

[H.A.S.C. No. 113-38]

HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION  
—  
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
—

HEARING HELD  
APRIL 25, 2013



—  
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

80-767

WASHINGTON : 2013

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON, California, *Chairman*

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas	ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina	LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia	MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida	ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina	ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey	SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah	JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio	RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota	JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama	MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona	JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania	DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas	NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado	JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia	HENRY C. "HANK" JOHNSON, Jr., Georgia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California	COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana	JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado	RON BARBER, Arizona
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia	ANDRÉ CARSON, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York	CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri	DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada	DEREK KILMER, Washington
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey	JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia	TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi	SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama	WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
MO BROOKS, Alabama	PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida	MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota	
PAUL COOK, California	
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma	
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio	
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana	

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, *Staff Director*  
CATHERINE SENDAK, *Professional Staff Member*  
DOUG BUSH, *Professional Staff Member*  
AARON FALK, *Clerk*

# CONTENTS

## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2013

	Page
HEARING:	
Thursday, April 25, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Army .....	1
APPENDIX:	
Thursday, April 25, 2013 .....	57

### THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013

#### FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

##### STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. "Buck," a Representative from California, Chair- man, Committee on Armed Services .....	1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services .....	2

##### WITNESSES

McHugh, Hon. John, Secretary of the Army .....	3
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army .....	6

##### APPENDIX

##### PREPARED STATEMENTS:

McHugh, Hon. John, joint with GEN Raymond T. Odierno .....	64
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" .....	61
Smith, Hon. Adam .....	62

##### DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Army Reserve Component Supporting Statement .....	89
---	----

##### WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

Mr. Barber .....	109
Mr. Forbes .....	109
Ms. Hanabusa .....	110
Mr. Thornberry .....	109

##### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Bridenstine .....	125
Ms. Duckworth .....	122
Mr. Garamendi .....	117
Mr. Loeb sack .....	115
Mr. Miller .....	115
Mr. Palazzo .....	123
Mrs. Roby .....	124
Mr. Runyan .....	121
Ms. Tsongas .....	116

IV

	Page
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued	
Mrs. Walorski .....	126

**FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

---

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, April 25, 2013.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,  
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The committee will come to order. Good morning.

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request for the Department of the Army.

I am pleased to welcome Secretary John McHugh and General Ray Odierno. It is great to see both of you again. Thank you for being here.

Our Nation is very fortunate to have the two of you leading our army during these challenging times.

I note that in your written testimony, you state that America’s Army is the best-trained, best-equipped, best-led fighting force in the world providing a credible and capable instrument of national power. I absolutely agree with you.

But what we need your help with is understanding the risks associated with the Army’s continued ability to meet the national security needs of this Nation and the critical assumptions behind these risks. For example, we hope to learn more about the Army’s plan to reduce the size of its force. With last year’s budget request based on the Budget Control Act, the Army announced that it would reduce end strength to 490,000 Active Duty soldiers, the minimum required to accomplish national security requirements.

The drawdown would require the Army to go from 45 Active Duty Brigade Combat Teams to 37. To date of the eight BCTs [Brigade Combat Team] will be deactivated, we have been told that two of the eight will be armored BCTs. We have also been told that the Army plans on adding a third maneuver battalion into each Active Component Army and infantry BCT.

It is our understanding that as a result of adding a third maneuver battalion, the total number of Active Component BCTs will go to some number below the 37. However, it is a year later, and we

still do not know how many BCTs the Army plans on drawing down to or where the Army will take the BCTs from.

Equally important, we do not know what type of BCTs the Army thinks it needs. This includes armor, infantry, and Stryker. I know that we are in difficult times and that hard choices must be made. I also know that you don't know from week to week what kind of money you are going to be having from the Congress, but I—it is tough, but I hope that your testimony today will highlight the areas of greatest risk and help this committee and others in Congress make the right choices.

Again, thank you both for your continued service to our nation. And I look forward to your testimonies.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to echo the chairman's comments and thanks to both Secretary McHugh and General Odierno for their outstanding leadership of the Army, and to the—all of those who serve in the Army. It is an amazing force doing amazing things all over the world, and we thank them for their service and sacrifice.

And look forward to hearing today more about the President's budget. I think it is a realistic look at the next 5—sorry—at fiscal year 2014, and then planning beyond. I am sure there are questions. The Chairman raised some good ones, and there will be more about the specifics of how that is implemented, and we will look forward to hearing about that.

But, of course, all of that is based on the assumption that sequestration magically goes away some time, you know, between—at a minimum between now and when fiscal year 2014 starts. So we would also like to hear from you about how you deal—continue to deal with the reality of fiscal year 2013 sequestration, but then also, you know, looking forward. It is the gift that keeps on giving: fiscal year 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. Until we turn it off, it is always going to be there, first, lurking in the back of your mind as you attempt to plan, and then, second, right there up front as something that you have to deal with, as you are dealing with it right now for fiscal year 2013.

You know, I will emphasize again that, you know, the best thing Congress could do right now is one way or the other turn off sequestration. You know, if we can get a budget deal to get there, great. But this notion that somehow torturing the discretionary budget and torturing the defense budget in particular to force us to get a budget deal is ridiculous. Clearly, it is not working; it is not forcing that to happen. And second, it is doing great damage while we are waiting for it to happen. So want to hear more about that.

And then lastly, would like to hear more about the sexual assault issue.

And I want to commend—I was at a dinner with General Odierno awhile back where he brought in some of the leaders in Congress who are concerned about this issue, had a very frank, very direct discussion about what had gone wrong, what was going to be done to get right. And I personally am very confident of the seriousness of the Army and of the Pentagon writ large to try to address this problem.

But it is still a large and vexing problem. And one of the big issues that I would love to hear you talk about is the push to change the way the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] works and to take away the commanders' authority over these—over sexual assault and sexual harassment cases. There has been, you know, the most recent case in the Air Force of a decision being overturned by a commander that has generated a lot of attention.

I know the military in particular—or the military in general and the Army in particular doesn't want to see that change, because the command structure is the command structure. But there is going to be increasing pressure to separate that legal process from the command if there is not visible progress made on protecting our men and women from sexual assault and sexual harassment.

So I would love to hear more comments from you about your concerns about that particular change and what we might be able to do to address the issue short of doing that.

Thank you again for being here. Thank you for your service.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Distinguished Ranking Member Smith and equally distinguished members of the committee, fourth time back. It is always a special opportunity; brings back a lot of very fond memories, most of which don't involve me sitting at this table, but it is always good to be with you.

And to talk a bit about the extraordinary work of America's Army this past year, talk about its current state, and of course the vital requirements that are necessary to sustain our combat power today and tomorrow and beyond.

Honestly, I wish I had better news to share, but today we find our Army at a very dangerous crossroads which, if we as a nation choose the wrong path, may severely damage our force, further reduce our readiness, and hamper our national security for years to come.

As you know, over the last 12 years, this Nation has built the most combat-ready, capable, and lethal fighting force the world has ever known. From Iraq and Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa and Korea, we have fought America's enemies. We have supported our allies and deterred would-be aggressors with unprecedented skill, determination, and quite frankly, results.

Over the past year, we have seen great success in operations ranging from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency to homeland security and disaster response. Soldiers and civilians from all the Components—Active, Guard, and Reserve—have repeatedly risked their lives to defend our freedom, save the lives of others, and to support our citizens in recovering from hurricanes, wildfires, and even droughts. There has been no foreign enemy, natural disaster, or threat to our homeland that your Army has not been prepared to decisively engage.

Unfortunately, today we face an unparalleled threat to our readiness capabilities in soldier and family programs, and that danger comes from the uncertainty caused by continued sequestration funding, through repeated continuing resolutions, and significant shortfalls in overseas contingency accounts.

In fiscal year 2013, the blunt axe known as sequestration, which as you know struck in the last half of this year, on top of the \$487 billion in Departmentwide cuts already imposed by the Budget Control Act, forced us to take extraordinary measures just to ensure that our warfighters have the support needed for the current fight. We made those hard decisions, but at a heavy price to our civilian employees, to our training needs, maintenance requirements, readiness levels, and to a myriad of other and vital programs necessary to sustain our force and develop it for the future.

For the Army, sequestration canceled and created an estimated shortfall of \$7.6 billion for the remaining 6 months of fiscal year 2013. This includes nearly \$5.5 billion in the operations and maintenance accounts alone. The impact of this drastic decline over such a short period will directly affect and significantly impact the readiness of our total force.

We have reduced flying hours, frozen hiring, and released hundreds of temporary and term workers. We were forced to cancel initial entry training for more than 2,300 military intelligence soldiers, reduce training to the squad level for all our nondeploying units, and we had to cancel all but 2 of the remaining brigade decisive action rotations at our national training center. And this is on top of drastic impacts to our depot, vehicle facility maintenance programs, and others.

Unavoidably, these negative effects will cascade well into next year and beyond. Simply put, to continue sequestration into 2014 and for the years following would not only be irresponsible and devastating to the force, but it would also directly hamper our ability to provide sufficiently trained and ready forces to protect our national interests.

Moreover, full implementation, as the ranking member noted, through fiscal year 2021 will require even greater force reductions that will dramatically increase our strategic risk. And I will give you an example. Just to maintain balance, we may have to reduce over 100,000 additional personnel across all three components. And when you couple those cuts that—with the cuts already driven by the Budget Control Act, your Army could lose up to 200,000 soldiers over the next 10 years alone.

As such, to mitigate against the continued impacts of such indiscriminate reductions, the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request, as in the House and Senate resolutions, does not reflect fur-



ther sequestration cuts. Rather, we attempt to protect some of our most vital capabilities which were developed over nearly a dozen years of war, and to hedge against even further reductions in readiness.

We hope that if additional funding reductions are required, they are properly backloaded into later fiscal years so that we are provided the time and the flexibility necessary to implement them as responsibly as possible.

For all its challenges, continued sequestration is only part of the danger we face. Since fiscal year 2010, the Army has experienced funding through some 15 differing continuing resolutions. This has caused repeated disruptions in our modernization efforts, uncertainty in our contracts, and unpredictability for our industrial base. Each continuing resolution prevents new starts for needed programs and creates inefficiencies that often result in wasteful spending for things we no longer need and can no longer afford. As you know, this year it was 6 months into the fiscal year before we had an appropriation. And for all of that, there is more. While we remain at war with a determined enemy in Afghanistan, while simultaneously conducting retrograde operations, we must remember that OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] funding is absolutely essential. Unfortunately, your Army currently faces up to a \$7.8 billion deficit in overseas contingency funding for this year.

Although as noted earlier, we will not allow our warfighters to suffer, OCO shortfalls disrupt our ability to repair and reset equipment, and directly impact our organic and commercial industrial bases. Continued budget uncertainty jeopardizes our ability to have the right forces with the right training and the right equipment in the right place to defend our Nation. Our readiness has suffered. Our equipment has suffered. And if we are not careful, our people may suffer as well.

Accordingly, more than ever, we need you, our strategic partners, to help us ensure that America's Army has the resources, tools, and force structure necessary to meet our requirements at home and abroad. The Army's fiscal year 2014 budget request is designed to do just that. As you will see, the fiscal year 2014 submission meets our current operational requirements, while allowing us to build an Army to meet future challenges through prudently aligning force structure, readiness, and modernization against strategic risk.

First, it helps us balance readiness across the total force—Active, National Guard, and Reserve. It allows us to refocus training toward core competencies and supports a steady and sensible transition to a smaller force. Second, it reinforces the Army's central role in the defense strategy by allowing us to strengthen our global engagements with regionally aligned forces, and ensures that we remain a linchpin of the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific theater.

Third, it provides for vital reset and replacement of battle-damaged equipment, helps to support our industrial base, and funds key modernization priorities focused on soldier squad systems and network and enhanced mobility.

Most importantly, it sustains our commitment to soldiers, civilians, and their family members, many of whom continue to deal with the wounds and illnesses and stresses of war. From suicide prevention and wounded warrior programs to resiliency training

and sexual assault prevention and prosecution, this budget is designed to strengthen, protect, and preserve our Army family using those programs that are efficient, effective, and comprehensive.

We have, as I know all on this committee agree, a sacred covenant with those who serve and with all of those who support them and we must not break it.

Nevertheless, we recognize our Nation's fiscal realities. And as such, our budget proposal will further these vital goals with a 4-percent reduction from fiscal year 2013's base budget achieved through prudent, well-planned reductions, not indiscriminate slashing. So in conclusion, on behalf of the men and women of your Army, let me thank you again for your thoughtful oversight, unwavering commitment, and proud partnership. With your support, as this committee I know firsthand has all so effectively done over so many years, the Army has become the finest land force in history. Now, as in the past, we need your help to protect the hard-fought capabilities developed over years of war and to ensure that we have the resources needed to meet the unforeseen challenges that lie ahead.

Our soldiers, civilians, and family members are second to none, as you know so well. They are patriots working tirelessly every day to support and to defend freedom. America's Army has succeeded in Iraq, is making progress in Afghanistan, and as this budget demonstrates, is focused on completing the current fight as we transform into a leaner, more adaptable force.

To do so, we need flexibility, predictability, and the funding necessary to ensure we have highly trained and ready forces to meet the mission. As we face these crossroads together, it is critical that we choose the right path for our soldiers, our Army, and our Nation.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and General Odierno can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General.

#### **STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY**

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and all the other distinguished members of the committee.

First, I want to thank you for your continued commitment to all our soldiers and families, especially over the past 12 years, where the partnership has enabled us to properly support them, ensuring they have what they need to be successful during their deployments.

Second, I want to thank the Congress for its hard work in passing the fiscal year 2013 Consolidated Appropriations and Further Continued Appropriations Act. We very much appreciate your help, which alleviated nearly \$6 billion of the \$18 billion shortfall to the Army's operation and maintenance accounts in fiscal year 2013.

I am humbled to be sitting here representing the 1.1 million soldiers, 255,000 Department of the Army civilians, and 1.4 million

family members of the United States Army. I am extremely proud of the competence, their character and commitment of our soldiers and civilians, their sacrifice, and their incredible accomplishments.

I remind everyone as we sit here today, the U.S. Army has nearly 80,000 soldiers deployed and more than 91,000 forward-stationed in 150 countries, including almost 60,000 in Afghanistan, thousands of others in Kuwait, Korea, new deployments, with command-and-control capability to Jordan, Patriots to Turkey, THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] batteries to Guam, and many other places around the world.

Our forces in Afghanistan continue to conduct a successful transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan national security forces, who increasingly demonstrate the self-reliance, confidence, and capability to protect their population and secure a more stable political future.

Today the Army's primary purpose remains steadfast, to fight and win the Nation's wars. We will continue to be ready to do that, even as we do our part to help the country solve our fiscal problems.

But the timing, magnitude, and method of implementing budget reductions will be critical. In fiscal year 2013 the Army still faces more than \$13 billion operations and maintenance shortfalls, which includes a \$5.5 billion reduction to the Army's base budget and a \$7.8 billion shortfall to overseas contingency operations accounts.

As a result, we have taken drastic actions to curb spending in the final 6 months of the year. We have curtailed training for 80 percent of the force, canceled 6 brigade maneuver combat training center rotations, cut 37,000 flying hours, initiated termination of 3,100 temporary employees, and canceled third- and fourth-quarter depot maintenance, and are planning to furlough our valued civilian workforce for 14 days in fiscal year 2013.

The cost of these actions is clear. We are sacrificing readiness to achieve reductions inside the short period of the fiscal year. And readiness cannot be bought back, not quickly and not cheaply.

So I am concerned that the problems created by the over-\$13 billion shortfall will push into fiscal year 2014 and beyond.

The Army's fiscal year 2014 base budget submission of \$129.7 billion enables us to support the 2012 defense strategy in fiscal year 2013, but does not account for the decay in readiness that will impact the Army as a result of these fiscal year 2013 problems.

In addition to this base budget, the Army will continue to require OCO funding for operations in Afghanistan and to continue to reset our force. The Army has submitted a separate request for fiscal year 2014 OCO. It is critical that this request be fully funded.

I would implore all of us to work together so that we receive a fiscal year 2014 national defense authorization and fiscal year 2014 budget on time. This will allow us to properly plan for and mitigate the risk associated with declining defense budgets.

It is imperative that we gain predictability in our budget process. If we don't, we will be unable to officially and effectively manage our resources, and it will be impossible to make informed decisions about the future of the Army.

I also think that it is in the best interest of our Army, the Department of Defense, and our national security to avert sequestra-

tion. The size and steepness of cuts required by sequestration make it impossible to downsize the force in a deliberate, logical manner that allows us to sustain an appropriate balance of readiness, modernization, and end strength.

The cuts are simply too steep. We just cannot move enough people out of the Army quickly enough to produce the level of savings needed to comply with sequester, and, therefore, will need to take disproportionate cuts in modernization and readiness.

Let me explain: Under sequestration the Army would need to again absorb immediate cuts in fiscal year 2014. This would likely force us to cut personnel accounts, reductions that could equate to tens of thousands of soldiers. But by the time we paid separation benefits for these soldiers, the cost to separate them would exceed the savings garnered.

The maximum we could reduce the force without breaking readiness and inducing excessive separation costs is about 20,000 soldiers per year. But this would only save us about \$2 billion a year.

So right now, almost the full weight of the sequester will again fall on modernization and readiness accounts, where such drastic cuts will take years to overcome. The net result will be units that are overmanned, unready, and unmodernized.

The steepness of the cuts of sequestration forces us to be hollow.

Even though I think the level of sequestration cuts are too large, if we backload them into the later years of sequester period, it would allow us the opportunity to properly plan and to sustain the balance we need in these uncertain times.

In spite of fiscal unpredictability and the impacts of sequestration, it is our responsibility to take action now to reshape the Army for the future.

As you look to fiscal year 2014 and beyond, our foremost priority is to ensure that our soldiers deployed on our operational commitments are trained, ready, and able to execute their missions. Simultaneously, we will continue to draw down the force. We are on schedule to remove 89,000 soldiers from the Army by fiscal year 2017 due to budget reductions levied by the 2011 Budget Control Act.

So far, most of these cuts have come from overseas formations, specifically in Europe.

In fiscal year 2014, future force reductions will affect almost every Army and joint installation across the United States. We will release our plans for these reductions in June.

The key to the current drawdown is to maintain the right balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization, so that we are properly sized and ready for whatever the country needs done.

Such an evenhanded approach is the only acceptable way, one, while the world remains such an unstable place, the most unstable I have seen in my nearly 37 years of service.

Full sequestration will dangerously steepen that drawdown ramp. It will require us to reduce a minimum of another 100,000 soldiers from the total Army, on top of the 89,000 soldiers already being reduced.

This will result in a 14-percent reduction of Army end strength and an almost 40-percent reduction in our Brigade Combat Teams.

In addition, these reductions will degrade support to combatant commanders in critical areas such as missile defense, special operations, cyber, logistics, intelligence, and communication.

And cuts of this magnitude will leave us with an excess infrastructure, making a future round of BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] essential.

Sequestration will degrade our ability to take care of our soldiers and families that have fought so hard and sacrificed so much over the last 12 years, both those who are leaving the Army and those who choose to stay in the Army.

Sequestration will make it impossible to execute a responsible drawdown, and it will challenge our ability to support the 2012 defense strategic guidance.

Looking to the future, we are reposturing our force to be globally responsive and regionally engaged.

We are aligning forces to geographic combatant commanders to provide mission-tailored, sized and scaled organizations for operational missions, exercises and theater-security cooperation activities.

For times of crisis, we will maintain a global response force, capable of conducting forced entry on short notice. We will reinvest in our expeditionary capabilities to deploy forces quickly and efficiently anywhere in the world. And we are refining the integration of our conventional special operations forces and cyber capabilities to ensure we can handle a broad range of emerging threats.

In this uncertain world, we need an Army that conducts many missions at many speeds, at many sizes, and under many conditions. Going forward, the Army will evolve into a force that can deploy and sustain capabilities across the range of military operations anywhere in the world, on short notice. It will have increased flexibility and agility in both its formations and hopefully its acquisition systems.

Our modernization strategy will center on the Army's strength, the soldier, making him the most discriminately lethal weapon in the U.S. military.

We will provide our soldiers with the network connections to give them unparalleled access to information and intelligence, so that they can make timely decisions all over the world.

And we will provide our soldiers with tactical mobility, survivability, and lethality to take decisive action, no matter what the mission might be.

As we prepare to operate in an increasingly complex and uncertain environment, our number one priority is to invest in our leaders. This spring we will roll out a brand-new leader development strategy which will invest in our soldiers' training, education, and development. It will fundamentally change the way we train, educate and assign, assess and promote our leaders. It will be the foundation of our future Army.

We will continue our efforts to take care of our soldiers. Twelve years of war has taught us the importance of building and sustaining the resiliency of our soldiers, civilians, and our family members.

Just this year, we rolled out the Army Ready and Resilient campaign. This holistic effort to build the emotional, mental, physical,

and spiritual health of our soldiers will pay dividends in all three components.

Caring for wounded warriors and keeping faith with veterans is essential to honoring their service. Our Soldier for Life campaign will ensure that our soldiers transition successfully into civilian life and enrich our American society with their Army experience.

With the support of Congress, we will maintain a military pay and benefits package, including affordable, high-quality health care, that acknowledges the burdens and sacrifice of service, while remaining responsive to the fiscal environment.

Manpower costs make up 44 percent of the Army's fiscal year 2014 budget. We need to work together to slow the rate of growth, while meeting our soldiers' needs.

We are at a strategic point in the future of the U.S. Army and our military. We must strike the right balance of capabilities both within the Army and across the joint force.

Our history tells us that if we get out of balance, our enemies will seek to take advantage.

Our soldiers are the finest men and women our country has to offer. Since 2001, more than 1.5 million soldiers have deployed, and more than half-a-million have deployed two, three, four, or more times.

More than 35,000 soldiers have been wounded, and over 4,800 have made the ultimate sacrifice to defend this great nation.

It is our responsibility to ensure that we will never send soldiers into harm's way that are not trained, equipped, well-led, and ready for any contingency, to include war.

It is our responsibility to honor their service and the sacrifice of our veterans, whether they remain in uniform or transition back to civilian life.

The strength of our Nation is our Army. The strength of our Army is our soldiers. The strength of our soldiers is our families, and that is what makes us "Army Strong."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very much for allowing me to testify here today. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I noticed that last year's budget documents referenced a rebalancing to the Pacific, while this year's references a rebalancing to both the Pacific and the Middle East.

It is unclear if that nuance is significant in your ongoing analysis. I raise the point because I am particularly concerned that the Army might sacrifice the full-spectrum capability of armored BCTs, since they are more expensive to equip and maintain.

I believe that it is critical for this committee to understand the assumptions underlying the force structure changes that the Army has been considering for over a year. As you know, our full committee markup is the first week of June.

General Odierno, as you consider the pending force structure and force-mix changes I discussed in my opening statement, are you equally weighting an Asia-Pacific or Middle East scenario? Is one seen as more or less likely?

And Mr. Secretary, how do we fulfill our constitutional oversight responsibilities if we do not have the timely insight as to what these changes are? When do you intend to announce the pending

force structure changes, and the bases that will be impacted by these changes?

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

First, as we continue to rebalance towards the Pacific, the next priority is maintaining a capability in the Middle East, and that is as per the defense strategy. And we are staying very true to that statement.

As we look around and look at how we have done significant analysis of the type and capability of the units that we will need to score at both the Pacific and the Middle East. For example, there is a need for a combination of light infantry armor and medium capability on the Korean peninsula. There is a need for the combination of medium armor and light infantry in the Middle East.

So as we come forward with our force structure, you will see that we sustained a right balance between the three. We believe that is the unique capability that the Army brings. And we are able to task-organize ourselves in order to meet whatever the needs are, whether it be a combination of light, medium or heavy, or heavy, or light depending on the environment that they have to operate in.

So you will see us maintain a level of balance between those capabilities as we move forward. Although the size will be smaller.

Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman.

As you and I talked previously, if I were still a member of this committee and representing a base as I did for 17 years I would be interested very much in the questions that you are asking. And I want to assure you we deeply appreciate that. We want to provide you the information as it is available that allows this committee and the Congress to do its appropriate oversight responsibilities.

As you know, and contrary to what some believe, the exercise we are currently involved in is really in reaction to the Budget Control Act that calls for us to reduce force strength down to 490,000. It really has nothing at the moment to do with sequestration.

And under Federal law there are processes by which we have to follow those kinds of objectives, and most principally under the National Environmental Protection Act, NEPA, to assess the requirement of a possible full environmental impact statement. We pursued that through what we call the PEA, Programmatic Environmental Assessment.

We looked at 21 facilities. Determined those sites based on the likelihood of a certain maximum gain of soldiers versus a certain maximum loss, 1,000 soldiers in either case. And that has been recently completed. The net effect was that none of the locations was there determined to be a significant environmental impact that would require a follow-on full environmental impact statement.

At the moment in part at the request from a good number of members of this committee, we are conducting public listening sessions across more than 30 communities and locations to provide the opportunity for citizen and civic organizations to come forward to share their perspective, to provide any information that they think would be of value to the Army as we go forward and make these final decisions.

I hope, and I expect, we will have that information back in the month of May, probably mid-to-later May, and then give it, its appropriate analysis. And I expect we will have a final basing decision to be announced by mid-June—I am shooting at mid-June for the latest.

We have attempted—and I make a commitment to you, Mr. Chairman, the Ranking Member, all the members of this committee to share with you all of the input information we possibly can as we go forward. We have certain set criteria by which we make these evaluations, geographic distribution, military value, and cost of investment necessary, et cetera.

Those are available—I believe we have, but if we have not as yet briefed the PSMs [Professional Staff Members] who can carry that information to you I promise you we will do that as soon as we possibly can.

The second piece of the analysis of course is to weighting of each one of those factors. Those decisions have not been met. I believe the—paperwork is with the Chief. He is reviewing. He will thereafter make his recommendations to me. He and I will go forward with that. And when we have those weighting factors again we will share them with the PSMs. We won't wait for the final analysis.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary MCHUGH. Sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to echo the Chairman's comments a little bit. No matter how these decisions come out, it is going to be hell. I don't want to tell you that if you like follow the right process and you are perfectly transparent then everything will be fine. It is not. I will say that it would be worse, I mean, the Air Force went through this with, you know, the Guard stuff of course last year. And by their own admission did a very poor job of working with the impacted states and impacted communities and made it much worse.

So transparency doesn't, you know, buy us necessarily a pain free experience, but I think it makes it work better. So the more you can keep us informed, and keep the impacted States informed of what is going on the better off you are going to be.

I just want to follow up on my opening comment on the UCMJ and the sexual assault situation, specifically your thoughts on taking the commander out of those criminal cases and essentially turning it over straight to the JAG [Judge Advocate General].

And tell us a little bit about, you know, how that impacts the culture, the concerns you would have in terms of how that would impact the command and whether or not that is a doable solution as a way to confront, you know, the very, very great sexual assault, sexual harassment problem that impacts by the way, not just women, but men as well who have been victims of these assaults.

Is that a realistic approach?

What are the limitations of it?

Is there a halfway step towards it that could be helpful?

General ODIERNO. Congressman, I would say, first off, we understand why we have to continually review this, to make sure that all the procedures are in place. And I believe that we have to work together on this and build some mutual trust with the importance



of the UCMJ and the impacts it might have on sexual assaults, specifically.

Couple things I would just say having been working with the military justice system for a very long time it really is essential to commander's authority. And, you know, the commander is responsible for the good order of discipline and health of the force, and what the UCMJ provides him is ability to punish quickly, locally, and visibly. And we can't ever lose that capability.

