

# COAST GUARD INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN THE TRANSIT ZONE

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## HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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## COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN THE TRANSIT ZONE

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MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1997

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Hastert, Souder, Barrett and Turner.

Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director and chief counsel; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Ianthe Saylor, clerk; Mike Yeager, minority counsel; and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk.

Mr. HASTERT. The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will come to order.

We have two people on the way over; and, because I think probably everybody's time is valuable sitting out in the audience, I would like to get going.

In today's hearing, we zero in on the national security threat posed by the explosion of maritime drug trafficking in the transit zone and the extraordinary efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard to combat it. Let me say, by transit zone, we mean the 2 million square miles between the United States and South American borders; it covers the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, Mexico and the Eastern Pacific.

We are privileged to have Admiral Robert Kramek, President Clinton's outstanding Interdiction Coordinator and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Admiral Kramek has been a tremendous leader in our interdiction efforts, and we welcome him here today.

We are also pleased to have with us several front-line Coast Guard personnel direct from operations within the transit zone—a C-130 pilot, a HU-25C pilot, a Commanding Officer of a cutter, and a Boarding Officer. These officers are the ones who have to risk their lives tracking, pursuing and arresting international drug traffickers off the coasts of Colombia and Mexico and our own coast. We are honored to have all of you brave men here today.

Finally, we have Admiral Paul Yost, former Coast Guard Commandant and the architect of the highly effective late-1980's drug interdiction program.

We welcome all of you.

Stopping the flow of cocaine into the United States is the No. 1 priority of the international drug control policy. Currently, over 30 percent of the cocaine entering the United States comes through the Caribbean, mostly from Colombia, bound for Mexico and Puerto Rico. Roughly \$15 billion worth of cocaine travels through the Caribbean. A great deal of this cocaine enters the United States through the ports and borders of Puerto Rico. Have no doubts, drugs entering Puerto Rico don't stop there—80 percent continue on to the rest of the United States.

All current indicators show an increase in trafficking through the Caribbean, but there is another untold story. Budget reductions since 1992 for interdiction efforts have reduced the ability of law enforcement and the Defense Department to identify, to track and to intercept international drug traffickers. The problem intensified in 1995. The President's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy stated that "a stronger focus on source countries was necessary," and the National Security Council "determined that a controlled shift in emphasis was required, a shift away from past efforts that focused primarily on interdiction in the transit zone to new efforts that focus on interdiction in and around source countries."

President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 14 making this determination official policy.

But the policy has not become a reality. While funding was shifted from transit zone interdiction, stripping the Coast Guard and others of critical resources, there was no increase in funds for source country programs. We lost critical transit zone support and gained no new resources in the source countries.

Due to this shift in resources, we have seen the Caribbean become an extremely active drug transit area. In fact, Puerto Rico has probably paid as high a price as anyone. Their murder rate has become higher than any State over the past several years, and 90 percent of all violence on the island is believed to be drug related.

Last June, this subcommittee conducted a field hearing in San Juan Harbor aboard a Coast Guard cutter aptly named the *Courageous*. At that hearing, we heard from Governor Rossello, who clearly conveyed the message that his island is under siege. Under his leadership, Puerto Rico has fought back. But they cannot do it alone. They need our support.

Reduced attention by the President and weaker funding is a big part of the problem. In fiscal 1991, President Bush committed \$2 billion to drug interdiction. By 1995, President Clinton had cut interdiction spending to \$1.2 billion. The President mothballed Customs and other aircraft, removed intelligence assets and reduced the number of Coast Guard cutters, ship days, flying hours and personnel.

In the last 3 years, Congress restored some of the much-needed funding for transit zone and source zone interdiction. But we are far from having the resources we had when Admiral Yost led our efforts in the late 1980's. For fiscal year 1998, the President has requested \$1.6 billion for interdiction and just under \$4 billion for the Coast Guard. We will work to make that happen, but more effort is needed.

Finally, we need to discuss how effective increased resources can be. A recently released report by the Institute for Defense Analyses

employed rigorous mathematical modeling to quality and determined that a properly planned, source zone interdiction strategy is cost-effective. Such a campaign increases cocaine prices and thereby reduces the use of cocaine in the United States.

Based on the success of a new operation called Frontier Shield, which Admiral Kramek will outline today, and the results of the IDA study, we now need to reassess our funding structure for interdiction and how important this part of the drug war is.

I hope that today's hearing will serve as a cornerstone for this subcommittee's efforts over the next 2 years. Thank you.

Before proceeding with our first panel, I am pleased to turn to my colleagues—we have none right now, we will reserve that for a later time—for any opening statements that they wish to enter into the record at that time.

I would like to welcome Admiral Robert Kramek, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. We appreciate your being here today. We know certainly this is a busy time of year for you.

Admiral, if you would stand and raise your hand, the committee's rules require me to swear you in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show that the witness responded in the affirmative.

Admiral, please proceed with your opening statement.

#### **STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT E. KRAHEK, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD**

Admiral KRAHEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear before you today and discuss Coast Guard transit zone interdiction operations and my role as U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.

I am often asked to discuss the many issues of the Coast Guard with respect to saving lives and protecting property, and drug interdiction is no different. By reducing the supply of cocaine and other drugs which are smuggled across our borders, the Coast Guard saves lives and protects property from drug-related violence.

Today, Mr. Chairman, we will talk about why interdiction is a very important tool in the effort to stop drugs from coming into our country and that it is a successful supply reduction effort.

We will also discuss the importance of maritime interdiction and why it is effective. When the correct resources are applied, as the Coast Guard has recently demonstrated during operation Frontier Shield, we get a lot of bang for our buck.

The Coast Guard is unique, as you know, in that it is the only member of the Armed Forces with law enforcement authority; and that is why we have become and been designated the lead agency for drug interdiction in the maritime regions, especially for surface in maritime and co-lead with Customs for air interdiction.

We, with the support of General McCaffrey, have put together a 5-year budget plan. Our fiscal 1998 appropriations, which I will be testifying on later on this week, is the first year of that 5-year plan to support the administration's 10-year strategy to successfully reduce drug use amongst all of our population.

The Coast Guard campaign is called Steel Web; and during this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I will describe a little bit of that campaign to you.

I would like to draw your attention right now to the threat slide all the way on the right showing the magnitude of cocaine flow. You and I have discussed that before, but it is illustrative of the threat in the maritime region in that those threat arrows, such as 100 metric tons of cocaine heading right toward Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, represents the transit from the source countries to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as an example, on the sea, over the sea, and in some cases even under the sea.

But, for the most part, the Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime interdiction; and our job is to take a look at where those threats are and, working with other agencies in the Federal Government, especially the Department of Defense, to mount a credible deterrence and interdiction force to prevent those drugs, especially cocaine, from entering the United States.

Testifying before you last year, Mr. Chairman, in the spring, you had properly identified almost 28 to 30 percent of the cocaine flowing up into Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands from the source countries. In response to that, I mounted a major campaign, which I will talk about in just a few minutes.

I think it is notable, though, that if you were to look at that chart, you would see on the west coast of Mexico almost 234 metric tons and on the east coast of Mexico almost 264 metric tons. Clearly more than 60 percent of the total cocaine flow coming out of the source countries goes to either coast of Mexico.

We will talk about some operations that are under way there now to thwart that, but those operations are just kicking off and are going to require more resources than are currently available to do it.

In his letter transmitting the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy to Congress, President Clinton wrote, "We must continue to shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat. We must continue our interdiction efforts, which have greatly disrupted the trafficking pattern of cocaine smugglers and have blocked the free flow of cocaine."

The Speaker of the House, Mr. Gingrich, in his acceptance speech at the beginning of the 105th Congress stated, "Drugs aren't statistics. Drugs are real human beings being destroyed. Drugs are real violence."

These statements by our Nation's leaders demonstrate our bipartisan commitment to combat this plague.

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, you are also going to hear from four Coast Guard personnel today.

Lieutenant Commander Mike Burns, a C-130 aircraft Commander, who will tell you about the use of new technology, forward-looking infrared and the aperture radars aboard our C-130 aircraft, and how he has recently used that technology in detection and monitoring and helping the interdiction role around Puerto Rico and the Caribbean AOR. There is money in our 1998 budget to support continued installation of the forward-looking infrared equipment on these aircraft.



You will also hear from Lieutenant Commander Randy Forrester, a Charlie Model Falcon aircraft Commander. This aircraft is specially outfitted with F-16 fighter aircraft radar and other sensors. It is very dangerous, what he does. He not only has to intercept aircraft, but then he has to get very close, track them and identify them, until we reach an end game where an apprehension can be made.

Our 1998 budget also brings back aircraft into our fleet and allows all of our Falcon aircraft to be located in Miami, FL, conducting the intercept mission for which they were designed and outfitted.

You will also hear from Lieutenant Jim Carlson, Commanding Officer of one of our 110-foot patrol boats, the Coast Guard cutter *Vashon*. These patrol boats are our first line of defense against smugglers trying to reach our shoreline.

They were designed to be away from home, from port, for 2 to 4 days. Many of them are away from home port for 45 days, Mr. Chairman. We brought them all the way down from Maine, as a matter of fact, and have them stationed in Puerto Rico, operating there for up to 5 and 6 weeks at a time in forward-operating bases. When not encountering drug smugglers, they are encountering the 9,000 migrants we interdicted in the Mona Passage coming from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico last year, some of which were also carrying drugs. Over 100 migrants this weekend alone were intercepted, some of them in a capsized vessel, and they deceased.

You will also hear from Petty Officer Mark Fitzmorris, a Boarding Officer on Coast Guard cutter *Tampa*. This Boarding Officer was involved in many inspections, and the *Tampa* was recently involved in seizing over 1,700 pounds of cocaine coming into Puerto Rico. He will be able to tell you about his experiences doing that particular mission.

I mentioned our 5-year budget plan, Mr. Chairman. The middle slide is called Steel Web. Steel Web is the campaign that we will mount over the next 5 years. That will provide both the deterrence and interdiction forces to intercept those threat arrows.

The Coast Guard is just one element in this. As the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, I coordinate the Department of Defense, Customs, DEA, FBI, all agencies, because it requires the resources of all of our agencies in order to counter this threat.

I know you visited Joint Interagency Task Force East in Key West. You have been to Puerto Rico and seen some of that in action. In a true spirit of jointness, more jointness than just in the five armed forces, joint interagency task forces working together is how our campaign plan is put together. Each agency is a piece of this patchwork quilt that is necessary to thwart this particular threat.

As I mentioned, funding for operation Steel Web for the first phase of our 5-year program is included in the Coast Guard's 1998 budget; and we will have a hearing on that this Wednesday.

You will notice on the Steel Web slide at the point of the 110 metric ton arrow is operation Steel Gauntlet. That is the operation around Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, Mr. Chairman.

We prototyped that operation this year. It is better known to you as operation Frontier Shield. It was in direct response to the hearings that you held this last May and the GAO report indicating the 28 percent of cocaine flowing up to that area of responsibility.

Steel Gauntlet will be the steady state operation that will deter and interdict drug smugglers. I hope 90 percent of the smugglers that take off from Colombia will not ever make it to Puerto Rico. They will either be deterred and go back or be caught. The level of resources we will ask for over the next 5 years in Steel Gauntlet will allow that to happen.

In the meantime, we tested that out, Mr. Chairman, with an operation called Frontier Shield. We took the resources that this committee was instrumental in convincing the appropriators to appropriate as a sort of a supplemental at the end of the last budget season, and in that particular case we started Frontier Shield and then were augmented with about \$14.5 million that the Appropriations Committee had supplied to ONDCP to help the Coast Guard in this endeavor.

I would like to just show you what robust interdiction can do. As you know, I met with Governor Rossello. I met with all the leaders in that part of the region, including the Prime Minister of Haiti and the President of the Dominican Republic, and recently went down to that AOR in the middle of operation Frontier Shield during Thanksgiving week.

These results you see here, we started this operation on October 1, 1996, until March 1st—so 4 months, 5 months, of operations. In that time, we have had 17,968 vessels sighted heading toward Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. We have sorted that out; and, of that, 1,562 were targets of interest.

To give you an order of magnitude of how much traffic is down there, we decided to board 892 of those vessels. Some of our personnel will tell you what it is like to do that later on in the hearing.

The results of those boardings were we seized 19,000 pounds of cocaine. We seized 11 vessels, and made 35 arrests. We witnessed 24,000 pounds of drugs jettisoned into the ocean. At the same time, we intercepted 2,237 illegal migrants who were trying to come up through the same area of responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, in a 5-month period, that equals 195 million cocaine doses we prevented from coming into the United States of America through a robust interdiction program, with the support that this committee gave us last year.

In summary, our mandate is clear. During the roll out of the 1997 National Drug Strategy, the President said we have to do more to shield our frontiers against drug traffickers. He went on to say we have had some successes against trafficking and we can do better with interdiction and we are learning how to do it, citing the success of Coast Guard operation Frontier Shield as his example.

Drug traffic in the transit zone remains a substantial threat to our national security. We must employ new tools to weave a seamless steel web of enforcement, and your Coast Guard is ready to do that.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize your support, oversight and long-term commitment to the national counternarcotics

effort. As America moves into the next century, the Coast Guard stands ready to meet our responsibilities in this important effort, especially with your support.

I am happy to answer any questions you may have, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. Any written material you have there will be entered into the record.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Kramek follows:]

STATEMENT OF  
ADMIRAL ROBERT E. KRAHEK, USCG  
ON  
TRANSIT ZONE INTERDICTION  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 10, 1997

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss Coast Guard transit zone drug interdiction operations.

The use of illicit drugs continues as an immediate threat to the well-being, safety and security of all Americans. The cost to society -- in terms of lost worker productivity, soaring medical costs, and drug related violent crime -- is staggering. Effective Coast Guard Transit Zone interdiction operations are vital to our national security under the National Drug Control Strategy.

Today, I will briefly describe the scope and nature of the Transit Zone, as well as the magnitude of the cocaine threat, as it is currently the drug which poses one of the greatest dangers to our nation. Next, I will discuss the current state of our interdiction effort, and provide an overview of Operation STEEL WEB, the Coast Guard's theater-wide campaign plan to combat this threat.

Let me begin by providing an overview of the Transit Zone, a six million square mile area between the U.S. and the source countries of South America. It includes all of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as much of the Eastern Pacific Ocean. The sheer size of this area presents a formidable obstacle which must be overcome in order to achieve our objectives. The task of maintaining a comprehensive overview of activity and sorting targets of interest from legitimate air and surface traffic is daunting.

Equally difficult is the logistical challenge of supporting our forces in such a widespread theater of operations, particularly in the Eastern Pacific. However, both challenges are nonetheless manageable, given the continued mutual support and cooperation of the Department of Defense (DOD), the intelligence and law enforcement communities, and the coordination provided by the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) East and West and the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC). Our relationship with Caribbean countries in the Transit Zone is equally important. We have, in conjunction with the Department of State, taken measures to promote increased air and maritime interdiction efforts with these nations.

