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**FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING
PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROGRAMS
AND AUTHORITIES TO MEET
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

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**FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY
PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES TO MEET 21ST CEN-
TURY CHALLENGES**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 14, 2013.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order.

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on “A Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs and Authorities to Meet 21st Century Challenges.”

Although building partnership capacity may seem like a broad term, this is an important area for the committee’s oversight of the recent defense strategy which places great emphasis on the important role of partnerships to U.S. national security.

Likewise, we have enacted significant legislation in this area because the committee has supported the notion that military commanders need to build certain capacities in partner nations to satisfy specific security theater requirements.

We heard testimony yesterday about the fiscal challenges the military faces as it deals with implementing sequestration, a long-term continuing resolution, and the underresourcing of overseas contingency operations accounts. These constraints will disproportionately hurt the Department’s operations and maintenance account from which the building partnership capacity authorities are also funded.

Given this fiscal environment, the emphasis on building partnership capacity and last year’s defense strategic guidance, and the global threats to U.S. national security interests, this hearing is the beginning of a continuing discussion on what is the proper roles for these BPC [Building Partnership Capacity] authorities.

In spite of our support for these authorities, many questions remain. What is the right amount of funding? What is the right balance between the Defense and State Departments in funding, strategizing, and executing these authorities? What is the right level of engagement and focus by the combatant commands and services on these activities? And is it a plausible assumption that partner nations will in fact use their new capabilities to act consistent with U.S. national security objectives?

Congress is the ultimate decisionmaker on funding. Our oversight responsibilities also require us to understand the impact of these authorities on U.S. national security interests and the ability of the COCOMs [combatant commanders] and Services to execute these authorities without compromising their key priorities and core capabilities.

Furthermore, this committee has expressed concern about the proliferation and duplication of BPC authorities. The authorities to be discussed today make up at least \$750 million per year in authorized funding, not including over a billion a year in counter-narcotics activities, and the trend is on the rise.

In today's fiscal environment, it is important that the Defense Department, COCOMs, and Services prioritize these BPC authorities and activities in coordination and consultation with the State Department. And it is critical that the Administration understand Congress's intent in authorizing these authorities and the need to strategize, plan, fund, execute, and assess these authorities.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. I think this is an incredibly important topic and a central tenet in our national security policy going forward.

We have global responsibilities and global interests. Go anywhere in the world and there is a U.S. interest there from Africa to Latin America to Asia. We have a lot of places that we are trying to influence events and obviously with limited resources. So to the extent that we can build partner capacity, develop partnerships with other nations, it can be a force multiplier for us in achieving our interests and certainly there have been a great many successes.

I think most notably in Somalia, which was and continues to be a significant challenge but has at least been contained with Al Shabaab's efforts there, and we did that with a fairly light U.S. footprint. We did it because we were able to build partnerships with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda and other African nations as well and work with them to contain the threat there and the capacity that we built amongst those nations was incredibly helpful to us and we are going to have a similar challenge up in Mali trying to find partners up there that we can work with.

I think the training that our military does to build the capacity of these nations is an incredible asset for our national security strategy. You know, it is a broad challenge. I agree with many of the chairman's remarks in terms of what we need to look at in terms of make this work better because it is not just Department of Defense.

The Department of Defense has a variety of different programs, but when you are thinking about building the capacity of partner nations, security is one element, but governance, rule of law, their education system, health care system, all of that too is important.

So it becomes a whole-of-government effort that we need to work on, and I do believe the Department of Defense in recent years has done a great job of working with the other aspects of U.S. interests, you know, USAID [United States Agency for International Development], State Department.

I was in the Philippines a few years ago, looking at one of our efforts down there and was really impressed at how closely the Special Operations Command was working with USAID on the projects that were necessary to build the capacity of the local population there.

I think figuring out how those interagency pieces need to work is one of the key challenges because we frequently hear the complaint that the Department of State and others have large numbers of responsibilities; DOD [Department of Defense] tends to have the most money. As a result of that, DOD has developed a number of development programs, other things that arguably are crossing over into what the lane traditionally would be USAID or other development agencies.

So figuring that out, figuring how to make sure everyone in our Government works together in capacity building is a critically important piece of this, but for our committee's purposes, first thing is to understand the DOD programs and those specific programs that are in place to help us build partner capacity.

So overall, I view this as an incredible success for us in the last 10 years. We want to figure out how to build on that, how to make it work better, how to get the whole-of-government approach to maximize the efficiency of this effort. I think this hearing is incredibly important.

I look forward to testimony and questions.

I thank the Chairman for holding it.

I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

To testify before the committee today, we have Mr. Michael Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Lieutenant General Terry Wolff, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) the Joint Staff; Ms. Janet St. Laurent, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.

I would like our witnesses—I would like to thank all of you for being here today, for your participation and for your contributions that you are making in this effort. And also I would like to note that the Department of State who has a key role to play in this discussion was also invited to participate, but declined.

We will continue to engage State in partnership with the Foreign Affairs Committee in this ongoing dialogue.

Secretary Sheehan.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL SHEEHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary SHEEHAN. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith. Thank you for very well framing the issue that we are going to discuss this morning.

And distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you this morning about building partner capacity. I provided a longer statement for the record. Myself, and Lieutenant General Wolff will make some brief remarks and get quickly to your questions.

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these programs, define what they are, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and outline the way forward in this critical area of our defense strategy. DOD has a wide range of authorities to assist partners in developing their defense capabilities.

The most important of these authorities are Section 1206, to Train and Equip Counterterrorism Units, Section 1207N, which provided funding for two specific theaters of actions against A.Q. [Al Qaeda] affiliates in Yemen and in East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund, which is a new pilot program.

The Global Security Contingency Fund, GSCF as you know, is a joint program between State and DOD, which authorized a pooled fund of up to \$250 million to meet emergent security issues. As part of this program, we started what we call a soft carve out specifically designed to support Admiral McRaven's initiative to build a global soft network with Special Operations forces around the world.

We have just concluded the first year of this program, and although it was admittedly a bumpy process, I think the fund has shown promise as an additional authority to pursue our defense needs.

I also want to mention Section 1208, which is not really a BPC authority as it is designed to directly support our operations, but it also has the added benefit of building important C.T. [counterterrorism], counterterrorism capabilities, in some of the most sensitive areas with some of the most sensitive units in areas plagued by Al Qaeda presence.

In addition to, we have various authorities that enable us to shape the local defense institutions at their national level to ensure the units that we equip and train are properly managed by the leadership of the host countries. These programs include Minister Defense Advisory Program or MODA, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative or DIRI, and our Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.

In the counternarcotics arena, we have authorities that help build partner capacity to fight organized crime and drug trafficking groups, Sections 1033, 1004, 1022 and 1021, that provide training, equipment, base operations, intelligence sharing, and other support to our counternarcotics programs.

We appreciate the flexibility of these counternarcotics authorities that also enable us to support efforts to attack the nexus of counterterrorism and counternarcotics, an area of increasing concern, particularly in Northwest Africa.

Also providing the Department of Defense a central transfer account for counternarcotics, we are in a stronger position to manage these programs and align them with our security priorities. Based on our experience with this account in counternarcotics, we may want to consider a similar account for our counterterrorism programs.

As Secretary Panetta recently made clear, the task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery of our defense strategy to become a critical skill set across our armed forces. We have gained a great deal of experience in this in the last decade.

BPC is often conducted by our Special Operations forces. Their training, regional orientation, and language skills make their operators very well prepared to do this type of activity. However, the general purpose forces are also preparing for BPC as well. Last March the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno, announced that Army brigades will be realigned for a variety of purposes, including training and mentoring partnered nation security forces.

Our track record I think has been solid. Our 1206 programs have been critical in supporting our efforts in Afghanistan. For example, in the Republic of Georgia, after many years of support from our 1206 program, Georgia is the largest per capita ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] contributor in the field.

They are now able to occupy their own battle space and play a key role in our counterinsurgency strategy to clear, hold, and build. They are a very important contribution that eases the burden on U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Outside of ISAF, we have had great success in the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaf Group, in Yemen against AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], in Colombia against the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and narco-trafficking groups, and in East Africa as Congressman Smith mentioned in his remarks, against Al Shabaab.

In the coming years we can and must build on a record of success. Programs like 1206, 1207N, and our CN [counternarcotics] authorities and other institution building programs have been critical to develop these programs.

After 9/11, the Congress and the Executive Branch called a series of audibles. The Congress created a series of temporary authorities for the Department of Defense, and they have largely succeeded in their intent. I think it is now an appropriate time for the Congress to consider extending some of the specific year-to-year authorities and perhaps make them permanent.

In addition, we support finding appropriations to these funds such as GSCF [Global Security Contingency Fund] and 1207, that as the chairman mentioned, are funded out of O&M [Operations and Maintenance] and other accounts, to provide a more steady stream of appropriation. These programs are proven winners. Not perfect by any measure, but worthy of continued support and refinement.

In conclusion, let me say that we expect combined operations with capable partners to continue to be an effective way to respond to the emerging security challenges worldwide and particularly in counterterrorism, but in a wide range of other ones. I am focusing

a lot on countering the proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] as well. These may be important instruments for those programs.

And Mr. Chairman, I am quite aware that foreign assistance is not always the most popular program with the public, especially in times of fiscal constraint. However, the programs that you have authorized and funded in this committee have brought real results to our national security. These are not foreign aid giveaways, but these successes should remind us that we cannot measure progress on a day-to-day basis.

These efforts take many months and years to get results, and the most important measure of effectiveness is on the battlefield in denying Al Qaeda and its affiliates the ability to organize strikes against our homeland from foreign sanctuaries and in protecting our Nation from other emerging threats to our security.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and testify in the Department's efforts to build partner capacity. That concludes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Sheehan can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

STATEMENT OF LTG TERRY WOLFF, USA, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J5), JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General WOLFF. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Members, members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify here today, and I am pleased and honored to be here with Assistant Secretary Sheehan and Ms. St. Laurent from the GAO [Government Accountability Office], and I ask that my oral remarks be entered into the records.

From our strongest allies to our newest relationships, strengthening partner engagement increases stability and security around the world, and these engagements are specifically constructed to enable a range of results from developing trust and furthering partnerships to strengthening coordination, interoperability, and mature allies.

The January 12th, the Defense Strategic Guidance states that building partner capacity remains important for sharing costs and responsibilities for global leadership. Looking ahead, the Department and the military will remain globally engaged providing a stabilizing presence through a network of alliances and presence through partnerships and cooperative approaches to address common security problems.

Across the globe we seek to be part of a security partnership of choice—we seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations. The Department and the military undertake a number of security cooperation activities to enable and encourage our foreign partners to work with us to achieve common security objectives, and these activities are aimed at preventing future crises and should these preventive efforts fail, ensuring that the Department and our partners are sufficiently trained and equipped to respond, as necessary.

Building partner capacity is a complex interwoven system of multiple lines of effort and throughout the Department and certainly across the interagency. Our main goal is to help our partners develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their own country's internal security and contribute to the greater regional stability as well as participate in multilateral operations.

Our coalition in Afghanistan stands as an example of the importance of interoperable and capable partners. Throughout the war, well-trained and highly effective partners have been fighting side by side U.S. forces. Many of our coalition partners deployed without caveats to some of the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan and performed admirably.

As ISAF and USFOR-A [United States Forces—Afghanistan] reshape our presence in Afghanistan as we move towards 2015, our reliance on these partners will continue, and as we work collectively with the Afghanistans it will be important to help them provide for their own Nation's security.

As we turn the page on a decade of a war, the Arab world is in a period of turmoil and change imparting across the region, as you well know, with somewhat of an uncertain future, and while the wave of unrest has changed the security environment, many of our long-standing U.S. goals in the region certainly endure.

And while the new strategic guidance directs us to a re-balance of the Asian Pacific region, we remain committed to our enduring strategic security interest in the Middle East, including maintaining freedom of navigation, confronting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering violent extremism, and continuing to advance towards Mideast peace process. All while supporting and watching political process and reform.

The task of training and advising and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical element of our strategy. The successful implementation of this effort has paid dividends in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, UAE [United Arab Emirates], among others.

In Jordan, the evolution of the Jordanian armed forces as a regional enabler has facilitated their ability to house multilateral special operating force exercises, such as Eager Lion which occurred last spring. Our partnerships with the Lebanese armed forces through Central Command's joint capabilities review resulted in increased capacity to secure and defend their borders.

Qatar and the UAE continue to support regional security and they provide support to both Operations Unified Protector and Enduring Freedom.

As I turn to the Western Hemisphere we are seeking opportunities to build partner capacity, develop, and continue to develop these security partnerships and create innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to these hemispheric security objectives.

The security assistance to Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean as well as the deployment at the El Salvadorian military in support of OAF [Operation Allied Force] and OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] underscore the opportunity for expanding these capabilities and capacities to further regional stabilization efforts.

We have tremendous partners in the U.S. Southern Command's area responsibility who are dedicated to our shared principles. Our efforts in the Asia-Pacific region are part of a synchronized whole-of-government approach that are aimed at refreshing and reinvigorating our military and our military-to-military relationships with established allies as well as other key emerging partners.

So we use building partner capacity events to engage our partners in this region. Exercises augment and supplement this. If you think about Pacific Command over the past few years, they have continued to grow their engagements in quality and quantity to achieve the best training value.

I use RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] as an example, which had 14 countries in 2010, which moved to 22 countries last year in the largest naval exercises that exist.

So PACOM's [Pacific Command] regional exercise has helped train not only the U.S. but partner forces, and they help reinforce our commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, improve interoperability, and send a strong message to the nations across the region.

The reliance on Asia represents a strategic adjustment that acknowledged the growing importance of the region as well as an area full of developing economies and the emergence of new security threats, but it doesn't mean a departure from established alliances.

And if I think to Europe, it has to do with how we are adjusting our presence there and we will reduce the conventional army presence there to only two brigades, but that doesn't mean European commands, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operating Forces won't continue time-honored partnership efforts with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and others through a robust exercise program.

African states and regional organizations are making progress, as the Assistant Secretary talked about, and this is about helping them deal with their security concerns and sources of instability. Nevertheless, our partners in Africa still lack important capabilities and the capacity to address varying results of instability across the region.

Facing this reality, the Department, in conjunction with State, continues to assist on the African continent to build their capacity to respond to these threats. These tailored efforts, as you know, include security assistance, exercises, some rotational presence, advisory efforts, and training and equipping, and all this is being implemented in a low-cost, small-footprint approach.

So in conclusion, as we face the security challenges of the 21st century, we have allies and partners who share an intent and in helping us advance this common security vision and shouldering a burden of global security, we believe that building partner capacity is a prudent investment which deepens our strategic ties and helps defend our interests in an area of diminishing resources in a fiscally constrained environment.

Globally integrated operations do place a premium on partnering and our forces must be able to operate effectively with U.S. Government agencies, partner militaries, indigenous and regional stakeholders and security forces through technology, command, and control, and a low-cost, low-footprint partnering capability.

So whatever form building partner capacity efforts take over time, in the end they have to be agile, flexible enough to respond to a rapidly changing world, and they must be conducted steadily over the long term to instill partner confidence with our commitment and reinforcement all with the State Department's role in leading to U.S. foreign policy efforts.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and testify on the Department and our military's efforts to build partner capacity, and I do want to thank you and this committee for your continued support to our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions today.

[The prepared statement of General Wolff can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. St. Laurent.

**STATEMENT OF JANET ST. LAURENT, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOV-
ERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today to discuss DOD's efforts to build the security capacity of partner nations.

Our work, over the past few years, looking at a variety of these programs, suggests that three key management practices are critical in helping DOD to achieve meaningful results and outcomes from these efforts. These practices include identifying clear goals and terminology for the various programs, coordinating and sharing information among program stakeholders, and evaluating program performance.

The first area, setting clear goals and defining terminology, is important to help ensure that DOD focuses its activities on the highest priority activities in light of resource constraints rather than undertaking a diffuse set of activities.

Our work has shown that some programs are well aligned with broader goals, while others need to be better aligned. For example, following our review of a joint task force in the Horn of Africa, we observed that the efforts being undertaken there needed to be reassessed and better aligned with Africa Command's priority missions. My understanding is that is in the process of being addressed. Our report on this topic was done a couple of years ago, so there has been some action.

We have also found that DOD uses a wide variety of terms to describe its partnership building activities, and some of this terminology does lead to some confusion. For example, in May 2012, we reported that the combatant commands and the military services had different views and perspectives about what the term "Security Force Assistance" means and how it differs from other DOD terms, such as "Security Cooperation," which is somewhat of a broader term that encompasses exercises, military-to-military exchanges, et cetera.

But as a result, combatant commands and the services were not totally clear about what steps they should take to implement DOD guidance on security force assistance, develop long-range strategies

and programs, and adjust training for general-purpose forces which are potentially going to play a greater role in this area in the future. Therefore, we recommended that DOD clarify its intent and expectations for the combatant command and the Services.

The second area involves the need for DOD components to effectively coordinate both within the Department and with civilian agencies to plan and execute security cooperation activities and share information. This is an area where DOD has taken some positive steps.

For example, U.S. Southern Command has involved over 10 intra-agency partners as it developed its recent planning and strategy documents, thereby helping to ensure a whole-of-government approach.

Still, opportunities for improvement remain. For instance, JO's [Joint Office] review of the National Guard State Partnership program found that the Guard bureau and combatant command's information systems did not always have accurate or consistent information on program activities and funding in this area.

Moreover, in a recent review of security assistance programs that supply equipment and training to foreign nations, we found that program officials do not always have accurate information on the status of acquisitions and equipment deliveries because DOD information systems contain limited information and are not always kept up to date. As a result, some of these equipment deliveries to foreign partners have been delayed and additional costs have been incurred.

The third and final area that I would like to discuss involves sustaining programs and measuring their results. Since 2010, we have reported the need for improvement and evaluation across a range of programs, including the section 1206 Train and Equip Program, DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts, counternarcotics activities, and the National Guard State Partnership Program.

Without good information on the impact of security assistance activities, it may be difficult for these programs to compete for funding during a time of tight budgets. For example, in 2010, we reported that DOD and other U.S. agencies need to place additional emphasis on how initiatives funded through the Section 1206 program will be evaluated and sustained over time.

Only 26 of the 135 proposals we reviewed addressed how projects should be sustained. We understand DOD is taking some actions to help address this area recently.

During our review of the National Guard State Partnership Program, we also heard positive, anecdotal accounts about the program's usefulness; however, DOD did not have a set of metrics and was not collecting information on results systematically. Without such efforts, along with greater focus on sustainment issues, the benefits of DOD partnership building activities could quickly erode.

In conclusion, by setting clear goals, coordinating activities, and sharing information and evaluating progress, DOD can better focus its efforts on helping U.S. partners enhance their capabilities in meaningful ways.

Effective management will also help DOD steward its resources and provide Congress with the information it needs to evaluate

current programs, consider future funding levels, and modify programs and funding approaches to the extent needed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Sheehan, General Wolff, yesterday this committee heard testimony about the readiness crisis and the significant fiscal difficulties facing the Defense Department. BPC activities, such as 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund are funded out of the operation maintenance account, which is already in extremis, but it will take significant further cuts if sequestration is implemented.

