[House Hearing, 113 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING ISSUES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REAUTHORIZATION ======================================================================= (113-63) HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 2, 2014 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 87-432 PDF WASHINGTON : 2014 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Columbia Vice Chair JERROLD NADLER, New York JOHN L. MICA, Florida CORRINE BROWN, Florida FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas GARY G. MILLER, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York DUNCAN HUNTER, California MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee BOB GIBBS, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland RICHARD L. HANNA, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida JANICE HAHN, California JEFF DENHAM, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada STEVE DAINES, Montana SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York TOM RICE, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma LOIS FRANKEL, Florida ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois MARK SANFORD, South Carolina DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida ------ Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials JEFF DENHAM, California, Chairman JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CORRINE BROWN, Florida JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey BOB GIBBS, Ohio JANICE HAHN, California PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona RICHARD L. HANNA, New York, Vice ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut Chair PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas (Ex Officio) SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) VACANCY CONTENTS Page Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v TESTIMONY Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration................................ 8 William F. Downey, executive vice president for corporate affairs and chief security officer, The Kenan Advantage Group, Inc., on behalf of the American Trucking Associations................... 8 Thomas E. Schick, senior director of distribution, Regulatory and Technical Affairs, American Chemistry Council.................. 8 Stephen Pelkey, chairman, Transportation Committee, American Pyrotechnics Association....................................... 8 Elizabeth M. Harman, assistant to the general president for hazardous materials, weapons of mass destruction training, and grants administration, International Association of Fire Fighters....................................................... 8 PREPARED STATEMENTS AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman: Prepared statement........................................... 39 Answers to questions for the record from the following Representatives: Hon. Jeff Denham, of California.......................... 47 Hon. Janice Hahn, of California.......................... 50 William F. Downey, prepared statement............................ 53 Thomas E. Schick: Prepared statement........................................... 58 Answers to questions for the record from Hon. Janice Hahn, of California................................................. 62 Stephen Pelkey: Prepared statement........................................... 64 Answers to questions for the record from the following Representatives: Hon. Jeff Denham, of California.......................... 71 Hon. Janice Hahn, of California.......................... 76 Elizabeth M. Harman, prepared statement.......................... 77 SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD Hon. Corrine Brown, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, request to submit a list of issues surrounding the movement of hazardous materials compiled by the following rail organizations: ATDA, BLET, BMWED, BRS, IAM, IBEW, TCU and TCU Carmen, IBT Teamsters, TWU, and SMART--Transportation Division. 4 Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, responses to requests for information from the following Representatives: Hon. Grace F. Napolitano, of California, regarding the safety and security of toxic gas shipments........................ 23 Hon. Corrine Brown, of Florida, regarding testing information that PHMSA has requested of the American Petroleum Institute.................................................. 33 Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, of Maryland, regarding PHMSA's assessment of penalties over the past decade............... 38 ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD Air Line Pilots Association, International, written testimony.... 84 John P. Tolman, vice president and national legislative representative, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, written testimony.................................... 93 Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, written testimony............ 97 Cynthia Hilton, executive vice president, Institute of Makers of Explosives, written testimony.................................. 100 LaMont Byrd, director, Safety and Health Department, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, written testimony...... 107 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXAMINING ISSUES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REAUTHORIZATION ---------- WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Denham (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Denham. The subcommittee will come to order. Before we begin, I have an administrative item to cover. I would like to ask unanimous consent that former chairman, Don Young, and Representative Rick Larsen be permitted to join the subcommittee for today's hearing, and ask questions. [No response.] Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. Well, good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials. Our hearing today will focus on reauthorizing of the Hazardous Materials Safety Program of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, PHMSA. The current authorization was part of MAP-21, which expires October 1, 2014. Our goal is to continue the advances made by MAP-21 in reducing regulatory burdens while ensuring hazardous materials are transported in a safe and efficient manner. We have a distinguished panel of witnesses today, and it is my pleasure to welcome back once again Ms. Cynthia Quarterman, Administrator of PHMSA, as well as--as you know, the Transportation Committee is working on a reauthorization of MAP-21, and I am proud that Chairman Shuster's leadership on the committee is looking at addressing a wide variety of transportation needs, including the reauthorization of the Hazardous Materials Safety Program. So, I look forward to the testimony and discussion today, as we move forward in that process. The movement of hazardous materials in commerce is integral to our Nation's health and economy. Hazmats include common, everyday products like paints, fuels, fertilizers, fireworks, explosive, alcohols, and batteries, that are essential to such industries as farming, medicine, manufacturing, mining, water purification, and entertainment industries. PHMSA is the agency within DOT entrusted with that mission, and determines what materials are hazardous, and promulgates and enforces, among others, the regulations that set forth the packaging, marking, labeling, placarding, and other requirements for the movement of these goods. Unlike other modal administrations within the DOT, PHMSA is unique in that its regulations apply across the modes, reaching to every form of commercial goods transportation. Our role is to ensure that these goods are moved in a safe, reliable manner that helps drive our continued economic growth. MAP-21 made several reforms and established new requirements for the transportation of hazmats. And I am looking forward to hearing about their ongoing implementation. A number of these requirements were important to developing new technologies and standards for hazmat transportation, improving the data collection analysis, and reporting of the agencies, and improving training for first responders and hazmat employees. MAP-21 also set new requirements and reviews of programs and processes to create more regulatory certainty, establish greater transparency, and cut red tape. In addition, the act enhanced enforcement power to ensure an already safe industry was made safer. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, including PHMSA Administrator Quarterman; Mr. Downey, on behalf of the American Trucking Associations; Mr. Schick, of the American Chemistry Council; Mr. Pelkey, of the American Pyrotechnics Association; and Ms. Harman, with the International Association of Fire Fighters, regarding these issues concerning hazmat transportation. I would now like to recognize the ranking member, Corrine Brown from Florida, for 5 minutes for any opening statement she may have. Ms. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on reauthorization of the Department of Transportation hazmat program, which was last reauthorized in MAP-21. This hearing is very timely, because the purpose of this program is to protect people and the environment from the risks of hazardous material transportation. In just a few weeks, on April the 28th, we will observe Workers Memorial Day to remember those who have suffered and died on the job, and to renew efforts to safeguard our Nation's workers. Just 44 years ago, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act, promising every worker the right to a safe job. Since that time, many in Congress have fought hard to make this promise a reality. But our work is far from done. Many jobs--hazards still exist, particularly in hazardous material transportation. Since I was first elected to Congress, one issue comes up every time we authorize the hazmat program: the authorizing of OSHA and DOT to protect hazmat workers. Let me be clear. The role these two agencies play in protecting hazmat workers is crucial. Yet some in the industry have proposed to eliminate OSHA jurisdiction, claiming that there are overlaps and confusing regulation. This is not the case. DOT has regulations on packaging and on safety procedures for loading and unloading materials. On the other hand, OSHA has regulations that provide for worker safety, including noise and air quality control, emergency preparation, personal protection equipment, and hazard communications. These regulations are not new. DOT and OSHA have shared this responsibility for decades, and these regulations are critical to maintaining the highest level of safety for hazmat workers. The fact is that 12 workers die every day in our country from work-related injuries. In 2013 alone, more than 4,300 workers were killed at work. I am committed to maintaining a safe and healthy workplace for all American workers, including those in this critical industry. And I will work to defeat any proposal that would eliminate OSHA protection for hazmat workers. In my home State of Florida, we recently had several dangerous explosions involving hazmat material. In July of last year, eight workers were in critical condition following an explosion at a Blue Rhino plant that was--forced an evacuation of area residents and shook houses 10 miles away. In July of 2007, a devastating explosion at the T2 chemical plant located close to my home in Jacksonville, Florida, killed 4 people and injured 32. Not only must we ensure the safety of hazmat workers, but we also need to focus on the safety of those responding to hazmat accidents, like our Nation's firefighters. I want to give a special welcome to the Democratic witness from the International Association of Fire Fighters, Elizabeth Harman. With her help last Congress, we were able to enact strong training standards in MAP-21 for firefighters and other emergency responders, and ensure continuing funding for important firefighters training program. According to DOT, more than 2 million emergency responders received training through their program. With that, I welcome the witnesses and look forward to hearing your testimony. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to include in today's hearing record a written statement from the Transportation Trades Department of AFL-CIO and 10 labor unions. Mr. Denham. Without objection. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Denham. I would like to again welcome our witnesses here today. I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses' full statements be included in the record. [No response.] Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. Since your written testimony has been made part of the record, the subcommittee would request that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. Ms. Quarterman, you may proceed. Thank you for joining us. TESTIMONY OF HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN, ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM F. DOWNEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR CORPORATE AFFAIRS AND CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, THE KENAN ADVANTAGE GROUP, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS; THOMAS E. SCHICK, SENIOR DIRECTOR OF DISTRIBUTION, REGULATORY AND TECHNICAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL; STEPHEN PELKEY, CHAIRMAN, TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, AMERICAN PYROTECHNICS ASSOCIATION; AND ELIZABETH M. HARMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE GENERAL PRESIDENT FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TRAINING, AND GRANTS ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS Ms. Quarterman. Thank you for having me. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify on PHMSA's progress in implementing Title III of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, also known as MAP- 21. Safety is the top priority for Secretary Foxx, the Department of Transportation, PHMSA, and all of its employees. All of us at DOT appreciate your dedication and leadership in advancing hazardous materials transportation safety. For a relatively small agency with limited resources, the staff at PHMSA works diligently to protect the American people and the environment from hazardous materials transportation incidents, and have made great strides in implementing the provisions included in MAP-21. Since MAP-21's enactment in 2012, PHMSA has met or will meet more than 90 percent of the established timelines for the 32 separate provisions assigned to the agency. This is very significant, especially given the many challenges and emerging issues that PHMSA has faced over the same time period, including efforts to enhance the safe transportation of crude by rail, and continuing to consistently reduce the number of major hazardous materials incidents, as we have done over the past 25 years. A significant contributor to PHMSA's success has been the strategy and action plan we developed and implemented to bolster compliance with hazardous materials regulations. As the transportation sector continues to evolve and become more interconnected with the international community, PHMSA has attempted to adopt smarter strategies to adapt to the challenges. As part of our enforcement strategy, and through the authority of MAP-21, PHMSA raised its maximum civil penalty amount for violations resulting in death, illnesses, and injuries. In addition, PHMSA is moving forward with advancing efforts in hazardous materials research and development. Our hazardous materials technical assessment research and development and analysis program is allowing us to work cooperatively with stakeholders to identify and mitigate hazardous materials risks, and to promote innovative approaches to support a safe, multimodal hazardous materials transportation system. We are also working to develop uniform performance standards for training our hazardous materials inspectors and investigators to ensure field staff continue to accurately identify instances of noncompliance and take appropriate enforcement actions. In addition to the nonregulatory efforts to improve safety I just described, PHMSA is continuing to fulfill our commitment to streamline hazardous materials regulations and processes. Since 2011, PHMSA has been reviewing and analyzing special permits to determine which ones can be converted into the hazardous materials regulations. We are currently working on a rulemaking effort that will address the conversion of active special permits into regulations that we expect to be published by October of this year. These are just a few of the many actions PHMSA has undertaken to address and implement the mandates included in MAP-21. As I have stated earlier, PHMSA is committed to improving transportation safety, and I believe our approach is working. Our safety mission is guided by our vision that no harm results from hazardous materials transportation, and I truly believe our efforts will continue to prevent and mitigate accidents and move us closer to our goal of zero deaths and incidents. Thank you again for the opportunity to speak today. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to safeguard people, property, and the environment from hazardous materials transportation risks. I would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman. Mr. Downey? Mr. Downey. Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about reauthorizing the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. My name is William Downey, and I am the executive vice president and chief security officer for The Kenan Advantage Group, which is located in North Canton, Ohio. We are North America's largest tank truck transporter and logistics provider to the petroleum, specialty products, and merchant gas industries. We employ approximately 9,000 people, and we are the only fuels delivery carrier with a nationwide presence. I am testifying today on behalf of the American Trucking Associations and the National Tank Truck Carriers. ATA and NTTC are members of the Interested Parties group, and endorse their comprehensive recommendations for hazmat reauthorization. Of the roughly 800,000 shipments of hazmat on a daily basis, in terms of product value, tonnage, and number of shipments, trucks move more hazmat than all other transportation modes, combined. Today I propose three commonsense solutions to improve the safe, secure, and efficient transport of hazmat. First, the present background screening process for hazmat endorsement on a commercial driver's license can be reformed. Second, the proposed wet lines rule can be halted. And, finally, the State hazmat permitting process can be improved. On background screening, presently a TSA-administered fingerprint-based background check is required for all hazmat CDL endorsements. This costs $86.50 in States that use TSA's contractor, but as much as $150 in States that perform the checks themselves. This security check is required for transporting all hazmat, including paint, nail polish, or alcohol-based products like perfume. None of those products pose a weaponized threat. Congress should limit fingerprint background checks to drivers transporting weaponized hazmat, also called ``security sensitive hazmat.'' All hazmat drivers would still be required to pass the relevant safety tests, as well as the name-based background checks. Drivers transporting security-sensitive hazmat would also be required to undergo a fingerprint-based background check before acquiring another card demonstrating the driver poses no terrorist threat. This proposal passed the House in 2009 with bipartisan support as part of the SAFE Truckers Act. To my second recommendation, wet lines are fuel-loading pipes used to fill and drain cargo tanks. MAP-21 banned PHMSA from issuing any final wet line regulation until GAO studied the rule. PHMSA's proposed regulation had very few benefits and high cost. Because of this, and the fact that better alternatives are available, GAO recommended withdrawing the rule. But, PHMSA has not done so. Instead, PHMSA has indicated their intent to promulgate a rule, anyway. Given GAO's finding, and PHMSA's refusal to withdraw the rule, a legislative ban is both appropriate and necessary. Finally, hazmat regulations forbid States from enacting any regulation or permit requirements that are not substantively the same as Federal regulations. However, States may require motor carriers to apply for permits to transport hazmat in their States. State permits are, unsurprisingly, substantively the same as Federal requirements. Carriers compliant with Federal requirements will, by definition, also be compliant with State requirements. Five States--Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and West Virginia--are currently members of the Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures. The alliance States have amalgamated their application process online. A carrier can visit the site once, provide all the necessary information through a single interface, select the States in which the carrier transports hazmat, and pay a single composite fee. States that wish to require hazmat permits should be compelled to join the alliance. States already participate in similar programs for administering fuel taxes and processing motor carrier registrations. ATA and its members, along with The Kenan Advantage Group, support safe and secure transportation of hazmat. Hazmat regulations can be improved by reforming hazmat endorsement background check, forbidding PHMSA from issuing a final warning on the wet line rule, and compelling all States to join the alliance for issuing hazmat permits. All three, I believe, are very commonsense approaches. On behalf of The Kenan Advantage Group and ATA, I would like to thank you for this opportunity, and I would welcome any questions from the Members. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Downey. Mr. Schick, you may proceed. Mr. Schick. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, members of the subcommittee. My name is Tom Schick, I am here on behalf of the American Chemistry Council. We appreciate this opportunity to testify on reauthorization of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. ACC represents the leading companies engaged in the business of chemistry. Our members apply the science of chemistry to make innovative products and services that make people's lives better, healthier, and safer. I would like to underscore the important role that the products manufactured and shipped by our members serve in virtually every aspect of our lives. The Nation depends on our industry to produce the chemicals that are necessary for safe drinking water, life- saving medications, medical devices, safe and plentiful food supply, energy-saving solar panels, and much more. Our members rely on all transportation modes to deliver products wherever they are needed to get the job done, from water treatment, to farms, to factories. Because a number of the shipments involve hazardous materials, we work constantly with our transportation partners to find ways to build upon an already impressive safety record. Through ACC's Responsible Care initiative, our member and partner companies are committed to continuous safety improvement in every aspect of transportation. Collectively, we have invested billions of dollars in training, technology, and equipment, and will continue to do so. We have also worked to establish a strong and successful partnership with emergency responders. For example, our members, working with other stakeholders, developed transportation community awareness and emergency response, known as the TRANSCAER program. This is a voluntary training effort to help communities prepare for possible hazmat incidents. Emergency responders also have access to a wide range of experts through ACC's CHEMTREC Center. When an incident does take place, the center provides the information on the best way to handle all types of hazmat. CHEMTREC provides this service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at no cost to emergency responders, other callers, Government, or taxpayers. We invite the members of the subcommittee and the staff to tour our CHEMTREC Center in northern Virginia, or attend a TRANSCAER event. Turning to HMTA reauthorization, we believe the Federal Government must continue to play the central role in ensuring safe transportation of hazmat. Congress has wisely established a comprehensive national regulatory system that is administered by DOT. HMTA has worked well in making the transportation of chemicals and other hazardous materials safe for the public, for workers, and emergency responders. As you consider legislation to reauthorize HMTA, we strongly support the uniform national regulatory program that assures that all aspects of hazmat transportation are consistent across this country. We also support DOT's excellent work in harmonizing, to the maximum extent possible, U.S. hazmat regulations with international standards. This harmonization not only facilitates commerce in these important products, but also promotes safety through consistent hazard communication requirements, and consistent procedures and equipment. We are concerned, however, about two aspects. One is the loading and unloading of hazardous materials. Several years ago, DOT withdrew from the regulation of loading and unloading in certain circumstances. Yet DOT, as well as others, are critically aware of the importance of loading and unloading in safety. We think that loading and unloading are fundamental to safe transportation, and that Federal regulation is the way to provide that uniformity to enhance the training of hazmat employees and the preparedness of emergency responders. So we would like to see DOT re-establish its full regulatory position on loading and unloading. Turning to special permits, these allow safety-based variations from the existing rules. Applicants for special permits come forward voluntarily with proposals, and these can only be approved if DOT finds there is at least an equivalent level of safety to what the regulations require. Special permits are a win-win process. The applicants gain operational flexibility at no loss of safety. Other parties can learn from and even use the same special permits, if they are approved by DOT to do so. And the Department learns about new procedures and technologies that can later be incorporated into the regulations. In fact, MAP-21, as mentioned earlier, has DOT doing that. There has been some talk about user fees for special permits. We oppose that at ACC. Special permits are an inherent and beneficial part of the regulatory process that governs hazmat transportation. We think it is appropriate to maintain that function without imposing user fees that could interfere with the development and implementation of new safety enhancements. In conclusion, the country depends on HMTA and the safe and reliable system to move hazmat. Where improvements are deemed appropriate, we can all work together to continuously improve it. We look forward to cooperating with you in this, and I would be glad to answer any questions. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Schick. Mr. Pelkey, you may proceed. Mr. Pelkey. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, other members of the subcommittee. I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to discuss issues regarding hazardous materials reauthorization, an issue of vital importance to the U.S. fireworks industry. I am Stephen Pelkey, president and CEO of Atlas Advanced Pyrotechnics, headquartered in Jaffrey, New Hampshire. I also currently serve on the board of directors of the American Pyrotechnics Association, and as the chairman of the APA's Transportation Committee. Atlas was founded in 1950 and is a prominent professional fireworks display company, producing award-winning displays throughout New England the world. Atlas employs 24 full-time workers. During our busy Fourth of July season, our employment rolls swell to 750 employees. I am here today on behalf of the APA. APA participates in the Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials Transportation coalition, commonly referred to as the IPs. I have been tasked to address the IPs and APA's number-one priority, which concerns the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Hazardous Material Safety Permit Program, and the ongoing delays in reforming this vital program. The HMSP program has been seriously flawed since inception, and I have detailed those flaws in my written submission. At the present time, to retain an HMSP, a carrier must maintain out-of-service inspection rates for vehicle, driver, and hazmat violations below a set percentile. HMSP holders are judged against all other carriers under the vehicle and driver rates. However, they are judged against themselves when determining the hazmat out-of-service rate, which is based on violations that, for the most part, are not crash-causal. And this is the most troubling and difficult area in which to maintain compliance. Unlike large, long-haul freight of all-kind transporters that operate year-round and are inspected frequently, display fireworks transporters operate primarily on a seasonal and periodic peak-time basis, typically driving much shorter distances and many fewer miles. Thus, we have far fewer inspection opportunities to offset any potential violation. In order to stay above the designated hazmat threshold, a carrier must have 14 clean inspections to overcome the effects of just 1 bad inspection. Atlas has firsthand experience with this extremely flawed program, as we unfortunately lost our permit in 2011 as a result of receiving several erroneous out- of-service citations that put our company above the hazmat disqualification threshold. Without a permit, in order for us to stay in business, we were forced to ship products in separate trucks, each legally transporting the less than 55 pounds of fireworks, the threshold which triggers the application of the HMSP. For the better part of a year, we put 8 to 10 trucks, separate trucks, on the road, legally moving less than the 55 pounds in each vehicle to each of our contracted display sites, as we aged out of the 12-month period to renew our permit. Needless to say, this placed an undue burden on our company, and one has to question whether public safety was enhanced by having multiple vehicles on the road, rather than transporting these products in just one vehicle. We appealed the erroneous paperwork-related citations to Federal Motor Carriers' DataQs. However, the State authority issuing the citation incorrectly entered the citation as ``no shipping papers offered.'' As Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration chose to side with the State authority, rather than provide us with an opportunity and appropriately appeal the citation directly to Federal Motor Carrier. While we understand limited agency resources necessitate the delegation of enforcement to the States, we believe it is not appropriate that the agency has delegated its ultimate authority to determine whether a hazmat safety permit should be renewed or denied. The APA, along with several other IPs has been advocating for the need of an administrative process that would also allow Federal Motor Carrier to intervene outside of the DataQs. We will call this an additional level of safety review to determine a carrier's fitness prior to the denial of a permit. In 2011, Federal Motor Carrier agreed that the HMSP program was flawed, and accepted our petition for rulemaking. However, we are disappointed that the agency has not made reform of this program a priority. While the agency's recently released assessment report to Congress recognized the need to provide a means for corrective actions and/or second level of review for carriers, the agency does not establish a timeframe to address this ongoing problem. I am pleased to see a number of recommendations outlined in the assessment. Several of the recommendations, however, will require rulemaking, which is a lengthy process. In short, hazardous material safety permit holders will have no prospect of immediate relief. Providing HMSP holders an opportunity for an additional level of safety review before their permit is denied must be a priority. We are grateful to members of this subcommittee who have joined in efforts to reform this program. Atlas is committed to ensuring safety in the handling, transportation, and execution of our fireworks displays. Atlas and members of the APA will continue to provide safe and spectacular fireworks displays and delight and thrill American families across our great Nation. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Pelkey. Mr. Pelkey. And I thank you for this opportunity to testify. Mr. Denham. Thank you for your testimony. Ms. Harman? Ms. Harman. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Elizabeth Harman, I serve as the assistant to the general president for hazmat, WMD training, and grants administration for the International Association of Fire Fighters. I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of IFF General President Harold Schaitberger and the 300,000 firefighters and emergency medical personnel who comprise our organization. Fire departments in the United States receive over 350,000 calls related to hazmat response each year. When an incident involving hazmat does occur, the individuals tasked with responding to the incident are most--almost, without fail, firefighters. Unfortunately, despite the potential for such an incident in every community in America, too many firefighters are insufficiently trained to ensure a safe and effective response. The reasons for the lack of properly trained firefighters vary, although, for the most part, it is simply a lack of funding. Nationwide, fire departments' funds are stretched thin, a situation which has been exasperated by the recent recession. In tight budgetary environments, training is often among the first items to be cut. Unfortunately, the lack of adequately trained personnel in the fire service means there are significant portions of the country where first responders are not prepared for an incident. This is an untenable situation which must be rectified. We must ensure that firefighters receive the type of training that is most appropriate for emergency response. Unfortunately, of the training that is being provided to firefighters, much is provided at an insufficient level. OSHA regulations identify special competencies for employees who are engaged in emergency response. Awareness level training is intended for individuals who are likely to witness or discover hazardous substance release, and notify the proper authorities, which, in most cases, would be a fire department. Operations level training is intended for workers who respond to releases or potential releases of hazardous substances. Their function is to contain the release from a safe distance, keep it from spreading, and prevent exposures. These regulations clearly indicate operations level training is the minimum level intended for firefighters. This is also supported by national consensus standards, such as NFPA 472. Providing awareness level training to firefighters is not sufficient. There is little point in training firefighters to learn how and when to call the fire department. Unfortunately, the number of firefighters receiving awareness level training, rather than operations level training, is growing. Congress has begun to address the inadequacies of hazardous materials training among firefighters. In MAP-21 Congress required that all training delivered to firefighters via PHMSA's hazardous material emergency preparedness grant program must be at the operations level or greater. While a positive step in the right direction, training provided via HMEP represents only a tiny fraction of the training received by firefighters nationwide. Congress should explore ways to encourage States and localities to provide all firefighters with operations level training, regardless of the funding source. We must also ensure that training is provided in a manner that must be customized and incorporate real-world events. Under the HMEP grant program, the IFF has received an annual grant to train instructors to deliver hazardous materials training to emergency responders nationwide in communities of all sizes. We have also recently, due to amendments in MAP-21, begun direct delivery of training, in addition to administering our train- the-trainer program. We believe our training provides the best model for training firefighters to respond safely and effectively to real-world hazmat incidents. We provide training to both professional and volunteer fire departments at no cost to them. The grant has enabled the IFF to sufficiently increase training rates in the first responder community. The IFF's unique training model provides responders with real-world training in hazmat response that few institutions can match. Instructors train through the IFF's program deliver training directly to responders in their own communities, allowing them to tailor their presentations to address unique concerns or challenges facing a particular community, such as a specific hazmat shipping route. The IFF model also utilizes highly experienced firefighter instructors to each its courses in a peer-to-peer setting. Independent evaluations of this training have found the programs to be cost effective, and evaluations have found the instruction to be highly effective. Simply put, the IFF provides exemplary hazmat training at a time when first responders need highly effective, appropriate training more than ever. We encourage the subcommittee to continue funding this valuable program, and use it as a model when considering expanding training opportunities for firefighters. PHMSA also has an important role to play in making it easier for responders to identify hazardous materials. The paperless hazardous communications pilot program established by MAP-21 represents a significant step forward in the development and advancement of identification tools. Providing first responders with access to updating e-shipping papers will help responders identify hazardous substances during a hazmat incident without putting personnel at risk. As PHMSA continues to develop HM-ACCESS, the program's success will depend upon meeting certain key criteria. First, responders must have access to e-shipping information. HM- ACCESS must conduct pilot tests in all forms of transportation. And PHMSA should consult with first responders, including rank- and-file users, at every step of the system's development. This concludes my testimony, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Harman. I will now recognize each Member for 5 minutes' worth of questioning. Mr. Young, you are recognized. Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the courtesy. Administrator Quarterman, in the wake of the recent train derailments involving crude oil, the Department of Transportation issued a safety alert announcing that Bakken crude oil could be more volatile than conventional crude oil, and may need to be handled differently. Instead of focusing on the cause of the derailment, your agency seems to be preoccupied with the characteristics of crude oil. When crude oil is transported by railcar, it is labeled as group one, two, and three. And which of these packing group, Mr.