[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RESILIENT COMMUNICATIONS: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE
ADVANCEMENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-116
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-857 WASHINGTON : 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida, Chairman
Scott Rigell, Virginia Laura Richardson, California
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania, Vice Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Chair Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Blake Farenthold, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Robert L. Turner, New York (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications..................... 1
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications........... 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
WITNESSES
Panel I
Ms. Roberta ``Bobbie'' Stempfley, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. David S. Turetsky, Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Panel II
Mr. Kyle Malady, Senior Vice President, Global Network
Engineering and Operations, Verizon:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Mr. Terry Hall, President, APCO International:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
Mr. Telford E. ``Trey'' Forgety, Director of Government
Relations, National Emergency Number Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Christopher I. McIntosh, Interoperability Coordinator, Office of
Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, Commonwealth of
Virginia:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
APPENDIX
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for David S. Turetsky.... 51
Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for David S.
Turetsky....................................................... 51
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Telford E. ``Trey''
Forgety........................................................ 52
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Kyle Malady.......... 53
RESILIENT COMMUNICATIONS: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE ADVANCEMENTS
----------
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:26 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bilirakis, Marino, Turner,
Richardson, Clarke, and Hochul.
Mr. Bilirakis. Good afternoon. Thank you for your patience.
The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will come to an order. The subcommittee is
meeting today to receive testimony on efforts to ensure the
resiliency of our communication capability.
Now I will give my opening statement.
Yesterday marked the 11th anniversary of the September 11
terrorist attacks. Among the many important recommendations
made by the 9/11 Commission was the need for operable and
interoperable communications. Much progress has been made in
the realm of communications since September 11 and Hurricane
Katrina.
Federal, State, and local entities have worked to enhance
their communications capabilities. The Office of Emergency
Communications has been working with States and localities to
accomplish the goals in the National Emergency Communications
Plan.
At long last, the D-Block has been allocated to public
safety. Members were recently appointed to the First Responder
Network Authority, or FirstNet. FirstNet works with Federal,
State, local, and Tribal partners. They will work to develop,
build, and operate the Nation-wide interoperable wireless
broadband network.
I am interested in hearing from all our witnesses about
their thoughts on the development and operation of the network.
To ensure and enhance the continuity of communications at the
Federal level, earlier this summer, President Obama signed
Executive Order 13618, ``Assignment of National Security and
Emergency Communications Functions.''
This Executive Order requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to serve as co-chair of the executive committee
established by the Executive Order. The Secretary must also
establish a joint program office in support of the executive
committee.
This committee has been aware of plans within the
Department to reorganize the communications functions within
the National Protection and Programs Directorate, although
requests for details on the structure of such a reorganization
have gone--they have gone unanswered.
Mr. Stempfley, I am particularly interested in hearing
about the Executive Order's impact on the communications
offices in NPPD. We must ensure that any reorganization or
consolidation of offices does not impair the ability of OEC and
NCS to achieve their vital missions, or erode any of the
advancements in our communications capabilities made to date.
While we acknowledge the progress we have made in these
areas, we must also acknowledge that more work remains. We need
only look at the impact of the derecho earlier this summer, the
storm, of course, that hit Virginia, and the impact of the 9-1-
1 call centers, of course, in the State of Virginia.
I am aware that there have been a number of reviews of what
happened as a result of the storm. I hope our witnesses will
discuss their findings and we can work together to use these
lessons learned to enhance the system in the future.
I am also interested in hearing about future capabilities
that next generation 9-1-1 will be to offer our emergency
response providers and the public they so ably serve.
With that, I welcome our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimony.
Now I will recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Richardson
from California, for her opening statement. You are recognized.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, on behalf of the committee and the Chairman
and all the Members here, I would like to acknowledge the
unfortunate loss that we had last night of Ambassador Stevens
and the other Foreign Service personnel. As those of you who
are here testifying, you serve the American public as we do.
In times like these, there is no aisle. We are all serving
the public. We want to thank you for your service and also be
very grateful for those families who experienced this loss.
With that, I would like to thank the witnesses who are here
today, and Mr. Bilirakis for holding this timely hearing.
Yesterday, as we observed the 11th anniversary of the September
11 attacks, as the Chairman mentioned, we were reminded of the
chaos that ensued as courageous first responders struggled to
use inadequate communications equipment to coordinate and
affect their mission.
Although the Nation has come a long way in gaining operable
and interoperable communications capabilities, 11 years and $13
billion later, we still have not achieved the goal of providing
Nation-wide interoperable communications capabilities for our
first responders.
Moreover, the derecho that hit, the disaster that hit the
Midwest and the Northeast in June demonstrated that even 9-1-1
technology that we had taken for granted is still vulnerable.
No matter how established a communications technology is, or
how much we invest to improve it, it is only as reliable as the
policies we have in place to ensure that it works.
I am pleased that earlier this year, President Obama signed
into law legislation creating a Nation-wide public safety
broadband network. I am hopeful that this network will
ultimately achieve the goal of providing our first responders
with a robust, state-of-the-art, interoperable communications
network.
At the same time, though, I am mindful that the building of
this network will be expensive and that it will require strong
collaboration with the private sector and the support of the
States if it is to achieve its maximum potential.
Unfortunately, given the severe fiscal crisis that we are
all experiencing on the local, State, and Federal level,
implementation, to be frank, is questionable. Towards that end,
I am troubled that the FirstNet board has not seen the need to
be able to include the local State partners, which I think will
be critical to all of our success.
Through that appointment last month and not including an
individual representing the State governments, some States may
consider not participating, which would be an expense to us
all.
I will be interested in learning today how FirstNet's
Federal partners can help create incentives to States to
participate in the Public Safety Broadband Network.
Otherwise, I am encouraged that the FCC is working with
FirstNet to undertake efforts to create strict technical and
interoperable requirements to ensure that networks developed by
States that opt out of the FirstNet are interoperable with
Federal networks.
Strong Federal leadership is required to ensure that the
public gets the Nation-wide interoperable that it is paying
for. Although Federal leadership and support is needed to
ensure that existing emergency communications technologies are
resilient and improve at the pace that the public expects, we
all have to accept a responsibility in that role as well.
As many people in this room have experienced, power outages
and backup power failures and private phone and cell networks
disrupted the 9-1-1 system across Northern Virginia, leaving
over 1 million people unable to call 9-1-1 for help if they
needed it.
I understand that the private provider and the FCC have
each conducted investigations into that 9-1-1 failure. We look
forward to the results.
I look forward to hearing about the proactive measures that
have been agreed upon to undertake and prevent future 9-1-1
failures going forward, and about the efforts that the FCC will
undertake to improve the resilience of the 9-1-1 system.
Additionally, while it is important to ensure the
resilience of the existing 9-1-1 technology, we must support
the transition to the next generation 9-1-1 technology as well.
Current 9-1-1 technology is outdated and does not have the
capabilities to receive the full complement of data and text
information that the public is capable of communicating.
Imagine that people incorrectly believe that 9-1-1 centers
can receive text messages. A next generation 9-1-1 system that
can support innovative technology will better serve us all.
Ultimately the Federal Government must provide the guidance
and the resources to help State and local governments implement
the next generation of 9-1-1 technology--excuse me, the next
generation of 9-1-1 technology.
Finally, I would like to return and acknowledge the fiscal
burdens that are faced by the States and for us here Federally
as well, and the struggle that we all will have before us to
maintain and to implement emergency communications capabilities
through the years of investment that has been done thus far.
Federal guidance for State emergency communications
investments must establish clear guidelines to ensure cash-
strapped States do not waste their limited resources.
Again, I look forward to the witnesses' testimonies here
today. I thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Ranking Member Richardson.
Also, my thoughts and prayers go out to the families of the
ambassador, the Americans that were killed in Libya yesterday.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 12, 2012
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing. I look forward
to hearing from our panel of witnesses.
The September 11 tragedy and Hurricane Katrina taught us that
interoperable communications are essential during a disaster.
Those catastrophic events taught us that lives can be saved if
first responders are able to communicate with each other.
Few questioned the need to provide Federal grant funding to enable
State and local governments to achieve interoperability.
Over the last decade, the Nation has invested $13 billion toward
the goal of creating a resilient, interoperable communications
infrastructure.
Our efforts to create that infrastructure have met with some
success in improving the ability of first responders and public safety
personnel to communicate with each other.
However, as every parent knows, ability does not always lead to
achievement.
While funding has assured the availability of the tools, we must
now move forward by making sure that the policies, procedures, and
formal linkages are in place to achieve success.
Our next steps must involve the effective coordination among
Federal, State, and local stakeholders in reviewing emergency
communications failures and developing requirements and standards for
advanced public safety communications systems.
Without coordination, our first responders will not be able to keep
pace as the technology changes the means of communication.
As a practical example, we know that most people under 30 do not
talk on the phone--they text. Text messages and video voicemail are now
standard communication methods. Yet few emergency response systems are
able to receive those kinds of communications.
We cannot allow disaster response efforts to be hampered because
Federal, State, and local governments are unable to reach the necessary
agreements to advance public safety communications systems.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, building a fully interoperable public
safety communications network can be achieved. It will require
collaboration and coordination. I hope that all the parties--public and
private sector--are ready for the challenge.
I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Before we turn to our first panel, the
subcommittee has received multiple written statements from
amateur radio operators. I ask unanimous consent to insert them
for the record.
Without objection, so ordered.* Thank you.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would like to recognize Mr. Clarke.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also ask unanimous
consent to insert a written statement from the National
Association of Broadcasters into the record.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. So ordered. Without objection, so
ordered.*
Mr. Clarke. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. I am pleased to welcome our first panel of
witnesses.
Our first witness is Ms. Bobbie Stempfley. Ms. Stempfley is
deputy assistant secretary of the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications. She previously served as the acting assistant
secretary for CS&C, as well as the director of the National
Cybersecurity Division.
Prior to joining DHS, Ms. Stempfley served as the chief
information officer for the Defense Information System Agency.
Ms. Stempfley received a bachelors of science in engineering
mathematics from the University of Arizona, and a masters of
science in the computer science from James Madison University.
Following Ms. Stempfley, we will receive testimony from Mr.
David Turetsky. Mr. Turetsky is the bureau chief of the Federal
Communications Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau.
Prior to joining the FCC, Mr. Turetsky served as deputy
assistant attorney general for civil and regulatory matters in
the Anti-Trust Division, and as senior counsel to the assistant
attorney general.
Mr. Turetsky has also held positions in the private sector
and private legal practice. Welcome.
Again, welcome. You entire written statements will appear
in the record. I ask that you each summarize your testimony for
5 minutes.
We will begin with Ms. Stempfley. Again, I want to thank
you for your patience. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ROBERTA ``BOBBIE'' STEMPFLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Stempfley. Thank you very much, Chairman Bilirakis,
Ranking Member Richardson, distinguished Members of the
committee. It is a pleasure to come and speak with you today
about the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to improve
communications for emergency response providers and Government
officials.
As you know, DHS remains focused on improving and providing
reliable communication capabilities for those important folks,
those first to arrive at a disaster site, the Nation's
emergency responders and our Federal, State, and local
partners.
At DHS, we recognizes that critical communications tools
are more than just technology. It is not the right equipment or
the right solution. It is a spectrum of things that range from
governance to standards to operating procedures, training and
exercises, integration of those systems into daily operations,
as well as that technology.
We have a complete set of work at the Department that
focuses on all of these efforts. Providing effective
communications solutions requires fostering and nurturing
relationships, relationships with those who own and operate the
communications infrastructure, with international standards
bodies, members of the emergency response community, and
especially our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
partners, as they are crucial as technology advances.
The Nation-wide Public Safety Broadband Network will affect
all aspects of emergency communications for our first
responders. As the network is planned and deployed, it is
essential that DHS is prepared to adapt to these changes and
support advancements in technology.
To this end, the Department is conducting a full review of
the functions and programs within the Office of Cybersecurity
and Communications to identify improvements that can be made in
the communications programs.
As you pointed out, this review was initiated in response
to Executive Order 13618, ``Assignment of National Security and
Emergency Preparedness Communications,'' signed by the
President on July 6, 2012.
The Executive Order benefits the overall DHS communications
mission by updating National security and emergency
preparedness communications responsibilities of the Federal
Government. The implementation of this will ensure the
Department is able to address the challenges of a dynamic
technological environment.
Through this review process, we are focused on increasing
the quality and breadth of support offered to our stakeholders,
which will be particularly helpful as we prepare for the
implementation of this Nation-wide public safety broadband
network and we continue the other important initiatives
underway.
DHS will continue in its responsibility of shaping National
policy and working with DHS components, Federal departments and
agencies, State and local governments, the private sector and
international partners to improve communication capabilities
and achieve the mission requirements and build on the progress
made to date.
As a part of the Department's progress in improving
interoperability, we have developed and implemented the
National Emergency Communications Plan. This plan contained the
first set of National performance goals for evaluating
emergency communications during local emergencies and complex
events, and a process for measuring these goals in every State
and territory.
Through the Office of Emergency Communications, a part of
the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, DHS has
achieved the first two goals outlined in this National plan and
is working with stakeholders to update the plan, taking into
consideration all events that have transpired since its
publication in 2008.
A few examples of these improvements we have seen include
creation at the State level of State-wide plans, State-wide
coordinators and governance, improving coordination of
increasing regional investments. Through the OEC Technical
Assistance Program, we have provided more than 700 targeted on-
site visits to State and urban areas to help with specific
issues.
We have also trained more than 4,000 police, firefighters,
and emergency management officials throughout the Nation to set
up communications in a standardized way. Additionally at the
Federal level, OEC has been working with other DHS components
through the One DHS Committee, as well as Federal agencies
through the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center
Committee, to improve emergency communications.
Both of these committees will continue to be actively
involved in the planning for the Nation-wide Public Safety
Broadband Network.
As mentioned, with the support and leadership of several
Members of this committee, the President signed the Middle
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 in February 22,
2012. Prior to the enactment of this law, the Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications was already working with our
Federal partners in the Departments of Commerce and Justice to
represent DHS in the administration's efforts to set broad
policy framework for the network and ensure the voices of State
and local stakeholder partners were heard.
DHS will continue working with those partners at all levels
of government by providing technical assistance, educating
public safety and Government officials, and ensuring the
network meets the needs of our stakeholders through the--
Program.
With the continued progress of the Nation-wide public
safety broadband network, this really is an exciting time for
the public safety community. While we have made significant
progress to ensure that public safety can communicate when
needed, there is still much work to be done.
We appreciate the committee's continued support for our
emergency communications initiatives. Thank you, again, for the
opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stempfley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roberta ``Bobbie'' Stempfley
September 12, 2012
introduction
Thank you Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
distinguished Members of the committee. It is a pleasure to discuss the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to improve
communications for emergency response providers and Government
officials.
DHS remains focused on improving and providing the communications
capabilities for those who are the first to arrive at the scene of a
disaster site--the Nation's emergency responders and our Federal,
State, and local partners. Our National leaders and public safety
personnel must have access to reliable and instantaneous communications
to effectively coordinate response and recovery operations. DHS
recognizes critical communications tools as more than a technology
problem that can be solved with the ``right'' equipment or the
``right'' communications system. All of the critical factors for a
successful communications solution--governance, standards, standard
operating procedures, training and exercises, and integration of
systems into daily operations, as well as technology--are being
addressed through the collective work of our programs.
Further, DHS believes that providing effective communications
solutions requires fostering and nurturing relationships with those who
own and operate the communications infrastructure, international
standards bodies, members of the emergency responder community, and
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners. These
cooperative relationships are crucial to providing interoperable
communications capabilities, planning for and developing priority
services for voice, data, and video communications as networks evolve,
and developing and implementing the Nation-wide Public Safety Broadband
Network.
fulfilling the dhs communications mission
The Nation-wide Public Safety Broadband Network will affect all
aspects of emergency communications for our first responders. As the
network is planned and deployed, it is essential that DHS is prepared
to adapt to these changes and support advancements in technology. To
this end, DHS is conducting a full review of the functions and programs
within CS&C to identify any improvements that could be made to its
communications programs. This review was initiated in response to
Executive Order (EO) 13618, the ``Assignment of National Security and
Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) Communications,'' signed by the
President on July 6, 2012. EO 13618 replaces EO 12472 and eliminates
the National Communications System (NCS). The EO updates and clarifies
the NS/EP communications responsibilities of the Federal Government to
address the challenges of a dynamic technological environment.
EO 13618 requires DHS to develop a management and organizational
plan to implement its NS/EP communications functions. CS&C is
conducting a comprehensive review to develop the plan, which included
an analysis of the functions and services of the OEC, the NCS, the
National Cyber Security Division, and the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC).
The EO further establishes the following two entities:
National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP)
Communications Executive Committee.--The EO created a NS/EP
Communications Executive Committee, an eight-department and
agency interagency committee, co-chaired by DHS and the
Department of Defense (DOD) to make recommendations to the
President of the United States on NS/EP communications-related
matters.
Executive Committee Joint Program Office (JPO).--The EO
directed the Secretary of DHS to establish a Joint Program
Office to support the Executive Committee. DHS is establishing
the JPO within CS&C, which complements DHS's existing
interagency fora and partnerships led by CS&C.
Through these new entities, as well as existing partnerships, DHS
will continue its responsibility of shaping National policy and working
with other DHS components, Federal departments and agencies, State and
local governments, the private sector and international partners to
improve communications capabilities and achieve mission requirements.
current initiatives and on-going challenges
Nation-wide Public Safety Broadband Network
On February 22, 2012, with the help and leadership of the United
States Congress, the President signed the Middle Class Tax Relief and
Job Creation Act of 2012, which establishes the Nation-wide Public
Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) for emergency responders at all levels
of government. The signing of the Act was the culmination of over a
decade of effort to see the reallocation of the ``D Block'' of spectrum
to public safety and to fulfill one of the 9/11 Commission
recommendations: The development of a Nation-wide interoperable
communications network. The Act establishes a new entity within the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the
Department of Commerce to oversee planning, construction, and operation
of the network, known as the First Responder Network Authority, or
FirstNet. The Secretary of Homeland Security is one of the three
Federal representatives to the FirstNet Board, in addition to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Attorney
General. On August 20, 2012, the Secretary of Commerce also appointed
12 additional Board members from the fields of public safety,
technology, network operations, and finance. Prior to the enactment of
the law, DHS, through the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)
within the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) was
already working with our Federal partners in the Departments of
Commerce and Justice to represent DHS in the administration's efforts
to help set the broad policy framework for the NPSBN and to ensure that
the voices of our State and local stakeholder partners were heard. Over
the past few months, DHS has increased its efforts to support the
implementation of the Network and to carry out our statutory
requirement to support the Secretary through her role as a member of
the FirstNet Board. More specific examples include the following
broadband-focused programs and activities:
Planning and Assessments.--DHS is preparing an update to the
National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), which is the
first Nation-wide strategy designed to advance emergency
communications across all levels of government. The updated
NECP will identify key broadband challenges and recommend near-
term actions to foster the integration of broadband
technologies and data capabilities, as well as propose measures
to maintain existing Land Mobile Radio communications
capabilities until broadband technologies can support mission-
critical communications. Simultaneously, CS&C is working with
individual States to update the State-wide Communication
Interoperability Plan (State-wide Plan) criteria to ensure that
State-wide Plans are reflective of broadband technologies and
data capabilities.
DHS is also conducting a cyber risk assessment of the NPSBN to help
the Department and our partners gain a better understanding of
risks related to its deployment. Relying on the Department's
expertise in cybersecurity, DHS will provide FirstNet with this
assessment and recommended implementation steps. We have held
several stakeholder meetings with public safety and industry
representatives to discuss cyber risk issues, with a focus on
network security and interoperability.
