[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. POLICY AND THE OSCE:
MAKING GOOD ON COMMITMENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 28, 2011
__________
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE 112-1-9]
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE
SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland,
Chairman Co-Chairman
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama TOM UDALL, New Mexico
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
New York MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State
MICHAEL C. CAMUNEZ, Department of Commerce
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense
[ii]
U.S. POLICY AND THE OSCE:
MAKING GOOD ON COMMITMENTS
----------
July 28, 2011
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 6
WITNESSES
Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs, Department of State.......................... 3
Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State................... 6
Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.......... 8
Dr. Michael Haltzel, Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic
Relations, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS)..................... 18
Catherine Fitzpatrick, Consultant, Jacob Blaustein Institute for
the Advancement of Human Rights................................ 21
APPENDICES
Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith.................. 30
Prepared statement of Philip H. Gordon........................... 31
Prepared statement of Michael H. Posner.......................... 35
Prepared statement of Alexander Vershbow......................... 40
Prepared statement of Dr. Michael Haltzel........................ 46
[iii]
U.S. POLICY AND THE OSCE:
MAKING GOOD ON COMMITMENTS
----------
July 28, 2011
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 1:30 p.m. in room 210, Cannnon
House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon.
Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State;
Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State; Alexander
Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense; Dr. Michael Haltzel,
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns
Hopkins University (SAIS); and Catherine Fitzpatrick,
Consultant, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of
Human Rights.
HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. The Commission will come to order, and good
afternoon, everybody. Thank you for being here for this very
important Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
hearing. I'd like to welcome our distinguished witnesses. It is
not often that we have the honor of hearing from three
assistant secretaries at the same time, including two who also
serve as Helsinki Commissioners, so you really should be up
here--[chuckles]--asking the questions. But thank you for being
here and thank you for your work on behalf of human rights and
all of the three baskets that make up the Helsinki Final Act.
Today we'll explore the U.S. policy towards the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a unique
intergovernmental organization that incorporates human rights
and economic development into its comprehensive concept of
security. Unfortunately, over the past several years, OSCE
countries with poor human rights records have been able to
thwart some of the organization's work on these issues.
Last December at the Astana Summit, the OSCE's first summit
since 1990, OSCE states failed to reach consensus on an action
plan laying out priorities for the coming years. Yet, the OSCE
needs to continue to focus on fundamental human rights issues.
This is its heritage, the reason it was created in the 1970s.
It must not allow itself to be sidetracked by Russia or other
un- or semi-democratic states which argue that the organization
should look only at positive examples of best practices or that
distract the OSCE from its work by insisting on lengthy
discussions of OSCE reform.
Likewise, our own government must raise the priority given
to human rights and humanitarian concerns, from supporting
oppressed people of Belarus, turning back the trend to restrict
Internet and media freedoms, supporting democracy in Kyrgyzstan
and democratic activists throughout all of central Asia, making
sure the OSCE partnership program is used to generally promote
human rights for oppressed minorities; and as for the Copts in
Egypt, helping OSCE countries to address the disturbing and
potential tragic demographic trends found in almost all of the
member states. All of these have been the subject of recent
commission hearings and as we look forward to working with the
executive branch on each and every one of these issues.
One issue I'd like to particularly raise here is the
international child abduction issue. I note parenthetically--
and unfortunately due to scheduling I will have to be absent
for most of this hearing--but at 2:00 I'll be hearing, as
chairman of the Global Health, Global Human Rights Africa
Subcommittee from Susan Jacobs and others about the efforts to
bring children home who have been abducted throughout the
world.
The Hague Treaty is now some 30 years old. And
unfortunately, much of its implementing processes have been
thwarted or mitigated by countries, especially government
authorities that have refused to take seriously their
obligations; and the hearing will focus on many of these
countries, with a particular emphasis on Japan. So regrettably
I will have to leave for that. Again, this hearing was actually
put on after that hearing.
I would also point out that at the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly in Belgrade earlier this month, there was a resolution
that we had authored as a commission to take up the issue of
international parental child abductions by promoting better
implementation of the Hague convention. My hope is that at the
OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius this year we can look at standards
for OSCE states to fill the gaps in the convention's
implementation. Like I said, 30 years after its signing there
are huge gaps that must be looked at.
I'd like to also say that--and I mentioned this to
Assistant Secretary Posner just a moment ago--but last week we
held a very disturbing hearing here in this room and heard from
three distinguished witnesses including Michelle Clark, who all
of you will recall was the director of OSCE trafficking work.
She did a landmark report on partner-country Egypt and focused
on the issue of the abduction and the forced marriages of
Coptic women, often starting as early as 14 and 15 years of
age, who are then forced into Islam and then after that forced
to take up a Muslim husband. If that isn't a definition of
trafficking, I don't know what is.
This has been reported on, as I think all of you know, in
the past in a cursory way, perhaps, by many human rights
reports. But she said--and she said it with emphasis--that the
idea that it's a mere allegation must be stricken from the
record, that this is now a common practice. And she estimated--
and she did on-the-ground investigations and, frankly, she
actually told us she would going back to do more on-the-ground
human rights investigations--that thousands of Coptic girls,
every year now, are being abducted and forced into Muslim
marriages, obviously against their will, against the will of
their families. And drugs and rape are very often a means to
expedite that conversion and that marriage--an absolute
horrific situation that has gotten scant coverage.
I plan--or actually offered an amendment to the foreign
relations bill when it was marked up last week in committee
condemning this egregious practice. And many of the members
wanted more information after the markup, which we are
providing and have provided. And I do think it's an issue we
need to engage robustly.
I'd like to introduce our first panel, beginning first with
Dr. Philip Gordon who serves as Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Eurasian affairs. Prior to assuming his
position he was a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution.
He also served as Director for European Affairs at the National
Security Council under President Clinton.
Michael Posner serves as Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. And prior to his current
position he was executive director and then president of Human
Rights First. And I would just say personally I've worked with
him for decades and it's great to have him before the
Commission. Before joining Human Rights First, he practiced law
in Chicago, and he also worked for the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, which obviously became Human Rights First.
Then we'll hear from Ambassador Alexander Vershbow who
serves as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs. A career foreign service officer, he has
served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the Russian Federation and
the Republic of Korea. He's held numerous senior-level foreign
policy positions principally focused on the former Soviet Union
and the Balkans.
And so I'd like to now ask our first panelist, Dr. Gordon,
if he would proceed.
PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND
EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Sec. Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored
to be here, and appreciate the opportunity to talk about our
agenda for the OSCE. I am particularly pleased to be sitting
here with my friends and close colleagues, Mike Posner and
Sandy Vershbow. I'd like to focus my remarks today on the OSCE
since the December 2010 Astana Summit, which I attended along
with Secretary Clinton.
And I'd like to begin by looking at our core foreign policy
goals for the organization, reviewing our achievements at
Astana and looking forward to the OSCE's Ministerial in Vilnius
this December. I've submitted a long version for the record,
and would like to just summarize here if I may.
Mr. Smith. Without objection. Your full statement and that
of our distinguished witnesses will be made a part of the
record.
Sec. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our approach to the OSCE rests firmly on the foundation of
relations with Europe and Eurasia as a whole. Europe remains a
key national priority for the United States for the simple
reason that nowhere does the United States have better, more
valuable partners than in Europe. The United States and Europe
share common values, our economies are intertwined, and our
militaries work together to address common security challenges.
U.S. bilateral engagement with Europe is complemented by
key multilateral institutions, including the OSCE. Through the
OSCE we engage on such U.S. priorities as advancing human
rights and fundamental freedoms, building democratic
institutions throughout the OSCE area, and advancing good
governance in the economic and environmental spheres, and
military transparency. In this period of tight budgets,
multilateral approaches often present an effective alternative
to unilateral engagement.
Today, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the principles and
commitments embodied by the OSCE face some serious challenges
both from the inside and outside of the organization. From
within, there is an uneven application of the Helsinki
principles. Regional crises and transnational threats are
proliferating. Efforts to resolve the protracted conflicts, for
example, in Georgia, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh continue to
face very frustrating obstacles.
To take another example, Russia's determination to limit
the role of the OSCE in Georgia has diminished possibilities
for international engagement in this region where transparency
and confidence building are sorely needed. Problems like these
make headlines, but they offer only a partial picture of the
OSCE, because the OSCE has also made tremendous contributions
toward advancing democratic prosperity and stability throughout
Europe and Eurasia. Although it is at times stymied by a lack
of political will, the OSCE nonetheless remains uniquely
positioned to build confidence through military transparency,
promote good governance and protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Europe and Eurasia.
At the Astana Summit last December, which was the first
OSCE summit in 11 years, the 56 participating states issued the
Astana Commemorative Declaration, which was a stronger
affirmation of the Helsinki principles and commitments of the
entire OSCE akey (ph) including, for the very first time, an
explicit statement that human rights situations in
participating states are matters of, quote, ``direct and
legitimate concern to all.'' Because of disagreements over the
protracted conflicts, we were indeed unable to get consensus on
an action plan at Astana. But the final document tasks future
chairmanships to develop a plan to address a range of common
challenges.
Since the summit, we've been working with the Lithuanian
chairmanship as new challenges present themselves. Among these
has been Belarus. After a flawed presidential election, the
Government of Belarus launched a brutal crackdown against the
opposition and civil society following, and closed the OSCE
office in Minsk. Through the invocation of the Moscow Mechanism
and other efforts, we are working to hold the Government of
Belarus accountable for its failure to protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
In close consultation with Senator Cardin and others on
this Committee, we have also taken concrete actions to address
the tragic case of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who died in pre-
trial detention in Russia. We've also worked with the
chairmanship to support greater OSCE assistance for North
Africa. For example, ODIHR, at the request of Egyptian
activists, is already holding a workshop for Egyptian civil
society on international standards of election observation in
advance of Egypt's November parliamentary elections.
Looking forward to the December OSCE Ministerial in
Vilnius, the United States is working with our partners to
achieve results in all three dimensions. Very briefly--in
political-military dimension, we want to agree on a substantial
update of the OSCE central arms control agreement, the Vienna
Document, which we hope will be reissued at Vilnius for the
first time since 1999. In the economic-environmental dimension,
we want to endorse greater economic transparency, good
governance and anti-corruption measures, as well as work with
the special representative on gender issues to empower women in
the economic sphere. In the human dimension, we hope to take
the Helsinki Final Act into the digital age with a decision
that would explicitly acknowledge that human rights and
fundamental freedoms can apply to online activity as they do to
offline activity. We want to reaffirm and strengthen
government's commitment to the protection of journalists.
We all know that a consensus-based organization with 56
participating states sometimes moves in frustratingly small
steps. The issues the OSCE faces can seem intractable, but
exchanging words is better than exchanging bullets, which
unfortunately we have experienced in the OSCE space in the last
three years. The OSCE has not yet lived up to its full
potential, but the OSCE does good and vital work and remains
essential for protecting human rights, promoting stability and
spreading democracy throughout the region.
The Helsinki Commission; you, Mr. Chairman; the
Commissioners and the experts on your staff play a vital role
ensuring that the participating states keep the promises made
at Helsinki. With your support, the United States will continue
to play a leading role in the OSCE to strengthen, build upon
the progress participating states have made over the past 35
years, and bring us closer to a truly stable, secure and
prosperous OSCE region. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Gordon, thank you very much for your testimony.
To note, there are eight consecutive votes on the floor right
now. I have 30 seconds to get to the floor. Co-Chairman Ben
Cardin will be here momentarily, but until then we will stand
in, momentarily, recess. Again, I apologize to our witnesses.
[Recess.]
HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. The Commission will come back to order. I
apologize; as I think Chairman Smith has indicated, the House
has series of votes. The Senate's waiting on the House. We may
be waiting a long time from what I understand. So we're sort of
in that position. Obviously the timing of this hearing was--we
didn't anticipate that we would be in the midst of these
negotiations concerning the budget. So we apologize to all of
our witnesses. I understand that Secretary Gordon, you've
already completed your opening statement, so we'll go to
Secretary Posner.
MICHAEL H. POSNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Sec. Posner. Thank you, Senator Cardin. I ask that my
written testimony be submitted to the record.
Mr. Cardin. Without objection, all of your statements will
be included in the record.
Sec. Posner. Great. First, I want to thank you for holding
this important hearing at this time. And I want to focus my
brief remarks on the human rights and human dimension aspect of
the OSCE.
First, for us, the OSCE is an important forum for raising
human rights issues in individual countries in concern. And in
the written testimony, I focus in particular on Belarus, Russia
and Uzbekistan. As Assistant Secretary Gordon said with respect
to Belarus, we see a refusal to extend the mandate of the OSCE
office in Minsk, its hindering of the Moscow Mechanism by not
allowing a special rapporteur into the country, and now their
resistance to joining consensus on the agenda for the human
dimension implementation meeting in Warsaw. But by its
obstructionist behavior, Belarus only draws more attention to
its poor human rights record.
We also have been and will continue to press for human
rights with respect to Russia. We've spoken out repeatedly at
the OSCE Permanent Council and in other OSCE fora about the--
about the many unresolved cases, like the murder of journalist
Paul Klebnikov, human rights activist Natalya Estemirova, and
the corruption and impunity as exemplified in the tragic case
of Sergei Magnitsky--Senator Cardin, a case in which you've
played such an important role in drawing international
attention, and we thank you for that--also restrictions on free
assembly for groups like Strategy-31.
For us, the OSCE is particularly important, though, in the
five Central Asian states, which don't really have another
regional forum. And so the comprehensive security we seek in
the OSCE region, and in Central Asia particularly, will remain
elusive until a range of serious human rights problems are
addressed. There is a pattern, for example, of serious human
rights violations in Uzbekistan. We've consistently raised our
concerns in cases like that of Dilmurod Sayid, a journalist who
was imprisoned for writing about corruption; Maxim Popov, who
remains incarcerated for working on AIDS issues; and we
continue to advocate for fair treatment and due process in
these and similar cases.
We are committed to working with civil society in
Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries to advance
democratic reforms at a moment where those issues are extremely
difficult. But sometimes the engagement does yield results. And
I want to point in a positive way to the actions by the
Government of Kyrgyzstan, which has decriminalized libel, an
issue in which the OSCE representative on freedom of the media
has persistently focused.
A second broad point I want to make is that the OSCE
remains a pioneering process relevant in today's world. It's a
comprehensive approach to security, to human values--which are
at the core of the Helsinki process--and there is also a
recognition of the vital role of civil society. The OSCE as an
institution and the civil society activists associated with the
Helsinki movement contribute expertise to our partnership with
Mediterranean states now undergoing transformations.
Third, and relating to that same point, the Helsinki
process must continue to champion citizen activism. Secretary
Clinton last summer gave an important speech in Krakow, Poland,
talking about the environment in which NGOs--which civil
society are now being restricted by governments who are unhappy
with their actions--the OSCE, through its engagement of civil
society, reinforces our strategy of supporting citizen
activism. In mid-August, my bureau will be reviewing proposals
for a new $500,000 program to create a
demand-driven, virtual network of human rights and democracy
activists in the OSCE region. We're calling it Helsinki 2.0.
This will help extend Helsinki's human dimension and the legacy
of citizen involvement.
Last point is that I think it's important for us to send a
clear message from Vilnius on Internet freedom. I appreciate
the Commission holding a hearing on that subject several weeks
ago. We applaud Lithuania for making media freedom both via old
and new technologies key themes of their chairmanship, and
we're grateful for the tireless effort of the OSCE permanent
representative on freedom of the media, Dunja Mijatovic.
