[House Report 113-650]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
113th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 113-650
======================================================================
ENSURING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CLAIMS AGAINST
THE UNITED STATES ACT
_______
December 8, 2014.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Goodlatte, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 5683]
[Including Committee Cost Estimate]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 5683) to ensure appropriate judicial review of
Federal Government actions by amending the prohibition on the
exercise of jurisdiction by the United States Court of Federal
Claims of certain claims pending in other courts, having
considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment
and recommend that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 2
Hearings......................................................... 10
Committee Consideration.......................................... 10
Committee Votes.................................................. 10
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 10
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 10
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 10
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 11
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings.............................. 11
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 11
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 11
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 11
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 12
Purpose and Summary
The Ensuring Access to Justice for Claims Against the
United States Act amends section 1500, title 28, United States
Code, in order to eliminate jurisdictional obstacles and
inefficiencies that prevent plaintiffs with claims against the
United States from receiving redress for Federal Government
actions that violate their constitutional, statutory, or
contractual rights. Currently, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 prohibits
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) from exercising
jurisdiction over any claim in which the plaintiff has pending
in any other Federal court a lawsuit against the United States
arising out of the same incident, even if the lawsuit in the
CFC seeks different relief. When combined with other limits on
the CFC's jurisdiction, this jurisdictional bar forces
plaintiffs to pick and choose among potentially meritorious
claims against the United States and leads to plaintiffs being
denied relief for unlawful government actions. This
jurisdictional bar, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor has explained,
causes ``plaintiffs whom Congress has forced to file parallel
actions in the CFC and a district court to obtain complete
relief [to] choose either to forgo relief in the district court
or to file first in the district court and risk the expiration
of the statute of limitations on their claims in the CFC.''\1\
H.R. 5683 efficiently fixes the jurisdictional problems created
by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 in order to ensure that government
employees, members of the armed forces, property owners,
government contractors, Indian tribes, and others can receive
the relief they are entitled to from actions taken by the
Federal Government.
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\1\United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1738
(2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Background and Need for the Legislation
In many cases under current Federal law, plaintiffs with
multiple claims against the United States government arising
out of a single incident are required to file at least two
separate actions to receive complete or even partial relief for
their injuries: one in Federal district court and a second in
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC). However, Federal law
also prevents plaintiffs from having both a district court and
the CFC consider both suits if they arise from substantially
the same operative facts. These contradictory requirements of
Federal law put plaintiffs into a jurisdictional Catch-22 when
seeking redress against the Federal Government for
infringements on their constitutional, statutory, or
contractual rights.
H.R. 5683, the ``Ensuring Access to Justice for Claims
Against the United States Act,'' addresses this problem by
amending section 1500 of title 28, United States Code, with
respect to the jurisdiction over civil actions against the
United States pending in, or on appeal from, the CFC.
Currently, section 1500 prohibits the CFC from exercising
jurisdiction over any claim in which the plaintiff has pending
in any other Federal court a lawsuit against the United States
arising out of the same incident, even if the lawsuit in the
CFC seeks different relief. When combined with other limits on
the CFC's jurisdiction, including the statute of
limitations,\2\ the jurisdictional bar in section 1500 forces
plaintiffs to pick and choose among potentially meritorious
claims against the United States and leads to plaintiffs being
denied relief for unlawful government actions. The
jurisdictional bar, as Justice Sotomayor has observed, causes
``plaintiffs whom Congress has forced to file parallel actions
in the CFC and a district court to obtain complete relief [to]
choose either to forgo relief in the district court or to file
first in the district court and risk the expiration of the
statute of limitations on their claims in the CFC.''\3\
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\2\The statute of limitations for cases before the Court of Federal
Claims (CFC) is 6 years. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2501 (2014). For cases in the
CFC, the statute of limitations is a condition on the United States'
waiver of sovereign immunity and therefore is a limit on the court's
jurisdiction. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130,
133-34 (2008).