So, what I think we have to do is take a deliberate approach to this to review what is the best way for us to give that—leave that flexibility with the commanders and make sure we are meeting with the intent of ensuring that those who deserve to be prosecuted for any incident, but specifically sexual assault, is taken into account.

You know, we clearly believe we have to protect the victims. We have to do justice and deter the crime of sexual assault. We believe we have to preserve the good in our system. We talk a lot about trust between soldiers, and until we are able to prove that we are going to—we will not tolerate sexual assault, sexual harassment, it is hard for us to build complete trust with the female members of our—

So I truly believe that UCMJ is critical to this. I think we have to be very careful about changes that we make. I suggest we do it in a very deliberate manner, working together to ensure that we understand all of the impacts.

Mr. SMITH. If I may, on that, I understand the point you are making on the front end, because, you know, as someone who used to prosecute domestic violence cases, a lot of times, you know, the evidence—there is no case to be made. The UCMJ gives the commander flexibility and time for the JAG probably couldn't do anything.

General ODIERNO. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. I mean, from a legal standpoint, they couldn't get there. And I get that.

Where you run into problems is with this Air Force case, where essentially the commander made himself a jury of one and said, "Well, okay the jury reached that conclusion, but I have looked at the evidence, I have look at the rulings that the judge made, I think he is wrong and I am going to overturn it."

That is very, very problematic, you know, because once you set up the JAG—the system is the system, I mean, you know some average person watching "Court TV," you know, or you see it could reach a different conclusion, but the reason we set up the legal system we set up within the UCMJ is because the jury system is there.

So that is—there is some way to walk our way between that. I think taking it completely away from the commander will eliminate some—would hurt that flexibility, but that example of the commander just saying, "Nope, jury nullification I don't agree." That is a problem.

General ODIERNO. I would just say that I think we have worked very carefully, the Joint Chiefs have worked very carefully on this issue. And we gave a recommendation to the Secretary which talked about taking a look at this. And we believe for felony of-

fenses that in the adjudication phase that we recommend we take the commander out of that, but you keep lower level findings and move forward.

I think that was a very good recommendation.

What I worry about is, there has been some discussion on getting in the front end of UCMJ. And that is problematic. And so I want to make sure that we go about this in a very deliberate manner. There is—so what we don't want to do is take the capability of the commander to use UCMJ as you pointed out, that gives us a range of options to sustain discipline. And we don't want to lose that capability. There has been some discussion of taking it all away, and we have to be very careful about that.

Mr. SMITH. Secretary McHugh, I am sorry.

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes, thank you, Mr. Smith.

I would just add to what the Chief said, and I think all of his points were important ones. Secretary Hagel has received the input—the official Army position is, “We support the initiative to amend the process by which the case at Aviano unfolded to take the commander out as the sole adjudicatory authority.”

And I think it is fair to say Secretary Hagel has committed himself to that, although the language is still being worked.

The other piece just to fill in the total blank, you know, wisely this Congress has asked that the Secretary appoint a special commission to look at the entire application of the UCMJ particularly in these kinds of cases, although in a more broad sense. That will probably begin to happen this summer and I think it would have value to receive the input of that before we take a particularly broad amendment process that changes, as you and the chief discussed, from start to finish.

Mr. SMITH. The final—

Secretary MCHUGH. The 60-piece, we fully support an amendment to that.

Mr. SMITH. Final quick point that I would make is if that is going to be the approach, one of the other big issues here is that the victims do not trust their commanders in far too many instances. So even on the front end, even when, yes, you want that adjudi—the authority to basically implement things short of a criminal procedure if you can't get there. If the men and women in service think, “Gosh, if I go to the commander, this is more likely to be a negative for me than it is for me to get any justice.” That is a big thing to wrestle with, even if you are short of the felony and short of all that, just the basic openness of it is going to have to be a major cultural restructure so the men and women trust that that commander isn't going to look at them as a pain that is causing problems for the unit, but as someone to be protected.

Secretary MCHUGH. Well—

Mr. SMITH. And that is a big motivation for a lot of those—desire for bigger changes.

Secretary MCHUGH. Could not agree more. And one of the things we have tried to do to respond to that is lift the convening authority in those kinds of cases to a higher level so that there is some space between the immediate commander and the alleged victim.

One of the big problems I think we have throughout society, and it certainly exists in these—

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely.

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. Circumstances is the victim fearing being victimized again by the system.

Mr. SMITH. And that is not peculiar.

Secretary MCHUGH. And we—

Mr. SMITH. Not peculiar to the military by any means, I understand it is a problem in a lot settings.

I thank you, gentlemen very much.

Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. And I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Odierno, I want to ask about regionally aligned brigades. And in y'all's statement, you talk about that will be a feature of the Army in the future with investments and language skills, regional expertise, cultural training.

My basic question is, how are you going to change the personnel system to make that work? Because if you put the investment in somebody to learn the language, et cetera, but then they rotate ever so often among different units that are aligned with different parts of the world, that initial investment isn't going to work. So explain the personnel changes that would be necessary for this.

General ODIERNO. A couple of things, Congressman. Our studies and our analysis, as we looked at this over the last several years, tells us a couple of things. Although language is important, it is not the key piece. It is understanding culture. It is understanding the underlying social-economic factors that affect the countries they are involved with.

So we are focusing on that with language. Now, I am not—but the language would be a much lower level. And we have capabilities now where units are training on language that we are finding to be very effective as they go to Afghanistan. So what we will do is, we will align forces at division and core level be—habitual brigades will rotate. Because people rotate between brigades, as well. And we will—as they train up, they will train up through these social-economic cultural facets, and that will prepare them to be then aligned. We will continue to assess this over time to see if we think we have to have brigades habitually associated or can we rotate them. And part of this gets to the mix, frankly. Because we want to have a mix of brigades, and that mix might change over time based on the threats that we see in a Pacific area. So we might have to adjust them. And so, we have to be prepared to move them between regions as we go forward.

So, I think, with the system we have in place, what we are doing in our schools, whether it be advanced course, basic course for officers, our NCO [non-commissioned officer] training courses, and then in the unit training, that will give them the basis and backbone for them to understand the socio-economic and cultural issues associated. And we think we can do that within the training time we have allocated to do it.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I guess I still don't completely understand. And the issue has been brought up. Do you have enough time in the training to get into that deep culture? And I am very

persuaded by General Flynn and others who argue that has really been the key in Afghanistan is understanding that culture is a pre-requisites for success.

But—just kind of on the basic level, currently, a soldier obviously could be in 1st Infantry Division, get transferred to 82nd Airborne—they could be aligned with completely different regions of the world. So will that rotation end? And once you are assigned to a particular organization, you will stay there.

General ODIERNO. It is hard to do that for a number of reasons. First is professional development and getting the right positions for the right people. And so, we have to be careful of saying that is how we are going to do this.

We will try to do that as much as we can as we go forward. But we are not going to lock ourselves to this as we do today in Afghanistan. You know, you will have a 10-to 12-month train-up period. Part of that will be doing a military skills. Part of that will be doing the culture and other training. We think that is enough time to get them to understand this.

And as we do it time after time, that will increase their ability to understand this. And so, I think we can move people around. I don't want to commit to saying we are just going to lock people into certain regions.

I also believe our young leaders want to be involved in more than one region. I think one of the—as we want to keep our best leaders, I think one of the real selling points to them is that they could potentially go to the Pacific this time. They could go to Middle East over here. That is exciting to them, to go and do different parts of the world. And I think within our training program, we can accommodate that where they are successful with the cultural and socioeconomic understanding of the areas. And I think we can do that in our schools as we go forward.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I appreciate it. I think this is—as you know, in a variety of forums, there is a heightened controversy about the personnel system, especially the Army because the Army is kind of the leader of that. Our—books coming out, suggesting better alternatives in something.

I think as we have tight budgets, figuring out reforms in the personnel system, as well as reforms—

General ODIERNO. Yes.

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. In acquisition and so forth is that something we need to—

General ODIERNO. I agree. And Congressman, I didn't give you any specifics. I will come back and do that. But I am going to release a leader development strategy here in about a month. And that it is going to touch on exactly what you are talking about, on how we are going to manage people differently. And part of gaining this expertise is the broadening assignments that we plan on giving them, which will help them to increase their expertise as well. And we will lay that out for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 109.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and commitment. I have two or three questions I want to try to get in.

General, in the report, it says here that there will be reductions, as you have indicated, from 562,000 to 490,000 soldiers. Recently, there was a public meeting at Fort Bragg to discuss the effect of these reductions throughout the Army.

As you know, there is an extremely strong relationship—supportive relationship in the community there between Fayetteville and Fort Bragg and the surrounding 11 counties that are impacted by Fort Bragg and the new forces command headquarters and Army Reserve command headquarters that have been built recently there.

What are the guidelines that are being used for determining the number of soldiers that may stay at a particular location?

General ODIERNO. Well, there is several things that we look at. We look at the infrastructure. We look at family programs. We look at how we spread them—we want to make sure we have our forces spread widely—distributed around the country.

There are training facilities that are assessed. There is access for strategic deployment that is assessed. These are a few of them. There is more than that, but those are a few of the ones that we are looking at. And we can give you the detailed list of what those are.

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right, and that is very helpful and very important. I know, for Fort Bragg. And speaking of that, also, as you know, JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] is located at Fort Bragg. In the budget request this year, it includes continued growth for U.S. special operation forces, including U.S. Army Special Operations Command and Army special operations forces.

How do you plan to manage the challenges that you see in the coming years as special forces grow, but we know there will be a reduction in conventional—the use of conventional forces and conventional budgets.

General ODIERNO. So we have almost completed the growth of our operational—special operations forces. What we are now doing is, adding the enabler piece to support the special operations forces. And that is the increase that we will work over the next couple of years.

As we have looked at this, obviously we recruit special operators out of the conventional force.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Right.

General ODIERNO. And so, we have done the analysis that we believe—at 490,000, there is—that gives us the right pool in order to continue to fill the special operations forces with the capabilities that they need. And we will have to continually assess that as we reduce the size—if we have to reduce the size of the conventional force below 490,000 and what the impact will be on our ability to provide the proper amount of special operations forces.

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right, and then finally, what role—if you can expand a little bit on the role you see for the Army in this pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. I know you talked about, in the report, about the U.S. Pacific Command and making it a three-star headquarters for that. What would you say is the Army's role in the air-sea battle concept for that region?

General ODIERNO. Well, first, Asia-Pacific is much bigger than air-sea battle. Air-sea battle is a operational technique. It is one of many. So it—as—first of all, as you gain access through air-sea battle, you gain access for reason, usually, to put ground forces on the ground. So we are working forced entry capabilities and how we contribute to that—looking, how we contribute air-missile defense capabilities through that in the Asia-Pacific.

But in addition to that, I point out that seven out of the 10 largest land armies in the world are in the Asia-Pacific. They major—in each one of the countries in the Pacific, the dominant Service is the Army. And so, we want to continue to engage, train, gain access through relationships to many of these countries, and build relationships. So it is important that the Army has the ability to do that in the Asia-Pacific region.

And there is many other things we want to do with them, building humanitarian assistance disaster relief contributions, which enables us—and we—which would enable us to work together and build relationships. And I think we bring a lot of capability in that area. And we also have the Korean peninsula, obviously, that requires significant ground capability in order to reinforce what is going on in the Asia-Pacific.

So we have 66,000 soldiers assigned to U.S. Army Pacific. And that is quite a significant number, and we will continue to support that number as we move forward.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, very much. Having been with our soldiers in Korea and also seeing the Army's presence in the Pacific Command and Hawaii, it is amazing the great work you can continue to do. And we hope—want to support you in what you need to do as we pivot to that area.

So thank you very much, and thank you for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you again.

General, great respect for you and all of our men and women in uniform who have served this Nation and are serving.

Recently, and I want to pick up on a comment you made, General, that obviously, you probably—not you personally, but the Services are under probably the most enormous stress they have seen in years. The failure of Congress to balance the budget, so therefore you have got to help us do that. You have acknowledged that, certainly. The Secretary has been here before.

I went over to Walter Reed a couple of weeks ago, and a young man from my district, Corporal Greg Hedrick, United States Army, lost a leg and fingers, and just impressed me so much that I am going to be thrilled to bring him over here and take him to lunch in the Members' dining room. I really cannot wait. His attitude is like all of them that I have ever met. No matter what they lost physically or mentally, they just have the greatest attitude.

My concern is that I have Camp Lejeune down in the district I represent. I have one of the best staffers in America, Jason Lowry. We have dealt with so many cases, with Active Duty marines and also marines who are in the process of waiting for the medical re-

view board before they can be discharged. And many times in that wait, they seem to self-medicate, which presents a problem.

In the last 6 months—and I want to thank Secretary McHugh and his aide, Colonel Bowman, have been extremely helpful—we have had two cases that quite frankly, not from the district, but because of my staffer who has built somewhat of a national reputation of getting in there and trying to help, we have had a situation involving two.

And I won't say any more than this, but two in the United States Army that were in that period of time. They served our Nation in Afghanistan and Iraq. They have done everything they could do. But waiting for that medical review board, they seemed to have gotten themselves into a situation that is not acceptable to the United States Army, or would be to the Marine Corps and Air Force, any of them. Now, I will get to the point I am trying to make, with hopefully a response from you and maybe even the Secretary of the Army. You mentioned—and one of my biggest passions, quite frankly, is those like yourselves who have done something I did not do—those who come back that are wounded, both physically and mentally.

I would like to get your assessment of the wounded warrior program in the United States Army under the stress of this budget situation. And is it becoming more and more of a problem of those who are coming back from Afghanistan, primarily now, waiting to be discharged, but having to wait to a point that they seem to get themselves in trouble, even though they are still under doctors' care.

I am not sure if I am asking that well enough, but you do understand what I am trying to ask. If I could get you to respond and the Secretary, please.

General ODIERNO. So, one of the things that—we have a very strong wounded warrior program that is across all our installations. We have our warrior training brigades that are specifically set up to assist these soldiers as they are waiting. So as they leave Walter Reed or SAMMC [San Antonio Military Medical Center] down in San Antonio and go back to their installation, they are able to sign into these warrior brigades which track them on a quite regular basis through this process.

But I will tell you, sir, your point is a good one, is that, you know, we are working hard to reduce this time that they have, this idle time. Now, we try to keep them busy, give them missions they can do. But we also want to speed up the processing time. We have made actually quite significant progress over the last year in reducing the times waiting on the evaluation boards.

And in fact, we now have significant numbers waiting for now the final VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] adjudication because we have been able to get through our process. And in fact, the reason the number—our end-strength numbers are a bit lower than they were projected this year is because we were able to get more people through the system faster than we expected. So we are working this very hard.

So we try to get them through the system faster, but we try to use these warrior transition brigades and battalions that are located to track these young men and women to make sure that they

are getting the care they need and if necessary, behavioral health care, which has also increased over the last couple of years in terms of our ability to provide that capability at each one of our installations.

So, we acknowledge the problem. We are trying to get after it by decreasing the period, by getting them in these warrior transition units, and then trying to get the behavioral health capability there to help them. We also started several years ago a pain reduction program, where we try to not use medication as much as we were before. And we are trying to come up with other methods that they can use instead of medication, so they don't run into this. So it is a combination of all those programs.

We have not solved it yet, Congressman, and we have got to continue to work hard.

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MCHUGH. Congressman Jones, first of all, I deeply appreciate the advocacy that you and your staff bring to these troubled soldiers in the Army's case. I signed a letter with respect to one of those cases to you last evening. Please review it and we can get back together if you choose to.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

Secretary MCHUGH. This is a troubling issue for us, because for all of the problems that a man or woman in uniform has coming back with either physical or mental wounds, to add to it artificially by a bureaucratic process and creating more frustration is not what we want to do. We want to be a source of relief and help and recovery.

As the chief noted, we have been working as an Army very, very diligently on the MEB [Medical Evaluation Board]/PEB [Physical Evaluation Board], the medical board and the physical evaluation board process, which is totally under Army control. The Secretary of Defense has set a 120-day target by which he wants all of those cases to process through. In our case, of course, the Army, for the last 4 months we have actually done better than that 120 days, down around 105 or so.

So, we are doing much better. As the chief noted, we are clearing out backlogs. That is helpful to those soldiers who have been queued up, but it is also, frankly, helpful to the Army readiness ratings as well. But the problem continues, where the joint process of IDES [Integrated Disability Evaluation System] between the Department of Defense and all the Services and the VA. And as Secretary Hagel and Secretary Shinseki have said repeatedly, we are putting all resources in an effort against that, to try to get that out of the way as well.

The other problem of the issue that you have raised is really that of medical and pharmaceutical abuse. We as an Army are doing much better amongst all of our soldiers, wounded and others, in terms of abuse of illegal drugs like marijuana and such, but prescription drug abuse is on the rise. And it lends itself into those medical care environments.

And the challenge we face is not just controlling it in the WTBs [Warrior Transition Battalion] and while they are under direct medical care at places like Walter Reed, but rather after they have made some recovery and can go into communities and to phar-



macies and procure it outside the medical system of the armed services.

So, this is something we have to work on. We want to be very fair. And the point of the cases you have brought to me, that we are not victimizing someone again who is reacting in ways just trying to cope with the problems they have brought home with them. And I can't tell you we will get it perfectly right every time, but I can tell you we will try as hard as we can every time.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, gentlemen.

I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General for the great work that you and the men and women you represent are doing for our country. Thank you very, very much.

Secretary McHugh, welcome home. In your testimony, you made reference, I believe, to 2,300 soldiers not being able to get some intelligence training because of the sequestration. Could you tell us what that means in practical terms?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, as America has witnessed in recent weeks, intelligence processes, whether on the battlefield or in other settings, is very, very important. That is certainly true for the United States Army. Our ability to provide accurate and timely intelligence to our commanders and to our soldiers, whether they are in theater or some other environment, is very, very important.

And we rely upon military intelligence specialists that receive, as you know from your time in this Congress, very specific training on methods, collection, et cetera. And those 2,300 are the—is the estimate that we just won't be able—seats we won't be able to fill.

I wish that was the only example. I could tick off for you, and in fact the chief mentioned in his opening comments other seats we won't be able to fill like 500-plus seats at Fort Rucker in our Army Center of Excellence for Aviation, and on and on and on. And those are holes that, as I mentioned previously, are not just filled overnight. They will create gaps for years to come.

Mr. ANDREWS. I want to thank the chairman and Mr. Smith for long before this sequestration became a reality, they were sounding the sentinel about what it would mean. This committee is not late to this process. But I would ask my colleagues to make a joint effort to get to the floor something that would end this problem.

You know, General Odierno, Secretary McHugh, the people they represent, make decisions every single day. And we have obviated our responsibility to make decisions about this problem. It really boils down to a couple of basic questions.

Do you think the sequestration should cover the military cuts we have seen? I think everybody here says no. Then you have to say: Well, should it cover cancer research at the NIH [National Institutes of Health] or kids enrolling in Head Start or air travelers across the country stuck in airports? I think we should pull the plug on the whole sequestration.

The second question we have to ask ourselves is: Well, should we cancel it for the whole 10 years or just for a limited period of time?

I think you have heard today we have to cancel it for the whole 10 years or you can't plan, you can't decide, you can't think.

The third question we have got to confront is if we cancel it out for 10 years, how do we come up with deficit reduction money to take its place? It is pretty simple, ladies and gentlemen, that it can't all come out of discretionary. That is what got us to this mess.

So people on our side have got to be honest about what they would do with Social Security and Medicare and other entitlements, and people on the other side have got to be honest about what they would do with revenue.

We can do this. This is not some natural disaster or international threat that is upon us. This is a totally self-imposed disaster.

And I just think it requires us, on both sides, to be willing to stand up, make some decisions, take some votes that won't be particularly popular, but get it done.

We have sat here, colleagues, for a year and a half, warning that these kind of things would happen. Well, they are now happening every single day.

And, look, I give bipartisan credit for the fact the committee has worked on this problem. But I have to be specific and say that there is a one-sided problem here, that nothing is getting to the floor.

We have been here since January 3rd in this Congress. We are voting on a helium bill this week. And we have not spent any time, not one debate, not one bill, not one vote, on ending this sequester.

I don't think that anybody has got an obligation to choose my way of ending the sequester. Again, there are various variations how this could be done.

But I think both of us, on both sides, have got to go to the leadership and say, "put on the floor various proposals that would end this sequestration and let us do our job, make a decision and take a vote."

It is one more hearing today where we are hearing about the wreckage of sequestration. But it is also one more day when we are doing absolutely nothing about it. And I think we owe it to the men and women who General Odierno and Secretary McHugh lead to break that pattern, to do our jobs, to take some votes and make some decisions. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Chairman, thank you.

And just to clarify the record, we have not only had on the floor once, but twice, bills that would have taken sequestration off from the military that we passed and sent over to the Senate. The chairman—

Mr. ANDREWS. Would my friend yield for just a moment?

Mr. FORBES. I only have 5 minutes, and I just can't—

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. That was the last Congress, and I just—

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary and General, we—you have earned and deserve the respect of this committee and the country, and we offer you that today.

And, Mr. Secretary, it is always great to just see you back here, and thank you for your service.

General, it is also a pleasure to see you. And one of the things we want to do, as you had mentioned, to make informed decisions about the Army. We need to sometime just kind of feel the components back, and one of the things that we certainly agree with you on, I do, on sequestration, I voted against it, fought against it.

We think it was a bad idea then, think it is a bad idea today.

But I want to also come back to something the Secretary mentioned and pointed out I think very clearly. According to the HASC [House Armed Services Committee] committee staff, we—the Administration has supported \$778 billion of cuts to national defense, prior to sequestration, even before sequestration.

If we look at the efficiencies that—you presided over many of them in cutting down the Joint Forces Command, and we have given the Department those charts and asked them to refute them if they were wrong. And so far they haven't been able to.

But as for that \$778 billion, which counts for the 106,000 soldiers and civilian positions that were going to be cut down, it would be fair to say, I think, that you supported all of those cuts. Is that not correct?

General ODIERNO. That is correct, Congressman.

Mr. FORBES. And the Army, at least to my knowledge, submitted nothing to this committee for an unfunded requirements list. Why was that the case? Why not submit that list?

General ODIERNO. Under last year's budget, we did not submit a unfunded requirements list. As I reviewed it, I felt that none of them raised to the level that we should ask for additional requirements last year.

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And I hope you can just appreciate how some of us have a difficult time—the stress we are talking about in the Army didn't just pop up in the last few months. This has been over a series of years. Yet, we have these huge cuts and the Army basically saying this is okay and not giving us any of the unfunded requirements list.

Let me ask you this question, though, going back to sequestration, it has raised the level of concern about the ability to maintain an Operational Reserve Component.

The effects are already beginning to impact the equipping, maintaining, and training of Reserve units, which, of course, is a critical concern to the logistics community, due to the fact that nearly 80 percent of our current sustainment forces are comprised of Reserve Component units.

Could you speak to this issue further and explain your perception of the impact these negative budgetary forces are having on the Army's sustainment forces?

General ODIERNO. First, the initial impacts it is having is our ability to do reset, this year, in 2013. That has to do with the shortfall in OCO that is causing that, as well as the sequestration. So as we have to slow down reset, that will slow down the ability for us to return the combat service support assets to all three components.

And so, as we look at their readiness and equipment on hand, it will take us a bit longer to get them the equipment they need to be prepared. And as we continue to go forward and continually have to push this to the right, the further that will get pushed to

the right, so it will impact readiness actually of all three components, but specifically in CSSs [Combat Service Support], as you point out, the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.

Mr. FORBES. And we have heard a number of people raise issues about your programmatic environmental assessment. And some concerns are that that is just a way of obviating a BRAC assessment.

Can you tell us what inefficiencies will be created without using the BRAC process to reduce the force structure?

General ODIERNO. Well, I think, first, you know, we are required to do the programmatic assessment, and we are required to do that by law, and that is what we have done.

I think the reductions that we are taking, based on my understanding, do not reach the thresholds of BRAC. So we are able to do this. And that is why we have to do this environmental assessment, to make sure, in fact, it does not reach a threshold or problematic case that would cause us to go into BRAC-like situations, as we look at how we cut our force structure.

But, that said, as we go forward with these cuts of 80,000, but even if we have to take more cuts based on sequestration, we are going to have to do a BRAC of some type.

Because of the amount of soldiers coming out of all three components, it is going to require us to relook whether our infrastructure supports the force that we are going to have, once we are finished with these reductions.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

Secretary MCHUGH. And may I just add a word, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, would you please respond for the record? His time has expired.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 109.]

Secretary MCHUGH. Of course. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, thank you for your testimony and for your service to our Nation.

My first question is for either one of you, and has to do about maintaining the Army National Guard as well as the Army Reserve as an Operational Reserve.

I am informed that the Army is substituting Active Component units for Reserve Component formations with many upcoming deployments. Now, I certainly appreciate the challenges that faces the Army, given sequestration, but these decisions have significant impact on unit readiness and the ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] model.

If this continues, where would the Reserve Component element fall in the ARFORGEN? Does the unit or individuals go back to beginning of the model and reset, or are they completely taken out of the model?

If we are taking these units out, we risk relegating the Reserve Component back to a Strategic Reserve and not an Operational Reserve as is indicated in your statement.

So can you comment on these points?

Secretary.

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I will start and then the Chief can certainly fill in. Actually, what we are doing is, I believe, the cases you have raised are not substituting Reserve for Active, they are rather Active for Reserve. We just offramped two Indiana Guard units. And it was a decision that we came to with great angst. It is not something we want to do.

However, it was a direct result of the economic and fiscal realities we are facing. That particular offramp saved the Army, the bottom-line budget, just over \$80 million.

And, as you noted, there unfortunately will probably be further offramping of R.C. [Reserve Component] Guard units, particularly into the future, although those decisions have not been finalized.

We want to do those as sparingly as possible. Providing disruption to planned deployments brings great hardship and challenge to those citizen-soldiers, there is no question about it.

But we have attempted to manage those as best we can. As has been noted in both the Chief and my other comments, we are doing some pretty dramatic things on the Active side as well. And the training means everybody goes back to square one. That is the challenge that I think we are facing.

And cancellation of BCT training rotations at the national training center, it is not something that they go the following week or the next month. It is that they go back to the back of the line.

And that is why we are very concerned about not having predictable, sufficient funding. That may be reduced funding, but at least predictable and timely funding, so that we can do less of those kinds of things, rather than more.

We remain fully committed to an operationalized Reserve, and——

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I have limited time, and I have one more question.

General, would you care——

General ODIERNO. I was just going to say, this has nothing to do with taking the National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve out of the ARFORGEN process. This has to do with our fiscal year 2013 budget disaster that we have, where we have a \$7.8 billion shortfall in OCO, and sequestration, and we have to do everything we can to save money.

And, unfortunately, one of the ways to save money was to substitute Active units for Reserve units, because it would cost us less money. And that is the only reason.

We are committed to the ARFORGEN process and we remain committed to it with all components as we go forward.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Thank you.

Now, my second question, I guess maybe the general would be able to answer this. I am pleased with the Joint Chiefs' decision to deploy a THAAD missile defense battery to Guam to address the North Korean missile threat situation.

It was encouraging, especially to my constituents, to have the added defense capability.

I recognize there will be an evaluation of the THAAD deployment in about 90 days, but I wanted to learn more about the Army's ef-

fort to source the force structure and equipment for a more permanent land-based missile defense on Guam.

The old EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] from 2009 calls for a permanent THAAD and Patriot missile defense task force on Guam. So where is the Army in planning for the resourcing of the force structure for this task force?

General ODIERNO. We are in the process of building five THAAD batteries.