What priority will BPC authorities get under the C.R. [Continuing Resolution] sequestration and shortfall in the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations]? Are these activities more important than the training and deployments that cannot currently be funded?

If the Department does plan and execute BPC activities, how will the Department prioritize which BPC activities it must complete, not simply in term of COCOM activities, but in light of the other O&M deficiencies that the joint staff is dealing with?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a very important question as we face sequestration.

The Secretary has been very clear about the potential catastrophic effect of sequestration on the Department. And we are going to be forced with some very difficult choices in the weeks and months ahead.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, a lot of our programs in BPC are funded by defensewide O&M, which are not always applicable to supporting Navy operations. So they are not necessarily out of the same pot of money, but the general question that you ask in terms of setting priorities among these is an appropriate one and a difficult one. I would say, however, though, that our support for building partnership capacity programs remains a very high priority.

When you think about these programs that are funding units that are directly engaged in pushing back Al Qaeda sanctuaries in different parts of the world, these are in direct interest of the United States; places where we cannot either for our own political decisionmaking process or the political decisionmaking process of the host country, that we cannot or should not deploy in those countries, the units that we are training and supporting are directly confronting those organizations that threaten our national security.

So I would say, Mr. Chairman, these programs are going to remain a priority to support, and if you look at 1206, of course is a counterterrorism program, and in the other programs, for instance in 1207N and then Global Security Contingency Fund, those programs are primarily designed to support the specialized counterterrorism units of countries where there is a significant Al Qaeda presence, and so those will remain high-priority issues, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. How would they rank as compared to readiness? I have heard stories that troops are not getting the same training that they were a year ago, that they are not having as much opportunity to fire their weapons and other things, cuts that are already being made in training which affects readiness. How would it compare to that?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, obviously the readiness of our forces are always a paramount priority in the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be like number one?

Secretary SHEEHAN. I would—yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman. However—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Okay.

General.

General WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I would just say I think readiness would remain number one, and there will be a delicate balance that we will have to work our way through as a better understanding of the impacts are assessed.

As the Assistant Secretary has said, and so have you all, the building partner capacity efforts are fairly small in the grand scheme of things, and it is fairly economical. So we have to figure out how to retain the appropriate balance and make the right trade-offs so that we can continue to deal with helping build those capacities out there where we watch these emergent threats continue to change.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of the choices that we will be forced to make aren't between a good thing and a bad thing. They are between two good things, and that is why it is difficult.

Ms. St. Laurent, your testimony mentioned several systemic challenges facing the implementation, execution, evaluation of the BPC authorities. What role do you think multiplicity, duplication, and overlap of all these authorities has in complicating these systematic challenges?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Many of the programs do have some similar features; however, they also have differences. So for example, a number of them are focused on enhancing counterterrorism skills. Also, a number of them are focused on enhancing partner nations' capacity to participate in stability and reconstruction operations.

So to some extent there are similarities, but in other cases there are differences. GSCF, for example, provides multiyear funding, also has some additional authorities to do other kinds of activities. We have done a large body of work on duplication and overlap in Federal programs over the past few years at GAO in response to a congressional mandate, and I would like to point out a couple of key themes from that work.

First of all, there are probably some additional administrative costs, legal review costs, management costs associated when there are large numbers of programs operating in a particular Government area, whether it is education and training programs, or in this case, security cooperation or building partnership activities.

To the extent that there can be some consolidation of programs to create fewer broader programs, that may reduce the amount and time of management attention needed to focus on the administra-

tive costs of those programs. So it may be possible to do some potential consolidation in this area.

However, there is always a trade-off because these programs are not identical and they have been set up, for example, in some cases to focus on specific countries and in other cases to focus on specific types of activities, like counterterrorism.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are going to have to realize that we will be having trade-offs, but in times of this really tight fiscal constraint, I think we are going to have to look at all possible areas where we can cut duplication certainly be one of those very important ones.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I can actually follow up on that, I guess one of the questions that occurs to me, why are there so many different authorities to accomplish a similar task? And you have mentioned some of the programs work better than others.

And it is a question for Mr. Sheehan as well.

I guess the example I would take is when you are looking to—you have a partner capacity challenge like we have now I guess in the area of North Africa, and you are trying to piece together. You say, well I need, I don't know, \$30 million or a lot less than that. How do you sort of look at the menu of authorities and say, I can get some from here, I can get some from there? So how do you piece that together now?

And second, Ms. St. Laurent, I would be interested, what would make more sense. You know, how would you say, well, we don't really need that, let's consolidate that and make it more simple? How do we make greater sense of these authorities?

Because I think at the starting point, it would be hard to figure out how much money you have available until you go look at a whole wide variety of authorities and say, okay, what is out there.

So there is a couple questions in there, but Mr. Sheehan, why don't you start.

And then Ms. St. Laurent, if you could offer a comment on that, it would be great.

Secretary SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congressman Smith.

Actually the reason we have these multiple authorities, I believe, because this committee and others recognized that we had a very changing, evolving security landscape at 9/11, and they reacted by creating special authorities to deal with certain evolving threats, and I believe it has been effective.

So yes, we may want to consolidate, but if you look at the purposes of these authorities, they were specifically targeted at very specific defense requirements; 1206 is a counterterrorism authority. It is very narrow in its application, and that is not necessarily a bad thing.

We then went to 1207 when the Congress recognized the evolving threats of Al Qaeda in Yemen and the evolving threat of Al Shabaab in East Africa. 1207N funding was directly targeted to those areas, and I think that was appropriate and effective in focusing the resources of our Government on those threats.

Counternarcotics authorities are obviously designed to prevent the scourge of drugs coming into the U.S., but also the flexibility

of those authorities that enabled us to use counternarcotics funding on the nexus of terrorism and counternarcotics is a good thing.

So yes, they are different, but I think there is sometimes strength in the differences of these programs and the focus they provide and the flexibility they provide to go after certain aspects of our national security.

These programs, I want to underscore this to me as a member of the Department of Defense—and I also was a senior official in the Department of State also—these programs are very important to the Department of Defense. They enable the Department of Defense to focus its effort.

Other programs that are run by the Department of State are also very, very important, but they are different. They do not enable the Department of Defense to respond quickly and effectively to these emerging threats like these authorities have over the past 6 or 7 years.

So I just want to underscore that yes, they are different. It looks like there is some duplication, but there was purpose in their creation, and in my view, they have been extremely effective in terms—if you look at the foreign aid programs of the last 50 years since the old Cold War, if you look at these and stack them up, I would argue that they have been extremely effective because of their focus.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. St. Laurent, you want—

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I would agree that often the reason why new programs do get added is because there is a gap in some of the existing programs and new authorities are needed. What sometimes happens is over time then in a particular area, there are a number of programs and some of the earlier programs are not necessarily evaluated to see if they need to continue. So I think this is an area of—

Mr. SMITH. Can you give us an example right now of one that might fall into that category within the BPC?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Well, I think one of the issues over the long term to think about is how, for example, there are a number of military-to-military exchange programs.

So the National Guard State Partnership Program contributes to some extent to that, but the theater commanders also have a number of other tools and programs that facilitate military exchanges. It may be that Congress and the administrations decide to retain all those programs because they do serve different purposes, but that is an area where there is some commonality.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. The other point I would like to make is when programs can be established to focus on providing a capability that we want to create in a partner country, in a partner country's military forces, that may be an appropriate way to structure programs. For example, one of the things we hear when we travel to the combatant commands is that they often have to piece together numerous funding sources to accomplish an objective.

So for example, the state partnership program may pay for the cost of transporting National Guardsmen to participate in activity, but then the combatant commander also has to find other funding sources to help round out all the other costs associated with what-

ever the particular activity is. So to the extent you can focus on capabilities that could be beneficial.

Mr. SMITH. One more quick question. There is also a fine line between BPC programs and development programs because I know DOD has been, you know, there is like the MIST [Military Information Support Team] program for instance, and some others out there, and there is a lot of concern—Secretary Gates had expressed the concern that DOD was doing stuff that frankly the State Department and USAID ought to be doing, and we ought to transfer those authorities over to them.

Now part of the reason that DOD's doing that is because they have the money. You know, sequestration could change that, but certainly they have more money than either State or USAID. You know, I know this isn't directly, you know, listed as a building partner capacity program within DOD, but I think they are very linked.

How does the BPC programs match up with the development programs? And where might there be some crossing over of authorities there that could be rationalized?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. My response to that would be that the BPC programs are more focused on building the capabilities of other countries' military forces for counterterrorism, stability operations, et cetera.

However, DOD has other programs, for example, some of the humanitarian assistance and civic aid programs under OHDACA [Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid] where DOD is engaged in activities like building schools, building wells, things like that. Those activities do tend to look like some of the activities that AID and State Department fund. So there is a tremendous need to ensure that there is good coordination.

We have found that there is room for improvement in that area, and we have a report on that topic that identifies where some of that overlap occurs and makes suggestions for enhancing the coordination. So that is one area where further improvement would be needed.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would just say that I agree with some of the comments Mr. Smith made at the beginning. I think this is a very important part of our national security.

From my standpoint of looking at this, it is a dangerous world. We can't be everywhere. Helping others develop the capability to do the things that need to be done makes sense, and part of the reason DOD is doing more of it is because they actually get it done; particularly on counterterrorism in a timely way.

But as the chairman points out, money is tight and part of what we have got to look at is whether these authorities that have kind of sprung up in various ways and various reasons on an ad hoc basis can't be improved in some way, and I think that is an important area for us to discuss.

Ms. St. Laurent, let me just ask a couple of quick questions right quick.

You talk about metrics and I am a big fan of being able to measure what we are getting for our money, but as I think back about some of the great successes in building partnership capacity, Philippines, Colombia, et cetera, what metric would you use to measure year by year the effort that is being made in situations like that?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. That is an excellent question, and we do recognize that this is a challenging area but however, there are different types of metrics.

So first of all, I think it is important for all the programs to think about metrics and establish, perhaps, a mix of metrics that they are going to use to gauge program success and those could be a combination. For example, in the counternarcotics area, you know, there are both output measures in terms of the number of interdictions, the number of individuals trained, things like that. So that is one form of metric that is perfectly acceptable. The harder and more difficult metrics to get at is the actual outcome.

So in this case for example, in training of the security forces, there could certainly be metrics about the numbers of individuals trained, the types of capabilities that they are trained in, but then there are ways to assess, we do it with our own forces through our readiness indicators, et cetera, the extent to which those capabilities are actually being enhanced.

And I think of the 1206 program DOD has begun to do more of these evaluations. You often need some baseline data as well to identify where you are starting from or where these countries are starting from and then be able to assess the progress over time.

So it is difficult to do—

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes.

Ms. ST. LAURENT [continuing]. But it can be done and we understand that it is not necessarily going to be perfect, but I think it will be very important so that these programs can demonstrate their value.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes, well I appreciate that.

Let me ask one other brief question, and then I want to get to Mr. Sheehan on something.

You talk about sustainability, and I think what you mean is starting something that the host country can then continue, but also something about sustainability are these programs that are just temporary.

So if a program is going to expire in 3 or 4 years, how can we, much less the host country, have that kind of sustainability? So do you agree that part of the issue here is that these are all temporary authorities and that some sort of permanent, rationalized authority would make some of these sustainability questions a little easier to deal with?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Again, I agree. This is a challenging area, funding can vary from year to year. It is often challenging for DOD to know exactly what funding they are getting, when they are getting it, and to create a longer term plan.

I do agree that in some cases either multiyear authority and more continuity in funding would be helpful. Congress has to evaluate that, of course, as to when they want to give that kind of authority and when they don't, but a key point is, again, sustain-

ability of something that needs to be thought about at the beginning of programs——

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay——

Ms. ST. LAURENT [continuing]. When they are being created.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Sheehan, just right quick, to fight terrorism, it is not always militaries in these countries that are needed.

To fight narco-terrorism, sometimes it is Coast Guard-like functions and law enforcement. You know, that is what the global security fund was supposed to do, but in the first years—I don't know—I think there is a fair amount of disappointment in the first year. Is that fair or not?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I, as you know, I have been frustrated to a degree in this first year working with this new authority. There is no question about it. It has been a difficult and bumpy process. We didn't nearly get to as many programs as we have liked to have, but I would say that some good came out of this program and I think there is some positive aspects in the future.

First, what we call the global soft carve-out was very, very important for Admiral McRaven and the special operations community to build the soft relationships that can be so crucial for our programs down the road, and we opened up some funding programs for that in what we call the Mainline GSCF.

Also, we were able to work with our State Department partners to focus those efforts in some very important countries for our national defense interests. In Libya with a border security program and obviously with the flow of weapons out of southern Liberia into the Sahel, this is a major, major problem that is upsetting the entire balance of security in North Africa.

In Nigeria, we have gotten into Nigeria with a counter-IED [improvised explosive device] program to start to build a relationship with the Nigerians, give them some capability to deal with Boko Haram in the northeast which is, again, is a looming problem for Africa that threatens the stability of that part of the region, not only with Al Qaeda, but with other aspects of sectarian violence that is very troubling.

We also supported a program in the Philippines, a very important partner both for counterterrorism and maritime programs, and as you mentioned Mr. Chairman, the GSCF enables us to provide funding to other than military organizations like Coast Guard and police, Minister of Interior organizations that are very important for our counterterrorism efforts.

So GSCF, although difficult, first year problematic did enable us to do some things that our authorities didn't, so I would give it overall a passing grade in terms of moving our interests forward and we hope to improve it in the years ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being before us.

I have been on for 17 years on this committee and worked through a lot of the issues with respect to Colombia when President Uribe was there and some of the work that we have done and

have gone down several times especially with some of the training that we have done there from a military standpoint.

I mean, obviously we were in there for a lot of reasons; lack of stability, FARC, and others who we thought might at some point be negative towards the U.S. if we lost ground in Colombia, and of course, the drug trade, all which effect in particular California because we are on the Pacific.

So my question to you is—and by the way, I also sit on WHINSEC [Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation] so you know the whole training up of—or interchangeability of trying to do civilian control over some of these military over in South America.

And so my question is, where do you see—where do you see some of the programs expanding with respect to Latin America, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, where do you see some of the efforts happening? What do you do when countries are so continuously changing maybe zinging back from left to right politically speaking, what are the things that concern you and what types of programs do you see for the future going into these countries south of us?

And I guess it would start with Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congresswoman Sanchez.

And I think by bringing up Colombia is obviously one of the models of our building partnership capacity. I first went to Colombia as a Lieutenant in 1980. I went to their commando school as a young Special Forces officer. At that time, we were beginning a partnership with the Colombians.

Over the last 30 years has been extremely close tight, growing every year and this is the point I want to make here is that the persistent engagement with the Colombian Army and the Colombian police as you know, has yielded results. We have invested the time, the money, the relationships that has reshaped their army, reshaped their police dramatically since I was there in 1980.

And I believe that it—Colombia represents a model for moving forward. What we did in Colombia is a combination of many, many authorities, both counterterrorism, counternarcotics authorities, to build their institutions from the top to the bottom, reforming them, ensuring that to try to protect them from the scourge of corruption involved in these huge sums of narcotics monies to strengthen their institutions to provide them the equipment, the training, and the wherewithal to deal with this nexus of narco-terrorism—

Ms. SANCHEZ. So Mr. Secretary, I see something like that and then I see for example what has been going on in Mexico, which has just been so much more difficult for us to help that country to get things together there.

So—

Secretary SHEEHAN. I think Mexico, I think, is a very special, unique case as you know. They are much more sensitive to American military presence in their country than say, Colombia where we had hundreds of advisers there operating in a very smooth and effective way.

Mexico is a different equation and actually what is interesting now to see, the folks that we worked with in Colombia over the years, it is easier for them to operate in Mexico and they are now

assisting the Mexicans in providing their experience in dealing with this threat in Mexico. And I think though in Mexico, we will find a way with the new government with the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party], to find a way to help them deal with this scourge and we will move forward.

I think perhaps one of the more promising areas or one of the most challenging and difficult areas would be in Central America, which also is now being affected by the narcotics trade through their territory. I think we will look to Colombia for examples of how we can strengthen those institutions in Central America that are under assault from the violence and the corruptive monies of the narcotics industry moving through there.

And in the Andean region as well, where we have been engaged for a long time with the cocaine and opium threats, we will again look to the Colombia model to build a comprehensive program to strengthen their ministries to deal with the threat.

General WOLFF. I would add just one thing or two things.

Number one, that SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] I think has it about right with Operation Martillo. It is a good way to empower others to help work these tasks, and additionally, there are other partners in the hemisphere who can help us. The Canadians want to help down in Central America as well.

So you build this network of partners that can help you so it is not always you in the lead and there are others that can help where there is historical baggage.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank Congresswoman Sanchez for raising the point about Plan Colombia.

I wish the American people knew what a success that is—and Secretary Sheehan that you were there, that is great.

But I know firsthand, we have exchange students who have stayed with us from Cali. Two of my sons went to high school as exchange students in Colombia to see this success, and, truly, the American people should be very proud of the American military efforts to provide stability in that extraordinary country.

I know firsthand, too, of the success of the relationship with the Republic of Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic. I am the co-chair of the Bulgaria caucus.

I am a member of the Friends of Slovakia caucus—to visit with our allies, our partners in Afghanistan, working side by side to promote peace in that country and the success there and the friendships that are being developed and the partnerships, the modernization, the professionalism, truly, they are success stories that should be told.

Additionally, Secretary Sheehan, a recent Government Accounting Office report raised concerns about the National Guard State Partnership Program. GAO highlighted concerns about the oversight funding and training and effectiveness of the program.

Do you believe it is appropriate for Congress to amend Title 32 in order to codify the National Guard State Partnership Program regarding the funding sources, purposes of the program, and speci-

fyng certain limitations on the use of funding? I appreciate very much that Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo of Guam and myself have introduced legislation that I hope would be of assistance.

Secretary SHEEHAN. I thank the congressman. I believe that the weaknesses of have been—excuse me. I am sorry.

Mr. Congressman, I believe that the weaknesses identified by the GAO are very important for us to strengthen our programs with the National Guard. At this point, I am not really prepared to say that we are ready to make those changes, but I will get back to you as soon as I can to come up with the DOD's response to the weaknesses found in this program, and I owe you an answer on that, Mr. Congressman.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Mr. WILSON. And as a former National Guardsman myself, I know that the Guard members truly—and I—we have the A.G. [Adjutant General] up front and former reservists here, too, but good people—we have had the privilege of working with our partners and it can be very positive.

A question I have for each of you; how will our counternarcotics funding be utilized in relation to the Afghan police and military in Afghanistan post-2014?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Congressman, we haven't made all our decisions regarding the post-2014 equation right now. That is being carefully considered, and we will review those over the next weeks and months ahead, but I will say that there are some aspects of the counternarcotics program in Afghanistan that have been very, very effective, particularly where we work with vetted units within the Afghan Ministry of Interior, have been very important in tackling the narcotics threat there.

So as we move forward with our final package for the post-2014, we will be evaluating what role the counternarcotics authorities will have there.

Mr. WILSON. And how does the counternarcotics partnership fit into the Administration's Asia-Pacific strategy?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Mr. Congressman, I think the counternarcotics program is important for all of our theaters, the narcotics monies that fuel these organized crimes have often had relation with terrorist organizations, or also provide smuggling networks that can be used to smuggle terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, or other threats to our security are extremely important in the Pacific as well as our theaters. It will be central to our strategy.

