
holding back information that would allow them to do security
improvements. It's the--it's basically going through the
clearance process.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, this is way past April 2007, in
case anybody didn't notice the weather change out there.
When will TSA, Mr. Hawley, begin enrolling workers at the
Port of New York and New Jersey in the TWIC program?
Mr. Hawley. It will be soon. I'm trying to figure out how
to give you an answer without making it one----
Senator Lautenberg. Me, too.
Mr. Hawley.--that we can't meet. I think it's going to be
in the next big series. Obviously, that is the--that is the big
port community on the East Coast, and there are a couple of the
smaller ones first to get the system burned in, but it will be
in the holiday-season/January time-frame that we'll begin in
the New York region.
Senator Lautenberg. The 10 or 11 test communities or
ports--that are identified for establishing the clearance
mechanism does not include--a port like the Port of New York
and New Jersey, which is one of the largest ports in the
country. We're going to smaller ports. And I don't know how
long we have to stand and wait. If there is any risk at all
with the people who come in, drive the trucks, and so forth--
now, most of the regular port workers have ID cards--but the
trucks that come in by the thousands each and every day don't
have any checks going on there. And I wonder why it is--that it
doesn't require immediate or critical attention to a port like
the New York/New Jersey Port, which has exposure to all kinds
of things that we dread thinking about, like the most dangerous
2 miles in the country, identified by the FBI, for a terrorist
attack.
Mr. Hawley. We've spent a lot of time working with the
ports there, and there's a lot of security in place. They are
right in line to get the TWIC program when it rolls out. And,
as you know, today is the first day we've started issuing them,
and once we get through this--the first couple of rounds, it
will----
Senator Lautenberg. How long might that take?
Mr. Hawley. Well, I was projecting in the holiday-to-
January time frame.
Senator Lautenberg. Holiday?
Mr. Hawley. Holiday this year. Yes, between now and
sometime in January.
Senator Lautenberg. That we might----
Mr. Hawley. Begin----
Senator Lautenberg.--that we might see a rollout in the----
Port of New York/New Jersey----
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg.--and I want to take a moment to ask Ms.
Berrick--has your office looked at TSA's efforts on assessing
security of critical infrastructure--bridges and tunnels?
Ms. Berrick. We do. We do have ongoing work, looking at
TSA's efforts in that area. We're going to be completing a
report, probably in the spring of 2008, so it's ongoing. And
we're finding that TSA is doing what they call, ``corporate
security reviews,'' where they'll go out to these bridges and
tunnels and assess the state of security, work with the states
there. Basically, at this point, it's in the early stages.
They're getting an understanding of what's being done for
security. There are some technologies that DHS is pursuing
related to bridges and tunnels, but it's still relatively in
the early stages.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, we've grown accustomed to
the pace here, and--not to be critical of the witness, but the
fact is that deadlines made--don't mean that deadlines are met.
Any deferrals of the serious problems that we might encounter
on the bridges and tunnels is something that ought not to be
acceptable, and it isn't.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Rockefeller?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Sir.
Senator Rockefeller. I was going to ask a bunch of
questions on air cargo, but I understand they've already been
asked.
Senator McCaskill. Bunch of them have.
Senator Rockefeller. So, that means that if I read the
memos that come out of this, I'll know what the answers were.
Senator McCaskill. Yes.
Senator Rockefeller. Or I could ask them.
Senator McCaskill. You could ask them again.
Senator Rockefeller. I will.
[Laughter.]
Senator Stevens. You know, the famous Simpson statement
that all the questions have been asked, but not everybody has
asked them.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. I am constantly amazed at the
asymmetry between everybody going through all of this trouble,
which I thoroughly support and was co-conspirator in writing,
with their handbags and carry-on bags and all the rest of it,
and then knowing that, if it's a 4-ounce something, I can put
it in my checked suitcase, or if I was a terrorist, if it was a
2-pound bomb, I could put it in my suitcase, and just check it.
I don't care how many times the question has been asked, I
don't understand that. I don't understand why we aren't doing
more on air cargo.
Mr. Hawley. We are doing more. And we talked a little bit
about the old report that is now out of date, and some of the
things that we have done between then and now. I think the
critical point is that the Committee was instrumental in
writing the legislation in the 9/11 bill, and I mentioned
earlier that we expect to meet the deadlines in the bill by the
terms written in the bill. We understand what they mean.
Senator Rockefeller. Do you have the money?
Mr. Hawley. To start? Yes, we're launching, and then, when
we need more money, we'll tell you. I think, around January
we're going to know more, in terms of what the----
Senator Rockefeller. Is OMB releasing to you the money you
need to do this?
Mr. Hawley. It isn't a money issue right now; so, yes. But
it's really at the point of program development. We have enough
program development money to get it done--to get it rolled out,
and then we'll figure out what the costs are.
Senator Rockefeller. See, but that sounds to me--like--what
you're really saying is, ``We've got good ideas, and we're
starting to implement some of those ideas, but we're not really
sure if we're going to have the money.''
Mr. Hawley. No, no, no.
Senator Rockefeller. That's what it sounds like to me.
Mr. Hawley. Well--I'm sorry. The--Ms. Berrick mentioned
some of the experience the international community has in air
cargo, and that what we'll be doing is adopting some of those
methods at--that are compatible with the language of the law,
and applying those. Some of those do not require congressional
appropriations, some of them are going to require expenses by
other parties in the supply chain. I think where the money will
come in is when we figure out what kind of technology we can
deploy, at airports, that can handle the cargo that we're going
to see there, and then we have to fight out who pays for that.
So, we are----
Senator Rockefeller. A lot of ``ifs.''
Mr. Hawley. We--pardon me?
Senator Rockefeller. A lot of ``ifs.''
Mr. Hawley. No, we pretty much know what we're doing on the
program, and it has to be driven down to the operational level
of exactly the details. So, I think--I mean, I--this is a tough
deadline, to hit 50 percent in 18 months, and we are accepting
that challenge, and we will meet that. And I believe that, in
future years--i.e., 3 years from now--that the 100 percent will
be done, as well.
Senator Rockefeller. OK. Oh, boy. Well, good luck. What
about general aviation? I've done a lot of flying on that,
which I pay for, when I have to get to West Virginia, because
we don't have a lot of flight service. And--once, in my entire
life, I--have been through a screening device. Once. I forget
the airport. And I know that you have plans for identification
and things of this sort, but I have the feeling that, in terms
of what people carry on, and the cargo, the pilots, the
passengers, nobody really has any idea of who they are, and,
like in everything else, they're getting a free ride.
Mr. Hawley. Our--we are working on, as I think we've
discussed, regulations in that area. We've done risk assessment
in the GA community to see what the higher-risk aircraft are,
and what to do about them. And then--so, I would expect, in the
coming months, that we'll come forward with the--a formal
program on that. We already are working, as you may know, with
our international partners on identifying aircraft as they come
to the United States, and also, with the GA community to, as
you mentioned, the identity validation of who's flying the
aircraft. And then, the passenger screening comes behind that.
Senator Rockefeller. Is it--and, I apologize; it'll just
take 3 seconds--the--is it not true that if you have the right
amount of explosives in a King Air, that you could pretty much
demolish this whole complex?
Mr. Hawley. You know, I think the answer to that is a
classified answer, but your point is well taken. Certainly, an
aircraft of that size loaded with explosives would----
Senator Rockefeller. I'm not talking about even a jet, just
a King Air.
Mr. Hawley. No, I understand. Yes, I'm----
Senator Rockefeller. Thanks.
Mr. Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator.
Ms. Berrick, we've got your report, and you touched on it
in your opening statement, but could you summarize, what does
your agency think about the progress that has been made on the
major programs, like TWIC and Secure Flight and cargo security
and the surface transportation security? Have you judged that,
relatively?
Ms. Berrick. Well, we have given an overall assessment on
TSA's progress in both aviation and surface. In aviation, we
concluded, if you look at all the legislative requirements that
Congress passed, Homeland Security Presidential Directives,
DHS's own plans, for aviation we found that TSA met 70 percent
of the expectations that were set out for them related to
aviation. This doesn't include the recent requirements in the
9/11 Act. In surface transportation security, there were much
less requirements set out in legislation for TSA. There were
only five. And we said that TSA met three of the five. So, in
terms of progress, much more has been done in commercial
aviation.
There's definitely becoming, and we're seeing through our
work, more of a focus on surface modes of transportation.
Senator Stevens. How is that related to the payment into
the system from the transportation mechanisms you reviewed? I
mean, it seems to me that the bulk of the money is coming from
airline passengers, and yet, part of that is going into the
other systems. Is that right?
Ms. Berrick. That's not our--that's not our understanding.
And we haven't looked specifically at how the fees flow in. I
know TWIC will be a fee-funded program, the program that you
mentioned, which is another major effort that TSA is----
Senator Stevens. But that's, again, airlines.