Outreach and Coordination.--DHS is working with all of its
stakeholder groups to ensure the views and requirements of the
public safety community are fully represented in broadband
planning and implementation efforts.
To increase coordination of Federal efforts for broadband
implementation, the Emergency Communications Preparedness
Center (ECPC) is working to identify Federal broadband
requirements by preparing a consolidated view of emergency
communications assets, addressing associated legal and
regulatory barriers, reviewing and analyzing Departmental
positions on pending broadband regulatory matters and
rulemakings, and establishing standardized grant guidance
and processes. The ECPC has identified the development of
broadband standards and research and development as one of
its strategic priorities.
Concurrently, the OneDHS Emergency Communications
Committee is providing consolidated Departmental input into
Federal interagency efforts, as well as developing
strategies for broadband technology migration from current
land mobile radio technology to next generation wireless
network technology.
DHS supports outreach efforts related to the development
and deployment of a Nation-wide public safety broadband
network by working with representatives from the SAFECOM
Executive Committee and Emergency Response Council to
develop educational materials on public safety broadband.
Educational materials include information on funding and
governance, and are targeted to multiple audiences.
DHS continues to coordinate with the emergency response
community, preparing wireless broadband guidance documents
for State-wide Interoperability Coordinators, urban area
and regional interoperability coordinators, public
officials and executives, and emergency responders to
support current NECP and State-wide Plan initiatives on
interoperability planning. The Department also continues to
provide emergency response stakeholders up-to-date and
comprehensive information about wireless broadband in the
emergency response environment. In addition, DHS is working
with States and jurisdictions to incorporate broadband
initiatives into the State-wide Plans.
Under the strategy and policy direction of the OneDHS
Emergency Communications Committee, DHS has initiated a
joint program management office to capture and implement
Department-wide broadband requirements to develop a next
generation tactical communications mobile platform for
voice, data, and video.
Grants.--DHS has been coordinating with Federal agencies to
ensure consistency in grant policies and requirements affecting
broadband investments. DHS has worked with its Federal agency
partners to limit investment in high-risk projects that may not
comply with FirstNet requirements or support the development of
a Nation-wide network for public safety users. Further, DHS has
aligned key grant guidance with Federal broadband goals. The
2013 SAFECOM grant guidance, which provides guidance to State
and local stakeholders applying for grants, will emphasize the
need to plan before purchasing--a strategy in full alignment
with the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) State and Local Implementation Grant
Program. The ECPC Recommendations for Federal Agencies:
Financial Assistance for Emergency Communication provides
guidance to Federal program managers administering emergency
communication grants, and stresses the need for technical
compliance to ensure Federally-funded investments are
compatible and interoperable. The ECPC Recommendations Document
will be updated to reflect new programs, policies, and
requirements related to the deployment of the Nationwide Public
Safety Broadband Network.
Technical Assistance.--DHS has developed a wireless
broadband technical assistance offering to assist State, local,
territorial, Tribal, and regional users to develop and improve
their use of broadband technology in line with the vision of a
Nationally-interoperable network. The offering is tailored for
each jurisdiction and provides informational briefings,
governance models, standard operating procedures, project
planning, and engineering support.
Research and Development.--The Science and Technology
Directorate's (S&T) Office for Interoperability and
Compatibility (OIC) is supporting the deployment of the Nation-
wide public safety broadband network through requirements-
gathering and standards acceleration activities. This includes
supporting the Department of Commerce's 700 MHz demonstration
network, which provides public safety with a unique testing
environment for broadband systems and devices before
operational use. Additionally, OIC is working with the
Department of Commerce on a modeling and simulation project to
provide public safety with the ability to evaluate broadband
network deployment scenarios and investigate how well new
technologies support public safety requirements. Further, OIC
is evaluating how to define a transition path for current Land
Mobile Radio technology to the future broadband network.
national and state-wide planning
Over the last 5 years, OEC has worked to fill many gaps in public
safety communications and DHS is seeing progress in several key areas
that enable emergency responders to interoperate in an all-hazards
environment. As part of its mission, the office led a comprehensive
Nation-wide planning effort with more than 150 stakeholders from the
emergency response community to develop the NECP. This included
significant feedback and coordination with the SAFECOM Executive
Committee, the SAFECOM Emergency Response Council, and the National
Public Safety Telecommunications Council. These stakeholder groups
represent the interests of millions of emergency responders, as well as
the State and local governments that public safety communications
serve. Involving these groups in the early phases ensured that the plan
took stakeholders' input into account and would be widely accepted in
the public safety community.
The NECP has been instrumental in defining communication priorities
for public safety personnel at all levels of government. CS&C has been
driving implementation of the NECP in coordination with its Federal,
State, and local partners, and we are seeing measurable improvements in
building capabilities and closing gaps identified in the plan for
governance, training, operating procedures, and others, including:
Enhanced State-wide Coordination.--The creation of State-
wide Communication Interoperability Plans, State-wide
Interoperability Coordinators, and State-wide Interoperability
Governing Bodies has improved coordination of emergency
communications activities and investments throughout all 56
States and territories. Through the State-wide Plan development
and updating process, the State-wide Interoperability
Coordinators, in collaboration with their governing bodies,
have been effective in helping States define their
communications needs and future investments and ensuring that
Federal funding is directed where it is most needed. In
addition, CS&C has conducted over 160 workshops during the past
4 years to assist States as they implement and update their
State-wide Plans.
Common Plans, Protocols, and Procedures.--The use of
standardized plans and procedures is driving improved command,
control, and communications among emergency responder agencies
in the field. CS&C and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) have worked with more than 140 jurisdictions, including
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) regions, to develop
Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans that document
formalized interoperability governance groups, standardized
policies and procedures, and emergency communications equipment
inventories. States continue to develop these communications
plans to cover additional regions.
NECP Goal Assessments
Implementation of the NECP has been a key driver behind much of our
progress in improving interoperability. More than 85 percent of the
NECP milestones were achieved, and progress is evident in all of the
NECP priority areas, including governance, training, and coordination.
Through the NECP, OEC also established the first set of National
performance goals for evaluating emergency communications during local
emergencies and complex events, as well as a process for measuring
these goals in every State and territory. These goals include:
Goal 1.--By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas
designated within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI)
can demonstrate response-level emergency communications within
1 hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and
agencies.
Goal 2.--By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions can
demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 1
hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and
agencies.
Goal 3.--By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions can
demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 3
hours, in the event of a significant event, as outlined in
National planning scenarios.
To implement Goal 1, OEC assessed UASI regions' abilities to
establish and demonstrate response-level emergency communications
during large-scale, planned events. Every urban area was able to
achieve the Goal, and the results showed progress in key emergency
communications capabilities beyond the development of Tactical
Interoperable Communications Plans (TICP) in 2007. For Goal 2, OEC
worked with all States and territories to assess emergency
communications at the county level, including county equivalents such
as parishes, municipalities, and townships. The process has generated
unparalleled data on interoperability emergency communications
capabilities and gaps and is helping DHS and States focus future
resources and improvement activities.
As of today, more than 2,800 counties and county equivalents have
participated in the Goal 2 process, including about 30,000 individual
public safety agencies. Among the participating jurisdictions, about 90
percent were able to achieve response-level communications and
demonstrate NECP Goal 2. The assessment also showed progress in key
areas of emergency communications, including the establishment of more
inclusive governance structures and formal standard operating
procedures, as well as the frequency and ease in which jurisdictions
use interoperable communications solutions.
CS&C is encouraged with the outcome of the NECP Goals. Both the
high level of participation and the demonstration of NECP Goal 1 and 2
are major accomplishments in the Department's on-going efforts to
assess progress Nation-wide and better target its emergency
communications resources, such as grants, technical assistance,
training, and other planning efforts. OEC is currently updating the
NECP and will be revising Goal 3 accordingly to take into consideration
events that have transpired since the NECP was first released in 2008.
This includes key findings from Goals 1 and 2, as well as lessons
learned/best practices from real-world disasters and events, such as
floods, hurricanes, earthquake, and tornadoes of 2011.
Collaboration with Federal Partners
In addition to the extensive progress made to improve emergency
communications at the State, local, and Tribal level noted above
through the work of the NECP, the Department, through OEC, is
coordinating efforts to improve emergency communications among DHS
Components and other Federal agencies.
As mentioned above, CS&C operates the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center to coordinate policy, planning, and administration
of emergency communications across 14 Federal departments and agencies.
The ECPC provides an inter-departmental mechanism to coordinate common
solutions, streamline development of policy and plans and jointly
engage State, local, territorial, and Tribal partners. The ECPC has
achieved early successes through defining a strategic agenda that
reflects shared member priorities and establishes issue-specific focus
groups to drive immediate action.
CS&C also administers the OneDHS Emergency Communications
Committee, which aims to improve internal coordination of policy and
planning across DHS Components with emergency communications missions.
This committee provides a vital mechanism for maximizing the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Department's emergency communications
investments and activities. The OneDHS Committee reached a significant
milestone in June 2011 with the creation of the unified OneDHS
Emergency Communications Strategy. The Strategy establishes a common
vision ``to ensure access to and exchange of mission-critical
information across the Homeland Security Enterprise anywhere, anytime,
through unified capabilities.'' It also sets goals for coordinating and
improving emergency communications architecture, investment,
governance, and operations.
Improved Governance and Coordination.--DHS is working with Federal,
regional, State, and local agencies to increase coordination,
information sharing, and oversight of interoperability through formal
governance structures and partnerships. CS&C instituted a Regional
Coordination Program to strengthen collaboration and knowledge sharing
with our stakeholders. CS&C has established a Regional Coordinator in
each of the 10 FEMA Regions, and they regularly participate in the
State-wide Interoperability Governing Bodies, urban area
interoperability meetings and their respective FEMA Regional Emergency
Communications Coordination Working Groups.
The CS&C Regional Coordination program has worked closely with FEMA
through the Disaster Emergency Communications Division to ensure State
and local agencies have the capability to communicate during disaster
response. Because the Regional Coordinators interact with stakeholders
every day, they have an in-depth understanding of the needs of
different communities across their Regions.
Targeted Technical Assistance.--CS&C has implemented a technical
assistance strategy to ensure that all States and territories can
request and receive its targeted, on-site emergency communications
assistance, while also focusing support on the States and urban areas
with the highest risk and lowest capability. These 40-plus offerings
are tailored to support the priorities in each State or territory
State-wide Plan and the objectives of the NECP, including the
implementation of the Nation-wide public safety broadband network
discussed above. Since 2008, the 56 States and territories have
combined to request more than 750 individual technical assistance
services from CS&C for support with the development of governance
structures, tactical and strategic planning, and a variety of
engineering services. To better address the interoperability needs at
the National and local level, CS&C has developed several on-line
offerings and tools that can be accessed via the internet.
Increased Training Opportunities.--As mentioned above, CS&C has
developed Communications Unit Leader (COML) and Communications
Technician (COMT) courses to improve emergency responders' proficiency
with communications equipment and to assist them with coordinating
roles and responsibilities during an incident or event. The COML
program has been embraced by emergency responders Nation-wide, and CS&C
has trained more than 3,500 responders, technicians, and planners to
lead communications at incidents across the Nation, including local
floods, blizzards, and wildfires. Trained COMLs have also contributed
to recovery efforts throughout the United States, including the recent
outbreak of tornados and massive flooding in the Midwest and Southeast.
To assist States in leveraging these trained responders, CS&C has
developed a portal for State-wide Coordinators to locate contact
information for every trained COML, COMT, and Auxiliary Communicator.
Future Enhancements
Future advancements in technology will provide emergency responders
and Government officials with new means to communicate during routine
events as well as disasters. However, these advancements will also
create new challenges that will require enhancements to current DHS
programs. In order to ensure DHS is prepared to support stakeholder
efforts to address these new challenges, the Department is reviewing
existing communications programs to identify where future enhancements
are necessary.
Critical Infrastructure Protection.--As we guide the transition of
emergency and NS/EP communications, CS&C will continue building and
nurturing those relationships that are critical to protecting the
Communications and Information Technology Infrastructures. Since 2003,
the Department has led the identification, prioritization, and
protection of the Nation's 18 critical infrastructure sectors under
Homeland Security President Directive 7 (HSPD-7). Since its inception,
CS&C led these critical efforts for the Communications and IT system of
systems, which is interdependent with other critical infrastructure.
CS&C will continue planning and reporting on the progress of these
sectors as outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. We
will continue our partnership with all stakeholders to jointly publish
Sector-Specific Plans and National Risk Assessments, which help to
mitigate vulnerabilities to infrastructure.
Priority Services Program Management.--CS&C develops and maintains
NS/EP communications priority services programs, which has supported
the communication needs of over 1 million users across all levels of
government and the private sector. The GETS program is a White House-
directed emergency telecommunications service. GETS supports over
274,000 Federal, State, local, and Tribal government, industry, and
non-governmental organization personnel in performing their NS/EP
communications missions by providing a robust mechanism to complete
calls during network congestion from anywhere in the United States.
Specifically, GETS provides 90 percent or more call completion rates
when network call volume is up to 8 times greater than normal capacity.
WPS is the wireless complement to GETS, created due to the
overwhelming success of GETS during 9/11. The program enhances the
ability of 108,000 NS/EP subscribers to complete cellular phone calls
through a degraded public switched telephone network during a crisis or
emergency situation. WPS calls receive the next available radio channel
during times of wireless congestion, which helps to ensure that key NS/
EP personnel can complete critical calls by providing priority access
for key leaders and supporting first responders. WPS service provides
authorized cellular phone users with the ability to have priority
within the public switched telephone network as well as priority access
to cellular radio channels.
The Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) Program is a Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)-sponsored program that authorizes and
provides priority restoration, provisioning, and reconstitution of NS/
EP communications. The TSP Program provides service providers with an
FCC mandate for prioritizing service requests by identifying those
services critical to NS/EP. TSP can save days to weeks on the time
required to return wireline voice/data services to normal, and there
are more than 200,000 active TSP circuit assignments in support of NS/
EP communications.
As the Nation's communications infrastructure migrates to an
Internet Protocol (IP) operating platform, expediting the convergence
between communications and cybersecurity activities remains a top
priority for the Department. CS&C continues its plans for ensuring
priority voice, data, and voice communications over these IP networks
through its Next Generation Networks Priority Service Program (NGN-PS).
Public-Private Partnerships.--Our partnership with the private
sector has been instrumental in developing critical NS/EP and emergency
communications policies within the Department. One of the Department's
most critical relationships exists with the President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC). The NSTAC is a
Federal Advisory Board comprising up to 30 Chief Executive Officers
from the Nation's leading communications, banking, and information
technology companies. Most notably, the NSTAC has been instrumental in
several Government-led initiatives, such as the creation of the
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC),
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) and the National Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications (NCC). Beyond its Federal Advisory role, CS&C
actively nurtures critical relationships with NSTAC member companies to
protect the overall Communications and IT infrastructures. CS&C will
continue its support to and partnership with the NSTAC to create
communications solutions for our stakeholders. Most recently, the NSTAC
examined four scenarios designed to stress future 2015-level networks,
and provided the President with recommendations for technology
enhancements and Government investments that would provide the best
network resilience and recovery.
Modeling, Analysis, and Technology Assessments.--The CS&C Modeling,
Analysis, and Technology Assessments team provides expertise in
modeling and analyzing current and future protocols, algorithms,
network designs, and capabilities that will impact priority service
communications in legacy and Next Generation Networks (NGNs). The
modeling team also maintains a suite of specialized infrastructure
analysis tools to provide critical infrastructure risk assessments for
the communications sector in the event of a man-made or natural
disaster. These services will play a large role in analyzing future
technology.
Standards Activities.--The CS&C Standards Team is currently an
active leader and contributor to various National and international
standards development organizations, ensuring industry-wide adoption of
non-proprietary solutions for NS/EP preparedness telecommunications
requirements. The team provides leadership and representation in
standards bodies to recommend standards that, when implemented in
Internet Protocol-based networks, will provide capabilities to ensure
National, State, and local leadership are able to communicate during
times of crisis. These activities will continue as the Department works
with partners to develop standards for both NS/EP communications and
public safety broadband requirements.
national response planning
CS&C is working with Federal, regional, State, and local agencies
to increase communications coordination, information sharing, and
oversight of emergency preparedness activities to improve response to
man-made and natural disasters. CS&C works with these entities to
ensure a coordinated response through formal governance structures and
partnerships.
Continuity of Operations and Government (COOP/COG).--CS&C will
continue leading the Department's responsibilities to ensure the U.S.
Government has the means to perform Enduring Constitutional Government,
National Essential Functions and Primary Mission Essential Functions as
directed in National Security Presidential Directive--51 (NSPD-51)/
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--20 (HSPD-20). Furthermore,
the CS&C in its role as Co-chair of the EO 13618 Executive Committee
will continue to assist the Federal Executive Branch in meeting its NS/
EP communications needs.
Emergency Response and Operations.--CS&C will also continue leading
response, recovery, and reconstitution efforts leveraging its Emergency
Support Function (ESF) No. 2 responsibilities. Partnerships with our
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and private-sector partners will
continue to be a critical enabler of the Department's broader homeland
security mission.
We will also continue operating a joint Government-industry
capability through the NCC. The NCC will continue providing critical
response, recovery, and provisioning and reconstitution efforts for
communications, leveraging the many DHS communications tools and
capabilities. As it has since 2000, the NCC will be serving as the
Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), which
brings together over 50 private-sector partners.
In addition to the overlapping missions and initiatives noted
above, this new organization will focus on supporting the responder
community at the Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial levels
and will enhance DHS's incident handling and response for cyber and
communications-related incidents.
conclusion
The Department appreciates the committee's support for our
communications activities. Thank you again for this opportunity to
testify.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Turetsky, you are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Yes, if you can turn the mic on, please. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DAVID S. TURETSKY, CHIEF, PUBLIC SAFETY AND
HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mr. Turetsky. Is that better?
Good afternoon, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member
Richardson, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you.
When Congress created the Federal Communications Commission
in 1934, it made one of the commission's foundational
obligations, ``the promotion of safety of life and property
through the use of wire and radio communications.''
In the years since, consistent with this mandate, the FCC
has applied Congress' public safety charge to changing
communications technologies, including, most recently, Voice
over Internet Protocol. Nowhere is our responsibility to
promote public safety more important than with regard to 9-1-1
services and availability.
Today I will focus my discussion on part of the FCC's
response to the June 29 derecho storm that hit parts of the
central, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeastern United States, and
dramatically affected emergency communications over wide
swathes of the country.
The vast majority of those in the path of the derecho were
able to continue to use wireline and mobile communications
networks effectively and reliably to make calls and reach 9-1-
1. But there was also another side which showed clearly that
telecommunications networks lacked needed and vital resiliency.
The FCC is very concerned that carrier network failures
deprived millions of the ability to reach 9-1-1 operators who
could dispatch needed help. There were brief and isolated
network breakdowns in Ohio and Indiana that knocked out 9-1-1
service, and longer, systemic failures elsewhere.
Most notably in northern Virginia and in West Virginia,
carrier network failures resulted in a significant number of 9-
1-1 call centers not receiving 9-1-1 calls at all, or the
location information necessary to enable proper dispatch.
The FCC promptly began an inquiry to learn all the facts,
circumstances, and causes of the outages and disruptions in
service. The goal of this inquiry is simple: To use this
information to make people safer.