Mr. WILSON. Again, I would like to thank each of you for your service and it really is a success story that—I had the opportunity to also visit with the Armed Forces in Ghana, and we have had nearly a 50-year relationship that—it really would be positive for the American people to know, understand, and know how appreciative the people are and how successful.

I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for your service.

I want to come back to Mr. Sheehan's comments that this is not foreign aid. I notice that the fiscal year 2013, 1206 notifications, the first tranche, is about \$71 million, give or take, if you add it up. It has \$7.63 million for Bulgaria. I think most of my constituents would say, why in God's name are we engaging in some joint security operation with Bulgaria? What does it possibly have to do with us?

And it is a fair question. The question was answered last July, a bus carry—would have carried 47 Israeli tourists near the airport was blown up by a bomb attack.

In recent days, the Bulgarian Government has identified Hezbollah as the likely perpetrator of the bomb attack. An account of that report from the *New York Times* last week says Bulgaria was chosen as a target not only because of the Black Sea's popularity with Israeli tourists, but because security there was more lax than in other European countries.

It goes on to say that Bulgarians living along the scenic Black Sea coast did not fear for their safety or expect a terrorist attack. The network of terrorists around the world, as you well know, is agile and intelligent. It finds the soft spots in the world and then attacks there where it seems to be the most likely case.

And one thing I think we need to keep in mind here, I think Mr. Thornberry said this very, very well, that this is a real investment in securing our citizens around the world. I did a little math on this. The money we are sending to Bulgaria this year represents \$1 out of every \$100,000 the United States spends on defense.

So out of every \$100,000 we spend in our defense budget, \$1 goes to Bulgaria or will go to Bulgaria for the purpose of providing interoperable command and control capabilities for force protection companies and military assistance teams, which, as a lay person, I take to mean, you know, figuring out the bad guys, where they are before they could strike and hurt other innocent people.

I think that this points out that we have three options in a world that is globally dangerous. The first is to adopt a catastrophic strategy of passivity, just sort of hoping this won't happen in Croatia or Estonia or Hungary or Latvia or Lithuania or any of the other countries. I think that is a major mistake.

The second option would be to increase the number of personnel we have and increase our global footprint. You know, put more U.S. troops or put U.S. troops in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary. I am not for that. I think it stretches us economically; it creates all kinds of geopolitical problems that we don't need. And I think it is not—the benefit is not worth the cost.

What you are suggesting and advocating for—and I agree with—is a strategy of making alliances and partnerships and enhancing the security capabilities of those strategic partners. Now I know a lot of that funding has come from our OCO accounts, or overseas contingency accounts, and those accounts are obviously going to drop pretty dramatically over time, as they should.

What is the importance of us replacing those OCO expenditures with regular baseline budget expenditures in order to continue strengthening these partnerships?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congressman Andrews. I think—I am glad you raised the issue of our support, not only of Bulgaria but our East European partners.

And I think this is, again, one of the most significant strategic relationship changes we have made over the last 10 years and it is based on them participating in ISAF, which supported 14 mostly East European countries and of course, these are not poor countries. So you asked the right question.

Why would we support them? But I would say that these modest investments in those countries gave us the ability to help shape their forces so that they could participate successfully in ISAF, thereby reducing our requirement to put additional U.S. forces on the ground. I think it was an exceptionally good investment.

And I think I will turn to General Wolff also to follow up on that, as he has much more experience on that.

General WOLFF. Sir, I just merely suggest that we have got about—they have about 580 or so Bulgarians in Afghanistan right now as part of ISAF, and so as those units have trained to go there, it has been about increasing and improving their capability so they can be a contributing member of the coalition. So this has grown over time as we have watched these countries improve their capability.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. I think this is a good investment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Yes, thank you for what you are doing. I look at most of the work that you are doing as a form of prevention in many areas of the world and avoiding larger-scale conflict.

My question is logistically does every BCP program or mission have an estimated end game or exit that is a goal or part of the metric, as we referred to it before, where we are planning to leave or at least have a minimal presence in these efforts?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Congressman, the issue of exit strategies and exits is an appropriate one, and we want to—our goal, as a former Special Forces operator, our goal is to work ourselves out of a job. When we are effective, we are able to go home.

I would caution, though, that normally the places where we go to operate are countries that are broken. We are not going to operate in Switzerland or in Germany or France. These are countries that are really—been broken up by years of internal conflicts, by scourges of narcotics or terrorism there that are surging through their countries.

So it often takes a long, long time, but I think it is very incumbent upon us, particularly even with our East European allies that are so important, to work ourselves out of a job with those countries as they gain their footing, as they gain their strength, that we exit ourselves out of that job.

General WOLFF. Sir, I might say that, you know, when I look at the NATO class of 1999 and then the NATO class of 2004, having watched how they contributed in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] in Iraq and now OEF, I think it is a success story. So over time, they do get better. They improve their own capabilities and their institu-

tional ability to man, equip, train, deploy, and then employ forces, and that is kind of the graduation exercise, I think.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, and thank you for your efforts. And I yield my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much.

It is good to see you all here, and it is actually refreshing over the years, when we started talking about interagency and then whole of government and this is all part of that discussion.

In—and I appreciate—I know that Secretary Sheehan and General Wolff, you both talked about the importance of and the role of the State Department here in building that capacity.

And I am actually sorry, Mr. Chairman, that we weren't able to have the State Department here as well, because I think that is such an important relationship.

There are areas—and David Berteau yesterday in our Emerging Threat Subcommittee, talked about the fact that the DOD has actually accepted missions that they weren't necessarily trained to handle. We know that some of the missions morphed and in many ways were more the mission of the State Department, and yet we see some reluctance, I guess, to give that up in some areas.

And I wondered if you could speak to that, whether you think the DOD is willing to relinquish their lead in some of those areas?

General WOLFF. Congresswoman, if I might lead. I think a lot of this is, we are talking about complementary efforts in a way, and some of the things that the Department of State does through Title 22 versus what we are talking about, I think, create a complementary effect. And the issue here is how can you ensure that that is economized and complementary in nature.

So out in Iraq and in Afghanistan we do interagency things at the tactical level, and then back here in Washington, we try to bring that together at the strategic level so that we have an understanding of what USAID is trying to do, as well as what the rest of State is doing.

I would merely suggest that it is not about them or us. It is really about the complementary nature of how we do things, and so we routinely deal with Assistant Secretary Shapiro from P.M. [Political-Military Affairs] who works so much of that for the Department of State. So it is complementary.

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there a collaboration piece of this thought that quite honestly, you know, whether it is cultural or otherwise, that there are some barriers to it that we still are having some difficulty addressing? And I guess if you could bring that, not just with necessarily with the State Department, but just with other entities of Government to try and do a number of the things that we are talking about here?

And Ms. St. Laurent in terms of sharing that data aligning better, is there an area particularly that we really do need to focus on a lot harder than we are doing today?

General WOLFF. The efforts by the whole-of-government approach that was mentioned previously in what we saw both in Iraq and Afghanistan, ultimately, what I found in my three tours in

Iraq was that, if you were going to try to help their security forces make changes, it was all going to be tied into the rule of law.

And so while there, I then went to find the Treasury attache, because I needed help trying to work through rule of law issues, so we could better ensure that their security forces could legally apprehend bad guys in their system and then keep them in their jails properly, and then try them in their courts versus a system we would try to impose through really a lack of understanding of the culture. So it really is a whole-of-government approach that we have to better bring to bear.

Secretary SHEEHAN. Congresswoman Davis, I would like to follow up on General Wolff.

I agree that the area where we need, where there is the grayest area, is in the Ministry of Interiors, and the police law of order functions. In our Government, in the United States, we know our police departments, they are local, and they stick to criminal activity.

In many other countries, to deal with the internal security threats that they have, it is a combination of their army doing it and police units. Some of these police units are paramilitary in nature, and so in that area there is a blending of both State functions and authorities and DOD authorities.

And I do believe that the flexibility that we have got under GSCF for instance, to train Minister of Interiors that are conducting paramilitary operations that are much more similar to what we do in the U.S. military, is important.

And so we need to stay very closely aligned with the State Department in those areas of where we work with Ministers of Interior.

Mrs. DAVIS. And Ms. St. Laurent do you believe that in the work that you have done in trying to look at some of these areas, and the three practices that you identified are, what kind of timeline I guess would you like to see to go back and look at those areas where we lack some capacity to deal with, whether it is the data collection or alignment or whatever. What should we be looking at 6 months from now?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Well, I think it kind of varies by program. Overall, I think this is a work in progress and we do recognize these are very challenging areas. Putting good evaluation mechanisms in place, even doing the interagency coordination, we have seen improvement over the past few years in a number of areas in terms of State and DOD collaborating more.

Each of the combatant commanders has a process for doing their security cooperation plans that they engage with State Department. However when we do our field work, we still see examples where State Department or embassies are not aware of things that DOD is doing.

So it is an ongoing, ongoing challenge and at times there is, for example, in the Trans-Sahel area of Africa, you know, sometimes there is a need for specific plans to be put in place, for example, to get at some of the counterterrorism issues there and do more of a plan that recognizes both what State is going to bring to the table as well as DOD.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Gentlelady's time has expired.

Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was visiting with a National Guardsman the other day who was sharing an incident that he had heard about in Central America where he was shot at in a law-and-order event while on duty there, and it just raised the greater question I have, since I believe they weren't allowed to carry firearms outside of the line of their duty, how is our National Guard resourced in these partnerships around the world? And how can they protect themselves in these dangerous countries?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is a difficult issue. We put people in harm's way every day; both Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, reservist, and often we send them to parts of the world that are dangerous and they do not carry weapons. That is happening right now in many parts of the world.

If we feel that to go to a part of the world and they are not allowed to carry weapons and it becomes too dangerous, we will call them back. Unfortunately, though we do take some risk when we go to these parts of the world; criminal activity, terrorist activity, others, but I think we are very prudent in evaluating those threats and trying to protect them.

But generally speaking in many of these countries our trainers and advisers will go unarmed, and it is incumbent upon us to make sure that we provide them the best protection they can and if becomes too dangerous, not to send them.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Have there been discussions in allowing them to carry, I mean, like concealed carry we have here between the foreign country as a prerequisite for us providing the aid, allowing our people to defend themselves or have that option?

Secretary SHEEHAN. If I might add, generally, I don't know the exact incident to which you are referring, but normally the host nation has the responsibility to provide that sort of security for us normally when we operate there.

In many of the countries they won't want us to bring weapons, because they will say, "We will provide that security for you. We want your training value not to be on your own force of protection, but to help us in other areas, and we will provide that security." But we can certainly research the incident that you have referred.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I am not sure—we will consider that, but I thought I did raise a very important vulnerability that we are sending our citizen soldiers abroad and they are vulnerable to people.

On another front, to what extent of all, if at all, does the Department of Defense conduct follow-up monitorings to ensure that partner military assets provided under BPC authorities, both equipment and trained units, are being used in support of U.S. national security objectives for which they were provided?

Secretary SHEEHAN. We in the Department have recognized that we need to improve our ability to assess, particularly in for instance our 1206 programs, which is a big program. And we are now in the process of developing a formalized process to evaluate our 1206 programs, and those are currently under way. These weak-

nesses were identified by the GAO and others and we are taking some major steps now to put those processes in place.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Ms. St. Laurent, do you have anything to add on that?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Well, I would say there is also an upfront piece of this, that processes that Congress and requirements that Congress has put in place to ensure that we are giving the assistance to countries that do not engage in gross violations of human rights. So there is that check up front also that is a part of many of these programs. So that can be helpful.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. What is the U.S. response if units trained and equipped by the U.S. misuse our equipment? And have there been any such misuses for instance in Yemen?

Secretary SHEEHAN. I think the record in Yemen is a very strong one. Obviously this is an army and a police force that has a lot of challenges, but we have been highly encouraged by President Hadi, who stepped in about a year ago, in reforming, restructuring both the army and the other ministries to align itself with the professional standards that we would expect in one of our partners.

So we think Yemen is moving in the right direction. Our investments there are paying dividends in the professionalization of their force, and in concrete, on the ground, denying of Al Qaeda sanctuary in a country that is a major threat to our interest.

General WOLFF. If I might say, the partnering occurs at multiple levels from their Ministry of Defense as well as enabling that ministry to lay out its way forward as it reforms its military and all of it is conventional forces, to the C.T. portion which is ongoing as well. So this will be a many-year project, but at President Hadi's request, Central Command has a team that has been working this to lay out the reorganization that they desire.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here this afternoon. It is an important hearing.

My colleague, Congressman Joe Wilson mentioned that he and I have co-authored a bill. We introduced H.R. 641. This bill would codify the National Guard State Partnership Program, he brought this up earlier, to the Secretary.

The bill is nearly identical to Section 335 of the House-passed fiscal year 2013 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], but it wasn't included in the final conference report, and I believe the State Partnership Program provides the Department of State and the combatant commands with a tremendous tool to partner with our allied nations.

Now, the conference report required DOD, Mr. Secretary, to ensure compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act. What is the status of this report? Does the Department of Defense place this in any kind of a priority? You didn't mention anything in your report to Congress, your testimony.

Secretary SHEEHAN. Congresswoman, I did not mention it. It is a priority, and we do owe you an answer to that, and I will get back to you as soon as I can after the end of this hearing.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Also, I have a question for Ms. St. Laurent of GAO. I note that the GAO report from May 2012 highlighted some concerns with the management of the state partnership program. The report raises concerns about the oversight framework, as well as the amount of guidance and training for the use of the program activities.

So beyond the internal efforts, do you believe that additional statutory authority would be helpful to address the use of funds and to clarify the roles and the missions of the state partnership program? And would changes help to ensure better oversight with the program by Congress?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Thank you. Yes, you are correct. Our report did identify a number of areas for improvement in managing the state guard partnership program. Specifically, we talked about the need to clarify the goals of the program, and again, put some procedures in place to evaluate the results, as well as ensure that the Department has accurate data on the activities being funded by the program.

Many of those issues can be resolved by DOD guidance and direction, and DOD is in the process of doing that. They did put out a new directive in December that clarifies some of these areas. Particularly, the guidance points out that the activities of the partnership program should be in support of the combatant commander and State Department priorities. So I think that is very helpful.

While DOD guidance could probably rectify many of these issues, additional legislation that would clarify from a congressional perspective the purposes of the program and also reaffirm that these activities should be in support of State Department and also combatant commander priorities, may be helpful.

Ms. BORDALLO. So your answer then would be affirmative to better oversight with the program by Congress?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I think, again, it could help to clarify Congress's intent. We would say it is not absolutely necessary. The DOD could address many of our management issues on its own. If Congress chooses to clarify congressional intent and purpose, that would be appropriate.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

My final question, Mr. Chairman, is for General Wolff. Can you comment on the value of the State partnership program to the combatant commanders? I have noticed a real focus and effort to expand this program with our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. So from your role in the J5, can you comment on the value of this program in building partnerships?

General WOLFF. Thank you for the question. I see enormous value added. It has got to be the right mission set though. So we can't ask the state partnership element to try to do something that far exceeds its capabilities. We have seen phenomenal return on investment with the OMLTs [Operational Mentor and Liaison Team] and the POMLTs [Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team] that have basically gone out and worked with their partner countries and then accompanied those forces into Afghanistan.

So the linkage, the person-to-person linkage that is established by our, you know, our military service folks linking up with those national militaries and then accompanying them on a mission is quite enormous. So I see a good economy of effort there and an economy of opportunity.

Ms. BORDALLO. And I certainly hope that now our focus will be to the Asia-Pacific area, which we are looking at currently.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Walorski.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question is for Mr. Sheehan, and thanks for what you do. I appreciate it. Can you describe the vetting process the Department of Defense uses when they determine which foreign military or other security units receive U.S. equipment and training through the BPC? And how long is that process, the vetting process?

Secretary SHEEHAN. You are referring to vetting of the country or vetting of the unit?

Mrs. WALORSKI. Vetting of the country and then also of the unit. How is the determination made?

Secretary SHEEHAN. We do both. What we do in my office is when I look at the map, I look at those parts of the world that are directly threatening U.S. interests both to the homeland and to our interests abroad, and we do an analysis based on our intelligence understanding of where those threats are.

And our resources align very, very closely with those threats, only modified by the extent that we can work with some partners more than others. And some parts of the world where we have some threats we are unable to establish the types of relationships we would like to, and we work on those.

So I would say it is directly correlated with the threat to our country that determines where we put our resources. That is where the vetting goes, and that is done in coordination with the Department of State, and I would say generally we have a tremendous consensus on that.

When it comes to the units and the individuals, for the units, again, we work in the country team to make sure that we are identifying the proper unit that is going to accomplish our goal, and particularly that that unit has the right mission within its national force, that it has the proper commanders that can execute the mission, and we vet it at the country team.

Then all the way down to the individuals, we are required under the Leahy vetting requirements to ensure that the people that receive our training uphold the standards of human rights and respect for the rule of law, and we consider those attributes as important as their ability to conduct combat operations. So there is vetting that goes from the strategic right down to the individual who receives the training.

Mrs. WALORSKI. So how long does that take then? So if you identify an area, how long does that vetting process take?

Secretary SHEEHAN. I would say we look at the countries annually, and sometimes it changes rapidly. If situations evolve like they have in the Sahel in the last year, we are able to shift resources where we see Al Qaeda making rapid gains.

Although we were anticipating this, we saw it, but the landscape changed in North Africa since the Arab spring, and we have been able to respond and shift resources to that area. In terms of—so I think that is sort of on an annual basis.

In terms of the vetting of the individuals, I think that can be done in weeks and months at the country team level.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you.

I yield my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. St. Laurent, can you—has GAO looked at how much total spending there has been for the—all the BPC authorities?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. We have looked at selected aspects, the Section 1206 program, and certain other accounts, but—and the State partnership fund—but probably not the entire range of programs.

Mr. LARSEN. Have you made any assessment about whether there ought to be one person in the Pentagon who looks across all the BPC authorities and programs to prevent inefficiencies and duplications?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. We haven't specifically made a recommendation on that. I certainly think that Mr. Sheehan's office is, you know, the key lead there in terms of trying to provide oversight.

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Sheehan, is there a difference between being a key lead and actually being one person in the Pentagon who has authority across BPC authorities?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Mr. Congressman, I think I have enough authority in this realm to provide oversight to most of our most important programs, if not all of them. I think it is fairly well established, although it probably could use a scrub to make sure that it is properly designated as the—

Mr. LARSEN. Have we let the Pentagon evolve into that, or is there enough direction?

Secretary SHEEHAN. There is a certain degree of evolution that has happened over the years, but I think it is settling in to reside in my office and with the J5 in partnering to manage these programs.

Mr. LARSEN. How much total spending then in fiscal year 2012—spending in fiscal year 2012 did you all across these programs have in BPC authorities?

Secretary SHEEHAN. I don't have that number at my fingertips, sir. I will get back to you on that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Mr. LARSEN. Please do that. Considering countries that have received assistance, there has been discussion about those who have graduated, and it is perhaps telling that the ones you noted that have graduated were NATO countries that you pointed to, General Wolff, as examples.

But are there countries that have flunked out, have graduated, or are they all similar to every parent's nightmare, which is the college student who is on the infinite year plan?

