[Senate Hearing 113-37]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-37
REBALANCE TO ASIA: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 21, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Acting Democratic Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Baer, Daniel B., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Bork, Ellen, director, Democracy and Human Rights, The Foreign
Policy Initiative, Washington, DC.............................. 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Rood, Steven, country field representative for the Philippines
and Pacific Island Nations, The Asia Foundation, San Francisco,
CA............................................................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 4
Yun, Joseph Y., Acting Assistant Secretary for East and Pacific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
(iii)
REBALANCE TO ASIA: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS?
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin, Udall, Murphy, Rubio, and
Johnson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Good morning, everyone. Let me welcome you
to the first hearing for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. I want to thank
Senator Menendez, the chairman of the committee, for his
cooperation as the subcommittee is starting its important
responsibilities here in the 113th Congress.
I also want to thank Senator Rubio, who I believe will be
here shortly. Senator Rubio and I have met in order to plan a
mutual agenda for the subcommittee during this Congress. We
both thought that starting with the Rebalanced to Asia policy
was the right way for the subcommittee to get the background we
need in order to carry out the very important work of the
subcommittee.
Just by way of background, for those who are familiar with
my own congressional career, I spent a good deal of time
working on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, and had the opportunity of chairing the United States
Helsinki Commission. We have many Asian partners that are in
the OSCE, which is an indication of their willingness to look
at the framework that we have used for security in Europe. Of
course, we have full membership from those countries of the
former Soviet Union in Central Asia.
So we have had experience in dealing with some of the
partner countries as it relates to security issues, which I
think will be helpful to me as I take on the responsibility of
the chair of this subcommittee.
This will be the first of a series of hearings examining
different elements of the administration's rebalanced Asia
policy. This policy realigns U.S. diplomatic, economic, and
military resources toward the Asia-Pacific region to help
create a regional set of norms that lead to greater peace,
stability, and economic growth in Asia.
The rebalance to Asia is not about containing China but
rather includes building a constructive relationship with
China. It is not just about our military presence. When we take
a look at our security interests in Asia, we look at three
baskets, as we did in Helsinki. We look at, yes, the military
aspects, and there have certainly been a lot of challenges in
Asia as it relates to military threats. But we also take a look
at the economic opportunities to build bridges in Asia, as well
as our values and human rights. We think all three are
extremely important as we try to rebalance our policies in Asia
itself.
In recent weeks, President Obama has reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment to rebalancing to Asia and underscored the region's
critical importance to U.S. prosperity and security. He
understands,
as do we, that the United States and Asian economies are tied
together and that as they grow, our opportunities do, too. Asia
accounts for more than a quarter of the global GDP, and over
the next 5 years nearly half of all growth outside the United
States is expected to come from Asia. Therefore, we have a
direct interest in being involved from an economic point of
view.
Southeast Asia, in particular, has a rapidly expanding
middle class and a highly educated labor pool. It is a largely
untapped market which includes the world's fourth most populous
country, Indonesia. It is estimated that by 2025, Asia will
account for almost half of the world's economic output.
We must also engage with Asia to protect our security
interests. The threat of nuclear proliferation lingers over the
Korean Peninsula. Disputes over territorial and historical
claims persist. And ensuring free navigation along the critical
maritime trade routes and the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes in the south and east China seas is in the
national interest of the United States. These are all good
reasons for us to pay more attention to the East Asia-Pacific
region.
But we must remember as we rebalance to Asia that the
fundamental respect for the human rights of every person, every
woman, man, and child, is the underpinning to security and
prosperity. Good governance which includes a respect for human
rights is the key to economic growth. As President Obama has
said, ``History offers a clear verdict: Governments that
respect the will of their people, which govern by consent and
not coercion, are more prosperous, they are more stable, and
more successful than governments that do not. Prosperity
without freedom is just another form of poverty.''
Rule of law, a fair system of justice, and transparent
governance which allows for a strong civil society are the
basic structures which allow a nation's citizens to have a
voice, to live in freedom and to build their prosperity. We
must strengthen these elements for our rebalance policy to
succeed.
Combating corruption and fostering good governance with
respect to human rights and the rule of law is a daunting task,
but we have made good progress, and we continue to work with
our partners and allies in the region both on a bilateral basis
and with regional organizations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, known as ASEAN, and the Pacific Island
Nations Forum, to institute and strengthen reform.
ASEAN has taken first steps toward recognizing the
importance of protecting human rights with the formation of the
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and the 2012 ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration. But, as I know many of our ASEAN
partners themselves recognize, these first steps are just that,
first steps. I think we need to look at what these commitments
are about, whether they need to be strengthened and how we can
make sure that there is a way to hold countries accountable to
basic human rights.
And by way of comparison, I once again bring up what we
have done in Helsinki. Helsinki is not a treaty. There is no
formal way of enforcing the commitments that have been made.
And yet I think history has shown that those commitments made
in 1975 by the member states have been very much in the
forefront, very much in the spotlight, and countries that have
not adhered to those principles have been held accountable, not
by formal means, but it starts with commitments that meet
international norms. It is important that we review what has
been done in ASEAN countries in this declaration as to whether
they reach the international norms and whether there is a
mechanism that will allow for accountability for those
countries that need to do better.
The signs of progress are encouraging. The number of
democratic countries in the world has expanded from 30 in 1974
to 117 today. Over the past 30 years the East Asia-Pacific
region has become more democratic, with the Philippines, South
Korea, Thailand, Mongolia, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste
joining the family of democracies. The past 2 years have seen
moves toward greater political freedom in Burma, long one of
the region's most authoritarian systems. Helping Burma have
free and fair elections in 2015 will be a top U.S. Government
priority.
Helping democratic states build institutions that deliver
effective governance and deepen the legitimacy of their
democratic systems is critical. We will continue to encourage
free and fair elections throughout the region as Malaysia and
Cambodia hold parliamentary elections this year and Indonesia
holds its third direct democratic Presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2014.
But elections alone are not enough. We must make sure that
the institutional structures that underpin a successful
democracy are strengthened, from the judiciary to the
bureaucracy to the legislature.
To build momentum for democratic reform, it is critical to
end subnational ethnic conflicts. Peace and stability are
essential to democratic progress, for protecting human rights,
for safe migration, and for combating trafficking in persons.
The peace process in the Philippines is a good example, where a
longstanding conflict in Mindanao now has a peaceful settlement
and path forward following negotiations which Malaysia
facilitated between the parties, civil society, and government
monitors.
As we encourage peaceful, democratic reform, and good
governance, we must continue to push for protecting universal
human rights by combating child labor and trafficking in
persons, protecting religious freedoms, and empowering women.
U.S. efforts to work with allies and friends in east Asia and
the Pacific to prevent trafficking in persons in the region are
beginning to pay off. In 2012, four EAP countries were moved
off the State Department's Tier 2 Watchlist as a result of
these efforts. That is an impressive improvement. We
acknowledge that. But we must keep up these vigorous efforts to
protect human rights. Trafficking in persons has been a top
priority of the United States in foreign policy considerations,
and a lot of progress has been made. But in Asia, there is
still a lot more that needs to be done.
We must remember that women's rights are human rights.
Women are the barometer of a nation's success and its
stability. In my previous role as chairman of the Subcommittee
on International Development and Foreign Assistance, the
successful integration of gender equity into our foreign aid
programs was one of our top priorities, and we made progress. I
welcome President Obama's March 19 nomination of Kathy Russell,
former Chief of Staff to Dr. Jill Biden, to the important post
of Ambassador at Large for Global Women's Issues at the
Department of State. I look forward to her confirmation
hearings. The Obama administration and the State Department
have done a good job of promoting gender equity issues, and
this will be one of our top priorities of this subcommittee.
Senator Rubio, before you arrived I pointed out that you
and I have had a chance to talk about the subcommittee and the
importance of the subcommittee, and I very much appreciate the
fact that we are working together on the agenda of our
subcommittee hearings in order to focus the proper attention of
the U.S. Senate to the challenges that we have in Asia and the
Pacific. So I very much appreciate that, and I look forward to
working with you in this Congress, and I thank you for your
help and cooperation.
Senator Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me take the
opportunity to thank you and your staff for how open they have
been in engaging in this issue, which I think is an
extraordinary opportunity to work on one of the most exciting
regions in the world, and at a very exciting time in world
history. I, too, look forward to working on a very robust
agenda to ensure that the subcommittee plays a strong role
within the foreign policy community in ensuring that our
nation's policies in East Asia and the Pacific region further
both our national interests and the goal of a better world.
I said at the outset, Asia is incredibly vibrant, and it is
also diverse ethnically, politically, economically, and the
home of half the world's population. That alone is a reason to
be paying a lot of attention. It has the second- and third-
largest economies in the world, and two out of our five largest
trading partners. Clearly, a prosperous, democratic, and stable
East Asia is crucial to our own national security, to our own
safety, but also to our own prosperity.
The administration has openly discussed an American pivot
or rebalance toward East Asia, and at a future hearing I hope
that we will more carefully explore exactly what this rebalance
means in light of America's commitments in other parts of the
world as well. But nevertheless, it is clear, and therefore I
think worrisome to several Asia observers whether there is a
comparable commitment to promoting democracy and respect for
human rights as part of that rebalance.
There is no doubt in my mind that a robust U.S. defense and
economic presence in East Asia is a source of stability, but
what is at stake in the region goes beyond just our ability to
deploy sophisticated weapons to counter immediate and emerging
threats. What would set us apart from authoritarian competitors
and lay the groundwork for a truly American legacy in East Asia
is also a strong commitment to advancing individual freedoms,
as the chairman has discussed.
The Republic of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, those are just
three examples of what Asian societies can accomplish by
embracing individual freedom, free markets, and independent
institutions that provide real checks and balances to political
authority.
At the other end of the spectrum stands ghastly regimes
like the Kim family in North Korea, where for more than six
decades the people have been enslaved, and it has caused untold
suffering. This tyrannical regime systematically denies its
citizens even the most basic personal freedoms, and it is
estimated to hold up to 200,000 human beings, 200,000 human
beings in political internment camps under gulag-style
conditions.
I am also concerned about China and to some extent Vietnam,
with the myth of authoritarian capitalism and modernization, as
well as authoritarian Burma, which we hope is in the process of
a real transition, and I hope we will talk a little bit about
that today.
More broadly, the region has the largest number of human
trafficking victims in the world. The chairman also pointed to
that, at a rate of 3.3 victims for 1,000 people. That is
shocking. These victims are enslaved in labor trafficking, as
well as sex trafficking across the region. I hope the United
States will continue to address the challenge of human rights
and democracy with boldness and clarity and consistency.
History has shown that there simply is no substitute for
transparent, accountable, and responsive government, whether it
is responding to citizens' calls for greater economic
opportunity, ensuring their safety, aiding those affected by
natural disasters. A government's ability to earn the trust of
its citizens is absolutely essential to its long-term
legitimacy, and therein lies the importance of this hearing and
hearings like that.
I hope that by holding this hearing we are sending a signal
to the region and to the administration and to our partners
here in the Senate and in the House that there is a bipartisan
commitment to ensure the promotion of human rights and
democratic governance all over the world, but especially at
this time in East Asia and the Pacific. If we stick to these
principles, if we stick to these principles and follow through
on our promises, we have the opportunity to help produce long-
lasting democratic stability, human rights, and prosperity in
the region, a legacy that I think we will all be proud of; a
legacy that our children will be proud of us for.
So, thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward
to many more like this.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
On our first panel we are very pleased to have the Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asia and
Pacific Affairs at the Department of State, Mr. Joseph Yun. It
is a pleasure to have you with us today.
Mr. Yun is a career diplomat, and we thank you very much
for your long service to our country. You come to this post
with a great deal of practical background, considering that you
have had assignments in South Korea, Thailand, France,
Indonesia, and Hong Kong.
You are joined by Mr. Daniel Baer, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
at the Department of State. His portfolio includes the Office
of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and the Office of
Multilateral and Global Affairs, so is a key person on the
subjects that we want to talk about today.
We welcome both of you. Your full statements will be made
part of the record.
We will start with Mr. Yun.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH Y. YUN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Yun. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member Rubio, and members of the committee, for having
me here today. I am here with my friend and colleague, Dan
Baer, with whom I have worked very closely over the past
several years in promoting democracy and human rights issues in
Asia and Pacific.
Mr. Chairman, as you and Ranking Member Rubio mentioned,
the United States is bound to Asia-Pacific through geography,
history, alliances, trade, and people-to-people ties, and those
will only grow in importance over the next decade and beyond.
Over the past 4 years, the U.S. Government has made a
deliberate strategic effort to broaden and deepen our
engagement in the region in what has come to be known as
rebalance to the Asian-Pacific. This strategic rebalance is
based on the recognition that the Asia-Pacific's political and
economic future and the future of the United States are deeply
linked.
The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region covers a broad
range of strategic objectives: Deepening our alliances in the
region; boosting economic growth and trade; strengthening our
relationships with emerging powers such as China, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and India; expanding good governance; developing
energy efficiency and environmental protection; and especially
expanding people-to-people ties.
While the rebalance reflects the importance the U.S.
Government places on a strategic and economic engagement in the
region, the dimension that binds the entire strategy together
is our strong support for advancing democracy and human rights,
what I would call our value issues. Democracy and respect for
human rights are increasingly part of the fabric of the Asia-
Pacific. In fact, according to Freedom House's most recent
``Freedom in the World'' report, during the past 5 years the
Asia-Pacific region has shown the greatest progress in the
world in achieving steady gains in political rights and civil
liberties.
Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, several examples come to
our mind as well, Indonesia being one of them, so is Timor-
Leste, Thailand, Taiwan, and more. Most recently, we have seen
very positive developments in Burma that have allowed us to
open a new chapter in bilateral relations. In November last
year, President Obama became the first sitting United States
President to visit Burma. During his visit, he emphasized that
the United States would help Burma solidify the progress it has
made, especially in addressing human rights challenges, and
also we would help them strengthen the hand of those seeking
further reform.
At the same time that we have seen these positive
developments, we have continued to press for improvements with
those governments that fall short on human rights and whose
democratic institutions remain weak. As Ranking Member Rubio
mentioned, North Korea is a case in point. North Korea's nearly
25 million people are in dire need of improvement in their
welfare, protection of human rights, and that remains an
essential goal of our overall North Korea policy.