\3\United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1738
(2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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The Ensuring Access to Justice for Claims Against the
United States Act efficiently fixes the ``jurisdictional
dance''\4\ created by section 1500 in order to ensure that
government employees, members of the armed forces, property
owners, government contractors, Indian tribes, and others can
receive the relief they are entitled to from actions taken by
the Federal Government. It is fundamentally unfair to those
whose rights have been violated by the Federal Government to
allow the procedural obstacles created by section 1500 to
stand. As Abraham Lincoln admonished in his first annual
message to Congress, ``[i]t is as much the duty of Government
to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as
it is to administer the same between private individuals.''\5\
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\4\Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1549 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
\5\President Abraham Lincoln, First Annual Message to Congress
(Dec. 3, 1861).
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BACKGROUND
A. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims
The CFC is the principal forum for litigating monetary
claims against the United States. Since 1855, the CFC and its
predecessor, the Court of Claims, have provided a fair forum to
allow claimants to bring suit against the Federal Government
for alleged violations of their rights.\6\ As has been observed
by its former Chief Judge Loren A. Smith, the CFC is the
institutional scale that weighs the government's actions
against the standard measure of the law and helps make concrete
the spirit of the First Amendment's guarantee of the right ``to
petition the Government for redress of grievances.''\7\
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\6\The CFC was recreated in October 1982 by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act pursuant to Article I of the Constitution. Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164 (1982). As part of
the 1982 Act, the CFC retained all the original jurisdiction of the
U.S. Court of Claims; the Court of Claims' appellate jurisdiction was
shifted to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. From 1982
until 1992, the CFC was named the U.S. Claims Court.
\7\U.S. Court of Federal Claims Bar Association, United States
Court of Federal Claims: The People's Court (2005).
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The CFC has nationwide jurisdiction, primarily pursuant to
the Tucker Act, over monetary claims against the United States
in excess of $10,000 that do not sound in tort and has
concurrent jurisdiction with United States District Courts for
non-tort claims $10,000 and below.\8\ The court is based in
Washington, D.C., and its judges hear cases around the country
at locations that are most convenient to the parties and the
witnesses. Cases the court adjudicates include patent cases,
government contract disputes, Fifth Amendment takings claims,
tax refund suits, military and civilian pay cases, vaccine
injury petitions, and Indian claims. The Federal Government is
always the defendant in cases before the CFC.
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\8\See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491 (2014) (``The United States Court of
Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort . . .
[or] to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting
to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a
proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or
any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a
procurement or a proposed procurement.'').
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B. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500
The lineage of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 runs back to the
aftermath of the Civil War, when its original purpose was to
preclude duplicative actions seeking compensation for seized
property (primarily cotton) by parties who had given aid to
Confederate soldiers.\9\ As the Supreme Court has explained,
section 1500 originated during a time
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\9\Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 206 (1993).
when residents of the Confederacy who had involuntarily
parted with property (usually cotton) during the war
[were] su[ing] the United States for compensation in
the Court of Claims. When these cotton claimants had
difficulty meeting the statutory condition that they
must have given no aid or comfort to participants in
the rebellion they resorted to separate suits in other
courts seeking compensation not from the Government as
such but from Federal officials. . . . It was these
duplicative lawsuits that induced Congress to prohibit
anyone from filing or prosecuting in the Court of
Claims ``any claim . . . for or in respect to which he
. . . shall have commenced and has pending'' an action
in any other court against an officer or agent of the
United States. The statute has long outlived the cotton
claimants. . . .\10\
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\10\Id. at 206 (internal citations omitted).
As currently written, section 1500 deprives the CFC of
jurisdiction over a claim that arises from substantially the
same operative facts as a claim pending in another Federal
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court, regardless of relief sought. Section 1500 reads in full:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not
have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to
which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any
other court any suit or process against the United
States or any person who, at the time when the cause of
action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in
respect thereto, acting or professing to act, directly
or indirectly under the authority of the United
States.\11\
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\11\28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500.
