[Senate Hearing 114-79]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-79
TSA OVERSIGHT AND EXAMINATION OF THE
FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DEAN HELLER, Nevada JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY PETERS, Michigan
STEVE DAINES, Montana
David Schwietert, Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, General Counsel
Jason Van Beek, Deputy General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Clint Odom, Democratic General Counsel and Policy Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire, MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
Chairman Ranking
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
ROY BLUNT, Missouri RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
TED CRUZ, Texas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
JERRY MORAN, Kansas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin GARY PETERS, Michigan
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
CORY GARDNER, Colorado
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 17, 2015................................... 1
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 3
Statement of Senator Booker...................................... 12
Statement of Senator Manchin..................................... 14
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 16
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 17
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 23
Witnesses
Melvin Carraway, Acting Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Melvin Carraway by:
Hon. Kelly Ayotte............................................ 27
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 28
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 29
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 31
Hon. Cory Booker............................................. 36
TSA OVERSIGHT AND EXAMINATION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST
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TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and
Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Kelly Ayotte,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Ayotte [presiding], Thune, Moran,
Gardner, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Blumenthal, Booker, Manchin, and
Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. Good afternoon and welcome. As you may
know, today marks my first hearing as the Chairman of this
Subcommittee, and today's hearing represents the first of what
we anticipate will be an active spring schedule.
The Subcommittee will soon begin a series of hearings in
preparation for this year's Federal Aviation Administration
reauthorization effort, as the agency's authorization expires
in September of this year.
I am very appreciative to be here with Senator Cantwell, my
Ranking Member. We basically just switched places. I have had
the honor of working with her in the past. I know we will work
together in a bipartisan fashion in this committee on these
important issues.
At a time when our Nation faces evolving security threats,
often focused on the airline industry and its partners, the
Transportation Security Administration's role is more important
than ever.
To protect the traveling public in our transportation
systems, we need strong leadership and a coherent strategy from
TSA to ensure our Nation is pursuing the best security
policies.
To that end, in January, I joined several of my colleagues
on the Commerce Committee, including Chairman Thune, Ranking
Member Nelson, Ranking Member Cantwell of this committee, and
Chairman Fischer in writing to the President asking him to
prioritize the formal nomination of the TSA Administrator, as
former Administrator John Pistole announced his intention to
retire in October 2014, which brings me to today's witness.
I want to welcome to the Subcommittee Mr. Melvin Carraway,
who serves as Deputy Administrator and current Acting
Administrator at TSA. Although Mr. Carraway has a long history
of service in various capacities at TSA, today's hearing is the
first time he will testify before a congressional committee,
but we really appreciate all of your hard work and what you are
trying to do.
Thank you for being here, and thank you for all your
service to the Nation. I look forward to hearing from you on
many important issues facing TSA and the safety of the
traveling public.
I also look forward to working closely with you moving
forward to address these issues. I hope you will view this
subcommittee as a partner in your important work.
At today's hearing, I look forward to hearing your views on
a number of issues facing our Nation's security situation and
TSA's operations. I know my colleagues have strong interest in
your comments as well. In short, we want to hear your vision
for the agency and how the budget request for Fiscal Year 2016
supports TSA's mission.
Additionally, I hope to hear from you how we can address a
number of issues that have recently garnered media attention,
including Federal Air Marshals' misconduct and access control
failings.
As you know, TSA has adopted an intelligence-driven, risk-
based security approach, which is designed to allow the agency
to deploy resources in a more focused and efficient manner,
concentrating on unknown and high risk travelers. This approach
simultaneously helps alleviate burdensome procedures for low-
risk passengers.
One tool that TSA uses in its risk-based security strategy
is TSA Pre3 which I am sure many of us have used. TSA recently
announced its intent to expand enrollment options for
application for Pre3, and we need to make sure this effort
does not diminish the safety or security of passengers but
applies to low-risk travelers for their convenience.
Anyone who travels through our Nation's airports is well
aware that TSA relies heavily on technology in order to screen
passengers and carry out its mission. Cost-effective
acquisition policies and procedures are critical to ensuring
TSA is able to deploy the best technology to effectively and
efficiently screen passengers and baggage.
Last Congress, I introduced legislation to improve
transparency and accountability in technology acquisition
spending and planning by TSA. The legislation was passed out of
the Commerce Committee and ultimately signed into law in
December.
Under the law, TSA is required to develop, update, and
publish biennially a strategic 5 year technology investment
plan, analyze whether an acquisition is justified before
acquiring any security related technology, establish and report
baseline performance requirements before acquiring any security
related technology, utilize any existing equipment in inventory
before getting additional units, and report to Congress on the
feasibility of tracking TSA's security technologies through
automated information and data capture technologies.
Understanding that this law is still being implemented, as
it is relatively new, I look forward to hearing an update on
your acquisition reform efforts.
Finally, the Federal Air Marshal Service is responsible for
detecting, deterring, and disrupting criminal and terrorist
acts against air carriers, passengers, airports, and crews.
As an additional line of defense against threats while
flights are in the air, the Federal Air Marshal Service should
be promoting confidence in our Nation's civil aviation system.
Yet recent news stories have dogged the service, including
media reports of abuse of authority with regard to improper
scheduling for inappropriate personal reasons. This is
extremely troubling, and recent media accounts have also
exposed security gaps in the use of security identification
display area, or SIDA badges.
While these instances may largely be attributed to employee
misconduct or misuse of the credential and not terrorist
activities, we must make sure that the proper mechanisms and
checks are in place to prevent these abuses from occurring and
to ensure security.
The Aviation Security Advisory Committee is conducting a
review of access control measures, and I look forward to
reviewing their findings and recommendations.
Also disturbing is the exposure of a gun smuggling
operation where an airline employee was able to sneak firearms
through the secure areas of an airport and into the cabins of
commercial airliners with the help of a co-conspirator.
This series of security and procedural breaches must be
investigated exhaustively, and it should also highlight the
need for ongoing assessments of security weaknesses.
TSA is very often the face of security on the home front.
Mr. Carraway, you have a tough job overseeing the agency with
an ever evolving threat landscape.
We must all continue to work to ensure that TSA is able to
adapt as well as stay ahead of those threats that we face as a
nation.
I would like to now turn it over to Ranking Member
Cantwell, and it is really is an honor to serve with her on
this subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Ayotte, and welcome
to the Chair position, and I enjoyed working with you in
similar capacities, so I am sure together we will continue to
focus on aviation and I look forward to the series of hearings
that we have set up over the next few weeks.
Acting Administrator Carraway, thank you for testifying
here today. The Transportation Security Administration's
mission has remained constant for the 13 years since this
committee created the agency to protect our travelers and our
transportation system.
In the time since the agency was first authorized, the
threats facing our transportation network have evolved to
protect the traveling public and need to continue to evolve.
There have been obstacles and missteps along the way, but we
all appreciate the hard work and dedication that the men and
women there have made to keep us safe.
To ensure the free and safe movement of people and goods
and services through the transportation system, TSA has
adapted. Security measures have been reactive at times but the
shift from one-size-fits-all approach to a risk-based security
has mitigated certain burdens for travelers. For example,
children and older Americans no longer have to remove their
shoes, and low-risk passengers can avail themselves of
expedited screening through the Pre3 program, which is now
active at 119 airports.
The $7.3 billion TSA budget proposed by the Administration
continues to develop the agency's multi-layered risk-based
approach which has improved security while creating
efficiencies and enabling commerce.
Through investments in workforce training and terrorist
watch list systems, TSA is building a counterterrorism
workforce and enabling intelligence and data driven decisions.
Analyzing and leveraging this information to better identify
the threats enables TSA to maximize the coverage where needed
through a variety of tools such as the Federal Air Marshal K-9
Units, VIPR teams, and other behavioral detections, TSA can
match each threat with the necessary levels of security.
This ability to adapt security to the threat level is
crucial for our success. We recently saw this in action when
TSA addressed emerging threats from abroad by requiring
travelers at their final part of departure into the United
States to open and activate certain electronic screening
devices.
This intelligence-driven decisionmaking is critical to our
success in combating terrorist threats. We must also thank our
international partners since we are not in this alone, and TSA
does important work with foreign nations to ensure that our
passengers are appropriately screened before boarding planes
headed back to the U.S. As with so many international efforts,
this is no small task.
Another major area of concern for all of our intelligence
and security forces is the increased presence that terrorist
groups have on the Internet as a terrorist organization uses
the Internet to recruit followers, to disseminate instructions,
and to share information about perceived security
vulnerabilities. We must remain vigilant to improve our
security posture.
While there are important investments in intelligence
capability and aviation security, this budget also contains
cuts to service transportation security and VIPR teams, which I
hope you will address today.
Acting Administrator Carraway, our transportation system,
our railroad system, our pipeline networks are all vitally
important, and must be secure.
In recent years, there have been a number of surface
transportation facilities under attack in places like Russia
and Mumbai, London and Madrid, as well as threats in New York
and Washington, D.C.
We cannot allow our focus to be so narrow that we do not
focus on preparing for those other types of transportation.
Thank you for being here today, and we look forward to your
continued mission of the TSA. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. We are very honored to have Mr.
Carraway here today, and he is the Acting Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration.
Mr. Carraway?
STATEMENT OF MELVIN CARRAWAY,
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Carraway. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman Ayotte. Thank
you for inviting me, and Ranking Member Cantwell, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
TSA is tasked with protecting the nation's transportation
systems and has developed its Fiscal Year 2016 budget request
with three priorities in mind, advancing risk-based security,
enhancing workforce engagement, and improving organizational
efficiency.
TSA could not accomplish this mission without a trained and
equipped workforce. In recent years, the adversaries we face
have become more inventive, persistent, and adaptive in design,
construction, and concealment of explosives, and they are not
isolated to a single country or a single region of the world.
As such, TSA is working to mitigate the risk we all face
when traveling from, within, and to the U.S.
In Fiscal Year 2014, transportation security officers
screened 650 million passengers and more than two billion
carry-on and checked bags, preventing approximately 105,000
dangerous prohibitive items, including 2,300 firearms, from
being carried onto planes.
Additionally, Federal Air Marshals flew thousands of
flights domestically and internationally providing in-flight
security for high risk routes. Visible Intermodal Prevention
and Response, VIPR, teams conducted almost 17,000 operations.
Transportation security inspectors completed over 1,054
airport inspections, including 17,894 aircraft operator
inspections, and 2,959 foreign air carrier inspections, to
ensure compliance with rules and regulations, and TSA's vetting
systems perpetually vetted 14.8 million transportation worker
records each day against the Terrorist Database.
Our risk-based security initiatives boost the effectiveness
of security resources by focusing them on high risk and unknown
travelers and commerce, while at the same time facilitating the
efficient movement of legitimate travelers, and commerce and
trade.
As a result, TSA's RBS initiatives are responsible for
approximately $350 million in savings over the past two years.
There are now 132 airports offering expedited screening through
TSA's Pre3, and 326 enrollment centers have processed an
enormous amount of individuals.
As a result, TSA increased the percent of passengers
receiving some sort of expedited screening from 9.6 in
September 2013 to 44.3 one year later. TSA's Pre3 volume has
increased 100 percent since 2013.
To help facilitate greater participation in our expedited
screening initiatives, TSA is exploring private sector
enrollment capabilities leveraging industry's expertise.
The President's budget for Fiscal Year 2016 includes $7.3
billion for TSA, which represents a sever percent decrease and
savings of $653 million in appropriated funding. The Fiscal
Year 2016 budget includes a reduction of $119 million and 1,748
personnel related to workforce savings from RBS efficiencies.
As RBS measures change the nature of airport screening
operations, including reducing the number of necessary lanes,
TSA can reduce the number of transportation security
specialists-explosives, we call them TSS-Es, resolve checkpoint
alarms when a suspected threat is detected with fewer screeners
and improved technology. Fewer TSS-Es are required. This will
result in a reduction of $2 million and 18 employees.
Additionally, TSA recently conducted an analysis of
inspection data and risk sources to drive and prioritize the
inspection activity as a result. TSA is proposing a reduction
of $6.5 million and 64 employees.
