[Senate Hearing 111-868]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-868
THE CURRENT READINESS OF THE U.S. FORCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 14, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
EVAN BAYH, Indiana, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
MARK UDALL, Colorado JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Current Readiness of the U.S. Forces
april 14, 2010
Page
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff................ 4
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine
Corps.......................................................... 9
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
U.S. Navy...................................................... 18
Chandler, Gen. Carrol H. USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 30
(iii)
THE CURRENT READINESS OF THE U.S. FORCES
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Evan Bayh
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bayh, Udall, Burris,
Inhofe, Chambliss, Thune, and Burr.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Peter K. Levine, general
counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel;
and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Patrick Hayes,
assistant to Senator Bayh; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to
Senator Udall; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris;
and Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EVAN BAYH, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bayh. Good afternoon, everyone. The hearing will
please come to order.
The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on
the current readiness of our forces with respect to deployed,
deploying, and nondeployed units, and the Services' ability to
meet combatant commanders' requirements and respond to
unforeseen contingencies. We're all particularly interested in
your assessment of strategic risk resulting from the commitment
of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other areas
around the globe. We are also interested in the status of unit
reset activities, how you are all managing those vital
readiness accounts, your areas of concern, and the impact and
expected duration of reset actions on near- and mid-term
readiness.
One of my concerns is that we have relied too much on
supplemental funding to resource our reset activities. In order
to restore the readiness of our Armed Forces, it will be
absolutely critical to fully fund reset several years beyond
our withdrawal dates from Iraq and Afghanistan. I remain
concerned that the requirements for combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan continue to consume readiness as fast as we can
create it. I understand that high operational demand and tempo
keeps the Services off balance. But, we must strive to find new
ways to restore readiness. While I understand the enemy we face
gets a vote, we must improve the way we do business, as our
current strategy is not sustainable and reduces our full
spectrum of capabilities today and in the long run.
My biggest fear is that prolonged stress on our Armed
Forces will break our Strategic Reserve. We must increase the
dwell time between deployments, not only for the men and women
in uniform, of our All-Volunteer Force, but for their families,
who are critically important, as well.
In order to reduce risk to our National Military Strategy,
we must continue to fully invest in our maintenance accounts to
restore readiness. We cannot afford to merely man, train, and
equip units ``just in time'' for deployment. We continue to
have a significant difference in readiness between deployed and
nondeployed forces. Nondeploying forces, along with our
National Guard and Reserve units, continue to bear the burden
of being billpayers for deploying units. We are very interested
in hearing the Services' goals, priorities, and investment
plans for rebuilding the force, and when they expect readiness
will begin to improve.
When we talk about supporting the troops, operation and
maintenance (O&M) accounts are where we must back up our talk
with funding. These are the funds that train, house, and
protect our Armed Forces with the food, water, ammunition,
flying hours, steaming days, and tank miles that need to
accomplish their mission. At a time when readiness is under
stress, we must do all that we can to protect these accounts
from unreasonable cuts.
Gentlemen, I know you have prepared statements, which will
be included in the record. In the interest of time, if you
would please summarize, and then we'll have plenty of time for
questions and discussions. If you could roughly keep it to
about 7 minutes, give or take, with some flexibility there for
things you think are particularly important, I think that would
be a good place to begin, and then we'll get into the questions
and answers, and flesh out the statements, as need be.
I want to sincerely thank all of you for your dedicated
service and your sacrifice to our Nation. I also want to thank
you all, for making the time to attend our hearing this
afternoon. I look forward to your testimony.
I will now turn to my friend and colleague, Senator Burr,
for his opening remarks. I want to thank him for his devotion
to this committee and to the good citizens of the State of
North Carolina.
Senator Burr. Thank you.
Senator Bayh. Senator Burr.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD BURR
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and Generals, welcome. We're delighted to have you
here today.
I commend the chairman for calling this hearing as we
continue to focus this committee's attention on the critical
issue of the readiness of our combat units.
I also want to thank our witnesses for their dedication and
for their service. I note that, despite 8 years of sustained
combat operations, morale remains high, recruiting remains
strong, retention is excellent, and our units, more
importantly, continue to accomplish their mission. These are
testaments to the leadership of our panelists, and their
service.
Mr. Chairman, this is the third year of hearings on current
unit readiness. During this time, we've achieved success in
Iraq, meeting our goal of an orderly drawdown and transfer of
security responsibilities to a democratically elected
government of Iraq. The drawdown in Iraq has allowed us to
surge forces and resources in Afghanistan in order to establish
stability in a country that, for years, served as a training
ground for terrorists. By this August, we plan to reduce U.S.
force levels in Iraq to 50,000. In Afghanistan, we're surging
30,000 troops over the same period of time. The Marine Corps
has completed its withdrawal from Iraq and is now deploying
roughly 8,000 of the 30,000 additional troops to support
increased combat operations in Afghanistan, bringing the Corps'
troop level in there to about 19,400. This combined logistical
movement is the largest effort since World War II.
I'd like to hear from each of our witnesses today how this
rapid redeployment of forces impacts personnel and equipment
readiness, particularly our readiness of nondeployed units at
home.
What concerns me is our ability to respond to the next
challenge; in other words, our strategic depth. Our Nation
expects that our fighting force in all Services has been the
best equipped and trained to provide to our most precious
resources, the young men and women who choose freely to serve
in our military. For them to be consistently ready, we need to
look further than those fateful days of September 11, when
attacks here, on our Nation, called for an immediate and
decisive response to the horrible attacks on New York and
Washington.
No better demonstration of what this country expects, in
terms of Strategic Reserve, can be found than the understanding
of what we've been asked to do in the 82nd Airborne, out of
Fort Bragg. Major elements of the division have recently
returned from a year in Afghanistan, yet on January 14, 2010,
the 82nd Airborne was called upon by the President, with no
prior notice, to deploy to Haiti to provide humanitarian
assistance, security, and disaster relief. Within days, over
3,000 personnel of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), a
decorated unit with two rotations in Afghanistan, began
providing manpower and security to about 15 food distribution
sites around Port-au-Prince, Haiti, as well as running the
international airport. Today major elements of the 2nd BCT
still remain in Haiti.
This is not only an Army response. The Marine Corps
deployed the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), on January
13 from Camp Lejeune, to support relief operations with a
network of sea-based logistics and land-based support, with as
many as 1,100 marines and sailors ashore, to conduct immediate
aid efforts.
The Navy also contributed invaluable medical assistance
offshore by an unnoticed deployment of the hospital ship, the
USS Comfort, as well as using the medical treatment facilities
on board the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.
The Air Force supplied critical strategic airlift and air
traffic controllers to maintain an essential flow of resources
temporarily operating Haiti's main airport at Port-au-Prince.
While our Armed Forces responded magnificently to the
disaster in Haiti, I'm concerned that we have our premier
combat units still engaged there and not back in the States
with their families. This means less time to prepare for their
next duty.
In order for our combat forces to be ready to respond to
future challenges, our support of these efforts to restore
their readiness should be constant and vigilant. This will be
tougher to accomplish in a budget climate of soaring deficits
and economic hardships. It may be easier to claim victory in
Afghanistan and then start drawing down budgets for the
Department of Defense (DOD). This would be the same mistake
we've made in the past. The best equipment and proper training
needs to be in place before our Nation asks for further
sacrifice. As such, we should not continue to accept risk
across the full spectrum of operations.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses lay out their plans
to reset forces, both in the Active and Reserve.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Senator Burr, for your statement
and for your service on the committee. I only wish that every
Member of the U.S. Senate could have the kind of cooperative
relationship that the two of us have been fortunate enough to
enjoy. So, it's been good working with you.
Gentlemen, just one personal note, since this is the last
time I'll be chairing this subcommittee hearing. It is my hope
that our working together has been rigorous but not painful,
because we're all on the same team. I'm very grateful to each
and every one of you for your service to our country. I believe
that very strongly, as do the 6.5 million people of my State.
General Chiarelli, why don't we begin with you.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
General Chiarelli. Chairman Bayh, Ranking Member Burr, I
thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss
the readiness the U.S. Army. I've submitted a statement for the
record. I look forward to answering your questions at the
conclusion of my opening remarks.
As you are all aware, these are challenging times for our
Nation's military. Still, our deployed forces represent the
best-manned, -equipped, -trained, and -led in the history of
our Army. I'm incredibly proud of all they've accomplished in
Iraq and Afghanistan and around the world.
America's Army remains a resilient, professional force
dedicated to defending the Homeland and defeating our enemies.
However, 8-plus years of war continues to strain our soldiers,
our civilians, and their families, as well as our ability to
build trained and ready forces and respond to unforeseen
contingencies. Ultimately, this impacts the overall readiness
of our force. Readiness is a reflection of the total number of
deployed or deployable soldiers, time to train, and
availability to materiel resources. We made progress over the
last year in mitigating some of the negative effects of the
consistently high demand for forces. If demand continues to
come down as forecasted, and budgetary expectations remains
consistent, we should be able to restore our operational depth
by fiscal year 2012.
That said, this prediction is based upon a number of
factors, not the least of which is the projected drawdown of
forces in Iraq. We all recognize we live in an uncertain world
and there is always the possibility that circumstances may
change unexpectedly and dramatically. In any event, we will
work very closely with Congress and with DOD to make necessary
adjustments. In the meantime, we must continue to work together
to ensure all soldiers, from both our Active and Reserve
components, and their families, are properly cared for and have
the training, equipment, and resources they need to accomplish
their mission, now and into the future.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, I thank you again for
your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to
the outstanding men and women of the U.S. Army. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, USA
introduction
Chairman Bayh, Ranking Member Burr, distinguished members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today to provide a status on the Readiness of U.S. Army forces with
respect to deployed, deploying and nondeployed units and the Army's
ability to provide forces to meet combatant commanders' requirements
and respond to unforeseen contingencies.
On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John M. McHugh and our
Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr., I would like to take this
opportunity to thank you for your continued, strong support and
demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army civilians, and family
members.
As all of you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation's
military. We have been at war for the past 8-plus years. With the
support of Congress, our forces deployed are the very best manned,
equipped, trained and led in the 234-year history of the U.S. Army.
That said, this success has come at the expense of our nondeployed and
Generating Forces. The consequence is increased strategic risk to the
Nation.
The prolonged demand and high operational tempo of this two-front
war have undeniably put a strain on the readiness of our Force. Our
current readiness is a reflection of the total number of available
soldiers, as well as materiel resources--coupled with time to train.
This sum measure of readiness is further impacted by the overall global
demand for Army forces.
So long as demand exceeds supply, the availability and
deployability of soldiers, units, and equipment will be challenged, as
will the Army's ability to build trained and ready forces. In
particular, heightened, prolonged demand results in periods of degraded
readiness for nondeployed forces in order to shift soldiers and
equipment to units preparing to deploy.
The Army currently has limited capacity to respond to unforeseen
contingencies. However, if demand for Army forces comes down as
forecasted and budgetary expectations remain consistent, then we should
be able to restore our full operational depth by fiscal year 2012.
Recognizing this process will be dependent upon a number of factors
to include the projected drawdown of forces in Iraq; the continued
implementation of the rotational Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
model; and, the continued transition of our Reserve component (RC)
force from a Strategic Reserve to an operational force, thus allowing
the Army recurrent, assured, predictable access to the RC to meet
operational requirements IAW ARFORGEN. By fiscal year 2013, these
actions, in part, and the resulting increase in operational depth
should enable our Army to mitigate current strategic risk and reliably
respond to the full range of potential, unforeseen contingencies.
In the meantime, I assure the members of this subcommittee, the
Army is doing everything within its control to improve our readiness
and restore balance to the Force. Congress remains a vital partner in
this shared endeavor.
our plan to restore balance to the force
The U.S. Army remains focused on the four imperatives of our plan
to restore balance to the Force: our ability to sustain the Army's
soldiers, civilians, and families; prepare forces for success in the
current conflict; reset returning units to rebuild the readiness
consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and
contingencies; and transform to meet the demands of the 21st century.
sustain our all-volunteer force
Sustaining our All-Volunteer Force is our first imperative. The
soldier, as Secretary Gates has said, is our greatest strategic asset.
Unfortunately, after 8-plus years of war, we continue to see the high
OPTEMPO and prolonged stress and strain on our Force manifested in the
increased demand for behavioral health counseling and drug and alcohol
counseling; increased divorce rates; and increased numbers of soldiers
temporarily nondeployable from nagging injuries from previous
deployments.
The Army remains focused on providing vital family programs and
services to include welfare and recreation; youth services and child
care; Survivor Outreach Services; mental and behavioral health
services; and expanded counseling and rehabilitative opportunities for
soldiers and family members.
In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the
Army began a 5-year, $50 million seminal study into suicide prevention
that will help inform the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk
Reduction, and Suicide Prevention (ACPHP). The Army also began
instituting our Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program, an all-
inclusive approach that puts mental health on par with physical
fitness. By promoting resiliency and life-coping skills, we hope to
help our soldiers, civilians, and family members to better deal with
stress and other challenges. By enhancing the quality of life across
our Army community, we believe we will see improvement in many other
areas of concern, including suicides.
prepare forces for success
The centerpiece of our plan to continue to restore balance to our
Force is the maturation of the ARFORGEN model. This model represents
the core process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a
sustained and rotational basis--to meet current and future strategic
demands.
The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools--Reset, Train-
Ready, and Available. This process increases predictability for
soldiers, families, employers, and communities. ARFORGEN enables our
Reserve component to remain an integral element of the operational
force while providing the Nation with strategic depth (i.e., those
nondeployed units which are 2 to 3 years from commitment) and
operational flexibility to meet unexpected contingencies.
manning
The Army is currently implementing the Active Army temporary end-
strength increase of up to 22,000 soldiers approved by the Secretary of
Defense in July 2009. More than 8 years of sustained combat operations,
coupled with taking the Army off of stop-loss, have increased
nondeployable rates in our units. These increasing non-deployable rates
(from 9.92 percent in fiscal year 2007 to 12 percent in fiscal year
2009) require us to continue to overfill our deploying units. The
soldiers needed to overfill those deploying units come largely from
both nondeployed and Generating Force units. The resulting reductions
in personnel hamper the affected units' ability to train which
ultimately impacts the units' overall readiness.
The decision was made to temporarily increase the Army endstrength
by 15,000 soldiers by end of fiscal year 2010. This increase assisted
in offsetting the decline in available personnel in our Army units. We
added 5,000 soldiers in fiscal year 2009, and will add an additional
10,000 in fiscal year 2010. The resulting temporary Army end-strength
will be 562,400 soldiers.
The Army is still assessing the need for the additional 7,000
soldier growth for fiscal year 2011. This would bring us to the total
22,000 end-strength increase. The decision on whether or not to add the
additional 7,000 personnel is pending confirmation of our immediate
demand, the pace of the drawdown from Iraq, and the requirement for
forces in Afghanistan. If the decision is made to add the additional
7,000 soldiers, growth could be complete by end of second quarter,
fiscal year 2011. We would hold at that end-strength for the requisite
12 months before beginning the 18-month drawdown. Regardless of the
decision on the 7,000 soldier growth, we plan to return to the pre-
increase end-strength level of 547,400 by the end of fiscal year 2013.
reset equipment
Equipment Reset is an essential element of readiness and restoring
balance to the Army for known and future requirements. Reset is a
necessary process that must continue not only as long as we have forces
deployed, but an additional 2 to 3 years after major deployments end to
ensure future equipment readiness.
Reset is especially challenging given the extraordinary wear on
vehicles, aircraft, and equipment in the harsh environments our forces
operate in today. Coarse sand, fine dust, extreme temperatures, and
high OPTEMPO erode sophisticated mechanical and electronic systems at
altitudes and loads which near the edge of the aircraft design
capabilities. Our rotary wing fleet, for example, operates up to six
times non-combat usage levels.
Reset timelines are directly related to the pace of the Iraq
drawdown, operational decisions such as the Operation Enduring Freedom
plus-up, available capacity within our industrial base (physical plant
capacities, labor and long lead-time parts) and the availability and
timing of funding. Over the past year, our depot-level Maintenance
Reset workload exceeded 100,000 items of equipment; and, we expect to
sustain this pace for as long as we have substantial forces deployed.
In fiscal year 2010, the Army plans to complete the equipment Reset 27
Brigades (25 maneuver and 2 enabling brigades), as well as numerous
below Brigade-level units.
Given current projections, we would expect our requirements to
decrease in the out-years as we complete the retrograde and Reset of
equipment from Iraq. That said, Reset activities alone cannot improve
Army Readiness in the near- or mid-term. Repairs, recapitalization, or
replacement of battle losses experienced in combat does not fix on-hand
equipment shortfalls that existed prior to a unit's deployment.
However, equipment Reset does ensure our on-hand equipment is
maintained at a high state of readiness to prepare units for future
combat operations.
readiness reporting
The Army has made progress towards implementing and advancing
readiness reporting policy and technology in 2009. Our current
readiness reporting system has considerably improved the accurate,
reliable measurement of units at the tactical and operational level.
However, significant challenges do still remain. The fast pace of
this war, coupled with the rapidly evolving demand for new and improved
capabilities means our requirements are constantly shifting and
equipment is continually on the move. Our longstanding unit readiness
reporting process was not designed to nor is it capable of keeping up
with or capturing the full `velocity' or magnitude of activity in our
current operating environments. Our longstanding readiness reporting
process has been adapted to support the ARFORGEN model and the Army's
new modular force structure.
We are making progress towards improving and expanding this
process. For example, the Army expanded the former Percent Effective
reporting to include manning and equipping levels for assigned
missions. This new rating called the A-Level incorporates assigned
mission manning and equipping ratings to better support commanders in
their assessments of assigned mission capabilities. These are reported
no later than 270 days prior to deployment or even earlier if the
command or component directs it.
These and other changes to the Army's overall readiness reporting
process represent significant improvements, but challenges still
remain. We must continue to make necessary adjustments and educate the
Force accordingly.
Army Prepositioned Stocks
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) continue--most recently in
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom--to fulfill
their primary purpose of enhancing the Army's strategic agility. We
have pulled equipment from and rebuilt APS several times over the past
8-plus years. Most recently, we used equipment from APS-3 and APS-5 to
support both the surge in Iraq and the ongoing plus-up in Afghanistan.
In order to restore operational flexibility and reduce strategic
risk, it is necessary that we continue to try to reconstitute APS, and
indeed, all our war reserve stocks. We have a strategy in place and
will continue to make appropriate budget requests to restore our APS to
full capability by 2015.
transforming our force
The Army is evolving our capabilities to meet current and future
strategic demands. We recognize that we must ensure our Nation has the
capability and range of military options to meet the challenges we face
in the 21st century. As Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey,
Jr. has stated, ``We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable
and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to
provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum
operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies--at a tempo
that is predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.''
The centerpiece of our efforts is the shift to a modular construct
focused at the brigade level, thus creating a more deployable,
adaptable, and versatile force. This ongoing transformation has greatly
enhanced the Army's ability to respond to any situation, quickly and
effectively. However, the degree of impact continues to vary, for
example, between Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), ``enablers,'' the Reserve
components, and individual soldiers.
strategic risk
Our Army remains a resilient, professional force dedicated to
defending the homeland and defeating our Nation's enemies. However, 8-
plus years of war continue to strain our soldiers, civilians, families,
equipment and infrastructure. We made considerable progress over the
last year in mitigating the negative effects of consistently high
demand for forces; nonetheless, high deployment-to-dwell ratios for
Army units and individuals continue to stress the All-Volunteer Force,
and challenge the Army's ability to respond to unexpected
contingencies. Strategic risk has been identified in the following
areas:
sustained demand
Since September 11, 2001, all deploying Army units are trained,
led, and equipped to achieve the highest readiness standards prior to
deployment. However, due to sustained demand, Army units are achieving
this deployment readiness closer and closer to their arrival dates in
theater. This creates operational risk by reducing the near-term
flexibility for adapting to mission-driven adjustments to arrival dates
or other requirements.
limited dwell time
Prolonged, heightened demand for Army forces continues to limit
availability of unit and individual dwell time. As a result, soldiers
often have minimal time to train, rest, and recuperate prior to their
next deployment. This also restricts the geographic combatant
commander's operational flexibility for altering unit arrival dates or
shifting areas of responsibility.
Projected increases to unit and individual dwell times depend on a
number of factors to include: absence of any significant new missions;
Iraq drawdown will proceed on time and year-end end-strength in Iraq
will be less than 50,000 personnel; we will maintain continued access
to RC forces; and, Afghanistan surge will proceed on time and not
increase beyond the planned level.
limited resources
Army and Defense resources are set within national affordability
parameters, yet demand is unconstrained. Over time, the Army (in
complete transparency with the Office of the Secrerary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and combatant commanders) has directed resources away from
non-deployed Operational Forces and our Generating Force to support our
forces deployed. The result is increased strategic risk in the Army's
ability to respond to unforeseen contingencies.
unfunded readiness priorities
While the Army does not have any unfunded requirements, as with any
budget request, there are areas where additional resources could
enhance existing programs. The continuous assessment of lessons learned
provides us with new information on possible items that, if
accelerated, would provide added value to commanders in the field.
unknown risk
We recognize that much of the risk we assume depends on minimal
projected reductions in demand and corresponding savings; and the
absence of unplanned events or a resurgence of tensions in 'hot spots'
around the world. If such unforeseen events occur, we will have to make
the necessary adjustments, to include reallocation of resources.
However, based on the current situation and known risks, we are
confident the fiscal year 2011 budget request, if appropriated in full,
would improve the overall readiness of our Force by ensuring the Army
is able to properly care for, train, equip and support our soldiers,
civilians, and family members around the world.
conclusion
These continue to be challenging times for our Nation and for our
military. With the support of Congress, we have deployed the best
manned, equipped, trained, and led forces in the history of the U.S.
Army over the past 8-plus years. However, the fact remains that we have
asked a great deal from our soldiers, civilians, and their families.
Looking ahead, the Army must continue to sustain our All-Volunteer
Army, modernize, adapt our institutions, and transform our Force. We
must ensure we have a trained and ready Force that is well-prepared,
expeditionary, versatile, lethal, sustainable, and able to adapt to any
situation.
I assure the members of this subcommittee--the Army's senior
leaders are focused and working hard to address these challenges and to
determine the needs of the Force for the future.
Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for your
continued and generous support of the outstanding men and women of the
U.S. Army and their families. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General Chiarelli.
General Amos, why don't we proceed next with you.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT,
U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Amos. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Bayh, Senator Burr, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the
readiness of your U.S. Marine Corps. On behalf of the more than
242,000 Active and Reserve marines and their families, I'd like
to extend my appreciation for the sustained support Congress
has faithfully provided its Corps.
As we begin this hearing, I would like to highlight a few
points from my written statement.
Within the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of
operations, we have successfully completed a responsible
drawdown of marines in Iraq. After 7 straight years of
sustained combat operations and nation-building, our work in
Iraq's Anbar Province is done. With the exception of our eight
training teams and the support to higher headquarters staff,
100 percent of our marines and 100 percent of their equipment
have left Iraq.
As we sit in this hearing room today, more than 31,000
marines remain deployed across the globe, supporting oversees
contingency operations (OCO) and security cooperation
activities and exercises. Specifically, your Corps has
reoriented its principal efforts towards Afghanistan. To date,
we have 20,525 marines and sailors on the ground in
Afghanistan. We will close the remainder of this surge force by
the end of this month.
All of our forward-deployed units were manned, trained, and
equipped to accomplish their assigned missions. These units
continue to report the highest levels of readiness for those
missions. For the past 8 years, we have been fully engaged in
winning combat operations as part of this generational struggle
against global extremism. As I testified last year before this
subcommittee, this sustained effort in performance does not
come without cost to the institution, to our equipment, and to
our strategic programs, and most importantly, to our marines
and their families.
Equipment readiness of our nondeployed units is of great
concern to our senior leadership. We have taxed our home-
station units, as the billpayer, to ensure that marines in
Afghanistan in our MEUs have everything that they need. As a
result, the majority of our nondeployed forces are reporting
degraded materiel readiness levels. This degraded state of
readiness within our nondeployed forces presents risk to our
ability to respond rapidly to other unexpected contingencies
around the globe.
The tempo of operations in the harsh environments that we
have been in since 2003 have accelerated the wear and tear on
our equipment. Necessarily, the diversion of equipment in
theater from Iraq to Afghanistan has delayed reset actions at
our logistics depots within the United States. Our current
estimate of the cost of reset for the Marine Corps is $8
billion. Additionally, validating the lessons learned from 8
years of combat has necessitated that we update and approve the
way we equip our units. The cost for these changes to our
equipment sets is estimated to be an additional $5 billion.
Money to reset and rebuild the Marine Corps will be required
for several years after the end of the war. I ask for your
continued support for that continued funding as we rebuild our
Nation's Corps. With your steadfast support, we will succeed in
current operations, take care of our marines and their
families, reset and modernize our equipment, and train the
marine air/ground task forces for the challenges of the future.
We continue to stand ready as the Nation's expeditionary force
in readiness.
I thank you, each of you, for your faithfulness to our
Nation, and I request that my written testimony be accepted for
the record. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC
introduction
Chairman Bayh, Ranking Member Burr, and distinguished members of
the committee, on behalf of your Marine Corps, I want to thank you for
your generous support and for the opportunity to speak with you today
about the readiness of the U.S. Marines. My statement will address our
efforts to create a balanced force capable of prevailing in current
conflicts while preparing for other contingencies, the readiness
challenges facing marines today, and the critical steps needed to reset
and reconstitute our Corps for today's complex challenges and
tomorrow's uncertain security environment.
Despite high operational tempo, your marines are resilient,
motivated, and performing superbly in missions around the globe. This
sustained effort and performance does not come without costs--to the
institution, to our equipment, to our strategic programs, and most
importantly, to our marines and their families. Continued congressional
investment in our marines and families, resetting and modernizing our
equipment, and training Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) for the
future security environment are critical to the Marine Corps' success
as the ``Nation's Force in Readiness.''
readiness assessment
The pace of operations for your marines remains high, with over
31,000 marines forward-deployed across the globe. In the U.S. Central
Command area of operations, there are over 23,000 marines deployed in
support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF).
Our mission in Iraq is now complete. After 7 years of intense combat
and nation building operations, the Marine Corps returned the Anbar
Province to the leadership of Iraq. With exception of some Training
Team members, our last piece of equipment and our last marine departed
Iraq this past week. In the course of the last 8 years, your Marine
Corps has been battle-tested, combat-hardened, and has accumulated
tremendous experience in irregular warfare and counter-insurgency
operations. Forward deployed units are manned, trained, and equipped to
accomplish their assigned missions, and these units are reporting the
highest levels of readiness for those missions. However, resources are
limited, and non-deployed units incur the costs of ensuring deployed
and next-to-deploy units have sufficient personnel, equipment, and
training. As a result, our nondeployed forces continue to report
degraded readiness levels. This degraded state of readiness within our
non-deployed forces presents risk in our ability to rapidly respond to
other unexpected contingencies.
Because our equipment, personnel, and training priorities are
focused on counter-insurgency operations, we have experienced
degradation in some of our traditional, full spectrum, core
competencies such as integrated combined arms operations and large-
scale seaborne operations. These skills are critical to maintaining the
Marine Corps' primacy in theater access operations that enable follow-
on joint forces. The OIF/OEF demand for units has also limited our
ability to fully meet combatant commander requests for theater
engagement activities. The current security environment has clearly
justified the tradeoffs we have made to support Overseas Contingency
Operations, but the uncertainty of the future makes it prudent to
regain our capabilities to operate across the full range of military
operations.
In addressing the challenges facing the Marine Corps, I have
structured my statement along the lines of our key readiness concerns--
equipment, personnel, military construction, training, amphibious
shipbuilding, and caring for our warriors and their families. I will
discuss the positive steps and proactive initiatives we are
undertaking, with your support, to reset, modernize, and reconstitute
the Marine Corps for an uncertain future. Finally, I will conclude with
some of our ongoing initiatives and programs that address the care and
welfare of our marines and their families.
equipment readiness
Ensuring that our marines are equipped with the most modern and
reliable combat gear is a necessity. However, the requirement to fully
resource deployed forces, often in excess of our tables of equipment,
has reduced the availability of materiel essential to outfit and train
our nondeployed units. Approximately 21.5 percent of all Marine Corps
ground equipment and 42 percent of our aviation assets are deployed
overseas. Most of this equipment is not rotating out of theater at the
conclusion of each force rotation; it remains in combat, to be used by
the relieving unit. As of 1 Mar 2010, Marine Corps Logistics Command
folded its flag, redeployed, and the final 21 trucks headed for Kuwait;
we have completed the responsible drawdown from Iraq, our mission there
is complete. While we reorient our effort to OEF operations, we have
been transitioning a significant amount of equipment to Afghanistan. We
continue to face significant home station equipment readiness
challenges.
ground equipment readiness
After 8 years of sustained combat operations, our deployed
equipment has been subject to significant wear and tear, harsh
environmental conditions, and increased operating hours and mileage.
Additionally, the weight associated with armor plating further
increases the wear on our deployed vehicle fleet and accelerates the
need for repair and replacement of these assets. Despite these
challenges and higher utilization on already aging equipment, our young
marines are keeping this equipment mission-ready every single day. The
high equipment maintenance readiness rates throughout the Marine Corps
are a testament to their dedication and hard work.
