[Senate Hearing 112-601]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-601
NATO: CHICAGO AND BEYOND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 10, 2012
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Binnendijk, Dr. Hans, vice president for research and applied
learning, National Defense University, Washington, DC.......... 47
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Brzezinski, Ian, senior fellow, the Atlantic Council; principle,
the Brzezinski Group, Washington, DC........................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Gordon, Hon. Philip H., Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Response to a question submitted for the record by Senator
James M. Inhofe............................................ 65
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard G. Lugar........................................... 65
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Kupchan, Dr. Charles A., professor, Georgetown University;
Whitney Shepardson senior fellow, Council of Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC................................................. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Senator from New Hampshire,
prepared statement............................................. 32
Townsend, James J., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for European and NATO Policy, U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard G. Lugar........................................... 66
Response to a question submitted for the record by Senator
Tom Udall.................................................. 69
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 69
(iii)
NATO: CHICAGO AND BEYOND
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THURSDAY, MAY 10, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Corker,
Risch, and Lee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you all very much for being here this morning. I
apologize if we are starting a moment or two late.
By way of process, I have a conflict at about 10:30, about
10:25. Senator Shaheen, who is the chairman of the European
Affairs Subcommittee, will chair the hearing from that point
forward. And I appreciate everybody's understanding of that.
Yesterday, the committee had the opportunity to have a very
healthy and broad discussion with Secretary General Rasmussen,
and he laid out for us the general expectations of the summit
and the road forward as we continue to define NATO's new
parameters.
This is our fourth hearing on NATO since 2009 and that's no
accident. I think all the members of the committee share the
belief that the alliance remains vital to American security and
its effectiveness as an institution deserves our continued
focus and attention.
But needless to say, that focus has changed. Europe has
changed. The world has changed. And later this month when the
allies meet in Chicago to discuss its future in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, a lot of that redefining will be on the table.
So this summit is about how do you make NATO stronger and
how do we learn from our shared experiences. In my judgment,
NATO is--and I think this is a shared judgment--a fundamental
element of our national security and its organization demands
critical analysis in order to meet the evolving threats of our
national security.
One thing is pretty clear about NATO. It has already
confounded its skeptics. From Bosnia to Kosovo, from
Afghanistan to Libya, the alliance has demonstrated an ability
to adapt to the post-cold-war security environment. Obviously,
we have had our challenges in both Afghanistan and Libya, but
we have learned from them.
The signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement by
President Obama last week signaled the gradual transition from
a war-fighting posture to a supportive role, and NATO's
commitment to the people of Libya in the past year has shown
that the alliance, properly leveraged, is still a very highly
responsive, capable, and legitimate tool when it really
matters.
I do not want to spend too much time on the full agenda in
which the members are engaged, including strengthening
partnerships with countries and organizations around the globe,
defending against terrorism and cyber threats, and deploying
defenses against the real missile threats that the alliance
faces. Each will get, I am sure, some further attention in the
course of the hearing today.
But let me just make a couple of broader points. First, on
Afghanistan and then second, on meeting our security needs in
the age of austerity.
Recently, just literally a day before the President arrived
in Afghanistan, I was there for 2 days for discussions with
Ambassador Crocker and the head of the United States forces,
General Allen. I met with President Karzai, his Cabinet
members, and with Jan Kubis, the head of the U.N. mission in
Afghanistan. I also visited with civil society members, with
potential Presidential candidates and parties. To a person,
everyone emphatically stated that the completion of this
agreement is something of a game-changer. And over the years
that I have traveled to Afghanistan and the region, I think
about 18 times since 9/11 events, I have had many conversations
with people at all different levels there in the high points
and the low points of the conflict, and I think I can
confidently say that I have never sensed quite a collective
sense of direction or sigh of relief as a consequence of that
agreement.
But I will say definitively--and I said this to Jan Kubis
and to President Karzai--that in the end our gains are going to
mean nothing if we lose sight of three major challenges that
remain.
One is the continued challenge of governance, the challenge
of corruption within the government process and the delivery of
services. That is paramount.
Two is the question of the continued danger of a sanctuary
war being prosecuted against the forces there. I am a veteran
of a sanctuary war, and I know how insidious it can be. And I
personally think it is simply unacceptable to have a zone of
immunity for acts of war against armed forces and against the
collective community that is trying to accomplish what it is
trying to accomplish. That means Pakistan has to become more
assertive and more cooperative, and we may have to resort to
other kinds of self-help depending on what they decide to do.
And the final point that I think everything hangs on--and
again, I underscored this as powerfully as I could and having
been involved in sort of trying to dig our way out of the
problems of 2009's election. We must prepare now for the
election process, not later, but now. It is imperative that the
Afghan Government, through an independent election commission,
put out the rules of the road for that election. The lists have
to be prepared. The registration has to take place. There has
to be openness, transparency, accountability. Free and fair
elections are mandatory to any chance to go forward after 2014
with any possibility of success.
So those three things leap out at the NATO challenge as we
go forward here.
And finally, the second point. The alliance can only endure
if there is a shared sacrifice and a shared commitment to the
common purpose. We talked yesterday with Secretary General
Rasmussen about this. The failure of some countries to muster
their 2-percent contributions and the expectations going
forward really raise serious questions still as we define the
road ahead. So we need to work with our European friends. We
all understand this is a time of austerity. It is a time of
austerity for everybody. But we are going to have to set
priorities. We are going to have to decide what is really
important and what is perhaps less important. And while we all
understand that military budgets may not be inviolable with
respect to the austerity, certain priorities have to stand out,
and I believe the mutuality of this defense is one of those and
we need to make that real.
So we have to be clear that even before the financial
crisis, NATO was seriously underfunded. And as we emerge from
the financial crisis, we have all got to commit the resources
necessary for the core security interests.
But I just say in the end I am delighted to have the panels
that we have here today. We could not have a better group of
experts of varying views to share our thinking about this
important topic. And on the first panel, we have Dr. Philip
Gordon, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs; James Townsend, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy. And on the
second panel, we are joined by Dr. Charles Kupchan, professor
of international affairs at Georgetown University and the
Whitney Shepardson senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations; and Ian Brzezinski, senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council and principal of the Brzezinski Group; and Dr. Hans
Binnendijk, vice president for Research and Applied Learning at
the National Defense University. So we are very grateful to all
of you today for taking time to be here and look forward to
your testimony.
The Chairman. And Senator Corker, I recognize you.
Senator Corker. Go ahead.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Gordon. Thank you, Chairman Kerry, and to other members
of the committee for inviting us here to testify on the NATO
summit, which the United States is proud to be hosting in
Chicago on May 20 and 21.
With your permission, Senator, I would like to submit my
full statement for the record and just briefly summarize my
comments here.
The Chairman. We appreciate that, and without objection,
the full statement will be in the record.
Dr. Gordon. Thank you.
I want to say I appreciate the committee's support for this
summit, as well as its sustained recognition of the
significance of this alliance to transatlantic security. This
Chicago summit will be the first NATO summit on American soil
in 13 years and the first ever outside of Washington. In
addition to the opportunity to showcase one of our Nation's
great cities, our hosting of the summit in Chicago is a
tangible symbol of the importance of NATO to the United States.
It is also an opportunity to underscore to the American people
the continued value of this alliance to security challenges we
face today.
At NATO's last summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago, the
allies unveiled a new strategic concept that defines NATO's
focus in the 21st century. Building on the decisions taken in
Lisbon, the allies have three objectives for the Chicago
summit: Afghanistan, capabilities, and partnerships. And if I
might, I would like to just say a few words about each.
On Afghanistan, the ISAF coalition has made significant
progress in preventing that country from serving as a safe
haven for terrorists and ensuring that Afghans are able to
provide for their own security. These are both necessary
conditions to fulfill the President's goal to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda.
Last week, as the chairman acknowledged, the United States
demonstrated its commitment to the long-term stability and
security of Afghanistan when President Obama and President
Karzai signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement. And again, I
appreciated hearing Chairman Kerry's assessment and look
forward to discussing Afghanistan further.
At Chicago where Afghanistan is concerned, the United
States anticipates three deliverables in particular: an
agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when ISAF's mission
will shift from combat to support for the Afghan National
Security Forces, the ANSF; second, an agreement on the size,
cost, and sustainment of the ANSF beyond 2014; and finally, a
roadmap for NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan.
Regarding capabilities, NATO's ability to deploy an
effective fighting force in the field makes the alliance
unique. However, its capacity to deter and respond to security
challenges will only be as successful as its forces are able,
effective, interoperable, and modern.
In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still
maintain a strong defense, but doing so requires innovation,
creativity, and effectiveness. The United States is modernizing
its presence in Europe at the same time that our NATO allies
and NATO as an institution are engaged in similar steps. This
is a clear opportunity--you might even say necessity--for our
European allies to take on greater responsibilities. The United
States continues to strongly urge those allies to meet the 2-
percent benchmark for defense spending and to contribute
politically, financially, and operationally to the strength of
the alliance. In addition to the total level of defense
spending, we should also focus on how these limited resources
are allocated and for what priorities.
NATO has made progress toward pooling more national
resources, which is exemplified through the capabilities
package that the United States anticipates that leaders will
endorse in Chicago. This package for Chicago includes missile
defense, the alliance ground surveillance program, and Baltic
air policing. Our allies are furthermore expected to endorse
the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, the DDPR. The DDPR
will identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and
missile defense capabilities that NATO needs to meet 21st
century security challenges, as well as reaffirm NATO's
commitment to making consensus decisions on alliance posture
issues.
Finally, the Chicago summit will highlight NATO's success
in working with a growing number of partners around the world.
Effective partnerships allow the alliance to extend its reach,
act with greater legitimacy, share burdens, and benefit from
the capabilities of others. Our allies will not take decisions
on further enlargement of NATO in Chicago, but they will,
nonetheless, send a clear, positive message to aspirant
countries in support of their membership goals. The United
States has been clear that NATO's door remains open to European
democracies that are willing and able to assume the
responsibilities and obligations of membership. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia are all working
closely with allies to meet NATO membership criteria.
Let me just very briefly talk specifically about two
aspirants that I know are of particular interest to this
committee: Macedonia and Georgia.
Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO
members and has contributed to regional and global security.
The United States fully supports the U.N. process, led by
Ambassador Nimetz. We also engage regularly with both Greece
and Macedonia to urge them to find a mutually acceptable
solution to the name dispute which will fulfill the decision
taken at the NATO summit in Bucharest and extend a membership
offer to Macedonia.
With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and
military engagement support the country's defense reform, train
and equip Georgian troops for participation in ISAF operations,
and advance its NATO interoperability. In January, President
Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to enhance this
cooperation to advance Georgia's military modernization,
defense reform, and self-defense capabilities. U.S. assistance
programs provide additional support to ongoing democratic and
economic reform efforts in Georgia, a critical part of
Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations where they have made
important strides. U.S. support for Georgia's territorial
integrity within its internationally recognized borders remains
steadfast and our nonrecognition of separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not change.
Finally, let me address NATO's relationship with Russia:
2012 marks the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act
and the 10th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council;
anniversaries that we commemorated at a NATO-Russia Foreign
Ministers meeting in Brussels last month. The NRC is founded on
our commitment to cooperate in areas of mutual interest and
address issues of disagreement. The best example of cooperation
is our joint efforts in Afghanistan where Russia's transit
support has been critical to the mission's success.
At the same time, NATO continues to seek cooperation with
Russia on missile defense in order to enhance our individual
capabilities to counter this threat. While we strive for
cooperation, we have also been frank in our discussions with
Russia that we will continue to develop and deploy our missile
defenses irrespective of the status of missile defense
cooperation with Russia. Let me be clear. NATO is not a threat
to Russia, nor is Russia a threat to NATO.
It is no secret that there are issues on which the allies
and Russia differ. Russia has been critical of NATO's operation
in Libya. We also disagree fundamentally over the situation in
Georgia. Since 2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity and has continued to urge
Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia.
In conclusion, the three summit priorities that I just
outlined demonstrate how far NATO has evolved since its
founding six decades ago. The reasons for its continued success
are clear. The alliance has over the last 63 years proven to be
an adaptable, durable, and cost-effective provider of security.
When President Obama welcomes his counterparts to Chicago in
just over a week, the United States will be prepared to work
with our allies and partners to ensure that the alliance
remains vibrant and capable for many more years to come.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Philip H. Gordon
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO summit, which
the United States is proud to be hosting in Chicago on May 20-21. I
appreciate the committee's support for this meeting, as well as its
sustained recognition of the significance of this alliance to
transatlantic security. This will be the first NATO summit on American
soil in 13 years and the first ever outside of Washington. In addition
to the opportunity to showcase one of our Nation's great cities, our
hosting of the summit is a tangible symbol of the importance of NATO to
the United States. It is also an opportunity to underscore to the
American people the continued value of the alliance to the security
challenges we face today.
Indeed, NATO is vital to U.S. security. More than ever, the
alliance is the mechanism through which the U.S. confronts diverse and
difficult threats to our security together with like-minded states who
share our fundamental values of democracy, human rights, and rule of
law. Our experiences in the cold war, in the Balkans and now in
Afghanistan prove that our core interests are better protected by
working together than by seeking to respond to threats alone as
individual nations.
At NATO's last summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago, allies
unveiled a new Strategic Concept that defines NATO's focus in the 21st
century. Former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, was appointed
by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen to develop the basis for the
Strategic Concept and consulted with this committee during that
process. First and foremost, NATO remains committed to the article 5
principle of collective defense. It is worth recalling that the first
and only time in the history of the alliance that article 5 was invoked
was after terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.
The very next day NATO invoked article 5 in recognition of the
principle that an attack against the U.S. represented an attack against
all.
In addition to being a collective security alliance, NATO is also a
cooperative security organization. Unlike an ad hoc coalition, NATO can
respond rapidly and achieve its military goals by sharing burdens. In
particular, NATO benefits from integrated structures and uses common
funding to develop common capabilities.
It is in this context that allies and partners will be meeting in
Chicago next month. Building on the decisions taken in Lisbon, the
President has three objectives for the Chicago summit. The centerpiece
will be the announcement of the next phase of transition in Afghanistan
and a reaffirmation of NATO's enduring commitment to the Afghan people.
Second, we will join allies in a robust discussion of our most critical
defense capability requirements in order to ensure that the security
that NATO provides is both comprehensive and cost effective. And
finally, we must continue our efforts to develop NATO's role as a
global hub for security partnerships.
Afghanistan: On Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) coalition--comprised of 90,000 U.S. troops serving
alongside 36,000 troops from NATO allies and 5,300 from partner
countries--has made significant progress in preventing the country from
serving as a safe haven for terrorists and ensuring that Afghans are
able to provide for their own security, both of which are necessary
conditions to fulfill the President's goal to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al-Qaeda. At Chicago, the U.S. anticipates three deliverables:
an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when ISAF's mission will
shift from combat to support for the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF); an agreement on the size, cost, and sustainment of the ANSF
beyond 2014; and a roadmap for NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan.
At the NATO summit in Lisbon, allies, ISAF partners and the Afghan
Government agreed upon a transition strategy that would result in the
Afghan Government assuming full responsibility for security across the
country by the end of 2014. This strategy is on track, as approximately
50 percent of the population lives in areas where Afghan forces are
taking the lead. As transition progresses, the role of ISAF forces will
evolve. In Chicago, leaders will establish a milestone in 2013 when
ISAF's mission will shift from combat to support as the ANSF becomes
more responsible for security.Throughout the transition period, ISAF
forces--including American forces--will continue to be fully combat
ready and will conduct combat operations as required. The United
States, allies and partners remain fully committed to this Lisbon
framework, as well as to the principle of ``in together, out
together.''
Leaders will also agree upon a plan for the future sustainment of
the ANSF, which has been endorsed by the international community and
the Government of Afghanistan and reflects what we believe will be
necessary to keep Afghan security in Afghan hands. It is our goal that
the international community will pledge 1 billion euro annually toward
supporting the ANSF beyond 2014. We know this is not an easy pledge,
particularly with some European governments facing difficult budget
decisions as they work to recover from the economic crisis. Already,
the British have stepped forward with a substantial commitment; we
welcome early pledges from Estonia, Latvia, and Luxembourg, as well. We
are engaged in active diplomacy to encourage contributions. Secretary
Clinton and Secretary Panetta were in Brussels last month for a series
of NATO meetings and emphasized the importance of ANSF funding in every
forum and in their bilateral meetings. We have also welcomed
complementary efforts to encourage ANSF funding, such as the Danish-led
Coalition of Committed Contributors initiative, which 23 nations have
signed onto--including the United States.
Finally, the summit will make clear that NATO will not abandon
Afghanistan after the ISAF mission concludes. In Chicago, the alliance
will reaffirm its enduring commitment beyond 2014 and define a new
phase of cooperation with Afghanistan. Last week, President Obama and
President Karzai signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which
demonstrates U.S. commitment to the long-term stability and security of
Afghanistan.
Capabilities: Turning to capabilities, NATO's ability to deploy an
effective fighting force in the field makes the alliance unique.
However, its capacity to deter and respond to security challenges will
only be as successful as its forces are able, effective, interoperable,
and modern. Last year's military operation in Libya showed that the
requirements for a strong, flexible, and deployable force remain vital.
New threats require capable, flexible, and immediately available
forces. Even when major operations in the field have ended, it is
essential for the alliance to continue to exercise, plan, and maintain
its forces.
In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still maintain a
strong defense, but doing so requires innovation, creativity, and
efficiencies. The United States is modernizing its presence in Europe
at the same time that our NATO allies, and NATO as an institution, are
engaged in similar steps. This is a clear opportunity for our European
allies to take on greater responsibility. The U.S. continues to
encourage allies to meet the 2-percent benchmark for defense spending
and to contribute politically, financially, and operationally to the
strength and security of the alliance. However, it is important not
only to focus on the total level of defense spending by allies but also
to consider how these limited resources are allocated and for what
priorities.
NATO has made progress toward pooling more national resources,
including through the defense capabilities package that the U.S.
anticipates leaders will endorse in Chicago. Two key elements of this
package will be the NATO Secretary General's ``smart defense''
initiative, which encourages allies to prioritize core capabilities in
the face of defense cuts, cooperate on enhancing collective
capabilities, and specialize according to national strengths, and his
``connected forces'' initiative, which aims to increase allied
interoperability. The package will also track progress on acquiring the
capabilities that leaders identified in Lisbon as NATO's most pressing
needs. The alliance's record in the last 18 months has been impressive
and includes several flagship capabilities programs. Let me cite three
examples:
At the Lisbon summit, NATO allies agreed to develop a NATO
missile defense capability to provide protection for all NATO
European territory, populations, and forces. The United States
is committed to doing its part by deploying all four phases of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach; in fact, the first phase
is already operational. Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey have
agreed to host critical elements. We would welcome additional
allied contributions. NATO remains equally committed to
pursuing practical missile defense cooperation with Russia,
which would enhance protection for all of us.
A second key capability is intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR)--the systems that provide NATO commanders
with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground.
Allies contributed more combat power in Libya than in previous
operations (around 85 percent of all air-to-ground strike
missions in Libya were conducted by European pilots, as
compared to about 15 percent in the Kosovo air campaign in
1999). However, Libya demonstrated considerable shortfalls in
European ISR capabilities as the U.S. provided one quarter of
the ISR sorties, nearly half of the ISR aircraft, and the vast
majority of analytical capability. This past February, NATO
Defense Ministers agreed to fund the Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS) program. The five drones that comprise this
system will provide NATO with crucial information, including
identifying potential threats, monitoring developing situations
such as humanitarian crises, and distinguishing possible
targets for air strikes.
A third initiative is Baltic Air Policing. The 2004
enlargement of NATO forced the alliance to examine burden-
sharing among allied militaries, as well as modernization
programs that benefit the alliance as a whole. In the Baltic
States, for example, air policing is seen as a national defense
imperative by three countries without national air forces. In
February, NATO allies agreed to the continuous presence of
fighters for NATO Air Policing of Baltic airspace. This helps
assure the security of allies in a way that is cost effective,
allowing them to invest resources into other important NATO
operations such as Afghanistan. For their part, the Baltic
States are working to increase their financial support for this
valuable programs.
In addition, the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)--
which allies will endorse in Chicago--will reaffirm NATO's
determination to maintain modern, flexible, credible capabilities that
are tailored to meet 21st century security challenges. The DDPR will
identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile
defense capabilities that NATO needs to meet these challenges, as well
as reaffirm NATO's commitment to making consensus decisions on alliance
posture issues. The DDPR will outline the priorities that NATO needs to
address, and the actions we need to take, to ensure that we have the
capabilities needed to fulfill the three core missions identified in
the new strategic concept, namely: collective defense, crisis
management, and cooperative security.
Partnerships: Finally, the Chicago summit will highlight NATO's
success in working with a growing number of partners around the world.
Effective partnerships allow the alliance to extend its reach, act with
greater legitimacy, share burdens, and benefit from the capabilities of
others. Non-NATO partners deploy troops, invest significant financial
resources, host exercises, and provide training. In Afghanistan, for
example, 22 non-NATO countries are working alongside the 28 nations of
NATO. Some partners (such as Austria, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, New
Zealand, and Sweden) contribute to NATO's efforts to train national
forces to prepare them for NATO missions. Partners (including
Australia, Finland, Japan, Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UAE)
also give financial support to either the Afghan National Army Trust
Fund or the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. Furthermore,
partners participate in discussions on wide-ranging security issues
from counterterrorism to cyber security.
In turn, NATO has worked to give partners a voice in decisions for
NATO-led operations in which they participate, opened alliance training
activities to partners, and developed flexible meeting formats to
ensure effective cooperation. Allies want the Chicago summit to
showcase the value of our partners, especially those who provide
significant political, financial, or operational support to the
alliance. All these countries have come to recognize that NATO is a hub
for building security, as well as a forum for dialogue and for bringing
countries together for collective action. In light of the dramatic
events of the Arab Spring and NATO's success in Libya, we envision a
particular focus on further engagement with partners in the wider
Middle East and North Africa region.
NATO membership has been of great interest to this committee since
the first post-cold-war enlargement of the alliance. Allies will not
take decisions on further enlargement of NATO in Chicago, but they will
nonetheless send a clear, positive message to aspirant countries in
support of their membership goals. The U.S. has been clear that NATO's
door remains open to European democracies that are willing and able to
assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia are all working closely
with allies to meet NATO membership criteria.
Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO members and
has contributed to regional and global security. The United States
fully supports the U.N. process, led by Ambassador Nimetz, and
regularly engages with both Greece and Macedonia to urge them to find a
mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute in order to fulfill
the decision taken at the NATO summit in Bucharest and extend a
membership offer to Macedonia.
The United States is assisting Montenegrin reform efforts by taking
steps to embed a Defense Advisor in the Ministry of Defense. We are
encouraging other allies to consider similar capacity-building support.
The recent agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina on registering defense
properties is a significant step forward toward fulfilling the
conditions laid out at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Tallinn in
April 2010. NATO should spare no effort in assisting the Bosnian
Government's implementation of this decision, which would allow them to
submit their first Annual National Program this fall.
With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and military
engagement support the country's defense reforms, train and equip
Georgian troops for participation in ISAF operations, and advance its
NATO interoperability. In January, President Obama and President
Saakashvili agreed to enhance this cooperation to advance Georgian
military modernization, defense reform, and self defense capabilities.
U.S. assistance programs provide additional support to ongoing
democratic and economic reform efforts in Georgia, a critical part of
Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, where they have made important
strides. U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity within its
internationally recognized borders remains steadfast, and our
nonrecognition of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
will not change.
Finally, let me say a word about NATO's relationship with Russia.
2012 marks the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the
10th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council. The 1997 Founding Act
expressed NATO and Russia's common commitment to end rivalry and build
mutual and cooperative security arrangements. It also provided
reassurance that NATO's open door to new members would not undermine
Russia's security. Five years after signing this act, our leaders met
in Rome to develop an expanded framework for our partnership, the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC), in order to have a forum for discussing the full
range of shared security concerns. We commemorated these anniversaries
at a NATO-Russia Foreign Ministers meeting last month in Brussels.
NATO-Russia relations cannot be defined by any single issue.