The magnitude of the drug smuggling threat in the region is significant. About 780 metric tons of cocaine are produced annually in South America. Approximately 640 metric tons flow north through the Transit Zone, with about 600 metric tons destined for the U.S. market. An estimated 58 percent of all cocaine enters the U.S. by crossing the Southwest border from Mexico. Most of the remainder enters through Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The majority of cocaine traffic is transported by non-commercial air and maritime modes through the Transit Zone. Intelligence indicators show a shift from non-commercial air transport back to non-commercial maritime surface routes in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. This trend is most likely a result of source country successes against air traffic and a perceived lack of maritime enforcement assets. About two-thirds of all cocaine reaching the U.S. is currently shipped via maritime surface modes at some point during transit, while the remainder is transported entirely via air routes. I truly believe unless the Coast Guard maintains a robust, proactive Transit Zone interdiction effort, the U.S. will see a flood of cocaine which will drive prices down, increase purity and make drug use more pervasive in our neighborhoods and schools.

The drug threat has not abated, and in fact, shows signs of increasing. Production has increased, concealment techniques have improved, and criminal smuggling organizations have expanded their distribution networks, reaching even into our nation's grade schools. These trends have chilling implications, as the drug trade has a number of detrimental

effects on our society. For example, 62 percent of violent crimes are related to the drug problem, and violent crimes topped the list of concerns for 84 percent of American taxpayers surveyed in a 1996 Gallup poll. Marijuana use is rising in high schools, and 82 percent of Americans polled felt that reducing illegal drug use among children and adolescents are extremely important applications of their tax dollars. The drug trade is directly responsible for as many as 20,000 deaths in the U.S. each year. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the illicit drug trade drains our economy of approximately 67 billion dollars each year. If this money were applied to legitimate investment and consumption the benefit to society would be substantial.

The National Drug Control Strategy specifies that an important and direct method of reducing the fiscal and social costs of illicit drugs is to interdict them before they reach our nation. Source country initiatives, domestic demand reduction programs, domestic law enforcement, and Transit Zone interdiction are all mutually supportive, but effective Transit Zone interdiction is a critical part of the Strategy in stemming the tide of illicit drugs entering our country. Coast Guard law enforcement operations are a vital component of the supply reduction aspect of the National Drug Control Strategy. Goals 4 and 5 of the Strategy clearly define our obligations: *to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and break foreign and domestic sources of supply.* Within the classified annex to the Strategy, there are some 25 mission essential tasks which we, the Coast Guard, are expected to fulfill in order to create a defense in depth posture in the Transit Zone.

For those of you who may not be fully aware of the scope of these responsibilities, let me provide some brief background information. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime interdiction and co-lead with the U.S. Customs Service for air interdiction. As such, we are poised to play an even more significant role in responding to this national problem. The Coast Guard is the only armed service with law enforcement authority, and thus is uniquely suited to balance the detection and monitoring support capabilities of the Department of Defense with the interdiction and apprehension efforts of other Federal

law enforcement agencies such as the Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Border Patrol.

The Coast Guard also supports Source Country initiatives aimed at stopping the flow of drugs from South America. We have deployed air interdiction aircraft to support Operation LASER STRIKE being conducted by the U. S. Southern Command, and provide personnel from the Coast Guard International Training Division to perform assessments and conduct riverine law enforcement training in key Source Countries.

However, Transit Zone interdiction is by far the most important aspect of Coast Guard counternarcotics operations. In an average year, the Coast Guard keeps nearly \$3 billion worth of illegal drugs off America's streets and out of the hands of our children. Of all Federal agencies, only the Coast Guard has jurisdiction to conduct law enforcement beyond our customs waters.

Our cutters and aircraft have established a continuous Coast Guard presence along the major threat axes. These high threat areas alone measure almost two hundred thousand square miles. To broaden the impact of our current Transit Zone efforts, the Coast Guard is actively involved in numerous joint operations with other agencies, and frequently conducts combined operations with the military and law enforcement organizations of our Transit Zone neighbors. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) are deployed on U.S. Navy vessels, as well as aboard British and Dutch warships in the Caribbean. A recent combined operation in the Caribbean with French Customs and French Naval assets is the first of its kind and has great potential for thwarting illegal narcotics shipments. Coast Guard officers are also vital members of Department of State led interagency teams which are negotiating a series of bilateral maritime counternarcotic agreements with our Caribbean neighbors to enable us to work effectively and efficiently with them. A tribute to their success is the recent signing of a bilateral maritime counternarcotic agreement with the Government of Colombia. Over the past several years we have also signed agreements with sixteen other Transit Zone nations. These

agreements help maximize the effectiveness of our cutters by reducing the time they spend waiting for authorization to board suspect vessels.

STEEL WEB is a comprehensive, flexible campaign plan to shield our maritime frontiers from the scourge of illegal drug trafficking. It is based on the premise that Transit Zone interdiction efforts remain a primary line of defense against the importation of illicit drugs into the U.S. Operation STEEL WEB campaign has three primary objectives:

- (1) Shield our maritime frontiers
  - Increase interdiction capability.
  - Reduce gaps in surveillance coverage
  - Enhance sea based endgame
- (2) Complement Source Country and Demand Reduction programs of other agencies.
- (3) Take action to meet our responsibilities under the National Drug Control Strategy.

Funding for STEEL WEB has been included in the Coast Guard's fiscal year 1998 budget request. I have requested \$388.6 million for counternarcotics, an increase of sixteen percent over the fiscal year 1997 budget. This is the first stage of a multi-year strategy to enable the Coast Guard to better meet its responsibilities in support of the National Drug Control Strategy by positioning the proper asset mix in the right places.

The STEEL WEB campaign is composed of two synchronized major operations. It is a Coast Guard initiative which will be fully integrated with operations of other agencies. OPERATION STEEL VISE is designed to apply pressure to smugglers using maritime routes to transshipment locations in Mexico. It will also provide a maritime component which will support U.S. Customs' OPERATION HARDLINE, a Southwest border control initiative. This Transit Zone operation will cover the maritime flanks of our



Southwest border in the Eastern Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico, and will target the maritime routes used to ship drugs into Mexico.

OPERATION STEEL GAUNTLET will target the maritime routes used to transport drugs to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It will provide direct support to U.S. Customs' OPERATION GATEWAY and the Department of Justice Puerto Rico/USVI High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) interagency initiative. We are so convinced of the importance of this initiative that we are surging our current resource base for the immediate future to conduct OPERATION FRONTIER SHIELD, an ongoing proof of concept surge operation designed to deny smuggling routes into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. We have concentrated our effort in high threat areas based on available intelligence. As a result of this operation, nearly 14,000 pounds of cocaine were seized, and another estimated 17,000 pounds were jettisoned by smugglers, thereby preventing 31,000 pounds of cocaine from threatening our streets during the first quarter of fiscal year 1997.

The lessons learned during FRONTIER SHIELD are being applied to the STEEL WEB campaign plan. Seated behind me are four Coast Guard members who have been on the front lines of this operation. They are here to tell you about their personal involvement in FRONTIER SHIELD and the successes achieved, as well as answer any questions you may have.


The Coast Guard's fiscal year 1998 budget request includes some of the resources we have identified to help fulfill our law enforcement mandate. Our resource priorities include, first and foremost, leveraging existing technology with an acquisition plan to enhance command and control, as well our compatibility with DOD assets. Additionally, investing in sensors will help fill the void in our surveillance and detection capability by expanding and improving the capability of our resources. We are seeking funding for a well-balanced package which includes investment in personnel, sensors, intelligence, vessel and aircraft operating hours, and support requirements. By staging and supporting





more assets and personnel in high threat areas, we will increase our presence and strengthen our ability to interdict and deter drug traffic. The investment in sensors and intelligence will allow us to work more efficiently and effectively. This is the cornerstone of our STEEL WEB campaign plan.

On February 25<sup>th</sup> of this year, the President introduced the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy. He described it as a "guide for action for the next ten years." In line with this declaration, General McCaffrey, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, has required all agencies to submit five year budget plans to provide a long-term commitment to support the Strategy. The Coast Guard is developing such a plan, and our fiscal year 1998 budget request is the first step in securing the necessary resources to effectively carry out our Transit Zone interdiction missions.

In summary, our mandate is clear. The President stated, "we have to do more to shield our frontiers against drug traffickers." He went on to say, "we have had some successes against trafficking," and "we can do better with interdiction, and we're learning how to do it," citing the success of the Coast Guard's Operation FRONTIER SHIELD as his example. Drug traffic in the Transit Zone remains a substantial threat to our national security. We must employ new tools to weave a seamless STEEL WEB of enforcement. Additional Coast Guard resources to deter and detect drug smugglers will enhance our maritime-based interdiction capability in the Transit Zone. The fiscal year 1998 budget request and the five-year plan mandated by the National Drug Control Strategy will seek funding for the tools to meet our responsibilities under the Strategy, which will strengthen our drug interdiction program thus enabling us to get the job done in the Transit Zone. The Coast Guard has a unique role and a sizable area of responsibility. The funding and resources requested for the STEEL WEB campaign will enable the Coast Guard to effectively shield America's maritime frontiers.

In closing, I would also like to recognize your support, oversight, and long term commitment to the national counternarcotics effort. As America moves into the next century, the Coast Guard stands ready to meet our responsibilities in this important effort. With your continued support, we can achieve the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy, and protect the safety, security, and well being of all Americans. I would like to thank you and the members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard's role in the Transit Zone. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.



			
			
<b>Signings:</b> 17,968		<b>Targets of Interest:</b> 1,562	
<b>Boardings:</b> 892		<b>Arrests:</b> 35	
<b>RESULTS</b>			
<b>Drug Seizures</b> 19,020 pounds		<b>Vessels Seized</b> 11	
<b>Jettison/Aborts*</b> 24,200 lbs.		<b>Migrants Interdicted</b> 2,237	
= 195 million cocaine doses			
		As of 3/10/97	

Mr. HASTERT. Let me ask a question.

Last week, there was a big news hit on Mexico and the certification of Mexico. One of the things that I said continually is that we probably ought to—before we certify Mexico, there are probably seven or eight things we should have been able to get extracted or leverage for that, and that advice wasn't taken and certification went on.

One of them was a permanent maritime agreement. It is my understanding that within the Mexican territorial waters we can't stop any vessel and hold them, even for the time that the Mexican Coast Guard or Navy can get out and check that. How would this impact your job? How would that agreement work?

Admiral KRAMEK. Well, we have that type of maritime agreement now with 18 of the 22 nations in the Caribbean region. The last time I testified, we had it only with 14 or 15. We are getting more and more cooperation.

There are a couple of nations now who haven't agreed with a maritime agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard and our Nation and the State Department. Mexico is one of those nations. But I am fairly optimistic that we are getting ready to reach one of those agreements.

I say that because there were four or five other issues that we recently were dealing with with Mexico over the last 5 or 6 years that we couldn't come to closure on, that all of a sudden have reached closure in the last couple of weeks. One of them, on the west coast of Mexico where you see the 234-metric-ton threat on operation Steel Vice, in order to operate down there, so far from our west coast bases, we need logistic support. Otherwise, you have to take your oilers and everything else with you.

Mexico has never agreed we could go in and refuel our aircraft or ships. They have just agreed in a diplomatic note, which I just received about a week ago, that we can now go through those logistic support agreements.

We are in constant discussions with them. I just sent Admiral Saunders, my Chief of Operations, to Mexico with General McCaffrey on his last high-level delegation meeting to negotiate with the Mexican Navy on the ship rider agreement. We are in discussions.

Why is it necessary? Well, I will go to the threat arrow where the 264 metric tons are coming up on the east coast of Mexico. I hope to launch another operation. I am able to tell you what the name is but, other than being in closed session, not the details right now and when it is going to happen. But it is going to be similar to Frontier Shield, only this is going to be called Gulf Shield in the Gulf of Mexico, to stop the flow of cocaine and marijuana from the east coast of Mexico to southwest Texas.

It is a considerable threat, with over 14 tons of cocaine and 100 tons of marijuana coming by sea across into south Texas from that area. Without the help of Mexico in stopping those people when we chase them and they try to get away from us and go back into Mexican territorial waters, without this type of agreement, then that operation can't be successful. That is why we need their cooperation in that endeavor.

Mr. HASTERT. You are saying 200-some tons—even in the age of bifocals, I can't read all those numbers—but that shipment comes

actually out of the north coast of Colombia and goes into Mexico, that you need that type of maritime agreement to stop that flow in the United States. Is that what you are saying?

Admiral Kramek. It would be very helpful. Because we see when we work together with the other nations—for instance, we have maritime agreements with the Bahamas, and that is why OPBAT is successful, as the Coast Guard helicopters, DEA agents, Bahamian National Security Police, armed in the end game, is there to the tremendous deterrence of the smugglers. They hardly do air drops in the Bahamas anymore. We need that type of agreement with Mexico to deter smugglers from coming.

Mr. HASTERT. Ten days ago at least we got an agreement with Colombia, a maritime agreement. How does that impact what you are trying to do?

Admiral Kramek. It has tremendous impact. We have been negotiating the agreement for 5 years. I am very happy that they have agreed to do that.

This last year, we have sent Coast Guard training teams to Colombia to help train their coast guard, which is part of their navy, on how to do interdiction. We have been aboard their ships. I sent a Coast Guard cutter there, the *Missouri Hawk*, for a couple of weeks to train them. Ambassador Frechette was very complimentary of all that action.

They have to see firsthand what we are talking about, and they just now in the last month signed the ship rider and maritime agreement with us. That will allow us to chase smugglers in their territorial sea. It will allow us to go directly to the Colombian Navy to get a statement of no objection, not having to go through our State Department and for foreign ministries, and they promised us response within an hour.

I will point out it is not the full-blown maritime agreement, as robust as we have with other countries, but it is more than a good start; and we have already tested it twice, and it works. I am very, very encouraged by their cooperation.

Mr. HASTERT. So, basically, the amount of cocaine coming off the north coast or the west coast of Colombia could be impacted by that, with that type of agreement?

Admiral Kramek. I would hope it would make it much more difficult for the smugglers and much more expensive for them to get there. We call that the departure zone, where it departs the source countries.

This whole thing is set up, if you will, as a defense in depth. There are three areas we operate at. There is the departure zone, where it comes right out of the source; the transit zone, in between; and the arrival zone in the United States.

This weekend we just had an interdiction. In fact, the staff just gave me a picture which I will share with the committee. In the arrival zone, right off the coast of Fort Lauderdale, FL, we seized 349 pounds of cocaine in a sailboat, estimated enough for 250,000 hits of crack cocaine. One person operating a sailboat had that. That had gotten by all of the other deterrents and was approaching the coast of United States, and one of our patrol boats picked it up.

Mr. HASTERT. I see on the map, too, and it may be just the way you have to draw the arrows, but you have a lot of movement off the coast of Venezuela. Is that indeed a fact or is that—

Admiral KRAHEK. No, that is indeed a fact. I will tell you that we have great difficulties recently on sharing intelligence information with Venezuela. We have gone down there and trained their coast guard, which, again, is part of their navy, so that they would be responsible patrolling from the shoreline out to 50 miles from their border with Colombia all the way up to the Lesser Antilles. So far, we have been unable to share technical information with Venezuela.