The policy to retain equipment in theater as forces rotate in and
out was accompanied by increased in-theater maintenance presence. This
infusion of maintenance support has paid great dividends, with deployed
ground equipment maintenance readiness above 90 percent. However, the
Marine Corps is experiencing challenges with the supply availability of
a number of critical equipment items at home stations. Supply readiness
rates (On-hand vs Required) have decreased for home station units,
while we work to meet the demand of deployed forces and those next-to-
deploy. Shortages of critical equipment limit home station units'
ability to prepare and train to their full core competencies and
present additional risk in availability of equipment necessary to
respond swiftly to unexpected contingencies.
The sourcing of equipment for the Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(MEB) in Afghanistan over the past year, and the transition to a much
larger Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (MEF(Fwd)), illustrates our
equipment availability challenge. Equipment assets were pulled from
across the entire Marine Corps to accomplish this task. To ensure the
MEF(Fwd) is provided the newest and most capable equipment, over 34
percent of their equipment came via new procurement provided by Marine
Corps Systems Command. Approximately 42 percent of the equipment came
from within the Central Command area of operations, including items
made available from units retrograding from Iraq; and about 4 percent
of the required assets were sourced from our Logistics Command Maritime
Prepositioning Ships Program and the Marine Corps Prepositioning
Program in Norway. Although a concerted effort was made to minimize the
impact on home station unit readiness, 20 percent of the equipment for
I MEF(Fwd) needed to be drawn from our non-deployed operating forces.
The net effect has been degradation in readiness at home station. For
instance, the overall supply rating of Marine Corps units in
Afghanistan is near 100 percent, while the supply rating of units at
home station is less than 60 percent.
Ground equipment age continues to be a top readiness challenge as
well. As equipment ages, more time, money, and effort are expended
repairing it. Ultimately, the answer to achieving sustained
improvements in ground equipment readiness is to improve logistics
processes and to modernize with highly reliable and maintainable
equipment. The Corps is achieving efficiencies by improving supply-
chain processes, adopting best practices, and leveraging proven
technological advances to facilitate responsive and reliable support to
the Operating Forces.
aviation equipment
Our aviation capability is a critical part of the MAGTF. Just like
our ground force units, deployed Marine aviation units receive priority
for aircraft, repair parts, and mission essential subsystems such as
forward-looking infrared (FLIR) pods. Nondeployed forces, therefore,
face significant challenges for available airframes and supply parts.
Exacerbating the readiness challenges in our aviation fleet, most
Marine aircraft are older, or are ``legacy'' platforms no longer in
production, thus placing an even greater strain on our logistics chain
and maintenance systems.
Our Marine Corps aviation platforms are supporting ground forces in
some of the world's harshest environments: Afghanistan, the Horn of
Africa, and aboard ships around the world. While operating in these
demanding areas, our aircraft are often doubling--sometimes, nearly
tripling--the utilization rates for which they were designed.
Maintaining the readiness of aviation assets while training aircrew
is a large effort, and one which Marine Corps aviation is meeting
through a careful and ongoing program of mitigation, bridging legacy
platforms to new aircraft. We are replacing our assault support and
tactical aviation airframes through programs of record, which will
provide the MAGTF with dependable and tactically dominant capabilities
for decades to come. The key to our steady improvement of Marine Corps
aircraft flexibility is maintaining the ``ramp rates'' at which we
purchase these improved airframes.
Fleet Readiness Centers have been able to mitigate the strain on
our aircraft materiel readiness through modifications, proactive
inspections, and additional maintenance actions. These efforts
successfully bolstered aircraft reliability, sustainability, and
survivability. We expect requirements for depot-level maintenance on
airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment will continue well
beyond the conclusion of hostilities.
prepositioning equipment and stores
Marine Corps Prepositioning Programs are comprised of the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF), with three Maritime Prepositioning Ships
Squadrons, and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N).
Since 2002, we have drawn equipment from our strategic programs and
stocks to support combat operations, Operation Unified Response, growth
of the Marine Corps, and other operational priorities. While the
readiness of the strategic prepositioning programs continues to
improve, equipment shortages in our strategic equipment prepositioned
stores have forced the Marine Corps to accept necessary risk in our
ability to rapidly respond to worldwide contingency operations. With
Congress' support, our end item shortfalls in the MPF and MCCP-N
programs will be reset, in accordance with operational priorities, as
equipment becomes available.
in-stores equipment
In-stores equipment refers to our pool of assets that serves as a
source of equipment to replace damaged or destroyed equipment in the
operating forces, and potentially fill shortfalls in the Active and
Reserve components. This equipment was used heavily to meet equipment
requirements in Iraq, and it continues to support our forces in
Afghanistan. The availability, or supply rating, for in-stores assets
has been degraded over the past years and limits our ability to rapidly
respond to unexpected contingencies and to replace damaged equipment in
the operating forces.
equipment initiatives
To counter the readiness impact of damaged, destroyed or worn out
equipment, the Marine Corps initiated a program to reset and modernize
our force. The goal of our reset and modernization programs is to
sustain the current fight by repairing or replacing worn out or
damaged/destroyed equipment while enhancing our support to the
warfighter by reconstituting our force with newer, more capable
equipment. Over time, these initiatives will help to increase
nondeployed unit readiness by enhancing home station equipment pools
and predeployment unit training requirements.
equipment reset
Reset consists of actions taken to restore units to a desired level
of combat capability commensurate with a unit's assigned mission. It
encompasses maintenance and supply activities that restore and enhance
combat capability to equipment that has been damaged, rendered
obsolete, or worn out beyond economical repair due to combat operations
by repairing, rebuilding, or procuring replacement equipment. In light
of the continued high tempo of operations in the CENTCOM AOR, and the
delay in reset actions due to the diversion of equipment to
Afghanistan, we estimate the cost of reset for the Marine Corps to be
$8 billion ($3 billion requested in the fiscal year 2011 OCO and an
additional $5 billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict.
To prepare for the reset of equipment redeployed from Iraq, we
created an OIF Reset Plan. The plan synchronizes Marine Corps reset
efforts to ensure we effectively and efficiently reset equipment to
support follow-on operations. Equipment being redeployed is inspected,
sorted and redistributed in theater, or redeployed to the continental
United States to maintenance facilities. This equipment will then be
repaired and distributed to fill shortfalls for established priorities.
Equipment determined to be beyond economical repair will be disposed of
and replacements procured.
modernization
As the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps
is required to prepare for the unexpected. We are making progress in
repairing and resetting existing equipment, but this effort must be
augmented with continued investment to modernize our capabilities.
Equipment modernization plans are a high priority within our Corps. Our
Commandant's Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 will help guide our
modernization efforts as we continue to be the agile and expeditionary
force for the Nation.
ground modernization
Prompted by a changing security environment and hard lessons
learned from 8 years of combat, the Marine Corps completed a review of
its Operating Force's ground equipment requirements. Recognizing that
our unit tables of equipment (T/Es) did not accurately reflect the
challenges and realities of the 21st century dispersed battlefield, the
Corps revised T/Es for our operating units. This revision was
synchronized with our modernization plans and programs, and provides
enhanced mobility, lethality, sustainment, and command and control
across the MAGTF. The new equipment requirements reflect the
capabilities necessary, not only for the Corps' current mission, but
for its future employment across the range of military operations,
against a variety of threats, and in diverse terrain and conditions. We
estimate the cost associated with our revised tables of equipment to be
$5 billion.
aviation modernization
We are modernizing the aircraft we fly, even as we continue our
long-range plan to replace our entire operational aircraft fleet with
new or rebuilt airframes; changing the way we think about aviation
support to our ground forces; and improving our capabilities to conduct
operations in any clime and place. We are committed to an ``in-stride
transition'' from 12 legacy type/model/series aircraft to 6 new
aircraft, including the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, the MV-22 Osprey,
the KC-130J, the CH-53K, and upgrades to our H-1 series helicopters. To
help meet the growing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
requirements of our operating forces, the Marine Corps is fielding
three groups of unmanned aircraft systems. It is critical that these
programs stay on track, and on timeline, with full funding support, due
to the declining service life of our legacy tactical aviation
platforms. These improvements will increase the Corps' aviation
capability and MAGTF flexibility, and ensure our continued warfighting
advantage.
personnel readiness
The Marine Corps is meeting all Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
and Operation Unified Response requirements. The demand and associated
operational tempo for marines will remain high as we provide requested
forces to Afghanistan. Meeting this global demand resulted in short
deployment-to-dwell ratios for many units, with some deployed for as
many months as they spend at home. Some of our low-density/high-demand
units such as Intelligence, Communications, Explosive Ordnance
Disposal, and certain aviation units, remain at about a 1:1 dwell
ratio, with only moderate relief in sight for the near future.
Insufficient dwell time negatively impacts our total force readiness
because it leaves inadequate time to conduct full spectrum training and
reconnect with families.
Another readiness detractor has been the need to task combat arms
units, such as artillery, air defense, and mechanized maneuver to
perform ``in-lieu-of'' (ILO) missions such as security, civil affairs,
and military policing. Shortages of those skill sets created the need
for ILO missions to meet the requirements for counter-insurgency
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although these mission assignments
are necessary, they have degraded our readiness because these combat
units are unable to train to and maintain proficiency in their primary
skill sets.
Additionally, the Marine Corps is tasked to fill a variety of
assignments for forward-deployed staffs, training teams, and joint/
coalition assignments that exceed our normal manning structures. The
manning requirements for these uncompensated Individual Augments (IAs),
Training Teams (TTs) and Joint Manning Documents (JMDs) seek seasoned
officers and staff noncommissioned officers because of their
leadership, experience, and training. We understand that these
augmentees and staff personnel are critical to continued success in
Iraq and Afghanistan, but their extended absence has degraded home
station readiness, full spectrum training, and unit cohesion. This has
become most evident in our field grade ranks. In addition to the IA,
TT, and JMD billets, emerging requirements associated with activation
of USCYBERCOM, the AF-PAK Hands program, AFRICOM, and increased SOCOM
support have compounded the demand for Marine majors, lieutenant
colonels, and colonels who would otherwise be assigned to key
leadership positions in the operating force.
personnel initiatives
In order to better meet the needs of a nation at war, the Corps has
grown to its authorized active duty end strength of 202,000 marines.
This increase in manpower will ultimately result in a Marine Corps with
three balanced Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), and will help
mitigate many of our operational tempo challenges described in the
previous section. A balanced Marine Corps will provide combatant
commanders with fully manned, trained, and equipped MAGTFs that are
multi-capable, responsive, and expeditionary. Additionally, our current
end strength growth will increase our capacity to deploy forces in
response to contingencies and to participate in exercises and
operations with our international partners in support of the Nation's
broader security objectives. It will also allow more time at home for
our marines to be with their families, to recover from long
deployments, regain proficiency in core skills, and prepare for their
next mission.
Thanks to the continued support of Congress, we have increased our
infantry, reconnaissance, intelligence, combat engineer, unmanned
aircraft, military police, civil affairs, and explosives ordnance
disposal communities. Most of these units have already deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan, mitigating the need for additional ILO missions. We
have realized improvements in dwell time for a number of stressed
communities. Although the plan is progressing well, the growth in end
strength will not result in an immediate improvement in reported
readiness, because it takes time to train and mature our newly
recruited marines and units.
military construction
In conjunction with the Marine Corps' growth, military construction
is critical to supporting and sustaining the new force structure and
maintaining the individual readiness and quality of life for our
marines. Thanks to your support, we recently expanded our construction
efforts and established a program that will provide adequate bachelor
housing for our entire force by 2014. Since the announcement of the
Commandant's Barracks Initiative in fiscal year 2008, Congress has
funded approximately 19,700 barracks spaces for our marines. We ask for
your continued support of this program to meet our 2014 goal.
Concurrent with our new construction efforts is our commitment for the
repair and maintenance of existing barracks to improve morale and
quality of life.
training marines to fight
In preparing marines to fight in ``any clime and place,'' the
perennial challenge to our Corps is to attain the proper balance
between core warfighting capabilities and those unique to current
operations. Decreased unit dwell times and shortages of equipment in
our non-deployed forces translate to a limited ability to conduct
training on tasks critical to our core competencies, such as integrated
combined arms, large force maneuver, and amphibious operations. Short
dwell times between deployments and the need for many units to perform
``in lieu of missions'' have resulted in a singular focus on counter-
insurgency training. Our marines continue to be well trained for
current operations through a challenging pre-deployment training
program that prepares them for all aspects of irregular warfare.
predeployment training program
We have continued to improve our demanding, realistic and adaptive
pre-deployment training program in order to properly prepare our
operating forces for the rigors and challenges they face in OEF. The
Predeployment Training Program (PTP) contains standards-based, skill
progression training which is evaluated by commanders and assessed by
our Training and Education Command at the final Mission Rehearsal
Exercise. The PTP includes counter-insurgency combat skills, training
in joint/coalition operations, working with our interagency partners,
and increasing operational language sets and cultural skills. Unit
after-action reports and unit surveys conducted by the Marine Corps
Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) are shared Corps-wide and have
influenced training changes to keep PTP relevant. For example, the
Afghanistan Pre-Deployment Training Program, while similar in many
facets to the PTP for Iraq, includes mountain warfare training, an
increased emphasis on MAGTF combined arms training, and a focus on
partnering and mentoring of host nation security forces.
While our PTP focuses on preparing Marine units for their next
deployment, we are further enhancing our education and training
programs to respond to ongoing changes in the security environment.
Through the efforts of the MAGTF Training Command and organizations
such as Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, Marine Corps
Tactics and Operations Group, the Center for Advanced Operational
Culture Learning, the Security Cooperation Education and Training
Center, Marine Corps Advisor Training Group, and the Marine Corps
University, we are providing holistic training and education for our
marines across the range of military operations. Based on a continuous
lessons learned feedback process, supported by the Marine Corps Center
for Lessons Learned, we are building Enhanced MAGTF Operations
capability which will make all of our MAGTFs more lethal, agile, and
survivable.
preparing for future conflict
As challenging as it is to prepare marines for the current fight,
our forces must adapt to the ever-changing character and conduct of
warfare to remain relevant. To meet the complex challenges in the
emerging security environment, we are improving training and education
for the fog, friction and uncertainty of the 21st century battlefield.
We are focusing efforts on our small unit leaders--the ``strategic
noncommissioned officers'' and junior officers--who will operate more
frequently in a decentralized manner and assume greater responsibility
in operations against hybrid threats.
To better prepare our MAGTF to operate across the spectrum of
conflict, we are developing an improved training and exercise program.
When implemented, this program will increase our ability to maintain
proficiency in core warfighting capabilities, such as combined arms
maneuver and amphibious operations, while continuing to meet current
commitments. Three important training concept exercises being developed
are the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX), the Marine Air
Ground Task Force Large Scale Exercise (MAGTF-LSE), and a joint Navy-
Marine Corps initiative titled Bold Alligator. The CALFEX will be a
live-fire training exercise aimed at developing combined arms maneuver
capabilities from individual marine to regimental-sized units. It will
incorporate lessons learned from today's conflicts, while training
adaptable and flexible MAGTFs for the future. The MAGTF-LSE will be a
scenario-based, service-level training exercise, scalable from MEB to
Marine Expeditionary Force levels. It will develop the MAGTF's
capability to conduct amphibious power projection and sustained
operations ashore in a combined, joint, whole-of-government
environment. Lastly, Bold Alligator is specifically designed to re-
energize the Navy/Marine Corps' understanding of the intricacies of
amphibious operations. The initial audience is Expeditionary Strike
Group 2 (ESG2) and the 2nd MEB who will participate in a number of
planning seminars and simulated exercises in preparation for the fleet
exercise scheduled in fiscal year 2011. We envision that the Bold
Alligator series will continue indefinitely and progress to include a
wider range of participants.
amphibious shipbuilding
Amphibious warships provide distributed forward presence to support
a wide range of missions from theater security cooperation and
humanitarian assistance to conventional deterrence to assuring access
for the Joint Force. In support of day-to-day Combatant Commander
demands and in major combat operations, the number of amphibious ships
in the Department of the Navy's inventory is critically important. As
discussed in the fiscal year 2011 Shipbuilding Report to Congress, the
Navy is reviewing options to increase the assault echelon to reflect a
minimum of 33 amphibious ships to support assured access operations
conducted by the assault echelons of 2.0 MEBs. The Navy and Marine
Corps have determined a minimum of 33 ships represents the limit of
acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship amphibious force requirement.
caring for our warriors and families
A critical part of our overall readiness is maintaining our solemn
responsibility to take care of our marines and their families. While
marines never waiver in the ideals of service to Country and Corps, the
needs of our marines and their families are constantly evolving. With
more than 45 percent of our marines married, we believe that investment
in our families is critical to the long-term health of our institution.
Marines have reasonable expectations regarding housing, schools, and
family support. It is incumbent upon us, with the generous support of
Congress, to support them in these key areas. Marines make an enduring
commitment to the Corps when they earn the title, Marine. The Corps, in
turn, makes an enduring commitment to every marine and his or her
family.
personnel and family readiness programs
Taking care of marines and their families remains one of our
highest priorities. With your help, we initiated a myriad of personnel
and family readiness program reforms during fiscal years 2008 and 2009
with supplemental appropriations. As a result of extensive program
assessments and evaluations, we have built these programs into our
baseline, and our baseline budget in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 is $399
million per year. Key accomplishments through our transition phase
include:
Establishment of over 400 full-time Family Readiness
Officer positions at the unit level to provide direct support
to the unit commander and families.
Development of an inventory of Lifeskills training
courses supported by full-time Marine Corps Family Team
Building trainers.
Transformation of the Exceptional Family Member
Program (EFMP) to ensure enrolled family members have access to
a continuum of care, while providing the sponsor every
opportunity for a successful career. The Marine Corps EFMP has
been recognized as a premier, full-service program to be used
as a template for other services. Since 2007, sponsor
enrollment has increased by 40 percent.
Direct attention to suicide prevention. The loss of
any marine through suicide is a tragedy. With 52 suicides
confirmed or suspected in 2009, the Marine Corps recorded its
highest suicide rate since the start of OEF/OIF. We are taking
proactive action, focusing on the important role of leaders of
all ranks in addressing this issue.
Enhancing Combat and Operational Stress Control
capabilities to further assist leaders with prevention, rapid
identification and early treatment of combat and operational
stress. Through the Operational Stress Control and Readiness
(OSCAR) program, we are embedding mental health professionals
in deploying operational units to directly support all Active
and Reserve ground combat elements. This will be achieved over
the next 3 years through the realignment of existing Navy
structure supporting the operating forces, and by increasing
the Navy mental health provider inventory. The OSCAR capability
is also being extended down to infantry battalions and
companies by providing additional training to OSCAR Extenders
(existing medical providers, corpsmen, chaplains, and religious
program specialists) to make the OSCAR expertise more
immediately available to marines. In addition, we are training
senior and junior marines to function as OSCAR Mentors. In this
capacity, they will actively engage marines who evidence stress
reactions, liaison with OSCAR Extenders, and advocate for
fellow marines regarding stress problems. OSCAR Mentors will
also greatly decrease the stigma associated with stress
reactions, and help marines take care of their own.
As we move forward, we are continuing to assess the efficacy of our
programs and to empower marines and their families to improve family
readiness and maintain a positive quality of life. These initiatives
and others demonstrate the commitment of the Marine Corps to our
families, and highlight the connection between family readiness and
mission readiness. We are grateful to Congress for your unwavering
support of these important programs.
improving care for our wounded warriors
The Marine Corps is proud of the positive and meaningful
accomplishments of the Wounded Warrior Regiment in providing
comprehensive recovery and transition support to our wounded, ill, and
injured marines and sailors and their families. The Regiment provides
all Active and Reserve marines with non-medical care without regard to
the origin of the Marine's condition. Whether the road to recovery
keeps wounded warriors in the Marine Corps or helps them transition to
civilian life, the Regiment continues to develop programs that focus on
Wounded Warriors' abilities and facilitates their recovery.
The Regiment's Recovery Care Coordinators serve as the primary
point of contact for wounded, ill and injured marines and their
families. These coordinators help marines meet individual goals for
recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration. They also work with
families and family caregivers to ensure they have the necessary
information, care and support during these difficult times.
The Sergeant Merlin German Wounded Warrior Call Center, a
Department of Defense Best Practice recipient, receives calls from
active duty members, veterans and families seeking assistance in
matters of Wounded Warrior care and transition. The call center also
conducts important outreach calls to monitor injury recovery and
distribute information on new programs offered by the Regiment, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs and other
entities. Augmented by a staff of psychological health professionals,
the call center also provides critical assistance to those seeking help
for post traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury.
Our Wounded Warrior Employment Cell, manned by marines and
representatives of the Departments of Labor and Veterans Affairs,
identifies and coordinates with employers and job training programs to
help wounded warriors obtain positions in which they are most likely to
succeed and enjoy fulfilling careers.
The Marine Corps' commitment to our wounded, ill, and injured is
steadfast. We are grateful for the support and leadership of Congress
on their behalf. I would like to extend my personal thanks to you and
all Members of Congress for your visits to our wounded, ill, and
injured marines and sailors and their families in the hospitals and
other facilities where they are being treated.
conclusion
This Nation has high expectations of her Corps--and marines know
that. Your marines are answering the call around the globe while
performing with distinction in the face of great danger and hardships.
The Corps provides the Nation unrivaled speed, agility, and flexibility
for deterring war and responding to crises; our ability to seize the
initiative and dominate our adversaries across the range of military
operations requires the right people, the right equipment, and
sufficient time to train and prepare.
As marines continue to serve in combat, we must provide them all
the resources required to complete the tasks we have given them. Now,
more than ever, they need the sustained support of the American people
and Congress to maintain readiness, reset the force during an extended
war, modernize to face the challenges of the future, and fulfill the
commitments made to marines, sailors, and their families.
On behalf of your marines, I offer our sincere appreciation for
your faithful support and thank you in advance for your ongoing efforts
to support our brave warriors. The Corps understands the value of each
dollar provided by the American taxpayer, and will continue to provide
maximum return for every dollar spent. Today over 203,253 Active and
39,400 Reserve Force marines remain ready and capable as the ``Nation's
Force in Readiness'' . . . and with your continued support, we will
stay that way.
Senator Bayh. Without objection, all the written testimony
will be accepted into the record.
General Amos, thank you very much.
Oh, and by the way, let me note the presence of Senator
Burris.
Thank you for your devotion to the committee, and your
attention here today.
Admiral Greenert.
STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bayh, Senator Burr, distinguished members of the
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, it's my honor to
appear before you to testify on the readiness of our Navy.
Mr. Chairman, I have a brief opening statement, and, as you
said, please accept my full statement for the record.
I'd like to make three points, if I may. My first point
addresses our increase in our fiscal year 2011 base budget O&M
request. During the past 9 years, sustaining the readiness of
our force in a high-demand operational environment has been
aided by OCO funds or similar supplemental funding. Despite
this, both the high operational tempo and the reduced
turnaround ratio continue to increase risk to fleet readiness,
force structure, and personnel.
As we look to the future, we have to balance global demand
with the global management of our forces, and we should
transition a supplemental resource dependency toward a baseline
budget that provides the level of resources and resource
support needed to meet an operational level that we refer to
now as the ``new normal.'' To do this, we have increased our
base budget O&M request by about 6 percent; that's $3.5
billion, when compared to last year. This request is designed
to meet our global obligations, properly sustain ships,
aircraft, and expeditionary equipment to reach the end of their
expected service lives, fund enduring flying readiness
requirements, and fund price increases--notably, fuel. We
request the support of Congress to fully fund the O&M request
in the base budget and to fund contingency operations and
maintenance in the OCO funding. This level of funding request,
appropriately, represents our ``new normal.''
My second point addresses reset. Navy ships and aircraft
are capital-intensive forces procured to last for decades.
Scheduled maintenance of our force structure, training and
certification of our crews between deployments, is a key
element in Navy's reset of the force. This interdeployment,
maintenance, and training, we refer to as ``reset in stride.''
It helps assure timely rotational deployment of our forces,
ensures capability and capacity for future missions, and
enables forces to surge for operations such as Operation
Unified Response in Haiti. Reset translates into decades of
readiness for each ship and aircraft, and it's a good return on
investment. We rely on OCO, if you will, to fund the requisite
OCOs and, in part, to reset in stride.
My third and final point addresses family readiness
programs. We remain committed to the professional and personal
development of our sailors, our Navy civilians, and the support
to their families. Our budget request will enhance support to
our sailors and their families, including those who are
wounded, ill, and injured. Our Navy child and youth programs
provide high quality educational and recreational programs for
our children. We are leveraging military construction, Recovery
Act funding, commercial contracts, and military-certified in-
home care expansion to increase our childcare spaces and to
meet our goal for placing children under care.
I request your strong support for our fiscal year 2011
readiness budget request and our identified priorities.
Thank you very much for your unwavering support to our
sailors, civilians, and families, and for all that you do to
make our Navy effective and an enduring global force for good.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Jonathan Greenert, USN
Chairman Bayh, Senator Burr, and distinguished members of the
Senate Armed Services Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, it
is my honor to appear before you to testify on the readiness of our
Navy. Our Navy remains the preeminent maritime power, providing our
Nation a global force for good. Our sailors and civilians continue to
perform exceptionally well around the world under demanding conditions.
Many of them are engaged in combat operations ashore, and assisting the
people of Iraq and Afghanistan by providing security and helping to
build an enduring infrastructure. Many are working with coalition
partners to enable safe passage of shipping, reassuring relationships
with allies; building partnership capacity, providing security force
assistance and providing deterrence through ballistic missile defense
and coalition operations. Still, others are responding to emergent
calls for disaster relief and providing humanitarian assistance in
Haiti. These diverse operations are tangible examples of our Navy's
core capabilities as described in our Maritime Strategy--``A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower''. The 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) validated the underlying principle in our Maritime
Strategy: preventing wars is as important as winning wars.
Additionally, the QDR found that U.S. security and prosperity are
connected to the global commons; that deterrence is a fundamental
military capability; and that partnerships are key to our strategy's
success, and essential to the global stability. QDR's outcomes are
consistent with the tenets of our Maritime Strategy. Naval operations
are often one component of a joint force. Accordingly, it is my
privilege to address the committee alongside my fellow Service Vice
Chiefs and the Assistant Commandant.
Coincident with our endeavor to build our future force, we remain
engaged in supporting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and all other
Combatant Commander (COCOM) Areas of Responsibility. For the second
year in a row, Navy has more sailors on the ground than at sea in the
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. At sea in CENTCOM, we
have more than 9,000 sailors, including a Carrier Strike Group
dedicated to providing air support to U.S. and coalition ground forces
in Afghanistan, and combatants supporting ballistic missile defense,
anti-piracy, maritime security, counter-terrorism, theater security and
security force assistance. Navy Riverine forces are on their sixth
deployment to Iraq, conducting interdiction patrols and training their
Iraqi counterparts. On the ground, we have more than 12,000 Active and
Reserve sailors supporting Navy, Joint, and Coalition Forces, and
Combatant Commander requirements. In Afghanistan, Navy Commanders lead
seven of the 13 U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We have
doubled the capacity of our Seabee construction battalions in
Afghanistan, to support U.S. and coalition forces and provide critical
infrastructure. Our Naval Special Warfare forces continue to be heavily
engaged in combat operations. Our Explosive Ordnance Disposal
detachments, many embedded in ground units, continue to conduct
counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations and train Iraqi
and Afghan C-IED units. As we shift effort from Iraq to Afghanistan,
demand for Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs) has increased. During a
recent trip to CENTCOM in mid-February, I met many of our dedicated
Navy men and women supporting these efforts and I could not be prouder
of their contribution. Their professionalism, dedication and skill, are
unmatched.
While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to be the primary
effort, our Navy remains globally engaged. We have 120 ships deployed--
over 40 percent of our fleet--providing U.S. presence in every region
of the world and demonstrating the capabilities of our Maritime
Strategy. Our ballistic missile submarines are providing strategic
nuclear deterrence, while our Aegis cruisers and destroyers are
providing conventional deterrence in the form of ballistic missile
defense in CENTCOM, the eastern Mediterranean, and western Pacific. Our
Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups continue to prevent
conflict and deter aggression in the western Pacific, Persian Gulf,
Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Their rotational deployments afford the
U.S. the ability to influence events abroad, and the opportunity to
rapidly respond to crises. Our Navy continues to confront irregular
challenges associated with regional instability, insurgency, piracy,
and violent extremism at sea, in the littorals, and on shore. We
recently published the ``Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular
Challenges'' to refine how our Navy will plan, resource, and deliver a
wide range of capabilities through tailored forces (e.g.: riverine,
maritime civil affairs and security, and special operations), and
through our multi-mission general purpose forces (ships and aircraft).
We are partnering with U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement teams in the
Caribbean to conduct counter-narcotics and to deny illegal traffickers
use of the sea. We recently deployed USS Freedom (LCS1), our first
Littoral Combat Ship, to U.S. Southern Command. She is currently
operating with counter-narcotics units in the Caribbean, and has
already executed three successful drug interdictions. Her deployment, 2
years ahead of schedule, will allow us to more quickly evaluate her
capabilities and incorporate operational lessons into the tactics,
techniques and procedures of this new class of ships. We continue to
strengthen relationships and enhance the capabilities of our
international partners through maritime security activities such as
global partnership stations in Africa, South America, and Southeast
Asia. We reassure our allies through high-end training and operations
in the Western Pacific and Europe.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations continue
in Haiti after a 7.0-magnitude earthquake devastated the nation. Within
hours of the earthquake, we mobilized the aircraft carrier USS Carl
Vinson (CVN70) with over a dozen helicopters, cargo aircraft, and
extensive water-making capability; and quickly thereafter, the USS
Bataan (LHD5) amphibious ready group with heavy lift helicopters and
command and control capability, a Reserve Cargo Handling Battalion, a
Seabee construction detachment, and a Marine Corps expeditionary unit;
our hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH1) with medical personnel and
supplies has completed over 850 major surgeries; a Navy dive and
salvage team is working with Army dive teams to rebuild piers in the
port facility; P-3 surveillance aircraft have flown over 90
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance missions; several surface
ships with helicopters, and Military Sealift Command ships with fuel
and cargo. Navy helicopters have transported over 900 medical
evacuation patients to our off-shore hospitals and flown over 2 million
meals-ready-to-eat throughout the disaster zone. Our disaster relief
effort continues there today as part of a comprehensive U.S. Government
and nongovernmental organization response. Global demand for Navy
forces remains high and continues to rise because of the ability of our
maritime forces to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military
impediments to access while bringing the persistence, flexibility and
agility to conduct a broad spectrum of operations from the sea.