Although local, State, and regional governmental entities
are primarily responsible for supporting and operating 9-1-1
services and providing radio communications for first
responders, our inquiry is particularly important. Only the FCC
can follow the full path of the storm across these
jurisdictions and bring communications expertise, statutory
responsibilities, excellent industry contacts, and public
visibility to the entire range of communications issues it
raised.
In our inquiry, we have met with more than half a dozen
carriers, more than 25 public safety answering points, called
PSAPS, at least once. We also sought input from the public and
interested parties by issuing a public notice asking for
information not only about the derecho, but also about other
similar disasters where
9-1-1 or other emergency services were affected.
We received reply comments just last week.
We also continue to evaluate important information
submitted to the commission on a confidential basis through two
key FCC systems: The Network Outage Reporting System, we call
NORS, and the Disaster Information Reporting System, we call
DIRS, both of which provide vital outage and critical
infrastructure status information during times of crisis.
While we are still reviewing the record, we have learned
that not all carriers have exactly the same problems in
providing reliable
9-1-1 networks.
Just two examples: First, not all carriers adequately
monitor and implement important best practices and technical
announcements that could reduce 9-1-1 outages from standards
organizations. So while best practices are helpful, they are
not the complete answer.
Second, there are important differences as to how carriers
ensure that necessary redundancy is preserved in the routing of
emergency circuits, including circuits that carry location
information.
We expect to produce a public report on what we learned
from the derecho before the end of the year. As I mentioned we
just received reply comments last week.
The FCC continually assesses how to enhance the reliability
and resiliency of communications networks. One developing way
is to foster the development of next generation 9-1-1 services,
which will enable people to make voice, text, or video
emergency contacts from any communications device, via Internet
Protocol-based networks.
At the end of the day, our communications networks need to
be just as reliable and resilient when there is an enhanced
need for emergency assistance as when there is not. We should
never forget that lives depend on it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turetsky follows:]
Prepared Statement of David S. Turetsky
September 12, 2012
Good afternoon, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
other Members of the House Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's)
efforts to enhance public safety by making critical communications
infrastructure more reliable and resilient, including America's 9-1-1
system.
introduction
The Commission is committed to working with its public safety
partners, communications providers, and others, to ensure the integrity
and reliability of our communications networks and services. It is
essential particularly in times of major emergencies, such as during
and after a natural disaster, that communications networks keep us
connected to each other and to the help we may need.
When Congress created the FCC in 1934, it made one of the
Commission's foundational obligations, ``the promotion of safety of
life and property through the use of wire and radio communications.''
In the years since, consistent with this mandate, the FCC has applied
Congress's public safety charge to changing communication technologies,
including, most recently, phone calls made over a broadband internet
connection instead of typical analog telephone lines (i.e.,
interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol, or ``VoIP.'') In fact,
Congress recently reaffirmed the FCC's core mission and its approach by
codifying the requirement that interconnected VoIP providers provide 9-
1-1 services.
To fulfill its mandate under the 1934 Communications Act, the FCC,
primarily through its Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, works
hand-in-hand with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal public safety
partners, to enhance the reliability of our Nation's communications
infrastructure. Nowhere is our responsibility to promote public safety
more important than with regard to 9-1-1 services and availability.
While we are always very concerned whenever there is a substantial
communications outage, we are exceptionally concerned when an outage
affects the public's ability to obtain help through 9-1-1.
Today I will focus my discussion on the impact of--and the FCC's
response to--the recent derecho storm that hit parts of the Central,
Mid-Atlantic, and Northeastern United States in late June. I will also
touch on the Commission's response to Hurricane Isaac just 2 weeks ago,
as well as efforts the FCC has taken to make our Nation's critical
communications infrastructure more resilient, and the challenges that
lie ahead.
the june derecho storm
The Derecho's Impact on Communications
On June 29, a fast-moving and extremely severe derecho weather
system dramatically affected emergency communications over wide swaths
of the United States. Starting in the Midwest and increasing in
ferocity through the mid-Atlantic and Northeastern regions of the
country, the derecho left death and destruction in its wake. Ohio,
Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, and New Jersey reported
deaths; and these and other States reported billions of dollars in
physical damage and severe adverse economic effects. Millions of people
lost electrical power during and after the storms for periods ranging
from a few hours to over a week, all during a historic, record-breaking
heat wave. Many needed help urgently, as live electrical wires came
down, trees crushed occupied homes and vehicles, and other emergencies
unfolded.
In many areas, communications services held up very well. The vast
majority of those in the path of the derecho were able to continue to
use wireline and mobile communications networks effectively and
reliably: To make calls, reach 9-1-1, and get help. The great majority
of Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs, which are 9-1-1 call centers)
were able to receive calls and location information, and to dispatch
help accordingly. Dedicated radio services for the public safety
community and first responders also seem to have been mostly unaffected
by the storm.
The broadcast industry performed well. As FCC Commissioner Pai
noted, broadcasters played a ``critical role'' for those impacted by
the storm--when ``electrical power, cell sites, and broadband networks
went offline, battery-power radios served as a lifeline connecting many
of us to the outside world.'' For me, in addition to numerous other
sources of information on conditions and developments, I listened to
WTOP, the Washington, DC area news station.
While this was the ``bright side,'' there also was another side,
which showed clearly that telecommunications networks lacked needed and
vital resiliency. For various lengths of time, millions lost the
ability to reach 9-1-1 operators who could dispatch needed help. Some
of those who attempted to make emergency calls found their wireless
service unavailable or their calls blocked. Call volume increases
during and after natural disasters, and this fact combined with cell
site and other outages complicated efforts to originate calls to secure
emergency help.
The FCC is particularly concerned that carrier network failures hit
some 9-1-1 facilities especially hard. There were isolated, short-
lasting network breakdowns in Ohio and Indiana that knocked out 9-1-1
service, but longer-lasting systemic failures elsewhere. Most notably,
in northern Virginia and in West Virginia, as a result of carrier
network failures, a significant number of 9-1-1 call centers couldn't
receive 9-1-1 calls at all, or didn't receive E9-1-1 location
information to enable proper dispatch. Even when some connectivity was
restored, 9-1-1 service was partially down for several days in many
call centers due to carrier failures.
The seriousness of the situation was illustrated most clearly
throughout northern Virginia, particularly in Fairfax County, parts of
Prince William County, Manassas Park, and Manassas, where well over 1
million people faced the possibility of not being able to call 9-1-1
successfully. In Fairfax County, for example, these carrier network
failures affected both primary and backup 9-1-1 systems. The result was
that the 9-1-1 call center serving most of the 1.1 million people of
Fairfax County couldn't receive any 9-1-1 calls at all for several
hours. Emergency officials have told us that about 8 hours after the
storm hit, from 7:30 in the morning on Saturday, June 30, until 3:00 PM
later that day, the carrier failures left Fairfax County wholly without
9-1-1 service--just as people were beginning to wake up and assess the
damage, report downed wires and trees to authorities, and begin the
clean-up process. Even after arrangements for rerouting 9-1-1 calls
finally were made,
9-1-1 service was significantly degraded for days--in fact, 9-1-1
features that we all now take for granted and which public safety
officials rely on, like automated number and location identification,
were not fully restored everywhere for days.
Similarly, West Virginia experienced serious problems, with even
more, but generally smaller 9-1-1 call centers knocked out of service
by carrier network failures. Many of the 50 9-1-1 call centers in West
Virginia were adversely affected.
Public safety officials from all of the affected areas tell us they
relied in part on broadcasters and social media, (particularly Twitter,
Facebook, and e-mail sign-ups) to get the word out on how to contact
emergency services. These officials, in light of the utter loss of
connectivity to 9-1-1 services, were sometimes reduced to telling
people needing help to walk to their nearest police station or fire
house--a completely unacceptable position for these first responders
and the affected communities.
The public's inability to reach 9-1-1 and obtain emergency
assistance during the derecho was not just a theoretical or abstract
concern, nor is it such in connection with other natural disasters This
is well understood by those who serve our country by answering 9-1-1
calls, first responders who risk all to save others, hospital workers
who try to save lives, and even by those who work to make
communications networks more resilient. Whether and how fast help can
be called and a first responder arrives might make the difference
between a life lost or the possibility of a healthy future. As the
Washington Post reported, in Falls Church, Virginia, Dylan Cooper
perished after he was struck by electrical wires brought down during
the derecho. Bystanders who came to his aid and called 9-1-1 reportedly
were not able to get through, even after calling for over 30 minutes.
In another instance, just a few hundred feet from her Washington, DC
apartment, a woman was knocked off her motorcycle and pinned under a
tree, leaving her partially paralyzed--she was saved when passers-by,
unable to get through to 9-1-1, flagged down an ambulance which was
able to provide additional help.
The FCC's Response
In responding to the derecho, the Commission worked very closely
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and others, to
monitor and respond to the communications outages caused by the storm,
including those severely impacting E 9-1-1 services.
In doing so, we utilized the FCC's Operations Center, which is
staffed 24 hours a day 7 days a week. We engaged in direct outreach to
carriers and other affected by the storms. We collected key data,
supported by pre-established information reporting protocols. We issued
Situation Reports, providing our Government partners with details of
the damage and the pace of recovery.
We also took immediate action to help lessen the impact of the
storm. For example, we granted an emergency Special Temporary Authority
the day after the derecho struck, so that a utility company from out-
of-State could go to Ohio to help restore power there, and communicate
using the frequencies that their communications equipment supported. We
also used the FCC's website and social media to issue a set of consumer
tips for communicating during an emergency.
Immediately after the impacts of the derecho on communications and
9-1-1 services dissipated, the FCC began an inquiry through its Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to learn all of the facts and
circumstances of the outages and disruptions in service, including the
causes. The inquiry covers both disruptions that affected the 9-1-1
call centers and those that affected cell sites, network
interconnection, switches, and other facilities. The latter impedes the
effective use by consumers of wireline, wireless, and broadband
communications to reach emergency providers in and after a natural
disaster, when more consumers than usual need to do so.
The goal of this inquiry is simple--to use this information to make
people safer. We want to enhance public safety by applying the lessons
learned to help make communications more reliable and resilient, and
reduce the chances that these failures will be repeated. As FCC
Commissioner Rosenworcel aptly put it: ``the agency has a duty to
search out the facts--wherever they may lead. Then we can apply the
lessons we learn and make our networks more resilient, more secure, and
more safe.''
Although local, State, and regional governmental entities are
primarily responsible for supporting and operating 9-1-1 services and
providing radio communications for first responders, our inquiry is
particularly important: Only the FCC can follow the full path of the
storm and bring communications expertise, statutory responsibilities,
excellent industry contacts, and public visibility to the entire range
of communications issues it raised. Moreover, as noted earlier,
Congress has given the FCC authority to ensure that communications
networks, including those that offer interconnected VoIP service,
promote the ``safety of life and property.''
To aid our core mission, the Commission has been seeking helpful
information and views from a broad range of stakeholders. On July 18,
we sought input from the public and interested parties by issuing a
Public Notice, asking for information not only about the derecho, but
also about other similar disasters where 9-1-1 or other emergency
services were affected. We received reply comments just last week,
which we are currently reviewing. This effort is distinct from, but
complementary to, a pre-existing inquiry into the overall resiliency,
reliability, and continuity of American communications infrastructure
and services, when exposed to catastrophic events.
We began our derecho-related inquiry by conducting a series of
meetings that is still on-going. We have spoken directly with a wide
range of stakeholders, some several times, including 6 different
communications service providers, 25 different
9-1-1 call centers in the most severely-impacted areas of Virginia and
West Virginia, and numerous public safety officials, including those
working for Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments.
We also continue to assess and evaluate important information
submitted to the Commission on a confidential basis through two key FCC
systems, the Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) and the Disaster
Information Reporting System (DIRS), both of which provide vital outage
and critical infrastructure status information during times of crisis.
Although we are still conducting our inquiry and reviewing the
record, we have already learned, for example, that not all carriers
have exactly the same problems in providing reliable 9-1-1 networks. To
provide just a couple illustrations:
not all carriers adequately monitored and implemented
important best practices and technical announcements from
standards organizations that specifically target reducing 9-1-1
carrier network outages. Thus, the development of standards
voluntarily may well be a good idea, but it is not a panacea.
there are some important differences on how carriers ensure
that necessary redundancy is preserved in the routing of
emergency circuits, including the circuits that carry location
information; on a going-forward basis, we are particularly
interested in how carriers conduct audits to enhance that
redundancy.
After we have completed a full review of the record, and before the end
of this year, we expect to produce a public report on what we learned
from the derecho.
We are also mindful that we need to consider not only highly
specific fixes that will result in improvement to the systems affected
by the derecho, but also whether more systemic improvements are needed
in our 9-1-1 system generally. The public safety community is rightly
concerned that 9-1-1 has been adversely impacted repeatedly by carrier
network problems. Even though the root causes may not be precisely the
same in each instance, we need to explore whether there are solutions
that can lower the risk of 9-1-1 failure generally.
impact of hurricane isaac and fcc response
I would also like to mention the communications impact of and the
FCC's response to Hurricane Isaac, which hit the Gulf Coast region just
2 weeks ago. Unlike the powerful, unanticipated, and fast-moving
derecho, Hurricane Isaac followed the pattern of a typical hurricane
and provided carriers with more lead time to mobilize their response
and reroute call traffic to avoid major outages.
Isaac severely affected the northern Gulf Coast region and caused
deaths in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida. Though almost a million
people in the affected States were without electrical power at the
height of the storm, and preliminary estimates are that it caused $1.5
billion in damage, we are thankful that, in contrast to the derecho, we
have received no reports of any 9-1-1 systems being completely knocked
out in the region where Isaac hit.
Beginning even before the hurricane hit, the FCC, in consultation
with its Federal partners, most notably FEMA, activated DIRS to gather
and monitor information for select, targeted counties and parishes in
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
The FCC staff worked tirelessly before, during, and after the
storm, including through the entire Labor Day weekend, compiling and
analyzing this information and preparing daily Situation Reports to
inform our Governmental partners in detail of the state of
communications services in the selected areas, which is vital knowledge
in setting public safety and restoration priorities. This information
identified, among other things, the extent of outages and the pace of
recovery experienced by wireless and wireline carriers, broadcasters,
cable providers, PSAPs, and others. The FCC's 24 7 Operations Center
assisted in these efforts.
The FCC also:
identified 9-1-1 call centers and broadcasters in Puerto
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi to determine their operational status and to assist
with provisioning any needs to help maintain or restore their
operations;
conducted outreach to Federal partners, emergency operation
centers, the National Association of Broadcasters, Association
of Public Safety Communications Officials (APCO), and National
Emergency Number Association (NENA), the
9-1-1 association;
deployed, at the request of FEMA Region IV, two Roll Call
Teams to conduct spectrum scans along Florida's Gulf Coast, and
in the States of Alabama and Mississippi. (In a hurricane
situation, Roll Call teams use spectrum analyzing equipment to
develop a baseline of public safety communications users before
the storm and then again after landfall, to identify which
systems are operating and which are not, and which areas their
signals reach, which assists in identifying and prioritizing
recovery needs);
conducted outreach to the Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama broadcaster associations to determine status of
their emergency preparations;
conducted outreach to FEMA Region VI to determine support
required from the FCC in Louisiana; and
conducted outreach to local Spanish language radio and
television broadcasters in the New Orleans area; and monitored
and coordinated with our Federal partners to ensure that the
non-English speaking community continued to have access to
vital local news and emergency information during and after
Isaac through KGLA 1540 AM/105.7 FM, and Telemundo Channel 42.
These efforts led to the refueling of the back-up generators
that serve these stations' transmitter and studio.
Notably, these types of coordination and action also reflect the
dramatic improvement that has occurred in the last few years in
preparation and coordination across the Government to respond to
National disasters. Much of the information supplied by the FCC came
through systems that did not exist at the time of Hurricane Katrina.
other fcc initiatives
The FCC is continually assessing and evaluating what initiatives it
should take to enhance the reliability and resiliency of our Nation's
critical communications facilities. In August of last year, for
example, the Chairman announced a five-step action plan to further the
development and deployment of Next Generation (NG)
9-1-1 services. The plan includes actions by the FCC, and a roadmap for
FCC partnerships with State, local, and Tribal 9-1-1 authorities, other
Federal agencies, and the private sector.
Though NG 9-1-1 deployment will take time to accomplish, NG 9-1-1
systems will improve the reliability of 9-1-1 service because Internet
Protocol-based architecture provides more flexibility and resiliency
than the legacy circuit-switched
9-1-1 system. In an NG 9-1-1 world, people will be able to make voice,
text, or video emergency ``calls'' from any communications device via
Internet Protocol-based networks.
When NG 9-1-1 ultimately becomes widely available, consumers will
benefit by having more ways to send information and more types of
information that they can transmit. For example, someone who is able to
text but not to speak aloud because of the danger they face, or someone
who is hearing impaired, will be able to seek and obtain help more
easily than now. In appropriate cases, the availability of more types
of information--pictures, videos, etc.--may enable first responders to
assess emergencies faster and more accurately, and launch a more
effective response.
There is much work to do to advance to a full NG 9-1-1 environment.
It will not be easy or fast. Consumers will need to be educated about
the transition, and must understand that even as NG 9-1-1 introduces
new capabilities, voice 9-1-1 calling will continue to have many
important advantages and will remain fully supported. We need to make
sure that as NG 9-1-1 is deployed, we address the many important and
valid concerns that PSAPs have about introducing new technology--so
that new technology serves our 9-1-1 professionals rather than the
other way around.
One crucial point: Even though the FCC and others are engaged in
the hard and important work of helping to make an NG 9-1-1 world a
reality in the not-too-distant future, we stress that it is essential
to public safety that the FCC, telecommunications carriers, and the
public safety community--take steps to improve the E 9-1-1 world as it
is today. The public demands this, and rightfully so. As FCC
Commissioner McDowell noted, having ``[h]ardened and reliable 9-1-1
systems is crucial to the public interest.'' The Chairman and other
Commissioners, and public safety, demand that we improve the
reliability of 9-1-1 in the world as it is today.
The FCC is also looking at what we can do better, including what
actions, if any, we can take to improve the process of obtaining
information through NORS and DIRS, how we use the information
internally, and whether we can communicate better in emergencies with
the public and with our partners, Federal and otherwise. As part of
those improvement efforts, I note that this past February, the FCC,
working with its public safety partners and telecommunication carriers,
adopted rules requiring interconnected VoIP service providers to report
significant network outages that meet specific criteria and thresholds.
The action was a common-sense recognition that interconnected VoIP
services have become increasingly popular in recent years. The number
of consumers using these services in lieu of traditional telephone
service is growing steadily, with more than 87 million residential
telephone subscriptions now provided as interconnected VoIP service.
This means VoIP platforms are carrying a substantial volume of 9-1-1
calls.
At the end of the day, the bottom line is: All Americans should
expect 9-1-1 service to be available not only in ``normal,'' everyday
circumstances where a range of emergencies take place, but especially
when it is perhaps most needed most of all--when a major disaster
occurs. Our communications networks need to be just as reliable and
resilient when there is an enhanced need for emergency assistance, as
when there is not. We should never forget that lives depend on it.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I would be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Bilirakis. Appreciate it very much. I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes for questions.
The first question is for Ms. Stempfley. Ms. Stempfley, as
you know, I sent a letter to the under secretary, Beers, back
in June requesting information on the rumored merger of OEC and
NCS. I received a reply a month later, but did really didn't
get a response to my questions.