As Ambassador Gordon and I have both noted in our written
testimonies, the U.S. Government is committed to fundamental
freedoms in the digital age, and the Astana summit ended
without adoption of a plan. We intend to renew our efforts in
the Vilnius Ministerial.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that we are
committed to a Europe that is whole, free and at peace, Europe
and Eurasia coming together in an integrated way. And there
can't be lasting security in this region until human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully exercised by all of the
people within the OSCE region.
Again, I want to thank you for holding these hearings and
for your own personal commitment to these issues.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you for your testimony and thank
for your participation on the Commission. Secretary Vershbow?
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Sec. Vershbow. Thank you, Senator Cardin. Thanks to you and
to Chairman Smith for inviting me to testify about the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and our
goals in the runup to the Vilnius Ministerial meeting in
December. And I'm very honored to associate myself with this
Commission and its achievements over the decades. Like my
colleagues, I have a longer statement that I'd like to submit
for the record.
Mr. Cardin. And it will be.
Sec. Vershbow. But I'll just summarize some of the main
points.
The OSCE has three attributes that make it unique. It has a
vast geographic scope; it has a three-basket approach to
security, encompassing human rights, economic development, as
well as military security that is still relevant today; and it
has an extraordinary legacy, having played a critical role both
in supporting and inspiring the forces of democracy and freedom
behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War and then bringing
order during Europe's tumultuous political transitions of the
early 1990s.
Throughout its history, the OSCE has adapted to new
challenges and changes in the security environment. And in
keeping with this tradition, it must continue to adapt to face
the challenges of the 21st century.
As we've heard, last December, the OSCE held its first
summit in Astana--the first summit since 1999. At the summit,
we learned that the achievements of the OSCE cannot be taken
for granted. The effort to produce an action plan for 2011
foundered over fundamental disagreements on conventional arms
control and the unresolved conflicts.
Fortunately, due in no small part to the efforts of my
friend Phil Gordon, the member states did succeed in producing
the Astana Commemorative Declaration which recommitted all 56
participating states to the Helsinki principles and to
revitalizing the
political-military dimension of European security.
And I'd like to focus on what the administration would like
to accomplish in this area by the time of the Ministerial in
December, with particular attention to the three most important
parts of the conventional arms control regime: The 1999 Vienna
Document, the Open Skies Treaty, and the CFE Treaty.
OSCE is engaged in an intensive effort to update the Vienna
Document for the first time since 1999. So far, the only
changes that have been agreed are administrative in nature.
One substantive proposal that we believe would be critical
to making the update a success is to lower the force thresholds
for notification of military maneuvers, a subject that's
central to the original intention of the Vienna document. So
far, only 35 of the 56 participating states have agreed to this
proposal, but we think it would better reduce force sizes in
Europe and it would send a clear signal that OSCE is serious
about modernizing military transparency and security in Europe
even though this is not the only updating that should be done,
either before or beyond Vilnius.
So we hope to have a deeper discussion with our OSCE
partners on a range of measures that would be necessary to
improve the security of all participating states. With military
budgets under pressure, we think that the Vienna Document must
continue to evolve to keep pace with the transformations
underway across Europe's militaries.
On Open Skies, the 34 states party to the treaty have flown
more than 700 aerial observation flights since the treaty
entered into force in 2002. The ability of any party to overfly
any part of the territory of every other party is actually
quite extraordinary. And, indeed, the United States and Russia
both used Open Skies to verify the New START treaty. We're
seeking to recommit the United States to the treaty by
increasing the number of flights in which we participate each
year and by upgrading our sensors to digital. While many states
are scaling back their participation due to budget cuts, we
note that Russia has renewed its commitment by purchasing new
Open Skies aircraft, so we look forward to the continued
operation of this landmark treaty.
The news on conventional armed forces in Europe, the CFE
Treaty, is less encouraging. As you know, the CFE impasse began
with Russia's December 2007 suspension of its compliance with
the treaty. Our efforts, led by Ambassador Victoria Nuland, to
conclude a framework agreement as the starting point of
negotiations to modernize the treaty have foundered on two main
issues: the right of states to choose whether or not to allow
foreign forces to be stationed on their sovereign territory,
and providing transparency among all parties regarding their
current military posture.
Currently, the United States is consulting with the other
parties to decide the way forward while continuing to encourage
Moscow to reconsider its position. But as NATO said at the
Lisbon summit last November, this situation in which 29 parties
implement the treaty while one does not cannot continue
indefinitely.
While the future of CFE remains uncertain, we remain
committed to conventional arms control and military
transparency in Europe. And while the CFE treaty can't be
replaced, we'll continue to work through the OSCE to advance
these objectives by modernizing the Vienna Document and the
Open Skies Treaty.
We also seek to use the leverage of OSCE's diverse
membership in trying to address the unresolved conflicts. And
we hope through cooperative efforts to resolve them.
Sadly, we've seen little sign of progress on resolving the
conflict between Georgia and Russia. Talks do continue in
Vienna and in Geneva on the possibility of an OSCE team that
could have access to all of the territory of Georgia within its
internationally recognized borders, but Russia has yet to
agree.
Our position remains unchanged. The United States continues
to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty
within its internationally recognized borders, and we will
maintain our support for international efforts to find a
peaceful resolution to the dispute over Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Russia needs to abide by its ceasefire arrangements
and take steps that promote stability in the region.
The OSCE continues to play an important role in supporting
a peaceful resolution of the dispute over Transdniestria
through the ``five plus two'' talks, and the United States
remains closely engaged with our OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs,
Russia and France, in supporting efforts to promote a peaceful
settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.
Unfortunately, an attempt last month to reach a
breakthrough failed and tensions along the line of contact are
increasing. But with the parties' inability to finalize the
Madrid basic principles to resolve the conflict, we remain at a
dangerous stalemate, and prospects for progress remain
uncertain.
Now, the OSCE is also a forerunner among regional
organizations in addressing emerging threats, such as
preventing nuclear proliferation to nonstate actors, the
control of small arms and light weapons, the promotion of
cybersecurity, and enhancing border security in Central Asia.
On nonproliferation, OSCE continues to work towards full
implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. OSCE
is setting norms for its members on nuclear nonproliferation by
hosting specialized workshops and specialized tools for
implementation.
OSCE is a vital forum for cooperation on reducing the
threat posed by small arms and light weapons. It's facilitated
cooperation among participating states in reducing trafficking,
securing existing stocks, and eliminating excess small arms and
light weapons and related materials since 1999. In March and
July of this year, DOD participated in OSCE-led visits to
Kyrgyzstan, and we're now working to ensure that that country's
man-portable air-defense systems, or MANPADS--and we're also
coordinating OSCE efforts to secure and destroy large
stockpiles of hazardous conventional ammunition.
On cybersecurity, OSCE hosted an important conference to
explore potential roles for the organization, which included
not only participating states, partners, and international
organizations but the European Commission, Japan, and NATO. In
the run-up to the Vilnius ministerial, the Pentagon will
continue to support State
Department-led discussions on developing cyber confidence-
building mechanisms in the OSCE to protect our vital interests.
We also have been working through OSCE to promote a stable,
secure, and prosperous Central Asia by improving border
security and working to combat illegal drug trafficking and
other forms of proliferation across the region. We believe OSCE
can do more in Afghanistan. The secretariat has proposed 16
projects to enhance Afghan border security with an emphasis on
building Afghan capacity. These are supportive of the
Afghanistan government's national development strategy. So far,
only a few have been implemented and we would like to see more
progress between now and Vilnius on these very important
projects.
So, to conclude, Senator, in 1970, it was unlikely that
NATO and the Warsaw Pact would hand each other their order of
battle, publish advance warning of and invite observers to
their large military exercises, conduct thousands of intrusive
inspections, and fly hundreds of uncontested reconnaissance
sorties over each other's territories. But now, we take these
measures for granted.
The OSCE, aided by this Commission, remains an important
tool to prevent future conflicts, to resolve the remaining
conflicts in Eurasia, to address new threats as they emerge. We
hope to be a bit further along by this year in projecting the
peace and security of OSCE to other areas of instability, but
clearly much more work remains to be done.
I hope that by the time of the Vilnius meeting in December,
the Astana summit will, ultimately, be seen as a turning point
in reinvigorating OSCE's security dimension and moving it
boldly into the 21st century.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you for that comprehensive
presentation. I thank all three of you.
It's clear to me that if the Vilnius Ministerial is going
to be successful, it's going to require a great deal of
preparation work by the United States. We saw a year ago with
the Astana preparations--were not up to what we wanted it to
be, and I agree with the observations; Secretary Gordon, but
for your work and the U.S. work, I think that would've been a
difficult time. I think we pulled out at the end some important
work that was done in Astana. And I really do applaud the U.S.
for your leadership there.
We can't chance that again. I think we need better
preparation moving in to the Ministerial. Of course, this is
not a summit, so the expectations are nowhere near as high, but
it still, I think, requires us--it's a once-a-year opportunity.
And I listen to your testimony, and I think you do have the
framework for some very important progress being made following
up on Astana and Vilnius. And I just encourage you to work with
our Commission here so that we can try to reinforce what you're
doing with the work of our Commission.
I want to just follow up, if I might--Secretary Vershbow,
that you pointed out: the strength of the OSCE, its
geographical scope, the fact that it has the three baskets that
are interwoven together, and its legacy. And we can all point
with pride a lot of what has been done as a result of the OSCE.
On the geographical side, since its inception, of course,
the United States and Russia were equal partners in an
organization in Europe which gave it a unique opportunity for
the relationship between the United States and Russia. The
breakup of the Soviet Union, of course, now gives us
opportunities in Central Asia that we did not have before, and
that's still unclear as to how we're going to be using that
opportunity to advance Central Asia.
And now, there is an interest in expanding the OSCE in the
Mediterranean beyond just our partner states, in using the
framework--it was Max Kampelman who originally suggested that
we create a separate OSCE for the Mediterranean. Later, he
said, well, it would take too long to do that; why don't we
just try to expand the Middle East into OSCE? And we've been
doing that. We've been doing that through the partnership
status. There is some talk within the Parliamentary Assembly to
try to give the Mediterranean partners higher standing. I would
be interested in the U.S. pursuing additional partner states in
the Middle East as well as increased participation in the OSCE
for the partner states.
So I guess if you could--and I would like to hear all three
of you--first, how you see us using the OSCE as it relates to
Russia, which I think is a real challenge. We have some of the
real experts here on Russia, so what should we be looking to as
far as the future of the OSCE as it relates to Russia? Central
Asia, sort of--[inaudible]
Sec. Gordon. Senator, I'd be happy to begin and pick up on
a couple of those. I'm sure my colleagues will follow up.
First, if I might--and thank you for your kind words about
our work on the road to Astana--I would note that your comments
about the difficulty of Astana actually go hand in hand with
your comments about the strength of OSCE, the strength of the
OSCE being that it works in all three dimensions, that there
are 56 participating states, its geography covers a broad swath
of issues; that gives it certain advantages, everybody's
involved and it's comprehensive.
At the same time, it creates challenges in advancing the
agenda that we saw in Astana, and we have no illusions about--
on the road to Vilnius and beyond. It is just something that we
have to live with. With a strong chairmanship in Lithuania and
our own work and the support of the Commission, we hope to--
despite these sort of structural challenges--make real progress
in Vilnius.
On the work in other areas, let me just start with the
Mediterranean. We do believe that there is a role for the OSCE
and the Mediterranean, one that it is indeed already playing.
Even short of an OSCE for the Mediterranean, which, as you
suggest, may be a bridge too far in the short term, the OSCE is
already working with neighboring states in the Mediterranean. I
think I mentioned in my testimony the workshop on elections in
Egypt that just took place in the past couple of weeks. A
number of OSCE members from Central Europe have had workshops
on democratic transitions, which is something also the OSCE can
help with. With years or even decades of experience of trying
to support rule of law, democracy, free market economies in the
OSCE space, it can be useful to those Mediterranean countries
that are seeking that transition as well.
And I guess I would say a similar thing about Central Asia,
where the OSCE is already hard at work trying to do that--
again, facing many challenges but trying to bring the lessons
of what it has learned in decades of democratic support in
Europe and Eurasia to Central Asia as well, and that will be
another theme in Vilnius.
Finally, on Russia: Once again, it's a consensus
organization. As Ambassador Vershbow said, we have had
significant differences with Russia on some of the key issues
we face, including in the area of arms control. But we can't
move forward without Russia. And we are committed to working
with the Russians as we need to in trying to strengthen the
organization and take advantage of one of its most important
voices in the full range of issues.
Sec. Posner. If I can just add a couple thoughts to that: I
think, to share Phil's observation, clearly, in places like
Tunisia, Egypt, hopefully in Libya, there is a desire to engage
with European partners and European countries that have gone
through political transformations moving towards democracy. If
the OSCE can be a forum for making that happen in an easier
way, then we should be encouraging that.
And I think we're going to see in the--I spend a lot of my
time now trying to deal with that region, and there is--these
are countries that have had, in many instances, 30 or 40 years
without any functioning political systems. And so it's in our
interest to facilitate that kind of exchange and engagement,
not so much to impose our thoughts of what's important, but try
to have a real discussion among states that have been through a
similar transformation.
I think the Central Asian piece, from a human rights
perspective, is in some respects the most important. Those five
Central Asian states don't have a Council of Europe or
certainly not a European Union. And they're tough states. On
human rights terms, we have a range of challenges. But I think
the OSCE, however fragile the architecture and however
difficult, I think is a platform. And it's an especially
important platform for the civil society in those states who
feel so marginalized by their own political systems. So I think
even though we continue to struggle over how to keep this as
part of the mix, it's critically important in whatever we do
that this be a piece of what we regard as a priority.
And finally, again, to share Phil's reflections on Russia,
we have our own challenges in dealing with the Russians on a
bilateral basis for human rights. But it's part of the reset,
it's part of our policy. We'll continue to engage. We
understand that these are issues in which we often don't agree,
but that doesn't mean we don't have the conversation. And it
spills over to the OSCE, where often the Russians are at
loggerheads with us about how far the OSCE should go. It's
critical we keep ODIHR as a functioning, strong entity. It's
critical that we keep doing the election monitoring. It's
critical that the human dimension piece be strong and we keep
that agenda where it needs to be.
So we've got our work cut out for us. But I think we're
pretty clear about what we need to do.
Sec. Vershbow. I thank you, Senator, for posing some very
good--interesting questions, challenging ones because, it's
ironic, in the case of Russia that OSCE itself was something
that evolved from a Russian or Soviet initiate--Brezhnev's
European Security Conference proposals. Yet now Russia seems
less enthusiastic about the full three-basket structure and
process that is at the heart of the OSCE.
Clearly there's a lot to be done on some of the issues I
discussed in my statement in the area of conventional arms
control. And I think the Russians still are keenly interested
in that, even if we are having serious difficulties in the case
of the CFE Agreement and finding a framework that respects the
key principles of host nation consent and transparency that I
mentioned. But hopefully the Russians will ultimately see that
a world without any CFE Agreement, without the predictability
and transparency that comes with negotiated arms control, will
be a much more unreliable basis on which to build European
security in the future.
But we do face a bigger challenge in getting all three
baskets back into the category of areas where the Russians are
actively cooperating with us in the OSCE framework, and indeed,
in other areas as well. Mike's addressed the human rights
issues; I think in the area of conflict prevention and crisis
management we've been trying for the last few years to
strengthen OSCE's ability to act proactively and at the early
stages of conflict.
