[Senate Report 114-250]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 457
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 114-250
_______________________________________________________________________
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
ACT OF 2015
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
S. 1846
TO AMEND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO SECURE
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST ELECTROMAGNETIC THREATS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
May 9, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-010 WASHINGTON : 2016
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
David S. Luckey, Director of Homeland Security
Brooke N. Ericson, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Jose J. Bautista, Professional Staff Member
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
Abigail A. Shenkle, Minority Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Calendar No. 457
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 114-250
======================================================================
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 2015
_______
May 9, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 1846]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 1846) to amend the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to secure critical infrastructure
against electromagnetic threats, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................7
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................7
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................9
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................9
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........10
I. Purpose and Summary
The purpose of S. 1846, the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act of 2015 (CIPA), is to require the United States
Department of Homeland Security (DHS, or the Department) to
develop, regularly update, and submit to Congress a strategy to
protect critical infrastructure against threats of geomagnetic
disturbance (GMD) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and, to the
extent practicable, to perform research and development and
incident response planning to mitigate the consequences of
threats of EMP and GMD.
II. Background and the Need for Legislation
Most of the nation's critical infrastructure depends on the
electric grid to function, making the electric grid incredibly
important to the nation's well-being, security, and economic
progress. This massive distribution network is comprised of
390,000 miles of transmission lines, $1 trillion in assets, and
6,000 power plants.\1\ The expansiveness of the grid also
creates a broad attack surface and multiple opportunities for
threats and hazards to disrupt the flow of electricity to end-
users. Public utilities, economic production, and the health
and well-being of Americans are impacted during significant
disruptions to the electrical grid.\2\
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\1\U.S. Dep't of Energy, Large Power Transformers and the U.S.
Electric Grid 5 (2014) [hereinafter Large Power Transformers],
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/04/f15/
LPTStudyUpdate-040914.pdf.
\2\See, e.g., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical
National Infrastructures (2008) [hereinafter EMP Commission Report],
available at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-
7MB.pdf.
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GMDs generated by space weather and EMPs generated by the
detonation of a nuclear weapon at high altitude are two
separate threats that have the capability to severely disrupt
the electric grid.\3\ Either event has the potential to disrupt
Americans' continued access to electricity. According to
Lloyd's of London, a severe GMD could leave tens of millions of
people without power for months or years and potentially cause
economic losses topping $2 trillion.\4\ Such an event is
``almost inevitable in the future,'' according to the
report.\5\
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\3\Lloyd's, Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid
(2013) [hereinafter Solar Storm Risk], available at https://
www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/risk-insight/library/natural-
environment/solar-storm; EMP Commission Report, supra note 2.
\4\See id.
\5\Lloyd's, Solar Storm Risk, supra note 3, at 4.
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Defining the threats
``Space weather'' generally describes ``highly fluctuating
magnetic fields and very energetic particles'' in
interplanetary space that cause ``collective, often violent,
changes in the space environment around Earth.''\6\ Also
referred to as ``solar storms,''\7\ this activity is often
generated by the Sun, which can eject plasma and magnetic
particles that strike the Earth's atmosphere and can cause
disturbances--known as geomagnetic disturbances, or GMDs--in
the Earth's magnetic fields.\8\ The magnitude, speed, and
trajectory of the ejection all play an important role in how
strong the resulting GMD may be.\9\
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\6\Daniel N. Baker, Science, How to cope with space weather (Aug.
30, 2002), available at http://science.sciencemag.org/content/297/5586/
1486.summary.
\7\Dan Mcmorrow, MITRE Corp., Impacts of Severe Space Weather on
the Electric Grid 23 (2011) [hereinafter Impacts of Severe Space
Weather].
\8\Space Weather Prediction Center, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, Geomagnetic Storms, http://
www.swpc.noaa.gov/phenomena/geomagnetic-storms.
\9\Id.
