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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

HEARING HELD
MARCH 13, 2014

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THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2014

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FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 13, 2014.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in room HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. THORNBERRY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Again, appreciate everyone's flexibility with rooms and times. And we are anxious to have this open hearing, and then, as Members know, we will continue in closed session downstairs just across the hall from the Intelligence Committee once the closed session has concluded.

I will just say welcome to our witnesses. I believe this will be the first time that Assistant Secretary Lumpkin has testified in front of our subcommittee.

We are glad to have you.

Admiral McRaven has been testifying a lot lately on both this side and the other side of the Capitol.

We are always grateful for your openness and your willingness to engage with this committee on all—a whole range of issues, and that includes being here today.

So, with that, I will yield to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island for any comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, I want to thank you very much for being here today. And we truly appreciate your service to the Nation, and we certainly hope that you will pass on our gratitude to all the men and women who serve under each of you in your charge when you see them next. And, again, thank you again for the work that you are doing.

The report of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] makes clear that our special operations forces [SOF] will remain an integral part of the way the United States addresses our global and national security interests today and in the future.

Even as we draw down in Afghanistan, the QDR calls for the growth in SOF and for them to remain decisively committed to our fight against Al Qaeda. It also highlights their role in dealing with other transnational threats, countering the spread—or use of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and, of course, the critical part in helping to build the capacity of our partner security forces as well.

Clearly it is a busy future for SOF, and even in our era of reduced defense resources, that is why I am pleased to see Secretary Lumpkin's renewed effort at strengthening SO/LIC's [Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict's] oversight over SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and ensuring that Admiral McRaven's forces are properly trained, manned, and equipped.

I know that Admiral McRaven presented SOCOM's posture statement to the full committee earlier this month, but I am glad to see you here today together. It is not unlike the service posture hearings we have at the full committee with the service secretaries and the chiefs together.

Not to detract from the role the subcommittee plays but, rather, to emphasize the importance of SOCOM and the role of SO/LIC, perhaps this is the way the full committee should treat SOCOM's posture statement in the future.

So now, as we proceed, I will be interested to hear if your acquisition authorities remain flexible enough to provide SOF what it needs without duplicating other service acquisition efforts.

Are your research and development accounts funded so that you can continue to set the pace to superior technology? Does your set of existing authorities, both statutory and command, provide you with the space in which to properly operate? And, finally and most importantly, how are your people and their families faring, and what can we do to help you take care of them properly?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman.

Without objection, your full statements will be made a part of the record.

And if you would like to summarize, Secretary Lumpkin—again, thanks for being here—you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW–INTENSITY CONFLICT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for your steadfast support for our special operators and the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The authorities and appropriations that Congress has provided the Department of Defense have allowed us to prosecute the current fight and ensure we are prepared to confront emerging threats and to protect the homeland.

I am pleased to testify here today with Admiral Bill McRaven, who has expertly led the United States Special Operations Command over the past 3 years.

The threat we face, especially from Al Qaeda, is continuing to change. Although the scale of the threat to the homeland has diminished, threats to our interests overseas are actually increasing.

With their leadership depleting, Al Qaeda still retains sanctuaries in remote areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Terrorist organizations are also expanding in Syria, North Africa, and the Sahel. The threat continues to evolve. We must maintain pressure on terrorist organizations to protect the homeland.

We are in a time of transition. We face a yet undetermined drawdown in Afghanistan and new fiscal realities. It may become more difficult to maintain pressure on Al Qaeda in their traditional safe havens. I closely monitor how the cuts to the services impact the readiness of USSOCOM.

We are assessing the impact on critical enablers. For example, we are ensuring that the cuts to the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] fleet will not erode our capabilities to find, fix, and finish targets. As we transition in Afghanistan and redistribute SOF into other theaters, we need to ensure our operations and maintenance accounts are resourced to support operations.

In accordance with the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] SO/LIC and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Logistics are strengthening our roles in the oversight of USSOCOM to maximize efficiencies and maintain oversight responsibilities over Major Force Program-11 funds. These include routine interactions between my staff and USSOCOM and frequent dialogue between me and Admiral McRaven.

We owe the President the best strategic options to accomplish our national security objectives. This includes—this is conducted in close coordination and honest discussion with the Congress as you exercise your oversight, authorization, and appropriations responsibilities.

We are moving from a state of perpetual war to perpetual engagement, engaging with partners to build their capacity, engaging problems before they become too big to fix, and engaging in direct and indirect action to disrupt and destroy our enemies.

As we move towards a globally networked perpetual engagement, our efforts are grounded in experiences that demonstrate the success of this approach. Colombia and Philippines are case studies in how small investment of SOF resourced for an enduring timeframe can have positive results.

In the Philippines, a task force of about 500 special operators and supporting general purpose forces helped degrade a serious transnational terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf and Jamaah Islamiyah.

In Colombia, we provided counterinsurgency training and humanitarian assistance to prevent narcotics traffickers from developing sanctuaries. This effort in Colombia not only resulted in a far more secure and prosperous nation now, it has emerged as a great exporter of regional security.

We have the same opportunities in Africa and the Middle East. Our support to the French in the Sahel has been critical in stemming the tide of extremism in Mali.

Modest support to AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia] in the Horn of Africa has helped reverse the trajectory of al-Shabaab. These discrete activities and operations constitute a global SOF network required for perpetual vigilance.

I am proud to represent the sailors, soldiers, airmen, marines, and civilians of USSOCOM. Their sacrifice in this war are immense. Since October 2001, 385 special operators have been killed in action and another 2,160 have been wounded.

I am committed to do everything I possibly can to ensure these brave warriors have the best training, equipment, and support we can provide. Working closely with Congress, we will surely have the right strategies and policies in place to employ them effectively.

Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral MCRAVEN. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, distinguished members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to address you today.

I would also like to recognize my friend and colleague, Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin. Mike and I have a long history together, and I greatly value ASD SO/LIC's partnership and oversight of USSOCOM.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to say that, since my last hearing, SOCOM has made some great strides in dealing with current conflicts, preparing for the future conflicts, and, most importantly, taking care of our people.

SOCOM continues to provide the finest warriors in the world to the fight in Afghanistan and, as we approach the end of 2014, your special operations forces will be ready to adjust to whatever decisions are made regarding our future employment in that country.

Globally, we are developing plans to better serve the geographic combatant commanders [GCCs] and the chiefs of mission who, owing to the past 12 years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, have gone under-resourced with SOF forces.

SOCOM, as the Department of Defense's [DOD] synchronizer for the war on terrorism, is also working hard to help better coordinate our activities locally, regionally, and globally with both the GCCs and the U.S. ambassadors.

I believe the future of U.S. special operations will be in helping to build partner capacity with those willing nations who share our interest. This will mean strengthening our existing allied relationships and building new ones. No nation alone can stem the rise of extremism. We need our friends and allies more now than ever before.

Our future as a special operations force is also inextricably linked to the general purpose force in the interagency. The past 12 years have shown us that a whole-of-government effort is required to be successful against extremism, and in SOF we have always, always, relied heavily on our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines for support around the globe.

Finally, we have gone to great lengths to take care of our most precious resource, our people. The Preservation of the Force and Families initiative, or the POTFF, has already seen a marked improvement in the morale and well-being of those who serve in SOF. While we still suffer from the tragedy of high suicide rates, I believe we have laid the foundation for keeping our force and their families strong and resilient into the future.

Once again, sir, thank you for your interest and unwavering support for the men and women in the special operations community and to those members of the committee, thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony of you both.

Admiral, I was struck when you testified in the full committee posture hearing, and I believe you said, essentially, the most important thing we can do to fight terrorism is working with others. And you just reiterated that the future of special operations is building partnership capacity.

Have I got that right as far as the most important thing we can do, in your view, to fight terrorism?

And then, secondly, my perception is we are very good, best in the world, at a variety of direct action and so forth, but we are still evolving our authorities, our organizations, our skills even, on building partnership capacity, this thing that you say is the most important.

Do you agree with my perception of where we are?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I do. And to maybe not clarify my words, but to add some emphasis on this, I think the most important thing to kind of fight the extremist threat that is out there is keep the pressure on them.

I think the way we do that in the special operations community is by building partner capacity so that the host nation where the extremists live, they can take care of their own security problems.

So I do think that that is the best tool we have, recognizing, however, that we are always going to have to be in a position to conduct direct action against those irreconcilables.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Let me just ask one other question right quick.

I had a Member of Congress within the past few weeks come to me and say, "Look at how much money Special Operations is asking for in the President's budget. That is nearly as much money as the Marine Corps is asking for, and they have a lot fewer people."

What is your answer to the question of why Special Operations Command, with fewer people, requires the funding that it does require?

I mean, it is one of the only—one of only—really, two areas in the budget where funding is going up was special operations and cyber.

But what is your answer to folks who say, "Why is this so expensive?"

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. The fact of the matter is it takes a lot to kind of grow a special operations operator. So when you look at the time from the time we bring them into the SOF community—and most of them, historically, the data will show that they spend about 7 to 8 years in the general purpose force.

So you see the general purpose force already picks up a certain amount of the financing of the base-level training. So by the time they hit, you know, E–5, some of them E–6, that is when they come into the special operations community.

Then to really make them world-class in—whether that is language, cultural training, direct action training, reconnaissance, it just takes more to train an average SOF soldier than it does a basic infantryman in the Marine Corps or in the Army.

And, obviously, as we look at the technology that we are able to apply against a problem set, that really isn't scalable, to some degree, across broad brigades or battalions.

It is scalable if you want to provide everybody in your squad a radio. If you want to make sure that ISR is supporting a platoon or an ODA [official development assistance] level operation, we have the resources to do that because it requires special technology and specially trained people to do the missions that we are being asked to do.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you again, gentlemen.

So, Admiral McRaven, as you—I am sure you know that this committee has been very interested in support of the development and fielding of directed-energy weapons to support military applications, and we understand that SOCOM, supported by JIEDDO [Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization], has been funding development of a manned portable high-energy laser system to address SOCOM particular needs.

Could you talk a little bit about the status of this development effort as well as what actions have been taken to test and potentially field such a weapons system.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. As you point out, we have been working with the JIEDDO. They have provided us some funding to do some initial testing with the manned portable high-energy weapons.

I do think that we have a future in looking at the high-energy weapons. The problems we have right now, of course, is we are going through to make sure that we are in compliance with the law.

The laser safety law is something we have to make sure that whatever manned portable device we have is compliant with that, and then there are some health laws and others that we have got to take into consideration as we are doing the testing.

We have done some basic-level testing in the continental United States. The results of that I have not seen, sir; so, I am happy to get back to you and take that one for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral.

And right now what is the current status of SOCOM's Undersea Mobility Program? And what gaps do you foresee?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have two areas in our Undersea Mobility that we are looking at. We have a smaller version, a wet submersible, the SWCS [shallow water combat submersible] we refer to it, and then we have our dry combat submersible.

So the dry combat submersible, we currently have a vessel that we are leasing, and we are doing some test and evaluation on that. And then we have two prototypes that are being built, one in the U.K. [United Kingdom] and one in Italy.

The eventual program of record is looking at a total of three dry combat submersibles. This really puts us in a position to have our SEALs [Sea, Air and Land forces] in this case, but other operators, in a dry environment as they transit from point A to point B.

The shallow water combat submersible, the SWCS, is a new variation, new technology based on our old SEAL delivery vehicle. So a wet submersible, a little bit more limited capability than the dry submersible.

But, frankly, we need both. The wet submersible will be able to get into regions where the dry submersible will not, but you have to have both capabilities. So we are looking at a program of record of about 10 shallow water combat submersibles.

The dry combat submersible, sir, is on track, and we are pleased with the direction we are heading. We have been working with the Navy on classifying this, as you know, classification, making sure that we are meeting industry standards for dry combat submersibles, and the Navy again has been working with us and doing this.

This submersible, the dry combat submersible, will not be attached to a larger submarine. So that actually allows me to buy down some of the risk as we are building the vessel itself.

The shallow water submersible, again, we are working with the Navy in developing that. And while we have had a little bit of slippage in the development because it is a new piece of equipment, I am confident we will be on track to produce the right number, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And I know that the submersible—that we had problem—technical problems with those in the past.

Have those been substantially overcome?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. In fact, sir, that is why we are actually going through an industry standard and looking at prototypes before we get into a final build.

So by looking at how industry works their dry submersibles, we think we are going to learn a lot in terms of kind of a systemic approach to building the dry submersible that industry is very good at doing.

And then we will take the lessons learned from there and incorporate them into our long-term dry combat submersible.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you.

So the Secretary of Defense has recently commented that SOF will grow to 69,700 personnel from roughly 67,000 today, and the fiscal year 2015 budget request includes this growth with declining budgets.

How will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How will you ensure you are not choosing quantity over quality?

And this is for both witnesses.

Secretary LUMPKIN. I think the key is, when we look at the numbers of SOF, we are not actually—even though from a programmatic view it is 72,000 going down to the 69,700, that is not actually a cut in the force. It is actually just stemming the growth of the force.

So because it has been a metered and well thought-out process on how we would grow the force, I think that we are definitely in a position and a trajectory to make sure that the force is robust.

What I am concerned most about is the cuts in the other services that provide the enablers for U.S. Special Operations Command. These are the things that are not organic to them, whether it is the ships that support them or, as I mentioned in my opening comments, the ISR that supports them.