I would like to broaden my comment on that, Mr. Chairman. It is very clear to me now, having done this for more than a few years, that unless there is regional cooperation in the source countries along with the United States, this can't be successful.

We have essentially shut down the air bridge, as you know, for the transfer of coca paste from Peru to Colombia. It is so successful it has driven the price of coca paste below alternate crops such as bananas and soybeans and pineapples. That was our goal.

The smugglers have adapted now, and they have moved to the rivers, and we have river training going on to combat that.

But what is worse is they are flying straight east into Brazil and then from Brazil up to Venezuela. So the State Department has a major effort under way now to get Brazil's cooperation with the United States, as well as Venezuela. The bottom line is all those countries need to have regional cooperation where they can go across each other's borders and get by our interdiction forces.

Mr. HASTERT. Let me ask you another pretty relevant question.

We talked in my opening statement about dollars. You are concerned about the appropriations and things coming up. If we are successful in getting the maritime agreements that we hope to get and the patrols that you need to do, do you, in your recent budget, have enough equipment to be involved in the west coast of Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean area?

Admiral KRAHEK. We have enough equipment to be involved in the first year of a 5-year plan. The operation on the west coast of Mexico where you see Steel Vice is called Caper Focus. It is under way now, and it is managed and under the operational control of the Joint Interagency Task Force East. Admiral Shkor is short of assets in terms of Coast Guard cutters, maritime patrol air draft, gray hulls and logistic supports.

Mr. HASTERT. Gray hulls—

Admiral KRAHEK. Those are Navy vessels.

Mr. HASTERT. White hulls are Coast Guard.

Admiral KRAHEK. That is right.

I sent out a message to the CINCs asking for their support. I think I will get more maritime patrol aircraft and Navy hull aircraft. But we won't be able to have a robust operation there until the next 2 or 3 years. We started out—now, what do I mean by that? We have some measures of effectiveness. Nobody has really ever put down the measure of effectiveness for drug interdiction. ONDCP has started a new study on this. I think they probably testified to that already.



Everybody in America is concerned about the Government Performance and Result Act and how well we do on this. I can tell you when we put together operation Frontier Shield, there had been some studies done which we used that indicate that if we can contact and be seen by 40 percent of the smugglers who leave, 80 percent of them will turn back and go the other way; and we will interdict and intercept 10 percent more.

So for every 100 smugglers that leave Colombia, we will either deter, disrupt the supply rights, or seize 90 percent of them. Only 10 percent of the cocaine leaving will get through.

We are nowhere near any one of those threat arrows being able to lay down the intelligence, the sensors of radar and the force structure necessary to do that. But that is what we did when we surged that operation in Frontier Shield.

I think for that one, because it is a small area of responsibility, we intend to keep up the pace against that threat and keep up those results. Because our goal was to not deny the smugglers Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as a trafficking route. We are successful, and in the 1998 budget enough money is being asked for to sustain that operation and to sustain Laser Strike, which you are familiar with in South America on the air bridge.

It will be a couple of more years before we are back to where we were in the early 1990's, where we can sustain the assets we need on the east and west coasts of Mexico.

Mr. HASTERT. Admiral, when you look at this issue and you are trying to coordinate gray hulls and white hulls and working with the Navy, what type of Navy ships do you work with and coordinate with, especially in the Caribbean area?

Admiral Kramek. In the Caribbean area, we have some frigates that we work with. Sometimes they are under our tactical control; sometimes they are under JIATF East.

In the case of Frontier Shield, the Navy designated some of their new 160-foot patrol craft, Cyclone class vessels, underneath our operational control; and we share these back and forth, whoever the Commander of the particular mission.

Maritime patrol aircraft are key. Not just P-3s and C-130's but we are also using AWACS, P-3s with roto domes, and then Customs jets, Citations and Coast Guard Falcons as interceptors to deter the air traffic.

Mr. HASTERT. One of the questions that we had on the Mexican certification and something that didn't happen in Mexico, we were promised in 1993 three radars to be placed in the south of Mexico. I don't know what the radar capabilities are of whatever seacraft we have in that area, whatever ships we have in that area. I know we have planes.

What is the impact of not having that radar, and is there some way we can make up for that?

Admiral Kramek. Well, the Mexicans don't have the capability to detect and monitor, using their own forces, drugs coming into their own country.

I would tell you that I have again recent information just in the last 48 hours that the Mexicans are going to move some of their naval forces further south, closer to the interdiction zone, to try to participate in that.

The bottom line is we pretty much have to find them, detect and monitor them and let the Mexicans know where they are coming from now—here they come, please react and respond because they are coming into your territorial sea.

There is a time lag there of a few hours; and, most often, if it is an air target, it is enough for the people to get away. We have to have a hand-off to the Mexicans. They have to have their own inherent capability for us to hand off a radar contact, much like you find when you fly across country and one FAA control region hands off to another. That is the way we do it with other countries. That is the way we are going it have to do it with Mexico.

Mr. HASTERT. So even with a maritime agreement, closer cooperation is more important?

Admiral KRAHEK. It is absolutely important in the air bridge, and it is essential in the maritime agreement as well.

Mr. HASTERT. You mentioned a couple minutes ago a ship rider agreement. Can you expand on what that is, No. 1, and how does that relate to the current authority you have to put law enforcement people in Department of Defense vessels?

Admiral KRAHEK. The ship rider agreement we have with foreign countries is much like our law enforcement attachments on the U.S. naval vessels. If there is a U.S. naval vessel underway in the Caribbean, it probably has on board a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment of about seven personnel who have the authority to enforce U.S. laws on the high seas against any U.S. flag vessel and with permission of a foreign country, either that country's laws or our laws.

Our armed forces are not allowed to enforce law because of the concept of posse comitatus, but the Coast Guard can as a law enforcement detachment on a U.S. Navy vessel.

The ship rider agreement works much the same way. We will bring a Bahamian with us on one of our Coast Guard cutters; and if a smuggler is entering Bahamian waters, we have permission to chase in the Bahamian waters. The law that is enforced is enforced by the Bahamian law enforcement person we have on board.

I do have the same thing on the high seas with fishery patrols. North of Midway, south of the Aleutian Islands, I have Chinese ship riders on board the ships. So when we find people violating the U.N. sanctions against drift net fishing, the Chinese ship rider can enforce Chinese laws on those Chinese violators.

It is a concept we have proven in maritime over the last 10 or 15 years that is very successful.

Mr. HASTERT. Do you anticipate with maritime agreements then that you will have Mexican ship riders and Colombian ship riders as well?

Admiral KRAHEK. That is correct.

Mr. HASTERT. Do you have it now?

Admiral KRAHEK. We have some Colombian ship riders. We don't have an agreement with Mexico yet on the ship rider agreement or on a maritime agreement. We are still negotiating with them.

Mr. HASTERT. Several minutes ago you talked about the riverine strategy. Of course, as we try to break down the air bridge between Colombia and Mexico and Mexico and our country, especially South American nations and Mexico, we have seen more and more of the

riverine system. It is going out of Bolivia and Peru into the Amazon basin and up through—it especially impacts Brazil and Venezuela. You talked about Venezuela a few minutes ago. Tell us about your assessment of what is happening.

Admiral Kramek. Smugglers are going to the river with the coca paste to try to move it up to Colombia, in particular to Colombia and a little to Venezuela, so it can be made into cocaine.

SOUTHCOM, which is part of our interdiction scheme, as well as JIATF West in San Francisco, JIATF East in Key West, JIATF South in Panama, the Operations Officer, General Wesley Clark in Panama, whose SOUTHCOM is also in charge of Joint Task Force South for counternarcotics, with a focus on South America.

They have put together a very robust program that I have asked them for as the Interdiction Coordinator called a Regional Waterways Management Strategy. Riverine is what we are talking about. I have General Clark's concept of operations for that. We are now in country in places like Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, and I believe recently in Venezuela, with teams to train those forces on denying smugglers routes on the Amazon tributaries.

This team usually consists of three supporting commanders, some from the special operations command at MacDill Air Force Base, a contingent of U.S. Marine Corps personnel provided by General Krulak to SOUTHCOM, and a contingent of Coast Guard personnel provided by myself. They all report to the CINCSouth in Panama. He deploys them throughout South America with the approval of the U.S. country teams and embassies.

In Bolivia, we have trained the 175-person riverine force called the Blue Devils as part of the Bolivian Navy in order to do this operation over the last 2 years. There is also a school we have established in Trinidad and Bolivia that trains these other nations as well. So we are trying to develop the inherent capability for a regional focus on riverine or waterways management throughout South America using that concept, and that is well under way.

Mr. HASTERT. A few minutes ago we talked about—you talked about—the first time you talked about the riverine system, trying to squeeze down the ability of getting this product to market and the ability, really, the interdiction ability that you have and why maritime agreements are so important.

There has been talk about some correlation, where you can tell when you squeeze down those markets, you start—when you squeeze down the ability to interdict and actually have some success in that area, you also affect the markets. There was an IDA study that talked about that. Will you comment on what you have seen and your ability to squeeze down on interdiction and what effect it has had in this country?

Admiral Kramek. Well, I use IDA for two purposes. First, I have the IDA analyst brief all of the operational commanders who are responsible for interdiction once a quarter. He also provides a monthly product.

The IDA analysis is what led us to operation Laser Strike as you know it now. That is, they were able to show us where all the air tracks were occurring in the air bridge between Peru and Colombia. We were then able to work regionally with Peru and Colombia and with our interagency group to provide them technical informa-

tion to disrupt 120 flights this last year, as you know, and essentially shut that source of supply of coca paste down that was going into Colombia.

IDA further goes on in their study to try to show how that affects price and purity on the street.

The study that they recently did has been approved by the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense paid for that study. It was reviewed by them, and so I think my comments would be, it met their approval process. Whether I believe in it or not, I can tell you that I base operations on IDA analysis. They know where the tracks are.

I would be delighted if I could see a sharp upturn in the cost of cocaine, because I know that if we can increase the price of cocaine by 50 percent, that reduces the demand by 25 percent. That is a known statistic. So, I also know that for every modest increase in interdiction, we reduce demand by over a percent in this country, and that is part of IDA's analysis as well.

I think the work they've done is valuable. I think it's still statistically being debated by those who did the IDA analysis and those who do the RAND analysis. That debate by statisticians will continue on. Overall, I think they have value. I get bang for my buck when I—when they show me the tracks and where the bad guys are and we put our assets on that threat arrow or on that target, we get good results.

Mr. HASTERT. I think that is important, because we need to know the basis for where you put the bang for the buck and what you expect out of that.

A couple of questions; then I am going to recognize my colleague from Texas.

One of the things that you said is that you need the ability of our radar in the area. We used to have pretty liberal use of AWACS, especially out of SOUTHCOM. That is gone to a large degree. You use the P-3s with the rotodomes now. Do you need more of those?

Admiral Kramek. We need the ones that we just recently ordered as a result of the increase in appropriations in the 1997 budget that this committee identified the last session of Congress. I say that because we had a lot of use of AWACS, but there were no national priorities for AWACS then. That was before Desert Storm and Iraq. That was before what is going on in the Middle East. That was before Bosnia.

AWACS are a national asset. Seeing how hard it was to get what we call rotodome time, AWACS time, I met with General Fogelman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and I said the interdiction community has as a low-cost rotodome aircraft that Customs has been running for years. It's a P-3 with a rotodome on it. Would you have your staff look at whether or not it would be valuable to buy more of these and that would free up AWACS as a national asset? They agreed. Chief of Staff of the Air Force supported me in that.

So the P-3 rotodomes will be sufficient, along with some AWACS time we get. We also get some E-2-C time, I should point out, which is the same type of detection and monitoring but only has

4 hours of endurance rather than 8 hours endurance. So we use all three aircraft.

Is it sufficient? Right now, when we get these other two aircraft on board in a year, it will be sufficient to share amongst all the operational commanders, and in fact I am very encouraged by what I see as a reduction in air smuggling. Because we have been successful there with OPBAT, with air drops off of Puerto Rico, with the air bridge down in between Peru and Colombia, more is moving to the water both in the maritime regions and to the rivers.

So in general, yes, I think we will have enough of what we have to share, and it's a very closely monitored asset that I work out with the joint staff to make sure each one of the operational commanders has enough rotodome time.

Mr. HASTERT. I recognize our colleague from Texas, Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to be here and to discuss what I think is probably one of the most important tasks that we have undertaken, to try to halt the flow of narcotics into our country, and I commend the Chair on spending the time of this committee to look at this issue, which I think is of utmost importance.

One of the questions, Admiral, that came to my mind that is certainly on the mind of many of us in Congress currently, relates to the cooperation that you have seen or perhaps not seen, from the Government of Mexico.

As you know, the President recently certified Mexico as a cooperating partner in the war and the fight against drugs, and many Members of Congress feel that perhaps we should decertify Mexico, and that issue will come to a vote here in the next few days in the Congress.

From your perspective in working with the Government of Mexico on the issues that you have charge over, could you tell us what your experience has been in terms of the degree of cooperation, or lack thereof, that you have seen from the Government of Mexico?

Admiral Kramek. The Government of Mexico and the Coast Guard have worked closely together for years and years, especially the Mexican Navy and the United States Coast Guard. But our foundations of working together were based on search and rescue. We have moved that good relationship into the area of maritime law enforcement, not only for drugs but, I have to point out, for fisheries. Much of our fisheries conservation problems in the Gulf of Mexico have to do with Mexico as well, especially in the southwest Texas border.

Working with Mexico takes a lot of patience and a lot of time. Mexico has always agreed to do coincidental operations, not joint operations. That means—they have constitutional barriers that prevent them from working together with us like many other countries in the world can, and so we work together so that we plan to show up in the same place at the same time to do a particular operation.

It's a slow process. I have seen over the last year or two their cooperation start to increase over previous levels, but it has a long way to go. We need ship rider agreements; we need better logistic support; we need a better hand-off of technical information.

I can say 2½ years ago, if I had a large aircraft flying from South America with 10 tons of cocaine in it and we were in the process of telling Mexico it was getting ready to land in Mexico and where, it was doubtful that I would get cooperation from Mexico to do anything about it. That is not true today. They will take action now. They will react on it.

A lot has to do with the high-level contact group that General McCaffrey has met now two meetings of that group in Mexico and then his visit with the top officials of Mexico this week. So I see their cooperation improving, but it has a long way to go.

Mr. TURNER. You have noted that cooperation is improving over—improving, did you say, over the past year and a half?

Admiral KRAHEK. I would say over the last 2½ years.

Mr. TURNER. In terms of your evaluation of the attitude of the Mexican Government, would you anticipate or would it be fair to anticipate that there would be continued cooperation from the Government of Mexico, or do you see any impediments to furthering the cooperative spirit that you have noted in the past year and a half?

Admiral KRAHEK. I see no impediments; I only see continued progress. In fact, I've seen more progress in the last 6 months and year than I've seen in the last 5 years before that.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Texas, and now I pass the mic to the distinguished vice chairman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. I would like to point out that while at the top we are continuing to try to work with them, what appears to have happened while Mexico may not have cooperated in the past years—in the years back, in the last couple of years they appear to be cooperating and handing the information possibly over to the cartels themselves.