But there too we've encountered Russian resistance to
giving more authority to the chairman in office to take the
initiative to send a fact-finding mission to an emerging area
of conflict. But this ultimately should be in Russia's
interest. We all will save a lot in terms of potential for
bloodshed and expenditure of our treasure if we can nip
conflicts in the bud through political means. And that's where
OSCE has great strengths that should be built upon.
I see tremendous potential in Central Asia to focus on some
of the transnational issues as well as the human rights issues,
since those countries do indeed not have as many other
institutional frameworks to which they can turn. And I think
there too with--whether you're looking at drug trafficking,
terrorism, organized crime--regional approaches that could be
facilitated by OSCE would be tremendous contributors to
Russia's security and to everyone else's.
On the Mediterranean countries, I agree with my colleagues
that the experience of the transition of the post-Cold War
period is certainly something that OSCE could help in sharing
with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. There
may be mechanisms that could be transposed from the European
framework to the Mediterranean framework and in the security
area as well, helping countries in transition develop civilian
control of the military--civil-military relations. And hereto
there may be an increased role for NATO which has had a
Mediterranean dialogue, which has largely been a consultative
forum, but may now have some operational role in the spirit of
the Partnership for Peace-- what the Partnership for Peace did
in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans in the post-
Cold War period.
So it's an organization with tremendous potential and we
hope we can begin to realize more of that at Vilnius and
beyond. And I agree with you on your points about closer
preparation, and we will certainly want to coordinate closely
with the commission as we go forward.
Mr. Cardin. Well, I appreciate that.
Secretary Posner, as you were talking about Russia and
progress made in human rights and that we can deal with that
and deal with other issues at the same time it reminded me of
my first involvement with the Helsinki Commission dealing with
Soviet Jews many years ago. And at that time, the logic of
naming names was being challenged internationally. And naming
names, I think, was perhaps the most effective way that the
Commission was able to advance basic rights by putting a face
on the issue.
And I think most recently--and you mentioned the Sergei
Magnitsky case, I think that also galvanized international
attention. And although Russia may not like the fact that we
have brought this on a personal level, it does bring it home
that they have failed to live up to commitments under the OSCE.
So I would just encourage us to continue to do that. I know
there's a lot of pressure not to embarrass countries because of
individual cases, but to me that's the most effective way that
we're going to be able to make progress towards compliance with
the principles of OSCE.
One last question I have, which--it's a process question,
and that is: The CSCE is 36 years old. When it was first
developed, there was the Soviet Union, we didn't have a
Parliamentary Assembly, Vienna was not what it is today. We're
seeing things that are happening; the consensus process is
being challenged, transparency is clearly a problem within
OSCE, there's mixed signals we're getting from many capitals
around the OSCE region as to how much support they're giving in
Vienna. How does the United States interject itself into
reforms within the OSCE?
We have direct interest in the Parliamentary Assembly. It's
played a critical role in election monitoring, one of the
principle services provided by the OSCE. There's been friction
between ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly. We had the
secretary general of the Parliamentary Assembly--who happens to
be with us today, Spencer Oliver--who was here in Congress when
the original Helsinki Act was passed and has a lot of
institutional knowledge of what needs to be done.
I guess, as I saw the results in Astana, I realized that
but for the United States we would not have been able to
achieve what we did. It seems to me that reform within OSCE
will not take place unless the United States is in the
leadership. And how do we develop that? How does the United
States put these issues up? I say that fully supportive of the
importance of the OSCE today with all of its problems. But it
could be much more effective, I think we all agree. How do we
go about exercising that leadership in the United States?
Sec. Gordon. And, again, I'm happy to start. And I'll start
by saying we share your premise, especially those of us who try
to work with the organization on a regular basis. It is clear
that it is suffering from the consensus principle and a lack of
political will among countries to allow it to function as
efficiently as it needs to. So how do we deal with that and how
have we been trying to do it?
First of all, as you say, through our own U.S. leadership
and vigorous action. Secretary Clinton herself is personally
invested in this. That's why she went to Astana; that's why she
has focused on this whole set of issues. The organization has a
new secretary general and we will give him our full support--a
very competent Italian, an experienced Italian diplomat. You
mentioned the Parliamentary Assembly which we will also
support. This Commission, and through our own efforts, we have
tried to find ways to make the organization more efficient by
allowing it to act, in some cases, when there isn't a
consensus.
And I think we mentioned using what's called the Moscow
Mechanism in Belarus. Obviously, when we wanted to follow up on
the very flawed elections and the use of violence by the regime
that followed those elections last December, if the OSCE had to
wait for every member to agree--that is to say including
Belarus--it couldn't have played a role. So we invoked and
supported the use of this Moscow Mechanism where a smaller
number of OSCE countries can send an observer-investigator into
a member state. And naturally, there was resistance to that in
some quarters. But we actually managed to do it, and I might
add including--with Russian support.
So there are ways to use the organization. It's not easy,
but those types of mechanisms can make it more efficient. We
tried to suggest a similar reform when it comes to crisis
response. At present, because of the consensus rule, the OSCE
is just too slow. If violence breaks out in a participating
state and most of us think it would be useful to have the OSCE
send someone, it is necessary to get support of all of them,
and lo and behold it's not surprising that maybe the state that
is using force doesn't want it to happen.
And we have tried to suggest that it would be more
effective to have a crisis response mechanism that didn't rely
on consensus, whether it's minus one or minus two or minus
three. But that is one of the issues we have not reached
consensus on, including from Russia which is reluctant to allow
for that capacity. We still support it; we still think it would
be a good idea to prevent a single country from blocking the
organization as a whole to have a crisis response action. So
that's unfortunate, and we will continue to try to lobby for
that change.
And then lastly I would just say that--to remind us all
that even when the organization at 56 in Vienna is stymied by a
lack of consensus, we shouldn't overlook the importance of the
sub-organizations of the OSCE, including ODHIR, including the
High Representative for Freedom of the Media, including the
High Commissioner for National Minorities. These organizations
are effective, sometimes quietly. So, you know, I just remind
us all that even as we get frustrated sometimes maybe by an
inability to get the entire organization to work, that doesn't
take anything away from the effectiveness of some of these
subgroups.
Sec. Vershbow. Thank you, Senator. And thanks, Phil. Phil
has covered some points that I would have made. I think the
bottom line is you're right, that the American leadership is
going to be critical to not only keeping the organization
effective in what it's doing now, but getting it to engage in
new areas where I think it can fill a void in the overall
security architecture of Europe and Eurasia. So we have to very
persistent in our diplomacy, patient but not too patient. I
think we have to recognize that if the institution doesn't
overcome what is, I think fair to call, a crisis of confidence
on the part of some of its members in the institution itself,
then it will be relegated to a second-tier status.
So I think that we have to continue to work very hard to
persuade the countries that have become more skeptical about
OSCE that it really is an asset that they could use to deal
with their own security problems and help them in dealing with
threats on their doorstep, preventing conflicts from emerging;
that it's not a burden, it's a relatively affordable
institution in terms of what we spend on it, but it can deliver
significant results. But clearly some countries still see OSCE
as a threat. And we have to overcome that attitude.
We certainly, from the DOD point of view, try to talk up
OSCE in our defense dialogues with the countries in Europe and
Eurasia. We certainly took a proactive role in the effort to
revitalize the CFE Treaty. And while it has not yet borne
fruit, we're still committed to try to shape an approach that
can respect the principles that are important to all the member
states but get that negotiating process back on track and bring
the agreement up to date in light of new geopolitical
realities.
So, again, persistence in our diplomacy will be key, but
clearly we have an uphill climb ahead of us.
Sec. Posner. Just a couple words to add what both have
said. Having attended both the human dimension meeting in
Warsaw and the summit in Astana last year, it is clear to me
how much the United States' leadership is vital. And I think
it's incumbent on us also to be redoubling our efforts to
engage at every level the Western European allies that should
be standing with us on all of these issues. They're there, but
they wait sometimes for us to lead. And for this organization
to succeed, we have to have a critical mass of countries that
are all working at full speed in the way that we do as a
delegation. I'm very proud to be part of this Government
because I see how much time and energy we put into these
issues.
Second thing, I think it is important that we change the
dynamic in a different way, which is that we've got to move to
create allies, for example, in the Central Asian area. It's one
of the reasons I mentioned Kyrgyzstan twice--I'm going to
mention in now a third time. It represents a potential change
in the atmosphere and the environment of this organization if
we can reinforce the best instincts of an emerging democracy in
Central Asia, which Kyrgyzstan could be--we're not there yet--
but it would suggest that we have an ally in a different place
where we could begin to build, I think, some new dynamic
changes.
The third thing, just following on what Phil said, I'm very
high on the work on the high representative on the media. I
think she's done an outstanding job. I also think the three
tolerance representatives--Andy Baker in particular, who's
focused on anti-
Semitism--below the radar in some ways, but taking on very
tough issues, doing real factual fact gathering, and building a
kind of momentum on very tough issues that are particularly
important now in Europe. And so that agenda, the tolerance
agenda, to me is a critically important one. We've got to,
again, pay attention and make sure that the resources and the
political support is behind that.
Last point, Senator, in relation to your comment on
Magnitsky, I think it's really important for us also to be
taking on the tough cases, to make that part of the routine.
Sometimes we do it privately, and when we can succeed that's
the best. But as you've done in the Magnitsky case, you've
raised the profile, you've caused us to, you know, redouble our
efforts. We were very engaged, but we're now engaged some more.
And we've certainly seen the reaction on the Russian side is
that you've gotten their attention. And I think that's a good
thing.
Mr. Cardin. Well, I thank you all for your observations
there. I was going to make an observation that the
parliamentarians can really help you bring about the kind of
consensus you need, but I didn't think this was good day for me
to mention that, considering where we are in Congress. But I do
think that the political involvement of the Parliamentary
Assembly can help.
As you mentioned, and I think rightly so, that the
institutions within OSCE had a great deal of strength. Even
though we need consensus for overall action, we have the
institutions that are now well established. I might point out
that in almost every one of those cases it was the leadership
of the United States that either initiated or funded their
operations. There was a lot of extra budgetary support that the
United States was behind to support the human rights capacity
of OSCE. And of course the tolerance was the U.S. initiative.
So I guess what I would encourage us all to do--as we look
towards the future, how do we transform OSCE to continue to be
relevant to meet the current needs? And that's why I look at
expanding its geographical side. I look at some of the steps
that we could take to integrate a better relationship between
the Parliamentary Assembly and the Permanent Council and what
happens in Vienna. Those issues, I think, are election
monitoring, which is one of our signature issues, and to make
sure that we continue to have the type of support to be able to
carry out those important functions. I think all that would be
important for us to continue.
Just one positive note before we call the second panel. Our
annual meeting was in Belgrade, and we look in the Balkans
today, and I think--although there's still many challenges,
Kosovo and Bosnia are still very much at risk--but clearly the
progress that's been made in the Balkans reflect not just the
work of the OSCE but the leadership of the United States. And I
couldn't tell you how proud we were to see the progress that
was made in Serbia.
I mean, Serbia was one of my principle countries of
interest just a few years ago for its failure to meet OSCE
commitments. And now it's clearly on the path for moving
towards EU. And that's, I think, a credit to the support of the
United States and the support of the OSCE through the process.
So I think there's been a lot of successes that we can point
to, but we still have challenges that we have to meet.
And with that thank you all very much. And we'll move to
the second panel. And, again, I apologize for the delay. Just
for the record, tell our first panel there may be questions
that we'll be submitting for the record. We would ask if you
would get them back to us in a timely way.
The second panel will consist of Dr. Mike Haltzel, senior
fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and
a senior adviser at the international consulting firm of
McLarty Associates. We also have Cathy Fitzpatrick, a
consultant to the human rights organization, a frequent
contributor to online publications at Eurasia and about the
OSCE, and also a Russian translator. She has testified for our
Commission several times, and has served as a public member of
the U.S. delegation to OSCE Human Dimensions in 1991, 2004 and
2010.
And I appreciate the patience of both of you--obviously
we're a little bit delayed. And we will try to move this on. We
will keep the record open for questions from members of the
Commission. We would ask our witnesses if questions are asked
to try to respond to them as promptly as possible.
Dr. Haltzel, I'd be glad to start with you.
DR. MICHAEL HALTZEL, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (SAIS)
Mr. Haltzel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask, first of
all, that the full text of my written remarks be entered into
the record.
Mr. Cardin. That's be true for both witnesses, your full
testimony will be included in the record, and you may proceed
as you wish.
Mr. Haltzel. Thank you. It's an honor and a pleasure to
participate in today's hearing. I'd like to take this
opportunity to commend you and Congressman Smith for your
energetic leadership of the Helsinki Commission. In a policy
world where coping with daily crisis makes it easy not to see
the forest for the trees, the Helsinki Commission stands out
for its ability to examine both current problems and their
deeper causes.
I would also mention the, quote-unquote, ``foot soldiers''
of our OSCE policy. During the past two years I've had the
honor of being the head of three U.S. delegations to OSCE
conferences. The 2009 H-Dem [ph] in Warsaw, 2010 Copenhagen
20th Anniversary Conference, and the 2010 Vienna Review
Conference. I can honestly say, Senator, I've never encountered
a more expert, hard-working and effective group of public
servants than the members of those three delegations and the
officials backing them up here in Washington, D.C. Several of
them are here in the room today. I think American people are
being extraordinarily well served by, and should be proud of,
these U.S. Federal employees.
Mr. Chairman, a lot of the territory was covered eloquently
by the three assistant secretaries on the first panel. I will
attempt to give a somewhat more general summary of an outsider
who on occasion has been part of the OSCE process. When one
views the Helsinki process over the nearly four decades of its
existence one must, I believe, judge it to have been a
resounding success. The old CSCE played a significant role in
hastening the demise of communism in Europe, the Caucasus and
Central Asia; and the territory of the OSCE today is
unquestionably in much better shape than it was when the
founders began their deliberations in the Finnish capital in
the early 1970s.
That's the relatively good news. The bad news--and I think
we've heard it, again, in the first panel and from you also,
Senator, is that since arguably its high point in 1990 at the
Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension, where actually I
was a public member, the organization has, in many respects,
been a disappointment. To be sure, it faces formidable
challenges. We've talked about Uzbekistan, in Andijan the
massacre in 2005; Kyrgyzstan, which as a new democratic
government and there is some hope, nonetheless had a violent,
repressive leader who fled last year. We know about the
insurgency spreading in Russia's largely Muslim North Caucasus
where Moscow has farmed out control of Chechnya to a brutal
warlord.
These and other abuses, again, were outlined by the first
panel and by Chairman Smith. Russia's military continues
illegally to occupy parts of Georgia and Moldova, talks on the
protracted conflicts seems stalled.
What has the OSCE been able to do to remedy these problems?
Unfortunately, I don't think enough. Last December's first-in-
a-
decade OSCE summit undoubtedly accomplished a formal
reaffirmation of the organization's lofty principles. We
deserve credit for leadership there, Phil Gordon especially.
In a healthy organization, however, I submit that this
reaffirmation would have been considered unnecessary. And we,
as you know, did plan for an action plan. My final statement at
Vienna, we outlined nine areas where the United States felt
progress had to be made or we could not agree to an action
plan. I'm glad we stuck to our principles because it would have
been incomplete otherwise.
The consensus rule we've talked about has become an
increasing burden. Nondemocratic members, Russia above all,
continually stymie organizational progress. We've talked about
American crisis response proposals that have been blocked:
preventive action in North Caucasus, aid in Afghanistan.
The lack of an enforcement mechanism is also a fundamental
weakness of the OSCE. At the Copenhagen conference last June,
where several other people on the staff were also present as
members of the delegation, we had a remarkably free and open
discussion in the last session. And all of the countries
basically said that the lack of an enforcement mechanism is a
serious flaw.