President Obama, in the mean time, issued Executive Order
13618. It is my understanding this merger will be completed
under that authority. Is that correct?
Ms. Stempfley. Thank you very much, sir, for the question,
because it really gives me the opportunity to talk about the
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications as a whole, and the
important focus areas that we have under the Executive Order
13618.
There are several areas in the implementation plan that we
have going through staffing process inside the administration
right now, that we are focused on. It includes ensuring that we
have broad operational reviews--so the National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center, which will be the
organization that integrates the operations capabilities of all
of the component parts of the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications, including those that are currently in the
National Communications System.
It also includes information about the pieces of the Office
Emergency Communication and of the National Communication
System that are best aligned and integrated with each other.
Finally, it recognizes some of the important points where
industry is coming together in strong ways. We want to have
consistent stakeholder engagement with our industry partners
across the communications and cybersecurity spectrum.
As I said in my opening statement, it is very important for
us to focus on ensuring that what this does is improve our
service to the public safety community.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, what does it mean to the merger of OEC
and NCS? How will this work to ensure--how will we work to
ensure that OEC will not be adversely impacted by this merger?
I mean, a lot of people are concerned about this, as you can
see and you can understand.
Ms. Stempfley. I certainly can understand. It has always
been a priority for the Department to--the public safety
community has been a priority for the Department.
What I would say is the statement that merger is too
limiting in what we are talking about. As I attempted to point
out, we are looking at ensuring that we can bring the best
parts of the National Communication System efforts that
actually expand on what OEC can do into that, look at what the
existing National Communication System does in operations and
align that with the broader operations capabilities across the
board.
I welcome further dialogue on this with your staff.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Well, we will follow up with that.
Ms. Stempfley. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Discuss now the new Executive Order. How
will it impact or change the continuity of communications
operations at FCC?
Mr. Turetsky. The new Executive Order, we think, is a very
positive development. The FCC is one of the eight entities on
the executive committee. The updating of the order I think, in
part, recognizes, at least from an FCC perspective, the
tremendous changes that have occurred over time.
I mentioned earlier the development of the DIRS reporting
system and the NORS reporting system. These didn't exist a
decade or 20 years ago when the prior structure was set up.
We produce in emergencies daily situation reports to help
provide information to FEMA and to our other Federal partners
about the status of networks, the pace of repair, to help
target what the immediate needs are. We do things like respond
to requests to send what we call roll call teams out to sites
where hurricanes are going to come, to scan the frequencies and
determine what is up and operating in terms of broadcast and
the like. Then we come back and do it afterward to see what is
not operating.
All of these kind of measures have given us a very active
role that has changed in the last few years from what was true
a long time ago. So from our point of view, a streamlined
executive committee that enables us to deal effectively with
our partners is a very positive development that will
facilitate emergency response.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Mr. Turetsky, can you discuss briefly
the next generation 9-1-1 and the potential it has to enhance
resiliency on the 9-1-1 capabilities? How far, in your
estimation--how far out are we in implementing this Nation-
wide?
Mr. Turetsky. We have got a ways to go. This is not going
to, in all of its glory, be an answer in the short term. I
think it is going to proceed in phases. I think one of the
phases that is achievable in the shorter term is texts to 9-1-
1.
Texts to 9-1-1 is a very important development for a number
of reasons. One, for hearing impaired citizens, it may be the
only realistic way in an emergency to reach out and communicate
effectively to obtain 9-1-1 help.
Second, in emergencies it may be the only available way for
other people. If you think about the kind of situation at
Virginia Tech, where you had a shooter going through halls,
trying to go into classrooms, you couldn't make 9-1-1 calls
very easily in certain of those areas because nobody wanted to
be heard. Silence was important.
Well, texting allows for that. It is another way to get
help. There are trials going on around the country. Verizon has
been a pioneer in these trials. AT&T has just been a pioneer as
well, announcing a trial of Tennessee.
Last week, I believe, we received a filing from Vermont
that said in a text to 9-1-1 trial, they saved one human life.
Someone who was going to commit suicide texted, did not make a
call. They were able to get there and prevent that.
So it is very, very promising. We can't wait for it all to
be available and operational, the parts of it that will take
longer. But there are parts of it we can do sooner rather than
later.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right, well, thank you very much.
Appreciate that.
Now I will recognize my Ranking Member. You are recognized
for 5 minutes, Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Ms. Stempfley, what assurances are that the FirstNet
will design and implement the Nation-wide public safety
broadband network in a way that would avoid some of the carrier
network vulnerabilities that were exposed recently by the
storm?
Further, given that carrier networks are not hardened in
the same way as public-safety-grade networks to withstand these
kinds of storms, was it wise for the NTIA to suspend the early
public safety LTE deployment, made possible by the Recovery
Act, such as the one that was near completion in the State of
Mississippi?
Ms. Stempfley. Ma'am, one of the advantages of the
relationship that the Department has with industry is the
communications sector, which represents the carriers plus the
wired line broadcast and other members, presents an annual
National Sector Risk Assessment.
That National Sector Risk Assessment talks about key
vulnerabilities that exist across the environment and
articulate the actions that the sector is taking as a part of
that. This is a plan that is required under the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan.
We are using that information to inform the work that is
being done by the FirstNet group. So that plan is a part of the
work that the Office of Emergency Communications is using as it
is helping through the Emergency Communications Preparedness
Center and through the FirstNet Advisory Board and others to
inform FirstNet and that board as they go forward.
Ms. Richardson. Had they, though, previously considered the
impacts of these types of storms that would have been on the
system?
Ms. Stempfley. So in the plan, there is certainly the
concept of physical issues, whether they be through natural or
unnatural causes. It doesn't go into a level of specificity
that this storm dictated, but it covers a broad set of efforts.
There is continual work for this sector to do to build more
detail into the plan. That work is underway with industry.
Ms. Richardson. Do you anticipate, going forward, that this
will, in fact, be considered?
Ms. Stempfley. I do.
Ms. Richardson [continuing]. Suggesting that?
Ms. Stempfley. Yes. Yes, ma'am. I believe it is actually in
the physical component of it. Certainly as communications ISAC,
which those members are represented on the floor of the
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center.
We have partners on the floor there, both from the carriers and
others.
As that ISAC meets and reviews that process and as that
sector coordinating council meets and reviews those activities,
a part of the Government contribution to that is articulating
what is of interest to the Government. This certainly is----
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Ms. Stempfley [continuing]. One item of interest.
Ms. Richardson. So if you could communicate that
information as it progresses back to the committee----
Ms. Stempfley. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson [continuing]. It would be helpful.
Mr. Turetsky, can you please tell me why you think the FCC
is uniquely qualified to monitor the status of and provide
information about the operations of our Nation's communications
infrastructure? Couldn't other agencies do the same thing?
Mr. Turetsky. Thank you for the question. I think the
derecho investigation was perhaps one of the illustrations of
what is unique about the FCC and what we bring to the table
that is hard to duplicate.
As the expert regulator in the communications sector, we
have deep relationships across the board with carriers who are
wireless or wire lined, with broadcasters, with cable
companies, and with all of the other participants in the
infrastructure.
We have a Nation-wide jurisdiction in the area that we are
talking about today. It includes, as I said, the promotion of
safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio
communications, which is a very broad jurisdiction.
It enables us to cross all of the lines and dig in with the
expertise we have, the jurisdiction we have, to address public
safety issues in a way that nobody else can.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Stempfley, again, I understand that many critics have
described the Executive Order 13618 as a potential power grab
by the administration. But it is my understanding that the
Executive Order is merely an exercise of the authority already
granted by the statutes dated back to 1934.
Could you discuss the statutory authorities that support
this Executive Order? I only have 28 seconds left.
Ms. Stempfley. Ma'am, Executive Order 13618 is an update of
24-year-old Executive Order 12472. The statutory authority is
the same.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
With that, I think I will yield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Now I will recognize Mr. Marino from the great State of
Pennsylvania. You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Mr. Marino. I have no questions at this time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
I now will recognize Mr. Clarke from the great State of
Michigan. You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The State of Michigan,
parts of it borders Canada. Because of that, I am very
concerned that the new broadcast spectrum auction that has been
authorized by Congress earlier this year could really pose a
problem to many of the people that I represent who are senior
citizens or disabled, who are struggling financially, all of
whom exclusively rely on local, over-the-air free television
for their information, and also to receive their emergency
information and news.
The broadcast incentive auction could result, I believe, in
the reduction in the number of channels available to local
television stations in the metro Detroit area as a result of
the likely repacking or reallocation of that spectrum that
would occur as a result of the incentive auction.
If that happens, many of the people that are the most
vulnerable, less likely to get information from any other
source, may not be able to get an emergency alert in the event
of an emergency.
Mr. Turetsky, would you commit to work with the Congress to
make sure that all Americans, especially the folks that I
represent in metro Detroit and those residents that live along
the Northern Border, that they would still have access to free
local, over-the-air television during an emergency, be able to
receive emergency communications?
Mr. Turetsky. Certainly, Congressman, the kinds of
communications you are talking about are very important. The
FCC will be working to preserve them.
I am not involved in the incentive auction item that is
coming up. But I would be happy to supply a further response in
writing on behalf of the commission.
But certainly we very much care about that issue and would
want to ensure that there is a continued source of information,
as you describe it.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you very much.
Then on the same note--and I am also concerned. You know,
we have had previous disasters where cell phone service has
failed. I am from Detroit and that happened many years ago.
If there is a way that we could make sure that these cell
phones either, you know, radio receivers in them, or those that
already have radio chips, so that they could be activated, so
that people would be able to have access, via radio, being able
to receive the emergency alerts, that would be helpful as well.
So if that is something that the FCC could also help
safeguard, that the emergency communications available through
cell phones would have that radio chip in them or have them
activated, we would appreciate that.
If you have any comments on that, I would also welcome.
Mr. Turetsky. I do. We provide a variety of ways that are
voluntary for emergency alerts to be received. To the extent
you are talking about the FM chip issue, in 2008 the commission
considered that issue and decided neither to require it nor to
prohibit it.
Since that time, the FM chip has been included in numerous
cell phones and is available today from the major carriers.
There is certainly a very important value to having access to
broadcast. I supplemented during the derecho when I had no
power the information I received through other sources with
information from WTOP radio and others.
But I did it with a crank radio and I did it when I went
into my car. I did it a lot of other ways.
Consumers have a number of options. If they want it from
their cell phone, that is an option that is available to them.
Right now, I think I would be inclined to leave it to the
marketplace.
Mr. Clarke. Well, thank you. I will follow up with you on
that too.
My final comment, Mr. Chairman, is that I would hope that
this subcommittee would exercise its oversight jurisdiction to
make sure that the broadcast spectrum auction preserves free,
over-the-air local television service, especially to those
residents that live along the Northern Border.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you.
I have one additional question. I will ask the Ranking
Member if she has any.
But this is for the two of you: How, if at all, will the
Executive Order signed by President Obama apply to FirstNet?
Ms. Stempfley. FirstNet is an independent entity. What the
Executive Order provides for is the opportunity for the Federal
users to present the resilience requirements of the Federal
user to the board, for the board's consideration.
So that would be the means by which the Executive Order
applies.
Mr. Bilirakis. Would you like to respond, sir, as well?
Mr. Turetsky. I don't have anything to----
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
Mr. Turetsky [continuing]. To add.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right.
Representative, do you have any questions? Any questions
for them? Any additional questions?
Mr. Clarke.
Okay. Thank you very much for your testimony. Appreciate
it. Thanks for your patience as well.
Now I will dismiss the first panel. We will get right into
the second panel.
We are expecting votes around 4:45. So we are going to try
to finish up. We will finish up before the next votes.
I welcome our second panel. Our first witness is Mr. Kyle
Malady. Mr. Malady is a senior vice president for the Global
Network Engineering and Operations at Verizon, where he is
responsible for the planning, design and operation of Verizon's
global voice, data, and I.P. network.
He previously served as the vice president of network and
technology at Verizon Wireless, and began his career with NYNEX
Mobile Communications. Mr. Malady has earned his degree in
mechanical engineering from the University of Bridgeport in
Connecticut, and his MBA in finance from NYU.
Following Mr. Malady, we will receive testimony from Mr.
Terry Hall. Mr. Hall is a communications manager with the York
County Virginia Regional Emergency Communications Center, and
has been appointed by the governor of Virginia to the State E
9-1-1 Service Board.
Mr. Hall currently serves as the president of the
Association of Public Safety Communications Officials.
Next, we will receive testimony from Mr. Trey Forgety. Mr.
Forgety is the director of government affairs and regulatory
counsel for the National Emergency Number Association, a
position he has held since 2010. Prior to joining NENA, Mr.
Forgety served for 2 years a presidential management fellow in
the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Emergency
Communications.
He has also worked with the FCC's Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau, and at NTIA. Mr. Forgety attended the
University of Tennessee, where he got both his bachelors of
science and applied physics and his J.D.
Finally, we will receive testimony from Mr. Chris McIntosh.
Excuse me. Mr. McIntosh is the Commonwealth of Virginia State-
wide interoperable communications coordinator. He also served
as the operations section chief at the Virginia Department of
Emergency Management and has worked in the private sector in
support of the Department of Homeland Security's Virtual USA
Program.
Mr. McIntosh served in the United States Navy--thank you
for your service--as a surface warfare officer. Mr. McIntosh
earned his B.A. in history from Penn State University.
Welcome. We look forward to your testimony. Your written
statements will appear in the record. I ask that you summarize
for 5 minutes.
We will start with Mr. Malady. You are recognized, sir, for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KYLE MALADY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL NETWORK
ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS, VERIZON
Mr. Malady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon to you
and to the Ranking Member Richardson and Members of the
subcommittee.
I am pleased to appear today to discuss Verizon's provision
of
9-1-1 services. I will specifically focus on the impact that a
severe storm had on the 9-1-1 network in northern Virginia in
late June. I will discuss the lessons we learned from that
event, and the steps we have taken to solidify our resilience
to natural disasters and commercial power outages.
Verizon provides service to over 1,500 9-1-1 call centers
across the country. These centers are referred to as Public
Safety Answering Points, or PSAPs. Our network connects people
who need assistance to each PSAP, where they can speak with
personnel trained to handle such emergency calls.
During a typical month, we deliver, on average, over 14.5
million calls to the PSAPs. Verizon is proud to be a part of
the 9-1-1 ecosystem. We take very seriously the important role
our networks play in ensuring 9-1-1 services are always
available, particularly in times of crisis.
Verizon designs its network to be fault tolerant. In fact,
our
9-1-1 networks' designs include multiple levels of diversity
and redundancy. If a particular call route is not working, we
send the call over another route to the PSAP automatically.
We also equip our critical facilities with back-up power
sources. If we lose commercial power, the facility is designed
to continue operating via a combination of built-in batteries
and generators.
We try to prepare for all reasonable contingencies in
emergency planning, to ensure that the 9-1-1 network is
available 24/7. But emergency preparedness is an ever-changing
and on-going process.
So if our systems do not work as planned or if a storm or
other event reveals opportunities for further improvements, we
will be proactive in implementing appropriate changes.
The June storm provided valuable lessons that allow us to
improve our ability to handle 9-1-1 calls and better serve the
public and our PSAP partners. So here is what happened in
northern Virginia as a result of the recent storm.
On Friday, June 29, a severe storm hit the Mid-Atlantic
region with unusually intense straight line winds. This derecho
caused widespread commercial power outages in the D.C. Metro
area, and widespread damage to Verizon's network.
It downed more poles than Hurricane Irene did in 2011. We
lost commercial power in more than 100 locations. Almost
everywhere, our back-up power systems kicked in. The batteries
and generators worked as designed, allowing us to continue
service. We were able to maintain 9-1-1 service to the vast
majority of the more than 200 PSAPs we serve across the storm's
path.
However, generator failures at our Fairfax and Arlington
facilities disabled hundreds of network systems, and causing us
to lose our ability to monitor the network in the impacted
area.
These generator failures also caused a loss of 9-1-1
service to four PSAPs. Our backup power systems should have
withstood the derecho without the resulting 9-1-1 outage, but
they did not. That is why we are making three key improvements,
above and beyond repairs to the generators that failed, that
will minimize the risk of 9-1-1 service disruptions in the
event of future power outages.
First, we are currently performing rigorous power system
audits in all mission-critical facilities supporting 9-1-1 in
the D.C. Metro area. We will complete these audits by the end
of October. We will also perform the same audits Nation-wide
and complete them by March, 2013.
We will take corrective measures, identify these power
audits right away.
Second, we are instituting new emergency procedures for
testing, power restoration, and personnel mobilization. We
could have restored service sooner if we recognized more
quickly the partial power outage in Fairfax. We have developed
procedures to accurately assess and effectively communicate the
status of our power systems.
This activity has been completed for the sites in northern
Virginia, and is underway for the rest of our service area.
Third, we are redesigning our systems to enhance the
survivability of our monitoring systems. This new design will
include new equipment and more diverse network connections.
Much of this redesign will be in place Nation-wide in 2013.
We are also working with the PSAPs to improve
communications during an emergency or system failure. Over the
past few years, Verizon has established robust processes to
communicate with the PSAPs during such events.
However, as a result of this storm, the northern Virginia
PSAPs have made recommendations on how to improve
communications, which we are supportive of and are working to
implement.
We must also improve our overall communications to the
public during events such as this. We will share additional
information about the future storm impacts and our restoration
efforts more quickly, in a more easily understood manner.
So in summary, Mr. Chairman, Verizon understands the
critical role of 9-1-1 services to the community. We are
applying improvements and lessons learned from the derecho in
the D.C. Metro area and in other areas to other areas in our
service territory as well, so that 9-1-1 services are always
available whenever needed.
Thank you. I look forward to answering any questions you
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malady follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kyle Malady
September 12, 2012
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee. I am
pleased to appear before you today on behalf of Verizon to discuss our
company's role in the provision of 9-1-1 services, the impact that a
severe storm had on the 9-1-1 network in northern Virginia in late
June, the lessons we have learned from that event, and the subsequent
steps we have taken to further solidify our resilience to natural
disasters and commercial power outages.
verizon designs its network to make 9-1-1 service available even in a
crisis
Verizon provides service to more than 1,500 9-1-1 call center
locations (referred to as ``Public Safety Answering Points'' or
``PSAPs'') around the country. The role of our network is to connect
callers to the personnel trained to respond to emergency calls in each
PSAP. Verizon is proud to be a part of the larger 9-1-1 ecosystem, and
we take very seriously the important role our networks plays in
ensuring
9-1-1 services are available around the clock--and, particularly, in
times of crisis. Accordingly, Verizon designs its network to be fault
tolerant so that we can continue to provide 9-1-1 services even during
natural disasters and the commercial power loss and network damage that
often come with them.
Our 9-1-1 network designs include multiple levels of diversity and
redundancy, so that--if a particular call route is not working--we can
send the call over another route to make sure it gets through to the
PSAPs. Similarly, Verizon equips its critical facilities with back-up
power sources, so that--in the event we lose commercial power at those
facilities--the network will continue operating and callers can still
place 9-1-1 calls reliably. Specifically, Verizon deploys a combination
of built-in batteries and generators at critical facilities to support
operations during a commercial power failure; the batteries provide an
immediate source of power following the loss of commercial power until
the generators go on-line (which is designed to occur automatically),
and then the batteries act as the back-up power source should the
generators fail.
