[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING DHS 10 YEARS LATER: HOW WISELY IS DHS SPENDING TAXPAYER
DOLLARS?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 15, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-2
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Keith J. Rothfus, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Ron Barber, Arizona
Keith J. Rothfus, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steve Daines, Montana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Ryan Consaul, Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the
State of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency............................ 1
The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency...................................... 3
Witnesses
Mr. James S. Gilmore, III, President and CEO, The Free Congress
Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst, Emergency Management and Homeland
Security Policy, Congressional Research Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson, Vice President for Business
Development, Cross Match Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Appendix
Question From Chairman Jeff Duncan for James S. Gilmore, III..... 59
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson.... 59
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Cathleen A. Berrick...... 59
ASSESSING DHS 10 YEARS LATER: HOW WISELY IS DHS SPENDING TAXPAYER
DOLLARS?
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Friday, February 15, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Duncan, Rothfus, Hudson, Daines,
Barber, Payne, and O'Rourke.
Mr. Duncan. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come
to order. The purpose of this hearing is to examine the
efficiency of the Department of Homeland Security and how
wisely they are spending taxpayer dollars.
Let me begin by extending a warm welcome to the other
Members of the subcommittee. I am looking forward to working
with Ranking Member Ron Barber, as we both share a strong
commitment to U.S. border security and ensuring our border
agents receive the support that they need to protect the
homeland. Last September, Ron and I attended the dedication
ceremony of the Brian A. Terry Border Patrol Station in
Arizona, honoring Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry, who was
killed in December 2010 in the line of duty in Arizona.
I also look forward to a strong bipartisan cooperation in
helping to make the Department of Homeland Security as
efficient and effective as possible.
I would also like to introduce our new freshman Majority
members. Today we have got Mr. Keith Rothfus from Pennsylvania
and Mr. Richard Hudson of North Carolina. Later joining us will
be Mr. Steven Daines of Montana. They bring a wealth of
experience to their new roles in the Congress and on this
subcommittee, and I look forward to leveraging their experience
and knowledge to provide effective oversight of DHS.
Let me pause for just a minute to thank the subcommittee
staff who have worked diligently to put this first hearing
together and preparing the Members of the committee. So thank
you for that. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Next month marks 10 years since the creation of the DHS
through Homeland Security Act of 2002. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, forced us to fundamentally rethink the
threats our Nation faces and our approach to defending the
homeland. As the 9/11 Commission report documents, before 9/11
no Executive department had as its first priority the job of
defending America from domestic attack. That changed with the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security. DHS was
established to: No. 1, prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States; No. 2, reduce America's vulnerability to
terrorism; and No. 3, help America recover from any attacks
that may occur.
DHS, however, has faced the massive challenge of creating a
new organization by integrating 22 separate Federal agencies
and components into a unified department. It is important to
always remember the gravity of the issues DHS faced in its
inception and how those experiences affect the Department's
current responsibilities to protect critical infrastructure,
develop countermeasures against chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats, secure our borders and
transportation systems, and manage the Federal Government's
response to terrorist attacks and major disasters.
Today, we seek to assess how wisely DHS is spending
American taxpayer dollars. Has it been successful in meeting
its mandate established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002?
We know that there have been 54 publicly-known attempted
terrorist attacks on the United States that have been thwarted
since 9/11. However, incidents such as the 2009 attack on Fort
Hood that killed 13 Americans, or the 2009 Christmas day
underwear bomber, and the 2010 attempted car bombing in Times
Square remind us to remain ever vigilant.
But are foiled terrorist attacks a good measure of DHS'
success or are there other criteria the American people should
use to evaluate the DHS? Today, many Americans question how DHS
uses the resources entrusted to it. In 2004, DHS had a budget
of $39 billion. Now it has a budget of almost $60 billion,
employs more than 225,000 people, operates in over 75
countries, and is the Nation's third-largest Federal agency.
Congressional watchdogs have issued thousands of reports
with ways to improve the efficiency of DHS and save taxpayer
dollars. The Government Accountability Office exposed billions
of dollars in cost overruns that major DHS acquisition programs
have incurred. As we learned yesterday, DHS remains on GAO's
high-risk list in several areas, including the Department's
management. In addition, the DHS Inspector General has
identified over $1 billion in questionable cost.
DHS, however, has yet to implement these cost savings
opportunities. In November 2012, the Inspector General also
identified significant challenges in how the Department
protects the homeland and manages its operations. The report
noted difficulties for TSA in securing our airports, for CBP in
identifying travelers entering the United States, and for FEMA
in determining whether to declare Federal disasters despite
spending $4.3 billion in response efforts annually. The IG also
stated that much more work remains for DHS to efficiently
manage its finances, consolidate old legacy databases to
efficient data systems, and improve acquisition outcomes.
Other examples of unacceptable waste by DHS have also been
revealed. For example, a recent Congressional investigation
found that TSA has over 3,500 administrative staff in
headquarters with an average salary over $100,000. These
figures don't include the number of TSA screeners across the
country, which ballooned to almost 48,000 in 2011, resulting in
TSA spending over $3 billion--half its budget--a year in
payroll, compensation, and benefits.
According to press reports, DHS generally doled out $61
million in salary awards in 2011 despite the hard economic
times and reduced take-home pay for many hardworking Americans.
Since its inception, DHS has also spent more than $35 billion
in homeland security grants. A recent Senate report documents
how DHS prioritizes its grant funding with DHS employees using
grant funds to pay a thousand-dollar fee for a conference at
the Paradise Point Resort and Spa, where they participated in
zombie apocalypse training. Other examples exist of DHS
spending money on children's mascots, overpriced law
enforcement training materials, and even bagpipes for the
Customs and Border Protection.
Now, while DHS has taken steps to improve its day-to-day
management, I believe that the American people still deserve
better. We are over $16 trillion in debt. Hardworking families
have had to make difficult budget decisions. DHS must do the
same. The numerous examples of DHS programs with cost overruns,
schedule delays, and performance problems cannot continue in
this constrained budget environment. We must help ensure DHS
becomes a better steward of taxpayer dollars.
This 10-year anniversary of the creation of DHS presents
this subcommittee with an opportunity to reflect on what has
worked, what has not worked, and where DHS needs to improve.
Recommendations by today's witnesses will help us better
understand the issues that DHS faces and identify ways to help
DHS improve, and I look forward to their testimony.
The Chairman will now recognize the Ranking Minority Member
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Barber,
for any statement he may have.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
here this morning. Welcome to the witnesses and our Members of
the subcommittee. I am looking forward to working with the
Chairman in a productive and bipartisan manner as we conduct
oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and other
homeland security functions. It is apparent to me already,
having met with the Chairman and spoken with him at length,
that we see eye-to-eye on many issues related to the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Department. I appreciate his
courtesies and collaboration with me as we move this important
agenda forward.
This is our first subcommittee meeting of the 113th
Congress, and I cannot think of a better issue to examine than
the manner in which the Department spends hard-earned taxpayer
money. The Department of Homeland Security has one of the
largest budgets in the Federal Government. Each year,
approximately $40 billion in appropriated funds flow in and out
of the Department. Among other things, these funds are used to
pay over 220,000 employees, secure our aviation system, provide
disaster aid to States and local governments, and purchase the
equipment used by those protecting our borders. We owe it to
the taxpayers to ensure that these funds are appropriately
used, fully accounted for, and spent wisely.
Unfortunately, over its 10-year history that has not always
been the case at the Department of Homeland Security. My
Congressional district in southern Arizona includes over 80
miles of U.S.-Mexico border, and my constituents along the
border are particularly affected by criminal activities along
the border, with nearly 40 percent of all drug seizures and
apprehensions occurring in the Tucson sector. This is
unacceptable. We must do better. The Department must do better.
I am reminded as I think about safety along the border of
two deaths that have occurred within the last 2\1/2\ years. The
Chairman mentioned that we attended a dedication ceremony of a
station on the Southwest Border for Brian Terry, a Border
Patrol agent who was killed in the line of duty. I am also
reminded of the death of Rob Krentz, a rancher, fourth-
generation rancher who was killed on his own land by a cartel
member. The safety of our citizens and the safety of the men
and women who protect our border is paramount. The Department
must respond and must use the money wisely to do so.
As their representative, and one of only 10 Members of
Congress that represent a district that shares a border with
Mexico, I am committed to ensuring that we improve border
security, particularly along the Southwest Border. As I visit
with ranchers, Border Patrol agents, and local law enforcement
agents in my district, I have seen first-hand how the
Department uses taxpayer dollars to secure the border, and I
know we can do better and we can do more.
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security announced its
plan to install technology along the Southwest Border that
would serve as a virtual fence and provide the Border Patrol
with information it needs to secure the border. Unbelievably,
the contract that allowed that project to go forward did so
specifically prohibiting Border Patrol agents, those who work
on the ground, from providing input into the design,
development, implementation of that system. That is
unacceptable. Seven years and over $1 billion later, we are
still without the plan that was originally envisioned. In
subsequent iteration, the Arizona Border Surveillance
Technology Program remains in question.
According to the GAO, the Department does not have the
information necessary to support and implement the estimated
$1.5 billion plan, which is the successor to the canceled
multibillion-dollar SBInet. In addition to finding that the
Department has not yet demonstrated the effectiveness and
suitability of its new approach for deploying surveillance
technology, the GAO also found that $1.5 billion, 10-year cost
estimate for the program may not be reliable. If this new plan
goes awry, the Department will have spent over $2 billion in an
attempt to develop border security technology with little more
to show than canceled programs and canceled checks to the
contractors.
This is but one example of why the Department must fix its
broken acquisition system to improve how it does its job cost
analysis and to make sure that we have a better way of
purchasing and deploying technology. To its credit, the new
administration has made some improvements. The newly created
Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, designed
to manage the day-to-day oversight of the acquisition programs,
appears to be a step in the right direction. I am concerned,
however, that only 45 staff are in this office, responsible for
over $18 billion.
Making the best use of scarce taxpayer dollars, and doing
all it can to protect men and women who live, Americans who
live along the border and across our country, is the first
responsibility of this Department and a primary responsibility
for this committee. I look forward to today's hearing and the
testimony and our continuing oversight of this important topic.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
Now, we are pleased to have a very distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this topic. The Honorable Jim
Gilmore is the former Governor of Virginia, and chairman of the
Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Prior to serving the Commonwealth of Virginia as
Governor from 1998 to 2002, Governor Gilmore was Virginia's
attorney general. He also served in the United States Army as a
counterintelligence agent. Thank you for that service, sir. In
2009, Governor Gilmore became president and CEO of Free
Congress Foundation.
Mr. Shawn Reese is an expert on homeland security policy at
the Congressional Research Service. He has written numerous
reports to Congress on Federal, State, and local homeland
security policy issues. He has testified before the House
Government Reform and Oversight Committee on the Homeland
Security Advisory System, the House Homeland Security Committee
on Federal counterterrorism training programs. Prior to coming
to CRS, Mr. Reese was an officer in the United States Army for
10 years. Thank you for your service, sir.
Mr. Ozzie Nelson currently serves as a senior associate in
the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Nelson
joined CSIS in September 2009 after retiring from the United
States Navy. Thank you for your service, sir. In 2005, he was
selected to serve as an inaugural member in the National
Counterterrorism Center's Directorate of Strategic Operational
Planning. Boy, that is a mouthful. Prior to his assignment at
the NCTC, Mr. Nelson served as an associate director for
maritime security in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the
National Security Council.
Ms. Cathleen Berrick is the managing director of homeland
security and justice issues at the Government Accountability
Office. In this position, she oversees GAO's reviews of
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice
programs and operations. Prior to being named managing director
by Comptroller General Gene Dodaro, she oversaw GAO's reviews
of aviation and surface transportation security matters, as
well as the Department of Homeland Security's management
issues. Prior to joining GAO, Ms. Berrick held numerous
positions at the Department of Defense and the U.S. Postal
Service.
Thank you all for being here today. The Chairman will now
start by recognizing Governor Gilmore to testify.
STATEMENT OF JAMES S. GILMORE, III, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE FREE
CONGRESS FOUNDATION
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member Barber, Members of the committee,
thank you for the invitation to address this important issue 10
years on, after 9/11, the 9/11 attack. The Free Congress
Foundation, which can be seen at freecongress.org, we started a
Center for National Security there to address many of the big
picture strategic issues, but not the least of which is
homeland security issues.
As the Chairman said, I chaired the National Congressional
Advisory Panel on Homeland Security for 3 years before the 9/11
attack, and for 2 years thereafter. While I was the Governor of
Virginia I was doing that work at the beginning. Ten years on,
we are in a position to do some assessment. The colleagues who
are here with me today are certainly experts in this field. I
would like to address very quickly some of the strategic issues
for just a moment.
The fundamental question, I think, for the committee, the
subcommittee and the full committee, is: Do you really have a
strategic plan that is adequate to safeguard the Nation?
Really, do you? Is Homeland Security structured to really carry
out that? How can you really assess the effectiveness of the
Department of Homeland Security unless you examine their
mission and their strategic plan and whether or not they are
successful with that? You can focus, of course, on Customs and
Border, Immigration, TSA, Coast Guard, the Office of
Preparedness, and the expenditure of the money in order to
carry out these missions. But we at the Advisory Panel did not
initially recommend the office because it doesn't include the
Department of Defense, the CIA, the FBI, and most importantly,
local and State officials.
The question really before the committee is, has the
strategic plan included enough to be able to really secure the
homeland? I point to two issues. Al-Qaeda has said in their
public statement that their goal is to collapse the economy of
the United States. That is what they have said. I think that
the committee has to remember that within the context that if
we waste money or carry out an ineffective program that draws
too much money unnecessarily, then we actually carry out the
mission of al-Qaeda. That is why this committee's work is so
important.
Second, I want to point to the issue of drug traffic on our
Southern Border, precisely as the Ranking Member did. This is a
serious danger to the United States, and remains so, and is
growing. The cartels are extremely vicious. They threaten
members of the constituency not only in the Southern Border but
across the United States. The young people who are really
becoming addicted, and this is not a voluntary matter, this is
involuntary, are being destroyed, young people's lives are
being destroyed, and the Nation is being weakened by this kind
of issue. So the border issues and the issues of cooperation
with our allies and with our law enforcement people is most
critical.
Let me focus in the last minute, 2 minutes on the real
concern that I have, and that is the issue of the civil
liberties and civil freedoms of the people of the United
States. The real danger here is that there will be another
attack. In fact, it is almost likely that there will be another
attack. It is in the hands of our adversaries. If such an
attack results in either panic, hysteria, or insecurity in the
minds of the people of the United States, there is danger of
overreaction, not only in the public, but specifically out of
the Congress of the United States. I point out that the Patriot
Act was passed in 26 days after 9/11, without serious full
consideration, because there was a political need by the
Members of the Congress to get reelected and to get those votes
and show real activity. This can happen again.
Now, I am not condemning the Patriot Act, but I am
concerned about the mindset that could occur if there is
another attack and we are not appropriately prepared. So I
would suggest to the Members of the committee that a goal that
we should see in homeland security is more public discussion
with the people of the United States about the nature of the
true threat, whether or not there is a real danger, what the
potential preparedness is of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Nation as a whole, how local people should be
cut in and participate, whether or not we are prepared to
respond to that kind of attack.
This kind of leadership opportunity is very significant. It
is a big opportunity for the Department of Homeland Security.
But the Department is quiet in terms of its actual discussion
with the American people. That confidence and calmness will be
necessary in the time of the crisis to make sure that we don't
restrict the liberties of the American people in exchange for
security. The goal of the United States has to be to have a
response plan in place, well understood, that not only secures
this Nation, but also simultaneously and without any mitigation
secures the civil liberties of the American people at the same
time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:]
Prepared Statement of James S. Gilmore, III
February 15, 2013
introduction
Chairman Duncan, it is honor to be here today. I commend you and
House Homeland Security Chairman Mike McCaul for holding these hearings
on reviewing American homeland security policy as an institution for
the 21st Century and checking how wisely we are spending our taxpayer
dollars. Communicating with the American public about the realities of
terrorism and how well our country is prepared is essential to
maintaining our liberty.
Since it is Abraham Lincoln's 214th birthday this week I think it
is fitting to start my testimony with a quote from a great American
leader: ``America will never be destroyed from the outside. If we
falter and lose our freedoms, it will be because we destroyed
ourselves.''
I was invited to testify due to my experience as the former
chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic
Response to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known
as the ``Gilmore Commission.'' From 1999 to 2003, the commission
produced five reports on the state of our Nation's ability to respond
to terrorist attacks.
Of its 164 recommendations, 146 have been adopted in whole or in
part. The commission thoroughly analyzed how the country achieved the
goal of National security, as well as how our preparedness related to
citizens' privacy and the role of the military. As I have said before,
the agency with the most guns should not always be relied on in a
crisis; we need to be prepared physically and emotionally when the
attack comes and that is how we keep our freedom and security intact
for future generations of Americans.
An assessment of the effectiveness of the DHS can only be made with
reference to the strategic plan the Department seeks to implement. The
first question must always be whether the DHS budget and spending
implements the National plan.
Our commission realized that small local communities are both the
most vulnerable and the most difficult to secure, due to the higher
need for private-sector involvement. The commission indentified the
``New Normal'' and recommended that all communities adopt this plan.
This program developed a plan of preparedness which could be carried
out by the mayor or local homeland security officials. We outlined the
following topics to help start the process for localities:
Response/Containment;
Intelligence/Situational Awareness;
Transportation/Logistics;
Public Health/Medical;
Legal/Intergovernmental;
Public Safety/Information;
Infrastructure/Economic;
Community/Citizen.
On a larger scale, the Congress and the Executive branch should
focus on the following in creating a National Plan:
State, Local, and Private-Sector Empowerment;
Intelligence;
Information Sharing;
Training, Exercising, Equipping, and Related Standards;
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection;
Research and Development, and Related Standards;
Role of the Military.
The influence of drugs and other illegal substances are a major
threat to American national security. The availability of narcotic
poisons to our population is a key element that is weakening our
communities. The routes used to traffick drugs can be used by al-Qaeda
to bring terrorists and weapons of mass destruction into our country.
In addition to the external threat we must be sensitive to the damaging
role of overreaction to our civil freedoms. Thus, we must be aware of
the policy actions we have taken with The PATRIOT ACT and the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We must always consider the role of
the military during a major event like Sept. 11 as we decide on our
future homeland policy.
one-sentence summary
The Gilmore Commission reports discuss preparedness--including
strategies, institutions, threats, capabilities, and lessons from other
nations.
main points
Point 1: We should plan strategically, especially at the State and
local levels.
In a free society like our own, there is no way to completely
eliminate the threat of terrorism. We have unlimited vulnerabilities,
and the multitude of activities and motivations makes it difficult to
assess terrorism threats. It is also difficult to assess whether our
actions are reducing the threats.
The only solution is to be prepared to mitigate the results of the
worst-case scenario, especially at the State and local levels. We
should also make a special point to plan strategically and look forward
to preemptively recognize threats and manage risks.
The only way we will achieve preparedness is through true
cooperation of various Government entities. But Federal, State, and
local governments do not coordinate strategically. In many cases, they
have different agendas and clashing organization systems. They are not
sharing enough information or intelligence, especially about potential
threats. As a result, we are less prepared than we should be.
The Federal Government should provide a clear definition of
preparedness and a strategic plan. Furthermore, States and local
governments should be empowered to implement the plan.
Point 2: We should use a risk management strategy for prevention.
Risk management means reducing threats and vulnerabilities. A
prevention strategy based on risk management might consist of:
1. Reducing threats: Dismantling terrorist groups and denying them
weapons.
2. Reducing vulnerabilities, day-to-day: ``Building the fortress''
against terrorism.
3. Reducing vulnerabilities, in the event of an immediate threat:
Taking steps to protect against specific attacks.
what about prevention?
The fifth Gilmore Commission Report is an excellent source for the
prevention community. It explains why the prevention cube is needed:
``Since there is no way to prevent all attacks, a risk management
strategy is needed. The way to manage risks effectively is to
collaborate and share information, especially about threats. This is
the heart of the prevention process.''
