

OVERSIGHT OF THE 1997 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 27, 1997

Serial No. 105-22

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

42-191 CC

WASHINGTON : 1997

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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OVERSIGHT OF THE 1997 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1997

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:35 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Hastert, Mica, Souder, Shadegg, Barr, Barrett, and Cummings.

Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Ianthe Saylor, clerk; and Mark Stephenson, minority professional staff member.

Mr. HASTERT. This meeting of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, will come to order.

Good morning and welcome. This morning's hearing focuses on a topic that touches every American, and I do mean every American. That topic is drugs. By "drugs," I mean drug abuse of every form, including the recent rise in drug abuse by America's youth. But I also mean the growing national security threat posed by wealthy, powerful, and violent drug cartels on our southern border.

We are privileged to have with us today a true leader in this increasingly violent war and a decorated veteran of two other wars. I want to welcome Gen. Barry McCaffrey, a friend and dedicated servant of the American people and our Nation's drug czar.

Before I turn to the President's latest drug strategy, however, I'll review the problems that we face in the drug war. We face exploding teenage willingness to try high-potency marijuana, often laced with PCP or crack. We face record-level teenage overdoses, like the heroin overdose that killed the Smashing Pumpkins' keyboard players last year. Heroin that only reached 10 percent purity in the late-1970's can now reach 95 percent purity. Kids do not usually get two chances with heroin that pure.

There are other new drugs threatening our kids and teens, including new stimulants, over-the-counter inhalants like Glade air freshener, and LSD marketed with pictures of the "Lion King." Let me point out the obvious: The drug traffickers are not trying to sell the "Lion King" to 16-year-olds; they are now targeting 8-year-olds with LSD.

We, of course, must still contend with our primary nemesis, cocaine. We are faced with 400 tons of cocaine entering the United States every year undetected, and 150 tons of methamphetamine, also known as "speed," that crosses our Southwest Border.

We face cocaine possessed by the Cali Cartel in Colombia, processed by that, and then the drugs that have caused more than 3,600 Colombian police officers to lose their lives in recent combat with the drug-trafficking guerrillas there.

We face the drugs that are linked to homicides in this city and every other American city, and increasingly, to murders, assaults, and rapes, and burglaries in rural America.

This hearing, like the other three that we have already held this session of Congress, is dedicated to two main purposes: First, shining a bright light on the national threat, a tragedy which the DEA reports is taking more than 10,000 American lives annually; second, to help build a national consensus that together, we, as a Nation of Republicans and Democrats, urban and rural communities, parents and kids, can turn back this riptide of drug abuse.

Before turning to our distinguished witness today, let me say that Congress will take action to help solve this problem. We will encourage parents to talk to their kids about the dangers of drugs. We will work together in communities across America. In fact, I will soon be introducing legislation with Congressmen Portman, Rangel, and Levin to spur the creation of community anti-drug coalitions to bring communities together to stop this scourge.

As we turn to examining the National Drug Strategy, I will ask Gen. McCaffrey to begin his testimony. I will do so with great respect for the General, his work, both as an officer in the Army and as a Director of the ONDCP; and my respect and friendship certainly will lead to cooperation. But we will continue to keep a critical eye to evaluate that drug strategy.

It is my duty and that of all of my colleagues to ensure that we pursue the best strategy possible to fit the American needs and to fight the scourge of drugs in our country.

I am pleased to turn to my colleague, the subcommittee's ranking minority member, Tom Barrett of Wisconsin, for any opening remarks he may have.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Gen. McCaffrey. You are a good man, and you have been a very effective Director the past year, and we are very happy to have you here today.

However, as you are far more aware than anybody else in this room, you face one of the most difficult and challenging jobs in this entire country. Before the hearing, a couple of us were talking up here, and I said, this guy has one tough job; and I applaud you for the enthusiasm and energy you put into your job.

The problem, of course, is that despite some encouraging signs, we are unfortunately seeing that the problem of drug use is getting worse in America, especially among America's youth. According to the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy released this week, the use of illegal drugs among eighth-graders is up 150 percent over the past 5 years, with more than half of all high school students using illegal drugs by the time they graduate.

The use of cocaine by eighth-graders has doubled to 4.5 percent in 1996, and almost one in four high school seniors used marijuana on a past-month basis in 1996, and it is being used by younger and younger children.

I was at the White House earlier this week, when you talked about the fact that a child who stays drug and alcohol free between the ages of 13 and 21, will most likely stay drug free his or her entire life, and I hope that you talk a little bit about that today, because I think that it puts the spotlight where it has to be, and that is on our Nation's youth and how important this fight is for all of us today.

Clearly, there must be more done if we are to prevent a future drug epidemic. This year's strategy and budget submission by the President provides some hope. It requests \$16 billion. That is \$818 million more than fiscal year 1997, a 5.4 percent increase, and the innovation of developing a 10-year strategy also strikes me as a good way to get a handle on long-term solutions to this problem.

Also of obvious concern, I think, to all of us here today is the recent revelations of corruption in the Mexican Government, and I am sure that that is going to come up a little bit today.

I look forward to hearing from you on these and other important issues. Thank you.

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection, we will ask that all Members put their opening statements in the record, and so ordered. I would like to welcome Gen. McCaffrey, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Strategy; and, General, as always, we are pleased to have you here. Would you stand and raise your right hand. The committee's rules require me to swear you in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show that the witness responded in the affirmative.

Thank you, General, and please proceed with your opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. BARRY R. McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY**

Gen. McCAFFREY. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much for the opportunity to appear in front of your committee to lay out some of our own thinking and, perhaps more importantly, respond to your own interests and questions. Let me also thank Congressman Tom Barrett for joining this leadership effort, and I look forward to working with you and the minority members of the committee.

I would be remiss if I did not very specifically acknowledge that many of you on this committee and certainly others in the House have been instrumental in my education and support in the way that we have developed this process over the last year. Rob Portman and Charlie Rangel, in particular, I need to publicly comment on as they have been very instrumental in a leadership role. I would also, if I may, acknowledge Elijah Cummings, who has taken me to Baltimore and tried to show me what drug abuse and its consequences really look like in an urban environment, and I thank you, sir; Steny Hoyer; Ben Gilman, who has done tremendous work in helping orient us on the problems of the interdiction zone and the source countries; Congressman Livingston, who pulled

together the leadership, along with you, Mr. Hastert, to give us the largest drug budget in history last year; Frank Wolf; Jim Kolbe; and David Obey.

I would also, if I may, publicly comment that Maxine Waters and the Congressional Black Caucus have been very involved in an oversight role on how this strategy has been developed. I have also consulted with Mr. Waxman.

Finally, the strategy that I have put in front of you today is clearly the work of a team effort. Although we have, by law, the responsibility of writing the annual drug strategy and pulling together and certifying the budget, there is no question that the big three people in my life are the Attorney General, Janet Reno; Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala; and Education Secretary Dick Riley.

A bunch of the other 14 significant officers of Government, though, took key roles in this: Bob Rubin; the former Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry; and others. We have certainly had the continuous involvement of the law enforcement national leadership, which we are really blessed to work with: Tom Constantine, Louis Freeh; and over in Treasury, Jim Johnson.

Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, point out what I have offered for the record, a statement that we have done considerable work on, and I apologize that we had this down here later than your staff would have liked. But that is on the floor for you to consider.

I have also included copies, if I may for the record, of the drug situation that I will portray on these briefing charts over to my left. Finally, I think Dr. John Carnevale in my office has put together a very useful piece of paper, the Fiscal Year 1998 Drug Control Budget. Now, there is a thicker book of this, but this tries to lay it out and show you how we are recommending for other congressional committees to consider the funding to make this strategy happen.

The strategy itself; there are two volumes, Mr. Chairman, that I have laid out. There is a third one that is classified. The first volume really is the one we ought to focus on, in my judgment. It is smaller; it is cleaner. We think it is a first rate piece of work. It took 4,000-some-odd sources of input to write this over the last 9 months. We think it is a guide to action and will be a useful way for us to organize our thinking conceptually over the next 10 years.

Also, by law, we submit the budget summary and other related documents required in the 1988 act, and I think that will be a source of good background information for many of you.

Finally, for the first time we have been able to complete and put into play a classified annex to the National Drug Strategy, and attempt to do the law enforcement-sensitive information and guidance to DOD or other overseas interdiction actors, and that is certainly available for your consideration.

Before giving you a very brief overview, I wonder if you might allow me to introduce Dr. Hoover Adger, who is sitting behind me; and Dr. Adger—sir, if you would stand up—has now joined us as my Deputy. That slot, of course, was authorized by the Congress last year and salary funded. I will submit it for congressional consideration as a Senate-approved position.

Dr. Adger comes with enormously distinguished credentials as a Johns Hopkins pediatrics professor of medicine with a lifelong specialization in adolescent addiction. He is very widely published, and I think he will be a tremendous source of strength and knowledge to all of us, and I wanted to publicly tell this committee that he is joining the team.

Very quickly, Pancho, if you would pull some slides here, there are five brief points I would make, and then I think I will just respond to your own interests. The first is to say that, look, America, 265 million of us, have walked away from drugs over the last 15 to 20 years. We were up at 25 million regular users. We are down to 12 million. Essentially, adult use of drugs is stable or declining; and, indeed, cocaine use is plummeting. It is down, we say, some 72 percent.

This is true, whether you look at the absolute number of casual users, at those who are new initiates, or whether you go to the 12th-grade population.

Now, it is hard for a police officer, a narcotics officer, an emergency room doctor to believe this, because we are also saying that the tonnage consumed in America has remained relatively stable. So emergency room admissions and crime and sickness and the consequences of this dreadful drug are increasing.

Here is a problem: eighth-graders. I capture this because they are at the front end of the most sensitive part of their nervous system development, their emotional development, their social progress. Drug use among eighth-graders, and it really started to turn around in 1989, we think, on the value systems, has gone up some 150 percent. When you look at kids in general, the peak year was probably around 1990, when disapproval started to go down, disapproval rates by young people.

In 1991, we saw the drop in the risk perception by youth, and then in 1992, actual drug use by young Americans started to go up. It has gone up every year since then. It is now only half as bad as it was in 1979. It will get worse if we do not get better organized.

Now, finally, let me announce that the drug situation is not static. Cocaine use may be plummeting, but new drugs are appearing, new, higher purity heroin; but a new drug, methamphetamine, I would put on the table as a potentially worse threat to America than the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980's. It is not just a West Coast threat now; it is out in rural Iowa and Missouri and Utah and Idaho and other places.

Finally, a quick note on the cost of all this. Emergency room admissions of drugs, as I have said, are going up, and so the medical and social consequences are getting worse.

Finally, many would argue, we have been willing, and I think correctly so, to stand firm on violent crime in the sales of drugs, but it has resulted in an explosion of incarcerations in this country. We are up to 1.6 million Americans behind bars, the highest per-capita incarceration rate, many would argue, on the face of the globe.

We can project potentially that the figure will get 25 percent worse in the coming years. When I point this out, not to decry our appropriate confrontation with violent crime, but to underscore

that if we do not back concepts like the drug court system, “Break the Cycle,” and effective treatment methodologies, that we are consigned to enormous recidivism rates and increasing incarceration, which cost us as taxpayers a fortune. That is a \$17 billion-a-year bill to pay for that system. I might add, it is so massive that the prison construction budget in the United States now exceeds that of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Finally, a comment: Interdiction is important. Cocaine; we strip off—“we,” meaning Peruvian cops, the Colombian Air Force, the Mexican Army, law enforcement in the United States—probably a third of the cocaine produced each year. We also get a good bit of the heroin. Worldwide, we say, some 32 metric tons gets seized.

The U.S. law enforcement agencies get 1.3 metric tons. Now, having said that, what we have got to face up to is though the devastation caused by drug abuse is enormous—we say \$70 billion a year and 16,000 dead—in fact, there is a reasonably small number of us abusing these drugs. That 3.6 million Americans’ demand is a fraction of the world’s total needs. So heroin, we say, perhaps 360 metric tons, on up to 450 metric tons available; we use 10 metric tons. Cocaine, we estimate potentially we are using 240 metric tons, but the world may be producing more than 800 metric tons. I might add, it is going up dramatically in Colombian production.

So, to end with a restatement of the National Drug Strategy, it focuses on education and prevention for 68 million American children. We are aware we have to manage the consequences of addiction for 3.6 million chronic addicts in America. Finally, we have an equal responsibility to construct appropriate Federal agencies to protect our air, land, and sea borders and to create international coalitions of cooperative democracies.

Drugs are not an American problem; it is not a Colombian problem; a Thai problem; it is a global problem, and I think we are going to have to work in a full partnership with these international actors.

Now, having said that, Mr. Chairman, you gave us some \$15.6 billion last year. We are asking for about \$16 billion this year for bipartisan support. We have written 32 objectives that lend themselves to performance measurement for those five goals. We are pretty far advanced. We have 126 working groups around the Government trying to define how we will come down here and demonstrate to you that we are taking this strategy and trying to achieve output functions with the money Congress gives us.

On that note, if I may, Mr. Chairman, let me end the formal remarks and respond to your own interests.

[The prepared statement of Gen. McCaffrey follows:]

**Statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey,
Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy
before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight –
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice, February 28, 1997**

All of us in the Office of National Drug Control Policy thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify today about the *1997 National Drug Control Strategy* which was just released by the President. The President's instructions when he asked me to take on this position were to help create a cooperative, bipartisan effort among Congress and the federal, state, and local governments. My commitment to you was to forge a coherent counterdrug strategy that would both reduce illicit drug use and also protect our youth and society from the terrible damage caused by drug abuse and drug trafficking. Today, I will not only brief you on the contents of the new drug control strategy, but also provide a report on drug policy issues.

Before doing so, I would like to recognize the members of this committee for your commitment to reducing illegal drug use and its consequences. Chairman Hastert, Mr. Barrett, we appreciate your leadership. We know that the bipartisan support this committee provided to the *1996 National Drug Control Strategy* and the FY 1997 counterdrug budget has been important to our successes. ONDCP has also appreciated the counsel and support of representatives Rob Portman, Charlie Rangel, Elijah Cummings, Steny Hoyer, Ben Gilman, Bob Livingston, Frank Wolf, Jim Kolbe, David Obey, and the other house members who share your commitment and who have greatly influenced this new strategy. We look forward to working with the members of this Committee, with Representative Maxine Waters and the Congressional Black Caucus, and with all representatives. Your continued support is essential if we are to achieve our objective of preventing the 68 million Americans under the age of 18 from becoming a new generation of drug addicts.

We were fortunate that when the President and Vice President released this strategy that key members of our team, including Attorney General Reno, HHS Secretary Shalala, Transportation Secretary Slater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili could join us. We were honored by the participation of the Senate and House leaders who have been instrumental in building bipartisan support for the national drug control effort. We were also honored to be joined by distinguished Americans who have done so much to reduce drug use and its consequences. Representing the private sector were: Jim Burke and Dick Bonnette of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Joe Califano from the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse; Jim Copple representing more than 4,000 community coalitions; Dr. Mitch Rosenthal of

Phoenix House; Luceille Fleming, President of the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Addiction Directors; Dr. Eric Voth, President of Drug Watch International; and most importantly, representing the sixty-eight million Americans on whose behalf we are working, D.A.R.E. kids and members of the Boys' & Girls' clubs. Also standing with us were representatives from the medical community that shares our commitment to drug policy that is based on science, not ideology, including: Dr. John Nelson of the American Medical Association, Dr. Jack Lewin, Vice President of the California Medical Association; Dr. Jay Cutler of the American Psychiatric Association; Dr. Doug Talbott, President, American Society of Addiction Medicine; and Dr. Thomas Kosten, President-Elect, American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry.

America's Drug Abuse Profile

An enduring sense of optimism.

As a nation, we have made enormous progress in our efforts to reduce drug use and its consequences. While America's illegal drug problem remains serious, it does not approach the emergency situation of the late 1970s or of the cocaine epidemic in the 1980s. Just 6 percent of our household population age twelve and over was using drugs in 1995, down from 14.1 percent in 1979. Cocaine use has also plunged. In 1995, 1.5 million Americans were current cocaine users, a 74 percent decline from 5.7 million a decade earlier. In addition, fewer people are trying cocaine. The estimated 533,000 first-time users in 1994 represented a 60 percent decline from approximately 1.3 million cocaine initiates per year between 1980 and 1984. It is clear that when we focus on the drug problem, drug use and its consequences can be driven down.

There are encouraging signs that our drug control efforts are succeeding.

- 1995 marked the first time in the past five years that drug-related emergency department episodes did not rise significantly.
- There was a steady decline in drug-related homicides between 1989 and 1995.
- The 1996 *Monitoring the Future* study found that heroin use decreased among twelfth graders and that the use of inhalants and LSD among eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders also declined.
- Coca cultivation in Peru, the source of 80 percent of the cocaine on our streets, declined by 18 percent in the past year.

But the consequences of illegal drug use remain unacceptably high.