Ms. Berrick. I'm sorry?
Senator Stevens. That's, again, an airline program, right?
Ms. Berrick. Well, right now it's being implemented at the
ports. Eventually, it may be implemented to other
transportation modes, including aviation. Right now, it's just
being implemented at the ports.
Senator Stevens. Will it pay for itself?
Ms. Berrick. That may be a better question for Mr. Hawley.
I know there were----
Senator Stevens. Well, let me ask----
Ms. Berrick.--appropriations----
Senator Stevens.--him, then. Are these other systems going
to pay for themselves? You know, I'm a little provincial.
Seventy percent of our travel is by air. And we're paying,
every time we travel. I think there are other people, who
travel in various modes of transportation, that aren't
contributing to this system. Am I wrong?
Mr. Hawley. The TWIC cards will be paid for by the people
buying them. So, that will be----
Senator Stevens. They're not paying, now, are they?
Mr. Hawley. We're just starting the implementation. But I
think your larger point, the transit drivers pay a significant
part of the--or transit users--pay a significant part of the
cost. It is paid for out of the municipality where they exist.
So, in an indirect form, I guess through taxes and also from
the fare box--but I think your point certainly, in dollars in
aviation, it is a large chunk of money that comes to the
Federal Government; in transit, it's dispersed throughout----
Senator Stevens. Well, I pay an exit tax, as well as a tax
on my airline ticket. The rail passengers don't do that, do
they?
Mr. Hawley. I don't believe they pay a separate tax.
Senator Stevens. How are we going to get to the time when
we balance this program so that the people involved pay for the
security that they're being delivered?
Mr. Hawley. I think that's a larger societal issue. And--
you know, that it goes to the economic model of how we pay for
security.
Senator Stevens. Well, let me get real provincial. In
airports like ours, why don't we have a line for the local
residents, and other lines for nonresidents? I would go into
one of these airports, and they would say, ``Hi, Ted. Take off
your belt and shoes.'' Now, why can't we get to the point of
recognition of local people?
Mr. Hawley. We're working on making the whole process go
more smoothly. And--I mentioned, earlier, in terms of spreading
it out, the identity issue--I guess we're feeling that, at this
point, everybody should have an exposure to some security,
although we are looking at breaking that up, based on--random.
So, in other people--some people get shoes, trace detection;
other people may have, you know, belts or something else.
Senator Stevens. All right. My last question is this. I saw
an elderly gentlemen. He was obviously a World War II vet, not
very articulate; he came through the system, and he set it off.
And he was having a very difficult time, everyone trying to
hold wands over him, everything else. He had shrapnel in him.
Do we have identifications for those people now, so they don't
have to go through that every time they go through that
screening?
Mr. Hawley. No, we don't. However, we do have--we just
deployed machinery that will make that automatic, so that the
people with hips and shrapnel or any other implant, basically,
will not slow them down, so they won't trigger secondary alarm
when they go through.
Senator Stevens. How far away is that?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we have it in Phoenix today, and we're
going to put some--probably four out in 2008.
Senator Stevens. Well, what do you do with those people,
when no one really understands it? That gentleman was put into
a secure room until someone figured out he was a vet with
shrapnel in him.
Mr. Hawley. They usually are able to resolve it at the--
right there are the magnetometer. And if the individual
requests secondary screening, of course they'll take them back.
But our officers are extremely well prepared for that
situation. It happens every day.
Senator Stevens. Senator?
Senator McCaskill. Back to foreign repair stations, Mr.
Hawley, the law that was passed in 2003 also mandated that you
all begin doing auditing of foreign repair stations. How many
foreign repair stations has TSA audited in the last year?
Mr. Hawley. I don't believe that we've audited any.
Senator McCaskill. And so, you've had no inspectors
traveling to foreign repair stations, even the five countries
where there are foreign repair stations that have been
identified, in April of this year, as--terrorist safe havens?
Mr. Hawley. Well, the FAA, as you know, has responsibility
to be in there, and--for the certified areas--and I think we
discussed, in your previous round, that we're preparing the
rule, and we'll be deploying our inspectors within 6 months of
the rule.
Senator McCaskill. Well, the law specifically gives TSA the
responsibility to audit for security; FAA just does safety. You
specifically have been mandated by Congress to audit for
security, and you're saying that has simply not been done.
Mr. Hawley. No--I'm saying we intend to meet the obligation
under the law, that we have to put out a rule that will give us
the regulatory authority to do it. And, when the rule is out,
then we go and inspect. And I think the law--the 9/11 law is
very clear, and it says, ``We want this rule out quickly''--we
are working on it--and, ``Once you get it out, 6 months later
you'd better start inspecting,'' and we will.
Senator McCaskill. I know you keep referring to the 9/11
law, but I think it's important that you realize that this law,
in fact, was a 2003 law. It's not the 9/11 law. It's been on
the books now for 4 years, and the requirements are long past
due. This is not something that we just passed--and the draft
rule has been sitting around for a couple of years. So, I hope
you work on that.
Let me move to airport screening. I've talked about, a
major issue, which are these foreign repair stations. This is
kind of a minor issue, but it's like I said in another hearing.
The face of our criminal justice system is our municipal
courts--people who get traffic tickets, even though our
criminal justice system is a labyrinth of people all over the
country at various levels doing a myriad of important
activities to keep our citizens safe. Our face of homeland
security is airport screening. That's where most Americans are
getting a sense as to whether or not what we're doing makes
sense, and whether or not we are comprehensive and proactive in
our security measures, rather than reactive and inconsistent.
And I think that many of the things that have occurred--and I
understand that they couldn't be helped, but the changing of
what you can take on and what you can't take on--the example
that Senator Stevens talked about, about the shrapnel, the
knees, the hips, all of the things, appear to be, sometimes,
nonsensical. And the one that more people have mentioned to me
than anything else, and perhaps it's because I'm a woman, is
mascara. Mascara does not have a different consistency than
lipstick. You can smear either one. Lipstick's OK, mascara
isn't. And the reason I think women have mentioned this to me
is that--every other makeup product you can get, you can get in
a powder form or lipstick, you can get it in a tube form, which
is OK. Mascara is the only one that doesn't come in a powder
form, which means, if someone wants to avoid having to check a
bag, they have to put mascara in the little bag, which means
it's not in their purse. If they're on the airplane, they don't
want to carry the mascara along with the shampoo in their
purse. And no one can explain to me why mascara is different
than lipstick. I haven't gotten a good explanation. So, I
figured I'd ask the boss.
Mr. Hawley. OK. If you can--if you dump it out on the
table, and it retains its form, it's OK. If you dump it out on
the table, and it kind of goes like that, then it needs to be
in the 3-ounce container, put in your baggie. And what quite a
lot of people do every day is put whatever it is they want into
that baggie, they--and carry it on, and have access to it
during the flight. So, it's actually, I think, a pretty
convenient way of bring it on.
Senator McCaskill. I don't think you've talked to enough
women.
Mr. Hawley. No, I--well, we've--we do. We have a lot of
work to make these things comfortable for people. The fact of
the matter is, it's not nonsensical, and there are people
trying to blow up aircraft using liquid explosives. And this is
the way that we worked with the National Laboratories, the FBI,
a lot of testing to determine what is a safe way to allow men
and women to bring whatever they want onto the aircraft. What
do you do for people who need medicines? What do you do for
infants? What do you do for breast milk? All of those things,
we've addressed and figured out a way that accommodates the
security need, which is a very real threat, I can assure you,
and also the passenger customer-service needs so they can
travel without necessarily checking a bag.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I quarrel with the notion that you
can dump mascara out on a table. And I hope the next time we
have a hearing, that you are as righteously indignant about
foreign repair stations and terrorists potentially working
under the hood of airplanes as you are about the mascara.
Thank you, Mr. Hawley.
Senator Stevens. Senator Lott?
Senator Rockefeller. Oh, I'm sorry, he hasn't spoken----
Senator Lott. Please go ahead.
Senator Stevens. Go ahead. He hasn't had a first round.
That's why I called him. Go ahead.
Senator Rockefeller. I defer to Mississippi.
Senator Lott. No, please go ahead.
Senator Rockefeller. OK. All right.