We have one built right now, the one that is deployed. The second one should be finished being built this—in the next couple of months. And then we will continue to build three more. So that will help us to develop a capability. So as we make decisions based on—in the joint staff, we will then have the structure to support the decisions that are made to operationally deploy these units forward. So that will help us.

Now, currently today we have 60 percent of our Patriot batteries deployed around the world. And so we—it is very difficult for us to maintain that OPTEMPO [operational tempo]. There is no program now to increase the number of Patriots, but we are increasing our THAAD batteries, and we are building them as we go.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

And I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Mr. FORBES. [Presiding.] Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson is, recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank both of you for being here. And Secretary McHugh, I want to assure you that Congresswoman Davis and I are maintaining the high standards of the military personnel subcommittee that you established—

Secretary MCHUGH. I am sure you are exceeding it.

Mr. WILSON. No, no, no. No hey—it was terrific on behalf of the service members, military families, and veterans. So thank you for your service.

And General Odierno, I will always cherish my visit—the briefing you gave in Baghdad, which clearly indicated that the—our military forces were making such a difference in reducing violence in that country against the people of Iraq, against the military forces. It was just extraordinary to see a reduction of almost 90 percent from the height.

So thank you for your extraordinary service.

And indeed for both of you my faith in you is that I have three sons currently serving with the Army National Guard, my wife has trained them well. Roxanne gets the credit, but we are really proud of your service.

With that, I am very concerned about the reduction in forces, General Odierno, and you were—indicated that there could be an additional reduction of 100,000 personnel.

In light of what happened last week in Boston, I sincerely believe that we are in a global war on terrorism, facing international Islamic jihadists, we should be prepared. And you just indicated that we have the most unstable world in 37 years of your service.

In light of that, how in the world is our country going to face the challenges ahead? We have currently planned 80,000 reduction in personnel, and you now say there could be 100,000. How can we

assure the American people that our military will be capable to respond?

General ODIERNO. Congressman, I think first of all, the Secretary and I will ensure whatever forces we have no matter what the number is, we will ensure they are ready and prepared to go. And that is, that balance that we want to achieve.

However, where it will be different is the type and number and size of the contingency we would be able to respond to. At 490,000 we believe we can do one major contingency, and a one that is somewhat smaller than that around the world. If we go below that with another 100,000 it will put into question what size of one major contingency would we be able to do.

And so that will be something we will have to continue to study as we reduce this—continue to reduce the size of the Army. So that is concerning about our ability to deter bad decisions if we get too small. And that is one of the things we are very concerned about as we look ahead to potential full sequestration.

Mr. WILSON. And I share a concern of Ms. Bordallo, and that is the situation with the—our Guard/ Reserve Active forces. If there was an additional reduction of 100,000 personnel, how steeply would that affect our Guard and Reserve?

General ODIERNO. Well, we would have to take a look at it and it depends on how many dollars we would have to get out. The—again these are—I don't want to pin myself down, but at least 50,000 of that—50,000 to 60,000 would come out of the Active Component, and then the rest of it would come out of a combination of the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard. So you would see another significant reduction in the Active Component, and then a smaller reduction in the National Guard/U.S. Army Reserve. And for me it is problematic on both sides that we take that reduction.

I worry about having the readiness and crisis response capability we need in our Active Component, and I worry about the reduction and whittling away of the depth that we need in our Operational Reserve to support us across the variety of mission if we have to reduce our Army Reserve and National Guard.

Mr. WILSON. And I am equally concerned about the domestic natural disasters that we need to be prepared for so that our Guard is prepared along working with our Governors.

Secretary McHugh, can you please provide us with an update on the Army individual carbine replacement program?

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes sir. As I believe you are aware, we have been conducting a dual track trying to do what is absolutely necessary based on input from Afghanistan to improve the product improvement, PIP [Product Improvement Program], program for the current M4 [carbine assault rifle], while at the same time trying to test amongst the various private sector competitors to determine whether or not we should purchase a new next-generation carbine to make sure that the technologies and the advancements would be worth the investment.

We are kind of midstream in that activity. There has been some input recently out of the Department of Defense as to the Army's requirement or lack thereof, we are trying to go through those findings to make a determination. We have funding in both the budget and the Future Years Defense Plan to go forward should we decide

to purchase a new individual carbine, but that decision is yet to be made.

I would hope we would have some further updates on that certainly by the beginning of the summer.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, both of you.

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you.

Mr. Loeb sack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thanks to both of you for your service and for your testimony today. Both of you are very much aware that the Army organic industrial base—our arsenals, depots, ammunition plants—really that is key to the Army's ability to respond, as you know, to a national security emergency, and make sure that our soldiers have the equipment that they need in the event of another contingency going forward.

You also know I think, Secretary McHugh, that I am proud to represent two critical organic base facilities, not only the Rock Island Arsenal, but the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant also in the Burlington area, Middletown specifically.

I think we have seen the importance of both these and other arsenals and depots over the course of the last decade. As a military parent. I am also glad that we have hardworking men and women at our arsenals, and at the depots and at the plants working every day to make sure that our troops have the equipment that they need, but I do share the concerns that both of you highlight in your joint testimony.

And on page 16 specifically, and I quote, "The current fiscal environment threatening the retention of critical skill sets in our depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants."

And of course I am very concerned about the proposed furloughs of the civilian workforce, including the furloughing of the working capital funded employees. I am worried that, that is going to further undermine the retention of our critical skills and our Army readiness.

So, Secretary McHugh, if you could, what is the Army's specific plan to reverse the very concerns that you mention on page 16 of the joint testimony regarding the retention of critical skills and how does the 2014 budget support those efforts? And specifically, how will the Army ensure that the critical manufacturing capabilities that those facilities possess and the workforce needed for those facilities are preserved within the organic industrial base?

Secretary MCHUGH. We are deeply concerned about this issue. And there is a challenge that is inescapable and that is you come out of two theaters of war and I think it is natural to assume you are just not going to have to buy and manufacturing the same levels of platforms and pieces of equipment that you did previously, but it is a challenge that is compounded by—as you noted—we comment upon in the posture statement as well as our opening remarks. The challenges of the current fiscal environment; \$7.8 billion shortage in overseas contingency monies.

We have to have the funding to get those products some \$21 billion worth of equipment that the Army wishes to return to our units back from Afghanistan back into the depots. back into the arsenals. Or have the products come out of the arsenals for a reset



of that equipment. That is about—if you consider the transportation costs about \$11 billion plus of work and expenditures that we would like to be able to make, but we have to have help on those OCO funding aspects.

What we are trying to do programmatically is really at two levels. The first is work with the Department of Defense—I believe I have mentioned before what is called the S2T2 [Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier], the sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis that the Department is leading that we are very active in trying to identify principally in the private sector, but also in the public sector and the military organic industrial base, where our failure points are, what kinds of inputs, where those highly skilled jobs are and how sensitive are they to throughput in terms of, you know, how many products are we moving through.

That effort is about a year old. They began last May, in 2012. They are now refining the data, and we expect those data to provide us very important information at least where we have to concentrate our resources and give us early red flags where necessary.

The other thing is more Army-centric. We are looking at our organic industrial base in a single study. And that is being complemented by a study by AT Tierney, very, I think, well-known prominent national firm that does industrial analysis, looking particularly at our ground combat fleet to again identify those especially single points of failure to give us the information so we can—whatever the resources we have what we can make those resource investments most wisely.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

And very quickly, and I think what I will do probably is submit another question for the record to General Odierno. Just to follow up on my colleagues here, Ms. Bordallo and Mr. Wilson, on the Guard and the Reserve. I have a lot of concerns about that moving forward, and particularly how the Army is leveraging the cost effectiveness of the Guard and Reserve, and how specifically the Army is maintaining—planning to maintain the Guard and Reserve as an Operational Reserve over the long term. But, thinking about it in terms of cost effectiveness.

My time is run out. I will submit that for the record.

Thanks to both of you.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your leadership.

General Odierno, I have got a question for you that relates to the impacts of sequestration. Part of the problem that we have in trying to set aside sequestration is that, you know, the Department of Defense was restrained really by the Administration from giving us information about the effects because the Department of Defense was restrained from beginning planning. Until you began the process of implementing sequestration, no one was clear as to what the effects of sequestration would be. We could project. We could assume. We could try to imagine, but now that we are in the period

of sequestration, you are actually putting pen to paper and able to give us an answer.

And, I think, that is really something that we need to focus on, is what are the effects of sequestration so that hopefully we can come to a period where there is the grand bargain and the setting aside of sequestration, not just for its effects this year, but also in the future.

We hear of, you know, FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and plane delays, but when we get to the issue of national security, the effects are much more critical, because they go to our capabilities and certainly then as we look to the threats that we are facing.

We had previously always had a national security strategy that required that we be able to be successful in two conflicts, being able to fight two wars. And that was, of course, because we knew that if we were engaged in one and we didn't have the capability to do two, that someone else might be, you know, interested in undertaking mischief while they believed that we were—incapable of responding.

So the concept of always being able to respond to two has been one that has kept us as a standard, safe and understanding that our adversaries would know that we could respond.

When the President and his strategic guidance has now begun to say that he has five major tenets, and one of those is that we would only be able to defeat a major adversary in one theater, conceding the two conflicts capability.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, when he was at the 2012 Munich Security Conference, in front of our major allies, said, "We will ensure that we can quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary anytime, any place. It is essential that we have the capability to deal with more than one adversary at a time. We believe we have shaped a force that will give us that capability." So a conflict between what Panetta is saying of our capability and what the President is now saying is our national strategy would be going down to one.

My concern is, is that with sequestration that we can't even meet the President's goal of one. We had the Marine Corps in front of us that—Marine Corps—Commandant of the Marines, General Amos stated that if the budget drops that much, meaning sequestration goes into place, or about 10 percent more, then the number of Marine Corps infantry battalions would dip from planned 23 into the teens. As a result, the Marine Corps would be very, very strained to fight even one major combat operation. And, General, again, trying to get grapple with the effects of sequestration so that we can get this set aside. I understand that when Congressman Wilson was speaking to you, you were saying that the new budgetary numbers would have you dropping to an area, perhaps, around 490,000 soldiers and that that may be sufficient for one major combat operation.

But looking at the effects of sequestration, if this is not set aside and we—and recognizing this is a 10-year program, my expectation would be that you would drop below a number even below that, and I would like your answer as to whether or not that would, as the Marine Corps has indicated, affect your ability to fight in even one major combat operation successfully.

General ODIERNO. I think under the current strategy we have, we are able to defeat one and then deter another. I think that is the language we are using. And that is the capability we have today.

If we go to full sequestration, we will—you know, we—2 years ago, we were 45 brigades. We are going to go somewhere between 32 and 37 brigades here in the next—based on the initial cut—now, if we cut again in the Active Component, we will go down something less than that. And we would have significant issues meeting anything more than one contingency if we can meet one contingency.

And then we would have to figure out how we are able to use our National Guard brigades much quicker than we can now. And that requires, not just the money investment, the issue with the National Guard is always time. Because they don't have the time to train because they are a part-time force. And so, it would be very difficult for us to meet anything above one contingency. And we would probably have difficulty meeting one contingency.

Mr. TURNER. I really appreciate that answer because although we always want to say that we have, you know, full and great strength against any adversary, and although we know our military would always rise to the challenge, recognizing that sequestration effect ties one of your hands behind your back. I appreciate you being honest and indicated that, yes, it would affect your ability to do one major combat operation.

With that, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Several of your comments when I was here—and my apologies for having to leave—but—dealt with the overseas contingency funds and the—as of this moment, we don't have the details on that. I think that is the case.

General ODIERNO. I think we provided those. But we certainly can provide that to you.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay.

My question—

Secretary MCHUGH. We haven't provided 2014—

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is what I was—

General ODIERNO. I am sorry.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Going forward and also the way in which sequestration plays into it, and that is in the details. Given that, my question really goes to the issue of how is the—what money is available, how will it be spent? What are your shortfalls, some \$7 billion just to return the equipment back to the United States. Could you go into that in a little more detail and when we might be able to have the details so that we can review it?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I certainly will defer to the Chief for his comments. But the \$7.8 billion in OCO shortfall that we both referenced are—with respect to this fiscal year, fiscal year 2013. And that is for virtually every aspect of the warfight. I mentioned that we have a redeployment and return and reset challenge of getting some \$21 billion worth of equipment out of Afghanistan back to the depots for reset. That will cost through the end of 2014, the

projected end of hostilities, along with second destination transportation and the reset costs themselves, about \$11 billion. But that is not just tightly aligned with the \$7.8 billion.

The \$7.8 billion is just to do the warfight for this year. And that is why we are challenged. The 2014 OCO budget is being formulated now. I expect it will be sent, of course, with the approval of OMB [Office of Management and Budget], the Administration by the Department, I would assume, fairly soon. And it will contain those details. But we are really more focused on this year because of the \$7.8 billion deficit we are facing.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thought that the sequestration did not affect the OCO funding?

Secretary MCHUGH. It doesn't. I mean, I am not talking about sequestration. That is another \$7.6 billion the Army faces.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And how is it that you came up short \$7.8 billion? What is the—

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we believe, as an Army, we started with a deficit going into the year. The other is, as you begin to reset, costs go up. And this has been a high burn-rate season. In other words, we are entering—we have had some tough fight, and there is always fudge factors. We are not so much concerned about not being 100-percent accurate. We are concerned about not having the funding stream to make up that deficit, which has not been the case in the past.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think—well, I am confused. I thought—

General ODIERNO. If I—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes?

General ODIERNO [continuing]. If I could try, yes. So for this year, we didn't get quite what we asked for our OCO budget for 2013 initially because of the closure of the Pak [Pakistan] LOCs [Line of Control], it significantly increased the cost of moving equipment. Fuel costs have gone up. So all of these things have challenged us now that we have a \$7.8 billion problem. And what—and in order to pay for that, we were taking out of our base budget.

So because we have to take out of our base budgets—because we are never going to allow it to go unfunded in Afghanistan—we now have to pay in our readiness of our units that are being prepared to deploy next or preparing for another contingency. And that is why it is causing us so much problem this year. And we will then—and then we will push it into 2014 as well because we have not been able to spend the dollars on our training that we thought was necessary.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I assume that the detail that goes with your discussion here is available to the committee. And—look forward—if it is already here, then I look forward to reading it. If it is not here, I look forward to seeing it.

Thank you very much—yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary McHugh, General Odierno, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you for what you are doing for our Nation.

I wanted to drill down a little bit from Mr. Turner's question and some previous questions about where we are from a readiness

standpoint. As you pointed out, the Army has arrived at about a 490,000 end-strength number in its reduction. I wanted to get your thoughts on what are the strategic risks associated with that as far as our posture and our ability to respond with a smaller force? And, as you heard, we live in a more dangerous world today, and, General Odierno, just as you point out.

And what are the assumptions being made with that reduction in force? And, again, it goes back to the strategy. So what assumptions are being made with that? And I wanted to ask a perspective question.

If you go back to September 10th, of 2001, can you give us your perspective on where we were at that particular point going in with where we were with force posture and with end strength, and how we were able to then pursue two wars on two different fronts. And did we have the proper training and readiness going in to 2001? So I just want to try—kind of get that perspective. Where are we today with this reduction? Where were we going into—to September 11th?

General ODIERNO. So, Congressman, let me start with where we were going into September 11th. We were at about 482,000 in the Active Component, about the same as we are today in the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. We had high readiness rates. We would invested in our readiness so all our Active force was ready. We had not quite invested what we wanted to in our National Guards. They weren't quite at the right readiness levels that we needed them at that time.

And so, we immediately consumed that readiness as we went into Iraq. And what happened is, as we opened up the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and as they went on longer, we had to then grow the Army because the Army was not big enough to fight two major contingencies, which tells me that, at 480,000, we were not able—capable of actually doing two major contingencies. Because we had to grow the Army in order to do that. And we had to significantly depend on our National Guard to buy us time so we could grow the Active Component.

So now, as we look ahead, the decisions behind going back now down to about the same level we were prior to 9/11, 490,000 was that we are now out of Iraq. We are out of Afghanistan. The growth was because of the long-term stability operations that we are involved in with both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since we are no longer involved with those, it is—we thought it was moderate risk to reduce the size of the Active Component back to close to what it was between 9/11 and now. Although it is the same number, it is a different Army. It is one that I think is better organized, more special operations forces, more aviation, more capacity in our ground combat forces, more capability in our logistics structure. So I think it is a much better Army than it was in 2001.

The problem now is we are not as ready now as were in 2001. We have now used our readiness. We have to buy back that readiness. And the problem we are having now is because we don't have the dollars, our readiness is starting to slip further. And I worry that we are going to move towards a more hollow Army because we don't have the dollars to sustain our readiness levels in order for us to respond to unknown contingencies.

And that is the challenge that we face right now. And that is my concern.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay.

Secretary McHugh, would you like to make a comment on that?

Secretary MCHUGH. No, I think the Chief covered it very well. We feel that within the new strategy at 490,000, we have acceptable risk across the board. But clearly, our near-term challenge is that of readiness, based on the phenomena we have discussed here of having to use more and more money out of our base to fund the warfight, that has caused us to take out MTC [Mission Training Center] rotations, empty pilot training seats, et cetera, et cetera.

And that is a particularly problematic thing in terms of our ability to immediately respond to some unforeseen threat.

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask you as a follow-up to that, how will the utilization of these regionally aligned forces going forward allow you to meet the new strategic guidance? Where would the dollars come from for that? And is this construct viable under sequestration? And what is the Guard and the Reserve role in that?

General ODIERNO. So as we have developed this regional aligned force concept, we are—we have this Army force generation concept where we go to reset, train, and available. So, you will go through a reset process. You will train up to a standard we think is necessary. And then you are available to be used against some combatant command. And both the Reserve Component and Active Component go through that.

The Active Component has a 24-month cycle. The Reserve Component has a 60-month cycle that they go through. And so we will utilize those forces as they become available. We are funding that based on our base budget submission. We can fund that. And then there are funds that are available from the combatant commands and others to help us to provide support to them.

We have to—we are just beginning this, so we will have to better work through the costs and the funding and do we have it right or now. But we will continue to make adjustments as we go forward.

The most important thing that we get out of this is now combatant commanders know who the unit is. They can focus on that area. They can conduct operations for that on a more regular basis. And to me, it is a much more efficient use of our capability, both in the U.S. Army Reserves, National Guard, and the Active Component.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, for your service.

We had a listening session that the Army conducted in Fort Huachuca recently and I just want to thank you, first of all, for conducting these sessions. It allows you to assess the kind of support that the Army has from the civilian community. And I would say that it was a packed room and not one comment was anything but positive. We have a very supportive community, as you prob-

ably well know, in that—in Sierra Vista, which is adjoining or next to Fort Huachuca.

General Odierno, I want to ask a question about Fort Huachuca and the capabilities that it has. As you know, it provides the Army and the joint force with a highly capable intelligence-gathering process and analysis and UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] pilot training. And I am very proud of the work that they do there.

I would be interested in your thoughts as we look to the future of ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] as we draw down in Afghanistan. It is a capability that I know has been very valuable to our commanders in theater. In his testimony on the defense budget, General Dempsey noted that the growth and evolution of ISR has been a bedrock in our efforts to meet these challenges and threats. And over the course of the last decade, nearly every combatant commander has requested increased ISR assets, given the evolving nature of the conflict.

You have spoken today, and we have been hearing questions regarding our ability to fight future wars. It looks like we might be down to one capability, hopefully no less. So, I would like to ask a question about how we can hold onto the ISR capability, given that we are drawing down, obviously, in Afghanistan? And how, given the current financial or fiscal constraints and challenges, how does the Army's budget going forward support the COCOM [Combatant Commander] requests and continue the work such as is being done at Fort Huachuca to help our commanders and our troops in theater?

General ODIERNO. So, what is a little bit different is our unmanned aerial vehicle strategy is one that is built inside of our units that we have. So, for example, we have unmanned aerial vehicles in our battalions, in our Brigade Combat Teams, and we now have them within our division headquarters. So they are inherent in our organizations and our ISR support is used to support Army intelligence, Army reconnaissance, and we are now building manned/unmanned aviation brigades that will have a combination of armed aerial reconnaissance with unmanned aerial capability together.

So, ours is absolutely essential to the future because we have built it as part of our strategy as to how we deploy our combat elements. And the UAV is central to that. So that will not change. And we will provide that with—internal to our organizations.

The Air Force provides UAVs that are external to the organization, specifically to support combatant commanders. Ours comes with the units. So as we dedicate units to combatant commanders, the UAV capability comes with it and it is totally integrated into all our operations.

So, it is critical to the future and the way ahead for us. And so, it continues to be very important for us to have the center out at Fort Huachuca, as well as working with our intel community out there as we continue to work and look ahead to how we want to increase our foundry program, which is a keystone of our intelligence collection program, to get—garner expertise across the different regions of the world as we move forward.

Mr. BARBER. Well, as you know, General, I hope we will be able to have you come out and take a look personally. It is an extraordinary facility, with capability that is second to none.

I want to ask a second question. We may not have enough time, but I will submit it for the record. Going back to what Congressman Jones was talking about earlier in regard to how we are serving our men and women in uniform who come back from theater. I just will leave you with this story, which I hope is an anomaly, maybe more widespread.

I was traveling back to Washington to Tucson, and I met a sergeant who was stationed at Fort Huachuca. He told me this story. He came back from his third deployment in Iraq, obviously an extended deployment in each case. He had his physical and then he asked for some—an opportunity to talk about mental health issues. He was given 30 minutes with a psychologist who declared that he was fine. Nine months later, when he got to Fort Huachuca, or after he was at Fort Huachuca, he had a diagnosis of traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a hearing loss—none of which had been picked up in that initial medical exam. As I say, I hope this is an anomaly, but to me it is a very troubling story if it indicates a larger issue of catching these issues at the front end when they most seriously could be treated and helped.

So if you could perhaps for the record respond to that, and what we are doing generally speaking.

Thank you so much. I yield back.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 109.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. Thank you for all that you have done for the country and for the Army, and the men and women that serve under you.

We have talked in the past, Mr. Secretary and General, about I think of the Distributed Common Ground System, the Army's intelligence-gathering software product that is out there. I appreciated, General, that you sent the vice chief yesterday. We had a great talk with him about the Distributed Common Ground System.

My question, though, comes—not really a question. I have got some information that 3rd ID [Infantry Division], contrary to what I have been told by the Army, still doesn't have the commercial off-the-shelf product that they are using in Afghanistan, back at Fort Stewart.

In fact, I have it right in front of me that the G3 directed a hold on the 3rd ID operational needs statement for Fort Stewart for the reach-back from Afghanistan, so they can train the people that are going to take their place there, and also use their analysts in CONUS [continental United States] helping them in Afghanistan. So, you still have units that are requesting the off-the-shelf product that are not getting it. That is number one.

Number two, I can't wait, and I look forward to working with you, and like I talked with the vice chief yesterday, on a way forward to work out how we can leverage and use the innovation and the ingenuity that exists in the open market in places like Silicon Valley and the northeast, where you have great commercial prod-



ucts, you have really smart people doing things that the Army is doing.

When the Army creates its own cloud—Google did their cloud a few years ago and it is fairly successful. DCGSs [Distributed Common Ground System] cloud isn't working yet, but it is soon to be there. Apple created a cloud a few years ago. It is working fantastically. That is what I use on my phone right now. You have a lot of products and a lot of commercial software out there, and in this time of extreme budget cuts—we have already spent almost \$3 billion on DCGS. You asked for another, I think, \$270 million this year. Life cycle costs going up—upwards towards \$8 billion or \$9 billion going into the future here on an internal DOD, in-the-Beltway, trying to recreate systems that already exist in real life and are used by big business every single day; that are used by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], all the special operations forces. They use some of these off-the-shelf products.

And I just look forward to working with you to fix this. Because what we want is the best for the warfighter in the most economic way possible, the most efficient and least bureaucratic way forward to get into the warfighter's hand what they need. And like I said, the 3rd ID still had their operational needs statement turned down.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Secretary MCHUGH. May we respond? I think I heard a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I don't want to respond if the gentleman is going to leave. Would you care to hear a brief response?

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Secretary, we have been talking about this for about a year and a half. And this 20-day-old e-mail where the 3rd ID still doesn't have reach-back to the off-the-shelf system, we can talk all we want to. It is not going anywhere. So that is—I am happy to stay here and hear a response—

General ODIERNO. First off, I object to this. I am tired of somebody telling me I don't care about our soldiers and we don't respond.

Mr. HUNTER. General—

General ODIERNO. Everybody on my staff cares about it, and they do all they can to help. So if you want to bring up an anecdotal incident, let's sit down, talk about it, and we will give it a response.

My guess, if I go back to my staff, we will tell you it in fact was responded to and they will tell you they don't need it or they said they have since not requested it and said they don't need it anymore.

We have been going back and forth with this for months. And I am tired of the anecdotal—

Mr. HUNTER. You know, if you don't—

General ODIERNO. Let me answer this.

Mr. HUNTER. You have a very powerful personality, but that doesn't refute the facts that you have gaps in the capability and the—

General ODIERNO. We have more capability today in our intelligence than we have ever had. When I was a division commander

in 2003, a company commander today with DCGS-A [DCGS-Army] has 20 times the capability I had as a division commander in 2003.

Our intel organization has moved forward greatly.

Now, let me go back to the statistics. It is \$10.2 billion over 30 years. That is the DCGS-A program. From 2005 to 2038.

Let's be careful about the statistics here. Okay? So I want to have a conversation about this, and I want you to get briefed on DCGS-A. DCGS-A is much more than what we are talking about here. It is link analysis and visualization. It is a capability that allows us to link intelligence from the national level all the way down—

Mr. HUNTER. General, I am with you—

General ODIERNO [continuing]. To the individual level.

Mr. HUNTER. I understand.

General ODIERNO. And I could go to 30 places that tell me it is working tremendously.

Is it perfect? No. Will we have iterative processes that can inject more technology? Absolutely.

Mr. HUNTER. General, I am sorry—

General ODIERNO. And I want to work with you on that as we go forward.

Mr. HUNTER. If you don't let me say anything, we can't have a conversation.

General ODIERNO. Well, you weren't going to let us say anything.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, you are right, but I have that prerogative when I am sitting up here.

General ODIERNO. Well, I have a prerogative too, and that is to answer a question or an accusation when it is made.

Mr. HUNTER. Number one, I was not accusatory. Number two, there was no question made. With that I yield back the balance of my time again, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am aware of this problem that we have had. And the reason I wanted to let the general respond. We made progress, I thought, yesterday on this, and I want to have that meeting that we set up. And we will move forward on this.

But I think that we will get this resolved, but I wanted to let the general respond.

And you have both had your word on this now. And we will follow up with these meetings. We will get to the bottom of this.

Thank you very much.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I need you to help me to have a greater confidence in the commitment to maintaining the National Guard and Reserve operational forces.

In your response to my colleague from Guam, the gentlelady from Guam, you said that, in fact, you were not substituting Active units for National Guard units in—but that you were offramping—in the short term, due to sequestration and the Budget Control Act, it is a short-term cost-savings measure.

Yet, General Odierno's response, as well as that April 18th letter, actually says that we are substituting Active Duty forces for National Guard and Reserve forces.

And are you going to—is this something that is happening solely under the Budget Control Act and sequestration, or is this a long-term plan to remove the Guard from traditional Guard missions, such as Kosovo, Sinai, Horn of Africa, as well as the offramping of the Indiana Guard units?

