[Senate Hearing 112-599]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-599
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FY 2013
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
86-686 PDF WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, DC....................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions for the record submitted by the
following Senators:
John F. Kerry............................................ 44
Richard G. Lugar......................................... 74
Barbara Boxer............................................ 122
Robert Menendez.......................................... 124
Benjamin L. Cardin....................................... 129
Jeanne Shaheen........................................... 133
James E. Risch........................................... 136
James M. Inhofe.......................................... 140
Johnny Isakson........................................... 140
Christopher A. Coons..................................... 141
Tom Udall................................................ 147
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
(iii)
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FY 2013
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb,
Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Rubio, DeMint,
Isakson, Barrasso, and Lee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Madam Secretary, welcome back to the committee. As always,
and I think you know this, it is a great pleasure for us to
welcome you here and to have you here. And it is enormously
helpful for us, obviously, to hear your thoughts--especially at
a time when we are facing so many different challenges and, at
the same time, presented with so many opportunities.
The demand for U.S. leadership has never been higher,
whether because of the issues raised by the Arab Spring, by
nuclear proliferation, by climate change, and particularly by
the challenge of Iran and the Middle East. Budget realities,
however, have placed a premium on projecting U.S. power not
only effectively, but efficiently.
I think that more than at recent moments, we need a smart,
coordinated, and strong budget in order to safeguard the
American people and particularly to fund the administration's
pursuit of opportunities and to face the challenges that we are
all too well aware of.
Obviously, for anybody running for office--and I know you
know this, Madam Secretary--cutting foreign aid and talking
about a sort of comparison between some particular community at
home, where you are standing, and our commitment abroad is a
pretty easy applause line on the stump. And needless to say, it
is good foreign policy to correct an unsustainable fiscal
course. So we need to do what we need to do in order to put our
house in order.
But at the same time, it seems to me that our expenditures
on diplomacy are really minuscule compared to the return on
investment. Our international affairs budget is, in my
judgment, a smart investment that ultimately yields outsized
returns and saves us money over the long haul.
There is nothing conservative about starving our foreign
policy budget of a few billion dollars today in order to spend
a trillion dollars later on when an otherwise avoidable crisis
strikes or an armed conflict looms. This year's budget request
reflects very difficult decisions and some obvious tradeoffs. I
commend the administration for identifying programs where we
can save money, for deepening reforms at State and USAID, and
for leveraging U.S. funds in multilateral forums.
We also all know how crucial our military is to our
national defense, and I think everybody on the committee and in
the administration shares the belief that we would never
hesitate to use force when necessary. But clearly, smart and
able diplomacy and development policy can neutralize threats
before they become crises and can manage crises if threats
escalate and assure security and stability after conflicts are
resolved. And all of this can be done at a fraction of the cost
of military deployment.
Diplomats and development experts support counterterrorism
efforts at this moment in countries like Yemen, Somalia,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and support programs to destroy small
arms and shoulder-fired missiles which deprive our enemies of
the tools to attack us. Teaching foreign military officers
American values and skills creates capacity so that we can
fight together and share burdens.
Training foreign law enforcement and counterterrorist
officials in American investigative techniques increases their
capacity, their capability, and our security. And implementing
stricter export controls, training international weapons
inspectors, and securing our borders allows us to guard against
the most pernicious of threats, the threat of weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism.
So the stakes are enormous in the coming years. We will
have great opportunities to build and redefine our
relationships around the world, particularly in the Middle
East. The region is moving in many different directions, but
one thing is clear. It is transforming before our eyes.
As you know, Madam Secretary, I recently traveled in the
Middle East, spent a number of days in the region, and came
away more convinced than ever of both the opportunities that
exist to help the people of the Middle East seek their
legitimate political and economic aspirations, but also with a
renewed sense of the fragility of this moment and the urgency
of our engagement in that region.
So I truly fully share your perspective in the goals of the
Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund, which will make
sure that we have the tools and the flexibility needed to act
proactively and take advantage of opportunities when they
arise.
I look forward to continuing that conversation with you to
make sure that you have those tools and also to try to
ascertain the best way forward with respect to the North Africa
Incentive Fund and the Middle East to support lasting change
and the continued hopes that we all share for a renewed effort
in the Middle East peace process.
We all know the difference that the United States can make.
Our efforts vaccinate children, combat climate change, engage
at-risk youth, and promote core U.S. national security
interests. Our global presence also does something else: It
creates jobs.
Through OPIC loans and multilateral forums, we both lift
the economies of low-income countries and simultaneously--and
this is important for Americans to understand in terms of our
own interests--we open markets for American businesses and
recognize the connections between promoting our business and
creating jobs elsewhere.
Energetic global leadership is a strategic imperative for
America, not a favor that we do for other countries. It is who
we are. It is in the American DNA. From the Marshall Plan to
our response to the earthquakes in Haiti and the floods in
Pakistan, it strengthens our security, and it makes us stronger
at home and in the world.
And as we carefully watch our expenditures, we also need to
scrutinize the cuts that have been proposed. So we look forward
to your comments this afternoon, Madam Secretary, and to
talking throughout the year about the State Department's
priorities.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
Secretary Clinton to the Foreign Relations Committee once
again. We look forward to discussing the administration's
foreign policy priorities and budget request for fiscal year
2013.
Since your visit last year, the American economy remains
under great stress. The unemployment rate stands well above the
historical standards at 8.3 percent nationally and 9 percent in
my home State of Indiana.
At the close of 2011, nearly 14 million Americans were
still looking for work and millions more were underemployed.
The United States national debt has risen above $15 trillion,
posing extreme economic risk for our country. American families
continue to bear the brunt of these economic uncertainties.
Within this context, the administration's request for
resources must be prioritized to meet the requirements of
budget austerity, while addressing the vital national security
objectives the chairman has so well outlined.
This past year has also brought further uncertainty
overseas. People in North Africa and the Middle East are
marking the anniversaries of their protests, their protests for
democracy and accountability from their leaders. For some,
these anniversaries have been celebrations of a break with a
troubled past. For others, they are a reminder that progress
remains very elusive.
In Syria, the world continues to bear witness to the
violent repression by the Assad regime against the Syrian
people. This tragedy unfolds daily, bringing with it an
increasing death toll.
After the regrettable veto in the Security Council by
Russia and China earlier this month, the U.N. General Assembly
voted overwhelmingly, as did the United States Senate, to
condemn the Syrian regime's brutal use of force against
civilians. During this upheaval, our Government must pay
special attention to Syria's weapons of mass destruction.
Now, in Egypt, the difficult transition to a democratic,
civilian government has been marked by changing timelines,
protests, and sectarian violence. Given this tentative
transition, when resources should be spent on building
institutions, it is disheartening that the Egyptian authorities
would choose to harass the work of the civil society
organizations focused on elections and government transparency.
I look forward to Secretary Clinton's update on efforts to
secure the release of those facing trial for their work on
behalf of democracy.
Amidst these changes in the region, we face the ongoing
threats to peace and the global economy posed by Iran as Iran's
Government continues to flout the will of the international
community for a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons program.
The most recent inspections by the IAEA failed, with Iran
refusing to address the IAEA's questions on or to grant
inspectors access to the sites.
The Iranian nuclear program is a grave threat to our close
ally Israel and to our own security interests. A growing
understanding that this crisis may lead to military conflict
has helped push oil prices well above $100 per barrel. An
increasing number of Americans are paying $4 or more per gallon
of gasoline, and most analysts believe prices will go higher.
Now, for years, I have talked about the risk to United
States national security of our dependence on foreign oil. I
appreciate Secretary Clinton's recent reorganization in the
Department in this regard, which elevates the prominence of
energy security within the State Department, and I compliment
you on this remarkable endeavor.
But given the intensity of multiple crises in the Middle
East and the certainty that threats to our oil supplies are not
limited to the current crisis with Iran, it is
incomprehensible, at least to me, that the President has
rejected approval of the Keystone XL pipeline.
Few national security decisions of the past several decades
are more clearly at odds with core United States interests than
the President's pipeline delay. The prospect that Iran could
obstruct oil flowing from the Strait of Hormuz for even a
relatively short period underscores the importance of having
safe and secure fuel supplies for the United States.
The Iranian threat is intensified by its growing alliance
with the Chavez regime in Venezuela, which could choose to
support Tehran with its own oil supply disruption during a
conflict. Our Government should explicitly warn Venezuela the
United States would regard such a disruption as a threat to
United States national security interests.
Today's high oil prices are difficult for American families
and American businesses, yet without action, the worst is
likely to be months or years down the road. Even if the Iranian
nuclear program is halted without resort to warfare, Middle
East oil supplies will remain at risk from political
manipulation, conflict, and terrorism.
A serious, sustained oil supply disruption could cripple
our economy. Over time, we know rising oil demand from China,
India, and other emerging economies will reduce spare capacity
and stress global oil supplies. The Keystone XL pipeline is one
of the best means at our disposal to help overcome future
difficulties now.
Moreover, the decision to delay sends a signal to markets
and our overseas enemies that we are not serious about ending
United States energy dependence. Pricing today incorporates
expectations of future supply.
We must not leave any doubt that this country will break
its oil dependence on unstable and unfriendly regimes. That
requires the United States Government to support domestic
drilling; it requires stronger supply relationships with
reliable allies like Canada; it requires more alternative
fuels; and it certainly requires innovation to do more with
less fuel.
While bolstering energy security, the Keystone XL pipeline
would create up to 20,000 new jobs for Americans, produced at
virtually no cost to American taxpayers. The administration, in
my judgment, should reverse course, and I would encourage
Secretary Clinton to recommend to the President that it is in
our national security interests to immediately approve the
Keystone XL pipeline.
Now, in closing, I would like to express my appreciation
for the dedicated men and women serving in roles within the
State Department and USAID. In an era of declining resources,
we are asking them to deal with very difficult and wide-ranging
challenges, often at even greater risk.
We are asking them to reduce threats from weapons of mass
destruction, help mitigate epidemics and food insecurity, watch
over United States business interests and travelers, promote
democracy, and assist in combating terrorism. We are asking
them to achieve these United States foreign policy goals and
innumerable others in a global environment that is increasingly
dangerous for diplomatic personnel.
We are very grateful for their willingness to serve their
country. We are grateful for your willingness to serve our
country. And we greet you again and look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Madam Secretary, the floor is yours, and we welcome your
comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much.
And I greatly appreciate, Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member
Lugar, members of the committee, to be here once again to have
this opportunity. And I want to thank you for the support that
this committee has given to the State Department and USAID over
the last 3 quite consequential and unpredictable years. And I
especially am grateful for the very kind words about our
diplomats and development experts who are serving around the
world, some in very difficult circumstances.
You have seen the world transforming right before your
eyes, from Arab revolutions, to the rise of new economic
powers, to a more dispersed but still dangerous al-Qaeda and
terrorist network. And in this time, only the United States of
America has the reach, resources, and relationships to anchor a
more peaceful and prosperous world.
The State Department and USAID budget we discuss today is a
proven investment in our national and economic security, but it
is also something more. It is a downpayment on America's
leadership.
When I took this job, I saw a world that needed America,
but also one that questioned our focus and our staying power.
So we have worked together to put American leadership on a firm
foundation for the decades ahead.
We have ended one war and are winding down another. We have
cemented our place as a Pacific power. We have also maintained
our alliance across the Atlantic. We have elevated the role of
economics within our diplomacy, and we have reached beyond
governments to engage directly with people, with a special
focus on women and girls.
We are updating diplomacy and development for the 21st
century and finding ways to work smarter and more efficiently.
And after the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review, we created two new bureaus, taking the work we were
already doing on counterterrorism and combining it with other
assets within the State Department to create a much more
focused effort on counterterrorism and on energy.
And I really commend Senator Lugar because it was his idea.
It was his talking with me when I was visiting with him prior
to my confirmation that made me determined that we would
actually accomplish this. And we have reorganized our assets
into a bureau focused on fragile states.
Now, like many Americans in these tough economic times, we
have certainly made difficult tradeoffs and painful cuts. We
have requested 18 percent less for Europe, Eurasia, and Central
Asia, preserving our most essential programs and using the
savings for more urgent needs elsewhere. We are scaling back
construction of our embassies and consulates, improving
procurement to save money, and taking steps across the board to
lower costs.
Our request of $51.6 billion represents an increase of less
than the rate of inflation and just over 1 percent of the
Federal budget, and this is coming at the very same time that
our responsibilities are multiplying around the world. Today, I
want briefly to highlight our five priorities.
First, our request allows us to sustain our vital national
security missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and
reflects the temporary extraordinary costs of operating on the
front lines. As President Obama has said, the tide of war is
receding. But as troops come home, thankfully, civilians remain
to carry out the critical missions of diplomacy and
development.
In Iraq, civilians are now in the lead, helping that
country emerge as a stable, sovereign democratic power. This
increases our civilian budget, but State and USAID are asking
for only one-tenth of the $48 billion the U.S. Government spent
on Iraq as recently as 2011.
The 2013 U.S. Governmentwide request for Iraq, including
defense spending, is now $40 billion less than it was just 2
years ago. So we are doing what must be done to try to
normalize our relationship at a far lower cost than what we
have been expending.
Over time, despite the tragic violence of this past week,
we expect to see similar governmentwide savings in Afghanistan.
This year's request will support the ongoing transition,
helping Afghans take responsibility for their own security and
their own future and ensuring that this country is never again
a safe haven for terrorists. We remain committed to working on
issues of joint interest with Pakistan, including
counterterrorism, economic stability, and regional cooperation.
Second, in the Asia-Pacific, the administration is making
an unprecedented effort to build a strong network of
relationships and institutions because we believe in the
century ahead, no region will be more consequential to our
economic and security future. As we tighten our belts around
the world, we are investing the diplomatic attention necessary
to do more with less.
In Asia, we are pursuing what I call forward deployed
diplomacy, strengthening our alliances, launching new strategic
dialogues, and economic initiatives; creating and joining
important multilateral institutions; even pursuing a possible
opening with Burma; all of which underscores America will
remain a Pacific power.
Third, we are focused on the wave of change sweeping the
Arab world. As the region transforms, so must our engagement.
Alongside our bilateral and security support, we are proposing
a $770 million Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund.
This fund will support credible proposals validated by
rigorous analysis and by Congress from countries that make a
meaningful commitment to democratic change, effective
institutions, and broad-based economic growth. In an
unpredictable time, it lets us respond to unanticipated needs
in a way that reflects both our agility and our leadership in
the region.
This budget request would also allow us to help the Syrian
people survive a brutal assault and plan for a future without
Assad. It continues our assistance for civil society and Arab
partners in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and elsewhere. It
provides a record level of support for our ally Israel, and it
makes possible our diplomacy at the U.N. and around the world,
which has now put in place with your help the toughest
sanctions that I think any country has ever faced against Iran.
The fourth priority is what I call economic statecraft, in
particular how we use diplomacy and development to create
American jobs. We have more than 1,000 State Department
economic officers working to help American businesses connect
to new markets and consumers. We are pushing back every day
against corruption, redtape, favoritism, distorted currencies,
and intellectual property theft.
Our investment in development also helps us create the
trading partners of the future. We have worked closely on three
trade agreements that we believe will create tens of thousands
of jobs in America, and we hope to work with Congress to ensure
that as Russia enters the WTO, foreign competitors do not have
an advantage over American businesses.
And finally, we are elevating development alongside
diplomacy and defense. Poverty, disease, hunger, climate change
can destabilize societies and sow the seeds for future
conflicts. We think we need to make strategic investments today
in order that we can meet our traditional foreign policy goals
in the future.
Through the Global Health Initiative, through our Feed the
Future Initiative, we are consolidating programs, increasing
our partners' capacity, shifting responsibilities to host
countries, and making an impact in areas of health and hunger
that will be a real credit to our country going forward.
And as we transform development, we really have to deliver
measurable results. Our long-term objective must be to empower
people to create and seize their own futures.
These five priorities are each crucial to American
leadership, and they rely on the work of some of the most
capable, hardest working, and bravest people I have ever met--
the men and women of State and USAID. Working with them is one
of the greatest honors I have had in public life.
With so much on the line, from the Arab world to the Asia-
Pacific, we simply cannot pull back. Investments in American
leadership did not cause our fiscal challenges, and retreating
from the world will not solve them.
Let me end on a personal note. American leadership means a
great deal to me personally. It is my job everywhere I go. And
after 3 years, 95 countries, and over 700,000 miles, I know
very well what it means to land in a plane that says the
``United States of America'' on the side.
People look to us to protect our allies, stand by our
principles, serve as an honest broker in making peace, to fight
hunger, poverty, and disease, to stand up to bullies and
tyrants everywhere.
American leadership is not just respected. It is required.
And it takes more than just resolve. It takes resources.
This country is an unparalleled force for good in the
world, and we all want to make sure it stays that way. So I
would urge you to work with us to make this investment in
strong American leadership and the more peaceful and prosperous
future that I believe will result.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, it
is good to be with you again. I am grateful for your support for
civilian power these past 3 years and eager to hear your thoughts on
the work ahead.
We are living through a time of volatility and possibility. The
Arab world is transforming. The rise of new powers is redrawing the
strategic map, creating new partners, new challenges and growing
economic competition. Al-Qaeda is weakened, but still dangerous. In
this time, only America has the reach, resources, and relationships to
anchor a more peaceful and prosperous world.
The State Department and USAID budget we discuss today is a proven
investment in our national and economic security, but also something
more: it is a downpayment on American leadership in a fast-changing
world.
When I became Secretary of State, I saw a world that needed
America, but also one that questioned our focus and staying power. Ever
since, we have worked together to put American leadership on a firm
foundation for the decades ahead. We have ended one war and are winding
down another. We have cemented our place as a Pacific power, while
maintaining the most powerful alliance in history across the Atlantic.
We have elevated the role of economics within our diplomacy to create
American jobs and advance our strategic interests. We have reached
beyond governments to engage directly with people--with a special focus
on women and girls.
We are updating our diplomacy and development for the 21st century,
making use of new technologies, partnering with the private sector and
finding ways to work smarter and more efficiently. After the first-ever
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we created two new
bureaus focused on counterterrorism and energy and reorganized a third
to prevent fragile states from becoming failed states.
Like many Americans in tough economic times, we have made difficult
tradeoffs and painful cuts. We have requested 18 percent less for
Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia, preserving our most essential
programs and using the savings for more urgent needs elsewhere. We are
scaling back construction, improving procurement, and taking countless
steps to lower costs.
Even as our challenges and responsibilities multiply around the
world, our request represents an increase of less than the rate of
inflation. State and USAID request $51.6 billion, just over 1 percent
of the Federal budget.
Today, I want to highlight five priorities--all made possible by
the investments in this budget.
First, our request allows us to sustain our vital national security
missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. As President Obama says,
``the tide of war is receding.'' But as troops come home, civilians
remain to carry out the critical missions of diplomacy and development.
Our request reflects the temporary, extraordinary costs of operating on
the front lines.
In Iraq, civilians are now in the lead, working to help that
country come through this current period of challenge and uncertainty
to emerge as a stable, sovereign, democratic partner. This increases
our civilian budget, but State and USAID are asking for only one-tenth
of the $48 billion the U.S. Government spent on Iraq as recently as
2011. The 2013 U.S. Governmentwide request for Iraq, including defense
spending, is now $40 billion less than it was just 2 years ago. So this
approach is saving taxpayers a great deal of money.
Over time, despite the past week's violence, we expect to see
similar governmentwide savings in Afghanistan, where civilians have
already taken on increased duties. This year's request will support the
ongoing transition, helping Afghans take responsibility for their own
future and ensure their country is never again a safe-haven for
terrorists to threaten America. In Pakistan, we have a challenging but
critical relationship. We remain committed to working on issues of
joint interest, including counterterrorism, economic stability, and
regional cooperation.
For the past decade, we have been focused--by necessity--on the
places where we face the greatest threats. In the decade ahead, we need
to be just as focused on the areas of greatest opportunity. Which
brings me to another critical priority: the Asia-Pacific region, from
the Indian subcontinent to the shores of the Americas. The Obama
administration is making an unprecedented effort to build a strong
network of relationships and institutions across the Pacific. In the
century ahead, no region will be more consequential.
As we tighten our belts around the world, we are investing the
diplomatic attention necessary to do more with less. In Asia, we are
pursuing what we call forward-deployed diplomacy--from strengthening
our alliances, to launching new strategic dialogues and economic
initiatives, to creating and joining important multilateral
institutions, to our new opening with Burma--to underscore that America
will remain a Pacific power.
Third, we are focused on the wave of change sweeping the Arab
world. We have a significant stake in successful democratic
transitions. And as the region transforms, so must our engagement.
Alongside our bilateral and security support, we are proposing a
$770 million Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund to encourage
major political and economic reforms. This fund will support credible
proposals--validated by rigorous analysis and key stakeholders,
including Congress--to promote democratic change, effective
institutions, and broad-based economic growth. When countries commit to
making genuine reform, the fund will provide meaningful assistance,
which ultimately puts our partnerships on firmer footing. And, in an
unpredictable time, it lets us respond to unanticipated needs in a way
that reflects our leadership role in the region.
Of course, not all countries in the region are embracing the mantle
of reform and responsibility. This budget request would allow us to
keep our commitment to help the Syrian people survive a brutal assault,
reclaim their country and plan for a future without Assad.
Our request also supports those working for change at the
grassroots. It continues our assistance for Arab partners in Jordan,
Morocco, and elsewhere. It provides a record level of support for our
ally, Israel. And it makes possible our diplomacy at the U.N. and
around the world, which has now put in place--with your help--by far
the toughest sanctions Iran has ever faced.
The fourth priority is what I call economic statecraft--how we act
at the crossroads of economics and diplomacy. At every turn, we are
asking: how can we use diplomacy and development to strengthen our
economy? We have more than 1,000 State Department economic officers
working every day to help American businesses connect to new markets
and consumers to create opportunities here at home. We are pushing back
against corruption, redtape, favoritism, distorted currencies and
intellectual property theft. USAID invests in the poorest, most
unstable regions because it is the right thing to do, but also because
it helps create the trading partners of the future. Under the
leadership of U.S. Trade Representative Kirk, we have worked closely
together on three trade agreements that will create tens of thousands
of American jobs. And we hope to work with Congress to ensure that, as
Russia enters the WTO, foreign competitors do not have an advantage
over American business.
Finally we are elevating development alongside diplomacy and
defense within our foreign policy. Poverty, disease, hunger, and
climate change can destabilize entire societies and sow the seeds for
future conflict. We have to make investments now not just to promote
human security, but to meet even our traditional foreign policy goals
down the road.
Through the Global Health Initiative, we are consolidating
programs, increasing efficiencies, and shifting responsibilities to
host countries. By driving down costs, we will be able to provide life-
saving HIV treatment for 6 million people by the end of 2013 without
additional spending--accelerating our progress toward President Obama's
vision of an AIDS-free generation. Building on past investments, we are
increasing countries' own health system capacity. That helps us target
our resources where they are most needed and have the greatest impact,
including areas like maternal and child health.
Our Feed the Future Initiative will help millions of men, women,
and children--farmers and consumers--by driving agricultural growth and
improving nutrition to hasten the day when countries no longer need
food aid at all.
As we pursue these initiatives, we are transforming the way we do
development. We are partnering with governments, local groups and the
private sector instead of substituting for them. We are making it a
priority to deliver measurable results, build local capacity and
promote good governance and progrowth policies to empower people to
create and seize their own opportunities.
These five priorities--the frontline states, the Asia-Pacific, the
Arab transitions, economic statecraft and elevating development--are
each crucial to American leadership. And they are just the beginning of
what we do to serve and safeguard the American people in every region
of the world--including Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and
Europe. State and USAID reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, fight
international trafficking, counter violent extremism, and protect U.S.
citizens overseas.
This work is done by some of the most capable, hardest working and
bravest people I have ever met: the men and women of State and USAID.
The political officers who worked for thousands of hours to assemble
and hold together a NATO-Arab coalition that helped the Libyan people
reclaim their future--without a single American death. The economic
officers helping American companies take part in the tens of billions
of dollars of construction underway as Brazil prepares for the World
Cup and Olympics. The development officers offering life-saving
treatment. The consular officers who serve as the front line of our
efforts to secure our borders. The public diplomacy officers who tell
the world our story. And the management officers who make everything
else possible. Working with them is one of the greatest honors I have
had in public life.
With so much on the line, from the Arab world to the Asia-Pacific,
we simply cannot pull back. Investments in American leadership are not
the cause of our fiscal challenges, and retreating from the world is
not the solution.
American leadership is personal for me. It is my job everywhere I
go. After 3 years, 95 countries and over 700,000 miles, I know very
well what it means to land in a plane that says ``United States of
America'' on the side. People look to us to protect our allies, stand
by our principles and serve as an honest broker in making peace; to
fight hunger, poverty, and disease; and to stand up to bullies and
tyrants. American leadership is not just respected. It is required. And
it takes more than just resolve. It takes resources.
This country is an unparalleled force for good in the world. We all
want to make sure it stays that way. I urge you to make this investment
in strong American leadership and a more peaceful and prosperous
future.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you
particularly for those last comments.
And I think I can express the thoughts of everybody on the
committee in expressing our gratitude to you for the enormous
energy you have expended and the terrific job that you have
done in public diplomacy for our country. I think we have seen
that in many of the photographs coming back from various parts
of the world.
I was particularly struck by the one of you and Aung San
Suu Kyi, which was really a historic moment. And I think those
and many others are the kinds of things that really do make a
difference. So we compliment you, all of us, on that.
Since I am confident colleagues are going to ask you
specific budget questions with respect to specific countries
what I would like to do is ask you perhaps to be a little bit
more broadly reflective and expand on the comments that you
just made, since this is now your fourth budget and, by your
own decision, the final budget that you will put before us.
And having now been in there for more than 3 years, I
wonder if you could put a little meat on the bones on the
importance of the foreign affairs budget number that we deal
with here?
Egypt, for instance, is teetering on potential economic
collapse unless the right decisions are made. That would have
profound implications on every other interest we have in the
region. There are many parts of the world where we are simply
not adequately staffed to be able to protect our economic
interests, to promote American business opportunities and so
forth.
And it seems to me that beggaring the foreign affairs
budget, which, as you said, is about 1 percent the entire
budget of the United States, but which has so much--which
touches on trillions of dollars of engagement, one way or the
other--simply does not make sense.
So would you share with the committee what you think we get
for this, and you have particularly put this fund in there for
the North Africa piece. And I think that is part of this
discussion. There must be some measure of frustration in some
degree as this budget is 8.5 percent lower than the President's
request, and the President's request clearly is reflective of
his sense--and your sense--of our national security priorities.
But what we are missing and what are we losing for not
being willing to be a little more critical about $100 billion a
year in military expenditure in Afghanistan and these small
amounts that get parceled out in these longer term investment
opportunities elsewhere?
Secretary Clinton. Well, that is a question, Mr. Chairman,
that I obviously spend a lot of time worrying about because as
we try to respond to the urgent demands that are made because
of changes in the world, we often find ourselves having to
reprogram, shift resources, come up with what we can so that
America is present, America is a player, America is in there
trying to influence the outcomes of events. And this past year
has been unprecedented in the demands that we have faced.
At the same time while we are dealing with the urgent, even
the emergency humanitarian and political strategic demands, we
also try to look over the horizon, which is one of the reasons
why the so-called pivot to Asia is so important. We need to be
very clearly present in Asia.
So it shouldn't be an ``either/or,'' and there are many
other examples of that that I could give you. We need to be
very clear-eyed about how we interact in this fast-moving
environment in which we find ourselves.
And I also firmly believe, as I alluded to in my opening
remarks, that were it not for the work that Foreign Service
officers and civil servants and locally employed staff do every
day, American businesses would not be as profitable and
expanding and creating jobs in this recovery as they are. I
mean, we have these 1,000 economic officers. We have many other
people who are there constantly trying to support American
business.
I just held and hosted a big conference at the State
Department where we called in American Chambers from across the
world so that we could be asking them, What are we doing right?
What can we do better?
We are in an economic competition that has profound
consequences, but it is primarily the work of diplomacy. As our
businesses are trying to open doors, they come to our
embassies. They come to the State Department. They say, ``What
do I need to know about this country? What can you do to help
me get to the right person so that my bid can be fairly
considered?''
We are also seeing an increase in travel to the United
States. So we have dramatically had to up our budget and our
presence in countries like Brazil and China because business
travelers, tourists, they want to come here. We want them to
come. That is good for our economy. It holds forth the
possibility of greater benefits.
We have to continue to counter violent extremism. I mean,
we have done, I think, a good job in going after the top
leadership of al-Qaeda, including bin Laden, but we can't rest.
I mean, al-Qaeda has now made a coalition with al-Shabaab.
And I just came back from North Africa, and everywhere I
went, from Tunisia to Algeria to Morocco, we talked a lot about
security because of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb.
We have to be constantly not only responding with our
intelligence community and military means, if necessary, but we
have to be on the ground picking up the information that can
then be shared with our intelligence and military
professionals. And we also put together for the first time this
past year a global counterterrorism forum, where we have the
major players from around the world.
I hosted the first meeting with Turkey in September. We are
setting up a center in the UAE to counter violent extremism. So
these are all parts of the multitudinous role that the
diplomacy and development experts at State and USAID perform
every single day, and obviously, we think it is important work
because we do it with great pride.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you for that. I know they do it
with great pride and to great effect.
I think one of the things I was struck by--this is not
under the 150 Account, but under the commerce account, which I
also serve on--was that when I was in Hong Kong, I remember
there were about three Foreign Commercial Service folks, who
were complaining bitterly that they didn't have either the
place, which other countries had, to convene meetings in or the
staff capacity and that we were literally missing, they said,
``billions of dollars of business'' because we weren't as
aggressive as other people in seeking it. So I think this
connection is something that we really need to try to
underscore to people.
Secretary Clinton. Well, I appreciate your mentioning the
Commerce Department because they have been our partners over
the past many decades. Their budget has been severely affected
with the result that they are removing commercial officers.
Here we helped to liberate Libya from Gaddafi, and the
commercial officer that could be there to help guide American
investments, whether it be in hydrocarbons or agriculture or
you name it, is not going to be renewed.
And throughout the world--and you know, I have had many
conversations with major American corporations, but also with
small and medium-sized businesses in our country. We are trying
to double exports in the 5 years. We are close to meeting that
goal. We have to keep upping the number so that we are always
on our toes because that is where a lot of the new jobs are
going to come from.
As Senator Lugar pointed out, we still have a lot of people
hurting in our country. And although I think we are making
progress, we want to accelerate that progress, and we have to
get into those markets overseas, and it is difficult for many
American companies to navigate through that without expert
help.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, in the budget that you
presented, the leading candidates to receive foreign assistance
are Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Egypt in that
order with very sizable portions of money--$3 billion for
Israel, $2.5 billion for Afghanistan, $2.2 billion for
Pakistan, $2 billion for Iraq, and so forth.
My question comes down to the fact that long ago, before
you had any responsibility, the United States decided to build
the largest embassy we have ever built in the world in Baghdad.
During many years, those of us who visited that building or the
general compound noted how important the security was around
all of it not only for United States personal, but for Iraqis
who were working with us to try to build democracy and
stability in that country.
Now, as we have withdrawn our Armed Forces and, as you
pointed out, the diplomatic mission still remains remarkably
vital and important, I ask this question along with the sidebar
of Afghanistan, which in this budget you presented contemplates
building consulates across Afghanistan, staffing them at
significant cost.
Given the realities of the security situations in both Iraq
and Afghanistan how do we, or even can we, adjust the size and
scope of these buildings given our current financial situation
and the political and diplomatic realities on the ground? You
can't try to revise the whole policy today in this hearing, but
is there discussion, as you contemplate this budget and as we
think about it, as to how to move forward, given these
circumstances and really how much building we should be doing?
Or how do we even secure what we have?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, you ask two very
important questions. With respect to Iraq, you know, the
planning for what we are doing now really began several years
ago in the prior administration. It set the date for
withdrawal. It set the date and the framework through the
strategic framework agreement for our relationship with Iraq.
And we certainly have planned to try to fulfill what we
considered to be national expectations. So we are doing
everything we can to ensure the safety of our staff and our
contractors in Iraq. We constantly monitor the on-the-ground
security conditions, but there is never a guarantee of safety.
And all staff who are deployed to Iraq are certainly aware
of the risks. They are getting out. They are working with their
counterparts in government agencies, businesses, NGOs. But we
are in the process of trying to right-size our presence in
Iraq. I think we have to assume we are moving toward a more
normalized relationship with Iraq, and that means we have got
to be very clear about what we can do and what we cannot do.
Because of our experience in Iraq, we are starting that
process earlier in Afghanistan, because we do have through the
end of 2014 until the NATO ISAF combat troops will be out. So
we are trying to get ahead of the curve.
But your questions are absolutely the right ones. I mean,
we do want there to be secure, democratic governance and
progress in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and how we allocate the
responsibilities within the civilian workforce is what we are
trying to determine.
Senator Lugar. On an entirely different subject, Madam
Secretary, yesterday the Keystone pipeline company announced it
was going to construct a pipeline between mid Oklahoma and
Houston, TX. They pointed out this would not require any OK by
the State Department. That was a great relief to you perhaps.
At the same time, it begs the question of why the State
Department has been studying the Keystone pipeline issue for 3
years. Now, the usual answer is because it crosses an
international boundary between Canada and the United States.
And nevertheless, after the State Department apparently had
come to a conclusion that it had been studied enough, I recall
a very large demonstration of citizens surrounded the White
House one Sunday in the latter part of last year, demanding
that the Keystone pipeline be stopped. There were many
arguments. One of these, however, was that essentially we
should not be importing more oil into our country. It is an
ardent theme of those who are fighting climate change who feel
that fossil fuels, whether they are oil, natural gas, or coal,
create CO2 and problems for our children and our grandchildren.
Nevertheless, even though it may be a very powerful
argument, it was an argument that apparently gave the President
enough consternation that he recommended it to go back to the
State Department for further review. Maybe perhaps by February
2013, you might be able to come up with an answer.
My hope is that it happens long before that, but can you
give us any idea what kind of deliberation is proceeding? Why
might there be a recommendation much sooner than the Keystone
proposal
on behalf of energy needs of our country, and particularly
given
the program of energy the President has presented, that has a
conspicuous omission of the oil that might come from our near
neighbor Canada?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, yesterday the Department
received a letter from TransCanada indicating their intent to
submit a new application for a pipeline which crosses the
United States-Canadian border and ends at Steele City, NE. You
are right that under the laws of the United States, the State
Department is responsible for evaluating any request for such
permits that do cross an international border.
And at this point, I obviously cannot make any comment on a
hypothetical application and permit, but I do think that your
concerns and the concerns of others about the pipeline, both
pro and con, suggest that it is important that the process
follow the laws and regulations because whatever the outcome,
it is likely to be controversial whichever way the decision is
finally made.
It is taking place within the context of U.S. gas and oil
supplies increasing dramatically domestically. In fact, we are
now beginning to export domestic supplies. I believe that we
have to continue to develop supplies everywhere. That is an
absolutely critical component of our energy security going
forward.
And I think that when you look at the request here, there
were, up until the very end of the process that we were engaged
in, serious questions raised and most particularly from one of
the States on the proposed pipeline route. Other States had
made their own determination, but it wasn't until recently that
Nebraska weighed in.
And so, I think that a new application triggers a new
review process under existing regulations. We would be able to
draw on some of the technical information that has already been
compiled. But I think it is probably fair to say that until we
get the application, until we actually have a chance to study
it, we won't be able to provide you information as to when a
decision could be made.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, Madam Secretary, let me join the
chairman and members of the committee in thanking you for your
dedicated service to our country. We very much appreciate you
representing America throughout the world. You have done an
incredible job.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. I want to talk about the issue of human
rights for a moment. You stated in the last December's OSCE
ministerial meeting in Vilnius that lasting peace and stability
depends just as much on meeting our citizens' legitimate
aspirations as they do our military security. That is certainly
true with the Russian citizens who are on the street demanding
that their legitimate aspirations be taken seriously by their
government.
Shortly, we will be considering whether to grant PNTR to
Russia, as the United States looks at Russia joining the World
Trade Organization. To me, that presents an opportunity for us
to advance the aspirations of the people of Russia.
Jackson-Vanik at its time may have been controversial, but
I think today we all recognize that the inclusion of Jackson-
Vanik put a spotlight on the world of the oppressive practices
of the former Soviet Union.
As we move to PNTR, I would like to get your view as to how
we can use that opportunity. Assistant Secretary Gordon was
quoted as saying, when responding to what Congress might do on
PNTR, said--on human rights, he said, ``We will see what they,
Congress, demand.''
I would hope we could work together on this issue, and I
would welcome your thoughts as to how we could use this
opportunity.
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Senator, let me commend you
for your long work on behalf of the Helsinki Commission and
your continuing interest in the OSCE, which I believe not only
played an important historical role, but still has a role to
play in maintaining an emphasis on human rights. Promoting
universal human rights is one of the highest priorities for the
United States around the world, and we engage on behalf of
human rights every day everywhere.
Our other priority, which we don't think is in conflict,
but is certainly one of particular importance, is promoting
U.S. trade and boosting our economy. We strongly believe that
voting for PNTR for Russia is a vote to create American jobs.
So we agree with you that we think it is important that we
go ahead and do that. Jackson-Vanik served a very important
role in the past by helping thousands of Jews to emigrate from
the Soviet Union, and we ought to lift it. Failing to lift it
will put our farmers and our manufacturers and our workers at a
disadvantage.
At the same time, we would like to work with you on the
need to send a clear, unmistakable message to Russia that we
care deeply about rule of law in Russia. We care deeply about
universal human rights and that Russians have every reason to
expect their government to protect their human rights.
So I am not standing back waiting. I would like to very
affirmatively offer to you the opportunity we work together
because I think we can do both. I don't, again, think it is
either/or. I strongly believe we should lift Jackson-Vanik, and
I believe we should send a message about our continuing concern
about human rights in Russia.
Senator Cardin. I thank you for that, and I look forward to
working with you. I do think we can do both, and I know there
are many Members of the Senate who agree on that.
Let me talk a little bit about an amendment that Senator
Lugar and I were responsible for including in the Dodd-Frank
legislation dealing with transparency of extractive industries
and in which you were extremely helpful in supporting that
effort and having it included in the Dodd-Frank provisions.
I would ask if you could perhaps share with us how you see
that playing internationally. We know that that is important
for investors to have transparency when they determine whether
to invest in a particular company. It also leads to stability
of governments that are critically important to U.S. interests.
The international community is looking at the United States
and sees the leadership here. And I am wondering if you could
share with us how you think this will be effective
internationally, the U.S. leadership on transparency of these
mineral companies so that the wealth goes to the people of the
country rather than to fund corruption.
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, I want to commend you and
Senator Lugar for including the principles that underpin the
extractive industries disclosure requirements in Dodd-Frank.
Look, we know and we see it every day how development of
natural resources has fueled corruption, mismanagement. It is
the so-called oil curse or resource curse that actually impedes
inclusive, broad-based economic growth. And so, you set a new
standard for transparency.
We are working very hard to try to make sure that it is
implemented effectively. We know that there are challenges in
doing this. I hope the regulations expected from the SEC
reflect the clear intent of the law, namely to require all
relevant companies operating in this sector to disclose the
payments they make to foreign governments.
I think everybody is benefited by the disinfectant of
sunshine and the spotlight to hold institutions accountable.
And the section 1504, which is what the SEC is promulgating
rules on, complements other efforts at transparency that we are
committed to.
And yet I hear a lot from people who are concerned about
whether the SEC is going to go far enough. In our system, they
are the ones that have responsibility for doing it. So we are
encouraging them to go as far as possible because the EU is
already considering provisions similar to section 1504 because
we passed 1504.
We are working at State on a program called the Energy
Governance and Capacity Initiative, which is trying to
encourage governments to manage their oil and gas and mineral
sector responsibly. So we have got a good start here. USAID
even has an EITI multidonor trust fund to help countries know
how to implement it.
So I think that our own Government, all aspects of our own
Government should be as forward-leaning as possible in giving
full weight to what the intent was behind the legislation that
you and Senator Lugar proposed and passed.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Let me just say and you don't need to respond, in regards
to Alan Gross in Cuba, we appreciate the fact that you are
working to get him released from the Cuban prison, and I look
forward to continuing to work with you on that issue.
I ask consent that an editorial from the Financial Times
about the rulemaking process for Section 1504 be included in
the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The above mentioned editorial follows:]
[From the Financial Times, Feb. 26, 2012]
Transparency rules
In the past two years, the US Congress and the European Commission
have acted boldly to clear up the murkiness in which natural resource
companies' payments to governments around the world are clouded.
Lobbying efforts aimed at overturning this progress on both sides of
the Atlantic should not be allowed to succeed.
In the US, the American Petroleum Institute, the lobby group for
the oil industry, has mounted a rearguard action to engage regulators
in a battle it lost against legislators in 2010. Senators Ben Cardin
and Richard Lugar inserted into the Dodd-Frank regulatory reform bill a
requirement that US-listed oil, gas and mining companies report
publicly their payments to host governments. The Securities and
Exchange Commission must now specify exact rules. It is this step that
lobbyists want to trip up.
In Europe, too, rule-making procedures give special interests
second chances. Last year the Commission proposed similar reporting
requirements, now going through the Council and the parliament. Denmark
is laudably eager to get the law passed before its Council presidency
ends in June. It should not be weakened along the way.
The case for public reporting has long been clear. Fuel and mineral
resources hold back the development of countries that have them as
often as they promote it.
The concentrated wealth they entail is a breeding ground for corruption
and waste. Publicity around what governments are paid for national
wealth extracted from the ground is not sufficient for managing it
better, or for reducing the instability of resource-rich states that
also threatens the well-being of importers. But it is necessary.
Many extractive companies are happy to live with this, but the most
recalcitrant demand changes. On both sides of the Atlantic the fight is
on to reshape the reporting rules so that whatever is published is less
informative. In particular, it is suggested that the laws' call for
reporting project-by-project details be watered down with overbroad
definitions of ``project''. There is no justification for this: most
payments to states are calculated on a project basis anyway, so
publishing such detail is no great burden.
What the rejectionist companies most seem to fear is an inability
to compete against non-western companies with fewer scruples. If
realistic, it would be a concern. But that case has not been proven: an
ability to bribe is not the only competitive edge in the industry. Nor
is it one either Europe or the US permits. Keeping it hard to expose
would not make it more legal.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today. I think
you have earned a well-deserved respect on both sides of the
aisle for the way you have conducted yourself as Secretary, the
way you have worked with all of us, and I thank you for that. I
really do.
I know that--and I especially thank you for coming before a
committee that doesn't do authorizing.
But you are presenting your budget. I realize that much of
this is punted to the Appropriations Committee, and there may
be a few committee meetings regarding this. But it is nice of
you to come up here anyway, even though we probably won't
impact that in any way.
One of the things that we did impact, I think, was the
START treaty. And we worked very closely with Rose and
Secretary Tauscher to work through the START treaty. And I
supported the START treaty. We worked very closely with your
office to make sure all the complements of that treaty were put
in place.
One of the big components, and I think a lot of people
would consider this to be rational, and that is if we are going
to reduce the number of nuclear arms that we have in this
country, we ought to make sure the ones that we have work. That
was a pretty rational thing.
We have guided systems that have literally tubes like our
old black and white televisions, and to at least have them
operate as well as my little BlackBerry might be a good thing
to do. And so, as part of that, we worked out a very intricate
plan, 1251 plan relating to modernization.
Matter of fact, Secretary Gates said, ``The modernization
program was very carefully worked out between ourselves and the
Department of Energy. And frankly, where we came out on that
played a fairly significant role in the willingness of the
Senate to ratify the START agreement.''
Secretary Panetta recently said, ``I think it is
tremendously shortsighted if they reduce funds that are
absolutely essential for modernization. If we aren't staying
ahead of it, we jeopardize the security of this country. So,
for that reason, I certainly would oppose any reductions with
regard to the funding.''
So now the START treaty is in place. It passed with a
majority. I helped do that, among others. And the budget that
has come forth from the administration this year almost totally
negates the agreement regarding funding.
I know, again, that you worked on that. Secretary Tauscher
worked on that. A lot of trust was built. Rose was up here
nonstop. I am just wondering within the Department, does that
create any kind of integrity issue, and how should those of us
who relied upon these commitments--a letter from the
President--how should we feel about this as it relates to other
serious agreements that may occur between Congress and the
White House?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Senator, thank you for your
engagement on that and other issues with me and with the
Department. I highly value this committee. I know how difficult
it is to get an authorization done, but in effect, the constant
consultations are very influential in determining our policy.
And with respect to NNSA modernization, the level of
funding requested in the November 2010 section 1251 report for
nuclear modernization was unprecedented, as you know, since the
end of the cold war. We had, frankly, neglected our nuclear
stockpile. We did not make the kinds of investments.
And as we have looked at what the sequence will be, the FY
2013 request for $11.5 billion will help the NNSA achieve the
nuclear security objectives and the underlying agreement that
you referred to under START. It is an increase. It is an
increase of 4.9 percent over the FY 2012 appropriations.
And it was developed, as I understand it--because you know
it is not in my budget. It is in the Department of Energy's
budget. It was developed closely in concert with the experts
about how much money could you spend in a year to get this
underway and then looking out, year after year, to actually
deliver.
Now if the Congress doesn't fully fund the President's
budget, as laid out in the 1251 report, then the President will
have to make a report to Congress.
Senator Corker. If I could?
Secretary Clinton. Yes.
Senator Corker. I know we don't have time, and I have
tremendous respect for you. So this is not meant to be
disrespectful.
But all that is history, but I am talking about the budget
that has just been submitted. The President did not ask for the
very funds that he committed to in the 1251 that was laid out.
It was all part of this package that we all worked so closely
together on. So it is a total--it is a reneging of an
agreement.
I guess I would ask the question if we are not going to
modernize as was laid out by everybody involved as being very
important, including our chairman, should we consider reducing,
slowing the commitment on the START treaty since we are not
really living up to the modernization component that was so
talked about in such detail, with such commitment by all
involved?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I don't think,
respectfully, I agree with the premise. There is a 4.9-percent
increase in the budget request for FY13. The $11.5 billion
requested will go into the modernization agenda. As I
understand it, it is what the experts who will be doing the
work at the labs and elsewhere believe can be effectively spent
in a year.
So I am happy to take this question for the record, have
the Department of Energy respond to it. But I really want to
say that I think that, given the budget, that the President and
the administration are meeting the assurances that were given
to you and others. It is tough in a time of budget restraint,
but $11.5 billion that will be this year's investment will be
followed by more, which will be followed by more.
Because I mean, if you gave the NNSA $100 billion, they
couldn't physically do the work. So I believe that we are on
the right track. But let me take that and get the Department of
Energy to respond.
[The written information from the State Department
follows:]
The administration remains committed to maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear arsenal. Over the past 3 years, the
administration has worked with Congress to develop a sustainable,
bipartisan commitment to a nuclear deterrent to defend and protect the
United States and our allies.
The administration's historic budget requests and nuclear
modernization plan have sought to reverse years of declining
investments in the nuclear weapons complex. With congressional passage
of the Budget Control Act (BCA), we face new fiscal realities. These do
not weaken our commitment to the nuclear deterrent, but they must
inform programmatic decisions.
As stated in the March 2 letter from Secretaries Panetta and Chu,
the administration worked aggressively to develop a budget request for
FY13 that makes hard choices to meet fiscal realities, but maintains
funding for the most critical programs and capabilities. The resulting
$7.6 billion is $363 million (or 5 percent) above the amount
appropriated by Congress for FY 2012, is sufficient to keep our
stockpile safe, secure, and effective.
This is one of the few accounts in the entire U.S. Government to
receive an increase of this size, and it demonstrates the
administration's support for the modernization of the U.S. nuclear
weapons complex in a time when there is significant scrutiny of all
budgets.
Senator Corker. I am glad I had the opportunity to raise
the issue, and again, I want to reiterate we have tremendous
respect for the way that you have dealt with us.
The issue of Iran, and I know there is not much time left,
is obviously front and center.
The Chairman. About 5 seconds.
Senator Corker. And I think--I think most people in the
country watching what is happening believe there is a very good
chance that we could end up with a military engagement with
Iran in the next 12 months. And I guess I would ask the
question of you, what is it that you would like to see Congress
do and not do as it relates to that particular issue?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that we are absolutely on
the same page. The administration has been unequivocal about
its policy toward Iran. With your good work and our efforts, we
have passed the Menendez-Kirk sanctions. We are implementing
those sanctions.
There has never been anything like them that the world has
ever agreed upon. We are diligently reaching out around the
world to get agreements from countries for whom it is quite
difficult to comply with our sanctions, but they are doing the
best they can. We know what the stakes are here.
We are in close, close consultation with Israel, with
Europe, with our friends in the gulf and elsewhere. We are
focused on the toughest form of diplomacy and economic pressure
to try to convince Iran to change course, and we have kept
every option on the table.
So, I mean, I think we are in agreement about the various
aspects of our proposals--of our policy where we are today. The
challenge is making sure that we are constantly evaluating
where Iran is and what Iran's reactions are.
The Chairman. Senator Corker, let me just say I appreciate
you raising that issue also, and I feel as if I am somewhat a
party to that agreement, having worked that with you.
I very strongly feel that the Secretary has appropriately
said that the amount of money being spent is what can be spent,
that it is on track within the constraints of the budget
overall. But I think that commitment remains extant and
obviously needs to be made good on. And we will work with you
on that.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your incredible service to
our country. I remember when you were sitting here for your
confirmation hearing, that there were those who had questions.
I think you have more than dissipated all those questions, and
you have just done an extraordinary job.
I want to talk about Iran. I hope you agree with me that
the best peaceful diplomacy tool left to us to stop Iran's
march toward nuclear weapons is the vigorous enforcement of the
sanctions policy that we presently have, particularly the
Central Bank of Iran. Would you agree that that is our best
peaceful diplomacy tool?
Secretary Clinton. It is certainly probably the highest
priority tool. We have other tools, but I think your
characterization is right.
Senator Menendez. And in that context then, with respect to
the implementation of the Central Bank sanctions that will
begin to take effect tomorrow on nonpetroleum transactions, I
have concerns about the subjective criteria that will be used
by the Department to determine whether a country has achieved
significant reductions in purchases of refined petroleum.
I would have preferred that we had some scale, but I have
heard the arguments for why having a subjective criteria may be
better. But can I presume that in the absence of a national
security waiver under the law, that all countries would be
required to actually make significant reductions in their
purchases during each of the 180-day periods?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, our expectation and the direction
we are giving to countries is that we do expect to see
significant reductions. And I am pleased to report, Senator,
that we have been aggressively reaching out to and working with
countries to assist them in being able to make such significant
reductions.
You know, for some countries, it is a lot harder than other
countries. And so, we have really come in with a lot of
suggestions to help them be able to do what we are asking them
to do.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate hearing that we expect to
see them make significant reductions in each of those 180-day
periods because I think it sends a very clear message to our
allies abroad, joining with the Europeans that are already
pursuing an oil embargo, about the seriousness of this nature.
In that respect, what progress can you tell us about with
reference to countries like China, India, and Turkey?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think with respect to China and
Turkey and India, we have had very intense and very blunt
conversations with each of those countries. I think that there
are a number of steps that we are pointing out to them that we
believe they can and should make.
I also can tell you that in a number of cases, both on
their government side and on their business side, they are
taking actions that go further and deeper than perhaps their
public statements might lead you to believe. And we are going
to continue to keep an absolute foot on the pedal in terms of
our accelerated aggressive outreach to them.
They are looking for ways to make up the lost revenues, the
lost crude oil. That is a difficulty for a lot of these
countries, not just the ones you mentioned. So we have had to
put together an entire team to try to assist them in thinking
through ways of doing that.
Senator Menendez. Well, I appreciate that because I think
the stronger and more uniform the message is, the fewer
challenges we will have getting countries to join us in common
cause toward something that is in their mutual national
security interest. This is not just about the United States,
not just about Israel, and certainly not even about the
European Union. It is about the entire region and certainly
beyond.
One final question in this regard. Several of us wrote a
letter to the President about the P5+1 talks and where that
would lead. And some of us are concerned that the Iranians, to
gain time, would just simply enter into a negotiation thinking
that either the sanctions would cease or that their enrichment
facilities and centrifuges would not be part of the discussion
on the table.
Can you give me a sense of the conditions that we are going
to be looking at as it relates to any such talks?
Secretary Clinton. Well, as we have done since 2009 within
the P5+1, we have pursued this dual-track policy, and we have
had a policy of pressure and a policy of engagement.
And we have used these escalating sanctions as a way to
persuade Iran to engage with us. And there are two things we
have been very clear about.
First, as outlined in Cathy Ashton's letter to Iran, any
conversation anywhere with Iran has to begin with the
disposition of their nuclear program. I mean, that is the No. 1
issue. And Iran's response to her letter appears to acknowledge
and accept that.
Second, we have been working with our colleagues in the
P5+1 to set forth the actions we expect Iran to take that would
have to be verifiable, would have to be sustainable because
there has to be some guarantee to the international community
that assuming they were willing to come into compliance with
their international obligations, that they would actually do so
in a way that was not reversible or certainly not immediately
reversible.
So we are a long way from having any assurance as to what
Iran would or would not do in the P5+1. But I can certainly
assure you, Senator, that there is not going to be any front-
loading of concessions on our part. This is going to be a very
hard-nosed negotiation, and we are joined by the P5+1 in that
kind of approach.
Senator Menendez. Well, I thank you for that. We look
forward to continuing to work with you.
And I will just close by saying I know that everything
cannot be a priority in the world, although I am sure
everything is important in the world. But certainly, I want to
call your attention to what is happening here in our own
hemisphere, and I appreciate that probably more than any other
Secretary of State, your travel to the hemisphere has been
extraordinary.
This is incredibly important when we see the erosion of
democracy within the hemisphere, the erosion of free press
within the hemisphere, the influences that Iran and China are
seeking within the hemisphere right in our own front yard. So I
look forward to continuing to work with you on that.
And I will have a question for the record on Camp Ashraf. I
am concerned about the transition at Camp Liberty and what goes
on there, and I look forward to your response.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, I am not going to dwell on this because
you spent quite a bit of time on it. But I didn't vote for the
treaty, but the administration almost took me with the promises
that it made. And there has been a lot of discussion as to
whether the promises are being kept or not, and I don't think
it comes as a surprise to you that there are a good number of
people on my side of the aisle that feel that the promises are
not being kept.
And the good chairman of this committee acted in very good
faith I think in soliciting votes and making commitments. The
President made commitments in writing. So when you take the
question for the record for the DOE, I don't think I would
focus on so much as what can be done as to whether or not the
commitments are being kept.
So that is my two-cents worth.
Moving to Iran for just a minute. As you try to work
through this Rubik's cube and try to get a handle on this thing
and try to get things ratcheted down, it is always best to
start with what is the other side thinking? And you read this
stuff and you just--it is hard to comprehend why they continue
to push the envelope and why they continue to pursue something
that everyone in the world doesn't want them to do.
What is your theory on that? Is it homegrown politics? What
is it that is motivating them to continue to do this?
[The written information from the State Department
follows:]
The administration remains committed to maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear arsenal. Over the past 3 years, the
administration has worked with Congress to develope a sustainable,
bipartisan commitment to a nuclear deterrent to defend and protect the
United States and our allies.
The administration's historic budget requests and nuclear
modernization plan have sought to reverse years of declining
investments in the nuclear weapons complex. With congressional passage
of the Budget Control Act (BCA), we face new fiscal realities. These do
not weaken our commitment to the nuclear deterrent, but they must
inform programmatic decisions.
As stated in the March 2 letter from Secretaries Panetta and Chu,
the administration worked aggressively to develop a budget request for
FY13 that makes hard choices to meet fiscal realities, but maintains
funding for the most critical programs and capabilities. The resulting
$7.6 billion is $363 million (or 5 percent) above the amount
appropriated by Congress for FY 2012, and is sufficient to keep our
stockpile safe, secure, and effective.
This is one of the few amounts in the entire U.S. Government to
receive an increase of this size, and it demonstrates the
administration's support for the modernization of the U.S. nuclear
weapons complex in a time when there is significant scrutiny of all
budgets.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, first, very briefly on
the question about nuclear modernization, I will certainly
provide you with information that I hope that makes it as clear
as possible that we took our obligations seriously, and we are
fulfilling them.
There may be debate about how fast we are going, where we
are doing it. That I don't have any expertise on, but I want to
reassure you that certainly I acted in good faith, and so I do
believe----
Senator Risch. I believe you did act in good faith. But the
comfort level needs to be raised, I can assure you.
Secretary Clinton. Well, I will do what I can. I will have
the
answers delivered with macaroni and cheese and other comfort
food that I hope makes that case to you.
Senator Risch. That will get you everywhere.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Clinton. Well, thank you, Senator.
Look, I know that last week, the Director of National
Intelligence former General Clapper, the Director of the CIA
former General Petraeus, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
General Dempsey, plus Secretary Panetta, all testified in front
of other committees here in the Senate that it is the
conclusion of our Intelligence Committee that the Iranians have
not yet made the decision to produce a nuclear weapon.
Now the explanation that I think came from those very
credible sources, patriots all, is that there is a continuing
debate going on inside the Iranian regime, and it is an
especially complicated debate for anybody on the outside and, I
dare say, some people who are on the inside to understand
because there is a lot of power struggle going on. There are
personality clashes.
The Supreme Leader, who is the head of the clerical
presence institutionally within Iran, the Revolutionary Guard
and the Quds Force, the Parliament, and the President, we just
get a lot of static in intelligence reporting and analysis from
not just our own sources, but international sources.
So I think there is a debate. There is no doubt they are
pursuing nuclear power. They have a right under the NPT as a
signatory to pursue peaceful civil nuclear power. And there is
no doubt that a lot of what has been discovered by the IAEA
points in the direction of a nuclear weapons program, and there
is no doubt that they raise all kinds of suspicions by putting
a lot of their work in their nuclear program into very remote,
inaccessible places and recently denying the IAEA the right to
investigate.
So I think it is understandable, Senator, why you and why
millions of people who are concerned and worried about this are
trying to discern what they want and what they are trying to
achieve. And that is one of the reasons why I support our dual
track of intense pressure and of being willing to engage
because I want to gather as much information not only about
actions, but about intentions.
And we have very deep ongoing consultations with Israel,
with the Gulf Arabs, with the Europeans, with others. There
isn't anybody of any stature in the world in any government
that really is not concerned about what the Iranians are doing,
and it is a source of constant discussion.
So what we are intending to do is ratchet up these
sanctions as hard and fast as we can. Follow what is going on
inside Iran, which seems to be a lot of economic pressures that
we think do have an impact on decisionmaking. Continuing to be
vigilant. Responding quickly to threats like the threat about
the Strait of Hormuz, leaving absolutely no question in the
Iranian mind as to what we would do should they take any
foolhardy action.
Having aircraft carriers going in and out of the gulf.
Consulting and planning with a lot of our partners. So that is
the state of play right now. But the question you asked is a
question that is asked every day in the intelligence community
and in foreign affairs agencies around the world.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate
that.
And I would think that someone in their decisionmaking
authority in Iran would look back at recent history in Iraq and
look what Saddam Hussein did. What a reckless thing to do to
take the world and make them believe something that isn't even
necessarily true.
So thank you very much for your analysis. I sincerely
appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, it is great to be with you again. Thank
you for appearing before us.
I have two questions. The first one concerns Pakistan, the
other, Iran.
With regard to Pakistan, this August, Senator Whitehouse,
Senator Blumenthal, and Senator Michael Bennet and I traveled
to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our trip had one focus, and
that was this question of IEDs and the material components
thereof. And just recently, the four of us sent you a letter
that you may have just gotten a number of days ago, and I
wanted to ask you about that topic.
I want to focus your attention on what the Pakistanis have
done or not done. The Pakistanis gave us assurances on our
trip--and I mean assurances at the highest levels of their
government--that they would take this matter more seriously and
that they would implement the strategic plan that they
presented to us in writing. And it is my judgment that, despite
these assurances, they have been very slow to implement the
plan, especially focusing on the networks that are moving
component parts that become the foundation of IEDs that are
either killing or grievously wounding our troops on a regular
basis in Afghanistan.
As a predicate to my question, I want to thank you for your
determined leadership on this. You have been focused. You have
been vigilant. And you have been persistent in pushing the
Pakistani leadership to help us on this, and I am grateful for
that.