I want to go back to this cargo thing--you said 50 percent
will be screened within 18 months, and virtually all of it,
within 3 years. I don't believe that. And you can tell me that
it's in your plans. I think you are both faced with a
fundamental problem that anybody who works for any
administration faces. You don't have enough money, you are
constrained in what you can say, your testimony this morning
was not written by you, free and clear, it was vetted by the
Office of Management and Budget; therefore, it has to agree
exactly with what the Bush Administration thinks. The Bush
Administration puts homeland security as a side issue, relative
to some wars that we may be fighting. And I just don't think
you can get it done. You've got a whole list of things that
you've got to do--you've got to submit a strategic plan to
Congress, timelines, testing, you've got a great many things
you have to do before you start to spread this out to the big
airports, much less the small ones. And if it isn't all of
them, since I consider Ames, Iowa, just as vulnerable as I do
New York City. I do. You may not, but I do. I don't see any way
that you can get it done, and I don't see what's wrong with
your telling us that--frankly, you don't think you can, and
what you really need is a whole lot more money and a whole lot
more emphasis and a whole lot more pushing from the
Administration.
Mr. Hawley. That, sir----
Senator Rockefeller. You could get fired, but, you'd be
telling the truth.
Mr. Hawley. Well, I can tell you the--a year ago, I would
not have thought that we could do 100 percent screening in 3
years, et cetera. Now I do. And the reason I do is because--and
I said, at the beginning, this committee worked with us to go
through the provisions of the law that it--was enacted--that is
a doable deal, and it is something that we could explain over a
period of time--and I could give you a briefing--and it would
show you--and it is a layered and shared responsibility that
involves the inspection, the screening of a variety of methods,
and then securing the supply chain along the way, so that each
step along the way there's some screening that will get to the
same commensurate level with passenger--or checked-baggage
screening by the time it gets to the airport. And it's a very
well-developed program, and a lot of it we've taken from our
European partners, specifically the U.K. So, this one--I mean,
there's--you're right, there are 117, 120 taskings in this law
for TSA, and we take them all seriously. This one, I personally
was involved in the language and understanding what could be
done, because I understand how tough it is. And we originally
had had veto, as you may recall, on this provision, as it was
earlier in the process, but this was not the subject of a veto
threat because--and I give this committee tremendous credit,
really, for sitting down and working through the thorny details
of how we actually will do it. So, I've--this one, I believe--
regardless of what anybody else says, this one I personally was
involved in, and I believe we are going to meet that.
Senator Rockefeller. OK. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Lott. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just--I have a
couple of questions here.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lott follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Trent Lott, U.S. Senator from Mississippi
I am pleased that the Commerce Committee is having this hearing to
get an update from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on
it's implementation schedule of the recently enacted 9/11 bill. I would
like to thank both of our distinguished witnesses for being here today.
I think the work that Mr. Hawley has done at the TSA so far is
commendable. In the past I have stressed that TSA needs to take a
common sense approach to security and I think he has done that so far.
One area that I believe that the Department of Homeland Security
and TSA need to really focus on is the use of technology to improve the
screening process. There are many promising technologies that exist,
the challenge is to test and deploy them expeditiously. I am afraid
that in many cases this is just taking too long. Our screeners deserve
to have the best tool possible to do their jobs. Terrorists are
constantly changing their methods and tactics, we need to adjust as
well.
I encourage TSA to continue to look for practical and innovative
ways to address security concerns that face our transportation systems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Senator Lott. Mr. Hawley, the GAO testimony points out
that, while TSA has developed the so-called backscatter
technology, ``limited progress has been made in fielding this
technology at passenger screening checkpoints.'' And, as you
know, I've long been an advocate of using innovative technology
to screen passengers and baggage to move the process along and
to also be more thorough. I understand that the testing has
indicated the technology is very effective at detecting
explosives and weapons that might be concealed on a person. Is
that correct? And why are you still experiencing delays
fielding the backscatter technology?
Mr. Hawley. The backscatter technology is, as you know,
tested in prototype, and we are satisfied with its work. We're
going to continue to work with it. But it is--it's meeting
expectation, and I expect that we will continue the deployment.
We've talked about adding additional cities after Phoenix. I
also should point out that we've--we are deploying a
significant amount of new technology at the passenger
checkpoint for carry-on bags, which is a very significant
deployment of technology----
Senator Lott. And you are doing that in pilot areas, aren't
you?
Mr. Hawley. Well, on the checkpoint technology for the
passenger bags, we've already done the pilot, and we've put out
a buy to get about 250 of the machines right away.
Senator Lott. All right, sir. So, you're still planning on
trying to go forward with fielding this technology----
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Lott.--correct? Uh-huh.
One of the problems, I suspect, is that TSA doesn't have
direct control over research and development, but they still
have to deploy it. The research and development is done by DHS.
You've got one agency doing the research and development,
you've got another agency that is charged with deploying it. It
seems to me like that's the typical Federal Government
bureaucratic process.
Ms. Berrick. We are actually looking at that, as it relates
specifically to checkpoint technologies. And, as you mentioned,
Department of Homeland Security, their Science and Technology
Office, has a role. They manage all research and development.
And TSA is a major customer of that.
What we found was, although DHS Science and Technology
manages research for all of the components, all of the
components are involved in the requirements for those programs,
so there'll be working groups where TSA would be a part of it
and could identify to DHS what their requirements are.
We did see some break-downs, though, in communication and
coordination. There's a Memorandum of Understanding between DHS
and TSA on how they're going to work together with
technologies. And there have been complaints from both sides
that that hasn't been fully implemented. So, we're exploring
this further as a part of our work, but--we have found that
there have been some breakdowns in communication, but we are
seeing that TSA is definitely very much a part of that process
and are communicating with S&T in what their requirements are.
Senator Lott. I wish you would pursue that, because, again,
it appears to me that things are better at these airport
terminals. I still see things that, you know, defy common
sense, and I still wonder why it takes so long to employ new
technology or new processes.
For instance, Mr. Hawley, the Registered Traveler plan,
that was delayed and delayed and delayed and delayed. I guess
it's been implemented. Is it being utilized very much? What's
happening with that?
Mr. Hawley. It's out there, and we've got seven operations
where passengers are going through. And we've got----
Senator Lott. ``Seven operations,'' you mean seven----
Mr. Hawley. Airports.
Senator Lott.--airports?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. And about 48,000 people have signed up.
And so, it is up. It is not running at full speed, I don't
think. I certainly wouldn't say that, and I don't think----
Senator Lott. What does it cost a registered traveler to go
through this process and get whatever it is he or she gets?
Mr. Hawley. It's about $100, and I think either $28 or $31
of that is--goes to the background checking that we do. And the
promise for Registered Traveler is to get beyond the ``cut to
the front of the line'' privilege, which is what it is now. And
that's the part that I see as exciting and promising, is
additional security deployed will help and be able to speed up
the processing for those people, and other identification
things that will smooth their way through the airport.
We do have a shoe scanner that one of the providers put out
there, on their own money, which was terrific, and we're
continuing to work with them to get it to the point where we
can use it so the people can keep their shoes on.
Senator Lott. That would be very nice.
Mr. Hawley. Yup.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lott. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. I'm going to put the statement I would
have made, had I been here at the beginning, in the record
after Senator Dorgan's comments.
I do urge that we find a way to deal with some of these
issues that the Members have spoken about, because we still
have some legislation that's got to go by--across the floor,
and I would like not to get so many amendments to that, these
appropriations bills dealing with this subject. So, I'd like to
find a chance where we might visit with you, Mr. Hawley, and
the Chairman, before those bills come to the floor.
Thank you very much, Ms. Berrick.
This concludes this hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Aeronautical Repair Station Association
Alexandria, VA, October 26, 2007
Hon. Daniel Inouye,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Ted Stevens,
Vice Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Re: Submission to Record for October 16, 2007
Hearing on
Oversight of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA)
Dear Chairman Inouye and Vice-Chairman Stevens:
We are writing to address issues raised about the use of foreign
repair stations at the October 16, 2007 hearing on oversight of TSA. In
particular, it is important that the leadership of the subcommittee
understand the following about foreign repair station security:
Foreign repair stations are an essential component of the
global aviation system. Without them there would be no
international travel.
Security standards do exist for repair stations based on
their location. Such standards come from existing TSA
regulations and the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO).
Pushing TSA to quickly produce rules mandating additional
security requirements will reallocate limited oversight
resources from areas where the threat is greatest.
Given the broad scope of the aviation maintenance industry,
adequate time is needed to review any rules proposed by TSA,
and mandates for new repair station security rules by August
2008 are unrealistic given TSA's current resources.
While ARSA understands the concern of the Committee that government
inaction may be putting the public at risk, we wish to underscore the
fact that there are both safety and security regulations already in
place. It is in the best interests of the industry to maintain high
standards in both of these areas.
Foreign repair stations are an essential component of the international
aviation system. Without them there would be no international
travel.