Secretary McHUGH. Yes. When the Guard—the two Indiana Guard units were offramped, they were replaced by Active. If I wasn't clear on that, I apologize. So to the extent that we are using in that one or two instances Active to replace Guard, it is true. But it was specific to the one rotation, or the upcoming rotation for those units into Afghanistan. And it was strictly a budgetary-driven, near-term decision that saved the United States Army over \$80 million, which, frankly, we felt we could better expend.

It was in no way intended to indicate a long-term process. It has nothing to do with any of the other assignments of either Active or Guard units to Kosovo or the Sinai, to the joint task force in Honduras, wherever, but rather a near-term budgetary reality.

As we have said repeatedly, because of the fact that we don't have sufficient funds in our overseas contingency accounts, we have to deal with this \$7.8 billion shortfall.

We can't let those troops go into harm's way without everything they need. And that \$80-plus million savings was just a requirement that had to be done.

But we certainly hope this is a short-term challenge, and we are fully committed to the Operational Reserve.

I would tell you, as we go down to 490 [490,000], with very few exceptions, virtually all of the cuts will come out of the Active Component, not the Reserve Component. So we have increased equipment on hand in both the Guard and Reserve to historic levels. If we have sufficient funding for reset, we will actually take those historic levels even higher.

The Guard and Reserve has been an irreplaceable part of our operational force, and we not just want it in the future, we need it in the future.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

You have to understand my confusion here, because I agree with you and I support you in what you are saying about the short-term stressors that you are under. I just need to be reassured that there is a long-term commitment.

In the discussion with the gentleman from Texas on a regionally aligned brigade, at no point, General, did you mention the work of the State partnership programs and the long-term relationships that are built, not just language, but joint training, mentoring, all of that, that these Guard units have been doing for over 20 years.

And, in fact, the outgoing commander, Admiral Stavridis and General Ham of AFRICOM [Africa Command] command and European Command both said that the State partnership program is one of the best tools that they had in their arsenals.

U.S. Pacific Command, PACOM, uses Hawaii National Guard on a regular basis because of the large percentage of Filipino and Asian members of those Guard units.

So I hope that this is a short-term thing, but I am nervous that we are looking at a long-term trend to push the Guard and Reserve back into a Strategic Reserve.

General ODIERNO. Sure, and I understand everybody's concern here, as we go through this large transition.

I mean, you know, we went from a time of having almost 300,000 soldiers deployed in 2005, and that is slowly coming down, so we have to adjust.

And that is what we are trying to do, adjust over time.

The state partnership program has been fully funded. It was fully funded last year, it is fully funded in this budget, it will continue to be fully funded.

So, you know, I don't even consider that part of regional—force because it is a funded program that we have that is separate for that, although it contributes greatly, as you just pointed out. It is a great program that will—in fact, we have actually asked the Guard to expand the program in the Pacific as we go forward, because we think it is such a program that brings us so much benefit as we execute it.

So I would just say, as we go forward here, we are rebalancing—you know, offramping Active units too, by the way. You know, so everybody is being offramped because requirements are going down.

And so, what we have to do is we are trying to rebalance how we do this best, using the skills of the Active and the Guard and Reserve.

For us to be a great Army that we have proven over the last 12 years, we have to have the right balance between the Active, Guard and Reserve. We need all three. They are all critically important to our success.

And we are dedicated to making sure we keep that right balance as we go forward, both from a size perspective, from an investment perspective, and a use perspective.

And these are just very difficult times right now, as we come out of this. And we are very transparent with the Guard and Army Reserve on how we do this. They are in every meeting with us. We talk very extensively about them.

And I believe they understand where we are heading with this.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you.

I just want to note that a recent report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board found that the life-cycle cost of a National Guardsman is less than one-third of his Active Duty counterpart, because you are not providing for such things as dependents' housing, schooling, health care, once they complete their rotation.

I will be submitting a question for the record on the modernization of the Guard and Reserve forces, especially as an example the pushing to the right of the modernization of Black Hawk fleet and other military equipment as well.

I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Fleming.

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for your service to our country. And I certainly don't envy you in this very difficult fiscal environment that we are in.

As you recall, I represent District 4 of Louisiana. Fort Polk is our Army base there, very important and vital to the Army.

And, General Odierno, you made a—you gave a response, and I appreciate your response, in the Senate this week regarding colocation.

And, as you recall, we have a BCT, as I understand it that is separate its main division. And so, we have, I guess two countervailing issues going on. One is that there is a value to the Army to colocate the BCTs, but at the same time to do so would create additional costs, whereas keeping that BCT at Fort Polk, we have a tremendous investment in MILCON [Military Construction] there, and in fact can actually, from my understanding from the environmental report, can actually accept 1,000 more soldiers than what we have today.

Can you expand on this colocation, how important, how much weight you are going to put on that, versus all the additional costs we may run into?

General ODIERNO. I think the question was colocation with division headquarters. And I think in our weighting, that is not part of the weighting criteria. We would align them to a division one way or another.

What I would say, what I caveat that with, though, is one of the lessons we have learned over the last 10, 12 years, if we want training and readiness oversight from a higher headquarters, it is important that we have that available. It is not absolutely necessary it be colocated with them.

And so that is not an overriding factor as we consider this.

So as we look at the criteria, that is not one of the major criteria we look at. I guess I would just leave it there.

Dr. FLEMING. Okay, so if I understand you correctly, that is not even weighted. You are just saying it is a desirable factor, but not a strong factor in the decisionmaking then?

Okay, great.

And, Secretary McHugh, I think you are privy to recent hearings that we had in the Fort Polk area. You know, Fort Polk was where General Patton set up the original training facilities before World War II. And historically the people of that area have undergone tremendous sacrifice to ensure the success of Army.

And even through the years, and even today, undergoing tremendous sacrifice, but they have done it with 110-percent commitment and love to the Army and to the U.S. military. And I think you saw evidence of this, people turning out in the streets with signs and in support. They are all in for the Army, sir, as you know.

I would love to hear your response and what you observed.

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we like being where we are liked. And there is no question we are liked and more at Fort Polk and the broader Louisiana State. It is a great facility. I have been there. The training that it provides is world-class. It has opportunities for expansion, which, you know, I think will be an important part of the evaluation process as we go forward.

So I just want to assure the good folks of the Fort Polk region that, you know, we are going to take their great support, not just at the public listening meeting, which I understand was almost historic in turn out, but also for their support over the years. And, as I said, we want to be—we like to be where we are liked.

But we do have a military value analysis that we are required to go through in waiting and such. And as I commented earlier, you know, we want to provide that information to the committee so that you can see it. I am—we are in the process right now in part. We are still conducting the listening sessions, but in part, taking the comments from those meetings like at Fort Polk and making sure we are giving full and fair consideration to every reasonable input.

Dr. FLEMING. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. And, again, we know that it is the only Army base that is actively undergoing land acquisition, money that had been programmed years ago, ongoing MILCON, some that is already completed, some that is actually under construction. We are building a school—local community has a tremendous bond issue. They went out in order to rebuild a school that was out in the community, the public works, the infrastructure, all this we are gearing up, even highways to go to Alexandria where we have an airport that is—a support facility for the Army.

So, again, we just thank you for your consideration. Again, we are pumped up. We are all ready for whatever the Army asks us to do. We salute you.

And thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to you, Mr. Secretary and General Odierno to your extraordinary service. I want to thank you for your stark testimony today because I think you—you brought in in better contrast the choices that we have before us and the way that we can really see the seriousness today of the majority and of the Congress is to move—to appoint conferees so we can actually deal with these choices before us. And that is something that, I think, we should be able to do as a result of this testimony today.

I wanted to ask you—you commented earlier about this—the issues of sexual assault, and I appreciate that. And I think that we need to separate the convening authority from other lines of command. But I also think we have to recognize that, you know, what we have had isn't working. And so, we can try and address these issues in multiple ways, and I think there is a very, very serious application of that going on right now. And I greatly appreciate it.

But I think we also have to question why it hasn't been effective in the past. And so, you know, looking at all those issues together, I hope we can come up with a much better way of approaching it.

On the issue of suicide, I know how seriously you take this as well. The National Institute of Mental Health is joining with you, I believe, in a number of studies. And I think if you could speak to what you think will come out of that, that will be helpful to the Army.

But I also know that, you know, we are relying on a lot of our civilian personnel to help us in working with the men and women of the Army and all of our Services. How do you see them also being affected by the sequestration? And is it making a difference in terms of the ability for us to really have an opportunity to see everybody who needs to be seen, whether they even initially volun-

teer or not, to try and have plans so that everybody has a chance to engage on the problems that they may be facing?

Secretary MCHUGH. Great questions, Congresswoman. Let me start with the STARRS [Army Study To Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers] program and the National Institute of Mental Health program. The chief and I were just briefed on the latest update. This was a 5-year longitudinal study. We are actually entering the last year of it now. And this is the point when all of the years and the—actually, millions of data input that has been gathered and collated and fed into the system begin to show us what we hope will be some positive ways forward.

The most likely outcomes, and of course we are waiting for the final determination—the most likely outcomes will be tools by which we can identify earlier the types of people who need particular help, where we can direct commanders' attention to maybe just pay a little bit more attention to a particular soldier—not to harm or to label that soldier, but to really get ahead of the curve, left of the bang, as we say.

And this scientist, the private sector scientists from the various institutes of higher learning that are working with the NIMH [National Institute of Mental Health] are all very, very excited about where this study and its analysis may ultimately take us. We are, as well. So we are still awaiting the final outcomes, but it is starting to take final shape.

I am deeply concerned about sequestration and furloughs on our behavioral health professionals. For the first time in nearly 4 years that I have been Secretary, we have finally actually surpassed the assessed requirement for behavioral health specialists. Those numbers are absolutely critical to make sure that soldiers can get help in a timely fashion, that we have enough of a cadre to conduct the five touch points on behavioral health—pre-, during, post-deployments—that we feel are important.

But, as it stands right now, those civilians will be subjected to the furlough requirements such as, they may be put into place. We have made a request that they be exempted, but that request has not been granted or refused to this point. But if we do have to furlough them, then we are furloughing some extremely important people. I am concerned about the impact of that.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

And, General Odierno, I believe you mentioned that you were putting together the study of paper about how to manage personnel differently? And so, I am looking forward to that. I hope that you will work with us, with Mr. Wilson and myself. And you certainly have a partner in the Secretary, having served on this—as subcommittee chair, as well. That could be very significant.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Heck.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Likewise, I want to thank both you, Mr. Secretary, and General for your service to our troops and our Nation, but I also want to thank the officers that are sitting behind you, and just as importantly if not more importantly, the specialists and staff sergeants sitting off to my left, your right, for their service.

Yes, I don't necessarily share the concerns about moving the Reserve and Guard back to a strategic force. I think when you look at the fact that 85 percent of transportation assets, 75 percent of medical assets, 70 percent of civil affairs and 60 percent of info ops [Information Operations] residing COMPO [Component] 2 and 3 [Army National Guard and Army Reserve, respectively], "Big Army" isn't going to war without us.

So my concern is not us reverting back to an operational force. My concern is, how do we maintain COMPO 2 and 3 as an operational force? And so, we have built an incredible operational force based on over a decade of real-world experience and rotating into the field of battle, incredible training and expanded opportunities, primarily funded through OCO monies.

And so, as we see a welcome drawdown in hostilities, a precipitous falloff in OCO money, obviously already short just this fiscal year, and the swap, no matter how short-term of A.C. [Active Component] units for R.C. units in some rotational deployments, how are we going to maintain that operational capability?

So the Reserve fiscal year 2014—Army Reserve fiscal year 2014 budget request is relatively flat. It is around the area of about \$5 million increase. But yet, in a surge situation, the requirement for apportioned units within the first 60 days, precludes, really, predeployment training to achieve their T-2 operational readiness and deploy.

How are we going to mitigate the risk? That is my question. How do we mitigate the risk? And I know that while the ARFORGEN cycle is supposed to get them from their, you know, reset to training to their ready year, but having lived through the ARFORGEN cycle, it doesn't always work. So how are we going to mitigate the risk so that we maintain this incredible operational capability we built in compo two and three?

General ODIERNO. Well, first, in the units that you outlined there is absolutely correct—the type of units that will be required to report quite quickly. And we have picked those units for a very specific reason because those are much easier to train and maintain capability for a number of reasons in the Guard and Reserve, because a lot of them, their normal jobs they have, equate very quickly to these jobs. And they require specific skills that aren't necessarily complex unit integration skills.

So what we are doing is, we are ensuring that they have the money to train to the level necessary. We work with both the Chief of Army Reserve and the Chief of the Army National Guard to ensure that they have the funding necessary to keep them to the T-2 level, which is what we are aiming for.

So as we build our budgets, we do that in the sense. When we run into more difficult problems, is when you talk about the Brigade Combat Teams, because it takes longer and more money to prepare them. So what we do, is we lead with our Active Brigade Combat Teams and then follow so we give the Reserve and the National Guard brigades more time to train.

And so, that process, I think, is a successful one. And that is the one we continue to move forward with as we go. And I think the way we have this organized, that we believe we are able to fund them at a level that will allow them to sustain a T-2 as



they rotate through this ARFORGEN process. And we are changing it. And we are reviewing it to make the ARFORGEN process more applicable to a more peacetime set or a set to respond to unknown contingencies. And so, we will work our way through that. As they have, say, flatlined the dollars for the Active—the Active Component has actually gone down. So we actually have invested more in them by keeping them on a flatline of capability where the money we are spending to train the Active Components have actually come down in this budget a little bit. That is one—and so, we—that is how we recognize the importance of trying to sustain a level of capability in the Reserve and National Guard in these areas.

Dr. HECK. And I appreciate that, General. I really do. But I can tell you, being in the—from units that are in that Tier 3 because of training, because we are supposedly able to go to war faster, i.e. medical units, you know, on the TDA [Table of Distributions and Allowances] side, my combat medics aren't medics in their day job. And with the increasing requirements to do all of the mandatory trainings on BTA [Battle Training Assembly] weekend, it leaves very little time to get them their medical training and maintain their skills. And with the drawdown on available AT [annual training] days because of budgets, even though it is a Tier 3, I still have concerns that when the balloon goes up my combat medics are going to be able to go out the door and meet that 60-day requirement.

Just to put it on the record.

Thank you again.

I yield back, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General, I am following up on what the Chair actually brought up and that is this balance—the rebalance to Asia-Pacific and how we are also going to maintain your commitment to partner in and around the Middle East.

Now, having said that, on page 10 of your testimony, you also are talking about U.S. Army Pacific elevating to a four-star general headquarters in 2013. And I just would like to say, thank you, because as you probably are very well aware, Senator Inouye—from Hawaii—always wanted a four-star general presence. And it was because irrespective of the air-and-sea comment earlier, general, it is because our allies in the Pacific, our Army and having the same level of command was something of respect for the senator.

And having thanked you for that, my question, though, is, what do you expect by having a four-star general in the Pacific?

How does that change your posture or what are we in Hawaii to expect from having a four-star general there?

Secretary MCHUGH. I will start and then the Chief can fill in the operational realities a little bit better. And first of all, we deeply mourn and miss the good senator. He was a great American, obviously, going back to his sacrifices in World War II, was also a great supporter of all the men and women in uniform. And, you know, he gave us so much. So if this elevation honors him that is cherry on the cake. And so we miss him as I said.

As you noted, Congresswoman, the main objective is to provide our relationships with our 21 of the 27 heads of military structure in the Pacific nations that our Army, the CHODs [Chief of Defense], the chairmen and the highest military officials an equal to talk to in the Army relationships. Everyone talks about land-sea battle, and there is a lot—or air-sea battle, and there is a lot of air and a lot of sea, but there is a lot of land as well.

And one of the objectives of our strategy is not to have to go to war, not to have to encounter conflict, and we think the Army particularly plays an important role in those kinds of activities. We have 24 major engagements throughout the Pacific region. We, unlike some of the other Services, have not cut back on any of those engagements.

And we think given the prevalence of Army forces throughout the Pacific we are going to have a very, as I said in my opening comments, the status as a linchpin in that Pacific—and I can tell you the PACOM commander, Admiral Locklear, is very excited about having Army units return from theater and having them available through our region aligned force and through our State partnership program. For example, Alaska and Mongolia—Alaska National Guard.

So, we think although it may not change and add a lot of buildings and a lot of staff at least in the beginning, you know, it is an important step symbolically to deal with other armies on an equal basis.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

General ODIERNO. Yes, I would just say we have done some reorganization as well. So 8th Army, which has been in Korea, now comes under the U.S. Army Pacific Commander, our forces in Japan. It is a broad responsibility. So we thought it was very important to have a four-star general in there and I just would reemphasize what the Secretary said, the importance of having a four-star general that can regularly meet and build relationships with our key allies and partners throughout the Asia-Pacific is incredibly important.

So we are very happy about this, and on 2 July General Brooks will take over, and we are looking forward to that day.

Ms. HANABUSA. Yes, thank you very much again.

And—I—and you may have to respond in writing to the next question. You know, also as part of your written testimony on page 8 you talk about the future, and you talk about how the mission is going to be able to respond quickly. We have been discussing, really the efficiencies, because of the cut in the budget. So now, my question is, how are you going to prepare for really two major theaters, Asia-Pacific as well as the Middle East?

And, do you believe that the training and-or the ability to be flexible which is paramount in all of your statements, are you going to be able to do that in two very distinct, and in my opinion, separate theaters?

And I am going to be out of time, and so if we could, can we take that for the record?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 110.]

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much, and thank you again for the four-star position.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Roby.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And to Mr. Secretary and General Odierno, thank you so much on behalf of my family for your service to our country and the sacrifices that both you and your family make.

And General Odierno I just want to—my “Thank You” note is in the mail although I am seeing you before you have received it. Thank you so much for coming to Fort Rucker and spending time with our soldiers and their families. It really, really made a deep impression that you were willing to take the time, particularly in light of the fiscal uncertainties that we are facing right now to be with them. So it was a pleasure to see you in Alabama, and feel free to come back any time.

I do want though based on your testimony both on February 13 and in light of us attaching the appropriations bill to the Continuing Resolution and then some of the testimony today out Army aviation—Army-wide to get a better clarification about the impact that, that will have on Fort Rucker this year with their current student load.

Army-wide we keep hearing this number 37,000 and 500, I just want to get clarification from you for the current student load at Rucker this year.

General ODIERNO. Yes, it is going to affect about 500 less pilots coming through Fort Rucker this year than we originally had planned. So we will have to slow down the amount of training that goes on there.

We have mitigated some—it was supposed to actually be higher. We were able to mitigate some of that, but we have had to slow that down. What we don’t want to do is back—have them go there and sit there. So we will have to push that to next fiscal year. And so we are going to have to figure out ways to catch up, which is going to be very difficult over time.

Mrs. ROBY. But does that—just so I understand—does that mean that their student load for this year will be funded and you are going to push it off into the next year?

General ODIERNO. There will be some reduction in this year of the student load.

Mrs. ROBY. But not as much as you initially—

General ODIERNO. Yes, but it is still significant. I mean, it is still about 500 pilots short of what we originally planned.

Mrs. ROBY. Okay, well help me understand, because I guess this is where I am confused a little bit. I mean, our intent in attaching that Continuing Resolution was to give you the flexibility to prioritize and, you know, based on what we know in our current mission, training these combat aviators is definitely a priority and you and I have discussed this on many occasions.

And so if you don’t have the flexibility you need, what do we need to do to get you that flexibility?

General ODIERNO. Well, what has happened is we have used all the authority we have. So DOD [Department of Defense] was given the ability to move \$7.5 billion. So that is between all the Services.

So our portion of that helped us a little bit, but it was not enough to allow us to transfer money in order to help and help to do all the training we had planned for this year. So we are still short about \$12 billion in our own end funds.

So in order to pay for Afghanistan, and to make up for sequestration we still had to make some changes and reductions in our training program, canceling CTC [Combat Training Center] rotations and reducing flying hours, and part of that is sending initial pilots through Rucker.

Now, we hope to get it back up to full speed by next year again. That is the hope, and then try to catch up, but that will depend on what our budget looks like next year.

Mrs. ROBY. Okay, I just want to—and thank you for helping me with that. Yesterday, the *Army Times* reported that the Army is suspending the aviation branch transfer panels indefinitely.

Can you just talk about what that means as it relates to readiness?

General ODIERNO. Yes, I think it is for the rest of this year.

So—again, we don't want to just send people—so a lot of these are ones who are going to be aviators and we don't want to just send them there without a seat. So we are delaying it is really what is going to happen. So we are not going to do it this year. We will—we should be able to implement it again next year where we will start moving them back into aviation if they want to go.

Mrs. ROBY. Okay—

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes, could I just—could I add just—you asked, and thank you for asking, what you might do. Obviously to get the 2014 budget on time would be critical to help take a step back to normalcy in all our training. I have been to Fort Rucker as well and great facility. Obviously our Army Center of Aviation Excellence.

The second thing is we will be sending—the Department will be sending a request over for additional reprogramming, more flexibility. So while that may not solve all our problems either, it would certainly be very, very helpful in allowing us not to take new money, not to add to the deficit or the budget, but rather to move money again and fill some of those gaps that the first passage of H.R. 113 just didn't take us far enough.

Mrs. ROBY. Okay, all right.

Well thank you both again.

And, Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here today.

I appreciate, very much, your—all the work you are doing to help protect our soldiers and our country as we confront very challenging times across the globe and here at home with all the fiscal constraints that we have to deal with.

I know you have heard this from a number of members, I just wanted to touch again upon the issue of sexual assault in the military. I appreciate very much the work the Army has done especially around the special victims units where really cutting-edge

approach is being taken to how one investigates and moves forward with these crimes, and so I want to thank you for that.

But, General Odierno, you also mentioned and I think Secretary McHugh too, that the Army is a profession that is built on the element of trust, and what I have learned as I have spoken with so many victims is that there is a break in that trust on a number of fronts.

So when the crime occurs in the first place, it is a deep affront to the survivors of this. The second affront comes when the commander does not respond appropriately as survivors come forward. The third affront is when those who do come forward sustain professional retaliation, often end up leaving the service, a profession they sought out and hoped to spend their life in, or at least a good number of years, and find themselves leaving.

And then the fourth affront is when the Uniform Code of Military Justice is not seen as dealing fairly with the process of moving forward.

And then the final affront, really, is how the VA deals with this. We are all working on this. I don't really want to go into it anymore, but just to say I have realized it comes at us in a lot of different ways, and there are a lot of different efforts to deal with it, these different pieces of it.

We have a lot of work to do, and I think, as you heard from our ranking member and others, that this is something we just need to stay on top of. And I look forward to continuing to work with you and the other Services as well.

I also want to thank you, General Odierno, for last year coming to join an annual event that I host on Capitol Hill. It was a real honor for my constituents to hear from you. And I have heard back from them how much they appreciated your remarks and continue to appreciate your leadership.

One of the items you raised in your speech, though, remains quite relevant to an issue we have today.

I really continue to be impressed by the efforts that the Army is investing towards energy efficiency. The costs of our dependence on legacy energy sources are very real, and are quite broad.

For example, the Army is still the largest facility energy consumer in the Federal Government, costing billions of dollars each year. Liquid fuel costs alone rose by \$1 billion from fiscal year 2010 to 2011, in part because of the threats posed in the Khyber Pass, which necessitated a costly rerouting of resupply routes into Afghanistan.

I have a question that really touches on a local base. I believe you are both aware of the important work that is being done at the base camp systems integration lab at Fort Devens in my native Massachusetts.

I actually had an opportunity to visit and see how they are partnering with some Natick Soldier Systems, as things are developed at Natick, they are then tested out at Devens.

The important work that is being done there is expected to reduce base camp fuel requirements by 20 percent or more, and water demands by up to 75 percent. It is really impressive to see what is being put in place.

So this facility was established less than 2 years ago. Obviously performing very important work, which gets at the core of force protection and fiscal imperatives, as we strive to attain greater energy efficiency.

I have a simple question: If—can I count on your continuing support for these kinds of vital efforts in a time of fiscal austerity, given the cost savings that are generated as a result of them?

General ODIERNO. You can. And it is not just cost savings that is important, as important as that is. And I have been to Natick as well. It is just amazing work.

But it is also soldier's lives. The less power we have to transport into a theater, the fewer times we have to mount a convoy to bring water and fuel around, those are saved American lives.

And so, we view it from both an economic but as well as a soldier-safety perspective, and we think it just makes good fiscal as well as good administrative sense.

Ms. TSONGAS. And you lead the way for the country in a lot of different ways, in terms of just the kinds of things you develop as a result of this investment.

General ODIERNO. We like doing that too. Absolutely.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I certainly want to thank the Secretary and the general for taking so much time out of their day to be here. We appreciate it.

And, General, I really want to thank you for your service and for your leadership. I will tell you that my sons and their units refer to you as "General O," with great respect and honor.

So saying that—and I have three sons that currently serve, two Active Duty and one in the Army National Guard as a pilot, just recently graduated last week from Fort Rucker.

But I am concerned, obviously, as we reshape our Army, particularly as we have just fought, you know, an irregular warfare, and now we have challenges out there, obviously, on the regular side too.

And as we have more emphasis placed on our SOF [Special Operations Forces] units, how is that going to affect our ability in general to respond to those issues, like South Korea versus North Korea?

General ODIERNO. What we have done is—I am very pleased with the innovation we have shown in developing what we call our decisive action rotations and capability that we are going to develop in the future.

We have developed a very complex scenario, both the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] at Fort Polk and NTC [National Training Center], in California, that will outline what I think is the future environment, which will be a combination of counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, as well as combined arms high-end maneuver.

We think that is the environment that we are going to be asked to deal with.

So it is a complex scenario that will cause our leaders at all levels to deal with how they maneuver, how they conduct combined

arms, but also have to do it in a environment that would require some stability operations and counterinsurgency work as well. And that is how we see the future.

So we have developed our rotations in this way. So our home station training will start to get focused—as we get more units coming out of Afghanistan, our home station training will focus here. Then when they go to their training center rotations to be certified, they will be focused in these areas.

And that will enable them to have the capability that is necessary to fight, whether it is in South Korea or somewhere in the Middle East or somewhere else around the world.

Because we think it will be a very complex environment. And I am very pleased with how we develop these scenarios.

We have done three or four of these rotations so far, and they have been very eye-opening for us, in terms of that we have to get back to some of our basic combined-arms skills, but also the complexity of the environment that the commander has got to operate in.

So I think we have got that about right. We will continue to adjust it as we go. And that will be the basis of us developing this capability. That is why it is so disappointing for us that we had to cancel these rotations this year, because they were going to be the beginning of us rebuilding some of this capability that we think we are going to have in the future.

And because we had to cancel these rotations, we have lost an opportunity to begin this adjustment and really regenerating our readiness.

Mr. NUGENT. Having a son that just returned from NTC about a month or so ago, you—I think it would be great for members of Congress to actually go there to see the training cycle, but, more importantly, our equipment.

You know, after 10 years, 12 years of war, our equipment has obviously taken a beating. And I know that your position in regards to making sure—and both you and the Secretary—making sure that our kids have the equipment and the training necessary to survive any position that we put them in as a nation to defend this country, are we learning—and I appreciate what you just said about the combined arms aspect, because one of them is a field artillery unit, with the heavy brigade, with the 1st Infantry.

But as we put our equipment through the paces, are we seeing that, you know, the effects of this lengthy, lengthy combat that we have involved in on our equipment, particularly the readiness of that equipment?

General ODIERNO. That is why the reset is so important. Every piece of equipment that has been either in Iraq or Afghanistan is going through a complete reset program, which ensures that it is at the level necessary for us to take it forward and use it and modernize it.

So I feel comfortable, as long as we are able to get all this equipment through this reset program.