So sharing the information from the drug czar, as we learned from the Department of Justice, from DEA, and other agencies, may not have turned out to have been very wise. We are even worried whether we had compromises in every attempt to try to—even try to arrest somebody at a wedding. They appear to have shared the information.

So we have to be very careful when we say someone is cooperating, because it may have been cooperating for ulterior motives, much like what happened in Colombia between the two cartels when they went after each other. But it is at least at the top levels, the mere fact they got rid of the drug czar, a hopeful sign that the President at least remains committed, and hopefully we can get some cooperation further down the line.

One of the things that was in the news today is, the Commander of SOUTHCOM had said that he felt that he was effectively working with the Colombian armed forces in at least—nobody is talking about the President, kind of the reverse of the Mexico situation, but that they were cooperating in the armed forces level.

Have you seen that? Have you had decent cooperation out of Colombia? Have you seen any change? The other thing that has been in the news the last few days is that Samper is threatening to stop

eradication efforts. Have you seen any change in the relationship with Colombia since the decertification announcement?

Admiral KRAHEK. Since decertification a year ago in Colombia, they were decertified last year as well as this year. From a military-to-military standpoint, from a Coast Guard-to-Colombian Coast Guard-Colombian Navy standpoint, I have seen greater cooperation than in the past. We just hammered out a maritime agreement together with the Colombians.

We have just had a Coast Guard cutter, the *Mohawk*, call on Colombia for a period of several weeks and train their personnel in drug interdiction. So from that standpoint, I have seen their willingness to cooperate and act together jointly better than we have before.

Mr. SOUDER. Before you go on, can I ask you to clarify? You are saying that prior to decertification they weren't cooperating very much. When we decertified, the cooperation actually got better with Colombia?

Admiral KRAHEK. In my view, it got better with Colombia, correct. Concerning the eradication, eradication is back on track, I think, as of this weekend. Colombia states that there was some technical reasons as to why they stopped it having to do with the type of defoliant and protection of the people who were eradicating and things of that nature. I am not quite sure of all the technical reasons, but I think that eradication is back on now and the country is again supporting that.

As with Mexico, there is a long way to go. But I can recall if I had testified 4 years ago and we had an operation concerning Colombia, I would testify it would take me 2 days, sometimes 3 days, through diplomatic channels to get the agreement with the country of Colombia to help us interdict a ship, even if I was already on board that ship, to get the diplomatic clearances I needed to either enforce Colombian law, United States law, or turn it back over to them. That is done in 1 hour now. So I would say that we are working toward better cooperation but we still have a long ways to go.

Mr. SOUDER. We are having—before I get into a couple of other specifics, a general question is being thrown at all of us on interdiction, and certainly the media's first focus on that we have a drug problem was helpful.

Lately, most of the emphasis seems to be that nothing works. Interdiction doesn't work; the treatment programs are not working; D.A.R.E. is not working. I am not sure whether they think we should legalize everything or whether it is just kind of general cynicism. But it is clear when I intercept a ship or vessels seized, we keep that amount of drugs from going to the streets.

But give the cost; how do you—and I am sorry I missed your testimony; I assume some of that was in the testimony. But succinctly, what would be a way to say it does work. Do you need more money? If so, what do you think we will get for that money? How much also is in just—like there are unintended consequences in this case, unintended positive consequences of either forcing if you had more money like the 1991 levels and what you are doing, how much of it forces them to go way up to the north or use other

routes that, in effect, drive their costs up as it comes into the country or decide to go to another country?

Admiral Kramek. What I think you just described is the reason why we need a coherent strategy. I believe we have a coherent strategy for the first time in years in 1996, with the President's 1996 strategy. We just rolled out the 1997 strategy. I would recommend that. I have recommended it to my staff to read, and especially the appendix to that strategy, which is the budget for all the agencies involved in carrying out that strategy. The appendix is four times thicker than the strategy, especially the classified annex to that strategy which lets all Federal agencies know what they should do. It is classified "Secret," and I think that at least in a closed hearing of this committee you should review that, because there are a lot of things that I think you would be pleased to see on how we are tasked by that strategy.

Now, that strategy is part of the President's 10-year plan, and along with that 10-year plan there will be 5-year budgets to support that plan, of course updated every year. That 5-year budget is underway now.

In the classified strategy—and this is unclassified—I can tell you this: I, as the Interdiction Coordinator, have been tasked by General McCaffrey with putting together a 5-year plan for all the assets that agencies require to accomplish the transit zone strategy that's called out in the plan, not dollars, but what ships, planes, radars—what things they need to do the job to the degree that the strategy calls for.

Having said that, the systems approach that ONDCP is using is the best one that I know as a manager. We are throwing out the things that don't work; we are trying to keep the things that work. In another year or two, the measures of effectiveness will be completed. This will be part of the Government Performance and Result Act. Congress will be able to provide oversight to all of those different types of things that worked, and you'll want to keep those because the benefits will exceed the costs or they will meet their performance measures.

As an example, I want to stop 80 percent to 90 percent of the drugs ever reaching Puerto Rico from Colombia. I know what laydown of assets and what intelligence I need to be able to do that I need to articulate to the administration to get the budget to do that and then have my oversight committees approve that, and 1998 is the first year of the 5-year budget plan that agencies are coming forward to ask for those resources.

Now, what works and what doesn't work? This is a balance between demand programs and supply programs, and we need to keep the ones that work. Some demand programs don't work; some do; same with some supply programs.

Frontier Shield works, and that's why we provided this demo, so that you could see the type of thing that works. Will that work everywhere? No, that can't work off the west coast of Mexico. There is a 2,000-mile coastline with no choke points. You can't use small patrol boats and the types of things that we used in that other area of responsibility.

But let's look at what has worked since 1985, because I think those who write and say that the investment we have made on



interdiction or the supply side isn't working are wrong. In 1985, there were 5.7 million cocaine users in the United States. In 1995, there were 1.5 million cocaine users in the United States. That is a substantial reduction.

Now, I know that crime is high; I know that the use of cocaine is up. There is about a 300-metric-ton demand in this country, and we have some chronic use. Two-thirds of all the cocaine use is used by chronic users, so some of the treatment programs proposed by the administration attack that. That is something you might want to do.

We also know that if we disrupt supply routes, some wonderful things happen. At the same time you held a hearing in May about 30 percent or 28 percent of the cocaine coming to Puerto Rico. I met with Governor Rossello from Puerto Rico and he said, "Commandant, I have a problem. I've had to call out the National Guard because the drug flow into Puerto Rico is so severe, the traffickers are paying off the people in Puerto Rico to transshipment in drugs, not in money. Now I have terrible crime and murder in the projects, and I've had to call out the National Guard. By the way, many of those traffickers were Dominicans."

So we have launched Operation Frontier Shield and another operation, and this last year we have reduced the flow of Dominican migrants into Puerto Rico by 80 percent from what it was. We have reduced the flow of drugs by Frontier Shield to Puerto Rico significantly. I would hope that a year from now Governor Rossello would say, "We don't need the National Guard anymore. While things aren't perfect, they're really improving. Our crime is down, our murder is down, our drug interdiction is down, and, together with Customs and DEA and DOD, we have removed Puerto Rico as a transshipment point for drugs into this country." We need to keep measuring that. If we are not doing that, then we're not effective.

But I think we need to take a look at the long-term trends on the investment that is made. I think the investment of interdiction is minuscule compared to the total drug budget. The entire interdiction budget for this country is 10 percent of the total counter-narcotics budget.

In terms of the Coast Guard, 9.8 percent of my total budget in 1998 will be for drug law enforcement. I don't think that's too much, and I think we get a lot of bang for our buck. This operation alone in 5 months kept 195 million cocaine doses off the streets of the United States. I don't think we can afford not to do that.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman. We will do a second round here.

I just wanted—you were talking about two-thirds of all the cocaine goes for chronic users. I think the thing that we need to watch out for is eight kids for every one chronic user that are using, casual use, could end up being chronic users, and of course the kids and the gangs and the ones that create some of the problems too.

One of the things, you were talking about the Dominican Republic. There was in the press today, and I wanted to ask you, the neighbor of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, it talks about there is a release out of Port au Prince that says that almost all of the cargo, a great deal of the cargo, headed from the United States to

Haiti gets diverted and doesn't pay the tariffs. Is that something that you are involved in, or is that really a domestic problem of the Haitians?

Admiral KRAHEK. It is something we are involved in indirectly. We just had a high-level administration meeting on Haiti where we discussed that. But I recently went to visit Haiti to look at that problem in November, and I met with the Ambassador and the Prime Minister. The Ambassador has asked that the Coast Guard lead a team, an interagency team on restoring the ports in Haiti. I mean, this is a country that depends almost 100 percent for its economic trade on the maritime region.

Sixty percent of the cargoes coming into Port au Prince are unmanifested. A lot that does reach the dock gets stolen. The harbor is unsafe to ships that are sunk there. The aids to navigation doesn't exist. It is a huge infrastructure that is required for us and other nations as well, to help Haiti restore their maritime infrastructure, and, in my estimation, it doesn't exist sufficiently enough to make their economy—put their economy back on its feet again.

Mr. HASTERT. Consequently, most of that cargo that would come in would be tariffed and at least give them some revenue runoff of, and they are deprived of that.

Admiral KRAHEK. It would be—I will tell you that we're going to lead a team of Customs, Corps of Engineers, NOAA, and others working with the interagency team.

One of the reasons I went to visit was to stand up and give awards to the first Haitian Coast Guard station, who helped us with two drug seizures there, as a matter of fact, both about 600 or 700 pounds of cocaine.

The Ambassador has asked us to set up two more Haitian Coast Guard stations, one in the north coast and one in the south coast. The Haitians are now working along with us to do that, and we are now working on our second Coast Guard station and training those people.

So it will be a long haul, but those things need to be done, Mr. Chairman, in order to make the Haitian economy viable.

Mr. HASTERT. The other side of my question was basically that there is nothing much to export out of Haiti, as I understand it, so a lot of those ships are actually backhauling refugees or illegal aliens and/or narcotics.

Admiral KRAHEK. What they will be able to bring out of Haiti is the light manufacturing and that type of export. Materials are brought into Haiti by businessmen, and they are made into clothing, as an example, and then taken out because the labor rate is so inexpensive. But you need a good transportation system in the maritime to allow that to happen. It is very fragile right now.

Mr. HASTERT. One other unrelated question, to go back to just some clarification: You talked about the P-3s. You have two P-3s; is that correct?

Admiral KRAHEK. Well, there is a lot more than that. I'm not sure how many there are. Two new ones have just been ordered with the 1997 budget addition that was provided by Congress. I want to think that there is probably four or six of them, maybe even more than that; I'm not sure.

Mr. HASTERT. Do you have intelligence capabilities on the two new ones? Do they have the rotodomes?

Admiral Kramek. Yes, they do.

Mr. HASTERT. You fly two P-3s, and they run about 8 hours. What do you need for a 24-hour watch?

Admiral Kramek. Well, in a lot of places, based on intel., we don't use them 7-by-24, 7 days a week, 24 hours around the clock. Most of these smuggling planes don't fly during the day; they only fly at night.

But I think we would have to talk about it in a closed hearing. If you would see where the laydown was and add up the number of planes, I guess what I am reporting to you is, based on the amount of AWACS allocated now, the P-3 rotodomes in service, the two new ones that are on order, there should be enough of that asset available to take care of the air threat that we know it today. That is the air threat, not the surface threat. That is to look for air targets and detect those that we have sorted out.

As important to some of those P-3s is the third ROTH, over-the-horizon radar, that is needed to be installed in Puerto Rico. It is funded, but there is an environmental problem with getting it installed.

Mr. HASTERT. One last comment or question: In one of the questions that you answered, you said that you don't think that we would be back to the level that we were in 1992, 4 years out. I'm not sure it was 4 years out or 3 years out, what you said. What things would you do? What are you building in the next 3 or 4 years so that we come back to the level that we were in 1992?

Admiral Kramek. I don't think that we should be at the level of hardware that we were at in the early nineties, but we should be at or better the level of effectiveness that we were. We have a different way of doing business than we had then.

DOD, the Department of Defense, has stepped up to the plate, in my estimation. They were just given the detection and monitoring mission as lead agency in 1989, and over the last 3 or 4 years they have successfully provided a communications system. They have fused intelligence. That means—and in the late eighties we didn't have this. We are now able to take all source intelligence from our national security systems, merge it with all of the law enforcement agencies—DEA, FBI—all of that information is all merged together in our joint interagency task forces, and a product is put together for the operator, a tactical product that he can operate on now.

So the laydown of what we have would look a little bit different, and, rather than just conducting very robust patrols, we had a lot of ships and aircraft conducting a lot of patrols. We would rely much more heavily on intelligence. I think in the late eighties and early nineties we probably relied on intelligence 20, 25 percent of the time. We operate on acute intelligence more than 70 percent of the time, and we should be moving to 90 percent. We have great intelligence assets in this country, and we need to focus them so we can take these very high valued assets and put them in the right place.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Admiral.

I yield now to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner. The gentleman has no questions.

The vice chairman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to just briefly followup on the funding and strategy question, too, because one of the things that we have seen is that nobody is arguing against treatment and prevention. We are increasing the budget 40 and 50 percent in the budget over the last number of years, whereas the eradication number has dropped and the interdiction number is comparatively flat.

The core—and we realize that cocaine use is down; methamphetamine is up; heroin is up. Crack is a form which is not counted in that cocaine number, and it is up most alarmingly in kids. As we have penetrated the higher-income groups and we have left those who are at most risk most vulnerable, while we need to treat, just focusing on that is not going to be enough, and we are trying to sort out how much needs to be spent on interdiction and eradication, because if we can get it before it gets there, as it comes out, it is like going out like this, and where it starts is pretty pointed.

One of the things—see if I have this general concept right as a layperson, that we used to always think of Florida and, to some degree, New Orleans area as major transit points, and as we spent a lot of money on focused interdiction, the traffickers logically decided to find other routes. We pushed it partly into Mexico, partly into Puerto Rico, and up into New York and other routes.

But is it not true that what we are gradually doing as we invest in this over the long term is building almost an international defense system that, when you defend one area, they move to another, but that if you don't leave some residual defense in that area, they will come right back?

Admiral Kramek. Well, that's why you need international cooperation and international agreements. No one country can do this by themselves. If four or five nations in the Caribbean decide not to join an international cooperation, the smugglers will go there.

One of the places which we don't have a maritime agreement, which might be surprising to everyone—it is to my people when I mention it to them—is Haiti. We just finished restoring democracy in Haiti, and there is no international maritime agreement with Haiti on drug smuggling or repatriation of migrants, because their new constitution doesn't permit it.

Mr. SOUDER. We didn't get any kind of agreement or—

Admiral Kramek. Correct, but we are negotiating with them, and, again, that is one of the reasons I just visited there.

Now, what would happen if Haiti never agreed to cooperate with us because their new constitution doesn't allow it? They are going to be a target for smugglers. They will be a weak point, and that is what we point out.