In these and other ways, Verizon tries to prepare for all
reasonable contingencies in its emergency planning to ensure that the
9-1-1 network is available whenever needed. But emergency preparedness
is not static; it is an ever-changing and on-going process. So, if our
systems do not work as planned or if a storm or other event reveals
opportunities for further improvements, Verizon has been and will be
proactive in implementing appropriate changes. Verizon recently
experienced just such an event, and we have learned valuable lessons
that will allow us to improve our ability to handle 9-1-1 calls and
serve PSAPs on a going-forward basis, even when we lose commercial
power to our own facilities.
the june 29, 2012 derecho and its impact on the 9-1-1 network in the
mid-atlantic states
Late in the evening of Friday, June 29, 2012, a severe storm hit
the Mid-Atlantic region with unusually intense straight-line winds.
This ``derecho'' caused widespread commercial power outages in the
Washington, DC, Virginia, and Maryland area, and widespread damage to
Verizon's networks. Indeed, the derecho downed more poles and generated
more commercial trouble tickets for Verizon than even Hurricane Irene
did in August 2011. As a result of the derecho, Verizon lost commercial
power in more than 100 locations.
At each of these locations, Verizon's emergency back-up power
systems kicked in, with batteries and nearly all the back-up generators
working as designed, allowing us to continue service. However, one of
two back-up generators failed to start at each of the Fairfax and
Arlington facilities, disabling hundreds of network transport systems,
and causing Verizon to lose much of its visibility into--or ability to
monitor--the network in the impacted area.
While Verizon was able to maintain 9-1-1 service to the vast
majority of the more than 200 PSAPs it serves across the storm's path,
these two generator failures caused a loss of 9-1-1 service to four
PSAPs in northern Virginia. Three of these PSAPs (Fairfax County,
Prince William County, and Manassas) did not receive
9-1-1 calls for several hours Saturday, June 30, and the other
(Manassas Park) did not receive 9-1-1 calls for much of that weekend.
In addition, a number of area PSAPs (including those four) faced other
9-1-1-related problems, consisting primarily of a lack of delivery of
location information on 9-1-1 calls and the loss of administrative and
back-up phone lines.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Location information, referred to as Automatic Location
Identifier (``ALI'') information, automatically provides the PSAP with
the address of 9-1-1 callers using landlines. Callers can dial 9-1-1
and reach the PSAP even if the ALI systems are not operating, and the
PSAP can dispatch the appropriate public safety response. In these
cases, however, a 9-1-1 call-taker must obtain location information
from the caller rather than the information appearing automatically. In
addition, the Arlington County PSAP's regular business lines (which
could also be used during emergencies) were not working because of the
problems at the Arlington central office, explained in more detail
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
verizon immediately investigated and identified the cause of the
temporary 9-1-1 outages
Immediately following the temporary loss of 9-1-1 service to these
four PSAPs, Verizon launched an investigation to determine the cause of
the outages. Our investigation determined that the 9-1-1 disruptions
were caused when, following the loss of commercial power, one of two
back-up generators at each of our Arlington and Fairfax central office
locations failed to start. Multiple failures cascading from these
specific generator problems and damage to Verizon's transport network
combined to cause the outages for the four PSAPs. Included among those
failures were systems that enable us to monitor the condition of our
network facilities in northern Virginia, and that loss of visibility
over our network hindered our initial efforts to assess and repair
damages.
Arlington Facility.--The Arlington facility has two generators that
must operate in tandem to support all of the equipment at the site. At
10:55 PM on June 29, 2012, the Arlington facility lost commercial
power. One of the two generators started, but the other did not. The
single running generator could not support the entire site load, became
overloaded, and shut down as designed. Back-up batteries served the
office's equipment into the morning of June 30. A power technician
arrived at 12:28 AM on June 30, but despite best efforts throughout the
night, could not get the second generator started. At approximately
5:00 AM on June 30, the batteries drained completely and network
equipment failed.\2\ Verizon deployed additional resources, working in
parallel both to start the second generator and prepare a replacement
mobile generator. Commercial power was restored at 12:45 PM, before
those efforts were completed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Some network equipment is more sensitive to low voltage and
failed before the batteries were completely exhausted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Verizon since has conducted extensive testing using third-party
experts to determine why the second generator in the Arlington facility
did not start. We determined that air had entered the fuel system,
resulting in a lack of fuel in the lines. We have since replaced the
fuel lines for both of the back-up generators at the Arlington facility
(even though no leaks were found in the generator that started).
Significantly, during the period while power was out in Arlington,
Verizon lost use of its telemetry systems located at that facility,
which ordinarily allow Verizon to monitor its network and other
facilities in northern Virginia. When Verizon lost its Arlington
telemetry systems, it lost its ability to monitor and identify problems
at other northern Virginia locations, including the Fairfax facility.
Once power was restored in the Arlington office, we began to regain our
visibility into the network at large.
Fairfax Facility.--The Fairfax facility has two generators that
each support specific components of network equipment in the location
when commercial power is lost. At approximately 10:35 PM on June 29,
the Fairfax facility lost its commercial power. One of the generators
started and supported its equipment as designed. The other generator
did not start, so back-up batteries served the corresponding equipment
into the morning of June 30. At approximately 6:15 AM, the batteries
completely drained and the network equipment in the specific section of
the facility served by the inoperable generator failed. Throughout this
period, the other generator supported its network equipment in the rest
of the building.
That morning, because we had lost visibility to the network in the
area, the decision was made to send technicians to various facilities,
including Fairfax. A central office technician arrived at the site at
7:30 AM, but did not immediately recognize that one section of the
facility was not on generator power. At approximately 9:45 AM, the
central office technician realized there was an issue in one section of
the building and called for a power technician. The power technician
arrived at the Fairfax facility at approximately 11:30 AM, investigated
the power plant, determined that the second generator had failed to
start, initiated the starting procedures, and brought the generator
back on manually by 12:15 PM. Verizon immediately started restoring the
equipment in the office and bringing services back on-line.
Verizon conducted extensive testing using third-party experts to
determine why the second generator did not start at this location,
ultimately concluding that the Fairfax generator did not start because
the auto-start mechanisms failed. Those mechanisms are designed to
automatically start the generator once commercial power is lost, but
they did not operate correctly and since have been replaced.
as result of the derecho outages, verizon is making several proactive
improvements to ensure that 9-1-1 services remain available in the
event of commercial power loss
In addition to implementing the specific fixes identified above,
Verizon is committed to making the following additional improvements
that will minimize the risk of 9-1-1 service disruptions in the event
of commercial power loss in the future.
Changes to Address Generator System Failures.--As described above,
we suffered key generator system failures that were different in each
of the two locations. The specific failures that occurred at those two
locations have been repaired, but we are extending our review to other
critical locations to address any other potential issues. In
particular, Verizon is conducting back-up power system audits in the
mission-critical Verizon facilities supporting 9-1-1 in Virginia,
Maryland, and Washington, DC, and will institute any corrective
measures identified in those power audits. For example, we have already
completed the Arlington audit and are instituting an automated controls
process to prioritize system load shedding (e.g., to support telemetry
over other, less critical functions) in case one of the two generators
fails.
Instituting New Emergency Practices and Procedures.--Our
investigation determined we could have improved our restoration of
service had we: (i) Recognized more quickly the partial power outage in
Fairfax, and (ii) been able to power some network equipment (e.g.,
telemetry systems) on the one generator in Arlington that was working.
Accordingly, Verizon has developed and posted at each location a set of
site-specific back-up power system assessment procedures that can be
used by any employee to determine if there is a loss of power to an
area of a building. Verizon also is developing and will post at each
location a site-specific set of procedures on how to manually start a
generator that does not start automatically and how to transfer certain
functions from a non-working generator to be powered by a working unit,
including instructions on how to serve system loads on a prioritized
basis (i.e., with available power to be used for more critical
functions first). And, to help ensure that back-up power will work when
needed, Verizon is enhancing our ``Black Out'' testing at critical
facilities. Under the new approach, we will continue to test our back-
up power systems regularly (as we have been doing), but will enhance
this existing testing by including tests for ``failed automated
controls'' and ``prioritized system load transfer'' scenarios.
Improvements to Communication and Mobilization.--Verizon has
maintained a standard practice of internal mobilization to address
service disruptions or outages based on their actual or potential
service impacts. This process is triggered by alarms in the system,
but--in the case of the northern Virginia outages--the loss of
visibility prevented us from receiving these alarms and, therefore,
delayed our response. To avoid this issue going forward, Verizon will
create two new event criteria for notification and mobilization
purposes. We have enhanced our notification and mobilization procedures
to trigger activity more quickly when back-up batteries are activated
or when telemetry is lost. These events now will trigger a response
that will lead to quicker escalation with greater resources.
Redesign the Telemetry Systems to Avoid Loss of Visibility to
Multiple Sites.--As noted above, Verizon's ability to identify and
address outages was impeded by the loss of telemetry functions at the
Arlington office. To avoid a similar problem in the future, Verizon
will redesign its telemetry network to include more diverse connections
and failover (alternative) locations, so that--if telemetry is
unavailable at one location--those critical functions can be carried on
at other facilities.
in addition to internal improvements to address the generator-starting
problems, verizon is working with psaps to address psap-specific
routing issues
As noted above, Verizon's 9-1-1 design provides multiple
diversities or redundancies ``inside the network.'' There are multiple
tandem offices providing routing so that, if one fails, the calls to
the failed office are routed through the other(s). Also, Verizon's ALI
databases and links to each ALI database are redundant, as are
Verizon's signaling systems, which route calls to their destinations.
However, Verizon's analysis of the network impacts following the
derecho has identified areas for improvement--especially with ALI
diversity--for certain, specific PSAP configurations. Since those
specific PSAP configurations are highly sensitive and confidential to
those PSAPs, and present security issues, they cannot be publicly
disclosed. However, Verizon is committed to working directly with the
specific PSAP partners to decide on improvements for their particular
configurations to minimize the risk of 9-1-1 service disruptions in the
future.
verizon is working with the psaps to improve communications during an
emergency or system failure
Over the past few years, Verizon has established robust processes
to communicate with PSAPs during an emergency or system failure,
particularly during high-volume (also known as ``mass calling'' or
``focused overload'') situations. In fact, Verizon has a large team
entirely dedicated to communicating with PSAPs. These processes
generally worked well during the derecho, as Verizon stayed in frequent
communication with PSAPs during the 9-1-1 outages, including sending
automatic notifications to PSAPs when certain alarms were triggered.
But, once Verizon lost its telemetry, we did not have the specific
information needed by the PSAPs to understand the impact of the event
and plan for alternatives. Likewise, certain automatic notifications
that go to PSAPs stopped when the alarms stopped.
As discussed above, Verizon is redesigning its telemetry systems so
it can retain its visibility into its network even when telemetry is
lost at one location, and that will improve the utility of the
communications with PSAPs in the face of catastrophic failures. But
there are other ways in which Verizon can improve its communications
with PSAPs during a crisis.
The 9-1-1 directors of the city of Alexandria, and the counties of
Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, and Stafford have
recommended that Verizon adopt five steps in response to the storm,
primarily focused on communications. These recommendations include: (1)
Adopting and utilizing the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
model to address and mitigate any and all significant events/incidents
impacting providing 9-1-1 service; (2) utilizing a system to notify the
PSAPs, via voice and text, as soon it is known or suspected by Verizon
that there is or may be an interruption of 9-1-1 service; (3)
developing a method to conduct a semi-annual drill/exercise on actions
to be taken in the event of a potential or actual 9-1-1 outage; (4)
providing a current contact list during the first week of each month
for the Verizon account manager assigned to each PSAP jurisdiction and
the four immediately escalating Verizon personnel up to a vice
president level; and (5) having a Verizon representative be present at
the jurisdictions' Emergency Operations Center (EOC), to provide
current, accurate information concerning
9-1-1 service and outages, other telephone service, etc. and liaison
with other parties staffing the EOC, when the EOC is activated.
Verizon believes these recommendations are constructive, and we
have already taken steps toward working with the 9-1-1 directors to
most effectively implement these concepts.
verizon is committed to better communication with the public during an
emergency
Verizon also is committed to improving communications with the
public during outages. In the future, when we face significant network-
related issues like those caused by the derecho, Verizon will share
additional information about our restoration efforts more quickly to
provide greater insight regarding the extent of the impact to our
subscribers and the expected duration of the restoral efforts. We are
mobilizing a more robust emergency response communications process to
ensure that media outlets and other channels are provided relevant
information on a timely basis.
verizon also is committed to looking at the next generation of 9-1-1
services
In addition to looking at issues directly related to the derecho,
Verizon has commented extensively on the appropriate way to develop
Next Generation 9-1-1 services (``NG 9-1-1'') at the Federal
Communications Commission, which has a rulemaking proceeding pending on
the subject. NG 9-1-1 takes into consideration the evolution of network
technologies, and contemplates the move to an IP-enabled
9-1-1 system. Verizon strongly supports a standards-based and efficient
transition to NG 9-1-1, which must involve more than just PSAPs and
their 9-1-1 networks if it is to be deployed successfully. Wireline,
wireless, and VoIP service providers, device and network equipment
manufacturers, app providers, State and local governments, and
consumers themselves must be involved if we are to realize the public
safety benefits of an end-to-end IP-enabled NG 9-1-1 system. Verizon is
committed to doing its part and is engaged in the development of NG 9-
1-1 standards and products across its business units.
With the right funding mechanisms, PSAPs could make the necessary
investments in NG 9-1-1 architecture and provide an overall increase in
9-1-1 system reliability. The architecture contemplates that all
critical components would be deployed with no single point of failure,
and that services are provided in a manner to survive disaster,
deliberate attack, and massive failure--which would require a redundant
and geographically diverse design. And full NG 9-1-1 is dependent upon
end-to-end IP communications, which has the capability to dynamically
reroute traffic and improve redundancy, and to dynamically re-route 9-
1-1 calls to established back-up PSAPs or even virtual PSAPs that can
efficiently serve multiple jurisdictions. Still, no network can be
fully immunized from natural and man-made disasters, so PSAPs will
still need to incorporate recommendations for reliability and security
into migration plans as appropriate. Verizon looks forward to working
with the PSAPs as part of its continued participation in NG 9-1-1
development.
verizon has developed text-to-9-1-1 capabilities
In further recognition of consumers' changing communications
demands, Verizon Wireless has voluntarily developed an interim SMS-to-
9-1-1 solution to supplement the existing 9-1-1 networks, and we are
committed to deploying this solution to capable PSAPs beginning in late
2012 or early 2013. This would allow the public to contact 9-1-1
through text messaging, providing another means to contact PSAPs during
an emergency, in addition to voice 9-1-1 calls.
As a general rule, however, Verizon expects that SMS-to-9-1-1
communications can be affected by outages in much the same way (and to
largely the same degree) as voice 9-1-1 calls. That is because the
interim SMS-to-9-1-1 solutions currently under development all rely on
existing radio, SMS, and PSAP architecture. Thus, cell site outages
would affect SMS-to-9-1-1 communications just as they would voice. And,
within a PSAP's facilities, an outage of the PSAP's network would also
necessarily affect SMS-to-9-1-1 traffic flowing over that network. By
the same token, PSAPs also may have limited SMS-to-9-1-1 ``call-
taking'' capabilities. Accordingly, while Verizon has been working on a
text-to-9-1-1 option, there is a broad consensus that--as the first
option--users can and should be instructed to make a voice call to 9-1-
1, if possible. Or stated differently, I would caution that we should
not rely heavily on alternate legacy technologies, such as SMS-to-9-1-
1, as a substantial alternate mechanism of reaching 9-1-1 in
emergencies. Instead, policymakers at all levels should remain focused
on the transition to end-to-end IP-enabled NG 9-1-1 services.
conclusion
Verizon understands the critical role of 9-1-1 services to the
community, and is committed to making improvements to avoid the issues
that occurred during the derecho and otherwise to ensure that the next
generation of 9-1-1 services are available to the public. Verizon will
improve its internal processes and procedures and work directly with
the PSAPs, as described above, to implement the lessons learned. And we
will look to apply improvements and lessons learned from the Washington
metropolitan area to other areas in our service territory as well, so
that 9-1-1 services are available whenever needed.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hall, you are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF TERRY HALL, PRESIDENT, APCO INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Hall. Good afternoon, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking
Member Richardson, and Members of the subcommittee. My name is
Terry Hall, and I am the current president of the Association
of Public Safety Communications Officials, known as APCO.
I am also the chief of emergency communications for the
York-Poquoson-Williamsburg Regional Emergency Communications
Center in York County, Virginia.
APCO is the world's largest organization of public safety
communications professionals. It includes members from police,
fire, emergency medical services, as well as public safety
answering points and emergency operation centers.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about
the importance of resilient communications.
Certainly, the need for resiliency was engrained into the
design of my own communications center in Hampton Roads. I made
sure to build resilience in the communications center based on
my years of experience in coping with the loss of commercial
power and loss of telephone network outages.
Although highlighted by the recent derecho storm last June,
outages are not all that uncommon and are also not specific to
any one telephone company. The public safety community attempts
to insulate themselves from telephone companies.
As an example, in York and James City Counties in Virginia,
we bypassed the telephone network by directly connecting two
public safety answering points together via our own microwaves
systems.
The widespread 9-1-1 disruptions that followed the derecho
forced APCO members to operate 9-1-1 communication centers
under very severe and frustrating conditions. Power losses and
back-up power failures at Verizon contributed to 9-1-1 outages.
9-1-1 call-takers and dispatchers, in their typical
professional fashion, acted very appropriately to save lives
and property using the best information and resources they had
on hand.
Nothing unique to the derecho caused the failures at
Verizon generators. As Verizon reported, one of its generators
failed due to air in the fuel line, and another failed due to a
defect in its auto-start mechanism. Thus, as we consider steps
to make emergency communications more resilient, we must not
overlook the importance of compliance with existing
requirements and procedures.
APCO is a National standards-making body. One of the
standards we continue to address is network monitoring.
Verizon's power and back-up power failures should have resulted
in an immediate alarm and an urgent response.
Carriers should test their generators and uninterrupted
power supplies under load conditions regularly, and promptly
report the test results to the Federal Communications
Commission, and complete a successful retest if required.
Further, when systems fail, carriers must immediately
provide
9-1-1 centers with meaningful and actionable information.
APCO looks forward to the deployment of next generation
9-1-1 technology, which holds great promise to assure a level
of diverse and redundancy that greatly exceeds current
capabilities we have in our communication centers today.
Let me next remark on yesterday's 11th anniversary of the
events of September 11, and how we remain very appreciative of
the work of this Congress in passing Public Safety Provisions
Act of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of
2012.
By sheer coincidence, the statutory deadline for the
appointments to the Nation-wide governance body established
under this legislation, called the First Responder Network, or
FirstNet, fell during APCO's annual conference on August 20.
We were honored that the acting secretary of commerce, Dr.
Rebecca Blank, announced the non-Federal board members of
FirstNet at our conference. The technology that will be
deployed for public safety broadband network, the public/
private partnerships to come, and the various statutory
requirements put forth by responsibilities of FirstNet will
lead to a very highly reliable, secure, and resilient network.
In sum, APCO looks forward to working with this
subcommittee and all stakeholders to ensure that public safety
communications reach a new level of resiliency and
sophistication.
Thank you again for the invitation to appear before you. I
welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Terry Hall
September 12, 2012
Good afternoon, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
Members of the subcommittee. My name is Terry Hall and I am the
president of the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials,
International, known as APCO. I am also the chief of Emergency
Communications for the York County Regional Emergency Communications
Center in Virginia. APCO is the world's largest organization of public
safety communications professionals, including members from police,
fire, and emergency medical services, as well as 9-1-1 public safety
answering points, referred to as PSAPs, and emergency operations
centers.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the
importance of resilient communications for the public safety community.