Mr. NUGENT. Have we been able to do that?

General ODIERNO. Up until now, we have. And so, the concern is that we have to delay that a bit, and that is why we need to have continued OCO funding about three years after we come out

of Afghanistan, to ensure we can reset the final pieces of equipment that are coming out of Afghanistan.

Mr. NUGENT. Well, my time is just about to expire.

And I once again want to thank both of you for your service and particularly to our Army. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Veasey.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask either gentleman that is here today about the helicopters. One of the things that sort of spurred my interest in Army helicopters is reading more about how more when we went into Vietnam in 1965 and I guess shortly after that you all introduced the Kiowa Warrior, and wanted to know about where that is at right now.

I know there have been many extensions and planned replacements of the Comanche and the armed reconnaissance helicopters, and that some of them have been even delayed and canceled.

I didn't know if you can just give me an update on the Army's modernization and upgrade plans for the Kiowa that is served really as the workhorse for the Army for quite some time now.

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes, the Kiowa Warrior has been an amazing workhorse. And we are deeply fortunate to have had it to help our soldiers in theater.

The fact of the matter is, though, it is a 40-plus year platform and it really is reaching the limits of its life extension capabilities.

We are currently going through an analysis for consideration of the development of a new Armed Aerial Scout. We recently had a volunteer flight demonstration program, where I believe five manufacturers provided airframes which Army pilots tested to try to see if the capability extensions were extant in those platforms, so that, you know, we could take the next step in the development of a new Armed Aerial Scout.

The early assessments on that volunteer flight demonstration was that, you know, insufficient and generational-type progress was just not there in those frames.

So in the interim, as we continue to pursue the potential paths for the development of an AAS [Armed Aerial Scout], we are going through a continued upgrade, called a CASUP [Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program], the cockpit and instrumentation upgrades for the Kiowa. That will bring it really to pretty much the life extension of its usefulness.

But we will keep it relevant to the fight into the 2030s, but we continue to be very interested in developing that next Armed Aerial Scout platform.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you.

General ODIERNO. If I could just add, we learned at the end of—as we used in Afghanistan, very successful, but we are starting to see some of the limitations that we have with the Kiowa in terms of power, in terms of its digital capability, which is what the Secretary just talked about, in terms of upgrading the cockpit.

So the decision we are going to have to make here is do we think technology is far enough along that it can really provide us a generational change in the Kiowa or do we have to reinvest in the Kiowa and wait for the technology that can result as a generational change in the Armed Aerial Scout?



And that is the decision we are going to have to make here pretty soon, as we go forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Odierno and Secretary McHugh, thank you so much, both of you, for your service to our country.

My first question—well, a statement, and that is that I hope you continue the practice of keeping our wounded warriors on Active Duty for their rehabilitation. I think that is a very significant change. My father was a career soldier. I was in the Army. And I volunteered as a teenager during the Vietnam War in an Army hospital.

And it—the morale was bad. Once they were stabilized there, they were sent to the VA facilities. And unfortunately, they were often substandard, and felt that they were abandoned by the Army. And I think now when I go to Bethesda and I meet with our wounded warriors, and I am glad to say also that the casualty rate is down. But the—in terms of rehabilitation, the numbers are still strong, but they are receiving great care.

And I am a subcommittee chairman in Veterans' Affairs and I clearly want to improve the quality of the care there. But it is not where it is where I am confident that they are going to get the same quality of care that they do right now at Bethesda and other facilities across this country. So, obviously, I want to see you continue that particular policy.

The second issue is that the base realignment closure commission—I wondered if you could tell me what you think the savings are to that; if you feel that we have surplus capacity in terms of facilities inside the continental United States. I wondered if you could answer that?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we have not done any current analysis, and previous NDAA's [National Defense Authorization Act] have precluded us from using funds to do that. And, you know, we have respected that. But if you go back to the last known assessment of excess capacity in the Army, I believe it is 2004, it shows us to have about 20-percent excess capacity.

I think it is fair to assume in those ensuing 8-plus years that that excess capacity has grown. And it is certainly from our view going to grow even more as we come down to 490,000 end strength within the Active Component. So, I think the judgment that we have is that, believe me, having sat through three BRAC rounds on this committee for 17 years, not something that is easy to do, but in these particularly challenging times, it is important for us to the next BRAC round—this budget asks for one in 2015—earlier, rather than later so we can begin to receive savings as quickly as possible. But that is pretty much where we are at this moment.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Well, my last issue is—concerns that fact that we are inevitably shifting our Guard and Reserve from an Operational to a Strategic Reserve. I think that will simply happen over time. We have drawn down in Iraq. We are drawing down in Afghanistan.

And my concern—I served in both the Army and the Marine Corps and their respective Reserve Components—as that—as time

elapses, that the readiness declines in the Guard and Reserve. And it may take—we may need to rethink the model that we have for the Guard and Reserve right now in terms of training requirements. Instead of going back—if we go back to that 2 weeks a year or one weekend a month, that may not do it.

And so—and I look back at the First Gulf War where we had units reporting in in the Guard and the Reserve that were not ready to be deployed. And we can never be in that situation again. I think that they are at a razor's edge right now in terms of capability, given all the deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I am worried that we may lose that over time.

And maybe, General Odierno, I am wondering if you could address that?

General ODIERNO. Well, Congressman, unfortunately, I mean, I agree with everything you have said. And it is going to degrade to some extent. There is no way that we can keep it at the level that it is been just because of the number of deployments. But we have got to come up with ways to do it better than we did before.

And I think we have to look at different ways. Maybe there are different ways to look at how we divide up that 39 days a year that they have available for them to train. And so we will work with the National Guard to take a look at that, because we have to figure this out. And we are trying to do it through this Army force generation process. During certain times, we will increase the number of days for certain years. We are committed to that.

I am not sure that is enough. So we will continue to work with the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve to come up with unique ways to try to figure out how we best utilize those 39 days. It is so hard within that short period of time to maintain the level of readiness. And we have just got to figure out how we best utilize and most efficiently utilize that time we are given.

Because one thing I tell everybody, in the last 12 years we have proven why exactly we need a National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. They are critical to everything that we do. This balance of Active, Guard, Reserve is critical to us as we move forward, and that will not change. And this is not about one or the other. It is about having that full range of capability that we need.

So, we are committed to that and we have got to come up with the right solutions as we go forward. And we look forward to working with you on that as we go forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you for your service. And I personally want to thank both of you for taking the time to come down to Anniston Army Depot.

Mr. Secretary, I was glad I could work it out to be there with you when you came.

And General, I am sorry I was up here tending to this business when you visited, but it was great for you all to do that. It means a lot to those folks when you come by and look at what great work they do.

A couple of weeks ago when the Secretary of Defense was here, I asked him about the furloughs, if they would apply to the Anniston Army Depot, given that the fund that pays for that work is fully funded. And they just—they didn't know at that time.

Are you all any further along at knowing as to whether or not there are going to be furloughs at the depot?

Secretary MCHUGH. To my knowledge, a final decision has not been made. Now, they are funded through a—

Mr. ROGERS. Working Capital Fund.

Secretary MCHUGH. But the comptroller—OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Comptroller Bob Hale has said that there is a requirement that that stay fully funded, so they are not sure right now how that would be assessed. If they have actually made a final determination, I am not aware of it as I sit here.

General ODIERNO. Yes, I think there is a combination of both. You have some that are funded by Working Capital Fund. You have some that are funded by other means. So it is unclear yet what the status of working capital—we are still waiting on an interpretation of that, frankly. So I guess we can't give you a better answer than what they gave you.

Mr. ROGERS. If they were to have to experience furloughs, what would that do to your readiness?

General ODIERNO. Well, it is going to decrease our equipment on-hand readiness because it is going to delay equipment getting sent back to the units. And so it is problematic for us.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, shifting gears, I have spoken to both of you all over the last couple of years about my support for the double v-hull Stryker and the work out there. And I am very proud that you all supported the procurement of a 3rd Brigade in your budget request.

What about the balance of the Strykers that we have got? Are you looking at putting double v-hulls on them?

General ODIERNO. I think initially we believe we have a requirement for three brigades. I think as we move forward, if we have the dollars and how we plan on using the Stryker in the future, we will certainly take a look at whether we want to do it across the entire fleet. It has proven to be pretty successful as we have used it in Afghanistan.

Right now, we think our requirement is three, but we will always continue to assess that as we go forward. The Stryker is going to maintain itself as a pretty significant part of our capability as we go forward.

Secretary MCHUGH. Could I?

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly.

Secretary MCHUGH. Just to the effectiveness of the Stryker, and I came across these datapoints. We have had just about between 100 and 120 significant events in Afghanistan with a double v-hull Stryker. And the vast, vast, vast majority of soldiers have walked away safely because of the capabilities that upgrade has brought.

So, it has been a tremendous success and it has been a real lifesaver for us.

Mr. ROGERS. I agree.

Lastly, I want to talk to you about the Abrams tank. The powertrain has been identified by the Army as one of the critical

upgrades required for the life-extension of the Abrams tank to 2045. Two years ago, Mr. Secretary, you testified that 60 percent of the maintenance cost for the Abrams tank is related to the engine and transmission, and by improving that powertrain, the Army would achieve 17 percent improvement in fuel efficiency.

In fiscal year 2012, this committee supported a \$47.8 million re-programming request from the Army that adopted commercial base improvements to insert a new dual configurable compressor that would be integrated within the Total Engine Revitalization Program. The committee understands this upgrade provides the Army with \$1.6 billion in maintenance and fuel savings, as well as will drive additional workload in the Anniston Army Depot.

What is the funding status of this program for fiscal year 2013 enacted budget and for the 2014 proposed budget?

Secretary MCHUGH. The FEI [Fuel Efficiency Initiative] has not been funded in the 2014. And the current funds are, frankly, unexecutable against the original program because we are using it to pay off our funding shortages. That was a very hard decision. The comments I made for the record 2 years ago were actually correct, and this was a program we wanted to follow up, but we find it impossible under the current fiscal conditions.

I will say with regard to Anniston in the PB [President's Budget] 2014, we have got just under \$8 million for part of the Tiger program, the engine upgrades that will be done at Anniston, and about \$178 million total in modernization. So we are not abandoning Anniston in terms of the Abrams, but the FEI program looks under some duress.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you both for your service.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

That concludes the questioning.

Thank you, again, gentlemen, for your service. Thank you for being here today.

And that will conclude this session. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

---

---

# **A P P E N D I X**

APRIL 25, 2013

---

---



---

---

**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

APRIL 25, 2013

---

---





**Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon**  
**Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization**  
**Budget Request from the Department of the Army**  
**April 25, 2013**

Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the President’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget request for the Department of the Army. I am pleased to welcome Secretary John McHugh and General Ray Odierno. It’s great to see you both again and thank you for your continued service. Our Nation is very fortunate to have you two leading our Army during these challenging times.

I note that in your written testimony you state that “America’s Army is the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led fighting force in the world, providing a credible and capable instrument of national power.” I absolutely agree with you, but what we need your help with is understanding the risks associated with the Army’s continued ability to meet the national security needs of this Nation, and the critical assumptions behind these risks.

For example, we hope to learn more about the Army’s plans to reduce the size of its force. With last year’s budget request, based on the Budget Control Act, the Army announced that it would reduce end strength to 490,000 Active Duty soldiers, the minimum required to accomplish national security requirements. The draw-down would require the Army to go from 45 Active Duty Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to 37. To date, of the 8 BCTs that will be deactivated, we have been told that 2 of the 8 will be Armor BCTs. We have also been told that the Army plans on adding a 3rd maneuver battalion to each Active Component Armor and Infantry BCT. It is our understanding that as a result of adding a 3rd maneuver battalion, the total number of Active Component BCTs will go to some number below 37 BCTs.

However, it is a year later and we still do not know how many BCTs the Army plans on drawing down to or where the Army will take the BCTs from. Equally important, we do not know what types of BCTs the Army thinks it needs. This includes Armor, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs. I know that we are in difficult times and that hard choices must be made. I hope that your testimony today will highlight areas of greatest risk and help this committee and others in Congress make the right choices. Again, thank you both for your continued service to our Nation. I look forward to your testimony.

**Statement of Hon. Adam Smith**  
**Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization**  
**Budget Request from the Department of the Army**  
**April 25, 2013**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh and General Odierno.

The President's budget proposal represents a responsible attempt to forge a grand bargain on the budget. The President proposed an "all of the above" deficit reduction strategy, dealing with revenues, entitlements, and discretionary spending, including defense spending, to deal with our fiscal problems. As a member who, with many others around here, has long supported a comprehensive, balanced approach, I am pleased that the President adopted this course of action. Everyone here, I am sure, hopes that a budget deal can be reached, eliminating the damaging effects of sequestration on critical national interests and, especially in the context of today's hearing, national security.

Some on this committee have attacked the President's proposal to reduce the defense budget by roughly \$119 billion between fiscal years 2017 and 2023. As we discuss potential solutions to our budgetary problems, it is important to keep a few things in mind. First, the proposed defense spending reductions would be far less painful than what the Department would absorb under sequestration. The President's budget would allow future Congresses and Administrations to determine where the cuts come from and how they would be implemented, rather than deal with indiscriminate cuts through sequestration. Moreover, the proposed \$119 billion is roughly a quarter of the amount that would be sequestered from the defense budget through fiscal year 2021. Many on this committee voted for the Budget Control Act, which created sequestration, and this committee must play an active role in removing the indiscriminate cuts.

The Continuing Resolution and then sequestration have caused and are causing real damage to the Army this year. So far this year, the Army has had to cancel seven training events at the National Training Center and the Joint National Training Center. These training events are vital to the effort to return the Army to full-spectrum combat capability after a decade of conducting counterinsurgency operations. I am sure our witnesses can highlight other cases. We need to be perfectly clear with ourselves and the American people; standing down these capabilities causes real damage to our readiness and will cost more to recreate in the future than it will save in the short term. We owe it to our brave men and women in uniform, our civilian Government workers, the American people, and ourselves to fix sequestration this year and reach a budget agreement.

While I hope we can reach an agreement that provides stability for the U.S. budget in the future and in particular the defense budget, I don't think we can fool ourselves that the overall defense budget is going up. Under any scenario, we are not going to be spending as much on defense as was planned 2 or 3 years ago. While some members of this committee like to talk about defense strategies unconstrained by resources, that option is off the table; the Budget Control Act, which many on this committee voted for, capped resources. Our challenge now is to make those hard choices, in strategy, in support costs, in shared sacrifices, that allow us to live within our means.

We are all going to have to look broadly to save enough money and position ourselves for the future—we in Congress, in conjunction with our witnesses here, should be considering how to reduce bureaucracy, how to further reform acquisition processes, and where we can stop spending on legacy programs that provide little useful capability at high costs. The Department has asked to close excess infrastructure, and we should listen. We have gotten used to nearly unlimited resources to fight the wars of the last ten years, but that time is over. Funding cuts are painful, but they also provide the opportunity for us to set up the Army for the future and to bring some rationality to the defense budget.

I look forward to working with the two witnesses here today, and with the other members of this Committee, on exactly these issues in the coming years.

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH  
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

AND

GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 113<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS

ON THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

APRIL 23, 2013

NOT FOR PUBLICATION  
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

**STATEMENT BY  
THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH  
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
AND  
GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

**Introduction**

The Army has been in a state of continuous war for the past twelve years, the longest in our Nation's history. More than 168,000 Soldiers are deployed or forward stationed in nearly 150 countries worldwide. The global security environment points to further instability, and the Army remains a key guardian of our national security.

The Army's ability to perform this vital role, and field a ready and capable force that meets mission requirements, has been placed at risk by fiscal challenges in FY13. The combined effects of funding reductions due to sequestration, the fiscal uncertainty of continuing resolutions and emerging shortfalls in Overseas Contingency Operations funding has significantly and rapidly degraded Army readiness, which will translate directly into FY 14 and beyond. This lack of predictability makes it difficult to address the posture of the Army in FY 14 with certainty and specificity. However, this document will address some of the potential long term effects that fiscal uncertainty will have on the Army.

### Landpower for the Nation

America's Army is the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led fighting force in the world, providing a credible and capable instrument of national power. Army forces play a fundamental role in all but one of the missions specified by the defense strategic guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. The Army's ability to provide strategic landpower for the Nation makes it uniquely suited to meet these requirements. Army forces are tailorable and scalable to meet mission requirements. The Army's ability to rapidly deploy task organized forces, from company to corps level over extended distances, sustain them and deliver precise, discriminate results is unmatched. Highly ready, responsive and capable ground forces prevent conflict through deterrence, by shaping Combatant Commanders' operational environment and, when necessary, winning the Nation's wars.

#### Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces

From *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*.

In all but one mission – maintain a nuclear deterrent – the Army is a vital contributor to the Joint Force:

- Counter terrorism and irregular warfare.
- Deter and defeat aggression.
- Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges.
- Counter weapons of mass destruction.
- Operate effectively in cyberspace.
- Operate effectively in space.
- Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
- Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities.
- Provide a stabilizing presence.
- Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations.
- Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

### Fiscal Challenges

The Budget Control Act of 2011 imposed caps on discretionary spending that required a \$487 billion reduction in planned defense spending over 10 years. As a result of these spending cuts and in line with the defense strategic guidance announced in January 2012, we are reducing Active Army end strength from a wartime high of about 570,000 to 490,000, the Army National Guard from 358,200 to 350,000, the Army Reserve from 206,000 to 205,000 and the Civilian workforce from 272,000 to 255,000.


all by the end of FY 17. These reductions, which began in FY 12, represent a net loss of 106,000 Soldier and Civilian positions.

The implementation of sequestration in FY 13 created a significant shortfall in Army funding, estimated at \$7.6 billion for the remaining months of the fiscal year, which includes nearly \$5.5 billion in the Operation and Maintenance account for active and reserve component forces. We also face up to a \$7.8 billion shortfall in Overseas Contingency Operations funding due to increasing costs related to the war in Afghanistan. The sharp decline over a short period of time significantly impacts readiness which will cascade into the next fiscal year and beyond.

The President's Budget includes balanced deficit reduction proposals that allow Congress to replace and repeal the sequester-related reductions required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 through FY 2021. In the absence of such an agreement, the Army may not be able to execute the current defense strategic guidance as planned. This may compel actions that break faith with our Soldiers, Civilians and Families. Full implementation of sequestration and its associated outyear budget cuts will require further force structure reductions that will greatly increase strategic risk. To maintain balance between force structure, readiness and modernization, the Army may have to reduce at least 100,000 additional personnel across the Total Force – the Active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. When coupled with previously planned cuts to end strength, the Army could lose up to 200,000 Soldiers over the next ten years. If steep cuts are required in FY 14 and beyond, this will create imbalance and significantly compound risk. It will cause a disproportionate investment across manpower, operations and maintenance, modernization and procurement, challenging our ability to sustain appropriate readiness in the near term in support of our current defense strategy.

To some extent, the impact of spending reductions can be mitigated if funding is timely and predictable, and cuts are back-loaded, enabling the Army to plan, resource and manage the programs that yield a highly trained and ready force. Continued fiscal uncertainty, on the other hand, poses considerable risk to our ability to maintain a ready force. Each continuing resolution prevents new starts for needed programs, limits reprogramming actions, creates inefficiency and often results in wasteful funding for accounts that we no longer want or need. Resource predictability affords the Army the opportunity to plan and shape the Army's force for the future within identified budgetary constraints.

The FY 14 Budget is designed to meet current operational requirements and allows us to build an Army to meet our future needs by balancing force structure, readiness and modernization. It fully supports the Army's central role in the defense strategic guidance. The budget request funds balanced readiness across the Total Force while retaining agility and capacity. It supports reset and replacement of battle-damaged equipment, as well as modernization priorities. A 4 percent reduction from the FY 13 Base Budget request reflects the Army's acceptance of measured risk, accommodating a tightening fiscal environment.





**America's Army Today**

Beyond combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army conducts many missions worldwide in support of national security objectives, as well as within the United States in support of civil authorities. The Total Force provides the foundation for Joint operations. Demand for Army forces in Afghanistan will continue to decrease. However, the requirement for strategic landpower capable of worldwide deployment will endure.

**Operations Around the World**

The Army has nearly 80,000 Soldiers currently committed to operations around the world – in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Philippines, Horn of Africa, Turkey, Sinai Peninsula and throughout the Middle East. Forward-stationed Army forces, in the Republic of Korea, Japan, Europe and elsewhere, provide Geographic Combatant Commands with an unparalleled capability to prevent conflict, shape the environment and, if necessary, win decisively. About 77,000 Soldiers are postured to support operations and engagements in the Asia-Pacific region. During 2012, these Soldiers participated in security cooperation engagements in 23 countries across the Pacific. Reductions to our force posture in Europe are underway, but a significant Army presence and commitment remains. Army forces in Europe remain a critical source of timely operational and logistical support for operations in other theaters, such as Southwest Asia and Africa. The long-term impacts of sequestration and the associated outyear reductions, particularly to force structure and readiness, threaten the Army's ability to provide trained and ready forces to perform these enduring and vital missions.

### **Operations in Afghanistan**

The approximately 60,000 Soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, in both conventional and special operations units, remain our top priority. The Army provides the corps-level headquarters that form the basic structures for conventional forces in the theater, and provides two division-level headquarters that control the majority of operational activities in the country. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force is built on a foundation of an Army Special Forces Group. The majority of combat units in theater are U.S. Army, and some of the most critical enablers such as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles and route clearance units are almost exclusively U.S. Army. The critical transition to Afghan leadership in security is being enabled by thousands of Army NCOs, Officers and Soldiers who have been re-missioned to advise and assist the increasingly capable Afghan National Security Forces. The Army also provides essential logistics capabilities that sustain the land-locked Afghan theater. In fact, only the Army can provide the theater logistics, transportation, medical and communications infrastructure necessary to support operations of this size, complexity and duration. The Army has also begun the challenging task of equipment and materiel retrograde and refit from Afghanistan. It is a daunting task by virtue of the sheer volume of the equipment that must be brought home as well; this challenge is compounded by harsh geography, adverse weather and ongoing combat operations. Funding shortfalls threaten to further extend the timeline and increase overall costs.

### **Missions as a Member of the Joint Force**

The Army provides a wide range of capabilities as an indispensable member of the Joint Force. Every day, the Army maintains deployable contingency forces, employs forward-based capabilities, delivers humanitarian assistance and conducts multilateral exercises with partners and allies. The Army maintains a Global Response Force at constant high readiness providing the Nation its only rapid response, inland forcible entry capability for unforeseen contingencies. Army forces set theaters for the Combatant Commanders maintaining constantly the critical logistical, communications,

intelligence, medical and inland ground transportation infrastructure to support all plans and contingencies. We maintain partner relationships that ensure access to critical regions around the world. Army commanders and headquarters lead Joint Task Forces, plan operations and exercise mission command of units across the full range of military operations. Army units provide space, air and missile defense capabilities for the Joint Force. We build and operate the space and terrestrial communication networks that connect our own units, the Joint community, and interagency and multinational partners. Soldiers provide essential logistics infrastructure, delivering food, fuel, ammunition, materiel and medical support that sustain Joint operations ranging from combat to humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Army collects and analyzes the intelligence that informs our actions and measures our progress, and provides the majority of the forces in U.S. Special Operations Command.

#### **Missions at Home and Support of Civil Authorities**

The Total Force is prepared to defend the Homeland and routinely conducts critical Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations. As this past year demonstrated through wildland fires, two major Hurricanes (Isaac and Sandy), floods in the heartland and multiple winter storm emergencies, the Army is always ready to respond to the call of its citizens. The Army does so by performing a wide range of complex tasks in support of civil authorities during natural and man-made disasters, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear incidents, and for counterdrug operations within each State, as well as along the approaches to the United States. After Hurricane Sandy struck the eastern United States, more than 22,000 active and reserve component Soldiers, which included over 10,000 Army National Guard Soldiers from 19 states, provided immediate and sustained relief. Army Corps of Engineers Soldiers and Civilians pumped more than 475 million gallons of water from the New York City subway system and all tunnels connecting Manhattan.

#### **The Army Vision**

The Army is **regionally engaged and globally responsive**; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape and Win.

#### **The Army for the Future**

The Army for the future will feature regionally aligned and mission-tailored forces designed to respond to combatant commander requirements to prevent conflict, shape the strategic environment and, when necessary, win decisively. Maintaining credible strategic landpower requires the Army to continually assess and refine how we operate, manage our human capital and increase our capabilities, all while mitigating the effects of significant reductions in funding. We must exploit our advantages in some key areas such as leader development; strategic, operational and tactical mobility; command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) and logistics. As we transition over the next five to ten years, this effort will be underpinned by a strong institutional Army. This institutional Army mans, trains, equips, deploys and ensures the readiness of all Army forces. It generates the concepts and doctrine that guides the way we operate. It runs the professional military education system, that provides our country unparalleled thinkers and leaders at the tactical operational and strategic levels. It recruits our Soldiers and prepares them for military services. It is the foundation upon which readiness is built, enabling the operational Army to provide landpower capability to the combatant commander. The institutional Army takes a deep look at the future strategic environment to formulate concepts and plans for the best mix of capabilities to meet the Nation's land warfare challenge – the right skills, right doctrine, right equipment and the right qualities in our adaptive leaders.

The Army must strike a balance between force structure, readiness and modernization, in a manner that is mindful of fiscal realities yet also provides the Nation with optimized but capable landpower. The decisions we have made in response to FY 13 budget reductions will have far reaching impacts on the Army. Clear priorities guided these decisions. All Soldiers meeting operational requirements – such as those deployed to Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Horn of Africa or forward stationed in the Republic of Korea – will be prepared and ready. We will fund programs related to Wounded Warrior care. Finally, we will determine whether we have sufficient funds to continue training the units that meet our Global Response Force requirements. The rest of the Army, however, will experience significant training and sustainment shortfalls that will impact readiness this year and will be felt for years to come. The Army's ability to perform its missions, as directed in the defense strategic guidance, will inevitably be degraded.

#### **Globally Responsive, Regionally Engaged Strategic Land Forces**

Regional alignment will provide Geographic Combatant Commands with mission-trained and regionally focused forces that are responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation activities. Regionally aligned forces are drawn from the Total Force, which includes Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve capabilities. Aligned Corps and Divisions will provide Joint Task Force capability to every Geographic Combatant Command. Through regional alignment, the Army will maintain its warfighting skills and complement these skills with language, regional expertise and cultural training. For example, 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, is aligned with U.S. Africa Command for FY 13. In support of U.S. Africa Command objectives, the brigade will conduct engagement activities in 34 African nations over the coming year.

Regionally aligned, mission tailored forces play an essential role in the defense strategic guidance, which rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region while maintaining our commitment to partners in and around the Middle East. Lessening demand for forces in Afghanistan allows our aligned units in the Asia-Pacific theater to refocus on supporting U.S. Pacific Command's objectives. In addition, U.S. Army Pacific will be elevated to a four-star headquarters in 2013. I Corps, stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, is developing Joint Task Force command capability, which will provide a deployable headquarters that can meet contingencies across the full range of military operations. These initiatives will enhance the capability and responsiveness of our forces. However, the training shortfalls and readiness impacts of sequestration places the Army's ability to provide these critical capabilities at risk.

#### **Training for Operational Adaptability**

In recent years the Army has deliberately focused training on counterinsurgency and stability operations to support requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will build upon that expertise while transitioning to a more versatile Army, with operationally adaptable land forces that will take on a broader range of missions in support of the national defense strategy. Innovative training methods produce ready and responsive forces while optimizing our resources. Army units train at Combat Training Centers, while deployed and at home station. Live, virtual and constructive training enables Army commanders to conduct multi-echelon events in a complex environment at home station. The Army's Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), which has been incorporated by each of our three maneuver Combat Training Centers, creates a realistic training environment that includes Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational partners against a wide range of opportunistic threats.