In April 2012, TSA established the TSA Academy located at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia,
and joined more than 92 partner organizations to train at
FLETC. The Academy's initial course offering taught
``Essentials of Supervising Screening Operations'' led by
dedicated groups of instructors and facilitators, including
Academy staff, Federal Air Marshals, and Federal Security
Directors.
In support of TSA's efforts to further professionalize its
screening workforce, the budget request includes $2.5 million
to expand mission essential training at the TSA Academy. The
funding will expand training staff to serve more employees and
support beneficial follow on training.
The budget request also supports an increase of $5.2
million to hire and train additional FAMs. The last class of
Federal Air Marshals came on board on September 11, 2011. It is
again time for this vital program to refresh its ranks.
The President's budget also includes funding to support
Department-wide initiatives related to cybersecurity,
requesting $2.9 million for remediation efforts to achieve
critical network infrastructure protection.
As TSA continues applying risk-based security principles
throughout the organization, we must continue investing in the
workforce we need to ensure our future successes. Through hard
work and operational efficiencies, we are becoming a smaller,
more capable workforce.
Madam Chair, thank you again for the opportunity to discuss
the President's Fiscal Year 2016 budget for TSA. I look forward
to working with the Committee, and I am pleased to answer any
questions that may arise.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carraway follows:]
Prepared Statement of Melvin Carraway, Acting Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Good afternoon Chairman Ayotte, Ranking Member Cantwell, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the President's
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Request for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA).
TSA is a high-performing counterterrorism organization, applying a
multi-layered, intelligence-driven, risk-based approach to protect the
Nation's transportation systems, including aviation, mass transit,
rail, highway, and pipeline. In support of this mission, TSA developed
the FY 2016 budget request with three priorities in mind: advancing
risk-based security, enhancing workforce engagement, and improving
organizational efficiency.
TSA could not accomplish this essential mission without a workforce
trained, equipped and committed to the safety and security of this
Nation. Each of our more than 50,000 personnel remains steadfast in the
face of a threat that has not diminished more than a decade following
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In fact, over the years,
the adversary has become more inventive and persistent, while at the
same time growing and spreading to other countries and regions. We
continue to face a real and persistent threat from adversaries adept in
the design, construction and concealment of explosives. As such, TSA is
evolving our approach to transportation security and to mitigate risks
we all face when traveling from, within and to the United States. I am
proud of the employees on the frontlines who conduct themselves as true
professionals in the performance of their daily duties.
In pursuit of TSA's mission, in FY 2014, Transportation Security
Officers screened approximately 650 million passengers, and more than 2
billion carry-on and checked bags, preventing approximately 105,000
dangerous prohibited items, including 2,300 firearms, from being
carried onto planes. TSA also screened a daily average of 6 million air
passengers against terrorist databases.
Additionally, Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) flew thousands of flights
domestically and internationally providing in-flight security for high
risk routes; Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams
conducted almost 17,000 operations; Transportation Security Inspectors
(TSIs) completed over 1,054 airport inspections, 17,894 aircraft
operator inspections, and 2,959 foreign air carrier inspections to
ensure compliance with rules and regulations; and TSA's vetting systems
perpetually vetted 14.8 million transportation worker records each day
against the Terrorist Screening Database.
Risk-Based Security (RBS)
TSA continues to deploy multi-layered, intelligence-driven, risk-
based initiatives to enhance security. These risk-based security
initiatives boost the effectiveness of security in a more efficient
manner, by directing resources focused on high-risk and unknown
travelers and commerce, while at the same time facilitating the
movement of legitimate travelers and trade. In addition, TSA has
enhanced the customer experience for the traveling public. RBS methods
have proven more efficient in moving people through the checkpoint than
standard screening lanes, requiring fewer screeners and fewer lanes
than traditional screening operations. As a result, TSA continues to
gain efficiencies through RBS initiatives, with savings of
approximately $350 million over the past two years at airports.
In order to bolster the ongoing success of RBS initiatives, TSA
continues to expand the prescreening process by increasing the number
of known, lower-risk travelers eligible for expedited screening. TSA
has made substantial strides in RBS including:
Increasing the number of airports with TSA Pre3 screening
lanes to 132;
Establishing 559 dedicated and supplemental TSA Pre3 lanes;
and
Adding TSA Pre3 Application Program enrollment sites at 326
centers, which have processed nearly one million applicants.
TSA continues to work closely with airlines to expand the number of
air carriers participating in TSA Pre3, enhance Known Crewmember, and
extend eligibility for TSA Pre3 to U.S. Armed Forces personnel and
Department of Defense civilian employees. In November 2014, TSA offered
TSA Pre3 expedited screening benefits to students of the four U.S.
service academies. On average, more than 60,000 Department of Defense
employees benefit from TSA Pre3 on a weekly basis.
Through these measures, TSA increased the percent of passengers
receiving some form of expedited screening from 9.6 percent in
September 2013 to 44.3 percent a year later. TSA Pre3 volume has
increased 600 percent with more than 300 million passengers receiving
expedited screening, since 2013. More than 12.5 million passengers were
screened between November 26 and December 2, a 1.3 percent increase
from 2013. Of the record number of travelers flying over this past
holiday season, nearly 50 percent experienced expedited screening. In
addition, nationwide, 99.6 percent of passengers moved expeditiously
through checkpoint lines, waiting less than 20 minutes in line.
TSA continues to focus on increasing the population of known and
trusted travelers receiving TSA Pre3 by expanding participation to
additional U.S. and foreign air carriers, identifying and enrolling
more trusted populations. In addition, TSA is exploring private sector
enrollment capabilities, leveraging industry expertise in marketing and
offering additional opportunities for enrollment beyond the existing
326 centers currently in existence across the Nation.
TSA's multi-layered approach to screening also includes real time
threat assessments through the deployment of behavior detection
techniques, explosives detection canines and explosives trace detection
equipment, and risk-based physical screening utilizing differentiated
screening procedures and technology applications.
Our RBS security efforts are part of a strategic application of
intelligence-driven risk mitigation principles that moves away from the
one-size-fits-all approach to security. TSA will continue to focus on
adopting risk-based approaches to other aspects of aviation security,
including checked baggage, air cargo, regulatory compliance, and
through the identification of potential enhancements to FAM
deployments.
Budget Highlights
The FY 2016 President's Budget includes total funding of $7.3
billion for TSA. This represents a 7 percent decrease in TSA's overall
budget, and a savings of $653 million in appropriated funding, over the
past five years, if the FY 2016 request is enacted. This funding
supports TSA's three strategic priorities constituting the basis of
TSA's budget request.
Risk Based Security
TSA continues to promote the most effective security in the most
efficient manner. The implementation of RBS initiatives has resulted in
a smaller, more professional and capable workforce. The FY 2016 budget
includes a reduction of $119 million and 1,748 personnel related to
workforce savings due to RBS efficiencies. This includes a reduction of
$110.5 million and 1,666 full-time equivalents (FTE) from the screener
workforce due to a more efficient screening process requiring fewer
personnel.
As TSA RBS measures change the nature of screening operations,
including reducing the number of lanes and transitioning to a smaller,
more professional workforce, TSA is able to reduce the number of
Transportation Security Specialist-Explosives (TSS-E) personnel by 18
employees and $2.0 million. TSS-Es resolve checkpoint alarms when a
suspected threat is detected, and train TSOs to better recognize
characteristics of explosive devices. This program will continue to
operate in the Nation's largest airports, but with fewer screeners and
improved technology, fewer TSS-Es are required for the training
responsibility.
Additionally, TSA recently conducted an analysis of inspection data
and risk scores to drive and prioritize inspection activity. That
information, along with the latest intelligence, will be used to deploy
Transportation Security Inspectors to focus on those areas with higher
risks and those parties requiring additional oversight to improve
security compliance. As a result, TSA is proposing a reduction of $6.5
million and 64 employees.
Workforce Engagement
In April 2012, TSA established the TSA Academy located at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia and
joined more than 92 partner organizations who train at FLETC. The
Academy's initial course offering was the Essentials of Supervising
Screening Operations led by a dedicated group of instructors and
facilitators including Academy staff, Federal Air Marshals (FAMs),
Federal Security Directors, and members of the FLETC Leadership and
International Training Division. The course was designed and developed
for delivery to our more than 4,500 Supervisory Transportation Security
Officers. By the end of FY 2014, 167 classes were delivered and 4,568
participants trained, including training for Lead Transportation
Security Officers, Transportation Security Inspectors, Security
Training Instructors, and TSS-E personnel.
In support of TSA's efforts towards professionalization of the
screening officer workforce, the budget request includes $2.5 million
to expand mission essential training at the TSA Academy. The funding
will expand training staff to serve more categories of employees and
support follow-on training that will continue to build upon an
established foundation.
The budget request also supports an increase of $5.2 million to
hire and train additional FAMs. These efforts will include recruitment
of women and veterans which will enhance the diversity and skill set of
our workforce. The last class of FAMs came onboard on September 11,
2011. Hiring will allow this vital program to refresh its ranks, and
assign new hires to locations of strategic value based on risk-based
principles and in accordance with a newly developed Concept of
Operations governing strategic deployment of FAMS on high-risk flights.
In FY 2016, the FAMS will finalize the workforce realignment begun
in FY 2015, through the closure of the final two of six offices. Upon
completion of the workforce realignment, resources will be positioned
with greater strategic value, enhancing the ability of the organization
to schedule FAMs on missions of the highest criticality, thereby
ensuring the most effective security in the most efficient manner.
Department-Wide Initiatives
TSA's budget includes funding to support Department-wide
initiatives related to cybersecurity and Watchlist services. TSA
requests $2.9 million for cybersecurity remediation efforts to achieve
the Department of Homeland Security's goal of remediating all known
vulnerabilities in the most high-risk systems by FY 2017, thereby
enhancing critical network infrastructure protection.
TSA utilizes the Watchlist Service, which provides terrorist
screening data to DHS components. The request includes an increase of
$2.8 million to automate currently manual processes. Once completed,
real-time updates will be available to TSA and other users of the
Watchlist Service.
Conclusion
As TSA continues applying risk-based security principles throughout
the organization, we must also continue shaping and investing in the
workforce we need to enable our future successes. Through hard work and
a focus on efficiency, we are becoming a smaller, more capable
workforce. I am committed to developing, training and equipping that
workforce to continue providing the most effective security in the most
efficient manner.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the
President's FY 2016 budget request for TSA. I look forward to working
together and will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Carraway.
I wanted to follow up with you on what I had asked about in my
opening statement, the Transportation Security Acquisition
Reform Act, that we had worked on, and signed into law late
last year. It does have a number of good government provisions.
Can you give me an update on how it is going on
implementing the Act?
Mr. Carraway. Let me first say thank you very much. It has
made a difference. Our Acquisition Department has used the
initiative very well. In fact, last week we had industry
partners engaged in the activity at headquarters. I met with
them and discussed moving forward. It is engagement like this
that the bill really brought to bear, and our Acquisition
Department is using it very rigorously as we move forward.
I will be able to provide you further details about
improvements that have occurred as we go forward, but I can
tell you it has made a difference, both in processes and uses,
and discussions with the industry as well.
Senator Ayotte. Great. You had said you just had recent
meetings with the industry, one of the parts of it is the five
year investment plan that I know is being put together by the
agency.
In that, will you be engaging the private industry in that
plan, and also give them an opportunity to give you feedback on
a draft of it?
Mr. Carraway. Yes, I will. What you indicated at the very
beginning of your opening remarks is about partnerships. My
background is built on partnerships, as my discussion was with
industries, partnerships is going to drive us moving forward,
and I will be engaging them through that process.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you so much. With that, I assume all
of the partnerships, including security technology
manufacturers are involved in the development of it?
Mr. Carraway. They were all present at the meeting; yes.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Fantastic. I look forward to an
update on that as you are able to implement the Act, and any
feedback you have in terms of how we can continue to work on
this issue to improve acquisition at TSA.
Mr. Carraway. I will do.
Senator Ayotte. One of the other issues I wanted to ask
about is as we look at some of the issues I raised in my
opening statement, the alleged misconduct by the Federal Air
Marshals that has been reported in the news recently, I
understand that it is probably under investigation, but can you
share with us what you can in terms of ensuring that we have
the type of professionalism and integrity in such an important
security service within TSA?