This jurisdictional bar created by section 1500 is
problematic because although most claims for money damages
against the United States must be filed in the CFC, other
claims against the government, including tort claims and claims
for equitable relief, must be brought in district court.\12\ As
a result, a plaintiff with multiple claims against the United
States arising out of a single incident (e.g., a contract claim
and a tort claim) must often file those claims in different
Federal courts. If a plaintiff brings each claim in the proper
court (the contract claim to the CFC and the tort claim to
district court), section 1500 may require the CFC to dismiss
the contract claim. The statute may therefore force a plaintiff
to choose which of its potentially meritorious claims to
pursue: if the statute of limitations for claims in the CFC
expires before the district court action has concluded, a
plaintiff will be foreclosed from prosecuting meritorious
claims that may only be brought in the CFC.
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\12\See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b)(1) (2014) (granting Federal
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims against the
United States).
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C. The Problem that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 Creates
While preventing duplicative litigation is as worthy a goal
today as when section 1500 was first enacted in 1868, the
provision no longer serves this purpose. As the former Chief
Judge Loren Smith, has observed:
Although, on its face, Sec. 1500 may appear to prevent
wasteful duplicative litigation, in practice it has had
precisely the opposite effect. Elimination of this
jurisdictional bar to suits related to cases in other
courts will save much wasteful litigation over non-
merits issues and will leave the court free to deal
with potential duplication through discretionary means.
The Court can stay duplicative litigation, if the
matter is being addressed in another forum, or proceed
with the case, if the matter appears to be stalled in
the other forum.\13\
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\13\Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 2-15 (1992) (statement of C.J.
Loren A. Smith).
The American Bar Association's section on public contract
law put it more bluntly: ``Section 1500 is an antiquated
statute . . . that has long since run its course. For decades
now, this tattered remnant of the Civil War has served to
create mischief for litigants and headaches for the
courts.''\14\ Moreover, Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS), a non-partisan, congressionally-mandated
administrative law think thank, has concluded that section 1500
``is an undesirably blunt tool for reducing the duplicative
burdens that may arise from simultaneous litigation. Federal
courts have both the authority and the competence . . . to
prevent double recoveries and ease the burdens of simultaneous
litigation . . . without unfairly depriving plaintiffs of the
opportunity to pursue all potentially meritorious claims
against the United States.''\15\
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\14\American Bar Association, Section on Public Contract Law Report
to the House of Delegates on ABA Resolution 300 at 1 (``ABA Report'').
\15\Administrative Conference of the United States, Administrative
Conference Recommendation 2012-6 at 5 (2012) (``Administrative
Conference Recommendation'').
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For decades both the CFC and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (the circuit court with appellate jurisdiction
over the CFC) had interpreted section 1500 in a manner that
allowed cases to be maintained in the CFC even if the plaintiff
had an action arising out of the same operative facts pending
in another Federal court as long as the two actions sought
different relief.\16\ In 2011, however, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation struck down this
interpretation of the statute concluding that ``[t]wo suits are
for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in
the CFC, if they are based on substantially the same operative
facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit.''\17\ As a
result, as Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence with the
Court's opinion, ``[u]nder the Court's construction of
Sec. 1500, plaintiffs whom Congress has forced to file parallel
actions in the CFC and a district court to obtain complete
relief must now choose either to forgo relief in the district
court or to file first in the district court and risk the
expiration of the statute of limitations on their claims in the
CFC.''\18\
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\16\See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, 27 F.3d at 1551 (``For the Court
of Federal Claims to be precluded from hearing a claim under Sec. 1500,
the claim pending in another court must arise from the same operative
facts, and must seek the same relief.'').
\17\131 S. Ct. at 1731.
\18\Id. at 1738.
