[Senate Hearing 111-783]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-783
INSERT TITLE HERELATIN AMERICA IN 2010: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND
THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY IN THE HEMISPHERE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
INSERT DATE HERE deg.DECEMBER 1, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DEMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Arnson, Dr. Cynthia, director, Latin American Program, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC....... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, statement......... 8
Daremblum, Hon. Jaime, director, Center for Latin American
Studies, senior fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC....... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
opening statement.......................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 6
Olson, Joy, executive director, Washington Office on Latin
America, Washington, DC........................................ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Schneider, Mark, senior vice president/special advisor on Latin
America, International Crisis Group, Washington, DC............ 21
Prepared statement........................................... 25
(iii)
LATIN AMERICA IN 2010: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE OF U.S.
POLICY IN THE HEMISPHERE
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Office Building, Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
presiding.
Present: Senators Dodd, Menendez, Lugar, Corker, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. The hearing will come to order. Let me
apologize to the witnesses and to my colleagues. I'm grateful
to my friends and staff, as well as the witnesses. Some of you,
once again, many of whom I've known for a long time, and I
welcome you to the committee to have a discussion about Latin
America in 2010, what we call ``Opportunities, Challenges and
the Future of U.S. Policy in the Hemisphere.''
Normally, first of all, John Kerry would be here, and I'm
deeply grateful to John for conceding the gavel to me here to
allow me to chair this hearing. In fact, I notice there are
caucuses and conferences going on. I know there is a Democratic
caucus going on, and so I anticipate some of my colleagues will
get a chance to come over here when that caucus concludes, to
share their own thoughts and views.
My opening comments are a little bit longer than they
normally would be since this will be my last hearing that I'll
be participating in. Well, we may meet again; I don't know. But
certainly chairing a hearing, on the Foreign Relations
Committee. So I wanted to share a few more thoughts about a
subject matter that I've obviously been deeply involved in and
cared about from the day I arrived here, with a full head of
black hair, 30 years ago. So with your indulgence, I'll take a
couple of minutes and then turn to my great friend Dick Lugar
for any thoughts he would have, and then we'll get to our
wonderful witnesses to share your observations and thoughts as
well as we kind of make an assessment of where we are here at
the end of the first decade of the 21st century.
So let me begin by thanking again John Kerry for allowing
me to take the gavel. Today will mark my last hearing as a
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Thirty years
ago-in fact, when I arrived in the Senate in January 1981-I've
often told this story, that Alan Dixon and I were the only two
Democrats elected that year. I think there were about 16
Republicans that came in in that Reagan landslide of 1980.
Unlike others, when you arrive in the Senate and you go to
the leadership and express your choices about committees and
where you'd like to be, Alan Dixon and I were told the
following: There are two seats on the Banking Committee,
there's one seat on Agriculture, and one seat on Foreign
Relations.
Well, needless to say, the Senator from Illinois had an
interest in agriculture. Not that I didn't, but he had
certainly more of a legitimate case to make. The two seats on
Banking, we each took one. And I ended up with a seat on
Foreign Relations.
Now, to put that in perspective for people, I've often told
the story, Jacob Javits and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, both
Members of this great body the Senate for years, waited 9 and
11 years respectively to get a seat on the Foreign Relations
Committee. There was a time not long before I arrived here when
this was one of the most coveted committees and you waited a
long time, sometimes into your second term, before a seat would
become available to you.
I say this with total politeness and respect. Today most of
our members on this committee are in their first term on the
Foreign Relations Committee, and good members, I might add. But
just a difference in how the ground has shifted over the past
number of years.
For me, this has been a remarkable experience, to be a part
of this committee over the past three decades. So it is with a
note of sadness, but also with tremendously fond memories of
having been a part of this committee and all the work that's
gone on, and particularly because I've had the wonderful
pleasure of serving with the gentleman here to my left, who has
just been a remarkable leader, inspiration.
I told someone the other day the only time I think in
recent memory-someone correct me, the staff-that we ever
actually had a foreign assistance bill that got out of this
committee on the floor and we passed was when Dick Lugar
chaired the committee, back a number of years ago. That and
work on the Philippines and so many other issues.
So throughout my service I've had the opportunity to work
with a number of people, obviously; also chaired or been the
ranking member on the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.
My friend Bob Corker has been a great partner in recent days on
that committee as well. Both Republicans and Democrats have
served here; the most significant challenges facing our country
in the last more than a quarter of a century.
There isn't the time to go into all of those details, but
when I arrived Chuck Percy was the chairman of the committee,
in January 1981. Then Jesse Helms was chairman, Claiborne Pell
was chairman, and of course Dick Lugar, and Vice President
Biden, as all of you recall, chaired this committee, along now
with Senator Kerry. The committee has benefited from a truly
illustrious group of Senators at the helm over the years,
grappling with some of the most difficult questions of the day.
Again, I'm delighted that Dick Lugar is here, because
again-I know there's an expectation we say these things, but if
I had to list my pantheon of the several hundred people I've
served with, I don't know who I would include in the top five
necessarily, but I tell you who definitely would be in the top
five and the fellow on my left without a any question in my
mind would be in that list.
I believe that anybody that has talked to or watched the
Senate for more than half a century would have to include the
gentleman to my left as part of one of the most remarkable
people that has ever served here. So I thank you, dear friend,
for that.
Let me also-Bob Corker has been through. We traveled
together to Central America and he went to Mexico with me a few
years ago at an interparliamentary meeting when he first
arrived here, and has been a wonderful friend. I am confident
over the years, if he'll stay engaged in these matters-I hope
he will-he'll play a real contribution to this committee.
Ms. Joy Olson, who's here with us-and I thank her-she's the
executive director of the Washington Office on Latin America
and has had decades of experience working to improve the human
rights conditions in Latin America, raising issues that would
otherwise have been ignored.
Mark Schneider and I have been great friends for almost-I
think that entire time of 30 years or more. We go back to the
days of his time at the Peace Corps and USAID, and he's now
with the International Crisis Group, where he serves as the
senior vice president and special advisor on Latin America; has
a deep knowledge of Haiti, by the way. I look forward to
hearing his thoughts on that matter and others.
Cynthia Arnson, Dr. Arnson, is the director of the Latin
American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars. Her academic work over the years on governance, human
rights, conflict in Latin America, has been very significant,
profound, and extremely important, and we thank you, doctor,
for your work.
Finally, I'm happy to welcome Ambassador Jaime Daremblum,
who is a senior fellow and the director of the Center for Latin
American Studies at the Hudson Institute, and again someone
I've spent a lot of time with over the years, listening to his
thoughts and views; served as the Ambassador of Costa Rica when
my brother Tom also served as Ambassador. He was the Ambassador
there from 1988-1998, excuse me-to 2004.
In 1996-and I know my colleagues, some of them have heard
me repeat this over and over again, but I can't say it often
enough because they made such a profound effect on my life-I
arrived in a very rural mountain village called Benito Moncion
in the Dominican Republic as a volunteer with the Peace Corps,
in 1966.
Today, nearly half a century later, I'm chairing my last
hearing as the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, the Peace Corps, and Global Narcotic
Affairs. In that time, Latin America has undergone remarkable
change, much of it positive, I would add. We're now seeing the
development of a new middle class, the consolidation of
democracy, the propagation of effective fiscal and social
policies, as well as the rise of some new global powers that
are occurring in this hemisphere as well.
Over the course of my service in the Senate, I've tried to
play a role in shaping that policy toward our neighbors to the
south and, although we've made progress, as I leave the Senate
it's long past time for a fundamental shift, I think, in how we
think and relate to this important region of the world, because
Latin America is not our back yard; it is our neighborhood in a
sense, and there's a very important distinction to make. When
we focus exclusively on the challenges still faced by our
neighbors and the related dangers we ourselves face, we run the
risk of missing out on the opportunities their progress has
created.
The Latin American economy, long defined as emerging, has
finally emerged. In the 5 years leading up to the 2008 global
financial crisis, Latin American economies experienced growth
rates of 5.5 percent while keeping inflation in single digits.
When the crisis did hit, Latin America stood strong, weathering
the crisis better than any other region in the world. While
income inequality remains a significant issue, as it does in
our own country, I might add as well, 40 million Americans,
Latin Americans, were lifted out of poverty, 40 million,
between the years of 2002 and 2008. It's not just the
increasingly stable economies that is providing opportunities
for historically poor Latin Americans. Governments are
beginning to deliver the education, health care, and social
services necessary for sustaining growth and progress.
Additional cash transfers, such as Mexico's Oportunidadas
program and Brazil's Bolsa Familia, have reduced poverty,
increased school attendance, and provided hope for a generation
of low-income families that otherwise have remained
marginalized.
Obviously, there's still much work to be done. I'm not
trying to sound like a Pollyanna, but I think it's worthwhile
to talk about progress. Too often all we talk about are the
trouble spots and the difficulties. Drug trafficking and
related violence on our Mexican border with our Mexican
neighbors is compelling, to put it mildly. In many parts of
Central America, citizens are forced to live and work behind
barbed wire and blast walls because of the violence that is
occurring.
Venezuela and Cuba remain examples of democracy denied in
my view. Again, I want to thank Dick Lugar for initiating an
effort we joined together on a few weeks ago, I believe it was,
expressing our concerns about the denial of democracy and
democratic institutions in Venezuela, and I thank him for his
leadership on that and was pleased to join him in that effort.
I have serious questions about the integrity of the November
28th elections as well, I might point out, in that area.
Out of the spotlight, there are still developmental
challenges. Productivity is growing too slowly. Savings are too
low and much of the labor force remains in the informal
economy. Women and indigenous populations still face
discrimination and the poor still often live in excluded parts
of the economy.
But that old metaphor, Latin America is the United States
back yard, is indicative I think of our habit of viewing the
region solely in terms of problems to be solved, not
opportunities to be celebrated. In turn, our neighbors too
often see us as paternalistic, instead of recognizing our
commonality. What a shame that is, because, despite these
challenges, there is much opportunity to be found in Latin
America.
After all, we are the No. 2 nation in the world in Spanish
speakers. Our enormous and influential Latin community has
brought cultural and familiar ties to the forefront, along with
our geographical proximity. Not only do we share a common
colonial history; there's reason to believe that our paths
forward may converge as well.
But to harness these opportunities, each of us of course
must play a role. Latin American and Caribbean nations have
concerns about sovereignty and I appreciate those concerns. But
the challenges we face respect no border, and we must be able
to encourage our neighbors to strengthen their social programs,
invest in their infrastructure, trust in democracy, and to work
together in a collaborative fashion if we're going to
effectively meet these challenges that are so compelling.
The Obama administration's work to integrate Central
American regional security initiative and the Caribbean Basin
security initiative with the Merida program is a step, I
believe, in the right direction, as is the administration's
new, though long overdue, focus on vital institution-building
and civil society programs in Mexico.
But the militarization of our responses to the challenges
we face in Mexico I think can also be a large mistake, and I
remain deeply concerned that not enough effort, creativity, and
attention is being focused on tackling the root causes of these
problems that exist in Mexico and other parts of Central
America.
We must look beyond the elites with whom we traditionally
engage and work with new emerging leaders, including the
dynamic mayors, governors, and other local leaders who have
emerged in a region where 75 percent of the population live in
urban centers. This outreach must also include women, the
indigenous populations that I've mentioned, poor and
minorities, who have traditionally been excluded from the
public square. I know this is a priority of Secretary Clinton
and I applaud her for her leadership in this area.
To strengthen our economic ties, I urge Congress to pass
the Colombian and Panamanian Free Trade Agreements. I was sort
of hoping that might happen in this lame duck session. They're
due, they're ready. It would be an incredible message with the
new government in Colombia under President Santos, and in
Panama, which has been a great partner, has gone through
several transitions peacefully and democracy, I think a warning
of our support.
In Venezuela there is a real cause for concern. We cannot
bury our heads in the sand. We've got to address this challenge
collectively in a smart and sophisticated way. Earlier this
year, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights released a
report that raised serious concerns regarding the further
degradation of human rights in Venezuela.
The situation is unacceptable, not just to us, but to all
in the region, in my view. But this is not a case of the United
States versus Venezuela, but rather Venezuela versus democracy
and those who embrace and cherish those principles.
The same principle applies to Cuba. I returned from Cuba
just a few weeks ago, stunned to see that the country is
finally making some of the critical changes in its own society
that many of us, including the Cuban people, have wanted for
years and years. The Cuban Government recently announced that 1
million Cubans have been let go from the government payrolls
and instead will be allowed to run their own businesses.
With the help of Cardinal Ortega and the Spanish
Government, what played very important roles, political
prisoners are also being released. So we welcome that.
No, you don't have to approve the way Cuba is run, and I
certainly don't. Cuba clearly has a long way to go, and it was
quite obvious and apparent to me just walking the streets of
Havana and visiting other communities out in the far west of
that island nation that there is a deep sense of frustration
that people on that island feel, after 40, almost 50, years of
the rule under Fidel Castro.
Nobody's arguing to the contrary, I might add. But the
simple truth is that Cuba is changing, so I question-the
question I have to ask is, why shouldn't we also be thinking
about how we can help this change occur and move it further
along. I count my extensive travel through Latin America as one
of the great privileges of my life as a Senator, and the recent
trip, as I said, to Cuba, and before that throughout the region
last winter, to meet with heads of state and others to get a
more current reading of the present situation as it exists in
this hemisphere.
So today I apologize for what is normally a little longer
statement on the issues, but I wanted to at least share with my
colleagues and the committee sort of my observations at the end
of this 30-year career on this side of the dais, and I again
look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Before doing that,
I ask my colleagues if they have any thoughts.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank Senator Chris Dodd, a truly
trusted and thoughtful partner on this committee during three
decades of our service together, for chairing this important
hearing on Latin America.
Given recent developments, today's hearing is especially
timely. Our foreign policy in Latin America continues to
struggle with perceptions that the United States has neglected
the region in the past. These perceptions often have been
inaccurate or incomplete, but there is little doubt that United
States engagement with Latin America over a period of decades
has been crisis-driven.
If we are going to achieve stronger regional cohesion and
prosperity, we must establish a clear sense of our interests
and develop a more comprehensive means of engaging with our
neighbors. This engagement must go beyond managing perceptions
in the region. We need to underscore that the United States is
dedicated to working with our Western Hemisphere partners on
economic development and growth, strong democratic
institutions, the rule of law, energy security, environmental
protection, human rights, and many other objectives.
An immediate step in this direction would be passage of the
Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which would provide new markets
and additional jobs for the United States and Colombia alike.
Similarly, we need to conclude a United States-Brazil Tax
Treaty, which would expand business opportunities in both
countries and equalize the playing field for many American
firms doing business in Brazil.
Our collaboration with Mexico has helped to create an
institutional framework that did not previously exist to fight
organized crime and drug trafficking. This framework is
essential if progress against the cartels is to be sustained
over time. But much more coordination may be required to help
Mexico degrade the capacity and influence of the cartels, which
has become a near, existential national security objective for
our neighbor.
The situation in Venezuela requires more attention to
building a regional consensus on opposing that government's
challenges to international norms. The erosion of democracy in
Venezuela is now accompanied by rising crime and economic
stagnation. Senior Venezuelan military officials have been
implicated in narcotics activities and the government
increasingly makes common cause with Iran, Syria, Burma, and
North Korea regarding international security and weapons of
mass destruction issues.
Our hearing also coincides with elections in Haiti. I and
others urged President Preval to enact much-needed reforms to
ensure the credibility of these elections. He refused to do
that. As a result, the elections have been fraught with
numerous reports of irregularities and fraud.
Political uncertainty now threatens to exacerbate the human
suffering in Haiti, where more than 200,000 people died as a
result of the January earthquake and 1.3 million people
continue to live in tents. A cholera epidemic has killed more
than 1,700 people in the past month.
The United States has an interest in helping to address the
ongoing humanitarian problems in Haiti, and we will continue to
do that through various means. But our willingness to direct
funds through the Haitian Government depends on the fair,
transparent, and legal resolution of the current political
crisis.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss our relations
with Latin America, but it's also Senator Dodd's last
appearance as chairman of the Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs. He has
served with distinction as chairman or ranking member of this
key subcommittee for more than 20 years. Even when others have
lost focus, he has been a consistent and passionate advocate
for strengthening United States ties with Latin American
nations.
I have appreciated greatly the opportunity to work with my
good friend over many years on issues pertaining to Latin
America and broader national security questions. Recently,
these collaborations have included a bipartisan resolution
expressing concern regarding transgressions against freedom of
expression in Venezuela and legislation urging multilateral
banks and development institutions to cancel Haiti's debts.
Although I know Senator Dodd will continue to play an important
role in Latin American affairs from some other vantage point,
his departure from the Senate will be felt deeply by all people
who are working to expand mutual respect, security, and
prosperity in the hemisphere, and I thank the Senator.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Dick, very much. Thank you, my
good friend. That's very gracious of you in your comments.
I turn to my friend from Tennessee.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. I don't think I've ever given any
introductory comments in the Foreign Relations Committee, but
I'll do it this time. I first of all want to thank our
witnesses for coming. I know some very familiar faces here,
offering very credible testimony.
But I'm really here because this is the last hearing that
Chairman Dodd will participate in. The Foreign Relations
Committee is an odd committee, especially from the Republican
side, as Senator Lugar knows, in that it's a committee that in
order to stay on it you have to bypass other very desirous and
important committees. For that reason, we haven't had the
tenure on the Republican side that you might have on your side
of the aisle and certainly that we have on other committees.
You know, each of us has to figure out a way of making a
mark in the Senate. There are 100 Senators and each of us sort
of choose different avenues as to how to do that. Senator Lugar
with arms negotiations certainly has been a leader for our
country and certainly here in the Senate.
But I want to say to Chairman Dodd, I had the privilege of
traveling with him to Latin America and to Mexico and
throughout Central America, and I have to tell you that the
thing that was so impactful was seeing the long, long-term
personal relationships that existed between you and the leaders
of these countries; the fact that when we entered these
countries it wasn't just the leaders that you knew and had
personal relationships; it was people throughout the country
that you continue to talk to on cell phone, back and forth to
the airport.
I think that that's something that we here in the Senate
don't do enough of. I think it's an era that is passing in some
ways and certainly should be refocused upon, if you will.
But I want to thank you for your commitment, especially to
this part of the world, to the way that you've shown the rest
of us who are coming along the real way of engaging in foreign
relations. That is actually having those personal relationships
that both of you have.
So I want to thank you for that and, as I said earlier
today, thank you for your general nature, your aspirational
nature, in causing all of us to want to be better Senators.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you very, very much. I appreciate
that.
Senator, any comments
Senator Risch. I just want to associate myself with those
remarks.
Senator Dodd. Take as much time as you like. [Laughter.]
