

[H.A.S.C. No. 113-83]

HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, AND
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
MARCH 5, 2014



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

87-615

WASHINGTON : 2014

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FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 5, 2014.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization budget request for the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command.

Joining us today are Admiral Samuel Locklear, General Lloyd Austin, and General David Rodriguez. Thank you for being with us.

Admiral Locklear, thank you for adapting your schedule to accommodate the Mid-Atlantic snow and ice.

He is not here, but one of my good friends that sits on this committee from Minnesota told me he was for global warming now. They have had 50 days below zero this winter.

The scope of this hearing is immense and it is doubtful that we will address all of the important issues we have here today, so I encourage members to submit questions for the record.

However, I do think the composite views of these three commanders provides an interesting and interactive opportunity to discuss the changing strategic environment, the global demand for forces, the implications of budget cuts and force reductions and risk among the commands.

Today's hearing is a study in contrast. The crisis unfolding in Ukraine is a sobering reminder that military strength, presence, and staying power in the world still matter.

And just yesterday, we received a budget request and new defense strategy that continues to cut our military strength and reduces our ability to respond to crises around the world.

The President's assumption that the tide of war is receding and that we can safely reduce American hard power in favor of soft power to assure our national security lies in stark contrast to reality. The majority of our vexing security challenges emanate from your three regions of the world: deterring an increasingly assertive

China; preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; denying Al Qaeda and its affiliates safe havens in Afghanistan and elsewhere to launch attacks against us and our allies; and stemming the violence and instability in the Middle East and North Africa within the context of the Arab Awakening.

These actors and others are surely watching how the United States responds to Russian aggression and some might be emboldened to further test U.S. resolve.

Our allies and partners are also closely watching. But in contrast, they worry about U.S. disengagement and the staying power of U.S. security agreements.

The administration has committed to a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific while also sustaining a heightened alert posture in the Middle East and North Africa.

How well are we doing both? A declining defense budget, reduction in troop strength and force structure, and diminished readiness, suggests that we can't do both; or if we do, we do so at an increased risk to our forces and their missions.

Nevertheless, the Department's new defense strategy and budget request take us down this path. I hope you can provide us with your best military judgment on the advisability of such an approach; how the strategy and budget reflect your mission requirements; and the implications for your command's force structure and needed capabilities.

This is a challenging time and we appreciate the leadership and counsel that you all provide us.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to our very distinguished panel. We very much appreciate your service and your terrific work for our country.

As the President—President, sorry—you mentioned the President, I almost called you the President, Mr. McKeon.

As the chairman said, you know, we could do a hearing entirely on, gosh, a dozen different issues from each of your regions. So, it is going to be an interesting challenge as we touch upon all of those topics and the challenges that are there.

But the chairman does correctly point out that at the top of this is the budget. It is certainly what we are thinking about.

You live with whatever budget you are given and then you go out and try to meet the challenges that each of your commands offers, you know; but the focus on the budget and where we go is an important part of what we do here.

I will say that it is wrong to assume that the President's budget reflects the President's opinion about, you know, where we think defense spending should go.

What the President's budget reflects is the top-line number that was given to him by this Congress; that is the amount of money that we all collectively decided to spend on defense.

So, I hope we will not waste a lot of time here saying that, “Gosh, I wish the Administration would spend more money on it.” If that is what we want to do, then we as Congress should get together and pass a budget that spends more money on it.

I have yet to see a proposal to actually do that, because apparently, we both want to dramatically cut what government spends and then complain about the impacts of what happens when you dramatically cut what government spends.

But the top-line number is the top-line number. That is what the President set the budget to.

And all I have really heard from the committee thus far is complaints about the things that were cut. And if we don’t cut some of those things—if we don’t do a base closure, if we don’t make some savings in personnel, if we don’t retire the A-10s or mothball 11 cruiser ships—then we have billions upon billions of dollars to make up somewhere else in the budget.

And I hope as we go forward, we will have that discussion. We as a committee will honestly say, “Look, I don’t think we should mothball those 11 cruisers, so here is where I am going to make up that \$5 billion from the cut.”

Or alternatively, as the President has done, he sent us an additional \$26 billion in spending on defense with the offsets to pay for it. Now, they are all offsets that the majority of Congress doesn’t like—they are increases in taxes and a variety of different things.

But if you want to spend \$26 billion more on the defense budget and find the savings elsewhere, then that, too, is a conversation we should have.

But to this point, since the budget has been released, all we have heard is an endless string of complaints about what is cut and an endless string of complaints about how the government is spending too much money.

That sort of hypocrisy is not going to serve our national security well. We need to resolve that issue and figure it out.

I will also point out that on the Ukraine, there are a whole lot of complex issues at work there, in terms of why Russia does what it does. I don’t think the United States defense budget is really one of them. Because back in 2008, when we had a defense budget well over \$700 billion and George W. Bush was President, Putin felt no limitation whatsoever on going into Georgia and essentially taking over two separate provinces, which he hasn’t given up, to date.

So there are a lot of complex issues at work here. I hope that we will understand them in their full context and work out in a non-partisan way to try to find out what the best solutions are.

Now, given your different areas, I will just touch on one I think is most important in each of yours.

Afghanistan, we are very interested in, General Austin. As, you know, President Karzai continues to cause us problems by not signing the Bilateral Security Agreement [BSA]—how you think we should best handle that.

I don’t believe that a zero option is the right way to go. We need a presence past the end of 2014 in order to continue to secure the transition that we have worked so hard to secure in Afghanistan; but how do we get there, given the fact that we can’t get the BSA signed?

General Rodriguez, particularly interested in Somalia and the Horn of Africa where AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] is most active, and the partnerships that we have built there. I think it is a real model for how we can have influence without having to spend as much money or commit as much troops.

Our working relationships with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, as well as others in the region, have really been a huge force multiplier in a critical part of the world. Curious, how that is going forward.

And then of course, in Asia, you know, our ongoing relationship with China. I was deeply encouraged that China and Taiwan not long ago had their first, I guess China would be reluctant to call it bilateral, let's just say their first meeting in forever. And I think there is some promise there. On the other hand, there are still many, many challenges in terms of how China overreaches on a variety of different issues, so I would be curious, in your viewpoints, as to how we work that out.

Again, thank you very much, we have a lot of ground to cover. I will yield back, and I thank the chairman for this hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Admiral, you want to lead off?

**STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, USN,
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. For 2 years, I have had the honor and the privilege of leading the exceptional men and women, both military and civilian, throughout the United States Pacific Command [PACOM]. They are not only skilled professionals who are dedicated to the defense of our great Nation, but within Pacific Command they serve as superb ambassadors and truly represent the values and strengths of our great Nation. We continue to work to ensure they are well-trained, that they are well-equipped, and that they are well-led to meet the challenges we are facing in the 21st century. So, I want to publicly thank them and their families for their sacrifices.

So, when I spoke to you last year, one day ago last year, I highlighted my concern of several issues that could challenge the security environment across the Pacific Command area of responsibility [AOR], which, in my view, I look at it as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Those challenges included the potential for significant humanitarian disasters; an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable North Korea; the continued escalation of complex territorial disputes; growing challenges to our freedom of action in the shared domains of the sea, the airspace, and cyberspace; growing regional transnational threats; and significant challenges associated with China's emergence as a global economic power and a regional military power.

And during the past year, we have been witness to all of these challenges, and our forces have been very busy attempting to secure the peace and defending U.S. interests throughout half of the globe. We have done our very best to remain ready to respond to

crisis and contingency, although that we have assumed greater risk. We have maintained focus on the key aspects of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, strengthening our alliances and partnerships and improving our posture and presence and developing the concepts and capabilities required by today's and tomorrow's security environment. And we have done all this against the backdrop of continued fiscal and resource uncertainty, and the resultant diminishing readiness and availability of our joint force.

I would like to thank the committee for your continued interest and support and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear can be found in the Appendix on page 56.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Austin.

**STATEMENT OF GEN LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

General AUSTIN. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the current posture and state of readiness of United States Central Command [CENTCOM]. I appreciate your strong and continued support of our men and women in uniform and their families, and I look forward to talking about them and the exceptional contributions that they are making on behalf of this command and our Nation.

I am pleased to be here alongside my colleagues, two very distinguished warriors, Admiral Sam Locklear and General Dave Rodriguez. I will join them in making a few brief opening comments, and then I am prepared to answer your questions.

I have been in command of CENTCOM for about a year now, and it has been an incredibly busy and productive period. We have dealt with a number of significant challenges to include the revolution in Egypt; the civil war in Syria that is severely impacting neighboring countries; Iranian aggression and malign activity; the perennial fight against Al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations; and of course, our top priority, which is the operation in Afghanistan.

The central region is an area fraught with turmoil, political instability and social upheaval, and economic stagnation. And while some may view it as a perpetual trouble spot, I don't believe that to be the case. When I look around the region, I see great potential for lasting improvement. But progress requires a clear understanding of the challenges and the particular circumstances.

Much of what is occurring in the CENTCOM AOR is the manifestation of the underlying currents at play in that strategically important part of the world, and foremost among them are the growing ethno-sectarian divide, the struggle between moderates and extremists, the rejection of corruption of oppressive governments, and an expanding "youth bulge" comprised of young, educated, unemployed, and often disenfranchised individuals.

And so, by understanding these currents, which are the root causes of the disruptive and destructive behaviors in the region, we and others are able to help mitigate the effects. We are also able to identify and pursue the many opportunities that are present

amidst the challenges. And that has been and will remain our focus at Central Command. What occurs in the central region has shown to have significant and lasting impacts on the global economy, on our vital interests, and those of our partner nations. Thus, it is critical that we continue to do what is necessary to maintain our influence and access and to contribute to strengthening regional security and stability. We are also focused on building the capacity and capability of our allies, while further improving our military-to-military relationships.

I have traveled extensively over the past year throughout the Middle East and South and Central Asia, and I have talked at great length with senior government and military officials about the challenges and the opportunities present in the region, and I can assure you that the opinion and support of the United States is still widely sought and highly valued. Our regional partners have seen what we are able to accomplish, and they respect and appreciate our leadership. Our military relationships are as strong as they have ever been, and they are indeed the foundation of America's strategic partnerships with almost every country in our area of responsibility.

The year ahead provides significant opportunities for the United States, together with our partners and our allies, both in the region and beyond. Opportunities to achieve diplomatic and military successes that will further contribute to improve security and stability in our area of responsibility. And certainly, while we remain pragmatic, we are also hopeful that the opportunity provided by the P5+1 [United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France, plus Germany] and the Joint Plan of Action, for example, will have a positive outcome, and that could fundamentally change the region for the better. We are likewise encouraged by the tremendous progress made by the Afghans, and the opportunity that exists to establish a lasting partnership with the people of that country. It is a partnership that we want to have going forward, and the people of Afghanistan have made it clear that they want the same thing. And these are just two examples.

The reality is that there are a number of opportunities present in the region, and the CENTCOM team stands postured and ready to do our part to pursue them, while also addressing the various challenges that exist in that complex and most important part of the world.

Ours is a very challenging mission, and it is made even more difficult by the realities of the fiscal environment; but given the enormity of the stakes, we will do what is required, and we will continue to work closely with and support the efforts of our colleagues across the interagency, to ensure a whole-of-government approach that provides for lasting and positive outcomes.

Ladies and gentlemen, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen, and their families, have worked exceptionally hard over the past 13 years. I have had the honor of serving beside them in combat. I have been privileged to lead them as they did difficult work, under some of the most difficult conditions in the world, and I have been humbled by their acts of absolute selflessness, as they have made enormous sacrifices on almost a daily basis in support of the mission and in support of one another.

I am incredibly proud of them, and I know that you are as well. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you for continuing to provide the capabilities, authorities, and resources that we need to effectively execute our mission in the strategic environment that I have described. And most importantly, thank you again for the strong support that you consistently show to our service men and women and their families, particularly those associated with the United States Central Command. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Austin can be found in the Appendix on page 82.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
General Rodriguez.

**STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

General RODRIGUEZ. [Off mic.]

The CHAIRMAN. Is your mic on, General?

General RODRIGUEZ. It is now, sir.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on the efforts of the United States Africa Command [AFRICOM]. I am honored to be testifying with General Austin and Admiral Locklear today. In light of the expanding connections between Africa Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command, I think it is fitting that we are appearing before this committee together.

Africa Command is adapting our strategy and approach to address growing opportunities and threats to U.S. national interests. In the past year, we have seen progress in regional and multinational cooperation in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, maritime security, and countering the Lord's Resistance Army. The successes to date of the African Union mission in Somalia, French and United Nations activities in Mali, and the African Union's regional task force against the Lord's Resistance Army are examples of this progress.

Along with this progress, Al Shabaab remains a persistent threat in East Africa, and is conducting more lethal and complex attacks, as demonstrated by the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi last September, and the attack on the Somali presidential palace last month.

Terrorist groups in North and West Africa are more actively sharing resources and planning attacks. And while piracy rates are stable after a steep decline in East Africa, they remain at concerning rates in West Africa.

Our tailored contributions to building partner capacity and enabling partners are critical to mitigating immediate threats in countries like Somalia and Mali. By supporting the gradual development of effective and democratic African security institutions, and professional forces that respect civilian authority, our shaping activities also reduce the likelihood of U.S. involvement in future interventions in Africa.

Our expanding security challenges in Africa make it vitally important that we align our resources with priorities across the globe,

strengthen and leverage all our partnerships, and increase our operational flexibility.

Sharpening our prioritization and deepening partnerships will help to mitigate risks and increase our effectiveness in a dynamic security environment.

Our Nation will face tough decisions about risks and tradeoffs in the future, and Africa Command will continue to work collaboratively with other combatant commands and the Joint Staff to provide our best military advice to inform decisionmakers about managing risk in our area of responsibility and beyond.

Thank you for your continued support to our mission and the men and women of Africa Command, who, every day, do their absolute best to make a difference for the United States.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Rodriguez can be found in the Appendix on page 129.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The ranking member was correct that the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs did not set the top line on the budget. The problem that we have, though, is—I think we cut too much out of Defense. I think probably most of the members of this committee agree.

And the budget that they presented to us didn't take into account sequestration. I know the media gave a lot of attention to the cuts in the Army, that would take the Army down to the lowest level since World War II. And the number was 440,000. But when they presented that budget in an earlier meeting to us, the Secretary and General Dempsey—they said that 440,000 would be if sequestration went away.

If sequestration remains in effect and kicks back in at the end of this budget deal that they worked out for the next year, the troop level would actually have to go down to 420,000, which is even worse than the budget that they are presenting and talking to us about.

What I would like to ask you gentlemen specifically—the reduction in troop strength and the force structure and the program terminations and delays—how will they affect your ability to meet your mission requirements and manage risks?

The Secretary said this budget would cause increased risk. What are the most significant gaps and shortfalls that you will see in your commands as you move forward, given this budget?

Admiral.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Thank you, sir.

The problem for the Pacific Command is severalfold. One, it is—about 52 percent of the world is in the Pacific Command. Much of what we do in the Pacific Command, because of vast size—the fact that there are five of our treaty allies that are there. A growing number of partners. A growing amount of our economy, growing number of national security—or U.S. security issues in that region. A rising China—those things all make a security environment that is more complex, not to mention, a very unpredictable and increasingly dangerous North Korea situation.

So, what we have endured in the last couple of years with the changes in the fiscal environment through sequestration is a requirement to try to keep the forces that are forward, they have to—

what we would refer to as the crisis response forces—those that would have to be able to respond quickly on the Korean Peninsula, that have to be able to respond should one of our allies be threatened.

The services, through our request, have had to move readiness from the rest of the global force, in particular, the force that is here in CONUS [continental United States]—and to push it in our direction so that we can keep those forces that have to do something quickly ready. And they have done that.

But it was at significant expense of the follow-on force. And the follow-on force are really what provide the deterrent value of the joint force, in general, in the Pacific AOR.

So, the forces that would have to follow immediately on any crisis or contingency that come from the United States—the readiness levels, in my view, are unacceptable to be able to support that in the timelines that we would need. This has created a number of years, based on the projections of the budget, for the services to recover that readiness in the force that we have today.

So, how has it impacted me otherwise? It is also—I also rely not only on the forces that are forward, but I rely on rotational force, particularly in the air and maritime area. Of the 52 percent of the world, only 17 percent of my part of the world is landmass. It happens that 6 out of every 10 people in the world live in that 17 percent. But the other 83 percent would be what I refer to as “grand commons”—“global commons”—that have to be protected from a cyber or space, maritime, air perspective.

And so, we will, because of the readiness of the force today—the depressed readiness of that force—the ability for the services to provide the type of maritime coverage, the air coverage of some of the key elements that we have historically needed in this part of the world for a crisis response have not been available to the level that I would consider acceptable risk.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

General AUSTIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, Central Command is responsible for a smaller piece of the globe, but we own about 90 percent of the problems currently that our country is facing in terms of issues that have arisen. And my concern with a shrinking budget would be whether or not the services would have what they need to provide trained and ready forces in a timely fashion.

I would be—I am further concerned about their ability to refurbish that critical equipment that we have used extensively over the past 13 years or so while we have been engaged in combat. And in addition to that, there are critical enablers, like ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], that—you know, as the top line decreases, we have less of an ability to provide those critical enablers that I think have been game changers in our fights in the past.

So, overall, Mr. Chairman, the ability of the services to provide those trained and ready forces and the critical enablers are what cause me greatest concern.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General.

General RODRIGUEZ. Sir, in the AFRICOM area of responsibility, the biggest risks that we see in the future are mainly in the intelligence area, as General Austin talked about. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as well as the intelligence personnel who support AFRICOM—many of them have been funded by OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations]. So, we are challenged in that area.

We also have a significant amount of activity going on throughout the area of responsibility, and in very, very small elements. So, I worry about medical evacuation and personal recovery and mobility assets, some of which, you know, were challenged during the past year because of sequestration and because of the readiness levels that those mobility air and—both helicopter and fixed-wing aviation assets were allowed to maintain.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I can remember years ago when Duncan Hunter was chairman or ranking member. He used to carry a little card that showed all the different shortfalls that you have each pointed out in your specific commands. And I remember what we did at that time was we asked if you had an additional amount of money, what would you buy? And I remember some of the things were bullets, canteens, tents.

Basically, we were well under-equipped. And I am hearing the same thing. It is just different things, but it is the same thing—that you have needs that are unmet through this budget, which puts us at greater risk as we go forward.

I appreciate your frankness and your ability to relate to us what your needs are.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will pick one of those regions of the world.

General Rodriguez, can you tell us a little bit about—update us on the situation in Mali and sort of West and North Africa, where you see the threats? Exactly how they have evolved in Mali and Libya, in sort of the very unstable part of the world where Al Qaeda and various affiliates are active. What are the groups we are worried about? How are we progressing in terms of being able to contain those threats?

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. Thank you.

In northwest Africa, the threats that are there are from Libya, and really, only into CENTCOM area of responsibility in Egypt. And it stretches down through the Maghreb and Sahel regions down to northern Mali.

The challenge in Mali was a very fragile situation with the government and the military leadership. And after Libya fell, there was a surge and a tremendous amount of fighters who flowed in and out of there, as well as arms, ammunition, explosives that have spread throughout the region. That is what caused the challenges in northern Mali, which both the French—initially, an African Union force, and now the U.N. [United Nations] forces have disrupted and moved a little bit north out of the challenging areas in northern Mali, where they had a new election, and have started on the road to rebuilding that country.

But between there and Libya, those support networks and movement of arms, ammunition, explosives, as well as personnel, continues to create security and stability challenges for those countries.

And we are working with all of them, as well as working with our partners, mainly the French, but also the Italians, the Brits, the Moroccans—have all worked to support the efforts, as well as the Turks in Libya.

So, what we are trying to do to help out the challenges in north-west Africa is work in a multinational effort, as I said down in Mali, 9 African nations going up to 16 are helping to participate there and regionalize the effort.

And in Libya, four of our European partners and another African partner are going to help to build that security forces up there.

They will continue to be challenged by borders and their inability to disrupt the movement and the flow of fighters and equipment, but we are going to continue to work to regionalize that problem and help all of them build the capacity to do it.

Mr. SMITH. Are there particular groups in that region that you think pose a transnational threat, or is it, at this point, primarily local conflicts?

General RODRIGUEZ. Most of them are local conflicts. Obviously, they have the will and the aspirations to do more than that.

In the—from the European perspective, of course, they are much closer to the problem, so they are extremely concerned about the illegal movement of personnel and equipment and terrorists in their southern border.

And it is—will depend, obviously, on how much pressure that we can continue to put on them with our—you know, in cooperation with our allies, whether they will be able to expand their capabilities outside the region.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

General RODRIGUEZ. The ones—the most troubling areas are in eastern Libya and southwestern Libya right now. But they flow and move, again, where they, you know, have the weakest government and security infrastructure.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

And gentlemen, I literally have dozens of questions, but I want to get my colleagues in there. We have had opportunity to speak before the hearing. So, I thank you for your service.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, Generals—thank you for your service and for the service of all those who serve under your commands.

You have heard two lines of questions really set forth before this committee—one is that we should be limiting ourselves to asking questions about how much do we have to spend and how do we best allocate those dollars. Many of us reject that limitation, as I believe does the chairman, and believe we should also be asking what do we need to do to defend the United States of America?

In asking that second set of questions, there are some who will characterize that as an endless chain of complaints about cuts. We reject that characterization.

We believe that it is an endless chain of warnings, warnings that the most expensive acquisition the United States could have over the next 10 years would be cheap armies and cheap navies.

And to that, Admiral Locklear, you have the distinct privilege and responsibility of having under your command a body of water that both the President and the Secretary of Defense have said it is absolutely crucial to the national defense strategy of this country over the next decade.

Is it fair to say that almost all, if not all of the countries in that region, the Asia-Pacific area, are actually increasing their navies at this time?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would say as a general statement, that is true. You know, we have 7 of the—it is the most militarized region of the world; not only navies—we have 7 of the 10 largest armies in my AOR; we have all the largest navies.

And many of our allies and our partners are growing maritime capabilities because for many decades, they relied solely on—primarily on the U.S. as an underwriter of maritime security—since World War II. And they focused internally on their militaries—on internal security.

And as they have become more prosperous and more—in some cases, more democratic, they have become internally more secure, which is a good thing; it led the rise of Asia.

But at the same time, now, they are looking at their commons and they are saying—into their economic zones—and they are saying, “How do I know what is going on and how do I protect it?”

So, they are building an ever more aggressive navy; submarine forces, high-end military capabilities.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, would it be fair to say that virtually every major contingency plan we have for that region—that our aircraft carriers are at the point or the front of that contingency plan?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would say that in my AOR, that aircraft carriers play a significant role in any crisis or any contingency, whether it is a reaction to a humanitarian disaster like we just had in the Philippines, which was reacted to almost simultaneous at occurring by the aircraft carrier and the forces that were there and then the Marine forces that came in and helped the joint force buildup.

But in any crisis or contingency, for this—for now and the foreseeable future, they play a significant role.

Mr. FORBES. Do you see, based on current situations, any gaps in your carrier deployment that you either have now or see in the foreseeable future?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. From my assessment, the global demand on maritime forces in general, which include our aircraft carrier force, far exceed what the Navy is able to resource.

So, it has implications that push risk in my direction when those forces that I would need—I believe that acceptable risks are not available because they are either not ready or they are somewhere else in the world.

Mr. FORBES. And we can argue over the number of ships that we should have in our Navy—some think 306, some 313, some 346.

But let's put that on the table for a minute. If our Navy were to go down to 250 plus or minus ships, could we remain a superpower, based on your analysis and professional military judgment?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I don't know that the size of a military is the only element of being a world power. But I do sense that world powers are globally dispersed in the maritime commons—probably in the air commons, as well as upcoming cyber and space commons.

In my estimation, a navy that is—the Navy that we have today—can't support the global requirements. I mean, when I was a young officer, I never considered that we would be contemplating operations in the Antarctic, but that will come—probably in the very near future.

I couldn't have found the Horn of Africa probably on a chart—or wasn't familiar with it. But now, we operate routinely there.

I would have never anticipated that there would be the kind of tensions in the vast South China Sea over territorial rights and fishing rights—or in the East China Sea.

And so, I can't tell you at what number we would no longer become a global maritime power, but we are getting close.

Mr. FORBES. Okay, thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, again, for being before us.

I have a question for PACOM commander. Admiral, before I pose the question, I understand that countries like Vietnam are asking for a closer military cooperation with the U.S. as a result of the East Sea maritime dispute.

I know that it is—that you are the military guy, but you do sit in on the civilian side as policy is being made.

And I would strongly urge you, along with the Department of Defense, to take Vietnam's human rights issues into consideration before committing to any maritime security package—because I believe that this country has been really terrible in its human rights issues; they continue to say they are going to do something and then they just get worse.

With that in mind, Admiral, can you provide this committee with your observations on the evolving security challenges presented by the ongoing maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas?

And from a contingency standpoint, I mean, what would you consider would be our role if things begin to devolve and get out of hand, with respect to those disputes?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Thank you. And first, I would very much take your comments and counsel on the human rights.

We track very closely with the State Department; we follow their lead to ensure that—and the Department of Justice to ensure that we are within the boundaries of what is legal to be able to do. And we are very sensitive to that because—for all the right reasons.

If you take a look at the territorial disputes, you ask yourself, “How did this all happen in this generation?” Well, what—why has it—it has just now popped up.

Well, reality—they have been around for a long time. But there hasn’t been much motivation to have to deal with them.

There were plenty of fish resources; energy resources weren’t that important. China was not on the rise that it is today.

And we didn’t have, until the 1980s, which we are not a signatory to—we didn’t have the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, which defined how you would lay out what belongs to you and your EEZs [exclusive economic zones]—your economic zones.

So, all that culminated in this century where now everybody—all these nations taking a look at, well, how do I ensure that for my sovereignty, that I have access to these in the way that I see them?

So, in the East China Sea and in the north there, over the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands, there is the issue between China and Japan that you are all very familiar with.

In that case, I think we made it clear—the role of the U.S. and the alliance with Japan and that those islands fall within what we consider a mutual defense treaty boundaries. And that has been stated widely by the Secretary of State; and so, we would—that is kind of the policy there.

How that will play out in the long run between the Chinese and Japanese would be speculation. But at this stage, we are watching it very carefully.

In the South China Sea, if you take a look at all the overlapping complaint—claims, it looks—it is like chicken soup. I mean, it is so complex—who would own what.

And so, there is really—it might be the only way forward is for them to use the international law—international tribunals to be able to come to agreement. And we have seen successes of that throughout the AOR where countries come together—they get a tribunal to be able to look at it and then they accept that.

What is complicated, though, I think is the perspective that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] or China has on their claims and the way that they are approaching those.

First, they don’t—they take a historic view of the South China Sea and they have a—what I think is a loosely defined historic nine-dash line, which basically gives them the entire fishing rights and mineral rights and EEZ rights to the South China Sea.

And this is in direct conflict with many of their neighbors who have similar claims and are looking to protect them.

There is—PRC, or China, has also done things, I think, that exacerbated the situation by establishment of an air defense zone in the East China Sea. And you understand what the U.S. position is on that.

So, the way ahead here is, first of all, I think that the role of an ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] is important. That the 10 nations of ASEAN who have equities, particularly in this part of the world, have got to be supported. And they have—they need to come together and to have a voice on how these things are dealt with. In particular, as it relates to how they deal with China.

They very much need to go forward quickly on a code of conduct that China needs to agree with to prevent miscalculation in the South China Sea.

Our role on it is—number one, is to be able to sense and understand what is going on. So, ISR assets are very important to me in that part of the world.

And then for us to be able to share information where necessary with our allies and with our partners so that there is a common understanding of what is actually happening in there.

But in the end, these things will need to be solved through arbitration, through legal means, through international forums, and not through coercion, which, we, as a U.S. policy, do not support coercive behavior to get to your claims by any claimant.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I appreciate it.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being here today.

I am very grateful. I have four sons currently serving in the military. At different times, they have been under your command. And I have always had faith in your leadership and your service, so thank you very, very much.

General Rodriguez, in your opinion, if AFRICOM headquarters were relocated to the continental United States, would you be able to accomplish your mission effectively?

General RODRIGUEZ. Sir, the Secretary of Defense—the former one looked at that, and the recommendation was to continue to leave it where it was. The strengths of keeping it in Europe is the close coordination with our international partners mainly, who are in Europe, as well as access to the continent. So, right now, for the foreseeable future, we are going to continue to leave it in that location.

Mr. WILSON. And, well, if it ever relocates to the continental United States, Charleston, South Carolina, comes to mind. With military facilities and—we also have a shared culture with West Africa, so there is a relationship which is very positive.

And, General Austin, what potential options and courses of actions have we considered if the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, allowing Al Qaeda's increasing presence and influence, which is creating safe havens to attack America?

General AUSTIN. Thank you, sir.

This is an issue that the Iraqis have to solve for themselves. And I think we can and should do some things to help them, because we face a common enemy.

As you know, we have spent a considerable amount of time battling Al Qaeda in Iraq in the past. And as that enemy resurfaces, I think it is prudent for us to do everything within our power to ensure that we help countries in the region, specifically Iraq, battle this enemy. And we are doing some things.