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It is not uncommon under the Supreme Court's 2011
interpretation of section 1500 for the CFC to be deprived of
jurisdiction over potentially meritorious claims against the
United States that would otherwise be within its authority to
adjudicate. Section 1500 ``frequently compels plaintiffs with
multiple claims to pursue only one claim and abandon the
others.''\19\ ``[S]ophisticated businesses and pro se parties
alike have fallen into the Sec. 1500 trap. The statute has
affected Federal employees, property owners, businesses, local
governments, and Indian tribes.''\20\ ACUS has identified the
following examples of potentially meritorious claims against
the United States that have been adversely affected by section
1500:
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\19\Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 639, 643
(2014).
\20\Emily S. Bremer and Jonathan R. Siegel, ``Clearing the Path To
Justice: The Need To Reform 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500,'' 65 Ala. L. Rev. 1,
31 (2013).
LA Federal employee who sued the government in
district court under both the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Her Equal Pay Act
claim was transferred to the CFC and was dismissed
under Section 1500.\21\
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\21\Griffin v. United States, 590 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
LProperty owners who sued in the CFC, claiming
the government had taken their property without just
compensation. Their claim was dismissed because they
had previously sued in district court on a tort
theory.\22\
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\22\Vaizburd v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 309 (2000).
LA local government that was sued by the
United States in district court over taxation of
certain Federal office buildings filed a counterclaim
against the United States for the taxes it believed it
was owed. The counterclaims were transferred to the CFC
and dismissed under Section 1500.\23\
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\23\United States v. Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
LAn Indian tribe that sued in the CFC for
breach of trust. Its claims were dismissed because it
sued on similar claims in district court on the same
day.\24\
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\24\Passamaquoddy Tribe v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 256 (2008).
These ``duplicative'' cases are the result of the fact that
plaintiffs with claims against the United States may have
reasonable grounds for filing multiple lawsuits arising out of
a single incident given the complex statutory scheme waiving
sovereign immunity for such claims. In many cases, however,
section 1500 forces plaintiffs to choose among valid claims and
abandon some claims as the price of pursuing others.
Alternatively, plaintiffs may be forced to wait several years
for a claim to run its course in one court before filing
another claim arising out of the same incident in the CFC, at
the risk of ending up on the wrong side of the 6-year statute
of limitations. For these reasons and others, section 1500
creates an unnecessary and highly problematic jurisdiction bar.
D. Support for this Legislation
There is broad support for repealing and replacing 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1500, as is done by the Ensuring Access to Justice
for Claims Against the United States Act. First, Congress
itself has expressed from time to time its desire to fix the
results created by section 1500.\25\ Additionally, judges on
both the CFC and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have
voiced support for the repeal of section 1500. Indeed, judges
have characterized section 1500 as: an ``outdated and ill-
conceived statute''; ``unfair and unworkable''; ``a badly
drafted statute . . . [that] does not lend itself easily to a
sensible construction''; ``an anachronism''; ``an awkward tool
that has outlived its original purpose''; and a ``trap for the
unwary.''\26\ Moreover, the Administrative Conference of the
United States, the American Bar Association, and the National
Congress of American Indians, among others, have expressed
strong support for addressing section 1500:
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\25\See S. 1028, 106th Cong. Sec. 6(a)(2)(A) (1999); H.R. 992,
105th Cong. Sec. 3(a) (as passed by House, Mar. 12, 1998); S. 2271,
105th Cong. Sec. 6(a)(2)(A) (1998); S. 1256, 105th Cong.
Sec. 8(a)(2)(A) (1997); S. 781, 105th Cong. Sec. 205(d)(2)(A) (1997);
S. 343, 104th Cong. Sec. 5(b)(2) (1995); S. 605, 104th Cong.
Sec. 205(d)(2)(A) (1995); S. 371, 104th Cong. Sec. 8(b)(1) (1995); H.R.
489, 104th Cong. Sec. 6(c)(2)(A) (1995); S. 135, 104th Cong.
Sec. 6(c)(2)(A) (1995); S. 1355, 103d Cong. Sec. 1(a) (1993); S. 2521,
102d Cong. Sec. 10(c) (1992).