This is a timely topic and I'm pleased to see this subcommittee's
interest in exploring these issues.
Certainly, the need for resiliency was engrained into the design of
my Communications Center in York County. I made sure to build
redundancy into this center based on my years of experience coping with
the loss of commercial electrical power and telephone network outages.
As the project manager for the regional public safety radio
communications system in that part of Virginia, I also am aware of the
need for highly reliable communications networks that survive natural
and man-made disasters. My experience with the importance of network
resiliency and reliability was especially enlightened during my
deployments as an urban search-and-rescue and disaster medical
assistance team member following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Isabelle,
and Gustav.
Although highlighted by the recent ``derecho'' storm last June that
wreaked havoc in the DC area, 9-1-1 outages are not all that uncommon--
such outages have occurred across the country for decades, with a
variety of causes, and are not specific to any one telephone company.
This has led some in the public safety community to attempt to insulate
themselves as much as possible, as I have done in York County, from
outages occurring at telephone company facilities that could adversely
impact 9-1-1 call centers. In York and James City Counties, for
example, we bypassed the public telephone network by directly
connecting two public safety answering points for redundancy purposes.
We applaud the recent efforts of the Federal Communications
Commission to explore the causes and potential solutions of 9-1-1
outages. APCO recently filed public comments with the FCC on August 17.
As APCO pointed out in its comments, the June derecho storms cut
off electricity to millions, caused substantial property damage, and,
most regrettably, loss of life. The storms also led to widespread and
unusually extended disruptions to 9-1-1 service in several areas,
especially in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC.
During and following the Derecho storms, many of APCO's members
were forced to operate 9-1-1 call centers under severe and frustrating
conditions. At least a portion of the 9-1-1 outages were a result of
power losses in Verizon's Central Offices and subsequent backup power
failures. Despite these adversities, 9-1-1 call takers, in their
typical professional fashion, acted appropriately to save life and
property using the best information and resources they had available to
them at the time.
It's important to note that while the June 29 derecho was unique in
its ferocity, nothing unique to the derecho caused the 9-1-1 failure.
As Verizon reported, one of its generators failed due to air in the
fuel line; another failed due to a defect in its auto-start mechanism.
This suggests that as we consider additional requirements and
procedures to make emergency communications more resilient, we must not
overlook the importance of compliance with and proper execution of the
requirements and procedures that are already in place.
APCO is a National standards-making body in the area of public
safety communications. These standards address many of the areas that
governing authorities and call center managers must consider when
assessing their level of preparedness and survivability against a wide
range of natural and man-made events. One of the standards addresses
network monitoring. A failure of power and back-up power at Verizon's
central office should have resulted in an immediate alarm state at its
network operations center and should have generated an urgent response
by carrier maintenance crews and technicians to resolve issues and
restore generator power. Instead, it seems that Verizon personnel were
not fully aware of the equipment failures and the subsequent impact on
9-1-1 call delivery. Therefore, carriers should test their generators
and uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) under load conditions regularly,
and report the results of their tests to the FCC's Public Safety &
Homeland Security Bureau within 3 business days, and complete a
successful retest if needed and report those results within 24 hours.
Compounding the impact of the 9-1-1 outages was the lack of outage
reporting and other communications from Verizon to emergency call
centers. In critical times of outages when systems fail, it is
imperative that there be direct contact between emergency call centers
and an on-call representative of the local carrier. Verizon has
acknowledged that the normal means of such communication was itself
disrupted by the outages. 9-1-1 centers need immediate, meaningful, and
actionable information concerning outages impacting the carriers that
serve them.
Carriers should establish hardened and redundant links to
disseminate outage information to emergency call centers in their
service areas. They should also utilize and regularly test an emergency
notification system that would timely notify public safety officials of
any events that impact the delivery of or ability to make 9-1-1 calls.
Today's 9-1-1 networks are based upon many decades-old
technologies, which have their own inherent limitations and challenges.
Thus, while as mentioned earlier, service providers could implement a
number of sensible improvements right away to assure better resiliency,
APCO also looks forward to working with local exchange carriers and
other 9-1-1 system service providers as Next Generation
9-1-1 technology is deployed. NG 9-1-1 holds great promise to assure a
level of diversity and redundancy that greatly exceeds current
capabilities.
Let me next remark on yesterday's 11th anniversary of the events of
September 11, and the transformation in public safety communications we
are about to witness with enactment of the public safety provisions of
the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012. We at APCO
remain very appreciative of the work of this Congress in passing this
especially important legislation, which will enable the deployment of
an advanced, public safety broadband network with a Nation-wide level
of interoperability from the start.
By sheer coincidence, the statutory deadline for the appointments
to the Nation-wide governance body established under this legislation,
the First Responder Network Authority, or ``FirstNet,'' fell during
APCO's annual conference on August 20. We were honored to have hosted
Acting Secretary of Commerce Dr. Rebecca Blank at our conference as she
publicly announced the non-Federal board members. We look forward to
working with the FirstNet Board to successfully implement the public
safety legislation.
Similar to the promise of Next Generation 9-1-1 technology, the
Long Term Evolution or ``LTE'' technology that will form the basis of
the public safety broadband network will inherently lead to improved
resiliencies and redundancies in wireless broadband communications.
Furthermore, the legislation itself rightly mandates that in carrying
out its duties and responsibilities, FirstNet is to ensure the
resiliency of the network. This extends to FirstNet's obligation to
consult with State and local jurisdictions concerning the adequacy of
hardening, security, reliability, and resiliency requirements. Finally,
I am hopeful that with the legislation's emphasis on establishing
public/private partnerships with a variety of commercial mobile service
providers, infrastructure owners, and backhaul providers, this too will
lead to a highly resilient, advanced wireless broadband communications
network for first responders.
APCO looks forward to working with this subcommittee and all
stakeholders to ensure that public safety communications reach a new
level of resiliency and sophistication.
Thank you again for the invitation to appear before you, and I
welcome any questions you may have.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Forgety, I apologize for mispronouncing your name
earlier You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF TREY FORGETY, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS,
NATIONAL EMERGENCY NUMBER ASSOCIATION
Mr. Forgety. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Representative
Richardson. Thank you to the entire committee for holding this
hearing on the reliability of emergency communication systems.
9-1-1 is the critical link between the public and emergency
respnoders. It is imperative that 9-1-1 systems always work.
Over the past 44.5 years, 9-1-1 systems and the carrier
networks that they are based on have served the public reliably
and well. That is why I believe that, in some ways, 9-1-1 has
fallen victim to its own success.
The public and policy makers at all levels of government
know 9-1-1 as a service that just works, and often fail to
consider the level of effort it takes to deploy, operate, and
maintain 9-1-1 systems.
Over the last 10 years, the Department of Homeland Security
has expended billions of dollars to improve planning,
coordination, and equipment for aging land mobile radio systems
and to transition those systems to broadband technology.
At the same time, DHS has devoted little time, attention,
or money to planning for or executing the transition from
legacy
E 9-1-1 systems to I.P.-based next generation 9-1-1. NENA is
very much looking forward to working with DHS to ensure that
the next version of the now 4-year-old National Emergency
Communications Plan will devote more than a single vague
milestone to improvements in 9-1-1 service.
Despite the lack of attention from the broader homeland
security enterprise, however, the 9-1-1 community at the local
and State levels has achieved remarkable successes. Even under
the extraordinary budget pressures of the last 4 years, States
like Alabama, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington have deployed
NG 9-1-1 systems or precursor networks and technologies, such
as broadband-based voice over I.P. transport for 9-1-1 calls
and
9-1-1 text messaging pilots.
Similarly, the 9-1-1 community is providing its own support
for disaster situations by self-organizing teams of
telecommunicators who can relieve overwhelmed call center staff
when a disaster strikes.
Just recently, one of these teams based out of Texas
relieved telecommunicators at the St. John the Baptist PSAP in
Louisiana when Hurricane Isaac kept them at their posts for
more than 40 hours straight.
Here I would like to commend officials from the DHS
National Communication System and the National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center, or NCCIC, for assisting
that team with access to the affected area and routing support.
These examples show how States that appropriately use the
more than $3 billion that consumers are charged each year for
9-1-1 service are reaping the benefits of their responsibility.
On the other hand, the lack of support for transitional costs
associated with the move to more resilient Next Gen 9-1-1
system architecture, and the continuing diversion by some
States of 9-1-1 service fees to purposes other than 9-1-1
system operation or improvement represent key risks to our
Nation's future security.
One scenario I think illustrates this point better than any
other. Everyone here will no doubt recall the failed Times
Square bombing attempt. Now that terrorist plot was foiled when
a member of the public saw something suspicious and said
something to 9-1-1.
Having 9-1-1 service available makes it possible for the
public to quickly contact the authorities and for field
responders to quickly locate the origin of the call and to
respond effectively.
Had an NG 9-1-1 system been in place in New York, the
caller that stopped that attack might have easily supplied
additional information, such a license plate photograph, that
might have sped up the response or led to additional
information about terrorist operatives.
That brings me to my final point: 9-1-1 represents a
tremendous source of actionable information for the public
safety community and the broader Government enterprise, but a
source that is currently untapped.
I can't tell you precisely, for example, the number of 9-1-
1 calls that are made on an average day or in an average month.
The best statistic available, about 600,000 calls per day, is
compiled by CTIA, the wireless association, on the basis of a
variety of different sources and a tedious methodology that is
riddled with extrapolations and assumptions.
But just as Verizon relies on telemetry from its network to
ensure that 9-1-1 systems are operating as expected, the public
safety community and Government officials should be able to
rely on data from 9-1-1 systems to ensure that those systems
are operating as expected, and to ensure that the public
resources are allocated efficiently.
As the committee considers the future of public safety
communications, I encourage you to keep in mind the need to
include
9-1-1 as a core component of all public safety and homeland
security planning and improvement efforts, to work toward
assisting States with cost of transitioning to Next Gen 9-1-1,
and finally to move swiftly to deploy advanced data collection
and analytics capabilities to PSAPs and government agencies at
all levels.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I welcome your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forgety follows:]
Prepared Statement of Telford E. ``Trey'' Forgety, III
September 12, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and may it please
the Committee: My name is Trey Forgety,\1\ and on behalf of the 9-1-1
Association's more than 7,000 public- and private-sector members, I
want to thank you for holding this hearing. Providing emergency
response service is perhaps the core function of Government, and 9-1-1
is the critical link between the public and emergency responders that
enables counties and towns to perform that function quickly and
efficiently. Next year, we will mark the 45th anniversary of the first
9-1-1 call. As we approach that important milestone, it is entirely
appropriate that we should confront pressing questions about how our
Nation's 9-1-1 systems are built and maintained now, how they will be
designed and operated in the future, and how we can improve and sustain
the reliability and resiliency of those systems as we transition to
next-generation IP-based networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ I joined NENA: The 9-1-1 Association in 2010 after 2 years as a
presidential management fellow in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Office of Emergency Communications. During my fellowship, I
served temporarily with the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC)
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and with the Department of
Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA). At the FCC, I developed recommendations for the Public Safety
chapter of the National Broadband Plan. Later, at Commerce, I worked to
implement the Plan's recommendations as NTIA evaluated applications to
the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program (BTOP). Both at NTIA and
DHS, I participated in discussions with senior administration officials
from the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Management and
Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National
Economic Council to develop policies for the deployment of the Nation-
wide mobile broadband network for first responders, now known as
FirstNet. I hold a Bachelor of Science in Applied Physics and a Doctor
of Jurisprudence, both from the University of Tennessee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is unfortunate, of course, that we must consider these questions
in the wake of events that have shown us all too clearly the
vulnerabilities of our existing systems. Damage to network and
commercial power infrastructure in the wake of the derecho that struck
the Midwest and the National Capital Region on June 29 of this year
left tens of thousands of homes, businesses, and wireless subscribers
without access to 9-1-1 service. As we consider the vulnerabilities
that led to those outages, however, I believe it important that we keep
in perspective the purpose of our inquiries: When the safety of the
public is at stake, we must put aside the temptation to assign blame,
and focus instead on learning how we can prevent future failures. NENA
has already engaged with the 9-1-1 community, with the carrier
community, and with officials from the Federal Communications
Commission to begin that process. Already, the Commission has issued a
Public Notice asking important questions about the nature and causes of
the 9-1-1 outages associated with the derecho. The comments received in
response to that notice have included a frank and detailed account by
Verizon of the equipment and procedural failures that occasioned the
outages, along with robust and well-considered recommendations from
Fairfax County, Virginia. It will take some time for the affected
municipalities, the serving carriers, and the broader public safety
community to fully analyze the causes of these outages. As we continue
to do so, however, there are a few key lessons that I believe we can
learn from the derecho and the outages it caused.
First, extended commercial power outages, whether resulting from
severe weather or some other cause, are predictable, and carriers and
public safety agencies responsible for 9-1-1 must both prepare for such
outages. On the carrier side, this is particularly important for
facilities that provide 9-1-1 service to Public Safety Answering
Points. Given the architecture of legacy E 9-1-1 systems, it is
generally a single Central Office of a single Local Exchange Carrier
that routes and terminates all
9-1-1 calls in a relatively large geographic area. This is one of the
few public safety communications circumstances in which the absence of
redundant facilities is tolerated, mostly because the cost of providing
fully redundant 9-1-1 trunks from all End Offices in the served area to
a redundant Selective Router would be prohibitively expensive.
Consequently, it is all the more imperative that these non-redundant
facilities have reliable, frequently-tested sources of backup power,
and that those sources prioritize safety-of-life systems such as
selective routing of 9-1-1 calls. Similarly, on the public safety side,
it is important that Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) have
reliable and frequently-tested sources of back-up power, and that such
capabilities are consistent across jurisdictions. As things stand
today, the resilience of 9-1-1 centers is largely a matter of
jurisdictional accident: Some States manage all 9-1-1 systems and PSAPs
within their borders, and build-in back-up power capabilities. Other
States leave system and PSAP management to the discretion of local
officials, but set mandatory requirements for resilience features such
as back-up power. Still other States, however, set no standards for the
construction and operation of PSAPs at all. In those States, the actual
preparedness of PSAPs for commercial outages can vary to the extreme:
Some PSAPs will have diverse grid connections, quick-reaction battery
systems, and stand-by generators to power the entire facility. Others
may have only short-term battery protection, or, in some cases, no
protection at all. Given the centrality of 9-1-1 service to public
safety and homeland security, NENA believes that both the carrier
community and the PSAP community must ensure that standards are in
place and followed to keep 9-1-1 service available during predictable
events like severe weather that deprive their facilities of commercial
power.
Second, legacy circuit-switched networks will soon outlive their
usefulness as the sole platform for providing 9-1-1 service. Over the
last 6 years, the public safety community, carriers, hardware
manufacturers, and software developers have worked collaboratively
through NENA to develop consensus standards for the architecture and
operation of Next Generation 9-1-1 systems. Next Generation 9-1-1, or
``NG 9-1-1,'' represents the first fundamental change in public
communications with public safety agencies since the introduction of 9-
1-1 service decades ago. Rather than relying on specialized and
expensive-to-replicate facilities in a single carrier's network, NG 9-
1-1 is based on open standards, commodity hardware, and fungible
connectivity. For example, an NG 9-1-1 PSAP will have the ability to
procure connectivity from multiple, diverse carriers to increase
resilience in the face of network failures. Indeed, NG 9-1-1 systems
can even be offered on a fully-redundant, cloud-hosted basis. This
change in paradigm will provide the public with several benefits,
including greater reliability and resilience of 9-1-1 service, an
expansion of available communications media to include text and video,
and lower costs of service resulting from competition for hardware,
software, and connectivity. NG 9-1-1 systems are already being
deployed, in stages, around the country, but deployment time lines are
inconsistent from State to State, and even from county to county. In
some places, it may be a decade or more before the public has access to
the advanced capabilities of NG 9-1-1. At the same time, funding for 9-
1-1 service, largely a fee-for-service model premised on wireline
telephone revenues, is undergoing its own radical transition. Wireline
subscribership continues to fall at a dramatic pace as wireless and
broadband service replace it in consumer adoption. Not all States have
prepared for or reacted to this transition, however, and many public
safety agencies already find themselves underfunded as the user fees
that once supported their operations dwindle while call volumes remain
the same or continue to rise. Agencies will also face some additional
costs as they transition to NG 9-1-1 in order to continue operating
legacy services and facilities in parallel with Next Generation
facilities and software until a final cut-over can be effected. This is
one area where NENA believes a relatively small amount of preparedness
grant funding could have a major impact on the readiness of key public
safety services for future natural disasters or terrorist events, and I
recommend that the committee consider including NG 9-1-1 transition
work as allowable costs in future rounds of Federal grants.
Third, the public safety community needs access to analytic and
visualization capabilities that are now common in the private sector in
order to leverage the tremendous value of aggregated 9-1-1 data. During
and after the derecho, for example, there arose significant questions
and perhaps even disagreements as to precisely when 9-1-1 service
failed, and precisely when it was restored. Had analytic capabilities
been in place, however, affected PSAPs could have detected the outage
quickly as 9-1-1 call volumes deviated from the expected range for that
date and time. From a preparedness perspective, robust analytic
capabilities will be key to future improvements in 9-1-1 service as
they allow 9-1-1 authorities to better match staffing levels to
expected call volumes, to reduce the instance of over-provisioning in
circuits or bandwidth used to terminate 9-1-1 calls, and to detect
service failures such as abnormally-long call ring times or abandonment
rates. In addition, analytic capabilities will also play an important
role in prioritizing the use of scarce public resources in the
improvement of public safety and homeland security response services.
For example, knowing the percentage of 9-1-1 calls in a given
jurisdiction that require a response by fire protection services, and
the type of response at that, will allow municipal officials to make
better, more informed choices about how to expend taxpayer dollars with
the greatest effect on taxpayer safety. Without these capabilities, the
public safety community will remain largely blind to the drivers of its
costs and largely unable to effectively articulate its impact on safety
of life and property in data-driven regulatory and legislative
processes. At the Federal level, analytic capabilities can form a
powerful tool for situational awareness and response prioritization.
Near-real-time map-based visualizations, for example, could allow
coordinating agencies such as FEMA and the FCC to detect incidents as
they occur and monitor their progress as they expand, contract, and
change in character. On a Nation-wide basis, NENA estimates that
deploying analytic and visualization capabilities to 366 metropolitan
statistical areas would cost less than $20 million in capital
expenditures, and less than $10 million in annual operating
expenditures; expanding such capabilities to all 6,000+ primary PSAPs
would be only marginally more expensive. Given the clear benefits that
such capabilities can provide in terms of on-going improvements to the
preparedness and resilience of public safety communications and to the
broader public safety enterprise, NENA believes that achieving a
Nation-wide deployment of such capabilities should be a key homeland
security goal for the next 5 years.
Providing reliable and responsive emergency communications service
to the public is the core mission of NENA's membership, and I am
pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you and your committee have called this
hearing and allowed me to testify about how we can better do so in the
future. I believe that significant improvements in the reliability and
resilience of 9-1-1 service can be achieved over the short term and
with minimal fiscal impact if only the necessary parties can work
together with a common goal and a common understanding that 9-1-1 is a
unique service with unique requirements and a central position in the
preparedness of our Nation. I look forward to working with you and with
my counterparts from the carrier community to ensure that those
improvements are made, and I am happy to take your questions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. McIntosh, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER I. MC INTOSH, INTEROPERABILITY
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND HOMELAND SECURITY,
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Mr. McIntosh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
committee.