So that is what I am diligently working on and focusing on because that is my greatest concern on making sure SOF maintains its capabilities. The services have been absolutely great, but there are competing requirements that they are having to resource. So I am working diligently with them to make sure that doesn't happen.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, do you care to comment?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir.

The only thing I would add is our basic qualification courses that we do at basic SEAL training or the special forces qualification course we have had to ramp up over the years as the demand signal for SOF increased.

So now we are fortunate to have the infrastructure in place to be able to meet the demand signal of the increasing force size. So I am not concerned at all, sir, that the quality of our force will diminish.

I can tell you from my experience the quality now is better than it has ever been, and I am pleased to say—and that is across the board with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, gentlemen.

Just to remind all Members, after this open session, we will head downstairs for a closed session, hopefully, all before votes resume.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson.

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And I welcome the panelists as well and express my deep gratitude for your leadership and to your command for their achievements and their sacrifices and their families.

I am going to ask a question on integration and cooperation, recognizing we are in open session here, fully understanding that, but also recognizing that the American people are looking for confidence in what we are doing.

So to the degree that you can bring it up to in the unclassified level, your response helps me communicate so we can keep that confidence going.

In 2009, a radicalized youth gets on an aircraft and is en route to our country, lights himself on fire, and it is not our system that saves us. It is really a brave soul on the aircraft puts him out.

And it turns out that weeks prior this young man's father had called our country and—expressing that he didn't recognize his son, that he was talking crazy talk that he could attack our country.

And when I had a chance to come here in 2011, I chatted with Admiral Olson, and I asked him—I said, "Did that call ever land on your desk?" And he said, "No."

And so, you know, working with General Clapper, we worked an amendment in the intel authorization bill to try to, you know, take some of the effective action that I saw firsthand in Iraq in terms of flattening intelligence, linking it with operations, and trying to elevate that up to a national-level asset.

And about 10 months or so later he came back and said, "You know, we are making progress on the cloud in terms of sharing information and, also, budgeting so that we can have better integration."

So I am interested in hearing how we have been doing in the last year on integration within the whole of government—I appreciate your opening remarks on that score—and then, also, cooperation.

I couldn't agree more, associate myself, with the remarks talking about how important it is that we work with our friends and allies.

And I think that goes across the whole of government as well in terms of our diplomacy and how we work and interact with countries across the world.

And then, of course, as—part of that is the deterrent and when deterrence fails and when we have irreconcilables, is taking direct action there.

So I am interested in that and certainly understanding the classification, but to the extent that I could get a response that helps me communicate to the public the confidence that I have with you.

Secretary LUMPKIN. The collaboration on the intelligence front within the interagency is phenomenal. I mean, my relationship with the folks at NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], DHS [Department of Homeland Security]—I mean, and it is just not my relationships. It is the departments and how we dialogue and we discuss.

So we are firing on all eight cylinders. I mean, the machine is working. So I feel very confident on the information and intelligence sharing that is happening.

The other piece is the information and intelligence with our allies and our partners, and that becomes—because this is truly a global challenge that we are facing, the security of the United States, because many of the threats, of course, come from outside the country. And that is a work in progress.

I mean, as we build our relationships and we continue to build the partner capacity, part of this is to make sure we can also have this information and intelligence sharing across the national security spectrum.

Admiral MCRAVEN. And, sir, I would echo the Secretary's comments.

You know, I have a personal and professional relationship with Tish Long at NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency]; Mike Flynn at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]; John Brennan at CIA; Jim Clapper, DNI [Director of National Intelligence]; Matt Olson at NCTC. I mean, these are personal and professional friends, and they do not hesitate to reach out to me personally if they think there is intelligence that is worth knowing.

But in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber you were referring to, I am not sure we will ever be good enough to see, you know, these individuals that are radicalized out in the middle of Yemen, in his case, just because, no matter how good our intelligence gets, it is very difficult sometimes to get that detailed and that in-depth on a particular target.

So this is why I think, again, we need to continue to build our relationships with other host nations so that they may see things that we don't see. And those relationships, sir, as you indicated, they need to be at the intelligence community level, the law enforcement, the mil to mil, the diplomatic levels.

And I am a very big believer in partnering, and I think this is where the tripwires will be crossed in our ability to find threats that maybe our intelligence community wasn't looking for, but the law enforcement community was, or just somebody comes in from the tribal region and says, "Hey, something doesn't seem right here."

So—but, again, I would echo the Secretary's sentiments that our relationship today is as good as I have ever seen it in my 37 years of doing this.

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, gentlemen. My time is just about expired.

So I would ask for the record, if you have recommendations as we move towards the mark where we could continue this trend, whether it be with regard to resources or approvals, authorities, would welcome that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]

Mr. GIBSON. And I thank you, gentlemen.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, thank you for being here. It is good to see you both.

I wanted to ask you first, Secretary Lumpkin, about the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office [CTTSO]. And you mentioned that in your statement, and I certainly have been very supportive of a whole-of-government approach.

Could you share with us, I think, why this investment is critical?

But I also at the same time know that we have a development and acquisition center. It seems like there is several different entities, and I suspect they interact, but I am a little concerned.

Is there replication and—or duplication, really? And what about the other services? Is there some way—as we talk about cost, is

there some way that some of that effort maybe could be more helpful to the other services or vice versa? I mean, how much of this is going on that we could streamline a little bit more?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you for the question.

The Counterterrorism Technical Support Office, or CTTSO, is truly a unique enterprise in the fact that it partners with not only the State Department, but each of the services, the combatant commands, and our international allies in order to work research and development projects.

So we have U.S.-U.K. projects. We are working projects in support of the U.S. Army where we can actually do cost-sharing and bring monies together for a common goal.

So it truly is a place where we do exactly what you are saying, is that we can support people's requirements and we can leverage it across the entire defense sector not only in the United States, but, also, with our partners.

So we can take an idea, whether it is a new type of ammunition that we need to look at in our support of special operations or even law enforcement, and then we can work together to do the development and then share the results and maybe even find a company or a technology that can provide something that we truly don't have today.

So it is——

Mrs. DAVIS. So is that different from DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] or does DARPA interface with that?

Secretary LUMPKIN. There are discussions that go on. DARPA and CTTSO—CTTSO is largely focused on truly the combating terrorism piece, whereas the DARPA has a much larger——

Mrs. DAVIS. Larger frame.

Secretary LUMPKIN [continuing]. Aperture that they are looking at.

So the other piece of it is the CTTSO gives us the ability to—if there is a project that we want to put in the future and we see it coming, we can do the initial research and development in order to support a future project. So it is quite agile and gives us the flexibility to do what we need.

Mrs. DAVIS. Admiral McRaven, did you want to comment on that? And can we—maybe could we save in some other areas if we put, you know, really the resources that you need to do this right? And do you have those resources today? Do you think that we do?

Secretary LUMPKIN. I think, again, the beauty of CTTSO in itself is that it is not just DOD money. I mean, because we are taking money—I mean, leveraging money from the interagency as well as the international community. So we have this pooling of resources for a common goal, and I think that is the real beauty of it.

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there also a way—and we know from certainly the San Diego community and others that there are many businesses that would like to be engaged in some way, and sometimes what they share with us is it is very difficult for them to get the attention for something.

And I am just wondering, how do you do that in terms of the business piece to that so that we can bring those things online, innovate quickly, and get the job done?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Well, we have an open forum for business that we do once a year before—and make sure they understand what we anticipate the requirements are.

In fact, I just did the opening comments for it here last month. So I think it is generally the first week in February we do that.

So we open it to business. We did it at the Reagan Center this year, and we had over 600 businesses in attendance who came to see what we were looking for at the future.

Mrs. DAVIS. Admiral McRaven, General Dunford was with us this morning talking about Afghanistan and where the gains—the good stories and some of the concerns.

What are your concerns when it comes to their special ops forces?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Ma'am, I am very confident in their special ops forces. In fact, I just received a detailed brief today from our folks in Afghanistan.

We are very pleased, very proud, of the great work the Afghans have done and that, frankly, my forces have done in training them. I think they have a very capable commando element, special forces element, and we are pleased with the development of the Afghan Local Police.

So I think, as long as we can continue to be in a position to shepherd these forces as they go forward into the future—and it doesn't require a lot to do that, but I do think we need to continue to be in a position to train, advise, and assist for a little bit longer in order to make sure that all the processes that General Dunford and General Allen before him and others before them have put in place and make sure those are functioning processes, pay, maintenance, those sorts of things.

I think, if we can get to that point, then they will be successful in the future. And so we certainly look forward to having the opportunity to continue to partner with our great Afghan special forces.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

In your testimony, Secretary Lumpkin, you mentioned the advances that Colombia has achieved. And I just had the opportunity to go with Chairman McKeon on a CODEL [congressional delegation] to Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and Panama, and I was so impressed with what the Colombian people and the military has done and how they have really taken it to the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and they have pushed them down and now they are in negotiations on that operation.

But while we were there, the general in charge was very adamant, saying, "We are on the 10-yard line. We are so close, but please don't leave us yet. The game is not over and, if you leave, it would be a game-changer for us. We need that."

So considering advances there that you mentioned in your testimony, how much longer do you anticipate that we will be engaged there with them? And what level of involvement do you foresee us pursuing still with them?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you for the question, because, you know, it is interesting from my days. I mean, my first time in Co-

lombia was in the late 1980s when I was in uniform at the time. To see where it has gone from that period to now is amazing.

And they are—the comment was absolutely correct, on the 10-yard line, and we need to make sure we sustain our presence and partnership with the Colombians in this effort.

I think the key is that we looked at it from the outset, when the development of Plan Colombia came into place, was—is that it was going to be an enduring commitment on our part.

And we—when we looked at it for that way, we knew that we weren't looking—we weren't playing the short game here. It was going to be the long game, and we focused on that.

And the enemy gets a vote, you know, as far as how long it is going to go; so, I am hesitant to say that it is going to be X number of years or months or what have you. But I think that the fruits of our labor and our efforts and the resources, it is a tremendous return on investment long term.

And I think it has served as a model that we could use in other regions and other areas and countries that—where there are challenges, because there is many countries that are challenging for us now that aren't near as bad as the situation that Colombia was in the late 1980s.

Mrs. HARTZLER. It did give me hope for other countries.

And do you see it possibly being used as a model for Mexico? I know that NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] has added a Special Operations Command, North there to establish that. So what lessons do you think that we can translate from Colombia to, say, Mexico?

Secretary LUMPKIN. I am kind of hesitant to say which country it would go to. But I think the key is that there has to be a comprehensive plan that is supported by the interagency that we make a commitment to and we know, again, it is a mindset of having the long game here and that there is going to be this enduring commitment to see it through to the end and having very clear metrics that we had with the Colombians and the Colombians clearly had skin in the game, which was key.

And so it is about everybody sitting around a table, understanding, with tremendous support from the Congress, and making sure that this was resourced. And it wouldn't have happened if the Congress had not been decisively engaged at the beginning.

Mrs. HARTZLER. If you were to list the five things—and that is what I kept trying to narrow down while I was there—what were the keys to the success here that we could translate to other countries?

And some of the answers that I got was, one, first of all, the people have to stand up, have to be fed up with it. The people of the country have to say enough is enough and be willing to get behind leadership.

And the second thing they said was to have strong leadership within their own government, willing to take them on, who are not corrupt and that sort of thing, but then having our engagement, too.

Now, those are three things from just visiting with a few people. But I would like to hear your top five things, lessons from Colom-

bia, why has that worked or why is it working, that we can translate to others.

Secretary LUMPKIN. If I could, just off the top of my head, I think that the top five things would be, first of all, as you mentioned, the people, but it is also a sense of nationalism. They saw themselves as a cohesive unit as a country. And I think that is actually key because it wasn't fragmented.

The other one was the interagency commitment and the support of the U.S. Congress on our part and that we could enter something knowing that we were looking at a long-term relationship. So we weren't rushing against timelines, but, rather, had key milestones because it was milestone-based.

I think that the other piece is it was resourced to the level that it needed to be resourced. And I believe that we—and my final one here is because there was a commitment and we had the relationship and the skin in the game of the Colombian people.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good.

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you for all you do.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral McRaven, you along with General Odierno and General Amos have embraced the concept of the human domain in a white paper entitled "Strategic Landpower" with great vigor.

This concept is built upon the lessons of the decade of war from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with his staff, and that noted—and it noted that the failure to understand the operational environment was the primary reason for the problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Do you agree with that assessment? And, if so, why?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have had a great conversation between the Commandant, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and myself about the human domain.

My point has always been you have to take the population into consideration, I think, regardless of what you are doing, whether it is a major conflict or whether it is an insurgency.

And as we look at the human domain as kind of the totality of the cultural, the ethnic, the social fabric that makes up the people that live in a particular area, you have to know that before you can make any decisions, whether those are, you know, large maneuver decisions for the Army, expeditionary decisions for the Marine Corps or counterinsurgency decisions for SOF.

So the human domain, to me, really is a fundamental area where we in the special operations community have to focus our time and our attention. We have to understand everything about the culture before we, you know, go off and make decisions that are going to affect those people in a certain area.

Mr. JOHNSON. And thank you.