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, my friend, as well. I thank my
colleagues, and we'll hear from our witnesses. Again, I'm very
honored you're all here, and to be a part of this discussion.
As I said, almost everyone at this table, we've been an ongoing
discussion for many years about this area. So why don't I just
begin in the order we introduced you.
Joy, we'll begin with you if that's OK and go down. Is that
OK with you? Good.
statement of joy olson, executive director, washington office on latin
america, washington, dc
Ms. Olson. Well, Senator Dodd and other members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the
future of United States-Latin American relations.
Senator Dodd. it's an honor to testify at your final
hearing. Among the many accomplishments in your distinguished
career, you will be remembered for your courageous support for
democracy and peace processes in Central America, and for the
beginnings of change in United States-Cuba policy. You've drawn
on your own deep knowledge and commitment to Latin America to
challenge the Congress to adopt policies that would form the
basis of a more cooperative relationship with the region. It's
been a privilege to work with you. You leave the Senate having
made concrete improvements in United States-Latin American
relations.
I would also like to recognize the staff that you've had
over the years. I've worked many years with Janice O'Connell
and now with Fulton Armstrong, and I remember Bob Dockery.
You've had great staff.
Senator Dodd. And Josh Blumenthal, who is here today.
Ms. Olson. And Josh as well. I'm sorry.
I will take this opportunity to reflect on some of the
issues you've worked on over the years and how change will
produce both challenge and opportunity in the years ahead.
Change in the region is taking place at every level. This is
not the Latin America of the 1970s. Parts of Latin America, for
example, are the most violent in the world, but the causes of
violence are quite different. Violence today is generally not
created by guerrilla movements or state-sponsored human rights
violators, but by street criminals, youth gangs, or organized
crime.
The challenge today is to make police and justice systems
function in a rights-respecting fashion. These systems must
work to hold accountable both organized crime and human rights
abusers. Governments must have the political will and ability
to arrest and prosecute criminals while not committing human
rights violations of their own, and the will to implement tax
structures while supporting a functioning justice system.
Poverty alleviation is another example of change.
Innovative conditional cash transfer programs have made
progress in reducing poverty. There is evidence that children
stay in school longer and are healthier. The question is will
these programs be sustainable and lead to economic development,
or will kids stay in school longer and then enter the work
force to find little opportunity in the formal sector. These
are some of the challenges today.
Notably, most of Latin America has weathered the economic
downturn much better than the United States. The economies that
are less dependent on the United States have been the least
affected. While of course there are many contributing factors
to this, what has been demonstrated is that the region's
stability, prosperity, and, in many ways, its future, are not
dependent on the United States.
While Latin America is facing long-term problems in new
contexts, it's also developing new political organizations,
like UNASUR, which do not include the United States. The
challenge for the United States is to be relevant to Latin
America.
While the problem of drugs is old, the good news is that
there is a vibrant drug policy debate happening in Latin
America. Information is being shared between countries about
drug control strategies that have reduced the harm caused by
drugs, and drug policies are beginning to change.
Unfortunately, in the region the United States is seen as the
enemy of an open drug policy dialogue. There is real
opportunity for greater collaboration and cooperation in Latin
America on drug policy.
While changes in the drug certification process that you
shepherded through the Congress, Senator Dodd, were an
important step forward, more affirmative actions need to be
taken. One step the Senate could take during the lame duck
session would be passing the bill to establish a Western
Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, which has already cleared
the House.
Unfortunately, prevailing debates in the U.S. Congress
about Latin America are often polarized and seem somewhat stuck
in the past. The polarization we see in Congress and in
politics here today has a damaging effect on foreign policy.
Its spillover distorts our understanding, diminishes our
credibility, and complicates our relationship with the region.
The debate in Congress too often reinforces an ``us against
them'' mentality.
The immigration debate is one example. We build higher and
longer walls to keep ``them'' out, and the tone and the visual
here is enormously offensive to Latin Americans. Missing from
the U.S. policy debate on immigration is an analysis of why
people leave their homes. We need to start thinking
``intermestically'' about domestic immigration and
international economic development policies at the same time,
because thinking intermestically we will make better policies,
and not thinking intermestically can create downright dangerous
policies. For example, dramatically increased border control at
the U.S. southern border has inadvertently contributed to the
consolidation of organized crime, as human and drug trafficking
routes have merged.
Overcoming polarization will be the challenge for this next
Congress. I had the privilege of testifying before the Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs after the coup
in Honduras, and the polarized nature of the debate was like a
flashback to the Central America years of the cold war.
Lingering cold war frameworks that see the region in black and
white terms are likely to get substantial air time in the next
Congress, and this cold war conceptualization can distort our
relationship with Latin America by placing too much emphasis on
extremes, instead of marginalizing them, and inhibiting our
ability to work together with the other 90 percent of the
region on common problems.
Finally-and I hate to say this-but the United States has
lost its credibility on human rights in Latin America because
we haven't practiced what we've preached. The United States is
seen as hypocritical. Our government uses human rights to beat
up its adversaries and soft-pedals when it comes to its
friends. The region thinks we consider ourselves above the law.
We haven't ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights. We have the posse comitatus law here in the United
States that divides policing and military functions, but with
Latin America we routinely promote the opposite. And let's not
forget, Guantanamo is in this hemisphere and, while many U.S.
citizens have forgotten that we're imprisoning people for years
without trial, Latin America certainly has not.
This is a moment of tremendous opportunity in United
States-Latin American relations. We need not lead Latin
America. We need to convince Latin America that it's worth
partnering with us, and that the United States wants to be a
partner in the solution of regional problems. To seize these
opportunities, we must change. We must think intermestically
and develop policies that demonstrate it. We must be consistent
on human rights at home and in foreign policy, and we must
demonstrate that Latin America matters to our future, even if
it means spending some money, using up some political capital,
and confronting hard-liners who want to relive cold war
conflicts of the past.
Senator Dodd. you were instrumental in fighting for peace,
human rights, and democratic governance in the Americas, and it
is my hope that others in the Congress, in the Senate in
particular, will rise to the occasion upon your departure and
help focus the U.S. attention on this new agenda. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joy Olson, Executive Director, Washington Office
on Latin America, Washington, DC
Senator Dodd and other members of the committee, thank you for
inviting me to testify today on the future of United States/Latin
American relations. Senator Dodd, it is an honor to testify at your
final hearing. Among the many accomplishments in your distinguished
career in the Senate, you will be remembered for your courageous
support of democracy and peace processes in Central America and for the
beginnings of change in United States/Cuba policy. You have drawn on
your own deep knowledge and commitment to Latin America to challenge
the U.S. Congress to adopt policies that would form the basis of a more
cooperative relationship with the region. It has been a privilege to
work with you. You leave the Senate having made concrete improvements
in United States/Latin American relations.
I will take this opportunity to reflect on some of the issues you
have worked on over the years and how changes taking place today will
produce both challenge and opportunity in the years ahead.
navigating change
Change in the region-new political dynamics, new economic patterns-
is taking place at every level. This is not the Latin America of 1970.
The issues confronting the region are changing, and regional leaders-
governmental, civil society, and business-at many levels are working on
solutions.
Parts of Latin America are the most violent in the world, but the
causes of violence are different now. The violence that still afflicts
too many in the region is generally not created by guerilla movements
or state sponsored human rights violators, but by street criminals,
youth gangs and/or organized crime. Organized crime groups, which
include contraband smugglers, extortionists, and robbery rings along
with drug traffickers, are not only engaging in violence, but
corrupting government officials and undermining democratic
institutions. Cities like Ciudad Juarez, San Salvador, Medellin,
Caracas, and Rio de Janiero are all trying to figure out how to cope
with these powerful groups that, in extremes, can rival or replace
state structures. Too much of this violence is rooted in the
trafficking of illicit drugs, destined for the U.S. market-an issue
that must be addressed anew in the policy arena.
In Latin America, the challenge today is to make police and justice
systems function in a rights respecting fashion. These systems must
work to hold accountable both organized crime and human rights abusers.
There has to be the political will and the ability for governments to
arrest and prosecute criminals while not committing human rights
violations. And, the will to implement tax structures to support a
functioning justice system
Poverty alleviation is another example of change. Innovative
targeted cash transfer programs (CCTs) have made progress in reducing
absolute poverty. This model- new to Latin America in the last decade-
makes much-needed financial resources available to poor households, but
requires certain actions from the cash recipients, such as keeping
children in school and having health checkups. Twenty-six countries in
Latin America have now implemented CCTs. There is evidence of children
staying in school longer and being healthier. The question now is, will
these programs be sustainable and lead to economic development? Or,
will kids stay in school longer and then enter the workforce to find
little opportunity in the formal sector?
If Latin America is facing long-term problems in new contexts, it
is also developing new approaches. There are exciting moves to develop
institutions that will facilitate regional solutions to regional
problems. One can critique UNASUR or the Mexican-sponsored Summit of
Latin America and the Caribbean (CALC), but it is clear that Latin
America, or a large part of it, is seeking to manage regional
conflicts, development and trade on its own. The United States needs to
recognize this reality.
Notably, most of Latin America has weathered the ``economic
downturn'' much better than the United States. And economies that are
less dependent on the United States have been the least affected. While
of course there are many factors contributing to this, what has been
demonstrated is that the region's stability, prosperity, and in many
ways, its future need not depend upon the United States.
Of course there are exceptions to everything I've said, but the
point remains the same. The challenges and opportunities Latin America
faces have taken new shapes under new circumstances. The challenge for
the United States is to be relevant to Latin America.
And yet, I'm sorry to say this, but many of the prevailing
attitudes and debates in the U.S. Congress about Latin America policy
tend to be polarized and seem stuck in the past.
polarization, collaboration and the need for ``intermestic''
policymaking
President Obama, in addressing the last Summit of the Americas,
pledged that, ``. . . the United States will be there as a friend and a
partner, because our futures are inextricably bound to the future of
the people of the entire hemisphere. And we are committed to shaping
that future through engagement that is strong and sustained, that is
meaningful, that is successful, and that is based on mutual respect and
equality.''
In foreign policy circles, we all talk a good game about
``partnership'' and ``collaboration'' with our neighbors to the south,
but the United States hasn't really figured out how to play by the new
rules. And, many policymakers haven't figured out that, for better or
for worse, the United States doesn't write those rules anymore. The
United States has to change how it conceives of its role with the
region and incorporate that into how it makes policy. It means thinking
more ``intermestically''- attempting to conceive of domestic and
international U.S. policy at the same time. It means working with our
neighbors to develop common solutions to common problems.
The polarization we see too often in Congress today has a damaging
effect on foreign policy. This polarization distorts our understanding,
diminishes our credibility, and complicates our relationship with the
region. The debate in Congress too often reinforces the ``us'' versus
``them'' mentality.
The immigration debate is a good example. In the United States,
immigration is currently at the forefront of polarizing issues, and it
spills over into our relationship with Latin America. We build bigger
and longer walls to keep ``them'' out. The tone and the visual here is
enormously offensive to Latin Americans.
Missing from the U.S. policy debate on immigration is an analysis
of why people leave their homes to make the treacherous journey north.
Migrants are certainly central to economic growth in the United States,
and sending countries certainly depend on the remittances sent by
migrants. But people leave their homelands and face terrible hardships,
even death-as we saw recently with the massacre of 72 Central American
migrants in Mexico-because they are desperate, facing a lack of
economic opportunity that enables them to sustain themselves and their
families at home.
We need to start thinking about migration and development as one.
And realize that immigration isn't only about domestic U.S. policies.
Economic development that will create more and better paying jobs in
Latin America is in our interest. If we think more intermestically, we
will make better policies for the United States.
Not thinking ``intermestically'' can create dangerous policies.
Dramatically increased border control at the U.S. southern border is
one example of a policy with serious unintended consequences. Those who
follow migration patterns in Mexico will tell you that as the United
States made it harder to cross our southern border, the way people
crossed the border changed. Now migrants need more sophisticated
knowledge of the weak links in the system. It is organized criminal
networks who have that information. And so the migration networks that
were once ``mom and pop'' operations have given way to drug trafficking
networks that control routes into the United States. Let me be clear.
The migrants are not criminals. They are the victims of organized
crime. \1\ And with those criminal networks come a much greater abuse
of migrants and more violence on the border. Although we once thought
it would keep us safer, more border security has lead to the
consolidation of organized crime on our border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In December WOLA, in conjunction with the Mexico-based Miguel
Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center, will publish a paper on the
kidnapping of migrants in Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So many of the issues we face today cannot be addressed by us
alone, but require new ways of thinking-ones that embrace understanding
transnational issues and develops national policies that are mutually
reinforcing.
Drug policy is one of the easiest issues to understand and one of
the hardest to affect. Drugs are a part of our societies and are not
going away. We can't win a war against them. Drugs and our policies to
control them create tremendous damage at many levels-consumption,
crime, disease, expense, and violence-with an often devastating impact
on families. The United States has spent years focusing its
international drug policy on source country eradication and regional
interdiction. When ``successful,'' these strategies have moved
production and transport to new areas. Every time it moves, some new
region of Latin America has been devastated by the violence and
corruption that follow the drug trade.
There is a vibrant drug policy debate happening in Latin America.
WOLA has been facilitating informal intergovernmental drug policy
dialogues for the past 3 years, and they are exciting. Information is
being shared between countries about drug control strategies that have
reduced the harm caused by drugs. Drug policies are being changed. The
consequences of drugs and drug policy are as controversial in Latin
America as they are here in the United States, and in some countries
like Mexico, even more so. But there is an underlying understanding
that the status quo is not good enough. Next week WOLA is releasing an
eight-country study looking at the impact of drug laws on incarceration
and prison overcrowding in Latin America. The study has revealed that
prisons are bursting at the seams with low-level/ nonviolent drug
offenders who are easily replaced in the drug trade. The human and
financial cost of the drug war is too high, and basically something's
got to give.
In the region, the United States is seen as the enemy of an open
discussion of drug policy. For too long the United States has judged
and conditioned other countries on their adherence to prescribed
approaches to drug policy.
There is a real opportunity for greater collaboration and
cooperation with Latin America on drug policy. While changes in the
drug certification process that you shepherded through Congress,
Senator Dodd, were an important step forward, more affirmative actions
need to be taken to change this dynamic. One small step the Senate
could take during the lame duck session would be passing the bill to
establish a Western Hemisphere drug policy commission, which has
already cleared the House.
Overcoming polarization will be the challenge for the next Congress
and the rest of this administration.
I had the privilege of testifying before the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs after the coup in Honduras. This
hearing was a disturbing experience, not just because the region had
not seen a military coup in years, but because the subcommittee's
analysis of the situation broke down along party lines. All of the
Democrats described the events in Honduras as a coup, and none of the
Republicans were willing to make that determination. The debate was
like a flashback to the Central America years of the cold war.
In Latin America, calling what happened in Honduras a coup was a
given. All the region's governments condemned it in those terms. In
some ways, the congressional debate here complicated efforts at
collaboration and engagement with Latin America on Honduras. Lingering
cold war frameworks that see the region in black and white terms are
likely to get substantial air time in the next Congress, including
spending too much time on Venezuela and Cuba.
This cold war conceptualization can distort our relationship with
Latin America by placing too much emphasis on extremes-instead of
marginalizing the extremes-and inhibiting our ability to work together
with the other 90 percent of the region on common problems.
To work together across party lines and with governments of
different political inclinations in the hemisphere, we should think in
terms of good government. Good government should not be a partisan
issue.
Finally, and I hate to say it, but the United States has lost its
credibility on human rights in Latin America. We have not practiced
what we preached. If you try to talk about human rights in Latin
America, which I do and I'm sure many of you do as well, you are
constantly reminded of this.
The United States is seen as hypocritical. Our government uses
human rights to beat up its adversaries (Cuba and Venezuela) and soft-
pedal when it comes to its friends (Colombia, Honduras, and Mexico).
Cuba and Venezuela deserve criticism, but so do Colombia, Honduras, and
Mexico. We need to confront the fact that we are not taken seriously on
human rights matters. The State Department writes in-depth annual human
rights reports and then both Republican and Democratic administrations
turn around and flout the human rights conditions that Congress has
imposed on aid to Colombia and Mexico.
The region views us as considering ourselves above the law. We
won't submit to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. We have the
posse comitatus law here that divides police and military functions,
but in our engagement with Latin America we routinely promote the
opposite, encouraging militaries to take on policing functions. \2\ We
even train Latin American police at U.S. military schools. And let's
not forget that Guantanamo is in this hemisphere. While many U.S.
citizens may have forgotten that we are imprisoning people for years
without trial, Latin America has certainly not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See ``Preach What you Practice: The Separation of Military and
Police Roles in the Americas,'' Washington Office on Latin America,
November, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
This is a moment of tremendous opportunity in United States/Latin
American relations. Prosperity in the region is increasing, and we are
one of its main trading partners. It is developing its own policies and
leadership and focusing on regional solutions to regional problems. We
do not need to ``lead'' Latin America. We need to convince Latin
America that it is worth partnering with us and that the UnitedStates
wants to be a partner in the solution of regional problems. Not just
their problems, but our problems-drugs, poverty, human rights, the
environment, migration, and development.
To seize these opportunities, we must change. We must think
intermestically and develop policies that demonstrate it. We must be
consistent on human rights-intermestically-at home and in foreign
policy. We must demonstrate that Latin America matters to our future-
even if it means spending some money, using up some political capital,
and confronting hard-liners who want to be reliving conflicts of the
past.
Senator Dodd. you were instrumental in fighting for peace, human
rights, and democratic governance in Central America during the 1980s
and 1990s. It is my hope that others in the U.S. Senate will rise to
the occasion upon your departure and help focus U.S. attention on this
new agenda.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Joy. I really appreciate
those nice comments as well.
Dr. Arnson, thank you. Once again, nice to see you, and I
appreciate your being here.
STATEMENT OF DR. CYNTHIA ARNSON, DIRECTOR, LATIN AMERICAN
PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much.
I'd like to associate myself with Joy's remarks in
expressing how much of an honor it is to be here at this
hearing, your last as chair of the subcommittee. Mr. Dodd, you
have been a leading voice on Latin American issues for decades.
You have rightfully earned the respect and admiration of people
in the United States and throughout the hemisphere for your
leadership.
I'm also particularly honored to have been a constituent of
yours back in the 1970s, when I lived in Middletown, and I'm
probably the only witness that has ever come before you who has
your picture on the cover of my first book. It's at a peasant
cooperative in El Salvador, along with your colleagues Jim
Leach from Iowa and the late Steven Solarz from New York.
Over the last decade, it's become more and more difficult
to conceive of, let alone implement, a one-size-fits-all policy
for Latin America and the Caribbean. I think for the most part
that the cold war ideological divisions have receded. Leaders
in the region of the center-right and the center-left have
converged around a commitment to democratic practices, to
macroeconomic stability, as well as the belief that the state
has an important role in the provision of social welfare.