Mr. Carraway. Let me begin by saying I deplore, do not
tolerate misconduct, behavior that brings discredit to the
agency. I act and have my staff act on those issues very
swiftly.
It is important to show accountability, not just at the
leadership level, but accountability also down to the
workforce. That is what I demand of the folks in TSA, because
our mission is so critical, so accountability becomes so
important.
I cannot speak to the particulars of any investigation, but
I can tell you that we have made significant changes not just
in the FAM Service but throughout TSA, by enlisting OPR, which
is our Office of Professional Responsibility. We have done
integrity testing continuously with our workforce.
In regard to the FAM Service, we have done an overhaul of
our FAM Service. The leadership, new leadership have been
brought into the FAM Service. It is an overhaul of all their
operations to create a check and balance in all of their
operations to include the TSOC, which is the Transportation
Security Operations Center, our Mission Control Center, and all
those efforts that are involved.
We have auditing that has also been done. This occurred
immediately at the change of leadership.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you for that. In turn, I also
wanted to cover the issue that arose with the security
identification display area badges. How do we ensure that those
types of abuses do not occur again where we have, as I
understood it, a number of badges that were unaccounted for,
and we obviously want to make sure that those do not end up in
the wrong hands.
Mr. Carraway. TSA is a regulatory agency. Our
responsibility is to oversee the airports and their use of
badges.
In the instance we are talking about here, there is always
a second biometric that is instilled in those badges. Although
they may be missing, some not accounted for, the use of them is
probably pretty limited because of the biometric effort that is
instilled.
For example, in Dallas/Ft. Worth, which I am very familiar
with, they require a palm print in addition to the face image
that is also on the card before you enter into the process.
Some require a PIN number, as Atlanta does. Other similar
biometrics are attached to the cards.
Although they may be missing, there are some other security
safeguards that are in place, but that does not excuse the
missing or not accounted for cards. We have the ability to hold
the airports accountable for those cards, and in many cases, we
do if the excuse or the reason or justification is not applied
appropriately.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you. Senator Cantwell?
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Carraway, I know budget challenges
are always top of mind, and one of the issues of allocating
scarce resources are about how we work with our various
airports as they try to integrate new equipment as well.
I want to ask particularly about TSA's level of support for
in-line baggage screening at some of our smaller hubs, because
they are obviously trying to keep pace.
The FAA through discretionary grants and AIP entitlement
funds is supporting a much needed terminal expansion at the
Tri-Cities Airport in Pasco, and a regional non-hub airport
located in the southeast part of our state. They just
experienced an annual growth rate of something like 12 percent.
The FAA is helping them, but they do not support the
installation of the new in-line baggage screening operation.
How does TSA work hand in hand with the FAA on these
installations, and how do you fairly evaluate these proposals
for in-line screening?
Mr. Carraway. Typically, we want to make sure that the
planning up front is fully done, and in many cases, there
happens to be a lot of changes that occur. Allocating funds or
setting aside funds becomes very difficult in those situations.
We deal with them talking about how the changes are going
to occur, and when we can help them appropriately, we do so. We
are constantly engaged with FAA on any changes that occur, and
we keep in line with our budget in regard to that.
We just simply cannot make promises to a system that may
not be fully implemented or designed properly, so we do not
allocate any funds in that regard until we know that has really
been secured.
Senator Cantwell. As far as major hubs versus smaller
airports, you help both; right?
Mr. Carraway. Oh, yes. That is what I meant.
Senator Cantwell. Since TSA was created, obviously we have
seen all sorts of different types of threats and they continue
to evolve, so what is the process for trying to improve the
screening process for the future as opposed to the past, and
what the last incident was?
Mr. Carraway. Well, I best can explain it by talking about
RBS that has moved from an idea, risk-based security, to a
philosophy within TSA. In every aspect, we use that moving
forward to assure that the resources that we use are moved in a
direction that is going to provide us utility in regards to a
threat.
I have a briefing each and every morning in regards to what
that threat may be. In the past, we have known that the threat
has been an entity, al-Qaeda, or some other group. Now, the
threat has sort of metastasized. It is decentralized. Our
efforts continue in addressing with our partners domestically
and internationally ways to address that.
Any of those determinations are best used at the
checkpoint, whether it is for EDO experiences, K-9s, or new
technology that we bring to the table as well. We always
attempt to stay ahead of the threat, and RBS allows us to do
that.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Senator
Peters? Senator Peters stepped out. Senator Booker?
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY BOOKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Booker. Thank you very much to both the Chair and
the Ranking Member for holding this really important hearing,
and it is great to have you here, Mr. Carraway, your first time
testifying before Congress.
I am really grateful not only for you being here but really
for your service. You are a great American working to secure
our nation, which is the most wanted tradition in our country.
The security of our transportation modes is a critical part
of the country's well-being in general. All the work you do on
behalf of this country again is just critical in protecting our
country, our livelihoods, and the most precious element of this
nation, which is the people.
I would be remiss if I did not also just thank publicly all
the TSA employees for the hard work they do. They get a lot of
hassle, but they do a lot of hard work day in and day out,
dedicated professionals who should be recognized as such.
Mr. Carraway. Thank you very much.
Senator Booker. While we have made great strides to prevent
terrorist incidents in the aviation sector, I think there is
still work to do to improve gaps in our surface transportation
system. If you look at the terrorist deaths, the attacks
focused on surface transportation. In many ways, that is the
more frightening reality globally, those soft targets.
The security of surface networks may not garner as much
attention but a large scale attack on our surface networks
could result in a significant loss of life as we have seen in
other countries, and also have devastating economic
ramifications.
I believe we need to be devoting a greater amount of
resources to focus on our surface transportation security. In
the 9/11 Commission Act, Congress required TSA to undertake
several surface transportation security actions. Some of these
have languished since 2007, like training the front line
transit and freight employees. I understand that in the absence
of TSA's guidance, many agencies have stepped up and
implemented training programs themselves, but if we cannot get
a training program out the door, it raises serious concerns
about the agency and how it is using its resources.
Mr. Carraway, the first question is what is taking so long?
Can you apprise the Committee of that?
Mr. Carraway. Let me begin by saying in 90 percent of our
effort, the budget has been toward aviation because it seems
the threat continues in the aviation sector, but that being
said, it is important for us to show and demonstrate our
reserve to deal with the surface area as well.
VIPR teams do that. They are flexible. They are a resource
that I think many in the local state sector have taken
advantage of. We assist them on several levels. We also provide
training to them as often as we can.
This is one of the areas where partnerships really become
very critical, and I support that wholeheartedly.
We have a division that is specifically designed to address
that issue. There are conference calls that we hold every week
with the private sector, from pipeline to rail and other
surface entities as well.
We do stay engaged and we understand the importance of it
and provide support to them as often in regard to the VIPR as
much as we can.
Senator Booker. I just want to say, and I know my time is
going to end in a moment, I hope I have another round, just to
remind the Committee, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there
have been nearly 2,000 attacks against transit systems
globally, resulting in close to 4,000 deaths.
These attacks include the 2004 bombing of a commuter train
in Madrid, which killed 191 people. The July 2005 bombing of
the London subway trains and bus, which killed 52 people. The
July 2006 attack on commuter attacks in Mumbai which killed 207
people.
And the May 2010 attack on a passenger train in India
killing 148 people. More recently, December 2013, a suicide
bomber killed 16 and injured at least 40 at a Russian train
station.
I understand 90 percent of our resources may be going to
aviation, but anybody that is looking at a map of terrorist
attacks since 9/11 would say hey, wait a minute, rail is really
important.
It is unacceptable to me, and I am not taking away from the
really great leadership, I affirmed your leadership, this is a
Senator who supports you, but I just think to have TSA
congressional specifications of what should have been done to
lie unaccomplished for 6 to 7 years is just unacceptable, and
they should be addressed, given all these attacks.
I guess in the 20 seconds I have left, I will try to sneak
a question in, although Senator Ayotte may crush me on that, I
just want to say really quick why is the surface transportation
part of your budget actually being reduced in Fiscal Year 2016?
Could you explain why TSA is requesting less funds in
Fiscal Year 2016 for transportation security? With the leave of
my chairman.
Mr. Carraway. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for the
question. It is because of the RBS initiative, the way we
direct our activities. What we have taken is an account of all
of those transit, rail, pipeline systems you account for,
giving them a ranking, and what we do then is we move our
resources to those high risk areas.
When that is the case, we do not need as many bodies or
employees to address that issue because we can focus upon where
that high risk issue is. That is why RBS becomes effective to
us, becomes efficient. We are using that manpower specifically.
Also, I can tell you I have met many of the rail entities,
from Amtrak, New Jersey to New York, Port Authority
individuals, and have discussed these issues with them. We stay
engaged at every level on the threat.
Senator Booker. Thank you. I appreciate the indulgence of
the chair in going over.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Manchin?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Again, Mr.
Carraway, I piggy back on what my good friend, Senator Booker,
had said about the TSA and how difficult the job is, and I know
the abuse they take.
The only thing I will say is they have an awful lot of my
little pen knives that people give me and I forget to take
them. If there is a way I can reclaim them, I would appreciate
it, tell me where to go. There were some really sentimental
ones there I lost. I would like to try to reclaim them.
I want to take off on what Senator Booker talked about as
far as trains. As you know, transporting crude oil now, and in
just the last 4 years, from 2009 to 2013, shipment by rail has
gone up 3,300 percent. They are expecting 10 more derailments
this year.
We just had a train derailment in West Virginia, it was
just an unbelievable thing. Thank God we had no injuries. It
was a miracle. If it had happened a mile or two prior to where
they actually went and derailed, we would have lost maybe a
whole community.
With that being said, and I know Senator Booker was just
telling you about the rules, nothing has been implemented. We
are not getting these changes that we are going to desperately
need. I want to know what efforts are ongoing that will reflect
on the new reality of what we are doing within this country,
and it is going to be growing exponentially.
Mr. Carraway. I can certainly get back to you on that
issue, let you know that all of those sectors within rail/
pipeline are important to me and to my staff as well. I can
tell you with assurance and hope to give you confidence that we
take those issues very swiftly. I will get back with you on
what we can do and possibly what we can do further.
Senator Manchin. The train rules as far as how we transport
hazardous material in this country have not changed for quite
some time. We are in jeopardy of losing an awful lot of lives,
and we are having a tremendous amount of increase in that
arena.
The Pre3 facility, we have a new one at Tri-State Airport
in Huntington. We are very appreciative of that. I understand
you had a 600 percent increase since 2013.
Mr. Carraway. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. It is just unbelievable. It is giving
legitimate travelers, honest law abiding citizens of this
country, a way to expedite, and I appreciate that.
In response to the CBS story that ran last November about
standard screening lanes merging with the Pre3 lanes, I think
it is important to get a clearer picture of why and when these
mergers take place, and what is being done to ensure that a
lone wolf factor, as we are hearing an awful lot about or
seeing, or other potential terrorists are not slipping through
those cracks, if they are merging along those lanes.
Mr. Carraway. If I can explain to you the difference
between the standard lane and the Pre3 lane. The Pre3 lane
operates at about 300 passengers an hour, a standard lane,
about 170, or half that, 150, an hour.
Senator Manchin. Pre3 has more volume?
Mr. Carraway. Yes, and I can explain to you why. What
happens is because we have used the RBS principles, we know
about those individuals that are going through the Pre3 lane.
We know more about them, they are at low risk, so they are not
taking off their jackets or shoes, so they are passing through
that quicker.
It may appear to those that that lane is longer, when in
actuality they are actually going faster, sort of like being at
the----
Senator Manchin. I think the concern is when they merge.
Mr. Carraway. What happens is if you are designated for
Pre3, you will go through the Pre3 lanes, and you will get
that security. Typically, sometimes, because of the way the
airport is constructed, they will know when they come up they
will say I am Pre-Checked, so they will go through without
taking off their jackets and shoes. Those in the center lane
will simply proceed as usual.
What happens that probably is not really noticed, besides
knowing much about the individual is in the Pre3, there is a
possibility that individual will have an ETD, explosive trace
detection on their hands, there is a possibility they may
receive a pat down, an additional pat down. There is the
possibility even that an individual if a dog----
Senator Manchin. My time is about to expire, if I may. Here
is the problem. I go through the Pre3. I will use me as an
example. I have a new knee, cobalt titanium knee. I have to go
through the full body scan. Here in D.C. at Reagan, the Pre3
does not do that. They have to walk me over to go through the
body scan. In little Charleston, West Virginia, they make me
hold a yellow tag. Here, they do not.
