[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A GLOBAL BATTLEGROUND: THE FIGHT AGAINST
ISLAMIST EXTREMISM AT HOME AND ABROAD
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-11
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Hon. Newt Gingrich, Former Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Gen. Michael V. Hayden, (USAF-Ret.), Former Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, and Former Director, National Security
Agency:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Philip Mudd, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the RAND President,
The RAND Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
A GLOBAL BATTLEGROUND: THE FIGHT AGAINST ISLAMIST EXTREMISM AT HOME AND
ABROAD
----------
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:38 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Smith, King, Perry, Katko,
Hurd, Carter, Walker, Loudermilk, McSally, Ratcliffe, Thompson,
Jackson Lee, Higgins, Richmond, Keating, Vela, Watson Coleman,
and Rice.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order.
Before we start, I would like to take a moment of silence
out of respect for the 150 victims of the German airline crash
today in the French Alps.
We send our deepest condolences to their families and to
our allies as they deal with this tragedy.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
global war against Islamist terror. Before 9/11 we failed to
recognize this threat when it was right before our eyes. This
failure brought us into war with violent Islamist extremism,
the perversion of a religion into a deeply insidious worldview.
Any attempt to deny the ideological underpinnings of the threat
endangers our security.
Throughout history we have seen power vacuums filled by
violent groups, deranged dictators, and extremist ideologies.
Nowhere is this more evident than with the rise of Islamist
terror groups, which have spread like wildfire on this
President's watch because of two glaring leadership failures.
The first failure was the President's decision to spin a
false narrative. The White House proclaimed our fight was
against core al-Qaeda and that that group was on the path to
defeat. In reality, the Jihadist threat had metastasized. The
President refused to characterize the Fort Hood and Boston
Marathon attacks for what they were--acts of brutal Islamist
terrorism.
The second leadership failure was the President's decision
to dismantle America's counterterrorism policies and return to
a pre-
9/11 law enforcement posture. The President tried to close
Guantanamo Bay and release hardened terrorists, sought to give
terrorists the same legal protections as U.S. citizens,
negotiated and swapped hostages with terrorists, and failed to
prevent the rise of ISIS and the emergence of al-Qaeda
sanctuaries.
A year after the President called ISIS the JV team, the
organization could draw on over 20,000 foreign fighters and has
been linked to 29 terrorist plots or attacks targeting the
West. What I thought was interesting: The day the President
said the global war on terror was effectively over was the day
that al-Baghdadi created ISIS.
ISIS now controls territory the size of Belgium, governs
millions of people, draws on billions of dollars in revenue,
and commands tens of thousands of foot-soldiers. Terrorist safe
havens have spread across the Middle East and Northern Africa.
Last week, ISIS claimed responsibility for the terror attack in
the museum in Tunisia. The gunmen involved had received
training in Libyan terror camps.
ISIS also claimed responsibility for the horrific attacks
on mosques in Yemen, which killed more than 150 people. Yemen's
instability has led to the evacuation of our remaining forces
and will further empower extremists. This situation is
alarming, given that al-Qaeda's premier bomb-makers in AQAP
have been targeting the homeland and Western interests for
years.
Over the past year, Islamist terrorists have struck Western
cities, including Paris, Sydney, Ottawa, Copenhagen, and
Brussels. We have witnessed the reach of extremists here at
home, as well. An Ohio-based ISIS sympathizer was arrested in
January for plotting to attack the United States Capitol.
Last week, an ISIS-aligned hacking group posted the names,
photos, and addresses of 100 American service members, calling
their brothers residing in America to attack these individuals.
At the other end of the Islamist extremist spectrum we face
Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism,
responsible for killing Americans for more than 3 decades.
In 2011 it attempted to assassinate the Saudi Arabian
ambassador in what would have been a mass-casualty attack here
in Washington.
The Iranian regime is on the march, destabilizing the
Middle East and stoking sectarian conflict. Yet this
administration has given up on rolling back Iran's nuclear
threat, and it continually fails to recognize the regime as
part of the radical Islamist threat. As Prime Minister
Netanyahu said before this Congress, ``Iran and ISIS are
competing for the crown of militant Islam.''
We continue to face dual threats here at home, foreign
fighters and home-grown terrorism. More than 180 Americans have
tried or succeeded in joining extremists in Syria and Iraq,
along with 3,000 to 5,000 other Westerners with visa-free
access to the United States. Armed with military training and
terrorist connections, these individuals are only a plane
flight away.
Islamist radicals are also tailoring their hateful ideology
toward Western audiences on social media and recruiting home-
grown fanatics. The easy transmission of extremist propaganda
on the internet has elevated the threat to the homeland. For
example, there have been at least 97 home-grown terror plots or
attacks in the United States since 9/11, and more than three-
fourths of them have taken place in the past 5 years.
The rise of radicalism we are witnessing today is not just
a passing phenomenon. The war against Islamist terror will be
the great struggle of our lifetime, the great struggle of this
century, and I believe we have a moral and strategic obligation
to fight it with all tools at our disposal.
Just as Communism and fascism before it, Islamic extremism
is a cancer that must be destroyed. To blunt their progress we
can begin by coalescing around a comprehensive strategy to wipe
out these Jihadists and their twisted ideologies.
Our purposes should be clear. It must be the policy of the
United States to confront and defeat Islamist terror groups
wherever they are, and prevent their reemergence in order to
ensure the long-term security of the United States and our
allies.
I look forward to hearing from the distinguished witnesses
we have here today, including the former Speaker of the House,
Mr. Gingrich.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
March 24, 2015
Before 9/11, we failed to recognize the threat when it was right
before our eyes. This failure brought us into war with violent Islamist
extremism--the perversion of a religion into a deeply insidious
worldview. Any attempt to deny the ideological underpinnings of the
threat endangers our security.
Throughout history, we have seen power vacuums filled by violent
groups, deranged dictators, and extremist ideologies. Nowhere is this
more evident than with the rise of Islamist terror groups, which have
spread like wildfire on this President's watch because of two glaring
leadership failures.
The first failure was the President's decision to spin a false
narrative. The White House proclaimed our fight was against ``core''
al-Qaeda and that the group was ``on the path to defeat.'' In reality,
the jihadist threat had metastasized. The President refused to
characterize the Ft. Hood and Boston Marathon attacks for what they
were--acts of brutal Islamist terrorism.
The second leadership failure was the President's decision to
dismantle America's counterterrorism policies and return to a pre-9/11
law-enforcement posture. The President tried to close Guantanamo Bay
and release hardened terrorists; sought to give terrorists the same
legal protections as U.S. citizens; negotiated and swapped hostages
with terrorists; and failed to prevent the rise of ISIS and the
emergence of al-Qaeda sanctuaries.
A year after the President called ISIS the ``JV team,'' the
organization can draw on over 20,000 foreign fighters and has been
linked to 29 terrorist plots or attacks targeting the West. And the day
the President said the global war on terror was effectively over was
the day al Baghdadi created ISIS. ISIS now controls territory the size
of Belgium, governs millions of people, draws on billions of dollars in
revenue, and commands tens of thousands of foot soldiers.
Terrorist safe havens have spread across the Middle East and North
Africa. Last week, ISIS claimed responsibility for the terror attack in
a museum in Tunisia; the gunmen involved had received training in
Libyan terror camps. ISIS also claimed responsibility for the horrific
attacks on mosques in Yemen which killed more than 150 people. Yemen's
instability has led to the evacuation of our remaining forces and will
further empower extremists. This situation is alarming given that al-
Qaeda's premier bomb-makers in AQAP have been targeting the homeland
and Western interests for years.
Over the past year, Islamist terrorists have struck Western cities,
including Paris, Sydney, Ottawa, Copenhagen, and Brussels. We have
witnessed the reach of extremists here at home as well. An Ohio-based
ISIS sympathizer was arrested in January for plotting to attack the
U.S. Capitol. Last week, an ISIS-aligned hacking group posted the
names, photos, and addresses of 100 American service members, calling
their ``brothers residing in America'' to attack these individuals.
At the other end of the Islamist extremist spectrum, we face Iran,
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism responsible for killing
Americans for more than three decades. In 2011, it attempted to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador in what would have been a
mass-casualty attack here in Washington.
The Iranian regime is on the march, destabilizing the Middle East
and stoking sectarian conflict. Yet this administration has given up on
rolling back Iran's nuclear threat and it continually fails to
recognize the regime as part of the radical Islamist threat. As Israeli
Prime Minister Netanyahu said before Congress, ``Iran and ISIS are
competing for the crown of militant Islam.''
We continue to face ``dual threats'' here at home: Foreign fighters
and home-grown terrorism. More than 180 Americans have tried or
succeeded in joining extremists in Syria and Iraq along with 3,000-
5,000 other Westerners with visa-free access to the United States.
Armed with military training and terrorist connections, these
individuals are only a plane flight away.
Islamist radicals are also tailoring their hateful ideology toward
Western audiences on social media and recruiting home-grown fanatics.
The easy transmission of extremist propaganda on the internet has
elevated the threat to the homeland. For example, there have been at
least 97 home-grown terror plots or attacks in the United States since
9/11--and more than three-fourths of them have taken place in the past
5 years.
The rise of radicalism we are witnessing today is not just a
passing phenomenon. The War against Islamist Terror will be the great
struggle our lifetime, the great struggle of this century, and I
believe we have a moral and strategic obligation to fight it with all
tools at our disposal. Just as communism and fascism before it,
Islamist extremism is a cancer that must be destroyed.
To blunt their progress, we can begin by coalescing around a
comprehensive strategy to wipe out these jihadists and their twisted
ideology. Our purpose should be clear: It must be the policy of the
United States to confront and defeat Islamist terror groups wherever
they are and prevent their reemergence in order to ensure the long-term
security of the United States and our allies.
Chairman McCaul. With that, I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. I want to thank the Chairman for holding
today's hearing. I would also like to welcome Speaker Gingrich
back to the House and thank Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Mudd for
appearing today.
I am also looking forward to General Hayden's testimony.
General Hayden, as you know, over the weekend the United States
pulled its remaining personnel out of Yemen due to a dire
security situation in that country. There have been some who
criticized the decision to pull out of Yemen, claiming that
pulling out of Yemen in the interest of security puts other
foreign intelligence at risk.
I want to learn from you when it is appropriate to leave
our public servants in a dangerous situation in the interest of
gathering more intelligence.
This hearing is the latest in a series of committee
activities relating to combating ideological extremism. Last
month, the Chairman and I announced a bipartisan task force on
the threat from foreign fighters. That task force commenced its
work on March 2.
In last month's full committee hearing on the threat from
foreign fighters, the director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, Nicholas Rasmussen, stated that more work remains to
ensure that our foreign partners are willing and able to
identify and stop foreign fighters at their borders. I look
forward to the task force's recommendation.
Also the committee Democrats have also asked the Government
Accountability Office to look into the Obama's administration's
counter violent extremism strategy. Further, it is my
understanding that the Majority staff is doing an examination
of the strategy.
Mr. Chairman, as we continue to examine the threat from
home-grown terrorism, it is my hope that in the future we hold
a hearing to learn from the administration how its strategy
empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism will be
helpful. While I understand that the White House held a summit
last month on violent extremism, this strategy has been in
place since 2011. It is past time that Members hear from the
administration on this topic.
Threats from foreign and domestic terrorist groups are not
going away overnight. For years we have seen how terrorist
groups use the internet and social media to recruit new members
and spread their ideology. It is not surprising that social
media is being used to espouse messages of fear and terror, to
cultivate extreme viewpoints and inspire terrorists.
These outlets are inexpensive and far-reaching, enabling
any extremist group to take advantage of them. A quick search
of the internet can produce content from extremists of all
stripes, from neo-Nazis to ISIL sympathizers to those who have
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Last month Director Rasmussen
also stated that ISIL's exploitation of social media played a
prominent role in the group's ability to recruit fighters from
around the world.
As we find ways to counter terrorist messages at home, we
do not focus on one specific ethnic, age, religious, or gender
group. The range of indictments and prosecutions from the
Department of Justice, from last week's indictment of a 47-
year-old Air Force veteran to the indictment of a 21-year-old
man from Southern California, to the sentencing of a 19-year-
old girl from Colorado to the sentencing of a 44-year-old man
from North Carolina illustrates that the number of Americans
seeking association with ISIL is diverse.
Mr. Chairman, an unfortunate reality we know all too well
but do not want to face is a successful lone-wolf attack
inspired by a terrorist group on American soil. I want to build
upon the work that we are already doing and encourage this
committee to continue the serious discussions on ways to
counter message while protecting innovations and Constitutional
rights. As we consider this threat, we also need to understand
how we may use social media to defuse rather than incite.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I
yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 24, 2015
Over the weekend, the United States pulled its remaining personnel
out of Yemen due to a dire security situation in that country. There
have been some who have criticized the decision to pull out of Yemen
claiming that pulling out of Yemen in the interest of security puts our
foreign intelligence at risk. I want to learn from General Hayden when
it is appropriate to leave our public servants in a dangerous situation
in the interest of gathering more intelligence.
This hearing is the latest in a series of committee activities
related to combating ideological extremism. Last month, the Chairman
and I announced a bi-partisan task force on the threat from foreign
fighters. That task force commenced its work on March 2.
In last month's full committee hearing on the threat from foreign
fighters, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center,
Nicholas Rasmussen, stated that more work remains to ensure that our
foreign partners are willing and able to identify and stop foreign
fighters at their borders. I look forward to the task force's
recommendations. Also, the committee Democrats have also asked the
Government Accountability Office to look into the Obama
administration's Counter Violent Extremism Strategy.
Further, it is my understanding that the Majority staff is doing an
examination of the strategy. As we continue to examine the threat from
home-grown terrorism, it is my hope that in the future we hold a
hearing to learn from the administration how its strategy, ``Empowering
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism'', will be helpful. While I
understand that the White House held a summit last month on violent
extremism, this strategy has been in place since 2011. It is past time
that Members hear from the administration on this topic.
Threats from foreign and domestic terrorist groups are not going
away overnight. For years, we have seen how terrorist groups use the
internet and social media to recruit new members and spread their
ideology. It is not surprising that social media is being used to
espouse messages of fear and terror; to cultivate extreme viewpoints;
and to inspire terrorists. These outlets are inexpensive and far-
reaching, enabling any extremist group to take advantage of them.
A quick search of the internet can produce content from extremists
of all stripes--from Neo Nazis to ISIL sympathizers to those who have
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Last month, Director Rasmussen also
stated that ISIL's exploitation of social media played a prominent role
in the group's ability to recruit fighters from around the world. As we
find ways to counter the terrorist's messages at home, we do not focus
on one specific ethnic, age, religious, or gender group.
The range of indictments and prosecutions from the Department of
Justice--from last week's indictment of a 47-year-old Air Force veteran
to the indictment of a 21-year-old man from Southern California to the
sentencing of a 19-year-old girl from Colorado to sentencing of a 44-
year-old man from North Carolina--illustrates that the number of
Americans seeking association with ISIL is diverse. None of the people
that the Department of Justice has charged with providing material
support to ISIL has been charged with plotting an attack in the United
States.
An unfortunate reality we know all too well, but do not want to
face, is a successful lone-wolf attack inspired by a terrorist group on
American soil. I want to build upon the work that we are already doing
and encourage this committee to continue the serious discussions on
ways to countermessage while protecting innovation and Constitutional
rights. As we consider this real threat, we also need to understand how
we may use social media to diffuse rather than incite.
Chairman McCaul. Thank the Ranking Member. Other Members
are reminded that statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
March 24, 2015
I thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for holding
this morning's hearing on ``A Global Battlefield: The Fight Against
Islamist Extremism at Home and Abroad.''
I welcome and thank today's witnesses: The Honorable Newt Gingrich,
former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; General Michael
Hayden (USAF-Ret.) the former director of the Central Intelligence
Agency as well as the former director of the National Security Agency;
Mr. Philip Mudd, senior fellow, New America Foundation; and Mr. Brian
Michael Jenkins, a senior adviser to the RAND President of The RAND
Corporation.
As a senior Member of this committee and former chair of the
Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Transportation Security my
commitment to air travel security and protecting the homeland from
terrorist attacks remains unwavering.
Since September 11, 2001, it has been a priority of this Nation to
prevent terrorists or those who would do Americans harm from boarding
flights whether they are domestic or international.
To succeed in the fight against violent extremism defined by the
actions of ISIS/ISIL and Boko Haram we must use every asset available
to stop the spread of the violence they perpetrate as well as their
ability to find safe havens in areas where Government authority is not
enforced or consistent.