Therefore, a true evaluation would include DHS's role and partnership
with other key National security organizations, including the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
the National Intelligence establishment, and local and State law
enforcement authorities. [Source: https://www.preventivestrategies.net/
public/spd.cfm?spi=prevention_library_book3.]
spending taxpayer dollars
The drumbeat of terrorism news never ends in our media society. But
we must accept that we cannot be completely safe in a free and open
society like America. One thing that I am most proud of is the emphasis
the Gilmore Commission placed on for protecting civil liberties as our
security consciousness is heightened. We must keep our security AND our
liberty intact. There is nothing worth gaining that will come as a
result of sacrificing our protection of basic freedoms. Right now, we
are achieving much while holding true to our values; however,
considerable room for improvement exists.
The current budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
$60 billion annually. That is up $20 billion since 2004. According to
an article published in the New Yorker magazine, Lockheed Martin alone
receives $30 billion annually in defense contracts. Does that mean we
aren't even close to spending enough on homeland security for our vast
country? In my opinion, our defense spending is appropriate based on
our current National strategy. Can we do better? The answer is a
definite yes.
In its fifth and final report in December 2003, our commission
repeated its prior emphasis that civil liberties must be a critical
element in the consideration of any program to combat terrorism. The
commission believed firmly in the principle that Benjamin Franklin
spoke of more than 250 years ago: ``They that can give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor
safety.''
In that final report, in fact, the commission included a treatise
about the importance of this issue and ways that the Nation might go
about achieving that result. I have included that document as an
attachment to my written statement and ask that the subcommittee
includes it in the record of this hearing.* We believe that it is still
applicable today.
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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Though the Nation's preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack
on our shores was not a primary concern of the Federal Government,
among some Government sectors (and some in the news media) there was a
growing anxiety about the numerous terrorist attacks occurring all over
the world in the 1990s--i.e. the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya, the
bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, and the reports of terrorist training camps
in Afghanistan.
An example of the coverage prior to Sept. 11 is found here. The
Washington Post reported on the commission on Dec. 15, 2000:
`` `Panel Calls for Creating Counterterrorism Agency'
``Friday, December 15, 2000; Page A08
``By David A. Vise
``Washington Post Staff Writer
``A federal panel warned yesterday that the United States is vulnerable
to terrorists wielding weapons of mass destruction, calling for the
creation of a new counterterrorism agency and the loosening of
restrictions on CIA agents that prevent them from recruiting
confidential informants who have committed human rights abuses.
``The panel, chaired by Virginia Gov. James S. Gilmore III, urges
President-elect Bush to bolster U.S. preparedness against terrorist
threats within one year. `The United States has no coherent, functional
national strategy for combating terrorism,' Gilmore said. `The
terrorist threat is real, and it is serious.' ''
The commission met with Vice President Cheney at the White House in
May 2001 to deliver our recommendations to him personally. One of those
recommendations was to create an Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
inside the White House within 1 year. It was created a few days after
Sept. 11, 2001.
The charge to the Nation's new director of homeland security, Gov.
Tom Ridge (R-PA), was to develop and coordinate a comprehensive
National strategy to strengthen the United States against terrorist
threats or attacks. In the words of President George W. Bush, Mr. Ridge
had the ``strength, experience, personal commitment and authority to
accomplish this critical mission.''
Following the attacks on September 11, more Congressional pressure
came to bear on the issue and, against the Gilmore Commission's
recommendations, Congress promoted the OHS to a Cabinet-level agency
and it became the Department of Homeland Security. Although our
Commission did not recommend the creation of DHS, now that it is the
main organ for homeland security, we wish to be helpful and
constructive to its mission.
Keep in mind, however: A recent New York Times article stated that
``of the more than 160,000 homicides in the country since Sept. 11,
2001, just 14 were carried out by al-Qaeda sympathizers in the name of
jihad.'' Does that mean we can save more taxpayer dollars and dismantle
the DHS? Of course not, but we need to understand what are we asking
the DHS to do and how can the agency should carry out its mission.
culture of preparedness
Members of Congress will always have a bipartisan fear of being
labeled soft on terrorism. Lobbyists will continue to fight for their
clients and obtain lucrative domestic security contracts, but we need
to have a National strategy that communicates to all Americans that we
are never completely safe. Ten years later we are safer and more
prepared, but are we spending the peoples' money wisely?
America was caught off-guard on Sept. 11, but propelled by public
anxiety, there were stunning advances in surveillance technology. Along
with the technological increase came an influx of taxpayer dollars into
homeland security--nearly $690 billion over a decade, by one estimate,
not including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. [Source: NY
Times]
The current debate on budget sequestration and a sense that major
attacks on the United States are unlikely may embolden many Republicans
and Democrats to look at our enormous counterterrorism bureaucracy and
ask themselves, ``Is the era of the open checkbook over?''
We all know that the Obama administration is facing a decision over
whether or not to scale back security spending. The most obvious
solution may be to eliminate the least productive programs. As always,
budget determination must be advised by reference to a National
strategy.
What we require is a more systematic, well-considered approach to
security than the current DHS supplies. More important than the
survival of DHS as an organization is to ensure that the majority of
Americans understand that we are prone to attack by extremist
organizations. This awareness will hopefully mean that when we are hit
again, we don't ramp up our security culture and destroy our freedoms
with ``overreaction.''
The experts here from the GAO, CRS, and CSIS have already outlined
the way forward in handling the abuse of taxpayers dollars. Last year,
when I testified on this topic I singled out a few items to consider as
objectives to save taxpayer dollars. I noted that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) isn't the only agency with duplication
problems. This is a Government-wide problem--but four Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report items stand out:
Homeland Security Grants.--The Department of Homeland Security
needs better project information and coordination among four
overlapping grant programs (current reform is underway with grant
consolidation).
Information Technology Investment Management.--The Office of
Management and Budget, and the Departments of Defense and Energy need
to address potentially duplicative information technology investments
to avoid investing in unnecessary systems.
Passenger Aviation Security Fees.--Options for adjusting the
passenger aviation security fee could further offset billions of
dollars in civil aviation security costs.
Domestic Disaster Assistance.--The Federal Emergency Management
Agency could reduce the costs to the Federal Government related to
major disasters declared by the President by updating the principal
indicator on which disaster funding decisions are based and better
measuring a State's capacity to respond without Federal assistance, and
by a clearer policy justification for engaging Federal assistance or
not doing so.
No matter how much money Washington spends, it will never be
enough. In 2006, I found myself in the private sector and began the
process for creating a blueprint based on my experience with the
commission. One major goal the commission was to include localities in
the National response. Mayors need to be ready at the local level since
all response is local. I recommend that we adopt a blueprint for the
private sector.
national blueprint for secure communities (the first 72 hours are
critical)
Today, many American communities simply don't have the assets or
financial resources to be fully prepared during the first 72 hours of
crisis. Whether the threat comes from a natural disaster or a terrorist
attack, many of our cities and towns are at risk. According to the
Department of Homeland Security, America's vulnerability is a cause
``for significant National concern.'' In addressing this concern, our
communities must find ways to augment their existing public-sector
resources by leveraging the assets and capabilities of citizens,
businesses, and community organizations during the initial hours or
days until help and reinforcement arrive. The National Blueprint for
Secure Communities is intended to help fill this void.
First response is always a local response. During the first 72
hours of a crisis, the quality of first response will be measured in
lives saved, property preserved, and the speed of community recovery.
As a society, our confidence in our ability to respond to a disaster,
whether natural or man-made, will profoundly affect how we approach the
challenges of preserving a free society in an age of terrorism.
The goal should be to seek community input through committees, the
internet, and the Congress. The committees must be comprised of first
responders, community leaders, private-sector representatives, local,
State, and National officials.
The subcommittees can be organized as such:
Response/Containment;
Intelligence/Situational Awareness;
Transportation/Logistics;
Public Health/Medical;
Legal/Intergovernmental;
Public Safety/Information;
Infrastructure/Economic;
Community/Citizen.
Instead of waiting for a plan--each community can prepare right now
and create a 10-point plan for their city to be responsive to any
disaster. From the Federal point of view, States and localities will
always be under pressure to reach for Federal grants and appropriations
to fill local budget gaps. Federal spending must be made in accordance
with a National strategic plan.
history of gilmore commission before & after 9/11
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Americans and most of the
civilized world looked ahead to the future with little fear--especially
of global war. A transcript of a Jan. 26, 1996 Bill Clinton
Presidential radio address delivered on a Saturday morning following
his recently delivered state of the union address sums up where he and
most of Americans were focused--Domestic Policy:
``These are the seven challenges I set forth Tuesday night--to
strengthen our families, to renew our schools and expand educational
opportunity, to help every American who's willing to work for it
achieve economic security, to take our streets back from crime, to
protect our environment, to reinvent our government so that it serves
better and costs less, and to keep America the leading force for peace
and freedom throughout the world. We will meet these challenges, not
through big government. The era of big government is over, but we can't
go back to a time when our citizens were just left to fend for
themselves.''
Little did we know then that by 2003 a Republican President would sign
a bipartisan bill creating another Government Cabinet agency called the
``Department of Homeland Security.''
history of the gilmore commission
From 1999 to 2003, I was proud to serve as chairman of the
Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic
Response to Terrorism Involving Weapons Mass Destruction--the shortened
name became known as ``The Gilmore Commission.'' To sum up what we did
in those 5 years prior and after 9/11 is this: Our commission was
focused on local responders. One Gilmore Commission member, Ray Downey,
served as a representative from the New York City Fire Department. Ray,
unfortunately, died serving the people of his city and Nation while
responding and saving lives on September 11, 2001.
congressional mandate for the gilmore commission
The Advisory Panel was established by Section 1405 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261
(H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). That Act
directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks.
It said: The panel shall----
1. Assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness
for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
2. Assess the progress of Federal training programs for local
emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction;
3. Assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of
unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements,
and the needs of maritime regions;
4. Recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with
respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response
efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response
capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; and
5. Assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in
funding effective local response capabilities.
That Act required the Advisory Panel to report its findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and
local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction to the President and the Congress three
times during the course of the Advisory Panel's deliberations--on
December 15 in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Advisory Panel's tenure was
extended for 2 years in accordance with Section 1514 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (S. 1358, Public Law
107-107, 107th Congress, First Session), which was signed into law by
the President on December 28, 2001. By virtue of that legislation, the
panel was required to submit two additional reports--one on December
15, 2002, and one on December 15, 2003.
advisory panel composition (a unique membership focused on first
responders)
Mister Chairman, please allow me to pay special tribute to the men
and women who serve on our panel. This Advisory Panel is unique in one
very important way. It is not the typical National ``blue ribbon''
panel, which in most cases historically have been composed almost
exclusively of what I will refer to as ``Washington Insiders''--people
who have spent most of their professional careers inside the Beltway.
This panel has a sprinkling of that kind of experience--a former Member
of Congress and Secretary of the Army, a former State Department
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, a former senior executive
from the CIA and the FBI, a former senior member of the intelligence
community, the former head of a National academy on public health, two
retired flag-rank military officers, a former senior executive in a
non-Governmental charitable organization, and the head of a National
law enforcement foundation. But what truly makes this panel special
and, therefore, causes its pronouncement to carry significantly more
weight, is the contribution from the members of the panel from the rest
of the country:
Three directors of State emergency management agencies, from
California, Iowa, and Indiana, two of whom now also serve their
Governors as Homeland Security Advisors;
The deputy director of a State homeland security agency;
A State epidemiologist and director of a State public health
agency;
A former city manager of a mid-size city;
The chief of police of a suburban city in a major
metropolitan area;
Senior professional and volunteer firefighters;
A senior emergency medical services officer of a major
metropolitan area;
And, of course--in the person of your witness--a former
State Governor.
These are representatives of the true ``first responders''--those
heroic men and women who put their lives on the line every day for the
public health and safety of all Americans. Moreover, so many of these
panel members are also National leaders in their professions: Our EMS
member is a past president of the National association of emergency
medical technicians; one of our emergency managers is the past
president of her National association; our law officer now is president
of the international association of chiefs of police; our
epidemiologist is past president of her professional organization; one
of our local firefighters is chair of the terrorism committee of the
international association of fire chiefs; the other is chair of the
prestigious National Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization
and InterOperability.
Those attacks continue to carry much poignancy for us, because of
the direct loss to the panel. Ray Downey, department deputy chief and
chief-in-charge of Special Operations Command, Fire Department of the
City of New York, perished in the collapse of the second tower in the
September 11 attack on the New York World Trade Center.
panel reports
In the history of the Panel, we produced five advisory reports to
the Congress and to the President of the United States. The first
report in 1999 assessed threat. The second report in 2000 developed the
fundamentals of a National strategy for combating terrorism.
The third report, dedicated to Ray Downey who lost his life in the
World Trade Center, filled out a National strategy in five key subject
areas: State and local response capabilities, health and medical
capabilities, immigration and border control, cybersecurity, and use of
the military. Our fourth report in 2002, issued in the year following
the 9/11 attacks, further made recommendations on how to marshal the
National effort towards a National strategy. It paid special attention
to the needs of intelligence sharing and the proper structure for
counterterrorism activities inside the United States. Our last report
was issued on December 15, 2003. That final report sought to express
some end-vision and direction for the United States as it develops its
National strategy and makes the country safer.
fifth report (2003)--forging america's new normalcy: securing our
homeland, preserving our liberty
Mister Chairman, the Advisory Panel released its fifth and final
report on December 15, 2003. In that report, the strategic vision,
themes, and recommendations were motivated by the unanimous view of the
panel that its final report should attempt to define a future state of
security against terrorism--one that the panel has chosen to call
``America's New Normalcy.''
That strategic vision offered by the panel reflects the guiding
principles that the panel has consistently enumerated throughout its
reports:
It must be truly National in scope, not just Federal.
It should build on the existing emergency response system
within an all-hazards framework.
It should be fully resourced with priorities based on risk.
It should be based on measurable performance.
It should be truly comprehensive, encompassing the full
spectrum of awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery against domestic and international threats against our
physical, economic, and societal well-being.
It should include psychological preparedness.
It should be institutionalized and sustained.
It should be responsive to requirements from and fully
coordinated with State and local officials and the private
sector as partners throughout the development, implementation,
and sustainment process.
It should include a clear process for strategic
communications and community involvement.
It must preserve civil liberties.
In developing the report, panel members all agreed at the outset
that it could not postulate, as part of its vision, a return to a pre-
September 11 ``normal.'' The threats from terrorism are now recognized
to be a condition must face far into the future. It was the panel's
firm intention to articulate a vision of the future that subjects
terrorism to a logical place in the array of threats from other sources
that the American people face every day--from natural diseases and
other illnesses to crime and traffic and other accidents, to mention a
few. The panel firmly believes that terrorism must be put in the
context of the other risks we face, and that resources should be
prioritized and allocated to that variety of risks in logical fashion.
In 2004 our panel proffered a view of the future--5 years hence--
that it believes offers a reasonable, measurable, and attainable
benchmark. It believes that, in the current absence of longer-term
measurable goals, this benchmark can provide government at all levels,
the private sector, and our citizens a set of objectives for readiness
and preparedness. The panel did not claim that the objectives presented
in this future view are all-encompassing. Neither do they necessarily
reflect the full continuum of advances that America may accomplish or
the successes that its enemies may realize in the next 5 years. The
view is a snapshot in time for the purpose of guiding the actions of
today and a roadmap for the future.
The panel said that America's new normalcy by January of 2009
should reflect:
Both the sustainment and further empowerment of individual
freedoms in the context of measurable advances that secure the
homeland.
Consistent commitment of resources that improve the ability
of all levels of government, the private sector, and our
citizens to prevent terrorist attacks and, if warranted, to
respond and recover effectively to the full range of threats
faced by the Nation.
A standardized and effective process for sharing information
and intelligence among all stakeholders--one built on moving
actionable information to the broadest possible audience
rapidly, and allowing for heightened security with minimal
undesirable economic and societal consequences.
Strong preparedness and readiness across State and local
government and the private sector with corresponding processes
that provide an enterprise-wide National capacity to plan,
equip, train, and exercise against measurable standards.
Clear definition about the roles, responsibilities, and
acceptable uses of the military domestically--that strengthens
the role of the National Guard and Federal Reserve Components
for any domestic mission and ensures that America's leaders
will never be confronted with competing choices of using the
military to respond to a domestic emergency versus the need to
project our strength globally to defeat those who would seek to
do us harm.
Clear processes for engaging academia, business, all levels
of government, and others in rapidly developing and
implementing research, development, and standards across
technology, public policy, and other areas needed to secure the
homeland--a process that focuses efforts on real versus
perceived needs. Well-understood and shared process, plans, and
incentives for protecting the Nation's critical infrastructures
of Government and in the private sector--a unified approach to
managing our risks.
The panel's Future Vision back in 2009 included specific details
involving:
State, Local, and Private-Sector Empowerment;
Intelligence;
Information Sharing;
Training, Exercising, Equipping, and Related Standards;
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection;
Research and Development, and Related Standards;
Role of the Military.
The GAO and DHS have prepared lengthy reports to enhance homeland
security of our Nation and the Congress is doing its due diligence.
Hearings like we are having today move forward the idea of making
progress happen, but we must always consider the role of the military
as we decide on our future homeland policy.
in conclusion
Civil Liberties are the foundation of the Gilmore Commission. The
panel addressed the on-going debate in the United States about the
trade-offs between security and civil liberties. It concluded that
history teaches, however, that the debate about finding the right
``balance'' between security and civil liberties is misleading, that
the traditional debate implies that security and liberty are competing
values and are mutually exclusive. It assumes that our liberties make
us vulnerable and if we will give up some of these liberties, at least
temporarily, we will be more secure.
It concluded that civil liberties and security are mutually
reinforcing. The panel said that we must, therefore, evaluate each
initiative along with the combined effect of all initiatives to combat
terrorism in terms of how well they preserve all of the ``unalienable
rights'' that the founders believed were essential to the strength and
security of our Nation--rights that have become so embedded in our
society and ingrained in our psyche that we must take special
precautions, take extra steps, to ensure that we do not cross the line.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Governor, for that fine testimony.
The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Reese.
STATEMENT OF SHAWN REESE, ANALYST, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND
HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Reese. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, Members
of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Congressional Research
Service, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before the subcommittee to discuss homeland security.
CRS was asked specifically to discuss homeland security
definitions and missions, and how multiple definitions within
strategic documents affect the funding and risk-based
prioritization of these missions.
Many observers agree that a clear prioritization of
National homeland security missions is needed, and a consensus
definition is necessary to prioritize missions ranging, for
example, from border security to counterterrorism to disaster
assistance. My written statement addresses these issues in
detail and discusses the absence of both a standard homeland
security definition and a single National homeland security
strategy, along with potential issues related to these matters.
I will now briefly discuss these issues.
Presently, homeland security is not funded using clearly-
defined National risk-based priorities. Arguably, these
priorities need to be set and need to be clear in order for
funding to be most effective. In August 2007, Congress enacted
Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act, which
required DHS Secretary to conduct a quadrennial review of
homeland security. This review was to be a comprehensive
examination of the Nation's homeland security strategy,
including recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and
the Nation's priorities, and guidance on the programs, assets,
capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the
Department.
Later, critics argued that the original 2010 version of the
review did not meet these requirements. Currently, DHS is
developing the 2014 Quadrennial Review. Now might be an ideal
time to review the concept of homeland security, its
definition, and how the concept and definition affect
Congressional appropriations and the identification of
priorities. However, more than 10 years after the 9/11
terrorist attacks, policymakers continue to grapple with the
definition and concept of homeland security.
Today, there are numerous mission-specific strategies, such
as the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security and
the National Response Framework. However, today there is no
single comprehensive National homeland security strategy. The
concept of homeland security is evolving. One may even argue
that it might be waning on a separate comprehensive policy
concept. Evidence for this viewpoint can be found in the
current administration's incorporation of the homeland security
staff into the National security staff, and the inclusion of
homeland security guidance in the 2010 National Security
Strategy. There has not been a distinct National homeland
security strategy since 2007. Additionally, the Office of
Management and Budget has questioned the value of requiring
Federal department and agencies to identify homeland security
funding in their fiscal year 2014 budget request submissions.
Three options stand out to address these issues. First,
Congress could require a distinct National homeland security
strategy, which would be similar to the Bush administration's
2002 and 2007 strategy. Second, Congress could require a
refinement of the National Security Strategy that could include
succinct risk-based homeland security priorities. Finally,
Congress may strictly focus on DHS activities. This option
would entail DHS further refining its Quadrennial Review, which
it is presently doing.