Eleven years ago yesterday, interoperable communications
was identified as one of the major areas of public safety that
required improvement following the attacks of 9/11.
Communications is the one constant that forms the foundation
for all other public safety disciplines. It is the bedrock of
every response plan, the core of every procedure.
Without reliable communications, effective command and
control cannot be achieved, critical information cannot be
passed, and life-threatening developments cannot be shared.
In the past 11 years, billions of dollars have been spent
across the Nation, new radio systems have been fielded,
interoperability has been greatly improved, and the ability of
our first responders, emergency managers, and homeland security
professionals to communicate is better than ever.
We stand at a crossroads, however. Many of those critical
radio systems procured in the years following 9/11 are becoming
antiquated. Technology, as is always the case, has continued
its relentless advance, resulting in the need to perform major
upgrades to existing systems, or in some cases wholesale
replacement.
The increased use of the finite radio spectrum resulted in
an FCC requirement to narrowband, resulting in the improved
efficiency in the use of spectrum, but also creating the de
facto obsolescence of an entire generation of radio equipment.
Maintenance and sustainment costs for existing systems
alone cost hundreds of millions of dollars, forcing
jurisdictions to make tough budgetary choices, often resulting
in critical systems no longer being supported.
All of this is occurring while funding levels have fallen
precipitously. Virginia has seen consecutive 50 percent cuts in
homeland security grant programs, and has seen the loss of two
urban area security initiatives. The loss of the Central
Virginia and Hampton Roads UASIs has resulted in the loss of
tens of millions of dollars in annual funding.
Systems built in those areas did not go away, however, and
are now competing with the rest of the commonwealth for the
dwindling SHSGP funding stream while their costs are migrated
to local budgets.
The invaluable Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant
Program has also not been funded. This grant provided for the
planning, training, and exercises of the most important
component of any communications program, the people. Technology
is useless without knowledgeable people who know how to use it
properly, have identified and trained to its capabilities and
limitations, and have planned and exercised its application in
numerous settings.
IECGP also funded many of the State-wide interoperability
coordinators around the country, whose job it is to focus
solely on issues surrounding interoperable communications.
Through the SWICs, States now have State-wide interoperability
executive committees that pull people from across jurisdictions
and disciplines, allowing them to work together to solve cross-
cutting communications problems, share lessons learned and best
practices.
With the loss of IECGP, these positions and associated
governance structures are increasingly beginning to fall victim
to the budget axe.
Simultaneously, we stand on the verge of a revolution in
emergency communications. Land mobile radio is becoming
integrated with voice over I.P. Virginia operates the largest
voice over I.P. public safety radio network in the country.
Soon in Virginia, any laptop, tablet, or smartphone in the
hands of a public safety professional will become a radio
capable of communicating all across the State.
All of these capabilities, indeed our entire path forward,
rely on reliable connectivity. The events of the derecho storm
at the end of June 2012 demonstrated how vulnerable public
safety networks are to saturation, degradation, or destruction.
The loss of a couple of key facilities resulted in a cascading
failure that affected millions of people's potential safety and
security.
In the wireless world, the rising popularity of smart
devices has created a demand for bandwidth that threatens to
overwhelm the entire public safety network when an incident
occurs, including text message-based alerting systems.
Public safety broadband offers a solution to address many
of the connectivity issues faced by public safety. Its
advocates cite the need of first responders and public safety
professionals to have unfettered access to wireless
communications.
We agree, but don't think the dialogue to date has been
broad enough. Public safety broadband also provides the
opportunity for public safety to implement a terrestrial
network, linking PSAPs, EOCs, and critical infrastructure
facilities in a secure and reliable manner, free from the
demands and limitations of the internet.
The challenge lies in making all of this a reality in the
current fiscal environment. As noted above, the commonwealth
and many other States' public safety communications budgets are
stretched to the breaking point. After conducting an informal
poll with localities within Virginia, where we asked how much
they could afford, the response was almost universally, if it
costs more than my cell service does now, we can't do it.
Virginia is a commonwealth made up of 135 jurisdictions.
They are all sovereign and they all have their own competing
budgetary requirements. It is only through getting these
jurisdictions to work together that we will achieve a
successful program implementation.
The existing State-wide interoperable executive committees
have been the laboratories for this approach. Their success is
evidenced by their existence in every State in the Nation.
Congress should recognize the assigned spectrum has value
to States. States should be free to use it to generate revenue.
Given the current fiscal environment, it would be irresponsible
and inadvisable for the commonwealth or any other State to
enter into a project as expensive, far-reaching, and mission-
critical as public safety broadband without having adequate
funding mechanisms in place.
Virginia is committed to this path. I stand to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntosh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher I. McIntosh
September 12, 2012
Eleven years ago yesterday, interoperable communications was
identified as one of the major areas of public safety that required
major improvement following the attacks of 9/11. Communications is the
one constant that forms the foundation for all other public safety
disciplines; it is the bedrock of every response plan, the core of
every procedure. Without reliable communications, effective command and
control cannot be achieved, critical information cannot be passed, and
life-threatening developments cannot be shared. In the past 11 years,
billions of dollars have been spent across the Nation, new radio
systems have been fielded, interoperability has been greatly improved,
and the ability of our first responders, emergency managers, and
homeland security professionals to communicate is better than ever.
We stand at a crossroads, however. Many of those critical radio
systems procured in the years following 9/11 are becoming antiquated.
Technology, as is always the case, has continued its relentless advance
resulting in the need to perform major upgrades to existing systems, or
in some cases wholesale replacement. The increased use of the finite
radio spectrum has resulted in the FCC requirement to ``narrowband'',
resulting in improved efficiency in the use of radio spectrum, but also
creating the de facto obsolescence of an entire generation of radio
equipment. Maintenance and sustainment costs for existing systems alone
cost hundreds of millions of dollars, forcing jurisdictions to make
tough budgetary choices, often resulting in critical systems no longer
being supported.
All of this is occurring while funding levels have fallen
precipitously. Virginia has seen consecutive 50% cuts in State Homeland
Security Grant Programs, dropping from $18 million in 2010 to less than
$5 million in 2012. Historically, almost 30% of this funding has gone
to support and maintain our communications programs. In 2011 alone, the
Commonwealth received $43 million in requests from localities for
communications grant funding, and was only able to allocate $2 million,
resulting in many necessary projects going unfunded. Virginia has also
seen the loss of two Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASIs). The loss
of the Central Virginia and Hampton Roads UASIs resulted in the loss of
tens of millions of dollars in annual funding. Systems implemented in
those areas did not go away, however, and now must compete with the
rest of the Commonwealth for the dwindling SHSGP funding stream while
their costs are migrated to local budgets. The invaluable Interoperable
Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP) has also not been
funded. This grant provided for the planning, training, and exercises
that improved the capabilities of the most important component of any
communications program, the people. Technology is useless without
knowledgeable people who know how to use it properly, have identified
and trained to its capabilities and limitations, and have planned and
exercised its application in numerous settings. IECGP also funded many
of the State-wide Interoperability Coordinators (SWICs) around the
country, whose job it is to focus solely on the issues surrounding
Interoperable Communications. Through the SWICs, States now have State-
wide Interoperablility Executive Committees (SIECs) that pull people in
from across jurisdictions and disciplines, allowing them to work
together to solve cross-cutting communications problems, share lessons
learned and best practices, and write strategic plans that shape a
common direction forward. With the loss of IECGP, these positions, and
the associated governance structures, are beginning to fall victim to
the budget axe.
Simultaneously, we stand on the verge of a revolution in emergency
communications capabilities. Traditional Land Mobile Radio systems are
beginning to become integrated with Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
technologies. By fusing voice communications with internet
technologies, a whole new world of possibilities is becoming a reality.
Virginia operates one of the largest Public Safety VoIP networks in the
Nation which, by the end of calendar year 2012, will have points of
presence in 122 jurisdictions, as well as the Virginia State Police,
Department of Transportation, and Department of Emergency Management.
The Commonwealth's Link to Interoperable Communications (COMLINC)
program allows different radio systems to be linked together, much in
the way that other radio gateways do, resulting in interoperability
through the creation of a ``patch'' by an operator in a Public Safety
Answering Point (PSAP). The true potential of COMLINC, when fully
implemented, lies in its VoIP functionality. Soon, any laptop, tablet,
or smart phone in the hands of a public safety professional will become
a radio capable of communicating with any PSAP in the State, or any
responder on a radio connected to it.
Due to this advancement, interoperable communications no longer
involves just voice and radio systems. We are entering an era where
interoperable information is the goal. Advances in Computer Aided
Dispatch (CAD), Crisis Management, VoIP, video, and Geospatial
Information Systems (GIS) allow for the sharing and display of
information that allows decision makers and responders to have
previously unheard of levels of situational awareness. Using the common
denominator of location, the ability to merge real-time information
such as CAD, weather, sensor data, video, and Crisis Management reports
with mapping systems and plan overlays allows personnel, from the
tactical to the strategic, to have a better understanding of a given
situation, presenting information in context that is critical for
effective decision making. For example, a large hazmat on the highway
is one thing, but a large hazmat on the highway upwind from a county
fair in a neighboring jurisdiction is something else entirely. The
integration of COMLINC and its VoIP functionality now allows not only
the rapid understanding of the true severity of a situation, but also
allows for the interaction of decision makers through the same
interface. Potentially, the days of a journal full of usernames and
passwords, hopping from system to system searching for tidbits of
relevant information, will be a thing of the past. Virginia has
recently completed a pilot project in the Charlottesville/Albermarle
region that demonstrated that this is possible today. We are following
that pilot up with another in Hampton Roads that kicks of this month,
with the goal of realizing a State-wide information sharing capability
by the end of next year.
It is important to note that we are not doing this in a vacuum.
Virginia along with Oregon and California initiated a National
Information Sharing Consortium (Consortium) in order to share
technology and best practices which will enable State and local
agencies across the country to work in tandem towards these goals which
we all share. Through the Consortium, which is growing daily, we will
be able to leverage one another's experiences so that we, as a
community, don't repeat costly mistakes over and over again.
Additionally, we are also working closely with the DHS Science and
Technology First Responders Group (FRG) and its Office of
Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) who are providing us critical
assistance in assessing and working through the issues with the new
generation of technologies that can facilitate achieving these goals
such as shared services in ``the cloud'' and various ``bridge''
technologies. Taken together all of this will enable us to create a
true ``Virtual USA'' enabling intrastate and interstate
interoperability and will serve as the roadmap towards making use of
the new broadband capabilities when they reach fruition.
All of these capabilities, indeed the entire path forward, rely on
reliable connectivity. The events of the derecho storm at the end of
June 2012 demonstrate how vulnerable public safety networks, where they
exist, are to saturation, degradation, or destruction. As the derecho
showed, the loss of a couple of key facilities can result in a
cascading failure that affects millions of people's potential safety
and security. In many cases, public safety responders rely on the
public network for mission-critical communications. This is especially
true in the wireless world, where the rise in popularity of smart
devices has created a demand for bandwidth that threatens to overwhelm
the entire network when an incident occurs. According to the
President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology's report
entitled ``Realizing the Full Potential of Government-Held Spectrum to
Spur Economic Growth'', the amount of wireless data transmitted from
smart phones and wirelessly connected tablets has doubled every year
for the last 4 years. We saw this scenario realized during the recent
earthquake in central Virginia. When the shaking stopped, most people
picked up their phones to call a loved one, text a friend, or post on a
social media site. This spike in volume resulted in the inability of
the public safety community to communicate via wireless network, both
with each other and with the public. Text message-based alerting
systems were rendered useless, as the networks that they are dependent
upon were so overwhelmed by traffic that texts didn't get through for
up to 30 minutes, if at all. Phone calls were pointless, emails were
spotty.
The problem isn't limited to the wireless world. We are
increasingly reliant on the internet itself for communicating critical
information. Everything from accessing the latest weather to requesting
assistance now flows on the web, the same web that you or I use at
home. Bandwidth in the terrestrial network is a finite resource,
subject to the similar loading demands as the wireless network. In
Virginia, we have experienced degradation in our capability to use web-
based information during several large-scale events. During tropical
storm Hanna, the prevalence of teleworkers in the Richmond area
resulted in difficulty in obtaining critical weather information from
the National Weather Service website. Ironically, my mom, at home in
another part of the State, had no trouble whatsoever accessing the same
information that I was struggling to get at the State EOC.
Unfortunately, there is currently no way for public safety to
prioritize traffic on the public internet.
Public Safety Broadband offers a solution that addresses many of
the connectivity issues faced by public safety. Its advocates cite the
needs of first responders and public safety professionals to have
unfettered access to wireless communications in order to improve their
ability to respond to incidents safely and effectively. I couldn't
agree more, but I don't think that the dialogue to date has been broad
enough. Public Safety Broadband also provides the opportunity for
public safety to implement a terrestrial network, linking PSAPs, EOCs,
and critical infrastructure facilities in a secure and reliable manner,
free from the demands and limitations of the public internet. This
network is necessary to support programs such as VoIP communications,
GIS-based information sharing, and Next Generation 9-1-1 routing. It
would allow for the consolidation of PSAPs, the rerouting of volume
around failures, the use of improved situational awareness tools, and
the ability for the public safety community to depend on data-based
communications unlike ever before. In short, it could change the entire
landscape of the discipline.
The challenge lies in making all of this a reality in the current
fiscal environment. As noted above, the Commonwealth's (and many other
States') public safety communications budgets are stretched to the
breaking point. After conducting an informal poll with the localities
within Virginia in which we asked how much they could afford to
contribute towards the operation of a Public Safety Broadband network,
the almost universal response is ``if it cost more than my cellular
service costs now, we can't do it''. Virginia is made up of 135
jurisdictions, each with its own sense of budgetary priorities and
fiscal demands. Since Virginia is a Commonwealth, each one of those 135
jurisdictions is also sovereign, free to make their own financial
decisions. This governance model is replicated in some form or fashion
across the country, and in over 11-plus years of focusing on
interoperability programs, what we've learned is that it is only
through the establishment of mutually beneficial partnerships, creating
a ``coalition of the willing'' that respects jurisdictional
independence, is a successful model for implementing interoperability
programs achieved. The existing State-wide Interoperability Executive
Committees have been the laboratories for this approach, and their
success is evidenced by their existence in every single State in the
Union.
While no one can argue the need for broadband, the implementation
of it has been the subject of much debate. It is only through a
partnership between the States and localities, their existing
governance structures, and the recently appointed ``FirstNet'' board
that the program will be successful. In this context, the fact that
there is not a single current State employee included in the recently
announced FirstNet board appointments is of concern.
FirstNet, with all the best intentions in the world, cannot be
expected to understand each State's unique circumstances and needs.
That is why National interoperability should be the task they focus on.
There is a real urgency in many States to get communications resources
up and running as soon as possible. As such, States should be allowed
to proceed immediately with their plans, as long as they are
interoperable with the Nation-wide network and meet minimum technical
standards, and build their networks ahead of FirstNet. This is also
true of all major cities, but especially true of Washington, DC. This
can be allowed under the ``special consideration . . . to areas with
unique homeland security requirements''. Major cities typically
represent the greatest threat from a terrorism and homeland security
perspective and therefore need to have their communications networks up
and running as a matter of priority.
Congress should recognize that the assigned spectrum has real value
to States for their public safety communications mission and as a
revenue generator. This revenue should flow straight to the States to
fund their respective public safety communications missions, and an
arrangement met for States to contribute from any surplus revenue to a
FirstNet fund for the National interoperability mission. This should be
the result of partnership between the individual States and FirstNet,
where States operate within a framework developed by FirstNet, but
create partnerships with its jurisdictions and surrounding States to
create coalitions of the willing that are able to work together to
solve the myriad of implementation issues that will inevitably arise,
at the correct geo-political level. States must also be allowed, within
the interoperable requirements established by FirstNet, to pursue every
technical means available, including those cited in the Presidents
Panel report, to ensure that the spectrum is used as efficiently and
effectively as possible. They must also be allowed to follow their
codified procurement procedures that are designed to ensure that
competition between vendors is maximized, resulting in reduced cost.
The conversation surrounding broadband governance must not be allowed
to devolve into an increasingly polarized discussion surrounding the
``opt-in vs. opt-out'' issue, usually driven by those without
experience in managing the challenging interests of local, State, and
Federal communications stakeholders.
Congress should be aware that even though the opt-out provision is
in legislation, it seems that there has been an active effort to
``discourage'' it. This risks interfering with the will of Congress.
This is manifest in a number of ways, some subtle, some more blatant,
and serves only to increase the tension of the conversation. ``Opting
out'' is an explicit State's right, as in the end they cannot and will
not be forced to participate in a costly program that obligates State
funds should they choose not to. In many cases (such as in a
Commonwealth), ``opting out'' may be a local right as well. In order to
be successful in achieving our combined goal of a Nation-wide
interoperable broadband capability for public safety, a successful
model must be developed that falls somewhere in between the extremes
``opt in vs. opt out'', focusing on a sense of cooperation and problem
solving that can result in an evolutionary leap forward in
communications capabilities while providing adequate fiscal protection
for its participants. Any other approach threatens alienating critical
partners and fails to take into consideration each jurisdiction's
unique and specific needs, potentially resulting in that jurisdiction
being forced to ``opt out'', the very scenario we all wish to avoid.
Given recent events, it would be both irresponsible and inadvisable
for the Commonwealth, or any other State, to enter into a project as
expensive, far-reaching, and mission-critical as Public Safety
Broadband without having adequate funding mechanisms in place. We
cannot assume that Federal funding will be available in perpetuity. We
must, up-front, ensure that the business model is in place that permits
the network, its operation and maintenance, and the planning, training,
and exercising that are going to be necessary to efficiently use it to
be adequately and reliably funded.
This is not a simple or easy path, but Virginia is committed to
this course because we strongly believe this ``convergence'' of voice
and data communications is the future. Given the current budget
environment, we also believe it is important that Federal, State, and
local efforts are in alignment, working together efficiently towards a
common goal. We are watching carefully the direction that FirstNet and
other Federally-supported efforts are taking, hoping to join them in a
spirit of cooperation and openness. In this we can use your help. You
can help us by putting the safeguards in place to make certain that
these efforts are driven by the needs of States and localities, as well
as making certain that the funding that you provide helps us to achieve
those crucial goals. We look forward to working with you on these
efforts.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. Thank the panel for
their testimony. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. I will
try not to take 5 minutes, though, because I know we are in the
interests of time.
Mr. Hall, APCO's former president was a signatory to a
letter to Secretary Napolitano earlier this summer expressing
concern about the potential impacts of a merger of OEC and NCS
on OEC's State and local public safety communications focus. I
share those concerns, as you know.
Has APCO received a response from DHS with regard to this
letter? If so, has DHS expressed a willingness to work with
APCO and other first responder organizations to ensure OEC's
mission is not diminished?
Mr. Hall. Yes, sir. We have received a response. We have
had several meetings as a result of that. We have great
dialogue moving forward. Our concern was that we keep those
projects and programs going, such as NPSTC and SafeCom and a
lot of the forward momentum we have for interoperability.
We believe that they are going to work with us on that. We
feel very positive. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. That is good. Very good.
Okay, Mr. Malady, my last question, I want to thank you for
your very candid testimony about the issues at Verizon that
caused the PSAP outages, and your willingness to work with
PSAPs to avoid any similar issues in the future.
To the point, you noted in your statement that you are
working with 9-1-1 directors to implement a number of
recommendations they made to you. Can you elaborate on the
status of your efforts?