Based on your observation of their actions or inaction on
this, do you think the Pakistani Government has taken any
measurable steps to specifically go after the networks? Because
I think that is what a lot of us are waiting to see, that is,
whether or not their professed plan becomes a plan of action
and specific steps. Can you tell us about how you see it?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I appreciate your
leadership on this issue. And as I reported to you some months
ago, I raised it at the very highest levels of the Pakistani
Government one more time. I discussed it at some length last
Thursday in London with the Foreign Minister. And it is very
clear they need to do more, and they need to do more for
themselves.
I mean, our concern is very much rooted in the terrible
attacks that take place in Afghanistan against our soldiers,
against other targets there. But in 2011, there were 1,966
terrorist attacks in Pakistan which resulted in 2,391 deaths,
the vast majority of which were the IEDs. So our point to
Pakistan has been this is not about the United States, NATO
ISAF, Afghanistan alone. This is also about you.
Now what they have done is they have introduced legislation
in their national assembly. I have been told they expect to
pass it shortly. It is focused on the transport of calcium
ammonium nitrate. They have an implementation plan in the
works. We have had several expert meetings with them on their
national counter-IED strategy that they approved in June 2011.
They are working actually with their Afghan counterparts to
improve coordination on the border to restrict fertilizer
imports. We have had several productive meetings between the
Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, and ISAF
over the past year. And so, we are making progress.
And I just have to say, Senator, that when I raised it
directly with the very highest levels of the military and
civilian governance in Pakistan, there was a lot of confusion.
They did not understand how fertilizer, that many of them told
me they use on their own farms, was such a problem.
So I explained to them after the Oklahoma City bombing, we
had to reach the same conclusion, and we had to go after the
use of fertilizer. And so, they are like 10 to 15 years behind
us in terms of thinking through what this means and how to do
it. So they are making progress, but they are not doing enough,
and they are not moving fast enough.
Senator Casey. I know that you sat with their leadership
back in May, and I remember seeing the video from Memorial Day
weekend. And when you came back, you called me about it. I
remember you making that point at the time.
But I just hope we can all continue to be as persistent as
you and others have been to make this point because, as you
said, it really is about protecting their own people as much as
it is about the urgency we feel about protecting our own
troops. And it is remarkable the lengths to which our Armed
Forces and our military intelligence have gone to protect
soldiers, to prevent and to deal with the aftermath of the
horror of those explosions.
And you know Pennsylvania well. A lot of Pennsylvanians
have served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. At last count, the
number of Pennsylvanian fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan was
79--it could be above 80 now. By the last count, that's 79
Pennsylvanians killed in action, and 573 wounded. So it is a
major issue for our families.
In my remaining time, let me address another aspect of the
Iranian question. The Institute for Science and International
Security recently released a report about efforts to prevent
Iran from gaining access to illicit nuclear materials.
The report said, ``There remain significant gaps, notably
the weak implementation of U.N. Security Council sanctions by
China. China remains vulnerable to Iran's smuggling of vital
goods for its nuclear program. Smugglers use front companies to
buy from Chinese suppliers or Western high-technology
subsidiaries located within its borders. There remain many
concerns about Iran's continued ability to transship goods
through countries with weak implementation of sanctions or
trade controls, commonly called countries of `transit concern.'
''
The basic question there, and I know you may have to
elaborate in writing, but can you say anything about the
efforts to urge China to do what it should do in terms of
preventing this illicit transfer?
Secretary Clinton. It is one of our highest priorities, and
we are working with the Chinese. They have made some progress.
They have eliminated some of the companies that were engaging
in that illicit trade, but they have not done everything that
we would like to see them do.
So I will get you more details. Some of that will have to
come in a classified section, but I will respond to that.
[The written information from the State Department
follows:]
Pakistan has taken steps to stop the flow of materials used to make
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from entering Afghanistan. Over the
past year, Pakistan established new requirements to monitor and secure
shipments of calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), ammonium nitrate (AN), and
potassium chlorate. Pakistan continues to participate in the ISAF-
Afghanistan-Pakistan IED coordination group aimed at improving
information-sharing on the IED threat between these two countries. Most
significantly, Pakistan supported the U.N. 1988 terrorist designation
of IED facilitator Samad Achekzai. This is the first such designation
related to IEDs.
These actions are a step in the right direction, but more stringent
controls are needed to further restrict access to these chemicals for
illicit use. It is clear Pakistan can do more and their actions must
have an impact. We will continued to engage Pakistan and press for more
progress in these areas.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Good afternoon. How are you?
A few months ago, I had the unique opportunity to travel to
Libya right in the aftermath of that transition. It was
startling to watch pro-American graffiti on the walls, and
people walking up to you on the streets and thanking America.
They very clearly knew who was with them, and they also
very clearly knew who had turned their back on them. And I hope
that will pay dividends in the future.
We are now several months into that transition and the U.S.
involvement in it. So my question really is two part. No. 1 is
how is that going in terms of our role there, the money that we
are spending, and how the budget anticipates our ongoing
involvement with Libya?
And then the second question is one that is hopeful that
there will be a transition similar to that in Syria very soon,
and what lessons have we learned or are learning from the
Libyan experience that as far as what role we could play,
particularly in things like making sure that these
sophisticated weapons--MANPADS and so forth--don't fall in the
wrong hands, but also some of the other things that are going
on?
So, in essence, how is the transition in Libya going as far
as our role is concerned, and what lessons are we taking from
Libya, that could potentially be applied to a Syrian transition
hopefully very soon?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, thank you for that visit. I
remember very well getting briefed about it. And you are right.
I think the United States has a very important opportunity from
Libya through Tunisia through Algeria to Morocco. If we do what
we need to do in those four countries, we can really help them
move toward sustainable democracy, open up their economies, and
produce results for people.
Libya is more challenging because Gaddafi destroyed all
institutions. They don't have institutions that they can remove
people from and fill people with because it was such a
personality cult. They are making progress. The new Prime
Minister will be coming to visit in just a few weeks.
I would urge, if it is not already on the schedule, that he
meet with members of this committee and explain to you what he
is doing, what his government is doing. They have cooperated
with us on going after the MANPADS. We have implemented a plan
that we worked through with them, and we are also working with
them to fulfill their signing of the conventional weapons
destruction technical arrangement. So they have been very
cooperative.
We know they faced problems in combining all of the
militias into a coherent, organized military presence. We are
certainly supporting them in their efforts to do so. I think
that we have got a chance here to really respond to their very
positive attitude toward the United States. This is something
that can bring dividends in not only how they develop, but in
our own standing and leadership in the region.
Reintegrating these militia members into civilian life and
into the security services is the biggest challenge. They are
getting their economy up and going. We are working with them on
trying to help with their wounded warriors, something that is,
I know, important to several members of the Senate.
The people in Libya seem still to be quite optimistic about
how things are going. But it is like starting from scratch.
They really are working as hard as they can, and I think it is
in our interest to support them.
With respect to Syria, it is a much more difficult and
complicated set of circumstances. I recently returned from a
meeting in Tunis, where about 70 countries and organizations
were present to try to plot a way forward on Syria. The
potential of supporting the political transition, the
humanitarian assistance that they need, ratcheting up
pressure--the EU just adopted more tougher sanctions
yesterday--is what we are all working on.
And then, as you know, there is a big debate about whether
there is a feasible way of trying to help the people who are
under assault by the Assad regime defend themselves.
So this is at an early stage, and there is a lot of good
work being done. But there is no plan yet that we can point to.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
And my last question is involving PEPFAR, which, as you
know, enjoys incredible bipartisan support here. I was pleased
to see earlier this year an increased commitment to the program
by the administration. Would the current budget projections,
which I think has some level of reduction, keep us on track for
the goal of putting 6 million people on life-sustaining
treatments by 2013? Does it keep us on that trajectory?
Secretary Clinton. It does, and I would welcome the
opportunity to provide you with more specific information. But
I just wanted briefly to say that we have brought down the cost
of the drugs dramatically. We have also leveraged American
support for the Global Fund to do the same. So I am confident
we are on the track to bringing down the number of infections
and bringing up the number of people on treatment.
And as you referenced, Senator, we do have a chance to have
an AIDS-free generation because the evidence is compelling that
treating people very early helps to prevent AIDS. And the
request that we have given to you will give us the maximum
impact in our investment in fighting HIV-AIDS.
But I will give you details on it because this has had
bipartisan support. This was a really historic program started
under the Bush administration, begun by President Bush, fully
supported on a bipartisan basis. It buys us so much goodwill.
You really--if you go to sub-Saharan Africa, it is one of the
reason why people have a positive view of the United States.
So we think we are on track, but I will give you additional
information on that.
[The written information from by the State Department
follows:]
The PEPFAR budget will indeed allow for such a goal. The FY 2013
request for PEPFAR bilateral programs is $4.54 billion, including HHS
appropriation for HIV/AIDS, accompanied by a contribution to the Global
Fund of $1.65 billion. PEPFAR is confident that these plans provide
sufficient resources to bilateral programs to keep PEPFAR on target to
meet its goal, announced by the President on World AIDS Day, to provide
treatment for 6 million people by 2013.
In FY 2013, PEPFAR will continue efforts to support greater impact
and efficiency through smart investments, improve the quality of
collect data, and ensure that country programs continue to reflect the
realities of the epidemic at the local level so that we can target our
investments to maximize impact. PEPFAR has reduced the cost of
treatment per person per year from over $1,100 to $335. Lower costs of
drugs, bulk purchasing, and simple changes like shipping medication by
ground instead of air have reduced the cost of treatment. Given the
efficiencies that PEPFAR has built into its system, we will be able to
reach this goal under this budget.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, I have to apologize for having missed
your opening remarks. I was presiding over the Senate at the
time, a chore which I am sure you well remember.
Secretary Clinton. I do.
Senator Webb. Let me begin by expressing my agreement with
your words of caution about the Syrian situation. It is
enormously complex, geographically, culturally, diplomatically,
and I think we are right to try to proceed very carefully
forward, no matter what we end up doing.
In fact, one of the more clarifying moments of my life was
when I was a journalist in Beirut in 1983, and you remember how
complicated that was. And in the middle of a very complicated
firefight, a Marine turned around to me and said, ``Sir, never
get involved in a five-sided argument.''
I would like to ask you a couple of questions with respect
to this region. First, I am interested in learning more about
this Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund. There is $770
million in the budget request for that fund, and that comes on
top of other programs, such as about $2 billion for the OPIC,
and $1 billion in debt swaps to Egypt, about $500 million in
existing funds being reallocated, and the considerable moneys
we give to other countries in the region.
I am just curious to learn from you what programmatic and
particular ways you see that fund as working?
Secretary Clinton. This fund idea came out of two
experiences, Senator. One experience about what happened this
past year when we were constantly trying to carve out money to
respond to the emerging needs in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and
how we could make sure we were demonstrating leadership,
whether it was humanitarian leadership, or in the case of
trying to create enterprise funds, debt swaps, the kinds of
things that would send a clear message to these new Arab
transformations that we were on their side.
The second source of experience is what we did at the fall
of the Soviet Union. Back in 1989, for example, we had support
for democracy in Eastern Europe, where we provided assistance
for Hungary and Poland at a $1 billion fund level, and it gave
us flexibility. We could be agile about it.
So what we are asking here is to give us some of that
flexibility. We would obviously come back to the Congress and
notify the Congress. We would look at projects based on
rigorous analysis as to what could work, helping the democratic
transformation.
I just came back from Tunisia, and here is an Islamist
government that is saying all the right things on human rights,
on women's rights, on economic reform. They have a huge budget
gap by their standard. It is a billion dollars.
That is a huge budget gap.
They have a very well thought-out plan about how they are
going to reform their economy, open it up. But they have to get
some help from where they are to where they are headed. And
they just basically said, ``What can the United States do for
us, and can you help us then leverage what you can do with
other countries?''
Well, that is the kind of request that we want to respond
to because it is in our interest to do so. So the fund would
complement existing bilateral and regional programs, but it
would give us flexibility to look and be as smart as possible.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
We have got about $12 billion in this budget request going
to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, at least by our staff's
count. You are about $4.8 billion into Iraq; $2.8 billion of
that for diplomatic funds, embassy, consulates, et cetera.
About $4.6 billion into Afghanistan, and $2.4 billion into
Pakistan; this actually reflects an increase in funding for
Pakistani military, as compared to last year.
The first question I have on this goes to some
correspondence that we initiated out of our office last year
that expresses concern about how Pakistan has been expanding
its nuclear program, even as our assistance programs have
continued over these years, and wanting to know whether we have
a firewall in the moneys that are going into Pakistan so that
they don't directly, or indirectly, assist in expansion of
their nuclear program.
Secretary Clinton. Well, we certainly have constructed one.
I think the fair question is, even with a firewall, if you
provide aid for other purposes, does that permit the government
then to divert funds that should be spent for health,
education, energy, et cetera, to that program? And it remains a
serious concern of mine, Senator.
You know, part of our ongoing and very tough dialogue with
Pakistan is around the reforms they need to make for their own
people. They have invested the great bulk of their revenues
into their military establishment, including their nuclear
program, to the great cost of providing basic education, health
care, electricity, the kinds of things that would demonstrate
to the people of Pakistan they had a government that, No. 1,
cared about them and, No. 2, produced for them.
So I can answer the direct question, yes, we have a
firewall. But that isn't the end of the dialogue, as you know
very well. And we are going to keep pressing hard to make sure
that the IMF and the World Bank and we and others are working
toward the kind of reforms that are going to stabilize Pakistan
for the long term.
Senator Webb. Well, I hope we can continue to focus on
that. We may have some more dialogue.
I had a number of discussions with Admiral Mullen on this
subject, and it is something that I think we should put at one
of our highest security priorities. And I understand how that
could be taken in a different way from the Pakistani side, but
you can't not look at the way that they have expanded their
nuclear program and not want to try to figure out whether we
are indirectly assisting it; that would clearly not be in our
national interest.
I am running out of time. So I am just going to say that I
hope we can find the right kind of off-ramps in terms of the
amount of money that we are spending in these transitional
occupations and contingency operations--like we have in Iraq
and Afghanistan--for the good of our own country and the good
of our budget, but in a way that doesn't destabilize the
region.
And again, I apologize for not being here at the beginning,
and I appreciate everything you have been doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, on the last question on
the off ramps, we are very committed to that, and I would like
to have our team come and brief you. And if you have any ideas
about that, I certainly would welcome them. And I also want to
publicly thank you for the great preliminary ground work you
did with respect to Burma. It made a big difference.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, and I will look forward
to that meeting with some of your people.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, thank you for the way you have
represented us around the world and for being here today. I
certainly agree with you that American power is a stabilizing
force around the world, and I am sure you will agree with me
that any perception of American weakness is a destabilizing
force around the world.
And in some circles today, I think because of a perception
that we are overextended, in financial trouble here at home,
and maybe tired of wars and intervention, that our
determination to continue to be a stabilizing force is in
question. As I look at your budget and budgets, I guess,
throughout the Federal Government now, I have to look at it not
so much as I once did as what we want to do or what we should
do, but what we are financially able to do, given the fact that
probably half of the money that we will be spending through the
State Department is either borrowed or printed money. So we
have got to make that money work for us.
And I agree with your priority, certainly, of facilitating
and expediting international business travel, trade, and energy
supplies are key to Americans' interests. But I do question
just looking at history that our attempts to, let us say, buy
friends in a lot of parts of the world have not appeared as
successful. It does seem that countries we have spent decades
supporting are willing to turn on us relatively quickly.
So I am very concerned that how we spend our money,
particularly the fact that we don't have enough to do the
things we need to do domestically. And so, I have a number of
questions about the budget, but I will just turn to one of them
because maybe it will shed some light on others. Again, this in
the context of our money meaning something and that we mean
what we say.
As you know, last year the United States pulled its funds
for UNESCO in accordance to United States law when the
organization decided to grant membership to Palestine. And they
have not changed their position on Palestine, but the
administration is now requesting $78 million and a waiver from
Congress in order to fund UNESCO.
So I would just like you to take a minute to explain why we
are changing, if we are, previous policy and asking for a
waiver of United States laws instead of insisting that they
comply with really U.N. agreements about Palestine that has
been going on for decades.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you.
Our position is absolutely clear that there cannot be any
premature recognition of Palestinians in any international body
because that is not a way to bring about a lasting peace
through a negotiation over a two-state solution. And we
believed, as we said at the time, that Palestinian membership
in UNESCO was premature and unhelpful in the overall goal that
we were seeking.
We continue to make that clear. We tell everyone that we
are against it and that we have legislation that requires us to
withdraw.
Now the State Department does believe that some benefits
accrue to the United States in membership in these
organizations. And as was pointed out in my earlier hearing
before the Senate Foreign Ops Subcommittee of the
Appropriations Committee, Israel remains a member of UNESCO,
despite the Palestinian membership. And in our conversations
with Israelis, they basically point out that there are a number
of areas where UNESCO action is helpful to the Israelis.
We have very clear instructions from our legislation, but
we also think it is in America's interests to do things like
Holocaust education programs, which UNESCO does, stand up for
the freedom of press and expression. So the waiver would give
us the opportunity to evaluate specific circumstances, and it
would also give us the chance to react if, by some unforeseen
circumstance, some of the major U.N. organizations, like the
World Health Organization or the International Atomic Energy
Agency, were to be so wrongheaded to extend membership. Those
are organizations that we really have a big stake in.
So the policy is one we agree with. We obviously follow the
legislation. But as we have done in many situations over the
years, providing some national security waiver would allow us
to make case-by-case decisions.
Senator DeMint. But aren't you afraid that this is going to
send a signal to United Nations, to the whole world that our
threats don't mean anything? I mean, we warned UNESCO not to
take this action. You warned them personally.
And for us less than a year later to come back and say,
well, never mind, we are going to fund you again, it just seems
like we are just telling the world that our words don't mean
anything.
Secretary Clinton. You know, I think, Senator, that all of
these issues that we are confronted with have different
factors. Certainly, we have made it abundantly clear that we
would stand in the way at the Security Council to any attempt
to try to provide a shortcut to the Palestinians. That is the
real issue to me is that they will never be a member of the
United Nations unless they negotiate a solution with Israel.
We do worry that there are a lot of initiatives that are
undertaken by these organizations that directly help Israel,
directly contribute to the potential for negotiations, and then
there are other actions that are very much in the United States
interests. I mean, if there were some new flu virus that arose
out of somewhere in the world that was killing people on the
way to the United States, working with the World Health
Organization would be in the interests of our people.
So I agree with you that we have taken a stand. It is based
on our law. But we can't predict the future, and I think some
flexibility that would be only exercised very prudently might
be worthwhile considering.
Senator DeMint. Thank you. And thanks again for your
service.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I want to echo my colleagues' thanks for
all of your effective and hard-working service for our country
around the world.
And I would also like to just echo what you had to say
about the role that our embassies play around the world in
promoting American trade and business interests. My office had
the opportunity to help organize a trade mission to India, and
the business people who went on that mission would not have had
the same prospects for meetings, for opportunities to do future
business without the support from our Embassy in India.
So thank you very much for that effort.
As I look at the top five recipients of U.S. foreign
assistance, and Senator Lugar read those earlier, No. 2 on that
list is Afghanistan, which has been in the headlines in the
last several weeks because of concerns about trust between the
United States and Afghanistan. Certainly on the military side,
there have been concerns raised about whether our strategy of
being able to turn over security to the Afghan forces has been
an effective one.
And I wonder if you could talk about what you are seeing on
the economic foreign assistance side and whether you see those
same kinds of strains and what concerns you have about how our
efforts there are working.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you for the kind
comments about the work of the Embassy in India. And I well
remember how difficult it was for you, having planned such an
excellent trip, and then being kept because of Senate business
unable to go. But that is what we like to do to try to promote
that kind of interaction, and we think it pays off.
With respect to Afghanistan, we do see progress on the
civilian side in terms of what our investment and the
investments of our partners has brought. There is still a very
long way to go. But if you look at health indicators, maternal
mortality has dropped significantly in Afghanistan, and I think
that that could not have been possible without investments on
the part of the United States and others, but also a real
commitment on the part of Afghans themselves--education,
energy, infrastructure.
So we do see progress. But I hasten to add we see a lot of
instability, and we see a very difficult road ahead for
Afghanistan.
The transition that is agreed to, to have the end of combat
missions and troops in 2014, is one that we are working to try
to support because like we saw in Iraq, when 2014 comes and
troops leave from NATO ISAF, the civilians in the United States
and other countries will be there and will be interacting with
the government, working with businesses, with citizen groups.
So we are intent upon doing everything we can to try to
strengthen those parts of the equation.
It is a difficult environment, but I think if you, as I did
recently, talk to hundreds of our civilians who are serving
across Afghanistan and asked them what they were doing on rule
of law, on women's empowerment, and so much else, they are
proud of what they are doing. They feel like they are making a
difference. So we have to protect them, and we have to enable
them to continue to do what they need to do and to be prepared
with whatever the right size mission is for our relationship
after 2014.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
As you know, we have a really serious situation in Egypt.
It also has been in the headlines, as a number of very
effective NGOs, their employees have been arrested, their
records have been taken. I wonder if you could speak both to
the situation there and what we think the prospects are for an
effective resolution that releases those Americans who are
being held and allows those NGOs to continue to do their work
or not.
But also speak to it in the context of the effort that we
have spent in Egypt over the years in terms of providing
foreign assistance, and again, it is in the top five of those
countries receiving foreign assistance, and how we explain to
the American public about the effectiveness of that foreign
assistance and what they are currently seeing being expressed
by Egyptians in the news today.
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, as you know, Senator, the
great majority of our foreign assistance over the last three
decades has been to the Egyptian military, and it did create a
very positive working relationship that was certainly to the
benefit of the Camp David accords enforcement and the peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel and also to the United States.
And it helped greatly in avoiding what we are now seeing in
Syria when the Egyptian revolution began. Long ties between
American and Egyptian officers played an instrumental role in
encouraging the Egyptian military not to intervene and cause a
great bloodbath in the streets of Egypt.
With respect to our NGOs, we think they have been working
in good faith to support Egyptian aspirations, the transition
to democracy. They are respected organizations. They have been
working in Egypt with a goal of trying to assist in all the
work that needs to be done, such as holding elections.
They don't favor a group. They don't favor individuals.
They are providing what we would call nonpartisan education and
information.
We are working very hard to resolve this NGO problem. We
have had a lot of tough conversations with various Egyptian
leaders, and we hope that we will see a resolution soon.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
My time has expired, but I do want to let you know that I
will be submitting for the record some specific questions about
the NATO summit coming up in Chicago in May. I think it offers
a tremendous opportunity for us to highlight the still critical
economic and security ties of our transatlantic partnership,
and so look forward to your responses.
Thank you.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Clinton, for joining us. I want to
join the chorus that you have heard from my colleagues praising
you for your hard work on our country's service.
Every time I watch the news, I wonder whether they ever
allow you to sleep. I hope they do.
Senator Lee. But rest assured, the American taxpayer is
getting his money's worth out of your service, and I appreciate
the hard work you have put in.
I want to follow up, first of all, on some of Senator
Shaheen's questions about Egypt. You know, in your fiscal year
2013 request, there is a request for an additional sum, going
up from $1.5 billion in the previous fiscal year to $1.56
billion for Egypt.
And I am wondering what level of cooperation do you feel
like we are getting out of Egypt in exchange for that? And
specifically, do you feel like Egypt has shown a commitment to
honoring its treaty obligations with Israel?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, I do. To that last question, we
have no evidence or even any intention expressed by different
centers of power within Egypt that any decision has been made
not to, and we have no evidence that there is any concern there
yet. We obviously consult closely with the Egyptians and the
Israelis about the challenges they face in the Sinai, for
example.
So, at this time, Senator, that is not yet a concern that
we have to address. We also believe that they have carried out
credible elections, and that was no easy task, given where they
started. But we have to judge them on what they both say and
what they do. And they don't yet have their government in
place.
So we are really unable to draw conclusions until we see
the new Parliament acting, until they hold elections for their
President, and then we will have more data on which to make
decisions.
Senator Lee. OK. And you feel like the aid that we give to
Egypt is a component of that? That is part of what is keeping
them maintaining the buy-in with respect to those hard-fought
treaty obligations, the treaty obligations that we and Israel
had so long hoped for need to be kept intact.
Do you feel like that is strengthening that position?
Secretary Clinton. It certainly has historically, and
again, sitting here today, I have no evidence on which to draw
any other conclusion. But I also know that we are going to
learn a lot more about the new government in the months ahead,
and we will be very vigilant.
But at the end of the day, I think Egyptians understand
that peace is in their interests, and they have a lot of work
to do to build their economy, to get their democracy up and
going. If I were certainly in their shoes, I would not be
wanting to abrogate agreements and cause problems when my plate
was already more than full.
Senator Lee. Good. And if they call you for advice on that,
I hope you will counsel them along those lines.
Secretary Clinton. I have said that.
Senator Lee. I want to turn to a study that was conducted
last year by the British Government. The name of the study, I
believe, was the Multilateral Aid Review. In that study, the
British Government undertook an examination of the performance
of various U.N. organizations against criteria including cost
control, delivery of outcome, transparency, and other related
factors.
The review found that performance was severely deficient
among several of these U.N. entities, including the
International Labor Organization, U.N. Habitat, and the Food
and Agriculture Organization. It found the performance, in
fact, so poor on those criteria that the British Government
chose to withdraw at least its core funding to those same
programs.
And the British Government also concluded that various
other U.N. entities, while not scoring quite as bad as those,
were jeopardized enough that they recommended that ``as a
matter of absolute urgency,'' the U.N. implement special
measures to try to improve those programs.
So my question for you is with the United States continuing
to provide support to the U.N., including these same programs,
do you feel like the U.S. funding toward those programs is
being utilized responsibly? Is it money well spent?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, we are a staunch supporter of
U.N. reform, and we have made it very clear that we expect
reforms at the level of the U.N. and at every constituent
group. We led efforts to cut the size of the 2012-2013 U.N.
budget. We are pushing them to be more efficient.
So we do think that the U.N. does an enormous amount of
good work, work that helps to share the burden of everything
from peacekeeping to keeping airplanes safe in the sky. They do
a lot of very important work. But they have got to reform, and
they have got to adapt to the expectations of more
accountability and transparency in their operations.
So we are adamant about that, and we are going to continue
to press it. We have made some progress in the last year or
two, but I am not satisfied. We have to expect more.
Senator Lee. What reviews, if any, has the State Department
conducted or will the State Department be conducting that are
comparable to this Multilateral Aid Review conducted by the
British Government?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we participated in a number of
such reviews. I will take that for the record and give you a
full accounting of that. The British Government, through their
development agency, conducted their own review, but we have
been involved in supporting independent high-level reviews, and
I would be glad to provide that to you.
[The written information from the State Department
follows:]
We greatly value your concern and assure you that we are working
very diligently to promote transparency, effectiveness, and
accountability across the spectrum of multilateral agencies to ensure
the most effective use of our aid. This issue is, and will remain, one
of our top priorities. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) evaluated the
effectiveness of various agencies in advancing the U.K.'s national
development priorities and contributed to the ongoing international
effort to promote results.
U.S. vision and leadership have been crucial to building consensus
for reform, making progress on concrete initiatives, and preventing
complacency and ``business as usual'' at the U.N. As the largest
financial contributor to the U.N., the U.S. is committed to ensuring
the funds are spent wisely and not wasted. Most significantly, we led
efforts to achieve a 5-percent cut in the size of the 2012-13 U.N.
regular budget, resulting in a savings to American taxpayers of as much
as $100 million, and representing the first time in 14 years--and only
the second time in the last 50 years--that the General Assembly has
approved a regular budget level below the previous biennium's final
appropriation. More specifically, we also advanced the estalishment of
a new U.N. agency called U.N. Women, combining four separate U.N.
offices into one stronger, streamlined and more efficient entity
working to support and empower women worldwide.
Although we do not produce a single product akin to the MAR, we are
working on all fronts to ensure close oversight of United States
funding to United Nations bodies and to promote their capacity to audit
or evaluate themselves. For instance, our support of the U.N. Office of
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) has been critical to it being a
strong and independent watchdog of taxpayer funds, and we spearheaded
efforts to strengthen OIOS through the creation of a new Assistant
Secretary General to serve as a deputy and help lead this vital office.
We have worked with great effect to ensure that audits and evaluations
produced by U.N. organizations, including UNDP and UNICEF, are made
available to donors.
The Department has spearheaded many reforms of U.N. agencies
through Phases I and II of the U.S.-sponsored United Nations
Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI), which targets areas
where member states can increase oversign and accountability and ensure
that contributions are utilized efficiently and effectively. For
example, when we launced UNTAI Phase I in 2007, most U.N. organizations
did not disclose their internal audit reports, and many lacked an
ethics and integrity framework. As a result of robut U.S. engagement
between 2007 and 2010, 10 U.N. organizations decided to make their
internal audit reports available to member states, 7 established
independent ethics functions, 3 implemented credible whistleblower
protections programs, and 4 began requiring their senior officials and
staff with fiduciary or procurement responsibilities to disclose their
financial interests. The Food and Agriculture Organization and
International Telecommunication Union were two of the most improved
U.N. agencies during Phase I. In Phase II of UNTAI, U.N. organizations
continue to make progress on oversight and ethics reforms. Reforms of
internal evaluation procurement, and risk management, which are new
goals under Phase II, are in their early stages, and work is ongoing
across the U.N. system to make progress.
We also constantly monitor U.N. organizations' practices,
especially with regard to their results frameworks, evaluations, and
evidence-based decisionmaking. We also utilize findings from
effectiveness reviews conducted byindependent entities, such as the
Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). We
have regularly attended MOPAN meetings, which focus on the Nework's
effectiveness reviews of various multilateral organizations, and we
will continue to support such independent reviews in the future.
These diverse efforts expand our knowledge base and help us make
more informed recommendations regarding our own budgetary allocations.
Our assessment of agencies' performance and their commitment to reform
will remain an important factor in those recommendations. As a result
of our efforts, U.N. organizations continue to make progress in terms
of oversight, ethics, and financial reforms, and we will continue these
efforts to ensure accountability and effectiveness.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much.
I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary, for your outstanding
service. You have demonstrated, I think, really remarkable
leadership and vision in a very difficult time in world
history, and I just want to applaud you and the administration
for leading a strong foreign policy that is based not just on
defense, but also diplomacy and development.
I was grateful for the chance to witness firsthand your
leadership on a joint delegation trip to Liberia for the
inauguration of President Johnson Sirleaf.
I think it is critical that the United States continue to
demonstrate support for democratically elected leaders in
Africa as well as in other places in the world, to encourage
the rule of law and good governance, and I am also grateful you
continue to elevate, as you did today, economic statecraft and
development among the five principal priorities you put forward
this year.
A number of the Senators who preceded me have touched on
issues of real concern to me--Alan Gross's case in Cuba, Iran
sanctions and making sure we continue to press them, the path
forward with Egypt. There has been lots of good ground covered,
and I want to associate myself with Senator Rubio's comments
about PEPFAR and its importance.
But as the Africa Subcommittee chair, I just wanted to
move, if I could, to the twin concerns of trade and governance
and how an American values agenda around governance and
transparency and rule of law also helps promote economic
opportunity, economic statecraft, as you put it.
You recently commented at the first-ever State Department
Global Business Conference how America's foreign policy can
champion U.S. business abroad and drive recovery here at home.
Describe for me, if you would, in a little detail the tools for
pursuing these critically important objectives in Africa, in
particular in this FY13 budget request, and what we are doing
around trade and investment for the United States. And then, if
we could, go on to a question about governance and how these
two connect.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you. And thanks for
your passion and commitment to Africa, and thanks for traveling
with us to Liberia.
I think that is an excellent question. You posed it with
respect to Africa. It obviously could be more generalized.
But speaking about Africa specifically, our approach
combines several different tools. First, trade missions to
Africa. Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson just took a large
delegation of American energy firms to Africa to meet with
government officials, to meet with utility companies and
businesses to talk about how the products and expertise of
American energy companies could really enhance development of
the energy sector in Africa.
Second, we are doing a lot of other energy work through our
newly constituted Energy Bureau because Africa is so blessed
with energy resources that are either not developed or
underdeveloped and underutilized or being developed in ways
that are not good for sustainable development. So we are
interacting at the highest levels of government to try to work
on that.
Third, the African Growth and Opportunities Act is a
tremendous tool, and we have actively worked the last 3 years
to help countries take better advantage of it. A lot of
countries that are members don't really utilize it to the
fullest and also to work with countries that could benefit from
it.
We have the Partnership for Growth. We have the Feed the
Future. We have the Global Health Initiative. These are
development objectives, but they are development objectives
that are really focused on enhancing the capacity in African
nations. The Millennium Challenge Grants, which are operating
in Africa, do some of the same work.
We also have encouraged greater regional integration, like
the development in East Africa of a kind of a common market
among some of the countries. We would like to see that all over
the continent. I mean, if African nations would open up their
borders to one another, if they would trade with one another,
knock down barriers, if they would develop transportation
networks, that would add dramatically to the ability of
Africans to reap economic benefits.
And the final thing I would say is probably no part of the
world has benefited more from the advance in information
technology, particularly wireless technology, especially mobile
phones, than Africa. So we have a lot of interesting
initiatives under way to help people do mobile banking, to help
them get linked into the futures markets on their mobile
phones. Just all kinds of really innovative ways that we have
promoted both from outside, but also from within by running
contests for young African entrepreneurs.
So, I mean, I could go on for a long time. But it is a very
important part of our agenda for Africa.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary.
And let me transition then to the other part of what I
think is our shared agenda for Africa, which is promoting
America's core commitment to transparency, to rule of law, to
democracy, to Internet freedom, to human rights.
Many of us were relieved that Senegal's elections proceeded
without significant violence, but it raises the ongoing
question, whether in Uganda, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, or
Zimbabwe, of national leaders who have either manipulated
constitutions or avoided really free and fair elections on a
continent where there has been steady progress toward democracy
in the last decade.
What can we do to encourage and sustain good governance in
Africa? What priorities are reflected in this 2013 budget in
that regard, and then what can we be doing together that will
help bring together these twin strands?
One of the most striking things Senator Isakson and I saw,
for example, in Nigeria was how that mobile phone revolution
you are talking about made possible transparent elections in
Nigeria in just the same way that they are making possible
access to the marketplace, information for small farmers in
Ghana. So how are we advancing the American values agenda in
Africa?
Secretary Clinton. Well, you are right to point out what
technology has meant because we have invested in helping
countries modernize their voting systems, making elections more
transparent. We did a lot of work in Kenya, and the
constitutional referendum there really demonstrated the impact
that technology can have because we were able to get technology
widely distributed, get votes counted without going through a
lot of hands.
So we are emphasizing use of technology to empower citizens
to hold their governments more accountable, to have elections
that are free, fair, and credible. We are also pushing very
hard on how we interact with leaders in Africa by supporting
those who are legitimately elected, like President Ouattara in
Cote d'Ivoire.
There was a case where there was a credible election. He
was elected, and the former President Gbagbo wouldn't leave.
Well, we weighed in very heavily.
So we are trying to demonstrate that our commitment to
technology, our commitment to elections, our commitment to good
governance go hand in hand with what we think Africans across
the continent want, which is more effective functioning
societies that give them a chance at a better future.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
I have additional questions I will submit for the record
about Nigeria, Somalia, the Sahel, others.
Thank you so much for your appearance before this committee
today, and thank you for your leadership.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
Let me just take a moment to thank you for your tremendous
energy and diligence and enthusiasm in your leadership of the
African Affairs Subcommittee. It has been really terrific and
much appreciated by the committee.
We are down to the hard core here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Udall has been here from the opening gavel to the
last question, and I am happy to recognize him.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Kerry.
And thank you, Secretary Clinton, for being here. Thank you
for your stamina. I think you have been here for more than 2
hours, and I really appreciate that, you taking some final
questions here.
And it seems to me, in listening to your travels, that you
may be one of our most traveling Secretaries of State, and you
may have set some records there. So I know all of us very much
appreciate that.
I have been a proponent of an accelerated transition in
Afghanistan, and I believe it is important that Afghans begin
to take a lead role in protecting their country so they can
begin to gain the experience and the capability before the
drawdown of United States forces is completed. And I believe
this will help stabilize Afghanistan and lead to a faster
drawdown of United States combat forces.
And I don't believe, Madam Secretary, as some have
asserted, that this means abandoning Afghanistan. I believe a
strong diplomatic training in counterterrorism will likely be
necessary to support the developing Afghan Government.
What I am wondering about is whether the State Department
has begun considering what Secretary Panetta posed recently
about accelerating the transition of combat responsibilities to
Afghans by mid or early 2013. Has the State Department been
considering this option? What are its implications?
Do you look forward to what is going to happen with the
NATO summit in May in Chicago? Is that going to be a part of
the discussion that occurs there?
Secretary Clinton. It certainly will. We agreed with all of
our NATO ISAF partners to have a transition that would,
beginning a year ago, transfer lead responsibility to Afghan
security. We are doing that. We are transferring districts
throughout Afghanistan on a regular basis.
We also know that there has to be continuing training in
order to equip the security forces to do what they are expected
to do. So this is an agreed-upon transition sequence that was
adopted at the Lisbon conference, is being worked through on
both the military and civilian sides, will be further refined
in Chicago, and we are certainly geared up to follow through on
that.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
The issue in your opening statement came up where you
talked about pivoting to Asia, and we know that the President
has talked about Marines in Australia. I know you recently gave
a speech talking about the South China Sea and activities
there.
Could you just talk in a broad, general way about what this
actually means for the United States to put more of an emphasis
in the Pacific? Are we talking about containment of China? I
mean, how does China relate to this whole thing, and what roles
are we trying to fulfill?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think, Senator, we have always
considered ourselves so blessed by geography that we were both
an Atlantic and a Pacific power, and that unique position has
granted the United States significant strategic advantages that
have been accompanied by economic benefits and so much else.
But because of our heavy emphasis starting on 9/11 in going
after those who attacked us, also the war in Iraq, the broader
emphasis on the Middle East, there were many in Asia who
thought that we were either by intention or by default
abandoning our leadership role in the Pacific, and it was our
intent to reestablish that leadership role, which we have done.
We have initiated new strategic dialogues in the region. We
became a full and active partner in strengthening our alliances
in ASEAN and APEC. We have joined the East Asia summit. We have
signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. We began the Lower
Mekong Initiative to work with countries that are dependent
upon the Mekong.
We have got great deal of work going on with Indonesia and
the Philippines. We have the major trade agreement with Korea.
We came to the aid of our good ally, Japan, after their
disasters. We are having this opening to Burma.
We are actively involved in what is going on in the Asia-
Pacific because we think it is very much in America's interest
to be so. And that includes being able to project both civilian
and military power. And as we looked at where we had forces
operating, we saw some gaps, and that is what the President
addressed on his recent trip to Australia.
We think that there is a great deal for America to gain by
being very much involved in and supporting the incredible
growth of the region. So that is what we are positioned to do.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
I just returned several weeks ago, maybe about a month ago
from India. And we had an excellent trip, and one of the things
that was remarkable was seeing the activity out in the villages
and seeing the cooking and seeing the pollution by the way they
cook. And I know that you have been a real advocate of these
kind of modern stoves that if they are utilized, I think, do a
lot of things from pollution to using less fuel, to make it a
healthier home and all that.
Could you just, in the last couple of seconds we have left
here, describe how you are doing that and what you are doing.
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, let me thank you for caring
about that, Senator, and asking a question about it. Because it
is one of those long-term projects that I think has tremendous
payoff, but it is not in the headlines. So thank you, sir.
We are actively driving an initiative we helped to put
together called the Global Cookstove Alliance, or the Alliance
for Global Cookstoves. We are working with dozens of other
countries, with the United Nations and organizations to help
create a market for cleaner burning cookstoves in developing
countries because you are right. This has tremendous benefits.
It cuts down on respiratory illnesses for women and
children. It also helps keep the environment clean by cutting
down the soot, the black carbon that goes into the atmosphere.
It is a security issue to the extent that many women and girls
are put at risk when they go out to gather fuel in many of
these countries.
So we have looked at the data. The National Institutes of
Health has been one of our partners. That in terms of cleaning
up the atmosphere, reducing health costs, this is one of the
most effective approaches we could take.
For anybody who is really interested, maybe you or some of
the staff would be interested, we have a display of clean
cookstoves in the State Department that we just opened a few
days ago because we want people to know what we are talking
about.
And when I was in India, I was in Chennai, we had an
exhibit set up and we are working some Indian universities that
are actually taking measurements of the pollution that goes
into women and children's lungs and also into the atmosphere.
That is related to an announcement we made last week that in
our effort to try to help the environment, the United States
has joined with five other countries in setting up a new
coalition to fight the climate forcers, the short-term climate
forcers--methane, soot, black carbon, et cetera. And
cookstoves, obviously, are part of that.
So, again, this is the kind of initiative that I think is
worth investing in. It will pay dividends down the road. It is
not a quick fix, but it is something that we are able to do
with public-private partnerships.
Senator Udall. Thank you for your efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thanks, Senator Udall. And thanks
for your patience.
Senator Lugar, do you have anything additional?
This hearing has taken a little longer, and I apologize,
Madam Secretary. But thank you for being patient and staying
with us.
We are going to keep the record open for a week.
There is one additional issue I just want to raise with you
very quickly. I know you are very familiar with the case of
Colin Bower, my constituent from Massachusetts whose two
children were taken illegally from Massachusetts against court
order and taken to Egypt. And he has had, as you know, an
extraordinarily difficult time trying to get resolution of
this.
I raise this at the end of the hearing not because it is of
last importance, but I want the Embassy and the Egyptian
Government to take note that this is increasingly a concern
among colleagues about respect for law and respect for family
and an individual parent's rights, as well as the sort of
international legal system.
So I hope we can continue to have that issue raised in the
context of your diplomacy, and we will continue to raise it,
obviously.
A final comment I would just say to all of you who are
wearing the yellow jackets here, I want to express my respect
for and appreciation for the way in which you have been present
today. Yours is an issue that is of note to all of us, and we
are concerned about it and pursuing thoughtful approaches to
it. But I am particularly appreciative for the respectful way
in which you have taken part in this hearing, and we thank you
for that.
Madam Secretary, thank you so much for being with us today.
We stand adjourned.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question (#1a-c). In July 2011, you announced the New Silk Road
(NSR) initiative, a long-term economic vision to transform Afghanistan
into a hub of transport and trade, connecting markets in India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. In December 2011 the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's majority staff released a report that
recommended several concrete steps for implementing NSR.
Please describe the FY 2013 spend plan for NSR.
Of the twenty NSR investment projects, which ones is the
United States prioritizing with other donors? Is the
administration casting a broad net or focusing on a few
specific projects that stand the greatest chance of success?
What big-ticket infrastructure projects is the United States
supporting? Which projects is the United States supporting that
will focus on removing barriers to continental transport and
trade?
Most of the projects envisioned under NSR will take 3 to 10
years to yield results. Which projects is the United States
supporting that will deliver results in the near term,
demonstrate the potential of this strategy, and help broaden
political support to sustain longer term U.S. engagement?
Answer. We appreciated the Senate Foreign Relations Majority Staff
Committee report of 19 December, 2011 ``Central Asia and the Transition
in Afghanistan.'' Our New Silk Road vision calls for an Afghanistan
that is economically reintegrated into its region, at the center of web
of transportation and trade linkages. We particularly appreciate your
recommendation to extend the New Silk Road vision beyond Afghanistan,
and both USAID and State are working on this challenge.
Because the New Silk Road vision is not a list of infrastructure
projects, it does not have an associated spend plan. However, you
should be aware that Mission Kabul will complete in late May a Program
Review to ensure that U.S. civilian assistance programming for
Afghanistan is fully in line with policy and Administrator Shah's
sustainability guidance, including to ensure projects are cost
effective and contribute to our transition objectives. The review will
discuss the need to identify institutional, governance, and policy
factors critical to the success of program initiatives.
Again, our New Silk Road vision is not a list of infrastructure
projects, but an organizing principle. We are very pleased to see
Afghanistan and its regional partners will come together at the fifth
Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA V) in
Dushanbe March 26-28. At RECCA, Afghanistan and its regional partners
will identify 15 hard and soft infrastructure programs that would
foster greater regional economic integration. Among these 15 projects,
several focus on cross-border issues, including Customs harmonization
and greater coordination between chambers of commerce. The Dushanbe
Declaration will stress the importance of a comprehensive regional
approach to challenges faced by the region, and emphasize the
importance of encouraging private sector investment as a driver of
economic growth. We will continue to support efforts by Afghanistan and
its region to implement our New Silk Road vision.
Among the 15 proposed RECCA V projects, the United States has
already provided significant assistance and support. For example, we
have supported the rehabilitation of the Salang Tunnel, we continue to
encourage regional partners to make progress on the Turkmenistan
Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) pipeline, we continue to support the
CASA 1000 energy project, we have been instrumental in developing the
Afghan fiber optic ring, and we play an important role in encouraging
cross-border transit trade initiatives. All of these initiatives are in
line with our New Silk Road vision.
Question (#2a). In June 2011, the Department launched a new $4.1
million initiative known as ``CACI,'' or the Central Asia
Counternarcotics Initiative, to build local capacity and stimulate
regional cooperation on counternarcotics. CACI seeks to establish
vetted units and build counternarcotics task forces in the five Central
Asian countries, linking them with existing task forces in Russia and
Afghanistan.
The administration has requested $9.1 million in its FY 2013
budget for CACI. Please describe how this money will be spent.
Answer. The administration requested $9.0M for CACI in FY 2013.
These funds will be spent to: (1) cover the ongoing operational costs,
including salary supplements, communications costs, vehicle
maintenance, training, polygraph and other vetting procedures of
Central Asian personnel in the three vetted units that we anticipate
will be operational, under DEA oversight, during fiscal year 2013; (2)
provide additional funding support to the Kyrgyz and Tajikistan drug
control agencies; (3) provide funding support to the Central Asian
Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC); (4) contribute
to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Regional
Program for Counternarcotics in Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries
as it relates to the development of investigative capacities and drug
task force development; (5) support operational cooperation between
Afghanistan's Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and Central Asian
vetted units; and (6) contribute to the NATO-Russia Council
Counternarcotics Training Program for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Central Asia.
Question (#2b). How will CACI be implemented, given recent reports
that Russia has convinced Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) members not to participate?
Answer. While news reports have indicated that some unnamed
officials associated with some parts of the Russian Government, and
some officials associated with the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), are not supportive of CACI, the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has advised us that the government does not oppose
CACI but would like to have additional information about the
initiative. Two countries in Central Asia have endorsed CACI and one of
them has already agreed to establish a vetted unit. We are in
discussions with two others which have shown strong interest in vetted
units. However, we can only establish these units in countries where
DEA has a full-time presence. The process of finding space for DEA at
our embassies and processing NSDD-38 requests is ongoing as are
negotiations with governments in the region.
Question (#3). This committee encourages cross-border stabilization
and development programs between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between
each country and the five Central Asian republics. The committee's
December 2011 majority staff report on ``Central Asia and the
Transition in Afghanistan'' offers a number of specific cross-border
proposals.
Please describe in detail the FY 2013 plan for cross-border
projects between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between each
country and Central Asia.
Answer. The Senate Foreign Relations Majority Staff Committee
report of 19 December 2011, entitled ``Central Asia and the Transition
in Afghanistan'' notes the importance that the New Silk Road vision
extend beyond Afghanistan, and both USAID and State are working to
support national and regional efforts to advance this agenda.
Over the past decade, the United States has spent significant
diplomatic effort and assistance funding to support cross-border
linkages that support sustainable Afghan economic growth. We
aggressively supported Afghan and Pakistani efforts to negotiate and
sign the Afghan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) and now
continue to support efforts by the parties to resolve outstanding
implementation efforts. U.S. funding to support the Afghan
transportation sector is helping to bring online a new stretch of rail
line, recently funded by the Asian Development Bank, that extends
connections to Uzbekistan to Mazar-e-Sharif.
USAID support to the Afghan electrical grid and the electrical
utility (DABS) has made possible the purchase of Central Asian
electricity for distribution to major Afghan urban areas, including
Kabul, to the benefit of both Afghanistan and the supplier countries.
There are many other examples of U.S. support for projects that
facilitate cross-border economic cooperation over recent years.
Ambassador Morningstar is leading a complex diplomatic engagement
with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to make the TAPI
pipeline a reality. These countries are making significant progress
toward agreement on a pipeline that would link world-class gas reserves
in Turkmenistan with massive demand in South Asia, a concrete example
of our New Silk Road vision.
We also continue to support the Asian Development Bank's Central
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, which brings
together 10 countries and 6 multilateral agencies to focus on tangible
ways to promote cross-border synergies in the areas of trade,
transportation, and energy.
We recognize that there is more we can likely do, and greater
synergies we can pursue between our assistance programs in the
countries of the region. That is why USAID is convening a series of
regional meetings to discuss opportunities for cross-border projects
that might help reintegrate Afghanistan into both Central Asia and
South Asia, in the spirit of our New Silk Road vision. This planning
session will inform the FY 2013 plan for cross-border projects, which
is at the initial planning stages given that we recently submitted a
congressional budget justification.
Question (#4a-e). I have a series of questions about the status and
future plans for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
Reports indicate that ANSF will be reduced to 230,000
personnel. What are the projected end strength numbers for the
Afghan National Army (ANA) in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016?
What are the projected end strength numbers for the Afghan
National Police (ANP) in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016?
What missions does the new strategy envision for the ANA?
What missions does the strategy envision for the ANP?
What is the demobilization plan for getting ANSF down to
230,000?
Answer. The goal of Afghanistan and the international community
remains clear: to build a strong, effective Afghan Army and police
force that is capable of securing Afghanistan's territory and
protecting the Afghan people from violent extremism. The international
community is committed to assisting the Afghans in this goal and in a
manner that is not a threat to any of Afghanistan's neighbors. It is
premature to publicly discuss what the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) will look like post-2014 and beyond as no decisions have been
made. We are in discussions with our NATO allies, ISAF partners, and
the Afghan Government on the nature of the long-term support necessary
to maintain a sufficient and sustainable ANSF. This collaborative
discussion with allies, partners, and the Afghan Government on
sustainable costs associated with the future posture of the Afghan
forces will be based on relevant variables during the post-transition
period and conditions on the ground. These discussions further
reinforce the long-term commitment by the United States and our NATO
allies to the Afghan people, as agreed at Bonn in December 2011 and at
the NATO Lisbon summit in November 2010.
Question (#4f-l). What is the current strength of the ANA and the
ANP? How many are present for duty?
What is the attrition rate for the ANA and ANP?
How many ANA units are capable of operating independently,
that is, capable of planning and executing missions,
maintaining command and control of subordinates, and exploiting
intelligence?
How many ANP units are capable of operating independently?
How many new ANA recruits come from the Pashtun south?
What is the ethnic composition of the ANA's officer corps?
What is the ethnic composition of the ANP? What is the
literacy rate for the ANA and ANP?
Answer. In regards to the current status of the Afghan National
Security Forces, I refer you to our colleagues at the Department of
Defense, who, through their work with the NATO Training Mission in
Afghanistan (NTM-A), work side by side with their Afghan partners on a
daily basis to build a strong, effective Afghan Army and police force
that is capable of securing Afghanistan's territory and protecting the
Afghan people from violent extremism.
Question (#4m). What metrics is the administration using to measure
success in the transition to Afghan lead for security responsibility?
Answer. Successful transition of security responsibility requires
that Afghan Security Forces, under effective Afghan civilian control,
will be capable of tackling security challenges on a sustainable and
irreversible basis--albeit with some level of continued support from
NATO. Afghan and NATO authorities have been assessing the readiness of
areas for transition through the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board
(JANIB), which produced its first set of conclusions and
recommendations on 24 February 2012. Transition is a conditions-based
process, not a calendar-driven event and the recommendations of the
JANIB are based on an assessment of conditions on the ground.
Criteria for the transition of a particular area include: ANSF are
capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance
from ISAF, security is at a level that allows the population to pursue
routine daily activities, local governance is sufficiently developed so
that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced, and
ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and
threat levels diminish. In addition, transition assessments also
consider the ability and authority of the Afghan Government to provide
the rule of law and manage public administration at subnational and
local levels and the capacity of an area to sustain socioeconomic
development.
Question (#4n). Has the U.S. mission changed in transitioned areas?
Answer. No area of Afghanistan has completed transition, as the
process is gradual and completely conditions-based. The announcement of
the beginning of transition is only the first step of a process that is
expected to last between 12-18 months, with a gradual reduction in
support to the ANSF from ISAF forces, until the point that the ANSF can
fully provide for the area's security. Even as Afghans assume the
security lead, ISAF will continue to be fully combat ready--and we will
engage in combat operations as necessary. Additionally, in order to
maintain the support and commitment of the Afghan people, we continue
to work with our Afghan partners to improve the provision of basic
services, promote government transparency and accountability,
strengthen institutions, and advance Afghan-led reconciliation
throughout Afghanistan, including in areas undergoing transition.
Question (#4o). Is ANSF capable of consolidating security gains in
transitioned areas, and if so, are these gains sustainable?
Answer. Although no area of Afghanistan has completed the
transition process in its entirety, the fact that the ANSF has so far
maintained control in those areas that have begun the transition
process is encouraging. While I would again refer you to our DOD
colleagues for specifics on ANSF capabilities, we have seen that the
insurgents attempt cowardly attacks aimed at causing fear and feelings
of insecurity among Afghan citizens. The successful, professional
response to many of these attacks by the ANSF, with ISAF mentors on
hand for support, is an indication that transition is working as
envisioned.
Question (#5). How much has been obligated and disbursed on
civilian assistance to Pakistan since October 2009? How much has been
obligated and disbursed in Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) funds? How much of
the $500 million in KLB funds committed to flood relief in Pakistan has
been obligated and disbursed?
Answer. From October 2009 to December 31, 2011, the United States
obligated $1.61 billion in bilateral civilian assistance to Pakistan.
During the same time period, the United States disbursed a total of
$2.6 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan. This includes both
funding obligated prior to October 2009 and over $800 million of
emergency humanitarian assistance following the floods of 2010 and
2011.
Of FY 2010 and FY 2011 bilateral civilian assistance authorized
under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) legislation, as of April 2012, the
United States has obligated $1.44 billion and disbursed $756 million of
funds authorized under KLB.
In response to the massive floods of 2010, then-Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke,
announced in November 2010 that the United States would seek to
redirect up to $500 million of existing bilateral civilian assistance
to Pakistan to support flood recovery and reconstruction. Of the $500
million commitment (all of which has been obligated), over 60 percent
has been disbursed, which includes $190 million toward the Citizens'
Damage Compensation Program (CDCP).
Of the remaining $310 million, approximately half of the funding is
supporting existing programming which could be redirected to address
flood recovery, for purposes such as: to provide seeds and fertilizer
to farmers affected by flooding; assistance to women's
microenterprises; maternal and child health programs and support for
small grants programs and gender equity grants, in flood-impacted
areas; and quick impact infrastructure projects in flood-impacted
regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The other half
supports reconstruction of infrastructure damaged by floods, including
schools, roads, bridges, and irrigation control systems.
Question (#6). The United States supports a peaceful and humane
solution to the situation at Camp Ashraf. Recently, 397 residents of
the camp were transported to Camp Liberty, where UNHCR is supposed to
begin processing them for resettlement. But there seem to be delays in
the processing and concerns about the presence of Iraqi security
personnel within the new living quarters.
What is the status of the full closure of Camp Ashraf and
what steps is the U.S. Government taking to ensure that the
Memorandum of Understanding that was agreed to by the U.N. and
the Iraqi Government is effectively implemented?
Answer. As you mentioned, on December 25, 2011, the United Nations
and the Government of Iraq (GOI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU). This MOU opened the way for a peaceful and humane temporary
relocation of Ashraf residents to Camp Hurriya (formerly Camp Liberty)
and their eventual departure from Iraq. The United States has publicly
supported the MOU, while also calling on the GOI to abide by the MOU's
terms, specifically the elements of the MOU that provide for the safety
and security of Camp Hurriya.
On January 31, following much work by the GOI, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and U.N. Human Rights Office in
Baghdad determined the infrastructure and facilities at Camp Hurriya to
be in accordance with international humanitarian standards, as required
by the MOU.
On February 18, the first group of Ashraf residents relocated to
Camp Hurriya. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
and the Office of the UNHCR, as they had committed, supported that
relocation through human rights monitoring and mediation of certain
issues between the GOI and the residents. There were complications
during that move, but despite delays, it took place peacefully and the
GOI provided significant resources for the protection of the residents'
travel. U.S. officials from Embassy Baghdad also observed portions of
this movement, at both Ashraf and Hurriya. A second and similar
relocation of nearly 400 residents occurred on March 8, followed by a
third relocation on March 19.
At Hurriya, the UNHCR has begun a verification and refugee status
determination process for the relocated residents, have registered over
500 residents and has conducted over 100 refugee status determination
interviews. U.N. monitors also remain available on a round-the-clock
basis. The residents at Hurriya, who have access to the Internet and
unrestricted ability to communicate with anyone outside Hurriya, have
identified problems with certain facilities at the camp. UNAMI, with
support from U.S. Embassy Baghdad, has acted swiftly to seek resolution
of those problems by the GOI. UNAMI and U.S. officials have also urged
leaders of the residents to work directly with the GOI on issues of
security, including police presence, and on resolving remaining and
future logistical issues. We have seen significant progress between the
residents and the GOI on finding practical solutions in that regard.
Patience and flexibility is required, and both the GOI and residents
must continue to cooperate to find solutions. The brief but unfortunate
outbreak of violence on April 8 at Camp Ashraf between Iraqi security
forces and residents shows that the progress so far cannot be regarded
as self-sustaining.
In addition to our general support for these U.N. efforts,
officials from U.S. Embassy Baghdad visit Hurriya regularly and
frequently, and are in contact with representatives of the residents
still at Ashraf. We remain attentive to the situation at Ashraf and
Hurriya and remain in active, regular contact with both the U.N. and
the GOI in support of completing a peaceful and safe relocation
process.
The decision of the remaining Ashraf residents to continue
relocations to Hurriya is vital in moving forward with the work of
UNHCR and the subsequent relocation of individuals out of Iraq. That
relocation will require efforts on the part of many governments,
including our own. We share your interest in seeing a peaceful
conclusion to this issue and we look forward to continuing our dialogue
with you.
Question (#7a-c). The United States has played a key role in
addressing the Iraqi displacement crisis by providing funding to ensure
refugee children have access to education, that torture survivors
receive medical treatment and that female-headed households receive
basic assistance. But the needs of these Iraqis persist, as thousands
of them continue to live in squalor.
a. How is the United States working with the Iraqi
Government, as well as its neighbors, to provide basic
assistance to these vulnerable populations?
b. How concretely is the United States assisting those who
voluntarily return to their homes?
c. What progress has been made to work with our partners to
find a durable solution for the thousands of refugees and
internally displaced persons?
Answer. In FY 2011, the State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) provided nearly $290 million to
support Iraqi refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims. So far in FY 2012,
State/PRM has provided almost $51 million to support this population,
and more will be provided in the coming months. While the U.S.
Government will continue to provide humanitarian assistance through
international and nongovernmental organizations to these populations,
we anticipate the levels will decline as the USG shifts from relief to
development activities, and as the Government of Iraq assumes
increasing ownership of addressing the needs of displaced Iraqis.
Outside of Iraq, the USG remains the single largest contributor of
humanitarian assistance for Iraqi refugees. Our funding supports
international organizations, such as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO),
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food
Programme (WFP), and nongovernmental organizations to address the needs
of roughly 168,000 registered Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries,
primarily Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. As a result of State Department
assistance, these populations received a range of services including
relief commodities, shelter, cash and livelihoods assistance, health
care, and education.
Syria hosts the majority of Iraqi refugees. Despite the ongoing
violence, State/PRM funding continues to provide assistance to refugees
in the form of cash assistance for vulnerable families, medical clinics
with pediatric care, primary education support and vocational education
for youth, and psychosocial counseling. In Jordan, the USG has worked
with the Government of Jordan to secure the right to work for Iraqis in
some sectors, access to the national health care system for primary
health care, and access to schools for Iraqi children. In Lebanon, our
partners provide psychosocial assistance to Iraqis and work with the
Government of Lebanon to integrate Iraqi children into the national
school system. In Turkey, funded partners provide language classes to
enable Iraqi children to attend Turkish schools.