Our readiness programs and their processes, which are designed to
maximize the operational availability of our Navy force structure and
infrastructure, have been able, thus far, to satisfy the evolving and
dynamic requirements of the COCOMs. Demand for naval forces continues
to increase and shows no signs of abating in the near future. Your Navy
is ready, responsive, agile, flexible--and actively engaged around the
world.
Realistically, our ability to meet increasing demand requires that
we continue our efforts to balance resources to sustain afloat and
ashore readiness, force structure, and the readiness of our sailors and
their families. In the aggregate, the health of all of these programs
describes our total capability and capacity to deliver capable forces
ready for tasking. During the past 9 years, sustaining the readiness of
our force in a high demand operational environment has been aided by
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds or similar supplemental
funding. Despite this, both the high operational tempo and the reduced
turn-around ratio (dwell) caused a high global demand for forces
continue to increase risk to fleet readiness, force structure and
personnel. As we look to the future, we must holistically address the
fleet's operational availability requirements versus our global force
management (GFM); and transition a supplemental resource dependency to
a baseline budget that provides the level of resource support necessary
to meet the Nation's maritime interests in an era of increasingly
diverse, concurrent crises--the ``new normal''.
We remain focused on ensuring we are ready to answer the call now
and in the future. Last year, we stated our risk was moderate, trending
toward significant, because of the challenges associated with fleet
capacity; increasing operational requirements; and growing manpower,
maintenance, and infrastructure costs. This risk has increased over the
last year. Trends in each of these areas have continued. We are able to
meet the most critical COCOM demands today. But we are increasingly
concerned about our ability to meet additional demands while sustaining
a ready force through its expected service life by conducting essential
maintenance and modernization to ``reset'' our fleet; and procuring the
future Navy so we are prepared to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
The cost to operate and maintain our fleet has outpaced inflation
by almost 2 percent each year. The need to balance between future fleet
readiness and current readiness for operational requirements has
resulted in risk. We increased our base budget OMN request by $3.5
billion, a 5.9 percent real increase in fiscal year 2011 compared to
last year. This request is tightly focused on meeting global COCOM
operations tempo (OPTEMPO) requirements, and on properly sustaining
ships and aircraft to reach expected service lives, funding enduring
flying readiness requirements in the base budget, and funding price
increases, most notably in fuel. We request the support of Congress to
fully fund the OMN request as we endeavor to fund enduring operations
and maintenance in our base budget, and resource contingency operations
and maintenance in OCO. The level of funding requested appropriately
represents our ``new normal''.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget request achieves the optimal balance
among our priorities to build tomorrow's Navy, maintain our warfighting
readiness and develop and support our sailors, Navy civilians, and
their families. It is aligned with Presidential and Department of
Defense (DOD) guidance and it represents our Maritime Strategy and the
2010 QDR.
resetting the force: prevailing today and ready for tomorrow
In addition to conducting rotational deployments, we are meeting
emerging combatant commander requirements for ballistic missile
defense; electronic attack; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; combat support and combat service support; and maritime
security force assistance. Our OPTEMPO in CENTCOM will continue as the
combat mission ends in Iraq. Navy enabling forces will remain in
CENTCOM to provide various combat support/combat service support to
joint and coalition forces in the region. Concurrently, we will
continue to maintain a forward-deployed force of about 100 ships
globally to prevent conflict, support allies, and respond to crises.
The high OPTEMPO has placed additional stress on our sailors and
their families, ships, and aircraft. We are operating (and therefore
consuming) our fleet at a higher than expected rate. Over the last
decade, the size of our fleet has decreased while our operational
requirements have grown. Consequently, there are more ships at sea
assigned to COCOMs today and fewer ships available for at-sea training,
exercises, or surge operations. Our challenge is to balance the need to
meet current operational requirements with the need to sustain sailors'
proficiency, and our ship and aircraft expected service lives.
Navy ships and aircraft are capital-intensive forces, procured to
last for decades. Scheduled maintenance of our force structure, and
training and certification of our crews between deployments is a key
element in the ``reset'' of the force. This ``reset in stride'' process
is perhaps different from other Services. It enables our ships and
aircraft to rotate deployments and provide continuous forward presence
as well as be ready for sustained surge operations, such as the
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Haiti recently. For
Navy, ``reset in stride'' translates into decades of readiness for each
ship and aircraft, a good return on investment. However, deferring
maintenance and modernization risks sustained combat effectiveness of
force structure and reduces expected service lives. Almost three-
quarters of our current fleet will still be in service in 2020. These
``in-service ships'' and submarines are a critical part of our 30-year
Shipbuilding Plan and future inventory. Investment in the readiness of
today's fleet will yield dividends in future capability and capacity.
Navy has a ``current value'' in ships and aircraft of approximately
$640 billion. We are perhaps unique in that our maintenance accounts
maintain the force, modernize, and ``reset in stride'' for the service
life of our platforms. Since increased emergent operations are
consuming the expected service lives of fleet units, at an advanced
rate, Navy relies on OCO to fund OCOs and ``reset-in-stride''. Annual
costs to own and operate the fleet represent about 3 percent of the
capital value of our fleet assets. As we continue Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and sustain operating
at a ``new normal'', operating and maintenance costs in our baseline
accounts must keep pace.
fleet readiness: operations, maintenance, expeditionary (combat
support)
Fleet Response Plan
The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) is Navy's force generation construct
and has an operational framework of four phases (maintenance, basic,
integrated, and sustainment). FRP has proven to optimize the return on
training and maintenance, enhance sailor proficiency, and ensure units
and forces are trained and certified in defined, progressive levels of
employable and deployable capability. It provides COCOMs and the
National Command Authority a transparent readiness assessment of Navy
forces--ready for tasking. An FRP cycle is defined as: that period from
the end of a maintenance phase to the end of the next maintenance
phase. For surface combatants, an FRP cycle is nominally 24-27 months.
Maintenance completed during the ``maintenance phase'' supports the
appropriate readiness during remaining phases of a cycle. Personnel
manning processes within the FRP cycle maintain appropriate defined
unit manning readiness levels throughout the entire FRP cycle. We do
not allow personnel readiness levels to atrophy and then peak just
before a deployment. Training processes in the FRP provide appropriate
required levels of unit readiness in the Fleet Response Training Plan
(FRTP), and sustain deliberate unit readiness levels throughout the
phases of the FRP. In the aggregate, the FRP provides Navy forces with
the capability to respond to the full spectrum of Navy roles and
missions through traditional rotational deployments as well as emergent
COCOM needs (Request for Forces (RFF)).
Today's global security environment has created emerging demands
for Navy forces requiring more flexibility to respond to rotational
deployments, and emergent RFFs from geographic COCOMs. While
reaffirming the importance of Navy forward presence resourced through
rotational deployments, changes in the global security landscape have
highlighted the need for trained and ready Naval forces capable of
responding on short notice ``surge'' requirements. The rotational
aspect of the FRP makes it an inherently sustainable plan if properly
resourced. Risk in achieving the desired level of presence or surge is
determined by force structure decisions, the OPTEMPO of assets while
deployed, personnel manning, a proper maintenance phase and the length
and rigor of an FRTP.
The FRP is applied to every unit and group (carrier strike groups
and amphibious ready groups). The required operational availability of
forces is derived from the GFM Plan and the ``surge'' requirements
needed to support the most stressing operational plan. Our top priority
is ensuring that forces are fully maintained, trained and ready to
deploy.
Ship Operations
The fiscal year 2011 ship operation budget request (including OCO)
provides funding for ships to steam an average of 58 days per quarter
(while deployed) and 24 days per quarter (non-deployed). This OPTEMPO
enables the Navy to meet FRP and training/certification requirements
with acceptable risk. Risk is mitigated through increased use of
simulators, concurrent training and certification events while
underway, and judicious use of fuel.
While Navy met all fiscal year 2009 GFM commitments, and the
operational requirements in support of OIF and OEF, some fiscal
constraints resulted in degradation of readiness. Some unit training
was prioritized to support FRTP training/certification only, and
exercise and U.S. port visits were deferred. Some ships deployed to
theater ``surge capable'' and certified for planned theater operations,
but not ``Major Combat Operation (MCO)'' ready. MCO is the FRTP goal.
The fiscal year 2009 mitigation strategy was intended to be the
exception--sustaining Navy training readiness at these levels will have
a cumulative risk to mission success in future operations. Crew
proficiency can degrade in these circumstances.
Navy ships require routine corrective and preventive maintenance,
assigned and conducted within the capability and capacity of the ship's
crew. Deferring repair parts re-stock results in eventual inventory
shortages, and will likely result in eventual deferred preventive
maintenance. Deferred corrective maintenance by the crew reduces unit
readiness and can result in increased workload and cost for shore-based
repair facilities. Deferred preventive and corrective maintenance will
cause degraded performance or failure of installed equipment during
critical training events or deployments. Annual ship repair part
obligations have remained relatively unchanged for several years.
During fiscal year 2009, fleet operation mitigations (reduced OPTEMPO)
helped reduce the impact of ship repair parts shortfalls until OCO
funds were appropriated. However, an uneven temporal allocation of
funds results in:
Delayed funding (planning) for ship maintenance
periods
Delayed repairs (e.g., cross-decking parts to satisfy
emergent requirements and requisitions)
Deferred preventative maintenance
Delayed storeroom re-stock of repair parts
Another factor in ship operations is the price of fuel.
Fluctuations in fuel prices complicate the ability to precisely budget
operating costs.
Ship Maintenance
The fiscal year 2011 budget request (including OCO) resources the
ship maintenance account to 99 percent of requirement. This includes
carrier, submarine and surface ship dry-docking availabilities,
anticipated voyage repair and 40 of 49 non dry-docking surface ship
availabilities. We assess this to meet currently known requirements
with an acceptable level of risk. A key factor in the Navy's 30-Year
Shipbuilding Plan is the ability to reach the expected service life of
our ships. Reaching full service life requires an integrated
engineering approach to ensure the right maintenance is planned, funded
and executed over a ship's lifetime. We are committed to the right
level at the most efficient cost. An example of our effort to reduce
the total cost of ownership, the submarine technical community has
increased the operating interval for SSN 688 and SSN 774 class
submarines through analysis of engineered technical requirements and
assessment of recently completed availabilities. This change will
improve operational availability while reducing the cost of submarine
life-cycle maintenance.
We made significant improvements in the way the Navy manages the
maintenance and modernization of its surface force through efforts such
as the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management (SSLCM) Activity and the
Surface Ship Life Cycle Assessment Pilot Study. Partnering with the
fleet, the SSLCM Activity will assess and manage the maintenance
requirements throughout the life cycle of surface ships, enabling more
precise and accurate planning and budgeting. The SSLCM is modeled after
two successful and similar programs; the Submarine Maintenance
Engineering Planning and Procurement Activity and the Carrier Planning
Activity.
SSLCM is conducting a detailed technical review of surface ship
class maintenance plans to make certain we understand the full
maintenance requirement necessary to reach expected service life for
these platforms. We have completed the update on two of our larger ship
classes, the DDG 51 and the LSD 41/49 classes. SSLCM is now the
designated life cycle organization responsible for maintaining the
Integrated Class Maintenance Plans, building availability work
packages, and providing technical oversight/approval for fleet work
deferral requests.
The cyclical nature of ship and submarine depot availabilities from
year to year causes variations in budget requests and in annual
obligation levels. Budget years with multiple ship-docking
availabilities increase required funding. More maintenance scheduled in
the private sector tends to increase funding in a given year. Nuclear
powered carriers and submarines are on a strict time-based maintenance
interval in order to maintain certification for unrestricted
operations.
Surface ship availabilities are conducted almost exclusively in the
private sector. Nuclear submarine and aircraft carrier availabilities
are primarily conducted in the public sector, with selected
availabilities completed by nuclear capable private shipyards (Electric
Boat (Subs) and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (Subs/Carriers)).
Whenever practical, maintenance is performed in the ship's homeport to
minimize the impact on our sailors and their families. The Navy
recognizes that both public and private sector maintenance
organizations need a stable and level workload to maximize efficient
execution. Navy works to level the workload to the maximum extent
possible within operational constraints.
Air Operations (Flying Hour Program)
The Flying Hour Program (FHP) account provides for the operation,
maintenance, and training of ten Navy carrier air wings (CVWs), three
Marine Corps air wings, Fleet Air Support (FAS) squadrons, training
commands, Reserve forces and various enabling activities. The fiscal
year 2011 budget request (including OCO) resources the FHP account to
achieve Training-rating (T-rating) levels of T2.5 for Navy and T2.0 for
the Marine Corps. TACAIR (Tactical Aviation) squadrons conduct strike
operations, provide flexibility in dealing with a wide range of
conventional and irregular threats, and provide long range and local
protection against airborne surface and sub-surface threats. FAS
squadrons provide vital fleet logistics and intelligence. Chief of
Naval Air Training (CNATRA) trains entry-level pilots and Fleet
Replacement Squadrons (FRS) provide transition training to our highly
capable, advanced fleet aircraft. Reserve component (RC) aviation
provides adversary and logistics air support, makes central
contributions to the counter-narcotics efforts, conducts mine warfare,
and augments Maritime Patrol, Electronic Warfare, and Special
Operations Support to OCO missions.
The aviation spares account supports 100 Type/Model/Series (TMS)
aircraft and approximately 3,700 aircraft in the fleet. Aviation spares
are funded to 75 percent of the requirement and is a part of the Navy's
Unfunded Programs List for fiscal year 2011. The Navy is evaluating
alternatives to manage this risk.
Aviation Maintenance
The Aviation Depot Maintenance account ensures operational aviation
units have sufficient numbers of Ready for Tasking (RFT) aircraft to
accomplish assigned missions. Shortages in the number of airframes,
engines, or other components can detract from the number of RFT
aircraft. The fiscal year 2011 budget request (including OCO) resources
the Aviation Depot Maintenance account to 96 percent of requirement.
The 4 percent unfunded will result in a projected cumulative backlog of
21 of 829 airframes and 342 of 1,998 engines, leaving a backlog of
acceptable technical and operational risk. The fiscal year 2011 budget
request ensures deployed squadrons have 100 percent of their Primary
Authorized Aircraft (PAA), and supports achieving our 100 percent zero
bare firewall engine goal. The Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) AIRSpeed
strategy continues to deliver cost-wise-readiness by focusing efforts
on reducing the cost of end to end resourcing, increasing productivity,
and improving the operational availability of aircraft.
We request that you fully support our baseline and OCO funding
requests for operations and maintenance to ensure the effectiveness of
our force, safety of our sailors, and longevity of our aircraft.
Strike Fighter Inventory Management
Our current force management measures are targeted at preserving
the service life of our existing legacy strike fighter aircraft (F/A-18
A-D). Therefore, we will reduce the number of aircraft available in our
TACAIR squadrons during non-deployed FRTP phases, to the minimum
required in order to meet training and certification. We will reduce
our Unit Deployed TACAIR squadrons (UDP) from twelve aircraft to ten
aircraft per squadron to match the corresponding decrease in Marine
Corps expeditionary squadrons. We are accelerating the transition of
five legacy F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18 E/F squadrons, using available
F/A-18 E/F aircraft, and will transition two additional legacy
squadrons using F/A-18 E/F attrition aircraft. These measures make
available legacy strike fighter aircraft for High Flight Hour (HFH)
inspections and, potentially, the Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP). Taken together, these would provide the option to extend the
service life of legacy aircraft and help manage the inventory. These
measures will expend the service life of some F-18 E/F aircraft earlier
than programmed. Accordingly, we are refining our depot level
production processes to maximize throughput and return legacy strike
fighter aircraft to the fleet expeditiously to ameliorate Super Hornet
life expenditure.
There are initiatives in place to extend the service life of our F/
A-18 A-D aircraft. HFH inspections, which have been in place for 2
years, provide the ability to extend the service life of our legacy F/
A-18 A-D aircraft to 8,600 flight hours. Further engineering analysis
is underway to determine the SLEP requirements necessary to reach the
service life extension goal of 10,000 flight hours should this course
of action be required.
Naval Expeditionary Forces (Combat Support)
Our Navy continues to place significant emphasis on strengthening
its expeditionary warfare forces to confront irregular challenges. The
fiscal year 2011 budget request continues to support Irregular Warfare
(IW) requirements and promotes synergy in IW with the Marine Corps and
U.S. Coast Guard. But despite efforts to increase capacity, stress on
the high demand and limited supply of expeditionary forces (EOD,
Riverine, Seabee) requires continuous monitoring and the employment of
mitigation strategies to ensure our forces meet Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) PERSTEMPO guidelines including deployment length,
deployment periodicity (dwell goal 1.0:2) and homeport tempo (greater
than 50 percent). During fiscal year 2007 the EOD community dwell ratio
was averaging 1.0:1. In fiscal year 2008, EOD introduced mitigation
options that increased their average dwell ratio above both CNO dwell
minimum (1.0:2). Other communities such as P-3, Seabee, Riverine and
EA-6B (Prowler) are currently above the minimum dwell ratio, but remain
below the CNO's goal (1.0:2).
The budget request provides for the manning, training, operations,
and maintenance of expeditionary forces under the purview of the Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) including: the Naval Construction
Force, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Mobile Diving and Salvage, Riverine
Forces, Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces, Navy Expeditionary
Logistics Support Group, Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center,
Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training, Navy Expeditionary
Intelligence Command, and Combat Camera.
Evolving warfighting missions and increases in COCOM demand for
Theater Security Cooperation Programs missions, building partner
capacity, and security force assistance, have expanded the training and
operational requirements for NECC Forces in every theater. For example,
within the past 14 months, Navy Seabees have twice been called upon to
enable the troop surge in Afghanistan. First, performing a ``lift and
shift'' from Iraq to Afghanistan to support the arrival of the Marine
Expeditionary Force, and subsequently, preparing for the arrival of the
30,000 additional troops directed by the ``surge''. The Seabees
constructed Forward Operating Bases, Combat Outposts, and support
facilities. To meet emergent training and global operational
requirements associated with OCOs, NECC leverages OCO funding to
provide the critical training and outfitting in theater and meet the
dynamic missions they execute throughout the theater.
Based on GFM requirements, NECC deploys mission-specific units to
fulfill COCOM requests. This involves employing traditional core
capabilities in the Navy Expeditionary Combat Force, as well as
emerging new mission capabilities that have been requested and
developed over the last several years. Combining the disparate
capabilities and capacity of these forces under a single type command
structure has increased Navy's responsiveness to support existing and
evolving irregular warfare missions in both rotational deployments and
emergent COCOM needs (RFFs). Navy Riverine forces are now on their
sixth deployment to OIF conducting interdiction patrols in southern
Iraq and training their Iraqi counterparts.
NECC is providing the training, preparation, and administrative
support oversight for the more than 13,000 IA and ad-hoc forces
performing enabler missions in support of ground forces. At 40,000
sailors, NECC represents about 12 percent of Navy manpower, yet
operates with 1.5 percent of Navy Total Obligation Authority--a bargain
considering the extensive capabilities they bring to COCOMs.
training readiness: connecting us to our future force
Ballistic missile proliferation continues to be a growing security
concern to our nation. Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a
core U.S. Navy capability. Our Navy's ability to train the force in a
flexible and agile fashion remains a necessity in an uncertain
strategic environment. We conducted our first BMD Fleet Synthetic
Training event this past year, proving the viability and effectiveness
of integrated Navy, Joint and partner-nation BMD training. Our budget
request continues to build this momentum to develop a comprehensive BMD
training program.
The Fleet Synthetic Training program provides realistic operational
training including seamless integration of geographically dispersed
Navy, Joint, Interagency, and coalition forces. Providing efficient and
effective synthesized training optimizes the FRTP.
The proliferation of advanced, stealthy, diesel submarines
continues to challenge our Navy's ability to guarantee access in all
global regions. Effective Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) training at sea
with active sonar systems is a necessary part of our FRTP. Synthetic
training can supplement, but not completely substitute for at-sea
training. Navy remains a world leader in marine mammal research and we
will continue our robust investment in this research in fiscal year
2010 and beyond. Through such efforts, and in full consultation and
cooperation with appropriate Federal agencies, Navy has developed
protective measures to mitigate the potential effects to marine mammals
and the ocean environment from the use of mid-frequency active sonar,
while meeting ASW training. We will continue to work closely with our
interagency partners to further refine our protective measures, as
scientific knowledge evolves.
Over the last year, we completed environmental planning
documentation for eight existing and proposed at-sea training and
combat certification areas. We anticipate completion of planning
documentation for another six areas over the next year, as we continue
to balance our responsibility to prepare naval forces for deployment
and combat operations with our responsibility to be environmental
stewards of the marine environment.
Conducting night and day field carrier landing practice (FCLP)
prior to at-sea carrier qualifications is a critical training
requirement for our fixed-wing, carrier-based pilots to develop and
maintain proficiency in the fundamentals of carrier aviation. We
continue to seek additional airfield capacity in the form of an
outlying landing field (OLF) that will enhance our ability to support
FCLP training for fixed-wing, carrier pilots stationed at and transient
to Naval Air Station Oceana and Naval Station Norfolk. The additional
OLF capacity will allow Navy to meet training requirements and overcome
challenges related to capacity limits, urban encroachment, and impacts
from adverse weather conditions at existing East Coast facilities. Navy
is committed to developing, with local, State, and Federal leaders, a
plan to ensure the OLF provides positive benefits to local communities
while addressing Navy training shortfalls.
Learning and Development
Quality education and training of our sailors provides unique
skills that give us an asymmetric advantage over potential adversaries
and sets us apart from every other Navy. To develop a highly-skilled,
combat-ready force, we have 15 learning centers around the country
providing high quality, tailored training to our sailors and Navy
civilians. We remain committed to the professional development of the
Navy Total Force, and continue to balance current and traditional
education and training requirements with emerging mission areas such as
cyber warfare, ballistic missile defense, and counterterrorism. We have
completed 40 of 82 enlisted learning and development roadmaps, which
describe in detail the required training, education, qualifications,
and assignments required throughout a sailor's career. We recognize the
importance of providing our officers with meaningful and relevant
education, particularly our Naval War College and Joint Professional
Military Education, to develop leaders who are strategically-minded,
critical thinkers, and adept in naval and joint warfare. Cultural
expertise, regional focus and linguistic expertise remain essential to
Navy's global mission, and our budget request supports expansion of the
Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture majors program for Naval
Reserve Officers Training Corps NROTC midshipmen as well as
implementation of the AF-PAK Hands Program, which will provide the
joint force with enhanced language and cultural capabilities in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
shore readiness
Shore infrastructure supports and enables operational and combat
readiness. It is an essential element to the quality of life and
quality of work for our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.
Increasing costs in manpower and afloat-readiness, combined with
emergent requirements compel us to take risk in Shore Readiness. To
manage this risk, our fiscal year 2011 shore readiness budget request
places a priority on supporting Navy and Joint mission readiness,
ensuring nuclear weapons security and safety, and improving our
bachelor and family quarters, including sustained funding for our
Homeport Ashore initiative. We are taking risk in other shore readiness
areas and at current levels, the recapitalization of our facilities
infrastructure is at risk.
To ensure our limited resources are applied to projects with the
highest return on investment, we continue to use a capabilities-based
Shore Investment Strategy to target shore investments where they will
have greatest impact on critical capabilities, specifically investments
associated with Navy warfighting requirements, improved quality of
life, and Family readiness.
Despite challenges, we have made essential progress and
improvements in nuclear weapons security, child care facilities, and
bachelors' quarters.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Your support and assistance through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 was very helpful. As you requested, we
identified Military Construction projects for Child Development Centers
and barracks and prioritized them while considering the ability to
obligate funds quickly. We selected infrastructure and energy projects
based on mission requirements, quality of life impact, environmental
planning status, and our ability to execute quickly. Our aggressive
execution schedule is on track, and construction outlays are ramping up
swiftly. Due to a very favorable bidding climate, savings of over $100
million have been realized as of the end of December 2009. Following
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance to invest in the
19 States and the District of Columbia with the highest unemployment
rates, additional projects for use of these savings have been developed
by Commander Navy Installations Command and submitted by OSD for
approval. The list of supplemental projects contains a continued
emphasis on critical repairs, Quality of Life and Work, energy
consumption related projects, enlisted housing, and child development
centers.
Energy and Climate
Energy reform is a strategic imperative. We are committed to
changing the way we do business to realize an energy-secure future. In
alignment with the Secretary of the Navy's goals, our priorities are to
advance energy security by, assuring mobility, expanding tactical
reach, protecting critical infrastructure, ``lightening the load'', and
greening our footprint. We will achieve these goals through energy
efficiency improvements, consumption reduction initiatives, and
adoption of alternative energy and fuels. Reducing our reliance on
fossil fuels will improve our combat capability by increasing time on
station, reducing time spent alongside replenishment ships, and
producing more effective and powerful future weapons. Most of our
projects remain in the demonstration phase; however, we are making good
progress in the form of an electric auxiliary propulsion system
delivered last year on the USS Makin Island (LHD 8), testing and
certification of bio-fuels as drop-in replacements for petroleum,
advanced hull and propeller coatings, solid state lighting
installations, and policies that encourage sailors to reduce their
consumption through simple changes in behavior.
Thanks to your support, the ARRA funded Navy energy conservation
and renewable energy investment in 11 tactical and 42 shore-based
projects totaling $455 million. Tactical projects included alternative
fuel, drive, and power systems for ships, aircraft and tactical
vehicles. Ashore projects included alternative energy (wind, solar and
geothermal) investments in 10 States and the installation of advance
metering infrastructure in three regions. Our fiscal year 2011 budget
continues to invest in tactical and ashore energy initiatives,
requesting $128 million for these efforts.
In our Maritime Strategy we addressed maritime operations in an era
of climate change, especially in the ice diminished Arctic. The CNO
established the Navy's Task Force on Climate Change to develop policy,
investment, and force-structure recommendations regarding climate
change in the Arctic and globally over the long-term. Our focus will be
to ensure Navy readiness and capability in a changing global
environment.
family readiness and sailor care
We remain committed to the professional and personal development of
our sailors and Navy civilians, and support to their families. We are
in the process of expanding opportunities for service at sea to women
in the Navy by offering assignments on submarines. Current plans are to
accept the first cadre of female officers into the submarine training
pipeline this year to facilitate their assignment aboard submarines as
early as fiscal year 2012. We intend to enhance support to our sailors
and their families, including those who are wounded, ill and injured,
through expanded child and youth care, Fleet and Family Support
services, Navy Safe Harbor, and the Operational Stress Control program.
We are aggressively addressing the rise in suicides over the last 12
months by implementing revised training and outreach programs for Navy
leadership, sailors, Navy civilians, and families to increase suicide
awareness and prevention. To reduce sexual assaults, we will refocus
our leadership, change our cultural approach and insist on
accountability. Led by the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office, a new direction for intrusive leadership by unit commanders and
an emphasis of intolerance for sexual assault and related behavior in
our Navy is underway. We remain committed to providing our sailors and
their families a comprehensive continuum of care that addresses all
aspects of medical, physical, psychological, and family readiness. Our
fiscal year 2011 budget request expands this network of services and
caregivers to ensure that all sailors and their families, and our
wounded, ill, and injured receive the highest quality healthcare
available. Navy Safe Harbor, Navy's Operational Stress Control Program,
Reserve Psychological Health Outreach Program, Warrior Transition
Program, Returning Warrior Workshop and Behavioral Health Needs
Assessments are critical elements of this continuum.
Navy Safe Harbor has been expanded and continues to provide non-
medical support for all seriously wounded, ill, and injured sailors,
coast guardsmen, and their families through a network of Recovery Care
Coordinators and non-medical Care Managers at 16 locations across the
country. Over the past year, Safe Harbor's enrollment has grown from
387 to 542. Over 84,000 sailors have participated in Operational Stress
Control (OSC) training, which is providing a comprehensive approach
designed to actively promote the psychological health of sailors and
their families throughout their careers while reducing the traditional
stigma associated with seeking help. Our individual augmentees receive
OSC training prior to deployment while the Warrior Transition Program
(WTP) and Returning Warrior Workshops (RWW) are essential to post-
deployment reintegration efforts. WTP, established in Kuwait and
expanded via Mobile Care Teams to Iraq and Afghanistan, provides a
place and time for individual augmentees to decompress and transition
from life in a war zone to resumption of life at home. The RWW
identifies problems, encourages sailors to share their experiences,
refers family members to essential resources, and facilitates the
demobilization process.
Stress on the Force
As we continue to operate at a high operational tempo to meet our
nation's demands around the world, the tone of the force remains
positive. We continue to monitor the health of the force by tracking
statistics on personal and family-related indicators such as stress,
financial health and command climate, and sailor and family
satisfaction with their services in Navy. Recent detailed survey
results indicate that sailors and their families remain satisfied with
command morale, the quality of leadership, education benefits, health
care, and compensation. We remain focused on our connection with the
family at the unit level so that we have informed, prepared, and
resilient families.