Does a program like the Human Terrain System support the human domain concept?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I am only vaguely familiar with the Human Terrain System. We have a number of programs out there

that look at the human terrain. I am not familiar with that exact system.

Having said that, we have a number of systems that layer our knowledge of the human terrain. So if you look at a valley in Kunar Province, for example, the systems we have out there can tell you the ethnicity, they can tell you the cultural ties, they can tell you the tribal relationships.

They can begin to layer this information one on top of the other. That gives us a much better appreciation for the dynamics in a certain region in Kunar or in Latin America or in Africa or wherever.

So we use a number of systems to, again, layer that information so we have a better understanding of the problem set we are dealing with.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think that SOCOM would be a good fit for the Human Terrain System?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, if I can take that for the record and get back to you. Again, I am not personally familiar with that specific system, but I will find out and get back to you, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

What status of operations—excuse me.

What special operations forces core mission areas and activities remain of critical importance to United States national security? In other words, given fiscal constraints, what should remain off of the chopping block to ensure that we do not hollow out the forces?

Secretary LUMPKIN. All of the core missions that are codified in Title 10 remain valid and necessary; so, I don't recommend shedding any mission sets from the U.S. Special Operations Command inventory.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. According to the May 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance on standards and procedures for the use of force in counterterrorism operations outside the United States and areas of active hostility, lethal action may only be taken in the case that an assessment has been made that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation.

Which individuals or which entity is responsible for making the original determination that capture of any given target is not feasible?

Secretary LUMPKIN. We have an interagency process that works and discusses that particular issue and makes recommendations.

Mr. JOHNSON. What would be the titles of those interagency personnel?

Secretary LUMPKIN. PPD–1, which is the Presidential Policy Directive Number 1, outlines the process for decisionmaking along this way.

So, normally, it is a process of interagency meetings, deputies meetings, principals meetings, and ultimate recommendations.

Mr. JOHNSON. So it is a collective decision?

Secretary LUMPKIN. It is a process that works through where we make sure everybody's concerns and equities are known. It makes recommendations.

Mr. JOHNSON. How quickly can it be called to act?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Quite rapidly, when necessary.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank the Secretary and Admiral McRaven again for you being here in the last 2 weeks.

And, Admiral, I really do appreciate your candor in regards to how you have discussed issues, particularly as it relates to our conventional forces.

Obviously, I know we are here about SOCOM, but you can't have one without the other, and I think sometimes people get somewhat confused about that.

And just for my good friend, Mr. Johnson, I mean, if you are ever interested in finding out what the criteria is and how decisions are made, we do have that in classified setting that goes over those particular issues, because I had the same concerns that you had, Mr. Johnson. So the committee has done a good job in that.

But, Admiral, today was the first time I heard that we were not going to use the dry combat submersible off of a submarine.

Did I hear that correctly?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have—right now our path is to take a look at what we have in terms of prototypes out there. So, as I said, we are leasing one vessel. We have two prototypes we are building.

However, the intent right now is, because we think our major platform, the SSGN [nuclear-powered guided missile submarine], is scheduled for retirement in the mid-2020s, we are preparing to be in a position, you know, not to build a submarine that is tied necessarily to the SSGN or to the follow-on vessel.

Now, having said that, we are absolutely, absolutely, looking at alternatives that would mate to a U.S. submarine. Right now, however, these prototypes are designed to industry standards first, and then we will learn from the industry standards to make a decision on what the final product will look like.

Mr. NUGENT. Obviously, to do that, I mean, you do have to have some type of a dry facility on the sub—on the deck of a sub.

Admiral MCRAVEN. No, sir. Not necessarily.

Mr. NUGENT. Okay.

Admiral MCRAVEN. So there—I mean, there are alternatives out there that would imply that you do not necessarily have to have a hangar, as we think of it——

Mr. NUGENT. Right.

Admiral MCRAVEN [continuing]. In order to be able to launch a dry submersible.

So, again, while we are not heading down that path right now, we are looking at alternatives that would put us in a position, if necessary, to be able to have the dry combat submersible launched from a U.S. submarine.

Mr. NUGENT. Having the ability to do that, launch it from a submarine, does that increase your capabilities?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, it does. Clearly, the clandestine nature of a large submarine puts us in a position to gain the element of surprise in certain areas.

However, having said that, you know, without going into too much detail in the open session, we have good tactics and good procedures that can get us close enough and, as we build the technology, we think we will be in a position with the dry combat submersible to meet most of our targets that we have looked at.

Mr. NUGENT. Both of these submersibles that you are talking about, the dry and the wet, replace—what is the legacy model sitting out there?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, the legacy model now on the wet side is the SEAL Delivery Vehicle or the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle [SDV], Mark 8, Mod—I'm not sure where we are now—Mod 3, Mod 4. I was raised on the Mark 8 SDV almost 30 years ago.

We have continued to upgrade it, however, and the technology on the Mark 8 today is reasonably good. But, frankly, the new technology that is coming online will make the next shallow water combat submersible really a generational leap beyond what the current capacity is.

We have no dry combat submersible in the inventory right now. Our Advanced SEAL Delivery System is no longer active. So, we are down to—we have no capability within the dry side.

Mr. NUGENT. And the wet obviously limits you in regards to distance that you can travel based upon the operator's ability to operate after being exposed to extremely cold water.

Is there anything else that is, I guess—is big Navy on board with the opportunity to utilize a dry combat submersible housed somewhere on another submarine to be named?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. So we are partnered with the Navy in this process. One of the reasons we are going with the industry standard is because, if you mate a dry submersible now with a Navy vessel—with a Navy submarine, then you have to comply with Navy standards.

And, frankly, we think the industry standards are good enough for our operations right now. If we had to do it in compliance with the Navy standards now, we think it would cost much more to meet those standards and may not, may not, give us a better capability.

So that is why we are exploring a number of different options, to find out whether or not the industry standards will be good enough for our future dry combat submersibles.

Mr. NUGENT. And I would think as we—you know, as we move along and budgets are tight, that is a good way to go, looking at industry standards, because every time we try to invent a new mousetrap—I hate to say it—one of my sons has one of those on his leg when he flies a Black Hawk—not too good.

So I appreciate it. And, Admiral, we are certainly here to support you. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman.

All sorts of implications for the larger acquisition reform effort in the exchange that you all just had, it seems to me.

Mr. Carson.

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Lumpkin, looking across the globe and considering the threat of transnational terrorism, what are your largest concerns?

What are we assuming? Where are we assuming risk in current strategies? And are we postured to counter these threats?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Not only am I the Acting Assistant Secretary for Special Operations, but I am also performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Policy right now. So I have an opportunity to take a—I have a much broader view than I would normally have just looking at it from the SOF perspective.

The world is just a much smaller place now. So when you ask what are the threats and—I would say the threat is it is coming from everywhere, I mean, in the sense that it is totally—space is fungible now. People can move from place to place, and the world is just much smaller.

So there aren't—while there are lines where the threat comes more directly, it can come from anywhere. So, for us, it is about having that—truly a global presence and having this networked approach that USSOCOM has built so well, as to making sure that each of the theater special operations commands and the SOF operators across—and there is—each geographic combatant commander has a TSOC, a theater special operations command—has got the ability to talk to each other.

And each one of them now works in supporting the geographic combatant command, but for Admiral McRaven at USSOCOM, and he has the ability to synchronize their operations. And I think that is key to—that allows me to sleep at night so I am not worrying about this and it keeps me up.

So I think we are postured for success, but the key is just making sure that that global SOF network remains resourced, active, and viable.

So would you like to add something?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Well, I am glad you are sleeping at night.

But I will tell you that the Secretary nailed it. When we talk about kind of the evolution of U.S. special operations—and I appreciate the opportunity to roll this out—you know, we have had a special operations enterprise for decades. We have been globally dispersed for the last 27 years that USSOCOM has been around.

Now that global enterprise—because of our ability to bring them together with communications, now we have taken those thousand disparate nodes and we have connected them through communications.

And starting last October we established a very disciplined what we call battle rhythm. So video teleconferences—whereas the Secretary said I have four video teleconferences a week, my staff has them every day with the entire network now.

And so we talk about the global SOF network. That is just the name. The enterprise has been there forever. Communications has allowed us to connect those various nodes, and now we can better meet the geographic combatant commander's requirements because we are much better synchronized.

And so the Secretary exactly characterized it. But the point I wanted to raise is, for decades, we have had thousands of people out on the battlefield. Until recently we haven't been able to connect them globally through both communications and authorities, and now we have that ability.

Mr. CARSON. To that point, Admiral, I have been interested in some time in service member mental health, particularly providing mental health assessments throughout deployment.

Can you give us some assessment of SOCOM's embedded behavioral health programs and the impact that they have had on resiliency, for that matter, in your units?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you for the question.

We have our program called the Preservation of the Force and Families. And my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, did a lengthy task force study before I took command, spent about 10 months looking at—talked to 7,000 soldiers, about a thousand spouses, 440 different units.

That report landed on my desk when I took command, and clearly what the report showed was that the force was frayed. And I can tell you in the last, you know, almost 3 years that I have been in command, the force has continued to fray.

But I am confident now that, as this body has provided us the resources necessary, we are getting ahead of the problems. So we are investing in the psychological performance, we are investing in the physical performance capabilities, and we are investing in family resiliency.

And we think the family resiliency piece is absolutely critical, and we do so with the support of the services. We leverage every service program out there. But we greatly appreciate what the Congress has allowed us to do in terms of the Preservation of the Force and Families.

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here.

If it is all right, Admiral McRaven, I will start with you. I am always grateful to men like you that give your life to the cause of freedom. My 5-year-olds have a better chance to attain that and live in that freedom, and I appreciate that, along with all the folks there behind you that wear the uniform.

You know, it has been the conviction of many of us that the threat and the challenge in terms of our national security should drive the budget rather than the reverse. And you know that, as much as we try to put that concept forward, that it usually is the victim of sometimes mathematics.

But you have outlined some pretty significant challenges that you face, and you have mentioned that the force is frayed.

And I just noticed that the initiative fund that you submitted in the fiscal year 2015 budget, the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative, included—includes 14—I am sorry—$400 million for SOCOM readiness and infrastructure.

And maybe give us just a quick idea of what those requirements are. And why were these not included in the fiscal year 2015 budget request?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. So the $400 million is actually broken down into two parts. One of them, 300-some-odd million, is for readiness.

So we are going to go back and—where we had to take cuts in order to meet the budget numbers were in flying hours and steaming hours and training hours.

So we will be able to put, I think, $350 million or so back into readiness to make sure that we are able to improve the readiness of our folks back in the continental United States.

It has never affected the readiness of our forces deploying forward. We always make sure that they are absolutely ready to go forward wherever that might be, whether it is Afghanistan or anywhere else on the globe.

But in the past we have taken some liberties with the readiness in the continental United States until they were ready to go forward.

Having said that, there were also three programs within that $400 million that are part of our Preservation of Force and Families. There are MILCON [military construction] projects that we are looking at.

And so we are grateful for this additional money coming in because we will be able to solve some of our readiness problems and, hopefully, some of our MILCON projects with the Preservation of the Force and Families.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir.

You know, as much as we try, whether it is QDR or whatever it might be—try to ascertain what our challenges are, it seems that the serendipity always outpaces our predictive capability. And so the only real answer is to have a comprehensive force that can meet whatever potential threat might come.

And it seems to me that may be one of the greatest things that we are overlooking here. We think that, you know, we are getting a leaner, meaner machine. And I appreciate that. But we need to have the overall capacity, ultimately, to handle what comes that we can't predict.

And so it is—with that in mind, Secretary Lumpkin, you have talked about a globally networked perpetual engagement for our special operations troops, and that is the same force that Admiral McRaven, in my judgment, wisely and rightly has indicated is fraying from the demand placed on them.

And at the same time, in asking for diplomatic immunity here, this administration has depended on our special operators to sort of be the glue for our worldwide military operations during a time that we are withdrawing and, really, backing off of our obligations to friends and allies alike across the globe. And to top it off, the budget is being cut.

So there is a breaking point to all of this. And I am just wondering what your own assessment of that breaking point is.

Secretary LUMPKIN. Going back to the QDR and—the QDR is a strategy-driven document. It happens to be budget-informed in order to recognize the realities of what we have as far as from a budget and what we have to operate with.

That said, the global engagement piece, I mean, this is about fulfilling our obligations and our commitments to our allies and our friends to help them build the partnership capacity, to build the capacity to deal with these security challenges that become too big to fix, and to leverage their capabilities to do things on their own

so we don't have to have this big military general purpose force to roll in and do that.

But this was—when we did QDR 6 and QDR 10, this was the reason we built the force. And QDR 6 was to grow the special operations force in order to focus and allow us to do this building partnership capacity mission. And the QDR 10 was focused on giving USSOCOM those organic enablers to do those missions whenever possible to reduce their reliance on the other services when feasible.

So that is—as we look at 2014 and we took in mind is—the end of combat operations in Iraq and we are looking at a reduction, we don't know what the—whether we are going to end up with a bilateral security agreement in Afghanistan at this juncture.

But at some point our footprint will be reduced in Afghanistan, and those forces—there is a demand signal by the geographic combatant commanders. They want more SOF in their theater.