In addition to USG financial assistance, we continue intensive
humanitarian diplomacy with host governments, the Government of Iraq
(GOI), and international organization and nongovernmental partners in
the region to protect displaced Iraqis and those who have chosen to
return to their homes. Inside Iraq, U.S. Government engagement is aimed
at encouraging the GOI to take greater ownership of managing the
displacement issue. We have seen some positive signs in this direction.
In August 2011 the GOI increased the return stipend from 1 million
dinars (about $849) to 4 million dinars ($3,395). In the months
following this decision, Iraq saw a large increase in returns of both
IDPs and refugees and, by the end of 2011, roughly 261,000 Iraqis had
returned to their home areas--the highest number since 2004. Iraq's
Ministry of Displacement and Migration is also making strides to
confront the housing issue for IDPs and returnees. Two large plots of
land in Baghdad have been identified for shelter construction, and the
GOI is working with UNHCR and the U.N. Human Settlements Program (U.N.-
HABITAT) to acquire proper title to this land, identify beneficiaries,
and start construction of shelters. The GOI has also recently announced
a Comprehensive Plan on Displacement that will guide the GOI actions to
address issues relating to displaced Iraqis in the coming years. We
will continue to work with the GOI as it moves forward to provide land
and shelter for the displaced, and to ensure the GOI includes the
displaced community in its resource planning.
Since 2007, the United States has admitted nearly 64,000 Iraqi
refugees for permanent resettlement. More than 10,000 of these accessed
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) through a direct access
mechanism created by the 2008 Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. Iraqis
eligible for direct access to the USRAP include direct-hire U.S.
employees, employees of certain entities receiving U.S. funds, and
employees of U.S.-based media organizations or NGOs, as well as certain
family members of those employees and Iraqi beneficiaries of approved
I-130 immigrant visa petitions, including Iraqis still inside Iraq. The
remainder were referred for resettlement consideration by UNHCR and
include many with identified vulnerabilities, including victims of
violence or torture, female-headed households, and those with medical
needs that could not be met in the country of asylum.
Since 2003, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
(USAID/OFDA) has provided more than $451 million of humanitarian
assistance to IDPs and vulnerable populations. This assistance has
included support for the distribution of emergency relief commodities;
the provision of emergency shelter; expanded access to essential water,
sanitation, and hygiene facilities and services; income-generating
opportunities and economic recovery; strengthened humanitarian
coordination and information-sharing among relief agencies supporting
IDPs; increased food security through agriculture and livestock-rearing
programs; and the promotion of children's psychosocial health through
the operation of child-friendly spaces and teacher training. Through
the Danish Refugee Council, USAID/OFDA enhanced the capacity of Iraqi
governorate authorities to prevent, respond to, and manage emergencies
through the expansion and strengthening of the existing national
Governorate Emergency Cell network currently operating in 11 of Iraq's
18 governorates.
By June 2012, USAID/OFDA's programs in Iraq will transition from
emergency relief to early recovery, laying the foundation for long-term
development and durable solutions. For instance, USAID/OFDA worked with
State/PRM to ensure successful transition of a returnee assistance
program, implemented by International Medical Corps (IMC), from USAID/
OFDA funding to a State/PRM-supported UNHCR program, once the USAID/
OFDA-supported program ended in January 2011. The program expanded the
capacity of the GOI Ministry of Migration and Displaced to efficiently
provide needs-based assistance--including registration, legal aid, and
protection--to vulnerable IDP and refugee returnee populations.
Principles relating to return, resettlement, and reintegration,
require that ``competent authorities''--in this case, the Iraqi
government--have the primary duty and responsibility to either allow
IDPs to return to their homes, or resettle and reintegrate them
voluntarily in other parts of the country. Special efforts should also
be made to ensure full participation of IDPs in planning and management
of their return, resettlement, and reintegration. IDPs should have the
right to participate fully and equally in public affairs, have equal
access to public services, and not be discriminated against for being
displaced. Additionally, ``competent authorities''--in this case, the
Iraqi Government--have the primary duty and responsibility to assist
IDPs in recovering and reclaiming their property and possessions or
compensation for their loss. Finally, international humanitarian
organizations and other appropriate actors must be allowed rapid and
unimpeded access to IDPs to assist in their return and resettlement.
USAID development assistance for durable solutions supports these
principles through the following activities:
Microfinance: USAID has recently committed $18.3 million to
focus on expanding access to credit for vulnerable groups,
including IDPs.
Access to Justice: USAID's Access to Justice Program assists
vulnerable and disadvantaged Iraqis by increasing awareness of
their rights as well as avenues for receiving remedies from the
Iraqi Government.
Civil Society and Governance: USAID works to strengthen
civil society through the Community Action Program (CAP) which
assists community action groups to identify their priorities,
implement solutions and advocate for their needs with local
authorities. Along with CAP, USAID's Governance Strengthening
Project and the Administrative Reform project, both provide
technical assistance to national, provincial, and local
governments to improve their capacity to respond to the needs
identified by local communities, such as IDPs.
Health and Education: USAID works with the Iraqi Ministry of
Health to improve their delivery of primary health care
services. USAID is also currently designing a Primary Education
program which will work with the Ministry of Education to
improve the delivery of primary education throughout the
country, and will also benefits IDPs.
By working with the Iraqi Government at all levels and with Iraqi
counterparts directly engaged and assisting the Iraqi people, USAID
assistance can work toward long-term durable solutions that improve the
Iraqi Government's response to IDP needs, while empowering IDPs
themselves to improve their situation.
Question (#8a-c). The administration has asked for $770 million in
FY 2013 funding for the newly created Middle East and North Africa
Incentive Fund. In your testimony, you justified this request by
referencing the difficulties in the past year in reprogramming funding
and by referencing the U.S.'s policies in Eastern and Central Europe
shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union.
a. What examples does the State Department have to show
where policy outcomes could have been improved if such
authority was available?
b. If much of this funding will ultimately be allocated
through other programs--USAID, NADR, INCLE, and others--who
will determine where this money flows and how it is accounted
for?
c. What kind of internal oversight will the State Department
rely on to ensure that fast-tracking funding to new projects
does not result in unnecessary waste and expenditure at the
taxpayer's expense? What criteria will be used in dispersing
this funding?
Answer. The MENA-IF represents a new approach to the Middle East
and North Africa by demonstrating a visible commitment to reform and to
the region; tying assistance to reform agendas; and providing
flexibility for contingencies in order to take advantage of new
opportunities. To support this new approach, this Fund has broad
authorities to allow the USG to better respond to political changes in
the Middle East and North Africa and incentivize meaningful and
sustainable political and economic reforms by tying these reforms to
significant levels of U.S. assistance.
a. While we were able to respond to Arab Spring events by
transferring money and reprogramming funds, the process was lengthy,
our tools were limited, the opportunity costs were high, and we were
not able to respond at levels commensurate with the diversity of
challenges and opportunities we faced, which ranged from humanitarian
needs to working with internal security forces. The MENA Incentive Fund
will improve upon the process by enabling a more timely and flexible
USG response to changing events in the MENA region. Reprogramming and
moving funding takes time, both in identifying available funds and
notifying the movement of these funds. Second, the MENA-IF will provide
flexible response mechanisms such as loan guarantees or enterprise
funds without having to seek new authorities each time we need to
provide short-, medium-, and long-term responses to regional changes.
Finally, when new opportunities arise that were not anticipated by
global programs-such as new opportunities to work with internal
security forces on human rights and capacity-building--MENA-IF funding
flexibilities will allow us to target sufficient resources
appropriately.
b. Regardless of which agency or bureau implements MENA-IF
programs, the funds will be centrally managed and allocated. Decisions
about potential implementing agencies will be made based on the types
of programming needed and each implementer's comparative advantage.
c. The same oversight mechanisms governing all foreign assistance
accounts will apply to the MENA-IF. We welcome credible proposals for
economic and political reform but will prioritize funding for those
countries that have the greatest commitment to reform (judged by
actions taken this year and/or credible reform proposals), where
successful outcomes would have the greatest impact in the country and/
or region, and where U.S. strategic interests are greatest. We will
evaluate them against qualitative assessments to determine commitment
to reform, need, access to resources, opportunities for U.S. engagement
and partnership (with partner governments as well as other
stakeholders, including IFIs, etc.), potential impact and strategic
interest.
Question (#9). What reforms do you believe need to occur in the
Egyptian economy to set it on a sustainable path to prosperity? How is
the United States supporting those reforms? Do you intend to use Middle
East and North Africa Incentive Funds, and how would that fit into the
$250 million of economic assistance that we already provide to Egypt?
Answer. We believe that the long-term success of Egypt's democratic
transition depends in large part upon the achievement of sustainable,
inclusive economic growth that can address Egypt's unemployment and
development challenges. To meet this goal, reforms in four main areas
are essential. First, Egypt needs to strengthen its private sector and
in particular the competitiveness of its small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), which employ the majority of Egyptians. Central to this is
improving the legal and regulatory environment for investment and
business. Egypt also needs to make financing available to a greater
number of SMEs so they can grow and hire more workers. Second, Egypt
should reduce trade barriers and implement other reforms to enhance
trade's significant potential as an economic driver and job creator.
Third, to address the revolution's demands to root out corruption and
cronyism, Egypt will need to achieve greater transparency and
accountability in governance. Fourth, Egypt should redouble its efforts
to deliver quality, market-relevant education to its workforce,
particularly for young graduates. This will better align the skills of
job-seekers with employers' needs.
To help Egypt create a brighter economic future that will help
ensure the country's long-term stability, the United States is
providing support in each of these areas. For instance, we are helping
Egypt make its private sector more competitive and enact reforms that
create an enabling business environment, reduce the cost of doing
business, and encourage innovation and entrepreneurship. We are also
assisting Egyptian financial institutions increase lending to small
businesses, including through a $250 million OPIC loan guarantee
facility. The new Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, currently
capitalized at $60 million, will invest in the SME sector, further
demonstrating our commitment to job creation. As part of the
administration's Middle East and North Africa Trade and Investment
Partnership (MENA-TIP), we will work closely with the Government of
Egypt on technical and policy reforms that can help Egypt expand its
regional and international trade, including through a program to
improve Egypt's trade facilitation regime and strengthen its domestic
market in order to create jobs and grow Egypt's economy. We are
supporting Egyptian efforts to promote transparency and anticorruption,
and we will seek opportunities to expand our support in this critical
area as the transition continues. In addition, we are helping Egypt
improve its vocational technical education system to bolster Egyptians'
employable skills and link qualified young Egyptians in the science and
technology sector to jobs in their field.
The Middle East North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA-IF) could
complement all of these efforts by creating incentives for the reforms
the Government of Egypt must make to grow the Egyptian economy and
attract greater foreign and domestic investment. Our current Economic
Support Funds package will continue to support the democratic
transition and sustainable economic growth that benefits the people of
Egypt. While the large bilateral assistance program means that Egypt
would not be top priority for MENA-IF funding, we would not rule out
particularly innovative ideas from a new Egyptian Government. MENA-IF
projects should complement the foundation built through our ongoing
bilateral economic assistance.
Question (#10a-b). The administration has repeatedly stated its
intent to end the Assad regime through a peaceful transition of power.
Among the many tools it has used at its disposal, it has cut all
economic ties with Syria and advocated for increasingly strict
sanctions within the international community. Yet a Russian company,
Rosoboronexport, continues to state its willingness to supply Syria
with weapons even as it works under a $375 million Department of
Defense contract, overseen by the State Department, to maintain
helicopters in Afghanistan.
a. Was the administration aware of Rosoboronexport's arms
sales to Syria at the time that it signed the contract for it
to work in Afghanistan?
b. Are there alternatives to Rosoboronexpert in Afghanistan?
Answer. We have voiced our concerns about Russian weapons sales to
Syria repeatedly, both publicly and through diplomatic channels, with
senior Russian officials. Secretary Clinton has publicly urged Russia
to cease arms sales to Syria. We will continue to press Russia on any
activities that contribute to the Syrian regime's violent crackdown or
threaten regional stability. For additional specific questions
regarding U.S. contracts with Rosoboronexport, we must refer you to the
Department of Defense.
Question (#10c). Most importantly, what systems and oversight are
in place to ensure that foreign companies signing contracts with the
United States are not engaging in other practices contrary to stated
administration policy?
Answer. Contracting Officers are responsible for determining that
companies are responsible contractors capable of performing
successfully before making an award. Companies who violate sanctions,
violate export controls, commit fraud, bribe officials and otherwise
engage in illegal and irresponsible behavior may be placed on the
governmentwide excluded parties list, which would make them ineligible
for award. This list is checked by State Contracting Officers before
award. The list is Internet-based and is maintained by the General
Services Administration.
Question (#11a). In December of last year the State Department
created a new office, the Office of the Under Secretary for Economic
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, which brought together the Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs; the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; the new Bureau of
Energy Resources; the Office of Science and Technology Adviser; and a
new office of Chief Economist, in an effort to enhance the Department's
commitment to economic statecraft, environmental sustainability, and
energy security.
What are you doing to get economic statecraft into the DNA
of the State Department?
Answer. In four speeches in summer and fall 2011, I outlined a
vision for Economic Statecraft that places a renewed emphasis on the
role and the importance of economics and market forces in our foreign
policy. The United States has long recognized that our foreign and
economic relations are indivisible.
With our far-reaching platform overseas, the State Department is
uniquely positioned to promote American economic leadership around the
world. As stated earlier, our goals are twofold: to change how we think
about and implement foreign policy; and to use that foreign policy to
reinvigorate the economy.
In order to elevate the economic and commercial diplomacy elements
of the Economic Statecraft agenda, we have established an Economic
Statecraft Task Force to ensure that we have the right people, support
tools, and engagement platforms. The Task Force covers four principal
areas of work.
The Human Capital working group is developing recommendations to
ensure the Department is hiring, training, deploying, and incentivizing
staff in a manner consistent with the requirements of effective
economic statecraft. We are looking at the data and collecting
viewpoints on how to make the best use of the Department's most
important asset--our people.
The Internal Tools working group is improving and developing
effective tools and resources. We are working with FSI and the Commerce
Department to develop new online courses intended for economic officers
and other Department of State staff to support execution of economic
statecraft objectives.
The External Engagement working group is implementing a strategy to
improve and elevate our engagement with the private sector and the
public at large. It uses the Department of State's online resources,
convening power, and global personnel network to increase our impact.
One key priority of external engagement is our ``Jobs Diplomacy''
agenda for helping U.S. business and advancing America's economic
interests abroad.
The Policy Targets of Opportunity working group, in conjunction
with posts and business support organizations, is identifying
opportunities for U.S. Government engagement on key policy priorities.
Deputy Secretary Nides recently issued a new Department travel policy
requesting all officials at the DAS-level and above to include economic
or business issues in their trips.
Question (#11b). As you reflect on lessons learned from these
initial few months, what additional efficiencies or additional
organizational changes do you think would be helpful to assure that the
Department's organization is properly calibrated and aligned to meet
the economic statecraft challenge?
Answer. These first few months of focus in Economic Statecraft have
given us the opportunity to get the lay of the land. As we continue our
bottom-up approach to find where the real challenges are and where real
change can be successfully implemented, we will discover what
organizational changes may be helpful.
Question (#11c). How is the new office positioned to seek to
adjudicate and align efforts on energy security and environmental
sustainability, which far too often are presented as opposites and with
policymakers asked to make false choices between achieving goals in one
area or the other as opposed to developing smart balanced approaches
that will enable us to advance the dual imperatives of energy security
and environmental stewardship?
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economics,
Energy, and the Environment was created, in part, to ensure that
environmental issues remain at the same level as economic growth and
energy. This is the first time that an Under Secretary of State has
been given the mandate by title to address environmental issues. The
realignment is not a way to subordinate one set of issues to another
(i.e., make false choices between energy security and environmental
stewardship) but rather will help ensure that all aspects of a given
issue are considered at a senior-level. This new organizational
structure will help us to better harmonize and coordinate our efforts
in the key areas of trade, financial flows, development assistance,
cybersecurity, science and innovation, sustainable development, health,
and many other areas.
Question (#12a). I wholeheartedly welcome your leadership elevating
the importance of Economic Statecraft in U.S. diplomacy. At the recent
Global Business Conference, you hosted major U.S. corporations and
businesses leaders, including the CEO's of Boeing and the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, to talk about the nexus of foreign policy and domestic
economic growth. You spoke of something that you called ``job
diplomacy.''
a. What does ``job diplomacy'' look like?
Answer. ``Jobs Diplomacy'' is a series of efforts focused on
promoting American business, pursuing policy priorities for U.S
competitiveness, and equipping State Department personnel with the
skills and tools they need to advocate for America's economic interests
abroad. ``Jobs Diplomacy'' is a top priority of our broader Economic
Statecraft agenda.
We will use our global network of economic staff at embassies,
consulates, and headquarters to connect U.S. industry, small
businesses, and state and local governments with economic information
and business opportunities abroad. State is implementing a year-long
plan to transform business promotion. We announced the following
efforts to implement ``jobs diplomacy'':
A commitment to meet with business leaders on every foreign
trip.
A policy directive to all senior State Department officials
(Deputy Assistant Secretaries and above) to conduct economic
outreach on every foreign trip.
A ``Direct Line to American Business'' program will be
launched, in which ambassadors in key markets will conduct
regular conference calls to brief the U.S. business community
on economic opportunities and answer questions.
State's Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental
Affairs will launch an initiative to help U.S. international
business councils at the state and local level arrange
briefings from State Department speakers and foreign diplomatic
personnel.
Regular leadership conferences will be convened around the
world to promote U.S. business modeled on the Global Business
Conference held February 21-22, 2012.
State will help U.S. business capitalize on economic
opportunities in emerging economies.
The Department will deploy Internet and social media tools
to share information about economic opportunities abroad more
widely and openly with U.S. businesses.
Question (#12b). What are your top priorities within the economic
statecraft initiative?
Answer. This work is a critical aspect of our broader economic
statecraft initiative, which covers a lot of ground, but at bottom,
boils down to two simple aims: First, as more nations come to deal in
economic power, how we think about and practice foreign policy must
change. And second, this is also a time when the needs of the American
people demand that our foreign policy be a force for economic renewal.
To deliver on these two objectives, we are pursuing four lines of work:
1. Update our priorities to focus on where we have the greatest
opportunities. Our foreign policy cannot be only focused on where we
face the greatest dangers, but must be focused on where we have the
greatest opportunities. This is the premise behind our ``pivot to
Asia,'' where--through efforts like the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
APEC, and our strategic dialogues with China, India and others--we are
establishing the United States not simply as a resident diplomatic and
military power in Asia, but as a resident economic power as well. To
name just a few more examples, we are also devoting new focus to the
challenges surrounding state capitalism, as well as unlocking the
emerging middle class in Africa to fuel growth on the continent.
2. Play better offense by updating and integrating our trade,
investment, and commercial diplomacy agenda. Future U.S. economic
growth will increasingly rely on our ability to compete and win
overseas. Shoring up American competitiveness will require confronting
systemic, inherently political problems that only a thoroughly
different brand of U.S. diplomacy can tackle. Through our ``Jobs
Diplomacy'' agenda, outlined above, we are answering this charge--and
coining a smarter, tougher brand of diplomacy when it comes to
advancing America's economic interests abroad.
3. Use economic tools to solve foreign policy challenges. We need
to recognize that many of the issues that we have traditionally
characterized as first-order ``security'' objectives--from fostering
reform and successful democratic transitions in the Middle East, to
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea--hinge increasingly on
important economic dimensions, and so economics must play a more
central role in shaping our choices and responses. This has guided our
responses to the transitions across the Middle East and North Africa--
where we are helping these countries lay the economic foundations for
successful democracies through fiscal stabilization measures, jobs and
skills training efforts, and incentives toward structural reforms. This
has also guided our New Silk Road efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan--
where we are creating a web of economic and transportation links that
will embed Afghanistan in the thriving economies of South Asia as ISAF
draws down its presence.
4. Build the capacity of the Department of State. As a Department,
we are expanding our capacity to advance our economic statecraft agenda
by ensuring that our diplomats have the knowledge, skills, resources,
and direction necessary to execute it. The first-ever Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), released in December 2010,
made a series of organizational changes to strengthen the Department's
ability to promote economic statecraft. State has established a new
Office of the Chief Economist, who has the rank of an Assistant
Secretary, and which will advise the Secretary on a range of strategies
for advancing U.S. competitiveness. Foreign Service Institute curricula
are being revised to ensure they reflect the realities of today's most
sophisticated and integrated global markets, as well as the needs of
American businesses that navigate them.
5. Under the leadership of Deputy Tom Nides, we are also working on
other steps to strengthen the Department's internal capacity on
economic and commercial issues.
Question (#12c). How do you intend to implement them, and how will
you measure results?
Answer. State is addressing top priorities for U.S. business with
an ambitious policy agenda:
In support of the National Export Initiative (NEI), State is
replicating best practices for export promotion at posts around
the world, targeting infrastructure opportunities, and
increasing support to small- and medium-size enterprises.
Designing and executing diplomatic strategies to combat a
host of nontariff barriers--including forced localization,
abusive regulatory practices, and other priorities for U.S.
firms. To increase inward investment, State is working with
Commerce to further the efforts of Select USA, aligning our
efforts with state and local initiatives, and pressing for
regulatory changes that facilitate rather than impede
investment into the United States. The State Department is
committed to giving our people the tools and skills they need
to serve as the world's best advocates for America's economic
interests and to create American jobs.
State has launched a comprehensive review of human capital
at the State Department, including training, staffing models
and performance management, with additional recommendations to
follow.
A new Department economic information portal and new
information resources are being created, so that economic
officers can better focus on supporting U.S. business. State is
coordinating training options to leverage resources across
agencies.
A distance learning program is being launched to help our
economic personnel continually acquire new skills and knowledge
that will help them advance our economic agenda and be
America's frontline economic professionals.
State has deployed a range of internal challenges and
collaboration tools to crowd-source suggestions and best
practices for effective economic work.
A new Department-wide prize will be awarded by the Deputy
Secretary, to recognize excellence and innovation in commercial
statecraft.
Beginning in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010, the Economic
and Business Affairs Bureau (EB) began coordinating and documenting the
Department's NEI efforts. Our more than 200 U.S. missions overseas are
asked to report quarterly on their contributions to the NEI. Posts have
reported increasing levels of commercial advocacy, U.S. business
outreach, and commercial success stories. The key indicators measured
include the number of commercial and economic policy advocacy
activities conducted by embassy personnel on behalf of U.S. businesses
that attempt to advance transactional deals, investment dispute
settlements, or favorable foreign government economic policy changes.
Question (#13a). This administration has made significant progress
in promoting the deployment of clean energy solutions and improving the
capacity of vulnerable countries to address the impacts of climate
change. In the FY13 budget, the administration requests $770 million in
``core'' funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative.
Given the important role the private sector plays in
developing innovative technologies to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and solutions to address some of the more dire
impacts of climate change such as drought and sea-level rise,
please discuss how you are working to leverage and engage the
private sector in your efforts?
Answer. The role of the private sector is critical in deploying
clean energy technologies and finding solutions to the impacts of
climate change. Most low-carbon infrastructure investment can and
should originate from the private sector rather than the public sector.
For this reason, engaging and leveraging the private sector is a
primary goal of our climate finance activities. In particular, we have
put increasing emphasis on the role of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-
Im), as these institutions directly leverage private finance in their
activities in developing countries while stimulating American
investment and jobs. These two agencies have increased their clean
energy finance activities from well under $500 million in FY 2009 to
$1.3 billion in FY 2011, consistent with congressional mandates to
increase their clean energy financing.
Leveraging private investment and engagement has also been a theme
in our bilateral and multilateral programs implemented through State,
USAID, and Treasury--including in greenhouse gas mitigation programs
such as the Global Methane Initiative, the World Bank's Partnership for
Market Readiness and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, the USAID-
supported Private Financing Advisory Network, and the Clean Technology
Fund (CTF).
Leveraging private commercial finance and investment for adaptation
activities is somewhat more difficult, as such activities are not
always deemed commercially viable by private investors. This is one
reason why we anticipate that funding for adaptation activities from
public sources may remain more important in the mid to long term
relative to mitigation finance. However, our contributions to
multilateral adaptation funds such as the Special Climate Change Fund
and Pilot Program for Country Resilience do leverage some private
sector finance, and USAID has done some pioneering work with private
reinsurance companies on insuring countries against climate change-
related risks.
Support for these programs is part of a concerted effort to target
public support for efforts that will have the maximum impact in scaling
up private investment in clean energy, forest preservation, and
adaptation to the effects of climate change.
Question (#13b). Please describe how the State Department's efforts
to date to implement the Global Climate Change Initiative have
contributed to the decisionmaking process for what future activities
will be supported by the FY 2013 funds?
Answer. State, USAID, and Treasury coordinate closely on the
implementation of the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI). Lessons
learned in the first 2 years (FY 2010-2011) of GCCI programming, along
with our understanding of the difficult fiscal environment, play a
major role in our FY 2013 request. For example, following our
experience with FY 2010 programming, we decided to focus our
programming in each of the GCCI ``pillars'' in a smaller number of
priority countries: small island developing states, least-developed
countries, Africa, and glacier-dependent countries for adaptation;
major developing country emitters and early clean energy adopters for
clean energy; and key forest ecosystems (Amazon, Congo, Southeast Asia)
for Sustainable Landscapes. A related priority has been support for the
development of Low Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS) in
developing country partners, a joint State/USAID Agency Priority Goal.
We did this because we found that larger amounts of funding in a
more limited number of countries produces more effective results than
smaller amounts spread across a larger pool of countries. This shift
began with our FY 2012 request and programming of the actual FY 2011
appropriation, and carries over into the FY 2013 request.
Finally, as noted above, we are increasingly using State, USAID,
and Treasury GCCI funds, along with policy engagement and the help of
our partners in OPIC and Ex-Im, to leverage additional financial
resources from both other donors and the private sector.
Question (#14). You recently launched a new partnership aimed at
reducing emissions from pollutants that have significant harmful
effects on public health and climate change. This new effort to reduce
so-called ``short-lived climate pollutants'' including black carbon,
methane, and hydroflurocarbons, creates a unique global opportunity for
a coalition of countries. It is my understanding that addressing these
pollutants will yield significant benefits to public health, food
security and energy access in developing countries.
Please discuss how this new coalition will complement
existing State Department activities to address these
pollutants and outline some of the benefits to the United
States and the international community of this new coalition?
Answer. This new partnership, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition,
is the first multilateral effort to treat short-lived climate
pollutants together, as a collective challenge. The founding coalition
partners are Bangladesh, Canada, Ghana, Mexico, Sweden, and the United
States, together with the U.N. Environment Programme. In its first
year, the Coalition will catalyze new international action to reduce
short-lived climate forcers and highlight and bolster the work of
existing efforts.
Fast action to reduce short-lived climate pollutants can serve to
further many objectives of the U.S. Government and the global
community. Reducing these pollutants would have a direct impact on
near-term global warming, with the potential to reduce the warming
expected by 2050 by as much as 0.5 Celsius degrees. At the same time,
by 2030, such action can prevent millions of premature deaths, while
also avoiding the annual loss of more than 30 million tons of crops.
Moreover, many of these benefits can be achieved at low cost and with
significant energy savings.
The United States is already actively engaged in efforts to reduce
these pollutants on the national and international levels. Here at
home, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency addresses these
pollutants through robust programs that protect public health and the
environment. Abroad, the State Department, USAID, and EPA are providing
support to developing countries who seek to reduce these pollutants and
other causes of climate change through programs like the EPA's Global
Methane Initiative, the Enhancing Capacity for Low Emissions
Development Strategies program, and USAID support for clean energy and
forest preservation. We will also reinvigorate efforts to address these
pollutants through existing work under the Global Alliance for Clean
Cookstoves, the Arctic Council, and the Montreal Protocol. The
Coalition's work will augment, not replace, global action to reduce
carbon dioxide (CO2), which is a key issue under the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change.
Question (#15). I understand that, under your leadership, progress
has been made to establish the League of Green Embassies, a bipartisan
collaboration of State Department's overseas building office, American
embassies, the Departments of Commerce and Energy, energy service
companies, U.S. clean-tech exporters and international stakeholders.
Please discuss the progress of the League to date, including
the savings to the Federal Government this program has achieved
through smarter energy choices. What will be the impact on
these savings if the program is expanded?
Answer. The progress of the League of Green Embassies to date can
be effectively demonstrated under three criteria:
(1) Number of embassy and industry partnerships the League has
established: The League counts among its members over 70 U.S. embassies
as well as a growing number of foreign missions in the United States,
and has partnered with the Alliance to Save Energy to tap its vast
membership for expertise and advice. Additionally, over 14 leading U.S.
companies have provided equipment and services at-cost to U.S.
embassies for Energy Efficiency Sweep events (``EE Sweeps''), in which
U.S. Diplomatic Mission facilities showcase American clean energy
technologies and services.
(2) Number of EE Sweeps completed: Eleven Europe EE Sweeps have
taken place beginning in November 2011. Ambassador-hosted events took
place in Berlin, Brussels, Madrid, Berne, Warsaw, Bratislava, Sophia,
Lisbon, and Rome, with Paris and Vienna to come. The Department will be
able to provide full metrics on cost savings after a year has passed as
these require an established baseline that accounts for weather and
seasonal anomalies. Projected energy savings versus preinstallation are
estimated to be up to 40 percent depending on level of investment and
regional energy costs.
(3) Education and publicity: The Department of State views the
League as a platform to share information on U.S. leadership in clean
energy technology and services. These events have led to U.S. companies
receiving increased interest and contracts for their products and
services. Additionally, the visibility of the program also advances
U.S. public diplomacy objectives of increasing public awareness of
alternative energy and energy efficient technologies.
The League of Green Embassies is part of the broader Greening
Diplomacy Initiative, a program to improve the environmental
performance and sustainability of the Department of State's worldwide
facilities and operations. The impact of expanding the League will be
more exposure around the world for energy efficient goods and services
and American leadership in this field. Additionally, the use of more
energy efficient technologies in American embassies will clearly lower
overall operational costs while demonstrating U.S. leadership in
resource efficiency and sustainable operations.
Question (#16). The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) has been one of our most successful foreign policy programs,
saving millions of lives and transforming the global health landscape.
However, PEPFAR funding was significantly reduced in the President's
Request, although funding for the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, with which our bilateral
programs are closely intertwined, was substantially increased.
With reductions in drug prices and gains in efficiencies, I
understand that this truly is a case where our experts in the
field are able to do more with less, but please explain how,
even with this reduction, PEPFAR can achieve our ambitious
treatment goals also meet other objectives such as training
health care workers so that countries can do more themselves.
Answer. With the resources provided in the budget request, by
focusing on proven interventions and continuing to push for greater
efficiency and lower cost, PEPFAR will be able to achieve its ambitious
goals, including--but not limited to--supporting treatment for 6
million HIV patients in FY 2013. This is true because PEPFAR continues
to increase impact, improve efficiency and lower costs. In the area of
treatment, costs per patient have declined from $1,100 to $335. Nearly
$600 million has been saved due to increased generic procurement. And
shifting from air freight to land and sea freight saved $52 million
through December 2010. For voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC),
teams have been able to expand patient load with increased experience.
One health VMMC team can now perform 8,000 circumcisions per year
versus 2,000 per year when we first began. And upcoming improvements in
VMMC technology hold the promise of cutting the cost of the procedure
by 50 percent or more. In the area of infrastructure and equipment,
investments have resulted in a decline of per-patient site level cost
by 80 percent in the 2 years following establishment of a treatment
site.
PEPFAR has become more efficient in using health care workers, with
tasks being more appropriately allocated among trained health
professionals, ranging from physicians to community health workers.
Perhaps most importantly, PEPFAR is seeing countries devote increased
resources to HIV and the health sector. South Africa, the country with
the largest HIV burden in the world, has dramatically increased its
financing of its response to over $1 billion per year. As we move
aggressively to a sustainable response, PEPFAR, the Global Fund and
partner countries are working more closely together--which will
ultimately produce an overall decrease in PEPFAR's programming costs
even as services are expanded to reach more people. Building on
science, focusing on proven interventions and increasing access to
life-saving antiretroviral treatment, the United States can help
dramatically decrease new infections with the resources provided in
this budget.
With respect to health workforce, partnerships such as our Medical
Education Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and Nursing Education
Partnership Initiative (NEPI) will continue under this budget. These
programs provide resources to governments and educational institutions
to better equip doctors, nurses and midwives to improve the health of
vulnerable populations. MEPI and NEPI support our objectives to
strengthen both the quantity and quality of health workforces and
reflect our continued engagement with country health and education
ministries. As PEPFAR transitions from an emergency response to a more
sustainable effort our programs support national plans that strengthen
health care delivery systems and empower countries to move toward
country ownership of their HIV/AIDS responses.
Question (#17a). President Obama plans to travel to Cartagena,
Colombia, in April for the Sixth Summit of the Americas. He made a
strong impression at the most recent summit in 2009 in Trinidad and
Tobago when he spoke about equal partnership. ``There is no senior
partner or junior partner,'' Obama said. ``There is just engagement
based on mutual respect.''
What message will the administration hope to convey at this
year's summit
Answer. At the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago,
President Obama challenged the region to embrace an updated
architecture of regional cooperation based on partnership and shared
responsibility. Many nations embraced that call and the results have
been significant. The Sixth Summit of the Americas provides an
excellent platform for the President to continue building on this
partnership agenda and to highlight the accomplishments of his
administration's hemispheric agenda.
Colombia's summit theme, ``Connecting the Americas: Partners for
Prosperity,'' reinforces the spirit of partnership that has been at the
core of the Obama administration's policy since 2009. Through the
establishment of equal partnerships and the power of proximity, the
United States is working effectively with an increasingly capable set
of partners to address key challenges facing the people of the
Americas--from energy and citizen security to more inclusive economic
growth and environmental protection--while also advancing core U.S.
interests, both in the region and beyond.
Fully recognizing that the region has moved beyond ``senior/junior
partner'' relationships with the United States, we intend to showcase
the strong record of progress, growth, inclusion, and security that we
have developed with governments in the region as we continue to
confront common threats and challenges.
Question(#17b). What are the most important Summit of the Americas
agenda items?
Answer. Heads of state and government from throughout the
hemisphere will convene under Colombia's leadership to address issues
of regional importance, including infrastructure integration, the
reduction of poverty and inequality, citizen security, natural disaster
response and preparedness, and the access to and use of information and
communication technologies throughout the hemisphere.
The administration will focus on advancing the Energy and Climate
Partnership of the Americas, a deliverable from the Fifth Summit of the
Americas, establishing engines for economic growth and competitiveness,
promoting innovation and social inclusion as vital components of
development, sustaining natural capital, and institutionalizing
government-private sector dialogue throughout the region.
Question (#17c). What goals does the United States seek to achieve
at the summit?
Answer. Colombia's theme ``Connecting the Americas: Partners for
Prosperity'' provides a useful framework to advance U.S. foreign
policy. Through the summit process the President plans to promote a
broad, inclusive agenda focused on the following key themes:
(1) An Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA)
initiative, proposed by Colombia, to interconnect electrical
power systems throughout the Americas;
(2) The President's 100,000 Strong in the Americas goal to
increase student exchange between the United States and Latin
America and the Caribbean;
(3) Encouraging the development and creation of small and
medium enterprises across borders, especially through diaspora
linkages;
(4) Promoting universal access to communications and
broadband technologies;
(5) Supporting economic growth by breaking down barriers to
women's economic participation;
(6) Increasing public-private partnerships by promoting
regular communication between private sector leaders and their
governments;
(7) Promoting climate change mitigation and adaptation by
reducing deforestation and promoting sustainable development in
the Andes-Amazon region;
(8) Supporting good governance and respect for human rights
by combating discrimination and promoting economic and social
inclusion; and
(9) Financing more effective and lower cost solutions to some
of the region's toughest development challenges.
Question (#18a). Under the Bush and the Obama administrations, the
United States has forged a particularly cooperative law enforcement
relationship with Mexico. Today our Federal law enforcement agencies
are sharing an unprecedented amount of information, helping target
successful enforcement operations against transnational criminal
organizations operating in both in Mexico and the United States.
Recognizing that the Merida Initiative has promoted a very
positive transformation of bilateral law enforcement
cooperation, what are the greatest obstacles to further
strengthening law enforcement cooperation between Mexico and
the United States?
Answer. The relationship of U.S. and Mexican law enforcement has
never been stronger. The cooperation of U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement is vital to the success of institutionalizing capacity to
sustain the rule of law. While we have delivered over $900 million in
Merida Initiative funding over the past 3 years, the Government of
Mexico continues to devote extensive resources toward strengthening law
enforcement and justice sector institutions.
Mexican law enforcement entities, particularly those at the federal
level, have made significant strides and expanded their capabilities to
confront the cartels; however, the initial challenges confronting
Mexico--notably corruption and a shortage of law enforcement
capabilities at the federal, state, and municipal level--continue to
exist.
The Government of Mexico initiated substantial reforms against
corruption in its law enforcement entities, but the process of
implementing the reforms presents a new set of challenges. For example,
Mexican law mandates that all police officers receive vetting every 3
years. Mexico's federal agencies and states have established ``Control
de Confianza'' centers to conduct this vetting, which includes a
background investigation, as well as toxicology, medical,
psychological, and polygraph examinations. The Control de Confianza
centers are working to obtain sufficient resources and develop needed
capabilities to conduct the vetting of thousands of currently serving
law enforcement officers and recruits. While the Mexican Federal Police
tripled its size, from 11,000 in 2006 to over 35,000 at present, many
states lack sufficient numbers of new police officers who are vetted
and trained to replace the removed, corrupt officers. Moreover, many
law enforcement forces continue to receive low pay, lack benefits like
survivors' benefits, and remain concerned for the safety of their
families and themselves. The cartels' concerted violence against
Mexican law enforcement fosters additional concern among law
enforcement officers.
The Merida Initiative provides assistance to the Control de
Confianza centers at the federal and state levels. At the federal
level, we are working with our Mexican counterparts to develop vetting
standards and standard operating procedures. We are also working to
develop Internal Affairs Units to investigate corruption and other
abuses within federal and state law enforcement forces. At the state
level, the Merida Initiative is providing training, technical
assistance, and equipment to expand the capacities and capabilities of
state-level Control de Confianza centers.
The shortage of law enforcement capabilities continues to plague
all levels of law enforcement, particularly those in Mexico's states.
Federal law enforcement, notably the Mexican Federal Police, have made
extensive gains in elevating general-level skills across the officers
in its force. Our Mexican federal partners are now turning to address
needs in specific, specialized law enforcement capabilities. With
Merida Initiative support and the expertise of our U.S. Government
agency colleagues, Mexican federal law enforcement officers are
receiving specialized training in antimoney laundering, criminal
investigations, and counternarcotics. We are also assisting Mexico's
federal forensic laboratories to meet international standards in the
forensic sciences, and we continue to enhance the ability of Mexican
federal agencies to detect illicit goods at key check points and ports
of entry with the donation of nonintrusive inspection equipment.
Many of Mexico's states and municipalities have faced challenges in
developing the capabilities and resources required to meet citizen
security needs and combat the cartels' violence. In addition to the
above-outlined assistance to the Control de Confianza centers, the
Merida Initiative has begun to support the Government of Mexico-
sponsored Model Police Units (MPUs--known in Mexico as Accredited State
Police Units), which are a major crimes task forces at the state level,
and the state police academies. Merida assistance is working to elevate
skill levels and expand the capabilities and resources of the MPUs in
21 states and Federal District by providing training, technical
assistance, and equipment. To date, over 1,300 investigators, 450
analysts, and 1,900 operations personnel have received training. Merida
is also providing assistance to the state police academies in the
Government of Mexico-designated priority states of Chihuahua, Nuevo
Leon, Sonora, and Tamaulipas, and to the development of a national law
enforcement training academy in Puebla. We are coordinating with the
Government of Mexico to place Senior Police Advisors/Mentors at those
academies to better respond to MPU and state law enforcement needs,
expand capabilities, and further elevate the skill levels of police
officers.
Question (#18b). What is the Government of Mexico's strategy to
strengthen law enforcement capabilities at the state government level?
Has the Mexican Government invited the United States to support the
training of specific state government police forces? Which ones?
Answer. The Merida Initiative supports Mexico's strategy of
developing and training Model Police Units (MPUs) in the states and
Federal District. The MPUs are similar to major crimes task forces and
will operate within the states and communicate and coordinate with
Mexican Federal Police and security forces. Our state and local law
enforcement programs have three foci: (1) train recruits for the MPU
program--currently, 21 states and the Federal District have started to
develop these units; (2) provide assistance to state police forces and
academies in the priority states of Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and
Tamaulipas; and, (3) support the development of a national law
enforcement training academy in Puebla. The U.S. -Mexico High Level
Group in 2011 designated Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas as
priority states for Merida assistance. The Government of Mexico
proposed expanding the list of priority states to eight during the
March 2012 meeting of the bilateral Policy Coordinating Group, adding
Durango, Guerrero, Michoacan, Sinaloa, and Sonora.
Our assistance provides training, technical assistance, and
equipment to the MPUs. To date, we have provided instructors to train
recruits in information analysis, investigations, and operations--the
three components of a MPU. Thus far, we have concentrated our efforts
in four state police academies (Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and
Tamaulipas) and Puebla's national law enforcement academy, due to open
in May. We are coordinating with the Government of Mexico to place
senior police advisors/mentors in Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and at
the Puebla Academy, and are evaluating requests for assistance from
other states, including Coahuila, Durango, Guerrero, and Veracruz.
Question (#18c). What steps has the Government of Mexico undertaken
to promote judicial reform at the federal level?
Answer. Mexico is undergoing a profound transformation of its
existing inquisitorial judicial system to introduce an oral advocacy
system where prosecutors, defense lawyers, and the accused appear
before a judge to present testimony and evidence in an open court. This
systemic, constitutionally mandated 8-year reform process carries a
deadline of 2016 and requires extensive training across the entire
justice sector, including the creation of entirely new business
processes. This massive effort consumes time, energy, resources, and
focus among judicial sector actors.
The Government of Mexico has stated its commitment to meet this
deadline and has begun an extensive effort to train and equip all
sectors of the justice sector.
Question (#18d). What have been the principle obstacles hindering
the Mexican Government's ability to promote judicial reform at the
federal level?
Answer. Mexico's transition from its inquisitorial legal system to
an oral, adversarial one is progressing, but several states are
advancing ahead of the federal legal system. This systemic, 8-year
reform process requires extensive training across the entire justice
sector, including the creation of entirely new business processes.
The greatest obstacle we see is Mexico's failure, as of yet, to
pass a Federal Code of Criminal Procedure--which would allow the
necessary legislative changes needed to implement the adversarial
system.
Additionally, during the extended Presidential transition that
stretches from the Presidential elections in July until the next
administration takes office in December 2012, the current
administration will be legally and politically prohibited from making
commitments to receive training or other assistance on behalf of the
next administration.
Question (#18e). How has the United States encouraged the Mexican
Government to promote federal level judicial reform?
Answer. The United States strongly supports the efforts of the
Mexican Government to implement a long-term solution to the weaknesses
in Mexico's legal system. Accordingly, the vast majority of U.S. Rule
of Law (ROL) assistance is focused on helping Mexico achieve the long-
term transformation of its justice sector, including strengthening the
capacity of institutions at the state and federal level. Existing U.S.
ROL assistance spans the breadth of institutional changes that will
support the creation of an effective justice system in Mexico.
Some examples of our programs include:
Federal, State, & Local Training: Through the Merida
Initiative, over $20 million in capacity-building training has
been delivered to SSP, PGR, the Tax Administration Service
(SAT), and state and local police officials. The project has
resulted in, among many other new capacities, 4,400 trained SSP
police investigators who are deployed throughout Mexico and can
incorporate the comprehensive intelligence cycle in federal
police investigations. All entities also have a much improved
capacity for leadership and management of police forces. In
addition, the development and certification of core instructor
cadres at the federal and state levels provides an improved
capacity for internal training. The Merida Initiative has also
provided assistance in the design of federally supported
training programs for judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and
investigative police.
Corrections System: Prior to Merida Initiative assistance,
the Mexican federal prison system contained seven prisons
holding 6,400 out of 45,000 total federal prisoners (with the
rest being held in state prisons) and no formalized system for
training, classification, and transportation. With Merida
support Mexico now has a fully functional national corrections
academy, 2,635 newly trained prison staff including
classification and transportation specialists, and has
increased the capacity of the federal prison system to 18,000
inmates. In January 2012, Mexico received international
accreditation from the American Correctional Association for
four facilities and the Federal Academy at Xalapa. Mexico was
also recently named the regional chair of the newly formed
Latin American Chapter of the International Corrections and
Prison Association in recognition of its leadership in
corrections reform.
Prosecutors and Investigators: Under Merida, U.S. and
Mexican officials have designed and developed a comprehensive
training program that combines prosecutors and investigators in
courses designed to help them master the current inquisitorial
code as well as the proposed accusatorial code pending before
the Mexican Congress. In 2012, 2,500 PGR prosecutors and 6,000
investigators will be trained in core investigative and
prosecutorial competencies, enhancing their ability to work
together to effectively prosecute cases.
Witness Protection: The Merida Initiative provided technical
assistance in drafting Mexico's first federal witness
protection law which was approved by the Mexican House in
November 2011and is pending passage in the Mexican Senate. With
expected passage of this legislation, the U.S. Marshals Service
will commence training and provide technical assistance to
create a sustainable witness protection program in the PGR and
to train almost 500 Federal Investigative Agency agents in all
aspects of witness protection with Merida funding. This will
collectively improve prosecutors' ability to engage witnesses
and elicit trial testimony, a key component in the oral trial
system.
Forensics Development of Attorney General's Office (PGR) and
Federal Police (SSP) Laboratories: With U.S. funded fixed and
mobile forensics extraction devices, the SSP now has the
capacity to collect evidence which is admissible in criminal
prosecutions. Additionally, Merida assistance has financed
training and equipment for PGR and SSP forensics laboratories
and as a result they are aggressively moving toward
international accreditation in core forensic disciplines. Sixty
PGR employees are in the process of completing final
certification after 16 weeks of digital forensics training and
11 SSP instructors having begun the certification process.
Crime Scene Investigators (CSI): Through Merida, 180 PGR
crime scene investigators and 158 of the 230 SSP investigators
received forensics training modeled after the International
Association of Identification and U.N. guidelines. Six PGR CSI
instructors received an additional 520 hours of training and
were certified as trainers. The SSP has requested that 11
instructors go through the instructor certification training in
2012. This provides both organizations with a new and
flourishing capacity to conduct crime scene investigations to
international standards, and to continue the standardized
training into the future.
PGR Multi-Agency Digital Forensics System: Merida assistance
funded the integration of the first DNA server into the PGR
network. With complementary U.S. training to PGR personnel,
Mexico now has the infrastructure to begin nationwide use of a
secure network to effectively collect and store DNA data,
transforming the way evidence is gathered and crimes
investigated and prosecuted at the federal level. In 2012, U.S.
assistance will help fund a forensics training center at the
national PGR laboratory to build on this capability.
Victims' Assistance: The Merida Initiative provided
technical assistance to the Federal Prosecutor's Office for the
creation of an office focused on crime victims. This office is
increasingly providing legal, medical, psychological, and
social services to crime victims in 16 of the 32 states. The
Merida Initiative is providing this federal office with
technical assistance to expand its services in more states and
coordinating with state authorities to ensure complementarity
of services for victims. The Merida Initiative will also
provide assistance to design services for victims of
particularly serious crimes, such as forced displacements and
extra-judicial executions.
Question (#19). Brazil has announced an ambitious program to
encourage university students to study science and technology overseas.
Describe the intent, scope, and funding of this initiative.
How will the Brazilian Government place students in the
United States?
What is the State Department doing to facilitate the placing
of Brazilian students enrolled in this program in the United
States?
Answer. In July 2011, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff announced
Science without Borders, a large-scale nationwide scholarship program
funded by the Government of Brazil to promote the expansion and
internationalization of Brazilian science and technology cadres. The
program aims to send 75,000 Brazilian university students in the
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields to
study and conduct research abroad over the next 4 years, with the
private sector funding an additional 26,000 scholarships, for a total
of 101,000 Brazilian students studying overseas. Boeing was the first
private company to provide funds, and we believe it likely that other
American companies will follow suit.
The Government of Brazil has stated its intention to place at least
half of these 101,000 students in U.S. universities and institutions of
higher education. The Department sees President Rousseff's Science
without Borders initiative as a boon to the bilateral relationship and
a complement to President Obama's 100,000 Strong in the Americas goal.
As you may know, President Obama announced 100,000 Strong in March
2011, aiming to have 100,000 students from Latin America and the
Caribbean study in the U.S. and 100,000 U.S. students studying in the
region each year.
In order to help facilitate these complementary efforts, the
Department is building networks of cooperation between the Brazilian
Government and universities in the United States. We have also expanded
English language, Fulbright, and educational advising programs to
prepare Brazilian students to succeed in the United States.
Through consultations with the Department, Brazilian education
officials have raised visibility and awareness of Science without
Borders in the U.S. educational community. The Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs' EducationUSA student advising program showcased
Science without Borders at the 2011 EducationUSA Forum and at several
national conferences of higher education associations in the United
States. Discussions with Brazilian officials and educators in the U.S.-
Brazil Global Partnership Dialogue and at subsequent events have shaped
Brazilian university leaders' understanding of the U.S. higher
education system, expanded U.S. awareness of opportunities in Brazil,
and generated United States-Brazilian educational partnerships. The
Department established a linkage between the Brazilian Government and
the Institute for International Education (IIE), with the result of the
first successful placement of 650 Science without Borders undergraduate
students in more than 100 American universities in 42 States in January
2012.
Undergraduate candidates for the program are nominated by their
Brazilian university and must receive approval from the Brazilian
agencies responsible for the implementation of the program, Brazil's
Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education (CAPES)
and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development
(CNPq). IIE conducts further review of the candidates and matches their
applications with appropriate universities in the United States. IIE
also manages payment of tuition, visa fees, placement logistics, and
other operational support. The final decision to accept a Science
without Borders student is made by the participating U.S. host
institution.
The U.S. Mission to Brazil is facilitating visa appointments and
hosting Science without Borders orientation events for students through
a collaborative effort by the Government of Brazil, EducationUSA, the
United States-Brazil Fulbright Commission, and IIE. To develop the pool
of students who are academically prepared for U.S. study, the
Department of State, in partnership with a consortium of 38 Binational
Centers in Brazil, launched english\3\ (``English cubed'') in March
2012. The countrywide English language immersion program will
incorporate language learning, test preparation, and orientation to
life on a U.S. campus.
Question (#20). What has the United States done, and what more can
it do, to address threats to freedom of the press in the Americas?
Answer. We are deeply troubled about recent threats to media
freedom in the Western Hemisphere. The past 5 years have reversed a 20-
year positive trend, with declines in freedom of expression, due to
government pressures in countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Nicaragua, and due to violence and intimidation from transnational
criminal groups in Mexico and Central America. The Department's
``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,'' reports and statements
by the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, NGO reports,
and other data document clearly the challenges to media outlets and
individual journalists from both government and nongovernment actors.
We have vigorously and repeatedly spoken out and expressed our
concerns to the Ecuadorian Government on the El Universo and Gran
Hermano libel cases, citing the Inter-American Democratic Charter's
words that freedom of expression is an ``essential component'' of
democracy, and stated unequivocally that democratically elected leaders
have a responsibility to ensure political and legal space for freedom
of expression. We continue to urge the Ecuadorian Government to address
the potentially chilling effect on press freedom as a result of these
and other cases.
In response to continued Venezuelan Government harassment and
intimidation of privately owned and opposition-oriented media outlets
and journalists by using threats, fines, targeted regulations, property
seizures, criminal investigations, and prosecutions, the Department has
repeatedly and publicly stated that free and independent media play the
key role in the dissemination of information and views. We will
continue to speak out when the role of this critical democratic
institution, part of the foundation of any healthy democracy, is
targeted by the Venezuelan Government.
In countries as diverse as Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
and Suriname, heavy-handed government attempts to influence media, in
some cases including imposition of restrictive legal frameworks and
denying or suspending licenses, threaten the free flow of information.
In Nicaragua, President Ortega has been consolidating a monopoly of
television and radio stations owned by him, his wife, and family
members. The government uses harassment, censorship, arbitrary
application of libel laws, and national security justifications to
suppress reporting, and withholds government advertising contracts from
independent media.
Government control of traditional media in Cuba (press, television,
radio) is complete, leaving Cubans isolated and eager for unfiltered
news from outside the island, about events on-island and worldwide.
Cuba has one of the lowest levels of Internet penetration in the world,
and the Cuban Government remains intent on barring the vast majority of
the populace from gaining unfettered access to the Web. Some Cuban
activists who are also independent journalists have been imprisoned for
their activities.
Cartel violence, particularly in Mexico and Central America, has
taken a heavy toll on journalists' lives and has a chilling effect on
media coverage of crime as well as on efforts to galvanize public
support for countercrime programs. Mexico is rated as one of the most
dangerous countries in the world for journalists by the United Nations
and leading NGOs. We will continue to support the Mexican Government,
which has taken considerable steps toward improving protections for
journalists, including positive legislative action just this month.
Through diplomatic engagement, public statements, and programs, the
Department calls attention to the obstacles to freedom of expression
and conveys support for those who strive to protect it, regardless of
whether the threat comes from government or nonstate actors. Our
embassies engage consistently with media organizations, human rights
groups, journalists, and governments in the countries where freedom of
expression is under threat. In Honduras we are supporting the Special
Victims Task Force, which investigates the murders of journalists,
among others. We will continue to enhance our public diplomacy programs
focused on journalist education and safety, and on social media's
capacity to buttress freedom of expression. The Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor as well as USAID manage programs throughout the
region to work toward decriminalization of libel, promote independent
journalism, empower civil society to support freedom of expression,
improve the quality of investigative journalism, and provide
journalists with tools to protect themselves in a climate of
intimidation.
We have strongly and publicly supported the OAS Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Expression, particularly against efforts to limit the
functioning and funding of that office, and will continue to support
this independent monitor of media freedom in the hemisphere. We will
also renew our calls for better implementation by countries of existing
standards and mechanisms, and support the work of international and
regional protection mechanisms.
Question (#21). What are the primary institutional obstacles
hindering the Government of Honduras from addressing more effectively
its enormous law enforcement challenges? Can the United States and
other partner nations help Honduras promote law enforcement reform if
these challenges are not addressed?
Answer. Rule of law institutions in Honduras suffer from a chronic
lack of resources, insufficient and unqualified personnel, and
widespread corruption. The average member of the Honduran National
Police has a sixth-grade education and lacks formal investigative
training. Police detectives, prosecutors, and judges are ill-equipped
to address rampant gang activity and overwhelmed by the rapid expansion
of transnational drug-trafficking organizations. Honduras is the
primary transshipment point for U.S.-bound cocaine, and it has the
world's highest murder rate. The result is pervasive impunity,
including for human rights abuses.
The Government of Honduras has demonstrated the political will to
strengthen its citizen security institutions and improve crime
prevention. In July 2010, the Honduran Congress approved an asset
forfeiture law to deprive criminals of ill-gotten gains and generate
public resources. In June 2011, Honduran lawmakers approved an
emergency tax to generate an additional $80 million annually for
security spending. The Congress also approved legislation permitting
judicially authorized wiretapping, and a constitutional amendment
authorizing the extradition of Honduran nationals to the United States.
Ultimately, success in combating crime and impunity will depend
upon the Government of Honduras' efforts to improve the capabilities of
its law enforcement institutions, root out corruption, expand state
control over Honduran territory, and provide productive alternatives to
young people tempted by lucrative offers from criminal enterprises. The
U.S. Government and other donors see an opportunity to provide
meaningful assistance in these areas to the Honduran people during this
difficult time.
The United States is helping to strengthen Honduras' rule of law
institutions by assisting in a comprehensive overhaul of the national
police academy curriculum, participating in the vetting of police, and
supporting a police investigative unit that focuses on human rights
violations. At the same time, we are directly combating criminal
elements through specialized units staffed by vetted Honduran
investigators and prosecutors and advised by U.S. experts. Though small
in scale, these units have had impressive successes in disrupting drug
trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, and gang activity.
Question (#22). How can the United States, working with other
partner nations and international organizations including the
Organization of American States, best ensure that the Venezuelan people
can freely choose who will represent them in the upcoming elections?
Answer. Venezuela will hold Presidential elections on October 7. In
current context, these elections will offer Venezuelans a particularly
important opportunity to exercise their democratic right to elect their
government and choose the future path for their country. All
signatories of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, including
Venezuela, have committed to hold ``periodic, free, and fair elections
based on secret balloting and universal suffrage.''
The international community can play an important role to guarantee
that the electoral process in Venezuela is free, fair, and transparent.
The U.S. Government has conveyed the importance of international
electoral observation missions to the Organization of American States,
the European Union, and other organizations that would conduct rigorous
observation of all aspects of the Venezuelan electoral process. The
Union of South American Nations announced on March 20 that its
Electoral Council will serve as observers in the elections. Multiple
observer missions can add to the depth and credibility of the overall
observation effort. For that reason, the United States would welcome
participation by credible international observation.
Question (#23). I strongly support the administration's efforts to
rebalance our attention, energy, and resources toward the Indo-Pacific
region. It's important to recognize that Asia's dynamic and growing
economies will be a global center of gravity that determines much of
the future of the 21st century. In Asia, many of our allies, partners,
and competitors are watching to see if we will continue to make
credible security and economic commitments, and match them with
concrete action. To do that, we need to adequately resource our
diplomacy in the region.
In your view, does this budget request for the East Asia and
Pacific region reflect the administration's decision to
rebalance U.S. efforts toward East Asia?
Answer. Looking forward to the next decade, we recognize that the
Asia-Pacific region will continue to increase in importance to the
United States and we understand that our diplomatic presence and
engagement should reflect the significance the region will have for our
country. Overall fiscal constraints in the foreign affairs budget have
placed limits on our ability to increase direct State Department and
USAID resources to the region in FY 2013. However, we are working
smartly to elevate our commitment to the region through a strategy that
is multifaceted, involving close coordination with the full spectrum of
interagency partners to make sure our diplomatic, defense, and
development efforts are targeted toward our highest priorities.
The efforts of our diplomats are an essential part of our
longstanding and ongoing engagement in the region. They are a critical
component of how we pursue and achieve our strategic objectives. For
example, we successfully concluded our implementation review process
for our free trade agreement with the Republic of Korea, which entered
into force on March 15 of this year, and are now working aggressively
on the Trans Pacific Partnership. Our enhanced engagement with Burma
and our strategy to match ``action-for-action'' to encourage the
country's reform process has already shown signs of progress including
a substantial release of political prisoners.
These efforts have already produced real results, such as new
strategic dialogues across the region with emerging partners,
strengthened alliances, and enhanced engagement with the region's
multilateral fora including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the East Asia summit, as well as deepening regional
cooperation on a range of economic issues through APEC. In addition, we
have established the Lower Mekong Initiative with four Southeast Asian
countries sharing the Mekong and launched a bilateral Comprehensive
Partnership with Indonesia and Partnership for Growth in the
Philippines. The budget request reflects the administration's continued
support for and commitment to these important initiatives.
We have also coordinated closely with our interagency partners to
significantly increase assistance to the region. Recently signed MCC
compacts will bring more than a billion dollars of American assistance
to Indonesia and the Philippines in the next 5 years.
We are substantially increasing our consular resources in the Asia-
Pacific to address an unprecedented increase in demand for U.S. visas
throughout that region. In China, we are expanding our consular
presence at every single post, and visa issuances have more than
doubled in the last 5 years.
As part of the National Export Initiative and the new focus on
economic statecraft, our diplomats are helping U.S. companies learn
about the massive infrastructure development opportunities in the ASEAN
region, particularly Indonesia. We believe that our companies are best
placed to bring world-class capabilities and state-of-the-art
technology toward this endeavor and in the process create jobs for
Americans at home.
Question (#24). After almost a half-century of military
dictatorship, Burma is now sending signals that it is ready to change
direction and rebuild its relationship with the United States.