Sequestration has had an immediate impact on the Army's ability to train at every level – individual Soldier, Brigade Combat Team and deployable headquarters. We were forced to cancel FY 13 Initial Entry Training (IET) for more than 2,300 Military

Intelligence Soldiers, and we may have to cancel up to 10 Field Artillery IET classes, which would affect over 200 Soldiers. We may also be forced to cancel all but 2 of the remaining FY13 brigade-level Decisive Action rotations at our Maneuver Combat Training Centers unless additional funds become available. Training in FY14 and beyond remains at risk as well. With sequestration, the Army will not be able to fully train our Soldiers, whether through professional military education or collective unit training, in a way that enables them to operate successfully in a complex environment across the full range of military operations. The long-term readiness impacts of the resulting deficit in trained forces will jeopardize the Army's ability to meet war plan requirements.

### **People**

The Soldiers of our all-volunteer force are the Army's greatest strategic asset. These professional men and women provide depth and versatility throughout the Total Force – the Active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. As the Army gets smaller, it becomes even more important that we retain and recruit only the highest quality Soldiers. With the support of Congress, we will maintain a military pay and benefits package – to include affordable, high-quality health care – that acknowledges the burdens and sacrifice of service while understanding our future fiscal environment. During 2012, 96 percent of the Army's recruits were high school graduates, exceeding the goal of 90 percent. The FY 12 active component recruiting effort produced the highest quality enlisted recruits in our history, based on test scores and waivers issued. We are also on track to sustain the high retention rate of the past 3 years. While the Army draws down, it is important that we do so at a pace that will allow us to continue to recruit and retain these high quality Soldiers. A precipitous drawdown, which may be necessary if sequestration and associated reductions in budgetary caps are fully implemented over the coming years, will have lasting impacts on the quality of the force.

The Army is committed to ensuring that female Soldiers are provided career opportunities that enable them to reach their highest potential while enhancing overall Army readiness. Over the last year, the Army opened more than 13,000 positions to women. In January 2013, the Department of Defense rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, thus enabling the elimination of unnecessary gender-based restrictions for assignment. The Army is currently developing, reviewing and validating occupational standards, with the aim of fully integrating women into occupational fields to the maximum extent possible. We are proceeding in a deliberate, measured and responsible way that preserves unit readiness, cohesion and morale.

### ***Ready and Resilient***

Caring for the Army means doing our best to prepare Soldiers, Civilians and Families for the rigors of Army life. The Army remains committed to providing Soldiers and Families with a quality of life commensurate with their service. We continue to review our investments and eliminate redundant and poor performing programs. The Army will make every effort to protect essential Army Family Programs, but they will be unavoidably affected by workforce reductions, cuts to base sustainment funding and the elimination of contracts.

The Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign enhances readiness for the Total Force by tailoring prevention and response measures to promote physical and mental fitness, emotional stability, personal growth and dignity and respect for all. An integral part of this campaign is the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness Program, which strengthens Soldiers, Family members and Army Civilians by addressing physical, emotional, family, spiritual and social fitness collectively. Healthy Soldiers, Families and Civilians perform better, are more resilient and improve unit readiness.



The challenges associated with suicide directly affect the force. It is a complex phenomenon that reflects broader societal problems and defies easy solutions. To better understand psychological health issues, the Army has partnered with a number of agencies to assess mental health risk and help commanders effectively address this persistent problem. In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the Army is examining risk and resilience factors among Soldiers in the largest behavioral health study of its kind ever undertaken. The study will develop data-driven methods to reduce or prevent suicide behaviors and improve Soldiers' overall mental health. The objective is to identify the most important risk and protective factors, and then act on them. Programs that improve Soldier and Family access to care, while reducing stigma, are essential to our efforts. The Embedded Behavioral Health program, which is being established for all operational units in the Active Army, is a leading example of how we are redesigning behavioral health services to improve the care that our Soldiers receive.

The Army is committed to providing quality care for our wounded, ill and injured Soldiers and their Families. During 2012, six new warrior transition complexes were completed, which consist of barracks, administrative facilities and a Soldier and Family Assistance Center. Medical innovation and groundbreaking research in areas such as traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder are helping us improve the care we provide our wounded Soldiers. Our command climate must foster an environment in which Soldiers can seek assistance without stigma.

#### ***Sexual Harassment / Assault Response and Prevention Program***

The Army continues to employ the Sexual Harassment / Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP) to eliminate sexual assault and harassment within our ranks. Active and engaged leadership is central to helping the Army community understand that a climate that respects and grants dignity to every member of the Army family increases our combat readiness. The Army will reinforce a culture in our basic training units, our officer training courses and our operational units in which sexual

harassment, sexual assault and hazing are not tolerated, and if they occur are dealt with rapidly and justly. We are adding 829 full-time military and civilian sexual assault response coordinators and victim advocates at the brigade level as well as 73 trainers, certifying those personnel, and executing more frequent command climate surveys in units. We have begun the hiring process for the 446 civilian positions.

The Army has increased emphasis on investigations, prosecutions and laboratory resources needed to effectively build cases in order to ensure each alleged incident is adequately investigated, and if found credible, prosecuted to the full extent of the law. All unrestricted sexual assault allegations are referred to the Criminal Investigation Division, where we have added four highly qualified expert criminal investigators and six expert military attorneys and 20 specially trained agents who pursue their investigations independent of the command. We have also hired 30 additional Lab Examiners. Our 20 Special Victim Prosecutors educate and support the victim and provide advice and counsel to the criminal investigators as well as commanders. Sequestration and associated Civilian furloughs are likely to degrade aspects of our SHARP efforts, from slowing hiring actions, to delaying lab results which hinders our ability to provide resolution for victims.

#### ***Develop Adaptive Leaders***

One of our greatest advantages is our officers and non-commissioned officers, and the Army's ability to provide strategic landpower depends on the quality of these leaders. While we can recruit and train Soldiers in relatively short order, the Army cannot build leaders in a similar timeframe. Army leaders must be innovative, possess a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar, highly complex and dangerous environments and display an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment. As we face an uncertain future with an uncertain level of resources, we must prudently commit to the one certain, high-payoff investment – our leaders. Training, education and experience are the pillars of our leader development strategy, and we have many

initiatives underway to ensure we cultivate, manage and optimize the talent of our leaders. We are instituting a program to match personal history and informal skills to duty assignments. We are implementing and improving our 360-degree assessment programs for officers and are making 360-degree assessments prerequisites to assume command at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels. We are dramatically increasing the opportunity for and emphasis on broadening experiences and have increased the number of fellowships for our officers in government, industry and academia. Cuts to institutional and unit training, due to sequestration, OCO budget shortfalls in FY13 and continuing fiscal uncertainty, will degrade our ability to develop leaders and will have long-term impacts on the readiness of the force.

#### **Equipment Modernization and Reset**

As we prepare for the future, we will need to invest considerable time and resources to restore equipment used in combat operations to an acceptable level of readiness through reset operations, a combination of repair, replacement, recapitalization and transition. At the same time, other pressing modernization needs require attention and investment. The long-term nature of sequestration-related budget reductions puts each of the Army's investment priorities at risk. All acquisition priorities and many equipment modernization programs may face unanticipated schedule or cost impacts in the out years.

The Army will require Overseas Contingency Operations funding for equipment reset for 3 years after the last piece of equipment has been retrograded from Afghanistan. This funding will support the substantial workload required for equipment retrograde, induction and repair, a process that can take up to 3 years for some items such as crash and battle damaged aircraft. FY 13 budget reductions have already placed the Army at a disadvantage, forcing the cancellation of depot maintenance that will delay required repairs and upgrades.

***Organic and Commercial Industrial Base***

The Army will deliberately draw down force and production levels to fulfill the strategic guidance we have received. Aware that the future may bring unexpected crises, we must retain the ability to regenerate capabilities quickly in response to unforeseen emergencies. It is critical that we find the right balance between our organic and the commercial industrial bases. The ability to reduce the industrial base in times of peace but surge as required remains essential to equipping the Army, the Joint Force, and, in many cases, our allies and coalition partners. The current fiscal environment threatens the retention of critical skill sets in our depots, arsenals and ammunition plants. Fiscal uncertainty in FY 13 led to delays in awarding many new contracts. Industry also began laying off workers and postponed hiring actions due to the slowdown in funding.

***Acquisition Reform***

The Army continues to reform the way it develops and acquires services and materiel through a capability portfolio review process. This approach exposes redundancies and ensures that funds are properly programmed in accordance with Combatant Commanders' requests, wartime lessons learned, progressive readiness and affordability. The Army develops capabilities through Army research and development processes, collaborating with other Services, industry, academia and international partners to identify and harvest technologies suitable for transition to the force.

***Modernization Strategy***

The Army must maintain the technological edge over potential adversaries, enabling the force to prevail in all domains. The Army for the future requires capabilities

that are versatile and tailorable, yet affordable and cost effective. The Army modernization effort goes beyond materiel and equipment solutions. It is a comprehensive strategy that includes doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel and facilities. The heart of the strategy is the use of mature technologies and incremental upgrades of existing equipment, while balancing research investments between evolutionary and disruptive technologies. The modernization strategy is also supported by a risk-based assessment to identify candidate capabilities for complete divestiture. Divestiture decisions will reduce total costs and preserve our ability to sustain the force.

### ***Soldier Systems***

The centerpiece of the Army Modernization Strategy is the Soldier and the squad. The Soldier portfolio focuses on equipment vital for squad success and empowers and enables squads with improved lethality, protection and situational awareness. It also includes resources to develop leaders and train Soldiers to take advantage of new or improved capabilities. Planned improvements for dismounted Soldiers include a mission command system that allows Soldiers to see each other's positions, mark hazards collaboratively and access on-the-move broadband voice, data and video capabilities. This unprecedented situational awareness, coupled with the continued fielding of advanced sensors and lightweight small arms systems, will ensure that our Soldiers and squads remain the best in the world.

### ***The Network and Investment in Cyber Capabilities***

The Network, also known as LandWarNet, is critical to empowering our Soldiers. Our senior leaders and Soldiers must have the right information at the right time to make the decisions essential to mission success. Consequently, the Army is building a single, secure, standards-based, versatile network that connects Soldiers and their equipment to vital information and our Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and

multinational partners. It is critical that network modernization and sustainment efforts meet the ever-growing demand for tactical and business-related information and enterprise services in a timely manner and at an affordable cost.

Ensuring freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and protecting our information and the Network is a continuing Army priority. The Army must strengthen its cyber security and network defense by building secure and resilient network environments, providing greater situational awareness, expanding programs for ensuring compliance with information assurance policies and best practices, and increasing training for all technical and non-technical personnel. To ensure the Army can defeat adversaries in both land and cyber domains, a full range of cyberspace capabilities must be available in support of the combatant commander, including well-trained cyber warriors, cyberspace operational freedom and assured mission command. This will require investment not only in technology, but also in people and process improvement.

#### ***Ground Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle***

The Army's top two vehicle modernization programs are the Ground Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. As a replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Ground Combat Vehicle will accommodate a full nine-man infantry squad in a vehicle that features increased underbelly and ballistic protection with scalable armor that provides maximum mission flexibility. The Ground Combat Vehicle will also provide sufficient space and power to host the Army's advanced network, increasing the effectiveness of the vehicle in any threat environment. The Army is developing the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to fill capability gaps in the light wheeled vehicle fleet, carefully balancing payload, performance and protection. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle combines an increased level of protection with improved mobility and transportability. It is also the Army's first network-ready vehicle. Together, this integrated team of vehicles will be capable of dominating across the range of military operations and allow for incremental improvements.

**Closing**

The American people have learned time and again that they can trust their Army to protect our national interests at home and abroad. Over the past 12 years of conflict, our Army has proven itself in arguably the most difficult environment we have ever faced. Our leaders at every level have displayed unparalleled ingenuity, flexibility and adaptability. Our Soldiers have displayed mental and physical toughness and courage under fire. They have transformed the Army into the most versatile, agile, rapidly deployable and sustainable strategic land force in the world.

We live in an uncertain world, which often requires a military response to protect our national security interests. When that time comes, the Army must be ready to answer the Nation's call. We cannot take the readiness of the force for granted. Sequestration budget cuts, and continuing fiscal uncertainty, have placed us on the outer edge of acceptable risk for our future force. The Army must be capable of providing strategic landpower that can prevent conflict, shape the environment and win the Nation's wars. Preventing conflict demands presence, shaping the environment demands presence, restoring the peace demands presence, and more often than not, that presence proudly wears the uniform of an American Soldier.

## John M. McHugh

### Secretary of the U.S. Army

Mr. John M. McHugh was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of the Army on Sep. 21, 2009, following his nomination by President Barack Obama and confirmation by the United States Senate.

As Secretary of the Army, he has statutory responsibility for all matters relating to the United States Army: manpower, personnel, reserve affairs, installations, environmental issues, weapons systems and equipment acquisition, communications, and financial management. Secretary McHugh is responsible for the Department of the Army's annual budget and supplemental of over \$200 billion. He leads a work force of more than 1.1 million active duty, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve Soldiers, 221,000 Department of the Army civilian employees, and 213,000 contracted service personnel. He has stewardship over 14 million acres of land.



At the time of his appointment as Secretary of the Army, Mr. McHugh was a sitting member of Congress representing Northern and Central New York. During his nine terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, he earned a reputation as a staunch advocate for Soldiers and their Families, working tirelessly to ensure they have proper facilities, training, and the quality of life necessary to carry out wartime missions while caring for those at home.

As a Member of Congress, Mr. McHugh served as the Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) with responsibility to oversee the policies and programs for the Department of Defense and each of the Armed Forces. Before becoming Ranking Member, Congressman McHugh was first the Chairman of the Morale, Welfare and Recreation Panel and then Chairman and later Ranking Member of the Committee's Subcommittee on Military Personnel. Mr. McHugh also served as a senior member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and for six years as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Postal Service that significantly reformed the Postal Service.

From 1997 to 2004, Mr. McHugh was a member of the House International Relations Committee. Subsequently, from 2005 to 2009, he served on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. McHugh was also a 14-year member of the United States Military Academy Board of Visitors. At the time of his nomination, Mr. McHugh was co-chair of the House Army Caucus, a bipartisan organization that works to educate fellow House Members and their staffs about Army issues and programs.

Secretary McHugh was born in Watertown, New York, where he began his public service career in 1971 as the Confidential Assistant to the City Manager. In 1976, he joined the staff of New York State Senator H. Douglas Barclay, with whom he served as Chief of Research and Liaison with local governments for nine years. Succeeding Senator Barclay in 1984, Mr. McHugh served four terms in the legislature's upper house before his election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1992.

Mr. McHugh received a B.A. in Political Science from Utica College of Syracuse University in 1970, and earned a Master's Degree in Public Administration from the State University of New York's Nelson A. Rockefeller Graduate School of Public Affairs in 1977.





**General Raymond T. Odierno**  
**38th Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army**



General Raymond T. Odierno, assumed duty as the 38<sup>th</sup> Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army on 7 September 2011.

A native of northern New Jersey, General Odierno attended the United States Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1976 with a commission in Field Artillery. During more than 35 years of service, he has commanded units at every echelon, from platoon to theater, with duty in Germany, Albania, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United States. After his first assignment with U.S. Army Europe, General Odierno was assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery at Fort Bragg, N.C., where he commanded two batteries and served as a battalion operations officer.

General Odierno returned to U.S. Army Europe serving as a battalion executive officer and division artillery executive officer including deployment for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He later commanded 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division, and the Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division.



From October 2001 to June 2004, General Odierno commanded the 4th Infantry Division, leading the division during Operation Iraqi Freedom from April 2003 to March 2004. From December 2006 to February 2008, he served as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps – Iraq (III Corps) as the operational commander of the surge of forces. Later, he served as the Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq and subsequently United States Forces - Iraq, from September 2008 until September 2010. Most recently he commanded United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

Other significant assignments include: Arms Control Officer, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Chief of Staff, V Corps; Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division; Deputy Commanding General, Task Force Hawk, Albania; Director of Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where he was the primary military advisor to Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice.

General Odierno holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering from West Point and a master's degree in Nuclear Effects Engineering from North Carolina State University. He is a graduate of the Army War College and holds a master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

General Odierno's awards and decorations include four Defense Distinguished Service Medals, two Army Distinguished Service Medals, the Defense Superior Service Medal, six Legions of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, four Meritorious Service Medals, the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, and the Combat Action Badge.



---

---

**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

APRIL 25, 2013

---

---



### 2013 Army Reserve Component Submission

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended Section 521 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using Section 521 reporting criteria. Unless otherwise indicated, the data included in the report is information that was available 30 September 2012. Section 517 (b) (2) (A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	AC in RC (%)*	Army Average (%) **
FY 2011		
Major	(73 of 86) 84.9%	93.3 %
Lieutenant Colonel	(6 of 11) 54.5%	86.8 %
FY 2012		
Major	(64 of 81) 79.0%	88.9%
Lieutenant Colonel	(8 of 12) 66.7%	82.7%

\*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

\*\*Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517 (b) (2) (B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	AC in RC (%)*	Army Average (%) **
FY 2011		
Major	(3 of 57) 5.3%	8.7%
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 10) 0.0%	3.5%
FY 2012		
Major	(1 of 57) 1.8%	8.0 %

Lieutenant Colonel	(1 of 10) 10.0%	8.0%
--------------------	-----------------	------

\*Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

\*\*Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the US Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 13,653 or 30.7 percent of which 422 were FY 12 accessions.

Army Reserve officers: 10,026 or 32 percent of which 698 were FY 12 accessions.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted: 63,567 or 20 percent of which 1,644 were FY 12 accessions.

Army Reserve enlisted: 36,175 or 24 percent of which 6,068 were FY 12 accessions.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY 12, there were five Service Academy graduates released from active duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY 12, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA to the Army Reserve.

In FY 12, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Army granted five waivers to the Army Reserve. The waiver provided one Soldier an opportunity to play a professional sport and complete service obligation. Waivers allowed four Soldiers to enter the Health Professionals Scholarship Program. All five Soldiers were appointed Reserve component officers.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY 12, there were no distinguished Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY 12, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In FY 12, there were no graduates released early from an active-duty obligation.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above First Lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

In FY 12, the ARNG recommended 2,183 commissioned officers for a position-vacancy promotion and the Senior Army Advisor, an active duty officer, concurred with all those promotion actions. The ARNG also recommended 1,234 warrant officers for a position-vacancy promotion, and the Senior Army Advisor likewise concurred with all those promotion actions. Prior to FY 12, warrant officers were not required to go before Federal Recognition Boards for promotion. Therefore, the numbers of warrant officers have not previously been included in the response to this question.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve recommended 62 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 35.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In FY 12, the ARNG had a total of 14 Soldiers that received a military education waiver. The waivers were granted based on non-completion of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) due to assignment to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) (“medical hold” or “medical hold-Over” units); and non-completion of the Advanced Leader Course or Senior Leader Course due to deployment or training schedule constraints.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve had a total of 7 Soldiers eligible for promotion if recommended that received Warrior Leadership Course (WLC) military education waivers as a result of being deployed or assigned to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) (i.e. medical hold). The USAR saw a reduction in waivers due to the Department of the Army (DA), Army Leader Development Strategy that went into effect 1 Oct 11. This policy discontinued waivers for the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC).

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S Army Reserve Command. The National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)

In FY 12, the ARNG had 83,728 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve had 55,639 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting. The population of ‘non-available’ reflects 28% of the total USAR end strength: 14% do not meet medical readiness standards (e.g., profile, pending medical review boards, adjudication) and 14% do not meet administrative requirements (e.g., initial entry training; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation; family-care plan, or Lautenberg Amendment restriction). The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) maintains detailed information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)



A total of 65 ARNG Soldiers, with at least 24 months time in ARNG, were losses in FY 12 due to lack of minimum required military education. The breakdown is 19 enlisted and 46 officers.

In FY12, the USAR discharged 32 officers and 7 enlisted Soldiers for not completing the required initial entry training required for deployment within 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In FY 12, there were no waivers granted Secretary of the Army to the Army National Guard under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA described in paragraph (9).

In FY 12, The Chief, Army Reserve, granted 210 waivers. The Army Reserve was delegated the authority to grant waivers for personnel who did not complete the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve. The reasons for waivers were categorized as Hardship, Medical or Administrative (i.e. Failed Height/Weight Standards, Failed to obtain Driver License, Accepted ROTC Scholarship, Temporary Disqualified, and Failed to Complete High School).

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In FY 12, 297,515 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 14,233 (4.8 percent of the Soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY 12, 160,864 USAR Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). These PHAs identified 10,879 (6.7%) soldiers for further review due to condition-limiting profiles (temporary or permanent) or failure to meet retention standards. The USAR expects temporary disqualifications to return to duty/deployable status upon resolution of the limiting condition.

b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In FY 12, the ARNG transferred all 14,233 Soldiers to a medically non-deployable status who were identified for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve identified a total of 7,696 Soldiers through PHAs or other field generated source (medical commands) as having a permanent non-deployable medical condition. These Soldiers are being vetted through a medical evaluation board or a non-duty related physical evaluation board for final determination.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.


Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRRA.

USAR Training Strategy IAW the Army Training Strategy executes the progressive training ARFORGEN model (Reset, Train/Ready 1, Train/Ready 2, Train/Ready 3, Available) over a 5 year cycle. The training proficiency achieved at the end of year 3 (Train/Ready) is contingent on Allocated or Apportioned designation.

Effective 1 January 2012, the Secretary of the Army implemented 9-months "Boots on the Ground" (BOG) for the Army. Under this policy USAR units are mobilized for 12 months with 9 months BOG and up to 90 days of post-mobilization training. This allowed the USAR to reduce the training demand on their allocated units while in a pre-mobilization status. For allocated units, the bulk of individual skills training are a pre-mobilization requirement consisting of 24 days of Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Collective training is conducted during 15 days of Annual Training (AT). USAR units will mobilize at no less than a T3 rating and deploy at T2. First Army assumed the training for Theater Specific Required Training (TSRT) on 1 October, 2012.

The USAR generates apportioned units to execute contingency missions, Operational Plans (OPLANS), or other Army requirements during the available year of the ARFORGEN cycle. The USAR is required to provide 26,284 soldiers to the Available Force Pool annually. During a surge requirement the USAR must be able to provide 19,780 (75%) of its total requirement within the first 45 days and 25,881 (98%) within 60 days. The demand for apportioned units within the first 60 days precludes pre-deployment training to achieve deployment readiness after mobilization. The graphic below demonstrates precisely why the Army Reserve must maintain T2 levels of readiness for USAR apportioned formations. The USAR training strategy produces T2 units at the start of the Available Year.



The number of pre-mobilization training days required to train Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) units is based on the complexity of the training to achieve T2. The USAR established three levels of training complexity based on the resources required to achieve readiness objectives.

- Level 1 - Most difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks, unit complexity, 6 additional training days – T/R 2&3. Ex: Signal Command, Theater Military Police Command, Combat Support Brigade.
- Level 2 - Moderately difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks, unit complexity, 6 additional training days – T/R3. Ex: Transportation Battalion, Military Police Battalion.
- Level 3 - Least difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks and unit complexity; no additional days required. Ex: Airfield Operations Detachments, Medical and Dental Companies

The Army Reserve has internal training support assets to meet collective training and mission command training requirements. The 84th Training Command (Unit Readiness) is the Army Reserve's Executive Agent for planning, coordinating, and conducting Warrior Exercises (WAREX) and Combat Support Training Exercises (CSTX) rotations. The command's training support brigades and battalions provide Observer, Controller/Trainer coverage for WAREXs and CSTXs. The 75th Training Division (Mission Command) advises, assists, and trains battalion and higher staffs in Mission Command. They provide exercise leadership and certified Observer, Controller/Trainers. They focus on developing the exercise architecture by replicating operational environments that facilitate Mission Command training; integrate Live/Virtual/Constructive-Gaming (LVC-G) design and simulations capabilities into seamless exercises that facilitate achievement of training objectives. Training is supported by First Army.

Timely alert for mobilizations—at least one year prior—is crucial to the Army National Guard's mission success. Under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, many training tasks previously conducted during the post-mobilization phase now occurs in local training areas before mobilization. First Army, in CONUS, manages and directs post-mobilization training for Reserve Component conventional forces. First Army, in theater, conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units waiting to deploy.

Army National Guard training and Army Reserve training complies with the ARFORGEN model of progressive training over multi-year cycles and reflects the Army Training Strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN cycle in three force pools (reset, train/ready, and available). Training progresses through these force pools with the initial focus on individual and leader training, migrating to low-level unit and battle staff, and finally culminating in multi-echelon, combined-arms exercises in the Ready year.

All ARNG units are "Combat Units." Forces Command Pre-Deployment Training, in support of Combatant Commands' guidance, identifies four categories of deploying units:

- Category (CAT) 1 includes units that would rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB)
- CAT 2 includes units that will, or potentially will, travel off a COB/FOB for short durations

- CAT 3 includes units that travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB
- CAT 4 consists of maneuver units with an Area of Operations (such as Brigade Combat Teams).


The pre-mobilization tasks increase by category, up to CAT 4. A unit's post-mobilization training time depends on the number of the pre-mobilization tasks completed during pre-mobilization. Army goals for post-mobilization training for Reserve Component headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type and category of the unit (note: this time does not include administrative and travel days). Any pre-mobilization tasks not completed during the pre-mobilization phase must be completed at a mobilization station. The ARNG typically sends units to a mobilization station with a pre-mobilization task completion rate of 90-95 percent. Smaller ARNG units typically arrive at mobilization station 100 percent complete.

Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of:

- theater orientation
- rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training
- counterinsurgency operations
- counter-improvised-explosive-device training
- convoy live-fire exercises
- completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period

Post-mobilization training days for a CAT 4 unit range from 50-65 training at mobilization station. This training supports a Combat Training Center culminating training event during post-mobilization CAT 4 unit is required to perform in order to be validated and deployed (National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center; 30 day training exercises).

Below is an outline depicting post-mobilization training day goals for various units:



The outline below depicts the actual number of post-mobilization training days for various units:\*

	Post Mobilization Training Days		
	Current	Goal	Delta
I/H/S Brigade Combat Team	63	45	18
Combat Aviation Brigade	33	60	-27
Military Police (Internment/Resettlement)	27	40	-3
Engineer Battalion (Route Clearance)	37	40	-3
Military Police Company	30	40	-10
Quartermaster Company	23	15	8
Engineer Company (Construction)	29	40	-11
Transportation Company (Heavy Equip Trans)	37	40	-3

\* from First Army-approved Post-Mobilization Training Plans.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

During FY 12, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs. During Army Training Summit III the ARNG-TRS/TRC branches participated in working groups with Department of the Army Management Office Training Support (DAMO-TRS), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Training Support Command (ATSC-STIDD) and other Major Commands to develop an ARFORGEN resourced training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with current Event Matrix Menu and ARFORGEN cycles for all components.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's) the ARNG is continuing to field and train using the Conduct of Fire Trainer- Situation Awareness (COFT-SA) and the Mobile-Conduct of Fire Trainer Situation Awareness (M-COFT-SA). Due to the geographical dispersion of units, the ARNG has a larger requirement for simulations that are Armory based. This brought the ARNG to develop and purchase the M-COFT-SA trainer as a mobile solution to fulfill training gaps. The ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers and is fielding the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) for the M2A2/A3 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS), Mobile Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (M-AGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2/A3 crews.

