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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE
IN AFGHANISTAN: POST-2014 TRANSITION,
RISKS, AND LESSONS LEARNED**
—

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**U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN
AFGHANISTAN: POST-2014 TRANSITION, RISKS,
AND LESSONS LEARNED**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 4, 2015.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. “MAC” THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Today the House Armed Services Committee meets to discuss the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

We have been engaged in military action in Afghanistan for 14 years. The predictions that this would be a long conflict have proven accurate.

While there have been setbacks in recent years, there is also cause for cautious optimism. The United States and its allies, especially the Afghan forces, have made some meaningful gains.

A counterinsurgency is one of the toughest types of war a democracy can fight. While this conflict has been a difficult one, it is not impossible. And both our future security and the future of the Afghan people depend on our success.

The people in Afghanistan currently have, in my opinion, the best opportunity for a stable, relatively peaceful country that they have had in over four decades. Together with the cooperation of our allies and the Kabul government, we have built a 352,000-strong Afghan National Security Force [ANSF]. Although building a capable security force takes time, the ANSF is growing in ability and capability.

But now is a critical moment. We must not repeat the mistakes of Iraq, where an early withdrawal that was based, in my view, on political rather than strategic calculations contributed to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL], where an enemy once devastated has reconstituted itself to pose an even bigger, more deadly threat.

Although the operational outlook is very different than Iraq, Afghanistan could also become unstable should the United States end the mission before the Afghan forces are capable of providing their own security. We should not have, in my view, a time-based withdrawal from Afghanistan, and I hope that the President reconsid-

ers his—the approach he has previously announced and listens to the request of President Ghani.

Today I hope to hear answers on some important questions, such as: What objectives must be met to secure our gains? What are the key tactical and operational challenges facing the ANSF? And, is our presence and the allied presence in Afghanistan adequate to meet those challenges?

Finally, as Congress considers the President's counter-ISIL AUMF [authorization for use of military force] request, some of our questions are what implications that would have on ongoing and future operations against ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan.

And we are fortunate to have General Campbell with us to answer these and many other questions today, but before turning to him I would yield to the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Smith.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing.

I want to thank General Campbell for being here and also for his service. I think he is the absolute right man for the job in Afghanistan. Certainly he has had a lot of experience there in a number of different roles during our conflict in Afghanistan.

And I think there has been progress just since General Campbell took over, and I will go ahead and give you all the credit for this. They finally arrived at a power-sharing arrangement within the Afghan government; signed a bilateral security agreement; and really laid the foundation, at least, to build off that solid government and build a partnership, unlike in Iraq, where we had, you know, very, very strong difficulty getting any sort of bilateral security agreement that would allow us to stay. We have achieved that.

As the chairman mentioned, President Ghani wants us to be there, and hopefully we can make that relationship work to help maintain the security.

Ultimately that, you know, that is the big challenge. Afghanistan has got to be responsible for itself. They have got to be able to provide for their own security, and they have made great strides in doing that.

As I am sure the general will point out, they have taken over the primary security role throughout the country and have done okay. Not going to, you know, sugar-coat that. It is still a very tough fight.

But they have held their own, they have managed to keep the country relatively stable in light of the insurgency, and we need to build on that because ultimately in Afghanistan and Iraq and all of these countries, Western military forces cannot impose security on another country. There is, you know, I mean, a fine line between helping them and appearing like a foreign occupying force. In this case, as we draw down and up the responsibility of the Afghan security forces, I think we have done it about right, giving them that responsibility.

But going forward, there will continue to be many, many challenges. The government still has corruption problems. The Taliban are still very active. The border issues with Pakistan have not been resolved.

And we definitely have a security interest in that region. As I have said many times before in this committee, I wish we didn't. It is a very, very difficult place to deal with.

But we do. The Taliban, Al Qaeda, these are groups that are part of the larger movement that threatens us, so we need a strong presence there that can help contain that—but again, hopefully one that builds towards self-sufficiency and the Afghan people being able to stand on their own, provide for their own security and their own governance.

I look forward to hearing from the general today on how we are progressing on those goals and where we go from here.

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Just on an administrative note, all members' offices were notified yesterday that for the purposes of this hearing we are going to go in reverse order for those who were here at the gavel. Part of my thinking is we have had a number of members—newer members who have sat through a long time on other hearings before you have gotten to answer questions. In addition, those of us who have been here a while have had the opportunity to ask a number of questions about Afghanistan, and so this is a good opportunity for newer members.

So after we hear from General Campbell, we will start at—go in reverse order for everyone who was here at the time of the gavel, and then, as we always do, recognize members in their order of appearance of coming into the committee room.

So, General Campbell, again, thank you for making time to be with us. Without objection, your full written statement will be made part of the record, and the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDER
OF OPERATION RESOLUTE SUPPORT AND U.S. FORCES-
AFGHANISTAN**

General CAMPBELL. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you, really, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored to lead and represent the service men and women of United States Forces-Afghanistan.

And I would like to begin by thanking the committee for your steadfast support of our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, our marines, and our civilians. And due to your leadership and commitment, they are the best-trained, best-equipped force our Nation has ever deployed, and their outstanding performance bears testimony to your backing and the backing of the American people, so thank you very much.

I would like to pay tribute to our military families. They are the unsung heroes of the last 13-plus years of our conflict. In many ways, our frequent absences from home are harder on them than they are on us, and without their love and support and their strength, we could not succeed. So I thank the military families.

I would also like to recognize the over 2,200 service men and women who have been killed in action in Afghanistan and the over 20,000-plus who have been wounded. Each day we strive to bring meaning to their sacrifices. And we honor their memories and their loved ones by continuing to build a secure and stable Afghanistan and by protecting our own homeland.

Over 13 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks, and we haven't forgotten why we first came to Afghanistan and why we remain there. And since 2001 the extraordinary efforts and courage of our forces have ensured that another terrorist attack originating from Afghanistan and directed against the U.S. homeland has not occurred.

Over 6 months have passed since I assumed command, and much has changed since then. Afghanistan, the region, the enemy, and our coalition have undergone many tremendous transitions, and most of these have been very positive.

I would like to emphasize a few of these today in order to place our current campaign in context and to really reaffirm the conditions that exist for us to achieve an enduring peace and potential strategic win for Afghanistan.

And in September Afghanistan completed the first peaceful, democratic transition in its history, and this was after a prolonged—very prolonged campaign. And this transition was a monumental achievement. It represented the Afghans' commitment to a democratic and open society.

The difference between the new national unity government and its predecessors is night and day. President Ghani and chief executive Abdullah have embraced the international community, our coalition, and the Afghan National Defense [and] Security Forces, or the ANDSF.

Our partnership is strong. We now have a ratified bilateral security agreement, and, sir, I would just tell you, a lot of people worked very, very hard for that; and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] status of the forces agreement, which grant us necessary authorities to continue our mission.

Dynamics within the region continue to evolve, as well. President Ghani has made regional engagement a top priority in order to address shared security and economic interest. Nowhere is this more evident than in Pakistan and Afghan relations. The Pakistani Taliban's murderous attack in Peshawar on 16 December may prove to be their 9/11 and really a game-changer for the region.

Most senior Pakistani officials recognize that they can no longer separate good terrorists from bad terrorists. And in the last few months I have witnessed firsthand substantive improvement in the interactions between Afghan and Pakistani militaries. They are now talking.

General Raheel, the Pakistan army chief of staff, remarked during his recent trip to Kabul, "The enemies of Afghanistan are the enemies of Pakistan." And this is a constructive admission, and we are doing everything we can to promote their closer cooperation. And while we must temper our expectations, I remain optimistic that both countries are working towards a more productive relationship.

The enemy remains in a state of flux, too. The Taliban failed to achieve any of their stated goals in 2014. They failed to disrupt the elections; they failed to undermine the political transition; and they failed to prevent the Afghan government from signing a long-term security agreement with both NATO and the United States.

On the battlefield they achieved no enduring gains. Mullah Omar hasn't been seen in years.

The Taliban's senior leadership is in disarray. Constantly pressured by the ANDSF, suffering from dissension within their own ranks, and lacking popular support, they have turned to high-profile terrorist attacks, particularly against soft targets inside of Kabul. In a desperate attempt to remain relevant, they are failing to win over the Afghan population.

With the coalition off the battlefield, they are primarily killing their fellow Afghans and Muslims, and they are murdering innocent civilians. And it is time now for them to lay down their arms and heed President Ghani's call to help rebuild the Afghan nation.

The possible rise of Daesh, or ISIL, is also a new development. Thus far, we believe that the Daesh presence in Afghanistan represents more of a rebranding of some of the marginalized Taliban, but we are still taking this potential threat, with its dangerous rhetoric and ideology, very, very seriously. We are working very closely with the ANDSF to evaluate and understand the dynamic nature of this fledgling network.

The potential emergence of Daesh represents an additional opportunity to bring both Afghanistan and Pakistanis together to confront this common threat. We will continue to engage leaders from both countries on ways we can collaborate to meet this challenge. We are all driven to prevent Daesh from establishing a meaningful foothold in Central Asia.

United States Forces-Afghanistan and our coalition have undergone tremendous changes, as well, here in the last 6 months. On January 1st, United States Forces-Afghanistan formally ended its combat mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, and commenced its new mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel.

We have also ended all detainee operations. Simultaneously, troops from 41 nations, which comprise the new NATO mission, Resolute Support, began executing their train, advise, and assist mission in order to develop the capabilities and long-term sustainability of the ANDSF.

On January 1st the ANDSF also assumed full security responsibilities. They are ready, and it is time. In their second fighting season in the lead, the ANDSF were challenged and tested, but they held their own against a very determined enemy.

On the battlefield, the ANDSF fought tenaciously and demonstrated their increasing capabilities. Today, the government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains firmly in control of all 34 of its provincial capitals and all of its major cities.

The Afghan special forces, in particular, have proven to be the most proficient in the entire region. They have constantly executed unilateral, direct-action missions using their own intelligence, using their own Special Mission Wing helicopters to carry out long-range insertions in low illumination. These are remarkable capabilities for any military.

For both the ANDSF and coalition, Afghanistan continues to be a dangerous place. Tragically, we lost a coalition soldier from Turkey last Thursday in a suicide attack inside of Kabul.

ANDSF casualty rates increased in 2004—or 2014, excuse me—roughly 5 to 7 percent higher than they were in 2013. However, I think this must be viewed in light of the fact that their operational tempo was four times greater than it was in 2013 and that over 100,000 coalition forces were not on the battlefield. Even considering the higher casualty rates, the ANDSF attrition rates, which account for all losses to the force, have not impacted combat readiness too severely.

Army and police recruiting has not been a problem. Afghan youths continue to join the ranks of the ANDSF.

And service in the security forces is widely respected and viewed as an honorable, patriotic profession. The Afghan National Army remains the most trusted institution in the country.

On balance, after watching the ANDSF respond to a variety of challenges over the past 6 months, I don't believe the insurgents represent an existential threat to the government. However, ANDSF still need a great deal of help in developing the systems and processes necessary to run a modern, professional army and police force.

They also need sustained support in addressing the capability gaps of aviation, intelligence, sustainment, and special operations. To address these gaps, our advisory mission and mentorship will continue to be vital. Our advisors are at the security ministries, at the army corps level, in police zones, and those remain our main efforts.

Although clear challenges exist, I do believe that the ANDSF capabilities, their capacities, and their morale will be sufficient, backstopped by our advisory efforts. And this will provide for Afghanistan's long-term security by the end of the Resolute Support Mission.

President Ghani recently remarked that, "Compelled by tragedy and cemented by mutual sacrifice, the partnership between Afghanistan, NATO, and the United States has entered a new phase." And I believe we are at a very critical inflection point in our campaign.

Many challenges remain before us as the new Afghan government continues to form. It is still finding its footing, and it must do so while contending with a security threat, corruption, and economic challenges.

Yet, all of these changes, transitions over the last 6 months offer us really a tremendous opening and an opportunity. The Ghani administration offers us a strategic opportunity to develop a strategic partnership that will stabilize Afghanistan and then, in turn, provide and offer greater security for the region, and ultimately the United States homeland.

There is a new spirit of cooperation in Kabul—something we didn't have before. And I firmly believe that our concurrent counterterrorism and train, advise, and assist efforts will reinforce and deepen our strategic partnership and shape conditions for a favorable outcome to this conflict.

We could offer no greater tribute to the American people, our fallen, and their loved ones, than by maintaining our commitment to a long-term stability of Afghanistan and the enduring protection of our homeland.

I would like to direct the members' attention to the charts and a couple photographs to your right front that we displayed. We have also provided paper copies for you to look at.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 81.]

General CAMPBELL. And I am often asked, "What have we accomplished? What have we achieved? What is success? Has it been worth it?"

And I frequently share these statistics and images to underscore the tremendous progress that has taken place in Afghanistan in the last 13-plus years. Every measurable piece you take a look at—roadways, people who use the Internet, number of people in school, females in school, the workforce. Pretty incredible. It is unprecedented.

The life expectancy, increase of 21 years just in the last 13 years. That is unprecedented. A remarkable return on our investment.

And few countries advanced so rapidly over the last several years, and that is success. And the coalition and our ANDSF created the conditions for that success—741 million years—life years of Afghanistan people, based on new life expectancy.

And I want to underscore that we are underwriting this progress not just for the Afghans, but for the American people. And the Afghan stability and security contributes to our own.

The next two will be pictures of where we were in 2001 and where we are in 2014. And the first one shows inside of Kabul then, and on the bottom now. That is at Maiwand Circle. And then Kabul at day—or Kabul at night, I am sorry. Fifth fastest growing city in the country. Remarkable difference.

We have undercut the terrorist appeal, which feeds on desperation and instability. The hard work and significant sacrifices of countless U.S. and coalition military personnel and civilians over the last 13-plus years has created the conditions where Afghans can now take the responsibility for their own security and governance.

The Afghans welcome the opportunity to shape their destiny, but they will—still desire and need our assistance. We are supporting the emergence of a secure, prosperous Afghanistan that desires to be and can be our reliable strategic partner, and one that will never again allow terrorists to use its territory to launch—to plan and launch attacks against us.

President Ghani has asked for additional flexibility in the NATO and U.S. mission to account for the fact that his government remains in transition. He acknowledges that while the ANDSF are better equipped—better equipped and trained than ever, work remains to build their bureaucratic processes and systems. Additionally, he believes that a sustained U.S. and NATO commitment provides vital stability to the country as a new government solidifies—a tremendous psychological boost to the Afghan people.

We will continuously assess the progress of Resolute Support, and United States Forces-Afghanistan is currently involved in a

comprehensive winter review of our campaign. And this review is taking a look at all of our lines of effort, not just the military.

And I have provided various options and recommendations for adjusting our force posture through my chain of command. One issue is to determine how long we should stay and can stay engaged at the regional level before we concentrate inside of Kabul.

Once again, I express my profound gratitude to the committee members for your unfailing support of our mission and our troops in Afghanistan. I am humbled and privileged to lead the men and women of their caliber and courage, and every day they are making all of us proud.

And I ask that, again, sir, as you said, that my written statement submitted earlier be taken for the record. I do look forward to your questions, and I notice that the first two rows are filled sir, so I look forward to that, as well.

So thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Campbell can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

And I would just say, I appreciate the data that you brought to us. Some of this is surprising to me, and I—some of the information about the attitudes of the Afghan people I think are helpful to us—are particularly helpful to us.

I think Mr. Smith and I are going to withhold our questions at the moment. I would request if we could put the posters down, just to—unless members have questions about it, just to not block folks' view.

And I would yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. MacArthur.

Mr. MACARTHUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General, I also really appreciated your comments and want to echo what you said about our men and women in uniform and their families and the sacrifices they have made. I think it is important at every opportunity to remember them.

I had a question about a comment that Secretary Carter made yesterday, and I want to get your take on it. Secretary Carter told the Senate Armed Services Committee that withdrawal from Afghanistan would be conditions-based. It seemed to me that hinted that maybe there was no firm deadline for withdrawal, and my understanding has been that there has been an articulated plan by the President to have troop drawdowns by the end of 2016.

So my question for you is, do you think that extending withdrawal past 2016 would help you better accomplish your goals on the ground?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thank you for the question, and I did see the Secretary's comments. So I have really provided options that stay within the framework of what the President put out there, and it does show the current plan as 9,800 U.S., going down to 5,500 by the end of December of 2015, going down to between 1,000 and 1.5—1,500 by the end of 2016.

The options that I presented forward did not go past 2016; they are all providing flexibility within 2015 and 2016, sir.

Mr. MACARTHUR. Not to put you in a difficult position relative to stated goals by the President, but it is helpful for us to get your

perspective as the commander on the ground. You showed tremendous progress here, which we, I think, all celebrate and want to see that continue and be in a position to be sustained after our mission there is complete.

What would be your level of confidence that you can achieve that by the end of 2016?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, honestly, I will be very candid, and I owe you my best military advice, as I do to, you know, my chain of command. I do not know what we can accomplish in the summer fighting season 2015 at the train-advise level that we are currently conducting.

We just started the new Resolute Support Mission on 1 January. What I really want to make sure we could do is get through a full, what we call a fighting season, April through the late September timeframe, focused on train, advise, and assist, plus with our CT [counterterrorism] mission.

And if we can—if we look at a downsize of the 5,500, that potentially could take our eye off a focus on train, advise, and assist when we really need it. So that is why the flexibility, I think, is very, very important.

You know, as the commander on the ground we take a look at all the different conditions that are out there. We continuously make assessments, taking into account the enemy situation, the friendly forces, how they are doing, the people, the different regions. And so all those will go in as I continue to make assessments and provide that.