\26\Low v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 447, 455 (2009) (cataloging
some of the criticisms of section 1500).
LAdministrative Conference of the United
States: ``The Administrative Conference recommends that
Congress repeal Section 1500. The Conference further
recommends that Congress replace Section 1500 with a
provision that permits plaintiffs to bring
congressionally authorized suits arising from the same
set of operative facts in the Court of Federal Claims
and other Federal courts at the same time, but also
contains a presumptive stay mechanism to mitigate any
burden on the courts or parties from simultaneous
litigation.''\27\
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\27\Administrative Conference Recommendation.
LAmerican Bar Association: ``The American Bar
Association urges Congress to repeal and replace 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1500 in accordance with the recommendation
of the Administrative Conference of the United States
to eliminate unnecessary procedural obstacles to the
fair and efficient review of claims against the United
States in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.''\28\
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\28\American Bar Association Resolution 300.
LNational Congress of American Indians: ``The
NCAI supports the reform or repeal of 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1500 in a manner that would protect the ability of
tribal plaintiffs to pursue claims involving
substantially the same operative facts against the
United States in both the Court of Federal Claims and
in other Federal courts.''\29\
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\29\Resolution #SAC-12-061 (2012).
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DISCUSSION
In 1886, Representative John Randolph Tucker introduced
legislation, which has come to be known as the Tucker Act, to
revise the jurisdiction and procedures of the Court of Claims
in order to ``give the people of the United States what every
civilized nation of the world has already done--the right to go
into the courts to seek redress against the Government for
their grievances.''\30\ This Committee reported that the Tucker
Act was a ``comprehensive measure by which claims against the
United States may be heard and determined.''\31\
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\30\18 Cong. Rec. 2680 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Bayne); see id., at
622 (remarks of Rep. Tucker); id., at 2679 (colloquy between Reps.
Tucker and Townshend); id., at 2680 (remarks of Rep. Holman).
\31\H.R. Rep. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1886).
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However, despite the intended comprehensive nature of the
Tucker Act, the complexity of the statutes that govern the
jurisdiction of Federal courts to hear cases asserting claims
against the United States have hindered the ability of
plaintiffs to seek comprehensive redress for unlawful
government actions. This complex jurisdictional scheme
regularly causes plaintiffs problems when the Federal
Government acts in a manner that raises questions regarding
both of the validity of the action and, if valid, the economic
consequences of the government's conduct. In general, questions
regarding whether the government has power to exercise its
authority must be brought in district court and questions
regarding whether monetary compensation is due to a plaintiff
because of the government's exercise of its authority must be
brought in the CFC.
Furthermore, even among monetary claims against the United
States, a single exercise of the government's authority could
lead to different causes of action against the government that
must be brought in different Federal courts. For example,
actions against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act must be brought in Federal district court,\32\ whereas
contract actions against the government must be brought in the
CFC.\33\ And, actions to quiet title between private property
owners and the United States must be filed in Federal district
court,\34\ while Fifth Amendment takings claims for just
compensation relating to title disputes must be filed in the
CFC.\35\
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\32\See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b)(1) (2014).
\33\See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491(a)(1) (2014).
\34\See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2409a (2014).
\35\See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491(a)(1) (2014).
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This jurisdictional scheme would be understandable--
different Federal courts have different specialties and
expertise--but for the fact that section 1500 precludes
plaintiffs with multiple types of claims arising from the same
incident from pursuing all of their claims against the United
States. While the Tucker Act grants the CFC jurisdiction to
hear a variety of monetary claims against the United States,
section 1500 limits the court's jurisdiction by prohibiting the
CFC from adjudicating ``any claim for or in respect to which
the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other court any suit or
process against the United States.'' Thus, if a plaintiff's
claims arise from a single incident and could be asserted in
both Federal district court and the CFC, section 1500 requires
the plaintiff to forgo its remedy in Federal district court to
pursue its remedy in the CFC. If the plaintiff pursues both
cases, it risks dismissal of the monetary claim filed in the
CFC.