In closing, multiple and competing definitions and missions
may hamper Congressional authorization, appropriations,
oversight functions, and may also restrict DHS and other
Federal entities' ability to prioritize and execute homeland
security missions. Failure to prioritize and execute homeland
security missions based on risk may result in unintended
consequences. I will conclude my testimony here, and once again
thank you for the privilege to appear before you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shawn Reese
February 15, 2013
introduction
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the Congressional Research Service I would
like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss
National homeland security strategy, definitions, and priorities.
The subcommittee requested that CRS discuss the implications of the
absence of a Federal Government-wide National homeland security
strategy, the use of multiple definitions of homeland security in
National strategic documents, the lack of National homeland security
priorities, and the funding of these priorities. This written statement
is drawn largely from my CRS report Defining Homeland Security:
Analysis and Congressional Considerations.
Accordingly, my statement summarizes key portions of this report,
and addresses key findings which include the absence of a consensus
definition of homeland security and priorities. My statement concludes
with an analysis of the potential consequences stemming from the lack
of a consensus homeland security definition, the absence of homeland
security priorities, and how this may affect the funding and execution
of critical homeland security activities.
current homeland security environment
Congress and policymakers are responsible for funding homeland
security priorities. These priorities need to exist, to be clear and
cogent, in order for funding to be most effective. Presently, as DHS
itself has stated, homeland security is not funded on clearly-defined
priorities. In an ideal scenario, there would be a clear definition of
homeland security, and a consensus about it; as well as prioritized
missions, goals, and activities. Policymakers could then use a process
to incorporate feedback and respond to new facts and situations as they
develop. However, more than 10 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
policymakers continue to grapple with the definition of homeland
security. For example, the U.S. Government does not have a single
definition for ``homeland security.'' Currently, different strategic
documents and mission statements offer varying missions that are
derived from different homeland security definitions.
Historically, the strategic documents framing National homeland
security policy have included National strategies produced by the White
House and documents developed by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). Prior to the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2002 and 2007
National Strategies for Homeland Security were the guiding documents
produced by the White House. In 2011, the White House issued the
National Strategy for Counterterrorism.
In conjunction with these White House strategies, DHS has developed
a series of evolving strategic documents that are based on the two
National homeland security strategies and include the 2008 Strategic
Plan--One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland; the 2010
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and Bottom-Up Review; and the 2012
Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan. The 2012 DHS strategic
plan is the latest evolution in DHS's process of defining its mission,
goals, and responsibilities. This plan, however, only addresses the
Department's homeland security purview and is not a document that
addresses homeland security missions and responsibilities that are
shared across the Federal Government.
Today, 30 Federal entities receive annual homeland security funding
excluding the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that 48% of annual homeland
security funding is appropriated to these Federal entities, with the
Department of Defense (DOD) receiving approximately 26% of total
Federal homeland security funding. DHS receives approximately 52%.\1\
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\1\ U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2013: Analytical Perspectives, February
2012, ``Appendix--Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and
Budget Account,'' http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
budget/fy2013/assets/homeland_supp.pdf.
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Currently, the Department of Homeland Security is developing the
2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which is scheduled to
be issued in late 2013 or early 2014. Given the anticipated issuance of
this latest QHSR, this might be an ideal time to review the concept of
homeland security, the definition of the term ``homeland security,''
and how the concept and definition of homeland security affect
Congressional appropriations and the identification of priorities as
established by DHS and the administration.
evolution of homeland security strategic documents
The concept of homeland security is evolving. One may argue that it
might even be waning as a separate policy concept. Evidence for this
viewpoint can be found in the current administration's incorporation of
the homeland security staff into the National security staff and the
inclusion of homeland security priorities within the 2010 National
Security Strategy. There has not been a National homeland security
strategy since 2007. Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has announced that it will no longer require Federal departments
and agencies to identify homeland security funding with their fiscal
year 2014 budget request submissions.\2\
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\2\ http://www.performance.gov/sites/default/files/tmp/
_List_of_Reports_Required_by_- P_L%20_111-352.xls.
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The evolution of the homeland security concept has been
communicated in several strategic documents. Today, strategic documents
provide guidance to all involved Federal entities and include the 2010
National Security Strategy and the 2011 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism. There are also strategic documents that provide
specific guidance to DHS entities and include the 2010 Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review, the Bottom-Up Review, and the 2012 Department
of Homeland Security Strategic Plan. Prior to issuance of these
documents, National and DHS homeland security strategic documents
included the 2002 and 2007 National Strategies for Homeland Security
and the 2008 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan. All of
these documents have varying definitions for ``homeland security'' and
varying missions have been derived from these definitions.
While the definitions and missions embodied in these strategic
documents have commonalities, there are significant differences.
Natural disasters are specifically identified as an integral part of
homeland security in five of the seven documents, and only three
documents--the 2008 and 2012 DHS Strategic Plans and the Bottom-Up
Review--specifically include border and maritime security and
immigration in their homeland security definitions. All of these
mentioned issues are important and involve significant funding
requests. However, the lack of consensus about the inclusion of these
policy areas in a definition of homeland security may have negative or
unproductive consequences for National homeland security operations. A
consensus definition would be useful, but may not be sufficient. A
clear prioritization of strategic missions would help focus and direct
Federal entities' homeland security activities. Additionally,
prioritization affects Congress's authorization, appropriation, and
oversight activities. Ultimately, DHS' current efforts to design and
issue the forthcoming QHSR may be important in the debate on homeland
security strategy.
quadrennial homeland security review
``In August 2007, Congress enacted the Implementing 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act \3\ which required the DHS Secretary to conduct a
quadrennial review of homeland security. This review was to be a
comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the
Nation, including recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and
priorities of the Nation for homeland security and guidance on the
programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of
the Department.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pub. L. 110-53.
\4\ 121 Stat. 544, 6 U.S.C. 347.
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Additionally, the DHS Secretary was to consult with the ``heads of
other Federal agencies'' and:
``delineate and update, as appropriate, the national homeland security
strategy, consistent with appropriate national and Departmental
strategies, strategic plans, and Homeland Security Presidential
Directives, including the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the
National Response Plan, and the Department Security Strategic
Plan.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid.
These updates were to ``prioritize the full range of the critical
homeland security mission areas of the Nation.''\6\ Many knowledgeable
observers concluded that the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
did not accomplish these requirements. For example, David Maurer,
Director of the Government Accountability Office's Homeland Security
and Justice Team stated before the House Committee on Homeland
Security's Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management on
February 3, 2013, that the 2010 QHSR identified five key DHS missions
but did not prioritize them as required by the 9/11 Commission Act.\7\
Additionally, Alan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy,
DHS, stated, in February 2012, that the Department was still in the
process of aligning resources with priorities. However, that process
was not completed for the 2010 QHSR.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Ibid.
\7\ David Maurer, Government Accountability Office, statement
before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management, ``Is DHS Effectively
Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats?'' hearing, 112th
Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 3, 2012.
\8\ Alan Cohn, Department of Homeland Security, statement before
the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Management, ``Is DHS Effectively Implementing a
Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats?'' hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd
sess., Feb. 3, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The continued absence of homeland security priorities may be the
result of competing or differing definitions of homeland security
within National strategic documents and the evolving concept of
homeland security. However, prior to 9/11 such entities as the Gilmore
Commission \9\ and the United States Commission on National Security
\10\ discussed the need to evolve the way National security policy was
conceptualized due to the end of the Cold War and the rise of
radicalized terrorism. After 9/11, policymakers concluded that a new
approach was needed to address the large-scale terrorist attacks. A
Presidential council and department were established, and a series of
Presidential Directives were issued in the name of ``homeland
security.'' These developments established that homeland security was a
distinct, but undefined concept.\11\ Later, the Federal, State, and
local government responses to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina
expanded the concept of homeland security to include significant
disasters, major public health emergencies, and other events that
threaten the United States, its economy, the rule of law, and
Government operations.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ For information on the Gilmore Commission, see http://
www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.html. The Gilmore Commission was
established prior to 9/11; however, it released its fifth and final
report in December 2003.
\10\ For information on the U.S. Commission on National Security,
see http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nssg.pdf. The U.S. Commission on
National Security was established in 1998 and issued its final report
in February 2001. The commission did reference the idea of ``homeland
security'' in early 2001.
\11\ Harold C. Relyea, ``Homeland Security and Information,''
Government Information Quarterly, vol. 19, 2002, p. 219.
\12\ Nadav Morag, ``Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United
States?,'' Homeland Security Affairs, vol. 7, September 2011, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
definitions and missions as part of strategy development
Definitions and missions are part of strategy development.
Policymakers develop strategy by identifying National interests,
prioritizing missions to achieve those National interests, and arraying
instruments of National power to achieve National interests.\13\
Strategy is not developed within a vacuum. President Barack Obama's
administration's 2010 National Security Strategy states that strategy
is meant to recognize ``the world as it is'' and mold it into ``the
world we seek.''\14\ Developing a homeland security strategy, however,
may be complicated if the key concept of homeland security is not
succinctly defined, and strategic missions are not aligned and
synchronized among different strategic documents and Federal entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American
Statecraft (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 5.
\14\ Executive Office of the President, National Security Strategy,
Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
definitions
The following table provides examples of strategic documents and
their specific homeland security definitions.
TABLE 1.--SUMMARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINITIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document Definition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 National Strategy for Homeland A concerted National effort to
Security (White House). prevent terrorist attacks
within the United States,
reduce America's vulnerability
to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from
attacks that do occur.\1\
2008 U.S. Department of Homeland A unified National effort to
Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years prevent and deter terrorist
2008-2013 (DHS). attacks, protect and respond
to hazards, and to secure the
National borders.\2\
2010 National Security Strategy (White A seamless coordination among
House). Federal, State, and local
governments to prevent,
protect against, and respond
to threats and natural
disasters.\3\
2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security A concerted National effort to
Review (DHS). ensure a homeland that is
safe, secure, and resilient
against terrorism and other
hazards where American
interests, aspirations, and
ways of life can thrive.\4\
2010 Bottom-Up Review (DHS)............ Preventing terrorism,
responding to and recovering
from natural disasters,
customs enforcement and
collection of customs revenue,
administration of legal
immigration services, safety
and stewardship of the
Nation's waterways and marine
transportation system, as well
as other legacy missions of
the various components of
DHS.\5\
2011 National Strategy For Defensive efforts to counter
Counterterrorism (White House). terrorist threats.\6\
2012 Strategic Plan (DHS).............. Efforts to ensure a homeland
that is safe, secure, and
resilient against terrorism
and other hazards.\7\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, The National
Homeland Security Strategy, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1.
\2\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission,
Securing the Homeland: U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal
Years 2008-2013, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 3.
\3\ Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC,
May 2010, p. 2.
\4\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, Washington, DC, February 2010, p. 13.
\5\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review, Washington,
DC, July 2010, p. 3.
\6\ Office of the President, National Strategy for Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC, June 2011, p. 11.
\7\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland
Security Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2012-2016, Washington, DC,
February 2012, p. 2. This document does not explicitly state a
definition for ``homeland security'' but it does define DHS's
``vision.''
Some common themes among these definitions are:
The homeland security enterprise encompasses a Federal,
State, local, and Tribal government and private-sector approach
that requires coordination;
Homeland security can involve securing against and
responding to both hazard-specific and all-hazards threats; and
Homeland security activities do not imply total protection
or complete threat reduction.
Each of these documents highlights the importance of coordinating
homeland security missions and activities. However, individual Federal,
State, local, and Tribal government efforts are not identified in the
documents.
The competing and varied definitions in these documents may
indicate that there is no succinct homeland security concept. Without a
succinct homeland security concept, policymakers and entities with
homeland security responsibilities may not successfully coordinate or
focus on the highest prioritized or most necessary activities.
Coordination is especially essential to homeland security because of
the multiple Federal agencies and the State and local partners with
whom they interact. Coordination may be difficult if these entities do
not operate with the same understanding of the homeland security
concept. For example, definitions that don't specifically include
immigration or natural disaster response and recovery may result in
homeland security stakeholders and Federal entities not adequately
resourcing and focusing on these activities. Additionally, an absence
of a consensus definition may result in Congress funding a homeland
security activity that DHS does not consider a priority. For example,
Congress may appropriate funding for a counterterrorism program such as
the State Homeland Security Grant Program when DHS may have identified
an all-hazards grant program, such as Emergency Management Performance
Grant Program, as a priority.
It is, however, possible that a consensus definition and overall
concept exists among policymakers and Federal entities, but that it
isn't communicated in the strategic documents.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Examination of such a possibility is beyond the scope of this
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, DHS Deputy Secretary Jane Lute stated that homeland
security `` . . . is operation, it's transactional, it's decentralized,
it's bottom-driven,'' and influenced by law enforcement, emergency
management, and the political environment. Conversely, DHS Deputy
Secretary Lute stated that National security `` . . . is strategic,
it's centralized, it's top-driven,'' and influenced by the military and
the intelligence community.\16\ Some see these comments as a reflection
of a DHS attempt to establish a homeland security definition that is
more operational than strategic and an illustration of the complexity
of a common understanding of homeland security and its associated
missions. Additionally, Congress has defined homeland security as:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Christopher Bellavita, ``A new perspective on homeland
security?'' Homeland Security Watch, December 20, 2011, http://
www.hlswatch.com/?2011/?12/?20/?a-new-perspective-on-homeland-security/
???.
(11) Homeland security
The term `homeland security' includes efforts----
(A) to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
(B) to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism;
(C) to minimize damage from a terrorist attack in the United
States; and
(D) to recover from a terrorist attack in the United States.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The Defense Production Act of 1950 as amended, sec. 722(11).
This definition is exclusive ``for the purposes of this act.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
varied missions
Varied homeland security definitions, in numerous documents, result
in homeland security stakeholders identifying and executing varied
strategic missions. Homeland security stakeholders include Federal
departments and agencies, State and local governments, and non-profit
and non-governmental organizations. The strategic documents mentioned
earlier and listed in the CRS report identify numerous homeland
security missions such as terrorism prevention; response and recovery;
critical infrastructure protection and resilience; Federal, State, and
local emergency management and preparedness; and border security. As
noted earlier, none of these documents specifically tasks a Federal
entity with the overall responsibility for homeland security. The
following table summarizes the varied missions in these strategic
documents.
TABLE 2.--SUMMARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS AND GOALS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document Missions and Goals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Prevent and disrupt
Security (White House). terrorist attacks.
Protect the American
people, critical
infrastructure, and key
resources.
Respond to and recover
from incidents that do occur.
Strengthen the
foundation to ensure long-term
success.\1\
2008 U.S. Department of Homeland Protect the Nation
Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years from dangerous people.
2008-2013 (DHS). Protect the Nation
from dangerous goods.
Protect critical
infrastructure.
Strengthen the
Nation's preparedness and
emergency response
capabilities.
Strengthen and unify
the Department's operations
and management.\2\
2010 National Security Strategy (White Strengthen National
House). capacity.
Ensure security and
prosperity at home.
Secure cyberspace.
Ensure American
economic prosperity.\3\
2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Prevent terrorism and
Review (DHS). enhance security.
Secure and manage our
borders.
Enforce and administer
our immigration laws.
Safeguard and secure
cyberspace.
Ensure resilience to
disasters.\4\
Provide essential
support to National and
economic security.\5\
2010 Bottom-Up Review (DHS)............ Prevent terrorism and
enhance security.
Secure and manage
borders.
Enforce and manage
immigration laws.
Safeguard and secure
cyberspace.
Ensure resilience to
disasters.
Improve Departmental
management and
accountability.\6\
2011 National Strategy for Protect the American
Counterterrorism (White House). people, homeland, and American
interests.
Eliminate threats to
the American people's,
homeland's, and interests'
physical safety.
Counter threats to
global peace and security.
Promote and protect
U.S. interests around the
globe.\7\
2012 Strategic Plan (DHS).............. Preventing terrorism
and enhancing security.
Securing and managing
our borders.
Enforcing and
administering our immigration
laws.
Safeguarding and
securing cyberspace.
Ensuring resilience to
disasters.\8\
Providing essential
support to National and
economic security.\9\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, National
Strategy for Homeland Security, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1.
\2\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission,
Securing the Homeland: U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal
Years 2008-2013, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 6-25.
\3\ Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC,
May 2010, p. 14.
\4\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, Washington, DC, February 2010, p. 2.
\5\ This mission of providing essential support to National and economic
security was not part of the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, but has been subsequently added as an additional mission. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review: Enhanced Stakeholder Consultation and Use of Risk Information
Could Strengthen Future Reviews, GAO-11-873, September 2011, p. 9.
\6\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review, Washington,
DC, July 2010, pp. i-ii.
\7\ Office of the President, National Strategy for Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC, June 2011, p. 8.
\8\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland
Security Strategic Goal: Fiscal Years 2012-2016, Washington, DC,
February 2012, pp. 3-18.
\9\ The 2012 Strategic Plan does not designate this as a specific
mission, but it does state that ``DHS contributes in many ways to
these elements to broader U.S. national and economic security while
fulfilling its homeland security missions.'' U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Goal:
Fiscal Years 2012-2016, Washington, DC, February 2012, p. 19.
These documents all identify specific missions as essential to
securing the Nation. All of the documents state that the Nation's
populace, critical infrastructure, and key resources need protection
from terrorism and disasters. This protection from both terrorism and
disasters is a key strategic homeland security mission. Some, but not
all, of the documents include missions related to border security,
immigration, the economy, and general resilience. Members of Congress
and Congressional committees, however, have sometimes criticized these
documents.
Senator Susan Collins--current Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs--expressed disappointment in
the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and 2010 Bottom-Up Review
arguing that they did not communicate priorities and did not compare
favorably to the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review.\18\ The
Quadrennial Defense Review identifies National security and U.S.
military priorities through a process `` . . . from objectives to
capabilities and activities to resources.''\19\ Furthermore, the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review missions are different from the
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security\20\ missions, and neither
identifies priorities, or resources, for DHS, or for other Federal
agencies. Since the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review missions are differing and varied,
and because the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review does not
specifically identify a strategic process to achieve the missions, it
could be assumed that this document was meant to be solely operational
guidance. Additionally, some critics found the Bottom-Up Review lacking
in detail and failing to meet its intended purpose.\21\ Further
Congressional criticism included an observation on the absence of a
single DHS strategy. At a House Homeland Security Committee's
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management hearing,
Chairman Michael McCaul stated that `` . . . DHS needs a single
strategic document which subordinate agencies can follow and make sure
the strategy is effectively and efficiently implemented. This single
document should conform to the National Security Strategy of the United
States of America. If the agencies do not have a clearly established
list of priorities, it will be difficult to complete assigned
missions.''\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Charting a Path Forward: The Homeland Security
Department's Quadrennial Review and Bottom-Up Review, 111th Cong., 2nd
sess., July 21, 2010.
\19\ U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review,
Washington, DC, February 2010, p. iii.
\20\ The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security is the most
recent National strategy specifically on homeland security.
\21\ Katherine McIntire Peters, ``DHS Bottom-Up Review is long on
ambition, short on detail,'' GovernmentExecutive.com, July 2010.
\22\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, ``Is DHS
Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats?'',
112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 3, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
federal homeland security mission activities and funding
The strategic homeland security documents provide Federal entities
information on the National approach to homeland security. These
documents are intended to identify Federal entity responsibilities in
the area of homeland security and assist Federal entities in
determining how to allocate Federal funding for that purpose. As
mentioned earlier, in fiscal year 2012 30 Federal departments,
agencies, and entities received annual homeland security funding
excluding DHS. OMB estimates that 48% of annual homeland security
funding is appropriated to these Federal entities, with DOD receiving
approximately 26% of total Federal homeland security funding. DHS
receives approximately 52%.
In an effort to measure Federal homeland security funding, Congress
required OMB to include a homeland security funding analysis in each
Presidential budget.\23\ OMB requires Federal departments, agencies,
and entities to provide budget request amounts based on the following
six 2003 National Strategy for Homeland Security mission areas:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Pub. L. 107-296 (Homeland Security Act of 2002), sec. 889.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intelligence and Warning;
Border and Transportation Security;
Domestic Counterterrorism;
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets;
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats; and
Emergency Preparedness and Response.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11:
Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Instructions for
Homeland Security Data Collection, Washington, DC, August 2011, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/
homeland.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OMB, however, notes that the National Strategy for Homeland
Security was revised in 2007, and that revision consolidated these six
mission areas into three: (1) Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;
(2) protect the American people, critical infrastructure, and key
resources; and (3) respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.
