[Senate Report 114-246]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 453
114th Congress } { Report
2d Session } SENATE { 114-246
_______________________________________________________________________
SECURITY CLEARANCE ACCOUNTABILITY, REFORM AND ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2015
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
TO ACCOMPY
S. 434
TO STRENGTHEN THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS
INVOLVED IN MISCONDUCT AFFECTING THE INTEGRITY OF
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS, TO UPDATE GUIDELINES FOR
SECURITY CLEARANCES, TO PREVENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
RELATING TO CONTRACTORS PROVIDING BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATION FIELDWORK SERVICES AND INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
April 28, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
______________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2016
_____________________________________________________________________________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
David S. Luckey, Director of Homeland Security
William H.W. McKenna, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Brooke N. Ericson, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
John A. Kane, Minority Senior Governmental Affairs Advisor
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 434]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 434), to strengthen
the accountability of individuals involved in misconduct
affecting the integrity of background investigations, to update
guidelines for security clearances, to prevent conflicts of
interest relating to contractors providing background
investigation fieldwork services and investigative support
services, and for other purposes, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that
the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................7
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................8
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................9
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................9
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........10
I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
S. 434, the Security Clearance Accountability, Reform, and
Enhancement Act of 2015, prohibits re-employment of background
investigators who engage in misconduct and requires agency
contractors and subcontractors to report employees who
intentionally compromise the integrity of background
investigations to the agency within 24 hours. The bill also
requires the President, at least every five years, to review
and update guidance for agencies to use in determining a
position's level of sensitivity and requisite background
investigation requirements. Finally, S. 434 prohibits a
contractor that performs background investigations from
conducting an agency's final quality review on a background
investigation conducted by the same contractor. S. 434 is
modeled after S. 1744 (113th Congress), the Security Clearance
Accountability, Reform, and Enhancement Act, and S. 2061 (113th
Congress), the Preventing Conflicts of Interest with
Contractors Act, which Congress considered but did not enact in
the 113th Congress.\1\
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\1\The Committee consulted the reports for S. 1744 (113th Cong.),
S. Rep. No. 113-276 (2014), and S. 2061 (113th Cong.), S. Rep. No. 113-
257 (2014), in drafting this report.
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II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
The need for background investigations
Over 4.5 million Federal employees and contractors are
eligible to hold a security clearance.\2\ Several recent high-
profile insider threat cases have shown that it is increasingly
important for the Federal Government to control and have a
complete understanding of who has access to sensitive
documents, employees, and facilities.
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\2\Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, 2014 Report on
Security Clearance Determinations (2014).
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In general, Federal agencies conduct background
investigations to determine individuals' suitability for
employment and access to government facilities, information,
and information systems.\3\ More exhaustive investigations are
reserved for determining whether to grant an individual a
security clearance to access classified materials, or appoint
an individual to a national security sensitive position or a
position of public trust.\4\ Individuals who hold national
security sensitive positions or positions of public trust are
also required to undergo periodic reinvestigations after their
initial investigation.\5\
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\3\See, e.g., Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-14-186T, Personnel
Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality Throughout
the Process 1, 9-10 (2013) (describing the classification of different
sensitivity levels for access to information) [hereinafter GAO-14-
186T].
\4\Agency positions are designated at a ``high, moderate, or low
risk level as determined by the position's potential for adverse impact
to the efficiency or integrity of the service,'' and ``positions at the
high or moderate risk levels would normally be designated as `Public
Trust' positions.'' 5 C.F.R. 731.106 (a)-(b) (2012). OPM's regulations
explain: ``[s]uch positions may involve policy making, major program
responsibility, public safety and health, law enforcement duties,
fiduciary responsibilities or other duties demanding a significant
degree of public trust, and positions involving access to or operation
or control of financial records, with a significant risk for causing
damage or realizing personal gain.'' Id.
\5\E.g., Memorandum for Heads of Agencies, Aligning OPM
Investigative Levels with Reform Concepts, from John P. Fitzpatrick,
Asst. Dep. Director of National Intelligence for Security, Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, and Kathy L. Dillaman, Assoc.
Director, Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel
Management (Aug. 24, 2010), available at https://www.opm.gov/
investigations/background-investigations/federal-investigations-
notices/2010/aligning_opm_investigative_levels.pdf; Office of Mgmt &
Budget, Suitability and Security Processes Review: Report to the
President 2 (2014) [hereinafter Suitability and Security Report].