General WOLFF. Sir, I think we have some teenagers still in our midst who are learning and growing, and there are setbacks as they—you know, as they learn to kind of spread their wings a bit.

I would use Mali as a good example where we did make some investment into the Mali military, and it didn't particularly pan out very well. We have gone back and taken a hard look at that. Chairman Dempsey has asked us to go do kind of a complete top-to-bottom review with Africa Command.

And we have taken a hard look at why some of the previous investments didn't, you know, generate kind of the outcome we had hoped, and I think we learned from these, and there are a lot of reasons in this particular case. So we kind of take those into play and try to ensure that we can learn from that experience.

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Sheehan.

Secretary SHEEHAN. I would agree that Mali is clearly our biggest failure. We spent tens of millions of dollars in Mali with that army and they got their butts kicked in northern Mali by the Tuareg rebellion, which was subsequently hijacked by AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], creating a major problem for us.

However, part of the reason of that was outside of their control. The amount of weapons pouring in from Libya definitely made their job more difficult, but it is no excuse. We didn't do very well there, but I would contrast that with a tremendous record of success on the African continent in the last 5 years.

When you look at the partnerships we have established in East Africa with the Ethiopians, the Ugandans, Djiboutians, the Burundians, the Kenyans; these have been extraordinarily successful in not only building the partnerships, successful militaries in action.

I can tell you that one of the NATO partners told me that the Kenyans would never get the Kismayo in Somalia. They weren't capable of doing it. They weren't up to the task, that they were a parade ground military.

Well, the fact of the matter is they are there. They did the job. We were there with them. We helped train and equip them, and we are very proud of our partnerships there. So we have some failures, but I think the record of success far outweighs them.

Mr. LARSEN. Great. I have a follow up. Mrs. Hartzler asked a question earlier that I think you gave an answer to a different question, and it is probably just because you didn't connect one and one here to get two.

What she asked is to what extent does the DOD conduct follow-up monitoring to ensure partner military assets provided under the authorities are being used to support U.S. national security objectives for which they are provided, as opposed to being used for objectives that are not our objectives.

You answered a question about assessing 1206 generally. This is a question about are the military assets we provide being used for the things that they are supposed to be used for, or are they being misused, and if they are, what are we doing about it?

General WOLFF. Congressman, I would say there is a time factor here. So, you know, as the training is applied, as the military grows in capability and capacity, the question then is at some point if they are not contributing to, let us say ISAF—I will use that as

a very simple example, the question then is will those trained forces continue to contribute with inside their system?

And I think the return on the investment, if the answer to that is yes, if we have trained them, if they have contributed to the mission at hand, but then the capability they bring back in their own military becomes, you know, additive in nature, then I think it is still a good investment on our part.

Mr. SCOTT. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Enyart.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sheehan, I, too, would like to know when the SecDef [Secretary of Defense] plans to certify the regulations regarding the State partnerships programs, if you could provide me that, I would appreciate it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]

Secretary SHEEHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENYART. And, Mr. Sheehan, I appreciate your comments, that these are proven programs.

And General Wolff, I appreciate your comments that these are agile, flexible programs, that they need a steady state in order to instill partner confidence. I agree with you. I think that is a critical element in the success of these programs. If we are not building partner confidence, then we are not succeeding in the programs.

In line with that—and I appreciate Mr. Thornberry's comments and question regarding metrics, and perhaps for Ms. St. Laurent, this is more anecdotal evidence, but my experience with the state partnership program has been that particularly the relationship between the Illinois National Guard and the Republic of Poland has been very productive—dates back to 1993—and that when the Republic of Poland was asked to provide military forces into Iraq, their first requirement for that was we will go if the Illinois National Guard goes with us. And for the last 10 years, there have been Illinois National Guardsmen directly incorporated into that Polish battle group's staff.

And today, as we speak, there are 17 Illinois National Guardsmen serving with the Poles directly incorporated into that battle group staff. I understand the difficulty of measuring quantitatively that leveraging, that synergy that has been developed.

However, what I would ask you is do you have an idea or do you have a concept of how we might be able to measure, to provide a metric that will establish how that partnership between the National Guard, particularly the Illinois National Guard—and Poland in this case—has led to the success in Afghanistan of that Polish battle group.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Again, I think we recognized in our report that we heard, first of all, very positive remarks by both combatant command staff and others about the value of the program. So we did recognize that. The program itself did not have any systematic effort to collect data. So we think it is important.

We also recognize, as I mentioned earlier, that it is challenging to get real good outcome measures, but there are some ways to do that and a variety of measures probably need to be put in place, both in terms just to document the range of activities that is going

on in this particular program, in terms of number of contacts, the extent of contacts, because we found that kind of data was incomplete in both the combatant commands and the Guard's records.

And I think, again, over time, there may be some ways through—I think you have to also maybe take a look at how other mil-to-mil exchange programs are evaluating their results, but through a combination of even surveying periodically other governments, certainly unless there is an actual operation that comes up, so you have got a data point that a country actually participates because of this, you probably can't do them on a systematic basis, but I understand that that is a significant outcome.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you. I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carson.

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have all heard stories about how American-supplied weapons had been used against our troops in Afghanistan, both those provided to combat the Soviet Union and those recently that were used in "green-on-blue" attacks.

Could you describe what Afghanistan has taught us about military aid and training and how those lessons are being used in pursuit of new partnerships? Do you believe that there is some level of inherent risk present in these partnerships that we should perhaps prepare for?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Mr. Congressman, clearly our most important capacity-building exercise we face in the Department of Defense is with our Afghan partners there, and we have learned a lot, particularly in the last several years, in trying to accelerate their ability to take on their responsibilities to secure their territory within their country. We have learned a lot of lessons. It is a very dangerous and risk-filled environment.

Obviously, and when you have a situation of internal stability, the enemy has the ability to penetrate the national security forces of the host country, particularly when they are so large, as in the case of Afghanistan, because of the nature of that threat.

It is a very large force and they have been able to penetrate, which has its inherent risks of this green on blue or even green on green violence that we see in Afghanistan. So we have learned a lot, and we are making great progress, and but there is a lot more to do, and I will turn to General Wolff.

General WOLFF. Sir, I would say there is an inherent risk, and as the Assistant Secretary has said, we are concerned about it. As you know, based on the rash of incidents last fall, General Allen instituted a series of requirements within the ISAF forces, but equally important he put additional and huge pressure on the leadership of the Afghan national security forces, beginning with the Minister of Defense, all the way down.

So while General Allen's directives to his command were to try to do everything possible to minimize this, the Afghans were also expected to do the same, and a lot of that had to do with revetting. A lot of that had to do with embedding CI [counterintelligence] sorts of forces in to take a look and see what was happening in those organizations, and doing a better job of looking at Afghan security forces coming back from leave, where we knew they were being possibly touched by extremists.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. And also if I could just add a point, we just put out a report within the past few days on Afghanistan issues, and one of the points we made is that certainly more progress in trying to reach agreement with DOD and the Afghan Government about sharing a biometric information would really help also in this situation.

Mr. CARSON. Sure.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Veasey.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about Yemen. During the 2011 unrest in Yemen, did units trained and equipped by the U.S. misuse the U.S. equipment, and how extensive is the U.S. end use monitoring in Yemen?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congressman.

Let me go back and review the 2011 period. I was not on the job at that point, but in 2011, of course, the president at the time, President Saleh, was in charge. He is subsequently gone from that and President Hadi is now the leader. That has been a positive step in the right direction, and as we met—and both General Wolff and I mentioned before—we believe he is instituting the proper reforms of their military.

And right now, over the last, I would say, last year or so, our partnership with the Yemeni military and some of their Ministry of Interior forces, have been extraordinarily effective and have contributed to a major progress against AQ in the Arabian Peninsula; AQAP, which is a major threat to U.S. homeland from Yemen.

So I think that, over the last year or so, with the new leadership at the top, we have much more confidence that our training and assistance is being used properly.

Mr. VEASEY. Okay.

My next question I wanted to ask you about drone strikes in southern Yemen and how are the locals—how are they perceiving the drone strikes? What is your—

Secretary SHEEHAN. Congressman, I don't want to avoid the question; we normally don't discuss those types of operations in an unclassified setting.

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. Okay. I understand.

Thank you.

I yield back the time.

Mr. SCOTT. Ma'am, General, Mr. Sheehan, I don't think there are any further questions, and thank you for your time. This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 14, 2013

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 14, 2013

Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs
and Authorities to Meet 21st Century Challenges
February 14, 2013

I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on a framework for building partnership capacity programs and authorities to meet 21st century challenges. Although “building partnership capacity” may seem like a broad term, this is an important area for the committee's oversight of the recent defense strategy, which places great emphasis on the important role of partnerships to U.S. national security. Likewise, we have enacted significant legislation in this area because the committee has supported the notion that military commanders need to build certain capacities in partner nations to satisfy specific theater security requirements.

We heard testimony yesterday about the fiscal challenges the military faces as it deals with implementing sequestration, a long-term continuing resolution, and the underresourcing of Overseas Contingency Operations accounts. These constraints will disproportionately hurt the Department's operations and maintenance (O&M) account, from which building partnership capacity authorities are also funded. Given this fiscal environment, the emphasis on building partnership capacity in last year's Defense Strategic Guidance and the global threats to U.S. national security interests, this hearing is the beginning of a continuing discussion on what is the proper role of these BPC authorities. In spite of our support for these authorities, many questions remain. What is the right amount of funding? What is the right balance between the Defense and State Departments in funding, strategizing and executing these authorities? What is the right level of engagement and focus by the combatant commands and Services on these activities? And is it a plausible assumption that partner nations will, in fact, use their new capabilities to act consistent with U.S. national security objectives? Congress is the ultimate decisionmaker on funding. Our oversight responsibilities also require us to understand the impact of these authorities on U.S. national security interests and the ability of the COCOMs and Services to execute these authorities without compromising other key priorities and core capabilities.

Furthermore, this committee has expressed concern about the proliferation and duplication of BPC authorities. The authorities to be discussed today make up at least \$750 million per year in authorized funding—not including over a billion a year in counter-

narcotics activities. And the trend is on the rise. In today's fiscal environment, it's important that the Defense Department, COCOMs, and Services prioritize these BPC authorities and activities, in coordination and consultation with the State Department. And it's critical that the Administration understand Congress's intent in authorizing these authorities, and the need to strategize, plan, fund, execute, and assess these authorities.

To testify before the committee today, we have:

- Mr. Michael Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict;
- Lieutenant General Terry Wolff, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), Joint Staff; and
- Ms. Janet St. Laurent, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.

I'd like to thank our witnesses for being with us today and to note that the Department of State, who has a key role to play in this discussion, was also invited to participate, but declined. We will continue to engage State, in partnership with the Foreign Affairs Committee, in this ongoing dialogue.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs
and Authorities to Meet 21st Century Challenges
February 14, 2013

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses for appearing before us today. Building partnership capacity is an integral part of the way the United States addresses our national security concerns. However, from the outset, I want to be clear that while I understand that today, in this context, we are talking about Title X programs that are designed to address a specific U.S. national security concern by, with, and through the efforts of our foreign partners, I take a broader view. Instability as a byproduct of insecurity is in nobody's interest. Regardless whether or not we have a pressing national security concern in a given region at the moment, we do have an overarching interest in reducing instability so that it does not breed the conditions that develop into a pressing national security concern.

But in terms of the more narrow family of BPC authorities under consideration in this hearing, it is important to understand that they are separate and distinct from what we think of as traditional foreign aid that responds to the needs our international partners perceive as their own national security requirements within the context of our larger U.S. foreign policy framework. BPC programs are designed to address a U.S. national security problem that a combatant commander, through the Secretary of Defense, has identified and thus enable our partners to assist us with a mutual security concern that is a priority for the United States. In some cases, with our help, they are better positioned to address it. In other cases, we are using an economy of force approach. But in all BPC cases, we are addressing a very real U.S. national security problem.

In the past few years we've seen some successes in our BPC efforts. We've been active in the Philippines and they have developed a significant counter to the insurgency in Mindanao, for instance. With our assistance, Uganda and Burundi have really taken the fight to Al Shabaab in Somalia and that country is beginning to turn around. Certainly our European partners who have deployed to Afghanistan with our assistance have been indispensable. But we've also had some problems in places like Mali, where it was clear that our efforts to build capacity of their Army were ineffective when it came time to oppose AQIM's march to Bamako. So, we must be judicious about with whom we choose to partner, what shape that partnership takes, and how we evaluate the return for our effort.

Returning to the broader view, security assistance programs shouldn't exist in a vacuum. In instable areas the problem is rarely the lack of guns. In general, our security assistance programs, in-

cluding those conducted under Title 22, ought to be a component of broader efforts to reduce the conditions that breed instability. Where feasible, BPC programs should be implemented in combination with programs that reduce poverty, improve governance, and encourage economic development. This is why the State Department and USAID have an essential role in the development of our BPC programs. It is both a check that the BPC program is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and an opportunity to fit these activities in the regional engagement architecture the State Department oversees.

Lastly, today I'd like to hear some discussion about what enduring form BPC authorities ought to take. Now it seems like it is a jumble of complementary, overlapping authorities that makes it a challenge to piece them together to address one complex security challenge. AFRICOM loves to brief a slide that shows a Ugandan soldier and how it took many different authorities to get him ready to deploy to Somalia. The Global Security Contingency Fund we passed into law in 2011 was supposed to get at some of that, but I've been disappointed about how it has seemed to get bogged down. Certainly, there's not a common understanding of its purpose, both here on the Hill, and, it seems, within the interagency. I'd like to get at some of that today.

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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
BY
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
ON
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY FOR 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGES
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY 14, 2013

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INTRODUCTION

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee: thank you for the opportunity to talk with you about the Department of Defense's efforts to build partner capacity. I am pleased to provide you with information about this critical element of our national security.

Upon release of the new defense strategy in January, President Obama emphasized that "we are joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity." Secretary Panetta expanded on this point in a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace on June 29, when he noted that working with key allies and regional partners to build their military and security forces became a major component of U.S. national security strategy after World War II. This approach has endured long beyond the Cold War, and for the United States military it has gained new – and appropriate – importance as a mission in the decade since 9/11.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

For the Department of Defense, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) is a fundamental aspect of our strategy, tied to the realization of U.S. defense objectives and the success of current and future military missions. Specifically, BPC is a key part of our transition strategy in Afghanistan and the commitment we have made with other International Security and Assistance Force partners to provide training and financial support to Afghanistan's National Security Forces (ANSF) beyond 2014. BPC encompasses a variety of activities, from security force assistance and developing professional, capable, and sustainable foreign security forces, to international security assistance with our partners at the State Department, to developing our own U.S. capability to collaborate with partners on complex challenges and building mutually beneficial security relationships. By enabling partners to achieve our shared national interests, we ultimately create a more cost-effective model for stability that is less reliant on direct U.S. military engagement. BPC mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States, serves to build a base of credible and capable partner countries that can effectively participate in multinational, coalition-based operations, and sets conditions for future cooperation and improved U.S. access. It also makes any necessary U.S. engagements more effective as we are able to leverage capable partners' unique local knowledge and understanding.

Security Force Assistance in particular is often but not always conducted by our special operations forces (SOF), whose history and proficiency at working "by, with, and through" partner forces makes them our provider of choice for this mission. SOF operate through persistent engagement in key countries, which generates operational context. Operational context is the thorough understanding and, in fact, expertise that is uniquely gained through multiple visits to the same areas. This includes understanding local culture, society, language, economy, history and politics. In short, SOF operators have valuable insights on the physical and human terrain of their areas, which allow them to be more precise and therefore successful in the enabling activities.

BPC permeates the Department of Defense's activities, and is a critical enabler to every primary military mission. Several examples follow below.

- *Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare.* Tools like the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program have been

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indispensable for maintaining constant pressure on al-Qaida and its affiliates worldwide. In order to counter regional and transnational terrorist organizations, we must develop and sustain a global network of allies and partners who can work together, communicate effectively and share the responsibilities of global leadership. In many cases, partners possess cultural and linguistic abilities that afford them better access and effectiveness than U.S. forces executing the same mission. Building on decades of BPC experience, our SOF are already at the forefront of this approach. They have played a key role in places like the Philippines where their engagement has yielded more capable partner forces and significant progress against terrorists. The ongoing relationship between SOF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) strengthened when SOF deployed in 2002 to act in a non-combat role to advise and assist the AFP in operations against Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist group taking advantage of safe havens in the southern Philippines. The units first engaged with local residents to learn their basic needs. This allowed US SOF to then work with the AFP to address grievances in the community, severing their ties with the terrorist groups. As SOF trained and advised the AFP personnel, they helped coordinate security efforts and interagency, sometimes international, programs to address key issues such as water, medical care, transportation, and education. Their actions speak louder than my words in demonstrating the effectiveness of BPC.

- *Counternarcotics.* DoD's counternarcotics authorities (i.e. Sections 1004, 1021, 1022, 1033) allow us to provide support to domestic and foreign law enforcement organizations, working with the State Department, as they work to counter the destabilizing effect of narcotics trafficking, terrorists, insurgents, and related threat financing. The impact of this support is most visible in countries such as Colombia, where a sustained, multi-agency BPC effort, together with State Department civilian police engagements and USAID development projects, has enhanced Colombia's ability to counter narcotics production and other security challenges within its own borders. Through this effort, which has drawn on SOF training, Colombia has become an important exporter of security, sharing its expertise with others in the region and beyond.
- *Deter and Defeat Aggression.* BPC efforts are critical to enhancing the aggregate capabilities and capacities of a network of defense partnerships designed to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, operate together with greater effect. Work needs to be done to ensure allies and partners are capable of operating in contested environments, including in the face of anti-access/area-denial threats. The Department's major exercise programs help us prepare for such challenges by promoting greater interoperability and allowing us to experiment with combined operating concepts.
- *Provide a Stabilizing Presence.* Exercises, deployments for training, and other military-to-military familiarization activities deter aggression from destabilizing regional actors while promoting interoperability, information sharing, and collaboration on mutual security objectives with our partners. We can never be certain where in the world U.S. forces may be required to operate, and being able to count on enduring relationships with partner nations is at the core of a multinational coalition's strength, helping to secure shared access to facilities and territory, information, and diplomatic support. SOF continues to effectively do this through a strategy of persistent engagement in key countries around the world. Intentionally small in scale, these types of engagements can support our partners in building the capacity to counter threats and foster stability.

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- *Conduct Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief.* In regions like the Pacific and Caribbean that are prone to hurricanes, tsunamis, and other large-scale natural disasters, Combatant Commanders conduct a variety of exercises and engagements that help Geographic Combatant Commands prepare for providing humanitarian relief in support of our civilian partners. This can also include medical, dental, or other civic assistance programs whereby U.S. forces have the opportunity to hone their skills while helping local populations. As we cultivate new security relationships with uncertain partners, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief training is an important mechanism for increased cooperation and relationship building with partner militaries. The Navy's Southern Partnership Station (SPS) is a good example of how we use port visits with partners around Central & South America and the Caribbean Basin to share best practices and improve our collective ability to support humanitarian relief operations in response to disasters.
- *Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.* The proliferation of WMD is a global challenge, one the U.S. cannot address alone. International partners have resources and relationships that can be brought to bear against this problem; building their capacity to do so is an integral component of our strategy to counter the spread of WMD. Efforts like the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are prominent examples of DoD's engagement along these lines, and many of the Combatant Commands are also active in Countering WMD BPC activities within their respective areas of responsibility.
- *Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.* Though U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, we have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counterinsurgency and security force assistance arenas. We will seek to codify these lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. SOF will be a key enabler here as well. As my own experience in El Salvador in the eighties demonstrates, SOF can lead the way to successfully reducing our footprint while maintaining stability and protecting US national interests. Through programs like the Village Stability Operations to build Afghan Local Police, and training and equipping Afghan Special Operations Forces, U.S. SOF efforts are helping to build sustainable capacity to facilitate stability in Afghanistan post-2014.