The ARNG-TRS continues to participate in the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to address the emerging requirement from the Training General Officer Steering Committee (TGOSC) to address the non-stabilized platform gunnery requirements. The ARNG has developed two solutions and updated those devices to meet the non-stabilized Gunnery requirements. The ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT) to train crew drills, convoy operations, command and control and non-stabilized platform gunnery. In addition, the ARNG has added an Individual Gunnery Trainer (IGT) to train individual gunners for .50 caliber, MK19, and M240 machine gun non-stabilized gunnery tasks listed in the forthcoming HBCT gunnery manual. Currently, all 54 States and Territories have received the VCOT capability. The IGT is an initiative that is currently being fielded; to date 147 IGT systems have been fielded to ARNG units with 80 more of the Brigade Combat Team solution.

The ARNG has bought down its requirement for 11 of the Non-Rated Crew Member Trainer for aviation crews using National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding. This is an Army Program of Record (PoR) trainer that simulates training the aviation crew skills prior to live events.

The ARNG is currently fielding the Operation Driver Simulator that trains transportation tasks in a family of vehicles, at both the unit and institutional levels. This is a recognized "In Lieu Of" training device.

The ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements. In FY 12 they have bought down their requirements using NGREA funding. This system is a PoR marksmanship training device. The ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) and phasing out systems that have concurrency issues. The EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit

collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. The ARMY is currently re-competing this contract and the ARNG has a representative that is on the source selection committee to address the ARNG dispersion challenges and additional training requirements.

The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills. The ARNG has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention, and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The IEDES kits consist of pyrotechnic and/or non-pyrotechnic training devices to achieve scalable signature effects. The ARNG has fielded 258 total IEDES kits, of which, 194 are non-pyrotechnic kits (A-kits) and 64 are pyrotechnic kits (B-kits). This distribution includes 53 ARNG training sites across 39 states and territories. They have received fielding, New Equipment Training (NET) and life cycle sustainment as of 3rd Quarter FY12. ARNG-TRS is continuing the effort to identify and fill requirements based on the recently completed Army Training Summit III. The latest IEDES innovation is the fielding of the IEDES Transit Cases to support less than company size training scenarios that has started in 3d Quarter FY12. The ARNG has restructured the Training Support section of the G-3 to address this issue and assigned an officer to manage the program of asymmetric warfare.

The ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Mission Command Training Support Program (MCTSP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Mission Training Complexes (MTC). The MCTSP consists of three MTCs at Camp Dodge, IA; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; and Fort Leavenworth, KS, with two additional sites for the future at Camp Gowen field/Orchard Range and Fort Chaffee. The Army Campaign Plan 2011 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The MCTSP synchronizes ARNG mission command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare, and execute battle staff training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during pre-mobilization training.

In order to provide the critical Culminating Training Event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) ARFORGEN cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool defined as certified company proficiency with demonstrated battalion battle staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained Soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

The ARNG is also looking to procure their requirement of the Dismounted Soldier Training Suite to compliment the Close Combat Tactical Trainer.



The ARNG way-ahead is continuing to use PoR and seven recognized “In Lieu of” devices to train and sustain vital and perishable skill sets and interact with all components to support the live, virtual, constructive and gaming training strategy. The ARNG-TRS is drafting a white paper that will address a well-informed TADSS strategy that is ARFORGEN or Future Forces Generation (FUFORGEN) driven. TADSS are a key function of the ARNG training at home station and are heavily relied upon by commanders at all levels. In times of fiscal uncertainty the use of simulations becomes greater and critical to the readiness of the ARNG.

The USAR executes a training strategy committed to producing trained units and battle staffs for 21st Century operations that are prepared for operational deployment in support of Combatant Commanders and other Army requirements. This requires realistic and comprehensive home station training supported by sufficient number of training man-days, and an appropriate mix of Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming platforms.

The USAR focused on maximizing simulation technology and home station training opportunities in support of commander’s Force Generation training readiness objectives. Home station training capabilities must provide a training framework (operational, institutional, and self development) that approximates the conditions of the operational environment while mitigating resource constraints of land, manpower, facilities, and training dollars. The Army Reserve requires blended, integrated, and distributive training capabilities (software, equipment, network capacity, and facilities) to train and educate more efficiently and effectively in support of ARFORGEN, the Army’s Training Concept, the Army Learning Concept, and the Army Leader Development Strategy.

The USAR is currently conducting a pilot program which adds ten laptops to ten different USARC locations. These computers are being fielded for Distance Learning (DL) to support commanders in the field and allow Soldiers to meet mandatory DA Electronic Based Distributed Learning (EBDL), Distance Learning (DL), and other training requirements.

The Warrior and Combat Support Training Exercises are the Army Reserve’s major collective training exercises conducted on Army Reserve installations. These exercises integrate live and constructive environments to train senior battle staffs and to conduct company and platoon level lanes training. The Army Reserve has made sizable investments in improving facilities and infrastructure in order to leverage technologies to enhance training, reduce costs, and facilitate collaboration. The TADSS and Virtual Battle Space 2 (VGS2) systems have increased the readiness of units trained on them. Additionally, the 75th Mission Command Training Division has integrated a high-tech joint constructive battle staff training simulation to provide more realistic training to rotating soldiers. The next step for the USAR is to link Virtual, Constructive, and Live environments.

The USAR has fifty (50) Digital Training Facilities (DTFs), located in twenty-eight (28) states. Daily, our Soldiers conduct DL training on any of the 562 course, Structured Self Development, and individual or squad and platoon level collective training within these facilities. The Army Reserve is currently focused on using the VBS2 and distributed capability within these facilities as Spokes to the Reserve’s five (5) Mission Command Training Centers (MCTCs) to conduct worldwide virtual and or constructive training.

The USAR has identified the Deployed Digital Training Campus (DDTC) as an effective portable capability to provide Gaming and Structured Self Development training to its units. In FY 12, the Army Reserve conducted an analysis to identify training gaps within the Pacific areas of American Samoa, Saipan and Guam. The Army Reserves will conduct a Proof of Principle (PoP) using the DDTC in American Samoa to enhance and improve the Soldiers' proficiency in Structured Self Development and individual, squad and platoon level proficiency. Additionally, VBS2 will be incorporated in Samoa, Guam and Saipan to supplement the current training and enhance training proficiency.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The states do not capture this data. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During FY 12, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 1,887 inspections of the Army National Guard. Regular Army Officers assigned to the

respective States and Territories as Inspectors General executed the bulk of these inspections (1,833). Of the remaining, First Army and the Department of the Army Inspector General conducted 26 inspections, and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), and various external inspection agencies conducted 28. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted two special assessments within the last 12 months. The first assessment was entitled "Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve" and was directed by the Chief, Army Reserve on 11 August 2011. This assessment (Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve) was conducted 17 October 2011 through 26 January 2012. A total of 38 units were assessed as part of this assessment. The final report was approved in April 2012. The second assessment entitled "Special Assessment of the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) within the US Army Reserve" was also directed by the Chief, Army Reserve on 22 August 2012. This assessment began in October 2012 and is concurrently ongoing; the expected completion date is February 2013. To date, a total 30 of the 50 units selected for this assessment have been assessed by members of the Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General. The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General has also conducted 7 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections within the past 12 months. The overall goal of both assessments as well as the IO inspections was not to evaluate a unit's deployability status. However, out of the total 74 units assessed/inspected, nothing was found that would cause a unit to be listed as non-deployable. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRRA.

The Army continues to meet Congressional intent as it pertains to Active Component (AC) support to Reserve Component (RC) readiness outlined in Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, as amended. Every RC unit that deployed during Fiscal Year 2012 was properly manned, equipped, trained, and certified to meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements prior to employment overseas and in the Continental United States (CONUS) by processes associated with Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).

The legislated roles and responsibilities formerly given to the commanders of multiple associated AC division and above units continue to be executed by the commanders of First Army (FORSCOM's executive agent for Active Army support for the training, readiness, and

mobilization of conventional RC units in the Continental United States); the 196<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade (U.S. Army Pacific's executive agent for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility); and the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) (for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the European Command's area of responsibility).

ARFORGEN continues to be the Army's core process to synchronize the progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of CCDR and other Army requirements. Within ARFORGEN, all active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units cycle through the ARFORGEN force pools and are designated either for deployment to a validated CCDR operational requirement or for the execution of a contingency mission, operational plan, or other validated Army requirement.

Assessments of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of these RC units and validation of their compatibility with AC forces (as required by sections 1131(b)(3) and 1131(b)(4) of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992) are executed and maintained by First Army, the 196<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, and USAREUR as the RC units progress through the ARFORGEN process into the deployment window.

On September 4, 2012, the Secretary of the Army signed Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy). This policy establishes a framework for the integration of the Army's Active and Reserve Components as a "Total Force" and includes general guidance on the integration of AC and RC forces for training, readiness, and employment. Implementation guidance is expected to be published in FY 2013.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC, 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

Title XI (FY 12) Authorizations				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	41	18	0	59
TRADOC	51	12	0	63
FORSCOM	1033	2165	101	3299
USARPAC	30	49	1	80
TOTAL	1155	2244	102	3501

Title XI (FY 12) Assigned				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	43	30	0	71

TRADOC	26	13	0	39
FORSCOM	869	2108	87	3064
USARPAC	25	46	1	72
TOTAL	963	2190	88	3241

As of February 5, 2013, the Army had 3,241 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. In FY06, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (Public Laws 108-767, Section 515). Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The data is not managed or captured by state – the chart above provides the best representation of how Title XI positions are dispersed and utilized.



---

---

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

APRIL 25, 2013

---

---





#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY**

General ODIERNO. Army Leader Development Strategy ensures broadly experienced leaders with a range of cultural and regional expertise:

The Army's leader development strategy provides for enhancements to personnel management that capture and catalog more detailed knowledge of individual leader talent profiles, and enable a better match between those talents and emerging missions and regionally aligned requirements. This type of talent management is a systemic process that better accounts for the individual traits of an officer, non-commissioned officer, or Army civilian—his or her experiences, aptitudes, and potential. The Army develops and employs well-rounded leaders based on proficiencies derived from operational experience, broadening assignments, higher civilian and professional military education, and demonstrated individual interests and acquired skills. The Army's re-structured professional development timelines provide a strong foundation in a specific basic branch military skill followed by periodic opportunities for a broader set of experiences in academic, joint, interagency, and multinational settings. By providing our leaders with this range of experiences, we enable them to rapidly acquire the socioeconomic and cultural nuances of specific areas of operations during mission-specific training for an assignment or deployment. This approach prepares leaders to exercise mission command doctrine effectively whether conducting unified land operations in complex and uncertain operational environments as part of a regionally aligned force, or supporting sustainment functions across the Army's generating force.

Managing individual talent and cultivating expertise through experiential opportunities, advanced military education, advanced civilian fellowships or graduate degree programs, and cross-cultural developmental programs spanning a full career ensures that the Army builds leaders with the ability to adapt quickly to any regional focus as they are assigned at every level of responsibility. [See page 16.]

---

#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES**

Secretary McHUGH. When the Army force structure is reduced, we must lower our facility overhead, infrastructure and civilian support staff to ensure that our investments in equipment, training, and maintenance do not become distorted. Otherwise, we may be required to unnecessarily divert scarce resources away from readiness. As we move forward with such reductions, we hope to conduct a capacity analysis to determine the level of excess infrastructure created by these changes, which could support a future BRAC round. [See page 24.]

---

#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER**

General ODIERNO. During Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn, the DOD implemented and refined key screening policies to help identify medical concerns and ensure those returning home receive continued medical care for deployment-related conditions to include behavioral health, traumatic brain injury, and hearing-loss.

In order to minimize stigma and to engage Soldiers early in the development of Behavioral Health concerns, the Army utilizes enhanced standardized person-to-person Behavioral Health screening at touch points synchronized with the Army Force Generation Cycle in accordance with National Defense Authorization Act of 2012. The Army conducts Behavioral Health screening for all Soldiers before deployment, while in theater, post deployment, at 4 to 6 months post deployment, and annually, regardless of deployment status, with the periodic health assessment. The results are recorded in the electronic health record, as well as in the military operational database.

The Behavioral Health screening considers the Soldier's relevant health records related to previous deployment(s), life stressors, substance use, suicidal or homicidal ideation, and symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression. Many factors influence the assessment: the differences in the way Soldiers report

their symptoms over time to different providers; the evolution of symptoms over time due to the natural progression of the healthcare conditions; and differences in the way providers interpret the reported symptoms. Screening providers incorporate all available information and clinical judgment to make any indicated referrals for health services. Soldiers may request a Behavioral Health referral at any time during this process, and they may also decline a recommended Behavioral Health referral if there are no urgent safety concerns or occupational or performance problems that require a duty limitation.

Many combat related behavioral health conditions may not manifest until several months post deployment, so it is common for Soldiers to present with few symptoms immediately post deployment. Regularly scheduled Post-Deployment Health Assessments (PDHA) at four to six months and Post Deployment Health Reassessments (PDHRAs) at 18 and 30 months, with the additional exams required by NDAA 2010, provide opportunities to identify latent onset healthcare conditions.

The PDHA mission is twofold: to document adverse occurrences and exposures (as stated in the DOD directive) and to identify and treat current deployment-related conditions. Although there is an extensive network of medical care in the deployed and non-deployed environments, the PDHA and the PDHRA are additional screening mechanisms to discuss health-related concerns.

With respect to Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), the DOD implemented a proactive screening policy in June 2010 "Policy Guidance for management of concussion/Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) in the Deployed Setting," which mandates a set of actions for any Service Member involved in potentially concussive events (such as being within 50 meters of a blast, sustaining a direct blow to the head, being in a vehicle collision, etc.). DOD policy mandates a minimum 24-hour downtime, medical clearance before returning to duty, and a report of the event in an electronic system for any Service member involved in a potentially concussive event. Commanders may waive the minimum 24-hour downtime for safety and other battlefield considerations. The minimum recovery period is extended to 7 days following symptoms resolution for multiple concussions within the past 12 months. When Soldiers redeploy, medical providers have access to the data reported in the electronic system, so they know which Soldiers have been involved in potentially concussive events (regardless of whether the external force resulted in a concussion diagnosis). TBI screening questions were added to the PDHA in 2008.

These same health assessments ask about blast exposure and traumatic brain injury and concussion to permit timely referral for evaluation and treatment at our TBI services at most of our installations. All of these conditions may present several months post deployment.

Hearing loss should be captured during the post-deployment assessment. Hearing loss and ringing in the ears from exposure to high levels of noise are frequently identified upon return from combat deployments. All Soldiers receive a screening hearing evaluation at the time of their post-deployment medical processing to determine if their post-deployment hearing status is different than their pre-deployment status. If a change in hearing is identified, the Soldier is referred to an audiologist for a detailed diagnostic hearing evaluation, typically several weeks after the post-deployment hearing check. At installations, like Ft. Huachuca, where there is no audiologist on the installation, diagnostic hearing evaluations are referred to off-installation network providers.

All Soldiers may raise health concerns at any time, not just during their military health assessments. We are confident in the services we provide our returning Warfighters, and we are available to review the specific concerns of the Fort Huachuca Non-Commissioned Officer you referenced. [See page 36.]

#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA**

General ODIERNO. As a foundation to the U.S. Defense Strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility, the Army must maintain our global engagements and strong relationships with our Key Partners, while cultivating new relationships with nations that share our common values.

Our defense efforts in the Middle East will continue to be aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. Our Strategic Guidance highlights that the United States places a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in—and support of—partner nations in and around the Middle East. As we reset units withdrawn from Iraq and reduce force structure in Afghanistan, we will maintain both a presence on the ground in the Middle East and Brigade Combat Teams in our Global Response Force available to react to near-term conflicts there.

Our rebalance to the Asia Pacific is part of a Whole-of-Government effort. The military Rebalance focuses on a regional alignment of forces that applies Army capabilities more efficiently to fulfill existing, funded requirements and contingency demand.

Our most important focus area in the Pacific is building partnership capacity to preserve influence and access, an example of which is our expansive exercise program to include 24 large-scale exercises in FY14 involving 14 nations in the region. The level and specificity of this type of engagement is endangered by sequestration.

Key to maintaining the Army's ability to respond to different regions of the world is the concept of Regionally Aligned Forces. All Army units train on their Mission Essential Task List (METL) for Full Spectrum Operations (i.e., offense, defense, counterinsurgency, stability operations, humanitarian assistance and civil support operations)—that are applicable to military operations in any region of the world—as they move through the progressive readiness cycle known as Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Concurrently, Regionally Aligned Forces will be trained on the social-economic and cultural aspects of the region to which they are aligned. If there is a sudden need to deploy forces to a specific region, the units that are aligned to that region, and are also in their available year for deployment, will be the first units that are deployed for that contingency. Other units that are not aligned to that region may also be deployed to support as needed. Additionally, ARFORGEN may be flexed to deploy units sooner (in order to meet an emergent requirement) or later (i.e., to allow for more region-specific training). [See page 46.]



---

---

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

APRIL 25, 2013

---

---



#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER**

Mr. MILLER. Last March you both testified that you expected to make a decision on the armed scout program by either the end of FY12, or beginning of FY13. We know that all the analysis from last year's RFI and voluntary flight demonstration has been completed for several months. The delayed decision is negatively impacting industry as they continue to expend resources refining potential solutions.

What steps are left for you to make an Armed Scout material decision and when can I expect an announcement on that decision? Is the decision delayed by budget and requirements considerations? If so, can the Army inform industry whether your analysis indicates the preferred course of action is to compete for a new platform?

In March, we received a briefing that focused on the flight demonstration, but lacked any of the critical study data such as return on invest and cost benefit analysis. When can the Congress and industry expect to receive the complete briefing on this program?

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army has not made a final decision regarding the armed scout. Results from the voluntary flight demonstration indicate that no aircraft exists today with integrated technologies necessary to satisfy AAS requirements. This needed technology integration and qualification effort will require significant cost, engineering and manufacturing development in order to meet threshold capabilities. These threshold capabilities would likely produce a scout platform whose performance is at best only commensurate with the performance of attack and cargo platforms currently in fielding. The goal is to have a defined way ahead by 3rd Qtr FY13. The business case analysis that includes the return on investment and cost benefit analysis is in progress but not yet completed. The Army is preparing an affordability assessment that will impact the business case analysis. Because the Army must establish budget assumptions prior to revising the affordability assessment, it would be premature to release results dealing with the business case or return on investment. The Army anticipates approving the business case analysis by 4th Qtr FY13.

---

#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK**

Mr. LOEBSACK. The JTRS HMS program is utilizing a dual manufacturing strategy which requires two qualified vendors to build identical open-architecture radios, using only Government-owned waveforms, during the initial stages of full-rate production. Since this strategy ensures that competition and flexibility are built into the HMS program, which maximizes the long-term affordability of the program and allows the Army to leverage the significant investment it has already made, does the Army plan to continue with this dual sourcing manufacturing strategy? If not, why?

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army strategy is to conduct full and open competition among all potential industry vendors to award a full rate production contract using Government-provided performance specifications. Language in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the Army to conduct full and open competition among all industry providers. As a result, the Army revised the acquisition strategy from competing initial full-rate production between the two qualified vendors to opening it up to all of industry. The acquisition strategy and request for proposals to comply with the 2013 NDAA are currently under review in both the Department of the Army and Department of Defense.

Mr. LOEBSACK. The FY 2014 budget request for JTRS HMS radios is significantly less than previous years requests for this program. Given the stated importance that the Army has placed on network modernization, what is the reasoning behind this budget request?

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army made the decision to reduce the number of Capability Sets fielded in Fiscal Year 2014 and beyond due to budgetary constraints and availability of forces. The reduction in requested funding aligns with the Army's plan to field a minimum of four Capability Set Brigade Combat Teams per year.

Mr. LOEBACK. How will the Army leverage the unprecedented experience within the National Guard and Reserve as well as the cost effectiveness of the Reserve Components in determining the right force structure mix? What factors will be considered in determining the future force structure mix? How specifically will the Army maintain the Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve?

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Prevailing in today's conflicts requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity—available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployments. The Army will maintain the Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve in accordance with the 60-month Army Force Generation Model, through a structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of the combatant commander and other Army commitments worldwide. Additionally, Reserve Component units are resourced with additional training days to meet requisite readiness rates for units that have been allocated or apportioned. Active Component/Reserve Component Mix (AC/RC Mix) is determined through the two-phase Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to identify the correct mix of unit types to provide a balanced and affordable force. TAA results in a cost informed force, based on Department of Defense priorities, budgetary constraints, authorized end strength, and senior leader guidance. Generally, the Active Component possesses those capabilities best suited for: (1) unpredictable and frequent deployments; (2) rapidly responding to complex operational events; and, (3) dealing with unexpected contingencies. Generally, the Reserve Component possesses those capabilities best suited for: (1) dealing with predictable deployments; (2) providing Title 10 and Title 32 support to local, state, and federal authorities; and, (3) providing operation and strategic depth.

---

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. I am concerned with the Army's request relating to unmanned systems, both on the procurement side and the research and development side. As you know, there have been more than 5,000 robots deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003, and by all accounts, these systems have protected soldiers and saved lives. While I understand that with the drawing down of action in these two countries, the need to send these systems may not be as great, but the Army budget request seems to reflect the idea that we will never need these systems again. I say this because of the drastic cuts and flatout elimination of many important aspects of military robotics. What is the Army's plan for investing in next-generation unmanned systems and for maintaining and enhancing the systems that have already been purchased?

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army's plan for investing in next generation Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) is to develop programs of record that address emerging requirements, leverage commercial technology, and improve cross-Service effectiveness and efficiency through commonality. Priorities for UGS include protecting the force, persistently monitoring the environment, lightening the Warfighter's physical and cognitive workloads, sustaining the force, and facilitating maneuver. The Army and Marine Corps are developing a joint requirement for the individual class of UGS, that seeks to provide a lighter, more capable, and less expensive individual transportable robot than the recently terminated Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV). The Army also plans to invest in robotics appliqué that will facilitate semi-autonomous operation of ground vehicle platforms and provide Soldiers with increased standoff from threats.

The Army's plan for maintaining and enhancing the systems that have already been purchased (over \$730 million) includes retaining and resetting 2,700 of 5,100 fielded unmanned ground systems upon return from theater. These systems will serve as bridging solutions for training and contingencies until programs of record systems are developed and fielded. The Army will divest 2,400 robots that are no longer sustainable due to obsolescence.

The Army's FY14 President's Budget request includes funding for unmanned ground systems, which include the Man Transportable Robotic System (MTRS) Increment II—a vehicle transportable robot; the Advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robotic System (AEODRS)—an individual transportable Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) robot; and the Route Clearance Interrogation System (RCIS)—a semi-autonomous appliqué capability that provides standoff while interrogating, classifying, and excavating deep buried explosive hazards.



### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Mr. GARAMENDI. Last week, your office issued a memo to Members outlining a change in policy for National Guard and Reserve soldiers that proposed canceling FY14 deployments in historically Guard-led missions such as Kosovo, the Sinai, and the Horn of Africa. 1. We all know that deployments mean readiness and if they can't deploy, their readiness will atrophy. Given the recent Secretary of Defense's Reserve Forces Policy Board findings showing the Reserve Component costing one-third that of the Active Component, please explain your reasoning, and provide me a detailed costed-out business case, for maintaining an Operational National Guard and Reserve while at the same time reducing their historical mission deployments.

Secretary McHUGH. The Budget Control Act of 2011 and a shortfall in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, combined with the need to ensure the highest readiness of our forces deployed or preparing for deployment to Afghanistan, forward stationed in Korea, and the Global Response Force, are forcing the Army to make a number of necessary but undesirable decisions such as replacing select Reserve Component (RC) units with Active Component (AC) units. Moreover, as a result of our ongoing mission analysis, requirement changes and fiscal constraints, worldwide deployments for 57 AC units have been cancelled this fiscal year alone, while more are being considered in the future. Additionally, as Afghanistan transitions to its directed force management levels, the need to maintain operational flexibility will produce evolving decisions relative to both AC and RC units. These decisions will not be based on cost alone and cannot be determined with a typical business—case analysis. Along with cost we must also consider capabilities and requirements, which differ among the Active and Reserve components.

Working closely with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, the Army identified RC units that will be replaced by AC units to support operational requirements in Fiscal Year 2014. The Army views these measures as temporary and will continue to program RC units for employment where possible under 10 U.S.C. § 12304(b) after this period of fiscal constraint passes. With respect to the missions in Kosovo, the Sinai, and Horn of Africa, we estimate we will save \$84.8 million by using AC forces.

The Army requires all of its components in order to address its full range of missions and contingency responsibilities outlined in the defense strategic guidance and in accordance with Army Total Force policy. Cost, readiness, responsiveness, and availability are all essential components in the decision to employ an Army capability to meet a valid requirement. Generally, AC formations and select RC units are maintained at a high state of readiness to be available to respond to war plans and contingencies; most RC elements are available to respond quickly in the homeland, and select numbers of these RC units are managed in a progressive readiness model in support of pre-planned combatant command requirements.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Secretary McHugh, in your testimony two days ago in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee you stated that "because of the amount of deployments that the Reserve Component has had, their unemployment rate is very high." Where are you getting this information from and how are you calculating it? When I talk to my Adjutant General they say their biggest complaint is that there aren't enough planned deployments and that more would help our National Guardsmen at home as well as for their operational readiness. Can you please submit to me your analysis of why you feel deployments hinder our National Guard and Reserve soldiers?

Secretary McHUGH. The National Guard Bureau in 2012 reported the unemployment rate for the Army National Guard to be greater than 20 percent, much higher than the national average. We must remember that the Reserve Component (RC) is comprised of citizen-soldiers and we need to ensure that we don't use them so often that they cannot maintain a job. Many of these citizen-soldiers have lost or had to quit jobs and that is not what we want our RC to have to do, even as an Operational Reserve.

So, we are working to assist the Reserve Components' civilian employers, by providing our RC Soldiers with predictable deployment cycle schedules.

In addition, the Army, in concert with Department of Labor and Veterans' Affairs, has revamped the transition program to ensure Soldiers are "employment ready" as they leave Active Duty. We are partnering with trade groups to directly certify skill sets taught in the military translate into officially recognized employable skills.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why would you remove the Army National Guard from historically Guard-led missions in Kosovo, the Sinai, and the Horn of Africa, where trust and partnership has already been established? How do you justify your commitment to the Total Force Policy if you intend on restricting or eliminating the Army National Guard's rotation in overseas operations?

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Due to the immediate budget shortfalls in FY13 and FY14 resulting from sequestration and cuts to Operational Contingency (OCO) and base funding, the Army had to make some tough choices. The total cost savings in pay and allowances for all-Active Component sourcing for these 3 missions is estimated at \$84.8 million for FY13 and FY14 combined. Additionally, as Army forces draw down from Afghanistan there are sufficient Active Component forces to perform the missions in support of Kosovo, the Sinai and the Horn of Africa.

While the National Guard has performed in an exemplary manner in the missions in support of Kosovo, the Sinai and the Horn of Africa, these missions have not always been sourced by the National Guard. The Army began using National Guard forces for these missions in 2003 to meet our global requirements. The historical record shows that for years the Multinational Observer Force (MFO) mission to Sinai was performed by 82nd Airborne Division. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission began as an Active Component mission then transitioned to the Reserve Components and recently has been split with  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the requirements filled by Active Component units and  $\frac{1}{3}$  filled by Reserve Component Units. The Horn of Africa mission began during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has been primarily completed by Reserve Component forces.

