[Senate Report 114-296]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 552
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 114-296
_______________________________________________________________________
AMENDING THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT
OF 2002 TO BUILD PARTNERSHIPS TO PREVENT VIOLENCE BY EXTREMISTS
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
S. 2522
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
July 11, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-010 WASHINGTON : 2016
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
Elizabeth McWhorter, Senior Professional Staff Member
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Calendar No. 552
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 114-296
======================================================================
AMENDING THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO BUILD PARTNERSHIPS TO
PREVENT VIOLENCE BY EXTREMISTS
_______
July 11, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2522]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 2522) to amend the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build partnerships to prevent
violence by extremists, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................8
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................8
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................9
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.......................10
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........11
I. Purpose and Summary
The purpose of S. 2522 is to establish the Office for
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS or ``the Department''). The bill
requires the DHS Secretary to designate, as head of the new
office, an Assistant Secretary who will coordinate the
Department's domestic countering violent extremism (CVE)
efforts. The bill also facilitates oversight of the
Department's CVE efforts by defining previously-ambiguous
language and requiring the DHS Secretary to report to Congress
on the Department's domestic CVE strategy and evaluation
metrics.
II. Background and the Need for Legislation
As early as 2003, national security officials have
differentiated between ``trying to stop terrorists'' and a
``long-range plan'' to encourage locals to counter violent
extremism.\1\ CVE involves building awareness, counter-
narrative measures, and interventions to prevent all forms of
terrorism.\2\ CVE does not include ``disruptive actions which
focus on stopping acts of terrorism by those who have already
subscribed to violence.''\3\
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\1\Memorandum from Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of
Def., to Gen. Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Pete Pace, & Doug Feith
2 (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ jhtml/
jframe.html# http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/ policy/
dod/d20031016sdmemo.pdf.
\2\Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to
Countering Violent Extremism, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/ US%20 Government%20 Approach%20to%20CVE-
Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf (last visited June 29, 2016).
\3\Id.
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In September 2015, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson recognized
domestic CVE as a key mission of the Department.\4\ He
attributed the importance of this mission to a global terrorist
threat, which he described to this Committee one month later as
evolving to exploit the Internet to ``publicly recruit and
inspire individuals to conduct attacks within their own
homelands.''\5\ As a result, ``lone actors or insular groups--
often self-directed or inspired by overseas groups, like ISIS--
pose the most serious threat to carry out attacks here.''\6\
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\4\Memorandum from Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dept of Homeland
Sec., to DHS Senior Leadership 1 (Sept. 28, 2015), available at:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Secretary%20Johnson's%20Building%20Community%20Partnerships%20Memo_1.pdf
\5\Id.; Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 10 (2015) (statement
of Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec.) [hereinafter
Threats to the Homeland].
\6\Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The
Balance between National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing
before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of
Matthew Olsen, Former Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center), available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
05-10-16%20Olsen%20Testimony.pdf.
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Hedieh Mirahmadi, President of the World Organization for
Resource Development and Education (WORDE), testified before
the Committee regarding the far-reaching, negative impacts
these domestic terrorist attacks have on social cohesion:
Domestic terror attacks are creating fault lines in
our societies that will only lead to more violence, if
they are not repaired. The separation of Muslims from
non-Muslims feeds into the bifurcated worldview of the
terrorists who say--it is us vs. them--the West against
Islam. A comprehensive prevention agenda therefore must
include programs that prevent that divide--so that
there is only an ``us'' against the terrorists.\7\
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\7\Inside the Mind of ISIS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of Hedieh
Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)),
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/ download/testimony-mirahmadi-
2016-01-20 [hereinafter Inside the Mind of ISIS].
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Building awareness
As early as 2008, DHS pioneered Federal efforts to build
community awareness of the terrorist threat and violent
extremist recruitment.\8\ The next year, DHS started
``developing case studies of homegrown violent extremists to
identify indicators of radicalization.''\9\
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\8\Communications between Dep't of Homeland Sec. staff and S.
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs Comm. staff (June 28, 2016).
\9\Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 12-13 (2012)
(citing Hon. Janet Napolitano's, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
Responses to Questions for the Record on file with HSGAC staff)
(explaining that by 2012, the Department had done over 75 case studies
and assessments on homegrown violent extremist activities and potential
material support activities in the United States--including an in-depth
study that looks at common behaviors associated with 62 cases of Al
Qaeda-inspired violent extremists) [hereinafter Homeland Threats and
Agency Responses]; Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist
Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (citing Hon. Janet
Napolitano's, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Responses to Questions
for the Record on file with HSGAC staff) [hereinafter Nine Years After
9/11].