At the same time, the differences between and among
countries of the region are growing. These differences have to
deal with levels of economic development, wealth, human
capital, social cohesion, the strength of democratic
institutions, adherence to the principles of representative
democracy, and the density of relations with the United States.
Thus, while it's appealing to speak of U.S. policy in the
Western Hemisphere, the truth is that diplomacy must take into
account the tremendous variety among and between countries and
subregions. The Obama administration's recognition of this
diversity and the more nuanced diplomacy that is required to
meet it represent, in my view, an advance over previous
decades.
As South American democracies have matured in the decade
since the transition from authoritarian rule, leaders have
sought to diversify their partners in the foreign policy and
economic arenas and to give priority to relationships beyond
the United States. The high levels of economic growth over the
last 10 years coupled, as you have mentioned, with policies
that have greatly reduced poverty and to some extent
inequality, have created the conditions for the exercise of
``soft power'' on the part of many countries in the hemisphere.
Some of this projection, particularly that exercised by a
country such as Venezuela, is aimed explicitly at limiting or
undermining
U.S. influence in the hemisphere. Other manifestations of
independence and assertiveness, however, reflect the increased
political as well as economic capacity of stable democracies.
Virtually all countries of the region, regardless of their
political orientation, have sought to expand their trading
partners and political alliances. In this environment, United
States and Latin American interests will inevitably clash at
times, as they did mightily in the last few months over
Brazilian President Lula's attempt to broker an agreement with
Iran over that country's nuclear ambitions, in opposition not
only to this country but also to the major powers of the U.N.
Security Council.
Aggressive efforts by actors such as China, Russia, and
Iran to expand their political, economic, and military
relationships in the hemisphere are a reality and pose many
challenges for U.S. interests. But our power to control, let
alone prevent, the diversification of Latin American foreign
relations is limited and in some cases, nonexistent.
I believe that U.S. influence, which is different from
control, will be maximized to the extent that the United States
recognizes, accepts, and works to situate itself within the
changed circumstances in the hemisphere. This is the normal
functioning of diplomacy among allies, whose interests will
converge some, but not all of the time.
Trade partners and trade patterns are rapidly changing
throughout the region. The United States remains by far Latin
America's largest trading partner, with trade totaling over
$500 billion last year. Asia is Latin America's second largest
partner, primarily but not exclusively represented by trade
with China. Asia has overtaken the European Union as Latin
America's second-largest trading partner. China has surpassed
the United States as the top export destination for Brazil,
Chile, and Peru. It's the second-largest export destination for
Argentina, Costa Rica, and Cuba.
When it comes to foreign direct investment in Latin
America, the United States share continues to dwarf that of
other countries or regions. However, the ability of the United
States to take advantage of the growth and dynamism in South
America has not been fully realized. The U.S. trade agenda is
stalled, largely because trade agreements have become proxies
for an unspoken national debate that has taken place only
indirectly, over who wins and who loses in the process of
globalization.
I believe that open trade contributes overall to the growth
of the
U.S. economy, but it does so unevenly and to the direct
detriment of certain regions and economic sectors. A time of
jobless recovery and burgeoning inequality in this country sets
the stage for rising protectionism. This will remain difficult
to counter absent a broader social pact in our own country that
invests in productivity and spreads the benefits as well as the
costs of free trade more equitably. Ultimately, United States
policy toward Latin America will be a product of domestic
United States priorities as well as partisan considerations as
they interact with the changed realities in the region. There
is little evidence to suggest, and indeed much to refute, the
notion that the United States is irrelevant to Latin America or
no longer considers the hemisphere a priority in diplomatic or
economic terms.
At the same time, quite frankly, many Latin American
countries are unimpressed with the United States own record on
issues that we have declared to be our priority, including the
reduction of poverty and inequality, addressing climate change,
and developing alternative energy. Latin American countries are
rightly proud of their own innovation, their example, their
progress; and our own inability, as Joy has mentioned, to
practice at times what we preach undermines the credibility
that is essential to foreign policy success.
I agree that the growing polarization of our own domestic
politics is an added impediment to productive engagement with
the hemisphere. There are sharp divisions in the policy
community and indeed at this witness table over how to
characterize the nature of Iran's relationship with such
countries as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the degree of
threat that that relationship represents.
Similarly, there is no consensus over the proper ways to
respond to the sharp reversals in the democratic process in
such countries as Venezuela and Nicaragua, let alone agreement
over how to engage with the process of change taking place in
Cuba.
I believe it's time for us to rethink what it is that we
want from the hemisphere. We should avoid the historic impulses
toward paternalism, on the one hand, as well as the tendency,
on the other hand, to pay attention only in the face of
security threats, real or imagined. The U.S. economy, it's no
secret to all of you, is in deep crisis, and will remain so for
the foreseeable future. Our country is still in the midst of
two major wars. We should not pretend to ourselves, let alone
to our allies in the region, that Latin America will be a
foreign policy priority. Claims to the contrary will only ring
hollow.
That said, there is all the room in the world for
recognizing that the political and economic advances in the
region over the last decade constitute a strategic asset for
the United States. Forging partnerships among equals means by
definition that we cannot get our own way all of the time or
even most of the time. I believe, however, that there is enough
common ground for the United States and the countries of the
Americas to recognize each other as paths to the realization of
their own interests and goals.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Arnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American
Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washngton,
DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to offer
this testimony today, and especially honored to be included in the last
session of this subcommittee chaired by Senator Christopher Dodd.
Senator Dodd has been a leading voice on Latin American issues within
the Congress for many decades. His tireless efforts on behalf of
democracy, human rights, and social justice have rightly earned him the
respect and admiration of public officials and private citizens
throughout the United States and the hemisphere.
My remarks will briefly address some major of the major political
and economic trends in Latin America and therefore the principal
challenges for U.S. policy.
disaggregate the region
Over the last decade, it has become more and more difficult to
conceive of, let alone implement, a one-size-fits-all U.S. policy for
Latin America and the Caribbean. It is true that the sharp ideological
divisions of the cold war have receded. And leaders of the center left
and center right have converged around a commitment to democratic
practices, macroeconomic stability, as well as the belief that state
has an important role to play in advancing social welfare.
At the same time, differences between and among countries and
subregions are growing. These differences have to do with levels of
economic development, wealth, human capital, and social cohesion; the
strength of democratic institutions and adherence to the principles of
representative democracy; and the density of relations with the United
States.
For example, Brazil is now the world's eighth largest economy, and
alone accounts for 40 percent of the entire region's GDP. Brazil's
state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, is the world's fourth largest
corporation (trailing only Exxon Mobil, Apple, and PetroChina).
According to the World Bank, South America as a whole grew an average
rate of 5-6 percent between 2004 and 2008, double the rate of U.S.
growth in this same period; and this gap has only widened since the
onset of the 2008 recession. Commodity and agriculturally rich
countries such as Chile, Peru, and Argentina have grown robustly during
a period of global recession, largely due to Chinese demand.
By contrast, the U.S. financial crisis of September 2008 has
brought havoc to those countries most deeply integrated with the United
States: Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Mexico has begun to
recover, but many smaller countries remain mired in recession. Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean are densely linked to the United
States due to patterns of trade, investment, remittances, and
migration. Their proximity to drug consumption and other illegal
markets in the United States has drawn us together in more perverse and
destructive terms as well.
In the Andean region, it is hard to imagine countries more
different in their political and economic orientations than Colombia
and Venezuela, despite the recent warming of relations between these
two neighbors. Colombia's economy is booming and foreign investment is
at record levels while oil-rich Venezuela is the only country in South
America to be mired in recession. The so-called ALBA nations of
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua share similar patterns of
hyper-presidentialism, autocracy, and authoritarianism. But there are
also important differences among them, including the constituencies
that constitute their core of support, and the strength, coherence, and
broad-based appeal of their political opposition.
Thus, while it is appealing to speak of U.S policy in the Western
Hemisphere, the truth is that diplomacy must take into account the
variety among and between countries and subregions. The Obama
administration's recognition of this diversity, and the more nuanced
diplomacy required to meet it, represent an advance over previous
decades.
diminished control or diminished influence?
As South American democracies have matured and deepened in the
decades since the transition from authoritarian rule, leaders have
sought to diversify foreign policy partners and to give priority to
relationships beyond the United States. High levels of economic growth
over the last 10 years, coupled with social policies that have reduced
poverty and expanded social cohesion, have created the conditions for
the projection and exercise of ``soft power'' by many countries of the
hemisphere. Some of this projection, particularly that exercised by
Venezuela-is aimed explicitly at limiting or undermining U.S. influence
in the region. Other manifestations of assertiveness and independence,
however, reflect the increased economic and political capacity of
stable democracies. Virtually all countries of the region, regardless
of political orientation, have sought to expand their trading partners
and political alliances.
In this environment, U.S. and Latin American interests will
inevitably clash at times, as they did mightily when Brazil's President
Lula attempted earlier this year to broker an agreement with Iran over
that country's nuclear ambitions, in opposition to the United States as
well as the major powers of the U.N. Security Council. In recent weeks,
by agreeing to extradite accused drug trafficker Walid Makled to
Venezuela rather than to the United States, Colombia demonstrated the
priority it attaches to the relationship with its immediate neighbor,
rather than Washington. Aggressive efforts by actors such as China,
Russia, Iran, to expand their political, economic, and military
relationships in the hemisphere is a reality and poses many challenges
for U.S. interests. But U.S. power to control, let alone prevent, the
diversification of Latin American foreign relations is limited and, in
some cases, nonexistent. Indeed, U.S. influence-something different
from control-will be maximized to the extent the United States
recognizes, accepts, and works to situate itself within the changed
circumstances in the hemisphere. This is the normal functioning of
diplomacy among allies, whose interests will converge some but not all
of the time. The current administration's emphasis on multilateralism
and partnership is promising in that it recognizes not only that the
United States does not have all the answers, but quite often, has much
to learn from Latin American countries themselves. It is not
coincidental that our greatest policy fiascos in the hemisphere over
these last 2 years-the dreadful handling of negotiations over a United
States-Colombia base agreement and the decision to break with the
hemisphere over how to respond to the 2009 coup in Honduras-occurred
precisely because the impulse to ``go it alone'' prevailed over the
more time-consuming processes of consultation and consensus-building.
patterns of trade, aid, and investment
Trade partners and trade patterns are rapidly changing throughout
the region. The United States remains by far Latin America's largest
trading partner (with trade totaling just over $500 billion last year),
although once Mexico is factored out of the equation, the U.S. role is
more limited. Asia (primarily but not exclusively China) is Latin
America's second largest partner, overtaking the European Union.
According to a 2010 study by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), China has now surpassed the
United States as the top export destination for Brazil and Chile; the
same became true for Peru by mid-2010. China is also the second-largest
export destination for Argentina, Costa Rica, and Cuba. China's growth
has had a profound impact on countries throughout the hemisphere. The
impact has been most positive for net exporters of energy, raw
materials, and agricultural products, and most negative for those
countries whose manufactured exports have been undermined by Chinese
competition in such major markets as the United States. All told,
China's trade deficit with Latin America totaled some $8.9 billion in
2009, largely due to raw materials exports from Brazil and Chile. At
the same time, there are growing concerns expressed within Latin
America as well as by international financial institutions about
China's commitment to environmental and labor standards, and about the
ways that Chinese patterns of trade and investment reinforce centuries-
old patterns of commodity dependence on the part of Latin American
economies. Clearly, managing the growing relationship with China and
ensuring that deepening economic ties contribute to Latin America's own
development goals and priorities is a challenge for the countries of
the hemisphere.
When it comes to foreign direct investment in Latin America, the
U.S. share continues to dwarf that of other countries or regions.
According to CEPAL, the United States accounted for 37 percent of total
FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1998-2008. It is also the
case that, even at a time of deep recession, U.S. assistance to Latin
America from the Agency for International Development has actually
increased, as did the commitment to the proven development practice of
micro-enterprise. And the United States is still-by overwhelming
margins-the largest single donor to the reconstruction of earthquake-
devastated Haiti.
However, the U.S. ability to take advantage of the growth and
dynamism in South America has not been fully realized. The U.S. trade
agenda has stalled, largely because free trade agreements have become
proxies for a national debate that has taken place only indirectly,
over winners and losers in a process of globalization. While more open
trade contributes overall to growth in the U.S. economy, it does so
unevenly and to the direct detriment of certain regions and economic
sectors. A time of jobless recovery and burgeoning inequality in the
United States sets the stage for rising protectionist sentiment. This
will remain difficult to counter absent a broader social pact in our
own country that invests in productivity and spreads the benefits as
well as the costs of free trade more equitably. The stalled free trade
agreements with Colombia and Panama, for example, deserve to move
forward. But they are unlikely to do so absent a coherent and shared
vision of the role of trade in U.S. economic growth, coupled with a
strategy for cushioning the adverse effects of trade on specific
sectors and communities. Trade adjustment assistance has been a
positive component of the trade policy agenda in the past, and should
remain so in the future.
north versus south america
Much of the focus, and certainly the resources, pertaining to U.S.
policy in the hemisphere have been devoted to addressing the security
crises in Mexico and Central America, and to a lesser extent the
Caribbean, due to drug trafficking and other activities of organized
crime. Given U.S. proximity to these countries and subregions, the role
of U.S. demand for illegal narcotics in fueling the violence, and the
role of arms trafficking and money laundering on the U.S. side of the
border, it is entirely appropriate and urgent that we do so. The Obama
administration has made great strides in embracing the notion of shared
responsibility for the orgy of drug violence engulfing Mexico;
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton set the tone during a March 2009
trip to Mexico, stating that ``our insatiable demand for illegal drugs
fuels the drug trade; our inability to prevent weapons from being
illegally smuggled across the border to arm these criminals, causes the
deaths of police, of soldiers, of civilians.'' President Obama himself
has acknowledged that ``a demand for these drugs in the United States
is what is helping to keep these cartels in business.''
The reality behind these words is that U.S. consumption of cocaine,
heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines is estimated to exceed $60
billion annually. And an estimated $18-39 billion flows south in the
form of bulk cash and high-caliber weapons for the cartels. Research
commissioned by the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center has
highlighted that, of the 75,000 firearms seized by the Mexican
Government in the last 3 years, about 80 percent, or 60,000, came from
the United States. A widening array of U.S. agencies-the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Justice Department;
Customs; Homeland Security-have deepened strategic cooperation with
Mexican counterparts on issues from intelligence-sharing to banking
regulations. U.S. security cooperation with Mexico under the Merida
Initiative has now shifted, de-emphasizing the transfer of arms and
heavy equipment to the Mexican army to focus in favor of the longer
term task of strengthening institutions, including the judicial system,
prosecutors, and the police. Cooperation among federal, state, and
local actors on both sides of the border increased on local as well as
national issues, and greater attention was devoted to modernizing
border infrastructure and helping border communities. U.S. assistance
to the countries of Central America and the Caribbean has also gone up,
but may not be sufficient. Meanwhile, Gil Kerlikowske, director of the
White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, has made modest but
nonetheless significant shifts in U.S. counter-narcotics budgets,
increasing spending for prevention and treatment of drug use by more
than 17 percent in 2010 and treating domestic drug consumption as a
public health as well as law enforcement problem. But there is no
national debate over more fundamental ways to reduce the demand for
drugs in this country, which remains a central driver of violence and
institutional decay throughout the region.
Despite the shift of U.S. policy emphasis, Mexico demonstrates more
than any other Latin American country how U.S. domestic political
considerations trump foreign policy in ways that undermine hopes for a
new direction. Promises aside, by September 2009 the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATFE) had revoked the licenses of
only 11 of the thousands of gun shops along the 2,000-mile United
States-Mexican border. There has been no push, by the administration or
by Congress, to renew the 10-year ban on assault weapons that expired
in 2004. And neither the administration nor the Senate have made
ratification of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives
and other Related Items, known as CIFTA, a priority. CIFTA was adopted
by the OAS in 1997 and submitted to the Congress the following year by
President Bill Clinton.
the dangers of partisan polarization
Ultimately, U.S. policy toward Latin America will be a product of
domestic U.S. priorities and partisan considerations as they interact
with changed realities in Latin America. There is little evidence to
suggest-and much to refute-the notion that the United States is
irrelevant to Latin America or no longer considers the hemisphere a
priority in diplomatic or economic terms. At the same time, many Latin
American countries are unimpressed with the United States' own record
on issues that we have declared to be our priority, including the
reduction of poverty and inequality, addressing climate change, and
developing alternative energy; Latin American countries are rightly
proud of their own innovation, example, and progress, and our own
inability at times to practice what we preach undermines the
credibility that is essential to our success.
The growing polarization of our own domestic politics is an added
impediment to productive engagement with the hemisphere. There are
sharp divisions in the policy community, for example, over how to
characterize the nature of Iran's relationship with such countries as
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the degree of ``threat'' that
relationship represents. Similarly, there is no consensus over the
proper ways to respond to sharp reversals of the democratic process in
such countries as Venezuela and Nicaragua, let alone over how to engage
with the process of change taking place in Cuba. (It is worth noting
that, according to the U.S. Department of Energy, more than 60 percent
of Venezuela's oil exports are destined for the United States-that
amounts to about 12 percent of U.S. oil imports-creating a bizarre form
of economic interdependence at odds with the chill in political
relations.) The temptation to use such hot-button issues for partisan
advantage is enormous, although the end-result of such debates is
rarely better policy.
It is time for us to rethink what we ``want'' from hemispheric
relations, avoiding historic impulses to paternalism, on the one hand,
or the tendency to pay attention only in the face of security threats,
real or imagined, on the other. The U.S. economy is in deep crisis, and
will remain so for the foreseeable future; our country is still in the
midst of two major wars. We should not pretend that Latin America will
be a foreign policy priority, and claims to the contrary will only ring
hollow. That said, there is all the room in the world for recognizing
that the political and economic advances in the region over the last
decade constitute a strategic asset for the United States. Forging
partnerships among equals means by definition that we cannot get our
own way all or even most of the time. There is enough common ground,
however, for the United States and countries of the Americas to
recognize each other as paths to the realization of their own interests
and goals.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, doctor. I appreciate that very
much.
Mark, thank you once again. I don't know how many times you've been
sitting at that table with Senator Lugar and myself over the years, but
we welcome you once again.
STATEMENT OF MARK L. SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT/SPECIAL
ADVISOR ON LATIN AMERICA, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I want to express my appreciation
to the committee for the opportunity to testify today on Latin
America in 2010 and the future of U.S. policy in the
hemisphere. I also want to thank Senator Lugar, Senator Corker,
and other Senators on the committee for this opportunity, but I
particularly want to commend Senator Dodd for his leadership
and commitment over the years in strengthening ties between the
United States and Latin America. You've always understood that
advancing justice for the peoples of the Americas puts the
United States on the right side of history and advances U.S.
national security at the same time.