The social and health costs to society of illicit drug use are staggering. Drug-related illness, death, and crime cost the nation approximately sixty-seven billion dollars. Every man, woman, and child in America pays nearly a thousand dollars annually to cover the expense of unnecessary health care, extra law enforcement, auto accidents, crime, and lost productivity resulting from substance abuse. Illicit drug use hurts families, businesses, and neighborhoods; impedes education; and chokes criminal justice, health, and social service systems. Some of those consequences include:

- **Increased illness and death.** Drug-induced deaths increased 47 percent between 1990 and 1994 and number approximately 14,000 a year. Furthermore, the nation's 3.6 million chronic drug users frequently spread infectious diseases like hepatitis, tuberculosis, and HIV. More than 33 percent of new AIDS cases affect injecting drug users and their sexual partners. Indeed, AIDS is the fastest-growing cause of illegal drug-related deaths.
- **Record high drug-related medical emergencies.** In 1995, there were 531,800 drug-related hospital emergency episodes, slightly more than 1994's 518,500 incidents, and a record high. Cocaine-related episodes also remain at a historic high while heroin-related emergencies increased between 1990 and 1995 by 124 percent.
- **Heroin fatalities.** Heroin-related deaths increased between 1993 and 1994 (the most recent year for which these statistics are available). In Phoenix, heroin fatalities were up 39 percent, 29 percent in Denver, and 25 percent in New Orleans.
- **Increased infant mortality.** About 5 percent of pregnant women are using illegal drugs and putting their children at risk. A Washington State study of Medicaid recipients showed an infant mortality rate of 14.9 per one thousand births among substance-abusing women as compared to 10.7 per one thousand for women who were not substance abusers. Children born to drug-abusing women were found to be 2.5 times more likely to die from sudden infant death syndrome.
- **Addiction to nicotine and smoke-related illness.** Every day, three thousand children become regular cigarette smokers; as a result, a third of these youngsters will die of a smoking-related disease. The vast majority of smokers (over 80 percent) first tried a cigarette before age eighteen.
- **Decreased workplace productivity.** Seventy-one percent of illegal drug users aged eighteen and older (7.4 million adults) are employed. According to an ongoing Postal Service study, among drug users, absenteeism is 66 percent higher, health

benefit utilization is 84 percent greater in dollar terms, disciplinary actions are 90 percent higher, and there is significantly higher employee turnover.

- **Violent crime.** In 1995, a majority of arrestees tested positively for drug use. Those arrested for robbery, burglary, and auto theft also had high positive rates. A large number of the twelve million property crimes committed each year are drug-related as are almost two million violent crimes.
- **Crowded prisons and jails.** In 1995, state and local law enforcement agencies made an estimated 1.4 million arrests for drug law violations. 59.5 percent of federal prisoners were drug offenders as were 22.3 percent of the inmates in state prisons. Drug-related offenses account for nearly three quarters of the total growth in federal prison inmates since 1980.

Drug use among youth is sky rocketing.

The most alarming drug trend is the increasing use of illegal drugs, tobacco, and alcohol among youth. Children who use these substances increase the chance of acquiring life-long dependency problems. According to a study conducted by Columbia University's Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), children who smoke marijuana are eighty-five times more likely to use cocaine than peers who never tried marijuana. The use of illicit drugs among eighth graders is up 150 percent over the past five years. While alarmingly high, the prevalence of drug use among today's young people has not returned to near-epidemic levels of the late 1970s. The most important challenge for drug policy is to reverse these dangerous trends.

Drug Use is a Shared Problem.

Many Americans believe that drug abuse is not their problem. They have a misconception that drug users belong to a segment of society different from their own or that drug abuse is remote from their environment. They are wrong. Drug users permeate our society. They are our family members, classmates, teammates, neighbors, and coworkers. Most of us have concluded that drug use and drug-related crime are among our nation's most pressing social problems. Approximately 45 percent of us know someone who has suffered a substance abuse problem.

While drug use and its consequences threaten Americans of every socioeconomic background, geographic region, educational level, and ethnic and racial identity, the effects of drug use are often felt disproportionately. Neighborhoods where illegal drug markets flourish are plagued by attendant crime and violence. Americans who lack comprehensive health plans and have smaller incomes may be less able to

afford treatment programs to overcome drug dependence. What all Americans must understand is that no one is immune from the consequences of drug use. Every family is vulnerable. We must make a commitment to reducing drug abuse and not mistakenly assume that illegal drugs are someone else's concern.

The 1997 National Drug Control Strategy:
Responding to the Challenge:

A comprehensive ten-year plan.

The *National Drug Control Strategy* is designed to provide guidance for the long-term. We propose a ten-year commitment supported by five-year budgets so that continuity of effort can help insure success. The strategy addresses the two sides of the challenge: limiting availability of illegal drugs and reducing demand. The *Strategy* contains our collective wisdom for confronting illegal drugs. It provides general guidance while identifying specific initiatives. Particular programs will be reassessed annually to maximize opportunities for success, but the overall approach must be sustained. The challenge is to reinforce progress while not wasting resources on unproductive efforts. Nevertheless, sufficient time must be allotted to a program to succeed before terminating or reducing its support.

The *National Drug Control Strategy* is America's main guide in the struggle to decrease illegal drug use. The strategy provides a compass for the nation to reach this critical objective. Developed in consultation with public and private organizations, it sets a course for the nation's collective effort against drugs.

Strategic goals.

The *1997 Strategy* refines the five goals of last year's strategy. Those goals are:

1. Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
2. Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
3. Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.
4. Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

Strategic Initiatives.

The key to a successful long-term strategy is mobilizing resources toward the systematic achievement of established goals. Key initiatives being undertaken to decrease drug use and its consequences are summarized below:

I. Youth-oriented initiatives.

- **Broadening “drug-free zones.”** Young Americans are more likely to use illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco if these substances are readily available or if their use is encouraged directly or subtly in youth-oriented materials. We must keep drugs out of areas where children and adolescents study, play, or spend leisure time. We must also depict these substances and effects in accurate ways.
- **Expanding School-Based Prevention Programs that Work.** Schools offer both formal and informal opportunities for developing youth attitudes toward drugs. The Department of Education will continue to focus on improving the quality of drug and violence prevention programming and changing the attitudes of students and parents regarding illicit use of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs.
- **Expanding Youth-Oriented Anti-Drug Messages.** Unfortunately, in recent years the number of drug-related public service announcements carried by television, radio, and print media have decreased markedly. We seek to reverse this trend by developing a public education campaign that supplements anti-drug announcements already offered by dedicated organizations like the Partnership for a Drug-Free America.
- **Preventing Alcohol Use by Youth.** Underage drinking continues to be a significant problem. The *Strategy* recommends educating youth, their mentors, and the public about the dangers of underage drinking; limiting youth access to alcoholic beverages; encouraging communities to support alcohol-free behavior on the part of youth; and creating both incentives and disincentives that lead to less alcohol use by young people.
- **Preventing Tobacco Use by Youth.** Despite a decline in adult smoking, the use of tobacco products is on the rise among American youth. We seek to diminish the appeal of, reduce access to, and educate youth about the lethal effects of tobacco products.

- **Collaborating with the Media and Entertainment Industries.** Youth, perhaps even more than the public at large, are affected by the icons of our society. The creative talent of the entertainment industries can depict drug use and its consequences accurately, thereby increasing the perception of risk that young people associate with illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco.
- **Reducing Drugged Driving.** Twenty percent of high school seniors state that they have smoked marijuana in a car. The initiative on drugs, driving, and youth is intended to reduce drug use by young people as well as general driving under the influence of drugs.

II. Initiatives to reduce drug-related crime and violence.

- **Expanding community policing.** The more we can link law enforcement with local residents in positive ways that create trusting relationships, the more secure our communities will be. The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program will eventually bring 100,000 new police officers onto the streets.
- **Integrating Federal, State, and Local Efforts.** We are encouraging greater cooperation between our law enforcement agencies. Edward Byrne Memorial Grants will provide financial support to multi-jurisdictional task forces. Coordination is facilitated by another federal initiative, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program which has identified counties in fifteen areas of the United States as areas which require increased federal assistance to alleviate drug-related problems. Properly targeted, HIDTAs offer greater efficiency in countering illegal drug trade in local areas. HIDTA programs are based on a logical, comprehensive methodology for prioritizing needs and working with other initiatives. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDEF) are another federal initiative for organizing more effective regional responses to changing drug trafficking patterns. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' Achilles Program is also an important mechanism for fostering task force approaches to drug law enforcement.
- **Disrupting Money Laundering.** Drug trafficking organizations exist to make a profit. They cannot sustain operations without revenue. Law enforcement and regulatory agencies will work together and with the private sector to stop money laundering and prevent financial institutions from being used to move drug proceeds. Within the United States, federal agencies will operate in concert with state and local officials to streamline operations. Abroad, we will work through international agencies and bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as cooperative arrangements to disrupt money laundering schemes. We will also

continue to encourage the adoption of effective anti-money laundering controls by other nations.

- **Linking Criminal Justice and Treatment Systems.** Drug treatment in the criminal justice setting can decrease drug use and criminal activity, reduce recidivism, and improve chances for subsequent employment while improving overall health and social conditions. The *Strategy* encourages drug treatment and education for prisoners, expanded use of drug courts that offer incentives for drug rehabilitation in lieu of incarceration, and integrated efforts to rid criminals of drug habits. The coercive power of the criminal justice system can be used to test and treat drug addicts arrested for committing crimes. Drug use while under supervision of the justice system should not be tolerated.
- **Expanding Alternatives to Incarceration.** Alternative judicial processes have demonstrated that they can motivate non-violent offenders to abandon drug-related activities and lower recidivism rates. More than two hundred drug courts around the country and community programs like Treatment Accountability for Safer Communities are already helping non-violent offenders break the cycle of drugs and crime. The *Strategy* expands such alternative approaches.
- **Reducing the Number of Chronic Drug Users.** Chronic drug users are at the heart of America's drug problem. Two-thirds of the nation's supply of cocaine is consumed by about 20 percent of the drug-using population. Chronic users maintain drug markets and keep drug traffickers in business. The *Strategy* focuses on helping the 3.6 million chronic drug users in America overcome addiction.

III. Initiatives to reduce health and social problems.

- **Lowering Entry Barriers to Treatment Programs.** The willingness of chronic drug users to undergo treatment is influenced by the availability of treatment programs, affordability of services, access to publicly-funded programs or medical coverage, personal motivation, family and employer support, and potential consequences of admitting a dependency problem. The *Strategy* seeks to reduce these barriers so that increasing numbers of chronic users can begin treatment. Programs should capitalize on individual motivation to end drug dependency. Publicly-funded treatment must be accessible to people who cannot afford private programs or lack adequate medical services.

- **Addressing Needs of the Vulnerable.** The health consequences of drug abuse are especially acute for pregnant women, children they are carrying, adolescents, racial and ethnic minorities, and people diagnosed with mental illnesses. Addiction is particularly devastating for the poor, who lack economic and family safety nets. We encourage treatment programs that address the special needs of these populations. States, communities, and health-care professionals are encouraged to integrate drug prevention and assessment programs in prenatal, pediatric, and adolescent medical practices or clinics.
- **Developing Anti-Cocaine Medications.** We are fortunate to have methadone for the treatment of opiate addiction. However, pharmacotherapies for cocaine dependency do not exist. We need to enhance vital research efforts to treat those addicted to cocaine.
- **Expanding Drug-Free Workplace Programs.** American businesses realize that keeping illegal drugs out of the workplace makes economic sense. Drug testing and employee assistance programs -- when combined with supervisory concern, leadership, and support -- reduce drug use. The share of major U.S. firms that test for drugs rose to 81 percent in January 1996. Our challenge is to expand these programs to the small business community that employs 87 percent of all workers.
- **Expanding Community Anti-Drug Efforts.** The community-based anti-drug movement in this country is strong, with more than 4,300 coalitions already organized. These coalitions are significant partners for local, state, and federal agencies working to reduce drug use, especially among young people. Community-based approaches to the drug problem must be supported. Such groups have the ability to mobilize community resources; inspire collective action; synchronize complementary prevention, treatment, and enforcement; and engender community pride.
- **Incorporating Religious Organizations.** Experience and research suggest that individuals whose values involve faith systems can benefit more rapidly from treatment. We must encourage religious organizations to join the national drug prevention effort. Religious organizations are urged to integrate efforts with community coalitions and nongovernmental organizations.
- **White House Mayor's Conference on Drug Control.** Our communities are making it clear that they will not accept the devastating consequences of drug use and trafficking. The individual leadership of Chicago's Mayor Rich Daley, Boise, Idaho's Mayor Brent Coles, Gary Indiana's Mayor Scott King, and Atlanta's Mayor Bill Campbell, and the collective efforts of the Conference of Mayors is already

making a difference. In May of this year, the first-ever White House Mayor's Conference on Drug Control will build on their successes and consider how our cities can better organize to reduce drug use and its consequences and how the federal government can support their efforts.

IV. Initiatives to shield our frontiers.

- **Preventing Drug Trafficking Across the Southwest Border.** If a single geographic region were to be identified as a microcosm of America's drug problem, it would be the U.S. - Mexican border. Cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana all cross into the United States here, hidden among the eighty four million cars, 232 million people, and 2.8 million trucks that the Customs Service estimates cross the thirty-eight ports of entry spanning nearly two thousand miles. American and Mexican ranchers often are harmed by violent bands of drug runners openly crossing their property.

Significant reinforcements have been committed to the substantial resources already focused on the Southwest Border. The U.S. Armed Forces' Joint Task Force-6, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and Operation Alliance are examples of in-place federal responses to this pressing problem. We are designing an overarching operational strategy to better organize our interdiction operations, focus resources, provide timely and accurate information that can secure evidence for specific cases, and anticipate strategic and tactical activities of drug traffickers.

- **Closing the Caribbean "Back Door."** U.S. intelligence estimates that the second-most significant drug trafficking route into the U.S. is through the Caribbean, specifically Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. We will continue to build on the successes of the Puerto Rico - U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA which supports the efforts of Governor Pedro Rossello and local law enforcement efforts. The Customs Service, under Commissioner George Weis' leadership, continues to conduct effective drug interdiction programs in the Caribbean. Customs' OPERATION GATEWAY, established in March 1996, has seized 5,889 kilos of cocaine, 45 kilos of heroin, 6,434 kilos of marijuana and \$3.1M in currency. The Coast Guard's extensive interdiction operations reflect Admiral Bob Kramek's determination to stop trafficking. Ongoing Coast Guard operations in the Caribbean include CARIBE VENTURE, and FRONTIER SHIELD. The latter is designed to seal Puerto Rico and surrounding islands from illicit drug trafficking. The FY 1998 request will allow the Coast Guard to fund campaign STEEL WEB and to provide increased operational support to the Puerto Rico/USVI HIDTA.

- **Addressing Other Drug Entry Points.** The greater our success at interrupting drug trafficking along any particular border, the more traffickers attempt to introduce illegal drugs elsewhere. Consequently, we must develop a comprehensive, coordinated capability that allows the federal government to focus resources in response to shifting drug trafficking threats. Existing organizations and initiatives -- like the three U.S. military Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces (East watching the Caribbean, South for Central and South America, and West for the Pacific) and the Customs Service's Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center -- have already increased the effectiveness of our efforts. HIDTAs, OCDETFs, and other federal initiatives that expand federal, state, and local coordination will remain the building blocks for this effort.

V. Initiatives to reduce drug availability.

- **Bilateral cooperation with Mexico.** We share the dismay of Mexican authorities by the recent revelation that Mexico's top anti-drug official, General Gutierrez Rebollo is alleged to have closely associated with the Carrillo Fuentes drug-trafficking organization. This high-level corruption and betrayal underscores the enormous corrupting influence and violence of the thirty billion dollar illegal drug trade. Mexican democratic institutions are under terrible internal attack by international drug criminals. We have, however, been encouraged by President Zedillo's dedication to rooting out corruption no matter where it is found.

Our two societies are joined by much more than a commonality of interest that results from being neighbors. We are also bound together by a commitment to democratic governance, respect for the dignity of the individual, reverence for the rule of law, and by commerce -- Mexico is our third largest trading partner after Canada and Japan. We must break up the Mexican criminal organizations that funnel drugs into the U.S. across the southwest border -- the most significant drug-trafficking route into our nation.

The challenge we face is to support the honest men and women in Mexican public service who are committed to confronting this threat to their national security and to complying with the provisions of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. They will need our help if they are to build over the next decade institutions that can stand up to the criminal organizations that use violence and corruption to attain their ends. The High Level Contact Group on Drug Control formed last March provides us a mechanism for developing an effective binational counterdrug strategy. Success against this terrible threat to our two societies will not come overnight. It will require a long-term

commitment on the part of dedicated and honest Mexican authorities and sustained, bilateral cooperation and partnership from the United States.