Although the original purpose of section 1500 was to
protect the United States against lawsuits that could lead to
double recoveries, modern preclusion principles protect against
this result. A plaintiff can no longer file suit against the
United States in the CFC and individual government officials
acting in their official capacities in district court and
recover in both cases: ``Today, it is well established that a
government and its officers, at least in their official
capacities, are in privity for purposes of res judicata. Thus,
a judgment in a suit against a Federal officer in his official
capacity will bind the United States government and vice
versa.''\36\
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\36\Bremer & Siegel, supra note 20, at 19.
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Simply put, section 1500 is no longer needed and leaving
this unnecessary statute in place regularly leads to injustices
for plaintiffs with claims against the United States:
To dismiss claims under Sec. 1500 when it no longer
serves its purpose is unjust. A basic principle of
modern civil procedure is that plaintiffs are permitted
to pursue all the claims that they may have against a
single defendant and are not required to ``elect''
among claims. This rule should be as valid against the
United States as against any other defendant. By
depriving plaintiffs of potentially meritorious claims
on the ground that they have filed related claims
elsewhere, Sec. 1500 works an injustice. . . . [I]t is
unfair to punish a plaintiff for bringing suit against
the United States in two different courts when the
plaintiff is simply doing what is required by
Congress's jurisdictional scheme.\37\
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\37\Id. at 20.
The unfair and wasteful results created by section 1500
deny plaintiffs access to justice for wrongs committed by the
United States government. Those who have been subject to
unlawful actions by the Federal Government should be permitted
to pursue all their claims against the United States without
being forced for technical, non-meritorious reasons to have to
choose among which of their potentially meritorious claims to
pursue. As the Federal Circuit has observed, ``[b]ecause this
nation relies in significant degree on litigation to control
the excesses to which Government may from time to time be
prone, it would not be sound policy to force plaintiffs to
forego monetary claims in order to challenge the validity of
Government action, or to preclude challenges to the validity of
Government action in order to protect a Constitutional claim
for compensation.''\38\ In short, section 1500 interferes with
the sound and efficient administration of justice and creates a
jurisdictional dance for unwary plaintiffs.
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\38\Loveladies Harbor, 27 F.3d at 1555-56.
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The Ensuring Access to Justice for Claims Against the
United States Act eliminates these wasteful obstacles to
justice and inefficient court procedures. The Act repeals and
replaces section 1500 with a procedure that avoids the burdens
that could be created by forcing the United States to litigate,
at the same time, two cases arising out of the same incident
while simultaneously protecting plaintiffs' ability to seek
complete relief when actions of the Federal Government violate
their legal rights.
The Act accomplishes this by striking the jurisdictional
bar from section 1500 and replacing it with a presumptive stay
provision. Under the presumptive stay provision, a plaintiff
could file and maintain actions arising out of a single
incident in both the CFC and the district court at the same
time, but the action that was filed second would be stayed
until the first-filed action is no longer pending. The stay
could be lifted by the agreement of the parties or upon a
finding by a judge that the stay is not in the interest of
justice. This presumptive stay provision provides judges with
flexibility to manage potentially duplicative litigation
against the United States in a manner that is consistent with
modern judicial practice.
H.R. 5683 removes unnecessary procedural obstacles that
Congress has placed in the way of the ability of plaintiffs to
receive redress from actions taken by the Federal Government
that infringe upon their constitutional, statutory, or
contractual rights. This legislation will clear the path to
justice for a wide variety of claimants with many different
kinds of claims. In so doing, H.R. 5683 helps the United States
fulfill its duty ``to render prompt justice against itself in
favor of its citizens.''\39\
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\39\President Lincoln, supra note 5.
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Hearings
The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R.
5683.
Committee Consideration
On November 13, 2014, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill H.R. 5683 favorably reported, without
amendment, by voice vote, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that there
were no recorded votes during the Committee's consideration of
H.R. 5683.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax
expenditures.