The public naming and shaming of human rights violators at
the HDIM drives nondemocratic participating states up the wall.
That's fine, and occasionally, it does improve the conditions
of imprisoned civil rights advocates. It rarely alters general
governmental behavior. It doesn't mean we shouldn't continue
trying; we should.
As several people have said, in the face of constant
stonewalling, some segments of the OSCE do manage to carry out
their mandates with distinction. I would cite especially Dunja
Mijatovic, the representative on freedom of the media; ODIHR,
of course; Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities; the Parliamentary Assembly; and last but
not least, the valuable field missions and training programs of
the organization.
I won't repeat what Secretary Vershbow had to say about the
arms control mandate. It's abundantly clear that Moscow's
refusal to accept the host nation consent principle and
transparency is a real disappointment. I certainly hope that
the update of the Vienna Document at the December Vilnius
ministerial will succeed.
So finally, we have an organization whose effectiveness
varies widely. As a norm setter, the OSCE has few, if any
equals. Its specialized agencies and field mission remain
valuable international players. But in enforcing its democratic
and human rights principles and its arms control efforts, the
OSCE has proved to be a disappointment. So what should we do?
Mr. Chairman, frustrating though it may be to some, I would
argue for more, not less commitment to the organization. U.S.
leadership, as we've all heard, is absolutely essential. We
should redouble our commitment both in personnel and in
behavior. We have excellent people at our permanent mission in
Vienna and a first-rate staff.
We should continue to introduce constructive initiatives
such as more effective crisis response mechanisms, which had
been vetoed until now; updating the Vienna document, as I said;
Internet freedom; greater economic transparency; more gender
equality. Many of these may be vetoed, but nonetheless I think
demonstrating that the U.S. is a good international citizen and
a leader at the OSCE has intrinsic value that should not be
underestimated.
At the HDIM, in that same vein, we should always be candid
about our own national shortcomings. We should publicly own up
to our deficiencies, as we have done, but then we should
explain the measures that we're taking to try to rectify them.
This increases our credibility within the organization,
especially among the European participating states.
I think the United States should always be the foremost
champion of NGOs and their right to participate in OSCE
conferences, and, whenever possible, even in Permanent Council
meetings.
In the negotiations over all manner of OSCE documents, from
routine announcements to treaties, we should be second to none
as paragraph experts, even if people consider us nitpickers.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we should never ``go along to get
along.'' On the vast majority of issues confronting the OSCE,
we are in agreement with our European friends and allies.
Occasionally, however, if they are willing, allegedly, quote,
unquote, for the good of the organization, to acquiesce in
resolutions or draft agreements that we feel would jeopardize
our national interest or compromise the principles of the OSCE,
we must resist group pressure to provide consensus. No matter
how much eye-rolling it may occasion, our being a minority of
one in such rare cases is not only ethically sound, but also
organizationally the most supportive position for the OSCE.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I thank you
again for the opportunity to offer my views. I look forward to
attempting to answer any of your questions.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you again for your testimony. Ms.
Fitzpatrick?
CATHERINE FITZPATRICK, CONSULTANT, JACOB BLAUSTEIN INSTITUTE
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Ms. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Senator, especially for
treating the OSCE as the indispensable organization.
What I would like to do today in my testimony is to focus
on the excellent recommendations that have already been made by
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in the Belgrade Declaration.
But it needs some focus, as it's a very long document.
OSCE should concentrate on developing a more effective
capacity to react diplomatically to crisis with particular
attention to strengthening human rights investigation capacity
and high-level public statements on crises.
There is a very frayed political consensus now, and the
OSCE faces not only its longstanding set of frozen, and, in
some places, thawing conflicts, but new challenges as we've
seen this last year: the pogroms in Kyrgyrstan, the brutal
crackdown in Belarus, the regression on press freedom by
Kazakhstan even as it was chairing the organization, and, of
course, the appalling terrorist attacks in Russia, Belarus and
now, tragically, Norway.
We never expected these kind of tragedies when we saw the
Berlin Wall fall when the Soviet Union dismantled. And it seems
as if our Helsinki ideals have not come to pass. The
organization has not been able to predict or respond to these
kinds of incidents effectively.
So to that end, we must increase the complementarity,
integration, and effectiveness of the various offices. We
should work at the ministerial level on a consensus-minus-one
basis to have a standby rapid reaction diplomatic mission. We
should strengthen the ability of ODIHR, the High Commissioner
for Nationalities, the various special representatives and the
Parliamentary Assembly to mount fact-finding missions as an
integral part of their function. We should also enable the
OSCE's secretary general and other OSCE leaders to speak out
more in condemnation of human rights violations, and not just
leave it to the rapporteurs.
All the deployed missions should have a human rights
component, and they should report more publicly than they do.
All the various institutions of OSCE should report to the
Permanent Council more, and that body should become more
transparent. I would advocate creating an OSCE mandate for
freedom of association with particular focus on human rights
defenders; this was done successfully by the U.S. at the U.N.
Human Rights Council, and that could be replicated. And we
should ensure that groups that incite hatred or violence or
that call for the destruction of any state or for the
destruction of anyone's rights do not receive government
support.
So the fact finding, which used to be at the heart of
Helsinki experience with the citizens' movements, it seems to
everywhere have been substituted with technical assistance and
training seminars. And that's a strategy that evolved to cope
with the refusal of some states to admit observers and accept
criticism of their record.
Through extraordinary efforts, the Finnish politician Kimmo
Kiljunen was able to mount a prestigious fact-finding panel in
Kyrgyzstan, as you know. Its findings represent an important
validation of the fact that while 75 percent of the victims
were ethnic Uzbeks, nearly a hundred percent of those tried for
the violence are also ethnic Uzbeks. And this disparity
represents a grave injustice. Although he was invited to
investigate the June pogroms by President Roza Otunbayeva,
Kiljunen was subsequently denounced by the Kyrgyz parliament
and declared persona non grata. So the OSCE PA has followed up
with this. There's been hearings with NGOs and so on, but more
is required. The Lithuanian chair-in-
office should immediately appoint a special envoy on Central
Asia to continue to press for implementation of the
Commission's recommendations. And there is a precedent for such
an envoy.
As good as it was, this Commission exposed significant
weaknesses in OSCE: the lack of a well-functioning permanent
institution staffed with regional experts and lawyers to
perform fact-
finding missions in rapid and thorough fashion.
Throughout OSCE's history, the function of fact finding has
been performed by different offices in different ways at
different times: Sometimes it's ODIHR with a very good report
on Kosovo and Chechnya in the past and on Andijan; sometimes
it's the High Commissioner for Nationalities; sometimes it's
the Parliamentary Assembly. So this is where this needs to be
coordinated and institutionalized better.
This process of fact finding should be shielded from
political processes. And to that end, the various bodies, such
as ODIHR and Parliamentary Assembly, should coordinate better
and institutionalize their fact finding and interact with the
Vienna Conflict Prevention Centre and the Permanent Council.
The right to know and act upon one's rights, which was the
inspiration for the founding of the Helsinki citizens'
movement, is still not a reality, even 35 years later.
Regrettably, work on behalf of NGO legalization has
devolved into a very tedious and expensive exercise in
technical assistance to two states for drafting laws and civic
association parties. But for some governments, that turns into
an opportunity to exhibit their duplicity and procrastination.
So I would rather see--instead of this focus on drafting laws,
I would like the OSCE to have a special mandate to focus on the
civic organizations that already exist and their actual
problems and to intervene with states on their behalf,
particularly for human rights monitors.
And even as we want to promote civil society, we also have
to be mindful of groups that incite imminent violence, and that
speaks to the role of the tolerance mandates and so on to
report more effectively.
The Permanent Council could indeed become more open and
transparent. While some officials do brief these meetings, the
head of ODIHR, the tolerance rapporteurs, the mission heads--
they're an invaluable resource--they should all be coming to
the Permanent Council and reporting more.
As for the call for public meetings at the Permanent
Council--well, we have seen at the U.N. Security Council that,
regrettably, when you have open meetings, than can lead to more
public posturing and canned speeches, and it drives the real
work then even further behind the scenes. So what I feel is
more operative is that, even if the sausage-making of diplomacy
is hidden from us, we should see the product of it more often.
So that means more consensus text from the chair, more
negotiated resolutions, more reporting. The U.S., of course,
has set a good example already by publishing their speeches to
the Permanent Council; few others, if any, do.
As for briefing by NGOs, there was a call in the Belgrade
Declaration to make this as often as once a week. I fear that
would only lead to some special interests posturing again and
also only those wealthy organizations that can afford to stay
in Vienna would be able to report. So I would like to see other
ways of just incorporating the NGO information better and also
arranging briefings occasionally.
Work on the charter status for OSCE should be delayed. An
organization that has had two missions expelled or suspended--
in Belarus and Georgia--and has had grave situations where OSCE
monitors or police advisers could not be deployed in a timely
fashion or were expelled, as we saw in Belarus, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan--that's not an organization that should be drafting
a charter until a basic consensus on both the nature and the
remedies for these situations is reached. We all lament the
absence of [teeth ?] for the many good findings and
recommendations of OSCE.
A debate on membership or expulsion criteria will likely be
futile. We could try to agree that no state seriously violating
Helsinki principles should be allowed to chair the
organization, and yet that is also a process we find we're not
able to start--to question.
But what we can do is create benchmarks that are very clear
for what we expect of the chair; for example, Ukraine coming in
and articulate those forcefully well in advance, and to protect
those groups inside the country that continue to expose the
violations by the state that is serving as chair.
So there's little that we can do sometimes, but when all
else fails, we can refuse to validate a state's behavior. And
that's when--when we look at some of the challenges coming up--
for example, the Russian elections--I think it's very important
not to reopen the process of evaluating criteria for
monitoring; we should leave that as is and hopefully make the
same kind of credible statement about these elections that
ODIHR and others have made in the past.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank both of you for your testimony.
You've given us a lot of really good ideas on the type of
reform. I put at the top of the list consensus minus one,
particularly as it relates to administrative decisions. We can
move faster in that. Transparency, to me, is a huge issue
within OSCE. The development of the structure in Vienna, which
seems to be, in many cases, independent of the member state
capitals, and how we get greater response in Vienna--quicker
response and be able to work more effectively to deal with
current issues--I think all of that's important.
I want to ask one question, and we may have some additional
questions for the record. And this is one that I don't think
has been given a lot of thought as to whether this is the best
way to move forward within OSCE. And that is the chair-in-
office.
I mean, some of your proposals are to give more authority
to the secretary general or to allow the different institutions
to be able to move forward or to have greater accountability
within the institutions directly to the secretary general. But
it seems to me that so much depends upon the chair-in-office
within OSCE. And I must tell you, I'm not sure there's a clear
path as to how the future chairmanships are going to be
determined within OSCE. There's certainly a geographical
discussion going on now. And I don't know what the answer is,
but I am concerned about so much dependent upon which country
is the chair within OSCE and whether there isn't a better way
to provide a direction than a yearly rotation of the chair from
one of the member states.
Ms. Fitzpatrick. Well, Senator, I would keep the chair-in-
office because it's--as with other multilateral organizations,
you have the EU changes every six months, you have the U.N.
Security Council changes its presidency every month. So
changing once a year isn't so terrible. And in any multilateral
organization, you're in a dialogue with some states that are
not like-minded; sooner or later, if they're members, they're
going to rotate into the chair.
I think what--a lot of time was spent during Kazakhstan's
chair in trying to explain precedents to them and bolstering
precedents from good practices by chairs, so that's important.
Mr. Cardin. I don't disagree with that. I'm really raising
this, not so much to suggest that there be a different--but how
do you deal with that? With Kazakhstan coming in as chair-in-
office, it was so much attention on the chair that it really,
in some respect, detracted from the organization.
Ms. Fitzpatrick. I agree that it did detract, and I think
that's where we have to work at bolstering ODIHR and the
capacity of other bodies to do fact finding, because the
chair--during the Kazakh chair, there was very poor response on
fact finding in crises.
But on the other hand, things like appointing--I mentioned
appointing the special envoy. That is within the power of the
chair. There's not a lot you can undo, but they do have this
discretionary power to appoint people, and then--and how they
shape the human dimension seminars, what the topics are. So
there is some scope there for making the chair effective.
Mr. Haltzel. I agree with you, Senator, it's a real
problem. Don't forget we were one of the last countries to
agree to Kazakhstan's chairmanship-in-office. You know all
about that. I believe the U.K. and the Czech Republic were the
other two. There were meetings in Madrid. They promised some
things, several of which they never delivered on.
I'm not enamored of the idea. And yes, the EU has a
rotating presidency, but they've whittled that way, way down as
a result of their newest--I mean, basically, the presidency of
the EU means a whole lot less than it did before the Lisbon
Treaty. So I'm not sure that that's much of a model.
Look, I think what we can do is, first of all, be very
careful about who gets into the chairmanship. And then we can
bolster them. As you well know, we have been helping the
Lithuanians. I think that's extremely good. Todd Becker, one of
our experienced diplomats, I'm told, has been seconded there
for the year. And some of the smaller countries need that sort
of help. And in fact, I remember when Slovenia was chairman-in-
office several years ago; they sent people over here to talk to
us to try to help them. But beyond that, I don't know. I have
the same sort of doubts that you do.
If I could backtrack on just one thing very briefly--and
that has to do with the suspension idea--I had that in my
written statement--but I feel that yes, the Moscow Mechanism is
being used against Belarus right now, but we heard from an
earlier testimony that the Belarusians are managing to
stonewall even within the Moscow mechanism. It is not unheard
of to suspend a country from the OSCE; it was done in 1992
against Yugoslavia, then Serbia and Montenegro because of the
wars there. I think if one is talking about leverage, I think
the United States should carefully consider bringing up a
resolution of suspension unless Belarus cooperates fully with
the Moscow Mechanism and changes some of its behavior.
Mr. Cardin. Well, our delegation to the Parliamentary
Assembly a couple of years ago challenged Belarus, and we
didn't get very far. So it's a tough thing to actually
accomplish. But your point is very well taken.
Let me ask you one final question as it relates to Russia.
What do you think--we know what Russia's intentions were when
the CSCE was formed: They wanted legitimacy in the
international community, and they thought that they could
withstand the scrutiny. And now we're not exactly sure what
their intentions are. Would you want to share with us what you
think our best strategy should be with Russia as it relates to
the OSCE?
Mr. Haltzel. Senator, I think they have, to some extent,
contradictory strategies. Don't forget, in 2008, President
Medvedev gave a speech in Berlin outlining his idea for a new
European security architecture, which was brought up within the
OSCE and, I'm happy to say, has more or less died a peaceful
death. It would have clearly undermined NATO and it should've
been, and I think really was, a nonstarter. I testified before
the Permanent Council on this in 2009.
My own feeling is that Russia would like HDIM to vanish
from the face of the earth. They would like to concentrate on
the arms control areas to their own advantage. And they don't
really care very much about the economic and environmental. I
don't think they want to see the whole organization die. I
think they'd be happy to see it just sort of dangle in the
wind.
What should we do about this? I think what we should do
about it is what we should do about the whole organization:
redouble our commitment. Put them on the spot. I mean, they had
a perm rep in Vienna who was the--[laughs]--I have to laugh--
the most aggressive but skillful man imaginable. I mean, and he
would just bull straight ahead. There's only one way to deal
with that; it's just have more staying power than they do, be
completely open about the arguments they're making being
specious, be the last delegation to leave a negotiation and
show our European friends that we're leaders and that we're
good international citizens and that we want to be the leaders
of the OSCE.