We have had considerable success over the past year. Mexico enacted a new Organized Crime Law in October. The Garcia Abrego drug trafficking organization has been seriously disrupted. Major traffickers such as the Lupericio brothers and Manuel Rodriguez Lopez and Jose Luis "Jota" Pereira have been arrested. Abrego and Pereira were expelled to the U.S. Last year, for the first time, two Mexican nationals were extradited to the U.S. Already in 1997, sixteen criminals have been extradited to the U.S. Training of specialized counterdrug units is well underway. Mexican drug seizures were up again in 1996. Finally, Mexico led the world in drug crop eradication. We must continue to demand concrete results from our efforts to protect the American people. We must also recognize that effective bilateral cooperation is the best way to address this threat to our two nations.

- **The Colombian Dilemma.** We face a difficult situation in Colombia. The democratic institutions of this nation are under attack by incredibly wealthy drug cartels and numerous trafficking organizations that frequently work in alliance with guerrilla groups. We have continued to support the efforts of elected Colombian officials, judges, prosecutors, policemen, and soldiers who have steadfastly opposed drug corruption. This year Colombia passed important anti-drug laws which have the potential, when implemented, to damage the major trafficking organizations. Yet we cannot ignore the following disturbing truths about Colombia:
 - Colombian coca cultivation has been increasing. Last year, Colombia edged out Bolivia as the world's second-leading coca cultivator. This year, the amount of land under cultivation grew by 32 percent.
 - Colombia continues to be the world's major producer and distributor of cocaine.
 - Just a few years ago, virtually no opium poppy was grown in Colombia. Now, about sixty-five metric tons of opium can be harvested – enough to produce six tons of heroin.
 - Traffickers continue to operate and intimidate from Colombian jails.
 - Colombia has failed to revive extradition to the United States.
 - Colombian heroin is being aggressively marketed along our eastern seaboard. In 1994, the last year for which DEA heroin seizure data is available, South American heroin represented 62 percent of seizures.

- We remain convinced that Colombian President Ernesto Samper's election was funded by narco-dollars. The Colombian Government's credibility continues to be tainted by President Samper.

Nevertheless, we cannot lose sight of the patriotism and courage of those Colombian individuals and institutions that continue to stand up to the drug trafficking menace. The important anti-drug laws enacted recently by the Colombian Congress were possible in great part because of the dedication and resolve of the Colombian business community. The Colombian police led by General Serrano and the Armed Forces under the leadership of General Bedoya continue to oppose trafficking organizations at great risk. Their actions and the leadership of distinguished Colombian public servants such as Prosecutor General Valdivieso and Foreign Minister Mejia remind us that drug traffickers are not representative of this proud nation of thirty seven million. They deserve our continued support.

- **Making Cocaine Less Available.** Our national efforts against coca cultivation and the production and trafficking of cocaine must be guided by our Western Hemisphere counterdrug strategy. Major initiatives include:
 - **Reduction of coca cultivation.** A top international drug policy priority is support for effective coca cultivation reduction programs in South America. We are encouraged by the dramatic 18 percent reduction in coca cultivation in Peru last year. For the first time in ten years, Peruvian coca cultivation has dropped below 100,000 hectares. Our goal of the virtual elimination within the next decade of cultivation of illegal coca is achievable. Our primary focus will consider alternative economic development in Peru – the source of 80 percent of the cocaine in America.
 - **Interdiction.** We have demonstrated that interdiction efforts in the source country zone can disrupt trafficking patterns significantly. Carga flights (Cocaine-carrying Caravelles and Boeing 707s) between Colombia and Mexico have stopped. We have broken the Andean air bridge between Peru and drug-processing labs in Colombia. Our challenges now are to react flexibly and block drug traffickers as they attempt to develop alternative river, ground, and maritime routes. In the "transit zone" of the Caribbean, Central America, Mexico, and the eastern Pacific waters we will also continue to conduct flexible, in-depth, intelligence-driven defenses. Even now, drug traffickers are using shipping containers, cargo ships, and fishing trawlers to compensate for our effectiveness against aerial smuggling.

- **Actions Against Trafficking Organizations.** The power, wealth, and sophistication of Colombian, Mexican, and other drug syndicates pose enormous threats to governmental and judicial institutions in many Western hemisphere countries. Our international cocaine control strategy will continue to include an across-the-spectrum attack on these criminal organizations.
- **Making Heroin Less Available.** Efforts against production and trafficking of heroin will continue to be guided by the U.S. heroin control policy of November 1995. The heroin interdiction challenge is enormous:
 - Potential global heroin production has increased about 60 percent in the past eight years to about 360 metric tons.
 - In 1995, worldwide heroin seizures totaled thirty-two metric tons, less than 10 percent of the global production potential.
 - The U.S. demand of approximately ten tons of heroin which is consumed by 600,000 addicts represents but a fraction of the production potential.
 - U.S. heroin seizures in 1995 were just 1.3 metric tons.

Our heroin control efforts must take this reality into account. We must continue to work through diplomatic and public channels to promote international awareness of the heroin threat. We must help strengthen law enforcement efforts in heroin source and transit countries and bring cooperative law enforcement efforts to bear against processing and trafficking. Finally, we must support Colombian and Mexican eradication programs and move promptly against any other illicit opium poppy cultivation encountered in the Western hemisphere.

- **Countering the Methamphetamine Threat.** Methamphetamine abuse is a significant problem on the West Coast, the Southwest, and Midwest. Methamphetamine is also moving eastward. Methamphetamine is manufactured in massive amounts in both California and Mexico. It is increasingly being produced in rural areas in the Midwest. All that is required to start up a meth lab is one hundred dollars worth of supplies which are readily available from retail stores and a recipe which can be pulled off the Internet. Methamphetamine has devastating consequences on those addicted to it. Methamphetamine users pose great threat to their family members and to police officers while under the drug's influence. This drug has the potential of becoming the crack cocaine of the 1990s and of overwhelming our law enforcement agencies and treatment programs if not confronted in the coming years. It may be the most devastating drug we've faced.

Thankfully, the new national anti-methamphetamine legislation provides initial tools with which to address this growing problem. ONDCP and the Department of Justice are reviewing the National Methamphetamine Strategy which was released last April. We conducted a regional methamphetamine conference in California last month to learn from the successes of state and local officials in Arizona, California, Hawaii, Oregon, New Mexico, and Washington. In May, a follow-on national methamphetamine conference will be held in Omaha, Nebraska with more than two hundred participants. We are encouraged by the quick recognition of this growing threat and the increasingly-well coordinated response.

- **Measuring and Reducing Illegal Domestic Marijuana Cultivation.** We have no accurate estimate of the extent of domestic marijuana cultivation. Our domestic cannabis crop reduction efforts must be supported by accurate information about drug crop locations and potentials. ONDCP will coordinate the development of a domestic marijuana crop measurement program and of more effective domestic eradication efforts.
- **Controlling the Diversion of Drug-essential Chemicals.** Drug production can be dramatically curtailed if the necessary precursor chemicals can be interdicted. We are encouraged that the importance of controlling chemical is internationally accepted and will continue to urge adoption of chemical control regimes by other nations. Mexico's 1996 law criminalizing precursor chemical trafficking is an example of the effective measures that must be taken.

VI. Other initiatives.

- **Streamlining the Counterdrug Effort.** More than fifty federal departments and agencies are responsible for implementing the National Drug Control Strategy. In addition, state and local governments, public interest groups, and private corporations make major contributions to the national effort. The *Strategy* promotes unity of effort through organizing concepts that facilitate coordination.
- **Restructuring Law Enforcement Counterdrug Information Coordination and Sharing Efforts.** Timely and accurate tactical information can allow trafficker and criminal organization vulnerabilities to be exploited. We must have a system that can detect, monitor, and track domestic drug production and trafficking activities across a spectrum of illegal activities that includes cultivation, movement of precursors, smuggling, wholesale and retail distribution, and laundering of profits. We have committed a great deal of efforts and significant resources to ensure informed operations. An Interdiction Intelligence Support Plan was promulgated in May, 1995 to better support interdiction operations. An Anti-Drug Network

(ADNET) was simultaneously established to serve as the communications backbone for interdiction centers. National-level law enforcement intelligence organizations like the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Center (FinCEN), and the El Paso Intelligence Center are making useful contributions. A review of the existing counterdrug intelligence architecture will enable us to make better use of these and other available resources.

- **Developing measures of effectiveness.** ONDCP and the drug control agencies are establishing a national performance system to measure progress of major drug programs supporting the *Strategy*, provide feedback for strategy refinement and system management, and assist the Administration in resource allocation. ONDCP has established a new program evaluation office to oversee the design and implementation of the new system. A first set of targets and measures will be submitted for congressional review this fiscal year. The measurement system will be dynamic, flexible, and responsive. The drug threat is dynamic, consequently, our knowledge of how to measure counterdrug activity must improve.
- **Applying a Research, Development, and Technology Application Strategy.** Gaps remain in our knowledge and capabilities, which science can narrow. We are encouraging a comprehensive, integrated technology strategy that promotes intelligent choices among projects, beginning with a bottom-up review of CTAC.
- **Countering Attempts to Legalize Marijuana.** We must reduce the rate of teenage drug use and prevent American youth from using more dangerous drugs like cocaine. To do this, we must continue to oppose efforts to legalize marijuana. According to research conducted by Columbia University's Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, marijuana is a gateway drug. Children who smoke it are eighty-five times more likely to use cocaine. Marijuana is a Schedule I drug under the provisions of the Controlled Substance Act because of its high potential for abuse and because there is no currently accepted medical use in the United States. In response to anecdotal claims about marijuana's medicinal effectiveness, ONDCP is funding a comprehensive review of the drug by the National Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine. The ultimate purpose of this review is to protect the American people by ensuring that science, not ideology, is the basis of drug control policy.

Resourcing the 1997 Strategy.

Progress on the drug front cannot be achieved without the funding necessary to educate children, reduce violent drug crime, treat citizens in need, protect our borders, and address foreign and domestic sources of supply. To support these goals for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, the President has requested \$16.0 billion to fund drug control efforts. This request represents an increase of \$818 million over the FY 1997 level of \$15.2 billion, or a 5.4 percent increase. The greatest proportion of spending, 35 percent, is for programs that increase the safety of America's citizens by reducing drug-related crime and violence. Budgetary highlights include:

- \$175 million for a national media campaign targeting illegal drug consumption by youth.
- \$620 million for Safe and Drug-Free Schools. An increase of \$64 million (11.5 percent) over FY 1997.
- \$510 million for Community Oriented Policing (COPS). An increase of \$41 million (9 percent) over FY 1997.
- \$522 million for prevention and treatment research by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). An increase of \$33 million (6 percent) over FY 1997.
- \$75 million for drug courts. An increase of \$45 million (150 percent) over FY 1997.
- \$367 million in drug-related resources for the Immigration and Naturalization Service. An increase of \$48 million over FY 1997. In addition, the overall INS request provides for an additional five hundred Border Patrol agents to stem the flow of illegal drugs and illegal aliens across the southwest border.
- \$214 million for the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Included in the INL budget is \$40 million for coca cultivation reduction and cocaine interdiction programs in Peru. An increase of \$17 million over FY 1997.

Counterdrug Funding Priorities for FY 1998-2002.

Although outyear funding levels for particular programs must be formulated in cooperation with all federal drug program agencies, ONDCP has identified priority areas for funding for the next five years. ONDCP will continue to emphasize these priorities throughout the five-year drug budget planning horizon. If additional funds for federal

drug control programs become available, the Administration will pursue the following priorities:

- **Reducing Youth Drug Use** -- The centerpiece of our *Strategy* remains the prevention of drug use by children. Youth-oriented prevention programs today can reduce the number of addicted adults who will cause enormous damage to themselves and our society tomorrow.
- **Reducing the Consequences of Chronic Drug Use** -- The *Strategy* also recognizes that significant reductions in illegal drug consumption cannot occur without addressing the problem of chronic drug use. Chronic drug users comprise about 20 percent of the drug-using population yet consume over two-thirds of the supply of drugs. By reducing the number of dependent drug users, we can lessen the adverse health and welfare consequences of illegal drug use as well as attendant criminal activity.
- **Reducing Drug-related Crime and Violence** -- Domestic law enforcement has helped take back our streets from the ravages of the drug trade. Of particular concern is the relationship between drugs and crime. A disproportionate number of more than twelve million property crimes and almost two million violent crimes that occur each year are committed by drug users or traffickers.
- **Stopping the Flow of Drugs at U.S. Borders** -- Unless we shield our borders from the flow of illegal drugs, the United States will never stem the tide of drug abuse. Interdiction is the key to stopping drugs from crossing our borders and reaching our neighborhoods.
- **Reducing Domestic and Foreign Sources of Supply** -- Interdiction programs alone cannot prevent drugs from flowing into the United States and reaching our children. Therefore, the *Strategy* must target sources of supply as well. Working with source and transit nations offers the greatest prospect for eliminating foreign sources of supply. Cocaine, heroin, and frequently methamphetamine are produced outside the United States; these illegal drugs cause the greatest harm to our citizens.
- **Maintaining Strategic Flexibility** -- A long-term strategy must be versatile and contain the infrastructure to respond to new drugs. America's drug problem is not static, as indicated by the recent emergence of methamphetamine. While the use of some drugs declines (e.g., cocaine), other substances make a comeback (e.g., methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin). Still other drugs are used for the first time. Our *Strategy* must contain the means to identify and monitor new drug use trends so that programs can address them proactively.

Conclusion

We must renew our focus on the drug problem.

National attention to the drug problem decreased when drugs faded as a pressing problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From 1989 to 1994, for example, a progressive decline in drug coverage was evident on network news. While the networks devoted 849 minutes to drug-related issues in 1989, in 1994 only 135 minutes dealt with this topic. According to the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, there has been a 20 percent reduction in the number of public service announcements (PSAs) carried by TV, radio, and print media since 1991. Overall media support for anti-drug messages (broadcast, print, and outdoor advertising) has decreased \$100 million since 1991. As the national spotlight on drug abuse faded, so did the effectiveness of drug-prevention messages.

Our children also dropped their guard as drugs became less prevalent and first-hand knowledge of dangerous substances became scarce. Consequently, disapproval of drugs and the perception of risk on the part of young people has declined throughout this decade. As a result, since 1992 more youth have been using alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs. A disturbing study prepared by CASA suggests that adults have become resigned to teen drug use. In fact, nearly half the parents from the "baby-boomer" generation expect their teenagers to try illegal drugs. Forty percent believe they have little influence over teenagers' decisions about whether to smoke, drink, or use illegal drugs. Both of these assumptions are incorrect. Parents have enormous influence over the decisions young people make.

The metaphor of a "war on drugs" is misleading.

Wars are expected to end. Addressing drug abuse is a continuous challenge; the moment we believe ourselves to be victorious and free to relax our resolve, drug abuse will rise again. Furthermore, the United States does not wage war on its citizens. The chronically addicted must be helped, not defeated. It is the suppliers of illegal drugs, both foreign and domestic, that must be confronted and eliminated.

A more appropriate conceptual framework for the drug problem is the metaphor of cancer. Dealing with cancer is a long-term proposition. It requires the mobilization of support mechanisms -- human, medical, educational, and societal, among others. To confront cancer, we must check its spread, deal with its consequences, and improve the prognosis. Resistance to the spread of cancer is necessary, but so is patience, compassion, and the will to carry on. Pain must be managed while the root cause is attacked. The road to recovery is long and complex.

We must continue to uphold our federal laws. Drug use and its consequences have gone down in large part because of the efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Upholding our laws has been and must continue to be an essential component of our drug control strategy. Our drug prevention and treatment programs cannot succeed unless drugs are socially disapproved and against the law.

We must act now to prevent a future drug epidemic.

We have failed to adequately address resurgent drug use among American children in the '90s. This problem did not develop recently. The 1993 *Interim National Drug Control Strategy* highlighted the problem of rising drug use among American youth, quoting the 1992 *Monitoring The Future* study which found that eighth graders and college students were "... reporting higher rates of drug use in 1992 than they did in 1991. Further, fewer eighth graders in 1992 perceived great risk with using cocaine or crack than did eighth graders in 1991." The continuation of these trends has been substantiated by every significant survey of drug use since 1993.

Our challenge and the top priority of the 1997 *National Drug Control Strategy* is to reverse these negative trends. America cannot allow a return to catastrophic illegal drug use levels of the past. Drug use and its consequences are reduced when the entire nation mobilizes. Individual Americans, communities, and organizations concerned with our children's well-being have already reduced the number of drug users by some 10 million in the past decade. Treatment and prevention efforts by groups such as ASPIRA, Boys' and Girls' Clubs, D.A.R.E., P.R.I.D.E., Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America, Lions, Elks, Kiwanis, Rotary, and other civic organizations, National Crime Prevention Council, National Family Partnership, National Family in Action, National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, Treatment Alternatives for Safer Communities, and the Partnership for a Drug-Free America have been critical components of this national drug control effort. Nevertheless, the attitudes and statements of national leaders are important. They set the tenor of the debate. They can also underscore to all Americans our collective seriousness about this problem.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy appreciates the support of all Committee members this past year. Chairman Hastert, Representative Barrett, we will continue to rely on your guidance. We welcome your continued involvement and oversight. Working together we can succeed in better protecting our citizens, communities, schools, workplaces, and homes from the menace of illegal drugs.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank you very much, General. One of the things that I just want to, for the record, we are not going to recess. We are going to try, for your convenience and everybody else to move through this, and there will be other Members coming back after they vote. There is a vote going on right now.