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Separately, a high-altitude nuclear explosion can create an
EMP consisting of an ``intense steep-front, short-duration
transient electromagnetic field, followed by a geomagnetic
disturbance with tens of seconds of duration.''\10\ Like a
radio wave, propagation of an EMP is dependent on its altitude
and power--generally, an EMP detonated higher in the atmosphere
will affect a wider area than one detonated closer to the
surface of the planet.\11\ For example, an EMP resulting from
the detonation of a nuclear weapon hundreds of miles above the
United States could cover the entire contiguous United
States.\12\
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\10\P.R. Barnes, et al., Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory,
Electromagnetic Pulse Research on Electric Power Systems: Program
Summary and Recommendations xv (1993), available at http://
web.ornl.gov/info/reports/1993/3445605662155.pdf [hereinafter Barnes
Emp Report].
\11\James Gilbert, et al., Metatech Corp., The Late-Time (E3) High-
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power
Grid 2-14 (2010) (prepared for Oak Ridge National Laboratory).
\12\See Barnes EMP Report, supra note 10, at xv.
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Potential impact on transformers
Like a GMD caused by a severe solar storm, a high-altitude
nuclear explosion leading to an EMP could put the electric grid
``out of service for periods measured in months to a year or
more,'' according to the congressionally-chartered Commission
to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) Attack, or ``EMP Commission.''\13\ The same report
states that widespread failure of large power transformers, or
LPTs, could result.\14\
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\13\EMP Commission Report, supra note 2, at passim.
\14\Id. at 43.
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High-altitude EMPs and high intensity GMDs both create
``geomagnetically induced currents'' (GICs)\15\ on the Earth's
surface that can lead to major current and voltage fluctuations
in anything on the ground that conducts electricity.\16\ The
effect is most notable in long conductors, especially long
power lines and pipelines, since the induced current
accumulates over the length of the conductor.\17\
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\15\James Gilbert, et al., Metatech Corp., The Late-Time (E3) High-
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power
Grid 2-45 (2010) (prepared for Oak Ridge National Laboratory).
\16\See Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 13.
\17\Id. at 39.
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Because LPTs are found at the end of long, high-voltage
transmission lines, they are susceptible to damage from the
cumulative effect of current and voltage changes resulting from
GICs.\18\ These transformers have a vital role in high-voltage
transmission of electricity across the nation. They ``step
up,'' or increase, the voltage of electricity entering
transmission lines, which is more efficient for long distance
transmission, and ``step down,'' or decrease, the voltage for
distribution to end-users, who require lower voltages.
Estimates indicate that there are at least 2,000 to 3,550
extra-high-voltage LPTs across the United States.\19\
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\18\Id. at 42.
\19\See Large Power Transformers, supra note 1, at 21; Impacts of
Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 41.
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Protecting LPTs from credible threats is important to
maintaining the integrity and operation of the electric grid.
Strong GICs can cause LPTs to melt and undergo other
disruptions.\20\ Losing even one LPT can be very consequential,
because replacing it is a major undertaking: LPTs can take over
one year to build; weigh hundreds of tons; cost $2 million to
$7.5 million each; and require solving major transportation
issues to get into the right locations.\21\
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\20\See Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-15-692T, Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts to
Address Electromagnetic Threats to the Electric Grid 6 (2015)
[hereinafter Critical Infrastructure Protection], available at http://
gao.gov/assets/680/671554.pdf.
\21\Large Power Transformers, supra note 1, at 7.
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These transformers are largely unprotected from high-
impact, low-frequency threats, including severe electromagnetic
threats, though some mitigation measures may exist.\22\ While
there are several industry-driven efforts to maintain an
inventory of spare transformers that can be utilized for
recovery, such initiatives do not fully mitigate the impact of
the threats to equipment. Challenges in delivering and
installing LPTs, their cost, and the lack of spare transformers
at all locations with active LPTs makes a spare transformer
inventory less than ideal.\23\ Protecting these transformers
and other assets before a major solar or EMP event is likely to
be a more cost-effective approach than only planning for
replacement.\24\
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\22\Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 2. See also
North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC), High-Impact, Low-
Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System (2010),
available at http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/Resources/Documents/
HILF%20Report.pdf; Peter Behr, Regulators Assess the Ultimate Blackout
Threat, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2010/07/02/02climatewire-regulators-assess-the-ultimate-blackout-
thre-82657.html.