As you know, sir, we have provided them some munitions and some weapons, based upon their request. You know, I have engaged Prime Minister Maliki personally. I have talked to their senior leaders about what they are doing, and revisited some lessons

learned from the past in terms of how you combat the type of enemy that they are currently faced with.

But, again, it is in our best interest to make sure that they can address this problem and keep it from further spreading.

Now, part of the solution—a major part of the solution is going to have to be a political solution. They are going to have to accommodate the Sunnis in a much greater way. And I think that counsel has been provided to the prime minister from a number of people.

Mr. WILSON. And, general, thank you very much. I had two sons serve in Iraq, and so it was, indeed, painfully obvious the Sunni-Shiite divide. And, as you say, it needs to be bridged.

Admiral Locklear, the Joint POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] Accounting Command's POW/MIA mission can assist PACOM in building partnerships with countries in the region capitalizing on the humanitarian aspect of JPAC's [Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command] mission.

Do you feel this is a useful tool for the PACOM commander? Additionally, if JPAC were not part of PACOM, but a worldwide asset, would you be able to capitalize on the mission of building partnerships?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first, let me say that the mission that JPAC does—already, they are a global outfit already. And the mission they do is essential, I think, for how we define ourselves as a military, as a nation—the fact that we show to the rest of the world that we go to great lengths to go bring our fallen MIAs home when we can find them is absolutely the right thing to do.

I think that they do—in fact, I know they do play a significant role in our interaction with nations throughout my AOR. In particular, where we can encourage through this humanitarian mission, which—I would call it that—the access to places where we may not have access.

So, we have very successful, ongoing operations as our host, for instance, in Vietnam. And we are looking for opportunities in Indonesia. Just last year, we were almost ready to move into North Korea, just before there was a provocation. And we were not—we were unable to do that, but that would have been—an almost unheard of thing is to have U.S. forces, U.S. scientists supported by JPAC in North Korea. Unfortunately, we weren't able to survive.

If they are aligned as a—as you put it, as a more global outfit, does it impact—I don't think—not necessarily. I think any operation that JPAC would do—recovery—that was in my AOR would have to be coordinated, as it would be with any of these other COCOMs [combatant commands], should there be the requirement in their command. So, I don't see that as a problem.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. And thank you for leaving no one behind.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of you for being here, and, of course, for your extraordinary service.

Admiral Locklear, just to follow up a little bit—and I am sorry I ran in on the middle of that response, but when you look at the budget request of the \$128 million for military infrastructure in the

AOR, what—what about that concerns you in some ways? Do you—what is it that you really believe is so critical to do? And is this going to cover it?

And also, where else do you think we really need to be looking in terms of that infrastructure?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you.

In my AOR, there is historic infrastructure that we support through longstanding alliances with Japan, Korea. And so, that infrastructure is important as it relates to the success of that alliance as we go forward. And both of those alliances in Japan and Korea, I think, will continue for the long term. And that infrastructure needs to be in place to support the alliance properly.

So, that is the kind of—that infrastructure. We also have the infrastructure that is in our territories and the infrastructure that is in Hawaii, for instance, that is important. As you look at the vastness of the Pacific—the forces that generate and the command and control from Hawaii as we look forward into Guam and we look forward into the theater—all that becomes important for us to be able to ensure that all the blood and sweat that the U.S. put into gaining access to those back in the 1940s, that we maintain that infrastructure in a way that we can access it when it is in our national interest to be able to do that.

We are also, though, not going to build any more bases overseas in other countries. We have made that decision. We are going forward with our allies and our partners to look at opportunities for us to partner together, to look for access agreements.

The ongoing operations that we have in the northern territories of Australia—where we are partnering with them to get to use ranges and to have some access on a mutually agreeable basis.

We are looking for the opportunity to close an access agreement with the Philippines that allows us to provide support to their minimum credible defense. At the same time, to be able to position ourselves better for everything from humanitarian assistance to disaster relief.

And with that, there are some infrastructure requirements that come. And I know that there is always a competition between, well, what you build at home and what you build overseas. I can assure you that when we look at this, we keep that in mind, and that we look for opportunities to leverage our allies and our partners as heavily as we can. Because they all have—most of them growing economies. Most of them have growing militaries. And we are figuring that into our long-term strategy.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay, thank you. I appreciate that.

I was looking for a little more specifics in terms of where you might see a shortfall that really needs to be addressed. And if you could provide me with that later, that would be helpful. Thank you.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Be happy to.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 147.]

Mrs. DAVIS. General Austin, I think we are all concerned about what is going to happen in Afghanistan. Having traveled there on numerous occasions, and particularly, meeting with women in rural areas, as well as the parliamentarians—how do you—I mean, how do we really talk about, I think, ensuring that the strides that have

been made for women, particularly, and girls in education, are not going to be lost, as we move forward—as they move forward?

I think this has always been about Afghans—securing Afghans. But at the same time, we know that it is going to take more than that.

General AUSTIN. Well, thank you, ma'am. I think it is—I mean, there is not much question in anyone's mind that, you know, the presence of the coalition here for, you know, some time in the future, will help to allow this wonderful thing that has begun to happen continue to evolve.

And, as you know, since you have been there a number of times, you know, Afghanistan was one of the most repressive countries in the world with respect to women's rights. And as we look at, you know, the impact that we have had some 13 years later, it really is remarkable.

Having said that, there is a long way to go. We fully appreciate that. But, you know, back in 2003, when I first entered the country, to think that we would have one day a police chief in the city of Kabul, and perhaps one day soon, a police chief—a female police chief in the city of Herat—sergeants major in the Army—

Mrs. DAVIS. It—sir, I guess—if I could interrupt. Is there something specific that we can point to that signals that that is being done and I can—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time is expired.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know many members have interest in that question area, so perhaps you could expand your answers in writing.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 147.]

Mr. TURNER. General Austin, General Rodriguez, I recognize, of course, General Austin, that you are the commander for Central Command; and General Rodriguez, the commander of Africa Command.

But my question to you is actually going to be about Europe—but it is not going to be about the recent change of events that have occurred with Russia and Ukraine; but it is going to be of the importance of our forward basing troops in Europe to your command.

Now, there are many in Congress—some people, even, on this committee—who question the forward basing of our troops in Europe.

Many times, I think it is a result because Congress misses the nexus of the importance of having those troops forward deployed for even your jobs and your positions.

So, I wanted to ask you if you could, please, help make that connection for us. Could you please describe what effect it would have upon you if we did not have our troops forward based in Europe?

And also, how do they enable your ability to carry out missions in Africa and the Middle East, moving critical supplies and supporting the missions that you currently have—and also, in missions that you might foresee?

And does it assist in, also, your ability to maintain international partnership? If you would, please, gentlemen, describe those re-

sources that we have in Europe and how they are important to your commands. General Austin?

General AUSTIN. Well, certainly all the forces that we could have forward deployed that they are within support distance—reasonable distance to be able to quickly support us—it is value added. And I would say further that if they are stationed in the Central Command region, that is even better.

But, you know, we have seen a number of examples of us using those—some of those capabilities; most recently, I think as everyone watched the potential strike against Syria, you know that there were forces from both Central Command and European Command that were involved in that planning and potential execution.

We have shared, you know, capabilities throughout; you know that we have made good use of the hospitals that are based in European area. We have used that region to transit, in terms of providing supplies to our soldiers.

So, it has been of great benefit and——

Mr. TURNER. General Austin—and I appreciate your statements of how it assists. But, you know, my understanding would be that you wouldn't be able to do the job you do if they were not there. Is that correct?

If suddenly that asset was not there for you, wouldn't that significantly impact your operations?

General AUSTIN. It would have an impact, yes, sir. But——

Mr. TURNER. General Rodriguez—your view?

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. Those—first of all, the relationships with our European partners are critical because they are also helping—working together in our multinational efforts.

They also provide the majority of the forces that I employ on the African continent and we have now put together some great force-sharing agreements where they are much more flexible.

So, every which way you can think of, whether it be supportive forces, supportive bases, or logistical support, the bases in Europe are critical to our mission in Africa. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. General, thank you.

Admiral Locklear, as we now look to Russia having invaded the Ukraine, many are concerned that the adventurous environment might result in China taking action against either the Philippines or Japan.

Do you have similar concerns that the current environment might encourage activities that we are all concerned about?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, my assessment today is that I don't have a lot of concerns that what is happening in Ukraine with Russia would motivate a change in the current status in the East China Sea or the South China Sea. So, I don't see that having a bearing. I am watching carefully what is coming out of the general press and what is being said by the diplomats in China about it; and my sense is that they are looking at this carefully to make sure that they—their perspective as a global leader—that they are having a measured perspective on this. That is my take of this——

Mr. TURNER. Admiral, quick question—are you more concerned about China's perhaps involvement with the Philippines or Japan, with respect to territorial conflicts?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I am concerned about them both. I would say that in the—probably if I were going to look at it from the Chinese perspective, I think they are very clear of the position in the East China Sea—the U.S. positions there.

As it relates to the broader, undefined areas in the South China Sea and the U.S. role in that position is less clearly defined. But we have been pretty firm on ensuring that every—all the claimants understand the U.S. position on no coercion, no change to status quo.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Admiral and Generals—welcome to the hearing.

And Admiral Locklear, I welcome you particularly because you have been able to brave the snowstorms and be here.

Admiral, Guam has maintained a robust depot-level ship repair capability for several decades now.

So, in 2005, the ship repair capability assisted in the emergent repair of the USS *San Francisco*, which ran into an underwater seamount. The repairs helped to keep the submarine operational until it could return to the West Coast for comprehensive repairs.

How important, in your opinion, is the depot-level ship repair capability with a dry dock capability to your responsibilities in the Pacific AOR?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. So, very important.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very important—thank you.

Another question, Admiral, I have for you—this past December, the governor of Okinawa signed a landfill permit allowing for the initial construction of the runway of Henoko.

Now, can you comment on the significance of this event and what that means for the realignment of Marines on Okinawa?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The signing of the landfill permit and the beginning work on the facility at Camp Schwab is not directly connected to the realignment of Marines. So, the realignment of Marines will go forward based on other initiatives such as infrastructure that has to be built in Guam and things like that.

That said, I would say that, first of all, we are very happy that the government of Japan got the landfill permit signed.

I think it is an indication of the government of Japan's commitment to the alliance and the changes necessary to make the alliance endure for the future. So, we are happy that it got signed.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. The final question is also for you, Admiral, and addresses a developing issue. I would like to address the issue of illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing in the Pacific AOR.

Several of our allies and partners in the region are complaining about illegal fishing in their respective EEZs. Now, in some cases, this overfishing is causing economic and security impacts.

Can you comment on the significance of this issue and what more the U.S. can do to combat this destabilizing activity?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I think the likelihood of illegal fishing in Oceania will only go up as the global fisheries and supplies of fish becomes under more pressure and fishermen move to places

where the fish actually are, which I think remains a reasonable amount of stocks in Oceania.

Most of the nations, or most of the folks in Oceania— island nations do not have the capability to properly, adequately monitor and understand what is happening in their economic zones. So, the ability for them to be taken advantage of to their economic detriment is growing.

The Coast Guard in the Pacific and the U.S. Navy in the Pacific work closely together to support, where we can, programs that allow us to help the nations monitor their economic zones for illegal fishing.

It is not comprehensive. It is the best we can do with the resources that we have over a vast, vast area.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Admiral. And I agree with you on the Coast Guard; I think we are undermanned and certainly could use more help in that area. Do you agree?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I have to refer that to the commandant of the Coast Guard. But I have always been amazed of how much our Coast Guard does for how small it is.

Ms. BORDALLO. And a vast area that they have to look after. Well, thank you very much.

And I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you all for your service; I appreciate that.

General Austin, can you talk to us a little bit about the missions and risks associated with the residual force level less than 10,000 in Afghanistan after this year? And also, what is your best professional military judgment on what would happen in Afghanistan in a zero option?

General AUSTIN. Well, certainly I think a zero option would be very problematic for the country of Afghanistan. I think the military would fracture because of a lack of support, both fiscally and our inability to provide advice and counsel—further advice and counsel to the Afghan security forces.

I think it would also be bad for the region. I think we would see significant hedging activity with the key countries in that region; and again, that would lead towards greater instability for some time to come.

With respect to the size of the force, as you know, our leadership is currently undergoing a decisionmaking process to really determine what that size of the force is going to be going forward.

I would just say that the size of the force is always based upon what missions you are trying to accomplish. Our principal missions, you know, going forward, will be to continue to advise the Afghan security forces, also to counter terrorism and you—as you know, sir, that is why we went there in the first place—to really push back on the folks that attacked us and take away their capability to do that in the future.

And so—as we do those things, I think it is necessary, also, to be able to provide force protection for the force that is deployed.

And as you evaluate what is required to accomplish those missions, you know, the smaller you get, the greater the risk is to the

mission, and the greater the risk to the force. So, those are the things that we have to balance out.

Mr. CONAWAY. The—whatever cap is set, would personnel associated with the example of Bagram, the world-class trauma center there, would they count against that cap? In other words, the issue is, we currently have, for the last, all these years, enjoyed an opportunity to save lives—battlefield injuries—that—under the golden hour and those kind of things by having Bagram there, the trauma center there is an important issue.

Will that go away under smaller forces? And we, in fact, begin to lose men and women—

General AUSTIN. Well, certainly—

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. To combat injuries that would otherwise not be lost?

General AUSTIN. Yes. Pardon me, sir.

Certainly, as, you know, we determine the size of the force, we will have to figure out what is required to support that force. And all of the forces there will be accounted for in that—whatever the number is.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

Pivoting over to the Gulf region—we have two Air Force bases there, military bases there that are currently funded under OCO. If that is unable to pivot to the regular budget, what impact will losing the base at Qatar and UAE [United Arab Emirates] be to our ability to operate?

General AUSTIN. Well, these are critical capabilities to us, sir, in terms of our ability to respond rapidly to contingencies, our ability to provide command and control. And I think, you know, going forward, it will be essential that we maintain those capabilities if at all possible.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. And just for this public forum, can you give us a quick couple of seconds on efforts with respect to getting Sergeant Bergdahl back?

General AUSTIN. Well, I can tell you, sir, that, you know, I am committed—my entire command is committed to getting Sergeant Bergdahl back. I just met with his parents in December. They came down and spent 2 days in my headquarters, and we walked them through all the things that we were doing to get Bowe back. And that remains at the top of my list to get things done. And, you know, so we will—I give you my guarantee that we will remain focused on that.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right, I appreciate that.

Real quickly, Admiral, the—for years now, our boats transiting the Strait of Hormuz have been working against not having some sort of incident occur with the Iranian boats—those kind of things. As we work in the South China Sea, do your boat drivers have the same kind of focus on what are the rules of engagement there?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, as I said earlier, we have encouraged the ASEAN nations, who operate out there, too, to pursue a code of conduct, particularly over the territorial disputes. But when it comes to maritime forces that are operating there, in particular, I assume you are referring to our interactions with the PLA [People's Liberation Army]—

Mr. CONAWAY. Right.

Admiral LOCKLEAR [continuing]. Navy, the Chinese Navy. We have mechanisms in place where we have dialogue. I mean, we have a—in general, our relationship with the Chinese today is co-operative, but competitive, and we know where there are areas where we have friction. And we do operate in close proximity to each other. And we have mechanisms that are run in my headquarters through—in Beijing, where we get together and talk about those issues so we can have a professional atmosphere. And so far, I would say that we are doing pretty well with each other, operating in those regions and respecting each other's professionalism and operating together.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here and all that you do to defend our country in a very dynamic and challenging world. So, I thank you for that.

And, as we have heard some comment sort of debating the impact of budget cuts on all that you do, I am very mindful of what Admiral Mullen said some years ago, that—he has said, quote, “I have said many times that I believe the single biggest threat to our national security is our debt.” So, I also believe we have every responsibility to help eliminate that threat. We must and will do our part.

And all that we are doing today is really in response to a daunting Federal budget deficit. So, I appreciate the tough choices that you are having to make.

I also remember another hearing in which a gentleman who—I wish I had his name before me—said that “a strategy without restraint—without fiscal restraint is not a strategy,” and that “fiscal restraint is really a forcing function.” It forces some very difficult choices, but some—perhaps in the end, better choices. Because we have to think very thoughtfully about where to put our efforts.

So, if we want something different, what we really need is a more balanced approach, and we look—in which we look not just at cuts across the discretionary budget and elsewhere, but also ways to bring revenue into the equation.

So, this hearing is really a very important part of our way forward. And I appreciate all that you are doing.

I am currently the ranking member of Oversight and Investigations, that subcommittee on this broader committee. And it has conducted a series of hearings involving the Department of Defense's response to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. And as a result of those hearings, the majority published a report of major findings last month.

One of the report's major findings was that the, quote, “U.S. military's response to the Benghazi attack was severely degraded because of the location and readiness of U.S. forces,” unquote.

However, another one of the report's major findings was that, quote, “The Department of Defense is working to correct many weaknesses revealed by the Benghazi attack,” unquote.

So, General Rodriguez, can you please talk about to the committee what changes the Defense Department has made to correct the issues that the Benghazi attack revealed? And in doing so,

could you please address changes to the posture of armed aircraft, ISR platforms, and quick response ground forces?

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, ma'am.

First, the top of that list is the cooperation and coordination with the entire Intelligence Community as well as the State Department, so that we all have a common view of what is happening out there to ensure that the indication and the warnings are the best that we can possibly make them.

The second thing is that we have moved forces and we have more capabilities ready to support challenges like that across the continent. We now have an East Africa Response Force stationed in Djibouti, an Army and Air Force combined—or joint force there to respond to situations at 15, or 15—excuse me—of the high-threat, high-risk embassies across Africa. We also have a Special Purpose MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] Crisis Response stationed up in Morón with—it has both air and ground assets. And we also have a Commander's In-Extremis Force that is now stationed in Germany at the European bases, as I said, that are so important to us.

We also have got the authority to access European forces faster to include the mobility assets, as well as the air assets that you mentioned. And we also have the capability to also access CENTCOM forces or SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] forces if that is required.

We had an experience just recently in South Sudan. And just to show you the difference—first of all, the intelligence and warning was there. Now, it was good that it is closer than West Africa, because that is a different situation—West Africa. And we had special operations forces, the East African Response Force, the CENTCOM Crisis Response element. The CENTCOM knew who was their reserve, as well as the Special Purpose MAGTF, all combined to support the efforts down in South Sudan.

The other thing I think that is important to understand is that the State Department, as well as the Marine Security Guards that support the State Department, have reinforced many of our embassies. And right now, I have also reinforced those embassies, so I have three forces at Libya, Tunis, and South Sudan to support the efforts of the State Department to continue to provide the mission that they do.

Ms. TSONGAS. What continues to——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman——

Ms. TSONGAS [continuing]. I lost my time. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time is expired.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Locklear, General Austin, General Rodriguez, thank you so much each of you for your service to our Nation, and thank you for joining us today.

Admiral Locklear, I wanted to begin with you. I have spent a significant amount of time in your AOR looking at the force structure laydown, looking at readiness components, understanding what is going on. Also, having the time to speak to partners in the region,

having conversations with them about our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, and how they look at things. And you can imagine, they are positive about us putting the rebalance into place, but somewhat skeptical about what they have seen to this point with that.

Can you tell me this? In looking at where we are going with the budget proposals, essentially with 11 cruisers being essentially put in suspended animation, with us not having the dollars available for the USS *George Washington* refueling, and looking at cutting short our LCS [littoral combat ship] build? Can you tell me, in light of that, and with the tyranny of distance that we have to deal with in the Asia-Pacific, and with us rebalancing there—obviously, the naval presence there is going to be an important part of that.

How are you going to be situated with accomplishing your mission in the face of a declining naval presence with fewer ships at your avail?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Wittman. And thanks for coming out to the AOR. I am sorry I missed you in Hawaii, but I understand that your visit was very well received.

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, yes.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It will—first of all, this isn't my—not just about maritime. There are similar types of issues that we are facing from a force availability in the Air Force, with ISR, with "fight tonight" forces ready for the Korean Peninsula—all those put pressure on the joint force to be able to provide it.

So, if you extrapolate a smaller, more lethal military, when it comes to some aspects of our military, and those that have to be forward, that have to be providing presence, capacity is an aspect that has to be considered. I mean, it is great to talk about how capable everything has got to be, but, you know, one ship that is completely capable or one airplane that is completely capable—it can only be in really in one place at one time.

Mr. WITTMAN. Exactly.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. So, the natural extrapolation is, is that as the world—I mean, the world gets a vote in all this. And we are not out ginning this stuff up, I don't think. I mean, it is kind of happening to us.

Mr. WITTMAN. Right.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. And we are giving our best military advice on how we position ourselves for a couple things. One, what is the most dangerous situations you might face as it relates to American interests. But we also are pragmatic, and we say, "What are the most likely things that might happen?"

And then we put a demand signal on the joint force to produce resources for the most likely thing that will happen, kind of hedging our bets just in case it goes worse.

So, on the maritime domain, you know, I think the Navy is going to have a hard time. With the numbers we have, we have a hard time today. Smaller numbers would be, for my AOR—assuming the rest of the world stays the way it is—would be difficult for me to maintain the type of maritime presence that I need.

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, let me take it down another step to drill down a little bit further in asking you specifically about amphibious and logistic ships.

As you know, in the AOR you talked about and we visited with marines here about having that presence and being able to have that first-strike capability, that forcible entry capability.

Obviously, having those amphibious ships and logistic ships are an important part of that. Can you tell me, in light of where we are going with our L-class ships, can you tell me, in the AOR, the role of amphibious and logistic ships?

How important is that to your mission set there within that combatant command? And then where does that leave us as we are looking at a declining number of amphibious and logistic ships as it relates to force readiness in the region?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, the role of logistic ships for my AOR really can't be understated—can be understated, but can't be overstated.

The reality is just because of the way we operate forward, even though we have reliable allies and partners who help us, we still have to move things around, like fuel. I mean, the PACOM AOR—I think I am the largest consumer of fuel, resources, maybe in all of DOD [Department of Defense] and maybe in the world.

And you have to be able to move that stuff around—you got to be able to move it reliably. So, what you can move around in peacetime, day to day, is much different than what you might be able to have to move around during contingency.

So, we have to have a logistics force that is not just about day-to-day operations—one that has some surge capabilities that can be able to support it.

So, we have to—the Navy and TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], they have to keep putting that in their equation; not just on the surface of the water, but also in the air.

As it relates to amphibious capability, first I think the amphibious capability of our Marine Corps will be most apparent—the need of it in my AOR. I mean, just because of the littoral nature of it, because of the history of the way the Marine Corps has operated, because of the forward forces we have that are there, and their ability for crisis response.

So, you can see, just in this Operation Damayan they had in the Philippines how quickly the Marines were able to respond with amphibious capability; that really made a big difference in turning that around—and that is just a HA/DR [humanitarian assistance/disaster relief] event. But—

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you.

Admiral LOCKLEAR [continuing]. They've got to be able to get them around.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith.

Generals, Admiral, thank you for being here.

Admiral Locklear, aloha. Admiral, in your testimony, you referenced the rising China and you didn't say whether it was—you didn't use the adjective threat.

So, I am—want to give you the opportunity—that when you said a rising China, what were you referring to? And I am, of course, looking at it in terms of from your military perspective.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first, I mean the rise of China globally, economically, and the fact that they have the desire or the ability to be able to build a military that—what I think they believe is necessary to defend their interests, both regionally and globally; we shouldn't be surprised by that.

We should also be recognizing that as a rising China, there is benefit to the world for a peaceful, prosperous China that is transparent and that has—that participates in the international institutions and is a—I have said this before—is a net provider of security rather than a net user of security. And I think that the future—they have the potential to be able to do that.

There are many areas where we cooperate. We have a growing relationship between China and the U.S.—mil-to-mil relationship—that is, I would say it is slow but steady and we are making progress in kind of breaking down the barriers we have to understand each other. And this is an essential part, I think, of having a peaceful, prosperous, stable China that has a military that helps.

They can have a significant role in what the outcome of North Korea is. And so, we need to encourage that.

What's frustrated them, though, however, is what is kind of happening in their own backyard as it relates to their relations with some of our allies and our partners. As I said earlier, their kind of ambiguous claims on their—territorial claims in the South China Sea, establishment of air defense zones; these all complicate the security environment and make us wonder.

Their military is on the rise. They reported today they are going to have a 12.2 percent increase in spending—just got reported this morning. And that is just what we can see; there is much more that might lie below that.

So, whether the military rise—I think that is a given; it will. The question is, is it transparent? What is it used for? Is it in cooperation in the larger security environment that its neighbors and that we as a Pacific nation want them included?

So, that remains the question; to see how they proceed. Some of the things that have happened in the last—since I talked to you last that have—in their own back—in their own local areas—have called into question how they are going to progress.

Ms. HANABUSA. Now—

Admiral LOCKLEAR. But—

Ms. HANABUSA. And one of the frustrations that we have had is that we have had people come in and testify in the same seats that you are in and a lot of them feel—seem to feel that the administration doesn't have a clear China strategy.

In other words, are they a threat or are they somebody that we are going to deal with economically or try to develop some kind of a global relationship with? But how can you do that out of the context of the military threat?

So, for example, we also do know—we hear words like the ADIZ [air defense identification zone], A2AD [anti-access, area denial]; and we also know that we have the Scarborough Shoals issues—plus you even mentioned Senkaku Diaoyu today; and we also have the issues with Taiwan Straits.

And in that context, we also know that they have very good short- and long-range ballistic missile capabilities; they have cruiser capabilities; and, of course, they have cyber capabilities.

So, in that context, now, how prepared do you feel that you are now, in light of this budget, for the PACOM AOR, as the PACOM commander? Can you meet all of these threats if the threat size rises?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would say that the preeminence of the U.S. military power globally will remain in place for a long time; and that even a rising China won't be able to, be able to globally threaten that.

I think where we have the most concern are in the region where we happen to have four or five very important allies to us, where the PRC has introduced some of their military capabilities that, on the surface, would appear to want to deny access to the United States and limit our ability to defend our allies and to protect our interests in that region.

So, they have focused much of their military spending on those things that—I mean, they understand what they think are our weaknesses and our—and they focus their—it appears that they focus their industrial capability on being able to go after those.

So, what we have to do—we have to have—whether the Chinese ever use these or not, they will probably proliferate. And so, these are challenges that will go not just in the local AOR, but they are going to proliferate into other parts of the world over this century.

So, we have to be aware of what they are; we have to have the right research and development in place and we have to fund the types of capabilities that allow us to maintain our dominance and our asymmetric capabilities for the—where we have significant ones—and we do have significant advantages.

Mr. FORBES [presiding]. The gentlelady's time——

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. Time is expired.

The gentleman from Nevada, Dr. Heck, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here today. Thank you for your long and distinguished service to our Nation and your commitment to our men and women in uniform.

General Rodriguez, when we look at some of the other commands around PACOM, there are roughly 330,000 military and civilian personnel assigned within its AOR—CENTCOM, about 90,000.

And then we come to AFRICOM that has a lack of dedicated assigned forces, which seem to be perhaps constraining the command's ability to conduct long-term and robust planning and execution of missions on the continent, as well as creating some risk to the command's ability to respond to crises.

What, if any, requests have you made to address these constraints and mitigate the risks, and what is the status of those requests?

General RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, sir. We have requested an allocation of forces that go year by year by assignment and we have been given a Special Purpose MAGTF Marine force; we have also been allocated a regionally aligned brigade from the U.S. Army.

And then we have also got approved the force-sharing agreements with EUCOM [U.S. European Command] to also access some of their forces to be used on the African continent.

As we look forward, we have asked for a regionally aligned division from the U.S. Army, as well as an intelligence brigade, minus from the Army, and a Theater Sustainment Organization, which is a tailored organization less than a brigade, as well as an engineer unit.

So, those are the things that we are asking to be allocated to us in the future.

Dr. HECK. And do you know the status of those requests?

General RODRIGUEZ. It is working through the process. It will probably be another 3 or 4 months before that decisionmaking process gets completed, sir.

Dr. HECK. And where is the Special Purpose MAGTF located?

General RODRIGUEZ. The Special Purpose MAGTF is located at Morón, Spain.

Dr. HECK. And the regionally aligned brigade?

General RODRIGUEZ. The regionally aligned brigade—the majority of the forces forward are at Djibouti. But they participate in exercises in theater security cooperation throughout the continent, sir.

Dr. HECK. And the allocation by year—approximately how many forces are being requested in that yearly allocation?

General RODRIGUEZ. I would have to get you the exact number. And I will get that to you afterwards, sir.

Dr. HECK. All right. Thank you.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Dr. HECK. I mean, obviously we are very concerned about—especially in light of the situation in Benghazi—making sure that AFRICOM has the resources necessary to respond in a timely manner. So, please keep us apprised; keep me apprised of the request for those additional forces. We will—

General RODRIGUEZ. Will do, sir.

Dr. HECK. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Mr. CONAWAY [presiding]. Gentleman yields back.