But I really do need to understand and see what we can do with these new entities what we call TAAC—train, advise, assist commands—that we have in the—in our spokes in Gambir and Jalalabad out in the east and Kandahar in the south, Herat in the west, and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north. This is a new dynamic. We haven't been at that level before.

My initial assessment right now is we will continue to work very well, and the Afghans really do—you know, over the last 13-plus years, have continued to develop. This is my third time in Afghanistan. My last time was as the Regional Command-East Commander 101st [Airborne Division], 2010 and 2011. Visited a couple times in between 2011 and when I took over this summer.

The difference from back in 2010 and 2011 to where we are today is just night and day. It is incredible.

The Afghan security force has continued to progress. They have an operation ongoing now—I won't go into great detail because it is an ongoing operation in northern Helmand, but this was an operation that was entirely planned and led from the Afghan perspective. I took back briefs on it about 3 weeks ago when I was down in Helmand.

This is a three-corps operation. The main effort is the 215th in Helmand. It has supporting efforts from the 205th in Kandahar, the 207th at Herat. I have never seen an Afghan operation that was that complex back-briefed to me and the senior leadership inside of Afghanistan and the police and the army side, and integration between all the Afghan security pillars—the police, the army, their intelligence was pretty remarkable, and so I think they continue to get better and better. I think I would be able to answer

that better after we get through this fighting season to really see how the train, advise, assist goes, but I do believe that the flexibility that we have asked for in several different options and that we put forward will provide us a better opportunity to take advantage of things that have changed over the last 6 months—President Ghani and his embracing of the international community, the relationship between Pakistan, some changes in leadership in the Afghan security forces.

And I really do think that leadership and then holding people accountable really makes a difference.

Mr. MACARTHUR. Thank you, General. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Aguilar.

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the change in format. I will be sure to add you to the Christmas card list. Thank you for that.

Thank you, General, for being here. With respect to the AUMF, if Congress were to pass the proposed AUMF could you provide us with examples of what you could and could not do within that?

General CAMPBELL. Thanks for your question, sir. I mean, I have not read the entire AUMF. I could tell you from looking at it briefly that what that would provide—I mean, the authorities I have today and the resources I have today I can continue to work hard at the CT mission and the train, advise, assist mission that I have.

With the AUMF, the way I understand it now, with no geographical boundaries I think I still would be able to prosecute what I need to for today. After 2015, where my authorities may change, then I would have to go back and relook that hard. But, sir, today I have no issues, as I think General Austin said from CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] yesterday with that.

Mr. AGUILAR. Have detention policies at all changed post 1 January?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. I do not have the authority to detain the insurgents. So all detainees that we would have had, they have been turned over to Afghanistan or other countries. I have no detention facilities inside of Afghanistan.

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you.

One of the things we have talked about extensively is risk. Can you talk to us—and you mentioned in your testimony that it wouldn't be affected too severely, but could you add some more color to the discussion of risk associated with the proposed draw-down?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, risk, you know, takes in a lot of different factors—the risk to the coalition and U.S. forces, the risk to the Afghan security forces. I think, again, any commander on the ground would like to have more resources, more people. We continue to work hard through that.

As I make the assessment today and take a look at many of the things as we have drawn down—I don't say withdrawal, but we are in a continuous transition. And I think for the next 2 years-plus it will be a continued transition; we have to adapt to those transitions.

But as you transition you lose people, which provides security. Most of my force protection and security is by, with, and through the Afghans as we consolidate.

We have gone from 300-plus COPs, combat outposts, and forward operating bases to less than 25 today. So that increases the risk in some areas to force protection, to security.

As you continue to transition forces you lose some resources, so the number of aircraft, the number of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms, all those things goes into the calculus as I take a look at the risk assessment both to risk to mission and to risk to force.

And again, as I looked at flexibility—President Ghani asked for flexibility. As I looked at that I did take in account all those to try to mitigate risk to force and risk to mission as we move forward.

Mr. AGUILAR. Can you give us some examples—and I know it could be speculative, but could you give us some examples of things that President Ghani may discuss when he addresses Congress later this month?

General CAMPBELL. First off, sir, with President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, the senior—the CEO [chief executive officer], I mean, it is really a new dynamic, and I have had to deal with President Karzai when I first got there in times afore, and I think the American people—all the people need to understand that every time President Ghani or Dr. Abdullah address a crowd they thank the international community.

They thank the U.S. in particular; they pick the U.S. out. They thank them for their support. They thank the families for the sacrifices of their sons and daughters.

You never would have heard that before, so it is a completely different atmosphere. I think the President will talk to all of you about that. I think he is quite proud of that.

He is quite proud that he has taken on his leadership role as a commander in chief. He has visited training sites. He has visited military hospitals.

He engages with the corps commanders. I mean, I attend their national security conferences. I am able to talk to them about different security issues at any time. I think he would tell you he spends probably 40 percent on security, 40 percent on the economics and where they need to go.

But I think he will really talk about, you know, where Afghanistan has come over the last 13 years, where its security forces are, where it would not be without the help of the great coalition and the U.S. in particular, not only for the men and women that have made sacrifices, for our families, but also for the economic impact that the U.S. provided, along with many other donor nations.

I think he may talk a little bit about how he sees the future and how he is going to get after corruption, and how he will continue to attack that and how he is going to broaden the perspective and deal in terms of a regional aspect, how he is engaged with Pakistan, India, China, Saudi Arabia, the entire region, and how he needs to do that both from an economic perspective but also from a security perspective.

Sir, I think he is looking forward to it, and I think all of you will find that he will be very engaging and his message will be one of

thanks, but also that he has a great vision for the future of Afghanistan.

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you for your continued service, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Knight.

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to talk about a couple other things. Let's talk about readiness of the forces.

This has been a generation that could have gone into their military career in 1990 and now be retired, and have been—or have seen battle for the last 24 years. So here in Congress we worry about things like sequestration, we worry about readiness of force, and worry about one-to-one ratios of young men and women being over there for a year and being back here for a year, or 6 months and a year, or something of that nature.

Can you give us an idea of the readiness of force today as compared to maybe 4 or 5 years ago, or even 10 years ago?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I can talk better and give you a perspective on the readiness of forces that I get from the services, as they are service providers. A little bit different perspective when I was the vice chief of the Army before I went over there 6 months ago. But all the forces that I get in Afghanistan, particularly from the U.S., are trained at the highest level and are focused on their mission in Afghanistan. So no issue with that.

And I think all the services prioritize their deploying forces first to ensure that they get that necessary training because they will be putting their lives on the line.

On the sequestration, I will just tell you that it was 6 months ago when I was a vice and I continue to talk to senior leadership from all the services that with sequestration that would devastate the services and their ability to provide the same type of forces that I get today.

You know, my son is a sergeant in the Army. He has been to Afghanistan twice. He has served in Ghazni; he has served in Jalalabad. He was in the 82nd Airborne [Division]. He is currently in the 101st.

And I worry about, you know, both as a father and then as a commander, the ability to make sure that we continue to provide the very best training, and all the resources and the things that go with that, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and our civilians that deploy. And sequestration would put—would dampen that—would elevate the risk, absolutely.

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you. And I think that you have got a lot of committed people here that believe that, too.

Secondly, when we talk about detainees and you say that you turn them over to the security forces or to Afghan—what happens from there? Is there some sort of a prosecution?

Is there some sort of judicial action there? Or are they just detained? Or are they released?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, it is probably all of the above, quite frankly. But with the detainees that we had there was a long process we went through to get assurances from either countries that they were sent to or to Afghanistan, as well, to make sure that the

right assurance was put in place that they would be tried, if they had to go through that process that they would be treated humanely.

And so that was carefully taken a look at, at all of the different detainees that were released from U.S. control, coalition control. Again, no longer do we have detention facilities.

Inside of the Afghan system that continues to grow. Up at Parwan outside of Baghram is probably the very best detention facility in all of Afghanistan, continues to be I think the gold standard that they have there.

They are in the process right now, based on direction from President Ghani, to move really the national threat detainees to Parwan and get them out of places that are overcrowded, like down in Kandahar or Pul-e-Charkhi, inside of Kabul, to make sure that they can lessen that, that they have the right security so that they are not freed without going through the proper trials.

And so I think they continue to work that very hard, but Parwan is a gold standard. It has the right prosecution efforts, has the right folks, the judges all kind of contained in one unit there. And we do have a very small train and advise, assist cell that will continue to help build that capability for them.

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, General. I yield back, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General, thank you very much for joining us this morning. I was impressed by what I saw on the CODEL [congressional delegation] 2 weeks ago, with the progress that you have made.

And I share the chairman's view of the situation in Iraq, where I think that all the progress that we made, or much of the progress we made during the surge, has now been squandered by withdrawing too quickly and not providing the ongoing political and diplomatic support that we frankly knew was necessary, that Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus called for at the end of the surge.

So, I am interested to hear from you what specifically you are doing differently in Afghanistan this time around. And I will add that I have the highest respect for President Ghani, but I am not interested in hearing what is different about our partner, because I think that after you invest trillions of dollars of our national treasure, after you invest thousands of lives, we shouldn't leave the eventual success of our mission up to the whims of our partner.

So I am interested in what you and the U.S. effort there is doing differently from Iraq.

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question. And again, thank you for visiting our troops there. I apologize for not being there. I was back here doing the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] testimony as you were forward.

So I would think—again, I spent 19—18, 19 months in Iraq as a one-star back in 2006, 2007 during the surge, inside of Baghdad. And I think the fundamental difference for me is really the Afghan security forces and their leadership and their determination to make sure—they see the news, they see the media.

They understand what is going on with Iraq. And they have personally told me, many of the senior leadership, that they will not let happen to Afghanistan what happened to Iraq.

You know, during the political instability last fall many people thought that they would divide among the ethnic fractures, which is what happened inside of Iraq. In Afghanistan they did not do that, despite a lot of talk. In fact, they solidified around that and took that as a point of pride to make sure that they didn't fracture, and that they were above that, and that they were a national force, and they take great pride in doing that.

I think the training that I have seen for the most part is all Afghan-led training. I was out in the 207th Corps in Herat a couple weeks ago and kind of unannounced I said let's—I asked the corps commander, "Let's go look at some training." He took me to medical training, to some of their marksmanship training. I saw them clearing buildings.

Again, this was unannounced—

Mr. MOULTON. General, with all due respect, that is fantastic news, but that is what the Afghans are doing and that is how the Afghans are doing things differently than the Iraqis. But what are we doing to ensure that?

I mean, President Ghani is a great partner today. He could, you know—God willing, this won't happen, but he could be gone tomorrow.

So what sort of backstops are we putting in place to ensure that if this does start to head south for any reason, we can recover and we won't end up with a situation like we had with Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, now thanks. I think really for me the continued train, advise, assist at the ministry level and what we are doing with the MOD [Ministry of Defense] and the MOI [Ministry of the Interior], and all levels of both those organizations that control the army, that control the police.

We are working on their transparency, accountability, oversight. We are working on their planning, programming, and budgeting. We are working on their sustainment. We are working on their planning capability. We are working on their strategic communications. Working on their intelligence.

These are all essential functions that we think they need to continue to have, you know, as we come out of there. And I think our continued work in those areas at the ministry levels will continue to help that.

The other piece is that they are looking hard at ensuring that they are a professional army and a professional police. And they have leadership courses that continue to go on. They pick bright leaders at all the ranks and bring them into special courses on leadership, and they understand the leadership makes a difference—I think different from what you saw in Iraq.

Mr. MOULTON. Are you seeing the State Department devote the level of resources needed to continue this mentorship and support at—on their diplomatic side of the house?

General CAMPBELL. We have a great relationship with Ambassador McKinley and the folks, you know, right—we are connected right next to embassy there. They don't do the MOD and MOI, but

they are engaged in all the other ministries and the NGOs [non-governmental organizations] there, and I do think that they are very dedicated and they continue to work very hard.

Again, all the coalition, all the state department of all the different embassies are all there because they are passionate about where Afghanistan could go in the future. They are excited about the future of Afghanistan.

I think everybody is working very hard, and the fact that what has happened in Iraq has been on the news, this gives them more determination to say, "This ain't gonna happen here."

Mr. MOULTON. And just my last question, just to ensure that we are maintaining our commitment to the long-term stability of Afghanistan, as you said in your earlier—in your spoken testimony, what is the ongoing financial commitment of the United States to make that happen?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, we are looking very, very hard at how we continue to be more efficient and how we can reduce that, but it is about—for 2015 about \$4.1 billion; and looking at fiscal year 2016 I think I have got that down to about \$3.8 billion because of some efficiencies that we have garnered both in their forces and in how we operate, and we will continue to look at that very, very hard. They are very dependent upon the U.S. and all the other donor nations to have this army and police they have, absolutely.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, General.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General Campbell, for your service and leadership. I, too, had the privilege to participate in the CODEL chaired by our subcommittee chair, Joe Wilson, and I joined Congressman Moulton and Congressman Ashford on the trip. It was great to visit some of the troops deployed from my district.

So my question is, in late February the DOD [Department of Defense] announced the three units to deploy as the upcoming rotation of forces in Afghanistan, and one of those units is the 2nd Brigade from the 10th Mountain Division, which I have the privilege of representing, which is located at Fort Drum, as you know. The 10th Mountain has supported operations in Afghanistan since 2001. It is the most deployed unit in the U.S. Army since 9/11 to both Iraq and Afghanistan.

So based upon my visit and our privilege of meeting with President Ghani and the upcoming deployment of soldiers in my district that I represent, I would like to know from you your assessment of the risks to the security situation as we draw down in Afghanistan and how that will impact our future operations against the Taliban.

General CAMPBELL. Ma'am, again, thank you for visiting, and thank you for the question. I do have Colonel Pat Frank with me over here that commanded 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain and was down in the southern part of Afghanistan back in 2010, 2011, and we are very appreciative of the 10th Mountain support.

You know, what I would tell you is that they will come in and they will work the train, advise, and assist. Force protection is our

number one priority. The President has told me that is his number one priority.

I look at that every single day. We continuously monitor the threat streams both inside of Kabul and at all of our combat outposts and our TAACs. Every single day we are looking at ways on how we mitigate that threat.

You know, but frankly, it will continue to be a very dangerous environment. There will be insurgents that want to kill our soldiers. You know, we shouldn't make—we shouldn't put that aside. That is out there every single day.

So every day what we can't do is become complacent. We tell our soldiers, you know, that in a 9-month, a 12-month rotation that they have their—they will have an opportunity to make a difference.

It may only be 15 seconds where they make that difference in their entire tour when it comes in terms of force protection. The issue is they don't get to pick when that 15 seconds is, so they have to be ready all the time.

And I think the services do a great job and our noncommissioned officers do a great job of preparing our soldiers to understand the risk that will become when they do deploy. And again, many of our soldiers have been there numerous times; they understand that.

It is changing and we continue to take a hard look at that. The green-on-blue incidents that have been out in the news here the last several years, where we have Afghan soldiers or police attack coalition or attack U.S. members—that continues to get much less as we have mitigated that through our own training with different programs to provide over-watch. The Afghans do a much better job on vetting both soldiers and police in how they do their training.

So that has gone way down and we feel, you know, we can't get complacent. We will continue to look at that.

But believe me, ma'am, the force protection is utmost in our mind and we work that very hard in our pre-deployment training, and once they get into country they are continually reminded and go through processes that make sure that they don't become complacent.

Ms. STEFANIK. I wanted to ask one follow-up. In our discussions with President Ghani we talked about the threat of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and the potential for ISIS to grow in Afghanistan and their most recent recruiting efforts.

Does that concern you? Can you talk about what those challenges are going to be not just in the short term but the long term?

General CAMPBELL. Again, thank you for the question. You know, it is a potential threat, is how President Ghani has used that. A concern to him, so it is a concern to me.

We take a hard look at that. We have engaged with our Afghan security partners in making sure we are seeing what they see, we understand how they see it. With all the other intelligence organizations that we have inside of Afghanistan we come together to discuss that potential threat.

I will tell you right now, we have seen some recruiting in different parts of the country. We have seen some night letter drops.

We have not seen it operationalize. We have not seen a lot of money come in and we have not seen those forces gather and prosecute targets at all.

But again, it is a potential threat for Afghanistan and Pakistan. So as I said in my opening comments, it is an area where I think Afghanistan and Pakistan can continue to work together to go after a potential threat that has already displayed, you know, how horrendous they will be.

And the Afghan security institutions and the army and the police have told me they will not let that happen. And the dynamics inside of Afghanistan are different than Iraq. You know, with the Sunni prosecution, how that has been in Iraq, the political piece.

This is not just—didn't just happen here the last several months. This has been building up for years and years in Syria and Iraq, and in Afghanistan it is a different dynamic with the culture that you have there, as well.

But we will see it, and we will continue to monitor it and make sure that we have a strategy that can attack it on a short-term, and mid-term, and a long-term.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ashford.

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General Campbell. I can tell you that when we went to see General Ghani he was so terribly appreciative of your efforts and all the efforts of our military and our support personnel. It was absolutely incredible.

I was also happy to hear from President Ghani that—of his relationship with the University of Nebraska at Omaha, and the—Tom Gouttierre and the Afghan studies program, which has been going on there for over 30 years. So I was glad to hear that.

And I want to thank Congressman Wilson, who is the chairman of our Emerging Threats Subcommittee, for his leadership, and also my two colleagues, who—it was an immensely important opportunity for me and I think our district to see what was going on.