The battle against violent extremism is constantly changing and it
is good to see in General Hayden's testimony that reality.
In recent days we have seen the conditions in Yemen fall into chaos
as violent extremism-inspired attacks have claimed the lives of
hundreds of worshipers attending prayer services at Mosques.
General Hayden's assessment that no one should second-guess
decisions of military leaders and the President to withdraw troops from
Yemen because they are in the best position to know all of the facts is
correct.
Today's witnesses testify that we are in a new era of geo-political
conflict.
It is no longer a matter of governments fielding armies or
combatants--but the emergence of what is best described as a new form
of geo-military transnational gang activity.
The affiliations of violent extremists individuals and groups are
loose with membership remaining fluid--one individual or small group
may identify with al-Qaeda today, and switch its identification to ISIL
or al-Shabaab or Boko Haram depending on which group is perceived to be
the strongest.
These groups require chaos to function and they attack institutions
and people regardless of their religious or ethnic traditions to
destabilize regions.
They act in the name of religion but institute intra- and inter-
Muslim faith conflicts against individuals and mosques to kill
thousands.
Violent extremism is not new--those who struggle to hold onto an
idyllic past or rigid view of their faith that does not tolerate non-
conformism has plagued societies throughout history.
The only tools that have succeed in overcoming violent extremism is
the commitment of those most affected by their violence to stand
against them.
In the case of ISIS/ISIL the boots on the ground needed to defeat
them must be Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, Kurdish, Peshmerga
with the full support of United States resources.
I firmly believe that the most important lesson over the last
decade is that the United States can want many things for the peoples
of the impacted region, but it is the people in the impacted regions
who must win these victories for themselves.
We must remember that after the battles are all fought and decided
that the underlying causes for so many willing souls to commit
themselves to kill and die for ISIS/ISIL and Boko Haram must be
addressed.
Where there is poverty, corruption, a sense of not having value or
social worth, violence and systemic disparity in living conditions and
insurmountable forces to resist upward mobility by poor communities
lays fertile ground for recruiting training and turning young minds
toward violence.
Some would argue that these problems are not ours to solve.
The counter argument is that the cost of not solving these
underlying problems makes the ability to win a lasting end to violent
extremism nearly impossible.
We cannot kill ideas with bombs--we must change hearts and minds.
I am a firm supporter of getting to the source of problems that
come from the complexity of our interconnected world.
Part of the struggle for peace we have today is a direct
consequence of invading Iraq without provocation or reason.
Paraphrasing Secretary of State Colin Powell's advice to President
George W. Bush: ``If we break it--we will own it.''
He was warning President Bush about the folly of entering into a
war of choice with Iraq and the complexities of that region of the
world that could spiral out of control.
It is time that we recognize how right Secretary Powell was then
and how his words are playing out every day.
Added to the challenge of violent extremism is its ability to very
effectively use the tools of social media to reach far beyond the
battlefield to influence young people to join their cause.
Our work as Members of this committee should focus on ensuring that
the Department of Homeland Security has the resources needed to meet
the challenges presented for violent extremism.
I thank today's witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. We are fortunate to have a very
distinguished panel before us here today. First, Speaker Newt
Gingrich served as Speaker of the House of Representatives from
1995 to 1999. He served the sixth district of Georgia in the
House for 20 years, and he is currently a contributor to CNN.
Thank you, sir, for being here today.
Next we have General Michael Hayden. He is a principal at
the Chertoff Group. Served as the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency from 2006 to 2009 and as director of the
National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005 and held a variety
of other posts during his 41-year Air Force career. Thank you,
sir, as well.
Mr. Philip Mudd is a senior research fellow at the New
America Foundation. He served in the Central Intelligence
Agency for 20 years, including as deputy director of the
agency's Counterterrorism Center from 2003 to 2005, and he also
served in the FBI's National security branch. Thank you, sir.
Then finally we have Mr. Brian Jenkins. He is a senior
advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation, served as an
advisor to the White House commission on aviation safety and
security and advised the National commission on terrorism in
2000. Previously also served in the United States Army. Thank
you, sir, for being here as well.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Gingrich.
STATEMENTS OF HON. NEWT GINGRICH, FORMER SPEAKER OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Gingrich. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member
Thompson, and all the Members of the committee for holding this
very important hearing. I am glad that you have begun a process
of fundamental rethinking which a number of other committees
will have to emulate. It is vital that the United States
Congress undertake a thorough no-holds-barred review of the
long global war in which we are now engaged with radical
Islamists.
This review will require a number of committees to
coordinate, since it will have to include Intelligence, Armed
Services, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Homeland Security at
a minimum.
There are three key sobering observations about where we
are today which should force this thorough, no-holds-barred
review of our situation. These three points, which I think are
backed up by the facts, suggest that the United States is
drifting into a crisis that could challenge its very survival
over time.
First, it is the case that after 35 years of conflict,
dating back to the Iranian seizure of the American Embassy in
Tehran and the ensuing hostage crisis, the United States and
its allies are losing the long global war with radical
Islamists. We are losing to both the violent jihad and to the
cultural jihad. The violent jihad has shown itself recently in
Paris, Australia, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Gaza,
Nigeria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Yemen, to name just some of
the most prominent areas of violence.
Cultural jihad is more insidious and in many ways more
dangerous. Cultural jihad strikes at our very ability to think
and have an honest dialogue about the steps necessary for our
survival.
Cultural jihad is winning when the Department of Defense
describes a terrorist attack at Fort Hood as workplace
violence.
Cultural jihad is winning when the President refers to
random killings in Paris, when they were clearly the actions of
Islamist terrorists and targeted against specific groups.
Cultural jihad is winning when the administration censors
training documents and lecturers according to sensitivity so
that they cannot describe radical Islamists with any reference
to the religious ideology which is the primary bond that unites
them.
In the 14 years since the 9/11 attacks, we have gone a long
way down the road of intellectually and morally disarming in
order to appease the cultural jihadists who are increasingly
aggressive in asserting their right to define how the rest of
us think and talk.
Second, it is the case that in an extraordinarily dangerous
pattern our intelligence system has been methodically limited
and manipulated to sustain false narratives while suppressing
or rejecting facts and analysis about those who would kill us.
For example, there is clear evidence the American people have
been given remarkably misleading analysis about al-Qaeda based
on a very limited translation and publication of about 24 of
the 1.5 million documents captured in the bin Laden raid.
A number of outside analysts have suggested that the
selective release of a small number of documents was designed
to make the case that al-Qaeda was weaker. These outside
analysts assert that a broader reading of more documents would
indicate al-Qaeda was doubling in size when our Government
claimed it was getting weaker, an analysis also supported by
obvious empirical facts on the ground.
Furthermore, there has been what could only be deliberate
foot-dragging and exploiting this extraordinary cache of
material. Both Lieutenant General Mike Flynn, the former head
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Colonel Derek Harvey, a
leading analyst of terrorism, have described the deliberately
misleading and restricted access to the bin Laden documents. A
number of intelligence operatives have described censorship
from above designed to make sure that intelligence which
undermines the official narrative simply does not see the light
of day.
Congress should explore legislation which would make it
illegal to instruct intelligence personnel to falsify
information or analysis. Basing American security policy on
politically-defined distortions of reality is a very dangerous
habit which could someday lead to a devastating defeat.
Congress has an obligation to ensure the American people are
learning the truth and have an opportunity to debate potential
policies in a fact-based environment.
Third, it is the case that our political elites have
refused to define our enemies. Their willful ignorance has made
it impossible to develop an effective strategy to defeat those
who would destroy our civilization. For example, the
President's own press secretary engages in verbal gymnastics to
avoid identifying the perpetrators of violence as radical
Islamists.
Josh Earnest says such labels do not, ``accurately describe
our enemies'' and that to use such a label, ``legitimizes
them.'' This is Orwellian doublespeak. The radical Islamists do
not need to be delegitimized. They need to be defeated. We
cannot defeat what we cannot name.
There has been a desperate desire among our elites to focus
on the act of terrorism rather than the motivation behind these
acts. There has been a deep desire to avoid the cultural and
religious motivation behind the jihadist factions.
Let me conclude because of time. I think it is very
important that we recognize that there are ties between
Minneapolis and Mogadishu. There are ties between London,
Paris, and ISIS. Al-Qaeda exists in many forms and under many
names. We are confronted by world-wide recruiting on the
internet, with Islamists reaching out to people we would never
have imagined were vulnerable to that kind of support.
We have been refusing to apply the insights and lessons of
history, but our enemies have been very willing to study,
learn, and rethink them. Until we reverse this, we will not in
fact be capable of winning this war.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gingrich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Newt Gingrich
March 24, 2015
Thank you Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson and all the
Members of the committee for holding this very important hearing.
I am glad that you have begun a process of fundamental rethinking
which a number of other committees will have to emulate.
It is vital that the United States Congress undertake a thorough,
no-holds-barred review of the long, global war in which we are now
engaged with radical Islamists. This review will require a number of
committees to coordinate since it will have to include Intelligence,
Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Homeland Security at a
minimum.
There are three key, sobering observations about where we are today
which should force this thorough, no-holds-barred review of our
situation.
These three points--which are backed up by the facts--suggest the
United States is drifting into a crisis that could challenge its very
survival.
First, it is the case that after 35 years of conflict dating back
to the Iranian seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the
ensuing hostage crisis, the United States and its allies are losing the
long, global war with radical Islamists.
We are losing to both the violent Jihad and to the cultural Jihad.
The violent Jihad has shown itself recently in Paris, Australia,
Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Gaza, Nigeria, Somalia,
Afghanistan, and Yemen to name just some of the most prominent areas of
violence.
Cultural Jihad is more insidious and in many ways more dangerous.
Cultural Jihad strikes at our very ability to think and to have an
honest dialogue about the steps necessary for our survival. Cultural
Jihad is winning when the Department of Defense describes a terrorist
attack at Fort Hood as ``workplace violence''.\1\ Cultural Jihad is
winning when the President refers to ``random'' killings in Paris when
they were clearly the actions of Islamist terrorists and targeted
against specific groups.\2\ Cultural Jihad is winning when the
administration censors training documents and lecturers according to
``sensitivity'' so that they cannot describe radical Islamists with any
reference to the religious ideology which is the primary bond that
unites them.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Defense Press Release, August 20, 2010, http://
www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60536.
\2\ President Obama, Interview with Vox News, February 2015, http:/
/www.vox.com/a/barack-obama-interview-vox-conversation/obama-foreign-
policy-transcript.
\3\ Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Speaks at the
Department's Conference on Post-
9/11 Discrimination, October 19, 2011 http://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/deputy-attorney-general-james-m-cole-speaks-department-s-
conference-post-911.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 14 years since the 9/11 attacks, we have gone a long way
down the road of intellectually and morally disarming in order to
appease the cultural Jihadists who are increasingly aggressive in
asserting their right to define how the rest of us think and talk.
Second, it is the case that, in an extraordinarily dangerous
pattern, our intelligence system has been methodically limited and
manipulated to sustain false narratives while suppressing or rejecting
facts and analysis about those who would kill us.
For example, there is clear evidence the American people have been
given remarkably misleading analysis about al-Qaeda based on a very
limited translation and publication of about 24 of the 1.5 million
documents captured in the bin Laden raid. A number of outside analysts
have suggested that the selective release of a small number of
documents was designed to make the case that al-Qaeda was weaker.\4\
These outside analysts assert that a broader reading of more documents
would indicate al-Qaeda was doubling in size when our Government
claimed it was getting weaker--an analysis also supported by obvious
empirical facts on the ground. Furthermore, there has been what could
only be deliberate foot-dragging in exploiting this extraordinary cache
of material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Stephen Hayes and Thomas Joscelyn, ``How America Was Mislead on
al Qaeda's Demise,'' Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2015; http://
www.wsj.com/articles/stephen-hayes-and-tomas-joscelyn-how-america-was-
misled-on-al-qaedas-demise-1425600796.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both Lt. General Mike Flynn, the former head of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and Colonel Derek Harvey, a leading analyst of
terrorism, have described the deliberately misleading and restricted
access to the bin Laden documents.
A number of intelligence operatives have described censorship from
above designed to make sure that intelligence which undermines the
official narrative simply does not see the light of day.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Eli Lake, `` `Over My Dead Body': Spies Fight Obama Push to
Downsize Terror War,'' The Daily Beast, May 21, 2015; http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/21/over-my-dead-body-spies-
fight-obama-push-to-downsize-terror-war.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress should explore legislation which would make it illegal to
instruct intelligence personnel to falsify information or analysis.
Basing American security policy on politically-defined distortions of
reality is a very dangerous habit which could someday lead to a
devastating defeat. Congress has an obligation to ensure the American
people are learning the truth and have an opportunity to debate
potential policies in a fact-based environment.
Third, it is the case that our political elites have refused to
define our enemies. Their willful ignorance has made it impossible to
develop an effective strategy to defeat those who would destroy our
civilization.
For example, the President's own press secretary engages in verbal
gymnastics to avoid identifying the perpetrators of violence as radical
Islamists. Josh Earnest said such labels do not ``accurately'' describe
our enemies and that to use such a label ``legitimizes'' them.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ John Earnest, Press Conference, January 13, 2015, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/13/press-briefing-press-
secretary-josh-earnest-1132015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is Orwellian double-speak. The radical Islamists do not need
to be de-legitimized. They need to be defeated. We cannot defeat what
we cannot name.
There has been a desperate desire among our elites to focus on the
act of terrorism rather than the motivation behind those acts. There
has been a deep desire to avoid the cultural and religious motivations
behind the Jihadists' actions. There is an amazing hostility to any
effort to study or teach the history of these patterns going back to
the Seventh Century.
Because our elites refuse to look at the religious and historic
motivations and patterns which drive our opponents, we are responding
the same way to attack after attack on our way of life without any
regard for learning about what really motivates our attackers. Only
once we learn what drives and informs our opponents will we not repeat
the same wrong response tactics, groundhog day-like, and finally start
to win this long war.
Currently each new event, each new group, each new pattern is
treated as though it's an isolated phenomenon--as if it's not part of a
larger struggle with a long history and deep roots in patterns that are
1,400 years old.
There is a passion for narrowing and localizing actions. The early
focus was al-Qaeda. Then it was the Taliban. Now it is ISIS. It is
beginning to be Boko Harum. As long as the elites can keep treating
each new eruption as a free-standing phenomenon, they can avoid having
to recognize that this is a global, world-wide movement that is
decentralized but not disordered.
There are ties between Minneapolis and Mogadishu.\7\ There are ties
between London, Paris, and ISIS. Al-Qaeda exists in many forms and
under many names. We are confronted by world-wide recruiting on the
internet, with Islamists reaching out to people we would never have
imagined were vulnerable to that kind of appeal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ CBS News, ``Minneapolis has become a recruiting ground for
Islamic extremists'', August 27, 2014; http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
minneapolis-has-become-recruiting-ground-for-islamic-extremists/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have been refusing to apply the insights and lessons of history
but our enemies have been very willing to study, learn, rethink, and
evolve.
The cultural Jihadists have learned our language and our
principles--freedom of speech, freedom of religion, tolerance--and they
apply them to defeat us without believing in them themselves. We
blindly play their game on their terms, and don't even think about how
absurd it is for people who accept no church, no synagogue, no temple,
in their heartland to come into our society and define multicultural
sensitivity totally to their advantage--meaning, in essence, that we
cannot criticize their ideas.
Our elites have been morally and intellectually disarmed by their
own unwillingness to look at both the immediate history of the first 35
years of the global war with radical Islamists and then to look deeper
into the roots of the ideology and the military-political system our
enemies draw upon as their guide to waging both physical and cultural
warfare.
One of the great threats to American independence is the steady
growth of foreign money pouring into our intellectual and political
systems to influence our thinking and limit our options for action.
Congress needs to adopt new laws to protect the United States from the
kind of foreign influences which are growing in size and boldness.
Sun Tzu, in the Art of War, written 500 years before Christ, warned
that ``all warfare is based on deception''. We are currently in a
period where our enemies are deceiving us--and our elites are actively
deceiving themselves--and us. The deception and dishonesty of our
elites is not accidental or uninformed. It is deliberate and willful.
The flow of foreign money and foreign influence is a significant part
of that pattern of deception.
We must clearly define our enemies before we can begin to develop
strategies to defeat them.
We have lost 35 years since this war began.
We are weaker and our enemies are stronger.