Ms. Duckworth, for 5 minutes.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I was disturbed to see that this year's proposed cuts to the National Guard's end strength and the seemingly escalation of words over the readiness threat levels for the National Guard and Reserve Forces. I would like to address that a little bit.

General Rodriguez, you just talked about forces that are dedicated to AFRICOM. You didn't mention the State Partnership Program at all. Can you touch on what role they play?

General RODRIGUEZ. I can, ma'am. Thank you.

We have eight states that are over in State Partnership Program. They perform a great role in building relationships, as well as building capacity of our partners.

We have just expanded North Dakota from one country to three, and we are also putting more requests in to get a couple more

State Partnership Programs. So they have been a long-term benefit to us in Africa.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. General Austin, can you speak a little bit to the role of Guard and Reserve forces in CENTCOM for example, in the past year? Roughly how many flight hours were flown by Guard or Reserve pilots? The amount of work that is done by Guard and Reserve medical staff and hospital facilities in theater and the like?

General AUSTIN. Well, ma'am, you know that the support that has been provided in Afghanistan has been a tremendous help throughout. I would have to take the question for the record to get you the exact amount of hours that have been flown by Guard forces, but it has been substantial throughout the AOR. And they have contributed in a meaningful way.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. Admiral Locklear, can you speak a little bit in your AO [area of operations] as well? You just came back from Thailand, I believe, last month with Cobra Gold. Looking at Cobra Gold and Garuda Shield and all of the exercises that go on there, what role do Guard and Reserve forces play in your AO, in PACOM?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, they play an important role, even though sometimes not in large numbers. They bring some capabilities and capacities that are important to the AOR. So, very appreciative of them. We have seven State Partnership Programs in my AOR. There are areas that we would like to grow those in.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. General Austin, I would like to touch a little bit on the line of questioning that Mrs. Davis, my colleague from—the gentlelady from California had started on Afghanistan, and what we are doing specifically to grow women leaders in both the Afghan military, but also their police forces. Can you speak a bit more to that?

General AUSTIN. We continue to focus on recruiting more women into the force, and to train those women to assume greater roles of responsibility. Right now I think the ratio is about 1 percent of the total force is female. But having said that, I think we are working a number of lines of effort simultaneously. It is refreshing to see that we have our first fixed-wing pilot that has recently been trained and so there are more to follow in the pipeline. This is—as you know, ma'am, it is not an easy task. But I think where we are now, based upon where we started, is we are a long way away from a start point. And we will continue to emphasize—work with the Afghans to continue to emphasize this going forward.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. What are we doing specifically with being able to put these women in, say the Afghan—the police forces out into places where they are needed? When I visited Afghanistan last year, one of the things that the women told us was that they didn't trust that they could go to the local police or military to report abuse, or report issues because there were no women there. When I spoke with the women in the military, and also their police forces, they said that—well, there are not even barracks there with bathrooms that they are allowed to use. So they can't be forward de-

ployed to those areas. And if they can't get out there, then they can't do their jobs.

General AUSTIN. Yes, ma'am. This is a challenge. And, you know, it is something that we are going to have to continue to work with the Afghan leadership on in moving forward. Again, I think there is a police chief that is going to take a position in Herat, which is out in the west as you know, in the near future. That is encouraging. But we are going to have to continue to emphasize to the Afghan leadership that, in order to get the women out to where they need to be and provide the right protections for them, there are things that they are going to need to continue to focus on. And we are just not there yet. So.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. All right. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, thank you for being here today and General Dempsey testified that the world was going to continue to be unpredictable, complex, and dangerous and would continue to surprise us in many unpleasant ways, before the Senate. And Admiral, I know that while we can have a plane or a boat, it can only be in one place at one time. And that brings me to an issue that all three of you have talked about, which is the ISR platforms and how we can use that as force multipliers. Certainly something that we can provide that many countries can't.

And the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System] fly out of my district. It is a platform that we have hoped to recapitalize so that we can get more intelligence to you in a faster manner. But if you could each speak to theater-wide ISR capabilities, whether or not you feel like they are properly resourced and what roles the JSTARS have played in each of your areas of command?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would say from my PACOM perspective, our ISR requirements are underresourced. And that is including our ISR resources for the Korean peninsula, as well as the growing number of places that we have to keep track of throughout this AOR. And that is not just in air-breathing ISR, it is all the way from your national technical means down all the way through HUMINT [human intelligence]. And so each year I make those requirements known to the DNI, Director of National Intelligence, about what my priorities are. And we are seeing some improvement, but we are still underresourced.

In the area of JSTARS, the JSTARS—I think every COCOM would tell you that they are—that JSTARS play and the capability that the JSTARS bring is just critical. The first, it provides—in my AOR, it provides a combat battle management capability that is important if I get into a comms [communications] or denied environment. So if my command and control from my central command nodes is cut off, which is highly likely in a conflict in my AOR, and this will—and that command and control capability is critical. It also provides unique capabilities with moving target capability, that—important for, like General Scaparrotti in Korea, as he tries to keep track of the fourth largest army in the world that is in position to be able to strike Seoul within minutes. And so those types of capabilities, I think for my AOR, are very important.

General AUSTIN. Well, sir, it is—likewise, ISR is a critical part of what we do in terms of warfighting. And even in those places where we are not engaged in kinetic activity on a daily basis, they help us remain aware of what is going on in the AOR. I have about—currently about—because of the fight in Afghanistan, about 85 percent of the inventory focused on the CENTCOM AOR. That helps me with activities in Afghanistan, but also helps our efforts as we prosecute the fight against terrorists in ungoverned spaces like Yemen and in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and other places.

That is about 62 percent of what I, you know, requested. Because you know, it is just not in the inventory to give us everything that we need. With respect to JSTARS, I can tell you that as a commander in the—a division commander in Afghanistan or a core commander in Iraq, the JSTARS platform was very, very helpful to us in prosecuting the fight. As Sam said, you know, moving target indicators—moving target indicator capability was really, really beneficial. And that command and control capability—that helped to augment was also very good.

So an essential part of what we did in the past and certainly, you know, the more of that we can get, the better.

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, thank you. The JSTARS capability, as both my partners mentioned, is usually important in Africa. It is good because of the broad space that it covers, and also bridges the gap between the national technical means and the smaller, lighter aircraft to better focus their efforts on where to look. As far—far as the entire intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts, everybody needs more, so we are working with our partners to help do the intelligence sharing, which is so important. Because the situational understanding we have to have in AFRICOM AOR to be able to respond quickly is usually important to all of us. So we work with all of our partners on that.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you gentlemen—do you have—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. The ISR that you need.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Several things here. Mr. Chairman, you started off the hearing talking about the budget. The President actually provides some \$24 billion additional over and above what was originally in the—and my understanding is that at this moment, the Republican caucus is rejecting that \$24 billion additional dollars for the military. I know that is not where you are, but you might look more closely at the options and opportunities that the President has provided.

Also the sequestration, which we constantly talk about here, came about as a direct result of the threat to default on the American debt. And that led to the sequestration and the compromise that was put together at that time. I know some members of this committee did not vote for that, but the option was to default on the American debt. That was brought to us by the Republican caucus.

General Austin, your written testimony really focuses much more on the social, economic, and political issues in your command. I am delighted that you did that. At least in your written testimony. Here, we tend to focus more on the military side of it. But it seems

to me that you are correctly paying a great deal of attention to economic development, social development, education and political development in your region.

Without that, we are not going to be successful. We have spent \$1 trillion in Afghanistan, \$1 trillion in Iraq. It is debatable whether it was a positive outcome or not. That is still in doubt. So I really urge you to continue to do that, and to continue to focus the attention of your command on those issues. And, I would appreciate hearing a comment on that, if you would, sir.

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. I certainly agree with you that in order to address the issues that exist in the region, and in order to work to push things in a direction that trends more towards security and stability, it is going to require a constant whole-of-government approach. And as you have pointed out, sir, the military is an instrument of power, but it is only one of many.

And so, I think we are going to have to work more closely with our partners in the region, to use everything that is in the inventory to push things in the right direction, and take advantage of opportunities.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I really appreciate you are heading in that direction, at least your testimony indicates that is where your mind is, and I think that all is to our benefit.

I also want to push back on Mr. Wilson, who thinks you ought—thinks Mr. Rodriguez ought to be located in South Carolina.

I think that would be a particularly unwise thing to do, General Rodriguez. You appropriately pointed out Africa and Europe have a long history together. And to be able to be in Europe, working with our allies, who have that history in Africa, is extremely important.

South Carolina is a wonderful place, but it is a long way and significantly disconnected.

I don't need your comment on it. I am pushing back here, so that people are aware, if he tries on the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to move you, I will push back. I hope others do also.

With regard to the ISR, General Rodriguez, if you could comment briefly about what you, specifically, need. And I am concerned here about the U-2 and its longevity or whether it is short or long is not yet clear.

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. Well, you know, again, based on the prioritization and decisionmaking in the Department of Defense, you know, we get the share that they think is best.

It is a little bit less than both what CENTCOM and PACOM get, but that is, you know, a prioritization that they continue to, you know, are forced to make.

And I think that what we are trying to do is creatively figure out how we can, you know, leverage all our allies, all our African partners, to both do that. European countries also have ISRs so we are trying to leverage all that.

But we are going to continue to be a risk and a challenge because of the inability to source all the ISR that is needed.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, I would just—I am sure the committee is aware, but I will point out to those of us that are here and for the record, that the Air Force has flip-flopped three times on what to

do with the Global Hawk. It now apparently is in line to continue. It is an asset that—you need it in the central—in Mali and in that area.

The U-2 is presumably scheduled to be—to go, and what is going to replace it?

These are fundamental questions. All three of you spoke to the need of ISR. That is gonna be a major issue.

So I thank you.

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, my 1—2 seconds over.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And, just to correct the record, the President actually put in \$56 billion in his budget over and above the budget deal that was worked out between the House and the Senate last fall and signed by the President.

Twenty-six billion dollars to go to defense and \$30 billion to go to social spending, which continues the trend that he had had in previous budgets where we tried to solve the budget on the backs of the military, taking half of the cuts out of the military, when they only account for about 17 percent, 18 percent, of the budget.

Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to first of all thank the two generals, not snubbing the admiral, but both of you have commanded two of my sons, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and now in AFRICOM, one of them who is currently deployed. So I want to thank you for your service and your leadership. It has been well received by their parents, that is for sure.

Admiral, as it relates to CHAMP [Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project], and for those that are unfamiliar with CHAMP in the committee, it is a microwave emitter that is utilized, can be flown to disable and knock out enemy electronics.

Air Force has had a successful test with CHAMP. It was placed on a cruise missile. They expect deployment out in 2020, 2025, because they want to develop another platform, which I am not opposed to.

But currently, we have an excess of cruise missiles. We have the ability to outfit some of those with CHAMP. That could help, I would think, in PACOM particularly, as a stand-off weapon, but one that doesn't have any collateral damage, doesn't injure or destroy anything, but does knock out the enemy's ability to target.

Do you have any comments as it would help in PACOM?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, to the degree that we use the entire electromagnetic spectrum to our advantage, and in any potential contingency or conflict you would try to deny the advantage of any potential adversary that—their capability to use it.

Things such as the microwave emitters, those types of technologies, are of a growing importance in a more technically sophisticated world. Having the capabilities that something like that demonstrator would provide in my AOR would be an important aspect of any planning I would do.

Mr. NUGENT. And I would think getting it in 18 months versus—like I said, I don't disagree with the Air Force's projection to do something reusable in 2025, but to have it available to you in 18

months, to your inventory, at least, to make decisions as to how you move forward, would that be helpful or not?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would say that of course the Air Force will have to speak for the decisions they make on that, but I understand the significant pressure that they are under to try to make good decisions. So we have a joint force, and want to ensure that we make near-term investments that, such as this, that they facilitate the longer-term investment.

So if this particular platform was a proper stepping stone to a greater capability in the future, why wouldn't I want it sooner than later?

Yes, sir.

Mr. NUGENT. I don't disagree with you.

Changing somewhat to General Austin, it was just reported in the news, reference to Israel interrupting a flow of weapons by the sea, coming from Iran, or at least manufactured in Syria, but through, you know, through the Sudan, that was going to go to Egypt and then over to the fight as it relates against Israel by Gaza.

You know, all the discussion right now with Iran is referenced to their nuclear capabilities. But, you know, as we move forward, right now, we see them as it relates to, you know, conventional arms, supplying and, you know, they are terrorists, support of terrorist actions throughout the world, but, in particularly as it relates to Israel.

Is the position that we are taking—I mean, we are so focused on the nuclear development. Are we losing sight of the fact that Iran poses other threats besides just nuclear?

General AUSTIN. I don't think we are, sir. I think, first of all, if we can—you know, we are very pragmatic about the P5+1 and our efforts there.

But if we can get that done, I think it will make a significant difference in the region.

Certainly, a nuclear Iran is something that no one wants to see.

But above and beyond that, I agree with you that Iran presents a number of other threats to the region. Their ability to mine the straits; their ability to conduct cyber attacks; their ballistic missile capability; and, of course, the issue that you just spoke to, the activities of the Quds Force and their efforts to spread malign activity, not only around the region, but across the globe.

And I think what the leaders in the region remain focused on are all those other things in addition to the nuclear capability.

So, certainly the folks in the region haven't lost sight of that. We have not lost sight of that.

But, again, if we can get the P5+1 negotiations to the right place, I think it will make a significant difference for all of us going forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses not only for being here today, but, more importantly, for your long and distinguished service to our country and to the people in your command.

Like many of my colleagues, I was quite disturbed and very concerned when the Secretary rolled out his proposed budget cuts last week. And I know we will be hearing more about it tomorrow.

In my view, this is absolutely not the time to hollow out our military or to eliminate critical air and sea assets. And I hope we can find a way forward that does not allow that to happen.

I would like to discuss a particular proposal this morning with you, and that is one that I think you know has generated considerable debate. And that is the mission of the A-10.

I am proud to represent many people in my district who are associated with Davis Monthan Air Force Base, many of the pilots who fly the A-10. At that base, we have the 355th Fighter Wing, which supports and operates 82 Warthog and trains the next generation of A-10 pilots.

And I think you all know that this critical platform to our military arsenal has been updated with new electronic packages, new wings, which will extend the life of the A-10 for another 15 to 20 years. It has already been flying for 30, but it has got a lot more life left, given the \$1.1 billion we have invested in upgrades.

This fighter plays a crucial role, in my view, in protecting our troops on the ground, a role that just cannot be suitably replicated by any other aircraft in our inventory.

In fact, Major General Bill Hix, deputy director of TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command], has said the A-10's "complementary mix of precision, area fires, sustained coverage, persistence, responsiveness, and moral and physical" impact on the enemy provides a capability that should not be overlooked.

And, as you know, the Warthog provides dynamic close air support at high altitudes, where attack helicopters can't fly, such as the mountains of eastern Afghanistan, and it can fly low and slow, and in tight places, close spaces, something aircraft, other aircraft cannot perform with the same effect.

General, the President's—President Obama's budget would divest the entire A-10 fleet to reduce costs.

And with countless sorties flown by the A-10 in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have proven lethal to the enemy, in support of ground troops during firefights, I ask you, General, how would the loss of the A-10 mission affect CENTCOM's close air support capabilities?

General AUSTIN. Is that my question, sir?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, sir, General Austin.

General AUSTIN. All right, thank you, sir.

Well, as you have indicated, the A-10 has provided a tremendous service to the forces on the ground over time. And I have seen it do wonderful things in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Having said that, you know, it is—actually the domain of the Air Force to really kind of figure out how to balance their requirements, you know, how to balance readiness and force modernization and end strength going forward.

As a combatant commander, you know, what I care about is when I put forth a requirement to support our troops, that the services can provide that support—credible support and in a timely fashion. And if the Air Force determines that there are other platforms that can deliver that, I would have to defer to their judg-

ment; but again, it has provided credible and sustained support to our troops in combat.

Mr. BARBER. Absolutely agree with you.

When I talk to the men and women of the Army down in Fort Huachuca, which is also down in my district, they have told me over and over again that when the Warthog shows up overhead they are going to have a much better day. And I think we need to make sure it is continuing.

I would like to pose a similar question, Admiral, to you. It is my understanding that PACOM's strategic approach relies on the A-10's assured presence to meet the demands of the military contingency mission. Osan Air Force base in South Korea, which houses the 51st Fighter Wing, employs a premier close air support A-10 fighter squadron, has more fire power to provide closer support than its counterparts and at a cheaper price.

If the A-10s in this region, Admiral, are divested, what capability will fill the close air support gap that would result, and at what price?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first let me say that I am very proud of the forces that—A-10 squadrons that operate in support of the Korean peninsula and in support of all of our operations in the PACOM AOR.

I am in the same position that General Austin is in, that, you know, the—given where we are today with the budget, and given the way we're in the future, the services are having to make hard decisions. And this is a decision that I have to defer to the Air Force on if they have to come back to me and be able to show us what will replace this.

There are capabilities out there. Clearly they don't exactly parallel what the A-10 can do. But, we will just have to—when this platform goes away, we will have to use what the services can resource and produce and we will have to readjust our plans to be able to minimize the amount of risk, assuming that we can do that.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bridenstine.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to clarify, contrary to the comments by my colleague, Congressman Garamendi, the President is not serious about increasing defense spending. What he is very serious about is holding proper defense spending hostage to social spending.

To start, I would like to quote the Assistant Secretary for Defense—Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Katrina McFarland. Her quote is, "Right now, the pivot is being looked at again, because, candidly, it can't happen."

She says, "Candidly, it can't happen."

Admiral Locklear, would you agree with that assessment or not?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I wouldn't completely agree with it. I mean, I think there are shades of how you have to answer that question.

First, the pivot is not just about military. We have got a lot of different aspects. So there are trade agreements, there are activities with our allies—if you come to my headquarters we are moving forward with the aspects of rebalancing. We are working hard on

the alliances, on the exercises to underpin them. We are moving our force structure into places we need to.

The real question is, is whether or not the force that Congress will eventually buy to give us, is it adequate for the security environment that is changing? And my AOR has changed significantly—in my lifetime it has changed dramatically in this area.

So whether or not we can resource to meet the challenges and remain the preeminent guarantor of security in the Pacific area, I think that is the question.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Admiral.

General Rodriguez, in your testimony you talked about some of the challenges you face with assets, including ISR, Medevac, crisis response, and my understanding is for some of those funding issues that you are having, you are actually turning to OCO funds, Overseas Contingency Operations funds, which should not technically be used for this. But can you share with us your testimony on ISR and other asset shortages that you might have?

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes.

As I mentioned in testimony, the ISR shortages that we have, you know, are less than half of our support—requests get supported. And on the personnel recovery and Medevac is about the long ranges that we are challenged with in AFRICOM that, you know, puts our people at risk at distances that we have challenges supporting.

And, on the crisis response forces, the challenge that we have is really in Western Africa where we don't have access agreements, overflight or expeditionary infrastructure to support ability to move closer when the indications and warnings are increased or there is an increased threat level to those high-risk, high-threat embassies in Western Africa.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. If you had your optimum order of battle, what kind of assets would you need and where would they be located?

General RODRIGUEZ. I would have some improved expeditionary infrastructure across West Africa so that we could go in and out of there as required based on the situation and then some increased ISR assets to support the entire Intelligence Community's ability to understand the situation as best as we possibly could on the ground so we couldn't get surprised.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. As far as mobility assets, can you describe the situation there?

General RODRIGUEZ. The mobility assets that we are talking about are multiple different types of platform, mostly air movement as well as helicopter movement and the long-range capability of the V-22s; it would be a combination of all those things.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you.

And, General Austin, I just wanted to get your take on what looks more and more real would be the zero option. Obviously the President has had some phone calls with the President of Afghanistan—or Afghanistan, and those have not gone well.

If we end up in a zero option in Afghanistan, can you describe to me, do you believe that would be stabilizing or destabilizing?

General AUSTIN. Well, I certainly believe it would be problematic for the country of Afghanistan, because I think the military would struggle, or the security forces would struggle going forward, be-

cause of the possibility of a lack of resources and also lack of mentorship.

Now, to be fair, going forward, our goal is to transition responsibilities for the security of Afghanistan to the country of Afghanistan, and we have been working hard at that for 13 years now. And so, as they stand up capability, what we want to do is stand down and trend towards a more normal relationship going forward.

And so, you know, we are hopeful that we can do that, and I think if we can do that, and we are there to help mentor them a bit more, then I think it will be extremely beneficial.

But again, the goal is to have the Afghans do this for themselves at some point going forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have some specific questions for Admiral Locklear about the number of carriers that we need. But, before I get into that, just revisiting the budget thing a little bit. The President is very, very serious about increasing the defense budget.

You know, he put together his strategy 3, 4 years ago. At the time there was considerable concern that that strategy didn't spend enough money, but it spent a heck of a lot more money than what we wound up spending in 3 years and what we project to spend going forward, as a result of the Budget Control Act, as a result of sequestration, as a result of a whole bunch of different issues.

So make no mistake about it, the \$26 billion that the President has asked for, he is very serious about, because that is, you know, what meets the strategy that they had put in place.

But yes, it is fair to say that he understands that a country does not simply stand on how much money it spends on defense. He cares also about infrastructure, about transportation, about investments in research. And it is the entire discretionary budget, that defense is slightly over half of, that has been most devastated by the Budget Control Act and by sequestration. And we, on this committee, document with great detail the impacts that has on our defense.

But, outside of this committee—and certainly in our districts—the impacts we have seen on transportation, you know, our infrastructure is just way behind. The impacts we have seen on investments in research, on education, on Head Start, on a whole lot of programs that are very important is just as real.

The President is serious about both.

Now, as Mr. Forbes and I had this epic battle about—you know, what to do about the budget, there is a clear disagreement about how to handle the larger budget. The President wants to get to that vision of the \$56 billion by increasing taxes and making cuts to entitlements.

You know, he put a proposal on the table a year ago for the Chained CPI [Consumer Price Index], you know, which was very controversial. He has not been at all unwilling to go after the entitlements. And the problem that we have collectively as a body, House, Senate, President is we can't get to a point where we get an agreement on raising taxes or cutting entitlements, which then

forces us into a discretionary budget that is lower than most of us want.

Some are very comfortable with it. You know, some, you know, very conservative folks want to cut everything including defense. I know the chairman battles that in his own caucus. There are some on our side who are more than comfortable cutting defense. But, overall, we cannot get an agreement to get to that larger number that the majority of us want, because we are unwilling to raise taxes and cut entitlements.

Now, on the Republican side, they say we don't need to raise taxes, and we have had that argument, but it is not President is, you know, interested in cutting defense. He put his plan in place 3 years ago that had us spending a lot more money than we are currently talking about spending, but all of these other fights, over the overall budget, have shoved us down to a number that is very problematic—I will agree with you on that.

It is a matter of how we get an agreement.

Which brings us to the point that I started with, we are where we are. We have the top line that we have. And the worst thing that this committee and this Congress could do at this point is to fight every single cut that has been proposed to hit that top line, because where that leaves us, it leaves us with a hollow force.

If we will not make the cuts in base infrastructure, in personnel costs, whether it is the—you know, the A-10 on that side, the 11 cruisers that we want to mothball—if we don't do that, what happens is readiness gets cut, because then you are down to the last thing and you cut down on training, you cut down on equipment, you cut down on maintenance.

That is a hollow force.

A hollow force is not about the size of the force. It is about whether or not the force you have is trained and equipped to do the missions that you are asking them to do. And if we don't make some of these other cuts, that is where we are likely to be.

Now, I am wide open to ideas, all right. If someone says, "Hey, can't cut the A-10," okay. Show me the \$3.5 billion. All right. Can't do the personnel cuts? Show the \$700 million. Show me the \$5 billion for the cruisers. But if we simply say no, no, no, no, no, at the end, we wind up with readiness in a very bad place.

On the carrier issue, you know, I have heard everywhere, I think I heard Mr. Forbes say at a forum we were at last week that we are in a 15-carrier world, that ideally, to meet our requirements, we would hit 15 carriers. But I also happen to know that a lot of folks very high up in the Navy think that we could survive quite easily with 10, 9, or even 8 carriers. That the 11 carriers are primarily about presence more than they are about warfighting capability, and there are a lot cheaper ways to establish presence.

Now, before my friends down in Norfolk freak out, I understand the industrial base argument. Okay. If you shrink down to 10 or 9 or 8, do you lose the ability to build any in the future? And that is something we certainly will need to talk about. But Admiral Locklear, from a strategy standpoint, you know, could we not have a very effective national security strategy with fewer than 11 aircraft carriers?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. In my view, you could not.

Mr. SMITH. Are there folks high up in the Navy who disagree with that view, without naming names?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't know who they are, if they do. If they do, they haven't been out and about very much or understand the utility of aircraft carriers as it relates to global security environment rather than just fighting wars.

Mr. SMITH. Just listening to internal dynamics, and I don't know if you are a part, but when we were talking, when folks were meeting to talk about how to hit this cap that we are all frustrated about for different reasons, were there not some in the Navy and some in the Pentagon who said that one of the ways to do that, they would support, would be reducing from 11 aircraft carriers?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. If they did, I don't know who they are. I mean, I am sure you could find someone, but I am not—wasn't privy to that argument, and I—to be honest with you, I can't see a—I mean, unless the world changes and the role of aircraft carriers can be subsumed by something else, which they can't, at least in the Navy and the military bill today—

Mr. SMITH. So spin that out for me a little. What is it, that if we had 10 instead of 11, that we couldn't do that would place us at risk?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. If you look at your defenses only in the context of can you fight a war—

Mr. SMITH. No, I am not.

Admiral LOCKLEAR [continuing]. Then the numbers of carriers that you—first of all, you have to get them there quickly. I mean, war is going to start more quickly than it did in the last century, so you have to be generally present with some things to be relevant in the early stages of any conflict. So, we made that investment in nuclear aircraft carriers for a lot of reasons, because they can just stay forward, as you know, they have significant strike capability, they also have a huge deterrent value, otherwise other countries, you know, like China, wouldn't be building them.

And they have the ability to be there in what we would call phase zero in day-to-day operations—

Mr. SMITH. Let me pause you on just one piece there.

At the moment, China has built one, and that they got from Russia, and it is not exactly incredibly capable, so China has been at this for quite a while, and they haven't built any, so I am not sure that is a good argument.

On the other side of it, I mean, I am not—I accept some of your broader arguments, but I am not sure that is an effective one.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, they have announced they are going to pursue a fleet of four just in this past year.

But we don't build carriers because of Chinese carriers.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. So, if you think globally today, you effectively have a 10-carrier force with 11 that is coming. The demand signal day to day from Syria, to Iran, to Korea, to the South China Sea that demand this asset be there because of the sovereignty issues, you don't have to have somebody's permission, because of the strike capability, because of the command and control capability they bring—

Mr. SMITH. And as security, any other ship that we could send out there?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes. Absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I take your point in that. We have other ships. We have cruisers, we have destroyers, we have submarines, we have other things we could send in for that same reason. What, and again, this is more of a thought experiment, because I think these are the type of thought experiments we are going to need to have in order to get to a budget that makes sense, what is it about an aircraft carrier that these other ships don't bring to forward presence in deterrence?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, they bring about 40 strike aircraft that are going to have, from Super Hornets into the next generation of F-35, stealth capability. They are going to have MV-22 capability. So there is this, I mean, to try to put that on another platform, you would end up having basically—

Mr. SMITH. Well, no, you wouldn't put it on another platform. The other platforms, what they bring, is they bring standoff weapon strike capability. They bring cruise missiles and a variety of other things; not implying that you have to fly in and shoot. So that is the tradeoff there.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. That is true, but I would say that a lot of what you do with aircraft carriers is you use them before you actually start shooting. And so the ability to maintain air and space and maritime dominance if you—if you are only going to rely on missiles that you fire and it is when the shooting starts, then you limit, you know, you start to limit the space for decisions to be made.

Mr. SMITH. Understood. Let me drill down a little bit on that.

So, aircraft carriers give us dominance that has nothing to do with what they could shoot. What is that, exactly? What do aircraft—what do aircraft carriers do that give us that sort of dominance outside of actually having to shoot?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first of all, they take with them—you know, generally go in an aircraft carrier strike group, which has other maritime assets with it, including cruisers and destroyers, that capability to interact with submarines, U.S. submarines that go with them.

Mr. SMITH. Understood, but the aircraft carrier is not necessarily required for that. That is part of that strike group, but the strike group is, I mean, that is just the way that we have assembled it, so—

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The aircraft carrier is not required? I don't—

Mr. SMITH. No, I am asking, to some degree. You know, if you have a strike group, why does an aircraft carrier have to be part of that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, we have deployed strike groups in the past. Then, we had battleships that were the centerpiece of a strike group. And we didn't like the options that those assets that became very expensive and kind of arcane provided for us. But we haven't seen that same change in the value of having U.S. sovereign aircraft carriers that can produce credible strike capability forward in places where we want to manage the crisis in our favor, and if cri-

sis occurs, be able to respond quickly. And that is the value of having a carrier forward in my AOR.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And you feel strongly that 11 is the number that we need at this point.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, you have about 10 now. We can't support the global demand. And so, I don't know how you get to a better equation. We have tried—the Navy has tried very hard to kind of get into a resourcing rate that ables up the presence capability. But, one thing for sure, in my experience is that part of the U.S. global leadership is maritime dominance, where we choose to have it. And at the front of that maritime dominance, which starts to become very important, particularly in the world we are in today, are the capability that aircraft carriers bring.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got a number of questions, and I will try and be quick. But, Admiral, I know it has been a long day with everything, but I just want to resurrect this question about the U-2s.