Let me kind of break this down. I see four areas. There is treatment that you have to address; there is the prevention issue that you have to address; there is intervention, trying to stop this stuff on our streets and interdiction at our borders; and then there is a foreign source, trying to stop this stuff by working with foreign countries so it actually is not grown, is never created, and never comes to us.

Our job, along with you, is trying to work to see how we expend funds in the wisest and best ways, and somewhere that magic formula is out there that we can keep drugs away from our children, that we can see a downward trend continuing in drug use in this country, and to stop that blip or sometimes very, very devastating increases that we see in drug use increases. As you know, we can put a lot of charts up, but we know that after 1991 or 1992, the increase among our children, especially our youngest children, in drug usage started to go up, and we need to find the strategies to stop that.

One of the things that we heard yesterday from representatives of 12 leading civic and youth-serving volunteer organizations was that it was brought to our attention that over 50 million adults and youth belong to one of these organizations or participate in these organizations, which are doing, I think, tremendous jobs with young people. How do you see the White House facilitating a relationship with these organizations, which apparently has not existed in the past?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, I could not agree with you more. At the end of the day, this problem in America is going to get solved at the community level, not Washington, DC. So the \$16 billion has to make sense, has to support parents, educators, local law enforcement, local coalitions. There is a fellow, Jim Copple, who is from CACDA. He and his organization have done magnificent work trying to support more than 4,300 community coalitions across America. They are getting organized and energized again because our children are at risk.

In addition, these great civic organizations which you have mentioned—Elk, Kiwanis, Lions, Optimists, religious organizations—also deserve our visibility and support. We are going to propose, I might add, on the reauthorization act for my small agency. You have got us at 154 people. I am going to try and reorganize and make it more obvious that one of our three elements in ONDCP is responsible for intergovernmental affairs, meaning responding to local State government and organizations.

Now, in addition, I think we have made pretty significant progress this year, though, in listening to these people and trying to respond to their own activities, whether it is PRIDE, D.A.R.E., Boys' and Girls' Clubs, or these civic organizations. But, Mr. Chairman, I agree with your point, they are essential to our future.

Mr. HASTERT. Let me talk and move to another area, and that is certainly the area of interdiction and foreign-source countries.

You say that we are able to take off the market about one-third of the cocaine that is produced, and about two-thirds of it moves into this country that was meant for this country; there is more going to other places.

Some of it is done in our borders, some of it is done in our streets, some of it is done on the high seas, some of it is done in the air, and our strategy with Peru, with the cooperation of their President, has been somewhat successful. We had talked privately and also openly that your strategy is going to be to try to increase that cooperation. Basically, 70 percent of the cocaine that comes into this country has, at least its growth origin, becomes a commodity in that country, and then moves up through the Andean Chain into Colombia and Mexico and into this country.

What more can we do in Peru? One of the things is really a function of economics, that if you can shut off the supply lines, there is a glut of cocaine. The price is pushed down. It is no longer attractive for the campesinos to grow this product—it is also the strategy in Bolivia—and then that there is just less of it there, and the prices are so low that it does not pay them to grow. Is that one of the courses or one of the strategies that you are going to continue to pursue?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. It is really a tough challenge. One of the things in Peru we are going to have to face up to is there are 200,000 people living on the land—campesinos, who are not the enemy—and they are out there because this is an impoverished country trying to develop alternative economic models. They would rather grow legal crops, in the viewpoint of the Peruvian leadership, than they would live a life of warfare between drug cartels and the Peruvian Armed Forces.

So we believe that the President and his government are committed to trying to move coca production out of the Peruvian economy. For the first time in 7 years, coca production is dramatically down anywhere in the world, and that is in Peru, minus 18 percent. We need a big idea. We need to support Peru's thinking on this, and in my judgment, over the next 5 to 10 years, we can probably make a dramatic impact.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. I guess I got the designated runner award to go over and vote and get back.

I had a number of questions. I hope I can continue to catch my breath here. One, in a direct followup with that, in the budget that you have proposed, I am glad to see that you increase the interdiction proposal over where it had been. Do you have any non-recurring costs in there for radar systems or other things like that?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. The interdiction piece deserves further analysis and work with your committee and others. There are continuing debates. One of the problems we had this year, to be blunt, was that terrible embassy crisis in Peru, which I think cautioned us from moving ahead as aggressively as we might have liked to.

There are significant increases. There is \$40 million on the table now for Peru. There is some new thinking. Gen. Wes Clark, CINC SOUTHCOM, is looking at river and coastal interdiction operations. The Peruvians are aggressively trying to work land-smuggling routes to respond to the tremendous success they and the Co-

lombian Air Force have had in the air bridge, but we need to analyze it carefully.

Specifically, as you look at the 1998 budget, Mr. Congressman, that we turned in, there are about \$168 million of nonrecurring costs, that if you take it off the 1997 budget, shows there has been a modest growth in interdiction of some \$28 million. Last year, you gave us \$250 million minus some, and we went out with DOD money and forfeiture money and bought some equipment that is going to stand us in good stead.

So interdiction is slightly up \$28 million over last year's 1997 budget.

Mr. SOUDER. I know we will continue to have some questions about moving into Brazil and the Amazon Basin to try to avoid the radar and detection in Peru and Bolivia. I was over in Thailand just after you were. We were voting, and so I was not able to piggyback with you the couple of days before that, which I was hoping to do. But, clearly, the way the heroin is moving out of that area, it is almost impossible, unless we get it at its source point, because it is going both directions around the world, and we need to look at that issue, and we will continue to do that.

I also wanted to make a brief comment and see what your reaction was on it. You had one chart there that showed 1989 being the peak of disapproval, and then the least usage, it was 12th-graders, I believe, being in 1991. I wanted to make a point with this, that I was working for Senator Coats at that point, and specifically was in charge of hiring. We put seven staff people on the drug issue alone. Multiple attorneys and Ph.D.'s worked with the Drug Czar at that point and passed lots of legislation.

Really, the peak of national attention was in 1989 and 1990, when we were reacting. We saw the funds go through going into 1991, but the political phrase at that point was, the top-three issues were drugs, drugs, and drugs. There was not a second issue in 1989.

Our campaign consultant for this campaign, at that point, was Dick Morris, and we tested. There was nothing in the country that tested like that, and we were all making a concerted effort. This, more or less, through the 12th-graders shows that when there is a concentrated effort, we, indeed, can make that kind of impact.

Now, part of my concern is, is that we do not get—I have seen some of your statements, which I agree with. Interdiction alone will not work. At the same time, interdiction is certainly a starting point and one we can get our hands on because the truth is, treatment alone does not work either because, as we get into treatment, we will find out, and I am on the subcommittee that oversees treatment programs—we do not have a really good success program with that, either.

I am on the oversight committee that has education, both the Education Committee and the Reform and Oversight Committee, and we have a mixed track record. The program that I think is best, which is D.A.R.E., has a mixed track record as the studies are going through, and it is very hard to sort this thing through.

I am concerned that a wrong signal is not accidentally sent, because I agree that we have to get prevention in the treatment, and if we can get the users off, but that interdiction is at least an equal

partner in this. We cannot be perceived as backing off of interdiction because unless we are doing all three of those, and that is most clearly the congressional role, because even in your budget I think you have \$3 billion for treatment and only about \$1.5 for interdiction.

It is not as though we cannot give the impression to the general public that we are focusing on interdiction solely, because that is not the truth. The part that has been cut is the interdiction, and the other parts have been rising.

Do you have any reactions to that?

Gen. McCaffrey. Well, basically I agree with your point. We have got to do interdiction. We have got to defend our air, land, and sea borders regardless of whether it is going to be a war winner. We owe the American people a decent organization of our 2,000-mile Southwest Border. Last year, we put about a 25 percent increase in funds into it. Last year, Congress gave us the money for 1,500 additional personnel. This year, the 1998 budget, we are asking for another 500 Border Patrol agents, 100-some-odd DEA, 50-some-odd FBI.

So your point is a good one. We have got to do that. We cannot get rolled on defending our own land, air, and sea space by criminal activity.

I think the balance point is one that I will have to listen carefully to your views on. I do not think we have done enough on source country operations in Peru, as an example. I think that is a good place to go and work seriously.

Finally, I would share your view: Heroin is the hardest thing to sort through. Worldwide production is up, double. It is in Afghanistan; it is in Burma; it is in Laos; it is in the Bekka Valley.

Mr. Souder. Nigerian trafficking is almost impossible to control.

Gen. McCaffrey. It tends to be most of a problem where Government has the least control. So you cannot go to the Government of Afghanistan and try to take sensible, cooperative, multinational measures.

Mr. Souder. One brief comment. I want to have one other question. The comment is, I first want to congratulate you on your aggressive stance on the myth of the medicinal use of marijuana and the willingness to stand up, because while we are trying to fight a drug war, we have another group of citizens that are undermining the very thing that we are trying to do. I very much appreciate your standing up because I think some of the death statistics are wrong. I am hearing from prosecutors and sheriffs that the crimes are 70 percent, that kind of thing.

I know in my district there are numerous automobile wrecks that have been reported as non-drug-related, and I hear from the kids that there was drug use involved, if not immediate, the night before or other things, and they are not being reported as drug deaths. The marijuana and cigarettes are the gateway drugs, but marijuana, in particular, in the potency, you are to be congratulated, because a lot of other people wavered in public in this battle.

My question is, and this is an obvious question today, could you describe, have you been part of the decertification question on Mexico? Are they taking your input? Do you have any comments on that process? Also, one other followup with that is we heard the

other day in the hearing about whether any information was compromised, what kind of discussion did you have with the Drug Czar in Mexico who has been part of the cartel?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your comment on the medical use of marijuana. I might add that what we are now doing, "we," meaning Secretary Shalala, Attorney General Reno, and the other 12 cabinet officers that were involved in that decision approved by the President of the United States, is we are supporting the viewpoint of the American Medical Association, the California Medical Association, the American Cancer Society.

We have the best medicine on the face of the earth. Part of it is due to the fact that we certify safe and effective agents through a scientific medical process done by the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug Administration. As long as we do that, the American people will not face thalidomide, laetrile, or quack medicines.

We have said there is no ideology involved in this kind of a decision. A Schedule I drug is methamphetamine. Cocaine is used for eye surgery. There is no ideology, but the American people must get a scientific medical system. So Dr. Harold Varmas, our brilliant, Nobel Prize Laureate, NIH Director, will focus on that issue. I have asked an independent American Academy of Science, Institute of Medicine, to look at what do we know and not know in scientific literature.

We have synthetic THC available right now, and if other of the 400-plus compounds in smoked marijuana show promise as therapeutic agents, I am sure they can be made available for the American medical establishment.

I thank you, sir, for your comment on that.

A quick response on the certification issue in Mexico, and I would ask for your permission. Of course, as you are aware, in accordance with the law, this is not a policy decision; these are a matter of public law, and the Secretary of State should be allowed to form her own viewpoint, which she will have to do really by Saturday. I will be involved in that discussion and try and join other senior officers of Government providing sound advice.

Mexico and Colombia are obviously special cases. I mean, in Mexico, 100 million people to our south, our third-biggest economic training partner; there is no border between the United States and Mexico. There are 85 million cars and trucks that come back and forth each year; 230 million people cross that border. We are culturally, economically, and politically integrated, and these brave men and women in public life in Mexico are now—and I am just putting this in context, my own view, as somebody who has dealt with foreign systems for 32 years, they are trying to move Mexico into a multiparty democracy, a First World economic alliance of NAFTA partners, and to create modern institutions of government.

I do not know about the certification issue, but I am persuaded that our children will be better off if we work with them in partnership. Partners demand concrete results, not just good feelings. So we ought to look for ways in which both nations can confront this absolutely incredible situation. Mexico has had 25 major assassinations in the last year, potentially more than 200 police officers murdered.

The institutions of democracy in Mexico are under internal attack, and I would suggest that it is our own judgment—and I would be remiss to not publicly say this—where we identify men and women of courage and dedication, if we believe President Zedillo and his senior officials of Government are trying to move the Mexican people into the future and protect them, we ought to stand up in public and say so, and I have been honored to do that.

I also, obviously, have carried a gun and worked with foreign governments for a long time. I am not unaware that violence and corruption are the twin tools that are being used against Colombia, Peru, the Cayman Islands, Panama, and the United States. We prosecuted 18,000 people in the Federal system last year. But I think they are trying, and I think they have suffered a grave disappointment with the alleged uncovering of a criminal organization involving their head drug cop.

Now, what did he get out of his couple of months in public office? I do not know. Constantine and others are going to have to very carefully assess that; certainly, the Mexicans are right now.

The easy one is when he was here in Washington, he did not get anything. But having had 2 months' access as the principle law enforcement officer involved in the drug system, we should view this as a major blow to our partnership on this issue. President Zedillo and his officers are going to have to move forward on the issue.

Mr. SOUDER. I would now like to recognize my friend and the distinguished ranking member from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I thank you, General, for coming here today. I, as I indicated before, attended the announcement earlier this week concerning the goals of the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy and had the opportunity to talk to some members of my local media following that, and I was somewhat saddened to sense that the general reaction was one of cynicism, almost, OK, here we go again; another war on drugs.

So it would be helpful for me, and I have got a few questions specifically, as to how you can help the public understand the importance of this and why this is not just another one-shot media hit and that there is something here.

My first question is, what is your office doing to improve the effectiveness of the Safe and Drug-Free School Program?

Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Congressman, it seems to me that the principle problem we do face is cynicism or low expectations. There are a lot of responsible women and men in city counsels, State legislatures, and, indeed, in the U.S. Congress who think this is hopeless, who think this is a 1-year spin operation. I do not share that viewpoint.

I mean, in reality, the American people, when they say enough is enough, get organized and make a difference, and we have seen drug abuse in America come down dramatically in the last 15 years. These are artificially high rates of drug abuse. We have got to remind ourselves, most Americans do not use drugs. A bunch of them have tried them; we say 50 to 72 million Americans have used illegal drugs and have walked away from it.

The problem is our children and those who are chronically addicted, and we have simply got to step up to the plate and say to the parents, to the educators, to the police chiefs that we recognize

that if we can get these young people through their 21st birthday, not just with threatening them with “brain on drugs” ads, but giving them positive options, by mentoring, by Boys’ and Girls’ Clubs, by sports activities, by religious activities, that they can indeed, and will in larger numbers than now reject drug abuse.

We have also got to remind ourselves that 80 percent of our kids today have never touched an illegal drug. The problem is, one out of five high school seniors has and is currently using illegal drugs. The problem with that is not only do they act like jerks and they get involved in teen pregnancy, traffic accidents, failure to learn, and dropping out of sports; not only do they mute their social development; many of them go on to become addicted to substances over time.

So we believe that, you know, Jim Burke from the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, can track the national attention on this issue through the news media and show that it can make a difference. That is why we put on the table what we think is a useful tool of \$175 million a year, with an equal, matching amount out of the advertising industry over 5 years to talk to children who watch 15,000 hours of television before they finish high school. I think your sense of our challenge about cynicism is a correct one.

Now, Safe and Drug-Free Schools; we put some more money in that program. If you look at the goals, Goals 1 through 5, the biggest increase in funds, percentage-wise, was Goal 1, a 21 percent increase. A little bit deceptive, because the single biggest percentage of the budget still, hands down, is law enforcement and prisons, and that is OK. But the increase, the \$800-some-odd million dollars, the largest increase went into demand reduction among children, and Safe and Drug-Free Schools was a big part of that.

We owe you, as Congress, a performance measure that allows me to come down here in future years and explain what we achieved out of spending that money. It has been inadequate in the past. The GAO went out and did a study, which I am sure was appropriate, and found that the money was not properly managed. But that program is essential. The Department of Education, we think, can manage it, and it can give us some really important outcomes.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you. On another question related to the program, several weeks ago, I had the good fortune of being up between 3 and 4 a.m., because we have a 3-week-old baby, so I got to see some of the shows and some of the public service announcements that were occurring at that time. Part of the initiative that you just referred to as a \$175 million initiative for public service announcements which would be matched by the private sector, I am curious as to whether the networks have bellied up to the bar and are going to be part of this or whether this is just \$175 million that we are turning over to the networks.

More importantly—and, again, this goes back to the cynicism I faced in my district was, oh, great; you are going to be running TV commercials. How is that going to work?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mr. BARRETT. If you would address those issues?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, we know how important advertising is, and we watch \$6 billion in the cigarette industry and a couple of billion dollars in the beer industry, and it does have an impact on

people; there is no question about it. We are the best in the world at it, and I personally watched us take the volunteer Army and go to this creative industry and help move us out of a draft environment and get the best young men and women in America to step forward and volunteer to serve in the armed forces.