I just had a member of the high-level group in the administration just travel through, this last week, 11 Caribbean nations with my chief of operations in that area and in an effort to hammer out in places like Barbados and others that don't have these agreements with us that they really need to for their own regional security. This is an international thing. It is international cooperation. You can't leave any holes, or the smugglers will go there.

I don't agree that you need to be every place, but you need to know where they are going from an intelligence standpoint so can you move your most reliable resources there quickly if you can.

Again, I am struck by the balance that the new 1996 and the 1997 strategy has on education and on prevention and on treatment and on interdiction. It is balanced.

I don't agree that we should get trapped and play one goal off against the other as being more effective. I think there are different objectives that may not work. But the fact of the matter is, I believe the long-range strategy is going to require more money by the Federal Government in all areas: Treatment, prevention, interdiction, source country.

I mean, if you really want to stop it, nobody will grow coca leaves in Bolivia or Peru. Peru is the center of gravity; 60 percent of all the coca leaves are grown in Peru; 80 percent of the cocaine that comes into the United States comes from coca leaves in Peru. It is essential that we make the source country strategy work, and so we have to make some investment in that area, and we haven't, as the chairman pointed out in his opening statement. The strategy exists, but the funding for it has never been provided because of various social, economic, and political reasons, not only in that country but our country as well.

Mr. SOUDER. We get paid to make decisions on how money is allocated because we have less of it to spend in the future. When we have one category increasing at 40 percent and another, I think, at 50 percent and one going down and one flat, we need the information with which to decide whether that decision was a correct decision because there is not more money to throw at all the categories. If you say it goes into drugs, then it is less for education or less for health or less for a retirement program. We could print it, but it doesn't maintain its value if we do that. So we have to make some tough decisions.

One of the questions—I understand that we cannot be equal force everywhere, but isn't it true that, if we had radars and our equipment concentrated in the Caribbean and then they moved over to Mexico, that we would need some residual cooperation in joint however you do it, Department of Defense, in that area? Because the logical thing to do would be, the stronger you get in the Gulf of Mexico, the more they come back around to the Pacific side.

Admiral Kramek. That is exactly right.

Mr. SOUDER. If you transfer resources to the Mexico side as opposed to getting additional resources, they are going to go back to the shorter side.

Admiral Kramek. Yes, but we're not transferring those resources.

I could tell you that Operation Caper Focus, you don't see that on the chart. It's an operation where the 234-metric-ton arrows go up the west coast of Mexico. There is a strong operation there now and has been for the last couple of months. The 1998 budget for all agencies continues to support that.

We won't get up to the level of activity we need there for the next couple of years, but this last year we have had some very, very dramatic operations there. The *Don Celso*, a vessel with 13,000 pounds of cocaine, was seized off of Ecuador and brought in there.

A vessel called the *Oyster*, which I particularly went to look at, with over 5,000 pounds of cocaine, came out of the west coast of Colombia heading up toward Mexico. A Coast Guard law enforcement detachment aboard a Navy vessel boarded it, found what they thought was the cocaine, using IONSCAN, our technical equipment, and part of the funds appropriated by Congress this last session, with this committee's help, helped us buy more technical equipment to detect cocaine on board.

But the bottom line is, we used the Department of Defense, Customs, DEA, and the Coast Guard; arrested—brought the ship into Panama; got the authority of Honduras—this was a Honduran flag vessel with Colombian crew—arrested the Colombians. They are in jail in Miami.

The vessel was then brought through the Panama Canal and properly searched. We found 5,000 pounds of cocaine that you couldn't find underway because it was inside the fuel-oil tanks in another tank. The boarding party had to kill 14 rats on the way to get there, and this thing was really horrible.

When I went on board—they didn't want me to go on board. I'm glad I went on board and put on coveralls and a respirator to see where this was. Down underneath the engines, almost in double bottoms which looked like sewage, was a tank with a cover on it. We first had to pump the oil out, and inside that tank was another tank with the 5,000 pounds of cocaine. That was all going up the west coast of Mexico, and we have had recent major seizures there because of good intelligence, because of some cooperation with Ecuador and some with Colombia.

So you keep the pressure on in all of these places. Are you going to stop it? No. You are going to deny the routes and make it tougher for the smugglers to get here, and you're going to give credibility to or demand reduction and education programs and give us the time to reduce demand and to educate the children.

All law enforcement officers would agree, I believe, with me and with this committee, that the long-term goal is to reduce demand in the United States. That's a long-term commitment. You can't keep the borders open, because if we left the borders open, look how many more doses of cocaine could come up. The price would be reduced, and then you have a two-to-one relationship. If the price is reduced, the demand goes up by a half.

Mr. SOUDER. Which is what is happening in our home area right now, because we're getting flooded from the outside, and no matter how hard you work at the schools or how many hospitals you fill with treatment, the street prices drop.

The headline in the newspaper was about a fiery crash on I-69 where a young boy, a high school senior, was on cocaine and marijuana, flipped his car over on top of another car of somebody from my hometown. That person had their legs busted, and it ran into another car. I think two deaths and six injuries because somebody was high on cocaine, because the stuff is flooding, and it is an upsetting process.

Just for the record, you mentioned Haiti and Mexico don't have a maritime agreement. Who would have maritime agreements?

**CARIBBEAN MARITIME COUNTERDRUG/AMIO AGREEMENTS**  
(10 March 1997)

	Shipboarding	Shiprider	Pursuit	Entry-to-Investigate	Overflight	Order-to-Land	AMIO
Antigua & Barbuda	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Bahamas		X			X		
Barbados							
Belize	X	X	X	X			
Colombia	X						
Costa Rica							
Cuba							X
Dominica	X	X	X	X			
Dominican Republic	X	X	X	X	X		
Ecuador							
El Salvador							
France (incl. FWI)							
Grenada	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Guatemala							
Haiti			X	X	X		
Honduras							
Jamaica							
Mexico							
Netherlands Antilles		X	X	X	X		
Nicaragua							
Panama		X					
St. Kitts & Nevis	X	X	X	X	X	X	
St. Lucia	X	X	X	X	X	X	
St. Vincent/ Grenadines	X	X	X	X			
Trinidad & Tobago	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Turks & Caicos		X (air only)					
United Kingdom	X	X					
Venezuela	X		X (air only)				

**Shipboarding:** Standing authority for the USCG to stop, board and search foreign vessels suspected of illicit traffic located seaward of the territorial sea of any nation.

**Shiprider:** Standing authority to embark law enforcement (L/E) officials on platforms of the parties, which officials may then authorize certain law enforcement actions.

**Pursuit:** Standing authority for U.S. Government (USG) L/E assets to pursue fleeing vessels or aircraft suspected of illicit traffic into foreign waters or airspace. May also include authority to stop, board and search pursued vessels.

**Entry-to-Investigate:** Standing authority for USG L/E assets to enter foreign waters or airspace to investigate vessels or aircraft located therein suspected of illicit traffic. May also include authority to stop, board and search such vessels.

**Overflight:** Standing authority for USG L/E assets to fly in foreign airspace when in support of counter drug (CD) operations.

**Order-to-Land:** Standing authority for USG L/E assets to order aircraft suspected of illicit traffic to land in the host nation.

**AMIO:** An agreement to facilitate maritime alien migrant interdiction operations, including repatriation authority.

Admiral Kramek. I will provide that for the record. But there is at least five or six countries right now, and I would like to provide that for the record.

Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.

Mr. Hastert. Without objection, so ordered. As a matter of fact, we're going to leave the record open, and anybody who would like to write and to have questions and submit questions, and if you would, within a week, submit those back in writing, I appreciate it. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

A list of signatory foreign governments and respective components of the standard "six part" bilateral maritime counterdrug agreement follows. None of the agreements involve specific funding commitments.



Mr. HASTERT. Admiral, one last question before we move on here. You have talked about what you can do with your acquisition, construction, and improvement budget. I think in our discussions before, and today, you probably don't have a lot of plans to, you know, bring in a lot of new hulls and build those or new airplanes. But if you had—this is a hypothetical question—if you had another \$200 million, what would you do with that money, and what would be the effect on interdiction?

Admiral Kramek. Well, first of all, if I go to some of the statistics and what we have done before the IDA study, I believe that for small investments in interdiction over all of the agencies for \$25 to \$30 million a year, that investment in interdiction assets, that tends to reduce demand by at least 1 percent in this country.

But what would I do with it? I would procure and fund the things on the 5-year budget strategies for the agencies involved in interdiction, if these were interdiction funds, those things that had been certified by ONDCP and General McCaffrey, the Drug Czar. We have already sent him some lists, and he has certified some things that we asked him for. That is what his role is.

My role as Interdiction Coordinator is to make sure that all of the agencies follow the strategy, and that they ask for sufficient resources to do it, and that they employ it efficiently, and each quarter I meet with all of them to make sure that they do that.

In terms of the Coast Guard, our 5-year budget strategy is about that amount, our 5-year budget plan, and it requires a couple of ships to be taken out of mothballs, a couple of patrol boats that are excess to the Navy to be turned over to the Coast Guard, a couple of frigates that are going to be decommissioned by the Navy and given to foreign countries in the Military Assistance Program to be given to the Coast Guard instead so we can operate H-60 helicopters off of them in a SEABAT operation in the eastern Caribbean. Much as the OPBAT has been successful in the Bahamas, we would operate these off ship, and then to provide the forward-looking infrareds for all the C-130's and the aperture radars for all of our ships.

That list is pretty well-known. We have submitted it to the administration. It is part of our 5-year budget strategy. Those are the things that we would be buying, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. If you had those things, do you believe that you could dramatically reduce further use of drugs in this country?

Admiral Kramek. I think we could reduce the flow of drugs into the United States to the extent that we can afford it. Now, what do I mean by that? This is a learning curve operation. If you had a contact rate of 40 percent, which is what I would be moving to, you can deter 80 percent of the drugs from coming into the United States. Our contact rates now are down around 15 percent. So this would bring us up to a higher contact rate.

Now what about the last 20 percent? We cannot in this country—this country has the longest sea borders of any country in the world. There is more shoreline in the United States and our tributaries in Hawaii and Alaska than any nation in the world. It is impossible to guard them all with that amount of contact rate.

But it is like a learning curve. I wouldn't recommend going any higher than a 40 percent contact rate, which would get you up to

that part of the 80 percent learning curve. You could go to 80 percent contact rate and it would only be 82 percent. In other words, you are way up on the curve here.

So our 5-year strategy is to get a 40 percent contact rate with the smugglers so that we can be 80 or 90 percent successful. I think that's in the doable range. I think that is what we need to do to deny them the routes while we continue with a robust education and treatment program.

Mr. HASTERT. So you are saying that when we get to above 40 percent contact you have a diminishing return, which doesn't pay for the investment?

Admiral KRAHEK. It doesn't pay for anything beyond that.

Mr. HASTERT. You say we're at 20 percent now?

Admiral KRAHEK. For Frontier Shield, we were almost at 40. For our current-day operations, we're at 20 percent or lower than that.

Mr. HASTERT. Two things: You have submitted what your 5-year plan is. Can we assume that if we brought that into play quicker, that you are doing what you say you did, or would you submit for the record what you think that \$200 million should be used for if you had the chance to do it?

Admiral KRAHEK. We could do it earlier in the 5-year period.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral KRAHEK. You're welcome, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. I would now like to welcome our second panel. This panel is comprised of certainly frontline Coast Guard personnel. They are Lieutenant Commander Mike Burns, a C-130 aircraft pilot; Lieutenant Commander Randy Forrester, HU-25C aircraft pilot; Lieutenant Jim Carlson, Commanding Officer of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Vashon*—I hope I said that right—and Boatswains Mate First Class Mark Fitzmorris, Boarding Officer on the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Tampa*.

Would you gentlemen please step forward. If you would all stand and raise your right hand, committee rules require me to swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show that the witnesses responded in the affirmative.

Please sit down, and we will start with Lieutenant Burns.

**STATEMENTS OF LCDR MIKE BURNS, U.S. COAST GUARD, C-130 AIRCRAFT PILOT; LCDR RANDY FORRESTER, U.S. COAST GUARD, HU-25C AIRCRAFT PILOT; LT JIM CARLSON, U.S. COAST GUARD, COMMANDING OFFICER, USCGC VASHON; AND BM1 MARK FITZMORRIS, U.S. COAST GUARD, BOARDING OFFICER, USCGC TAMPA**

Commander BURNS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for allowing me to go ahead and give you some insights to my Frontier Shield experiences.

I am Lieutenant Commander Mike Burns. I'm from Chicago, IL, born and raised. I joined the Coast Guard team in 1986. I'm presently a C-130 Aircraft Commander based out of Clearwater, FL. I have been flying C-130's out of Clearwater, FL, for the past 5 years now.

I have extensive experience in the Greater Antilles Section Region. I fly the C-130 aircraft. It is a four-engine aircraft. It's very long range, has a high endurance, and it's the primary surveillance aircraft that is utilized in Frontier Shield. Clearwater has provided two C-130 aircraft from the start of Frontier Shield, and basically we provide the backbone of the maritime surface patrols.

A deployment crew consists of eight crew members. We normally deployed for 2 weeks at a time. We are normally tasked to fly 7 or 8 hours a day or night, and it's quite a popular mission with the crews. The crews are very motivated. They like to go down to Frontier Shield. That is what they're trained for, and they feel that they are really making a contribution to go down there.

It was on the November deployment that I went on. It was quite different and unique in that the air station had just received its first forward-looking infrared radar on a C-130 aircraft. This was quite important to us, and we were quite excited using this new hardware down in Frontier Shield.

Since we did have this new capability, our tasking was for night patrols. Generally speaking, we would launch at about 8 p.m., and return at 3 a.m., for 2-week periods of time. It was on our third night of tasking, it was around midnight, we were about 60 nautical miles south of Puerto Rico, when my radar operator had reported that he had two contacts on his APS-37 radar, sea surface radar, and he asked us to go ahead and move in that particular direction to see if we could take a look at what he had.

We moved in that particular direction and turned it over to our forward-looking infrared radar sensor operator who sits in the back of the aircraft, and on his TV screen as we overflew these contacts he had described to us that he had seen two low-silhouette vessels in the water. These are called yolas.

Normally a yola is a low-silhouette, very slender, sometimes—mostly wood structure, sometimes fiberglass, usually has a single outboard engine, and extremely hard to detect in the daytime. They are very small and hard to detect in any kind of rough seas also. So it was really a good catch by our radar operator to go ahead and catch the two yolas.

What he described to us was, on his FLIR screen he saw that these two yolas were sitting dead in the water. They were obviously lights out, and they had huge containers on them, at which time we didn't know what they were, and they had one person on board. With the overflight we spooked them, and basically they took off. One yola started turning north, the other one eastbound.

The best way I can describe what the next 2½ hours was like, it was like a cat and mouse game. Obviously, they were trying to evade us. We worked very hard to go ahead and ensure that we monitored their directions, positions, and this was done with a great deal of work between both the radar operator and our FLIR operator. We were lucky enough to go ahead and pass this information to our commander of the task force. We were also lucky enough to have two surface vessels that were close enough that they could go ahead and chase down the yolas.