Congress has a duty to pursue the truth and to think through the
strategies needed and the structures which will be needed to implement
those strategies.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the dangers we face.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. The Chairman now
recognizes General Hayden.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, (USAF-RET.), FORMER DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY
General Hayden. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Thompson, for the invitation. Let me also thank the
entire committee for taking on what is a difficult but very
important topic. We are engaged in a global battlefield,
fighting against those who would commit violence on the
innocent for their own warped objectives. There is much to be
said about the battlefield, and I am sure we will be talking in
great detail about it as we go forward today.
But I also know we cannot have an honest discussion of that
without also discussing one of the world's great monotheisms.
So before I launch into that let me say that I understand that
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism all trace their roots back to
the same deserts, that we are all people of the book and that
we are all children of Abraham. But we cannot conduct, as the
Speaker just noted, we cannot conduct a useful discussion of
the current conflict without also talking about Islam.
We are not talking about all of Islam. We are certainly not
talking about all Muslims, but we risk confusing ourselves if
we ignore the religious roots that some use to justify their
violence.
If you look at the current conflict in the Levant, ISIS and
so on, there are actually three wars going on there
simultaneously. The first is an intra-Sunni battle. In one case
one group of Sunni terrorists, ISIS, against another group, al-
Qaeda. In another it is Sunni-based violent extremism against
the Sunni states in the region, so it is ISIS Jordan, ISIS
Egypt, ISIS against Saudi Arabia. It is all Sunni on Sunni,
with Sunni fundamentalists trying to construct an Islamic
caliphate at the expense of traditional Muslim states.
Second conflict, Sunni-Shia, which is unfortunately the
continuation of the succession crisis that began at the death
of the Prophet in 632. Here we have the so-called Shia
crescent--Iran, large portions of Iraq, the Alawites in Syria,
Hezbollah in Lebanon--against the Sunni monarchies in states
like Egypt. Frankly, the worst of the current violence we are
seeing like, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the mass bombings
in Yemen, reflect the Sunni-Shia conflict. I suspect that is
going to take on an increasingly powerful flavor for the
violence in the Middle East.
The third conflict is the challenge of reconciling Islam
with what we in the West at least call modernity. I want to
avoid cultural arrogance here, since Christendom went through a
similar crisis in the 17th Century. But at the end of the
Thirty Years War then we in Europe broadly decided to separate
the sacred from the secular in our political cultures. I know
that is an oversimplification but it is instructive, and that
outcome has led to a growth of religious tolerance that has
characterized at least the best of Western life since then.
It remains to be seen whether or not another great
monotheism, Islam, follows that same arc, or if religion there
will remain the business of the state, or in its extreme form,
replace the state.
Now the common thread across those three conflicts within
Sunni Islam, Sunni-Shia, and Islam and modernity, the common
thread is Islam. Richard Haas, the chairman of the Council on
Foreign Relations, has compared the current conflict to the
Thirty Years War in Europe. I fear that he is correct and, Mr.
Chairman, what we are seeing here is going to last a generation
or more.
I know that a lot has been made about recent administration
comments that what we really have here is a lack of opportunity
and these issues could be solved by more jobs and better
economic development, and actually there is truth to that. When
I was at CIA I was fond of saying that many jihadists join the
movement for the same reasons that some young Americans join
the Crips and the Bloods. There is much here about youthful
alienation, the need to belong to something greater than self,
the search for meaningful identity. But it also matters what
gang you join, and this gang at its senior levels justifies its
horrific violence through reference to the holy Quoran.
Mr. Chairman, it is fundamentally a struggle over ideas.
Unfortunately, it is a struggle over which we, as a largely
Judeo-Christian nation, have only limited influence. We can try
to set the conditions for success, we could try to empower and
protect moderate voices. But we also have to look to our own
safety by resorting to force to kill or capture those who are
already committed to do us violence.
But in the long term the only solution for this lies within
Islam itself, and here a recent speech by President Sisi of
Egypt to the scholars at El Azhar University, the seat of Sunni
scholarship, is incredibly encouraging. In essence the
President of Egypt told the theologians that they have to get
their act together and correct and discredit what he views to
be gross misinterpretations of Islamic scripture by the
jihadists.
By the way, he also attended mass and wished his Coptic
fellow citizens Merry Christmas. President Sisi is an
observant, pious Muslim, so his words and his action should
carry some weight and also offer us some hope.
Mr. Chairman, there is a lot more to be said about this and
I look forward to the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hayden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael V. Hayden
March 24, 2015
Thank you Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for the
invitation to be here today. Let me also thank the entire committee for
taking on this difficult, but very important topic.
We are truly engaged on a global battlefield fighting against those
who would visit violence on the innocent for their own warped
objectives.
There is much to be said about this battlefield and I am sure we
will discuss the roots of the violent extremism which we now face.
And I know we cannot have an honest discussion of that without also
discussing one of the world's great monotheisms. So before I launch
into that, let me say that I understand that Islam, Christianity, and
Judaism all trace their roots to the same deserts. That we are all
people of the book. And that we are all children of Abraham.
But we cannot conduct a useful discussion of our current conflict
without also talking about Islam. In my view, we are not talking about
all of Islam and we certainly are not talking about all Muslims, but we
risk confusing ourselves if we ignore the religious roots that some use
to justify their violence.
In looking at the current conflict in the Levant, there are
actually three wars going on simultaneously.
The first is an intra-Sunni battle, in one case pitting Isis
against al-Qaeda. In another case, it is Sunni-based violent extremists
against the Sunni states in the region. Here we see Isis against
Jordan. Isis against Egypt. Isis against Saudi Arabia. This is all
Sunni-on-Sunni, with Sunni fundamentalists trying to construct an
Islamic caliphate at the expense of traditional Muslim states.
The second conflict is Sunni-Shia, the continuation of a succession
crisis following the death of the prophet that began in 632. Here we
have the so-called Shia Crescent--Iran, much of Iraq, the Alawites in
Syria, and Hezballah in Lebanon--against the Sunni monarchies and
states like Egypt. The worst of the current violence we are seeing,
like the horrific mosque bombings in Yemen, reflect this conflict. And
I think we will see this conflict becoming more dominant and more
violent as we go forward.
The third conflict is the challenge of reconciling Islam with what
we in the West call modernity. I want to avoid cultural arrogance here,
Mr. Chairman, since Christendom went through a similar crisis in the
17th Century. And at the end of the Thirty Years War then, we in Europe
broadly decided to separate the sacred from the secular in our
political cultures. I know that that is an oversimplification, but it
is instructive. That outcome has led to a growth of religious tolerance
that has characterized the best of Western life since. It remains to be
seen whether or not another great monotheism, Islam, will follow this
same arc or if religion there will remain the business of state or--in
its extreme form--replace the state.
The common thread across these three conflicts is Islam. And
indeed, Richard Haass, the chairman of the Council on Foreign
Relations, has compared the current conflict in the Levant to Europe's
Thirty Years War. I fear that he is correct and what we are seeing here
will last a generation or more.
I know that much has been made about recent administration comments
that what we really have here is a lack of opportunity and that these
issues could be solved by more jobs and better economic development.
There is actually truth to that. When at CIA I was fond of saying
that many jihadists join the movement for the same reasons that some
young Americans join the Crips and the Bloods. There is much here about
youthful alienation, the need to belong to something greater than self,
the search for meaningful identity. But it also matters what gang you
join. And this gang, at its senior levels, justifies its horrific
violence through references to the holy Quran.
This is fundamentally a struggle over ideas, and unfortunately it
is a struggle over which we, as largely a Judeo-Christian nation, have
only limited influence. We can try to set the conditions for success,
by empowering and protecting moderate voices, for example. We also have
to look to our own safety by resorting to force to kill or capture
those already committed to doing us violence.
But over the long term, the only solution lies within Islam itself.
Here, the recent speech by President Sisi of Egypt to the scholars al
Azhar University, the seat of Sunni scholarship, is most encouraging.
In essence, the president told the theologians that they have to get
their act together and correct and discredit what he views to be gross
misinterpretations of Islamic scripture by the jihadists.
Sisi also attended Mass and wished his Coptic fellow citizens Merry
Christmas.
President Sisi is an observant, pious Muslim so his words and his
actions should carry some weight and offer us some hope.
Mr. Chairman, there is a lot more to be said about this topic and I
look forward to the committee's questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, General. The Chairman now
recognizes Mr. Mudd.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP MUDD, SENIOR FELLOW, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
Mr. Mudd. Thank you. I was calculating that I think I sat
through maybe 2,000 threat briefings between 2001 and 2010 at
the FBI and CIA, so let me sketch that story and bring it to
today. Those first briefings I sat in, we had an adversary, an
enemy that was geographically concentrated, Afghanistan,
Pakistan. We had a clear partner, that was largely the
Pakistanis, extending to people like the Saudis, but a lot of
the action was in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Recruitment by the adversary was done personally. The 19
hijackers had personal interaction, either themselves or with
their partners within al-Qaeda organization, and we owned the
data. Silicon Valley didn't.
Let's transition quickly. If you look at the intervening
years, we went from Afghanistan and Pakistan. I remember the
threat briefings about the beheading of an American in Saudi
Arabia back in about 2003. We had attacks against tourists and
embassies in Indonesia back in that time frame. We transitioned
to foreign fighters going into Iraq.
I moved to the Bureau. We had Somali kids, first-generation
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, going out to Somalia. We went back
to Iraq and today we talk about Nigeria. So the geographic
space has changed radically in the 14 years.
Let me take you back to the story of the threat table and
transition to where we are today and draw a contrast. We don't
have a geographic location. We have got Africa, we have got
Tunisia, we have got Somalia, Yemen, Iraq. The Indonesians and
the Filipinos have done okay, but I am not sure they will do
okay forever.
We don't have a single partner. We have got partners in
Mali and Cameroon, in Nigeria. We have got partners in the
African Union. We have lost partners in Yemen, so the
partnerships are going to change radically as the geography and
the adversary changes.
The adversary is recruiting not personally but digitally.
We did not face this at the threat table in 2001, 2002, 2003.
We didn't. We don't own the data. PayPal does, Google does,
Verizon does.
So let me offer you a suggestion, a handful of suggestions
on how we handle not only a conflict that has changed rapidly
in the story that I just told you but a conflict that I can
tell you as an expert analyst, I don't know where it is going
to go tomorrow. Anybody who says here is the geographic space
and here is the partner in 2016, throw them out. They don't
know.
No. 1, we are going to have to be agile. Look at what the
French did in Mali a few years ago. Small footprint, special
forces, intelligence support, partnership with local security
services, and think about bringing in the CIA and the military
to talk about not where the geography is--we don't know--but
how do we ensure they are enabled for rapid movement against a
rapid adversary?
When you do that, let me caution you, there is going to be
human rights problems. If you think that is theoretical, we
deal with it today in Iraq and we are dealing with it in
Nigeria. These are the partners who are fighting the
adversaries. These partners are dirty and the partners of the
future will be. So when we think about enabling them, we are
going to step into it.
Next, and let me close on this. The cyber issue, which I
know is critically important to a lot of you, and in the past
few years I have been out of Government and talked to the cyber
folks, talked to Silicon Valley. Not only do we not own the
data, the U.S. Government is not well-positioned, nor will it
ever be, to own a conversation in a democratic society about a
religion that is not part of our Judeo-Christian heritage. We
don't own the concepts. Furthermore, I don't think we have the
agility to respond to an adversary that moves as quickly as
this adversary does.
I think we need a different engagement in the digital
space. None of this engagement, in my view, should be led by
the U.S. Government. It should be enabled by the U.S.
Government. Let me give you two examples.
The scenarios I see for recruitment on the internet. A 15-
year-old girl, for example in Denver, talks to somebody on
Facebook, maybe sees something on Twitter, maybe sees something
in Instagram. The scenarios we worry about there, the age of
the child, the travel routes, the way data moves, the way that
individual interacts with the internet. We should be creating
scenarios that we talk about with the owners of the data in
Silicon Valley. What I am talking about is having working
groups and saying, this is what we are seeing in the digital
space. You own the space. What would you recommend we do and
what are you worried about in terms of law and policy?
``What should we do?'' is the question that we should be
posing to Silicon Valley and not necessarily telling them how
we are going to resolve this.
Finally, when we fight this I think we should be enabling
people who are already in this space. Let me give you one
example. Women are powerful in this game because families are
being destroyed. Increasingly those women have smart phones. If
you look at smart phone usage and how smart phone usage will
change in the Arabian Peninsula, in north Africa, remarkable.
We should be talking also to NGOs, for example, about how
we open doors in places like Africa and Central Asia. Bring in
Yahoo, bring in Twitter. What do you need to do to ensure that
women get on-line and start talking about how violence is
destroying families? I am not saying that is the only solution.
All I am saying is in the examples I gave you in the digital
space, the U.S. Government doesn't own the data and they don't
own the action.
Just a few thoughts. I think I am 1 second over.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mudd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip Mudd
March 24, 2015
The terror battleground has undergone a revolution during the 14
years after the 9/11 attacks. Among the most significant changes
intelligence community agencies face are the rapid spread of the
physical geography of terrorism and the virtual geography of terror
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment.
When I returned to the CIA from a White House assignment in January
2002, the CIA Counterterrorist Center faced a clear terror target: The
architects of the 9/11 attacks. Most of those al-Qaeda terrorists fled
from Afghanistan to Pakistan--though some went to Iran--and their
geographic footprint was small; overall, the al-Qaeda organization was
not large. Before 9/11, though, the dissemination of the al-Qaeda
message had spread across the globe, as far afield as East Asia, North
Africa, and Western Europe. The methods of disseminating that message
had not yet entered the internet age. Today, like the rapid spread of
the locations in which al-Qaeda-inspired groups operate, the virtual
efforts by these groups have ridden the internet and social media wave.
What was once an al-Qaeda group is now an al-Qaedist revolution.
Both these stories, then--the physical reach of violent extremism
and its virtual influence--have changed, and they continue to evolve
quickly:
We do not have an adversary's leadership that operates
within one clearly-defined geographic area. The al-Qaedist
revolution, now morphed into the new and different ISIS
ideology, includes leadership and groupings in areas as far-
flung as northern Nigeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the
West.
We cannot target individuals who are radicalization nodes;
now, the nodes are virtual, difficult to trace, and easily
altered, sheltered, or moved by the adversary.
We can talk about the evolution of these changes and the emerging
virtual nodes, but we might consider focusing as well on how we respond
to them, in both the public and private sectors. Following are a few
questions we might consider discussing during the hearing on 24 March:
What kind of public/private partnerships might we consider
as we enter an era in which private companies--phone, internet,
shopping, and other digitally-driven firms--hold information
that can help locate, track, and apprehend adversaries?
How should the U.S. Government engage with NGOs and private-
sector companies in developing strategies to counter this
ideology? Should the Government lead or follow?
Thank you for inviting me to the hearing. I look forward to the
conversation about the future of counterterrorism, and the future of
intelligence and Federal law enforcement in the digital age.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Jenkins is recognized.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISER TO THE RAND
PRESIDENT, THE RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson,
Members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me
to testify on this important issue. Right now the United States
confronts a complex and scary matrix of threats. I am going to
focus on the threats emanating from the groups in the Middle
East.
The civil wars in Syria and Iraq will continue. That is
going to sharpen the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias.
It is going to continue to threaten the stability of the
region, and it is going to continue to attract foreign
recruits. This goes on.
But neither the rebels arrayed against the Assad regime nor
the so-called Islamic State forces in Iraq are going to be able
to bring down the governments in Damascus or in Baghdad. But
neither government is going to be able to reestablish its
authority throughout its territory.
Meanwhile, the surrounding countries and the rest of the
world will be dealing with the consequences of these conflicts
for many years to come: Humanitarian catastrophe, massive
refugee populations, and what has become a terrorist factory.
Two galaxies of jihadist terrorism in the region represent
a threat to the U.S. homeland, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Although the
capability of al-Qaeda's core group itself to launch direct
attacks on the United States has diminished, al-Qaeda remains
committed to attacking us through its affiliates, its allies
and home-grown terrorists.
U.S. and British intelligence officials have recently
warned that al-Qaeda elements in Syria are also attempting to
recruit foreign fighters to mount terrorist attacks in the West
right now.
ISIL is a bit different. ISIL has murdered Westerners who
have fallen into its hands. It has urged its supporters to
carry out terrorist attacks in their own countries. It has
applauded them when they have done so. It continues to attract
large numbers of Western recruits.
The group right now is preoccupied with expanding and
defending its territory. However, ISIL could change its
strategy as it loses ground to U.S.-supported offensives.