And, I will stay away from the A-10s and full disclosure, I am a Marine officer asking an admiral with two Army officers an Air Force question, but my concern is about Korea and the U-2s and the situation there. The U-2 has had more than nine lives, you know, ever since 1960, going forward. And I always thought it was based on a cost-benefit analysis that what you got for that high-altitude platform in bad weather and everything else, it has been around, and I noticed that it is out of the budget. I am going to stay away from the A-10s and all the other stuff.

But in your opinion, right now, doing that, because of Korea, do you weigh in on that at all? Would you prefer to still see if it has got a lot of miles? I was one of the ones in 1968 to want to get rid of the M-16, and it is still around, so sometimes improvements can be made, and if you could just quickly comment on that.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I think when General Scaparrotti comes to see you, he will be able to give you a detail of how he figures the U-2 into his plans, but in general, the U-2 today is central to the ISR plan for the Korea peninsula. It has capabilities that you just well articulated. I don't, you know, need to go through those again. But, I think in the dialogue that the Air Force has had that said, "We just can't afford everything." So, we want to go, and we have to go in the direction of these unmanneds. They have other, broader capabilities, and we have to merge the capabilities that the U-2 bring and put it on these unmanned platforms, which, the unmanned piece is not a bad direction for the future. I mean, that is a good direction for us.

So, to the degree that this decision motivates the ISR capabilities to be migrated onto those unmanned platforms in a way that services the warfighter demand, that is, I think, that is an opportunity, but it has to be realized.

Mr. COOK. General Austin, real quick, we have had different briefs about the equipment coming out of Afghanistan. And one time I heard there was \$21 billion to \$22 billion worth of equip-

ment, and the Marine Corps, last brief, said they had a lot of their equipment that came through Pakistan. Do you have any estimate on how much gear we still have left right now that is—we have got to get back and the clock is ticking. Could you address that, briefly?

General AUSTIN. Yes sir. In terms of vehicles, there are probably about 17,000-plus vehicles in-country and there are about 3,000 or so, well, there are a number of containers there that we will have to redeploy as well.

Mr. COOK. Coming through Pakistan, primarily, or is that the port of choice, or the country—

General AUSTIN. We use number of routes, sir.

Mr. COOK. Depending upon how we—okay.

General AUSTIN. Southern ground LOC [line of communication] in Pakistan, predominantly, is about 44 percent of our inventory goes down that route. We use multimodal, you know, flat out transfer at some point, and put it on a ship. Other means.

Mr. COOK. Yes sir. The MRAPS [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles]. You know, we had a brief, a couple months ago, about, and I don't know, I think the thing has changed, the number was that they were going to chop up, or the old ones or what have you. And then I look at the situation in Iraq, unfortunately, Fallujah, where the Iraqis can't—they have tried to come back and seize that. They ran into a number of IEDs [improvised explosive devices], and based upon that—the situation which really hasn't changed in a couple of decades, almost, are we looking at the number of MRAPs that maybe we want to put in part of the pre-position forces or expand that? Has that been revisited at all because of—

General AUSTIN. The services have done extensive work, sir, to determine what their needs going forward are, both in pre-position stocks, in both to support their training efforts back at home and their rapid deployment efforts as well.

Mr. COOK. Okay. The last question I have is about Egypt, and of course the situation with the buying Russian equipment and the helicopters in the Sinai. How do you feel about the Egyptians obviously want more helicopters to combat that terrorist threat in the Sinai. Do you have any comments on that?

General AUSTIN. Well, certainly, I think that they have been clear about their need for more Apaches from us to, excuse me, to support their efforts. I think that certainly, you know, we should support them when we can support them, and again, once you know, if our leadership decides that that is the right thing to do, but clearly they have a need. They are in a fight in the Sinai. They are great partners from a military perspective, and I think we want to maintain that partnership.

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Yield back.

[Laughter.]

I enjoyed the discussion between the admiral and Mr. Smith about aircraft carriers. I would like to make a couple of comments about it, and I would like to ask some questions of the admiral about that, too. You know, I think one of the main things that we benefit from with our strong military is—goes back to the com-

ments of General Eisenhower, President Eisenhower. We hear a lot about beware of the military industrial complex. But he also said, be so strong that nobody dares attack us for fear of annihilation. And I think, because we have had a strong military, continue to have a very strong military, it keeps us out of war. And that is—should be, hopefully, the ultimate goal. I know that is what you work on every day, to keep our young men and women out of harm's way, and that is something that I think that the aircraft carrier goes a long way, as a deterrent, if we never had to use them.

The fact that we have them keeps us out of probably many conflicts. By having 10, and this is what I would like to ask you, Admiral Locklear, we have 11. One of them needs to be refueled. So, that cuts us down to 10, and I know in the budget they are saying they want to hold off on refueling that one, so basically, we are going to just take it out of the service and then decide later, I guess, what, that is the plan with that, and with the 13 cruisers. But, if we have 11, or 10, what is their position? I mean, 10 aren't all forward at all times, right? How do you position those?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, with the exception of the *George Washington*, which is forward-deployed in Japan in support of the alliance and in response to the Korean peninsula, the remaining 10 of them are distributed on the east and west coast of the United States. So, the cost-benefit of having a nuclear carrier that can stay deployed for a long time with the capabilities that it has is that it is also, the cost is that it is a nuclear carrier, and it requires care and feeding to be able to operate these things for 50 years, and with an industrial base that is generally pretty small to be able to support it.

So, there is a requirement by the Navy to be able to get these things through their required maintenance to be able to send them back out. So, there is a turnaround ratio. Now, in the case of the kind of day-to-day world we are in, with the number of carriers today, the Navy struggles to meet the carrier demand signal from basically CENTCOM and PACOM. In fact, they can't do it. I mean there is—they can't meet it, and they will tell you that.

In the case of—and so that is in your kind of normal, day-to-day managing of a very complex security environment and the role that those carriers plays in it. So, we have two or three to four carriers out at any one time, that is a lot in kind of steady state. Now, in the case of a larger conflict, where you had to go to a contingency, you may require three, four, five, six aircraft carriers, and then those would have to be surged; but in my case, it takes a while for things to get out and to get surged, and you may not have—the “flash-to-bang” in Korea is about a day, and you are going to have potential for a million people dead in a day. And so, thinking that we are going to surge a large capacity for the United States to get on top of that particular problem will just put us—creates issues for us.

So, I guess that was a long answer to your question. That the entire force has to be looked at as an enterprise that pushes out the carriers in peacetime on the ability to be able to manage, provide that forward presence that is critical, I think, to our security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for your service. Thank you for being here today. Appreciate your patience, your indulgence, and thank you to the men and women that serve with you. Would you please convey that back to them, of how much we appreciate them and their families and the sacrifices that they make on a daily basis for us. Thank you very much, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 5, 2014

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 5, 2014

Opening Statement of Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
HEARING ON
Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command
March 5, 2014

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The committee meets to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization budget requests for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Joining us today are Admiral Samuel Locklear, General Lloyd Austin, and General David Rodriguez. Thank you for being with us, and Admiral Locklear – thank you for adapting your schedule to accommodate Mid-Atlantic snow and ice.

The scope of this hearing is immense and it’s doubtful we will address all of the important issues we have here today. So I encourage members to submit questions for the record.

However, I do think the composite views of these three commanders provides an interesting—and interactive—opportunity to discuss the changing strategic environment, the global demand for forces, the implications of budget cuts and force reductions, and risk among the commands.

Today’s hearing is a study in contrasts. The crisis unfolding in Ukraine is a sobering reminder that military strength, presence, and staying power in the world still matter. Yet just yesterday, we received a budget request and new defense strategy that continues to cut our military strength and reduces our ability to respond to crises around the world.

The President’s assumption that the “tide of war is receding” and that we can safely reduce American hard power in favor of soft power to assure our national security lies in stark contrast to reality. The majority of our vexing security challenges emanate from your three regions of the world: deterring an increasingly assertive China, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; denying al Qaeda and its affiliates safe-havens in Afghanistan and elsewhere to launch attacks against us and our allies; and stemming the violence and instability in the Middle

East and North Africa within the context of the Arab Awakening.

These actors and others are surely watching how the United States responds to Russian aggression and some might be emboldened to further test U.S. resolve.

Our allies and partners are also closely watching. But, in contrast, they worry about U.S. disengagement and the staying power of U.S. security commitments. The administration has committed to a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific while also sustaining a heightened alert posture in the Middle East and North Africa. How well are we doing both? A declining defense budget, reductions in troop strength and force structure, and diminished readiness, suggest we can't do both. Or if we do, we do so at an increased risk to our forces and their missions.

Nevertheless, the Department's new defense strategy and budget request take us down this path. I hope you can provide us with your best military judgment on the advisability of such an approach; how the strategy and budget reflect your mission requirements; and the implications for your command's force structure and needed capabilities.

This is a challenging time and we appreciate the leadership and counsel you provide.

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith**HEARING ON****Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the U.S.
Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command****March 5, 2014**

Admiral Locklear, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is vital to our national interests, and U.S. service men and women play crucial roles in promoting peace within the U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility. Our government's renewed focus on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region relies on the U.S. military to support the implementation of a wide variety of diplomatic, economic, and developmental priorities and objectives.

As the rebalance gains momentum, the United States should continue to provide and maintain collective security; peaceably address concerns and mitigate disputes; promote shared interests and objectives; and cultivate healthy multi-lateral exchange. We should: work to establish a stable and mutually beneficial relationship with China; continue to contain and marginalize the North Korean regime; further develop our security relationship with India; encourage regional democratization efforts; and strengthen enduring ties with our allies in Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

Unfortunately, transnational threats, such as violent extremism and illicit trafficking, continue to menace the region. Disease, malnourishment, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural disaster also persist. The more we can do to maintain stability by defusing tensions and by avoiding conflict through engagement and cooperative efforts with our allies and partners, the more we can help to realize growth and prosperity in the region. The United States will continue to lead in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and to offer assurances through its strong forward presence. The U.S. Pacific Command's flexible force posture remains essential to surmounting regional security challenges. I would especially appreciate Admiral Locklear's views on how the United States might optimize its

rebalancing efforts, particularly in this era of fiscal constraint, to impart a positive and lasting effect on the Indo-Asia-Pacific community.

General Austin, last year when your predecessor, General Mattis, was here, I read him a litany of the challenges he faced in his area of responsibility. As you sit here, it seems like that list has just gotten longer. The war in Afghanistan continues, although the U.S. role is changing significantly, and the actions of President Karzai have left us with substantial uncertainty about our and NATO's future presence there. We and our international partners are deep in negotiations with Iran that will hopefully ensure that they cannot develop a nuclear weapon to threaten us or our close allies in the region. The civil war in Syria grinds on, contributing to regional insecurity through refugees and the spread of terrorism. Iraq once again faces real challenges from al Qaeda-inspired terrorists. Egypt, an important regional ally, is going through another major transition in government and is facing its own security challenges in the Sinai. Yemen is the unwilling host of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and is also going through changes in how it's governed.

While our war in Iraq is over and our involvement in combat in Afghanistan is coming to an end, we currently maintain a robust force level in the CENTCOM region, with forces in Jordan, throughout the Gulf, and obviously Afghanistan. Your command has done much, and continues to do more, to work with our partners and allies to combat threats to all of us, build security in the region, and increase the capability of partners to resist regional threats and aggression. Last year for example, this committee with support from CENTCOM acted to enhance military cooperation among our Gulf Allies on missile defense efforts. I hope you can share with us today how you plan to continue these efforts, what authorities and funding you require for this effort. Building security and assisting partner nations to improve governance will be key efforts in combating al Qaeda and helping manage the difficult transition in this region.

Finally, General Austin, I hope you can help us think through the end of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account—more than any other command, CENTCOM has relied on OCO to fund a variety of bases and operations that not only supported ongoing combat operations, but are necessary

to maintain our presence in the region and reassure allies. A key effort going forward will be finding ways to bring these kinds of funds back into the base budget, making it clear that our presence and involvement in the region is not episodic and war-driven, but is instead driven by our long term interests and our commitment to the security of our allies.

Turning to AFRICOM, events on the continent, including the recent crisis in South Sudan, continue to underscore the point that the US has a strategic interest in stability in Africa. In recent years we've seen U.S. involvement in the conflicts combating violent extremists in Somalia and Mali. We helped remove a dictator in Libya, and have assisted in the hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army. We've seen continued, growing success in each of those efforts, but they all require vigilance and perseverance to expand and solidify those gains. Beyond that, however, we've witnessed considerable unrest in the great lakes regions, and Boko Haram has been very active and very dangerous in Nigeria and continues to see opportunities to achieve an even wider impact. Those are only two illustrative examples that remind us that the continent is a big place, and there are a lot of places that deserve our attention.

Thus, with all that's going on around the globe today, it is fortunate that we have AFRICOM focused on our national security interests in its area of responsibility. But, as I've said before, our interests go well beyond the pressing security concerns. Let's be clear that AFRICOM's good work will be for nothing if we don't have a robust corresponding diplomacy and development strategy to support human rights, justice and freedom for commerce that address the underlying causes of instability.

Again, I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing here today.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
5 MARCH 2014

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to present an update on the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). I have had the privilege of leading soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines for over two years in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region; these young men and women are doing great things in support of U.S., allies and partners throughout a region critical to U.S. national interests. In concert with our allies and partners, USPACOM balances historical, geographic, and cultural factors against modern day political and economic events in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction and conflict in the most militarized region in the world. USPACOM's actions in our nation's rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region are a visible and enduring demonstration of U.S. commitment to the region. Our actions are reflected in a continued and steady investment in forces, infrastructure, and engagement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and are designed to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships, maintain our access to the global commons, deter aggression, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Security Environment

Since last year's testimony before this Committee, four critical leadership transitions have been completed, seven national elections were conducted on democratic principles, and the region is readying for free and open elections in two of the most populous countries on earth. When I last testified, Xi Jinping had just assumed the position as China's new President, completing the formal leadership transition in China. Since then President Xi put forward a comprehensive agenda of domestic, economic, and social reforms. In North Korea, Kim Jong Un is beginning his third year in power. The recent purge of his uncle, Chang Song-Taek and frequent reshuffling of military commanders suggest that the struggles between new and old guards are not fully resolved. To the south, Republic of Korea (ROK) President Park Geun-Hye

continues to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance and to maintain a path to peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe implemented policies such as establishing a National Security Council and passing the Secrets Protection Act that allow it to better address the persistent and emerging security challenge of the next decade.

The last year saw elections in Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, the Maldives, and Mongolia. In Bangladesh and Cambodia, the results were strongly contested and are not fully resolved, creating uncertainty and political instability. A sharp political division continues in Thailand, despite new elections. Next on the horizon are important national elections in India in May and Indonesia in April and July. Burma continues to undergo its dramatic democratic and economic transition, including the release of over a thousand political prisoners and the possibility of a national ceasefire agreement.

The countries of the Asia-Pacific region are not only more stable politically; they are also more engaged in multilateral political organizations and economic institutions. A multilateral security architecture -- comprised of groups such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regional actors collaborating on issues ranging from humanitarian assistance to maritime security to counterterrorism is emerging to help manage tensions and prevent conflict. ASEAN has grown in this leadership role under Brunei's chairmanship in 2013, and hopefully has opportunities to grow even more under 2014 chairman Burma. We've seen encouraging examples of states using international fora to resolve disputes peacefully, such as the Philippines using the United Nations Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to argue its case against China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, and Thailand's and Cambodia's pledge to abide by the International Court of Justice's recent decision in their long-standing border dispute.

Indo-Asia-Pacific economies increasingly drive the world economy. Forty percent of global economic growth is attributed to this region. Yet the area is still home to some of the most devastating poverty on earth. As with other parts of the world, the divide between “haves” and “have-nots” grows wider, leading to political and economic disenfranchisement and disturbing population shifts across borders. The International Organization for Migration estimates that 31.5 million people in Asia have been displaced due to economic disparities. These hardships are further aggravated by intense competition for natural resources. In an area home to more than half the earth’s population, demand for food, water, and energy is increasing. Friction caused by water shortages is evident between India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, China and Southeast Asia. Much of the region is unable to adequately provide for their own food requirements, highlighting the need for stable, plentiful supplies through international commerce. The same is true for energy supplies. Disruption of these supplies or unexpected price increases quickly strains many governments’ ability to ensure their people’s needs are met.

North Korea: North Korea remains our most dangerous and enduring challenge. As many Indo-Asia-Pacific countries seek to achieve greater prosperity, improve compliance and adhere to regional and international law, and strive for stable relations, North Korea remains isolated and unstable. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in contravention of its international obligations, constitutes a significant threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

During last year’s posture hearings, the region was in the middle of a North Korean “provocation campaign”—a calculated series of North Korean actions designed to escalate tensions and extract political and economic concessions from other members of the Six-Party Talks. This campaign began with a satellite launch, in December 2012, which was particularly

concerning because it violated UN Security Council resolutions and verified technology necessary for a three-stage Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). North Korea continued its campaign through last spring. They conducted another underground nuclear test, threatened the use of a nuclear weapon against the United States, and concurrently conducted a mobile missile deployment of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, reportedly capable of ranging our western most U.S. territory in the Pacific. Though we have not yet seen their “KN08” ICBM tested, its presumed range and mobility gives North Korea a theoretical ability to deliver a missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to anywhere in the United States with little to no warning. In addition, North Korea pledged to “readjust and restart” facilities at Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center – including the plutonium-production reactor that has been shut down for the past six years.

Consistent with previous provocation cycles, recently, North Korea then shifted to a more conciliatory approach and has expressed claimed that it is willing to talk to the United States either bilaterally or within the Six-Party Talks framework with no concrete steps towards required denuclearization obligations or even negotiate on the issue of denuclearization.

North Korea’s role in weapons proliferation remains troubling. North Korea continues to violate United Nations Security resolutions against selling weapons and weapon-related technologies around the globe. The July 2013 Panamanian confiscation of a North Korean ship loaded with fighter aircraft and other weapons from Cuba in direct violation of UN sanctions is one example. While it has become harder to sell to traditional customers such as Iran and Syria, North Korea is attempting to open new markets in Africa and South America. North Korea’s proliferation activities defy the will of the international community and represent a clear danger to the peace, prosperity, and stability of the Asia-Pacific region

Natural Disasters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is the world's most disaster-prone with eighty percent of all natural disaster occurrences. It contends with more super-typhoons, cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes, and floods than any other region. This past year, a super typhoon hit the Philippines, severe flooding and a major earthquake in New Zealand, devastating flooding in India and Nepal, another earthquake in the Sichuan Province of China, and flooding and drought in the Marshall Islands. During Operation Damayan in the Philippines, we joined the Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC) as an enabler to relief efforts coordinated by the Government of the Philippines, a testament to the importance of capability building initiatives and theater security cooperation.. Our Center for Excellence in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief serves as a clearing house for information and best practices in disaster relief and supporting preparedness efforts throughout the region. We also stand ready to respond to the all too frequent vectors of disease that plague this region. Large populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in many Indo-Asia-Pacific nations create optimal conditions for the rapid spread of human- or animal-borne diseases. Regional information sharing and rapid response to health crises is improving, but the danger remains high.

Territorial Disputes: The primacy of economic growth, free trade, and global financial interdependency keeps outright inter-nation conflict at bay. The most likely scenario for conflict in this part of the world is a tactical miscalculation that escalates into a larger conflict. There is no more likely stage for this scenario than the complex web of competing territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. Competing territorial claims in East is a significant and growing threat to regional peace and stability The use of Coast Guards and an implicit rule set imposed by Japanese and Chinese leadership signaled that neither country wants escalation. China's

declaration in November of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea encompassing the Senkakus immediately raised tensions. As Chinese and Japanese reconnaissance and fighter aircraft increasingly interact, and China flies unmanned aerial vehicles over the area the chances for miscalculation or misunderstanding remain high. USPACOM continues to watch this situation very closely.

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are even more complex. No less than seven claimants have overlapping claims in this oil, gas, and mineral rich sea. By far the most excessive claim is China's, which extends to almost the entire South China Sea and includes other claimants' Exclusive Economic Zone in the region, up to and sometimes including the 12nm territorial sea. China's activities in the South China Sea appears to consist of slowly increasing its naval and air presence in the region, meeting and checking any activity by any of the more aggressive claimants in the disputed areas, and providing political and economic incentives to quiet the other claimants. As evidence of this policy, China increased its maritime presence in 2013 and now maintains three continuous Coast Guard patrols in the South China Sea, backed up by regular transits of Chinese Navy warships. Attempts by other claimants to assert claims and prevent Chinese actions that seek to assert operational superiority provide the potential for miscalculation.

Through multilateral forums, USPACOM supports the U.S. position advocating for adjudication of claims by duly constituted international bodies and multilateral solutions. Unlike other nations involved in this and similar disputes, China consistently opposes international arbitration, instead insisting on bilateral negotiations—a construct that risks China's domination of smaller claimants. The activities by multilateral forums to adopt international codes of conduct for the South China Sea and those efforts to legally adjudicate claims need our support.

Cyber: Cyberspace is growing not only in its importance relative to the flow of global commerce but also in its importance to our ability to conduct military operations—making it an attractive target for those seeking to challenge the economic and security order. Cyber threats come from a diverse range of countries, organizations, and individuals. China is rapidly expanding and improving its cyberspace capabilities to meet their national and military objectives, as are others, including North Korea and Russia, not to mention rogue groups and individuals who are increasingly enabled by technology. These actors seek to exploit our vulnerabilities by gaining unauthorized access to our networks and infrastructure on a daily basis. Potential adversaries are actively probing critical infrastructure throughout the United States and in partner countries.

Violent extremism: Periodic eruptions of religious, ethnic, political, and separatist violence continues to plague some of our closest partners in the region, limiting our engagement efforts. India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines are all working against a confluence of criminal and extremist networks that enable transnational facilitation of people, material, and money across the region to support various causes which threaten regional peace and prosperity. A sustained effort to build and enhance the capacity of our allies and partners is the cornerstone of our counter terrorism strategy in South and Southeast Asia. We are encouraged by the persistent pressure that our partner nations are placing on these networks. Through close and continuous cooperation we have eroded localized insurgencies and degraded transnational extremist organizations with global reach such as Al-Qaida, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and Hezbollah.

The movement of terrorist networks as they seek safe havens and target new areas is a potential challenge. Despite modest gains over the past few years, India-Pakistan relations are

promising but fragile and the cease fire violations along the Line of Control in 2013 are certainly cause for concern. Barring another major terror attack in India, a conflict between these two nuclear powers is remote, but continued violence along the contentious border will erode the political space to improve relations. Looking further beyond the immediate term, we should remain guardedly optimistic that India and China—the two largest Asian powers—value the economic benefits of cooperation and will strive, in New Delhi’s words, “for peace and tranquility on the border as the foundation of a stable relationship.”

Chinese Military Modernization and Intent: While we recognize and understand China's desire to develop a military commensurate with its diverse interests. The United States remains committed to preserving regional peace and security, to meeting our security commitments to our regional allies, and guaranteeing free access to the sea, air, and space domains. We are meeting that challenge by improving our military-to-military relationships with China, while steadfastly standing by our friends and allies in the region. Although U.S./China military-to-military ties are improving, we will need ever more transparency and understanding of Chinese military intentions and capabilities if we are to minimize friction and avoid conflict in the future.

The Chinese military continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capability of its armed forces to project power to fight and win a short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict. While preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus of their military investment, China’s interests have grown and it has gained greater influence in the world , with its military modernization increasingly focused on expanding power projection capabilities into the East China Sea, South China Sea, the Western Pacific, and even the Indian Ocean. This

expansion, in part, is focused on developing the capabilities to deny U.S. access to the Western Pacific during a time of crisis or conflict and to provide the means by which China can bolster its broad maritime claims in the region.

Chinese military operations are expanding in size, complexity, duration and geographic location. During 2013, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy conducted the highest number of open ocean voyages and training exercises seen to date. This included the largest ever Chinese military naval exercise observed outside the first island chain and into the Western Pacific, highlighting an enhanced power projection capability and increased ability to use military exercises to send political messages to regional allies and partners and others in Asia.

This expansion in Chinese military power projection is driven by the rapid modernization of Chinese military capabilities. Over the course of the last year, the PLA continued large-scale investment in advanced short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, military cyberspace capabilities, and improved capabilities in nuclear deterrence and long-range conventional strike, advanced fighter aircraft, integrated air defenses, undersea warfare, and command and control. China's first aircraft carrier, the *Liaoning*, began to integrate its air wing and conduct flight operations.

China's advance in submarine capabilities is significant. They possess a large and increasingly capable submarine force. China continues the production of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The platform will carry a new missile with an estimated range of more than

4,000 nm. This will give the China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, probably before the end of 2014.

Allies and Partners

The United States' five treaty allies the USPACOM AOR; Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines and Thailand each play a critical role in addressing aspects of these challenges. The bilateral relationships we build with our allies is key to mutual defense but also form the basis for multilateral security arrangements that can strengthen efforts to address Asia-Pacific security challenges.

Australia: Our alliance with Australia anchors peace and stability in the region. The Australians take a leading role in regional security issues, and we are coordinating our Theater Campaign Plan with their Regional Campaign Plans to synchronize and optimize our mutual efforts.

USPACOM is working closely with the Australian Defence Staff to advance U.S. force posture initiatives including the Marine Rotational Forces in Darwin and dispersed rotational U.S. Air Force capabilities at Royal Australian Air Force bases. Increased rotational presence in Australia with a more robust bilateral training and exercise program continues to enhance U.S.-Australia interoperability and regional stability.

Japan: The alliance between our two countries is stronger than ever. USPACOM remains ready to carry out the U.S. security commitment to Japan through a full range of military capabilities. U.S. Forces Japan and Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) collaborate and work towards greater shared responsibilities in realistic training, exercises, interoperability and

bilateral planning. With the 2006 establishment of the Japanese Joint Staff, U.S. Forces Japan is building a close relationship to enhance interoperability and information sharing. The October, 2013 agreement by our “2+2” Security Consultative Committee (SCC) to review the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines for the first time since 1997 should enable the JSDF to play a greater role in both the defense of Japan and in response to contingencies further afield. We will continue to maintain a robust military presence in Japan in order to meet future security. Last year, the Marines replaced aging CH-46 helicopters with MV-22 Ospreys and recently the Government of Japan approved a land-fill permit on Okinawa to allow the construction of a new airfield that will facilitate improved posture of U.S. Marine aircraft. The U.S. Navy has begun the gradual replacement of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with the newer and more capable P-8s. We will continue to deploy well-equipped, highly trained and ready forces along with our newest equipment to best support Japan and the region.

During North Korea ballistic missile provocations last year, the U.S. and Japan worked very closely to defend against potential threats. It became apparent to both USPACOM and Japan that we need an additional TPY 2 radar in Japan to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) against missile threats. This will serve to provide early warning of missile threats to improve defense of the U.S. homeland, our forces forward deployed, and to Japan.

We continue to work with Japan and the Republic of Korea (RoK), towards a trilateral mil-to-mil arrangement capable of addressing North Korea provocations. Trilateral mil-to-mil exercises and operations will improve each participants understanding of the mutual challenges and shared opportunities that exist in and around the Korean peninsula.

Philippines: USPACOM is identifying opportunities, informed by a proposed Agreement on Enhanced Defense Cooperation with the Philippines, for an enhanced rotational

presence of U.S. forces to improve the training and capability of both our forces. U.S. forces are assisting the Philippine force efforts to improve its maritime security capabilities. Key Philippine efforts include improving Maritime Domain Awareness through development of long-range aircraft and waterborne patrols within the Philippines' Economic Exclusion Zone and enhancing integration among the National Coast Watch system.

The typhoon response in November provided evidence of the strength of the U.S.-Philippines alliance. During Operation Damayan, U.S. military relief operations assisted the people of the Philippines. More importantly, the Philippines Armed Forces was well-prepared for the emergency. Their participation in two previous DoD-sponsored humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) planning exercises enabled a rapid damage assessment to response and recover execution process. USPACOM continues to stand by our ally as they undergo recovery efforts.

Republic of Korea: The U.S. and ROK alliance remains strong. For 61 years, we have worked together to provide peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and we continue to work to enhance our relationship and collective capabilities. We recently concluded negotiations for the 9th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and have developed a new cost sharing arrangement that will be in place through 2018.

The U.S. and ROK have agreed to transfer Operational Control on a conditions- and milestones-based timeline, and deliberations are ongoing to ensure we are developing the right capabilities for the alliance. We believe that the best way to ensure deterrence and maintain the strength of the alliance is through development of combined capabilities to respond vigorously to any future North Korean provocation.