And with the post-2014 Afghanistan and, as we draw down the forces, it will give us the ability to meet those unmet demands within the GCC. So they can do that capacity building with our partners and our allies.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Talk about MILCON reminds me that I believe we have an outstanding request for special operations military construction that was requested to be submitted with the budget. I don't think we have quite gotten it yet.

So, Secretary Lumpkin, I might just put that on your radar screen, if you don't mind, when you go back to the building, to check and see where that is.

You were talking earlier that, in addition to being the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, you are the Acting Under Secretary for Policy.

You are also in charge of the task force looking for one of our folks who has been taken captive. Correct?

Secretary LUMPKIN. I am the Department lead for that endeavor. Yes.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Looks to me like you have got a full plate.

Secretary LUMPKIN. I keep busy. Yes, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, have they nominated somebody for Policy yet?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Yes, sir. Been nominated, had the hearing. We are waiting for the confirmation process to work its way through.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. When you testified in front of the Senate, I know you were asked about the Authorization for the Use of Military Force [AUMF]. And, frankly, I have gotten a little confused over the years what the administration policy is towards that. Sometimes we hear that it is don't mess with it. Sometimes it is change it.

Can you help me understand the administration's policy? And from your experience, isn't it getting harder and harder to do the things that we ask our special operators to do around the world,

relying back on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that was passed in September 2001?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you for the question, sir. I truly do appreciate it.

In May of last year, the President in his May speech at National Defense University mentioned about revising and eventually repealing the AUMF as a goal.

I truly believe that the AUMF has served us well. It continues to serve us well. It gives us the ability to keep this Nation safe and do the missions that we need to do.

That said, my comment to the Senate was that we are at an inflection point. We are at a point that is—it is always good to relook at authorities because they evolve. The threat evolves.

And so I would encourage a look at the AUMF, make sure it is doing everything we need it to do. And if it is not, if it needs to be taken in or expanded or whatever, it is a chance to do that if we are going to take a look at it. And that is what I support.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Well, I agree, actually.

And what I also agree with is that we should not ask our men and women to go and do something anywhere in the world that they are not fully backed up with law to do.

And I worry about this strain as we get further and further away from 9/11, and the exact wording of the AUMF makes it harder and harder to draw those connections.

So. Speaking of authorities, Admiral, let me just touch back. We talked at the beginning about working with others. One of the things that has been requested is an extension of the 1208 authority as well as increasing the dollar limit on that.

In this forum, can you describe for us the role that 1208 plays, how important you think it is in the menu of options that special operators have to work with others, with 1206 and global security.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. And then I would like to defer to Secretary Lumpkin because he has been very supportive of increasing the amount of money for our 1208.

Sir, I would tell you 1208 is probably the single most important authority we have in our fight against terrorism. It allows us to build forces, to train them, to equip them, and to do so with, I think, the right amount of oversight. And right now we are finding that this is a—again, about building partner capacity. This is a growth industry.

So whereas a couple of years ago we had a certain level of authority, we found that our expenditure rates didn't really match the authority. Now already we are closing in on the $50 million authority, and I think the demand signal—I know the demand signal out there is even larger than that. So Secretary Lumpkin has put forth a proposal to increase the authority, and I am in strong favor of that.

However, one of the problems we run into is, as we look at how we build partner capacity, we do have to have a patchwork of various authorities. So we do use 1206 when appropriate; 1207, the Global Security Contingency Fund; 1208.

And we make it work, but there is an awkwardness to it and sometimes limitations to it. Some of the authorities allow us to work with the Minister of Defense, but not the Minister of Interior

[MOI], where, in some cases, their counterterrorism forces actually are in the MOI, or some allows us to build minor military construction, you know, a small shoot house or a small barracks; others don't.

So what we try to do is find the right authority for the right situation, but that is not always easy. 1208 is the—gives us the greatest latitude, but it is strictly focused on counterterrorism, whereas 1206 and 1207 give us a little bit more latitude in other areas.

Secretary LUMPKIN. And, if I may, I absolutely agree with the admiral in the sense that 1208 is a tremendous tool for us. And we are rapidly approaching our maximum authorization of the $50 million, and we are not even halfway through the year yet.

We are tightening up our obligation, looking at what we can—find other mechanisms to fund so we don't find ourselves up against a wall.

But the other concern I have is that, in the event it is not renewed or we end up with a continuing resolution where it doesn't allow me to continue operations, stopping that particular mission set has significant impact operationally.

So I would encourage and support getting an extended authorization sooner rather than later.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I am struck by the conversation you all were having with Mrs. Hartzler. This is an operational authority, not some of the other authorities. And, yet, operationally it still takes a while to help develop some of these capacities. And so we don't want to be shortsighted about it.

Mr. Langevin, do you have other questions?

Mr. LANGEVIN. I probably will hold for the classified session.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Does anybody else have open session questions?

Mr. HUNTER. Sure. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Really quick.

JIEDDO. I am just wondering what do you see with JIEDDO going forward? You know, what do you do with JIEDDO right now?

They have been supporting SOCOM for a long time. They are also supporting, you know, big Army, Marines, everybody else, too.

But from your side of things, what do you want to see happening with them going forward? What parts of them should be kept and what parts of JIEDDO are just bureaucratic and won't be needed anymore once we get out of Afghanistan?

Secretary LUMPKIN. From a larger policy perspective, JIEDDO, as you are keenly aware, has been crucial and instrumental and been tremendously supportive to our operations and initiatives forward.

So, for me, from a policy perspective, would really like to ensure we codify it in the Department long term and it doesn't go by the wayside as we move past—beyond our current operations.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you this, though. When you codify it, you want to make sure it is really, really good. So you want to maybe cut out the parts that you don't think are being productive right now or not as productive or change those parts and keep the parts that are really good, if you codify it.

So what parts would those be? What parts would you keep? What parts would you change? Or you can get back to me if you don't have that on you right now.

Secretary LUMPKIN. I will defer to see if Admiral McRaven has it, but I can get back to you on that.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have a JIEDDO rep, as you know, in almost every location where we have our SOF forces. And, as the Secretary said, JIEDDO has been absolutely fabulous over the years.

For us, you know, what JIEDDO has learned to do is to understand networks. So as we look at the terrorist threat, frankly, where JIEDDO started out focusing on IEDs [improvised explosive devices]—and, of course, understanding IEDs meant you had to understand the IED network—now the folks at JIEDDO, because they understand the foundation of network development, you can take that talent and that capability and overlay it on the threat networks elsewhere.

So I am a very big believer that what JIEDDO has learned, the IED fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, is fungible as we move forward and have to fight networks globally.

So I wouldn't portend to tell you where you could cut them or not cut them. I can tell you that they have been a tremendous resource to SOCOM and we greatly appreciate what they have done and, frankly, how they have, to some degree, reshaped themselves and looked at the broader network problem set.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. All right. Thank you both.

With that, the open portion of this hearing will be adjourned, and we will move swiftly down one floor and across the hall.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to be reconvened in classified session.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 13, 2014

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 13, 2014

STATEMENT OF

HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

BEFORE THE 113th CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

MARCH 13, 2014

Introduction

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me to join you today, and for all your steadfast support for our Special Operators and the U.S. Special Operations Command. I am very pleased to be before you with Admiral Bill McRaven, who has expertly led USSOCOM over the past three years. I say without reservation that Admiral McRaven has made a strong command even better. He's been a visionary leader for decades. The programs and initiatives he's put in place to provide premier special operations capabilities to our Geographic Combatant Commands, to oversee and synchronize global counterterrorism operations, and to take care of our Special Operators and their families, will serve the nation for years to come.

Evolving Threats

The nature of the threat that we are facing, especially regarding al-Qa'ida, is changing. Pressure from the U.S. and our allies has altered al-Qa'ida's campaign plan. Al-Qa'ida has been forced to relinquish control over its affiliates, which allows threats from these groups to develop more quickly. Although the scale of threat to the U.S. homeland has diminished, threats to U.S. persons and interests overseas are increasing. We're also seeing an increase in the use of technology, perhaps a function of a younger generation of terrorists who are more adept with smart phones and social media services.

Although their leadership cadre has been depleted, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates retain sanctuaries in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and in remote areas of Yemen and Somalia. It is also working to co-opt insurgent movements and violent extremists in Syria, North Africa, and the Sahel. From these regions, the threat of al-Qa'ida attacks against U.S. interests and personnel overseas has grown. Al-Qa'ida is a resilient organization that has become adept at exploiting lapses in security during and following political transitions, civil wars, and periods of unrest. This is particularly true across the Middle East and in Africa. The threat posed by al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups will continue to evolve and it is essential that we remain vigilant, prepared and resourced the meet the threat. We must maintain pressure on al-Qa'ida and its affiliates to ensure they cannot reconstitute a capability to attack the homeland.

The threats we face are not limited to al-Qa'ida and terrorist organizations. North Korea continues to present a threat by proliferating weapons of mass destruction. As we have seen play out over the past few months in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, political instability exacerbated by ethnic and or religious differences can escalate into violence requiring international intervention. We are also called upon to support regional issues, such as the effort to eradicate the Lord's Resistance Army from Central Africa. These demands will continue and we must be prepared to conduct a wide range of operations, often with little notice.

Time of Transition

The Department of Defense is in a time of transition. We are ending the longest prolonged period of war in our nation's history. The future of Afghanistan - as we go through negotiations

on the Bilateral Security Agreement - is yet to be determined. If we are unable to achieve an acceptable agreement and withdraw our forces, it will be much more difficult to maintain pressure on al-Qa'ida in Kunar and Nuristan, which are the traditional al Qa'ida safe havens. Secretary Hagel has told us to plan for all contingences and the department is doing just that.

We are at the end of a long period of historic growth in military budgets and manpower, and must increase our effort to make the most efficient and effective use of the taxpayer dollar without diminishing America's safety. The President's Budget submission for Fiscal Year 2015 levels SOF growth at 69,700 Service Members. ADM McRaven and USSOCOM have done an excellent job finding efficiencies within the Headquarters and realigning billets and capabilities to support the seven Theater Special Operations Commands that are under the combatant command of USSOCOM, but operate in direct support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

As ASD SO/LIC, I watch very closely how cuts to the services impact the readiness of USSOCOM. As the Department continues to review and make adjustments to size the force correctly, we are closely monitoring and assessing the availability of critical enablers. For example, we are working with the services to ensure that cuts to the current ISR fleet will not erode our core capability to find, fix, and finish targets. At the same time, we are continuing to balance our organic enabler capabilities to allow SOF to deploy with speed, precision, and lethality to a broad range of contingencies anywhere in the world.

After some very tough decisions during this year's budget review, USSOCOM's base budget request for FY 2015 is less than the levels projected in the five-year budget plan submitted by the President last year but greater than the amount enacted for FY 2014. As we transition operations in Afghanistan and redistribute SOF into other theaters, we will need to ensure that our Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts are sufficiently resourced to support these deployments.

We will also watch our Investment accounts carefully. We must maintain the ability to recapitalize and update current platforms such as the efforts underway with both the MC-130J and MC-130P tanker fleets, and to develop and procure SOF specific platforms and systems for both ground and maritime mobility. We must also ensure we invest in the future. Investment in research and development is much like investment in education; the benefits are most often seen a decade down the road. A critical element in the research and development enterprise for special operations is the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) which is part of SO/LIC. CTTSO brings together, SOF, the interagency, industry and the Services to find the best solutions to existing and future requirements. Their efforts complement and enhance those of USSOCOM's Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisition Center.

Improving our Oversight

It is imperative from an oversight perspective that SO/LIC look across the department and find material, acquisition and manpower options that ensure our Special Operations forces are trained, ready and postured to meet the rapidly evolving threat.

We have reinforced our supervisory capabilities by leveraging the subject matter expertise of the Joint Staff and the OSD Staff to include the offices of AT&L, P&R, Comptroller, OUDI and CAPE. This effort reflects the FY 2014 NDAA which calls on ASD SO/LIC and USD AT&L to strengthen their defined roles in the oversight of USSOCOM.

We have a number of established processes that bring USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, and the OSD Staff together to ensure we maintain proper oversight of USSOCOM strategy and policy initiatives and maintain oversight responsibilities of Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) funds. These include, but are not limited to routine interaction between my staff and the USSOCOM Washington Office, daily coordination with the Joint Staff on operations – ongoing and planned, senior level SO/LIC attendance at the monthly USSOCOM Commander's Decision Round Table, and frequent dialogue between myself and Admiral McRaven.

The oversight responsibilities of my office take on added importance in an environment of fiscal constraint and technological growth. By partnering with OSD AT&L through a SOF acquisition senior level forum, we are enabling the Department to share technology information with the Services, resolve issues, and provide opportunities to leverage technology and resources for SOF.

Strategic Options

In times of uncertainty, we owe the President and the Secretary of Defense the best strategic options to accomplish our national security objectives. This is conducted in close coordination and honest discussion with Congress as you exercise your oversight, authorization and appropriation responsibilities. In the best case, we develop options in advance of crisis, but we must also maintain the ability to quickly react to and support national defense objectives during the heat of crisis.

We must develop options that allow SOF to operate forward in this increasingly population-centric fight that centers not on terrain, but within the human domain. We are moving from a state of "perpetual war" to "perpetual engagement" – engaging with partners to build their capacity; engaging with problems before they become too big to fix without breaking the budget – and, yes, engaging in action, direct or indirect, whenever necessary to keep our enemies off-balance or eliminate continuing/imminent threats.