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Positions within an agency are designated as ``sensitive
positions'' if an individual occupying a position could bring
about ``a material adverse effect on the national
security.''\6\ Most sensitive career civil service positions
and some others are categorized by three levels of sensitivity:
``Noncritical-Sensitive,'' ``Critical-Sensitive,'' and
``Special-Sensitive.''\7\ Positions that require access to
classified information are always considered sensitive
positions.\8\ Aside from whether a position may have an impact
on national security, positions within an agency are ``moderate
risk public trust'' positions or ``high risk public trust
positions,'' depending on the level of risk that someone in the
position could harm the efficiency or integrity of the
agency.\9\
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\6\See Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. Comp. 936 (1953).
\7\See Office of Personnel Mgmt, Position Designation Tool,
Position Designation of National Security and Public Trust Positions
(2010), http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/
position-designation-tool/oct2010.pdf.
\8\Id.
\9\See 5 C.F.R. 731.106 (2012).
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By definition, classified national security information is
information which could reasonably be expected to damage our
national security if disclosed to an unauthorized person.\10\
Therefore, the Federal Government only issues an authorization
to access classified national security information--a security
clearance--after a satisfactory background investigation.\11\
All classified national security information is classified at
one of three collateral classification levels--``Top Secret,''
``Secret,'' or ``Confidential.''\12\ An individual's security
clearance level, and therefore the scope of the individual's
background investigation, corresponds to the highest level of
classified national security information the person is
authorized to access.\13\ Information classified at the lowest
collateral classification level--confidential--is information
that could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national
security if disclosed to an unauthorized person.\14\
Information classified at the next level up--secret--is
information that could reasonably be expected to cause serious
damage to national security if disclosed to an unauthorized
person.\15\ Information classified at the highest collateral
classification level--top secret--is information that could
reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to
national security if disclosed to an unauthorized person.\16\
Particularly sensitive information, such as Sensitive
Compartmented Information and information on Special Access
Programs, may be protected by controlled access programs which
further limit dissemination.\17\
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\10\Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298 (2009).
\11\See GAO-14-186T, supra note 3 at 1-2.
\12\See Exec. Order No. 13,526.
\13\See e.g., Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence,
Intelligence Community Policy Guidance Number 704.1, Personnel Security
Investigative Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access
to Sensitive Compartmented Information and Other Controlled Access
Program Information (2008) (describing the scope of background check
standards ``A'', ``B'', and ``C'') [hereinafter ODNI Guidance 704.1];
see also GAO-14-186T, supra note 3 at 8.
\14\See Exec. Order No. 13,526; see also Office of Personnel MGMT,
supra note 7 at 1.
\15\See sources cited supra note at 14
\16\See id.
\17\E.g., ODNI Guidance 704.1, supra note 13; Exec. Order No.
12,958 Sec. 4.1(h), 4.4 (1995).
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Responsibility for background investigations
The Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Federal
Investigative Services (FIS) conducts the vast majority of
background investigations for other agencies.\18\ OPM and other
agencies use a mix of contractors and Federal employees to
conduct background investigations and support those
investigations by gathering information on the subjects of
investigations.\19\
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\18\See Suitability and Security Report, supra note 5, at 3 (noting
that OPM conducts approximately 95 percent of all background checks
across government).
\19\See id.
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Background investigations typically include interviews of
friends, family, and coworkers; reviews of educational,
employment, and mental health records; and criminal history and
credit checks, all of which can be conducted by either Federal
employees or contractors.\20\ However, final adjudication rests
with the Federal Government--in other words, the decision
whether an individual is suitable for Federal employment and
the decision whether to grant a security clearance is an
inherently governmental function and must be made by a Federal
employee (generally an employee of the requesting agency).\21\
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\20\See generally ODNI Guidance 704.1.
\21\Id. at 3.
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Integrity of background investigations conducted by Federal and
contractor employees
Because agencies rely on background investigations to
adjudicate an employee's suitability for a sensitive position
or clearance, errors or falsifications in those background
investigations can lead to inaccurate assessments of an
employee's suitability for a sensitive position or a security
clearance. Such investigations may omit or incorrectly
characterize derogatory information upon which an adjudicator
would have denied suitability or a security clearance. Quality
assurance is therefore an essential part of the investigative
process. Such quality reviews ensure that investigations are
thorough and comply with all applicable standards.