Mr. Cardin. Good point.
Ms. Fitzpatrick. Well, I think on the challenge of Russia,
that it was actually a very explicit plan of Russia to
undermine OSCE's human rights components. From their letter
some years ago, signed also by Kazakhstan and others, I think
they've worked very methodically at destroying budgets,
undermining the principles. So I think they have to be called
on that.
And I think the elections present profound opportunity, but
also a challenge, because ODIHR and others will be under
enormous pressure to call that as being valid. And we can
already see with the crackdown on Live Journal, with many
problems in Russia, their real conditions don't obtain for free
and fair elections. So I think focusing on the election is very
important. And I also think that the Moscow Mechanism has to
mechanize in Moscow on Belarus. We have to explicitly negotiate
with Russia on Belarus. There's one school of thought that
says, never raise Belarus with Russia, because that puts it
into their sphere of influence. But they're the ones who bail
out Lukashenko. Their television is also very important. So I
think any component--you know, programming that we do should
focus on Russian television. It's no Al-Jazeera for this region
by any stretch, but it's all we have as far as reaching the
whole region by satellite, so we should work more on getting on
Russian television to make known our views.
Mr. Cardin. Well, let me thank both of you. I think your
testimonies have been very helpful to us as we try to chart the
future leading up to the ministerial in Vilnius, but more
importantly, leading to the future of the OSCE. With that, our
hearing will stand adjourned. Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith
Good afternoon and welcome to our witnesses and everyone joining us
today. It is not often that we have the honor of hearing from three
assistant secretaries at the same time, including two also serving as
Helsinki Commissioners. As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I
appreciate the close and cooperative relationship the commission has
long had with the executive branch.
Today we will explore U.S. policy towards the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe--a unique intergovernmental
organization that incorporates human rights and economic development
into its comprehensive concept of security.
Unfortunately, over the past several years, OSCE countries with
poor human rights records have been able to thwart some of the
Organization's work on these issues.
Last December, at the Astana summit, the OSCE's first summit since
1999, OSCE states failed to reach consensus on an action plan laying
out priorities for the coming years. Yet the OSCE needs to continue to
focus on fundamental human rights issues. This is its heritage--the
reason it was created in the 1970s. It must not allow itself to be
sidetracked by Russia or other un- or semi-democratic states which
argue that the Organization should look only at positive examples of
``best practices,'' or that distract the OSCE from its work by
insisting on lengthy discussions of OSCE ``reform.''
Likewise our own Government must raise the priority given to human
rights and humanitarian concerns, from supporting oppressed people of
Belarus, turning back the trend to restrict Internet and media freedom,
supporting democracy in Kyrgyzstan, democratic activists throughout all
of central Asia, making sure the OSCE Partnership program is used to
genuinely promote human rights for oppressed minorities, as for the
Copts in Egypt, helping OSCE countries to address the disturbing and
potentially tragic demographic trends found in almost all member
states. All of these have been the subject of recent Commission
hearings, and we look forward to working with the executive branch on
these issues.
One issue I'd particularly like to raise here is international
child abduction. I authored a resolution that was adopted at the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session in Belgrade earlier this month
urging the OSCE to take up the issue of international parental child
abductions by promoting better implementation of the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. I believe the
OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius this year could set new standards for OSCE
states to fill gaps in the convention's implementation, and hope to be
able to work together with the Department of State toward this goal.
Prepared Statement of Sec. Philip H. Gordon
Introduction
Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Cardin, Members of the Commission:
Thank you very much for inviting me here today to discuss our agenda
for the OSCE. Let me also take this opportunity to thank the excellent
Helsinki Commission staff members who have worked long, hard, and in
cooperation with their State colleagues to safeguard the principles and
commitments of the OSCE, and to hold participating States to account.
I will focus my remarks today on the OSCE in the aftermath of the
December, 2010 Astana Summit. I will begin by looking at our core
foreign policy goals for the OSCE, reviewing the achievements of Astana
and looking forward to the OSCE's Ministerial meeting in Vilnius this
December.
OSCE: Shared Values, Inconsistent Implementation
Nowhere does the United States have better or more valuable
partners than in Europe. The U.S. and Europe share common values, our
economies are intertwined, and our militaries work together to address
common security challenges. U.S. bilateral engagement with our European
partners is complemented by our work together in key multilateral
regional institutions. Our engagement with NATO Allies--including
operational military cooperation--on the full gamut of security issues
has no equivalent anywhere else in the world. Through the OSCE we are
able to engage on such U.S. priorities as advancing human rights and
fundamental freedoms, building democratic institutions in the Western
Balkans, combating trafficking in persons, as well as North Africa and
Afghanistan, to name just a few. In this age of a tight budget and many
demands, multilateral approaches often present a more effective
alternative to unilateral engagement.
The OSCE was founded on the principle of comprehensive security,
that is, the conviction that true security has an economic and
environmental dimension and a human dimension, in addition to the
political-military dimension. As the world'slargest regional security
organization with membership that stretches from Vancouver to
Vladivostok, with partners in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa,
the OSCE has unmatched scope to advance this concept and strengthen
security across all three dimensions and increasingly beyond the OSCE
region itself.
Today the principles and commitments enshrined in the founding
document of the OSCE--the Helsinki Final Act--are facing serious
challenges from both inside and outside the organization. From within,
there is uneven application of the Helsinki principles, and I regret to
say that there are OSCE participating States where journalists can find
it too dangerous to report the news, where political activists are
beaten and incarcerated, where religious and minority groups, such as
the Roma, continue to face persecution, and where economic growth is
stifled by endemic corruption. Regional crises and transnational
threats are proliferating. Efforts to resolve the protracted conflicts
in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh continue to face frustrating
obstacles. The OSCE's inability to reach consensus on ways to address
these issues is increasingly identified by critics as evidence of the
organization's ineffectiveness.
This Commission--and your able staff--know well the reasons why
OSCE decision-making is complicated and how easy it is for one nation
to use the organization's consensus rule to prevent timely and
effective action in a situation of crisis. Russia's determination to
limit the role of OSCE in Georgia, for example, has diminished
possibilities for international engagement in this region where
transparency and confidence-building are sorely needed.
Problems like these make headlines, but they offer only a partial
picture of the role OSCE plays in Europe today. The OSCE has deepened
and strengthened European and Eurasian security through initiatives to
enhance rule of law, provide for free and fair elections, develop an
independent media, respect the rights of minority groups, and improve
the ability of citizens to exercise their fundamental freedoms. The
OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and
the OSCE's field missions have been at the forefront in assisting OSCE
participating States to strengthen their democracy and thereby their
security.
In concert with those bodies, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the
High Commissioner for National Minorities, the Representative on
Freedom of the Media, and the Chairmanship's Special Representatives on
Tolerance and Gender Issues make for a powerful set of instruments to
help participating States live up to their commitments and thus bring
security to the region.The OSCE has made tremendous strides toward
building a zone of prosperity and stability that stretches from western
Canada to the Russian Far East. Although it is at times stymied by a
lack of sustained political will and attempts by some participating
States to constrain its flexibility, the OSCE nonetheless remains
uniquely positioned to build confidence, promote good governance, and
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe and Eurasia.
Moving Forward from Astana
At the Astana Summit last December--the first OSCE Summit in eleven
years--the 56 participating States issued the Astana Commemorative
Declaration--a strong reaffirmation of the Helsinki principles and
commitments and the entire OSCE acquis. This included the first-ever
explicit affirmation by the former Soviet states of the declaration
originally made in the OSCE's 1991 Moscow Document that makes human
rights conditions in individual OSCE participating States matters of
``direct and legitimate concern'' to all of them. The final document
also tasked future OSCE Chairmanships to build on efforts last year to
develop an action plan to address a range of common challenges that
notably include the protracted conflicts, conflict prevention and
crisis response, counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, issues facing
media freedom, anti-Semitism, treatment of minorities such as the Roma
and Sinti, and trafficking in persons to name a few.
The Astana Summit also underscored the vital role that civil
society plays in the OSCE region, as numerous human rights activists
from some of the OSCE region's most embattled corners engaged
constructively with government delegations and provided input to the
work of the Summit. With strong U.S. support, NGOs and civil society
representatives participated in the final three days of the Human
Dimension portion of the Review Conference preceding the Summit, as
well as in a civil society forum and an independently organized
parallel NGO conference. Secretary Clinton also held a vibrant,
standing-room only town hall event at Eurasian University with NGO and
civil society representatives.
The Astana Summit opened a new chapter for the OSCE. It provided
renewed impetus for action to make the OSCE space--including the
Central Asian space--even more democratic, prosperous, and secure for
our citizens. The Administration has remained deeply engaged in the
work of the OSCE across all three dimensions. We are seeking ways to
sustain the momentum that was generated--in both government and civil
society networks--by the Astana Summit.
Lithuania's Chairmanship
In 2010 and 2011, crises in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the
ongoing need for the OSCE to hold its membership to the highest
standards of human rights performance and comprehensive security. The
tragic case in Russia of Sergey Magnitsky, a lawyer who died in pre-
trial detention, is most illustrative of the problems facing the
judiciaries of too many member states, and a problem that we are
seeking to address in close consultation with Senator Cardin and others
on this committee.
We will continue to press for greater implementation of OSCE
commitments in Europe. The Arab Spring has shown us vividly the link
between democracy and security, and we will look for opportunities to
offer OSCE expertise in democratic transition and institution building
to the countries of North Africa and to the OSCE's other partners, such
as Afghanistan.
Soon after the Astana Summit, Belarus presented the first challenge
for the OSCE as its government launched a sustained, brutal crackdown
against opposition politicians and activists, civil society, and
independent media after a flawed presidential election. Since then, we
have worked closely with the Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office, the EU, and
like-minded OSCE participating States to manage and address these
issues. Despite rhetoric that it was willing to cooperate with the
OSCE, Belarus refused to extend the mandate of the OSCE Office in
Minsk, claiming that the Office's mandate had been completed. At the
government's insistence, the OSCE office in Minsk officially closed in
March. In stark contrast to the stunning events unfolding during the
Arab Spring in Northern Africa, Belarus seems to have entered a
prolonged winter of backpedaling on human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
In response, we joined with 13 other participating States to invoke
the Moscow Mechanism, a tool established in the 1991 Moscow Document
that allows for special rapporteur missions to address concerns about
the implementation of human rights commitments. Together we appointed a
rapporteur to investigate the crackdown by the Government of Belarus
against opposition candidates, civil society representatives and
journalists, and the mass arrests that followed the December 19
presidential election. Though Belarus refused to cooperate, the
rapporteur was able to conduct his fact-finding mission and reported
back with a number of constructive recommendations that holds the
Government of Belarus accountable for its failure to protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms,including freedom of expression,
prohibiting torture, and upholding the rule of law. We continue to work
to ensure that the OSCE and the international community focus on the
concerns raised in the report.
Dramatic developments in OSCE's partner states have captured
headlines. Working closely with the Lithuanian Chair, we have supported
engagement with Tunisia and Egypt in order to offer OSCE expertise to
nascent democracies emerging in North Africa. We are taking a
realistic, pragmatic approach offering advice and guidance on issues
such as democratic elections and human rights monitoring. Assistance
could come through sharing of materials such as handbooks and
guidelines, visits by subject matter experts, and participation in OSCE
meetings, conferences, seminars, as well as specific projects--either
in the OSCE region or in the Partner State. At the request of Egyptian
activists, ODIHR is already organizing a workshop for Egyptian civil
society on international standards and tools of election observation,
in advance of Egypt's November parliamentary elections.
Goals for Vilnius
In December, the OSCE will meet in Vilnius, Lithuania at the level
of foreign ministers to review results achieved since Astana and take
decisions for future work. The United States is working with like-
minded partners to achieve specific results in all three dimensions:
In the political-military dimension, we want to agree on
a substantial update of the Vienna Document, which will be reissued at
Vilnius for the first time since 1999. Building on the existing
measures, we are re-examining how data exchange, notification,
observation, and possibly other measures can offer greater security and
transparency in light of today's smaller post-Cold War military
establishments. Our effort to update the Vienna Document is part of our
broader commitment to improve military transparency in Europe and
ensure arms control and the confidence and security building measures
regime are relevant to the challenges of the 21st century. U.S. efforts
to find a way forward on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
are separate from this work on Vienna Document, but they are motivated
by some of the same goals and concerns: we want to achieve greater
military transparency and cooperation on conventional forces in Europe
as a route to increased confidence and trust.
In the economic-environmental dimension, we want to
endorse greater economic transparency, good governance and anti-
corruption measures, as well as identify ways to better empower women
in the economic sphere. Citizens must be able to trust their
governments to develop economic and environmental resources in a
responsible and equitable manner. We hope that at Vilnius all OSCE
members will endorse the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
endorsed by the G-8 in Deauville, and agree on goals and best practices
to promote the economic empowerment of women.
In the human dimension, we hope to take the Helsinki
Final Act into the digital age. We are seeking consensus on a
declaration that would explicitly acknowledge that human rights and
fundamental freedoms can apply to online activity as they do to offline
activity. This includes, in particular the freedoms of expression,
assembly, and association. Even more urgent is the need to reaffirm and
strengthen governments' commitment to the protection of journalists.
Both of these goals address priority issues for both the OSCE
Representative on the Freedom of Media and the Lithuanian Chairmanship.
We also want to see the OSCE give greater attention to Central
Asia, including addressing longstanding challenges to democracy and
human rights in that region. The OSCE can and should assist
Kyrgyzstan's fledgling parliamentary democracy and play a greater role
in helping stabilize and secure Afghanistan, particularly in the area
of border management.
Of course, we envision that the Vilnius Ministerial will be an
opportunity for OSCE Ministers to declare formally our support for
Mediterranean Partners, such as Egypt and Tunisia, and offer to assist
them in democratic institution building and electoral reform.
Finally, the OSCE must continue to play a direct role in resolving
the protracted conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh. As
the 2008 war in Georgia showed, these conflicts hold the devastating
potential to destabilize security in the OSCE region, and their
resolution must remain a high priority for the OSCE and all its member
states. We intend to use the meeting in Vilnius to highlight progress
made on each of these conflicts this year and the challenges that
remain to be addressed. This is difficult and frustrating work. But
OSCE is one of a handful of international institutions that has the
political standing to engage on the protracted conflicts, and it has
the ability to shine a light on the human and security situation in
these regions. Impartial, comprehensive, accurate reporting is not
something to be feared or avoided, and that is what OSCE is ideally
suited to deliver, if it can get unhindered, status-neutral access to
regions of conflict. If the OSCE's role is undermined, the
international community is diminished; the United States will stand
firmly against that. We will continue to push hard to improve theOSCE's
ability to respond to crises in a fast and effective manner, including
preventing the development of new conflicts in the OSCE area.
OSCE Moving Forward
We all know that a consensus-based organization with 56
participating States sometimes moves in baby steps when we want to see
larger and faster strides. We can take comfort that whether the OSCE is
working to eliminate rocket fuel in Ukraine, advocating for journalists
and bloggers in Azerbaijan, or developing a multi-ethnic police force
in Serbia and Kyrgyzstan, those small steps can result in impressive
progress over time, and thus deserve our sustained attention.
The OSCE enables its participating States to address issues of
concern in a forum which allows for a full and open debate. The issues
can seem intractable but exchanging words beats the alternative of
exchanging bullets. We have had bullets exchanged in the OSCE space in
the last three years and that is something the OSCE participating
States need to eliminate in the future. The potential of the OSCE has
not yet been fulfilled - and therein lies its promise for the future.