Suicide is a tragic event affecting sailor, family, and unit
readiness. We continue efforts at suicide prevention through a multi-
faceted approach of communication, training, and command support
designed to foster resilience and promote psychological health among
sailors. Navy's latest 12-month suicide rate of 13.3 per 100,000
sailors represents a small decrease from the previous year's rate of
13.8 per 100,000 sailors. Although suicides are significantly below the
national rate for the same age and gender demographic (19.0 per 100,000
individuals), we are not satisfied. Any loss is unacceptable. We remain
committed to creating an environment in which stress and other suicide-
related factors are more openly recognized, discussed, and addressed.
We continue to develop and enhance programs designed to mitigate
suicide risk and improve the resilience of the force. These programs
focus on substance abuse prevention, financial management, positive
family relationships, physical readiness, and family support, with the
goal of reducing individual stress. We continue to work toward a
greater understanding of the issues surrounding suicide to ensure that
our policies, training, interventions, and communication efforts are
meeting their intended objectives.
Child and Youth Programs
Our Navy Child and Youth Programs, the top priority within Family
Readiness Programs, provide high-quality educational and recreational
programs for our Navy children. We are leveraging Military Construction
funding, Recovery Act funding, commercial contracts, and military-
certified in-home care expansion to increase child care spaces and to
meet our goal of placing children under care within 3 months of their
request. By the end of 2011, we will meet this goal and will be in
compliance with OSD's direction to provide child care to at least 80
percent of our military population. While we are meeting our child care
capacity goals, recapitalization of our existing infrastructure is
still required. In addition to increasing child care spaces, we are
also adding 25,000 additional hours of respite child care and youth
services for families of deployed sailors and our wounded, ill, and
injured. Our child care and youth programs are a highly valued resource
by our sailors and their families, and are an investment in the
Nation's future.
Bachelor Housing
Our bachelor housing program is currently focused on two goals:
providing Homeport Ashore housing (at our Interim Assignment Policy)
for our junior sea-duty sailors by 2016 and eliminating our substandard
(Q4) bachelor housing inventory by 2020. We appreciate the assistance
of Congress to commence a Homeport Ashore initiative in Coronado, CA,
with an fiscal year 2009 Recovery Act bachelor housing project that
will eliminate 1,056 spaces in the deficit. We are continuing this
important Quality of Life initiative by requesting $75 million in new
construction in fiscal year 2011 for bachelor housing in San Diego to
provide an additional 772 spaces to our inventory. The PB11 Future
Years Defense Plan contains 6 Military Construction projects that will
provide the 4,305 spaces required to complete the Homeport Ashore
initiative by 2016.
Family Housing
Our fiscal year 2011 family housing budget request includes $68.2
million for family housing construction, improvements, planning, and
design. This amount includes $37.2 million for replacement construction
of 71 homes for naval base personnel at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
and $28.4 million for 116 housing units in Japan. In addition, our
fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $329.7 million for the
operation and maintenance of 10,000 Navy-owned homes and 3,700 leased
homes.
Utilizing a combination of increased recapitalization funding and
PPV authorities, the Navy met the Secretary of Defense's goal to fund
by, fiscal year 2007, the elimination of all inadequate military family
housing units, which Navy defined as homes requiring repairs,
improvements, or replacement costing more than $50,000. To establish
common standards across all four Services, the Secretary of Defense
redefined family housing condition ratings in 2009 to correlate with
the Facility Condition Rating system used across DOD. This system
classifies any unit in a Q3 or Q4 condition as inadequate. Navy has
identified those government-owned units as Q3/Q4, most of which are
overseas. These units represent 6 percent of the entire Navy inventory.
Navy is on target to achieve the Secretary of Defense goal that 90
percent of family housing to be at an adequate (Q1/Q2) condition by
2015.
Our portfolio management program collects and analyzes financial,
occupancy, construction, and resident satisfaction data to ensure our
PPV projects are optimized and performing as required and the services
provided meet expectations. We regularly host PPV focus groups to
assess the quality of privatized housing and housing services delivered
to Navy families and make changes in Navy policies and procedures as
required. We continue to receive very positive feedback from our Navy
families. This enhanced oversight of our PPV partners meets required
congressional reporting and ensures Navy sailors and their families
continue to benefit from quality housing and services.
Individual Augmentees (IA)
Navy currently has over 11,000 sailors serving as IAs worldwide.
Since last year, Navy designated Commander, U.S. Fleet Force Command
(CUSFF) as the Executive Agent for Individual Augmentees, accountable
to the CNO for the IA program. Through the efforts of USFF, including
the creation of the Navy Preparedness Alliance to focus the efforts of
our personnel assignment, medical, Reserve, ashore, and fleet
leadership, the efficiency and effectiveness of the program has
improved dramatically. For example, as testified to by our sailors and
their families, notification to our sailors of IA assignment has
improved, and our IA ``family support'' programs are more effective.
More than 8,000 IA sailors are on the ground in CENTCOM, serving in
vital support roles across both adaptive core and temporary \1\ mission
areas such as provincial reconstruction teams, detainee operations,
civil affairs, training teams, C-IED, intelligence, and medical
support. As the focus shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan, we anticipate
the demand for sailors to support the joint force in nontraditional
missions to remain at or above their present levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Temporary--missions for which Navy does not have standard,
mission-ready capabilities.
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To better support our IA sailors and their families, we have made
significant progress in integrating the IA experience into a Navy
career, ensuring IA duty enhances a sailor's career and increased
predictability associated with IA deployments. IA resourcing and
support is a priority, and will require vigilance by Navy leadership.
conclusion
In a recent statement, Secretary Mabus clearly described the
mindset of our Navy. ``Our sea services are always forward-deployed,
always forward-leaning. We do not rest or lie at anchor, waiting for
the call. For the call is now, and unremitting--and so is our
resolve.'' We work to refine Navy readiness processes to ensure
``Forces Ready for Tasking'' are delivered whenever and wherever the
Nation calls. In an increasingly interconnected and multi-polar world,
the nature of challenges to our Nation's interests tomorrow could be
different from the nature of the challenges that we face today. We are
a force ready to fight our Nation's wars, but we are also focused on
deterring or containing conflict regionally or locally. To deal
effectively with today's myriad challenges requires established
relationships of trust and confidence with potential partners all over
the globe. Our Navy plays an enduring role in meeting that requirement
through the execution of our Maritime Strategy. Our presence provides
the opportunities to positively influence circumstances and events to
protect or optimize our vital national interests. That presence also
enables the Navy to respond to requests for humanitarian assistance and
disaster recovery as needed.
Readiness is a matter of capable forces ready for tasking, with
sufficient capacity. The return on investment in our readiness accounts
is measured by the ability of the Navy to deliver required capabilities
in rotational deployments and in response to emergent needs of the
COCOMs. In a high demand environment with finite resources, achieving
that readiness requires careful assessment of risk and consequences, a
judicious balance of multiple, equally valid but competing
requirements. The support of Congress and this committee in effectively
maintaining that balance is most appreciated.
I ask for your strong support of our fiscal year 2011 readiness
budget request and our indentified priorities. Thank you for your
unwavering support and commitment to our sailors, Navy civilians, and
their families, and for all you do to make our U.S. Navy an effective
and enduring global force for good.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Admiral, for your leadership.
General Chandler.
STATEMENT OF GEN. CARROL H. CHANDLER, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Chandler. Mr. Chairman, Senator Burr, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to represent your U.S. Air Force to the
subcommittee today. I, like the rest of my joint teammates, am
proud to be here to represent our Service.
Let me begin by saying that your 680,000-strong U.S. Air
Force--Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilians--is ready to
execute its mission. Our readiness is demonstrated every day as
we serve alongside our joint and coalition partners in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and around the world. On any given day, there are
approximately 40,000 deployed airmen providing close air
support, tactile and strategic airlift, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) critical medical care, and
combat search and rescue, along with combat and combat support
functions. Of these 40,000, there are approximately 5,300
airmen performing joint expeditionary taskings, providing
combat and combat support functions within the Army and the
Marine Corps in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In addition to our deployed presence, more than 131,000
airmen are performing deployed-in-place missions, supporting
combatant commanders. These airmen are operating remotely
piloted vehicles, maintaining satellite constellations,
conducting inter-theater airlift, and maintaining our nuclear
deterrence posture. Additionally, the Air Force continues to
provide defense for the Homeland as the total force effort,
with the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve personnel, from
locations across the United States.
Stabilizing our end strength is a critical part of
maintaining personnel readiness. We're moving toward a force
with approximately 332,000 Active Duty airmen, approximately
71,000 Reserve airmen, and approximately 107,000 Air National
Guard personnel.
The Air Force met its goals for new accessions in retaining
our current experience in nearly every area. Our retention
rates are the highest that they've been in 15 years and
generally exceeding our goals by about 20 percent. Only health
professionals fail to meet their retention in recruiting goals,
and efforts are underway to mitigate these shortfalls through
bonuses.
Selective retention bonuses remain our most effective
retention tool. These bonuses, along with critical skills
retentions bonuses for officers, are successfully targeting 91
enlisted and 3 officer specialties.
Last June, the Air Force initiated the Year of the Air
Force Family. More than half way through this effort, we're on
course to eliminate known childcare deficit in our child
development centers by 2012. We're increasing spouse employment
referral assistance and adding 54 school liaison officers to
assist school transitions for almost 175,000 school-aged Air
Force dependents. We're improving our exceptional family member
program, which supports more than 15,000 airmen with special-
needs family members. We're also increasing the quality of
programs provided for deployment and reintegration support for
our airmen and their families.
Our aircraft are well-maintained and ready. Although our
aircraft inventory is seeing extensive use in contingency
operations, the fleet's average age is continuing to increase,
the dedicated work and professionalism of our airmen ensure
that we're ready.
Our combat Air Force aircraft continue to provide global
power when and where required. Our airlift fleet continues to
provide strategic airlift, as well as theater and direct-
support airlift missions, moving a wide variety of equipment,
personnel, and supplies.
The recent release of the KC-X request for proposal begins
the process of recapitalizing our aerial refueling aircraft.
The planned acquisition of 179 KC-X aircraft will help provide
refueling capability for decades to come.
The Nation's nuclear aircraft and intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) remain the highest priority for our
Service. Of all the missions the Air Force accomplishes every
day, none is more critical than providing strategic deterrence.
ICBM crews sit nuclear alert every day, and nuclear-capable
fighter and bomber crews and their weapons systems contribute
to our deterrence posture.
Again, Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will continue to provide
our best military advice and stewardship, delivering global
vigilance, reach, and power for America. We thank you for your
continued support for the U.S. Air Force, and particularly for
our airmen and their families. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chandler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Carrol H. Chandler, USAF
introduction
Today, the United States confronts a dynamic international
environment marked by security challenges of unprecedented diversity.
Along with our Joint partners, the Air Force will defend and advance
the interests of the United States by providing unique capabilities to
succeed in current conflicts while preparing to counter future threats
to our national security. Over the last year, the Air Force made
progress in strengthening not only our readiness for today's
operations, but also in fostering the flexibility required for the
uncertain requirements of tomorrow. Through increased balance, our
Service can maintain its readiness to meet the obligations set forth in
the Quadrennial Defense Review: prevail in today's wars, prevent and
deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide
range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer
Force.
daily operations and readiness
The Air Force is committed to readiness and ongoing operations.
After 19 years of continuous deployments and 9 years of operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, these operations continue to stress both people
and platforms. Since the events of September 11, the tempo of our
operations has continued to increase: we have executed more than 50,000
sorties supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and almost 66,000 sorties
supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, delivered over 1.73 million
passengers and 606,000 tons of cargo, and employed almost 1,980 tons of
munitions. Additionally, we have transported nearly 70,000 patients
from the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and our
combat search and rescue forces met the ``golden hour'' goal of
transporting seriously wounded warriors to treatment facilities within
60 minutes of injury nearly 98 percent of time. Lastly, our aeromedical
evacuation sorties moved critically injured warriors to regional
hospitals within hours of injury, contributing to the 95 percent
battlefield injury survival rate.
We are a global force that is dedicated to supporting combatant
commander requirements from both the continental U.S. and overseas
bases. Nearly 40,000 of America's airmen, or about 7 percent of the
force, are deployed to 263 locations across the globe, including 63
locations in the Middle East. Also, deployed airmen currently fill
about 5,300 Joint Expeditionary Taskings, helping the joint team with
critical combat and combat support functions. In addition to those
deployed, nearly 219,000 airmen--fully 43 percent of the force--support
combatant commander requirements from their home stations in the
continental U.S., Europe, and the Pacific each day. These airmen
operate the Nation's space and missile forces, process and exploit
remotely collected intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR), provide national intelligence support, protect American
airspace, actively engage with our allies and partners, and contribute
in many other ways. Finally, defense of the homeland is a total force
mission with a minimum of 40 aircraft from 18 locations engaged in
operations at any given time.
fiscal year 2011 budget request overview
The fiscal year 2011 Air Force budget request of $119.6 billion
reflects our commitment to the Joint fight, and contributes to a
refocused investment strategy emphasizing Joint force activities. This
request balances providing capabilities for today's commitments and
posturing for future challenges. We chose to improve existing
capabilities whenever possible, and to pursue new systems when
required. This approach to modernization and recapitalization keeps
pace with threat developments and required capabilities, while ensuring
responsible stewardship of resources. In developing this budget
request, we also carefully preserved and enhanced our comprehensive
approach to taking care of airmen and Air Force families. In fiscal
year 2011 we will stabilize end strength at 332,200 Active Duty airmen,
Reserve component end strength at 71,200, and Air National Guard end
strength at 106,700.
Our fiscal year 2011 $45.8 billion operations and maintenance (O&M)
budget request supports operations at 80 major installations and funds
air, space, and cyber operations, as well as intelligence, logistics,
nuclear deterrence, Special Operations, and search and rescue
capabilities. This O&M request is 8.5 percent above the fiscal year
2010 authorization due largely to fuel price increases, growth in
enabling functions such as intelligence and communications, force
structure transformations such as joint basing and in-sourcing, and
shifting focus toward new missions such as cyber capabilities
supporting the stand-up of U.S. Cyber Command.
personnel readiness
Our dedicated airmen are the foundation of the Air Force.
Recruiting, training, and retaining an All-Volunteer Force requires
significant investment. This investment drives the very effectiveness
of our highly-skilled and technically proficient force.
Deployed Forces
The Air Force can, at times, support combatant commands without
forward deploying personnel. Some tasks, however, require physical
presence. Nearly 40,000 airmen are forward-deployed to combatant
commands on any given day, 55 percent for 179 days or longer.
Approximately 75 percent of deployed airmen support operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to the capabilities required by current
conflicts, a relatively small portion of our total force deploys more
frequently than the force as a whole. Sixteen of the 132 enlisted
specialties and eleven of the 125 officer specialties are considered
``stressed'' due to their deployment operations tempo. A number of
programs are in place to bolster the manning in these career fields as
well as mitigate potential negative effects on their families and
personal well-being.
We will continue to provide the full range of air, space, and cyber
capabilities to meet combatant commander requirements. Remotely piloted
aircraft currently provide 41 continuous combat air patrols to U.S.
CENTCOM. This number will grow to 50 by the end of fiscal year 2011,
and to 65 by the end of fiscal year 2013. Over the last year we
developed and fielded the Project Liberty program, providing additional
airborne ISR capability. We are also increasing our deployed capacity
in explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence, security, provincial
reconstruction teams, tactical air control parties, and air liaison
officers. As the surge in Afghanistan ramps up, the Air Force will not
only increase its presence in Afghanistan, but also increase our
strategic airlift commitment, including mobilizing 2,400 Guard and
Reserve airmen.
Recruiting and Retention
We continue to meet both our recruiting and retention goals for
nearly every Air Force career field. Recruiting among the Active,
Guard, and Reserve components has been solid. Active duty recruiting
met fiscal year 2009 goals and is on track for fiscal year 2010 in all
but the medical and health specialties. Officer recruiting for health
professions dropped to 70 percent of the goal, and enlisted health
specialties fell to 60 percent. The Air National Guard exceeded their
enlisted recruiting goals in fiscal year 2009, and they are on track to
meet or exceed their desired number of accessions in fiscal year 2010.
However, the Air National Guard recently initiated a new campaign to
improve officer accessions which are approximately 25 percent below
their target.
Both officer and enlisted retention remain strong. Enlisted
retention is well above 95 percent overall, and in excess of our goals
for mid-career enlisted airmen. Although retention of mid-career
officers in the contracting, special tactics, and health-related
specialties is challenging, efforts are underway to mitigate shortfalls
through targeted accession and retention bonuses. The fiscal year 2011
budget request allocates $685 million for targeted bonuses and
retention incentives in part to fund Critical Skills Retention Bonuses
for the specialties critically short of officers between 8-14 years of
commissioned service, and Selective Retention Bonuses (SRB) for the
enlisted force in 91 specialties. Enlisted SRBs remain our most
effective and targeted retention tool, and this budget will improve
this program's effectiveness by increasing the maximum enlisted
retention bonus to $90,000. In the short-term, however, dealing with
fewer airmen exiting the force may be more challenging than meeting our
recruiting and retention goals.
Total Force Integration
The Air Force is maximizing our capacity by leveraging the strength
of National Guard and Reserve airmen through associations with the
Active-Duty Force. We are currently executing 142 Total Force
Integration (TFI) initiatives that pool Active, Guard, and Reserve
personnel and equipment. Many of these associations result in new
missions for total force personnel as we seek greater balance. In
conjunction with the National Guard Bureau and Air Force Major
Commands, we are currently conducting a top-to-bottom assessment of our
TFI processes to maximize the effectiveness of current and future
associations.
Year of the Air Force Family
Air Force families bear the greatest burden at home when airmen
deploy. The Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff established
July 2009 through June 2010 as the Year of the Air Force Family. More
than half way into this effort, we have completed our assessment of
existing programs and are now recalibrating family support efforts. As
part of this focus, we are on course to eliminate the known child care
deficit at our Child Development Centers by 2012, increase spouse
employment referral assistance, and add 54 school liaison officers to
assist school transitions for the almost 175,000 school-age Air Force
dependents. We augmented our exceptional family member program which
supports more than 15,000 airmen with special-needs family members. We
also increased the quality of programs providing deployment and re-
integration support to our airmen and their families, and foresee
adding a number of initiatives designed to enhance the resiliency of
airman in the face of emotional and psychological hardships related to
the stress of deployments.
Suicide Prevention
Despite our focus on resiliency, too many airmen are lost to
suicide each year. There have been 24 suicides among Active, Guard,
Reserve, and civilian personnel so far in calendar year 2010, 7 more
than this time last year. In response, our Air Force Suicide Prevention
Program is focusing on clinical and non-clinical intervention as well
as leadership involvement at all levels. As part of this emphasis we
fielded new training programs, improved access to mental health
providers in primary care settings, and increased training for military
chaplains. In the coming months we will roll out an updated clinical
guide to managing suicidal behavior, tailor training for our higher
risk populations, and emphasize suicide prevention in forthcoming
airmen resiliency initiatives.
Wounded Warriors
The Air Force is committed to taking care of its wounded airmen. We
fully support the Office of the Secretary of Defense programs designed
to keep highly skilled men and women on active duty. If this is not
feasible, the Air Force will ensure airmen receive enhanced assistance
through the Air Force Wounded Warrior program. We have 17 Recovery Care
Coordinators at 15 locations dedicated to aiding the recovery,
rehabilitation, and re-integration of airmen, and we are adding 10 more
care coordinators this year. This program, currently serving 651
Wounded Warrior airmen, will provide lifetime support.
aircraft readiness
Although our aircraft inventory has seen extensive use in
contingency operations and its average age continues to increase, the
dedicated work and professionalism of our airmen ensures we are ready.
After retiring many of our oldest and most maintenance-intensive
aircraft such as all KC-135Es and a fourth of the C-130Es, less than 1
percent of Air Force aircraft are grounded and fewer than 5 percent are
flying with operational restrictions. Although we continue to meet
combatant commander requirements, operations tempo continues to take a
toll and many of our aircraft are increasingly unavailable due to
required maintenance.
Consequently, modernization and recapitalization remain priorities.
By accelerating the planned retirement of 257 legacy fighter aircraft,
we are committed to a smaller, but more capable fifth-generation
fighter force. These retirements freed more than 4,000 personnel to
operate remotely piloted aircraft and to process, exploit, and
disseminate intelligence. This shift accepts a moderate amount of
warfighting risk due to decreased capacity, but is necessary to move
forward to more capable and survivable next generation platforms.
Within our mobility fleet, the recent release of a KC-X request for
proposal began the process of recapitalizing our aerial refueling
aircraft. The planned acquisition of 179 KC-X aircraft will help
provide refueling capability for decades to come. Similarly, the recent
release of the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study-2016 indicates
that there is excess strategic airlift capacity. Consequently, the
fiscal year 2011 budget request proposes the early retirement of 17 of
our oldest C-5As.
Combat Air Forces
The readiness of Combat Air Forces aircraft is adequate despite
challenges from accumulating hours on our fleet faster than envisioned
when these aircraft were fielded. The B-1, B-52, and F-15E did not meet
aircraft availability standards due to maintenance and depot-related
issues, and the F-22 fell short of the projected availability due to
low observable maintenance requirements. Recent improvements in many F-
22 system components and increased durability of low observable
materials resulted in a 32-percent reduction in maintenance man-hours
per flying hour.
Mobility Air Forces
The readiness of the Mobility Air Forces remains high while meeting
robust and dynamic operational requirements. Our airlift fleet
continues to provide strategic airlift as well as theater and direct
support airlift missions moving personnel and a wide variety of
equipment and supplies. We recently concluded a successful
demonstration of direct support for the Army in Iraq, validating both
the operating concept and the use of C-130s and C-27Js for that
mission. The direct support mission is a matter of trust for the Air
Force, and we are committed to providing this capability for the Joint
Force. In addition, we will continue direct support through aerial
delivery--a mission that airdrops supplies to isolated locations and is
essential to the success of the Afghanistan strategy. Our airdrop
requirements increased seven-fold in the last year.
Exercises
Green Flag and Red Flag are the primary predeployment close air
support and large force composite training opportunities for most units
deploying to contingency operations. These exercises continuously
incorporate lessons learned from ongoing operations. Both exercises
include other services and more than 20 partner nations, contributing
to Joint and Coalition interoperability.
Flying hour program
This is the first year the Air Force recalibrated our annual flying
hour submission to reflect the amount of executable flying hours in
light of deployment-related pilot availability. This change decreased
the flying hour request by 162,000 hours, and is consistent with recent
under-execution of peacetime flying hours and over-execution of
overseas contingency operations hours. The revised request for 1.2
million flying hours is fully funded within our budget request.
nuclear deterrence
Today we continue to strengthen the nuclear enterprise, which
remains the number one priority of our Service. Air Force Global Strike
Command, established in August 2009, provides a renewed vigor and
energy to the operation, training, and equipping of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and nuclear-capable bomber forces. The stand
up of a fourth operational squadron of B-52s in October 2009 enhances
our readiness to perform nuclear deterrence missions, as well as
support conventional mission requirements.
The sustainment of nuclear weapons was consolidated in the Air
Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), which manages nuclear weapons
system life cycle sustainment. AFNWC is instituting a positive
inventory control methodology for weapon system components and 100%
accountability of all nuclear weapons related material. Finally, Air
Force leadership instituted a more robust, standardized inspection
capability that increased the rigor and intensity of the inspection and
verification process to ensure our Air Force maintains the high
standards required by the critical nuclear mission.
Of all the missions the Air Force ably accomplishes every day, none
is more critical than providing strategic deterrence. ICBM crews sit
nuclear alert everyday in underground facilities, just as they have for
the last 50 years, and nuclear-capable fighter and bomber crews and
their highly-capable weapon systems contribute to our deterrence
posture.
conclusion
Despite 19 years of sustained Air Force deployments, the personnel
and aircraft of the U.S. Air Force are ready to face any challenge with
precision and reliability. Although ongoing operations affect a portion
of our readiness, we are balancing our force to ensure our personnel,
weapon systems, equipment, and organizations are prepared for today's
operations and tomorrow's uncertain challenges.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General Chandler.
I note the presence of Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss, thank you. I appreciate your service on
this subcommittee, and your leadership.
We're going to have 7 minutes per round. So, I'll try and
be brief, and then turn to Senator Burr, and we'll then proceed
in order of arrival at the subcommittee hearing.
Admiral Greenert, let me begin with you. First, a little
background, then I'll get to my question.
Last year, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) submitted
only two unfunded priorities--ship and aircraft depot
maintenance--to the amount of about $395 million. This
committee, on both sides of the aisle, supported that request.
Unfortunately, those amounts were not supported by the
Appropriations Committees. As a result, a 1-year backlog of
critical maintenance was not executed and deferred, which
places unnecessary risk on fleet readiness, reduces the service
life of the fleet, drives up long-term sustainment costs, and
increases strategic risk for the Nation. While I am encouraged
that the fiscal year 2011 budget request, including OCO,
resources the ship maintenance to 99 percent of the
requirement, we still have the 1-year backlog to confront. To
the Navy's credit, once again you have submitted only three
unfunded priorities for ship and aircraft depot maintenance and
spare parts.
So, my questions, Admiral, are, what was the impact of not
getting the $395 million in fiscal year 2010? What happens if
we do not support your unfunded maintenance priorities again in
this fiscal year? What is the risk and impact to readiness?
Admiral Greenert. Senator, thank you for the question. The
most difficult portion of dealing with the shortfall in the
year of execution is, frankly, determining where you have to
mitigate that lack of funding, if you will. What we've
determined--in the past, we used to take the ploy that surface
ship maintenance, being a predominantly privately contracted
entity was where we would mitigate that shortfall. But, you
also hit the nail on the head when you said ``mean expected
service life for our ships.'' That is a primary concern of
ours.
Without the additional funds, and to mitigate $395 million
in unfunded requirements, on top of a growing requirement that
we have in fiscal year 2010 of about $450 million in CENTCOM
operations due to the shift from Operation Iraqi Freedom to
Operation Enduring Freedom, on top of $250 million in fuel
price increases, and on top of another $150 million in requests
for forces, which are emergent requests from our combatant
commanders, we find that, among our operating accounts, we have
to take actions, such as to defer some port visits, defer some
exercises, reduce flying for those that are nondeployed or for
airwings that return. But, what I'd like to assure you of is
that one of our focuses is to make sure that our ships meet
their expected service life.
So, we are honing the line as much as feasible on ship
maintenance. However, when we don't receive the unfunded
priority list, that puts more pressure on that. It can be
debilitating as it rolls over into the next year.
The risk is the long-term health of the ships. It tends to
manifest itself, sometimes, in that year, but, too often, later
down the road, when we need to reset our forces.
So, in summary, it really becomes a matter of mitigating
among the operating accounts. That's the problem that we have
to deal with, sir.
Senator Bayh. Admiral, what does fiscal year 2011's
unfunded maintenance request buy back?
Admiral Greenert. Fiscal year 2011's maintenance request
for aircraft spares is $423 million. We've found that we have
introduced some type model series aircraft, the MV-22. It has
been in service for some time, but as we get to understand the
needs, that cost has gone up and we're using more spares. We're
using the aircraft more. The increased operations in CENTCOM,
in our Hornets, in our helicopters, and in some of our P-3s,
have added to an increased use of spares, so that describes
that piece.
$75 million is for aircraft depot maintenance, and that
would buy down our backlog of airframes and engines to no more
than 1 year's backlog, which we find to be a risk that we can
deal with without too much----
Senator Bayh. Do you have the capacity to execute, here, if
your requests are authorized and appropriated?
Admiral Greenert. We do have the capacity to execute, yes,
sir.
Lastly, $35 million is----
Senator Bayh. Make sure the Appropriations Committee has
the benefit of your testimony here today. Hopefully, they'll
make sure.
Admiral Greenert. I will do that, sir, you can be sure of
it.
Senator Bayh. Let's see. We don't have the light system in
effect here today so someone is going to let me know when my 7
minutes is up. I don't want to have a mini-filibuster here.
This question is for all the witnesses. Are we budgeting to
restore readiness in the fiscal year and the years beyond?
Specifically, when can we expect to reach our dwell-time goals
and to increase or restore the restoration of our strategic
depth? Anybody want to take a stab at that one? Any volunteers
from the committee?
General Chiarelli? You're a brave man, General. [Laughter]
General Chiarelli. Senator, we expect to reach our dwell
goals in most military occupational specialties (MOS). I talk
in individual dwell goals, where an individual will see he or
she is going to be home for 2 years in 2012. But, I think it's
important to note that, although in 2012, you will be in a
position where you will have 2 years of dwell, you really don't
have the dwell until you have the dwell. It is like Ranking
Member Burr talked about when he talked about the 82nd. The
82nd was supposed to be home for 2 years, but took a detour
down to Haiti. So, that creates issues, when we see these
unforecasted contingencies.
The second part of the question, Senator?
Senator Bayh. I think that pretty adequately covers it.
General Chiarelli. Okay.
Senator Bayh. Let me follow up, though, with you on
something else, if I can shift gears a little bit, General.
Last week, DOD sent Congress a reprogramming request for fiscal
year 2010. Included in that request was a $573 million
reduction in the $1.3 billion Humvee procurement funding
Congress approved for the Army. Can you confirm that the Army
plans to buy new Humvees with the remaining $770 million?
General Chiarelli. We plan to buy 2,662 additional Humvees.
We have reached our acquisition objective for Humvees--in fact,
gone over it--and will begin a recap program for other Humvee
requirements.