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The challenges facing domestic law enforcement include
discerning when freedom of speech and expression cross into
criminal activity; examining a broad pool of suspects and an
evolving, decentralized threat; and trying to prevent a growing
number of simple, opportunistic attacks.\10\ Domestic law
enforcement strategies to prevent terrorism largely focus on
stopping the operational aspects of violent terrorist
plots.\11\ The problem with solely focusing on stopping
terrorists operationally is that, as attacks increase in
number, they are also increasingly difficult for domestic law
enforcement to detect and disrupt.\12\
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\10\Threats to the Homeland 10, 15, 25 (statement of Hon. Jeh
Johnson, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec., and Hon. James B. Comey,
Director, FBI, Hon. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, NCTC); Naureen
Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative:
Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center
on Global Counterterrorism 6 (Feb. 2013), http://globalcenter.org/ wp-
content/ uploads /2013/03/ Feb2013 _ CT_StratComm.pdf.
\11\Jerome P. Bjelopera, Cong. Research Serv., R42553, Countering
Violent Extremism in the United States 1 (2014).
\12\Threats to the Homeland (statement of Hon. Jeh Johnson,
Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
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From 2009 to 2015, 74 percent of terrorist attacks in the
United States were conducted by lone wolves--individuals who
carry out a terrorist attack entirely on their own.\13\ That
total rose to 90 percent when counting incidents involving one
or two perpetrators.\14\ As Peter Bergen, the Director of the
New America Foundation's National Security Studies Program,
told this Committee in November, ``every person who's been
killed by a jihadi terrorist in this country since 9/11 has
been killed by an American citizen or resident.''\15\
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\13\Lone Wolf Report, Southern Poverty Law Center 4, 8-9 (Feb. 11,
2015), available at https://www.splcenter.org/ sites/ default/ files/
d6_legacy_files/ downloads/ publication/ lone_wolf_special_report_0.pdf
[hereinafter Lone Wolf Report]; Inside the Mind of ISIS 41-42
(explaining social sciences research that associates lone wolves with a
higher likelihood of mental illness).
\14\Lone Wolf Report at 4, 8.
\15\The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th
Cong. 113 (2015) (statement of Peter Bergen, Director, National
Security Studies Program, New America Foundation).
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Examples of recent terrorist attacks include those in 2009
in Little Rock, Arkansas and Ft. Hood, Texas; the shooting at a
Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin in 2012; the 2013 bombings
at the Boston Marathon in Boston, Massachusetts and shootings
in Chattanooga, Tennessee; shootings in Garland, Texas,
Charleston, South Carolina, and San Bernardino, California in
2015; and the attack in Orlando, Florida in 2016.\16\ Homegrown
terrorist attacks involving self-radicalized individuals are
not solely the result of ISIS or Al Qaeda-inspired extremism.
For example, Dylann Roof, the suspect in the 2015 mass shooting
in Charleston, South Carolina, appears to have become self-
radicalized according to the manifesto he published online.\17\
The Department's CVE partnerships are the result of broader
government and civil society collaboration to better identify
the radicalization retrospectively in each of these cases and
prevent similar terrorist attacks.\18\
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\16\See generally, The Ideology of ISIS: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016);
Terrorism Gone Viral: Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond: Hearing
Before H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Michael
B. Steinbach, Assistant Director, FBI); The Rise of Radicalization: Is
the U.S. Government Failing to Counter International and Domestic
Terrorism?: Hearing Before H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong. 20-21
(2015) (statement of J. Richard Cohen, President, Southern Poverty Law
Center) [hereinafter The Rise of Radicalization]; see also Lorenzo
Vidino & Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa, The
George Washington Univ., Program on Extremism 7 (Dec. 2015), https://
cchs.gwu.edu/sites/ cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf; Deadly Attacks Since 9/11,
International Security, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/
deadly-attacks.html (last visited June 24, 2016).
\17\The Rise of Radicalization at 20-21 (statement of J. Richard
Cohen, President, Southern Poverty Law Center).
\18\Michael J. Williams, Ph.D., John G. Horgan, Ph.D., & Williams
P. Evans, Ph.D., Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based,
Muslim-Led CVE Program, National Criminal Justice Reference Service 8
(June 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf.