President Thein Sein's government is authoring a series of reforms that
both baffle and excite long-time observers. If the parliamentary
elections this April go well, after consulting with Aung San Suu Kyi,
other Burmese democrats, and our partners overseas, some leaders in
Congress will likely support efforts to ease some sanctions as part of
a gradual process that encourages reform and improves the lives of the
people. You made a historic trip to Burma this November as part of an
effort to show the U.S. Government is willing to invest in the
country's reformers and encourage change. While the country's
democrats, for the first time in decades, are finding reasons for
encouragement, Burma's welcomed signs of spring remain fragile.
What additional steps is the administration prepared to take
in the coming months to help enlarge this window of opportunity
and facilitate continued progress?
If the government continues on the right track, will you
advise in favor of easing certain sanctions? Where will you
start? Would you support the provision of technical assistance
from international financial institutions like the IMF, World
Bank, and ADB?
Answer. The United States has played a leading role in seizing what
we view as a window of opportunity, and we are seeking to enlarge that
window. Following my visit to Burma in late 2011, we announced our
commitment to match ``action-for-action'' to help encourage and sustain
progress toward democracy and national reconciliation. In recent
months, we have provided U.S. support for international financial
assessment missions and limited technical assistance, undertaken steps
to resume World War II remains recovery operations and counternarcotics
cooperation, invited Burma to join the Lower Mekong Initiative, and we
have announced that we are going to begin the process of upgrading
diplomatic ties with Burma by exchanging Ambassadors.
Additionally, we are prepared to support U.N. Development Program's
move toward conducting a normal country program in Burma. We are also
seeking ways to expand U.S. assistance for microfinance and health
activities in Burma and to increase educational exchanges to build
capacity and promote human resource development in the country. In
response to increased desire to strengthen civil society, we are
renovating our American Center in Rangoon to increase its capacity for
outreach.
If the Government of Burma continues in this positive direction
towards democratic reform, we will consider additional steps to support
and encourage further transformation. The April 1 parliamentary by-
elections are an important milestone in Burma's democratization
efforts. If the election process is free and fair, we will consider a
range of actions including the targeted easing of certain sanctions and
enhancing our USAID presence in Burma.
In February, I authorized a partial waiver of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act Tier 3 sanctions to enable U.S. support for
international financial institution assessment missions and some
technical assistance in Burma through the 2012 fiscal year. If the
Burmese Government continues on the reform path--takes concrete steps
to achieve greater civic openness, end violence in ethnic minority
areas, and sever military ties with North Korea--we will consider
further steps such as easing restrictions on bilateral assistance.
Once Burma has made the reforms we are looking to see, we believe
that the international financial institutions can play a powerful role
to promote overdue economic reforms to accomplish growth and poverty
reduction in Burma. If circumstances warrant, we and our Treasury
colleagues will consult closely with Congress on how we can support a
resumption of multilateral financial assistance to Burma.
Question (#25). The administration recently decided to send a
Senate-confirmed ambassador and signaled its willingness to receive
Burma's counterpart in Washington. An ambassadorial exchange is not a
reward. Upgrading our diplomatic presence could allow us to more
effectively monitor events, advocate for human rights, and advance U.S.
interests and values. Much work remains to be done, and time is of the
essence.
When can we expect the administration to come forward with a
nominee for this critically important post?
Answer. Following a substantial release of political prisoners in
January, the President and I announced that the United States would
upgrade diplomatic ties by exchanging Ambassadors. This action will
enable us to strengthen our ongoing high-level dialogue with senior
government officials and pro-democracy groups, deepen and establish
long-term ties with the Burmese Government and people, and identify new
possibilities to support the reform process.
We are actively considering prospective nominees and aim to
identify and name a nominee in the coming weeks. We expect our
Ambassador, once nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, to work in close coordination with the Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator for Burma.
Question (#26). According to some estimates, ethnic minorities
constitute about 30 percent of Burma's population. President Thein Sein
is in the process of negotiating cease-fires with the armed wings of
various ethnic groups and making efforts to implement reforms.
As the country begins to gradually emerge from international
isolation, what steps is the United States taking to encourage
the Government of Burma to protect the rights of minorities,
specifically including the Rohingya, and to integrate these
communities into the political process?
Answer. We have consistently called on the Burmese Government to
halt hostilities in all of Burma's ethnic minority areas and begin an
inclusive dialogue with ethnic minority groups toward genuine national
reconciliation. Protecting the rights of all of Burma's diverse
peoples, including the Rohingya, remains a priority for the United
States Government. We are encouraged that the Burmese Government has
signed cease-fire agreements with a number of armed ethnic minority
groups. These preliminary agreements need to be followed up with a
process for dialogue that addresses the deep mistrust between ethnic
communities and the Burmese Government and begins laying the groundwork
for lasting peace.
During my meeting with President Thein Sein in December 2011, I
specifically raised the situation of the Rohingya and expressed our
concerns about reports of ongoing human rights violations. The Rohingya
continue to face severe discrimination and lack basic rights including
citizenship, freedom of movement, and freedom to marry. I underscored
the need for the Burmese Government to take appropriate measures to
protect its people, to ensure nondiscrimination, to investigate all
allegations of abuse, and to hold accountable all those found
responsible for human rights abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law.
As we move forward to support sustained democratic reform efforts
in Burma, we will continue to emphasize the need for the Burmese
Government to take additional concrete steps towards reconciliation
with its ethnic minority groups.
Question (#27). The Department has worked very cooperatively with
the East-West Center across a number of different areas: helping host
APEC, inviting the Pacific Island leaders, and working on a recent,
major English language initiative in Southeast Asia, to name several.
The Center has also been the site of several major policy addresses on
the region.
Is this close relationship and the Center's important role
in helping rebalance our strategy toward Asia sufficiently
reflected in its FY 2013 budget allocation (e.g., $10.8
million)?
Answer. The East-West Center is a well-known and respected
institution that improves the Asia-Pacific region's understanding and
appreciation of American values and society. Its programs largely
support U.S. and Asia Pacific understanding and relations through
cooperative research study, education programs, and exchange, including
annual participation of approximately 2,000 individuals.
The Center augments U.S. capacity to deal with and lead in the
rapidly growing Asia-Pacific region and plays major role in supporting
our renewed regional engagement with Asia and the Pacific. Overall
fiscal constraints in the foreign affairs budget have forced the
Department to make difficult tradeoffs. However, we are working to
elevate our commitment to the region through a strategy that is
multifaceted, involving close coordination with the full spectrum of
interagency and international partners to make sure our diplomatic,
defense, and development efforts are targeted toward our highest
priorities.
For example, the East-West Center serves as our implementing
partner on the Brunei-U.S. Partnership on English Language Education
for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is a
multifaceted $25 million English-language training program funded by
the Government of Brunei that draws upon State Department and East West
Center expertise in English-language teaching to help unify the diverse
members of ASEAN through use of English. This creative public-private
partnership not only reflects a shared commitment on the part of the
East-West Center and the U.S. Government to advance educational
opportunities in the region, but also demonstrates a resourceful
approach to funding these priorities.
At the same time we are working to leverage partnerships to advance
our engagement in the region, it is also important in this constrained
budget environment that we are forthcoming about the anticipated
impacts of reduced funding and our efforts to address those impacts.
The FY 2013 request of $10.8 million for the East-West Center is a net
decrease of $10.2 million from the FY 2011 Actual and $5.9 million
below the FY 2012 Estimate. At this funding level, the Center must
fundamentally reshape itself. Some projects will be carried out if
funding outside of the Center's direct appropriation can be secured.
The number of scholarships as well as the award amount will be reduced.
Center research activities will be more focused around issues of
health, environment, governance and justice, regional relationships and
organizations, and trade and their interrelationships. The Pacific
Islands Development Program will be folded into the larger Research
umbrella. The Education and Seminars Programs and External Affairs will
focus on degree fellow awards and programs that are self-supporting,
attract large external funding or are mission-critical, such as the
journalism exchanges and alumni engagement.
Question (#28). What do you see as the political, institutional,
and security implications of the current eurozone financial crisis? How
is it shaping your views on the strategy and objectives for U.S.
foreign policy? What scenarios should the United States plan for?
Answer. Europe remains America's partner of first resort on global
challenges; a prolonged economic crisis in the European Union would
potentially affect the long-term ability of crisis-stricken European
countries to partner with us. We do not see this happening at present;
European Union member states and other partners in Europe have moved
decisively in recent months and years to expand assistance to critical
transition countries in the Arab world, ramp up sanctions against Syria
and Iran regarding those regimes' human rights abuses and defiance of
international commitments, and sustain EU engagement in eastern Europe
and around the world.
Driven by economic imbalances, competitiveness gaps, and
institutional weaknesses in its monetary union, Europe's debt crisis
illustrates the importance of pursuing sustainable, balanced growth in
the world economy. It also shows the need for a progrowth, projobs
agenda and strong economic coordination to support the global recovery
while European governments put new institutions and policies into
place. Finally, the crisis demonstrates the continued importance of
international cooperation to restore financial stability, boost
confidence, and create jobs.
Europe is the most significant foreign source of investment and
jobs in America, so a long-term economic crisis in Europe would have a
direct impact on our foreign economic policy and on the economic
dynamism that underpins U.S. strength in the world. While Europe's debt
crisis remains the foremost challenge to the global economy, the
leaders of euro-area countries have pledged to do whatever it takes to
stand behind the euro. We are confident they have the capacity and the
resources to deliver on that commitment.
Europe's debt crisis highlights the importance of continued close
cooperation with our European partners on diplomacy, defense, and
development, reiterating our shared commitment to remain engaged
globally. In a time of constrained budgetary resources on both sides of
the Atlantic, it is more important than ever to coordinate with
partners in Europe who can bring unique capabilities to bear in pursuit
of shared goals. We are working together to ensure complementary
outcome-focused development efforts in the Middle East and North Africa
region, in sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere. Such coordination is
crucial to maintain engagement and make sure our efforts are mutually
reinforcing.
Question (#29). Can you please explain how the administration is
distributing the aid to Nagorno-Karabakh? Are there any official
restrictions on communication, contacts, travel, or other interactions
between U.S. and Nagorno-Karabakh government officials?
Answer. The administration shares Congress' view on the importance
of aiding those who have been affected by the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh (NK). Since 1998, the United States has provided over $37
million in humanitarian assistance to victims of the NK conflict,
including food, shelter, emergency and medical supplies, access to
quality health care and water, and demining projects. U.S. assistance
currently supports humanitarian demining and improved access to potable
water. The demining project has thus far cleared 94 percent of
antipersonnel and antitank mines and 71 percent of the battle area. We
are concluding a potable water project that will expand access to clean
water in the city of Stepanakert. We intend to continue our support to
the people of Nagorno-Karabakh in FY 2013.
As a cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States remains
committed at the highest levels to assisting the sides of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement. We
continue to engage the leaders of the sides to reach agreement on a
framework for such a settlement, which then can lead to a comprehensive
peace treaty. No country, including Armenia, recognizes the self-
declared independence of the so-called ``Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.''
However, the U.S. cochair of the Minsk Group does travel regularly to
Nagorno-Karabakh to meet with the de facto authorities there, as part
of the overall effort to engage all the populations that have been
affected by the conflict.
Question (#30). Is there additional information on the destruction
of the medieval Armenian cemetery at Djulfa by the Azeri government.
Can you report any other destructions of human heritage that have taken
place in the North Caucasus since that time?
Answer. The United States has condemned the destruction of the
Djulfa cemetery and urged the Azerbaijanis to investigate the incident.
Despite our repeated requests to visit the Djulfa cemetery, local
authorities have so far refused permission to do so.
As in many conflict areas, the Caucasus has seen destruction of
important historical monuments. The United States is engaged with
governments in the region to ensure the preservation of historical
monuments and artifacts. For example, the United States, through the
U.S. Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation, has provided funding
to improve infrastructure and capacity to support the long-term
preservation of the Noratus cemetery in Armenia, home to the largest
surviving collection of Armenian cross stones in the world. Under the
same program, we have also sponsored the preservation of a medieval
scholarly center near Tatev Monastery in Armenia. In Azerbaijan, the
United States, among other projects, has awarded funding to the Gala
Mosque project to help preserve the tower walls and mosque of the Gala
village.
Question (#31). Are you concerned about ongoing threats by Turkey
regarding the exploration for oil off the coast of the Republic of
Cyprus?
Answer. The United States supports the right of the Republic of
Cyprus to explore for energy in its offshore areas. We believe that
Cyprus' oil and gas resources, like all of its resources, should be
equitably shared between both communities in the context of an overall
settlement. This policy, which we convey to both the Republic of Cyprus
and Turkey, reflects our long-standing support of the Cypriot-led
efforts under U.N. auspices to reunify the island into a bizonal,
bicommunal federation and to encourage the two sides to come to a
peaceful settlement.
On February 11, Cyprus announced the second round of licensing for
offshore hydrocarbon exploration. In response, Turkey issued a press
release that reaffirmed its strong opposition to this exploration
absent an agreement. We have encouraged all sides to address concerns
through talks. We continue to urge all parties to refrain from actions
or statements which could increase tension in the region.
Question (#32). What is the United States currently doing to
promote the construction of Southern corridor pipeline, such as
Nabucco, from the Caspian to Europe?
Answer. Our Office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy has
been working hard on this issue, and there have been a number of recent
developments on the Southern corridor. First of all, I would note that
Nabucco has always been one of several options to achieve our shared
goal with Europe of bringing new sources of supply to market, with a
significant portion of that gas supplied to our friends and allies in
the Balkans and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In October of last year,
Turkey and Azerbaijan took an important step when they signed a long-
awaited
gas supply deal. Then just in February, the consortium controlling
Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II natural gas field narrowed the choices for a
route from Turkey to Europe to a scaled-down version of Nabucco, known
as Nabucco West, the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) and the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline. We continue to work closely with all the companies
and parties involved to achieve energy security for Europe.
Question (#33). You have championed women's initiatives throughout
your tenure as Secretary of State. You know that integrating gender
into program design and implementation greatly enhances the
effectiveness of our foreign policy and foreign assistance efforts. The
administration recently released the National Action Plan on Women,
Peace, and Security. The Plan has a goal to empower half of the world's
population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace
in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity.
How will the administration's proposed budget support
efforts to integrate gender throughout U.S. foreign policy
programs and strategies and across agencies?
Answer. The administration's proposed budget will support efforts
to integrate gender throughout U.S. foreign policy programs and
strategies and across agencies through: (a) programs targeted to
advance gender equality and the status of women and girls, and (b)
ensuring that the full range of programs--from economic development to
humanitarian assistance to exchange programs, as well as conflict
prevention and crisis response operations--identify and address
existing disparities, capitalize on the skills and contributions of
women and girls, and are accessible and responsive to women and girls.
The U.S. National Security Strategy recognizes that ``countries are
more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal
rights and opportunity.'' Evidence shows that investments in women's
employment, health, and education are correlated with greater economic
growth and more successful development outcomes. Engaging women as
political and social actors can change policy choices and makes
institutions more representative and better performing. And a growing
body of evidence shows that women bring a range of unique experiences
and contributions in decisionmaking on matters of peace and security
that lead to improved outcomes in conflict prevention and resolution.
To achieve successful outcomes for U.S. foreign policy priorities,
including stability, prosperity, and peace, we must focus on promoting
gender equality and advancing the political, economic, social, and
cultural status of women and girls across our work. To further this
strategic imperative, we have issued the Department of State's first-
ever Secretarial Policy Guidance on Promoting Gender Equality to
Achieve our National Security and Foreign Policy Objectives. The policy
guidance requests embassies and bureaus to build on existing efforts
and work to bolster participation and leadership opportunities for
women in local and national government processes, civil society, and
international and multilateral forums; to unleash the potential of
women to spur economic development by addressing the structural and
social impediments that disadvantage and prevent women from
contributing to their fullest extent in formal and informal economies;
and to draw on the full contributions of both women and men in
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. The Department is also
working to address the distinct needs of women and girls in disaster
and crisis response through the U.S. National Action Plan on Women,
Peace, and Security framework. USAID has also issued a new policy on
Gender Equality and Female Empowerment, which requires integration of
gender throughout our development work.
Furthering gender equality and advancing the status of women and
girls in our work means going beyond simply ensuring a balanced
approach to our diplomatic efforts, development assistance, and
humanitarian aid; it also means focusing on reducing gaps between women
and men and girls and boys in resources, opportunities and outcomes in
our programs and the full range of our engagement with host
governments, civil society, and the private sector. It also means
encouraging and increasing women's direct participation through
bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomacy to ensure better
outcomes for governments and society.
To ensure that we are making progress, the Department will
integrate gender through four key mechanisms: (a) strategic and budget
planning; (b) programming; (c) monitoring and evaluation; and (d)
management and training. We estimate that our FY 2013 request for
foreign assistance will be used to fund over $300 million in activities
where gender equality or women's empowerment is an explicit goal; $1.23
billion in activities where gender equality or women's empowerment is
an important but secondary outcome; and $147 million in activities that
are aimed at preventing and responding to gender-based violence, for a
total of $1.68 billion.
Question (#34a). In our efforts to combat, prevent, and punish mass
atrocities, we sometimes struggle for tools. In the past, the
Department has been able to turn to the Department of State Rewards for
Justice Program to assist with the apprehension and punishment of
persons wanted by the war crimes tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. The Department has also been able to use the
Program in connection with its efforts to combat and punish terrorists
and narcotraffickers.
Do you consider the program to have been successful? Can you
provide representative examples of the program working at its
best?
Answer. Yes, the Department's three rewards programs are important
tools for the U.S. Department of State, and protect the national
security of the United States. The Rewards for Justice (RFJ)
Counterterrorism Program is one of the U.S. Government's most valuable
assets in the fight against international terrorism and is the public
face of U.S. efforts to prevent these acts and bring to justice those
responsible. Since its inception in 1984, RFJ has paid over $100
million to more than 70 individuals who provided information.
The RFJ Counterterrorism Program is credited with successes that
have demonstrated global results. RFJ paid a $2 million reward to a
source who provided information to Diplomatic Security (DS) special
agents in Pakistan for the location of Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1995, Pakistani authorities,
assisted by DS agents, arrested Yousef in Pakistan and extradited him
to the United States. He is currently at a maximum security detention
center in Colorado. In 2003, Uday and Qusay Hussein were brought to
justice. In this instance, an RFJ campaign had been initiated and, in
just 18 days, a source came forward with credible, actionable
information--the fastest result in RFJ history. The 101st Airborne
Division conducted an operation to capture Uday and Qusay, which
resulted in the deaths of these two wanted persons.
The War Crimes Rewards Program has been instrumental in bringing to
justice some of the most notorious and brutal fugitives sought by the
U.N. International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and Rwanda (ICTR). In the past 2 years alone, the program has made 14
payments for information leading to the arrest and conviction of these
fugitives.
The Narcotics Rewards Program has proved a valuable tool for U.S.
law enforcement agencies--not only encouraging confidential informants
to come forward and thereby helping bring traffickers to justice, but
also applying pressure to drug traffickers, making their illicit
operations significantly more difficult and costly. Since the program's
inception in 1986, the Secretary of State has authorized approximately
$71 million in rewards to confidential informants who helped bring
narcotics traffickers to justice. Over the past 3 years, Narcotics
Rewards payments have averaged approximately $10 million annually.
The Narcotics Rewards Program has helped to bring important
traffickers to justice, including major logistics managers for cocaine
distribution networks out of Colombia and Venezuela, like Salomon
Camacho-Mora. More recently, the program has helped to bring a number
of cartel leaders to justice in Mexico. For example, after publicizing
rewards for certain members of the Arturo Beltran-Leyva drug
trafficking organization in early December 2009, Marcos Arturo Beltran-
Leyva was killed during a law enforcement operation attempting to
capture him. The organization's logistics leader, Jose Gerardo Alvarez-
Vasquez, was separately captured in April 2010.
Due to the sensitivity of these programs, we are limited in the
type of specifics we can provide in regards to the operations and
successes. However, further details are provided in the classified
reports that the Department of State submits to the House Foreign
Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees for every reward paid
by each of these three programs.
Question (#34b). As the Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone
tribunals wind up their work, do you see a potential role for the
program with respect to other tribunals designed to hold accountable
those accused of committing mass atrocities?
Answer. The War Crimes Rewards Program has been instrumental in
bringing to justice some of the most notorious and brutal fugitives
sought by the U.N. International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). In the last 2 years alone, we have
made 14 payments for information leading to the arrest and conviction
of these fugitives. Further details are provided in the report that we
submit to the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relation
Committees for every reward we issue.
However, the present statutory authority for the War Crimes Rewards
Program is limited to those fugitives indicted by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL), the ICTR and ICTY. From these three tribunals,
there remain only nine targeted fugitives at large, all from the ICTR.
After the capture of those fugitives, the program will be unable to
ensure accountability for some of the world's worst crimes. The State
Department would like to expand this program to bolster our ongoing
efforts to help bring other alleged war criminals to justice. To do so,
we would need legislation authorizing the Department to publicize and
pay rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction in any
country, or the transfer to or conviction by an international criminal
tribunal of specifically identified foreign nationals accused of war
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.
Under such authority, fugitives would only be added to the rewards
program after careful review and approval by an interagency committee
and the Secretary of State or her designee. That committee would
include representatives from relevant agencies, including State, DOD,
DOJ, DHS and the Intelligence Community.
Question (#34c). How could the expansion of the program strengthen
the hand of the State Department in efforts, for example, to assist
with international efforts to apprehend Joseph Kony or remove him from
the battlefield?
Answer. Subject to the interagency committee's recommendations and
approval by the Secretary of State, some individuals who could be
considered for inclusion in the War Crimes Rewards Program under the
expanded authority include Joseph Kony and the other top commanders of
the Lord's Resistance Army wanted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
The expansion of the War Crimes Rewards Program could bolster
efforts to generate information about the whereabouts of Joseph Kony
and other LRA commanders by giving lower level fighters a material
incentive to provide information. Our military advisors believe this
program would enhance their efforts in the field. We believe it could
also help encourage lower level LRA fighters to defect and escape from
the organization's ranks. Since October, scores of individuals have
escaped or been released from the LRA's ranks. We are working with the
governments in the region and U.N. to encourage more individuals to
defect. If Joseph Kony and the other top LRA commanders were added to
the program, the Department of State would work to publicize the
rewards using leaflets, radio broadcasts, and other publicity tools.
Question (#34d). Do you believe the program could be helpful with
respect to other U.S. law enforcement priorities, such as combating
transnational organized crime? If so, how?
Answer. The Department of State's U.S. and foreign law enforcement
partners recognize our Rewards Programs as valuable tools that create
incentives for offering information, which in turn helps bring
criminals to justice. However, since the inception of the three
original programs, transnational crime and its perpetrators have
evolved, extending far beyond narcotics- or terror-related activities.
These criminals are willing to capitalize on any avenue that might
produce illicit profits, covering a range of illicit activity from
intellectual property rights piracy, arms trafficking, trafficking in
persons, to cyber crime. As these criminal organizations expand their
reach, they have become more complex and volatile, which destabilizes
democratic institutions and the integrity of the global economy. We
believe strongly that it is important to update our toolkit to address
the threats before us.
On July 25, 2011, President Obama introduced a National Strategy to
Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which illustrates the evolving
criminal threat and encourages additional tools to counter it.
Transnational criminal organizations rely heavily on their control over
and the secrecy of their illicit networks. Our Rewards Program
successes demonstrate that we can undermine this sense of confidence
and control by terrorist and criminal networks, disrupting their
ability to operate effectively. The ability to offer rewards for
information that brings transnational organized criminals to justice
and publicize the targeting of these criminals, if authorized by the
Congress, would help U.S. authorities and our international partners to
dismantle organized criminal networks as well.
Question (#34e). Representative Royce has introduced legislation
entitled the Department of State Rewards Program Update and Technical
Corrections Act of 2012 that seeks to address aspects of these
international challenges. Do you support this legislation?
Answer. Yes, we welcome the legislation that Representative Royce
has introduced, H.R. 4077, which would allow the Department of State to
better use the program to pursue and help bring to justice individuals,
such as Joseph Kony, who are accused of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity.
Question (#35). The State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (S/CRS) had some real successes, most notably in its
work in South Sudan, but also struggled to find its footing. The new
Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO) Bureau presents an opportunity
to build on these lessons learned and better institutionalize
prevention and enhance our response capabilities. One of the strengths
of S/CRS has been its interagency character. Some concerns have been
raised, however, that agencies such as the Department of Justice and
the Department of Agriculture will play much smaller roles in the new
Civilian Response Corps and in the lese larger efforts.
How do you respond to such concerns about the whole-of-
government approach and what role do you envision for these
other agencies as the program moves forward?
Answer. To be more innovative and agile, CSO is developing a new
model for the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) that will seek to include
the widest possible range of partners, including the interagency, from
the beginning of its engagements. The result should be an expeditionary
team made up of leaders and experts from all parts of the United
States, interagency, state and local governments, and other sources of
talent.
The nature of places where CSO is operating is changing. We see a
range of cases where the U.S. role is pivotal but not dominant, rather
than the heavy footprint of Afghanistan and Iraq. In turn, we are
focusing on a smaller CRC-Active component which emphasizes leaders,
and a broader approach which expands potential partners and has a ``pay
as we use'' business model like the CRC-Standby. This will allow us to
respond with those who can work independently, such as supporting a
Presidential inquiry in Liberia, or who can lead a small team that
draws on both USG and local resources. To succeed, country cases must
accelerate local ownership and that too will be at the heart of CSO's
emphasis.
We believe that this approach will be more effective and responsive
to the needs of each case and more cost effective than the current
model.
Question (#36). In the time since USAID was incorporated into the
State Department's planning and budgeting processes, to what extent
have you been able to find cost savings from consolidating operating
budgets or foreign aid programs with similar objectives?
Answer. Since the integration of the Department of State and USAID
budgets with the creation of the Office of the U.S. Foreign Assistance
Resources (F), the Department has made significant progress in
establishing and implementing effective mechanisms to coordinate State/
USAID foreign assistance programs and align foreign assistance
resources with policy priorities.
The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) goes even
further by taking a comprehensive look at how we can spend our
resources most efficiently, how we can achieve our priorities most
effectively, what we should be doing differently, and how we should
prepare ourselves for the world ahead. The QDDR's key reforms to State
and USAID planning and budget processes are designed to strengthen the
links between diplomatic and development efforts, as well as more
effectively align policy priorities, strategic responses, budget
planning, and performance management. Our commitment to rigorous
planning and performance management maximizes the effect of every
dollar spent.
The new strategic planning effort is anchored by two processes that
will greatly enhance our ability to coordinate State and USAID
programs, as well as identify overlap and opportunities for cost
savings. The first process will produce Joint Regional Strategies,
collaborative efforts between State and USAID to develop multiyear
regional strategies that identify joint goals, objectives, priorities
for resources and programming, and tradeoffs. The second process will
produce Integrated Country Strategies, also a collaborative effort
designed to bring all agencies under Chief of Mission authority
together to develop common objectives and a plan for best aligning
their resources to achieve objectives. USAID's new Country Development
and Cooperation Strategies will form the core of the development aspect
of the Integrated Country Strategies.
The QDDR recognized the importance of integrating development with
other foreign policy considerations through integrated planning and
budgeting; and it emphasized the importance of a strong and coherent
development perspective within that integrated whole. Strengthening
USAID's policy, strategy, planning, and budget capacities are a crucial
part of this vision. Along with the integrated planning and budgeting
processes at State, this will provide enhanced ability to make results-
based tradeoffs among programs implemented by various bureaus and
agencies.
With regard to operating budgets, USAID and State have made
progress on consolidating management services; a recent GAO study
attested to the economies of scale that consolidation has produced.
Based on a QDDR recommendation, the Joint Management Board has begun
operation and seeks further consolidation of management services, and a
robust and flexible platform that provides efficient and effective
support to diplomacy and development.
Question (#37). In the development of the FY 2013 budget request,
to what extent have you eliminated or reallocated funds to better align
the Department's budget and foreign assistance with the
administration's national security strategy and current foreign policy
priorities?
Answer. The FY 2013 budget for the Department of State and U.S.
Agency for International Development is shaped by U.S. national
security interests and foreign policy priorities. The budget request is
informed by the results of the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR) which focuses on ensuring that we get the
most out of every dollar from the American taxpayers, while protecting
our interests and projecting our leadership in the 21st century.
The FY 2013 budget elevates diplomacy and development, which,
alongside defense, are critical tools of American power. It continues
our vital national security missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan; builds a strong network of relationships and institutions
across the Pacific; supports transitions in Middle East and North
Africa by incentivizing political and economic reforms; emphasizes
economic statecraft to strengthen the U.S. economy; and elevates
development, making strategic investments to address poverty, disease,
hunger, and climate change, which can destabilize entire societies and
sow the seeds for future conflict.
Under strict budget caps set by the 2011 Budget Control Act, our FY
2013 budget seeks to stretch every taxpayer dollar as far as possible
without compromising our core national security and foreign policy
interests. Our budget reflects our careful evaluation of all programs
and all spending, makes difficult tradeoffs, and takes full advantage
of programs that are successfully becoming more efficient and thus need
fewer resources to accomplish our goals.
For example, progress and efficiencies in the Global Health
Initiative allow us to meet our key objectives and to achieve the
President's stated goal of putting 6 million people on HIV/AIDS
treatment globally by the end of 2013. This is 2 million more people
than our old treatment goal and puts us on the path to an AIDS-free
generation in an era of tight budgets.
We focused Feed the Future and Global Health Initiative programs on
countries with the greatest need and capacity for sustainable progress,
leading to the elimination or reduction of Feed the Future and global
health funding for several countries.
We reduced funding for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia by $113
million (18 percent), reflecting shifting global priorities and
progress over time by some countries in the region toward market-based
democracy. And we reduced funding for programs that are on a glidepath
to more host-country ownership.
In addition, we scaled back funding for overseas construction for 1
year, despite the ongoing need for updated, more secure diplomatic
facilities. We are also saving on administrative costs through measures
including more efficient travel, freight, utilities, communications,
consolidation of services between State and USAID, and centralized and
bulk procurement.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question (#1). Oil markets today are exceptionally tight and
vulnerable to supply disruption. Expert analysis by the Rapidan Group
indicates just 1.6 million barrels of spare capacity, which means that
even today's high gas prices could easily skyrocket if Iran makes good
on its threats against the Strait of Hormuz, if terrorists successfully
attack oil infrastructure, or if an unfriendly leader such as Hugo
Chavez seeks manipulate his exports to the United States. Ironically,
Democratic Senate leadership is calling for Saudi Arabia to boost
production even while they are against increasing oil trade with
Canada. Indeed, the Obama administration recently rejected a permit for
the Keystone XL pipeline upon a recommendation from the State
Department.
Please share with the committee your strategy to boost
liquidity in global oil markets in the next few months,
particularly as gas prices for Americans continue to sky-
rocket.
Answer. In the case of global oil markets, we are pursuing a
strategy that improves our energy security and fosters economic growth,
while managing our resources and protecting our environment for future
generations. Just last month, I signed a groundbreaking transboundary
hydrocarbons agreement with Mexico on oil and gas exploration in the
Gulf of Mexico to create jobs and new opportunities and to address our
energy needs. With regard to our northern neighbor, Canada is currently
our single largest supplier of energy, providing 28 percent of U.S. oil
imports or close to 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. We do not
anticipate this situation will change in the near term.
Let me emphasize again, that the Department's recommendation to the
President on January 18, 2012, that the application for a Presidential
Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline be denied was not based on the
merits. At the time of the recommendation, the alternative route for
the pipeline through Nebraska had not yet been established and, thus,
there was insufficient time to conduct the necessary analysis.
Question (#2-3). The State Department recently concluded 1,217 days
of review of the Keystone XL pipeline permit, including finalizing an
environmental review. Midway through finalizing a national interest
determination, President Obama publicly weighed in to the debate, and
the State Department halted the determination. The protracted delay
undermines our confidence in the Department's competence to undertake
timely review of strategically and economically important projects, and
it throws into question whether the Department was allowed to make a
decision of U.S. interest based on the facts, rather than political
concerns.
Could you please tell us if White House officials gave any
guidance to the State Department to delay the permit decision
or to ultimately recommend a rejection of the permit?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony, the Department recommended to
the President on January 18, 2012, that the application for a
Presidential Permit be denied due to insufficient time to conduct the
necessary analysis, and the President accepted our recommendation and
determined that the Keystone XL pipeline project, as presented and
analyzed at that time, would not serve the national interest. The White
House did not exert any influence over the State Department's
recommendation.
If not, could you please explain how the State Department
was unable to act upon the strategic and economic benefits of
Keystone XL after more than 3 years of review?
Answer. On November 10, 2011, the State Department made the
decision to halt the national interest determination process and seek
more information regarding alternative routes that would avoid the
Nebraska Sand Hills. At that time, the Nebraska legislature was in a
special legislative session, called specifically to consider the issue
of developing state requirements for the approval of petroleum
pipelines in response to widespread concern over the Nebraska Sand
Hills and potential threats of an oil spill to groundwater. These
concerns were expressed by individuals and groups across the political
spectrum. For example, after the final EIS was issued in August of
2011, the Governor of Nebraska requested that the State Department deny
TransCanada's permit application on the basis that it would not be in
the national interest to approve a pipeline with a route through the
Nebraska Sand Hills and over the Oglalla Aquifer. Rather than denying
the permit application at that time, the State Department decided, as
mentioned, that it needed to obtain more information about alternative
routes that would avoid the Sand Hills. Subsequent to that decision,
also in November of 2011, the applicant, TransCanada, reached an
agreement with the State of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline around the
Sand Hills, and the State of Nebraska enacted legislation that provided
for state-level approval of a route through Nebraska. In December 2011,
the Department of State was working on the process to obtain the
necessary additional information, including consulting with Nebraska
state officials. We were unable to complete the process because of the
imposition of the arbitrary deadline in the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act passed on December 23, 2011.
Question (#4). The Keystone XL pipeline would create thousands of
private sector jobs, and it would help protect United States national
security interests. It comes at no taxpayer expense, and it will
strengthen our vital ties with our ally Canada.
The State Department recently concluded 1,217 days of review of the
Keystone XL pipeline permit, including finalizing an environmental
review. Midway through finalizing a national interest determination,
President Obama publicly weighed into the debate, and the State
Department halted the determination. The protracted delay undermines
our confidence in the Department's competence to undertake timely
review of strategically and economically important projects, and it
throws into question whether the Department was allowed to make a
decision of U.S. interest based on the facts, rather than political
concerns.
Reversal of Keystone XL Permit Decision: Is there any legal
blockage to the State Department reversing its recommendation
to President Obama on Keystone XL, to encourage immediate
approval?
Answer. The State Department's recommendation to President Obama to
deny the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline is final. Any
new applications would be treated as a new process, following
regulations and procedures for such pipeline reviews.
Question (#5). Pertaining to the State Department Record of
Decision: In the
Department's record of decision, concurrent with the report pursuant
to Section 501(b)(2) of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act
of 2011, stated (page 5) that regardless of Keystone XL, there would be
no net change in imports or exports due to Keystone XL. The difference
is, of course, where those exports would originate. In other words, the
State Department and Obama administration acknowledges no benefits to
replacing Venezuelan or Middle Eastern crude (or declining production
from Mexico) with reliable and abundant Canadian crude.
Is it the Department's position that the source of our
imports is irrelevant so long as the net quantities do not
change?
Answer. The Department's record of decision also noted that the
economic analysis conducted as part of the preparation of the final EIS
indicated that regardless of Keystone XL, over the remainder of this
decade there was unlikely to be a significant difference in the amount
of crude oil imported from Canada. The source of imported oil,
including over the long term, would have been among the factors, along
with other economic, energy security, foreign policy, environmental and
trade factors, we would have considered if the national interest
determination was allowed to proceed as planned.
Question (#6). In the record of decision, the State Department and
Obama administration assert that there is currently excess cross-border
capacity. That is a curious argument since, as a purely privately
funded project, it would make no economic sense for companies backing
Keystone XL to pay the estimates $7+ billion cost.
Please explain exactly where this excess capacity is, and
how it matches to the crude export quantities expected from
Canada.
Answer. As noted in the record of decision: ``There is currently
excess cross-border pipeline capacity, but limited connections to the
U.S. Gulf Coast refineries.'' As noted in the final EIS (section
1.4.3), the current cross-border pipelines deliver primarily to the
Midwest in the United States. Additional information about how the
current cross-border capacity relates to projected quantities of crude
oil production in Western Canada, as well as to other potential
additions of crude oil transport capacity in North America, is included
in the final EIS, Appendix V, ``Keystone XL Assessment'' and ``Keystone
XL Assessment--No Expansion Update.''
Question (#7-8). In the record of decision, the State Department
and Obama administration asserts that ``The United States will continue
to work with Canada to ensure our shared interests in energy . . . ''.
The Government of Canada has made clear their national priority in
development of the oil sands.
Is the U.S. Government unsupportive of oil sands
development?
Answer. No. The Department earlier approved permits to construct
and operate petroleum pipelines from the Western Canadian Sedimentary
Basin, which includes the Canadian oil sands. These approvals were the
Keystone pipeline in 2008, and the Alberta Clipper pipeline in 2009.
If the U.S. Government is not antioil sands development, is
it the Obama administration's policy that trade in crude from
the oil sands should not be expanded?
Answer. As I have stated previously, the continued development of
oil and gas supplies in North America and globally is a critical
component of our energy diplomacy.
Question (#9). In the record of decision, the State Department and
Obama administration assert that ``denying the [Keystone XL pipeline]
permit at this time is unlikely to have a substantial impact on U.S.
employment, economic activity, trade, energy security, or foreign
policy over the longer term.'' Such a conclusion is clearly at odds
with the reality of our security and economic needs. As with all
infrastructure projects, the private sector jobs created would
predominantly be in the construction and manufacturing sectors, both of
which have been particularly hard-hit in the economic downturn. By the
logic described in the report, rejection of the pipeline is the Obama
administration saying that those jobs are not sufficiently important to
sway its judgment.
Do you stand by the conclusions of the report? If not, how
would you adjust it today?
Answer. The Department's recommendation to the President on January
18, 2012, that the application for a Presidential Permit for the
Keystone XL pipeline be denied was not based on the merits of the
project. The Department recommended to the President that the
application for a Presidential Permit be denied because the arbitrary
deadline imposed by the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of
2011 did not provide sufficient time to conduct the necessary analysis.
Question (#10). Pertaining to the State Department Review of the
Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Application: Please describe, in detail,
why after 1,217 days
the State Department still determined that it had insufficient time to
review the application.
Answer. In response to Question #3, I described the concerns that
led the Department to decide on November 10, 2011, that the Department
needed additional information regarding potential alternative routes
around the Nebraskan Sand Hills. The arbitrary deadline imposed by the
Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of December 23, 2011, gave
the Department insufficient time to conduct the necessary analysis,
particularly since at that time a complete pipeline route had not been
identified.
Question (#11). Do you view it as acceptable that the Department
has kept a major private sector project, and associated jobs, more than
3 years to review?
Answer. The State Department has consistently stated that it did
not think it would be responsible to hasten a decision on what
constitutes the national interest in response to an arbitrary deadline.
For more details please see the responses to Questions 3 and 10.
Question (#12). What steps will you take to ensure that such a
review does not take such a long time in the future?
Answer. The Department will take the time necessary to analyze new
pipeline applications consistent with relevant statutes, regulations,
and Executive orders.
Question (#13). The Department and the Obama administration have
pointed to concerns in Nebraska for the Department's unwillingness to
approve the pipeline. However, concerns around the Ogallala Aquifer and
Sand Hills were not hidden and not unexpected. How is it that the
Department did not, by its own reasoning, recognize and act upon these
issues prior to November 2011?
Answer. Prior to our November 2011 decision that we needed
additional information to determine the impact of alternative routes,
we had been engaged in discussions with TransCanada and the State of
Nebraska. After the final EIS was released on August 26, 2011, the
Department held a public comment period to obtain input for the
national interest determination. During this period the public provided
input on many issues. Only during this public comment period did the
intensity and uniformity of concern about the proposed route through
the Sand Hills, including by Nebraska's elected officials fully reveal
itself. Please see also my response to Question 3.
Question (#14). The State Department conducted both an EIS and a
Supplemental EIS, and issued a final EIS in August 2011. Please explain
why, after years of environmental review, the Department declared that
it would need more than a year to adjust the pipeline route proposed in
Nebraska?
Answer. On November 10, 2011, the State Department made the
decision to halt the national interest determination process and seek
more information regarding alternative routes that would avoid the
Nebraska Sand Hills. At that time, the Nebraska legislature was in a
special legislative session, called specifically to consider the issue
of developing state requirements for the approval of petroleum
pipelines in response to widespread concern over the Nebraska Sand
Hills and potential threats of an oil spill to groundwater. These
concerns were expressed by individuals and groups across the political
spectrum. For example, after the final EIS was issued in August 2011,
the Governor of Nebraska requested that the State Department deny
TransCanada's permit application on the basis that it would not be in
the national interest to approve a pipeline with a route through the
Nebraska Sand Hills and over the Oglalla Aquifer. Rather than denying
the permit application at that time, the State Department decided, as
mentioned, that it needed to obtain more information about alternative
routes that would avoid the Sand Hills. Subsequent to that decision,
also in November 2011, the applicant, TransCanada, reached an agreement
with the State of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline around the Sand
Hills, and the State of Nebraska enacted legislation that provided for
state-level approval of a route through Nebraska. In December 2011, the
Department of State was working on the process to obtain the necessary
additional information, including consulting with Nebraska state
officials. We were unable to complete the process because of the
imposition of the arbitrary deadline in the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act passed on December 23, 2011.
Prior to our November 2011 decision that we needed additional
information to determine the impact of alternative routes, we had been
engaged in discussions with TransCanada and the State of Nebraska.
After the final EIS was released on August 26, 2011, the Department
held a public comment period to obtain input for the national interest
determination. During this period the public provided input on many
issues. Only during this public comment period did the intensity and
uniformity of concern about the proposed route through the Sand Hills,
including by Nebraska's elected officials fully reveal itself.
Question (#15). Did the State Department examine alternative routes
in Nebraska prior to November 2011, and if so, why were those routes
not given preference?
Answer. In the final Environmental Impact Statement in Volume 2,
Section 4.3, the State Department examined alternative routes that
included different potential routes through Nebraska. Those routes,
however, generally involved significantly longer routes, were
economically or technically infeasible, and/or would not have provided
any environmental advantage over the proposed route. The State
Department did not examine an alternative route strictly within the
State of Nebraska designed to avoid the Nebraska Sand Hills. For more
information, please see my responses to Questions 3 and 13.
Question (#16). Pertaining to the National Interest Determination
Review: Prior to suspension of the Keystone XL permit review in
November 2011, the Department was already more than half way through
completion of the national interest determination, which it has slated
for conclusion in December 2011.
Given that the Department is no longer reviewing Keystone
XL, please share the Department's preliminary findings as they
had progressed by November 2011 pertaining to: energy security,
foreign policy, and trade impacts of Keystone XL, if approved.
Answer. The record of decision contains the Department's findings
pertaining to energy security, foreign policy, and trade impacts of
Keystone XL. The final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) contains
additional information and analysis regarding those impacts.
Question (#17-20). Permit Review Authority and Process: Canada is
our largest trading partner and close ally. A default presumption that
expanded trade is economically beneficial and supportive of our foreign
policy seems reasonable. Moreover, lack of ability of the Department to
give Keystone XL a timely review has raised questions of competence in
the energy and environmental area (including as noted in the Inspector
General's review). Moreover, the State Department's role in the permit
review process is not based in statute.
Please respond to the argument that the State Department,
while maintaining a consultative role, is not best suited to be
the lead agency in pipeline permit review.
Answer. Executive Order (EO) 13337 delegates to the State
Department the authority to receive and grant applications for
Presidential Permits for cross-border facilities and outlines a process
for the Department to determine whether granting such permits would be
in the national interest.
Leaving aside Executive Order 13337, simply permitting a
pipeline to cross the border does not in itself authorize
construction. The company involved must still obtain
permissions from state authorities, which have primary
jurisdiction over oil pipeline citing, and from relevant
Federal agencies such as BLM and the Army Corps. Given that the
State Department is not specialized in relevant environmental
issues, would it make sense for the NEPA process (if required)
to be separated from the National Interest Determination?
Answer. The State Department's consideration of what constitutes
the national interest is not limited to only what is required by the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In consultation with other
relevant agencies such as BLM, it was determined that having the State
Department serve as the lead agency for the NEPA process was most
consistent with NEPA and its implementing regulations.
How has establishment of the Energy Bureau changed
responsibility for permit review?
Answer. The establishment of the Bureau of Energy Resources has not
changed responsibility for permit review, but the Bureau of Energy
Resources would also be involved in any future permit reviews.
The 1968 Executive order that first established the
permitting requirement stated that ``the proper conduct of the
foreign relations of the United States requires that Executive
permission be obtained for the construction and maintenance at
the borders of the United States of facilities connecting the
United States with a foreign country.'' Since 1968, the
Executive branch's role in approving the connection of
pipelines at U.S. border crossings has been based on foreign
policy considerations, a point reinforced by the Secretary of
State (not EPA Administrator, for example) being vested with
principle authority. What has changed in the conduct of foreign
affairs that environmental concerns have, in the case of
Keystone XL, trumped decades of precedent?
Answer. The Department's recommendation to the President on January
18, 2012, that the application for a Presidential Permit for the
Keystone XL pipeline be denied was not based on the merits. The
arbitrary deadline imposed by the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act of December 23, 2011, gave the Department insufficient
time to conduct the necessary analysis, particularly since at that time
a complete pipeline route had not been identified.
Question (#21-23). Integrity of Fair Application Review: By
Executive order, the State Department is charged to prepare
recommendations for the President on granting of a transborder pipeline
permit. The employees of all companies deserve a fair hearing on the
merits of the application, not subject to interference from the White
House in the review process.
At any point, did White House officials give guidance to
State Department officials on the criteria or timelines of
review on Keystone XL?
Answer. No. The White House did not exert any influence over the
State Department's review process or recommendation.
In mid-November 2011, the Department announced that it would
delay a decision on the Keystone XL permit application until
after the 2012 election. At any point, did White House
officials give guidance to State Department officials to delay
the permit decision?
Answer. No. The White House did not exert any influence over the
State Department's review process or recommendation.
In January 2012, the Department recommended that the
President reject the Keystone XL permit. At any point, did
White House officials give guidance to State Department
officials to make such a recommendation?
Answer. No. The White House did not exert any influence over the
State Department's recommendation.
Question (#24). Recognition of States Authority and Assistance:
Questions about the routes of pipelines within U.S. States, like other
local land use decisions, are traditionally and appropriately matters
to be decided by the States themselves. The Department has indicated
that the proposed routing of Keystone XL must shift within the State of
Nebraska. Indeed, legislation I have offered allows Nebraska to do just
that. However, it appears that the Department is presuming authority to
resite a pipeline by forcing a change in Nebraska, an authority not
given in statute so reserved for the states.
Please clarify whether the Department believes it has the
authority to site oil pipelines, and, if so, the source of that
authority.
Answer. The Department did not indicate that the proposed routing
of Keystone XL must shift within the State of Nebraska, nor is the
Department presuming authority to resite the pipeline in Nebraska. On
November 10, 2011, the State Department made the decision to halt the
national interest determination process and seek more information
regarding alternative routes that would avoid the Nebraska Sand Hills.
At that time, the Nebraska legislature was in a special legislative
session, called specifically to consider the issue of developing state
requirements for the approval of petroleum pipelines in response to
widespread concern over the Nebraska Sand Hills and potential threats
of an oil spill to groundwater. Subsequently, also in November 2011,
the applicant, TransCanada, reached an agreement with the State of
Nebraska to reroute the pipeline around the Sand Hills, and the State
of Nebraska enacted legislation that provided for State-level approval
of a route through Nebraska. The Department's consideration of what is
in the national interest includes consideration of all potential
impacts of a proposed pipeline, including those impacts associated with
a particular route.
Question (#25). The State of Nebraska continues to pursue
finalization of a new Keystone XL pipeline route through its territory,
pursuant to Nebraska State law. Given that the State Department and
Obama administration have encouraged just such a review, it seems
prudent for the Department to provide assistance.
Are you willing to commit the State Department to cooperate
as needed with Nebraska and to provide any appropriate
assistance to Nebraska in order to complete its route selection
process, particularly given the stated intention of TransCanada
to resubmit the application?
Answer. There is currently no pipeline application before the
Department and thus no basis for the Department to take action
regarding a pipeline review. If the Department receives a new
application, we will cooperate with other State and Federal agencies,
including relevant officials in the State of Nebraska, to ensure an
efficient review of the application that avoids unnecessary duplication
of efforts.
Question (#26-27). Reapplication of Keystone XL: TransCanada has
indicated that, absent congressional action to approve override the
President's rejection of Keystone XL, it will reapply for a permit.
Have State Department officials given guidance to
TransCanada on the timing of any such reapplication, and, if
so, what was that guidance?
Answer. The Department has not given any guidance to TransCanada on
the timing of any new applications.
Given that the State Department has already spent 1,217 days
reviewing the Keystone XL application, and any reapplication is
likely to be substantially similar except in the State of
Nebraska, how can the Department justify recent comments that
no expedited review would be made available?
Answer. If the Department receives a new application, we will
cooperate with other State and Federal agencies, including relevant
officials in the State of Nebraska, to ensure an efficient review of
the application that avoids unnecessary duplication of efforts. There
are certain requirements must be met for any new pipeline application.
Question (#28-30). Disposition of Crude Oil Intended for Keystone
XL: The Government of Canada has clearly stated its intentions to ship
the oil sands crude oil that would have gone through Keystone XL to its
Western Coast, to be shipped through Puget Sound and onward to Asian
markets. Indeed, China and Canada signed a high-level energy agreement
just days after the Obama administration rejected the Keystone XL
pipeline.
What message has the State Department given to Canada, given
that government's anger over rejection of Keystone XL?
Answer. The United States-Canada alliance is a cornerstone of both
countries' national security. We believe Canada will remain committed
to the bilateral alliance, and the United States will continue to work
with Canada to ensure our shared interests in energy, environmental,
and economic issues are not adversely affected by the decision to deny
the permit in January.
Does the Department believe that rejection of Keystone XL
will prevent oil sands development from occurring?
Answer. The Department's recommendation to the President on January
18, 2012, that the application for a Presidential Permit for the
Keystone XL pipeline be denied was not based on the merits. The
arbitrary deadline imposed by the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act of December 23, 2011, gave the Department insufficient
time to conduct the necessary analysis, particularly since at that time
a complete pipeline route had not been identified. As noted in the
final EIS, including the economic analyses in Appendix V, in all but
the scenario where there is no additional crude oil transport capacity
added above 2010 levels, there is unlikely to be a significant
difference in the rate of oil sands development.
Does the Department view it as a loss to the U.S. economy
and energy security that Canada will divert intended oil flows
from Keystone XL to Asia?
Answer. The Department's recommendation to the President on January
18, 201, that the application for a Presidential Permit for the
Keystone XL pipeline be denied was not based on the merits. The
arbitrary deadline imposed by the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act of December 23, 2011, gave the Department insufficient
time to conduct the necessary analysis, particularly since at that time
a complete pipeline route had not been identified. The disposition of
crude oil is determined primarily by market forces. The economic
analysis included in the final EIS indicated that regardless of
Keystone XL, there is significant market incentive for Canadian crude
oil producers to seek access to Asian markets. That economic analysis
also indicated that the export of Canadian crude oil to Asia instead of
the United States was not sensitive to the construction of the Keystone
XL pipeline.
data reporting and transparency
Lack of reliable data on global oil production and capacity
introduces additional uncertainty into markets, putting upward pressure
on prices. Spare capacity is particularly crucial in managing oil price
volatility, but data is unreliable. It is generally believed that OPEC
inflates its spare capacity estimates, and at this point only Saudi
Arabia is likely to have any spare capacity available.
Question (#31). Please provide an update on Department activities
to advocate reliable and transparent data reporting amongst oil
producing nations.
Answer. Our new Energy Bureau has deepened our engagement with IEA
and OPEC on data reporting, and we have broadened our engagement with
the International Energy Forum. The IEF hosts the Joint Oil Data
Initiative, which brings together data from the principal data sources
and allows the public to assess methodology and accuracy. Beyond this,
the State Department reviews multiple public and classified data
sources to assess consistency, and to identify discrepancies.
Question (#32). Do you view OPEC data on spare capacity as
accurate?
Answer. OPEC does not routinely report data on spare capacity. We
use the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the
International Energy Agency (IEA) as primary sources of data on spare
capacity, and augment that with information received from Posts and
from diplomatic engagements with OPEC and non-OPEC members. We cross-
check this data for consistency with multiple classified and public
data sources.
Question (#33). Given that the IEA and EIA have limited ability to
assess OPEC projections, what other tools does the Department deploy to
project spare capacity?
Answer. The Department engages directly and consistently with
significant energy producers. Just in the past several months we have
engaged with several OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Libya,
Kuwait, Iraq, Angola, and Nigeria to discuss oil production plans and
spare capacity. Posts also provide updates on production outages and
increases by engaging host governments and the private sector. We
review, as well, multiple classified and open data sources.
Question (#34). A report entitled the ``Petroleum and Poverty
Paradox'' identified several recommendations for the State Department
to increase attention on extractive industries transparency, including
in revenue reporting, budgeting, and management of mineral revenue
funds. That report, and the ensuing legislation with lead cosponsor
Senator Ben Cardin ``Energy Security Through Transparency,'' part of
which became the Cardin-Lugar amendment S. 1504 to Dodd-Frank, included
encouragement for the U.S. Government to become an Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative implementing country and to include
transparency as a U.S. priority in multilateral fora.
Please update the committee on the Department's progress in
achieving transparency commitments through the OECD and APEC.
Answer. In the OECD, member states are required to submit data in a
number of areas that is then subject to peer review. This process is an
exercise in opening a country's books, and by its nature promotes
transparency. The OECD is also a standards-setting and rulesmaking
organization. Many of its finished products, whether formal agreements
such as the Anti-Bribery Convention, or OECD standards on investment,
trade, or taxation, are at their core exercises in member state
transparency. Non-member countries that sign on to these agreements
adopt the transparency requirements of the member states as well, and
aspiring accession countries, such as Russia, allow member-state
countries to review not only their legislation and procedures, but
their actual enforcement of transparency measure across whole sectors
of their economies. Finally, the OECD works with particular regions,
such as the Middle East and North Africa, to promote good policy on
governance and investment climate--both areas have a strong element of
transparency. We will be partnering with the OECD in May to hold a
conference in Tunisia on transparency and open government.
The Department is also advocating transparency through APEC. As
outlined in the Ministerial Statement from the High Level Policy
Dialogue on Open Governance and Economic Growth chaired by the
Secretary at the APEC summit in Honolulu last year, the APEC Anti-
Corruption and Transparency Experts' Working Group (ACT) is committed
to reporting on progress toward implementing APEC anticorruption and
transparency principles. Specifically, each economy will be completing
comprehensive interim reports in 2012 and 2013 and presenting a report
in 2014. The United States is on track to fulfill this commitment, and
we presented our progress toward completing our own interim report at
the 14th ACT meeting in Moscow in February. We also circulated our
draft widely as a model to be used by other countries.
Question (#35). Given the presence of major oil, natural gas, and
minerals producing countries in the G20, what barriers for progress on
commitments to transparency exist?
Answer. We have sought to use the anticorruption work stream in the
G20 to promote transparency and anticorruption. At the urging of the
United States, anticorruption and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) were included in the agenda for the 2009
G20 summit in Pittsburgh, and the final communique included strong
language urging participation in EITI. The Pittsburgh language advanced
by the United States was cited by the EITI Secretariat as ``important
for EITI.'' The G20 is a very new forum for discussion of these issues,
representing a diverse set of countries, but the United States
continues to promote the development of specific, actionable
commitments on transparency and anticorruption through this forum. An
additional barrier to progress is that the United States itself is not
yet EITI compliant, but starting down this path is a step in the right
direction.
Question (#36). What commitments [for transparency] is the U.S.
Government advocating for the G20?
Answer. As the United States moves to become an Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI) candidate country, we continue to
encourage other members of the G20 to join the EITI. Through the Open
Government Partnership (OGP), we are encouraging the more than 40
countries developing action plans to include EITI membership in their
plans. The anticorruption work stream of the G20, which the United
States originated and has strongly promoted, has been one instrument to
promote EITI. In the 2009 summit hosted by the United States in
Pittsburgh, leaders indicated in their communique that ``We support
voluntary participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative.'' The 2010 G20 Seoul Anticorruption Action Plan commits
countries ``to promote integrity, transparency, accountability and the
prevention of corruption, in the public sector, including in the
management of public finances'' and to combat corruption in specific
sectors. Through the G20 Anticorruption Working Group set up in Seoul,
we have pursued these and other commitments, and worked to drill down
to actionable steps and press for implementation, including in the
critical areas of transparency and integrity in public procurement,
fiscal transparency, adoption and enforcement of laws criminalizing
foreign bribery, and public integrity measures. Other focuses include
accession to and implementation of the U.N. Convention against
Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, cooperation on asset
recovery, work by the Financial Action Task Force, whistleblower
protection, safeguarding anticorruption authorities, and engagement
with the private sector.
Question (#37). The State Department will play an increasingly
important role in explaining the importance of transparency to foreign
governments and work closely with U.S. companies to explain their
requirements under U.S. law for foreign governments unsure about
disclosures required by the SEC pursuant to the Cardin-Lugar amendment,
section 1504 of Dodd-Frank. There is a precedent for this, for example,
in our embassies explaining U.S. legal requirements under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. Please describe the capacity and preparedness
for our embassies to undertake this task, particularly in countries
such as Angola, China, and Qatar.
Answer. Our embassies are well positioned and prepared to explain
how changes in U.S. law may affect companies operating in their host
countries. Embassies throughout the world have been instrumental in
educating host governments and corporations about U.S. legal
requirements under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Once the SEC
issues final regulations, the State Department will work through our
posts overseas to help host governments create the necessary conditions
for companies listed in the United States to be compliant with U.S.
law. We will continue to advocate for other governments to adopt
transparency standards along the lines of those in the Dodd-Frank Act.
This applies equally well in countries such as Angola, China, and
Qatar, as it does in the nations around the globe.
Question (#38). The Cardin-Lugar amendment, section 1504 of Dodd-
Frank, contains the requirement that rules ``shall support the
commitment of the Federal Government to international transparency
promotion efforts'' and authorizes consultation in the rulemaking
process between the SEC and other Agencies. In other words, the statute
clearly invites the State Department to give input, which would seem
obvious since the Department leads international transparency efforts
(so is best suited to define those efforts) and the Department will
have a significant responsibility to explain those rules abroad.
However, Department officials have declined to provide comment to the
SEC.
Does the State Department lack the legal authority to
provide an opinion to the SEC on implementation of Cardin-
Lugar?
Answer. The State Department's practice is not to submit public
comments in response to rulemaking proposals.
Question (#39). Is it Department policy that it must be formally
asked, in writing, before expressing an opinion to the SEC on the
content of U.S. foreign policy in this area?
Answer. The State Department does not normally submit public
comments in response to rulemaking proposals. It is, however,
Department policy to respond to official correspondence in an
appropriate and timely manner.
bureau of energy
The Department recently reorganized to consolidate energy functions
within a new Energy Bureau, and to better coordinate closely related
functions with science and climate offices. In December 2007, a law I
authored was enacted to require establishment of an International
Energy Coordinator with the primary mission of putting energy at the
top of our diplomatic agenda and better leveraging relevant activities
and expertise across the Department.
Question (#40). Please describe how moving the Coordinator from
being within the Secretary's office to be under an Under Secretary and
one among dozens of similarly positioned officials will continue to
give energy prominence.
Answer. The establishment of the International Energy Coordinator,
based on your leadership, was instrumental in formalizing a consistent
mechanism for high-level diplomatic engagement on energy security
issues. The State Department has committed to the effective
coordination of resources to address the political, security, economic,
development, and environmental challenges posed by energy. To this end,
the Bureau for Energy Resources was established to pull together our
diplomatic and programmatic efforts on oil, natural gas, coal,
electricity, renewable energy, transparent energy governance, and
strategic resources.
Question (#41). Please describe why functions around climate
change, which by-and-large is a question of energy generation and
usage, are not within the Energy Bureau.
Answer. Climate change is a multifaceted issue and a significant
and important part of addressing it requires reducing emissions from
the energy sector. However, addressing climate change also requires
adaptation to climate impacts and reducing emissions from other
industrial sources as well as in the land use, forestry, and the
agriculture sectors. Energy is one component of a much broader
international dialogue around climate change that also involves climate
science, environmental impacts, and action in a broad range of economic
sectors.