Indeed, the NRC is founded on our commitment to cooperate in areas of
mutual interest and address issues of disagreement. The best example of
cooperation is our joint efforts in Afghanistan. Russia's transit
support for NATO allies and our ISAF partners has been critical to the
mission's success. For the U.S. alone, more than 42,000 containers of
cargo have transited Russia under NRC arrangements, providing materiel
for U.S. troops and our ISAF partners. Since 2006, NATO allies and
Russia have worked together to provide counternarcotics training to
more than 2,000 law enforcement officers from Afghanistan, Central
Asia, and Pakistan. In addition, the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust
Fund helps address the challenges of keeping the Afghan Air Force's
helicopter fleet operation-ready. Beyond Afghanistan, NATO continues
practical security cooperation with Russia in key areas such as
counterterrorism and counterpiracy.
At the same time, NATO continues to seek cooperation with Russia on
missile defense. By working together, we can enhance our individual
capabilities to counter the ballistic missile threat. We can also show
firsthand that NATO's missile defense efforts are not a threat to
Russia. In late March, the NRC held its first theater missile defense
exercises since 2008, an important step. While we strive for
cooperation, we have also been frank in our discussions with Russia
that we will continue to develop and deploy our missile defenses
irrespective of the status of missile defense cooperation with Russia.
Let me be clear: NATO is not a threat to Russia, nor is Russia a threat
to NATO.
It is no secret that there are issues on which the allies and
Russia differ. Russia has been critical of NATO's operation in Libya.
We also disagree fundamentally over the situation in Georgia. Since
2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity and has continued to urge Russia to meet its commitments with
respect to Georgia.
As we look to Chicago, these three summit priorities--defining the
next phase of the transition in Afghanistan, outlining a vision for
addressing 21st century challenges in a period of austerity, and
expanding our partnerships--show just how much NATO has evolved since
its founding six decades ago. The reasons for the alliance's continued
success are clear: NATO has, over the last 63 years, proven to be an
adaptable, durable, and cost-effective provider of security. President
Obama made this point at the NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl: ``We
cannot be content to merely celebrate the achievements of the 20th
century, or enjoy the comforts of the 21st century; we must learn from
the past to build on its success. We must renew our institutions, our
alliances. We must seek the solutions to the challenges of this young
century.'' In Chicago, the United States will work with its allies and
partners to ensure that the alliance remains vibrant and capable for
many more years to come. With that, I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate it.
Secretary Townsend.
STATEMENT OF JAMES J. TOWNSEND, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Townsend. Chairman Kerry and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO summit
which the United States will host in Chicago in May. I will
describe for the committee what we hope to achieve at the
summit from the defense point of view and its relevance for
U.S. national security. I particularly look forward to hearing
the committee's views on the summit and the priorities you have
for its outcomes.
I would like to summarize my statement, Mr. Chairman, and
submit the full statement for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Townsend. NATO heads of state and government come
together at a summit every few years not only to approve
important pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the
highest level the commitment allies have made to one another in
the North Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to come to one
another's defense, as expressed in article 5 of the treaty, is
a solemn one that has only been invoked once, after the United
States was attacked on September 11, 2001.
This commitment was critical during the cold war to help
deter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the
United States and our allies. Even with the end of the cold
war, this article 5 commitment remains the core of the
alliance. NATO serves as the organizing framework to ensure
that we have allies willing and able to fight alongside us in
conflict and provides an integrated military structure that
puts the military teeth behind alliance political decisions to
take action. In addition to ensuring the interoperability of
our allies, NATO serves as a hub and an integrator of a network
of global security partners.
The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates
this point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing
involving the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
However, when NATO answered the U.N.'s call to protect the
Libyan people, it was able to take on the mission and execute
it successfully. Had NATO not been there or had NATO been too
weak an institution to take on such an operation, the coalition
would have had to carry on alone.
Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is
critical to ensure NATO is ready when it is needed. This has
been true for the past 20 years when the turbulence of the
international system has demanded that NATO respond nearly
continuously to crises throughout the globe. Today, for
example, NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the Balkans,
countering pirates in the waters off of Somalia, and have just
concluded operations in Libya. Looking out into the future,
challenges to the United States and our allies can come from
ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, as well as from just the
instability that we can see happening as turmoil takes place as
nations wrestle to set up their forms of government. We must be
ready to meet emerging threats. We would prefer to meet these
challenges together with allies and not alone.
So the strategic context for the summit is what I have just
described, and for our work at NATO every day, this is what we
have in mind. How can we keep NATO and the allies ready and
able to meet the challenges of today and in the future? This is
especially complex today as the European economic crisis
compels allies to cut defense spending and force structure in
order to reduce their debt and decrease government spending.
Allies, too, have different views and priorities regarding
perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own
military forces. Not every ally sees the world and their role
in it the way we do. But one thing we all agree on is that we
need the alliance to be unified and strong. Allies look to the
United States to lead the way in keeping NATO strong, capable,
and credible.
That is where we come to the summit in Chicago. At Chicago,
heads of state and government will agree or approve work that
we committed to at the last summit at Lisbon 18 months ago. At
Chicago, this work will focus on three areas: an agreement on a
strategic plan for Afghanistan, military capabilities, and NATO
partnerships.
The United States has three summit objectives. No. 1 is
charting a clear path for the completion of transition and
reaffirming NATO's commitment to the long-term security of
Afghanistan. The second objective, maintaining NATO's core
defense capabilities during this period of austerity and
building a force ready for future challenges. And finally,
deepening the engagement of NATO's partner nations in alliance
operations and activities.
Chairman, I would like to conclude my summary here, and I
welcome your questions and look forward to a good discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
James Townsend
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar and Members of the Committee,
thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO summit which
the United States will host in Chicago in May. I will describe for the
committee what we hope to achieve at the summit from the Defense point
of view and its relevance for U.S. national security. I particularly
look forward to hearing the committee's views on the summit and the
priorities you have for its outcomes.
NATO heads of state and government come together at a summit every
few years not only to approve important pieces of alliance business,
but also to renew at the highest level the commitment allies have made
to one another in the North Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to come to
one another's defense as expressed in article 5 of the treaty is a
solemn one that has only been invoked once--after the United States was
attacked on September 11, 2001.
This commitment was critical during the cold war to help deter the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the United States and
our allies. Even with the end of the cold war, this article 5
commitment remains the core of the alliance. NATO serves as the
organizing framework to ensure that we have allies willing and able to
fight alongside us in conflict, and provides an integrated military
structure that puts the military teeth behind alliance political
decisions to take action. In addition to ensuring the interoperability
of our allies, NATO serves as a hub and integrator of a network of
global security partners.
The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates this
point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing involving the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France. However, when NATO
answered the U.N.'s call to protect the Libyan people, it was able to
take on the mission and execute it successfully. Had NATO not been
there, or had NATO been too weak an institution to take on such an
operation, the coalition would have had to carry on alone.
Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is critical to
ensuring NATO is ready when it is needed. This has been true for the
past 20 years, when the turbulence of the international system has
demanded that NATO respond nearly continuously to crises throughout the
globe. Today, for example, NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the
Balkans, countering pirates in the waters off Somalia, and have
concluded operations in Libya. Looking out into the future, challenges
to the United States and our allies can come from ballistic missile
proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, as
well as from the instability we see in North Africa, the Middle East,
and elsewhere. We must be ready to meet emerging threats, and we would
prefer to meet these challenges together with allies, and not alone.
So the strategic context for the summit, and for our work at NATO
every day, is how can we keep NATO and the allies ready and able to
meet the challenges of today and in the future? This is especially
complex today as the European economic crisis compels allies to cut
defense spending and force structure in order to reduce their debt and
decrease government spending.
Allies too have different views and priorities regarding
perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own military
forces. Not every ally sees the world and their role in it the way we
do. But one thing we all agree on is that we need the alliance to be
unified and strong. Allies look to the United States to lead the way in
keeping NATO strong, capable, and credible.
That is where we come to the summit. At Chicago, heads of state and
government will agree or approve work that we committed to at the last
summit at Lisbon 18 months ago.
At Chicago this work will focus on three areas: an agreement on a
strategic plan for Afghanistan, military capabilities, and NATO
partnerships. The United States has three summit objectives:
Charting a clear path for the completion of transition and
reaffirming NATO's commitment to the long-term security of
Afghanistan;
Maintaining NATO's core defense capabilities during this
period of austerity and building a force ready for future
challenges; and,
Deepening the engagement of NATO's partner nations in
alliance operations and activities.
Afghanistan. While the past few months have been tumultuous in
Afghanistan, U.S. forces, and those of our allies and ISAF partners,
have shown deep resolve and dedication to the transition strategy laid
out at the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon. ISAF troops continue to perform
exceptionally well, particularly in the process of training and
partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces, in our effort to
ensure that the Afghans are ready to assume full responsibility for
security in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. While ISAF troops will
stand ready to conduct combat operations as required right up until the
end of 2014, the fact is that Afghan forces are growing ever stronger
and more professional. This was clearly demonstrated a few weeks ago
when ANSF troops successfully repelled enemy attacks in and around
Kabul.
Our strategy is working. What we do from now until the end of
2014--whether on the ground in Afghanistan, back here in Washington, or
in Chicago next month--must build responsibly on what ISAF has
accomplished to date. Our efforts must safeguard NATO's primary
objective in Afghanistan: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda
and ensure Afghanistan never again serves as a safe-haven for
terrorists. I have no doubt that our resolve will be tested in the
coming months, but I also have no doubt that the U.S. and our ISAF
partners will remain focused on our Lisbon commitments. The Strategic
Partnership Agreement that President Obama and President Karzai signed
just days ago, provides a clear demonstration of our commitment to the
long-term stability and security of Afghanistan.
The upcoming NATO summit presents us with an important opportunity
to send a unified message that we are on track to achieve our Lisbon
goals. We view the Chicago summit as a critical milestone in our effort
in Afghanistan, as leaders come together to determine the next phase of
transition and the future of our support for Afghanistan and its
security forces. All of these steps will help define how we can
responsibly conclude the war in Afghanistan while achieving our
objectives and building a long-term partnership with the Afghan people.
Alliance Military Capabilities. One of the greatest challenges that
NATO faces today is the need to maintain critical combat capabilities
during this period of economic austerity, as defense investment
decisions made now will affect the availability of defense capabilities
5 to 10 years from now.
To help nations under financial pressure keep up their military
strength and build for the future, NATO is putting together a
capabilities package for approval at Chicago that provides an
organizing framework to advance a range of capability initiatives, both
old and new, to get us through the next 10 years with our capabilities
intact and our forces strong. It protects a core of capabilities from
further cuts and provides tools to help nations acquire military
capabilities more affordably.
The major elements of the capabilities package are as follows:
Smart Defense: Introduced by NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen, Smart
Defense is a concept by which NATO members can enhance
security capabilities more efficiently through greater
multinational coordination, collaboration, and coherence. The
U.S. supports the Smart Defense approach, and will participate
in many of the multinational initiatives, but Smart Defense
must not be used as a means to justify further cuts to allies'
defense budgets. There can be no substitute for nations
providing adequate resources and investment in their own
domestic and our collective security. In addition to applying
resources most efficiently in an austere fiscal environment,
Smart Defense should also ensure investments are made in the
right capabilities when economic conditions improve.
Missile Defense. In Lisbon, NATO allies took the
unprecedented step of declaring that NATO would develop a
territorial ballistic missile defense capability, taking on
this critical mission in the face of the real and emerging
ballistic missile threat to NATO European territories and
populations. Since then, we have worked closely with our NATO
allies to turn this ambition into a real capability. In
Chicago, we expect to further that goal by taking steps to
advance the implementation of our missile defense system.
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). At the 2010 NATO Lisbon
summit, heads of state and government identified AGS as one of
the alliance's top 10 critical capabilities. Recent operations
in Libya highlighted alliance shortfalls in surveillance and
reconnaissance. The Alliance Ground Surveillance system will
provide alliance members with a significantly enhanced ability
to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
operations and all of the associated tasks.
Training. I would like to highlight the improvements in
training that I believe will be critical to implementing the
Chicago capabilities package. This commitment is reflected in
the changes the United States is making to its force posture in
Europe. The NATO Response Force will continue to be the engine
for transformation within the alliance. Only through a robust
exercise program can we develop and validate new doctrine,
provide visible assurance of alliance commitment to collective
security, and institutionalize the interoperability we have
developed over the past 10 years in places like Afghanistan,
Kosovo, and Libya. The United States is refining plans to
rotate U.S.-based ground units to Europe twice during each NATO
Response Force cycle to participate in NATO Response Force
training and exercises. In addition, these units will be
available to participate in full-spectrum training with
individual allies as well as multinational formations.
Baltic Air Policing. In the Baltic Region the United States
is a key contributor to NATO's Baltic Air Policing Mission,
which deploys fighter aircraft that are ready to launch at a
moment's notice. The United States joined with all 27 other
NATO allies in February to ensure a continuing presence of
fighters for NATO Air Policing of Baltic skies. NATO Air
Policing helps assure the security of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania in a way that is cost effective, allowing them to
focus resources on other critical NATO priorities. We
anticipate that for their part, the Baltic nations will
increase their Host Nation Support for nations that deploy
fighter aircraft. This mission demonstrates our commitment to
the collective defense of all NATO members and is also a superb
example of defense burden-sharing through Smart Defense.
This capabilities package provides the ways and means to ensure
alliance forces are capable and effective. While tools such as Smart
Defense will help us achieve these goals, all allies must maintain a
base consisting of essential operational capabilities. These core
capabilities must be protected from further cuts to ensure that we will
have the forces we need over the next 10 years and that we have a sure
foundation upon which to build NATO Forces in 2020 and beyond. One of
the ways they will reaffirm NATO's determination to maintain modern,
flexible, credible capabilities is by approving the Deterrence and
Defense Posture Review which will identify the appropriate mix of
nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities NATO needs to
meet today's challenges and tomorrow's emerging threats.
Partnerships. NATO is working more closely than ever with non-NATO
partners to address global challenges. We saw the value of our
partnerships in Libya, when our European partners as well as countries
in the Middle East and North Africa helped the alliance to protect the
Libyan people, and we continue to benefit from our partners'
contributions in Afghanistan, with 22 countries standing shoulder to
shoulder with NATO. In Chicago we look to broaden and deepen our
network of partnerships worldwide.
This summit is an opportunity to carry forward the critical work
our alliance is conduction. At Chicago, we will underscore NATO's
accomplishments in Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans--successes
delivered despite financial crisis. But as we confront current
challenges, we must also invest in the future. NATO relies on
individual allies for the bulk of the capabilities needed for future
operations, but we must find a way to ensure NATO will be able to
maintain critical capabilities in this period of austerity. We can
ensure the greatness of this alliance into the next decade in spite of
fiscal and security challenges; but we must invest the extra effort to
work collectively and to support those institutions that facilitate our
multinational cooperation.
The Chairman. Well, thanks very much, Secretary Townsend.
We will have that, I am sure.
Let me ask you quickly, if I can, before I turn the gavel
over. Secretary Gordon, first of all, what is the reaction of
the Europeans generally to the Obama administration's decision
to take two of the four combat brigades, Army brigades, out of
Europe? And what is the impact? I mean, how is that going to
affect----
Dr. Gordon. No, I appreciate the opportunity to address
that because I think we have been quite successful in
explaining what is behind that thinking. I was actually in
Berlin, Lithuania, and Copenhagen the week we announced it and
had the opportunity to engage extensively and to explain the
thinking behind it.
It is a misunderstanding to even think about it in terms of
a withdrawal from Europe. That was the initial concern, that
people would be imagining that somehow we were reducing our
presence in Europe. The fact is those brigade combat teams that
you are referring to have been fighting in southwest Asia for
the past decade. The issue that the Defense Department was
addressing in rethinking our force presence in Europe was after
this decade of heavy presence, spending hundreds of billions of
dollars and hundreds of thousands of troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan, what was the right posture moving forward,
especially at a time of fiscal constraint. And we have had the
opportunity to explain this thinking to our European allies,
that we remain absolutely committed to Europe and to article 5.
And moving forward, even after those brigade combat teams do
not return to their original homes in Germany, Europe will have
at least as many U.S. forces as it has had for the past decade,
during which we believe that article 5 has been credible and we
have absolutely had an ability to defend Europe.
We have also--and the Pentagon is working this out as we
speak--taken the decision to ensure that elements of those
brigade combat teams rotate through Europe to ensure the
critical partnership function that they performed while they
were there.
So whereas there may have been some initial concern that
the headline of withdrawing troops in Europe would dominate, we
think that by actually explaining what is behind this thinking
and reiterating our commitment to Europe which, by the way,
should not be--I will end with this--reduced to the number of
brigade combat teams in Europe. Over the 3 years of the Obama
administration, we have done a number of other things to
modernize and reiterate our commitment to Europe, including
deploying missile defense, which will mean an American
presence--including troops, people--in Romania and Poland. We
are going to have the radar in Turkey. We are rotating Aegis
cruisers which will home port in Spain. So there is actually a
whole web of new American presence in Europe. We have moved
forward on an aviation detachment in Poland. We have done some
other things with special forces in the U.K. and elsewhere. So
we have also tried to remind them that America's commitment to
Europe and America's presence in Europe should not be reduced
to the number of brigade combat teams.
The Chairman. Can you give me a quick take--because I have
one other question I want to ask--on President-elect Hollande's
promise to withdraw our combat forces by the end of this year
out of Afghanistan and the impact of that on the entire
collective effort?
Dr. Gordon. Absolutely. As you know, one of the things we
were most successful in doing at the NATO summit in Lisbon was
getting everyone on the same page for the 2014 timetable. Our
core principle has been ``in together, out together.'' And at
Lisbon, the alliance as a whole, ISAF as a whole, agreed that
combat troops would remain performing their mission, being
successful through the end of 2014, after which they would be
gone.
Candidate Francois Hollande took the position that French
troops should be out sooner than that by the end of 2012, and
this is obviously something we will look forward to discussing
with the President once he is sworn in. In fact, I leave for
Paris this afternoon to carry on this conversation, which has
already begun. We have been in touch with them, as you would
expect, in recent days and weeks. The French assure us that
they are committed to our common success in Afghanistan, and I
am sure we will find a way forward that ensures that common
success.
All I can do is speak to our own view, which is that this
principle of ``in together, out together'' remains critical,
and we should also not lose sight of the fact, which I think is
quite an accomplishment for the President and his leadership of
this alliance, that every single member of ISAF has stuck to
that. And there have not been the withdrawals, notwithstanding
the economic crisis that we know is painful, notwithstanding
the domestic political pressures. Every member of ISAF is on
board for maintaining that commitment to the end of 2014.
The Chairman. Well, those will be interesting discussions,
obviously. I was just sitting here thinking how you have the
toughest job of all having to travel to these difficult
capitals of London and Brussels and Paris and so forth.
Dr. Gordon. I made clear to Secretary----
The Chairman. You do not have to comment. [Laughter.]
Dr. Gordon. I started to say I made clear to Secretary
Clinton that I am ready to spend as much time as necessary in
Paris in the coming weeks. That is the least I can do.
The Chairman. Fair enough.
Final question just quickly. Almost a year ago now,
Secretary Gates made a very strong statement to the alliance in
which he lamented, ``that many of the allies are unwilling to
devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to
be serious and capable partners in their own defense.'' Where
does the administration stand with respect to that statement
today, and what can we hope for?
Dr. Gordon. Mr. Chairman, as I underscored in my statement,
we continue to urge our European partners to uphold their
responsibilities in the areas of defense, including the common
pledge of 2-percent spending on defense. It is a reality that
the trend of European defense spending is poor, and in the long
run, if it is not sustained, the alliance will not be able to
do what we have so successfully done for so many years and
decades, including most recently in Libya where,
notwithstanding the real constraints that we face, the European
allies were able to step up. They flew more than 85 percent of
the strike missions in Libya. They made a critically important
contribution. In Afghanistan, they have sustained nearly 40,000
troops as part of ISAF for almost a decade. In these and other
cases, we want more and need more, but we should not overlook
the fact that they are making critically important
contributions. We are constantly urging them to make the
investments necessary so that that will be true in 5 years from
now, just as it is true today.
Last thing. We understand the constraints. That is why one
of the deliverables for Chicago that both Jim and I have
emphasized is this question of capabilities and smart defense.
Even if we sustain levels, we have to do it better, more
efficiently, and we have some particular projects that we would
be happy to talk about that will actually show the alliance
moving forward in pooling and sharing and spending more wisely
with the limited resources that are available.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate it. There are obviously
some followups to that. And, Secretary Townsend, I am sure you
have a point of view on it. So we will leave the record open
for a week after this and we will try not to burden you with
too much, but there may be some things we want to do to fill it
out.
I will now recognize Senator Corker, and I will turn the
gavel over to Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your testimony.
You know, this issue of the 2-percent GDP commitment that
is not being honored is something that has been talked about
for a long time. Secretary Albright was in maybe 2 years ago
talking about the same thing. Secretary Gates has been in
talking about the same thing and certainly did so in Europe.
And we talked yesterday with the Secretary General about this
same issue, and it continues to be, well, we are urging. I do
think it is a huge problem, and this trend has been continuing
for a long time. We understand Europe is under stress right
now.
But what set of ingredients do you think exist or what is
it that we are doing? You know, we spent last year a little bit
over 5 percent of GDP here on defense, and I am glad that we
did. I know it is dropping to the high 4s in this next year.
And certainly I think we should make sure we invest
appropriately in that regard. But as we continue to do what we
are doing, we almost become the provider of security services,
and they more and more are becoming the consumer of security
services, and there does not seem to be anything that is really
changing that dynamic. I know there have been commitments in
Afghanistan, and on a per capita basis, many of the countries
have actually had more casualties than us and we honor that.
But from the standpoint of year-in/year-out investment in
modernization and defense forces, it is just not happening. And
we have been talking this same line since I have been here. I
have been here 5 years now and nothing has changed. As a matter
of fact, it is moving in the other direction. There are only
three countries today, us, the U.K., and believe it or not,
Greece, of the entire alliance that is investing 2 percent. A
lot of people are saying Greece's investment is not being done
wisely or at least that is what we heard yesterday.
But I just wonder if there is anything that you would tell
us that other than urging, anything that is going to really
change that dynamic and cause this to be a true alliance and
not one of us again providing security services and them being
the consumers.
Dr. Gordon. Again, I will start and Jim may want to jump in
on this.
First of all, Senator, we agree with that assessment, and
that is why, as I say, we have been clear in making similar
comments to our European allies about how critical this is.
I would again recall Libya as an example of doing more than
urging, where we faced a grave humanitarian crisis, the
situation of a dictator using violence against his own people,
European allies coming to us and telling how important it was
for us to act, and the Arab League calling for intervention as
well. We went to the Europeans in that case and said we agree.
Action needs to be taken. We took the lead, got a U.N. Security
Council resolution, and said we are prepared to do what only we
can do.
Senator Corker. I appreciate and honor that too. But you
know, to build an appropriate defense mechanism as a group of
countries, it takes year-in/year-out, year-in/year-out
investment. I mean, just as we see right now with sequestration
here, I mean, the Pentagon is already beginning to be concerned
about the future because their horizon is not just in a month,
but it is over a long period of time. And I think what we are
seeing in Europe is over a long period of time a very downward
trajectory.
And so I honor what happened in Libya, but I am still not
seeing anything whatsoever that is changing the trend to move
it back up to, by the way, what is a commitment. I mean, this
is not like a goal. A 2-percent investment of GDP is an
absolute commitment by the NATO allies. It is not being
honored. And so what I am concerned about is the long-run
trajectory and that is what we are not seeing. And I am just
wondering again what set of ingredients is going to change
that, especially with the economic times we are dealing with.
Dr. Gordon. Once again, Senator, I agree with that
assessment.
The point I was going to make about Libya is not just in
the short term but actually addresses the longer term point
which was to say in that case, we said we will provide our
unique capabilities, but we expect you to be able to play a
major role yourselves. And by insisting on that, we got them to
do it in that case and are now able to say, well, there is the
example. If you do not continue to invest in the advanced
fighter planes and precision-guided munitions and the
intelligence assets, then you will not be able to do this in
the future and you cannot expect the United States to do it for
you. You know, only they can make those decisions. But that is
what they are hearing from us.
And we also believe, as I referred to our capabilities
deliverables for Chicago, there are a lot of inefficiencies in
the alliance when it comes to defense spending. There are
redundancies and people are not doing it, if I might, smartly
enough. And just to take one example, the agreement by NATO
countries to build this allied ground surveillance system where
13 of them will come together and buy five drones--built by an
American company, by the way--to be able to share all of this
with the entire alliance is the sort of thing they need to be
investing in. Unless they are going to have enough money for
all of them to buy individual drones, which is not realistic,
this is the sort of thing that they can do with less money to
actually provide a capability for everybody. So we are trying
to do that as well.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you. And I am glad we are on
the same page here.