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In 2008, Committee staff published a report titled Violent
Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist
Threat warning about the increased frequency with which United
States-based militants are active online.\19\ Eight years
later, the Committee heard from experts that the Government
needs to do more to teach parents about online threats their
children face.\20\ To illustrate these threats, Hedieh
Mirahmadi described a systemic problem of youth exposure to
Internet predators, saying that ``many young people are either
unaware or ignore the long-term consequences of inappropriate
uses of social media and . . . run the risk of being recruited
by an Internet predator--whether that's a pedophile or a
terrorist.''\21\
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\19\Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
110th Cong., Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the
Homegrown Terrorist Threat, (Comm. Print, May 8, 2008), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/IslamistReport.pdf.
\20\Inside the Mind of ISIS at 16, 67 (statements of Dr. Jessica
Stern, Research Professor, Pardee School for Global Studies, Boston
Uni., and Dr. Bernard Haykel, Director, The Institute of Transregional
Studies, and Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton Univ.)
(explaining that parents think kids are safe online and a description
of ISIS luring kids from online discussions to play its own version of
Grand Theft Auto the video game).
\21\Id. at 5 (statement of Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Org.
for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/
testimony-mirahmadi-2016-01-20.
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Counter-narrative measures
At the Committee's 2015 hearing on the use of social media
by terrorists, Peter Bergen testified on the importance of
amplifying a positive message rather than trying to attack or
eliminate the negative message put forward by terrorist groups
like ISIS.\22\ In 2016, further testimony before the Committee
on the topic of messaging revealed that foreign fighters are
often motivated to avenge the oppressed as a result of ISIS's
focus on a narrative of victimization, humiliation, and
ultimately, redemption.\23\ To address this, Dr. Jessica Stern,
a Research Professor at Boston University's Pardee School of
Global Studies, testified that any counter-narrative should
offer vulnerable individuals ``another way to be heroes,'' and
should avoid feeding a narrative of ISIS as the redeeming
champion that defends humiliated victims.\24\
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\22\Jihad 2.0: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 63 (2015) (statement of Peter Bergen,
Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation)
[hereinafter Jihad 2.0].
\23\Inside the Mind of ISIS at 11, 15, 32 (statements of Dr.
Jessica Stern, Research Professor, Pardee School for Global Studies,
Boston Uni., and Dr. Bernard Haykel, Director, The Institute of
Transregional Studies, and Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton
Univ.).
\24\Id. at 31-33 (statement of Dr. Jessica Stern, Research
Professor, Pardee School for Global Studies, Boston U.).
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Also at the Committee's social media hearing, Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross, a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense
of Democracies, testified that ``the interconnectivity of the
Internet . . . suddenly makes someone who is alone a part of a
group.''\25\ To counter the social appeal of terrorist
narratives, the Department's CVE measures promote integrated
and resilient communities that are aware of threats and better
equipped to expose the lies and manipulations of a foreign
terrorist organization that hopes to exploit vulnerable
individuals for a narrow violent agenda.\26\ Dr. Healton, who
previously served as President and Chief Executive Officer of
Legacy, the leading Foundation dedicated to tobacco control,
highlighted a successful example of youth changing behavior
after a national campaign exposed how the tobacco industry was
lying to its customers in a hearing on countering the demand
for drugs.\27\ Dr. Healton testified that youth were energized
by a grassroots campaign in the days before social media.\28\
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\25\Jihad 2.0 at 31 (statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior
Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
\26\Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to
Countering Violent Extremism, DHS https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/US%20Government%20Approach%20to%20CVE-
Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf (last visited June 29, 2016).
\27\America's Insatiable Demand For Drugs: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016)
(statement of Cheryl Healton, Dean, New York University).
\28\Id.
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Interventions
In August 2011, the Administration released a strategy
entitled ``Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism in the United States.''\29\ The Administration
describes this as both a strategy to ``prevent'' and a policy
to ``counter'' violent extremism domestically.\30\ This
strategy expresses a willingness to consider new and innovative
preventive tools that can address the evolving nature of
terrorism better than traditional Federal counterterrorism
functions.\31\
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\29\Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United
States (Aug. 3, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2011/08/03/empowering-local-partners-prevent-violent-extremism-united-
states.
\30\Press Release: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (Feb
18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-
sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism.
\31\Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative:
Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center
on Global Counterterrorism 6 (Feb. 2013), http://globalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_Strat&Comm.pdf.