Looking across regions in the context of these various missions, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Military Departments, Combatant Commands, and the State Department, strive to carefully prioritize which partners we engage with, how often, and to what end. In advancing a common security vision for the future, we work closely with our civilian agency colleagues to identify shared priorities. As Secretary Panetta reinforced, the Department of State must "have a leading role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, so that we can reaffirm and strengthen our strategic approach to defense partnerships."

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EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES

As we look to the future security environment, we recognize that BPC will need to address a broad range of security challenges. In the wake of the Benghazi attack and increasing syndication of terrorist threats, we must make capacity building for internal security forces and counterterrorism operations a clear priority. We must be able to work with partners in the Persian Gulf to strengthen their ability to counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and advance collaborative efforts with Israel to deploy systems like Iron Dome, which protects Israeli citizens against the threat of rockets. We must invest in new capabilities with allies in Northeast Asia, such as missile defense, to counter North Korea. We will also work to strengthen the maritime security and humanitarian assistance capabilities of key partners in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Currently, throughout the year, SOF conducts engagements in more than 100 countries worldwide. In close coordination with the State Department and in alignment with our broader foreign policy goals, our special operations forces draw from their experiences in places like Colombia, Yemen, and East Africa to build the capacity of partner forces through training, equipping, advising and assisting, and integrating civil affairs teams, military information support teams, and even cultural support teams to ensure effective support capabilities. And we will strengthen NATO's capabilities in missile defense, meet our Article 5 commitments, and ensure that we can conduct expeditionary operations with our European allies. And we must ensure that they can assume a greater burden of the responsibility when we do engage.

More broadly, the Secretary made clear in his 29 June speech at the United States Institute of Peace that the Department needs to take a strategic approach to security cooperation and make sure that we have comprehensive and integrated capabilities in key regions in order to confront critical security challenges. Over the past decade, much of the strategic emphasis in security cooperation has rightly focused on supporting current operations and helping states deal with internal instability. As we draw down from a decade of conflict, we will place additional strategic emphasis on preparing our network of allies and partners to confront emerging challenges. We will also ensure that our security cooperation tools are calibrated so that the U.S. is optimally prepared to exploit emerging opportunities and counter potential threats—meaning lowering the barriers to defense cooperation and being prepared to rapidly take advantage of opportunities with like-minded partners.

The accomplishments of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan are an important example of the value of building partner capacity, and the NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan typifies the criticality of international security partnerships. As we approach 2014, we will continue to work alongside our coalition partners as we transition full security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces. We are taking significant steps towards this vision through the fielding of Coalition Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams. These teams enable the transition of lead security responsibility to the Afghan Government and Security Forces and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Coalition and Afghanistan as codified at the Chicago NATO Summit last spring. As the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai in May reflects, the United States and Afghanistan share “a common desire for peace and to strengthen collective efforts to achieve a region that is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates.”

For instance, after a multi-year effort to build the capabilities of specialized Afghan counternarcotics units, these units have begun to undertake independent, sustained operations to deprive the Taliban of an important source of its revenue. This investment has helped make

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these units among the most capable in Afghanistan and reliable partners for interagency and international counterdrug operations.

Even as we continue the transition process, we have been clear that we have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan and our assistance will not cease after 2014. We must be prepared to maintain a financial and political investment for years to come or we risk watching our security gains in Afghanistan devolve. Regional and transnational threats, like international terrorism and drug trafficking, will persist and may expand given changes in the security environment, and we will need to maintain a strong partnership with Afghanistan and its neighbors to counter such threats. We will not forget what brought us to Afghanistan in the first place and will continue to work with our partners to pursue al-Qaida, its affiliates, and other terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its interests, wherever they make safe-haven; from the sands of the Maghreb and streets of Mogadishu, to the jungles of Mindanao.

We expect that combined operations with capable partners will continue to be the most effective way to respond to emerging security challenges worldwide. This will require U.S. forces to exercise and engage regularly with our foreign military counterparts to maintain the high levels of proficiency, interoperability, and readiness that we have attained in Afghanistan. In the fight against al-Qaida, our success in enabling partners to defend and govern their own countries is just as important as the fighting that we do ourselves. In support of this effort, we appreciate the committee making Section 1206 assistance more effective by enabling us to provide small-scale military construction in conjunction with other forms of capacity-building assistance. This kind of modification is critical, as we have seen that equipping a partner with boats is not sustainable if they don't have a dock on which to land them, or a boathouse in which to store and maintain them.

We are also concerned about drug trafficking and the rise of some transnational organized crime (TOC) to the level of a national security threat. While we play a lead role in the detection and monitoring of narcotics approaching the United States by air and sea, DoD works to support U.S. law enforcement personnel and State Department officers to support counter the organizations that traffic illicit drugs and foment instability in various regions around the world. As the President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime states "TOC presents sophisticated and multi-faceted threats that cannot be addressed through law enforcement action alone." We have also seen a dramatic rise in the number of terrorist organizations that rely on the proceeds from drug trafficking, and this crime-terror nexus represents an especially dangerous convergence. As we face increasing budgetary pressures, BPC will remain a central component of our efforts in this regard.

Promoting Shared Responsibility While Addressing Military Needs

We appreciate the committee's support in working with the Senate last year to pass the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) legislation. The GSCF is a unique innovation that recognizes the shared responsibility between the Departments of State and Defense for conducting security sector assistance, and we are excited to be moving forward with several initial projects to test out this new business model. During its pilot phase, we intend for GSCF projects to address national level priorities shared by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Our ability to effectively plan and successfully operate to build partner capacity can be best supported by authorities that are not subject to year-to-year variation. In this respect, GSCF's multi-year authority is of great benefit in addressing national level priorities and could be similarly beneficial for other more targeted capacity-building programs.

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Over the last 7 years, working closely with the State Department, BPC programs like Section 1206 have proven that such efforts large impact and can be operated responsibly in close synchronization with our colleagues in the State Department. We firmly believe that State and DoD collaboration on Section 1206 proposals makes the overall selection process more rigorous and results in better programs. We look forward to continued close work with the State Department and other agencies to ensure that DoD's BPC efforts are agile in responding to partners' needs and consistent with U.S. foreign policy.

Enhancing Skill Sets & Improving Internal Processes

As Secretary Panetta recently made clear "the task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical skill set across our armed forces." Accordingly, we are working to enhance DoD skills sets, capabilities, and tools for encouraging and enabling partnerships, as well as streamlining DoD's internal BPC and security force assistance processes.

In developing innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to BPC, SOF will continue to play a critical role. This will be especially true in physically austere and politically sensitive environments. U.S. SOF will also be integral in building a cohesive global network with their counterparts in the international special operations community.

Over the last decade, our general purpose forces (GPF) have developed considerable skills in training, advising, and assisting the security forces of friendly foreign countries. Historically, SOF have conducted the majority of DoD's activities to train, equip, advise, and assist international security forces. However, the large demand for building partner nation capability over the past decade coupled with the limited availability of SOF for this mission has required the GPF to adapt and develop their skills in conducting an increasingly larger portion of security force assistance activities. As this experience will be important to leverage in future conflicts and in the avoidance of future conflicts, OSD is in the process of developing the means to track individuals with related experience and identifying opportunities for these individuals to maintain their skills.

Similarly, our experience in Afghanistan with the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MoDA) has demonstrated the positive impact that DoD civilian personnel can have in the field by helping to build capable defense institutions and providing professional advice and assistance at the ministerial level. MoDA and our other defense institution building initiatives like the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) are important capacity building tools that will sustain other security assistance efforts over time by building the core competencies needed in effective and accountable defense ministries. We are grateful for this committee's support in expanding MoDA's program authority outside Afghanistan, and are preparing to expand the MoDA program globally in the coming months.

Streamlining Processes to Speed Up and Improve Security Cooperation Programs

Secretary Panetta has also charged that we streamline the Department's internal processes to speed up and improve security cooperation programs – and work with the Department of State and Congress to do the same. Making the security cooperation system more responsive will enable the U.S. to take advantage of opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners and be the security partner of choice globally. Even where authorities exist, the patchwork character

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and temporary nature of authorities presents management, planning, and sustainment challenges that can hinder internal processes no matter how efficient they could become.

We are working to become more anticipatory and expedient in the delivery of defense articles and services. This means better anticipating partners' needs ahead of time, fast-tracking priority sales, and incorporating U.S. exportability requirements up front in the development process. We are also working to make U.S. government decision-making simpler, faster and more predictable for our partners. We have built Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams (ERGTs) that work with combatant command staffs, embassy country teams, and partner nations to better define partner military requirements and develop appropriate acquisition or assistance programs. ERGTs help partners clearly articulate what capability they want to build and identify the equipment, training courses, and other assistance it will take to achieve that desired capability, as recently occurred with Armenia's expanded peacekeeping capability. We are also preparing to leverage the newly-recapitalized Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to identify and purchase high-demand items and items with lengthy production lead times with the goal of accelerating the delivery to the partner. A recently authorized pilot program, the Special Defense Repair Fund, will afford even greater responsiveness by allowing us to repair, overhaul, and refurbish in-stock defense articles in anticipation of partner sales and transfers. We are also working with the Department of Commerce and others as part of the President's Export Control Reform Initiative to update the U.S. Munitions List and streamline the technology security and foreign disclosure processes to increase the speed with which we can provide material assistance to partners.

Defense trade is a promising avenue for deepening security cooperation with our most capable partner nations. Our ongoing work in reforming our export control system is a critical part of fostering that cooperation. Each transaction creates new opportunities for training, for exercises, for relationship building. It also supports our industrial base, with roughly one third of defense industry output supported by defense exports. This is important for American jobs and for our ability to invest in new defense capabilities for the future.

Returns on Investment

Documenting the impact of BPC activities or showing the "bang for the buck" is more art than science and by necessity must involve more qualitative than quantitative results. Traditional assessments primarily show success in terms of measurable outputs that indicate whether project implementation proceeded as designed, such as number of people trained or quantity of vehicles delivered. We continue to work with our partners and independent research, for example there is a pending study GAO, to document the impacts of these programs. In addition we would like to share several examples that best demonstrate how our BPC investment has benefitted the American taxpayer.

Colombia is a good example of where more than a decade of security force assistance has enabled a partner to combat internal destabilizing elements effectively -- in that case, the FARC and other designated terrorist organizations. In particular, we have provided support to aviation training, intelligence and operational fusion, operational planning, riverine operations, logistics, command and control, security, and medical training. Colombia is also a prime example of how SOF plays a leading role in BPC. U.S. special operations forces used their core skillset -- building relationships, training and mentoring partner forces -- to dramatically improve Colombia's capacities to address internal threats. Now, we are encouraged to see that Colombia

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is in turn providing justice sector and security force assistance of their own to other U.S. partner nations across the Americas and in Africa.

As cited previously, the fifty flags that wave at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters in Afghanistan symbolize how building the capacity of other nations in turns pays dividends for U.S. security interests. A range of forces from El Salvador to Mongolia have made a significant contribution to coalition operations, facilitated largely by equipment and training that we have provided. Georgia, which is already the largest per-capita ISAF contributor, is a prime example. It has nearly doubled its contribution to ISAF by providing two counterinsurgency-trained light infantry battalions without national caveats. This increase will make Georgia the largest non-NATO ISAF force contributor. These forces occupy their own battle space and play a key role in the counterinsurgency strategy of clear, hold, and build; an important contribution that eases the burden on U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

It is also worth noting that our security force assistance programs with the Armed Forces of the Philippines over the last several years have enabled those forces to conduct effective domestic counterterrorism operations and to contribute to regional maritime security. Specifically, we have worked toward improving their surveillance, tracking, and interception capabilities, and provided tactical equipment that has been used in numerous operations against extremist organizations in the southern Philippines. Importantly, the provision of radars has been a catalyst for Philippine interest in acquiring secure targeting capabilities and communications methods, which will enable information sharing with U.S. Pacific Command on tracking activities in the tri-border area of the southern Philippines. The Government of the Philippines recognizes the importance of these investments and is now sustaining its newly acquired capabilities through national funds/Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.

Finally, I would like to mention the impact of our assistance to Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, and Kenya in supporting their efforts in the African Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM. AMISOM is backed by the U.N. Security Council and the African Union and tasked to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective governance country-wide. The specialized counterterrorism training and equipment support provided to AMISOM troop contributors through Sections 1206 and 1207(n) is part of a whole-of-government approach to supporting AMISOM, and complements the long-standing State Department train-and-equip efforts for AMISOM, including the work of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The training and equipment provided by the U.S. Government has enabled AMISOM, in concert with the security forces of the Somali Transitional Federal Government, to reclaim the capital city of Mogadishu and a number of towns previously held by the al-Qaida linked terrorist group al-Shabaab. AMISOM's success in pushing back al-Shabaab is an important trend. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former CIA Director David Petraeus have testified before numerous committees this year, Somalia continues to pose a threat to the United States as a training ground and launching pad for individuals seeking to conduct violent attacks against innocent people around the world.

CONCLUSION

With constrained resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of our BPC activities. DoD's BPC activities do expose us to some risk. We face

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risks from the time, money and effort which may not, in the end, yield security returns. We also face the risk that the partners we train and equip engage in egregious behavior which violates the laws, norms, and human rights of their fellow citizens. Further risks come from the danger in upsetting regional balances. It is important that we acknowledge and take seriously these risks in assessing if BPC is worth the investment. DoD works actively with our civilian agency colleagues to reduce these risks by designing program elements that emphasize the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the need for legitimate civilian authority in countries where we conduct BPC activities. Before conducting any training program with a foreign security force, we coordinate with the Department of State to ensure that the prospective unit that will receive training has not committed a gross violation of human rights.

We must also recognize, though, that BPC can reduce our risk around the world by strengthening collective security, augmenting stability, and, when necessary, enabling military action. Our persistent engagement serves a key role in helping our foreign partners provide for their own security. These relationships can also foster respect for the rule of law, preventing future violations of rights and norms. This overall contribution to multilateral security is an investment that pays immediate and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S. interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S. interests. These activities are a cost-effective way to strengthen our national security posture by building lasting relationships and alliances with partner nations. The Department's BPC activities are major elements of Geographic Combatant Commanders' plans to work with foreign militaries, and will be imperative for DoD into the foreseeable future.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and testify on the Department's efforts to build partner capacity. This concludes my statement.



Michael A. Sheehan

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict**



Michael A. Sheehan was confirmed by the U.S. Senate and sworn-in as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) in December 2011. He is the Secretary of Defense's principal civilian advisor on programs, policies, and resources for special operations. In addition, the office oversees Defense Department policies and programs regarding counternarcotics, humanitarian assistance, security force assistance programs for building partner capacity, and stability operations. Mr. Sheehan has over thirty-years in public service; much of it involved in counter terrorism, counter insurgency, peacekeeping, and law enforcement operations.



Mr. Sheehan is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in a variety of infantry and special forces assignments. In the infantry, he commanded a mechanized company in an armored brigade in Korea with multiple tours on the Demilitarized Zone (1983-85). As a special forces officer, Mr. Sheehan served in a variety of counter terrorism and counter insurgency capacities. He commanded an

Operational Detachment -Alpha in a hostage rescue unit in Panama (Company C, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)) and participated in numerous training and advisory deployments in Latin America including Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador. In addition, Mr. Sheehan graduated from the Colombian Commando course, Lancero. He is Airborne, Ranger, Special Forces, Jungle Warfare, and Jumpmaster qualified, and is a recipient of the Combat Infantry Badge. In 1985 and 1986, Mr. Sheehan was the brigade counter insurgency advisor for the Fourth Brigade in Chalatenango, El Salvador, one of the most combative regions in the country.

While on active duty, Mr. Sheehan served in the field on peacekeeping missions in Somalia (1993-94) and Haiti (1995). In both cases, he was Special Advisor to the head of the United Nations (U.N.) mission and engaged in the integration of U.N. military and civilian police programs. Mr. Sheehan served on the National Security Council staff for both President George H.W. Bush (1989-92) and President William Jefferson Clinton (1995-97).

After retiring from the Army in 1997, Mr. Sheehan served at the State Department in the Bureau of International Organizations. After the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, Mr. Sheehan was appointed by President Clinton as Ambassador-at-Large for Counter Terrorism (1998-2000) and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in 1999. During his tenure Mr. Sheehan establish bi-lateral counter terrorism working groups with India and Russia (both of which are still operating). From 2001 to 2003, Sheehan went back to peacekeeping duty as the Assistant Secretary General of Mission Support in the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, where he was responsible for supporting 16 missions around the world and over 40,000 military and police peacekeepers.

From 2003 to 2006, Mr. Sheehan served as the New York Police Department (NYPD) Deputy Commissioner for Counter Terrorism. In this position he was instrumental in reshaping the NYPD into what is widely regarded as one of the most effective counter terrorism organizations in the world.

Mr. Sheehan has master degrees from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service (1988)

and the US Army Command and Staff College (1991). In both programs his dissertations concerned irregular warfare theory and practice. Mr. Sheehan spoke and lectured on counter terrorism and counter-insurgency policy and was a distinguished fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and the Center for Law and Security at NYU. In addition, he was the on-air counter terrorism analyst for NBC News from 2006-11.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL TERRY WOLFF
DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS & POLICY
J5 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS

ON BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY FOR 21st CENTURY CHALLENGES

FEBRUARY 14, 2013

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McKeon, Ranking member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today and talk about the Department of Defense's efforts to build partner capacity to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

From our strongest allies to our newest relationships, strengthening partner engagement increases stability and security around the world. These engagements are each specifically constructed to enable a range of results from developing trust and furthering partnerships to strengthening coordination and interoperability with mature allies.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes that Building Partner Capacity would be used to mitigate risks during personnel drawdowns and advance the strategic rebalance toward Asia. Thus, Building Partner Capacity is becoming a key component in how the United States will structure and employ military resources going forward. We find ourselves at a strategic inflection point and the 2012 guidance promotes BPC as integral to a U.S. security strategy that enables future savings through burden sharing with our partners and allies.

The Department's strategic guidance recognizes that deepening global interdependence calls for continued U.S. engagement and leadership in the world, including military power. The unique ability of U.S. military forces to project military power abroad has enabled the Department to deter aggression, defeat threats, protect the global security environment and provide crisis response. It also has made the United States the security partner of choice for allies and partners around the world. Looking ahead, the Department will

remain globally engaged, providing a stabilizing presence through a network of alliances, partnerships and cooperative approaches to address common security problems.