Unfortunately, recent investigations and events have
highlighted serious errors and falsifications in background
investigations over a period of many years. Some cleared
Federal employees and contractors have even used their
privileges to commit serious crimes, highlighting the need for
better investigations and quality controls on those
investigations.\22\ As then--OPM Inspector General (IG) Patrick
McFarland testified in 2013:
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\22\See Dep't of Defense, Internal Review of the Washington Navy
Yard Shooting (2013) [hereinafter DoD Internal Review]; Dep't of
Defense, Security from Within: Independent Review of the Washington
Navy Yard Shooting (2013) [hereinafter DoD External Review], available
at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Independent-Review-
of-the-WNY-Shooting-14-Nov-2013.pdf.
One of the most flagrant criminal violations that we
encounter is the falsification of background
investigation reports [. . . .] There are situations
where the Federal Investigative Services' background
investigators, either Federal employees or contractors,
report interviews that never occurred, record answers
to questions that were never asked, and document
records checks that were never conducted. For example,
a record searcher fabricated 1,600 credit checks that
she never actually completed. Ironically, her own
background investigation had been falsified by a
background investigator convicted in a different
fabrication case.\23\
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\23\See Safeguarding our Nation's Secrets: Examining the Security
Clearance Process: Joint Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Efficiency
and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce and the
S. Subcomm. on Financial and Contracting Oversight, of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter
Safeguarding our Nation's Secrets Hearing] (statement of Patrick
McFarland, Inspector General, U.S. Office of Personnel Management).
In October 2013, the Department of Justice joined a qui tam
False Claims Act complaint by a former employee of OPM's then
primary background investigations contractor, U.S.
Investigative Services (USIS). At the time, USIS was OPM's
largest background investigation contractor by number of
investigations.\24\ In its complaint, the United States alleged
that,
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\24\Notice of Election to Intervene by United States of America,
United States Ex Rel Blake Percival v. U.S. Investigations Services,
LLC, No. 11-CV-527 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2013).
Beginning in at least March 2008, and continuing
through at least September 2012, USIS management
devised and executed a scheme to deliberately
circumvent contractually required quality reviews of
completed background investigations in order to
increase the company's revenues and profits.
Specifically, USIS devised a practice referred to
internally as ``dumping'' or ``flushing,'' which
involved releasing cases to OPM and representing them
as complete when, in fact, not all [Reports of
Investigation] comprising those cases had received a
quality review as required by the Fieldwork Contracts.
[. . . .] During the time period March 2008 through
September 2012, USIS released at least 665,000
background investigations to OPM and represented them
as complete when, in fact, one or more of the [Reports
of Investigation] comprising those background
investigations had not received a quality review as
required by the Fieldwork Contracts. This represented
approximately forty percent of the total background
investigations conducted by USIS during that time
frame.\25\
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\25\United States' Complaint, United States Ex Rel Blake Percival,
No. 11-CV-527.
In a 2013 letter to then-Ranking Minority Member Tom
Coburn, the acting Director of OPM explained that some lower-
level investigations may be reviewed by contract employees
rather than Federal employees.\26\ This type of work, in fact,
was performed by former OPM investigations contractor USIS
under its support contract with OPM and had previously been
identified by the OPM IG as raising quality concerns.\27\
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\26\Letter from Acting Director Elaine Kaplan, U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, to Ranking Member Tom Coburn, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Oct. 31, 2013).
\27\Office of Inspector General, Office of Personnel Management,
4A-IS-00-09-060, Audit of the Quality Assurance Process Over Background
Investigations 10-11 (2010).
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There have even been several examples in the past few years
of cleared Federal employees and contractors who committed
grave crimes. For example, on September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis,
a cleared United States Navy contractor killed 12 employees and
wounded several others in a mass shooting at the Washington,
D.C., Navy Yard.\28\ When Alexis first applied for a security
clearance in 2007, he failed to disclose a Seattle arrest for
``malicious mischief'' after shooting the rear tires of a
vehicle.\29\ Alexis was required to disclose this arrest on his
SF-86 form and when the incident was uncovered during the
course of Alexis' investigation, he claimed to have simply
``deflated'' the tires on a vehicle.\30\ However, the police
report from Seattle was never obtained during Alexis'
background investigation.\31\ Alexis was subsequently granted a
clearance by adjudicators who had never reviewed the police
report despite knowing he had misled them on his SF-86.\32\
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\28\S. Rep. No. 113-276 (2014); see DOD Internal Review, supra note
22; DOD External Review, supra note 22.