The United States also remains deeply concerned about the
continued deterioration in the human rights situation in China.
We will continue to discuss human rights issues frankly with
our Chinese counterparts and press them to respect the rule of
law and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of
all of its citizens.
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that there is much more work
that needs to be done, especially in the countries I have just
mentioned, as well as in countries like Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam, to ensure that all citizens enjoy media freedom and
freedom of expression, and that there is space for civil
society to have their voices heard. We remain quite concerned
about the disappearance of Lao civil society activist Sombath
Somphone. In Cambodia, we have consistently raised our concerns
about the case of exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy.
Clearly, there is a significant amount of work still to be
done, but there are also many examples of areas where we have
worked very closely with our partners in the region to promote
a variety of human rights and democracy issues. We emphasize
the dependence of democratic institutions on a strong rule of
law. We make it a priority to protect the rights of women
around the world and empower them economically and politically.
We also promote the protection of the human rights of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender persons around the world.
We have joined with Indonesia, the Philippines, and five
other founding governments to launch a global forum, the Open
Government Partnership, where governments work closely with
civil society to develop action plans with concrete commitments
to improve transparency of governments and how they serve the
people. These are just a few examples of many ways in which we
actively support democracy and human rights in the region.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to
testify today. I am pleased to answer any questions you may
have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:]
Prepared Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary Joseph Y. Yun
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Rubio, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today with my colleague, Dan Baer, to testify on the important issues
of democracy and human rights in the context of the rebalance to Asia.
I would also like to thank the committee for its leadership in
supporting and promoting engagement with the Asia-Pacific region and
advancing U.S. interests there. I look forward to working further with
you and other Members of Congress to continue to expand our involvement
in the region.
The United States is bound to Asia through geography, history,
alliances, trade, and people-to-people ties, which will continue to
grow in importance over the next decade and beyond. Over the last 4
years, the U.S. Government has made a deliberate, strategic effort to
broaden and deepen our engagement in the region in what has come to be
known as the ``rebalance'' to the Asia-Pacific. This strategic
rebalance is based on the recognition that the Asia-Pacific's political
and economic future and the future of the United States are deeply and
increasingly linked.
The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region covers a range of
strategic objectives: deepening our alliances in the region; boosting
economic growth and trade; strengthening our relationships with
emerging powers; expanding good governance, democracy, and human
rights; shaping a regional architecture; and deterring conflict.
And while the rebalance reflects the importance the U.S. Government
places on our strategic and economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific,
the dimension that binds the entire strategy together is our strong
support for advancing democracy and human rights.
Democracy and human rights give people the chance to live with
dignity and to achieve a better future. Good governance is critical to
reducing poverty, building rule of law, and allowing for open
discussion of ideas in civil society. Strong democratic institutions
increase transparency and ethics, which help to combat corruption.
Democracies give people a way to devote energy to productive political
and civic engagement and reduce the allure of extremism. And open
societies offer more opportunities for economic, educational, cultural,
religious, and people-to-people exchanges, which are part of the
foundation for peace. It is for these reasons that the U.S. Government
places so much importance on democracy and human rights and works with
governments, civil society activists, journalists, and human rights
organizations around the world. It is not only the right thing to do;
it is also the strategically smart thing to do.
Democracy and respect for human rights are increasingly part of the
fabric of the Asia-Pacific. In fact, according to Freedom House's most
recent ``Freedom in the World'' report, during the past 5 years, the
Asia-Pacific region has shown the greatest progress in the world in
achieving steady gains in political rights and civil liberties. There
are numerous examples that immediately come to mind in the Asia-Pacific
that have demonstrated profound progress in respecting human rights and
good governance. In just 15 years, Indonesia has transitioned rapidly
from an authoritarian regime to a thriving democracy. Timor-Leste,
Southeast Asia's youngest democracy, is already a leader in injecting
the concerns of fragile and post-conflict countries into discussions of
aid effectiveness and the post-2015 development agenda for other post-
conflict countries. Thailand has overcome sharp political differences
and military rule to restore democratic governance. Taiwan's voters
have twice changed their ruling party through the power of peaceful
balloting, and Taiwan was awarded the highest rating for political
rights and the second-highest rating for civil liberties in the 2013
``Freedom in the World'' report. And perhaps the most striking example
of all in recent history is Burma, where positive developments on a
range of concerns of the international community have allowed us to
open a new chapter in bilateral relations.
At the same time that we have seen positive developments, we
continue to press for improvements with those governments that fall
short on human rights and whose democratic institutions remain weak.
Improving the welfare of North Korea's nearly 25 million people, who
live under conditions which, as described by U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in North Korea Marzuki Darusman, may constitute crimes
against humanity, is an essential goal of our overall North Korea
policy. We have cosponsored a resolution at the U.N. Human Rights
Council to establish a Commission of Inquiry, building on Special
Rapporteur Darusman's work, to investigate systematic, widespread, and
grave human rights violations. With our nongovernmental organization
(NGO) partners, we continue to support programs that document and raise
awareness about human rights conditions, promote rule of law and lay
the foundation for civil society, and promote the flow of outside
information to the North Korean people.
Human rights issues continue to be a central element of the U.S.-
China bilateral relationship. We continue to discuss human rights
frankly with Chinese counterparts and to press China to respect the
rule of law and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of
all its citizens. But we remain concerned about the continued
deterioration in the human rights situation in China. The use of forced
disappearances, extralegal detentions, and lack of due process in
judicial proceedings are troublesome, particularly when such practices
target public-interest lawyers, writers, artists, intellectuals,
bloggers, religious figures, and activists in China for exercising
their internationally recognized human rights. Authorities continue the
severe cultural and religious repression of ethnic Uighurs and
Tibetans, and China's response to self-immolations by Tibetans has been
harsh, including using criminal penalties to punish the relatives and
associates of those who self-immolated.
We recognize that there is much work to be done in countries like
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to ensure that all citizens enjoy media
freedoms and freedom of expression and that there is space for civil
society to have their voices heard. We remain concerned about the
disappearance of Lao civil society activist Sombath Somphone. As a
respected figure who could work with activists, the government, and the
international community alike, his disappearance 4 months ago has sent
a chill through the activist community. We urge the Lao Government to
redouble their investigation efforts and to be transparent about
information they may have about his whereabouts and well-being. In
Cambodia, we have consistently raised our concerns about the cases of
independent radio operator Mam Sanando, recently freed from detention,
and exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy. We were encouraged by the
release of Mam Sonando, but will continue to urge Cambodia to improve
its record on the issues of resolving land rights and tolerance of
dissent, and to fulfill its pledge to genuine multiparty democracy,
particularly in the runup to critical national elections in July.
We also have more work to do in engaging the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their historic attempt to address
the importance of promoting and protecting human rights in Southeast
Asia as a region. In November 2012, ASEAN announced the adoption of the
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. As we noted in November 2012, we are
deeply concerned that many of the Declaration's principles and articles
could weaken and erode universal human rights and fundamental freedoms
as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). We
urge ASEAN, in consultation with civil society, to amend and strengthen
its Declaration to reflect a commitment to protect and advance fully
the fundamental freedoms of its people and to bring the document in
line with the standards embodied in the UDHR and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Clearly, there is a significant amount of difficult work still to
be done, but there are also so many examples of areas where we work
closely with our partners in the Asia-Pacific region to promote a
variety of human rights and democracy issues. We are committed to
working with countries across the region to strengthen judicial systems
and rule of law. In the Philippines, for example, through USAID's
Judicial Strengthening to Increase Court Effectiveness (JUSTICE)
program, the U.S. Government is playing an important role in the
Philippines' effort to help transform its judicial system. JUSTICE, an
approximately $20 million program, focuses on improving court
efficiency, primarily through docket decongestion and reduction of
trial delays, strengthening contract and intellectual property
enforcement, and building confidence in the integrity of courts.
We are also focused on protecting the rights of women throughout
the region and on empowering them economically and politically. In
keeping with this goal, we have directed our embassies and consulates
in the Asia-Pacific region to promote women's rights and equality
through policy development, programming, monitoring and reporting,
management, and training. We have invested in programs for ASEAN that
directly address women's issues through support of ``Track II'' civil
society programs such as the Human Rights Resource Center and
consultations with the ASEAN Commission for the Protection of the
Rights of Women and Children. The efforts of our regional USAID office
in Port Moresby to empower women and strengthen democratic institutions
in Papua New Guinea were a crucial component of that country's
successful election in July 2012, which witnessed the election of three
female Members of Parliament.
We are also proud of our leadership in the Equal Futures
Partnership, a multistakeholder initiative developed by the White House
after President Obama's 2011 U.N. General Assembly address. The
partnership consists of a core group of member states, working with
civil society, private sector organizations, and other multilateral
stakeholders, including the World Bank and U.N. Women working together
to identify key barriers to women's political and economic empowerment
and address them with specific new commitments. Founding members
include Indonesia and Australia; Thailand and New Zealand have declared
their intent to join. We hope to enlist the participation of other
Asian-Pacific countries in the future.
In July 2012, the U.S. and Cambodian Governments convened the
first-ever Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy Dialogue as
part of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). Delegations from LMI
countries (Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Burma) and from
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan attended the conference. The more
than 150 representatives discussed integration of women into policy
planning, gender equality and women's empowerment, and increased
participation by women in economic and political development. As a
result of this conference, the Department of State and USAID are
coordinating several new initiatives that empower women from LMI
countries in the fields of science and technology, as well as in areas
such as natural resource management.
We also take very seriously the goal of advancing the human rights
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons around the
world. On International Human Rights Day, December 6, 2011, former
Secretary Clinton famously declared in Geneva that ``gay rights are
human rights and human rights are gay rights.'' On that same day,
President Obama signed a Presidential Memorandum directing all Federal
agencies engaged abroad to ensure that U.S. diplomacy and foreign
assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT persons.
Through our missions abroad we are working to fulfill this directive by
engaging actively with civil society groups and governments. Highlights
include Mission China's engagement with a federation of LGBT NGOs to
support more than 33 rights events held across six provinces, and the
``Proud to be Us'' event supported by the U.S. Embassy to Laos.
In terms of promoting transparent and inclusive governments that
provide a strong foundation for democracy, we joined with Indonesia,
the Philippines and five other founding governments to launch a global
forum, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011. OGP aims to
secure concrete commitments from participant governments in order to
promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness
new technologies to strengthen governance. Under this initiative
governments are working in close consultation with civil society to
develop country action plans with concrete innovative commitments to
improve how governments serve their people. There are currently 58
countries in OGP, including the Republic of Korea. Indonesia is
currently a cochair of the initiative.
Before I conclude my testimony, I would like to make special
mention of Burma, a country in which we are seeing a great shift with
regard to respect for human rights and good governance, and a country
that demonstrates the possibility for change that exists in the Asia-
Pacific region. In November 2012, President Obama became the first
sitting U.S. President to visit Burma. He affirmed U.S. support for
democracy, civil society, and freedom and noted the centrality of human
rights to our bilateral relationship. Recognizing the progress that
Burma has made across a wide range of areas, he expressed our country's
unwavering support for the aspirations of all the people of Burma. Last
year, we reestablished our USAID Mission in Rangoon, and over fiscal
years 2012 and 2013, we will provide $170 million to strengthen
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; promote transparent
governance; advance peace and reconciliation; meet humanitarian needs;
and enhance economic development that can improve the health and
livelihoods of the Burmese people. We supported an expanded U.N.
Development Program mandate in Burma to address inclusive community
development, poverty reduction, and local governance capacity-building
programs, among other areas. We agreed upon a joint plan to combat
human trafficking. We have also restarted the Fulbright program and
held the first U.S. university fair in Rangoon last month. However, as
the President also made clear, there is still a long road ahead. That
is why we are focused on helping Burma solidify the progress it has
made so far and strengthen the hand of those seeking further reform, so
that that process becomes irreversible.
We recognize that much of the history of the 21st century will be
written in Asia, and we are working to ensure that it is a century in
which economies grow, conflicts are avoided, and security is
strengthened. Supporting democracy and human rights across the region
will be a central component of our efforts.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I am
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Mr. Baer.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL B. BAER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Baer. Thank you very much, Chairman Cardin and Ranking
Member Rubio and Senator Johnson, for being here. Thank you to
the committee for hosting this hearing and inviting me to
testify with my good friend and colleague, Joe Yun. As Joe has
said, we have had the opportunity to work very closely
together, and it has been a great professional joy for me.
The Obama administration's rebalance is a purposeful,
strategic move in our foreign policy. It is motivated by the
opportunity to develop deeper and more wide-ranging
partnerships in a part of the world that is increasingly
important to American interests.
Headline news coverage of the pivot often focuses on issues
of hard security and trade agreements. The role of political
progress, and in particular the advance of human rights and
democracy, is less frequently a strand in the public discourse.
So the topic of this hearing fills a gap and gives us an
opportunity to consider important questions.
Does the rebalance, as a purposeful addition to U.S.
foreign policy, include progress on human rights and democracy
as part of its objectives? And does progress, or lack thereof,
on human rights and democratic governance affect the prospects
of achieving the full range of objectives that motivate the
broader rebalance? The questions are related, of course, and
the answer to both is a firm ``Yes.''
In the second half of the 20th century, human rights were a
clear pillar in our regional foreign policy with respect to
Europe. We recognize that it was not only our moral convictions
but our economic and security interests that would be best met
by a democratic Europe. The underlying truths haven't changed.
Human rights and democracy are foundational to our foreign
policy because they are foundational to our polity, and also
because U.S. national interests will be most durably met by a
world in which states are part of a stable rule-based order.
That stable order can only be grounded on the durable peace
that human rights and democratic governance deliver.
That belief animated President Obama's 2011 speech to the
Australian Parliament announcing the rebalance, and the
necessity of U.S. leadership in support of human rights as a
central element of it. Because while the region includes big
and fast-growing economies and opportunities for more effective
partnerships, we can't forget that the region also includes
many hundreds of millions of people who have yet to experience
protections for their human rights. It includes strongmen who
manipulate flawed elections and suppress speech in order to
stay in power. It includes places where the rule of law is
notably absent and where members of religious and other
minorities suffer abuses with impunity. It includes governments
that treat the Internet as a new threat to be regulated and
controlled, rather than as a platform for free expression and
opportunity.