We had information that a Navy patrol boat was to the north. This Navy patrol boat had a Coast Guard leader team on board, and we were successful in getting the first yola stopped, and the

leader team did wind up boarding this yola. We also had a Coast Guard 110-foot patrol boat that got the other yola and stopped them. We found out that the large containers that they had in the yola were fuel caches that allowed them to go ahead and basically transit to those positions that were well off Puerto Rico.

After the flight, when we had returned, we were informed by our law enforcement folks that the larger mother ship was proceeding up from Colombia and was en route to the position of those two yolas to go ahead and off-load drugs. We know from previous experience that these yolas are capable of carrying anywhere from 1 to 2 tons of cocaine.

I think that this illustrates that we can be very effective with transit zone interdiction. However, we must have the proper tools to go ahead and do the job that we are sent out there to do. Clearly, the difference in this case was the fact that we had sophisticated sensors. It was a perfect example of the Coast Guard team taking back the nighttime from the bad guys.

Thank you for allowing me to make this statement.

Mr. HASTERT. I have to say that the Chicago winters are worse than what you are experiencing down there.

At this time, I would like to introduce Randy Forrester, Lieutenant Commander on the HU-25C.

Commander FORRESTER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee.

I am Lieutenant Commander Randy Forrester originally from Indiana. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to be here and represent the air station men and women of Miami, FL. We do have the privilege to serve our country down in the Caribbean, and South America. We have been involved in Laser Strike and, most recently, Operation Frontier Shield.

As an aircraft commander of an HU-25 Falcon Charlie model aircraft, it is basically a small business type of aircraft outfitted with the F-16 radar, and we are busy quite a bit. We most recently had two aircraft deployed down in Operation Laser Strike and two aircraft deployed in Frontier Shield. We only have seven aircraft at the unit, and basically what that means for the crews is, about every 2 weeks out of a month you're on the road either in Operation Laser Strike or Frontier Shield.

Most recently, I've had the opportunity to go down to—in the middle of January in to support Operation Frontier Shield. We deployed with a crew of five personnel, a pilot, a copilot, a drop master, a sensor operator, and a basic air crewman.

Wherever we are, whether it is off the coast of Miami, down in Puerto Rico in Frontier Shield or in Laser Strike, we're capable of doing multiple sorts of missions. If we have a search and rescue case that involves someone who needs a raft or needs a pump, we are able to deliver that no matter where we are.

The situation down in Operation Frontier Shield—we deployed down there on January 7th. We stand 12-hour alert windows, and usually, the case we are going to talk about this afternoon, we checked in with our operation coordinator in San Juan, Puerto Rico, before we go on watch and we ask, "Hey, is there anything going on tonight?"

The night prior to the President's Inauguration, we checked in and they advised us that there was an air target coming up with South America that was being tracked by I believe it was a Navy dome aircraft. It was being followed. A Customs Citation had launched out of Puerto Rico and was now tracking the aircraft toward Puerto Rico. We were advised to go ahead and launch and intercept and assist as necessary.

We departed out of Rincon that evening, probably about an hour before the sun set, headed en route, and checked in with the dome aircraft. They basically filled us in on the situation, and what had evolved since we had been briefed by our coordinator was that the aircraft that they were tracking had dropped several bails into the water probably about 40 miles south of Puerto Rico.

The traffic, the Customs—another Customs aircraft, a Nomad, has been in close proximity to that and were tracking a go-fast vessel that was heading toward the suspected drugs where the bails had been dropped. The aircraft that made the drop turned around and started heading back toward South America.

Since we are air intercept capable, we asked them if they needed us to go ahead and track the aircraft back to wherever in South America, whether it be Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela, to maybe set up an end game in one of the countries down there. We were advised that that was not necessary and there were other assets probably out of Howard that were being launched to intercept the aircraft as it headed back south.

Meanwhile, the go-fast vessel had picked the bails, loaded them on to the boat, and started heading toward Puerto Rico, the south-east coast of Puerto Rico. We were advised that the Coast Guard cutter *Tampa* was on scene. They were en route, trying to get the vessel to stop. They were fortunate enough that the vessel did stop, and their lookouts on board the vessel had suspected that they thought some people were throwing things overboard. We were about 25 miles from the scene at the time and asked to come in to start looking for bails in the water.

We got on the scene in about 5 or 6 minutes and started looking. It was just about sunset now. What they normally do if the bails are about 50 to 75 pounds, they will put chemlights on them, which is a small tube that lights up. They threw the bails into the water. We were low level, about 200 feet, trying to see them up with the Mark 1 eyeball. Unfortunately, we were not successful with that. We also had the FLIR on board, trying to look with the forward-looking infrared to see any types of vessels.

Meanwhile, the *Tampa* was successful in getting the go-fast to stop, and Petty Officer Fitzmorris will tell about that situation. We continued to look for the bails at a low level. It was about an hour and a half before we were diverted back to our other mission of surface interdiction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you.

Lieutenant Carlson.

Lieutenant CARLSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am Lieutenant Jim Carlson. I'm Commanding Officer of the cutter *Vashon* out of Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. The 110-foot patrol boat has a crew typi-

cally of 16 crew members. I happened to be on the good fortune to be overbilled by 2, so I have 18 crew members.

A 110-foot patrol boat operates at speeds of up to 30 knots. We are employed as pouncer. What that means is that we work in conjunction frequently with a Falcon or a C-130. They'll detect targets of interest and vector us in to investigate further, typically concluding in a boarding.

The *Vashon* is one of five 110-foot patrol boats home ported in Puerto Rico and one of the eight that was in theater for Frontier Shield. The Coast Guard brought three additional patrol boats into Puerto Rico from the East Coast, as Admiral Kramek mentioned, some as far away as Maine.

Working in Puerto Rico, or Greater Antilles section area of responsibility, gives us the opportunity to patrol a little further than many 110's. We patrol from the Dominican Republic as far south as Grenada. During Frontier Shield, the emphasis, however, was on Puerto Rico with the Virgin Islands as far west as the Dominican Republic coast.

I had the opportunity to work with some of these foreign maritime services. I worked with the Dominican Republic Navy three times, Antigua-Barbados Coast Guard once, and the British Virgin Islands Marine Police and Her Majesty's Customs in British Virgin Islands; we've seen some successes there.

My ship worked with British Virgin Islands Customs and Marine Police to interdict an airdrop, a small one, 300 pounds of marijuana. We were the first unit on scene. We rapidly got permission to go into British Virgin Islands territorial seas to conduct limited operations, i.e., just take a look around and secure any drugs that happened to be on the scene. We worked with two British Virgin Islands vessels, British Virgin Islands fixed-wing aircraft, and a Coast Guard helicopter. That bust yielded 300 pounds of marijuana, three arrests, and a seized vessel and an aircraft. So there are some successes in this regard. There are challenges, however, that lie ahead.

One of the times—one of the instances we worked with the Dominican Republic Navy, I had the opportunity to talk to my counterpart on the Dominican Republic Navy patrol boat—about the same size, 105 foot. He was telling me how one of his two engines was not operational. He knew what the problem was but didn't have the money to fix it, and also, their budget was so tight that he had to pay for the ship's crew's meals out of his own pocket. I did not know this at the time. We were invoking or enacting the U.S. Dominican Republic bilateral counterdrug agreement. I sent one of my Boarding Officers over to the Dominican Republic Navy vessel to do some boardings, and he told me he hadn't eaten all day because he didn't want to take the food out of the Dominican Republic Navy crew members' mouths. So there are some challenges that lie ahead.

But why are we doing this? I think the point needs to be made that we have seen great strides over the last couple of years. Two years ago, we saw these foreign maritime services frequently were lucky to get a vessel underway during the day. They have progressed to the point now where we can contact them at night. They can recall a crew, get a boat underway, frequently talk to one of

the U.S. aircraft that may be monitoring a target of interest—whether it be a Customs Nomad surface surveillance vessel, Coast Guard C-130, or Coast Guard Falcon, or even a Navy P-3 in some instances—intercept that target of interest and board it that night. Which is a significant stride that we have seen.

All this is in an effort, as Admiral Kramek mentioned, to form international partnerships, the thinking being, if they can patrol their area around their territorial seas, it frees us up to do some other things and the better partnerships throughout the area.

I want to touch briefly on yolas. We talked about yolas. There is a connotation there that they are conducting illegal activity, which is not always the case. The yolas are all over Puerto Rico. There is a number of fishing cooperatives on the south coast who fish the banks there. You will see yolas all over the place.

One, they are extremely difficult to detect, which causes a problem for me from different facets. One, from a law enforcement facet, yolas are also used to bring drugs and migrants over from the Dominican Republic. I can't see them. Two, from a safety of seas aspect, I have to be extremely careful when I am patrolling that I don't hit one of these guys legally fishing on the banks when I patrol with my navigation lights out at night so as not to reveal my position.

So I have to be very careful when patrolling not to hit the legal guys, but also it is very difficult to detect anyone conducting any illegal activity. I have had the good fortune, recently, to prototype a hand-held version of the FLIR basically on the aircraft, about the size of a camcorder. It is a wonderful sensor. Basically it paints a black and white negative, different picture of the ocean at night, and it depicts differences in heat sensors, so it allows me to see these yolas better than with any other sensor. Unfortunately, there are only three prototypes to be passed around between the eight patrol boats in theater.

That concludes my remarks this afternoon. I would like to thank you for this unique opportunity. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. HASTERT. Now I would like to direct and invite Boatswains Mark Fitzmorris to testify. You are a Boarding Officer for the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Tampa*; is that correct?

Boatswains FITZMORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. My name is Petty Officer Fitzmorris, from the Coast Guard, assigned to the *Tampa*, which is a 270-foot cutter out of Portsmouth, VA. The *Tampa* was involved in Operation Frontier Shield for two separate patrols. The first patrol was October and November, and then we went back there in January, for January and part of February.

On the night of January 19th, on the evening actually of January 19th, the cutter *Tampa* set the law enforcement bill, which basically tells the people on the crew that we are approaching a vessel; we will be conducting preboarding and possibly a boarding on the vessel.

I was the Boarding Officer that night, so I went to the bridge. When I got to the bridge, there was quite a bit of activity going on. I learned that we were in pursuit of a go-fast type vessel, that we

were being vectored in to this vessel by a Customs aircraft, and that the vessel was trying to get away from us.

While I was on the bridge, we did get visual on the go-fast. The go-fast was going away from us, trying to get away from us. The sea state that night was quite a bit choppy. It was 4 to 6 foot seas at this point in time. The go-fast was going all the way out of the water as it was hitting the waves, and trying to get away.

We tried to contact the vessel with radio. We were not successful in getting the vessel to come up on radio. Eventually the vessel came to a stop. I went below to get my boarding team ready to go over and board the vessel. My boarding team consisted of myself, one Lieutenant Junior Grade, my Assistant Boarding Officer, two other Petty Officers, and a seaman. The experience level on my boarding team was not very high. Two of the boarding team members, it was their absolute first boarding. One of the members, it was his second boarding.

While I was briefing the crew, getting our gear ready, getting our gun belts on, body armor, et cetera, and the deck department was getting the small boat ready, we heard from the PA system for all hands topside to start looking in the water for bales. I then went back up to the bridge to find out what was going on and was informed the lookouts had spotted people on board the boat throw something, we didn't know what, into the water.

We went down below. We got into our small boat and started over to the subject vessel. On the way over, the sea state was still quite choppy. As we approached the vessel, we saw that it was registered in Puerto Rico. The name on the vessel was *The Hard Life*. Because it was registered in Puerto Rico, we knew that we had jurisdiction over this vessel and we could just go on board.

We approached the vessel, tried to talk to the people on board. They indicated they only spoke Spanish. We boarded the vessel. I speak a very limited amount of Spanish. We got on board.

My first concern when I got on board was to assure the safety of my boarding team. I was identifying the crew, finding out who the captain was, and checking to see if there were any weapons on board.

While I was doing this, a member of my boarding team looked in the cabin of the go-fast and indicated to me that I should look down there. When I looked down there, I saw many, it turned out to be later only 22, large packages, packages were approximately 1½ foot by 2 foot by about 8 inch deep, orange, wrapped in orange plastic packages. On the outside of the orange there was some mesh netting on it and there were chem-lights attached. I attempted to find out from the captain of the vessel what was in there. The captain of the vessel would not answer me.

I sent at this point in time for an interpreter from my ship so they could prevent any possible miscommunications between myself and the people on board. When the interpreter came over, we again asked what was in the packages. They indicated—they refused to answer to us. I told the captain that I would like to look in the packages to ensure that they did not have any contraband on board. The captain said that I could go ahead and do that.



We opened up the packages. We found a white powdery substance. We used our narcotics identification kits, tested the substance. The substance turned out to be cocaine.

While we were dealing with this, I noticed that the forward cabin had water in it and the water level was rising. At this point after testing the cocaine for—the substance for cocaine, I requested permission from my command to arrest the crew and to seize the boat. When I received that permission, I decided at that point in time it was better to get those people off, get them on to the *Tampa*, so I could get a rescue assistance team on board to take care of the flooding we had. We then did that.

We put the prisoners on the *Tampa*, got a R&A team on board. They dewatered the boat, and found that a pipe, there was a broken pipe on board. They effected repairs, and we determined that the reason that the vessel had stopped for us wasn't because they—not because we outran them, that is for sure. It was by beating on the boat so hard, they ended up breaking both of their engines. One engine could not operate at all, the other I could barely maintain steerageway.

We had our engineers come over from the *Tampa*, attempted to repair it so we could drive it. We were approximately 40 miles south of Puerto Rico. Our engineers attempted to repair and they weren't able to, so we determined that the best course would be to tow it in.

The *Tampa* was unable to tow us for a couple of hours because of some helicopter operations; we were bringing Customs agents out to interview the prisoners. We had to wait until that was done before we could take it in tow. Eventually, we did get the vessel in tow and the vessel was towed—when we got the vessel in tow, I took my boarding team, put them back on the *Tampa* because we had some squalls that came through, the sea state built up and we were getting pounded on the boat pretty well. I stayed on board the vessel and was towed into Ponce, arrived there the next day where we turned the vessel over to Customs.

That concludes my testimony. Thank you very much.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Boatswains Mate First Class Fitzmorris.

Mr. HASTERT. You talk about all the equipment that you have to have, the body armor, all the side arms and everything. Do you have adequate equipment to do the job that you have to do?

Boatswains FITZMORRIS. As far as the type of equipment, yes, sir, we do. Right now, however, we are a little short on equipment on board our boat and some of our boarding team members actually tradeoff.

Mr. HASTERT. Like what kind of equipment?

Boatswains FITZMORRIS. We are currently getting more gun belts for the people, for the boarding teams, et cetera.

Mr. HASTERT. How about communication equipment?

Boatswains FITZMORRIS. Our communication equipment we have on board, we currently use secured comms. between us and the ship. Sometimes they work. Usually they get wet on the way over. It is very wet transferring back and forth. We will take three with us, and sometimes have one working when we get over there.

Mr. HASTERT. Lieutenant Carlson, one of the things you talked about is the FLIRs, the hand-held FLIRs. You say you have three of them.

Lieutenant CARLSON. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. HASTERT. You have to trade around?

Lieutenant CARLSON. That is correct.

Mr. HASTERT. Different ships?