The Helsinki Commission--you, the Commissioners, and the experts on
your staff--play a vital role in ensuring that the participating States
keep the promises they made at Helsinki. With your support, the United
States will continue to play a leading role at the OSCE, to strengthen
and build upon the progress the participating States have made over the
past 35 years, and bring us closer to a truly stable, secure, and
prosperous OSCE region.
I am happy to take your questions at this time.
Prepared Statement of Sec. Michael H. Posner
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Distinguished Members of the Commission: I
appreciate your calling this timely hearing on the work of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as we plan
for the December Ministerial Meeting in Vilnius and beyond. I have the
privilege of working for a former Helsinki Commissioner, Secretary
Clinton, and it is my honor to serve as the Helsinki Commissioner for
the Department of State. The Commission's efforts help strengthen my
hand and that of my State Department colleagues as we work with other
governments, civil society advocates, and the private sector to defend
and advance human rights and democratic government across the OSCE
region.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask the Commission to consider my testimony
today in conjunction with that of Assistant Secretaries Gordon and
Vershbow. If I may, I will direct my comments today in particular to
the OSCE's Human Dimension--the principles that animate it, the
challenges that confront it, and what all of us can and must do to
defend and advance it. As the only regional forum with a membership
that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the OSCE constitutes a
vital platform for raising concerns about human rights and democratic
governance in key countries of concern, such as Belarus, Russia and
Uzbekistan.
A Pioneering Process, Then and Now
The Helsinki process was launched 36 years ago next week, in the
midst of a Cold War and in a different century. The past twenty years
since the end of Soviet Communism have seen profound changes in the
OSCE region and the world. With them came an opportunity for the
participating States to increase in number, establish and develop the
OSCE as an organization, and, most significantly, agree to ground
breaking commitments in the areas of human rights and democratic
governance. These commitments remain a global high water mark. The OSCE
has not been merely a reflection of the great post-Soviet geopolitical
changes. The OSCE's comprehensive concept of linking security among
states to respect for human rights within states, and the citizens
monitoring movements that the Helsinki process inspired, helped create
and shape the new reality in Europe and Eurasia.
And I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that the OSCE's comprehensive
approach to security, the human and democratic values at the core of
the Helsinki process, and its recognition of the vital role and
contributions of civil society--remain inspiring and innovative
concepts in this new century, not just to men and women within the OSCE
region, but to people around the world.
Time and again, most recently in North Africa and the Middle East,
we see that governments' respect for human rights and their
responsiveness to the aspirations of their citizens are essential to
security, stability and peace. The OSCE, and the civil society groups
associated with the Helsinki process, can make useful contributions of
experience and expertise to our partner Mediterranean States undergoing
transformations. Even as we speak, OSCE's Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is holding its first workshop for
Egyptian civil society representatives interested in election
monitoring in support of the Arab Spring.
The Enduring Importance of Implementation
As Assistant Secretary Gordon noted, the participating States at
the Astana Summit last December, including those that joined the OSCE
in the post-Soviet period, reaffirmed in the Summit's Commemorative
Declaration the principles of Helsinki and all the commitments made to
date. They also reaffirmed that human rights are not solely a domestic
issue, but also a matter of ``direct and legitimate'' interest to other
States. Secretary Clinton, Assistant Secretary Gordon, Ambassador Kelly
and his outstanding delegation, and I worked intensively with like-
minded counterparts to ensure that the Commemorative Declaration was
strong and unequivocal. I believe that we succeeded.
But we all agree that reaffirmation is not enough. We must continue
to address serious problems of implementation within OSCE participating
States, through our bilateral diplomacy and through the OSCE and other
multilateral organizations.All countries, including our own, have room
for improvement in living up to our OSCE commitments and all have a
responsibility to do so. That said, the work and resources of the OSCE
should focus most on the areas where implementation remains weakest and
where humarn rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and
democratic principles of government face the greatest challenges. This
is not a reflection of political bias or double standards. It is not a
matter of ``East of Vienna versus West of Vienna''--as some
participating States assert. The divide that concerns the OSCE is not
between East and West; OSCE must address the gap between commitments
and practice. Human rights are universal, but they are not universally
respected in the OSCE region. That is the truth, and the OSCE must
address it.
Advocates of human rights, democracy, and labor who seek to help
their fellow citizens know and act upon their rights are targeted for
persecution, even murder, in some participating States. Laws are
wielded like political weapons against those who expose abuses or
express disagreement with official policies and practices. Judicial
independence and the rule of law have yet to be established or fully
respected in practice. NGOs are subjected to increasing legal
restrictions and burdensome administrative measures that impede their
peaceful work, reflecting a disturbing global phenomenon. There are
human rights and humanitarian aspects of protracted conflicts that must
be addressed as essential elements of settlement and reconciliation
processes.
Media--particularly independent media--are under pressure to be
silent or to self-censor. For practicing their profession, journalists
are victims of brutal, sometimes deadly, attacks, often carried out
with complete impunity. Countries in the OSCE region are also part of a
growing global trend by governments to restrict Internet Freedom, and
thus the exercise of freedoms of expression, association and assembly
via new media. Too many people in the OSCE region are denied the
opportunity to access a range of sources of information. The
Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic, who testified
before you a few weeks ago, deserves special mention for raising
awareness and pushing to protect journalists and an independent media
throughout the OSCE space.
Democratic development is uneven across the OSCE region. Not all
elections meet OSCE's standards. Not all officials and government
institutions operate in an accountable and transparent manner. The next
few years will see national elections in a number of OSCE States,
including my own country. The United States continues to welcome ODIHR
observers and we hope our fellow participating States will do likewise.
We are pleased that Russia recently has invited ODIHR to conduct a
needs assessment for an elections observer mission in the lead-up to
December's parliamentary elections, and we urge Russia to extend a
formal, unrestricted invitation for this observation mission once the
assessment is completed. We also look to Russia to invite ODIHR to do
the same for the presidential elections in 2012. Similarly, we hope
that ODIHR will be invited to observe the upcoming parliamentary
elections in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Serbia, and
Ukraine, and the presidential elections in Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Turkmenistan.
Not surprisingly, participating states with serious implementation
problems do not like to have their records in the spotlight, as we see
so clearly demonstrated by Belarus's refusal to extend the mandate of
the OSCE Office in Minsk, its refusal to cooperate with the Moscow
Mechanism Rapporteur, and now its resistance to joining consensus on
the detailed agenda for the annual Human Dimension Implementation
Meeting in Warsaw. The Representative on Freedom of the Media has not
been allowed to visit Belarus since the crackdown last December.
Belarus rejected a fact-finding mission by the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly Working Group on Belarus and the Working Group's Chair was
denied a visa to observe trials of political prisoners. Such
obstructionist behavior only draws more attention to Belarus'
lamentable human rights record.
The report of the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism Rapporteur on Belarus
contains a wealth of constructive recommendations, which we urge
Belarus to accept so that it can increase its integration into the OSCE
community, instead of deepening its isolation.With respect to Russia,
we have spoken out in the OSCE Permanent Council and other OSCE fora
about the continued assaults on fundamental freedoms of the press and
assembly, and the rule of law. We repeatedly have expressed our
concerns about: the many unsolved cases of murdered journalists like
Paul Klebnikov and human rights activists like Natalia Estemirova;
corruption and impunity as exemplified by the tragic case of Sergei
Magnitsky; and restrictions on freedom of assembly for members of
groups like Strategy 31, the Khimki Forest Defenders, and for members
of various Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender groups. We have
raised our concerns about Russia's disappointing decision to deny the
opposition group PARNAS registration so that it can compete in the
upcoming parliamentary elections and we urge Russian authorities to
reconsider that decision.
We continue to monitor and speak out about the treatment of
minorities in Russia, including the application of the so-called ``law
on extremism'' to peaceful religious groups. We also are concerned
about inter-ethnic tensions and incidents of violence between ethnic
Russians and minority groups, as well as by reports of serious human
rights violations in the North Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya.
These reports include disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture,
and retribution against those who report abuses.
Mr. Chairman, as we set our sights on the Ministerial in Vilnius, I
want to emphasize that our interest in human rights and democratic
development in Central Asia did not begin or end with the Astana
Summit. The United States remains committed to working bilaterally and
within the OSCE with the participating States of Central Asia and with
civil society in that region to advance domestic democratic reforms,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.
We also will continue to work with Central Asian states to reinforce
border security to counter transnational threats such as narcotics and
terrorism, and to bolster security in Afghanistan, an OSCE partner. We
have stressed that Kazakhstan's legacy as the 2010 Chair of the OSCE
will be determined by the continued efforts it makes, now that the
spotlight has left Astana, to deliver on the pledges made there to
reinvigorate comprehensive security and protect the human rights of
citizens. We strongly encourage OSCE representatives, as well as high
public officials from the participating States, including the Members
of this Commission and Members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to
seek opportunities to engage with the governments and citizens of
Central Asian states to advance Human Dimension issues.
We have seen that such engagement can yield results. Most recently,
the Government of Kyrgyzstan decriminalized libel, an issue on which
the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media had persistently
focused. We applaud Kyrgyzstan's becoming the first Central Asian
country and the 13th OSCE participating State to decriminalize
defamation. This measure will strengthen freedom of expression in
Kyrgyzstan and set an example for the rest of the OSCE community.
Kyrgyzstan also deserves recognition for its support of the OSCE
Academy in Bishkek, which operates according to a Memorandum of
Understanding between the Kyrgyz government and the OSCE. The United
States joined the Academy's Board of Trustees in March 2011 and since
its foundation in 2005 we have been strong supporters of the excellent
work the Academy is doing to provide graduate studies to Central Asian
and Afghan students. Coupled with the steps Kyrgyzstan has taken to
ensure inquiry into the abuses committed during the June 2010 conflict,
we think that the positive trajectory for Kyrgyzstan's democratization
can continue. The OSCE remains well-poised to assist.
Mr. Chairman, the comprehensive security we seek in the OSCE
region, and in Central Asia particularly, will remain elusive until
serious human rights problems are addressed. We will continue to press
for the implementation by the Central Asian states of OSCE commitments
in all three dimensions, and to offer our assistance toward that end.
For example, Uzbekistan continues to exhibit a poor record on media
freedom, freedom of religion, and a wide range of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. We regretted the Uzbekistan Supreme Court
decision in June to close the Human Rights Watch office in Tashkent. We
have raised in the OSCE and elsewhere the cases of Dilmurod Sayid, a
journalist imprisoned for writing about corruption, and Maxim Popov,
who remains incarcerated for working to decrease the incidence of AIDS
in the country, and we will continue to advocate for fair treatment and
due process in those, and similar, cases.
We also remain deeply concerned over the arrests of religious
adherents, including Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, Protestants and
members of some Islamic groups in Uzbekistan. Reported raids on the
homes of members of non-majority religious groups, coupled with bans on
the import of some religious publications and the confiscation or
destruction of religious literature, further chill the climate for
religious expression.
We will continue to use the OSCE as a platform for pressing these
and other human rights challenges in Uzbekistan, including ongoing
reports of torture in detention and the use of child labor in the
annual cotton harvest.
Mr. Chairman, looking across the OSCE, community, we see
intolerance and hate crimes against religious and ethnic minorities,
including Roma and Sinti. I wish to commend the essential work of
OSCE's three tolerance representatives: Rabbi Andrew Baker, on
Combating Anti-Semitism, Dr. Massimo Introvigne, on Combating Racism,
Xenophobia and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and
Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions, and
Ambassador Adil Akhmetiv, on combating Intolerance and Discrimination
against Muslims. I also salute the efforts of the OSCE's Contact Point
on Roman and Sinti Issues. Violence against women and assaults on
individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity are
widespread problems. People with disabilities experience discrimination
and tend to be relegated to the margins of society. The OSCE region is
both a source and a destination for human trafficking. Men, women and
children are forced into servitude within its borders.
To meet all of these challenges of implementation, participating
States must strengthen their political will to honor their commitments.
We and other like-minded governments must work vigilantly to ensure
that the capacity and integrity of ODIHR, the High Commissioner on
National Minorities, and other OSCE institutions are strengthened, not
weakened, and that full use is made of the OSCE's good offices,
mechanisms, and field missions. Today, for example, the High
Commissioner is working to prevent ethnic tensions from boiling over
again in Central Asia and to ensure that children can receive an
adequate education in their language in Slovakia, Serbia, and other
parts of Europe. And the field missions are standing up freedom of
information and human rights ombudsmen who can defend citizens' rights.
Let me now say a few words about the state of consensus in the OSCE
and its prospects for meeting today's human, economic, and military
security challenges. It is evident that some participating States lack
the political will to meet the commitments they have already made. They
are often reluctant or unwilling to give their consent so that the OSCE
can take timely and effective action in key areas of concern, including
the persistent implementation problems.
Mr. Chairman, we have encountered such dilemmas before in OSCE's
history. During the Cold War, Human Dimension commitments made by the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries were honored more in the breach
than in practice. Despite this challenge, the Helsinki process managed
to advance, thanks to the moral force of Helsinki monitoring groups as
well as the West's principled, sustained diplomacy. This tenacity
ultimately paid off with the emergence of the democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. And the need for sustained, principled
efforts by governments and their citizens is equally compelling now.
Today, we must be steadfast in the face of threats from some
participating States to withhold consensus or attempt to water down
commitments or weaken OSCE institutions. We will creatively use the
full array of existing OSCE authorities, institutions, principles, and
precedents to support the efforts of today's activists on the ground
who are pressing for human rights and democratic reforms. Consensus to
act on issues of human rights and democracy may be hard to reach at the
State-to-State level, but there is a growing grassroots consensus among
citizens of the OSCE region and regions across the globe that
governments must respect human rights and give their people a
meaningful role in shaping the future of their countries.
The Helsinki Process and Support for Citizen Activism
President Obama and Secretary Clinton have made support and defense
of civil society a global foreign policy priority, and we see our work
in OSCE as integral to that effort.
OSCE was the first regional organization to recognize the
importance of civil society and provide for NGO participation in its
proceedings. Secretary Clinton made a special point of holding a Town
Hall with civil society groups in Astana during the OSCE Summit, and we
will continue to encourage and defend NGO involvement at the Human
Dimension Implementation Meetings and other expert meetings of the
OSCE.
Mr. Chairman, the Commission has long championed the vital role
that non-governmental organizations play in the OSCE process. I am
pleased to report that my own Bureau and Ambassador Kelly have
collaborated on a new effort aimed at helping connect civil society
activists across the OSCE region through new technologies.
In mid-August, my bureau will be reviewing proposals for a new
$500,000 program to create a demand-driven virtual network of human
rights and democracy activists in the OSCE region, which we intend to
launch in September. We call it Helsinki 2.0. The network would serve
as a sustainable coordination platform for reinvigorating human rights
advocacy in Europe and Eurasia. A virtual interface will be created to
enable activists to have regular engagement with governments beyond the
traditional appearances at annual OSCE meetings. We hope that this
Helsinki 2.0 platform will enhance activists' ability to network with
one another and with the OSCE. This effort should help extend
Helsinki's Human Dimension and its legacy of citizen advocacy into the
Digital Age.
Enduring Freedoms, New Apps
Mr. Chairman, the Commission has greatly helped to elevate the
issue of Internet freedom. I very much appreciate your holding a
hearing on the subject a few weeks ago, at which my Deputy, Dan Baer,
testified. It is vitally important that the OSCE take a principled and
pioneering stand on Internet freedom.