Facing defeat, it could implement a revenge-driven strategy
aimed at provoking a final showdown.
Retaking the towns now held by ISIL is certain to be a long
and bloody struggle which could scatter fleeing foreign
fighters across the planet. Some Westerners will come home
seeking refuge or revenge.
Meanwhile, Western governments are faced with a continuing
flow of nationals to Syria while trying to intercept those
coming back, and that volume is growing.
The good news is that thus far comparatively few Americans
are involved in going off to Syria and Iraq, although that
number is already more than the total number that tried to go
to all of the other jihadists fronts since 9/11.
Western governments also have to deal with the threat of
action by frustrated home-grown jihadists who are unable to
travel to Syria. Now ISIL's use of deliberate barbaric forms of
violence, this resonates with a self-selecting audience of
people who are not repelled by such atrocities and may even
exert to participate. This is a dangerous bunch.
The last couple of years the terrorist jihad has been
distracted by the schism between al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State. The two wings of the jihadist movement have even engaged
in open warfare in Syria. But these internal divisions have
not--have not prevented the spread of jihadist ideology and the
establishment of new jihadist footholds. The emergence of the
two powerful jihadist adversaries with access to considerable
human and financial resources perpetuates the threat. The
recent attacks on Western tourists in Tunisia and on Shia
mosques in Yemen, both of which were claimed by ISIL,
underscore the danger.
Neither side exercises direct control over home-grown
jihadists. In fact, some Western jihadists welcome the split,
hoping that it will lead to a competition to see which can
carry out the more spectacular attacks. The ideology of violent
jihad is certainly going to continue. It is going to fuel these
regional conflicts while continued exhortation on the internet
and intensive media coverage of terrorist attacks like those in
Brussels, Ottawa, Sydney, Paris, and Copenhagen are going to
excite jihadist fanatics and what we might call jihadist loons.
The most likely threat right now to the United States
homeland comes from home-grown terrorists carrying out
unsophisticated but lethal assaults. Returning foreign fighters
add another layer to the threat, and although international
cooperation hopefully has made the terrorists' operating
environment a bit more hostile for them, still we have to be
willing to accept the risk of more ambitious attempts launched
on the United States from abroad. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT429.html.
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March 24, 2015
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important
issue.
Homeland security today confronts a complex and scary matrix of
threats that range from continued efforts to radicalize and recruit
home-grown terrorists to sophisticated cyber attacks on our financial
systems and critical infrastructure.
My testimony will focus on the terrorist threat emanating from the
conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Here are the key conclusions:
The civil wars in Syria and Iraq will continue, sharpening
the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias, threatening the
stability of the region, and attracting foreign recruits.
Neither the rebels arrayed against the Assad regime nor the
so-called Islamic State forces in Iraq will be able to bring
down the governments in Damascus or Baghdad. But neither
government will be able to reestablish its authority throughout
its territory.
For the foreseeable future, Syria will remain a mosaic of
ethnic and sectarian enclaves, some under government control,
others under rebel control. In Iraq, Iranian-backed Shia
militias augmented by regular Iraqi forces and some Sunni
militias may push back the Islamic State, but the central
government has relinquished military power to militias under
control of Iran, Shia clerics, or tribal sheikhs. The Iraqi
army is not the dominant member of this assemblage. The
territory controlled by Kurdish forces will remain autonomous,
if not formally independent. Winning back territory from the
Islamic State will not win the loyalty of Iraq's Sunnis.
Excesses by Shia militias will guarantee their continued
resistance.
The surrounding countries and the rest of the world will be dealing
with the consequences of these conflicts--humanitarian catastrophe,
massive refugee populations, and a terrorist factory--for many years to
come.
There are now two galaxies of jihadist terrorists in the region
that represent a credible threat to the U.S. homeland: Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates, particularly Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in
Yemen and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) in Syria, and the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL).
The al-Qaeda threat is a continuing one. Although the capability of
its core group to launch direct attacks on the United States--the ``far
enemy''--has diminished, al-Qaeda remains committed to attacking us
through its affiliates, allies, and home-grown terrorists. In the past,
AQAP has recruited volunteers and attempted terrorist attacks on U.S.-
bound flights and continues to try to inspire recruits to carry out
attacks in the United States. U.S. and British intelligence officials
warn that al-Qaeda elements embedded in al-Nusra are also attempting to
recruit foreign fighters to mount new terrorist attacks in the West.
ISIL presents a long-term threat. It has brutally murdered
Westerners who fell into its hands. It has urged its supporters in the
West to carry out terrorist attacks in their own countries and has
applauded them when they have done so. And it continues to attract
large numbers of Western recruits.
There is no evidence yet that ISIL is planning to launch its own
terrorist attacks in the West. It is currently preoccupied with
expanding and defending its territory, which is why it needs a
continuing flow of foreign volunteers. However, ISIL could change its
strategy as it loses ground to U.S.-supported ground offensives. Facing
defeat, it could implement a revenge-driven strategy calculated to
provoke direct American intervention and a final showdown.
Retaking the cities and towns now held by ISIL is almost certain to
be a long, bloody struggle, which could easily turn into a slaughter
that scatters fleeing foreign fighters across the planet. Some will
join other jihadist fronts; Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus
are possibilities. Some Westerners will seek refuge--or revenge--at
home.
Meanwhile, Western governments, including the United States, are
faced with the continued flow of their nationals to Syria and Iraq
while trying to intercept those coming back, possibly to carry out
individual acts of terrorism. This has already occurred, albeit on a
small scale, in Europe.
European authorities are already being overwhelmed by the volume of
persons traveling to and from Syria. Thus far, the number of Americans
involved appears to be manageable with current resources and laws,
although that number is growing. According to official estimates,
between 130 and 150 Americans have gone to or attempted to go to Syria
in the past 3 years--already more than the total number that have gone
to or tried to go to all of the other jihadist fronts since 9/11, a few
more than 100.
Western governments must also deal with the threat of action by
frustrated home-grown jihadists who are inspired by al-Qaeda's or
ISIL's exhortations to action but who are unable to travel to Syria.
ISIL's claimed re-creation of the Caliphate has galvanized extremists
world-wide. ISIL has also effectively exploited social media to reach a
large and impressionable audience.
ISIL's use of deliberately barbaric forms of violence--mass
executions, beheadings, crucifixions, burning people alive--resonates
with a unique, self-selecting audience of people who are not repelled
by such atrocities and may even seek to participate in them. Intensive
media coverage of terrorist attacks like those in Brussels, Ottawa,
Sydney, Paris, and Copenhagen or of stabbings or driving automobiles
into crowds provide further incitement to jihadist fanatics and
jihadist loons.
Since the latter part of 2013, the terrorist jihad has been
distracted by the schism between the supporters of al-Qaeda and the
supporters of the Islamic State. Competition between these groups'
leaderships for pledges of loyalty and expressions of support
continues. Open warfare between the two factions has occurred in Syria.
Victory by one over the other seems unlikely. The jihadist movement
will always be subject to centrifugal forces, but the current split may
or may not persist.
The internal divisions have not prevented the spread of jihadist
ideology and establishment of new jihadist footholds, whether these
display al-Qaeda's black standard or the logo of the Islamic State.
Beyond Syria and Iraq lies a complex landscape of shifting loyalties.
In addition to AQAP in Yemen and al-Nusra in Syria, al-Qaeda counts
on its Somali affiliate, al-Shabaab, and its North African affiliate,
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (or AQIM), which has some presence in
Tunisia. Al Murabitun is a splinter group of AQIM operating in the
Sahel. In late 2014, al-Qaeda established a new front in India, calling
it al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS.
Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia (the two are distinct
organizations) remain unaffiliated, although some of their members have
declared their loyalty to the Islamic State, which has been recruiting
from various al-Qaeda and independent groups. An estimated 3,000
Tunisians and over 500 Libyans are reportedly fighting in Syria and
Iraq.
Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar al Maqdis or Ansar Jerusalem,
operating in Egypt's Sinai desert, have both pledged loyalty to the
Islamic State, as have some disgruntled Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.
The recent attack on Western tourists in Tunisia and explosions at
Shia mosques in Yemen, both of which were claimed by the Islamic State,
along with the closing of American diplomatic facilities in Saudi
Arabia, underscore the danger posed by the spread of jihadist ideology
and radicalizing role of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.
Despite the poaching of recruits and mustering oaths, in fact, the
feud between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has little relevance
outside of the war zone in Syria. Neither side in the internal quarrel
exercises direct control over home-grown jihadists, where the push for
action comes as much from the bottom as it does from the top. Some
Western jihadists even welcome the split, hoping that it will lead to
competition between the two wings of the movement to see which can
carry out more spectacular attacks in the West.
Both al-Qaeda and ISIL believe that communications are as important
as the armed struggle. Both have effectively exploited the internet,
al-Qaeda in a more controlled manner and ISIL using social media. We
have never really abated the power of the message coming from al-Qaeda,
and now ISIL, through its actions and communications, has amplified
that message to inspire a broader audience. That message will continue
to spread and fuel instability in regional conflicts.
There is, nonetheless, good news--in that neither al-Qaeda nor ISIL
has achieved more than limited success in persuading Americans to join
their version of jihad. The terrorist organizations have not been able
to build a deep reservoir of support here; there have been few
terrorist plots, and thus far there is no exodus of U.S. volunteers
going to Syria.
The most likely threat to U.S. homeland security therefore comes
from home-grown terrorists carrying out unsophisticated, but lethal,
attacks. As we have seen in the terrorist assaults at Fort Hood, Paris,
and Tunis, or numerous non-terrorist shootings in the United States, a
pair of gunmen, or even just one, can cause serious casualties. Over
the long term, we cannot exclude the possibility of more ambitious
plots, although domestic intelligence efforts have been remarkably
successful.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. The Chairman now
recognizes myself for questions. I look back--the President's
campaign narrative was to end the war in Iraq and Afghanistan
and shut down Guantanamo. We were so quick to withdraw out of
Iraq, we failed to negotiate a status of forces agreement and
the political malfeasance with the Prime Minister Maliki and
his purging of the Sunni tribes, those two factors coupled
together I think created the formation of ISIS.
I think this President has had a hard time getting his head
wrapped around, how could this have happened under my watch?
How could ISIS have happened? Now we have seen the
establishment of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria and we are also
seeing what I call forward operating bases now in northern
Africa and throughout the Middle East.
We are seeing the rapid destabilization. We saw that in
Yemen. It happened in Libya. We saw Tunisia being hit, and it
is all throughout northern Africa, including when we had to
shut down our embassies temporarily in Saudi Arabia.
This is alarming to me, and I agree with the Speaker that
we are currently losing this war. But I always think the first
premise when you fight a war, and it is, is to define the enemy
to defeat them. Yet the President fails to call it what it is,
and that is radical Islamist extremism.
Mr. Speaker can you tell me why some discount that, that it
is just not important? General Hayden, I think you talked about
the house of Abraham. I saw the structure of his house in Iraq
and the three major religions coming out of that house, I hope
one day we can coexist peacefully. It may not happen in my
lifetime but I want it to happen in my children's lifetime. But
it is theologically-based.
So Mr. Speaker, can you tell me why that is so important?
Mr. Gingrich. Thank you. I think the core thing to
understand here, and this goes way beyond the current
administration. This was also true under President Bush. We had
a fundamental misunderstanding of our enemies from Day 1. This
is a movement. It is not an organization. You can't take Cold
War models of the Communist Party structure, just as you can't
take Western models of state-to-state conflict.
This movement has been out there. You can argue when it
should start. I am actually thinking about trying to put
together a course on this. Because you can argue it starts with
Khomeini coming back from Paris and issuing his book on Islamic
governance. You can argue that it starts with the war in
Afghanistan and people like the mujahedin becoming more and
more radicalized.
You can argue it starts with the Muslim Brotherhood and the
degree to which their leadership right after World War II was
deeply offended by the West. I mean, they come in a room like
this, they see women sitting here, they know this is sinful,
they know this is evil and they say so.
They go back and they say, look, we are being destroyed.
When Khomeini said we were the great Satan, he really meant our
cultural system was a direct assault on everything he believed
in. We don't understand, this is a movement. You know, ISIS
didn't exist 2\1/2\ years ago. So the focus now on ISIS is just
one more example of the American model of bunchball, where we
all rush to the latest thing and then we are going to focus on
Boko Haram and then we will focus on al-Shabab. The fact is,
there is a world-wide movement. It is connected by religious
fanaticism. It exists in both a physical and cultural warfare
model. None of that is permitable in the current American
governing structure. You can't have this conversation in the
Executive branch. I think it means we have--and this is not
about Obama. We as a country have a huge problem because we
can't even describe who opposes us.
Chairman McCaul. General Hayden, we pulled our embassy out
of Yemen. With that goes a great degree of our intelligence
footprint capability, as you know as former director of the
CIA, NSA. The special forces now are withdrawing.
AQAP, one of the biggest threats to the United States in
terms of external operations, five plots in recent years,
including the Christmas day bomber, responsible also for the
Paris attacks. These are the ones, when you say who was most
likely hit the United States, it is always AQAP. Yet now we are
completely withdrawing so they can operate with impunity.
My concern, and quite frankly, sir, given your experience,
is the lack of coverage that we are going to have now, lack of
ability to know what is going on on the ground and a lack or
inability to attack AQAP before they can attack us. Can you
comment on that?
General Hayden. I can, Mr. Chairman. I can imagine what is
going on at Langley now as they try to recover or at least
sustain some of the things that had been going on in Yemen.
Your question is fundamentally about the physical pressure we
were able to maintain on al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We
had two broad thrusts there I think. One was cooperating with
the Yemeni government and using their forces to create that
kind of physical pressure. Well, that government no longer
exists so that is off the table.
We had our own forces there largely through targeted
killings. Targeted killings require exquisite intelligence and
there is no secret sauce there. It is fabric that is created
out of all varieties and streams of intelligence collection.
So let's look now at what is our capacity to continue
targeted killings. Tactical intelligence will continue. I
suspect it will be a little degraded but pretty much stays in
place. Liaison with the government in Yemen, that is gone.
Then finally, the human sources, which are really critical
in making sure you are being very correct when you apply
violence with this kind of precision. The human source networks
will continue but I suspect they will erode over time because
of our lack of physical presence in the country. So I think the
overall assessment is the physical pressure we had on al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula is reduced and, barring something like
a return, it will continue to erode as we go forward.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, and I would submit it is also
true in Libya and in Syria today. I am very concerned about
this.
The Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Mr. Speaker, let me say
how I appreciate your historical analysis of how we got to
where we are today, and the fact that rather than just blame
President Obama, you talked about the broader perspective.
General Hayden, let me say how I appreciate you
understanding the fact that when a situation is bad that
sometimes we have to take our men and women out of a situation,
reassess, and come back with a different strategy. All our
brave people do a wonderful job, but at some point if
situations become intolerable, you have to retreat for an
alternate strategy.
So I think my concern is for you, sir, is based on what I
have heard from the testimony, it is absolutely imperative that
we identify what allies we have left in the region, that we
create some kind of a strategy to address this in a broader
fashion because their enemy is our enemy and we have to
convince our allies that that is what we have to do. Obviously
we are going to have to have a significant burden with that
task. I understand that.
General, can you tell me if that strategy of working with
our allies is still a good strategy going forward?
General Hayden. It is, Congressman, and even if it has its
failings, in many cases there are few and sometimes no other
options available. So we have eroded the cooperation with the
Yemeni government now, which has ceased to function. We have
very strong relationships with the Saudi government, whose
interest in Yemen is at least as strong as ours, and so I am
sure that we are deepening the liaison relationship with them
as well.
Phil mentioned the importance of liaison in our past
successful efforts, but the fact is we are going to have to be
very agile. Frankly, and I don't mean to refer to the Saudis in
this light, but frankly begin to cooperate with some folks in
an ideal world we would rather not have on our side because of
the great threat posed by the extremists right now.
One other thing I would mention, Congressman, is on that
decision to remove the forces, Special Forces from Yemen, to
evacuate the embassy, I feel as if I have no right or grounds
to second-guess that decision. That is kind of like the field
commander has got to call it as he sees it. People like us,
like me just support the field commander making that decision.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Speaker, you want to comment on whether
working with allies is still a good strategy in this fight
against terrorism?
Mr. Gingrich. I think working with allies is the only
strategy that will work. I mean almost all of our successful
wars, whether it is World War II, or the Cold War, we have
always tried to surround ourselves with allies.