So we do have confidence in it, and there is some history there. Again, Partnership for a Drug-Free America and the American Advertising Council knows a lot about this. Now, we have gone out and started consultations with the entertainment world, the news media, and advertising. We think right now they provide a little over \$2 million a year pro bono advertising, but it is coming down dramatically. It dropped 30 percent in the last few years, and the economics of the industry are causing some problems.

So my guess is they will support us; they will get involved. They are responsible people. ABC has done a tremendous program that is going to saturate the air waves in the coming months. This starts next week. I went out to Hollywood and had a very useful 2 days and challenged the TV industry and the movie industry to join us in this effort, and I think there was a very positive response, and I met with the NBC leadership.

So I think there is some confidence in what we are going to try and do.

Mr. BARRETT. OK. Thank you. Finally, one question that my colleague, Congressman Tim Holden, asked me to pose to you. You visited the Southwest Border on several occasions, and on Tuesday of this week, the chief of the Border Patrol testified before this subcommittee on the violence toward law enforcement officials and the increasing amount of illegal drugs crossing the United States-Mexican border. What technical assistance have you provided to the U.S. Border Patrol for its protection of their agents and better surveillance of illegal activities along the Southwest Border?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. The first thing I did was I sent a reconnaissance representative along the Southwest Border last March, and then I went back, and I went with Doug Kruhm, the Border Patrol Chief, and Tom Constantine, the DEA Chief, and I have been to many of the places along that border and been tutored by Customs, INS. I have been to Joint Task Force 6. I have gone and worked the intelligence problem. I have crossed the border and listened to the Mexican side of it. I have a decent grounding on what the challenge is.

We have an inadequate U.S. Federal law enforcement establishment, and we have an inadequate intelligence system focused south on the drug threat. We owe the President, by next summer, a better concept. We have got an initial one now. We have clearly got good men and women along that border.

The Border Patrol is one of the most professional law enforcement operations on the face of the earth. That is what Mexican ranchers and U.S. ranchers trust, and they are doing a tremendous job, but they are inadequately sized. They have got a five-phase strategy they have thought out, but I would argue that before we are done with this, rather than 5,700 people on the Border Patrol, we are more likely to have 20,000, and you cannot build cops like you can surge the armed forces. They have to be older. They have to get grounded. It takes 5 years to build a good cop, and we need

a Customs Agency that has high technology instead of 4,000 National Guardsmen unloading trucks of lettuce.

Now, last year, you gave us 11 mobile, x-ray machines. What a tremendous step forward. We get those out there, and we are going to start deterring drug smuggling through our 38 ports of entry.

Now, there is a lot we can do, and we need to do more. We have got some people at threat living on our border, and that is unacceptable.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. Before I pass the questions down the row here, let me just ask you, you talked about the National Guard, but the National Guard has been pretty supportive, haven't they? They have been in other areas. I know we had testimony out in California last year about what the National Guard was doing.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Thank God for the National Guard. I mean, on a given day, there are 3 or 4,000 of them in the State supporting law enforcement. Of course, they are non-Title X forces, so their flexibility is considerable. Right now, they are manning Air Force Guard ground-based radar stations in Latin America. They are flying F-16's out of Panama. They are running intel operations. They provide intelligence translators for the FBI and DEA.

If you go into the Los Angeles Police Department Deconfliction Center, there is a National Guard sergeant in there. They are in my office, so they are doing a tremendous piece of work.

Mr. HASTERT. I just did not want to leave the impression that all they did was unload lettuce, but they are doing other things.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. No. That is right.

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. General, you are in charge of our war on drugs or our efforts to stem the increase in use of illegal drugs for the country, and I think you were in January. Is that correct?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Indeed.

Mr. MICA. In January, you made statements lavishing praise on the Drug Czar of Mexico, Mr. Gutierrez, and I think you called him, "a guy of absolutely unquestioned integrity" and also gave praise for him during his appointment, I think, last December.

I am completely baffled at the lack of intelligence, the lack of information that you have as drug czar, or had as drug czar, in making those statements.

Can you tell me what the problem is?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, I think the problem is the Mexicans selected a general officer from field command, put him in a very responsible position, and then are apparently learning—we are going to watch this very carefully in the weeks to come—that he was actually part of a protection operation for one of the drug criminal organizations.

So he had developed a tremendous reputation for aggressiveness in the field, had actually made three of the biggest busts in Mexico, but possibly we are going to learn in the coming weeks—we will have to watch, of course, as evidence is laid out—possibly we will learn that he was really a tool of another criminal organization.

So Mexico made a terrible choice. They are disappointed, and our intelligence also did not pick up on that.

Mr. MICA. But you were not informed as our drug czar. You had no idea of the history or the drug connections of this individual. Is that correct?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. No. I would go beyond that. I had an incorrect opinion that he was a guy—

Mr. MICA. That just really disturbs me even more because of the importance of intelligence in the drug war.

I met this morning briefly with the chairman of the Intelligence Committee of the House of Representatives, Mr. Goss, and I asked him this morning, and I am going to followup today with a written request, for a complete investigation of the matter, because we could have, in fact, jeopardized many lives. We could have jeopardized what I consider national security in this situation.

Now, you testified a few minutes ago that you did not transmit any confidential information to Gen. Gutierrez when you met with him; and that is correct?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Right.

Mr. MICA. But it is my understanding that you also briefed the Attorney General, Lazano, in the past. Is that correct?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. That is correct.

Mr. MICA. What concerns me is I understand that all the files that Gen. Lazano—

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Attorney General Madrazo—it was actually a Madrazo visit, with Gutierrez Rebollo with him.

Mr. MICA. But on previous occasions, it is my information that the Mexican Attorney General, Lazano, had confidential information and that, in fact, those files had been turned over to Gutierrez, and that concerns me. I am concerned that, first, we do not have the intelligence, the information-gathering capability to inform our drug czar to not put you out on a limb to make statements like this.

So, I am calling for that investigation by the House Intelligence Committee, even though your agency is overlooking—I'm sorry—is looking over that—it may be overlooked, but it is a very serious situation. I want to point out a couple of things.

First of all, I do not know if you realize it, but in your report on page 53, this chart, I think, is incorrect. The chart, I think it was put in in an averse manner. If you get today's report from GAO, which has the same sources, published this report correctly, and I wish that would be changed in your report.

Furthermore, we also heard testimony here this week from Ambassador Gelbard, who is in charge of State; Tom Constantine, who is in charge of DEA; about their roles in the drug war. They said that they are having trouble with the administration taking action and getting equipment to Colombia and to Peru. In fact, we have list of some of the information that has been on a list of equipment to be provided to those countries that has not been provided.

Now, what assurance can you give me that you are coordinating efforts to get that equipment on the front line for things that had been appropriated or approved in the past—and they referred to some of this as “off the shelf,” and we have a two-page list of it—let alone, our subcommittee and Congress appropriating more funds to put up more equipment that is not getting into the war of drugs?

Gen. McCaffrey. I would be glad to look into it. The Colombia situation has been very complicated over the last year. When they were decertified, there was essentially a commitment that we would continue counterdrug cooperation in accordance with the law.

One of the, I thought, unfortunate drawbacks was that it did affect our 614 drawdown authority with Colombia and, indeed, FMF sales of equipment to Colombian police and military, and that has been a problem.

Mr. MICA. Now, 614 authority has a clear authority for waivers, and when that information was brought up by Mr. Gelbard, Ambassador Gelbard, I produced a document that showed 614 waivers that were given to Somalia, that were given to Haiti, that were given to others in the national interest. If it is not in the national interest to get this equipment into the hands with a waiver from the President of the United States, I do not know what is in the national interest.

Gen. McCaffrey. Basically, I share your viewpoint, Mr. Mica, and I think what we need to do is produce such a 614 drawdown authority and support these various courageous police and military officials in Colombia. I think you are right.

Mr. MICA. Is that going to be forthcoming? Is that a recommendation to the President?

Gen. McCaffrey. Without question.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg. The gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gen. McCaffrey, it certainly is good to see you again. I thank you for your efforts. I also want to thank you for coming to Baltimore to see firsthand a city where out of a population of 691,000, we have documented over 50,000 addicts, which means 1 out of every 14.

I guess what I am trying to figure out today, you know, I listened to the news conference the other day with the President, and I certainly applaud what the President is doing, and I think that everybody who sits up here wants to do everything in our power to help you. I guess the question always becomes, what is most cost-efficient and effective? The President said he wants to put out a certain amount of money for advertising and things of that nature.

You may have said this while I was out of the room, and if you did, I am sorry; and I am sure that is your aim, too, cost-efficient and effective. Can you tell us the basis of what went into this strategy right here, say, for example, advertisement? You have a lot of people who are sort of skeptical, saying, "Well, wait a minute. How do we know that that is going to work?"

I know that in some instances you cannot say something is definitely going to work, but I think what the American people want and I think what all of us need is to have some kind of feeling that whatever we are doing, whatever money we are putting forth, whatever efforts we are putting forth are going to likely have results that are favorable.

As I listen to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, there just seems to be some skepticism, a lot of skepticism about what we are doing. I know you have not been in office but so long, but appar-

ently a lot of research must have gone into the President's proposal the other day. I am trying to figure out exactly how you all came to the conclusions, how you came up with your priorities, and what effect you think, if all of that is carried out, will have.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. First of all, I think skepticism is appropriate, and that is a healthy way to go into this. I had to put up a strategy, define objectives, do performance measures, and then be held accountable over time to achieve results, and to throttle back on programs that do not work and increase those that do. So, I think that is entirely correct.

Having said that, I would also like to differentiate between a strategy and its funding. That is a strategy. That is based on 4,000-plus people and their input, and I read every one of them, and I have got a brilliant group of people that borrowed from models around America, people who know what they are talking about. So, I think this is pretty sensible stuff.

Now, each year, it seems to me, we have got to come down and debate the resources that go into that strategy, and then we ought to adjust them. This is not a 10-year, cookie-cutter solution, and I think we need a 5-year budget. I do not think you can have a debate over the coming budget year and see the tradeoff between a little over \$3 a head on drug prevention money per child in America and \$17 billion of law enforcement, prison construction and operations. So, I think we have got to get our headlights out a little bit farther.

Now, when you come down to something specific like advertising: Will it help? What is cost effective? It is not helpful to argue from anecdotal data instead of baseline studies. But if you go to Miami and look at the ASPIRA program, and if you have a survey instrument that tells you who children-at-risk are, and if you bus them into a high school, a 4-year high school at \$2,000 a head and get a dramatic change from kids who do not become addicted, we suggest, Mr. Taxpayer, that is \$2 million a child you saved in societal costs.

We are saying that it is a lot more cost effective than busting the young woman or man 3 years after high school and locking them up for 15 years at what we say is \$22.6 thousand a year to incarcerate a person in America, in the average Federal system.

Those are cost-effective solutions. Now, go to advertising, \$175 million times two. We want half of it for free. We know Americans spend \$49 billion a year on illegal drugs. If you can keep them off that behavior through age 21, they will not join that enormous threat to America.

I think this will work. It works on every other product. Why can't we sell young Americans on a healthy, spiritually involved, productive life?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I also want to thank you for selecting Dr. Adger. He hails from Johns Hopkins, which is, of course, in my district, and I think you made a wonderful selection. I am sure that he will add a lot to what you all are doing.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg.

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gen. McCaffrey, I want to focus on where we are allocating our dollars and our efforts and where I see differences between the priorities established by the President and the administration and those which appear to be the priorities established by the Congress.

As I look at these numbers, and I just want to see if you agree with me generally, the Congress over the past 3 years, 2 years, at least, has focused on interdiction and prevention efforts. The President, by contrast—and I include in interdiction international efforts, that is, efforts at source countries—the President, on the other hand, has focused more on drug abuse treatment. You would agree with that?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. No, I would not. I think part of the problem is how we categorize and discuss these issues. By law, we tell Congress we spend money in two areas: demand reduction and supply reduction. I think it is very distorting in its impact. Most of the money we spend in America on drug efforts are law enforcement and prisons, period.

Mr. SHADEGG. Well, let us put law enforcement and prisons aside—

Gen. MCCAFFREY. That is most of the money, and then go on to the next one. Right.

Mr. SHADEGG. Let us look at the four efforts that the chairman focused on at the beginning, which are treatment, interdiction, international efforts, and prevention. If you look at page 22 of this report, which I guess is your report, and I tend to look at the numbers, if you look first at interdiction, and you begin in 1991—

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Right.

Mr. SHADEGG [continuing]. At that point, it was 19 percent of the total. In the budget you are requesting for this year, it has dropped to 10 percent of the total. That is a 21 percent decrease in moneys dedicated to interdiction.

If you then look in the second column at prevention, an area I am interested in because I would like to see kids not get hooked in the first place, it is the second column, again beginning at 1991 as the base year and looking at the request for 1998, you see it is going from \$1,479 million to \$1,916 million. That is a slight increase, so it is a 24 percent increase for prevention as compared to a 21 percent decrease for interdiction.

But then, if you look at the line right above that, you see that from 1991 to now, there has been a dramatic increase in treatment dollars. Again, looking at the base year of 1991, we are talking about \$1,877.3 million versus your request for next year, which is \$3,000, \$3.5, a 38 percent increase.

So it appears, at least from these numbers, to me quite dramatically that the administration is continuing to emphasize treatment and, to a lesser degree, 38 percent growth in treatment dollars; a 21 percent growth in prevention dollars, which are going to the kids that I worry about; and a 21 percent decrease over that same time period in dollars allocated to interdiction.

I see a fundamental disagreement here, and I guess my question is, on what basis do you tell the American people that that is an appropriate policy and why?

Gen. McCaffrey. Well, let me, first of all, suggest that I share your concern for prevention, and at the heart and soul of the strategy, it seems to me you focus on 68 million children. You have got a subset of 39 million, age 10 and below. If you can get that 39 million through age 21, we have saved ourselves enormous agony down the line. So I basically share your viewpoint on that factor.

I also think your concern about interdiction is appropriate. How much is enough? The peak year was in 1991; you are entirely correct. It got up around \$2 billion. It dropped to a low point in about probably 1993. We are now building it back up to where it is around \$1.6 billion, and I would certainly be open to further discussion on whether that is enough.

DOD has got a very tight budget, and they are reluctant to throw money at Aegis cruisers in the Caribbean and AWACS flying hours unless we can see a payoff.

Mr. SHADEGG. Well, my home State is Arizona, and I am worried about the border with Arizona and the developments in the press lately. So, I am not so concerned about aircraft carriers as I am doing something about a very serious threat immediately south of the United States.

Gen. McCaffrey. We put a ton of money into the Southwest Border in the 1997 budget. There is more of it in the 1998 budget, and your point is entirely correct. We owe the American people a Southwest Border effort with the appropriate law enforcement capabilities and intelligence.

Mr. SHADEGG. Let me go at this percentage, at this issue of what the low point was. Again, looking at that chart on page 22, at least as a proportion of our total effort, you can argue that we hit a low point in 1995. It actually climbed slightly last year. In 1995, it became 10 percent of the effort. In 1991, it was 19 percent of our effort. It climbed last year to 11 percent, a slight increase; but the numbers you have requested would take interdiction back down to only 10 percent of our effort. Again, just a slight decrease—

Gen. McCaffrey. Yes.

Mr. SHADEGG [continuing]. But it looks to me like the low point, the world is kind of at the low point on interdiction.

Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I think what you can also say, and I have got a chart here to display it, we have had interdiction and the source country strategy money going up since 1993.

Mr. SHADEGG. It did get dramatically cut prior to that.

Gen. McCaffrey. But you are talking a percentage of the whole effort. Right now, at \$1.6 billion, that is an increase. It was an increase last year. It was an increase the year before that. So the 3 years in a row, we brought it up; and at the Southwest Border, more specifically, there has been a dramatic change in manpower, technology, and funding, and there ought to be more to come.

Mr. SHADEGG. I guess let me just conclude by saying, if you look at, at least for the last 3 years in a row, the Congress has put more money into interdiction than the President requested, and I do not think we are only at this level of 10 percent interdiction right now not because of the President's request, but because of the Congress's request.

Indeed, look at the younger drug potential abusers, focusing on youth, Congress for the last 3 years has increased money for inter-

diction and for the last year has increased money for both source countries, and for prevention. By contrast, the President has tried to put more money into treatment, and I guess, again—and I know my time has expired—I am interested in the President justifying and you justifying to the country why we ought to be——

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mr. SHADEGG [continuing]. Increasing our allocation for treatment as distinguished from those efforts which I think focus on youth, which include interdiction, source country efforts, and prevention.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. The search for the truth and who submitted what budget and what action was taken is a tough one. Let me tell you what I think is the case, and I have got a chart that I can share with you to display it.