Let me ask another question. This commitment to
Afghanistan. The last I checked--and I am a little dated on
this. To provide enough resources for them just to maintain the
security forces that we have trained up with them, I think it
is about $9 billion a year, if I remember correctly. You all
might correct me. I think the budget authority last time I
checked in Afghanistan--and again I am a little dated--was
around $1.5 billion-$2 billion. So there is a huge gap. And
that is for the entire government. OK?
What is the entire security tab and what kind of
commitments? Because this is something that is coming up like
right now. This is not a trajectory. These are commitments we
need to make. What is the exact gap, and when do we expect from
our NATO allies to have those real pledges coming forth to fill
that gap?
Dr. Gordon. We will have to get you the exact numbers on
where we are right now. I can talk a little bit about----
Senator Corker. I think I meant the order of magnitude.
Dr. Gordon. I mean, what we are focused on where this is
concerned for Chicago, obviously, is that this number needs to
go down. I think your order of magnitude is about right on
where we are and have been for the past couple of years. None
of us want to keep spending that amount years into the future,
and that is why we are focused on how to leave something
sustainable in our wake. Once Afghans are fully in charge of
their security, we want it to work, but we know we are going to
have to help. And the plan that we are looking at for Chicago
would involve the international community putting in around $4
billion a year to maintain the Afghan National Security Forces
for up to a decade. Now, the Afghans themselves have already
pledged $500 million a year of their own money toward that goal
for 3 years, and that amount should rise year by year after
that. And Secretary Gates challenged the rest of ISAF to come
up with a billion euros per year, so about $1.3 billion of that
$4.1 billion total. And we have been working very hard at the
highest levels of our Government to get the rest of the
international community to deliver on that pledge so that if we
get to that point, of the $4.1 billion, the Afghans will be
doing $\1/2\ billion, the other members of ISAF would be doing
at least $1.3 billion. That would bring our numbers down,
obviously, considerably by a factor of 5 or 6 or more.
Senator Corker. And you think you may get those commitments
in Chicago. Is that what you are saying? Or is that going to
take a much longer period of time?
Dr. Gordon. We are looking to get as solid a political
commitment from as many countries as possible, and I think it
is fair to say we are making good progress toward that goal.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you for your work.
And, Madam Chairman, thank you.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
Let me thank our witnesses.
Secretary Gordon, I want to follow up on a point that I
talked to Secretary General Rasmussen about yesterday, and that
is the Chicago summit will not be an enlargement summit. And I
got the Secretary General's view on how we deal with the
aspirant nations that one day we hope will be part of NATO.
And I want to start off with my concern. It has been that
ability or desire to join either the European Union or NATO
that has been a motivating factor to accelerate democratic
reforms in many countries of Europe. And we have seen that work
very successfully.
I think there must be some disappointment that the summit
will not be an enlargement summit. Montenegro and Macedonia
were very close to moving forward on their plans. We have the
issues with Bosnia where they have made some significant
progress and have not quite met the target dates, but they are
moving forward in a very positive way. Georgia has also made
substantial progress, and I understand they may not have
reached the plateau for formal acceptance. But I think the
signal that is being sent is that we are slowing down the
formal expansion of NATO for many reasons and many legitimate
reasons. On a parallel path, the EU has been very slow now on
expansion because of the economic problems of Europe.
So I guess I would like to get the administration's view as
to how we continue to keep the momentum moving toward
democratic reform and ultimate membership in NATO in countries
that we have been very actively engaged, the four I mentioned,
plus others.
Dr. Gordon. Thank you, Senator.
The first point is I absolutely agree that historically
NATO enlargement has been good for NATO, good for Europe, and
good for those countries. As you said, it has contributed to
democracy in Europe and stability and has been absolutely the
right policy, and administrations of different stripes have all
been strongly supportive of it. We completely agree with that.
I think we have been saying--and this phrase that you heard
with Rasmussen, ``not an enlargement summit''--we have been
saying, OK, it is not an enlargement summit, but it is also not
a summit that should be backing away from enlargement. It so
happens that there is not a country ready to be included in the
alliance at this summit with a consensus behind it. So in that
sense, it is not an enlargement summit. But we want to be clear
that this does not mean that we are not focused on enlargement
or as supportive as ever of the open door policy.
One of the ways we are going to signal that is Secretary
Clinton will participate in a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers
with the four aspirant countries to specifically acknowledge
them, note that the door remains open, and talk to them about
the process going forward. And we hope and expect that the
communique will also signal our strong support for enlargement
in general and the processes of these four aspirants in
particular.
The only reason that none are joining at the summit--I
think you would also agree that every case needs to be treated
separately and we should have high standards and important
criteria for joining the alliance. And we continue to work in
different ways with each of the four countries you mentioned. I
would be happy to talk in more detail about where we are with
each. But our bottom line point is no one should see this
summit as somehow the end of enlargement or some different
priority. We remain committed to the open door.
Senator Cardin. And I accept that and I agree with you.
Each of the four countries is truly unique, and I understand
the hurdles that each of the four countries still has
remaining. I really do.
I think, though, that it is very important the signal that
is given. The types of reforms that are being carried out, not
just in these four countries but others who would like to
become one day candidates for a plan for entering NATO are not
necessarily popular locally, the types of commitments to their
defense, the types of commitments to their constitutional
change for authority, the types of democratic reforms that we
see, the types of controls necessary for security. Those types
of issues are not always the most popular domestically in those
countries. But they are able to do it because they see a path
toward integration, and if that path looks like it is going to
be a long haul, seeing in the recent European elections that
populaces do not always go for the responsible route--and so I
think it is very important that the message come from the
United States clearly.
I am pleased Secretary Clinton will be talking to the four
aspirant countries. But we have to be very clear that we do
want integration and we do see the path that will lead to that
and that there are reforms that need to be pursued and although
we are not ready at this summit, we do anticipate there will be
enlargement and we do encourage countries to seek membership in
Europe and membership in NATO.
Dr. Gordon. We agree with that for the very reasons you
state, and it is our goal and commitment to make sure that the
summit sends a positive signal in that direction. I will be
honest. Not every member of NATO is enthusiastic about the
enlargement process, and sometimes it takes some persuading to
make sure that that positive signal gets sent. But it is
certainly this administration's view and we appreciate the
support of this committee for that goal.
Senator Cardin. And we have seen that at prior summits, the
exact points that you have raised. I know there are concerns
about other countries in Europe and their view about NATO
enlargement. We are all aware of all those different issues.
And that is why I think it is particularly important for U.S.
leadership to be pretty focused and clear in Chicago.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for coming.
As you probably know, this committee met with the Secretary
General yesterday and we had a spirited discussion along the
lines that Senator Cardin raised on enlargement. And I would
like to associate myself with his remarks. I think all of us
have the same concerns that he does and want to make certain
that the communication is clear that wanting to join is one
thing. A strong commitment to the requirements for joining is
another issue that certainly needs to be underscored.
Let me say that, Secretary Gordon, you correctly
identified, I think, the issues that this committee is
interested in, and I want to talk about just one of those
briefly and that is the Georgia situation. It is a concern to a
lot of us. In your remarks, you have talked about the stressing
that you did to the Russians about meeting their commitments as
far as Georgia is concerned. And you touched on it kind of
lightly, and I do not mean that derogatorily. It is almost as
if the international community understands the commitments that
the Russians have made regarding Georgia, but no one really
expects them to meet those commitments. As I kind of read
between the lines with what you were saying, it was almost a
reiteration of that. And it is unfortunate.
But give me your thoughts on whether Russia is going to
meet its commitments. I mean, they made very strong
commitments--or excuse me--not strong commitments--clear
commitments as to what they were and what they were not going
to do to the French. And the one that I am most interested in
is the obligation to vacate occupied territories. It is just
not right. The Russians said that they would meet the
commitment to vacate. They have not done that. And from what I
can tell, nobody really expects them to do that. What are your
thoughts on that regard?
Dr. Gordon. Thank you, Senator. I will not pretend it is
easy to find a way to get Russia to meet those commitments. We
completely agree with your assessment that Russia is currently
in violation of the cease-fire agreements that were reached in
August and September 2008. They had six points, and one of them
was for Russian troops to go back to where they were prior to
the start of the conflict, and those troops are not currently
back to where they were prior to the start of the conflict. We
believe, therefore, like you that Russia is in violation of
those commitments. And we have been clear and Secretary Clinton
has referred to Russia's occupation of Georgia. This is not
meant to be provocative, but to simply describe what we believe
to be the case which is Russia having military forces within
the territorial boundaries of an internationally recognized
country.
We have been very active in preventing any further
recognitions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is of course
what Russia did. I think there are maybe three other countries
in the world that have done so, and every single other member
of the international community has refused to do so. In that
sense, we believe we have denied Russia any legitimization that
they have tried to have over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
We have also maintained not just rhetorical support for
Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity but genuine
support for the country of Georgia. This was most recently
manifested in the visit that President Saakashvili paid to
President Obama in the Oval Office where we committed to
strengthening the economic relationship, which is hugely
important to Georgia and its success as a country, and the
defense relationship.
And I will take the opportunity to express appreciation for
the contributions Georgia has made in Afghanistan where they
are one of the leading troop contributors certainly per capita.
And we are working to strengthen that defense relationship as
well.
Senator Risch. And I think we have all done likewise in
expressing appreciation.
But I have to tell you it is disheartening to sit here and
watch this sort of thing where a commitment is made like this,
and it is just handled cavalierly by the international
community. Nobody does anything about it. It is disheartening,
to say the least.
Mr. Townsend, I am going to follow up on comments that
Senator Corker made. And if you feel comfortable in answering
these, fine; if not, we can go back to Mr. Gordon. But it has
to do with the sustainability of the ANSF forces.
You know, those of us who deal with this regularly, when
you put a pencil to this, it just does not work. I know
Secretary Gordon has said--in fact, I think he listed as the
No. 1 priority for the Chicago meeting was to chart a clear
path forward for security forces in Afghanistan for
sustainability. And I understand you want the money that you
want from the Europeans and from others, but when you look at
what it costs to maintain the ANSF and you compare it to the
GDP of the country, even if you include the drug profits that
they make, it just does not work.
So what are your thoughts on that? How do you get there?
How do you get some confidence in being able to do this when
the numbers just do not work?
Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Senator. The pencil work you
describe is, I am sure, being done on the Hill. It is being
done by the administration as well I know. But my Department,
as well as the Department of State--we are working those
numbers as well. At NATO, too, with allies, with the Afghan
Government. There are a lot of pencils going about trying to
determine, as we chart the way forward between now and 2014 and
post-2014. Whether you are at NATO and you are looking at what
the NATO presence could be, whether you are looking at the
United States side of it on a bilateral basis, the Afghan side,
what we have to figure first is what do we think we are going
to need in terms of the ANSF to do the job after 2014. What
needs to be some of the factors we look at?
And I think one of the major factors driving the size of
the ANSF, which is, of course, part of what drives the number,
will be conditions on the ground, the type of job the ANSF will
face after 2014, what will the Taliban look like. These are all
right now unknown factors. We feel that we have got a pretty
good feeling for what we think could happen, but so much
depends on how much we are able to degrade the Taliban and so
that presents less of a threat to Afghanistan and less of a
threat to the ANSF. That certainly impacts the size.
We know, as Senator Kerry talked about, there is a very
important election coming up in 2014. What would be the
requirements there in terms of security and making sure that
that election goes off without a security threat?
So the pencils are moving and we are still in the middle of
that work. At Chicago, NATO is going to produce its strategic
plan for Afghanistan where it will be trying to deal with these
numbers and describe what the NATO presence is going to look
like. As you know, we just signed also the U.S. Strategic
Partnership Agreement with the Afghans. And so we are right now
putting down on paper the structure of what we think we are
going to be doing. That will impact what the ANSF will look
like, and that in turn will have the cost figure there.
And so we know we have got a tall job ahead, but we know
too that we have got to make sure that the Afghans have what we
think they are going to need to do the job and we are in the
middle of doing that now.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
I have to say that I think everybody has got a long ways to
go before the comfort level of a lot of people up here is met.
We are very nervous about this and have a difficult time
bringing the two ends together with the amount of money that we
are talking about and particularly under the present economic
circumstances of this country, the European countries, and
clearly the Afghans themselves.
My time is up. I would like to hear from you, Mr. Gordon.
Maybe we will get another round here. But thank you very much,
Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Risch.
I want to get into some of the specifics of the upcoming
summit, but before I do that, I want to ask you about some news
that broke this morning around the decision in Russia that
newly inaugurated President Putin is not going to come to the
G8 summit next week. And I wonder what we think about this
decision by Mr. Putin, if that comes as a surprise, and more
generally, how is his return to the Presidency going to affect
NATO-Russian relations?
Secretary Gordon.
Dr. Gordon. Thank you. I am happy to address both the
narrower question of the G8 summit and the broader one about
United States-Russia relations.
President Putin called President Obama yesterday to have an
exchange on the anniversary of Victory Day but more
specifically to let him know that he looked forward to
continuing the relationship. It is the first time they have
spoken since he was inaugurated. Given Putin's responsibilities
in Moscow, having just been inaugurated, of trying to put a
Cabinet together, he felt it was important to stay there and
instead would send former President--now Prime Minister--
Medvedev to the G8 summit and instead suggested that the two
Presidents meet at the next G20 meeting, which is some 5 weeks
from today. So that is that. And the President will look
forward to seeing Prime Minister Medvedev at the G8 and he will
look forward to seeing President Putin at the G20.
In terms of the broader relationship, as you know, we have
been very proud of what we have been able to accomplish with
Russia over the past 3 years on the very straightforward basis
that we have a lot of interests in common. And where we have
some significant differences--and I was just talking about one
with regard to Georgia--the President felt it was in our
national interest to pursue those areas of cooperation where we
could, while agreeing to disagree and standing for our
principles elsewhere. And, as you know, we have done that. The
New START treaty agreement on transit in Afghanistan, the 123
civil nuclear agreement, Russian support for Security Council
resolutions on Iran, most recently Russia's agreement to join
the WTO which included a bilateral economic treaty with
Georgia, all of this we think is in our interests and is the
basis for cooperation with Russia.
And so your question is how does that continue with
President Putin. We will see. I can only speak from our end
that we are determined to pursue the same practical policy we
have all along in our own national interest. We will look for
areas of cooperation with Russia. Nobody can predict the
future. What we can say, however, is that President Putin, then
Prime Minister Putin, was around for every agreement that I
just described, and we managed to agree then. So there is no
reason to believe that, even with those two gentlemen in
different jobs, we will not be successful in continuing to
reach practical areas of agreement when they are mutual.
Senator Shaheen. So we really think he is just busy and
there is no underlying ulterior motive here.
Dr. Gordon. I think only the Russian Government can--we
take at face value what----
Senator Shaheen. That was a rhetorical question.
[Laughter.]
Stepping back a little bit from the specifics of the
upcoming Chicago summit, I want to talk about what we see as a
NATO member, the messages is that people should take away from
Chicago. Last month I had the opportunity to host with the
Atlantic Council an event around the upcoming summit. Secretary
Albright and former Senator Warner were there. And it was very
well attended. There was a lot of interest in it.
And I think the summit comes at a very important time as we
look at what has happened with NATO, what is happening in
Europe right now. There have, in some quarters, been a
suggestion that we should pull back from our commitments to
NATO, that the same is true in Europe, as we look at the
declining defense budgets, which people have raised here today.
And I actually think that would be a mistake if we look at the
successes of NATO, and you both talked about those very
eloquently in your opening remarks. This is a 60-year-old
alliance. It has been the most successful one in modern history
anyway. You talked about the success in Libya. We still
represent three of the top four defense spending countries in
the world. And we have, after a decade of fighting in
Afghanistan, the most experienced fighting force that we have
seen again in modern history. Enlargement has been good for
Europe.
So in view of where the alliance is now, in view of some of
the criticisms and questions that have been raised about its
ongoing potency to deal with the challenges we face in the
world today, what is the message that you all would like to see
coming out of the Chicago summit about NATO and about our role
in NATO? I would like to ask actually both of you if you could
address that.
Dr. Gordon. Well, Madam Chairman, I could not agree more
with your analysis and could not disagree more with the notion
that maybe it is time to move on. And as you say, beyond the
particulars on Afghanistan in capabilities, I think the overall
message is that it is simply in the national security interests
of the United States to strengthen our partnerships with these
key allies. Whatever the drawbacks and deficiencies in defense
spending or different points of view we may have on some
international questions, it is clearly in our interest to face
the daunting challenges we face around the world with a
standing alliance of countries who broadly share our values and
interests.
And I just think that the case for doing that in some ways
is greater than ever before, given the fiscal situation that we
are all in. If you just take any of the most recent examples--
doing Afghanistan is challenging enough--imagine trying to do
it without this alliance, without the contributions of our
partners, without an integrated military command structure and
a tradition of militaries that cooperate with each other, and
some common pooled assets like the AWACs and soon allied ground
surveillance. It just does not make sense. Again, broadly
speaking, European partners are those with which we manage
global problems whether it is in the Balkans, in Libya, in
Afghanistan, or--not in a military sense, but our Iran
negotiations and so many other questions. So I think it is just
absolutely the case that it is in our interest to do this.
Again, Libya is another very recent example. I do not think
anybody would have imagined us doing a military operation in
Libya, if you look back a couple of years ago, but to have a
command and control system that is practiced and interoperable
forces and a political body in Brussels because, you know, you
cannot just whip these things up at the snap of a finger. You
have to have these standing institutions and structures. So I
think that is the broad message of cooperation we would like to
see go out.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Townsend, would you like to add to that?
Mr. Townsend. Senator, thank you very much. I agree with
everything that Assistant Secretary Gordon said.
And just a personal reflection, I have worked in the
Department of Defense since the early 1980s in various guises,
as well as at the Atlantic Council. And what I have seen over
time and when I answer this question to groups of Americans,
you know, when a crisis happens, going back so many years, the
telephones ring in Europe. They do not ring other places in
terms of Washington calling our allies, calling the NATO
Secretary General. That is where the phone rings in those early
days as we grapple with what to do. And it is something that is
precious and it is something that we have not always had.
And if you look back in history, whether to the 1930s and
watched how we as nations tried to organize ourselves to deal
with problems--the problems of those days are different than
problems today. But we have with NATO an organizing entity to
help us quickly come together just on a political basis at 28
around a table and try to sort out what do we need to do. We
are able to go to the U.N. with these nations with us and get
U.N. assistance. The U.N. Security Council takes on these
issues. And then when politically we all decide on a course of
action, you have at NATO on the military side the integrated
military structure that actually helps us to organize ourselves
militarily and take action pretty quickly.
And Assistant Secretary Gordon mentioned Libya. And I use
Libya as well as an illustration on how we were able to come
together politically, work with the United Nations, work with
the international community, not just with our European allies
but broadly, and then take a course of action. And it is a
great test case of the theory.
But I will also say in closing that we have to always work
at it. There will always be critics, and we need the critics
because we need to understand where we are failing here and
there, the lessons learned coming out of Libya, the defense
spending, the capabilities. And I have worked for years with
this trying to keep moving forward and keep the alliance
strong. We will never reach 100 percent in terms of fixing all
the problems and getting it exactly right, but we have to keep
trying. And what I know Assistant Secretary Gordon and I, who
have worked for many years on this together--we want to hand
off to our successors an alliance that is continuing to move
forward and continuing to look for ways to get better.
And a lot of what the Chicago summit is and the
capabilities package particularly are ways in which we can try
to address the defense spending issues, the way we can address
trying to spend money with a priority. Some of the Senators in
their statements have talked about prioritizing in this era of
austerity how we spend money. That is what we are going to be
trying to do in Chicago. And every summit, as it comes around,
takes us another step toward addressing these issues and
becoming an even stronger alliance.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both very much.
Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thanks to both of you for joining us.
I would like to start with Mr. Gordon. Do you anticipate
that over the next 10 days we might see any softening of
Turkey's objection to Israel's participation in the upcoming
summit?
Dr. Gordon. I think there is some misconception about this
issue that I actually appreciate the opportunity to clarify.
NATO had not envisaged inviting Israel to the Chicago
summit. Israel is an important partner of NATO. It is certainly
an important ally of the United States. It is a member of the
Mediterranean Dialogue, one of NATO's manifold partnership
arrangements. But the Chicago summit was never going to have a
meeting of every single one of those partnerships simply as a
matter of logistics and time. So there was no meeting of the
Mediterranean Dialogue
or particular invitation to Israel for Turkey to block. And I
have
seen news reports and speculation about this, but that is just
not accurate.
What is accurate, as you know very well, is that the
Turkey-Israel relationship is fraught, which we deeply regret
because one of the more positive aspects of the Middle East is
that there was deep cooperation between those two countries.
And we have invested an awful lot of diplomacy in overcoming
that, and we regret that partnership activities at NATO with
Israel are not proceeding because of Turkish objections. And we
have been very clear about that, that no country should bring
bilateral disputes into the alliance. So as a broad matter, it
is something we are very focused on advancing. As a specific
matter for the NATO summit, it is not really an issue.
Senator Lee. OK. So would you say that the relationship
between Turkey and Israel does not bode well for the
partnership, such as it is, between Israel and NATO?
Dr. Gordon. That is right. And as I say, NATO has a history
of partnership activities with lots of countries throughout the
Mediterranean Arab world. We see it as a package. As I said,
first of all, we do not accept that countries should bring any
bilateral dispute into the alliance, and we do not accept that
countries can pick and choose in blocking partnership
activities. So our view is if an ally--and as you know, NATO
operates by consensus. If an ally is going to block partnership
with one country, then we are not going to accept partnership--
--
Senator Lee. Partnerships generally.
Dr. Gordon [continuing]. Generally. And that is where we
are now because we are not going to allow sort of
discrimination against a particular ally.
Senator Lee. Right, right. But Turkey's actions here sort
of jeopardize that understanding. Right? They are challenging
that assumption, that assertion.
Dr. Gordon. Well, not the assertion that it is all or
nothing. We, the United States, because again everything is by
consensus, will not allow certain countries to be blocked and
others to go ahead with their participation.
Senator Lee. But Turkey is, nonetheless, objecting to any
partnership activities that involve Israel.
Dr. Gordon. Correct.
Senator Lee. Through the Mediterranean partnership or
otherwise.
Dr. Gordon. Correct.
Senator Lee. What are the administration's plans with
regard to possible funding of Afghan security forces at their
peak of 350,000 troops beyond 2014? What can you tell us about
that?
Dr. Gordon. Well, as I think you know, you are right that
the peak ANSF will be around 330,000-350,000 troops. But then
in the longer term, we believe a sustainable goal will be
considerably less than that, closer to 230,000, because our
principal guiding thinking about this all along is that ANSF
need to be sufficient to do the mission but also sustainable,
which is to say affordable, over the long term. And that is
where we think this remains to be decided. It is one of the
issues to be discussed among allies in Chicago and work
continues to be done, but we do not envisage that that 350,000
peak will be sustained necessarily over the next decade.
We also acknowledge--and this is partly a further response
to Senator Risch's questions earlier--that the Afghans cannot
do this by themselves. The international community is going to
have to step up and play a major role probably for the next
decade in ensuring that ANSF are sustainable. But it is also
important to remember that whatever that costs the
international community, it will be far less than we have been
paying every year for the past decade.
Senator Lee. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Townsend, French President-elect Francois Hollande has
indicated that he would like to withdraw all French combat
forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2012. What do you think
the odds are that that will actually occur?
Mr. Townsend. Senator, I am not a betting man, so
establishing odds is going to be difficult. But we have been in
touch with the Hollande team as they begin to take the reins of
power. They are not there yet obviously. The inauguration has
got to come. I know Assistant Secretary Gordon just a few
minutes ago told the committee that he will be going to Paris I
think this afternoon to talk to the team.
Their shadow Defense Minister, if you will, Messr. Le
Drian, came by about a month or 2 ago, and I spoke with him a
bit and listened to what he had to say.
I think they face the situation that many politicians face
after an election. They are now going to be faced with
governance. They are going to be faced with a summit where a
lot of work has been done by the allies to try to make sure
that the way ahead is something that we are all unified on. And
of course, we are going to be making a declaration at the
summit on Afghanistan. There will also be the NATO strategic
plan for Afghanistan that will be agreed there. So there has
been a lot of work done. And so the new French Government, as
it takes the reins of power once Hollande is inaugurated, they
are going to be stepping into an already flowing stream. And so
we are looking forward to talking to them and explaining this
to them as they get ready to take that big step.
Speaking personally, I would expect and I would hope that
they would understand, as they take the reins of power in
France, that in the NATO context they will be one of 28 nations
that is coming together around the plan for 2014 and afterward.