The fact is, in some cases--I mean it is unfortunate right
now that, for example, the administration is not doing more to
reinforce el-Sisi, who is the President of Egypt, and who has
taken exactly the right position on the need to reform Islamic
views to make them more modern.
But I also want to reemphasize something which has been
said by several people up here. We are going to have a lot--we
are going to have allies that make us uncomfortable. We are
going to have allies that don't fit the test of exact purity.
Let me just be a little controversial since I used to serve up
here.
You know it would be really helpful for the Congress to go
to the agencies and find out, what are the things Congress has
imposed over the last 40 years that make agility impossible?
What are the things Congress has imposed that make working with
difficult allies very dangerous?
I mean we have managed to set a standard of purity which
cripples us in dealing with this. We have managed to set a
standard of bureaucracy, which virtually guarantees we won't be
agile. Congress is going to have to reform those things because
they are written into the law.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Jenkins, with the time I have left, do
you see the lone-wolf scenario as a clear and present danger
for us here in this country?
Mr. Jenkins. First of all, I despise the term lone wolf. I
just think that it romanticizes and elevates these adversaries.
I have always instead used the term stray dogs. That is not to
be insulting, but the problem we face is you know you--it is
very, very difficult to predict dangerousness.
We have these people that are on the internet. They are
barking. They are snapping. They are exhorting each other to
action. To try to figure out which one is going to bite is
very, very difficult.
I mean and so this is a problem we have. As these volumes
of home-grown and foreign fighters increase, that just
increases the problem overall.
Thus far we have been really fortunate here in that in the
United States, in terms of Americans getting involved in this,
we have had a number of dangerous people. But the numbers are
nowhere comparable to what we see taking place in Europe. That
is the good news.
The second part of the good news is that these plots, many
of them have been remarkably amateurish and have been--there is
a reason for that. That is because a lot of them are one-offs.
These are not terrorist groups that are able to carry on
continued operations.
I mean in the 1970s we were dealing with 50 to 60 terrorist
bombings a year in this country. But that was carried out by
groups, whether on the far left or far right or motivated by
foreign quarrels. They carried on those campaigns. They started
out as incompetent. Over a period of time they learned how to
do it and got better. We don't have that now.
The third piece of good news is that our domestic
intelligence, while still not optimal, has been extremely
effective in identifying and breaking up a lot of these plots.
So we do face some dangers. But thus far we have been able
to contain this at, as I say, a much lower level than we are
seeing abroad. That doesn't mean that one--two persons or even
one person getting hold of a gun can't be a lethal opponent and
carry out an attack that would create alarm and reactions in
this country that would go far beyond even the actual
casualties.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Chairman recognizes Mr. Smith from Texas.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield my time to
the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe, and happy to have him
ask questions.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank the gentleman. I would like to thank
the witnesses here for giving testimony today and being willing
to discuss what I think is perhaps the most critical topic of
our day. I say that as a former U.S. attorney and as a former
terrorism prosecutor who has seen and learned first-hand the
gravity of the threat that violent Islamic extremism poses to
the United States and to the rest of the world.
I have also seen where President Obama has recently
declared that al-Qaeda is on the run. He of course has mocked
ISIS as the junior varsity. He in fact refuses to use the word
Islam and terrorism in the same sentence.
In short, I think that the administration's approach is
making our efforts to defend and defeat this threat even more
difficult. I think that this is underscored by the fact, and
reflected in the fact that we have now been forced to pull out
of Syria. We have been forced to pull out of Libya. We have
been forced to pull out of Yemen.
So my first question to you, Speaker Gingrich, is: Has the
pull-out in Syria, Libya, and Yemen compromised, in your
opinion, our ability to intercept Islamic terrorist threats as
they develop?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, I would say two things. One--and I
would be interested in the comments of other folks up here at
this table who have much more professional background in this.
I think it is a very different environment than anything we
historically analyzed.
Remember, ISIS is actually serving as a magnet to draw
thousands of people. I just saw a study of where ISIS tweets
come from and the U.S. ranks fourth, far above Pakistan, far
above even Jordan. The number of people who are tweeting have
been in favor of ISIS.
So you have a very different kind of environment now. I
would say that what is happening in part is that you are
having--and this by the way, people at the CIA were warning me
about as early as December 2001. But what you are having is an
attractiveness for people who are alienated and who are looking
for some meaning in their life.
So even if you tomorrow morning could crush ISIS part of
the result might be that you would send 10,000 foreign fighters
back home who would actually spread the virus. We need to think
of this as an epidemiology problem. This is not a statecraft
problem.
I would say that clearly, I mean the fact that we have
closed our embassy in Saudi Arabia out of fear for physical
safety should be a wake-up call to everybody in this country.
The Saudis are very tough. If they are worried enough that we
are closing the embassy, even though temporarily, I think there
are things under way that are dangerous.
To not understand we have a two-front war. You have the
Iranians who are the leading sponsor of state terrorism, and
you have a Sunni-based terrorism. They are both our mortal
enemies. They both would be happy to destroy us. We have no
strategy for either one right now.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
General Hayden, I would be interested in your insights on
the same question.
General Hayden. Sure. It is the closure of embassies and
consulates both cause and effect here, all right. It is the
effect of our losing control of the situation. It is also the
cause of our losing control of the situation. As we withdraw
and that footprint on the ground goes away, we just have a
lower level of knowledge of the situation there.
I would add an additional thought. I will try to use the
language of the region. When we go about closing embassies and
not having diplomatic presence and so on, we look weak.
The concept of the strong horse and the weak horse is a
very important concept in this part of the world. So we appear
to be a nation in retreat when we take these kinds of steps, in
addition to the concrete operational effects that it has.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, general. I would like to ask you
another question because in a recent piece that you wrote for
the Washington Times earlier this month you noted that the
administration and its negotiating partners have conceded
Iran's right to enrich through this process.
You quoted Henry Kissinger, saying that the administration
has decided to ``manage rather than prevent nuclear
proliferation.'' My question is simply this: I would like your
insight on the broader impact of this nuclear agreement with
respect to future--our ability to affect future counter
proliferation efforts.
General Hayden. I think it has a dark effect on it,
Congressman. A couple of things come to mind. No. 1, a
struggling, at best, regional power, it would have just stared
down the world and six of the most powerful nations on the
planet and has now been allowed to have an industrial strength
nuclear program. An awful lot of other countries are going to
school on that. So I think the effects globally are bad.
The effects locally are bad because I don't think the Sunni
states, and the speaker has emphasized this Sunni-Shia split
may be becoming the defining flavor of this violence. I don't
think the Sunnis will let that stand without a response on
their part.
Then finally, when you get this agreement, despite the fact
that all the other characteristics of Iran--let's even say it
is successful, all right, which might be problematic. All the
other defining characteristics of Iranian states, whether of
terrorism, regional hegemony, moving into Iraq and so on, all
that stays in place. But they are no longer the international
outlaw that they once were. With the signing of this agreement
they become more or less a normal country, which makes all
these other factors even worse.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, general.
I have questions for all of the witnesses. I wish I had
more time to ask them. I again want to thank you all for being
here. This is, again, a vitally important issue. Your testimony
is going to be critical in forming our opinions going forward
on this committee. Thank you for being here. I will thank the
gentlemen again and yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hayden, particularly in your testimony you talked
about the Shia-Sunni divide. The current head of ISIS is Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi takes his name from Abu Bakr, who was
a companion of the Prophet Muhammad. He was not a prophet
himself, but also the father-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. He
was the first caliph in Val Nasser's ``The Shia Revival.''
He talks about the divide between Shia and Sunni in that in
certain parts of the Middle East Sunnis believe that Shia are
apostates, they are nonbelievers. He also believes that--some
believe that Shias have tails.
I just want to deal with what we have today within the
historical context of what we know only too well. We were told
that there would be an international response to degrade and
destroy ISIS. We were told that this coalition would consist of
62 countries, including many of the 22-member Arab League
nations. Look at the record. From the air last month General
Lloyd Austin said that 8,500 ISIS militants were killed by
coalition air strikes in Iraq and Syria.
To date, coalition forces conducted 1,631 airstrikes in
Iraq; 1,551 or 70 percent were conducted by the United States.
Coalition forces conducted 1,262 airstrikes in Syria; 1,169 or
93 percent were carried out by the United States.
Of the 1,262 coalition airstrikes in Syria, only 84 were
conducted by Arab nations of Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates combined. None of the Arab nations are
conducting airstrikes in Iraq. Where is the international
coalition, including the Arab League?
The United States has also provided $2.9 billion in
humanitarian aid to Syria, far more than anybody else. The
United States continues to provide record humanitarian and
development assistance to Iraq.
Let's move to the ground. The CIA estimates that there are
31,000 ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria. ISIS controls Iraq's
second-largest city of Mosul with between 1,000 and 2,000
fighters embedded there.
Mosul has a population of a million people. We are told
that to retake Mosul we need between 20,000 and 25,000 Iraq and
Kurdish forces that will be required to clear block-by-block
ISIS from Mosul after United States air strikes are conducted
there.
United States spent $26 billion to build a 250,000-member
Iraqi army. The first test of the Iraqi army was against ISIS
last July. The Iraqi army folded, to put it mildly.
Also, there are by some estimates between 400,000 and
800,000 Shia militias supporting the Iraqi army today. The
problem is they have a sectarian goal, not a nationalist goal.
Those militias are directed by a guy by the name of Qasem
Soleimani. Soleimani is the commander of the Quds Force in Iran
who is now on the ground in Iraq.
Further, earlier this year the new Prime Minister Abadi
announced a major assistance plan for Kurdistan consisting of
17 percent of all Iraq's oil revenues in perpetuity, and $1
billion to support the Kurdish army, the Peshmerga. Peshmerga
are an experienced and effective fighting force of some
180,000.
Now we are told that we might need American troops on the
ground in addition to the 3,000 that we currently have there.
Where is the international coalition? Where is the Arab League?
So, the math just doesn't add up. You got between 400,000
and 800,000 Shia militias supported by our guy in Iraq. You got
180,000 Peshmerga who just did an oil revenue and military
support deal with our guy in Iraq.
Then you have the Iraqi army who ran last year from ISIS.
Now we are told because of a change in government for a few
months they now have the will and the skill to fight ISIS. My
concern is this: 1.3 million Iraq fighters should be able to
retake Mosul of 1,000 or 2,000 ISIS fighters. They should be
able to take on 31,000 estimated ISIS fighters in Iraq and
Syria.
Without a clear national agenda, not a sectarian one, we
may be looking at deploying American troops into what
potentially will be a second civil war, in the same decade,
essentially alone again.
See, in that part of the world where there is no political
center you only have sides. While the overlay is that the
American presence is vitally important to defeat ISIS, and we
have demonstrated clearly a willingness to do that and to
commit resources to it.
But in that part of the world there is also not only the
morning after, but the morning after the morning after. As the
Speaker said, you know they are just waiting to get ISIS out of
there so they can have their civil war. That is the dilemma
that we are dealing with.
I took a lot of time for the question. I apologize for not
leaving a lot of time for the answer.
General Hayden. Just a couple of comments come to mind,
Congressman. First of all, with regard to the American
footprint, I don't think anyone responsible is calling for
American combat brigades to be maneuvering in the Syrian or
Iraqi desert again. But I do think our rules of engagement make
our current deployment less effective than it would otherwise
be.
We don't allow our forces to go forward below brigade
echelon levels, which means that they don't stiffen the local
forces. It is more difficult to call in precise tactical
airstrikes. We don't have our own reach out and touch people
arm with regard to American Special Forces.
With regard to the Peshmerga, they are very large, actually
quite good. I actually think they are our best friends in the
region. But they have largely been a checkpoint army. They have
been responsible for local security. So there is a transition
there, not just with training but with equipment.
You mentioned the Sunni-Shia divide. Absolutely. Right now,
as I think you suggested, what we have are Shia militias under
Iranian officers attempting to retake Tikrit, an overwhelmingly
Sunni town. That is not part of the solution. That is a
continuation of the problem. I think we should judge it to be
that way.
Then finally with boots on the ground, sooner or later we
will need boots on the ground. My sense is we are going to have
to have Sunni feet in those boots from one country or many from
the region. Otherwise it will be for naught.
Chairman McCaul. Gentleman's time is expired. Mr. King is
recognized.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
Speaker, it is always good to see you back.
General Hayden, my first question would be to you.
Congressman Ratcliffe mentioned Iran and also the op-ed that
you wrote the other day. As I understand the press reports,
negotiators are seeking a verification spectrum regime that
would keep Iran a year away from enriching enough fissile
material to make a bomb.
You stated in the op-ed that the 1-year breakout time may
not be sufficient to detect and reverse Iranian violations. Can
you expand on that and say why you believe the verification
regime may not be sufficient?
General Hayden. Yes, sir. First of all, a year looks like a
long period of time and from some aspects it is.
I co-authored that with Olli Heinonen from the IAEA. So
Olli brought his knowledge of how things work in Vienna. I
brought my background with how things work in the American
intelligence community.
We gamed it out. We didn't take a long time before we began
to figure out scenarios in which it would be very difficult to
mobilize action within a 12-month period.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, you have got the distance
between flash and bang. You have got from the Iranian violation
to the first detection of the Iranian violation, which may be a
considerable period of time. You go from the first detection to
building up a body of evidence that you can convince the
American Government that what you have got here is a very
serious problem.
I can only imagine, Congressman, what the burden of proof
is going to look like if whether director of National
intelligence goes into the Oval Office and says, Mr. President
we have got a real issue here.
After the President has decided that we have got a real
issue here, he has got to take it to the international
community because, as you well know, as this thing is rolling
out it is going to be the Security Council that is going to
validate this agreement.
So to un-validate this agreement will require us going
first to Vienna to get the international inspectors to look at
that which we suspect. Then from Vienna to New York in order to
aggregate international action to give us sanction to take
whatever steps we think might be necessary.
You go to New York you are trying to convince the Russians
and the Chinese. So it is not hard to imagine scenarios in
which a year isn't enough to mobilize action that would truly
deter the Iranians from completing the break-out.
Mr. King. Thank you, general. Let me also--I would be
remiss if I didn't thank you for the--all the free advice and
counsel you have given me over the years. So thank you very
much. Let me ask--I guess starting with Newt and going across.
It has been mentioned that General Sisi has really stepped
forward as a moderate Muslim speaking to secular-type
interpretation. If each of the four of you can comment on the
fact that we are denying weapons systems right now to President
Sisi. Any of you? Newt? Mr. Speaker, excuse me.
Mr. Gingrich. I think this administration is almost 180
degrees off in reality about what is going on in Egypt. The
Muslim Brotherhood is our enemy, not our friend. Yet the State
Department meets with the Muslim Brotherhood.
El-Sisi, who may not represent everything you would like in
good government, does represent a very long Egyptian tradition
that has been very hostile to radical Islamists, and is very
much desirous of being an ally of the United States. I think we
should be doing everything we can to strengthen him and to
reinforce his legitimacy.
Because as General Hayden said, you would like him to look
like the strong horse, not the weak horse. You would like
people to think gee, if you are an ally of the United States
the world gets better, it doesn't get worse. The administration
is almost precisely opposite what it should be in reality.
General Hayden. I would add to that very briefly, look, I
was made uncomfortable by what the general did in the year or
so after he took power from Mohamed Morsi. There are too many
people in jail and there are too many journalists in jail.
But all that said, we talked about, you know, we don't get
to pick all of our partners in this war, despite discomfort
with some of the things he has done, he is going to be one of
the more acceptable partners in this conflict.
I see every advantage in our repairing our relationship
with him.
Mr. King. Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. If you look at some of the successes in recent
years, it is groups of governments, I am thinking of the
African Union in Somalia. I think the Nigerians will have a lot
of success against Boko with Cameroon, Mali, et cetera.
I think Sisi has the opportunity, when you are looking at a
place like Libya, to give us a local partner so that we don't
have to either wait for nothing to happen or intervene
ourselves.
That said, let's talk about a very simple choice. When you
have the transition after the Arab revolutions, you have the
choice between elections that lead to Islamists who cause
problems, and support for authoritarian regimes that will fight
Islamists and favor U.S. interests, but will not lead to one
man-one vote.
So do you want security or do you want democracy? They are
not mixing well after the 2011 revolutions.
Mr. King. You mentioned Libya, should we have given Egypt
more support when they took action in Libya? Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. I think so. Again, I am just a practitioner who
looks at where we succeed. There are some questions about the
fact that there was a lack of Arab support despite the sort of
papering over of what is going on in Iraq, in other words, not
a lot of Arab action there.