The strategy also states that these original 2003 mission areas are
still used to ensure ``continuity and granularity.''\25\ OMB does not
address President Obama administration's issuance of the 2010 National
Security Strategy which supersedes the 2007 National Strategy for
Homeland Security. It should be noted that OMB, in the fiscal year 2014
budget request is not requesting Federal agencies to identify homeland
security mission amounts in their submissions. This may further hamper
the ability to track Federal funding for homeland security activities
and restrict the ability to determine if funding aligns with National
homeland security priorities. The following table shows the amount of
funding provided for homeland security missions for fiscal year 2012
and the amount requested for fiscal year 2013 by agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Ibid.
TABLE 3.--FISCAL YEAR 2012 APPROPRIATIONS AND FISCAL YEAR 2013 REQUEST FOR HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION FUNDING BY
AGENCY
(Budget Authority in Millions of Dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Department Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 2013 Request
2012 Enacted 2013 Request as % of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture..................................................... $570.1 $551.4 0.80%
Commerce........................................................ $289.6 $304.1 0.44%
Defense......................................................... $17,358.4 $17,955.1 26.05%
Education....................................................... $30.9 $35.5 0.05%
Energy.......................................................... $1,923.3 $1,874.7 2.72%
Health and Human Services....................................... $4,146.8 $4,112.2 5.97%
Homeland Security............................................... $35,214.7 $35,533.7 51.57%
Housing and Urban Develop- ment................................ $3.0 $3.0 \1\ --
Interior........................................................ $57.6 $56.7 0.08%
Justice......................................................... $4,055.4 $3,992.8 5.79%
Labor........................................................... $46.3 $36.6 0.05%
State........................................................... $2,283.4 $2,353.8 3.42%
Transportation.................................................. $246.6 $243.3 0.35%
Treasury........................................................ $123.0 $121.1 0.18%
Veterans Affairs................................................ $394.5 $383.7 0.56%
Corps of Engineers.............................................. $35.5 $35.5 0.05%
Environmental Protection Agency................................ $101.8 $102.6 0.15%
Executive Office of the President............................... $10.4 $11.0 0.02%
General Services Administration................................. $38.0 $59.0 0.09%
National Aeronautics and Space Administration................... $228.9 $216.1 0.31%
National Science Foundation..................................... $443.9 $425.9 0.62%
Office of Personnel Management.................................. $1.3 $0.6 \2\ --
Social Security Administration.................................. $234.3 $252.1 0.37%
District of Columbia............................................ $15.0 $25.0 0.04%
Federal Communications Commission............................... .............. $1.7 \3\ --
Intelligence Community Management Account....................... $8.8 -- --
National Archives and Records Administration.................... $22.6 $22.5 0.03%
Nuclear Regulatory Commission................................... $78.4 $76.6 0.11%
Securities and Exchange Commission.............................. $8.0 $8.0 0.01%
Smithsonian Institution......................................... $97.0 $100.1 0.15%
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum................................. $11.0 $11.0 0.02%
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... $67,988.0 \4\ $68,905.2 \5\ 100%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2013:
Analytical Perspectives, February 2012, ``Appendix--Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and Budget
Account,'' http://www.whitehouse.gov/?sites/?default/?files/?omb/?budget/?fy2013/?assets/?homeland_supp.pdf.
\1\ This amount is less than 0.01%.
\2\ This amount is less than 0.01%.
\3\ This amount is less than 0.01%.
\4\ The majority of this funding is categorized as protecting critical infrastructure and key assets.
\5\ Percentages in column may not equal 100 due to rounding.
This allocation of Federal homeland security funding reveals that
approximately 50% of Federal funding is not appropriated for DHS
missions or activities. Additionally, it could mean that relying on
detailed DHS strategies may be insufficient for developing a structured
and coherent National homeland security, and that a coordinating and
encompassing National homeland security definition may be important to
prioritizing homeland security activities and funding.
The 2010 National Security Strategy states that homeland security
is ``a seamless coordination among Federal, State, and local
governments to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats and
natural disasters.''\26\ Homeland security requires coordination
because numerous Federal, State, and local entities have responsibility
for various homeland security activities. The proliferation of
responsibilities entitled ``homeland security activities'' is due to a
couple of factors. One factor is that homeland security developed from
the pre-9/11 concept of law enforcement and emergency management.
Another factor is the continuously evolving definition of ``homeland
security.'' Some degree of evolution of the homeland security concept
is expected. Policymakers respond to events and crises like terrorist
attacks and natural disasters by using and adjusting strategies, plans,
and operations. These strategies, plans, and operations also evolve to
reflect changing priorities. The definition of homeland security
evolves in accordance with the evolution of these strategies, plans,
and operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Office of the President, National Security Strategy,
Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
congressional considerations
Policymakers are faced with a complex and detailed list of risks,
or threats to security, for which they then attempt to plan. However,
some have argued that managing those risks correctly 99% of the time
may not be good enough when even a single failure may lead to
significant human and financial costs.\27\ Homeland security is
essentially about managing risks. The purpose of a strategic process is
to develop missions to achieve that end. Before risk management can be
accurate and adequate, policymakers ideally coordinate and communicate.
That work to some degree depends on developing a foundation of common
definitions of key terms and concepts. It is also necessary, in order
to best coordinate and communicate, to ensure stakeholders are aware
of, trained for, and prepared to meet assigned missions. At the
National level, there does yet not appear to be alignment of homeland
security definitions and missions among disparate Federal entities. DHS
is, however, attempting to align its definition and missions, but does
not prioritize its missions; there is clarity lacking in the National
strategies of Federal, State, and local roles and responsibilities;
and, potentially, some may argue that funding is driving priorities
rather than priorities driving the funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and
American Politics, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, CQPress, 2007, p. 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS is aligning its definition and missions in the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review, the Bottom-Up Review, and the 2012 Strategic
Plan; however, DHS does not prioritize the missions. DHS prioritizes
specific goals, objectives, activities, and specific initiatives within
the missions, and prioritizes initiatives across the missions. There is
still no single National homeland security definition, nor is there a
prioritization of National homeland security or DHS missions.
There is no evidence in the existing homeland security strategic
documents that supports the aligning and prioritization of the varied
missions, nor do any of the documents appear to convey how National,
State, or local resources are to be allocated to achieve these
missions. Without prioritized resource allocation to align missions,
proponents of prioritization of the Nation's homeland security
activities and operations maintain that plans and responses may be
haphazard and inconsistent. Another potential consequence of the
absence of clear missions is that available funding then tends to
govern the priorities.
Congress may decide to address the issues associated with homeland
security strategy, definitions, and missions, in light of the potential
for significant events to occur similar to the 9/11 terrorist attacks
and Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. Many observers assert that these
outstanding policy issues result from the varied definitions and
missions identified in numerous National strategic documents.
Additionally, they note that these documents do not consistently
address risk mitigation associated with the full range of homeland
security threats. From this perspective one piece missing from these
documents, and their guidance, is a discussion of the resources and
fiscal costs associated with preparing for low-risk, but high-
consequence threats.
Specifically, Congress may choose to consider a number of options
addressing the apparent lack of a consensus homeland security
definition that prioritizes missions by requiring the development of a
more succinct, and distinct, National homeland security strategy. One
of these options might be to require a total rewrite of a National
homeland security strategy. This option would be similar to the Bush
administration's issuance of National homeland security strategies in
2002 and 2007. Such a strategy could include a definitive listing of
mission priorities based on an encompassing definition that not only
includes DHS specific responsibilities, but all Federal department and
agency responsibilities. A strategy that includes priorities could
improve Congress's and other policymakers' ability to make choices
between competing homeland security missions. This option would also be
a departure from the current administration's practice of including
National homeland security guidance in the National Security Strategy.
Another option would be to build upon the current approach by
requiring the administration to develop the National Security Strategy
that succinctly identifies homeland security missions and priorities.
Alternatively, Congress may determine that the present course of
including National homeland security guidance in the National Security
Strategy is adequate, and may focus strictly on DHS activities. This
option would entail DHS further refining its Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review which it has begun to do with its 2012 Strategic Plan
and as it prepares the 2014 QHSR.
It has been argued that homeland security, at its core, is about
coordination because of the disparate stakeholders and risks.\28\ Many
observers assert that homeland security is not only about coordination
of resources and actions to counter risks; it is also about the
coordination of the strategic process policymakers use in determining
the risks, the stakeholders and their missions, and the prioritization
of those missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without a general consensus on the physical and philosophical
definition and missions of homeland security, achieved through a
strategic process, some believe that there will continue to be the
potential for disjointed and disparate approaches to securing the
Nation. From this perspective general consensus on the homeland
security concept necessarily starts with a consensus definition and an
accepted list of prioritized missions that are constantly reevaluated
to meet risks of the new paradigm that is homeland security in the 21st
Century. These varied definitions and missions, however, may be the
result of a strategic process that has attempted to adjust Federal
homeland security policy to continually emerging threats and risks.
Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much, Mr. Reese.
The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Nelson to testify.
STATEMENT OF RICK ``OZZIE'' NELSON, VICE PRESIDENT FOR BUSINESS
DEVELOPMENT, CROSS MATCH TECHNOLOGIES
Mr. Nelson. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
Barber, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today. I want to note, while
still affiliated with CSIS, I am now a vice president at Cross
Match Technologies. I would like to take this time to discuss
how the Department of Homeland Security, Congress, and the
American people can work together to support DHS' continued
evolution to a risk-based security model.
Following 9/11, we created the Department of Homeland
Security and gave it the mandate to protect all people from all
things all the time. With this mandate came relatively robust
Federal budgets. But times have changed. In order for DHS to
continue to protect the homeland during the period of limited
budgets, we as a Nation must accept this basic but vital fact
that we cannot guarantee and cannot afford to provide absolute
security. Instead, we must embrace an approach to protecting
the Nation through risk-based security. This will require
identifying where the greatest risks to our security are and
allocating limited resources against those risks. DHS is moving
in this direction, but it must be accelerated and done so with
the support of Congress.
In the past, we have not had the political will to
implement such models given that they do carry with them an
inherent degree of risk. Yet the silver lining in the current
fiscal climate is that it has forced us to look past these
political hurdles, presenting us with an opportunity to fully
embrace a risk-based approach. My remarks will focus on two key
areas where I believe further efficiency can be made. My
written testimony includes a broader range of ideas and depths
of analysis.
First, in order to identify risk, DHS will need to continue
its focus on information and intelligence sharing. A risk-based
model of security is inherently driven by information and
intelligence, which enables policymakers and analysts to make
informed decisions where the risk is highest. This begins with
DHS' network of fusion centers, which become all the more
valuable as the Department transitions towards this model.
Fusion centers serve as the primary point, the front door, if
you wish, of interaction between the Federal Government and
State and local centers and the private sector. While the
current architecture and number of fusion centers may not be
fully optimized, they will continue to play a valuable role in
information sharing, and must not be abandoned. As such, DHS
must take steps to ensure the increased controversy over how
these centers are employed does not threaten their continued
utility. The Department must accept that State and local
entities will only be willing to continue to participate in
fusion centers if they add value beyond counterterrorism, and
must work to strike a balance between counterterrorism and an
all-hazards mission.
The second issue I want to discuss is screening and
credentialing. DHS screens and credentials millions of
individuals every day seeking to gain access from everything
from air travel to computer systems. An effective and efficient
means of screening and credentialing is vital to a risk-based
security approach and would allow DHS to allocate its resources
against those who potentially pose the greatest threat.
However, responsibility for screening and credentialing is
currently spread across multiple agencies within DHS. This
diffused model is inefficient, and as demand rises and budgets
fall will increasingly become untenable. For the Department's
screening and credentialing services, the way ahead may lie
with an enterprise approach. Integration of all DHS' databases
should be accelerated, and programs like TSA's PreCheck and
CBP's Global Entry should continue to be expanded to include a
greater number of travelers from a variety of sources. Further,
trusted travelers enrolled in one program should be provided an
ID number or biometric profile that will be recognized across
programs, greater increasing operability.
By streamlining and screening credentialing, DHS can not
only increase security, but save limited budget dollars.
Secretary Napolitano recently stated a goal of having 50
percent of travelers enrolled in a trusted traveler program
within 2 years. This goal should be embraced and supported by
Congress.
In conclusion, moving to a risk-based model for security
will not be without its challenges and will require that
Congress, DHS, and the American people engage in an on-going
dialogue about our priorities and the level of risk we are
willing to accept. It is important to emphasize and to
understand that no matter how well executed, any adoption of a
risk-based model will inherently mean assuming some degree of
risk. In implementing them, we must be willing to accept not
only the risks, but the potential consequences, and that we
cannot simply revert to trying to provide complete protection
if and when there is an attack.
Furthermore, it means accepting that while some mission
areas will see increased resources, others may receive little
or nothing. If we as a Nation are willing to accept these
facts, a risk-based model for homeland security holds the
potential to help reorient us towards tomorrow's threats even
as budgets are tightened. Thank you again for the opportunity
to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson
February 15, 2013
Since its creation a decade ago, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has been tasked with variety of missions but one primary
focus; protecting the United States of America from al-Qaeda and its
brand of Islamist terrorism. Following the horror of 9/11, we vowed to
never again let such an attack take place on American soil, and so we
created DHS and gave it the mandate to prevent any and all terrorism in
the United States. For much of the last decade we were willing to
largely maintain this approach, given the continued threat posed by al-
Qaeda and relatively robust Federal budgets. We didn't make hard
choices regarding what was or wasn't working or where to focus our
efforts and resources because we didn't need to and we thought we were
safer in not doing so. However, in recent years our budgets have
shrunk, and the threats we face have shifted. Times have changed, and
DHS will, by necessity, need to change with them.
In order for DHS to continue to protect the homeland during this
period of limited budgets, we as a Nation will need to accept the basic
but vital fact that we cannot guarantee and cannot afford to try to
provide absolute security from all things for all people at all times.
Instead, we must embrace an approach to protecting the Nation through
risk-based security. This will require identifying where the greatest
risks to our security are, and allocating limited resources against
those risks. In doing so, we will allow DHS not only to better adapt to
shrinking budgets by cutting spending on low-probability, low-
consequence threats, but increase our security by better utilizing
available funds to prepare for those threats that pose the greatest
risk and consequence. Risk-based models are not a new concept, and have
been proposed in some form by every recent administration. However, in
the past we simply have not had the political will to implement such
models, given that they do carry with them an inherent degree of risk.
Yet the silver lining of the current fiscal climate is that it has
forced us to look past these political hurdles, presenting us with an
opportunity to fully embrace a risk-based approach.
The first step in the path towards implementing an effective risk-
based model for homeland security is recognizing the fact that al-
Qaeda, which has consumed our attention and the majority of our
homeland security resources for the past decade, likely no longer
constitutes the threat to the homeland that it once did. Al-Qaeda has
been decimated by the death of bin Laden and dismantling of al-Qaeda
core, and while recent events in West Africa have made clear that
affiliated groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb remain cause
for concern, the threat of another terrorist attack in the United
States approaching the scale of 9/11 has been vastly diminished. Yet
even as the threat of al-Qaeda recedes, new challenges are emerging
that will require shifts in the Department's resources and focus. As
such, DHS will need to continue to find new efficiencies in its efforts
to protect the United States by focusing on identifying emerging risks
while refining its calculus regarding existing risks.
In order to do so, DHS will need to continue to accelerate its
focus on information and intelligence sharing. A risk-based model of
security is inherently driven by information and intelligence, which
enables policy-makers and analysts to make informed decisions on where
risk is highest. Therefore, as DHS increasingly transitions to a risk-
based model, the concept of homeland security intelligence must be
refined and the Department's role as the primary conduit for
information sharing with State and local governments and the private
sector must be further solidified. This begins with the network of
fusion centers.
Fusion centers, established since 9/11, will become all the more
valuable as the Department transitions to a risk-based model. Fusion
centers have a vital role to play in supporting information sharing,
serving as the primary point of interaction between the Federal
Government, the State and local entities most likely to witness
suspicious terrorism-related activity, and private industry, which owns
85% of the Nation's critical infrastructure. While the current
architecture and number of fusion centers may not be fully optimized,
they will continue to play a valuable role in information sharing, and
must not be abandoned. As such, DHS must take steps to ensure that
increased controversy over how these centers are employed does not
threaten their continued utility. The Department and other Federal
agencies must accept that State and local entities will only be willing
to continue to participate in fusion centers if they add value beyond
counterterrorism and must work together to strike a working balance
between counterterrorism and all-hazards missions. The Department
should also encourage State and local partners to participate in
standardized intelligence training, in order to equip those on the
ground with a better understanding of the intelligence process and
equalize some of the disparities between various fusion centers.
Additionally, the fusion centers need to find a means to better engage
with the private sector. This includes not only finding new avenues for
integrating information provided by the private sector, but keeping
private companies and businesses informed of potential threats in a
useful and timely manner while remaining cognizant of privacy and civil
liberties concerns. Fusion centers have the potential to play a vital
role in building a risk-based model of security but will be hampered in
their mission unless the Department and its partners can come together
to address these challenges.
In addition to intelligence and information sharing, the effective
screening and credentialing of individuals seeking access to everything
from air travel to computer systems is vital to a risk-based approach.
An effective, efficient means of screening and credentialing would
allow DHS to allocate its resources against those who potentially pose
the greatest threat. However, responsibility for screening and
credentialing is currently spread across multiple agencies within DHS
who employ multiple, unique systems. This diffuse model is inefficient
and, as demand rises and budgets fall, will increasingly become
untenable. For the Department's screening and credentialing services,
which also rely on intelligence and information, the way ahead may lie
with an enterprise approach. At present, the multitude of systems being
utilized contributes to redundancies. Furthermore, without full
integration, there is the danger that vital existing information in one
system will be overlooked when making a decision based on information
in a second system. Integration of all DHS databases should be
accelerated so that all elements of the Department have as much
information as possible regarding those they are screening and
credentialing. Screening and credentialing processes also could benefit
substantially from greater automation. The further introduction of
automated processes could significantly reduce the time needed for many
tasks associated with screening and credentialing, greatly improving
efficiency. Programs like Transportation Security Administration's
PreCheck and Customs and Border Protection's Global Entry should also
be expanded to include a greater number of trusted travelers from a
variety of sources. Further, trusted travelers enrolled in one program
should be provided an ID number or biometric profile that would be
recognized across programs, greatly increasing interoperability while
decreasing the resources spent screening those who have already been
screened by another program. By streamlining screening and
credentialing, DHS can not only increase security, but save limited
budget dollars. Secretary Napolitano recently stated a goal of having
50% of travelers enrolled in a Trusted Traveler program within 2 years.
This goal should be embraced and supported by Congress.
Additionally, the Department should examine the creation of a
Department-wide targeting center for the analysis of screening data
from across DHS. While various component agencies maintain their own
analytic targeting centers, no single agency has a complete picture of
all the information residing in the Department's many screening and
credentialing systems. A DHS-wide center could provide a more complete
view, putting together pieces that other, smaller centers might miss,
creating a more complete picture of the risks the Department must
counter.
Even as the Department attempts to focus on those areas that
present the most risk, it must still seek to find efficiencies in areas
where threats are relatively low but could be disproportionately
costly, most notably with regards to chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high explosive weapons (CBRNE). In recent
years, the United States has built an extensive network of
capabilities, program, and offices intended to detect and respond to
these weapons, yet many of these are not well integrated with one
another, leading to significant inefficiencies. Integration of all
CBRNE research and development under one entity, such as DHS Office of
Science and Technology (S&T), would be a logical first step and would
reduce costly R&D redundancies. Additionally, the various components
involved in CBRNE detection and response would greatly benefit from an
integrated information sharing architecture as the National Information
Exchange Model (NIEM) as well as integrated technologies that can
quickly connect and share data between the various agencies and
departments involved. This integration could well serve to both reduce
costs and increase security in the long term by reducing duplication
and increasing coordination.
