[Senate Report 114-295]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
114th Congress } { Report
2d Session } SENATE { 114-295
_______________________________________________________________________
COMBAT TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACT OF 2016
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
TO ACCOMPANY
S. 2517
TO REQUIRE A REPORT ON UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO
COMBAT TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
July 11, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
____________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2016
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
Elizabeth McWhorter, Senior Professional Staff Member
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Calendar No. 551
114th Congress} { Report
SENATE
2nd Session } { 114-295
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COMBAT TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACT OF 2016
_______
July 11, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2517]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 2517) to require a
report on United States strategy to combat terrorist use of
social media, and for other purposes, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends
that the bill, as amended, do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................5
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................6
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................6
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................7
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............7
I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
The purpose of S. 2517, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social
Media Act of 2016, is to require the President to provide
Congress with the strategy of the United States to combat
terrorists' and terrorist organizations' use of social media.
The bill also requires the President to provide Congress with a
report and evaluation of the United States' efforts, to date,
to combat terrorists' and terrorist organizations' use of
social media.
II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
In 2015, President Barack Obama identified the following
groups as the preeminent security threat to our country: Al
Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and their
affiliates.\1\
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\1\See generally, National Security Strategy, The White House 20
(2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/2015_national_securitystrategy.pdf.
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According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
approximately 250 Americans have either traveled, or attempted
to travel, to Syria and Iraq.\2\
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\2\E-mail correspondence between HSGAC Comm. staff and FBI
Congressional Affairs Liaison, May 23, 2016 (on file with Comm. staff).
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Homegrown violent extremists are also increasingly
conducting simple, opportunistic attacks at home.\3\ In the
wake of international efforts to deter foreign fighters from
joining ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the terrorist group's message
is ``if you cannot travel, kill where you are.''\4\ This makes
the approximately 900 ISIS-inspired individuals the FBI was
investigating throughout the country in late 2015 especially
alarming.\5\ From two or three homegrown violent extremist
attacks a year in 2009, the number of these incidents jumped to
a dozen just five years later in 2014, and more than doubled in
2015.\6\
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\3\See generally, Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement
of Nicholas Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center),
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=83C519E9-9310-
4587-B00F-07179D39C0AD [hereinafter Threats to the Homeland].
\4\Threats to the Homeland (statement of James Comey, Director, The
Federal Bureau of Investigation at 1).
\5\Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets
to Raqqa, The George Washington University Program on Extremism (Dec.
2015), https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report_0.pdf. [hereinafter ISIS in
America: From Retweets to Raqqa].
\6\Threats to the Homeland (statement of Nicholas Rasmussen,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center at 2).
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Examples of recent incidents include attacks in 2009 in
Little Rock, Arkansas and Ft. Hood, Texas; bombings at the
Boston Marathon in Boston, Massachusetts and shootings in
Chattanooga, Tennessee in 2013; shootings in Garland, Texas and
San Bernardino, California in 2015; and the attack in Orlando,
Florida in 2016.\7\
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\7\See generally, The Ideology of ISIS: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016); Terrorism
Gone Viral: Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond: Hearing Before H.
Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Michael B.
Steinbach, Assistant Director, the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150603/103513/
HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-SteinbachM-20150603.pdf; see also ISIS in America:
From Retweets to Raqqa at 3-4, 31.
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Spreading a poisonous ideology via the Internet
In May 2008, Committee staff published a report titled
Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown
Terrorist Threat warning about the increased frequency with
which United States-based militants are active online.\8\ The
internet allows groups like ISIS to distribute their poisonous
ideology unbound by national borders, requiring homeland
security efforts to consider countering this ideology
online.\9\ The 9/11 Review Commission described the online
radicalization efforts of these groups as ``an unprecedented
challenge'' that ``transcends geographic boundaries and
demographics.''\10\
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\8\Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
110th Cong., Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the
Homegrown Terrorist Threat (Comm. Print, May 8, 2008), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/IslamistReport.pdf.