I think the Egyptians have a lot of options for us in
Libya. I would suggest if we do that we bring in some other
players so it is not just us and Egypt.
Mr. King. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. I think you have to put the events in Iran and
the events in Egypt together. On the one hand, as Iran edges
closer to acquisition of a nuclear weapon, or the perception
that it is about to have one, that is--that gives them three
things.
It is a scepter of power. It is a potential deterrent that
makes going against them in the future more difficult. But more
importantly, it emboldens a more aggressive policy of backing
subversion because they think they now have protection and can
get away with it.
At the same time, if you look at our relationship with
Egypt, we have demonstrated a degree of unreliability, not to
say fecklessness in terms of there.
Those two things affect everyone's calculations in the
region. These are practical people. Apart from the ideology-
driven people, these are practical people who say, all right,
the Americans want us to do this, they want intelligence, they
want troops, they want us to participate in their coalition.
Now if we get in a jam, are the Americans going to be a
reliable partner that will back us up? Or are we going to get
lectures about democracy and other issues, which are not
unimportant to us, but, as I say, they are going to make those
kind of cold-blooded calculations because they have to survive
in a very rough neighborhood.
Mr. King. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman recognizes the gentlelady
from New York, Miss Rice.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hayden, you are the most experienced military
tactician on this panel. You are the primary decision maker
regarding America's strategy to combat violent Islamist
extremism.
Now putting aside the politics of how we got here, and in
the interest of coming up with real solutions, can you lay out
in detail what your game plan would be?
General Hayden. Well, that is a tall order, ma'am. But a
couple of----
Miss Rice. I have every confidence you can handle it.
[Laughter.]
General Hayden. A couple of high points: Let's look at ISIS
as kind of a close-in problem. I frankly think that our
strategy with regard to ISIS in Iraq is coherent. I think it is
under-resourced, all right. I don't think we are leaning
forward enough. We talked about rules of engagement, what we
allow our forces to do.
So there I would double-down. I would particularly double-
down on the Kurds as a reliable partner.
I don't see coherence yet in our strategy with regard to
ISIS in Syria. We are keeping their heads down. We are rooting
their capacity. We are making them less rich than they used to
be, therefore less capable.
But I don't think anything we are doing yet there in anyway
fits into the decisive column. So there I think we need to do
some heavier lifting, forces on the ground so that we actually
have kind of a hammer and anvil with air power and ground
forces.
I would also reinvestigate why it is we keep the regime off
the table in terms of people we include to be our enemy there.
So that is with regard to ISIS. We also have kinetic
activity we have talked about in Somalia, in Yemen, again,
degrading those folks who are already convinced they want to
come kill us.
Ma'am, the most serious problem I see is the production
rate of people who want to come kill us in 3, 5, or 10 years.
That gets back to the ideological issue that we have talked
about here.
There, it is a tough game. I can't--we were actually very
successful in the Bush administration with the close-in fight,
those folks already committed to come and kill us. We were not
nearly as successful with the deep fight, the ideological
fight. That still remains the one we have to do.
A very quick anecdote. I was President Obama's CIA chief
for 3 weeks. During one of those weeks we actually achieved an
operational act in the CIA that made America safer.
Rahm Emanuel came up and said, good on you, that is really
good stuff. I had the temerity to say to the President's chief
of staff, thank you very much, that is very kind, but you
understand, if we don't change the facts on the ground, we get
to do this forever.
We have to defend ourselves now, protect ourselves, buy
time, but then we have got to make use of that time on these
broader strategic issues.
Miss Rice. Thank you, General.
Mr. Jenkins, what is a greater threat to the United States,
the radicalization of Americans at home or the threat of
foreign fighters returning to the United States after becoming
radicalized in another country?
Mr. Jenkins. I am not recognized in the field of prophecy,
so I am not going to try to say which would--both of them are
simply different dimensions of the threat. As I said, thus far
despite an intensive campaign, at least by al-Qaeda, now this
is changing with the Islamic State.
But at least by al-Qaeda, they have made an intensive on-
line sales campaign. They haven't sold a lot of cars. That is
good news.
The Islamic State is different in that they have been--
whereas al-Qaeda's communications were much more centrally
directed and controlled through websites that favored them.
ISIS has made much greater use of social media, and
therefore it has reached a larger and younger audience who live
in that media environment, and has had a greater effect.
The real question here in the long run is, is that going to
really change enough of them or is this becoming kind of a
conveyor for youthful discontents and rebellion? I don't know
about 15-year-old girls from Colorado running off to some
romance with the desert version of Hannibal Lecter.
I mean, but----
Miss Rice. Well, why have they been more effective with
their messaging and their wooing of non-Americans rather than
Americans? Is the message different? Is the--what is----
Mr. Jenkins. It is interesting, when you look at the
individual biographies, they say where they are getting their
big numbers is out of Europe. There is no question there that
there are large unassimilated, marginalized immigrant
diasporas, whereas in the American community where certainly we
are a nation of immigrants as well, but we have been, and this
is good news for us, again, much more successful in
assimilating these people.
So if you look at the--at, for example, education levels of
the Americans who are being wooed into this, it is roughly the
equivalent of the same age educational level of the general
population.
What you find instead therefore you find much more
individual motives, someone feels their ``life sucks'': That is
a quote. They are--they feel insulted. There is--no question,
however uncomfortable that makes us, there is an element of
religious motivation in this. But it is added to senses of
anger, alienation, desire to do something meaningful,
participate in an epic adventure. If you, in contrast, go to
some of these other places where they are picking up a lot of
people, there you really see a--much more of a community-based
issue as opposed to an individual-based issue.
Now, as I say, with the ability through social media to
reach a much broader audience of young people, are they going--
is that going to remain virtual? I mean, as I said, al-Qaeda
has created an on-line virtual army; fortunately, it remains
mostly virtual.
Is ISIS going to get smarter at this and be able to
actually generate something beyond a lot of people tweeting and
doing other things? I am not sure. So far they are picking up
more people who intend or try to travel to Syria and Iraq.
So they are getting a bigger purchase on an audience than
we have seen before. That is a long-term concern.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
I will start with Mr. Mudd, if you could. Would you be able
to rate the current administration regarding home-grown
terrorism, radicalization here at home, and the things that we
have done to combat it or to deal with it in the macro and the
micro sense?
Assuming that you might have a divergent opinion, can you
contrast what would you do differently from what is currently
being done, if you can, on a macro sense, anyhow?
Mr. Mudd. Let me give you a few thoughts. I did serve on
loan from the CIA to the FBI for about 4\1/2\ years, so I
watched this from the inside. Operationally I think we do
pretty well. If you look at what we anticipated 14 years ago,
we got a lot less than we anticipated. When you are at the
threat table in 2001, 2002, and 2003 and somebody tells you we
will not suffer a catastrophic event in this country, you would
have said, no way. We did not understand the adversary.
In terms, and so, we could talk about operationally, but I
think the Bureau uses a lot of resources. I don't think it is
particularly efficient. That is not a criticism. It is just
because they are charged by people like you to make sure
nothing happens in this country. So we chased everybody we
could find with the resources we had when I was in the Bureau.
Ideologically, in terms of this fight on the internet, et
cetera, I don't think--this is not a comment on this White
House or the other. I am a practitioner and a servant. I am not
a politician. I don't think we do very well in this sphere
because we want to own it within Government.
I mentioned it earlier when I started speaking, I think
there is an opportunity to talk to the people who do own it.
For example, I don't want to get into specific companies, but I
have talked to some of the companies in this space, that is the
social media space. They don't really understand what the
adversary looks like. Therefore, they can't offer in my
judgment good guidance about how to chase the adversary.
I think they see the U.S. Government as telling them what
to do when we want their data, as opposed to saying here is
what the target looks like. California, Silicon Valley, can you
tell us how you want us to change the law so you can give us
data to hunt these folks? I don't think we enable them to get
out there and message.
So I don't think the U.S. Government generally and the
American system is very good at being agile and influencing the
way people think about Islamist ideology. I don't think we
should be that good. I think there are other people who would
be better. I would suggest that we ask, that we give them what
we are facing. I don't think you have to go into a secret
environment to do that. I could brief them today.
We tell them that this is what we are facing in the digital
world, Facebook, Yahoo, PayPal, all these guys. What would you
suggest we do? Let's talk about ideas before you get into
legislative changes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. Mr. Speaker, I have been a combatant
commander and I guarantee you that my troops knew what the
mission was and knew who the enemy was, and your testimony
particularly centered around the inability, the unwillingness
to identify the enemy. It doesn't just stay at the top. It
cascades down through the disparate organizations. I am
assuming you mean DHS as well.
So with your experience in Government and the whole-of-
Government, what do you think that this committee can do to
motivate, so to speak, DHS to identify the enemy? I mean, we
can't force them to do it. Then craft a policy regarding the
identification and the defeat of the enemy within the country,
if you would. What could this committee do?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, first of all, the Congress actually
could force a great deal. Now whether or not you get it signed
into law in the short run. But if you go back, the last time we
faced the kind of penetration we have now was in the 1930s and
1940s with the Soviets, and the Congress was very active in
beginning to figure out what was going on and it was very
tumultuous. People didn't like it.
You have got to confront the fact that what you now have is
a willful denial of objective reality. Well, the Congress does
have an ability to pass laws, to make regulations, and then to
hold the kind of hearings and investigations to get this stuff
out in the open. So I would start there. I would also say,
since you have been a combatant commander, one of the things
that came up earlier: It bothers me that we have had almost no
serious review of what hasn't worked. We have been at this now
with thousands of dead, tens of thousands of wounded. We have
tried to train armies, which have collapsed. We clearly don't
have the correct doctrine for what we are doing, and yet you
are not going to go out and find very many people who want to
peel back the cloth and figure out what we are doing.
Finally, in terms of winning the ideological war, at its
peak under Reagan, the U.S. Information Agency was separate
from the State Department and 35 percent the size of State. It
was an enormous project, consciously sending out messages that
broke the morale of the Soviet empire. We have nothing
comparable to that today.
So there are a number of steps you could take, but I think
if you simply start by saying you would like to have hearings
on, you would like to have your staff investigating, what are
new trainees told at DHS? What do the documents look like? What
kind of people are brought in to the do the briefings? How are
they vetted? I think you will be stunned how methodically and
systematically we have become blind over the last 10 or 12
years, and how cultural jihad is more dangerous than physical
jihad.
Until we confront that--and you can confront it in this
committee by holding hearings about that agency, how it
operates, what it tells itself, how it communicates, and you
will begin to find out that a great deal of what we currently
do is nonsense.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman recognizes Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that indeed
if you are going to analyze ISIS, ISIL, Daesh, whatever you
want to use for a term, there is something to be said clearly
that there are those that are true ideologues, people that have
this apocalyptic view of things. But I have been talking to
people on the ground over there, including military people as
well, and they say you can't simplify it that way, that there
are different factions.
Now I know, you know, in my own opinion, for instance in
the Boston bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, I would say he is more
categorized as his uncle called him, a loser, a misfit. You
have these people, many of them foreign, you know, some of the
foreign fighters that go over there. But there are people that
have nothing going on in their life. They have no hope. They
are not powerful in their own right. Nothing going on even in
the more personal aspects of their life. They are people
attracted to the adventure.
Then you have another group I think, that sits sort-of
back, the old Baathists and people that lost their power in
Iraq, who kind-of want to sit back and influence things as best
they can as well. Another group that has been a faction of this
that has been talked about is just the pure criminals there,
just out for the money.
So I understand that many of you said that there is a
danger in underestimating the ideological part of this, the
religious part of this. But I think there is a danger too, to
make one size fits all and not look at the other factions that
are represented by that and by the things I just mentioned.
Can you comment on that? I mean, if our approach is just
one dimensional, there is about four factions I just named, how
best are we approaching this? Take your pick.
Mr. Gingrich. Who would you like----
Mr. Keating. Well, I was hoping there would be a little
leadership in answering that question.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Gingrich. Let me just say as a historian, you could
have made exactly the same argument about the Communists and
exactly the same argument about the Nazis. The Nazis gained an
enormous amount of their power by attracting every loser in
Germany and giving them a sense of meaning. The communists used
some of the dumbest people on the planet.
But the core operating model in both cases was highly
ideological and was led by people quite prepared to die for
what they believed in. All the evidence we have so far is that
these--and I emphasize, it is a movement. I think we waste far
too much energy arguing over organizational structures. There
is a world-wide movement that is gaining momentum that is best
dealt with as an epidemiology problem. The core momentum there
is clearly driven by a sense of religious imperative.
Mr. Keating. My impression, and I did a little work on
this, a good example because it is my home State, is Tamerlan
Tsarnaev is no ideologue. He is a loser. He was. So I don't
think that holds for all the people being attracted to this.
They are attracted for different reasons, and part of it will
deal with how the misgovernance in a lot of these areas and the
corruption continues to create problems.
Again, if we are one-dimensional, just ask any of the other
three, do you think it is that simple? It is just one group and
you're just going to ignore all the other factions?
General Hayden. Let me revisit something I just suggested
in my opening comments, that indeed an awful lot of recruiting
looks more like why young Americans join the Crips and the
Bloods than it has to do with the holy Quoran. I understand
that. It is alienation, it is something bigger than self and so
on.
But it also matters, I think as the Speaker suggested, it
also matters what gang you join. This particular gang at the
top is driven by this messianic, apocalyptic vision, which then
makes these misfits joining that organization more dangerous
than other----
Mr. Keating. Well, I just suggest this, that that is good
in part, in my opinion, and I don't disagree at all. Let's wipe
out the leadership of this group. Let's get Baghdadi, let's get
all of them. But if we don't deal with those other issues I am
talking about, there is just going to be a new group coming up.
That is the problem we have too.
So if we don't understand that we have to do something with
the Sunnis, they have to feel politically connected at all in
this and have a place to live, if we don't deal with all these
other issues and just spend too much of our time, inordinately
so, I think, giving very simple answers, saying, well, the
President doesn't recognize who it is, and if we don't call
them by name then we can't deal with them. That might sound
good in a sound clip, but I am talking about what is really
happening.
Don't you think that if we don't deal with all these other
issues we are just going to be right back in the same cycle?
Because all these other things are just going to bring another
leader, another group, another ideological group.
Mr. Mudd. One quick comment on watching the evolution of
how these guys think. I think there is a change in evolution
about 10 years ago. The first guys we took down at the agency
were ideologues. The architects of 9/11 were steeped in
thinking about how you could change Islam to justify what they
called attacks against the far enemy, the far enemy being the
United States.
Overseas and in the United States, I believe starting at
about roughly 2005, 2006, we started seeing more emotional
motivation, people who would see a photo out of Iraq of a dead
baby or a dead woman, saying I have got to go fight the
crusaders because I saw this picture on Jazeera. I talked to
some of these people. This is not a theory. This is sitting
down, why did you go? I saw a photo.
So there is a distinction between an upper echelon-
idealogue--they have to die; they are not going to turn back
again. The masses who are motivated they think by idealogy, but
by emotion.
One closing word. When you think about not how we see this
intellectually, but how we talk about this, be careful. The
reason is the adversary wants to create this into us versus
them. They want to say we are here to protect you in Iraq
against the crusaders.
There is now ISIS moving into Afghanistan. You just see
interviews from the past couple days of people saying in
Afghanistan I want to go fight the crusader in Iraq. The
adversary cannot explain to these emotional fellow travelers
why murder of innocence is acceptable.
So you can categorize this for this that 98 percent is a
fight between good and evil, which is what they want. Or you
can categorize it as a fight against people who choose to
murder for a political purpose----
Mr. Keating. My time is up, but I am in agreement with what
you said there. But just my point is it is more complex than
that.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Chairman recognizes Mr. Hurd.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. It is great to see
former colleagues from my days at the CIA. My first question is
to General Hayden and Mr. Mudd. You know in December 2001 the
fall of Kandahar killed 30 percent of al-Qaeda leadership.
The fall, the Taliban was pushed out of Pakistan. There
were 400 Americans on the ground, 100 CIA officers, 300 Special
Forces. Is this a model? Or I guess my question is, is that--
what are the pros and cons of that model being used in places
like Yemen, Syria, Africa? Is that something that can still be
done?
Mr. Mudd. Three categories of stuff because I don't think
there is one shoe fits all. In certain cases you have a
government that is so good at what they do that modest levels
of American support. I would think Indonesia. Indonesians have
done a great job against what I thought was a significant
threat in 2003 Bali attacks, et cetera.
Southern Philippines again, modest American support. That
has gone pretty well. Other places you have a constellation of
governments that can help. The African Union in Somalia has
done well.