What we are saying is could it be merged. Let's say I am
really going through the full check, not the Pre3, the
reason----
Mr. Carraway. The reason it is difficult to merge those is
because if you are in Pre3, the idea is to expedite that, to
keep the lanes moving. That is how we gain our efficiency. That
is how we gain the real benefit of----
Senator Manchin. Yes, but as soon as they know I have to go
through the full body scan, they send me over here.
Mr. Carraway. Right.
Senator Manchin. I could very easily have been somebody on
the airline and got right in with me and snuck through maybe.
You do not think?
Mr. Carraway. I do not think so. I really have a great deal
of confidence in my people.
Senator Manchin. If you get my pen knives back, I will let
you slide on that.
Mr. Carraway. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Those of us
that serve with you in the Senate can understand why you might
be undergoing some additional scrutiny.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. I just saw that Senator Blumenthal arrived.
Senator Blumenthal?
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. Thank you for
being here, thank you for your service. I want to follow up on
some of the questions that I heard Senator Booker ask about
surface transportation, because I think one of the
misconceptions that is widely shared, one of the common
misconceptions, is that the TSA focuses only on air transport.
Do you think there is a need for more funding and maybe
more allocation of resources to surface transportation, and if
so, where in the country, and what kind of surface
transportation?
Mr. Carraway. I do not want to assume, being positive about
resources from a budget perspective will happen. I can just
address it from what I know that we have done heretofore, and
how we are proceeding with issues as it relates to the surface
environment. Our FAMs are very flexible in using the VIPRs. In
the VIPRs, we have transportation inspectors. We have
behavioral detection officers. Often, there are K-9s as well.
What they do is they assess in their communities, in their
regions, where the highest risk is. They have communication
with rail, pipeline, and other surface entities to determine
where their best use would be, and they are then allocated and
they then serve to support what the state and local agencies
are doing in that area as well.
That indicates and I believe is the best use of our
resources to address where those high-risk areas are. Who knows
them best than the locals that are there. We partner with them
to move in that area. That is how we address the issues.
Senator Blumenthal. What would you say is the greatest
threat? I ride the train very frequently going back up to
Connecticut. What should I be looking for?
Mr. Carraway. What frightens me more so than anything else
in talking to our partners in Amtrak and others is that
individual that may be carrying a backpack or device of some
type to create harm.
Senator Blumenthal. With a bomb?
Mr. Carraway. Yes, of course.
Senator Blumenthal. How often have you found those kinds of
devices on trains?
Mr. Carraway. Well, we have not found any, but I believe
what the deterrent is, the deterrent such as the FAMs, Amtrak
Police, Port Authority officers, those are deterrents because
you never know where they may end up, and that is the
flexibility that the VIPRs actually bring to the table.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me shift topics for a moment. The
Pre3 system, who actually supervises and maintains control,
who actually runs that system?
Mr. Carraway. I am not exactly sure I understand your
question.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you, for example, determine when
Pre3 is open or not open at an airport?
Mr. Carraway. It is the TSA Federal Security Director (FSD)
in conjunction with the loads that may be happening at the
airport, the events that may be happening at the airport
environment. They look at what the schedules are with the
airlines, with the airports, and the FSD, the Federal Security
Director, is responsible for opening or closing the Pre3
lanes.
Senator Blumenthal. You as Acting Administrator do not have
control over that?
Mr. Carraway. No. That responsibility is to the Federal
Security Director; yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Finally, let me just say as a frequent
traveler and I interact with a lot of TSA public servants, and
they are almost uniformly very polite and careful and courteous
and professional, I have no personal complaints about them.
Have the complaints that you have received from the public
trended in one way or another?
Mr. Carraway. Thank you for that question. Before I left
the office, I was asking about that issue. I was pleasantly
pleased to find that 80 percent of the comments from the public
that we have received within the last six months have been
very, very positive.
Obviously, Pre3 has sort of helped that, but 80 percent of
them have been positive. I was very happy about that.
Senator Blumenthal. Great. My time has expired. I thank you
for being here.
Mr. Carraway. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Klobuchar?
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. Thank you so much, sorry I
have been a little late here. We had some things going on.
I wanted to start out with a pretty serious topic. In our
state, we have had now, since November, several people
attempting to travel to the Mideast to join ISIS and others
have joined in the past Al-Shabaab. In fact, we have had 20
indictments out of Minnesota, including nine convictions out of
the U.S. Attorney's Office for people that have tried to help
or have helped Al-Shabaab.
How is information such as the No Fly List or biometric
data being disseminated amongst allies to prevent someone
believed to have been trained by terrorists from boarding a
plane without additional scrutiny?
Mr. Carraway. We work very closely with our international
partners in regard to travel of individuals, selectees
particularly. Every morning, I have an intel briefing about the
Watch List and those on the No Travel List to prevent that from
happening. We monitor with the FBI, and other entities as well.
We are very robust in reviewing travel patterns. May I say
to you we are very cognizant of what is happening in your area.
I have a visit coming up fairly soon, hoping to address the
community there. We have been robust in our communication
outreach to hopefully address the issue of radicalization, and
we will continue to do that. I will be able to report back to
you on how successful----
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. That is the other part of the
concern, obviously. I know our U.S. Attorney has been working
with you on that. Thank you.
In 2012, the No Hassle Flying Act, which I introduced with
Senator Blunt, was signed into law. This legislation allows the
TSA to waive domestic baggage rescreening for luggage that has
already been screened by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at
a foreign airport, such as one of the eight airports in Canada
that actually have pre-clearance facilities. It was very
important they have those kinds of facilities.
How is implementation of this law proceeding?
Mr. Carraway. It is going fairly well. In fact, I had a
meeting yesterday with a couple of airlines about that issue.
Our Canadian partners are very, very engaged. Their use of
standards that we require has been continually met, which
obviously is a requirement. It is important they maintain to
the U.S. standards, and that has been done. We are engaged very
actively with them. Thank you for that.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Can you comment on the
effectiveness of this law as an example of risk-based security?
Mr. Carraway. Definitely. Again, these individuals are
vetted before they come through into U.S. ports, and that is
the beauty of this initiative. It allows them to move directly
to any other travel they have once they enter the U.S. with
their bags. It has been very, very effective.
Senator Klobuchar. We are really proud of our hub airport
in Minnesota, as you know. Have you been there?
Mr. Carraway. Yes, I have, love it.
Senator Klobuchar. Were you able to say that to Newark
and----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carraway. I love Newark Airport.
Senator Klobuchar. Yes, but we have like really cool
restaurants. All right. We have, as you saw, invested in a lot
of new infrastructure and modernized our facilities to improve
the traveler experience, and these efforts can also help make
your job easier by streamlining passenger flows by how we have
made some of these restructures.
However, this is the problem from our airport's
perspective, I just met with them last week. We find these new
structural ways to help with efficiency and then you guys
reduce your staffing, which is good, but then it neutralized
the benefits, then we are kind of back to the same staff lines.
Do you see what I mean?
Mr. Carraway. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar. We gained some efficiencies. Have you
heard this concern before, and how do you get at it? You want
to find that middle ground where you reduce some staffing, of
course, to save money, but then we still have some benefits
from expending the money on the infrastructure changes.
Mr. Carraway. The way I answer that is to remember that RBS
and Pre3 within itself is a security initiative. That when
applied appropriately can provide increase of passenger
experience.
When it comes to smaller airports, it is a difficult
balance in doing that. From our perspective, I always have to
put that security initiative first, which sometimes makes a
difficulty in smaller airports.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Carraway. You are welcome.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. Mr. Carraway, I wanted to ask
you, it is my understanding when we talk about the TSA Pre3
program that airport operators are eager to partner with TSA to
expand enrollment in Pre3 where appropriate.
What is your assessment of a direct role for airports in
enrolling perspective participants into the program using
airport capabilities and systems already in place at their
facilities? We obviously can look at how much it is going to
cost and if they are using existing facilities, that helps. Can
you update us on how we are engaging airports to increase
participation where appropriate?
Mr. Carraway. We are really looking forward to increasing
Pre3 enrollment. One of the things that we are looking to do
now is to engage a third party enrollment partner with us for
Pre3 as well. The airlines bringing international carriers
into the mix would increase enrollments as well.
As relates to the design and construction of airports, we
try to minimize taking up space in the airport because we know
that in a lot of places it is minimum. The airports today were
not constructed for some of the efforts that we are doing.
As they begin to roll out such as Indianapolis, Orlando has
done a significant change, Albuquerque, New Mexico has done a
significant change, we are able to put in those Pre3 lines and
they do not impact the airport in a negative sense.
What we look for to include enrollment, international
carriers, more frequent flyers if possible from the airlines,
to include more individuals or Government employees that have
been vetted with clearances already. Those are the efforts we
are trying to do right now in addition to the private sector
enrollment option.
Senator Ayotte. Just to follow up, you said you were
looking at engaging a third party contractor to help with this.
I know you had an RFP up previously in December, and then it
was removed. Can you explain to us why that was done, and do
you plan on republishing relatively soon?
Mr. Carraway. Yes. I had to pull back the RFP to do some
technical changes, wanted to make certain that the language we
were putting out would allow for all vendors, all those
interested, to participate.
I anticipate having that RFP back out to the public
probably within the next week.
Senator Ayotte. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Carraway. You are welcome.
Senator Ayotte. I also wanted to ask about the coordination
between airports and airlines, and what TSA is doing to ensure
effective coordination as you respond to questions from
travelers on new security initiatives or modified security
initiatives.
The other question I wanted to just get some insight on is
that we know that the checked baggage screening technology is
reaching the end of its useful life and needs to be replaced.
Many airports are unaware of the time-frame for replacement of
the systems. So how are you also communicating in terms of the
technology deployment plan with airport operators to ensure
they have enough time to modify their facilities to incorporate
new screening technology?
Mr. Carraway. Let me answer your last question first. We
realize that a lot of the equipment is coming to its years.
However, we believe that if we add new algorithms, we spiral
use this type of equipment, we can extend the life out of it.
We had those discussions with the airports.
We do not want to come to this committee or to others and
talk about purchasing new technology or new equipment without
testing it completely. We want to make certain that it also
meets our goals moving forward, that they are networked, that
it can provide us information about the systems, and our
success in detection capability efforts.
That is what is happening at this particular point. We are
engaged with the airports in just that discussion. As you well
know, there is not a great deal of money sitting to move those
forward, so we have to prioritize them, and we do that with
each of the airports.
Senator Ayotte. Great.
Mr. Carraway. In regards to your other question, I travel
extensively to meet with the CEOs of both the airlines and
those managers of airports constantly. What I do is talk about
the threat to them. I also talk to them about the operations. I
also talk to them about how Pre3 and our security efforts can
be increased.
More importantly, we are a regulatory agency as well, so I
want to make certain that issues such as perimeter security and
employee access issues are being addressed, and certainly how
they are operating within the environment.
Those are the things that I do constantly, and I have my
workforce, other managers, that do that as well.
Senator Ayotte. I certainly do not want to be outdone by
New Jersey or Minnesota. We would love to have you come visit
Manchester, New Hampshire, and let me just tell you that the
TSA agents that I interact with in New Hampshire are terrific,
and they are very professional. We would love to have you.
Mr. Carraway. May I tell you I have been to Manchester, and
what a wonderful airport. I think it is at the top of the list,
actually.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. We think it is at the top, too, so I am
glad you agree. Thank you. I would like to call on Senator
Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you so much, Chairwoman. I would like
to second that Mr. Manchin's pen knives are very important. I
might go out and buy him some now for his birthday.
In all seriousness, I have a lot of grave concern again
about surface transportation and surface protection. New York
City, or what I like to call the ``Greater Newark Metropolitan
Area,'' has a lot of dense rail traffic. We have seen what has
happened to subways, rail transit railways and the like
globally.
In the area between Elizabeth, Newark, New Jersey, and New
Jersey Turnpike, Amtrak's northeast corridor, Newark
International Airport, and the busiest sea port on the East
Coast, all overlap in what the FBI and Government officials
from New Jersey have called the most dangerous two miles in
America for terrorist targets.