France has played a very important role in the development of
this plan, a very important role in Afghanistan. And so they
will be taking on, as they take the reins of power, a very big
responsibility to join with us and to go forward in an alliance
that wants to make sure that there will be an enduring presence
after 2014, that the alliance will do its bit in helping the
Afghan ANSF and the Afghan Government stand up and take on its
role as a nation. And I am sure that the discussions that
Assistant Secretary Gordon will have will be along those lines.
Senator Lee. Thanks to both of you.
Madam Chair, I see my time has expired.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for doing
this today.
As all of you are aware, the United States has about 90,000
troops currently in the combat mission there in Afghanistan.
And I think they have done an outstanding job in terms of the
mission that we have entrusted to them, and I think they have
largely accomplished their mission. I mean, Osama bin Laden is
dead. The Taliban is no longer in power. Terrorists no longer
have a safe haven in Afghanistan. And that is why I was really
encouraged when Secretary Panetta stated that we could bring
home our combat troops as early as 2013: ``Hopefully by mid to
the latter part of 2013, we will be able to make a transition
from a combat role to a training, advice, and assist role.''
Could you update me on his hope and where we are on that?
I mean, I interpreted at the time when he said that that he was
really moving in that direction, but I have not heard anything
else and I am wondering. Mr. Townsend, maybe you could start on
where we are because I think there are a growing number of
Americans who ask the question, Why are we in these villages
and basically policing villages when we have been there for 10
years? Why are the Afghans not doing that?
And it just seems to me that Secretary Panetta hit it on
the head when he said we need to move our combat forces out of
that combat role and do everything we can to have the Afghans
out there in the front taking the lead, moving forward to bear
the major part of responsibility. And I hope that that is what
we are pushing for.
And I also hope that the Chicago summit, when folks come
together, that they listen to these kinds of issues and maybe
reconsider the 2014 date that they have. But please, go ahead.
Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate that
question. That is certainly where we are working toward right
now is this transition.
Twenty fourteen, of course, has been the date that came
from the Lisbon summit as an important date, both to the
alliance and to President Karzai, where we will see that the
Afghans taking the lead for security and taking on the front
end of the combat missions from 2014 out.
But what is important now, what has been underway that
Secretary Panetta was talking about was this transition from
the United States and other allies being in the lead for a lot
of the combat missions to that transitioning to the Afghans.
That is underway, and the date of 2013 that has been discussed
we look on as a milestone date along the road to 2014.
Twenty thirteen is important because in terms of this
transition, this is where the ANSF will be in the security lead
for most of Afghanistan by that time. Already here in 2012, the
Afghan forces, the ANSF, are taking on the lead in much of
Afghanistan. Twenty thirteen will see, I think, pretty much the
completion of that. Now, it has got to be facts on the ground
and certainly the Afghan Government and the ISAF commander and
the allies are working on this. But right now, if you talk to
General Allen and some of the commanders, we have been pretty
impressed with the work of the ANSF, that they are certainly up
to the task of taking the lead in terms of combat, and that we
are going to see this transition that you mentioned and that
Secretary Panetta mentioned in terms of allied forces, U.S.
forces, transitioning from combat to this advise and assist and
letting the Afghans take this lead in terms of combat. And that
is what we are seeing. In a great extent, 2013 is going to be a
landmark year for that.
And we have seen over the past couple months security
incidents have happened such as in Kabul. The ANSF have done
the right thing. They have stepped up, and we have been very
impressed with their performance. So a lot of what I can hear
from you in terms of your aspirations of what you want to see
in terms of transition is occurring.
And while, as we go from 2013 to 2014, we will be primarily
in this assist role, we will be ready to take on combat should
that happen, but I think what we are seeing, though, is that
the ANSF is going to be up to the task and we will be largely
doing this assisting and this training up to 2014.
Senator Udall. Well, it seems to me that before you have
this firm date, whenever we set it, of getting out of
Afghanistan in terms of combat troops, not the counterterrorism
role and all the assists and the other things that we clearly
need to continue, that you need to really test out whether they
are up to it. And they need to be there in the front doing the
job and us just be in an assist role to make sure that we test
their capabilities. And I think that is what Secretary Panetta
was hitting on in terms of that we have been there so long, we
need to try to do everything we can to get them out and be
doing the major responsibility for security, and we are really
only in an advise and assist role.
And I just hope we are not headed for a situation where we
are going to keep pushing our date down the line. We need them
to take responsibility. If they cannot do it, we need a really
tough, firm assessment of what is going on and a reassessment
of what is going on.
Mr. Gordon, I do not know whether you were going to comment
or not. You made some notes there. But I thought that was
primarily a question for Mr. Townsend, but I am happy to hear
from you too.
Dr. Gordon. No. I would just endorse what Jim Townsend
said. I hear what you are saying and that is precisely the
point of the milestone, after which our role will be primarily
training, advising, and assisting. But we also have to be clear
and honest. We cannot promise that from some date in 2013 there
will be no combat in Afghanistan. Obviously, that would be
ideal. But we need to make sure we succeed as well. So from the
milestone we will primarily train, advise, and assist, and by
the end of 2014, combat troops are out and Afghans are fully in
charge. And the purpose in many ways of the discussions in
Chicago will be to get everyone on the same page for exactly
that concept: the milestone, the transition at the end of 2014,
and how we make sure we succeed after 2014.
Senator Udall. Well, my guess is that in Chicago there is
going to be a big push to try to do what Secretary Panetta was
talking about. I think many of our NATO partners, as in
France--you are going to go talk to them, but I think they just
see this, that we have waited too long in terms of having an
Afghan lead. I mean, I have heard the Europeans talking about
this for 8 years. I mean, they have talked about this should be
Afghan-led, security should be Afghan-led. And I think they are
getting very impatient.
I know that you all cannot make a commitment publicly and
say this is what we are going to discuss at the meeting in
Chicago because that would be the big headline in everything.
But I hope that there is very serious discussion about this
transition and how quickly we can do it and how we make sure
that this is an Afghan-led security operation.
Sorry to run over, Madam Chair, but I really appreciate
you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
In the interests of time because we have another panel, I
think we should go ahead and move on unless either Senator
Udall--Senator Lee is leaving. So unless you have further
questions, I am going to move on to the second panel.
Senator Udall. I am ready for the second panel.
Senator Shaheen. Good.
Senator Udall. Thank you both.
Senator Shaheen. I have a lot more questions, but I will
reserve those. So let me thank you both very much. Have a good
trip to Paris, Under Secretary Gordon.
While we are transitioning the panels in and out, I will
take a moment to introduce the second panel. Senator Kerry did
that a little bit. But let me point out that each of the next
three experts has extensive experience working throughout
Government and in the private sector on Europe and NATO issues,
and we are very pleased to have them join us today.
First is Dr. Charles Kupchan who is the Whitney Shepardson
Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a
professor of international affairs in the Walsh School of
Foreign Service and Government at Georgetown University.
Second is Ian Brzezinski who is a senior fellow in the
International Security Program at the Atlantic Council and a
member of the council's Strategic Advisors Group. He also leads
the Brzezinski Group.
Finally is Dr. Hans Binnendijk who is currently the vice
president for research at the National Defense University and
the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy at the
university.
Thank you all very much for being here.
Let me just point out I have a statement that I am going to
submit for the record and ask Dr. Kupchan if he would like to
begin.
[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeanne Shaheen,
U.S. Senator From New Hampshire
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today to examine the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which will convene in Chicago just
10 days from now to discuss the alliance's current and future
trajectory. We have two impressive panels of witnesses here to help us
better understand the difficult issues facing NATO and its members.
This year's NATO summit could not come at a more important time. In
Washington and in the capitals of nearly all NATO member nations,
Western leaders are wrestling with unprecedented challenges: fiscal
crises that have forced unwelcome austerity measures, declining defense
budgets, less-than-robust economic growth, and even a return to
recession in some European countries. At the same time, global security
demands are rapidly evolving and becoming more and more complex.
In the face of these difficult and growing challenges, there may be
a tendency to question ourselves, to pull back or to lower our goals
and expectations. I think this is exactly the wrong time to question
the very principles that have guided this alliance to be the
successful, dominant force that it is today.
The message out of the Chicago summit this month needs to be that
the United States and its NATO allies will continue to be a dominant
force for good in
the world--just as we have been over the last 60 years. We should
emphasize
that NATO is ready to adapt to 21st century threats, to address our
shortfalls and to make the tough choices necessary to meet the next
generation of security challenges.
A successful summit will need to see progress on a number of
critical issues facing the alliance today.
The first is Afghanistan, where we are seeking to shift from a
combat-focused role to one of training, advising, and assisting the
Afghan forces as they take the lead for the security of their country.
Last week, President Obama signed the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership
Agreement, providing a 10-year commitment to our Afghan partners after
the transfer of security responsibility in 2014. At the summit, we
should seek buy-in and support from our NATO allies while working
closely with alliance members--and our Afghan partners--to identify
realistic, sustainable troop numbers and financial commitments.
The second is NATO's ``Smart Defense'' initiative, which has been
touted as an effort to prioritize defense projects and pool and share
resources at a time of increasingly strained budgets. I welcome the
effort to ensure the maximum possible return on investment of our
limited defense dollars, and NATO can build on successful initiatives
like the Baltic Air Policing mission and the Strategic Air Lift
Capability program. However, it is important that ``Smart Defense''
does not become an excuse for further underinvestment in much-needed
defense spending by our allies.
The lack of burden-sharing will remain an important issue that must
be addressed in Chicago. Just a few NATO countries are spending at or
above 2 percent of their GDP, the level of commitment required of all
alliance members. While the United States spends over 4 percent of its
GDP on defense, Europe as a whole spends only 1.6 percent, and many of
those individual countries spend less than
1 percent. The United States spends three times more than the other 27
allies combined.
The NATO Strategic Concept--agreed to at the Lisbon summit 2 years
ago--outlined the capabilities needed to deter and defend against
future threats to the alliance. In Chicago, ``Smart Defense'' should be
utilized to begin to meet all of those capabilities and to make real
commitments of resources toward that effort.
Finally, at the summit, we must maintain our focus on the
alliance's ``open door'' policy. NATO enlargement has been one of the
great successes of the alliance over the last two decades, bringing in
critical allies in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, which have rapidly
transformed themselves from security consumers to security
contributors. Poland and Romania will soon host critical missile
defense sites. Estonia may be one of only a few NATO members to
actually reach its defense spending requirements. And most of the newer
members have also made significant troop commitments to the fight in
Afghanistan.
Despite the success, enlargement has begun to demonstrate signs of
strain, due to both geographic location and political realities. At the
Chicago summit, no new members are expected to join the alliance;
however, that does not mean NATO's ``open door'' is off the agenda.
There are currently four aspirant nations that are interested in
pursuing membership, including Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro and Macedonia. It will be important for NATO to maintain the
credibility of our ``open door'' by identifying a clear path to NATO
membership for deserving countries.
The summit in Chicago comes at a crucial time for the U.S. and our
allies, and these are just three of many important issues that should
be discussed. In a world where the security focus is shifting toward
Asia and military budgets are shrinking, now is the time for NATO to
redefine its role as a preeminent force for peace and stability.
Despite our difficulties, NATO has arguably been the most
successful modern military alliance in history. Our deep ties were born
out of World War II, where victory as a truly joint force was unlike
anything that had ever been seen before. At the height of the cold war,
our alliance deterred the very real threat of a nuclear devastation
brought on by two global superpowers bent on conflict. It is an
alliance that helped tear down the Berlin Wall and dismantle the
Communist empire.And, it has moved us ever closer to a Europe that is
``whole, free, and at peace.''
Today, even in the face of austerity, our alliance is an unrivaled
military force. NATO has three of the top four defense spending
countries in the world and represents nearly two-thirds of worldwide
military expenditures. Due to nearly a decade of fighting in
Afghanistan, NATO members have some of the most experienced, battle-
tested warriors in a generation. NATO acted when no other force in the
world had the capacity or the will to avert genocide in the Balkans or
prevent a civilian massacre in Libya, ultimately bringing an end to
brutal dictatorial regimes in both places.
Do we have our problems? Absolutely. We need to take an honest,
critical account of our shortfalls and inadequacies. Libya exposed some
glaring capability gaps. Our open door policy has begun to show some
strain and limits. At times, we struggle to find consensus on the role
NATO should play in the world, and we have serious questions about
equality and burden-sharing.
Past success does not guarantee future relevance. Any alliance that
wishes to remain relevant to a rapidly changing world must adapt and
respond to new realities. As such, we come to Chicago at a critical
turning point. NATO needs to define its role in a world where the focus
is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific. And it needs to do so in a time of
shrinking budgets.
The outcome there will help determine whether we will remain the
undisputed leader of a free society in this century. Chicago should be
a chance to remind the world--and perhaps convince a new generation of
Americans--that the United States and its NATO allies continue to wield
unprecedented influence and are actively shaping our world for the
better.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY; WHITNEY SHEPARDSON SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kupchan. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is a
privilege to have the opportunity to have a conversation with
the committee today. I will simply summarize my written
testimony and would like to ask that it be submitted for the
record.
I think the upcoming summit in Chicago represents a moment
for stocktaking, in the sense that we have been through two
decades of post-cold-war NATO, and I think the alliance has
fared much better than many of us had expected in the sense
that most alliances disappear when the threat that gave birth
to them disappears. But here we are in 2012 and not only is
NATO still in existence, but it has troops in Kosovo, in
Afghanistan, just fought a war in Libya, and has partnerships
around the world. So clearly the alliance is a going concern.
I also think that despite the ups and downs of
transatlantic relations over the last 20 years, we can
relatively confidently say that the United States and Europe
remain each other's best partners and that when the American
President or a European leader looks out at the world and says
who do I call when there is a problem out there, the answer is
the person on the other side of the Atlantic. My judgment is
that that is not going to change anytime soon, and that is
partly because of the affinity of interest and common values
but it is also because there are not other options. And even
though there are rising powers in the world, I think we still
count on our European allies and can rely on our European
allies more than we can count on others.
At the same time, I think it is clear that we are at the
cusp of a major transition, a historic transition in the global
landscape in which the community of nations that NATO
represents is losing the primacy that it has enjoyed for the
last 200 years. If you look at the share of global product
represented by NATO--and I would include Japan in that
calculation because they have been part of the Western world
since World War II--we have gone from roughly 70 percent of
global product to 50 percent, and we are now headed toward 40
percent. And that says to me that the big security questions of
the day are about how we are going to manage that transition.
The big challenges to American security moving forward are not
within the Atlantic community but outside the Atlantic
community.
And as a consequence, the relevance of this alliance to us
and to our European allies--but I think more to us because we
are a global power--will be what is NATO doing in this wider
world. How is NATO keeping the United States safe as the global
distribution of power shifts in the years and decades ahead? I
would like to offer a few comments on that broad subject of
NATO in the wider world.
First, I think it is important to keep in mind that NATO
represents the primary institutional infrastructure of the
West. It keeps us together as a meaningful political community.
That is particularly important when some of the emerging powers
around us do not share our values and do not share our
interests. I think one of the grand strategic questions of our
time is how can we preserve the rules-based system that the
United States and the Europeans have together built since World
War II as the circle widens, as more players have seats at the
table. This is not a conversation that is front and center on
NATO's agenda, but I think it has to be moving forward because
the West, if it comes together, coheres, and generates a plan
for managing this transition, it will withstand the test of
time. If the United States and Europe go their separate ways in
figuring out how to preserve a rules-based system, then I fear
that the next 20-30 years will be a very bumpy period in
international history.
The second point in this respect is that I think that NATO
needs to establish itself as a global security hub. That in my
mind does not mean that NATO should go global. I think a global
NATO would be a bridge too far. It would be a step that would
burden the alliance with political requests and material
requests that it would be unable to sustain. And in that
respect, I think we should be sober and cautious about thinking
of NATO as the military alliance of last resort for missions
moving forward.
Yes, NATO went into Afghanistan. Yes, the allies will
hopefully leave together. Yes, NATO just finished a mission in
Libya that was reasonably successful. But I think the take-away
from Afghanistan and Libya should be sobriety, not gearing up
for the next NATO deployment. The Afghan mission has been
somewhat successful, but not a smashing success. Most of the
allies are chafing at the bit to get out--as you were just
saying, Senator--and I think that it will be a long time coming
before NATO engages in the same kind of operation that it
engaged in in Afghanistan.
Libya--I think the success is more conclusive, but many of
the conditions that were present in Libya are not being
replicated elsewhere, particularly in Syria: a U.N.-backed
legal authority, the approval of the Arab world, the degree to
which Libya was close to reservoirs of European power and
therefore easy for the Europeans to do--even though they still
relied heavily on United States support.
In that regard, I think some of the most important NATO
programs moving forward will not be the deployment of force
even though, surely, there will be some of that. Instead, some
of the most effective initiatives will be the broad array of
global programs, including the NATO partnerships, the
Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,
the support for the African Union, and the training mission in
Iraq, which has already concluded. I think in many respects,
NATO has to help other regions do for themselves what NATO has
done for the Atlantic community: deepen integration, understand
what it means to work together, and gradually build the
solidarity that preserves regional peace.
Two final comments. One concerns a subject we have already
discussed this morning. If NATO is to be a global hub and to
serve as the institutional core of the West during this period
of transition, I think it requires a European pillar that
stands up to the plate. And this issue is more pressing today
than it has ever been before. We have had debates about burden-
sharing since NATO was born. But during the cold war, that
debate only went so far because the Europeans were quite
confident that we were there to stay and that if something went
wrong, the United States would show up at the party.
I think right now we are seeing a world where the Europeans
know that they need to do more. The U.S. pivot to Asia and the
drawdown in Europe are not only justified and inevitable, but
they also put a fire to the feet of the Europeans about the
need to do more to balance the alliance.
I am skeptical that the Europeans will spend more on
defense. In fact, I would go as far as to say they are going to
be spending less, and that is because for the foreseeable
future, they are going to be worried about bailing out Greece,
how to deal with their debt, and how to save the eurozone and
perhaps even the European Union. That picture says to me that
we should be pressing them not so much about spending, because
I think that is running into a brick wall, but on rationalizing
how they spend, on getting more bang for the buck, on getting
them to pool their resources. That aggregation in my mind is
the best way to get Europe to become more capable. This
approach, in many respects, would also involve much closer
links between NATO and the European Union.
Finally, I think that it would be remiss for me not to make
the following point, which is not going to be on the summit
agenda in Chicago, but I think should be in the back of our
minds in any case. And that is, from the very beginning of the
Atlantic partnership, our strength abroad has depended upon our
strength at home, our economy, our political solvency. What I
am most worried about today, as I testify before the committee,
is not whether we get NATO enlargement right. It is not when
and how we get out of Afghanistan. It is the degree to which we
are now stumbling--the West collectively--in terms of our
economies stuck in neutral, the European Union pulling apart,
experiencing a renationalization of the sort that we have not
seen since World War II, and our own political system here
going through a very rough patch.
So my final thought would be it is impossible to think
about, talk about, and imagine NATO's future without doing the
hard work of getting our own houses in order because in the end
of the day NATO will only be as strong as its individual Member
States. We have a lot of work to do on that front.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kupchan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles A. Kupchan
NATO has demonstrated impressive resilience and solidarity since
the cold war's end. Indeed, it has defied history; alliances usually
disband when the collective threat that brought them into being
disappears. Instead, NATO has not only survived, but markedly expanded
its membership and undertaken major missions in the Balkans,
Afghanistan, and Libya. As the cold war came to a close, few observers
could have predicted that NATO, 20 years later, would be in the midst
of an extended operation in Afghanistan while simultaneously carrying
out a successful air campaign to topple the Libyan Government.
The durability of NATO stems from the reality that the United
States and Europe remain one another's best partner. To be sure,
differing perspectives and priorities regularly test transatlantic
solidarity. But teamwork between the United States and Europe remains
vital to addressing most international challenges. As President Obama
affirmed prior to the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, ``our relationship
with our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our
engagement with the world, and a catalyst for global cooperation. With
no other region does the United States have such a close alignment of
values, interests, capabilities, and goals.''
NATO's endurance beyond the cold war's end makes clear that it is
much more than a military alliance. NATO is perhaps the primary
institution responsible for preserving the coherence and effectiveness
of the West as a community of shared values and interests. That
function, reinforced by transatlantic cooperation in a multiplicity of
other forms, will only grow more important over time as the primacy
long enjoyed by the Atlantic democracies gives way to a redistribution
of global power.
Its impressive track record notwithstanding, the 2012 NATO summit
in Chicago represents a moment that demands strategic ambition and
vision, not complacency. As many parts of the developing world continue
to experience economic and political awakenings, NATO must serve as an
anchor of liberal values and democratic institution and as a key venue
for managing a global landscape in transition. Most emerging security
challenges lie well beyond alliance territory, making NATO's ability to
serve as a global security hub and to contribute to stability in other
regions fundamental to its future relevance.
The missions in Afghanistan and Libya represent important steps in
this direction, but they also reveal the profound political and
operational difficulties confronting the prospect of a ``global NATO.''
Accordingly, even as the alliance invests in its capacities for
military intervention, it should recognize that one of its key
contributions to security ``out of area'' will be facilitating regional
integration and building regional capacity. NATO's ability to serve as
a global security hub also depends on addressing the issue of burden-
sharing; Europe must strengthen its own ability to project power if it
is to remain an attractive partner for the United States. Finally, NATO
members must be mindful of the reality that purpose and strength abroad
require purpose and strength at home. Ultimately, the welfare and
efficacy of the Western alliance depends upon restoring economic and
political solvency on both sides of the Atlantic.
NATO IN THE WIDER WORLD
During the cold war, the West (including Japan) collectively
accounted for roughly 75 percent of global economic output. Today, it
accounts for about 50 percent, and that share will decline steadily as
emerging economies continue to enjoy impressive rates of growth.
Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing
countries--Brazil, China, India, and Russia--to match that of the G7
countries within about two decades. This ongoing shift in wealth is
already affecting military expenditures. For the first time in the
modern era, Asia now spends more on defense than Europe.
The international system is headed into uncharted waters; Western
nations need a common strategy to address this tectonic shift in the
global landscape. The 21st century will hardly be the first time that
multiple centers of power embraced quite different models of governance
and commerce: during the 17th century, for example, the Holy Roman
Empire, Ottoman Empire, Mughal Empire, Qing Dynasty, and Tokugawa
Shogunate each ran its affairs according to its own distinct rules and
culture. But these powers were largely self-contained; they rarely
interacted with each other and thus had no need to agree on a set of
common rules to guide their relations.
This century, in contrast, will mark the first time in history in
which multiple versions of order and modernity coexist in an
interconnected world; no longer will the West anchor globalization.
Multiple power centers, and the competing political and economic
systems they represent, will vie on a more level playing field.
Effective global governance will require forging common ground amid an
equalizing distribution of power and rising ideological diversity.
NATO is by no means the only available venue for coordinating
Western efforts to manage this transition, but its political and
military institutions and its time-tested mechanisms for building
consensus among the Atlantic democracies are tremendous assets. The
fact that almost 20 leaders of non-NATO countries plan to attend the
Chicago summit attests to the alliance's growing reach. As the European
Union deepens its collective character and its new foreign policy
institutions, teamwork between NATO and the EU can guide the West's
engagement with the wider world. The top priority is forging a united
front on countering emerging threats and on making the adaptations to
international institutions and rules needed to preserve cooperative
stability amid global change.
Although it is impossible to predict where the next NATO mission
might take place, the alliance will surely continue to play a direct
role in addressing security challenges well beyond its borders. At the
same time, the idea of a ``global NATO'' is a bridge too far. Trying to
turn the alliance into an all-purpose vehicle of choice for military
operations around the world would likely lead to its demise, not
revitalization. In many parts of the world, a NATO-led mission might
lack legitimacy among local parties, compromising its chances of
success. Efforts to turn NATO into a global alliance would also saddle
it with unsustainable burdens and insurmountable political divides.
The missions in Afghanistan and Libya amply demonstrated the
readiness of NATO to take on missions well beyond alliance territory.
NATO also maintains ongoing operations in Kosovo, off the Horn of
Africa (Operation Ocean Shield), and in the Mediterranean (Operation
Active Endeavour). But such missions may well prove to be more the
exception than the rule. In Afghanistan, NATO members have demonstrated
impressive solidarity. The mission, however, has not been an
unqualified success and member governments now face strong domestic
pressures to bring the operation to an end. It is doubtful that NATO
would countenance a similar mission for a long time to come. In Libya,
NATO was more successful in meeting its objectives, and Europeans
demonstrated their ability to take the lead (although not without
significant U.S. participation). But the Libya operation does not
represent a model for the future. Many aspects of the intervention in
Libya would be difficult to replicate, including strong support in the
Arab world and approval by the U.N. Security Council. Due to Libya's
proximity to European air bases, European members of NATO were able to
carry out missions that would be much more difficult in theaters
farther afield. The impediments to military intervention in Syria are a
case in point.