\29\See DOD Internal Review, supra note 22, at App'x B (Seattle
Police Department Incident Report and Related Documents); DOD External
Review, supra note 22, at 36.
\30\DOD External Review, supra note 22, at 36.
\31\DOD External Review, supra note 22, at 12, 36.
\32\Id.
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Additionally, in June, 2013, computer systems administrator
Edward Snowden leaked 50,000-200,000 classified documents that
he obtained from the National Security Agency while working for
intelligence contractors Dell and Booz Allen.\33\
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\33\S. Rep. No. 113-276 (2014); see Safeguarding our Nation's
Secrets, supra note 23; Current and Projected National Security Threats
to the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence,
113th Cong. (2014) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director, National
Intelligence); Mark Hosenball, NSA chief says Snowden leaked up to
200,000 secret documents, Reuters, Nov. 14, 2013, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-nsa-idUSBRE9AD19B20131114; see
also Mark Hosenball, Snowden Downloaded NSA Secrets While Working for
Dell, Sources Say, Reuters, Aug. 15, 2013, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/15/usa-security-snowden-dell-
idUSL2N0GF11220130815.
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Conflicts of interest
One of the requirements for background investigations is a
final quality review of the investigation to ensure its
integrity, completeness, and accuracy. Until recently,
contractors could conduct the final quality review of
background investigations, resulting in a potential conflict of
interest where a contractor reviewed its own work or the work
of a competitor. This meant that a contractor that conducted a
review could show bias toward approving its own work or against
approving the work of its competitors. For example, according
to the Department of Justice complaint, USIS management, in
organizing its reviews of its own reports of investigation,
established a priority level system to identify the risk that a
report of investigation would be reviewed by Federal agencies.
The management then passed this information to their
investigative branch, instructing them to dump cases likely to
be federally reviewed.\34\
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\34\United States' Complaint, supra note 25.
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In February 2014, OPM announced a change in this policy--by
requiring that only Federal employees conduct final
investigative quality reviews.\35\ However, the decision does
not preclude OPM from reverting the policy in the future to
allow contractors to conduct the final quality-review of their
own work. In order to prevent such conflicts of interest, this
bill prohibits contractors from conducting the final quality
review of background investigations in which the contractor
participated. It does not prohibit a contractor from reviewing
its work for internal quality control. However an independent
third party or Federal employee must conduct the final quality
review.
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\35\Suitability and Security Report, supra note 5, at 13.
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Accountability measures for misconduct
OPM's usual response to misconduct by a contractor--
administrative removal of the employee from the contract--has
been ``insufficient'' according to former Inspector General
McFarland.\36\ Such an action does not prohibit the same
individual from performing background investigations for the
Federal Government under another contract. This bill would
prevent these types of abuses by demanding better
accountability from OPM and its contractors through timely
reporting of misconduct, stiffer penalties for misconduct, and
improved reporting to Congress.
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\36\See Safeguarding our Nation's Secrets Hearing, supra note 23
(statement of Patrick McFarland, Inspector General, U.S. Office of
Personnel Management).
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Guidance for designating the sensitivity level of positions
Inconsistent and outdated guidance for agencies in
designating the sensitive level for national security sensitive
positions also creates a potential vulnerability in the
security clearance process. Current guidance is ambiguous and
has led to Federal agencies inconsistently and sometimes
incorrectly designating a position's sensitivity level.\37\
Both overstating and understating a position's sensitivity
level is problematic.
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\37\Id. (statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office).
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As a result, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recommended that Federal agencies establish ``clearly defined
policies and procedures'' in ``determining if Federal civilian
positions require a security clearance'' or designation as a
national security position.\38\ GAO also recommended periodic
review of the designation of these positions since
circumstances change over time.\39\ According to GAO,
regulations OPM and the Director of National Intelligence
promulgated in December, 2010, would result in clearly defined
policies and procedures for determining whether civilian
positions need security clearances.\40\
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\38\Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-12-800, Security Clearances:
Agencies need clearly Defined Policy for determining Civilian Position
Requirements 20 (2012).
\39\Id. at 21.
\40\Id.; see Safeguarding our Nation's Secrets Hearing, supra note
23 (statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, Government Accountability Office).