Mr. Malady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, it is our
responsibility to find out what we can here and make all the
corrections that we can to make this more resilient. I
appreciate your comment.
As far as the working with the PSAPs, especially around
communications, one of the first things that the PSAPs in
Northern Virginia who were affected by this came to us and
said, you know, we need to do a better job of communicating
between each other.
They made five specific suggestions, one of which is the
ability to communicate multimodal. So right now, we have spent
a lot of time and effort working out a system where we send
them emails when we have issues or we will pick up a telephone.
But now we are putting in systems. We have actually
selected a system and are trialing it right now that will give
us the ability to communicate with PSAPs via emails, text
messages, automated phone calls, and other sorts of
communication ways, so we can always alert them of what is
happening.
Another one is getting an escalation procedure in place, so
that every single month we give them a list of the escalation
procedures, with the names and numbers of people, all the way
to vice presidential level in our company, so they can always
have someone to talk to and they can escalate as needed.
So those are a couple of the different things that we have
worked on with them and we are instituting now.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. I yield back the balance of my
time.
I am going to recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Richardson
from California, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Hall, in your testimony today and in your
comments to the FCC, you provided detailed insight into how
private carriers can improve resilience of the 9-1-1 network.
How would you suggest that those private carriers
prioritize the improvements to the network that you have
recommended?
Mr. Hall. I would say that the very first in the
communications directly with the PSAP. Running a PSAP myself
and listening to those comments from the folks in Northern
Virginia, being able to have a two-way dialogue was very
important.
When we receive emails and e-blast and so on, that is very
good. But if we have questions, we need the correspondence to
be two-way. I will say that in recent months, being a Verizon
customer myself, we have actually seen the escalation list and
the two-way communications that Verizon is speaking about now.
So they have implemented those. We are seeing some positive
immediate changes as a result of that.
But two-way communications.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. McIntosh, in your testimony, you indicated that the
Federal Government is not doing enough to discourage the States
from opting out of the Nation-wide Public Safety Broadband
Network.
Can you describe the incentives the Federal Government
might implement to entice States to participate in the
FirstNet, instead of building their own networks?
Mr. McIntosh. Yes, ma'am. The issue here is the success and
failures, as far as the States are concerned, in building the
broadband network lies in the fiscal burden that that bears.
Partnering with States so that States can explore other means
of generating revenue to offset operating and maintenance costs
for the operation of the network is critical.
Just some quick math; the average price point that we have
seen in other similar networks operating across the country,
for the Virginia State Police alone to have enough subscribers
for them to use the network, it would cost the commonwealth
approximately $4 million a year. That is for one agency.
So we are obviously very concerned about taking an unfunded
financial burden, with full understanding that Federal funds
may not be available in perpetuity, and the commonwealth and
the localities within it may have to take over that burden.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Mr. Forgety, regarding 9-1-1 user fees, are you aware of
how many States dedicate all their 9-1-1 user fees to advance
9-1-1 technology?
Mr. Forgety. Representative, I don't have in front of me
the specific figures. I can tell you that there are two sources
for that information of varying quality.
First of all, I believe it is a semi-annual report by the
FCC on States that have diverted 9-1-1 funds to other purposes.
That was required, I believe, under the Net 9-1-1 Improvement
Act back in 2008.
That report is very valuable, but it is limited because it
relies on States to self-certify whether or not they have
diverted funds to improper purposes. So in some cases, what we
have seen is States will actually use 9-1-1 funds for some
other purpose and yet still certify that they are using those
funds as they have told the public they will.
In the recently passed Next Generation 9-1-1 Advancement
Act that was part of the Middle Class Tax Relief Act, there was
actually another report authorized out of the GAO that is
supposed to look at primary source material to determine
whether States are, in fact, using 9-1-1 fees for the purposes
which they have advertised, essentially.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you.
I will recognize Mr. Marino from the State of Pennsylvania.
You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Yes, okay. All right.
Ms. Hochul from New York, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hochul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One thing that troubles me, and I am impressed with the
progress that has been made, but, you know, we don't have to go
back as far as Virginia Tech. I had a situation in my own
district where there was a gun that went off in a high school.
Fifty students in a lock-down situation thought they were
texting 9-1-1 for help.
I find it hard to believe it is 2012 and we haven't
overcome the barriers to make that happen. We have a whole
generation of young people. I got to tell you how often I text.
In fact, I couldn't talk to my teenagers unless I learned how
to text.
So we are, in my judgement, so far behind the curve on
where this country is on this. So I appreciate all the efforts
that you have made with two-way communication. I am impressed
with all that.
But what are the barriers? I introduced a bill called the
Alert Act, after hearing this story in my district. It would
have communication providers have to give an error message, at
least, send something back so someone knows it didn't go
through, because these kids all think help was coming as a
result of their efforts.
So I am not sure if my bill is going to pass. But can't the
communications community on their own take steps to make sure
that that is occurring? At least I would like to make it be--I
would like to have it occurring. I would like to have the 9-1-1
texting receive, people can send pictures of an accident. You
get a lot more information. It would be incredibly valuable.
But in the mean time, can't people at least get an error
message from their communications company, at least telling
them that no one receives this; you better pick up a phone or
something? So are we getting any closer to that? Because that
is a huge problem, in my mind. It would be a dramatic
improvement in our public safety if we could accomplish that
sooner than later.
Throw that out to everybody.
Mr. Malady. So as the gentleman from the FCC stated
earlier, we are in the early days now of the ability for folks
to text
9-1-1 at Verizon. I can't speak for everybody else. I am going
to be honest with you. I am not the expert on this particular
subject.
But we have been in trials. He alluded to a trial in
Vermont, where a life was saved and also a text was sent about
a domestic violence incident, and the text went through and the
first responders came and broke that up.
So that is all good. We are testing it in a couple other
jurisdictions. We are at the forefront of this. We are rolling
this out. We do think it is a good idea.
In our particular implementation, we are sending back, in
certain circumstances, the notice to a person that your text
did not go through. But I can't talk about what there might be
limitations at a PSAP level, or there might be other
limitations in other carriers' networks that don't allow them
to do that.
I am not the right person to really to comment on that. I
don't have the expertise.
Mr. Hall. Terry Hall with APCO. I will respond as well.
Running a PSAP, we are getting ready to undertake a program to
be one of the early adopters with a very large local exchange
carrier and wireless carrier to take text to 9-1-1.
The biggest challenge that we have are some of the things
that you have already addressed, as well as is this at a new
language? Is it going to overwhelm us? Are we going to be able
to track these calls?
So it is very important that these early adopters get out
there and do some best practices and some benchmarking. In my
own PSAP, we had to form a workgroup to talk about what are
their fears. Their biggest fear was we have 30-plus-year-old
people who are going to be dealing with people that have
another language than we are used to.
So we developed a dictionary, if you will, to put out at
each one of the consoles, to understand what is coming in. The
vendor that we are working with has assured us that if we
become overwhelmed, we are going to be able to log off, and
that they will receive information on their cell phone that
texting is not available and that they need to contact 9-1-1
via a landline or a voice dial.
So it is a work in progress.
Mr. Forgety. I will follow that up with a couple points. I
think we have seen significant action by the carrier community
over the past year. There have been major announcements from
Verizon and more recently from AT&T of Nation-wide SMS or text,
more generally, deployments to 9-1-1 that overcome some of the
limitations we have previously seen, including latency and
location determination.
We have also seen action out of the FCC, in particular
asking questions about how we can get to a state where, at the
very minimum, someone in an area where text to 9-1-1 is not
supported will receive precisely the kind of error message that
you are talking about, and such that we will have text
capabilities that work both for the consumer and for public
safety, using either existing equipment or reasonably available
equipment.
Ms. Hochul. Thank you. I have one more question after the
next one, but----
Mr. McIntosh. I have nothing to add.
Ms. Hochul. Okay. Thank you.
Very quick question: I come from a State where counties are
diverting 9-1-1 funds. This is something I hear from my
sheriffs. They are not happy about it. I don't know what
authority is available to make sure that it is being put in
place. In fact, I suspect if the money was being used
appropriately for 9-1-1 purposes, there would be more resources
available for my local PSAPs to be able to implement the
technology they need to accept a 9-1-1 text.
So it is something I am also--I appreciate your questions
on that. It is something I am concerned on. I want to see those
reports on what consequences there are to States that are
diverting it inappropriately.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Bilirakis [continuing]. Witnesses for their valuable
testimony. Thank you for your patience as well. The Members for
their questions. The Members of the subcommittee may have some
additional questions for you. If you would respond in writing,
we would appreciate it very much.
The hearing record will be open for 10 days. Without
objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thanks so much.
[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for David S. Turetsky
Question. Could you please discuss how the Commission worked with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in responding to the
communications outages caused by the June derecho?
Answer. Immediately following the derecho, FCC staff contacted the
FEMA Region III, Regional Emergency Communications Coordinator (RECC),
and FEMA Headquarters to provide information about the status of
communications in the National Capital Region and West Virginia, and to
determine if FEMA required the deployment of the FCC's staff and Roll
Call capability. Under Roll Call FCC teams use equipment to identify
which public safety systems are not working to prioritize recovery
needs. FCC remained in constant contact with the FEMA Region III RECC
over the next several days providing twice-daily updates on
communications restoration. In addition, FEMA asked the FCC to gather
information and report on the operation of telecommunications services
for the affected counties in Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and DC.
FCC contacted communications service providers and gathered this
information from communications service providers and reported it to
FEMA from June 30 to July 4.
Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for David S. Turetsky
Question. Recent emergency response events have again reinforced
the need to reach as many citizens as possible with emergency alerts.
The Commercial Mobile Alert System should be an effective way to reach
large portions of the population.
Currently, how many wireless carriers that have opted into
the CMAS program are capable of providing CMAS alerts? [If not
100%] What is the hold-up? Are delays being experienced with
the FCC, DHS, or FEMA?
Answer. Based on our records, 74 wireless carriers have opted in to
provide CMAS alerts. Under our rules, carriers that have opted in were
required to deploy CMAS by April 7, 2012. Our understanding is that
most wireless carriers that opted in, including the four major Nation-
wide carriers, have done so and are in fact currently delivering CMAS
alerts to subscribers. In order to deploy CMAS, however, carriers first
must be authorized by FEMA and DHS to connect to FEMA's Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) gateway. This requires that the
carriers, FEMA and the DHS complete Memoranda of Agreement and
Interconnection Security Agreements, and then test the gateway
connection. According to FEMA, once a carrier has initiated the
process, it takes approximately 4 weeks to complete. It is our
understanding that most carriers that have opted in have obtained their
connection while others are in the process of completing the FEMA
authorization process.
Understanding that all wireless consumers, especially in
rural or lower-income areas, may not have the latest smartphone
that is capable of receiving cell broadcast alerts, can you
confirm that the use of applications to provide CMAS alerts to
a larger population is compliant with the technology-neutral
directives of the program?
Answer. Consistent with the WARN Act, the Commission's CMAS rules
contain specific performance requirements that handsets must meet in
order to be CMAS (or WEA) capable. The Commission adopted these rules
in a technologically neutral manner so that individual carriers and
handset manufacturers can provide CMAS-capable handsets using a wide
range of handset technologies and at a wide range of price points, from
high-priced smart phones to fully subsidized feature phones. Since the
launch of the program in April 2012, participating wireless carriers
have made available a wide range of devices, not limited to smart
phones, that support CMAS alerts and which are compliant with FCC
rules.
The Commission does not mandate particular telephone technologies,
nor does it mandate that any individual wireless carrier provide
inexpensive wireless telephones to its customers. Further, the
Commission's CMAS rules do not address ``applications'' supplied by
third parties and purporting to support CMAS alerts. Rather, CMAS
technology is resident in each handset's wiring and software.
Lists of compliant handsets can be found on individual wireless
carrier websites, and are compiled by CTIA here: http://www.ctia.org/
consumer_info/safety/index.cfm/AID/12082.
Regarding handset availability, we are aware of at least one rural
carrier that alleges that it has not been able to obtain CMAS-capable
handsets for its customers, and are working with FEMA and the wireless
industry to ensure that the smaller and rural wireless providers have
access to CMAS-compatible handsets equal to that enjoyed by the large
carriers.
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Telford E. ``Trey'' Forgety
Question. Mr. Forgety, we hear a lot about next generation 9-1-1
(NG 9-1-1) and the significant advancement that technology such as
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) will bring to Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs). I understand that some 9-1-1 call centers
across the country are now able to receive text messages, another
exciting development. How far away are we from developing the PSAPs of
the future where callers will be able to send video and images from
cell phones for example?
Answer. It is my pleasure to respond to your question of October 4
concerning the time line for development and deployment of next
generation public safety answering points. NENA has expended great
effort over the last decade to develop open, consensus standards for NG
9-1-1 and to establish a legal and regulatory framework that fosters
meaningful competition in the market for 9-1-1-related equipment,
software, and services. Those efforts have begun to bear fruit, as
States as diverse as Vermont, Alabama, Washington, and Tennessee have
started to deploy transitional 9-1-1 systems with intermediate
capabilities and foundational infrastructure. In many cases, however,
these efforts have been stymied by laws and regulations drafted at a
time at which there was no alternative to the physical reality of the
public-switched telephone network (PSTN). This, coupled with the
persistent exclusion of 9-1-1 from nearly all Federal preparedness,
homeland security, and public safety grant funding streams has slowed
the deployment of NG 9-1-1 service. As you are aware, IP-based
communications systems offer the potential for dramatic improvements in
service to the public and significant cost savings for still-struggling
municipal and State governments.
In order to overcome these challenges and reap the benefits of
modern communications technology, NENA believes that we must undertake
a serious effort to eliminate legacy laws and regulations that inhibit
the deployment of advanced technology, and include 9-1-1 improvements
as eligible costs in all Federal grant programs aimed at public safety
communications and preparedness.
In your letter, you correctly note that some text messaging trials
have taken place in small geographic areas such as Blackhawk County,
Iowa, and Durham, North Carolina. These trials, however, represent but
a meager response to an imminent and pressing need: The public
overwhelming prefers text for much of its daily communications needs,
and, for certain segments of the public, text messaging represents the
only--or the only safe--means of communicating. For example,
individuals with hearing or speech disabilities and victims of domestic
violence are often unable to make a voice call to 9-1-1 due to their
impairment or fear of reprisal, respectively. For these individuals,
text-to-9-1-1 represents the only viable option to seek timely
emergency assistance. Commercial solution providers now offer an array
of text-to-9-1-1 service offerings on a competitive basis, and major
carriers have announced plans for broader text-to-9-1-1 trials or
deployments. These developments are encouraging, but are far from
sufficient: In order for text messaging to serve the public as many
already believe (wrongly) that it does, text-to-9-1-1 must be made
operational throughout the country. Otherwise, the public could face a
bewildering patchwork of jurisdictions, carriers, and devices with
which text service does and doesn't work.
To speed the deployment of ubiquitous text-to-9-1-1 service, NENA
has advocated for a three-part solution that would ensure access to
text-to-9-1-1 on a reasonable but certain time frame while preserving
the flexibility of carriers and public safety answering points alike to
engineer their own solutions for text messaging support. First, we
propose carriers be required to implement a ``bounce-back'' message in
areas where text-to-9-1-1 is not yet supported. This short-term measure
would alert consumers who are unaware that this capability does not
exist in most carrier networks or jurisdictions of the need to contact
9-1-1 via voice telephone call. Second, we propose that carriers be
required to implement text--without specifying a required text
messaging platform--by a reasonable date certain. This will allow
carriers to choose the text-messaging platform that is best suited to
their unique architectures and user bases, and avoid the imposition of
unrealistic or unnecessary requirements. Finally, we propose that PSAPs
be permitted to choose the method by which they wish to receive text
messages. This would allow PSAPs to leverage existing investments in
TTY equipment and software required under ADA regulations, or to
implement transitional IP-based or full-blown NG 9-1-1 service
processes, as circumstances permit. NENA believes that this approach
strikes an appropriate balance between the needs of the public, the
public safety community, and carriers.
Beyond these transitional steps, the PSAP of the future looms large
in the sights of NENA's members. Already, PSAPs around the country are
implementing transitional technologies like consumer-facing data
registries, ``big data'' analytics, blueforce tracking, and integrated
mass-notification systems. True next-generation capabilities such as
photo and video interchange will not, however, be available until the
transition is further along. These capabilities require significantly
different infrastructure that--though cheaper to operate on a long-term
basis--may not be readily deployable due to the lack of funding for
transitional operations during which both legacy and next generation
systems must be simultaneously maintained. Furthermore, the diverse and
ever-changing world of applications, devices, and networks that modern
video and still-image communications inhabit presents novel and unique
problems for our existing regulatory apparatus which developed in
response to a much more monolithic model of telecommunications. Sorting
through jurisdictional questions alone will take some time. Too,
Congressional action may be required to provide the certainty necessary
to ensure that the public will continue to have access to robust
emergency communications capabilities using the applications, devices,
and networks they prefer without opening the door to excessive
regulation of competitive markets for those products and services.
These are important issues that deserve exploration, and I urge you to
continue the committee's inquiry into 9-1-1 matters in the upcoming
Congress.
Once again, thank you for holding this important hearing, and for
providing NENA with this opportunity to inform the committee about the
pressing issues facing the 9-1-1 community. If I may be of any further
service, please do not hesitate to ask!
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Kyle Malady
Question. Mr. Malady, in your testimony, you discussed several
tests Verizon is conducting to root out and protect against system
vulnerabilities. Among others, you mentioned tests for ``failed
automated controls'' and ``prioritized system load transfer''
scenarios. Can you tell us more about these tests and about other tests
Verizon plans to execute?
Answer. In my testimony, I referred to enhanced testing for
``failed automated controls.'' As background and as a matter of course
prior to the June derecho, we frequently conducted tests to ensure
that, in the event of a commercial power outage, our generators would
start and support equipment at affected sites. We executed these tests
using an automated control system (known as a ``controller'') in
central offices that senses the loss of utility power; signals the
generator(s) to start; and, once the generator(s) are working, opens
and closes a series of breakers to transfer the equipment from
commercial power to generator power. Thus, our previous testing routine
focused on verifying that site equipment would transfer to generator
power when the automated controller was functioning properly.
As a result of our investigation, we have added procedures to our
maintenance routine to test the transfer to back-up generator power in
the event that the automated controller is not functional. We have
created procedures for turning on generators manually and for manually
opening and closing the various breakers.
In my testimony, I also referred to ``prioritized system load
transfer'' scenario testing. Prioritized system load transfer refers to
the ability, in an office with multiple generators that are connected
as a common system, to program the controller to close only the
breakers connected to priority equipment if one of the generators in
the system is not operating. This enables priority equipment to be
powered by the generator(s) that is operational. Again, as a result of
our investigation after the storm, we have instituted a number of
improvements to test our prioritized load transfer capabilities. For
example, we now test to ensure that prioritized equipment continues to
be powered in the case where one of the generators fails to start. We
also test to ensure that prioritized equipment continues to be powered
in the case where all of the generators initially start but then one
generator fails. In all of the scenarios, we are testing to confirm
that the controller closes only certain breakers to ensure that higher
priority equipment continues to be powered by the generator(s) that is
operational.
Finally, we are also implementing test scenarios that assume that
the controller's prioritized system load capability has failed. In
those scenarios, we will test to ensure that we can manually control
the breakers to achieve the system loads that an operational controller
would have achieved.
Verizon has added the testing protocols described above to our
existing power test procedures.
Thank you for the opportunity to clarify these points.