The International Crisis Group works to prevent and resolve
deadly conflict and we work now in some 60 countries. In Latin
America, we're headquartered in Bogota and we focus on the
Andes, the Colombian conflict, and we've been in Haiti since
2004. We've just opened a new project in Guatemala, for obvious
reasons.
To assess U.S. relations with Latin America, as you've
heard, to some degree one has to look backward. Both Senator
Dodd and I served as Peace Corps volunteers in the late 1960s
in countries under authoritarian rule, Senator Dodd in the
Dominican Republic and me in El Salvador. We saw the desires of
the people we worked with for decent futures for their
families, better education for their children, and greater
freedom for their countries-opportunities that we took for
granted here.
Many of the obstacles to those opportunities are gone. The
military dictatorships thankfully are a thing of the past. The
ideological conflict that one has to remember took more than
300,000 lives in Central America over decades has largely
disappeared. And the region's economies have done even better
through reform and intelligent management than most of the
world in rebounding from the financial crisis of 2008.
But I do want to stress that there are serious challenges.
First, there is inequality and exclusion. Today the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean is releasing its
annual report on the social panorama. It will show that in 2009
some 183 million persons in the region were forced to live on
less than $2 a day and more than 74 million live in extreme
poverty, on less than $1 a day. Eleven of the eighteen worst
countries in the world in income inequality are in Latin
America. Indigenous peoples and Afro-Latin Americans also still
face discrimination on a daily basis.
The consequences also have to be seen politically. In
Bolivia, after almost 500 years of exclusion and discrimination
the majority turned to Evo Morales, in some sense expressing
the success of the expansion of the democratic franchise, but
at the same time also reflecting the failure of economic and
social policies and of democratic leadership.
It seems to us that there are three ways, at least three
ways, that the United States can help the countries of the
region in dealing with that challenge: First, by expanding our
assistance for rural development. It's vital to know that when
one looks across the board at where the FARC and the ELN are
able to locate, where drug cultivation takes place, where
migration to the United States is initiated, it's largely in
the rural poverty areas of these countries. We can do more in
terms of strengthening them and helping them move in the area
of rural development.
Second, in expanding quality education. We all know that
that's fundamental, both in the short term and in the long
term, in terms of development.
Finally, as you've heard, encouraging tax reform. There's
no other answer in terms of dealing with the problems of income
inequality right now in the region than responding to every
analysis of the World Bank, the IMF, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the U.S. Government that one has to do a
better job in helping the countries reform their tax systems,
halt tax evasion, and begin to focus more directly on providing
the resources necessary to provide education and health care in
those countries.
The second challenge in the region today is combating crime
and drugs. There's just no question that today organized crime
and cartels directly assault state institutions and citizen
security from the Andes through the Caribbean, Central America,
and Mexico to this country. There's a war against the state
going on across our southern border in Mexico, which is the
final jumping-off point to carry the bulk of Colombian and
Andean cocaine into this market.
Mexico is simply a democracy under siege. It's also clear
that while the response of the Mexican state, with United
States support, under Plan Merida has blocked the cartels from
taking full control over the border region, it's also pushed
more of the drug flow to Central America. Since 2008, for the
first time ever, drug traffickers shifted their first stop from
the Andes coming into the United States market to Central
America rather than Mexico, and those governments are far less
capable of responding to the threat.
In Guatemala, we've reported that traffickers control
municipalities and local authorities through money and
coercion. They've penetrated the high echelons of law
enforcement institutions. In fact, the U.N.-sponsored
International Commission against Impunity, known by its
initials of CICIG, has probably saved Guatemala's justice
system from total implosion.
The drugs originate largely in Colombia, where during the
past 8 years under President Uribe and Plan Colombia the
capacity of the Colombian state to defend itself against the
FARC and the ELN was strengthened; but we've yet to see a fully
adequate response to serious human rights abuses, impunity, or
the sustainable expansion of state institutions and services,
except on a very small pilot basis. There has also yet to be a
real breakthrough in halting the violence from combat over
control in drug corridors in Colombia, and we've seen a
surprising and very worrisome rise of illegal armed groups in
that country; new ones. Some of the cultivation, once again,
has moved back to Peru and Bolivia, but the bulk of the cocaine
still originates in Colombia. From the Andes, year in and year
out, there's approximately 1,000 metric tons of cocaine heading
north.
We believe that tackling drugs and crime will require
fundamental changes in the U.S. counterdrug policy. Demand
reduction policies need to be addressed here, fundamentally as
a public health issue not solely as a crime enforcement issue,
and must move away from a one-size-fits-all approach to
criminal incarceration. We have to do a better job to stop the
arms smuggling flow south and the money-laundering flow north,
and that's going to require a high-level review of current
counterdrug policies by the Congress and by the administration.
In Colombia today under President Santos, we see a welcome
set of new initiatives on land restitution, eliminating a rogue
intelligence agency, expanding victims' rights, and recognizing
the important role of an independent judiciary. Our report last
month argued that now is the time for a more integrated and
comprehensive conflict resolution strategy, focused not only on
strengthening the military, but on advancing justice, economic,
and political reform. Given the weakness of the FARC, the high
political standing of President Santos, and these initiatives,
we believe a window of opportunity now exists to pursue a
negotiated end to 40 years of Colombia's conflict.
The third challenge-and we've heard some of it from you as
well-is strengthening democracy and confronting corruption.
Democratic partners are the best guarantors of our values, our
interests, and our security. In most of the region, there is a
basic acceptance of the core values and institutions of
democratic governance. Yet key elements of pluralism, checks
and balances, and separation of powers are no longer viewed as
essential in a few countries.
The fact is that those are exceptions to the norm; the norm
set out in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and we have
to think in a different way about how we help countries close
the gap between the principles of democracy and national
realities. The United States needs to link itself much more
closely with other democracies in the hemisphere in pursuing
that effort.
In this regard, finally, let me just note that democracy,
stability, and economic development require a functioning,
fair, and independent criminal justice system. The United
States needs to organize itself better to help support other
countries in this effort bilaterally as well as multilaterally.
One example is CICIG. Its success in Guatemala has prompted the
Presidents of both El Salvador and Honduras to express interest
in a similar mechanism. Finding a way to replicate CICIG in
other Central American countries should be high on everyone's
agenda.
Finally, in a hemisphere where a third of the population is
under 15 and nearly 50 percent is under 18, new ways must be
found to encourage young people to see the value in political
participation and to offer more opportunities for youth to
exercise their rights as citizens.
Mr. Chairman, you asked me to briefly talk about Haiti and
I will do that for 1 minute. Last Sunday's election in the
midst of a cholera epidemic was messy, confusing, and
disappointing, and the outcome still remains unclear. The
country sadly failed to overcome perennial distrust and
polarization despite the pressing need for national consensus
on state-building and reconstruction following last January's
devastating earthquake.
It will be several days before we know the two top
Presidential candidates who are supposed to face each other in
a runoff. But even more important, there is a crucial question
as to the numbers and percentage of eligible voters who were
disenfranchised, and that's an issue that we need to be
concerned about. Almost everything went wrong that could go
wrong, in one place or another. An undetermined number of
voters did not get their ID cards and therefore could not vote.
Some of those who did could not find their names on the lists
where they were told to vote. Voter verification telephone
lines were saturated. Party agents were denied access to some
polling stations. Ballots did not arrive in time in some
places. Some polling places opened late, others not at all.
The initial response of a dozen of the opposition
candidates, most of whom, frankly, had little chance, was to
say annul the election. The OAS and CARICOM's joint electoral
observation mission issued a statement that, despite the
irregularities, the initial call for annulment was precipitous
and stated that the magnitude of the irregularities had not yet
invalidated the vote. They urged calm and for everyone to await
the results of the tabulation and dispute resolution process.
That process is fundamental to any outcome that's going to
be considered credible. Two leading opposition candidates,
Mirlande Manigat and ``Sweet Mickey'' Martelly, are in fact
waiting and have not joined the position calling for the
annulment of the election.
We have reported on the problems a month ago. Basically,
even before the earthquake, Haiti's weak infrastructure in
terms of electoral machinery was clear. They've had a makeshift
electoral council for decades. Political parties have yet to
generate policy choices. There is an often corrupt judiciary,
limited public security.
Then the earthquake destroyed the capital, killed 230,000,
and displaced 1.5 million people. Then we had cholera. Right
now, the numbers are somewhere in the neighborhood of over
80,000 who have been affected and close to 2,000 have died.
During these last couple of weeks as they tried to respond
to cholera with a weak government and overstretched
international agencies, there's no question that that had some
impact on the ability to manage the logistics of the electoral
preparation.
So now what? First we have to let the process play itself
out. Tabulation, we understand, of some 4,000 of the 11,000
polling places has taken place and they're moving day to day.
They should have by the end of the week the rest of the 11,000.
At that point, those places where people could not vote or they
make claims of fraud, have to be investigated and a resolution
determined, perhaps re-voting in some places.
Ultimately, Haiti, even now, needs to forge a political
consensus and agreement on completing the current electoral
process to elect a President and Parliament. Even before a
second round, what's clearly required is for the government,
the international community, and the opposition political
leaders to sit down and come together for the good of the
country and forge a path to a new government and an accelerated
rebuilding of Haiti.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Schneider, senior vice president,
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC
I want to express my appreciation to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee forthe opportunity to testify today on ``Latin America in
2010: Opportunities, Challenges, and the Future of U.S. Policy in the
Hemisphere.'' I particularly want to commend Senator Chris Dodd for his
leadership and commitment to strengthening ties between the United
States and the countries of the region. He has always understood that
advancing justice for the peoples of the Americas puts the United
States on the right side of history and advances U.S. national
security.
The International Crisis Group has been recognized as the
independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental source of field-based
analysis, policy advice, and advocacy to governments, the United
Nations, OAS, and other multilateral organizations on the prevention
and resolution of deadly conflict. Crisis Group publishes annually more
than 80 reports and briefing papers, as well as the monthly CrisisWatch
bulletin.
Our staff is located on the ground in 12 regional offices and 17
other locations, covering over 60 countries. We maintain advocacy
offices in Brussels (the global headquarters), Washington, and New
York, and we now have liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing.
In Latin America, the Crisis Group regional program headquarters
are in Bogota, and Colombia's civil conflict has been the central focus
of our Andean project. However, we also have published reports on
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia identifying the drivers of conflict in
those countries. We have also been in Haiti since 2004, and have just
opened a project in Guatemala.
To assess U.S. relations with Latin America today, it is worth
quickly looking backward. Both Senator Dodd and I served as Peace Corps
volunteers in the late 1960s in countries under authoritarian rule in
the hemisphere-Senator Dodd in the Dominican Republican and me in El
Salvador. We saw the desires of the people we worked with for decent
futures for their families, better education for their children and
greater freedom for their countries-opportunities that we took for
granted.
Since then, many obstacles to those opportunities have been
removed; most countries in the Americas are now democracies, and in
2001, the members of the Organization of American States adopted an
Inter-American Charter for Democracy that enunciated fundamental
democratic principles. The exceptions to that norm are clearly seen as
just that exceptions.
The hemisphere is also largely free of the ideological conflict
that sparked deadly violence for decades and cost tens of thousands of
lives in Central America. And in Colombia the last remaining insurgency
has been weakened and splintered, and the once powerful and equally
brutal paramilitary has been largely demobilized. Still, serious
concerns remain.
Hemisphere economies of many countries are solid and competitive.
The financial structures of most countries were sufficiently resilient
to do better than most of the world-including the United States-in
withstanding and quickly recovering from the global financial crisis.
The economies in the region have grown steadily during this century,
averaging 5.5 percent annual growth until the 2008 financial crisis.
However, this was far below Asia's 9 percent growth, and too low to
make a sustainable impact on poverty reduction. After declining by
nearly 2 percent in overall GDP in 2009, the Economic Commission on
Latin America and the Caribbean now expects recovery to boost GDP by
more than 5 percent this year, with Brazil leading the way at 7.6
percent. Unfortunately, in 2011 GDP growth is likely to slow to below 4
percent. Innovative social policies-from conditional cash transfer
programs such as Bolsa Familha in Brazil or oportunidades in Mexico, to
widespread access to microcredit and village banking-actually began in
Latin America and spread across the globe and, along with growth,
helped millions escape poverty for the first time, but still amounted
to only 0.4 percent of regional GDP.
However serious challenges remain to the governments of the
hemisphere, to the regional political and financial organizations, and
to U.S. policy. The primary challenges are: (1) confronting inequality
and exclusion; (2) combating crime and drugs; and (3) strengthening
democracy and combating corruption.
First, there is inequality and exclusion. Despite economic growth,
in 2009, some 183 million were report to live on less than $2 per day
and more than 74 million on less than $1 per day. Many who climbed
above the poverty line during the ``boom'' years fell back into poverty
last year and have yet to feel the impact of the recovery.
The reality remains that 11 of the 18 worst countries in income
inequality are in Latin America. UNDP and ECLAC report that on average,
the top 10 percent of the population makes 48 percent of national
income, while the bottom 10 percent only captures 1.6 percent. These
income disparity figures not only reflect lost opportunities for
millions, they also may make political extremes more attractive to a
frustrated population that now has access to the voting booth-and the
results are evident in Venezuela.
Indigenous peoples and Afro-Latin-Americans still face
discrimination on a daily basis-not dissimilar from the discrimination
that has scarred this country.
A World Bank study found indigenous men earn 65 percent less than
whites in the seven countries with the highest numbers of indigenous
people. Indigenous women have the least access to potable water,
education, and employment in the hemisphere. In Bolivia, almost 500
years of exclusion and discrimination had barred its indigenous
majority from meaningful participation in national life. Turning to Evo
Morales was an expression of the success of expansion of the democratic
franchise even as it reflected the failure of economic and social
policies, and of democratic leadership.
Response: There are at least three ways the United States can
significantly reduce inequity and exclusion: (1) expand help for rural
development and small farmers; (2) expand quality education; and (3)
encourage tax reform. Reexamining and prioritizing U.S., Inter-American
Development Bank, and World Bank assistance in these areas would
contribute significantly to altering inequity and exclusion in the
Americas. Rural investment: It is in the rural areas that investing in
physical infrastructure, land reform, income generating opportunities
and social services can make the greatest direct impact on growth and
poverty reduction. And there are well-proven ways to do so:
Support ways to expand access of the rural poor to land through
land markets, land funds, and what Brazil calls ``land market-
assisted land reform,'' by expropriating unproductive land, or
using a land tax mechanism that encourages making more land
available to small farmers.
Help provide secure title to the land that the poor own so they can
acquire working capital for their farming and micro and small
loans for off-farm activities;
Invest substantially more in micro- and small-credit facilities.
In 1999, USAID was financing credit for close to 1 million
microentrepreneurs and the IDB, World Bank, and others did the
same for another 1 million. But 50 million needed such credit.
Today the need is even greater.
Invest in human capital formation-in schools, health, nutrition-and
in social capital, cooperatives, joint ventures, and small and
medium businesses to create formal sector employment and
increase funding for labor rights enforcement.
Invest in technology and rural infrastructure-so that rural roads,
electricity, water and sewers, and information technology
actually reach the rural poor. As part of the ``New Deal,'' the
United States made a massive investment in rural
infrastructure. The same needs to happen in Latin America. Let
me highlight the reasons these actions are in the U.S. national
interest.
The flow of illegal migration from Central America and Mexico
originates in the poorest rural communities of those countries. Coca
cultivation takes place in the poorest regions of the Andean ridge
countries. Those are the same regions where the FARC and the illegal
armed groups have found a home in the past-and today. They also are the
regions where the indigenous live.
Quality education: Promoting access to quality education reduces
inequality. The USAID FY 2011 $2 billion budget request only included
$55 million for basic education. Yet, education-especially girls'
education-remains one of the most cost effective investments in the
region's future. More needs to be done. The real question is how to
partner with the IDB, World Bank, and donors to press for some kind of
matching increase in Latin American governments' education spending for
strengthening teacher training, keeping children in school longer, and
improving educational quality.
Tax reform: A third avenue is to generate adequate tax revenues to
fund some of these needs and to do it in a way that promotes greater
equity. Despite all of the commitments to increase tax revenues in the
Guatemala 1996 peace accord, tax revenues still represent barely 10
percent of GDP. Not surprisingly the state's ability to offer education
and health, or reach the rural population with basic infrastructure, is
severely limited. In Colombia, tax revenues are not much higher. And in
both countries-and most of the region-the structure is hugely
regressive, depending significantly on indirect taxes that makes little
distinction between rich and poor. Even then, tax evasion is extremely
high. Hopefully, Secretary Clinton's strong statement on the need for
the rich to pay their fair share of taxes will be heeded.
A second challenge is combating crime and drugs. Organized crime
and drug cartels directly assault state institutions and citizen
security in the Andes, Central America, and Mexico. There is a war
against the state going on just across our southern border in Mexico,
which has become the final jumping off point to carry the bulk of
Colombian cocaine into the United States.
Well-armed drug cartels-with assault rifles and grenade launchers
made or purchased in the United States-kill each other for control over
drug corridors, and combat Mexican state and municipal police and the
army for control over city halls and state capitals. Since 2005, some
28,000 Mexicans have been killed in the violent waves across Mexico.
Despite Mexican troops patrolling streets, mayors and governors have
been kidnapped and killed, and entire regions live in fear. Mexico is
by no means a failed state, but it is a democracy under siege. Charges
of human rights abuses have proliferated against Mexico's armed forces
since these are not forces trained to undertake the task of civilian
law enforcement.
It is also clear that while the response of the Mexican state, with
U.S. support under Plan Merida, has blocked the cartels from acquiring
full control over border regions, it has also pushed more of the drug
flow to Central America. In 2008, drug traffickers shifted their first
stop from the Andes to the U.S. market from Mexicoto Central America,
and those governments are far less able to defend themselves.
Crisis Group has reported that for many years, Guatemala was the
domain of the Sinaloa cartel. That era came to an end when the Gulf
cartel arrived to challenge those territorial rights, bringing with it
paid assassins, the ``Zetas.'' From 2004 to 2008, homicides rose by 50
percent according to the U.N.-sponsored International Commission
against Impunity (CICIG). Last year, the death toll climbed to morethan
6,000, matching the toll in Mexico, a country with a population nearly
10 times larger. Impunity is starkly evident when fewer than 4 percent
of the murder cases result in convictions.
Traffickers control municipalities and local authorities through
money and coercion. These same well-financed and well-armed networks of
traffickers have also penetrated the high echelons of law enforcement
institutions. In fact, CICIG hasbeen one of the last bastions of the
rule of law and has probably saved Guatemala's justice system from
itself.