The Chicago Convention of 1944 and ICAO standards require that the
State of Registry (i.e., the country in which an aircraft is
registered) oversee the maintenance performed on that aircraft and
related components, regardless of where the work is performed.\1\
Consequently, a U.S. registered aircraft requiring maintenance while
outside of the U.S. must have that work performed by an FAA-
certificated maintenance provider. Similarly, when an aircraft of
foreign registry requires maintenance while in the U.S., only a repair
station certificated or validated by the relevant National Aviation
Authority (NAA) may perform the work. For example, only a European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)-certificated repair station may perform
maintenance on an aircraft of French registry within the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, ICAO Annex 8, Airworthiness, 4.2.1(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prohibiting or otherwise limiting the use of repair stations
overseas would make international travel impossible, since aircraft
need some level of work performed when they land at their destination.
Furthermore, foreign authorities may choose to take retaliatory action
against U.S. counterparts for any restrictions put in place.
Indeed, it seems such action is possible. In a letter dated October
22, 2007 from Mark Wilson, Chairman of the EASA Advisory Board,
Congress's proposals regarding the requirement for additional
inspections of foreign repair stations and proposed drug and alcohol
testing were examined. Chairman Wilson stated, ``Adoption of such
legislative text would bring to an end any possibility to finalise a
balanced, reciprocal EU-US Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA)
and association Maintenance Implementing Procedures (MIPs) . . .''
Given this warning, it is necessary for Congress to closely examine
the effect its proposals will have not just on the traveling public,
but on the global aviation community.
Security standards do exist for repair stations based on their
location. Such standards come from the FAA, existing TSA
regulations, and ICAO.
Domestically, many repair stations located on an airport are
required to have their personnel undergo criminal background checks
under TSA regulations if they require unescorted access to the
designated airport security identification display area (SIDA).
Therefore, a repair station employee that performs line maintenance for
an air carrier would have the same 10-year criminal background check
requirement as an airline mechanic. Many repair stations voluntarily
implement additional security procedures since the quality and safety
of their work directly affects their business.
However, many U.S. repair stations are located miles away from
airports and perform specialized work on component parts that have been
removed from the airplane and sent to them for repair. These facilities
are usually small businesses; thus, imposing undue security burdens on
them would jeopardize an entire sector of highly-specialized workers.
Our members understand the need for safety and security, since their
livelihood depends upon it, and we ask that Congress recognize the
difference in repair facilities, remembering that our industry shares
their same goal: maintaining a high level of safety and security.
Internationally, each country must implement the types of security
procedures to be followed just as they must do in the safety area.
These are based on ICAO standards contained in Annex 17 and thus are
very similar to TSA regulations. They include, but are not limited to:
A national civil aviation security program with continuous
threat monitoring and mandatory quality control procedures;
Airport security programs for each airport serving
international carriers;
Air operator security programs;
Background checks for persons implementing security control
measures and persons with unescorted access to restricted
security areas; and
Periodic ICAO security audits.
The professionals at the TSA, ICAO and other countries' security
oversight organizations have concluded that resources should be focused
where the threat is greatest. Therefore, FAA foreign repair stations
working on components and located miles away from an airport are not
required to implement background checks for their employees. However,
if they perform line maintenance at an international airport or
otherwise require access to the ramp area, foreign repair station
employees would be subject to similar security requirements to their
FAA counterparts, including background checks.
Neither domestic nor international security requirements are based
on whether a person works for an airline or a repair station; they are
dependent on the degree of access the individual has to an aircraft.
Further, mandating additional security requirements where none are
truly needed will reallocate limited oversight resources from areas
where the threat is greater. This could have the unintended consequence
of reducing the level of security for the traveling public.
Pushing TSA to quickly produce rules mandating additional security
requirements will reallocate limited oversight resources from
areas where the threat is greater.
The testimony given by Assistant Secretary Kip Hawley mentioned
several of the initiatives TSA is working on to increase safety, from
highways and rail, to aviation and cargo shipments. Threats exist
throughout all modes of transportation, and TSA must be allowed the
opportunity to prioritize its resources to those areas where the threat
is greatest. During the October 16 hearing, Assistant Secretary Hawley
testified that the TSA currently is committed to focusing its resources
on ``high priority items'' facing national security interests.
Given the broad scope of the aviation maintenance industry, adequate
time is needed to review any rules proposed by TSA, and
Congressional mandates for new repair station security rules by
August 2008 are unrealistic given TSA's current resources.
Congress's recently passed mandate in section 1616 of H.R. 1
(Public Law 110-53) severely limits the ability of TSA to conduct an
adequate rulemaking. While ARSA understands Congress's concern over the
delay, as stated above, TSA must be allowed to prioritize its resources
and personnel to address the areas with the greatest need. As Secretary
Hawley stated in his written testimony,
``. . . many of the rulemaking requirements mandated in the 9/
11 Act do not adequately recognize the obligations that TSA
must give the many stakeholders affected by proposed
regulations and the general public . . . These requirements are
time consuming but are time well spent to assure that our
regulations achieve their objective in a way that is
transparent to stakeholders and the public and does not
adversely affect travel and commerce.''
Furthermore, punishing industry for government inaction sets a very
dangerous precedent. The penalties in section 1616 hurt repair stations
and companies who are doing their best to comply with existing law, and
which do not have the ability or influence to force TSA to promulgate
these new rules.
Congress may not have considered the fact that restrictions such as
those in section 1616 may adversely affect the trade balance between
the U.S. and other countries, specifically the EU. There are only 698
FAA-certificated repair stations outside the U.S.; yet there are
approximately 1,200 EASA-certificated repair stations and numerous
other NAA-certificated repair stations in the U.S.
Conclusion
Although ARSA has testified before on this subject, we felt it was
important to underscore the safety and economic necessity of foreign
repair stations. With the topic of maintenance overseas gaining more
and more visibility with the press, it is important to emphasize the
facts, and not allow legislation or news coverage to be based on fear.
Furthermore, as the possibility of retaliation by foreign civil
aviation authorities looms, now is the time for the Senate to look
carefully at the effect it is having on the international aviation
community.
Should you have any questions or require additional information, do
not hesitate to contact me.
Regards,
Marshall S. Filler,
Managing Director and General Counsel.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. Can you provide greater detail regarding the efforts
the TSA is taking to comply with the new requirements in the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Law, that specifies that 50 percent of cargo
on commercial passenger aircraft must be screened in 18 months and 100
percent screening be achieved within 3 years? How does the new system
compare with current international efforts to screen cargo transported
on commercial passenger flights?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) approach
to air cargo security is comprised of multiple programs, which form a
layered security approach to include vetting, screening, and risk-based
targeting of air cargo to guard against potential attack. To comply
with the air cargo screening requirements of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, TSA plans to build
upon established programs and is in the process of developing a
Certified Cargo Screener Program. Together, enhancements to existing
air cargo screening requirements and the planned Certified Cargo
Screener Program will satisfy the requirement that 100 percent of air
cargo transported on passenger aircraft is screened to provide a level
of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening
of passenger checked baggage. The Certified Cargo Screener Program is
an entirely new program that TSA is developing whereby indirect air
carriers, third party logistics entities, and shippers will perform
cargo screening functions and implement secure supply chain security
practices. The Certified Cargo Screener Program will be a robust
combination of stringent security standards at the facility and
personnel level. It will require Certified Screeners to implement
secure standard operating procedures and utilize chain of custody
measures that will establish and maintain the security of cargo as it
moves throughout the supply chain. All Certified Screeners will be
subject to TSA inspection to ensure that they are complying with all
applicable program requirements.
TSA's existing security programs concentrate the responsibility for
screening cargo to aircraft operators and foreign air carriers,
utilizing TSA-approved physical and technological screening methods.
The Certified Cargo Screener Program will similarly require entities
that are validated and certified to screen air cargo to use TSA-
approved physical and technological screening methods. However, a
greater level of screening can be achieved because screening will be
allocated across the air cargo supply chain. By spreading the
responsibility for screening air cargo to entities other than aircraft
operators and air carriers, TSA will be able to meet the legislative
mandate that 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft
be screened to provide a level of security commensurate with the level
of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage.
TSA has examined and leveraged the United Kingdom's and Ireland's
Known Consignor Programs to provide a solid framework for TSA's planned
Certified Cargo Screener Program. These programs require certification
of the entity's supply chain security practices and require the entity
to implement secure standard operating procedures as well as utilize
chain of custody measures that will establish and maintain the security
of cargo as it moves throughout the supply chain.
Question 2. What efforts does the TSA have underway to develop
``in-line'' explosive detection systems (EDS) systems at airports that
requested support through the agency's Letter of Intent (LOI) process?
How long does the TSA expect it will take to deploy in-line EDS systems
at the airports that require them?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) welcomes
the opportunity to make use of the resources provided in the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to
continue its efforts to expand the number of airports with in-line
checked baggage screening solutions at those airports where such a
system is determined to be the optimal solution. The Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires TSA to
allocate $250 million each Fiscal Year (2008 through 2028) to support
airport improvement projects to fulfill Letters of Intent for in-line
baggage screening systems. Of the total amount, $50 million is to be
allocated to projects at small hub and non-hub airports.