The Department undertakes numerous security cooperation activities to enable and encourage our foreign partners to work with us to achieve our common strategic objectives. These activities are aimed at preventing future crises, and should these preventative efforts fail, ensuring the Department and its partners are sufficiently trained and equipped to respond as necessary.

FOCUS AREAS OF OUR EFFORTS

Building Partner Capacity is not one singular thing. It is a complex, interwoven system with multiple lines of effort being undertaken throughout the Department and across the Interagency. Our main goal for these efforts is to assist our partners to develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their own countries' internal security, contribute to a greater regional stability, and participate in multilateral operations. The Department's efforts include, and are not limited to:

- Building operational capability, capacity, and performance of our partners in their counterterrorism efforts. For example, the Department is engaged with Uganda, Burundi and other East African nations to increase their capacity to combat threats posed by al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. In Central Africa, the Department is working with partners to counter the Lord's Resistance Army. The Department's efforts in the last ten years to bolster the capacity of security forces in the Philippines have allowed that country to significantly reduce the size and freedom of movement of the Abu Sayyaf Group, minimizing its capability to conduct terrorist activities.
- Enhancing the professional militaries of our partners. These activities are

conducted through programs and activities such as the International Military Education and Training program, senior leader visits and regional centers such as the Marshall Center and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. In Fiscal Year 2012, the International Military Education and Training program reached approximately 6000 students from 135 countries. The regional centers are key institutions for building relationships and forging common understanding. They foster open communications and educational opportunities for military and civilian participants alike.

- Sharing intelligence and information. The Department is engaged with our partners to develop sharing agreements critical to success in combating threats from terrorist organizations as well as transnational organized crime. We have robust and mature sharing relationships with our long-term partners in Europe and the Pacific, and are collaborating closely with our newest partners, particularly in Africa where our relationships are in the nascent stages.
- Increasing interoperability. Sharing common tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as equipment and planning processes enable our partners to participate in multi-national coalition operations and respond to emerging security challenges worldwide. The myriad facets of interoperability are routinely exercised with our partners through the Joint/Combined Exchange Training activities and the Developing Country Combined Exercise Program.

There is no better example of the importance of interoperable and capable partners than the coalition in Afghanistan. Throughout the war, well-trained and highly effective partners have been fighting side-by-side with U.S. forces. Many of our coalition partners deployed without caveats to some of the most dangerous regions in Afghanistan and performed admirably. As U.S. forces begin to withdraw in 2014, our reliance on these partners will continue as we

collectively prepare Afghan forces to provide for their own security.

REGIONAL IMPACT OF BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

As the Department turns the page on a decade of war, the Arab World is in a period of turmoil and change, impacting across the region and world with an uncertain future. While the wave of unrest has changed the security environment, many long-standing U.S. goals in the region endure.

The task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical element of our strategy. The successful implementation of this strategy paid dividends in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, among others. In Jordan, the evolution of the Jordanian Armed Forces as a regional enabler facilitated their ability to host the multi-lateral special operations-focused EAGER LION exercise. The Department's partnership with the Lebanese armed forces through USCENTCOM's Joint Capabilities Review resulted in an increased capacity to secure and defend their borders. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates supported regional security by providing support to Operations UNIFIED PROTECTOR and ENDURING FREEDOM.

In the western hemisphere, the Department seeks opportunities to build partner capacity, develop security partnerships, and create innovative, low-cost and small footprint approaches to achieve hemispheric security objectives. The security assistance to Colombia, Central America and the Caribbean, as well as the deployments of El Salvadoran military personnel in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, underscores the opportunities for expanding capabilities and capacities to further regional stabilization efforts. For example, Colombia has provided security training to more than 11,000 police officers in 21 Latin American and African countries, as well as Afghanistan, making it a force multiplier for U.S. assistance. The

Department has tremendous partners in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility who are dedicated to our shared principles of democracy.

In Central America, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and weak rule of law institutions, including the police and armed forces, are threats affecting the entire region. Our Central American partners are stepping up to this challenge and are taking tangible steps towards addressing the problem. For example, El Salvador is building joint civilian law enforcement – military narcotics interdiction teams, Costa Rica approved a security tax on business to help pay for increased capability, Panama is investing in equipment for security forces and reforming its police, and Honduras approved a security tax and is working on procedures to facilitate the extradition of traffickers and gang members to the United States.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance calls for a "re-balance toward the Asia-Pacific region." The U.S. rebalance reflects a recognition that the United States must substantially increase its political, economic and defense investments in the Asia-Pacific given the region's fundamental importance to our future prosperity and security. Maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is central to broader U.S. strategic interests, including through halting proliferation in North Korea, maintaining freedom of navigation in the region's maritime spaces including the South and East China Seas, and promoting increased transparency in the region's military activities. As such, the Department's partnership efforts in the region are integrated within a broader whole-of-government approach. The Department's efforts are aimed at refreshing and reinvigorating our military to military relationships with established allies as well as other key existing and emerging regional partners in order to meet a range of 21st century challenges. While empowering and working with (and within) indigenous multi-national forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, we must continue to demonstrate active military leadership and presence in the region to deter potential

adversaries, reassure our allies and partners in Asia, and reinforce international norms—including those that advance freedom of navigation and access to the global commons. Global commons are geographical areas that are outside the jurisdiction of any nation, and include the oceans outside territorial limits and Antarctica. Global commons do not include contiguous zones and fisheries zones of foreign nations.

Free and secure access to the commons is critical to ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, particularly in the vital sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean - areas of increased maritime congestion and resource contention. Regional partnerships with, and between, Southeast Asian countries, closer strategic cooperation with our allies, and a more sustained and systematic cooperation with emerging powers such as India will enhance regional stability and provide better prospects for peaceful, non-coercive resolution of disputes and fair access to the commons for all.

This rebalance to Asia represents a strategic adjustment that acknowledges the growing importance of this region with its increasingly significant share of the global economy and the emergence of new security challenges. However, it does not mean a departure from established alliances. While the Department will reduce its conventional Army presence in Europe to two Brigades, we will continue our partnership with NATO allies through participation and training with the NATO Response Force. In this way the Department can continue its time-honored relationships and reassure steadfast allies, yet with fewer U. S. forces deployed overseas.

African states and regional organizations are making significant progress in developing the ability to address security concerns and sources of instability on the continent. This dynamic is reflected in the robust role of the African Union Mission in Somalia, in the Africa Union's lead role in facilitating

negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, and in the Economic Community of West African States' efforts to facilitate a political settlement in response to the recent coup in Mali. Nonetheless, the United States' partners in Africa still lack important capabilities and the capacity to address all of the varying sources of instability across Africa.

Facing this reality, the Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of State, continues to assist partners on the African continent with building their capacity to respond to security threats, as this effort represents a measurable investment with significant return in the future. The Department's efforts in this respect take several forms, including security assistance, exercises, rotational presence, advisory efforts, and training and equipping, and they are tailored to the threats that are present. All of these efforts are implemented as low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives in Africa. By assisting capable and willing African partners to address threats like the Lord's Resistance Army, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, we help them to create the space necessary to continue developing, politically and economically, which benefits both Africa and the United States.

CONCLUSION

As we face the security challenges of the 21st century, we have many allies and partners who share an interest in helping advance a common security vision and shouldering the burden of global security. Building capacity is the long term solution to reduce our presence in protecting the territory of others, while defending our interests in a fiscally-constrained environment. Building Partner Capacity must therefore be given greater emphasis and be coordinated with other instruments of national power to meet current and future U.S. global objectives.

Whatever forms our Building Partner Capacity efforts may take over time, in the end they must be agile and flexible enough to respond to a rapidly changing world, be conducted steadily over the long term to instill partner confidence in the United States' commitment and reinforce State Department's role in leading U.S. foreign policy efforts.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and testify on the Department's efforts to build partner capacity. I also want to thank this committee for your continued support of our men and women in uniform.

Lieutenant General Terry Wolff

Director, Strategic Plans & Policy, J5

Lieutenant General Terry Wolff was commissioned a second lieutenant from the United States Military Academy in 1979. Lieutenant Wolff attended Ranger School and the Armor Officer Basic Course. His initial tour was spent at Fort Hood serving in the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry as a Platoon Leader and Troop Executive Officer, then as the 1st Cavalry Division Assistant Secretary of the General Staff. In 1983, following the Armor Officer Advance Course, Captain Wolff spent three years with the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 1st Armored Division in Germany, serving as the S3 Air and the C Troop Commander.



Lieutenant General Terry Wolff
Director, Strategic Plans & Policy, J5

Upon returning from Europe in 1986, Captain Wolff spent three years at Armor Branch as an Assignment Officer. In 1991, following two years at Fort Leavenworth, Major Wolff returned to Germany as the 3rd Infantry Division G3 Plans Officer. In 1992, he moved to Vilseck, serving as the battalion S3 of 1st Battalion, 37th Armor and the brigade S3 of 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. In the summer of 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Wolff moved to Fort Carson, Colorado, becoming the Deputy Regimental Commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. From June 1996 to June 1998, he commanded the Regiment's Third Squadron.

The summer of 1999 saw Lieutenant Colonel Wolff graduating from the Naval War College and returning to Germany where he served as the G3 of the 1st Armored Division.

Colonel Wolff commanded the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment for three years, taking them to Iraq in March 2003. This assignment was followed by two years on the Joint Staff, first as the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division Chief and later as a Special Assistant to the Assistant to the Chairman.

In 2005, Colonel Wolff became the Deputy Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson. Brigadier General Wolff deployed to Iraq in 2006, serving as the Commanding General of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team.

After nearly two years on the National Security Council as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan, Major General Wolff returned to Germany and the First Armored Division. He commanded 1AD from May 2009 to May 2011, a period which including a deployment to Iraq and the command of the United States Division Center. Following the division's redeployment, Major General Wolff also served as the Deputy Commanding General of United States Army Europe for five months, departing Europe in July. Lieutenant General Wolff is currently serving as the Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, J5 at the Pentagon.
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BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation

Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Managing Director
Defense Capabilities and Management



GAO-13-335T



Highlights of GAO-13-335T, a testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

February 14, 2013

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has increasingly focused on security cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies, furthering the U.S. objective of securing international peace and cooperation. Both the 2011 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* and the 2011 *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* identify building partner capacity as a worldwide priority. As DOD continues to emphasize building partner capacity, the need for efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners and within the U.S. government has become more important, in part due to fiscal challenges, which can be exacerbated by overlapping or ineffective efforts.

This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen DOD's management of its building partner capacity efforts by focusing on three key practices: (1) setting clear goals and defining terminology, (2) coordinating activities and sharing information, and (3) sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. It is based on GAO's body of work on building partner capacity from April 2010 through November 2012.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made numerous recommendations to align goals with broader strategies and to clarify terminology; develop mechanisms to better coordinate activities and share information; and develop and implement plans and metrics to sustain and evaluate progress. DOD has generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and has taken some actions, but work remains to fully implement GAO's recommendations.

View GAO-13-335T. For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

GAO's recent work has identified key practices that would enhance the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of building partner capacity efforts. Such efforts include a range of security cooperation activities such as military exercises with partner nations and counternarcotics activities. In GAO's reviews of these activities, GAO found that DOD has demonstrated some of these key practices, but opportunities for improvement remain.

- Setting clear goals and defining terminology.** Setting clear goals and defining terminology can help stakeholders understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and how they fit in with broad national security interests. GAO has reported that DOD activities to build the capacity of foreign military forces through the Global Train and Equip program have generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism priorities while also addressing partner countries' security interests. However, in a 2012 review of security force assistance, GAO found that the lack of a common understanding of this term within DOD resulted in different interpretations of what types of activities are included and presented challenges in planning activities and forecasting needs for force capabilities. GAO recommended DOD take steps to clarify its intent and then determine what additional actions are required to plan for and conduct security force assistance.
- Coordinating activities and sharing information.** Coordination mechanisms that facilitate communication within DOD and across agencies are needed to achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity efforts. In 2012, GAO found that stakeholders had difficulties in obtaining status information on security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are difficult to access and contain limited information. The department is developing a new information system to address this gap but it will not be fully implemented until 2020. Further, GAO's review of the National Guard State Partnership Program in 2012 found that data systems used by the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau were not interoperable and users applied varying methods and definitions to track the program's activities and funding. As a result, the data on types and frequency of activities were incomplete and inconsistent. GAO recommended that DOD develop guidance including agreed-upon definitions for data fields.
- Sustaining efforts and evaluating progress.** Developing plans to sustain projects and establishing mechanisms to evaluate them can help ensure that programs have long-term impact. In 2010, GAO reported that the long-term impact of some projects to train and equip foreign militaries could be limited because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed their sustainment. Specifically, only 26 percent of the 135 proposals for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects explicitly addressed the recipient country's ability or willingness to bear sustainment costs. In a review on counternarcotics efforts in 2012, GAO found that DOD is working to improve its counternarcotics performance measurement system, but the department has been unable to attest to the reliability of the performance data for several countries from 2007 through 2011. GAO recommended that DOD submit its performance summary report with the reliability attestation to the National Drug Control Policy office.

United States Government Accountability Office

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts at building partner capacity and share with you a few key practices that can lead to effective management of these efforts. DOD has become increasingly focused on a broad range of security cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies and further the U.S. objective of securing international peace and cooperation. These activities include training, equipping, advising, and assisting host countries' security forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories. The 2011 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*¹ and the 2011 *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*² identify building partner capacity as a worldwide priority. These documents stress that the global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of the United States' national power must be applied. They also emphasize the need to strengthen and expand the United States' network of international partnerships to enhance security and, according to the *National Military Strategy*, the joint force, combatant commands, and service chiefs shall partner with other U.S. government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation. Further, the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* report cites building the security capacity of partner nations as a key mission area and emphasizes security force assistance as an increasingly critical element of this mission. It also identifies several initiatives to enhance its ability to build partner nation security capacity, such as strengthening and institutionalizing the capabilities of general purpose forces to conduct security force assistance, enhancing linguistic, regional and cultural abilities, and strengthening the department's capacities for ministerial-level training.

As DOD continues to emphasize building partner capacity, the need for efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners and within the U.S. government has become more important, in part due to fiscal challenges, which can be exacerbated by overlapping or ineffective efforts. Strategic

¹Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America's Military Leadership*, Feb. 8, 2011.

²The White House, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, June 28, 2011.

guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012 emphasized that building partner capacity elsewhere in the world is important for sharing the costs and the responsibilities of global leadership and that the department would develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieving the United States' security objectives.³

Since 2010, we have issued numerous reports and testimonies and made recommendations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's management of its building partner capacity efforts. My testimony today is based on our prior work and will discuss three key practices that we believe could provide opportunities for DOD to more effectively manage its building partner capacity efforts. The key practices are: (1) setting clear goals and defining terminology, (2) coordinating activities and sharing information, and (3) sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. The examples I will draw on today are based on our past work and include partner capacity building efforts that are primarily funded by DOD. Detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found in the reports and testimonies we cite throughout this statement. For the purposes of this testimony, we also updated information on the status of our recommendations. We conducted the work supporting our prior reports, which were issued from April 2010 through November 2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

DOD's efforts to build partner capacity include a broad range of security cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies. These security cooperation activities include military-to-military training, military exercises in cooperation with partner nations, knowledge sharing from subject matter experts, visits between senior military leaders, providing military equipment and supplies, and counternarcotics activities. Table 1 below describes selected partner capacity activities that DOD implements. The table illustrates the broad

³Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Jan. 5, 2012.

range of activities DOD engages in to build partner capacity and is not a comprehensive list.

Table 1: Descriptions of Select DOD Activities that May Be Used to Build Partner Capacity

Program	Description
Counterdrug Programs	DOD counterdrug programs may provide support to foreign security forces to stop the flow of illegal drugs. It provides support for counterdrug activities of federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies. DOD requested approximately \$1 billion for its counterdrug programs in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.
National Guard State Partnership Program	A DOD security cooperation program that pairs state National Guards with foreign countries to promote national objectives, stability, partner capacity, and a better understanding and trust between the United States and foreign countries. As of May 2012, there were 63 active partnerships. This program began in 1993. For fiscal year 2013, the department requested \$10 million for the program. ⁸
Peacetime Humanitarian Assistance Programs	DOD's two key programs are the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid-funded humanitarian assistance program and the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program. Activities, which are typically performed outside of war or disaster environments, include renovating schools and hospitals, drilling wells, providing basic health care, and providing training to prepare for natural disasters. DOD requested approximately \$109 million for the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid program in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.
Global Train and Equip Program (also known as Section 1206 Program)	Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 created this program, which is used to build the capacity of foreign military forces through provision of training, equipment, and small-scale military construction activities. It is to be used to build foreign military capacity to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in, or support, military and stabilization operations in which U.S. forces are participating. Section 1206, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use up to \$350 million each year, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, through fiscal year 2014. DOD requested \$365 million for the Section 1206 program in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.
Global Security Contingency Fund	Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, enacted in December 2011, established the Global Security Contingency Fund. This fund provides resources for emergent challenges such as training and other support to enhance the capabilities of foreign military and security forces to conduct security and counterterrorism operations and participate in or support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with United States foreign policy and national security interests. It also provides resources to assist with rule of law programs and stabilization efforts in certain cases. The fund is jointly administered and funded by the State Department and DOD, with the State Department in the lead. The legislation also included transitional authorities for DOD-led assistance to Africa and Yemen. The fiscal year 2012 consolidated appropriations act does not appropriate new monies to the fund, but permits DOD and the State Department to transfer up to \$250 million to the fund from other accounts.

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, and the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013.

Note: There are several other authorities that have to do with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that are not included in the table.

⁸Section 1204 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239 (Jan. 2, 2013), states that no activities under the State Partnership Program may be carried out after February 28, 2013, until (1) the Secretary of Defense submits to the appropriate congressional committees the final regulations required by subsection (a) of section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-84) regarding the use of DOD funds to pay costs incurred by the National Guard in conducting activities under the State Partnership Program and (2) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that appropriate modifications have been made, and appropriate controls have been instituted, to ensure the compliance of the program with the Antideficiency Act in the future. As of February 5, 2013, the Secretary had not submitted such regulations or made such certification. However, a DOD official told us that the department's response to Section 1204 is under review, and the department expects to meet the deadline.

To perform its military missions around the world, DOD operates six unified military geographic combatant commands, which are responsible for a variety of functions including planning for and conducting missions that range from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.⁴ As part of their planning responsibilities, geographic combatant commands develop theater campaign plans, which are multiyear plans that reflect the command's strategy to achieve certain end states within their areas of responsibility. These plans are the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation activities. A hierarchy of national and strategic guidance—including the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, and the *Guidance for Employment of the Force*—informs the development of the combatant commands' theater campaign plans.

In addition to theater campaign planning, DOD uses different implementation processes to formulate and decide whether to approve specific building partner capacity activities and projects. For example, for Section 1206 program projects, each geographic combatant command reviews proposals from the U.S. embassy in its area of responsibility and endorses for final submission those proposed projects that address its highest priorities. The U.S. Special Operations Command also reviews all Section 1206 project proposals to ensure that each aligns with U.S. military strategy and ranks each proposal across the geographic combatant commands in accordance with counterterrorism priorities.⁵ As a different example, for the National Guard State Partnership Program, any nation requesting a state partnership sends its official request to its respective U.S. ambassador. Once the partnership is endorsed, the request is forwarded to the appropriate combatant command. If the command finds that the partnership meets strategic objectives and priorities, the command sends the request to the National Guard Bureau. If the Chief of the National Guard Bureau accepts the request, he or she

⁴The six geographic combatant commands are: U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Central Command.