NATO should of course keep its integrated military structure in
fine working order; unforeseen missions can emerge with little warning,
often requiring urgent action. But some of NATO's most important and
effective contributions to global security are likely to come in the
form of capacity-building rather than war-fighting. In this regard,
NATO should aim to do for other regions what it has done for the
Atlantic community: advance the cause of security and peace through
political/military integration and building regional capability. Put
differently, NATO should help other regions help themselves through
training, assistance, exercises, and exchanges. Some of most important
security institutions of the 21st century are likely to be regional
ones--such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union, the
Association of Southeast Asia States, and the Union of South American
Nations. NATO should be investing in the efficacy of these regional
bodies.
In pursuit of this objective, NATO should intensify and expand the
numerous programs it already maintains to advance these goals,
including:
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace:
engages 22 European partner countries in multilateral and
bilateral relations with NATO.
Mediterranean Dialogue: engages Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in NATO activities.
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: provides training and
exchanges with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates.
NATO Partners: engages non-NATO members in NATO operations,
including Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mongolia.
Support for African Union: provides NATO assistance to the
AU mission in Somalia and to AU peacekeeping capacity.
Training Mission in Iraq (2004-2011): trained Iraq's armed
forces.
As NATO deepens its engagement in areas beyond its territorial
boundaries, it should address potential changes to its decisionmaking
procedures to ensure its effectiveness. In the absence of the unifying
threat posed by the Soviet Union, NATO solidarity is more difficult to
sustain--as made clear by the inequitable division of labor in
Afghanistan and the decisions by roughly half of NATO's members to
abstain from participation in the Libya mission. To ensure that
divergent perspectives do not become a source of paralysis, the
alliance should consider moving away from a consensus-based approach to
decisionmaking. Options such as the formation of coalitions of the
willing and the use of constructive abstentions--members opt out of
rather than block joint action--could provide NATO the greater
flexibility it needs. New decisionmaking procedures would also provide
the opportunity for more input from non-NATO members that participate
in alliance operations.
THE EUROPEAN PILLAR
Inequitable-burden sharing has strained transatlantic relations
even in good economic times. Europe's military shortfalls have become
even more problematic amid the global downturn. The United States is
scaling back its own defense spending, making Washington more sensitive
to the readiness of its partners to shoulder defense responsibilities.
Nonetheless, America's European allies are slashing, not augmenting,
their own defense expenditures; they now spend about 1.5 percent of
their GDPs on defense, compared with over 4 percent in the United
States. In addition, NATO's new missions depend heavily upon types of
capability--lift, targeting, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance--that highlight Europe's military shortcomings. It is
this reality that prompted former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to
worry that NATO's future could be ``dim if not dismal.'' Put simply,
Europe will be of declining strategic relevance to the United States if
its ability to shoulder international responsibilities continues to
decline.
In light of the economic problems plaguing Europe, increases in
defense spending are not likely for the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, the only realistic course for strengthening the European
pillar of NATO is for European nations to do a much better job of
aggregating their political will and resources. America's European
allies need to allocate defense resources more effectively and take
advantage of the institutional changes effected by the Lisbon Treaty to
forge a more common and collective security policy. Europe would be not
only investing in its own security, but also strengthening the
integrity of the Atlantic link.
The integration of Europe has admittedly arrived at a fragile
moment. The eurozone crisis has led to a renationalization of political
life that is fragmenting Europe's landscape. But there are also
developments on the positive side of the ledger. France's reintegration
into NATO's military structure advances the prospect for better
cooperation between the EU and NATO. It is conceivable, if not likely,
that a ``core'' Europe--an inner grouping that provides for more
centralized and purposeful governance--could emerge from the ongoing
fiscal crisis. The deeper integration and oversight reflected in the
fiscal pact could be replicated in the security realm. In addition,
precisely because austerity is cutting into resource availability, it
is leading to new collective synergies--such as conventional and
nuclear cooperation between Britain and France. Finally, the drawdown
of U.S. troop levels in Europe and the prospect of a ``pivot'' to Asia
should help convince Europeans that ``free-riding in perpetuity'' is
not an option.
Building a more capable European pillar is primarily up to
Europeans: they must increase their deployable military and civilian
assets and ensure that the more capable institutions launched by the
Lisbon Treaty are not offset by the renationalization of European
politics. But the United States can help by making clear its
unequivocal support for a strong Europe and engaging the EU at the
collective level as its institutions mature.
STRENGTH STARTS AT HOME
Many analysts have fretted over the past two decades about the
prospects for NATO's survival in the post-cold-war era. Their anxiety
has so far proved unnecessary; the alliance is alive and well. However,
most analysts failed to foresee what today may well be the greatest
threat to NATO's future--the economic and political malaise plaguing
both sides of the Atlantic. The West has entered a prolonged period of
sluggish economic growth, political polarization, and self-doubt,
producing a crisis of democratic governance. It cannot be accidental
that the United States and Europe (as well as Japan) are simultaneously
passing through a period of unprecedented economic duress and political
discontent. Globalization, by reallocating wealth and making less
effective the policy levers that democratic states have at their
disposal, is producing a widening gap between what electorates are
asking of their governments and what those governments are able to
deliver.
At issue is not merely the availability of resources for defense,
but the political vitality of the West. The West's strength abroad has
always depended upon its economic health and political purpose at home.
The political awakening in the Middle East and the continuing rise of
illiberal powers make all the more urgent the task of revitalizing the
Western model of free commerce and democratic governance. Backstopped
by NATO and the broader network of ties that bind North America and
Europe to each other, the West needs to ensure that it has the economic
and political wherewithal to anchor the ongoing shift in the
international system.
The NATO summit in Chicago is not the place for discussion of how
to stabilize the eurozone or breathe new life into the European
project. Nor is it the appropriate venue for debate about restoring
Western economies to full health and rebuilding popular confidence in
democratic institutions.
Nonetheless, NATO is in the midst of charting its new course for
the 21st century. Any serious consideration of the future of the
alliance must urgently address how to restore the West's economic and
political vitality. Strength starts at home; in the end, NATO can only
be as strong and resilient as its individual members.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Brzezinski. Can I just get you to get a little closer
to the mic so we can hear better?
STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, SENIOR FELLOW, THE ATLANTIC
COUNCIL; PRINCIPAL, THE BRZEZINSKI GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brzezinski. As a former Senate staffer, who served this
committee and prior to that, the late Senator William V. Roth,
it is a real pleasure to return to these halls. It makes me
recall the strong, bipartisan leadership that this committee
brought to the efforts to extend NATO membership to the
democracies of Central Europe. Those were historic decisions.
They strengthened the alliance. They strengthened transatlantic
security.
The Chicago summit is going to be important in large part
because of the context in which it takes place. That context
includes a war in Afghanistan from which both the United States
and Europe appear to be disengaging; economic crises on both
sides of the Atlantic; diminishing or atrophying European
defense capabilities; NATO's qualified success in Libya, one
that nonetheless raised questions about U.S. commitment to NATO
and highlighted European defense shortfalls; and of course, the
recent U.S. defense guidance that features a pivot to Asia and
initiates another reduction of American forces stationed in
Europe.
Some have asserted that this should be an implementation
summit that focuses on the alliance's military operation in
Afghanistan and reviews NATO's progress under its new Strategic
Concept. In light of our context, that would be insufficient.
That would reinforce a sense of NATO's growing irrelevance and
further a process of transatlantic decoupling.
Senator Shaheen, you asked what should be the one central
message from the Chicago summit. In my view, if the Chicago
summit is to have one overarching purpose, it should be to
provide a credible reaffirmation of the transatlantic bargain,
one in which the United States demonstrates real commitment to
Europe's regional security interests and our European allies
demonstrate they are ready to stand with the United States to
address global challenges to transatlantic security.
Toward that end, the United States should pursue five
priorities at the Chicago summit.
First and foremost, the President must credibly reaffirm
Europe's centrality in U.S. global strategy. The drifting apart
of the two continents has many causes, but they include a
United States transatlantic agenda whose dominant elements
recently have been: a vaguely defined reset of relations with
Russia; the new defense guidance; and, a proposed missile
defense architecture that still remains conditional. The
decision to further reduce United States forces stationed in
Europe occurs in the context of an increasingly assertive
Russian foreign policy. Just last week, Russia's chief of the
general staff threatened to launch preemptive strikes against
proposed missile defense sites in Central Europe.
Washington should remove the conditionality that still
hangs over U.S. missile defense plans for Europe. That
conditionality not only undercuts European confidence in the
U.S. commitment to build those sites, it certainly incentivizes
Kremlin opposition.
The U.S. military drawdown will also make it important to
ensure that the remaining forces in Europe are fully equipped
and funded, and equally important, careful consideration has to
be given how in the future the United States and Europe will
sustain their military interoperability. The way we fight war--
the way the United States fights wars--has become so
technologically complex. It is now much more difficult,
challenging, and time-consuming to maintain interoperability
with other allied forces. It is not yet clear how
interoperability will be sustained as the United States further
reduces its forces in Europe. Continued ambiguity on this issue
communicates disinterest not just in the regional security
concerns of our allies but also in their role as potential
partners in out-of-area operations.
Second, the Chicago summit should be used to reanimate the
vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure as a guiding
priority of the alliance, and the United States should be
leading this effort. A Europe that is undivided, whole, and
free would be a more stable and secure continent, one thereby
better able to address global concerns in partnership with the
United States.
Imagine Europe today if it did not integrate Poland, the
Baltics, Romania, and Bulgaria into NATO. Would the EU have
extended membership to all of them? Would Russia and Poland be
on a path today toward more normalized relations?
To revitalize the process of NATO enlargement, the alliance
can, and should, at the Chicago summit declare its intent to
issue invitations no later than the next summit to qualified
candidates. It should underscore the urgency of resolving
Macedonia's dispute with Greece over the former's name, the
last remaining impediment to its accession to the alliance. It
should assert that Georgia's path to NATO can be through the
existing NATO-Georgia Commission; and, it should applaud
Montenegro's significant progress under the membership action
plan.
Third, the alliance must chart its way forward in this era
of financial austerity. Resource constraints are a double-edged
sword. They can halt multinational cooperation and generate
division, and indeed, we see a little bit of that today as the
Central Europeans watch aghast as Germany, France, and Italy
sell military equipment to Russia in their efforts to sustain
their respective national defense industries.
Allow me to commend Senator Lugar and the Congressional
Research Service for their recently published study examining
these sales. I hope this report will prompt the alliance to
take action on this potentially divisive issue.
Austerity can also be leveraged to drive forward needed
prioritization, innovation, and collaboration. I am glad the
alliance plans to roll out Force 2020, a set of long-term
capability goals, but I hope it will give equal, if not
greater, emphasis to near-term, multinational projects that
address existing shortfalls. Such projects as shared logistics
hubs and pooled buys of platforms are urgently needed. Because
they can be accomplished in the near term, these are projects
that will also be more credible to NATO publics than promises
regarding the distant future.
Fourth, the summit should be used to expand and deepen the
partnerships the alliance has developed around the world.
Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand, Korea, Jordan, UAE, Qatar,
Morocco, and other non-NATO members have made important
contributions to ISAF, the Libya mission, and other alliance
operations. In addition to military capability, they bring
diplomatic leverage, as well as needed insight and intelligence
regarding their respective localities and regions.
NATO should expand the Partnership for Peace so that it is
open to all who qualify regardless of geography. Those who
contribute more militarily should have the opportunity to be
certified as NATO-interoperable. Those certified could then be
allowed to participate perhaps in a tiered fashion in different
NATO programs, be it NATO exercises, the integrated command
structure, centers of excellence, and civilian agencies.
And finally, of course, NATO at Chicago needs to
demonstrate unambiguous determination to sustain a stable
Afghanistan. I hope NATO will be able to commit to a strategic
partnership with Kabul that will endure well beyond 2014. The
recently signed United States-Afghanistan agreement is an
important step but, even if it is fleshed out robustly, will
likely be insufficient to ensure success in Afghanistan in the
absence of a long-term transatlantic commitment.
Strong leadership has always been a prerequisite for NATO's
vibrancy and success. Likewise, Europe's ability and
willingness to contribute the military forces and political
capital necessary to address regional and global concerns are
equally essential. It is neither in Europe's nor the United
States interest to allow the transatlantic bargain that has
done so well over the last decade to drift into irrelevance. If
the Chicago summit credibly reaffirms that bargain, it will
serve as an important if not inspiring benchmark of American
commitment and European ambition regarding the transatlantic
alliance.
Thank you for the opportunity to share my views.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ian J. Brzezinski
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I
am honored to speak at your hearing on the upcoming meeting of NATO
heads of state in Chicago on May 20.
As a former Senate staffer, who served this committee and prior to
that the late Senator, William V. Roth, it is a real pleasure to return
to these Halls. It makes me recall the strong, bipartisan leadership
this committee brought to the effort to extend NATO membership to the
democracies of Central Europe. Those were historic decisions. They
strengthened the alliance and transatlantic security.
The Chicago summit will be important in large part because of the
context in which it takes place. That context includes:
A war in Afghanistan from which both the United States and
Europe appear to be disengaging;
Economic crises on both sides of the Atlantic that have
atrophied European defense capabilities;
A qualified success in Libya that nonetheless raised
questions about U.S. commitment to NATO and highlighted
European defense shortfalls; and,
The new U.S. defense guidance that features a pivot to Asia
and reduction in American forces stationed in Europe.
Some have asserted that the NATO meeting in Chicago should be an
``implementation summit'' that focuses on Afghanistan and reviews
alliance progress under its new Strategic Concept promulgated in 2010.
In the light of the above, that will be insufficient. That would
reinforce a sense of NATO's growing irrelevance and further a process
of transatlantic decoupling.
If the Chicago summit is to have one principal, overarching
purpose, it should be to provide credible reaffirmation of the
Transatlantic Bargain--one in which the United States demonstrates
commitment to Europe's regional security interests and our European
allies demonstrate that they stand ready to address global challenges
to transatlantic security.
WHY IS NATO RELEVANT TO TODAY?
Today, the transatlantic community lacks consensus over how to
address the unprecedented dilemmas inherent in global connectivity and
interdependence. Advances in transportation and the ongoing revolution
in communications have facilitated the spread of prosperity, respect
for human rights, democratic principles of governance, among other
positive attributes of modernity. However, these benefits have also
been accompanied by challenges, including transnational threats,
sociopolitical upheavals, and a decentralization of global power.
Transnational Threats: Among the most urgent of these threats has
been the proliferation of technologies pertaining to weapons of mass
destruction, missiles and other means than can be used to terrorize, if
not severely damage, societies. These threats have been accompanied by
the emergence of powerful and sometimes dangerous nonstate actors, the
latter including criminal and terrorist organizations whose ideological
and operational reach span across continents.
The Global Political Awakening: The revolution in communications,
including global television, the Internet, and cell phones, now links
previously isolated populations, exposing them to each other's
economies and cultures, politics, standards of living and ideologies.
The result has been recent events in Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain,
Iran, and Russia--referred to as a ``global political awakening'' by
Zbigniew Brzezinski [full disclosure--he is my father \1\] and it is a
a double-edged sword.
It can bring down dictators, end corrupt autocracies, and create
opportunities for democracy, reform, and accountability in government.
It can also be an impatient force, one prone to violence especially
when it is driven primarily by sentiments that flow from inequity and
injustice. As demonstrated in Russia and the Middle East, this
political awakening often generates social upheaval in the absence of
leadership, a clear platform or ideology. In these cases, especially if
events take a destructive turn, this upheaval can leave societies
vulnerable to organized groups intent on leveraging dangerous
ideologies.
The Rise of the Rest and the Dispersal of Power: What some have
called the third strategic revolution involves a profound shift in the
global balance of power.\2\ If 1991 marked a brief unipolar moment
featuring a globally preeminent United States, globalization has
contributed to the emergence of a more complex constellation of actors
with global reach and ambitions. These include China, India, Brazil,
Russia, and could well include others in the future.
The implications of these three separate but related dynamics for
the transatlantic community are both urgent and profound. Today's world
is one where the United States, even in collusion with Europe, is no
longer as predominant as it was in the past. The rise of new powers has
resulted in a dispersion of global power away from the West and to
other regions of world.
The emergence of new powers with regional, if not global,
aspirations is often accompanied by territorial claims, historic
grudges, and economic demands that can drive geopolitical tension,
competition, and collision. These increase the likelihood of regional
conflicts. They make consensual decisionmaking more difficult, and they
yield a world that is more volatile and unpredictable.
Managing this new global order and its proclivity to uncertainty,
if not violence, is the defining challenge of our time. Its effective
management will require:
Economic resources that can be readily mobilized to foster
economic development, if not to stave off, economic crisis
consequent to upheavals;
Military capabilities that are expeditious and can be
readily integrated with civilian efforts, including those
fostering economic and political development;
Political legitimacy that is optimized through multilateral
versus unilateral action.
It is due to these requirements that the transatlantic community
and its key institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and the European Union (EU), have grown in importance. Indeed, due to
the growing complexity and turbulence of the post-cold-war era, the
democracies of North America and Europe need each other more rather
than less. Their respective ability to shape the world order is diluted
by divergence and strengthened through collective action.
The transatlantic community brings to the table powerful capacities
in each of these three dimensions. Europe and North America constitute
the world's most important economic partnership, and that will remain
the case for the foreseeable future. Today, the EU and U.S. account for
54 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). In 2010, the U.S.
generated $15 trillion in GDP, the EU $16 trillion. (China in contrast
produced $6 trillion in GDP and today lacks partnerships akin to that
between the United States and Europe.\3\)
Second, the cornerstone of the transatlantic community, NATO,
remains history's most successful multinational military alliance. It
is unmatched in its ability to generate and sustain interoperability
among military forces, an increasingly challenging requirement in
battlefields where operations are ever more technologically complex and
whose technologies evolve ever more rapidly. In this regard, the value
of NATO has been vividly demonstrated by coalition operations in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
Third, members of transatlantic community, particularly the newest
members of NATO and the EU, offer experience useful to societies in
North Africa and the Middle East transitioning from authoritarian to
more democratically accountable systems of governance buttressed by
market-based economies.
Fourth, the transatlantic community presents a collective of
likeminded democracies--and herein lies a vision for its role in the
global order of today and tomorrow. It can serve as the core of a
geographically and culturally expanding community of democracies that
act collectively to promote freedom, stability, and security around the
globe.
In a world where power is more dispersed, only by operating in
concert will the nations of Europe and North America be able to tap
this potential in the effort to manage the complex volatility
consequent to the challenges posed by transnational threats,
sociopolitical upheavals, and a shifting global balance of power.
REVITALIZING THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN
Herein, lies the challenge before President Obama and his NATO
counterparts when they meet in Chicago on May 20. In order for that
potential to be tapped, the transatlantic bargain that sustained the
alliance during the first decade of the cold war must be revitalized.
Toward that end the United States should pursue five objectives in
Chicago if this summit is to be remembered as moment of transatlantic
renewal rather than transatlantic disengagement.
First, the President must credibly reaffirm Europe's centrality in
U.S. global strategy. The drifting apart of the two continents has many
causes, but they include a U.S. transatlantic agenda whose dominant
elements recently have been a vaguely defined reset of relations with
Russia, a defense guidance that articulates a pivot to Asia, and
reductions of combat capability deployed in Europe.
This has left many with the impression that America views Europe as
increasingly irrelevant to U.S. interests in the world at large. The
force reduction decisions generate questions about America's commitment
to NATO's article 5 responsibilities. The decision to withdraw two of
the four Brigade Combat teams deployed in Europe contradicts the 2010
posture statement to Congress of the U.S. Commander of EUCOM, Admiral
James Stavrides who stated: ``Without the four Brigade Combat Teams and
one tactical intermediate headquarters capability, European Command
assumes risk in its capability to conduct steady-state security
cooperation, shaping, and contingency missions. Deterrence and
reassurance are at increased risk.''
The fact that U.S. drawdowns in Europe occur in the context of an
increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy, rising Russian defense
expenditures, and increased Russian military deployments along the
country's western frontiers only adds to a sense of regional
consternation. The belligerent tone of Russian policy was recently
underscored by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Russia, General Nikolai Makarov, who threatened to launch preemptive
strikes against missile defense sites the U.S. plans to build in
Central Europe.
The United States should remove the conditionality it has placed
over those missile defense sites. That conditionality not only
undercuts European confidence in the U.S. commitment to the European
Phased Adaptive Approach, it encourages and incentivizes the Kremlin's
opposition to its implementation.
U.S. military reductions in Europe will make it even more important
to ensure that those elements remaining are fully equipped and funded.
Additionally, careful consideration needs to be given to how the U.S.
and Europe will sustain interoperability between their military forces.
American units stationed in Europe are highly effective, low cost force
multipliers. They facilitate training, planning, and relationships
essential for U.S. and European forces to fight together effectively in
Europe and elsewhere.
Recognizing this, the Obama administration promised to increase
rotational deployments to Europe. But, it will be challenging for a
unit that rotates to Europe for 6 to 8 weeks a year to match the
engagement a unit permanently stationed there has with its European
counterparts.
The administration has yet to communicate when and what units will
execute those exercise rotations. It would be appropriate and
reassuring to NATO allies to have that training schedule articulated by
the time of the Chicago summit. Continued ambiguity on this issue
communicates disinterest not just in Europe's regional security, but
also in Europe's role as a military partner in out of area operations.
Second, the Chicago summit should be used to reanimate the vision
of a Europe whole, free, and secure as a guiding priority for the
transatlantic relationship. This vision has been largely sidelined
since the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. While it may be too late to
generate the consensus necessary for new invitations at Chicago, the
summit should nonetheless leverage the process of enlargement forward,
particularly concerning the candidacies of Macedonia, Montenegro, and
Georgia.
NATO enlargement has strengthened the transatlantic community by
integrating nations into community of free-market democracies committed
to each other's security. A Europe that is undivided, whole, and free
would be a more stable and secure continent and one better able to
address global concerns in partnership with the United States.
Imagine a Europe today that did not integrate Poland, the Baltics
and Romania, Bulgaria, into NATO? Would the EU have integrated these
countries? Would Russia and Poland be on the path today toward
normalized relations?
Abandoning this vision would have strategic consequences. It would
undercut those in aspirant countries--and for that matter Kiev--who
seek a future for their countries in the transatlantic community. It
would reinforce those in the Kremlin nostalgic for a sphere of
influence over Russia's periphery vice those who see value in normal,
cooperative relations with neighboring democracies.
To revitalize the process of NATO enlargement at the Chicago
summit, NATO heads of state can and should:
Declare its intent to issue invitations to qualified
aspirants no later than the next summit;
Underscore the urgency of resolving Macedonia dispute with
Greece over the former's name, the last remaining obstacle to
Skopje' accession to the alliance;
Assert that Georgia's path to NATO can be through the NATO-
Georgia Commission; and,
Applaud Montenegro's significant progress under the
Alliance's Membership Action Plan.
The Chicago summit presents the alliance an opportunity to make
clear that its ``open door policy'' is neither a passive phrase nor an
empty slogan. The open door policy needs to be both a guiding vision
that extends to all Europe's democracies and an active, forward-moving
process central the alliance's security strategy.
Third, the alliance must chart its way forward in an era of
financial austerity. The Chicago summit occurs in the midst of a
prolonged economic crisis on both sides of the alliance, but in Europe
it has exacerbated an endemic problem of eroding European military
capabilities. A study by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) recently found that total defense spending for 37
European countries had declined by an average of 1.8 percent annually
between 2001 an 2009, from total of 251B Euros to 218B. Today, only two
European NATO members spend 2 percent of GDP or more on defense.
The qualified success of NATO forces in Libya last year highlighted
this crisis in underinvestment in European military capabilities.
During Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, European allies ran short of
precision-guided munitions and found themselves dependent upon U.S.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and
refueling planes, among other critical assets.
Resource constraints are a double-edged sword. They can halt
multinational cooperation, undermine capabilities and generate division
within the alliance. We see this today as Central Europeans watch
aghast as German, French, and Italian firms sell military equipment to
Russia in their effort to sustain their respective defense industries.