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S. 434 would adopt similar requirements to those
recommended by GAO. Specifically the bill would require the
President, acting through relevant agencies, to review and
update guidance for agencies to use in determining the
sensitivity designation of positions and the appropriate
background investigation to initiate for each position
designation. The bill also requires that at least every five
years the President review and revise position designations in
accordance with the guidance if necessary.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
On February 10, 2015, Senator Tester introduced S. 434, the
Security Clearance Accountability, Reform, and Enhancement Act
of 2015, with Senators McCaskill and Vitter, which was referred
to the Committee.
S. 434 is based on two acts from the previous Congress: S.
1744 (113th Congress), the Security Clearance Accountability,
Reform, and Enhancement Act, and S. 2061 (113th Congress), the
Preventing Conflicts of Interest with Contractors Act. Both S.
1744 and S. 2061 were reported out of the Committee and passed
the Senate by voice vote, but were not taken up in the House
before the end of the Congress.
The Committee considered S. 434 at a business meeting on
May 6, 2015 and ordered the bill, without amendment, reported
favorably by voice vote. Senators present for the vote were:
Johnson, McCain, Portman, Lankford, Ernst, Sasse, Carper,
McCaskill, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and Peters.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED
Section 1. Short title
This section provides the bill's short title, the
``Security Clearance Accountability, Reform, and Enhancement
Act of 2015.''
Section 2. Table of contents
This section provides a table of contents for the bill.
TITLE I--SECURITY CLEARANCE ACCOUNTABILITY, REFORM, AND ENHANCEMENT
Section 101. Definitions
This section defines terms used in the title including
``appropriate agency,'' ``appropriate congressional
committees,'' ``covered contract,'' ``covered individual,'' and
``covered misconduct.''
Section 102. Accountability of individuals involved in misconduct
affecting the integrity of agency background investigations
Subsection (a) states that a Federal employee who engages
in covered misconduct is unfit for Federal employment and bars
the individual from working on background investigations.
Subsection (b) similarly bars a Federal contractor who
engages in covered misconduct from the contract and from
working on background investigation under any contract. This
section also requires current and future contracts for
background investigations include a provision requiring
disclosure of misconduct to the contracting agency within 24
hours of discovery, and referral of the allegation for agency
investigation within 5 days.
Subsection (c) requires an annual report from the President
on implementation of this section.
Section 103. Review and update of position designation guidance
This section requires that--within 180 days and every five
years thereafter--the President update guidance for agencies to
use in determining the sensitivity designation of positions and
background investigation necessary for the position. This
section also requires a report from the President within 30
days of each required review.
TITLE II--PREVENTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITH CONTRACTORS
Section 201. Definitions
This section defines terms used in the title
Section 202. Limitation on contracting to prevent organizational
conflicts of interest
This section prohibits a contractor from performing the
agency's final quality review of the contractor's own work.
This provision is intended to prevent conflicts of interest
that might otherwise undermine the impartiality and objectivity
of the quality review or give a contractor an unfair
competitive advantage over other contractors.
V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
May 21, 2015.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 434, the Security
Clearance Accountability, Reform, and Enhancement Act of 2015.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Pickford.
Sincerely,
Keith Hall.
Enclosure.
S. 434--Security Clearance Accountability, Reform, and Enhancement Act
of 2015
S. 434 would amend federal law to reform the security
clearance process. A security clearance is a determination that
a federal employee or contractor is eligible for access to
classified national security information. The bill would
require all federal agencies to terminate or place on
administrative leave any employee that is involved in
misconduct involving the security clearance process and
prohibit employees of contractors and subcontractors involved
in similar misconduct from performing background
investigations. S. 434 also would prevent security clearance
contractors from reviewing and approving their own background
investigations.
Based on information from the Office of Personnel
Management, which oversees the private firms that conduct the
majority of investigations needed for security clearances, most
of the provisions of the legislation would codify and expand
current federal policies and practices regarding security
clearances. Therefore, CBO estimates that implementing this
legislation would have an insignificant cost. Enacting S. 434
could affect direct spending by some agencies (such as the
Tennessee Valley Authority) because they are authorized to use
receipts from the sale of goods, fees, and other collections to
cover their operating costs. Therefore, pay-as-you-go
procedures apply. Because most of those agencies can adjust the
amounts they collect, CBO estimates that any net changes in
direct spending by those agencies would not be significant.
Enacting the bill would not affect revenues.
S. 434 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew
Pickford. The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss,
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
Because this legislation would not repeal or amend any
provision of current law, it would make no changes in existing
law within the meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph 12
of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
[all]