For as long as these conditions remain, both the region's
potential progress and the potential dividends of our
engagement will be hampered. There is much to gain in my view,
but achieving the full potential return on our investment, both
for our citizens and for the people of the region, depends on
political progress.
In his speech in Canberra, President Obama spoke
specifically to three ways in which we are exercising
leadership. First, he said that we have strengthened civil
society because it empowers citizens to hold their governments
accountable. Burma's budding democratic transition will succeed
only if the country's civil society is strong and can help
drive it. That is why we continue to press that the political
leaders recently released from Burmese prisons return to
society with their full civil rights restored. It is why we
have encouraged the government to engage civil society
directly, including the recently formed committee that is
charged with working through the remaining political prisoner
cases. It is why the administration's reporting requirements
will ask U.S. investors how they have conducted human rights
due diligence.
In Cambodia, civil society organized and led a campaign to
resist a menacing proposed NGO law. We supported their efforts,
and former Secretary Clinton repeatedly urged the Cambodian
Government to scrap the law. Prime Minister Hun Sen eventually
announced that the NGO law would be shelved and would not be
brought forward again without civil society support.
Other challenges remain, of course, in Cambodia. We were
deeply disturbed to see the re-arrest of Born Samnang and Sok
Sam Oeun, who are widely viewed as scapegoats in the 2004
murder of union leader Chea Vichea. Opposition leader Sam
Rainsy remains in self-imposed exile to avoid imprisonment on
politically motivated charges. While we welcomed Mam Sonando's
release last week as a positive step, the charges continue to
hang over his head, and others remain in jail.
The second element President Obama committed us to was
advancing the rights of all people, including women, religious
minorities, and other vulnerable populations. Members of this
subcommittee know that there are parts of the region where not
only are members of minority groups not protected, but their
rights are actively targeted for repression. The United States
remains deeply concerned about repressive Chinese policies that
threaten the distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious
heritage of Tibetans and that have contributed to a climate of
increasing desperation in which more than 100 Tibetans have
resorted to self-immolation. In Xinjiang, where I visited in
late 2011, members of the Uighur population continue to face
discrimination, arbitrary detention, and restrictions on
religious freedom and freedom of movement. Unsurprisingly,
tensions remain high.
Almost everyone is vulnerable to abuses and violations in
North Korea. Just this week, the United States is supporting a
resolution at the Human Rights Council to create a commission
of inquiry into the systematic and widespread abuses committed
by that regime.
Finally, in Canberra, the President said we encourage open
government because democracies depend on an informed and active
citizenry. The Open Government Partnership is being chaired by
Indonesia this year, but initiatives like the OGP only work
when they are supported by an open and active civil society. So
the United States will continue to press for progress to ensure
protections for freedom of expression, association, and
assembly.
One area where this is particularly important, where there
are worrying trends in some parts of the region, is with the
Internet and new connection technologies. In countries like
Vietnam, which has an impressive level of Internet penetration
but a large number of bloggers and others who have been
imprisoned for what they said online, we must continue to make
the case that human rights apply online as they do offline. We
need to underscore that it is no coincidence that Silicon
Valley is in a country where ideas are exchanged freely and
that Vietnam's Steve Jobs or Mark Zuckerberg will not be able
to contribute to the growth of their country if he or she is
sitting in a prison cell because of something written online.
I know that Secretary Kerry, who has long maintained a deep
personal interest in the region, is committed to carrying
forward the work of leading the rebalance in a way that
advances all of the interests of the United States, including a
strong rule-based global order grounded in respect for human
rights, that enables durable economic prosperity and peace.
Thanks very much for having me, and I will be happy to take
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel B. Baer
Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Rubio, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today with my
good friend and colleague, Acting Assistant Secretary Joe Yun.
The Obama administration's ``rebalance'' is a purposeful, strategic
move in our foreign policy. It is motivated by opportunity to develop
deeper and more wide-ranging partnerships in a part of the world that
is increasingly important to American interests. The region includes
the second- and third-largest economies in the world and some of the
fastest growing ones, economies with enormous future potential; the
vast majority of U.S. cross-ocean trade passes through the region's
shipping channels; and regional security in Asia has a direct effect on
U.S. interests as the recent actions and threats by the North Korean
regime underscore. The rebalance offers an opportunity to build
resilient networks of cooperation, trust, and stable expectations that
will protect U.S. interests and help us remain prepared to tackle
shared challenges in the years to come.
Headline news coverage of the Obama administration's rebalance or
``pivot'' to the Asia-Pacific region often focuses on questions of hard
security, military dispositions, and trade agreements. The role of
political progress--in particular, of the advance of human rights and
democracy--is less frequently a strand in the public discourse about
the pivot. So the topic of this hearing helps fill a gap, and gives us
an opportunity to consider important questions: Does the ``rebalance,''
as a purposeful addition to U.S. foreign policy, include progress on
human rights and democracy as part of its objectives? And does
progress--or lack thereof--on human rights and democratic governance
affect the prospects of achieving the full range of objectives that
motivate the broader ``rebalance''?
The questions are related, of course, and the answer to both is a
firm, ``Yes.''
The advance of human rights and democracy has long been an
established objective of U.S. foreign policy through administrations of
both parties. In the second half of the 20th century, human rights were
a clear pillar in our regional foreign policy with respect to Europe--
we recognized that it was not only our moral convictions but our
economic and security interests that would best be met by a democratic
Europe. The underlying truths haven't changed: human rights and
democracy are foundational to our foreign policy because they are
foundational to our polity; and because U.S. national interests will be
most durably met by a world in which states are part of a stable rules-
based order. That stable order can only be grounded on the durable
peace that human rights and democratic governance deliver.
That's why our 2010 National Security Strategy unambiguously
declares that, ``the United States can more effectively forge consensus
to tackle shared challenges when working with governments that reflect
the will and respect the rights of their people, rather than just the
narrow interests of those in power.'' That belief animated President
Obama's 2011 speech to the Australian Parliament announcing the
rebalance, and the necessity of U.S. leadership in support of human
rights as a central element of it. Because while, as I've said, the
region includes big and fast-growing economies, as well as
opportunities for more effective partnerships in tackling transnational
security issues, and while there are many opportunities for mutually
beneficial cooperation in the years ahead, we cannot forget that the
region also includes many hundreds of millions of people who have yet
to experience protections for their universal human rights. It includes
strongmen who manipulate flawed elections and suppress speech and
expression in order to stay in power, and it includes places where the
``rule of law'' is notably absent and where members of religious and
other minorities suffer abuses with impunity. It includes governments
that treat the Internet as a new threat to be regulated and controlled
rather than as a platform for free expression and opportunity. For as
long as these conditions remain, both the region's potential progress
and the potential dividends of our engagement, will be hampered. There
is still much to gain, in my view, but achieving the full potential
return on our investment--both for our citizens and for the people of
the region--depends on political progress.
In this respect, in his speech in Canberra, President Obama spoke
specifically to three ways in which we are exercising leadership. I
want to touch on each of them--and briefly offer a few concrete
examples.
First, President Obama declared that ``We help strengthen civil
societies, because they empower our citizens to hold their governments
accountable.'' We are well aware of the need for political change in
many places, and we are also well aware that durable change is most
likely to come from within. That means we can be effective by standing
up for civil society, throwing civil society actors a lifeline of
support when they need it, and helping to preserve the space for them
to make the case for change in their own societies.
Burma's budding democratic transition will succeed only if the
country's civil society is strong and can help drive it. That's why we
continue to press the Burmese Government to ensure that the political
leaders recently released from Burmese prisons return to society with
their full civil rights restored and with their academic and
professional credentials recognized. These men and women will be
critical building blocks of a new, robust civil society in Burma and we
must support them.
We have encouraged the Government of Burma to engage civil society
directly to chart a new course and to find ways of working in
partnership. One timely example of this is the recently formed
committee--chaired by the government and including civil society,
opposition party representatives and the new national human rights
commission--that is charged with working through remaining political
prisoner cases. This is a great opportunity--not only to free remaining
political prisoners and contribute to broader national reconciliation,
but also to provide a concrete example of how government and civil
society can work together to tackle a tough issue.
We have kept civil society in mind as we have eased sanctions. The
administration's reporting requirements will ask U.S. investors whose
aggregate new investment exceeds $500,000 to report to the State
Department on a number of issues, including how they have conducted
human rights due diligence, by, for example, complying with
international standards and engaging civil society and others on
potential impacts of business investments.
We also have also supported the emergence of enabling environment
for civil society in Burma. Because the existing civil society law in
Burma is highly restrictive, we have encouraged civil society and the
government to work together to change it so that NGOs are able to
freely operate and so that the country's protection of the fundamental
freedoms of assembly and association are consistent with international
best practices.
Twenty-one years after the accords that ended the horrors of war,
Cambodia has a vibrant civil society that remains a strong, independent
force able to push for accountability and improvements from the
Cambodian Government. Several years ago, the Cambodian Government
sought to push through laws aimed at weakening civil society by
stifling human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and trade
unions. Cambodian civil society organized and led a campaign to resist
these laws. We supported their efforts, and former Secretary Clinton
repeatedly urged the Cambodian Government to scrap the proposed NGO
law. We were pleased when Prime Minister Hun Sen announced, at the end
of 2011, that the NGO law would be shelved and would not be brought
forward again without civil society's support. The trade union law,
though much improved after receiving civil society input, has yet to be
adopted. Needless to say, civil society and the international community
remain on guard.
Other challenges remain. We were deeply disturbed to see
independent broadcaster Mam Sonando jailed last July on charges of
insurrection, and the re-arrest of Born Samnang and Sok Sam Oeun, who
are widely viewed as scapegoats in the case of the 2004 murder of union
leader Chea Vichea. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy remains in self-
imposed exile to avoid imprisonment on politically motivated charges.
In his visit to Cambodia last November, President Obama underscored our
concerns about human rights and democracy directly to Prime Minister
Sen. We welcomed Mam Sonando's release last week as a positive step,
but the charges continue to hang over his head, and several others
remain in jail or under threat for protesting seizure of their land or
for reporting on the destruction of Cambodia's forests.
The second element I'd like to highlight from President Obama's
speech in Canberra is his commitment of U.S. leadership to--quote--
``advance the rights of all people--women, minorities, and indigenous
cultures--because when societies harness the potential of all their
citizens, these societies are more successful, they are more prosperous
and they are more just.''
Members of this subcommittee know that there are parts of the
region where not only are members of minority groups not protected, but
also their rights are actively targeted for repression. These policies
don't just violate those individuals' rights, they exacerbate tensions
and can lead to the kind of social instability that challenges
political and economic structures. The United States remains deeply
concerned about repressive Chinese policies that threaten the distinct
cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage of Tibetans, and that have
contributed to a climate of increasing desperation in which more than
100 Tibetans have resorted to self-immolation. In Xinjiang, where I
visited in late 2011, members of the Uighur population continue to face
discrimination, arbitrary detention, and restrictions on religious
freedom and freedom of movement. Unsurprisingly, social tensions remain
high.
Elsewhere in the region, where democracy is taking root and
democratic gains are undeniable, building strong democracies that hold
fast to protections for all citizens, even when they are unpopular with
the majority, is an ongoing challenge. Indonesia's democratic progress
in the last 15 years has been truly remarkable. While the vast majority
of Indonesians freely practice their religious beliefs, some religious
minorities have found themselves the victims of terrible violence and
abuses, and the government will have to work to do more to protect all
citizens.
And even in addressing particularly difficult situations like North
Korea, the United States has continued, with our international
partners, to demonstrate our concern about the regime's abuses and our
compassion for the North Korean people. Just this week, the United
States is supporting efforts at the United Nations Human Rights
Council's 22nd session in Geneva to urge adoption of a Commission of
Inquiry into the systematic and widespread abuses committed by the
regime.
Finally, in Canberra, the President said that, ``we encourage open
government, because democracies depend on an informed and active
citizenry.''
Open government requires affirmative efforts to make transparent
aspects of government decisionmaking and activity, and to preserve an
open society in which citizens are free to scrutinize and criticize
government and identify opportunities for improvement. The Open
Government Partnership (OGP)--a multilateral initiative that now
includes governments and civil society from around the world--is now
being cochaired by Indonesia and offers opportunities for practical
cooperation among governments in making governance better and more
transparent.
But initiatives like OGP only work if they are supported by an open
and active civil society, so the United States will continue to press
for progress to ensure protections for freedom of expression,
association, and assembly. One area where this is particularly
important, and where there are worrying trends in some parts of the
region, is with, regard traditional media, as well as the Internet and
new connection technologies.
Whereas a few years ago, governments were taking a technical
approach to Internet repression--using filters, surveillance, malware,
and other techniques, we now see increasingly that they are pairing
ever more sophisticated technical attacks with a regulatory approach,
where governments also utilize legislation to limit Internet freedom.
In countries like Vietnam--which has an impressive level of Internet
penetration but a large number of bloggers and others who have been
imprisoned for what they've said online--we must continue to make the
case that human rights apply online as they do offline. We need to
underscore that it's no coincidence that Silicon Valley is in a country
where ideas are exchanged freely, and that Vietnam's Steve Jobs or Mark
Zuckerberg won't be able to contribute to the growth of the country if
he or she is sitting in a prison cell because of something she/he wrote
on a blog.
The Asia-Pacific region today is more free, more prosperous, and
more respecting of internationally recognized human rights than at any
point in history. Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, New
Zealand, and many Pacific Island nations form an arc of democracy and
freedom that, while far from perfect, serves as a model and a beacon of
hope. Younger democracies, most notably Indonesia, have emerged to give
voice to their people and to promote democratic practices in the
region, even while they engage in the difficult work of creating
durable institutions, reforming the security services, and delivering
on the promise of human rights for all people. And longstanding allies
like Thailand and the Philippines continue to work to strengthen their
democracies so that they can deliver for a new generation.
The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region builds from that
base, bringing new American commitment and resources to bear in
supporting the peoples of the Asia-Pacific who are constructing strong
civil societies and transparent, accountable governments that respect
and support the rights of all of community members. As former Secretary
Clinton has said, that is the right thing to do, and it is the smart
thing to do, and I know that Secretary Kerry, who has long maintained a
deep personal interest in the region is committed to carrying forward
the work of leading the rebalance in a way that advances all of the
interests of the United States, including a strong rule-based global
order, grounded in respect for human rights, that enables durable
economic prosperity and peace.