In the past, the Helsinki process was a major international
platform for defending citizens who expressed dissenting views via
samizdat and for protesting the jamming of radio broadcasts. Two
decades ago, in response to efforts by the Ceausescu regime to restrict
citizens' access to Xerox machines, an explicit commitment was included
in the OSCE's Copenhagen document pledging that ``no limitation will be
imposed on access to, and use of, means of reproducing documents of any
kind.'' Today, email, social networking, and text messaging are new
forms of samizdat and tools of human rights advocacy as well as
indispensible tools of commerce, education, and global communications.
We applaud Lithuania for making media freedom via old and new
technologies and the safety of journalists key themes of its
Chairmanship. I want to emphasize that cyber issues are relevant to all
three dimensions of the OSCE. As we partner with other governments,
civil society, and the business sector on ways we can safeguard against
very real cyber security threats, we will do so ever mindful that the
measures we take must be consistent with our human dimension
commitments to respect the exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Mr. Chairman, as Assistant Secretary Gordon noted, the United
States advanced language for inclusion in the Astana Summit Action Plan
on the exercise of ``Fundamental Freedoms in the Digital Age.'' Since,
as you know, the Astana Summit ended without the adoption of such a
plan, we intend to renew our efforts to get this breakthrough language
adopted at the OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius in December. OSCE's adoption
of such language would, I believe, mark the first time that any
regional organization formally recognizes that respect for the full
range of human rights, and fundamental freedoms must extend to the use
of new technologies.
The United States looks forward to working with the Lithuanian
Chair, the EU, other participating States and civil society to ensure
that the OSCE sends a strong and clear message from Vilnius on Internet
Freedom. If I were to distill that message into a tweet to the world,
it would be: ``Enduring Freedoms, New Apps.''
Promises Made, Promises to be Kept
Mr. Chairman, when he signed the Helsinki Final Act 36 years ago,
President Ford famously said, ``History will judge this Conference not
by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow--not by the
promises we make, but by the promises we keep.'' He was right then, and
his statement is even more true today.
Europe cannot be completely whole, free and at peace--
Europe and Eurasia cannot become truly integrated--
There can be no lasting security extending from Vancouver to
Vladivostok--
until human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully exercised
by all people who live within the OSCE community of nations.
On behalf of President Obama and the American people, I thank the
Commission for its decades of principled work to ensure that the
promises made in Helsinki are kept. Now I would be happy to answer your
questions.
Prepared Statement of Sec. Alexander Vershbow
Introduction
I want to thank Chairman Smith and Co-Chairman Cardin for having me
back to testify about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and our goals in the run-up to the Vilnius Ministerial in
December. I am particularly proud that you have made me a Commissioner,
along with my esteemed colleagues here today. I am honored to associate
myself with this Commission and its myriad achievements over the
decades.
The OSCE
The OSCE has three attributes that make it unique. First, it has a
vast geographic scope, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, from
Vancouver to Vladivostok. This scope allows it to address a diverse set
of security challenges with a variety of approaches, drawing on its
extraordinary 56-nation membership.
Second, the OSCE has a three-basket approach to security--comprised
of the human dimension, the economic and environmental dimension, and
of course the
political-military dimension. This comprehensive approach, enshrined in
the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, was revolutionary at the time--by
including dialogue on human rights, democracy, and economic development
along with military transparency--and is still relevant today.
Third, the OSCE has an extraordinary and storied history. The
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--the predecessor to
the OSCE--played a critical role in providing support and hope to
persecuted groups behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, and
helped to bring order during Europe's tumultuous political transitions
of the early 1990s.
Throughout its history, the OSCE has adapted to new challenges and
changes in the security environment. In keeping with this tradition, we
must continue to adapt the OSCE's political-military security toolbox
to face the challenges of the 21st century.
Astana Summit
In December of last year, the OSCE held its first Summit since 1999
in Astana, Kazakhstan. At the Summit, we learned that the achievements
of the OSCE cannot be taken for granted. The effort to produce an
action plan for 2011 foundered over fundamental disagreements on the
security challenges facing the OSCE--especially on conventional arms
control and the unresolved conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagomo-
Karabakh. The United States insisted on an action plan that reflected
our longstanding principles on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
host nation consent as it relates to the unresolved conflicts. Russia
was unwilling to support this, and the resulting impasse threatened the
Summit outcome.
Without hope of consensus on an action plan, the U.S. delegation,
led by my good friend Assistant Secretary of State Phil Gordon, worked
assiduously to produce the Astana Commemorative Declaration instead.
The Declaration recommits all 56 participating States of the OSCE ``to
the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic
and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to
Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common
goals.''
Importantly, the Astana Declaration reaffirmed the right of
countries to choose their own security arrangements and reasserted that
no country can create a sphere of influence or seek to strengthen its
security at the expense of others. The Declaration reiterated the
importance of arms control and confidence- and security-building
measures, highlighting their role in ensuring military stability,
predictability and transparency. It also committed all of us to
revitalize, modernize, and update the three most important parts of the
conventional arms control regime--the Vienna Document 1999, the Open
Skies Treaty, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.
I will leave it to my colleagues from State to address the human
and economic-environmental dimension, and focus instead on what the
Administration would like to accomplish before the OSCE Ministerial in
December in the political-military dimension of security.
Conventional Arms Control
I will address each part of the conventional arms control regime in
turn, and note that the United States is fully engaged in the process
of modernizing them, in both Vienna and Washington. Last month,
Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, assisted by Deputy
Assistant Secretary Daniel Russell and my Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Celeste Wallander, attended OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference.
DASD Wallander represented me in discussions on the Vienna Document
1999, and it is to that instrument that I turn now.
Vienna Document 1999
The OSCE can trace its role in arms control to four pages in the
1975 Helsinki Final Act, which established a confidence-building
mechanism to reduce the chance of conflicts arising from large military
maneuvers in Europe. The subsequent talks on military transparency,
which eventually resulted in the Vienna Document 1999, formed one of
three pillars of the effort to secure peace in Europe during the Cold
War. The second pillar was the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks,
focusing on balancing NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional armaments,
which evolved into the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, or
CFE. The third pillar was the ongoing bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic
arms limitation talks, which eventually led to the START Treaty.
The Vienna Document has grown to 60 pages, and comprises a series
of confidence- and security-building measures designed to increase the
transparency of military affairs on the territory of all participating
European and Central Asian States. It includes a conflict-prevention
mechanism, visits to military air bases, annual exchanges of military
information, on-site inspections and visits to evaluate the information
exchanges, and a series of military-to-military contacts. The Vienna
Document 1999 applies to all military forces in the OSCE zone of
application.
The OSCE is engaged in an intensive effort to update the Vienna
Document for the first time since 1999. With the direction provided by
our Heads of State in Astana, we are approaching the milestone of
issuing a new Vienna Document in December in Vilnius. Delegations have
been working in the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation for the past
year to review the Vienna Document comprehensively and update it to
meet today's demands. Several proposals already have been adopted, and
dozens more are under consideration. However, the proposals adopted to
date have been administrative in nature, and more needs to be done if
this effort is to be judged a success. One proposal to increase
military transparency that I would like to highlight would lower the
thresholds for notification of military manoeuvres--a subject central
to the intent of the original document. Adopting this proposal made by
the French delegation would send a clear signal that the OSCE is
serious about modernizing its approach to military transparency and
security.
The dedication all delegations are demonstrating in this effort is
encouraging; however, much more needs to be done. I believe the United
States needs to have a deeper discussion with other delegations on the
future of military transparency and what measures are needed to improve
the security of all participating States. Our military budgets are all
under pressure, and many participating States are undergoing rapid and
radical military transformations. The Vienna Document must continue to
evolve to keep pace--and the quality of military advice in Vienna must
be equal to the challenge.
Open Skies
The Treaty on Open Skies started with an idea by President
Eisenhower--to reduce the need for destabilizing espionage and
transform the security environment. The idea was revived in the 1980s,
and then, in 2002, the Treaty entered into force. To date, the 34
States Parties have flown more than 700 aerial observation flights,
providing unprecedented levels of military transparency. The ability of
any party to overfly every part of the territory of every other party
from Honolulu to Vladivostok is extraordinary. Indeed, the United
States and Russia both use the Open Skies Treaty as part of the
verification of the New START, highlighting the linkages and
reinforcing effects among these agreements.
In June 2010, the parties met for their second Review Conference in
Vienna. There, they recommitted themselves to addressing the challenges
and guiding the way toward improved transparency. These challenges
include implementation problems, such as increasing instances of
interference with the full exercise of Treaty rights; economic issues,
such as determining the future of aging airframes; and technological
issues, including adapting to digital technology and fully implementing
Treaty-allowed sensors. Addressing these challenges will require
political will and could put strains on increasingly scarce defense
budgets.
We are seeking to recommit the United States to the Treaty, both by
increasing the number of flights we fly and participate in each year,
and by taking advantage of the ability to upgrade our sensors from film
to digital capability. According to recent media reports, Russia has
begun flight-testing a new TU-214 airframe with a full suite of digital
sensors for use under the Treaty--the same airframe as the forthcoming
replacement for their equivalent to Air Force One. No other
participating State has been able to commit to updating its aircraft.
In fact, some, notably the United Kingdom, have eliminated their
aircraft due to budgetary pressures.
CFE
The news on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty is less
encouraging. However, it is worth noting the Treaty's achievements--
including the elimination of more than 72,000 battle tanks, armored
combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack
helicopters; the successful completion of thousands of on-site
inspections; and the orderly, verifiable, and peaceful withdrawal of
the massed armored forces that typified the Cold War standoff for
decades. The CFE Treaty succeeded in eliminating the possibility of
large-scale, surprise attack in Central Europe; it has been at an
impasse with Russia's ``suspension'' of implementation of CFE in
December 2007, which was further complicated by Russia's 2008 invasion
of Georgia.
The State Department named Ambassador Victoria Nuland as Special
Envoy to engage in modernizing CFE in February 2010. She consulted
closely with our NATO Allies to launch an effort to reach agreement
among the 30 CFE Parties, joined by the six NATO members that are not
signatories of the CFE Treaty (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania,
Croatia, and Slovenia), on a framework agreement based on three of
President Obama's five principles of European security: 1) reciprocal
transparency of conventional armed forces; 2) reciprocal restraints on
concentrations of heavy forces and permanent basing in sensitive
regions; and 3) a renewed insistence on host-nation consent for the
stationing of foreign forces on sovereign territory.
Since June 2010, the United States and our Allies have been engaged
in an intensive effort to reach agreement on a framework for
negotiations to strengthen and modernize conventional arms control in
Europe. However, after ten rounds of consultations in Vienna, Russia
remains inflexible on two key issues: host-nation consent for the
stationing of foreign troops on sovereign territory, and providing
appropriate transparency among all parties regarding their current
military posture for the period of any negotiation. Currently, the
United States is consulting with Allies to decide the way forward,
while continuing to encourage Moscow to reconsider its position. If
Russia will not reconsider, we must look carefully at our options
regarding the current unequal situation, whereby 29 Parties implement
the Treaty and one does not. As the NATO communique issued at the
Lisbon Summit warned, this situation cannot continue indefinitely.
While the future of CFE remains uncertain and the Treaty cannot be
replaced by the Vienna Document, we remain committed to conventional
arms control and military transparency in Europe. We will continue to
work through the OSCE to advance these objectives through modernizing
the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty.
Outside of the OSCE, we are working both bilaterally with Russia
and through the NATO-Russia Council to address concerns about missile
defense and strategic stability. At the same time, through the Forum
for Security Cooperation, we are seeking to address modern threats,
such as transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, Central Asian
instability, and unsecured, unsafe stocks of small arms and light
weapons. Finally, we are using every opportunity possible, including
the OSCE, to address the unresolved conflicts that have contributed to
the stalemate on modernizing of the CFE.
The Unresolved Conflicts
The OSCE continues to play a critical role as a central forum for
addressing the unresolved conflicts which emerged at the end of the
Cold War in Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh. As the 2008 war in
Georgia showed, these conflicts hold the devastating potential to
destabilize security in the OSCE region, and their resolution must
remain a high priority for the OSCE and all its member states. The
United States seeks to use the leverage of the OSCE's diverse
membership to address these unresolved conflicts, and, through
cooperative efforts, resolve them. While each of the conflict
resolution processes has faced myriad difficulties this year, I still
hold out hope that with the help of our Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office,
we can show progress by Vilnius.
Georgia
We have seen few signs toward progress on resolving the conflict
between Georgia and Russia. First and foremost, the OSCE has not been
able to resume its presence on both sides of the administrative
boundaries in Georgia. Talks continue in Vienna and Geneva on the
possibility that an OSCE team, based in Vienna, will be given access to
all of the territory of Georgia within its internationally-recognized
borders. This would be a significant step forward, but Russia and
Georgia have yet to agree on the conditions for bringing such a team
into existence.
As the Co-Chairs of this Committee noted after the 2008
hostilities, Russia's invasion of Georgia represented ``a clear
violation of Georgia's territorial integrity and Principle Four of the
Helsinki Final Act.'' The expiration of the OSCE mandate in Georgia at
the end of 2009 was regrettable. Our position remains unchanged: the
U.S. continues to advocate for allowing humanitarian assistance, as
well as a return to pre-conflict positions, as Russia committed to
doing as part of the August 8, 2008 ceasefire agreement. The U.S.
continues to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty
within its internationally recognized borders, and we will maintain our
support for international efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the
dispute over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia needs to abide by its
ceasefire arrangements and take steps that promote stability in the
region. We reaffirm this message regularly to our Russian counterparts.
Moldova
The OSCE (then the CSCE) became involved in peacekeeping in Moldova
in 1993, and continues to play an important role in supporting a
peaceful resolution of the dispute over Transnistria through the 5+2
talks. These talks comprise Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and
the OSCE, plus the U.S. and the EU as observers. The United States
continues to press for a resumption of formal 5+2 negotiations to make
progress toward a settlement that will end this conflict based on
Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Informal 5+2 talks in
February discussed freedom of movement between the sides, the
negotiating process, and a work plan for 2011--but showed limited
results. President Medvedev hosted another informal 5+2 meeting in June
in Moscow, but was unable to reach agreement on holding a formal
meeting in September. Even without formal 5+2 negotiations, we
encourage the parties to continue to pursue confidence-building
measures, such as those to facilitate commerce within the existing
customs process and to otherwise work to improve the daily lives of
citizens on both sides of the Dniester River.
In addition, the OSCE stands ready to support the completion of the
removal of the estimated 20,000 tons of ex-Soviet arms and ammunition
left on Moldovan territory, in Cobnasa, as well as any remaining
equipment. The OSCE began assisting Russia and Moldova in removal and
destruction of equipment, arms, and ammunition in 1999, but Russia
stopped this effort in March 2004. The OSCE has allocated both money
and manpower ready to facilitate the completion of Russia's obligation
to complete this effort.
Nagorno-Karabakh
The United States remains closely engaged with our OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairs--Russia and France--in supporting efforts to bring a peaceful
settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagomo-Karabakh
conflict. Presidents Obama, Medvedev, and Sarkozy in a joint statement
at the G-8 Summit in Deauville in May noted ``the time has arrived'' to
move beyond the ``unacceptable status quo'' and called for a ``decisive
step toward a peaceful settlement.'' Specifically, the three presidents
urged the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to finalize the Basic
Principles, which will provide the formula for a future comprehensive
settlement. If we reach agreement on the Basic Principles, the United
States will work diligently with its partners, including the EU and the
OSCE, to take the next steps toward implementing an eventual peaceful
settlement to this terrible conflict.