It is incredibly busy, densely packed, and filled with
commerce and commuters. New Jersey is a great example of how
vulnerable our surface transportation systems are to a
potential devastating attack.
The TSA is critical and must do everything in their power,
in your power, to not just improve security at our airports,
but also along our highways, rail, transit lines, and ports.
I am concerned about a lower level of funding, especially
when it seems like a lot of work that was required to be done
six plus years ago has not been done, and because of my grave
concern for the surface transportation in this dense region, I
just want to ask if you would commit to working with me and my
staff to address these transportation security issues.
I am telling you right now again that if you look globally,
there have been hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of deaths
due to terrorist attacks on rail, on rail, on rail.
I am just hoping that you can commit today, and my staff is
prepared to work with you, just to try to push some of these
projects that have been languishing forward, as well as to
figure out what we can do to beef it up and invest more
resources more wisely in accordance with risk assessments that
you all are doing.
Mr. Carraway. Senator, I give you my commitment, I will
work with you and your staff to do just that.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much. The last really quick
question I have is I understand a TSA report from one year ago
considered but ultimately decided against requiring law
enforcement to be stationed at all times within 300 feet of TSA
security check points. The decision was instead to recommend
officers be stationed there only during peak travel times.
Obviously, we all want to stop bad guys or gals before they
get on a plane, and I have had law enforcement officers tell me
that having a police presence at all times available to
immediately respond at the TSA security check points is the
best way to be prepared. They are unarmed, these TSA officials.
If we have a situation like Los Angeles, at a non-peak time, it
puts TSA officers in jeopardy as well as passengers themselves.
Can you explain the thought process underpinning the
decision to only station law enforcement officers within 300
feet of the TSA's screening check points during peak travel
times? Really, why not all times?
Mr. Carraway. The short answer is resources. Many of the
airport authorities do not have the resources to address every
checkpoint. Every airport is not designed the same. Some
airports, Long Beach has extensive access points, so the
resources for them is just not possible for them to have a law
enforcement officer every time at the checkpoint.
What we do, what we have allowed to happen is for a minimum
time of response to emergencies, we put that in an agreement
with the law enforcement officers, the police departments there
at the airport, so they have an amount of time in which to
respond to issues that are happening there.
In addition, we have completed about 79 percent of the 450
airports in the U.S. and provided duress alarms at the TDC,
which is the travel document checker stations, at the X-ray
stations, and other critical component parts in the checkpoint
environment that are available.
We also have trained our officers about the active shooter
issue. We have done a video. We have done drills about
emergency access routes, things of that nature.
I believe we have done a yeoman's task in providing
knowledge, information, and availability from the law
enforcement perspective as well as security perspective.
Senator Booker. Mr. Carraway, I would just conclude by
saying that clearly you are putting in a lot of work and
effort, given the resources that you have, but I almost think
in requesting for the budget, this might be an area in which we
know we have a vulnerability.
I, for myself, who travels a lot, can travel all the way up
to the security check point with nobody checking my
identification, nobody assessing my risk, and literally be in a
position where I could do a tremendous amount of damage. Again,
like we saw in Los Angeles.
To me, when you have a lot of studies and even your own
thought about the importance of having an armed officer within
300 feet at all times, not to have it seems unacceptable.
I just came from a hearing earlier today about all of this
stuff we want to put down at the border costing billions and
billions of dollars, and we cannot come up with the resources
to put one armed officer within 300 feet to respond to a
situation that we have already seen happen in Los Angeles. That
seems a little weak to me, and again, not putting our
priorities to where the security risks exist.
Mr. Carraway. It is because realizing we will never have
all of the dollars and all the resources available to us. It is
the philosophy with in the RBS structure that we use those
resources at the place where we recognize the highest risks to
be.
Certainly, I will consider that, Senator, and look into it,
and discuss with other experts to see how that plays out.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you very
much, Chairman.
Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carraway, I am going to ask you a
couple more questions and then the Chairman of the Commerce
Committee, Senator Thune, is on his way. We will not hold you
too much longer unless Senator Klobuchar has anything else.
Senator Klobuchar. No.
Senator Ayotte. Great. I wanted to ask you a couple of
follow-up questions about the Acquisition Act that we had
talked about at the beginning. One of the issues I wanted to
follow up on was how the TSA is planning to interface with the
DHS Science and Technology Directorate to provide TSA
requirements for research and development investment.
Mr. Carraway. Just this past month, extensive meetings
between the DHS S&T and our Office of Science Technology as
well as Acquisitions about new technologies that are there, to
ensure they are a part of the network system, the long planning
initiative that we have for acquisitions of equipment and
technology.
They are the ones that actually will sometimes bring that
new technology to us. It is our responsibility to ensure it
meets the security perspective and meets the goals within our
existing technology and planning moving forward. It has been in
my estimation a very good partnership.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you. I see that the Chairman
of the Commerce Committee, Senator Thune, is here, and I would
like to call on him.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for holding
this hearing, and thank you, Mr. Carraway, for appearing before
us today.
Mr. Carraway. Nice seeing you again.
The Chairman. Yes, likewise, it is nice to see you again. I
do want to say, and I appreciate your service as Deputy
Administrator and now as Acting Administrator at TSA, that I
think it is critical to take steps to formally nominate an
individual to fill the Senate-confirmed position of
Administrator, and perhaps you will be that nominee.
But Administrator Pistole gave us plenty of notice as to
his intention to retire, over 5 months ago, and no action has
been taken by the White House.
As you may know, I along with many of my fellow committee
colleagues, wrote to the President in January urging him to
nominate such an individual. I am disappointed to report that
we have not yet received a response to that letter, much less a
formal nomination.
TSA has, of course, the important task of protecting the
nation's 660 million annual air travelers from terrorist
threats and attacks, and there certainly can be ramifications
as we witnessed last year when there was an one-year vacancy
with the Administrator at the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration as the agency experienced an all-time record
number of automobile safety recalls.
We have seen terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda that
continue to threaten western targets. We saw with the December
issue of al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine and its ``How-to Guide''
on crafting a non-metallic IED for use against aircraft.
For these reasons, it becomes all the more important to
have a Senate-confirmed leader. In addition to giving proper
weight to the counterterrorism activities of the TSA, I believe
a Senate-confirmed Administrator would also be in a better
position to address workforce and system access issues raised
by several recent reports of misconduct and potential
vulnerabilities.
Just last month, an investigative report documented alleged
misconduct among Federal Air Marshals who were inappropriately
reassigned from their allotted flights to facilitate trysts
with other agency personnel or to get better routes and
preferred destinations.
With respect to access to secure areas of airports, a
number of recent incidents have involved the secure
identification display area, or SIDA, badges that airline and
airport employees use on a daily basis.
This past December, it was revealed that a Delta ramp agent
in Atlanta allegedly used his SIDA badge to bypass TSA security
to further an interstate gun smuggling operation via commercial
aircraft.
In January, an Atlanta-based FAA Aviation Safety Inspector
used his SIDA badge to bypass TSA's security at the airport and
transport a firearm in his carry-on bag.
In addition, SIDA badges have reportedly been lost or
stolen in large numbers at Atlanta's airport, and it is unclear
whether this problem and other breaches in Atlanta are an
anomaly or the norm at our airports.
Today, Mr. Carraway, I am going to be sending you a letter
asking for additional details about these reported SIDA badge
abuses and breaches and any others that TSA knows about, and I
hope I can expect a quick response as well as information about
TSA's action plan in the meantime.
Finally, I want to say as part of the budget process, I
would note the Administration has proposed yet another fee hike
on the traveling public, and has even signaled more costs and
fees down the road. With airfares already high, I do not know
why the Obama Administration sees the wisdom in treating
airline passengers like a piggyback and jacking up fees, but I
would welcome any insights that you might be able to share on
that.
Thank you for appearing in front of the Committee today. My
comments about the need for the President to act are not
intended to be a reflection on you personally, and I hope you
understand that.
Mr. Carraway. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I just believe that having a Senate-confirmed
leader at the TSA matters, and I hope the President agrees. If
you expect to be nominated in a formal capacity, we would
certainly welcome that information.
Having said that--I am going to send this letter, can we
expect a quick reply to our letter on the SIDA issues?
Mr. Carraway. Most certainly.
The Chairman. Thank you. I also just want to ask about
TSA's efforts to expand and develop the Pre3 program for
trusted travelers. This is a program which is very popular with
enrollees and the general public, but the DHS Inspector General
recently reported concerns and recommendations regarding
Pre3's vetting and screening processes, as well as the
program's communication and coordination.
I understand TSA did not concur with all of the IG
recommendations. Without getting into classified information,
can you respond generally to the IG's concerns, and explain why
the agency does not agree with all of the IG's recommendations?
Mr. Carraway. I always appreciate the involvement of the
IG's Office in reviewing for us, but specifically the issue
within TSA Pre3 really is a security issue. Sometimes I think
that is lost on many that have an opportunity to see that,
because there is extensive vetting that really goes on, whether
in the checkpoint line, even before an individual actually
purchases his or her ticket, and in the vetting that goes on
once they sign up for and pay their $85, there is extensive
vetting going on.
Our simple issue with the report is about vetting that
really happens and an understanding of that operation.
The Chairman. Part of that IG report discussed reliance of
the Pre3 program on various airline frequent flyer programs.
Could you explain generally how frequent flyer enrollees are
currently incorporated into Pre3, to what extent previous
frequent flyer participants are subject to additional vetting,
and how they will be considered in this program in the future?
Mr. Carraway. Every participant into the system goes
through an adjudication process that we actually run in
addition to the normal biometric checks, identification checks,
that actually happen. In some cases, it is quite extensive
adjudication, making certain it is done properly. Even the fact
that they may be a frequent flyer does not give them the
guarantee they will get into the system.
The Chairman. Madam Chair, thank you for the hearing, and
Mr. Carraway, thank you.
Mr. Carraway. My pleasure. Good seeing you again. Thank
you, sir.
The Chairman. My time has expired.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman of the
Committee, and I want to thank Mr. Carraway for being here, and
certainly as Acting Administrator. We look forward to working
with you on these issues. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Carraway. Thank you very much.
Senator Ayotte. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kelly Ayotte to
Melvin Carraway
Question 1. The Screening Partnership Program allows airports to
apply to ``opt-out'' of TSA-administered screening and utilize private
vendors to perform the screening of passengers and baggage.
Participants must meet TSA standards and protocol, however. What is the
relationship between the airports, the TSA, and the private vendors
within the Screening Partnership Program? Which parties enter into the
contract?
Answer. Per the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of
2001 (P.L. 107-71), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
performs the Federal Government oversight role at each airport where
security screening services are provided. TSA's Screening Partnership
Program (SPP) manages the use of qualified private screening companies
to perform the screening of passengers and baggage at airports
participating in the Program. The airport is not a participant in the
Federal acquisition process.
The TSA Federal Security Directors (FSDs) are the final authority
over security in the screening operations at airports, independent of
whether a Federal workforce or qualified private screening company
performs the work. FSDs maintain oversight of SPP airports as Federal
employees and are responsible for all screening operations at the
airport. FSDs also ensure qualified private screening companies provide
effective and efficient security operations.
SPP contracts are signed by a warranted TSA Contracting Officer and
an authorized representative from the qualified private screening
company.
Question 2. Understanding that TSA standards and protocols govern,
is there room for flexibility when it comes to staffing hours to
maximize the potential benefits from working with private contractors?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) annually
estimates the number of productive hours needed for each airport. This
estimate is based on a wait time objective of ten minutes and a
combination of factors such as airport layout, equipment and passenger
demand. Productive hours take into account operational screening,
airport-specific screening related tasks, as well as recurrent
training.
Airport-specific information is presented in the TSA Request for
Proposals (RFP) that serves as the basis for soliciting proposals from
qualified private screening companies. These companies (called
``Offerors'' in the Federal procurement process) use the data from the
RFP to develop their proposed staffing plan to meet the airport-
specific passenger and baggage screening requirements.