Within ASEAN, our initial optimism at the formation of the
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2010 has not
materialized. AICHR's human rights declaration of 2012 did not commit
the organization or any ASEAN state to actually improve its human
rights record, nor did it create a meaningful complaints mechanism. We
continue to engage AICHR and its commissioners on ways to move the
organization toward becoming a genuine regional human rights protection
body. And we have made clear that there is an opportunity to revise the
declaration to bring it in line with internationally recognized
universal human rights standards.
In some areas, we see backsliding. In North Korea, religious
freedom is not a reality. In Vietnam the right to religious freedom,
which seemed to be improving several years ago, has been stagnant for
several years. In Burma, a Country of Particular Concern, churches in
Kachin state are used as military garrisons and centers for sexual
violence and torture. Too many governments still favor one religion
over others or pursue policies to thwart religion and belief
altogether. Even in Indonesia, where in law and practice the right to
believe is enjoyed, the government does not take effective steps to
protect members of religious minorities or the right not to believe.
Workers in East Asia have not enjoyed the benefits they should in
light of the economic growth globalization has brought to the region,
but there are some promising opportunities, and we have used these
openings to advance workers' rights. New laws in Burma have led to the
registration of over 400 enterprise-level unions and a budding
institution for dispute resolution, which we support through grants to
the International Labor Organization; in China, regulations have put in
place new resources for mediation and conciliation, and we are working
cooperatively with the Chinese Government to promote these positive
developments. The United States has made respect for fundamental labor
rights a key element of negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Still, workers in the formal sector face challenges to exercising labor
rights due to a casualization of work and a shift toward short-term or
temporary contracts. Workers in the informal sector, including in
construction and domestic work, do not generally receive the same
protections under labor law, and migrant workers remain marginalized,
vulnerable to harassment, abuse, exploitation, and human trafficking.
These are the kinds of challenges we seek to address through both
policy and programs.
The State Department and our partners use two primary tools to
bring about a more democratic and more rights-respecting Asia-Pacific:
honest dialogue with governments, civil society organizations and
people; and grassroots, results-oriented programming. From Burma to
Cambodia, Mongolia to Papua New Guinea, we support dozens of innovative
programs that increase the effectiveness of local CSOs to improve their
local environments on their terms. Our programs have trained labor
activists, brought human rights principles to security forces,
strengthened election mechanisms, and enabled citizen journalists to
connect, share, and publish their work. Our rapid response mechanisms
have enabled us to provide immediate relief and help activists and
civil society leaders when their governments respond negatively to
their insisting on having a voice in the decisions that most affect
their lives. We are working with our international partners to sustain
and expand the Lifeline NGO Fund and other funds stewarded by DRL so
that embattled organizations have the resources they need to continue
their vital work.
In this constrained funding environment, our programs reap large
dividends as we support people and organizations that preserve the
fundamentals of an accountable and rights respecting society. The new
Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights
coordinates and integrates the activities and programs of eight
functional bureaus and offices, addressing the full spectrum of
``hard'' and ``soft'' security threats that are fundamental to building
more democratic, secure, stable and just societies that protect and
empower the people within them. To maximize the use of resources, we
also closely cooperate with other parts of the USG, such as USAID on
strengthening civil society, free media, rule of law and human rights
in the region. In Burma, we just concluded a joint rule of law and
human rights assessment with USAID, which will allow the USG to have a
more targeted program approach when it comes to rule of law
programming.
The Asia-Pacific is in a period of unprecedented political and
economic change. The region's people, who have been for too long held
back by poverty and oppression, are seeking out freedom and democracy
in unprecedented numbers. But those changes have also highlighted that
significant work remains to be done. If the United States and its
partners--likeminded governments, civil society organizations and
ordinary people--lessen their efforts now, the precious gains made
toward democracy and human rights will be compromised. Even in the
region's bona fide democracies, backsliding and regression are still
very real possibilities. Strong regional initiatives and continued,
serious engagement with regional goverments will be key to ensuring a
democratic, secure, and stable Asia-Pacific.
I thank the chairman, the ranking member, and the subcommittee's
distinguished members, for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome
your questions.
Senator Cardin. Let me thank both of you for your
testimony. It was by design that we have our first hearing on
the rebalance to Asia, and it is also by design that our focus
on this hearing deals with good governance and human rights. I
say that because there is a concern as to whether that aspect
of the relationship will get the type of attention and priority
that it needs.
Senator Rubio mentioned North Korea. We are all very
concerned about North Korea. Its nuclear threat is of paramount
importance and we must deal with that threat. If we are
successful in dealing with that threat, and I expect that we
will be, long-term stability depends upon North Korea changing
its political system to respect the human rights of its
citizens. It is the worst country as far as respecting the
rights of its citizens under any international norm, and its
economic system is starving its own people.
So, long term, we need to deal with those issues. As
countries are becoming democratic or transitioning into
democracy in Asia, it is so important that good governance and
human rights be a key part of it, because other countries are
looking at what is happening with countries that have
transitioned into democratic states.
Which leads me to my question. This Asian Regional Bureau
at the State Department is in the bottom half as far as the
number of staff people and resources that it has. The military
issues will always have high visibility and priority. How can
we, this committee, help to make sure that the good governance
and human rights dimension receives the kind of support and
attention by staff and by action that we believe is necessary?
How can we hold you accountable--your statements were
excellent, and I know that they are heartfelt.
What can we do as a committee to make sure that good
governance and human rights gets the type of attention in the
State Department that it needs to get?
I have been through this many times, and I have seen many
agendas set for bilateral meetings that I was extremely
disappointed that good governance and human rights, if it was
on the agenda, was a footnote rather than a priority. How can
we help make this a priority in our State Department
strategies?
Mr. Yun. Mr. Chairman, I will have a crack, and then I will
let my colleague also.
I think it is really a matter of two things, I would say.
Foremost, it is a matter of high-level engagement. If you, for
example, as well as senior officials from U.S. Congress engage
in these issues, they will pay attention. They will pay
attention when we have hearings such as these. They will pay
attention when you travel out to the region and raise these
issues. And, of course, it is also true that we, in the
administration, have to do the same. So I would say it is a
matter of engagement, high-level engagement.
Second, it is also a matter of resources, because after you
and senior officials engage, we have to have resources to
implement them, and there are a variety of ways currently that
we spend those resources. One, of course, we have some funds
that come out through USAID in the form of assistance. I would
say there is a specific pillar called democracy and good
governance that we tap into to promote civil society, to
promote parliamentary exchanges, and that is a very, very
important program for us to preserve.
Also, it is a matter of having adequate personnel in the
field. We have in many places a designated human rights
officer, but not in all places, and in some places we need more
than one. So for us to have a designated human rights officer
who interacts with political prisoners, with civil society, is
very important.
So I think it is a matter of high-level engagement,
implementation for us, and also means resources.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Mr. Baer.
Mr. Baer. Thank you. In addition to the kind of
institutional setup that Joe talked about, I think part of what
we need to do is that all of us need to keep it clear in our
approach that human rights is not only one of the outcomes but
actually part of the strategy. It is part of the comparative
advantage that we have as a country, anywhere where we are
engaging, is that our military and our economy are strong, the
strongest in the world, but they are even stronger because they
are ours, and people look to us for leadership because of the
values we represent. So as we push for these changes, this is
something that we can do that augments our influence in a good
way and in a way that helps people on the ground, and I think
we need to keep that in mind.
I think one of the things that we have tried to do in the
last few years is really also take advantage of the fact that
people in the region, if we widen our scope, and I am just
thinking about the government-to-government conversations where
it is important to raise these issues, but taking our cue from
people on the ground, we see increasingly that people in China,
for example, and Vietnam are themselves discussing issues of
fairness that they see in their society. They are discussing
concerns about lack of transparency over everyday issues like
pollution or food safety, et cetera, and we can take a cue from
them in raising our concerns with governments and say, you
know, this isn't just a United States talking point. This is
something that millions of your own people are talking about,
and for your own good, you need to figure out a way to deal
with these conversations about fairness.
I think with respect to programming, as Joe said, obviously
our assistance can be vital in many parts around the world to
supporting civil society, and we believe change comes from
within and will be sustained from within in that respect, and
so it is critically important. It is important also that we
preserve what has been a U.S. tradition of being willing to
support civil society even where host governments are not
terribly crazy about that. So we need to be able to do the edgy
kind of programming that is often needed in the toughest
places.
Senator Cardin. Let me ask you specifically to help us on
the declaration on human rights as to where it needs to be
strengthened. We don't want to just see a fig leaf effort to
deal with human rights. We want to see whether we can't
institutionalize within the region a mechanism that has
confidence among a significant number of Asian countries that
are dealing with these challenges.
So I would like to put special focus on where that needs to
be strengthened and trying to learn from some good practices as
to how you can use that to really make progress on human
rights. While all of the basic internationally recognized human
rights standards are important, this committee will want to
have special emphasis placed on the trafficking issues, not
just origin countries and countries that are transmitting
individuals, but also destination countries, and we should also
discuss gender issues. Gender equity issues are a matter that
has been of direct interest. I will want to follow up on all of
those specific issues.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, let me just begin with this question
regarding North Korea and China. What is the current state of
that relationship? Do we believe that the Chinese Government
and Chinese authorities are reevaluating their relationship
with North Korea vis-a-vis recent behavior on the part of the
North Korean Government?
I have seen some journals speculate that perhaps North
Korea has outlived its utility in its current form and the way
they act toward China, and the way they view the world. What is
the nature of that relationship today, and have we noticed a
shift on the part of the Chinese Government with regard to
North Korea over the last few months?
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Senator Rubio. I think perhaps some of
the discussion I would hope to take place in a classified
setting and where we can go into a lot more in-depth on some of
the information that we can share with you.
Of course, China has always said, and they are, in fact,
threatened by increasing rhetoric and also nuclear weapons in
North Korea. I would say that it has never been in the Chinese
interest to have a nuclear North Korea. However, the Chinese
have always stated that they rely on friendly relations with
North Korea, and they would want the rest of the parties,
especially the United States, to have a dialogue engagement
strategy.
Our view is that North Korea must commit itself to
denuclearization, which they, in fact, did in 2005 in the joint
statement that was the heart of the six-party talks. Our view
is that only on that basis, only if they have credible and
authentic commitment to denuclearization can we even consider
engagement.
As you know, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Rubio, this
has been a problem for decades, and we are working very closely
with China, as well as other parties. There have been a number
of phone calls between President Obama and Chinese leadership,
and Secretary Kerry will be in China in about 2 weeks' time. So
we will have a good discussion.
But, Senator Rubio, we would like to give you a more
comprehensive briefing in a classified setting.
Thank you.
Senator Rubio. This question may fall in the same purview,
but I will ask it anyway. I have noticed in recent speeches a
reference to something called the ``China Dream.'' The ``China
Dream,'' of course, is not just a throwaway line. It references
a book that was published in China a few years ago, I believe,
by, I believe, an Army general, and the premise of the book is
basically that the goal of the Chinese Government should be to
displace the United States. The goal of the book, called the
``China Dream,'' is that the Chinese Government's goal should
be to displace the United States as the world's predominant
both economic and military power.
So in the framework of that, what is our sense? Obviously,
I think that a more prosperous China is a positive development,
and certainly a very positive development for the people of
China, and I believe personally that it holds potentially great
promise. On the other hand, I think we have always grappled
here in the West to fully understand what are China's
ambitions, stated ambitions for its future vis-a-vis the United
States, vis-a-vis global dominance and global power.
What can you share with us with regard to, or what insight
could you give us? Is that an active debate that is going on
today among those in China? I know that some in the military in
China are pushing for a much more nationalistic view. Those
debates happen in all countries all over the world. But what is
the state of that internal debate, in your opinion, with
regards to what these global ambitions are in the big picture?
Mr. Yun. China, of course, wants to play a global role.
There is no question about it. We do believe that it should
play a responsible global role. I believe that the most
important debate, that is going on in China now, is how should
a rising China that is a rising power globally, as well as
regionally, interact with an established power, that is the
United States? How do they interact with other regional powers?
Senator Rubio. Do they view us as an established power or a
declining power?
Mr. Yun. I would say they view us as an established power.
In fact, the current President and the U.S. Vice President last
year in February, Xi Jinping, when he came to Washington, that
was at the heart of his agenda, to have a discussion on how a
rising power should interact with an established power.
We welcome that discussion, Mr. Chairman. We welcome the
discussion, and these are the discussions we will be having
with Chinese leadership. On our part, we have stressed to them
that, yes, we want this discussion, but we are also mindful
that a rising power has a global responsibility not just in the
region and beyond, in places like Iran, Syria, and elsewhere.
One area where we have worked well and consistently over
the past decades, though, is actually in North Korea, where
they realize this is a tremendous regional threat, and those
discussions have been very helpful. But we would, of course,
want China, which has so much leverage vis-a-vis North Korea,
to exercise it more.
Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Well, I guess that is a starting point for
my final question for both of you, and that regards the
repatriation of North Korean refugees. The Chinese Government
routinely repatriates these refugees despite knowing the
serious consequences that they face when they are returned to
North Korea. We have discussed those earlier today. I think
there is an actual legal problem with this as well. In
particular, I would like your opinion on the following
statement I am about to make, and that is that I think these
forcible repatriations of North Korean refugees from China
violates their international obligations, and in particular
under the 1951 convention related to the status of refugees and
its 1967 protocol.
I guess my question is what views do we have on that?
Because if we are talking about a rising power in the region
who we are encouraging to assume the role that rising powers
have traditionally assumed in the world when the world has been
safe and the world has been stable, returning political
prisoners to a country where they are going to be treated in
the most horrifying conditions is not necessarily the behavior
of a country like that and, in fact, violates their existing
international obligations.
Have we stated this to them? Have we expressed this in any
form? What is your opinion in that regard?
Mr. Yun. We have stated on a number of occasions that
repatriation of refugees, as well as peoples who are seeking
asylum for political reasons, should not happen. They should go
through the internationally acknowledged rules on those. Mr.
Chairman, we have made these points in regard to North Korea as
well as other refugee issues that surround the Chinese region.