\9\S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong.,
Special Report, Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the
U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack, 7, 18-9
(Feb. 2011); see also J.M. Berger & Jonathan Morgan, The ISIS Twitter
Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on
Twitter, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World
No. 20 (2015), available at http://www.brookings.edu//media/research/
files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/
isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf; National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Transcending
Organization: Individuals and the `Islamic State' (2014).
\10\9/11 Review Commission, The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the
21st Century (Mar. 2015), available at https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century.
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Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has
testified before this Committee that terrorist groups use the
internet to ``inspire individuals to conduct attacks within
their own homelands.''\11\ Between 2014 and June 2016,
homegrown violent jihadists plotted 76 total plots in the
United States.\12\
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\11\Threats to the Homeland (statement of Jeh Johnson, Secretary,
Dep't of Homeland Security).
\12\Jerome P. Bjelopera, Cong. Research Serv., R44110, The Islamic
State's Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement
(2016).
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Groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda value strategic communication
as integral to the advancement of their political agendas.\13\
It allows them to establish legitimacy through historical or
religious narratives that resonate with target audiences and
potential supporters.\14\ Al Qaeda's current leader once
stated, ``We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle
is taking place in the battlefield of the media.''\15\ An
American citizen who once served as a terrorist group
commander, propagandist, and recruiter further elaborated on
this stance that ``[t]he war of narratives has become even more
important than the war of navies, napalm, and knives.''\16\
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\13\Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative:
Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center
on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 20-21 (Feb. 2013), available at
http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/
Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf; Carsten Bockstette, Jihadist Terrorist Use of
Strategic Communication Management Techniques, European Center for
Security Studies at 5 (Dec. 2008), available at http://
www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/
occPapers/occ-paper_20-en.pdf; Gregory L. Keeney & Detlof von
Winterfeldt, Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists,
CREATE Homeland Security Center (Aug. 2009), available at http://
research.create.usc.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1142&context=nonpublished_reports.
\14\Joanna Nathan & Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban:
Insights from the Afghan Field 23-42 (2012) (explaining that the
extensive efforts undertaken by the Taliban to frame the fight as jihad
imply that they view the legitimacy conveyed by these words as a
critical source of strength in their fight); Will McCants, The ISIS
Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic
State 56 (1st ed. 2015) (explaining that Osama bin Laden was so
frustrated with Western media's shortening of Al Qaeda's full name,
Qa'idat al-Jihad, to a word that had nothing to do with Islam that he
considered changing the group's name to one that would force the media
and United States government to acknowledge the Islamic nature of the
group and reinforce his narrative that the West was at war with
Islam.).
\15\Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence, Letter from al-
Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi (Oct. 2005), available at http://fas.org/irp/
news/2005/10/dni101105.html.
\16\U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks of Alberto Fernandez, Coordinator
for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,
Conference at the Newseum (Dec. 2013), available at http://
www.state.gov/r/cscc/releases/218606.htm.
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The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) notes that ``the internet played
an increasingly pivotal role'' in the radicalization of foreign
fighters.''\17\ In 2002, just 37 percent of Americans
attempting to travel to join terrorist groups were influenced
by the internet in some way,\18\ compared to 83 percent in
2015.\19\ Furthermore, as the internet's influence has
increased, the average time from initial radicalization to the
decision to travel has decreased from approximately 16 months
in 2002 to less than 10 months in 2015.\20\ The window of
opportunity for intervention before criminal action is
diminishing.
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\17\Overview: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in United
States-Foreign Fighters (PIRUS-FF), START Consortium (Apr. 2016),
available at https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS-
FF_InfographicSeries_April2016.pdf.
\18\Id.
\19\Id.
\20\Id.