Thailand: Thailand, with whom we have the oldest treaty in Asia, demonstrates a willingness and capability to be a regional leader. Their efforts assist in addressing several issues including negotiating competing South China Sea maritime claim disputes, serving as an enabler for engaging Burma, and encouraging trilateral engagements. Thailand is committed to increased responsibility for regional security matters.

Activities with the Thai military, including the annual Cobra Gold exercise, the largest and longest running joint/combined exercise of its kind, are the means by which we remain tightly aligned with Thailand. The Thais have expanded this formerly bilateral U.S.-Thai exercise into a premier multilateral event with a dozen participant countries from around the region.

Singapore: Singapore is designated a "Major Security Cooperation Partner," a title that reflects the value of our bilateral relationship. Singapore is critical to U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. Their continued commitment to U.S. military presence in the region is underscored by their support of the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) rotational deployments. Singapore's Changi Naval Base, with its modern shore infrastructure and command and control center, is a key enabler of LCS and provides critical support to other key other forward operating naval forces.

India: India continues its rise as a regional and emerging global power. Its increasing, positive presence in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region as security provider is an important factor in regional stability. Last year, USPACOM participated in the U.S.-India

Strategic Dialogue and looks forward to India's participation in this year's Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.

India has had impressive growth in defense trade with the U.S., purchasing C-17s, C-130Js, and P-8s. As we look to mature our defense relationship, there is further opportunity for growth in defense sales, co-development and co-production under the aegis of the U.S. India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. These systems would expand India's capabilities to provide for their own security and help their efforts to be a security provider for the region.

New Zealand: We continue to improve our relationship with New Zealand. USPACOM recently co-hosted with our New Zealand counterpart an Inaugural Bilateral Defense Dialogue and we plan follow-on dialogue this summer. We will be conducting 22 joint military-to-military exercises with New Zealand this year. We have revised our policy to allow their warships to visit our global military ports on a case-by-case basis and look forward to New Zealand's participation in this summer's RIMPAC exercise.

Oceania: USPACOM remains engaged by assisting the Pacific island nations to build capacity to detect, deter, and seek redress for illegal activities within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and have enhanced expansion of selected partner Coast Guard ship rider agreements to include U.S. Navy ships. In addition to EEZ control, capacity-building for effective HA/DR response remains USPACOM's focus for the Oceania sub-region. USPACOM has increased the regional understanding of the area security concerns through regular participation in the Pacific Island Forum as a mechanism to discuss mutual security issues.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): USPACOM has expanded combined and joint training and exercises in the region, notably with Indonesia, Malaysia, and other ASEAN members. There has been success using multilateral forums to build partner capacity in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, intelligence cooperation, counter narcotics, maritime security, maritime domain awareness and cyber security and peacekeeping operations.

ASEAN's goal to develop a code of conduct for the South China Sea, and the efforts of some ASEAN nations to adjudicate claims using international bodies are positive initiatives which we support. USPACOM will continue to explore ways to support the ADMM and ASEAN Regional Forum for addressing common security challenges. The recent ADMM Counter-Terrorism Exercise is an example of successful collaboration with regional partners on transnational threats. Other multilateral engagements such as the recent event in Brunei focused on military medicine and maritime collaboration in areas of counter-piracy, search and rescue, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). The recently concluded ADMM-Plus multilateral peacekeeping (PKO) exercise in the Philippines focused on force generation, sustainment and logistics, and field operations.

Improving partner relations remains vital toward building multilateral cooperation arrangements. The multilateral forums of ASEAN provide an ideal mechanism to build multilateral capabilities. The ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting (ADMM) forum is beginning to formalize those relationships to address the region's security challenges. In fact, the U.S. Secretary of Defense is hosting the next ADMM forum in Hawaii. There are also key ASEAN member countries building close bilateral military relationships which can greatly enhance regional stability. For example, in adherence to the 2013 U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive

Partnership, we will continue to assist Vietnam in developing its non-lethal defense capabilities in specialized areas such as maritime security, search and rescue, disaster management, and peacekeeping.

U.S. - China Relationship: The last year has seen some progress in improving the cooperative aspects of our military-to-military relationship with China. There are three major areas of military-to-military engagement opportunities with the Chinese. First, is using current mechanisms to exchange views on the international security environment and expand common understanding of common problems, including discussions on Iran and North Korea. U.S. and Chinese participation in the Fullerton Forum, the Strategic Security Dialogue in Singapore, along with China's invitation to join the USPACOM Chiefs of Defense Conference are examples of forums for discussing common problems.

Secondly, we work to develop increased institutional understanding. The Mid-Level Officers Exchange is a program where the Peoples' Liberation Army and USPACOM host a delegation of each other's field grade officers to better understand cultural, linguistic, and historical factors. A group of officers from the USPACOM staff and components are traveling this week to three cities in China, at the PLA's invitation, to gain an appreciation of how their military organizations and institutions work.

Thirdly, we can build areas of mutual cooperation. The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) dialogues are held to exchange views on maritime domain safety. Chinese ships recently completed a port visit berthing in Pearl Harbor last November. Sixty three PLA soldiers participated in Humanitarian Assistance training at a Hawaiian training area. Next year, the Chinese are scheduled to reciprocate and will host a similar number of U.S. soldiers. The

Chinese participation in the Cobra Gold exercise, as well as their upcoming participation in the world's largest naval exercise, RIMPAC, illustrates a growing effort to include China in large multilateral activities to increase awareness and cooperation. All of the activities were scoped to ensure they fall within Congressional guidance regarding U.S. and China military-to-military interaction.

Resources

Budget uncertainty has hampered our readiness and complicated our ability to execute long-term plans and to efficiently use our resources. These uncertainties impact our people, as well as our equipment and infrastructure by reducing training and delaying needed investments. They ultimately reduce our readiness, our ability to respond to crisis and contingency as well as degrade our ability to reliably interact with our allies and partners in the region.

The USPACOM joint forces are like an 'arrow.' Our forward stationed and consistently rotational forces – the point of the 'arrow'-- represent our credible deterrence and the "fight tonight" force necessary for immediate crisis and contingency response. Follow-on-forces from the continental U.S. required for sustained operations form - the 'shaft of the arrow'-, and underpinning these forces are critical platform investments and the research and development needed to ensure our continuous dominance. Over the past year we have been forced to prioritize readiness at the point of the spear at the great expense of the readiness of the follow-on force and the critical investments needed for these forces to outpace emerging threats, potentially eroding our historic dominance in both capability and capacity.

Due to continued budget uncertainty, we were forced to make difficult short-term choices and scale back or cancel valuable training exercises, negatively impacting both the multinational training needed to strengthen our alliances and build partner capacities as well as some unilateral

training necessary to maintain our high end warfighting capabilities. These budgetary uncertainties are also driving force management uncertainty. Current global force management resourcing, and the continuing demand to source deployed and ready forces from USPACOM AOR to other regions of the world, creates periods in USPACOM where we lack adequate intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities as well as key response forces, ultimately degrading our deterrence posture and our ability to respond.

Posture, Presence, and Readiness

Driven by the changing strategic environment, evolving capabilities of potential competitors, and constrained resourcing, we have changed the way we plan for crises, internationalized the USPACOM headquarters to better collaborate with allies and partners, and created a more agile and effective command and control architecture - a command and control architecture that can seamlessly transition from daily routine business to crisis. Strategic warning times in the USPACOM AOR are eroding and key to addressing this is our ability to rapidly assess and shape events as crises emerge. This approach places a premium on robust, modern, agile, forward-deployed forces, maintained at the highest levels of readiness, and capable of deploying rapidly.

USPACOM is doing much to prepare the force for 21st century threats. Our components are looking at new ideas for employment of forces to better fit the needs and dynamic nature of the Indo-Asia-Pacific and to send a powerful and visible message of our commitment across the region. The Marine rotational force deployments to Darwin, the *USS Freedom* (the first Littoral Combat Ship rotating through Singapore), and rotational deployments of F-22s to Japan and F-16s to South Korea are just a few examples of these efforts. Likewise, the U.S. Army Pacific

(USARPAC) is currently exploring a future employment model that helps us work with Allies and partners, using existing exercises and engagements as the foundation.

Critical to continued success in the USPACOM AOR is properly setting the theater to ensure a full range of military operations can be supported by the necessary forces postured, capabilities, and infrastructure.

Forward pre-positioning (PREPO) is a vital. Agile, responsive and sustained operations demand a resilient network of capabilities to deploy and sustain my most demanding contingency plan required forces. While we have made some strides to address current theater issues, I remain focused on building capacity in these areas:

- Army PREPO stocks: FY16-20 sustainment funding to ensure reliability/availability.
- PREPO Fuel: Continue to build capacity for forward positioned stocks.
- PREPO Munitions: Remove expired assets to create space for needed resources.
- PREPO Bridging: Procure additional resources to enhance capacity.
- Combat Engineers: balance active/reserve mix to meet plan timelines.

Our \$1.4B FY14 MILCON program supports operational capability requirements to base MV-22's in Hawaii and an additional TYP-2 radars in Japan, and improve theater logistics and mobility facilities. Coupled with active and passive defense measures, MILCON pays for selective hardening of critical facilities and the establishment of aircraft dispersal locations to improve critical force and asset resiliency. Projects like the General Purpose and Fuel Maintenance hangers and the command post at Guam are examples. Continued targeted investments are needed to support "next generation" systems the Joint Strike Fighter, address airfield requirements and co-locate mission support and maintenance facilities which enhance readiness, improve mission response and reduce costs associated with returning aviation assets to

CONUS. Support for other dispersed locations like those in Australia also offer increased security cooperation opportunities, deepening our already close alliance. Additional sites we are considering in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands offer expanded opportunities for training and divert airfields as well.

Many of our bases, established during World War II or in the early years of the Cold War, require rehabilitation. Infrastructure improvement programs like MILCON, Host-Nation Funded Construction (HNFC), and Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) ensure the readiness of forces and facilities needed to meet the challenges of a dynamic security environment. In addition to continuing the outstanding support Congress has provided for MILCON, we ask for consideration to fully fund Service requests for SRM, which contribute directly to the readiness of critical ports/airfields, command/control/communication, fuel handling and munitions facilities.

Continued engagement by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) further supports our objectives. USACE's unique expertise builds capacity in critical areas, including disaster response and water resource management, and their Planning and Design (P&D) funding directly supports the HNFC program. FY15 P&D funding for USACE (\$20M) will enable efficient utilization of billions of dollars of HNFC in Japan and Korea, ensuring our base sharing approach supports current budget trends.

Cooperative Security Locations (CSL's) are important to our ability to respond agilely in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. CSL are enduring locations characterized by the periodic (non-permanent) presence of rotational U.S. forces. Although many of these locations, like Thong Prong Pier in Thailand, provide important strategic access, we lack the authorities to make these low cost improvements. Increased funding to enable low cost improvements would enhance our

security cooperation effectiveness with key Allies and Partners in the region To address this gap, we are requesting a new \$30M 'Security Cooperation Authority', managed by the Joint Staff under the MILCON appropriation. The new authority will provide us the flexibility to rapidly fund CSL development in support of DOD priorities in theater.

USPACOM posture is also dependent on the need to build stronger Security Cooperation capacities with our partners.

Engagement resources like Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) are also powerful engagement resource tools. FMF and IMET are critical to demonstrating U.S. commitment to priority regional security concerns such as maritime security and disaster relief; enabling troop contributing countries to participate in peacekeeping and coalition operations; and providing professionalization opportunities in support of deeper partnerships with the United States and U.S. interests, including strengthening democratic values and human rights. Two other tools that help build capacity are the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. GSCF is a broad-based pilot program (ending in 2015) that allows improved interagency security cooperation. I highly encourage you to continue this authority beyond 2015, especially considering the benefits from the \$40 million GSCF allocation largely applied to the Philippines' law enforcement and maritime security capabilities, including the establishment of the Interagency Maritime Technical Training Center. The EDA program also allows us to build vital capabilities, but current statute limits transfer of certain ships to partner nations. Equally important is continued Congressional support of the Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement Training Transformation Program. These resources enable funding for joint exercises and engagement that sustain force readiness, strengthen alliances, expand partner

networks, and prepare for a full range of military operations. The Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) remains a uniquely effective executive outreach tool to convey our strategic interests to multi-national audiences and needs our continued support.

Expansion of the DoD's State Partnership Program (SPP) run by the National Guard Bureau has begun in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Recent collaborative efforts to fully integrate SPP into our Security Cooperation programs have led to the successful introduction of five Bilateral Affairs Officers and the establishment of DoD's newest partnership (Nevada – Tonga). We now have 8 of 66 SPP programs world-wide (Mongolia, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Tonga). In order to meet theater objectives and opportunities in 11 additionally identified Asia Pacific nations, we continue to establish new partnerships in the region.

To sustain our current technological superiority, we must rapidly develop affordable and innovative capabilities that force our potential adversaries to respond with more costly solutions—costly in terms of money, time and resources. Our ability to successfully develop innovative capabilities will ensure we continue to be the world's most dominant and lethal fighting force. In order to meet this challenge, innovative approaches through affordable / high payoff science and technology programs as well as through innovation and experimentation must be accelerated. Specifically, the unique challenges in terms of distance and threat require we maintain our technological advantages in areas such as – mobility, unmanned platforms, long-range strike, ISR, sub-surface capabilities, cyber, space, and missile defense.

We continue to look for opportunities to leverage the capabilities and resources of our allies and partners. Sharing and co-development of technologies with allies, as well as conducting experimentation and demonstrations within the operationally relevant environments

offered by our partners will help to achieve this goal. USPACOM will continue to work closely with our partners, and allies, generating capabilities that achieve regional security.

USPACOM's success depends on our ability to accurately assess the theater security environment with penetrating and persistent ISR and domain awareness. These capabilities depend on resourcing for agile command and control of ISR; modernized sensors and platforms with the reach to excel in a non-permissive environment; and secure, assured means for sharing critical information with our allies, partners, and our forces. The nexus for leveraging these capabilities—the USPACOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center—also requires modernization of aging and dispersed infrastructure which is costly to operate and sustain.

USPACOM continues as a global leader in intelligence and cyber systems. It has established and is maturing the Joint Cyber Center-Pacific (CYBERPAC), which plans, integrates, synchronizes and directs theater cyberspace operations. The aim is to set the theater for cyberspace operations, provide assured command and control and information sharing with joint and inter-organizational partners and forces, and direct regional cyber missions to meet USPACOM objectives. USPACOM continues to work with DoD counterparts to receive additional cyber forces and build appropriate mechanisms to command and control such forces across all operations.

Agile and resilient C4 (Command, Control, Communication, and Computers) capabilities are critical for assuring our ability to maintain communications and situational awareness; command and control forward deployed forces; and coordinate actions with coalition partners. This holds particularly true for USPACOM, which must overcome the "Tyranny of Distance" posed by the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region. From moving supplies in support of a humanitarian

assistance/disaster relief effort to full spectrum coalition operations, modern joint forces depend upon assured command and control and interoperability.

Future globally integrated operations will require even more integrated communications with mission partners on a single security classification level with a common language. Therefore, a more defensible and secure C4 cyber architecture designed to communicate with mission partners is needed. USPACOM was recently designated to lead Increment 2 of the Joint Information Environment (JIE), which will accommodate Service networks and joint/coalition warfighting networks in a standard network infrastructure with improved security capabilities. JIE will further strengthen collective cyber security in the region and will redefine joint/coalition communications, establish a credible cyber defense posture, and improve staff efficiency and support. We have already expanded traditional communications interoperability forums with Korea, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines to include cyber defense.

Conclusion

At USPACOM, we are committed to maintaining a security environment that protects and defends U.S. interests throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. If adequately resourced, we will make efficient use of these resources in order to ensure we are properly postured and ready to respond to any crisis that threatens U.S. interests. I would like to thank the Committee on behalf of the many men, women, and their families that live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Theater for all your continued support and I look forward to answering your questions.




United States Navy Biography

Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Adm. Locklear is a 1977 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.

His career as a surface warfare officer includes assignments aboard USS *William V. Pratt* (DDG 44), USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70), USS *Callaghan* (DDG 994), and USS *Truxtun* (CG 35), culminating in command of USS *Leffwich* (DD 984). Subsequent command assignments include commander, Destroyer Squadron Two; commander, *Nimitz* Strike Group; commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet; and commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

Ashore, he served as executive assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; the 78th commandant of Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy; director, Assessment Division (OPNAV N81); director, Programming Division (OPNAV N80); and, as director, Navy Staff.



He is a 1992 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and holds a master's degree in Public Administration from the George Washington University.

Locklear is the commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

His personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal with one gold star, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with four gold stars, Bronze Star Medal, and numerous individual, campaign and unit awards.

Updated: 12 March 2012

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL LLOYD J. AUSTIN III
COMMANDER
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
5 MARCH 2014

Introduction: The Central Region, comprised of 20 countries in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, is geographically vast and holds as much as 60% of the world's proven oil reserves and plentiful natural gas reserves. Both of which will remain vital to the global energy market, to the economic health of our allies and partners, and to the United States. This strategically important region also claims major sea lines of communication for international commerce and trade, including the critical maritime chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The region is rich in history and culture, and there are numerous ethnic groups, languages, and traditions represented. It is also home to three of the world's five major religions. All things considered, events that occur there have considerable and far-reaching impacts. The past has clearly shown that when the region experiences any degree of strife or instability, every country there and others around the globe – to include the U.S. – feel the effects. Specifically, what happens in the Central Region influences the global economy and affects, in ways big and small, our vital interests and those of our partner nations, namely, as President Obama affirmed before the United Nations in September 2013: the free flow of resources through key shipping lanes; the defense of our homeland against the pervasive and persistent threat of terrorism and extremism; and, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, it is critical that we do what is necessary to bolster security and stability in this most important part of the world. It is for this same reason that we continue to confront external aggression against our allies and partners.

In this context, in 2014, the U.S. finds itself at a strategic inflection point. Though problems abound in the Central Region, perspective is everything. In the decisive year ahead resides a real chance for the United States, together with our partners and allies, to achieve diplomatic and

military successes and thereby generate much-needed positive momentum in the Middle East and Central and South Asia. To do so, we must widen our collective perspectives and look beyond the challenges that exist and seize the many opportunities that are present throughout the region. The USCENTCOM team is fully committed to doing so and to ensuring that our efforts contribute to an effective whole-of-government approach to advancing and safeguarding U.S. vital interests in the region and around the globe.

We, at USCENTCOM, remain always ready to seize available opportunities, while responding to contingencies and providing support to our partners and allies. We remain always vigilant to ensure that we avoid strategic surprise. At the same time we remain engaged and present, while doing all that we can to improve security and stability throughout the Central Region, in part by helping our partners to build military capability and capacity. This work is being done each day by the dedicated and hard-working men and women of this command, including more than 94,000 U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen and Civilians selflessly serving and sacrificing in difficult and dangerous places. They – *and their families* – are doing an extraordinary job. They are and will remain our foremost priority.

This past year has been an active one for U.S. Central Command. In Afghanistan, we expect to complete our transition from combat operations to our train, advise and assist (TAA) and counter-terrorism (CT) missions by the end of 2014. The Afghans have taken the lead on nearly all security operations and are showing considerable capability and fortitude. While our diplomats continue to pursue a bilateral security agreement (BSA) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), our retrograde and base closures remain on schedule.

Pending further policy decisions, while we are readying for the TAA and CT missions, we remain prepared to implement the full-range of options with respect to our post-2014 presence. Meanwhile, we continue to provide critical assistance to the Egyptian Armed Forces in the Sinai. We also have been doing what we can to manage the effects of the ongoing civil war in Syria. Of particular concern is the growing refugee crisis affecting millions of people in Syria and neighboring countries, namely Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. We also developed strike options in response to Syrian President Bashar al Assad's use of chemical weapons. The credible threat of the use of military force ultimately contributed to the diplomatic option currently being implemented. We are hopeful that a positive outcome to the crisis in Syria will be reached. We continue to undertake contingency planning to address a variety of potential scenarios. This also holds true of our efforts with regard to Iran, where we support the U.S. Government policy combining diplomacy, economic pressure, and the resolve to keep military options on the table. In the past several months, we supported embassy ordered departures from Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, and South Sudan. We continue to do all that we can to counter the growing terrorist threat emanating from the region, and we are assisting our partners in their efforts to build greater capability and capacity to defend their sovereign spaces. Finally, we conducted and participated in 52 multilateral and bilateral training exercises held in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), along with many of our allies and partners.

As we look ahead, our goal is to build upon our past achievements. We recognize that we must do all that we can to address the challenges and also pursue the opportunities present in the Central Region. At USCENTCOM, we are appropriately postured, and have adopted a theater strategy and a deliberate approach that we are confident will enable us to accomplish our mission.

USCENTCOM's Mission. USCENTCOM's mission statement is: *"With national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability and prosperity."*

Strategic Environment. Developing nations within the region are plagued by poverty and violence, mired in political discord, beset by ethnic and religious tensions, stressed by resource competition and economic stagnation, and strained by a 'youth bulge' that both impels and reinforces popular discontent, and drives demands for political and social reforms. All combine to imperil our vital national interests and those of our trusted partners and allies.

"Underlying Currents." To effectively address the challenges present in the Central Region, we must understand and take into account the full range of forces, or what I refer to as the "underlying currents," at play in this strategically important part of the world. Attitudes and behaviors in the Middle East are driven by these political, economic and socio-cultural currents. They are fueling many of the tensions and conflicts across the USCENTCOM AOR. Each of them, or some combination thereof, is directly contributing to the chaos, volatility, and violence that we are seeing in many regional countries. The principal underlying currents are:

Growing ethno-sectarian divide—we are seeing a significant increase in ethno-sectarian violence in the Middle East. More so than in the past, groups are coalescing around ethnic or sectarian issues, rather than national identity. This is causing a fracturing of institutions (e.g.,

governments, militaries) along sectarian lines and associated rifts among mixed populations (e.g., Sunni, Shia). If allowed to continue unabated, this type of regional sectarian behavior soon could lead to a decades-long sectarian conflict stretching from Beirut to Damascus to Baghdad to Sanaa.

At present, we are seeing this divide playing out between several ethno-sectarian groups. The one that is growing the widest and most dangerously is the Sunni-Shia divide. At the same time, there is the ongoing Arab-Kurd divide, which has worsened in Iraq. Lastly, there is the ongoing Arab-Israeli divide. These and other similar confrontations, such as those between Pashtun and other ethnicities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and between Muslims and Hindus, are emotionally charged and will prove difficult to resolve. There is deep-seated distrust among these groups and this continues to hinder any attempts at reconciliation. These relationships are also affected, in many cases, by territorial disputes, proxy activity, violence, and regional instability.

Struggle between Extremists and Moderates—of significant concern is the growing struggle across the region between Extremists and Moderates. The growing activism of radical elements is of particular concern to the United States and our partner nations because the beliefs and practices espoused by many of these groups do not align with our values or the values of the majority of the populations in that part of the world. The dangers of Islamic extremism are on the rise throughout the Central Region. To effectively address this threat it is necessary to counter the ideas that often incite extremism. We also need to do all that we can to limit ungoverned spaces by ensuring that countries develop the capability and capacity to exercise greater control over their sovereign territories. Central to our strategy are our efforts to promote

moderate elements and participatory governance and build security capacity to facilitate improved stability.

Rejection of corruption and oppressive governments—The Arab Spring movement reflects a widespread desire for freedom and reform. People want change and they want to have a say in their fate. In many ways, the global expansion of technology triggered this upheaval because more people were able to see alternatives on the television and the Internet, and this made them increasingly intolerant of their own circumstances and oppressive governments. The conditions that caused this shift to come about still exist throughout the USCENTCOM AOR. In fact, it is likely that what we have seen to date is only the beginning of a long period of change. Citizens in many countries are rejecting autocratic rule and publicly expressing their opinions and frustrations with their governments and leaders. Social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, have provided people with a public voice, and they are expressing their discontent and the strong desire for political reform with increased frequency. The desire for change and for increased freedom and reforms is likely to become even more pronounced in the Central Region in coming months and years.

The “Youth Bulge”—Stability in the region is further complicated by the growing population of young, educated, largely unemployed and, in many cases, disenchanted youth. This “youth bulge” in many respects breeds and reinforces discontent and drives demands for political and social reforms. This demographic is of particular concern given its size; over 40% of the people living in the region are between the ages of 15 and 29. These young, energetic, and dissatisfied individuals want change. They want greater autonomy, the right of self-determination, and

increased opportunity. They are willing to voice their opinions publicly without fearing the consequences of their actions. Unfortunately, these disillusioned young people also represent ripe targets for recruitment by terrorist and extremist groups.

We must be able to recognize and understand these and possible other “underlying currents” at play in the Central Region if we hope to effectively manage the challenges that are present and also pursue opportunities by which to shape positive outcomes in that part of the world. It may not be possible to halt or reverse the trends. However, the effects may be mitigated if properly addressed.

Top 10 USCENTCOM Priorities. Looking ahead to the next year, USCENTCOM will remain ready, engaged and vigilant—effectively integrated with other instruments of power; strengthening relationships with partners; and supporting bilateral and multilateral collective defense relationships to counter adversaries, improve security, support enduring stability, and secure our vital interests in the Central Region. In support of this vision, the command remains focused on a wide range of issues, activities, and operations relevant to the USCENTCOM AOR, including our Top 10 priority efforts:

- Responsibly transition Operation Enduring Freedom and support Afghanistan as a regionally integrated, secure, stable and developing country;
- Prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, as directed, disrupt their development and prevent their use;
- Counter malign Iranian influence, while reducing and mitigating the negative impact of proxies;

- Manage and contain the potential consequences of the Syrian civil war and other “fault-line” confrontations across the Middle East to prevent the spread of sectarian-fueled radicalism threatening moderates;
- Defeat Al Qaeda (AQ), deny violent extremists safe havens and freedom of movement, and limit the reach of terrorists;
- Protect lines of communication, ensure free use of the global commons, and secure unimpeded global access for legal commerce;
- Develop and execute security cooperation programs, leveraging military-to-military relationships that improve bilateral and multilateral partnerships and build interdependent collective partnered “capacities”;
- Lead and enable the continued development of bilateral and multilateral collective security frameworks that improve information sharing, integrated planning, security and stability;
- Shape, support and encourage cross-combatant command, interagency, and partner/coalition programs and approaches, while making the best use of military resources; and,
- Maintain and improve our ready and flexible headquarters, capabilities, protected networks, and forces enabled by required freedom of movement, access, and basing to support crisis response

USCENTCOM Challenges and Opportunities. There are significant opportunities present amidst the challenges that reside in the Central Region.

Challenge (Afghanistan): Operations in Afghanistan remain our top priority. Our goal is to conduct a successful transition in Afghanistan while also helping to achieve a capable and sustainable Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). Equally important are our continued efforts in support of ongoing CT missions. We must maintain pressure on terrorist networks to avoid resurgence in capability that could lead to an attack on our homeland or our interests

around the globe. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to achieve a BSA, we will move rapidly to consider alternatives for continuing a security cooperation relationship with Afghanistan. Unfortunately, in the wake of such a precipitous departure, GIRoA's long-term viability is likely to be at high risk and the odds of an upsurge in terrorists' capability increases without continued substantial international economic and security assistance.

We are currently focused on four principal efforts: 1) Completing the transition and retrograde of U.S. personnel and equipment out of Afghanistan; 2) Maintaining the safety and security of U.S./Coalition troops and personnel; 3) Supporting continuing CT efforts that are contributing to the defeat of Al Qaeda (AQ) and other violent extremist groups, including the Haqqani Network; and, 4) Advising, training and assisting the ANSF, while also helping them to prepare to provide security in support of the April 2014 scheduled national elections.

Our retrograde operations remain on-track, with the vast majority of movement conducted via ground through Pakistan. We have several means for conducting retrograde available to us, including multiple ground routes through Pakistan and the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in Central Asia, Russia and the Caucasus. We use multiple modes of transport to maximize our efficiency and, in some cases, retrograde solely via air routes. However, movement in this region is quite difficult, principally due to terrain and conditions on the ground. While base closures and materiel reduction are proceeding as planned, our services' equipment reset will likely continue into 2015.

The surest way to achieve long-term stability and security in this region is a self-sustaining security force. Our continued presence – if a BSA is concluded – complemented by NATO’s presence, will enable us to assist our Afghan partners through a critical period of transition. It would also serve to further reassure allies and partners of U.S. and Western military staying power.

It truly is remarkable all that U.S., Afghan and Coalition forces have accomplished in Afghanistan over the past 12+ years. The ANSF has dramatically improved its capability and capacity. Today, their forces are comprised of nearly 344K Afghans [352K authorized], representing every ethnicity. They are leading nearly all security operations throughout the country and actively taking the fight to the Taliban. The campaign also has had a positive impact on education, literacy levels, and women’s rights throughout much of the country. Some of these effects, particularly the increase in literacy levels, are irreversible.