The actual number of contract screeners (or headcount) may differ
from how the Federal Government would staff the airport. Each Offeror
has the flexibility to staff according to their specific airport
(proposed) solution. TSA routinely seeks efficiencies in federalized
screening operations and engages with SPP contractors to affect
contracting adjustments to improve SPP airport operations.
Question 3. What is the intended benefit for airports to apply for
the Screening Partnership Program? Is that benefit being achieved?
Answer. The Aviation & Transportation Security Act (ATSA) which
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) mandated a
pilot program in which airports could ``opt out'' of having a Federal
screening workforce. Instead, TSA would contract services to screen
passengers and baggage (including some cargo) for explosives, weapons,
and other prohibited items from a qualified vendor working under
Federal oversight. Five airports of different size and risk categories
participated in the pilot program and after its successful completion
these airports became the initial participants of the Screener
Partnership Program (SPP) which was then opened to all airports to
join.
The Federal Aviation Administration Modernization Act of 2012
states that TSA ``shall approve an application submitted by an airport
operator under subsection (a) if the Under Secretary determines that
the approval would not compromise security or detrimentally affect the
cost-efficiency or the effectiveness of the screening of passengers or
property at the airport.'' Contracts for security screening services
are awarded after an extensive evaluation of competitive proposals to
the best qualified vendor. The evaluation process validates that the
selected vendor meets the qualifications set forth by ATSA, the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act, and that a vendor has the appropriate
past performance, operational and program management approaches to
successfully meet the requirements of the contract.
Because participation in the SPP is voluntary, TSA remains neutral
with respect to whether airport operators decide to submit an
application to participate. It is TSA's understanding that each airport
applies to the SPP program with its own expectations of the benefits it
will achieve as a result. TSA is unable to state whether each airport
considers those benefits to have been achieved through participation in
SPP.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Melvin Carraway
Question 1. A yes-or-no answer to the following question: Are
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) Federal law enforcement
officers?
Answer. No.
Question 2. A yes-or-no answer to the following question: Do
Transportation Security Officers receive Federal law enforcement
training?
Answer. No, Transportation Security Officers do not receive the
same training that would be delivered to an armed Federal law
enforcement officer.
Question 3. A yes-or-no answer to the following question: Do
Transportation Security Officers receive any additional training that
was not provided to screeners?
Answer. No. A Transportation Security Officer (TSO) and a screener
are synonymous; therefore, their training is the same. The term
``Screener'' was used in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(Public Law 107-71). In 2006, the Transportation Security
Administration changed the position title to ``Transportation Security
Officer'' to better reflect the level of training and responsibility
associated with the position.
Question 4. A yes-or-no answer to the following question: Are
Transportation Security Officers eligible for Federal law enforcement
pay or retirement benefits that were not provided to screeners?
Answer. No.
Question 5. Please explain the difference between a screener and a
Transportation Security Officer.
Answer. A screener and Transportation Security Officer (TSO) are
synonymous. The term ``Screener'' was used in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71). In 2006, the
Transportation Security Administration changed the position title to
``Transportation Security Officer'' to better reflect the level of
training and responsibility associated with the position.
Question 6. A yes-or-no answer to the following question: Does TSA
need any additional authority from Congress to allow Transportation
Security Officers to carry a firearm or arrest and apprehend an
individual?
Answer. No. Existing statutory authority under 49 USC 114((n) and
(p)) allows the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to classify and designate an employee of TSA to
serve as a law enforcement officer; and such individuals are permitted
to carry a firearm, make arrests for violations of Federal law, and
seek and execute warrants. TSA has not exercised this authority for its
TSOs.
Question 7. How much money has TSA spent on metal TSO badges since
2007? Please provide the yearly amounts.
Answer. From calendar year 2008 through 2012, the Transportation
Security Administration ordered 66,036 badges for $1.2 million for
issuance to the Transportation Security Officers, and as replacement
badges for those that were damaged or lost. The below chart outlines
overall costs, as well as the yearly costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar Year Number of Badges Total Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 57,655 $1,030,789
2009 250 $4,605
2010 3,429 $65,700
2011 2,582 $52,125
2012 2,120 $43,926
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total 66,036 $1,197,145
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: TSA transitioned to metal badges in 2008
Question 8. Since 2008, how many Transportation Security Officer
metal officer badges have been reported lost or stolen?
Answer. As of April 24, 2015, since 2008, 1012 Transportation
Security Officer metal badges have been reported lost or stolen; 201
were recovered, leaving a total of 811 as lost or stolen. The
Transportation Security Administration's Transportation Security
Operations Center, upon report of a lost or stolen badge, inputs the
badge information into the National Crime Information Center database.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
REPORTED
REPORTED LOST RECOVERED TOTAL LOST
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 56 7 49
2009 169 26 143
2010 115 21 94
2011 152 38 114
2012 157 31 126
2013 160 38 122
2014 160 34 126
2015 43 6 37
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS 1,012 201 811
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 9. Since 2001, how many screeners or Transportation
Security Officers have been arrested?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
of Inspection has documented reports of 1,297 arrests of Transportation
Security Officers (TSO) between December 2002 and March 2015. To better
ensure that all employee arrests are reported, TSA recently implemented
a perpetual vetting program to conduct a check of various law
enforcement reporting programs for the purpose of capturing prior and
current arrests of current employees.
Question 10. How many screeners and Transportation Security
Officers have participated in Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams outside the aviation environment? Please provide
the yearly totals. Please also explain if Transportation Security
Officers receive any additional training before participating in a VIPR
team.
Answer. The current appropriation for the Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response Program (VIPR) supports 30 dedicated
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) located in the cities of Boston,
New York, and Washington, D.C.
In addition, airport Federal Security Directors in other locations
have provided TSO support for a limited number of VIPR operations in
their areas of responsibility during the past year (April 1, 2014-March
31, 2015). These VIPR operations have included approximately 30-40
additional TSOs nationwide, often for only one VIPR operation in
instances of surge requirements in the field.
No additional specialized training beyond their existing training
requirement is needed to deliver the screening capability for VIPR
operations outside of the aviation environment. Local transportation
security and law enforcement stakeholder partners can provide safety
and orientation training for all TSA personnel involved in these VIPR
operations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Melvin Carraway
Question 1. In recent years, TSA has undertaken efforts to
implement risk-based security (RBS) initiatives, focusing resources on
the highest-risk areas. One of the tools that TSA uses to conduct RBS
is the Secure Flight program, which is meant to identify a passenger's
security risk level before boarding a flight. A recent DHS OIG
investigation reported that a former domestic terrorist, who had served
time for homicide and explosives-related crimes, qualified as ``low
risk'' through Secure Flight. What factors contributed to this
assessment?
The Secure Flight programs draws its watchlist information from
Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. How is TSA working
to strengthen the cybersecurity protocols for the sensitive databases
that the Secure Flight program uses to assess passenger risk?
Answer. Secure Flight relies heavily on information from the
national law enforcement and national intelligence communities. Before
an individual is allowed into a TSA Pre3 expedited screening lane,
Secure Flight matches the passenger against terrorism databases and
watchlists to determine if the passenger is inhibited from flying (a
``No Fly''), designated for enhanced screening (a ``Selectee''), or
prohibited from expedited screening through TSA Pre3 because of other
disqualifying activities (e.g., a record of bringing a prohibited item
to a checkpoint). If a passenger is not excluded from TSA Pre3 under
these three circumstances, then Secure Flight uses information provided
in the passenger/flight data to establish whether the individual is
suitable for expedited screening.
In this specific instance, this individual was not in the U.S.
Government's Terrorist Screening Database and therefore was not
identified as an individual who was inhibited from flying or who was
designated for enhanced screening, or who was prohibited from being
eligible for expedited screening through TSA Pre3 for other
disqualifying activities. TSA continues to review intelligence and
threat data to determine a traveler's risk category and the risk
assessment rules used by Secure Flight to determine whether an
individual will be granted TSA Pre3 eligibility for expedited
screening.
TSA continually works to strengthen the cybersecurity protocols of
the Secure Flight program through the implementation of an enterprise
security monitoring suite and a continuous monitoring program designed
to identify threats early, keep up with evolving threats, and reduce
overall risk. In 2013, the Secure Flight program participated in an
extensive Red Team assessment conducted by the National Security Agency
(NSA) with positive results and minimal findings. TSA implemented
system improvements to enhance our security posture based on
recommendations from NSA. The program continues to focus its efforts
toward identifying possible security vulnerabilities and implementing
enhancements to improve cybersecurity protocols.
Question 2. In 2010, there were allegations of misconduct and
discrimination at the Federal Air Marshal Service's (FAMS) Orlando
field office. In response, I wrote to the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG) to review those
allegations. While the report did not find widespread misconduct, it
did raise some red flags about the FAMS.
According to a recent news report, a TSA employee with
responsibility for dispatching Federal air marshals manipulated
schedules to facilitate an inappropriate relationship with a Federal
Air Marshal. Though I may withhold final judgement until this matter is
thoroughly investigated, I am deeply concerned about repeated acts of
alleged misconduct with the FAMS. What is TSA doing to ensure that the
traveling public remains priority number one for the FAMS and to
eliminate this vulnerability?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has a zero
tolerance for employee misconduct, and has strong processes in place to
address such problems when they come to light. The Office of
Inspections is responsible, along with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Inspector General, for investigating and establishing
the factual record. The Office of Professional Responsibility
determines the appropriate administrative action and ensures that due
process is provided in order to protect an employee's rights. In the
event that criminal misconduct is discovered, the case will be referred
for review to the U.S. Department of Justice.
In June 2014, the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals
(OLE/FAMS) Assistant Administrator directed a review of the OLE/FAMS
Systems Operations Control Section to identify and resolve potential
vulnerabilities related to Federal Air Marshal (FAM) mission flight
scheduling processes. Due to the complex nature of the scheduling
process, a dedicated group of employees with significant experience in
FAM mission scheduling was charged with performing an overarching
evaluation of current practices and procedures. This review resulted in
a number of mitigation efforts which have been implemented and include:
Increased supervisory oversight of daily operations;
Implementation of additional checks and balances through
separation of critical functions;
Enhanced system access controls; and,
Standup of an internal unit to conduct continuous business
process and operational assessments.
Protecting the traveling public remains the priority of TSA and its
OLE/FAMS office. The vast majority of OLE/FAMS employees are comprised
of dedicated, honorable professionals whose mission is focused on the
safety and security of individuals traveling domestically and
internationally. OLE/FAMS has implemented several important programs to
recognize these individuals and further instill and promote integrity,
professionalism and accountability. A few of these initiatives include
increased recognition of employee performance and accomplishments from
TSA and DHS leadership, field office visits from OLE/FAMS senior
leaders, and increased mentoring and training opportunities.
Question 3. Last year, it was discovered that airport personnel
were engaged in a gun running operation at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson
Airport, where firearms were smuggled around TSA screening checkpoints
and loaded on planes bound for New York's John F. Kennedy Airport.
More recently, it was reported that hundreds of airport personnel
security credentials, known as SIDA badges, have been lost or stolen
from employees at Atlanta and other airports nationwide.
As part of TSA's response, you have asked that the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee develop recommendations for airport
personnel security procedures; that review is ongoing. Certain aviation
stakeholders have expressed concerns that the logistics of 100 percent
physical screening of employees is not practical, do you believe more
can be done to improve these employee security processes without
creating unachievable security mandates?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is taking
additional steps to address the potential insider threat vulnerability
at U.S. airports. These steps follow a 90-day Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) comprehensive review. Immediate actions
include: (1) Recurrent background checks for all aviation workers; (2)
Requiring airport and airline employees traveling as passengers to be
screened by TSA prior to travel; (3) Reducing the number of access
points to secured areas; (4) Increasing aviation employee screening, to
include additional randomization screening throughout the workday; and
(5) Re-emphasizing situational awareness programs and encouraging
detection and reporting of threat activity. TSA is also continuing to
analyze the recommendations of the ASAC report to identify additional
mitigating measures for future implementation. The ASAC report did
conclude that 100 percent physical employee screening would not
completely eliminate potential risks, but would divert critical
resources from other critical security functions to mitigate other
risks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Melvin Carraway
Question 1. The administration's budget request for Fiscal Year
2016 seeks $5.6 billion for aviation security--but just $124 million
for surface transportation security. The budget request also seeks to
reduce the number of TSA employees working on transportation security
by almost five percent. What this means is that efforts like TSA's
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) (pronounced
``viper'') program will be reduced. As you know, VIPR teams consist of
TSA officials and local law enforcement officials who conduct periodic
patrols of transit and passenger rail systems and create a visual
deterrent to would-be terrorists. But the budget reduces the number of
teams from 33 to 31. Is TSA putting enough resources toward our surface
transportation security network? Does TSA have enough manpower to carry
out its mission to protect railroads, transit and ports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
sufficient resources to successfully carry out the mission of
protecting the surface modes of transportation, which includes mass
transit, passenger rail, freight rail, highways, pipeline, and maritime
modes. With the available resources, TSA secures the surface modes
through sector and modal planning efforts, operational deterrence
support through inspections and Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams, training, screening and detection programs,
regulations, and vulnerability and risk assessments.