Obviously we went to Jordan and Iraq and to Afghanistan, so we got the entire picture, in a way. And Congresswoman Stefanik I think asked a critical question that I was left with is—you know, we have many fewer members of the armed services in Iraq and—than we do in Afghanistan, and for historic reasons and for reasons that you have discussed.

Could I just ask you to comment just a little more on this situation? If the ISIS situation becomes more—it already is very dangerous, but where more troops from the American side are necessary, or whatever the eventuality may be, could you just comment a little bit more on that interrelationship?

President Ghani did talk about what you suggest, that they are observing, watching. He talked about his Pakistani—his openings to Pakistan and his discussions with Pakistan, which seem very, very positive.

But this threat in Syria and Iraq, which is growing and—but were contained to a certain degree, it is the same Middle East area, so how do you—again, could you just comment a little more on that interrelationship? What if it becomes more difficult for the Iraqi forces to be successful in their country? Thank you.

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I can't comment on the Iraqi forces; I can comment on the Afghan forces. And again, they have—the senior leadership of the Afghan police and army have told me on several occasions that, you know, they will not let what happened to Iraq happen to Afghanistan. They are very determined about that, have gone out of their way to tell that to me as, you know, that question has been raised in many different instances with them, and as they talk to their leadership, as they have talked to the President.

The President brings this up, though, because he wants people to understand that the environment in Afghanistan continues to evolve. It is a dynamic environment and he doesn't want his forces to become complacent. He wants them to understand that what happened in Syria and Iraq and this network can jump stages of growing to this network, and that it evolves very, very quickly.

And so I think he just wants to make sure that his forces, his intelligence services are taking a look at everything and making sure that it doesn't get a foothold inside of Afghanistan and continues to spread. And he can be helped with this association with Pakistan because they have the same issues there, and I think that relationship and understanding that they have a common enemy that they can work toward together will help them.

So I think that they are looking at this very hard. He gets several security updates a day, and the Daesh or the ISIL piece continues to be on his mind.

But in the National Security Council meetings that I sit in he has all the senior cabinet folks in there, that is a point of discussion in most of them. But I think they view it as a potential threat and ensuring that they have a strategy as we move forward, and I think they will—that will continue to evolve over time.

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, General.

And I would yield back my time at this point. I had a question about Pakistan I am sure it will be asked and answered, so thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Zinke.

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General, it is always good to see you again. I tell you, I sleep better at night knowing you are there.

You know, as a former deputy commander and acting commander of special forces in Iraq, you know, I think we left Iraq too soon. I think we—when we left Iran or Iraq on a timeline rather than a condition on the ground, it affected the Sunnis; we disenfranchised them, I believe. We isolated the Kurds.

We, to a degree, empowered a centralized government to be non-inclusive. And the result was a vacuum. And that vacuum, I think what we are seeing today, was filled by ISIS.

And my concern is we don't repeat the same model in Afghanistan, and I think the concern of the committee remains the same.

Looking forward, what would you consider to be your three priority conditions, and what is that end strength to support that?

And lastly, in my experience, having a detention center—at least a temporary detention center—gave us the ability to rapidly turn around sensitive site exploitation and do follow-on missions in a timely manner that made a difference on the ground. And not hav-

ing the ability to have a detention center—at least a temporary detention center—to me would adversely affect your ability, when you find a target, to rapidly turn around and do follow-on missions. If you would comment on that, whether, in fact, it does adversely affect your ability to turn around?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for your service, and thank you for the questions, as well.

If I can answer the last one first, then come back to the ISIL piece on the intelligence. So intelligence, as you know, drives operations, and that is what we really try to instill in our Afghan partners, that all their operations should be intelligence-based, and we continue to work that very hard.

We do have a very good relationship with the MOI and the MOD, and the NDS [National Directorate of Security], which is their intel [intelligence] service. And so as they have the detainees, we work a relationship to make sure that we can partner with them, and the intelligence, the information they get from their detainees, we try to make sure that we can get that information as well, because it impacts our force protection and we can also help guide them.

They are building a fusion cell, which combines the MOD, the MOI, and the NDS together—lessons that we have learned over years and years. They are stove-piped where they are now, and so you have MOI working off different pieces, MOD working off pieces, and NDS working off pieces. And what we are really trying to force is this sharing.

They are testing this really with a pilot down in northern Helmand in this operation today, and we are seeing quite good success off of this as they do share all that intelligence and understand that it makes them a better-capable force as they get this intelligence, turn it very quickly to drive to other targets. So I think our relationship over the last 13-plus years of working with them at the ministry levels now and at the corps levels, we have a relationship to enable to make sure that we can help them with that intelligence. So I feel comfortable where we are at.

Still got a lot of work to do with that. They don't have the same type of ISR or those platforms that provide us some of that. We share where we can, but we have got to make sure we continue to build their capabilities.

So we are working on how we build the intel capability. Intelligence is one of the eight essential functions that we continue to build at all the ministry levels. My senior deputy chief of staff for intelligence, the J-2, Major General Scotty Berrier, was a CENTCOM J-2 before this assignment. He really is the senior intel advisor that I have in country and he works with both the MOI and MOD to build that intel capability.

So I feel much better than where we were on building that, and I think that is going to help all of us in the end.

On the ISIS piece, sir, on conditions, you know, I take a look every single day and assess different conditions. Time is one of those conditions, number of people on the ground, both from a coalition perspective and from an Afghan security institution perspective is another condition.

So I think I would take a look at all those. I really do want to take a look at what happens after this first full fighting season,

where the Afghans are really totally on their own. They have led it for the last 2 years but this is the first time that they really are on their own and we really are just in the train, advise, assist and don't have the resources to provide for them, and they are working very hard on their own capacity for close air support, intelligence, and those areas.

And so, you know, I can't give you a number that I would feel comfortable with right now. I think I need to let this play out.

But I do believe that we are—the best thing that we can do to hedge against Afghanistan not becoming an Iraq, my number one priority would be to continue to train, advise, assist, and build their own capacity and their capability both in close air support, both in their special operating forces, which increases their CT capability. And they want to be—and President Ghani has said many times, you know, he is a strategic partner and wants to continue to build the Afghan CT capability so down the road they have that, and then we will continue to work with them on that.

Mr. ZINKE. I will follow up on the detention centers. Do we have the ability—if you get a high-priority target, do we have the ability to be present during those initial interrogations and interviews, or is it separate?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Is there a one-sentence answer, General?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I would rather cover that with you in a closed session, sir, and I can give you a little more detail on that.

Mr. ZINKE. All right, sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Graham.

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General. It is so good to hear some good news of—so thank you for your report.

One thing that you stated is that the terrorist appeal has been undercut in Afghanistan. That is something that we need to figure out how do we bring that reality into other places in the region.

But my question focuses on local law enforcement. I am aware that recently that Prime Minister Ghani has changed some of the leaders of the local police forces, and I was wondering, what is the interaction between military and law enforcement?

My husband happens to be law enforcement, and I know how important it is to have that close relationship. It is often those closest to us that can have the greatest impact on our behaviors.

So is the military involved in working with local law enforcement, and do you see that as a positive development with the changes in law enforcement recently in Kabul? Thank you.

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, ma'am, for the question. You know, in Afghanistan it really is—we talk about pillars and the security pillars, and the police and the army being two different pillars there. And what I tell people is when these pillars—they do cross-pillar coordination, they work together, the army and the police, then they are much stronger and they can't be beat.

And I attend a Saturday 3-, 4-hour session every Saturday, which we call the senior security shura, and that has the senior members of MOD, the senior members of MOI, NDS, which is their intel arm, and then the national security advisor, Minister Atmar.

And so the police and the army interaction is daily, every single day.

The police operate a little bit differently. They do have the law enforcement aspect; they continue to work through that. But in many places they are the only security institution in the far reaches of Afghanistan, and so they are a threat to the insurgency.

Afghan Local Police, which are designed to provide security inside of the villages, are probably the most attacked. They have the least amount of training, they don't have the same weapons as the regular police or the army. And so they do get attacked, but they do stand up and they do protect, and they are feared by the Taliban and the other insurgents because they are directly linked to the people inside the communities.

But I think the linkage between the police and the army is a strong one and they continue to work it.

In the provinces they have what they call OCCPs or OCCRs. These are institutions that the governors have that have police, army, and the intel folks all together inside one, for lack of a better term, an operational command and control element at both the regional and then at the provincial level.

And they provide interaction between the police and army. They sit right next to each other in desks and work that, and then they interact with their higher headquarters, which also has police and army.

In my headquarters inside of Kabul I have army—Afghan army representatives, Afghan police that sit right next to each other inside of my combined joint operations center, as well. So that interaction is very good.

And if I could just hit the intel piece or the terrorist appeal piece, what I will tell you is that less than 10 percent of the people in Afghanistan embrace the Taliban, and that number continues to go down. And a lot of that is because of the actions of the Taliban, and they understand that the civilian casualty piece—although a report said something like 75 percent are caused by the insurgents, you know, our records show potentially above 90 percent are caused by the terrorists, and the people are just frankly tired of this.

And they want a better life—they want the exact same thing we want. They want to be able to send their kids to school. They want to be—have a roof over their head. They want to have a job to provide for them.

And so they understand that underneath this national unity government—85 percent of the people want this government, they want it to do well, and they are tired of what—the Taliban and what they represent. That is a big change from where we were just a couple years ago.

Ms. GRAHAM. Well, thank you very much for that positive report. I want to correct myself—President Ghani, get his title correct.

And let's hope that what you have accomplished in Afghanistan will continue and can be spread throughout the region. Thank you for your time, General, and your service.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Walorski.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for being here.

My question is, I think it has been fairly disconcerting—it has to me, anyway—of how much information, when it comes to operational security, the President of the United States has given out and how we read it every day in the media. We learn about the withdrawal, the troop size; we learn, as the Taliban does at the same time, all kinds of unbelievable information.

And to kind of follow up on my colleague's comment—and I really don't want to ask you this for public disclosure, but I want to ask you for this either in writing or a classified briefing. I want to know the detailed Plan B. What are the flags and the signs that are going to trigger our reengagement, should this go awry?

I really do want to know, because I want to know that we do have a plan. And I don't want to ask it in public for everybody in the world to listen, because it really does concern me, but I would ask for you to provide that in writing or a classified briefing. What are we looking for that is going to happen so we don't end up again with more loss of blood and life and an engagement for America, as we are looking at in Iraq?

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mrs. WALORSKI. And then my other question is on this new AUMF with ISIL. As you understand your role—I had attended a briefing a couple of months ago and somebody was here from the State Department and we were talking about current rules of engagement, current AUMF as it pertains to Afghanistan with this train, advise, and assist mission. And my question specifically was, as we know ISIL is networking all over that part of the world, we know ISIL is looking around and recruiting in Afghanistan.

So my question was—under this current operation you are under—was, “If ISIL is identified by American troops or Afghan National Security Forces, in our train, advise, and assist mode that we are in, can we absolutely destroy ISIL when they are identified?”

And the answer from the State Department was, “No, ma'am. They would not be considered a threat to the United States at that point.”

My comment was, “I would consider the fact that we are at war with them and the mere existence of ISIL means we should destroy them.”

So in your role right now, what is your understanding in your current AUMF when ISIL is identified? Are they taken out because we are at war with them or are they given a pass?

General CAMPBELL. Ma'am, thanks for your question. We don't talk about rules of engagement, obviously, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures, the TTPs that go along with that.

I would just answer that and say that I am comfortable with the authorities that I have today that I can prosecute the mission both from a CT perspective and from a train, advise, and assist perspective, and also protect the force that I have. But I can't go into the rules of—

Mrs. WALORSKI. I understand.

General CAMPBELL [continuing]. Engagement in this environment.

Mrs. WALORSKI. I understand. And again, I would like to have a conversation or some kind of follow-up that talks about that in—

General CAMPBELL. Absolutely, ma'am.

Mrs. WALORSKI [continuing]. At some point.

And then also, with this new AUMF, what is the difference going to be in how you can engage ISIS now? Do you see further gains—do you have more advantages in this new AUMF than you do now?

General CAMPBELL. Ma'am, I haven't seen the final written document that has gone through, but I have glanced through pieces of it. I know that there is no geographical boundaries, which would help out in Afghanistan.

I would have to do a more detailed look at that. But again, for right now I have the authorities that I need to be able to prosecute the CT and the train, advise, assist mission I have. I would have to take a harder look at that and I can come to you on the AUMF and how that would impact 2015, and then, you know, more importantly for me, as we transition—

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate it.

General CAMPBELL [continuing]. Into 2016 and beyond.

Mrs. WALORSKI. And then, in relation to the size of the troops and the troop strength, 10,000, 5,000—10,000, 5,000—compared to what you are doing right now, where are—what additional kinds of missions and what additional kind of coverage do you have right now that you are going to lose? And if that is something that we can't talk about here either I would like to have a conversation about that.

When we are talking about drawing down from 10,000 to 5,000, what are we actually losing there? And again, what steps are in between there that talk about for our purposes of the train, assist, and assist the Afghani forces?

What does that mean? How much coverage, then, are the Afghan forces going to be having to do on their own? What does that mean as far as risk?

I understand you probably can't talk about a lot of that here, but I really do want to follow up answers to those questions so that we know, as Members of Congress who are going to be voting on this new AUMF, that there really is some kind of a plan, and we are not going to sit here again—I don't think anybody can take anybody's word for anything. We may have all the faith in the world in this new President, but we also see how these things change on a dime. And I think we are—we owe the American public a chance to at least have seen, even in a classified setting, that there is a plan.

So I appreciate it, and I look forward to your responses either in writing or in a classified briefing. Thank you, sir. I yield back my time.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, ma'am.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O'Rourke.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would first like to thank you and those who serve and have served under you, including the Bulldog Brigade from Fort

Bliss in El Paso, Texas, for the incredible job that you are doing and have done in Afghanistan. And I join my colleagues in just thanking you for this terrific performance, which goes beyond any claims that someone could make or anecdote, but actually by the numbers and by the pictures and what we can see and what my colleagues were able to see in their recent visit.

And I agree with many of the comments made so far that I think there are many lessons that we can apply from your success, this country's success, in Afghanistan to our operations and objectives in Iraq.

When it comes to the proposed AUMF that we are considering to combat ISIS, my understanding that the immediate goal is to stop ISIS and ultimately to degrade, defeat, and destroy ISIS. What is our goal in Afghanistan relative to the Taliban?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks. And I really do believe that, again, on the AUMF—I have to look at that harder and look forward to other questions in maybe a closed setting and we can talk through that on the resources that we have to be able to do that.

Sir, on the Taliban piece what I would tell you is our goal really is to build the Afghan capacity, both in their police and in their army, to be able to have a secure, stable Afghanistan for the future. And the Taliban and their message, you know, is not having any traction with the Afghan people.

As I said in my opening comments, it really is time now for the Afghan Taliban to take a look at what they are trying to do and become part of the political process. President Ghani, in his inauguration speech, opened the door there for them to come back and really work hard on reconciliation, which could potentially be a game-changer down the road. But, you know, that has to work with Pakistan and where they go, and where Afghanistan is, as they continue to build their Afghan security force capability.

But I do believe that, you know, they want to get the Taliban to where they are part of the Afghan vision moving forward, and killing other Afghans is not part of that vision. And so they have to operate from a position of strength, and I think 352,000 Afghan security forces and another 30,000 Afghan Local Police give them that capability.

And the Taliban now are looking around and saying, "You know, the coalition forces, they have signed a BSA [bilateral security agreement], a SOFA [status of forces agreement]; they are going to continue to help and provide train, assist, and advise—you know, what we have been trying to do here for the last year. We have got to cut this out. We have got to come in."

And so I think that is really where we are going with the Taliban, but it is because the Afghan security forces are going to drive this, not the coalition.

Mr. O'ROURKE. And to that point, I think we are seeing record casualties and losses from the Afghan security forces and thankfully, and much to do, I think, with your leadership and the service of our men and women on the ground, diminished casualties from coalition forces.

You have, or military commanders have asked for additional flexibility, something that I think makes a lot of sense and fully endorse, given the lessons that we learned from Iraq and are learning

from Iraq. I am assuming that flexibility includes the ability for airstrikes, raids against terrorists and those who seek to do us harm.

What status—and to the degree that you can offer clarity in this—what will you have to see on the ground in that country to recommend that we no longer need that flexibility and that we can meet our—what is going to be in 2016 our goal of having normal embassy level of protection? Again, through numbers or as clearly as you can, describe what that condition will have to look like for you to make that recommendation.

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question. If I could address the casualty piece first and just tell you that, as I talked about in my opening statement, 5 to 7 percent, probably larger or more increase than 2013; but again, if you put it in context, it is about—the operational tempo that both the police and the army have, four times greater than they had in 2013.

And again, 100,000 coalition were not out there, and so it was expected that casualties would rise. You know, one casualty is too much, but what we have continued to focus on are two things.

One is continue to improve the Afghan capability to reduce the died of wounds and work on their CASEVAC [casualty evacuation], their MEDEVAC [medical evacuation], their doctors, their combat medics, their lifesaver capabilities. So we are working that all very hard. That continues to progress.

And then also, the recruiting piece. They have got that much better. You know, they don't recruit all year round, like all of our services do. They kind of stop during the summer in the fighting season. Now they have got processes in place to do it kind of year round, and so it doesn't ebb and flow like that.

And really the casualty piece is not the—is not really from a—the attrition rate is not just based on the casualties. In fact, the number one reason is leadership, and making sure they have the right leadership, as opposed to combat casualties.