There is still much work to be done by the government and people of Afghanistan. Enduring success will require the Afghan government to continue to enhance its capabilities in the wake of a successful transfer of power following the scheduled national elections to be held in April 2014. This represents the critical first step in the country’s political transition. They will also have to make a more concerted effort to counter corruption. If the Afghan leadership does not make the right decisions going forward, the opportunities that they have been afforded could easily be squandered. Furthermore, the return of instability and diminished security and even tyranny will affect Afghanistan, as well as the surrounding Central Asian states and the region as a whole. We have been in Afghanistan for nearly 13 years, representing the longest period of

continuous conflict fought by our Nation's all-volunteer force. Together with our Afghan and Coalition partners, we have invested lives and other precious resources to improve security and stability in that country. Going forward, we want to do all that we can to preserve those hard-earned gains.

Opportunity (Afghanistan): Our intent is to maintain an enduring relationship with the Afghan military as we work together to preserve improved security and stability in the region. Our continued presence – if a BSA is concluded – will enable us to train and advise Afghan security forces and further improve their capability and confidence during a critical period of transition. Our presence would also allow us to maintain much-needed pressure on Al Qaeda.

There also exists an opportunity to normalize our relationships with Afghanistan and Pakistan, while also improving relations between these two countries in a way that will enhance regional security. We should encourage them to find common ground in their efforts to counter the increasingly complex nexus of violent extremist organizations operating in their border regions.

The past 12+ years in Afghanistan have witnessed incredible growth and maturation in USCENTCOM's collaborative partnerships with USEUCOM and NATO. Now, as operations wind down in that country, we should look to identify areas of common interest that would benefit from our continued collaboration. Certainly the convergence of our shared interests with those of Central and South Asia (CASA) states, specifically in the areas of CT, counter-proliferation (CP), and counter-narcotics (CN), provides a place from which to effectively

engage and shape regional stability, especially in the context of a reduced U.S.-international presence in Afghanistan post-2014.

Challenge (Syria): We are also focused on the conflict in Syria. It represents the most difficult challenge that I have witnessed in my 38-year military career. What started as a backlash against corruption and oppressive authoritarian rule has now expanded into a civil war. Nearing its third full year, the conflict appears to have reached, what I would characterize as a “dynamic stalemate” with neither side able to achieve its operational objectives.

The conflict is further complicated by the presence of chemical weapons (CW), the tremendous influx of foreign fighters and a humanitarian crisis that affects millions of people in Syria and in neighboring countries; and is exacerbated by the Assad regime’s deliberate targeting of civilians and denial of humanitarian access. We are collaborating with our interagency partners in developing solutions to the pressing humanitarian crisis that threatens the stability of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. Meanwhile, the credible threat of the use of military force, initiated by the United States in response to the regime’s use of CW, prompted President Assad to agree to destroy all such weapons in Syria under the direct supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Thus far, the Assad regime has missed milestones set by the international community to transport priority chemicals to the Syrian coast for removal and destruction. The regime must follow through on its obligation to eliminate its chemical weapons program. Meanwhile, we remain committed to facilitating a negotiated political solution, which remains the only way to sustainably resolve the conflict.

Support and engagement by the United States and others is needed to bolster the broader regional effort in response to the conflict in Syria. This sentiment was consistently echoed by regional leaders during my recent engagements. Nearly all partners, both in and out of the region, have expressed growing anxiety with respect to the violent extremists operating from ungoverned space within Syria. The flow of foreign fighters and funding going into Syria is a significant concern. When I took command of USCENTCOM in March of 2013, the intelligence community estimated there were ~800-1,000 jihadists in Syria. Today, that number is upwards of 7,000. This is alarming, particularly when you consider that many of these fighters will eventually return home, and some may head to Europe or even the United States better trained and equipped and even more radicalized. At the same time, extremists are exploiting the sectarian fault line running from Beirut to Damascus to Baghdad to Sanaa. Left unchecked, the resulting instability could embroil the greater region into conflict. Several nations are pursuing independent actions to address this threat. We will continue to support our partners in order to protect our vital interests and theirs as well.

Opportunity (Syria): Much effort is being put forth by U.S. Government elements and others to achieve the desired diplomatic or political solution to the crisis in Syria. This work must continue in earnest. The widespread violence and tremendous human suffering that is occurring in Syria and in neighboring countries will likely have far-reaching and lasting consequences for the region. In the near-term, work to remove or destroy declared CW materials from Syria is underway. Successfully removing these weapons would create additional decision space that could enable us to do more to address other difficult challenges present inside that country. If the flow of foreign fighters could be curbed significantly, and the support provided to the regime

by Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), Iranian Qods Forces and others was stopped or greatly reduced, it could lead to a break in the stalemate and an eventual resolution to the conflict.

Challenge (Iran): We continue to pay close attention to Iran's actions. As a result of the understandings reached with the P5+1, Iran has taken specific and verifiable actions for the first time in nearly a decade that halted progress on its nuclear program and rolled it back in key respects, stopping the advance of the program and introducing increased transparency into Iran's nuclear activities. Despite this progress, significant concerns do remain. In addition to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program, there is growing anxiety in the region and beyond concerning the malign activity being perpetrated by the Iranian Threat Network (ITN), which consists of Qods Force, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, regional surrogates, and proxies. We are seeing a significant increase in Iranian proxy activity in Syria, principally through Iran's support of LH and the regime. This is contributing to the humanitarian crisis and significantly altered political-societal demographic balances within and between the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq. There is also widespread unease with respect to the counter-maritime, theater ballistic missile and cyber capabilities possessed by Iran. Each of these represents a very real and significant threat to U.S. and our partners' interests. Going forward, we should look to employ nuanced approaches in dealing with these distinct challenges, while providing the means necessary to enable our partners to do their part to address them, both militarily and diplomatically.

Opportunity (Iran): Progress towards a comprehensive solution that would severely restrict Iran's nuclear weapons 'breakout' capacity has the potential to moderate certain objectionable

Iranian activities in non-nuclear areas (e.g., ITN, theater ballistic missile, cyber). If the P5+1 are able to achieve a long-term resolution with respect to Iran's nuclear program, that would represent a step in the right direction, and present an unprecedented opportunity for positive change.

Challenge (Counter-terrorism): While we have made progress in counter-terrorism (CT), violent extremist ideology endures and continues to imperil U.S. and partner interests. Al Qaeda and its Affiliates and Adherents (AQAA) and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) operating out of ungoverned spaces are exploiting regional turmoil to expand their activities. Among the VEOs present in the region, AQAA pose the most significant threat. In recent years, AQ has become more diffuse, entrenched, and interconnected. While AQ core is less capable today, the jihadist movement is in more locations, both in the Central Region and globally. This expanding threat is increasingly difficult to combat and track, leaving the U.S. homeland and our partners and allies more vulnerable to strategic surprise. At the same time, we are increasingly concerned about the expanding activity of extremist elements operating in sovereign spaces, to include Iraq, Egypt and Syria. These elements threaten U.S. interests because they foment regional instability and create platforms from which to plot actions targeting our homeland. Many of these extremist elements are highly capable and clearly maintain the intent to conduct future attacks on the U.S. homeland and our interests around the globe. In particular, we must keep pressure on AQ elements operating in Eastern Afghanistan, in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Yemen, and elsewhere. USCENTCOM will continue to support our partners' CT efforts. Our collaboration, particularly through joint combined exercises and training events, helps to build our partners' capability and confidence, and thereby

contributes to increasing governance over ungoverned spaces. This, in turn, helps to deny terrorists and extremists freedom of movement.

Opportunity (Counter-terrorism): The main strength of most VEOs is their extremist ideology, which shows no signs of abating. Ideology transcends personalities and persists even after key leaders are killed. This threat cannot be eliminated simply by targeting individuals. To defeat AQ and other VEOs, we must defeat the ideas that often incite extremism, while also guarding against ungoverned spaces and conditions that allow those ideas to flourish. Our continued presence and active engagement is the most effective way that we can help our partners build greater capability and capacity to meet these threats. We must also look at realigning our critical resources, recognizing that by developing a structure that provides for greater agility and speed of action we will go a long way towards improving our posture and security in the face of this growing threat.

U.S. Engagement in the Central Region. There is a widely-held misperception that the United States is disengaging from the Middle East in order to focus our efforts and attention elsewhere around the globe. To the contrary, the United States fully intends to maintain a strong and enduring military posture in the Central Region, one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression and assure our allies. However, the differing perception held by some must not be overlooked. If not effectively countered, the perceived lack of U.S. commitment could affect our partners' willingness to stand with us and thereby create space for other actors to challenge U.S. regional security interests. We must assure our regional partners of our continued, strong commitment and demonstrate our support through our actions and active presence.

A Regional Perspective. Today, the Central Region is experiencing a deep shift, the total effects of which will likely not be known for years to come. In some parts of the Levant, into Iraq, and even as far as Bahrain, we see a more obvious and accelerating Sunni-Shia sectarian contest. The increasing violence, unresolved political issues, and lack of inclusive governance have weakened Egyptian and Iraqi internal stability, as well as each country's regional leadership potential. The outcomes of the situations in Egypt, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria will largely determine the future regional security environment. Poor outcomes will create additional seams and ungoverned spaces that will be exploited by malign actors, including Al Qaeda.

Around the Region: 20 countries, 20 stories. If we want to achieve lasting effects in the Central Region we must view the challenges present in the 20 countries that make up the USCENTCOM AOR in the context of the "underlying currents" at play and in view of the interconnectedness of behaviors and outcomes. Equally important, we must take care not to simply respond to or manage the challenges that exist. We must also pursue the many opportunities present in the region, understanding that it is principally through these opportunities that we will achieve diplomatic and military successes in specific areas. These successes will, in turn, serve as "force multipliers." The compounding progress and momentum achieved will enable us to increase stability in the region and enhance security on behalf of the United States and our partners around the globe.

Below are synopses of the current state of affairs in each of the 20 countries in the USCENTCOM AOR minus Afghanistan, Syria and Iran which were addressed in the previous section, "USCENTCOM Challenges and Opportunities" (see pages 9-15):

The Gulf States—We enjoy strong relationships with our partners in the Gulf States and will continue to engage with them, both bilaterally and as a collective body through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This collaboration enhances U.S. security, as our capabilities are made more robust through enhanced partner capacity and, ultimately, working “by, with and through” the GCC. This is currently on display and paying dividends at the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar and the Combined Maritime Operations Center in Bahrain. It is important that we continue to support Gulf States’ efforts as they work to address crises emanating from Syria, Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere; internal political challenges; growing ethno-sectarian and extremist violence; demographic shifts; and, Iranian hegemonic ambitions. We remain focused on improving their capabilities specific to ballistic missile defense, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection and counter-terrorism. We have also strongly advocated increased ballistic missile defense cooperation among the GCC states and are beginning to see increased interest and progress.

In December, at the Manama Dialogue held in Bahrain, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced several new initiatives designed to further strengthen cooperation between the United States and our GCC partners. First, DoD will work with the GCC on better integration of its members’ missile defense capabilities, acknowledging that a multilateral framework is the best way to develop interoperable and integrated regional missile defense. Second, the Defense Department intends to expand its security cooperation with partners in the region by working in a coordinated way with the GCC, including the sales of U.S. defense articles to the GCC as an organization. Third, building upon the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum and similar events, Secretary Hagel invited our GCC partners to participate in an annual U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial, which

will allow the United States and GCC member nations to take the next step in coordinating defense policies and enhancing our military cooperation. All of these initiatives are intended to help strengthen the GCC and regional security, and USCENTCOM intends to fully support them. Through our continued presence in the region, training and equipping programs, and further expansion of multilateral exercises and activities, we are setting conditions for increased burden-sharing. Ultimately this will enable us to remain better postured to respond to crises or contingency operations, while also providing a counterbalance to the potential threat posed by Iran.

For decades, security cooperation has served as the cornerstone of the United States' relationship with **Saudi Arabia**. Now, as we face compounding security challenges in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is taking a more independent and outspoken role in safeguarding its interests in the region. Still, despite recent policy disagreements pertaining to Syria, Egypt and Iran, the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to work closely together to contend with violent extremist groups operating in ungoverned spaces, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the humanitarian crisis emanating from Syria and other challenges threatening regional security and stability. Our support of Saudi Arabia in enhancing its defense capabilities will serve to further deter hostile actors, increase U.S.-Saudi military interoperability and, in so doing, positively impact security and stability in the region, as well as the global economy.

A long-time partner and strong ally in the region, **Kuwait** provides critical support for U.S. troops and equipment, and it is playing a significant role in the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. For the first time, Kuwait committed to hosting the U.S. multilateral exercise,

Eagle Resolve 2015, which will further bolster regional cooperative defense efforts. Kuwait continues to struggle with significant political challenges that threaten internal stability. Meanwhile, they have made progress in reconciling long-standing issues with neighboring Iraq, thereby contributing to improved stability in the region. Looking ahead, we can expect to enjoy strong relations with the Kuwaiti military, built upon many years of trust shared since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

The **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** is a valued, contributing partner with whom we share a historically strong military-to-military relationship. The UAE remains solidly committed to a collective defense of the region and has taken the lead in providing air and missile defense capabilities for the Gulf. The Emiratis recent combined U.S. Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) live-fire exercise demonstrated yet another important capability added to its formation. Given their potential to enhance the AOR's stability by providing leadership and military capability, they most certainly merit our continued close engagement and tangible foreign military sales (FMS) support.

We share a close and robust partnership with **Qatar**. They host and provide critical support to two of our forward headquarters and facilities. Over the past several months, Qatar has experienced some friction with GCC partners, namely Saudi Arabia and UAE, principally due to Qatar's perceived support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and radical jihadist groups operating in Syria. Despite this, Qatar represents a voice able and willing to take a lead in the GCC's ongoing pursuit of improved regional stability and security. Qatar's multiple FMS

requests and renewed Defense Cooperation Agreement provide tangible examples to this end. They warrant our continued close engagement and support.

Bahrain remains an important partner and one of the greatest bulwarks against Iranian malign influence in the region. We have a long-standing close military-to-military relationship with Bahrain, one of four partners with whom we share a bilateral defense agreement, in addition to UAE, Kuwait and Jordan. Bahrain provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and by providing facilities and infrastructure for U.S. forces engaged in regional security operations. Despite their efforts in The National Dialogue, Bahrain's Sunni-dominated government and Shia opposition have failed to achieve a political compromise. This effort has been complicated by radical elements supported by Iran. Frequent public protests have created further opportunities for external actors to enflame tensions. This has led to miscalculation, non-proportional responses to perceived threats, and a hardening of both government and opposition positions. We must maintain a pragmatic policy that supports Bahrain while encouraging adherence to human rights. We are starting to see a logical hedging by Bahrain as it seeks assistance from others, specifically China. The current FMS holds may be perpetuating this behavior. In the wake of the successful Manama Dialogue, held in December 2013, we have an opportunity to work with the Bahrainis to address these and other challenges and, in so doing, further improve internal and regional security and stability.

Oman continues to play a steady role and provides a voice of moderation in the region. The country also provides the United States and our allies and partners with critical regional access.

We value our shared appreciation of the situation in the Gulf. At the same time, we recognize that Oman seeks to maintain a constructive relationship with its close neighbor, Iran. Recent terror threats from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have stimulated closer cooperation between Oman and the United States specific to counter-terrorism. We will continue to support and, where possible, expand upon these collaborative efforts.

Iraq, positioned between Iran and Saudi Arabia, remains at the geo-strategic center of the Middle East and the historically preeminent Shia-Sunni fault-line. Over the past year, the country's security situation has deteriorated significantly with violence reaching levels last seen at the height of the sectarian conflict (2006-2008). The principal cause of the growing instability has been the Shia-led government's lack of meaningful reform and inclusiveness of minority Sunnis and Kurds. The situation is further exacerbated by the active presence of Al Qaeda (through the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and the steady influx of jihadists coming into Iraq from Syria. This has come to a head most recently in key areas of Anbar Province. In response to this immediate threat, USCENTCOM, with Congressional support, was able to meet urgent materiel requirements through the FMS process (e.g., small arms, rockets, Hellfire missiles). Leveraging this opportunity, we continue to expand security cooperation activities aimed at strengthening our military-to-military ties. Examples include inviting the Iraqis to participate in regional exercises, such as Eager Lion, and facilitating support for Iraq from nations other than Iran, such as Turkey and Jordan. Now one of the world's largest producers of oil, Iraq has the potential to become a prosperous country and a leader and proactive enabler of regional stability. However, it will be unable to achieve its potential without first achieving a sustainable level of stability and security. This will require major internal political reform, and

the sincere inclusion of the Sunnis and Kurds into the political process that will significantly curb violence across the country.

In **Yemen**, President Hadi worked faithfully through the political transition plan mandated by the 2011 GCC-brokered agreement. The successful conclusion of the National Dialogue was a major achievement. However, it represents one of many steps required to establish a more representative government. While Hadi continues to exhibit sound leadership and a strong commitment to reform, he is facing an increasingly fragile security situation impacted by secessionists in the south, a growing AQAP threat and escalating violence between proxy-funded Houthis and Salafists. We are working closely with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense to restructure the military and security apparatus to effectively deal with these national security threats. We will persist in our efforts to strengthen our relationship in the face of the very serious threat posed by terrorists groups operating out of ungoverned spaces. We also will continue to provide support to the national unity government and to the Yemeni Special Forces focused on reducing those opportunities that enable violent extremists groups to hold terrain, challenge the elected government and prepare to conduct operations elsewhere in the region and against the U.S. homeland.

The Levant—Over the past three years, countries bordering Syria have absorbed more than 2 million refugees. This is causing considerable internal domestic problems. However, these partner nations continue to show tremendous compassion and resiliency in response to this devastating humanitarian crisis. We will keep doing all that we can to support them. Meanwhile, the expanding brutality, as illustrated by the Assad Regime's 21 August 2013

chemical weapons attack in the suburbs of Damascus, has drawn the focus and ire of the international community. Fracture of opposition forces and the increasing prominence of radical Islamist elements on the battlefield further adds to the tremendous complexity of the problem set in Syria. The direct involvement of Iran and LH fighters also is complicating and enflaming this expanding conflict. This growing crisis must be addressed and will require the efforts of regional partners and the international community, recognizing that, allowed to continue unabated, it will likely result in a region-wide conflict lasting a decade or more.

The Government of **Lebanon's** recent formation of a cabinet ended a 10-month political stalemate. While this positive development could lead to a better functioning government, violence is unlikely to subside until the Syria conflict is resolved. Currently, Lebanon is threatened by growing instability inside the country, as evidenced by increasing incidents of sectarian violence, including car bombs. This is due to a variety of contributing factors, including poor governance, Lebanese Hezbollah's involvement in the Syria conflict, which has resulted in a cycle of retaliatory violence, and the significant influx of Sunni refugees from Syria. This is negatively impacting the delicate sectarian balance in the country. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a multi-confessional and national security force, is striving to contain the spread of violence. However, its ability to do so is increasingly strained. We continue to work closely with our military counterparts in addressing their growing security demands. Our expanded support of the LAF, specifically through foreign military financing (FMF), the Global Security Contingency Fund and other train and equip funds, represents our best method for enhancing their capability and capacity to meet current and future security challenges.

Jordan remains one of our most reliable regional partners, as demonstrated by our formal defense agreement, their direct support to Afghanistan, participation in multilateral exercises and support for the Middle East Peace process. Jordan continues to struggle with growing instability, primarily stemming from the crisis in Syria. The influx of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees has placed a heavy burden on Jordan's government and economy. There is also increasing concern regarding the growing threat to the region posed by violent extremists. As a consistent moderate voice, Jordan is an exemplar in the region. We will continue to work closely with Jordan to address our shared challenges. I have dedicated a forward presence, USCENTCOM Forward-Jordan, to assist the Jordanian Armed Forces in their efforts. The U.S. goals are to help ease the burden on the nation's economy and enhance its overall stability and security situation.

While **Egypt** is an anchor state in the Central Region, it has experienced a considerable amount of internal turmoil in recent months. The change in government in July 2013, was prompted by growing popular unrest with the Morsi government because it proved unwilling or unable to govern in a way that was fully inclusive. The interim government has made some strides towards a more democratic and inclusive government, primarily through the lifting of the state of emergency (14 November 2013) and the successful conduct of a public referendum on the constitution (14-15 January 2014). However, despite the progress made on the political roadmap, the interim Egyptian government has made decisions inconsistent with inclusive democracy—through restrictions on the press, demonstrations, civil society, and opposition parties. The interim government has yet to tackle the dire and pressing economic problems that are greatly affecting the country and its people. Absent significant economic reforms or

sustained levels of external financial support from the Gulf, Egypt's economy will continue to falter. As the political transition continues, Egypt is also facing heightened extremist attacks in the Sinai and the Nile Valley. The military and security services have heightened counterterrorism operations in the Sinai, but continue to struggle to contain this threat.

We maintain a historically strong military-to-military relationship with the Egyptian Armed Forces and will continue to work with them to advance our mutual security interests. Given the importance of Egypt's stability to overall security and stability in the region, we should continue to support the political transition and encourage pursuit of necessary economic reforms. USCENTCOM will continue to work closely with the Egyptian military to improve its ability to secure Egypt's borders and to help it to counter the threat posed by extremists in the Sinai and the Nile Valley.

Central and South Asia (CASA)—The CASA states are in the midst of a crucial period as ISAF reduces its presence in Afghanistan and completes the shift from combat operations to the current train, advise and assist mission in support of Afghan security forces. There is growing uncertainty regarding long-term U.S. and NATO commitment to Afghanistan and the region post-2014. There is also concern with respect to Afghanistan's ability to preserve the gains achieved and to maintain long-lasting security and stability in the absence of U.S. and Coalition forces. As a result, we are seeing a number of complex hedging activities by Afghanistan and neighboring states looking to protect their individual interests. This behavior highlights the importance of adjusting our strategy in the CASA region as we look to support our partners and also confront the significant threats of narcotics trafficking, proliferation of WMD and terrorism.

We continue to look for opportunities to mature military-to-military relationships among the Central Asian states, ideally helping them to move beyond rivalries and towards finding common ground for increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Al Qaeda continues to operate in Pakistan's FATA and, to a lesser extent, areas of eastern Afghanistan. Continued pressure on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan also increases the chances that AQ will be displaced to less restrictive areas in the CASA region that would provide AQ and other violent extremists with safe havens from which to facilitate terror networks, plan attacks, pursue WMD, etc. Meanwhile, other regional actors, to include Russia, China and Iran, are attempting to expand their spheres of influence in the CASA region for security and economic purposes. Long-standing tensions between Pakistan and India also threaten regional stability as both states have substantial military forces arrayed along their borders and the disputed Kashmir Line of Control.

In **Pakistan**, we face a confluence of persistent challenges that have long hindered the efforts of the Pakistan government to fight terrorism and our ability to provide needed assistance. Central to Pakistan's struggles is its poor economy and burgeoning "youth bulge." Given these conditions, radicalism is on the rise in settled areas and threatens increased militant activity and insurgency in parts of Pakistan where the sway of the state traditionally has been the strongest. At the same time, terrorist attacks and ethno-sectarian violence threaten the government's tenuous control over some areas. Further compounding these internal challenges is Pakistan's strained relationships with its neighbors.

The U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military relationship has improved over the past two years, reflecting increased cooperation in areas of mutual interest including the defeat of AQ, reconciliation in Afghanistan and support for Pakistan's fight against militant and terrorist groups. Greater security assistance, training, support and operational reimbursement through the Coalition Support Fund have enhanced Pakistan's ability to conduct counter-insurgency (COIN)/CT operations. In November 2013, we held the second strategic-level Defense Consultative Group meeting, focused primarily on implementing a framework for promoting peace and stability based on common COIN and CT interests. The Out-Year Security Assistance Roadmap will focus on enhancing Pakistan's precision strike, air mobility, survivability/counter-improvised explosive device (IED) capability, battlefield communications, night vision, border security and maritime security/counter-narcotics capabilities. Additionally, we are nesting these initiatives within our Military Consultative Committee, which finalizes our annual engagement plan and the USCENTCOM exercise program. The end result will be a synchronization of activities aimed at helping Pakistan build capabilities in support of our common objectives across all security cooperation lines of effort. While we continue to strengthen our cooperation in areas of mutual interest, we are engaging with Pakistan where our interests diverge, most notably with respect to the Haqqani Network which enjoys safe haven on Pakistan soil.

Our relationship with **Uzbekistan** is advancing in a deliberate, balanced way driven by shared regional security concerns. We have resumed Special Forces training and initiated a non-binding five-year framework plan. Our bilateral training conducted in June 2013 focused on CT and CN and renewed collaboration in support of shared interests. The Uzbeks also continue to provide support for operations in Afghanistan, principally by allowing access to NDN routes. While the

Uzbeks prefer to work bilaterally, we see significant potential in their expressed desire to contribute positively to regional stability. Our security cooperation programs are carefully managed so as not to upset the regional military balance.

Our relationship with **Tajikistan** continues to improve against the backdrop of significant security challenges. They are supporting operations in Afghanistan by allowing transit along the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan route of the NDN. Additionally, they have shown their support for broader security initiatives, including CT, CN and border security. Tajikistan's lengthy border with Afghanistan and the associated access to ungoverned spaces presents difficulties for the country's security forces. Enhancing Tajikistan's ability to secure this border against narco-traffickers and VEOs is vital to ensuring internal and regional stability. Our modest investment of resources in support of their force modernization efforts is primarily focused on enhancing the country's capability to address security challenges while encouraging the continued professional development of its defense. This will contribute to the protection of our shared interests from the threat of VEOs.

We are redefining our relationship with the **Kyrgyz Republic** as we ascertain the full impact of the planned July 2014 closure of the Manas Transit Center and termination of our Framework Defense Cooperation Agreement. A new Framework Agreement will be necessary to maximize U.S.-Kyrgyz Republic security cooperation. Until such an agreement is reached, our security cooperation activities will likely decrease. While these challenges have limited our ability to further develop our military-to-military relationship, we continue to pursue all opportunities where our interests align, particularly in the areas of CT and border security.

Our relationship with **Kazakhstan** continues to mature and has great potential for expansion. In 2012, we signed a Five-Year Military Cooperation Plan (2013-2017) and a Three-Year Plan of Cooperation in support of Kazakhstan's Partnership for Peace Training Center. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Defense is transforming its forces from a traditional Soviet-style territorial defense role into a western-modeled expeditionary, professional and technologically advanced force capable of meeting threats in the post-2014 security environment. Kazakhstan is the most significant regional contributor to stability and security in Afghanistan. They have pledged grants to the ANSF fund after 2014, while also offering technical service support for ANSF equipment and providing educational opportunities in Kazakhstan for young Afghans. In August 2013, we conducted Steppe Eagle, an annual multinational peacekeeping exercise co-sponsored by the United States and Kazakhstan. This exercise facilitated the continued development of the Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Brigade. Once the brigade is operational, Kazakhstan intends to deploy subordinate units in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations as early as this year. Kazakhstan remains an enduring and reliable partner, well positioned to serve as bulwark for increased stability within the region.

Turkmenistan is a valued partner and enabler for regional stability. Of note is their support of Afghanistan where they are contributing through a series of bilateral development projects. They also permit DoD humanitarian assistance overflights. While the United States and Turkmenistan share numerous regional interests, their policy of positive neutrality governs the shape and pace of our security assistance relationship. Turkmenistan remains committed to self-imposed restrictions on military exchanges and cooperation with the United States and other nations in order to maintain its neutrality. Our security assistance relationship has seen modest growth as

we help Turkmenistan to further develop its border security forces and the capabilities of the Turkmen Caspian Sea Fleet. However, we do not foresee any changes to their policy, so it is likely our interactions, though productive, will remain limited.

Central Asia's position, bordering Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan, assures its long-term importance to the United States. By improving upon our military-to-military relationships we will be better able to maintain access and influence, counter malign activity, protect lines of communication and deny VEOs access to ungoverned spaces and restrict their freedom of movement. Going forward, initiatives will be tailored to transform our current limited transactional-based relationships into more constructive cooperative exchanges based on common interests and focused on training and equipping them to conduct more effective CT, CP and CN operations.

Our Strategic Approach. USCENTCOM's goal is to effect incremental, holistic improvements to Central Region security and stability, in part, by shaping the behaviors and perceptions that fuel regional volatility. The intent is to generate a cumulative impact that de-escalates conflicts, mitigates confrontations and sets conditions for durable peace, cooperation, and prosperity throughout the region. Our strategic approach is defined by the "**MANAGE-PREVENT-SHAPE**" construct.

Our priority effort is to **MANAGE** operations, actions and activities in order to de-escalate violent conflict, contain its effects, maintain theater security and stability and protect U.S. interests and those of our partners. At the same time, we recognize that our charge is not simply

to wage today's wars for a period. Rather, our goal is to achieve lasting and improved security and stability throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia. We do so by managing the current conflicts, while also taking measures to **PREVENT** other confrontations and situations from escalating and becoming conflicts. At the same time, we are pursuing opportunities and doing what we can to effectively **SHAPE** behaviors, perceptions and outcomes in different areas. These efforts cross the entire theater strategic framework (near-, mid-, long-term actions).