Committee Cost Estimate
With respect to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, an estimate and comparison
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office
under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was
not submitted to the Committee before the filing of the report.
Duplication of Federal Programs
No provision of H.R. 5683 establishes or reauthorizes a
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of
another Federal program, a program that was included in any
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance.
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings
The Committee estimates that H.R. 5683 specifically directs
to be completed no specific rule makings within the meaning of
5 U.S.C. Sec. 551.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.
5683, will amend 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 in order to ensure that
claimants with multiple claims against the United States are
able to seek complete legal relief for their injuries.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, H.R. 5683 does not contain any
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of Rule XXI.
Section-by-Section Analysis
The following discussion describes the bill as reported by
the Committee.
Section 1. Short Title
Section 1 sets forth the short title of the legislation as
the ``Ensuring Access to Justice for Claims Against the United
States Act.''
Section 2. Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims
Subsection (a) replaces the current text of 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1500 with a presumptive stay provision. The presumptive
stay provision provides that if a plaintiff has a civil action
pending in, or on appeal from, the Court of Federal Claims, and
that plaintiff also has pending in any other Federal court a
civil action that includes a claim against the United States
(or an agency or officer of the United States) arising from
substantially the same set of operative facts as the suit in
the CFC, the court presiding over the action that was filed
later shall stay the action until the action that was filed
first is no longer pending. Subsection (a) further provides
that the stay may be lifted upon agreement of the parties or
upon a determination by the court that the stay is not in the
interest of justice. Finally, the subsection establishes that
if the cases covered by section 1500 are filed on the same day,
the case filed in the CFC shall be treated as the first filed
case.
Subsection (b) provides that the changes made to 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1500 shall apply to all cases currently pending in the
Federal courts, whether filed before, on, or after the date of
enactment. The Act's presumptive stay provision, however, does
not apply in a case in which the action filed later (as
determined in accordance with the legislation) is pending on
the date of enactment in a Court of Appeals of the United
States or the Supreme Court of the United States, or in a case
in which judgment has been entered as of such date of enactment
but for which the time to file an appeal has not expired.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change
is proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART IV--JURISDICTION AND VENUE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 91--UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Sec.
1491. Claims against United States generally; actions involving
Tennessee Valley Authority.
* * * * * * *
[1500. Pendency of claims in other courts.]
1500. Presumption of stay.
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 1500. Pendency of claims in other courts
[The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have
jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the
plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any
suit or process against the United States or any person who, at
the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or
process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to
act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United
States.]
Sec. 1500. Presumption of stay
(a) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``court'' means any of the courts
described in section 610; and
(2) the term ``Court of Federal Claims'' means the
United States Court of Federal Claims.
(b) Presumption of Stay.--Except as provided in subsection
(d), if a civil action is pending in, or on appeal from, the
Court of Federal Claims, and the plaintiff or assignee of the
plaintiff also has pending in any other court a civil action
that includes a claim against the United States or an agency or
officer of the United States arising from substantially the
same set of operative facts, the court presiding over the
action that was filed later shall stay the action, in whole or
in part, until the action that was filed first is no longer
pending.
(c) Determining First-Filed Action.--
(1) Appeals.--For purposes of subsection (b), the
date of filing for a civil action that is pending on
appeal from the Court of Federal Claims is the date on
which the action was filed in the Court of Federal
Claims.
(2) Actions or appeals filed on same day.--For
purposes of subsection (b), if the actions described in
subsection (b) were filed on the same day, without
regard to the time of day, the action that is pending
in, or on appeal from, the Court of Federal Claims
shall be treated as having been filed first.
(d) Exceptions.--The requirement to stay an action under
subsection (b) shall not apply if--
(1) the parties in each of the actions that include
a claim based on substantially the same set of
operative facts otherwise agree; or
(2) the required stay is not, or ceases to be, in
the interests of justice.
* * * * * * *