\23\Industry initiatives include the Spare Transformer Equipment
Program (STEP) operated by the Edison Electric Institute, and Grid
Assurance, an entity created by several utilities for recovery and
resiliency.
\24\Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 66.
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Leaving the electrical grid and LPTs unprotected from high
intensity GMD could threaten broad areas of the country.
According to a study by a major insurer, a high intensity GMD
event could have a total economic cost of $600 million to $1.6
trillion due to damages inflicted on transformers.\25\ Between
20 million and 40 million people could lose power for up to two
years.\26\ Other predictions of the impact of high intensity
GMD have been more severe.\27\ According to Joseph McClelland,
Director of the Office of Energy Infrastructure Security at the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, who testified before the
Committee on July 22, 2015, one Oak Ridge National Laboratory
study concluded a 1-in-100-year GMD event could ``damage or
destroy 300 high-voltage electric grid transformers,
interrupting service to 130 million people, with some outages
lasting for a period of years.''\28\
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\25\Solar Storm Risk, supra note 3.
\26\Id.
\27\Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 51.
\28\Protecting the Electric Grid against the Potential Threats of
Solar Weather and EMP: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 12 (2015) (statement of Mr. Joseph
McClelland) [hereinafter Protecting the Electric Grid].
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Historical experiences
Major space weather events have occurred several times in
recorded history. The largest recorded space weather event on
Earth happened in 1859, largely before the electric grid or its
mitigation measures existed, and when the planet's most
extensive technology network was still the telegraph
system.\29\ Known as the Carrington Event, the massive solar
storm and the resulting GICs sparked telegraph wires, shocked
operators, and knocked out telegraph operations throughout
North America, Europe, and parts of Australia and Asia for two
days.\30\ In 1989, another major solar storm caused the Hydro-
Quebec power grid to fail within two minutes.\31\ More than six
million people lost power for nine hours, costing $13.2
billion.\32\ Dr. Richard L. Garwin testified before the
Committee: ``I emphasize that a once-per-century event might
occur next week; it has a probability of 10 percent of
occurring within the next 10 years.''\33\
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\29\Solar Storm Risk, supra note 3.
\30\Id.
\31\Id.
\32\Id.
\33\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 27 (statement
of Dr. Richard L. Garwin).
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The world's experience with high-altitude EMP has been
limited to several nuclear tests, such as those carried out by
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In
one such test, known as Starfish Prime, the United States
detonated a nuclear weapon 250 miles above the Pacific
Ocean.\34\ Although 800 miles from the detonation, a series of
streetlights failed in Oahu, Hawaii, as breakers tripped in the
wake of power surges resulting from the blast's EMP.\35\
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\34\Barnes EMP Report, supra note 10, at 1.
\35\Id.
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The Soviet Union carried out a similar test around the same
time over Kazakhstan.\36\ The test caused the failure of a 500-
km-long communications line and its protective equipment.\37\
It also disrupted a 600-mile-long underground power line buried
three feet underground and caused a fire in a city power
generation facility.\38\
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\36\Yousaf M. Butt, The EMP Threat: Fact, Fiction, and Response
(Part 1), The Space Review (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://
www.thespacereview.com/article/1549/1.
\37\Id.; V.N. Greetsai, et al., Response of long lines to nuclear
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), 40 IEEE Transactions on
Electromagnetic Compatibility 348 (1998).
\38\Butt, supra note 36.