Austerity can also be leveraged to drive forward needed
prioritization, innovation, and collaboration. Toward this end, NATO
Headquarters and Allied Command Transformation are driving forward a
capabilities package at the summit consisting of a Smart Defense
Initiative intended to foster pooling and sharing of resources, a
Connected Forces Initiative to improve training and exercises and Force
2020, a long-term plan defining the forces the alliance should be able
to bring to the battlefield at the end of this decade.
The alliance's capability shortfalls are real and urgent today.
NATO has worked diligently to foster Smart Defense initiatives in areas
of logistics and sustainment, force protection, training, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat operations. The summit's
capability emphasis should focus on these projects to which allies can
sign up today and deliver in the near term.
Capability development need not always be revolutionary and
dramatic. In an age of austerity, the focus should be on the practical
and attainable. Such projects are not only needed for operational
purposes, they are more credible to NATO publics than promises
concerning the distant future.
Fourth, the Chicago summit should be used to expand and deepen the
partnerships the alliance has developed around the world. The
globalized and increasingly hybrid character of today's challenges make
it important for the alliance to expand and deepen its relationships
with nongovernmental organizations and nonmember states around the
globe. They have been of great value to NATO's efforts in Afghanistan,
Libya, and elsewhere. They include the military and financial
contributions of Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Jordan, the
UAE, Qatar and Morocco, among others.
Partner contributions bring more than military forces. They can
also serve vital political purposes and provide invaluable insight and
intelligence specific to the cultural, historical, political, and
geographic realities of their respective localities, be it the Greater
Middle East, Asia, or Africa.
NATO should expand the Partnership for Peace so that is open to all
who qualify and who seek to participate regardless of geography. It
should be tiered to reflect the degree of engagement and integration
sought by member states. Those who make regular and significant
contributions to NATO operations--such as Sweden, for example--should
be eligible for a process that certifies them as interoperable with
NATO forces. That certification should make them eligible for specified
NATO programs, including: exercises; training; the integrated command
structure; civilian agencies; centers of excellence; and,
decisionmaking structures overseeing operations in which their forces
are employed.
Global partnerships are an absolute requirement for an alliance
that has to be engaged around the world. They constitute one important
means by which the transatlantic community, as a whole, can ``pivot''
from the challenges of the past to those of today and tomorrow.
Finally, NATO must demonstrate unambiguous determination to sustain
a stable Afghanistan. At its last summit in Lisbon in November 2010,
the alliance and the Afghan Government agreed to a transition strategy
intended to shift to Kabul full responsibility for security across all
of Afghanistan. At Chicago, NATO aims to map out a strategic
partnership with Afghanistan that will endure well beyond 2014. The
U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, even if it is fleshed out
robustly, will likely be insufficient to ensure success in Afghanistan
in the absence of a long-term transatlantic commitment to the Afghan
people.
Failure in Afghanistan would present its own negative regional
consequences. It would also be a serious blow to the credibility of the
alliance and, thus, to the commitment of its member states who have
sacrificed much largely out of resolute solidarity with the United
States.
CONCLUSION
Strong U.S. leadership has always been a prerequisite for NATO's
vibrancy and success. Likewise, Europe's ability to contribute the
military forces and political capital necessary to address both
regional and global concerns are equally essential to the alliance's
relevance. It is neither in Europe's nor the United States interest to
allow the Transatlantic Bargain to drift into irrelevance.
The Chicago summit presents the United States an opportunity to
contribute to the revitalization of the Transatlantic Bargain:
Through robust military engagement with Europe, the United
States would reinforce the credibility of its commitment to the
North Atlantic Treaty and sustain, if not improve, the ability
of European and U.S. forces to operate together within and
beyond the North Atlantic area.
By leading the effort to fulfill the vision of a unified,
undivided Europe, the United States would drive forward a
process that strengthens Europe's stability and security and
thereby reaffirm the centrality of Europe in America's global
strategy.
By ensuring that the Alliances' Smart Defense initiatives
feature not just long-term vision but also practical near term
initiatives, the U.S. will help NATO address urgent shortfalls
and in a manner credible to its increasingly skeptical publics.
By leveraging the potential offered by a network of NATO
global partnerships, the United States and Europe can play a
more effective role together addressing the global challenges
that already define this century.
In these ways, the Chicago summit can emerge as an important, if
not inspiring, benchmark of American commitment and European ambition
regarding the Transatlantic Alliance.
----------------
End Notes
1. Brzezinski, Zbignew, ``Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis
of Global Power.'' Basic Books, 2012. This work also influenced the
section on the dispersal of global power.
2. For insight into the emerging global balance of power and its
ramifications see: Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ``Strategic Vision'' and
Zakaria, Fareed, ``The Post American World: 2.O.'' W.W. Norton &
Company, 2011.
3. For an insightful annual survey of the EU-U.S. trade
relationship, see Daniel Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan (eds.), ``The
Transatlantic Economy 2012,'' Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns
Hopkins University, 2012.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Let me just point out that you mentioned the report that
was done that Senator Lugar had requested on the recent sales
of military equipment. I would just like to point out we will
be submitting that for the record. So thank you for raising
that.
[Editor's note.--The submitted report mentioned above was too
voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be
maintained in the permanent record of the committee.]
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Binnendij.
STATEMENT OF DR. HANS BINNENDIJK, VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH
AND APPLIED LEARNING, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON,
DC
Dr. Binnendijk. Madam Chairman, Senator Udall, let me also
say that it is a great pleasure to be back testifying before
this committee. I spent nearly a decade of my life in those
seats back there serving this committee on both sides of the
aisle. And I was just recalling that my first boss up here was
Hubert Humphrey after he left the Vice Presidency. So I am sort
of dating myself.
I wanted to make just a few very general comments about the
summit and then focus in on what I was asked to talk about,
which is military and defense capabilities. And I might ask
that my full statement be placed in the record and I will just
ad lib a little bit if I might.
First, let me say that if you look at past summits, they
often tend to be turning points in the direction of the
alliance. If you look back to the Rome and London summits, it
was really turning the alliance from a cold-war organization to
one that would endure for other missions. Madrid was about
enlargement, really a change in the alliance. Prague was about
military transformation of the alliance. Lisbon was a new
strategic concept and a new direction for the alliance
politically.
So the question is what will be the focus of the Chicago
summit? And I think the headline will certainly be Afghanistan,
Senator Udall, and the kinds of questions that you were
focusing on. It will be about how do you transition, how do you
keep the ``in together/out together'' formula, and what is the
formula for the post-2014 period.
But I think the other two elements of the summit, both
capabilities and partnerships, are also very important. Dr.
Kupchan talked a bit about partnerships. I think this is
extremely important because the alliance basically will not
fight by itself anymore. Wherever it goes in out-of-area
operations, it is going to have partners, and it needs to have
capable partners.
I do not see this particular summit basket as being full at
this point. I think more work needs to be done. I think there
are real opportunities to make our partners interoperable, to
certify that, to give them better consultation arrangements,
and I think a bit of work could still be done between now and
Chicago on that.
But let me turn my attention to military capabilities
because that is what I was asked to talk about. I want to raise
four problems, and I will argue that the summit will take
positive steps in each case to begin to alleviate those
problems.
The first problem has been addressed already in some depth.
That is the collapse of European defense spending. A little
over a decade ago, the United States spent about half of total
NATO defense spending. Right now, it is about 69 percent. The
United States today spends about 4.8 percent of its GDP on
defense. The alliance average now is about 1.6 and falling.
That 2-percent figure that we talk about--there is only a
handful of European allies who spend that much. And that
creates problems.
Personnel costs have remained about the same for European
militaries. They are funding operations out of their current
budgets while we fund them out of supplementals. So what does
that mean? It means that their investment accounts and their
procurement accounts are being hurt very badly. That is about
the future. So they are cutting into their future defense
capabilities.
Their cuts are not being coordinated with NATO or really
with many others. These are national decisions and that has to
change.
We have done an assessment at NDU about the impact of this,
and we have seen what you might call horizontal cuts initially
where you are cutting across the force, and that tends to
hollow out. It tends to make the forces less ready, less
sustainable. And now they are moving to vertical cuts where
they are taking entire chunks of capability out of the force.
You see this with the Dutch in armor. You see it with the
Danish in submarines. You see it with the British and their
carrier capabilities. So this is a problem for the future.
Now, the summit I think will take some steps in the right
direction. I think we are going to see some kind of a
commitment out of the summit to identify the core capabilities
that the alliance needs and to try to protect that core and to
also create kind of an aspirational view of where we should be
going, and that would be called NATO Force 2020. I think the
summit will continue the Lisbon capabilities commitment and the
work that was done there, and it will continue the command
structure reform.
What will be new here is what Secretary Rasmussen has
called ``smart defense.'' That is really about pooling and
sharing. Somebody referred to it as ``let us go buy together.''
That is not a bad start. There will be about 20 projects or so
that will be put on the table at Chicago to demonstrate that
smart defense will have some meat on the bones.
And then there will be what is called a connected force
initiative. The danger here is that the military
interoperability between the United States and our European
allies is very important and very fragile. We have good
interoperability now because of combined operations in
Afghanistan and Libya, but ISAF will end so we need to start
thinking now about how to continue to maintain that
interoperability. There will be an initiative at the summit to
try to do that.
I think more needs to be done to deal with this problem. We
need to put smart defense on steroids. My view is that as
things get worse, we are going to have to have a much higher
degree of role specialization within the alliance. Clusters of
allies will need to become responsible for certain missions.
This means allies will have to be able to trust their fellow
allies. If they are going to concentrate on a certain
capability, a certain role or mission, they are going to have
to trust allies. That trust is not there yet. So we have to
build that trust and move in that direction.
I think our own EUCOM command needs to become much more of
an interoperability command. EUCOM has been sort of a lily pad
where we move U.S. troops to forward areas of operations:
Afghanistan, Iraq in the past. That has to change. EUCOM has to
be about maintaining the interoperability of our forces. And as
I said, we need to do much more with our partners.
The second problem is missile defense. You know the story
here: The Iranian threat is building; Russia is trying to limit
the European Phased-Adaptive Approach and to get as much of a
veto over its future as they can.
I think missile defense is a success story for the summit.
There is a consensus in the alliance that we need to move
forward with missile defense, and that is a really solid
consensus and it is a good thing. We will be able to announce
at the summit that there will be an interim capability for
missile defense. If you look at both the technical and the
political achievements here over the last couple of years, they
are great. We have deployed a missile defense radar in Turkey.
We will be deploying missile interceptors in Romania and
Poland. We will be home-porting Aegis destroyers in Rota,
Spain. We have got agreement on a command and control system
for the alliance called ALT BMD. And the Dutch and others will
be building up their sea borne radar capability. So there is a
whole long list of things that the allies have done to build on
this consensus, and I think that is good news.
The problem in all of this, of course, is that we cannot
get the Russians to cooperate. I think they are concerned about
countries in their so-called ``near abroad'' that are
participating in this, and they are concerned about where phase
III and phase IV of the EPAA will go. Will it represent some
threat to their deterrent capability? The United States has
gone out of our way to assure them that it will not undermine
their deterrent capability.
I do think it is important for us continue to try
cooperation with the Russians, and this is very important. It
is standing in the way of other things. But we should not cross
redlines and I do not think we will. So far, the Obama
administration in my view has been very successful in putting
forward good ideas to the Russians but not crossing those
redlines.
The third problem has to do with nuclear deterrence. I was
asked to say a few words about the Deterrence and Defense
Posture Review. This is really about nuclear deterrence in
Europe. We have perhaps a few hundred U.S. nuclear weapons that
are forward-deployed in Europe, and as we know, the Germans and
others have been putting pressure on the system to reduce those
numbers.
The Strategic Concept that came out of the Lisbon summit
designed a very nice formula for this. It said that the
alliance will remain a nuclear alliance as long as there are
nuclear weapons, but we will try to create the conditions for
further reductions; there would be no unilateral action, and
that the aim of all of this should be to create greater
transparency for Russian substrategic systems and to get these
Russian systems relocated out of Europe. I think that is a good
formula.
What happened subsequently is that there was additional
pressure to try to change that Lisbon formula, and I think that
was what was behind the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review.
To its credit, I think the administration has been able to work
with that Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. And it has not
been made public yet, but I believe the conclusion of that
review is that the current mix is sound. And that is an
important conclusion to obtain.
The fourth problem is--and Ian mentioned this--reassurance
on article 5. I was privileged to work with Secretary Albright
on NATO's new Strategic Concept. I was one of her advisors to
the group of experts. This article 5 reassurance problem was
probably the single most important issue that we tackled. And
out of our work and in the new NATO Strategic Concept there is
a very clear statement about the importance of article 5.
What has happened subsequently is that both European
defense cuts and also Russian intimidation has led to some
opening up of that question again. Is reassurance really what
we said it would be at Lisbon with regard to article 5?
I think a number of things have happened since then that
should give comfort to our eastern allies. One is that we now
have new plans to deal with problems, threats from that part of
the world, and we will be exercising those plans; for example,
Steadfast Jazz is coming up next year. Baltic air policing will
be continued at least through 2018 and probably beyond. The
NATO Response Force, which Ian and I worked on many years ago,
will be revitalized and refocused on article 5. The United
States has F-16 training programs in Poland and will retain a
base in Romania. So this is just a few examples of the steps
that we have taken as a nation and as an alliance to reassure
our eastern allies that article 5 remains vital. There is more
that can be done, but I think those are important first steps.
So I have laid out these four problems, and my argument is
that at the summit and within NATO, we are taking steps to deal
with all those problems. That does not mean they go away as
problems, but steps are taken to deal with them.
Thank you, ma'am.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Binnendijk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Hans Binnendijk
It is a great pleasure for me to appear before this committee
again. I spent nearly a decade working on the staff of this committee.
NATO is focused on the Chicago summit. Past summits have marked major
turning points in NATO's direction. For example the Prague summit will
be remembered for transforming NATO's military capability, and the
Lisbon summit will be remembered for shifting the alliance's political
focus with a new Strategic Concept. This summit will not mark a major
turning point in NATO's direction. Instead it will be a celebration of
renewed NATO cohesion. At the center of the summit will be an agreement
on NATO's ongoing commitment to Afghanistan.
The second key item on the summit agenda behind Afghanistan is the
Alliance's military posture. That is what I would like to discuss with
the committee today. Let me divide my testimony into three parts and
discuss in turn: (1) NATO's conventional capabilities, (2) European
missile defense, and (3) NATO nuclear deterrence and the Deterrence and
Defense Posture Review. My general conclusion is that while there are
difficult challenges in all three areas, the alliance is postured to
make progress in all three areas at the Chicago summit.
CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
The Economics of European Defense Spending
The impacts of economic austerity since 2008 on European defense
spending and forces have been significant and are far from over. The
situation is especially acute because the recent downturn began from an
already low level of defense investment.
At the end of the cold war European NATO members were spending an
average of 2.7 percent of GDP on defense (in constant 2010 dollars).
Soon thereafter budgets declined precipitously as European public
sentiment forced a ``peace dividend'' from which Europe has yet to
recover. In 2001 NATO's European members spent an average of 1.9
percent of GDP on defense. This aggregated to $279.8 billion, compared
to the U.S. defense budget of 3 percent of GDP, or $385 billion. These
figures equate to 41 percent and 57 percent of total NATO defense
spending for European NATO members and for the United States
respectively.
In 2011, the latest data available, NATO's European members
averaged just 1.6 percent of GDP or $282.9 billion spent on defense
while the United States spent 4.8 percent of GDP or $685.6 billion on
defense. These figures equate to 69 percent and 28 percent of total
NATO defense spending for European NATO members and the United States
respectively. (In both 2001 and 2011, Canada provides the other
approximate 2-3 percent spending to round up to 100 percent of NATO
spending.) The near term future is not bright: today 11 European
countries both within and outside of the eurozone are officially in
recession for a second time in 4 years.
European capabilities have contracted over this long period of flat
or lower spending for two reasons. First, personnel costs have remained
relatively fixed even as overall troop strength has declined. Second,
unlike the United States, Europeans fund operations such as Kosovo and
Afghanistan out of annual budgets without supplemental funding. The
only relief is to shrink defense investment accounts even as the costs
of new systems increase.
Overall European defense spending in NATO is also less efficient
for the obvious reason that spending is disaggregated across 26
separate national military structures and defense bureaucracies. Added
to these realities is the gradually growing investment in European
Union level structures: those institutions that give visibility and
some substance to the concept of a Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP), intended as a complement NATO at the low end of the military
spectrum. CSDP is a positive development endorsed by the United States,
however it is not without cost.
Why has Europe invested so little in its own defense over so long;
a period unprecedented in modern times? Three reasons underlie this
trend. First, most Europeans do not perceive a major military threat,
resulting in little appetite for increased defense spending. Since the
cold war European public concern for defense has lingered at less than
10 percent and from 2003-2011 eurobarometer polls show only 1-2 percent
of Europeans select defense or foreign affairs among their uppermost
concerns. Second, the financial crisis of 2008 that persists across
Europe puts further pressure on governments to avoid increases in
defense, especially as recent public protest signal that austerity
measures may have reached their political limit. Finally, Europeans
know they can rely on the United States for strategic deterrence and
defense and for operational crisis response in situations such as
Libya. From this vantage point, they spend enough to remain credible
allies in some areas. Beyond this vague threshold, allies are focused
on domestic priorities.
NDU Assessment of European Defense Cuts
In summer 2011 NDU undertook an analysis of the impact of national
cuts in defense spending across Europe. Special attention was given to
the situations in seven key allied countries. We found that since 2008
most European cuts were typical of earlier downturns but much deeper.
We termed these across the board budget reductions ``horizontal cuts.''
They affected all national forces through reduced training and
exercises, gapped personnel billets, diminished stocks of fuel and
munitions, stretched out maintenance and deferred modernization.
Transformation initiatives were slowed or ground to a halt.
More drastic cuts were also observed, where nations eliminated
whole categories of capability, or most of a capability, in order to
stay within available budgets. We call these ``vertical cuts.'' One
example is the Dutch decision to discard all remaining armored forces,
rather than continue to trim across the board. Once eliminated,
restoring basic defense capabilities such as armored forces is a long-
term proposition. In essence such cuts redefine national defense
strategies in a fundamental way. With the Dutch decision six NATO
members have no armored forces (Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). These nations must rely on other
allies for such capabilities. In recent years, Denmark has eliminated
submarine forces and the U.K. has retired its carrier-based naval
aviation for an anticipated period of 10 years.
The biggest impact to date is on the readiness and sustainability
of existing forces. Nations focus their spending on deployed or
deploying forces to the neglect of their wider forces. NATO is at risk
of having far fewer forces ready and able to deploy. There is a limit
to how far horizontal cuts can be made before units become untenable as
a result of inoperable equipment or untrained and missing personnel. It
would appear these limits are being approached and that the only
choices that remain are to spend more or cut force structure; i.e, more
vertical cuts. The number of allies able to maintain their current
spectrum of capabilities, especially in combat brigades, naval
combatants and strike aircraft will diminish over the next 10 years
without additional defense spending by allies.
European defense spending cuts will therefore soon open
unacceptable gaps in the capabilities military commanders deem
essential to perform the alliance's three strategic tasks of collective
defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. In order to keep
the risk of that outcome low, NATO has to channel near-term national
defense spending into efforts that close gaps and provide the optimum
capability for each nation's investment.
There is some good news in this otherwise dim picture of
conventional European defense capabilities. Taken as a whole, NATO
Europe is still the second strongest military power in the world. They
are willing to use their power; for example, 90 percent of all
ordinance dropped on Libya was delivered by Europeans. And some
progress has been made on ``high end enablers'' such as air to ground
surveillance, joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, the
decision to broaden AWACS to all NATO allies, and the European Union
initiative on refueling tankers. This will shift some of the burden
from the United States since we usually supply these high-end enablers
to the alliance. The problem is that the European firepower that these
enablers support is being cut by perhaps 20-30 percent or more.
The Upcoming NATO Summit--Opportunities for Solutions
The Chicago summit provides an important opportunity for NATO to
help members realize the most from their defense investments. In so
doing, it will generate the optimum collective return from limited
national investments.
First, NATO must agree at the summit on a core set of required
capabilities commanders really must have to perform the three strategic
tasks cited above. This will likely be something less than what NATO
commanders consider the minimum requirement for all stated goals yet it
has to establish what NATO needs to remain credible to its members; and
to any possible adversary across the spectrum of military missions. At
the summit, NATO heads of state and government should endorse a pledge
not to reduce any of these required core capabilities if forced to
further cut defense spending.
Second, NATO should define at the summit an aspirational goal
force, what some are already calling NATO Force 2020. This should
describe what a future NATO force should look like when the current
financial crisis passes and defense spending recovers. This force
should be capable of performing the full level of ambition in terms of
the continuous and concurrent NATO operations agreed by nations in 2006
and reaffirmed in 2011. NATO has not been capable of this level of
operations for several years. At Chicago it must set a longer term goal
of providing the forces to match its political aims.
Third, the Chicago summit must reaffirm the 11 critical capability
commitments agreed by heads of state and government at their last
summit in 2010 at Lisbon. Significant progress has been made since then
on all 11 in spite of the financial crisis. That is laudable and
encouraging. Chicago has to maintain momentum on these critical
programs, all of which were carefully weighed and selected at a summit
also framed by the pressures of financial constraints. Follow through
at this next summit is an important political signal.
Fourth, NATO leaders must press the alliance to move ahead with
command structure and agency reforms approved at Lisbon. These are
already being vigorously pursued. They will cut costs and streamline
NATO institutions for the management of alliance political, military
and administrative business. It is essential that overhead costs be
controlled and, wherever possible, reduced. NATO has a good plan to
achieve these goals, but it will take several more years of strong top-
down emphasis to put all reforms in place.
Fifth, Secretary General Rasmussen's 2011 concept of Smart Defense,
NATO's new capabilities initiative, should be endorsed and put into
action. Allied Command Transformation has already identified about 20
specific Smart Defense projects aimed at greater efficiencies through
multinational cooperation. More are anticipated. This year the
Secretary General announced a related initiative called the Connected
Forces Initiative. This initiative concentrates on deepening
interoperability among NATO members and partners, through greater
emphasis on education and training, more effective exercises--
especially for the NATO Response Force, and more adaptive technological
interface among existing systems.
Both Smart Defense and the Connected Forces Initiative should
include strong links to the EU's parallel initiatives of pooling and
sharing defense capabilities, being steered by the European Defense
Agency. The NATO and EU initiatives are complementary and define
cooperative efforts intended to get more capability out of what nations
invest.
Steps Beyond Smart Defense
NATO's Smart Defense concept opens a new horizon in multinational
cooperation that should be pushed beyond the initial steps described
above. As European cuts continue, we will need Smart Defense on
steroids. Agreements to date are concentrated on cooperation in the
areas of procurement, logistics, and training infrastructure--with a
few operational exceptions. These will cut costs and promise real
savings; hence they must be completed in the near term.
A bolder goal should then be set. Clusters of NATO nations should
be asked to agree to take on greater role specialization and focus on
specific missions. Similarly equipped and like-minded allies and
partners would form informal, core clusters of nations interested in
honing specific capabilities relative to some of NATO's missions, both
article 5 and non-article 5. NDU has called these Mission Focus Groups.
This phenomenon has existed informally for a long time in the
alliance in select areas and to great effect. NATO has standing
maritime groups that refined operational capabilities over more than 10
years in the Mediterranean (Operation Allied Endeavor). These forces
are now committed to the antipiracy mission Operation Ocean Shield
where much of the same skills are being applied. Another select group
of allies focus on NATO nuclear mission expertise and capabilities and
still another provides seasoned multinational capacity for air policing
missions over the Baltic States. NATO defines many specific missions
within the strategic tasks of collective defense and crisis management
that are performed initially by a cluster of allies with the best
capabilities and often proximate to the mission area.
Allies are not prepared to accept this bolder concept of mission
focused groups at Chicago. It requires a high degree of trust that
allied nations will provide capabilities another nation has given up to
specialize in other missions. However, as the budget crisis persists
and allies are forced to cut deeper into existing capabilities, much
can be gained by working with allies to identify mission capabilities
they will hold as their highest resource priorities. NATO should build
on informal mission clusters already in being, and adopt the concept in
other mission areas based on military advice, harmonization with the
NATO Defense Planning Process and members' resource constraints.
The Chicago Summit Focus on a Future Role of the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM)
In the future EUCOM becomes vital to U.S. operations worldwide as
the strongest link to America's most capable and seasoned military
allies and partners. At the Chicago summit the United States should
emphasis its continuing commitment to NATO through EUCOM in light of
announced force drawdowns in 2012 and 2013.