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Inadequate Federal response
Despite this accelerating and increasing threat to the
homeland, numerous experts have testified before this Committee
that the United States currently lacks a comprehensive strategy
to combat and counter terrorist narratives online.\21\ It may
be the case that no message is powerful enough to neutralize
this threat. However, identifying narrative themes that
influence homegrown violent extremists can inform an alignment
of words and deeds that undercut perceived inconsistencies
often exploited by terrorist propaganda.\22\ A Federal review
of terrorist narratives for these themes and a subsequent
national strategy to combat and counter those narratives will
ensure consistency among United States policies, actions, and
words.
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\21\Inside the Mind of ISIS: Understanding Its Goals and Ideology
to Better Protect the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Jessica
Stern, Boston University); see also Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next
Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
\22\Cristina Archetti, Terrorism, Communication and New Media:
Explaining Radicalization in the Digital Age, Terrorism Research
Institute (2015), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/401/html.
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Whereas the Center for Global Engagement's Twitter account
has only garnered approximately 26,600 followers and sent
approximately 12,000 tweets, pro-ISIS accounts (numbering
anywhere between 46,000 and 90,000 in over 100 countries)
collectively share an average of 133,422 tweets per day to a
much larger audience of followers.\23\ Despite its rebranding
and efforts to identify a successful counter-narrative, the
Center for Global Engagement is still trying to develop a
narrative as viral as those spread by extremist organizations
such as ISIS.\24\
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\23\J.M. Berger & Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census:
Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter,
The Brookings Institute (Mar. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu//media/
research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/
isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf; see also Global Engagement,
Twitter, https://twitter.com/TheGEC (approximations as of June 8,
2016).
\24\William D. Casebeer & James A. Russell, Storytelling and
Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive `Counter-Narrative Strategy,' IV,
Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval
Postgraduate School (Mar. 2005), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/
nps/casebeer_mar05.pdf; see also Michael Jacobson, Learning Counter-
Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist Dropouts, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (Jan. 2010), http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/learning-counter-
narrative-lessons-from-cases-of-terrorist-dropouts; Naureen Chowdhury
Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism
Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center on Global
Counterterrorism (Feb. 2013), http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_ StratComm.pdf; Alberto M. Fernandez, Here
to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks, The Brookings
Institute (Oct. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu//media/research/files/
papers/2015/10/combating-isis-propaganda-fernandez/is-
propaganda_web_english.pdf.
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Requiring a national strategy to counter online radicalization
In the 2011 ``Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United
States,'' this Administration committed to creating a strategy
to counter online radicalization.\25\ The Administration has
not yet provided such a strategy.\26\
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\25\The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners
to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, The White House 20
(2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf.
\26\See generally Countering Online Radicalization in America,
Bipartisan Policy Center 7 (Dec 2012), available at http://
cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org /wp-content/uploads/sites/default /files/
BPC%20 _Online%20Radicalization %20Report.pdf.
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Accordingly, S. 2517, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social
Media Act of 2016, requires the Administration to provide
Congress with a comprehensive strategy aimed at aligning
Federal efforts to disrupt and counter violent extremist
messaging online. The bill also requires the Administration to
provide a report to Congress that not only details the role
social media plays in domestic and foreign radicalization, but
also evaluates current government efforts to combat and counter
terrorists' use of social media.
The required national strategy to counter online
radicalization should be informed by a study of a wide range of
terrorists' and terrorist organizations' online recruitment
efforts and, if possible, include organizations and individuals
that adhere to a range of ideologies. While a national strategy
will aim to counter all terrorist online radicalization, it
should prioritize preventing violent extremism and terrorism
that is inspired by Al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates.\27\
In addition, in an effort to clarify ambiguous national
security related terms of art, S. 2517 notably defines the term
``radicalization'' for the first time in Federal statute.
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\27\See generally National Security Strategy, The White House 20
(2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
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Finally, S. 2517 protects the First Amendment rights of
Americans engaged in constitutionally-protected behavior while
demanding the guidance necessary to build an effective, whole-
of-government approach to counter online radicalization.