While the United States has marginally increased its support to
those countries through the Central American Regional Security
Initiative, the reality is that Central America, once the center of
ideologically based cold-war violence, now finds itself the arena for a
new and equally deadly conflict.
While Plan Colombia has strengthened the capacity of the Colombian
state to defend itself against the FARC and the ELN, tangentially
encouraged paramilitary demobilization, we have yet to see more than a
limited start to sustainably extending state presence. There also is
yet to be a real breakthrough in halting the pattern of drug
cultivation and trafficking which continues to fuel violence in
Colombia. The upswing in coca cultivation in Peru and the continuing
trafficking-driven violencein Central America underscores the patchwork
progress the Plan has made in achieving its counterdrug objectives.
Even while arguments over coca cultivation statistics persist between
UNODC and the United States, there appears to be little argument,
according to the Inter-Agency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM),
that the amount of cocaine being moved north-not to mention east to
Europe through West Africa, continues at levels above 1,000 metric tons
year in and year out.
One other thing to note is that the Colombia drug flow remains in
the hands of the FARC, of some undemobilized paramilitary, of new
illegal armed groups and of ``pure'' drug traffickers. There were 12
departments where coca was grown in 1999, and while it now appears in
smaller plots of lands, coca is cultivated, today in 22 of 34
departments.
Response: In Colombia under President Santos, we are seeing a
welcome set of new initiatives on land restitution, eliminating a rogue
intelligence agency, expanding victim rights, and recognizing the
important role of an independent judiciary. Crisis Group report last
month ``Colombia: President Santos's Conflict Resolution Opportunity''
argued that now is the time for a more integrated and comprehensive
conflict resolution strategy, focused not only on the military, but
also on advancing justice reforms to protect human rights, economic
reforms to reduce inequalities, and political reforms to strengthen the
country's institutions. The roots of Colombia's conflict need to be
frontally tackled.
Respect for human rights needs to be more fully integrated into the
fabric of Colombia's security forces, starting with pursuing the
perpetrators of almost 2,300 civilian extrajudicial executions. Those
responsible should be prosecuted vigorously in civilian, not military,
courts.
The President must broaden his focus beyond the FARC and ELN to
include combating new illegal armed groups. In particular, he should
investigate ties between illegal armed groups and state security
forces, which undermine government legitimacy. President Santos'
political support is at a peak now, and that backing, coupled with the
relative weakness of the FARC and ELN, gives him a real chance to put a
permanent end to the country's armed insurgency. Convincing progress on
key reforms could lay the groundwork for a negotiation with the
guerrillas that ends the Colombian insurgency once and for all, and
does so while respecting the rights of victims.
Tackling drugs and crime will require fundamental changes in the
counterdrug strategy which do a better job of reducing cocaine
production and trafficking and combating an organized criminal network
that reaches from the Andes to corrupt government officials across the
Caribbean and Central America and Mexico.
Demand reduction policies need to be addressed as a public health
issue, not a crime enforcement issue, and must move away from a one-
size-fits-all approach to criminal incarceration. Treating chronic
users through a public health prism and mainly traffickers as criminals
would produce more effective policy, and perhaps allow law enforcement
to do a better job breaking up the trafficking combines. This will
require a high-level review of current counterdrug policies by the
administration and Congress. That effort needs to focus on
strengthening demand reduction here and relevant rule of law
institutions throughout the Americas.
It also needs to include much more stringent measures to end arms
trafficking from the United States to illegal groups in Latin America.
And a far stronger effort must be made to follow the money laundering
that permits dirty money from dirty drugs to line the pockets of
organized crime.
A third challenge is strengthening democracy and confronting
corruption. We have seen the end-hopefully forever-of the era of
military dictatorships, some of which this country supported in
reacting to the cold war. Democratic partners are the best guarantors
of our values, our interests, and our security. In most of the region
there is a basic acceptance of the core values and institutions of
governance-all underlined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Yet
key elements of pluralism, checks and balances, and separation of
powers are no longer considered essential in a few countries. And
political parties are failing the job of representation in others.
Foreign policy and foreign assistance programs still pay
insufficient attention to issues of governance. Despite the 1996
adoption of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and follow
up mechanisms, in 2005, the Latinobarometro, a hemisphere wide poll,
found that more than 68 percent of respondents believed that their
public officials were corrupt, ranging from 41 percent in Uruguay to 82
percent in Ecuador. Over the past 15 years in Latin America and the
Caribbean, we have seen 15 elected Presidents who did not finish their
term of office, some removed with only minimal legal trimmings.
The twin to corruption is the impunity that enables the elites in
their countries to evade paying taxes, fail to treat their employees
with dignity, receive favored access to contracts and buy their way out
of any brush with the law. The consequent popular belief that those
with power operate with impunity undercuts the democratic ethos. It
violates the social contract. A few years ago, a poll found that 66
percent of Latin Americans said they had little to no confidence in
their judicial system.
Response: Strengthening the rule of law has to be a high priority
for anyone interested in political stability, sustaining economic
reform policies and strengthening social cohesion. It also is critical
to addressing underlying causes of conflict in many of the countries of
the region. They need more competent police, an impartial judiciary,
and access to justice for the poor.
To date, the United States has not been well-organized enough to
provide that kind of integrated assistance in countries, either before
or after conflict occurs. Nor have the international financial
institutions been brought on board fully when it comes to helping
countries invest in police, criminal justice reform, prison
construction, and correctional services. Democracy, stability, and
economic development require a functioning, fair, and independent
criminal justice system. The United States needs to do more bilaterally
as well as with institutions like the IDB, the U.N., the World Bank,
and the OAS, the latter being specifically charged with the monitoring
observation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
CICIG's success in Guatemala has prompted both El Salvadoran and
Honduran Presidents to express interest in similar support. Finding a
way to replicate CICIG in other Central American countries should be
high on everyone's agenda.
In countries where the distance is greatest between the principles
of democracy and national realities, it is essential that the United
States link itself to other democracies in trying to design new more
effective policies and programs that can help close the gap as soon as
possible. The Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights are
valuable independent agencies that should be supported in promoting the
full range of rights under the convention. The OAS itself should be
supported to strengthen its own analytic capabilities with respect to
identifying compliance failures under the Democratic Charter. Those
failures more often than not also constitute warning signs of future
conflict.
In a hemisphere where a third of the population is under the age of
15, new ways must be found to encourage young people to see the value
in political participation and to offer more opportunities for youth to
exercise their rights as citizens more fully.
Haiti: Mr. Chairman, I was also asked to speak to the current
situation in Haiti. The election last Sunday in Haiti appears to
constitute a step backward in the state-building task that must
accompany any successful earthquake reconstruction effort.
Many things went wrong in many places around the country. An
undetermined number of voters could not find their names on the lists;
voter verification telephone lines were saturated; party agents were
denied access to polling stations due to limited space or manipulation;
ballots did not arrive in time in some places, some voters who had
registered to obtain new ID cards never received them and were turned
away from polling places, some polling places opened late, others not
at all. The initial reaction of a dozen of the opposition candidates,
including Michel Martelly, Mirlande Manigat, Jean Henry Ceant, Jacques
Edouard Alexis, Charles H. Baker, and independent Josette Bijou was to
call for an annulment of the election, and for the population to
mobilize in peaceful protest. Subsequently the two leading opposition
candidates Manigat and Martelly, decided to await the results of the
tabulation, and their names reportedly were not on the formal request
for annulment submittedto the provisional electoral council (CEP) last
night by others.
The CEP has acknowledged some irregularities, but believes the
elections met acceptable standards. The elections results, which are
now being tallied by the CEP at the Vote Tabulation Center, are
expected to be published on 5 December. But charges of fraud in some
sites and obvious procedural problems in many polling places, have
already opened up further questions about the credibility of the
process. The dispute resolution process, which should begin today, must
be completely transparent. Parties must be prepared to come forward
with proof of the alleged fraudulent acts using the legal channels
provided by the electoral law. The CEP and international partners
supporting the elections must hold the process up to full scrutiny if
the results of the polls are to be accepted, and a government with some
measure of legitimacy elected.
The OAS/CARICOM international coordinating monitoring group issued
a statement that despite the irregularities, which the CEP had claimed
affected 4 percent of the 1,500 voting sites but an undetermined number
of tables, the initial call for annulment was viewed as
``precipitous.'' They urged calm and for everyone to await the results
of the tabulation and dispute resolution process. The crucial question
is the numbers and percentage of eligible voters who were
disenfranchised.
Crisis Group's report Haiti: the ``Stakes of the Post-Quake
Elections'' assessed election preparations a month ago, We recalled
that the task was daunting even before the earthquake that had
destroyed infrastructure and diplaced 1.5 million people. Three
quarters of the population lived in poverty, most urban income earners
relied on the informal economy, and the inequalities of the elite-
dominated society were the most glaring in the hemisphere. The weak
institutional infrastructure was reflected in the protracted makeshift
status of the (CEP); a ramshackle political system featuring scores of
parties unable to generate coherent policy choices for voters; an often
corrupt judiciary and limited public security. Unresolved discord
between the executive and opposition parties over the CEP's composition
and perceived bias in favour of outgoing President Rene Preval added to
the credibility challenge. All this lies at the root of a perpetual
crisis of confidence in the electoral process.
The tragic earthquake produced neither the change in the ``all or
nothing'' style of politics nor the broad national consensus on
reconstruction that would have eased the way to elections.
The parties and candidates, even with international technical and
financial assistance, struggled to energize and facilitate voting for
4.5 million citizens, some whom lost their identification cards in the
earthquake, and many of whom are among the IDPs living in spontaneous
and insecure camps.
Beyond the difficult logistics, Crisis Group had underscored the
confusion that was likely to affect the voters themselves. Some 400,000
new national ID cards had to be distributed to voters who had recently
turned 18, moved, or lost their cards in the earthquake, even if their
names were already on the voting lists. Training of some 35,000 poll
workers to handle the eligible voters was completed the day before the
election. Voters had to choose a President from among 19 candidates,
and 110 parliamentarians from close to 1,000 candidates. They were
voting at 1,500 polling locations around the country, which were for
many, completely new polling places since old ones were destroyed in
the earthquake, or because they themselves were displaced in camps or
communities far from their usual neighborhoods.
To compound this difficult situation, the response to the cholera
epidemic likely added to the pressures on an already weakened public
administration and overstretched international agencies. For the past
month, they were forced to manage emergency treatment of cholera
victims, water purification, sanitation disposal and public health
education, and they still had to carry off the final logistics for
Sunday's election.
Cholera still threatens Port-au-Prince's tent camps teeming with
more than a million earthquake victims and the city slums surrounding
them, where several dozen deaths have already been recorded. More than
70,000 people have been infected, 31,000 treated in hospitals or
centers, and 1,650 people have died. Those numbers are expected to more
than double over coming months, before water purification, basic
sanitation, rapid treatment and behavioral changes based on public
health messages can begin to stem the epidemic.
It is a nightmare scenario that many feared after January's quake,
the region's worst natural disaster in history. Early on, it appeared
that the massive outpouring of volunteers, money, and civilian and
military emergency workers would be able to stave off a cholera
outbreak as they treated the trauma and performed triage as well as
possible. However, the U.N. emergency appeal for $150 million just to
stem the current death toll has generated barely 19 percent response.
Unfortunately, there is no panacea to quickly end to the epidemic,
but the rapid expansion of treatment centers and distribution of ORT
and medicines can save lives: The failure of both national and
international institutions to move more quickly to adopt a resettlement
policy for the 1.5 million displaced persons is impacting Haiti's
chances for long-term recovery. It has also created rising frustration
and anger among the population that over the last 2 weeks exploded in
violence directed at U.N. peacekeepers and government public health
centers. Today, 7 months after it was pledged, only a tiny amount of
the $5.3 billion promised for the first 18 months of recovery has
materialized in Haiti in the form of projects that people can actually
see and benefit from.
More work must be done to quickly move displaced people from tents
to stable housing and from joblessness to employment. Haitians need to
see progress being made on building transitional and permanent housing,
on removing more rubble faster, with more equipment imported for that
purpose if need be. More Haitian laborers need to be hired-and paid-to
help. Delays on making these policy decisions have to end, and donors
need to quicken the pace in funding this reconstruction. Some $300 m.
of the U.S. funds, after delays of several months following enactment,
have been made available for disbursement and the remainder of the
$1.15 billion pledged last March can be obligated once projects are
approved.
With all of Haiti's complicated and seemingly herculean challenges,
a few things remain clear:
More than a million Haitians in the 21st century should not be
living in misery in tent cities, some dying of a disease whose
origins were known more than a century ago, and which is
preventable with that knowledge and access to clean water and
sanitation.
Donors who have promised reconstruction help need to fulfill those
promises- no matter what other demands on their time and money.
Personal power struggles need to end now with a commitment by every
political leader to a national consensus on recovery and
reconstruction, backed by an international community that
demands no less.
And the next government's reforms must include electoral reforms
spanning the electoral registry, civil service and nonpartisan
elections management, a permanent electoral council and
reducing the frequency of elections. Immediately, Haiti needs
to forge a political consensus and agreement on completing the
current electoral process. The country needs to insure that
this process of electing a new government is viewed in the end
as acceptable. Under the current emergency legislation, until
next May, there is a constitutional President and 19 elected
Senators. Even before a second round, which still is likely to
be required, the IHRC and the international community and the
opposition political parties and other sectors, need to come
together for the good of the country and forge a path to a new
government and an accelerated rebuilding of their country.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mark.
Mr. Ambassador, you've been very patient through all of
this and we thank you very, very much. Thank you for your
service to our country as well. Delighted you're here with us
today.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAIME DAREMBLUM, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR LATIN
AMERICAN STUDIES, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Daremblum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
distinguished members of the committee. It is a great honor to
be speaking before you today. I would first like to thank
Senator Dodd for all his many years of service, and
particularly for his efforts to improve United States relations
with Latin America, including my home country of Costa Rica,
where he has many friends.
On a more personal note, I want to thank Senator Dodd for
all the help and friendship shown to Costa Rica and myself
during the years I served as Ambassador here in Washington.
I would also like to thank Senator Lugar for his consistent
efforts to defend democracy and safeguard regional security
throughout the Western Hemisphere through the years, as
evidenced recently by the fundamental questions submitted as
part of the confirmation process of Ambassador-designate to
Venezuela Larry Palmer.
Our topic is the current state of Latin America, a region
that is often neglected in United States foreign policy
debates, but is vitally important to United States interests.
As we survey the political and economic landscape, we find many
encouraging signs. Democracy has become firmly entrenched in
most countries and the successful resolution of the 2009
Honduran crisis showed that even small, poor democracies have
the institutional strength to withstand autocratic challenges.
After decades of boom and bust volatility, Latin American
economies finally seem to be moving toward a trajectory of
stable growth. They have generally become more resilient, as
was evidenced during the recent global recession.
On the other hand, some economies have been weakened by
radical populism, which has taken root in Venezuela, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua. In Venezuela, the Chavez regime has
formed a strategic alliance with the world's leading state
sponsor of terrorism, Iran, and has aided multiple terrorist
groups, including the Colombian FARC, the Spanish ETA, and the
Iranian-backed Hezbollah. In Nicaragua, Sandinista leader
Daniel Ortega has returned to his old ways and he is gradually
eroding constitutional checks and balances. With the world
distracted by other news, Nicaraguan armed forces recently
invaded the territory of Costa Rica, a country that has no
military. As we meet here today, Nicaraguan troops continue to
occupy a Costa Rican river island, despite an OAS resolution
calling for them to leave the area.
In short, Latin America offers much to make us cheer and
much to make us worry. I will discuss the positive developments
first.
Smart economic management and increased foreign trade have
helped many countries become better prepared to weather global
financial storms. Fiscal deficits have fallen, tariffs have
been slashed dramatically, and the nontariff barriers to trade
have been reduced even more. Prior to the 2008 global crisis,
Latin America was experiencing its best economic performance in
a quarter of a century, which was fueling the growth of a broad
middle class. Some 50 million households emerged from poverty
between 2002 and 2007. It is not unrealistic to expect that a
majority of the region's population will soon belong to the
middle class.
In short, Latin America is on the right economic path, but
we shouldn't celebrate just as yet. A good part of its pre-2008
economic growth stemmed from favorable external factors, such
as high commodity prices and lower interest rates. During the
pre-2008 expansion, Latin America's growth rates were
relatively high, but they were still below those in Asia. Latin
America has also trailed Asia in poverty reduction and its
levels of income inequality continue to be the steepest in the
world, largely because of its education deficit.
Indeed, Latin America is lagging in both the
competitiveness of its universities and the number of its
students who attend the world's best schools. As a sample, last
year the Times of London published a ranking of the top 200
global universities. Only one Latin American university, the
National Autonomous University of Mexico, made the list, and it
ranked 190th.
Similarly, the number of Latin American students attending
United States universities is relatively low. And while Asian
universities emphasize engineering and the hard sciences, Latin
American universities tend to focus more on social sciences.
Diversity of knowledge is to be welcomed, of course, but
information technology is the industry with the largest
worldwide growth potential. According to a recent report, Latin
America will experience a shortage of 126,000 computer
engineers this year.
Education is clearly one of the region's major long-term
socioeconomic challenges and offers a wide field of
collaboration with the United States.
Its short-term security challenges include the drug war,
attacks on democracy, and the growing influence of Iran.
Narcotrafficking has brought terrible bloodshed to Mexico, but,
even worse, could destabilize small countries in Central
America and the Caribbean. Populist governments in Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and elsewhere have undermined democratic
institutions, scared away foreign investors, and menaced their
neighbors. Russia has sold billions of dollars worth of arms to
Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, thereby threatening to unleash a
regional arms race. Meanwhile, Chavez has enabled Iran to
greatly expand its strategic footprint in Latin America.
I believe the Venezuela-Iran alliance represents a big
threat to hemispheric stability. Their close financial
cooperation is especially disturbing. Iran's Banco
Internacional de Desarrollo is now operating in Caracas,
despite being sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for
its links to the Iranian military. Speaking to the Brookings
Institution in 2009, former New York City district attorney,
Robert Morgenthau, warned that ``a foothold into the Venezuelan
banking system is a perfect `sanctions-busting' method'' for
Iran.
As for military collaboration, Russian media recently
reported that the Kremlin might sell its S-300 air defense
systems to Venezuela instead of Iran, due to international
sanctions against the Islamic Republic. The fear is that Chavez
will then sell those weapons to Iran. Venezuela is working to
create its own version of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and
last week Chavez claimed to have secured a $4 billion credit
line to buy even more Russian weapons after those bought during
his October shopping trip to Moscow. But are all those Russian
arms solely for Venezuelan armed forces, or the pro-Chavez
militias? Or is Venezuela planning to funnel at least some of
the weapons to its allies, including Iran?