In February 2006, TSA published an Electronic Baggage Screening
Program (EBSP) Strategic Framework for identifying airports that would
benefit from in-line systems, and within that framework we have an
airport prioritization model (APM) to prioritize airports for Federal
funding of these checked baggage screening systems.
Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, in February 2007, DHS turned to the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC) to sponsor a Baggage Screening Investment Study
(BSIS). The ASAC, comprised of industry stakeholders, outlined a number
of financing and cost sharing options that could be considered for
funding in-line systems. TSA is evaluating each of these options, and
others, to identify the most efficient and cost effective methods for
deploying these resources to the highest priority airports.
Because the aviation industry is dynamic and changes to operations
are sometimes unpredictable, a spend plan is developed each fiscal year
designating the projects that will be funded using appropriated funds
for the purchase and installation of checked baggage explosives
detection systems (EDS). TSA also determines where it is appropriate to
reimburse airports for eligible costs associated with in-line systems
that the airports have already built without Federal funding. TSA
continues to work with its industry partners and the Administration to
effect the most economical and effective process available to support
construction of these types of systems.
Question 3. When do you expect the TSA to begin testing and
implementing the Secure Flight program? What do you believe to be the
agency's biggest challenges in implementing the Secure Flight program?
Answer. The following key milestones for the program are based on
the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 budget request, but are subject
to change based on the impact of the Continuing Resolution (CR) and
final FY 2008 funding:
Benchmark testing with volunteer aircraft operators--
December 2007
Parallel testing begins--Third Quarter FY 2008
Domestic cutovers begin--Second Quarter FY 2009
Funding is the biggest challenge for Secure Flight implementation.
In FY 2007, the program expended $31 million, but the rate used to
calculate the CR is based on the FY 2007 enacted level of $15 million.
This rate leaves the Secure Flight program significantly short of
funding for the duration of the CR. If the CR extends into calendar
year 2008, TSA will be forced to take steps that would result in
significant delays to the Secure Flight program. Furthermore, funding
for the FY 2008 budget at less than the President's requested level
will delay development and deployment of Secure Flight. The progress
the Secure Flight program has made in the last year is substantial with
strong forward momentum. The future of this important aviation security
program and 9/11 Commission recommendation is in jeopardy unless the
current funding is resolved.
Stakeholder understanding and commitment are also important to the
success of the Secure Flight program. It is a highly visible program
including diverse stakeholder groups such as the travel industry,
passengers, Congress, airlines, and privacy advocacy groups. TSA will
continue to reach out to stakeholders to engage them in the program and
to obtain input.
Question 4. What actions has DHS taken to establish standards and
guidelines for developing and implementing the vulnerability
assessments and security plans for railroad carriers and over-the-road
bus operators?
Answer.
Freight Railroad
After September 11, 2001, the freight railroad industry developed
and implemented their own corporate security plans. In an ongoing
effort to ensure a robust level of security planning, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in 2007 conducted
Corporate Security Reviews on all seven of the Class I carriers. These
reviews include an assessment of a carrier's plan, its implementation,
and if necessary, TSA recommendations for improvement. TSA's Corporate
Security Review (CSR) program is one layer of freight rail security
that TSA will use to inform its regulatory efforts.
TSA has begun developing the vulnerability assessment and security
plan regulations for freight railroad carriers required under section
1512 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007. TSA will draw on existing Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and private industry knowledge of security planning including the U.S.
Coast Guard and infrastructure protection security plan regulations and
the Association of American Railroads industry plan in developing its
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) required under the Act.
Mass Transit
TSA has begun developing the concepts that will produce the
required regulation of security plans for mass transit and passenger
rail systems. We anticipate the conduct of vulnerability assessments
will be a component of the required plans. Consultation with the mass
transit and passenger rail community--including representatives of
systems, law enforcement and security forces, and employee
organizations--as well as public safety officials will facilitate the
development of requirements that meet the statutory requirements and
reflect operational realities.
Mass transit and passenger rail systems operating in the Nation's
sizable metropolitan areas are among the most thoroughly assessed of
all transportation modes. Since 9/11, they have undergone security
assessments by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the former
Office of Grants and Training at DHS (for grant funding eligibility),
the American Public Transportation Association, private sector security
consultants (funded by DHS grants), and now under the Baseline
Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program conducted by TSA
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs).
Through the BASE program, TSA assesses a transit system's security
posture on the 17 Security and Emergency Management Action Items. The
Actions Items cover a range of areas that are foundational to an
effective security program, including security program management and
accountability, security and emergency response training, drills and
exercises, public awareness, protective measures for Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS) threat levels, physical security, personnel
security, and information sharing and security. Particular emphasis is
placed on posture in the six Transit Security Fundamentals (protection
of underground/underwater infrastructure; protection of other high
consequence systems and assets; random, unpredictable deterrence;
training; exercises; and public awareness). This program is dynamic,
with regular reviews to ensure assessment tools continue to reflect
security realities and priorities.
TSA completed BASE reviews of 45 of the largest 50 mass transit and
passenger rail agencies, plus 8 others ranked in the 51-100 range in
size, with the goal of completing the largest 100 by the end of Fiscal
Year (FY) 2008. Simultaneous with the BASE reviews, TSA engaged each of
the top 50 agencies directly during January-February 2007 to complete
self-assessments on their posture in the Transit Security Fundamentals.
All 50 agencies completed these self-assessments, showing remarkable
candor in their review of their respective agencies' posture.
TSA development and implementation of focused security programs and
initiatives and resource allocations, notably Transit Security Grant
Program funds, for security enhancement has directly resulted from
these reviews. Specific examples include the streamlined security
training initiative, authorization of grant funding for deployment of
dedicated anti-terrorism teams, and cooperative agreements on risk-
based priorities and targeted mitigation projects through the Regional
Transit Security Working Groups.
Highway and Motor Carrier
Many of TSA's surface transportation modal divisions have conducted
threat, criticality and vulnerability assessments for two to 3 years
under the CSR process. The process places modal security specialists in
stakeholder sites for a thorough overview and analysis of the
stakeholder's security preparedness plans and points of vulnerability.
Despite the fact that most surface modes have not yet been subjected to
TSA regulatory requirements for comprehensive security plans, the
Agency has made significant progress in identifying security gaps and
in recommending appropriate mitigation tools from industry best
practices, technology and newly-developed policy guidance. The process
is especially valuable when it is combined with DHS's intelligence
offices and linked to timely and credible threat information. TSA is
expanding its CSR system now with the use of DHS field personnel and
on-site law enforcement agencies to reach the massive stakeholder
community.
TSA is also partnering with the motorcoach industry and is
developing a set of security action items (SAI) that when implemented
will provide critical gap closures within the industry. These SAIs are
being vetted through the industry and other partners.
Question 5. What progress has TSA made in implementing its surface
transportation inspection program?
Answer. Substantial progress has been made in implementing the TSA
Surface Transportation Security Inspections Program (STSIP) since its
inception in 2005.
The surface inspectors develop and implement programs and
initiatives to improve regional collaboration and coordination to
ensure security resources are applied in the most effective manner. For
optimal effectiveness, leadership of the STSIP at Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) headquarters and regional levels work in
concert with the Office of Security Operations (OSO) Federal Security
Directors, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and the staffs of
Transportation Security Network Management (TSNM)-Mass Transit and
TSNM-Freight Rail. National priorities set by TSNM lead to customized
security products that are developed in coordination with the STSIP and
drive the activities of inspectors on the national level. The
Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs)-Surface act as fact finders
and Ambassadors for TSA's security policies and programs in the field.