Lieutenant CARLSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. Is that pretty important for use?

Lieutenant CARLSON. Extremely important. We got some night-vision goggles which are also important. If you are away from the companies and it may be a dark night, overcast, there is no ambient light from which the night-vision goggles could amplify, so sometimes they are not of use. The infrared camera is very valuable.

Mr. HASTERT. How many units are used in three FLIRs?

Lieutenant CARLSON. I didn't understand the question.

Mr. HASTERT. How many units?

Lieutenant CARLSON. Since we only have the three, frequently when the 110 pulls in, they will try to do a swap. I will run them across the pier to the ship relieving them, give them the suitcase, and they will get underway. Sometimes people get underway early, people come in late, and the swap can't be made. So frequently, I wouldn't say frequently, probably about half the time we are patrolling without that.

Mr. HASTERT. So how many more do you need?

Lieutenant CARLSON. I would like one on my ship. Probably in theater, one for each patrol boat.

Mr. HASTERT. How many boats are there?

Lieutenant CARLSON. Right now there are eight patrol boats.

Mr. HASTERT. Only three of these units?

Lieutenant CARLSON. That is correct. It would also be valuable for the larger ships in the area. At any time we have larger ships.

Mr. HASTERT. Night-vision goggles, you have an adequate amount of those?

Lieutenant CARLSON. We have three sets of night-vision goggles on board.

Mr. HASTERT. For each ship?

Lieutenant CARLSON. I know each ship has at least one.

Mr. HASTERT. I am going to pass to the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. When you look at the size of the Gulf of Mexico, you know people have to be going by with drugs in them. What would you do if you were in our position or the President's position or anywhere, understanding that they have budget constraints and they are trying to balance different things, but what would you do if money wasn't the object to try and catch more of the people going by you? Any of you.

Lieutenant CARLSON. I—for me, I don't think I am qualified to answer that question, sir. I don't know what the threat is in the area. I don't know—we have operations analysis type people that could probably better adequately answer that.

Mr. SOUDER. One of the things that struck me last night, we rented two movies, "Harriet, the Spy," which didn't cover the drug

issue very much, and "The French Connection," which I hadn't seen for a while. When we looked at that and how they buried the heroin inside the car, when we heard Admiral Kramek talk about the oil tank, inside the oil tank, it would seem on the surface that when you were discussing the ship that you intercepted, it had bales of marijuana floating in the water, that they weren't taking a lot of precautions to hide that inside the hull or that type of thing.

Also, when you were describing the seeing orange bags of cocaine when you came on board, that is not like buried inside of a motor where it is impossible to find. Which suggests they don't think their odds of getting caught are too high.

Is that a false assumption or is the size of their load not critical or are they just particularly stupid?

Lt. Commander FORRESTER. Your first statement about how large the ocean waves are in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean, there is such a large mass of water to cover, the detection in monitoring is probably our key thing. You have to find these vessels first. Because of the limited resources, it is so difficult sometimes just to find them. With the C-130 capabilities, with their radar, that is a great help.

The more detection assets out there to locate these vessels, it is probably our biggest frustration. You search a lot of times for many hours and never locate anyone. It is detecting those and then they can be boarded by the 110's or the vessels.

Mr. SOUDER. So you don't think that the problem is the ability to detect, but our limitations in the number of units we have detecting? Or is it part of it?

Lt. Commander FORRESTER. It is a combination of both, in my opinion, sir. It is having the technical ability, for example, in the HU-25 Falcon, we are mostly an air intercept asset. When it comes to detecting the small yolas, in any type of sea state, we have a very low likelihood of detecting a small yola at 25 or even a go-fast boat. If it is flat waters, we are pretty effective in detecting surface contacts. It is a combination of both, of having the technical ability to do it, the equipment, the FLIR, the APS-137, the C-130 has a great radar, and then obviously the assets.

The more you are out there, the more likelihood, the number of flight hours to fly, the number of underway days for the boats to be out there. It is a combination of both of those. The ability to detect it with the proper equipment and then the assets out there to utilize that equipment.

Lieutenant CARLSON. Also, sir, just to bring one more point to light, there are different modes of smuggling. The yolas are difficult to detect. The people in the yolas know that. So in that sense there are not many places you can hide drugs on a yola.

A sailboat coming up from South America, however, of which there are hundreds cruising those islands, we have come across modes where they go into a yard, maybe a covert yard somewhere, a shipyard, remove the keel, hollow it out, put drugs in there and bolt the keel back on. There is no way to find that in a boarding at sea. So it is not so much they are so flagrant or blatant that they don't think they will get caught, it just depends on the mode of smuggling.

Mr. SOUDER. If they had it in the hull, you wouldn't be able to find it?

Lieutenant CARLSON. If they had it in the keel, short of any other intelligence, there would be no way for us to access that keel.

In a typical boarding, the Boarding Officer is relying on a number of things to tip him off. One would be intelligence, one would be crew members' reactions when boarding team members are in different areas of the vessel. One is just plain view, maybe someone is so blatant to think they wouldn't get caught. But if someone has been doing this for awhile and has something hidden in the keel, it would be extremely difficult to detect that at sea.

Mr. SOUDER. You don't have the equivalent of like a drug dog?

Lieutenant CARLSON. We do. Some ships do have, not permanently stationed, but some ships do take on drug dogs occasionally. The new technology, the IONSCAN and CINDI are two pieces of equipment that would in that case detect the drugs. I don't happen to have them on my ship.

Mr. SOUDER. I think we saw a demonstration of one of those at one of our hearings.

If I could return, Commander Burns, do you have something you want to insert in any of this discussion?

Lt. Commander BURNS. I will. I will go ahead and point out one thing, again getting back to the C-130 aircraft, it has been the backbone of the air surveillance down until Frontier Shield. I have always felt that we have had tremendous capability for detection of any sea surface vessels. We have had the APS-137 radar, which was employed. Navy technologies, it was utilized to go ahead and detect Soviet submarine periscopes. So that is how advanced this technology is. It is an asset that we have had in Clearwater aircraft since 1988, and I felt it was the biggest step the Coast Guard had taken for maritime patrol aircraft since we have had C-130's.

It is also my feeling that with the acquisition of the FLIR to C-130 aircraft, we have one now, that was probably the second biggest step we have taken.

The reason why I say that is because the C-130 always had this very, very good ability to detect assets, but we would have to visually ID these vessels during the day. Quite frankly, at nighttime we would have to pack up our tent and go home because we had no way to go ahead and ID these surface contacts.

We did that, or we would work with other units. A helicopter or a fixed wing aircraft that had the FLIR or night-vision goggles would have to be incorporated with our flight plan to go out and ID the targets that we detected.

Mr. SOUDER. Do we have an adequate number of the FLIRs?

Lt. Commander BURNS. We have one FLIR at Clearwater at this time. That is all we have been funded for.

What I would like to point out is that this FLIR acts as a force multiplier and allows us to go ahead and act as an independent, autonomous aircraft that can go out, do the detection, and ID the targets. We do not have to rely on another resource.

In terms of working with the Coast Guard cutters, for us to go ahead and detect targets and have to go ahead and have the Coast Guard cutter jump from target to target to target in terms of time and fuel, is very, very costly and very ineffective. That is why I

think that we are moving in the right direction by putting this advanced technology FLIR on C-130 aircraft.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you have a rough idea of what that costs?

Lt. Commander BURNS. I do. I am not sure that my figures are exact. It is my understanding, and I will leave this so that we can go back for the record, but I believe it is \$800,000 is what we paid for the Texas Instrument FLIR 49.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

While he is waiting, can I come back to the marijuana floating in the water? About what was that worth?

Lieutenant CARLSON. I am not sure of the street value of that, sir. I can certainly insert that for the record.

Mr. SOUDER. It was in the hundreds of thousands or millions?

Lieutenant CARLSON. I don't know, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Approximately 300 pounds of marijuana was recovered from the water following the disrupted airdrop. The estimated street value of this contraband was \$1.2 million.

Mr. SOUDER. I am still intrigued, because it had to be a pretty large amount. It seems like if they thought there was a fairly high risk of getting caught, you would—

Lieutenant CARLSON. That was the strangest airdrop I have ever been associated with, sir. It was during the day on a Sunday morning. I don't know what the guy was thinking.

Mr. SOUDER. He was probably high.

Lieutenant CARLSON. He was probably using some of the product; that is right.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Indiana.

Lt. Commander BURNS. We are talking about a C-130. I am going to go back to the testimony that Admiral Yost gave us about 2 years ago, and it says, I am quoting here, "Yost testified the Coast Guard C-130 airborne early warning aircraft had been turned over to the Air Force, stripped of its equipment, including a dome-mounted radar, and is now used for transportation of cargo." In addition, Yost reported that the new, and I am reading this verbatim, "Yost reported that the new command control communications intelligence center has been closed and its duties are performed elsewhere."

Now, are these aircraft that are not in use now?

Lt. Commander BURNS. It was my understanding the domed aircraft that we used, it was the Coast Guard 1721, it was turned over to the Air Force. It still belongs to the Air Force, and I do not have any idea as to what the Air Force is doing with it at this time.

Mr. HASTERT. The domed radar is not the same FLIR you are talking about, right?

Lt. Commander BURNS. No, sir, it is not.

Mr. HASTERT. It performs a like duty?

Lt. Commander BURNS. The FLIR is a small ball attachment. We modified the attachment point to be on the belly of the aircraft, on the right-hand side. We have a pallet that is in the back of the aircraft, of which we have a radar screen for the radar operator and for the FLIR operator, and they sit side-by-side. Basically, they can both work detection and IDing at the same time. So it is totally different from what we are referring to with the 1721.

Mr. HASTERT. How many of these C-130's do you have now in operation?

Lt. Commander BURNS. We have seven C-130 aircraft at Air Station Clearwater. We only have one FLIR. Right now it is mounted to a specific aircraft, and that is due to the tolerances of not having a common frame structure underneath the aircraft. Right now it is under one of our aircraft. It will go down for 2 weeks at a time. However, when that aircraft returns back to Clearwater, the FLIR goes with it.

Presently we are working, our engineers are working to go ahead and get three common airframe mounts on our aircraft so that when the aircraft returns, it is a very simple removal from one aircraft on to the other aircraft, so that aircraft can go ahead and then go down the feeder and to utilize it again.

Mr. HASTERT. So not only do you have one FLIR for seven or eight aircraft, but it is not interchangeable?

Lt. Commander BURNS. It is not easily interchangeable. It takes about 3 days for the removal and installation on the next aircraft.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you.

Well, gentlemen, I appreciate your testimony. You kind of give us a flavor for being there on the front scene of this. We hear a lot of testimony from time to time about what we should do and the issues of how things should be done, often from somebody sitting behind a desk, including ourselves. I appreciate the work that you do, your firsthand experience that you have brought forward today, and it is very helpful and very valuable. Thank you for participating.

It is now my distinct pleasure to welcome Admiral Paul Yost, former Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and current president of the James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation.

I have to tell you while you are coming up, I don't know if you remember, but I sat on this subcommittee years ago when you were first starting to put together the ability to stop drugs and work on building up the drug interdiction effort in the late 1980's and early 1990's. We certainly thank you for your effort, and we thank you for being with us today.

If you will stand and raise your right hand, committee rules require me to swear you in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show the witness responded in the affirmative.

Admiral, please proceed with your opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PAUL A. YOST, PRESIDENT, JAMES MADISON MEMORIAL FELLOWSHIP FOUNDATION, AND FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD**

Admiral YOST. Thank you very much. I am Admiral Paul Yost, U.S. Coast Guard retired. I was Commander of the Atlantic area for the Coast Guard between 1984 and 1986, and then Commandant between 1986 and 1990.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, I gave testimony to this committee 2 years ago, I think it was March 9th, and I ask that it be referenced or made a part of the record in this committee hearing.

I have not prepared written testimony, but would like to orally expand on my previous testimony.

In the 1984 to 1990 era, we didn't seem to have the tension between source country and transit zone strategy that I see today. I don't think that that competition should exist, and I don't think it is particularly healthy.

Both are needed, and they must be done in unison. Let me explain by example.

In the late 1900's, early 1990's we had an operation we called HAT TRICK. The idea was to pulse into the transit zone with an overwhelming force immediately after the marijuana harvesting season. This forced the cartels to either ship through our pulse or to stockpile. The second piece of the equation was the source country piece. That is, the Colombian army descended on the stockpiles in the port zones and destroyed the harvest.

It worked. The source country's armed forces destroyed masses of marijuana while the transit zone pulse held most of the drug vessels in port.

The next harvest season we tried to do the same thing, but something had happened in the source country. A few months before they had had a major national disaster, earthquakes and mud slides, and the armed forces were completely employed in the national disaster. So we got no help from the source country.

The next season we tried to do the same thing again, but this time the Colombian Supreme Court had been attacked by the cartels, many judges had been taken hostage, records had been destroyed, and what we found is that at that time of the Colombian effort, national will had all but disappeared. Again, the source country part of the equation was not there.

In each of these seasons, the cartels stockpiled and shipped after our pulse. The first season, of course, they didn't have anything to ship because their own armed forces had destroyed most of it. The second two seasons, because without the source country help, they were able to outwait us and try to ship after the pulse was over.

The message here is source country strategy is a powerful tool, but it is not reliable, it is not as reliable as the transit zone effort. You have to do both. One you control, the second is a function of foreign policy and source country internal politics.

Also in the 1984 to 1990 era, I saw less tension between the demand and the supply side efforts, although there was still some tension there. In truth, again, both are needed. However, as long as large supplies of drugs are available in the United States, drug use will be high. That is, demand reduction doesn't work as well with high supply. Again, the two have to work in unison.

Unfortunately, interdiction in the transit zone is very expensive and the temptation is not to properly fund it.

In that regard, not much has changed from then to now. We didn't have enough money then in either the President's budget or the "Congressional Stage" budget. I understand the Coast Guard budget for drug interdiction was reduced after 1990 by almost 50 percent. There is plenty of fault to go around for this, including with the Coast Guard itself whose leaders felt that putting money and assets in fisheries and in Merchant Marine safety after the

Exxon Valdez spill was wise. As it turns out, it was not wise, in my opinion.

The budget at both the Presidential and "Congressional Stages" supported this transfer of effort from drug interdiction into fisheries and Merchant Marine safety. We are now paying the price in increased supply, followed by increased demand.

My understanding is that Admiral Kramek is actively realigning the asset allocation in this regard, but it takes time. It took years to buildup the force structure we had in 1990. It is going to take years to reinstate it at great cost, and meanwhile we are going to be inundated by drugs in this country.

I would be pleased to answer any of your questions.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Admiral.

At this time I would like to invite our vice chairman, Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. We heard earlier today, and also from General McCaffrey and in the President's drug budget, that cocaine use has dramatically dropped. Are you suggesting that the cutbacks haven't been all good news? In effect, we have been hearing that, well, we made great progress, and that we didn't pay a price for the cutbacks.

Admiral YOST. Well, let me say I admire General McCaffrey, and I think he is a warrior and he is the guy for the job. I don't have any of the details or the facts or the statistics on what the supply is. All I read is in the newspaper that supply is up and use is up amongst children of high school age. That may not be so. I don't have that intelligence available to me as the General does.