I would say this is a very serious problem whether it happens
in China or in other countries in the region because, as you
have noted, there has been a flood of refugees coming out and
they seek----
Senator Rubio. Have we taken a position that this is in
violation of their international obligations? Have we taken
that as an official position?
Mr. Yun. We have taken that position, that this is a
violation of international obligations.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like
to thank the witnesses for your testimony.
As long as we are talking about China and North Korea, we
just witnessed what we believe I think is probably a North
Korean-directed attack at South Korea in terms of cyber
security. I do quite honestly appreciate the fact that this
administration has started conveying to the American public and
making public some of the threats that China poses, where an
awful lot of these cyber security issues are emanating from.
I guess I just want to ask, are we getting a reaction from
the Chinese Government in terms of the fact that we are raising
this issue? Have they made any assurances in terms of what they
are going to do in terms of cracking down on some of the cyber
threats, some of the industrial espionage that is probably
coming from China?
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Senator Johnson. This again, I would
very much like to give you a classified briefing on this, on
the exchanges we have had. As you can imagine, this is quite a
sensitive issue. We have discussed it with our Chinese
counterparts, and President Obama has raised it.
This is becoming an increasing issue, which is why we now
have gone public with so many of our statements on this issue.
I believe this will also be very much discussed when Secretary
Kerry is in Beijing in mid-April. So I do look forward to a
classified briefing on cyber security issues.
Senator Johnson. OK. Well, I will not go down that path any
further because I will probably get the same type--and I
understand that. I respect the sensitivity of that.
If we are really concerned about human rights, human rights
violations, information is powerful, and it is not a good sign,
the result of the international telecom union, that conference
or meeting in Dubai. We went backward in terms of Internet
freedom and that free flow and dissemination of information.
Can either one of you speak to how that is harming our
efforts, and is there a way to repair the damage or overturn
the results of Dubai?
Mr. Baer. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Thank you for your
attention to Dubai because it was an important meeting, and
sometimes it seems like there was not enough attention that got
paid to it. So I appreciate that you are watching so closely.
As you said, it was a crucial moment. I think there was
clear organizing on the part of a group of states who want to
create international standards that would allow them to control
content online, and that is clearly not in the interest of U.S.
business or in the interest of human rights and Internet
freedom.
I think this is part of our broader project. What we are
seeing increasingly is that threats to Internet freedom that a
few years ago was largely a technical exercise on the part of
governments, putting up filters, hacking into e-mail accounts,
et cetera, they have moved to a regulatory approach. They have
not ceased the technical attacks, but they have moved to a
regulatory approach that is happening both at a local,
sometimes, and at a national level, and then now at an
international level, trying to affect international regulations
that would allow them to limit the openness of the Internet.
It is something that we are going to have to continue to
work against in multiple fora. China and Russia have put
forward, a year and a half ago, a so-called code of conduct
about the Internet in the first committee in New York, in the
U.N., and we have made clear that that code of conduct is not
the right approach because it is all about controlling the
information rather than preserving an open, interconnected
Internet that can be a platform for prosperity and growth for
everyone. It is going to be an ongoing conversation, and we
will continue to push with others.
I think one of the things about Dubai, if you look at who
agreed and who did not, the countries that have benefited from
the Internet, who represent Internet companies and startups
that are adding to prosperity, et cetera, all of those
countries were on the side of preserving openness, by and
large, and one of the things we have to do is make the case,
particularly to less developed countries, that if they want to
enjoy the prosperity that the Internet can be a platform for,
they have a stake in preserving the openness of the Internet,
too. It is something we are working to coordinate
diplomatically so that as we go into fora like Dubai, we are
not just the United States and the Europeans making the case
but we have a coalition that includes Kenya and Costa Rica and
Mongolia and others, so that there is a group of like-minded
states making the case for openness as we go into more of these
fora.
Senator Johnson. Specifically, what do you think the result
was of Dubai? And I have heard that there is a second step
where we maybe can roll it back and stop the damage. I mean,
can you speak specifically to your evaluation of what happened
in Dubai and what we can do?
Mr. Baer. I think that Dubai was--well, first of all, there
could have been a very bad result of Dubai that would have
placed the Internet officially under an intergovernmental body
without input from the private sector and civil society, et
cetera, and that did not happen. I think the conversation in
Dubai was multifaceted. We had a huge delegation, et cetera,
that had representatives from businesses and civil society. We
made the case for openness. Some states lined up behind a
convention that would have been damaging for the future of the
Internet.
There is an ongoing conversation. There will be an ongoing
conversation. We have the opportunity to make the case for
openness going forward, but it is going to be a heavy lift and
we need to stay focused on it.
Senator Johnson. OK. But you are making a very concerted
effort to make sure that we go into the next round and try and
roll this thing back. And is there a pretty good chance that we
can roll back the damage, or are we on an inevitable path here
now?
Mr. Baer. In many of the areas that I work in for human
rights, the overlap between the business case and the human
rights case, while I believe it is always there, is not as
obviously there as in this one, and I think that gives me some
degree of optimism that we will be able to make the case. In
many cases, it is the fact that this is technical stuff that a
lot of governments have not had the opportunity to come up to
speed on, and that we need to figure out how to break it down
and make sure that the implications of bad decisions, bad
regulations are fully clear to the governments that are
participating, and I think that we do have a chance, and
certainly there are a good number of us who are very focused on
what is at stake here, and we will do our best to make sure
that we are, at each turn, making sure that we tilt the balance
toward openness.
Senator Johnson. OK. Well, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin. Secretary Yun, you mentioned the foreign
international development assistance and its role in dealing
with good governance and human rights. I would like to pursue
that further, not necessarily in response to a specific
question to be answered today but how we can weigh in on the
use of those tools to promote more effectively good governance
in the countries under the jurisdiction of your portfolio in
this subcommittee.
We know that we have two countries that are a part of the
Millennium Challenge grants, and in Indonesia that is being
used very aggressively to deal with the issue of budget
accountability, which is certainly an important subject. We
have other tools available in international development
assistance, and we want to make sure that they are used
effectively. We have very tight dollars. We know that. This
subcommittee wants to advocate for the use of the resources in
the most effective way as possible to advance U.S. interests.
So if you could help us sort through the priorities in that
area, I think that would be helpful. If you have a comment
about that now, fine, but I would like this to be a working
relationship as to how we can better fine-tune the use of that
tool. We work very closely with the Appropriations Committee.
Senator Leahy, I know, is very interested in this area also. So
we would try to work with you to use this tool more effectively
in carrying out good governance and human rights.
Mr. Yun. We would very much like to do that. I think that
is a great idea. As you mentioned, we have USAID funds, as well
as some Millennium Challenge accounts. I would say on the
Millennium Challenge, you mentioned some of the budget issues.
On the Philippines side, there is also one that aims to have
essentially tax collection more clear. They are not collecting
enough taxes. According to their tax rate, there should be
more. So there is a lot of underreporting going on. So on those
two, we are happy to work with you, sir, and also on overall
democracy and governance side of our USAID funds.
Senator Cardin. And there is one other aspect. We had a
meeting with Administrator Shah of USAID this week, and he is
promoting more direct contact, people-to-people business by
American individuals, American businesses, American
universities. In Asia, that is particularly valuable. As we
pointed out, the market is expanding for American businesses to
work with us to help in good governance and human rights
development. It also means better markets for their products as
they move down the road.
So the people-to-people programs are also of great
interest. As we can leverage all the tools to get more
involvement, I think it would be helpful in carrying out our
objectives. I welcome your thoughts in those areas.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Before we leave, I just wanted to talk about
the state of progress with regards to Burma and what is going
on there. It is a very interesting case as we see this kind of
transition. I think it actually could potentially, one day in
the future, serve as a model to some other authoritarian
countries who we may want to examine changing relationships
with, even when they change their model of governance.
What is the status of that? How is that going in terms of
the carrot-and-stick approach where incremental changes in
governance and human rights space is being met with incremental
changes, potentially or supposedly incremental changes in our
policy toward them? How would you judge the progress of that?
Are we moving forward? Are we moving backward? Has there been a
lull in action? It does not get the attention it deserves, but
I would love to hear a status report.
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Senator Rubio. I would say we are very
optimistic, and the progress that has been made over the past 2
years has been more than anyone would have expected. I don't
want to go through a list of everything, but even in our last
round of discussions with the Burmese officials, they have made
it clear that they are going to account for the remaining
political prisoners. They have already released quite a lot,
and they will account for that.
We have also had in-depth discussions with Aung San Suu
Kyi, the Nobel laureate, and she is pleased, and she is active.
She is a member of their national assembly and working quite
well as head of one of the committees in the national assembly.
Still, there are some serious challenges, and one of them
is the difficulty between the government and ethnic minorities.
There are two ethnic minority groups that are posing huge,
enormous challenges. One is the continuing fight with the
Kachins up in the north, on China's border. The other one is
the Rohingyas down in the south. So I think until the ethnic
situation settles down, I think it will be very difficult for
the government as a whole.
So we are expanding in many types of engagements. We have
increased our development assistance there. We have begun very
small steps on military-to-military exchanges, and also we will
be doing a lot more in terms of general exchanges, having their
students over here, and we would like to invite their
parliamentarians over here to discuss their role with our
parliamentarians.
So I would say we are very optimistic. Regarding your
thought, Senator Rubio, of this as a demonstration project, I
think that is very important. We talk a lot about North Korea,
and in some sense it is a demonstration project for North Korea
if they are willing to change. We do not have hostile intent.
If they are willing to change, we will change our posture and
our policy, and we will help them get there.
Thank you.
Mr. Baer. If I could just add, I think I agree with what
Joe has said, and I think what has been most striking is at a
macrolevel the military has been in control for so long there
that as they make this transition, there are an enormous number
of laws that they need to change, and the good news is that
they have started to change those laws. There is a great legal
reform project that lies ahead of them, but they have made
initial changes to some of the most crucial laws.
There is institution-building that has to happen. There
need to be institutions that are able to take on the role that
the military has played for so long. So there is a real massive
project that is going on. I think as we look, as the chairman
said, to 2015 and the elections there, there will be bumps in
the road but we are hopeful that 2015, as a kind of next major
milestone, that in the lead-up to those elections we will see
something different than in 2010. We will see free and fair
campaigning. We will see open and free expression. We will see
people able to assemble, et cetera, and I think we will
continue to stay engaged with them going forward.
My former boss, Secretary Posner, testified last month
about the progress here, and I know he has met with you,
Senator Cardin. As Joe said, we will continue to work together,
and this is one of the places where Joe and I have worked most
closely.
Senator Rubio. My last question is about South Korea. There
is all the attention to the north and not enough, I guess, to
the south. In so many ways, we like to hold up South Korea as
an example of progress. I mean, a country that was at one time
a recipient of aid is now a donor. It is a country we now have
a robust trade relationship with and really is a graphic
example in that famous Google Earth picture of North Korea and
South Korea where one has lights and trees and the other
doesn't. It is just a reminder of two very different systems,
the same people living under two different governments, heading
in two very different directions.
I am curious about the mood in South Korea given all the
recent events. There is some reporting about--in essence, I
think the relationship is at a critical point, is it not, where
they look at us for continued assurance of this military
stability, continued assurance of this economic relationship
that allows them to continue to progress? I mean, one thing is
to analyze what is going on in the peninsula from abroad.
Another thing is to be living there where every single day you
are being threatened with these sort of attacks and you really
do not have the capabilities to directly respond without help
from others.
What is the political mood given the recent elections? What
is the direction of the South Korea Government? What is their
mindset, not just vis-a-vis North Korea, but vis-a-vis the
United States commitment to them and to the region?
Mr. Yun. I think you said it just right, sir. I think South
Korea is a case in point of what openness can achieve in terms
of both economic strength and the freedoms that go with it. As
you know, we have had a very, very strong alliance
relationship, perhaps second to none in the world, with South
Korea, and a big part of that is what we call extended
deterrence. That is, we are committed to defending South Korea
against all external attacks, and our commitment is there
through about 29,000 troops who are still stationed in South
Korea. So there is no uncertainty with regards to our
commitment to defend South Korea, and I believe that has gotten
through completely to South Koreans. If you look at the polling
data and so on, there is a very strong support for the
alliance. There is a very strong relationship with the United
States.
Senator Rubio, we will soon have very high-level engagement
with South Korea. The newly elected President of South Korea,
Park Geun-hye, will be visiting Washington in May and, of
course, Secretary Kerry will be going to Seoul in early April.
So we have an enormous amount of consultation at every level,
and please be assured that South Koreans completely understand
our commitment, and they rely on it, and we are, of course,
totally committed.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Cardin, and thank you
for holding this hearing, I think a very good hearing on human
rights and governance over in Asia. I wanted to focus a little
bit on--and thank you both for your service, I really
appreciate it--focus a little bit on Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos. Are human rights conditions in those three countries
worsening? What approach should the United States take toward
these countries in light of reports that freedom of expression
and the role of the NGOs are being curtailed?
Mr. Baer. Thank you, Senator, for calling attention to the
human rights issues in these three countries. I think that
certainly in Vietnam we have been disappointed in recent years
to see backsliding, particularly on freedom of expression
issues. I mentioned in my testimony the approach to the
Internet. While it has great penetration in Vietnam and they
are rightly proud of that, people are being prosecuted for what
they say online under really draconian national security laws,
et cetera, and that is an issue that we continue to raise both
in our human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese as well as in
other bilateral engagements.
In Cambodia, you mentioned civil society.
Senator Udall. Is that worsening even though we have put a
push on that in the last----
Mr. Baer. I would say it has not gotten better. I mean, we
were seeing some progress in religious freedom issues in
Vietnam a few years ago, and that too seems to have stagnated.
It is unfortunate, and to be honest, I think the government
needs to come around to seeing that the Internet penetration
that they are proud of is not fully valuable without having
people be able to exchange ideas and say, hey, I have this idea
for a company, or post a song on YouTube, which somebody has
been prosecuted for, without being worried that they are going
to get thrown in jail.
So we will continue to make the case firmly to them, not
only in the context of the human rights dialogue but also in
the context of TPP negotiations. We talk about Internet issues,
we talk about labor issues and concerns over labor conditions,
et cetera. And so we have a range of conversations with the
government. It is a strong relationship in many ways, and we
can raise this in a number of different conversations and
highlight our concerns.