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More recently, experts have raised concerns, including at a
Committee hearing in 2015, regarding North Korea and Iran,
which have orbited satellites over the United States.\39\
According to former Director of Central Intelligence, James
Woolsey, who testified at the July 22, 2015, hearing before the
Committee, such satellites may be test runs for similar
orbiters that could carry nuclear weapons and cause high-
altitude EMP over the United States in the future.\40\ Using a
satellite to carry out an attack using high-altitude EMP ``is
easier than launching a long-range missile at a target on the
Earth,'' according to former Director Woolsey.\41\ However, a
spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency of the Department of
Defense has stated that interceptors used for missile defense
are able to defeat nuclear weapons detonated in space equally
as well as weapons aimed at ground targets.\42\
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\39\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 72-73
(statement of James Woolsey, former Director, Central Intelligence).
\40\Id.; see also R. James Woolsey & Peter Vincent Pry, How North
Korea Could Cripple the U.S., Wall St. J., May 21, 2013.
\41\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 73 (statement
of James Woolsey, former Director, Central Intelligence).
\42\William J. Broad, Among Gingrich's Passions, A Doomsday Vision,
N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
12/12/us/politics/gingrichs-electromagnetic-pulse-warning-has-
skeptics.html.
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Industry groups emphasize the differences between the
potential threats to the electric grid posed by EMP and GMD.
Bridgette Bourge, Senior Principal with the National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association, testified before the
Committee that while low-level geomagnetic disturbances are
experienced fairly frequently, ``a nuclear-induced EMP is
considered an extremely low-likelihood, high-consequence
event.''\43\ Additionally, according to Ms. Bourge's testimony
before the Committee, given the relative frequency of low-level
GMD events, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
has developed industry reliability standards to address the
threat of geomagnetic disturbances to the electric grid,
effective last year.\44\
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\43\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 4 (written
statement of Ms. Bridgette Bourge).
\44\Id. at 4.
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Status of Federal action
Recognizing the vulnerability of the grid, the EMP
Commission made 15 recommendations to DHS and the Department of
Energy that would improve the grid's resiliency.\45\ These
recommendations include:
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\45\EMP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 55.
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Understand system and network-level
vulnerabilities, including cascading effects;
Evaluate and implement quick fixes;
Develop national and regional restoration
plans;
Extend black start capability;
Prioritize and protect critical nodes; and
Assure protection of high-value generation
and transmission assets.
DHS is the Federal agency responsible for leading the
Federal Government's efforts to protect and secure our nation's
critical infrastructure across 16 sectors from a variety of
threats and hazards, including cyber and physical.\46\
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\46\Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) directs the
Department to coordinate with ``sector-specific agencies'' to carry out
activities to protect and secure critical infrastructure from all
hazards. The Department of Energy is the sector-specific agency for the
energy sector. See Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013); Exec. Order No.
13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
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According to GAO, DHS has undertaken several projects to
address threats to the electric grid at large, but has not
specifically addressed all of the Commission's
recommendations.\47\ The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has also found that there is uncertainty within DHS about which
office should have ownership of Departmental efforts to study
EMP threats. Additionally, the National Protection and Programs
Directorate, the office tasked by the Department with managing
and addressing the risks of space weather threats, has not
identified specific roles or activities it performs to address
such threats.\48\ GAO states that neither DHS nor DOE has
identified the most critical substations and transformers, a
key responsibility under DHS's risk management framework.\49\
According to GAO, DHS also has not fully taken advantage of
opportunities to work with stakeholders in understanding the
nature of these threats and discuss research priorities.\50\
However, GAO also acknowledges that DHS ``does not have a
statutory obligation to specifically address [the EMP
Commission's] recommendations.''\51\
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\47\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 23-24
(statement of Christopher P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
\48\Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 20 at 10.
\49\Id. at 13.
\50\Id. at 14.
\51\Id. at 1.
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The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act requires DHS to
prepare a strategy to protect the nation's critical
infrastructure against EMP and GMD, informed by an
intelligence-based review and comparison of the risk and
consequence of all hazards facing critical infrastructures. The
bill also requires the Department to incorporate these threats
in national planning frameworks and to carry out an educational
campaign on these threats to the extent practicable.