Senator Bayh. That's about $560 million for
recapitalization, I think.
General Chiarelli. I believe so.
Senator Bayh. Can you explain the difference--Humvee recap
programs and the number of each type of vehicle you intend to
recap, and the cost per vehicle for each?
General Chiarelli. Currently, we are recapping 5,046
unarmored Humvees at about $55,000 per vehicle, and 4,270
uparmored Humvees in fiscal year 2011, at a cost of $105,000 to
$130,000 apiece, depending on the Humvee.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, General.
My time is expired in this round. I will now turn to my
colleague, Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Chiarelli and General Amos, given the surge of
30,000 forces that are currently being deployed to Afghanistan,
do you have the right type of equipment in sufficient
quantities to fully equip the surged forces for the mission in
Afghanistan?
Let me go to you first, General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. We do. As the mine resistant ambush
protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles (ATV) arrive in
Afghanistan, it will not be too long before, I believe, we'll
be able to get everybody who can be out of them, out of the
uparmored Humvee and into the MRAP ATV. But, we have had great
success in getting equipment into Afghanistan, thanks to the
great work of 3rd Army as they took equipment coming out of
Iraq, ran it through maintenance, and we were able to get that
equipment into Afghanistan. In fact, we have equipment in
Afghanistan ahead of forces right now.
Senator Burr. General Amos?
General Amos. Senator, we do. We have everything we need in
Afghanistan. There's a little bit flowing in, but not much. The
last time I checked, we had about 2 percent left to flow in for
that 19,400 marine and sailor force that you talked about in
your opening statement. We are good in Afghanistan. Of note,
though, about 42 percent of the equipment that ended up
fleshing out--it's a total of about 75,000, what we call,
principal end items--now, that doesn't mean 75,000 vehicles,
but a vehicle is a principal end item; it could be a radio
that's a principal end item--but 75,000 principal end items to
flesh out and get that command the equipment that it needs in
Afghanistan. About 40 percent of that came from Iraq.
So, I think the key piece is--the answer is yes, we do.
They are fully equipped. They are reporting the highest levels
of readiness in Afghanistan. So, our young men and women that
are forward deployed have everything that they need. It works,
and it's up. But, to get that, we ended up taking equipment
that we had planned on--this responsible drawdown that I
referred to in my opening statement. We've been going through
there, for the last year in Iraq, to get ourselves out, get
positioned in Kuwait, get it on ships, and get it back to
Albany and get it back to Barstow, to depots. About 42 percent
of that gear, or 40 percent of it, is not going to make it back
this year. It's probably not going to make it back next year.
So that's the kind of strain on the force, but we have
everything that we need over there, Senator. You can rest
assured of that.
Senator Burr. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Admiral, in your written testimony you said, ``The cost to
operate and maintain our fleet has outpaced inflation by almost
2 percent each year. The need to balance between future fleet
readiness and current readiness for the operational
requirements has resulted in risk.'' In what areas of readiness
are we at risk?
Admiral Greenert. My concern, readiness at risk, is in
surface ship maintenance, predominantly, to be most specific.
We have to do a few things. One, we have to make sure we
understand the requirement to make sure that when a ship goes
in for long-term maintenance, we know what needs to get done in
order to assure that it will reach its expected service life.
Two, then we have to fund it to that level and ensure that that
gets executed. Then, three, in the operations--when the ship is
operating, we need to understand the impact of what the
additional--we're riding them pretty hard--roll that into that
next maintenance package. That's what I called ``reset in
stride.'' We have to keep up with that, Senator.
Senator Burr. Is the risk reflected, in the underfunding of
certain readiness activities, in the fiscal year 2011 base
budget, or is it OCO requests?
Admiral Greenert. The risk is that we are at 99 percent of
our known maintenance requirement in fiscal year 2011. So,
that's not much risk. That 1 percent is manageable.
My concern is carryover from the fiscal year 2010
execution, and I described some of that risk at a previous
question. We have shortfalls in the year of execution. To your
point, if we do not receive the OCO request, then we are
operating these ships in contingency manner, and that's taking
away from their service life. That's risk we'll carry forward.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Admiral.
General Chiarelli, as I stated in my opening statement, I'm
concerned about the long-term cost of resetting the resources
of the Army units, that they may not be supported amidst other
Federal budget decisions we still need to make in the next 2
years. You stated in our readiness hearings last year, and I
quote, ``The Army expects our reset requirements will be in the
range of $13 to $14 billion per year, as long as we have forces
deployed in for 2 to 3 years thereafter to ensure readiness for
the future.'' Is that number still an accurate number, or would
you like the opportunity to update it in any way?
General Chiarelli. If I look forward to the next 3 years,
we're looking at anywhere between $30 billion and $36 billion,
total, for reset. For fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011,
our numbers are almost identical--close to $11 billion in each
year, and that includes procurement money.
Senator Burr. That's in your budget request?
General Chiarelli. That is in the OCO request. It is, sir.
We expect--and that is in fiscal year 2011, too, just--almost
identical.
Senator Burr. Does that amount include the cost required to
restore prepositioned equipment?
General Chiarelli. It does not, I believe, include that
cost.
Senator Burr. Okay. Again, in your written testimony you
state that, ``In order to restore the Army's full operational
depth by fiscal year 2012, the Reserve component--that is, our
National Guard and Reserve Forces--must continue a transition
from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force, thus allowing
the Army recurrent, assured, and predictable access to the
Reserve components to meet operational requirements.'' How
would you characterize the availability of equipment and
resources for nondeployed Guard units, as compared to
nondeployed Active Duty units?
General Chiarelli. Active component units are reaching an
equipment level of about 80 percent, and National Guard units,
in all equipment, 75 percent. However, the critical dual-use
equipment is at 83 percent, and expected to make it to 87
percent, here, in the next 6 months.
Senator Burr. General Chandler, if I could turn to you with
the same question, relative to the nondeployed Active-Duty
Force, versus the Guard and Reserve nondeployed.
General Chandler. Sir, I would say exactly what General
Amos said earlier. We have, in some ways, taken from some of
our nondeploying units to make sure some of our deploying units
have exactly what they need to do the job. That's reflected in
a lot of Status of Resources and Training System ratings that
you see, both in flying units as well as support units.
Senator Burr. I've heard information that the Air Force
intends to draw down a disproportionate number of C-130s from
service in the Air National Guard. One, is it true? Two, can
you elaborate on the pros and cons of maintaining aircraft in
the Active component, as opposed to the Air National Guard?
General Chandler. Sir, I understand your question. I will
tell you, I've spent a lot of time over the last week with the
director of the Guard as well as the Reserve. Just as a point
of background, I will tell you that what you saw in that budget
was an effort to react to what we saw coming in the military
capabilities assessment; in other words, the C-130 fleet
getting smaller. We took that opportunity to retire some of the
older aircraft. Exactly how we get at the distribution, and how
we'll do that, realizing that we have a Federal mission, and
the States have a mission as well, and how we balance that, is
what we're discussing with the Chief and the Secretary. We
should have an answer shortly.
Senator Burr. I appreciate your consideration under that,
especially given the fact that we drew down that Guard
contingent some time ago, and the further drawdown would
deplete their resources to carry out their mission.
My time's expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, Senator Burr.
It's good to note Senator Udall's attendance today.
Thank you for your good work on the committee.
Senator Burris, I think you're next.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to add my thanks to these four distinguished
Americans for your committed service to this country and to the
world. So, my hat's off to you, Generals and Admiral. Job well
done.
Recently completed Joint Staff studies show that in Iraq,
DOD was highly dependent on contractors in four of the nine
joint capacity areas. Furthermore, the Government
Accountability Office has recently reported that planning
operations planned for future operations include little or no
information on contractors. Given DOD's high dependency on
contractors to meet its mission, how do the Services assure
themselves that the needed contractors will be available when
needed? General Chiarelli, do you want to try that one?
General Chiarelli. As far as I know, Senator, we have not
had issues in getting the contractors that we need. That has
not been reported to me as an issue. I think you know that,
currently, we have about 1-to-1 contractor for every soldier
who is deployed, so the numbers are high. However, I do not
know of any issues in getting contractors.
Senator Burris. General Amos, any word on Marine Corps'
contracting?
General Amos. Senator, ours is a little bit easier. Because
we nest under the Army, as executive agent for things like
logistics and a lot of the logistics hauling and that kind of
stuff, we don't really hire contractors. We have brought some
contractors forward, for instance, from our depot in Albany,
GA, and brought them forward. We had them in Iraq working,
doing some less-than-depot-level work to keep our equipment up
to speed. We're in the process of transitioning that same kind
of capability into Afghanistan right now. But, we don't really
do much contracting in the way that I think your question leads
us to.
Senator Burris. Admiral, does the Navy do any contracting?
Admiral Greenert. Not much, Senator. We come self-
contained; our Seabees, self-contained, don't use contractors.
Same story with our explosive ordinance detachments. Otherwise,
we are embedded in a ground unit in their support, so we would
depend on their support, to the degree they use contractors,
sir.
Senator Burris. Just to change the subject a little bit,
Admiral, I just left Djibouti, down at Camp ``Lemonyar'' or
however you say it, ``Lemonyon''.
Admiral Greenert. ``Lemonier'' sir.
Senator Burris. Lemonier?
Admiral Greenert. Lemonier. Yes, sir.
Senator Burris. My French is not very good, my German is
better. I see our people are living down there, I talked to the
Seabees, and the captain there was very excited, but they're
living in containers and tents. Can we at least get them in
some containers or some decent facilities? Has that been
budgeted, Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. Senator, I can assure you, what they are
living in has been budgeted.
Senator Burris. In some new facilities?
Admiral Greenert. Some new facilities. These containers
are, frankly--did you have the opportunity, by chance, to get
inside one?
Senator Burris. Oh, yes, I did.
Admiral Greenert. You did? Okay.
Senator Burris. I was there.
Admiral Greenert. The reports that I get--and I was there
about 6 weeks ago--was that those were satisfactory. The tents
were not. The tents are very hot and they use massive amounts
of energy.
Senator Burris. Yes.
Admiral Greenert. We're getting out of the tents. That will
be before the year ends.
Senator Burris. But, that is the plan, to get out of the
tents.
Admiral Greenert. Get out of the tents, yes, sir. Two
reasons. One, they're not good quality-of-life for support, but
also two, they are extremely energy depleting.
Senator Burris. I'm sure Captain Flynn will be glad to hear
that, because he made a special remark on that.
General, how about the Air Force, you all doing any
contracting there?
General Chandler. Sir, we have a certain amount of
expeditionary integral support in the Air Force, in terms of
Red Horse Civil Engineering, for example, and services to take
care of the folks. Based on what I've seen, and if my numbers
are right, the Air Force does about 70 percent of the
contracting work, in terms of officers and noncomissioned
officers, for contracting in that part of the world.
Senator Burris. So, General, if you were to do some work at
Scott Air Force Base--say, that you were to expand housing or
do something for those four commands down there in my
territory--who would do the work? Would we contract it out to
private contractors, or how would that be done at Scott?
General Chandler. There would typically be a contracting
officer that would work the contract, in whatever arrangement--
and particularly in terms of housing in the privatized scheme
that we're doing now.
Senator Burris. Yes.
General Chandler. That would be work by a contracting
officer in the Air Force civil engineering organization that
handles those contracts.
Senator Burris. By the way, I want you to know I was born
and raised down in that area. I remember when we used to call
it Scott Field, and there were maybe two or three planes flying
out of there. You all have really expanded that area, General.
General Chandler. It's a great installation, Senator.
Senator Burris. It's really good for our southern Illinois
community, and we appreciate what those commands are doing down
there.
Now, do the Services need a readiness reporting system for
contractors--and maybe the Army can answer--do you need a
readiness reporting system for contractors?
General Chiarelli. I don't believe we do. We have
contracting officers representatives (COR), who are watching
our contractors to make sure that they're fulfilling their
portion of the contract. That's become a priority in the Army
as we both increase the number of folks that we have in
contracting command, and commanders realize the absolute
necessity of ensuring that they have good, qualified CORs to
ensure that the terms of contracts are being met.
Senator Burris. Okay. General Chiarelli, the Army Chief of
Staff recently directed that units preparing to deployed to
Iraq or Afghanistan identify and train CORs prior to deploying.
How does the Army track this information?
General Chiarelli. We have requirements for CORs. I do not
know how we track the total numbers, but commanders have been
told to train the necessary number that they need for the area
that they're going into. I have not received any reports that
they are not doing that. In fact, I've heard that the quality
of the CORs has gone up considerably since the beginning of the
war.
Senator Burris. Thank you, General.
My time is expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Senator Burris.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as always it's a pleasure to have you here.
Thanks for your service. Be sure and convey to all those men
and women that serve under you how much we appreciate their
great service.
Just this past week, I was informed that one of my Academy
nominees to West Point, 1st Lieutenant Robert Collins, class of
2008, was killed by an improvised explosive device in Mosul. It
certainly hits home when those tragic events occur, and it
emphasizes more the importance of your testimony here today.
I'd like to thank each of you again and to recognize Lieutenant
Collins' family for their sacrifice and for their son's service
to our Nation. When I talked to his mother yesterday--both his
mother and his father are retired Army lieutenant colonels--she
said, ``You know, we knew and he knew that when he joined the
family business, there were risks involved,'' but it doesn't
make it any easier when you lose a top young man like that,
General Chiarelli.
I want to start with you, General Chandler. You note in
your written statement that Air Force has been operating under
continuous stress in deployments for 19 years, including 9
years of operations, obviously, in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know
this has taken a toll on your airmen, but also on your
aircraft. I understand that your air logistics centers have a
backlog of work and have been challenged to deliver aircraft on
schedule, back to warfighters, due in part to aircraft coming
into the depots requiring more work than they have previously
had, based on the near continuous use that you referred to. I
assume that you agree this is extremely important, that the Air
Force receive every dollar that you requested in the fiscal
year 2011 budget to support aircraft maintenance and depot
activities. Is that correct?
General Chandler. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Chambliss. I note that the number-one priority of
the Air Force's unfunded requirements is $337 million for
weapon system sustainment, which will go towards a variety of
depot maintenance and service life extension programs that you
had deemed to be high priorities. Could you elaborate on how
you would use those funds and how important they are to the Air
Force?
General Chandler. Sir, they are extremely important,
because it takes us from about an 82 percent dial to an 85
percent dial on weapon system sustainment of at least known
requirements. Like the other Services, our requirements
continue to grow, and we continue to chase that, hence the
unfunded priority. That represents about 16 aircraft through
depot maintenance and about six to seven engines that would go
through depot maintenance, as the vast majority of the money.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
General Chiarelli, General Amos, from your testimony we've
heard that our soldiers and marines are stressed, particularly
our ground forces, and that you've had challenges in fulfilling
your manning requirements for deploying units. I'm also told
that in some of our deploying units, mainly Army BCTs and
Marine regiments, that we have almost battalion-sized elements
remaining back in the rear as nondeployables. More importantly,
I've also been told that these nondeployable numbers have been
rising over the past few years.
Now, it seems to me if we were to take efforts to reduce
these nondeployables, that it should invariably increase the
amount of available personnel for deployed units. Are the Army
and Marine Corps taking steps to reduce these nondeployable
soldiers and marines and replace them or turn them into
individuals that we are able to deploy?
General Chiarelli?
General Chiarelli. We're doing our best to do that, but our
numbers continue to go up. One reason they've continued to go
up, we are averaging between 12 and 14 percent nondeployable in
our BCTs at this time. One of the reasons why we've seen it go
up is because the Army has taken units off stop-loss since the
first of the year. That alone, given the fact we can only give
them a 90-day drop on their contract, means that we have to
hold onto them until we reach that point, which drives up the
nondeployable rate. Other nondeployables we've seen increase
are medical nondeployables. But, we have young men and women,
who, after three rotations--the knee operation that they needed
after the first rotation won't wait for the fourth rotation. We
owe it to them to make sure they have the opportunity to be
taken care of, and that's what we're doing. Our largest
increase has been in medical nondeployables, and it is because
of many of those muscular-skeletal kinds of issues that arise.
Senator Chambliss. General Amos.
General Amos. Senator, right now, of a force of 202,000
reported as of just a couple days ago, we had 31,602 that we
would classify as nondeployables. That sounds like an awful
lot, but, of note in there, just about 29,000 of those are what
we call trainees--marines that are in boot camp, marines that
are in advance infantry skill training, marines that are in
pilot training and going through their military occupation
specialties training--22,000 of that 31,600 are in training
right now, so they are nondeployable. Another almost 4,000 are
in transit; at any given time, they're moving from the east
coast to the west coast or coming out of schools or moving into
their new units, and they're in what we call transit. Then we
have about 3,400 of them that are medical, that are not
expected to recover. We track those very carefully. So, while
the number 31,000 sounds high, it actually makes sense. Then
there's some other small or very small numbers in there.
But, we have not had any trouble fleshing out our combat
units, Senator. We have marines reenlisting and extending
contracts, their 4-year enlistment, to extend for 6 months so
that they could go back with the unit that they deployed with,
in some cases already twice. So, we have not had a problem with
fleshing out our units. We track the nondeployables very, very
closely.
Senator Chambliss. General Chiarelli, is this a funding
issue, that these folks are having these medical problems, or
what's the reason?
General Chiarelli. It's the time between deployment,
Senator. We have aviation units that are going 1-to-1 right
now. They are 1 year deployed, 1 year back home. It is that. We
have instances where, as I indicated earlier, the only thing
that counts is individual dwell. Keeping track of the dwell of
an inanimate object, like a flag, means nothing; it's the
individual that's key and critical. We do not allow anybody to
redeploy that doesn't have 12 months of dwell time. One of the
increases I've seen in our nondeployables are individuals we
have to leave behind for a month or 2 in order to get them 12
months of dwell time back home, because they've transferred
from another unit. With the MOSs we have, some are just more
stressed than others are. Those things are driving it up. It's
not a money issue, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Let me go back to that dwell time. As
far as training is concerned, I know there are efforts underway
to increase that dwell time for all of our service men and
women once they return from deployment, and I think that, once
we get to where we can have a 1-to-3 ratio, it'll make things
much better for you. But, as it now stands, are units,
particularly our tactical units, able to train in their
traditional core competencies while still preparing for full-
spectrum operations and counterinsurgency?
General Chiarelli. They're doing more today than they were
doing yesterday. The mere fact that we're focusing on
Afghanistan, which I believe is a different fight, has caused
us to move into more full-spectrum type of training. But, as we
approach at least 1-to-2, we're going to see the amount of that
training be able to increase over time.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Thank you very much.
General Amos, just be sure when you go to Albany, that you
don't say ``ALL ben ny,'' it's ``All BEN ny.'' [Laughter.]
General Amos. Sir, I'll take that under advisement. When I
do go to ``All BEN ny,'' I'll be happy to pronounce it
correctly. Thank you, sir.
Senator Chambliss. It's a great base, too, but--you can
bring that depot to North Carolina. We'll let you call it
whatever you want to. [Laughter.]
Senator Bayh. All politics is local. [Laughter.]
Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, gentlemen. As an old expedition mountain
climber, I'm reminded of the adage that I think I heard first
applied to the military, which is in--with all due respect to
those in the military of other responsibilities, that--if I can
get this right--tactics are for amateurs; strategies are for
rank amateurs; logistics are the responsibility of the true
professionals. So, thank you for the work you do in this
important area that often is taken for granted.
General Chiarelli, great to see you again. I have fond
memories--and again, I don't want to cast dispersions on
anybody else who was in Iraq at the time I first met you, but
you were serving as the ``Mayor of Baghdad'' and, I think, were
on the cutting edge of helping us understand this concept of
counterinsurgency and how we best help these countries in which
we're forced to operate, rebuild themselves, and take
responsibility for their own future. So, again, it's good to
see you.
Gentlemen, if I might, I want to be slightly parochial
before I move to some broader questions, although I think the
parochial nature of my concerns apply across the Service
branches, and certainly in theater. We're about to begin the
latest round of a fighting season in Afghanistan. Rotary-wing
capabilities are really important. In Colorado, we have the
High Altitude Army Aviation Training Site (HAATS) in Eagle,
which is near Vail. What it does is, it captures the expertise
and institutional knowledge of cadre of the experienced
Colorado National Guard pilots, and leverages that to save
lives in battlespace. It appears that the high altitude
mountain environment training that the Active component is
offering at Fort Carson, based on the train-the-trainer course
that HAATS offers, is also trying to address the need for high
altitude training. I'm concerned that the nature of the Active
component means that those trainers, after doing their good
work, will then move on in their careers. In addition, Fort
Carson, I believe, doesn't have the varied terrain and
consistent environmental conditions that are found in the
mountains around Eagle.
So, my question to General Chiarelli is, can we institute
multicomponent training at HAATS, following the successful
multicomponent warrior leader course that the Colorado National
Guard runs at Fort Carson?
General Chiarelli. HAATS is a national treasure. My
executive officer happens to be an aviator. Aviators are always
telling stories, and he told me, in preparing his brigade to go
to Afghanistan, he sent about 200 of his pilots in command and
instructor pilots to HAATS for training, but he, too, deployed
his brigades by battalion to Denver, and they did individual
training as part of HAATS, brought those instructors down,
because of the throughput issues at HAATS, and had them do
train-the-trainer on their battalions, doing collective
training in the Denver area. It was much less expensive. At the
same time, he was able to give everybody the benefit of that
fantastic training by using a train-the-trainer model for
pilots in command and instructor pilots.
I believe that is what a majority of our brigades are
doing. There's no doubt, HAATS is saving lives today in
Afghanistan, because of our ability to get that key and
critical training. It is a fantastic course.
Senator Udall. General, I think you're aware, too, of the
recent tragedy that occurred on Mount Massive, which is the
second highest peak in Colorado, at 14,400 feet. A rotary-wing
exercise took place on Mount Massive. The bird was piloted by
those that hadn't had that kind of training, and there was a
tragic fatal accident that occurred. I know we're learning a
lot of lessons from that, but I hope we'll continue to use
HAATS and think about how we keep that training capability as
broadly available as possible.
I know you've had this invitation before, we'd love to get
you out to Colorado. I know your executive officer has spoken,
but we'd be happy to accompany you and do some flying with you,
if you're able to come out at some point.
General Chiarelli. Appreciate it, Senator.
Senator Udall. I'll leave that as an open-ended invitation
to you.
General Chiarelli. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Udall. If I might, I'd like to follow up on a
question I think the Senator from Georgia--who's also trying to
teach me how to speak Georgian, by the way. He was talking
about dwell time, and you've talked about musculoskeletal
situations and the need for knee surgery and rehabilitation.
We're learning more and more about this marvelous organ we
have, called the brain, and we have hidden wounds that occur in
combat, we increasingly understand. Could you talk a little
about what you've learned--and perhaps the other general
officers that are here might want to chime in--and, when it
comes to dwell time, the need for our men and women in uniform
to recuperate, mentally, emotionally, spiritually, as well.
General Chiarelli. I have, currently, 6,200 soldiers that
are most seriously wounded. We categorize anyone who has a
single disqualifying injury of 30 percent or greater, and put
them in what we call the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) program. Of
that population, 56 percent have either post-traumatic stress
(PTS) or traumatic brain injury (TBI); 18 percent, TBI, and the
remainder is PTS. We are instituting new protocols in theater
that require soldiers, that are either in a vehicle that is
damaged within 50 meters of a blast or in a building with an
explosion, to go through an evaluation for a concussion as soon
after the event as possible and 24 hours later. If they pass
both those evaluations, they'll return to duty; if they don't,
they are treated by a doctor until their brain has had an
opportunity--the concussion has had an opportunity to repair
itself.
PTS is a concern for soldiers back here, and we are working
to both inform our medics so they can better identify PTS when
it occurs down range, and we're using telemedicine to give a
30- to 40-minute evaluation of every soldier that comes back to
the States. We've done two units now, one battalion in Hawaii
and a brigade in Alaska, so we can get a good evaluation. The
results, using this telemedicine, are very, very encouraging.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that update. I know my time's
expired, but would anybody else want to comment briefly?
General Amos?
General Amos. Senator, we share the same battlefield with
our Army brothers, and have experienced the same levels of TBI
and PTS. General Chiarelli and I worked on that pretty hard
last fall to develop this protocol that he just described. That
is in use right now in the Marine zone as well in the Helmand
Province. The idea is recognition that you get that wonderful
thing between your ears rung really hard and there is a
propensity--if it's not treated, if the brain is not put at
rest immediately, the propensity, they've found, for PTS down
the road is there. It doesn't mean you're going to have it, but
it does mean that there's a propensity towards that. So,
there's a recognition, both in the Army and the Marine Corps,
that this is serious problem. This effort, this concussive
protocol that General Chairelli described, is in effort to say,
Okay, 100 percent of those marines and soldiers that have been
either knocked out, had what we call a grade-three concussion--
which is, you are knocked unconscious or something less--you
are done. You're going to go back into the wire, you're going
to get evaluated, we're going to put your brain at rest. Then,
depending on how you look and what the doctors are saying,
we'll determine whether you ever even leave the wire again. In
fact, the way we do it is, it's called ``three strikes, you're
in.'' If you just get three grade-one concussions, you're done.
You're going to stay inside the wire, you'll perform a
function; you're not going to go back out again. So, it's a
recognition for that, sir.
We've had--I'm just looking at--since January 2003 to
September 2009, there have been 7,746 mild TBI cases reported
within the Marine Corps. So a mild TBI case would be something
that, ``Okay, I took a pretty hard blow--I may not have been
knocked out, but I took a pretty hard blow to the head.'' So,
there is great recognition of that problem, Senator, and I just
want you to know we're working as fast as we can to try to
ameliorate that.
Senator Udall. Thank for that. I test the patience of the
Chairman, but I certainly would welcome the Navy and the Air
Force, as well, to weigh in.
Admiral Greenert. Senator, given we deploy embedded in the
ground units, our folks are susceptible to the same thing. I
think overarching the program, the factor is, our work is not
done when folks return from deployment. That's a cultural
change. A lot of our sailors, that's something new to them.
``What do you mean, you need to do a post-deployment health
assessment?'' We need to look at folks, not just when they come
back--30 days, 90 days--sometimes it takes 120 days for this to
manifest itself and their personalities to change.
The other factor I would just mention to you is, their
support group is the family. They're back here worrying all
this time. There's a lot of stress. It's almost the boiling
frog concept--just a little bit more, a little bit more, a
little bit more--and we're finding it manifests itself in what
we call the tone of the force--things from divorces, to
drinking, to behavioral changes around the force, within our
families. We need to watch them, as well.
Thanks.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
General, my patience is infinite, but Senator Thune is
being very patient, as well. This is a very important subject.
If you have some thoughts, could you make them brief?
General Chandler. Sir, I would just say, we have
approximately 650 airmen in the AW2 program; that's out of
about 1,100 airmen that have been wounded in combat, some of
which suffer the same consequences, in terms of TBI. We've put
a lot of effort and, frankly, learned a lot from the Marine
Corps and from the Army, in terms of resiliency, what it takes,
not just for the member, but their family, as well.
One other aspect of this, of course, is the remotely-
piloted business, where you can find yourself in combat part of
the day, and then home the rest of the day, which is something
that we also watch very carefully.
The only thing that I would add is, we've actually had
some--``success'' is not what I would call it, but--in the
early stages of experimentation with hyperbaric chamber
treatment for TBI, which I know is something that our surgeons
general share amongst themselves.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Senator Udall, for asking about that, a very
important signature of challenges from the conflicts we find
ourselves in.
Senator Thune?
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your great service to our
country.
General Chandler, in your prepared statement, you said
that, ``The B-1, B-52, and 15E did not meet aircraft
availability standards, due to maintenance- and depot-related
issues, and the F-22 fell short of the projected availability,
due to low observable maintenance requirements.'' Yet, this
year the Air Force's number-one unfunded priority was for
depot-level maintenance on several aircraft, including the B-1.
Can you explain what maintenance standards the B-1 and the B-52
failed to meet, and what depot-related maintenance issues the
Air Force is having with these aircraft?
General Chandler. Yes, sir. What you're seeing is a
manifestation of trying to balance the requirements for today
with being prepared for tomorrow on the throughput, obviously,
in depot maintenance and the things that we need to do there.
Let me address, if I may, the F-22 first. I would tell you,
we're still learning a lot about that aircraft. Eighty percent
of the low observable maintenance that we're required to do on
the aircraft is caused by having to do maintenance on something
that really had nothing to do with low observable. Said another
way, we had to remove a panel to repair a part or replace
something underneath that panel that subsequently led to low
observable maintenance requirements.
Over the last 2 years, we've been able to lower maintenance
man-hours per flying hour by 30 percent each year--frankly, by
getting smarter and by replacing things under those panels, to
give them a longer service life. We're sitting somewhere
between 65 and 70 percent--66, 67, typically, on a daily
basis--of mission-capable rates in the F-22 today; that's
against an Air Force standard of about 75, and we project that
that will continue to improve.
I would tell you, as far as the F-15E and the B-1, and even
the B-52 for that matter, some of this reduction in mission-
capable status is goodness, from the standpoint of taking those
aircraft down and working on them, primarily in the areas of
avionics. The B-1, for example, replacing the front cockpit, if
you will, the pilot and co-pilot avionics displays. Also, we've
podded that aircraft to give it situational awareness and to be
able to do precision targeting and part of the maintenance
that's being performed is moving that display into the cockpit
so we can not only control the pod, but display the pod the way
we want to do it.