The success of this integrated OSO-TSNM approach through the STSIP
is demonstrated in the achievements made since the STSIP began
operations in earnest in the fall of 2005. Highlights include:
TSA has advanced a regional engagement strategy for mass
transit security by networking with transit systems in
metropolitan areas to: (1) expand visible, random, and
unpredictable security activities; (2) facilitate the delivery
of security training programs to broader audiences of transit
system employees; and (3) make security tools available for use
in systems;
In a coordinated effort involving the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), TSA developed several comprehensive security assessment
and review programs to determine and elevate the security
baseline in passenger rail and mass transit. These programs
include the Security Analysis and Action Program (SAAP),
Security Directive Reviews (SDR), and the more recent Baseline
Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program;
TSA has completed assessments under the SDR or SAAP programs
of multiple rail/transit properties;
TSA has conducted BASE assessments of 54 transit agencies
nationwide, including 45 of the largest 50 transit systems;
STSIP Inspectors have conducted more than 1,000 Transit
Station Profiles and 40 rail and mass transit Operations Center
Profiles nationwide. These profiles provide valuable critical
infrastructure data and give the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and TSA an accurate picture of security
countermeasures that are in place, the location of the
transportation asset, and accurate contact information on each
asset;
In a coordinated effort with the FTA, TSA has engaged with
the State Safety Oversight Agencies (SSOA) to support the
conduct of on-site security assessments and audits required for
heavy rail (i.e., subway) systems under 49 CFR Part 659. The
initial effort took place in the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)
system. The program is expanding dramatically, due in large
part to the coordinated Federal effort and engagement with the
SSOAs through their biannual conferences;
TSA has partnered with the FTA, the DHS Offices of Grants
and Training and Science and Technology, the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA), and the mass transit
industry to develop voluntary security standards and
recommended practices for both mass transit rail and bus
transportation;
The STSIP participates in the interagency Mass Transit
Security Information Sharing Network, a forum comprised of
subject matter experts from the Department of Transportation,
DHS, TSA, and FTA to streamline Federal information gathering
and exchange to support timely decision-making and information
products in threat situations, incident response, and normal
operations. TSIs-Surface channel and receive information
through this process in response to incidents in transit
systems in their areas of responsibility as well as during
international events and regular drills and exercises;
TSA has developed a voluntary inspection program of the
Nation's freight railroads using the Toxic Inhalation Hazmat
(TIH) Freight Rail Security Action Items to elevate the level
of security in freight rail yards, storage facilities, and
rights of way. To date, STSIs have completed over 1,600 field
inspections and interviewed more than 3,000 front-line railroad
employees in 46 high-threat urban areas.
Although TSA has issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making for rail
and passenger rail, there does not yet exist a regulatory regime for
the STSIP. At this stage of its development, the STSIP performs
voluntary assessments only and is primarily in a supportive and
facilitative role with the mass transit, passenger rail, and freight
rail communities.
Close alignment of the STSIs with TSA strategies ensures an
integrated approach that has demonstrated success in advancing security
programs in surface transportation. Priority taskings for the STSIP
align with national risk-based strategies as described below:
Security Action Item TIH reviews in freight rail through
November 2008.
BASE reviews of mass transit systems through the completion
of the Top 100 systems.
Security Analysis and Action Program vulnerability and risk
assessments in freight and passenger rail environments with
special emphasis on high threat urban areas and major passenger
rail infrastructure.
Building a nationwide rail and mass transit infrastructure
profile database.
Supporting Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR)
teams, which consist of varying force packages of Federal Air
Marshals, TSIs, Transportation Security Officers, behavior
detection officers, TSA explosives detection canine teams, and
supporting equipment, that work with local security and law
enforcement officials to supplement existing security
resources, provide deterrent presence and detection
capabilities, and introduce an element of unpredictability to
disrupt potential terrorist planning activities.
In addition to these primary responsibilities, TSIs-Surface are
actively involved in a variety of other functions critical to TSA's
surface transportation security efforts. These include:
Security Incident Response--TSIs are responsible for
responding on scene to a significant surface transportation
security incident or natural disaster in order to ensure the
timely and accurate communication of information to TSA
headquarters and the Freedom Center and effective liaison with
passenger rail and rail and bus transit systems.
Heightened Threat Deployments--TSIs staff stakeholder
transportation operations centers or emergency operations
centers, as directed, during periods of heightened threat in
order to provide timely information from the local level to TSA
headquarters and the Freedom Center and ensure effective
liaison with passenger rail and rail and bus transit systems.
Additionally, TSIs support other TSA operations during specific
threats (for example, providing support to TSA airport
operations during an aviation-specific threat).
Special Event Support--TSIs provide additional operational
and subject matter expertise to multiagency task forces during
National Special Security Events (NSSE) or other high threat
events.
Stakeholder Outreach--TSIs establish and maintain
partnerships among public and private transportation
stakeholders in order to enhance information sharing
capabilities, best practice development, and coordinated
response planning.
Transportation Security Grant Program (TSGP)--TSIs
participate as subject matter experts to review grant
applications under the DHS TSGP.
TSIs regularly collaborate with other government and private
industry stakeholders on large scale assessments that cross
jurisdictions and/or have regional implications.
TSIs coordinate their activities, when appropriate, with the FRA
pursuant to the TSA/FRA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (September
2006), which outlines roles and responsibilities of inspectors as well
as inspection coordination requirements. Additionally, there are MOUs
between TSA and the FTA and TSA and the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration that govern coordination of mass
transit security and hazardous materials transportation security
issues, respectively.
TSIs accompany FRA safety inspectors on their compliance
reviews under 49 CFR Part 239 (emergency preparedness plans and
programs for passenger/commuter rail).
TSIs coordinate with other agencies during response to
significant security or other incidents that impact surface
transportation.
TSIs regularly participate on regional security roundtables
and working groups that include Federal, State, and local
governments, as well as industry representatives.
TSIs collaborate with the SSOAs that have a specific
responsibility for security oversight of rail fixed guideway
systems under 49 CFR Part 659.
TSIs regularly participate in local emergency response
drills and exercises.
TSIs participate on TSA VIPR teams, which consist of varying
force packages of Federal Air Marshals, TSIs, Transportation
Security Officers, Behavior Detection Officers, TSA explosives
detection canine teams, and supporting equipment, that work
with local security and law enforcement officials to supplement
existing security resources, provide deterrent presence and
detection capabilities, and introduce an element of
unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist planning
activities.
TSIs participate on National Transit Security Roundtables,
which are twice yearly forums that bring together the security
chiefs and directors from the top 50 transit agencies (by
passenger volume) in a working seminar to develop effective
solutions to security challenges.
TSIs participate in PortSTEP exercises, which are
intergovernmental, multi-jurisdictional regional exercises
executed through the Area Maritime Security committees.
TSIs represent TSA in the joint initiative of the American
Public Transportation Association Standards Development
Committee and Federal security partners (TSA, FTA, and DHS
Standards Executive and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency) to develop operational and technology security
standards.
Question 6. The 9/11 Commission Recommendations Law requires
significant levels of cooperation and coordination between the TSA and
the DOT in order to enhance security while improving efficiency and the
use of Department resources. Can you describe the efforts that your
agency is taking to strengthen your relationship with DOT? Are you
getting the cooperation you need from Transportation Secretary Mary
Peters?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) have an ongoing, active, and cooperative
relationship concerning security matters. Each mode maintains a
Government Coordinating Council that includes representatives from DHS,
TSA, DOT, and other appropriate Federal agencies. The tasks from the
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 are
discussed and, as appropriate, are collaboratively addressed through
these councils. In addition, DHS, TSA, and DOT jointly evaluated the
requirements of the Act, agreed to the designations of lead agencies,
and identified points of contact. DHS, TSA and DOT are also cooperating
through other existing committees, councils, and working groups to
coordinate research and development, cyber security, and threat
assessments, HAZMAT regulations, transportation system recovery
planning, and aviation security operations and planning.
Question 7. Your testimony suggests that since the budget
allocations and homeland security appropriations bill were considered
prior to enactment of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Law,
appropriations equal to the funding authorized by it are unlikely.
Given that these programs and funding levels were provided based on the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, will the President be
requesting additional funding in FY 2008 either through a Supplemental
Appropriations request, or a budget amendment?
Answer. The President has submitted an Amendment to the Fiscal Year
(FY) 2008 Budget Request to address critical security gaps identified
in the FY 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. While the Amendment was
not specifically formulated to address the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requirements, it does contain
funding for two of the mission-critical items identified by the Act.
The FY 2008 Budget Amendment proposes $20 million in funding for 10
additional Visible Intermodal Protection and Response teams which will
provide protection in multiple modes of transportation as well as $10
million to support 92 additional K-9 teams for multi-modal coverage (46
teams through Cooperative agreements and 46 TSA-led teams).
Question 8. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act
of 2006 consolidated all of the funding for the Department's research
and development functions within the Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T). In August 2006, you signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with S&T which shifted the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)
from TSA to S&T. Do you think this consolidation has weakened the TSL's
core mission and made the process for certifying EDS for the TSA more
inefficient? Please explain why or why not.
Answer. Shifting the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) from
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) has not weakened TSL's core mission. As a
customer of the S&T Directorate, TSA's work remains the number one
priority of TSL.
The S&T Directorate is working closely with TSA to ensure that the
S&T Directorate is meeting TSA's priorities and requirements. TSL has
accomplished priority certifications and qualifications of equipment
for TSA, including work with EDS, in a timely fashion.
Question 9. To what extend has the DHS, the TSA and the TSL
considered the qualification and certification of EDS for use in modes
of transportation other than aviation?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
responsible for certifying and qualifying technology across all modes
of transportation. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate and TSL
support TSA and other customers in developing solutions that can fill
their technology gaps. These technology gaps are identified in a
collaborative process where TSA works with S&T and TSL on a continuing
and reoccurring basis.