So what it would take for me, really, I think, to recommend that, you know, we would continue to transition and work a glide slope differently would—to make sure that the seams and the gaps that we have identified for a very long time, that we need to continue to work on the Afghan security forces and on their ministries, that we have gotten them to a level that they can have the processes that they need without us.

So the areas of aviation. You know, we continue to build up our aviation capability. Their close air support. You know, the first thing I always get asked for is close air support, or building their close air support.

And so when I get a request that says, "Hey, can you fly close air support?" I have asked them first, "Do you have a quick reaction force out there? Have you fired your mortars? Have you fired your artillery? Have you taken your Mi-17s [transport helicopters] that have forward-firing machine guns on them? You have a few Mi-35s [attack helicopters]. Have you used those?"

So we try to get all those out there to make sure they are working through those processes.

We are working the MD-530, which is a Little Bird helicopter that has two 50-cal [caliber] machine guns on the sides. We will continue to work that.

They won't have much for the next fighting season, but that will continue to develop. And we are working on a fixed-wing capability that provides them close air support in the future, as well, an A-29 Super Tucano. So that will continue to grow.

But once we get the close—the aviation support, once we get their intelligence, once we work on their sustainment, once we continue to build their special forces capability, I would feel much better as we close the gap on those seams that we had out there.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bridenstine.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, the President's stated policy is to take our strength from 10,800 troops in Afghanistan down to 5,000 troops by the end of 2015. In your best professional military judgment, is that the right end strength at the end of 2015?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, it is about 5,500, half of—somewhere around 5,500 by the end of December, and again, the options that I provided I think provide flexibility both for President Ghani and as the commander on the ground to take a look at force protection and how to get after the train, advise, and assist.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In 2014 the Afghan security forces lost over 20,000 personnel to desertions and deaths. Does that concern you?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, the numbers, again, as I talked about, if you put it in the context then I think we are working processes and procedures to make sure that that doesn't have a great impact. As I said up front, it hasn't had a severe impact on their readiness.

Any desertion, any casualty, of course that will—would concern me. It concerns their leadership. It concerns the President.

But I think, again, it is about having processes in place to bring those people on board, to keep them in. And it really isn't about the combat casualties. That is a fraction of it.

But the—a lot of the desertion piece is on leadership and making sure that, you know, people are looking at them and saying, "Are they getting paid? Do they have the right living conditions?"

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In your judgment, is there a correlation between our drawdown, cutting our troops by half, and their desertions?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I haven't looked at that hard but my gut would tell me no.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay.

On page 16 of your testimony you discuss the Islamic State. As the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, you suggest that ISIS is your priority—is one of your priority intelligence requirements.

Can you share with this panel—ISIS? What is going on with ISIS in Afghanistan now that makes it a priority intelligence requirement?

General CAMPBELL. Thanks for the question.

So, you know, PIR, or priority intelligence requirement, I have several of those; that is not my only PIR. And so as we took a look at—and talking to President Ghani, as we kind of did a deep dive with all of the security agencies and the intel agencies inside of Af-

ghanistan to look at what they were doing, I said I need to learn more about this, and one way to do that is to make it a PIR for my intel folks.

So as we go through a number of things that we take a look at it, as we allocate resources from ISR platforms, other things, because it is a PIR it will get more—a better look at it and provide me more continued updates on that.

And that is why I did that, because again, concern for President Ghani, concern for me. Could grow very rapidly. Again, at this state the term that has been out there is “nascent.” It is a nascent organization.

But again, as we talked about, it grew very quickly in Iraq and Syria. They have the potential to jump over different stages and build a network, and we want to make sure that we are looking at that very hard. So making it PIR just gives me a little bit better visibility on it.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Press reports in early February indicate that Mullah Abdul Rauf was killed in Afghanistan in a drone strike. The Washington Post called Rauf a figure actively recruiting for ISIS in Afghanistan, specifically Helmand, where coalition troops withdrew in October.

Can you confirm these reports? This was in The Washington Post.

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. It has been in a lot of the media. Mullah Rauf Khadim was designated as a deputy emir of Daesh, or ISIL, inside of Afghanistan, the emir of what they call the Khorasan, which is Pakistan, Afghanistan, in that area. Was actually a TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan] from Pakistan, so this was the guy that said, hey, I am the deputy emir, and—

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I have got 1 minute left, so I have a few more questions about this, General—

General CAMPBELL. Answer is yes on—

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Okay. You are aware.

So when you think about Rauf, he was a Taliban commander. He was detained at GTMO [Guantanamo Bay Naval Facility], released. We turned him over to the Afghan detention facility where he escaped and he became a recruiter for ISIS. Are you aware of all this?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I am aware he is from GTMO, that he was underneath Afghan control. I don't know any details on the escape at all.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. As we look at the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] coming forward here, we have got to make decisions about GTMO in the NDAA. Does it concern you that our troops in Afghanistan are fighting the same enemy twice?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, it concerns me that they are fighting any enemy. If it is once or twice I would have the same concern, absolutely, but—

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In your best military judgment, is closing GTMO at this time, knowing that 30 percent of the people are going back into the war, is that good or bad judgment?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, that is a policy question and I am a military guy. You know, I don't want to get drug into that policy.

What I would tell you is I—what I want to make sure I have the ability to do is if people are going to come back into Afghanistan, that I have the ability to make sure I am comfortable with the assurances that Afghanistan, or whatever country makes when they release people and turn them over to another country, that I have the ability to make sure I understand what assurances we have that these people will not attack coalition forces again. So I want to make sure I am tied into that as we move forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Veasey.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask the general a couple of questions based on the popular opinion poll that he gave us here, and it was talking about Afghans expressing confidence in their new government.

Do you have any sort of sense of how Afghans feel as far as confidence is concerned with Afghan capability post-U.S. or U.S.—post-U.S. drawdown?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, again, it is—you know, like anything else, I think they understand the capability that just having the coalition with them provides, and a lot of it is just giving them some confidence.

You know, as I have taken a look on close air support—I give you that as an example that I get asked a lot of times, “I need close air support. I need close air support.”

What I tell the Afghans is, “Don’t plan your operation wholly dependent upon close air support. You have the capability. The Taliban doesn’t have close air support. The Taliban doesn’t have up-armored Humvees. That Taliban doesn’t have [122 millimeter] D-30 howitzers. The Taliban doesn’t have, you know, the weapons that you have.”

So a part of it is just leadership again, and then really having the confidence to take this fight to the enemy. But if you go out on the streets of Kabul and you engage with, you know, 85 percent or 80-plus percent of the people, they would tell you they are thankful for the coalition, that they want the coalition around.

I think they are more comfortable if they have a coalition because it knows, you know, one, from helping out the security forces; it also provides them the opportunity to engage, have jobs, and that kind of thing. So I think they would tell you that they feel comfortable with the coalition presence.

Mr. VEASEY. Right. Exactly.

Well, what about with a U.S. drawdown, how would that be perceived out in the terror community? Do you think the people in the terror community, whether it is the Taliban or even outside of the Taliban, outside of Afghanistan, you know, how do they view, you know, the Afghans’ capability as far as being able to protect their own country?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks. I think, you know, I would go back—if I can answer the last one a little bit more in detail.

There was, I think, at different points in time a sense of abandonment if you talk to some Afghans. But for the most part the security forces, as they get the message out and show the people of Afghanistan what they are capable of, then I think that increases their confidence that the Afghan security forces can handle this. So

there was early on, I think, some abandonment-type discussion going on. I have not seen that, quite frankly, in the last several months as the Afghan security forces continue to get better and better.

I think on the terror community that you talked about, I think they were thinking that the coalition would be gone after 2014 and that, you know, they would wait that out. I think with the BSA and the SOFA now signed they understand that for many, many years we will have a continued commitment by the international community to remain in Afghanistan both in some number, but also in the resources provided to Afghanistan.

And again, I think that the time has come that they have got to become part of the political process. They have got to get back into—to being part of Afghanistan—they can't have Afghans killing Afghans, Muslims killing Muslims.

And I think it is a sign of strength that President Ghani, on his first day of office, signed the BSA and the SOFA, and the message is sent to the terrorist community is, hey, you know, we thought it was going to go away and it is not.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, first of all, I want to commend you on your testimony, your years of service in combat, peace, the—can't even add up all the deployments you have been through, and I—what I wanted to address is something that isn't here, and it is of concern to our NATO partners, maybe under the radar, and that is the situation of the poppy and the drugs and the corruption that, from a rational viewpoint, it affects Europe.

How are we doing on—can you comment on the status of that and where it is going right now?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question.

There have been a lot of different reports on the cultivation of poppies and what—the impact that it has financially for the insurgents in the area, a lot of that coming out of the Helmand area. Media reports will say that has increased over the last couple years as opposed to going down.

Trade is a concern to President Ghani. He has talked about it. He is looking hard at a strategy on how he goes after that and deals with the people that produce it, that deals with the insurgents that use it for their gain.

They have looked at different options down there. They do have quite a good record of a small task force that goes after and seizes different places and, for lack of a better term, drug labs that produce what comes out of there. But, you know, quite frankly, you know, it has not been enough and the strategy there has not taken that away from the insurgents.

That is not part of my TAA or part of my CT mission, so I can't comment, you know, further on that piece of it. But bottom line, it does provide, you know fuel, financial assistance to the Taliban, and we have to take—and the government of Afghanistan is looking hard at a holistic look at how they can combat that.

Mr. COOK. Thank you.

The relationship with Pakistan obviously has improved quite a bit—the military. The equipment—at one time we were always concerned about the equipment backlog going through Pakistan and everything else. Are we in pretty good shape right now on that? We had containers backed up to the sky, and just a quick update on that or—

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question. I mean, the logistical community and what our Nation has done with retrograde of equipment is phenomenal. I think, you know, years down the road when people take a look at this and understand—fully understand the amount of equipment that came out and how it came out, this is—they will be—this is record-setting.

And so we are on glide path now. We hit those back—all the numbers that we thought we needed to hit coming out of the mission to where we are today, we are on those numbers. So I feel very, very comfortable.

It ebbs and flows on how we do that through Torkham, through down in the south, based on the relationship with Pakistan. But again, the relationship with Pakistan today in Afghanistan is the best I have seen it in all the times I have been over there, and a lot of that is because of General Raheel, chief of the army in Pakistan, and then President Ghani, and their relationship—how they come together.

But the retrograde, I think, is on glide slope. I have no concerns there right now.

Mr. COOK. Yes. I was very, very happy to hear that.

I want to switch gears real quick. Uzbekistan in the north. Landlocked country, obviously. I think they have to have good relations with Pakistan. Iran is a whole new ballgame, as you know.

What is the relationship with Uzbekistan right now? I know at one time they were working on that bridge or that—the—I think it was the train that was going down there. Is that still ongoing or—

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I haven't seen a final piece where they have signed an MOU, memorandum of understanding, or MOA, agreement. I know that President Ghani has personally reached out to all the countries in the region. He has visited many of them.

I don't think in the last couple months that he has visited Uzbekistan, but I know he has talked to the senior leadership there. They have talked about the rail; they have talked about the bridges; they have talked about sharing of intelligence back and forth and how they can fight different insurgents.

Really a lot in the north is around criminal activity as opposed to, you know, the insurgent piece. There is arms trafficking, there is drug trafficking, and those kind of things. So they are working together.

He has sent senior members of his administration to different countries around—I couldn't—I can find out, but I know that I think several members of senior positions in Afghanistan have gone to visit Uzbekistan, as well.

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. Again, thank you for your service. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for being here today.

At a time of sequestration, when we are cutting our funding for U.S. forces here in the U.S. and looking at everything from shutting down commissaries on bases to adjusting retirement benefits for our forces, we are looking at our future expenditures in Afghanistan. Now, I have concerns that we have sufficient oversight with how the Afghans are spending the money that we are providing them with the resource. And specifically, you had mentioned, you know, their lack of self-sustaining capability, logistical capability.

I would like to look specifically at their ability to account for personnel. We talked about already the over 20,000 troop attrition in the Afghan forces that has been reported.

You know, I rely on the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction's [SIGAR] reports as to what is going on there and I see that there have been some real concerns. I mean, the numbers of Afghan military and police forces fluctuate significantly, sometime from quarter to quarter by as much as 20,000 or 40,000 personnel.

And I am worried that we are spending this money, we are not spending as much on our own U.S. forces here, we are spending money there, but, you know, those 40,000 troop fluctuations, are those best case scenario an accounting error? Those folks were never there, or they quit? Or were we paying for folks that were never there—ghost soldiers, as you were, that were on the books?

So can you talk a little bit about how we are providing oversight for the Afghans and help to them to figure out how they can get a handle on their forces and how they are spending this money that we are providing?

General CAMPBELL. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your service, as well.

You know, that is always a very, very tough, complex thing to get your hands around. People in our own Army, as you know, we have a hard time sometimes figuring out exactly who is present for duty, who is not.

Many of the figures I think you have seen in the last several days on numbers—you know, first off, we need to make sure that SIGAR and Members of Congress have total transparency on everything that we are doing inside of Afghanistan, and I want to make sure—and we are committed to provide SIGAR and, again, Congress everything they need to do that.

Some of the things are classified, and I—and back in August timeframe—so this is not a new story, but back in August when I got there I asked that we take a holistic look at all the information that was going out to not only the SIGAR but to the press and everybody else, and I said, "Anything that is readiness data"—and sometimes numbers of people and how you take a look at that could be construed as readiness data—but I said, "Anything that is readiness data for the Afghans needs to be classified." We just can't put that out, for the Afghans' good and also because we are wholly dependent upon the Afghans now for our own force protection. It became more so that I needed to have the readiness data classified.

The U.S. Army's readiness data is classified. All of our services' data is classified, as you know.

So that decision was made in August. I reaffirmed with President Ghani—in fact, he approached me about having that kind of data classified. And again, here in the last probably 2 weeks or so I went back to him and said, "I want to make sure you are comfortable, because I am getting asked a lot of questions on this."

He was absolutely adamant that Afghan data that pertained to readiness data was classified. So I feel very comfortable where we are at.

And I have not, as has been reported in some media, changed my mind. I have not. Readiness data remains classified.

Now, on the numbers of people—and again, the last report that came out a couple days ago from SIGAR, I think what happened there—and there is—again, I want to make sure SIGAR has everything they need to do their job and Congress has that information, as well. But I think numbers reported and numbers where you get that information comes from many different sources, and there is a report, called the 1230 Report, that Congress has dictated that I give, and that is sort of the—that is the base line, and that is where the numbers need to come from. And I think SIGAR understands that as well.

But I think some of the reports you saw and where the discrepancy were were like quarterly reports, and they may not have even come from my headquarters but they came from maybe lower headquarters, where members of potentially SIGAR went down to a lower headquarters, said, "Hey, what are your numbers?" And so we have to do a much better job at my headquarters to make sure that we have processes in place that we can provide the right data at the right time, but we have to have a better procedure to do that.

And we are working on that. I just signed a standard operating procedure to consolidate how we work that.

We have over 50, probably 62 different audits going on inside of Afghanistan, from SIGAR to AAA [Army Audit Agency] to DODIG [Department of Defense Inspector General]—60-plus. And so as we have transitioned and brought our numbers down, I don't have the people in country to do all of that.

I am dependent upon reach-back or other ways, and we have got to come up with a way to be able to figure out how we provide audit data, but at the same time continue to transition. And I don't have that capability. I have to raise that with my own leadership as we go forward.

But the numbers that I think you saw the last couple days, I think there is a miscommunication. When I learned through The New York Times, not through SIGAR, that these numbers are going to be replaced, I contacted John Sopko with SIGAR and said, "Hey, we need to take a hard look at this data you are getting ready to release. I don't think it is right."

So I alerted him to that, they stopped the release of that piece. And again, we are looking hard at how we can continue to work making sure everybody gets the right data. Hopefully that got to your question.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for being here.

If there is one thing we have learned over the last several months it is that the people of a country have to be willing to hold that country, and I am speaking specifically of Iraq. Afghanistan obviously a very different country. I think that from the context of the American citizen that maybe the way it is talked about the perception is it is all one and the same issue, if you will.

And I do think that we need to do a better job of getting that message out when we do have the victories, because all America is hearing right now is the bad that is happening in the Middle East. So thank you for your service.

I want to talk with you about one of the issues that you have talked about a couple of times: close air support. Obviously, in order for Afghanistan to be a success they have to be able to hold that country from the Taliban and other terrorist organizations when we are hopefully completely out of there.

The Afghanistan Air Force, the A-29 [Super Tucano] light air support mission right now is currently—they are being trained at Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta. If you could just speak to the—that element, how critical it is, the air support and Afghanistan's being able to carry out their own air support long term, and then how many A-29s do you expect we should be prepared to provide for the Afghanistan Air Force?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question. And again, we are very thankful in Georgia that they have that capability to provide the training for the A-29s. It is a very long process. You know, looking in hindsight, I wish we would have started that years ago and we would have that capability now, but we are where we are and I think what is happening there—training the pilots, training the maintainers for this fixed-wing close air support capability—is critical for Afghanistan and their air force as we move to the future.

You know, quite frankly, we can't get it quick enough for them. The current program has about 20 aircraft over the next 3 years that will come to Afghanistan.

We won't have any for this fighting season 2015. We will get some at the end of the year, a couple more before start of fighting season 2016. But most will come out in 2017 and then in 2018. So that is another reason we need to continue to have this train, advise, and assist for the next several years, working at least on the air force piece.

But it is a great, great capability. They are looking forward to it. And I think it will give them, and the people in that region will understand, that the Afghans have this great close air support capability.