Additionally, the bill requires the Science and Technology
Directorate of DHS to conduct research on mitigating the
consequences of EMP and GMD, to the extent practicable.
III. Legislative History
On October 30, 2013, Representative Trent Franks introduced
H.R. 3410, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. The act
passed the House of Representatives by voice vote on December
1, 2014, but the Senate did not take up the Act during the
113th Congress.
In the 114th Congress, on February 25, 2015, Representative
Franks introduced H.R. 1073, the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act. The act passed the House of Representatives by
voice vote on November 16, 2015.
On July 22, 2015, the Committee held a hearing entitled
Protecting the Electric Grid from the Potential Threats of
Solar Storms and Electromagnetic Pulse to examine the nature
and potential consequences of GMD and EMP to the nation's
electric grid.
On July 23, 2015, Chairman Ron Johnson introduced S. 1846,
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, with Senator Ted
Cruz, and the bill was referred to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered S.
1846 at a business meeting held on July 29, 2015.
At the business meeting, Senator Johnson offered one
amendment in the nature of a substitute, which modified the
original language to distinguish between GMD and EMP, and
required DHS to incorporate intelligence-based analyses into
its research and mitigation strategies. The Committee adopted
the amendment and ordered the bill, as amended, reported
favorably, both by voice vote. Senators present for both the
vote on the amendment and the vote on the bill were: Johnson,
Portman, Lankford, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and
Peters.
Consistent with the Committee's order on technical and
conforming changes at the meeting, the Committee reports the
bill with a technical amendment by mutual agreement of the full
Committee majority and minority staff.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported
Section 1. Short title
This section provides the bill's short title, the
``Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015'' or ``CIPA.''
Section 2. EMP and GMD planning, research and development, and
protection and preparedness
Subsection (a) of this section amends section 2 and 201 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, adds a new section 319 and
section 526 to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and provides
various implementation requirements for the new provisions.
The amendments to section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as provided in subsection (a), add definitions of EMP and
GMD.
The amendments to section 201 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, as provided in subsection (a), require the Secretary
to perform an intelligence-based review and comparison of the
risk and consequence of threats and hazards, including GMD and
EMP, to critical infrastructure and develop and submit to
Congress a strategy to protect critical infrastructure from the
potential threats of GMD and EMP. The strategy must be updated
biennially.
The Committee intends this strategy to focus particularly
on critical infrastructures within the energy sector, including
the electric grid and critical assets needed to ensure the
grid's operation. The bill provides the Secretary latitude to
incorporate the strategy into existing recommendations,
provided that any resulting documents clearly address the
requirements in this section. The strategy should be informed,
to the extent practicable, by the findings of the intelligence-
based review of threat, risk and consequence facing critical
infrastructures required by this section.
The new section 319 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
as added by subsection (a) requires the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, to the extent practicable, to carry out
research and development to evaluate risks to critical
infrastructures from GMD and EMP, and identify opportunities
for mitigation. The subsection prescribes the minimum scope of
the research and development conducted under Section 319.
The section requires the Under Secretary to consult with
relevant Federal and industry stakeholders on the research
required by this section. The Under Secretary should build upon
existing Federal and nonfederal research, such as that
performed or commissioned by the national laboratories and
industry associations, to understand the risk posed by EMP and
GMD threats relative to all other threats and hazards facing
the grid. Research and development required by this section
should evaluate and analyze a range of alternative approaches
in order to improve the resilience of the electric grid.
Incorporating real-world operational and cost data into this
analysis would likely prove to be a valuable asset to research
regarding the analysis of technology options for resiliency.