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However, the accompanying Strategic Implementation Plan
(SIP) ensured that traditional national security or law
enforcement agencies will lead the programs and activities
outlined in the strategy.\32\ Moreover, the SIP ``does not
outline mechanisms for law enforcement to refer radicalizing
individuals for community intervention.''\33\ As such, the CVE
strategy and SIP support training society to recognize
radicalization, but offer no recommendations on how to cope
with a radicalized individual unless that individual
``mobilizes and becomes a terrorism suspect.''\34\
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\32\Jerome P. Bjelopera, supra note 11, at 29.
\33\ Id. at 17.
\34\Id.
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Moreover, according to a National Institute of Justice
funded evaluation of a ``multi-faceted, U.S. community-based,
Muslim-led CVE program,'' the Government CVE strategy of
``centralized coordination and decentralized execution''\35\
has led to a grass-roots ``lack of basic awareness and
information regarding appropriate responses to the warning
signs of radicalization'' that impedes efforts to seek help
``when an acquaintance, friend, or loved one appears to be on a
path toward violent extremism.''\36\ This same evaluation,
together with a separate study by the same researchers, made
valuable findings that could help the Department ensure funding
is awarded to the most effective community-led CVE programs
possible. It found that peers are best positioned to notice
radical changes in a friend's baseline behavior.\37\ While
approaching a third-party goes against the grain, peers were
willing to do so, but more likely to directly talk to a friend
that showed signs of supporting violent extremism then to
approach law enforcement.\38\
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\35\Nine Years After 9/11 (statement of Michael E. Leiter,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center).
\36\Michael J. Williams, Ph.D., John G. Horgan, Ph.D., & Williams
P. Evans, Ph.D., Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based,
Muslim-Led CVE Program, National Criminal Justice Reference Service 8-9
(June 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf.
\37\Id. at 54.
\38\Williams et al, The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for
Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-
Seeking, 8 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression
49-50 (2016), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
19434472.2015.1101147.
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Importantly, a CVE-engaged network of community,
government, nonprofit, and religious community actors is
critical to community-led interventions. That network
necessarily includes law enforcement so that if, or when, the
line to criminal activity is crossed, civilian service
providers know who to call. For example, in a study of lone
wolf terrorist attacks that occurred after the attacks on
September 11, 2001, 76 percent of perpetrators broadcasted
their intentions prior to an attack, often more than once.\39\
CVE engagements should inform communities that any such open
threat of criminal intent should be referred to law
enforcement. Law enforcement can build collaborative
partnerships with communities by keeping them aware of local
threats and educating civilians about the legal limitations of
law enforcement interventions when no crime has been committed.
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\39\Inside the Mind of ISIS at 2 (Hedieh Mirahmadi, President,
World Org. for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)).
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Office of Partnerships Against Violent Extremism
Until recently, DHS's CVE efforts were ``scattered across a
number of components, lack[ed] specific goals, and [resulted
in] tangible measures of success in pursuit of those
goals.''\40\ In September 2015, Secretary Johnson announced the
creation of the Office of Community Partnerships, which would
serve as the Department's new CVE office.\41\ To reflect the
Committee's agreement that the Department's CVE efforts should
be coordinated in one office, and to codify the
responsibilities of that office, S. 2522 creates the ``Office
of Partnerships Against Violent Extremism'' (or the ``Office'')
within DHS. The name of the office clarifies the shared mission
of government and civilian CVE providers: to prevent harm by
building social cohesion through the development of
partnerships between different levels of the government and
with community leaders, religious communities, civic groups,
and non-profit organizations.
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\40\Johnson supra note 4, at 1.
\41\Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Sec., Secretary Jeh Johnson on
DHS's New Office for Community Partnerships (Sept. 28, 2015), https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/28/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-
dhs%E2%80%99s-new-office-community-partnerships#.
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Given the serious nature of the violent extremism threat to
the homeland, the bill elevates the head of the Office to an
Assistant Secretary position to help ensure that the position
has appropriate stature and influence. In an effort to improve
the transparency of the Department's CVE efforts, the Assistant
Secretary will develop a strategy and annually report to
Congress. Transparency is critical to building the trust
necessary to accomplish the Office's stated purpose of
partnering with communities to prevent violent extremism. In
addition, the new Office will create a national digital
engagement strategy, or a national campaign, to build awareness
of threats among communities at risk and better equip them to
expose the lies and manipulations of a foreign terrorist
organization that hopes to exploit vulnerable individuals for a
narrow violent agenda. This is a continuation of the
Department's longstanding efforts to inform communities and
state and local law enforcement on common behaviors that could
indicate a developing terrorist attack.\42\
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\42\Homeland Threats and Agency Responses (citing Hon. Janet
Napolitano's, Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Sec., Responses to Questions
for the Record on file with HSGAC staff); Understanding the Homeland
Threat Landscape--Considerations for the 112th Congress: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Hon.