We are working other ways to work that here in the near term with forward-firing machine guns under Mi-17s, with MD-530, this Little Bird I talked about. And again, they do have indirect-fire mortars, 120 mortars, D-30 howitzers that will continue to work with them on different ways to improve that capability. But this is

a huge asset they are looking forward to getting inside of Afghanistan.

Mr. SCOTT. You know, we have to make sure that when we leave that country that that country is prepared to hold and govern themselves. Just the situation in Iraq right now is—that is certainly lessons learned the hard way, if you will.

Mr. Chairman, I don't have any further questions.

Thank you for the A-29 mention, and if we can ever host you at Moody Air Force Base, be happy to have you down there.

With that, I yield the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General, for your endurance and service.

Tomorrow night at the state armory in Hartford there is going to be a sendoff for the Connecticut Army National Guard 192nd Military Police Battalion, who are heading off to Afghanistan. And, you know, first of all, they were given notice almost 60 days ago to the day that they were being sent over. And I realize this is not sort of in your lane in terms of, you know, making the decisions about, you know, reaching into Guard and Reserve units.

You know, what I would say is that, frankly, there are folks who are kind of scratching their heads that if we are at a force level of about 10,000, you know, Guard and Reserves—there was, I think, an understanding and an acceptance back during the surge days, you know, when we had hundreds of thousands of people over in the Middle East—you know, tapping into the Guard at this point, and frankly, doing it with almost the bare notice required by law, is something that, again, folks are struggling with.

And so first of all, I guess I would ask you—and I don't mean to put you on the spot, but if you were in front of those families tomorrow night, you know, what you would share with them. And I am not asking you to, you know, explain the decision-making process, because I realize that that happens somewhere else, in terms of your command.

But again, as their leader over in Afghanistan, you know, what would be your thoughts that you would share with the families?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thank you. And again, the Army—all of our service could not do what we do without our military families. So I would first thank them for their sacrifice, for having to allow us to have that soldier continue to serve.

I would tell them that what they are getting ready to do, you know, two things—is a very, very important mission, will mean a great deal to the Afghan people but also provide for our own security back here.

I would ask them to watch out for each other and always take care of brothers and sisters on their left and right to make sure that force protection is always foremost in their mind. I would ask them never to get complacent. But that they do have a very, very important job.

You know, many times when I tell the soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines over there that sometimes you are too close to it; they can't see some of these changes we talked about earlier, and they—you know, people serve for different reasons, but they do serve be-

cause they know that they are serving for the greater good. And when they come to Afghanistan I tell them, you know, "Whatever you do, make that place better than when you found it," and I think I have seen over the years everybody continues to do that.

They will have an impact on whatever they do and whoever they touch. And again, sometimes this is an impact that they can't be able to put into words, but I would just tell you their service would be honored and that they will feel good about what they have done after they leave there.

I can't speak to the service provider piece, that only that, you know, for many, many years our National Guard, our U.S. Army Reserve have played an important role both in Iraq and Afghanistan and will continue as we move forward. And so I appreciate their service.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Well, thank you. And I will share those thoughts.

You know, frankly, I think as we have sort of wrestled with the drawdown and force reduction and sequestration and the Budget Control Act, you know, it sort of has reignited a little bit of the sort of tension about whether or not the Guard and Reserve really are on parity, in terms of the rest of the forces. And again, the fact that they got this order to head over, you know, again, at a time when maybe the average person wouldn't think that kind of, you know, is consistent with the rest of the force level, underscores to me the value that Active Duty still apply—you know, believes exists, in terms of the Guard and Reserve units.

And they have done yeoman's work during both conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, you know, they deserve all the kudos and appreciation that we can possibly give them.

So again, thank you for your comments, and again, I will pass them along.

I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, General Campbell, thank you and your staff for being here today.

And I am going to take a little different approach. I looked at your narrative and the comment by Senator Levin, who is now retired, and says, "I just cite these public opinion polls—Americans, 65 or 70 percent think we haven't achieved anything." And then he is critical of the people that don't think we have achieved anything by saying at the end of it, "And the people who are 7,000 miles away think we haven't?"

You know, well, I would say to the Senator, it is those people back home that are paying the bills. They need to get something out of the tax dollars that they are paying.

When we went into Afghanistan in 2001 the debt of our Nation was \$5.95 trillion. Today it is over \$18 trillion in debt. And you know from your brothers and sisters in the military what we are faced with with budgets.

All right. Then I read in a blog from yesterday by Jason Ditz—D-I-T-Z—between casualties and desertion, Afghan military is shrinking fast. "The desertion problem is a longstanding one, with many Afghans signing up for the military, sticking around long

enough to get their first paycheck, then bailing, and often taking their weapons with them as a sort of severance package.”

Then in *The Guardian* yesterday, “Afghan Officials Sanction Murder, Torture, Rape, Says Report.” Now, I realize that this is from Human Rights Watch, and we can have our views on that, whether it is a liberal group or a conservative group or whatever. That is fair. But they still write this, and apparently there has been no dispute.

And I will read just one paragraph: “The report focuses on eight commanders and officials across Afghanistan, some of them counted among the country’s most powerful men, and key allies for foreign troops. Some are accused of personally inflicting violence, others of having responsibility for militias or government forces that commit the crimes.”

I know some good things are happening. I don’t question that at all. But where—Afghanistan has been proving in history it is the Wild West.

What my concern is that we have got 9 more years of a financial commitment and a military commitment, which might be limited in numbers but they are still young men and women over there walking the roads to be shot at and have their legs blown off. I just wondered, because we in Congress are going to be grappling with sequestration this year.

The chairman and ranking member, who are doing a great job, are very concerned about the military budget, and I think all of us here are, as well. I know I am. I have Camp Lejeune down in my district and Cherry Point Marine Air Station.

But I get to a point that I just wonder—not talking about you, sir; you are an outstanding, great military person—but will there ever be anyone in the diplomatic corps or the military that say, “You know, we have done about all we can do?” Some things are impossible.

Yes, some people will benefit, but when I read reports like this, whether they be from the left or the right—Pat Buchanan is one of my biggest heroes. Ron Paul is one of my dearest friends. And I continue to see 9 more years of spending money that we don’t have so we can decrease the number in our military.

It doesn’t make any sense. I know you don’t make the policy decisions. I understand that.

But will there ever be someone who follows behind you and follows behind me that will be honest to the Congress and the American people who have to pay the bill that we have done about as much as we can do?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question.

Sir, I would answer like this: Again, you know, quite frankly, this is the world we live in, not maybe the world we want. And I think the complexity of the world we live in is a generational piece that is going to go on long after you and I are out of here, and we need to understand that and look at it as a generational issue and put strategies and policies in place that will get at this long-term.

So it is not going to change overnight, and I think we just have to change our mindset on where we are at. And I think the American people are well served by the great men and women who continue to raise their right hand and serve, knowing that they can

go into harm's way, knowing that despite trying to do something bigger than themselves, that they are going to face going into a service that is going to have budget issues that is going to take away.

And so I think this is a long-term issue we have to get at.

But what I am pleased about is that, you know, you mentioned all those different reports there, and there are challenges, not only in Afghanistan but many places in the world. I do see Afghanistan as a place, because of the significant investment in lives and in financial that we have provided to them, that this can be the bright spot, that this is, for lack of a better term, a strategic win that will carry on in this part of the world that is a very complex, dangerous part.

And for very little continued investment, we can make this the shining light of Central Asia and that part of the world. And I think, you know, we have got to start someplace, and Afghanistan is the good news story among all these other bad things that are coming out.

And for every bad news report you just mentioned there, sir, there are probably 9 or 10 good news that do not get out because, as you know, good news doesn't sell. What I have had to do is take—I give President Ghani a good news story storyboard that I collect each week.

I have my commanders provide me a good news storyboard that talks about the good things that Afghans are doing in different areas, and when I meet with him I say, "Mr. President, Dr. Abdullah, here are some good news stories. You are not hearing about it in the news but you need to know this is happening."

And I give them 10 or 15 PowerPoint slides with pictures showing good news story in Afghanistan, and that word just doesn't get out because it doesn't sell. But believe me, sir, for every VBIED [vehicle-borne improvised explosive device], suicide vest that went off in Kabul, there are 9 or 10 that are stopped.

And so there is good news out there.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentledady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Campbell, thank you for your challenging leadership in Afghanistan.

I want to quote the 2015 National Security Strategy in saying, "We must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power. Indeed, in the long term our efforts to work with other countries to counter the ideology and the root causes of violent extremists will be more important."

I strongly support this approach, General. However, I am also concerned that the persistence we have shown in Afghanistan and our presence there can have harmful effects on our long-term readiness.

As we draw down to a force capable of protecting our security interests in the region, how will we capitalize and re-utilize the equipment—and I know this was brought up earlier—that we currently have in-country to protect the readiness of our total force? Specifically, can you comment on retrograde efforts, as they are supported in the fiscal year 2016 budget, and what impact sequestration would have on this effort if sequestration is not repealed?

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, ma'am. And thank you for your visit last fall, as well.

I haven't looked at the numbers for the retrograde portion for fiscal year 2016. I would tell you that we will continue to need the necessary resources, the financial piece to bring back the retrograde that we have in Afghanistan so that we can put that back into the force here. Probably 80 percent of that now is for the Army.

But the very best equipment that we have is in Afghanistan, so we need to continue to make sure we get that back, get it reset, and get that into the force.

I do think that we are on glide slope to do that. We had some concerns, you know, a year, year and a half ago, but as a vice then now as a commander on the ground, I don't have those same concerns and we will continue to get that back to the Army.

Sequestration, from a different perspective, I think will impact the readiness of all of our services. And again, that is why I think all the service chiefs, the chairmen have come out, as you know, and said that it would have a really, really bad impact if we go to sequestration—on readiness.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.

And my second question is, recently the first lady of Afghanistan had said, "Women come to me and say you have forgotten us." I am a strong champion of women's rights and wonder, what can we do, working with the Afghans and NATO, to ensure women's rights are respected across the country as we continue to draw down our forces? How are we encouraging or working with the Afghan government to ensure greater inclusion of women in civic society?

And a few years back I traveled with Speaker—then Speaker leader Pelosi, and we visited many of the women leaders in Afghanistan, and they were very, very concerned about the future. So can you comment on that, General?

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, ma'am. And we work very hard, both from a coalition perspective, but also President Ghani works very hard to make sure that he looks hard at how he is working on the gender issues, and particularly the women piece here, both from a military perspective, security perspective, and getting women into the police and getting them into the army.

The money, \$25 million, that Congress has approved for this, specifically pinpointed to work on these type of issues, is very, very helpful, and we are thankful of that support.

But it will take time for the police and the army—and the police are doing much better than the army, quite frankly, on integrating women into the force. But we will look very hard as we go through there. But some of the cultural differences they have make that, you know, a little bit tougher.

But I think they are both committed, from the MOI perspective, Ministry of Interior—and I will engage the minister of defense once we have new minister of defense. I have engaged the current acting and the chief of army on this, and they are always looking at ways on how they can improve.

You know, I want to say 24 percent of parliament is women. You know, I don't think we have that in our own Congress, so that is very good in Afghanistan.

So President Ghani and the first lady have really put a hard press on those throughout Afghanistan and reaching out, as well. I do have a gender advisor from my force, from Australia, actually, that focuses on a lot of different activities that are going on to see how we can do that much better. She engages with NATO and all of our NATO and partner forces, as well, to ensure we are doing everything we can to enrich this and continue to keep emphasis on it.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much, General, for your comments. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.

Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Campbell, thank you so much for your service and taking on the mission that you are taking on. And it is encouraging to see the positive that we don't often hear about.

I would agree with you wholeheartedly, I think it was a great move by Ghani to sign a BSA and the SOFA. That bodes well for all of us. And I think it was probably wise, from where I sit, for Ghani and Abdullah to come together as governance partners.

And so my question to you is, what are you seeing as far as that relationship between the two of them and its effect on any national unity in Afghanistan?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks. That is a great question.

I look at this every day and I do think that both President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah gave up some to make sure that they can continue to have Afghanistan as a nation continue to move forward. They both did that after a long period there.

As they work together and as I see both of them many times, both together and then separately, I think they complement each other as they work together. They both have great vision for where they want to take Afghanistan.

And, you know, it is—it really is a people around each of them I think that they have to continue to work through, and they have run into instances where they have had differences, but I think they work hard to make sure as they come out to the public that they have one voice as they move forward. That is not easy all the time, but I think they understand how important it is so they work toward that, both from a security perspective and then from an economic perspective.

But again, I think they complement each other and I am honored to have the opportunity to engage with both of them quite a few times every week.

Dr. WENSTRUP. So, General, in that sense, is that carried over to the military in some ways, as far as unity and cohesion amongst the military and the morale within the military—the Afghan forces?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. As I said, he is—Dr. Ghani, President Ghani is a commander in chief. He said that up front. And so his interaction with all the security forces is completely different from where we were underneath President Karzai.

Their morale, you know, just—it has gone way up just knowing that they have somebody that cares for their welfare, that has visited them at training sites, that has visited their wounded in hos-

pitals, that has talked to them about changing the authorities for corps commanders on what they can and can't do.

He has video teleconferences several times since I have been with him with the senior leadership. He has a National Security Council meeting every week that he brings in the senior leadership from the police and the army.

So again, I think they are thankful that they do have a commander in chief that has taken not only their own welfare but also their families' welfare, as he looks at different ways to help out wounded warriors, those kind of things. So it is quite good.

Dr. WENSTRUP. And with that in mind, since they have not been in office very long, do you anticipate—you know, the question has come up a couple times about the deserters. Do you anticipate that that rate will slow down as a result, or hopefully, anyway?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, what they are—how would I try to make that tie-in, and I think, you know, President Ghani, what he is trying to do is put leadership in that can make a difference. So he is taking a hard look at all of his generals. He has retired on order of about 60 general officers since he has been—as the President.

You know, they hadn't had any retirements in the last 4 or 5 years underneath President Karzai. So in the last 4 months or so they had—they have had about 60-plus.

So that is infusing new blood. He is looking hard at the people that he puts into those positions. You know, he is trying to interview every one of his general officers or the people that he promotes to be general officer. He is trying to put them based on their merit, you know, which is very good.

And I think leadership is going to change the attrition piece. You know, what happens on the attrition, I said part of it is combat casualties. That is only a small piece.

The desertion, if you take a hard look at why people desert—and they have instituted an attrition working group in the army that I have senior advisors that attend now. It went dormant for a while. We have instituted that back up to make sure we get after this issue.

But when you take a hard look at it, it is leadership. It is, for instance, having a soldier that is assigned to the 215th Corps in Helmand and he has been there for 4 years, so all he knows is combat after combat after combat. And they haven't been able to get on a cyclic, so they have sort of a red, amber, green, so they can go through and they can take leave, they can have training, and then they can fight.

And so they are just now starting to have that cyclic force generation process that gives them that ability. And once they get that into place I really do think you will see the desertion piece go way down.

Part of it is they are assigned to the 215th, you get down there, you see no future about being rotated to another corps and you are always going to be on it because their personnel management, how they do talent management is not right. They are moving toward that. If you are in the 215th down in Helmand but you live in Badakhshan, way up north, you know, it takes you days to get back there, or you may never get back there, and once you do get back there and you interact with your family and they are out in

the fields trying to harvest, you know, you may go past what your 20 days of leave would be, and then you are considered a deserter, and then you don't want to come back, although many do.

So I think leadership is going to make the difference on the attrition piece, and I think President Ghani is a big part of that.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, those sound like logical things to address. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, just one quick question.

You did mention wounded warriors. What percentage of the medical care being given in theater right now is coming from American personnel, would you estimate, as opposed to—

General CAMPBELL. For the Afghans, sir?

Dr. WENSTRUP. For the whole theater. You talk about, you know, the wounded warriors. Is it U.S. physicians, surgeons taking care of the wounded predominantly, or is the Afghan medical—

General CAMPBELL. No, sir. You know, they have their own medical system. I have sat down with the Afghan army's surgeon general and talked to him on one occasion on how they can improve different areas of that, but no, they have regional hospitals.

We have some advisors at different places that are continuing to work through that, but they only come to a coalition facility, like at Bagram, if it is a very, very, you know, worst case that they can't handle, and that has been on very few instances since I have been there.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much, and—

General CAMPBELL. Thank you, sir.

Dr. WENSTRUP [continuing]. We will have a chance to meet with you again in a classified setting, and appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General, for hanging in here. I have appreciated very much your knowledge and very nuanced testimony.

I want to follow up on Congresswoman Bordallo's last comment. As a Member of Congress I have made six trips to Afghanistan, and four with a delegation of women—generally three Republican congressional—Congresswomen and three Democratic Congresswomen.

And our goal really has been twofold. It has been over Mother's Day, so to thank our women soldiers. Often we commiserate with them, know how hard it is to be away from home on Mother's Day, as it is for all of those who are serving.

But we have also had the real opportunity to see the gains that have been made for women in Afghanistan. And while they are not as widespread as we would like, I think Kabul has been a prime beneficiary of them, but—and other urban settings—but nevertheless, those gains have been real and your report showed that, in terms of health care, access to education, a whole—access to work, although—however, limited.

So as we are drawing down, our concern really is that those gains are not somehow traded away. And as you have talked about President Ghani's reaching out and referencing the Taliban in his inaugural speech, I can tell you that as we meet with women over there those comments send chills through them because we know how terribly they suffered under the Taliban regime.