So, there are some things that are going on, in terms of
driving the rates down. We have the aircraft we need to do the
job. Now's the time, we feel, as long as we can get the money,
to continue those kinds of improvements on the legacy fleet
that will then allow us to transition to the fleets of the
future, whether it be the F-35, in the fighter world, or
looking down the road at the next-generation long-range
platform.
Senator Thune. If these particular aircraft didn't meet the
projected availabilities, why were there depot-level
maintenance initiatives unfunded in this year's requests?
General Chandler. Again, sir, I would tell, that's simply a
matter of trying to balance what we do with what we're being
required to do today, and then maintaining the depot
maintenance. There's no doubt in our mind--and we understand
that it's taking OCO funding to get us to 82 percent, and then
the $337 million unfunded requirement to get to 85 percent, of
weapon systems sustainment. That is one of those big issues
that we're going to have to watch closely, not only with the
amount of money that we're finding and asking in OCO funding,
but how we transition that to the base budget, so we can get at
the issue that you're pointing out.
Senator Thune. Okay. In your prepared statement, you also
said that the standup of a fourth operational squadron of B-52s
in October 2009 enhances our readiness to perform nuclear
deterrence missions as well as support conventional mission
requirements. It's my understanding that one of the reasons
that the standup was ordered was to help the Air Force focus
specifically on nuclear training issues in the midst of
constant deployments, and yet the recently published Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) states that it will convert some B-52Hs to
a conventional-only role. The question is, what is the thinking
behind standing up a new squadron of B-52s in order to help
focus that community on the nuclear mission and, less than 5
months later, having the administration announce it will
convert the number of nuclear-capable B-52s to conventional-
only aircraft?
General Chandler. Sir, the fourth squadron, as you
describe, allows the units to not only concentrate on the
nuclear mission, but have a constant and sustainable rotation
of units through the nuclear mission and the conventional
mission, which we asked them, obviously, to do both of. We know
that the triad will be supported by the new NPR. The analysis
of that force structure, I would say, is still ongoing. Exactly
how we adjust, in terms of nuclear and conventional bombers,
remains to be seen.
Senator Thune. I want to come back, General, you mentioned
the sniper advanced targeting pod, and the integration of that
into the B-1 bomber and other Air Force aircraft, and how I
think that's had a great impact on effective close air support
in Afghanistan. However, there seems to be a lack of these
advanced targeting pods for training use, because they're in
such high demand in theater. So crews are using these advanced
targeting pods overseas in combat; however, they have very
limited ability to train with these advanced pods at home. Does
the Air Force have a need for additional advanced targeting
pods for training use? If so, how would additional pods affect
combat readiness?
General Chandler. Sir, the overall requirement is
approximately 835 pods. We find ourselves programmed through
fiscal year 2012 to get up to about 625 or 35. Through 2012, we
anticipate we'll be able to get away from the just-in-time
training scenario that you describe, and then we'll have to
follow on with 200 additional pods to do that.
Senator Thune. Okay.
Thank you. I think that's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
Out of respect for the time of our witnesses today, and in
the interest of moving things along, I think we'll now move to
5-minute rounds of questioning. I just have two.
General Chandler, I'd like to follow up on some of your
remarks to Senator Thune. As you say, it is an important issue.
Just a little preamble before the question.
In your prepared statement, you say, ``Modernization and
recapitalization remain priorities.'' However, the fiscal year
2011 budget request only funds weapon system requirements at 65
percent, as you mentioned, of your requirement, and that
increases to only 83 percent with OCO funding. While I admire
the Air Force for making weapon system sustainment your top
unfunded priority, even if we authorized the maximum amount,
which I support--and I hope my colleagues in the Appropriations
Committees support, as well--you will still only be at 85
percent of your requirement.
I understand we operate in tough economic times, but if we
do not fully fund weapon system sustainment, we will always
have a maintenance backlog. So, my question is, what does the
Air Force risk by not fully funding weapons system sustainment?
General Chandler. Sir, the majority of the risk that you
see, that 15 percent that's not funded, will be reflected in
aircraft and engines that go through depots. That's about a $2
billion deficit. We understand that that is no small thing to
try to get our arms around. That will continue to build in bow
wave that someday we will pay the price for. So, we're looking
next year at how we continue to move things out of OCO into the
baseline budget and produce a more sustainable, if you will,
weapon system support plan.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General.
General Amos, this is for you. It came to the attention of
some on the committee--I'd like to kind of cut to the chase--
I'd like to ask you--there's apparently a small brouhaha about
uniforms, which, in the great scheme of things, isn't the most
important issue out there, but it was requested that I ask you
about this. I understand the Marine Corps objected to the Navy
fielding a ground combat uniform, and that if it were fielded,
it be restricted to, basically, the SEALs, because it was too
similar to the Marine Corps camouflage pattern. I wanted to ask
you if that was correct; and if so, what was the rationale for
objecting to the uniform being used more broadly? I understand
the unique character of the Corps, and maybe some rivalry with
the Navy, that kind of thing, but what's the rationale for
that?
General Amos. Sir, what you described is true. Two
commandants ago, when General Jim Jones became the Commandant,
he set on a course to put the Marine Corps in a unique uniform
and get something that was more practical, something that
didn't require having to go through the laundry and get
starched and all the things we've been living with for years
and years and years and years and years. We even went away from
the old spit-shine boots, and went to the rough-out boot, and
it just all made sense. So, 10 years ago, he was successful in
doing that. It was an enormous effort, and that single uniform
effort generated an enormous amount of pride inside an
organization that is steeped in tradition.
So we have had that now for 10 years, and it's served us
well. In fact, you talk to any marine out there, they love
them. They're comfortable, and they wear well.
Other Services have come online over the last several years
and developed their own Service-particular uniform, but--I
think all our Services have done that--there was an effort.
Senator Bayh. I think the Corps actually patented this
uniform, didn't they?
General Amos. They did, sir.
Senator Bayh. Is that correct? That's interesting.
General Amos. There's little eagle, globes, and anchor in
the pattern, and it was put in there for a purpose. The purpose
is that this would be a Marine Corps-unique uniform. We're not
saying that other Services can't have additional uniforms. In
fact, all the Services have them now. But, it came to our
attention last fall that there had been an effort underway,
down in U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), to use a
pattern that was so close that, from 5 or 10 feet away, it
looked absolutely identical, and we objected to that. We just
said, ``Look, there are plenty of patterns that are out there
that are effective. There are patterns out there that can
provide your Service whatever unique uniform you want. But, in
this case, we'd appreciate it if your Service would pick--or
your effort would pick--a uniform that was significantly or
enough different from ours that you could determine a marine on
the ground versus somebody else on the ground.'' It became a
point of internal pride within the Marine Corps.
Senator Bayh. Boy, my time is expired, but how did they
respond to your response? I take it they brought it to
somebody's attention around here, so they must not have been
completely thrilled.
General Amos. Sir, I think it's settled down now, and there
is an agreement with the SEALs, forward deployed, to wear that
pattern. It is a very good camouflage pattern. Tactically, it
does what they hoped would happen. So, the agreement between
the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps is that those
forward-deployed SEALs and those types of folks can use that
uniform over there. Even though it is not using the patented
pattern--like I said, it's so very, very close--and it's a
point of pride, sir. It's internal pride. It actually
transcends all the general officers. It's down to the young
lance corporals and privates first class, the young 18-year-
olds, who go, ``No, wait a minute, this is my uniform, and I'm
a U.S. Marine.'' So, it's probably hard to understand outside
the Corps, but that's the inertia generated inside the
institution.
Senator Bayh. Pride and unit elan are certainly important
factors, so I appreciate your response.
Senator, I think it's down to you and me. Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Amos, in view of the limitations on the legacy
Marine Corps helicopter assets, such as the CH-46 and C-53,
which have been deployed in Afghanistan, what other aviation
assets do you believe will be in high demand?
General Amos. Sir, we are in a transition from your time
down at New River and Camp Lejeune, and what we transitioned
from--almost 10 years ago--about 13 type model series down to
what we're going to end up with, something around, I think,
five or six. 53 Echo, there's no question that that airplane
has been a workhorse. I'm just looking at--for the last 10
months, from February 2009 to January 2010, readiness, the
average mission-capable rate across the 53 Echo community is 65
percent. That is a heavy, heavy maintenance-intensive airplane,
probably the most maintenance man-hours per flight hour. I
don't know what that is, but it is significant. So, that
airplane is--we'll continue to maintain until we get its
replacement, the 53 Kilo.
But, most of the rest of our stuff, our legacy platforms--
the CH-46, the 40-plus-year-old helicopter that we dearly love
and have been flying--is transitioning to the MV-22. We've done
it back in your State, in North Carolina; it's completely done.
We have one squadron standing up on the west coast right now,
and we have one foot in the 46 and one foot in the V-22 and we
will have completed that in the next several years.
So, our Hueys and Cobras, the older versions have been
under an enormous amount of strain. But, we have fielded the
new replacement for the Huey, the Yankee version of that
airplane--four blades, new engines, new rotor head, glass
cockpit--and the readiness on that airplane is high, and it is
significantly more capable than the older ones.
So, we have lived with these legacy airplanes now for a
long time, tried to be good stewards. But, we are in that
transition right now, Senator, leaving the old and going to the
new, and so, we're going to sustain the old, while we have to.
We have 53 Deltas in Afghanistan right now, the old two-engine
version that was a predecessor to the Echo. So, we are flying
and trying to maintain them as best we can. I don't know
whether that answers your question.
Senator Burr. General, have I asked you if you have
adequate airlift capabilities?
General Amos. Do we have what, now?
Senator Burr. Do you have adequate airlift capabilities?
General Amos. We do, sir, we do.
Senator Burr. Okay.
General Amos. In fact, it's interesting you ask that,
because the Secretary of Defense, one of his highest priorities
in really the last year has been ISR--increase the amount of
ISR, and then rotary-wing lift. The ISR is a combination of
everybody sitting at this table and their assets; and rotary-
wing lift is predominantly the Army and the Marine Corps. But,
I will also tell you, the Air Force--for instance, down in
Helmand Province, the boys flying those medevac airplanes that
are down there have saved an enormous amount of lives for us.
But, lift capacity, as far as moving around the theater, we
absolutely do. We have what we need for that, sir. We're not
wanting in that.
Senator Burr. Good.
Just as a general note--and I shared this with the
Chairman--I looked at new technology over the Easter break
that's designed for rotary aircraft, to balance that engine and
the propeller when it's revved up, which eliminates the shaking
in a helicopter. It was an amazing simulator to sit in and see
one with and without. It made me really question how that would
change the depot hours and intervals for some of the rotary
aircraft. I know across DOD that technology is being looked at.
I'm sure I didn't see a single technology. There are probably
others out there. But, clearly we're going to bring some things
that provide us longer life, based upon how we change what,
historically, we've used, because we've used technology to
extend its life and to have a lesser impact on the platform
itself over time.
Last question. Again, General Amos, the establishment of a
Marine Corps component of Special Operations Forces was a
relatively recent force structure development. From my time
down at Camp Lejeune, I can report that the marines assigned to
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command are training
well, they're ready to be deployed worldwide with their
brethren of the other Services. How do you assess their
readiness?
General Amos. Sir, I don't have the precise readiness
figure in front of me where I could tell that this Special
Operations Battalion is--on average because they don't report
their readiness through us, they report it through the SOCOM.
But, absolutely no question, we put our arms around them.
They're marines. Those marines came out of our Force
Reconnaissance Units and our standard Marine Reconnaissance
Units and then across the Marine Corps, when we stood them up.
It sits about 2,500 marines and sailors right now. What we're
doing now is, we are rebalancing within that number of 2,500,
with lessons learned. We found out that we needed one less
Special Operations battalion, but we needed more combat service
support integrated within those battalions, that would deploy
with them. So, inside that number, that box, we are shifting
around the deck chairs, so to speak, to make sure we have the
right balance. But, I'll tell you, my sense is, having seen
it--I was there when we stood it up at Camp Lejeune, and I just
visited, with some of our marines--Special Operations lads--out
in the western part of Helmand Province and out there towards
the Iranian border--they are highly trained. They are
incredible young men. I think the testimony for me is, when you
see them, and they're wounded--in Bethesda or Walter Reed or
Brooke--they're the ones that are getting out of the beds.
They're severely wounded. They're the ones that leave the
hospital first. They're the ones that are determined to get
back on their feet and get back with their brothers again. So,
it's a special breed, and they're well trained, and their
morale is enormously high. I think it's a huge success story,
sir.
Senator Burr. Thank you. I'm impressed with what I've seen
when I've been there.
Let me conclude--by once again stating to all of you, thank
you for your service. More importantly, please share those
thanks with the men and women that serve under you. We can't
thank you enough for the insight that you're able to provide
this committee. More importantly--I think I can speak for the
chairman--our door is open. When there is a need, let us know
what the need is. We want to make sure that every warrior has
the equipment that they need, that they don't fall short, that
our mission is one we intend to win, and not one just to be
there.
Thanks.
Senator Bayh. Those are my sentiments exactly, Senator.
Thank you for your comments.
This is a collaborative process. Let us know what you need.
We're here to make sure that our military men and women have
the equipment that they need to perform the services that they
so gallantly do on our behalf.
So, gentlemen, thanks to each of you for your service.
Please convey our respect and appreciation to the men and women
who work with you. I look forward to working with you the rest
of this fiscal year to make sure you get what you need.
Thanks very much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
army equipping and manning
1. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, I'm concerned about the current
process in which we man and equip units just in time for deployment. I
understand you must accomplish your mission under many constraints, and
high operational tempo continues to severely stress the force. Your
hard work in these challenging times is to be commended. What is the
risk in building unit readiness just in time for deployment and where
is there room for improvement in the predeployment process with respect
to manning, equipping, and training?
General Chiarelli. The risk is that some Army units may not deploy
with the desired combination of soldiers and equipment with enough time
to train collectively before deployment. As long as demand for forces
exceeds the available supply of Army units, the Army will continue to
be forced to shift the elements of readiness (soldiers and equipment)
to units that have pending deployments. The Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) model provides the Army a mechanism to synchronize soldiers
and equipment in a predictable manner in order to provide trained and
ready units to combatant commanders.
To improve this process, the Army is refining its force generation
model to build provisions for a contingency force consisting of 1 corps
headquarters, 3 division headquarters, 10 brigade combat teams (BCT),
and the 45,000 enablers required to support these formations. The Army
will use fiscal year 2011 as a transition year to begin to build
operational depth; by 2012, the Army will have achieved operational
depth by resourcing the contingency force; by 2013, the Army will have
sustained operational depth. Of course, this is contingent upon
predicted levels of demand for forces decreasing to sustainable levels.
2. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, what is the readiness impact,
we leave equipment in Afghanistan and Iraq, on deploying and
nondeploying units as well as our National Guard and Reserve units?
General Chiarelli. The Army leaves equipment in theater for the
specific purpose of providing deploying units with the equipment
necessary to meet mission requirements. This process achieves readiness
for the deploying unit, while degrading the readiness of the
nondeployed units. Army equipment on hand (EOH) as of 30 March 2010 is
78 percent for the entire Army, 80 percent for the Active component, 80
percent for the Reserves, and 77 percent for the Guard. We are
intensively managing our EOH to ensure that next deploying units from
all components have sufficient equipment for training and deployment.
Specific examples of our most critical shortages are Prophet Systems,
Self-Protection Adaptive Roller Kit mine roller, Route Clearance
Vehicles and associated Ground Penetrating Radar, Family of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, and Tactical Satellite Radios. We are mitigating
these shortages using theater provided equipment and other strategies.
3. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, how long can we expect
nondeploying units to be the bill payers for deploying units, and what
impact will that have on long-term readiness?
General Chiarelli. To some extent, a portion of the nondeploying
force will remain the billpayers for our deploying forces in the
future. Since the implementation of the ARFORGEN, we have migrated from
a tiered-readiness system to a cyclical readiness system by instituting
periods of degraded readiness into a unit's deployment cycle (Reset,
Train/Ready, and Available phases). So, naturally, some of the low
readiness levels reported by nondeployed Army units are expected as
part of this ARFORGEN process. Both Active and Reserve component units
move through a Reset phase of ARFORGEN where readiness is expected to
be low.
Over the long term, however, the critical area for the Army to
improve readiness in nondeployed units is in the Train/Ready phase of
ARFORGEN. Here, units should be resourced to begin collective training.
As the demand for forces decreases to sustainable levels and the Army
is able to restore balance, the ARFORGEN model will enable the Army to
better manage unit readiness.
4. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, how can we help you alleviate
some of the constraints such as time, funding, and planning?
General Chiarelli. Continued support from Congress for fully
funding our budget request on time remains a critical element to
achieving stability for our Army. Assuming the drawdown in Iraq
continues on schedule and no further troop requirements are needed in
Afghanistan, we will achieve our intermediate goal of Boots-on-the-
Ground (BOG): Dwell ratio of 1:2 for the Active component and 1:4 for
the Reserve component beginning in fiscal year 2012. These combined
factors will help alleviate constraints affecting unit readiness
levels.
return to full spectrum operations
5. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, the way in which we train our
soldiers according to their mission essential task lists (METL) has
changed recently. My concern is that in compacting our METLs we may be
changing what we have to do in accordance with our National Military
Strategy (NMS), to what we can do because of current global commitments
in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the process we are not truly prepared for
full spectrum operations (FSO). Are our METLs truly capturing FSO and
in what areas of training are we currently accepting risk?
General Chiarelli. Our recent doctrinal shift to a FSO METL more
closely represents the full spectrum operations requirements of the
NMS. The last few years of frequent deployments and short dwell periods
left our units focused either on their current deployment, or in
preparation for specific mission requirements of their next deployment.
This has created risk in our proficiency to conduct operations in other
mission environments. With increasing dwell anticipated beginning in
fiscal year 2012, our forces will finally be able to expand their
training focus across the spectrum of conflict, thus, reducing
strategic risk. As an example, a number of BCTs currently scheduled to
participate in Army Combat Training Center rotations in fiscal year
2011 will undergo full spectrum scenarios, rather than being solely
focused on Afghanistan scenarios.
6. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, to what extent did the Army
validate and coordinate the reorganizing of METL with U.S. Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM)?
General Chiarelli. The Army METL is focused on tasks performed by
Army tactical formations and is based on Army doctrine that is nested
entirely within joint doctrinal concepts and constructs. Therefore,
Army METL directly supports the joint METL developed by JFCOM.
7. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, given the commitments to
ongoing operations, to what extent will the Army and/or Marine Corps
have sufficiently trained and ready forces among its nondeployed units
to respond to a Homeland defense scenario or another contingency
elsewhere in the world?
General Chiarelli. The Army currently has limited capacity to
respond to unforeseen contingencies. The ARFORGEN model provides the
Army a mechanism to synchronize soldiers and equipment in a predictable
manner in order to provide trained and ready units to combatant
commanders and respond to contingencies. The Army is improving its
force generation model to build provisions for a contingency force
consisting of 1 corps headquarters, 3 division headquarters, 10 BCTs,
and 45,000 enablers. Likewise, redistribution of Active-Duty Forces
across a 3-year lifecycle, and Reserve component units across a 5-year
lifecycle, will allow the Army to generate consistent contingency force
pools at a predictable rate. Together, these initiatives will restore
operational depth and our capacity to respond to unforeseen
contingencies.
Providing timely and appropriate response to incidents remains one
of the Army's key operational concepts and the Army will continue
providing military support to Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments during Homeland defense operations. The Army will continue
ongoing efforts to properly organize, equip, and train chemical,
biological, radioactive nuclear high-yield explosives (CBRNE)
Consequence Management Response Forces to enable rapid, effective
responses to any CBRNE-related incident. Additionally, the Army
continues to support planning efforts for a rapid and effective
response to an influenza pandemic with focus on regionalized support to
save lives, reduce suffering, and slow the spread of infection while
preserving mission assurance and combat readiness. In the future, the
Army will identify ways to streamline support provided to civil
authorities in accordance with the rules and regulations established by
the Department of Defense (DOD). One initiative is producing a yearly
standing execution order, which will cover natural and manmade
disasters. The Army has identified organizations to provide the
required support outlined in the order.
8. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, does the Army's current budget
request reflect the funds required to return to FSOs training while
training forces preparing to deploy to ongoing operations?
General Chiarelli. The fiscal year 2011 budget request asks for
resources to prepare the Army for offense, defense, and stability
operations in the current counterinsurgency environment. In fiscal year
2012, further implementation of the ARFORGEN model and the increased
dwell time will support a FSO training strategy. This will enable the
Army to train the force to combat hybrid threats in complex operating
environments across the full spectrum of conflict.
9. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, given that training has been
focused on preparing forces for ongoing operations for several years,
has the Army/Marine Corps assessed the impact on the ability of its
units to perform the core missions for which they were organized and
trained?
General Chiarelli. The Army continues to assess the impact that
ongoing operations have on the ability of units to perform their core
functions. This assessment involves analysis of pre-deployment and
post-deployment readiness trends and the performance of units at key
training events. Monthly, unit commanders are required to report how
well their units are resourced and trained to perform the core
functions for which they were designed. The Army has achieved limited
success training on FSOs with units having greater than 9 months in the
Train-Ready pool. We expect to see improvement as the demand for forces
decreases and dwell time increases. In fiscal year 2011, up to four
brigades are scheduled to conduct rotations at the Army Combat Training
Centers and train on FSOs.
10. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, to what extent have
individuals and units experienced a degradation in skills given that a
large portion of the force has not been training on FSOs for several
years?
General Chiarelli. It is true that as units approach their
deployment dates, they focus primarily on building proficiency for the
predominantly counter-insurgency mission environment to which they are
deploying. While commanders report that the current demand for forces
and limited dwell are not allowing units sufficient time to develop and
train on all their core competencies, training concerns fall well
behind personnel and equipment issues as the primary drivers of
readiness impacts. Additionally, to a degree, Army units have been and
are able to train on some core competencies. The Army's current
doctrine requires units to execute some mix of offense, defense, and
stability operations during any mission, so preparing to execute these
operations for a counterinsurgency environment prepares them, to some
extent, to execute these operations in a more traditional operational
environment. As time at home station between deployments increases,
units will be able to train on a broader range of mission environments
that includes more conventional threats and different situational
complexities.
11. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, how does the Army/Marine Corps
intend to address any skill degradation?
General Chiarelli. Whether preparing to deploy for a specific
mission or to remain ready for contingencies, Army units have
maintained the fundamentals of FSOs which include offense, defense, and
stability operations. The combat experience the Army gained in Iraq and
Afghanistan has prepared us to serve elsewhere if required.
Additionally, the Army relies on continuing professional military
education to address skill degradation. Progressive educational
opportunities throughout a leader's career exposes him/her to
warfighting knowledge and skills required for operations across the
spectrum of conflict. The Army will address skill degradation for major
combat operations (MCO) by redesigning rotations undertaken by
contingency forces at our Combat Training Centers. In fiscal year 2011,
up to four brigades are scheduled to conduct FSO rotations which will
prepare contingency forces for operations against hybrid threats under
complex conditions.
12. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, has the Army developed a plan
to ensure that sufficient knowledgeable trainers are available for its
forces, in light of the recent memo from General Dempsey, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, regarding the
increased reliance on contractors to conduct training?
General Chiarelli. Yes, the Army does have a plan to ensure
training requirements are sufficiently resourced with the appropriate
skill set. In a time of high demands on the Army, TRADOC and the Army
staff must intensively manage our instructors to ensure quality
training. In some areas, the most knowledgeable trainers are not
soldiers. For example, new equipment training for unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) require contractors because there are no qualified
soldiers who can train this skill. Culture and language training is
similar. The best instructors come from academia for complex languages
such as Pashtu, Urdu, and Mandarin Chinese. In other areas, trainers
with current experience from Iraq and Afghanistan are desirable but not
critical. For example, training mechanics how to maintain and repair
vehicles can be taught by a contractor or an Army soldier. The outcome
in either case will be the same. Finally, there are areas that require
a soldier as the trainer--initial military training, leader development
training for junior officers, NCOs, and soldiers, and the Battle
Command Training Program. As a result of General Dempsey's memo, the DA
Staff and TRADOC leadership work closely to intensively manage
instructors to ensure we have the most knowledgeable trainers at our
training posts.
prepositioned stock
13. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, the current
date to restore our prepositioned stocks of equipment around the globe
is 2015. Not only have we had to draw equipment from our stocks to
equip deploying units, new challenges have emerged as we field units
with new types of equipment like the mine resistant ambush protected
(MRAP) all terrain vehicle (M-ATV) and other urgent operational need
items that are requested from the field commanders on the ground. Are
we going to meet the 2015 goal to restore prepositioned stocks of
equipment with our current levels of funding, and how are modifying our
inventory and lifecycle logistical management processes to accommodate
these new items, such as the MRAP vehicle and the M-ATV?
General Chiarelli. If the Army prepositioned stocks (APS) fiscal
years 2011-2015 base budget and Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)
funding requests are fully funded, we feel confident that we will
restore our APS capability by fiscal year 2015. We are constantly
assessing our APS strategy and equipment to ensure we maintain the
right capabilities based on current and future operations and
contingencies. These assessments will continue to influence the
equipment we place in APS, as well as our APS facilities, vessels, and
maintenance requirements. In addition, these assessments include the
future integration of MRAP vehicles, to include the M-ATV, into our APS
sets. The Army, in preparation for the transition of the MRAP program
from the Joint Program Office to the Army, will establish an Army
Program Management Office responsible for the fleet management and life
cycle sustainment of these systems. Tank-Automotive and Armaments
Command, in coordination with Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), is
reviewing parts inventories while Army Materiel Command is establishing
the necessary repair program to sustain these critical assets.
General Amos. The Marine Corps will meet the reset goal early. Our
Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRON) will be fully reset in
2012 and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) will
be reset in 2013. Both Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) and MCPP-N
will be reset within Marine Corps priorities as assets become
available. With new inventory come attendant issues in lifecycle
management. MRAPs and M-ATVs, for instance, were procured and deployed
into Iraq and Afghanistan at a very rapid rate--resulting in numerous
variants within the MRAP family inventory. With so many variants, the
Marine Corps has had a tougher time procuring common spare parts,
training mechanics on common systems, and resetting the vehicles as
they return from Iraq as part of the drawdown.
Nevertheless, we have adjusted our practices accordingly to
modernize the equipment aboard the MPSRONs. We have begun loading the
MPF with capabilities that are applicable across the full range of
military operations--retaining the ability to generate Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) capable of conducting MCOs while also
providing assets that can support missions at the lower end of the
spectrum.
14. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, currently we
rely heavily on contractors for MRAP and M-ATV maintenance. What is the
plan for the future and how are we ensuring we have an organic
industrial capability to repair these combat vehicles and are we
budgeting for such actions?
General Chiarelli. Currently MRAP maintenance in theater is
performed by a combination of both soldier-mechanics and contractor-
mechanics. The depot-level MRAP sustainment strategy has recently been
approved. This strategy developed by the Joint Depot Maintenance
Activities Group (consisting of all four Services within the DOD)
designated Red River Army Depot and U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Command
in Albany, GA and Barstow, CA as maintenance facilities responsible for
MRAP depot level repair. The Army initiated a pilot repair program at
Red River Army Depot in fiscal year 2010, and plans a pilot overhaul
program for fiscal year 2014. The MRAP JPO is currently funding MRAP
sustainment. The Army will program funding in the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) for fiscal years 2012-2016.
General Amos. Currently, the MRAP JPO employs a hybrid support
strategy consisting of organic (military and government personnel) and
contractor assets for the maintenance, fielding, and sustainment of the
MRAP family of vehicles. The hybrid strategy embeds JPO Field Service
Representatives in units abroad as well as within domestically located
Home Station Training facilities. While contractors are a key part of
initial MRAP vehicle maintenance, fielding, and sustainment, the JPO is
working towards a fully organic sustainment strategy within all the
Services.
Along with the above strategy, the Joint Depot Maintenance
Activities Group designated Red River Army Depot and U.S. Marine Corps
Logistics Command (LOGCOM) (Albany, GA and Barstow, CA) as depot
maintenance facilities responsible for depot level repair of MRAPs in
January 2009. The Army initiated a reset pilot program at Red River
Army Depot in 3rd quarter fiscal year 2010 and a pilot overhaul program
planned for fiscal year 2014. The Marine Corps has already initiated
Proof of Principle actions at Maintenance Center, Albany, GA. These
pilot programs will provide an initial national repair capability until
a full depot sustainment program is established.
The MRAP JPO is currently funding MRAP sustainment and the Services
will program funding in POM 12-16. OCOs dollars will fund a level of
reset for vehicles returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/
Operation New Dawn (a.k.a. Iraqi Freedom) (OIF). The program's
appropriated budget through fiscal year 2010 is $40 billion including
$12.0 billion in OCO funding in fiscal year 2010. A total of $1.1
billion to complete fiscal year 2010 requirements was received in the
most recent OCO to address increase in vehicle procurement quantities.
A total of $3.415 billion is requested in the fiscal year 2011 OCO for
sustainment, retrofits, and reset requirements. Fiscal year 2012 and
out-year requirements are under review to reflect decisions and
assumptions regarding OIF drawdown and OEF demands, quantities planned
for long- and short-term storage, and home station training.
army and marine corps reset concerns
15. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, as we draw
down forces in Iraq, will you meet the timelines that have been set by
the President, and what are the key challenges you face while
increasing forces in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Yes. The drawdown of forces in support of OIF
and the increase of forces in support of OEF will meet the required
timelines. There is no direct competition for the resources needed to
accomplish the force drawdown and force increase, because the Army
synchronized both major tasks and de-conflicted resources accordingly.