⁵The U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for preparing special operations forces to carry out assigned missions and to plan and conduct special operations. Its mission is (1) to provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the United States and its interests and (2) to synchronize global operations against terrorist networks, including receiving, reviewing, coordinating, and prioritizing all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terror.

notifies the combatant command and solicits proposals from the adjutants general of the state Guards. These proposals go through three levels of review within DOD, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau forwards a recommended nominee to the combatant command and the partner country's U.S. embassy for final approval.

I would like to now discuss the key practices we have identified that can aid DOD in more effectively managing its building partner capacity activities.

Setting Clear Goals and Defining Terminology

Setting clear goals and defining terminology can help stakeholders understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and how they fit in with broad national security interests. In our reviews, we found that DOD's efforts to align goals with broader strategies and clarify terminology have varied. More specifically, in some reviews, we found that programs have aligned with broader strategies but DOD officials have experienced challenges in agreeing upon key terms.

A positive example of strategic alignment involves our work on the Section 1206 program.⁶ In 2010, we reported that the Section 1206 activities have generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism priorities while also addressing the partner countries' security interests.⁷ For example, in 2010, we found that DOD and the State Department (State) have used Section 1206 funds in Kazakhstan to address its priority of enhancing the country's counterterrorism capacity in the Caspian Sea, according to a U.S. embassy official. Additionally, in Pakistan, U.S. officials used Section 1206 funds to increase special operations capacity to support counterterrorism operations on its western border. Overall, from fiscal year 2006 to 2009, DOD and State allotted \$932 million, or 95 percent, of all Section 1206 funding for counterterrorism-related equipment and training for partner countries and

⁶The Section 1206 program authorizes DOD to build the capacity of a foreign country's military forces in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations or to support or participate in military and stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces are participating. The section also authorizes DOD to build the capacity of a foreign country's maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.

⁷GAO, *International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs*, GAO-10-431 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010).

the remaining \$47 million, or 5 percent, to build the capacity of five partner nations to participate in stability operations with the United States, such as providing spare parts for a country's ground vehicles. We also found that most Section 1206 counterterrorism resources had been directed to countries that the U.S. intelligence community has identified as priority countries for the counterterrorism effort.⁸

In another case we found that DOD is taking steps to address challenges faced by department officials in identifying and defining partner country assistance requirements. In a November 2012 report on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's oversight of security cooperation and assistance programs, we found that since 2009, DOD has initiated reforms to improve the process of developing assistance requests that are intended to reduce implementation delays and improve the effectiveness of assistance to partner countries.⁹ First, DOD developed new training courses and provided in-country advisors to help country officials identify short- and long-term requirements and strategies to meet those requirements. Second, DOD is reforming its own processes for defining requirements to improve long-term effectiveness of security cooperation programs and provide short-term solutions for meeting requirements using assistance requests. Third, DOD created a strategic planning support group to assist combatant commands with early identification and resolution of issues related to capability requirements and certain types of assistance requests. Fourth, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency established expeditionary teams whose purpose is to help the combatant commands, partner countries, and security cooperation officers identify and refine a partner country's requirements.

In contrast, we recommended in 2010 that DOD re-evaluate the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa located in Djibouti to ensure it is appropriately aligned to support U.S. Africa Command's mission of sustained security engagement.¹⁰ While U.S. Africa Command stated that

⁸The list of priority countries is classified, which limits the precision of the analytical information we can report.

⁹GAO, *Security Assistance: DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management*, GAO-13-84 (Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2012).

¹⁰GAO, *Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force*, GAO-10-504 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010).

the Task Force's original mission of countering violent extremism and its location at Camp Lemonnier remain important, particularly given terrorist threats in the region, we found some activities that may not be aligned with the command's mission. For example, at a training exercise for incoming Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa officials, discussion was raised concerning Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa's discovery of a dilapidated school in Kenya with a placard stating "donated by Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa"; current staff had been unaware of the school's existence. While the activity may have promoted temporary benefits for the participants at the time it was built, its dilapidated state could have potentially promoted unfavorable views of the U.S. military within the partner nation and heightened concerns about how such activities fit into a framework of sustained security engagement. In another example, other embassy officials stated that the experiences of African navy and coast guard participants of Task Force maritime training sessions were dampened because participants had anticipated a permanent training program; instead, they received sporadic and short-term training, which may not promote U.S. Africa Command's mission of sustained or long-term security engagement. As a result, we recommended that U.S. Africa Command complete its evaluation of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa to determine whether the Task Force should be retained, and if so, whether changes are needed to its mission, structure, and resources to best support the command's mission. In a 2012 follow up on our recommendation, U.S. Africa Command stated that it had issued a plan to alter the Task Force's mission in accordance with the command's assessment of the current security environment. However, DOD has not identified how the Task Force is changing its structure and resources to support the new mission.

Another review in 2012 found that DOD's lack of clarity surrounding the term "security force assistance" has created challenges for the combatant commands and military services in their efforts to plan for security force assistance as a distinct activity and enhance force capabilities.¹¹ DOD intends to focus more on security force assistance activities and has directed the combatant commands to incorporate them into their long range plans and forecast requirements. In its instruction, DOD defined security force assistance as "DOD activities that contribute to unified

¹¹GAO, *Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts*, GAO-12-556 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012).

action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions."¹² Seeking to clarify this definition, DOD has further stated that security force assistance encompasses all DOD activities conducted under various programs to "organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise foreign security forces and their supporting institutions from the tactical to ministerial levels."¹³ Notwithstanding DOD's efforts to clarify its terminology, we found that the commands continue to lack a common understanding of the term and therefore some were unclear as to what additional actions were needed to meet DOD's intent. Officials we interviewed generally viewed security force assistance as a recharacterization of some of their existing security cooperation activities but had different interpretations of what types of activities should be considered as security force assistance. For example, within one command, officials considered nearly every activity with partner nations to be security force assistance. Another command considered only individual efforts to train partner nations as security force assistance and excluded other activities. Also, some command officials were not clear as to the intent of DOD's increased focus on security force assistance and whether any related adjustments should be made in their plans and scope or level of activities. As a result, they do not currently distinguish security force assistance from other security cooperation activities in their plans. The services are taking steps and investing resources to organize and train general purpose forces capable of conducting security force assistance based on current requirements. Without greater clarity in regard to future needs, the services are uncertain whether their current efforts are sufficient or whether additional capabilities will be required. Therefore, we recommended that DOD take steps to clarify its intent, including the level of effort that combatant commands should devote to security force assistance, and what additional actions are required by the commands to plan for and conduct security force assistance beyond their existing security cooperation efforts. These steps would also help inform the services' efforts to ensure that the capabilities that they are developing and thus the resources that they are investing are appropriate and adequate to meet future requirements. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.

¹²Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance* (Oct. 27, 2010).

¹³Department of Defense, *Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework* (Nov. 1, 2011).

In another instance, we found that DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development used different terminology to describe similar efforts during our review of DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts.¹⁴ For example, according to DOD officials, DOD uses the term "humanitarian assistance" to describe its strategically planned assistance. In contrast, the U.S. Agency for International Development and State refer to immediate, life-saving relief as "humanitarian assistance" but other capacity-building efforts as "development assistance." DOD officials explained that the terminology they use is derived from their legislative authority to perform humanitarian assistance, and DOD and U.S. Agency for International Development officials said that DOD uses "humanitarian assistance" rather than "development assistance" to ensure that the department is not perceived as performing development efforts that are outside of its legislatively-prescribed areas of responsibility. Further, DOD officials who are engaged in implementing some of DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts told us that differences in terminology can create challenges among agencies in understanding the scope and nature of each others' efforts. State officials said that differing terminology creates challenges to setting goals or objectives when planning with other agencies. As a result, we recommended and they agreed that DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development collaborate to develop guidance that provides a common understanding of the terminology used for their humanitarian and development assistance efforts. In a 2013 follow-up on our recommendation, DOD officials stated that they have continued to regularly engage officials at State and the U.S. Agency for International Development through working groups and briefings to minimize confusion over terminology, but did not identify any actions taken to develop guidance on the differences in the agencies' terminology.

Coordinating Activities and Sharing Information

National strategies have emphasized the importance of building partner capacity using an interagency and whole of government approach, but mechanisms for coordinating activities and sharing information within DOD and across agencies have not been consistently implemented. Our work shows that DOD has taken steps to work with other agencies on activities, such as embedding representatives from their agencies at its

¹⁴GAO, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts*, GAO-12-359 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2012).

combatant commands, but challenges remain. Agencies have different organizational structures, planning processes, and funding sources to plan for and conduct their building partner capacity efforts, which can hinder interagency collaboration. Given these organizational differences, coordination mechanisms that can facilitate interagency collaboration are needed to achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity efforts.

Our work has found that DOD has led or participated in coordinating activities and taken steps to share and integrate information for building partner capacity activities through some of the programs at its geographic combatant commands. For instance, U.S. Southern Command is a geographic combatant command that operates in the Americas and the Caribbean, areas primarily affected by challenges such as corruption, crime, transnational terrorism, natural disasters, and poverty that impact the security and stability of the region. In recent years, in an effort to better support security and stability in the region, U.S. Southern Command has sought to become a more interagency-oriented command, recognizing that many of the challenges it faces cross role and mission lines of various U.S. government agencies. In 2010, our review of U.S. Southern Command found that the command coordinated with interagency partners to develop mutually reinforcing strategies, including its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan and its 2020 Command Strategy.¹⁵ U.S. Southern Command coordinated the development of its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan, which lays out the command's theater priorities and guides its resource allocations, with over 10 U.S. government departments, agencies, and offices. In addition, for U.S. Southern Command's 2020 Command Strategy, which was in development in 2010, the command conducted a 3-day conference to gather perspectives from interagency partners on the command's assessment of challenges in the region and the command's strategic objectives.

However, challenges with coordinating and information sharing with other agencies remain. In 2012, we reported that DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development recognize the need to improve information sharing for humanitarian assistance efforts and they have

¹⁵GAO, *Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation*, GAO-10-801 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010).

begun to take steps to address the challenge.¹⁶ DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts include constructing schools, digging water wells, preparing communities for natural disasters, and helping local populations obtain medical care. Despite DOD's various collaborative efforts, challenges remain, particularly in project coordination and data management for information sharing. For example, officials said that the frequent rotation of personnel can lead to continuity challenges. Many officials also stated that coordination tends to be personality driven; when staff is replaced, relationships have to be rebuilt and progress can be lost. Further, while officials from DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development said that interagency personnel at the commands have helped improve coordination with DOD, the roles of these personnel may be limited. Some State and U.S. Agency for International Development officials explained that the role of their advisors assigned to DOD's combatant commands is limited. Specifically, they are able to report on what is happening in their respective areas of responsibility but cannot make decisions or speak on behalf of their home agencies. Moreover, DOD, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development do not have full visibility over each others' assistance efforts, which could result in a fragmented approach to U.S. assistance. There are several initiatives under way to improve information sharing; however, no framework, such as a common database, currently exists for the agencies to readily access information on each others' efforts. Therefore, we recommended that the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and DOD develop a framework for sharing information to be used by all agencies in their assistance efforts, and indicated that this framework could involve selecting an existing initiative, such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard. They agreed with our recommendation, and in 2012 DOD officials stated they submitted foreign assistance data on their peacetime humanitarian assistance programs and 12 other security programs to State for inclusion into the Foreign Assistance Dashboard. Further, State officials said they expect to have DOD's foreign assistance data available on the Dashboard by the end of fiscal year 2013.

We have found that when agencies share information, managing and integrating information from multiple sources present challenges regarding data comparability. For instance, we found that the multiple

¹⁶GAO-12-359.

data systems used to track National Guard State Partnership Program activities and funding are not interoperable and users apply varying methods and definitions to guide data inputs.¹⁷ In 2012, we reported that we could not provide complete information on the types and frequency of State Partnership Program activities because activity data are incomplete as well as inconsistent. According to National Guard Bureau officials, DOD's *Guidance for Employment of the Force* mandates that all security cooperation activities be tracked, including State Partnership Program activities, in management information system databases.¹⁸ However, the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commands maintain separate databases for tracking events and each entity independently tracks its activities in databases that are not interoperable. Further, the terminology used to identify activity types varied both across the combatant commands and between the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau. As a result, we found it difficult to identify whether the data in different databases were describing the same activity or two separate activities. Therefore, we recommended and the department agreed that DOD, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, the combatant commands, and the embassy country teams, develop guidance for all stakeholders that includes agreed-upon definitions for data fields and rules for maintaining data until the program's global data system is fully implemented. In December 2012, DOD issued an instruction requiring combatant commanders to submit annual records of State Partnership Program activities and defining specific data that must be included in these reports. While this instruction does not directly identify data field definitions, it could provide a basis for improving the department's efforts to track State Partnership Program activities and funding.

¹⁷GAO, *State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners*, GAO-12-548 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012).

¹⁸As stated in the note to Table 1, Section 1204 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 established certain requirements for DOD regarding the State Partnership Program, including the submission of regulations to Congress. As of February 5, 2013, the department had not met these requirements. However, a DOD official told us the department expected to meet them by the statutory deadline of February 28, 2013. On December 14, 2012, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, which stated that it, among other things, provides instructions for the use of funds appropriated to DOD to pay the costs of authorized State Partnership Program activities conducted in accordance with section 1210 of Public Law 111-84.

In 2012, we found that DOD efforts to provide timely security assistance were affected by communication and coordination issues within DOD that in some cases delayed assistance and increased costs.¹⁹ DOD's Security Cooperation Organizations in foreign countries reported persistent difficulties obtaining information from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the implementing agencies of the military departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—on the status of security assistance equipment acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are difficult for them to access and contain limited information. DOD's existing delivery tracking system provides only limited data on the status of equipment deliveries because partner country agents and DOD agencies are not entering the needed data into the system. Without advance notice of deliveries, Security Cooperation Organization staff have been unable to ensure that addresses were correct and that partner countries were ready to receive and process deliveries, resulting in delays or increased costs. For example, security cooperation officers we met with reported instances where:

- equipment was held by the partner country's customs agency because the delivery lacked proper documentation or proper address labels, and additional customs fees were incurred while the security cooperation officers found the missing information;
- shipments were warehoused in a customs office for 2 years because they had no addresses or were improperly addressed;
- the Security Cooperation Organization discovered equipment at ports and airports that had arrived without advance notice.

To improve the ability of combatant commands and Security Cooperation Organization officials to obtain information on the acquisition and delivery status of assistance agreements, we recommended that DOD establish procedures to help ensure that DOD agencies populate security assistance information systems with complete data. In response, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency stated that it would work with the military departments to ensure that information systems are populated with acquisition and delivery status data. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is also developing a new electronic system, the Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution, to improve visibility and aggregate data from the separate computer management systems used

¹⁹GAO-13-84.

by DOD's implementing agencies, but it is not expected to be fully implemented until 2020.

Sustaining Efforts and Evaluating Progress

Developing plans to sustain DOD's building partner capacity activities and establishing mechanisms to monitor programs and evaluate results can help ensure that these programs have long-term impact. Our work has shown that some building partner capacity activities may not endure because planning for sustainment has been a systemic challenge. In a 2009 memo to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense stated that sustaining the results of capacity-building has proven difficult because the lack of multi-year planning and funding authorities at the outset of security assistance efforts makes it difficult for the U.S. government and its partners to build or maintain effective collaborative relationships.²⁰ Further, our work has also shown that DOD had not consistently defined performance measures, and reporting on progress and effectiveness of some building partner capacity activities has been limited to anecdotal information.

One example of sustainment planning challenges came from our review of the Section 1206 program. In 2010, we reported that the long-term impact of some Section 1206 projects could be limited because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects.²¹ For example, we found that most participating countries have relatively low incomes and may be unwilling or unable to provide the necessary resources to sustain projects. According to project proposal instructions applicable at the time of our report, proposals must explain how projects will be sustained in future years. However, we found that only 26 percent of the 135 proposals we reviewed for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects explicitly addressed the recipient country's ability or willingness to bear sustainment costs. Moreover, only 1 of the 15 Security Assistance Officers we interviewed indicated that he believed his partner nation had the ability to sustain its Section 1206 projects independently. For example, the Security Assistance Officer in Mali noted that sustainment of the Section 1206 project to train and equip that country's light infantry units would be problematic if the country had to find its own funding. Our

²⁰Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *DOD Review of Building the Security Capacity of Partner Nations* (June 18, 2009).

²¹GAO-10-431.

2010 report also showed that DOD and State had conducted little monitoring and evaluation of the Section 1206 security assistance program. Specifically, DOD and State's reporting has generally consisted of anecdotal information and DOD officials told us that they had not consistently monitored these security assistance projects. Our review of 149 approved proposals for Section 1206 projects for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 showed that only 32 percent (48 proposals) defined measures of effectiveness or anticipated outcomes. In addition, only 25 percent (34) of 135 approved fiscal year 2007 through 2009 proposals we reviewed documented an intention to monitor results. We recommended that DOD and State develop and implement specific plans to monitor, evaluate, and report routinely on the results of such monitoring and evaluation for Section 1206 projects. DOD agreed with our recommendation and, in response, completed its first systematic assessments of Section 1206 projects implemented in 5 countries in 2012.²² As part of that effort, DOD also created the *Section 1206 Assessment Handbook* to be used for the future, annual assessment efforts. Officials we spoke to stated that these pilot assessments validated the assessment methodology, which will be used to evaluate all future potential recipients' capabilities prior to receipt of Section 1206 equipment, as well as to conduct evaluations of selected Section 1206 efforts following the implementation.

In a separate review of U.S. Africa Command in 2010, we found that it is unclear whether all of the activities that U.S. Africa Command inherited or is planning fully align with its mission of sustained security engagement in Africa because the command was generally not measuring the long-term effects of its activities.²³ For example, U.S. Africa Command officials we met with while observing a command activity in Uganda told us that the command planned to produce an "after action" report after the activity, but they acknowledged that U.S. Africa Command needs to develop a method to perform longer-term assessments of activities. Command officials also stated they did not know whether projects such as reconstructing a school would have a sustainable effect on the community and State officials added that the command's efforts to support U.S.

²²DOD considers information about the results of the assessments to be sensitive.

²³GAO, *Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa*, GAO-10-794 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010).

embassies by augmenting or broadening existing public-diplomacy efforts were not being assessed. While long-term evaluation can be difficult to achieve, particularly the ability to link an action to a desired effect, we noted it nonetheless remains important for the command to have some performance measures. Therefore, we recommended that U.S. Africa Command conduct long-term assessments of the full range of its activities to determine whether the activities are having their intended effects and supporting the Command's mission. In a 2012 follow up to our recommendation, the command stated that it has conducted nationwide polling and stakeholder interviews across several African countries to develop a baseline against which progress can be measured. For example, the command asked how participants viewed their nation's military and how they felt toward international cooperation in military training and peacekeeping in Africa. However, U.S. Africa Command still needs to take steps to develop metrics and indicators in order to conduct more thorough assessments. Until the long-term assessments of its activities are completed, U.S. Africa Command may have difficulty making successful future planning decisions and allocating resources to maximize its effect in Africa.