And so I think our concern, our bipartisan concern, has become, you know, how do we protect the gains that have been made? And as we have talked today about some of the differences about Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems to me that one of them has really been the signing of the bilateral security agreement, and that it has set up a very different framework and I think has given us leverage, a role in Afghanistan as it transitions to its next phase.

So I am curious—while the security situation is really your role and many of these other gains have been investments that have come about through other parts of our presence there—how you see the United States' role using its ongoing relationship with the government to make sure that, let's just say negotiations do go forward with the Taliban, how we make sure, how we use our leverage there, how you use your leverage, representing the United States, to make sure that women's gains remain on the table and they are somehow not traded away as others argue for a path forward in which the Taliban are brought into the government?

General CAMPBELL. Ma'am, thank you for your visits. Thank you for your question.

Again, I think leadership has a big deal here to play. I think, again, the difference here is that President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah are very committed to this. It is written in their constitution, and so as they work with the Taliban, if there is reconciliation down the road, I think one of the key parameters there will be is that the constitution will hold, and inside the constitution it talks about respect of women's rights.

Again, I think with the first lady, with President Ghani, with Ambassador McKinley and his team at the embassy, with the 30, 40-plus ambassadors I interact with periodically, they all have this upmost in their mind. It comes up in different settings, different meetings I am at.

And so, you know, it is sort of a drum beat that President Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, senior leadership, and then the other ministries continue to hear, and they understand how important it is that they abide by, you know, their constitution and where they want to go.

So I think leadership will make a difference, and I understand that in my realm, in the security realm, what we are—what we have changed now is everything is conditions-based. And so we sign letters of commitment to provide finance, to provide fuel, on and on and on and on.

And I think this is where the same ways we look forward in this area that it could be conditions-based, and everything that we continue to do through different NGOs we make conditions-based and they abide by their constitution, and I think the leadership can make that happen over there.

Ms. TSONGAS. I can remember a hearing we had here where a woman who is a leader of one of the NGOs over there said the first indication that things are not going well for women will be the street—if you stop seeing women on the street. So that really does come back to the role of the Afghan National Police.

Are you confident that they are up to the task? And if not, do you see—how would we challenge them to do it better?

General CAMPBELL. Ma'am, the police have done much better on integrating women into their force. They are doing much better

now on understanding how they have to deal with communities and understanding community policing.

As we did a deep dive back in December on all the security incidents inside of Kabul, we talked about the high-profile attacks. One way of getting after that was having a police force that had community policing on their mind, understood what that meant.

As was mentioned earlier by one of the members, President Ghani made a change on many of the district commanders inside of Kabul, made a change here. They have been talking about that for a while. He just did that. I think that will adjust.

As I travel around the streets of Kabul the streets are bustling, a lot of women are out and around. And so that indication there says that continues to build.

Again, I think this will be a challenge that they will—that leadership, in keeping a spotlight on this and having the international community make sure they understand how important it is, and that if they don't continue to abide by this then there is a conditionality where they—you take away something, whether it is financial and—you know, they are very dependent upon the donor nations right now, so I think conditions have to go on this.

And I know they are working very, very hard on this and they are dedicated toward that. But there will be challenges as they move forward.

And, ma'am, it is going to take time. So, you know, as I talk about within their army they have a goal—a very hard goal of getting 10 percent into their army. They are less than 1 percent today; they are trying to work toward that.

But I look at my own Army, and after 239 years we are at about 15 percent, you know, so it is going to take time and it is harder based on the cultural differences they have there, but I think they are committed to working at this very hard.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, General. Thank you for your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I mentioned to you that I thought the questions would be better starting from the bottom, or the more junior members, and I think the questioning has been excellent today. I think we have touched on a lot of topics.

You have had a number of questions about ISIS, or ISIL, and I realize that you are not here as a lawyer, and that you haven't read and studied carefully the implications of what the President has proposed. And I heard you say that at this point ISIS is a nascent threat, although—in Afghanistan, although one you are watching very carefully.

But as we explore this AUMF that the President has requested for ISIS, thinking about how it would work for people like you, whether we are talking about Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, or whatever, one of the concerns is that it has more restrictions on ISIS than the current AUMF has on Al Qaeda, and some of these groups live side by side.

And so to me, there is just a commonsense concern here that if you have got two different standards to go after two different terrorist groups, how do you have the intelligence to know which is which? And then operationally, how do you have a—have to have a lawyer by your side to make every single decision?

I mean, isn't that—if it comes to be that way—and I—this is a big if, and I am—again, I am not trying to put you on the spot either, but operationally would that not be a matter of concern?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks for the question. And, you know, any commander on the ground would tell you he wants as much flexibility as he can get. And so any policy that provides commanders on the ground the flexibility to make decisions in a timely manner is something that I would—I will be in favor of.

You are right though, sir, the insurgents—and I can only speak for Afghanistan, but the insurgents inside of Afghanistan, they in many cases feed off of each other, and they are interrelated in many different ways and you may have one that provides, you know, finance, food, lodging to one; one that may provide weapons, and secure routes for another. But some fight each other internally, but also it is very, very tough, as we take a hard look at it, to separate some of these organizations.

What I do have right now is the authorities to prosecute those who come after the coalition, and that is how I take a look at it as I try to bend those, is that those that—not by their status, but by their conduct—come after coalition forces.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason we are in Afghanistan to begin with is because that is the place from which a plot was launched that ultimately killed 3,000 Americans. And what can you tell us about your assessment of Al Qaeda's core ability to reconstitute itself were it not to be under constant pressure from us?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, thanks again for that question. I do think we have to make sure we understand the threat and how the threat will continue to evolve.

The continued pressure that we provide now with our very credible CT capability, the very best in the world, I believe has prevented a—another attack on the homeland. And I do believe if you do not have pressure—continued pressure on AQ, that it would be a matter of time that they would regenerate that capability.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the current drawdown plan, would your ability to gather intelligence for the CT mission be significantly downgraded in this calendar year?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I—you know, as I look at it, I would much rather go into a classified session with you to discuss that piece—

The CHAIRMAN. And I sure don't want to get into details.

General CAMPBELL. But, sir, as you know, as you go from a—any time you go from one number to another, you have to make very, very tough decisions on where you balance that.

And, you know, as I talked before, force protection is utmost in my mind. ISR and other pieces that provide—they do provide continued force protection for me, and so, you know, I look at it very hard and I have to balance that. And so those numbers—well, I am going to make some very tough decisions on where you take that, and then what I have to do if I don't feel comfortable with that, I need to make sure that I come forward to my senior leadership and provide them, you know, what I believe the risk to force is and what the risk to mission is.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, and I appreciate that. Again, I am just thinking from a commonsense measure, if you are in fewer places

around the country you have fewer opportunities to gather intelligence, include on force protection, as you mentioned, and on counterterrorism mission, as well, which is of concern to me.

Just to clarify—and I think you answered this earlier—all of the high-value terrorists who were in our custody have now been turned over to Afghan custody, correct?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, not all Afghan. They have been turned over to some other third countries, as well. But I do not have any detainees. I do not have detention authority underneath my authorities after 1 January.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So they have all gone somewhere, but not all necessarily to the Afghans.

General CAMPBELL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Last thought: I am struck. We had, as you know, General Austin here yesterday, and I am struck by the number of members on this committee on both sides of the aisle who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and feel very strongly that they do not want the sacrifice that has been made in Afghanistan to—I hate to say go to waste, but there is tremendous frustration at what has happened in Iraq, and you got a sense of that today.

I know from your service and from those who serve under you, you share that determination to make sure that, whether we are talking taxpayer dollars or American lives, that the sacrifice is upheld and honored and that it is not wasted because of policy decisions.

The only thing I would request of you is, as you watch this situation in Afghanistan, probably closer than anybody else, if you believe that we are headed down the wrong path, i.e., headed down a path that we went down in Iraq, I know this committee expects and requests you to raise a flag to us as well as your chain of command and say, “This is headed in the wrong path,” because I—this committee obviously shares what I have no doubt is your commitment to make sure that all of that sacrifice these last 14 years results in a stable, relatively peaceful Afghanistan from which terrorists cannot again launch attacks against us.

So I will appreciate that, sir. You are welcome to say anything you want, but you don’t have to.

General CAMPBELL. Sir, absolutely. I am committed to that. That is what I owe my leadership and Congress here, to give you my best military advice as we move forward on that, and I am absolutely committed to that.

And, sir, thank you for your leadership, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

Well, thank you, sir. I appreciate answering all our questions today.

And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 4, 2015

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 4, 2015

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JOHN F CAMPBELL, USA
COMMANDER
U.S. FORCES—AFGHANISTAN
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
4 MARCH 2015

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Afghanistan: What We've Achieved

I. Where We Are – State of the Campaign

In the wake of the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. military forces promptly deployed to Afghanistan with the objective to eliminate the international terrorist threat emanating from there. We were soon joined by our NATO allies and other international partners. Over thirteen years later, we have not forgotten the motivations for our mission in Afghanistan and why we remain. Our primary focus continues to be on preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven again for al Qaeda and other international extremist groups. Since 2001, the extraordinary efforts of both our conventional and special operations forces have ensured that another terrorist attack originating from Afghanistan and directed against the U.S. homeland has not occurred. Today, U.S. special operations forces, alongside their Afghan counterparts, continue to impose considerable pressure on the remaining fragments of the terrorist networks that attacked us. Significantly, the Afghan National Defense & Security Forces (ANDSF) have also assumed full responsibility for securing the Afghan people. Our Afghan partners have proven that they can and will take the tactical fight from here. They are ready, and it is time.

On 1 January 2015, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) formally ended its combat mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, and commenced its new mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel. Simultaneously, troops from 41 nations (26 Alliance & 15 partner nations), which comprise the new NATO mission, Resolute Support, began executing their Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission in order to build the capabilities and long-term sustainability of the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) and ANDSF. U.S. forces are now carrying out two well-defined missions: a

Counter-Terrorism (CT) mission against the remnants of al Qaeda and the Resolute Support TAA mission in support of Afghan security forces.

Our CT and TAA efforts are concurrent and complementary. While we continue to attack the remnants of al-Qaeda, we are also building the ANDSF so that they can secure the Afghan people and contribute to stability throughout the region. Both of these efforts will contribute to a more secure and productive Afghanistan and prevent the re-emergence of terrorist safe havens.

In spite of considerable progress, it is clear that our campaign will remain a challenging one. Last year's political impasse, delay in signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and setbacks in forming a new cabinet, have created a period of comparative stagnation in ANDSF institutional development. In this environment of uncertainty, some incumbent Afghan leaders have been hesitant to make necessary decisions. Many Alliance members and operational partners understandably delayed fulfilling their Resolute Support force commitments until a new administration was installed and the BSA and SOFA were signed. Their deferrals resulted in advisors and other forces either arriving just in time or late for the start of Resolute Support.

The new Afghan National Unity Government will have to overcome considerable political pressures and obstacles as President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah determine how they will distribute power and responsibilities. Thus far, both leaders have demonstrated an admirable willingness to cooperate and address these challenges. Both have elevated the Afghan people's interests above their own.

The ANDSF will surely be tested in Fighting Season 2015 as well. It will also take time for us to evaluate the efficacy of our TAA efforts and our regional approach at the Train, Advise, & Assist Commands (TAACs). We will inevitably have to make adjustments. Additionally, we will need to balance our short and long-term efforts and weigh potential operational gains against U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan. We will do all of this as we manage considerable risks to our mission and force and contend with a myriad of lethal threats. Due to all of these factors, we must be prepared and adapt as needed. Likewise, we will need to evaluate and prioritize our efforts in light of restricted resources and the limited time available to accomplish our mission.

The next two years of the Resolute Support campaign will play a crucial role in cementing our gains. While we strive to improve ANDSF capabilities and sustainability, we will continue to re-posture our forces and adjust our footprint. As in the past, our drawdown will occur under enemy pressure. We will need to manage our efforts to maximize the effects of our TAACs and our continued consolidation toward a Kabul-centric posture.

Historical Context & Framework for New USFOR-A/NATO Mission

Our transition to Resolute Support represents the natural evolution of our maturing partnership with the increasingly capable ANDSF. Back in 2011, more than 140,000 Coalition troops were distributed over 800 sites. Our forces were then heavily engaged in combat and tactical-level advising. We have now reduced our forces and footprint to about 13,000 Coalition troops at 21 bases throughout Afghanistan. With the exception of our continued tactical advising of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), we are no longer engaged in brigade-level and below

advising. Instead, we are now mentoring our Afghan counterparts at the corps headquarters and security ministries. This significant shift in our mission focus has been complemented and driven by the rapid expansion and development of the ANDSF into a skilled and courageous force of approximately 350,000. During the past two fighting seasons, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have repeatedly shown that they can win battles on their own. When they work together, they have also proven that they can overmatch the insurgents wherever and whenever they challenge them.

Resolute Support is not a continuation of the ISAF mission on a smaller scale. While Resolute Support shares some similarities, it represents a significant paradigm shift. In contrast to a few years ago, our Afghan partners are at the forefront of combat operations and they are now bearing the brunt of enemy attacks. Accordingly, U.S. and Coalition casualties have significantly dropped with combat fatalities in 2014 less than half of what they were in 2013.

The designation of Resolute Support as a non-combat mission does not eliminate the fact that we will still operate in a hostile environment—our personnel will be exposed to risks in 2015 and beyond. Afghanistan remains a dangerous place. Even though U.S. and NATO personnel will support combat operations indirectly, we can anticipate that we will be targeted, and we will suffer casualties. Therefore, force protection remains my priority concern, and we have the necessary authority to take adequate measures to protect our forces.

The tragic death of MG Harold Greene last August stands as a testament to the risks that our advisors continue to be exposed to every day. Although insider attacks against U.S. and

Coalition forces declined again in 2014, they remain a focus area of force protection. Fortunately, these attacks have not significantly affected the strong relationship between Coalition and ANDSF personnel. We continue to implement mitigations to avoid patterns and prevent complacency. These measures have reduced, but not eliminated, the threat. We will remain vigilant to prevent future insider attacks.

Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA) will be the cornerstone of Resolute Support and represents our unified effort to generate, employ, and sustain the ANDSF and ASI. FBSFA encompasses all Resolute Support activities required to develop ANDSF operational effectiveness and includes partnering, advising, and supporting the ANDSF at the corps-level and above. The FBSFA framework concentrates on eight Essential Functions (EFs):

EF 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute (PPBE): generate requirements, develop a resource informed budget, and execute a spending plan

EF 2: Internal controls to assure Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO)

EF 3: Civilian governance of the ASI, including adherence to the Rule of Law (RoL)

EF 4: Force generate: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop professional ANDSF (FORGEN)

EF 5: Sustain the force through effective facilities management, maintenance, medical, and logistics systems (FORSUST)

EF 6: Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns and operations (C2):

Inter-ministerial and joint coordination

Command, control and employ Ground, Air, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)

EF 7: Sufficient Intelligence capabilities and processes (INT)

EF 8: Maintain internal and external strategic communications capabilities (STRATCOM)

The execution of Resolute Support is based on a limited regional TAA approach and located at the “four spokes” in Coalition TAACs in the north, south, east, and west, with one central “hub” in Kabul City. I view our TAACs as the critical component of our FBSFA efforts in 2015. They serve as our principal connection and touch point between the ministries and fielded forces. Hence, they play a central role in our ability to assess the efficacy of our ministerial efforts and how well they support ongoing ANDSF security operations.

II. Where We Are – State of the ANDSF

Results of the 2014 Fighting Season & Preparations for the 2015 Fighting Season

In their second fighting season in the lead, the ANDSF proved proficient at securing the Afghan people, fighting their own battles, and holding the gains achieved by ISAF over the last 13+ years. On the battlefield, the ANDSF fought tenaciously and demonstrated their increasing capabilities. They independently planned, led, and executed numerous combined-arms operations. Both ANA and ANP units showed increased tactical flexibility and endurance as well.

Determined to preempt insurgent aims for the 2015 Fighting Season, the ANDSF recently commenced Operation ZOLFIQAR, their cross-pillar and multi-corps operation in Northern Helmand Province. Significantly, this is the first large-scale operation that the ANDSF have independently planned and executed since they assumed full security responsibilities. Three

ANA Corps and numerous ANP units continue to clear historical areas of insurgent activity to include Sangin and the Upper Sangin Valley methodically and effectively. Simultaneously, they are conducting complementary operations in western districts of Kandahar Province to prevent the insurgents' reinforcement or escape. The ANDSF's initial progress has been encouraging and impressive. Their success in reducing several insurgent strongholds demonstrates what they can accomplish with deliberate planning, cross-pillar cooperation, and effective leadership.

Of note, ANDSF operational tempo (OPTEMPO) was four times higher in 2014 than in 2013. Not surprisingly, and regrettably, ANDSF casualty rates also increased last year. The combination of an increased OPTEMPO; assumption of greater security responsibilities; the drawdown of Coalition forces; and the aggressive pursuit of the enemy, all contributed to a moderate increase in casualty rates. This uptick was borne primarily by the ANP and Afghan Local Police (ALP). The latter operate in isolated areas and are not as well equipped or trained as other ANDSF. The insurgents also target the ALP more frequently because the ALP are not centrally garrisoned and instead live in villages among the Afghan people. Therefore, they present the most immediate threat and challenge to insurgent efforts to control and intimidate the populace. Overall, the ANP and ALP are the most frequently engaged elements of the ANDSF and they continue to suffer the majority of ANDSF casualties. They often represent the first line of defense and provide the most immediate connection between the Afghan government and Afghan people. The ANP and ALP's persistent courage and resilience in the face of considerable risks merit respect and commendation.