We must build upon our existing network of bilateral alliances and partnerships and seek opportunities to develop additional partnerships. We must address the sources of potential conflict before they create larger problems. This new network approach involves interagency support to foster bilateral ties.

This work – which focuses on security cooperation, building partner capacity, and a keen awareness of local conditions - relies heavily on the capabilities of our Special Operations

Forces. The ability of SOF to operate with a small footprint in the human domain and in contested environments will only become more important in a future of globally dispersed and irregular threats.

As we build networks with our willing partner nations, SOF is very reliant upon congressionally authorized and properly appropriated programs. I want to thank Congress for continued support for Section 1208 and 1206 authorities. Section 1208 is a critical tool that extends the reach of our forces by allowing them to work more closely with foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals supporting U.S special operations to combat terrorism. The demand for programs under these authorities from the Geographic Combatant Commanders is high and we are approaching the $50 million annual authorization cap. With the challenges and limitations of U.S. unilateral direct action operations, we believe the need for 1208 authority - as a complementary force multiplier - will extend past its' current expiration at the end of fiscal year 2015.

Section 1206 authority allows the Secretary of Defense to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism or stability operations. Section 1206 has had notable successes in Afghanistan as we prepared our NATO partners for combat operations. The challenge before us now is to attain the same level of success we have enjoyed through this authority in Afghanistan in other parts of the globe. Programs under this same authority are now focused on the terrorist hot spots of Yemen, East Africa and North Africa.

Programs under both of these authorities are examples of our continued close cooperation with the Department of State. Programs under 1208 must have concurrence from the relevant Chief of Mission and 1206 must have concurrence from the Secretary of State. We have already notified Congress for the first two tranches of 1206 authority programs for this fiscal year.

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), a pilot authority entering its third year, was established as a joint Department of Defense and Department of State administered program. The fiscal year 2014 Appropriations Act provided $30 million for GSCF, the first time money was appropriated for the authority. We appreciate your support for this, as it will greatly improve our ability to execute GCSF programs. Along with the Department of State, we are committed to identifying high priority programs for GSCF.

Past Operations and Future Successes

As we move towards a state of globally-networked perpetual engagement, increased reliance on partner nations, and reduced footprint operations, our efforts are grounded in experiences that demonstrate the success of this approach. Colombia and the Philippines are case studies in how a small investment of SOF, resourced for an enduring time frame, can have positive results.

In the Philippines, with a task force of about 500 SOF and general-purpose force enablers, we helped degrade what was once considered to be a serious transnational terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf and Jamaah Islamiyah. Our efforts helped deny al-Qa'ida a strong regional presence in

Southeast Asia, and made if harder for terrorists to carry out high profile attacks such as the 2002 Bali bombing.

In Colombia, we provided significant military aid, counter-insurgency training, and humanitarian assistance in a broad-based initiative to prevent narcotics traffickers from developing sanctuaries in that country. Plan Colombia was a sustained commitment to building the capacity of an important partner. It involved long-term efforts to help Colombia build a more professional, more accountable, more capable military – giving that nation the ability to solve its own security challenges, and to take ownership of the vital process of eliminating terrorist and insurgent sanctuaries within its own borders. Plan Colombia was an interagency effort to assist the Colombians in eradicating narcotics and building stronger financial institutions.
This work has paid off. Colombia is not only a far more secure and prosperous nation now; it has emerged as an exporter of regional security.

We have the same opportunities before us now in Africa and parts of the Middle East. As we did in Colombia and the Philippines we must be willing to accept the risk of placing small numbers of specially trained forces forward to develop the trust of our partner forces and enable them over the long term to adequately deal with violent extremists and terrorists that threaten our mutual security goals. These relatively small investments come in many forms and can be tailored to support U.S. security objectives. Our logistical, intelligence and, when required, operational support to the French and African partners in the Sahel has been critical in stemming the tide of violent extremism in Mali. Modest investments supporting AMISOM troops in the Horn of

Africa have helped to reverse the trajectory of al-Shabaab. In Yemen, we have had successes but require a more robust and sustained effort to turn the tide of AQAP's expansion.

These discrete activities and operations, in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders, in close concert and with the concurrence of Ambassadors and country teams, anchored through liaison with the inter-agency and in partnership with willing allies is what comprises a global SOF network. What we do in Yemen has effects across the Gulf of Aden in Somalia. Our activities in the Sahel to support regional armed forces efforts to interdict smuggling and resupply lines have effects in Mali and Libya. We do not always have to take unilateral direct action, but the nature of the threat does require that we must always be engaged.

Conclusion


Within SOF, we have five axioms that we call the SOF Truths. The first of which is, "Humans are more important than hardware." The SOF operator is our primary weapon system, and it is my goal and the goal of all in SO/LIC to ensure they are resourced and prepared for today's fight and the battles we will face in the future. The same can be said of taking care of our families. USSOCOM's Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program, takes a whole-person approach to the mental, physical, spiritual and psychological welfare of the force. With the great demands we place on our SOF operators, the pro-active nature of this program builds resilience and strength both for the SOF operator and for our families.

As ASD SO/LIC, I am proud to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airman, Marines, and Civilians that are assigned to USSOCOM. Their sacrifices in this war are immense – since October 2001, 385 Special Operators have been killed in action, and another 2,160 have been wounded. We have asked a lot of the men and women assigned to our SOF formations since 9/11, and we will continue to ask much of them in the future. I am committed to doing everything I can to ensure these brave warriors have the best training, equipment, and overall support we can possibly provide and to work closely with Congress and my senior Policy colleagues across the government to ensure we have the right strategies and policies in place to employ them effectively.

I thank Congress for your continuing support to our men and women in uniform and look forward to your questions.

Michael D. Lumpkin

**Assistant Secretary of Defense,
SO/LIC, Performing Duties,
Under Sec. of Defense for Policy**



Michael D. Lumpkin is currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. When performing the duties of USD (P), Mr. Lumpkin provides advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Mr. Lumpkin was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) on December 2, 2013, following his nomination by President Barack Obama and confirmation by the U.S. Senate.

In his role as Assistant Secretary (SO/LIC), Mr. Lumpkin is the principal advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense on Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. He is responsible primarily for the overall supervision, to include oversight of policy and resources, of special operations and low intensity conflict activities. These activities include: counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, information operations, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In his role as Assistant Secretary (SO/LIC), Mr. Lumpkin also oversees the Department of Defense counter-narcotics program, building partnership capacity initiatives and humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.

Prior to his assuming duties as Assistant Secretary (SO/LIC), Mr. Lumpkin served as a Senior Executive at both the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs. His previous positions include Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for (SO/LIC), and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Mr. Lumpkin has also significant experience in the private sector where he served as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at Industrial Security Alliance Partners and Executive Director of Business Development at ATI.

Mr. Lumpkin has more than 20 years of active duty military service as a US Navy SEAL where he held every leadership position from platoon commander to Team commanding officer. Mr. Lumpkin has participated in numerous campaigns and contingencies throughout the world to include both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Mr. Lumpkin holds a MA from Naval Postgraduate School in National Security Affairs. He is a recognized subspecialist in Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Western Hemisphere Affairs.

POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
BEFORE THE 113th CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to address you, the third in my tenure as the 9th commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

USSOCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands, yet distinct in its numerous Service, military department, and defense agency-like responsibilities. Under Title 10 U.S. Code Sections 164 and 167, it is my legal responsibility, as USSOCOM Commander, to organize, train and equip my force. This includes building a strategy that supports the goals and objectives of the Defense Strategic Guidance and providing combat ready forces to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Our mission remains to provide trained, equipped, ready, and regionally aligned special operations forces (SOF) in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), and through unified action, conduct sustained special operations to eliminate threats to U.S. interests and protect the American people. I am greatly appreciative of the continued support from Congress and this committee in particular. We welcome the opportunity to update the members of the House with our current posture.

As it stands today, my force is comprised of 66,000 men and women. On any given day, our SOF are deployed in over 75 countries, in many cases working side-by-side with multiple interagency and international partners. Our unique contribution to national security emanates from our superb SOF warriors, who time and time again demonstrate their dedication to duty, tenacity, and unwavering commitment to the security of our Nation. Since 9/11, our operations, ranging from peacetime engagement and building partner capacity, to direct action raids and irregular warfare, have contributed significantly to not only our own National Security, but

global stability at large. As their Commander, I will forever be grateful for the contributions of these fine men and women and their families who support them.

Generational Conflict

Our Nation and its allies are engaged in a generational conflict. Our most extreme adversaries largely consist of individuals and organizations that are irreconcilable to a non-violent ideology. Terrorism and extremism are problems that we will have to deal with for some time to come. We face unprecedented challenges from an increasingly complex operating environment filled with agile, rapidly adapting belligerents — adversaries that we expect to be even more innovative and asymmetric in their approach to conflict in the years ahead.

Complicating the global situation are some key trends shaping the strategic security environment: the redistribution and diffusion of global power; the rising role of non-state actors; the easy access to advanced technology — especially information technology; shifting demographics — specifically the rapid growth and expansion of the urban environment; and the improving, yet still fragile economic health of the United States and its partners. Modern interconnectivity ensures that instability and conflict will not often be constrained by geographic boundaries. There is no such thing as a local problem. Local issues quickly become regional, and regional issues inevitably have global influence.

Afghanistan is a prominent example of this. Their security infrastructure is still fragile, and under constant threat from multiple groups. Although the Afghan Army is leading operations there, and the Afghan Local Police have grown in size and capability to foster stability in dispersed villages, there is more work to be done.

In Yemen, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula continues to find ungoverned spaces from which to operate and from which to stage attacks and promote their violent ideology. In Northwest Africa, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitun, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other violent extremist groups are fighting to expand their influence, destabilize communities, and discredit weak governments.

In the Levant, the flow of foreign fighters into Syria is unprecedented, even compared to what we saw in Iraq. The experience they gain will threaten future regional stability and feed violent extremist organizations as they flow back out of that civil war and threaten our allies and partners in the Middle East, Europe, and beyond. In the Pacific, growing tensions between regional powers raise the risk of miscalculation.

In the Western Hemisphere, alliances between transnational criminal organizations, violent extremist organizations, and state leaders create corruption and threaten governments' stability. Growing relationships between terrorist organizations and human smuggling networks present new opportunities to move terrorists and contraband around the world undetected via smuggling routes. The challenges the U.S. and its allies face from transnational violent extremist organizations require a global approach and a global perspective to counter a global threat.

Persistent Engagement

Active, forward engagement is the foundation of this global Special Operations approach, and represents the comprehensive, layered defense required to isolate violent extremist networks and prevent adversaries from conducting successful operations against the homeland, U.S. interests, and our allies. In accordance with Presidential and SECDEF guidance and in coordination with the Department of State, we continue to forge relationships with partner nations, where augmenting the capability of local forces equates to perhaps the most cost-effective way of deterring adversaries worldwide and protecting American citizens abroad. While doing so, we remain committed to human rights vetting and the safeguarding of civil liberties throughout these military and strategic alliances.

Our SOF engagement takes place in the Human Domain — the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior in a population-centric conflict. The Human Domain is about developing an understanding of, and nurturing influence among, critical populaces. SOF is uniquely suited for operations that win population-centric conflicts, oftentimes, and preferably, before they start.

Chairman Dempsey has said that successfully confronting tomorrow's national security challenges requires "building a stronger network to defeat the networks that confront us." Networks are rooted in relationships, and building global relationships requires trust. At its foundation, relationships can only be achieved by persistently engaging with willing partners. Increased understanding, trust, and influence are vital to preventing miscalculations and protracted conflicts. Proactive, relationship-based approaches grow through effective, enduring partnerships and globally-agile, forward-deployed or forward-based SOF. SOF can achieve these strategic ends with a small footprint, while not constituting an irreversible foreign policy decision.

However, no matter how much we engage regionally and globally and seek peaceful paths to stability, we will inevitably find ourselves facing irreconcilables, bent on organizing and executing operations against our homeland, interests, and allies. Defeating organizations like al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and adherents, requires persistent pressure against their critical requirements, capabilities, and resources. It requires the removal of key leaders, denying/disrupting safe havens, severing connectivity between extremist nodes, challenging violent ideology, and offering alternatives to potential recruits. When we remove pressure, we see them metastasize, regionally and globally. To that end, we must maintain the world's premier capability to conduct global, full-spectrum direct action — unilaterally if required. Our ability to proactively apply pressure and, when required, respond quickly with decisive action requires access; and access requires active forward engagement by the interagency team.

Organized for Success

In order to have persistent engagement, we need to be organized for success. Our organization must be prepared to employ the guidance we receive from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman. In his May, 2013 speech on U.S. Counterterrorism policy, the President said, in part:

> "Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless global war on terror, but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle networks of violent extremists that threaten America."

Our strategy is further informed by the current Defense Strategic Guidance, which directs the Joint Force of the future to be agile, flexible, ready, and use *innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches*. The Secretary and the Chairman also issued guidance for USSOCOM to develop a campaign plan to achieve strategic end states and persistently align SOF capability and provide SOF support to GCC requirements.