The State Department's Special Envoy for Climate Change engages
regularly with Environment Ministers from around the world on all these
issues to present a comprehensive and consistent strategy on the many
issues related to climate change. In doing so, the special envoy's
office also works very closely with the new Bureau of Energy Resources
to coordinate efforts relevant to clean and renewable energy
deployment. A very important pillar of the new Energy Bureau is the
directorate on Energy Transformation, which focuses on alternative and
renewable energy and energy efficiency and electricity markets. Through
this directorate, the Energy Bureau now leads the U.S. Government's
representation to the International
Renewable Energy Agency and the Global Bioenergy Partnership, important
functions that were transferred from the Office of Global Change in the
Bureau of Oceans, International Environment, and Scientific Affairs
during the reorganization.
Question (#42). Some have questioned whether the Energy Bureau will
lead to more bureaucracy. Please describe how the new Bureau has
repurposed existing funds, and what your plans for growth are.
Answer. Funding for ENR operating expenses is based on the
reallocation of existing resources. The total FY12 budget for Bureau
operating expenses and salaries is estimated at $11.4 million. The
total FY13 budget request for operating expenses and salaries is $16.9
million, an increase of $5.4 million which maintains current services
and reflects a staff increase of 22 FTE.
With regards to staffing, the Bureau has 53 FTEs. By FY 2013, we
anticipate the staffing level at 75 employees.
Question (#43). Please describe partnerships the Bureau has, or
will, form with private industry both in conventional and
unconventional energy areas. What has the reaction been to the Bureau
in the private sector?
Answer. The reaction to ENR's creation was extremely positive
across the board. Our private sector partners were very pleased that
the Department is taking positive steps toward recognizing the
importance of energy as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. ENR has
been actively engaged in working with the private sector on numerous
issues, from forming partnerships to increase worldwide access to
energy to helping our allies effectively and safely develop their
energy resources. One example of this is our Unconventional Gas
Technical Engagement Program (UGTEP). The program focuses on all
sources of unconventional gas, not just shale gas. It highlights the
potential these various sources have to make a significant impact on
long-term global energy security and the challenges posed by their
potentially harmful impacts. This is an important tool for sharing with
other countries the experiences we have had in the United States with
the development and production of shale gas and other nonconventional
gas and oil resources, and what various levels of government--Federal,
State, and local--and industry have found to be the best practices
associated with unconventional gas development. Through programs like
this, ENR strengthens is relationships with the private sector and
promotes the energy issues vital to U.S. foreign policy.
Question (#44). How is repetition with the Department of Energy
international energy functions being prevented? Are there steps that
can be taken to better integrate activities between the Departments?
Answer. The new Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) and the Department
of Energy work closely together and have complementary capabilities.
DOE has world-leading technical expertise on energy issues and
established relationships with energy ministries. ENR has essembled
excellent geopolitical and policy expertise, and enjoys the benefit of
reaching out to State's diplomatic posts around the world. DOE and ENR
have worked together on common country approaches, each lending their
expertise. Both have traveled together to advance energy relationships.
This collaboration, we believe, is strengthening our impact.
Question (#45). In addition to the global Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs, the Department also continued appointment
of a special envoy to give high-level attention to European and
Eurasian energy affairs. Indeed, having a credible high-level official
devoted to specific tasks (in particular opening of the Southern
corridor) has been crucial to prompting more concerted action in
Brussels and Eastern Europe, and it has shown strengthen in partnership
with Caucasian and Central Asian countries under pressure from Russia
to maintain current energy arrangements.
Please describe how you view the future need for the current
special envoy position.
Answer. The special envoy for Europe and Eurasia brings expertise
and senior leadership that have been essential to U.S. interest in the
region. We continue to benefit from the strong coordination between the
special envoy and ENR, as the region works through energy challenges
that fundamentally affect the economies and geopolitics of the region.
Question (#46). The Department has conducted an important effort to
encourage responsible development of global shale gas reserves. Please
describe progress on that initiative and resources in the budget
request to continue work.
Answer. The Department's Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement
Program (UGTEP), formerly known as the Global Shale Gas Initiative,
continues to make significant progress engaging with international
partners on the various environmental, regulatory, legal, and technical
issues involved in unconventional gas development.
In 2011, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, India, and Jordan
participated in State Department-coordinated informational visits to
the United States. During their visits, the delegations had in-depth
technical engagement on the U.S. experience in the pursuit of
responsibly and environmentally sound development of unconventional
natural gas. These programs included meetings with the Departments of
Energy, Interior, Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.
Trade and Development Agency, as well as state regulators, experienced
academics, community advocacy groups, and industry.
Under UGTEP, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) conducted technical
workshops with partner countries including China, India, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. Shale gas resource
assessments have been released for China, India, and Uruguay; other
assessments should be completed for other key countries in 2012.
UGTEP has been included in the Bureau of Energy Resources foreign
assistance budget request for FY 2013, which totals $14.25 million.
Future programs may support additional visits by relevant foreign
officials to the United States and extended technical engagement with
U.S. experts; regional shale gas conferences to broaden the dialogue on
and understanding of unconventional gas development challenges;
technical visits by U.S. experts and resident regulatory and
environmental advisors to key partner countries; and additional or
follow-on unconventional gas resource assessments by the USGS.
Question (#47). The Department has conducted an important effort to
encourage responsible development of global shale gas reserves. What is
the Department doing to help prevent antishale policies from taking
hold in several European countries?
Answer. Unconventional natural gas, which includes shale gas, if
developed responsibly and in an environmentally sound manner, can play
an important role in a country's energy security.
Under the auspices of the Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement
Program (UGTEP) and through our embassies, we actively provide European
countries with information on U.S. efforts to reduce the potential
harmful impacts of unconventional natural gas development. This
includes reports by the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board
Subcommittee on Shale Gas Production, and the Environmental Protection
Agency's study on the effects of hydraulic fracturing on the life-cycle
of water. Through this engagement, we share the U.S. experience and
best practices so that European countries understand the potential to
develop unconventional gas safely and in an environmentally sound
manner if the proper regulatory and environmental protection frameworks
are in place.
In November 2011 the State Department welcomed representatives from
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia to the United States for a 10-day visit
on unconventional gas development. This delegation met with U.S.
interagency partners from the Department of Energy, Department of
Interior, Department of Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency, as
well as state regulators, experienced academics, community advocacy
groups, and industry representatives to get a holistic perspective of
the U.S. experience with unconventional natural gas development--
specifically regarding shale gas. Future activities may include
additional U.S. visits, in-country engagement by U.S. experts, and
additional workshops.
Our Energy Resources Bureau is also working with Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy Affairs Morningstar to foster a constructive dialogue
in the U.S.-EU Energy Council's Energy Security Working Group, as well
as in bilateral discussions with EU member states. The Department is
also working with individual European countries under the auspices of
the International Energy Agency (IEA) to develop globally recognized
best practices and standards for unconventional gas development, as
well as supporting efforts to better understand the impacts of
increased unconventional gas production on the global energy market.
energy product exports
The State Department budget notes requests of expanded funding to
achieve goals of doubling exports under the National Export Initiative.
Currently, exports of U.S. crude oil are generally prohibited. Exports
of manufactured (or refined) products produced from U.S. refineries are
not currently restricted, and the U.S. exports approximately 15 percent
of refined products. Those exports have increased during recent years
of economic downturn and are, in effect, helping to keep American
workers employed.
Question (#48). Do you believe that the free trade of manufactured
products, including those manufactured by America's refinery workers,
is beneficial to goals of increasing exports and promoting economic
growth?
Answer. The Department fully supports the Administration's goal of
doubling exports under the National Export Initiative. Increased
exports of U.S. manufactured goods will help promote economic growth
and create jobs.
Question (#49). What is the Department's position on export
potential for liquefied natural gas?
Answer. The Department of Energy has the authority to review
applications for LNG export facilities. The Administration has recently
granted two licenses for exports of LNG, taking into account resource
estimates that indicate adequate gas supply in the U.S. to support both
increased domestic consumption and exports. We support the decisions
taken by the Department of Energy and recognize that each license
application will be reviewed and judged based on prevailing facts and
market conditions.
price mitigation and oil shortage preparedness
Oil markets today are exceptionally tight and vulnerable to supply
disruption. The Energy Information Administration has revised spare
capacity estimates down by 42 percent over the last 2 months. Expert
analysis by the Rapidan Group indicates just 1.6 million barrels of
spare capacity (defined as availability within 30 days), which means
that even today's high gas prices could easily skyrocket if Iran makes
good on its threats against the Strait of Hormuz, if terrorists
successfully attack oil infrastructure, or if an unfriendly leader such
as Hugo Chavez seeks manipulate his exports to the United States.
Question (#50). What are your expectations for increases in oil
production capacity in key countries, such as Iraq, over the next 90
days?
Answer. In addition to information from the Energy Information
Administration and the International Energy Agency, we continue to
engage with a number of oil producing countries to better understand
the supply and demand dynamics of international oil markets. In
addition to those countries, such as Saudi Arabia, with significant
spare production capacity, there are several countries with the
potential to increase production capacity in the near future, including
Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, and others.
While Iraq suffers from chronic infrastructure problems, they have
made steady gains and successfully inaugurated a new single-point
mooring in the south. The Government of Iraq and industry experts have
told us that they believe Iraq can increase production by 500,000
barrels per day during 2012.
Question (#51). The International Energy Agency's outdated
statutory membership requirements have prevented inclusion of China and
India, two major oil consumers, in formal emergency planning. Do you
view this as a hindrance to effective emergency coordination and
planning? What remedies are available?
Answer. IEA candidates for accession must first be members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The IEA
has for many years pursued considerable bilateral engagement with both
China and India as a top priority, and the IEA continues to look for
ways to boost these links. The United States has aggressively
encouraged this increased engagement with the IEA and continues to do
so.
The International Energy Agency's growing engagement with both
states has included cooperation on emergency response measures,
including discussions on development and maintenance of petroleum
reserves. For example, extensive emergency preparedness measures were
part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the IEA
and India in October 2011. That MOU also includes the IEA sharing best
practices with India on management of oil stockholding (both publicly
and privately held), emergency stock release mechanisms, and the IEA's
preparation of an emergency response assessment for India. Discussions
with both China and India have included means of coordination during
supply disruptions.
More broadly, the IEA Governing Board, with strong U.S. support,
has directed the Agency to coordinate with key petroleum suppliers and
consumers in the event of a disruption in supply, and the IEA
Secretariat has indicated it plans to pursue consultations with key
non-IEA countries in the event of an emergency.
Question (#52). Important strict sanctions on Iranian oil exports,
designed to help stop Iran's nuclear weapons program, will further
squeeze oil markets.
Is the administration reconsidering the premise that oil
markets are liquid enough to handle loss of Iranian exports and
a higher risk premium?
Answer. We are closely following developments in oil markets
worldwide, and the President will make a determination on this by March
30, as required by section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2012.
Question (#53). If so, what is the administration's backup plan for
easing price volatility?
Answer. As the President has noted, the administration is well
aware of the pain that higher gasoline prices impose on American
consumers, but there are no short-term silver bullets. However, much of
the recent increases in oil prices are due to concerns over the
potential for conflict in the gulf, rather than to fundamental change
in the global supply and demand balance. The surest way to reduce that
volatility will be to continue to try to resolve the underlying
political challenges in that region.
Question (#54). Please share with the committee your strategy to
boost liquidity in global oil markets in the next few months.
Answer. As the President has said, promoting stability in global
oil markets requires an ``all the above strategy.'' At home we have
significantly increased production. We have more oil and gas rigs
operating than the rest of the world, and we have vigorously pursued
higher efficiency standards. Internationally, we work intensively with
energy producers and companies to encourage policy and business
conditions conducive to sustainable production of energy resources. Our
engagement spans all continents and seeks to capture the benefits from
traditional and new producers.
Question (#55). Is the administration prepared to withstand
increases in oil prices as markets tighten?
Answer. We recognize the pain that higher gasoline prices cause for
American consumers. However, we believe that the biggest factor
contributing to the rise in prices is uncertainty and risk of a
disruption of supply from the Middle East, particularly related to
Iran, and the speculation this has caused in the market. We should
expect that Iran will talk up the risk to talk up the prices. Peaceful
resolution of international concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program
would contribute to stability in the gulf and we are pursuing that
resolution through our dual-track policy of pressure and engagement,
while monitoring developments closely and taking appropriate steps to
ensure free transit of legitimate trade.
Question (#56). If global oil prices rise with sanctions, it may be
tempting to ease their implementation or release stocks from the
strategic petroleum reserve quickly, leaving them lessened if they are
needed in the near future. What criteria does the administration have
for when to trigger a SPR release and to coordinate a release with IEA
member countries?
Answer. Since becoming law on December 31, 2011, the State
Department has worked tirelessly to enforce the provisions of section
1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012. A decision
to release stocks from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would be made by
the President, and the State Department is not in a position to
prejudge when or under what circumstances he might exercise that
authority.
Question (#57). Are plans underway to reduce Chinese oil hoarding
in the event of an Iran-related conflict?
Answer. We consult closely with China on our dual-track approach to
resolve international concerns about Iran's nuclear program. We also
discuss world oil markets both bilaterally and multilaterally. We are
not aware of plans by China to hoard oil in the event of an Iran-
related conflict. A broad range of countries are making the decision to
reduce their reliance on Iranian crude oil and we are continuously
monitoring the market. We will continue to vigorously and aggressively
take action consistent with the law and other U.S. sanctions to achieve
our fundamental goal: unrelenting pressure on the Iranian regime to
comply with its international obligations.
Question (#58). What plans are in place for China and other non-IEA
countries to coordinate with IEA countries, including Japan, in use of
emergency stocks?
Answer. China is already informally cooperating with the IEA on
strategic petroleum reserves, and the United States is encouraging
deeper cooperation.
Question (#59). What, if anything, is being done to expedite the
completion of UAE's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which avoids the Strait
of Hormuz?
Answer. It is our understanding that the construction of the
pipeline has largely been completed, but that additional testing and
certification needs to be conducted before it can start carrying oil.
In recent visits, we have expressed our interest in this project to
Emirati authorities. They have told us that they are working closely
with their contractor to complete the pipeline as soon as possible.
Question (#60). What planning is being done to meet demand needs of
countries that are highly dependent on Iranian oil, such as Greece?
Answer. The Department has been engaged with both consumers and oil
producing countries to assess the availability of adequate supplies.
Key suppliers have told us privately and stated publicly that they will
respond to market demand. Still, importers and exporters will need to
agree to contractual arrangements, and commercial terms which
inevitably entail negotiations between parties.
Question (#61). Tight oil markets increase the attractiveness of
terrorist strikes against major infrastructure. Please describe
Department efforts, and funding requested, to avert such threats.
Answer. The U.S. Global Energy Critical Infrastructure Protection
(GECIP) Strategy was developed in 2006 following the failed terrorist
attack on the world largest oil complex at Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia. Under
this strategy we have identified the most important global oil and gas
production, refining, transmission and export facilities and offered
technical assistance to the countries in which these facilities are
located to identify potential vulnerabilities and enhance security. The
list of
facilities, the specific criteria for inclusion and the names of
designated partner countries is classified.
This initiative has led to a very significant cooperative program
with involving numerous federal agencies, including the Department of
State. Discussions with a number of other potential partners are
ongoing. As partners are expected to cover the cost of assistance
provided under GECIP, the Department has not requested funding to
support this program.
Question (#62). Today's tightness in the global oil market requires
immediate action, and it is also a reminder of the need to prepare to
prevent future circumstances. Indeed, structural shifts in global
demand overseas and struggling production expansion indicate such
tightness will become more common.
Do you agree with the argument that, in cases of supply
emergency, it is beneficial for the United States to source its
imports from friendly countries in stable regions, such as
Canada?
Answer. In cases of supply emergency, it could be beneficial for
the energy security of the United States to source its crude oil
imports from friendly countries in stable regions, such as Canada.
However, the specifics of the hypothetical example would determine the
optimal course of action. The United States and Canada continue to
share the largest and most integrated energy relationship in the
world--in natural gas and electricity, as well as in oil. Canada is the
No. 1 supplier of imported oil to the United States.
Question (#63). In cases of supply emergency, do you agree with the
statement that crude oil supplies being delivered by pipeline directly
into our refineries are more reliable, and often priced at a slight
discount due to lower transport costs, preferential to relying on oil
brought in by tanker from Venezuela and the Middle East?
Answer. Pipelines are generally considered a reliable, economic
method of transport. For this reason they are widely used, when
possible, for transporting bulk commodities like crude oil, natural
gas, and refined petroleum products.
The relative cost of pipelines versus waterborne transport would
depend on the relative distances, on shipping rates, and just as
important, on insurance costs. The quality and characteristics of the
oil, and requirements for different purposes, are also a consideration.
In the case of a supply emergency, crude oil by pipeline could be
cheaper but this would depend on a wide range of hypothetical
circumstances.
Question (#64). In considering future Iranian sanctions and the
possible need for national security exemptions, it is important to
consider real cases of U.S. interest. Development of the Shah Deniz
fields, and shipment of that gas to strategic allies in Eastern Europe,
is a clear priority that has spanned administrations, which you have
reaffirmed. However, there is discussion of the gas going to Greece and
Italy, neither of which suffers the same strains of dependence on
Russia as do many Eastern European allies.
In your view, would shipment of Caspian gas via the TAP or
ITGI pipelines rise to the level of a vital national security
interest of the United States?
Answer. Development of Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz gas field and
shipment of that gas to our strategic allies in Eastern Europe are
essential parts of our Eurasian energy policy. Therefore we would
support any pipeline that brings Caspian gas to Europe provided the
following two conditions are met: (1) a significant portion of the gas
must be supplied to our friends and allies in the Balkans and elsewhere
in Eastern Europe, which are particularly dependent on a single source
of gas; and (2) the pipeline must be expandable, so that additional
sources of gas can be accommodated once they become available.
Question (#65). Brazil.--The new Brazilia Government has shifted
the country away from Iran--a welcome and marked contrast from
President Lula. Unlike her predecessor, President Rousseff has not
engaged in high-profile Presidential diplomacy with Iran, and her
government declined to receive Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his
January 2012 Latin American tour.
Will the United States help cement these vastly improved
relationships with Brazil by hosting a formal state dinner for
President Rouseff next month during her visit here?
Answer. The Obama administration has taken a number of significant
steps to solidify our longstanding ties with Brazil, and President
Obama looks forward to hosting Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff for
meetings at the White House as part of their ongoing dialogue regarding
the growing partnership between the United States and Brazil across a
wide range of bilateral, regional, and multilateral issues. While not a
State visit, the two Presidents will execute an ambitious and broad
agenda, including meeting with the U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum, and follow up
on progress made under the three Presidential dialogues launched during
President Obama's March 2011 visit to Brazil--the Strategic Energy
Dialogue, the Economic and Financial Dialogue, and the Global
Partnership Dialogue. The visit is an important continuation of our
efforts to grow commercial, economic, education, and innovation ties
between our two countries.
Question (#66). Additionally, will you pursue other policies that
include negotiating a market access agreement with MERCOSUL, the
Southern Common Market, and a Bilateral Tax Treaty with Brazil?
Answer. The United States stands ready to pursue policies that
provide greater access to Mercosul markets for U.S. exporters. To date,
however, Mercosul has given no indication that it is ready to consider
real tariff liberalization or undertake other types of commitments that
would be required. In practice, Mercosul has served as an umbrella for
various political relationships rather than as a functioning customs
union. Nevertheless, we continue to express to Mercosul members the
mutual benefits of free and open trade.
The administration remains interested in concluding a bilateral
income tax treaty with Brazil that would be consistent with
international standards and provide meaningful tax benefits to cross-
border investors. The United States and Brazil have held a number of
consultations since 2006 to determine the feasibility of concluding
such an agreement, and intend to continue these discussions. In
addition, the United States signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement
(TIEA) with Brazil in 2007. The TIEA was approved by Brazil's House of
Representatives in February 2010 and is awaiting approval by Brazil's
Senate.
Question (#67). What other moves is the administration making on
this effort? For example, does the United States support Brazil's
efforts for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council?
Answer. The United States and Brazil enjoy excellent bilateral
relations and are building a 21st century partnership with a focus on
global issues that affect both countries. Since President Rousseff was
inaugurated on January 1, 2011, she has received numerous high-level
visitors from the United States including President Obama in March 2011
and Secretary Clinton, who attended President Rousseff's inauguration.
In addition to our growing bilateral cooperation, we are working
with Brazil to enhance trilateral cooperation on issues such as
development in Africa, and we have excellent ongoing cooperation in
Haiti. We recently signed trilateral cooperation agreements in Bolivia
and Mozambique. We are working together on biofuels and other forms of
renewable energy. We also collaborate on sustainable urban development
and planning issues, and promote educational and scientific exchanges.
We share a commitment to combat racial, ethnic, and LGBT
discrimination, to advance the empowerment of women, and to fight
exploitative child labor and forced labor. In these and a growing
number of new areas, the U.S.-Brazilian partnership has the potential
to have a major positive global impact.
During his visit to Brazil, President Obama expressed appreciation
for Brazil's aspiration to become a permanent member of the Security
Council and acknowledged Brazil's assumption of global
responsibilities.
The administration believes the long-term viability of the U.N.
Security Council depends on its reflecting the world of the 21st
century. As such, we will work to enhance the ability of the Security
Council to carry out its mandate and effectively meet the challenges of
the new century.
Question (#68). Argentina.--I am concerned that the policies
implemented by Resolution 3252/2012, and others geared at restricting
imports of the Government of Argentina are making it difficult for U.S.
businesses to export to willing buyers in the Argentine market. Please
explain what the Department of State is doing to support U.S. companies
in their efforts to export into this market?
Answer. U.S. exports to Argentina increased 22 percent in 2011,
resulting in a trade surplus of more than $5 billion. While we are
pleased with this growth, we remain concerned by measures introduced by
the Argentine Government that create barriers to trade and investment,
including increased use of nonautomatic licenses, requirements that all
imports and purchases of dollars to pay for those imports be approved
by the government, restrictions on remittances abroad of profits and
dividends, and requirements that companies balance imports with
exports. Such measures are not consistent with the free trade model
that will lead to the greatest benefits for all. We have conveyed our
concerns to the Government of Argentina both bilaterally and in the WTO
that these new policies pose barriers to trade and investment that have
a negative effect on both U.S. and Argentine companies. Other nations,
similarly affected, have made the same point to the Argentine
Government. In those cases where U.S. companies have given us
permission to address their concerns with the Argentine Government, we
have done so, including directly assisting a U.S. company to obtain
import permits for U.S.-made equipment. However, in many cases U.S.
companies ask us to keep their concerns confidential for understandable
reasons. We are committed to working together with the Government of
Argentina to address these concerns so that we may establish a more
productive bilateral commercial relationship.
Question (#69-70). I understand that Roberta Jacobson, Acting
Assistant Secretary of State, recently visited Argentina.
Did she raise barriers to U.S. exports with the Argentine
Government?
If so, was she able to make any progress in terms of a
change in these policies?
Answer. Yes, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson
raised concerns regarding barriers to U.S. exports during her recent
visit to Argentina, and expressed the desire that our governments
continue to work collaboratively to resolve these existing issues.
The fact that she raised these issues with key officials
demonstrates that we remain concerned about these measures. We will
continue to voice our concerns at various levels with the Argentine
Government. We recognize the importance of a free and open commercial
environment, and will continue to encourage the Government of Argentina
to allow for predictable and reliable policies to enhance trade and
investment.
Question (#71). I assume the Department of State is working hard to
support the administration's efforts to increase exports. What is the
State Department doing to break down the barriers to U.S. companies
presented by Argentina's policies?
Answer. Senior U.S. officials, including at Embassy Buenos Aires,
have raised concerns about barriers to U.S. exports at various levels
of the Argentine Government. These issues were highlighted by our
Ambassador to Argentina, Vilma Martinez, in a recent meeting with the
Argentine Ministers of Agriculture, Economy, and Industry. We will
continue to raise our concerns at every opportunity and will encourage
the Argentine Government to provide a transparent regulatory
environment that promotes fair and open competition. Additionally, we
will continue to raise these issues multilaterally at the WTO. We
remain strongly committed to working with Argentina to strengthen the
bilateral commercial relationship and to resolve these key concerns.
Question (#72). I understand that one of the pillars of the State
Department's Jobs Diplomacy initiative is leveling the playing field
for fair competition.
What steps is the State Department taking to level the
playing field in Latin America as major economies like
Argentina and Brazil adopt increasingly protectionist policies
that disadvantage U.S. companies?
Answer. The Department is committed to utilizing all available
resources to identify, address, and remove barriers to trade and
investment between the United States and our trading partners. Emerging
economies, such as Argentina and Brazil, offer tremendous potential to
support additional American jobs by providing American producers with
access to millions of international customers.
The Department and our embassies continue to raise concerns about
protectionist policies and barriers to U.S. companies in Argentina and
Brazil. We regularly meet with representatives of U.S. firms doing
business overseas to listen to the challenges they face and convey
their concerns to foreign government officials, including at senior
levels. We continue to encourage our trading partners to assume a
transparent regulatory environment that promotes fair and open
competition. When appropriate, we also express our concerns through the
WTO and other international organizations and mechanisms.
Question (#73). How does the Department's policy of Economic
Statecraft plan to address the threat to the world trading order that
countries like Argentina are posing by violating WTO provisions without
impunity?
Answer. The Department's Economic Statecraft agenda elevates
economic issues and weaves our economic priorities into our larger
international diplomatic engagement. One of the key elements is
promoting a trade agenda that addresses nontariff and other barriers to
market access as well as ensures free and fair competition and a level
playing field--also known as competitive neutrality--for all players in
the global marketplace. Through our bilateral engagement with countries
like Argentina, we will continue to work within our existing trade and
investment agreements, as well as high-level dialogues, to encourage
their governments to respect their trade and investment commitments.
Question (#74). According to recent reports, the U.S. Treasury
Department is considering allowing Argentina to restructure its debt
through the Paris Club. Although approximately $3.5 million of this
debt is owed to the U.S. Government, this amount is small in comparison
to the over $3.5 billion Argentina owes to private U.S. creditors. In
fact, the amount owed to private American creditors is so large that if
Argentina were to pay these debts, the U.S. Government would receive
far more from tax revenues on those payments alone than it would from a
settlement of the debt owed to the U.S. Government.
In light of these facts, will the U.S. Government wait until
Argentina has satisfied all awards under the U.S.-Argentine
Bilateral Investment Treaty and the more than 100 outstanding
U.S. court judgments against it before approving a Paris Club
deal for Argentina?
Answer. Argentina's arrears to U.S. Government agencies total about
$550 million, and U.S. Government effort, including in the Paris Club,
is appropriately focused on recovering full payment on these loans
extended on behalf of American taxpayers. It would not be in the
taxpayers' interest to impose additional conditions, unrelated to Paris
Club claims, on the pursuit of this objective.
U.S. Government efforts to recover on loans, extended on behalf of
our taxpayers, in no way diminishes our urging of Argentina to honor
the claims of private American bondholders and investors. We continue
to use every opportunity to press Argentina to do so.
Question (#75). Several countries have called on the IMF to play a
substantial role in resolving the eurozone debt crisis. In light of
this, it is critical that the United States take steps to foster global
respect for the IMF institution. I am very concerned that such respect
is being undermined by Argentina's continuing refusal to submit to
consultation under Article IV of the IMF Charter. There are only three
other countries that have rejected such consultation (Somalia,
Venezuela, and Ecuador).
Given the need to maintain international confidence in the
IMF, will the United States persist in urging Argentina to
participate in an Article IV consultation?
Answer. As a member of the IMF, Argentina is obligated by the IMF
Articles of Agreement and is strongly encouraged to strive for openness
in economic policies affecting other countries. Surveillance is
critical to IMF effectiveness and to the stability of the international
monetary system. Each member of the IMF has an obligation to consult
with the IMF on exchange rate and domestic economic policies under
Article IV. We are extremely disappointed that Argentina has not
completed an Article IV consultation since 2006. We have, and will
continue, to support the IMF policy of urging Argentina to uphold all
of its obligations under the Articles of Agreement for member
countries.
Question (#76). Do you anticipate any dilution of this requirement?
Answer. We do not expect any dilution of this IMF requirement in
the case of Argentina. In February, the IMF found Argentina to have
made insufficient progress in improving the quality of its data and set
a 6-month deadline for remedial action. Per the IMF process under
Argentina's Article VIII reporting requirements the IMF will hold an
informal Board meeting in May to discuss Argentina's failure to release
data and will meet formally in September 2012 to decide whether to
censure Argentina if it does not bring its data reporting into
compliance with its obligations under the Articles of Agreement.
Question (#77). Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for
Argentina expires June 30, 2013. In the meantime, Argentina's benefits
continue unless there's an affirmative decision to terminate them for
actions inconsistent with the eligibility criteria.
In your opinion, have Argentina's actions been consistent
with GSP eligibility criteria?
Answer. The U.S. law governing GSP requires beneficiary countries,
as a precondition for GSP eligibility, to act in good faith in
recognizing and enforcing final arbitral awards from international
courts. The U.S. Government has received two petitions seeking to
remove Argentina's eligibility for GSP trade benefits based on the
Argentine Government's failure to recognize as binding and enforce two
separate, final International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) awards. An ongoing interagency review, led by USTR, is
now at an advanced stage and the final outcome of that review is
expected to be announced soon.
Question (#78). Cuba.--On March 26, 2012, Pope Benedict XVI will
visit Cuba.
Do you intend to or have you already appealed to the
relevant Vatican officials for Pope Benedict to request the
release on humanitarian grounds of Alan Gross, the American
social worker and international development professional
arrested in December 2009 while in Cuba as a contractor for the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)?
Answer. Since Alan Gross was unjustly detained in Havana more than
2 years ago for facilitating uncensored Internet connectivity between
Cuba's Jewish community and the rest of the world, we have used every
appropriate opportunity to press for his release. U.S. Government
officials have continually raised Mr. Gross' case with numerous Cuban
and foreign interlocutors. We have urged our partners around the world
to press the Cuban Government for Mr. Gross' immediate release. In a
statement before the U.N. General Assembly in October 2011, we called
upon Cuba to release Mr. Gross unconditionally. We have met with
prominent figures traveling to Cuba and encouraged them to advocate for
Mr. Gross' release, which they have done. We have done the same with
religious leaders from many different faiths, including the Catholic
Church. We will continue to use every appropriate diplomatic channel to
press for Mr. Gross' release both publicly and privately. Alan Gross
has been unjustly imprisoned in Cuba for far too long, and should be
freed immediately to return to his family.
Question (#79). Haiti: What is the State Department's position
regarding the possibility of the Haitian Government reestablishing
Haiti's military?
Answer. From the standpoint of citizen security, the United States
Government considers the focus of resources should be the development
of the Haitian National Police (HNP), its growth and
professionalization, as the police are key to security in Haiti. In
fact, the HNP needs a substantial increase in its annual operating
budget if the Government of Haiti is to fulfill its commitment to fully
support the police.
In addition, a well-trained police force, respectful of human
rights, will be key to the gradual withdrawal of United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
The United States also believes that strengthening the justice
system and rule of law is essential for political stability and
economic development, as well as security.
Question (#80). Please explain your views regarding former Haitian
Prime Minister Garry Conille's plans to audit $300 million in contracts
awarded by his predecessor after the earthquake. Is an audit necessary?
Answer. We support former Prime Minister Conille's efforts to
promote transparency and accountability in the spending of public funds
in Haiti, including the audit of these contracts.
Question (#81). Please provide your views regarding the Haitian
Government's relationship with the Government of Venezuela. What is the
nature of this relationship? Does this relationship worry you?
Answer. Venezuela has pledged $1.3 billion in post-earthquake
assistance to Haiti. As the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere,
and one still recovering from the effects of a devastating earthquake,
Haiti is not in a position to turn down significant offers of
assistance. As one of the largest donors to Haiti's reconstruction,
Venezuela was invited by the Government of Haiti to serve as a voting
member of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.
The United States has not done any joint reconstruction projects
with the Government of Venezuela and has no plans to do so.
Question (#82). Mexico.--All of Mexico's Presidential candidates,
including Josefina Vazquez Mota, the candidate from President Caldron's
political party (PAN), have promised that if they were to win the
election they would change the current strategy to fight
narcotrafficking in Mexico.
Are you worried that a new Mexican President may back away
from Mexico's current commitments regarding cooperation to
fight narcotrafficking with the United States under the Merida
Initiative?
Answer. The relationship between the United States and Mexico is
strong and has grown deeper and more productive throughout President
Calderon's tenure. Our cooperation covers a wide range of issues,
including security, economic competitiveness, trade, energy,
environment, climate, human rights, cultural and educational ties, and
regional and global issues.
During his visit to Mexico on March 5, Vice President Biden met
separately with Presidential candidates, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador,
Enrique Pena Nieto, and Josefina Vazquez Mota to discuss bilateral
relations and learn more about their respective visions for the future
of Mexico. All three candidates expressed a commitment to continue
cooperation with the United States in combating transnational criminal
organizations and the meetings provided an opportunity to underscore
with each candidate that the United States looks forward to working
closely with Mexico's next administration led by whomever the Mexican
people elect on July 1.
The common interest shared by the United States and Mexico in
combating transnational criminal organizations and reducing crime and
violence to enhance the security of communities on both sides of our
shared border extends beyond any political party or administration. We
are committed to working in partnership with Mexico to meet the
evolving challenges posed by transnational criminal organizations. We
will do so until the final day of the Calderon administration and,
beginning on its first day, with Mexico's next administration.
Question (#83). Venezuela.--Have you already, or under what
circumstances would you or other relevant senior State Department
officials consider issuing an explicit warning to Venezuela that the
United States would regard a cutoff of oil exports in coordination with
Iran as a threat to U.S. national interests?
Answer. As you may be aware, the Venezuelan Government has
threatened to cut oil sales to the United States on a regular basis
over the last several years. It has not done so for a variety of
reasons, including the deep and historic interconnections between the
oil sectors in our two nations. Another important factor is that a
decision from the Venezuelan Government to cut off oil exports to the
United States would significantly cause more damage to the Venezuelan
economy than it would to the U.S. economy. Venezuela produces 2.5
million barrels per day (bbl/day) and exports over 40 percent of that
production, approximately 1.06 million bbl/day, to the United States.
Those Venezuelan exports represent only about 10 percent of U.S.
imports of crude and refined products.
The United States has been Venezuela's No. 1 oil market for many
years. Venezuela's reliance on oil exports to the United States,
coupled with the absence of a market with the geographic proximity and
depth of the United States, makes an embargo potentially quite damaging
to the Venezuelan economy and thus highly unlikely.
As the Secretary has noted, we believe that all nations in the
hemisphere should think twice about engagement with Iran. We have also
underlined to nations in the hemisphere that should they choose to
engage with Iran, it is important that they appeal for Iran to heed the
requirements of the international community regarding its nuclear
program.
Question (#84). Have you or other relevant senior State Department
officials made efforts to expand strategic energy agreements with
Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and other countries in the hemisphere to help
assure access to supplies of petroleum and refined products and ethanol
in the event of a Venezuelan cutoff of oil exports in coordination with
Iran?
Answer. The Department's goal is to promote U.S. energy security,
while fostering greater cooperation toward a clean energy future with
our allies. In order to secure our energy supplies, we are working
closely with key partners in the Western Hemisphere, including Brazil,
Mexico, Canada, and Colombia.
In March 2011 Presidents Obama and Rousseff established the
Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED) to deepen energy cooperation between
our nations' energy sectors, strengthen mutual energy security, create
new jobs, and reduce carbon pollution. The SED builds on previous U.S.-
Brazil Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) on energy cooperation,
including the 2007 Biofuels MOU. Our cooperation on biofuels consists
of bilateral research and development activities; projects in Central
America, the Caribbean, and Africa to offer assistance to third-party
countries interested in developing a biofuels industry; and the
development of technical standards to promote a global market for
biofuels. A new area under the SED is our collaboration on the
development and testing of aviation biofuels. We have also discussed
the desirability of facilitating opportunities for international
collaboration and investment in Brazilian oil development.
Mexico, consistently one of the top three exporters of petroleum to
the United States, is a crucial energy partner for the United States.
The administration places a high priority on energy cooperation with
Mexico and seeks to deepen the existing relationship in the oil and gas
sector and to expand collaboration into new areas such as wind energy,
energy efficiency, and a bilateral renewable energy market. Most
recently, Secretary Clinton signed an agreement on February 20
concerning the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the
international maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. The
Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement is designed to enhance energy
security in North America and support our shared duty to exercise
responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico. It is built on a
commitment to the safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of
transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety and
environmental standards.
The United States and Canada continue to share the largest and most
integrated energy relationship in the world--in natural gas and
electricity, as well as in oil. We expect this relationship to endure
and expand. Canada is the No. 1 supplier of imported oil to the United
States. Canada is continuing to collaborate with the United States in
securing the energy future of both countries through a diverse mix of
energy sources, technology, and innovation.
We are also cooperating with Colombia to ensure our energy
security. Colombia is a major oil, coal, hydroelectric, and emerging
biofuels producer with significant growth potential. Energy is one of
the thematic working groups under the U.S.-Colombia High-Level
Partnership Dialogue (HLPD), led by the Department of State, which met
in October 2010 and May 2011; Colombia will host the next HLPD meeting
later this year. The energy working group focuses on furthering
cooperation on energy efficiency, renewable energy, oil and gas
(including off-shore drilling), interconnection, mining, and energy
development projects to promote sustainable development, including
through the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA).
President Obama announced ECPA at the 2009 Summit of the Americas,
and we are working with governments, international organizations, and
civil society on low-carbon solutions to energy challenges and
developing partnerships to mitigate and adapt to climate change in the
region. To date, the United States and other governments have
collaborated on approximately 40 ECPA initiatives, including projects
that promote renewable technologies, alternative fuels, and energy
efficiency.
Question (#85). Pakistan.--The events of the last 12 months have
riddled our relationship with Pakistan with doubt and foreboding, yet
there remain critical elements of cooperation that must be sustained.
In order for Pakistan to become a more stable, responsive, and
responsible state it must bolster freedom of the press and create an
economic environment that attracts investment.
How will the significant funding that remains from past year
appropriations be more specifically focused on building the
capacity of an independent media and thriving business sector?
Answer. At the heart of U.S. civilian assistance is the fundamental
belief that a stable, tolerant, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan is
in the U.S. national security interest. To this end, we have a number
of initiatives that bolster the strength of the Pakistani private
sector and the media, both of which are integral to Pakistan's future.
Central to this effort is the objective to move to ``trade, not aid''
with Pakistan.
For example, on the private sector: the top two priorities of U.S.
civilian assistance to Pakistan (energy and economic growth) reflect
the emphasis we place on helping improve the economic environment and
attracting investment in Pakistan, which will further drive private
sector employment and growth. Pakistan's energy crisis has a crippling
effect on its economic development and ability to attract investment;
our top assistance priority is to work with Pakistan to help address
its energy shortfalls, in order to improve economic growth, employment,
and investment.
Our second priority for civilian assistance is to help Pakistan
foster economic growth. U.S. assistance includes programs to promote
private-sector-led growth in a variety of areas. The administration is
developing an initative to help make investment capital available to
Pakistan's small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs. This signature
initiative, currently in development, will specifically focus on
private sector investment in Pakistan and increasing access to capital
for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which represent 90
percent of Pakistan's businesses, employ 78 percent of the
nonagricultural workforce, and contribute over 30 percent of GDP.
USAID's Agribusiness program is designed to help farmers not only
produce more goods, but improve their business processes to sell more
goods in local and international markets. The U.S. Trade and
Development Agency (USTDA) has funded business case analyses that
support trade and investment in several sectors. The U.S. Commerce
Department also implements programming that facilitates U.S. investment
in Pakistan's private sector.
In order to support Pakistan's independent media, the United States
funds projects supporting Pakistani journalists operating in conflict
zones by providing programs on professional standards and safety when
reporting in the field, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Such a
project, funded by the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor (DRL), also works to increase the capacity of
journalists to report more accurately, responsibly, and fairly when
covering national issues. The work of these journalists educates local
populations about ongoing issues in their communities, which improves
transparency and strengthens citizens' calls for accountability and
good governance. Supporting journalists in Pakistan also casts light on
the realities and challenges in Pakistan's border areas.
In addition, we have a range of public diplomacy exchange programs
that provide Pakistani journalists opportunities for training and
professional development, and connect them to the international
journalism community from which they can learn, collaborate, and gain
support for their efforts, while highlighting the significant
challenges journalists face in Pakistan. These programs vary from
month-long internships at first-rate U.S. media organizations to
smaller, focused programs that connect groups in the Pakistan
journalism community to key individuals and organizations throughout
the United States to address issues critical to the practice of
journalism in Pakistan. Other public diplomacy programs provide
journalism scholarships for Pakistani students, as well as
opportunities for mid-career journalism professionals to spend a year
at top U.S. graduate institutions. Collectively, these programs
strengthen the independent media by increasing the expertise of
Pakistani journalists, exposing them to best practices and connecting
them with the international journalism community and one another.
Question (#86). What action has the administration taken to ensure
abductions and killings of journalists, such as Saleem Shazad, are
resolved and justice rendered in concert with Pakistani citizens?
Answer. Freedom of the media is a core element of and a necessary
condition for a stable democracy, and a tenet highly cherished by the
United States. Although Pakistan enjoys a vibrant media, journalists
face a variety of threats in their everyday work. Members of the press
have suffered intimidation, harassment, violence, torture,
disappearances, and even death from a number of actors, including
Pakistani authorities. This discourages critical reporting on security-
related topics. We take abuses of this kind very seriously and are
concerned about the welfare of journalists in Pakistan. The United
States supports strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of
law in order to hold accountable those who are responsible for
violating human rights, including in Pakistan. This includes publicly
condemning the death of Saleem Shazad and calling for a thorough
investigation into his case.
We continue to raise our concerns at the highest levels in our
dialogue with the Government of Pakistan as well as in our exchanges
with Pakistani civil society. We continue to monitor the situation in
Pakistan closely.
Question (#87). What combination of bilateral and multilateral
efforts has been made to ensure that recommendations by the well-
regarded Pakistan Business Council that have been made to the
Government of Pakistan are fulfilled?
Answer. Pakistan urgently needs economic reforms, especially in the
energy, water, and transportation sectors, to make its businesses more
competitive, attract investment and promote economic development and
trade. We support the Pakistan Business Council reform recommendations
through the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. Through our working
groups on economics and finance, energy, and water, we have pressed for
a broad array of economic reforms with our Pakistani counterparts to
promote free market principles, rationalize pricing and improve
transparency. Multilaterally, we are a member of the Friends of
Democratic Pakistan (FODP) group of countries, which has produced
reports and roadmaps for the reform of the energy and water sectors. We
facilitated the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and
encouraged increased trade between Pakistan and its neighbors. We are
actively promoting the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India gas
pipeline (TAPI), the CASA 1000 electric power grid, and regional
integration through infrastructure projects and regulatory reforms. In
her June 2011 speech in Chennai, India, Secretary Clinton put forward
the U.S. strategic vision of the New Silk Road, which supported
initiatives to advance regional economic integration. We also support
business and civil society groups in their push for economic reform.
The Government of Pakistan has begun raising natural gas and
electricity prices to reduce crippling subsidies and improve income
taxe collection as a way to reduce budget deficits and improve
macroeconomic stability.
Question (#88). A continuing criticism of U.S. civilian aid to
Pakistan is that the Pakistanis themselves have no understanding that
important investments are being made by the American people. While
there is a reasonable argument to protect particular investments and
the implementing partners from risk in the field, public perceptions of
inertia and false promises carry with them considerable negative
consequences as well.
Especially in light of the continued strains between our two
countries, how are you working to promote greater understanding
by Pakistani citizens that our civilian aid programs are funded
by U.S. citizens and enabling improved governance by a nascent
civilian government?
Answer. Despite recent challenges in the relationship, the United
States has been clear that we will continue civilian assistance to
Pakistan, as testament to our long-term commitment to the people of
Pakistan and an investment in the country's successful future--
something that is in both countries' interest. We also work closely
with the Government of Pakistan to communicate that since the passage
of the Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act (Kerry-Lugar-Berman) in
October 2009, the United States has disbursed over $2.6 billion in
civilian assistance to Pakistan, including about $800 million in
emergency humanitarian assistance to address the needs of those
impacted by the floods of the last 2 years and military actions in FATA
and KP province.
While challenges in the relationship have made it more difficult to
publically message on the results of U.S. assistance, the U.S. Embassy
and consulates have made a substantial effort to focus media attention
on those results. This has included developing documentaries about U.S.
civilian assistance programs and placing them on Pakistani television
and YouTube, conducting weekly live Urdu-language radio programs on
specific projects, and partnering with a leading Pakistani firm to
conduct a nationwide awareness campaign in the vernacular in order to
raise awareness levels. USAID has also recently upgraded its Web site
to provide greater transparency and information about U.S. assistance
projects. U.S. policy is to brand all U.S. assistance, except when
specific security or other challenges require a formalized exception.
The aggregate impact of our programs in Pakistan will be felt
gradually over the years. Development progress takes time and we
continue to manage expectations both in the United States and Pakistan
about the pace of U.S. assistance impact.
Question (#89-92). The population of Pakistan is estimated to
increase from 170 million to 260 million by the year 2030. It is
further estimated that by 2030, the urban population will double, and
about 50 percent of the total population of Pakistan will be living in
urban areas. Experts examining U.S. civilian aid to Pakistan recommend
that assistance now focused primarily in rural areas be refocused on
urban and periurban areas going forward. The growing dissatisfaction of
the populace in these areas stems from the combination of limited
economic opportunity, physical insecurity, and misguided or ambivalent
governance.
To what extent are you examining investments in civilian
assistance in urban areas in addition to rural areas?
What assumptions are you using for such assessments as they
relate to our national security interests in a long-term
relationship with Pakistan?
How does the urban development element fit in the near term
given the existing threats that emanate from some of Pakistan's
major cities?
What opportunities are there for collaborative development
in such areas, and what obstacles hinder their impact?
Answer. A recent Woodrow Wilson Center report and other analyses
have pointed to the importance of urban and periurban areas to
Pakistan's future, both in terms of economic growth and countering
violent extremism. As such, our approach to civilian assistance to
Pakistan--which is centered around five priority sectors, namely
energy, economic growth, stabilization, education and health--very
consciously strikes a balance between programming that promotes urban
versus rural development.
Our assumptions for assistance include that: (1) overall, U.S.
assistance is a nationwide program to benefit Pakistan's population
writ large, rather than any particular region; (2) that programming
will be intentionally split between urban and rural populations,
including the remote border areas of KP and FATA; and (3) that
opportunities to counter violent extremism will be a consideration in
program decisionmaking and design. These considerations acknowledge
that some of the greatest discontent and potential for extremism and
violence do indeed emanate from urban areas.
A number of economic growth programs oriented toward urban
development complement those with a rural orientation. Those focused on
urban growth include the ongoing Entrepreneurs Program, which has
trained 70,000 women entrepreneurs to date in financial literacy and
other skills, including in Karachi and other urban areas. In addition,
a signature program currently under design to provide investment
capital to Pakistani small- and medium-sized enterprises will also
foster urban employment.
Furthermore, in energy, our top assistance priority, we made the
decision to focus primarily on helping Pakistan resolve the shortfall
it currently faces on its national electric grid, in lieu of focusing
on providing electricity to rural populations off-grid or adding
populations (and by extension increasing demand) to the national grid.
Such a decision has the effect of focusing effort and resources on
urban development, as only 60 percent of Pakistan's population is
connected to the national grid, predominately in urban areas.
Prioritizing energy assistance and development is also designed to
address a core obstacle to urban investment and employment, since
insufficient energy supply is responsible for large-scale unemployment
and furloughs in industrial areas.
Question (#93). Syria.--With Russia and China refusing to
cooperate, it is clear that international pressure is unlikely to be
sufficient to shift Assad from power. Meanwhile, in Syria the death
toll continues to mount, instability in the region expands, and the
world is looking to the United States for leadership.
How is Syria fundamentally different from Libya and what is
the administration doing to solidify the international
consensus on ways forward?
Answer. We believe that the Syrian people deserve the same
opportunity to shape their future that the Tunisians, Egyptians,
Libyans, and Yemenis now enjoy. However, from the beginning of the
unrest, we have been clear that Syria is not Libya. The geopolitical
landscape, regime and opposition cohesion, and the regional dynamics at
play in Syria differ dramatically from those in Libya. We believe that
taking more assertive steps would only be effective if it occurred
through a coordinated regional and international framework. We have
tried hard to persuade the U.N. Security Council to put its weight
behind the Arab League's initiative, but our efforts have been blocked
on two occasions.
We believe that a political solution in Syria is still possible. We
are working to isolate the Assad regime diplomatically, crimp its cash
flow, ensure humanitarian assistance reaches suffering Syrian
civilians, and encourage the opposition to unite around a platform of
outreach to Syria's minorities and peaceful, orderly political
transition. Moreover, we have built an international coalition
dedicated to the same goals and methods, one that has been on display
in the U.N. General Assembly and the recent Friends of the Syrian
People conference in Tunis.
Question (#94). Food Security.--Your Department launched the Feed
the Future Initiative in May 2010, and the effort will enter its fourth
year in FY 2013. You have been requesting and receiving nearly a
billion dollars annually for the program, and my impression is that the
program has had a series of fits and starts.
What results has the Feed the Future program achieved toward
the goals of accelerating agricultural growth and improving
nutrition?
Answer. Through the President's Global Hunger and Food Security
Initiative, Feed the Future, the United States has promoted
agricultural-led growth by raising the incomes of the poor, increasing
the availability of and access to food, and reducing undernutrition
through sustained, long-term development progress. Developed to attack
the root causes of hunger and poverty, Feed the Future lays the
foundation for sustainable global food security which gained increased
attention due to the human and economic impacts of the 2007-2008 food
crisis. In the 3 years since the L'Aquila summit, the United States has
gone from a low of $245 million in agricultural investment in 2008 for
State/USAID and Treasury to $888 million in 2010, $1.1 billion in 2011,
and a request of $1.2 billion in 2013.
In the past year, Feed the Future investments have increased the
productivity and access of vulnerable populations to nutritious foods.
In FY 2011, Feed the Future investments assisted over 3 million farmers
in applying new agricultural production technologies and management
practices, increasing the value of export sales by $86 million.
Nutrition interventions resulted in the decrease in the prevalence of
underweight children under age 5 participating in USAID programs, from
27 percent in FY 2010 to 25 percent in FY 2011. Achievements are a
result of the implementation of Feed the Future USG strategies which
refocused resources to (1) support specific value chains and subregions
where we can maximize economic growth, job creation, and nutritional
impacts; (2) leverage investments with other donors and private sector;
(3) integrate gender and nutrition; and (4) create clear connections to
food assistance for a systematic transition from assistance to country-
led development.
In Tanzania, Feed the Future trained 84,000 smallholder
horticulture farmers on best production practices and improved
technology use on 4,812 hectares of smallholder horticulture
farmland. Investment successes have inspired the Government of
Tanzania to increase the allocation of its budget to
agriculture from 7 percent in FY 2010 to 10 percent by 2014.
In Ghana, programs provided 36 financial institutions with
training in how to increase lending to the agricultural sector,
resulting in nearly 1 million dollar's worth of finance
available to farmers and other value chain actors. Through Feed
the Future support, two major input companies expanded to
become mobile money merchants and can now transfer money to 48
of their retailers in the Upper West Region, ensuring timely
payment and supply of inputs to remote areas in the upcoming
farming season.
In Bangladesh, Feed the Future investments reached 435,728
farmers who applied a new soil fertilization technique and
other improved management practices on 244,605 hectares,
resulting in a rice yield increase of 15 percent. Programs
disseminated the fertilizer deep placement (FDP) technique,
burying urea briquettes near the roots of rice plants to
improve efficiency of inputs, and expanding the private sector
system for supplying urea briquettes. Our investments created
the first-ever rice surplus in the Barisal division, which had
previously experienced a perennial rice deficit.
In Guatemala, Feed the Future provided training to 40
producer groups in new production practices, marketing skills,
and post-harvest handling to equip farmers to be viable, long-
term participants in targeted value chains. Working with the
Guatemalan National Coffee Association, coffee producers
expanded their production levels, improved management practices
and achieved extraordinary sales of $26 million, including $7.2
million in sales of coffee certified for niche markets.
In Zambia, Feed the Future nutrition programs trained 73
health care workers from 3 districts in Infant and Young Child
Feeding and provided financial and technical support for
planning, supervision, and monitoring of the biannual Child
Health Week. As a result, approximately 2 million children aged
6 to 59 months received vitamin A supplementation.
Question (#95). How has the Initiative's emphasis on public-private
partnerships allowed the United States to find efficiencies and cost
savings, while also making progress toward agricultural development in
the focus countries?
Answer. Feed the Future views the private sector as an equal
partner in the development community and embraces its role in creating
jobs, enabling economic growth, and bringing much-needed innovation and
expertise to the countries and people that we aspire to serve. The
private sector is particularly important in increasing the
sustainability of U.S. assistance and fostering private sector-led
growth in emerging markets, which is critical to reducing poverty,
fighting hunger, and improving nutrition. In addition to the private
sector, Feed the Future builds off our Nation's comparative advantage
in advanced technologies through its emphasis on promoting innovation.
This agenda goes beyond science and technology to include the use of
innovative financial instruments such as indexed insurance and more
inclusive agriculture financing, as well as a new application of
existing technologies to increase food security.
The FY 2013 President's Budget request for Feed the Future includes
$32 million to promote and leverage increased private sector investment
in Feed the Future focus countries. Engagement of the private sector at
all stages of this initiative, from the development of Agriculture
Country Implementation Plans to program execution, is critical to the
success and sustainability of our investments. FY 2013-funded programs
will increase private sector investment in focus areas, mitigate
private sector risks, access private sector innovation, improve the
enabling environment for greater private sector investment, and
facilitate the commercialization of new technologies that improve
agricultural production. This funding will also be used to catalyze new
private/public partnership models and promote innovative investment
models.
To leverage private sector investments and intellectual capital, we
have:
Signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Walmart to
increase production of high-quality vegetables and fruits for
the Central American regional markets by supporting new, small,
and medium independent growers and exploring linkages to
Walmart's national, regional, and global supply chains.
Helped establish the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor
of Tanzania (SAGCOT), a public-private partnership that aims to
boost agricultural productivity in Tanzania and the wider
region. SAGCOT will promote ``clusters'' of profitable
agricultural farming and services businesses, with major
benefits for smallholder farmers and local communities.
Announced a unique, trilateral partnership between PepsiCo,
USAID, and the World Food Programme that will provide a
nutritionally fortified feeding product while helping to build
long-term economic stability for smallholder chickpea farmers
in Ethiopia by involving them directly in PepsiCo's product
supply chain.
Launched an alliance with the World Cocoa Foundation and the
Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) to invest in sustainable
cocoa programs in West Africa. The partnership includes private
sector participation from key chocolate-producing companies
including Cargill, The Hershey Company, Kraft Foods, Lindt &
Sprungli, Nestle, and Mars, among others.
Question (#96). Foreign Assistance--Transparency/Taxpayer
Accountability.--This past November, you attended the Fourth High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea. At the forum, you committed
the United States as a signatory to the International Aid Transparency
Initiative. I support aid transparency as a means to ensure that U.S.
foreign assistance is invested transparently to see exactly what our
resources are being used for and to reduce the risk for corruption.
How is this new commitment to aid transparency reflected in
your budget request, and how will U.S. taxpayer investments in
assistance become more transparent through this initiative?
Answer. The United States is pleased to be a signatory to the
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). IATI provides a
common international standard for the publication of aid information.
The United States endorses the principles of transparency and openness
embodied by IATI. Prior to signing on to IATI, the United States
supported the IATI efforts by participating in the IATI Technical
Advisory Group (TAG) from its inception. Work is underway to enable a
crosswalk of the U.S. Government (USG) foreign assistance information
contained in the Foreign Assistance Dashboard
(www.foreignassistance.gov) to allow us to report assistance
information in the IATI format. A standardized reporting format will
enable consistent and regular reporting and accurate comparisons across
donors, countries, and private philanthropic organizations, as well as
promote broad access by beneficiaries, U.S. and other international
stakeholders.
Most of the costs of meeting the IATI standard will be borne by the
individual U.S. Government agencies that manage foreign assistance and
will be reflected as needed in their respective budget requests. For
the USG, the modest cost of converting data on the Foreign Assistance
Dashboard to the IATI format has been subsumed in the ongoing work on
the development of the Dashboard, which is reflected in the FY 2013
foreign assistance budget.
Question (#97). Iraq.--According to the Inspector General, more
than 80 percent of your approximately $6 billion in Iraq is overhead,
rather than used on programs and assistance. Much of these costs come
from the need to import virtually everything needed to feed, clothe,
and protect our diplomats.
Is such a model sustainable over the long run?
Answer. Now that we have successfully completed the military-to-
civilian transition in Iraq, we are developing the next phase of our
transition: streamlining and normalizing operations for our diplomatic
platform. As security conditions improve and more goods and services
become readily available on the local economy, we have begun to
transition to the same model we use in difficult environments all over
the world, where we live largely on the local economy and rely on our
locally engaged staff for support services. We are working on a
targeted reduction of personnel for agencies under Chief of Mission
authority, with reductions reflecting a whole of government approach as
prioritized by the Ambassador. We are currently assessing all our
facilities and will consolidate our physical footprint in Baghdad.
We are very committed to our diplomatic mission and ensuring that
Iraq continues its development as a strong regional ally. These changes
allow us to continue to focus on our strategic objectives, supported by
an efficient, consolidated infrastructure.
Question (#98). Also, what has been the impact of a security
environment that continues to limit our diplomats' ability to move
outside the Embassy and execute projects?
Answer. While the safety and security of our personnel remains a
paramount consideration, our diplomats and development experts in Iraq
are fully engaged in strengthening the relationships we have built with
Iraqi officials, politicians, and social leaders. Our Ambassador and
Embassy officers meet regularly with President Talabani, Prime Minister
Maliki, cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and civil society leaders
throughout Iraq. Movements outside the Embassy for these engagements
have increased--not decreased--since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in
December. We continue to successfully implement our various assistance
programs. Embassy and Government of Iraq security personnel work
effectively together to ensure that our officials can do their jobs
safely.
Question (#99). Finally, what has been the impact of the Arab
Spring on the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi people--has this helped
or hindered the progress of democracy?
Answer. The Arab Spring did not impact Iraq the way it did other
countries in the region. Iraq has had a series of elections since 2005
giving Iraqis an opportunity to express their aspirations through the
ballot box instead of through mass demonstrations. There were two ``Day
of Rage'' protests in February 2011 inspired by Arab Spring protests
elsewhere. However, the demand of the demonstrators was not for the
toppling of the government but rather for improvement of basic
services, such as water and electricity, provided by the government.
The Iraqi leadership heard these protestors and has been working to
address Iraqis' desire for dependable basic services. The Arab Spring
has only reinforced what Iraq's leaders have already learned from
elections and a vibrant, open political environment--that political
leaders need to be responsive to popular needs.
Question (#100). I am pleased by the intent and purpose of
employing direct hire personnel to staff the Iraq Police Development
Program (PDP). Nevertheless, that program, even in its scaled-back
scope, appears to be challenged by several other factors, as reported
by the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction in its most
recent report. It is difficult to see from Washington the program's
value and impact, particularly given resistance from the Iraqis,
security challenges, and the costs and complexity of the mission.
In your opinion, is there a point at which the PDP, if
further reduced in size and scope, would no longer be worth
continuing?
Answer. The Police Development Program was designed as a flexible
program which could be adapted to respond to changing needs and
priorities. The program's careful targeting of key law enforcement
functions helps to ensure that we continue to meet U.S. and Iraqi
goals.
Question (#101). In your opinion, would the MOI be capable of
sustaining an effective police force without the PDP?
Answer. The Iraqi Government and the Ministry of Interior (MOI)
have made great strides in building a substantial public security
infrastructure. We believe we can contribute significantly to their
ongoing efforts to further enhance Iraq's civilian security
capabilities. During the Saddam years, Iraq was cut off from the law
enforcement reform and modernization efforts that were taking place in
most developed countries. The PDP aims to help Iraq catch up, for
example, by identifying opportunities to improve management systems and
processes that in turn build greater accountability and responsibility,
make the most of human and financial resources dedicated to Iraq's
public security, and make Iraq's police services more professional and
effective.