What, in fact, has happened since 1991, I will assert, is that each year until the 1995 budget, the administration, whether it was Republican under Bush or Democratic under President Clinton, submitted an interdiction-INL combined budget. In every year, it was cut by the U.S. Congress, whether it was controlled by the Democrats or the Republicans, until the election-year budget.

In fact, that is what happened. Then we started up in the election-year budget, on the 1997 budget, and on the proposed 1998 budget. So, I would suggest to you that the President's requests for 3 years in a row was what we got funded. We got an additional \$250 million out of you this last year, which was great. Let me just, if I can, show you the numbers.

Mr. SHADEGG. No. My time has expired. If you just said that only in the election year did the Congress increase funding for interdiction, that is flat not true, because the Congress——

Mr. SOUDER [presiding]. We will come back to a second round. We can follow this up in the second round if there was a questionable statement in that, because the budget that we had to deal with in our first year was already through when we got in.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. I agree. Agreed.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barr, from Georgia.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Mr. Congressmen, I still basically agree with your point. Prevention, Southwest Border; I am entirely in agreement with your central argument. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barr, from Georgia.

Mr. BARR. I just do not know where to start, General. You all are masters of understatement, I will tell you that. We had a Deputy Assistant Attorney General here 2 days ago, who says that the extent of corruption in Mexico is not fully known. Now we hear that our intelligence did not pick up on this problem. What an understatement.

I think we have got some serious problems here, but let me try and start with this document. I hope you all do not distribute this to the officers who are putting their lives on the line fighting the war against drugs, the Spanish word for which is "guerra."

It was used the other day, General, up here by generals from Colombia who are, indeed, fighting a war, a war in which their citizens are being murdered; in which their military and police are being murdered; in which equipment built in this country and furnished to them to protect themselves is being shot out of the skies.

We had an officer here from, I think, the Border Patrol the other day who was telling us about men and women under his command that are being shot. Where, in heaven's name—and I would like to know who, on page 5 of your report, says that this is not a war—where in God's name did that notion come from and that language? Is that yours? That is unbelievable, General, to talk in this report that a metaphor of a war on drugs is misleading.

Maybe it is only misleading because it is not strong enough to send a signal to the American people and to law enforcement officers, both on our side of the border as well as in Latin America that people affected by drug abuse in this country are victims and ought to be helped, that this is not a war on drugs, that that is too harsh a term, it is not hard to understand why I think this administration's drug policy is an abject failure.

I do not think that the figures that we are seeing are artificially high. When I talk with police officers and parents and school children about the extent of drug usage, which is going up among young people in many categories, I do not walk away from those discussions, General, that these figures are artificially high. I think they are very accurate, and if perhaps anything, perhaps not quite accurate enough in terms of the tremendous increases that we have seen in some areas.

We have heard other testimony, General, earlier this week and 2 weeks ago from Mr. Gelbard over at State. State apparently does not even recognize that in Colombia there is a union between the formerly terrorist organizations and the narcotics traffickers, and, indeed, the term "narco-terrorism" is a very realistic term.

We see in Mexico a case very much like the Ames case in our country here, where all of the signs were there for an extended period of time that something stank—bank accounts, lavish living, and so forth—and we apparently either just turned a blind eye to it in an effort to make it appear as if Mexico was really doing a lot more than it was perhaps to justify loaning them billions of dollars. I do not know, but all of the signs were there, and then to say our intelligence did not pick up on this problem is a rather slight understatement.

You mentioned, General, that you had traveled to Hollywood for 2 days, and that is certainly a component of this, to talk with the people out there about the glorification of drugs in our society. I would like to see some of our people travel down to Colombia instead. It may not be quite as nice as Hollywood; it may be a little more dangerous.

But we have heard from the men and women who do believe that this is a war, and I think they are accurate in their assessment, who put their lives on the line. We have heard from them, and they have told us that we are not helping them nearly to the extent that we should or that we have promised them.

Colombia, in particular, I am talking about. The decertification of Mexico, contrary to what our Government leaders told the Colombian leaders, the men and women in the military and in the police are, indeed, fighting the war against drugs down there. Contrary to what we told them, the military assistance, the support has, indeed, slowed down tremendously, and they have told us it is hurting, hurting their effort, both systemically in terms of ero-

sion of their morale of their officers, as well as their ability to actually fight the war on drugs.

I have a letter here, dated February 25 of this year, from the Colombian national police general, Gen. Serrano, to the House International Relations Committee. I do not know whether you have seen it, but I suspect you know what it says, and that is that we are not helping them to the extent that we can or that we promised.

I am just phenomenally disappointed in what is going on here. I think we have an absolute failure of leadership on the part of our Government, and this business with Mexico is just one little example of it. We apparently have not only no strategy in dealing with this problem, but we have members of our own Government, and we had several of them here the other day, they do not even know who is on the damage assessment team.

I would appreciate some thoughts. I know there is a lot in there, but it is very heartfelt, and it represents the views of an awful lot of citizens in this country who, I think, would be as disappointed as I am if they saw this book.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, Mr. Barr, if I may, let me, first of all, tell you, I share your own sense of sadness about the way Mexico has developed over the last certainly several years. It is a great tragedy. It is something that we probably have to work with for a decade to come to address.

I certainly share your viewpoint on the nature of warfare in the source country zone: Colombia; Peru; Bolivia, to a lesser extent; Mexico, certainly. I must remind you, if I may, quite publicly now, you are dealing with a guy that has been wounded in combat three times. I know all about war.

Mr. BARR. Let us not get into that. Nobody is questioning your patriotism, and I am not saying that it is just a war down there; I am saying that it—

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, regular order.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Yes. Mr. Barr, I just wanted to make sure you understood that I have been in Colombia, I have been in Mexico, I have been in Peru, and I do know what I am talking about. Now, the problem in Mexico and Peru deserves our support, but I am not too sure that you and I ought to see ourselves as personally responsible for the outcome of selection of their government officials.

Now, let me, if I may, directly respond to your concerns. I might add, you misunderstood something I said. The figures that are artificially high means we do not need to tolerate drug abuse rates at the level we currently have. Twelve million Americans regularly using drugs is too many, and we can make it lower than that. That is what I mean by "artificially high." I am well aware, having been in most urban areas in America and in rural, Midwest communities, that those figures are accurate and, indeed, are getting worse.

I would also suggest I join your own viewpoint that police and military forces in Colombia and elsewhere deserve our support, and they will get it from me, and they have had it in the past. I know these people, and I visited them, and understand what their concerns are, and will fall in line to try and move them forward.

Now, Mexico is in a very tough situation. They are under internal assault from violence and corruption. That \$30 billion came out of our communities. That is what is helping destroy Mexico.

They are trying to move to a modern economy, to a multiparty democracy. We believe their senior leadership are honest men and women. We were wrong about Gen. Gutierrez Rebollo. There are others we will see in the future who will be affected by this corruption, but where we find people of good will, we deserve to stand with them and to publicly state we have that viewpoint.

Now, finally, if you will, we may just have a difference of conceptual organization. The language on not using the "war on drugs" comes directly from me. Now, I borrowed that basically from having a 32-year involvement in the U.S. Armed Forces in which we went through the seventies where the armed forces almost got wrecked by drug abuse, and we worked our way out of it, and I can assure you it was not by arresting people and kicking butt.

We tried to use drug education prevention programs. We focused on treatment programs. We had an advantage over civil society of sergeants, of people who got involved with young people and treated them with dignity and gave them meaningful work. Because of that and drug testing and the commitment of people like me, after 10 years of hard work, we are a drug-free institution today, and that is the kind of commitment I would like to bring to America.

So if you are concerned about the metaphor of a cancer, we will try and make sure your worries are taken into account. I know you are committed to this issue, as I am, but I really would urge you to understand that this is not a cop-out; this is a dedication of a 10-year confrontation with a serious issue.

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman's time has expired.

General, I think one of the things, we are getting in a war over words, and we need to have a war over action, I would think. To me, a war is something ultimately that you win or lose, and I hope whatever this action is, it is something that we can win. Our country depends on it, our children depend on it, and certainly our future depends on it.

I just want to lay out some parameters, and I am going to have to vacate the chair here in a few minutes. But I want to lay some parameters that I think concerns us and certainly reflects my views and the views of a lot of people that you and I have both talked to.

We look at your chart here, the chart of the National Drug Control Budget, and I know the budget does not always reflect exactly all the activity that goes on because there is resources that are already in place, resources that we have to replace, resources that have built up over the years. So there are other activities going on.

But certainly the domestic law enforcement, which includes DEA and FBI and INS and the joint task force and Justice and everybody else, you know, those are the people who are out on our streets day in and day out fighting that war or that action, whatever kind of terminology you want to call it. I cannot say that it is enough or not enough. We need to make sure that they have that support and the means to carry out the job they have to do.

The next issue of treatment. I guess that is where the real question is, and I have talked to a lot of folks across this country. Treat-

ment is important. We need to take those people who have made mistakes and have gotten involved in drugs and try to turn their life around. The fact is, at least most statistics of people tell me, about 80 percent of those people go back to using drugs again.

Maybe that means we need a better program, we need to find new ways to do that, but to a lot of folks it means that it is important to do this, and it is certainly important to try to help people who have made mistakes, but we have spent a lot of money sometimes to no avail there.

The other issue is the interdiction issue, and we look at real numbers there. For instance, the treatment has gone from about, I believe, \$1.8 billion a couple of years ago to about \$3 billion in your budget today; and, again, you cannot reflect everything by dollars, but there has been a pretty good increase there.

When you start to look at interdiction, we have gone to a high in the early 1990's of \$2 billion to a low of \$1.2 billion, and now we are coming back up to about \$1.6 billion. We have never reached the level that we were at one time.

To a lot of us, the interdiction is being able to take that stuff off the streets, to stop it at the borders, to stop it coming in by boat or by plane or by carrier. Or the x-ray machines that we need at the border. We talk about 11 x-ray machines. We probably need 111 x-ray machines. I do not know. I am just pulling numbers out of the air, but, you know, we need a lot of stuff to be able to do the interdiction.

We need the people to do it, and that is an area that I think if we can stop drugs coming across the border at a cost of \$2,000 a kilo before they get on the streets and they cost \$200,000 per kilo or at some market price or whatever numbers you want to pull out, that is an effective way to do it. But even more so, when you get down to the international operations, you talked about Peru. I think that we have the potential to be very, very successful there. We need to talk—and we have not even scratched the surface—we need to talk about what we are going to do in Southeast Asia.

Quite frankly, because we do not have the kind of relationships diplomatically with some countries like Minmar and China, that we cannot get our DEA agents or will not let our DEA agents or our intelligence in there to help them solve their problems or crop replacement situations, we need to have, and I think you agree with us, a regional strategy there that we really seriously need to talk about, because cocaine is one thing; heroin is something else.

Now, heroin comes from Colombia, but also a lot of it comes from the Golden Triangle and the environs around there. We need to talk about that, and I do not think we have even scratched the surface.

That is all part of that international effort that I think we need to beef up and put the dollars in so we can stop the stuff, for instance, cocaine, at \$200 a kilo. It is certainly pretty effective to stop it at that price rather than to stop it at a huge price on our streets. If you would, take a couple of minutes and kind of reflect on that, if you would.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. The support for law enforcement is absolutely essential. This budget has gone up. It is an \$800 million increase. It still reflects the dominant commitment to saying that drugs are

wrong, drugs are disapproved, they are against the law, and we will support law enforcement, and we will lock people up where they sell them or become involved in violent crime. We ought to do that. We ought to pay the bill up front. That is not an option; that is an obligation to the American people.

Now, let me talk briefly about treatment. If you would like to understand the contribution of effective drug treatment in America, you have to go ask a narcotics officer in Los Angeles, New York, rural Iowa, or wherever, because there is not a police officer in this country or someone involved in the American Correctional Association that does not understand that we cannot just lock people up, put them in the slammer for a month to 7 years, and put them back on the street.

We also have got to take into account this is a chronic, relapsing disorder. Cures, like smoking addiction, do not come easy, but it is relatively easy, if you have a treatment methodology and a follow-on program, to reduce the consequences of crime, violence, AIDS, spouse abuse in America. I would just tell you that there is a tiny number of Americans, percentage-wise, who are devastating our society, 2.7 million chronic addicted; and they consume 80 percent, some argue, two-thirds to 80 percent, of the drugs in America. You have got to go into that community.

Some of them are alleged to be committing crimes of as high as 300 felonies a year. So, when I talk to police officers, they are the ones that talk to me about treatment alternatives to crime. I think we have just got to go that route. We have got to make sure we are spending our money wisely. I think your point is a good one.

I think the notion of getting enough interdiction is unarguable. We have got to get technology and common sense and better organization into our Southwest Border. We have got to create the Customs, Border Patrol, and Coast Guard that we need for the next century, and INS. We have got to get better organization of our intelligence service, and I owe you continuing responses on that.

Peru, we need a big idea. If we want to do something dramatic about cocaine, Peru is the place to go, even though Colombia has now edged out Bolivia as the second largest nation in the world on hectareage under cultivation. Cocaine seizures in Colombia are down, and cultivation is up by 32 percent, but Peru is where 70-some-odd percent of the cocaine in America comes from.

I think one of the really fundamental points you made, Mr. Chairman, is what do we do about heroin? If you want to solve heroin, you have got to recognize we have such a low part of the worldwide consumption, that Colombia alone and Mexico could provide all of our requirements. Then we look at this incredible production of opium in Burma, Afghanistan, and Laos, which are the top three nations in the world, and what are we going to do about it?

I think you are entirely correct. Your trip over there was very useful. We are going to have to try regional cooperative efforts and not think that we can do this, the United States, unilaterally. The Chinese must understand that they are more at risk from Burmese heroin than Baltimore is. They have got a million addicts or more, and it is a threat to our Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Thai, and other regional partners.

What I would also, though, remind all of us is we look at what comes in and out of this great country, the richest country on the face of the earth. It is 340 metric tons of cocaine, 10 metric tons of heroin. It is at most a millionth of the annual movement of tonnage in and out of this Nation. It is a tiny BB hidden in a bale of hay, and we are just going to have to do better with technology and intelligence, not manpower. There is a pretty important BB in that bale of hay, and we are going to have to work together if we are going to be able to find it; whether it is a needle in a haystack or a BB in a bale, we need to work at that.

One other comment on that. I understand that there are 2.7 million people who are the problems and the recidivists in the treatment programs. I hope that we can help them. We have also got 10 million kids at risk that we need to make sure that they cannot get their hands on this stuff or it is awfully tough to get their hands on this stuff.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank you for your testimony. I pass on now to Congressman Barrett.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. Only a small percentage of the baggage going on airplanes are guns and bombs, so we have to get them all. It is not easy and it is expensive and that is one of the problems we have when we are trying to balance the budget.

I am curious. You were commander of SOUTHCOM in Panama. Did you ever know Gen. Gutierrez in that capacity?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. No, I did not. I made one trip into Mexico during that period of time with Dr. Perry, but Mexico is not part of the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

Mr. SOUDER. Had you ever heard anything about him prior when you were in that command? I understand that it is not completely logical, in my opinion, that it is not a part of SOUTHCOM, but that is another question. Had you ever heard anything about him or concerns or—

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, before we went down to Mexico, I think we went down and met him on a high-level contact group in December. Before we went down there, I had an intelligence briefing on our viewpoint, again, on the Mexican leadership I would be dealing with, and that certainly included the Attorney General, Madrazo, and Gen. Gutierrez Rebollo. So I went down there, having read our assessment of these two people.

Mr. SOUDER. Our assessment at that time was positive?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Indeed. Our publicly stated opinion essentially reflected what we said in private, and we retain our viewpoint that the Attorney General, Madrazo, is a noted legal scholar, a human rights activist, a man of high integrity and dedication to Mexico. The assessment on Gutierrez Rebollo, based sadly enough, on his splendid performance against selected drug criminal organizations, was that he was a real hard-nosed field soldier. It was sadly mistaken. The Mexicans, of course, are horrendously disappointed by this blow to their own national security.

Mr. SOUDER. One other curiosity. You mentioned twice earlier in your testimony to it being alleged and saying facts will unfold, which we all understand, except it does not seem to be being denied that he was in Fuentes's apartment. There are some facts that

are in dispute and some facts that are pretty irrevocable already on the table. Would you not agree with that?

Gen. McCaffrey. I am not trying to be legalistic, Mr. Souder. You know, what I need to understand is that in Colombia—I already know that the President of Colombia is alleged to have been elected with \$6 million in drug money; that the Minister of Defense that I dealt with down there, Botero, is in the slammer; that several others—Medina, the campaign chairman—are under indictment. I am aware of the corrosive power of \$30 billion of drug money on democratic institutions.

So what we are going to try to do in Mexico is try and support this President and his senior officers as they roll up this latest corrupting influence to their police forces, but we have got to keep a very objective eye on what is happening.

Mr. Souder. Our concern, and just so you understand that it is intense in Congress right now, and if you were in our shoes, you would understand it as well as in your own shoes, and that is, is that I am not one who is particularly defending Colombia at this point other than that their Attorney General and their national police and their defense are dying on the front lines, and they could have been removed by Samper. I think we need to keep the pressure on Colombia because they are letting these people sit in prison and operate their cartels, but they are moving.