Additionally, the "Forces For" Unified Commands Memorandum (which assigns forces to U.S. commands across the globe), signed by SECDEF in 2013, gives USSOCOM Combatant Command authority over the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) — units assigned to each of the seven Combatant Commands (e.g., EUCOM, PACOM). USSOCOM's management of the TSOCs establishes the global agility necessary to support the GCCs with the correct mix of SOF capabilities at the right time and place. It is with this national-level guidance that we have sought to strengthen our global SOF network of allies and partners.

In September, 2013, USSOCOM hosted a Global Synchronization Conference. The GCCs gathered in our headquarters to review and discuss SOCOM's plan to align capability and support their steady-state requirements and national objectives; the visiting commanders' feedback was overwhelmingly positive. Our plan aims to protect the American homeland through an active, layered defense by sustaining special operations forces forward to engage partners and proactively deter, prevent, and when necessary, defeat threats to the United States.

In order to meet these objectives, we are taking four specific actions. First, as we draw down from Afghanistan, we are redistributing those forces across the Combatant Commands to better meet the needs of the regional military commanders. Second, we are in the process of realigning our CONUS-based forces to focus more closely on regional problem sets, ensuring that our personnel are true experts in the terrain, languages, and cultures in their respective areas of responsibility. Third, we are establishing subordinate task elements who have a high-end counterterrorism capability under each Theater Special Operations Command. Finally, to tie it all together, we've implemented a daily coordination system of enterprise-wide video teleconferences to share information across the global network and synchronize effects. The network is now truly beginning to perform to its potential. As the global synchronizer for the

planning of global operations against borderless terrorist networks, USSOCOM can provide a sustained level of effort regionally and link those efforts to create global effects.

None of this can be accomplished without resources, and we are pleased that the recent passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) safeguards both Command readiness levels and SOF's current capabilities; we thank you for this stability. After a rigorous Program Budget Review, USSOCOM's budget is not expected to reach the levels projected in the five year budget plan submitted by the President last year. But, despite current fiscal austerity and force drawdown, the office of the Secretary of Defense has recommended that SOF grow to 69,700 personnel from roughly 66,000 today. These numbers reflect Congress' and DOD's intent to rebalance the Nation's defense, which began with the 2006 Defense Quadrennial Review.

In order to maintain a global SOF network compatible with Defense Strategic Guidance, USSOCOM's programmed manpower plan is essential. Preserving our current level of resource flexibility within investment accounts cannot be overstated. USSOCOM relies heavily on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding today, with the National Mission Force, in particular, funded with 67% of OCO. In addition, we remain reliant on the Services for logistics, installations services, combat service support in forward deployed locations, and institutional training and education. We look forward to working with Congress to maintain a sustainable long-term funding stream.

We are engaging with the conventional forces as they adapt to strategic guidance in their own ways. We are coordinating with the Army's effort to regionally align their forces, the Navy's push to revitalize the maritime proficiency of their SOF after over a decade of land-centric operations, and the Air Force's focus on development of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. We are collaborating with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to provide special operations forces liaison elements to deploying Marine Expeditionary Units/Amphibious Readiness Groups. These teams will provide enhanced capabilities to the Geographic Combatant Commanders by leveraging our enduring partnership with the United States Marine Corps.

We continue to strengthen our relationships with our interagency partners, whose collective support is absolutely essential to our operations. Special Operations are but one part of a tremendous team of interagency partners, including the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, the FBI, the Intelligence Community, and many others that are keeping our Nation safe. One of our most significant partners is the National Security Agency (NSA). We could not perform our counter-terrorism mission without the NSA — period! The work these incredible professionals do every day in defense of this Nation is inspiring. I could not be more proud to be associated with these great Americans. In order to ensure SOCOM's actions are fully coordinated with this interagency team, we maintain a robust network of special operations support teams with many of our partners, as well as maintaining liaison officers from those agencies at our headquarters in Tampa.

Our ability to organize for success would be impossible without my unique authority, by law, to equip my force with SOF-unique capabilities through my Acquisition Executive and Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (SORDAC). USSOCOM is developing several acquisition programs needed to carry out the strategic guidance we have been given. Our priorities in FY 2014 will include equipping SOF operators as a system; recapitalizing and procuring new air, ground, and maritime platforms; and ensuring we have the communications infrastructure and equipment to sustain operations.

USSOCOM will build upon our ability to provide 24/7 ISR throughout the full spectrum of operations. We continue to modify our wide variety of manned aircraft with the latest in sensor technologies. For unmanned systems, to meet current and emerging threats, USSOCOM will rely on longer endurance platforms which include a fleet of extended range MQ-9 Reapers. We will use our rapid acquisition capabilities to ensure they are responsive to the needs on the battlefield.

We are recapitalizing our venerable C-130 fleet. The AC-130J program, which will eventually give the entire fixed-wing gunship fleet the latest in close-air support capabilities, started flight test. In 2013, the multi-mission MC-130J program delivered nineteen aircraft and is on track to replace our aging MC-130H penetrator and MC-130P tanker fleets.

Also, to ensure the SOF operator has the required agility for future security environments, we've initiated the procurement of a new Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV). This vehicle can negotiate challenging terrain and, importantly, is internally transportable via our SOF rotary-wing aircraft. We are fielding a new fleet of surface maritime mobility craft, including the continued deliveries of the Combat Craft Assault (CCA) platforms, and the down select to the final Combatant Craft Medium (CCM) platform. Additionally, we continue the development of new subsurface maritime craft through the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) and Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) efforts.

Enterprise-wide, we recognize a need to expand communications infrastructure, especially with respect to ISR data. Spurred by conflict over the last 13 years in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, the U.S. has invested heavily in a robust terrestrial network of fiber optic cables and other equipment that transports massive amounts of information to and from Southwest Asia. As we draw down in Afghanistan, SOF Airborne ISR assets will likely shift to areas lacking that robust terrestrial network. In response, we continue to pursue a DOD-wide, joint airborne ISR data transport enterprise that is both cost efficient and capable of supporting any ISR asset, independent of platform or sensor.

SOCOM also continues to pursue game-changing technologies, utilizing a process that allows better synchronization of SOF-related technology initiatives with government agencies and other technology developers. For FY 2014, SOCOM is focusing on strategic, long-term technology development efforts in order to enhance protection and survivability for our operators through advanced materials and methods. This includes hardware that augments human physical and sensory capabilities, improves the precision and lethality of existing weapon systems, and improves situational awareness.

For instance, the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS project — referred to by some as the "Iron Man Suit") represents our Nation's outstanding efforts to leverage emerging technology to ensure that our SOF operators are protected to the maximum extent possible. Equally important, the project has the potential to drive improvements in how we do acquisitions

by fostering new collaborative development models within industry. By teaming with a wide range of corporations, government agencies, universities and national laboratories, the TALOS project is leveraging the expertise of leading minds throughout the country to redefine the state of the art in survivability and operator capability. USSOCOM continues to streamline its acquisition processes to achieve maximum outputs at lowest acquisition cost, while maintaining its reputation as the DOD's premier rapid acquisition organization. We appreciate Congress' support for these programs so we can accomplish the strategic goals the President has set for us.

People -- Our Most Important Resource

We will never be able to organize for success if we don't take great care to preserve our force. Perhaps our most enduring and important SOF truth is that "humans are more important than hardware." While the high-tech gear is critical to our success, we are also masters of the low-tech — the operator who can be cold, wet, miserable, and in harm's way, but persevere to accomplish the mission. Everything we do as a command is entirely dependent on those highly-skilled people that make up the Special Operations community, and those highly-skilled people rely on strong family support in order to operate forward in complex environments.

Preservation of the force and families, commonly known as POTFF, is therefore **our number one priority here at home**! The welfare of these brave service members and their families is critical to our command's readiness and our ability to accomplish the mission. It is also a moral imperative. We demand the best from our people and in return have an obligation to provide the best care, education, equipment, and training to them. We are grateful to Congress for passing into law Section 554 of the FY 2014 Defense Authorization Act, which authorizes us to support family programs by finding innovative solutions to meet their unique needs.

Over the past year, USSOCOM has made tremendous strides in developing an integrated series of capabilities to build and preserve the fighting strength of the SOF warrior and assure the well-being of their families. We are approaching this endeavor via multiple lanes, combining mental, physical, social, and spiritual aspects into a holistic approach. Building and preserving the resilience of our warriors and their families ensures SOF mission readiness and functional capability.

Looking to leverage innovative ways to not only care for our warriors, but improve their performance, we have expanded our evidence-based Human Performance Program (HPP) to the entire force. This is not a separate medical system — far from it. We continue to get outstanding medical support from our Service partners.

The HPP is designed to meet the unique physical needs of SOF operators, who operate in a variety of austere environments with harsh terrain and carry specialized equipment that requires peak physical conditioning. Our SEALs and special boat operators may parachute into the ocean and conduct an over-the-horizon swim in 60 degree water temperatures while dragging heavy equipment one day, then patrol several miles through dense jungle to conduct a reconnaissance mission the next. Our Green Berets may be called on to infiltrate independently into a denied area and traverse rugged terrain at altitudes of over 8,000 feet with over 100 pounds of gear on their backs in order to link up with an indigenous force. Our special mission units often conduct high-altitude low-opening (HALO) parachute jumps from over 18,000 feet, with oxygen, and then assemble and conduct a ground movement to the target area. These unique, varied activities tax the human body in extraordinary ways and require tailored physical conditioning, before, during, and after their operations.

This conditioning is accomplished in part through a comprehensive "pre-habilitative" physical training program, developed and led by certified professionals. It involves focused strength and conditioning, performance nutrition, and physical therapy. The idea is to provide a "tunable" program that can deliver specific, enhanced areas of performance to individual SOF units. Where it previously existed as a conceptual model, it is now available to all SOF operators. We continue to develop best practices and metrics to support the validity and effectiveness of the program. The net result is improved readiness and reduced healthcare costs through early intervention, rapid rehabilitation, and injury reduction. This program is vital to the readiness and resiliency of our force and ensuring mission success in the most demanding environments.

The Command's Psychological Performance Program has also developed substantially over the past year. We have embedded behavioral healthcare professionals throughout the SOF enterprise

and this proximate presence has made a tremendous difference to the service members and their families. Commanders have related how the skill and accessibility of these professionals has saved lives and they now view these care providers as integral members of the command's staff. The constant, embedded presence of the behavioral health staff is also breaking the stigma associated with seeking care.

We need these specialists more than ever because suicides continue to be a challenge. While the Department saw a marked decline in suicides this past year, the SOF community's rate remained tragically steady. Accordingly, we are redoubling our efforts to ensure that our leaders are fully engaged with their personnel. As such, we are working with DOD and academia to provide additional training and resources to arm leadership, providers, and chaplains with the knowledge and understanding they need to help prevent further loss of life. Full application of the POTFF initiative will build within our operators the resilience they require to deal with the stress we put upon our force.

In addition to our focus on psychological, physical, and mental health, we are striving to provide the Geographic Combatant Commanders the most educated SOF operators possible to support their objectives. Our operators require the ability to rapidly think, assess, and respond at the tactical level while always considering strategic implications. In addition, they require advanced cognitive skills that enable them to interpret regional activities in the context of a complex world.

These skills are developed through advanced education, in concert with language training and regional proficiency, providing the SOF operator with comprehension and reasoning abilities that enable true regional expertise. We continue to work with our Service partners to ensure these education efforts are not duplicative, but are "SOF specific." One way in which we achieve this is through Joint Special Operations University, which last year taught over 8,000 students, to include SOF and non-SOF, military and civilian, international partners and U.S. members alike, through both resident and distance learning SOF education programs.

Lastly, we are in the process of implementing the SECDEF's guidance to integrate women in all combat military operational specialties no later than January 2016. We have had women

attached to our combat units for several years, serving with Cultural Support Teams, Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Teams, Intel, and a host of other occupational specialties and they have performed magnificently. While we are still assessing the feasibility of including women in certain combat specialties, we have already begun to fully integrate them into our SOF aviation career field.

We Can't do it Alone

Even as we produce and develop a force that is organized for success, capable of persistent engagement, and prepared for enduring conflict, we can't do it alone. While we must maintain unilateral capabilities, a partnered approach with local civilian and military forces will always be the most effective bulwark against global, borderless threats. To that end, we're working to engage with the right partners, with the right training, connected and enabled in the right way.

We are expanding our network of foreign liaison officers to create a sense of community with the interagency, allies, and partner nations. Currently, ten partner nations are integrated into the USSOCOM headquarters and are working side-by-side with our staff on global SOF network matters. These officers serve as the "connective tissue" to our allied counterparts. Our ability to collaborate with partners must be supported by a robust communications infrastructure, and we need to seek opportunities and approvals to expand tactical intelligence sharing with those partners willing to pursue like-minded objectives.

In 2013, joint exercises with Kenyan and Ugandan forces led to increased counterterrorism capabilities in their fight against al-Shabaab. Similarly, SOF assistance to Jordan and Lebanon lessened the impact of Syrian refugees on host communities. In Latin America, SOF contributed to efforts to counter transnational criminal organizations in Colombia and El Salvador.