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Sec.).
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S. 2522 requires the new Office to issue a report that
includes an evaluation of the use of Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) and State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)
grants to support community-led CVE efforts and whether such
grants are effectively used to counter violent extremism. It
also prohibits the award of UASI or SHSP grants to any group
that has funded domestic terrorism or international terrorism.
The Office should develop Federal guidance to facilitate
the creation of community-led intervention and prevention
options, as well as build awareness of those options and the
Federal support available. Based on recent lessons learned from
current CVE programs, it should develop training curriculum
that outlines how to approach a peer who might be radicalizing
and develop guidance for when and how a peer should involve
third parties.\43\
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\43\Id.
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This legislation prioritizes CVE partnerships with civil
society groups and communities. It also codifies coordination
with the Department's Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties whenever the Department engages communities at risk
for radicalization and recruitment for violent extremist
activities to ensure that the Department's CVE activities fully
respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all
persons.
As the Committee has learned, ``no family is immune from
the radicalization threat.''\44\ Therefore, S. 2522 makes clear
that communities at risk for radicalization shall not be
defined or identified solely by the community's race, religious
affinity, or ethnicity.
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\44\Inside the Mind of ISIS (statements of Lorenzo Vidino,
Director, Program on Extremism, The George Washington Univ., and Hedieh
Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE))
(explaining that approximately 40 percent of those arrested for ISIS-
related crimes in the United States were people who had not grown up
practicing Islam, but who were converts); ISIS in America: From
Retweets to Raqqa at 7 (explaining that 40 percent is a statistically
significant number as it is nearly double the percentage within the
broader American Muslim population).
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III. Legislative History
Ranking Member Tom Carper introduced S. 2522 on February 9,
2016, which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered S. 2522 at a
business meeting on February 10, 2016.
Chairman Ron Johnson offered one amendment in the nature of
a substitute. The amendment makes technical changes, strikes
language establishing a new CVE grant program, and requires an
evaluation of the use and effectiveness of UASI and SHSP grants
awarded to community-led CVE efforts. The substitute amendment
also provides definitions for the terms ``Administrator,''
``Assistant Secretary,'' ``Domestic Terrorism; International
Terrorism,'' and ``Radicalization.'' Finally, the substitute
amendment prohibits the use of UASI or SHSP grants to support
any group that has funded domestic terrorism or international
terrorism.
The Committee adopted the amendment and ordered the bill,
as amended, reported favorably, both by voice vote. Senators
present for both the vote on the amendment and the vote on the
bill were: Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, Lankford, Ayotte,
Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp,
Booker, and Peters.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported
Section 1. Authorization of the Office for Partnerships Against Violent
Extremism of the Department of Homeland Security
Subsection (a) of S. 2522 amends the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 and is divided into two further subsections.
Subsection (a) (1) of S. 2522 amends Title XIII of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 by inserting a new section 802,
which establishes the Office in DHS.
The new section 802 is divided into seven subsections.
These subsections establish the Office and its leadership,
define the Office's responsibilities, require DHS to develop a
strategy to counter violent extremism, and impose periodic
reporting and review requirements upon the Office.
Subsection (a) defines ``Administrator,'' ``Assistant
Secretary,'' ``countering violent extremism,'' ``domestic
terrorism,'' ``international terrorism,'' ``radicalization,''
and ``violent extremism.''
Subsection (b) establishes the Office. Subsection (c)
states that the Secretary shall designate an Assistant
Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism who will
report directly to the Secretary. Subsection (d) states that
the Secretary shall designate a career Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism, and is
authorized to assign or hire permanent staff to the Office.
Subsection (e) describes the responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism.
These responsibilities include leading DHS CVE efforts to
partner with communities and civil society groups; ensuring all
such activities respect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties; and assessing methods used by violent extremists to
recruit persons and disseminate propaganda. The Office is also
responsible for developing a digital engagement strategy;
serving as the primary DHS coordinator with other Federal CVE
efforts; providing CVE-relevant guidance to the Administrator
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency regarding the use of
UASI and SHSP grants; and expanding philanthropic support for
domestic CVE efforts. The Office may not consider a community
to be at risk for radicalization and recruitment solely on the
basis of race, religious affiliation, or ethnicity.