It is no longer possible to deny that Chavez poses a
serious threat to United States security interests in Latin
America. Various reports point out that the amount of cocaine
transiting through Venezuela has increased significantly. That
is alarming, but not surprising, given the extent to which the
Chavez regime has supported and sheltered Colombian
narcoterrorists belonging to the FARC.
Just a few weeks ago, Chavez promoted Venezuelan military
officer, Henry Rangel Silva, to the rank of ``General in
Chief,'' even though the U.S. Treasury Department has accused
Rangel Silva of aiding the FARC and being a drug kingpin.
Finally, a word about Cuba. In September, Cuban officials
announced that they would be laying off nearly 500,000 state
workers. Weakened by a severe economic crisis, the Castro
regime is taking small steps to expand private enterprise. It
has also agreed to release political prisoners in hopes of
convincing the European Union to normalize relations.
Julio Cesar Galvez, one of the liberated and expelled
prisoners now living in Spain, told the Associated Press: ``Our
departure from Cuba should not be seen as a gesture of
goodwill, but rather as a desperate measure by a regime
urgently seeking to gain any kind of credit.''
The Castro brothers know that the Cuban economy is in a
dire condition, and they know that Washington could throw their
government a lifeline if it were to eliminate the United States
travel ban. Congress is currently debating legislation that
would scrap travel restrictions and provide Havana with a
massive infusion of hard currency.
Yet, as the Washington Post argued in a recent editorial,
``Fundamental changes of U.S. policy toward Cuba should await
fundamental reforms by the regime. When average Cubans are
allowed the right to free speech and free assembly, along with
that to cut hair and trim palm trees, it will be time for
American tourists and business executives to return to the
island.'' That sounds like the correct strategy to me, but I
look forward to discussing this issue, among others, with the
committee.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Daremblum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, senior fellow and
director, Center for Latin American Studies, Hudson Institute,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a great honor to be speaking before you today. I would
first like to thank Senator Dodd for his many years of service, and
particularly for his efforts to improve U.S. relations with the nations
of Latin America, including my home country of Costa Rica. I would also
like to thank Senator Lugar for his consistent efforts to defend
democracy and safeguard regional security throughout the Western
Hemisphere through the years, as evidenced recently by the questions
submitted as part of the confirmation process of Ambassador-Designate
to Venezuela Larry Palmer.
Our topic is the current state of Latin America, a region that is
often neglected in U.S. foreign policy debates but is vitally important
to U.S. interests. As we survey the political and economic landscape,
we find many encouraging signs. Democracy has become firmly entrenched
in most countries, and the successful resolution of the 2009 Honduran
crisis showed that even small, poor democracies have the institutional
strength to withstand autocratic challenges. After decades of boom-and-
bust volatility, Latin American economies finally seem to be moving
toward a trajectory of stable growth. They have generally become more
resilient, as was evidenced during the recent global recession.
On the other hand, some economies have been weakened by radical
populism, which has taken root in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Nicaragua. In Venezuela, the Chavez regime has formed a strategic
alliance with the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism (Iran) and
has aided multiple terrorist groups, including the Colombian FARC, the
Spanish ETA, and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. In Nicaragua, Sandinista
leader Daniel Ortega has returned to his old ways, and he is gradually
eroding constitutional checks and balances. With the world distracted
by other news, Nicaraguan armed forces recently invaded the sovereign
territory of Costa Rica, a country that has no military. As we meet
here today, Nicaraguan troops continue to occupy a Costa Rican river
island, despite an OAS resolution calling for them to leave the area.
In short, Latin America offers much to make us cheer and much to
make us worry. I will discuss the positive developments first, before
turning to the negative.
Smart economic management and increased foreign trade have helped
many countries become better prepared to weather global financial
storms. Fiscal deficits have fallen, tariffs have been slashed
dramatically, and the nontariff barriers to trade have been reduced
even more. Prior to the 2008 global crisis, Latin America was
experiencing its best economic performance in a quarter-century, which
was fueling the growth of a broad middle class. According to the
Economist magazine, some 15 million households emerged from poverty
between 2002 and 2007. It is not unrealistic to expect that a majority
of the region's population will soon belong to the middle class.
In short, Latin America is on the right economic path-but we
shouldn't celebrate just yet. A good part of its pre-2008 economic
growth stemmed from favorable external factors, such as high commodity
prices and low interest rates. It is worrisome that, with only a few
exceptions, Latin American governments did not take advantage of the
commodity boom to push for labor and tax reforms that would have made
their economies more competitive.
During the pre-2008 expansion, Latin America's growth rates were
relatively high, but they were still below those in Asia. Latin America
has also trailed Asia in poverty reduction, and its levels of income
inequality continue to be the steepest in the world, largely because of
its education deficit. Indeed, Latin America is lagging in both the
competitiveness of its universities and the number of its students who
attend the world's best schools. Last year, the Times of London
published a ranking of the top 200 global universities. Only one Latin
American university-the National Autonomous University of Mexico-made
the list, and it ranked 190th. Similarly, the number of Latin American
students attending U.S. universities is relatively low. And while Asian
universities emphasize engineering and the hard sciences, Latin
American universities tend to focus more on the social sciences.
Diversity of knowledge is to be welcomed, of course, but information
technology is the industry with the largest worldwide growth potential.
And according to a recent report, Latin America will experience a
shortage of 126,000 computer engineers this year.
Education is clearly one of the region's major long-term
socioeconomic challenges. Its short-term security challenges include
the drug war, attacks on democracy, and the growing influence of Iran.
Narcotrafficking has brought terrible bloodshed to Mexico and could
destabilize small countries in Central America and the Caribbean.
Populist governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and elsewhere have
undermined democratic institutions, scared away foreign investors, and
menaced their neighbors. Russia has sold billions of dollars' worth of
arms to Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, thereby threatening to
unleash a regional arms race. Meanwhile, Chavez has enabled Iran to
greatly expand its strategic footprint in Latin America, and his
government has also assisted the Iranian-sponsored terrorist
organization Hezbollah.
I believe the Venezuela-Iran alliance represents the biggest threat
to hemispheric stability since the cold war. Their close financial
cooperation is especially disturbing.
Iran's Banco Internacional de Desarrollo is now operating in
Caracas, despite being sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for
its links to the Iranian military. Speaking to the Brookings
Institution in 2009, former New York City district attorney, Robert
Morgenthau, warned that ``a foothold into the Venezuelan banking system
is a perfect `sanctions-busting' method'' for Tehran.
As for military collaboration, Russian media recently reported that
the Kremlin might sell its S-300 air-defense systems to Venezuela
instead of Iran, due to international sanctions against the Islamic
Republic. The fear is that Chavez would then sell those weapons to
Tehran. Venezuela is working to create its own version of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, and last week Chavez claimed to have secured a $4
billion credit line to buy even more Russian weapons after those bought
during his October shopping trip to Moscow. But are all those Russian
arms solely for the Venezuelan Armed Forces, or the pro-Chavez
militias? Or is Venezuela planning to funnel at least some of the
weapons to its allies in Tehran?
It is no longer possible to deny that Chavez poses a serious threat
to U.S. security interests in Latin America. A 2009 Government
Accountability Office report confirmed that the amount of cocaine
transiting through Venezuela has increased ``significantly.'' That is
alarming but not surprising, given the extent to which the Chavez
regime has supported and sheltered Colombian narcoterrorists belonging
to the FARC. Just a few weeks ago, Chavez promoted Venezuelan military
officer, Henry Rangel Silva, to the rank of ``General in Chief,'' even
though the U.S. Treasury Department has accused Rangel Silva of aiding
the FARC.
Finally, a word about Cuba. In September, Communist officials
announced that they would be laying off nearly 500,000 state workers.
Weakened by a severe economic crisis, the Castro regime is taking small
steps to expand private enterprise. It has also agreed to release
political prisoners in hopes of convincing the European Union to
normalize relations.
Julio Cesar Galvez, one of the liberated prisoners now living in
Spain, told the Associated Press, ``Our departure (from Cuba) should
not be seen as a gesture of goodwill but rather as a desperate measure
by a regime urgently seeking to gain any kind of credit.'' The Castro
brothers know that the Cuban economy is in dire condition, and they
know that Washington could throw their government a lifeline if it were
to eliminate the U.S. travel ban. Congress is currently debating
legislation that would scrap travel restrictions and provide Havana
with a massive infusion of hard currency.
Yet, as the Washington Post argued in a recent editorial,
``Fundamental changes of U.S. policy toward Cuba should await
fundamental reforms by the regime. When average Cubans are allowed the
right to free speech and free assembly, along with that to cut hair and
trim palm trees, it will be time for American tourists and business
executives to return to the island.''
That sounds like the correct strategy to me, but I look forward to
discussing this issue (among many others) with the committee.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Again, I
appreciate your testimony.
We've been joined by my colleague from New Jersey, Bob
Menendez. Bob, thanks. Obviously, he has a deep, deep interest
in the subject matter that has brought us all together.
I'm going to do something a little bit out of the ordinary
because I know colleagues have to be in different places. Dick,
I'm going to defer to you right away for any questions you
would like to raise, because I know people have schedules to
do. So I'll defer my questions until you've had a chance to
raise your own.
Senator Lugar. I'll wait for you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd. Senator.
Senator Risch. I'll pass, too.
Senator Dodd. Are you sure?
Senator Risch. Yes.
Senator Dodd. Well, let me just-there are so many questions
that are raised with you here. Let me start with Brazil a
little bit, because obviously there's a lot of excitement about
Brazil's role hemispherically, the old expression: Brazil gets
the sniffles, the rest of the region gets pneumonia. And
conversely, if Brazil is doing well, then there's also great
news for the region, given the implications and just the shared
borders and economics. There's a lot to encourage what's
occurring in Brazil.
When I was there early this year, I think in the state of
Sao Paolo alone, in the midst of our own crisis and with the
automobile issues, I think there were some 95,000 Chevrolets
sold in the province of Sao Paolo alone, as an indication of
how they were doing versus our own economic situation at the
time.
Energy issues, very exciting, what's occurring; very green;
moving in the direction, under President Lula. Had good
elections, I gather. They hadn't occurred yet, but there was a
lot of preparation, anticipation of the outcome, although it
was a little closer than I think people thought it was in the
end, with the runoff that occurred.
But we've also seen Brazil-and Secretary Clinton I thought
made a valiant effort prior to President Lula's decision to go
to Iran to try and discourage that participation. I was there
as well and made an effort, quite frankly, to try and dissuade
him from that step. I didn't see the value in it particularly.
But I wonder if you might just share with us your own quick
observations about Brazil's role, both regionally, which is
important, but also this reaching out to become more of a
global influence, and what you make of that. Or is that just
something-was that a particular decision that President Lula
wanted to make, maybe in anticipation now that the new
administration will be more focused domestically and
regionally, rather than internationally as President Lula had
been?
Anyone want to start with that? Yes, go ahead, doctor.
Dr. Arnson. I'll take a crack at that. Brazil is currently
the eighth largest economy in the world. In the coming decade,
some projections are that it will be the fourth or fifth
largest economy. It produces 40 percent of the GDP of the
entire hemisphere.
Brazil traditionally has been inward-looking. To the extent
that it has had foreign policy ambitions, those have been
focused on its neighbors in South America. But I think that
under the current leadership there has been a desire to play a
greater role on the world stage.
My own sense is that President Lula exaggerated his ability
as so-called ``third world'' country and as a man of the left
to play an influential role, for example, in brokering the
Israeli-Palestinian crisis and certainly in playing a role
regarding Iran's nuclear policy.
That said, there are others who believe that the agreement
that Turkey and Brazil were able to negotiate with the Iranian
Government should have served as a starting point. It was
certainly not sufficient, but incorporated a number of the
elements of previous
U.S. proposals, and should have been taken up and pushed
further. I believe that the new government of Dilma Rousseff
will be less anxious to solidify a relationship with Iran.
Rousseff herself is a victim of human rights violations in
Brazil, was brutally tortured, and I think is fully cognizant
of the role of women in Iran and also of the significant human
rights violations that take place under the regime.
We should expect that Brazil will continue to assert itself
in the hemisphere as well as around the globe. Those
initiatives will not always be welcomed by the United States,
but I think to the extent that we can work creatively and
diplomatically, as our Ambassador, Tom Shannon, has done, to
engage the Brazilian Government and work toward common ends, we
will only enhance our influence.
Brazil is the case par excellence of how the new-found
economic dynamism, social cohesion, and reductions in poverty
and inequality have served as a basis for a greater projection
in many parts of the world. Brazil aspires to a place on the
U.N. Security Council, as a member of the so-called BRICs, sees
itself as the wave of the future. And quite frankly many people
in Brazil and in the Brazilian Government see the United States
as a power in decline. So we should expect that there will be
ongoing frictions, but also good opportunities.
Senator Dodd. Again, this is one of the cases where I think
President Bush and the relationship between President Bush and
President Lula was a very dynamic and positive one, and I think
was the cause of-I hope I didn't sound critical. I disagreed
with that decision on President Lula and Iran, for the reasons
you've explained. But there has been a very constructive and
positive role that Brazil has played regionally as well, and
very exciting.
I visited their Bolsa. The exchange is one of the most
dynamic to see. I think 90 percent of the public companies in
Latin America exchanged on that highly electronic Bolsa that is
really a model of what electronic trading can be. So it's a
very, very exciting place to be, and I think there's a
tremendous opportunity.
Anyone else want to comment on the Brazilian situation?
Yes, Mark.
Mr. Schneider. I think that the one thing is that Brazil in
its relations with the rest of the hemisphere clearly has a
desire to be seen as not a directing figure, but as a country
that is always ready to cooperate. I think you're going to see
Lula perhaps playing a role in UNASUR and I think that there's
a likelihood that Brazil potentially would be one of the
countries, given its strength economically and its basic
democratic values, that the United States should be thinking
about counseling with on issues where we're concerned about
other countries moving away from democratic values.
The only other point I would make is that in Africa, Brazil
has a certain degree of receptivity. Again, where that is
possible, it's something where we should talk to Brazil about
issues going on in Africa, particularly development issues. As
you mentioned earlier, Bolsa Familia is a fantastic program.
One of the things to remember, though-and here's where
Brazil could play a role hemispherically through the IDB and
the World Bank-is that all of the conditional cash transfer
programs in the hemisphere, all of them, constitute only four-
tenths of 1 percent of GDP. If they were expanded, if they were
doubled to 0.8 percent, eight-tenths of a percent of GDP, it
would have an enormous impact on poverty and inequality.
One of the things in the recent report by Sao Paulo is that
it shows what just this minor sort of increase could be. Brazil
could play a leading role in helping make that happen out of
the World Bank and the IDB.
Senator Dodd. Well, they're going to have quite a stage
now, with the World Cup and the Olympics coming up in the next
few years.
Mr. Schneider. That's right.
Senator Dodd. Quickly, anyone else want to comment on this?
Do you, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Daremblum. Yes, just a couple of very short comments.
Brazil has really been an example for many Latin American
countries of how it is possible to have a wise and prudent
management of the economy, combined with very impressive social
programs- of which, of course, Bolsa Familia, which was
initiated by President Cardoso and continued and expanded by
President Lula, has been replicated throughout Latin America
and even in cities here in the United States, I think New York,
are now testing this type of strategy.
On the foreign policy aspect, I don't tend to get so
alarmed by Lula's flirting with Ahmadinejad. I think in the
case of Ahmadinejad he overdid himself. I think that crossed
the line. But in general, the phenomenon that we have seen in
Brazil, which is not too different from a phenomenon that
existed for many years in Mexico, is that leaders who wanted to
pursue market-type economic measures-opening up to free trade,
opening up to opportunities for private enterprise-had to play
the left card in foreign policy as a consolation to their
constituencies.
In the case of Lula, Lula comes from the party of the
workers, Partido dos Trabalhadores-very much to the left. This
is the same thing we saw in Mexico: how much Presidents, even
President Zedillo and the ones before him, really exceeded in
their movements toward the left in order to pacify their
constituency in the PRI.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just following through on the colloquy on Brazil, several
years ago-and this problem still continues for our country-many
people saw a great urgency in greater energy independence for
the United States, with less reliance on oil, especially that
from the Middle East and hostile states. One of the exciting
developments in Brazil was the development of ethanol from
sugar cane and the diversification therefore in the
transportation system, which gave Brazilians a choice between
ethanol and a petroleum-based fuel, one which has never been a
possibility for American motorists.
That energy situation has grown. It's been desirable as the
world has begun to take more of a look at climate change
issues. The Brazilians have resented the fact that we have had
a tariff really against importation. This is largely because
the fledgling corn ethanol industry in our country, a first
attempt really to gain some degree of energy independence, has
required protection, at least some would feel.
I mention this because I had many conversations with the
Brazilian Ambassador and other Brazilian officials during that
period of time, suggesting perhaps that we ought to have a
partnership on energy, in which we encouraged other countries
in South and Central America who had sugar cane or other
products, for that matter, to develop energy resources that
were going to be important for the United States and important
for them as the new method of income, and likewise, to get to a
point some of you have made in terms of information services,
scientific endeavors, entrepreneurship, and what have you, to
move off into different channels.
This really has never taken off and I am sad that that's
the case, but it need not be the case forever. But I am
energized by the discussion today to say that, of course,
Brazil has gone well beyond leadership in energy resources.
We've been discussing diplomacy, the increase in gross national
product, and many aspects of it.
What if a new initiative were to be created in the United
States in which we really indicated to the Brazilians, and
hopefully they reciprocated, that the two of us have an
opportunity, but maybe also an obligation, to be helpful not
only to our own citizens and our economies, but together to
tackle the problems that you have mentioned and I've sort of
ticked off as you all discussed: the problem of agriculture,
for example, and the problem of basic nutrition for many
countries in the region.
Clearly, the problem of education at all levels, without
which citizens in our own country are not going to prosper is
going to be equal in difficulty in Latin America. This is
particularly crucial given that you've indicated in Brazil, as
I recall, or some countries, the youth may constitute 50
percent of the population presently. This is a horrible deficit
if you start out in a world economy that's already competitive.
In other words, we've tried to grasp some very big issues-
energy, education, agriculture, and food and nutrition, in
essence, and see if we can make some progress in this respect,
where it might appear that the United States is not in a
preaching attitude, looking at others sort of in a missionary
aspect, but rather in a partnership with a strong country, the
eighth-largest economy in the world, in which we all think in a
compassionate but constructive way about our hemisphere.
I mention this because in our own country, as all of you
would observe, we have a great deal of polarization right now
on the immigration issue. We have problems that are exacerbated
by the drug problem, because in fact drug demand in our country
many would say drives the whole train of drug situations
throughout Latin America. This brings about all kinds of
misunderstandings with our near neighbor Mexico, which is a
tremendously helpful partner. But at the same time, when the
President of Mexico came to the United States, he had some very
sharp remarks to make in the joint session about arms going
into Mexico and about various other ways of enforcement.