A high ANDSF attrition rate, which accounts for casualties and all other losses to the force, has had an impact on combat readiness. If present rates continue, it will pose challenges to force development over time. The main causes of ANDSF attrition are assessed as poor leadership; high operational tempo; inadequate soldier/police care; and poor force management. We continue to help the Afghans reduce combat casualties and address systemic causes of attrition in order to ensure the long-term viability of their forces.

The ANDSF successfully maintained control of all key terrain and populated areas in 2014. The insurgents were only able to overrun four district centers in isolated portions of the country temporarily. Within 96 hours, the ANDSF retook all of them. The ANDSF are actively taking the fight to the insurgents. Today, the Afghan government remains firmly in control of its 34 provincial capitals and all of its major cities.

Perhaps most importantly, the ANDSF stayed above the fray throughout the election dispute last summer. They maintained political neutrality and exhibited no evidence of fracturing along ethnic or tribal lines. They also provided effective security for two national elections and a lengthy Independent Election Commission audit process. In spite of expansive Taliban threats and determined efforts to disrupt the democratic process, the ANDSF provided superior protection for nearly eight million Afghan citizens who courageously chose to defy insurgent intimidation tactics and voted. ANDSF professionalism and non-partisanship stand in stark contrast to their Iraqi counterparts. Regular polling reveals the vast majority of Afghans hold a favorable view of their soldiers and police. The Afghan National Army (ANA) remains the most trusted institution in the country with an approval rating that regularly exceeds 85%.

The ASSF (or Afghan special operations forces), in particular, have demonstrated improved proficiency. Their commando units are now conducting night raids independently using their own intelligence to drive their operations. The Special Mission Wing (SMW) is also executing long-range, full-mission profiles in low illumination. Working together, the commando units and SMW are consistently running unilateral direct action missions against insurgent leaders and facilitators. These are remarkable achievements, which reflect the maturation of their formidable capabilities.

While the conventional ANDSF still have capability gaps and shortfalls, they do possess significant assets to fight the insurgents—e.g. heavy mortars, D-30s howitzers, armed Mi-17s, armored vehicles, etc.—and dedicated training with these platforms. The insurgents have none of these. However, the ANDSF would greatly benefit from improved leadership and increased confidence; ANDSF soldiers and police perform well when they are well led. “There are no bad soldiers, only bad leaders.” That is why our insistence on sound leadership and strict accountability remains our most important guiding principle. Fortunately, the Afghan senior leadership concurs. Change in Afghanistan comes from the top-down. President Ghani and CE Abdullah are the driving force behind meaningful transformation and merit-based appointments in the ASI and ANDSF. However, both must navigate a political labyrinth as they move forward with their reform agenda.

Of note, President Ghani’s recent retirement of 47 general officers reflects his significant involvement as the Commander-in-Chief of the ASI and ANDSF. By streamlining the top-heavy

command structure in both the ASI and ANDSF, he has removed generals who have long exceeded mandatory retirement age to make room for the next generation of leaders.

On balance, after watching the ANDSF respond to a variety of challenges over the past six months, I do not believe the Taliban-led insurgency represents an existential threat to the Government of Afghanistan. The ANDSF require less Coalition assistance to conduct security operations, but they still need support to develop the systems, processes, and institutions necessary to run a professional, self-sufficient, and self-sustaining army and police force.

ANDSF Capability Gaps

ANDSF performance in 2014 and early 2015 highlighted capability gaps and shortfalls that will likely persist for years. Their most critical gaps are found in aviation, intelligence, special operations, and the ASI's ability to conduct tasks such as planning, programming, budgeting, and human resource management. At the security ministries, our advisors are focusing on building ASI systems and processes. They are also working to improve integration between the different security pillars—army, police, and intelligence services. At the corps-level, our advisors are concentrating on developing ANDSF planning capacity, command and control, and operational capabilities. Additionally, they are addressing developmental shortfalls in the areas of medical and counter-IED measures. With limited exceptions, we have completed fielding of new equipment for the ANDSF and are now focused on sustaining that equipment and replenishing battle losses. For example, we have just received approval for a \$900M procurement of HMMWVs and light and medium tactical vehicles that will replace aged-out and destroyed vehicles. We are not, however, buying new variants of vehicles or other major end items to

expand authorized equipment levels. Reported shortages in operational units are most often the result of the ANDSF's underdeveloped logistics system rather than actual aggregate supply shortages. Because the ANDSF has had little involvement in ordering their supplies for their forces—the Coalition has done that for them—their logistics warehouse managers are often unaware of inbound shipments, and the units in the field do not have the information they need to place a requisition using the correct ordering number. The upshot is that supplies sit in warehouses unsorted and the demand and supply signals do not match. DoD sent teams to Afghanistan late last year that identified actions to improve the supply system and life cycle management of equipment and we are implementing those recommendations. I should note that a member of one of those teams, Mr. Stephen F. Byus from the Defense Logistics Agency, was killed in a vehicle-borne IED attack in Kabul in the performance of his duties. We are also working with the Afghans to break the culture of hoarding and eliminate false claims of shortages in order to garner more resources and assistance. At all levels, our advisors also continue to emphasize and enforce Afghan financial transparency and accountability of donor resources.

Although considerable challenges remain, I believe the ANDSF's capabilities, capacities, and morale will be sufficient with our advisory efforts and limited enabler support to provide for Afghanistan's long-term security. Our collective efforts are hardening the Afghan state and giving it needed time to develop and mature. By improving security conditions, we are also reducing the operating space for insurgents and incentivizing their participation in the reconciliation process.

It is important that we continue to exercise strategic patience with the ASI and ANSF. The U.S. Armed forces have contended with challenges such as force sustainment for 250 years. In contrast, the ANDSF have only existed for 13 years.

III. Where We Are – State of the Threat

With security responsibilities fully transitioned to the ANSF, al Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Adherents (AQAA), Taliban, Haqqani Network (HQN), and other insurgent and extremist groups will undoubtedly attempt to reestablish their authority and prominence. Collectively, the enemy will continue to present a formidable challenge to the Afghan government, USFOR-A, and the Coalition in 2015. Nevertheless, it is important not to view the enemy as a monolithic entity. They represent disparate factions with different motivations and capabilities. At times they may collaborate, and at other occasions they may work against each other. One of our persistent challenges is to identify these fissures and exploit them.

In 2015, AQAA will likely attempt to rebuild its support networks and planning capabilities with the intention of reconstituting its strike capabilities against Western interests. AQAA activities are now more focused on survival than on planning and facilitating future attacks. It will be critical that, in coordination with our Afghan partners, our comprehensive CT efforts continue to apply pressure against the AQAA network in order to prevent its regeneration.

The Taliban are also in a period of transition. They began 2015 weakened, but not yet defeated. Politically, they have become increasingly marginalized. However, the Taliban remain a resilient, lethal force in spite of the fact that they accomplished none of their major strategic or

operational objectives in 2014 and suffered considerable casualties. We see dissension within the movement. Mullah Omar has not been seen in years. Senior Taliban leaders disagree on how to prioritize their political and military efforts. Many Taliban tactical units also continue to suffer from acute resource shortfalls. Numerous junior Taliban fighters are becoming increasingly resentful towards their leadership as they continue to fight and die at high rates while their senior leaders remain in safe havens in Pakistan.

The absence of Coalition combat units on the battlefield has also weakened one of the principal propaganda lines for the Taliban armed struggle: that they seek to rid Afghanistan of “malevolent foreign influences.” Now they are fighting against and killing almost exclusively their fellow Afghans. They will indeed feel emboldened by the Coalition’s transition from direct combat operations to our TAA role and an accompanying reduction of our combat enablers. As a result, the Taliban will likely test the ANDSF aggressively in 2015 as they did in 2014. Taliban threats from indirect fire, insider attacks, and complex attacks are projected to increase in the next fighting season.

It is unlikely that the Taliban will be able to overmatch the ANDSF on the battlefield in 2015. Nonetheless, the Taliban will still endeavor to frame localized, tactical successes (albeit temporary) into strategic victories through the media. The Taliban will most likely be willing to absorb considerable casualties and physical losses in order to gain psychological victories. And they will maintain an adaptive propaganda apparatus, which they will leverage to influence the Afghan people, the international community, and their supporters. As we saw in 2014, the

Taliban will strive to shape perceptions in the information space, despite their mixed military performance and continued political failures.

The Taliban have recently shifted their tactics to High Profile Attacks against soft targets—especially in Kabul—in order to undermine popular perceptions of improved security and increased public confidence in the Afghan government. These strikes garner considerable media attention, while requiring minimal resources and entailing little risk. What is not captured in the media, however, is that these tactics reflect the bankruptcy of the enemy’s message and strategy. They continue to target innocent civilians and alienate the population with their indiscriminate attacks. These are not the tactics of an insurgent movement capable of overthrowing the Afghan government.

The HQN remains the most virulent strain of the insurgency. It presents one of the greatest risks to Coalition forces, and it continues to be a critical enabler of al Qaeda. HQN shares the Afghan Taliban goal of expelling Coalition forces, overthrowing the Afghan government, and re-establishing an extremist state. They lead the insurgency in several eastern Afghan provinces and have demonstrated the capability and intent to launch and support high profile and complex attacks against the Coalition. In response to several dangerous threat streams against Coalition and Afghan personnel—particularly in Kabul, ANDSF and U.S. special operations forces have stepped up security operations against HQN. These operations have successfully disrupted several dangerous threats streams that sought to inflict significant casualties on the force.

We are also keeping our eye on the potential emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Afghanistan. ISIL has become one of my Priority Intelligence Requirements. Thus far, we have seen some evidence of limited recruiting efforts, and a few Taliban have rebranded themselves as ISIL. This rebranding is most likely an attempt to attract media attention, solicit greater resources, and increase recruitment. The Taliban networks are well established, and significant ideological, sectarian, and cultural differences exist between the movements. The Taliban have already declared that they will not allow ISIL in Afghanistan, but the potential emergence of ISIL has sharply focused the ANSF, National Directorate of Security (NDS), and political leadership. All are collaborating closely in order to prevent this threat from expanding. Additionally, the budding presence of ISIL in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas also offers another opportunity for both countries to work together. For now, we assess that there is a potential threat that ISIL can establish a credible presence in Afghanistan. We remain cognizant of this latent danger and we will continue to monitor it.

While insurgent and terrorist networks have proven to be resilient and adaptive, Coalition and ANDSF operations have kept these groups at bay. Continued pressure on core al Qaeda and its supporters will be required to prevent them from regenerating. Ultimately, the long-term solution to extremists remains a capable and sustainable ANDSF that can secure the nation.

IV. Challenges and Opportunities

Strategic Partnership with GIRA

All aspects of Afghan society remain in a state of flux as we start 2015. Political and security transitions continue to occur simultaneously. Last year's political uncertainty caused considerable anxiety and threatened to undermine the progress made by the ANDSF in the security domain. Economic growth was similarly stymied by a lack of investor confidence in the Afghan government and its prospects for the future.

The National Unity Government presents both significant promise and risk. On the positive side, President Ghani and CEO Abdullah have proven to be amenable to working with the International Community, NATO, and the United States. Both are also committed to addressing the challenges of corruption and nepotism. Both are supportive of women's rights and their empowerment in Afghan society, and most importantly, both are committed to achieving an enduring peace in Afghanistan and the region.

We now have a golden opportunity to deepen our partnership with Afghanistan. However, the forward momentum of our campaign continues to be stymied by delays in forming a new cabinet. We anticipate that President Ghani and CEO Abdullah will contend with a few challenges as they delineate their respective responsibilities. We will need to weather any resulting uncertainty in the ensuing months as the two resolve how they will address their respective supporters while still promoting meritocratic governance. However, the very characteristics that threaten gridlock in the current Afghan government also promise that, when policies are set, the vast majority of legitimate Afghan political interests will be committed to supporting them.

Despite myriad challenges, the fundamental partnership between the Coalition and the Afghan government, to include ASI and ANDSF, remains strong. I have personally developed close professional relationships with nearly all senior Afghan leaders. At all levels, Coalition and Afghan leaders continue to work together in pursuit of shared strategic objectives. Moreover, the Afghan government, civil leaders, and military commanders demonstrate a growing appreciation for the Coalition's efforts. Afghan leaders are genuine in their gratitude for our shared sacrifice. I have also seen our Afghan partners develop a sense of ownership and pride in their army and police force. Afghans realize and appreciate that they now have credible, professional security forces that can protect them.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Military to Military Relationship

The role of Pakistan remains critical to stability in Afghanistan. Suspensions and competing interests have historically characterized Afghan-Pakistani relations, and these are most likely to persist in 2015. However, recent high-level engagements between Afghan and Pakistani leaders since President Ghani's election represent one promising sign for regional security. The common threat of violent extremism may serve as a catalyst for improved cooperation between the two countries, and we have already seen progress in the Afghanistan-Pakistan military-to-military relationship. Pakistan, just like Afghanistan, has suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists and violent extremists. The recent Pakistani Taliban attack on a school in Peshawar could mark a significant shift in bilateral relations. Senior Pakistani military officers have said that they can no longer discriminate between "good and bad" terrorists. They appear to be taking meaningful actions to back up their words. Aggressive Pakistan Army operations in the last several months have applied considerable pressure on extremists operating in the border region.

Pointedly, General Raheel, Chief of the Pakistan Army Staff, stated during his recent visit to Kabul, “The enemies of Afghanistan are the enemies of Pakistan.” This sentiment had never been expressed publically before and left a meaningful impact upon the Afghan senior leadership. General Raheel’s efforts are being matched by President Ghani’s initiatives to encourage rapprochement between both countries. Encouragingly, both appear to be pushing for an eventual political reconciliation with the Taliban.

Taking advantage of this window of opportunity, Resolute Support plays a key facilitator role in the pursuit of a constructive and effective relationship between the Afghan and Pakistan militaries. We continue to encourage actively and enable the Afghan and Pakistani officers to meet and coordinate their security efforts. Recent consultations between Afghan and Pakistani corps commanders showed great promise. However, it will take considerable time and effort to convince the Afghan and Pakistani people to support this new spirit of accommodation. Afghan and Pakistani political and military relations are likely to improve incrementally and on a transactional basis. Ultimately, we will still need to manage our expectations.

Other Regional Actors

Other regional players such as Iran, India, China, Russia, and the Central Asian States have a shared interest in supporting the continued security and increased stability of Afghanistan. President Ghani has shown real leadership and vision by engaging with regional leadership and on the wider global stage. While many of these countries will continue to compete both openly and covertly with one another for increased influence in Afghanistan, all will benefit from a

more secure and stable country. President Ghani appreciates that Afghanistan needs regional support in order to realize his vision of transforming Afghanistan into a vital transportation and commercial hub in Central Asia.

Stewardship of U.S. Resources

Stewardship of U.S. taxpayer dollars remains a top priority for USFOR-A. It is our obligation to protect the trust and confidence of the American people. Yet, war is an inherently inefficient and challenging endeavor, and despite the dedicated efforts of many, cases have unfortunately occurred over the years in which American resources were not spent as efficiently as possible. We are working hard to ensure both prudent spending and the identification of areas for cost savings. USFOR-A has also welcomed and incorporated into our processes the recommendations of independent agencies and various inspectors general, which have proven most helpful when released in time to effect change. USFOR-A will continue to scrutinize every dollar spent to ensure it is necessary to mission success.

All components of Resolute Support are committed to achieving dramatic results through increased fiscal discipline, financial oversight, and policy adherence. In the last year, we have placed stringent financial controls on U.S. taxpayer dollars and international donors' contributions. We have done so through a series of financial commitment letters with the Ministries of Defense and Interior. These letters establish performance expectations for the responsible management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the NATO ANA Trust Fund, and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. If the criteria spelled out in the commitment letters are not met, funding can be withdrawn or withheld until steps are taken to

course-correct. These enforcement mechanisms underpin our messaging to Afghan leadership they must demonstrate greater accountability and transparency in the spending of donor funds. To retain both the U.S. and international support, Afghans must alter the behaviours and attitudes that have resulted in fiscal mismanagement and the tacit acceptance of waste, fraud, and corruption.

We recognize that we will continue to operate in an increasingly constrained resource environment. Accordingly, we have steadily reduced budgetary requirements since 2012 when the U.S. and international contributions to the ANDSF exceeded \$12.3 billion. Today, we are no longer building the ANDSF as they are almost fully manned and equipped. Consequently, we have shifted our financial support to improving their readiness and sustainment. We continue to find ways to reduce this amount and make the ANDSF more efficient.

I would like to commend to the Committee the sterling work of our Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). This subordinate command continues to implement our comprehensive financial strategy to build Afghan fiscal discipline through budget compliance. CSTC-A has, and continues to play, an outsized role in our campaign. In spite of their small numbers, these highly talented individuals have provided rigorous oversight of billions in expenditures. Their enforcement of greater financial transparency continues to build international donor confidence and encourage sustained foreign investment in Afghanistan.

CSTC-A has also implemented several initiatives, many based on Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recommendations, to establish greater accountability in ANDSF and

ASI processes. CSTC-A has placed additional conditional controls on U.S. and NATO funding. These conditions are intended to ensure the proper implementation and integration of financial accounting, payroll, human resources, and real property systems within the ASI. In this manner, CSTC-A prevents funds from being misappropriated or otherwise misused.

CSTC-A also directly supports an average of over 30 ongoing external and internal audits of the Coalition, ASI, and ANDSF at any given time throughout the year. It will continue working on implementing systems and processes for effective ASI/ANDSF internal control programs that will not only identify corruption, but dissuade it. Of note, CSTC-A has doubled the number of financial and acquisition advisors over the past six months and has established an integration cell to ensure that ANDSF financial and personnel pay systems are adequately developed and integrated.