NATO has 28 members: 32 formal partners and 9 informal partners
participating or having participated in International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan. By far most of these
partners are in NATO and/or the Europe Union. Yet even the seven NATO
partners in the Pacific region have come to adopt many NATO standards,
tactics, and procedures over the past 10 years of ISAF operations.
Maintaining this perishable reservoir of interoperable partners should
be a primary mission of EUCOM as ISAF operations draw down.
The core of EUCOM's efforts at partner engagement will be the new
U.S. commitment to participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF) with
elements of a brigade combat team (BCT) based in the United States and
deployed annually to Europe for exercises with allies. The details of
this commitment are yet to be worked out. However, EUCOM, DOD and the
Congress should take a very broad view of partner engagement and build
a strong transatlantic bridge that will sustain allied support for the
U.S. worldwide. EUCOM should be the engine for engagement with all NATO
members and partners. It should make its training areas available for
allies. Deploying U.S. forces--air and maritime as well as land--should
be programmed for engagement with forces of multiple allies and not
limited to the NRF. It should study investing in forward command
elements of a brigade and or corps in-theater to plan with allies and
periodically exercise as part of the NRF's tactical and operational
joint command structure.
In order to reduce the impact of the withdrawal of the final two
heavy Brigade Combat Teams from Europe by the end of 2013, the forces
rotating to Europe to meet the U.S. commitment to the NRF should be
heavy forces as often as possible. While the current trend is toward
lighter forces, heavy forces are a reality in Europe where there are
almost 10,000 main battle tanks among allies and partners. In contrast,
the U.S. will soon have no main battle tanks in Europe for the first
time since June 1944. That could have a negative effect on the
confidence of some allies in the U.S. commitment to NATO, especially in
Central and Eastern Europe where the main interest remains article 5
preparedness.
A wise investment would be to provide EUCOM with a prepositioned
heavy BCT set of equipment, visibly maintained and exercised in theater
as a political symbol of military resolve. Moreover, U.S. force
deployments to exercises in Europe would be more affordable and
therefore would be more likely to be sustained over the long term, as
envisioned by the U.S. commitment.
Given the global value of interoperable partners, Congress should
consider establishment of an interoperability line in the DOD budget
specific to EUCOM. This budget line should fund NRF participation, plus
the maintenance and deepening of interoperability across all NATO
members, partners, and future partners. The risk in requiring the
funding of interoperability activities to come out of Service budgets
is that it will be perpetually vulnerable to higher priorities and
limited resources. EUCOM should be designated the global coordinator
for U.S. interoperability, responsible to reach out to other COCOMs to
ensure standards and agreements are consistent for all U.S. forces
worldwide.
EUCOM should look innovatively at a host of other initiatives that
will nurture transatlantic interoperability, especially as the drawdown
of forces under ISAF curtails operational multinational experience.
Partner Initiatives at the NATO Summit
Given the vast numbers of partners in various organizational
geometries, NATO needs to find ways to differentiate among partner
levels of engagement with the alliance. A least common denominator
approach is no longer the best, neither for NATO or its wealth of
partners. Indications are that as many as 13 NATO partners will be
present in Chicago, an ideal opportunity for the alliance to take steps
to reshape its formal partnership programs along more functional and
substantive lines. Partners could be invited to signal their
willingness to work with the alliance more closely in operational
areas. If mutually agreed, NATO would then design a concentrated
program aimed at honing greater interoperability with these allies and
establish an appropriate certification process. In turn, NATO would
consult more closely with these partners when considering operations
that affect their interests.
THE EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH
The threat that is driving U.S. (and NATO) missile defense efforts
originates from the Middle East, primarily from Iran. In 2007, the Bush
administration proposed creating a ``Third Site'' in Europe consisting
of 10 long-range mid-course interceptors in Poland and a radar system
in the Czech Republic. The Obama administration replaced that plan with
a more flexible and responsive plan called the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA). EPAA is based on the SM3 interceptor, deployed in four
phases through 2020, on land and at sea. Throughout all four phases,
increasingly capable versions of the SM3 will be introduced. The EPAA
is designed to adapt in response to the evolution of the ballistic
missile threat and BMD technology.
The United States plans to make the EPAA its national contribution
to the NATO missile defense plan. The United States is not alone
fielding the capabilities or in bearing the costs for missile defense
in Europe. There is a strong consensus in the alliance in support of a
NATO-wide territorial missile defense capability, in addition to its
already agreed position of defending deployed troops against missile
threats. Getting this expanded consensus has been a political and
technical achievement
Major milestones include the following:
Agreement by the Turks to host a U.S. BMD radar. That
critical radar was deployed in December 2011.
Agreement by the Romanians and the Poles to host land-based
Aegis Ashore SM interceptor sites, in the 2015 and 2018
timeframes respectively.
Agreement by the Spanish to home-port four U.S. Aegis ships
with SM3 Interceptors, starting in 2014.
Deployment of the first U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ship (March
2011) to the Mediterranean Sea in support of EPAA.
Agreement by the alliance to fund the so-called ALT BMD
command and control program for territorial BMD. NATO now has a
BMD command and control center at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.
Agreement by the Dutch and potentially others to upgrade
radar systems for BMD use on their frigates.
Integration of several other national missile defense
systemsinto the NATO BMD effort, such as German and Dutch
Patriots, or future French early warning sensors.
At the NATO summit in Chicago, the alliance plans to announce that
it has an operational ``interim capability'' for command and control
for NATO missile defense. This will be common-funded and represents the
first step in implementing NATO's 2010 decision to pursue territorial
missile defense. The interim capability for command and control will
allow U.S. EPAA assets to operate under a NATO mission.
While there is good news regarding EPAA implementation and NATO
BMD, Russia continues to oppose missile defense in Europe and is
refusing to cooperate. That is why President Putin will not attend the
Chicago summit. Russia was opposed to the mid-course interceptors
proposed by the Bush administration and after a brief pause they have
also opposed the Obama administration's EPAA. They are concerned about
deployments in Poland and Romania, their former Warsaw Pact Allies.
They are concerned about Phase III and IV when more capable Standard
Missiles will be deployed; they say they fear a threat to their second
strike capability. They remain bitter about the abrogation of the ABM
Treaty.
In the negotiations on BMD cooperation, the Russians have tried
multiple tactics to seek limitations or even a veto over NATO BMD
deployments and use. They have also sought to intimidate host nations
for EPAA assets.
Per President Obama's direction, U.S. and NATO negotiators have not
agreed to such limitations, and have made clear such limitations are
unacceptable. The worldwide ballistic missile threat is real and
growing, hence the U.S. needs these capabilities for defense of our
population, forces, allies, and partners. But there is still a great
deal of scope for meaningful and mutually beneficial cooperation with
Russia. This is a high-priority effort. We have made numerous proposals
and have adapted some Russian ideas, such as the concept for two NATO-
Russian centers that might be created for operational coordination and
data-sharing.
Progress has been slow. To find a breakthrough, the United States
has been building a detailed case for why the EPAA and NATO missile
defense are not a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent. Last week
Assistant Secretary of Defense Madelyn Creedon spoke at a conference in
Moscow, presenting a strong argument. She pointed out that even the
SM3-IIB is not designed or positioned to catch sophisticated Russian
ICBMs. Furthermore she highlighted the quantitative argument. Russia
has hundreds of ICBMs, while the EPAA will employ only a few dozen
interceptors. Simply by looking at a globe, one can see that facilities
in Poland, Romania, and Turkey are optimally positioned to defend NATO
from the Middle East, not counter Russia launches toward the United
States.
It remains in the U.S. interest to seek an agreement with Russia on
BMD cooperation. But the U.S. can not agree to the ``legally binding''
assurances that Russia seeks. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has
suggested ``political assurances'', along the lines of the NATO
consensus on EPAA, but Russia does not seem interested. Nonetheless,
cooperation is ultimately in Russia's interest. They are testing the
alliance. Once their test fails, the hope is that they will recognize
that the transparency and real missile defense benefits they would gain
with cooperation will outweigh their other concerns.
THE DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW
The NATO Strategic Concept, agreed at the Lisbon summit, contains a
carefully worked out compromise on the role of nuclear deterrence in
Europe. On the one hand it stated that as long as nuclear weapons
exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, and that NATO will retain
the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons. On the other
hand, it stated that NATO's broad goal is to reduce the role and number
of nuclear weapons and to create the conditions for a nonnuclear world.
To square this circle, it agreed that nations would not take unilateral
action to withdraw nuclear assets and that in negotiating future
nuclear reductions the aim should be to seek Russian agreement to
increase nuclear transparency and to relocate their weapons away from
NATO territory.
This puts the focus in the right place. The nuclear problem in
Europe is Russia. They have 10 times the nonstrategic nuclear weapons
that NATO has in Europe. The Russian doctrine is first use. And they
have used nuclear weapons to intimidate their neighbors. But they have
refused to talk about either nonstrategic nuclear weapons transparency
or reductions. An agreement on missile defense cooperation could change
their attitude.
But several European countries, with Germany in the lead, have
sought to modify that NATO consensus. They have concerns about the
safety of U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. And so those nations
initiated a Deterrence and Defense Posture review, which has recently
been completed. That so-called DDPR assessed NATO's conventional,
nuclear, and BMD capabilities. The main protagonists were the Germans
and the French.
The U.S. interest here is to retain the Strategic Concept consensus
and to put the burden of nuclear reductions in Europe where it belongs,
on Russia. While the DDPR has not yet been made public, I anticipate
that its basic conclusion will be that the current mix of defenses is
sound.
A major issue during the deliberations focused on NATO's
declaratory policy. The U.S. sought to bring NATO's declaratory policy
for nuclear use closer to that of the United States. U.S. declaratory
policy has a so-called ``negative security assurance'' which says it
will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states who
are a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a possible
reconsideration of this policy if biological weapons are used against
the United States. France and the U.K. have their own declaratory
policies. Several nations sought to exclude discussion of declaratory
policies from the DDPR.
REASSURANCE ON THE ARTICLE 5 COMMITMENT
Several years ago some of our Eastern European allies raised
concerns about the continuing validity of the article 5 (all for one)
commitment. This became a central issue in the study undertaken by
former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the Group of Experts.
That group highlighted the importance of article 5 and that emphasis
made its way into NATO's new Strategic Concept.
Cuts in defense spending and belligerent Russian comments have
reawakened some of those concerns. The alliance and the United States
have taken several steps to make clear that the article 5 commitment
remains rock solid. A few examples include the following:
Defense plans have been refocused on article 5.
Exercises have been planned to test that new including
``Steadfast Jazz'' in 2013.
Baltic Air Policing will be continued until at least 2018.
The NATO Response Force will be revitalized and focused more
on article 5 missions.
The United States will conduct F-16 training in Poland.
A United States base will be retained in Romania.
More can be done, for example, to make sure that NATO's core
military capabilities retain a robust article 5 capability.
CONCLUSION
There are downward pressures on both NATO's conventional defense
capabilities and on the willingness for European nations to host U.S.
nuclear deterrent assets. The Chicago summit is poised to take useful
steps to mitigate those pressures and retain a useful military
capability for the alliance. The summit will also take another
important step to protect the alliance against the potential nuclear
and missile threat from Iran. The cost for that may be a deteriorating
relationship with Russia. While the summit will be a success with
regard to these issues, this committee will need to continually monitor
the situation to assure that those downward pressures on defense
budgets do not create the ``dim if not dismal'' situation that
Secretary Robert Gates envisioned.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much.
I want to start, Dr. Binnendijk, with your comments around
missile defense. As Mr. Brzezinski mentioned earlier, this
month we heard Russia suggest that they might use preemptive
force against missile installations if there is not a
cooperative agreement reached with NATO. Do you think this is
just posturing? Do you think this represents a heightened
threat on the part of Russia to oppose the missile defense
installations, or should we just expect more rhetoric and
continue? You suggested that we have been operating in a way
that is sufficient to continue to have some sort of a
relationship with Russia that allows us to move forward.
Dr. Binnendijk. I think we are being tested by the
Russians. There is a long history to this, of course. During
the cold war, essentially the United States convinced the
Russians of the importance of a second strike capability, and
that notion was accepted by both sides and kept the peace
during the cold war. I think the Russians were quite upset when
the ABM Treaty was abrogated because it tended to challenge
that cold-war notion of mutual assured destruction. When the
Bush administration put forward the notion of the so-called
third missile defense site, which was different in composition
but a similar purpose, the Russians opposed that. When the
Obama administration decided to go with another option, the
Phased-Adaptive Approach based on the Standard Missile 3, the
Russians were quite. They thought it might be a good deal. Then
they started looking at it. They started looking at phase III
and IV and thought, well, maybe that is a threat.
So I think they are testing us. They are uncomfortable with
where the EPA might go. They would like to set limits. I think
actually if you look at the consensus in Europe, the consensus
in Europe really is about creating missile defenses to deal
with an Iranian threat, not to deal with a Russian threat. If
you look at the capabilities that we are talking about, these
missile interceptors are slow. They are not going to catch an
ICBM. We have been telling the Russians that. They want greater
assurances. They want legally binding assurances. I am not sure
that a legally binding assurance would be ratified. So
Secretary General Rasmussen is prepared to give political
assurances.
I do not think we need to give in, though. I think we need
to understand where the redlines are. There is a real threat
coming from the Middle East. This is a serious proposal that
has consensus, and I do not think we should let the Russians
move us from the direction in which we are headed. But we ought
to seek to give them as many reassurances as we can within the
scope of the plan that we have.
Senator Shaheen. Let me just ask the other two panelists.
Do you all agree with that analysis?
Mr. Brzezinski. I agree with the analysis. I think Hans is
spot on.
I would add that I think Russian motivations behind their
opposition to those defense plans are really more geopolitical
than they are technical. They are more upset over the fact the
United States will have military installations on the
territories of Poland and Romania.
The only thing that I would add concerns the conditionality
of U.S. missile defense plans. Allow me to quote the President,
he stated--President Obama--``as long as a threat from Iran
persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that
is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is
eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security and the
driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will
be removed.''
Now, that has been hanging like a dark cloud over Central
Europe, undercutting Central European confidence in America's
commitment to this plan. I do not think there is high
confidence in Warsaw, in Bucharest, and elsewhere that these
facilities are going to be built in 2018. In fact, Poland's
Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski when reporting on the state of
Polish foreign policy to his Parliament just this spring, said
``we stand ready to implement the Poland-United States
agreement on the missile defense base even though we are aware
of the fact that United States plans may be subject to
modification, for example, if agreement is reached on Iran's
nuclear program.'' So they are not confident at all that these
plans are going to go forward.
I personally think these plans are justified whether or not
we make progress with Iran because we have a basic fact.
Weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies are
proliferating. Missile defense is going to become a required
part of any major nation's or alliance's complement of military
capabilities, including NATO's complement of defense
capabilities.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Kupchan.
Dr. Kupchan. I would associate myself with Dr. Binnendijk's
analysis. I think that the dispute over missile defense is
really part of a broader lack of confidence and trust that
exists between NATO and Russia. I would agree with what Ian
just said that it is not a technical issue. It is much broader
than that.
I am someone who is broadly supportive of the Obama
administration's reset policy toward Russia. It has had good
days and bad days, but I think the glass is more half full than
half empty. And I believe that we should continue to press on
United States-Russian relations and NATO-Russian relations,
realizing that we have differences over Georgia, that we have
differences over missile defense, but continue to pocket those
areas where we have agreement because if we can build greater
trust, if we can get the Russians to see that NATO means them
no harm, then I actually think we will be able to reach
agreement on missile defense and perhaps on Georgia. I do not
want to minimize the difficulties of doing that, but I think
the outreach to Russia is correct and we should push hard on
that front.
One quick comment on what Mr. Brzezinski said about
conditionality. I do not see Obama's commitment to missile
defense as conditional. I think it is conditional in the sense
that it is being adapted to the nature of the threat, and that
is why there was a revision to begin with to move toward a sea-
based structure that would better deal with the threat from
Iran. So I think that both sides of the house are moving
forward on missile defense. What remains to be determined is
the exact nature of that system, and that will depend upon the
nature of the threat.
Senator Shaheen. But I assume you would agree with his
analysis that there is still some concern in Eastern European
capitals about the commitment of our missile defense efforts.
Dr. Kupchan. I think there is still some broad discomfort
in Central Europe about the degree to which they do not enjoy
the same pride of place that they did in the alliance 10 years
ago. During the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
they were the apple's eye. They had a sort of door-open policy
in Washington. They do not enjoy quite as much access and pride
of place as they used to. I do not think that is because the
Obama administration is neglecting them or going over their
heads or working on Russia at their expense. I think it is what
one could call the ``new normal,'' a NATO alliance in which
Poland starts to enjoy the same kind of status as an Italy and
a Spain. That requires adjustment, but it is actually very good
news for Poland.
Senator Shaheen. Given what you said about the Russian
reset, do you share what we heard earlier from Secretary Gordon
that we should not read anything more ominous into Putin's not
coming to the G8 summit other than that he has work at home?
Dr. Kupchan. I find it regrettable that President Putin has
decided not to come. I think that it is a mistake on Russia's
part. Who knows exactly why he made that decision? But there is
no question that his initial decision not to go to Chicago and
now his decision not to show up at the G8 suggests that he is
keeping a certain distance. I am confident that over time
Russia is going to orient itself westward, and that is because
I am not sure geopolitically speaking they have a lot of other
options. Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan is not a bright
future for Russia. It is in my mind just a question of when
Russian domestic politics works itself out. It could take a
very long time, but I think Putin is smart enough to know that
the arrow points westward and that the markets, the
institutions of the European Union and NATO provide a better
future for Russia than the alternatives.
Senator Shaheen. You said in your statement that--I am not
quoting you exactly, but you suggested that as the circle
widens, preserving the rules-based system, as you said, that
has really been established by the United States and Europe and
the transatlantic relationship will be difficult if the United
States and Europe do not move forward together. Is there some
reason to believe that we will not be moving forward together?
Are you suggesting that because of the current fiscal crisis,
because of some of the domestic issues that you identified,
that we should worry about this as a future challenge?
Dr. Kupchan. I worry about two different dimensions of that
challenge. One is the bigger question of the degree to which
the Chinas, the Indias, the Brazils of the world will embrace a
rules-based system, and if so, will it be our rules-based
system. And I think that is a conversation that will be
increasingly important in the years ahead. It has already
started.
My second concern is that we cannot manage that task on our
own. The West as a going concern has really been about
partnership between the United States and Europe and between
the United States and Japan and other allies in the Pacific.
And I do worry that the European Union's foreseeable future is
perhaps introverted and fragmented. So it is not that they will
diverge from us on the need to sustain a rules-based system. It
is they might not be in the game due to their economic and
political weakness, and that I think would leave us in an
exposed position. The United States and Europe should together
do what they can to refurbish and revitalize the West as an
anchor of liberal values, open markets, and democratic
institutions; they are now under threat. Rising powers do not
share these same commitments, and that is why we need to make
sure that our model is strong and serves as an example for the
rest of the world.
Senator Shaheen. You know, we had a panel in the European
Affairs Subcommittee last fall on the European fiscal crisis,
and virtually all of the panelists agreed that one of the most
important things we could do to support Europe in addressing
their fiscal crisis was to address our own at home. So I would
certainly support your analysis.
Let me just go to an issue that I think has been brought up
several times, and that is, as we look at the summit, as we
look at the future of NATO, that the partnerships is one way
for us to expand the influence and the ability to work in the
global environment that we are now in. Do you think that offers
an opportunity? And I guess I would ask Mr. Brzezinski and Dr.
Binnendijk if you have views on this as well. Do you think this
offers the opportunity to expand the circle in a way that
allows that influence to continue to happen as you look at the
partnerships that have been developed and that are being looked
at in the future? Is this a way for NATO to continue to have
some influence and work with those countries with rising
economies?
Mr. Brzezinski. Absolutely. I think partnerships are the
way of the future for the alliance. The fact is that the most
urgent challenges and most surprising, unpredictable challenges
are most likely going to come from outside the North Atlantic
area. It is going to be the Middle East. It is going to be
Asia. I think it is eventually going to be Africa also because
of the systemic challenges these regions are facing. NATO is
going to be drawn into them just the way we have been drawn
into Afghanistan because those changes, when they are
particularly negative, can directly affect our own security. We
experienced that on September 11, 2011.
Partnerships provide an opportunity not only to bring more
capability to the table, but they also provide an opportunity
to bring to the table countries, regions, players, sometimes
nongovernmental organizations that really understand the
situation because they live there. They have the relationships.
They have the diplomatic clout, the diplomatic legitimacy. They
have the intelligence. They can provide the nuance that
countries from the North Atlantic area do not have. We are
going to need more of those relationships. I think it is smart
to think about NATO as a community of like-minded democracies
serving as a hub that can participate with a wider set of
players, be it Brazil, be it India, be it Japan, Australia,
most of whom already have these relationships. We need to
deepen them and leverage them more.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Binnendijk.
Dr. Binnendijk. Let me answer your last two questions
together because I think they do fit together.
If you look at American grand strategy today and you look
at the so-called pivot to Asia or the rebalancing to Asia, I
think that is probably the right thing to do. That is where the
long-term security challenges lie. Shorter term challenges
still remain in the greater Middle East. So that is the second
part. And we are looking to our European allies to help us in
that second endeavor, otherwise we are not going to have the
capacity to do it. The question is, are the European allies
willing and able to do that? There is Afghanistan fatigue in
Europe, as there is here, but it is even worse in Europe. And
you have got the financial problems that we discussed.
So as you look at that strategy, the question is: Are the
European allies willing to go along with this strategy. Some
have talked about not pivoting away from Europe, but rather
pivoting with Europe, and that notion of pivoting with Europe
requires partners who are willing and able to do it. And that
is the test. Will they be able to do that? So that is the first
part of the answer.
The second part has to do with partnership, and here I
agree with Ian. We are going to have 13 or so partners meeting
with NATO in Chicago, and there is a real opportunity there.
If you look at so-called partnerships for the alliance
today, you have got the Partnership for Peace, which was
initially a waiting chamber for membership. Now you have some
very capable countries and some very less capable countries in
the PEP. It is not really functional anymore. You have got the
Med Dialogue. You have the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and
others. But they do not make much sense anymore.
We really need to rethink partnerships in general for the
alliance. It does not mean you cannot keep those dialogues
going, but to me it is about capabilities and will. And you
need to find those ``functional partners,'' who can be with us,
and they can be global: Australia, Japan, South Korea, India,
potentially others. How do you partner with them, and how can
they be useful to the alliance and to the United States? Where
you have to start, in addition to the political elements, is
military interoperability so that we can operate together when
agreed. And there are standards within NATO. We should be using
those NATO standards to apply to these other countries so that
when we come together in an operation, we are interoperable and
we should be able to certify that. And these countries should
get something for that, which is greater consultation.
So I think there is a lot that can be done with this notion
of partnership that will help that grand strategy to be able to
work.
Senator Shaheen. You know, I think you all have mentioned
the pivot toward Asia and what the European reaction has been
in some quarters. I liked your comment, Dr. Binnendijk, about
the idea that this is really--what is happening in Asia is of
equal interest to Europe and there is an opportunity to pivot
together.
And I wonder if any of you have thoughts about to what
extent that kind of message will come out of the summit in
Chicago and whether there is an opportunity to make that point
in a way that has not been made to date anyway?
Dr. Kupchan. You know, I think the Europeans are beginning
to understand the importance of global engagement. They are
beginning to understand that the future of our partnership with
them depends on their readiness to do things that are well
beyond their normal purview. But I think that is going to be a
long-term process in the sense that the Europeans at this point
simply do not have the equities or the capabilities to be
players in Asia in the same way we are. That does not mean they
cannot be helpful. That does not mean that they cannot invest
in the kind of capabilities that will get them there.
But I do think--and this comes back to the discussion we
were just having about partnerships--that that conversation
should not just be about what partners can do for NATO to
increase NATO capability, it is also about what NATO can do for
others in the sense that--as I suggested in my opening remarks,
I am not sure that NATO is going to be sending out the fire
trucks every few months whenever there is a problem out there.
Who is going to be sending out the fire trucks? Probably
groupings that are local. So if I were to guess at what the
most important security institutions of the coming decades will
be, they are going to be regional institutions like ASEAN in
Southeast Asia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African
Union, and UNASUR, which is a defense union emerging in Latin
America. And so I think that NATO's engagement with these
groups should be partly about interoperability, as Hans was
just saying, but also teaching them to do for themselves what
NATO has done for itself. NATO is the most successful
multinational, operational, integrated military/political
institution in history. So, if NATO is not always able to
address crises, it should invest in making sure that others
will be ready to fill the gap.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Yes, Mr. Brzezinski.