Subsection (f) requires the Secretary of DHS to submit,
within 90 days of enactment, a comprehensive CVE strategy to
the appropriate congressional committees. The strategy shall
address DHS's community and digital engagement efforts;
interagency cooperation; privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties protections; evaluation metrics; a violent extremism
threat assessment; and CVE goals. The strategy shall facilitate
oversight and transparency of DHS's research on violent
extremism; relevant nondiscrimination policies; community
engagement and partnerships; support for non-DHS partners; and
the dissemination of training, resources, and threat
assessments. Within 90 days of the submission of the strategy
described above, the Secretary shall submit to the same
committees an implementation plan with an integrated master
schedule and cost estimate for included activities and
programs.
Subsection (g) requires the Assistant Secretary for
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism to submit an annual
report of the Department's and the Office's activities to
counter violent extremism; a summary of civil rights and civil
liberties protections; an evaluation of the use and
effectiveness of UASI and SHSP grants to support efforts of
local communities in the United States to counter violent
extremism; and a description of how the Office has incorporated
lessons learned. The first such annual report is due on April
1, 2017.
Subsection (h) requires the Office for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties within DHS to conduct a review of the Office to
ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are
respected. This review shall be made publicly available on the
DHS website.
Subsection (a)(2) of S. 2522 amends Title XX of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to prohibit using UASI and SHSP
funds to support any organization or group which has knowingly
or recklessly funded domestic terrorism or international
terrorism.
Subsection (b) of S. 2522 includes technical and conforming
amendments to the table of contents of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002.
Subsection (c) of S. 2522 sunsets Subsection (a) (1) of S.
2522 and Subsection (b) of S. 2522.
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
May 17, 2016.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2522, a bill to
amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build partnerships
to prevent violence by extremists.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Aurora
Swanson.
Sincerely,
Keith Hall.
Enclosure.
S. 2522--A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build
partnerships to prevent violence by extremists
S. 2522 would establish an Office for Partnership Against
Violent Extremism within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to develop and implement a strategy to coordinate efforts
throughout all levels of government and private industry to
counter violent extremism. CBO estimates that implementing the
legislation would have no significant effect on the federal
budget over the 2017-2021 period because DHS is already
performing those activities under current law.
Enacting S. 2522 would not affect direct spending or
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO
also estimates that enacting the bill would not increase net
direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027.
Under current law, DHS established the Office of Community
Partnerships (OCP) in 2015 to counter violent extremism in
communities throughout the United States. In fiscal year 2016,
$3 million was provided for OCP and DHS expects to spend
similar amounts ($3.5 million) each year thereafter for OCP's
activities. Those activities (which are similar to provisions
in the bill) include:
Forming a task force to coordinate efforts
to counter violent extremism with federal and
nonfederal partners in communities throughout the
United States,
Providing technical assistance and support
to communities to counter violent extremism, and
Sharing information about the risks of
violent extremism in communities, and establishing
infrastructure to share lessons learned, best
practices, and feedback on the findings of the task
force.
S. 2522 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aurora Swanson.
The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
S. 2522 as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is
printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES; INSPECTOR GENERAL;
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; COAST GUARD; GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Coordination with Non-Federal Entities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 802. Office for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism.
SEC. 802. OFFICE FOR PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Administrator.--The term `Administrator' means
the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
(2) Assistant Secretary.--The term `Assistant
Secretary' means the Assistant Secretary for
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism designated under
subsection (c).
(3) Countering violent extremism.--The term
`countering violent extremism' means proactive and
relevant actions to counter recruitment,
radicalization, and mobilization to violence and to
address the immediate factors that lead to violent
extremism and radicalization.
(4) Domestic terrorism; international terrorism.--The
terms `domestic terrorism' and `international
terrorism' have the meanings given those terms in
section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.
(5) Radicalization.--The term `radicalization' means
the process by which an individual chooses to
facilitate or commit domestic terrorism or
international terrorism.
(6) Violent extremism.--The term `violent extremism'
means international or domestic terrorism.
(b) Establishment.--There is in the Department an Office
for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism.
(c) Head of Office.--The Office for Partnerships Against
Violent Extremism shall be headed by an Assistant Secretary for
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism, who shall be designated
by the Secretary and report directly to the Secretary.
(d) Deputy Assistant Secretary; Assignment of Personnel.--
The Secretary shall--
(1) designate a career Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism; and
(2) assign or hire, as appropriate, permanent staff
to the Office for Partnerships Against Violent
Extremism.