I think your drawing attention to the condition of civil
society, I think that is something that, around the world,
there has been in the last 10 years this kind of global trend
of governments realizing that civil society can, in fact, hold
them accountable, and many of them deciding that they do not
want to be held accountable, and therefore taking both legal
and extralegal measures to curtail the activities of civil
society.
There was an NGO law that was proposed in Cambodia a few
years ago. Cambodian civil society rallied together to campaign
against it. We lent a strong hand of support. Secretary Clinton
herself was engaged several times, and Hun Sen eventually
announced that he was going to shelve that pending consensus
from civil society.
But this is something that we are working on in many
countries. In Burma right now, we are encouraging them to
revise an old civil society law that was from the SLORC era
that bans organizations larger than five people and things like
this. So this is a kind of regional trend.
In Laos, I was there last month where we raised concerns.
If you follow Laos, you may know that one of the kind of key
figures in civil society in Laos, which is really quite nascent
in many ways, Sombath Somphone, disappeared in December, and
his case has not turned up any new information. For some time
now, the government has told us that they are investigating,
but I went there to deliver the message that we want to know
more about what they are finding or not finding. It has really
had a chilling effect on the broader civil society in Laos
because this was a guy who was not seen as a particularly
radical guy. He was friends with a lot of folks in the
government. He worked with them, et cetera. So the fact that he
could suffer consequences was of grave concern to everybody on
the ground in Vientiane and beyond.
So I think this will remain a set of issues that we will
have to continue to raise in all three of the countries that
you listed.
Mr. Yun. I very much agree with Dan's characterization, but
I would say that our rebalance, there is also a bit of
rebalance within Asia, and that is we are also concentrating
substantially more than we did in Southeast Asia. These are
countries we believe that we have enormous economic interests.
They are the fastest growing region. So we put in a lot of
effort, especially in Southeast Asia, and I think the chairman
mentioned, for example, the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights.
While the substance of the Declaration on Human Rights is not
what we would wish, I would say that Southeast Asians doing it
is an important fact. They have never agreed among all of them
what are their human rights and that they ought to have common
human rights goals.
So I agree with you, the substance is lacking, but at the
same time doing it is important.
Also for us, I believe when have a forum like the ASEAN
East Asian summit, that is multilateral, just as the chairman
raised the OSCE, for example. These become forum where we can
share and raise issues. And frankly, human rights is one of the
more difficult issues we raise with our partners, but we must
raise them, and having this multilateral avenue is a great,
great help.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much. Thanks.
Senator Cardin. It is interesting to point out that my two
colleagues that are here are also commissioners on the Helsinki
Commission. So we have a heavy dose of the Helsinki Commission
here on the Asian subcommittee.
With my colleagues' indulgence, I want to just put one more
quick question forward. Dealing with good governance,
particularly in Asia as it relates to the military. The
military has such a dominant role that they can play a key
position as far as reforms toward democracy. Can you just give
me quickly your status update as to what reforms are taking
place within the military in this region that we should be
concerned about or encourage?
Mr. Yun. I think this points to the importance of a mil-mil
relationship. We have, for example, the Pacific Command that
visits there often, as well as relationship with the Pentagon.
When these guys go out, when our defense experts and uniformed
officers go out, they can really talk to them soldier to
soldier, and I have seen that. For them it is really, No. 1,
how to respect human rights. When you do an operation, how do
you make sure civilians--damage to civilian populations is
minimized? What should be the rules of operation? That, I
believe, is where our own soldiers can really point the way.
Second is the good governance side, as you mentioned. How
much military role should there be? And there have been, of
course, a lot of reforms, and as I mentioned from the
beginning, you can see it. Really, the number of military coups
that are happening in the region are way, way down. In fact, I
do not really remember the last one. Maybe it was Fiji. So we
are seeing far less military intervention than we ever did,
which is very, very good news. But we still have situations,
the prime example being Burma, where 25 percent of their
legislature is appointed by the military. So it is not a
sustainable long-term situation.
We had a similar situation in Indonesia. They got rid of it
some time ago.
And then, of course, there is also the business side. In
many of these countries, the military runs and operates their
businesses, and that is not a good situation either.
Mr. Baer. If I may, I think Joe is absolutely right. I
mean, you are right to focus on the reform aspect, and the
toughest aspects of reform are where the military is involved
in government and in business, and when it is involved in both,
it is particularly tough, and there is no easy recipe for
persuading a bunch of guys who have had a lot of power and
gotten a lot of money for a long time to give that up. It is
predictably challenging.
I think our own military is our best messenger in many
respects on this. We brought the commander of the Army in the
Pacific, Frank Wiercinski, to the Burma human rights dialogue
that we held last October, and I got to watch him engage with
his counterparts and talk about what civilian control meant to
him and why he appreciated it, and why it was part of being a
professional 21st-century military. Having that come from a guy
with three stars on his shoulder and deliver that message, it
was certainly more powerful than had it come from me, but even
more valuable than had it come from any civilian.
I think that one of the things I saw in General Wiercinski
the week before last and one of the things we talked about was
the ability, the opportunities that we have to work together
more often. He actually went to Laos right before me and we had
communicated on that trip. So making sure that we are
delivering one message as a government in terms of the
importance not just to our civilian side of civilian leadership
but to our military side of being able to work with
professional forces that are under civilian control in the
region.
Senator Cardin. Well, I appreciate that answer. I have
noticed under the Obama administration, under Secretary Clinton
and now Secretary Kerry, a much closer relationship between
State and Defense. Engaging the Pacific Command on these issues
I think makes a great deal of sense, and we will follow up from
our committee with Pacific Command on some of these issues as
well.
So, thank you both for your testimony. We appreciate it
very much.
We will now go to our second panel, and let me welcome Mr.
Steven Rood, who is the country director of the Philippines and
Pacific Island Nations at Asia Foundation. As regional advisor
for local governance, he helps build local government
decentralization and municipal government programs throughout
the region.
Mr. Rood, I saw in your background something I found to be
pretty fascinating. You are the only foreign faculty member
with tenure at the University of the Philippines. I take it you
accomplished that recognizing that sequestration could have a
problem for your U.S. support. That was well thought out and
well planned.
We are also pleased to welcome Ellen Bork. Ms. Bork is the
director of Democracy and Human Rights at the Foreign Policy
Initiative. Before FPI, Ellen worked at Freedom House, where
she directed projects assisting activists and dissidents around
the world.
Let me just offer our condolences on the loss of your dad,
Judge Bork, a distinguished jurist. Our deepest condolences. He
had incredible accomplishments in the legal field.
Both of you, we are pleased to have you here, and your
statements will be made part of our record. You may proceed as
you wish, starting first with Mr. Rood.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN ROOD, COUNTRY FIELD REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE
PHILIPPINES AND PACIFIC ISLAND NATIONS, THE ASIA FOUNDATION,
SAN FRANCISCO, CA
Mr. Rood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be asked to
testify on behalf of my organization, the Asia Foundation, on
the issues of democracy and human rights in Asia. Thank you for
the invitation.
The Asia Foundation is a private, nonprofit organization
that was founded nearly 60 years ago. Through its programs, the
foundation has helped build democratic institutions, reform
economies, support civil society, and empower women throughout
Asia. These investments in local partnerships have helped to
support more politically and economically stable Asian
countries that are important and reliable allies and partners
for the United States.
The foundation has 17 country offices in Asia. I head our
Philippines office, where we opened our doors in 1954.
Throughout the region, the foundation works with hundreds of
Asian partner organizations and identifies reform-minded
individuals and future leaders. The foundation also facilitates
regional exchanges to share experiences among Asian countries,
recognizing both the diversity and the local context of shared
development challenges.
For those of us who have worked in Asia for a long time,
increased attention to the region is always welcome. The
rebalance to Asia policy will help reinforce U.S. commitments
on all fronts.
Despite the economic and political advances of the past
decade, many countries in Asia continue to face challenges.
Even countries which have made important progress continue to
struggle in delivering on democracy's promise on a daily basis.
Assistance programs have contributed to Asia's democratic
development and economic well-being and represent an important
aspect of American soft power. It is the United States that has
led the way through its sustained commitment to the expansion
of democracy and human rights.
This is not true of all donors, and the donor world is
changing. In addition to the traditional bilateral donors such
as USAID, and multilateral organizations such as the World
Bank, there are a wide range of emerging Asian donors who look
at development in an entirely different manner. Since 2001, the
foundation has held a series of donor dialogues with these
emerging donors from Korea, Thailand, China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and India to share their views on
development cooperation.
What we are learning is that the approaches, focus, and
effectiveness of providing assistance differ between the
emerging and the traditional donors. As countries turn to these
new donors, who often offer unconditional aid, there is concern
that the influence of established donors, particularly on
sensitive topics, might be reduced. Nongovernmental
organizations represent important partners in this context. The
Asia Foundation's engagement in Asia might be helpful in
assessing the effectiveness of democracy and human rights
programs.
Our approach examines the interrelated interests of
government, the private sector, and the NGO communities, and
focuses on problem identification, local knowledge, and
flexible mechanisms to achieve successful outcomes. Examples of
programs include countertrafficking in Vietnam, where we work
with both civil society and government to improve standards for
the treatment of victims, and a program in the Philippines,
with USAID funding, which has resulted in a remarkable increase
in land title registration for tens of thousands of Filipinos
who otherwise would have no rights to the public land that they
had lived on and in some cases paid taxes on for decades.
Further examples are included in my written testimony.
These programs rely on an ability to work with all
stakeholders involved in the reform process. Where space might
be shrinking for civil society, it is critical to try to build
local organizational capacity and cooperation. Preserving an
enabling environment for civil society, interacting with
governments to the extent possible, and accepting the
inevitable twists and turns of democratic development can
require patience and new modes of thinking.
The foundation defines civil society broadly. It includes
human rights and women's rights groups, health and education
NGOs, but also business and trade associations, bar
associations, women's groups and religious organizations,
journalists and media groups, and civic and charitable
organizations of all kinds. These groups all have an important
role to play and help to expand the space for reform.
There are many examples of how civil society has played a
large role in democratic development, often with U.S.
assistance through the Asia Foundation. For instance, in
countries like Indonesia, it was civil society and religious
organizations working together under the Suharto regime which
provided not only service delivery but, in the post-1999 era,
the creative ideas and the basis for legal reforms, women's
rights, human rights advocacy, countercorruption and watchdog
functions, and important economic reforms. Many were supported
by the Asia Foundation with USAID funding.
The Philippines is another good case in point where, under
the Marcos era, civil society actors were key in the country's
political and economic development, and remain so to this day.
We see real opportunities for the United States to support
democracy and human rights advancements in the rebalancing
toward Asia by making a long-term commitment to the region in
terms of investing in relationships and resources,
understanding the uncertain path toward democracy and a
willingness to continue pressing forward, and building
relationships with other donors, including Asian donors, to
coordinate our mutually beneficial goals and objectives.
The Asia Foundation's experience in Asia shows that such
long-term commitments, local partnerships and relationships
with other donors can advance democracy and the protection of
human rights in the region, thereby advancing the mutual
interests of the United States and Asia.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee, and I am pleased to respond to questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rood follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Rood
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and members of the subcommittee, I am
pleased to be asked to testify on behalf of my organization, The Asia
Foundation, on the issue of democracy and human rights in Asia. Thank
you for the invitation to speak before the subcommittee on a very
important topic.
The Asia Foundation is a private, nonprofit organization that was
founded nearly 60 years ago. Through its programs, the Foundation has
made sustained investments to build democratic institutions, reform
economies, support civil society capacity, and empower women throughout
Asia. These investments have helped to support more politically and
economically stable countries throughout the region that are important
and reliable allies and partners for the United States.
The Foundation has 17 country offices in Asia, and works with
hundreds of established and emerging Asian partner organizations and
identifies reform-minded individuals and future leaders. We accomplish
this through grants to local organizations and through our staff and
experts on the ground across Asia. The Foundation's grantees can be
found throughout the public and private sectors in Asia, and are
leaders of government, industry, and a diverse civil society. Over our
long history in Asia, at the heart of The Asia Foundation's mission has
been advancing democratic institutions and expanding civil society to
protect human rights, improve governance, and promote economic reform
and growth.
For those of us who have worked in Asia for a long time, increased
attention to the region is always welcome. The ``Rebalance to Asia''
will help to reinforce U.S. commitment to the region on all fronts.
Despite the economic and political advances of the last decade,
many countries in Asia continue to face challenges in democracy and
governance, adherence to the rule of law, elimination of corruption,
decreasing religious tolerance, political volatility and, in some
cases, armed conflict. In fact, even many countries who have made
important progress in democracy continue to struggle in making
democracy meaningful beyond periodic elections, and delivering on
democracy's promise on a daily basis.
In this context, assistance programs have made an important
contribution toward Asia's democratic development and economic well-
being, and can continue to do so. But there have been concerns over the
impact of these programs. How do we know they are effective? How do we
measure success? This is a challenge not only for the United States but
for other donors as well, and there are growing efforts by donors to
coordinate and harmonize their programs in order to avoid duplication
and increase impact. The extent to which U.S. programs are coordinated
with other donors always depends on the scope and focus of the
assistance, but there is clearly more of an effort in this direction
and progress is being made to refine and develop measures for
evaluation.
The development cooperation landscape is changing. In addition to
the traditional donors such as USAID, there are a wide range of
emerging Asian donors who look at development in an entirely different
way. Asian countries have emerged as game changers in the aid arena,
challenging traditional notions of aid, reshaping global aid
architecture, and placing new challenges on the global development
agenda. As countries turn to these new donors, who often offer
unconditioned aid, there is concern that the influence of established
donors, particularly on controversial topics, might be reduced.
Recognizing the importance of these new actors to future
development policy and practice, since 2011 the Foundation has provided
a platform for emerging donors from Thailand, Korea, China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and India to share their views on development
cooperation and international development challenges alongside
traditional donors. Following the Foundation's side event on Asian
Approaches to Development Cooperation at the High Level Forum for Aid
Effectiveness in Busan, Korea, in 2011, the Foundation has held several
dialogues in Asia on Asian perspectives on international development
cooperation and strategies on issues such as pro-poor growth and
climate. We have also expanded our work facilitating south-south
cooperation between emerging donors and other countries in Asia on
issues such as disaster risk management.