Additionally, Section 1208 authority has been absolutely critical to our current and future efforts against al-Qa'ida and organizations of their ilk. It provides us the ability to apply a modest portion of our annual budget to deliver critical enablers to select irregular forces, groups or individuals, directly involved in the terrorism fight. This authority uniquely provides USSOCOM with access and skill sets in locations where we may not otherwise be able to

operate, subject to the SECDEF granting specific operational authority. This authority uniquely provides USSOCOM with access and skill sets in locations where we may not otherwise be able to operate, subject to SECDEF granting specific operational authority. The strategic value of enabling and leveraging such forces to carry out tactical operations alongside, or even in-lieu of, U.S. forces cannot be overstated. We are appreciative of Congress' support for this authority since 2005, and are hopeful for continued support.

In summary, I believe we are involved in a generational conflict, one which requires persistent forward engagement to provide a layered defense and the ability to respond rapidly if a regional crisis occurs. To be successful in our fight against extremism and other threats to the United States, we must be organized for success, we must partner with those allies and friends who have mutual interests, and above all we must take care of our people — now and in the future.

I thank you for your continued support of our entire USSOCOM family — individuals committed to the safety and security of our great Nation. These proud warriors and their families rely on your support to accomplish the great things they do each and every day to ensure our Nation's security and way of life.

United States Navy
Biography

Admiral William H. McRaven
Commander, United States Special Operations Command
United States Navy

Adm. McRaven is the ninth commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide.

McRaven served from June 2008 to June 2011 as the 11th commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C. JSOC is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics.

McRaven served from June 2006 to March 2008 as commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). In addition to his duties as commander, SOCEUR, he was designated as the first director of the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre where he was charged with enhancing the capabilities and interoperability of all NATO Special Operations Forces.

McRaven has commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as deputy commanding general for Operations at JSOC; commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group One; commander of SEAL Team Three; task group commander in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; task unit commander during *Desert Storm* and *Desert Shield*; squadron commander at Naval Special Warfare Development Group; and, SEAL platoon commander at Underwater Demolition Team 21/SEAL Team Four.

McRaven's diverse staff and interagency experience includes assignments as the director for Strategic Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council Staff; assessment director at USSOCOM, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the chief of staff at Naval Special Warfare Group One.

McRaven's professional education includes assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School, where he helped establish, and was the first graduate from, the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum.

Updated: 24 January 2012

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MARCH 13, 2014

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM is currently pursuing directed energy systems as a non-kinetic, stand-off anti-materiel solution. We have a requirement to surgically disable or disrupt a variety of fixed facility infrastructure and systems, with required capabilities ranging from breaching and access to disablement of critical equipment. The Man Portable High Energy Laser is one of several technologies under consideration for this critical mission.

The MPHEL system was developed in close cooperation with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. Boeing Directed Energy Systems Albuquerque, NM has served as the lead contractor from September 2012 to present. The current prototype MPHEL system has an output power of 2 kilowatts and weighs approximately 750 pounds in a configuration the size of four large Pelican cases. The emphasis of further development will be on reducing the form factor, reducing weight, and increasing effective range.

Initial testing of the prototype MPHEL system was conducted at Kirtland AFB, NM from January to February 2014, and produced positive results. The prototype demonstrated an ability to disable electronics devices, burn through various metals, and disable electrical systems. The prototype system will now be shipped to USSOCOM in May 2014 for user evaluation and target characterization, establishing the baseline for further development. At this time there are no plans to procure or field the MPHEL in its current form factor.

Recognizing the importance of safety, and the unique legal implications of directed energy systems, USSOCOM engaged early with the US Army Institute of Public Health. A preliminary evaluation of the system was conducted in December 2013 to determine potential health hazards. Initial results placed the MPHEL in a mishap risk category of medium, and identified several proposed design modifications for future versions. The final report is pending. [See page 7.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

Admiral MCRAVEN. The human domain fills a critical conceptual gap in visualizing the operating environment. None of the existing domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyber) sufficiently address the centrality of people to contemporary and future strategy, operations and activities. The human domain complements the other domains and more fully describes the contemporary and future operating environments. It is not new in warfare, and a host of related terms have been developed to describe it. Most of these terms insufficiently define the scope and scale of the centrality of humans within the operating environment.

The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program implemented by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command to develop, train, and integrate a social science based research and analysis capability that enables sociocultural understanding across the operational environment. In this regard, the HTS supports operations in the human domain by enhancing understanding of the cognitive, information, social, cultural, and physical elements that affect the domain. The HTS supports joint and coalition forces by providing social science support to military commanders in the form of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) composed of individuals with social science academic backgrounds. HTTs deploy with tactical units to assist in bringing knowledge of the local population into a coherent framework. Developing this sociocultural understanding provides a method for considering the effects of military operations among local populations. Operations in the human domain require this identification and ability to influence relevant populations in order to enhance stability, prevent conflict, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries.

The HTS continues to support commanders in Afghanistan with HTTs that provide sociocultural information and reporting to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and to U.S. commanders and staffs in order to build understanding, peace and security. In August 2013, fourteen HTTs were deployed to Afghanistan. [See page 15.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON

Secretary LUMPKIN. I believe our military forces and Geographic Combatant Commanders have the authorities and programs necessary to mitigate current transnational terrorist threats. Our forces leverage, integrate, and implement a wide variety of security assistance and military cooperation programs. The current authorities available, such as Sections 1203, 1206, 1207, and 1208, provide additional and focused tools that the Department of Defense and our Geographic Combatant Commanders use to build directly or to enhance the capabilities and capacities of our partner to counter the threats of terrorism or indirectly support counterterrorism operations. I do not recommend any immediate changes to existing counterterrorism authorities or program resourcing. However, the Department of Defense is taking a close look at our statutory authorities for assistance to foreign security forces to assess the extent to which they meet evolving requirements. We intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings following this internal review. [See page 10.]

Admiral MCRAVEN. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is currently conducting information sharing initiatives under existing authorities. CDRUSSOCOM derives authority to share information and/or intelligence with foreign partners from National Disclosure Policy-1 and any applicable exceptions in accordance with CJCSI 5221.01D and DOD Directive 5230.11. USSOCOM is coordinating disclosure and/or release of information and/or with partners through the appropriate information sharing/foreign disclosure offices. [See page 10.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 13, 2014

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Mr. THORNBERRY. Do our forces and geographic combatant commanders have the authorities they need to mitigate current and future transnational terrorist threats? What changes would you recommend, including potential changes to the AUMF?

Secretary LUMPKIN. With the strong support of Congress, the Department has gained several new authorities since 2001 that have been essential to conducting counterterrorism operations and building partner nation capabilities. Key authorities for partner capability building are found in uncodified, temporary provisions of law, and looking ahead we will be challenged to sustain our current capabilities should these authorities lapse. We would like to work with Congress to determine what is needed beyond the "current fight." With respect to the AUMF, the President has said it needs to be revised and ultimately repealed. We look forward to working with Congress on this as well.

Mr. THORNBERRY. A great deal has been written and said about the relationship between special operations forces and the CIA. What is your opinion of how the CIA and SOF should share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given respective strengths and weaknesses? What coordination role does your office (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict) play in helping to coordinate and de-conflict CIA–DOD operations and activities? What are some areas of improvement?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Close coordination and deconfliction between DOD and CIA is essential to protecting our national security interests, as is also the case with other departments and agencies as part of a whole-of-government approach. In those areas in which special operations forces and CIA have related responsibilities, we coordinate our efforts through a robust exchange of liaison officers and detailees who collaborate on a daily basis. At the headquarters level, the National Security Council Staff hosts regular meetings focused on counterterrorism coordination and deconfliction. As the ASD SO/LIC, I represent the Department and provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on these matters. In this capacity, I work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the DOD General Counsel to ensure DOD operations are fully aligned with relevant intelligence policies and comply with all applicable laws. In the realm of DOD–CIA collaboration on counterterrorism operations, we are currently working on initiatives to strengthen and improve the flow of information, technology, and practical expertise to cross-level capabilities between the two organizations.

Mr. THORNBERRY. What changes can you recommend to the present set of Security Force Assistance authorities such as 1206 and Global Security Contingency Fund? Are these the right types of authorities to satisfy future geographic combatant commander requirements to develop partner nation capabilities?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Many of the existing Security Force Assistance (SFA) authorities, including Section 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), are still relatively new. Since their creation, in Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2012, respectively, the Department of Defense has invested a significant amount of time and effort in developing the organizational structures and processes required for their effective use. We believe that Section 1206 has been a success and that the GSCF is now poised to succeed.

However, the global strategic environment has evolved since the creation of these new authorities, and we anticipate that it will continue to evolve over the next several years. The threat of terrorism increasingly flows from Al Qaeda's dispersed affiliates and offshoots rather than from its core, presenting a diffuse set of threats against which to apply these authorities. Although we are drawing down in Afghanistan and uncertain about our level of presence there beyond 2014, many of the partners we trained and equipped to assist with stability operations there are now poised to assist with similar operations in other regions of the world. Recent events in Ukraine underscore the importance of continued engagement with our Eastern European and Baltic partners. Given this shifting dynamic, the Department of Defense is taking a close look at our SFA authorities to assess the extent to which they meet these diverse and evolving requirements. We intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings following this internal review.

Mr. THORNBERRY. A recent report on special operations forces by the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that, "the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict has difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command's policy and resources as directed by law." Do you agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how that office conducts oversight of policy and resources of SOCOM?

Secretary LUMPKIN. My office provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by 10 USC § 138. As such, I provide oversight of special operations policy and resources matters and provide advice to implement Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy security priorities to meet the challenges posed by the global security environment. The relationship with the Commander, USSOCOM is collaborative and cooperative, with a common goal to develop the best possible special operations forces and to employ them effectively. Ultimately, I advise the Secretary of Defense and provide recommendations regarding special operations that are in the best interest of the Department.

During each of the last three QDRs, the Department has reviewed, evaluated, and determined the appropriate resourcing of USSOCOM to improve the U.S. capability to combat terrorism on a global basis. With each of these reviews, SOLIC has also evolved and adapted as an organization to meet statutory and Department oversight requirements. SOLIC's oversight of special operations has further developed in partnership with the other parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, interagency counterparts, and Congress, and through coordination with the USSOCOM staff. I work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Personnel and Readiness and leverage their subject matter expertise to provide oversight. I also work closely with the Director of CAPE, the DOD Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to develop the optimum force structure, resources, and authorities to meet future special operations requirements.

I will continue work closely with all relevant officials to ensure our nation sustains a ready, capable Special Operations force, prepared to meet the fiscal, operational, and global challenges we face today and into the future.

Mr. THORNBERRY. In addition to more than 4,000 positions authorized for SOCOM and its components, the service component commands of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, taken together, have more than 2,000 authorized positions to support SOCOM and its operations. Have you looked for efficiencies between and among SOCOM and its subordinate commands? If not, why not? If so, what did you find?

Admiral MCRAVEN. The numbers stated in the question are inaccurate.

Of the 4093 billets, 2168 billets are in commands and organizations that do not perform Functional Combatant Command (U.S. Special Operations Command), or Service Component Command activities and functions. The following organizations do not meet the definition of a Functional Combatant Command or Service Component Command;

- Joint Special Operations Command, a Sub-Unified Command
- Special Operations Command-North, a Theater Special Operations Command
- Special Operations Command-Joint Concepts, a Theater Special Operations Command disestablished in 2013 and manpower zeroed out in 2014
- Special Operations Joint Task Force is an operational unit with rotational assignment to the U.S. Central Command theater of operations
- Regional Special Operations Coordination Center (RSCC) is not a direct reporting unit to USSOCOM, and none had been established in FY13. The manpower was identified on the JTD as a precursor to possible resourcing in FY14. RSCC is in Proof-of-Concept development, with activities authorized by Congress on a limited basis
- Special Operations Research and Development Center is a Service-like function that no other Combatant Command Headquarter possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes all systems/weapons development and procurement activities that are not associated with HQ Management functions
- Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is an educational activity/entity that no other Combatant Command Headquarter possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes NDU, Naval Postgraduate School, Service Academies, the Defense Industrial University, etc. JSOU falls into this category and is not a function of a Functional Combatant Command, or Service Component Command

The 2110 billets identified for the Service Component Commands are correct.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Have you looked for efficiencies between and among SOCOM and its subordinate commands? If not, why not? If so, what did you find?

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM constantly evaluates its manpower requirements. Since 2007, USSOCOM has undergone numerous reviews, studies, and evaluations

from OSD, JS, and internal reviews to find efficiencies, comply with DOD direction to eliminate contractors, replace military with civilians, cap the number of both civilians and military, and to streamline activities wherever possible. In addition to complying with all OSD and JS guidance, USSOCOM purposely evaluates our resources, both manpower and dollars to ensure we maintain a balanced, effective, efficient, and affordable portfolio of capabilities to meet the National Security and Defense Security Strategies while complying with the Laws, Regulations, Policies, and Procedures set forth by the President, Congress, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services. Total requirements for manpower always far exceed available end-strength, are dynamic, evolving, and prioritized constantly to mitigate risk across the breadth of the Special Operations enterprise. Our budget submissions to Congress outline the most recent and up-to-date alignment of forces to meet our warfighting requirements within the resources allotted by OSD.

Mr. THORNBERRY. The Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative fund submitted with the FY15 budget includes $400 million for SOCOM readiness and infrastructure unfunded requirements. Please outline these requirements for the committee; and discuss why and how these requirements were NOT included in the FY15 base budget request?