The new section 526 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
as added by subsection (a), requires the Secretary, to the
extent practicable, to create an incident annex or other
response strategy that would guide the response to a major GMD
or EMP event. The Secretary would have the authority to
incorporate the annex or response strategy for GMD and EMP into
an existing document. The new section 526 also requires the
Secretary, to the extent practicable, to conduct outreach to
educate owners and operators of critical infrastructure,
emergency planners, and emergency response providers at all
levels of government about the threats of GMD and EMP.
The Committee intends the Secretary to incorporate into the
response plan the results of the required research on the
various restoration and recovery capabilities of critical
infrastructure under several GMD and EMP scenarios.
Subsection (b) of the bill includes technical and
conforming amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Subsection (c) provides a one-year deadline for the
Secretary to submit to Congress the strategy to protect and
prepare critical infrastructure against the threats of EMP and
GMD.
Subsection (d) directs the Secretary to report to Congress
on the progress made in addressing requirements in the bill,
such as the requirements to conduct research and development to
mitigate the consequences of threats of EMP and GMD, and
outreach to emergency planners and emergency response providers
regarding the threats of EMP and GMD. The report must include
estimated completion dates for requirements not completed as of
the report date.
Section 3. No regulatory authority
Section 3 provides that the bill does not grant any
regulatory authority.
Section 4. No new authorization of appropriations
Section 4 clarifies that the bill provides no new
authorization of appropriations and that the activities
required by the bill must be carried out to the extent
practicable using funds appropriated under existing
authorizations.
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
August 11, 2015.
Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1846, the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark
Grabowicz.
Sincerely,
Keith Hall.
Enclosure.
S. 1846--Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015
S. 1846 would require the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to undertake research and planning activities to mitigate
the potential consequences of electromagnetic pulses and
geomagnetic disturbances--resulting from either intentional
acts or natural causes--on critical infrastructure, such as
public utilities and national security assets. DHS is currently
carrying out programs similar to those required by the bill,
and CBO estimates that implementing S. 1846 would not
significantly affect spending by the department. Because
enacting the legislation would not affect direct spending or
revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
S. 1846 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
On July 13, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R.
1073, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, as ordered
reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security on June
25, 2015. The two bills are similar and CBO's estimates of the
budgetary effects are the same.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz.
The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis.
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
S. 1846 as reported are shown as follows (existing law proposed
to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is
shown in roman):
UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
TITLE 14--COAST GUARD
* * * * * * *
PART II--COAST GUARD RESERVE AND AUXILIARY
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CHAPTER 21--COAST GUARD RESERVE
Subchapter A--General
SEC. 701. ORGANIZATION
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SEC. 712. ACTIVE DUTY FOR EMERGENCY AUGMENTATION OF REGULAR FORCES
(a) Notwithstanding another law, and for the emergency
augmentation of the Regular Coast Guard forces during a, or to
aid in prevention of an imminent, serious natural or manmade
disaster, accident, catastrophe, act of terrorism (as defined
in [section 2(16)] section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 (16))), or transportation security incident
as defined in section 70101 of title 46, the Secretary may,
without the consent of the member affected, order to active
duty of not more than 60 days in any 4-month period and not
more than 120 days in any 2-year period an organized training
unit of the Coast Guard Ready Reserve, a member thereof, or a
member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit.
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HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) * * *
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
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TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Sec. 301. Under Secretary for Science and Technology
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Sec. 319. GMD and EMP mitigation research and development.
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Sec. 526. National planning and education.
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SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act, the following definitions apply:
(1) * * *
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(7) EMP.--The term ``EMP'' means an electromagnetic
pulse caused by a nuclear device or nonnuclear device,
including such a pulse caused by an act of terrorism.
[7] (8) * * *
[8] (9) * * *
(10) GMD.--The term ``GMD'' means a geomagnetic
disturbance caused by solar storms or other naturally
occurring phenomena.