The question, however, comes when we come back to Mexico is that we heard at the hearing earlier this week that there are concerns about up to 90 percent of the police force in Tijuana and Baja California, and we pulled back agents; that there are concerns about two of the Governors of Mexico; that we have the drug czar going down, apparently as part of a cartel; we have seen assassinations all over the country; one of the Governors, if, indeed—and I do not know enough about it, and the evidence here is still sketchy on the Governor, Sonora, but he is clearly the man, if not one of the key men, behind President Zedillo's election, which has not come out as much in the media; that the core question here is, on what basis, other than we met with President Zedillo, we have met with the foreign minister numerous times.

I think they are wonderful men, but quite frankly, you thought all these other people were good men. Our intelligence briefings said they were good men. Gen. Gutierrez, for example. There were others in the process that we dealt with in that period of time who turned out—I mean, we have touted the Salinas administration, which certainly had a lot of questions with it.

Gen. McCaffrey. Yes.

Mr. Souder. Colosio is dead. That we are looking at this type of thing and saying, we want to believe you, we want to believe them, but you are telling us that our intelligence is lousy, if it exists at all.

Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I really did not say that, Mr. Souder. I said our intelligence was wrong and confirming that the Mexicans had made a drastic mistake in selecting this general officer as their head cop.

Mr. Souder. One of the questions here is that we seem to be getting surprised a lot lately.

Gen. McCaffrey. Well, let me also tell you that there ought to be a twofold approach, in my judgment, in dealing with foreign governments like the French, the Israelis, the Mexicans, and the Canadians. In public, I think what I ought to do is publicly state those ethically correct ways that we are working with a foreign government and praise their leadership where we see honest men and women in public life, and privately we ought to push to make changes.

That is what we do with other major nations, and that is what we have done with Mexico. But I would urge you to understand that we focus a lot of attention on these countries, and we have got people all over them. I listen to the DEA, the FBI, the agency military attaches. I have traveled there. I know these people. I do not have a three-piece suit. I have spent most of my life banging around the world. I speak Spanish, and I am not naive. I am committed to defending the American people.

Mr. Souder. One of the concerns I have, that in your report you say that, or you testified earlier today, that we should be looking at a new concept for enforcement in intelligence by next summer. Did you mean the summer of next year or the summer of this year? Wouldn't you, having been a veteran in the Gulf war, if you had gotten this kind of intelligence information, heads would have been rolling already?

Well, we can argue whether it is a war or a cancer; I think it is both.

Gen. McCaffrey. Yes.

Mr. Souder [presiding]. But this is pretty upsetting.

Gen. McCaffrey. Well, it should be. I think we have got tremendous law enforcement agencies at work in the Southwest Border and supporting Mexico right now. They probably need much better conceptual structure to it. I think our intelligence system facing south can be reviewed.

Now, I would not want to say that it is a failure. I have been working with the Agency for the last 4 years, looking south, in DIA and DEA and the other people that try and pay attention to our southern neighbors. We know a lot more, sadly enough, about criminal activity in the Chapare Valley than we do about drug addiction in Baltimore.

So I think that there is a lot of very capable, dedicated, and stable view of what is going on to the south. I do not think we ought to overreact. We made a mistake in accepting the judgment of the Mexican administration, but they are doing as good as they can. We are just going to have to buckle down and do better.

Mr. Souder. Well, with that set up for Baltimore, we will go to the gentleman, Mr. Cummings, from Maryland.

Mr. Cummings. Thank you. Gen. McCaffrey, you said something a few moments ago that really kind of struck my interest in answering a question. You talked about the military and the efforts that have been made in the military to rid this institution, that is, the military here in the United States, of a drug problem.

Just from the way you answered the question, I take it that there are some strategies that were used to accomplish that that you assume can be used in the bigger picture, and I am just trying

to figure out how did the military do it. I guess when I look at the military, I look at an institution that is sort of restricted.

In other words, when you are talking about the greater society, you have got people everywhere, but when you have got military bases, you have got certain controls there; and I am just trying to figure out how it was done, and of those strategies what can be used to address this problem that we have in the United States all over our country?

Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Congressman, I think it is a legitimate question. It is one I am somewhat uneasy sometimes to answer because I am keenly aware that the tools that the U.S. Marine Corps uses or the 82d Airborne are not necessarily appropriate for a free and open society with a fundamental commitment to rights to privacy and due process and, indeed, a sense of leave us alone.

Now, having said that, the best thing we can learn out of the military's experience in the seventies and eighties is these are the same beautiful, young women and men that are in Baltimore that are in the 82d Airborne and on ships at sea.

So I came into this position with a sense of optimism and a faith in American young people, and I think that when they have options and are treated with respect, when they have meaningful work to do, when people say "zero tolerance for drugs" and set the example, not people that say—like 72 million Americans who have used an illegal drug—not people who say we have never used drugs, but we are not going to use them anymore. But if you stay at that process for a long time—in this case it was probably a decade—you end up with a lot less drug use.

Now, because of the military and we had the drug testing system, we ended up with darn-near zero. Now, that may be unrealistic, zero. We have still got an alcohol abuse problem of significant proportions in the armed forces. We have got too many people smoking cigarettes, but we have done an incredible piece of work. So has the New York City Police Department. So have the faculties of a lot of colleges. So has a lot of big business. There is a zero tolerance for drug abuse in most of large, corporate America.

I am not persuaded that sensible drug prevention and education programs cannot produce dramatic results over time. I believe they can.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am sure you are familiar with this concept of—I forget the author's name, this guy that wrote "Fixing Broken Windows," talking about zero tolerance and his philosophy that you have to start with the petty offenses and be hard on the petty offenders so that problems do not increase and escalate. I assume that you have contact with police departments all over the country, and you just talked about zero tolerance.

Do you agree with that concept of fixing broken windows?

Gen. McCaffrey. I have been fascinated with watching the incredible success in Miami, San Diego, Los Angeles, New York City, Commissioner Safir and his people. It is simply awesome what U.S. law enforcement is doing now on their own, to a large extent, with community policing, with getting in there and getting involved with measuring the right things. The New York Police Department does not measure the number of arrests. They do not measure the number of kilograms of drugs seized. They measure and hold their pre-

cinct captains now responsible for the reduction of crime that wrecks the quality of life in New York City. It has taken them 5 years, and they are achieving incredible results.

I see it in other cities. Miami is probably half as bad off as it was a decade ago. So I think community policing is a big contribution. We can do more to support their efforts. This High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program that Congress has now put \$140 million into; we have 15 HIDTAs. You just designated five new ones in the last budget. This is a contribution to America's law enforcement, prosecution, treatment, sensible policy, so I think there is some real progress.

Mr. CUMMINGS. There was a show on last night, one of the national shows, that was talking about we are spending so many dollars incarcerating such a large portion of our population and that as we spend those dollars incarcerating people—and they showed a parallel how money is being taken away from schools, from educating young children.

When I look at the charts and I look at the money that we are spending with regard to domestic law enforcement, it just kind of concerns me that some kind of way we have got to get to that small population that you talked about a few minutes ago that are using the drugs, committing the crimes, filling up our jails, and literally taking dollars away from our children.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Sure.

Mr. CUMMINGS. It is sad.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. I might add, though, that at that point you have lost. When you are dealing with 2.7 million chronic-addicted Americans, it is a painful situation at best. We can reduce the damage they do to themselves or families and their communities, but it is not an easy way out. It seems to me the investment up front in understanding, the solution is parents, educators, ministers, coaches, local law enforcement, and positive options for young Americans. That is the cheapest way to address a \$70 billion damage to American society out of drug addiction.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. I also want to make a brief comment, an invitation to work together. One of the things that we have done is formed a new Empowerment Subcommittee that I am going to be chairing to work on a number of these issues, because in addition to the drug problem, we have to look at the economic development, the school, the juvenile justice questions, and I would welcome you sitting in and helping us as we go through—

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I accept your invitation. I will do that.

Mr. SOUDER. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Could one of you gentlemen put the chart up that refers to cocaine casual use?

Mr. Drug Czar, I hate to criticize your report and your charts, but I think that your report is trying to put a pretty face on some pretty ugly statistics. To put that chart in there with that title is a little bit offensive to me, for several reasons. Next to it, it shows the dramatic increase by our youth of cocaine, and I looked through the charts to see about heroin, which is, as you know, and you have been in my community, heroin use is off the charts.

I submit to you that cocaine use is down because heroin is so damned cheap you can buy it almost as cheaply as cocaine and that it is becoming more available. The production in your statistics show that it is available, so I am not pleased with the presentation that shows our drug policy is working, casual use is down. If it is down and so great, we look at every statistic, cocaine has flattened out a bit, heroin coming off the charts, and marijuana, according to your charts, is increasing.

So I think that you have given us an accurate portrayal of what is happening with these charts.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, I am not quite sure that I follow your point. In fact, cocaine use is down. It is really unarguable. It has gone from a little under 6 million—

Mr. MICA. It is being supplanted by heroin.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. No, probably not.

Mr. MICA. Well, in my community they are dying—

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, let me, if I may, give you—

Mr. MICA [continuing]. In middle-class suburbs on the streets.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, let me give you what we think is the case. What I will also grant you, though, is that our numbers, which I use with great confidence, are just the best numbers I can get, and they are subject to debate, and we owe you better statistics in the future.

But having said that, heroin use in America, the problem is there is a lot more of it available, it is higher purity, it is lower cost, and new populations are trying it, young people, a lot of young, white Americans in suburbs, with a tremendous increase in the number of folk getting in trouble because they are using such high-purity stuff.

But heroin use so far, thank God, has not yet gone off the charts. It probably will if we do not get organized. Now, your area, which I was grateful to visit and listen to their problems, has had nine youngsters die of heroin overdose in the last year, greater than the city of Los Angeles. You are in the absolute center of the storm of Colombian heroin, which is showing up on the Eastern seaboard, aggressively marketed by the same criminal organization that is pushing cocaine.

Mr. MICA. Again, the charts, we can produce these charts, but it is the perception, too; and I am telling you that Americans fear going to sleep at night in their own neighborhoods. I live part of the time in Washington, DC, and I fear going to sleep in this community for the first time, and in central Florida. Your statistics, to me, just do not jibe.

There are encouraging signs. The last 5 years, drug-related emergency department episodes did not rise significantly, and then you still show a rise here on drug users burdening our system. There is a steady decline in drug-related homicides between 1989 and 1995. If you take out New York City and some of the other places where there have been some local efforts, it is still a disaster.

Washington, DC—399 people killed last year. Last night, they blew away a couple of more, and there is a couple, I saw on the news this morning, in critical condition. It is everywhere; it is not just my community.

Federal drug prosecutions; I do not see a damn thing about them in here. Excuse my language, but I get a little bit excited about it. Federal drug prosecutions are down, and I do not see this as part of the strategy.

Now, if you said that New York City, one of the reasons is zero tolerance, if you said that for 10 years if you have a zero-tolerance policy in your chart—we do not see the rest of this chart, but if you look at the statistics for 10 years under the past administrations, it was going down, down, down, and comes off the chart in 1993—tough prosecution does work, and the Federal prosecution is diminishing.

Gen. McCaffrey. Well, you know, what I think of your frustration on the terrible impact of 3.6 million addicts on Orlando, Florida and rural Iowa, and Missouri, I could not agree more. There are more people sick, and their age rate is up, and violent crime is disastrous.

Mr. MICA. Methamphetamine is rampant. One of your charts shows that. They are in the little communities.

Gen. McCaffrey. We have tried to portray that. I could not agree more.

Mr. MICA. One last point, and let me say a couple of things. First of all, you mentioned that we do not have a border between Mexico and the United States. Well, I tell you, when they murdered Enrique Camarena, we had a border between the United States, and we had some leadership from the Federal level, and we closed down that border. If it is necessary and a policy of the United States, we should close down and tighten that border, and a lot is going to depend on what you all do in the next few hours, as far as your policy toward certification.

You go back and see what Willie Von Robb did in closing down the borders and tightening up. So it is part of the national policy.

The other thing, too, is I salute your education. You know I will spend any amount of money we need for enforcement, education, for treatment, as long as it is successful. But I ask you, the \$180 million or \$175 million you have put in for public advertising; who owns the air waves in this country?

Gen. McCaffrey. Right now, if you want to buy TV time—

Mr. MICA. Who owns the air waves? Who issues the licenses? In your own report here, you give us information that public service announcements have dropped 20 percent. In fact, the people own the air waves. A license and franchise is given by the Federal Government, and up until a few years ago, the media, in fact, television and radio, who take a license and franchise from the people, were giving free PSAs back in the 1980's, and that has dramatically declined.

I submit that they should also be given this public franchise back, and if necessary, we should have a requirement that they participate in this because it is in the national interest—they hold the public franchise—and not rip off the taxpayers in this manner.

Mr. Souder. I wanted to make a brief comment on this chart, too. What we see often is typical of a lot of different things, and that is, is that middle- and upper-class people adjust when they see the harm and when we start a crusade. To some degree, that is

what has happened in cocaine, the kids in the crack, the methamphetamine.

In Fort Wayne, in 1992, we had 39 hits of LSD taken. In 1994, 9,790 hits of LSD. It is the most vulnerable, least educated, and the poorest who are getting left behind, and the only point I think we are trying to make with this is while we need to say we are pleased with some of the success, we cannot beat our chests too much, because we are drowning in the highest risk areas.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. That chart is meant to say exactly what it says: Drug use in America is down by half. Cocaine use is down by 75 percent, and new, dynamic drug threats are emerging, including methamphetamine. Our children and the addicted of America are destroying our cities, our communities, and our work places. It is a very serious problem. It is \$70 billion and 16,000 dead, and that is why I am over here.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barrett from Wisconsin.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the chairman that we should not be beating our chests, but I also do not think we should be beating you over the head, General.

I think that you have done a very good job today. I think that you have been very honest, you have showed us where there are problems. You have not tried to sugar coat anything. You have explained to us that this is a serious problem, and as I said in my opening statement, I think you have one of the most difficult jobs in this entire country.

If you ask the American people whether drug abuse is a Democratic problem or a Republican problem, they would say, "We do not care; it is an American problem."

Gen. MCCAFFREY. I agree.

Mr. BARRETT. I think it is a serious mistake for us, if we decide, well, just because the Democrats are in the White House and you were appointed by a Democratic President, that somehow we are not winning the war or the cancer battle or whatever you want to call it. This is too serious a problem to just play politics with, and we can have some legitimate differences of opinion, and we do have some legitimate differences of opinion as to priorities pertaining to treatment, to prevention, or interdiction, or how many dollars we should put into police officers or prisons.

But I think that this, more than virtually any other issue, is an issue where we have to work together. I think that you have provided the leadership on a very nonpartisan basis, which I think it has to be. I would not want you in here being a Democratic hack. I think that would be a huge mistake, but I again want to commend you for the job that I think you are doing; and I do not want your job, because I think it is too hard a job.

I think it is far too hard a job, and as I also indicated in my opening statement, Americans are very cynical about this battle because they have not seen the drug use, and they have seen people whose lives have been ruined. So I think that we have to combat the cynicism, and I do not think that we as an institution should be increasing that cynicism.

So, again, congratulations, and anything I can do to help you, I will do to help you.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barr of Georgia.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. General, I would suspect that you and I would speak for probably everybody in this room and everybody in the listening and viewing audience that we do not want kids to smoke cigarettes. But the problem that I have—and you all's strategy is replete with references of drugs, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, tobacco, alcohol—and I think I understand perhaps at least what you are trying to say, and that is that, to some extent, perhaps behavior that is bad at the beginning becomes worse as kids get older. They use tobacco and they know they are not supposed to and it just gets worse.

That is a good point. I disagree with making that point in a way that—and this is the danger that I think linking those three really will result in. Young people do not see these things as rationally as we do, and if we, as the administration is doing, are putting out a strategy that links these three things constantly, and I have heard the President say it also—he is very adept at that; he will get two or three words, like the business we had last year with the balanced budget, the environment, children, and elderly, and he just repeats it, and that is the message that gets out there.

The thing that I worry about is if we constantly keep talking about drugs, tobacco, and alcohol, we are not going to raise the level of seriousness and the kids' perception of how serious tobacco use is, we are going to lower their perception of how dangerous illicit drugs are.

To my way of thinking, and we have heard from some of the law enforcement officials from both sides of the border here during the past couple of weeks, the problem is not tobacco usage. There are no tobacco traffickers out there that are killing people, that are shooting the helicopters out of the sky and so forth. It is drugs; that is where the immediate problem and crisis is.

I just think it can be somewhat self-defeating to link these three because there are a lot of people that are going to see that different from the way you and I see it. They are going to say, "Ah, ha, illicit drugs are no worse than tobacco." I know that is not what you are trying to say, but I would caution again, in setting out a strategy, because this is what the President talks about. He does that, and a lot of, I think, young people are going to see that, and I think it can be problematic.