As DHS moves into its second decade, it will also face new threats
and new risks beyond terrorism. One area where the risks are certainly
growing, and which will require a series of new investments, is
cybersecurity and operations. In addition to the threat posed to our
critical infrastructure, General Keith Alexander, Commander of
USCYBERCOM and director of the National Security Agency, recently noted
that intellectual property theft represents ``the greatest transfer of
wealth in history,'' leeching billions of dollars from the Nation's
economy each year. As such, DHS will need to take a variety of steps to
meet this new risk. One cybersecurity measure which would be relatively
easy to implement would be for DHS to establish a basic training
program for Federal employees across the U.S. Government instructing
them on how to identify, understand, and report suspicious cyber
activity. Such training would not only reduce the risk that a given
employee would become the victim of a cyberattack, but by emphasizing
reporting of attempted attacks, would increase the speed at which
information regarding the attack could be disseminated, allowing
Government and industry to identify the areas of greatest risk more
quickly and move to prevent attacks on other systems before they can
have an effect. While cyber education alone is far from sufficient to
meet the threat, it would be a valuable and relatively cost-effective
step in reducing the emerging risk of cyber attack.
At times, risk-based security will necessitate significant long-
term investments in order to meet growing challenges, such as
increasing activity in the Arctic. As Arctic sea ice recedes, opening
the region to increased traffic, exploration, and territorial
competition, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) will likely be stretched to
the breaking point. In recent years, the Coast Guard has been operating
at an increased operational tempo even as the vessels they rely upon
have grown more and more outdated. The average age of a Coast Guard
cutter is a worrying 43 years, yet in the past decade the USCG has been
called upon for ever-expanding range of missions, running the gamut
from protecting fisheries to guarding Iraqi oil platforms.\1\
Additionally, the number of icebreakers the USCG maintains, which are
vital for Arctic operations, has dwindled to just two. At present, the
USCG is expected to fulfill its growing number and range of missions
with a shockingly small budget; in 2012 we spent more on the Afghan
National Security Forces than we did on our own Coast Guard.\2\ As we
examine areas in which the investment of our limited resources could
have the most value, the Coast Guard is an obvious choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``United States Coast Guard 2012 Posture Statement'', February,
2012, http://www.uscg.mil/posturestatement/docs/
uscg_2012_posture_statement.pdf.
\2\ ``Justification for FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)'', Office of the Secretary of
Defense, February 2012, http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/
OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY13/OCO//asff.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving to a risk-based model for security will not be without its
challenges, and will require that Congress, DHS, and the American
people engage in an on-going dialogue about our priorities and the
level of risk we are willing to accept. It is important to emphasize
and to understand that no matter how well executed, any adoption of a
risk-based model will inherently mean assuming some degree of risk; in
implementing them, we must be willing to accept not only the risks, but
the potential consequences, and that we cannot simply revert to trying
to provide complete protection if and when there is an attack.
Furthermore, it means accepting that while some mission areas will see
increased resources, others may receive little or nothing. If we as a
Nation are willing to accept these facts, a risk-based model for
homeland security holds the potential to help reorient us towards
tomorrow's threats even as budgets are tightened.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much for that testimony.
The Chairman will now recognize Ms. Berrick to testify.
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
Barber, and Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be
here to discuss DHS' on-going efforts to build a unified
Department and position itself for the future.
When DHS began operations 10 years ago, GAO recognized that
creating such a large and complex Department would take years
to achieve. Since that time, we have conducted an extensive
body of work at the Department, issuing over 1,300 products and
making over 1,800 recommendations to strengthen their programs
and operations. Our work has collectively shown that the
Department has made significant progress across its range of
missions. However, it is important to note that DHS is still
maturing, more work remains, and there are several cross-
cutting themes that have affected their efforts thus far and
need to be addressed moving forward.
In terms of progress, DHS has developed strategic and
operational plans, hired, deployed, and trained workforces,
established new offices and programs, and issued policies and
regulations to govern its operations. However, more work
remains. Many of DHS' problems have come with a significant
price tag. For example, we reported that DHS needs better
information and coordination to prevent unnecessary duplication
among four overlapping large grant programs that together
accounted for over $20 billion in grants awarded from 2002
through 2011. In another example, as was mentioned by
Representative Barber this morning, DHS experienced schedule
delays and performance shortfalls with its Secure Border
Initiative program, resulting in its ultimate cancellation. DHS
has also taken action to address a small percentage of
individuals who have overstayed their visas.
We reported that DHS could also reduce the costs to the
Federal Government related to major disaster declarations by
updating the principal indicator on which assistance decisions
are based to better reflect the State's capability to respond
to that disaster. Had the indicator been updated for inflation
alone, about 25 percent fewer disasters may have been funded by
the Federal Government between 2004 and 2011. Although the
specific reasons for these and other challenges vary, we
identified three common themes, based on our work, that have
hindered the Department's progress, and should be addressed
moving forward.
First, DHS has made important strides in strengthening
their management functions such as acquisition and IT in recent
years. However, significant challenges remain that pose serious
risks. For example, DHS' major acquisition programs continue to
cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than planned,
and deliver less capability than promised. We reported in
September that 42 out of 70 major programs we reviewed at DHS
experienced cost growth and schedule slippages or both. Sixteen
of these programs accounted for $32 billion in cost overruns
over a 3-year period, just 16 of those programs. The need to
strengthen DHS' management functions is on GAO's high-risk list
for this reason.
Second, DHS has made important strides in providing
leadership and coordinating efforts with its stakeholders, but
needs to take additional action to strengthen partnerships in
the sharing and utilization of terrorism and law enforcement
information. GAO also designated information sharing as high-
risk throughout the Federal Government, including DHS. It has
been on our high-risk list since 2005.
Finally, limitations in strategic and program planning and
limited assessments to inform approaches and investments have
hindered the Department's efforts. DHS has also made progress
in analyzing risks across sectors, but they have made less
progress in actually incorporating that information into its
planning and budgeting decision process.
Given DHS' significant leadership role in homeland
security, it is critical that its programs and operations are
operating as efficiently and as effectively as possible, are
sustainable, and continue to mature to address pressing
security needs. In summary, nearly 10 years after DHS'
creation, they have indeed made significant progress, but have
yet to reach their full potential. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
the opportunity to testify. I look forward to questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick
February 15, 2013
gao-13-370t
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on
progress made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and work
remaining in implementing its homeland security missions since it began
operations almost 10 years ago on March 1, 2003. This milestone
provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made since
it began operating as a single department and the challenges it has
faced in implementing its missions, as well as to identify issues that
will be important for the Department to address as it moves forward,
based on work we have completed on DHS programs and operations in key
areas.
Since DHS began operations, we have evaluated numerous Departmental
programs and issued more than 1,300 reports and Congressional
testimonies in areas such as border security and immigration,
transportation security, and emergency management, among others. We
have made approximately 1,800 recommendations to DHS designed to
strengthen its operations. DHS has implemented more than 60 percent of
these recommendations, has actions under way to address others, and has
taken additional steps to strengthen its mission activities. However,
the Department has more to do to ensure that it conducts its missions
efficiently and effectively while simultaneously preparing to address
future challenges that face the Department and the Nation.
In 2003, we designated implementing and transforming DHS as high-
risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with major
management challenges--into one department.\1\ Further, failure to
effectively address DHS's management and mission risks could have
serious consequences for U.S. National and economic security. Since
2003, we have identified additional high-risk areas where DHS has
primary or significant responsibilities, including protecting the
Federal Government's information systems and the Nation's critical
cyber infrastructure, establishing effective mechanisms for sharing and
managing terrorism-related information to protect the homeland, and the
National Flood Insurance Program.\2\
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\1\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, DC:
January 2003).
\2\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, DC:
February 2013). The National Flood Insurance Program is a key component
of the Federal Government's efforts to limit the damage and financial
impact of floods.
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In September 2011, we issued a report summarizing progress made by
DHS in implementing its homeland security missions 10 years after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.\3\ We reported that DHS had
implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important
goals in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its
potential. We also reported, however, that as DHS continues to mature,
more work remains for it to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness
of those efforts to achieve its full potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work
Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/
11, GAO-11-881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 7, 2011).
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My statement today is based on these and associated products, and
addresses: (1) DHS's progress implementing and strengthening its
mission functions, and (2) cross-cutting issues that have affected the
Department's implementation efforts.
For these past reports, among other things, we analyzed DHS
documents; reviewed and updated our past reports, supplemented by DHS
Office of Inspector General (IG) reports, issued since DHS began its
operations in March 2003; and interviewed DHS officials. We conducted
this work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. More detailed information on the scope and methodology from
our previous work can be found within each specific report.
dhs continues to implement and strengthen its mission functions, but
key operational and management challenges remain
Progress Implementing and Strengthening DHS's Mission Functions
Since DHS began operations in March 2003, it has developed and
implemented key policies, programs, and activities for implementing its
homeland security missions and functions that have created and
strengthened a foundation for achieving its potential as it continues
to mature. We reported in our assessment of DHS's progress and
challenges 10 years after the September 11 attacks, as well as in our
more recent work, that the Department has implemented key homeland
security operations and achieved important goals in many areas. These
included developing strategic and operational plans across its range of
missions; hiring, deploying, and training workforces; establishing new,
or expanding existing, offices and programs; and developing and issuing
policies, procedures, and regulations to govern its homeland security
operations.\4\
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\4\ GAO-11-881.
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For example:
DHS successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces,
including the Federal screening workforce to assume screening
responsibilities at airports Nation-wide, and about 20,000
agents to patrol U.S. land borders.
DHS also created new programs and offices, or expanded
existing ones, to implement key homeland security
responsibilities, such as establishing the National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center to, among
other things, coordinate the Nation's efforts to prepare for,
prevent, and respond to cyber threats to systems and
communications networks.
DHS issued policies and procedures addressing, among other
things, the screening of passengers at airport checkpoints,
inspecting travelers seeking entry into the United States, and
assessing immigration benefit applications and processes for
detecting possible fraud.
DHS issued the National Response Framework, which outlines
disaster response guiding principles, including major roles and
responsibilities of Government, non-Governmental organizations,
and private-sector entities for response to disasters of all
sizes and causes.
After initial difficulty in fielding the program, DHS
developed and implemented Secure Flight, a passenger
prescreening program through which the Federal Government now
screens all passengers on all commercial flights to, from, and
within the United States.
In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data indicating it had met
its interim goal to secure the land border with a decrease in
apprehensions. Our data analysis showed that apprehensions
decreased within each Southwest Border sector and by 68 percent
in the Tucson sector from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.
Border Patrol officials attributed this decrease in part to
changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of Border Patrol
strategic objectives.\5\
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\5\ GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet
in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25
(Washington, DC: Dec. 10, 2012). Border Patrol, within U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, is the Federal agency with primary responsibility
for securing the National borders between designated U.S. land border
ports of entry.
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We reported in September 2012 that DHS, through its
component agencies, particularly the Coast Guard and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has made substantial
progress in implementing various programs that, collectively,
have improved maritime security.\6\ For example, in November
2011, we reported that the Coast Guard's risk assessment model
generally met DHS criteria for being complete, reproducible,
documented, and defensible.\7\ Coast Guard units throughout the
country use this risk model to improve maritime domain
awareness and better assess security risks to key maritime
infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after
the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO-12-1009T (Washington, DC:
Sept. 11, 2012).
\7\ GAO, Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but
More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and
Operations, GAO-12-14 (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2011).
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DHS has taken important actions to conduct voluntary
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) security
surveys and vulnerability assessments, provide information to
CIKR stakeholders, and assess the effectiveness of security
surveys and vulnerability assessments.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Could Better
Manage Security Surveys and Vulnerability Assessments, GAO-12-378
(Washington, DC: May 31, 2012).
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Challenges Implementing DHS's Missions
DHS has made progress in implementing its homeland security
missions, but more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses
in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to
strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve
its full potential. Our recent work has shown that many DHS programs
and investments continue to experience cost overruns, schedule delays,
and performance problems, and can be better coordinated to reduce
overlap and the potential for unnecessary duplication, and achieve cost
savings.\9\ For example:
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\9\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Actions Needed To Reduce
Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication, Achieve Cost Savings,
and Strengthen Mission Functions, GAO-12-464T (Washington, DC: Mar. 8,
2012).
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DHS needs better project information and coordination to
identify and prevent potential unnecessary duplication among
four overlapping grant programs that in total constituted $20
billion in grants from fiscal years 2002 through 2011. We also
found that DHS has not implemented outcome-based performance
measures for any of the four programs, which hampers its
ability to fully assess the effectiveness of these grant
programs.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information
and Coordination Among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303
(Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012).
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DHS has not developed a process to identify and analyze
program risks in its Student and Exchange Visitor Program, such
as a process to evaluate prior and suspected cases of school
noncompliance and fraud. The program is intended to ensure that
foreign students studying in the United States comply with the
terms of their admission into the country and to certify
schools as authorized to accept foreign students in academic
and vocational programs. The program's budget authority in
fiscal year 2012 was $120 million.\11\
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\11\ GAO, Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess
Risks and Strengthen Oversight Functions, GAO-12-572 (Washington, DC:
June 18, 2012).
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DHS did not validate the science supporting the Screening of
Passengers by Observation Techniques program or determine if
behavior detection techniques could be successfully used across
the aviation system to detect threats before deploying the
program. The program has an annual cost of over $200
million.\12\ We are currently reviewing DHS's efforts to assess
the effectiveness of the program and ensure that behavior
detection officers are consistently implementing program
protocols, and we expect to report on the results of our work
later this year.
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\12\ GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger
Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist
to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, GAO-10-763
(Washington, DC: May 20, 2010).
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DHS experienced schedule delays and performance problems
with its information technology program for securing the border
between ports of entry--the Secure Border Initiative Network
(SBInet)--which led to its cancellation after 5 years and about
$1 billion after deploying 53 miles of SBInet systems to the
Arizona border.\13\ DHS has adopted a new approach for
developing a technology plan for surveillance at the remainder
of the Arizona border, referred to as the Arizona Border
Surveillance Technology Plan (Plan), with an estimated life-
cycle cost of $1.5 billion. To develop the Plan, DHS conducted
an analysis of alternatives and outreach to potential vendors,
and took other steps to test the viability of the current
system. However, DHS has not documented the analysis justifying
the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of
border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan, or
defined the mission benefits or developed performance metrics
to assess its implementation of the Plan. We are reviewing
DHS's efforts to implement the Plan, and we expect to report on
the results of our work later this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information
on Plans and Costs Is Needed Before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington,
DC: Nov. 4, 2011).
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DHS spent more than $200 million on advanced spectroscopic
portals, used to detect smuggled nuclear or radiological
materials, without issuing an accurate analysis of both the
benefits and the costs--which we later estimated at over $2
billion--and a determination of whether additional detection
capabilities were worth the additional costs. DHS subsequently
canceled the advanced spectroscopic portals program as
originally conceived.\14\
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\14\ GAO-12-464T.
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Each year DHS processes millions of applications and
petitions for more than 50 types of immigrant- and
nonimmigrant-related benefits for persons seeking to study,
work, visit, or live in the United States, and for persons
seeking to become U.S. citizens. DHS embarked on a major
initiative in 2005 to transform its current paper-based system
into an electronic account-based system that is to use
electronic adjudication and account-based case management
tools, including tools that are to allow applicants to apply
on-line for benefits. However, DHS did not consistently follow
the acquisition management approach outlined in its management
directives in developing and managing the program. The lack of
defined requirements, acquisition strategy, and associated cost
parameters contributed to program deployment delays of over 2
years. In addition, DHS estimates that through fiscal year
2011, it spent about $703 million, about $292 million more than
the original program baseline estimate.\15\
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\15\ GAO, Immigration Benefits: Consistent Adherence to DHS's
Acquisition Policy Could Help Improve Transformation Program Outcomes,
and GAO-12-66 (Washington, DC: Nov. 22, 2011).
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We found that DHS could reduce the costs to the Federal
Government related to major disasters declared by the President
by updating the principal indicator on which disaster funding
decisions are based and better measuring a State's capacity to
respond without Federal assistance. From fiscal years 2004
through 2011, the President approved 539 major disaster
declarations at a cost of $78.7 billion.\16\
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\16\ GAO, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to
Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own,
GAO-12-838 (Washington, DC: Sept. 12, 2012). This total includes
obligations made as of September 30, 2011, for major disasters declared
from fiscal years 2004 through 2011.
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dhs can strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations
by continuing to address cross-cutting issues that have impacted its
progress
Our work on DHS's mission functions and cross-cutting issues has
identified three key themes--leading and coordinating the homeland
security enterprise, implementing and integrating management functions
for results, and strategically managing risks and assessing homeland
security efforts--that have impacted the Department's progress since it
began operations.\17\ As these themes have contributed to challenges in
the Department's management and operations, addressing them can result
in increased efficiencies and effectiveness. For example, DHS can help
reduce cost overruns and performance shortfalls by strengthening the
management of its acquisitions, and reduce inefficiencies and costs for
homeland security by improving its research and development (R&D)
management. These themes provide insights that can inform DHS's efforts
as it works to implement its missions within a dynamic and evolving
homeland security environment. DHS made progress and has had successes
in all of these areas, but our work found that these themes have been
at the foundation of DHS's implementation challenges, and need to be
addressed from a Department-wide perspective to effectively and
efficiently position the Department for the future.
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\17\ DHS defines the homeland security enterprise as the Federal,
State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector
entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who share
a common National interest in the safety and security of the United
States and the American population.
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Leading and Coordinating the Homeland Security Enterprise
DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the
homeland and has significant leadership and coordination
responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security
enterprise. To satisfy these responsibilities, it is critically
important that DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective
partnerships with its stakeholders while at the same time addressing
DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. DHS has made
important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts
across the homeland security enterprise, but needs to take additional
actions to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and
utilization of information. For example, DHS has improved coordination
and clarified roles with State and local governments for emergency
management. DHS also strengthened its partnerships and collaboration
with foreign governments to coordinate and standardize security
practices for aviation security. The Department has further
demonstrated leadership by establishing a governance board to serve as
the decision-making body for DHS information-sharing issues.\18\ The
board has enhanced collaboration among DHS components and identified a
list of key information-sharing initiatives.
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\18\ GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Has Demonstrated Leadership and
Progress, but Additional Actions Could Help Sustain and Strengthen
Efforts, GAO-12-809 (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2012). DHS has
established a decision-making body--the Information Sharing and
Safeguarding Governance Board--that demonstrates senior executive-level
commitment to improving information sharing. The board has identified
information-sharing gaps and developed a list of key initiatives to
help address those gaps.
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Although DHS has made important progress, more work remains. We
designated terrorism-related information sharing as high-risk in 2005
because the Government faces significant challenges in analyzing and
disseminating this information in a timely, accurate, and useful
manner.\19\ In our most recent high-risk update, we reported that the
Federal Government's leadership structure is committed to enhancing the
sharing and management of terrorism-related information and has made
significant progress defining a governance structure to implement the
Information Sharing Environment--an approach that is intended to serve
as an overarching solution to strengthening sharing.\20\ However, we
also reported that the key departments and agencies responsible for
information-sharing activities, including DHS, need to continue their
efforts to share and manage terrorism-related information by, among
other things, identifying technological capabilities and services that
can be shared across departments and developing metrics that measure
the performance of, and results achieved by, projects and activities.
DHS officials explained that its information-sharing initiatives are
integral to its mission activities and are funded through its
components' respective budgets. However, in September 2012 we reported
that five of DHS's top eight priority information-sharing initiatives
faced funding shortfalls, and DHS had to delay or scale back at least
four of them.\21\
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\19\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, DC:
January 2005).
\20\ GAO-13-283.
\21\ GAO-12-809.
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Implementing and Integrating Management Functions for Results
Following its establishment, DHS focused its efforts primarily on
implementing its various missions to meet pressing homeland security
needs and threats, and less on creating and integrating a fully and
effectively functioning department. As the Department matured, it has
put into place management policies and processes and made a range of
other enhancements to its management functions, which include
acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital
management. However, DHS has not always effectively executed or
integrated these functions.
While challenges remain for DHS to address across its range of
missions, the Department has made considerable progress in transforming
its original component agencies into a single Cabinet-level department
and positioning itself to achieve its full potential.