[9] (11) * * *
[10] (12) * * *
[11] (13) * * *
[12] (14) * * *
[13] (15) * * *
[14] (16) * * *
[15] (17) * * *
[16] (18) * * *
[17] (19) * * *
[18] (20) * * *
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TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection;
Access to Information
SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Responsibilities of Secretary Relating to Intelligence
and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--The
responsibilities of the Secretary relating to intelligence and
analysis and infrastructure protection shall be as follows:
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(1) * * *
(26)(A) To conduct an intelligence-based review and
comparison of the risk and consequence of threats and
hazards, including GMD and EMP, facing critical
infrastructures, and prepare and submit to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives--
(i) a recommended strategy to protect and
prepare the critical infrastructure of the
American homeland against threats of EMP and
GMD, including from acts of terrorism; and
(ii) not less frequently than every 2 years,
updates of the recommended strategy.
(B) The recommended strategy under subparagraph (A)
shall--
(i) be based on findings of the research and
development conducted under section 319;
(ii) be developed in consultation with the
relevant Federal sector-specific agencies (as
defined under Presidential Policy Directive-21)
for critical infrastructures;
(iii) be developed in consultation with the
relevant sector coordinating councils for
critical infrastructures;
(iv) be informed, to the extent practicable,
by the findings of the intelligence-based
review and comparison of the risk and
consequence of threats and hazards, including
GMD and EMP, facing critical infrastructures
conducted under subparagraph (A); and
(v) be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
(C) The Secretary may, if appropriate, incorporate
the recommended strategy into a broader recommendation
developed by the Department to help protect and prepare
critical infrastructure from terrorism, cyber attacks,
and other threats and hazards if, as incorporated, the
recommended strategy complies with subparagraph (B).
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TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
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SEC. 319. GMD AND EMP MITIGATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
(a) In General.--In furtherance of domestic preparedness
and response, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary
for Science and Technology, and in consultation with other
relevant executive agencies and relevant owners and operators
of critical infrastructure, shall, to the extent practicable,
conduct research and development to mitigate the consequences
of threats of EMP and GMD.
(b) Scope.--The scope of the research and development under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An objective scientific analysis--
(A) evaluating the risks to critical
infrastructures from a range of threats of EMP
and GMD; and
(B) which shall--
(i) be conducted in conjunction with
the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis; and
(ii) include a review and comparison
of the range of threats and hazards
facing critical infrastructure of the
electric grid.
(2) Determination of the critical utilities and
national security assets and infrastructures that are
at risk from threats of EMP and GMD.
(3) An evaluation of emergency planning and response
technologies that would address the findings and
recommendations of experts, including those of the
Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States
from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, which shall include
a review of the feasibility of--
(A) rapidly isolating 1 or more portions of
the electrical grid from the main electrical
grid; and
(B) training utility and transmission
operators to deactivate transmission lines
within seconds of an event constituting a
threat of EMP or GMD.
(4) An analysis of technology options that are
available to improve the resiliency of critical
infrastructure to threats of EMP and GMD, which shall
include an analysis of neutral current blocking devices
that may protect high-voltage transmission lines.
(5) The restoration and recovery capabilities of
critical infrastructure under differing levels of
damage and disruption from various threats of EMP and
GMD, as informed by the objective scientific analysis
conducted under paragraph (1).
(6) An analysis of the feasibility of a real-time
alert system to inform electric grid operators and
other stakeholders within milliseconds of a high-
altitude nuclear explosion.
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TITLE IV--NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
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SEC. 501. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act, the following definitions apply:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(13) the term ``tribal government'' means the
government of any entity described in [section
2(11)(B)] section 2(13)(B); and
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SEC. 526. NATIONAL PLANNING AND EDUCATION.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall, to the extent
practicable--
(1) develop an incident annex or similar response and
planning strategy that guides the response to a major
GMD or EMP event; and
(2) conduct outreach to educate owners and operators
of critical infrastructure, emergency planners, and
emergency response providers at all levels of
government regarding threats of EMP and GMD.
(b) Existing Annexes and Plans.--The incident annex or
response and planning strategy developed under subsection
(a)(1) may be incorporated into existing incident annexes or
response plans.
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