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM's $400 million portion of the Department's $26 billion Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative (OGSI) is outlined in the attachment. USSOCOM's request addresses the most pressing readiness and infrastructure requirements that could not be resourced within USSOCOM's FY15 President's Budget (PB). The FY15 PB resourced the highest priority programs required by special operations forces to conduct missions in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders' requirements.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you outline some of the more difficult advanced technology requirements that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on the battlefield?

a. As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the need for non-lethal weapons and directed energy weapons increase?

b. How are you managing to stay ahead in research and development while your budget in this area has steadily declined over the past several fiscal years?

Admiral MCRAVEN. a. USSOCOM expects to remain engaged in global counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future. United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) will continue to operate in close proximity to their Afghan partners, as aggregate US Forces retrograde from Afghanistan. Today, USSOF forces are gradually migrating from rural areas to fixed bases in larger population centers. This will reduce associated operational risk, and allow for sustained advisory and engagement support at the appropriate operational levels necessary to enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to unilaterally maintain operational momentum and evolve as an institution.

Village Stability Operations will be completed December 2014 and on-going USSOF Security Force Assistance efforts, which have always been the focus of USSOF, are now reorienting away from the tactical to the operational level. This has led to emphasis being placed on the development of the Special Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command Headquarters and its brigades, the various Afghan Special Police headquarter elements and a variety of efforts designed to develop intelligence and their sustainment capacities. The limited tactical level advisory support continues and will predominantly occur from permanent bases, where the Afghan Security forces have established training centers. Given the limited nature of USSOF's future tactical operational role in Afghanistan, we do not see demand increasing for advanced technological requirements. However, as USSOF expands globally demands for a multitude of advanced technologies will grow enabling USSOCOM to remain at the tip of the spear and conduct our core missions, as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense SOF needs enhanced lethal capabilities against multiple types of moving targets that will provide greater accuracy and desired target effects while minimizing collateral damage to near-zero probability. SOF has long-standing requirements for a variety of less-than-lethal (LTL), scalable effects weapons (SEW), to include those for which directed energy may provide the optimal solutions. SOF's interests in LTL SEW capabilities include dissuading and disabling personnel, and rendering equipment and/or facilities functionally ineffective. Key technological challenges include smaller, light-weight and affordable power generation and multi-mode seekers for long-range precision weapons; LTL SEW technologies that render personnel or equipment ineffective to ensure mission success with greater force protection and less likelihood of civilian casualties; state-of-the-art light-weight personnel protective armor and multi-spectral sensory enhancement technologies; and broad spectrum, multi-sensory signature reduction. The critical aspect for all of these technologies is their compatibility with SOF

tactics, techniques and procedures using SOF- or GPF-provided soldier, ground, airborne, and/or maritime systems.

b. USSOCOM's S&T Directorate leverages other government agencies and labs, whenever able, to maximize the efficiency and effect of our limited RDT&E budget. USSOCOM's overarching FY15–19 S&T Integrated Priority List (STIPL) which includes Comprehensive Signature Management, Anti-Access/Area Denial, SOF Small Unit Dominance, Human Performance, and Battlespace Awareness, requires external support to address these high priority S&T needs.

USSOCOM's S&T Directorate is coordinating Technology Discovery Sessions chaired by the SOCOM Deputy Commander and Acquisition Executive. In these sessions, SOCOM invites forward thinking senior industry and academic leaders to discuss such topics as technology investment strategies, how to avoid technological surprise, partnering opportunities, and how USSOCOM can best prepare for the future. SOCOM senior leadership establishes specific focused topics and invitees for two to three planned follow-on events per year.

The following provide a few recent and relevant examples of collaboration with Service labs and centers. SOCOM S&T, in collaboration with the Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC), a University-Affiliated Research Center of the US Department of Defense, sponsored a joint SERC Capstone project with the University of Alabama and Stevens Institute of Technology resulting in the development of a SOF non-lethal capability to stop boats up to 50 meters in length. In collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory, we are developing wind sensing technologies which will dramatically increase AC–130 Gunship first-round accuracy. Similarly, our relationship with the U.S. Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC) has enabled efficient development of critical lifesaving technologies for special operations forces. Uncontrolled external hemorrhage remains the leading cause of death on the battlefield. Despite recent advances in hemorrhage control technologies, controlling the bleeding in large wounds ("sharkbite") remains difficult and a SOCOM Commander top priority. A "Sharkbite" project developed a novel wound stasis dressing to treat SOF non-compressible hemorrhagic injuries. The "SharkBite Trauma Kit" includes three revolutionary tools that are now pending FDA approval before transition to USSOCOM's PEO–SOF Warrior's Tactical Combat Casualty Care Program of Record and SOF medics. The collaboration may lead to a capability for the conventional force as well.

Mr. THORNBERRY. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you outline for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in previously closed positions?

Admiral MCRAVEN. There are many women currently serving in SOF positions. Based on the January 2013 direction from Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM is reviewing all SOF positions closed to women with the intent of opening them all by January 2016. USSOCOM may only keep closed those positions that are specifically approved by both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The decision to open or keep specific positions closed to women will be guided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's guidance to ensure "the success of our Nation's warfighting forces . . . ," that "all Service men and women are set up for success with viable career paths . . . ," and "to retain the trust of the American people."

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you update the committee on SOCOM's intelligence functions, requirements, and initiatives?

a. What specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements do you have? b. What manned and unmanned ISR systems are you investing in, and why? c. How do you coordinate with the Services in these areas? d. What role does your J2 (Intelligence) Director play in identifying and filling those unique requirements? e. How is SOCOM working to resource Theater Special Operations Command intelligence requirements? f. What role is SOCOM playing in the Defense Intelligence Agency's new Defense Clandestine Service?

Admiral MCRAVEN. (a) USSOCOM is working closely with SOF Theater and Component commands to refine air, ground, and maritime ISR requirements to support the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCC). Future draw downs in Afghanistan do not change SOCOM's enduring global AISR requirement, but rather reflect a need to shift ISR capabilities to other areas of responsibility in support of GCC operations outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Reference Memorandum for Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to Special Operations Forces dated 9 January 2012; or Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) for Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of Special Operations Forces dated 8 June 2012.

(b) USSOCOM currently operates the U–28 as its primary manned ISR platform along with JAVAMAN aircraft in a GOCO capacity. USSOCOM plans to transition to the MC–12 that is being divested by the USAF. This transition will incur an initial investment to upgrade capabilities to meet the U–28 Mission. However, the MC–12 provides dual-engine capability, longer flight duration, and additional capacity for ISR equipment.

USSOCOM's FY15–16 budget includes unmanned MQ–9 baseline investment funding to enable continued rapid development and integration of permissive ISR capabilities critical to global SOF operations on up to 50 MQ–9s and associated ground equipment to meet current and future permissive ISR requirements. This enables USSOCOM to transition from MQ–1/9 unmanned aircraft to a full MQ–9ER fleet by leveraging the replacement of USAF provided MQ–1B with USAF provided Extended Range MQ–9 Reapers.

(c) USSOCOM is partnering with the Services to mitigate shortfalls like initiatives to promote best practices in full-motion-video (FMV) exploitation and develop relationships where SOF and Services can share the burden of exploitation. USSOCOM is working with the Services to ensure budget reductions of Service-provided assets, like permissive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, are protected to so that SOF can contend with future global threats and challenges.

(d) USSOCOM J2 Intelligence Director conducts weekly ISR Councils to discuss/evaluate SOF ISR requirements and issues. USSOCOM J2 participates in both deliberate and urgent requirements, planning processes through Service Warfighter Talks, and formal requirement document coordination through either their Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) or the similar SOF Capability Integration Development System (SOFCIDS). USSOCOM coordinates closely with USD(I), ISR Task Force, Services, Components, and TSOCs to refine requirements, synchronize efforts, and advocate for ISR capability.

(e) USSOCOM is working to capture Theater Special Operations Command intelligence requirements through weekly ISR Councils and TSOC Deep Dives as well as addressing requirements identified by TSOC Commanders during monthly Commander Decision Roundtables (CDRT). Requirements are validated through the JCIDS or SOFCIDS process and then resourced through the USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process.

(f) USSOCOM fully supports the Defense Intelligence Agency's new Defense Clandestine Service. Over the past year DCS has established a presence in USSOCOM Headquarters to ensure we align our efforts and requirements. Due to classification, discussions on USSOCOM specific roles and interaction with the Defense Clandestine Service will need to be addressed in a closed session.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON

Mr. CARSON. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM forces will change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM continue meeting its deployment requirements?

Secretary LUMPKIN. I anticipate as SOF requirements go down in Afghanistan, we will redistribute forces to other regions in a manner that is aligned to current, emerging threats and to achieve a more balanced SOF posture across the Geographic Combatant Commands. The Department considered this redistribution of SOF during the FY 2015 program review, and we believe we have properly resourced USSOCOM for training, readiness, and sustainment requirements in the years ahead.

Mr. CARSON. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or countries do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM deployments? And can you give us an idea of the types of missions you expect they will see, either alone or with partner nations?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Our goal is to realign and redistribute SOF across the Geographic Combatant Commands in a manner that is aligned to current and emerging threats. Consistent with the approach of working bilaterally when possible, SOF will retain the capability to advise and assist partners to take action to counter enemy threats and disrupt their planning, training, and recruitment. We will be postured to conduct direct action to protect U.S. persons from attack when necessary. At the same time, we will expand and enrich our engagement with security partners to build capacity, improve capabilities, and foster greater cooperation. This includes expanding bilateral exercises, joint exchanges, and other training events with international SOF partners.

Mr. CARSON. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM forces will change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM continue meeting its deployment requirements?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Recently, we have been deploying between 8,000 to 10,000 Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel throughout the globe, on a daily basis. I anticipate our pace of deployment to drop below our current deployed numbers in the near term if we draw down in Afghanistan, and will increase to comparable numbers of 8–10K deployed SOF as we mature our SOF Campaign Plan. This plan will focus our efforts on building partner nation capacity through persistent regional SOF presence, while posturing a SOF capability that can conduct direct actions against emerging terrorist threats—both requiring a trained and ready deployed force. Through prioritization of resources, we can continue to meet our deployment requirements with our current and proposed future budgets.

Mr. CARSON. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or countries do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM deployments? And can you give us an idea of the types of missions you expect they will see, either alone or with partner nations?

Admiral MCRAVEN. First, I believe that SOF will continue to be deployed to Afghanistan in some operational capacity. As we have drawn down from Iraq in December 2011 and now, Afghanistan, SOF personnel capacity has become available to deploy to other geographic regions. Since that time, the African continent has experienced the largest increase in deployed SOF personnel, and I believe will continue to be one of the primary recipients of SOF deployments in the future. As our SOF Campaign Plan focuses on building partner nation capacity, we will continue to execute those missions of Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, Information Operations, Stability Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance, while also executing direct actions against emerging terrorist threats. These direct actions will range from advise and assist, precision reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare, with a focus on Counter-terrorism. We will strive to partner with foreign nations at every opportunity to conduct direct and indirect operations, but we will always be prepared to execute alone. At the present time, the preponderance of our SOF operations on the African continent is being conducted with the support of other partner nations. Finally, I believe that the demand for SOF by the Geographic Combatant Commanders will outweigh our SOF capacity for future SOF Campaign Plan requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON

Mr. GIBSON. What are some recommendations for improving intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government?

Secretary LUMPKIN. DOD works with its partners in the Intelligence Community to ensure relevant intelligence information is shared appropriately. Recent initiatives include DOD funded inter-agency collaboration in the areas of counterterrorism, countering transnational organized crime (CTOC), and maritime domain awareness. DOD also provides domestic agencies with valuable instruction in the detection of improvised explosive devices, conducting terrorism analysis, and mapping cultural terrain. Lastly, DOD fosters interagency integration via the embedding of DOD personnel in other agencies, including the National Counterterrorism Center, FBI Field Intelligence Groups, and FBI joint terrorism task forces.

Mr. GIBSON. What are some recommendations for improving intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Intelligence collaboration has increased significantly as a result of 10+ years of war. The single thread that forced this collaboration, across the whole-of-government, is our national security interest. Looking toward the future, we must continue to wrap our challenges with policies, authorities, process, and information sharing architectures with this common unifying force of national security.

We must continue to create conditions for success. For instance, we must resource efforts like the Department of Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E) and the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE), and force convergence between these communities of interest. DI2E and IC ITE convergence has the potential to significantly increase the speed of knowledge to decision/action by our most senior leaders of government. It will increase information transparency and knowledge sharing at all levels. Increased resources for DI2E and IC ITE will only achieve a technical solution and many could argue that technology is not a limiting factor. To a certain extent, they would be correct. Any advances to

force convergence, from a technology perspective, must be accompanied by reformation of policy that inhibits collaboration.

The policies that protect our nation's critical information and intelligence are the same policies that inhibit collaboration. The Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Diplomatic communities operate within complicated yet essential frameworks to conduct the business of national security. We must continue to explore policy reforms that simultaneously safeguard our knowledge and increase transparency, while being mindful of intelligence oversight and information assurance. Likewise, any changes in policy must account for one of our greatest force multipliers, our coalition partners.

The decade of war has been complimented by the efforts of our coalition partners. At the lowest tactical echelons, we achieve remarkable success on the battlefield. We must continue to seek reform in policies that enable government to government information sharing by empowering senior leaders and Commanders with greater latitude to make the call, ease restrictions, and increase collaboration.