Much of TSA's success is based on collaboration with security
partners at the Federal, State, and local levels, where much of the
resources and efforts exist.
An example of TSA's collaborative approach to voluntary security
efforts with stakeholders is through use of its VIPR program resources
to respond to areas with the highest terrorist risk in both surface and
aviation modes. The VIPR program is currently updating its Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) to further increase its risk-based focus and
personnel utilization. The CONOPS framework is based on aligning risk
mitigation capabilities by evaluating potential deployment locations
against the appropriate Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment
(TSSRA) scenarios. As resource levels vary, the program will apply the
CONOPS to add or reduce deployment levels consistent with the TSSRA
risk profile, maximizing mitigation at locations of highest risk.
Question 2. In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53). That
legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security--through the
TSA--to create a regulatory framework that addresses the threats facing
our passenger and freight rail systems and transit agencies. Among
other things, the legislation directs DHS and TSA to do the following:
Approve security plans for all railroads that are considered
vulnerable, high-risk targets for a terrorist attack (Section
1512);
Issue regulations that establish training standards on
potential security threats and conditions for frontline
employees at public transportation agencies, railroads and bus
providers (Sections 1408, 1517 and 1534); and
Provide a framework for conducting name-based security
background checks and immigration status checks on all
frontline employees at public transportation agencies and
railroads (Sections 1411, 1520 and 1522).
The legislation was enacted in August 2007 and these items were all
due within one year of that date. Yet it is now more than six years
since the latest deadline, and we still do not have final action on
many of the legislation's requirements.
Failure to complete all the mandates of the legislation raises
questions about attention to urgent priorities and whether we are
prepared for any and all emerging threats on the horizon. Mr. Carraway,
why is it taking so long to carry out these mandates? When will these
actions be complete?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to move forward on the implementation of mandates required by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public
Law 110-53 (9/11 Act). TSA is developing the proposed rule required
under Section 1512, as well as a proposed rule to integrate the
training requirements for three surface modes into a single rule to
meet the requirements of Sections 1408 (public transportation), 1517
(railroads), and 1534 (over-the-road buses). TSA has obtained input on
current programs and costs in light of efforts by both stakeholders and
the government since September 11, 2001, to raise the baseline of
security for public transportation, railroads, and buses, and
incorporate a more risk-based approach to fulfilling the requirements
of the 9/11 Act.
The details included in the 9/11 Act's regulatory requirements have
served as guidance to both the industry and government as they have
worked together to develop programs and prioritize resources to raise
the security baseline for public transportation, railroads, and buses.
The current baseline across the industry resulting from voluntary
efforts is very close to what TSA would expect to see once the 9/11
Act's regulatory requirements are implemented. TSA has prioritized the
development and distribution of security training resources for surface
transportation frontline employees through modally-specific training
products, which improves assessment results across all modes of surface
transportation. With this targeted effort on security training, TSA has
seen assessment results related to security training improve across all
modes of surface transportation. As a result, TSA anticipates the
majority of highest-risk systems would need, at most, minor
enhancements to their current security programs to satisfy the proposed
requirements and ensure the permanency of this important level of
security.
TSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consider the
training rule among their highest priorities. The DHS goal, consistent
with the Unified Agenda, is to submit a proposed rule to the Office of
Management and Budget by the end of the calendar year. TSA has
requested information from stakeholders on current training levels and
is analyzing the results to evaluate costs and benefits of the
regulatory requirements.
In addition, TSA is developing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
satisfy the requirements of Sections 1411, 1520, and 1522. TSA will
determine through the surface training rule who will require vetting
based on risk. Once that is complete, TSA can define the vetting
standard that will apply.
Finally, TSA is developing a comprehensive vetting capability which
will allow the addition of new populations to the vetting system. The
Technology Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) creates a person-centric
system that will eliminate redundant background checks and streamline
credentialing services. Once completed, TIM, coupled will a common
universal fee structure also under development, will enable TSA to add
new vetted populations, including those required by the 9/11 Act.
Question 3. The TSA is charged with the tremendous task of keeping
the country's aviation and surface transportation networks safe. The
agency has faced countless threats and has been critical in thwarting
them. There have been changes in technology, developments in assessing
risks, and evolutions in the types of threats the Nation faces, and the
TSA has the hard job of keeping pace with it all.
At the forefront of these efforts are the TSA agents that interface
daily with the traveling public. They are the face of the agency and
the ones that have the closest interactions with civilians. They also
face the greatest risk as they put their lives on the line to protect
against attacks to transportation networks.
The role these agents play is undoubtedly crucial to the safety of
the traveling public, but as I looked through the letters I've received
about the TSA from constituents in my preparation for TSA's presence
before the committee, the message was overwhelming that many people
feel that they are mistreated and at times intimidated by TSA agents.
Mr. Carraway: In many ways TSA is the face of the Federal
government--TSA employees encounter hundreds of thousands of passengers
day-to-day. How much training time is devoted to the treatment of
passengers? Are there currently plans in place to improve the treatment
of the traveling public?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
continually provides training to its officer workforce to help them
understand the importance of effective communications and the courteous
treatment of individuals processed through security checkpoints. TSA's
officer workforce is required to take basic new hire training comprised
of classroom and on-the-job training (OJT), and must successfully
complete annual requirements of TSA's National Training Plan (NTP),
comprised of web-based and instructor-led training courses. A common
theme throughout training is the importance of professionalism,
respect, courtesy and integrity.
New hire officer candidate training is infused with the key
principles necessary for a professional Transportation Security Officer
(TSO) workforce, and includes specific lessons focused on the TSA's
Code of Conduct; Customer Focused Security; and Communications and
Active Listening. The new hire officer candidate training also includes
64 hours of classroom training and an OJT training program, which takes
nearly 150 hours to complete, depending upon the new hire's ability to
demonstrate proficiency for each of the screening procedures.
TSA's ongoing training for the officer workforce is mandated
through the NTP, developed annually, which includes general and
technical training. This mandatory training (approximately 65 hours)
focuses the officers' attention on effectively using critical thinking
skills to help facilitate the screening process through communication
and courteous treatment of passengers.
In 2013, TSA initiated an ``Image Awareness'' training series to
review core expectations with the officer workforce using current
events and references. The training is a facilitated discussion between
leadership and the officers, and has thus far focused on TSA's core
value of integrity, the agency's Code of Conduct, and overall
performance expectations. The third installment is focused on customer/
passenger engagement and will be released this summer.
TSA has also introduced a series of training courses for its front
line TSO leadership team, to include Leads, Supervisors and Managers.
These courses are the ``Essentials of Leading, Supervising, or Managing
Screening Operations,'' which are delivered at TSA's Training Academy
at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) facility at
Glynco, GA (for uniformed Leads and Supervisors--2 week courses), and
TSA's Training Center at Atlantic City, NJ (for Managers--1 week
course). These courses focus on helping the leadership team understand
how to use communications tools and practices to build a strong
professional screening team at the checkpoint and baggage screening
areas. The use of TSA's Training Academy, located at the FLETC at
Glynco, GA, has yielded positive feedback from the attendees, and has
demonstrated TSA's commitment to the development of a professional
workforce.
TSA plans to continue its efforts to provide training to its
officer workforce, strengthen passenger engagement, and improve
communication skills. The Image Awareness Series will be used to
deliver 1-2 new sessions each year for the entire workforce. The
planned migration of new hire officer candidate training to the TSA
Academy at the FLETC facility over the next four to five years will
increase the ability of TSA to fully explain and emphasize its
expectations regarding professionalism and passenger engagement to its
new hires at the start of their TSA careers into the professional
culture of TSA.
Question 4. Mr. Carraway: The GAO has reported that the TSA
Behavior Detection and Analysis program methodology has not been
completely validated. Are you concerned that some of the BDA practices
lead to the mistreatment of innocent passengers? What is being done to
correct and improve agent interactions with the public?
Answer. Behavior detection and analysis is a critical layer in the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) risk-based security
system, as passengers are observed for behaviors which may indicate
that an individual poses a threat to transportation security. These
techniques, including observation and verbal engagement, have been an
accepted practice for many years within the law enforcement, customs
and border enforcement, defense, and security communities. In April
2011, the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate (DHS S&T) completed a comprehensive study that examined the
validity of using behavior indicators in order to identify high-risk
passengers. The study found that TSA's program provided a number of
screening benefits and is more effective than random selection at
identifying high-risk passengers. While S&T and GAO both noted some
deficiencies in the methodology used as a part of the study, it was an
important step in assessing the technique in an operational
environment.
In addition, the program continues to improve and evolve. Since the
2011 Validation Study, TSA revised indicators based on the research
literature; provided improved standardized information for each
indicator (e.g., operational definitions, assessment criteria, further
information); improved processes such as revising thresholds,
terminology changes, and providing greater emphasis on critical aspects
(e.g., passenger interaction); and enhanced training.
In 2012, TSA began a third party, independent review by the
American Institutes for Research, to test, refine and strengthen the
unique indicators used by the officers to detect ill intent. This
review was completed in 2014. TSA continues to work with the Government
Accountability Office, meeting with them as recently as last month, in
addressing all of their recommendations.
Additionally, TSA has taken, and continues to take, great strides
to ensure the screening workforce receives clear guidance and training
to prevent any form of unlawful profiling. TSA has reiterated the
agency's zero tolerance policy for unlawful profiling through shift
briefs, job aids, yearly pledge, and management communications to TSA's
workforce. TSA training documents have been reviewed and revised to
emphasize that unlawful profiling violates agency policy and anti-
discrimination laws.
Question 5. Connecticut has five general aviation (GA) airports.
These airports have a tremendous impact on the local communities and
economies that they serve by improving the operational efficiency of
the businesses in the surrounding areas.
Although these airports are important, they are not large enough
nor do they generate enough revenue to adequately address security
needs without the help of the TSA. Oftentimes, the GA community cites
the increase in cost and logistical restraints in any attempts to shift
a greater share of the security burden from the TSA to GA stakeholders.
Mr. Carraway: The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act directs the TSA to create a standardized risk assessment
program for GA airports as well as establish a grant program to
strengthen GA airport security. What is the status of each directive?
What can be done to increase the efficiency of the coordination
efforts between the TSA and GA airports to improve GA security without
making it more costly?
Do you believe the TSA can play a larger role in GA airport
security?
Answer. In response to the requirements of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) formed the General Aviation (GA) Stakeholder
Strategic Engagement planning committee to develop and design GA
stakeholder engagement initiatives. This engagement led to a table top
exercise in 2012 that included 98 GA participants from 28 GA
organizations. The goal was to improve GA capabilities in the areas of
prevention, protection, and threat mitigation. As a result of lessons
learned during the exercise, TSA published and shared with stakeholders
the GA Strategic Engagement Report.
TSA continues to work with GA airports and stakeholders on a
regular basis to evaluate risk-based security best practices without
increasing costs to the GA community. For example, TSA conducted a
Threat and Vulnerability Assessment of General Aviation and shared
these results with the GA community. TSA worked with aviation partners
to develop an Airport Characteristics Measurement Tool to provide
standardized risk assessment information and GA Airport Security
Guidelines. TSA also partnered with GA airports to implement the GA
Secure Hotline program for airport and aircraft operators to facilitate
reporting of suspicious activity. TSA, in accordance with the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, drafted a GA
airport security grants program. However, in the budget process at that
time, due to resource allocation and comparative risk assessment,
funding was not allocated for this effort.