The plan supporting the drawdown of OIF forces is detailed and
sufficient time is available to accomplish the mission. The execution
of the drawdown is on track and going according to plan. The tasks
associated with the increase in forces in support of OEF are well-
defined and being closely managed. Key challenges identified by the
Army include the repositioning of selected units with sufficient
deployment tour length remaining, from Iraq to Afghanistan. As forces
drawdown in OIF, equipment to support the increased requirement in OEF
has been identified and will be shipped to Afghanistan and configured
for issue to units. OEF has some unique equipment requirements, such as
the M-ATV, and the additional requirements have been identified in
sufficient time to ensure the equipment is produced and shipped in
advance of the unit arrival. The preparation of units identified to
support the force increase have been given priority by the Army. The
execution of the force increase is on track and going according to
plan.
General Amos. The Marine Corps met its portion of the 30,000 force
increase in March of this year. We are now at a steady state of 19,401
OEF Marine Air Ground Task Force in Afghanistan and can sustain that
requirement as long as the Nation requires while meeting other
combatant commander requirements.
16. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, to what
extent has the Army and Marine Corps assessed the risks and developed
mitigation strategies in the event the plans for the draw down and the
surge in Afghanistan do not go as planned?
General Chiarelli. The Army is on track to provide manned, trained,
and equipped forces of the type and quantity requested by the Central
Command (CENTCOM) commander. The lead brigade and enabling capabilities
are already on their way to theater. If necessary, the Army will
accelerate deploying units if requested by CENTCOM. While doing so, we
continue to move toward our goal of restoring balance to soldiers and
their families.
General Amos. With a current force manning structure of 202,000,
the Marine Corps will be able to sustain the current Afghanistan MAGTF
requirement of 19,401 personnel for as long as necessary. In addition,
the Marine Corps will continue to source a 3.0 Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU) presence globally while fulfilling security cooperation (SC)
foundation activities to the maximum extent possible.
equipment reset
17. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, you have
expressed some concerns about the ability to adequately reset equipment
returning from Iraq, while increasing operational support in
Afghanistan, and preparing troops to respond to future contingency
operations around the world. As the drawdown in Iraq continues, DOD and
the Services can expect to see an increase in reset requirements as a
result of force reductions in Iraq and a growing presence in
Afghanistan. In addition, DOD industrial facilities and contractors
will be depending on accurate demand signals to effectively and
efficiently reset the right equipment, at the right time, according to
the right priorities. Also, the Services maintain that U.S. forces can
expect to participate in a long war that will require an enduring reset
that will surpass OIF and OEF. Given these enormous challenges with
resetting equipment to enhance the overall capability and readiness of
forces, to what extent are equipping strategies and force generation
models identifying the mix of numbers of equipment to be reset to
support operations in Afghanistan or future threats, or is the demand
for reset, as a practical matter, being driven by the type and numbers
of equipment returning to the United States from Iraq?
General Chiarelli. The ARFORGEN integrates units scheduled for
deployment with units being replaced. We forecast our equipment reset
requirements based on the ARFORGEN model, which depicts the unit relief
in place, transfer of authority dates, and, consequently, equipment
forecasted for retrograde. The order of induction for equipment into
reset activities is prioritized based on demand. Our forecasting method
is initially based on historical trends and then revised based on
actual equipment returning from theater.
General Amos. Operational needs in Afghanistan were a main driver
in what was initially retrograded from Iraq. For example, approximately
40 percent of the equipment in Afghanistan came from within theater,
mainly from Iraq. Maintenance was conducted in Kuwait and then the
required equipment was sent from Kuwait to Afghanistan. Because so much
of the OIF equipment was sent to OEF, total reset actions have been
deferred until we begin to drawdown our presence in Afghanistan.
All equipment not diverted to support OEF has been retrograded to
the continental United States (CONUS), and we are in the process of
resetting that equipment. To help develop the requirements for OIF
reset, and project costs for reset execution, the Marine Corps created
the ground equipment reset cost model to estimate total reset cost. The
model is a collection of ground equipment reset strategies for each
equipment type deployed to the MARCENT theater. These strategies
include: depot maintenance; field maintenance; new procurement; and no
reset required. Reset strategies are tailored to individual equipment
types based on a range of factors including relative age, density in
theater, usage rates in theater, and other criteria. These reset
strategies are routinely updated and validated though a comprehensive
process. Managing this information for all deployed ground equipment
enables more detailed maintenance, procurement, and disposal planning
during reset execution.
18. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, how will
force modernization or modularity priorities be weighed against short-
term Afghanistan specific needs when resetting equipment?
General Chiarelli. Afghanistan is our number 1 priority. We
anticipate being able to fill the vast majority of our equipment
requirements for OEF with: (1) equipment retrograded from Iraq; (2) new
procurement/production currently being received; (3) unit provided/
deployed equipment; and (4) equipment available from national level
(depot) reset. New demands from Afghanistan, however, have not
significantly impacted Army modernization or modular transformation
efforts. We continue to modernize and transform to sustain our soldiers
and provide the necessary capabilities to guarantee success in any
mission or environment.
General Amos. New procurement must play a major part in force
modernization. For the last 9 years, the Marine Corps has been engaged
in a land war and we have adapted. However, as we reconstitute our
force to the future, we must focus on our roots of amphibious and
expeditionary capabilities. Force modernization will thus focus on
those capabilities that will prepare us for the next challenge.
Afghanistan specific needs determined what equipment was sent
directly from OIF to OEF. Now that the equipment has returned to CONUS,
the Marine Corps continues to determine reset priorities according to
several comprehensive processes. These processes will identify ground
equipment challenges and recommend policies, actions, and equipment
sourcing solutions to ensure ground equipment allocation aligns with
prioritizations established by the Commandant.
19. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, to what
extent do the Services expect reset to become an enduring component in
the base budget to support long-term contingency operations?
General Chiarelli. Reset is a cost of war, and therefore has
historically been funded through supplemental appropriations. The Army
is not planning for reset to become an enduring component in the base
budget to support long-term named contingency operations. However, the
Army will continue to require reset funding for equipment deployed to
OIF and OEF as long as forces are deployed plus 2 to 3 years to ensure
equipment serviceability and readiness is restored and equipment is
ready for the next contingency.
For other than named contingency operations, such as routine
training or engagement exercises, equipment reset will be funded
through the base budget.
General Amos. Reset by definition is the cost to repair and replace
equipment directly used in combat operations, thus it is not an
enduring requirement and should not become a component of the base
budget. Once OCO cease, a reset period of 2 to 4 years will commence to
restore warfighting capabilities but will not remain a permanent
baseline requirement.
afghanistan supply and equipment support
20. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, the
difficulties in transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan will
be a challenge as DOD implements its plans to increase U.S. forces by
30,000. Additionally, DOD must manage both the Afghanistan increase and
Iraq drawdown at the same time, and the troop increase in Afghanistan
will be dependent to some extent on equipment being retrograded from
Iraq. Are you confident that you will be able to provide all the
necessary supplies and equipment to deployed forces operating in
Afghanistan when they need them?
General Chiarelli. The plus-up of forces in Afghanistan and the
drawdown of forces in Iraq are indeed challenges; however, I am
confident that we will accomplish this mission. The Army works very
closely with the CENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the
DLA, and multiple other supporting organizations to overcome the myriad
of challenges.
In doing so, we establish clear standards and have included
enforceable metrics for our commercial carriers to ensure that required
delivery times are met, that we maintain in-transit visibility of
supplies and equipment, and that equipment and sustainment cargo is
delivered in good order and condition.
To optimize airlift capability, TRANSCOM and CENTCOM worked hard to
maximize multi-modal operations (movement of cargo initially by sea and
then by air from an airfield closer to Afghanistan), to minimize delays
leading up to our required delivery dates, and to aggregate airlift
requirements so as to produce more efficient and effective loads.
Additionally, advancements in property accountability processes
ensure that equipment no longer needed in Iraq is readily identified
and offered for use in Afghanistan. This equipment is being sent
through maintenance in Kuwait before being onward moved to Afghanistan.
Furthermore, units redeploying from Afghanistan have been instructed to
leave behind much of their equipment for follow on units in order to
minimize the burden on the ground lines of communication leading into
and out of Afghanistan.
General Amos. Yes, we were successful in deploying equipment and
supplies to meet the required timelines for the OEF surge and we
continue to equip and sustain our forces deployed in Afghanistan. The
Marine Corps units, personnel, and equipment tied to MAGTFs that are
assigned to the CENTCOM commander are moved in accordance with the
Time-Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD) within the Joint
Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) as validated by
CENTCOM and executed by TRANSCOM's organic and contracted commercial
transportation assets. The Marine Corps sourced equipment for the surge
using the TPFDD and JOPES procedures to ensure equipment was provided
in accordance with the supported commander's priorities and plans in
OEF.
The sourcing of the OEF equipment requirement was accomplished
using a combination of assets available in theater, mainly Iraq, that
were mission capable or able to be brought to mission capable status in
time to meet the OEF requirement, planned procurements, in stores
assets, and through global sourcing from home station units.
21. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, have any
units in Afghanistan reported that they have been unable to conduct
their missions due to a lack of supplies and equipment?
General Chiarelli. A review of readiness reports for units
operating in Afghanistan from October 2009 to March 2010 indicates no
Army units reported an inability to perform their assigned mission due
to a lack of supplies or equipment. Headquarters, Department of the
Army and U.S. Army CENTCOM work very hard to ensure that required
equipment is on hand upon unit arrival in Afghanistan.
General Amos. No Marine Corps units have reported that they have
been unable to conduct their missions due to a lack of supplies and
equipment. This is not to say readiness challenges do not exist for our
units in Afghanistan. Although collectively our deployed forces
continue to report the highest levels of readiness, it is also true
that readiness challenges do exist for some units in Afghanistan and
from time to time these units may experience a slight degradation in
capability. Battle damage due to enemy action and the harsh operating
environment are the prime factors; however, at no time have these
factors prevented a unit from accomplishing its mission. A robust
forward in stores program and principle end item (PEI) rotation process
are designed to mitigate these challenges to our forward deployed
units.
22. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, to what
extent will the troop increase in Afghanistan be dependent on equipment
retrograded from Iraq, and is there a risk the equipment needed from
Iraq will not be available in the planned timeframes to support the
Afghanistan troop increase?
General Chiarelli. The Army has carefully developed a plan to
resource equipment needed in Afghanistan from both domestic production
and Iraq retrograde. Of the equipment required to resource the
Afghanistan surge, 85 percent will come from domestic production and 15
percent from Iraq retrograde. We are confident these resource
quantities will be met, given that the Army has thoroughly analyzed the
availability and throughput capability for theater refurbishment.
General Amos. Approximately 40 percent of the equipment in
Afghanistan came from within theater, mainly from Iraq. This equipment
was mission capable or able to be brought to mission capable status in
time to have met the OEF surge requirement.
23. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, what effect,
if any, will use of equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan have on the
plans to reset equipment for use in other future contingency
operations?
General Chiarelli. The expansion in Afghanistan will create a
decline in national level (depot) reset requirements and production in
the short term. Additionally, there will be an increased requirement
for theater refurbishment of equipment as specific items are moved from
Iraq to Afghanistan. We believe this will cause a delay in the Army
achieving balance within 12 to 18 months.
General Amos. The Marine Corps had initially forecasted to complete
OIF ground equipment reset actions in fiscal year 2012; however, due to
operational necessity, equipment scheduled for retrograde from OIF in
2009 for reset beginning 2010, was diverted to OEF. As a result there
are impacts to the reset plans, timeline, and budget required to
execute reset; these impacts are in the process of being identified and
analyzed.
Because the Marine Corps held large quantities of equipment
retrograded from Iraq to support the increased footprint in
Afghanistan, the reset of a significant portion of equipment used in
Iraq has been deferred beyond 2011. The majority of equipment that
remained in theater consists of armored vehicles, including most of our
deployed medium tactical fleet, our entire fleet of MRAP vehicles,
light armored reconnaissance vehicles, and some theater-specific items.
While the decision to leave wheeled vehicle fleets and other
critical items in theater enabled a quick and seamless transition from
Iraq to Afghanistan, those same assets drive a significant portion of
the Marine Corps' total reset liability and depot maintenance costs.
Foregoing reset actions now (e.g. field or depot-level maintenance)
will undoubtedly result in higher than normal equipment wash-out rates
and more costly depot repairs once the equipment is eventually able to
be reset.
The initial planning has commenced for drawing down forces in
Afghanistan, which will follow the same planning process as was used
for Iraq's drawdown. Equipment requiring reset actions will be included
in the development of an OEF equipment reset plan and be retrograded to
the maintenance depots at either Albany, GA or Barstow, CA or sent to
other Service depots or commercial sources of repair for depot
maintenance, modernization and rebuild, or field level maintenance
repair actions. Following appropriate maintenance and repair actions,
equipment will be returned to Ready For Issue (RFI) condition and is
used to source Marine Corps equipment requirements in accordance with
the Commandant of the Marine Corps' equipment priorities.
24. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, to what
extent will the United States provide equipment to coalition forces,
and what impact will this have, if any, on the flow of U.S. forces into
Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. The U.S. Army provides equipment to our
coalition partners using congressionally-granted authorities that will
have no impact on the flow of U.S. forces into Afghanistan. It is in
the best interest of our Nation to support our coalition partners with
equipment, when feasible.
In Afghanistan, we are building coalition partner capabilities in
two ways. First, we are utilizing the authority granted under section
1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
2007, whereby we can loan certain types of equipment (such as Up-
Armored HMMWVs, crew-served weapons, protective masks, and add-on armor
kits) for up to 1 year to our coalition partners. Second, for other
types of equipment outside the scope of section 1202, we utilize
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements to loan equipment to our
coalition partners.
In Afghanistan, we are also enabling the Afghanistan National
Security Forces (ANSF) to build their Minimum Essential Capabilities
(MEC) through the following three authorities: Excess Defense Articles
(EDA) (section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961); Non-Excess
(section 1234, NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010); and Sale from Stock (section
21 of the Arms Export Control Act).
In Iraq, we are transferring certain equipment to the Government of
Iraq (GoI) to ensure they achieve their required MEC. As with the ANSF
in Afghanistan, we are executing these equipment transfers through
multiple authorities: EDA (section 516), Non-Excess (section 1234), and
Sale from Stock (section 21). Additionally, we are also using Foreign
Excess Personal Property (Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. 511-514)) authority to transfer
operational bases to the GoI.
General Amos. The Marine Corps has provided equipment to seven
coalition nations contributing forces to Afghanistan and will continue
to do so when tasked by the Joint Staff to the greatest extent possible
without degrading our own ability to successfully accomplish our
assigned mission. This level of commitment will not impact the
deployment or employment of Marine Corps forces into Afghanistan.
The Marine Corps has provided a significant quantity of vehicles
and garrison equipment from stores within the CENTCOM AOR to the
Georgian battalion serving as part of the Marine Expeditionary Force.
Types of equipment provided from stores within theater include: MRAP
vehicles, night vision devices, MRAP ambulances, force tracking
systems, tactical radios, tactical trailers, GPS systems, medical
supplies, IED jammer systems, and miscellaneous garrison equipment. The
Marine Corps has also provided equipment under the Coalition
Operational Needs Statement (CONS) process to the following coalition
partner nations: Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Georgia, Portugal,
Polish, and Romania. The Marine Corps will maintain its combat
readiness notwithstanding transferring equipment to coalition forces.
additional contracting concerns
25. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, further
complicating DOD's redeployment from Iraq is the fact that DOD will be
simultaneously transitioning several major support contracts in Iraq,
including the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract,
during the height of the redeployment, which may lead to interruption
of services. What actions are the Services taking to mitigate the
potential adverse impact of these contract transitions during the
drawdown?
General Chiarelli. The Army strategy to transition from LOGCAP III
to IV in Southwest Asia was built on two fundamental principles: to
minimize the effect on the operational commander in the field, and to
make sound business decisions in order to be good stewards of
resources. We built our transition plan to start in the most benign
environment (Kuwait) and progressively move to the most challenging
theaters (Afghanistan and Iraq). Our plan allowed us to build upon
lessons learned as we progressively increased contract task order
scale, scope, and complexity.
In February 2010, the Rock Island Contracting Center, a subordinate
command of the Army Contracting Command, awarded a LOGCAP IV task order
to Kellogg Brown and Root Services (KBR) for the provision of Corps
Logistic Support Services, Postal Services, and the Theater
Transportation Mission in Iraq. KBR conducts a phased transition to the
new task order beginning 15 May 2010; the projected completion date is
1 September 2010. This will complete transition of one of the two
remaining LOGCAP III task orders in Iraq.
ARCENT conducted the Business Case Analysis (BCA) on whether to
transition the remaining LOGCAP III task order (for Base Life Support)
in Iraq LOGCAP IV, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Cost and Economics validated the methodology and results.
The Army used that BCA to determine the best course of action for BLS
in Iraq. At this time, the final decision on whether to transition the
BLS task order from LOGCAP III to IV is still pending.
General Amos. The drawdown of the Marine Corps component from Iraq
and subsequent transition to operations in Afghanistan was conducted
seamlessly and did not result in a curtailment of support contracts
such as the LOGCAP. Marines operating in Afghanistan continue to
benefit by LOGCAP support services; the LOGCAP is currently managed by
the U.S. Army.
26. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, what specific
factors are the Services considering as it weighs whether to proceed
with the transition to the new LOGCAP contract for base and life
support in Iraq?
General Chiarelli. While examining whether to proceed from LOGCAP
III to LOGCAP IV, the Army considered the following factors: the
operational impact of any transition, the BCA of alternative courses of
action, and the ability of the LOGCAP III contractor to perform the
mission.
Headquarters, U.S. Forces-Iraq assessed the operational impact of a
possible transition. Headquarters, ARCENT conducted a BCA, and the
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and
Economics validated the BCA. The BCA assessed four courses of action
using a list of operational and financial criteria. The criteria
included: timing--executable within existing security agreement
timeline; sufficiency--provides the required level of base life support
services in Iraq; legality--meets the Federal Acquisition Regulation
requirements; and funding--sufficient funding available. The BCA
analysts weighed the criteria based on their relative importance to
each other. The Defense Contract Audit Agency provided advisory
services to the ARCENT Comptroller in support of the analysis. DOD
Inspector General and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
also reviewed the BCA and endorsed its conclusions.
DCMA continues to assess the ability of the current LOGCAP III
contractor to perform the mission. In March 2010, the Administrative
Contracting Officer advised the Procuring Contracting Officer that
KBR's accounting, estimating, and purchasing systems, as well as its
cost accounting standards disclosure statements, were adequate and in
accordance with applicable regulations.
General Amos. The Marine Corps continually seeks ways to increase
its combat potential within programmed resource allocations. The use of
contractors in combat theaters of operations such as Iraq and
Afghanistan has allowed the Marine Corps to effectively release
military units for other missions or to fill support shortfalls. The
Department of the Army-managed LOGCAP includes all pre-planned
logistics and engineering/construction-oriented contingency contracts
actually awarded, and peacetime contracts which include contingency
clauses. LOGCAP is primarily designed for use in areas where no
bilateral or multilateral agreements exist. LOGCAP support services are
also used effectively during CONUS mobilizations to assist support
bases in preparing forces for mobilization.
support for urgent need and nonstandard equipment
27. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, approximately
$11.7 billion of equipment in Iraq currently belongs to military units
and will be returning with those units when they redeploy to the United
States. The remainder includes theater provided equipment comprised of
$10.2 billion in standard military gear and about $2.9 billion in
nonstandard gear. As we increase troop levels in Afghanistan, the Army
and Marine Corps have been adjusting their plans to redeploy equipment
from Iraq. Some of this redeploying equipment, which was scheduled to
return to the United States, is now being redirected to units headed to
Afghanistan. In addition, some forces will move directly from Iraq to
Afghanistan. Can you tell me to what extent the theater-provided
equipment in Iraq will be returned to the United States for reset
versus being repaired or reset in theater before being shipped to
Afghanistan to support the surge there?
General Chiarelli. Every piece of equipment being redirected from
Iraq to Afghanistan will be inspected and refurbished as necessary to
ensure its serviceability before arrival in Afghanistan. We are not
planning to ship any equipment currently in Iraq to the United States
for reset and then transport the same equipment to Afghanistan.
Shipping to, and reset in, the United States would consume too much
time for this to be a viable option. Some equipment that is currently
inducted in national-level depot reset, however, may be available in
time for shipment to Afghanistan to meet requirements.
General Amos. All theater provided equipment (TPE) carried by
Marine Corps forces in Iraq was turned over to the Army prior to
redeployment. The Marine Corps' Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)
(MEF (Fwd)) in Afghanistan carries limited amounts of TPE as part of
its deployed equipment density list (EDL). As was the case in Iraq, all
TPE in Afghanistan is provided to the Marine Corps by the Army. Upon
redeployment, or as TPE is no longer required for deployed operations,
it will be returned to the Army. All other equipment on the MEF (Fwd)
EDL--whether it is standard or ``non-standard'' equipment--is currently
planned for redeployment to CONUS and reset.
28. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, to what
extent are we pulling from our prepositioned equipment to support the
surge in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Over the past 2 years, more than 2,600 pieces of
APS equipment have been issued in support of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The use of this APS equipment resulted in delaying the
completion of rebuilding the APS-5 Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) by
1 year, from March 2010 to March 2011. Examples of equipment drawn are
tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV), trailers, engineer equipment, material
handling equipment, communication equipment, and generators. We are
planning to address these shortages through repaired and reset
equipment retrograded from Iraq, as well as equipment coming from
depots and new production.
General Amos. For Afghanistan, MCPP-N provided 41 principal end
items to support the establishment of MEB-A in January 2010. Meanwhile,
there were 298 principal end items downloaded at Blount Island Command
that were shipped to Afghanistan to also support MEB-A.
Equipment from MPSRON-1 was required to outfit new units standing
up fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 as part of our end strength
increase to 202,000 marines. Equipment from MPSRON-2 was offloaded to
support OIF II.
29. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, will the TPE
returning from Iraq be repaired or reset in theater to replace
prepositioned equipment drawn to support the Afghanistan surge?
General Chiarelli. Yes, prior to TPE being completely retrograded
out of theater, CENTCOM will make determine if the equipment can be
repaired in theater to be sourced against a theater requirement, to
include specific APS needs. We have already begun using repaired TPE
(i.e., vehicles, radios, generators, and other support equipment) to
fill some of our APS shortages. We will continue to use a combination
of repaired and reset equipment retrograded from Iraq, as well as
equipment coming from depots and new production to replace our
prepositioned equipment.
General Amos. All TPE carried by Marine Corps forces in Iraq was
turned over to the Army prior to redeployment. The Marine Corps' MEF
(Fwd) in Afghanistan carries limited amounts of TPE as part of its
deployed EDL. As was the case in Iraq, all TPE in Afghanistan is
provided to the Marine Corps by the Army. Upon redeployment, or as TPE
is no longer required for deployed operations, it will be returned to
the Army. All other equipment on the MEF (Fwd) EDL--whether it is
standard or ``non-standard'' equipment--is currently planned for
redeployment to CONUS and reset.
30. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, what are the
plans for the reset and sustainment of the almost $3 billion in
nonstandard gear that we have rapidly acquired to support urgent
warfighter needs?
General Chiarelli. We fully recognize that Non-Standard Equipment
(NS-E) has played a significant role in enhancing the Army's
capabilities. The Army has established a process called ``Capabilities
Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT),'' to determine the long-term
plan for NS-E, which classifies NS-E into three categories:
(1) Acquisition Program Candidates (APC): This is equipment which
has been determined to have long-term applicability to Army equipping
requirements, and so will be assigned to a program manager for movement
through the formal Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS). All APC equipment will be reset upon its return and
will eventually be issued to units in accordance with an approved Basis
of Issue Plan (BOIP). The Army will manage these capabilities like any
other acquisition program, with sustainment planned as part of the
systems lifecycle.
(2) Sustain: This is equipment found to be useful for current
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and so will be reset and continue
to be used in OEF and Operation New Dawn (OND). When no longer required
in OEF and OND, it may be placed in War Reserve or Operational Project
Stocks, or may be disposed of, depending upon how current the
technology remains.
(3) Terminate: This is equipment that the Army has determined is
no longer militarily useful, and will therefore be disposed of. If
feasible, disposal might be through Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
General Amos. The Marine Corps principally uses the Expeditionary
Force Development System (EFDS) to determine requirements for
warfighting capabilities, to include equipment fielded by nonstandard
methods. That equipment is typically fielded via either the Service's
Urgent Needs Process (UNP) or the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON)
process. EFDS, conducted throughout each POM cycle, includes a bottom-
up component that reviews each item of NS-E, first with respect to the
capability gaps those items are intended to resolve. If validated, they
are approved as entries to the MAGTF Gap List (MGL) by the Marine
Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) led by the Assistant Commandant
of the Marine Corps. Solution strategies are then developed to address
each gap, which might include new technologies. If the particular item
of NS-E is judged the best plan to provide a solution, it is included
on the MROC-approved MAGTF Requirements List (MRL). Finally, the MRL is
used to identify and prioritize initiatives for inclusion in the
upcoming POM. In every case, investment in NS-E depends upon the
establishment of that particular item as an enduring Marine Corps
requirement. The Marine Corps will address the reset of NS-E once CD&I
has determined what equipment will remain a part of the Marine Corps
inventory.
31. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli and General Amos, have you
determined how much of this NS-E has proven useful and therefore should
be reset and sustained? If not, what are your plans for this equipment
and where are you in executing that plan?
General Chiarelli. The Army has established the CDRT to determine
the long-term plan for NS-E. Through this program, NS-E will be
classified into three categories:
(1) APC: This is equipment which has been determined to have
long-term applicability to Army equipping requirements, and so will be
assigned to a program manager for movement through the formal JCIDS.
All APC equipment will be reset upon its return and will eventually be
issued to units in accordance with an approved Basis of Issue Plan
(BOIP). The Army will manage these capabilities like any other
acquisition program, with sustainment planned as part of the systems
lifecycle.
(2) Sustain: This is equipment found to be useful for current
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and so will be reset and continue
to be used in OEF and OND. When no longer required in OEF and OND, it
may be placed in War Reserve or Operational Project Stocks, or may be
disposed of, depending upon how current the technology remains.
(3) Terminate: This is equipment that the Army has determined is
no longer militarily useful, and will therefore be disposed of. If
feasible, disposal might be through FMS.
The Army has coordinated and synchronized processes at every level
to properly account for and dispose of equipment. We have established
metrics for monitoring our progress and are currently on track in
capturing accountability and disposition of our equipment.
General Amos. A large percentage of NS-E has proven very useful to
our Marine Corps forces operating in theater. And, the investment of
those nonstandard items for future use depends upon the establishment
of the particular item as an enduring Marine Corps requirement.
The Marine Corps uses the EFDS to determine requirements for
warfighting capabilities, to include equipment fielded by nonstandard
methods. That equipment is typically fielded through what is known as
the UNP or the JUON process, which includes a bottom-up review of each
item of NS-E. If validated, the equipment is approved as entries to the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Gap List by the MROC. If the NS-E
is determined to be an enduring requirement, it is included on the
MROC-approved MAGTF Requirements List. The MAGTF Requirements List is
then used to identify and prioritize initiatives for inclusion in the
upcoming POM.
The Marine Corps is continuing to determine plans for the use of
nonstandard items. However, current estimates project that
approximately 47 percent of all equipment repaired in 2010 will be
repaired either at a depot or field level maintenance facility, and 36
percent of the returning equipment will be replaced. The remaining
percentage includes items for which no reset action will be taken. This
includes theater-specific items which have no intended usage beyond
OIF, or items that can be placed directly back into the Marine Corps
inventory with no further maintenance action required.
marine corps reset
32. Senator Bayh. General Amos, the Marine Corps seems to be facing
a lot of unanswered questions that will affect its total requirement
for equipment reset. The Marine Corps is requesting billions of dollars
to repair its battle-worn equipment, but at the same time there are
questions regarding whether the Marine Corps should be procuring new
lighter equipment to support it expeditionary roots. To what extent
does the Marine Corps know what equipment it will reset through new
procurement, rather than through repair and recapitalization?
General Amos. The reset cost model shows what equipment is in the
MARCENT AOR and how the Marine Corps projects how they will reset that
equipment. Reset includes the projection of field level maintenance,
depot level maintenance, or new procurement to replace items based upon
the developed reset cost model. The reset of ground equipment returning
from the MARCENT AOR will be challenging as we rebalance resources to
support ongoing combat operations, rearm, and reposition forces around
the world.
As we retrograde and redeploy, a significant number of principal
end items (PEI) must be reset in a timely manner to sustain continued
operations, reset home station units and strategic programs such as our
MPF. The reset of ground equipment returning from combat generally
falls into four categories. They are: (1) procurement/replacement; (2)
depot maintenance; (3) field maintenance; and (4) no maintenance
required. Each category has a separate logistics action. The initial
assessment of equipment being redeployed takes place in theater by
forward deployed elements of Marine Corps Logistic Command (MCLC).
Using a triage methodology, we determine the type of reset action
required and take appropriate measures based on that assessment. Some
equipment that is determined to be beyond repair will be disposed of in
theater. Equipment that is economical to repair will be directed to an
appropriate level maintenance facility, typically here in CONUS. Where
necessary, the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) will procure
replacements for equipment which is beyond economic repair or obsolete.
New procurement will play a major part in force modernization.