The Army will continue to ensure the highest possible readiness for Reserve Component Soldiers through the 5-year progressive readiness model. This model ensures that units achieve combat readiness (i.e., trained, manned and equipped) by the 5th year of their cycle. The units are staggered in the cycles so that the Army always has pool of ready and available Reserve Units to draw from. The 5-year cycle also provides the Soldiers (and their families and employers) with predictability in their deployments.

Mr. GARAMENDI. With defense budgets shrinking, it's important to evaluate if our current Active Component and Reserve Component force mix is appropriate for future engagements. We should ask ourselves if we need a very large standing Army with our current defense shift toward PACOM or would a larger, "pay-as-you-go" flexible National Guard allow us to maintain capabilities and continue to meet every challenge. Has the Army discussed ways that the Army Guard could be used more to save money and maintain some of your capabilities, since they train and perform to the same standards, can perform any mission, and cost  $\frac{1}{3}$  of an Active Army soldier? A recent report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board has concluded that the fully burdened life-cycle cost of a National Guardsman is less than  $\frac{1}{3}$  that of his Active Duty counterpart. Considering that once National Guardsmen have concluded their deployment tour and no longer incur expenses such as dependent housing, schooling, and health care, how do you see this as an effective long-term cost-savings measure for the Army?

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army requires all of its components in order to address its full range of missions and contingency responsibilities outlined in the defense strategic guidance and in accordance with Army Total Force policy. Cost, readiness, responsiveness, capability, availability and our requirements are all essential components in the decision to employ an Army capability in support of the full range of national security needs. Generally, Active Component formations and select Reserve Component units are maintained at a high state of readiness to be available to respond to war plans and contingencies; most Reserve Component elements are available to respond in the homeland, and are managed in a progressive readiness model in support of pre-planned combatant command requirements.

Understanding fully-burdened life cycle costs by component is an important factor in deciding the appropriate component for a mission, as is readiness, responsiveness, and availability. The Reserve Forces Policy Board estimate was limited in its scope in that it did not address institutional overhead such as schools, training facilities, maintenance, and transportation in preparation for an operational deployment. Additionally, the life cycle costs for Reserve Components increases as they are used in an Operational Reserve role and cost basically the same as the Active Component when mobilized.

Mr. GARAMENDI. In your budget, you request \$321M in MILCON funding for the Army National Guard, a significant reduction of almost 48% from FY13 funding. My understanding is that the justification is based on the Active Army's facility health, which has improved greatly over the last decade, and the assumption that the Guard is in similarly good shape. However, over 46% of Army Guard Readiness Centers are 50 years old and older, and many are not suitable to put soldiers in. The decrease in facility investment will lead to lasting negative impacts on the National Guard ability to effectively serving the Nation and communities during crises. Can you discuss how the Army came to these decisions to decrease much-needed MILCON funding for the ARNG over the next several years?

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army remains committed to providing military construction (MILCON) funding to all components in support of their most urgent facility modernization and recapitalization requirements. Fiscal constraints resulting from the 2011 Budget Control Act triggered funding reductions in Army investment accounts, including MILCON. In the face of these across-the-board reductions, the Army has established a funding allocation among the components that is proportional to the components footprint and to component's recapitalization and deficit requirements.

The Budget Control Act across-the-board reductions resulted in a 60% reduction to the Active Component MILCON funding for the FY13 and FY14 budget years as compared to funding levels in the FY12–16 President's Budget Future years Defense Plan. By comparison, the National Guard received a 17% reduction in funding. Additionally, as compared to FY12–16 funding levels, the Active Component went from 82% of the total FY13 and FY14 MILCON funding to 68% while the National Guard increased from 12% to 21%.

Mr. GARAMENDI. What are the details behind your discussion as to how you came up \$7.8 billion short for war funding?

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army has experienced higher Operation and Maintenance (OMA) Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) costs than initially projected over the course of the fiscal year. These shortfalls initially approached nearly \$10 billion and Army has worked diligently to reduce the shortfall, which currently stands at \$8.3 billion. Continuous reviews with ARCENT update the status of requirements as the year progresses. The reason for the increase from \$7.8 billion to \$8.3 billion is primarily due to Strategic Lift requirements internal to the ARCENT Theater of Operations. Components of the unfunded requirements are:

Activity	Current UFR (\$K)
LOGCAP	\$1,483,725
Stock Fund	\$1,607,835
Non-Stock Fund	\$1,498,000
In-Theater Maintenance (ITM)	\$791,675
Subsistence for Civilians	\$145,000
Premium Transportation	\$234,000
TACSWACAA	\$200,558
160th Signal BDE	\$43,973
Second Destination Transportation	\$1,385,920
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$7,390,686</b>
CLS ISR BA4 Capability Support	\$285,500
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$7,676,186</b>
STRATLIFT	\$600,000
<b>OMA OCO Total</b>	<b>\$8,276,186</b>

As of: 6 May 2013

Activity Details.

a. Theater Operations. (LOGCAP, Stock Fund, Non-Stock Fund, In-Theater Maintenance) Fuel, repair parts, and other supplies for units continue to be consumed at a high rate, in correlation with Active combat operations. While USFOR-A has closed a considerable number of FOBs and COBs; a significant number remains, including the large hubs in Kabul and Kandahar which account for the majority of the LOGCAP and local service contract costs.

b. Subsistence and Premium Transportation. Army is responsible to fund subsistence and the transportation of subsistence items for all service members, DOD Civilians and Contract personnel in Theater. The number of civilians and contractors currently in Theater exceeds the projected PB13 level developed last year.

c. Total Army Communications Southwest Asia, Central Asia (TACSWACAA)/160th Signal BDE In-Theater Support. These programs provide a robust strategic communications capability in the Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). 160th Signal BDE In-Theater Support provides all combat and combat support forces communication engineering/logistics/security support. TACSWACAA provides the tactical ability to perform C2, requisition of repair parts/supplies, and transportation operations in-theater. These programs rely on contractors to reduce the deployment (potentially a brigade-size element) of Signal Soldiers.

d. Second Destination Transportation (SDT). While the PAK GLOC is open, it has yet to achieve its pre-closure rates. 20% of the export cargo shipped for the month of April flowed along the PAK GLOC. As it continues to mature, we anticipate approximately 55% of export cargo will move on it. The remaining export cargo will flow along the other three routes, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), multimodal and direct air, which will balance the goals of cost avoidance and risk reduction by maintaining viable retrograde options. The PAK GLOC is fragile in terms of opening/closing due to political and military events. If it is closed again for some reason, or does not achieve the desired level of throughput the Army will have to increase its use of the other more expensive routes.

e. Contract Logistics Support (CLS) ISR, PGSS/VADER. Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) is a stand-alone tethered aerostat well-suited for small to medium-sized sites. PGSS provides radar systems to cue aerostat payloads providing near real-time eyes on target. PGSS also provides a communications platform for EPLRS/SINCGARS. Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) allows accurate Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery readily available to ground commanders. The antenna is designed to support multiple missions, including the capability to detect dismounts and facilitate the exploitation of this data.

f. Strategic Lift (STRATLIFT). STRATLIFT supports deployment and redeployment of Soldiers and Equipment to the CENTCOM AOR, including the intra-theater movement and shipments associated with MRAP shipments to Theater.

Mr. GARAMENDI. In your testimony 2 days ago in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee you stated that the National Guard needs "Two years' notice for deployments." First, I'm curious from where did you come up with that number, since my Adjutant General tells me that his units can be mobilized with no notice and be ready to train? And moreover, even if your assertion is correct, with the Army Force Generation model, don't you have a certain percentage of the National Guard force ready to go in any given year? If this model has worked so well, why then, are you abandoning it now?

General ODIERNO. Thirty-nine (39) days a year is the statutory number of days in a fiscal year for a Guard unit to train and includes 1 weekend per month (24 days on Inactive Duty status) and 15 days of Annual Training on Active Duty status. In support of operational deployments, Guard units are given additional pay/training resources to complete a 5-year rotational model divided into 1-year periods, with the unit being available for mobilization and deployment in the fifth year. In the first two years, Guard units have 39 days each year for training. In the third year, National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) have 48.5 days for training. Other units have 39 days. In the fourth year, BCTs have 54 to 60 days for training. Other units have 48.5 training days (National Guard) or 45 training days (Army Reserve). In year 5 the unit is available for mobilization and deployment (consisting of 270 days deployed and 90 days for leave and demobilization training). Upon completion of the deployment or completion of the available year without a deployment, the unit returns to the Reset phase of their next 5-year cycle.

The progressive readiness model has been effective and efficient to meet the demands of persistent conflict, while also balancing the needs of National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers, their employers, and their families with respect to predictability of training requirements and deployments. Fiscal restraints and reduction in demand for forces post OEF will influence the Army's end strength and force structure.

In contrast, Active units in the Train/Ready period can train for 218 days prior to deployment. Because of their higher state of readiness, Active Component units can be deployed more rapidly than Reserve Component forces in response to a no notice or short notice crisis. Reserve Component units require additional time to mobilize, train, equip, and deploy. Analysis of Contingency Plan requirements indicates

that there are timelines the National Guard/Reserve cannot meet due to the mobilization process. The Army constantly examines our force structure to ensure we have the right force properly manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish the missions outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance.

Mr. GARAMENDI. In your testimony two days ago in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee you stated that National Guardsmen train “39 days a year.” And that “Active Component trains over 250 days a year.” Where are you getting these numbers from and can you please provide me the documentation that backs up this statement? You also stated that utilizing more National Guardsmen in place of Active Component soldiers would mean “if you decide to go that way, you’re taking significant risk in being able to respond to unknown contingencies.” General, isn’t that your job to have these soldiers ready? Please explain why you would be unable to maintain a ready force if the Reserve Component is utilized more?

General ODIERNO. Thirty-nine (39) days a year is the statutory number of days in a fiscal year for a Guard unit to train and includes 1 weekend per month (24 days on Inactive Duty status) and 15 days of Annual Training on Active Duty status. In support of operational deployments, Guard units are given additional pay/training resources to complete a 5-year rotational model divided into 1-year periods, with the unit being available for mobilization and deployment in the fifth year. In the first two years, Guard units have 39 days each year for training. In the third year, National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) have 48.5 days for training. Other units have 39 days. In the fourth year, BCTs have 54 to 60 days for training. Other units have 48.5 training days (National Guard) or 45 training days (Army Reserve). In year 5 the unit is available for mobilization and deployment (consisting of 270 days deployed and 90 days for leave and demobilization training). Upon completion of the deployment or completion of the available year without a deployment, the unit returns to the Reset phase of their next 5-year cycle.

The progressive readiness model has been effective and efficient to meet the demands of persistent conflict, while also balancing the needs of National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers, their employers, and their families with respect to predictability of training requirements and deployments. Fiscal restraints and reduction in demand for forces post OEF will influence the Army’s end strength and force structure.

In contrast, Active units in the Train/Ready period can train for 218 days prior to deployment. Because of their higher state of readiness, Active Component units can be deployed more rapidly than Reserve Component forces in response to a no notice or short notice crisis. Reserve Component units require additional time to mobilize, train, equip, and deploy. Analysis of Contingency Plan requirements indicates that there are timelines the National Guard/Reserve cannot meet due to the mobilization process. The Army constantly examines our force structure to ensure we have the right force properly manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish the missions outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance.

---

#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN

Mr. RUNYAN. The M1 Abrams engine fuel efficiency initiative is one of the critical upgrades required to extend the life of the tank to 2045. Previously, the Army testified that 60% of the maintenance costs for the Abrams is related to the engine and transmission, and that by improving the power train, the Army would achieve 17% improvement in fuel efficiency. HASC also understands this pending upgrade will provide \$1.6 billion in savings. What is the funding status of this engine upgrade program?

General ODIERNO. The Abrams Fuel Efficiency Initiative (FEI) is an effort that leverages existing improvements in turbine engine and transmission technology to reduce the amount of fuel consumed. This initiative will reduce the number of component parts in the powertrain (engine and transmission) to lower operational and support costs. The Product Manager for the Abrams Tank is actively supporting an Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) led cost benefit analysis (CBA) for a more fuel efficient Abrams powertrain. The alternatives being considered are: Transmission FEI only; Full Turbine Powertrain (engine & transmission) FEI; GDLS diesel powertrain (for potential Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) commonality); BAE Hybrid Electric Diesel (for potential GCV commonality); L3 1790 Diesel; and the Common Aviation Turbine program. The CBA is expected to be completed in 4QFY13.

The Abrams FEI initiative is not currently an approved or funded program, but could become a core Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) effort in a future Abrams ECP-2 modernization effort. The Army is keenly aware of the benefits of an Abrams

FEI effort and will review opportunities to pursue an executable FEI program once the ARCIC CBA is complete.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH

Ms. DUCKWORTH. In the Army's FY2014 request for Procurement programs, you requested \$592.2 million in research and development for the Ground Combat Vehicle program. Are you concerned about the programmatic risk we are assuming by essentially letting one contractor run the timeline for research and development? I as much as any of my fellow Members on the Committee want our soldiers to have modernized and effective equipment that is worthy of the best military in the world, but can you speak to the need of this vehicle that current assets cannot provide? Do you believe that those functionalities are 1) attainable and 2) worth the cost and potential program overruns we might incur? Are the functions of having a higher seating capacity worth the \$24 billion? How do you respond to criticisms that we would be spending \$28 billion (a conservative estimate that assumes all goes according to plan) on a Ground Combat Vehicle on a major weapons system that is uncertain to have utility in future conflicts?

Secretary MCHUGH. 1. The Army understands the programmatic risk associated with carrying one vendor into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. However, in light of the current fiscal environment and after a careful assessment, the Army believes the cost to carry a second vendor at approximately \$2.5B into the EMD phase would not, with any degree of certainty, yield a corresponding significant programmatic savings or risk reduction. We believe, based on the use of mature technologies and the progress made in the Technology Development (TD) phase, that the current strategy is low-moderate risk and achievable.

2. Current vehicles do not provide the necessary combination of force protection, lethality, mobility, and growth potential to pace future threats in both the Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS) environments. Ten years of adapting the current Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to an ever-changing threat has quickly reduced the space available on the IFV to adjust to future threats. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) will allow us to protect our Soldiers to the anticipated level of threat, as well as have the potential to grow capabilities (protection, lethality, network, etc . . . ) in the future. In Operation Iraqi Freedom the IFV was particularly vulnerable to IEDs, continually putting the mounted infantry squad at high risk. Making the IFV more survivable against IEDs resulted in an IFV that is still under-protected, under powered, and challenged to house the full suite of network equipment required to leverage our communications technology advantages over the enemy.

3. The functionalities are both attainable and worth the investment. The GCV program is based on the use of mature technologies to mitigate the risk of potential program overruns. The requirements, as laid out in the current Draft Capabilities Development Document (CDD), are achievable. Supporting technologies such as armor, propulsion systems (engine and transmissions), and weapons are mature and ready to enter the EMD phase. Our focus will continue to be on integrating key components and subsystems. In fact, during the TD phase the Army adjusted the requirements to reduce technology-related risks and better align with achievable technologies and reduce unit cost. The Army will continue to use an Independent Review Team for identifying technology risks and to adjust the appropriate requirements as necessary.

4. The \$24 billion purchases protection, lethality, adaptability, mobility, and space, weight, power & cooling (SWaP-C). Adequate protection and the ability to adapt that protection cause the need for a new hull; the current hull is unable to provide both the protection and adaptability. In designing a new hull, the Army addressed Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) considerations to inform a new hull design, one of which was squad integrity. The ability to carry the entire squad increased mission effectiveness and reduced casualties because it enabled squad deployment with unit integrity, providing immediate, coherent combat power on the ground. The added cost of increasing seating capacity is estimated at \$200 thousand per vehicle, or approximately \$375 million for the 1,874 vehicles. Approximately \$375 million is the cost of adding the additional seating capacity of two Soldiers and gaining squad integrity.

5. The GCV investment provides the Army a combination of increased force protection, lethality, mobility and growth potential to defeat threats in both the CAM and WAS environments. The Army must equip its forces across the range of military operations to ensure that it can deter and defeat future threats. The Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the tactical force element that is designed purpose-

fully to defeat those state adversary capabilities that could threaten allies, proliferate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or hold vital interests at risk. The GCV closes the gaps of the current IFV. The GCV is designed to be effective in both CAM and WAS to include being adaptable to the uncertainty of future conflict requirements. The IFV mission is a critical piece of the Army role to counter WMD, to project power despite Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD), and to defeat and deter aggression.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Last week, your office issued a concerning memo to Members of Congress advising us of a change in policy regarding deployments of Army National Guard and the Army Reserve where you propose canceling some or all future deployments for the Army National Guard beginning in FY14. The memo stated that cost savings was one of the reasons for this drastic and seemingly counterintuitive change. I as much as anybody want to make sure we are spending less, not more; and smarter. How much do you estimate would be saved by replacing Guardsmen with Active Duty personnel on overseas deployments? Have you factored into account the long-term costs Active Duty personnel would have, rather than the short-term savings for FY14? A recent report from The Reserve Forces Policy Board found that the life-cycle cost of one National Guardsman is less than one third that of his Active Duty counterpart. Considering that guardsmen train and perform to the same standards; can perform any mission as active duty; and no longer incur expenses such as dependent housing, schooling, and health care once they complete their deployment, how do you see this as an effective long-term cost-savings measure for the Army? Why would you remove the Army National Guard from historically Guard-led missions in Kosovo, the Sinai, and the Horn of Africa, where trust and partnership have already been established? Would removing the Army National Guard from overseas deployments cause a significant drop in the high levels of readiness that the Guard has attained through over a decade of overseas operations? Wouldn't this drop in readiness incur additional long-term costs in order to return to readiness levels sufficient for future threats? How do you justify your commitment to the Total Force Policy if you intend on restricting or eliminating the Army National Guard's rotation in overseas operations?

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. In FY13, the Army still faces a more than \$13 billion Operation and Maintenance account shortfall. This includes the \$5.5 billion reduction due to sequestration and an \$8.3 billion shortfall in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) account. The emergency reprogramming action being considered by Congress would restore \$5 billion of the \$8.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall. However, without any additional transfer authority or supplemental, the Army would be forced to fund the remaining \$3.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall from its already reduced Base OMA account. We need to save money and find every dollar we can. This has also forced us to make some tough choices, and the decision to change the sourcing for the Kosovo, Sinai, and Horn of Africa missions from Reserve Component to Active Component (AC) units is one of those decisions. We estimate it will allow us to save \$84.8 million dollars. It is important to note that RC units are not alone in being impacted by the current fiscal environment. The fiscal constraints, combined with ongoing mission analysis and requirement changes, have resulted in the cancellation of worldwide deployments for 57 AC units this fiscal year alone, and more are being considered in the future.

---

#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. PALAZZO. Last week it came to my attention that the Army is taking away some Guard missions under the guise of cost savings. According to a memo released last week, beginning in FY14 the Army will substitute Active Component Units for Reserve Components where cost savings are possible. My biggest concern is that taking away these Guard deployments will marginalize the force and potentially take it back to pre-9/11 Strategic Reserve status. Congress has put a tremendous amount of effort and tens of billions of dollars into making the Army National Guard an operational force over a decade of conflict. I am all for cutting the budget and doing it smartly, but gentlemen this is just another step too far. If the point is to save money, it should be noted that a National Guard member costs about one-third of his Active Duty counterpart, and nearly \$2.6 billion could be saved for every 10,000 positions shifted from the full-time AC to the part-time Guard. It's time to relook at the savings that can be found in rebalancing the force.

This proposal is counter to the Army's promise of keeping the Guard and Reserve operational and represents what amounts to a reduction in mission for the National Guard. The Army National Guard of 2013 is the best-manned, best-trained, best-

equipped, and most experienced force in its long history. Ceasing overseas deployments of National Guard troops will cause a domino effect ultimately resulting in a diminishment of the great investment Congress has made in the Guard over the last decade.

If you have anything to add about this issue, I welcome your thoughts.

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. In FY13, the Army faces the combined effects of a sequestered budget and an increase in theater demand. These two have put a \$13 billion pressure on the Army's Operation and Maintenance accounts. This includes the \$4.6 billion Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) reduction due to sequestration and an \$8.3 billion theater activities level higher than the FY13 President's Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request. The emergency reprogramming action being considered by Congress would restore \$5 billion of the \$8.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall. However, without any additional transfer authority or supplemental, the Army would be forced to fund the remaining \$3.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall from its already reduced base OMA account. We need to save money and find every dollar we can. This has forced us to make some tough choices, and the decision to change the sourcing for the Kosovo, Sinai, and Horn of Africa missions from Reserve Component to Active Component units is one of those decisions. We estimate it will allow us to save \$84.8 million across FY13 and FY14. It is important to note that RC units are not alone in being impacted by the current fiscal environment. The fiscal constraints, combined with ongoing mission analysis and requirement changes, have resulted in the cancellation of worldwide deployments for 57 AC units this fiscal year alone, and more are being considered in the future.

Understanding fully-burdened life cycle costs by component is an important factor in deciding the appropriate component for a mission, as is readiness, responsiveness, and availability. The Armed Forces Policy Board estimate was limited in its scope in that it did not address institutional overhead such as schools, training facilities, maintenance, and transportation in preparation for an operational deployment. Additionally, the life cycle costs for Reserve Components increases as they are used in an Operational Reserve role and cost basically the same as the Active Component when mobilized.

The Army will continue to train, man and equip the RC through the progressive readiness model for preplanned missions. The RC provides unique capabilities to meet geographic combatant command requirements; currently we have over 39K deployed worldwide.

---

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY

Mrs. ROBY. As I understand the Budget Request, our Army has a substantial problem of underfunded Operations and Maintenance accounts, which has forced you to make hard decisions. As a general statement, the O&M problem is forcing you to use your Procurement Accounts as a bill payer to cover the O&M shortfall.

Given this O&M challenge, would you agree that when this Committee considers decisions for the FY14 bill, we can help you best by carefully considering the O&M impacts on the Army?

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Committee can best help the Army by carefully considering the O&M budget submission and help us buy back the readiness we will lose due to the impacts of sequestration in FY13. The Army will outline the buyback of readiness in the Notice to Congress on Unfunded Priorities (Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013).

Mrs. ROBY. The National Guard continues to benefit greatly from the multimission capability of the Lakota helicopter. Its versatility, low cost of maintenance, and reliability continue to greatly assist the National Guard in their role of supporting civil authorities with a wide range of missions. Moreover, the increasing need for helicopters to assist the Border Patrol and State law enforcement agencies in keeping our borders safe is a crucial component of any immigration reform.

As the Army continues to look for the Guard as more of an Operational versus a Strategic Reserve, are we ensuring that NORTHCOM is proactively working with the TAGS to leverage National Guard aviation units' unique ability to work with Federal and State authorities in providing critical rotary-wing capacity for border security?

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. The United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security are working hand-in-hand with the National Guard Bureau to ensure that their mission requirements are resourced adequately. The current employment of the 11 UH-72A Lakotas on the southern border to help reinforce the Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine fleet of nearly 300 aircraft is just one of many examples. While the



UH-72A is a very capable aircraft in a permissive environment like the border mission, it is only one of many aircraft the National Guard has at its disposal to execute that particular mission.

---

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I am interested in the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept. I think language and cultural training will make our general purpose forces more effective. How will this concept work in practice? Will a brigade assigned to, say, Africa Command remain tied to that COCOM? How will sequestration impact the deployment of Regionally Aligned Brigades?

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept is an organizing principle for the provision of Army forces to the geographic and functional Combatant Commands (CCMDs). RAF are drawn from the Army Total Force, which includes the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve components. Regional alignment of the Army Total Force enables the Army to support the CCMD with more versatility, greater responsiveness, consistent availability and focused commitment. As part of the concept, Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will be allocated to CCMDs in support of all Theater Campaign Plan requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation activities. Most forces are based in CONUS but aligned to CCMDs for planning, coordination, and engagement.

Army Forces will achieve a baseline of training that focuses on combined arms maneuver and wide area security, while developing the language, regional expertise and cultural training necessary to support CCMD-directed requirements. Through active engagement in various missions and activities, ranging from ongoing operations and exercises to small-scale security cooperation activities, soldiers and units will build their individual and institutional knowledge of the culture and potential operating environment. This will energize our leaders and soldiers, facilitate an expeditionary mindset, and better prepare them for future operations should the need to respond to conflict arise.

Habitual alignment will occur at Echelon above Brigade (Corps and Division level); although full implementation of habitual alignment will not be possible before FY17. While it is highly desirable to maintain habitual alignment at BCT level, the practicalities of current defense missions and the mix of BCT capabilities makes this a goal that may not be fully met.

The cost to implement the RAF concept will be drawn entirely from the current Army O&M budget. While RAF implementation is viable under sequestration, the ability for the concept to reach full potential in supporting CCMD requirements will be delayed across additional budget years. This is mainly due to decreased funding for CCMD programs, exercises, Department of State (DOS) Title 22 programs, and decisive action training for units in FY13. Regional alignment does not create new, unfunded requirements for training, equipping, or employing the Army Force, nor does it create new programs for overseas employment. It better organizes and prepares the Army to fulfill existing, funded requirements.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The Paladin Integrated Management system will be built in my home state of Oklahoma at Fort Sill. Can you talk about the status of testing and evaluation? Please describe why PIM is so important to the warfighter.

Secretary McHUGH and General ODIERNO. Testing and evaluation of the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) system remains on schedule. The system has fired over 5,000 test rounds, been driven over 7,000 miles, and is meeting the program requirements. A Limited User Test of six days of Operational Testing was successfully completed in November 2012. Soldier feedback on system performance has been favorable. PIM's new chassis provides additional size, weight, and power capacity to support add-on armor for improved force protection and the ability to accommodate current and future Army network requirements. PIM shares a common power train with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle enabling this system to maneuver with the Armored Brigade Combat Team combat vehicles, while reducing the logistical footprint. The Army's current self-propelled howitzer, the M109A6 Paladin, does not provide sufficient force protection for Soldiers on today's battlefield and cannot support key technology integration such as the Network and the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station. Without the PIM program, the Army would be required to maintain the current M109A6 howitzers with chassis built in the 1960s that are 12,750 pounds over the design specifications. Additionally, the engines have already been overhauled 2-3 times each and the M109A6 has no ability to stay with the Abrams and Bradley in mobile warfare.

**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI**

Mrs. WALORSKI. Last year sixteen Adjutants General requested funding to modernize the aging HMMWV fleet. Over 60% of our vehicle inventory is more than 20 years old, rendering them unable to accommodate the necessary enhancements through the RECAP process that result in the payload, power, fuel efficiency and systems required to meet the missions of tomorrow. In the recently approved FY2013 Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, a \$100 million fund to begin a multiyear program to modernize our rapidly aging HMMWV fleet was approved. What are your plans relative to this issue, and what priority do you attach to it relative to your modernization programs?

General ODIERNO. The Army supports the use of the \$100M to continue the highly successful Recapitalization (RECAP) program at Red River Army Depot while divesting excess High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). The Army considers this program the most cost effective means to improve overall readiness, but is placing less priority on RECAP and more emphasis on divestiture. The Army HMMWV inventory on hand (149K) exceeds both current (134K) and projected Light Tactical Vehicles requirements (all projected to be significantly lower than 134K). Army data shows that the Light Tactical fleet for the Army National Guard (ARNG) will be 7.9 years old after they divest their excess HMMWVs which account for the majority of the vehicles over 20 years old. The ARNG supports the Army's equipment modernization strategy to modernize Light Tactical Vehicles by recapitalizing existing Up-Armor HMMWVs. During the RECAP process, HMMWVs are disassembled, rebuilt with parts support from AM General, and returned to units in the latest configuration with "zero miles, zero hours." The Army's current approved requirement to procure new vehicles is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and we have prioritized our resources to provide this much needed capability.