(e) Responsibilities.--
(1) In general.--The Assistant Secretary shall be
responsible for the following:
(A) Leading the efforts of the Department to
counter violent extremism across all the
components and offices of the Department that
conduct strategic and supportive efforts to
counter violent extremism. Such efforts shall
include the following:
(i) Partnering with communities to
address vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by violent extremists in the
United States and explore potential
remedies for Government and non-
government institutions.
(ii) Working with civil society
groups and communities to counter
violent extremist propaganda,
messaging, or recruitment.
(iii) In coordination with the Office
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of
the Department, managing the outreach
and engagement efforts of the
Department directed toward communities
at risk for radicalization and
recruitment for violent extremist
activities.
(iv) Ensuring relevant information,
research, and products inform efforts
to counter violent extremism.
(v) Developing and maintaining
Department-wide strategy, plans,
policies, and programs to counter
violent extremism. Such plans shall, at
a minimum, address each of the
following:
(I) The Department's plan to
leverage new and existing
Internet and other technologies
and social media platforms to
improve non-government efforts
to counter violent extremism,
as well as the best practices
and lessons learned from other
Federal, State, local, tribal,
territorial, and foreign
partners engaged in similar
counter-messaging efforts.
(II) The Department's
countering violent extremism-
related engagement efforts.
(III) The use of cooperative
agreements with State, local,
tribal, territorial, and other
Federal departments and
agencies responsible for
efforts relating to countering
violent extremism.
(vi) Coordinating with the Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the
Department to ensure all of the
activities of the Department related to
countering violent extremism fully
respect the privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties of all persons.
(vii) In coordination with the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology
and in consultation with the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, identifying and recommending
new empirical research and analysis
requirements to ensure the
dissemination of information and
methods for Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial countering
violent extremism practitioners,
officials, law enforcement personnel,
and non-governmental partners to
utilize such research and analysis.
(viii) Assessing the methods used by
violent extremists to disseminate
propaganda and messaging to communities
at risk for recruitment by violent
extremists.
(B) Developing a digital engagement strategy
that expands the outreach efforts of the
Department to counter violent extremist
messaging by--
(i) exploring ways to utilize
relevant Internet and other
technologies and social media
platforms; and
(ii) maximizing other resources
available to the Department.
(C) Serving as the primary representative of
the Department in coordinating countering
violent extremism efforts with other Federal
departments and agencies and non-governmental
organizations.
(D) Serving as the primary Department-level
representative in coordinating with the
Department of State on international countering
violent extremism issues.
(E) In coordination with the Administrator,
providing guidance regarding the use of grants
made to State, local, and tribal governments
under sections 2003 and 2004 under the
allowable uses guidelines related to countering
violent extremism.
(F) Developing a plan to expand philanthropic
support for domestic efforts related to
countering violent extremism, including by
identifying viable community projects and needs
for possible philanthropic support.
(2) Communities at risk.--For purposes of this
subsection, the term `communities at risk' shall not
include a community that is determined to be at risk
solely on the basis of race, religious affiliation, or
ethnicity.
(f) Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the United
States.--
(1) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives a comprehensive Department strategy to
counter violent extremism in the United States.
(2) Contents of strategy.--The strategy required
under paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum, address each
of the following:
(A) The Department's digital engagement
effort, including a plan to leverage new and
existing Internet, digital, and other
technologies and social media platforms to
counter violent extremism, as well as the best
practices and lessons learned from other
Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial,
nongovernmental, and foreign partners engaged
in similar counter-messaging activities.
(B) The Department's countering violent
extremism-related engagement and outreach
activities.
(C) The use of cooperative agreements with
State, local, tribal, territorial, and other
Federal departments and agencies responsible
for activities relating to countering violent
extremism.
(D) Ensuring all activities related to
countering violent extremism adhere to relevant
Department and applicable Department of Justice
guidance regarding privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties, including safeguards against
discrimination.
(E) The development of qualitative and
quantitative outcome-based metrics to evaluate
the Department's programs and policies to
counter violent extremism.
(F) An analysis of the homeland security risk
posed by violent extremism based on the threat
environment and empirical data assessing
terrorist activities and incidents, and violent
extremist propaganda, messaging, or
recruitment.
(G) Information on the Department's near-
term, mid-term, and long-term risk-based goals
for countering violent extremism, reflecting
the risk analysis conducted under subparagraph
(F).
(3) Strategic considerations.--In drafting the
strategy required under paragraph (1), the Secretary
shall consider including the following:
(A) Departmental efforts to undertake
research to improve the Department's
understanding of the risk of violent extremism
and to identify ways to improve countering
violent extremism activities and programs,
including outreach, training, and information
sharing programs.