So I don't want to skip Mexico, but on the other hand, we
have some polarization that is not going to evaporate in our
domestic politics. In any event, it is important to sort of
reach out to Brazil at this point it may also be helpful, if
the Brazilian leadership is interested in the prestige which
comes with recognition of being a leader in this respect. They
need not then go off to Iran or find the Turks somewhere along
the trail or try all sorts of unusual alliances to gain
attention, to gain prestige.
So let me just ask you for your impressions of a new
partnership, but in this case a very big one, in which we come
really into a different kind of relationship voluntarily, but
likewise as people who are sincere about our humane interests,
as well as the economic fortunes.
Mark.
Mr. Schneider. I think that that would be an excellent
initiative. I think that actually that would be the kind of
initiative that could take place not solely with the United
States and Brazil alone, but would also very quickly draw
others together, possibly partnering with the IDB and the World
Bank so that you have available matching resources.
Brazil, by the way, in the area of education has been doing
some quite exciting things in terms of expanding access. There
are programs that provide teachers with special opportunities,
bonuses for being a good teacher, and opportunities to obtain
higher education degrees. There's a strong effort in Brazil to
move education out into their rural poverty area as well.
So I think in agriculture also, that there are excellent
areas for potential partnership. I would think that the
administration here- if you remember, Secretary Clinton and
President Obama have this initiative on food, nutrition, that
they're trying to push forward. I would think that that would
be something that would be very sympathetically received by
Brazil.
Senator Lugar. Yes, Joy.
Ms. Olson. I think it's a wonderful idea, too. I think it
would be worth giving some real thought to how to set up some
different kinds of models and discussions. The thing that
compels me is that there are so many issues where a number of
countries, not just us and Brazil, but so many countries in the
hemisphere, are fundamentally addressing the same problems.
If you talk about urban violence, some of the same gangs
exist in the United States that exist in Central America. If
you watch what's been going on in Brazil the past few days in
trying to deal with gangs in Rio. Colombia has similar issues.
This issue of violence-it's not just about top-level organized
crime. It's about violence prevention-what do you do in terms
of good government on violence prevention. Defining things in
terms of good government really would be an interesting way to
do it.
The other thing I would say is, on drug policy, there is an
opportunity right now for a drug policy dialogue. My office for
the past 3 years has been involved in what we've been calling
``informal intergovernmental drug policy dialogues'' with Latin
America. Representatives from the Brazilian and other
governments have been involved in these discussions.
The fascinating thing is these dialogues have been off the
record, and an opportunity for vice-minister-level people and
some academics to sit down and say: What works in terms of harm
reduction strategies? What's the situation in terms of long-
term incarceration of nonviolent low-level offenders and prison
overcrowding? Really, the same problems that the United States
is trying to figure out how to address right now.
So I think we should try to identify problems where we're
really dealing with the same thing, in somewhat different
contexts. We should look at how to create a different kind of
discussion that's really about how we solve these problems in
our own communities, while learning from each other.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Mr. Daremblum. I think your initiative, Senator Lugar, is
excellent. That's really the way to go between the United
States and Latin America in diplomatically solving a number of
problems.
Actually, a partnership on education was announced at the
Presidential Meeting of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in
April 2009, in which President Obama announced that he would
inaugurate a major partnership to promote education, to further
education. Well, unfortunately, we're still waiting for that.
Also, in terms of energy, I recall that during a visit of
President Lula with President Bush, a partnership for energy
was announced and some sort of an accord was established with
the participation of the Inter-American Development Bank, the
IDB. It called for the creation, or for the establishment, of a
number of pilot projects of plants for the production of
ethanol. One of them was built in El Salvador. Whatever
happened to this initiative since then, I don't know. But it
was a great idea.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. Arnson. If I could just add for one second, because I
know we're over our time. I believe there are such partnerships
under way and I simply do not know enough about it. But I think
that Secretary Clinton and Assistant Secretary Valenzuela have
been involved in kind of fostering the very kind of alliances
that you've suggested.
But I'd also come back to something that you said earlier,
which is that our own domestic politics complicate our ability
to engage in these kinds of partnerships. Brazil is deeply
resentful of the tariffs that exist, that prevent the import of
Brazilian ethanol into the United States, even though sugar
cane ethanol is produced much more cheaply and in a much more
environmentally sustainable way than corn ethanol. So it's a
classic example in which the United States appears to not
exactly practice what it preaches, both in terms of open trade
regimes and the fostering of alternative energy.
But I agree that this is a critical area, and to the extent
that the United States and countries of the region can partner
in ways that are to everyone's benefit, it's only for the good.
Senator Dodd. I would just make one observation: 75 percent
of the population of Latin America are living in urban
settings; 50 percent of the population living is under the age
of 18. A lot of times our relations are state to state. In
fact, one of the ideas which I raised with Secretary Clinton,
and she seemed to have liked, is thinking about how we might
start talking about these mayors and these governors in Latin
America, where a lot of the most creative thoughts and
interesting things are occurring.
Too often, we overplay that. It is state to state, rather
than starting to look at emerging leaders. I think of the
former mayor of Bogota. He lost the Presidential election to
President Santos, but a very interesting mayor, a very popular
mayor of Bogota, for instance. Governor Serra of Brazil, lost
the election, but I think most people recognize him as a very
competent governor of that state.
Maybe we ought to be spending a little more time looking at
the relationships at that level, and given again the urban
concentration-not to minimize the importance of the rural
areas, Mark, you talked about-but it might be a way of really
consolidating.
And last, to just mention, I don't know if we ever did this
before-the reason I mentioned President Bush and President Lula
is because I remember when they met and everyone anticipated
this very uneasy, uncomfortable meeting. I remember having
dinner that night with President Lula after the meeting. They
had spent about 11/2, 2 hours together. They developed a very
good relationship.
It's the only time I know that President Bush has suggested
we establish Cabinet-to-Cabinet meetings, that President Bush's
Cabinet and the Brazilian Cabinet actually met. I don't think
it's happened anywhere else since. Maybe it has, but I'm just
not aware of it.
But it was intriguing to me that they actually had that
kind of a relationship. It was interesting.
Senator Lugar. If I may--
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Senator Lugar. My only point, I suppose-and I think those
are excellent suggestions. But the whole relationship needs to
be elevated in a public relations way.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Senator Lugar. In other words, if Secretary Clinton were to
come to this hearing some day and say, I have a great new idea.
Or the President could announce it during his State of the
Union and Secretary Clinton subsequently comes to discuss it
with us in more detail, and so forth. From there, the
governors, the mayors, and others could participate in the
initiative. But for the moment, our hearing today is about the
overall relationship and the need to elevate this in a more
exciting, intriguing way which captivates the attention of the
American people and, we hope, maybe the Brazilians. Such an
initiative could probably only start from the top and then work
its way down.
Senator Dodd. You're right. I agree with that.
Bob, sorry to encroach upon your time.
Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me say that, as someone who for the last 18 years
since I came to the House and then the last 5 here in the
Senate, have been focused on the Western Hemisphere, I
appreciate your leadership in so many ways, because it's a
rather small universe of Members of Congress who are focused on
the Western Hemisphere.
So while we may not have always agreed, although I think 95
percent of the time we did, we certainly-I certainly appreciate
that, and I will miss you not being here in that and other
regards as well.
I think a lot about this and I care less about, for
example, what the Chavezes of the world do and I care more
about what we do. I had high expectations-the new
administration, certainly at the outset, did certain things
that I said, wow, we're finally going to have some real time
and attention here to our own hemisphere, our own front yard.
Then it sort of like dissipated. Now, I know there are many
world events taking place, but I think there's a crying clarion
call for attention in the Western Hemisphere in our own
national interest, in our own national security, that goes
beyond being a good neighbor. Certainly we can and should be a
good neighbor, but when, as some of my colleagues have said,
when we talk about undocumented immigration and the challenge
of immigration reform in this country, people leave their
countries for only two reasons: civil unrest or dire economic
circumstances. There's a reason and an opportunity to try to
work on that.
There is a real opportunity to understand that our
challenges with narcotics, if you don't give a poor coca farmer
something else to grow that is sustainable or some other
sustainable development opportunity, he's going to do what he
has to do to take care of his family. But that ends up in the
streets of New Jersey.
If in fact we care about growing our economy, then
certainly having a more robust middle class in Latin America
and the Caribbean, which has a propensity for U.S. goods and
services, is in our economic interests.
Diseases that know no boundaries or borders have re-
surfaced, that we had largely eradicated. The question of
energy is so pressing for us hemispherically and there are
great opportunities, including trying to preserve the largest
carbon sink in the world.
And the list goes on and on. Collective security in this
hemisphere. So I listened to the individual issues, but I say
to myself, what is our agenda? What is the national agenda of
the United States as it relates to the Western Hemisphere? And
I'm not quite sure that I can define it.
I look at the enormous inequality, which is one of the
underlying root causes of the challenge that we have in the
hemisphere, and I say, well, we can't do that alone. Why can't
we find ways to reorient that which we do do in a way that
ultimately seeks to deal with some of those root causes, which
is why I created the Social and Development Fund for the
Americas, which got a fair amount of bipartisan support, but we
haven't been able to ultimately move it.
I look at our way-at what's happening in the context of
narcotics, and I think we've totally lost our way in this
regard, in terms of understanding all of the elements,
including demand issues here in the United States. And I say to
myself, doesn't Elliot Engles, which I support, Western
Hemisphere drug policy that has provisions that I included in
some of the things that Senator Kerry and I did here, shouldn't
we be moving in that direction.
I think about the OAS as an institution that could and
should play a more vital role. But it needs some reforms.
Unfortunately, we have a bill that does exactly that, that has
bipartisan support, but it is being stopped by some members
simply because they want to make a statement about Honduras.
Well, this doesn't give us any sort of an agenda at the end
of the day. If that doesn't happen legislatively from the
Congress, and if the administration doesn't really have a
cohesive agenda that has this and so much more, then the Latin
Americans look and say: Well, what's the U.S. interest as it
relates to us?
So we talk a good game about being interested, but it seems
to me that we have not quite had the agenda that engages the
Latin Americans and therefore continues to permit a vacuum in
which the Chavezes of the world can move forward.
So I'm wondering-and then I hear in my present role as the
chairman of the subcommittee of all of our foreign assistance,
I hear about changes in that regard that may very well mean
less resources for the Western Hemisphere at a time in which
there are greater challenges in the Western Hemisphere, and
that worries me.
So I'm wondering, from your perspective, how do we get
control of and create an agenda here that will be meaningful
for the United States, obviously in its national interest and
its national security, but at the same time engages the Latin
Americans in a way that I think Senator Lugar was talking about
vis-a-vis Brazil leading. But we need hemispheric engagement at
the end of the day. Maybe some people can be a catalyst to
that. So I'd love to hear that.
Then the only other question I have-that's a very generic
question, and I'd like to hear as part of your answer whether
any of the things I've mentioned, some of the legislative
initiatives, make sense.
Then I have a dear affection for Colombia and have been a
strong supporter, but I look at the latest set of events with
President Santos. You know, he took office in August. He has
met several times with Chavez. They both have vowed to
dramatically improve their relationships. That may be a good
thing. He recently complied with Chavez's wishes in granting-
this is President Santos-in granting the extradition of a
Venezuelan drug kingpin to Venezuela rather than to the United
States. Both had made requests to do that.
Some suggest that Chavez wants this gentleman, Macled, at
home to keep him silent or press him to recant his testimony.
The Santos government has no immediate plans to submit to the
Colombian Congress a new bill authorizing the presence of U.S.
troops in several Colombian military bases. And I see all of
this and I say it's one of two things. Colombia has Venezuela
as a major exporter of its goods, so it has economic interests.
I understand that.
Then the other thing is he's playing poker, which I like to
do myself, and whether or not in the process of playing poker
we're getting closer to Chavez, at least in the honeymoon
period, so we get the United States to respond, whether on a
free trade deal or something else.
So in any event, I'd like to hear some responses to these
perceptions. In the first instance, how do we get an agenda
that we can move forward. Then what do you think about what's
happening with President Santos?
Ms. Olson. Thank you. If I may, Senator--
Senator Dodd. Have you got the microphone there, Joy?
Ms. Olson. Sorry.
I'm really interested in your early remarks about
reconceptualization and coming up with an agenda, because I
really thought about this as I was working on the testimony. It
feels like we are at this moment where there needs to be a
different kind of definition of things that in many ways makes
us more relevant to the region. The term I kept coming back to,
which I know is not new and I think Abe Lowenthal came up with
a long time ago, was the idea of being able to think and
develop policies intermestically- being able to have a policy
discussion that is about drug policy here and drug policy in
Mexico and drug policy in Brazil and Europe, to be able to
think about these things much more holistically than we do
right now.
I know that the committee structure of Congress doesn't
really lend itself to that, but I do think that that's the
challenge. And not just on drug policy; on others. But I would
agree with you that this Western Hemisphere Drug Commission-the
bill that passed the House and is being worked on over here-is
really a step in the right direction. It also signals that we
are willing to give some profound thought to what works and
what doesn't work, which I think is the basic issue that needs
to be addressed.
Another thing on the intermestic conceptualization front: I
think when it comes to migration and development, we have to
think about them together, but we don't. It's extremely hard,
and I know you've been working on this for years, to get
anybody to talk about economic development in the context of
the immigration debate, or not even the debate, but just in the
concept of immigration.
I think that it's the challenge, not just in formulating a
policy agenda, but almost in reforming how we all think about
the region and developing policy and problem-solving.
Just lastly, because I think this is exciting, we're in
discussions right now that came out of work that WOLA was doing
on youth gang violence in Central America. What we were seeing
was there were models of communities both here in the United
States and in Central America that had reduced violence where
gangs were present. So one of our questions was, how do you end
up with national policies and regional citizen security
policies that learn from and reinforce and support what we know
works at the local level.
Senator Dodd. this goes to your point of us sometimes being
good at these government-to-government discussions. But when it
comes to violence prevention, it isn't just done at the
government-to-government level. In places where things really
work, it's because there's intense coordination going on
between schools, church programs, after-school programs, local
business, where there's smart policing that's rights-
respecting, that's targeted on the violent elements of the
gangs and not just on arresting large numbers of young people.
It's this coordination piece. So one of the things that
we're in discussions on right now with people both at the World
Bank and at the IDB and with almost all of the Central American
governments-and this came out of the work with the
nongovernmental community-is: how do we develop a coordinating
mechanism? Because a lot of money is being spent on citizen
security issues in Central America. How do we facilitate the
kinds of discussions that will develop more effective policies
at violence prevention?
So I think we're at this point where there's a real need
for reconceptualization.
Dr. Arnson. I'd like to briefly address your final comment,
Senator Menendez, about the actions of the Colombian
Government. I think that what Santos has done over the last 100
days is a classic representation of the way South American
countries are defining their own national interest in ways that
are not necessarily the same as the way the United States sees
its national interest vis-a-vis that country.
I can only speculate as to the reasons that Santos agreed
to extradite the drug trafficker back to Venezuela as opposed
to the United States. But the Santos government has a very
strong interest in preventing the FARC from using Venezuelan
territory, in securing Venezuelan cooperation in a greater and
tighter control of the border area, and there are many other
things that Colombia cares about vis-a-vis its own immediate
neighborhood that are of critical importance to them, and
possibly we don't see the same- we don't see the things eye to
eye.
I think that the desire to assert independence from the
United States started with the radical-left, but includes the
social democratic left as well as the center-right. I think
this is a classic example. There is a decoupling of the way
Colombia defines its own national security interests and the
way the United States has defined that alliance. In other
words, under the previous administration I think there was a
complete coincidence, particularly between the Bush
administration and the agenda of the Uribe government. There
are many analysts in Colombia on all sides of the political
spectrum that see that Colombia paid a price for that within
South America in particular. The bases agreement was very
costly diplomatically to Colombia within the region because of
the way it was handled, and there is obvious dissatisfaction
with the failure of the
U.S. Congress to move forward on the free trade agreement.
So I think Santos has decided that Colombia's insertion in
Latin America, given the degrees of intra-Latin American trade
and investment and south-south cooperation, is more important
to him right now than the relationship with the United States.
He has visited many countries of the region. He came to New
York for the
U.N. General Assembly. He has not come to Washington. I
think the message could not be clearer. Again, it's an
expression of assertiveness that poses a challenge to us, but
not necessarily an irreconcilable difference.
Mr. Schneider. Could I--if I could, let me just take a
little bit of a different point of view on the last point. I
don't think there's any problem with respect to Santos and the
relationship with the United States, No. 1.
No. 2, I think that Santos made it a significant part of
his political decision to demonstrate distance from the
previous administration in a variety of ways. He opened up
relations with the judiciary, where there had been a horrendous
confrontation. He made it clear that he was going to look at
the issue between the previous Colombian Government and civil
society in a different way. He was going to talk about the
rights of the human rights activists and the human rights
groups, that they were not the enemy. He talked about the
possibility of exploring negotiations with the FARC. All things
that were not done before. He submitted to the Congress three
pieces of legislation: one on land restitution, one on land
reform, one on doing away with the DAS. He also most recently
submitted a new slate of candidates for Attorney General to the
Supreme Court.
These were actions that were designed to say: I'm
independent, I think that Colombia needs to move in a different
direction. Yes, we're going to continue to be tough militarily
against the FARC, but we have an opportunity to go in a
different direction.
With respect to Chavez, I think here Cindy is absolutely
right. When you go to the border and you talk to the local
authorities about how they deal with the problems, they're
totally overwhelmed by the capacity of the FARC, the ELN, drug
traffickers, to move back and forth across the Venezuela border
as they wish. The reality is that if Santos can get from Chavez
a decision to actually put some constraints on that flow,
particularly in terms of the FARC having any sanctuary there,
it would be a major advance in putting pressure on the FARC,
hopefully pressure that will ultimately lead to some kind of
negotiated end to the conflict.
I think at the same time, it's not in Chavez's interest to
be seen as someone who cooperates with and provides support for
drug traffickers. So I think Chavez did extradite a couple of
suspect traffickers to the United States. He's been playing
this issue lately.
I did want to also say with respect to three issues that
you had raised. One, a social development fund. This issue
should be a bipartisan issue in terms of our relationship with
the hemisphere. I would hope that the next Congress would move
your bill if you can't get it through during this lame duck.
Second, on the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission.
That in fact could partner with the blue ribbon panel on the
same issue that the Latin Americans did themselves, Presidents
Gaviria, Zedillo, and Fernando Henriquez Cardoso, which
basically said: This is not working, not only not working in
terms of U.S. concerns, but also not working in terms of our
countries. So I think this is an issue where you can in fact
find a way to move forward together with Latin America.