Our Vendor Vetting Task Force, also known as Task Force 2010, has also achieved notable results. Their efforts have proven to be very effective in stopping U.S. money from going to insurgents. Since its inception, we estimate that the Task Force 2010 has prevented over \$30M in taxpayer money from falling into enemy hands. I am also convinced that this task force has saved American lives by identifying high-risk vendors who support the enemy.

President Ghani and the Afghan government have recently made significant strides in improving their processes to detain, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate insurgents and extremists. The Afghans are also in the process of developing legal statutes that will ensure thorough investigations and trials for suspected terrorists, in order to uphold the rule of law and promote

greater legitimacy for the Afghan judicial branch. Through our mentorship, the Afghans are now taking the initiative to centralize the detention and incarceration of all national security threats at the Parwan Detention Facility, which is now run entirely by the Afghans. Continued U.S. support for the Afghan justice system and responsible application of Afghan laws will greatly enhance efforts to defeat the insurgency and reinforce the legitimacy and credibility of the Afghan government.

V. Desired Conditions & Assessment for the End of 2015

Considering the dynamism of the operational environment and the players within it, we will not pursue, nor hope to achieve, a static “endstate” for 2015. Our campaign will evolve and adapt. What we will pursue, however, is a general improvement in security conditions and ANDSF capabilities. In order for the insurgents to reconsider their goals, the ANDSF will need to demonstrate resilience and progress in 2015. If the ANDSF can achieve this objective in their first year with full security responsibilities and with decreasing U.S. and Coalition enabler support, then their momentum should be considerable going into 2016 when the ANDSF will be even more experienced and capable.

The following are some of our objectives for 2015:

- ASI/ANDSF increasingly capable of protecting the population and securing a legitimate Afghan government with limited U.S. and Coalition support
- ASI/ANDSF confidence is increased
- ASI/ANDSF are increasingly self-sustaining excepting aviation and the intelligence enterprise

- ASI/ANDSF increasingly capable of neutralizing terrorist networks and denying terrorist safe havens with limited U.S. and Coalition support
- ASI progress promotes continued U.S. and international funding commitments
- USFOR-A/Resolute Support forces retain sufficient regional access, Freedom of Movement, and Freedom of Action
- ASI/PAKMIL relationship is constructive

If achieved, then we will consider our campaign to be on track. We will continuously assess the progress of the mission and the efficacy of our efforts.

In recent weeks, President Ghani has asked for additional flexibility in the NATO and U.S. mission to account for the fact that his government remains in transition. He acknowledged that while the ANDSF are better equipped than ever, work remains to build their bureaucratic processes and systems, and his administration would require considerable time and effort to address the challenges of systemic corruption. Moreover, he believes a sustained U.S. and Coalition presence provides actual and psychological stability to the country as the new government solidifies.

I have provided various options and my recommendations through my chain of command.

VI. Metrics of Progress

Across most metrics, societal progress in Afghanistan has been significant in the last 13+ years. U.S. and Coalition forces, along with an increasingly capable ANSF, have provided the

necessary security to enable these improvements. Much of this progress has been paid with American blood and treasure. The following two charts highlight the tremendous improvements made since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001:

Societal Fundamentals: Then and Now (1 of 2)			Updated on 3 Mar 11	RS
<i>Infrastructure/Communications</i>				
	Taliban: 2001	Now		
Roadways/Paved Roads	18,000km/60km	42,150km/12,350km		
Access to Reliable Electricity	6%	28%		
TV/Radio Stations	None/3	50/150		
Internet Users	None	6,000,000+		
Cell Phone Subscribers	25,000	22,000,000+		
<i>Education</i>				
Schools	1,000	14,000+		
Teachers	20,000	186,000+		
Students Enrolled in Primary & Secondary Schools	<900,000	8,000,000+		
% Who Are Females	Almost None	36%		
Students Enrolled in Universities	UNK	150,000+		
Literacy Rate	12%	39%		
Sources: CIA World Fact Book 2014; GfRA Ministry of Communications & Information Technology; Afghan Central Statistics Organization 2014; World Bank Development Indicators; Afghan Energy Information Center; International Airline Industry Directory, 2014 UNHCR Country Profile-Afghanistan 2014; UNICEF, "Realizing Self-Reliance" GfRA Publication, 20 Nov 14				
By almost all metrics, progress in Afghanistan has been <i>significant</i> in the last 13 years; the Coalition and ANSF have provided the necessary security to enable these advancements				

Societal Fundamentals: Then and Now (2 of 2)			Updated on 3 Mar 11	RS
<i>Economy/Politics</i>				
	Taliban: 2001	Now		
Size of Economy	\$4 Billion	\$20.6+ Billion		
GDP (USD per Capita)	\$186.00	\$688.00+		
Access to Clean Water	22%	64%		
Passenger Cars (per 1,000 people)	0.5	20		
Commercial Overflights & Landings (Daily)	None	756		
% of Women in Labor Force	UNK	24.4%		
% of Women in National Parliament	None	28%		
<i>Population/Health</i>				
Refugees	>3,500,000	<2,700,000		
Population of Kabul	<500,000	>3.5 Million		
Infant Mortality (Children Dying Before Age 5)	26%	9.7%		
Maternal Mortality (Women Dying from Childbirth)	1.6%	0.33%		
Healthcare Access/Facilities	9%/498	60%/2,507		
Life Expectancy	43	64		
Sources (Continued): Afghanistan Mortality Survey; Ministry of Public Health; UNDP Human Development Index; World Bank TOLD News Research; USAID Survey; Asia Foundation; MOBY Research; UNICEF				

It is important to emphasize that these extraordinary advances in Afghan society have stabilized the country, promoted widespread support for the central government, and inspired confidence in the future. Of note, 77% of Afghans desire that the Coalition remains to assist the Afghan security forces, at least until the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) can stand alone.

Current Afghan Popular Opinions (Updated on 3 Nov 13)

- 77% of Afghans express confidence in their new government
- 87% of Afghans approve the political agreement between President Ghani & CE Abdullah
- 78% of Afghans believe the security situation in their district has improved or remained steady in the last 6 months (since June 2014)
- 81% of Afghans say their government has more influence in their district than the insurgents do
- 87% of Afghans express confidence in the Afghan National Army (ANA)
- 59% of Afghans believe that the ANA is capable of defeating the insurgents
- 76% of Afghans express confidence in the Afghan National Police (ANP)
- 82% of Afghans believe that GIRoA is leading the effort to improve security (vs. the Coalition)
- 77% of Afghans want the Coalition to remain in the country to assist the ANDSF, at least until the Afghan military and police can stand alone
- <10% of the Afghan people support the Taliban
 - <30% of Afghans in Kandahar Province (the heartland of the Taliban) support the insurgents
 - <2% of Afghan women desire a return to Taliban rule
- 64% of Afghans believe that it is unlikely that the Taliban will return to power
- 55% of Afghans believe that their country is heading in the right direction

Sources: Agence France-Presse; BBC; ABC; Aole Foundation-Afghan Survey 2014; Afghan Ministry of Communications Internal Report; MOBY Research; Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) Survey Report, Wave 26; Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR)

In general, Afghans are far more optimistic about their country's future than outsiders are.

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Dramatic, but fragile developmental advancements in Afghan society have also directly contributed to an improved security environment. The fragility of these gains reinforces the need for both our continued security efforts and civilian assistance programs. While sustained U.S. security and development aid to Afghanistan is intrinsically beneficial to the Afghans, it also contributes substantively to U.S. national security by ensuring that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists.

VII. Conclusion

The hard work and significant sacrifices of countless U.S. and Coalition military personnel and civilians over the last 13+ years have created the conditions where Afghans can now take responsibility for their security and governance. The Afghans welcome the opportunity to shape their destiny, but they still desire and need our assistance.

The Ghani administration offers us an extraordinary opportunity to develop a meaningful strategic partnership that will stabilize Afghanistan, and in turn, offer greater security for the U.S. homeland. Political progress in Kabul demonstrates the return on U.S. and international investments in the future of Afghanistan and the Afghan people. President Ghani recently remarked at the NATO Foreign Ministerial, “Compelled by tragedy and cemented by mutual sacrifice, the partnership between Afghanistan, NATO, and the U.S. has entered a new phase.”

I firmly believe that our combined CT and TAA efforts in support of the ANDSF and ASI will reinforce and deepen our strategic partnership with the Afghan government. We could offer no greater tribute to the American people, our fallen, and their loved ones than to maintain our commitment to the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan to ensure we accomplish the national security objectives for which our fallen so valiantly fought.

General John F. Campbell, USA
Commander, Resolute Support and United States Forces-Afghanistan

U.S. Army General John F. Campbell assumed duties as the Commander, International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces-Afghanistan on August 26, 2014; after serving as the 34th U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff.

The son of a U.S. Air Force Senior Master Sergeant, General Campbell grew up on military bases around the world before attending the United States Military Academy at West Point. He graduated in 1979 with a commission in the Infantry. During his 35 years of service, he has commanded units at every echelon from platoon to division, with duty in Germany, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan and the United States.

General Campbell served as the Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY, and led the division as Combined Joint Task Force 101 during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Additionally he commanded 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division and led the brigade during OEF; commanded 2nd Battalion, 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division (Light); and as a junior officer, he commanded a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha in the 5th Special Forces Group and an Infantry company in the 82nd Airborne Division.

General Campbell served 17 months as the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 at Headquarters, Department of the Army. Other significant assignments include: Executive Officer to the 35th Army Chief of Staff; Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver), 1st Cavalry Division and Multinational Division Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom; Deputy Director for Regional Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff; Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, and deployed in support of Operation Uphold Democracy; and Professor of Military Science University of California, Davis.



General Campbell holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from West Point and a master's degree in Public Administration from Golden Gate University. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

General Campbell's awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, two Legions of Merit, three Bronze Star Medals, two Defense Meritorious Service Medals, six Meritorious Service Medals, the Air Medal, the Joint Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Combat Action Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge, the Pathfinder Badge, the Ranger Tab, the Special Forces Tab, and the Army and Joint Staff Badges.



General Campbell and his wife Ann, of 30 years, have two children Jennifer and John Jr.


DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 4, 2015


Changing the Narrative





“I just cite these public opinion polls-- Americans--65% or 70% think we haven’t achieved anything. In Afghanistan, it’s 70% or 80% think we have. How does that happen--that the people who are in the middle of that war think we’ve really done some good, and the people who are 7,000 miles away think we haven’t?”


-Senator Carl Levin (Retired)
Former Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee



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		Societal Fundamentals: Then and Now (1 of 2)		
				Updated on 3 Mar 15
<u>Infrastructure/Communications</u>		Taliban: 2001	Now	
Roadways/Paved Roads		18,000km/60km	42,150km/12,350km	
Access to Reliable Electricity		6%	28%	
TV/Radio Stations		None/3	50/150	
Internet Users		None	6,000,000+	
Cell Phone Subscribers		25,000	22,000,000+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2,000,000+ Afghans use Facebook • 100% of the country will have cell phone coverage within 3 years
<u>Education</u>				
Schools		1,000	14,000+	
Teachers		20,000	186,000+	
Students Enrolled in Primary & Secondary Schools		<900,000	8,000,000+	
% Who Are Females		Almost None	36%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Afghan literacy rate is predicted to reach 90% by 2040
Students Enrolled in Universities		UNK	150,000+	
Literacy Rate		12%	39%	
Sources: CIA World Fact Book 2014; GfRoa Ministry of Communications & Information Technology; Afghan Central Statistics Organization 2014; World Bank Development Indicators; Afghan Energy Information Center; International Airline Industry Directory; 2014 UNHCR Country Profile-Afghanistan 2014; UNICEF; "Realizing Self-Reliance"-GfRoa Publication; 20 Nov 14				
By almost all metrics, progress in Afghanistan has been <i>significant</i> in the last 13 years; the Coalition and ANSF have provided the necessary security to enable these advancements				

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 Societal Fundamentals: Then and Now (2 of 2)		Updated on 3 Mar 15	RS
<i>Economy/Politics</i>	Taliban: 2001	Now	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Afghan economy continues to grow (albeit unevenly) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2011: 6.1% - 2012: <u>14.4%</u> - 2013: 3.7% - 2014: 1.5% - 2015: <u>4.0%</u> Forecast
Size of Economy	\$4 Billion	\$20.6+ Billion	
GDP (USD per Capita)	\$186.00	\$688.00+	
Access to Clean Water	22%	64%	
Passenger Cars (per 1,000 people)	0.5	20	
Commercial Overflights & Landings (Daily)	None	756	
% of Women in Labor Force	UNK	24.4%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Health improvements have raised life expectancies by 21+ years • ~35.3 Million Afghans X 21 Years = <u>Gift of >741 Million Years of Life</u>
% of Women in National Parliament	None	28%	
<i>Population/Health</i>			
Refugees	>3,500,000	<2,700,000	
Population of Kabul	<500,000	>3.5 Million	
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Healthcare Access/Facilities	9%/498	60%/2,507	
Life Expectancy	43	64	
Sources (Continued): Afghanistan Mortality Survey: Ministry of Public Health; UNDP Human Development Index; World Bank; TOLO News Research; USAID Survey; Asia Foundation; MOBY Research; UNICEF			

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Current Afghan Popular Opinions



Updated on 3 Mar 15

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
Sources: Agence France-Presse; BBC; NBC ; ABC; Asia Foundation-Afghan Survey 2014; Afghan Ministry of Communications Internal Report; MOBY Research; Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) Survey Report, Wave 26; Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR)

In general, Afghans are far more optimistic about their country's future than outsiders are.


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
 NATO

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Present-Day Kabul at Night



Kabul ranks as the *fifth fastest growing city in the world*. Under Taliban rule, the capital's population dwindled to fewer than 500,000. Today, Kabul's population exceeds 3,500,000. The United Nations (UN) projects that Kabul's population will reach 7,000,000 by 2025.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 4, 2015

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. In your testimony, you cited a recent approval for a \$900 million procurement of HMMWVs and light and medium tactical vehicles that will replace aged-out and destroyed vehicles. With regard to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) vehicle replacement and sustainment decisions, has a reset and full fleet audit occurred to determine true ANSF vehicle inventory, condition and need for replacement versus refurbishment? If not, is an effort underway to implement a formal reset/audit program prior to new vehicle procurement and delivery across the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police fleets?

General CAMPBELL. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. In your testimony you discussed some of the inherent differences between how the Afghan National Army as a military entity and the Afghan National Police as a civilian entity function. As new Train, Advise, and Assist contracts are developed for critical Afghan National Security Forces support functions, such as vehicle maintenance, supply and fleet management, are these differing operational dynamics being considered to ensure proper training and management mechanisms are implemented to limit waste and corruption once control is handed over to the Afghans? Are current coalition contractors providing these services being engaged to gain insights regarding challenges, successes and lessons learned as new contracts and training programs are being developed?

General CAMPBELL. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. General Campbell, how do you interpret the phrase “enduring ground operations,” which are prohibited in the President’s proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)? Do you believe that phrase is clear?

General, what in your opinion are the most important things we have learned during our operations in Afghanistan that can be put to use in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)?

In reference to ISIL, you stated in January 2015, “We are seeing reports of some recruiting. There have been some night letter drops, there have been reports of people trying to recruit both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” How serious do you perceive the threat to be in Afghanistan from ISIL?

What limitations are presently in place under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs that you would hope to see changed with a new AUMF?

General CAMPBELL. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. 2013 marked the first time since establishment of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund that money has been explicitly authorized and appropriated for recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan National Security Forces. How will you work to ensure that money is directed to impact not only the number of women in the forces but also the institutional reforms needed to ensure the safety and security of these women?

General CAMPBELL. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained in the committee files.]

Ms. TSONGAS. In your view, what impact can more women serving in the Afghan National Security Forces have on the achievement of ongoing U.S. objectives in Afghanistan?

General CAMPBELL. Women make up 50 percent of the Afghan population and their contribution to the peace and security of Afghanistan is essential. A professional and sustainable ANDSF must include the equal opportunity for women to serve in the security forces in order to maximize the talent that exists within the

Afghan population. Women are largely discriminated against and segregated in Afghan society and there is no better way to ensure their human rights than through enabling their participation and service in the Afghan security forces.

Gender integration in all aspects of society is essential to societal change, economic growth and peace and stability. As Afghan women become more educated and it becomes more culturally acceptable for women to participate in the workforce, more opportunities will arise for women to secure their own future. Women are the largest untapped human resource in Afghanistan. Peace and security are more likely to be achieved if the government and security institutions incorporate and empower women and there is no better way of legitimizing this than through serving in the security institutions. The increasing number of women in the police has largely contributed to a greater number of gender based violence cases being reported due to the level of trust that women have in other women. The employment of women in the military also increases human intelligence capability and enables searches to be conducted of the homes of insurgents in which women reside.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Mr. COFFMAN. Will Train, Advise, and Assist teams, Special Operation Command teams or other units be integrated into the Afghan National Security Forces structure below the corps level?

General CAMPBELL. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COFFMAN. Will Train, Advise, and Assist Teams or any other military element be integrated into Afghan National Security Forces combat operations at the tactical level?

General CAMPBELL. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COFFMAN. Does the Afghan National Security Forces have the proficiency, resources, and force structure to conduct close air support, conduct of fire, and other core combined arms capabilities? Do they require NATO support in order to conduct these types of missions and at what level?

General CAMPBELL. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