I think I mentioned earlier that we can do the same thing
with the Nigerians, Somali, Cameroon in Africa. So that is why
I was saying support to Sisi might work. I would suggest we
figure out if there is a group of people that sort-of spread
the pain.
Then finally, and I think we have talked about Iraq a lot.
But there are certain countries that there isn't going to be a
constellation of power. There is an American interest. There is
a major amount of support that is required that we have to go
in and say that regardless of whether it says in the newspapers
that there is a coalition there is not. The Americans have to
get more aggressive if they want to turn back this adversary.
So I would say it depends on how much government you have.
It depends on whether that government has a major problem or a
modest problem. It depends on whether you can find partners to
work. So figure out what the threat is. Figure out what the
government capability is locally and work from there.
General Hayden. I would agree totally. As you know, we
spend an awful lot of time at the agency with what we call
liaison. We do it not because we are charitable. We do it
because it works. Obviously you can't get out of the liaison
service something that they have not put in. But there is
generally always something there from which you can benefit.
Mr. Mudd. I am sorry. One more comment. We haven't talked
about this enough. Americans are squeamish about this. Drones.
As a practitioner I can tell you there should be a National
conversation at some point about where drones are used in
environments where we are not at war. For example, is Boko
Haram an appropriate target?
My reason is quite simple. If you look at the fundamental
characteristics that drive success, in my judgment, for
terrorist organizations, its visionary leadership that had the
safe haven and time to plot. That used to be Yemen, Somalia,
northern Nigeria, Afghanistan. Every single one of these has
these characteristics of visionary leadership and safe haven.
When the adversary talks about what brings them pain, and I
use this as a litmus test, if they complain about something
incessantly, that is a good thing. They hate drones.
So we can be squeamish about talking about the use of
lethal force outside war zones. We can be worried,
appropriately, about intervening too early and alienating
people. But if you want to take out the kinds of leadership who
have the vision to say the far enemy in Washington is our
enemy, drones have been incredibly effective.
General Hayden. Could I just add after you and I said
goodbye to one another in Texas yesterday I actually read the
documents from the Osama bin Laden cache that were made public
in the recent court case in New York.
It is remarkable prose about how painful the targeted
killing program was against the al-Qaeda leadership. It is
something that I would recommend all of you have your staffs
pull some quotes for you to read because Phil is right, it
really, really hurt them.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, gentlemen.
My next question is for Mr. Speaker. You talk about the
cultural jihad. You know the CIA has traditionally had the role
of covert action. In finding al-Qaeda in the late 2000s it was
countering--it was propping up moderate imams to counter that
threat. You know this is too big. The ISIS's use of social
media is too big.
How can the Federal--where should the Federal Government
be? How can we be--I know you mentioned you know the U.S.
Information Agency during the Communist era. I agree with Mr.
Mudd that you know we have to get our partner nations involved
in this fight. How do we do that from a Government perspective?
Mr. Gingrich. I think it is a very important question. I
would say first of all, Congress ought to explore
reestablishing the USIA as an independent agency. I think we
put it in State when I was speaker. I think in retrospect that
is a mistake. You need a forward-looking, independent voice
that is out there communicating your message.
Second, and this will be very controversial and very hard
to do. If we had had today's rules in Italy and France during
the elections after World War II, both countries would have
gone Communist. It is a fact that we went in very covertly with
huge resources to make sure they did not go Communist.
You start with el-Sisi. We should be taking his speech at
the university, which is exactly the message we want. That
speech should be everywhere in the Muslim world with our help
getting it there, and translating it out of Arabic into every
local population. So take that example.
I think second, we are going to have to--and this goes back
to homeland security. We have both an offensive and a defensive
tool here. On offense we want to be communicating our messages
on our terms. We want to do it better than our opposition,
which today is not true. Ironically, ISIS is better at tweeting
than the United States Government.
Second, we defensively want to crush their capacity to
communicate. That is going to require some very serious
arguments inside the United States about what is and is not
legitimate conversation, if we are serious about eliminating
the cultural threat as well as the physical threat.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Chairman now recognizes Mrs. Watson
Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady, and I think the
gentlelady is allowing me to go in front of her and not
yielding her time for her time to be able to ask questions. Let
me thank you for your courtesies, Congresswoman Watson Coleman.
Let me thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for this very
astute and important hearing.
My first remarks are to thank all of you for your service
to the country. The Speaker has been the Speaker for a number
of us who have had the privilege of serving here in the United
States Congress. Certainly, General Hayden, we are aware of
your wonderful leadership and service to this Nation. Mr. Mudd
and Mr. Jenkins, we cannot do without experts.
My first point is that I think that we must be very clear
in Homeland Security and the other committees that terrorism
and the fight against terrorism is not a Republican or a
Democratic, if you will, singular and sole opportunity to claim
service to the country.
I am very grateful for Speaker Gingrich's comments, which
many of us have said is that it is vital that the United
States, if I may take your words, Congress undertakes a
thorough, no-holds-barred review of the long global war in
which we are now engaged. Speaker uses radical Islamists. I
would use radical Sunnis, radical Shiites encountering
extremism.
He is absolutely right that we have to include
Intelligence, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and
Homeland Security and the leadership of the Congress to
understand the vital roles these committees play in the
securing of the Nation but in the coordination of their work.
I might also say that for a long period of time that I have
had the privilege of serving on this committee I have started
using the term franchise terrorism. Now we have got lone wolves
and a number of other comments.
Let me just say this to General Hayden, if I might. Having
been to Yemen and walked the streets when it was in a different
status, meeting with leaders, riding in taxicabs, do you think
it was appropriate for the administration to remove those
Special Forces based upon what I would assume is the
intelligence that they had at this point in time? It does not
say whether they will return or not return? We have not made
that conclusion. But to remove them out of harm's way.
General Hayden. Congresswoman, I completely defer to the
local commander and the administration. That is not something
that should be second guessed. People who are responsible for
the safety of our men and women have to make that decision and
we should all just live with their judgment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that because I want to make
it very clear that we cannot be successful if we begin to say
it is the President's fault, it is this administration's fault.
I think Speaker Gingrich nailed it on the head. I may disagree
with my colleagues here in Congress, but we have a
responsibility to engage in this process.
But I will not sit at this committee table and yield to
conversation that suggests that the administration, in this
instance President Barack Obama, has in any way failed any more
than I am sure there will be challenges to my disagreement with
the Iraq War.
My point that the Iraq War left us in a--not in the able
wonderful service of our many men and women of whom I visited
in Iraq certainly could not stand in their shoes. But did not
come to where we wanted it to be primarily because of the very
poor leadership of Maliki and what he did with the Shiites and
Sunnis.
So let me, quickly, get as I remain here I want to make
sure that we stay on the fact that we must be unified. So to
both Speaker Gingrich, let me say that I celebrate what you
said about the U.S. Information Agency. That is a hot point
that we should move on quickly.
So the question is to Mr. Gingrich, Mr. Hayden, and Mr.
Jenkins. What are the next steps? We have lone wolves. We have
franchise terrorism. We have gangs.
ISIS is the most heinous organization that I think in the
history of the United States confronting an international
position. We cannot say that it is not. So we cannot condemn a
President who other Presidents may have had situations of war,
but did not have situations of ISIS.
I would welcome the comments of Speaker Gingrich, General
Hayden, and Mr. Jenkins, if you will, and Mr. Mudd, if you
don't mind, I am a few seconds from ending.
I thank my colleagues. I thank you very much.
Mr. Gingrich. Well, let me, first of all, thank the
gentlelady for her comments. I think we are in agreement that
this should be dealt with as a National issue, not a partisan
issue.
We should be dealing with also recognizing that the next
President and probably the President after that are gonna be
dealing with this. This is a long, difficult process. I said on
9/14 or 9/15, this was a 50- to 75-year war. Since I think we
have been off-track for 15 years, unfortunately it is still a
50- to 75-year war.
I would say the first thing Congress could do--this will
sound amorphous, but it is really important--the first thing
that Congress has to have is a genuine debate about what the
war is about. I mean, the Congress has got to decide, is this
in fact, as I suggest, an epidemiology that involves a
movement, that 15-year-old girls aren't being recruited in
Denver accidentally, and that we are up against a world-wide,
global campaign, which is gonna force us to change some of our
rules and change some of our institutions.
If that is true, then let me repeat the rather bold thing I
suggested earlier, which is that Congress ought to ask the
National security institutions what are the things that
Congress has done over the last 30 years that hamstrings their
ability to be effective.
I mean, the amount of junk we have imposed on these
agencies and on these departments that makes it impossible for
them to have the effectiveness of the Americans between 1941
and 1955.
If you look at the gap in legal requirements, reporting, et
cetera, and you will find that we have crippled ourselves and
that this institution, the Congress, is as much at the heart of
that as anybody else.
I would start with: What is the nature of the war? Actually
figure out, with a genuine National debate and resolution to
that effect.
Second, a genuine, serious review of what we do to make it
impossible for the Executive branch to be effective.
General Hayden. Congresswoman, this may reflect my personal
experience, a little bit, but, building off of what the Speaker
just said, I think it is the power of political consensus here.
It is the volume of American activity, it is the
consistency of American activity. So, if we can get the two
political branches agreed upon objectives, the strategy and,
frankly, what creates the left- and right-hand boundaries of
acceptable pursuit of those objectives, I think that goes a
long way to solving some of the problems that the Speaker
defined.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins. I will just quickly underscore the points made
by the Speaker and General Hayden.
Look, World War II and the Cold War were easier, because
they were perceived as existential threats, and that did not
eliminate debate about strategy, but it imposed a political
unity and a unity of effort that lasted over a period of
decades, in the case of the Cold War.
We do not have that now. Absent the perception, that
perception which focuses our minds, then all sorts of other
agendas begin to interfere with this and interfere with what we
are doing and why we are doing it.
So, let me go back to the Speaker's advice, in that we
really say, what are our National interests in this part of the
world? What are our concerns? What is it that we ought to be
doing about it? Have we imposed upon ourselves constraints that
don't make sense? Which of those constraints, despite the risk
that they impose, are we going to take because they are
fundamental reflections of American values? When we get that,
then within that, certainly there can be political debate, but
there cannot be a kind of zigzag course and the lack of unity
that weakens us as a country.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman and the Ranking
Member.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman recognizes Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here. This is, as you can
imagine, quite enlightening.
I have to--following from the Congresswoman's recent
comments, I am a little bit concerned. I mean, I hear you
telling me that President Sisi in Egypt is the type of leader,
although he is not perfect, and not everything we want, that we
ought to rally around. Then I hear that we are not doing that,
that the administration is not doing that.
I am not trying to point fingers here, but I am wondering,
the administration is not backing someone who you all agree
that this is what we ought to be doing, or at least seem to be
agreeing on that.
Then I look at other things that have happened, like Boko
Haram, and now they are affiliated with ISIS. Yet, the
administration, again, never recognized them as a terrorist
threat. It seems to me that the administration is taking the
dental theory of ignore your teeth, and they will go away.
I mean, we are ignoring these groups, and they are not
going away. I am just wondering, can you prove me wrong? Can
you enlighten me and tell me that that is not what is
happening?
Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Gingrich. Well, let me draw a distinction. I do believe
that the President and his immediate team have a world view
which led them to believe before they came into office that
certain strategies would work, and that those strategies
involved a dramatic reduction in American forces and it
involved a conscious, psychological appeasement of Islam in
general, in the hopes that that would reduce the boiling point,
if you will, of the problems.
They have followed that strategy. They believe that the
Muslim Brotherhood is a reasonable organization, at a time, by
the way, when the Saudis have condemned it. The Egyptians have
condemned it. The Jordanians have condemned it. When there is a
mortal struggle under way between traditional elites and the
Muslim Brotherhood, which is at least as vicious as the
struggle with al-Qaeda and ISIS, a point that General Hayden
has made, that this is a multi-way fight.
I don't have any idea how one changes the President's view.
The President--let me be quite clear, as an Army brat, a hard-
line Republican obviously tried to beat him twice. The American
people picked him to be President. He gets 2 more years of
this.
The most we can do is try to surround him with law and try
to surround him with appropriations that maximize moving
towards a much more effective war footing than we are right
now.
But I don't think that--we can't sit around and wait for 2
years. Frankly, just yelling at him doesn't do much good.
Mr. Carter. Okay. I acknowledge that. I accept that.
Tell me what we can do. Now, you--I mean, General, what can
Congress do? What can we----
Mr. Gingrich. Now, look, let me just start with this.
Congress can do investigations and Congress can hold hearings,
not just anti-administration investigations, but just trying to
surface reality.
Congress can also ask the great departments that are out
there of people who have devoted their lifetime to serve this
country. That is why I think you go to them and say, tell me
what we do to screw up your life, you will be shocked how much
information they are gonna give you, because nobody has ever
asked them how they could be more effective if they weren't
crippled by what is literally 40 years of law and regulation
that now lays over their capabilities.
Mr. Carter. Can you give me an example of a law or
regulation that we can do away with that might help?
Mr. Gingrich. I am yielding to----
Mr. Carter. Sure.
General Hayden. Well, all of us have pointed out that some
of our partners in this enterprise will be partners of
necessity more or less than partners of choice. That brings
up--that is why I mentioned to Congresswoman Jackson Lee, you
got to let us know the left- and right-hand boundaries of
acceptable behavior here. Because the last thing you want is an
agency--or the permanent government is how I would really
describe it--going out and doing things about which they
believe there is a political consensus. As soon as they have
made everyone feel a lot more comfortable and a lot more safe,
then be accused of coloring outside those left- and right-hand
boundaries.
Again, reflecting my personal history, Congressman, perhaps
more than others--you know, Phil is included in this, as well--
how much energy did my own agency out at Langley put in over
the last 3 years because of the demand to revisit what the
agency did with al-Qaeda detainees? Now, that is a tremendous
consumption of energy and talent. Believe me, the best of the
agency was put on the process because of the nature of the
problem.
So, again, that constant political consensus, clear
guidance that maybe looking a lot more through the windscreen
than through the rearview mirror.
Mr. Carter. One final question--let me ask you this--how
much of a game plan, if you will, would it be for us to try to
try to rally around a group there who could fight these people
from within? I mean, would that not behoove us as a Nation? But
yet, we don't seem to be doing that if we are not rallying
around President Sisi.
Mr. Jenkins. You could make a--the United States could, if
it decided to, make a major investment to create a counterforce
in the region. I am talking about within Syria and Iraq. It
would be necessarily a Sunni force. We are not going to get
Alawites under Assad or Shias being commanded by Iranian
commanders to join it.
Currently, we are talking about training a 5,000-person
force. Quite frankly, a 5,000-person force is not going to be a
contender in this. It is not even going to be a bit player.
Maybe you do it because it is a way of keeping your hand in.
Maybe you do it because of political pressure. But if we wanted
to, we could say, ``Look, we are going to create a--or try to
create a counterforce here, and it is going to represent the
Sunnis.''
Now, you can do that; there are questions about how
effective it would be militarily. We can probably address that.
But as you do that, it is always going to have political
consequences. The political consequences are going to be, you
are now going to have a--if we are successful, a tough Sunni
force that is going to have something to say about its future
in Syria and Iraq. That may not be consistent with what current
U.S. policy is on Syria and Iraq. But we could do it.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chairman recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to each and every one of you for your testimony.
Speaker Gingrich, I appreciate a couple of things that you
said--a lot of things that you said. But the notion that
perhaps Congress needs to be evaluating and asking the
agencies, what are the things that we have done that impede
your ability to do what we need you to do now, that may have
made sense back when, but perhaps don't now. I think who knows
better than you what Congress can do to get involved and, you
know, to create situations that need to be revisited? So, I
appreciate that. I appreciate the fact that you are talking
about not just one administration, but just sort of the
evolution of the issues.
I appreciate, Mr. Mudd, that you said that women may be the
answer to this problem. You did say that, right? You were the
one that said that we needed to arm women with smart phones and
recognize that they are----
Mr. Mudd. Correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman [continuing]. The mothers and they are
the wives and they are the ones that are losing their family
members. Perhaps, you know, in a culture that doesn't feel that
women have much value other than to be covered and quiet, just
the notion that we really could be a very strong force for
peace. Because we understand the loss of life in a different
way. I appreciated the things that you said.
General, you said something that really struck with me. I
believe it was you. It may have been Mr. Jenkins, though.
Somebody said, ``ISIS is concerned with the activities in the
region. ISIS is about creating its state and its influence in
the region. But al-Qaeda still has an interest in coming back
and hitting us.''