Unfortunately, there has been a step backward in this effort. I am
sad to report that the attempt to reach a breakthrough in Kazan, Russia
on June 24 failed, while tensions along the Line of Contact are
increasing. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain unable to fmalize the Basic
Principles, and we remain at an unhelpful and dangerous stalemate.
President Medvedev has put forward another proposal to break the
stalemate, but the prospects for progress are uncertain.
New and Emerging Threats
Part of the rich history of the OSCE, and a source of its strength,
has been the adaptability of the institution to face new and emerging
threats. No one in 1975 could have imagined that cybersecurity would be
a topic of discussion among states. In addition, the specter of nuclear
proliferation to non-state actors, the control of small arms and light
weapons, and border security in Central Asia all have become issues
that concern all participating States. Fortunately, the OSCE provides
ample flexibility to address new threats as they arise.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted in April 2004 to
facilitate an effective global response to WMD proliferation threats by
committing states to improve their domestic controls and prevent non-
state actors from acquiring or developing WMD and their means of
delivery. As the world's largest regional security organization, the
OSCE plays an important role in the full implementation of UNSCR 1540
through effective norm-setting and providing leadership that other
regional groupings with less developed structures are looking to
follow.
The United Nations Committee overseeing implementation has welcomed
the OSCE's efforts to implement UNSCR 1540, praising its ability to
leverage and empower regional approaches and understandings. In January
2011, the OSCE hosted a workshop specifically to define the
Organization's role in facilitating UN Security Council Resolution
1540. It brought together policymakers and experts from around the
world, reviewing progress in the implementation of UNSCR 1540, the
facilitation role appropriate for regional organizations and the UN,
best practices, lessons learned, and the utility of border controls and
end-use monitoring.
The OSCE 1540 workshop demonstrated the Organization's critical
role in bringing together national, international, and non-governmental
organizations to stop the spread of WMD, and the results are leading to
further cooperation. The United States, with support from other
delegations, is pressing for the development of such OSCE tools as a
best-practices guide for UNSCR 1540 implementation for OSCE
participating States, integration of the 1540 Adviser who started
working in 2010 at the Secretariat level, national action plans, and
making use of OSCE institutions such as the Dushanbe Border Management
College.
Small Arms and Light Weapons
The OSCE continues to provide a vital forum for Euro-Atlantic
cooperation on the reduction of threats posed by the illicit transfer
of small arms and light weapons and their possession by subnational
groups. Beginning with the adoption of the OSCE Document on Small Arms
and Light Weapons in 1999, the OSCE has fostered cooperation among
participating States in reducing trafficking, securing existing stocks,
and eliminating excess small arms and light weapons and related
materials.
In March 2011, DoD participated in an OSCE-led assessment of
ammunition storage, destruction, and related infrastructure in
Kyrgyzstan. During this visit, DoD discovered poorly secured man-
portable air defense systems MANP ADS and large stockpiles of obsolete
and hazardous conventional ammunition. As a result the United States
has offered funding for physical security upgrades and MANP ADS
destruction there. DoD will participate in an OSCE follow-up visit in
July to assess the possibility of an OSCE-funded storage and security
improvement program at seven ammunition and small arms and light
weapons depots.
Cyber Security
Next, I would like to address the role of the OSCE in cyber
security. Information technologies are vital not only to the global
economy but to our national security. There is no exaggerating DoD's
dependence on information networks and systems for the command and
control of our forces, intelligence and logistics, and weapons
technologies. As malicious cyber activities increase in their scope and
sophistication, international concern has increased.
In May, the OSCE hosted a conference on cyber security to explore
potential roles for the organization. The conference was broadly
attended, with participants from the participating States, partners,
and international organizations, including Japan, the European
Commission, and NATO. At the conference, the United States suggested
that the OSCE promote confidence-building mechanisms within the
political-military dimension of security to address cyber threats. In
the run-up to the Vilnius Ministerial, DoD will continue to support
State Department-led discussions on such mechanisms to protect our
vital interests.
Border Security in Central Asia
The United States has been working to promote a stable, secure, and
prosperous Central Asia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the
OSCE Summit in Astana, all participants renewed their commitments
across all three dimensions, as well as to continue their efforts to
promote a stable, independent, prosperous, and democratic Afghanistan.
We can achieve this by improving border security and working to combat
drug trafficking and other forms of proliferation across Central Asia.
One area where the United States certainly hopes the OSCE will do
more is with Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan, an OSCE
Partner Country made an urgent request for support in 2007. Responding
to this request, the OSCE Secretariat proposed sixteen separate
projects to enhance Afghan border security, including an emphasis on
building Afghan capacity. These projects are designed to support the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy in close coordination with
the Government of Afghanistan. We would like to see more progress in
these projects.
Conclusion
In 1970, if you addressed a group of NATO or Warsaw Pact military
planners and told them that they would, within their lifetimes, hand
each other their order of battle, publish advance warning of large
military exercises, invite the other side to observe the largest of
these exercises, conduct thousands of intrusive inspections, and fly
hundreds of uncontested reconnaissance sorties over each others'
territory, they would have responded with disbelief. Now, we take these
measures for granted.
The Helsinki Process, initiated in 1973, and aided by this
Commission, remains an important tool to remind people that this effort
is still underway, and still necessary to prevent future conflicts,
resolve the remaining conflicts in Eurasia, and address new threats as
they emerge.
I had hoped that by 2011 we would be looking forward to projecting
the peace and security of the OSCE area to other areas of instability
that the OSCE area would be serving as a beacon and a guide to the rest
of the world. Instead, we have much work to do to fulfill our original
promise of a Europe whole, free and secure. As well as engaging in the
hard work of creating the conditions necessary for advancement and
growth in Central Asia.
I hope that, in the future, the OSCE's Astana Summit will be seen a
turning point, where the participating States truly and fully
recommitted themselves to reinvigorate the OSCE and move boldly into
the 21st century. I think we see some positive signs as we advance
toward our next milestone, the Vilnius Ministerial. Time will tell, and
with your help, we will succeed.
Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael Haltzel \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dr. Michael Haltzel is Senior Fellow at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Senior Advisor at the
consulting firm McLarty Associates. He was Head of the U.S. Delegations
to recent OSCE conferences in Warsaw, Copenhagen, and Vienna.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor and a pleasure to
participate in today's hearing. I would like to take this opportunity
to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and Co-Chairman Senator Cardin, for your
energetic leadership of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. In a policy world where coping with daily crises makes it
easy not to see the forest for the trees, the Helsinki Commission
stands out for its ability to examine both current problems and their
deeper causes. Having two prestigious figures at the helm of the
Commission, greatly enhances its credibility and the impact of its
findings.
I would also mention the ``foot soldiers'' of our OSCE policy.
During the past two years I have had the honor of being head of three
U.S. delegations to OSCE conferences: the 2009 Human Dimension
Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, the 2010 Copenhagen 20th Anniversary
Conference, and the 2010 Vienna Review Conference. I have never
encountered a more expert, hard-working, and effective group of public
servants than the members of those three delegations and the officials
backing them up in Washington, D.C. They included staff of the Helsinki
Commission, career Foreign Service Officers, and State Department civil
servants, plus a few public members with specialized professional
backgrounds. Several of them are in this room today. The American
people are being extraordinarily well served by, and should be proud
of, these U.S. federal employees.
Mr. Chairman, when one views the Helsinki Process over the nearly
four decades of its existence, one must, I believe, judge it to have
been a resounding success. The CSCE (Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe) played a significant role in hastening the
demise of communism in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Although
Europe has not yet completely achieved the lofty goal of being ``whole,
free, and at peace,'' the territory of the OSCE is unquestionably in
much better shape than it was when the founders began their
deliberations in the Finnish capital in the early 1970s. In Europe,
only one dictator remains--Aleksandr Lukashenka in Belarus--while in
Central Asia and the Caucasus a half-dozen other OSCE participating
States have governments that are not democracies. Compared with the old
Soviet Union and its communist satellites, though, the situation has
markedly improved.
That's the relatively good news. The bad news is that since its
high-point in 1990 at the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension,
which wrote what is still the most comprehensive document on human
rights, the organization (as of January 1, 1995 called the OSCE) has
been in many respects a disappointment. For reasons that I will outline
shortly, I would not call it a failure. But as I recently stated in an
op-ed jointly written with former U.S. Ambassador William Courtney and
former EU Ambassador Denis Corboy, \2\ the OSCE, with 56 participating
States the world's largest regional security organization, is in
crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Punching above our weight to lead top regional security
organisation,'' The Irish Times, June 10, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be sure, the OSCE faces a formidable array of challenges.
Uzbekistan has never come to terms with the massacre of hundreds of
protestors in Andijon in 2005. The new, democratic government in
neighboring Kyrgyzstan is struggling with the aftermath of a violent,
repressive leader who fled last year. Insurgencies are spreading in
Russia's largely Muslim north Caucasus, while Moscow has farmed out
control of Chechnya to a brutal warlord.
Meanwhile, Russia's military continues illegally to occupy parts of
Georgia and Moldova. Talks on ``frozen'' or ``protracted'' conflicts in
Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are
stalled, with only occasional, tantalizing indications of positive
movement.
What has the OSCE been able to do to remedy these problems?
Unfortunately, other than offering rhetorical balm, not much. At last
December's first-in-a-decade OSCE summit in Astana, Kazakhstan the
participating States, with strong leadership from Assistant Secretary
Gordon, did formally reaffirm the organization's lofty principles. In a
healthy organization, however, I submit that this reaffirmation would
have been considered unnecessary.
Considerably more important was the fact that the participating
States were unable to agree upon an Action Plan for the OSCE.
Mr. Chairman, the United States gave fair warning that we would not
accept a vague, toothless Action Plan. In my statement to the Closing
Plenary Session of the Vienna Review Conference on October 26, 2010, I
outlined nine specific goals and implementation measures for the Astana
Summit, which, if not accepted would make the United States hard
pressed to accept an Action Plan. \3\ I am gratified that at Astana the
United States stuck to its principles, which are fully consonant with
those of the OSCE. Not so with several other participating States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ http://photos.state.gov/libraries/adana/5/ViennaRevCon/
ClosingPlenary--10-26-10.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, take the paucity of concrete, remedial OSCE actions,
which is cause for great concern. The OSCE's consensus rule has become
an increasing burden. Only once has a participating State been
suspended, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
in 1992. Uzbekistan should have been suspended after the Andijon
massacre six years ago. The government of Belarus violently suppressed
peaceful protests against the rigged election of December 2010 and has
imprisoned leading opposition figures. Since April of this year Minsk
has been under investigation by a mission of independent experts under
the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism, which does not require consensus to be
activated but which itself can be compromised by the participating
State under investigation. The Lukashenka regime surely deserves
suspension, but I am doubtful that it will be so penalized. I hope I
will be proved to be unduly pessimistic.
Non-democratic members, Russia above all, continually stymie
organizational progress. Moscow has vetoed carefully crafted U.S.
crisis-response proposals, preventive action in the north Caucasus, and
aid in Afghanistan, adjacent to OSCE territory in Central Asia.
The lack of an enforcement mechanism is also a fundamental weakness
of the OSCE. The public ``naming and shaming'' of human rights
violators at the HDIM drives non-democratic participating States up the
wall and occasionally improves the conditions of imprisoned civil
rights advocates, but it rarely alters general governmental behavior.
In the face of constant stonewalling, a few segments of the OSCE
manage to carry out their mandates with distinction. The OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatovic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, who testified before this Commission two weeks ago, is
fearless in her speaking truth to power. The Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), based in Warsaw and headed by
the Slovenian diplomat Janez Lenarcic, draws high marks for its work in
election observation, democratic development, human rights, tolerance
and non-discrimination, and rule of law. The OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities former Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek
commands universal respect for his efforts. The OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly plays an important role, although its relationship with the
Permanent Council needs improvement. Last but not least, the OSCE runs
valuable field missions and training programs in several troubled
areas.
The OSCE also has a key mandate in arms control. Assistant
Secretary Vershbow undoubtedly will go into the details, so I will only
touch on one important facet: the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty (CFE), which was signed by 30 states-parties at the 1999
Istanbul OSCE Summit and has been ratified by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan. NATO members have refused to ratify the accord until
Russia complies with the commitments it made in Istanbul twelve years
ago to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Last year the
United States undertook an intensive, good-faith effort to negotiate a
Framework Agreement on the Adapted CFE but has failed to date, largely
because Moscow refuses to accept the principle of "host nation consent"
and adequate transparency.
So we have an organization whose effectiveness varies widely. As a
norm-setter, the OSCE has few, if any, equals. Its specialized agencies
and field missions remain valuable international players. But in
enforcing its democratic and human rights principles and in arms
control the OSCE has proved to be a huge disappointment. The
organization remains important and is an integral tool of U.S.
diplomacy, but even its strongest proponents--and I count myself in
that group--must admit that it has been on a downward slide over the
last decade.
What, then, should U.S. policy toward the OSCE be?
Mr. Chairman, frustrating though it may be to some, I would argue
for ``more, not less'' commitment to the organization. Abandoning or
reducing our participation in the OSCE is simply not an option. We
should redouble our commitment, both in personnel and in behavior. The
United States should be the most activist OSCE participating State.
That means sending our best and our brightest, like our current
Ambassador Ian Kelly and his new DCM Ambassador Gary Robbins, to
represent the U.S. at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. It means
backing up the Permanent Representative with an outstanding staff, both
on site and at the Helsinki Commission and at the State Department in
Washington. A prerequisite for these steps, of course, is adequate
Congressional funding.
In terms of behavior within the OSCE, the United States should be
second to none in its engagement, both positively and negatively. At
the December 2011 OSCE Ministerial in Vilnius, we should continue to
push our constructive initiatives--such as more effective crisis-
response mechanisms, updating the Vienna Document on arms control,
formalizing internet freedom, codifying gender equality, and demanding
more economic transparency--even if many or all of these initiatives
will most likely be vetoed by Russia or others. Demonstrating that the
U.S. is a good international citizen and a dedicated OSCE member has
intrinsic value that should not be underestimated.
At the HDIM, the United States should continue its leadership,
including the ``naming and shaming'' that is called for in an
implementation meeting. In that vein, we should always be candid about
our own national shortcomings. My experience at the Warsaw HDIM two
years ago was that by publicly owning up to our deficiencies and then
explaining the measures we are taking to rectify them we increase our
credibility, especially among the European participating States.
The United States should always be the foremost champion of non-
governmental organizations and their right to participate in OSCE
conferences. Whatever the occasional rhetorical excesses of some NGO
representatives, these organizations infuse a breath of fresh air into
OSCE proceedings and provide an essential link to the citizenries of
participating States, especially non-democratic countries.
In negotiations over all manner of OSCE documents--from routine
announcements to treaties--the United States should be the
quintessential ``paragraph experts,'' even at the risk of being labeled
``nit-pickers.'' I would prefer to describe it by the somewhat
inelegant German term of possessing Sitzfleisch, meaning being
assiduous. We should be diligent, careful to a fault, and tireless.
Earning the reputation as the last delegation to leave a negotiation
strengthens our hand in the future.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States should never ``go along to
get along.'' On the vast majority of issues confronting the OSCE, we
are in agreement with our European friends and allies. Occasionally,
however, if they are willing--allegedly ``for the good of the
organization''--to acquiesce in resolutions or draft agreements that we
feel would jeopardize our national interest or compromise the
principles of the OSCE, we must resist group pressure to provide
consensus. No matter how much eye-rolling it may occasion, our being a
minority of one in such rare cases is not only ethically sound, but
also organizationally the most supportive position.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I thank you, again, for
the opportunity to offer my views, and I look forward to attempting to
answer any questions Members may wish to pose.
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