Question (#102). What value added contributions would the PDP
provide to the MOI?
Answer. PDP advisors help the MOI to identify and address
opportunities to improve its organizational structures and systems so
the MOI can more effectively manage Iraq's civilian security forces.
The PDP demonstrates, for example, how the standardization of
procedures--ranging from operational planning to logistics--can improve
efficiency and accountability in accordance with international best
practices. The advisors show how the MOI can promote and protect human
rights, including gender rights, including through engagement with the
Iraqi public.
PDP also facilitates greater MOI cooperation with the Embassy and
U.S. law enforcement. That cooperation not only promotes more effective
protection of U.S. Government and private personnel, facilities, and
businesses but also allows us to wage a common fight against
transnational threats such as terrorism, money-laundering, and
smuggling of humans and illicit materials.
Question (#103). What would be the implications of eliminating the
PDP for Iraqi security and crime reduction?
Answer. The United States has a unique opportunity through the PDP
to influence the direction and success of law enforcement reform and
capacity-building in Iraq at a critical stage in the development of
Iraq's civilian security institutions. We have a strategic interest in
promoting effective Iraqi responses to criminal and terrorist threats.
By strengthening citizen security and peaceful dispute-resolution
mechanisms, we are helping Iraqi authorities prevent the destabilizing
return to reliance on militias, or an erosion of confidence in
democratic government. We also have an interest in supporting the
continued development of Iraq's public safety institutions in line with
the best practices of democratic governments, rather than the
repressive policies that characterized the Saddam era.
Eliminating the PDP would also weaken U.S. and Iraqi law
enforcement cooperation in combating transnational threats, and
potentially weaken Iraqi adherence to internationally recognized
policing standards.
Question (#104). Ambassador Jeffrey has stated publicly his
recognition that his mission more resembles an army post than an
embassy and his desire to shed some of the costly legacy pieces of the
operation, such as expatriate static guards, imported food and support
items.
What new authorities or exceptions to laws do you need to
expedite such transitions to enable cutting costs in 2012?
Answer. The Department of State requires no new authorities or
exceptions to transition to a more traditional support structure. The
pace of the change will be set by an improving security environment and
the availability of goods and services in Iraq, including the
availability of safe, reliable transportation to and within Iraq.
Question (#105-106). For FY 13, you have requested $900 million in
FMF for Iraq.
Please provide for the committee a status of unobligated
balances in ISFF and FMF accounts from prior years'
appropriations.
Answer. According to Department of Defense (DOD), which oversees
the ISFF program, the unobligated balance is approximately $360
million. These funds are accounted for in the FY11/12 ISFF Spend Plan
for the third and fourth quarters of FY12, which DOD submitted to
Congress in July 2011.
There are no prior-year FMF unobligated funds as FY12 is the first
year we sought FMF for Iraq.
Second, of the 400 or so cases that are active, how many are
structured as regular FMS cases to include appropriate security
and administrative fees under the AECA?
Answer. The 324 active cases supporting Iraq, regardless of funding
source, are structured as Foreign Military Sales. All of the FMS cases
supporting Iraq include the standard 3.8 percent FMS administrative
fee. Owing to the physical security provided by USF-I, the pre-2012 FMS
cases did not include the SAT related overhead costs.
Question (#107). For FY 13, you have requested $900 million in FMF
for Iraq. What is your intent with future FMS cases?
Answer. Beginning January 1, 2012, new cases funded with either FMF
or Iraqi funds will include SAT-related overhead costs and will
continue to be structured as regular cases. The first such case is the
F-16s, for which the Iraqis will fund all related costs. Admin and
security costs for ISFF cases will continue to be funded through ISFF
appropriations and authorities.
Because of the current locations of some FMS cases, some of the
overall security cost burden for an FMF-funded case is borne elsewhere
as operations costs. Administrative costs will be fully included.
Question (#108-110). Section 1244 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2008 requires you to make ``a reasonable effort''
to provide an individual in Iraq who is applying for a special
immigrant visa and is in imminent danger ``with protection or the
immediate removal from Iraq.''
What criteria do you use to define individuals who are in
imminent danger?
How many people in Iraq fit this category?
Answer. The overall situation in Iraq remains the subject of
concern, but all Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants must either be
under threat, or have experienced threat, to qualify for the program.
In practical terms, it is very difficult to objectively validate and
qualify a threat as imminent. Although the U.S. Embassy is unable to
provide protection to SIV applicants inside Iraq, those considering
themselves in imminent danger may request that the State Department
process their SIV applications in neighboring countries. The State
Department, along with the Department of Homeland Security and other
agencies, is focused on processing all SIVs as expeditiously as
possible to minimize the threat to all qualified Iraqis applying for
SIVs.
Visa Office records indicate that 111 Iraqi SIV applicants moved
their visa application process from Iraq to a neighboring country; 570
Iraq SIVs applied initially in neighboring countries.
What steps are you taking to protect those individuals or
remove them from Iraq?
Answer. Although security in Iraq has improved, the situation
remains challenging. Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants must
either be under threat, or have experienced threat, to qualify for the
SIV program. For those who consider themselves to be in imminent danger
the State Department can transfer and process their SIV application in
a neighboring country, should the applicant relocate. If an SIV
applicant relocates to another country, they may also present
themselves to the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), who has the mandate to provide protection to those who are
determined to qualify as refugees.
Question (#111). Europe.--We have been working for many years on
establishing a Southern Energy corridor to Europe but progress has been
very slow in recent years. Could you please detail the recent progress
in making the Nabucco Pipeline a reality?
Answer. Our Office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy has
been working tremendously hard on this issue, and there have been a
number of recent developments on the Southern corridor. First of all, I
would note that Nabucco has always been one of several options to
achieve our shared goal with Europe of bringing new sources of supply
to market, with a significant portion of that gas supplied to our
friends and allies in the Balkans and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In
October of last year, Turkey and Azerbaijan took an important step when
they signed a long-awaited gas supply deal. Then in February, the
consortium controlling Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II natural gas field
narrowed the choices for a route from Turkey to Europe to a scaled-down
version of Nabucco, known as Nabucco West, the South East Europe
Pipeline (SEEP), and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline.
We continue to work closely with all the companies and parties
involved to achieve energy security for Europe.
Question (#112). NATO plans to hold a summit this May in Chicago,
the first summit since 1999 in the United States. I'd be interested to
learn when the U.S. priorities are for the summit. Is the United States
actively pressing for further NATO enlargement?
Answer. We have three main goals for the Chicago summit: transition
in Afghanistan, new capabilities for the alliance, and acknowledging
NATO's partnerships, including with aspirants. In advance of the
summit, we are working with allies and partners to define NATO's post-
2014 role in Afghanistan. We are encouraging allies to make new
commitments to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) post-
2014. NATO allies also need to develop and maintain critical alliance
capabilities to ensure that NATO is able to perform a variety of roles
and missions in the evolving security environment. This includes
completion of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), as well
as progress in meeting the capabilities requirements agreed by the
alliance at Lisbon in 2010 and related capabilities initiatives.
Finally, we would like to use the summit as an opportunity to highlight
our key partners' contributions to NATO's operations and broader
strategic goals.
Although enlargement is not the central theme in the discussions at
Chicago, we will look to demonstrate actively that the door remains
open to aspirants. The Chicago Summit Communique will contain language
acknowledging the aspirants and NATO's open door policy. The United
States works bilaterally and through NATO to support aspirants' efforts
to meet NATO standards and encourage them to take the steps required to
become interoperable with NATO. We offer joint training opportunities,
in addition to encouraging and supporting partner contributions to
NATO's worldwide operations in order to increase interoperability and
build an atmosphere of cooperation and trust at all levels of planning
and operations.
Question (#113). How much progress have we made in establishing a
missile defense capability in Europe?
Answer. President Obama is committed to protecting the United
States, U.S. deployed forces, and our European allies and partners
against the growing threat of ballistic missiles. Over the past 2
years, working together with our NATO allies, the administration has
achieved significant progress in implementing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and we are on a path to achieve the
milestones outlined by the President.
President Obama made clear his desire to implement EPAA in a NATO
context. At the Lisbon summit in November 2010, NATO made the historic
decision to endorse a missile defense capability whose aim is to
provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations,
territory, and forces against the increasing threats posed by the
proliferation of ballistic missiles. Allies at Lisbon welcomed the EPAA
as the U.S. national contribution to NATO's missile defense capability,
as well as welcoming additional voluntary contributions from other
allies. NATO is working toward declaring an ``interim'' NATO missile
defense capability at Chicago.
Working together with our NATO allies, the administration has
achieved significant progress in implementing the EPAA. We have:
Deployed a rotational Aegis-equipped ship to the
Mediterranean;
Deployed a missile defense radar in Turkey;
Brought into force basing agreements with Romania and Poland
to host missile defense interceptor sites; and
Reached agreement in-principle with Spain to host four
multirole Aegis-equipped ships at Rota, Spain.
The administration will continue to consult closely with Congress
and with our NATO allies to implement the vision that the President set
forth in September 2009. We will also continue to rigorously evaluate
the threat posed by ballistic missiles and we will adapt our missile
defense system accordingly. The United States remains committed to
cost-effective and proven missile defenses that provide flexibility to
address emerging threats.
Question (#114). The need for defense austerity has been felt on
both sides of the Atlantic and has resulted in changes to the U.S.
force posture in Europe. How do you see these changes affecting the
NATO alliance, particularly in terms of our ability to fulfill our
Article Five commitments and conduct training and steady state
operations with allies?
Answer. The United States is able to fulfill its Article Five
commitments and will remain so even after our force posture changes are
implemented. We are committed to maintaining a robust and visible
military presence in Europe capable of deterring and defending against
aggression. To that end, we are deploying new capabilities in Europe,
including missile defense assets in Poland, Romania, and Turkey, and
Aegis ships in Spain. We are establishing an aviation detachment in
Poland to further enhance training opportunities. And we will take
steps to increase the responsiveness of special operations forces in
the region. We are also developing the concept outlined at the Munich
Security Conference by Secretary Panetta to increase our exercises and
training with allies.
The United States is modernizing its presence in Europe at the same
time our NATO allies, and NATO itself, are engaged in similar steps.
This is an opportunity for our European allies to take on greater
responsibility. At the Lisbon summit in 2010, the alliance approved a
list of critical capabilities, many of which have become a pillar of
the Secretary General's Smart Defense initiative to pool, share, and
specialize capabilities. We are determined to adapt NATO forces to make
them more deployable, sustainable, and interoperable, and thus more
effective. We continue to encourage allies to meet their defense
spending commitments and to contribute politically, financially, and
operationally to the strength and security of the alliance, even in
these austere economic times.
Question (#115). Afghanistan.--Criticism of corruption within the
Afghan Police force and the Ministry of Interior abound.
How does your budget address corruption within the Ministry
of the Interior, as well as across the national and provincial
governance structures?
Answer. Corruption in Afghanistan remains a serious issue and we
continue to engage the Afghan Government to address the problem. We are
working with our Afghan partners on various anticorruption measures by
promoting transparency and good governance while working to prevent
fraud, waste, and abuse. We support the Afghan ministries, governors,
and local leaders, including the Ministry of Interior and its officials
in finding ways to combat corruption.
Our assistance to Afghan ministries includes ethics training to
Afghan civil servants and the judiciary, capacity-building for internal
Afghan audits, improving procurement systems within Afghan justice
ministries, and encouraging the enactment and enforcement of
anticorruption laws.
To address specific issues within the Ministry of Interior, we
supported Afghan efforts to make police salary payments electronic via
cell phone. This eliminates the opportunity for siphoning off police
salaries at the local and provincial levels. The Department of Defense
also has embedded advisors at the local, provincial, and national
levels that help mentor police on ethical behavior, in addition to the
ethics training they receive as part of their police academy training.
The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is an FBI/internationally
mentored unit of 153 vetted investigators from the Ministry of Interior
(MOI) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) who investigate
corruption, kidnapping and organized crime cases. Since its inception
in September 2009, the MCTF's has significantly increased its
investigative capacity through training and mentoring provided by the
FBI and other international partners. This training and mentoring has
led to hundreds of arrests. Afghan investigators from MOI and NDS have
exhibited an ability to conduct investigations in a logical manner,
using sophisticated investigative techniques such as telephone
wiretaps, cellular telephone exploitation, and GPS tracking. The Afghan
leadership has demonstrated an ability successfully to manage their
cases, investigators, and resources. The MCTF continues to receive
financial assistance from DOD (through both CSTC-A and CENTCOM), which
provides funding for vehicles, vehicle maintenance, equipment, and some
consumable supplies.
The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) provides Operational and Maintenance (O&M) funding to
maintain Camp Falcon where the MCTF is located, and where MCTF mentors
reside. However, the work of the MCTF is often frustrated by the lack
of followthrough in prosecution when it refers cases to the Attorney
General's Office. No major corruption cases investigated by the MCTF in
the last 2 years have been prosecuted by the Attorney General's Office.
The Ministry of Interior also dissolved seven private security
companies in 2011 connected to Afghan officials, citing its
``commitment to transparency and the rule of law,'' and, in Kandahar
province, the MOI fired the chief of police of an Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP) camp, who was involved in corruption.
Question (#116). How have you inoculated U.S. assistance from gross
misappropriation of funds?
Answer. The United States is taking an integrated civilian-military
approach to combat areas of corruption that impact the delivery of our
assistance. Our approach includes safeguarding the use of U.S. funds,
stopping illicit funds from fueling the insurgency, eliminating
opportunities for insurgents to erode public support for the Afghan
state, and strengthening institutions that will promote accountability
and allow for transition. The U.S. Government has improved its vetting
system and oversight mechanisms for civilian assistance contracting, as
well as increased information-sharing between different government
agencies such as the Department of Defense and USAID.
The Department of Defense's Task Force 2010 was organized to help
commanders better understand with whom they are doing business and to
ensure contracting dollars were not empowering the wrong people or
undermining the United States and the international community's efforts
in Afghanistan. The organization uses intelligence, law enforcement,
auditors and forensic financial analysts to gain visibility on the flow
of contracting funds below the prime contractor level, to determine
where issues and concerns exist, and to identify actions to mitigate
fiscal and force protection risk.
In addition, USAID has significantly increased oversight and
monitoring staff and is fully implementing the Accountable Assistance
for Afghanistan (A3), an agency initiative to safeguard U.S. funds. The
A3 initiative implements a number of suggested oversight improvement
including the increased use of cost-reimbursable contracts, limits on
subcontractors, improved vetting, increased use of electronic funds
transfers, and the creation of onsite monitoring capacity in forward
operating bases and provincial reconstruction teams.
Question (#117). While handover of security responsibility to
Afghans is forecast to be complete by the end of 2014, some ISAF
partners, such as France have indicated they will depart much sooner.
The budget proposal for 2013 does not effectively narrow the United
States focus in Afghanistan while growing in relative size to every
other partner nation investment.
When will our budget in Afghanistan reflect the fiscal
realities of our domestic debt as well as the narrower national
security interests relative to Afghanistan?
Answer. The resources requested for FY 2013 in Afghanistan will
play a key role in ensuring Afghanistan never again serves as a safe
haven for al-Qaeda or other extremist groups. In the last year, we've
taken significant strides toward a secure and stable Afghanistan
through gains on the battlefield, the end of bin Laden, and strong
commitments by the region and international community to Afghanistan's
future at the Istanbul and Bonn conferences. At the NATO summit in
Chicago later this spring, we plan to join with international partners
to announce a plan to share the burden of training and equipping Afghan
security forces to ensure Afghanistan's long-term stability. We remain
committed to our goal of transitioning security responsibility to the
Government of Afghanistan by the end of 2014, which should result in a
significant reduction in U.S. military spending. Resources requested in
FY 2013 are necessary to support security transition, firmly set
Afghanistan on a path toward greater economic sustainability, and
enhance the ability of the Afghan Government to provide necessary
services to its people.
We regularly review our existing portfolio to focus programming on
activities that support our highest priorities. As the military draws
down and more responsibilities transition to Afghans, funding for
programs explicitly tied to stabilization and counterinsurgency will
shift from support for short-term stability needs to support for
Afghan-led development and building the capacity of the government to
address sources of instability. Our program in FY 2013 will also
continue to improve project sustainability through capacity-building to
ensure Afghans can maintain past investments into the future. Nowhere
is this more evident than our investments in the infrastructure sector.
In FY 2013 our request for infrastructure decreases by 12 percent from
FY 2012 and 31 percent from FY 2011, where our major focus is on
increasing operations and maintenance capacity and sustainability as
opposed to new construction projects.
Relatively stable levels of development assistance will be critical
to ensuring a successful transition at the end of 2014. We have
identified key foundational investment areas (including energy
infrastructure, sustainable agriculture, and government economic
capacity) where programming resources now will be important in
fostering a more sustainable and resilient economy. As was the case in
Iraq, as we near transition in Afghanistan, the costs for Department of
State and USAID programs and operations are likely to increase in the
short-term as military spending declines. Nonetheless, we do expect the
trajectory of our assistance program to decrease beyond 2014.
Question (#118). Why are we building consulates across Afghanistan
and staffing them at significant cost if we have paid attention to the
lessons of our experience in Iraq where we are evidently scaling back
considerably?
Answer. We recognize that our political and diplomatic strategy in
Afghanistan must be based on a realistic assessment of the resources
available to us, and we continually adjust our end-state planning with
a careful eye on costs. Future State operations will see a smaller
direct-hire population across our enduring Afghanistan locations than
at present. Since security for our diplomats will always be expensive,
we are determined to place the absolute minimum number of staff in
harm's way. Going forward, we are incorporating lessons still being
learned from Iraq, including colocation with other agencies wherever
possible, leveraging existing Government contracts, and making maximum
use of locally engaged staff.
Our enduring diplomatic presence must, nonetheless, support the
achievement of our goals. The President has identified two vital
national interests in Afghanistan: defeating al-Qaeda and preventing
Afghanistan from again becoming a sanctuary for terrorism. These goals
require that we support the continued stability of Afghanistan after
Transition is complete at the end of 2014. Afghanistan, however,
remains a mosaic of regional power bases, each with a different mix of
ethnic and political players. We must, therefore, have a sufficient
diplomatic presence throughout the country to help manage regional/
ethnic tensions, to aid our Afghan partners to develop a functioning
governance structure recognized as legitimate by the population, and to
support reintegration and reconciliation of reconcilable insurgents.
Presence throughout the country will also allow us to monitor
Afghanistan's relations with its neighbors and promote development of
regional political, economic, and commercial links. Posts in Kabul as
well as in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad will ensure
that we can engage key regional leaders on an enduring basis to achieve
our goals.
Question (#119). As the United States began its transition from
military to civilian-led activities in Iraq last year, you had
requested $1 billion in OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations) funding
for its Police Development Program (PDP). I note that you are seeking
additional funding through the OCO account for this purpose for Iraq
again this year. As the United States moves from military to civilian-
led activities in Afghanistan, it has become clear that the extremely
high investment in police training has had limited impact on the
performance and perception of Afghanistan's police forces as an
effective and sustainable institution of public protection. While this
begs the readiness question given the expected transition in the next
year or two, it also raises concern over the value of such expenditures
and the inevitable reabsorption of the rule-of-law training mission
from the Department of Defense.
What new methods and responsibilities are being implemented
by the so-called ``whole of government'' approach to preparing
for an orderly transition?
Answer. Transition is proceeding in the context of close
coordination among U.S. agencies in Washington and on the ground in
Afghanistan. While the U.S. military and our ISAF partners cooperate in
training the Afghan National Security Forces to take responsibility for
security, USAID and State are working to improve governance and help
lay the foundations of a sustainable Afghan economy.
Within the context of the wider USG transition coordination effort,
the Coordinating Director of Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (CDROLLE)
at Embassy Kabul provides the nexus for interagency coordination on all
rule-of-law programs, including those which have a connection with law
enforcement. For example, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice
are actively planning to play a supporting role to rule-of-law
facilities and missions including the National Interdiction Unit, the
Sensitive Investigative Unit, the Major Crimes Task Force, the Counter
Narcotics Justice Center, Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
Headquarters and field locations, the Judicial Security Unit, the
Justice Center in Parwan, and Provincial Justice Centers. Emphasis is
given to building Afghan Government capacity and transitioning lead
operational and planning roles to Afghan officials. Where necessary and
appropriate, planning includes transition of current military projects
to civilian oversight.
In our coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD), no
decisions have been taken on changing the current model in which the
DOD takes the lead in
the training and funding of the ANSF, and the State Department expects
that the DOD will continue to provide sustainment to the ANSF
throughout and following transition.
Question (#120). What resources are you proposing to address
improved coordination and collaboration with DOD in prioritizing
effective training and equipping in transition?
Answer. Prior to 2011, the Department of State implemented the
Afghan National Police (ANP) civilian police training and mentoring
program under the overall direction of the DOD and the Combined
Security Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A). In April 2011, the
program was transferred from the Department of State and consolidated
under one Department of Defense contract for ANP support. The NATO
Training Mission--Afghanistan (NTM-A) coordinates with the Ministry of
Interior and international community partners (such as EUPOL) through
the International Police Coordination Board to determine ongoing and
emerging training priorities for the ANP.
The challenges to standing up a professional ANP force are well-
documented and remain a core focus of the international community's
effort in building Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capabilities.
Still, notable gains in ANP operational capability have been achieved
in recent years, allowing for the current transition to an Afghan
security lead in numerous provinces, districts, and cities throughout
Afghanistan. As of March 2012, more than half the population of
Afghanistan resides in areas where Afghans are taking responsibility
for security. The capacity of the ANP to assume more demanding policing
functions such as riot control, investigations and community outreach
initiatives has strengthened and, as noted in the Asia Foundation's
2011 Survey of the Afghan People, Afghan public perception of the ANP
has improved in recent years with 85 percent of respondents agreeing
that ``the ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people'' and 83
percent of respondents indicating that ``the ANP helps improve
security.''
Looking ahead to 2014 and beyond, the ANSF will maintain the
operational lead for ensuring the safety and security of Afghanistan,
however, NTM-A will likely retain a post-2014 presence in support of
continued professionalization of the ANP. Unlike the interagency
transition of the police program in Iraq--which was mandated by
National Security Presidential Decision Directive 36--in Afghanistan
there is no mandate from the administration to transition the police
program among U.S. Government agencies following drawdown of U.S.
military forces. As such, the Department of State has not requested
funds in FY13 for a resumption of the ANP training program from the
Department of Defense.
Question (#121). Criticism of corruption within the Afghan Police
Force and the Ministry of Interior abound. How does your budget address
corruption within the Ministry of the Interior, as well as across the
national and provincial governance structures?
Answer. Corruption in Afghanistan remains a serious issue and we
continue to engage the Afghan Government to address the problem. We are
working with our Afghan partners on various anticorruption measures by
promoting transparency and good governance while working to prevent
fraud, waste, and abuse. We support the Afghan ministries, governors,
and local leaders, including the Ministry of Interior and its officials
in finding ways to combat corruption.
Our assistance to Afghan ministries includes ethics training to
Afghan civil servants and the judiciary, capacity-building for internal
Afghan audits, improving procurement systems within Afghan justice
ministries, and encouraging the enactment and enforcement of
anticorruption laws. To address specific issues within the Ministry of
Interior, we supported Afghan efforts to make police salary payments
electronic via cell phone. This eliminates the opportunity for
siphoning off police salaries at the local and provincial levels. The
Department of Defense also has embedded advisors at the local,
provincial, and national levels that help mentor police on ethical
behavior, in addition to the ethics training they receive as part of
their police academy training.
The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is an FBI/internationally
mentored unit of 153 vetted investigators from the Ministry of Interior
(MOI) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) who investigate
corruption, kidnapping, and organized crime cases. Since its inception
in September 2009, the MCTF's has significantly increased its
investigative capacity through training and mentoring provided by the
FBI and other international partners. This training and mentoring has
led to hundreds of arrests. Afghan investigators from MOI and NDS have
exhibited an ability to conduct investigations in a logical manner,
using sophisticated investigative techniques such as telephone
wiretaps, cellular telephone exploitation, and GPS tracking. The Afghan
leadership has demonstrated an ability successfully to manage their
cases, investigators, and resources. The MCTF continues to receive
financial assistance from DOD (through both CSTC-A and CENTCOM), which
provides funding for vehicles, vehicle maintenance, equipment, and some
consumable supplies.
The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) provides Operational and Maintenance (O&M) funding to
maintain Camp Falcon where the MCTF is located, and where MCTF mentors
reside. However, the work of the MCTF is often frustrated by the lack
of followthrough in prosecution when it refers cases to the Attorney
General's Office. No major corruption cases investigated by the MCTF in
the last 2 years have been prosecuted by the Attorney General's Office.
The Ministry of Interior also dissolved seven private security
companies in 2011 connected to Afghan officials, citing its
``commitment to transparency and the rule of law,'' and, in Kandahar
province, the MOI fired the chief of police of an Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP) camp, who was involved in corruption.
Question (#122). How have you inoculated U.S. assistance from gross
misappropriation of funds?
Answer. The United States is taking an integrated civilian-military
approach to combat areas of corruption that impact the delivery of our
assistance. Our approach includes safeguarding the use of U.S. funds,
stopping illicit funds from fueling the insurgency, eliminating
opportunities for insurgents to erode public support for the Afghan
state, and strengthening institutions that will promote accountability
and allow for transition. The U.S. Government has improved its vetting
system and oversight mechanisms for civilian assistance contracting, as
well as increased information sharing between different government
agencies such as the Department of Defense and USAID.
The Department of Defense's Task Force 2010 was organized to help
commanders better understand with whom they are doing business and to
ensure contracting dollars were not empowering the wrong people or
undermining the United States and the international community's efforts
in Afghanistan. The organization uses intelligence, law enforcement,
auditors and forensic financial analysts to gain visibility on the flow
of contracting funds below the prime contractor level, to determine
where issues and concerns exist, and to identify actions to mitigate
fiscal and force protection risk.
In addition, USAID has significantly increased oversight and
monitoring staff and is fully implementing the Accountable Assistance
for Afghanistan (A3), an agency initiative to safeguard U.S. funds. The
A3 initiative implements a number of suggested oversight improvement
including the increased use of cost-reimbursable contracts, limits on
subcontractors, improved vetting, increased use of electronic funds
transfers, and the creation of onsite monitoring capacity in forward
operating bases and provincial reconstruction teams.
Question (#123). The Millennium Challenge Corporation's key
indicators for working with a country's government are: ruling justly,
providing economic freedom, and investing in people. Included within
the broad category of ruling justly are elements such as political
rights and rule of law. Although situations evolve, currently there are
two MCC eligible countries that could be in violation of these
indicators, Senegal and Malawi, where there are allegations that the
current governments are abusing the political process.
How does the MCC maintain effective control over U.S.
resources in countries where these sorts of events are
occurring?
Answer. MCC maintains extremely tight control mechanisms on all
funds in partner countries. These control systems, which include
ongoing monitoring by MCC's Fiscal Accountability and Procurement
specialists, quarterly financial reports, semiannual or annual
independent audits, and direct disbursement from MCC to major
contractors through a common payments system (so that the vast majority
of funds do not flow through the partner government) are not subject to
changes in the local policy environment.
MCC safeguards against corruption and fraud through multiple
channels, including procurement requirements, training for local
Millennium Challenge Account accountable entities (MCAs), and anonymous
tips for investigation and/or referral to MCC's Inspector General
(OIG). As part of an ongoing effort to protect taxpayer funds, MCC has
published its Policy on Preventing, Detecting, and Remediating
Corruption and Fraud in MCC Operations (``Anti-Fraud and Corruption
Policy''). The policy is an effort to bolster the risk detection and
assessment and management capacity of MCAs to identify corruption and/
or fraud in MCC-funded programs and projects. This is done in part
through rigorous monitoring and evaluation, as well as the use of
independent fiscal and procurement agents when necessary. This
standardized policy works to achieve greater consistency across MCC and
MCA teams in their approaches to the prevention of fraud and
corruption, and ensures that allegations of corruption and fraud are
consistently addressed and, when appropriate, referred to the OIG.
MCC has implemented processes and policies to address eligibility
concerns related to eligibility criteria measured by the MCC scorecard.
MCC's authorizing legislation gives it the right to suspend or
terminate country programs if ``the country or entity has engaged in a
pattern of actions inconsistent with the [eligibility] criteria.'' The
process to consider such a decision is outlined in the publically
available ``Policy on Suspension and Termination'' document. When
examining whether a policy decline is severe enough to warrant action,
MCC looks at whether the country has demonstrated a pattern of actions
that clearly moves the country farther away from positive performance.
MCC has made use of this policy in the past to suspend or terminate
Compact or Threshold program assistance, but only in cases of a clear
pattern of actions. MCC continues to monitor the situation in Senegal
and Malawi closely.
Question (#124). What determinations are being made regarding the
status of MCC programs in each country?
Answer. Malawi: There are no compact activities being conducted in
Malawi at the present time. MCC placed the compact on operational hold
on August 3, 2011, due to actions by the Government of Malawi that were
inconsistent with MCC's democratic governance criteria. At that time,
MCC told the Government of Malawi that the hold was intended to allow
MCC to ``review its partnership with Malawi, including whether to
recommend to its Board of Directors whether to suspend or terminate its
assistance.'' The MCC Board of Directors is expected to consider the
status of the Malawi Compact at its quarterly meeting on March 22.
Senegal: On February 7, 2012, MCC released the following statement
on the situation in Senegal: ``MCC takes seriously its partner
countries' commitment to accountable, democratic governance. Free,
fair, and competitive elections are one extremely visible reflection of
that commitment. MCC respects both the democratic and electoral
processes in Senegal, as well as the rights of individuals to peaceful
political participation. We are closely monitoring the events in
Senegal, in coordination with our colleagues at the U.S. Embassy in
Dakar. MCC looks forward to seeing all sectors of Senegalese society
reject violence in favor of a full and active democratic process.''
On February 26, Senegal conducted a Presidential election, which
was described by observers as peaceful, orderly, and transparent. The
election resulted in a runoff between the incumbent President and an
opposition candidate. Senegal will hold a second round of voting on
March 25. MCC continues to closely monitoring the events in Senegal, in
coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Dakar. The agency has informed
the Government of Senegal that both the quality of the election and the
nature of the government's response to protests, if any, could have
serious implications for Senegal's compact. MCC continues to track
events in collaboration with the U.S. Embassy and pay careful attention
to the reports of independent observers and election monitors on the
ground.
The MCC is negotiating second compacts with countries which are in
the process of completing initial compacts. The agency has set forth
guidance for determining eligibility for second compacts including
progress toward compact results, the nature of the country's
partnership with the agency and the degree to which the agency has
implemented the compact in accordance with the agency's policies. I
have concerns about this evaluation process, somewhat based on the
second compacts that are being initiated. For instance, the committee
recently received congressional notification of a second compact with
Cape Verde.
Question (#125). The MCC is negotiating second compacts with
countries which are in the process of completing initial compacts. The
agency has set forth guidance for determining eligibility for second
compacts including progress toward compact results, the nature of the
country's partnership with the agency and the degree to which the
agency has implemented the compact in accordance with the agency's
policies. I have concerns about this evaluation process, somewhat based
on the second compacts that are being initiated. For instance, the
committee recently received congressional notification of a second
compact with Cape Verde.
Was there a thorough evaluation process conducted to
determine if a second compact was warranted?
Answer. Yes. MCC has a rigorous and transparent process for
selecting countries for compact eligibility, and Cape Verde emerged as
the first country eligible to compete for a second compact. Every
September, MCC publishes a Selection Criteria and Methodology Report
that outlines how countries will be evaluated for compact eligibility,
including the criteria for selecting countries for second compacts.
Cape Verde was initially selected for compact eligibility in fiscal
year 2010 based on the evaluation process laid out in the ``Fiscal Year
2010 Selection Criteria and Methodology Report.''
Cape Verde is an African success story whose strengths in political
and economic governance are widely recognized, and performs well on
MCC's scorecard.
In terms of Ruling Justly indicators, Cape Verde regularly
scores in the top 15 percent of all MCC candidate countries for
each and every Ruling Justly indicator. This performance was
recognized elsewhere when former President Pires was awarded
the African leadership prize by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation for
his leadership in making Cape Verde a model of democracy and
stability.
In terms of Investing in People, Cape Verde is on track to
reach most of the MDGs by 2015.
In terms of Economic Freedom, the World Bank reports on
``Cape Verde's strong track record of macroeconomic management
and solid structural reforms'' and notes that growth has been
driven by strong public and private investment.
For fiscal year 2010, when determining eligibility for a second
compact, MCC considered, among other factors, the country's policy
performance using the selection criteria and methodology outlined in
this report, the opportunity to reduce poverty and generate economic
growth in the country, the funds available to MCC to carry out compact
assistance, and the country's performance implementing its first
compact.
To assess implementation of a first compact, the MCC recommends
that the Board consider the nature of the country partnership with MCC,
the degree to which the country has demonstrated a commitment and
capacity to achieve program results, and the degree to which the
country has implemented the compact in accordance with MCC's core
policies and standards. In selecting Cape Verde for a second compact,
MCC recognized Cape Verde's strong policy performance, impressive
reforms, and achievements of the initial compact. The country's
technical capacity, political will, and willingness to contribute its
own resources were also important considerations.
MCC's experience with Cape Verde revealed a reform-minded
democracy, committed to transparency and interested in improving
government effectiveness. The initial partnership with MCC created new
incentives for Cape Verde to continue existing policy reforms at the
national level, implement new reforms at the sector level, and improve
its performance on the scorecard indicators.
Question (#126). How are we ensuring that governments are not under
the impression that a second compact is a given? I am very concerned
that in an effort to fully utilize MCC funds, the agency may be moving
forward too hastily on second compacts.
Answer. MCC's Board is particularly selective when determining
eligibility for follow-on partnerships. In addition to good policy
performance, countries must show meaningful progress toward achieving
first compact results before being considered for a subsequent compact.
Of the ten countries that will conclude first compacts by the end of
2012 (Armenia, Benin, Cape Verde, El Salvador, Ghana, Georgia,
Honduras, Mali, Nicaragua, and Vanuatu), MCC's Board has selected five
as eligible for subsequent compacts--Cape Verde in fiscal year 2010,
Georgia and Ghana in fiscal year 2011, and Benin and El Salvador in
fiscal year 2011.
MCC communicates very clearly to its partner countries that second
compacts should not be assumed. This message is transmitted frequently
and consistently to countries that express interest in second compact
eligibility.
MCC's engagement with partner countries is by no means open-ended.
MCC carefully considers each country partnership based on the country's
policy and implementation performance, as well as the opportunities to
have an impact on growth and poverty reduction. This includes
consideration of the potential sustainability of MCC's investments, and
the country's ability to attract and leverage public and private
resources in support of development. Selective, effectively targeted
programs, such as those financed by MCC, are critical to ending the
cycle of aid dependency, ensuring sustainability, and promoting country
ownership.
MCC's use of subsequent compacts is focused on helping countries
solidify a sustainable economic growth path that attracts private
investment and allows countries to move away from dependence on aid.
Plainly stated, MCC does not intend to have open-ended relationships
with countries. Selective subsequent compacts, however, do play a
pivotal role in MCC's ability to reduce poverty and promote sustainable
economic growth, and provide opportunities for both MCC and its partner
countries to explore innovative programs, including strategic
partnerships with the private and nongovernmental sectors.
Question (#127-129). Trade/Business Agency Streamlining.--The White
House has sent notification of its intent to consolidate certain trade
and business agencies, including the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation and the Trade and Development Agency. Streamlining
government is a laudable effort; however, we must be thoughtful in the
process and carefully evaluate the effects and results.
What are the actual savings of such consolidation? We have
not yet been presented with a detailed picture of what the
resulting Department will look like. In fact, we've been
presented with very little information overall.
Will these agencies with divergent missions be able to
effectively function under one roof?
Will such consolidation actually benefit U.S. companies and
workers which are struggling to survive in these difficult
economic times?
Answer. At this time, the Department is not involved in the
consolidation of these trade and business agencies. We respectfully
refer you to the White House.
Question (#130). In response to a letter last summer on polio
eradication efforts in Pakistan, I received a letter from Deputy
Secretary Nides informing me that the State Department was prepared to
shift $4.5 million from FY 2010 maternal and child health programs to
bolster polio eradication efforts in Pakistan. This was to be combined
with $2 million that was already allocated for these efforts for FY
2011.
Were those funds actually shifted?
Answer. Yes, the $4.5 million in FY 2010 Maternal and Child Health
(MCH) funds were shifted and combined with $2 million in FY11 funds to
bolster polio eradication efforts in Pakistan. Overall, a total of $10
million in MCH funds has been committed to polio for FY 2010 and FY
2011 in Pakistan. This includes the $4.5 million shifted from FY 2010
MCH funds, the original $3.5 million of FY 2010 MCH funds, and the $2
million in FY 2011 funds, allocated to bolster polio eradication
initiatives implemented by the World Health Organization (WHO) and
UNICEF in Pakistan.
Question (#131). How much is expected to be spent on continued
eradication efforts in Pakistan?
Answer. The FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification includes $2
million for polio eradication efforts in Pakistan. In FY 2013, USAID
will reassess the epidemiologic and funding requirements. Projected
support for both UNICEF and WHO is expected to remain at about $2
million per year, unless there are compelling emergency funding needs.
Pakistan receives significant donor funding for polio eradication
efforts, particularly from Japan, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
World Bank, Britain and the United States. The Saudi Government,
through the Islamic Development Bank, and the Gates Foundation, are
currently working on establishing a significant new funding mechanism.
Question (#132). The administration's FY 2013 budget gives a large
increase to GAVI Alliance to help meet the administration's multiyear
pledge. Will those additional funds come at the expense of other USG
vaccination programs, both bilateral and multilateral?
Answer. The FY 2013 budget includes $145 million for the USG
contribution to the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI
Alliance). Vaccines are among the most cost-effective public health
interventions. This Alliance--with donor and host country governments,
civil society and the private sector partners--leverages USG resources
and helps to ensure that our development dollars have the greatest
impact. For example, the USG pledge has allowed GAVI to negotiate a 67-
percent price reduction on rotavirus vaccines so that children in low-
income countries can be protected against this cause of diarrheal
disease. The priority will be the rollout of pneumococcal conjugate and
rotavirus vaccines to combat pneumonia and diarrhea, the two leading
killers of children, and strengthening logistics systems.
Combined with other donors, the USG contribution will enable the
GAVI Alliance to immunize an additional 243 million children in
developing countries. The USG commitment leverages billions of dollars
that other donors have committed to GAVI, multiplying the impact of our
funding more than eightfold.
The FY 2013 GAVI contribution will not negatively impact bilateral
investments needed for immunization system development. The
administration recognizes that vaccines alone cannot achieve the
objectives set forth by the international community to significantly
reduce childhood deaths due to vaccine preventable diseases. Therefore,
in addition to the GAVI Alliance contribution, the USG is playing an
active role in assisting countries to build the systems to bring
lifesaving vaccines to every child in a sustainable manner. USAID
collaborates with other USG agencies, as well as international
organizations, private sector groups, and the NGO community, to ensure
that countries have access to the support that they need to bring the
vaccines purchased through GAVI to every child. Bilateral and
multilateral activities to build immunization capacity at the local and
national level in recipient countries will continue to receive support
to ensure that vaccine investments made through the GAVI Alliance are
maximized.
Question (#133). What is the proposed FY13 funding level of non-
GAVI related vaccination programs?
Answer. The non-GAVI immunization funding by USAID is approximately
$48 million annually. In addition to the GAVI Alliance contribution and
bilateral funding for immunizations, the USG plays an active role in
assisting countries to build systems to bring lifesaving vaccines to
every child in a sustainable manner.
USAID collaborates with other USG departments and agencies, as well
as international organizations, private sector groups, and the NGO
community, to ensure that countries have access to the support that
they need to bring the vaccines purchased through GAVI to every child.
The streams of funding that support these two critical areas are
synergistic and do not detract from one other. Bilateral and
multilateral activities to build immunization capacity at the local and
national level in GAVI Alliance recipient countries will continue to
receive the support they need to make sure that the vaccine investment
made through GAVI and bilateral programs is maximized.
Question (#134). I was pleased to learn of the recent polio
eradication effort success in India; however, I am troubled about the
setbacks we have seen with efforts in Afghanistan's polio eradication
program. The United States has been a strong partner on this front.
Is there more that the United States could be, and should
be, doing to increase the immunization rates in Afghanistan?
Answer. We share concerns about polio incidence in Afghanistan.
Taking into account efforts to promote Afghan leadership of the health
system, USAID is providing strong support to facilitate polio
eradication efforts by working in partnership with the Ministry of
Public Heath in Afghanistan and the United Nations. Given the public
health emergency situation, USAID is exploring how we can leverage our
existing programs and resources across all sectors to help UNICEF and
WHO's polio eradication efforts nationally, and in high-risk districts
in both countries where wild poliovirus still circulates. Supplemental
activities currently under consideration include: increasing awareness
and acceptance of polio vaccination in conjunction with UNICEF's plan
for a multimedia mass communication campaign customized for the local
context; enhancing local ownership and coordination in partnership with
the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in Afghanistan; increasing
vaccination coverage, including through strengthening the existing
surveillance network and routine immunization infrastructure; improving
the capacity of the vaccinator pool, and doing more work at the border
to prevent cross-border transmission.
Question (#135). PEPFAR.--In December, during his World AIDS Day
Address, President Obama announced that by the end of 2013, the United
States will be supporting 6 million people on antiretroviral treatment.
That is a 50-percent increase of where we were at the end of 2011--a
number that took up 8 years and tens of billions of dollars to reach.
The administration's 2013 budget cuts funding for bilateral HIV/AIDS
programs.
How do you envision meeting that ambitious goal in such a short
amount of time, with less funding?
Answer. Since the beginning of this administration, our focus has
been on saving more lives. The President set ambitious new goals on
World AIDS Day 2011, including support for treatment of 6 million
people, reaching more than 1.5 million HIV-positive pregnant women for
prevention of mother-to-child transmission, supporting more than 4.7
million voluntary medical male circumcisions, and distributing more
than 1 billion condoms--all by the end of FY 2013. With the FY 2013
budget, we can achieve these goals, continue the strong history of U.S.
leadership on HIV/AIDS, and continue to work for an AIDS-free
generation.
In light of the President's commitment, we carefully considered the
PEPFAR bilateral funding level needed to ensure that the targets will
be achieved. Our models show that the appropriation we have already
received for FY 2012, along with our request for FY 2013, will keep us
on track to meet the goals.
In FY 2013, PEPFAR will continue efforts to support greater impact
and efficiency through smart investments, improve the quality of
collected data, and ensure that country programs continue to reflect
the realities of the epidemic at the local level so that we can target
our investments to maximize impact. As an example of how PEPFAR has
been able to increase its impact, PEPFAR has reduced the cost of
treatment per person per year from over $1,100 to $335. Lower costs of
drugs, bulk purchasing, and simple changes like shipping medication by
ground instead of air have reduced the cost of treatment dramatically.
Given the efficiencies that PEPFAR has built into its system, we are
confident that we will be able to reach the goals under this budget.
Question (#136). The administration's FY 2013 budget request
proposes to shift $250 million from FY 2012 PEPFAR bilateral program
funds to go the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and
Tuberculosis. The budget also proposes allocating the Global Fund $1.65
billion FY 2013. Is it the administration's view to shift HIV/AIDS
program funds from bilateral programs to multilateral entities?
Answer. Global AIDS is a shared responsibility. The U.S. bilateral
programs cannot meet the global AIDS challenge alone, and are most
effective with a robust Global Fund. This year in particular, our
budget decisions came down to recognition that we have a unique
opportunity to ensure that bilateral programs continue to meet the
President's goals while also strengthening our most critical donor
partner in the global AIDS response--the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Because each dollar the United States invests
in the Fund leverages $2.50 from other donors, an increased U.S.
investment at this time is crucial for increasing the commitment of
others to meet the shared responsibility.
The USG continues to work to increase collaboration between PEPFAR
and Global Fund-financed programs on the ground to reach more people in
more countries with higher quality services and directly leverage the
results of the Global Fund. PEPFAR and the Global Fund have developed
and expanded our collaboration over the past several years. At the
country level, the Global Fund, PEPFAR, and partner countries
collaborate--in areas ranging from grant management, technical
assistance and capacity-building, to the provision of antiretroviral
drugs and joint programming--working hand in hand in-country to save
and improve lives. The two organizations coordinate strategically at
the global, regional, and country levels to ensure that resources are
used efficiently and effectively. PEPFAR needs a well-functioning
Global Fund to achieve our bilateral program targets and overall goals,
and the Global Fund needs PEPFAR to ensure quality and strong program
management. If either the Fund or PEPFAR bilateral are underresourced,
there will be negative repercussions for both programs that will
threaten our ability to achieve a sustainable response.
In October 2010, USG tied its multiyear pledge to the Global Fund
to successful implementation of reforms that increase the impact of
grants. The Fund took decisive action in adopting comprehensive reforms
last year, and now is the time to implement those far-reaching changes
as expeditiously as possible. We are very pleased with the appointment
of the Fund's new General Manager who has promised to advance the
reform agenda as rapidly as possible, and with his steps to improve
fiduciary oversight and grant management. The increased funding for the
Global Fund will keep the United States on track to fulfill its pledge,
but even more important, it will mitigate risk to the PEPFAR bilateral
program and those it serves.
This shift for FY 2013 responds to the unique moment we have and
our opportunity to take action. In future years, we will again consider
the right mix of U.S. investments to move us toward the goal of an
AIDS-free generation.
Question (#137). Since there is no new additional funding coming
into the global AIDS program, where will this money come from?
Answer. Through a combination of declining costs, greater
efficiencies, high-impact interventions and increased cost-sharing with
partner countries and the Global Fund, every dollar we invest through
PEPFAR is going farther. The following are some of the key factors that
provided us with the assurance that we will be able to meet the
President's goals with this budget.
First, we are targeting shifts in resources toward treatment at a
time when treatment costs are coming down. This is allowing us to
greatly increase the number of people supported on treatment to our
target of 6 million people by the end of FY 2013. PEPFAR's per-patient
cost of providing treatment has declined from over $1,100 per patient
per year to approximately $335 in 2011, and we are convinced that
further gains in efficiency are achievable. We are also experiencing
gains by using generic drugs, shipping commodities more cheaply,
shifting health worker tasks as appropriate, linking AIDS services to
the broader health system, and collecting and using data on the costs
of providing services. Taken together, these developments allow PEPFAR
to do much more treatment for less.
Our increases in treatment are matched by better use of our
prevention dollars. We are reallocating funds from lower impact
prevention interventions to both treatment as prevention and high-
impact prevention interventions. For example, PEPFAR is leading the
effort to expand voluntary medical male circumcision in eastern and
southern Africa where it will have the most impact. Circumcision is a
one-time procedure that confers a large lifetime prevention benefit,
both to the individual and to others in his community. By increasing
our total investment in circumcision, we are multiplying our impact on
the virus. And as we gain experience conducting successful high-volume
campaigns and new circumcision devices become available, the average
cost of a circumcision will drop even further.
Another area that has freed up resources for treatment is the
reduced need for non-ARV care for people living with HIV. Increasingly,
HIV is a chronic disease that PEPFAR programs are managing on an
outpatient basis, rather than in the hospital. By getting people on
treatment sooner and keeping them healthy, PEPFAR is averting the
opportunistic infections that have driven up care costs.
PEPFAR has worked to partner with countries in the global AIDS
fight, and countries are stepping up and increasingly taking on
services we once provided. This is most striking in the lower middle-
income countries of southern Africa--South Africa, Botswana, and
Namibia. In South Africa, the government has more than doubled its
commitment on HIV/AIDS in recent years to well over $1 billion per
year. A special 2-year ``bridge funding'' commitment by PEPFAR to
provide ARVs in South Africa (with aggressively negotiated pricing) was
highly successful in enabling the government to launch its own
increased purchasing of ARVs with newly negotiated low prices. The
government is now approaching the goal of providing all ARVs needed in-
country, with added support from the Global Fund, enabling PEPFAR to
move increasingly to a supportive technical assistance role that will
allow for lower budget allocations as we shift from service delivery to
an advisory role. This is shared responsibility for HIV/AIDS at work.
In other countries, specific contextual factors have dictated a
downward adjustment for FY 2013. We were able to use prior-year funding
to continue several multiyear special initiatives--like the Medical and
Nursing Education Partnerships--thus freeing up resources that allow us
to strengthen the Global Fund.
Question (#138). Will country teams have to reprogram funds in
order to adjust to the funding shift?
Answer. Country teams will not need to reprogram in order to adjust
to the budget--they will still have the resources they need to achieve
the goals. Country teams may seek to reprogram for other reasons as
country priorities shift, but this budget will not require such
reprogramming.
Question (#139). Commission on Wartime Contracting : On p. 182 in
your QDDR, you state the need to:
Elevate accountability for planning and oversight of large
contracts. Procurement planning focuses on soliciting,
evaluating, negotiating, and awarding contracts. Many contracts
are well into their performance phase before an adequate
contract administration strategy is established or resources
for contract administration are identified. Contract
administration planning must take place at program inception.
Sufficient resources for contractor oversight, support, travel,
communications, and other appropriate resources will be
identified and included as part of the contracting process
itself. Each Assistant Secretary at State will be required to
certify personally that program planning and oversight is
adequate for every service contract valued at an annual
expenditure of $25 million or more. Assistant Secretaries will
verify in their annual management control statements that they
have reviewed implementation plans and oversight arrangements
for these contracts and have judged the oversight to be
sufficient.
This note falls in line with the Commission on Wartime
Contracting's recommendation #6: ``Elevate the positions and expand the
authority of civilian officials responsible for contingency contracting
at Defense, State, and USAID.'' And yet, the Acquisitions office, led
by the senior most acquisitions specialist in the department,
responsible for some $8 or $9 billion in contracts and grants, is six
bureaucratic levels below you, and no one above that individual is an
acquisitions or contracting specialist; they are all Foreign Service
officers or political appointees.
In a response to the CWC recommendations, the Department of State
stated this model is ``most suitable to support its contingency needs''
and that the professional acquisition staff is ``sufficient'' and the
work above her level is ``overseen'' and ``consistently coordinated.''
With great respect for the strong team you have in place, and the
Under Secretary for Management, the structure is inadequate for the
increasing demands the country is placing upon it, and it appears you
have ignored your own recommendation, as well as the CWC's.
Please detail for the committee how you will (using your own
words), ``Elevate accountability for planning and oversight of
large contracts.'' This is not an OIG or inspection function,
it's a management function.
Answer. The Department acknowledges that its contracting function
has grown considerably over the past few years. Although not as large
as that of DOD or other Federal agencies, State's contracting activity
grew from $1.8 billion in 2001 to $8.8 billion in 2011. Most of this
growth was for programs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As our contracting activity increased, we faced two challenges: (1)
we needed additional acquisition personnel to support our procurement
efforts; and (2) the requirements offices needed to better support our
acquisitions with up-front planning and contract administration
oversight.
The Department of State increased acquisition staff using funding
in a Working Capital Fund, which is generated through a 1 percent fee
on all procurements. Using a Working Capital Fund allows the Department
to rapidly right-size our procurement staff to the acquisition
workload. As an example, we hired 103 additional procurement staff
since 2008. This professional acquisition staff is capable of handling
$9 billion in contracting a year.
The Department of State acquisition model uses a centralized
contracting approach to consolidate and coordinate resources. A
Washington, DC-based central office staffed with acquisition
professionals provides primary and backup acquisition support for
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and other worldwide locations.
Two Regional Procurement Support Offices provide additional forward
deployed support. The Department centralized the acquisition of
worldwide local guard services using this Washington, DC-based approach
with great success.
The Chief Acquisitions Officer (CAO), as required by Congress, is a
noncareer, politically appointed, position. That position at the
Department is currently filled by a Senate-confirmed, career Senior
Foreign Service officer with worldwide experience with our acquisition
needs and challenges, as well as experience working with our Department
of Defense colleagues. The Head of Contracting Activity (HCA), as
acknowledged by the committee, is a seasoned professional with a solid
record of acquisition accomplishments.
The Chief Acquisitions Officer works hand in hand with the Under
Secretary for Management on acquisition issues, especially contingency
contracting. Major decisions on contingency contracting policy, such as
how to strengthen private security contractor oversight, are led by the
Under Secretary for Management. There have not been acquisition issues
whose solutions have been impeded by the current flexible, well
coordinated structure.
Contracting is a team effort at the Department with close
relationships between acquisition and requirements personnel;
collaboration is essential to anticipate upcoming requirements, allow
sufficient lead time, consider various methods of procurement, and
otherwise increase the efficiency of the acquisition process. In this
team approach, acquisition personnel support requirements office
personnel by contracting for program needs in accordance with laws and
regulations, and requirements office personnel support acquisition
personnel by assuming an active role in the acquisition process and
contract administration. This collaboration is necessary for effective
implementation, execution, and accomplishment of a contracting program.
While this team approach had been set out in the Foreign Affairs
Handbook since at least 2005, we found that our requirements office
personnel needed to take a more active role in contracting and that
accountability for contract administration needed to be enhanced.
The Department acknowledges that improvements are always possible
in our contracting oversight and management, and we continue to look
for ways to enhance accountability for contracting throughout our
organization. The examples of contracting challenges cited by the CWC
in its final report are not a function of the organizational location
or strength of our acquisition staff, but rather of the need for more
effective contract administration support.
To elevate accountability for contracting, the QDDR team
established that the Assistant Secretary of a performing Bureau needed
to ensure that adequate resources, both personnel and funding, are
identified early in program planning to make certain contract
administration is not an afterthought. Department guidance issued in a
Procurement Information Bulletin in June 2011 requires the cognizant
Assistant Secretary to certify that planning and oversight is adequate
for every service contract valued at an annual expenditure of $25
million or more, and also to verify in their annual management control
reviews that they have examined these contractual arrangements and
judged oversight to continue to be sufficient.
Further, responsibility for effective contract administration was
elevated when all Department employees were reminded of the importance
of planning for sufficient contract resources throughout the life of
the contract, most recently through the issuance of a Department Notice
in January 2012, which reiterated the Assistant Secretaries'
responsibilities.
The January 2012 Department Notice on planning for adequate
contract resources reminded all staff that, ``Effective contract
administration is a critical core competency in the procurement
process. Contract administration planning should take place at the
beginning of the procurement process as an essential part of the
acquisition plan. Such plans shall be developed by the Bureau technical
program office and should consider an initial assessment of resources
required for contractor oversight, support, travel and communications.
Planning must also take into account the need for multiple technical
monitors based on geographic dispersion and multiple technical
disciplines. Program offices must identify financial and other
resources that are reserved for implementation of contract
administration.''
We believe our ability to increase our acquisitions staff through
the Working Capital Fund--hiring 103 staff since 2008, coupled with the
steps taken to elevate accountability of the requirements offices for
contracting--serves as a solid foundation for our contracting function
at State.
Question (#140-141). In the Commission on Wartime Contracting's
final report to Congress, it made a recommendation (#11) to ``improve
contractor performance-data recording and use.'' In the State
Department's response to this recommendation, it indicated that State
``agrees with this recommendation, and looks for implementation with a
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) change.''
Has State promulgated or recommended such a change?
What progress is being made to make this change in order to
follow through on addressing this recommendation?
Answer. The Department agrees in part with the Commission on
Wartime Contracting's (CWC's) Recommendation #11. However, we note that
the CWC's recommendation is actually directed at Congress, stating that
``Congress should direct agency heads to improve contractor
performance-data recording and use.''
Assuming that Congress concurs with this CWC recommendation, we
believe that implementation is best achieved with a Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) change. Amending the FAR is a collaborative process;
the Department of Defense (DOD), GSA, and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) jointly issue the FAR for use by executive
agencies in acquiring goods and services.
To clarify State's position on CWC Recommendation 11, which the CWC
broke into three subrecommendations:
1. Allow contractors to respond to, but not appeal, agency performance
assessments.
State agrees with this part of the recommendation.
2. Align past performance assessments with contractor proposals.
State understood this recommendation to require that, when
evaluating contractor proposals, only the performance evaluations
included in the past performance database could be used. This would
exclude commercial information, state government data, and any other
surveys State might want to conduct concerning a contractor's past
performance. As such, we disagree with the recommendation, finding it
to be too restrictive, and contrary to the best interests of the U.S.
Government and the American taxpayer.
3. Require agencies to certify past performance information.
We do not agree that requiring contracting officers to certify the
use of the database would increase use of the database. The
availability of relevant data and ease of collection would encourage
use.
Question (#142-144). The idea that our missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan will rely on contractors is no longer new or surprising.
Nevertheless, the size and scope of the contractor force that you will
be hiring, numbered at some 14,000 in Iraq alone, presents challenges
to Embassy Baghdad, the Consulates, and the Management and Acquisitions
team back here in the States. Your Inspector General Howard Geisel
stated in a meeting with my staff, ``The biggest single problem in
these situations is the Department having enough qualified contracting
officer representatives (CORs) within the missions and in the
contingency regions.''
According to the CWC, despite this growth, `` . . . the number of
contract specialists . . . rose by only 3 percent governmentwide
between 1992 and 2009.'' In many instances, you have hired temporary
personnel, or are relying on the Department of Defense to do the
Department of State's contracting oversight--for instance some 52 DCMA
personnel support your Iraq contracts. I am further concerned that so
much of this COR work is done remotely and that so few State-Department
personnel are in the field with the contractors.
What new authorities or new funding do you need to increase
the number of trained, full-time, U.S. Government contract
oversight specialists?
Considering the worldwide demand, how many CORs do you
project needing in the next 5 years and how many are on
permanent hire with the Department?
If no new authorities or funding are needed, what is
preventing your hiring and deploying more CORs?
Answer. The Department's contracting function has grown from $1.8
billion in 2001 to $8.8 billion in 2011, mostly because of growth for
programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. As our contracting activity
increased, we have hired additional Acquisitions Management staff using
funding in the Working Capital Fund, which is generated through a 1-
percent fee on all procurements. The Working Capital Fund has provided
sufficient funding for this staffing surge, and State has hired 103
additional staff in the Office of Acquisitions Management since 2008.
Working as team members with our Acquisitions staff, Contracting
Officer Representatives (CORs) are U.S. Government employees from the
requirements office who monitor contract performance. The Contracting
Officer from Acquisitions strives to appoint a COR as soon as a
requirement is initiated, so that the COR can assist in the
solicitation process. The Contracting Officer may appoint an
individual--a U.S. Government employee known as a government technical
monitor or GTM--to assist the COR in monitoring a contractor's
performance.
Over the past few years, we have trained and deployed more CORs. In
FY11 the Department had 1,080 employees certified to carry out COR
duties and projects an increase to 1,200 in FY12. We have taken steps
to improve our initial planning and continued oversight of contracts by
our requirements offices. Examples of improvements that State has made
include:
We mandated upfront planning for contract administration on
major programs, and require that the Assistant Secretary of the
requirements office ensure adequate contract administration
resources, both personnel and funding.
The Department increased the number of CORs assigned to
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Department of State has updated COR training to be more
interactive, skills-based and adult-learning focused.
Training: All CORs and GTMs, both domestic and overseas, must
complete a 40-hour approved training course. Available training has
been expanded by launching a skills-based COR class in May 2011 at the
Foreign Service Institute (FSI). A separate basic class has been
tailored for CORs from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to include
oversight of local guards and other security programs overseas. The
40-hour Defense Acquisition University (DAU) online basic COR course is
being adapted for Department of State online COR training and includes
overseas contracting considerations. We hope to have it available to
students by summer 2012. In addition to basic COR training, FSI offers
a number of courses on contract related topics such as procurement
integrity, negotiation, program management, and cultural sensitivity,
both on campus and online. The DAU course, ``Mission Support
Planning,'' recommended by the CWC, is offered by FSI as an online
course.
COR Performance: In January and April 2011, we issued Department
notices reminding staff of the requirement to include work elements for
CORs and GTMs in performance appraisals and to seek the Contracting
Officer's feedback on COR performance. The April 2011 notice provided
guidance on critical work elements for supervisors to include in COR
and GTM performance appraisal plans (or Employee Evaluation Reports).
The Department created a COR Award to highlight contract
administration achievements by the COR, and published an article in the
May 2011 State Magazine highlighting the importance of contract
administration and the valuable role of the COR.