(B) The Department's nondiscrimination
policies as they relate to countering violent
extremism.
(C) Departmental efforts to help promote
community engagement and partnerships to
counter violent extremism in furtherance of the
strategy.
(D) Departmental efforts to help increase
support for programs and initiatives to counter
violent extremism of other Federal, State,
local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental,
and foreign partners that are in furtherance of
the strategy, and which adhere to all relevant
constitutional, legal, and privacy protections.
(E) Departmental efforts to disseminate to
local law enforcement agencies and the general
public information on resources, such as
training guidance, workshop reports, and the
violent extremist threat, through multiple
platforms, including the development of a
dedicated webpage, and information regarding
the effectiveness of those efforts.
(F) Departmental efforts to use cooperative
agreements with State, local, tribal,
territorial, and other Federal departments and
agencies responsible for efforts relating to
countering violent extremism, and information
regarding the effectiveness of those efforts.
(G) Information on oversight mechanisms and
protections to ensure that activities and
programs undertaken pursuant to the strategy
adhere to all relevant constitutional, legal,
and privacy protections.
(H) Departmental efforts to conduct oversight
of all countering violent extremism training
and training materials and other resources
developed or funded by the Department.
(I) Departmental efforts to foster
transparency by making, to the extent
practicable, all regulations, guidance,
documents, policies, and training materials
publicly available, including through any
webpage developed under subparagraph (E).
(4) Strategic implementation plan.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after
the date on which the Secretary submits the
strategy required under paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives an implementation plan for each
of the components and offices of the Department
with responsibilities under the strategy.
(B) Contents.--The implementation plan
required under subparagraph (A) shall include
an integrated master schedule and cost estimate
for activities and programs contained in the
implementation plan, with specificity on how
each such activity and program aligns with
near-term, mid-term, and long-term goals
specified in the strategy required under
paragraph (1).
(g) Annual Report.--Not later than April 1, 2017, and
annually thereafter, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to
Congress an annual report on the Office for Partnerships
Against Violent Extremism, which shall include the following:
(1) A description of the status of the programs and
policies of the Department for countering violent
extremism in the United States.
(2) A description of the efforts of the Office for
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism to cooperate
with and provide assistance to other Federal
departments and agencies.
(3) Qualitative and quantitative metrics for
evaluating the success of such programs and policies
and the steps taken to evaluate the success of such
programs and policies.
(4) An accounting of--
(A) grants and cooperative agreements awarded
by the Department to counter violent extremism;
and
(B) all training specifically aimed at
countering violent extremism sponsored by the
Department.
(5) An analysis of how the Department's activities to
counter violent extremism correspond and adapt to the
threat environment.
(6) A summary of how civil rights and civil liberties
are protected in the Department's activities to counter
violent extremism.
(7) An evaluation of the use of section 2003 and
section 2004 grants and cooperative agreements awarded
to support efforts of local communities in the United
States to counter violent extremism, including
information on the effectiveness of such grants and
cooperative agreements in countering violent extremism.
(8) A description of how the Office for Partnerships
Against Violent Extremism incorporated lessons learned
from the countering violent extremism programs and
policies of foreign, State, local, tribal, and
territorial governments and stakeholder communities.
(h) Annual Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this section, and every year thereafter, the
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department
shall--
(1) conduct a review of the Office for Partnerships
Against Violent Extremism activities to ensure that all
of the activities of the Office related to countering
violent extremism respect the privacy, civil rights,
and civil liberties of all persons; and
(2) make publicly available on the website of the
Department a report containing the results of the
review conducted under paragraph (1).; and
* * * * * * *
TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Grants to States and High-Risk Urban Areas
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2008. USE OF FUNDS.
a) * * *
(b) Limitations on Use of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Funds provided under section 2003 or
2004 may not be used--
(A) To supplant State or local funds, except
that northing in this paragraph shall prohibit
the use of grant funds provided to a State or
high-risk urban area for otherwise permissible
uses under subsection (a) on the basis that a
State or high-risk urban area has previously
used State or local funds to support the same
or similar uses; [or]
(B) For any State or local government cost-
sharing contribution[.];or
(C) to support any organization or group
which has knowingly or recklessly funded
domestic terrorism or international terrorism
(as those terms are defined in section 2331 of
title 18, United States Code) or organization
or group known to engage in or recruit to such
activities, as determined by the Assistant
Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent
Extremism in consultation with the
Administrator and the heads of other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies.
* * * * * * *
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