Mr. Brzezinski. I would hope that would be the message that
comes from Chicago, that we will be pivoting together to the
new challenges of the 21st century. That is the essence of the
transatlantic bargain.
I think global partnerships are a way to do that because it
would be the United States, Canada, and our European allies
reaching out to the Brazils, to the Indias, the Australias and
deepening the transatlantic community's ties to them. That is
Europe and North America pivoting together to these new
regions.
But I am concerned about our ability to pivot militarily
together as we reduce the U.S. force presence in Europe. We are
reducing two of four BCT's, brigade combat teams. We are
pulling out prepositioned ships from the Mediterranean and we
are pulling out an A-10 squadron, among other elements. I think
it does raise, because it has not been adequately addressed by
the administration, the important issue of how in the long term
we will maintain interoperability between United States and
European forces so that they can pivot together to these new
regions.
To get a sense of the implications the administration's
decisions to reduce U.S. presence in Europe portend for
engagement between United States and European forces, lets take
a closer look at their plans for future engagement. They have
decided to remove or eliminate two brigade combat teams now
deployed in Europe. To make up for that loss of presence, the
administration has committed a United States brigade combat
team to the NATO Response Force. Fantastic, that is a first-
rate decision. We should have done it a long time ago.
The administration has also said it will ensure that two
brigade combat team equivalents will rotate to Europe each
year, which sounds good. When you start scratching the surface
of that, those rotations are only 6 to 8 weeks long per year.
That comes nowhere close to the kind of engagement that a
permanently based unit in Europe can provide. That comes
nowhere close to the kind of level of joint training that a
unit based in Europe can do with the Italians, with the Poles,
with the Norwegians and such. And so I think there is a real
question out there of what is going to happen to all the great
interoperability we have developed over the last decade.
Remember when Europeans started first flowing into
Afghanistan and into Iraq also, we had real interoperability
problems. It was not smooth. As the battlefield becomes more
complex, more technologically demanding interoperability is
more difficult to develop and more difficult to sustain. It
requires more engagement rather than less engagement. So that
is the question mark I bring to the table concerning these
reductions of U.S. military presence in Europe.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, Dr. Binnendij.
Dr. Binnendijk. I would hope that the message from Chicago
is that we face global challenges together, that this group of
nations, this group of democracies needs to work together to
meet those global challenges. That is what the message should
be.
And I think if you look at Libya and what happened there,
it does demonstrate that if an issue is in the interest of our
allies to engage in, they will do it. It did not require all
European allies to engage in that. Enough engaged. Ninety
percent of the ordnance dropped on Libya was European ordnance.
So that demonstrates that when there is an interest, there can
be a will. So I would not write off the Europeans as quickly as
some others might.
Now, they are in a near existential crisis today over the
future of the euro, and we see that with developments in
Greece. So that will complicate it.
Let me just say a final word about what Ian just raised
which is the sort of narrower issue of brigade combat teams and
the American presence there.
As Ian suggested that this was a very sound decision to
have these brigade combat teams--to have at least one U.S.-
based brigade combat team deploy battalions to Europe to do
joint training with the NATO Response Force. That ought to be a
model. It ought to be a model for what we do to maintain
military interoperability between the United States and our
allies post-ISAF.
And we need to find many other examples. And this actually
may be a place where the committee could play a constructive
role to try to urge the administration to find other places
because interoperability is very precious and it is very
fragile, and we need to be able to sustain that if we are going
to sustain the alliance over time post-ISAF.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much. I know we
promised to have folks out by about 12:30.
So let me just close with one question that is a little
more parochial for me. I am planning to attend the summit in
Chicago, and one of the programs that I am going to be
participating in is the Atlantic Council's Young Atlanticist
Program. Obviously, it is aimed at trying to engage more young
professional leaders and future decisionmakers in policy
questions and particularly in the importance of NATO. So do you
all have thoughts about what we can do to better engage
upcoming leaders on NATO and on what the next generation should
look like for NATO and for our future leaders? You professors
ought to have some really good ideas about this.
Mr. Brzezinski. We are thrilled to have you at the Atlantic
Council conference there, Senator Shaheen. The fact that you
are attending this event and some of the NATO events in Chicago
is important because you represent this institution and that
communicates a lot. It communicates a lot of commitment.
With that said, I would reinforce that message. They need
to hear that that America is interested in Europe's security
interests.
And second, I would encourage our European allies to think
globally and to recognize that they and their countries have a
lot at stake globally, and they have to start looking beyond
their immediate financial crises and thinking about how their
interests are affected by developments in Asia, Africa, Latin
America.
And then third, I would remind them, just as Charlie did
today, that by working with the United States, we are together
stronger and are going to be more influential and better able
to shape and drive events beyond the North Atlantic area in
Asia, in Africa, in the Middle East together than if we try to
do that separately.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Any other thoughts?
Dr. Kupchan. I would concur that it is not just important
but more and more important over time in the sense that I think
on both sides of the Atlantic we are going through generational
changes that are to some extent--``eroding'' would be too
strong a word, but diminishing the social foundations of the
partnership in the sense that--I guess you and I, Ian--we sort
of represent the last generation of people in this game who
entered professional life when the cold war was still alive.
Not so for younger generations. The students I teach at
Georgetown are growing up in a world in which Atlantic
Partnership, the cold war, the Berlin Wall are very remote.
That is why it is especially important to get younger Americans
and Europeans to engage in these issues, to be educated on
these issues.
And also for Europeans, I think the other thing I worry
about is their own commitment to the European project. One of
the issues that polling data is beginning to show is that they
do not have the same emotional attachment to Europe as the
older generation. What Angela Merkel has been doing with the
euro--moving reluctantly and cautiously--Helmet Kohl would have
never done because the European project was sacred ground for
him. And that is particularly why I think investing in the
emerging generation is so critical.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Binnendijk, you have the last word.
Dr. Binnendijk. Thank you.
First, I think it is great that you are going for that
purpose, and Fran Burwell has just done a great job with that
program. And it is a problem. I mean, I go to meetings on NATO,
and everybody looks like me and my generation. And we need to
fix that problem.
I have taken one small step. I have my daughter, Anika, now
engaged in NATO affairs. So that is a personal contribution.
Senator Shaheen. So if I bring my daughter, that would help
probably. Right?
Dr. Binnendijk. I think the message is that we are really
faced with global challenges, global problems that cannot be
solved by the United States or a small group of nations alone.
They have to be solved globally. For all of the faults that the
Europeans have, they still are our best partners in dealing
with those global challenges. And it is not just military
stuff. It is energy. It is climate. It is cyber. All of these
new challenges. And actually that is where the latest
generation is focusing. They understand those problems. And so
I would focus on those as well.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you all very much. This has
been very enlightening.
At this time, I will close the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon to Question
Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
Question. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, member states agreed
that Georgia would become a future NATO member. This decision has been
reaffirmed by NATO on numerous subsequent occasions. Georgia has been
making impressive progress in its democratic transformation which I
believe facilitates Georgia's NATO accession process. Georgia has also
made extraordinary contributions to the International Security
Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan.
The NATO summit in Chicago is an important moment to recognize
Georgia's progress and advance its prospects for membership in the
alliance. U.S. leadership is essential for this. Could you please
elaborate further on how the administration will use the summit to
ensure not only that Georgia's progress and its contributions to NATO
are recognized, but that it is also given a clear roadmap and
benchmarks for achieving full NATO membership?
Answer. The United States continues to support Georgia's
aspirations for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including
NATO. In order to be considered for NATO membership, Georgia must make
further progress on the range of reforms required to meet NATO's
standards for membership. Georgia's Annual National Program (ANP) and
the NATO--Georgia Commission (NGC) continue to guide Georgia's reform
efforts in this regard.
While the Chicago summit is not an enlargement summit, we have
worked hard with allies to secure a strong signal of support for
Georgia's candidacy. Specifically, Georgia has been invited to attend
an aspirants meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers along with
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. This meeting will
highlight NATO's open door policy and support for these countries Euro-
Atlantic aspirations. Georgia continues to be an important NATO partner
and significant contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan and will
be represented at the ISAF summit meeting. Additionally, at the summit
we are going to highlight those partners who have made significant
contributions to NATO operations and activities by holding a heads of
state meeting with 13 of these partners, including Georgia.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. To advance the bipartisan agenda of NATO enlargement,
Congress has passed several bills to authorize security assistance
geared toward NATO enlargement, the most recent of which is the NATO
Enhancement Act. Do you support passage of the NATO Enhancement Act,
which is pending before the committee?
Answer. Yes. We appreciate the bill's strong support for NATO,
which continues the long tradition of Senate advocacy. The bill's
support for NATO enlargement reflects the administration's policy that
Euro-Atlantic integration is critical to achieving a Europe whole,
free, and at peace. We particularly appreciate the continuation of
programs to assist NATO aspirants to meet the standards for NATO
membership, which are helpful to our efforts to hasten their entry.
Question. What effect has the recent ICJ decision concerning the
Macedonia-Greece name dispute issue had on moving the parties closer to
a compromise? Has this decision had any impact on U.S. policy toward
the issue?
Answer. The United States looks to the leaders of both countries to
use the ICJ judgment as an opportunity to renew their efforts toward
finding a solution that benefits both Greece and Macedonia. The U.S.
position on the name dispute is longstanding. We strongly support the
ongoing U.N. effort, led by Matthew Nimetz, to resolve this issue and
will support any mutually acceptable solution. We regularly engage both
countries at a high level on this issue and continue to urge Athens and
Skopje to reach agreement on the name issue as soon as possible.
Question. Please list all European military assets that have been
expressly assigned to the NATO missile defense mission in terms of
radars, sensors, and air/missile defense interceptors.
Answer. While Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to
host U.S. missile defense assets in support of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, NATO allies are just
beginning to capitalize upon the alliance's decision to develop a NATO
missile defense capability. The alliance has, and continues to develop,
a command and control system paid for with NATO common funding. Allies
have committed over $1 billion in common funding toward the NATO
missile defense command and control architecture.
At the Chicago NATO summit, heads of state and government noted the
potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defense, and
encouraged allies to explore possible additional voluntary
contributions, including though multinational cooperation, to provide
relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in
planning, development, procurement, and deployment.
Allies are stepping up as contributors to the NATO missile defense
effort. For example, the Netherlands has agreed to contribute their
deployable Patriot air and missile defense systems as needed. In
September, the Netherlands announced that it would upgrade the SMART-L
radars aboard its air defense frigates so as to be able to contribute
sensor missile defense data to NATO. France is further developing the
SAMP/T system, which has capabilities similar to those of the Patriot
and is continuing to explore the development of a space-based early
warning radar system.
Discussions between allies and the NATO organization, as well as
bilateral discussions between the United States and our NATO allies, on
their possible future contributions to European missile defense are
ongoing.
Question. What steps has the Department taken to ensure greater
European contributions to the missile defense mission?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense work closely together
to engage European allies continuously both bilaterally and at NATO on
NATO missile defense. Through bilateral and NATO working groups, as
well as senior level policy and defense discussions, the United States
strongly advocates for additional European contributions to NATO
missile defense. We believe the alliance has a number of opportunities
for national and multinational contributions to bring additional
capability to NATO's missile defense mission. For example, a number of
allies possess maritime assets that could be upgraded for missile
defense capabilities. In September 2011, the Netherlands announced
plans for the upgrade of the SMART-L radars on its four air defense
frigates in order to contribute to NATO missile defense at a cost of
approximately 250 million euro. The Departments of State and Defense
will continue to engage allies to deepen our bilateral and collective
missile defense cooperation.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary James Townsend to Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. To advance the bipartisan agenda of NATO enlargement,
Congress has passed several bills to authorize security assistance
geared toward NATO enlargement, the most recent of which is the NATO
Enhancement Act. Do you support passage of the NATO Enhancement Act,
which is pending before the committee?
Answer. Yes. We appreciate the bill's strong support for NATO. The
bill's support for NATO enlargement reflects recognition that Euro-
Atlantic integration is critical to achieving a Europe that is whole,
free, and at peace. We particularly appreciate the continuation of
programs to assist NATO aspirants to meet the standards for NATO
membership, which are helpful to our efforts to support their entry.
Question. What effect has the recent ICJ decision concerning the
Macedonia-Greece name dispute issue had on moving the parties closer to
a compromise? Has this decision had any impact on U.S. policy toward
the issue?
Answer. The United States looks to the leaders of both countries to
use the ICJ judgment as an opportunity to renew their efforts toward
finding a solution acceptable to both Greece and Macedonia. The United
States continues to support the ongoing U.N. effort, led by Matthew
Nimetz, to resolve this issue and will support any mutually acceptable
solution. We regularly engage both countries at a high level on this
issue and continue to urge Athens and Skopje to reach agreement as soon
as possible.
Question. Please list all European military assets that have been
expressly assigned to the NATO missile defense mission in terms of
radars, sensors, and air/missile defense interceptors.
Answer. While Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to
host U.S. missile defense assets in support of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, NATO allies are just
beginning to capitalize upon the alliance's decision to develop a NATO
missile defense capability. The alliance is developing a command-and-
control system paid for with NATO common funding.
At the Chicago NATO summit, heads of state and government will note
the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defense, and
encourage allies to explore possible additional voluntary
contributions, including though multinational cooperation, to provide
relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in
planning, development, procurement, and deployment.
Allies are stepping up as contributors to the NATO missile defense
effort. In September 2011, the Netherlands announced that it would
upgrade the SMART-L radars aboard its air defense frigates so as to be
able to contribute sensor missile defense data to NATO. France is
further developing the Surface-to-Air Missile Platform/Terrain (SAMP/T)
system, which has capabilities similar to those of the Patriot, and is
continuing to explore the development of a space-based early warning
radar system. The Netherlands and Germany could contribute their
deployable Patriot air and missile defense systems as needed.
Discussions between allies and the NATO organization, as well as
bilateral discussions between the United States and our NATO allies, on
their possible future contributions to European missile defense are
ongoing.
Question. What steps has the Department taken to ensure greater
European contributions to the missile defense mission?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense work closely together
to engage European allies both bilaterally and at NATO on NATO missile
defense. Through bilateral and NATO working groups, as well as senior-
level policy and defense discussions, the United States strongly
advocates for additional European contributions to NATO missile
defense. We believe the alliance has a number of opportunities for
national and multinational contributions to bring additional capability
to NATO's missile defense mission. For example, a number of allies
possess maritime assets that could be upgraded for missile defense
capabilities. In September 2011, the Netherlands announced plans for
the upgrade of its air defense frigates in order to contribute to NATO
missile defense. The Departments of State and Defense will continue to
engage allies to deepen our bilateral and collective missile defense
cooperation.
Question. Please describe all steps that are being taken to
reassure allies as two Brigade Combat Teams are being withdrawn from
Europe.
Answer. European allies remain vitally important to the United
States, and the new strategic guidance calls Europe ``our principal
partner in seeking global and economic security.'' We consulted with
allies in advance of the decision on the brigade combat teams (BCT),
and we continue to reassure them that we have strong, enduring
interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe and in
bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO.
Although our posture in Europe will evolve with the strategic
landscape, we will maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied
security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for
coalition operations. We will maintain a substantial presence in
Europe--with capable military forces focused on combined training,
exercises, and military cooperation--and provide new capabilities,
including missile defense, that address the evolving threats to Europe
and the United States. The U.S. European Command assesses that the two
remaining BCTs represent an adequate ground combat maneuver force for
assigned missions, including partner capacity-building activities.
Additionally, there are meaningful improvements in U.S. air and naval
posture that will enable security cooperation activities consistent
with the new strategic guidance.
To reassure allies further, we will allocate a U.S.-based BCT to
the NATO Response Force and rotate elements of this U.S.-based BCT to
Europe in order to bolster the training and exercising we conduct with
allies to ensure strong links and interoperability. We will continue to
implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense. We
deployed a radar in Turkey and an Aegis ship in the eastern
Mediterranean, and we plan to station land-based SM-3 missiles in
Romania and Poland and forward deploy four Aegis multimission ships to
Spain. We will continue to support a framework for the NATO Special
Operations Forces (SOF) Headquarters. We will establish an aviation
detachment in Poland later this year and plan to rotate aircraft to it
on a quarterly basis beginning in 2013. We also plan to enhance
readiness training at combat training centers in Germany.
Question. What is the schedule for sending U.S. forces to Europe to
train with their European counterparts? Which forces will be part of
these missions?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, in
coordination with the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Army,
continues to plan for a fiscal year 2014 implementation of a
reinvigorated contribution to the NATO Response Force (NRF). As part of
committing an Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the NRF on an annual
basis, the vision is that that BCT will rotate elements (up to a
battalion task force and BCT Headquarters) up to twice a year to Europe
to conduct interoperability-focused training. The Department will make
a final decision on how to implement this concept later this year.
Question. What concrete commitments will be made by allies under
the Smart Defense Initiative?
Answer. ``Smart Defense,'' a term initially introduced by Secretary
General Rasmussen in March 2011, describes a framework that assists
nations to build greater security through multinational collaboration,
coordination, coherence, and efficiency. At the Chicago summit, heads
of state are expected to agree to a Defense Package that will help NATO
develop and deliver the capabilities that our missions and operations
require, a package that paves the way ahead whereby NATO, in 2020, will
continue to have the capabilities necessary to address the threats and
the challenges that may be anticipated. The following are highlights of
the Defense Package:
Missile Defense: Leaders will declare they have an interim NATO
ballistic missile defense capability. NATO will now have an
operationally meaningful ballistic missile defense mission.
--The United States has agreements with four countries--Spain,
Turkey, Romania, Poland--to host U.S. missile defense assets.
--Allies themselves have committed to invest more than $1 billion in
command and control and communications infrastructure needed to
support the ballistic missile defense system.
--U.S. missile defense ships are already in the Mediterranean, and
they are able to operate under NATO command.
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS): At Chicago, it is anticipated
that NATO will sign a contract to acquire the AGS system (five Global
Hawk drones and associated command and control ground stations).
--Thirteen allies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and the United States) are undertaking to acquire the
system, and all allies will contribute to the operational
costs.
--Two additional allies have pledged a desire to become additional
acquisition partners.
Baltic Air Policing: At Chicago, it is anticipated that allies will
agree to extend the Baltic air policing mission.
--Various allies take turns in patrolling air space, thus allowing
the Baltic allies to focus their investment efforts in other
critical areas, such as deployable forces for Afghanistan.
Smart Defense Multinational Projects: There are approximately 20
smaller scale initiatives (categories including improvements in
sustainment, force protection, intelligence, and engagement) underway
to acquire NATO capabilities efficiently. This list is continually
evolving.
--Each project is led by a specific ally and supported by one or more
additional allies.
--Lead nations for individual nations include Germany, the United
States, Canada, France, Italy, the U.K., Denmark, Portugal, the
Czech Republic, Turkey, and the Netherlands.
--Nearly every other NATO member is supporting one or more
multinational projects.
Question. What is the schedule for the F-16 detachment in Poland
and how many aircraft will be involved?
Answer. The 10 full-time personnel for the Aviation Detachment at
Poland's Lask Airbase are scheduled to begin arriving in October 2012,
with an official ceremony scheduled for the following month. Aircraft
rotations are planned to begin in the first quarter of calendar year
(CY) 2013 and to occur quarterly thereafter, lasting approximately 2
weeks at a time. Aircraft type and numbers for each rotation will vary,
but they are projected to be composed of at least four F-16 or two C-
130 aircraft (both of which Poland possesses) to enhance U.S. Air Force
and Polish Air Force cooperation most effectively. A unit has not yet
been identified for the initial C-130 unit rotation in the first
quarter of CY13, so specific dates and aircraft numbers are not yet
firm; F-16 unit rotations are anticipated for the second and third
quarters of CY13.
______
Response of Deputy Assistant Secretary James Townsend to Question
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. In the state of New Mexico, the German Air Force flies
aircraft out of Holloman Air Force Base. They are extremely
professional, and a very welcome part of the Holloman community and
nearby Alamogordo. This joint training is crucial for strengthening the
alliance, but also for improving the interoperability of U.S. and NATO
forces. Working together, before there is conflict, is a crucial part
of preparation for NATO. What can we do to expand NATO training in the
United States, are there countries interested in expanding joint
training, and what is preventing this from occurring?
Answer. Joint, multinational training is indeed critical to
sustaining and improving interoperability, and something NATO takes
very seriously. Each year, the alliance develops and publishes the NATO
Military Training and Exercise Program, which covers a 5-year period
and focuses on preparing multinational headquarters and forces for
operations. The program addresses training and certification exercises
for land, maritime, and air units, as well as for joint and
multinational headquarters.
The United States also participates in bilateral training with many
newer NATO allies through the National Guard Bureau-administered State
Partnership Program. National Guard personnel often travel overseas to
train with their Partners, and on several occasions, Partners have
traveled to the United States for small unit training.
The United States also participates in several officer exchange
programs where allied officers attend U.S. professional military
education courses, are embedded in U.S. staffs, and in some cases
deploy to operations with U.S. units. During the April 2012 NATO
Defense Ministerial, Secretary Panetta invited ministers from the other
27 allies to explore opportunities to send their forces to the United
States for training. To date, none have accepted the offer. We believe
this is due primarily to the costs associated with deploying forces and
equipment to the United States and the desire of most allies to train
on their home soil.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary James Townsend to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. Ensuring the capabilities, independence and
professionalism of the ANSF over the next few years will be critical to
the stability of Afghanistan in the future. However, the lack of
southern Pashtun officers and enlisted personnel in the ANSF
jeopardizes the cohesion needed to ably represent the ethnic makeup of
the country and address ongoing security challenges in the south. In
addition, there is currently a shortfall of 440 training positions that
has an adverse impact on NATO's ability to adequately train Afghans in
a timely manner. ``What is NATO doing to improve the ethnic makeup of
the ANSF, specifically by increasing the proportion of ANSF officers
and enlisted personnel that are southern Pashtuns?'' What is NATO doing
to address the shortfall of ANSF trainers and encourage its members to
fill the open positions?
Answer. At the upcoming Chicago summit, NATO is expected to
reaffirm its commitment to support the Government of Afghanistan in its
responsibility to develop Afghan forces that are capable of assuming
full lead for security in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and of
maintaining security after transition is complete. Afghan forces that
are inclusive and representative of all Afghan people will be better
able to meet those requirements; however, allies and non-NATO partner
nations recognize that ANSF recruiting is an Afghan responsibility. The
Afghan National Army Recruiting Command and Afghan National Police
Recruiting agencies continue to focus on recruiting officer and
enlisted candidates from the southern Pashtun regions of Afghanistan.
Southern Pashtuns average approximately 12 percent of Afghans
recruited.
Regarding your question on trainers, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe actively manages NATO and ISAF partner nation force
contributions in relation to the Commander ISAF-validated Combined
Joint Statement of Requirements. This force generation process
maximizes the utility of allied and partner nation troop contributions
throughout the ongoing transition from combat to support of the ANSF.
The most recent joint manning conference, held in May 2012, helped
address ISAF's shifting requirements from institutional trainers to
security force assistance teams as the ANSF's internal training
capacity continues to expand and Afghan training institutions continue
to transition to ANSF lead.
Question. NATO's support for Afghan women has been key to raising
the profile of women's rights and emphasizing the important role that
women can play in conflict resolution and peace building. Although
there has been progress on these issues, many continue to be concerned
that the ongoing political reconciliation process with the Taliban
could result in backsliding on key protections for women. ``What
specific steps does NATO plan to take to ensure that women's rights are
protected during the security transition, including in areas where the
ANSF has assumed primary responsibility for security, and after 2014?''
How can NATO ensure that the ANSF are prepared to respond to incidents
of violence against women and other rights violations? What is being
done to increase the number of women recruited for the ANSF?
Answer. At the upcoming Chicago cummit, NATO is expected to
reaffirm its commitment to support the Government of Afghanistan in its
responsibility to develop Afghan forces that are capable of assuming
full lead for security by the end of 2014 and of maintaining security
in Afghanistan after transition is complete. NATO and the Government of
Afghanistan also recognize that a political process involving
successful reconciliation with the Taliban is integral to peace and
stability. This process must be Afghan-led to succeed, and NATO stands
ready to support that process as long as the Government of Afghanistan
remains resolved to deliver on its commitment to a democratic society
where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens are
respected--including the equality of men and women and the active
participation of both in Afghan civil society.
It is the case, however, that recruiting women into the ANSF
continues to be a challenge. NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan is
working at the ministerial level to increase the opportunities
available for women within the ANSF and to improve acceptance of women
across the force.