Requirements Offices: With regard to the Department's program
offices, we have instituted enhanced planning for technical contracting
support, including adequate COR support. The Bureaus of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and Diplomatic Security
(DS), the two Bureaus most heavily involved in overseas contingency
contracting, have both significantly increased resources to support
contract administration.
We instituted operational measures and increased contract oversight
to ensure professionalism and responsibility over private security
contractor (PSC) personnel. DS is staffed to achieve this oversight in
Iraq and Afghanistan. DS's actions for management, oversight, and
operational control of PSC personnel include:
DS Special Agents at each post in Iraq and Afghanistan serve
as managers for the Static Guard and Personal Protective
Security programs;
DS Special Agents at each post and in headquarters also
serve as CORs and assistant CORs (A/CORs) for the direct
management and oversight of the Worldwide Protective Services
(WPS) contract; and
DS personnel at each post are assigned as GTMs to assist the
CORs and
A/CORs in the field with the oversight of the WPS contract.
Among its measures to improve ongoing contract administration, INL
has increased the number of program officers and contract
administration personnel in the field and at headquarters. INL also has
improved the accessibility of contract management staff to COR files by
instituting remote electronic access from the field to headquarters.
Use of Defense Contract Management Agency: Prior to the final
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in December 2011, we worked very
closely, every day, on an unprecedented level with our DOD colleagues
on implementing the transition, and we continue to use DOD resources in
theater. The joint DOD Equipping Board identified more than 3,260
individual pieces of equipment worth approximately $224 million to be
transferred as excess, sold, or loaned to State; sustainment for this
equipment is being provided on a reimbursable basis through a contract
managed by the Army Sustainment Command at Rock Island. We are
procuring life support services under DOD's competitively awarded
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program or LOGCAP IV. We implemented a
full range of IT support services, in many cases partnering with DOD to
improve efficiency and reduce costs.
Because we rely on these DOD contracts in Iraq, we sought support
from DOD, including using the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
to monitor contractors' performance and management systems, and to
protect U.S. Government property. DCMA staff are on the ground and
experienced with these contracts, and we believe using DCMA for this
contract support is a prudent use of available resources. DCMA provides
contract administration services to many Federal agencies. DCMA support
is paired with Department of State CORs on DOD contracts.
The Department found that use of temporary Civil Service staffing
authority is very useful in acquiring contract administration resources
and we appreciate congressional support of this flexibility as well as
for the President's Department of State budget requests.
The Office of Acquisitions Management (AQM) has been using the OPM
delegated Direct Hire Authority (DHA) for Acquisition Positions since
March 2010. As a result, AQM has been able to successfully recruit
professional acquisition force direct-hires as a result of this
authority. The DHA ends for the entire Federal Government on September
30, 2012. Extending this authority for 4 years (or indefinitely) will
allow the Department to continue to recruit talented professionals,
thereby adding to the existing professional government acquisition
corps.
Question (#145). Iraq/Afghanistan Personnel Casualties.--What
system do you have in place for tracking State and USAID contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department uses the DOD Synchronized Pre-Deployment
Operational Tracker (SPOT) as the official database to account for
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question (#146). Please provide to the committee killed and wounded
figures for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Answer. Since the beginning of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there have been a total of six deaths of direct hire
Foreign Affairs employees--with the breakdown being one death in
Afghanistan and five in Iraq. This number includes all Foreign Affairs
employees from all agencies, excluding the Department of Defense.
However the question of injury is a more complex issue. The number
of Foreign Affairs employees that have been wounded during these
conflicts varies depending on the type and severity of injury and when
and where the injury occurred. The statistic that we have that most
adequately captures the total number of injures in Iraq and Afghanistan
is 190 injuries since the start of the conflict. We do not have data
that indicates how many of these injuries are conflict related (e.g.,
mortar attack), and how many are routine (e.g., car accident).
The Department does not have historic data on contractors killed
and wounded as we only recently began tracking this data. The data for
FY 2011 for the State Department is as follows:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTRACTORS KILLED OR WOUNDED IN PERFORMANCE OF
DUTIES IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN DURING FY 2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Killed Wounded Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan................... 7 6 13
Iraq.......................... 0 10 10
-----------------------------------------
Total number of 7 16 23
contractor personnel
killed or wounded......
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data Source: Department Bureau Offices. Collected by a census process
on a quarterly basis.
* The 7 deaths from Afghanistan were Afghan Nationals supporting mine
clearance operations.
Question (#147). Somalia.--The recent decision to support and
contribute to the expanded U.N. Support Package for the African Union
Mission in Somalia appears to pursue a similar approach proven
misguided in the past; a foreign occupying force in a hostile country
with few allies among the Somali population and a fundamentally flawed
and incompetent government entity propped up by the international
community. Compounding this further is the fact that the international
community has little if any operational plan, lacks strategic
agreements among the partner nations as to their respective roles or
purposes, and has a decade-old and anemic political process which has
marginal positive influence on the conflict.
Why should the United States agree to fund an expansion of
this mission to triple the force from its original size and
widely expand its mandate across the country with
circumstantial evidence of some recent international interest
in resolving this decades-long conflict?
Answer. Stabilizing Somalia remains critical for our national
security, counterterrorism, and foreign policy interests. The United
States designated
al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2008, and the group
announced its formal merger with al-Qaeda in early 2012. Al-Shabaab
continues to use Somalia as a safe haven and base of operations and
extremists in Somalia may threaten the United States and its interests.
The ongoing conflict in Somalia, exacerbated by
al-Shabaab, has bred instability across the Horn of Africa, displaced
millions of Somalis, and fomented one of the world's worst humanitarian
crises.
The success of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is
essential to achieving our national security goals in Somalia.
Strengthening and expanding AMISOM is critical for establishing secure
space for stabilization efforts and governance to take shape in
southern and central Somalia. Legitimate governance and political
reconciliation cannot take hold as long as al-Shabaab remains in
control of large sections of southern and central Somalia.
Regional efforts to combat al-Shabaab are degrading the group's
capability to destabilize Somalia and the surrounding region, and are
also intensifying preexisting fissures within the organization. It is
critical that we help AMISOM to keep the pressure on the organization
at this moment when it no longer controls Mogadishu, has ceded large
swaths of territory, and is engaged in battles on multiple fronts.
The Somali National Security Forces are playing a significant part
in combating al-Shabaab, but they are not yet capable of operating on
their own or holding territory for a sustained period of time without
external support. Therefore, AMISOM's reach must be expanded in order
to extend the reach of legitimate governance.
We believe that the current international attention on Somalia is
not fleeting--rather, we are seeing more and more partners step up with
more than just words by providing actual resources. There was strong
support for AMISOM expansion among countries in the region, the AU, and
the U.N. Security Council. The U.K.-hosted London conference on Somalia
significantly raised the profile of Somalia issues and reflected the
high level of interest in the international community.
In addition to the U.S. and EU support, we are now seeing less
traditional donors such as Turkey step up with significant assistance
for humanitarian, development and security sector reform efforts. Even
China recently committed publicly to provide additional resources to
AMISOM. We are strongly committed to ensuring that the United States is
not left to carry the burden in terms of support for AMISOM and the
Transitional Federal Government alone. We have consistently made clear
to the AU the need to expand the pool of donors for both efforts.
Question #148. What specific agreement has Kenya made in having
their ill-conceived incursion and ill-experienced force fall under
AMISOM authority?
Answer. On February 22, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 2036, which increased the mandated troop levels and
expanded the mandate of AMISOM, thereby providing the opportunity for
the AU to incorporate Kenyan forces into the AMISOM mission. AU and
Kenyan officials are in the midst of formalizing the arrangement to
incorporate Kenyan forces in Somalia into an expanded AMISOM. Once
these Kenyan forces are officially part of AMISOM, Kenya will be
eligible to receive the logistics support package from the U.N. Support
Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) referenced in UNSCR 2036 that is provided to
all Troop Contributing Countries.
Question #149. What are the concrete commitments by troop-
contributing countries to date?
Answer. As of March 13, the African Union (AU) lists the nominal
force strength of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as
9,779 troops, which includes 5,138 Ugandans, 4,445 Burundians, 100
Djiboutians, and 76 multinational headquarters staff officers. Uganda
and Burundi will deploy a combined 2,500 additional troops (on top of
their current commitments) to AMISOM. Uganda's intended augmentation
unit will complete training in April 2012. Burundi's intended
augmentation unit will complete training in early May 2012. Djibouti
has committed politically to deploying a full battalion of at least 850
personnel (including the 100 currently deployed). There remain
outstanding management issues that have slowed completion of the
deployment. Sierra Leone has committed to providing a battalion of 850
personnel to the mission, which would replace a Kenyan battalion in
southern Somalia, according to AMISOM's latest Concept of Operations.
Kenya has officially committed between 4,400-4,600 troops to the
mission, although AU officials and Kenya are still negotiating final
arrangements to formalize the incorporation of Kenyan forces into
AMISOM. The U.N. Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) will conduct a
predeployment visit with the Kenyan forces to determine the troop
numbers, equipment classification, and equipment reimbursement rates,
which will then be formalized in a Letter of Assist.
Question #150. What further commitments are there relative to this
expansion to the full complement given that even the last increase has
not been achieved?
Answer. If all of the AMISOM troop commitments made as of February
28 are met (up to their full level), AMISOM will reach its full
mandated force strength of 17,731 personnel. There are no additional
commitments beyond those listed in the answer to QFR #149, nor could
additional commitments be incorporated under the mandated force
strength unless the mandate is further revised or current commitments
are not met.
Question #151. What does the full complement of the intended
``support package'' contain by way of equipment, supplies, weapons, and
funding?
Answer. The United Nations Support Office for the African Union
Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) has provided the logistical support for
AMISOM since the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1863
(2009). U.N. Security Council Resolution 2010 (2011) authorized and
further enhanced the continuation of the U.N. logistical support
package until October 31, 2012.
UNSOA currently provides AMISOM troops, through assessed
contributions, the following support items: water, food, fuel, power
generation, maintenance, limited facilities construction, medical
evacuation, limited medical support, communications equipment, kitchen
equipment, stationery, and deployment/redeployment transportation.
Assessed contributions also fund the U.N. Mine Action Service's
advanced counterimprovised explosive device (IED) training for AMISOM
troops.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) authorized the
expansion of AMISOM from 12,000 to 17,731 troops and authorized UNSOA
to extend the existing logistical support package to the additional
AMISOM troops, as well as expand the scope of that package to include
additional elements such as contingent owned equipment reimbursement
and the addition of critical enablers.
More specifically, the expanded package will add helicopters and
fixed wing airplanes (the exact amounts have not yet been determined)
that will support AMISOM's expanded areas of operation, as well as
longer distance capacity vehicles (again, numbers not yet determined)
to provide supplies through long overland lines of communication,
additional combat engineering to provide route clearance (including
counter-IED capability), and construction engineering to fortify
positions.
Some of these logistics capabilities will be organic to AMISOM,
some will be contracted. The exact mix of the two is currently being
discussed by the AU and UNSOA.
Question #152. What criteria have been established to determine
what elements of the support package is delivered when and to what
entities?
Answer. Only African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop
contributing countries are authorized to receive logistics support,
counter-IED training, and reimbursement of contingent owned equipment
from the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), up to a maximum of
17,731 uniformed and 20 civilian personnel. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2036 (2012) further reinforced this and requires the U.N. to
ensure proper transparency and accountability, and application of
internal controls to ensure that only AMISOM troop contributing
countries receive UNSOA support. The United States is actively engaged
with the U.N. and AU on these control measures to ensure proper
utilization of resources.
UNSOA is currently working with the AU on how best to support
logistically AMISOM's expansion beyond Mogadishu. The addition of force
multipliers and enablers, including helicopters, is essential to
provide AMISOM with greater operational capability and flexibility to
degrade al-Shabaab.
Question (#153-155). United States assistance to Somalia includes
bilateral, multilateral, and other avenues of funding including,
humanitarian, diplomatic, technical capacity-building, peacekeeping,
peacekeeper training, peripheral train and equip of neighboring forces,
military and intelligence cooperation in the region, antipiracy,
refugee and so on.
What is the total cost of United States assistance for
Somalia across all accounts on an annual basis from FY10 and
FY11 broken out by source and purpose in bilateral and
multilateral accounts?
Answer. U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to promote
political and economic stability, prevent the use of Somalia as a haven
for international terrorism, and alleviate the humanitarian crisis
caused by years of conflict, drought, flooding, and poor governance.
The total cost of United States assistance to support efforts in
Somalia across the Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) accounts in FY 2010 is approximately
$187 million and in FY 2011 is approximately $246 million. The table
below is a breakdown of foreign assistance funding by program
objective, program area, and by account. State Department operations
funding for Somalia is also included for both years.
SOMALIA FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BY ACCOUNT, PROGRAM OBJECTIVE AND AREA, FY
2010-FY 2011
[Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2010 FY 2011
actual actual
total total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/State Somalia Foreign Assistance + State 187,001 246,621
Operations Funding for Somalia TOTAL\1\......
USAID/State Somalia Foreign Assistance TOTAL.. 185,861 245,969
Economic Support Fund......................... 31,270 19,627
1 Peace and Security........................ 12,000 8,436
1.6 Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation 12,000 8,436
2 Governing Justly and Democratically....... 11,270 3,070
2.2 Good Governance....................... 3,757 3,070
2.3 Political Competition and Consensus- 6,433 --
Building.................................
2.4 Civil Society......................... 1,080 --
3 Investing in People....................... 5,000 5,000
3.2 Education............................. 5,000 5,000
4 Economic Growth........................... 3,000 3,121
4.6 Private Sector Competitiveness........ 3,000 3,121
Global Health Programs--USAID................. 1,550 1,547
3 Investing in People....................... 1,550 1,547
3.1 Health................................ 1,550 1,547
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and 2,353 2,000
Related Programs.............................
1 Peace and Security........................ 2,353 2,000
1.1 Counter-Terrorism..................... 353 --
1.3 Stabilization Operations and Security 2,000 2,000
Sector Reform............................
Peacekeeping Operations \2\................... 102,000 75,300
1 Peace and Security........................ 102,000 75,300
1.3 Stabilization Operations and Security 102,000 75,300
Sector Reform............................
Regional/Central Foreign Assistance Funding 48,688 147,495
for Somalia \3\..............................
State/AF Economic Support Fund (Partnership 1,200 --
for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism)...
1 Peace and Security........................ 1,200 --
1.1 Counter-Terrorism..................... 1,200 --
State/PM Peacekeeping Operations (Global Peace 15,818 12,247
Operations Initiative) \4\...................
1 Peace and Security........................ 15,818 12,247
1.3 Stabilization Operations and Security 15,818 12,247
Sector Reform............................
USAID/OFDA: International Disaster Assistance 16,667 46,620
\5\..........................................
5 Humanitarian Assistance................... 16,667 46,620
5.1 Protection, Assistance and Solutions.. 16,667 46,620
USAID/FFP: International Disaster Assistance -- 42,517
\5\..........................................
5 Humanitarian Assistance................... -- 42,517
5.1 Protection, Assistance and Solutions.. -- 42,517
USAID/FFP: Food for Peace Title II \5\........ 15,003 46,111
5 Humanitarian Assistance................... 15,003 46,111
5.1 Protection, Assistance and Solutions.. 15,003 46,111
State Operations Funding for Somalia TOTAL.... 1,140 652
State/AF Diplomatic and Consular Direct 602 477
Funding......................................
State/AF Public Diplomacy Direct Funding...... 538 175
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Figures do not include OE support costs from USAID/East Africa
Regional Mission.
\2\ In FY 2011, $14.799 million in U.N. peacekeeping credits was applied
to pay a portion of the FY 2011 UNSOA assessment.
\3\ In addition, funding was also provided from the Migration and
Refugee Assistance and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
accounts to assist Somali IDPs and refugees in neighboring countries.
\4\ The Peacekeeping Operations (Global Peace Operations Initiative)
funding listed above only includes that which has directly benefited
troops deploying to Somalia (e.g. training or modest deployment
equipment), primarily through Africa Contingency Operations Training &
Assistance (ACOTA).
\5\ Humanitarian assistance funding is tracked by year of obligation.
Under the same criteria, what is the expected cost for FY12
and FY13 if the AMISOM force should achieve the last mandated
level by FY12, and what will it cost the United States at the
new mandated levels?
Answer. We estimate the additional cost to the United States for
the expanded troop level and support package is approximately $46
million in the first year of expansion (of which a portion may be
assessed in FY 2012) for increased staffing, infrastructure
improvements, and equipment acquisition and approximately $38 million
in subsequent years. This would lead to an estimated total U.S. share
of assessed costs for U.N. Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), including
the additional enablers, of approximately $138 million in the first
year of the mandate and $130 million in subsequent years, compared to
the FY 2013 Request level of $92 million.
Where will the funding for this operation be drawn given
that this was not incorporated in the FY13 budget request? What
will the tradeoff be in assistance elsewhere?
Answer. In consultation with the Congress, the Department
anticipates funding any new, additional requirements to support the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by making tradeoffs within FY
2012 and FY 2013 resources. The FY 2012 requirements will depend on the
size and timing of U.N. assessments, which are expected in July or
August. At that time, the Department will review options, including the
status of available credits and/or whether to draw on the flexibility
provided for the foreign assistance accounts within the FY 2012
Overseas Contingency Operations appropriation. However, in order to use
FY 2012 foreign assistance funds, the administration would need a
legislative remedy that would allow for additional funds to be provided
through the Peacekeeping Operations account (the FY 2012 Peacekeeping
Operations appropriation caps the amount that can be provided to the
U.N. Support Office for AMISOM at $91.8 million). As the FY 2013
request for Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities
(CIPA) was based on assessed peacekeeping mission levels as of December
2011 (when the budget locked for FY 2013), the Department plans to
consult with Congress on the most appropriate funding source that would
maximize transfer authorities.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. Though the Egyptian Government has lifted the travel ban
on the six Americans who have been accused of spurring unrest in the
country, the criminal charges against them have not been dropped and
their trial is scheduled to resume in late April. As a result, there is
considerable debate here in Congress about whether the United States
should continue to provide assistance to the Egyptian Government and
about the future of United States-Egyptian relations.
What is the current status of the negotiations to resolve
the issue of the American foreign aid workers? How do you see
this being resolved and can you give any timeframe? What, do
you believe, is the true motive behind the crackdown on civil
society organizations?
Do you believe you have the tools you need to exert
sufficient pressure on the Egyptian Government, including the
language included in last year's State and Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill which requires you to certify that Egypt is
meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty and that the government is ``implementing policies to
protect freedom of expression, association, and religion and
due process of law''?
Answer. We have worked hard to urge the Egyptian Government to end
its pursuit of the NGO case and its harassment of civil society
organizations, to drop the charges against the NGO workers, and to
return confiscated property. Although the travel ban on international
NGO workers was lifted, the trials for the charged Egyptian and
international NGO workers are ongoing. President Obama reached out to
Field Marshal Tantawi; I have spoken many times with the Foreign
Minister; and our military colleagues have reached out to their
counterparts at the highest levels. Ambassador Patterson is working
with all of the parties on the ground that are involved with or
affected by the Egyptian investigation.
The Egyptian Government's motivation in cracking down on these
organizations is not entirely clear. The Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation has alleged that U.S. funding of unregistered
NGOs violated an agreement between the United States and Egypt, but the
United States has not agreed to such a restriction. The U.S.-funded
organizations have been working in good faith to support Egypt's
transition to democracy. They are respected organizations that receive
support from the U.S. Government and have been working in Egypt with
the sole goal of supporting Egypt's transition to democracy. We believe
it is in Egypt's interest to allow these groups to operate and
contribute to Egypt's transition. It is important to note that these
Egyptian investigations also target domestic Egyptian groups performing
work that is necessary and valuable for any democratic society. Civil
society groups represent the views and aspirations of the people, which
is what democracy is all about. In order for Egypt's democratic
transition to succeed, these groups must be allowed to operate without
restriction.
While we work toward a resolution to the NGO crisis, we can't lose
sight of the range of our strategic interests in Egypt. We have a great
deal at stake here: our relationship with the largest Arab country,
transit and over-flight rights, the Israel-Egyptian peace treaty, and
our support for democracy and political transition in the Arab world.
In terms of our bilateral assistance to Egypt, we are guided by the
need to safeguard our interconnected strategic interests: maintaining a
critically important bilateral partnership with Egypt and supporting
the success of a democratic transition for Egypt that meets the
aspirations of all Egyptians.
Question. Currently, there is a law in Afghanistan that permits the
arrest and imprisonment of women fleeing situations of domestic abuse.
Is the United States putting pressure on Afghan President
Hamid Karzai to change this appalling law?
How can we continue to push the Afghan Government to ensure
that women's rights are safeguarded?
Answer. While there is no codified Afghan law that permits the
arrest and imprisonment of women for fleeing situations of domestic
abuse, the Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion in 2010 that women
who flee their homes and do not immediately go to the police or a close
relative should be imprisoned as a precaution against promiscuity and
prostitution. As a result, women and girls continue to be wrongfully
imprisoned through common practice and deference to arguable
interpretations of tribal and Sharia Law.
The Afghan Constitution enshrines women's rights, and the 2009 Law
for the Elimination of Violence against Women, which President Karzai
passed by decree, codifies vital protections. These protections include
the criminalization of 23 acts of abuse toward women and girls,
including but not limited to rape, forced prostitution, domestic
violence, baad or giving girls as payment to settle family or tribal
disputes, forced marriage, underage marriage, and prohibiting a woman
or girl from accessing education or work. We know this law can only
achieve full effectiveness when implemented in its entirety and
enforced at all levels, which is why we will continue to support
programs that raise awareness on the rights of women and ensure these
rights are protected. Our programs are also working to educate legal
professionals, justice sector officials, and citizens on this issue,
and to uphold the protections guaranteed to women, children, and all
Afghan citizens under the law. For example, DRL funds several programs
that aim to increase government and civil society capacity to advance
women's access to justice; as a result of one DRL project, 92 percent
of women in eight provinces reported their access to justice has
increased and 70 to 90 percent expressed there has been an increase in
awareness of women's rights in their communities.
Additionally, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) established an international fund for Afghan
women's shelters in 2011, helped develop a permanent Afghan Shelter
Network for stakeholders, increased provincial shelter presence and
legal aid coverage by 67 percent since 2010, and tripled the number of
prosecutorial Violence Against Women Units since 2011. We now support 8
of the 14 total shelters in Afghanistan for women seeking violence-free
lives for themselves and their children. Combined, these shelters--run
by Afghan women for Afghan women--benefit more than 1,000 women and
children each year in seven provinces, providing housing, education,
skills training, health care, and legal aid and mediation services for
victims of domestic abuse.
We also provide training for prosecutors at Violence Against Women
(VAW) Units at the Office of the Attorney General in Kabul, supported
the opening of four new provincial VAW Units, with two more to open
this year. These units are dedicated to prosecuting crimes against
women and girls and have led to 26 convictions so far. More than 750
women from 23 provinces have initiated cases through the VAW Unit in
Kabul since it opened in March 2010.
Additionally, INL aids incarcerated Afghan women through the
Corrections System Support Program, which supports six female
corrections advisors who work with women and their children in prison.
This program also provides educational, recreational, and vocational
materials to incarcerated women in eight Afghan provinces.
Through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM),
the State Department has also partnered with international
organizations and NGOs to support prevention of and response to gender-
based violence in Afghanistan. These projects improve women's knowledge
of their rights, increase access to support services including medical
care and counseling, and develop sustainable livelihood opportunities
for Afghan women. Additionally, PRM funds health care and education
programs, both in Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in Pakistan,
which focus on reducing child and maternal morbidity and mortality.
Question. Recently, Russia and China vetoed--for the second time--a
U.N. Security Council resolution that would have condemned President
Bashar al-Assad's violent crackdown on protesters in Syria.
Can you speak to Russia and China's motivation in protecting
the Syrian Government?
Do you see any chance of Russia and China backing off their
opposition to any condemnation of the Assad regime's violence?
Answer. Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice have unequivocally
expressed the United States profound disappointment with China's and
Russia's vetoes of Security Council resolutions on Syria in October and
February. The United States has long maintained that strong action by
the Council is overdue and essential.
The United States diplomatic effort with Russia on this issue has
been extensive. The Secretary has spoken with Foreign Minister Lavrov
numerous times to discuss Syria and met with him February 4 and again
March 12 following his attendance at a meeting of the Arab League in
Cairo. While Russia has yet to agree to a resolution text, the United
States and Russia both support the mission of the U.N. and Arab
League's special envoy, Kofi Annan. We have also welcomed Russia's
interest in extending humanitarian assistance to Syrians and its
support for the missions of both Annan and Valerie Amos, the Under
Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief
Coordinator.
The United States continues to engage significantly with China on
this issue. The issue of Syria has been raised with the Chinese
Government at the highest levels, including with Chinese Vice President
Xi Jinping during his mid-February visit to Washington. While the
Chinese have also not yet agreed to a resolution text, we continue to
press the issue with them. Their recent six-point plan on Syria,
coupled with their recent $2 million donation to the Red Cross for
humanitarian work in Syria, shows an interest in appearing to be seen
as an active proponent of a peaceful resolution of the situation--and
as an impartial party condemning the violence ``on all sides''--rather
than a supporter of Assad's regime.
Question. On January 17, a Turkish court ruled that no government
officials were involved in or aware of a plot behind the 2007 murder of
the Turkish Armenian journalist Hrant Dink.
Are you satisfied with Turkey's record in properly
investigating and prosecuting Mr. Dink's murder?
Have you made any statements--public or private--to express
concern about the persecution of writers in Turkey for their
sentiments on the Armenian Genocide?
Answer. Full accountability is integral to the vitality of any
democracy. We continue to monitor the progress of the Hrant Dink case
closely, including the January 17 verdict and the filing of an appeal
by the Istanbul Prosecutor Chief Prosecutor. We were encouraged by the
issuance on February 20 of a State Inspection Council (DDK) report
acknowledging mistakes were made in the investigation of government
officials alleged to have acted negligently in preventing Mr. Dink's
murder. U.S. officials in Turkey will continue to attend court hearings
and discuss the case with both Turkish officials and the human rights
community.
We remain concerned about limits on free expression in Turkey,
including limits on commentary on the horrific events of 1915, which
President Obama has described as one of the worst atrocities of the
20th century. The Ambassador and other U.S. officials have expressed
our concerns about media freedom at all levels, both publicly and
privately, to the government. I referenced this issue during a speech
on United States-Turkey relations at the American Turkish Council on
October 31, saying, ``A vibrant economy depends upon the free exchange
of ideas, the free flow of information, and the rule of law.'' I also
highlighted the issue in public remarks during my July 2011 visit to
Turkey.
The Turkish Government, including at senior levels, has conveyed
its commitment to address concerns about media freedom in Turkey. The
government forwarded an important package of judicial reforms to
Parliament in January that, if enacted, would stop investigations and
annul convictions of press offences carrying a sentence of less than 5
years. Turkey's Parliament is also redrafting the 1982 constitution to
better protect individual rights and freedoms. Of course, these
measures are just a first step; Turkey must go further. We will
continue to monitor developments in Turkey, stressing the importance we
attach to concrete measures to expand media freedom in law and
practice.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Palestinian Unity Talks.--An agreement between Fatah and
Hamas to form a unity government would be a real setback for peace.
Hamas remains a terrorist group bent on Israel's destruction. On May 5
of last year, Madame Secretary, you stated that the United States has
``made it very clear that we cannot support any government that
consists of Hamas unless, and until, Hamas adopts the Quartet
principles.'' Does that position still hold? What happens to U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians if a unity government including Hamas is
formed?
Answer. We continue to closely monitor developments related to
Palestinian reconciliation, including the February 6 ``Doha
Declaration'' and its possible implementation.
There have been a number of public agreements regarding Hamas-Fatah
reconciliation over the past few years, but very little has happened on
the ground. To date no changes have been made in the structure and
makeup of the Palestinian Authority (PA)--Mahmoud Abbas remains the
President and Salam Fayyad remains the Prime Minister. Palestinian
security forces continue to actively pursue and arrest those seeking to
undermine stability, including Hamas militants.
Our position has not changed. Hamas remains a designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization. We have been clear with the Palestinian
leadership about the principles that must guide a possible future
Palestinian Government in order for it to play a constructive role in
achieving peace and building an independent state. Any Palestinian
Government must embrace the ``Quartet Principles''--it must
unambiguously and explicitly commit to nonviolence, recognition of
Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations between
the parties. President Abbas has been clear that he remains committed
to those principles. If a new government emerges, we will evaluate it
carefully in accordance with the provisions of U.S. law, including the
provisions of the 2012 appropriations act. We will ensure our policy
toward such a government fully complies with that law.
Question. I would like to draw your attention to the very troubling
security situation in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. The
Obama administration has sought to develop collaborative partnerships
with countries throughout these two regions, via Merida, CARSI, CBSI.
On the one hand, I applaud the administration's counternarcotics
efforts which have been very effective in establishing a cooperative
security relationship between the United States and other countries.
On the other hand, the security situation for citizens living in
the region is growing worse by the day. Homicides are up in every
country in Central America. Crime is rampant throughout the Caribbean
and even vacationing U.S. Supreme Court Justices are not immune from
the violence. The narcotraffickers are buying off government officials
and corruption has returned to the region with a vengeance: The people
are losing faith in the police; judicial institutions are being
undermined; elections are being bought with drug profits. Citizens of
nearly every Central American nation now rank public insecurity as the
top problem facing their countries.
In September, President Obama identified every Central American
country as a major drug transit country, with Belize and El Salvador
making their first appearance on the ``drug majors'' list. The use of
Central America as a transshipment zone has grown, as traffickers have
used overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking, and short-
distance aerial trafficking rather than long-range maritime or aerial
trafficking to transport cocaine from South America to Mexico.
Currently, as much as 90 percent of all illicit drugs that enter North
America have transited Central America. This use of the Central
America-Mexico corridor as a transit zone represents a major shift in
trafficking routes and as we seek to close these routes, the cartels
are rebuilding their transit routes through the Caribbean.
Madam Secretary, we are losing the fight against drugs right here
in our own front yard. The pervasive lack of security in the region not
only threatens regional governments and civil society, but the United
States--whether in the form of declining support for democracy as a
result of corrupt governance, drug traffickers acting with impunity as
a result of weak state presence, or increased emigration as a result of
economic and physical insecurity.
So I am extremely concerned when I look over the funding request
for CARSI and CBSI, and see that both programs are severely underfunded
in the FY13 appropriations request. The CARSI request is for $107.5
million, up just $2.5 million from the FY12 request; and the CBSI
request is $59 million, down from $73 million requested in FY12. How
can the administration justify a 19-percent reduction in CBSI when A/S
Brownfield testified at a hearing I chaired last year that the drug
cartels are moving back into the Caribbean. These are his words: ``The
handwriting is on the wall. They [the cartels] will return. We know
we're going to have to deal with this crisis again. It is in our
interest . . . to prepare for it now and in advance.''
And how can the administration justify a small increase in CARSI
funding when in 2010, more cocaine was confiscated in Costa Rica,
Panama, and Nicaragua than Mexico? We are on the verge of a failed
state in Honduras, and this is how we allocate our resources? Why is
the administration requesting more than $500 million of INL money to
train police in Iraq when we have as great, if not a greater, threat in
our own hemisphere? Madam Secretary, I recognize the importance of the
``front line states,'' but we are spending billions of dollars on
states that don't want American help, rather than our neighbor's in
this hemisphere who bear the brunt of America's drug habit and are
literally begging for more cooperation and more assistance.
Answer. Threats posed by trafficking and transnational crime to the
rule of law in Central America and the Caribbean directly impact U.S.
interests and national security. The administration's FY 2013 request
for the Western Hemisphere prioritizes U.S. assistance to counter these
threats, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. U.S. security
assistance for Central America and the Caribbean emphasizes training
and capacity building, which supports sustainability and builds
stronger institutions to counter rule of law threats for the long term.
The $107.5M FY 2013 request for Central America Regional Security
(CARSI) Initiative will continue training and capacity efforts
initiated with prior year U.S. assistance to strengthen Central
America's capacity to administer the rule of law and counter threats
posed by trafficking and transnational crime, particularly in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. CARSI assistance will remain heavily
oriented toward training, mentoring, professionalization, and capacity-
building for law enforcement personnel and rule of law institutions.
CARSI community action and municipal crime prevention activities
address at-risk segments of society and marginalized communities.
In the Caribbean, the $59M FY 2013 request for the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative (CBSI) reflects a transition from initial
investments, made with prior year U.S. assistance, in the acquisition
of new equipment systems and hardware. FY 2013 CBSI assistance will
emphasize sustainment of those systems, follow-on training and
capacity-building, and ongoing prevention activities, all of which are
lower cost.
Question. Press Freedom in Latin America.--Madam Secretary I am
greatly concerned about the deteriorating state of press freedom in
Latin America. Without a free and independent media, no country can
claim to be a democracy. Yet journalists throughout the region are
being harassed and penalized when they speak out against corrupt
governments; they are being shot and killed by drug cartels when they
report on narcotrafficking; and they now find themselves subject to
criminal and tax penalties of corrupt judicial systems.
This last issue of criminal liability is a particularly troubling
trend. When elected officials in Latin America are feeling the heat of
a critical fourth estate, they too often turn to new laws and the
criminalization of libel and slander in order to silence the offending
journalists. Much like we see in Russia, governments in Latin America
are now willing to use the court system to mandate jail sentences on
journalists, or to impose exorbitantly large tax bills on their media
companies to eliminate private media and to support government-
controlled media. However, unlike Russia, I don't see the State
Department speaking out against this censorship in Latin America.
I want to highlight two recent cases in Latin America of government
censorship through corrupt judicial systems. In Ecuador, the case of El
Universo newspaper is very troubling. After an editorial in February
2011, that President Correa found to be offensive, he sued for libel.
After a number of hearings, the high courts found in the President's
favor to the tune of $42 million and mandated jail sentences for the
editor and the two owners of the paper. One of the judges in the case,
after she fled to Colombia, announced that she had been offered bribes
from the government to find the paper guilty. After immense
international pressure, Correa announced pardons for El Universo and
several others accused of libel, but not without noting that he had
won, stating ``We have shown that you can sue and beat the abusive
media.''
In Venezuela, the owners of last independent TV station,
Globovision, are seeking asylum in the U.S. because of persecution by
the Chavez regime. The government has used the court system to impose
absurd taxes on the station in an effort to drive it out of business,
or to allow the government to buy shares and take over the board of
directors. The owners have already lost a number of businesses that
they owned outside of the media sphere, and family members have
received threats, at least one has sought asylum in this country. The
Venezuelan Government has literally put all of the independent media
out of business, and now the newspapers and airwaves are entirely
controlled by Chavez's cronies. How can the Venezuelan people expect
free, fair elections in October if the opposition does not get equal
coverage in the media?
Are you concerned about this trend in the Americas, where the press
is directly or indirectly forced to self-censor or be subjected to
legal suit, forced to flee their countries and worse?
Again, Madam Secretary, what is the State Department's position on
this matter, and do you have any concrete actions that you can take to
help remedy this situation.
Answer. We are deeply troubled about recent threats to media
freedom in the Western Hemisphere, and particularly the individual
cases you mention. The past 5 years have reversed a 20-year positive
trend, with declines in freedom of expression, due to government
pressures in countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and due
to violence and intimidation from transnational criminal groups in
Mexico and Central America. The Department of State's ``Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices,'' reports and statements by the OAS Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, NGO reports, and other data
document clearly the challenges to media outlets and individual
journalists from both government and nongovernment actors.
The examples of the El Universo and Gran Hermano libel cases in
Ecuador show how international pressure can help push back on
government attempts to quash freedom of expression. We have vigorously
and repeatedly spoken out and expressed our concerns to the Ecuadorian
Government on these cases, citing the Inter-American Democratic
Charter's words that freedom of expression is an ``essential
component'' of democracy, and stated unequivocally that democratically
elected leaders have a responsibility to ensure political and legal
space for freedom of expression. We continue to urge the Ecuadorian
Government to address the potentially chilling effect on press freedom
as a result of these and other cases.
The Venezuelan Government continues to harass and intimidate
privately owned and opposition-oriented television stations, media
outlets, and journalists by using threats, fines, targeted regulations,
property seizures, criminal investigations, and prosecutions. These
actions have led the independent media to engage in self-censorship due
to fear of government reprisal. The Department has repeatedly and
publicly stated that a free and independent media plays the key role in
the dissemination of information and views, which is essential to a
well-functioning democracy. We will continue to speak out when the role
of this critical democratic institution, part of the foundation of any
healthy democracy, is targeted by the Venezuelan Government.
In countries as diverse as Argentina, Paraguay, Nicaragua,
Suriname, and Panama, heavy-handed government attempts to influence
media, in some cases including imposition of restrictive legal
frameworks and denying or suspending licenses, threaten the free flow
of information. In Nicaragua, President Ortega has been consolidating a
monopoly of television and radio stations owned by him and his family.
The government uses harassment, censorship, arbitrary application of
libel laws, and national security justifications to suppress reporting,
and withholds government advertising contracts from independent media.
Government-driven pressure inhibits media expression in numerous
countries in the region. Government control of traditional media in
Cuba (press, television, radio) is complete, leaving Cubans isolated
and eager for unfiltered news from outside the island, about events on-
island and worldwide. Cuba has one of the lowest levels of Internet
penetration in the world, and the Cuban Government remains intent on
barring the vast majority of the populace from gaining unfettered
access to the Web. The level of self-censorship among the Cuban
population is extremely high due to real and perceived threats if they
speak candidly and on the record. Some Cuban activists who are also
independent journalists have been imprisoned for their activities.
[Criminal violence, particularly in Mexico and Central America, has
taken a heavy toll on journalists' lives and has a chilling effect on
media coverage as well as on efforts to galvanize public support for
anticrime programs. The Mexican Government has taken numerous steps to
improve protections for journalists. On March 13 the Mexican Senate
unanimously approved constitutional reforms that would federalize
crimes against journalists.]
Through diplomatic engagement and public statements, the Department
of State calls attention to the obstacles to freedom of expression and
conveys support for those who strive to protect it, regardless of
whether the threat comes from government or nonstate actors. Our
embassies engage consistently with media organizations, human rights
groups, journalists, and governments in the countries where freedom of
expression is under threat. In Honduras we are supporting the Special
Victims Task Force, which investigates the murders of journalists,
among others. We are enhancing our public diplomacy programs focused on
journalist education and safety, and on social media's capacity to
buttress freedom of expression. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor as well as USAID manage programs throughout the region to
work toward decriminalization of libel, promote independent journalism,
empower civil society to support freedom of expression, improve the
quality of investigative journalism, and provide journalists with tools
to protect themselves in a climate of intimidation.
Question. There have been increasing cease-fire violations in
Nagorno Karabakh, with the most recent resulting in the death of an
Armenian soldier. Azerbaijan's President has repeatedly stated that
only the first stage of war is over. The three Minsk Group Cochairs
have all called for the pulling back of snipers as a crucial step for
decreasing the tensions. It has been at least a year since both Armenia
and Nagorno Karbakh have agreed to this proposal, but Azerbaijan has
not. What are you doing to encourage Azerbaijan's acceptance of this
important proposal to prevent war from resuming in this vital area for
U.S. interests?
Answer. As a cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States
remains deeply committed to assisting the sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict to reach a lasting and peaceful settlement. We reiterate at
every opportunity that there is no military solution to the conflict,
and that only a peaceful settlement will lead to security, stability,
and reconciliation in the region. We regret any loss of life, and
continue to call upon the sides to take steps--including the withdrawal
of snipers--to improve the atmosphere for negotiations, prevent
unnecessary casualties, and strengthen implementation of the cease-
fire.
Question. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan ordered the demolition of
a statue to Armenia-Turkey friendship last April and in February
protesters in Turkey, including Turkey's Interior Minister and other
senior Turkish Government officials, walked the streets with signs
saying, ``You are all Armenians, You are all bastards,'' and ``Today
Taksim, Tomorrow Yerevan: We will descend upon you suddenly in the
night.'' A correspondent for the French Daily Le Monde noted that the
``embers of 1915 are still burning.'' Have you ever publicly condemned
any of these actions, which foment dangerous anti-Armenian hatred in
Turkey and destabilize the region?
Answer. I have stated publicly and privately that the rights of all
individuals in Turkey must be protected, that individuals should enjoy
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom to
practice their religion and speak their minds. In public statements
following my extensive bilateral meetings with Foreign Minister
Davutoglu in Washington on February 13, I was clear that we are
continually interested in the very important work being done by the
Government of Turkey on religious freedom, and the return of property
to religious communities. We continue to urge governments, civil
society leaders, clerics, human rights groups, and all people of
conscience in all nations, including Turkey, to speak out against
ethnic and religion-based hatred. In my speech at the Annual Conference
on U.S.-Turkey Relations on October 31, 2011, I stated that Turkey's
ability to realize its full potential depends upon its resolve to
strengthen democracy at home and promote peace and stability in the
neighborhood. Turkey's ongoing constitutional reform process represents
a valuable opportunity to strengthen its democracy, and I have had very
productive conversations with the highest levels of the Turkish
Government about taking this opportunity to deepen Turkey's respect for
human rights for all Turkish citizens, including the right to speak and
worship freely. It is important to note that the Turkish people
themselves, and their leaders, are increasingly and publicly expressing
their support for better relations with Armenia and their opposition to
hateful speech and actions. For example, Prime Minister Erdogan
publicly condemned the individuals who disrupted the February 26
demonstrations marking the 20th anniversary of the Hocali incident with
anti-Armenian signs and slogans. Turkish citizens organized a
counterdemonstration on March 4 and drew a larger crowd to express
outrage over the hate speech featured in the previous week's
demonstration and demonstrate solidarity with Turkey's Armenian
minority.
Question. For more than 25 years, Camp Ashraf in Iraq has been home
to over 3,000 Iranian refugees. Though the MEK has been included on the
U.S. terrorist list since 1997, we have considered the residents of
Camp Ashraf to be ``noncombatants'' and ``protected persons'' under the
Geneva Conventions since 2004. With the complete withdrawal of our
troops from Iraq this past December an agreement was reached that sent
many members of Camp Ashraf to the former U.S. military base, Camp
Liberty. Over the past few weeks, however, residents have expressed
concern about the size, infrastructure, and treatment of the refugee
group since they arrived at their new home, asserting that ``In a
nutshell, Camp Liberty lacks the most basic international humanitarian
standards and human rights standards'' and ``is a prison from all
respects.'' Could you comment on the transfer of residents from Camp
Ashraf to Camp Liberty, the conditions at the latter and what is being
done to address these concerns?
Answer. As you noted, on December 25, 2011, the United Nations
(U.N.) and the Government of Iraq (GOI) signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), which paved the way for a peaceful and humane
temporary relocation of Ashraf residents to Camp Hurriya and their
eventual departure from Iraq. The United States has publicly supported
the MOU, while also calling on the GOI to abide by the MOU's terms,
specifically the elements of the MOU that provide for the safety and
security of the residents.
On January 31, following much work by the GOI, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and U.N. Human Rights Office in
Baghdad determined the infrastructure and facilities at Camp Hurriya to
be in accordance with international humanitarian standards, as required
by the MOU.
On February 18, the first group of about 400 Ashraf residents
relocated to Camp Hurriya. The U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
and the Office of the UNHCR, as they had committed, supported that
relocation through human rights monitoring and mediation of certain
issues between the GOI and the residents. There were complications
during that move, but despite delays, it took place peacefully and the
GOI provided significant resources for the protection of the residents'
travel. U.S. officials from Embassy Baghdad also observed portions of
this movement, at both Ashraf and Hurriya.
At Hurriya, the UNHCR has begun a verification and refugee status
determination process for the relocated residents, and U.N. monitors
maintain a round-
the-clock presence. The residents at Hurriya, who have access to the
Internet and unrestricted ability to communicate with anyone outside
Hurriya, have identified problems with certain facilities at the camp.
UNAMI, with support from U.S. Embassy Baghdad, has acted swiftly to
seek repairs to those problems by the GOI. UNAMI and U.S. officials
have also urged leaders of the residents to work directly with the GOI
on resolving remaining and future logistical issues. We have seen some
progress between the residents and the GOI on finding practical
solutions in that regard. Patience and flexibility is required, and
both the GOI and residents must cooperate to find solutions to the
issues and problems that still exist.
In addition to our general support for these U.N. efforts,
officials from U.S. Embassy Baghdad joined UNAMI in observing parts of
the relocation and U.S. Embassy officers have visited Hurriya
frequently since. We remain attentive to the situation at Ashraf and
Hurriya and remain in active, regular contact with both the U.N. and
the GOI in support of completing a peaceful and safe relocation
process.
The prompt decision of the remaining Ashraf residents to continue
relocations to Hurriya is vital in moving forward with the work of
UNHCR and the subsequent relocation of individuals out of Iraq. We
share your interest in seeing a peaceful conclusion to this issue and
we look forward to continuing our dialogue with you.
The residents of Camp Ashraf do not have the status of ``protected
persons'' under Fourth Geneva Convention. After the end of the
occupation of Iraq, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) continued to
treat the residents of Ashraf as ``protected persons'' as a matter of
policy, not as a matter of legal obligation, until
MNF-I's U.N. mandate expired at the end of 2008. With the expiration of
MNF-I's U.N. Security Council Resolution mandate, the Government of
Iraq assumed security responsibility for Ashraf.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question (#1). Women in Afghanistan and Reconciliation.--Last
month, in a sign that they are moving toward formal talks with the
American-led coalition in Afghanistan, the Taliban announced they were
opening a political office in Qatar that could allow for direct
negotiations over the endgame in the Afghan war. Now that
reconciliation looks like more of a reality, how are we ensuring that
women are actually a meaningful part of that transition and will not be
edged out as the Taliban enters?
Further, as we draw down from Afghanistan what are our contingency
plans for Afghan women during that transition process? Will we be in
the position to bring Afghan women over as refugees to the United
States if their physical safety is in danger in an Afghanistan with a
more conservative and Taliban-influenced leadership?
Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to promoting the full
range of human rights of Afghan women as their involvement is critical
to the future stability and development of Afghanistan. We have
invested in policies and programs to foster women's leadership capacity
in all areas of political participation, decisionmaking, and civil
society. The essential role of women in peacebuilding, reconciliation,
and conflict resolution is at the core of the recently launched U.S.
National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.
The U.S. goal in supporting reconciliation is to get Afghans
talking with other Afghans about the future of their country. We have
said from the start that negotiations must meaningfully include women,
as well as ethnic minorities and members of civil society. One of our
redlines is that insurgents who want to reconcile must commit to abide
by Afghanistan's Constitution and the rights enshrined in it--including
women's rights to political participation; to basic freedoms, such as
access to health services, education, and the right to work; and to
live free from violence. For a stable and secure future in Afghanistan,
women must be included at all levels of the reconciliation process.
We are incorporating gender issues into our strategic thinking and
program support in the peace processes, including at the local and
district levels. We are working with the Department of Defense (DOD) to
ensure that funding available for reintegration supports initiatives
and community development projects that benefit women and girls. In
addition, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) now
requires all those applying for grant funding to include information on
how their programs will address the human rights concerns of
marginalized populations, particularly women. To further implement the
focus on gender integration outlined in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR), we have issued the State Department's first-
ever Policy Guidance on Promoting Gender Equality to Achieve our
National Security and Foreign Policy Objectives to build on existing
efforts to integrate gender throughout all of the State Department's
diplomatic and development work. The guidance emphasizes four key
mechanisms for achieving gender integration: planning and budget
development, programming, monitoring and evaluation, and management and
training. Similarly, USAID has solidified its commitment to women's
programming with the recently unveiled Gender Equality and Female
Empowerment Policy and the Counter Trafficking in Persons Policy. These
policies are all in line with the December 2011 National Action Plan on
Women, Peace and Security and related Presidential Executive order on
the same topic, and seek to fully integrate the role of women in peace
processes.
Our activities are closely aligned with the National Action Plan
for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA), which reflects Afghan women's own
priorities for their political, economic, and social empowerment. USAID
is taking several steps to reinforce our commitment to empowering women
which include: (1) the issuance of a Mission Order on Gender in
September 2011, which institutionalizes a gender approach for all USAID
Afghanistan programming; and (2) undertaking over 20 gender analyses of
existing and new programs to ensure that current and future programming
is compliant with Agency policy as put forward in the recently released
directives referenced above. These analyses will help maximize USAID
funding. Evidence of this focus is represented in our ``Stabilization
in Key Areas'' (SIKA) program, which will have a Gender Advisor at each
of the platforms, working with the Contracting Officer's Representative
(COR), to enhance coordination and effective project design. Since
2008, we have more than doubled spending attributed to women and girls,
as well as created and fully staffed a new Gender Unit in 2010.
In addition, we continue to provide our full suite of traditional
development programs for women. In the past year alone, we have
provided more than 500 grants for capacity-building for civil society,
basic education, women's equality under the law, land reform,
microenterprise, and political and social advocacy. USAID advises the
Ministry of Women's Affairs to help it advocate for policies that
promote and protect women's rights. Specifically, USAID is working with
the Ministry on implementation of the National Action Plan for the
Women of Afghanistan.
We are also fully engaged with organizations such as the
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Afghanistan
Women's Network to ensure that they are capable of driving a women's
rights agenda as well as a gender-conscious approach to development.
We are also developing a new strategy and package of programs
called ``Women in Transition'' (WIT). WIT will focus on providing
mainstream business and employment opportunities for women through
targeted technical and vocational training, business development
services and small- and medium-sized enterprise financing. Both the
strategy and programs are designed to firmly entrench women as leaders
in the development of their own country.
We know that no society can advance if half of its population is
left behind. Therefore, we will also continue to support Afghan women's
own efforts to be meaningfully included in seminal, countrywide
political decisionmaking processes as we have since the end of Taliban
rule, such as at the 2001 Bonn Conference, the London Conference,
Consultative Peace Jirga, Kabul Conference, and Bonn 2011, in order to
support the long-term transition and development of Afghanistan.
With regard to resettlement of Afghan women, generally, to be
considered a refugee, a person must be outside his or her country of
nationality. The United States has resettled Afghan refugees, including
vulnerable women, for decades. We will continue to accept resettlement
referrals of Afghan refugees from the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) as long as there is a need.
Question (#2). Iraqi Refugees.--As you may know, Section 1244(e) of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008--The Refugee Crisis in
Iraq Act--requires that your Department provide protection, or the
immediate removal from Iraq, for Iraqis who are in imminent danger
because of their work for the United States and are still awaiting the
issuance of their Special Immigrant Visas. What procedures have been
put in place to provide protection for these U.S.-affiliated Iraqis?
In order to reduce the costs of operating our Embassy in Baghdad, I
understand that efforts are being made to increase the number of local
employees and to increase sourcing goods and services locally. Are the
ongoing threats to Iraqis who work for the United States and the
extreme delays in processing Special Immigrant Visas for them having an
impact on increasing local hires in Iraq?
Answer. The overall situation in Iraq remains the subject of
concern, but we note that all Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants
must either be under threat, or have experienced threat to qualify for
the program. In practical terms, it is very difficult to validate
objectively and qualify a threat as imminent. The U.S. Embassy is
unable to provide protection to SIV applicants inside Iraq, but for
those who consider themselves in imminent danger, the State Department
is able to process their SIV applications in neighboring countries,
should the applicant relocate. Many have taken advantage of this
option: 111 Iraqi SIV applicants moved their visa applications from
Iraq to a neighboring country, and 570 Iraqis applied for SIVs in
neighboring countries initially. Former employees have also
successfully applied for admission to the United States under the
refugee program.
Ongoing threats and other forms of pressure do reduce the number of
potential Iraqi applicants for employment at the U.S. mission, and the
prospect of a safe relocation through the SIV program mitigates this.
The Embassy does not believe that the length of the process to apply
for the SIV program has an impact on the pool of Iraqi applicants for
work at the mission.
Question (#3). Gender and the Budget.--Secretary Clinton, you have
repeatedly stated that in all of the U.S.'s development efforts, there
will be a focus on elevating the role of women and girls as they are
critical to advancing social, economic, and political progress. Can you
please share what concrete steps you view are necessary for both State
and USAID to fully achieve this vision of addressing both women's and
girl's needs effectively throughout project outcomes, both in
Washington and abroad?
Answer. The administration's proposed budget will support efforts
to integrate gender throughout U.S. foreign policy programs and
strategies and across agencies through: (a) programs targeted to
advance gender equality and the status of women and girls, and (b)
ensuring that the full range of programs--from economic development to
humanitarian assistance to exchange programs, as well as conflict
prevention and crisis response operations--identify and address
existing disparities, capitalize on the skills and contributions of
women and girls, and are accessible and responsive to women and girls.
The U.S. National Security Strategy recognizes that ``countries are
more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal
rights and opportunity.'' Evidence shows that investments in women's
employment, health, and education are correlated with greater economic
growth and more successful development outcomes. Engaging women as
political and social actors can change policy choices and makes
institutions more representative and better performing. And a growing
body of evidence shows that women bring a range of unique experiences
and contributions in decisionmaking on matters of peace and security
that lead to improved outcomes in conflict prevention and resolution.
To achieve successful outcomes for U.S. foreign policy priorities,
including stability, prosperity, and peace, we must focus on promoting
gender equality and advancing the political, economic, social, and
cultural status of women and girls across our work. To further this
strategic imperative, we have issued the Department of State's first-
ever Secretarial Policy Guidance on Promoting Gender Equality to
Achieve our National Security and Foreign Policy Objectives. In
addition, USAID released a new policy on Gender Equality and Female
Empowerment. Both policies contain specific steps to ensure that State
and USAID advance the status of women and promote gender equality in
policy development, strategic planning, budgeting and programming,
monitoring and evaluation, and management and training practices.
Furthering gender equality and advancing the status of women and
girls in our work means going beyond simply ensuring a balanced
approach to our diplomatic efforts, development assistance, and
humanitarian aid. It means focusing on reducing gaps between women and
men and girls and boys in resources, opportunities, and outcomes in our
programs and the full range of our engagement with host governments,
civil society, and the private sector. It also means encouraging and
increasing women's direct participation through bilateral, regional,
and multilateral diplomacy to ensure better outcomes for governments
and society.
We estimate that our FY 2013 request for foreign assistance will be
used to fund over $300 million in activities where gender equality or
women's empowerment is an explicit goal; $1.23 billion in activities
where gender equality or women's empowerment is an important but
secondary outcome; and $147 million in activities that are aimed at
preventing and responding to gender-based violence, for a total of
$1.68 billion.
Question (#4). OSCE.--The President's proposal for an 18-percent
cut in OSCE-related funding could result in reducing American secondees
to the OSCE Secretariat, institutions, and field operations by one-
third, as well as eliminate funding for extra-budgetary projects (i.e.,
funding for Rabbi Andy Baker's travel as Personal Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office, as well as a substantial portion of ODIHR's
programming budget). It is my understanding that the President's
request for OSCE-related funding for FY 2013 reflects an 18-percent cut
in spending. We are in a challenging budget climate, but this cut could
substantially reduce our ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals
through the organization.
How can we preserve our leadership in the organization?
What steps are being taken to preserve our capacity to fund
extra-budgetary projects?
As you know, the Helsinki Commission has led efforts to combat
anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination within the European
countries that make up the OSCE region. The June Norway attacks,
November discovery of an underground neo-Nazi cell in Germany that has
been operating for decades, December killings of Senegalese street
vendors by a far-right Italian group, and continuing violence against
Roma has prompted our Commissioners to call for increased action by the
State Department on addressing issues of racism and xenophobia and
supporting the civil and human rights of affected communities.
With cuts to Europe's budget, what is being done to allow
for a specific Department focus on these issues ranging from
effective monitoring to increasing the capacity of affected
communities to respond to hate crimes and other forms of
discrimination?
Answer. The administration commitment to the OSCE, the premier
multilateral mechanism for supporting democratic development and
respect for human rights in Europe and Eurasia, remains steadfast. We
appreciate the strong Helsinki Commission and bipartisan congressional
support for the OSCE. The United States will pay its full contributions
to the OSCE's 2012 budget, and the President has requested sufficient
resources from Congress to pay our full budget share next year. We
intend to continue the practice of providing funding over and above our
OSCE budget contributions for activities such as election monitoring,
extra-budgetary projects and personnel secondments, although this
funding may be at reduced levels from past years. The Office for
Democratic Institution and Human Rights (ODIHR) remains a top priority,
especially as regards its democratization and human rights promotion
efforts. The United States has contributed generously to ODIHR extra-
budgetary programs and projects in recent years, with a particular
focus on election observation and tolerance programs, including efforts
to combat anti-Semitism. We will also continue to support high priority
U.S. foreign policy goals in the OSCE's first and second dimensions,
including conventional arms control, as well as counterterrorism,
border security, counternarcotics, and good governance activities.
Question (#5). ROMA.--Currently 12 countries are taking part in a
``Decade of Roma Inclusion'' (2005-2015), a multilateral initiative to
identify a limited number of measurable national goals for improvements
in the fields of employment, health, and housing for Roma. (Those
countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, and Spain.) On February 5, 2012, the Secretary of State
announced during a trip to Bulgaria that the United States is joining
the Decade of Roma Inclusion as an observer.
Madam Secretary, I welcome your announcement in Sofia on February 5
that the United States will become an observer in the ``Decade of Roma
Inclusion,'' and your outstanding leadership on Romani human rights
issues. Bearing in mind that the United States has closed down USAID
missions in Europe, even while many Roma live in conditions that the
UNDP has compared to sub-Saharan Africa, will the United States make a
small contribution [$20,000] to the Decade's work, particularly to
support the engagement of grassroots civil society?
Answer. We are helping Romani communities and individuals
everywhere chart a new path so that every Romani person may live up to
her or his potential. Since 2009, the Bureau of Democracy Human Rights
and Labor has invested over $2 million in programs designed to improve
the lives of European Roma through increasing access to justice,
promoting interethnic dialogue and multiethnic civic engagement among
youth at the community level. Other USG-funded assistance projects
totaling more than $3.5 million in this period have supported OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) efforts to
assist with the integration of Roma minorities in the Western Balkans;
a technology camp in Romania focused on building ICT capacities within
Roma communities to address social inclusion and civic engagement
issues; scholarships, tutoring, and mentoring to Roma NGOs and
students; and the resettlement of 50 displaced Roma families out of
lead-poisoned camps in north Mitrovica, Kosovo. Our embassies across
the region will continue to conduct a broad range of efforts to support
Roma inclusion.
We will be observing the Decade of Roma Inclusion and urging
governments and NGOs to continue working to improve the status of Roma
throughout Europe. We will not be taking on new financial obligations
for the Decade of Roma Inclusion, but we continue to support Roma
through the current initiatives that work to increase legal assistance,
expand educational opportunities, and help more Romani people
participate in political discourse.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. Chicago Summit Goals.--The United States will host the
NATO summit in Chicago this May. This will be the first summit on
American soil since 1999, and I believe it provides a unique
opportunity to highlight the still-critical economic and security ties
of our transatlantic partnership and to reaffirm the West's unrivaled
influence in our 21st century world.
Despite our challenges, the NATO alliance continues to represent
arguably the most successful military partnership in the history of our
world.
As the Subcommittee Chair on European Affairs, we will be engaging
in the many discussions leading up to the summit, and we look forward
to working with your team in the weeks ahead.
What priority objectives does the administration have in
Chicago? What challenges do you anticipate?
Answer. The upcoming NATO summit in Chicago, to be held May 20-21,
is an opportunity for the United States to underscore our enduring
commitment to the alliance. We hope that NATO will be able to record at
Chicago concrete accomplishments in three main areas: Afghanistan,
capabilities, and partnerships. These priorities align with NATO
Secretary General Rasmussen's idea of an alliance that is ``committed,
capable, and connected.''
In advance of the summit, we are working closely with allies and
coalition partners to define NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan, even
as we remain committed to the ISAF mission today. We are also
encouraging allies to make new commitments to sustain the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) post-2014.
Looking ahead, in this period of budget austerity, NATO allies need
to agree on how to develop and maintain critical alliance capabilities
to ensure that NATO is able to perform a variety of roles and missions
in the evolving security environment. NATO's Deterrence and Defense
Posture Review will outline what allies envision as the appropriate mix
of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense forces to meet new
security challenges. We expect to record at the upcoming summit
progress in meeting the capabilities commitments agreed at the Lisbon
summit in 2010. Related to this goal, we hope to showcase a few of
NATO's most recent achievements in the area of capabilities, including
an interim NATO missile defense capability, Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS), and Baltic Air Policing (BAP).