This and similar engagement also provides an opportunity for the
United States to work with countries like Thailand, as emerging donors
in their own right, but who continue to face certain democracy and
governance challenges domestically, as well as issues that are rooted
in broader East Asian regional issues like economic integration and
environment. This could also be an important model for partnership in
Burma and other East Asian countries.
What we are learning from this series is that the modalities,
focus, and effectiveness of providing assistance differ between the
emerging and traditional donors. While it is true that the United
States has sustained a long-term commitment to the expansion of
democracy, human rights, women's rights and civil society, this is not
true of all donors. To date, the focus of these new donors has been
more on traditional infrastructure, economic growth, and development.
At the same time, nongovernmental organizations like The Asia
Foundation are able to contribute to the protection of women's rights,
advance the rule of law, promote greater public security, expand
transparency, and counter corruption through work with both government
and local civil society partners. Effective programs require committed
partners and adequate and stable funding, as well as the right
mechanism and approach in executing the assistance.
The Asia Foundation's approach takes into consideration both
political and economic factors in looking at the incentives for reform,
and has a few dimensions that might prove helpful in assessing the
effectiveness of programs and their linkages to progress on democracy,
governance, and human rights issues. Our holistic approach looks at the
interrelated interests of government, the private sector, and the NGO
communities to identify whose interests are most served by the desired
changes. Then, by working with local partners, the Foundation acts as
an honest broker to support strategic inputs, whether they are
technical assessments, training, strategic design, or even seed funding
for pilot projects, and support and enable local partners to take the
lead in achieving more sustainable solutions to national and regional
challenges. In this context, focused problem identification, local
knowledge, and flexible mechanisms contribute to successful outcomes.
In addition to country specific investments, the Foundation also
facilitates regional exchanges to share experiences among Asian
countries and local partners in many of the countries where we work.
In the Philippines for example, one success that touched on
increased transparency, countercorruption and increased rights for
citizens relates to land titling. The right to land title and therefore
access to credit is tremendously important to millions of Filipinos.
Many people have lived on their land for decades, have built homes,
opened businesses and even paid taxes on the land but don't have the
documentation to pass along to their children, to sell it or use it as
collateral to get a bank loan, or sleep at night knowing that their
property rights are secure. Property rights reform in the Philippines,
as outlined in our recent book ``Built on Dreams, Grounded in Reality''
(2012), was the result of an approach that consisted of analyzing the
problem, pursuing a strategy that identified the incentives and
motivation for reform, and developing an action plan. With USAID
assistance, The Asia Foundation and its local partner, the Foundation
for Economic Freedom designed a program that helped to pass the
Residential Free Patent Act of 2010, which increased the registration
of land titles 1,420 percent in 2011, the first full year of
implementation, from approximately 6,600 in 2010 to 55,300 in 2011, and
65,600 in 2012.
In Vietnam, working with local partners, programs to support women
victims of trafficking have been highly successful. The Foundation just
completed a 3-year antitrafficking program that delivered safe
migration education to over 62,000 people. We provided technical
assistance and held extensive consultations with NGOs and other service
providers working with trafficking victims to provide inputs into the
government's development of the National Minimum Standards for the
treatment of victims of trafficking.
In Thailand, there is a continued need to enforce human rights
protections. The Foundation's Department of State funded forensics
project advances human rights protection by strengthening the capacity
of formal justice agencies, forensic pathologists, university medical
faculties, human rights NGOs and human rights lawyers associations, and
the print and broadcast media to apply forensic investigative
techniques. The same approach has been utilized in the Philippines,
again with funding from the Department of State, to help end a culture
of impunity by going beyond reliance on testimony to scientific
evidence.
In the context where space might be shrinking for civil society, it
is important to try to identify effective ways to achieve increased
public participation and citizen involvement. In such restrictive
environments, it is critical to try to support local organizations to
have the space to continue to do their work and carry out dialogues
about the issues that matter to them and to society. Civil society in
these contexts are also quite weak and atomized, so building their
organizational capacity is important for the long term, as well as an
opportunity for different groups within civil society to work together.
Preserving an enabling environment for civil society, interacting with
governments to the extent possible, and accepting the inevitable twists
and turns of democratic development can require patience and new modes
of thinking.
One way is to define civil society broadly. We are not only talking
about political parties and advocacy groups, just as we are not
defining democratic progress only by free and fair elections. The
Foundation defines civil society to include not only these groups, but
also business and trade associations, bar associations, women's groups,
religious organizations, journalists and media groups, health and
education NGOs, and civic and charitable organizations of all kinds.
These groups all have an important role to play and help to expand the
space for reform. We have seen this unfold over time throughout Asia.
The Foundation, often with U.S. Government funding and support, has
invested significantly in civil society organizations, broadly defined,
building their capacity and identifying individuals who are working
toward reform.
For instance, in the post-World-War-II era, the Asia Foundation's
programs in countries where democratic traditions were weak, like
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, supported a wide range of civil society
groups. They provided education, health, and other important social
services, as well as advocacy and the generation of new ideas, and thus
became important contributors to economic development and growth.
Today, these countries stand as models of stability and democracy in
the region, bolstered by increased public participation and expanded
opportunities made possible through the inclusion of civil society
organizations in policymaking.
More recently in countries like Indonesia, it was civil society and
religious organizations working together under the Suharto regime,
which provided not only service delivery, but in the post-1999 era, the
creative ideas and basis for legal reforms, women's rights, human
rights advocacy, counter corruption and watch dog functions, and
important economic reforms which drew on broad consultations with the
public. We should continue to take stock of the fruit of the long-term
U.S. investments--many in leadership in post-reform institutions are
people with whom the Foundation partnered with in the past as part of
Foundation civil society partnerships with USAID funding. For instance,
this includes leadership in the Election Commission, Corruption
Eradication Commission, Committee for Free Information, Press Council
(which existed in New Order but revamped post-reformasi), Judicial
Commission, National Committee of Human Rights, and National Commission
on Women's Rights.
The Philippines is another good case in point, where under the
Marcos era, civil society became an important contributor to the
country's political and economic development and remains so to this
day. Civil society organizations have contributed to more transparency
and accountability in governance, expanded press freedom shone the
light on human rights abuses, and worked to develop political will for
economic reform.
Another example is in Thailand, where the Foundation supported the
1997 People's Constitution, the first of its kind to be informed by the
inputs of women and other citizen stakeholders. We also provided
followup support for public institutions like the Constitutional and
Administrative Courts that were created under the Constitution and
continue today.
In Vietnam, where the Foundation works with a broad range of civil
society, we seeded an initiative with the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce
and Industry. USAID viewed the program as important, and has continued
to support the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), a survey of
small and medium enterprises. PCI was just released for the 8th time to
tremendous public and media interest in Vietnam, having established
itself as a respected national instrument measuring provincial economic
governance and allowing the voice of the private sector to reach
policymakers.
We see real opportunities for the United States in the rebalancing
toward Asia in:
(1) Making a long-term commitment to the region, in terms of
relationships and resources;
(2) Understanding of the uncertain path toward democracy, and
a commitment to continue pressing forward; and
(3) Building relationships with other donors, including Asian
donors, in coordinating on mutually beneficial goals and
objectives.
The Asia Foundation's experience in Asia shows that such long-term
commitments, local partnerships and relationships with other donors can
advance democracy and protection of human rights in the region, thereby
advancing the mutual interests of the United States and Asia.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee and I am pleased to respond to questions.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Rood.
Ms. Bork.
STATEMENT OF ELLEN BORK, DIRECTOR, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
THE FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Bork. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to
thank the committee for inviting me today. It brings back lots
of good memories to be in the committee room where I worked as
a staffer for Senator Helms and Senator Thomas in the late
1990s. I would like to thank you also for mentioning my dad.
Your condolences are greatly appreciated. Thank you.
You convened this hearing to address this democracy issue
and its role in the rebalance or the pivot, which President
Obama launched in late 2011. I know a lot of military experts
have criticized whether it is adequately resourced on military
terms. From a democracy and human rights point of view, I think
the jury is out, which is not to say that the administration
has not laid a very strong rhetorical case. President Obama
himself, when he initiated it in Canberra, really spoke very
powerfully of the Asian region's democracy struggles and linked
his leadership to pursuing democracy, freedom, and prosperity.
Secretary Clinton also did the same. However, I noticed that
National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon gave a little bit less
emphasis to that recently when he spoke; I think it was last
week.
This comes against a backdrop of a record on support for
democracy and human rights that is mixed at best from the Obama
administration. There are a number of disappointments to
mention, the response to the Iranian elections and the Green
Movement, the rise of authoritarian regimes in Russia and
Venezuela, and later on I will mention also China.
I certainly want to acknowledge Burma as a very positive
development, and that is very exciting to all of us. I am happy
to give credit wherever credit is due, mostly, of course, to
the Burmese people. In the last couple of years, Aung San Suu
Kyi has been able to emerge from house arrest to lead her party
in sweeping by-elections. President Thein Sein, a former
general, certainly gives very good indications of being
interested in long-term reform. At the same time, there is a
lot about it that we do not understand, and we can't quite tell
how committed people around him are; such as some of the major
business figures and the military.
I should mention also that the President's not clearly in
control of the military. How serious that is or how permanent
that is, I don't know. But the ongoing violence in Kachin, for
example, is something that gives rise to some doubt about his
commitment or ability to resolve that conflict and to human
rights in general.
Despite the fact that Burma is something that we are
optimistic about, I am worried that the administration has
moved rather quickly in removing its sources of leverage,
lifting sanctions well before national elections or a
constitutional amendment that would reduce the role of the
military or enable Aung San Suu Kyi to run for President.
At the same time, I do think Burma--and I think this came
up from the previous pane--Burma has the potential to be a
demonstration case or to be a model for the pivot or for the
rebalance. It showed that the United States could pursue a
policy over decades of supporting a democratic opposition and
really lead the rest of the world in maintaining that course,
and not wavering in that course when others decided to depart
from it. I think that that has paid off enormously in Burma and
that it is a major factor why Burma is moving in the right
direction.
And I would just like to mention that when I visited Burma
last August, I heard from ordinary Burmese, including many
people who were former political prisoners, that their ability
to go forward, but also their ability to resist Chinese
influence, depends on a strong relationship with the United
States and Europe.
We all know that the administration is careful not to
present the rebalance as a challenge to China, and that is
understandable. On the other hand, the rebalance in my view
cannot proceed effectively if we do not address China as a
major democracy and human rights problem.
China presents itself as an alternative governance model
throughout the world, and particularly in the region, and even
as its own human rights record is deteriorating by the
administration's own account. The administration's human rights
policy is lacking in a number of ways. I simply think that
engagement without consequences for rights abuses is not very
effective. There is a great emphasis on things like the human
rights dialogue with Beijing, which is not a very serious way
to advance human rights.
Not only should the United States be pursuing a more
serious human rights policy toward China, it also needs to join
with other democracies in the region to advance democratic
principles and find a way to coordinate in a multilateral way
on such things. That kind of coordination needs to look forward
toward developments that we are all going to face, like the
selection of Hong Kong's chief executive in 2017. We would be
naive if we did not think that China might decide to come up
with an undemocratic way of selecting that post.
The Burma elections are another matter the United States
must prepare for, and I would like to emphasize that Tibet also
requires our attention. The Dalai Lama's devolution of his
political power to an elected leader, Lobsang Sangay, is a
major development that has not gotten enough attention from the
international community or the United States.
Asia's existing multilateral fora are not well-suited to
building support for democracy and human rights. Now would be a
very good time for the United States to explore the creation of
a multilateral forum of Asian democracies. Democracy and human
rights as a criterion for membership and as a top priority.
That, I think, would be a major and admirable outcome of the
rebalance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bork follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ellen Bork
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it's an honor to testify
before you and a pleasure to return to the Foreign Relations Committee
where I served as a staffer for Chairman Helms and Senator Thomas in
the late 1990s.
Mr. Chairman, you convened this hearing to address the democracy,
good governance, and human rights elements of the ``rebalance to
Asia,'' a policy President Obama launched in late 2011. That policy has
come in for criticism from military experts who believe it is not
adequately resourced. As for democracy and human rights, it remains to
be seen whether the administration's stated commitment to values as the
``heart'' of the rebalance will be fulfilled.
Rhetorically, the administration has laid out a strong case for the
importance of values to the rebalance. When President Obama spoke to
the Australian Parliament in 2011 he linked the policy to Asia's most
dramatic struggles for freedom and to the pursuit of ``free societies,
free governments, free economies, [and] free people.''
However, as the President begins his second term, his record of
support for democracy and human rights is mixed at best. His weak
response to the Iranian elections and the Green movement, failure to
challenge the rise of authoritarianism in Russia and Venezuela and lack
of leadership in supporting Democrats in Arab Spring countries are all
worrisome signs that the President may not follow through on his own
words when it comes to Asia.
The administration can of course point to Burma as an exciting
development under its watch. Aung San Suu Kyi, released from many years
under house arrest led her National League for Democracy Party in by-
elections, sweeping almost all the available seats. Significant easing
of repression has occurred under Burma's President, the former general
Thein Sein. However, much remains to be done and much remains opaque.
At times Thein Sein has seemed not to control the military--or if he
does, he has been unwilling to rein in those forces as they wage war in
Kachin.
Indeed, there is reason for concern about the haste with which the
Obama administration is lifting sanctions and pursuing ties with
Burma's unreformed military even before Burma has held nationwide
elections or changed the constitution to diminish the role of the
military and allow Aung San Suu Kyi to be a candidate for President.
Nevertheless, the lesson of Burma must be that a policy that placed
support for democracy over purely strategic interests can succeed. In
Burma, the United States supported a democratic movement for 25 years,
applied sanctions and political leverage and persevered even when other
countries followed other paths. That was the right thing to do, and the
Burmese people know it. Burma's people ``want very much to be
associated with the United States,'' the journalist and former
political prisoner Maung Wuntha told me in August 2012. ``They believe
that the ability to resist China depends on strong relationships with
the United States and Europe.''
Of course, the rebalance is inspired by China, whether the
administration says so explicitly or not. The administration simply
cannot advance the rebalance's democracy component without a better
human rights stance toward China, because the challenge China presents
is not simply its growth in economic and military power but also its
example as an alternative political system. Even as the administration
cites continuing deterioration in China's human rights situation, it
insists that abuses are best addressed in private with Chinese
officials, or sometimes obliquely, as Secretary Clinton did in Mongolia
last summer.