TSA develops its annual budget request based on reducing risk and
maximizing security effectiveness in a cost efficient manner. TSA
remains committed to working with Congress and GA airports to develop
innovative methods to improve security without additional cost to the
GA community.
Question 6. Our railroads and transit systems are a vital, integral
parts of American life--especially in dense, urban places like the
Northeast Corridor, the region of the state I represent. The 9/11
Commission urged us to vigilantly protect the ``neglected parts of our
transportation security system'' like and rail and transit--just as
much as we protect aviation. ``Surface transportation systems such as
railroads and mass transit remain hard to protect because they are so
accessible and extensive,'' the commission warned. Late last year,
Iraq's prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, claimed he had information that
the Islamic State planned to attack targets throughout Europe and the
United States, including ``the metros of Paris and the U.S.'' U.S.
officials claimed his assertions were unfounded, but still they raise
vital reminders about transit and rail security, especially in light of
high-profile attacks in recent years on rail systems in Madrid, Mumbai,
Moscow and London.
Our country's public transportation and passenger rail systems are
used by tens of millions every day and serve as the backbone of
economic activity throughout the country. They carry nearly five times
as many people per day as our airlines do. Penn Station in New York
City handles half a million passengers a day--making it busier than all
three New York City regional airports combined, and the busiest
transportation hub in our country.
It's critical we ensure that rail and transit systems are safe and
secure for all who rely on them. Our freight rail network is also
critical to our economy, and a recent surge in shipments of crude by
rail has raised questions about terrorist threats to crude oil trains.
An attack on these systems could harm tens of thousands and disrupt an
economy depended upon by millions. TSA is the agency responsible for
surface transportation security--in addition to its aviation
responsibilities.
Mr. Carraway: What efforts are you taking to ensure our Nation's
vast and expansive surface transportation network is secure and not
``neglected,'' as the 9/11 Commission warned?
Answer. An integral part of the surface transportation security
effort is engaging stakeholders in developing effective operational
security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) engages with
Federal, State, local, and private sector partners to identify ways to
assess risk, develop voluntary security standards, reduce
vulnerabilities, and improve security through collaborative efforts.
These efforts cover mass transit, passenger rail, freight rail,
highways, pipeline, and, with the United States Coast Guard, maritime
modes.
As an example, TSA and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) have a long-standing security partnership through programs
designed to deter terrorist activity through expanded random,
unpredictable security activities. Amtrak has also expanded
coordination with other rail and public transportation agencies and
local law enforcement through the Regional Alliance Including Local,
State and Federal Efforts (RAILSAFE) program. Operation RAILSAFE is a
coordinated effort involving counterterrorism activities such as
heightened station and right-of-way patrols, increased security
presence on board trains, explosives detection canine sweeps, and
random passenger bag inspections. On average, more than 40 states and
over 200 agencies participate, including TSA's Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams.
TSA also conducts system-level reviews of mass transit agencies,
passenger railroads (including Amtrak), and over-the-road bus operators
through the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE)
program. BASE assessments are conducted by TSA's Transportation
Security Inspectors-Surface with emphasis on the 100 largest mass
transit and passenger railroad systems and over-the-road bus operations
as measured by passenger volume. This group accounts for over 80
percent of all users of public transportation.
TSA also requires freight rail and passenger rail entities to
designate a security coordinator and report significant security
concerns and, for rail cars containing rail security-sensitive
materials, certain freight rail entities must comply with chain of
custody and control requirements and provide location and shipping
information. TSA continues to work with freight railroads, at the
corporate and field levels, to identify risks and incorporate risk-
mitigating activities into the railroads' operational plans and
practices and regulatory compliance.
Additionally, TSA facilitates Intermodal Security Training and
Exercise Program (I-STEP) exercises to help surface transportation
entities test and evaluate their prevention and preparedness
capabilities and their ability to respond to threats. As new threats
emerge, I-STEP scenarios are updated to ensure industry partners are
prepared to exercise the most appropriate countermeasures.
TSA has also developed and distributed security training resources
for surface transportation frontline employees such as TSA-produced
training modules and grant program funding. TSA's First
ObserverTM program trains highway professionals to observe,
assess, and report potential security and terrorism incidents. Finally,
TSA partners with the Federal Emergency Management Agency to allocate
transit security grants under the Transit Security Grant Program
(TSGP), which allows state and local entities to mitigate terrorism
risk through operational deterrence activities such as counterterrorism
teams, mobile screening teams, explosives detection canine teams,
training, drills/exercises, and public awareness campaigns; site
hardening; equipment purchases; and other capital security
improvements. Between FY 2006 and FY 2014, approximately $2.1 billion
in TSGP funding was awarded to public mass transit owners and
operators, including Amtrak and their dedicated law enforcement
providers.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Cory Booker to
Melvin Carraway
Question 1. Northeastern New Jersey is a densely packed area filled
with commerce and commuters, and an example of how vulnerable our
surface transportation systems are to a potentially devastating attack.
The TSA must do everything in your power to not just improve security
at our airports but also along our highways, rail, transit lines, and
ports.
Acting Administrator Carraway, Newark is part of a major seaport.
In the coming years the volume of cargo at the port is expected to
dramatically increase. What steps is the TSA taking to help local,
state, and Federal agencies inspect cargo and ensure security at our
country's major ports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works very
closely with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to ensure security at our country's major
ports. Per the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, USCG is
the lead for maritime-related security initiatives. Since 2010, the
Newark port area has received over $1.3 million in direct awards and
$64 million in combined awards under the Port Security Grant Program
(PSGP) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for
where projects that encompass the Ports of New York, New Jersey, and
Newark.
TSA also supports maritime security efforts in several important
ways, including the following:
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
Program: The TWIC Program is a strategic security partnership
among the USCG, TSA, and the private sector that verifies the
identity and conducts security threat assessments of
individuals seeking unescorted access to secure port areas. The
TWIC Program further enables maritime vessel and facility
operators to make informed access-control decisions. TSA is
responsible for enrollment, conduct of security threat
assessments, systems operations and maintenance related to TWIC
card issuance. The USCG is responsible for enforcement of
regulations governing the use of TWIC cards at regulated
facilities and vessels.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program:
TSA's VIPR teams partner with state and local law enforcement
officers to operate throughout the transportation system,
including port areas and terminals, as an additional layer of
security. TSA has conducted more than 5,500 VIPR operations at
maritime locations since the program's inception in 2005.
National Canine Program: Ten TSA canine teams are currently
dedicated to maritime sector and 76 multi-modal teams can
deploy to maritime assets based on ongoing threat information.
Question 2. I am proud of the TSA workers making sacrifices and
putting themselves at risk to protect Americans as they carry out their
duties, and I am concerned about the low morale reported in the agency.
For years critical government employees have seen their pay remain
stagnant. This problem is especially troubling for TSA workers, because
they do not benefit from most of the Title 5 rights that are
commonplace for workers in other agencies, such as the G.S. pay scale.
In addition, I have heard concerns from my constituents that work for
TSA about ongoing efforts to reduce wait times for travelers, which is
making it more challenging for workers to properly screen bags and
people.
Acting Administrator Carraway, can you explain what steps TSA is
taking to improve morale among the workforce?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is taking
many steps to improve morale among the workforce. TSA analyzes results
from workforce opinion surveys, such as the Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey (FEVS), on an annual basis and targets high priority areas for
improvement through local (e.g., airport, office) and TSA-wide action
plans. TSA focuses improvement action planning in leadership
development, improving communication to the workforce, and engaging
employees in problem solving. Some of the methods by which TSA is
targeting employee morale concerns include:
Soliciting input on agency improvements from the workforce
through its IdeaFactory, an online forum for TSA employees to
share ideas and suggestions.
Launching a blog targeted towards mid and senior leaders to
stress the importance and provide examples of good engagement
practices.
Expanding opportunities for leadership courses and
leadership development programs.
Creating a learning, engagement and development portal
called Success U that equips employees with the information and
resources they need to improve themselves and the organization,
including free career coaching resources and mentoring program
opportunities.
Conducting action planning at the supervisor/team level
emphasizing ownership in team improvement. Recently launched at
10 large airports, these teams have seen improvements in key
areas such as communication and career development.
Question 3. Have you considered expanding Title 5 rights to TSA
workers?
Answer. In 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA), Public Law 107-71, which established the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as an excepted service
agency. Under ATSA, as stated in 49 USC Sec. 114(n), TSA employees are
covered under the personnel management system of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), as set forth in 49 USC Sec. 40122(g) and subject
to the requirements of Section 40122, the TSA Administrator may make
modifications to the FAA personnel management system. Specifically,
Section 40122(g) explains that Title 5 shall not apply to this
personnel management system, with the exception of specific enumerated
sections. Therefore, the General Schedule (GS) pay system established
under Title 5 is not applicable to either TSA or FAA without statutory
changes.
While TSA is not covered by the GS pay system, TSA's Core
Compensation System is composed of pay bands and applies to all
employees who are not in the Transportation Security Executive Service.
This system is used to determine employee pay and covers employees in a
fair and equitable manner. TSA also has goal and competency-based
performance management systems for all employees that allow supervisors
and managers to recognize and reward high performers through salary
increases and performance awards.
Question 4. What steps are you taking to address concerns in your
workforce that speeding up lines is making it harder for TSA workers to
do their jobs properly and keep our country safe?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken
multiple steps to engage and educate the workforce on the principles of
risk-based security (RBS), and in the process, giving them a more
complete understanding of how providing expedited screening to
passengers deemed low-risk enables TSA to focus resources on higher
risk passengers. Leadership provided several tools to the field to
further this understanding, including Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP), a Frequently Asked Questions website, and an Implementation
Guide.
TSA Headquarters also hosts a monthly teleconference call with the
field personnel to provide information on various topics such as TSA
Pre3, technical guidance, and policy/program changes. In December
2014, TSA created and began dissemination of a monthly newsletter
compiled of technology, field briefings, program updates, and
operational data.
Further, TSA has implemented the Operations Network for Employees
initiative to foster collaborative and productive working relationships
between headquarters and the frontline workforce. This is a multi-phase
initiative, which includes bringing field employees to TSA Headquarters
to act as a voice for their peers and to gain a better understanding of
how decisions are made and how programs are deployed to the field. The
initial working groups from the field helped headquarters personnel
identify that a better understanding of RBS principles is needed. As a
result, TSA is committed to developing additional training overviews on
key RBS components to share with field personnel.
Question 5. I applaud the TSA for working diligently to implement a
risk-based security (RBS) initiative that improves efficiency and
strengthens security. However, I am concerned about proposed changes to
the cornerstone of the TSA's RBS program, TSA Precheck. In December
2014, TSA issued a request for proposals (RFP) to update the TSA
Precheck database system without the requirement to include FBI
database screening in the process. While the RFP was quickly withdrawn,
this proposal indicates that TSA is considering a major shift in
policy. As you know, the TSA utilizes FBI-certified contractors to
fingerprint pre-check applicants and transmit those fingerprints to the
FBI for cross-matching with their criminal database. I would like more
information from the TSA on the change in policy indicated in the
December 2014 RFP, because I am concerned that relying entirely on
commercial databases to screen TSA Precheck applicants could threaten
safety.
Acting Administrator Carraway, why did the December 2014 RFP not
include an FBI channeling requirement?
Does eliminating the FBI database requirement weaken the vetting
process?
Answer. While the existing TSA Pre3 Application Program does
require a criminal history background check based on fingerprint
submission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recognizes that there may
be other avenues for completing a criminal history check available to
vendors using capabilities currently utilized as best practices in
industry.
The Request for Proposal (RFP) released in December 2014 had asked
prospective vendors to propose their approaches to completing the
criminal background check prior to submitting the applicant to TSA.
While the current TSA process would serve as a baseline, vendors could
also propose an alternate process to achieve the same outcomes using
different capabilities. The RFP had required that, before any alternate
processes for conducting criminal history checks could be implemented,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate would need to test and evaluate the proposal. DHS and TSA
would analyze the testing results to determine if the solutions meet
TSA threat assessment standards, as well as remain consistent with
privacy and civil rights and civil liberty policies. Any vendor
solution that did not pass testing would not have been implemented.
TSA removed the RFP in order to make clarifying technical changes
and expects to repost it in the near future.
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