So, I guess my question is to what extent--since I think we
have been relatively safe--I mean, there have been things--I
mean, we have been relatively safe here in the homeland. So,
this administration and Congress must be doing some things
right.
To what extent is there the continued capacity to know in
advance, particularly al-Qaeda, what it is thinking of doing?
Because we hear all the time that someone had planned to do
something, and that someone's effort had been foiled by the
intelligence that we had.
The other question I have--and whoever wants to jump in and
answer, just fine with me--what should we be thinking about in
terms of ISIS, not in terms of what ISIS is doing in the
region, but in terms of the threat to life here on the
homeland?
I mean, do we see ISIS evolving into an external view so
that now we ought to be concerned about what they are going to
try to do here? Or is it going to be sufficiently, you know,
busy over there, and then perhaps we need to be prioritizing
our resources and our efforts and our concerns in a different
way? So, I would appreciate hearing from either perspective on
this question.
Mr. Jenkins. Let me go first very, very quickly. We have
been successful in thwarting home-grown terrorist plots. That
is largely because of our efforts to--in terms of domestic
intelligence. This has been very, very effective. With a fair
amount of help from the American citizens and the community
that have provided tips.
With regard to thwarting plots from abroad, there again, we
haven't been 100 percent successful, but that has been the
result of probably unprecedented cooperation among the
intelligence services and law enforcement organizations in the
world that have enabled us to do this. Plus, our own
significant effort.
With regard to ISIS as a threat, I did say that ISIS right
now is preoccupied with expanding its territory. It has--it
cannot survive as a stable nation. This is a plunder-based
economy driven by an internal push to take more territory and
continued fighting. So, it has to do that.
We are in the process now of bombing it. We may be called
upon to increase our air campaign to help the recovery of
Tikrit and Mosul from them. At a certain point, ISIS may decide
that it faces defeat. The only way it can save itself is to
draw us into some kind of a final showdown. The way to do it is
to carry out major attacks against us. It has significant
resources, both financial, and resources to do it.
Mrs. Watson Coleman [continuing]. I guess for my last sort-
of comment, I am concerned that groups that align with certain
groups--we have seen where we have had alliances. We have seen
those alliances break down, and our alliance becomes our enemy.
So, it is difficult for us to decide who we are going to
coalesce with in any substantial or sustainable moment, and to
fight a particular enemy. Because that situation has changed
from time to time. To suggest that all we need to do is find a
bunch of people, or a couple of countries that are going to be
working with us, and think that that is sustainable I think is
just sort of naive.
I thank you very much, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, panel, for being here today. I would
also like to thank the family and friends who have been very
patient in waiting on this.
The subject of today's hearing is the fight against
Islamist extremism at home and abroad. I want to address that a
little bit.
I heard earlier from Member Keating that this is really
just a bunch of misfits and, see, losers. I just thought
about--of those 21 Egyptian Christians who lost their lives.
How many of those that were actually doing the beheading would
be considered losers and misfits? I don't think that is a
precursor for the damage of barbaric activities that one can--
that can go into it.
The question I have--or let me set it up this way. A few
weeks ago, we had a few moments with Secretary Jeh Johnson. He
said this is not theologically-based. My concern and my
question regarding that is that he also said the imams and the
clerics are very slow to give up some of the individuals that
they fear have the potential of being radicalized. Well, then
it can't be both. If it is not--if there is not a theological
thread that runs through this--and I am speaking as a former
minister of 15 years--who have friends and people who have been
held captive--in fact, I am even dialoguing right now with
Naghmeh Abedini, whose husband is in Iranian prison due to his
Christian beliefs.
The problem is this. It either has to have a religious
thread to it, or they are just basically criminals. If imams
and clerics are slow to give them up, to me, it tells me there
is somewhere there is--even if it is extremist, there is a
religious thread involved in this.
I believe that General Hayden asked the question, and even
answered it. He said, ``What unites these factions?'' You said,
``Islam.'' Is it fair to say that if Islam is the noun in this
process, the action is the hatred that many of these radical
Islamic extremists have for our belief system, not just from a
political standpoint, but also from a religious base?
I will start with Mr. Hayden, and I would like to follow up
with the speaker. Do you feel like that is a very valid part of
this?
General Hayden. The leadership of the movement--what has
made this global has been their interpretation, and many--and I
would agree--would say misinterpretation of Islamic scripture.
They claim to take their legitimacy from the Islamic faith. So,
I think we need to respect that. I will say again one more
time, Congressman, a lot of people join just because they are
alienated, and you have got this whole youthful wanting to be
part of something bigger than themselves. But it does matter
what gang you join. This gang has certain objectives and it
legitimates certain kinds of behavior.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, General.
Speaker.
Mr. Gingrich. Well, let me start by saying that to the best
of my knowledge, the number of Norwegian Lutheran terrorists
has been de minimis. To start with that notion--I mean, this
whole idiocy that you can't talk honestly about the nature of
the people who are trying to kill you strikes me as utterly
irrational.
By the way, we had exactly the same experience in the 1940s
and early 1950 with the Soviets. You can read Diana West,
``American Betrayal.'' It is breathtaking how hard we worked to
hide from the degree of Soviet penetration because it shook our
whole system. Well, you are in the same business again.
So--but I want to emphasize a point here that I think will
take a while to sink in for the whole National debate. ISIS is
a 2-year-old phenomenon. Boko Haram starts around 2001. Al-
Qaeda is a little bit earlier. I have no idea what the various
lineages are or the various factions in Yemen or--but my point
is, there is a world-wide movement. It is explicitly
religiously motivated. That doesn't mean that every Muslim is
bad. It does mean that there is a strain of Islam which occurs
in two forms: A physical Jihad and a cultural Jihad.
The cultural Jihad definition is very simple. They believe
that Islamic law is superior to all other law, and that the
rest of us ultimately have to basically yield to Islamic law.
Those two factions--the physical and the cultural--are clearly
at war with the West. Until we can have an honest National
debate and discuss that, and then say if this is true, what is
our response?
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
One of the things that offends me is the high-level
involvement of human and sex trafficking that these particular
factions are involved in, raising the revenue into the hundreds
of millions of dollars.
Part of it is this concept--that as a person of a Judeo-
Christian faith, there are dozens of places that if you were to
enter, you would have loss of life or torture, but there is no
place like that where an radical Islamist can enter where he
has to be that concerned. So, I want us to look at it from--
globally.
The last thing--I will conclude with this since my time is
expired--I appreciate your--I think it was your words--this is
a willful denial of objective reality. If it is okay, I will
tweet that out a little bit later. With that, I yield back.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman recognizes Mr. Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. First of all, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for having the hearing. I think this was a very productive
hearing. Hearing from people who know what they are talking
about.
My sense--and why I ran for Congress and why I am here--is
to try to get to the solutions, and ask anybody who has the
ability to offer some expertise on trying to figure out an
answer. Which means simply, know what you know and know what
you don't know. The things you don't know, ask the people who
do.
But while we are here, it just reminds me of the circus
atmosphere of Congress, and the fact that we don't put on a
unified front to our enemies. To the extent that we are
continuously--and even here today, the question was: Can you
rate the administration's effort against the enemies? As
opposed to, can you rate our efforts against the enemies, and
what can we do?
Mr. Speaker, you were asked a question about the lack of
flexibility. I think someone else--and I think it was Mr. Mudd,
who talked about agility for our troops and our strategists and
what we can do. You can explain it all day, but you can't
understand it for us. My frustration is the fact that I think
we are so blind in partisanship that we just won't sit down and
listen.
I want to just ask, am I getting the right takeaways? First
was the agility and flexibility and find out what we have done
as a Congress to limit the hands of our forces, and clearly
defining the left and right borders of what we consider
acceptable behavior, and not going backwards afterwards with
hearings and hearings and hearings, and wasting resources and
time.
Also the fact that drones are very, very productive and it
causes a certain amount of fear, because it takes away their
leadership's ability to have time and safe havens to plot out
what they want to do.
The other thing we can do is have hearings and do things as
a Congress to figure out the benefits of the targeted killing
programs and things of that like to see how effective it was
and how it would help us here, and then assert our own thing.
So part of, I guess my question is: Do you think that a
focused Congress on the issues that we raised here, with the
ability to hold hearings and other things--and Mr. Speaker, you
know them better than I, do you think we have the tools to add
to this fight? The question was whether it's criminals, thugs,
or a thread of religious tone. Well, it is both--it is criminal
thugs who are using religion to push their sinister goals, and
they are winning the propaganda war on the fact that they have
some good mission behind it.
So, Mr. Speaker, do we have the tools to do it? If so,
where do we go from here in your opinion?
We can take that question and go down the line.
Mr. Gingrich. Well, let me just say that the founding
fathers were amazingly wise. They created institutions that
have enormous capability.
As early as 1793, 1794, they were debating whether or not
to complete frigates in order to go and intimidate the Barbary
pirates. They decided not to because the negotiations were
going pretty well, and had to go back later and finish them.
But the Congress has a long history of being involved in
trying to understand, what are our National security interests
and what do we need to do about them?
I would say--the point you have made, which several Members
have made--if we could get beyond partisanship to have a real
National security and homeland security debate, and engage the
entire Congress as General Hayden said, in creating a consensus
that could last--the Cold War consensus lasted over 40 years,
because people argued it out, thought it through, and decided,
you know, it is what we have to do.
We need a similar dialogue, and it needs to transcend
Democrat, Republican, and be an American dialogue.
General Hayden. I second that Congressman. When I was
director at the CIA, we consciously made a decision not to do
some things that frankly were--we believe were legal, maybe
even somewhat effective, in order to build the kind of
political consensus that the Speaker just described.
In other words, I would even be willing to perhaps not be
as bold as I would otherwise be in order not to face an on/off
switch every 24 months.
Mr. Mudd. Just one quick comment on this. One of the things
I worried about most when I was in the service wasn't just the
adversary. It related to American citizens, and that is there
have been debates over the past several years about how we look
at American citizens, in particular how we look at their
digital trail.
I would encourage you again bipartisan to make sure you
clearly understand what you have asked particularly the FBI to
do with data and what limitations that provides them. Data is
moving so fast; how much digital trail each American gives. I
was always concerned we are over-collecting; we are under-
collecting; we are on the wrong person; we are using the wrong
criteria. I know it sounds like a technical issue. It is
fundamental to the hunt for unknowns in the United States.
How much latitude do you want to give Federal agencies to
chase Americans' data? How can they collect it and how can they
analyze it, and make sure you distinguish between the two,
fundamental difference. It is okay, in my opinion, if you
collect it; I want to know how you are going to use it; very
different from an analyst perspective.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman recognizes the ever-patient
Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you panel. I really appreciate all your perspectives
today. I agree with a lot of what was said today. Some of my
perspectives are formed from 26 years in the military. My last
assignment, running counter-terrorism operations for AFRICOM
and the tremendous frustrations that we experienced as we
watched some of these threats that have been going on for
decades, but are continuing to grow and metastasize in their
capabilities, both al-Shabaab, AQAP across the way, Boko Haram,
AQIM and us not declaratively stating that this is in our
National interests to address these threats.
They are growing these safe havens. We could have done some
things to address them, and now all of a sudden they are--you
know, they are rearing their ugly heads, but we have watched it
grow, and we have done nothing about it.
So ISIS is the latest, but these extremists organizations
have been growing and metastasizing for a long time, so I
appreciate everybody's perspectives on that.
Also a tremendous fan of drones. As a person who is a
pilot, that sounds funny that I would be supporting unmanned,
or un-womanned, aircraft, but I testified before the Senate
last year on that.
Look, if we decide that it is legal to use lethal force and
we decide it is good policy, that provides us persistence and
tremendous oversight to be able to use those assets, so I
agree. So thanks for talking about that.
I have a question, sort of the big picture. Speaker
Gingrich, I would appreciate your perspectives on this first,
is it seems like right now we are doing the second-graders with
the soccer ball--we are addressing ISIS. Oh my gosh, we have
got to deal with it. We will do whatever it takes to try to and
address that, to include tolerating Soleimani leading the
effort to also tolerate that it really emboldened Assad, that
Iran's, you know, hand is strengthening in the region, and it
just seems like we are looking very tactically at this threat
instead of strategically.
As we look at strengthening Iran's hand as the largest
state sponsor of terror as an unintended consequence, that is
very concerning to me in their capabilities march, you know, of
militant Islam.
I do agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu, who said, in this
case, the enemy of our enemy is our enemy, and not our friend.
It seems like people are looking at it like it is a seesaw,
like either we are going to deal with ISIS, and therefore we
are strengthening Assad and Iran, or the other way around, like
it is one or the other.
Is there a strategic framework where we could be addressing
both of those threats? Because obviously our Sunni allies in
the region are on the sidelines because of this dynamic, and
that is part of why they are not participating fully. So how do
we strategically address both of those threats? What would we
do differently, Speaker Gingrich?
Mr. Gingrich. Well, first of all we are missing two key
ingredients that we had in the late 1940s. George Kennan wrote
what was called ``the long telegram'' in 1946 which explained
that the Soviet Union was a world-wide competitor and that we
had to collide with it and had no choice.
That changed Washington's view dramatically. In 1950, NSC
finished writing NSC-68 which really set the framework for the
entire Cold War and was a very long-range document.
So I would say we currently don't have either of those, and
that--I want to say, I think this has been a bipartisan
problem. I think that what happened is we got sucked into
tactical decisions and at best operational decisions, we had
very little strategic thinking and very little strategic
decision making for a very human reason.
If you really look at this--and I had this experience, I
was at the agency in December 2001. The counterterrorism guys
were giving me a briefing. They said--I said, what is your
target set? They said, about 5,000 people.
I said, what is the recruiting base? They said, oh, 3 to 5
percent of Islam. So I said, wait a second, that is 39 million
to 65 million people. They nodded at me. They said, yes, that
is right.
I said--and they said, we can't get the White House to
understand this isn't about 5,000 people. So I took one page. I
had a really big circle that had 39-65 million, and then a
really tiny circle that said 5,000.
I went and I saw Rice and Cheney and Rumsfeld, and I said,
this is the moment in ``Jaws'' where the police chief says ``we
need a bigger boat.''
Now the fact is the boat we need is so big, and it has
taken us a decade more to begin to realize it, this ain't going
away. This is going to get worse. Now I think we are on the
edge of being able to have a genuine bipartisan debate that
really transcends just fighting over the President, and gets
into the question, given that this is true, what do we need to
do about it?
Until we have that debate, and understand, Iran is our
mortal enemy.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Mr. Gingrich. Radical Sunni behavior is our mortal enemy.
These are not marginal enemies. These are mortal enemies
comparable to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
Until we are prepared to deal with them at that level and
understand that it is a world-wide epidemiology problem,
particularly on the Sunni side, and it is a very specific state
problem on the Iranian side, people don't want to think like
that because it leads you to make decisions that are too
frightening.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
General Hayden, any insights?
General Hayden. Yes. Congresswoman, your story about
chasing the rabbit in Africom brings a thought to mind. You
have got these franchises popping up. I always pictured them to
be very difficult decisions.
Like let's take Boko Haram, all right? It doesn't appear to
be an enemy of the United States. They are not killing our
people. They are not threatening to kill our people. Do I
really want to put an American face on suppressing Boko Haram
and thereby accelerate or even create something that would not
have existed in terms of a threat?
The longer I look at this, though, the more I see the
connective tissue between these different groups. This is more
in the form of a question. I have not yet arrived at an answer.
But if it is right that the connective tissue is stronger
than we have seen, that they are part of a globalized movement
that the Speaker has described, that changes your--the
character of your decision making over here as to how quickly
you want to put an American face on going after some of these
movements.
Ms. McSally. Exactly. Great. Thank you.
My time has expired, I appreciate it. I yield back. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
Let me thank the witnesses. I just want to close with, you
know, my father was a bombardier on a B-17 in the European
theater. They were all-in to win. We defeated fascism.
The long-term struggle against communism that, Mr. Speaker,
as you mentioned, we had a plan laid out and a strategy to
defeat communism. We won.
Now we face Islamist extremism. It will be a long-term
ideological struggle. But I do think in the end we win this one
as well.
I also finally want to thank the Speaker who had something
to do with this hearing. I read his opinion piece and was
inspired to put this hearing together because I think it is
important that Congress has a role, an oversight role, and a
role to have hearings to draw attention to the American people
on this issue and shape the policies that impact the security
of the United States.
So let me thank you for that as well.
With that, this hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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