Important strides have also been made in strengthening the
Department's management functions and in integrating those functions
across the Department, particularly in recent years. However, continued
progress is needed in order to mitigate the risks that management
weaknesses pose to mission accomplishment and the efficient and
effective use of the Department's resources. In particular, the
Department needs to demonstrate continued progress in implementing and
strengthening key management initiatives and addressing corrective
actions and outcomes that GAO identified, and DHS committed to taking
actions address this high-risk area. For example:
Acquisition management.--Although DHS has made progress in
strengthening its acquisition function, most of the
Department's major acquisition programs continue to cost more
than expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver
less capability than promised. We identified 42 programs that
experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, with 16 of
the programs' costs increasing from a total of $19.7 billion in
2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011--an aggregate increase of 166
percent. We reported in September 2012 that DHS leadership has
authorized and continued to invest in major acquisition
programs even though the vast majority of those programs lack
foundational documents demonstrating the knowledge needed to
help manage risks and measure performance.\22\ We recommended
that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key
program and portfolio management practices and ensure
acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy.
DHS concurred with our recommendations and reported taking
actions to address some of them.
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\22\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined
Investment Management to Help Meet Mission Needs, GAO-12-833
(Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2012).
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Information technology management.--DHS has defined and
begun to implement a vision for a tiered governance structure
intended to improve information technology (IT) program and
portfolio management, which is generally consistent with best
practices. However, the governance structure covers less than
20 percent (about 16 of 80) of DHS's major IT investments and 3
of its 13 portfolios, and the Department has not yet finalized
the policies and procedures associated with this structure. In
July 2012, we recommended that DHS finalize the policies and
procedures and continue to implement the structure. DHS agreed
with these recommendations and estimated it would address them
by September 2013.\23\
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\23\ GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Further Define and
Implement Its New Governance Process, GAO-12-818 (Washington, DC: July
25, 2012).
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Financial management.--DHS has, among other things, received
a qualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2012 financial
statements.\24\ DHS is working to resolve the audit
qualification to obtain an unqualified opinion for fiscal year
2013.\25\ However, DHS components are currently in the early
planning stages of their financial systems modernization
efforts, and until these efforts are complete, their current
systems will continue to inadequately support effective
financial management, in part because of their lack of
substantial compliance with key Federal financial management
requirements. Without sound controls and systems, DHS faces
challenges in obtaining and sustaining audit opinions on its
financial statement and internal controls over financial
reporting, as well as ensuring its financial management systems
generate reliable, useful, and timely information for day-to-
day decision making.
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\24\ A qualified opinion states that, except for the effects of the
matter(s) to which the qualification relates, the audited financial
statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial
position, results of operations, and cash flows of the entity in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. DHS's
auditors issued their audit qualification due to DHS's inability to
support certain components of property, plant, and equipment and
heritage and stewardship assets. DHS's complete set of financial
statements consist of the Balance Sheet, Statement of Net Cost,
Statement of Changes in Net Position, Statement of Budgetary Resources,
and Statement of Custodial Activity.
\25\ An unqualified opinion states that the audited financial
statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial
position, results of operations, and cash flows of the entity in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
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Human capital management.--In December 2012, we identified
several factors that have hampered DHS's strategic workforce
planning efforts and recommended, among other things, that DHS
identify and document additional performance measures to assess
workforce planning efforts.\26\ DHS agreed with these
recommendations and stated that it plans to take actions to
address them. In addition, DHS has made efforts to improve
employee morale, such as taking actions to determine the root
causes of morale problems. Despite these efforts, however,
Federal surveys have consistently found that DHS employees are
less satisfied with their jobs than the Government-wide
average.
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\26\ GAO, DHS Strategic Workforce Planning: Oversight of
Department-wide Efforts Should Be Strengthened, GAO-13-65 (Washington,
DC: Dec. 3, 2012).
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In September 2012, we recommended, among other things, that DHS
improve its root cause analysis efforts of morale issues. DHS agreed
with these recommendations and noted actions it plans to take to
address them.\27\
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\27\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to
Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting
Action Plans, GAO-12-940 (Washington, DC: Sept. 28, 2012).
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Strategically Managing Risks and Assessing Homeland Security Efforts
Forming a new department while working to implement statutorily
mandated and Department-initiated programs and responding to evolving
threats, was, and is, a significant challenge facing DHS. Key threats,
such as attempted attacks against the aviation sector, have impacted
and altered DHS's approaches and investments, such as changes DHS made
to its processes and technology investments for screening passengers
and baggage at airports. It is understandable that these threats had to
be addressed immediately as they arose. However, limited strategic and
program planning by DHS, as well as assessment to inform approaches and
investment decisions, has contributed to programs not meeting strategic
needs or not doing so in an efficient manner.
Further, DHS has made important progress in analyzing risk across
sectors, but it has more work to do in using this information to inform
planning and resource-allocation decisions. Risk management has been
widely supported by Congress and DHS as a management approach for
homeland security, enhancing the Department's ability to make informed
decisions and prioritize resource investments. Since DHS does not have
unlimited resources and cannot protect the Nation from every
conceivable threat, it must make risk-informed decisions regarding its
homeland security approaches and strategies. We reported in September
2011 that using existing risk assessment tools could assist DHS in
prioritizing its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)
implementation mechanisms.\28\ For example, examining the extent to
which risk information could be used to help prioritize implementation
mechanisms for the next QHSR could help DHS determine how to
incorporate and use such information to strengthen prioritization and
resource allocation decisions. DHS officials plan to implement a
National risk assessment in advance of the next QHSR, which DHS
anticipates conducting in fiscal year 2013.
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\28\ GAO, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Enhanced
Stakeholder Consultation and Use of Risk Information Could Strengthen
Future Reviews, GAO-11-873 (Washington, DC: Sept. 15, 2011). The
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review outlined a strategic framework for
homeland security to guide the activities of homeland security
partners, including Federal, State, local, and Tribal government
agencies; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations.
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Our work has also found that DHS continues to miss opportunities to
optimize performance across its missions due to a lack of reliable
performance information or assessment of existing information;
evaluation among possible alternatives; and, as appropriate, adjustment
of programs or operations that are not meeting mission needs. For
example, we reported in February 2013 that the Government's strategy
documents related to Information Systems and the Nation's Cyber
Critical Infrastructure Protection included few milestones or
performance measures, making it difficult to track progress in
accomplishing stated goals and objectives.\29\ In addition, in
September 2012, we reported that DHS had approved a third generation of
BioWatch technology--to further enhance detection of certain pathogens
in the air--without fully evaluating viable alternatives based on risk,
costs, and benefits.\30\ As the Department further matures and seeks to
optimize its operations, DHS will need to look beyond immediate
requirements; assess programs' sustainability across the long term,
particularly in light of constrained budgets; and evaluate trade-offs
within and among programs across the homeland security enterprise.
Doing so should better equip DHS to adapt and respond to new threats in
a sustainable manner as it works to address existing ones.
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\29\ GAO-13-283.
\30\ GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate Mission Need and
Alternatives Before Proceeding with BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition,
GAO-12-810 (Washington, DC: Sept. 10, 2012).
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concluding observations
Given DHS's role and leadership responsibilities in securing the
homeland, it is critical that the Department's programs and activities
are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible; are
sustainable; and continue to mature, evolve, and adapt to address
pressing security needs. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has
implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important
goals and milestones in many areas. DHS has also made important
progress in strengthening partnerships with stakeholders, improving its
management processes and sharing of information, and enhancing its risk
management and performance measurement efforts. Important strides have
also been made in strengthening the Department's management functions
and in integrating those functions across the Department, particularly
in recent years. Senior leaders at the Department have also continued
to demonstrate strong commitment to addressing the Department's
management challenges across the management functions. These
accomplishments are especially noteworthy given that the Department has
had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning Cabinet
department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking for
any organization and one that can take years to achieve even under less
daunting circumstances.
Impacting the Department's efforts have been a variety of factors
and events, such as attempted terrorist attacks and natural disasters,
as well as new responsibilities and authorities provided by Congress
and the administration. These events collectively have forced DHS to
continually reassess its priorities and reallocate resources as needed,
and have impacted its continued integration and transformation. Given
the nature of DHS's mission, the need to remain nimble and adaptable to
respond to evolving threats, as well as to work to anticipate new ones,
will not change and may become even more complex and challenging as
domestic and world events unfold, particularly in light of reduced
budgets and constrained resources. Our work has shown that to better
position itself to address these challenges, DHS should place an
increased emphasis on and take additional action in supporting and
leveraging the homeland security enterprise; managing its operations to
achieve needed results; and strategically planning for the future while
assessing and adjusting, as needed, what exists today. DHS also needs
to continue its efforts to address the associated high-risk areas that
we have identified which have affected its implementation efforts.
Addressing these issues will be critically important for the Department
to strengthen its homeland security programs and operations. DHS has
indeed made significant strides in protecting the homeland, but has yet
to reach its full potential.
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much.
Thank the witnesses for excellent testimony and providing
your comments beforehand. The Chairman will now recognize
himself for a question.
Ten years. It is a tremendous opportunity for us to stop
and look back at the effectiveness of the Department. Oversight
to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent effectively is an
important part and important role of Congress. The protection
of civil liberties is, in my opinion, just as important.
With the passage of NDAA and the fear of indefinite
detention among the American people, the talk of drone use over
United States territory, and CISPA, SOPA, and Executive Orders
on cyber-terrorism do concern Americans about their civil
liberties and privacy. So, Governor Gilmore, your panel made
the issue of civil liberties a cornerstone at the commission.
Are you satisfied that the Department is evaluating each
initiative and program in terms of how well they preserve our
unalienable rights to make sure that they aren't crossing the
line?
Mr. Gilmore. No, Congressman, I am not. As I said in my
opening remarks, my principal concern remains that without a
thorough discussion of the nature of the threat and the
preparedness of the United States to respond to it, there is an
environment, a political environment that could in fact
endanger and threaten the civil freedoms of the United States
if all of a sudden the American people demand a response, that
Congress feels that it must respond, and civil liberties could
be the first thing that goes overboard.
You mentioned the National Defense Authorization Act. I
think it is a very legitimate concern. One of the principal
focuses of our Advisory Panel--principal focuses--was whether
or not and how you use the military, the uniformed military in
the homeland. If you create a panic or a stress environment in
the United States, there is a danger that the Executive branch
will simply respond and use whatever resources are available to
it without regard to the law or the restrictions such as Posse
Comitatus, which is of course we know a doctrine that prohibits
the use of military in the homeland. It was one of the five
principal focuses of our Advisory Panel, our concern over this
type of environment.
The NDAA, the National Defense Authorization Act, in fact,
in our view, does begin to move the military into a domestic
responsibility and into a domestic function. This is not good.
That is why the focus of our panel was to focus on local and
State responders, as well as Federal law enforcement, so that
nonmilitary people are in fact doing what is necessary to
protect the homeland. So once again, as I close this answer,
Congressman, I am concerned about exactly the issue that you
point out.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that. I share the concern as
well. Just recently, the general assembly in my home State
passed legislation to push back against NDAA. So we are
watching that very closely.
On Wednesday, the full committee had a hearing looking at a
new perspective on the threats to the homeland. The Honorable
David Walker, the founder and CEO of the Comeback America
Initiative, spoke of the value of appointing a chief operating
officer for the Department of Homeland Security. We met
yesterday, he and I, and he elaborated that this position
should have specific qualification requirements, a term of 5 to
7 years, a performance contract, and be considered at level 2.
Now, I realize that the Department of Defense has done
something similar to that with its chief management official.
Ms. Berrick, from a management angle, how effective do you
think this type of model is for helping DHS improve in its
leadership and implementation capabilities?
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that can be
effective. That is a suggestion that GAO made early in the
Department's creation, having that central authority and
visibility and continuity over the operations of the
Department. However, I also think DHS' current structure, with
their Under Secretary for Management, can be effective if that
individual is given the authority and the resources to
implement their position effectively.
Now, recently, a few months ago, DHS actually issued a
directive that strengthens the Under Secretary for Management's
authority among the various DHS components. We think that is a
very positive step in the right direction.
So, in summary, I think both models can work. I think DHS
as structured can achieve that same end, again, if the Under
Secretary for Management is given the support and authority
that he or she needs.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Thanks for that.
Mr. Reese, just a final follow-up on that. You talked about
Congress directing DHS initiatives through budgeting and other
things. Do you think Congress should have more day-to-day--not
to say day-to-day--but more hands-on input on how the money
should be spent, directing DHS in certain areas?
Mr. Reese. Well, sir, as you know, I work for Congressional
Research Service, so I don't have an opinion. But there is an
option that Congress could be involved in, through legislation
possibly, requiring DHS to identify, either through mission-
focused and risk-based priorities, specifically within the
Department, or Congress could look at cross-cutting and getting
the whole of Government to discuss and prioritize missions.
That is one way that would affect funding and appropriations,
sir.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Barber for his
question.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, as I think about how we spend or should spend
public money, I think we should spend it like all of us do in
our own households, with prudence and with care. But one more
piece, of course, as public money is spent it has to be
extremely accountable. That is an issue that I want to get to
this morning.
You know, I understand that we have made progress, Ms.
Berrick, you spoke to that, in DHS 10 years later we are better
than we were when we started, and hopefully can improve even
more so in the years ahead. It is no small task. I acknowledge
that the Secretary has taken on one of the most important and
challenging tasks in the Federal Government, trying to bring
together 22 agencies into an effective working organization.
Back a long time ago I participated in the formation of an
agency that brought together eight State agencies. That was in
1974. It is still a work in progress. We can't afford to let
that be a continued issue for the Department of Homeland
Security.
So, I want to ask a question, Mr. Nelson, if you could
respond to this. According to the Partnership for Public
Service, the Department is ranked 19th out of 19 among large
Federal agencies on overall employee satisfaction. I have heard
directly, as I meet with people back home, from our Border
Patrol agents, particularly in the Tucson Sector, about
examples of the problems with management and management
priorities. For example, we have had six sector chiefs in 6
years in the Tucson Sector. We have had concerns raised by the
people who are on the ground, the men and women who protect our
country, the Border Patrol agents, of inattention to
priorities, beginning with the most basic employee needs. For
example, I have been told that currently employees or agents
are unable to purchase uniforms and boots that they need to
report for duty. Additionally, I understand that our agents
assigned to forward operating bases along the border have been
charged with 24-hour staffing for up to a week at a time with
no overtime or rest.
So my questions are these. What impact do you think these
policies and the dissatisfaction amongst our Border Patrol
agents has on our security and the effectiveness of the
administration of Departmental functions? What do you believe
the Department can do to improve the leadership and management
of the workforce?
Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, for that
question. DHS, in my opinion, in Washington, DC, is probably
one of the most difficult places to work for a variety of
reasons. One is the mandate we placed on them. We have to wake
up every morning and, again, protect all people from all things
all the time. They have zero margin for error. Additionally, no
other Department, I would argue, interacts with the American
people in such a personal level on a daily basis as does DHS,
which makes their job, again, extraordinarily difficult.
It is only, as we stated, 10 years into this. We didn't
have, prior to September 11, we didn't really have a DHS
workforce waiting to come into action after the creation. We
had separate agencies operating independently, but we didn't
have a unified Department. This dynamic over the last 10 years
has taken its toll. But I do believe the Department has made
significant strides in trying to create a Homeland Security
personnel cadre to attend to those individuals, to have career
paths for them, to do the best they can to meet their needs and
demands. That is something they are going to have to continue.
We have to have a homeland security workforce where individuals
that are working at the Department are familiar with the
agencies, and people that are working at the agencies are
familiar with the Department.
Again, the greater challenge for DHS is it is not just an
internal issue. They also have to do this with the State and
local governments, and they also have to do this with the
private sector. So creating a workforce with such a broad
mandate is going to take time, it is going to take some
strategic investment. Thank you.
Mr. Barber. Thank you for that answer. I remain concerned,
as I think we all should, that employee morale is at such a low
level. I understand the difficulty of bringing together 22
agencies, silos that want to preserve their individual
authority, but we must do better, particularly for those men
and women who every day put on the uniform, go into rugged
territory to protect our homeland, and who really I think
deserve better.
Let me ask you, if I could, quickly, Ms. Berrick, about
another issue. Along with the Ranking Member of the Homeland
Security Committee, Congressman Thompson, I recently requested
a GAO review of the border resource deployment at the new
Border Patrol strategic plan. The GAO report came out about a
month ago. We had some public meetings on it in Arizona. What
was really disappointing to me was that the results of that
study showed that when the Department rolled out its strategic
plan, its risk-based strategic plan, it had no goals, it had no
metrics, it had no evaluation processes.
As the Department has now accepted the GAO recommendations
by November of this year to implement them, in your view what
immediate steps should be taken to bring that about? Second,
who should be at the table? Who should be asked about what
should be the goals, what should be the risk management
measurements and evaluation process before those changes or
aspects of the plan are implemented?
Ms. Berrick. Thank you. A couple of things. Yeah, it is
critically important that DHS implement the strategic plan that
they put in place last year. The reason goals and measures are
important, because it is really how DHS is going to define
security at the border. What ultimately are they shooting for
in terms of ensuring security along the Southwest Border? Then,
along with that, do they have the resources that they need to
do that? What is the appropriate mix of resources?
As you know, DHS used to have a measure for border security
called operational control that they have stopped using since
2011. But what that measure basically said was: How well are we
doing protecting the border, stopping the illegal traffic
coming through the border and illegal goods coming over? DHS
stopped using that measure and now they are just looking at
apprehensions, which, you know, isn't as sophisticated a
measure, it doesn't give a great picture of security. They are
in the process of revising that to come up with a better
measure, but it is going on 2 years now. That really needs to
get resolved. Then, you know, coupled with that, they need to
determine what the appropriate mix of resources they need to
support that and achieve that goal.
In terms of who they should bring at the table, they need
to bring all the relevant stakeholders. You know, I think they
should have agents that are on the ground that are dealing with
this day in and day out, the stakeholders along the border, the
other Federal agencies that play a role in this. As you
mentioned, and as I mentioned in my opening statement, you
know, the need for DHS to really forge effective partnerships
and bring stakeholders in on these key decisions is really
critical. I mean, Homeland Security as an enterprise, it is not
just DHS. So to be successful they are going to have to bring
those stakeholders in and get their input.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Ms. Berrick.
Mr. Duncan. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chairman
will now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Rothfus, for a question.
Mr. Rothfus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
panelists for the work you have done in preparing your
testimony today.
Just looking at the 10-year history of DHS and how we
brought together the disparate agencies, have any of you given
any consideration as to whether perhaps some of these agencies
should be reorganized themselves? Would there be any merit to
taking a look at ICE and CBP, putting them together? What I am
looking at, wondering about is whether there might be a more
efficient structure at the agency that frankly could help
morale. Any of you. Just consideration of reorganization of the
elements within the agency that would promote more efficiency
and unity of mission.
Ms. Berrick. Well, speaking on behalf of GAO's perspective
and the work that we have done at DHS, I think that they could
have been organized in a number of different ways. The decision
was made to create and integrate these 22 components. They are
10 years into it.
I think DHS can be successful as organized, but there are
some cross-cutting issues that they are going to need to
address. One is the management of the Department, because that
has a direct impact on their ability to implement their
missions. You know, there is other cross-cutting issues that
they need to address, strategic planning, you know, risk
assessments.
So, you know, I think, and perhaps this is more of a
question as they were first being created, but I think today,
looking at where they are, they can be successful as
structured, but they are going to need to address these issues
in order to be.
Mr. Rothfus. Morale has been an issue at the agency since
its creation, is that not true?
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, if I could, to respond to you
very quickly, you are concerned about morale because of the
identity of the Department. The Department came together as a
whole group of already existing agencies, things as disparate
as Border Control and Coast Guard and all of this. So they all
had their own identities, and now all of a sudden they are
being asked to take on new identities.
Now we are 10 years into this, and certainly Ms. Berrick's
report isn't all that optimistic about the way that it is being
managed. We at the Advisory Panel focused our issue on the
mission, and think that the committee should do that. The
question is: Is the mission being performed successfully? If it
is not, is that because we, in fact, have these disparate
organizations and can they be reorganized in a better way? The
real challenge that I see is that you spend so much time and
money trying to integrate managerially that maybe the mission
could be lost.
Mr. Rothfus. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. The gentleman yields back. The Chairman will
now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. O'Rourke, for a
question.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor Gilmore, you mentioned that one of the aims al-
Qaeda has in pursuing attacks against the United States is to
destroy our economy. I represent much of El Paso, Texas. We
have five ports of entry there through which pass $80 billion
in trade annually, about 20 percent of all U.S.-Mexico trade.