Question 10. On Wednesday, October 3, 2007, you announced that
Honolulu, Hawaii, would begin to enroll seaport personnel for TWIC in
mid-November. That time has arrived and no one with the TSA nor with
the contractor Lockheed Martin can provide the most basic operational
information such as how many trusted agents are hired and trained to
enroll workers; how many fixed and mobile enrollment stations will be
deployed; or what the enrollment facilities' hours of operation will
be. How confident are you that this enrollment process will be
implemented efficiently, successfully, and on time?
Answer. The enrollment center in Honolulu opened on November 7,
2007. Lockheed Martin provided Port stakeholders with advance notice of
the plans for when pre-enrollment and enrollment activities were to
begin. There are 4 trusted agents staffed at the Honolulu enrollment
center, with two fixed and one mobile enrollment station. The hours of
operation are Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. However,
Lockheed is currently evaluating changing these hours to 7:30 a.m. to
4:30 p.m. in order to better accommodate the workforce.
Question 11. When can we expect to see the deployment schedule for
the TWIC program at the other 134 enrollment locations?
Answer. On October 31, 2007, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) released a general schedule for all 147 enrollment
locations. TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard expanded the original list of
134 to 147 based on stakeholder input. This listing provides monthly or
quarterly deployment time-frames. The list is available to the public
on TSA's website at www.tsa.gov/twic. As the start of the enrollment
period for each grouping of ports nears, TSA will post a specific
enrollment start date in the Federal Register. To date, TSA has
announced the start of enrollment for 22 locations in the Federal
Register.
Question 12. How does an employer go about arranging for a trusted
agent to enroll employees at its facility?
Answer. If an employer is interested in arranging for a mobile
enrollment center, they should contact the Lockheed Martin Operations
Manager, Stacy Bonnah-DeMoss at 703310-9157 or the Field Coordinator to
discuss arrangements at the requestor's facility.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question. The recently enacted 9/11 Commission recommendations
legislation (Pub. L. 110-53) provides significant resources and an
expanded Letter of Intent program to expedite the installation of in-
line electronic screening systems for the enhanced screening of checked
baggage at our Nation's airports.
The Committee was clear on its intent that TSA and the
Administration should fully utilize the 20 year horizon for LOIs.
However, the Committee is concerned by rumblings that the
Administration may be pursuing a limited short-term view of the
program, which would have detrimental effects on the ability of
airports to obtain requisite funding from the financial bond markets.
Is it TSA's intention to issue multi-year Letters of Intent to
airports for in-line projects? Can TSA assure the Committee that the
Department will issue multi-year LOIs for in-line systems in FY 2008,
in accordance with the law?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) welcomes
the opportunity to make use of the resources provided for in the 9/11
Commission recommendations legislation to continue its efforts to
expand the number of airports with in-line checked baggage screening
solutions, at those airports where such a system is determined to be
the optimal solution. TSA will continue to work with its industry
partners and the Administration throughout Fiscal Year 2008 to affect
the most economical and effective process available to support
construction of these types of systems.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. When will TSA begin enrolling workers at the Port of
New York and New Jersey in the TWIC program? What about the Port of
Philadelphia/Camden?
Answer. Enrollments at the Port of New York and New Jersey are
currently targeted to begin the week of December 17, 2007. There will
be a total of 3 sites. The other two will open within a month of the
opening of the first site. Enrollment at the Port of Philadelphia/
Camden is currently targeted to begin the week of December 10, 2007. A
second site is targeted for mid-2008. Plans are being finalized for
these locations and notifications to port stakeholders will begin
shortly.
Question 2. Do you believe our Nation's rail and vehicle bridges
and tunnels are sufficiently protected against terrorist attack? Has
the Department completed a security assessment of the Nation's rail and
vehicle bridges and tunnels?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considers
mitigation of risk to underwater transit tunnels as a strategic
priority. Protecting this infrastructure requires an integrated
approach aligning Federal capabilities with mass transit and passenger
rail systems that operate in this infrastructure. To harness Federal
expertise and advance coordinated effort, TSA convened an interagency
Tunnel Risk Mitigation Working Group in 2006. This interagency effort
brings together Subject Matter Experts from a range of relevant fields
among Department of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation
organizational elements to identify, assess, and prioritize the risk to
mass transit and passenger rail systems with underwater tunnels in the
United States. This effort also assists transit agencies in planning
and implementing protective measures to deter and prevent attacks as
well as blast mitigation and emergency response strategies in the event
of a terrorist attack and/or all hazards incident or event.
Through regular meetings, this working group has developed
mitigation strategies, engaged stakeholders, analyzed and applied the
results of risk assessments, prepared statements of work for testing
and modeling programs, and integrated the overall risk mitigation
effort for a cohesive, coordinated, and effective approach. The
initiative has:
Identified and assessed risk to all 29 underwater tunnels in
the nation;
Prioritized tunnel risk mitigation based on risk to drive
grant funding to most pressing areas;
Developed strategies for funding future technology research
and development aimed at producing novel approaches to this
challenging problem; and
Produced and disseminated recommended protective measures
transit agencies may implement to enhance security with
available resources or through targeted grant funding.
These recommended measures derive from the experience gained in
Federal security assessments and the ongoing work to identify and
prioritize tunnels and develop a strategic plan to mitigate risk. The
interagency group is working closely with the transit industry to
ensure the implementation of protective measures to mitigate risk in
transit tunnels. TSA security assessments of passenger rail and mass
transit agencies with tunnel infrastructure include review of
protective measures implemented to mitigate risk.
To advance this concerted effort, the Transit Security Grant
Program has made projects to protect high risk underwater and
underground assets and systems a top funding priority.
Question 3. A report on the security of bridges and tunnels in the
New York/New Jersey region was due last March. When will you submit
this report to Congress?
Answer. A classified report, as required by the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, was delivered to the
Chairman and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
on October 22, 2007.
Question 4. Do you know how much funding will be required to better
secure our Nation's highest-priority bridges and tunnels, especially
high-priority rail tunnels?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
recognizes, through the assessments it has conducted, that there are
operational and structural aspects to improving bridge and tunnel
security and that each bridge and tunnel requires varying approaches to
achieve the desired level of security. TSA, State and regional
authorities, and the owners and operators of the highest priority
bridges and tunnels have focused their efforts primarily on operational
security solutions that include: establishment of an interagency Tunnel
Risk Mitigation Working Group, assessment of vulnerabilities of the
Nation's 29 underwater transit tunnels, development of security
recommendations and guidelines, assessment of risk mitigation measures
employed through the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement
Program inspections conducted by TSA Surface Transportation Security
Inspectors, deployments of Visible Intermodal Protection and Response
Teams, and increased security awareness campaigns.
As an example, one of the most symbolic of America's highway
bridges has been spending approximately $6 million annually just on
security. They have invested in intruder detection technology and
personnel to monitor those devices, perimeter fencing, structural
hardening, and both full- and part-time emergency response staff as
well as oversight contracts with local law enforcement units. While
improvements in technology may help displace personnel costs in the
future, the security needs of just the Nation's most critical bridges
and tunnels will involve significant costs for many years to come.
The Transit Security Grant Program funds many operational
initiatives. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, $136 million was awarded under
the TSGP. About one-third of that amount was awarded for operational
security improvements in the Nation's most critical tunnels. The FY
2007 awards have not been finalized.
Structural security improvements require a substantially greater
investment. Efforts are underway to determine the requirements for
security improvements, and ultimately the costs of those improvements,
at some of the Nation's highest priority underwater tunnels. Structural
options under consideration include the replacement of antiquated
structures or hardening existing structures to improve their resilience
to attack. The costs of these initiatives are roughly estimated to be
between $100 million to $500 million per structure for hardening and up
to several billion dollars per structure for replacement.
Question 5. When will TSA comply with Section 125 of the SAFE Port
Act of 2006 concerning threat assessments of port truck drivers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
anticipates completion of the threat assessments for port truck drivers
by summer 2008. Collection of driver information from all state motor
vehicle licensing agencies is underway at this time. There is
substantial variation in the technological capabilities of the states,
leading some to respond to TSA's request earlier than others. Also, as
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential is deployed across
the country we will enroll these drivers and they will go through a
much more thorough check than the name-based check, and it will be done
perpetually.
Question 6. Will the President request sufficient levels of
security funding for Amtrak's capital and operating needs in the
Department of Homeland Security's 2009 budget? Do you anticipate that
Amtrak will be required to use funding from sources other than DHS
grants for these functions?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security has been working in
conjunction with the Department of Transportation and the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation to identify and address security needs
for Amtrak. Historically, Federal grant assistance has been provided to
Amtrak through FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate both for capital and
operating needs.
DHS believes that sufficient levels of security funding for
Amtrak's capital and operating needs will be included in the
President's Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, and does not anticipate
additional funding requirements from sources other than DHS grants.