-- Madam Administrator, is the most dangerous? Ms. Quarterman. Thank you for your question. The Administration is not just focused on identifying the characteristics of the crude oil. In fact, we have a three-part approach, which includes, as the very first step, prevention of incidents. The second is mitigation of incidents, should they occur. And the third is making response available to incidents. In terms of the packing group that is the most dangerous, packing group one, sir. Mr. Young. And Bakken oil is number two, if I am not mistaken. Bakken oil is two. Ms. Quarterman. Bakken oil may be one or two. We have seen from our testing---- Mr. Young. It is two. It is two. One is the most volatile. Bakken oil is two. At the last safety hearing you said that cars are not a silver bullet, and we should be focused on preventing derailments. Yet yesterday, you publicly complained that the oil industry has not shared Bakken crude characteristics with your agency. What is the number one cause for rail--tankers to be derailed? Ms. Quarterman. I think we have been clear from the beginning, sir, that it is a multi--it is a very complicated problem which requires a comprehensive approach. Included among that approach are determining the characteristics of the crude. And, as I said at the beginning, prevention is the very first leg of the three-legged stool that we think will prevent this from occurring, and we have been working very hard---- Mr. Young. In all due respects, madam---- Ms. Quarterman. Sure. Mr. Young. In all due respects, where is the problem of any rail going off because of what you are carrying? Ms. Quarterman. [No response.] Mr. Young. There is none. It is at the rail. It is not the liquid which you are carrying in the container. This is not a new process. Ms. Quarterman. Everything has to be---- Mr. Young. This has been going on for years and years and-- -- Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Considered, sir. Mr. Young [continuing]. Years and years, and I--my interest in this, we have--we transport volatile fuel in tank cars, as they are made today, the same cars that are used in the Bakken field, and yet there seems to be some interest in your agency to say that it is the car's fault. It is the rail's fault. Ms. Quarterman. I am not here to ascribe blame to anyone. I am here to tell you that, as a multiple--it requires multiple responses. It is a comprehensive approach which includes prevention. Yes, you are correct, we need to ensure that train cars stay on the track, absolutely true. But we also need to ensure that the package itself is appropriate, and that the materials that are in the package are appropriately packaged, and that the materials are appropriate to be shipped. Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, my interest in this is this is another agency that doesn't understand what in the world they are doing. A multiple facet, and you are going to package something different that has been packaged all these years, and you say we have to have a new way, area, time of packaging crude oil that--makes no difference what we have been doing all these years. Happens to be more volume. There is probably rails that have been misused, and that is where we should be concentrating. And, by the way, how many of the oil companies have shared their data with you on Bakken oil? Ms. Quarterman. I believe we have received information from three companies so far. Mr. Young. It is four, but that is OK. I just--because they have communicated with you. And have they ever said anything about the cars? Ms. Quarterman. I beg your pardon? Mr. Young. Have they ever said anything about the cars? Ms. Quarterman. Well, as I said, I believe that there were three companies that provided information to us. And in terms of the cars, I don't understand your question. Mr. Young. No. What I am saying--have they ever said anything about the cars being inadequate to carry the fuel? Ms. Quarterman. Have the companies---- Mr. Young. Yes. Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Said that the cars were--I have no idea. Mr. Young. No? OK. Mr. Chairman, again, what I don't want to see is an agency, ``OK, we are going to have a silver bullet, we are going to produce new cars, double hull,'' da, da, da--has nothing to do with these derailments. As ex- chairman of this committee, that is what we should be concentrating on, not the other stuff. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Young. Ms. Brown? Ms. Brown. I think we need to follow up on this discussion, because the last meeting we had AAR said the cause was inadequate, and they are beginning to develop additional cars. But in addition to that, it really doesn't matter if your city explodes, whether the car was at fault or whether what they was carrying is at fault. We need to make sure that we do the multiplicity of things, including prevention. That is the first thing. But the question that I have here is that we asked the last time, and seeing your testimony, that the Petroleum Institute said that they were cooperating. I need to know. Have they provided you with the information that you need for the testing? And, if not, what is it that we need to do to make sure that you are getting what you need, whether it is this crude, the oil crude, or this new crude we using? If it kills you, then it is the same. Ms. Quarterman. Well, let me just say that we are working hard with all the stakeholders involved in this, and asking them to come to the table and cooperate with us, in terms of providing information, whether they be a rail industry or a petroleum industry. We have, as I mentioned, a few companies who have come forward, and we applaud---- Ms. Brown. How many companies are we talking about? Ms. Quarterman. We have had three companies provide us detailed information. We have had conversations with several companies who have provided more anecdotal information. My statement went more to the American Petroleum Institute, who has not provided any individual information on that. They have, however, come forward to put together a working group to look at classification piece, and try to come forward with the standard, and we appreciate that assistance. Other organizations have also stepped forward: the American Petroleum--wait, fuel--the Association of Fuel and Petroleum Manufacturers have indicated that they are going to put together some information for us. My statement really went to the American Petroleum Institute, who has not supplied any data with respect to the characteristics of the crude. And one would think that they would know. Ms. Brown. Two questions. What, as far as the material is concerned, the firefighters, when we train them--and this is for you also, Ms. Harman--how can we make sure that they have the adequate equipment and training so that they can protect themselves when we have an explosion? We have had two in Florida where people were killed. And we have got to make sure that that does not happen. Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. That is an excellent point, and I appreciate your comments in your opening comments. And you may not be aware, we do have some of our instructors from Jacksonville, Florida, who are part of our instructor cadre that teach all over the United States, as well as Canada, with other funding sources. And training, for us, is key. Training for urban areas, rural, and suburban, is key. And there are times when our instructors will arrive at locations. They know they need the training, they have requested the training. And I can tell you when our instructors arrive there, they don't necessarily have the proper equipment to do what they need to do. And that is where our training model that comes into play brings those outside experiences, folks that have dealt with experiences-- unfortunately, like you have in Florida--to bring that to those smaller, rural areas, to say, ``You know what? You need this equipment, you need that equipment.'' Then, the next question is, ``Where is the funding that comes from that?'' They are small departments working off a-- rural volunteer fire departments working off budgets of $89,000 a year. There are large metropolitan areas that are working on much larger budgets. But the key to this equipment is true operations-based training, which, at times, is your basic firefighting equipment and a whole lot of water. Sometimes foam is at play in some of this, but if it is a running liquid that is going, foam is not going to eventually help that. So, our instructors will help guide those departments where they need to go. Ms. Brown. Ms. Quarterman, you mentioned in your testimony, or the last time, there are grants available. How do you let the community know that these grants are available for training, and to educate the community? Ms. Quarterman. Yes, there are grants available: the HMEP grants, which were referred to earlier. And when those grants come out we have a--obviously, we send out a press release, we tweet it around the country, we talk to individual members to let them know that this is available to their States and localities. And in this past instance, we have included a special provision related to crude oil. Let me just add to what Ms. Harman said on the firefighter front. We have put together a working group to talk about the Bakken crude in responding to those incidents. As was mentioned earlier, we sent out a safety alert, which was focused, in many ways, to the emergency response community, so that they would know that when they see these trainloads of crude going across the country, it is not crude that they may be accustomed to responding to. It is really a much lighter, more volatile crude. Thank you. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown. Thank---- Mr. Denham. Mr. Hanna? Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Chairman. Administrator Quarterman, can you answer a quick question for me? Are more hazardous materials--meaning oil, gas, et cetera, natural gas, propane-- carried underground than over ground? Ms. Quarterman. I think the answer is yes. Mr. Hanna. So that the XL pipeline might not be a bad idea? Ms. Quarterman. That is not under my authority---- Mr. Hanna. No, I realize that. I just couldn't resist. [Laughter.] Mr. Hanna. The--Mr. Pelkey--thank you. You said that you need 14 positive inspections to offset 1. Is that regardless of the size or number of trips that your particular business is making? Mr. Pelkey. Yes. There is a certain threshold that you have to maintain under for any hazmat type of---- Mr. Hanna. So that--the conclusion would be that if you are not a big company, you may never get back to a point where you are making--you have made enough inspections. You may be--find yourself in a position where you are begging to be inspected, because you need to get past that 14 threshold. Mr. Pelkey. Correct. Mr. Hanna. So, shouldn't it be more flexible for somebody who is small, as opposed to big? I mean, does 14 fit every company? And, let's--conversely, if you are a huge company, you may get inspected 14 times in a day, which lets them--you know, they would actually be able to have an error a day, because they are off the hook the next day. Am I getting that---- Mr. Pelkey. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great question. It is further exacerbated because most display companies across the country normally would perform their duties and their work over this July 2nd, 3rd, 4th of July, New Year's Eve or Labor Day. And in most cases, there aren't any enforcement teams that are out there that are inspecting on those particular---- Mr. Hanna. So you---- Mr. Pelkey [continuing]. Nights and weekends, and you are lucky to see one. If you did receive one--and sometimes you do--often times you wouldn't even have a hazardous material authorized person to inspect. Therefore, you would be going through the inspection process---- Mr. Hanna. So you can't get a ticket if you beg for one on the wrong day. Mr. Pelkey. We have gone through, and several of our members of the American Pyrotechnics Association have gone through a stop, a weigh point, and begged for an inspection, for a hazmat inspection, and there just isn't a certified inspector there. Mr. Hanna. Mr. Schick, did you want to say something? Mr. Schick. I am not going to--we don't operate motor carriers, for the most part---- Mr. Hanna. Right, right. Mr. Schick [continuing]. I am not going to join into that one. Mr. Hanna. Well, thank you very much. Chairman? Mr. Denham. Mr. Hanna yields back. Mr. DeFazio? Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would--he is not here, but I would respectfully disagree with the former chairman. We need to know what materials are being carried, and both obviously deal with operational issues, which is FRA, and they are not before us today, and deal with, you know, the actual containment of those materials. And it does make a difference, in terms of the containment. It certainly makes a difference to the first responders, in terms of the knowledge of--the training and the materials to deal with that. So I would have some disagreement there. But on--Madam Administrator, on February 26th we held a hearing. And, as you might remember, we had some discussion. I was trying to find out about a potential date for rulemaking for the new tank cars. I am wondering what the current status is. Have you completed your work? Is it at the Secretary's office? Is it down there with the trolls at OMB? Where is it? Ms. Quarterman. We have made great progress since we--I last testified before you. We have a--shall we say a draft in circulation? So we are working very hard, and hoping to move that rule out very soon. Mr. DeFazio. Can we just go back to what ``very soon'' might mean? Not to belabor my point from the last hearing, but I would like--here is the issue--we have one major rail company looking at making a huge investment. Whether or not they will have a safe harbor if they go ahead with their improved tank car, whether or not other people will buy the AAR version, or whether or not people will try and make the 111's safer, depends upon both the rule you put forward, what it proposes, and what conditions it puts on the existing cars. Ms. Quarterman. No, I agree with that, and we have been having ongoing conversations with those folks, as well. So we know that commitments are being considered, and that is why we are working as fast as we possibly can to get a rule out. Mr. DeFazio. OK. So I am not going to get much further with that. So, there is another issue, which I actually was surprised by. I have been on the Aviation Subcommittee for a very long time, and I had no idea that the lithium batteries are nominally the jurisdiction of PHMSA, but have been delegated to FAA. And I would note that I think we are 8 years or so into a rulemaking, which I hope doesn't happen with tank cars. Can you give me any idea about what DOT is doing to harmonize our standards with those of ICAO, which would seem to be reasonable to me? Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. Yes, it is actually our rulemaking, and we are responsible for hazmat, no matter how it moves, as well as operational issues related to hazmat in different modes. We have a rule that we are hoping to get out very soon to complete our harmonization with ICAO on the lithium battery, as well. Mr. DeFazio. OK. And is that rule somewhere other than in your agency? Ms. Quarterman. It is. Mr. DeFazio. Would it be down at OMB? Ms. Quarterman. I think it is all public, where it is. It is---- Mr. DeFazio. Is it there? I mean you can tell me yes or no? Ms. Quarterman. Yes, it is. Mr. DeFazio. Yes. I can find it, yes. Ms. Quarterman. Yes. Mr. DeFazio. OK. I once had a colleague, Al Swift, from Washington State. And he described to me the people at OMB. He says, ``DeFazio, they are the trolls with the green eyeshades that hide under the bridges, and they come out and gnaw on your leg every once in a while.'' I know OMB is concerned about cost effectiveness, but when it comes to saving lives or keeping an airplane in the air, I think they need to move more promptly. So now I know where to direct my concerns. Although, in terms of the tank car, I think they are still to you; in terms of lithium batteries, it is to OMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Denham. Ms. Quarterman, the GAO report on the safety of wet lines raised significant concerns with the accuracy of the data, and found that the costs and benefits were not accurately presented in the proposed rule. Yet PHMSA refuses to withdraw proposed wet lines rule. Do you plan on withdrawing the proposed rule? And why, or why not? Ms. Quarterman. Let me just say for my friends at OMB who work really hard on our issues, that, you know, that they are supportive, I think, of safety, as well. On your question on wet lines, we are in the process of reviewing the results from the GAO study to determine--I mean they were critical of our regulatory evaluation, determining the costs and benefits associated with the wet lines rule. So we are still in the process of reviewing that, looking at the data that we have associated with that, looking at the recommendations that they gave to us about how we might improve that data. And then, we will determine whether we withdraw the rule or move forward with it. Whether we do either, we will certainly want to improve the safety of wet lines, whether it is through a rulemaking or something else. My colleague, Mr. Downey, mentioned that there are other options available. I welcome him to come talk to our staff about ways that we might improve wet lines in the future. Mr. Denham. So, just to be clear, you do not disagree with the GAO report. Ms. Quarterman. They drew some conclusions about our analysis, our cost benefit analysis. We are going back to look at their recommendations, and try to improve that, and then we will make a determination on how to proceed. Mr. Denham. Thank you. And what is your timeline on that? Ms. Quarterman. We don't have a timeline, that I am aware of, at the moment. You know, the next few months we will be looking at that. Mr. Denham. This is something you intend on either--making a recommendation one way or another within the next couple of months? Ms. Quarterman. Yes. We have been a little busy recently. Mr. Denham. Thank you. Mr. Downey, you expressed concern about the wet lines rulemaking. How would you propose that PHMSA use its resources in order to withdraw its proposed rulemaking? Mr. Downey. With the GAO report, but also the independent evaluation that was done. Our position is that we can take the dollars that would be required to retrofit our trailers, or buy new trailers with some type of device that would evacuate the wet lines, and put those dollars to training or other types of technologies that would prevent accidents, such as anti- rollover stability equipment. Mr. Denham. Thank you. Mr. Schick, you are supportive of PHMSA's regulating loading and unloading of hazardous materials. What are the benefits PHMSA's--what are the benefits of PHMSA's doing so? And, specifically, will it help the preparedness of emergency responders? Mr. Schick. Mr. Chairman, we are totally supportive of that. As I said in the written testimony, they had somewhat withdrawn the application of their authority, which they pretty clearly have. We think that that is primarily for operational safety and operational efficiency of the shippers and the consignees who do the loading and unloading and are present when that happens. It is important for safety for everyone that the same kind of activity, say the same unloading conducted with the same equipment from the same, let's say, cargo tank, be under PHMSA's jurisdiction, so they have oversight over everything. It should not matter whether the person doing the unloading happens to be the employee of the trucking company or happens to be the employee of the consignee. I think since that happens mostly on site, it is primarily for those kind of operations, rather than emergency responders. But more fundamentally, the loading and unloading are known to be potential causes of accidents. So, if you are looking to prevent accidents, obviously you want your loading and unloading to be done in a safe manner. And we believe that if it is done in a consistent manner under Federal oversight, as opposed to possibly disparate ways under different State and local jurisdictions, that will enhance safety. Mr. Denham. Thank you. And can you also explain the concerns you have with imposing further costs on special permits and approvals of applicants? Mr. Schick. Yes, I can, sir. As I said in testimony, the special permit applications actually come from parties--it could be shippers or carriers, it could be Government agencies who are in the role of a shipper, for example--that have come up with a new way to do something. But they know, full well, it does not fit under the current written PHMSA regulations. So they come forward, they acknowledge that, they make a presentation to the agency, and the agency evaluates it. It cannot proceed to grant a special permit unless it is shown to be at least as protective as what the rules apply. If it passes that test, and it can be put into place by the applicant who gets a special permit, other parties who do the same thing can also use that, and the agency, in effect, gets research and development. They get new ideas brought to them, and they get to look at them. And then, over time, they can move those into the regulations. So everyone benefits. Mr. Denham. Thank you. Ms. Napolitano? Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, sir. Ms. Quarterman, what steps are being taken to ensure the safe, secure shipment of chlorine and other toxic gases? The railroad companies recently partnered with DOT and TSA to put in place the procedures to further improve the safety and secure shipment of the gas. Could you share some of those procedures, quickly? Ms. Quarterman. I will have to get back to you for--on the record on that. Mrs. Napolitano. Would you report that back, please? Ms. Quarterman. Yes, absolutely. [The information follows:] Working closely with FRA and TSA, PHMSA established several critical requirements to ensure safety and security of toxic gas shipments. Key requirements and procedures include:Security Plans (49 CFR Sec. 172.800)--Each person who offers for transportation in commerce or transports in commerce a PIH material must develop and adhere to a transportation security plan. The security plan must be based on an assessment of the possible transportation security risks for materials transported, stored, or unloaded incidental to movement. Key components of the security plan include: Measures to address assessed risks regarding personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security; Identification by job title of the senior management official responsible for development and implementation of the plan; Security duties for each position or department responsible for implementing the plan; and Training for hazmat employees. Rail Routing (49 CFR Sec. 172.820)--Rail carriers must assess available routes using, at a minimum, the 27 factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172 of the HMR to determine the safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive hazardous materials. These factors address safety and security issues, such as the condition of the track and supporting infrastructure; the presence or absence of signals; past incidents; population density along the route; environmentally sensitive or significant areas; venues along the route (stations, events, places of congregation); emergency response capability along the route; measures and countermeasures already in place to address apparent safety and security risks; and proximity to iconic targets. The regulations require rail carriers to make conscientious efforts to develop logical and defendable routing decisions using these factors. Speed Restriction by Rail (49 CFR Sec. 174.86)--For trains transporting any loaded, placarded tank cars containing a material poisonous by inhalation, the maximum allowable operating speed is 50 mph. Enhanced Tank Car Design (49 CFR Sec. Sec. 179.100 and 179.102-3)--Increased tank car design standards for head and shell puncture resistance, nozzles, and top fittings protection. Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you. Mr. Schick, you were talking about the training of loading and unloading. That is a real serious issue with me. I have one of the largest corridors of rail transportation and truck transportation in my area. And I visited some of the places where they build the double wall for chemicals. My concern is that we are providing training at one of the local university colleges for firefighting in hazmats. But are we training them in the proper procedures of loading and unloading? Mr. Schick. I don't believe, ma'am, that the firefighters would be doing the loading and unloading. I am talking about the loading that happens at the production site, and the unloading at the receiver's site. Mrs. Napolitano. Right, but---- Mr. Schick. Rather than what might happen---- Mrs. Napolitano [continuing]. If there is a spill, the firefighters have to come in and help clean up. Do they not? Mr. Schick. If it is on--if it is outside of transportation, there--certainly could be called in certain circumstances. If it happens during transportation, obviously, it is out in the public space, and it is a different issue, I think, in that sense. But, again, I think the loading and unloading itself is not done by the emergency responders. The National Transportation Safety Board a number of years ago--took a very close look at this back in 2001--this was at the time when PHMSA was in the process of drawing back its regulatory authority. And the NTSB said in no uncertain terms that they are not convinced that if RSPA--it was then called RSPA, Research and Special Programs Administration; it is PHMSA today--relinquished its regulatory authority over hazardous materials loading/unloading operations, other Federal, State agencies would be able--they are concerned whether they would be able to exercise the necessary safety oversight of these very specific areas of transportation. That is why we at ACC support--and I believe the large Interested Parties community generally supports--the re-establishment of loading and unloading as primary functions under DOT's jurisdiction, and not to leave it to disparate points of view. Another aspect from industry is if someone is involved in that at a plant site, if they are going to be transferred and have a job opportunity elsewhere within their corporation, it would also be helpful--it is not a safety issue, but it would be helpful, not only for the company, but for the personnel, to be able to go somewhere else and have the same rules apply. Mrs. Napolitano. But are the chemical companies required to report on-site accidents of loading and unloading? Mr. Schick. I would--I think I will ask Ms. Quarterman, who is here. I think that when the carrier is present, the carrier files a 5800 report, which is the report for the unintended release of hazardous materials. I think what happens without the carrier being present--even, as I said, with exactly the same process and equipment, I think you may be having PHMSA deprive itself of exactly that kind of knowledge. Mrs. Napolitano. Ms. Quarterman? Ms. Quarterman. If there is a loading and unloading incident that is associated with transportation, then, yes, it would be reported on the 5800 report. Mrs. Napolitano. OK, thank you. And, Ms. Harman, how much placarding information should be displayed on the railcars carrying material? And is this important to the local folks to be able to know what is being transported? Ms. Harman. Thank you for your question. Yes, it is absolutely critical that we understand what is being placarded. Your first responders that arrive to a scene of an incident like that, their job is defensive operations, not just to recognize, but also to prevent any further damage to the community, whether they have to dam and dike. They have got to notify the community, they have got to look up that particular item in the ERG book, and figure out if there needs to be some sort of evacuation, how far that needs to be. So, yes, it is absolutely critical that we are able to know what is in that container. Mrs. Napolitano. Where should be the best place for displaying of such material that is being transported? Ms. Harman. Right in the public view, of where those are located now. In addition, if there is an incident, and that is an obstructed view, the shipping papers are critical for us, as well. Mrs. Napolitano. Well, that question has come up in the past, because there have been some instances in my area in years past, and there was no way of getting to the cab, to the front of the locomotive. And so there was a question about what was inherently being carried. Ms. Harman. Right. Mrs. Napolitano. Because the placarding was not sufficient. Ms. Harman. Right. And the key for us--you know, worst case scenario--I mean, obviously, the placarding needs to be there for us. The shipping papers need to be there for us. Even if-- when we move into an e-shipping, electronic world, you know, that shouldn't replace the paper shipping papers for us. There is always a way for us to go back to the basics. It is critical for firefighters. But if we cannot view those, it is going to be treated as any other flammable liquid until additional resources arrive. Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hanna [presiding]. Ms. Esty? Ms. Esty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am really glad we are having this hearing today. Just last year, we had one of these chemical spills in Fulton Park, in one of my cities in Waterbury, Connecticut. And, again, the issues Ms. Harman has raised about the preparedness of those who arrive at the scene and often do not know what they are encountering, and have to make life-and- death decisions immediately for a community. So I want to drill down a little bit more into some of those issues. So, Administrator Quarterman, does PHMSA currently have a system that can collect and analyze hazardous material incident data collected by emergency responders? Ms. Quarterman. We do not have the data that is collected by emergency responders. We do require reporting by anyone who has an incident, and we have that data, which we correlate. We have had conversations. My deputy is actually a former fire chief, and he has had conversation with several different firefighting organizations about what data they do collect, and the extent to which we might get some of that data and integrate it with ours, because we actually collect data not just for us, but for all the modes who have involvement in hazmat. Ms. Esty. So is there a reason we don't have a system that, as a regular course of business, collects this data? Ms. Quarterman. I--it is an ongoing conversation. Part of it has to be attributed to resources. Ms. Esty. All right. And following up on that, Ms. Harman had expressed concern about--that whatever systems are developed, that they need to be accessible 24 hours a day, and whether there is paperwork there or not. What provisions, if any, is--you know, is the agency looking at? And, in PHMSA, what is in place now to ensure that electronic communications are accessible in these dramatic incidents? It might be 2 a.m., chaos is reigning, somebody is trying to look at a sheet of paper and determine what these substances are, and what they should do. Ms. Quarterman. Currently, paper is the only thing that is available. We are in the process of putting together a pilot to do electronic reporting for movement of hazardous materials. We actually had a session last year including, most importantly, emergency responders, because we viewed their opinions as, you know, paramount, in terms of how do we move from paper to electronic. To what extent do we need paper? So that is an ongoing conversation. Obviously, when we have a pilot, hopefully this year, that will be a part of what we want to learn, a big part of what we want to learn, and make sure that things move smoothly. Ms. Esty. For Ms. Harman, I know that the National Fire Protection Agency estimates that 65 percent of departments that are responsible for responding for hazmat do not have formal training. What can we do in Congress? What can we do to address that? And, obviously, as we are seeing--as you can tell by the questioning about Bakken crude, we expect there are going to be more transportation within our borders on these issues. What do you recommend that we in Congress ought to be looking at? It is resources, obviously, some of that. But if it is just up to grants, I have got to tell you I represent 41 cities and towns. Some of these towns are 4,000 people. And if we are leaving it up to the volunteer firefighters in Goshen, Connecticut, to know that there is funding available someplace, and a grant application maybe, that their 100 volunteers will get life-sustaining training, I don't think that is acceptable. I don't think that is acceptable for our communities, and it is not acceptable for our volunteers, who put their lives on the line. So, what should we be doing on the congressional level? Ms. Harman. Well, not the answer you want to hear, but continued funding is key for us. I mean training is key. The training is out there. There are multiple modes of training deliveries. There are fixed facility training. We are proud of the portable delivery training model that we bring. We have a strong demand for training right now. There is a wait list for classes that we can't even get to. The train-the-trainer model is important for us, particularly for those smaller communities. We don't see as many requests for train-the-trainer coming in, particularly now, and particularly from the smaller volunteer communities, because you have got folks in this economy not only trying to volunteer, but working multiple jobs, finding it difficult to do training. They take a train-the-trainer, now they have got to prepare themselves as an instructor to teach the rest of their community, and they may not have some of those larger scale incidents like you have had there in Waterbury to bring that experience into their facility. So, it is important, I think, for Congress to continue to, number one, enforce that operations level training. It should be the minimum level of training for all firefighters, regardless if they are career or volunteer, and encourage them to reach out to organizations. They have got to take a proactive approach. We are certainly there to provide training throughout career or volunteer. There is other funding sources that are there. There is online training modules that we offer. The resources are there, but it takes a level of effort to also get that. Ms. Esty. Also, if you could, quickly, give us your advice on gear, what sort of gear they ought to be looking at having. Ms. Harman. Gear is critical. I mean your traditional turnout gear for firefighters, which is your firefighting ensemble, a self-contained breathing apparatus, is key. A lot of water, a lot of hose. There has been a lot of discussion about foam, and foam caches set up. You know, a large-scale incident, I don't think any large jurisdiction is going to have enough foam to put out any of these. So it is really the traditional firefighter that you see now, if you were to call 911 and showed up here, is the same firefighter that is initially going to show up on a scene like that in their regular turnout gear. Mr. Denham [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Michaud. Mr. Michaud. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the panelists, as well, for testifying today. This question is for Ms. Harman. As you are aware, last summer, when the train wreck in Lac- Megantic--the severity of that wreck. And, since then, several of my colleagues and I have advocated for multiple-person crews on freight trains, particularly those carrying hazardous materials or meeting trains carrying hazardous materials. We believe that this is a public safety issue, and the FRA actually believes it is a safety issue, as well. And if you look at past rail accidents, there are many incidents of multiple-person crews being able to mitigate the damage by separating the train from the burning cars, and being able to work with first responders. My question to you is, could you share with us your thoughts on how having multiple crewmembers on hazmat trains could improve safety and interaction with the first responders? Ms. Harman. Sure. We believe in multiple crews--are crucial for us to get the response done appropriately and efficiently. You know, the original driver of that train can easily be injured in the crash themselves. Having multiple people, particularly multiple people who are trained, who are trained to work collaboratively with the first responders so they don't meet for the first time at the scene of that incident, that is critical for us. Mr. Michaud. Thank you. The second question is for you, as well. I recently met with a mayor who is a head of the Maine Municipal Association and learned that many local fire departments only carry enough foam to extinguish a car fire. That would be incapable of responding to a major rail or truck disaster calling for additional foam from surrounding areas. I recognize that we probably can't ensure that every fire department in the country has the resources to respond to every kind of major disaster, but I do think that local fire departments should have the information to quickly locate and call for those additional resources in the case of an emergency. Is there something that we should do at the congressional level to facilitate this type of information sharing? Or do you have any ideas of what we can do, as far as foam, as it relates to major train wreck? Ms. Harman. No, that is an excellent question. We get a lot of questions on foam. How much is enough? How much is not enough? The true underlying resolve to a lot of this is pre- planning. It is knowing who your partners are, knowing what is coming through your community, knowing what you need to be prepared for, and potentially how much. As I said earlier, I don't think enough foam is going to cover any major incident. And it has to do with the pre- planning. And at times, really, if you are in a rural area and there is not an immediate threat to life or significant property, there is going to be a time where you are just going to let it burn off. So, you know, we are supportive of free planning, of collaborative training, and bringing folks together so that they truly--they are not meeting for the first time at the scene of that incident. Mr. Michaud. Thank you. Does anyone else on the panel want to address the issue about adequacy of foam, particularly if you are in a rural area with a major train wreck? Ms. Quarterman. I will just comment on the end comment from Ms. Harman, in that my deputy has said the same thing. It is not intuitive for me, not being a firefighter, but he has said, you know, in an instance like that, you try to get the people out, and you probably just let the fire burn out. So---- Mr. Michaud. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. Mr. Denham. Thank you. Ms. Hahn? Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, I had an incident that just happened in my district in Wilmington, California, where 40 barrels of crude oil from a crack in an idle oil pipeline spewed into a residential neighborhood in Wilmington, California. Obviously, this spill endangered the health and safety of hundreds of my constituents, as well as caused untold amounts in property damage and cost to the local economy. And while the spill is still under investigation, information that we have learned so far suggests that the spill was caused by an internal corrosion of an idle pipeline that, unfortunately, still contained a lot of oil. The current owner of the pipeline believed that the idle pipeline was empty when it was received 15 years ago from the previous owner. And no inspection of the inside of the pipeline apparently is required under PHMSA or State guidelines. So, while there is a clear process for shutting down pipelines that are not intended to be used any more through the process of abandonment, and there is clear inspection and monitoring process for active pipelines, it seems to me there is no process for ensuring that idle, out-of-service pipelines that are believed to be empty, but are intended to be used again, are actually empty of hazardous material. I just feel like if at any point during this 15 years, if the current owner of the pipeline had verified that it was empty, or State officials would have verified it was empty, or the Federal Government would have verified it was empty, this spill would have never occurred. And I think it is this lack of verification that led to a hazardous pipeline spill and seriously, you know, endangered my constituents, who are already kind of the--on the short end of the stick, living next to the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, which is--any manner of hazardous event could happen on a daily basis. Also, this community probably sits on more pipelines than any other community, I believe, in southern California. So, am I not understanding it properly? Is there a process for any kind of verification of an out-of-service, idle pipeline, versus an active or abandoned pipeline? And, if not, why not? And is this a loophole that we should try to close? Ms. Quarterman. Well, as you know, the--this current situation is under investigation, so we can't really talk about the details of that situation. But you are right, that my understanding is that the pipeline was idle, as opposed to abandoned. Whether a pipeline is idle for 15 years, I think, is an open question. Certainly, if it is an abandoned pipeline, it should have been---- Ms. Hahn. It has to be capped and---- Ms. Quarterman. It has to be capped and cleaned. So that is something that we will follow up with you on as we go through the investigation---- Ms. Hahn. Are you aware--is PHMSA aware of this kind of a loophole in---- Ms. Quarterman. It is the first time I have heard anything about this before, so---- Ms. Hahn. Right. I just think it is--might need to look at how we verify. It is all simple verification of a pipeline that has been deemed idle or out of service. Particularly when they acquire it from another company. Nobody--there was no third- party verification that, in fact, it was empty. And while it may not be a lot of crude oil to the oil company, they seemed to scoff when I was like, ``Forty barrels before you capped it?'' And they were sort of like, ``That is not that much.'' But, obviously, in a residential neighborhood, that is an extreme problem and hazard and smell and---- Ms. Quarterman. Well, it is a lot---- Ms. Hahn. The equipment that has to come in to try to cap it, it was a big mess. But I feel like it might be something we should work together to solve. Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. Ms. Hahn. My second question is about strengthening pipeline inspections. And right now, California has 5 inspectors inspecting over 750 pipelines in the ground. Additionally, in accordance with PHMSA guidelines, companies, and not the actual inspectors themselves, are in charge of conducting inspections of pipeline. Inspectors are in charge of conducting audits of the companies' inspections. Is this the best process we have, going forward? And can you give me some assurance that we are--all pipelines are inspected in a timely manner? And how do we strengthen this current system so there is more accountability for the companies who have failed to adequately inspect their pipelines? Ms. Quarterman. Well, you will see in the Department's fiscal year 2015 budget, we have a large request for the pipeline safety program. Included in that is additional grant money for States to improve--and our inspection, I mean, the biggest part of that goes to our inspection force, adding many, many new people. So, the President's budget supports that right now. In terms of inspection--and in some ways it is a misnomer. I mean our staff does go out and review the documents of companies, but they also go out during construction, and doing some maintenance, so they do inspect to that. I think what you are referring to is an internal inspection of a pipeline, which is something that--the Government doesn't own these pipelines, so we have no way to put any equipment in them to verify that. So that is really reviewing the inspections, or the assessments that companies have performed. Absolutely, we need more resources. Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Denham. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman. Ms. Hahn. I yield back. Mr. Denham. Mr. Larsen? Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First off, I want to dispel a notion that PHMSA believes in a silver bullet approach. Ms. Quarterman was in my office 2\1/2\ months ago. And I think I am quoting you when you said, ``There is no silver bullet to resolving this issue.'' But classification is part of it. Railcar safety is part of it. Training for first responders is part of it. There is probably other parts I am missing. But I want to understand the classification issue, because API was here with us last hearing and said in 6 months--not a 2-year timeline they usually take, but a 6-month timeline they usually take to establish a new classification standard for Bakken. That is what they said. But the reports the last couple days seems to come across, from PHMSA's perspective, they expected information sooner than that. Am I conflating two issues, or am I--or are you--do you have a faster timeline than API has? Ms. Quarterman. There are actually two different issues. One, the work that API is doing is on an industry standard for classification, which is what they do quite frequently on different issues. And we have a staff person who is on that committee, working towards assisting in that classification standard. Should it be something that we agree at the end of the day is worthwhile, we could adopt it and put it in our regulations. That is one thing. The other thing is actual data about the attributes of the crude, itself. What is its initial boiling point? What is its flash point? What is its vapor pressure? Mr. Larsen. Yes, right. Ms. Quarterman. Those kinds of details, which Mr. Young may know, because he suggested this was a class II---- Mr. Larsen. Right. Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Crude, whereas we have some information of our own which doesn't necessarily support that. Mr. Larsen. OK. Ms. Quarterman. It could be class I or class II. Mr. Larsen. So you said that three companies--it could be four companies--have provided information. How many other companies have you requested information from and have not received information from? Ms. Quarterman. We went out, initially, to API and asked that they bring in some of their members. After that, we sort of expanded our reach, and we had a series of crude oil meetings where we invited not just API, we invited AFPM, who I mentioned is coming forward with some information. We also individually reached out to some of the biggest shippers. I forgot how many, I don't know if it was---- Mr. Larsen. OK. Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. The top 10 or top 20, but we invited them all to come in and talk to us. And those who couldn't come, we sent a letter and said, ``If you can't come, we will set up a separate meeting for you, or we will call you, whatever we can to get as much information as possible.'' Mr. Larsen. OK. And then, so that is where you are right now on trying to establish these basic data points about the Bakken crude. And those are--that is the basic data that you are trying to uncover currently. Ms. Quarterman. Yes. But let me just add that, you know, we can't wait for data from other companies or from any industry organization. We have been on the ground in an unprecedented effort, with our sister agencies, drawing crude oil from trains, from trucks, from pipelines, and sending it to labs and having it tested ourselves. So we are getting information on the attributes of that crude from the ground up. Mr. Larsen. Yes. And just--you know, as you know, in my district alone we have four refineries. We are moving from about zero gallons a day maybe last year, late last--or early last year, to about 12 million gallons a day of Bakken crude moving through the district on rail when all four facilities have their offload facilities built. So this has really become an issue quickly in our district. And part of it, part of the answer, has to do with firefighters. And, by the way, before I go further, not just the firefighters, all first responders, but certainly firefighters, Arlington Fire District and Darrington Fire District and folks from Clark County, Nevada; Boone County, Missouri; Colorado, all converging on Highway 530 to deal with the mudslide and be part of FEMA's incident command teams. And they are all doing a great job, and this last weekend they have been able to turn over and get some new people in, to give people some rest. And we appreciate what firefighters and other first responders are doing. I want to pass that on to you. And then, Mr. Schick, I want to take up your--you don't need to turn on the mic for this--I just want to take up your invitation to visit the facility, so long as you include a briefing on the--not just the CHEMTREC, but the---- Mr. Schick. TRANSCAER, as well? Mr. Larsen. TRANSCAER as part of that. Can you do that? Mr. Schick. Yes. Mr. Larsen. Thank you so much. Yield back. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Mr. Lipinski? Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Ranking Member Brown for holding this hearing today. Certainly the public safety in the transport of hazardous materials is a very important responsibility of this subcommittee, so I am glad we are here to look at PHMSA's progress since the authorization of MAP-21. One area that I know we all have a great interest and concern about is the transport of hazardous material by rail. I know Mr. DeFazio had covered some of the issues already. What I want to focus on is the paperless manifest for trains that carry hazardous materials. I know it is very important, it is an issue that has been raised in some of the accidents that have occurred is the need for first responders to know what is on the trains in case there is an accident, and find out what the risk is from any material on the trains. So, I was happy that MAP-21, I know, had a requirement for PHMSA to evaluate a paperless system. And I know that right now the railroads themselves are working on electronic systems. As I raised before on this committee to the AAR, that I think more should be done in order to make sure that this information is available to first responders. So, I wanted to ask Administrator Quarterman. Can you tell me where PHMSA is right now on this requirement that was put in in MAP-21? And I want to know if you are working with the railroads at all on what they are working on doing with these paperless manifests. Ms. Quarterman. We are working with all constituents. I mentioned earlier we had a workshop in July of last year, and included the emergency responders and all of the modes to talk about use of this electronic format. Right now there is a requirement in our rule for--on rail that the train consist must show where the hazardous materials are on the train, and it must be updated if it gets moved around, so that emergency responders will have that knowledge, or should have that knowledge if they go to fight a fire at--because of hazardous materials. Mr. Lipinski. And do you anticipate PHMSA issuing any further regulations in the space--in rail, or any other---- Ms. Quarterman. We are at the pilot project phase. We are not at the regulation phase. I mean we really need to go and do a few pilots, see how it works before we talk about issuing any regs. So we are early on. Mr. Lipinski. OK. Well, I just wanted to make sure that we continue to work on this, and as we go down the road, and make sure that we do have the best system in place, so that first responders can have adequate information. And, with that, I will yield back. Thank you. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. Ms. Brown? Ms. Brown. Thank you. Ms. Quarterman, this is a yes or no question. Yesterday we received your statement that the American Petroleum Institute and its members have not been cooperative with your agency, and have refused to provide testing information with your safety experts. Is that yes or no? Ms. Quarterman. Yes. Ms. Brown. OK. Could you give us in writing what questions that you have asked them and they have not responded to, please? Ms. Quarterman. I would be happy to. [The information follows:] PHMSA posed the following questions to API and crude oil shippers prior to meetings in early February. What tests or methods do you use to determine the properties of the crude oil to include its vapor pressure, flammable gas content, flash point, boiling point, hydrogen sulfide content and corrosive properties prior to offering it in transportation? Who performs these tests and how frequently are they completed? When you find high levels of gases in crude, what actions do you require of your oilfield personnel before loading into a transport vehicle? What information about the crude oil properties, if any, is provided by the producers to you prior to transportation? How is this information communicated? What information do you share with truck and rail carriers about the crude oil properties? Are there any prescribed limits involving vapor pressure, flammable gas concentration or hydrogen sulfide content above which the crude oil is not placed into transportation? If so, what are these limits and how are they determined? To date, PHMSA has received some testing information from individual crude oil companies but thus far the data has been limited. As part of ongoing efforts, PHMSA has supported the American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee initiative to develop industry standards for proper sampling techniques, testing criteria and frequency for crude oil. PHMSA is actively participating in the discussions during working group sessions and plans to continue up through expected completion in July. Ms. Brown. OK. Now, my next question, Mr. Downey, I was very involved with the wet lines issue. And, in fact, I went over to Baltimore to test it, you know. And I know that we are on tight budgets. And so, in your testimony, you said it would be better if you all use that money for anti-rollover technology, which is really the problem in the industry, and not the wet lines. Can you expound upon that, please? Mr. Downey. That is a very good point, Ranking Member Brown. In fact, I was in Baltimore at that hearing, as well. And if you look---- Ms. Brown. And I went around---- Mr. Downey. I know you did. Ms. Brown [continuing]. Before we went to the hearing. Mr. Downey. Yes, and one of our folks was there. Ms. Brown. I recommend the chairman do the same. Mr. Downey. I guess our point is that, looking at the cost benefit analysis that was done in the surveys, looking at the dangers of retrofitting some of the trailers--and I know that when you---- Ms. Brown. I don't think your mic is on. Mr. Downey. It is. I believe it is---- Ms. Brown. Well, pull it up, pull it up. Mr. Downey. Is that better? Ms. Brown. Yes, sir. Mr. Downey. OK, thank you. But looking at the risks to retrofitting the trailers--and when you were in Baltimore, I believe that they discussed that with you--we could take those dollars and minimize risk and put it into technology that would make the traveling public safer, keep our tractors and trailers on the road, with the anti-roll stability. That is our position. Does that answer your question? Ms. Brown. Yes, sir. And I would be interested in making sure that we get some directions to the agency in that vein, because, basically, in--from what I can gather, the information that we have gotten, that is where the problem is, and not with the wet lines. Mr. Downey. Yes. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Brown. OK. My last question, pertaining to making sure that we protect the firefighters and the first responders, and--do the firefighters have the gear to respond to the hazmat incidents? And I am particularly concerned about the crude oil, ethanol, and the lithium batteries. And those batteries, I understand, could play a major part when it comes to airplane crashes and other things. Ms. Harman. The traditional gear for--that firefighters are going to be wearing, donning and doffing as they show up to these scenes here, is your traditional turnout gear. That is your initial response. Your typical firefighter that is coming in here in their bunker jacket, their bunker boots, and their pants with their suspenders and their self-contained breathing apparatus, gloves, a lot of hose, a lot of fire--not fire--a lot of water. Your second set that is coming in are definitely going to be going more into the hot zone. Those are your technicians, those are your specialists. So that gear that is out there we believe right now is sufficient that is out there. There is new technologies coming out every day. We stay abreast of that, and there is a cost that comes to that. So we are always watching that to see, you know, how is this going to be afforded, how are these skill sets going to be acquired. But the gear that is there now, so long as the fire departments have the minimum level of what they need, and the training that they need to respond in an operational capacity, they should be pretty well set to go. Ms. Brown. Ms. Quarterman? Ms. Quarterman. Yes? You want me to answer the same question about gear? Ms. Brown. Yes. Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we agree that it is important. We would have to look at our grant language to ensure that it is something that we could fund through our existing HMEP grant program, the extent to which we can fund it. Ms. Brown. Is it possible to let the Members know when the grant applications are available? Ms. Quarterman. We would love to. Ms. Brown. So that we could make sure our communities know about it? Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. If you don't know, we will make sure you know. Ms. Brown. Because are you saying that you put it in the Federal Register? Ms. Quarterman. We put it in the Federal Register, but we realize that not everybody reads that, so we have been tweeting it---- Ms. Brown. And some small communities don't have a person that is looking for that all the time. Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we try to do a press release, as well. But we will absolutely let the Members know. Ms. Brown. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Brown. Ms. Hahn? Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, one of the other issues I have been dealing with for a long time, even before I came to Congress, is that I have a facility, LPG tanks, which are located in San Pedro. I think they were built in 1976, aging facilities, they can hold up to 25 million gallons of LPG. I have been trying to get them moved or shut down for as long as I can remember. They are on private property, so I am struggling with what to do. But the threat of leakage and vaporizing and igniting and--it sits next to a soccer field, an elementary school, residential neighborhood. So, just have two things on that. One, in 1986, I guess, Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to- Know Act, EPCRA. And after 9/11, DHS came in and many of these highly volatile facilities now are being classified as a possible homeland security threat. You know, attack on one of them, obviously, could produce the same effect as a natural disaster. So now, that has superseded EPCRA. So now I believe a member of the community has to go downtown to their fire department, look at documents in secret, not allowed to take out copies of those documents, so it really has undermined, in my opinion, a community's right to know the kinds of hazardous materials and threat to their livelihood that exists in their community. Is this something that you feel like we should do a better job of balancing? Is this something maybe you and Jay Johnson could have a conversation about? Because I really do think--I mean I am all about homeland security, but I am also about a community's right to know what kind of hazardous material is in their neighborhood, and what they need to do to prepare themselves against disaster. Ms. Quarterman. I agree with you, and we have a similar effect on the pipeline side, where, as we had created, I think--or the agency had created very detailed maps of the pipeline system, and put it on the web, and almost immediately had to pull it down because of 9/11, I think it is worthwhile to have that conversation. I have heard that some of those things are no longer as covered as they used to be. There are less concerns. But I agree with you, the public has a right to know where these facilities are, and to be prepared to respond. And certainly emergency responders need to be prepared to respond in those instances. So I will take you up on that, and have a conversation---- Ms. Hahn. Great. And maybe even there is a compromise in how they--you know, besides going downtown to a fire department and looking at documents in secret, is there a compromise there? Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. Ms. Hahn. Yes. And the other thing, what can I tell my constituents in San Pedro, California, that PHMSA is doing to protect them from a possible leak, vapor cloud, ignite? I mean, the threat of something happening with 25 million gallons of propane and butane is just a daily concern. And we can't figure out which agency could help us, you know, protect the community against a disaster. Ms. Quarterman. I am not sure that we have oversight of that particular facility. Our oversight is to pipelines and things that are moving in transportation. But I would say to your constituency that, you know, PHMSA is a small agency with a huge mission, and you will see the number of incidents going down, down, down over time. Our folks are dedicated to ensuring that nothing happens, and we really are moving towards zero incidents. So you walk around every day---- Ms. Hahn. And this facility actually has a rail line now. Ms. Quarterman. Yes. Ms. Hahn. And so this product is being---- Ms. Quarterman. Is moving in and out. Ms. Hahn. Is moving by rail. So---- Ms. Quarterman. Most of the time nothing happens. We are all surrounded by pipelines, by trucks moving hazardous materials, by trains every moment of the day. So we are talking about an infinitesimal possibility of something going wrong. I mean, really, considering the amount of---- Ms. Hahn. If it makes them sleep better at night. Ms. Quarterman. I know. Ms. Hahn. Well, if you would take a look into this facility and the railcars for me, I would appreciate it. Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Hahn. Mr. Cummings? Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Ms. Quarterman, in 2009 this committee conducted an investigation of DOT's hazmat program, and were made aware of an internal DOT analysis which showed that 60 to 90 percent of all accidents were unreported, and that little had been done to address it. The audit also found that there were several invisible risks where DOT had little to no data, such as LNG facility incidents, hazmat incidents in the maritime mode, loading and unloading of rail tank cars, and environmental effects of hazmat spills. Four years later, in September 2013, the GAO reported that DOT's incident data is still significantly flawed, raising concerns for what should be a data-driven agency. What is DOT doing to improve its hazmat data, particularly data on accidents and incidents? Ms. Quarterman. We have had, since the September of 2009, we have had teams working on data quality, especially with respect to unreported incidents. We now do our own intelligence gathering, if you will, for incidents that are not reported to us on the 5800 report. And we include those within our database. So we are trying to get data from as many different sources as possible, and include it within our system. And then we go out, we follow up with anybody who has not reported that incident. So I think our data quality has improved a great deal. I am not familiar with the GAO report that you are referring to---- Mr. Cummings. OK. Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. In 2013. Mr. Cummings. Well, do you think we are missing--still missing some of these incidents and accidents? Ms. Quarterman. I am certain we are missing some of these. I mean if they are not reported any place that we are looking, then we are not getting that. You know, the--we have very recently completed a data report about how we might do even more to clean up our data and make it better. But it is a resource-intensive exercise, and we need more resources to be able to continue to make our data better. We put in place an IT modernization program as part of the response to that 2009. We have had only small pieces of that funded. So it is an uphill battle, but I think we are doing a good job at cleaning up the data. Mr. Cummings. Well, in your testimony you indicated that, pursuant to MAP-21 legislation, PHMSA adopted a new rule on April 17, 2013, to remove the maximum penalty for a violation of hazardous materials rules, and to raise from $75,000 to $175,000 the maximum penalty for a knowing violation, and a violation resulting in death, serious illness, or severe injury to any person, or substantial destruction of property. How many times over the past decade has PHMSA assessed the maximum penalty for either a willful violation, a violation that resulted in death, or injury, or substantial destruction of property, and how--have any such penalties been assessed since the enactment of the new rule? Ms. Quarterman. I would have to go and get that data for you. I can tell you that our penalty authority has gone up. And for the first time, I think, in many, many years, we also revised our penalty guidelines, which sort of circumscribe how much the penalties are. In my view, the penalties are still extremely low. But I will provide that record for you---- Mr. Cummings. Yes. Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. That answer for you for the record. Mr. Cummings. How soon can you get that to me? Ms. Quarterman. We should be able to do it in a week or so. [The information follows:] Question: How many times over the past decade has PHMSA assessed the maximum penalty for either a willful violation, a violation that resulted in death, or injury, or substantial destruction of property? Answer: Seven (three at $50,000 and four at $55,000). Question: Have any such penalties been assessed since the enactment of the new rule? Answer: Zero. Mr. Cummings. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much. Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. I want to thank each of our witnesses for their testimony today. If there are no further questions, I would ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions that have been submitted to them in writing, and unanimous consent that the record remain open 15 days for any additional comments and information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's hearing. [No response.] Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. I would like to thank our witnesses again for their testimony. If no other Members have anything to add, this subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]