Included in both the report and evaluation is a requirement
that the Administration assess the impact that efforts to
combat terrorists' use of social media may have on the civil
rights and civil liberties of United States persons not engaged
in terrorist activities. The national strategy to counter
online radicalization should be crafted to ensure the civil
rights and civil liberties of United States persons are
protected as required by current law.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Chairman Ron Johnson and Senator Joni Ernst introduced S.
2517 on February 9, 2016, which was referred to the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Senator Cory
Booker joined as a cosponsor on February 11, 2016.
The Committee considered S. 2517 at a business meeting on
February 10, 2016. Chairman Johnson offered one amendment to
define ambiguous terms of art and strengthen civil rights and
civil liberty protections for United States persons. The
Committee adopted the amendment and ordered the bill, as
amended, reported favorably, both by voice vote. Senators
present for both the vote on the amendment and the vote on the
bill were: Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, Lankford, Ayotte,
Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp,
Booker, and Peters.
Similar legislation, H.R. 3654, the Combat Terrorist Use of
Social Media Act of 2015, passed the House of Representatives
by voice vote and under suspension of the rules on December 16,
2015.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED
Section 1. Short title
This section provides the bill's short title, the ``Combat
Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of 2016.''
Section 2. Definitions
This section defines ``appropriate congressional
committees,'' ``domestic terrorism,'' ``international
terrorism,'' ``radicalization,'' and ``United States person.''
Section 3. Report on strategy to combat terrorist use of social media
Section 3 requires the President to transmit to the
appropriate Congressional committees a report on terrorists'
and terrorist organizations' use of social media and efforts of
the United States to combat such use. The report is required to
evaluate the role of social media in radicalization and assess
the impact that efforts to combat terrorists' use of social
media may have on the civil rights and civil liberties of
United States persons not engaged in terrorist activities. The
report is to be transmitted no later than 90 days after
enactment of S. 2517.
Section 3 also requires the President to submit to the
appropriate Congressional committees an evaluation of the
United States' efforts to combat the use of social media by
terrorists and terrorist organizations and recommendations for
improvements. This evaluation is required to assess the impact
of such efforts on the civil rights and civil liberties of
United States persons who are not engaged in terrorism. This
evaluation is to be submitted within 180 days of enactment.
The report and evaluation required under this section shall
be submitted in an unclassified form, and may include a
classified annex to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Section 4. Policy and comprehensive strategy to counter terrorists' and
terrorist organizations' use of social media
Section 4 requires the President to submit a comprehensive
strategy to counter the use of social media by terrorists and
terrorist organizations. This strategy must be submitted within
180 days of enactment, in an unclassified form, and may include
a classified annex to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Section 5. Prohibition on New Regulatory Authority
Section 5 makes clear that the bill does not provide the
President or any Federal department or agency with authority to
promulgate regulations or set standards for non-Federal
entities.
V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
March 18, 2016.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2517, the Combat
Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of 2016.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark
Grabowicz.
Sincerely,
Keith Hall.
Enclosure.
S. 2517--Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of 2016
S. 2517 would require the President, within 90 days of the
bill's enactment, to submit to the Congress a report on
terrorists' use of social media and an overview of current
efforts to counter those activities. Within 180 days of the
bill's enactment, the President would be required to submit to
the Congress a comprehensive strategy to counter terrorists'
use of social media and an evaluation of current efforts to
combat such use of social media. Based on the cost of similar
activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
less than $500,000 over the 2017-2021 period; such spending
would be subject to the availability of appropriated amounts.
Because enacting S. 2517 would not affect direct spending
or revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO
estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase net
direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027.
S. 2517 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
On January 13, 2016, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for
H.R. 3654, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of
2015, as passed by the House of Representatives on December 16,
2015. The two pieces of legislation are similar and CBO's
estimate of the budgetary effects are the same.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz.
The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
Because this legislation would not repeal or amend any
provision of current law, it would make no changes in existing
law within the meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph 12
of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
[all]