In keeping with an ``engagement'' policy that has prevailed since
the adoption of PNTR for China, there is no serious threat of
consequences for abuses. Washington's human rights dialogues with
Beijing are the embodiment of ``de-linkage.'' At last year's dialogue,
the administration explicitly rejected the idea that the dialogue is a
forum for obtaining releases of political prisoners or for negotiating
systemic change. More generally, the United States undermines its
stated commitment to human rights by carrying on business as usual and
failing to integrate these vital topics into the centerpiece of U.S.-
China relations, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
To build on the progress in Burma, the United States must shape the
political environment in Asia. Both bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy are necessary. This administration is joining the region's
existing institutions. President Obama participates in the East Asia
summit, for example. However, once inside organizations with broad
agendas and no political criteria for membership, the United States
frequently runs up against Chinese influence that may run counter to
those of America and its allies.
If the administration is serious about pursuing democratic values
and objectives as part of the rebalance, some new thinking is in order.
A forum for Asian/Pacific democracies would be useful. While many Asian
countries are pleased to see the U.S. participating in fora with China,
those fora are often inhospitable to an agenda based on democratic
values. ``Chinese multilateralism,'' Gary J. Schmitt has written ``is
not driven by some new commitment to liberal internationalism, but by
old-fashioned realpolitik and China's desire to stem interference in
its own domestic rule.''
Greater coordination among the region's democracies would enable
effective responses to crises or other events and could also prevent
the backsliding that occurs without such bulwarks in place. A forum of
Asian democracies might consider: preparations for the 2015 Burma
elections and the 2017 date for a change in the way Hong Kong's chief
executive is chosen. Tibet is another issue that would benefit from
coordinated action among the democracies. The United States and its
allies must consider the momentous changes that have taken place in the
Tibetan leadership, that is, the Dalai Lama's handover of political
power to an elected leader of the exile government and the Dalai Lama's
plans for his succession.
Asia is undergoing a wave of leadership transitions. Presidents
Shinzo Abe and Park Geung Hye have just taken office in Japan and South
Korea respectively. Indonesia is having an election next year. Now is a
good time to consider greater coordination among the region's
democracies. Although China would certainly object to such a group, the
alternative will be to struggle with China's growing assertiveness in
the organizations it dominates.
Democracy has made strong gains in Asia over the past few decades.
The United States should build on that foundation with an
institutional, multilateral framework that would help sustain and make
permanent this progress and the peace and prosperity that comes with
it. That would be a great outcome of the rebalance policy and an
excellent legacy for President Obama.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank both of you for your testimony.
We get some of our best information on evaluating human
rights progress from the NGOs. Can you just give us a status as
to how well the NGO community is able to operate in countries
like Burma, Cambodia, or Vietnam, or Laos, which are countries
in transition where we have had inconsistent progress on the
human rights front, and how helpful the United States interest
has been in promoting the access and strength of the NGOs in
these countries?
Mr. Rood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I would begin by
stressing that there are a wide variety of situations that you
just canvassed. Many of the different groups have different
experiences. The Cambodian civil society is considerably more
robust, for instance, than is the Laotian civil society, which
is very much more fragile. So one needs to take into account
the differing abilities of the civil society organizations
themselves.
Second, I would say that the United States interest is
crucial in this, because without the ability to point to the
domestic developments, but also the international developments,
these civil societies, nascent as they might be, are very much
handicapped.
Third thing I would say is that my experience--and I first
got to the Philippines back under the Marcos dictatorship--my
experience has been that there are always people that you are
able to begin to lever relationships with, within the
government, within the private sector, and so on. So one of the
abilities of international NGOs is to help local civil society
move toward a more enabling environment.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Rood, I want to ask you your advice.
You have been very much involved in the Philippines, in the
southern Philippines. Mindanao has made progress in a
longstanding conflict. We are not quite complete yet. There is
a process moving forward. Could you just share with us what
lessons are learned and how that conflict has been recently
handled that could help us with ethnic problem resolutions in
Burma or in Thailand or in other countries where we still have
conflicts that are far from being as advanced as we hope is
happening in the southern Philippines?
Mr. Rood. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I attend the peace talks in
Kuala Lumpur as an official member of the International Contact
Group and have considerable interaction with the people working
on peace movements in both southern Thailand and Myanmar,
Burma.
It seems to me that there are a number of different lessons
to be learned. The first is that one needs to have leadership
from the executive branch of the government. That is, the
President or the Prime Minister needs to be engaged.
Second, there does need to be a long process of change in
the military mindset. One of the things that we have been able
to do in the Philippines is send people from the Philippines,
generals from the Philippines who have become more aware of the
importance of relating to communities, avoiding human rights
violations and winning that way, sending them to places like
southern Thailand and Burma so that generals on those sides
begin to see the utility of other ways of undertaking this
activity.
Third, one needs to build linkages both between
international civil society and domestic civil society, but
also among domestic civil society and the media there so that
the citizens of the country, the broader citizenry both
understand how these minority issues affect them rather than
being some far-off problem that need not concern them, and help
them bring the national government along.
Senator Cardin. Ms. Bork, we have invested a lot in Burma
recently. It has gotten a lot of attention from the United
States. We have seen some progress being made. What is your
confidence level that there really is a path that will lead in
a reasonable period of time to a democratic country that
respects the rights of its citizens?
Ms. Bork. My confidence on that goes up and down. I think
it depends on a lot of things. I am not always clear that the
leadership in Burma is--it is not so much that I don't think it
is committed to reform. I think, having been under such
incredible isolation and following such a different route for a
long time, it would be understandable that reaching a result
that we would approve of or see as a real achievement of
democracy will be very difficult.
It will take more than the 3 years between now and
elections for that to happen. I am optimistic, if everyone does
their part, that we can get to the right place. I think the
Burmese people are very resilient and have done an
extraordinary job of maintaining this cause this long. I am
worried about corruption and rule of law. I am worried about
those actors that have influence using it for the wrong
purposes, and I am worried about reengagement with the Burmese
military in ways that are not helpful to a transformation of
that military into a civilian, democratically supervised
military.
Senator Cardin. Is there a further role for the United
States in regards to those concerns to help give us a better
chance toward progress?
Ms. Bork. Absolutely. I think that we have very talented
diplomats working on all of this. I think there is a role for
Congress to remain engaged, because Congress played an
extremely important role by maintaining this cause over such a
long period of time and by having very high standards. There
are always people who would like to engage more, so to speak,
not that that word really is very helpful all the time, or to
engage without high standards, let's say.
Senator Cardin. When you refer to Congress, or are you
referring to the sanction part of it, or are you referring to
the tools for progress, or all of the above?
Ms. Bork. Well, all of the above. I think Congress' role in
helping to reach this point is huge. So I think Congress needs
to remain engaged. I think that it is understandable that as
Aung San Suu Kyi has emerged and indicated her willingness to
move forward and change our policy, that people have wanted to
do that. But I think there is momentum in moving away from the
policy we held, and we have to be a little careful about that
and just be nimble about remaining engaged and finding the
right moments to continue to use our leverage and express
ourselves in principled terms.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
sorry I was not here for the first panel, and welcome to our
second.
I really just had one subject to explore, and that is to go
a little bit more deeply into the leverage that comes through
military cooperation. We are clearly going to be more tempted
during this pivot to engage in joint exercises to provide
training, and to link ourselves with the various militaries of
the region, and you have seen that already in a place like
Cambodia, where we still know that there are 300 political
murders over the last 20 years. We are providing military
training to an elite unit commanded by a member of the ruler's
family.
In Burma, of course, we have a temptation to engage in
increased military cooperation given the recent events.
My question, I guess, is this. What do we know about the
leverage that comes with military cooperation? What opportunity
does that offer, present us in terms of trying to push
societies to take on issues of human rights, and where are some
instances in countries where you think we maybe have gone too
far already, where we have engaged in a way that would send the
opposite message, that our willingness and our interest in
moving military operations into the region has maybe sent a
signal that we are going to jump before they have done the
things necessary that historically we have looked to to comply
with the Leahy law?
Ms. Bork. Thank you for that question, Senator. I worked
here a long time ago when there was a desire to engage with the
Indonesian military, and it gave me a skepticism about military
training that is seen as the vehicle for bringing about
democratic transition. It seems to me that any military
engagement that we proceed with on the Burmese side--which I am
not sure should be happening, or if it is, it should be
happening in a very limited way, and I think Acting Assistant
Secretary Yun said it was--it needs to remain at all times as
the instrument of the larger policy.
In Indonesia, there were times where it seemed that,
because it was an authoritarian regime, that we needed to
engage with them and that we could get close to leaders of that
regime, and that this would have its own sort of momentum
toward reform and serve our interests. But it did not, and that
caused a lot of problems.
As any engagement with the Burmese military goes forward,
it would be very useful for Senators to ask about the lessons
learned from these previous occasions. You mentioned the very
troubling example of Cambodia. I remember also in the late
1990s that after a coup in Cambodia, Hun Sen's son continued to
attend West Point, which seemed to me to send a really weird
signal. That kind of thing happens too often and such mixed
signals can be reduced only so long as there is a very coherent
policy that extends to the military and it is not operated in a
separate way.
I did like that Dan Baer said that democracy is not just
the result of the rebalance; it should be a means of achieving
the rebalance. He really sees it as an integrated element. So
that applies to military training as well.
It seems to me that I think the Burmese Government very
much wants the opening to the United States for strategic
reasons of their own. That provides the United States with
leverage to seek serious reform in the Burmese military in
order to have the relationship with us that they want.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Rood.
Mr. Rood. Yes. As you can imagine, I have been observing
the Philippine mil-mil relationship with the United States as
it revived after the expulsion from the bases, and it has been
long term, and it has been gradual, and on the whole it has
been very positive. The human rights violations by the
Philippine military have declined, and the ability to achieve
security gains without using actual violent deadly force has
been very much improved, and they now have a new internal
security plan which puts human rights at the center of it, and
they are retraining their entire people.
However, during that time, there were times when it was
clear that there was backsliding. There were times when the
extra-judicial killings skyrocketed. So in that process, one
needs to be continually evaluating whether or not we are
achieving these goals that we are setting both in terms of
security, of course, but in terms of democracy and human rights
through that activity.
Senator Murphy. One additional question. Ms. Bork, maybe
you can take this. Last summer, many people were gripped by the
exodus of ethnic Muslims out of several regions in Burma. What
do you sense is the seriousness of the new government to tackle
that issue moving forward?
Ms. Bork. The Rohingyas' plight is very serious, and it is
striking to me that there is intolerance throughout Burmese
society on this. It is not confined to the military although
the military, of course, is in a position to behave worse than
civil society. But it seems to me that there needs to be
greater leadership by Burmese leaders to change decades-long
discrimination and racism toward the Rohingya, and it has been
disappointing that leading Burmese human rights activists have
not been at the forefront of efforts to do that. At times, it
has seemed that the President himself has done a bit better.
A lot of things need to change in order for that problem to
be resolved. I am worried about the deep-seated prejudice and
laws and attitudes that have not yet been changed about the
Rohingya. So that should be a top priority.
Senator Murphy. A top priority for us, as well.
Ms. Bork. Yes.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
As I said in my opening statement, one of the major
barometers on good governance is how countries deal with and
treat women. It is critically important not just for advancing
human rights. It is economic issues, whether you will have
sustainable economies, and I would say it also is very much
related to the military security of a country, the way that it
involves and gives rights to women.
Can you just give us your assessment as to what countries
we should be concentrating on in order to advance gender equity
issues, which you think are the most problematic at this point?
Mr. Rood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The foundation considers
the issue of gender equality and women's empowerment very
deeply indeed. It seems to me that we have, again, a range of
countries where sometimes the social structure is relatively
egalitarian, as it is in the Philippines, for instance, where
women on the average are better educated than men and they
have, except for politics, pretty equal opportunities. However,
they still suffer disproportionately from the victimization of
trafficking. So even in an area where you have got good social
equality, there are women's issues to be addressed.
It seems to me that in any country, there are issues that
need to be brought up with respect to property rights, with
respect to the ability to obtain an education, with respect to
access to health. So I think that in any particular country,
there would be issues that we would need to push forward with
respect to women, rather than singling out any particular
country.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. We will be looking
country-specific and would appreciate your guidance as we do
that.
Ms. Bork, in any of the countries that you have been
involved with, is there some specific issues that you would
want us to deal with and concentrate on? Let us start with
Burma, since you were recently in Burma. What is the status of
women in Burma?
Ms. Bork. I am not a sociologist on that point. I have to
say that in every country in Southeast Asia, there seems to me
to be reasons to work very hard on gender equality. I do not
have anything else to add to that.
Senator Cardin. That was a diplomatic answer but one that
is accurate. There is a problem in every country.
I think, Mr. Rood, your point about the Philippines is a
good point, that even a country that does protect in its legal
structure and in practice opportunity for women, that there are
major areas of concern. Trafficking is a huge issue in Asia, so
we are going to spend some time on trafficking. We have made a
lot of progress because it is no longer accepted, and therefore
we need to root out those who are facilitating it, whether they
are origin countries or destination countries or transit
countries. We really do need to have a game plan to rid us of
this modern form of slavery, and we will continue to do that.
The gender equity issues have been a very high priority of
the Obama administration and will be a very high priority of
this committee.
Mr. Rood. If I may, Mr. Chairman, one of the issues you
raised in your opening statement about subnational conflict,
ethnic conflict, is a contributory factor to the issues of
trafficking, because women in those situations are terribly
vulnerable to being trafficked. So even in a place like the
Philippines, much of the trafficking takes place out of the
southern Philippines because of the displacement caused by the
conflict. Similarly in Burma, the ethnic minority areas and
southern Thailand, and so on. So conflict is one of those
issues that disproportionately falls on women.
Senator Cardin. There is no question about the
interrelationship of these issues, you are absolutely right.
Conflict areas are areas where there is going to be horrible
tragedies in many different ways.
Let me thank you again for your testimony. I think this is
the first of a series of hearings that we will be holding on
the rebalancing, so we will be spending other attention to it,
maybe specific countries, maybe other general areas. I will
review that with Senator Rubio. But again, thank you for your
testimony.
With that, this subcommittee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]