Right now we have bridge wait times for cargo that last up to 9
hours, and it is becoming more cost-effective for some of the
shippers in Ciudad Juarez to air freight cargo out of that
location rather than cross it through those ports of entry.
With the potential for sequester and the possibility that
we may need to furlough or even cut positions when we are
already understaffed at those ports of entry, can you or any of
the other panelists address what that might do to our economy
and how we might better prioritize those crossings? I remind
everyone that more than 6 million jobs in this country are
dependent on that cross-border trade.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, it is a remarkable question about
how one harmonizes the economic power of the United States with
the challenge that we are seeing worldwide to that power by
threatening the economy. The economic challenges that we are
seeing are deliberately and strategically the goal of a group
of adversaries that want to undo that.
So I think that the mission that you are discussing is a
good one to lay on the table, which is: How do we continue to
have the commerce while at the same time we deal with this
problem of the ingestion of illegal drugs, of illegal
individuals, of illegal even arms and human trafficking? These
are serious dangers on the Southern Border. I laid out in my
opening remarks the fact that this needs to be a principal
mission.
Now, I think it is a legitimate question. Have we become
so, not confused, but have we become so focused on the
managerial questions, about how we deal with morale, about how
we deal with the integration of all these disparate
organizations, that we are not able to achieve the mission,
which is to secure the economic strength and value of the
United States? I think it is a legitimate inquiry.
Mr. O'Rourke. One of the issues that you also touched on in
your testimony and just mentioned again, so much of the focus
at our ports of entry are legitimate crossings and the length
of border in between those crossings is on interdicting drugs.
I don't want to minimize the dangers that those drugs pose to
our communities and to the most vulnerable within them,
especially our children, but with 16 States that have already
approved medicinal use of marijuana, two States that have
essentially legalized it, it is clear the direction in which
this country is moving regardless of how any of us feel about
it.
With that being said, and one recent report I read shows
that 95 percent of the Border Patrol's resources as they are
connected to pursuing this war on drugs are focused on
marijuana, do any of you have any recommendations about how
Congress can better respond to this and prioritize our
resources to focus on those threats that I think we could all
agree are a lot more existential in nature? Al-Qaeda,
terrorists, human smuggling, those things that are true evils
that we want to stop and prevent from entering this country.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you. I do want to make a comment related
to how to go about to do that. I want to kind of move back to
the comment I made about the management of the Department. The
reason, you know, management is so critical is because it
enables DHS, it gives them the ability to do the things that
you talk about to implement their mission and facilitate
commerce while balancing that with security.
Now, I will give you an example. DHS was developing a
program called CAARS to detect shielded nuclear material in
vehicles and in containers coming through our ports. This was a
critical mission need that the Department identified, and they
needed to field this program quickly, again balancing commerce
with security. The problem was, as they were developing it they
weren't getting stakeholders involved on what the requirements
were, they weren't managing it with the rigor that they needed
to. As a result, they ended up with a system that didn't even
fit within primary inspection lanes.
So that was a management issue that had a direct effect on
DHS' ability to secure our borders. So it is critical. I think
in making those tough decisions about balancing security with
the flow of commerce, management is really central to that.
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, I know the time has almost
expired, but if I may give a direct answer to the Congressman.
Congressman, there will be no aid and comfort from me with
respect to the legalization of any kind of drugs in the United
States. As a former prosecutor and Attorney General, I think
what is overlooked is the involuntary nature of the use of
drugs. We think that as a libertarian kind of idea people
should be able to do what they want to do and all that kind of
thing. The truth is, people aren't doing what they really
should do or ought to do or want to do. They are doing what
they are being compelled to do, particularly with respect to
narcotics. I think it is a danger to the United States, it
needs to be focused on, and we have to have a more honest
conversation with the American people about it.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chairman
will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina and the
Chairman of the Transportation Subcommittee, Mr. Hudson, for a
question.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
Governor, it is always a pleasure to be with you, sir.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate your comments about the
legalization of drugs.
My question today, though, is directed to Ms. Berrick. The
Government Accountability Office does an excellent job annually
reporting on Federal programs, agencies, and offices,
initiatives which have duplicate goals and activities, and has
issued key reports presenting opportunities to reduce potential
Government duplication, achieve cost savings, help agencies
become more effective.
What has GAO identified as the key areas of duplication,
overlap, and fragmentation in the Department of Homeland
Security activities?
Ms. Berrick. Thank you.
Yes, GAO is mandated to issue a report annually on
duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across the Federal
Government. We have issued our first two reports. We will be
issuing a third in April of this year.
Related to DHS, we identified 17 areas of duplication,
overlap, and fragmentation and the billions of dollars that we
believe the Department should address. Some of this will
require Congressional action. I will give you a couple of
examples.
One I mentioned in my opening statement, which is the
coordination of grant programs. There are multiple grant
programs that DHS administers that are going to overlapping
individuals for overlapping purposes. That may be okay, but the
Department needs to have visibility over where those grants are
going. If, you know, an entity is getting multiple grants, that
was by design, not by accident.
So we believe the Department needs better coordination and
visibility over the projects for these grant awards. There are
also opportunities to streamline the grants so there are not so
many out there. It will make it easier for the Department to
manage.
Another example I will give is related to Federal disaster
assistance. When the President makes decisions about declaring
a Federal disaster--and, of course, the Governor requests
that--FEMA informs the President's decision by assessing the
State's capability to respond. They base that assessment on
basically a per capita income indicator of the State, and right
now the indicator is $1.35. That figure was created in 1986.
There wasn't a whole lot of analysis that went behind it, and
it hasn't even been adjusted for inflation every year since.
Had that indicator been adjusted to reflect increases in
per capita income within the States, 44 percent of disasters
declared over the roughly last 9-year period perhaps wouldn't
have been funded by the Federal Government. Had that factor
been adjusted for inflation alone, the percentage comes down to
25 percent.
So I think, you know, in the tough fiscal environment with
reduced budgets that the Department is going to have to face,
as the entire Federal Government is facing, they are really
going to need to look for opportunities to streamline
operations, be more cost-effective, and, you know, be more
rigorous in how they make resource allocation decisions.
Mr. Hudson. I think that is true across the spectrum in
Government, but particularly in this case.
What actions have you seen the Department of Homeland
Security--that they have already taken, where they have been
successful in doing some of this streamlining?
Ms. Berrick. DHS did go through an internal effort to look
for opportunities for cost savings, but it tended to focus on,
you know, operational issues, you know, the way in which they
were managing resources more internally within the Department.
We think that they need to look more broadly at some of these
tough issues.
They are working on it. For example, DHS did submit to the
Congress a proposal to streamline their grant programs, and I
know that that is being discussed and considered. But our view
is that they need to look at the higher-ticket dollar items
like their grants, like Federal disaster declarations.
We have highlighted in our past duplication and overlap
reports, you know, other opportunities. For example, TSA funds
the installation of in-line baggage screening systems at
airports. They pick up 90 percent of the tab, and then the
airports pick up 10 percent. We identify that TSA made a
recommendation they should go back and relook at that cost
share. Is that appropriate, given that the airports are getting
some benefits out of these in-line systems? They are getting
faster throughput through the airports, which benefits them.
So we think those are the types of things that DHS should
put more emphasis on.
GAO is actually tracking DHS and the entire Federal
Government's efforts to implement our recommendations coming
out of these annual duplication and overlap reports. So we will
continue to track and report on their progress in addressing
those issues.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you. I appreciate the good work you do.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman for the fine questioning.
The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Payne from New Jersey
for a round.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for being here
today.
Ms. Berrick, is there a way we can coordinate our
technology and communications at our ports so we can ensure all
of our cargo is checked, this process is made more efficient,
and ensure security?
Ms. Berrick. Thank you.
DHS does have a mandate to screen all cargo containers
coming into the United States before they arrive in the United
States, but they have had difficulty in addressing that. That
is a massive problem.
They have created a program called Secure Border--not
Secure--Secure Freight Initiative, I believe, is the name of
it, where they are deploying personnel oversees to try to
ensure the screening of containers coming into the United
States. But they have to get agreements with the host country.
There is a big price tag associated with it. So they are really
in the early stages.
So what GAO has said, you know, given the challenges in
doing this, DHS is really going to have to implement a risk-
based approach--you know, where are the highest-risk ports?
What are the highest-risk containers?--and utilize the programs
they have in place right now to assess risk to really target
their resources where they can provide the most benefit.
Because as has been said today, they can't secure everything--
--
Mr. Payne. Right.
Ms. Berrick [continuing]. And they are going to have to
make some trade-offs in deciding what they can do.
Mr. Payne. This is just a very important issue for my
district, having the Port of Newark and also the Port of
Elizabeth right next to--book-ending my district.
Let me ask you also, it is my understanding that using
private contractors can be more costly even though Federalized
employees, much of the time, do the same job but are paid less.
Would you agree that this leads to reduced morale? Would you
agree that then we should move toward Federalizing these
employees versus private contractors?
Ms. Berrick. GAO has looked at this issue of the use of
contractors throughout the Department of Homeland Security. A
few years ago, DHS couldn't even identify how many contractors
they had. There was a massive number of contractors within the
Department.
What we think is important for them to do right now is to
determine what is the appropriate mix of Federal versus
contractor personnel, now that they have done a lot of work to
identify what contractors they have, to really think through,
you know, what is an inherently Governmental function that
should be performed by Government employees, you know, versus
contractors. So I think that is, you know, step No. 1.
Then, obviously, with that, they should consider the cost,
what can be done more efficiently with contractors versus
Federal employees. But first they need to know how many they
have and then really think about what is inherently
Governmental that should be kept within house.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Well, I would think that bringing them in-
house, it would be able to control those costs more effectively
than, as you say, than not even knowing how many contractors
are involved. But thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. The gentleman yields back.
Now the Chairman will recognize the gentleman from the big
sky country of Montana, Mr. Daines, for questioning.
Mr. Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
``Big sky'' is right about Montana, and big. I notice some
of my peers here represent districts and States that actually
share borders here, either with Canada or with Mexico. In light
of that, perhaps this might be for Ms. Berrick.
I am very appreciative of the candid and thoughtful
testimony this morning. It is refreshing.
Have you looked at and found ways, substantive ways,
perhaps we can spend less money and get more, actually, as it
relates to border security, looking at your findings? It is a
huge topic. It is a topic that I think we all see here in
Washington is going to become, you know, front and center as it
relates to border security.
What could you share with us of ways we can perhaps get
better value from the way we administer border security?
Ms. Berrick. You know, I think the first thing DHS can do
is to use a lot of the good risk information that they have
generated and really build that into their decision-making. You
know, recognize that they are not going to be able to secure
everything 100 percent of the time, so what are the riskiest
things, if you will, that they should be devoting their
resources to? I think that is important.
I think a second thing that is important is, when they
decide that they need to implement a program to ensure security
at the border or airports or elsewhere, really putting the
rigor and the discipline into thinking through exactly what is
the right alternative and then, once we make a decision, how do
we go about procuring this?
Oftentimes we have found that DHS hasn't done a great job
looking at the alternatives, you know, weighing the pros and
cons, and really putting the discipline into the process that
they need to, you know, versus rushing with one solution that
may not be the best alternative.
Now, you know, of course we recognize that DHS has to work
quickly to respond to threats as they evolve. You know,
sometimes they may not have the luxury to do what I am
suggesting. But looking at the Department overall, we think
there have been a number of missed opportunities because they
haven't really, you know, thought through and done that
planning up front that ultimately would have benefited them. As
a result, programs that they want to field, you know, sometimes
aren't successful or it takes years longer to get them out than
they had hoped.
Mr. Daines. I have a follow-up question. When I look at the
State of Montana, as an at-large Member, my district is my
State. Montana is a State that in one corner you can place
Washington, DC, the other corner, you can place Chicago. That
is the size of the State of Montana. We share a Northern Border
with Canada that is over 600 miles long.
Perhaps just turning attention to the Northern Border and
vulnerabilities there, are we putting enough emphasis on
securing the Northern Border? We talk a lot about the Southern
Border, and rightfully so. I recognize we live in a constrained
environment financially. You have to stack-rank priorities and
fund accordingly. But perhaps some comments on our Northern
Border and vulnerabilities. Are we putting enough effort there?
Ms. Berrick. Yeah, I think that more work is required at
the Northern Border. I mentioned earlier that CBP used to have
a measure called operational control of the border. They did
that both for the Southwest Border and the Northern Border. The
Southwest Border, in 2011 they were saying they had operational
control of about 40 percent of the border. On the Northern
Border, that is much lower; it was less than 10 percent at the
time.
It is a difficult border to secure. It has unique
challenges. We think one thing DHS can do is really leverage
partnerships along the border, create task forces, you know,
try to employ risk-based decision-making.
This is going to be a part of implementing their strategic
plan. CBP issued this plan last year to identify the framework
for how they are going to secure both the Southwest and
Northern Border, but they haven't made a lot of progress in
really moving forward with that plan and putting some meat
around what is that going to mean in terms of programs and
resources. So the Northern Border will be a critical aspect
that they will have to think through as they move forward with
that plan.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, if I could----
Mr. Daines. May I----
Mr. Gilmore. Oh, I am sorry. If I could add something, the
Northern Border is vast compared to the Southwest Border.
Mr. Daines. Uh-huh.
Mr. Gilmore. I spoke recently in Canada, and the Canadians
are at pains to be--they are our most loyal allies and friends
and, by the way, our biggest commercial partners in the United
States of America. But sometimes they feel like that the United
States neglects them in terms of our respect and cooperation. I
think that those are diplomatic issues that we have to continue
to focus on.
I want to answer your question directly by saying that we
need to spend more time thinking about intelligence sharing and
making sure the CIA, FBI, Canadian officials, local law
enforcement people all along the Northern Border are sharing
information appropriately to recognize the risk and the danger.
Because, otherwise, you end up patrolling thousands of miles of
untracked area that it is impossible to do. As you know,
Congressman, many of the towns are literally divided by the
border.
Mr. Daines. Correct. That is right. Thank you, Governor.
Mr. Nelson. May I add to that?
One thing I think it is important to note: The last 2
years, there has been significant progress between DHS and the
government of Canada, specifically on the Beyond the Border
Action Plan. In fact, they just issued their implementation
update recently, and Canada was down here briefing that.
There has been a series of pilot programs, the U.S. Coast
Guard Shiprider program. There have been efforts for domain
awareness inside the Great Lakes. It has been, I think, one of
the strengths of what the Department has done in international
cooperation. The whole goal there is to have free trade--trade
flow more freely along there.
So, you know, Canada has now made a commitment they are
going to fund some of these programs. They are waiting for the
United States to kind of reciprocate on this end. So I think it
is important not to forget the successes that we have seen over
the last 2 years.
Thank you.
Mr. Daines. Well, thanks for those comments. I would just
offer, too, I am looking forward to engaging--especially with
constrained resources, it would be the citizens and local law
enforcement, as well, that could work together in patrolling
these vast miles of our Northern Border.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. The gentleman's time has expired, but we do
have time for a second round of questioning if Members would
like do that and if the witnesses can endure.
I want to thank Governor Gilmore for mentioning cooperation
and intelligence sharing with our neighbors. I passed a bill,
signed by the President, dealing with the Iranian threat in the
Western Hemisphere, and a big portion of that is looking at how
we are working with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere--
that includes Canada but also our southern neighbors, as well--
to thwart any sort of threat to the homeland. I think that is a
valuable thing.
My question is: Coming from the private sector, you know,
what I see out of Government is, a lot of times, they do not
operate efficiently like we have to operate in the private
sector. You either operate efficiently, you either are
productive and profitable, or you go out of business, or
someone else steps in that can do it better and takes the
business away from you.
So, Governor Gilmore, I want to ask: The private sector
constantly finds efficiencies to ensure the most effective work
processes. How can DHS better incorporate a business-model
approach and leverage lessons learned from the private sector
into the processes and the business of homeland security at
large?
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, it always comes down, as I think
there is a consistent theme with all the witnesses today, to
the strategy, the planning, and the strategic mission. You have
to assess that and then determine the best possible way to
address that.
Government is never going to be as efficient as, for
example, private contractors. To return to Congressman Payne's
comment a few minutes ago, back when we did our commission
report, we actually initiated the notion of trusted shippers,
so that you look and see from overseas who is bringing things
in and then you can have confidence that those are going to be
safe and secure, and then you focus on the more risk-based
suspect containers. That, of course, means that your Government
employees are in a position to concentrate their attention, as
they so loyally do, on that type of mission.
But at the end of the day, Congressman, the key is that you
have to understand what your mission is and whether or not you
can most efficiently employ your resources to do it. That
requires, in my view, this Congress to oversee that, and I know
that you are doing that this morning.
Mr. Duncan. The word, or term, ``operational control'' has
been used a lot since I have been in Congress, and no one has
really been able to define to me what operational control truly
is. So I will ask the panel, all four of you: What is
operational control of our border, in your opinion?
I will start with Ms. Berrick, and let's go back toward the
Governor.
Ms. Berrick.
Ms. Berrick. When CBP used that measure a couple of years
ago, there were a lot of different factors that went in to
calculating it. It was apprehensions, turn-backs, estimated
flow coming across the border. It was pretty sophisticated in
how they went about approaching that. Currently, they are
really just looking at apprehensions, which we don't feel is a
great measure. It is an indicator, but we don't think it is a
great measure for assessing control of the border.
So my response is, I don't think CBP has a good definition
of what operational control is today. They have been working on
trying to come up with that definition. Now they are saying it
may take until 2014 to come up with it. We think it is
critical.
We think CBP needs to be the ones to define it since they
are managing the border. I am sure Congress will ask GAO to
look at it once they do define it. But right now they just
don't have a good measure for operational control.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Nelson.
Mr. Nelson. I would measure it more along the terms of
effectiveness: How effective are we being at achieving the
mission? They have been effective at keeping terrorist attacks
from happening in the United States, DHS has been. The
effectiveness of the border, how you measure those, with
apprehensions or whatever metric you use, is never fully going
to capture that.
I think it is also difficult to capture how effective you
are when you are still dealing and struggling with issues about
immigration reform, which I know is an issue that the Congress
is taking on this year. But, again, how do you measure
effectiveness when you don't know what the strategic guidance
may be from Congress or from the President on these particular
issues because we are still waiting to hear that? I think that
will be important going forward.
Mr. Duncan. All right.
Mr. Reese.
Mr. Reese. I think the discussion of--I first have to say,
border security is not an issue that I specifically focus on at
CRS. I think it is actually a good analogy when I was
discussing this idea of what is homeland security. As we are
talking and the very people--the very agency responsible for
operational control are having a hard time defining it. We are
using words like ``terrorism'' and ``immigration'' and
``customs.''
I think it comes back to this idea of, we don't have this
concept yet. Or we have a concept, but it is according to who
you speak to. Until we actually have the discussion like we are
having now, we are going to continue to wonder what do words
mean, what does operational control of the border mean? I don't
have an answer for you, Congressman.
Mr. Duncan. Governor.
Mr. Gilmore. Well, you know, it is a term of art, and what,
in fact, really does it mean? It is Government talking to
itself about what it is trying to achieve.
Operational control? I don't know if we have operational
control or not. It is an incident of American sovereignty as to
whether we have control over our borders or not. But at the end
of the day, if we think that we are not bringing cocaine across
the Southern Border, we are kidding ourselves. We know we are.
Those routes and those methodologies can be used by potential
terrorists if they decide to do a military operation against
us. That is why it is so important.
At the end of the day, though--I want to come back to this
last theme--if we are going to have operational control over
our borders, it is going to be because the people of the United
States are engaged in this issue and understand when they
participate in drug activity or other kinds of activity that
they are enabling a lack of operational control over our
borders. At the end of the day, homeland security is the job of
every citizen of the United States, not just the Government.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that.
Before I turn it over to the Ranking Member, I will discuss
a conversation he and I had just this week about ranchers in
his district that are fearful to leave their children at home
to go into town to buy a gallon of milk because of the folks
that are coming across our border.
So I think, when you talk about operational control, it
needs to be to the point of safety and security of those
ranchers in Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, California, feel safe
to leave their children at home on their property.
With that, I will yield to the Ranking Member for
questioning.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The point you just
made is a point I would like to explore a little further, and
my first question is for Ms. Berrick.