With regard to, if I could, a couple of specific questions, we have talked, and a number of Members have talked this morning and this afternoon, about the problem with Gen. Gutierrez. Are you aware of any intelligence that was coming into our Government that indicated there was a problem with this man?

Gen. McCaffrey. Let me, if I may, address your point on smoking cigarettes and alcohol and say that I got your concern. What I can promise you is that my own focus ought to be in accordance with the 1988 law that Congress passed that told me what the Agency should focus on, and that does not include the responsible use of alcohol or smoking cigarettes by people over 21 and 18, respectively. So that will not be part of our focus, even though I am aware, as you are, as rational Americans, that we killed 440,000 people with cigarettes last year and 100,000 with alcohol.

But I agree, I basically ought to stay on my portfolio, and that is off the table. Alcohol is a mildly addictive drug. Most Americans do not have a problem with it. It is unfortunate that it has produced 10 to 18 million alcoholics in the Nation, hands down the worst drug problem we face. It is not my responsibility, and I am not going to do it.

Now, to get back to the responsibility I do have, though, on Goal No. 1, which is to America's youth to reject drug abuse, alcohol, and tobacco, those are illegal activities; they are against the law. If you look back over the history of this Agency, starting in 1989, with the Bush administration, they clearly got the point that if you smoke cigarettes, if you abuse alcohol, if you use marijuana or other illegal drugs, you are involved in gateway behavior to addictive problems in life. That is really the difficulty with cigarettes, alcohol, and pot.

So we know that we have got a tremendous challenge. Cigarette use in this country is down across the board, except with children it is up. It has gone up dramatically. Three thousand kids a day are starting smoking, and a thousand of them will die from it. Now, more importantly, if you are smoking pot as a 12-year-old, your chance of ending up using cocaine—this is just math; there is no defined causal relationship—goes up 89-fold. If you are smoking cigarettes as a 12-year-old, your chances of having an addictive problem later in life go up five-fold.

So we are persuaded we ought to tell our kids, zero illegal drug activity—no booze, no cigarettes, no marijuana, heroin, et cetera. I think we will do that, and we will help the country out.

To respond to your second question, I believe it would probably be useful for you, if you would care to, I would be glad to share with you the Agency and other intelligence sources that I used and use over time in assessing these foreign leaders and who I am dealing with; and I would be glad to show you the two classified biographies on Gutierrez Rebollo I used.

Now, subsequent to that, there is some further discussion on whether other data bases might have had hits on him. It would not be helpful in this public environment to discuss it in detail, except to say that in this case, Mexico's senior leadership made an error of judgment and feel betrayed by treasonist activity and that we did not pick up on it either.

Mr. BARR. Is there an inter-agency damage-assessment team operating at this point to assess the damage occasioned by this latest problem?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Yes. The Department of Justice and other elements are watching the situation about as closely as you can imagine.

Mr. BARR. I am not talking about is there a group of people watching it. Is there a damage-assessment team, an interagency damage-assessment team that is focusing and meeting specifically to assess the extent of damage occasioned by Gutierrez's revelations?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Tom Constantine is doing a formal assessment of what he thinks came out of all this.

Mr. BARR. I know, in his agency.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Right.

Mr. BARR. Is there an inter-agency damage-assessment team?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. I am not sure I am giving you the right answer, but, yes, there is. Each of the elements of the United States Government who are involved in supporting the Mexican counter-drug operations are trying to understand——

Mr. BARR. I know. I know each agency is. Is there an inter-agency, coordinated effort, specific effort by our Government to assess one of the most problematic breaches of intelligence in the entire history of our war on drugs, and if there is not, there is not. I am just asking if there is a coordinated, inter-agency, damage-assessment team.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, I am not sure I can give you an answer to that. Yes, I am the guy on the spot to make sure that each of these various departments of Government, that there is some oversight of what they are doing, and so I would be glad to serve as your focal point on that. There is a very serious——

Mr. BARR. I do not need anybody to serve as my focal point——

Mr. BARRETT. General order.

Mr. BARR. Fine, fine.

Mr. SOUDER. We are going to go to one more round on each side, not a full round, but 5 minutes on each side, because we know we have had you here a long time, and we appreciate it very much.

Did you have a question, Mr. Mica? I have a couple of points I wanted to make.

Mr. MICA. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Did you want to go to the other side first for fairness? I will wait. I can always hold my question.

Mr. SOUDER. They have no questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things that concerns me is another chart that was in this report, and it talks about youth attitudes determine drug use, examples of marijuana and 12th-graders, and it says perception drops, risk perception drops and use rises, and it clicks in in about 1992. Who do you believe these young people look up to?

I think that we are still suffering from the appointment in the last administration of a surgeon general who said “Just say maybe” and that we are still suffering from a President who said maybe if he had it to do over again, he would inhale. I think that this chart also shows that we continue to have this problem. We still continue to have a President who has not spoken out on the issue of legalization.

I do not think he has spoken out once on that. I know you have spoken out on it. This is the question of marijuana, and I wrote you a note, as a matter of fact, on congratulating you on speaking it out.

But the President made over 2,600 speeches and interviews between 1993 and 1995, and mentioned drugs 23 times and has not mentioned anything on this legalization. If the President of the United States, the chief health officer of the United States, is not helping to set this, then how can I tell my 17-year-old that there is risk. If they say it is OK and their risk perception drops, which this chart shows, and usage increases, we are not getting the leadership at the national level that we need to turn this around.

Now we are going to do paid advertising, which, if we have to do, we will do; but I still do not think that provides the leadership. When is the President going to speak out?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, the chart, Mr. Mica, on youth attitudes is University of Michigan data, and we think it is pretty good. It goes back to the 1960's. Dr. Lloyd Johnson and his team up there really helped, I think, a lot of us understand how youth form attitudes on the consequences of drug abuse.

We combined it with a lot of very serious work done by Columbia University, Joe Califano and his associates, Dr. Herb Kleber and others. We think we do understand why youths form their value systems, and principally, they listen to their parents. They listen to their homeroom teacher, they listen to their ministers, the coach, the people who they have respect and love for and engage with them.

In this country, values are formed by ordinary people. Now, you can get a cross-cutting problem if you have entertainment figures in music and TV and other things that are discordant notes, but essentially what we are is what our parents and those who love us told us to do.

That is the problem right there. It seems to me that we not only saw a drop-off in TV coverage, we not only saw a change in the amount of energy that we put into some of these drug prevention programs; we ended up with a population of parents that came along who had used drugs, many of them, 50 to 70 million, and they are trying to sort out what message to give their children.

Now, in addition, we have got parents who are dual-income families, they are not home 3-to-7, they are not home on weekends, and that is another change. So we are going to have to organize ourselves to address that problem.

If my two daughters are going to be professional women and involved in the work force, and thank God they are, then we have got to have an organizational scheme to engage our kids.

To respond to your note on the President, look, by law, I am a non-political officer of Government. I was honored to take part in this whole operation. I was honored to be present yesterday when the President, the Vice President, the Cabinet of the United States, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, the chairman of the JCS, and the rest of us stood up to put the strategy in front of the American people, and the President articulated what we were going to try and do. He said it during his State of the Union speech.

I think he and others in this Government share your view, Mr. Mica, that we are committed to a non-drug, non-stoned America, and we are willing to work at it. I very much appreciate the bipartisan support that I have gotten out of this Congress in the last 2 years, whether it was money or tutoring or whatever, and I think we have got to start working partnership and stop counting the number of words in speeches. That is not the problem; the problem is kids and drugs.

Mr. MICA. So national leadership is not a problem on the issue or has not been a problem.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. I am quite proud of the support, to be blunt, that I have gotten out of the President and Vice President Gore

and Janet Reno. Two of the most important women in my life nowadays are Donna Shalala and Janet Reno. I think they are serious, dedicated, intelligent folks; and Dick Riley is absolutely engaged, and Bill Perry is one of the finest public servants I have ever encountered. So, to be blunt, I am very positive. They have given me the money I asked for and the support.

Mr. SOUDER. I also want to thank you on behalf of this committee for having worked with us. Since you came on board, we have worked aggressively with you in this committee in a bipartisan way, and hopefully we can continue to do that, because having everybody focused is important.

Mr. Barrett, do you have any questions?

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you again, and you will get your reward in heaven.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I would like to turn to a topic I do not think we have really touched on today but that worries me as well, and that is found on pages 58 and 59 of the Strategy regarding legalization of marijuana.

I hope that we are in agreement here that marijuana is, indeed, a mind-altering drug, that it does things to the human mind and the human body that inherently pose a danger to society. It affects people's ability to perceive the world around them and to react properly to it.

People take marijuana for the same reason they take cocaine or heroin, and that is to alter their mind. That is why they are mind-altering drugs, and that is why they are illegal. I know that there have been efforts. We saw unfortunately the results of well-funded campaigns in two Western States this past year to obscure that fact.

There are continuing efforts to legalize marijuana, and the title of this section of your paper says "Countering Attempts To Legalize Marijuana," and you make a statement in here that we must continue to oppose efforts to legalize marijuana, but there is nothing in here at all about what we are doing and how we propose to do that.

There is no strategy whatsoever; it just says we are going to continue to counter attempts, and that particularly bothers me is not even so much that there is no specifics and no plan laid out for doing that, but the entire last, lengthy paragraph in that section very clearly leaves the door opened that maybe we will—we are spending taxpayer money, you state here, to review the possible therapeutic effects of marijuana.

Frankly, I do not give a damn what therapeutic effects marijuana may or may not have; the fact of the matter is, it is a mind-altering drug, so whether or not it has any therapeutic effects, it is still a mind-altering drug. Why, in heaven's name, would we want to open the door to legalize its use for medical purposes? Your paper here seems to contradict itself.

Also, I mean, I really would appreciate—I do not understand what is going on here, because there is nothing here about countering attempts to legalize marijuana; there is only a great deal of detail about maybe there is a medical use for it that may lead to

some sort of legalization. How much money is this study going to take?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Well, Mr. Barr, let me, first of all, join you completely in your viewpoint that America is better off with marijuana being a Schedule I drug. No good has come out of it. A bunch of Americans have tried it. It led to a lot of difficulty. It is a major problem in the universities today and high schools: failure to learn, teenage pregnancy, stoned driving and death. We know, although we cannot demonstrate the scientific causal relationship, we know the statistical correlation between pot use among adolescents and later addictive problems is overwhelming.

We are opposed to the legalization of marijuana, and that strategy, that is just a marker point. We will actively follow that issue. Without being paranoid, there is a very well organized, determined, heavily funded, national legalization strategy with law firms and polling firms and political operatives, and that is what happened to a large extent in California and Arizona.

Now, they have also recognized the American people are not going to support the legalization of marijuana. That is what the polls are telling us. That is what parents are telling us, police officers, and ministers. Now, I think they have gone after some other approaches that suggest medical use, growing hemp, et cetera.

Now, medical is an easy one. Intellectually, there is not a bit of problem. We use cocaine, methamphetamine, demerol, and other very powerful, dangerous drugs, the Schedule II drugs. We have enormous trust in the American medical establishment, but they all have to get passed as safe and effective medicines. If you can make the case, pass peer group review, go to the NIH and the FDA, great, you can become a medicine. If you are a laetrile or thalidomide, you do not get through the gates.

What we did in the 1980's, looking at the history of it, there were hundreds of studies of smoked dope, and out of that they said we need to provide doctors THC, one of the active components of the cannabinoids. Since 1985, it has been in a pill form, Marinol. It is used by some physicians for nausea for certain discomforts. It is basically no longer very effective compared to other, much better medications.

Mr. BARR. Could I just interrupt, not to stop you, but since my colleague on the other side gets upset if I go a little bit too long, and mention one other thing that you could crank into your final remarks here.

With regard to the use of marijuana, on the one hand, getting back to my question previously about tobacco, we have seen this administration very clearly is engaged in a very concerted public relations effort against tobacco usage, trying to use the FDA sort of as its hammer in that effort, a very aggressive program, and yet we are at this very same time, we are funding efforts to see if maybe there is a good use for marijuana.

Even if that were a good idea, which I do not think, I just disagree absolutely with doing that, in the great scheme of things aren't there better things that we could be using that money on to fight the war on drugs right now?

Gen. MCCAFFREY. I think if we are going to be intellectually honest with ourselves, we are going to have to pay attention to the

viewpoints of the medical research community when they claim they want smoked dope to use to manage chemotherapy nausea or claim that it is a pain-management tool or claim that it is a glaucoma treatment. The appropriate way to do that is to not get it into politics. Take it to the NIH and the FDA—we have got brilliant men and women over there—and let them look at it in a scientific manner. That is what we are doing, and I think we will end up—again, we have an open mind on it.

If some of those 435 compounds in marijuana have medical benefit, we will isolate more of them, and these brilliant people in NIH and the pharmaceutical industry can make it available for American medicine. Other than that, it will not be a medicine, so I think we are doing the right thing, a very sensible approach, Donna Shalala, Dr. Harold Varmas, Dr. Alan Leshner, and we will not get tricked on this issue.

Mr. SOUDER. That is really important, and we are going to be watching that closely because we know the politics of science as well—

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. And this is too critical.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General, I will be very brief. I just want to do three things.

No. 1, I want to thank you for what you are doing. I really want to thank you. I agree with Mr. Barrett, you have to have one of the toughest jobs in the world, not just America, but in the world. I also want to thank you for when you came to Baltimore. You do not know it, but you went into the streets of Baltimore, no guards. You stood there with young men who had been addicted but who had gotten off of drugs. You put your arms around them and told them that they could make it.

So often I think what happens is people sit in towers and look down and never come down to where the troops are, you might say, or where the battle is really being fought, but I just want you to know that one of those young men said to me the other day that it meant so much to him that you took the time to spend hours in Baltimore with them, to talk to them and encourage them to get beyond where they are and in the difficult circumstances that they found themselves; and I thank you for that.

Finally, I want to encourage you. I want to encourage you. I know this must be very, very difficult at times, when you are trying to rid our Nation of a problem that touches so many people, and it really does, in so many ways. But I just wanted to encourage you to continue on with what you are doing.

I think it was Winston Churchill who said, “Never give up, never, never, never.” I know sometimes it may get very dark, sometimes the end may seem very difficult to see, but I feel real good about what you are doing, because when I looked at those young men that day that you came to Baltimore a few months ago—and these are street guys, and they had this guy—there is this white guy, a General, of all things, to come in, and they trusted you. They trusted that you were giving it the very best that you had, and these are the kind of guys you cannot fool too easily.

So I just want to, you know, encourage you and thank you.

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Thank you for those words, Mr. Congressman. They mean a lot to me.

Mr. SOUDER. I think that Mr. Mica had a point of personal privilege.

Mr. MICA. Just a quick point of personal privilege. General, I do want to admit to being, without a doubt, probably one of the harshest critics of the administration policy over the past 4 years, but I do want to say that I will do anything, and we have worked together despite differences, to get you the resources that you need to bring attention to this problem to do whatever this Congress needs to do to effectively address the problem.

So I renew my commitment to you. If we have had problems in the past, I am not interested in the past; I am interested in the future. We will deal with the past, but I thank you for your efforts. I thank you for making this a national priority, and for working with this subcommittee the way you have, and we will continue to work with you, and we also will continue to keep an eye on your job and the other jobs done by the administration in this effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to reiterate that we focus on interdiction here and that we have more jurisdictional authority over the Defense Department, and those areas, than we do over the other areas, although because we have jurisdiction over your office, we get into prevention and treatment. But as I challenged you last time you were here, we intend to, and need to, at several committee levels, look at the prevention-and-treatment programs just as critically as we look at the interdiction programs.

There is not one of us who has not met people in every urban area, suburban area, and rural area who have figured out the hustle of how to go to treatment programs. I have met many people in homeless shelters and runaway shelters, kids in schools, who have been through as many as 7 to 10 programs, and they know how to get through them.

The zero tolerance that we talked about earlier today and trying to do the drug testing, and hopefully you do that in your office as well, the random drug testing, those type of—

Gen. MCCAFFREY. Starting with me. Right.

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. Modeling ourselves and asking for the drug dogs in the schools. That is not the ultimate solution to the problem, because the reason that people are turning to drugs has to be addressed as well, and they are multiple. They could be health reasons, they could be family problems, and we understand that, but our immediate problem is to address the drug question and to lower the risk.

We have boosted these treatment dollars tremendously without any corresponding real evaluation and tough evaluation of insurance questions, of a whole array of issues.

But I want to thank you for your very good testimony today. The amount of time you take here, this is really just the beginning. To many of us, you are kind of the Gen. McArthur of the drug war. We very much appreciate this, because in this area you came in, you got everybody focused again.

This committee has been on the point with hearings all over the country and here to help try to move the money. We want to con-

tinue to try to do that and make sure that that money, in a time of declining budget deficits, hopefully, we make every dollar count. To do that, we need your help; and, once again, we very much appreciate your time today.

With that, the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