Our ability to effectively employ our MANAGE-PREVENT-SHAPE strategic approach is largely dependent upon the capabilities and readiness of our forward deployed military forces, working in concert with other elements of U.S. power and influence. These elements include our diplomatic efforts, both multilateral and bilateral, and trade and energy. Equally important are our efforts aimed at building regional partners' capability and capacity and also strengthening our bilateral and multilateral relationships, principally through key leader engagements and training and joint exercise programs. The long-term security architecture of the Central Region demands that our partners be capable of conducting deterrence and defending themselves and our common security interests. This can only be accomplished if we maintain strong military-to-military relationships and build on existing security frameworks; recognizing that we cannot surge trust.

Leverage Partnerships. In an effort to counter the "underlying currents" that are the root cause of violence and instability in the Central Region, we must leverage the ability and willingness of key regional leaders to influence behaviors. By encouraging certain states to adopt more moderate positions, for example, while promoting the efforts and voices of others that are

already considered moderate, we may be able to limit the impact of radical Islamists. Likewise, by limiting the availability of ungoverned spaces, we may diminish the reach and effectiveness of violent extremists operating in the region. We cannot force a universal change in behaviors. But, we can set the right conditions and promote the efforts of influential states and regional leaders who may, through their words and actions, achieve significant and lasting improvements.

Building Partner Capacity (BPC). Building partner capacity is a preventative measure and force multiplier. Our goal is for our partners and allies to be stronger and more capable in dealing with common threats. Joint training exercises, key leader engagements and FMS and FMF financing programs all represent key pillars of our BPC strategy. When compared to periods of sustained conflict, it is a low-cost and high-return investment that contributes to improving stability throughout the Central Region while lessening the need for costly U.S. military intervention. Tangible by-products include increased access, influence, enhanced interoperability and improved security for forward-deployed forces, diplomatic sites and other U.S. interests. Working “by-with-and through” our regional partners, whenever possible, also serves to enhance the legitimacy and durability of our actions and presence and allows for increased burden sharing.

Training and Joint Exercise Programs. The USCENTCOM Exercise Program continues to provide meaningful opportunities to assist with BPC, enhance unity of effort and shape occasions for key leader engagements throughout the AOR. During FY13 and 1st Quarter FY14, four of the five USCENTCOM component commands developed or continued existing exercises covering the full spectrum of USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Objectives. This

past year, USCENTCOM executed 52 bilateral and multilateral exercises. Our successful training efforts included the Eagle Resolve exercise, which was hosted by Qatar and included naval, land, and air components from 12 nations, as well as 2,000 U.S. service members and 1,000 of their counterparts. Our Eager Lion 2013 exercise in Jordan involved 8,000 personnel from 19 nations, including 5,000 U.S. service members. The International Mine Countermeasures Exercise 2013, conducted across 8,000 square nautical miles stretching from the North Arabian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to the Gulf of Oman, united some 40 nations, 6,500 service members, and 35 ships in defense of the maritime commons.

In addition to military-to-military engagement, the exercise program achieved a number of objectives, including: demonstrating mutual commitment to regional security; combined command, control and communications interoperability; integrating staff planning and execution of joint combined operations; the development of coalition warfare; the refinement of complementary warfare capabilities; the enhancement of U.S. capability to support contingency operations; and the maintenance of U.S. presence and basing access and overflight in the region. FY14-16 exercise focus areas will be: enhanced U.S./coalition interoperability; CT/critical infrastructure protection; integrated air and missile defense; counter WMD; and, maritime security, with an emphasis on mine countermeasures.

Critical Needs and Concerns. The realities of the current fiscal environment will have a lasting impact on USCENTCOM headquarters (HQs), our five component commands and 18 country teams, and these realities must be confronted soberly, prudently and opportunistically. The cumulative effects of operating under successive continuing resolutions and budget uncertainty

have created significant obstacles to both USCENTCOM HQs and the USCENTCOM AOR in terms of planning and execution. Persistent fiscal uncertainty hinders efficient and timely implementation of operational, logistical, tactical and strategic milestones and objectives.

Required capabilities. For the foreseeable future, turbulence and uncertainty will define the Central Region, and vitally important U.S. national interests will be at stake. Therefore, it is necessary that USCENTCOM be adequately resourced and supported with the authorities, equipment, capabilities and forces required to address existing challenges and to pursue opportunities. Among the specific capabilities required are:

Forces and Equipment. Forward-deployed rotational and permanently-assigned joint forces, fighter and lift assets, surveillance platforms, ballistic missile defense assets, naval vessels, ground forces, and cyber teams that are trained, equipped, mission-capable and ready to respond quickly are indispensable to protecting our vital interests and reassuring our partners in the region. It is likewise essential that we maintain the strategic flexibility required to effectively respond to contingencies.

Information Operations (IO). Our adversaries continue their reliance on the information domain to recruit, fund, spread their ideology and control their operations. Our investments in IO thus far have made it USCENTCOM's most cost-effective method and the top non-lethal tool for disrupting terrorist activities across the Central Region. Our military information support operations programs provide critical non-kinetic capabilities designed to conduct a range of activities. Our Regional Web Interaction Program (RWIP), for example, provides non-lethal

tools to disrupt ongoing terrorist recruitment and propaganda. The requirement to employ IO will persist beyond major combat and counter-insurgency operations. We will need to maintain the technological infrastructure, sustained baseline funding and continued investment to allow for further development of this valuable tool.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The theater ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. The threat from short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in regions where the U.S. deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing at a rapid pace, with systems becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate. This trajectory is likely to continue over the next decade. We must be ready and capable of defending against missile threats to United States forces, while also protecting our partners and allies and enabling them to defend themselves. Our capability and capacity would be further enhanced through the acquisition of additional interceptors and BMD systems. However, the global demand exceeds supply. Therefore, the U.S. should continue to pursue investments in re-locatable ground- and sea-based BMD assets balanced against U.S. homeland defense needs.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets. We have enjoyed, for the most part, air supremacy for the last 12+ years while engaged in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. Now, we are out of Iraq and in the process of transitioning forces from Afghanistan. However, VEOs, principally Al Qaeda and other proxy actors continue to pose a significant and growing threat in the Central Region. Ascertaining the intentions and capabilities of these various elements is not an easy task. As airborne ISR and other collection assets diminish in the region,

our knowledge will lessen even further. Now, more than ever, a persistent eye is needed to gain insight into threats and strategic risks to our national security interests. In many ways, collection in anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environments presents the toughest problem for the future. It simply cannot be overemphasized that human intelligence, satellite and airborne assets, and other special collection capabilities remain integral to our ability to effectively counter potential threats.

Combined military intelligence operations and sharing is a critical component of USCENTCOM operations. Over the past decade, intelligence community sharing policies have enabled near-seamless operations with traditional foreign partners. Over the last year, we have seen an increase in military intelligence collaboration with regional allies who bring new and unique accesses and insights into the actions and plans of our adversaries. These increasingly important regional partnerships are possible because of the close working relationship USCENTCOM's intelligence directorate maintains with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The progressive intelligence sharing authorities that we possess were provided by Director Clapper's team. I will continue to ask the intelligence community's senior leaders to emphasize the production of intelligence in a manner that affords USCENTCOM an opportunity to responsibly share it in a time-sensitive environment with our most trusted partners in order to enable increased bilateral and multilateral planning and operations.

Appropriately Postured. We sincerely appreciate Congress' continued support for capabilities required to sustain future operations in the Central Region and to respond to emerging situations; these include: prepositioned stock and munitions; a streamlined overseas military construction

process that supports our necessary posture and security cooperation objectives; continued contingency construction and unspecific minor military construction authorities; increased sea-basing capabilities; and airfield, base, and port repair capabilities needed to rapidly recover forward infrastructure in a conflict. These capabilities enable our effective and timely response to the most likely and most dangerous scenarios in the Central Region. They also support our efforts to shape positive outcomes for the future.

Cyber Security. In the coming month and years, USCENTCOM will need to be able to aggressively improve our cyber security posture in response to advanced persistent threats to our networks and critical information. As the cyber community matures, we will plan, coordinate, integrate and conduct network operations and defensive activities in cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations. Key requirements, resourcing and training and awareness for adequate cyber security remain at the forefront of USCENTCOM's cyber campaign. This campaign entails a multi-disciplined security approach to address a diverse and changing threat, adequate resourcing at appropriate operational levels to enable the rapid implementation of orders and a command and control framework that aligns with the operational chain of command.

DoD requires redundant and resilient communications in this AOR. We ask for your continued support in sustaining the investments we have made to make our information technology and communications infrastructure resilient, as these programs are currently 97% Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funded. In addition, we are assisting our regional partners in building their capacity and expertise in the cyber domain as we are heavily reliant on host nation

communications infrastructure across the Central Region. With Congress' backing, we will continue to focus on cyber security cooperation as a key part of our theater strategy.

Enduring Coalition Presence at USCENTCOM HQs. We enjoy a robust coalition presence at USCENTCOM HQs that currently includes 55 nations from five continents. These foreign officers serve as senior national representatives, providing USCENTCOM with a vital and expedient link to our operational and strategic partners. Their presence and active participation in the command's day-to-day activities assists the commander and key staff in retaining military-to-military relations with representatives of a country's chief of defense. Coalition presence also enables bilateral and multilateral information sharing, while maintaining a capability to rapidly develop plans to support military and humanitarian operations. It is a capability that we should retain, though I am currently looking to reshape and refocus the coalition as an enduring entity, post-2014. While their continued presence will require an extension of current authorities and funding, it represents a strong investment that aligns with and directly supports USCENTCOM's mission in what is a strategically critical and dynamic area of responsibility.

Required Authorities and Resources. We appreciate Congress' continued support for the following key authorities and appropriations. They remain critical to our partnerships, access, interoperability, responsiveness and flexibility in the dynamic USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

Building Partner Capacity. Continued support for flexible authorities is needed to effectively react to urgent and emergent threats. Global Train and Equip and Global Security Contingency

Fund authorities demonstrate the ability of DoD and the Department of State to work together to effectively build partner capacity. The FY14 NDAA extends authority for DoD to loan specific equipment to partners through Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) through December 2014. We strongly endorse and support making this authority permanent and global as an integral part of all ACSAs since it facilitates greater integration of coalition forces into regional contingencies and enhances security cooperation. Finally, continued support for our exercise and engagement efforts is necessary to maintain and enhance partnerships that are critical to ensuring and defending regional stability, which supports our national military and theater campaign strategies within the USCENTCOM AOR.

Foreign Military Financing and Sales (FMF and FMS). Our need for continued Congressional funding of FMF programs that support USCENTCOM security cooperation objectives cannot be overstated. We appreciate Congressional support for interagency initiatives to streamline the FMS and FMF process to ensure that we remain the partner of choice for our allies in the region and are able to capitalize on emerging opportunities.

Coalition Support (CF). Authorities, such as Global Lift and Sustain, are critical to our ability to provide our partners with logistical, military, and other support, along with specialized training and equipment. Continuing to provide this support is vital to building and maintaining a coalition, which in turn reduces the burden on U.S. forces and increases interoperability.

DoD Counter-Drug and Counter-Narcotics Authorities. USCENTCOM uses existing worldwide DoD Counter-Drug (CD) authorities to provide support for Afghanistan security force

development and U.S. Government agency law enforcement. These authorities provide wide latitude to support our law enforcement agencies in building reliable CD security partners. Funding under these authorities represents one of the largest sources of security assistance for Central Asia, and it provides leverage for access, builds security infrastructure, promotes rule of law, and reduces funding for violent extremists and insurgents in the Central Region. The majority of USCENTCOM's CD funding is through OCO appropriations; however, the program must endure in order to sustain these cooperative law enforcement activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Finally, to maintain the additional gains we have made in disrupting the flow of VEOs and illicit narcotics trafficking, we must maintain our counter-narcotics programs in the Central Asian states.

Resourcing Afghanistan Transition. In addition to the efforts referenced above, several key authorities and appropriations are essential to maintaining our momentum in the Afghanistan transition and will remain critical in the future environment as we shape the region to prevent crises; these include:

The **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)** is the cornerstone of our strategy and essential to ensuring the ANSF are capable of providing for the security and stability of their country after the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom. It is from the authorities and funding of ASFF that we provide assistance to the ANSF through the procurement of equipment and supplies, services, specialized training, and facility and infrastructure support, as well as salaries for the 352,000 members of the ANSF and 30,000 Afghan local police. Continued sustainment of the ANSF will prove the key component of the post-2014 train and advise mission in Afghanistan.

We will also need to honor our commitments to the Afghan people and complete the critical infrastructure projects we began under the **Afghan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)**, as part of the Afghan counterinsurgency campaign. These projects focus on power, water and transportation as we transition out of Afghanistan and set the conditions for a long-term security relationship. Many key AIF projects will reach completion post-2014. .

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds enable commanders on the ground to provide urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction to maintain security and promote stability during transition. We need this funding to continue, albeit at a much reduced level, as long as U.S. forces are on the ground in Afghanistan to ensure our commanders have the full spectrum of capabilities at their disposal.

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)-funded Accounts. For over a decade, the full range of military operations in the Central Region has been funded through contingency appropriations. By nature, OCO funding is temporary. However, many of our missions in the region will endure despite their initial ties to Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. To do so we will need to develop an enduring approach to resourcing the defense strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR.

The U.S. Central Command Team. Over the course of my 38-year military career, one truth has held constant: provided the right resources and equipment, people can and will successfully accomplish any mission given to them. During three deployments to Iraq and one to

Afghanistan, and also while stationed stateside, I have seen our men and women in uniform do the most incredible and selfless things in support of operations and one another. They continue to humble and inspire me each and every day.

At USCENTCOM, people absolutely are our most important assets. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen and Civilians, and their Families who make up our world-class team are doing an outstanding job, day-in and day-out, selflessly serving and sacrificing in support of the mission at our headquarters in Tampa and in forward locations throughout the Central Region. We absolutely could not do what we do without them, and they will maintain our strong and unwavering support. In addition to making sure that they have the necessary resources, equipment, and authorities, we remain 100 percent committed to doing everything we can to take care them, both on- and off-duty.

Suicide Prevention. Suicide Prevention remains a top priority across all levels of leadership at USCENTCOM HQs and throughout the USCENTCOM AOR, to include among the ranks of our deployed service members. We are fully committed to ensuring access to the full range of available resiliency building and suicide prevention assets and resources. We continue to partner with our Service force providers to educate leaders and service members, both at home and abroad, on behavioral health issues, available resources and ongoing efforts to decrease the stigma often associated with seeking and receiving treatment. All efforts retain the singular focus that the loss of even a single service member from suicide is one too many.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR). Over the past year, the SAPR program has taken center stage in our endeavor to provide an environment free from sexual assault and discrimination. Ongoing efforts throughout USCENTCOM focus on increased training and awareness in coordination with victim advocates and victim assistance, and we will continue to actively pursue, investigate and prosecute sexual assaults as warranted. In the unfortunate event that a sexual assault occurs, the victim's physical and emotional needs are immediately addressed, whether or not he or she opts for restricted or unrestricted reporting of the assault. The military cannot afford such attacks from within and you can be assured that this is and will remain a top priority for all personnel assigned to or associated with this command.

Conclusion. The year ahead is certain to be a decisive one throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia. The region is more dynamic and volatile than at any other time. What will unfold will inevitably impact the global economy, as well as the security of U.S. vital interests and those of our partner nations. Therefore, it is imperative that we continue to do all that we can to help keep things in USCENTCOM's AOR as stable and secure as possible. To this end, in the coming year, we will pursue stronger relationships with and among our partners and allies. We will view the various challenges in the region through a lens that takes into account the "underlying currents" at play. We will manage existing conflicts, while helping to prevent confrontations and situations from becoming new conflicts. At the same time, we will vigorously pursue opportunities, recognizing that it is through them that we will shape positive outcomes and achieve improved security, stability and prosperity in the region and beyond. We also will actively support the efforts of our colleagues in other U.S. Government departments and

agencies; realizing that, while we may employ different methods, we are in pursuit of many of the same goals and objectives.

The tasks ahead will prove extremely challenging, yet they are absolutely worthy of our collective efforts and sacrifices. Given the enormity of the stakes, we must—*and we will*—work together to enable a Central Region where improved security leads to greater stability and prosperity for all people, throughout this strategically important part of the world and around the globe, including here at home.

USCENTCOM: Ready, Engaged, Vigilant!



General Lloyd J. Austin III
Commander, U.S. Central Command



General Lloyd J. Austin III, hails from Thomasville, Georgia. He was commissioned an Infantry second lieutenant in 1975 upon graduation from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.

General Austin has served in a wide variety of command and staff positions throughout his 37-year career. His early assignments included duty with: the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army; 2d Battalion, 508th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; U.S. Army Recruiting Battalion, Indianapolis, Indiana; United States Military Academy, West Point, New York; 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York.

General Austin returned to Fort Bragg in 1993 and served as Commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division; G-3 82d Airborne Division; and later as the Commander, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division from 1997 to 1999. Following duty at Fort Bragg, he was assigned to the Pentagon where he served as Chief, Joint Operations Division, J-3 on the Joint Staff.

General Austin served as the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM from July 2001 until June 2003, and as Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York from September 2003 until August 2005 with duty as Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-180, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. He then served as the Chief of Staff, United States Central Command from September 2005 until November 2006 followed by assignment as the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps in December 2006 where he commanded Multi-National Corps – Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM from February 2008 until April 2009. He was then assigned to the Pentagon as the Director, Joint Staff from August 2009 to August 2010. General Austin commanded United States Forces – Iraq from September 2010 through the completion of OPERATION NEW DAWN in December 2011. Most recently General Austin served as the 33d Vice Chief of Staff of the Army from January 2012 to March 2013. General Austin assumed command of United States Central Command on 22 March 2013.

His military education includes the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from the United States Military Academy, a Master's Degree in Education from Auburn University and a Master's Degree in Business Management from Webster University.

General Austin's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Three Oak Leaf Clusters), the Distinguished Service Medal (with Two Oak Leaf Clusters), the Silver Star, the Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (with Four Oak Leaf Clusters), the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal (with Six Oak Leaf Clusters), the Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Combat Action Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, the Ranger Tab and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.



HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, USA,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
POSTURE HEARING
5 MARCH 2014

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

United States Africa Command is adapting our strategy and approach to address increasing U.S. national interests, transnational security threats, and crises in Africa. The African continent presents significant opportunities and challenges, including those associated with military-to-military relationships. Regional instability and growth in the al-Qa'ida network, combined with expanded responsibilities for protecting U.S. personnel and facilities, have increased our operational requirements. While our activities can mitigate immediate security threats and crises, reducing threats to the United States and the costs associated with intervention in Africa will ultimately hinge on the long-term development of effective and democratic partner nation security institutions and professional forces that respect civilian authority. The development of democratic security institutions and professional forces will be most effective if undertaken in the broader context of civilian-led efforts to strengthen governance and the rule of law. Together, these efforts will support enduring U.S. economic and security interests.

In the near term, we are working with African defense leaders, multinational organizations, European allies and interagency partners to address the immediate threats of violent extremism and regional instability. African partners are increasingly leading regional security efforts, and we are making significant progress in expanding collaboration and information-sharing with African and European partners as we help to build capacity and enable partner activities. We are working closely with other combatant commands and U.S. Government agencies to increase our operational flexibility.

The opportunity costs associated with addressing immediate threats and crises have made it more challenging to pursue our broader objective of expanding the positive influence of effective and professional African security forces. We accomplish this primarily through military-to-military engagement with countries that have the greatest potential to be regional leaders and influencers in the future. This includes countries already on positive long-term trajectories, as well as those that face a long road ahead in building trusted security institutions that enable responsive governance and economic progress. Strengthening relationships with current and potential regional powers is key to shaping the future security environment to advance our enduring national interests of security, prosperity, values, and promoting international order.

Our expanding operational requirements and their associated opportunity costs make it vitally important that we align resources with priorities across the globe, strengthen and leverage partnerships, and further enhance our operational flexibility. In Fiscal Year 2013, we conducted 55 operations, 10 exercises, and 481 security cooperation activities, making Africa Command an extremely active geographic command. We are pleased with what we have been able to accomplish with modest responses tailored to support local requirements, despite being one of the smallest combatant commands. Modest investments, in the right places, go a long way in Africa.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Africa is on the rise and will be increasingly important to the United States in the future. With six of the world's ten fastest growing economies, a population of 1 billion that will double by 2050, and the largest regional voting bloc in multilateral organizations, Africa's global influence and importance to the national interests of the United States and our allies are significant – and growing. Perceptions of the United States are generally positive across the African continent, providing natural connections on which to build and pursue shared interests.

In spite of many upward trends, Africa's security environment remains dynamic and uncertain. While the continent's expanding political, economic, and social integration are positive developments as a whole, they are also contributing to Africa's increasing role in multiple transnational threat networks, including the global al-Qa'ida network and drug trafficking networks reaching into the Americas, Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. Countering the growing activity of the al-Qa'ida network in Africa and addressing instability in key nations are our primary near-term challenges. The collective aftermath of revolutions in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, including uncertain political transitions, spillover effects, and exploitation by violent extremist organizations of under-governed spaces and porous borders, are key sources of instability that require us to remain vigilant in the near term. In the long term, our military-to-military engagement can help to reinforce and shape relations with those countries that have the greatest potential to positively influence security on the African continent, now and in the future.

Growth of the al-Qa'ida Network in Africa. Instability in North and West Africa has created opportunities for extremist groups to utilize uncontrolled territory to destabilize new governments. The network of al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents continues to exploit Africa's under-governed regions and porous borders for training and movement of fighters, resources, and skills. Like-minded extremists with allegiances to multiple groups increasingly collaborate in recruitment, training, operations, and financing across Africa and beyond. Terrorists are learning their trade abroad, returning to their countries with hard-earned skills that increase their lethality. North Africa is a significant source of foreign fighters in the current conflict in Syria. Syria has become a significant location for al-Qa'ida-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip extremists, who may also present threats when they return home. The increasingly syndicated and active violent extremist network in Africa is also linked to core al-Qa'ida, which is on a downward trajectory, and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which is resurging and remains intent on targeting the United States and U.S. interests overseas. Multinational efforts are disrupting terrorist training, operations, and the movement of weapons, money, and fighters, but the growth and activity of the violent extremist network across the African continent continue to outpace these efforts. Additional pressure in east Africa and the Sahel and Maghreb regions, including efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and promote improved governance, justice, and the rule of law, are required to reduce the network.

Regional Instability. Current conflicts across the African continent vary widely in character, but share a few basic traits: complexity, asymmetry, and unpredictability. The internal instability associated with weak states can trigger external consequences that draw responses from the United States, African partners, and the broader international community. Weak governance, corruption, and political instability are often mutually reinforcing. Food insecurity and access to natural resources, including water, can exacerbate state weakness, drive human migration, and heighten social disruptions and regional tensions. The cumulative effects of instability in Africa draw considerable resources from countries and regional organizations on the continent, as well as the broader international community; nearly 80 percent of United Nations peacekeeping personnel worldwide are deployed in missions in Africa. In some countries, the failure of governments to deliver basic services to the people and enforce the rule of law has fueled distrust and fear in the government and security forces. Where a country lacks good leadership, external actors have only a modest capacity to positively influence the country's future. Where there is leadership that has the best interests of the country at heart, the United States and other partners can apply judicious measures to help the country move forward.

Regional and global integration. Political shocks and post-revolutionary transitions in North Africa continue to reverberate throughout the greater Mediterranean Basin and, by extension, the Middle East, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is increasingly important to our European allies, who are directly affected by the rising economic and political influence of some African countries, as well as the symptoms of instability emanating from other countries. Many European allies view Africa as the source of their greatest external security threats, including terrorism, illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking, and drug and arms trafficking. Our support to allies in addressing mutual security challenges in Africa may influence their willingness and ability to help shoulder the burden in future conflicts in other areas of the world. The African continent's energy and strategic mineral reserves are also of growing significance to China, India, and other countries in the broader Indian Ocean Basin. Africa's increasing importance to allies and emerging powers, including China, India, and Brazil, provides opportunities to reinforce U.S. security objectives in other regions through our engagement on the continent. While most African countries prefer to partner with the United States across all sectors, many will partner with any country that can increase their security and prosperity. We should be deliberate in determining where we leave gaps others may fill.

MISSION

Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

APPROACH

We believe efforts to meet security challenges in Africa are best led and conducted by African partners. We work with partners to ensure our military efforts support and complement comprehensive solutions to security challenges that leverage all elements of national and international power, including civilian efforts to gradually strengthen governance, justice and the rule of law.

We work closely with African and European partners to shape the security environment, share information, address immediate mutual threats, and respond to crisis. We coordinate with U.S. Government agencies and U.S. Embassies to ensure our activities support U.S. policy goals and the efforts of U.S. Ambassadors. We also work closely with other combatant commands, especially European Command, Central Command, Special Operations Command, and Transportation Command, to mitigate risk collaboratively, including through force-sharing agreements; by sharing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and by posturing forces to respond to crisis. The trust and teamwork between multinational and interagency partners is vital to the success of collective action.

Military activities are executed by Defense Attaché Offices, Offices of Security Cooperation, and six subordinate headquarters, some of which are shared with U.S. European Command: U.S. Army Africa and Southern European Task Force, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, and Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa.

Africa Command's activities support partner efforts in six functional areas: countering violent extremist organizations and the networks that support them; building defense institutions and forces; strengthening maritime security; supporting peace support operations; supporting humanitarian and disaster response; and countering illicit flows of drugs, weapons, money, and people. The command assists in the development of defense institutions and forces as part of a broader U.S. Government effort. Our contributions also support the development of the African continental and regional security architecture. The capacities we help to build can strengthen the ability of our partners to combat wildlife poaching and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Our long-term advisory relationships with militaries in fragile states help build and support local capacities as our partners make gradual progress toward stability, in their own ways and at a pace they can sustain.

Africa Command's primary tools for implementing our strategy are military-to-military engagements, programs, exercises, and operations, which are supported by our strategic posture and presence on the continent.

- Our **engagements** support bilateral relationships managed by U.S. Ambassadors and play a critical role in strengthening military-to-military relations in a region where we have little forward presence.

- Our **programs** and combined **exercises** strengthen defense institutions and the effectiveness of U.S. and partner forces. They also build trust and confidence, enhance interoperability, and promote adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights. When planned appropriately, combined training and exercises can also help to preserve and enhance the readiness of U.S. and partner forces.
- Our **operations** are closely coordinated with regional and interagency partners and other combatant commands. When possible, our operations are planned and executed with the military forces of local partners, with the United States in a supporting role. In certain cases, our tailored advise, assist, and accompany teams help to enhance the effectiveness of partner operations, with lower risk to U.S. forces.
- Our strategic **posture** and **presence** are premised on the concept of a tailored, flexible, light footprint that leverages and supports the posture and presence of partners and is supported by expeditionary infrastructure. Our single enduring presence in the region is at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which provides a critical platform for our activities, as well as those of Central Command, Special Operations Command, and Transportation Command. The operational challenges of conducting our activities across Africa, and their associated risks, are significant. Our limited and highly dispersed presence on the continent makes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; mobility; medical support; and personnel recovery capabilities especially important to our mission, and I expect these requirements to grow in the future. As we look to future requirements, diversifying our posture to include a maritime capability would increase operational flexibility in support of crisis response and other high-priority missions.

To address future requirements and mitigate risk to our national interests in Africa, we are pursuing the following actions, which focus on increasing collaboration with partners, enhancing operational flexibility, and closing key gaps:

- Strengthening strategic relationships and the capabilities and capacities of partners, including by investing in developing defense institutions and providing robust training and education opportunities.
- Expanding communication, collaboration, and interoperability with multinational and interagency partners, to enable increased alignment of strategies and resources and avoid inefficiencies.

- Adapting our posture and presence for the future to reduce risk to mission and personnel, increase freedom of movement, expand strategic reach, and improve our ability to respond rapidly to crisis. Leveraging and supporting the posture and presence of partners are critical elements of our approach.
- Working with the intelligence community to improve our ability to share information rapidly with multinational and interagency partners, with the goal of making this the norm, rather than the exception.
- Leveraging combined training and exercises to strengthen interoperability and maintain readiness of U.S. and partner forces.
- Utilizing flexible, tailorable capabilities, including the Army's Regionally Aligned Force; the Marine Corps' Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force; and Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces advise and assist teams embedded in institutional, strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters to strengthen partner capability and support regional, African Union, and United Nations peace operations.
- Increasing operational flexibility by developing additional force-sharing agreements with other combatant commands and working with U.S. Embassies to seek diplomatic agreements to facilitate access and overflight.
- Working with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense to pursue the increased assignment and or allocation of forces by properly registering the demand signal for critical capabilities.
- Working with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense to address gaps in key enablers, including mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to support partnered and unilateral operations.
- Leveraging strategic communications and military information support operations as non-lethal tools for disrupting the spread of violent extremist ideology, recruitment, and messaging.

IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND ENHANCING STABILITY IN EAST AFRICA

Al-Qa'ida affiliate al-Shabaab remains a persistent threat in Somalia and East Africa. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces have been challenged in regaining the momentum against al-Shabaab, which responded to losses of territory by conducting asymmetric attacks in Somalia and Kenya.

AMISOM's recent increase in force strength and the integration of Ethiopia, which played a major role in multinational security efforts in Somalia last year, are positive developments that will help AMISOM and Somali forces to more effectively counter al-Shabaab, particularly if the international community is able to source key enablers.