You know, we talked earlier about the new strategic plan
that is a risk-based plan that was rolled out last May,
unfortunately without goals or measurements, evaluation
processes, which is problematic, to say the least.
When I think about border security and how you define it--
and it is a very elusive term--I think, as the Chairman just
mentioned, that when I hear anecdotally from the ranchers--and
I hear from them all the time on conference calls and other
ways--that they are unsafe in their home, they don't feel that
they can even go to the clothesline without being armed, to me
that is an indication that at least where they live we don't
have a secure border or a border that keeps them safe. So that
is one way.
But I am really interested in adding to the anecdotal
information by having sound empirical information or data that
lets us have both elements of an evaluation.
As we think about this new risk-based strategic plan, I
asked you earlier about who should be at the table. I agree,
all the stakeholders should be at the table to define that. But
what suggestions do you have of ways in which the Department
can actually measure success using its new strategic plan,
which is a risk-based plan?
Ms. Berrick. You mentioned data. I think that is one point
to make up front. Right now the sectors are collecting data in
different ways, so it is very difficult for somebody to come in
and look across the sectors and draw conclusions about security
along the Southwest Border because the data is being collected
in different ways. So I think that is important, and having DHS
try to get a handle on that.
You know, second, a part of their strategic plan--you know,
we talked about the measures and the goals. Another part of the
strategic plan that still has to be implemented is how they are
going to leverage stakeholder relationships and how those are
going to be developed and supported, related to security along
the Southwest Border. So they still need to define exactly what
that needs to look like and how they are going to implement it.
So that is going to be really critical, as well.
I think the third piece is what you mentioned, is they are
going to have to make decisions--and obviously this is a policy
call, as well, for the country--on, you know, what is security
along the border. You know, first of all, define it. You know,
to date, CBP, Border Patrol has been operating under the
assumption of whatever resources they have. You know, they are
putting them along the border. They are thinking, you know,
based on the budget I have, this is what I can do, versus, you
know, what is the end-state, what ultimately do we want for
security along the Southwest Border, and do that in a risk-
based way.
Once they have defined that, they need to have measures so
that--and collect data in consistent ways so that they can
objectively look at to what extent they are achieving that end.
Right now I don't think it has been defined, and they don't
have measures, and the data isn't great or consistently
collected.
Mr. Barber. Thank you. I would agree. I have heard that
from many different people, that we have from sector to sector
different ways of even collecting the same information or same
ideas.
Let me ask a question now, Governor Gilmore, of you. As we
have discussed today and as you know, there have been numerous
occasions where the Department has spent millions of dollars,
actually wasted millions of dollars, on technology that doesn't
achieve the intended security goal. As a former small-business
owner myself, I, as was mentioned earlier, know that you have
to spend your money wisely, you have to put it where it is
going to make the most profit if you are in business. I think
the Government needs to find ways to do the same.
I have heard from a number of small-business owners that
they have great ideas, and everyone has a great idea, but that
the problem that they face is how to penetrate the bureaucracy
at DHS to even get a hearing or consideration of their idea,
particularly as it relates to new and innovative ways to
improve security.
What is your thinking, Governor, about how we can change
that situation or that dynamic so that these good ideas can
actually at least get a hearing?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, I have never been able to do it.
No, Congressman, it really comes, I think, down to
administrative and Congressional demand that the mission itself
be effectively carried out. Then I think there has to be a
focus on oversight as to the best way to do that and whether
the Department of Homeland Security is implementing it.
So, to the extent that they go back to many of the usual
suspects in the defense community, the question is: Are there
better ideas that can in fact be incorporated? Can we find a
new methodology to do that, other than the general contractor-
type of approach?
As we know, the typical approach of the Government,
particularly DHS, is to hire a big player. Then the really
innovative small-business people you are talking about simply
become bit players as subcontractors along there. The question
is: Can we find a way to make sure that we are fully engaging
the most innovative small-business people as they come up with
new and innovative ideas? That is an administrative approach
that I think the Congress could rightly demand.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Governor.
Mr. Duncan. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Daines for
questioning.
Mr. Daines. Going back to the--the title of this hearing is
``Spending Tax Dollars Wisely.'' Like the Chairman and the
Ranking Member--they are asking questions about value, and,
like the Chairman, I spent 28 years in the private sector,
where every dollar is scrutinized for return on investment.
I want to move over to the issue of cybersecurity. I think
it is another hot topic. How do we ensure we are going to get
the most effective, you know, bang for the buck as it relates
to spending dollars on cybersecurity?
Because I think there is going to be more investment made
there. I have only been here for 40-plus days, but I can see
this town knows how to spend money, and I want to make sure we
are getting good return on investment and value.
So maybe that might be for Mr. Nelson.
Mr. Nelson. Great. I thank you for the question.
I think that DHS obviously has a huge role in this. I mean,
it goes back to our information-sharing architecture, which is
in place, for the most part. It is, now, how do we utilize
that, utilizing, for example, the fusion centers?
One of the things that we have to focus on when it comes to
cyber, because it is such a sensitive thing, because the
private sector obviously owns most of that infrastructure, is
that flow of information has to be two ways. It can't just be
that the Department is giving threat information to the
corporations, to the companies. It has to be, as well, the
companies have to be willing to share that threat information.
That is one of the biggest challenges we are having right
now due to liability issues and marketing issues, that some
companies are afraid to share where they are being attacked,
and they are being attacked. That is something I think the DHS
is a relatively low-cost solution. How do we open up that flow
of communication on what the threats are that we are actually
facing?
Another one is I think DHS as an institution should be the
lead for the Federal Government on cybersecurity training.
Someone has to do this. Every department has some sort of
cybersecurity training. It is not congruent across Government.
Give one department the mandate to do that, consolidate those
resources, and let them set the baseline for how our Government
employees should be trained.
Thank you.
Mr. Daines. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Gilmore. If I could add, Congressman----
Mr. Daines. Yes?
Mr. Gilmore [continuing]. Yesterday, I discovered I left my
cell phone charger in Richmond when I came back to Washington,
and my phone went down. I felt completely disengaged and had to
race over to my iPad to get back on-line again.
The enemy understands that, with the more sophisticated
economy that is now developing in the United States, that if
they can disrupt our cyber abilities, they can disable our
response abilities. That is certainly true in a terrorist
situation.
I ask this question: Do we have a unified American strategy
for cybersecurity? I am aware that the Department of Defense
has set up an entire Cyber Command. They are, by the way,
completely unconnected to the Department of Homeland Security.
The question, I guess, that one would repeat is: Do we have
a unified approach in the United States Government to
cybersecurity in this country and infrastructure protection? I
think we probably don't, which means there is a danger of
duplication or even confusion.
Mr. Daines. Thank you.
I have one more question, Mr. Chairman, if I could.
I spent the last 12 years, actually, with a cloud computing
company, a global company. We think about border security as
this, you know, physical borders, lines we can see. Certainly
in the area of cybersecurity now, it is the entire--it is the
global challenge we face.
Any comments, too, around how we can kind of unleash the
private sector, who are--it is in their self-interest,
certainly in their best interest, to ensure that we have, you
know, hard networks and tight security. Any comments from the
witnesses?
Mr. Nelson. Again, it comes down to how--85 percent of the
critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. How do
we enable DHS to work with those entities? How do we share that
information? Should it be that we have DHS cyber experts
embedded inside companies and companies embedded inside, you
know, DHS to share that information? We have to make those
relationships much more robust, and that is going to be the key
going forward.
Ms. Berrick. If I could just add, GAO has designated
cybersecurity as a Government-wide high-risk area. We have
experts who spend a lot of time looking at this issue across
Government. They would be happy to come up, if you would like,
and talk to you more about the work GAO has done, what we have
recommended across Government.
I mean, it is a massive problem. DHS has key
responsibilities. You asked specifically about the private
sector. They have set up a--they call it Computer Emergency
Readiness Team that helps the private sector with their
detection capabilities, and the private sector can report
incidents through this center. That showed a significant uptick
in issues.
So it is, again, a massive problem. It is going to take a
lot of work for DHS to address this. It is going to be a
Federal Government-wide effort. Again, GAO would be happy to
come up and talk to you in more detail if you would like.
Mr. Daines. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Daines. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
I would just inform the Members that Chairman McCaul is
planning to have a full committee hearing on cybersecurity
sometime in the very near future. I know that the Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Mr. Meehan, is very
interested in a lot of the questions that you had today.
So, with that, I will recognize Mr. O'Rourke from Texas for
a question.
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. Nelson, you cited the Secretary's goal of
getting 50 percent of travelers enrolled in a secure traveler
program like the SENTRI program.
Again, to use El Paso as an example, we have millions of
border crossings every year. The Mexican nationals who are
crossing north really keep our retail economy alive. They spend
upwards of $2 billion a year in El Paso. You can imagine the
thousands of jobs that are tied to that spending.
Yet, right now, those Mexican nationals are waiting 3 and 4
hours in auto lines and, I think more cruelly, in pedestrian
lines. It can be 35 degrees and raining in El Paso right now.
Folks are waiting 3 and 4 hours for the privilege of spending
their hard-earned dollars in the El Paso economy. As I
mentioned earlier, with the prospect of sequester, furloughing
agents, it could get even worse.
One additional example, the Paso del Norte Bridge in
downtown El Paso, of the 11 potential lanes at peak travel
times, according to a study conducted last year by Cambridge
Systematics, only 5 of those are manned.
So I really appreciate the goal. However, enrollment in--an
application into the SENTRI program costs $122, which may not
seem like a lot to some of us, but for the folks who are
crossing that is not money that they ever have at any one given
time, for many of them.
Is there any wisdom in finding a way to cover that cost for
the benefit of having those folks screened, having biometric
scanning, reducing the labor at the point of border crossing,
and obviously helping the economy of El Paso and the United
States?
Mr. Nelson. Thank you for that question. I appreciate that.
As we talk a lot about the balance between privacy and
security, there is obviously the critical balance and some
would argue more critical disjuncture between trade and
security. We have to provide a secure border, but we have to
facilitate trade, not just with our partners up north but
obviously with your district near El Paso.
The good thing about technology is, over time, the price
goes down. It does become more affordable. Again, as we have,
as I am encouraging, an enterprise-wide, you know, approach to
training, DHS can see cost savings. Using something like
biometrics, which, you know, confirms someone's identity,
allows an individual or allows DHS to spend time screening
those individuals that are a great risk.
Most of the people that are crossing that border coming
into the United States want to go back to Mexico. So how do we
get them in the system once, where we can expedite how they are
crossing, they can add to the economy of El Paso, and then go
back, and they are considered trusted. Then DHS can spend its
time going after those that are trying to smuggle drugs or
other illicit activities.
So I think if they invest in this capability and pursue
this, you will see a cost savings in terms of trade in those
kinds of programs when they are paying for themselves.
Mr. O'Rourke. For Governor Gilmore, again, I appreciate
your comments in regards to how we better pursue the war on
drugs, stop illegal and dangerous drugs from coming in to this
country. But in the spirit of this panel and spending taxpayer
dollars wisely, let me try to get at the solution that I hope
to arrive at.
You know, we are spending billions of dollars right now to
interdict these drugs. By volume, marijuana is the largest. We
have put up billions of dollars in walls. We have doubled the
size of the Border Patrol. As the father of three young
children, I am deeply concerned that marijuana is just as or
even more available today, especially in middle schools, than
it has been before.
So, again, in the spirit of today's hearing, how do we
spend that money more effectively, do a better job of
interdicting and stopping those drugs from coming into our
communities, and yet still meet all of the other threats that
are posed at our international border crossings?
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, I have actually been to El Paso,
and I appreciate your able representation of that community and
your focus on their economic well-being. I appreciate the
spirit of your remarks here today.
I have put a lot of thought into the drug issue, and you
can tell by my emphasis today that I am deeply concerned about
this. I guess my answer to you is that I see the poisoning of
young people, whether it is in El Paso or Chicago, as a threat
to the National security. That is the way I define National
security, as well as al-Qaeda and other potential attacks.
We can also broadly address the threat of this country as
natural disasters. We just saw the protestations of the New
Yorkers the other day because of the hurricane up there.
So here is the answer, I think. I think that the Congress
should and this committee should put a lot of thinking into the
definition, as my colleagues have said, of what homeland
security is and then set its priority and then make a decision
about where our limited funds are best spent.
I, for one, believe that the enabling of any drug culture
in this country is inimical to the interests of the United
States. But I certainly acknowledge that you can pick and
choose and make those decisions as to what the greatest threat
to this country is and use your money accordingly.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Well, that concludes the first foray of this
subcommittee into this hearing of the DHS after 10 years. I
want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and
the Members for their questions and participation today.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
these in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7, the hearing
record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:36 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Chairman Jeff Duncan for James S. Gilmore, III
Question. With the recent announcement by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) of the releasing of a large number of detained
persons without the supposed knowledge of Secretary Napolitano or head
ICE officials, what does this say about management of the Department?
Please explain.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson
Question 1. With the recent announcement by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) of the releasing of a large number of detained
persons without the supposed knowledge of Secretary Napolitano or head
ICE officials, what does this say about management of the Department?
Please explain.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. For 10 years, the Department's Office of Inspector
General has identified multiple employee integrity and corruption
cases. How has the Department dealt with this major management issue in
the past and what are your suggestions to the Department moving
forward?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Cathleen A. Berrick
[Note.-- The responses are based on previously-issued GAO
products.\1\]
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\1\ See GAO, DHS Strategic Workforce Planning: Oversight of
Department-wide Efforts Should Be Strengthened, GAO-13-65 (Washington,
DC: Dec. 3, 2012); Federal Emergency Management Agency: Workforce
Planning and Training Could Be Enhanced by Incorporating Strategic
Management Principles, GAO-12-487 (Washington, DC: Apr. 26, 2012);
Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management
to Help Meet Mission Needs, GAO-12-833 (Washington, DC: Sept. 18,
2012); DOD Civilian Workforce: Observations on DOD's Efforts to Plan
for Civilian Workforce Requirements, GAO-12-962T (Washington, DC: July
26, 2012); and Workforce Reductions: Downsizing Strategies Used in
Select Organizations, GAO/GGD-95-54 (Washington, DC: Mar. 13, 1995).
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Question 1. With over 225,000 people employed at DHS, a vast bulk
of funding is allotted for human capital costs. Can the Department's
workforce be streamlined to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent on
the Department's most essential programs?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) workforce of
over 225,000 people supports the Department's multiple missions to
prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage the Nation's
borders, enforce and administer immigration laws, safeguard and secure
cyberspace, and ensure resilience from disasters. Given the critical
nature of DHS's mission to protect the security and economy of our
Nation, it is important for DHS to have the personnel needed with the
right skills to accomplish these missions. Our work has shown that DHS
needs to better align its strategic planning with programmatic goals
and budgetary realities to develop long-term strategies for acquiring,
developing, and retaining staff to achieve these goals.\2\ Strategic
workforce planning that is integrated with broader organizational
strategic planning is essential for ensuring that agencies have the
talent, skill, and experience mix they need to cost-effectively execute
their mission and program goals.
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\2\ GAO-13-65.
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In December 2010, DHS issued a workforce strategy and a revised
workforce planning guide to help the Department plan for its workforce
needs. DHS components are in various stages of implementing these
workforce planning efforts. In December 2012, we identified several
factors that have hampered DHS's strategic workforce planning efforts,
such as the lack of an effective oversight approach for monitoring and
evaluating components' progress in implementing strategic workforce
planning.\3\ We recommended that DHS, among other things, identify and
document additional performance measures to assess workforce planning
efforts at the component level, integrate human capital audit results
with components' annual operational plans, and provide timely feedback
on those plans. DHS agreed with these recommendations and stated that
it plans to take actions to address them.
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\3\ GAO-13-65.
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We have also previously reported on workforce planning-related
challenges at DHS and its components. These challenges include
collecting and analyzing workforce data, determining optimal staffing,
and identifying gaps in workforce needs, amongst others. For example,
in April 2012, we reported that the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's (FEMA) workforce-related decisions could be enhanced by
developing systematic processes to collect and analyze its agency-wide
workforce and training data.\4\ Without systematically collecting and
analyzing workforce and training data, FEMA will be limited in its
understanding of its workforce and training needs. Further, in
September 2012, we reported that most of DHS's major acquisition
programs experienced workforce shortfalls--specifically a lack of
Government personnel-increasing the likelihood their programs will
perform poorly in the future.\5\
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\4\ GAO-12-487.
\5\ GAO-12-833.
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Should Congress or DHS determine that workforce reductions or
streamlining is warranted at the Department, our body of work on prior
workforce reductions at the Department of Defense (DOD) and other
organizations can provide important lessons learned and highlight the
importance of strategic workforce planning, including a consideration
of costs, to help ensure that DHS has a fully capable workforce to
carry out its mission. For example, in July 2012, we testified that
DOD's downsizing in the early 1990s did not focus on reshaping the
civilian workforce in a strategic manner.\6\ This downsizing resulted
in significant imbalances in terms of shape, skills, and retirement
eligibility and a workforce characterized by a growing gap between
older, experienced employees and younger, less experienced ones. We
also found that DOD's efforts were hampered by incomplete data and the
lack of a clear strategy for avoiding the adverse effects of downsizing
and minimizing skills imbalances.
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\6\ GAO-12-962T.
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Our prior work on the downsizing conducted by other organizations
adds further perspective on some challenges associated with certain
strategies and the need to conduct effective planning when downsizing a
workforce. In 1995, we conducted a review of downsizing undertaken by
17 private companies, 5 States, and 3 foreign governments, generally
selected because they were reputed to have downsized successfully.\7\
We reported that:
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\7\ GAO/GGD-95-54.
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a number of factors may constrain organizations' downsizing
strategies, such as public sentiment, budget limitations,
legislative mandates to maintain certain programs, and
personnel laws;
using attrition as a sole downsizing tool can result in
skills imbalances in an organization's workforce because the
employees who leave are not necessarily those the organization
determined to be excess;
attrition is often not sufficient to reduce employment
levels in the short term; and
some workforce reduction strategies have been found to slow
the hiring, promotion, and transfer process and create skills
imbalances.
We found that one key theme emerged from such downsizing efforts.
Specifically, most organizations found that workforce planning had been
essential in identifying positions to be eliminated and pinpointing
specific employees for potential separation. In organizations where
planning did not occur or was not effectively implemented, difficulties
arose in the downsizing. For example, we reported that a lack of
effective planning for skills retention can lead to a loss of critical
staff, and that an organization that simply reduces the number of
employees without changing work processes will likely have staffing
growth recur eventually.
With the long-term fiscal challenges currently facing the Nation,
streamlining the DHS workforce, as well as those of other Federal
agencies, may be considered in the future as an option to achieve cost
savings. These decisions should be made with care. If reductions are
made, it is imperative that DHS cautiously and strategically take into
account Department-wide critical skills and competencies needed to
maintain and meet its mission, drawing upon experiences and lessons
learned from other agencies, as appropriate.
Question 2. To what extent has the Department assessed the
managerial and cost impacts of increased telework and alternate work
schedules? What cost savings, if any, could DHS incur and what
challenges in the Department's management and information sharing could
result?
Answer. We have not examined DHS's telework and alternative work
schedule policies and practices. As a result, we are unable to comment
on DHS's use of telework and alternative work schedules and the extent
to which these practices have led to cost savings and challenges.
However, telework and alternative work schedule policies and practices
have both been cited as important management strategies with benefits
for both the organization and employees. For example, the benefits of
telework include supporting continuity of operations during
emergencies, contributing to a greener environment, increasing
employees' ability to balance work and life demands, decreasing
facility operating costs, and improving employee retention and
recruitment. For more than a decade, Congress has indicated its desire
that agencies create telework programs. In 2010, the Telework
Enhancement Act of 2010 (the Act) was enacted.\8\
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\8\ Pub. L. No. 111-292, 124 Stat. 3165.
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The Act required Federal agencies to submit annual reports to the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on their telework programs, and
OPM to report annually to Congress on the telework programs of each
agency, among other things. According to OPM's 2012 telework report, 10
percent of eligible DHS employees reported teleworking in September
2011, and DHS's established goal for the next reporting period is 15
percent. The Act also calls for OPM to assess progress made by agencies
in achieving any identified, non-participation goals (e.g., energy use,
recruitment, retention, and employee attitudes). OPM reported that
agency progress on measuring telework cost savings and results on
telework goals other than participation are a work in progress.