On the OAS strengthening, I think it's clear that there's a
need to do that. I actually would urge giving the OAS greater
analytic capabilities in terms of conflict prevention through
an early warning system and the ability to mount more effective
diplomatic responses.
Now, in terms of how do you get a new strategic Latin
America agenda in this administration, I think you have to
harness the Hispanic Caucus. I think they have to be making
this one of their priorities going to the President. Ultimately
a new strategy must come from the White House and I think both
of you, are better able than I am to set out that kind of a
strategy. But that's where it has to take place.
Senator Dodd. Go ahead.
Mr. Daremblum. I think that I agree with all the previous
speakers, but I think also that there is another ingredient in
talking about Santos. It is the ingredient of a vacuum that
many Presidents, many leaders in South America, are feeling in
terms of a lack of engagement with the United States on a
number of problems.
So I think the idea of partnering with Latin American
countries on a number of things is a great idea and a way of
getting them involved and getting them to be a part of a U.S.
initiative.
Let me say that, in terms of drugs and narcotrafficking and
human rights in general, there are two agencies which function
within the aegis of the OAS, but they are autonomous of the
OAS, and they have been functioning rather well. One is the
CICAG, which is cooperation among police forces, law
enforcement, judiciaries, concerning terrorism and concerning
narcotrafficking, which has been working. I've heard a great
deal of satisfaction from the governments in this regard.
Also in terms of human rights, the Commission on Human
Rights has been working very well. I think they really
represent the steppingstone on which to build future
initiatives among the various governments.
Senator Dodd. Let me just add. Bob, I think you're so
terribly thoughtful and cognizant. We just don't talk about
enlightened self-interest. We talk about what we can do for
these countries instead of, as you framed it so well, what's in
our interest, our common interest. There's nothing wrong with
enlightened self-interest.
In every one of the subject matters you raised, there is an
enlightened self-interest that I think we in the public arena
have not done a very good job of articulating to our
constituencies. I think, in fairness to the Obama
administration, I have the same sense of regret in a way, and I
think you said it well. Obviously, Afghanistan, Iraq, other
issues. There are only so many issues they can grapple with at
the same time.
I had really hoped that President Obama would get to Brazil
between the election of the new President and the inauguration
in January. I thought it would be a great visit to make in the
region. So I know there's a lot of pressure on them to do these
various things. My hope is that maybe now there will be some
attention to this, because I think it's good politics for all
the reasons you've identified.
I want to just ask you quickly at the table. I expressed my
view that I thought we ought to-I had hoped we'd get in the
lame duck session to the ratification of the Colombian Free
Trade Agreement and the Panamanian Free Trade Agreement. Would
you just give me a quick yes or no, would you be in favor of
that? Are you in favor of that, Mr. Ambassador, those two
treaties?
Mr. Daremblum. Yes, of course.
Senator Dodd. Joy? I know the conditions you have. I just
want to get sort of a yes or no. We all get asked that
question, too, and we never answer very well.
Ms. Olson. Panama, yes. Colombia is moving in the right
direction on some things, and I think figuring out how to
leverage that progress at this particular moment is a good
idea.
Senator Dodd. Cynthia.
Dr. Arnson. Yes; on both counts.
Mr. Schneider. I think that I agree with the point that Joy
just made. You have to come to a judgment that approval-at this
stage-with respect to Colombia, is going to support Santos in
continuing the reform path, particularly on human rights, on
which he has embarked. But you have to come to that clear
judgment.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you this, and again going to what
Bob's point was. One of the things that again struck me when I
was back in the region again earlier this winter and spring in
Central America, that Bob Corker went with me on, and we were
in all four of the countries plus Panama, the Central American
countries, the sovereignty issue. Again, we would hear this
over and over again. Obviously, sovereignty is a critically
important issue in Latin America. Yet when you look at the drug
issue, in just the Central American countries-and I happen to
think President Lobo, by the way, is doing a very good job in
Honduras, in the wake of all the difficulties we're familiar
with. President Chinchilla, I was there for her inauguration in
Costa Rica, and I think-I've known her in the past. My brother
was there. She was the I think Minister of Justice.
Mr. Daremblum. Minister of Public Security.
Senator Dodd. Public security, she was at the time.
President Martinelli in Panama. There are some good people
there. But the problem is the cartels seem to know where to
move based on whatever country is investing in its security
resources. Either offshore, onshore, they play it like a harp.
So the greatest asset for the cartels are in fact the very
sovereignty issues that these adjoining countries embrace, so
that there's very little, or at least not enough, cooperation
where there is the notion of this is a common threat, a common
problem.
I realize there's a lot more to this issue than merely
this, but it strikes me that until we can convince these
countries to start to really work cooperatively and get
resources working in the same direction, sovereignty is the
greatest asset the cartels have, in a sense. Anyway, that's my
observation.
Any thoughts quickly on that subject matter?
Mr. Schneider. Let me just offer two positive comments. One
is all the Central American countries now recognize that they
are under attack and that they don't have the resources
themselves to withstand it. They all recognize that. So they're
all reaching out.
So if we were able in fact to come up with a significant
cooperative effort-the administration has the Central American
regional security effort. But it has not yet developed in a way
that provides the kind of institution-building resources that
are needed. The other is that you have on the military side
JIATF-South, which does involve every Central American country.
I think that that actually is a useful thing. The second is
through the Central American Integration System-known by its
Spanish acronym, SICA. That hasn't been used effectively to try
and deal with the question of sovereignty in a way that permits
you to have cross-border cooperation, intelligence-sharing, et
cetera, and that might be an avenue for them to also adopt a
CICIG model in each Central American country.
Senator Dodd. Anything else on that quick point?
Dr. Arnson. There is an attempt to create greater
cooperation along the lines that Mark was mentioning, fostered
by the Organization of American States, by the Central American
Presidents themselves, as well as by the U.S. Government. I
frankly don't see the sovereignty issue as playing a role as an
impediment as much as the sheer ability of the cartels to
corrupt, to take advantage of weaknesses in institutions,
weaknesses in the police and the judiciary, in countries'
territorial control, which is the way it began in Colombia, and
now which is a critical issue in Guatemala.
The cartels are able to exploit these weaknesses and shift
their operations in accordance with pressures they might feel
or other opportunities that they seek. I'm not sure that the
sovereignty issue is as much an issue here as the weakness of
the institutions available in the region to combat this.
Senator Dodd. That's well said.
There's so much to talk about, obviously, and even in a
hearing of 2 or 3 hours we hardly-we haven't even mentioned
President Calderon in Mexico in the last 2 hours, our neighbor
to the south.
I was very impressed with President Pinera in Chile and
very impressed, by the way, with President Correa in Ecuador.
Knows our country very well, obviously. Was a student at the
University of Illinois. I was very impressed. I had a long
lunch with young business leaders in Ecuador, and I fully
expected sort of a hostile reaction to President Correa based
on what I had heard. Every one of them to a person applauded
him, just went out of their way. One of the reasons was because
he was treating large corporations- making them pay taxes, do
other things. As smaller entrepreneurs, they were paying taxes.
They didn't have the influence politically. So he's really
creating an environment down there that seems to be working.
I think it's in our interest with people like President
Pinera and President Correa, that are not big players
economically, although Chile, most of its trade goes to the
Pacific Rim, and obviously very stable, but that we realize
we've got some allies here. We're going to have our
difficulties with them from time to time, but there are some
very creative, very smart leadership, new leadership, emerging
in the hemisphere that can play a very important role in my
view. Because they come from smaller countries or ones that we
don't have much to quarrel with, they can become great assets,
I think.
President Correa has a great understanding of us and a
great affection for the United States in my view. I think
Secretary Clinton had a similar reaction in her meeting with
him. She met with him shortly after I did. We happened to go in
different directions. Alan Garcia, who would have thought? I
mean, Alan Garcia--the Alan Garcia that I knew 25 years ago,
the one that I know today, is this remarkable leader who's
leaving office, obviously, but is just doing a great job.
So can anybody just comment on some of these leaders like
this in the region that aren't necessarily the focus of our
attention, but what roles they can play.
Yes.
Dr. Arnson. I appreciate that you raise that because I
think the tendency when one looks particularly at South America
is to think in terms of Brazil, given the size of the country
or the size of the economy. President Ronald Reagan once made a
comment, that was ridiculed at the time, when he traveled to
the region to say: There are a lot of countries down there. I
think that's true of South America and it's important not to
lose sight of the variety of successes that go from Uruguay to
Chile to Peru.
Senator Dodd. Cynthia, excuse me one second. I'm going to
interrupt you before my colleague leaves.
I appreciate my colleague's kind comments about my imminent
departure after 30 years on this committee and in the Senate.
I'll tell you, one of the things I feel very good about is that
there are people like Bob Menendez, who care about these
issues. When you leave and you care about something as much as
I do about Latin America and our relationship, knowing that
there are people in this body who care as much, if not more,
than I do. He brings not only intellectual interest in this
thing, but there are other interests which he brings because of
ethnicity and background that are critically important in my
view, a passion about this question.
So Bob, I thank you. I feel a lot more secure walking away
knowing that there's someone else who's going to carry on. So
thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Sorry, Cynthia. I apologize.
Dr. Arnson. Just to finish, there are countries throughout
the hemisphere who are very ambivalent about the emergence of
Brazil or the leadership role that Brazil has tried to play in
the region, and see themselves as countries with their own
interests and who collectively represent a significant economic
block, are models of consolidated democracies to greater or
lesser degrees.
We shouldn't forget that there are many countries in the
hemisphere. The policy right now has focused, quite rightfully,
on Mexico. In the past it focused on Colombia. But there's a
big hemisphere down there and I think that we should keep the
number of countries and their diversity in mind.
Senator Dodd. Yes, Joy.
Ms. Olson. I'm reminded of Tip O'Neill's phrase: All
politics is local. I think that in terms of this kind of
reconceptualization of relationship, the degree to which we can
embrace the idea that all politics is local and that we need to
relate to the reality that exists in very distinctly different
countries of the region, so that we're engaging with them on
their self-interest. That's where we'll start building
something different, and I think have better success.
Senator Dodd. You made the point earlier, and all of you
have one way or another, one of the more difficult things we've
had with, unfortunately, not even colleagues here but others,
is the tremendous diversity. With the exception obviously of
Brazil and some of the English-speaking islands, it's far more
complicated than a common language. Just in Central America
alone, which the Ambassador knows, the fundamental distinctions
and differences that exist even with very proximate neighbors
is something that needs to be-I think there's a growing
appreciation of that as well.
Look, I want to come back. I can't let you leave without
Haiti, because clearly the elections you've talked about, but
obviously, going back to the loss of 200,000 lives, 70,000
people have been affected by cholera, 2,000 lives lost, 1.5
million people living in tents. Typically what happens too
often is there is obviously this great outpouring, a very
natural sense of outpouring of benevolence and care and
generosity in the immediate wake of the tragedy last winter,
but also we know as time goes on and the cameras leave and the
nightly news programs and so forth move on to other issues, the
attention diminishes.
Tragically, this is a matter that deserves our attention.
The election obviously is the immediate one in hand. I don't
know if any of you want to share any thoughts or ideas.
President Clinton, to his eternal credit in my view, just does
not quit on this issue. He is just sticking with this thing,
and I admire him immensely for his commitment to it. but he
can't do it alone, obviously.
I wonder if you just have any thoughts on what else we
could be doing, how could we lead in some way. This has got to
change, and obviously there's a lot of resources that have gone
in. Legitimately, people are going to ask, what's coming back
as a result of billions that are being spent. So I wonder if
you might just quickly share some thoughts if you have any on
this subject.
Mr. Schneider. Just a couple things. By the way, I would
ask that my full statement be included.
Senator Dodd. It will be. All of your statement, all your
thoughts, will be.
Mr. Schneider. The one thing in there, it seems to me, that
has not been sufficiently focused on and that can be done is
the need to have a policy decision on resettlement. You're not
going to move 1.5 million people from tents to permanent
housing in the next 6 months or a year. But you've got to have
a resettlement policy that says, if you're in a particular
category, this is what the future holds, including for example,
this is what the package of benefits will be to go back to a
house which we've decided is structurally sound. I believe that
that's an issue where there needs to be a much greater degree
of pressure and consensus-building from here, ``here'' being
the international community, and in Haiti, to make that happen.
If there's one thing that I would say between now and whoever
is inaugurated, you've got to get that done. That just has not
yet been done, and that's not a question of insufficient money.
It's a policy issue that just has to be forced through.
The second is, as you mentioned, of the U.S. money, the
$1.15 billion that was approved in August, there is still-as I
understand it, it was only very recently that $300 million was
made available for disbursement, and the remainder still is not
available for disbursement. It's available for--
Senator Dodd. Why is that happening, Mark? What's going on?
Mr. Schneider. There's a request for the administration to
come up with a greater specificity in how it plans to use the
money, and that has not yet been satisfied.
Senator Dodd. That's not an illegitimate concern.
Mr. Schneider. Of course it is, but that needs-then they
need to be pushed to do it, and it needs to move forward more
quickly.
Senator Dodd. OK.
Mr. Schneider. By the way, the United States is actually
more advanced than other donors relative to moving their
funding from pledge to disbursement.
The other thing: Never forget in Haiti, police reform,
judicial reform, rule of law. If that doesn't happen in the
next administration-reconstruction and governance is not going
to take place. They were partially there before the quake. They
were moving in the right direction on police.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you this, Mark. I raised the issue
some months ago, back earlier this year, and others have raised
it, of the notion of a trusteeship.
Mr. Schneider. I know.
Senator Dodd. I know this is radical thinking, although
it's not unprecedented, when you have such a failed state
condition and such desperate needs of literally thousands and
thousands of people, that the idea-and I'm not unsure this
would be not unwelcome, by the way, from some of the reaction
that occurred.
It is a radical thought, but I was just curious if you had
any.
Mr. Schneider. I just don't think, for a whole range of
historical reasons in Haiti, I just don't think that that is
likely to be accepted without a great deal of reaction,
including violent reaction. At the same time, there's no
question that the role of the international community has to be
far greater than the normal cooperation relationship.
You mentioned President Clinton's role. He actually sits as
a cochair of the Interim Haiti Recover Commission. The
peacekeeping mission there MINUSTAH, also has to stay there and
has to be part of the next government's effort to ensure
adequate citizen security. So I think there is going to be the
need for much greater international presence and
responsibility. But I think if you go to the point of
protectorate--
Senator Dodd. I hear you.
I note, by the way, you've appeared 11 times before this
committee since 1993 and several of them were on Haiti itself.
Any other comments on Haiti?
Mr. Daremblum. Yes. There is a problem that has increased
over the days in Haiti, and I hear this complaint very, very
often from donors-not only donor countries but also private
entities, NGOs, et cetera. It is the lack of an adequate human
apparatus within the government to really expedite the coming
in of materials, products. Many large shipments of aid are
waiting in customs and are waiting at the docks.
That I am afraid is going to aggravate the will to continue
helping Haiti. But one of the main things for cooperation with
this country with Haiti, which badly needs it, is really to
help them create an adequate bureaucracy, an adequate
administrative structure for dealing and coping with aid.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you, by the way, Mark, and I'll
ask all four of you, but particularly those who've commented,
if you could in the next maybe few days put together a series
of things that you think we ought to be asking either of the
administration, the OAS, the World Bank, the IMF, other donor
countries. I'd be prepared in the few days I've got left here
to try and shepherd something like that and get a number of
people who might be interested in raising the profile of this
and get some requests going that might jump-start some of these
very things you're talking about.
Rather than ask you to enumerate it all right here, if
you'd give it some thought and get it to us, I'll try and take
advantage of the few hours I've got left when people might
answer a phone call to--
Mr. Schneider. Could I raise one other thing that relates
to that, as well as what Senator Menendez was talking about,
which is how do you raise the agenda for Latin America. It's
something that at least, that I've supported, which is that
there has not been a special envoy for the Americas in this
administration. I think that, given where we are and for all of
the reasons-Iraq, Afghanistan-a special envoy for the Americas
might be something that would in fact be both a vehicle and a
locus for developing that kind of agenda.
Senator Dodd. Well, listen. I thank all of you. You've been
terrific, and again I thank you. I over the years have enjoyed
immensely your advice and counsel, and I appreciate it.
I'd be remiss at the conclusion of a hearing here if I-and
I appreciate Joy triggering this. I should have done it myself.
But I've been blessed as a member here with some remarkable
staff people across the spectrum, on committees and personal
staff, in 30 years. But beginning with Bob Dockery, who's now a
pro bono lawyer somewhere in Florida, but worked with Chairman
Fulbright up here, Senator Byrd before I was elected, and then
joined me and spent about a decade or so with me, and Janice
O'Connell, who spent the last 20 years here.
In fact, the new Senator Kirk from Illinois, I met him the
other day. I hadn't met him before. He said to me: How's Janice
O'Connell doing? He said: Well, I worked for Bernie Aronson and
I love Janice O'Connell. I said: You may have been the only
person I know at the State Department who's going to react that
way. Janice did a remarkable job, of course, over the years,
just terrific. And Josh Blumenthal, who's been working with me,
has just done a wonderful, wonderful job as well in carrying on
in that great tradition.
So I'm very grateful to all of them, and others. There have
been others who've supported their efforts over the years, and
I thank them immensely for their service.
Lastly, I'd be remiss if I didn't point out Steve Solarz.
We were elected together to the House of Representatives in
1974. I didn't serve on the House Foreign Affairs Committee
with him, but we became very good friends over the years. I
remember Doc Morgan, who was chairing the House Foreign Affairs
Committee years ago, and when any head of state would come to a
meeting and complete their opening comments, Doc Morgan would
say: Aside from Steve Solarz, does anyone else have a question
in the room? Steve always had-and they were great questions.
He always was so knowledgeable. I traveled with him once
and I swore I'd never do it again. I thought I had a lot of
energy, but I never met anybody like Steve Solarz. He could go
through a country and knew everybody. Bob Corker said I know a
lot of people in Latin America. Steve Solarz knew everybody all
over the world.
I recently spoke with a fellow-I was in India and we were
talking about United States-India relations and of course going
back over the years. He said the one person who deserves more
credit for revitalizing the United States-India relationship
was Steve Solarz. Long before anyone else, after the difficult
years in the early 1970s and the nuclear question, Steve Solarz
kept on talking about the importance of that bilateral
relationship pretty much alone, for a long time. Ultimately,
President Clinton of course was the first American President to
visit India in years.
So Steve is no longer with us, having lost his battle with
cancer about 24 or 48 hours ago. But I thought a lot about him
here today and his contribution to our country. So I wouldn't
want a committee meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to conclude without thanking him for his service.
With that note, I thank all of you again, and this
committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]