U.S. and partner efforts in Somalia focus on strengthening the ability of AMISOM and Somali forces to disrupt and contain al-Shabaab and expand state-controlled areas to allow for the continued development of the Federal Government of Somalia. The international community is also supporting the development of security institutions and forces in Somalia, to set the conditions for the future transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali National Army and Police.

U.S. support to preparing AMISOM troop contributing countries for deployment to Somalia has enhanced partner capacities in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations. The United States continues to support AMISOM troop contributing countries in preparing for deployment, primarily through contracted training funded by the Department of State and increasingly supported by military mentors and trainers. Our military efforts have expanded in the past year to include planning and coordination with AMISOM and multinational partners, primarily through a small U.S. military coordination cell in Somalia, which is also conducting assessments to inform future security cooperation proposals. Precise partnered and unilateral operations continue to play limited but important roles in weakening al-Shabaab, and the support and collaboration of Central Command and Special Operations Command, including through force-sharing arrangements, have been critical to the effectiveness of operations in Somalia.

In waters off Somalia, piracy rates remain stable following recent steep declines. Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden have decreased significantly since 2011, reflecting the combined effects of multinational military operations, the capture and prosecution of many suspected pirates, and improved industry security measures, including the use of armed guards. In 2013, zero ships were hijacked in nine attempted attacks in the region, compared to 27 hijackings in 166 reported attempts in 2011. Success in counter-piracy efforts in the western Indian Ocean, another area of strong collaboration with Central Command, may offer useful lessons for the Gulf of Guinea, where maritime crime rates remain at concerning levels.

We will continue working with multinational and interagency partners, as well as other combatant commands, to support efforts to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab in Somalia and maintain improvements in maritime security in the western Indian Ocean. We will also look for opportunities to support the development of Somali defense institutions and forces.

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND ENHANCING STABILITY IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

In North and West Africa, we have made some progress in forging regional and multinational cooperation to combat the spillover effects from revolutions in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. These revolutions, coupled with the fragility of neighboring states, continue to destabilize the region. The spillover effects of revolutions include the return of fighters and flow of weapons from Libya to neighboring countries following the fall of the Qadhafi regime, and the export of foreign fighters from North Africa to the Syrian conflict. Terrorist groups in North and West Africa have expanded their operations, increasing threats to U.S. interests. Al-Qa'ida affiliates and adherents, and other terrorist groups, have formed a dispersed network that disregards borders and uses historic trading routes to exploit vast areas of weak government control. Al-Qa'ida affiliates and adherents operating in North and West Africa include al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah, Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia, and Moktar Belmoktar's al-Mulathameem Brigade, which has morphed into al-Murabitun.

Among the countries in the region that have recently experienced revolutions, Tunisia appears best poised to succeed in its transition to a new government, and its military has been a stabilizing factor through the transition. In Libya, the security situation is volatile and tenuous, especially in the eastern and south-western parts of the country. Militia groups control significant areas of territory and continue to exert pressure on the Libyan government, which is challenged to provide basic security and services. We are supporting Libyan efforts to improve internal security by participating in a multinational effort to support modest defense institution building and the development of security forces, to include General Purpose and Special Operations Forces. We are currently in the planning stages and expect to begin program implementation later this year.

In many places in the region, U.S. assistance is having positive effects on strengthening the counter-terrorism and border security capacities of regional partners and maintaining pressure on terrorist organizations. In Mali, French and African forces reduced the territory controlled by AQIM and other terrorist groups last year and provided space for democratic progress, including elections. Thirty-five (35) countries, including 16 African countries, have pledged troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). U.S. support has enabled MINUSMA and French operations to secure key cities and disrupt terrorist organizations. The Department of State has led U.S. efforts to support the preparation of African troop contributing countries for MINUSMA deployment with non-lethal equipment and pre-deployment training supported by U.S. military mentors and trainers. U.S. forces are also advising and assisting MINUSMA forces. Mali faces a key security transition this year as French forces reduce in the country and Malian and MINUSMA forces assume greater security responsibilities.

In addition to supporting partner efforts to stabilize Mali, our programs and exercises are helping our regional partners disrupt and contain the threat posed by Boko Haram. Boko Haram continues to attack civilian and government facilities in northern Nigeria and has extended its reach into parts of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. Nigeria has relied on a primarily military approach to counter Boko Haram; we are working with Nigeria and drawing on lessons from U.S. experience in counter-insurgency efforts to support efforts to develop a more comprehensive approach that respects universal human rights and ensures perpetrators of violence are brought to justice.

We are actively increasing regional cooperation with African and European partners, including in information-sharing and combined training, exercises, and operations. Our cooperation builds security capacity and can help to reinforce our partners' willingness to advance our shared interests. Our enabling support to French operations in Mali is advancing collective security interests while also reinforcing this critical trans-Atlantic security relationship. In addition to participating in the strong and growing multinational cooperation across North and West Africa, we continue to work with the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership to build longer-term, comprehensive regional counter-terrorism capacity.

Enhancing regional approaches will be essential to effectively addressing the root causes of instability and countering the growth and freedom of movement and action of terrorist elements across the network. As part of this, deepening our cooperation with African and European partners will enhance our mutual ability to leverage combined posture and presence to address immediate threats in the region. As we work with partners to support the development of democratic security institutions and professional forces, parallel progress in civilian-led efforts to strengthen governance, the criminal justice sector, and the rule of law will be critical to sustainable progress. We are grateful for the Congress's continuing support for the foreign operations appropriations that make these latter efforts possible, and enable a "whole of government" approach in this critical region.

PROTECTING U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES

While we have the responsibility to help protect all U.S. personnel and facilities on the African continent, our activities this past year focused heavily on supporting the Department of State in strengthening the security of high threat, high risk diplomatic missions in 15 locations across North, East, West, and Central Africa. The sheer size of Africa and the continent's limited infrastructure constrain the rapid deployment of crisis response forces to many of these locations, posing significant risks to mission and personnel.

Our current response forces consist of Army Regionally Aligned Force and Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force elements, a Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team, and a Commander's In-extremis Force. The majority of our response forces are based in Europe, with the exception of the Regionally Aligned Force element known as the East Africa Response Force, which is based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

Recent operations to support the Department of State in securing U.S. personnel and facilities in South Sudan tested our crisis response capabilities. As the situation in South Sudan unfolded, indications and warnings provided by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance proved vital to understanding the situation and informing the timely repositioning of assets. The East Africa Response Force provided security augmentation to the U.S. Embassy, and the Central Command Crisis Response Element and the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response assisted in evacuation operations. This was a strong joint and interagency effort that included robust support from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Special Operations Forces, as well as other combatant commands and the U.S. intelligence community. Our ability to deploy

forces rapidly reflected the unique circumstances of the situation, including sufficient advance warning to allow the prepositioning of response forces near South Sudan, and was not representative of the speed with which we would typically be able to respond to requests from the Department of State to secure U.S. personnel or facilities throughout the continent.

We are working with the Department of State to refine crisis indicators, work toward a common understanding of decision points and authorities for evacuation operations, and identify options to improve response times. Developing additional expeditionary infrastructure to enable the rotational presence of response forces at locations where we currently have limited or no presence would increase our ability to reduce response times, given sufficient advance warning of crisis.

ENHANCING STABILITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Despite modest increases in regional capabilities and cooperation in the past year, maritime criminal activities in the Gulf of Guinea remain at concerning levels. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea continues to negatively affect commerce, fisheries, the marine environment, food security, oil distribution, and regional economic development.

Several West African littoral countries, including Nigeria and Senegal, are addressing maritime threats actively and encouraging greater regional cooperation. The Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of West African States are also promoting regional cooperation to address maritime crime, including by establishing combined patrols. Regional cooperation and interoperability are essential, given the threat and the small size of naval forces relative to the area of waters to be patrolled.

Africa Command will continue to work with Gulf of Guinea partners to build capacity and conduct combined operations through initiatives like the Africa Partnership Station, the African Law Enforcement Partnership, and counter-narcotics programs. Our maritime security exercises facilitate regional maritime cooperation and interoperability. These efforts support and complement civilian initiatives that address the root causes of maritime crime by strengthening governance and criminal justice systems and promoting economic development.

The political will of African governments and the development of comprehensive approaches to maritime security that emphasize civilian security and law enforcement elements will be critical to improving regional maritime security.

COUNTERING THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is one of several persistent destabilizing influences in central Africa and has created significant humanitarian challenges. The African Union Regional Task Force against the LRA, led by Uganda and with advice and assistance from the United States, is reducing the threat posed by the LRA to populations in central Africa. In the last six months alone, U.S. forces provided enabling support to 33 partner operations that disrupted LRA activities and significantly increased pressure on the LRA. Military operations, combined with robust efforts by civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations, have resulted in increased defections, the capture of key LRA leaders, and decreased threats to civilian populations. Additional enablers would allow our partners to respond more rapidly to actionable intelligence and improve the effectiveness of their operations.

LONG-TERM PRIORITIES

To be effective in our pursuit of enduring effects, our activities must be nested within a broader U.S. Government effort. Often, they are also nested within a multinational effort. Our priorities for military-to-military engagement are the African countries with the greatest potential, by virtue of their population, economy, and national power, to influence the continent positively in future decades. With countries already on positive trajectories as regional leaders and influencers, we can focus on strengthening military-to-military relationships to build capacity together. For others whose success is less certain, engagement and shaping by the international community can help to gradually enhance governance and security trends.

We recognize that if integrated into comprehensive strategies, the activities we conduct to address our immediate priorities help strengthen partner capacities and shape the regional security environment for the longer term. They also influence relationships and perceptions of the United States in ways that can affect our ability to address future challenges. As we address our immediate

priorities, we must also dedicate efforts to tending to our long-term priorities. Working with the range of international and interagency partners to effectively shape a more peaceful and secure future will reduce the likelihood of the United States and our partners being perpetually entwined in addressing immediate security threats.

CONCLUSION

Africa's importance to our national interests of security, prosperity, democratic values, and international order continues to grow. While the security environment in Africa will remain uncertain for the foreseeable future, we have an imperative to find effective ways to address increasing threats to our security. We also have an opportunity to make judicious investments that make security more sustainable while also furthering enduring U.S. interests. The increasing convergence of U.S. security interests in Africa with those of African partners, European allies, and the broader international community provides opportunities to significantly enhance multilateral cooperation as we work toward long-term stability and security. Improving trust and collaboration, and maintaining patience and consistency in our collective efforts, will improve the likelihood of our collective success.

A dynamic security environment and economy of force region call for disciplined flexibility – the ability to flex based on a general alignment of resources to strategy, a clear understanding of the management of risks, and realistic assumptions about what our posture and relationships can support. Sharpening our prioritization across the globe, deepening cooperation with partners and allies to better leverage combined efforts, and adhering to disciplined flexibility will help to mitigate risks and increase our efficiency. Our Nation will have to make increasingly tough decisions about risks and tradeoffs in the future. The Africa Command team will continue to work collaboratively with other combatant commands and the Joint Staff to provide our best military advice to inform decisions about managing risk in our area of responsibility and beyond.

Thank you for your continued support to the soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, coastguardsmen, civilians, and contractors of Africa Command.

We will go forward, together.



General David M. Rodriguez
Commander, United States Africa Command



General David M. Rodriguez became the third commander of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, on April 5, 2013. U.S. Africa Command is one of six unified geographic combatant commands within the Department of Defense unified command structure.

A native of West Chester, Pennsylvania, General Rodriguez earned his commission from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York in 1976.

General Rodriguez has commanded at every level. His previous assignment was Commanding General of the United States Army Forces Command. Additional commands include: the International Security Assistance Force - Joint Command (IJC) in Afghanistan; the 82nd Airborne Division; 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division; and 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He commanded companies in 75th Ranger Regiment, and 1st Armored Division.

General Rodriguez's Army and Joint experiences include: Commander, IJC in Afghanistan; Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Commander, Joint Task Force 82 in Afghanistan; Joint Staff Deputy Director, Regional Operations (J3); and Defense Joint Exercise Officer, United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea.

General Rodriguez's combat experiences include: G-3 Planner, XVIII Airborne Corps, Operation Just Cause, 1989-1990; Operations Officer, 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1990-1991; Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2003; Commander, Multi-National Division-Northwest, 2005; Commander, Joint Task Force-82 in Afghanistan, 2007-2008; and Deputy Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan and Commander, International Security Assistance Force - Joint Command, 2009-2011.

General Rodriguez holds a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College and a Masters of Military Art and Science from the United States Army Command and General Staff College.

General Rodriguez's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, numerous foreign awards, Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, and Ranger Tab.

He is married to the former Virginia E. Flaherty of Red Bank, New Jersey and they have four children; Amy, Melissa, David, and Andrew.



**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 5, 2014

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The FY15 budget request includes more than \$775M of military construction (MILCON) supporting USPACOM and Service requirements in the Pacific theater. This budget request meets the USPACOM posture requirements.

The \$128M for military infrastructure referenced in your question refers to the Presidential Budget Request MILCON program specifically for Guam. Table 1 below provides a breakdown of those requirements.

Table 1: FY15 President's Budget submission for Guam MILCON program

GDP Initiative	PACOM Initiative	Project	Country	Location	Lead Agent	MILCON ROM (\$M)
DPRI	Basing and Resiliency	Ground Support Element Shops at North Ramp (USMC)	Guam	Andersen AFB	USN	\$21.88
DPRI	Basing and Resiliency	Marine Wing Support Squadron Facilities at North Ramp (USMC)	Guam	Andersen AFB	USN	\$28.77
Access in South and Southeast Asia	Basing and Resiliency	Guam Strike Fuel Systems Maint Hanger Inc. 2	Guam	Andersen AFB	USAF	\$64.00
Access in South and Southeast Asia	Basing and Resiliency	PRTC RED HORSE Logistics Facility	Guam	Andersen AFB	USAF	\$3.15
Access in South and Southeast Asia	Basing and Resiliency	PRTC Combat Communications Infrastructure Facility	Guam	Andersen AFB	USAF	\$3.75
Access in South and Southeast Asia	Basing and Resiliency	PRTC Satellite Fire Station	Guam	Andersen AFB	USAF	\$6.50
Total						\$128.05

[See page 17.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

General AUSTIN. We continue to focus on recruiting more women into the force. And to train those women to assume greater roles of responsibility. Right now I think the ratio is about one percent of the total force is female. But having said that, I think we're working a number of lines of effort simultaneously. It's refreshing to see that we have our first fixed wing pilot that's recently been trained and so there are more to follow in the pipeline. This is, as you know, not an easy task. But I think where we are now, based upon where we started, we're a long way away from a start point. And we'll continue to emphasize and work with the Afghans to continue to emphasize this going forward.

Ensuring these women get assigned where they are needed is a challenge. And, you know, it's something that we're going to have to continue to work with the Afghan leadership on in moving forward. Again, I think there's a police chief that's going to take a position in Herat, which is out in the west as you know, in the near future. That's encouraging. But we're going to have to continue to emphasize to the Afghan leadership that, in order to get the women out to where they need to be and provide the right protections for them, there are things that they're going to need to continue to focus on. And we're just not there yet. [See page 18.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 5, 2014

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. We've had many lessons learned from contracting actions during contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. Are you adequately resourced to plan, execute, and oversee the contract support you would need in the event of a major contingency in your area of responsibility?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Although United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has made great progress towards integrating contract planning, USPACOM currently has a shortfall of Operational Contract Support (OCS) integration throughout the Theater. The establishments of Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) planners at USPACOM, United States Forces Korea (USFK) and United States Forces Japan (USFJ) have increased OCS integration and readiness by adding planning capabilities. USPACOM has issued an updated OCS Instruction to components and Sub-Unified Commands, describing the OCS environment within the USPACOM AOR and providing planning and execution guidance for OCS. Current planning efforts include OCS direction and guidance as part of base plans and annexes. USPACOM is the first Combatant Command (CCMD) to implement an OCS Mission Integrator (OMI) cell through an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff (JS) initiative demonstrating the capability. This OMI Cell will provide the operational capacity to integrate OCS across the broader staff, and provide increased capability to support planning for contract support across all joint capability areas.

The OMI concept will be implemented through this demonstration, developing and executing the first overseas Joint OCS Exercise next year to provide training throughout USPACOM and our Service Components while exercising command and control for contract planning and execution supporting a major operation. The OMI team will enable planning, integration and contract execution capability throughout the Theater, from the CCMD to Service Components; from contracting offices to requiring activities, while providing command and control to link contracting support to operations. OMI will demonstrate operational contract support effectiveness through participation in the existing USPACOM operationalized command and control construct, ensuring OCS is integrated throughout our plans at both the CCMD and Service Component level.

Mr. MCKEON. We've had many lessons learned from contracting actions during contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. Are you adequately resourced to plan, execute, and oversee the contract support you would need in the event of a major contingency in your area of responsibility?

General AUSTIN. We recognize the importance of Operational Contract Support (OCS) as a critical enabler for a broad range of potential contingencies and have incorporated OCS into each of our major contingency plans. The development of requirements and the execution and oversight of contracting actions are primarily Service issues but we, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, are attempting to mitigate resourcing deficiencies by coordinating training geared specifically for OCS planning and activities. We continue to advocate for each Service component to have trained OCS planners and to have those planners integrated into the Service component plans. Additionally, we are working closely with the Joint Staff to refine and integrate OCS doctrine into our planning efforts. Implementation of OCS processes and procedures by the Services is improving our ability to define contract support requirements, award contracts that efficiently fulfill the requirement and ensure proper contract oversight in theater. We utilize resources provided by outside organiza-

tions to support OCS efforts, but they are not sufficient. Neither the Combatant Commands nor the Service components are staffed with OCS planners which are required to ensure OCS is integrated in all planning efforts.

Mr. McKEON. We've had many lessons learned from contracting actions during contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. Are you adequately resourced to plan, execute, and oversee the contract support you would need in the event of a major contingency in your area of responsibility?

General RODRIGUEZ. USAFRICOM is prepared to plan, execute, and oversee operational contract support (OCS) in a contingency environment, but there are aspects of OCS in USAFRICOM that we can improve. Below are some of the actions and initiatives that we've taken to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but also to educate and train our personnel to develop requirements and execute and oversee contracting actions during a contingency.

1. We are doubling the size of our four-person OCS branch in order to centralize acquisition/contracting expertise to oversee, assist, and provide quality control for all USAFRICOM Directorate Operational and non-operational contracting activities—from requirements generation through contract execution, oversight/administration.
2. In partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency, we have two embedded Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) planners working closely with our staff to ensure we incorporate OCS considerations in operations planning.
3. We are developing our OCS Common Operational Picture (COP) and leveraging the capabilities resident in the new Global Combat Support System—Joint (GCSS-J) to synchronize and optimize OCS efforts at various levels of organizational structure in our AOR. This effort represents an on-going initiative to establish a centralized repository of relevant OCS information available to key stakeholders.
4. In order to improve OCS in our component commands, we conduct Staff Assistance Visits (SAV) to ensure current OCS processes, policies, tools, and procedures enhance mission execution. The end state of the scheduled SAVs is to gain better understanding of component OCS procedures, gaps, and issues, and streamlined OCS processes and standardized procedures.
5. We have developed an OCS planning template as a guide that enables our subordinate commands to plan OCS with respect to operations, security cooperation activities, and exercises.
6. We have taken advantage of available OCS training offered by Joint Staff/J4 and Army Logistics University. In Nov 13, USAFRICOM hosted the first 2-week JOPEC course taught by Joint Staff/J4 in Stuttgart, Germany, for operational and logistics planners and other DOD entities with OCS equity. The course focuses on planning for contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. We have requested two JOPEC sessions for the next fiscal year.
7. We have established validation boards for operational requirements and are currently in the process of streamlining our validation procedures to better consolidate contracting actions, reduce cost, and eliminate duplication of efforts. Additionally, in order to synchronize and optimize OCS and other logistics-related efforts in the AOR, we conduct monthly OCS Working Group and quarterly Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board meetings.
8. We are in the process of gathering observations for submission into the Department of Defense's Joint Lessons Learned Information Management System (JLLIS) related to Operational Contract Support. Lessons learned will be incorporated into training events and activities as we have done in the past.
9. DLA JCASO has developed an OCS Readiness Scorecard management tool which provides an assessment of performance measures on 28 OCS-related assigned and implied tasks in policy, campaign plans, operations orders, and directives. We review this scorecard at OCS forums such as our quarterly CLPSB and our monthly OCS Working Groups to understand if required tasks are being executed and if not, why not, and what corrective actions can be taken.
10. We continuously coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) to mature our Contract/

Spend Performance Assessment capability. We are committed to improving end-to-end visibility over HQ AFRICOM requirements and contracts and to strengthening the positive control we have over externally sourced support. With OSD/DCMO's support and assistance, we analyzed AFRICOM's data for all FY13 HQ requirements, financials, and contracts to measure ability to match Requirements to Commitments and Obligations to Contracts in systems of record.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO

Mr. LOBIONDO. When the U-2 goes out of service will we still be able to fulfill all of the high-altitude intelligence collection requirements we have in the Pacific? Will we be able to continue monitoring activities in North Korea without regard to weather conditions as we can now with the U-2? Will other assets provide the same sort of flexibility to react in a crisis and the same capabilities as the U-2? In a scenario where our space assets may be degraded will other platforms be able to provide the same critical intelligence support we now get from the U-2? Did you and the other combatant commanders have any input into the decision to retire the U-2s? If so, what was your recommendation?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee has conducted a series of hearings involving the Department of Defense's response to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. As a result of these hearings, the majority published a report of major findings last month.

One of the report's major findings was that the "U.S. military's response to the Benghazi attack was severely degraded because of the location and readiness of U.S. forces." However, another one of the report's major findings was that "the Department of Defense is working to correct many weaknesses revealed by the Benghazi attack."

Can you please explain to the committee what changes the Department of Defense has made to correct the issues that the Benghazi attack revealed? Please specifically address changes to the posture of armed aircraft, ISR platforms, and quick-response ground forces.

Additionally, can you please describe how these changes to DOD posture in your AOR helped during the situations in Somalia and South Sudan.

General RODRIGUEZ. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. On the subject of effectors, the Congress has supported acceleration of the deployment of the PAC-3 missile to combatant commands but production and resources limit replacing the current missile inventory one-for-one with PAC-3s. This concerns several members of the House since, in multiple scenarios, U.S. forces would deplete the current inventory of PAC-3s before some hypothetical opposing forces deplete their inventories of threats. PAC-2/GEM-T is an upgrade to PAC-2 that, when combined with the PAC-3 inventory, can counter short and long-range threats and address evasive characteristics of enemy missiles. Do you currently believe you have the necessary inventory mix of PAC-2/GEM-Ts and PAC-3s to sufficiently address the full range of threat scenarios?

General AUSTIN. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SHUSTER. In his confirmation discussions, Secretary Hagel confirmed that CENTCOM has an outstanding requirement for persistent elevated surveillance and fire control. In a July 22, 2013, op-ed in "The Hill," Commander Kirk S. Lippold (USN Ret.), former commander of the USS *Cole*, suggested that capability to address that requirement in the form of the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) could have supported the type of force protection mission needed to defend against the attack on the *Cole*. Are you aware that a JLENS orbit stands in strategic reserve in New Mexico today? Would deployment of that asset to the Persian Gulf help CENTCOM provide the surveillance and fire

control required to provide missile defense and force protection to forward deployed troops?

General AUSTIN. I am aware of the JLENS system orbiting in strategic reserve at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico; however, as I understand it, the Army was directed not to plan for procurement, but to employ one Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) orbit to support a 3-year exercise at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The decision to terminate planned procurement of JLENS was based on affordability and other competing priorities. My team has assessed that JLENS could be used to effectively counter swarming boats, UAVs, and cruise missiles. However, considering JLENS' fielding requirements, which include host nation approval, airspace restrictions, site preparation requirements, and the need for trained soldiers, it is debatable whether or not the cost/benefit ration merits efforts to deploy the system.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. 1. What is the annualized cost of O&M for each of the following platforms: EMARSS, Project Liberty (MC-12) and Sable Spear? 2. What are the associated procurement costs (total annualized for each program) for each of the following platforms: EMARSS, Project Liberty (MC-12) and Sable Spear? 3. What is the capability and endurance comparison between the following platforms: EMARSS, Project Liberty (MC-12) and Sable Spear? 4. If OCO O&M for ISR was not funded, what capabilities would be lost? Would it have an effect on footprint size, or number, for the remaining ISR assets—assuming USAFRICOM were to maintain the same level of capability? 5. What geographic footprint is required for each of the following platforms: EMARSS, Project Liberty (MC-12) and Sable Spear?

Note: Sable Spear is a project name known by AFRICOM and SOCOM

General RODRIGUEZ. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. SPEIER. Throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan we've been heavily reliant upon private security contractors. A few years ago the Afghans said that our aid programs and convoys couldn't rely on contractors anymore and instead had to use the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). SIGAR and others pointed out that relying on APPF significantly increased security risks for our service men and women and aid workers there. The government of Afghanistan recently disbanded the APPF. General Austin, what does this mean for security in Afghanistan? Are we going to go back to using private security contractors instead, and how are you mitigating security concerns?

General AUSTIN. The President of Afghanistan directed that the responsibility for the security mission of the APPF be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. The exact date of implementation and the transition plan are still undefined at this point. We continue to monitor the situation; so far there have been no lapses in the security services provided by the APPF. We are also working with the Ministry of the Interior to help develop their implementation plan. We do not expect to revert back to using private security contractors.

Ms. SPEIER. Last year I sent a letter to Secretary Hagel after SIGAR found that burn pits were being used at Forward Operating Base Salerno, in violation of DOD guidelines and CENTCOM regulations, and we had wasted \$5.4 million on incinerators to protect our service men and women's health that were never used. I was told that there weren't any other bases that had received waivers to use burn pits, but in December SIGAR issued a report about the same thing—\$5.4 million wasted on inoperable incinerators, and continued use of open air burn pits in violation of DOD policy. General Austin, are there any other bases in Afghanistan that are operating open air burn pits, in violation of policy, and have been issued a waiver?

General AUSTIN. There is currently one burn pit operating at Forward Operating Base Sabit Qadam, where the base exceeds the population of 100 U.S. personnel. This burn pit is operating with a USCENTCOM approved waiver. The base was scheduled for closure, but USFOR-A requested a 90-day waiver extension to support operational requirements. There is no other viable alternative means for waste disposal under the current operational conditions and in anticipation of base closure.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH

Ms. DUCKWORTH. This is a follow-up on Representative Duckworth's question on the role of the Guard and Reserve within CENTCOM—she was looking for more specific details.

What percentage of missions within the CENTCOM AOR are completed by the Guard and Reserve ground element and what is the nature of those operations? Please describe whether those are combat operations or support operations. Additionally, how many flight hours were flown by Guard and Reserve pilots and again, what were the nature of those operations: support, combat, humanitarian etc.? In which countries are they operating and can you please detail the percentage of readiness levels compared to their Active Duty counterparts?

General AUSTIN. Guard and Reserve forces constitute approximately 15% of the total force operating in the USCENTCOM AOR. The average Guard and Reserve manning in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Fiscal Year 2013 was 13,587 personnel. The total flight hours in Fiscal Year 2013 executed by Guard and Reserve pilots exceeded 125,000 flight hours and included mobility, air-refueling, combat (fighter, bomber, helicopter, and SOF), ISR and Search and Rescue mission sets. When Guard and Reserve forces deploy to the theater they are at 100% readiness, they are completely integrated with the active force. Questions regarding the exact breakdown of ground and air missions, along with specific details, would be best answered by the Services.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI

Mrs. WALORSKI. Are you concerned about our long-term ability to project airpower in your area of responsibility, particularly given (1) the decreased carrier presence in the Arabian Gulf and (2) the fact that our bases in Al Udeid and Al Dhafra are supported by OCO funds?

General AUSTIN. The combination of carrier presence and enduring bases at Al Udeid, Qatar and Al Dhafra, United Arab Emirates provides us with flexibility and a sustainable capability for projecting airpower in the Arabian Gulf. This critical capability has enabled us to manage current conflicts and prevent other situations and confrontations from escalating into conflicts. While we are facing significant budgetary constraints, we must remain present and engaged in the Central Region going forward, in order to reassure our allies and convey strength to our potential adversaries. This will require base lined funding, once OCO funds are no longer available.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Given the short-term growth of the Iranian economy, do you think the current relaxed sanctions on Iran are sufficient to incentivize a comprehensive nuclear agreement?

General AUSTIN. Thus far, the relaxed sanctions appear to be prompting Iranian compliance and willingness to negotiate a final comprehensive nuclear agreement. Ultimately, Iran seeks permanent sanctions relief, while securing terms regarding its nuclear program that are favorable to the regime.

Iran recently complained it has not been able to access any of the foreign reserves released so far under the terms of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) interim agreement. As a result, Tehran is beginning to highlight P5+1 "noncompliance" with the agreement while touting its own continued compliance. Additionally, it is already courting international investment and building economic relationships beyond the JPOA framework, which potentially violate standing sanctions.