Question 7. Since the inception of the agency, how many TSA
employees have notified the Office of Special Counsel of agency abuse,
fraud, or waste pursuant to whistleblower complaint procedures and are
still employed by the TSA? How many complainants are no longer employed
by the TSA?
Answer. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) does not provide the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with the names of all
complainants or the number of employees who have filed complaints
pursuant to the whistleblower complaint procedures. OSC only notifies
TSA when OSC determines that it is appropriate for a complaint to
proceed to mediation or a full investigation. Throughout Fiscal Years
2006 and 2007, there were 14 active complaints in OSC's investigative
process. Two of these are still open investigations and one has been
settled. The remaining 11 have all been closed by OSC with no further
action taken. Three of these 14 individuals are currently TSA employees
(one has one of the open investigations, two had cases closed with no
further action).
Question 8. What is TSA doing to improve its ability to check
passenger carry-on bags for explosives?
Answer. To drive improvement in the screening system nationwide,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made covert
assessments very difficult for our screening workforce, and we
frequently use high-level vulnerability testing to identify best
practices in explosives detection. We believe that covert testing is a
powerful tool to identify vulnerabilities in the system, and we are
building a culture of heightened awareness of threat items at every
airport in the country.
A key to building this culture is the implementation of covert
drills involving simulated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for the
screening workforce. As part of this effort, TSA deployed 5,800 bomb
test kits to the field and provided intensive onsite training to every
Transportation Security Officer (ISO). IED recognition is at the
forefront of our training objectives, and we have incorporated emerging
threats such as liquid explosives. Today, TSA conducts 2,500 IED
recognition drills a day, and we are currently conducting a study to
identify an optimal level and frequency of drills.
Further, TSA recognized that a more systematic, nationwide
framework to assess the effectiveness of the screening process and
identify areas to focus our resources in training and technology was
needed. Therefore, TSA instituted a comprehensive program to measure
screening performance called the Aviation Screening Assessment Program
(ASAP). ASAP is aggressively focused on improving recognition of IEDs,
and TSA has performed thousands of covert assessments at airports
across the country in just 6 months. Through ASAP, we are assessing our
performance every day in every aspect of the screening process.
Findings from ASAP are reported directly to TSA leadership, and we
will use these performance metrics to make strategic decisions within
the screening environment, from the type of equipment TSA purchases to
the type of training TSA delivers to our TSOs.
In addition, TSOs undergo extensive individual training using the
Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which displays fictional threat
items within x-ray images of actual passenger bags in order to evaluate
the ISO's ability to detect threat items. TSO responses are recorded
and downloaded monthly for analysis and reporting. TIP is a
multifunctional system that extends well beyond an evaluation tool. It
provides screeners with real-time experience in detecting threats and
resolving alarms in passenger baggage. It is an immediate feedback and
reinforcement system that increases screener accuracy. At a higher
level, TIP data shows performance trends by airport and nationally and
these trends help TSA identify national training needs.
The result of all of these performance assessment efforts is that
our TSOs are the most tested workforce in the country. TSOs are tested
every day, on every shift, at every checkpoint in the United States,
and we believe that this intensive activity will drive the improvements
we all desire in our explosives detection capabilities.
To support our IED training initiatives, the Bomb Appraisal Officer
(BAO) Program has been instituted at our Nation's airports. BAOs spend
a substantial amount of their time providing IED training to TSOs.
Their expertise proves invaluable when conducting this training. This
program is still in the deployment phase, having grown from an initial
class of 13 to more than 100 BAOs currently in the field. As of October
2007, BAOs have conducted over 12,500 hours of training to
approximately 40,000 TSOs.
In addition to the training and testing of TSOs, we are working
hard to deploy new explosives detection technology, including
backscatter and millimeter wave imaging, automated explosives detection
systems, and other technologies that will play an important role in
TSA's layered security approach. The deployment of advanced technology
will be guided by a 5-year strategic plan that has two core goals: (1)
improving explosives detection capabilities, and (2) developing the
capacity to detect hostile intent before and during the screening
process. Examples of this technology include:
Whole Body Imagers. We are field testing whole body imagers,
such as the backscatter and millimeter wave technologies, to
quickly and safely screen passengers for prohibited items
without the need for physical contact. Field testing is
underway at Phoenix, and test sites will be expanded to two
other major airports in early 2008.
Bottled Liquids Scanners. After recently completing field
testing at six major airports, we have purchased and are
deploying over 200 bottled liquids scanning devices at
checkpoints, and are now using a hand-held liquids scanner for
non-checkpoint screening locations.
Hand-Held Explosives Scanners. In the 3rd quarter of the
2007 Fiscal Year, we purchased 23 hand-held explosives scanners
to supplement the over 50 devices now in use. These devices are
mobile and can be used for explosives detection at non-
checkpoint locations.
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray. We have recently completed
field testing of AT X-ray equipment for carry-on baggage at
four airports. This technology will provide TSOs with enhanced
capability to identify and detect threats through improved
imagery and analysis tools. We will begin deploying these
systems in 2008.
Checkpoint Automated Carry-On Explosives Detection Systems
(Auto-EDS). We are field testing Auto-EDS for inspecting carry-
on items at four additional airports, and we have plans to test
these systems' capabilities to inspect both carry-on and
checked baggage at smaller airports. Auto-EDS supports enhanced
threat detection through computed tomography X-ray, 3D imagery
and automated explosives and weapons detection. A limited
quantity of these systems is expected to be deployed in 2008.
Cast and Prosthesis Scanner. After completing field testing
at three airports, we have purchased cast and prosthesis
scanners to provide a safe, dignified, and non-invasive way to
identify potential threats and clear passengers wearing casts,
braces, and prosthetic devices. Deployment activities for these
units are expected to begin in 2008.
We will continue to explore additional technologies to maintain our
evolving ability to detect prohibited items at checkpoints.
An initiative critical to the second core goal is Screening of
Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT), a program initiated to
develop strong behavior observation skills in our TSOs. TSA must not
make the mistake of focusing so intently on the property individuals
carry through checkpoints that we miss indicators that an individual
could be engaged in criminal and/or terrorist activity. SPOT
systematically identifies high-risk passengers exhibiting significant
levels of stress, fear, and deception associated with criminal intent,
allowing our officers to either refer the passenger for enhanced
screening or to law enforcement.
Because behavioral screening has a strong record of effectiveness
in the prevention of criminal and terrorist activity, TSA has
significantly increased the number of airports with SPOT to now cover
over 75 percent of the traveling public. To date, TSA Behavior
Detection Officers have made passenger referrals resulting in 391
arrests. The program will be expanded to 155 airports in 2008.
A third initiative strengthening security at our checkpoints is the
Optimization Program. Through this effort, TSA sends optimization teams
to airports to observe their checkpoints in action and find ways to
improve how they operate. The teams are made up of experts in screening
procedures, staffing models, equipment and checkpoint design, and
passenger flow, and they improve security by reducing passenger delays
and frustration and eliminating structural problems that are obstacles
to an effective screening process. Recommendations from the
optimization team are presented to the airport's Federal Security
Director, and every recommendation is tracked at TSA headquarters to
ensure that airports are provided the assistance they need to be
successful.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Trent Lott to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. The GAO's testimony points out that while TSA has
developed backscatter technology, ``limited progress has been made in
fielding this technology at passenger screening checkpoints.'' As you
know, I have long been an advocate of using innovative technology to
screen passengers and baggage. My understating is that testing has
indicated that this technology is very effective at detecting
explosives and weapons that might be concealed on a person, is this
correct? Why have there been delays in fielding backscatter technology?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently conducting a field operational pilot of whole body imaging
technology; which includes both backscatter and millimeter wave
technology. While laboratory testing has validated detection
capabilities of whole body imaging technology, it is crucial to also
evaluate technology on its operational effectiveness and efficiency
prior to procuring technology for full deployment. Additionally, TSA,
in consultation with the DHS Privacy Office, continues to work closely
with the vendors in the development of privacy protection algorithms
that will not diminish the effectiveness of the technology. TSA is
currently conducting the pilot of backscatter and millimeter wave
technologies at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport and is
expanding it to Los Angeles International Airport and John F. Kennedy
International Airport in New York. A pilot using only millimeter wave
technology is planned for the Miami International Airport. TSA
anticipates completing the operational pilots by the end of the third
quarter in Fiscal Year 2008 and will make procurement and deployment
decisions based on the results of the pilot.
Question 2. The 9/11 bill requires that TSA develop a strategic
plan for deploying explosive detection equipment at airport
checkpoints. What is the status of this plan?
Answer. The report to Congress required by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, entitled ``Aviation
Security Report--Development of a Passenger Checkpoint Strategic
Plan,'' dated September 2007, was delivered to Congress, including the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, on October
4, 2007.