Mr. SOUDER. I don't think any of us along the way are questioning that he and Admiral Kramek and others aren't great warriors in the drug battle. We are wondering whether they are muzzled to some degree by their positions, because if in fact you can cut the budget 50 percent and make progress, quite frankly, as somebody representing the taxpayers of this country, I have to ask, well, so what?

The question is, what do you think, could you be a little more specific? I know you testified to us before. What do you think some of the things that might have happened because of these cutbacks are?

Admiral YOST. Yes. I am not sure that I could tell you statistically what happened in the way of drug supply. What I can tell you is that from 1990, 1989, 1990, 1991, in that era, to 1993 or 1994, there was about a 50 percent drop in the operating expense of the Coast Guard budget dedicated to drug interdiction.

That caused, I read in the newspapers, an increase in supply. I am surprised to hear that there isn't any increase in supply. But I would not disagree with General McCaffrey. He has all the intelligence available to him. I am involved in running an educational foundation that has to do with the Constitution of the United States. I don't have any of that intelligence.

Mr. SOUDER. In his defense and the others, I don't think they said there was a decrease in supply. What they said was the number of cocaine addicts had declined because every law enforcement official around the country will tell you that that is part of the reason that the price has dropped, is the supply is up, and the purity is up.



It is clear the supply is there. We are seeing it in the youth. We are trying to figure out this one number that keeps popping up on charts about cocaine addicts. That doesn't apparently involve crack.

Admiral YOST. I can't help you on that. I just don't have the information. I can't supply it for the record. It is not available to me.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you believe, had the budget been kept at levels that it were, we would have heard what we heard on the last panel as we get equipment like sensors or FLIRs, that we would be short those? Are those some of the prices we paid by having reduced the budget?

Admiral YOST. I am not sure that the shortages that the young officers and men here reported are critical. They were talking about a FLIR that was a prototype, that was a hand-held, that apparently they are testing it out for more procurement.

I testified last time that I felt very badly about the loss of the airborne early warning aircraft. We had three AWACS aircraft dedicated to this job in the Caribbean, Coast Guard aircraft. We had created a Coast Guard air station just to support those complicated aircraft. We had put F-16 radars on Falcons so they could sit on strip alert, come off strip alert and intercept. We had all that in place, and because of a decision that was made partly because of budget priorities, partly because of the Exxon Valdez, partly because of emphasis on fisheries, a lot of that was taken down and the money and the men transferred elsewhere.

Now we have got a real warrior as Commandant of the Coast Guard, and he is trying, as I understand, to move that back in. It can't be done overnight. It can be taken down overnight. It is easy to tear down a building. It takes a long time to rebuild it. That is what he and General McCaffrey are trying to do, is my understanding.

Mr. SOUDER. Now, it is kind of hard, because, we do a lot of different things here in addition to fund-raising that—not here in the Congress—but as Members of Congress, going back and forth to our districts and town meetings and trying to sustain a family life. So it is hard to keep track of all the different variables. I get lost sometimes in the numbers.

But what I heard Admiral Kramek saying at first was that we didn't need the AWACS because there are smaller type systems that can do the same amount of tracking. Were you here during his testimony? Can you explain that?

Admiral YOST. I was. What I heard the Admiral say is that AWACS is a national asset. Although we had more available before Desert Storm, before Bosnia, before some of the other emergencies, AWACS now is a very scarce item and one has to program it very carefully, and that is being done by the Department of Defense.

He is getting his share, but whether he is getting all that he would like, I don't think he said whether he was or not.

AWACS is always highly desirable. Of course, I felt when the Coast Guard had their own AWACS, it made continuity of command much easier when you didn't have to compete in the marketplace against other national priorities.

Mr. SOUDER. If you were in our position, what is the single greatest thing you would focus on relative to the Coast Guard right now in addition? Would it be the AWACS?

Admiral YOST. Well, I would have to salute Admiral Kramek on that. I am not sure, because I don't know what his force structure is. All I can tell you is we had more forces dedicated to drug interdiction in 1990 than we have in 1997. The newspaper tells me we have a greater supply of drugs in 1997 than we had in 1990, 1991, and 1992. Whether that is true or not, I don't have the intelligence, the national intelligence to know.

I do know that supply and demand must be done at the same time. I know supply is very, very expensive compared to demand. So you can't pull money out of supply and move it over to another area without hurting the whole equation.

Mr. SOUDER. You suggested in your testimony that it was more complicated when we had to deal with source country things than when we dealt with interdiction because of the international diplomacy. But are you surprised that we continue to not get a maritime agreement out of Mexico and we don't have one with Haiti?

Admiral YOST. Well, I don't know whether I was surprised. It was a piece of knowledge that I didn't have until I listened to the testimony here. I am sure it is available in the newspapers. I must have just not read the right articles.

But I know that dealing with these countries, they are very concerned with sovereignty, they are very concerned with the United States being the big brother to the north, and that has been around for a long, long time, since I was in grammar school. We heard about those problems. So I am not really surprised that they are not willing to give something that they feel affects their sovereignty.

Again, that is not in my portfolio really to comment on, other than saying I am not surprised and that I am aware. I don't think I can say more.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you have any comments, this will be my last question, Mr. Chairman, or any suggestions based on your experience, because this is a comparatively new phenomenon, I am sure it was there to some degree, but what to do with the movement to the Pacific side on Mexico?

Admiral YOST. No, I don't have any ideas on that side. It is a much bigger problem than on this side. There are no choke points. As the Admiral points out, there is a lot of ocean there.

I think that you need assets, and how you deploy them and what the strategy is is up to General McCaffrey, a superstar, and Admiral Kramek, one of the best Commandants we have ever had. I am not going to second guess those guys.

Mr. HASTERT. Admiral Yost, again, I want to say I really appreciate your being here today and giving us your expertise.

The testimony that you gave before this committee basically 2 years ago said that, and at that time it was probably more critical than it is today, that a lot of the work that you had done and we had put together, and I served in this Congress, I have been here since 1986, is gone. That was disassembled. We don't have the AWACS flying. They are other places. We have other problems.

But this thing, we also hear a national strategy that this isn't a war any more, it is like a cancer. Well, I go back to my old coaching philosophy, which I did before I got into another business like this. When something is a cancer, you don't usually win that. A

war you can win. You have to put your resources out there and make sure you do win it.

If you had resources again, what would four or five things—this whole debate on whether we should certify Mexico or decertify Mexico, there are some things that we could have done to make leverage, that we could have done other things. This is foreign policy, but it really gives you tools to get things done.

What are four or five things that we could do in your opinion to help win this war? I still think it is a war, in my opinion.

Admiral YOST. Well, unfortunately, as you said before, we are not really treating it as a war, and when you don't treat it as a war, it is very hard to fight it on a war footing. We don't shoot down aircraft coming into this country carrying cocaine. When we track them, very often when they find out we are tracking them, they turn around, do a 180, go back and land in Colombia or wherever they came from. They refuel and 3 or 4 days later they will take off again, give it another shot.

There is no great penalty for turning around and going back with a cargo. If worse comes to worse, they might even drop the cargo and turn back. So it is very hard when you are not on a wartime footing to make the enemy pay the price when he makes a big mistake. When he makes a big mistake, the enemy in the aircraft turns back and goes home.

The go-fast boat will sometimes be able to jettison the cargo, and when you finally catch him, if you do catch him, he is clean and you have trouble making a case against him. If you don't catch him, he goes home.

So we are not on war footing, and it is hard to make the enemy pay the price. Without war footing and rules of engagement that approach war, I don't know how you do it. Neither do I know any administration or any Congress that is going to violate all the IKAO treaties by starting to shoot down civilian aircraft. So it is kind of a catch-22.

I don't have any great ideas how we are going to win this war. I didn't win it in 1990 when I had these assets. We weren't winning the war then. We were keeping even with it, maybe we were even decreasing the supply some. Maybe we were decreasing the use some. But we were certainly a long way from winning it.

So I don't know what kind of assets it would take to add to the stockpile to win the war, along with rules of engagement that would allow us to make the enemy pay the price. I don't see either of those things in the offing. So I hesitate to say any more than that.

Mr. HASTERT. Well, in the 1990's you did end up having the assets and you did have a strategy and you did, through your pulse technique, really kind of shut down the Caribbean. Other things happened when you shut down the Caribbean. The air bridge from Colombia up to Mexico and then in from Mexico into the four branches into the United States, I mean, the way the stuff moved changed. You would have to be able to fight that and adjust to that.

But knowing what you know today, you were in the interdiction operations not just in the Caribbean but in Vietnam, during that

war, and if you were speaking frankly, what would you do, at least in a strategy that we are not doing today?

You talk about shoot-down policy. We have a shoot-down policy. It happens to be in Peru, but we have worked with them and been pretty successful.

Admiral YOST. It works. It works. That is Peruvian aircraft, sometimes using our intelligence, et cetera, and that worked. It worked very well. I think it is still working.

We shut down the movement; by shut down, we vastly reduced the movement of marijuana and cocaine over the Caribbean into the United States. When we did that, then the movement began to be along the land bridge, through Mexico and into Mexican airfields and then transported by land across into California, or sometimes they would fly it directly into California.

Once you stop it over the maritime area, then you have got to have the assets on the land border. Now you are getting again into sovereignty, you are getting into posse comitatus, you are getting into what kind of a force, are we at war, what kind of force do we put on the land border. Those are political questions well above my pay grade.

But once you stop it across the maritime area, you have got to stop it on the land area. If you let go on the maritime area, it will come back into the maritime area.

So it is a balloon, and wherever you grab it, it comes someplace else.

Mr. HASTERT. Admiral, if you were working on this project today, in fact when you were there, you integrated other DOD assets. Do you think we should be doing more with other DOD assets today?

Admiral YOST. Well, of course things have changed a lot since I was there. I would say this: When I was Commandant, I was very interested in using DOD assets and having control of those assets. I was not particularly interested in seeing DOD get into the drug interdiction business. At that time, DOD had plenty of other things to do, so they didn't—they were reluctant to get into the drug interdiction business.

Now I think things have changed, where DOD is very interested in drug interdiction; they are very active in drug interdiction. General McCaffrey is the drug czar and is very familiar with the DOD system.

So the ideas that I had, which was let's get one guy in the maritime area, hopefully the Commandant, with all the assets he needs, either with Coast Guard shields painted on them or tasked by DOD to his operational control. I think we are probably beyond that. We have moved beyond that, and I don't think we can go back to that, and I think that the system we have now is fine.

You have just got to add assets to it. That is the answer. You have got to add assets before you are going to stop the supply.

Mr. HASTERT. A couple weeks ago, because of the nature of this committee, I was in the southern command of Europe, and out on a command ship. I saw capabilities, that I am not sure if I am free to talk about here or not, so I won't. But it just boggled your mind about being able to identify what was moving where and when. It is unbelievable. If you cover the whole area of the Baltics, you cer-

tainly should be able to do that type of thing and be able to watch what is moving over our Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

Admiral YOST. You put an AWACS over the Caribbean and you have got almost the whole Caribbean on your screen, air and surface. You have two people in the back end of that AWACS, one of them is handling the air picture, other the surface picture. They have a good idea what is going on in the Caribbean. Then you need strike aircraft on strip alert that are able to launch and track. That is the asset you need. Those are a lot of assets if you are going to stay there, as Admiral Kramek says, 24 hours, 7 days a week.

We don't have those kind of assets. The national assets are not available. I don't know why we got rid of the C-130 aircraft with the radar dome and took the dome off of it. That was a great asset. But apparently the decision was made to take the money and the people that were running that C-130 and the three AWACS aircraft and use them in areas such as Merchant Marine safety, to avoid oil spills like the Exxon Valdez, those kind of things. I wasn't privy to that, but it was an administration and congressional and a Coast Guard decision. It is—if it is a wrong decision, there is plenty of blame to go around. If it is the right decision, there is plenty of credit to go around. So I can't second guess it from 7 years out of being the Commandant of what they should be doing now.

Mr. HASTERT. Admiral, as we said, partly because of what you were able to do in the late 1980's and 1990's and we were able to basically shut down most of the drugs moving through the Caribbean—

Admiral YOST. We were.

Mr. HASTERT. Now there are new technologies and the air bridge developed and the Mexico land bridge, those types of things. Because we have been somewhat successful, not very, but somewhat successful, still about 70 percent of the narcotics that comes in from Colombia, moves in from the land area once being flown or maritimed into Mexico. But the 30 percent that moves through the Caribbean, do you think we could have the ability if we had the assets to stop that from reaching our shores?

Admiral YOST. I think that if you add assets to that equation, you are going to reduce the amount of drugs coming across the Caribbean. Whether that will drive it back to the land bridge or back on the Pacific side, I don't know. I would guess some of it would try to go that way. So you can't add assets in the Caribbean without also being ready to stop it wherever it is coming through, both the transit zone and the source country, which have to work in unison, as I said.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. One thing we did hear when we were down in South America is that because we were putting cost pressures, reducing the payments to the campesinos growing it, some of them were looking for alternatives for the first time, which is one of the other affects you have, a change in the cost structure. I was intrigued, you worked in the Vietnam interdiction?

Admiral YOST. I did.

Mr. SOUDER. I have heard both from Asian sources and American sources that there is some concern that as we presumably move to-

ward some form of normalization with Vietnam, that Saigon could become a major point for having heroin trafficking. They are concerned over there; we are concerned over here. Do you share some of those concerns, and how would you start to look at this down the road?

Admiral YOST. I don't share those concerns, only because I don't know.

What I brought out of Vietnam was having the responsibility for closing off the coast of Vietnam to the importation of arms from either—well, the Vietcong or whoever, that we had compared to drug interdiction, which had almost an unlimited amount of assets.

We had ships, aircraft, patrol boats, 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. We patrolled those coasts and we were in a war. When somebody tried to come through the blockade, we sunk them, and people lost their lives. It was a war, and we shut it down there and we could shut it down here.

But we will never here get the rules of engagement because it is not a war and we will never get the assets we had in Vietnam on a war. We will never get the command and control that we had with one commander who commanded the whole thing.

Here we have multiple agencies, FBI, DEA, Customs, Coast Guard, and we have a drug czar who is not in command of these things. He is a coordinator. As I said last time, and it was probably a poor analogy, but I kind of like it, if General Eisenhower standing on that heavy cruiser at Normandy was the czar instead of the supreme allied commander, I wonder how much cooperation he would have gotten when he said: "You guys in the Air Force, would you like to fly today? You guys in the Navy, would you like to land? How about you Coast Guard guys, are you ready to put the landing party ashore?"

It is a difference between a coordinator, a czar or a coordinator, and a supreme allied commander.

I am not saying we will ever have a supreme allied commander this war, because it is not a war, and we don't have the assets and we don't have the pyramid structure and we don't have all the rules of engagement.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much for your testimony, even though it is pretty discouraging. As Congressman Mica likes to say, it shows we are in a skirmish, not a war.

Admiral YOST. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. Admiral, we certainly appreciate you being here today and your testimony.

I want to thank all of today's witnesses for this excellent testimony we have had. This hearing and the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]