More recently, in 2012, we found that because the National Guard's State Partnership Program did not have agreed-upon goals or metrics, it could not assess progress.²⁴ National Guard Bureau officials acknowledged that once they update program goals and objectives, they will need to develop metrics to measure results of the program. The officials are working with experts from other organizations and have begun to develop metrics for the program. However, they indicated that due to the relationship-building nature of the program, it is difficult to establish appropriate metrics that capture the effects of the program. We recommended that the department complete and implement the program's comprehensive oversight framework by using the goals, objectives, and metrics currently being developed. In the December 2012 DOD instruction, the department directed the alignment of State Partnership Program activities with combatant commanders' theater security cooperation program objectives, as well as with the objectives of the U.S. embassies and national security objectives of the partner nations. This is a positive step; however, goals, objectives, or metrics specific to the State Partnership Program still need to be completed. Such goals, objectives, and metrics would form the

²⁴GAO-12-548.

foundation for a comprehensive oversight framework and, until they are put into place, DOD cannot fully assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources.

In addition, our work on counternarcotics efforts has found challenges with the reliability of performance data. For example, our 2012 review of the Andean countries²⁵ found that although DOD is working to improve its counternarcotics performance measurement system, the department's Inspector General has been unable to attest to the reliability of the performance data from 2007 through 2011, as required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy.²⁶ We previously reported that DOD had established performance measures for its counternarcotics activities, such as percentage of tasked counternarcotics missions flown, the number of partner nation law enforcement agencies engaged, and the number of military working dog teams trained.²⁷ However, during our 2012 review, we found that the DOD Inspector General cited a number of reasons for not attesting to the reliability of DOD's performance data. One example was that DOD's 2008 performance report did not include 4 consecutive years of data required for tracking improvements. Lacking these attestations from DOD, the Office of National Drug Control Policy has minimal assurance of the reliability of DOD's reporting on its estimated \$956 million in counternarcotics assistance for those years. Without reliable information, the Office of National Drug Control Policy may be limited in its ability to carry out its responsibility for coordinating and overseeing implementation of the policies, goals, objectives, and priorities established by the national drug control program and to report to Congress on counternarcotics assistance provided by agencies under its purview. As a result, we recommended that the department submit its performance summary report along with the Inspector General's attestations of the reliability of the information reported to the National

²⁵The Andean region consists of five countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

²⁶GAO, *Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results*, GAO-12-824 (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2012). See also Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, *Drug Control Accounting* (May 1, 2007) for data reliability requirements.

²⁷GAO, *Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement System to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities*, GAO-10-835 (Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010).

Drug Control Policy office. DOD agreed with our recommendation but did not detail how it would address this recommendation.

In conclusion, DOD's building partner capacity efforts encompass a broad range of security cooperation activities that focus on emphasizing existing alliances and expanding cooperation with emerging partners to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests, as well as sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.²⁸ Given the recent emphasis on these efforts, it is vital to manage them effectively and efficiently. By setting clear goals and defining terminology, coordinating activities and sharing information, and sustaining efforts and evaluating progress, DOD can avoid confusion about the activities and help to assess their long-term impact. Effective management of current and future building partner capacity efforts will help DOD steward its resources to achieve its strategic priorities and provide Congress with the information it needs as it evaluates current programs and considers future funding levels. Moreover, effective management of these efforts will likely better position the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions and future uncertainties around the world.

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

For future information regarding this statement, please contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement are listed in appendix II.

²⁸*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.*

Appendix I: Related GAO Products

Security Assistance: DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management. GAO-13-84. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2012.

Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Aidean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results. GAO-12-824. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2012.

State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners. GAO-12-548. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.

Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts. GAO-12-359. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2012.

Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement System to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities. GAO-10-835. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs. GAO-10-431. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4300 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact name above, Charles Michael Johnson Jr., Director; John Pendleton, Director; Sharon Pickup, Director; Marie Mak, Assistant Director; James Michels, Assistant Director; Jennifer Andreone, Kathryn Bolduc, Katherine Forsyth, Simon Hirschfeld, Meghan Perez, Erika Prochaska, Steven Putansu, Jodie Sandel, Michael Simon, John Van Schaik, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Nicole Willems made key contributions to this testimony.

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Janet St. Laurent
Managing Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. GAO

Ms. Janet St. Laurent is Managing Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office's Defense Capabilities and Management team. Her primary responsibilities are to manage and testify on GAO's work related to defense issues including force structure, readiness, logistics, infrastructure, base closures, defense budgets, emerging threats, business transformation and military and civilian human capital issues. She has also led numerous reviews and testified on DOD's support to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, she co-led GAO's first congressionally-mandated annual report on opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue which was issued in March 2011. As co-leader of this effort, she provided testimony on cost-savings opportunities to the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform in September 2010 and has participated in numerous conferences and radio and television events.

From 2003-2006, Ms. St. Laurent served as Director for Force Structure and Defense Planning in GAO's Defense Capabilities and Management team. Her principal duties included leading GAO's work on force structure, defense planning, strategic forces, and military transformation issues. Prior to August 2002, she served as an Assistant Director in the Defense Capabilities and Management team for 10 years. Ms. St. Laurent joined GAO's Boston Regional Office in 1978 and also served in GAO's offices in New York City and Frankfurt, Germany where she conducted numerous evaluations of foreign aid, defense, energy and social programs.

Ms. St. Laurent received a Master of Science in National Security Strategy from the National War College in 1999. She also holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Massachusetts. In 2001, she completed an executive leadership program at Harvard University. Ms. St. Laurent has received numerous GAO awards throughout her career and was a 2011 Samuel J. Heyman Service to America award finalist.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

FEBRUARY 14, 2013

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Secretary SHEEHAN. As required by section 1204 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239), the Department of Defense will provide on February 26, 2013, a copy of Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, “State Partnership Program,” dated December 14, 2012, the regulations required by subsection (a) of section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84).

Appropriate modifications have been made, and appropriate controls have been issued, to ensure the compliance of the State Partnership Program with section 1341 of title 31, United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Anti-Deficiency Act”). [See page 26.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Secretary SHEEHAN. Total Fiscal Year 2012 BPC authority expenditures included: Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (\$32.77M); Defense Institution Reform Initiative (\$12.8M); Global Train & Equip Program (including Section 1206 (\$218.6M),¹ Section 1207(n) Yemen (\$75M),² Section 1207(n) East Africa (\$41.2M),³ and Counter-Lord’s Resistance Army (CLRA) 1206 (\$22.5M)⁴); Humanitarian & Civic Assistance (\$10.2M); International Counter-drug Program (\$691.1M); Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (\$11.5M); and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster & Civic Aid (\$117.4M). [See page 29.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Secretary SHEEHAN. The Department acknowledges shortfalls highlighted in the GAO report and the need for updated program goals, objectives, and oversight. As a result of the GAO report and concerns expressed by Congress, the Department published Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, “State Partnership Program.” We believe this Instruction provides appropriate modifications to the program and that appropriate controls have been implemented to address those concerns.

The Department sees the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) as a valuable tool in its security cooperation toolkit. Now with the new instruction in place, the Department is evaluating proposed legislation regarding the SPP. [See page 20.]

¹This figure reflects the amount notified to Congress for Section 1206 programs, not actual expenditures. In the course of executing the program, eight (8) FY2012 Section 1206 programs notified early in FY2012 resulted in savings. Savings from these programs were used to fund programs notified in the latter half of FY2012.

²The FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation was also used to fund the Transitional Authorities programs under Section 1207(n) for Yemen and East Africa, and the CLRA program for Uganda. DOD requested a reprogramming action to backfill the FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation to fund additional proposals submitted by the GCCs in FY2012; however, the request was not approved.

³The FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation was also used to fund the Transitional Authorities programs under Section 1207(n) for Yemen and East Africa, and the CLRA program for Uganda. DOD requested a reprogramming action to backfill the FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation to fund additional proposals submitted by the GCCs in FY2012; however, the request was not approved.

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART

Secretary SHEEHAN. On December 14, 2012, the Department of Defense issued Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5111.20, "State Partnership Program," in part to address the requirement in subsection 1210(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84), that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall prescribe regulations regarding the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense to pay the costs incurred by the National Guard in conducting activities under the State Partnership Program. I will provide a copy of the DODI to Congress on February 26, 2013. [See page 31.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

FEBRUARY 14, 2013

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. Section 1206 was originally intended as a temporary authority. Almost 7 years later, the authority continues with no foreseeable end. Does the Department view 1206 as a permanent authority or as a temporary authority? Is the Department examining how 1206 activities could be incorporated into or executed under the GSCF?

Secretary SHEEHAN. We view Section 1206 as a critical element of the DOD “tool kit” for responding to near-term and emerging counterterrorism and stability operations requirements identified by Geographic Combatant Commanders. The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) authority is a 3-year pilot program with a broader scope, and we are in the early stages of assessing its effectiveness. Thus far, the multiple GSCF congressional notification and prior approval reprogramming requirements have proven inherently challenging, and it remains unknown the extent to which GSCF—as a shared authority with the Department of State—will address future DOD priorities that lack sufficient support within the Department of State. We will work closely with Congress and our State Department colleagues to improve the GSCF process throughout the pilot program. At the same time, we will continue to rely on the Section 1206 authority to increase capacity of partner nations to counter terrorist threats in North Africa, regional threats from Al Qaeda, and other emerging counterterrorism challenges.

Mr. MCKEON. To what degree, and in what ways, are the current authorities governing U.S. counterterrorism assistance in sub-Saharan Africa sufficient to enable a strategic, effective, and transparent response that is appropriately scaled to the threat? What are the key challenges in providing counterterrorism capacity-building assistance to African partners? What changes to the relevant legislative authorities would you recommend, if any, to address these challenges?

Secretary SHEEHAN. Existing authorities, such as Section 1206, allow the U.S. Government to provide certain counterterrorism (CT) capabilities to our foreign partners, which enables U.S. Africa Command to work effectively toward our Nation’s strategic goals in the region. The key challenge we have in developing CT capacity with African partners is in maintaining persistent, long-term engagement with them that endures political turmoil in the region. As we have experienced with certain West African partners over the past five years, all U.S. security assistance is normally suspended during internal political crisis. Section 1206 is a year-to-year, project-by-project authority; its effectiveness is particularly affected by such discontinuity. Legislation that allows greater flexibility to sustain critical partner relationships in these scenarios would expand policy options for long-term capacity building in fragile states, and improve our ability to counter transnational terrorist groups seeking to expand their safe havens.

Mr. MCKEON. To what extent are host country officials involved in developing and evaluating the various BPC programs? For each BPC authority, could you please tell us at what point host nation officials are asked to participate and which officials do participate? What types of feedback do host nation officials provide, and how is it used to evaluate and develop lessons learned for BCP programs?

Secretary SHEEHAN. We recognize that partner government buy-in is a critical component of developing and evaluating our Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs. Host-nation engagement is among the first phases in security sector assistance planning, ensuring that DOD has adequately assessed partner capacity and capability and political will. We seek to ensure that the United States and the partner share common expectations for the use, sustainment, and evaluation of U.S. assistance. For each program, planning includes robust country team review, supported by senior defense official or security cooperation officer engagement with host nation officials. These engagements provide critical insights into the potential challenges a partner’s security forces may encounter toward integrating new capabilities into existing infrastructure and applying capabilities in ways that complement U.S. goals and objectives. Indeed, country team discussions with the host nation during the planning phase often identify potential shortfalls in host-nation absorptive capacity or gaps within defense institutions (e.g., resource management or human cap-

ital management), which, when addressed, can ensure a better return on U.S. investments.

Mr. McKEON. To what extent, if at all, does DOD conduct follow-up monitoring to ensure that partner military assets provided under BPC authorities, both equipment and trained units, are being used in support of the U.S. national security objectives for which they were provided?

Secretary SHEEHAN. As an example, and in part as the result of a 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Section 1206 that identified a need to perform assessments, we began a two-phase process in late 2010 to assess Section 1206 programs. In the first phase, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (SO/LIC) commissioned RAND Corporation to survey the Section 1206 stakeholder community and identify possible sources of assessment data. In the second phase, OSD SO/LIC commissioned SAIC to develop an assessment framework for Section 1206 programs and to conduct assessments in five countries. A joint U.S. Government-SAIC team conducted assessments in the Philippines, Georgia, Djibouti, Tunisia, and Poland last year. SAIC submitted the assessment framework report, individual country reports, implementation guidance, and an assessment handbook to OSD Policy. We shared these reports as well as an overview of the assessment framework and results with House and Senate staff in February 2013.

DOD's counternarcotics program measures partner nation progress towards desired Building Partner Capacity (BPC) end-states through frameworks that rely on explicit, objective, and observable demonstration of partners' capabilities. These frameworks are documented in our standard operating procedures and are intrinsically linked to national strategic goals and DOD counternarcotics and global threats strategy. Performance data are collected annually or more frequently as required by the specific BPC initiative and operating environment.

I would also note that the Department sought to establish a Security Cooperation Assessments Office. We recognize the importance of effective assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of our BPC programs. Thus, we were disappointed that this Committee acceded to the Senate Arms Services Committee requirement communicated in the 2012 Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2012 to not fund the Security Cooperation Assessments Office that would have been located within OSD SO/LIC.

Mr. McKEON. Recognizing that the BPC authorities were initially designed to respond to emerging threats, the list of BPC recipient countries has been fairly consistent from year to year, given ongoing terrorist threats in certain regions. What is the cost-benefit to being able to identify and budget BPC support for specific cases prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, and if so, would it be possible for DOD to submit proposed country- or region-specific programs in its annual budget requests, similar to the State Department's annual foreign operations requests?

Secretary SHEEHAN. DOD recognizes the utility of prior planning, and we try to apply this principle to our Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, as appropriate. As I mentioned in my Statement for the Record, through the work of Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams, Geographic Combatant Commands, and country teams, we are working to become more anticipatory of partner requirements. However, prior planning is useful only to an extent, particularly when faced with certain complex threats. Agile BPC authorities help us realize U.S. defense objectives by being more responsive to cooperation opportunities with like-minded partners. For example, the Section 1206 authority provides DOD unique and critical flexibility to address emergent threats, allowing us to change course rapidly to tackle unforeseen security threats. When Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up a plane on Christmas Day 2009, DOD was working on a Section 1206 program of assistance focused on other terrorist threats. We were able to shift priorities quickly and the next Section 1206 tranche of programs notified to Congress focused on Yemen and the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Maintaining flexibility to respond to urgent threats is key to successful execution of the Section 1206 program.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER

Mr. BARBER. Ms. St. Laurent, in May 2010, the President released an updated version of his National Security Strategy. The President's strategy noted that American shoulders cannot continue to bear the burden of the challenges of the new century alone. Instead, we must increase our reliance on allies and partners to respond to global threats. To do so, requires that our allies possess the capability to respond to and counter these global threats. Building capacity with our allies and partners not only reduces the burden on our military but augments our foreign relations.

While the State Department has led for the Nation in matters of foreign affairs, the Department of Defense has provided a substantial contribution to this effort. For instance, the Arizona Air National Guard's 162nd Fighter Wing trains 25 of our allies on various aircraft. Through this mission, they build relationships and understanding with our allies, service member to service member. As we continue to build partner capacity and rely more heavily on partners and allies, the U.S. military by default plays a larger role in our Nation's foreign relations. More to the point, the U.S. military has the ability to foster positive international relations separate from the Department of State. However, the Department of Defense relies on legislative authorities granted by this body to build partnership capacity.

Ms. St. Laurent, what authorities need to be amended or granted to allow the Department of Defense to better facilitate foreign relations?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts its efforts to build the capacity of foreign partner nations under a variety of authorities, and GAO's prior work has found that additional congressional guidance for some programs could be provided to help clarify the scope of programs and DOD's roles and responsibilities in performing partner capacity building activities. For example, GAO's 2012 report¹ on DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts found that the legislation guiding DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts does not provide detailed guidance on the Department's role in performing these activities. Our report suggested that given the fiscally constrained environment and potential overlap in the types of peacetime, humanitarian, and development assistance activities being performed by DOD, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, DOD and other agencies involved in assistance efforts could benefit from additional direction from Congress. Specifically, our report recommended that Congress consider amending the legislation that supports the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program to more specifically define DOD's role in humanitarian assistance, taking into account the roles and similar types of efforts performed by the civilian agencies. In another example, our 2010 report² on DOD and the Department of State's Section 1206 security assistance program—used to build the capacity of foreign military forces in order to conduct counterterrorism operations or support U.S. operations—found that there were uncertainties regarding what funds could be used to support sustainment of projects, which can affect the long-term impact and effectiveness of projects. We therefore recommended that DOD, in consultation with Department of State, seek additional guidance from Congress on what funding authorities could be used to sustain Section 1206 projects that DOD determines are effective at addressing specific terrorist or stabilization threats in high priority countries when partner nation funds are unavailable. As of December 2012, DOD had not obtained such guidance from Congress, according to officials from the Section 1206 program office.

Mr. BARBER. Ms. St. Laurent, in your testimony you cited the need in building partner capacity to equip, advise, and assist host countries' security forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories. You also state that building the security capacity of partner nations is a key mission area for the Defense Department and a worldwide priority for the United States.

A great example of this is the success of the Iron Dome missile program in Israel. Developed with the Israelis and funded by the United States, just a few months ago in the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, this system showed its great promise and performed superbly. I believe it is a critical investment that needs to be fully funded and opportunities for co-production explored, so that we may continue our commitment and deliver a weapon system that will ensure the security, safety, and prosperity of Israel. As the Defense Department continues to emphasize building partner capacity, do you agree that the need for efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners, such as has been achieved thus far with Iron Dome, has become increasingly important to our defense strategy? And do you believe that the United States should continue investing in mutually beneficial relationships with our allies even in the face of our country's fiscal challenges because of the long-term benefit to our global security?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. GAO has often reported on the importance of efficient and effective coordination among U.S. entities and foreign partners. For example, in Novem-

¹ GAO, Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts, GAO-12-359 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2012).

² GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010).

ber 2012, we reported that DOD efforts to provide timely security assistance to foreign partners were affected by communication and coordination issues.³ Specifically, DOD security cooperation officials we interviewed reported that a lack of information on security assistance shipment tracking resulted in problems such as delayed assistance, increased costs, or negative effects on their ability to keep partner countries informed about the progress of the assistance agreements. We concluded that this lack of timely and accurate information on security assistance agreement and delivery status could delay assistance, impact the costs of fielding equipment and training, and may adversely affect U.S. relationships with partner countries. Over the last several years, we have also reported on the importance of aligning U.S. development objectives with U.S. national security goals and foreign partner objectives in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴ For example, we noted that the roles, responsibilities, commitments, and activities of all the organizations involved in these countries, including the host governments, should be clearly defined and coordinated to prioritize the spending of limited resources and avoid unnecessary duplication.⁵



³ GAO, Security Assistance: DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management, GAO-13-84 (Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2012).

⁴ GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should be Addressed in U.S. Strategies, GAO-09-476T (Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009). See also, GAO, Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination, GAO-11-138 (Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2010).

⁵ GAO-09-476T.