NATO's partnerships with non-NATO members have been key to the
success of our recent operations. Therefore, we would also like to use
the summit as an opportunity to highlight the value of some of our key
partners' contributions to NATO's operations and broader strategic
goals and to ensure we have means in place to work with them when
combat operations in Afghanistan have ended.
The austere economic climate will be the biggest challenge to
achieving these goals in Chicago, but allies recognize the paramount
importance of security and the value that NATO offers in leveraging
each other's defense and security capabilities.
Question. Open Door Policy.--NATO has long asserted an ``open
door'' policy toward other European democracies. In light of the fact
that no countries will be considered for membership at the Chicago
summit this year, how can NATO continue to make credible its ``open
door'' policy and move aspiring countries down the road toward possible
future membership?
Answer. While the Chicago summit will not focus primarily on
enlargement, NATO's door remains open to aspirants. NATO continues to
support aspirant partners' efforts to meet NATO standards through the
implementation of their Annual National Plans (ANPs) and through other
NATO processes to advance their candidacies. The United States works
bilaterally with aspirants as well, to encourage them to take the steps
required to become interoperable with NATO and to achieve NATO's
standards. We will continue to offer joint training opportunities in
addition to encouraging and supporting partner contributions to NATO's
worldwide operations, including the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the counterpiracy operation
Ocean Shield, in order to increase interoperability and build an
atmosphere of cooperation and trust at all levels of planning and
operations. All of NATO's aspirants contribute troops to ISAF and will
therefore attend that portion of the summit. The Chicago Summit
Communique will also contain language acknowledging aspirants and
NATO's open door policy.
Question. Georgia.--One NATO partner country that has been hitting
well above its weight is Georgia. Georgian troops continue to fight in
some of the most dangerous territory in Afghanistan, including in
Helmand province. They continue to make great sacrifices. Just
recently, three Georgian soldiers were killed by an insurgent attack in
Afghanistan, and in total the country has lost 15 of its soldiers on
the ground there. As we know, Georgia was promised future NATO
membership by NATO at the Bucharest summit; however, since then, the
path forward for Georgia is uncertain. I believe Georgia still has
reforms to undertake before it should be considered as a NATO member;
however, it is important that we offer a clear path forward for them.
Can you talk about the role Georgia has played in the fight
in Afghanistan? In the absence of a Membership Action Plan, how
can we more explicitly move Georgia down the path of NATO
membership at Chicago?
Answer. Georgia is a significant contributor to the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Georgia currently
contributes approximately 950 troops and plans to deploy approximately
another 750 troops this fall, which will make it the largest non-NATO
contributor to ISAF. While demonstrating exemplary performance
alongside U.S. Marines in Helmand province, Georgian soldiers and their
families have also made great sacrifices with 15 soldiers killed in
action and dozens wounded, some severely. We are working with the
Georgian Government to care for their wounded soldiers.
On NATO, the United States is working closely with allies on
planning for the summit in Chicago, which will focus primarily on NATO
engagement in Afghanistan. Georgia continues to be an important NATO
partner and significant contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan,
and we believe the summit should highlight this partnership. The
administration supports Georgia's NATO membership aspirations, and is
working with the Georgian Government to implement the wide array of
reforms necessary to meet Euro-Atlantic standards. Georgia's Annual
National Program (ANP) and the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) play
central roles in this regard. The administration is also working with
allies on ways to acknowledge the progress that Georgia has made on
democratic, economic, and defense reforms at the summit.
Question. European Investment in Defense.--One of the issues that
will play a prominent role in Chicago is NATO's Smart Defense
initiative. There is no doubt that we, as an alliance, should be
cooperating more and sharing and pooling our resources. However, Smart
Defense cannot be an excuse for continued under investment by our
European allies. According to the NATO Secretary General's 2011 Annual
Report, only three countries are spending at or above 2 percent of GDP,
the commitment level of defense spending agreed upon by the alliance.
What message will the United States press in Chicago with
respect to defense investment spending by our European allies?
Answer. Only four of our NATO allies (Albania, France, Greece, and
the U.K.; Estonia could become the fifth in 2012) meet NATO's defense
spending benchmark of 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and
the United States takes every opportunity to emphasize to allies that
NATO provides allied populations with the best security value for money
and urge Allies to fulfill their pledges to increase defense spending.
All allies must continue to invest politically, militarily, and
financially to keep the alliance strong and secure. At a recent NATO
Defense Ministerial, Secretary Panetta endorsed the Secretary General's
``Smart Defense'' strategy that calls for realistic efforts to maintain
and develop multinational capabilities despite defense budget cuts in
the United States and Europe. In advance of the summit, we urge allied
participation in pooled capability programs such as AWACS, Alliance
Ground Surveillance (AGS), and exploring maritime missile defense
cooperation, as well as role specialization programs such as Baltic Air
Policing (BAP).
Question. While we do see some countries moving further away from
their 2-percent spending commitments, there are some like Estonia who
are actually placing a greater emphasis on defense spending. How can we
give some of our younger NATO members--like those in Eastern Europe and
the Baltics--a more prominent voice in NATO affairs?
Answer. While defense spending commitments are highly valued and
encouraged, they are not the only contributions that strengthen the
alliance. We strongly support all allies and partners who make
important political, financial, and military contributions to the
efforts of the alliance. The value of allied and partner contributions
has been clear for more than a decade in Afghanistan and more recently
was seen in the case of Operation Unified Protector in Libya, where the
United States was able to provide operational support while other
allies and partners took the lead in combat efforts. Such nations
achieve greater influence for themselves in the alliance by leading
through example. We seek to encourage these nations by recognizing the
contributions they have made and rewarding their efforts. While we
recognize the importance of adhering to agreed defense spending
commitments and encourage allies to do so, we do not assess
contributions to the alliance on the criteria of defense spending
alone.
With regard to the Baltic countries, we deeply appreciate their
commitment to the alliance, both in terms of defense spending and in
operational commitments like Afghanistan. We strongly encourage
alliance support for the Baltic Air Policing mission, in part so that
our Baltic allies can continue to make strong contributions in other
areas of importance to the alliance--an example of Smart Defense.
Question. NATO-Russia.--Missile defense remains a point of
contention between NATO and Russia, and negotiations on possible
cooperation will continue. However, NATO shares a much wider range of
security interests with Russia outside of strictly missile defense. Can
you give the committee a sense of some of the important--but perhaps
less prominent--areas of mutual interest where we hope to continue to
work closely with Russia?
Answer. Our goal for building NATO-Russia relations is to find ways
we can continue and intensify our efforts to address the shared threats
that our nations face in the 21st century. The NATO-Russia Council
(NRC) is a dynamic forum for discussions on areas where we disagree,
and for constructive dialogue to move forward practical cooperation in
areas of shared concern. Both elements of NATO's engagement with Russia
are important.
At Lisbon, leaders endorsed the NRC Joint Review of 21st Century
Common Security Challenges (Joint Review) that identified five key
areas for practical cooperation: Afghanistan, counterterrorism,
counterpiracy, countering weapons of mass destruction, and responding
to natural and manmade disasters.
Our record of cooperation on Afghanistan reflects the common
interests that Russia and NATO allies share in building peace and
security for this region. NATO-Russia arrangements provide ground
transit for materiel into and out of Afghanistan, in support of the
United States and our ISAF partners. To date, over 40,000 containers of
supplies have been shipped through Russia based on these arrangements.
The NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund announced at Lisbon has made
an immediate and positive impact on Afghanistan's ability to maintain
its fleet of Russian-built helicopters. Russia has provided over $3
million in cash to the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, to
provide advanced training to Afghan helicopter maintenance technicians,
which has been matched with more than $17 million in cash and in-kind
donations provided by NATO allies. This fund will provide parts and
training to help build critical capabilities enabling the Government of
Afghanistan to maintain its fleet of Russian-built helicopters. Since
2006, more than 1,800 law enforcement officers from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Central Asia have received training through the NATO-
Russia Council. Over the past 3 years, the United States contribution
to this program has increased. This increase reflects the importance we
attach to building counternarcotics capacity in the region, and the
potential of the NRC training program to help meet these critical
needs.
The NATO-Russia Council has several successful counterterrorism
projects. The NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) is on track to
become the first 24/7 NATO-Russia operation in 2012. CAI is an aviation
counterterrorism program that allows NRC participant countries
(currently Poland, Turkey, Norway, and Russia) to share tracking data
regarding civilian aircraft of concern transiting sensitive border
airspace. In June 2011, Turkey and Poland participated with Russia in
the CAI live exercise Vigilant Skies, testing a coordinated
counterterrorism response across shared borders. Vigilant Skies marked
the first time Russian jets participated in a live exercise with NATO.
NRC countries are also working together on the STANDEX (``Stand-off
Detection of Explosive Devices'') project through shared technologies,
expertise, and financial contributions. STANDEX, which is designed to
detect and counter a terrorist threat to mass transit and other public
spaces, is on track to be live-tested in 2013.
Russian and NATO ships continue to help each other fight piracy in
the Indian Ocean. We welcome the Russian Federation's 2011 initiative
to expand and enhance our ongoing cooperation, and we look forward to
working within the NRC to build agreement to move our counterpiracy
efforts forward.
May 2011's BOLD MONARCH marked the first time a Russian submarine
participated in a NATO exercise. An annual NATO exercise, BOLD MONARCH
is designed to maximize international cooperation in submarine rescue
operations and is the largest of its kind in the world. We continue to
support expansion of disaster response cooperation through the NATO-
Russia Council, and through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Centre (EADRCC), another NATO partnership in which Russia
is a member.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
nuclear modernization & missile defense
Question. What is the status of negotiations with the Russian
Federation on the Defense Technical Cooperation (DTC) Agreement on
Missile Defense?
a. Do you anticipate reaching an agreement before the NATO
summit in Chicago?
Answer. The proposed DTC Agreement is an umbrella agreement that
would provide a legal framework to conduct a broad range of bilateral
research and development projects. Key provisions of the agreement
include intellectual property and classified information security. The
agreement is not focused solely on any specific area of cooperation and
it could be used for many areas, including cooperation on countering
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as missile defense.
Although the negotiators continue to meet, including a session planned
for April, we do not anticipate concluding the DTC Agreement by the
NATO summit.
b. Administration officials have briefed Congress that you
want to have a Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement with the
Russian Federation before concluding a DTC Agreement. Is this
still the administration's position? What is the status of
these negotiations?
Answer. The administration is not pursuing a BMD Cooperation
Agreement with Russia. A BMD Cooperation Agreement would have been a
more limited form of the DTC Agreement focused solely on missile
defense cooperation, and would not have constrained or limited U.S. BMD
programs, deployments, or activities quantitatively, qualitatively,
geographically, operationally, or in any other way. Russia declined to
pursue a BMD Cooperation Agreement. As such, there are no discussions
ongoing. Instead, the Department of Defense is pursuing the broader
Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement. If bilateral missile defense
cooperation efforts can be identified and mutually agreed, an
implementing agreement to facilitate them could be established under
the DTC Agreement, once concluded.
Question. Condition 9 of the New START Resolution of Ratification,
as well as the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, requires
that the President provide a report to Congress if the amount
appropriated for nuclear modernization falls below the 1251 target in
any given year. That is now the case as the FY12 funding figure for
NNSA weapons activities is some $400 million below the FY12 target. In
the report, the President must explain whether the funding shortfall
impacts the safety, security, and credibility of our nuclear forces and
what he intends to do to compensate for the funding shortfall. Dr. Jim
Miller (Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy)
testified before the House Armed Services Committee and stated:
We understand the requirement to report if we have less
funding than in the section 1251 as requested in Section 1251
Report. Our interpretation of that has been substantially less.
In fiscal year 2011 actually slightly less was appropriated
than requested. Our judgment was that a 1 percent or less
change didn't require us to submit the report. The difference
we are looking at now in both the House and the Senate
appropriations bill, I think, would trigger that, and we would
have to examine that question.
When will the administration submit this report to Congress?
Answer. The administration understands and acknowledges the
parallel reporting requirements of Condition 9 of the New START Treaty
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification and Section 1045(a)(2)
of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. We note the
approximately $416 million shortfall in FY12 appropriated funding for
NNSA Weapons Activities in FY 2012. Recognizing this shortfall, the
administration is working expeditiously to fulfill the requirements of
Condition 9 of the Resolution of Ratification and Section 1045 of the
NDAA.
georgia
Question. It is my understanding that the administration is
requiring U.S. European Command to rewrite its assessment of Georgian
military needs and capabilities before considering any type of arms
sales to the country. The original assessment was conducted in late
2009. Given how recently this assessment was conducted, what is the
justification for repeating the study?
Answer. As part of our ongoing security and defense relationship
with Georgia, the Department of Defense, including U.S. European
Command, regularly assesses Georgia's military needs and capabilities.
Through our current defense cooperation efforts, we seek to maximize
U.S. security assistance to support Georgia's defense reform and
modernization, self defense capabilities, and to provide training and
equipment in support of Georgian participation in ISAF operations in
Afghanistan. Per standard practice, the administration reviews all
requests for export licenses and arms transfers individually, assessing
legal, technical, and policy considerations.
Question. Will the language the administration is seeking among our
NATO partners regarding the aspirations of Georgia provide a clear path
toward membership?
Answer. NATO maintains an Open Door policy for aspiring members.
The United States is working closely with NATO allies on planning for
the summit in Chicago, which will focus primarily on NATO engagement in
Afghanistan. Georgia continues to be an important NATO partner and
significant contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan, and we
believe the summit should highlight this partnership. The
administration supports Georgia's NATO membership aspirations and is
working with the Georgian Government to implement the wide array of
reforms necessary to meet Euro-Atlantic standards. Georgia's Annual
National Program (ANP) and the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) play
central roles in this regard. The administration is also working with
allies on ways to acknowledge the progress that Georgia has made on
democratic, economic, and defense reforms at the summit.
Question. You have often commented about the rule of law in Russia.
As you know, S. 1039 addresses this issue more broadly than just the
case of Sergey Magnitsky.
What is your view of media reports that Russia is continuing
its case against Magnitsky even though he died as a result of
Russian Government actions or inaction while in custody?
Answer. We continue to call for full accountability for those
responsible for Sergey Magnitsky's unjust imprisonment and wrongful
death. Pursuing criminal charges against him serves no purpose other
than to deflect attention away from the circumstances surrounding his
tragic case.
Have you denied visas or taken any other action against
those responsible for the unjust imprisonment of Khodorkovsky
and Lebedev?
Answer. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the
August 4, 2011, Presidential Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as
Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Participate in Serious
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuse, the
Department is required to deny visas to individuals involved in serious
human rights violations, and we do so regularly. However in keeping
with the INA, we are not able to publicly disclose the names of
individuals who are denied visas.
Will you say publicly that Khodorkovsky and Lebedev should
be unconditionally released?
Answer. After the second trial of Mr. Khodorkovsky and Mr. Lebedev
in December 2010, we noted that their conviction on charges of
embezzlement and money laundering raises serious questions about
selective prosecution and about the rule of law being overshadowed by
political considerations. We welcomed news that President Medvedev has
ordered the country's prosecutor general to review the conviction.
Do you oppose the passage of S. 1039? If so, why?
Answer. The administration has welcomed Senator Cardin's campaign
for justice for Sergey Magnitsky, and shares the Senator's concerns
about this tragic case and about rule of law in Russia more broadly.
The State Department has already taken important actions--using the
existing authorities of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as well as
the expanded powers provided by the Presidential Proclamation issued in
August--to ensure that no one implicated in Mr. Magnitsky's death can
travel to the United States. We have raised concerns about the bill's
requirements to name names and potentially freeze assets in the absence
of a strong evidentiary standard, but have also assured the Senator
that we are ready to work with him and his colleagues to ensure that
those responsible for Mr. Magnitsky's death are brought to justice.
Question. What steps is the administration taking to secure the
extradition of Ali Musa Daqduq to U.S. custody?
What is the likelihood that the Government of Iraq will
comply with U.S. requests?
What leverage is the administration willing to use in order
to ensure a hand over?
If he is ultimately released, what is the likelihood that he
would flee to Lebanon or Syria and how would that further
exacerbate the crisis there?
Answer. The United States presented an extradition request to the
Government of Iraq the first week of February for Daqduq to stand trial
before a Military Commission in the United States for his alleged role
in the deaths of five U.S. servicemen in Karbala, Iraq, in 2007. We
discuss this case at the highest levels of the Iraqi Government and
have received assurances that Daqduq will face justice for the crimes
he is alleged to have committed. Iraq has held Daqduq for over 2
months, and is exploring what next steps it can take, consistent with
its own legal system. Iraq understands how important the proper
handling of this case is to Iraq's relationship with the United States.
We believe Daqduq is a dangerous individual and his release could have
a detrimental effect on U.S. interests, but it impossible to speculate
specific consequences of his release.
Question. Do you know of any senior Taliban or Haqqani Network
leaders currently (or impending) receiving medical treatment in Saudi
Arabia, UAE, or Qatar. If so, when did you learn about this
possibility?
Answer. The Department of State refers you to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence to respond to this question.
Question. We have provided substantial assistance to the Lebanese
Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the past and the President
requested $70 million in economic assistance, $75 million in military
assistance and $15.5 million in internal security assistance for
Lebanon for FY 2013. Given that Hezbollah continues to take on a
greater role in the Lebanese Government, I am very worried about how
this assistance might be used in the future and about the fact that the
Lebanese Army has done little to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament.
I understand that the administration is currently reviewing
our assistance to Lebanon and that it has yet to put forward a
congressional notification for FY12 money. What is the status
of this review and how is it being carried out?
How will our aid to Lebanon be affected in light of
Hezbollah's growing role in the government?
Answer. The Department of State has not yet released the FY 2012
Lebanon spending plan, but it is forthcoming. We continuously review
all aspects of our assistance to Lebanon to ensure that all programs
further U.S. objectives and remain within the national interest. As
part of this review, the State Department has carefully assessed the
Lebanese Government's policies and statements since its formation in
June 2011. While we continue to have concerns about Hezbollah's
influence within the body politic, we do not believe this government to
be ``Hezbollah-run.'' Hezbollah holds 3 out of 30 Cabinet seats--the
same number it held in the previous government of Saad Hariri. Nor are
the various factions represented in the Cabinet universally pro-
Hezbollah. In fact, Prime Minister Najib Mikati and his centrist allies
in the Cabinet have been successful in maintaining the government's
commitment to Lebanon's international obligations, despite pressure
from Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian factions within Lebanon to do the
opposite.
In particular, we have been reassured by Prime Minister Mikati's
actions in November 2011to fulfill Lebanon's 2011 funding obligation
($32.2 million) to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which has indicted
four Hezbollah operatives accused of involvement in the assassination
of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other victims. In addition,
Prime Minister Mikati continues to support the implementation of U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 and has maintained a policy
of disassociation with regard to the unrest in Syria, despite pressure
from pro-Asad factions in his coalition to do more to support the
regime in Damascus.
Our recent budget requests seek to strengthen moderate forces in
Lebanon and displace the influence of extremist nonstate actors such as
Hezbollah and its backers in Iran and Syria. The U.S. Government has
safeguards in place designed to minimize the risk that Hezbollah or
other terrorist organizations will benefit from U.S. assistance
activities.
While we will continue to monitor developments in Lebanon closely,
U.S. assistance to certain Lebanese central institutions, namely the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF),
continues to advance key U.S. interests and priorities, including:
stability within Lebanon and on the Blue Line between Israel and
Lebanon; maintenance of Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, and
regional stability. The LAF continues to be a professional and well-
respected Lebanese institution with a strong relationship with the U.S.
military. With the support of U.S. assistance and training, the LAF
maintains a presence in all areas of Lebanon, including southern
Lebanon and the area south of the Litani (as called for by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1701), and regularly conducts internal
security, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism operations. An end to
U.S. support to the LAF would be a strategic victory for Hezbollah, and
cause LAF capabilities to deteriorate, and with them, security in
southern Lebanon and along Israel's northern border.
argentina
Question. As you know, in 2001, Argentina had the largest default
in history, where it defaulted on over $81 billion in international
bonds. In the United States alone, over 100 court judgments have
ordered Argentina to fulfill its debt obligations to U.S. creditors,
but Argentina still has not done so.
What steps is your Department taking to compel Argentina to
honor these rulings?
Answer. On the margins of the Cannes G20 summit in November,
President Obama discussed with President Fernandez de Kirchner the need
for Argentina to normalize its relationship with the international
financial and investment community, and he urged Argentina to take
concrete actions with respect to repayment of outstanding arrears and
complying with final and binding arbitral awards. Senior State
Department officials and others in the administration have followed up
with Argentine officials to reinforce the President's message.
We believe it is in the mutual interest of Argentina and the United
States that Argentina resolve its longstanding obligations to creditors
and arbitral award holders.
In meeting its obligations to creditors and investors, Argentina
will send a strong signal that it welcomes and encourages foreign and
domestic investment that is crucial for the sustained economic growth.
Question. According to recent reports, the U.S. Treasury Department
is considering allowing Argentina to restructure its debt through the
Paris Club. Although approximately $3.5 million of this debt is owed to
the U.S. Government, this amount is small in comparison to the over
$3.5 billion Argentina owes to private U.S. creditors. In fact, the
amount owed to private American creditors is so large that if Argentina
were to pay these debts, the U.S. Government would receive far more
from tax revenues on those payments alone than it would from a
settlement of the debt owed to the U.S. Government.
In light of these facts, will the U.S. Government wait until
Argentina has satisfied all awards under the U.S.-Argentine
bilateral investment treaty and the more than 100 outstanding
U.S. court judgments against it before approving a Paris Club
deal for Argentina?
Answer. Argentina's arrears to U.S. Government agencies total about
$550 million, and U.S. Government effort, including in the Paris Club,
is appropriately focused on recovering full payment on these loans
extended on behalf of American taxpayers. It would not be in the
taxpayers' interest to impose additional conditions, unrelated to Paris
Club claims, on the pursuit of this objective.
U.S. Government efforts to recover on loans, extended on behalf of
our taxpayers, in no way diminishes our urging of Argentina to honor
the claims of private American bondholders and investors. We continue
to use every opportunity to press Argentina to do so.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
Question. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, member states agreed
that Georgia would become a future NATO member. This decision has been
reaffirmed by NATO on numerous subsequent occasions. Georgia has been
making impressive progress in its democratic transformation which I
believe facilitates Georgia's NATO accession process. Georgia has also
made extraordinary contributions to the International Security
Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan.
The NATO summit in Chicago is an important moment to recognize
Georgia's progress and advance its prospects for membership in the
alliance. U.S. leadership is essential for this.
Could you please elaborate on how the administration will
use the summit to ensure not only that Georgia's progress and
its contributions to NATO are recognized, but that it is also
given a clear roadmap and benchmarks for achieving full NATO
membership?
Answer. The United States is working closely with NATO allies on
planning for the summit in Chicago, which will focus primarily on NATO
engagement in Afghanistan. Georgia continues to be an important NATO
partner and significant contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan,
and we believe the summit should highlight this partnership. The
administration supports Georgia's NATO membership aspirations, and is
working with the Georgian Government to implement the wide array of
reforms necessary to meet Euro-Atlantic standards. Georgia's Annual
National Program (ANP) and the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) play
central roles in this regard. The administration is also working with
allies on ways to acknowledge the progress that Georgia has made on
democratic, economic, and defense reforms at the summit.
Question. Despite Malaysia's portrayal as a moderate Muslim
democracy, minorities there face increasing restrictions on religious
freedom, including attacks on non-Muslim places of worship and the
growing power and influence of the Sharia Islamic law court system over
cases involving Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists. In addition,
minorities are economically marginalized through government policies
that favor the majority Muslim Malay population (Article 153 of the
Constitution) and face political repression through draconian security
measures.
How can the State Department play a more active role in
working with the Malaysian Government to promote more equitable
policies that ensure religious freedom and equality for all the
country's citizens?
Answer. The United States Government maintains a broad and active
dialogue with the Government of Malaysia as part of our productive
bilateral partnership. The United States Government engages with
religious groups, nongovernment organizations, civil society, and
political parties within Malaysia. The United States Government seeks
in all these engagements to promote understanding of the United States
and U.S. policy, including the promotion of internationally accepted
norms of religious freedom and human rights. The International
Religious Freedom report highlights the promotion of those norms and
serves as a basis for our engagement with the Malaysian Government.
U.S. engagement with Malaysia includes engagement by the U.S.
Ambassador and the staff of the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Senior
Washington-based officials are directly involved with Malaysian
counterparts; as an example, Special Representative to Muslim
Communities Farah Pandith has visited Malaysia twice and met with
government and nongovernment representatives.
______
Response of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Question
Submitted by Senator Johnny Isakson
Question. Last year, Congress directed the State Department to
assist American victims of Libyan terrorism regarding the use of the
frozen assets of former Libyan dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, for
compensation. As you are aware, it is possible that the compensation
fund for American victims of Libyan terrorism established pursuant to
the Libyan Claims Resolution Act could have a shortfall. Please
describe efforts the Department is undertaking to: (1) establish
contingency plans in the event of a shortfall; (2) engage in state-to-
state negotiations with the new Libyan Government to ensure American
victims of Libyan state-sponsored terrorism receive full compensation
in accordance with awards set forth by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission; and (3) use assets belonging to Muammar Qaddafi, the
Qaddafi family, and advisors currently under U.S. control to compensate
these American victims of terrorism.
Answer. The Department believes that it is premature to determine
whether there will be a shortfall in settlement funds. The Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) is still in the process of
adjudicating and, in some cases, establishing the appropriate levels of
compensation for many of the claims that were referred to it as part of
the Libya claims program. The FCSC must be allowed to complete more of
this work before a projection regarding the sufficiency of settlement
funds can be made. In the event of a shortfall, the International
Claims Settlement Act of 1949 establishes that each claimant who
receives an award from the FCSC will receive a pro rata share of the
available settlement funds up to the full amount of that award.
Regarding possible state-to-state negotiations, the 2008 U.S.-Libya
Claims Settlement Agreement provided for the ``full and final
settlement'' of terrorism-related claims against Libya and its public
officials in exchange for the $1.5 billion settlement amount. Given the
terms of this agreement, there does not appear to be a legal basis for
seeking additional compensation from the Government of Libya at this
juncture. Doing so could well undermine our efforts to secure
compensation for other U.S. nationals through similar claims
settlements with other governments in the future.
Furthermore, frozen Qadhafi family assets would not be an
appropriate source of additional funds for these claims, which the
United States has already settled through the 2008 U.S.-Libya Claims
Settlement Agreement. This would similarly undermine the United States
ability to conclude similar claims settlements on behalf of U.S.
nationals in the future. Moreover, those Qadhafi family assets that are
in the United States have been frozen pursuant to legally binding U.N.
Security Council Resolutions. Those resolutions indicate that any
frozen assets shall be used for the benefit and in accordance with the
needs and wishes of the Libyan people. If the United States were to
unilaterally decide on an alternative disposition of these assets, it
would undermine our ability to obtain similar U.N. action in the future
and could expose the United States to claims under international law.
We are not aware of any Qadhafi family member interest in the
assets that comprise the amounts reported publicly by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as blocked pursuant to the Libya
sanctions program. We understand that the only property reported to
OFAC as blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13566 that might contain an
interest of a Qadhafi family member is nonliquid property regarding
which valuation would be difficult to ascertain and that may have no
significant value.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons
Question. Sudan.--What is the status of the roadmap toward
normalized relations that we initially presented to the Government of
Sudan more than a year ago?
Answer. The current situation in the Sudanese states of Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile has caused us to suspend discussions on the
roadmap. The United States told the Government of Sudan that in order
to discuss steps toward normalization, we need for Sudan, at a minimum,
to address the crises in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. In
particular, this would include action by Sudan to end the continued
bombing that is taking such a toll on civilians, to permit
international humanitarian access to these Two Areas, and to resume
negotiations with the SPLM-N to find a political solution to the
conflict. Unfortunately, the Government of Sudan has not met these
conditions. Additionally, the full normalization of relations between
the United States and Sudan would require the resolution of outstanding
Comprehensive Peace Agreement issues, including oil arrangements, and
progress in Darfur.
Question. Sudan.--I am increasingly concerned about the assessments
by the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS NET) of growing food
insecurity in conflict-affected areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
What further pressure can the United States and its allies
bring to bear on Sudan, which continues to deny access for
humanitarian workers despite the serious and deteriorating
situation for civilians?
Answer. Since October of last year, we have relentlessly pursued
unrestricted humanitarian access to the Two Areas with the Government
of Sudan. I have told the Government of Sudan on numerous occasions
that we, as the U.S. Government, cannot stand by and watch a crisis
unfold. We have engaged AU Chairman Jean Ping, AUHIP Chairman Thabo
Mbeki, U.N. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios,
and U.N. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos,
who have all reached out directly to the Government of Sudan on this
crisis. We have demarched a number of countries and organizations with
influence in Khartoum asking them to raise this with the government. We
have worked tirelessly to raise awareness of the crisis through
briefing of the advocacy community and Members of Congress. We are
continuing to highlight the issue at the U.N. Security Council, and at
high-profile events to impress a sense of urgency on the Government of
Sudan. The President of the Security Council issued a statement on
March 6 condemning violence along the border of Sudan and South Sudan,
and renewing the 15-member Security Council's unanimous call to allow
full, unfettered access for international humanitarian organizations to
enter the Two Areas for proper assessment of needs and delivery of
assistance. We remain hopeful that our diplomatic efforts and pressures
on the Government of Sudan will yield progress. The United Nations,
African Union, and the League of Arab States have made a joint proposal
to the Government of Sudan for a major humanitarian program in these
areas. We very much hope this proposal will be approved, because it
offers the most effective means to reach the maximum amount of affected
people.
Question. Somalia.--With the end of the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) this August, what more can the United States and its
allies do to strengthen Somalia's weak system of governance in order to
make it more transparent and participatory, and encourage long-term
economic growth and stability?
Answer. The schedule for completing key constitutional tasks is
extremely tight, but we are working closely with international partners
to help Somali leaders ensure a successful transition and a transparent
political process. Through USAID, we are providing support to the TFG
to achieve key transitional goals, including providing technical
assistance to the Council of Experts and the Independent Federal
Constitutional Commission, promoting public outreach on the draft
constitution, and developing civic education programs to help the
Somali public understand the constitutional process. But ultimately,
the TFG and other Somali stakeholders will bear responsibility for
adhering to the timetable and achieving sufficient inclusivity and
transparency.
In concert with the international community, we are working closely
with the TFG and regional actors to implement the Roadmap to End the
Transition, which specifically addresses transparency in government in
the following ways: creating an Independent Interim Electoral
Commission, which will help appoint members of the Constituent
Assembly; ordering a comprehensive report on all TFG expenditures and
revenues; and formulating a national budget, which the TFG cabinet
approved in January 2012. We support financially Somali efforts to
draft the constitution and fund advisors to the Ministry of Finance to
help it tackle budget reform.
Since 2010, USAID has obligated $38 million for stabilization
projects in Somaliland, Puntland, Mogadishu, and in some of the regions
where al-Shabaab has been pushed out. These projects, part of USAID's
Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS), bring regional
authorities together to quickly provide durable development programs to
local communities that will encourage long-term growth and stability.
We plan to expand these TIS projects and have encouraged other partners
to contribute to and coordinate stabilization assistance.
Question. West Africa.--The FY 2013 budget request includes
relatively little bilateral development assistance for Niger ($2
million), none for Mauritania or Cote d'Ivoire, and declining amounts
for Mali ($66.1 million compared to $72.1 in FY 2012) and Senegal
($33.9 million compared to $50 million in FY 2012). Given unprecedented
political unrest in Senegal, conflict in Mali, broader insecurity in
the Sahel region, and a fragile political transition in Cote d'Ivoire,
please describe how the administration anticipates using the FY 2013
foreign operations budget to advance democratic governance and
stability in West Africa.
Answer. The U.S. Government's overriding interests in Cote d'Ivoire
have long been to help restore peace, encourage disarmament and
reconciliation of hostile factions, and to support a democratic
government whose legitimacy can be accepted by all citizens of Cote
d'Ivoire. FY 2013 is a key year for solidifying Cote d'Ivoire's
historic democratic achievement following its post-election crisis. The
total FY 2013 foreign assistance request for Cote d'Ivoire is $137.3
million, spread across five funding accounts and includes $13.5 million
in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to support Cote d'Ivoire's political
transition. State/AF traditionally programs ESF funds to support
development programs in countries that are transitioning from
instability to stability. FY 2013 ESF programs in Cote d'Ivoire will
focus on reconciliation and strengthening the country's fragile
democracy. ESF resources are complemented by peace and security
programs funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)--$2 million,
International Military Education and Training (IMET)--$200,000, and
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)--$200,000 accounts. The request
includes resources to support multiethnic participation in the
democratic process in lieu of violence and separation; enhance capacity
of national, provincial and local governmental institutions, the media,
and civil society leading to better governance and increased public
confidence in the democratic process; support credible and legitimate
legislative elections and follow-on activities; increase respect for
the rule of law and human rights; and address the HIV/AIDS epidemic
through expanded access to prevention, care, and treatment services.
Continued fighting in northern Mali, coupled with a poor harvest,
is hampering the government's development plans and poses new
challenges to the Presidential and legislative elections scheduled this
year. FY 2013 is an important year in which we will continue to
strengthen Mali's democratic and security institutions. The FY 2013
foreign assistance request for Mali is $129.2 million. Although lower
than the FY 2012 estimate, the request includes funding for the
training of mayors, communal council members, and civil society
organizations, while simultaneously supporting literacy and educational
development, which will enable the Government of Mali (GOM) to design
and manage the delivery of vital services to constituents. The Peace
and Security program will promote military professionalism, advance
respect for human rights, and strengthen the capacity of the GOM to
protect itself from terrorist and criminal threats and to participate
in peacekeeping operations. Through the Global Health Initiative (GHI),
we will help Mali achieve major improvements in malaria reduction,
maternal and child health, and family planning and reproductive health.
GHI will also support work on HIV/AIDS and nutrition. Last, through the
President's Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative the United
States will work with the GOM to increase agriculture productivity and
growth.
Recent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) activity across the
Sahel has caused the Government of Mauritania to bolster its
counterterrorism and counterradicalization efforts. These efforts
include collaborating regionally in the Sahel and with Maghreb nations,
as well as making security their top domestic priority. Through the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) we are helping
Mauritania bolster its border security and professionalize its
military. In addition, the FY 2013 foreign assistance request for
Mauritania includes $150,000 for International Military Education and
Training (IMET) to support stabilization and security sector reform.
This will continue to support counterterrorism activities and English
language training of Mauritanian officers in order to increase their
interoperability with international troops.
The international community resumed development assistance and
increased engagement with the inauguration of Mahamadou Issoufou as
President of Niger in April 2011. Eleven months into the Issoufou
administration, the country is at a turning point. One of our primary
objectives is to support a transparent and responsive democracy that
respects human rights in Niger. The FY 2013 request for Niger is $17.1
million, across three funding accounts. Of this, $2 million (double the
FY 2012 estimate) is requested in Development Assistance to expand
programs focused on civil society and promoting good governance;
specifically, improving public sector accountability and performance
across a broader spectrum of public services. The request also includes
$15 million for Food for Peace (Title II) to improve food security and
support productive agricultural enterprises.
Last, in Senegal, U.S. support with FY 2011 resources helped to
wage a successful public advocacy campaign to ensure a free, fair,
peaceful, and inclusive Presidential electoral process. The FY 2013
request for Senegal includes ample funding to advance democratic
governance and stability in the country. The requested assistance will
play a key role in consolidating democratic outcomes resulting from the
2012 Presidential and legislative elections while continuing to support
Senegal's efforts to enhance local government capacity, promote laws
and policies that lead to greater judicial independence, and strengthen
the key oversight institutions such as the national corruption
committee, national reform commission, and national procurement agency
to provide more rigorous oversight.
Question. LRA.--I welcomed the administration's notification to
Congress in October that it was deploying about 100 military advisors
to help Uganda and other regional countries counter the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA).
Please provide an update on the progress and status of the
advisory mission.
Do you expect the American military personnel to remain in
Africa until Joseph Kony and other senior LRA leaders are
apprehended?
Answer. The United States continues to pursue our multifaceted,
comprehensive strategy to help the people and governments of the region
mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA and bring the top
LRA commanders to justice. As one part of that strategy, we have
deployed a small number of U.S. military forces to the LRA-affected
region to serve as advisors to the national militaries pursuing the
LRA's top commanders and seeking to protect local populations.
Small teams of the U.S. military advisors are now working with the
national military forces in forward operating sites in the LRA-affected
areas. In these locations, the U.S. military advisors have made
progress building relationships with military and civilian leaders,
increasing information-sharing and analysis across borders, and
synchronizing information on LRA movements. U.S. military advisors are
also working with the Congolese military and the U.N. peacekeeping
force, MONUSCO, at the Joint Intelligence and Operations Center in
Dungu and helping them to plan their operations to counter the LRA.
U.S. military advisors helped them plan a joint operation that was
carried out to help deter the LRA from committing massacres in the DRC
during the Christmas season, as it did in 2008 and 2009.
There continues to be a robust interagency review process to ensure
that this advisory effort is helping the region to make progress toward
ending the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the LRA.
This is not meant to be an open-ended deployment. We believe our
advisors can provide critical capabilities in the near-term to help the
national military forces pursuing the LRA to succeed. We have made
clear to the governments in the region that our continued support is
also contingent on their continued leadership and collaboration in the
fight against the LRA.
Question. Nigeria.--What are the political and security
implications of the increasing number of attacks against civilians
perpetrated by Boko Haram? Is this an internal governance problem that
Nigerian leadership must address, or is it an indication of ties to
international terrorist groups? What role has the United States played
in stemming this instability, and how concerned should we be about the
potential economic implications in Nigeria and for bilateral trade?
Answer. We abhor the violence attributed to Boko Haram in northern
Nigeria. We support the Nigerian authorities in their efforts to bring
the perpetrators of violent acts to justice, and stress the importance
of protecting civilians in any security response to threats and
attacks. In our view, Boko Haram is dangerous but not a threat to
Nigeria's political stability.
The extremist violence in northern Nigeria requires more than just
a security response. Groups such as Boko Haram exploit legitimate
grievances of the northern population to garner recruits and public
support. To address the political and socio-economic challenges of the
north, the Nigerian Government must effectively engage communities
vulnerable to extremist violence and promote human rights practices
among its security forces, whose heavy-handed tactics reinforce
northerners' concerns that the Nigerian Government does not care about
their lives.
Boko Haram operates in the most impoverished part of Nigeria. A
U.N. study shows that poverty levels in the 12 most northern states are
nearly twice as high as in the rest of the country. Children in the far
north are almost four times as likely to be malnourished. An
astonishing 77 percent of women in the far north have no formal
education, compared to only 17 percent in the rest of the country.
While Boko Haram is not a monolithic group, its aims are largely to
discredit the Nigerian Government. It is focused primarily on local
Nigerian issues and actors, and responds principally to political and
security developments within Nigeria. We are concerned about reports
that Boko Haram is in contact with other extremist groups such as al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and are monitoring these
developments closely. Most Nigerians abhor Boko Haram tactics and
ideology, although there is a growing minority among certain ethnic
groups that view Boko Haram as promoting their interests.
The United States engages regularly with our Nigerian counterparts
on issues of violent extremism. We convened a meeting of the U.S.-
Nigeria Binational Commission in January to specifically discuss this
issue. On multiple occasions, we have urged the Nigerians to seriously
address longstanding grievances underlying unrest in northern Nigeria.
U.S. companies do look to foreign governments to assure them that they
can safely do business in countries where they operate. Our primary
trade commodity from Nigeria is oil from the southern part of the
country and this trade remains strong.
Question. The Sahel is facing a two-fold crisis of drought and
insecurity sparked by climatic issues and the flow of weapons from
Libya. I have watched with growing concern the predictions of drought
and hunger for 12 million people across Niger and six other countries,
at the same time that a newly armed Tuareg insurgency is attacking
civilians and government installations in northern Mali.
Can you please comment on U.S. efforts to address the
problems of both insecurity and hunger in the Sahel?
Answer. USAID is greatly concerned by the security and hunger
situation in the Sahel and is working to address both issues.
We have taken early integrated action to address food insecurity
through emergency aid that saves lives and longer term programs that
increase resilience across the Sahel. Our strategy bridges the span
from relief to recovery to development by addressing the root causes of
hunger, malnutrition, and instability in West Africa.
Our approach supports national and regional structures that promote
food security and nutrition, while providing short-term assistance to
vulnerable populations--such as food assistance, treatment for acute
malnutrition, and building community resilience through cash-based
programs to provide funds to protect and restore livelihoods. For
instance, USAID is providing vouchers that enable vulnerable households
to take advantage of functioning markets, which strengthens local
commerce and helps individuals access food and other goods and
services. At the same time, USAID cash-for-work activities provide
short-term, income-generating opportunities and rehabilitate public
infrastructure. To improve crop production, USAID is supporting fairs
to distribute improved seeds to vulnerable farmers in the region.
To date in FY 2012, the U.S. Government has provided nearly $200
million in emergency assistance in response to food insecurity and
conflict in the Sahel, including $9.2 million from USAID's Office U.S.
of Foreign Disaster Assistance, $179 million from USAID's Office of
Food for Peace, and $9.5 million from the State Department Bureau of
Population Migration and Refugees.
Tribal conflicts, extremist violence, and political and economic
marginalization contribute to instability in the Sahel and can
undermine development, so our emergency and agricultural support is
complemented by long-term efforts to address conflict as one of the
root causes of chronic poverty and instability. Through the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), USAID coordinates with the
Departments of State and Defense to strengthen government
counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation
among security forces, promote democratic governance, and discredit
terrorist ideology. USAID programs are actively mitigating conflict and
encouraging reintegration of those whose actions may exacerbate crises
or who may be motivated by poverty and hunger to radicalize. These
programs specifically reach out to young men--the demographic most
likely to be recruited by extremist groups. USAID-supported educational
and vocational opportunities counter indoctrination efforts by violent
extremist organizations and provide them with new skills, job security,
and a positive vision of their future.
In northern Mali specifically, the security situation is of great
concern, even more so now due to the current military unrest. However,
as you know, activities that counter violent extremism and insecurity
may be suspended due to the recent unlawful seizure of power.
We will continue to monitor these situations closely and respond to
need as robustly as possible.
Question. GHI/FTF.--The biggest change in the budget for Africa
comes from a decrease in Global Health Initiative funds, which
represents approximately two-thirds of the total funding for Africa. As
I understand it, the FY 2013 budget request reflects a reduction of 5
percent for USAID-administered GHI funds and 12 percent for State-
administered GHI funds compared to FY 2012. The request also includes a
12 percent reduction in Feed the Future funds compared to FY 2012.
Please describe the reasoning behind, and implications of, the cuts.
Answer. USAID-Administered GHI Funds: In FY 2013, USAID
prioritized, focused, and concentrated our investments across every
portfolio, particularly in Global Health and Feed the Future. The FY
2013 request was developed in the context of the current fiscal
environment; the budget for the Global Health Initiative represents a
straight-line from the FY 2011 level. With our current funding, this
administration's global health investments are saving millions of lives
around the world. Since 2008, child mortality has declined by 16
percent and maternal mortality by 13 percent in priority countries for
maternal and child health (MCH). In 2011 alone, the President's Malaria
Initiative protected more than 58 million individuals from malaria
infection.
The FY 2013 request reflects innovation and efficiency gains which
allow our dollars to go further, including the graduation of mature
programs, refocusing funding to countries with the greatest need, and
leveraging of resources through public-private partnerships and
multilateral institutions. Efforts to increase the focus of health
programs overall resulted in the shift of funding from nonpriority
programs in Africa to higher priority countries in other regions. For
example, regarding tuberculosis programming, USAID closed programs in
Namibia and Ghana to increase funding for other countries with a higher
burden of tuberculosis.
State-Administered GHI Funds: For FY 2013, PEPFAR made Africa
country allocations based upon gains in program efficiency, realignment
of priorities to better reflect country-specific contextual issues
(such as absorptive capacity and availability of other resources in
country), and increased programmatic and financial ownership by partner
countries.
PEPFAR programs are able to expand without increased resources due
to reduced treatment costs and efficiency gains spurred by scientific
advances, task-shifting and a greater focus on cost-effective models of
service delivery. Treatment costs have dropped from $1,100 to $335 per
patient/year. One factor has been PEPFAR's commitment to procuring
generic drugs with bulk purchasing through the Supply Chain Management
System. In FY 2010, 97 percent of drugs procured were generic brands.
PEPFAR has also made simple cost-saving changes, such as shipping by
land and sea instead of air. Scientific advances and innovation within
several areas, including voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC)
devices, will allow PEPFAR to deliver expanded services for less. With
a new device, VMMC unit costs are expected to drop from approximately
$142 to $32 by the end of 2012. Finally, shifting from hospital-based
services to less expensive community clinics, adjusting the frequency
of follow-up visits for stable patients, and transitioning from doctors
to nurses for the provision of some services are greatly reducing
PEPFAR costs and allows for expanded capacity overall.
A purposeful realignment of resources to better reflect country-
specific contexts has also contributed to PEPFAR's ability to reduce
its bilateral budget in FY 2013. This has included deeper analysis of
epidemics at the country level, the capacity of governments and
implementing partners, and progress toward increasing country ownership
of HIV/AIDS programs. These factors have positioned PEPFAR to safely
reduce budgets in some African countries while increasing budgets in
others.
Finally, through coordination of PEPFAR and the Global Fund, U.S.
investments against AIDS are expanded both geographically and
programmatically. This increased interdependence of PEPFAR and the
Global Fund allows for a greater impact. The PEPFAR bilateral program
cannot reach the goals without a robust and functioning Global Fund,
and we anticipate that the increased resources proposed for the Fund in
the FY 2013 budget will have an important impact in key African
countries.
Feed the Future Funds: The FY 2013 request of $1.2 billion for the
President's Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, Feed the
Future, will fund the fourth year of this Presidential Initiative and
reflects a coordinated interagency strategy that expands support for
both bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. This request
includes $1.1 billion for State Department and USAID, of which $1.0
billion is for agriculture and $90 million is for nutrition programs.
In addition, the Department of Treasury is requesting $134 million for
a further U.S. contribution to the multidonor Global Agriculture and
Food Security Program (GAFSP). At this requested level, the
administration anticipates meeting the President's commitment to
provide $475 million to the GAFSP.
The FY 2013 request continues to address the root causes of hunger
by helping countries increase agricultural-led growth by raising
agricultural productivity, improving access to markets, increasing the
incomes of the poor, and reducing undernutrition--especially of women
and children--through sustained, long-term development programs. In
priority countries, it is accelerating progress toward the Millennium
Development Goal of reducing the number of people living in extreme
poverty and suffering from hunger and undernutrition. Feed the Future
programs also focus on reducing long-term vulnerability to food
insecurity, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and harness
science and technology to help populations adapt to increasingly
erratic production seasons. These efforts stand alongside the
administration's ongoing commitment to humanitarian assistance that
alleviates the immediate impacts of hunger and undernutrition.
The combined FY 2013 request for State Department and USAID
agriculture and nutrition programs is 3 percent ($27.4 million) greater
than the FY 2012 estimate level. For State/USAID agriculture programs,
the $1.0 billion request is 3 percent ($32.4 million) greater than the
FY 2012 estimate level of $968.1 million.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. As you have probably heard, I recently met with the Nobel
Prize Winner and IPCC Chair Dr. Rajendra Pachauri in India. During this
meeting it was made clear to me that the science on climate change is
getting stronger and the impacts we are facing in the future look
increasingly dire. I know I don't need to convince you about the
science on this issue, and the fact that climate change will likely
lead to many issues which impact our national security as a result of
drought, famine, migrations, and the impact of higher sea levels in
coastal areas. However, given this great threat to the future of the
planet, I am discouraged that the request for Global Climate Change was
reduced from $482 million in fiscal year 2012 to $470 million in fiscal
year 2013.
Can you please explain why climate change has been
deemphasized given the immense threat it poses to the future of
our planet and the Nation?
Answer. Combating climate change remains a key priority of this
administration, one we address both through our foreign assistance and
through diplomatic efforts, including international climate change
negotiations. The FY 2013 joint State/USAID/Treasury request of $770
million for the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) will support
sustainable economic growth, U.S. national interests, and environmental
protection. State and USAID programs ($470 million in the FY 2013
request) support a diverse global clean energy resource base, conserve
and restore the world's tropical forests, and enhance resilience to
weather and climate-related disasters and damage. This work also
sustains U.S. credibility and leadership on an issue that is high
priority for countries around the world, including some of our longest
standing allies.
The 2.5-percent decrease in the FY 2013 State/USAID GCCI request
was not a deemphasis on climate change but rather a recognition of the
difficult fiscal situation and the need to support other equally
critical foreign assistance priorities within the budget such as
Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and the President's Global Health and
Feed the Future assistance initiatives. Even with this modest cut,
GCCI funding will continue to be concentrated in priority countries and
programs, including:
(For adaptation) those countries most vulnerable to climate
impacts, including small island developing states, least
developed countries, sub-Saharan Africa, and glacier-dependant
countries;
Low Emissions Development Strategy (LEDS) partners;
Large and/or emerging industrial greenhouse gas emitters;
and
Key tropical forest ecosystems such as the Congo and Amazon
Basin and Southeast Asia.
GCCI funding increasingly will also seek to leverage the additional
financial flows, particularly from the private sector, needed to help
developing countries invest in technologies for low-emissions, climate-
resilient development. Leveraging climate financing from the private
sector and other donor countries is a key priority for the State
Department as we seek to maximize the value of every U.S. dollar spent
on this critical issue, and this will become an increasingly important
priority going forward.
It should also be noted that, many USG assistance programs outside
the GCCI, including both other USAID programs and activities undertaken
by other agencies, also support the battle against climate change.
Thus, while appropriated funding for the GCCI was $819 million in FY
2011, we estimate the total USG contribution to climate change (aka
``Fast Start'') finance for developing countries during FY11 to be
approximately $3.1 billion. For example, in India alone, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provided $214 million in FY 2011
in investment finance and insurance for renewable energy activities.
Question. In a recent Foreign Affairs piece, Ehud Eiran, a Research
Fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, and former officer in the Israeli
Army as well as assistant to Prime Minister Ehud Barak's Foreign Policy
Advisor wrote a piece titled ``What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran:
Public Debate Can Prevent a Strategic Disaster.'' This article, I
believe, is extremely important given the recent rhetoric regarding how
to deal with Iran's developing nuclear capability. One of his most
important points was that there has not been serious discussion about
what would happen after a possible military strike and that, ``Without
serious public discussion about the possibility of a long war with
Iran, Israel could enter an extended conflict unprepared to provide for
and defend its citizens. I am very concerned that this debate may also
be lacking in some quarters in the United States, and would ask,
whether or not we will be asking these tough questions in the public
and posing them to our ally Israel before we, or Israel alone, crosses
the Rubicon, and what role do you believe Congress should play to
actively engage in such a policy debate?
Answer. U. S. policy on Iran's nuclear program is straightforward:
We are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. An
opportunity still remains for diplomacy--backed by pressure--to
succeed. We are in close consultations with all of our international
partners on maximizing this opportunity to persuade Iran to resolve the
international community's concerns regarding the nature of its nuclear
program. The level of our cooperation with Israel, in particular, on a
range of regional and strategic issues is unprecedented. We continue to
have frank discussions with the Israelis on our options regarding Iran,
which President Obama recently stated includes all elements of American
power: a political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort
to sustain international unity and ensure that the Iranian program is
monitored; an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions; and a
military effort to be prepared for any contingency.
We share the Congress' concern about Iranian behavior. We are
aggressively implementing new sanctions pursuant to Section 1245 of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, as well as continuing to
enforce sanctions already in place. Working with allies to strengthen
implementation of these existing sanctions and to exploit new regime
vulnerabilities, while maintaining P5+1 consensus, offers the best
opportunity for resolving our concerns. Within that framework, we
welcome your ideas to help us continue to increase the pressure for a
change in Iranian behavior.
Question. While most of the public attention in the world is on
Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, I fear that we are not paying
enough attention to the many atrocities occurring in our own backyard.
While what is occurring in the Middle East is deplorable and very
concerning, I am also concerned about Central America, a region which
is home to increasing levels of violence, and the country with the
highest murder rate in the world, Honduras. Madame Secretary, how does
the budget for Central America help stabilize these areas, and should
we be doing more given the urgent and deteriorating security situation
in this region?
Answer. We share your concern regarding the citizen security crisis
in Central America and the accompanying factors that bring violence to
the region. The problem is large and complex, but the United States is
committed to continuing to work with Central American governments and
civil society, as well as other donor nations and institutions, to
support the region's efforts to reverse the deteriorating state of
citizen security.
The Central America Citizen Security Partnership is the United
States coordination mechanism in response to the citizen security
situation. This partnership aims to help protect citizens of Central
America, the United States, and the hemisphere, who are increasingly
threatened by organized crime, gangs, and drug-fueled violence. Under
the partnership, the United States uses the Central America Regional
Security Initiative to implement programming in targeted areas,
including to reduce levels of crime and violence, support prevention
efforts for at-risk youth and those living in marginalized communities,
and strengthen rule of law institutions.
Since FY 2008, the United States has committed $361.5 million to
these efforts. We look forward to working with you on our proposed FY
2012 CARSI allocation of $105 million, and the administration's FY 2013
$107.5 million CARSI request.
Citizen security is a priority for the people of Central America.
Given the proximity of Central America to our own border, it is
imperative to continue our commitment to the region to sustain our
efforts and build upon the unparalleled levels of collaboration
occurring amongst the Central Americans themselves in addressing their
most pressing citizen security, rule of law, and prevention challenges.
Question. I am happy to see that there has been progress with
Merida in Mexico. I am also very well aware, that like the United
States, Mexico is also in an election year. That is why I believe that
public support of Merida is very important. While I have been assured
by members of the three major parties in Mexico, that they support
continuing to work with the United States to fight against organized
drug cartels, I am also aware that in some public areas, there has been
a backlash against the initiative as a result of human rights and law
and order concerns. This seems to be a crucial area, given the fact
that law and governance training, as well as reforms to the federal and
state constitutions are progressing faster in some regions of Mexico
than others.
How can the State Department better assist the Mexican Government
in their battles against organized crime and narcotrafficking in the
region while also addressing important issues such as judicial reform
and human rights so that the average Mexican citizen does not lose
faith in the justice system funding for International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement has been greatly decreased from the FY12 estimate
of $248,500,000 to the FY13's request of $199,000,000 million . . .
given the importance of ensuring the success of these programs, what
justifies such a large cut in INCLE funding?
Answer. The Merida Initiative is an unprecedented partnership
between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and
associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the
rule of law. Of the $1.6 billion from all accounts appropriated for the
Merida Initiative through FY 2011, we have delivered over $900 million
in equipment, capacity-building, and technical assistance, including
$504 million in CY 2011 alone. Merida assistance supports the
Government of Mexico by dismantling organized criminal groups,
strengthening institutions, building a 21st century border, and
building strong and resilient communities.
Our reduced assistance request for Mexico in FY 2013 reflects the
shift from ``big ticket'' items, such as helicopters and maritime
aerial surveillance planes to lower cost training and technical
assistance. The programming stresses reforming and strengthening
Mexico's law enforcement and justice institutions so that they will be
more transparent and effective in providing citizen safety.
We support Mexico's judicial reform and institutional strengthening
efforts at the federal and state levels through: judicial exchanges;
training of judges, prosecutors, and investigators; increasing the
efficiency of court administration; and assisting in the creation of
standards for witness protection, chain of custody and forensics.
Our security sector assistance emphasizes: training for federal and
state police officers; providing technical assistance for curriculum
development to federal and state police academies, which will elevate
the quality instruction for future classes of police recruits;
providing polygraph machines and training for conducting employee
background investigations; and providing equipment and technical
assistance to establish a National Police Registry, to ensure corrupt
officers are not hired by another government security agency.
We work to promote respect for human rights through our programming
across the board, incorporating human rights training into our security
and law enforcement training and our rule of law programming.
USAID conducts human rights training and education for police,
prosecutors, and other officials to promote implementation of
international human rights standards. USAID is supporting the
participation of human rights and other NGOs in justice sector reforms,
so that these NGOs are better equipped to engage the Government of
Mexico on human rights issues and educate citizens on their roles and
responsibilities in the new system. USAID also supports the United
Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights' office in Mexico to work
with Mexican Government agencies to strengthen observance of human
rights norms.
Question. Senator Corker mentioned issues about NNSA funding
levels, and I just want to add that the people of New Mexico are very
concerned about these cuts and whether the National Labs will be able
to meet the national security requirements they have been entrusted
with. In New Mexico, a major construction project was cancelled as a
result of NNSA's budget decisions. Both the Bush and Obama
administrations called for the CMRR-NF to satisfy New START obligations
and to address the growing safety issues at the 50-year-old building
it's meant to replace. In the face of dramatic budget cuts,
construction delays and growing costs, it's being put on the back-
burner by the administration. I have concerns about how this will
affect the lab employees working in the outdated building and its
impact on Northern New Mexico. I have not yet received a full
explanation about the shift, and hope I can have an explanation soon.
Answer. The administration remains committed to maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Over the past 3 years, the
administration has worked with Congress to develop a sustainable,
bipartisan commitment to a nuclear deterrent to defend and protect the
United States and our allies.
The administration's historic budget requests and nuclear
modernization plan have sought to reverse years of declining
investments in the nuclear weapons complex. With congressional passage
of the Budget Control Act (BCA), we face new fiscal realities. These do
not weaken our commitment to maintaining our nuclear deterrent and
modernizing the weapons complex, but they must inform programmatic
decisions.
Our colleagues at DOE/NNSA can provide a full explanation of the FY
2013 funding decisions, as they relate to the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement Nuclear Facility.
Question. Over the last 30 years, the United States prioritized
maintaining relations with the Egyptian Government and military over
support for civil society. U.S. funds for civil society did not exceed
1 percent, even when people were advocating for reform ahead of
elections. In FY12, the United States promised $1.3 billion in military
aid if the country met its legal obligations to hold free and fair
elections and protect basic rights. The United States also gave Egypt
$300 million in economic and social aid through the Ministry for
International Cooperation, the ministry believed to be driving the NGO
harassment.
How can the United States better incentivize the Egyptian
Government to be more accountable to its people?
How will resources in the FY13 budget take a more balanced
approach to supporting the Egyptian people and civil society?
And how can U.S. military and diplomatic priorities better
align so that foreign assistance strengthens, not weakens, the
relationship between the Egyptian people and their government?
Answer. Our assistance, whether in the form of Economic Support
Funds (ESF) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF), has long sought to
promote a more accountable Egyptian Government responsive to its
people. For example, our ESF has helped to increase the transparency
and effectiveness of Egyptian line ministries that deliver crucial
social services to the Egyptian people. Additionally, ESF channeled for
direct support to our partners helps nascent Egyptian and international
NGOs build their capacity and hold the GOE accountable to the Egyptian
people. Our FMF has also for decades aimed to professionalize the
Egyptian military so that the armed forces serve the interests of the
Egyptian people and jointly advance our shared national security
priorities. The decision by the Egyptian Armed Forces to avoid firing
on peaceful demonstrators and to side with protesters demanding the
resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 helped
allow Egypt's democratic transition to take place. We also provided
unprecedented levels of direct support to civil society organizations
in Egypt following the revolution for activities that we believe helped
make the electoral process more transparent and participatory.
Starting July 1, Egypt will have a new democratically elected
government. We will discuss with Egypt's emerging political leaders how
our assistance can advance the goals you have described--supporting a
government that can deliver real advances for the Egyptian people.
As part of this, President Obama and I have made support for civil
society a priority in our policy toward Egypt's transition, and we do
not intend to back away from that commitment. We remain deeply
concerned about intimidation and legal proceedings against democracy
activists and civil society organizations in Egypt. We will continue to
communicate our support of Egyptian civil society through diplomatic
exchanges, public diplomacy, programmatic assistance, and direct
meetings with civil society organizations.
The strategic relationship we maintain with the Egyptian Armed
Forces, of which FMF is a part, need not undermine our relationship
with a democratic Egyptian Government. The goal of our FMF will remain
to help assist an Egyptian military that protects national security
within a democratic framework.