Equipment retrograded or redeployed from theater is inspected to
determine if depot level repairs are required. The use of DOD core
depot maintenance capabilities play a critical role in the reset of
ground equipment. The goal of depot operations is to restore equipment
to full capability as quickly as possible. Ground equipment repaired at
designated depot-level repair activities will normally undergo 100
percent overhaul/rebuild. However, Inspect and Repair Only as Necessary
(IROAN) and Selective Overhaul and Repair (SOAR) programs are viable
options when determined to be a more effective and efficient means to
return equipment to full mission capability and back into the hands of
marines.
33. Senator Bayh. General Amos, how much of the Marine Corps
equipment returned from Iraq was actually in good enough condition that
it could be repaired and sent to Afghanistan?
General Amos. Approximately 40 percent of the equipment in
Afghanistan came from within theater, mainly from Iraq. Maintenance was
conducted in Kuwait and then the required equipment was sent from
Kuwait to Afghanistan. Because so much of the OIF equipment was sent to
OEF, total reset actions have been deferred until we begin to drawdown
our presence in Afghanistan. Equipment from OIF which was not
redirected, returned to CONUS to be inducted into the reset process. As
the reset process continues, that equipment will continue to be fielded
across the enterprise to fill equipment requirements in accordance with
the CMC Priority List.
34. Senator Bayh. General Amos, how did the Marine Corps make up
the difference, and what is the status and plans for the Marine Corps
equipment that was not diverted to Afghanistan?
General Amos. Marine Corps forward deployed forces have the
resources and equipment needed to conduct operations in support of OEF,
but this has come at the expense of our home station, nondeployed
units. For example, equipment used to support OIF that was scheduled to
go through a depot overhaul has now been redirected to support OEF. As
a result, we expect much higher than normal wash-out rates and more
costly depot repairs when the equipment is eventually reset. This
increased cost will be significant considering that over 40 percent of
the equipment in Afghanistan was sourced from the CENTCOM theater (most
of that coming from Iraq). Of the equipment that was retrograded to
CONUS a significant portion was deemed obsolete or unsuitable for
future use by the Marine Corps. In addition to shifting equipment from
Iraq to Afghanistan, we drew heavily from the home station, nondeployed
units. This resulted in an additional 5 to 10 percent decrease in
equipment supply readiness for home station units, which directly
impacts our preparedness for contingencies beyond Afghanistan. In
short, we have assumed considerable risk within our nondeployed
operational units where EOH currently averages 60 percent of the
requirement.
Prior to the decision to deploy additional forces to OEF, the
Marine Corps planned on performing depot maintenance on over 12,000
retrograded items, and field maintenance on over 24,000 items in fiscal
year 2010. Due to the diversion of equipment to support our increased
footprint in Afghanistan, we now expect that depot maintenance will be
performed on approximately 6,100 retrograded items, and field
maintenance on approximately 10,000 items in fiscal year 2010.
The process of reset execution is further integrated via the Marine
Corps Logistics Command-led Enterprise Level Maintenance Program
(ELMP). This is a comprehensive program that plans, programs, budgets
for, and executes requirements for depot level maintenance. Once
retrograded equipment is repaired through depots or via field
maintenance, the process of filling equipment requirements is guided by
the Commandant of the Marine Corps Equipment Priority List.
navy changes in crew size
35. Senator Bayh. Admiral Greenert, in the interest of increasing
efficiencies and saving costs, the Navy has implemented several
initiatives over the past several years, including reducing the size of
crews assigned to surface combatants, shifting from hands-on to more
computer-based training for basic engineering and other courses. At the
same time, ships are facing increased mission requirements, such as for
force protection and ballistic missile defense (BMD). To what extent
has the Navy evaluated the impact of these changes in crew size and
training on the ability of ships to maintain readiness, perform all
required missions, and pass all required inspections?
Admiral Greenert. Navy has incorporated the manpower requirements
associated with force protection and BMD within our ship manpower
documents across the surface force where applicable. Additionally, Navy
has addressed the impacts of reduced crew manning. Within Program
Review 2011, we have added 16 Engineman billets in LSD 41 class ships
and 35 Machinist Mate billets in LHD 1 class ships to mitigate some
impacts of optimal manning crew reductions. We are also evaluating the
feasibility of restoring manpower within other surface ships.
Navy has focused efforts to deliver additional training to the
waterfront and leveraged lessons learned to establish a blended
training solution, which combines computer based training with
traditional instructor-led training that, includes seminars and
practical application in laboratories featuring hands-on training using
both equipment and high fidelity simulators. This method utilizes the
cost benefits of computer-based training to produce a more competent
sailor. Billets for afloat-training have been increased to provide the
warfighter increased access to subject matter experts while in port or
during local operations. New programs, such as Advanced Warfare
Training, taught by the Center for Surface Combat Systems, deliver
waterfront training to the sailor to build confidence in maintaining
the combat systems suite, operator proficiency, and the ability to work
in a team environment.
air force key enablers
36. Senator Bayh. General Chandler, given the growing reliance on
the Air Force to provide key enabling support capabilities to ongoing
operations, such as military police and engineers, what impact has this
had on force readiness?
General Chandler. The reliance on the Air Force to provide key
enabling support capabilities through Joint Expeditionary Taskings
(JET) degrades overall Air Force unit readiness by diminishing from
organized, trained, and equipped unit numbers. For each augmentee that
is tasked, an Air Force capability is degraded by not having its full
complement of deployment ready personnel. For example, over the last
year, the Air Force provided on average 1,025 personnel to fill
military police (MP)-like capabilities. This amounted to roughly 25
percent of the total deployment requirements for Air Force Security
Forces. These missions have included Police Transition Teams, Detainee
Operations, Law and Order Detachments, and the like. In addition,
augmentee sourcing is generally supported by Field Grade Officers and
Senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCO), which adversely affects unit
leadership, training, and capability. As an example, Civil Engineering
officers are 1 of 11 stressed officer career fields and 8 of 17
stressed enlisted career fields are within Civil Engineering. Air Force
end strength does not account for augmentee tasks which are over and
above postured capability. In addition to MP and engineers, augmentees
tend to be tasked from high-tempo capability areas such as
Intelligence, Communications, Logistics Readiness, et cetera, further
exacerbating sustainment of rotational sourcing.
37. Senator Bayh. General Chandler, given that these requirements
are expected to continue, does the Air Force have plans to adjust its
force structure to increase the inventory of these capabilities?
General Chandler. The Air Force is ``all in.'' We size our human
capital inventory based on long-term stability needs, therefore the Air
Force does not plan to increase the inventories in these capabilities.
We are taking steps to mitigate the high tempo on individual airmen. We
continue to execute enlisted retraining programs both for first-term
airmen and NCOs and are implementing a formal officer crossflow program
to do the same for our officer force. We have protected high OPTEMPO
career fields where possible from force management actions as we strive
to meet overall end strength. These efforts will help maintain the
proper inventory in enabling support capabilities and shape the force
to meet current and emergent Air Force missions.
38. Senator Bayh. General Chandler, on April 2, at an Air Force
Association-sponsored breakfast, Air Force Chief of Staff General
Schwartz told reporters, ``a service life extension program (SLEP) for
aging F-15 and F-16 fighters would cost about 10 to 15 percent of what
it would costs to buy new aircraft.'' Yet my staff has been told that
to execute SLEP and increase from 8,600 flying hours to 10,000 flying
hours will cost approximately $25 million per aircraft, while the cost
of a new aircraft is approximately $42 million. This doesn't make
fiscal sense. What is the engineering data and explanation behind the
comments made by General Schwartz?
General Chandler. SLEP of current fighters provides essentially the
same capability as new fourth generation fighters. The Air Force
determined that SLEP costs about 10 to 15 percent of new aircraft based
upon a comparison of current estimates for procurement of new fourth
generation fighters (F-15E+, F-16 B50+, F/A-18 E/F) and a POM quality
estimate for F-16 B40/50 SLEP (structure and avionics). The estimate of
10 to 15 percent is considered to be in the heart of the envelope of
procuring new aircraft after considering many variables including
quantity, multi-year versus single year procurement, and structural
upgrade only versus modernization. New aircraft such as the F-16 B50+
range in price from $54.3 million to $59.8 million and new F-15+ from
$76.4 million to $87.3 million; the cost to SLEP an F-16 B40/50 is
$8.69 million per aircraft, all in base year 2010 dollars. SLEP cost
estimates were provided by F-16 System Program Office, and included
structural upgrade (SLEP), Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
radar, Center Display Unit (CDU), ALQ-213 EW Management System (EWMS),
and Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS). Costs were validated by the Air
Force costing agency and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
reviewed them. The quoted figure of $25 million per aircraft SLEP is a
Navy estimate for the F-18.
Bottom line, the cost of a SLEP depends on the modernization
options selected but 10 to 15 percent of the cost of new procurement
bounds most options.
39. Senator Bayh. General Chandler, have these figures of 10 to 15
percent been validated by DOD and by the Capability Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) office or anyone else?
General Chandler. The CAPE office has not validated these numbers,
but the Air Force costing agency and the GAO have reviewed them.
Results of these reviews are pending.
40. Senator Bayh. General Chandler, currently, the Air Force may
deploy individuals or parts of units to meet the requirements of
combatant commanders. However, I'm concerned it does not reflect the
impact of these deployments in reporting the readiness of nondeployed
units. Specifically, for readiness reporting purposes, a nondeployed
unit reports as if it has all its personnel and capabilities even
though some may be deployed. Doesn't this mask the true readiness of
Air Force units?
General Chandler. Joint Staff Status of Resources and Training
System (SORTS) guidance (CJCSM 3150.02) allows the counting of
personnel as `available' if they are available within the forecasted
mission or alert response time. For those units that have a mission
response time that would permit its deployed personnel to be ready to
redeploy to another contingency within the unit's mission response
time, it is appropriate for them to count those personnel as available.
For those personnel that would not be available within mission response
time, units count them as unavailable and this is reflected in their
overall SORTS rating. In addition, the Joint Staff guidance assumes
that appropriate deployment orders have been received. By adhering to
the Joint Staff guidance, the true readiness of Air Force units is
presented to senior leadership for contingency sourcing, and the
readiness of Air Force units is not masked. While we currently adhere
to CJCSM 3150.02, the Air Force believes it can improve its readiness
reporting and is undertaking an effort to develop an improved reporting
process.
reduction in army readiness
41. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, while we work to support the
surge of forces in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq, we are reliant
upon sufficient ground transportation capabilities for the movement of
soldiers, equipment, and supplies. The fiscal year 2011 budget
indicates that there will be a 2-year gap in the procurement of 34-ton
flatbed semitrailers as well as similar pauses in other classes of
heavy ground transportation assets for the Army. How does the Army plan
cover this procurement shortfall?
General Chiarelli. The Army has met its fiscal year 2011
requirement for the 34-ton flatbed trailer and is not projected to
procure more trailers at this time. We currently are authorized 8,001
trailers and have 8,632 on-hand.
The Army plans to procure new Palletized Load System trucks through
fiscal year 2011, Heavy Equipment Tractors through fiscal year 2012,
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks Light Equipment Tractor and
Load Handling System Trucks through fiscal year 2016, and the 40-ton
trailers through fiscal year 2016. This will continue until the Army
meets its acquisition objective for each of these systems.
Additionally, the Army will focus on Heavy Tactical Vehicles and
Trailers through fiscal year 2025 to extend the service life of its
vehicles through recapitalization and modernization of older truck
variants to the current armor-capable configurations. The Army will
reduce sustainment costs by divesting the oldest vehicle and trailer
variants that are excess or are being replaced by new production.
42. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, what is the projected rate of
loss for these types of trailers both to obsolescence and hostile
action?
General Chiarelli. Since 2007, the washout rate for 34-ton flatbed
semitrailers at our depots is 1.5 percent. We do not have a reported
combat loss of these trailers since 2007. In 2007, three 34-ton flatbed
semitrailers were lost to combat operations, and in 2006, four were
lost to combat operations.
43. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, how many 34-ton flatbed
semitrailers, if any, will be left in Iraq and therefore unavailable
for use in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Afghanistan is our first priority for the
redistribution of equipment coming out of Iraq. Any 34-ton flatbed
semitrailers that are not mission essential in Iraq will be sent to
support operations in Afghanistan as required. We do not plan to leave
any 34-ton flatbed semitrailers in Iraq.
44. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, why is the Army opening
competition for one type of trailer (M872A5, 34-ton) but procuring
another (M871A3, 22-ton) via the General Services Administration (GSA)
schedule?
General Chiarelli. The M871A3 is a commercial 22\1/2\ ton trailer
that has been altered and modified to include military specific
requirements such as a blackout lighting system trailer, lifting and
tie down provisions, stream/river fording capability, prime mover
compatibility, and can transport up to one 20-foot International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) container or cargo. 10 U.S.C.
2304 and 41 U.S.C. 253, requires, with certain limited exceptions, that
contracting officers shall promote and provide for full and open
competition in soliciting offers and awarding government contracts. In
the case of the M871A3, the Army is procuring the trailer via the GSA
Schedule because it is readily available and GSA is listed as an
acceptable competitive procedure in accordance with Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) 6.102(d)(3). The configuration of the M871A3 available
on the GSA Schedule has been tested to verify conformance to the Army's
required performance capabilities and Type Classified.
The Army requirement for the 34-ton M872 trailer is to transport a
single 40-foot or two 20-foot ISO containers, palletized cargo, or
light combat or tactical vehicles. Unlike the M871A3, the M872A4 does
not have a GSA option that meets the Army's requirement to transport a
single 40-foot or two 20-foot ISO containers. Therefore, the Army must
compete its future procurements of M872 Series 34-ton semitrailers as
prescribed by law and in the FAR.
45. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, do the flatbed semitrailers
procured off the GSA Schedule need to meet the same testing and
performance requirements as those which are procured on a competitive
basis? If not, why not?
General Chiarelli. Yes, the flatbed semitrailers procured off the
GSA Schedule need to meet the same testing and performance
requirements. The M871A3s that the Army is procuring off the GSA
Schedule were extensively tested by the Army at the Aberdeen Test
Center from May 1999 through January 2002. The performance requirements
to which the M871A3s have been procured were addressed within a GSA
commercially-available performance specification. This trailer
specification was modified to address military-specific performance
requirements such as a blackout lighting system, trailer-lifting and
tie-down provisions, ammunition transport capability, an upgraded
suspension system to handle the rigors of off-road tactical mobility,
and painting with Chemical Agent Resistant Coating (CARC).
______
Questions Submitted by Senators Evan Bayh and Roland W. Burris
marine corps reset
46. Senator Bayh and Senator Burris. General Amos, the Marine Corps
seems to be facing a lot of unanswered questions that will affect its
total requirement for equipment reset. The Marine Corps is requesting
billions of dollars to repair its battle-worn equipment, but at the
same time there are questions regarding whether the Marines should be
procuring new lighter equipment to support it expeditionary roots. To
what extent does the Marine Corps know what equipment it will reset
through new procurement, rather than through repair and
recapitalization?
General Amos. The Reset Cost Model shows what equipment is in the
MARCENT AOR and how the Marine Corps projects will reset that
equipment. Reset includes the projection of field level maintenance,
depot level maintenance, or new procurement to replace items based upon
the developed Reset Cost Model. The reset of ground equipment returning
from the MARCENT AOR will be challenging as we rebalance resources to
support ongoing combat operations, rearm, and reposition forces around
the world.
As we retrograde and redeploy, a significant number of principal
end items (PEI) must be reset in a timely manner to sustain continued
operations, reset home station units and strategic programs such as our
MPF. The reset of ground equipment returning from combat generally
falls into four categories. They are: (1) procurement/replacement; (2)
depot maintenance; (3) field maintenance; and (4) no maintenance
required. Each category has a separate logistics action. The initial
assessment of equipment being redeployed takes place in theater by
forward deployed elements of MCLC. Using a triage methodology, we
determine the type of reset action required and take appropriate
measures based on that assessment. Some equipment that is determined to
be beyond repair will be disposed of in theater. Equipment that is
economical to repair will be directed to an appropriate level
maintenance facility, typically here in CONUS. Where necessary, the
MCSC will procure replacements for equipment which is beyond economic
repair or obsolete. New procurement will play a major part in force
modernization.
Equipment retrograded or redeployed from theater is inspected to
determine if depot level repairs are required. The use of DOD core
depot maintenance capabilities play a critical role in the reset of
ground equipment. The goal of depot operations is to restore equipment
to full capability as quickly as possible. Ground equipment repaired at
designated depot-level repair activities will normally undergo 100
percent overhaul/rebuild. However, IROAN and SOAR programs are viable
options when determined to be a more effective and efficient means to
return equipment to full mission capability and back into the hands of
marines.
47. Senator Bayh and Senator Burris. General Amos, how much of the
Marine Corps equipment returned from Iraq was actually in good enough
condition that it could be repaired and sent to Afghanistan?
General Amos. Approximately 40 percent of the equipment in
Afghanistan came from within theater, mainly from Iraq. Maintenance was
conducted in Kuwait and then the required equipment was sent from
Kuwait to Afghanistan. Because so much of the OIF equipment was sent to
OEF, total reset actions have been deferred until we begin to drawdown
our presence in Afghanistan. Equipment from OIF which was not
redirected, returned to CONUS to be inducted into the reset process. As
the reset process continues, that equipment will continue to be fielded
across the enterprise to fill equipment requirements in accordance with
the CMC Priority List.
48. Senator Bayh and Senator Burris. General Amos, how did the
Marine Corps make up the difference, and what is the status and plans
for the Marine Corps equipment that was not diverted to Afghanistan?
General Amos. Marine Corps forward deployed forces have the
resources and equipment needed to conduct operations in support of OEF,
but this has come at the expense of our home station, nondeployed
units. For example, equipment used to support OIF that was scheduled to
go through a depot overhaul has now been redirected to support OEF. As
a result, we expect much higher than normal wash-out rates and more
costly depot repairs when the equipment is eventually reset. This
increased cost will be significant considering that over 40 percent of
the equipment in Afghanistan was sourced from the CENTCOM theater (most
of that coming from Iraq). Of the equipment that was retrograded to
CONUS a significant portion was deemed obsolete or unsuitable for
future use by the Marine Corps. In addition to shifting equipment from
Iraq to Afghanistan, we drew heavily from the home station, nondeployed
units. This resulted in an additional 5 to 10 percent decrease in
equipment supply readiness for home station units, which directly
impacts our preparedness for contingencies beyond Afghanistan. In
short, we have assumed considerable risk within our nondeployed
operational units where EOH currently averages 60 percent of the
requirement.
Prior to the decision to deploy additional forces to OEF, the
Marine Corps planned on performing depot maintenance on over 12,000
retrograded items, and field maintenance on over 24,000 items in fiscal
year 2010. Due to the diversion of equipment to support our increased
footprint in Afghanistan, we now expect that depot maintenance will be
performed on approximately 6,100 retrograded items, and field
maintenance on approximately 10,000 items in fiscal year 2010.
The process of reset execution is further integrated via the Marine
Corps Logistics Command-led ELMP. This is a comprehensive program that
plans, programs, budgets for, and executes requirements for depot level
maintenance. Once retrograded equipment is repaired through depots or
via field maintenance, the process of filling equipment requirements is
guided by the Commandant of the Marine Corps Equipment Priority List.
issues with readiness reporting
49. Senator Bayh and Senator Burris. General Chiarelli, General
Amos, Admiral Greenert, and General Chandler, I can understand how a
unit commander knows his or her unit the best. And in reporting their
unit readiness through the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) we
capture not only whether they are ready, but ready for what. My concern
is that should they be allowed to subjectively upgrade if the
statistics and data do not support a higher unit readiness rating?
General Chiarelli. The unit status report is intended to reflect
the unit commander's personal assessments and individual judgments.
Clearly there are circumstances where a unit commander subjectively
upgrades even when the currently measured statistics and data do not
support a higher unit readiness rating. For example, a unit may be
short some of its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE)
required items; however, the commander, based on his or her knowledge
of the unit's current training proficiency and the availability of
other equipment items, assesses that the missing equipment items do not
significantly degrade the ability of the unit to accomplish its core
functions or increase its vulnerability, and upgrades the overall C-
level assessment accordingly. Similarly, the unit commander may
subjectively change the ``Assigned Mission Level (A-level) to reflect
unit training proficiency that is not measured otherwise. Reports are
processed through command channels so that commanders at higher levels
can review the report for accuracy and provide additional comments, if
necessary. Currently, Army Regulation 220-1 allows any unit commander
to subjectively upgrade or downgrade the overall readiness assessment
(C-level and A-level) by one level unilaterally. In general, two level
changes require the approval of the commander at the next higher level.
Three level changes require Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)
approval. This policy is intended to balance the desire to support
commander prerogatives with the need to provide the timely, accurate,
and objective reports prescribed by Congress in the 1999 NDAA.
General Amos. While we believe we have a very good readiness
reporting system, we also believe that no one knows and understands the
readiness and capabilities of his or her unit better than that unit's
commander. If a commander has a strong and compelling reason to
override the readiness rating of his or her unit based on objective
inputs, the commander should be able to do so.
Our readiness reporting policy provides specific guidelines for
when and why commanders can use the override function. Reports are
reviewed for accuracy throughout the chain of command all the way up to
the Headquarters Marine Corps level. In their commander's comments,
commanders must clearly articulate the reasons for their subjective
upgrade (or downgrade) to provide balance to their report. This human
dimension in our readiness reporting is important; ultimately the
commander is entrusted and responsible for the readiness of his or her
unit and we believe the commander should have the final say on how
ready his or her unit is.
Admiral Greenert. The commander's assessment represents their
first-hand knowledge of the unit's readiness, which is primarily based
on information about the resources available to support and accomplish
the mission. DRRS-Navy (DRRS-N) makes available to the commander
information from authoritative data sources that reflect the status of
those resources (Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, and
Facilities) that help assess Mission Essential Tasks (MET) that each
ship, unit, or squadron is required to perform to support their core
mission areas. The commander must balance his/her overall knowledge of
the full spectrum of resources that support the required capabilities,
with the experience factor relative to the reliability of equipment/
systems when making the assessment. These experienced commanders have
received many years of training, and their judgment is an exceptional
resource and an important factor in the most effective evaluation of
readiness. This judgment can either lead them to assess a readiness
level higher or lower than the data may otherwise support. In addition,
senior commanders have access to the readiness information from their
subordinate units in DRRS-N. This promotes open dialogue about any
questionable assessments, and it also serves as means for monitoring
the quality of readiness.
General Chandler. There is no subjective upgrade of the unit
readiness in the DRRS; the commander's assessment is subjective by the
very design of the system. Each unit has a core METL which contains
several METs. Each MET is assessed against a variety of measures,
usually objective, but some of them may be subjective as well. These
objective and subjective measures are used by the commander to inform
his overall assessment; there is no published DOD or Air Force guidance
equating individual MET assessments to a commander's overall
assessment. Because of the complexity of unit readiness, commanders are
permitted to use their experience and judgment, in addition to the
factors that make up the SORTS sub-area assessments, when making their
overall unit readiness assessment.
50. Senator Bayh and Senator Burris. General Chiarelli, General
Amos, Admiral Greenert, and General Chandler, my concern is that we may
be masking true readiness at the unit level and as that information is
passed up the chain of command to the Joint Staff, combatant
commanders, and JFCOM, that those assessments and abilities to respond
to mission requirements may not possess absolute clarity. I'll give you
an example: SOCOM does not allow commanders to subjectively upgrade
their unit readiness reporting status. Why do conventional forces allow
subjective upgrades and as a result of that are we not masking true
readiness reporting?
General Chiarelli. The responsibilities and authorities for
implementing and enforcing various readiness reporting requirements are
shared among the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, the combatant
commanders and the Service Secretaries in accordance with existing law
and policy. Title 10 U.S.C. establishes that the SOCOM Commander is
responsible to ensure the combat readiness of assigned forces and for
monitoring the mission readiness of all special operations forces,
restrictions on subjective changes for Army Special Operations Forces
are within his authority. Current Army policy restricts, but does not
prohibit, subjective changes to the overall readiness assessments
contained in unit status reports. While the commander of a conventional
Army unit may subjectively change his overall assessment, he is
required to clearly explain and justify the subjective change in
mandatory comments, and he cannot change the objective resource
measurements that reflect the current status of personnel and
equipment. Unit status reports are processed through command channels,
and all subjective changes to overall readiness assessments are clearly
identifiable to commanders at higher levels with those management
oversight responsibilities.
General Amos. The Marine Corps believes that no one knows and
understands the readiness and capabilities of his or her unit better
than the unit commander. If a commander has a strong and compelling
reason to override the readiness rating of his or her unit based on
objective inputs, the commander should be able to do so. There are
sometimes other factors to consider other than objective inputs
exclusively, such as unit morale or a commander's training and judgment
applied to a specific situation.
Our readiness reporting policy provides specific guidelines for
when and why commanders can use the override function. In their
commander's comments, commanders must clearly articulate the reasons
for their subjective upgrade (or downgrade) to provide balance to their
report. Reports are reviewed for accuracy throughout the chain of
command all the way up to the Headquarters Marine Corps level.
This human dimension in our readiness reporting is important;
ultimately the commander is entrusted and responsible for the readiness
of his or her unit and we believe the commander should have the final
say on how ready his or her unit is.
Admiral Greenert. The commander's assessment represents their
first-hand knowledge of the unit's readiness, which is primarily based
on information about the resources available to support and accomplish
the mission. DRRS-N makes available to the commander information from
authoritative data sources that reflect the status of those resources
(Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, and Facilities) that
help assess METs that each ship, unit, or squadron is required to
perform to support their core mission areas. The commander must balance
his/her overall knowledge of the full spectrum of resources that
support the required capabilities, with the experience factor relative
to the reliability of equipment/systems when making the assessment.
These experienced commanders have received many years of training, and
their judgment is an exceptional resource and an important factor in
the most effective evaluation of readiness. This judgment can either
lead them to assess a readiness level higher or lower than the data may
otherwise support. In addition, senior commanders have access to the
readiness information from their subordinate units in DRRS-N. This
promotes open dialogue about any questionable assessments, and it also
serves as means for monitoring the quality of readiness assessments
overall.
General Chandler. Joint Staff SORTS guidance (CJCSM 3150.02) allows
commanders to subjectively assess their unit's readiness up or down to
permit commanders to use their judgment and consider factors outside of
the strict factors that make up the personnel, equipment, and training
ratings. The Air Force has three major commands who have supplemented
SORTS reporting guidance and do not allow their commanders to
subjectively assess up. However, the Air Force is going to address this
policy with the major commands to ensure standardization across the Air
Force.
The following are a few of the reasons provided in Air Force SORTS
guidance (AFI 10-201), that are not accounted for elsewhere, for why a
commander may assess up or down: inspection results, personnel turnover
rates, unusually high/low morale, demonstrated maintenance surge
capabilities, modification programs, and the ability of contractors or
foreign nationals to provide services.
This is not a masking of true readiness. Readiness, by its nature,
is subjective. Objective measures are used to inform the commander's
subjective assessment.
51. Senator Bayh and Senator Burris. General Chiarelli, General
Amos, Admiral Greenert, and General Chandler, how does our current
readiness reporting system account for new and urgent operational need
items such as the MRAP and M-ATV, and how are they being tracked and
implemented into your MTOE?
General Chiarelli. AR 220-1 establishes requirements for units to
report an ``Assigned Mission Level'' (A-level) following the formal
assignment of a mission for planning or execution. The A-level is
supported by an Assigned Mission Equipment Level'' (AME level) that is
intended to reflect the current availability to the unit of the
specific equipment items required for the assigned mission. While many
of these mission-required equipment items will reside on the unit's
MTOE, several equipment items may not, especially if they are
``theater-unique'' and/or if the unit has been assigned to accomplish a
nontraditional mission (for example, a field artillery unit assigned a
security force mission). The Army Tasking Authority--the command or
force provider that formally assigned the mission to the unit--is
responsible to establish or convey the specific resource requirements
for the mission to the unit. Resource requirements that exceed or
differ from those documented on the unit's MTOE or that will require an
urgent operational need statement (ONS) require Headquarters,
Department of the Army (HQDA) approval. Frequently, HQDA pre-approves
MRAPs and M-ATVs for missions via Mission Essential Equipment Lists
(MEEL). Subsequently, these MEELs and ONS are considered during the
force development process to determine whether any future MTOE
adjustments are necessary.
General Amos. Marine Corps policy ensures each UNS item is
appropriately categorized in our supply and maintenance systems of
record. The readiness of these items is tracked closely through these
systems by both forward deployed commanders and the Service
Headquarters. Although UNS items are not identified as mission
essential equipment (MEE) or PEIs per Marine Corps policy, those UNS
items which are deemed key readiness drivers, as in the case of MRAPs
and M-ATVs (as of February 2010), are treated as significant military
equipment and tracked in our current readiness reporting system as
PEIs.
Admiral Greenert. DRRS-N documents readiness across all resource
pillars (Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, and
Facilities) for each specific platform. This is accomplished after the
Navy METs (NMET) have been loaded for the specific unit identification
code (UIC) employing the equipment. Although DRRS-N is not designed to
track equipment below the UIC-level, Navy is developing a Global Force
Management (GFM) Organization Server that will track force structure
below the UIC-level. The GFM Org server will be fully operational in
March 2011.
General Chandler. Our current readiness reporting system does not
treat new and urgent operational need items differently than other
items. All new equipment is added to equipment lists and tracked in the
same manner. Our SORTS reporting system accounts for new items once
they have been included on the Design Operational Capability (DOC)
statements. Units would then report the equipment condition (`R'
rating) or the supplies on hand (`S' rating) of that equipment. The
DRRS would account for new items after they have been included as part
of a MET. Units would then report against specific measures that would
quantify a standard for that equipment.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Burr
dwell time for major combat units
52. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, the 2009 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) assumed that the Armed Forces must be prepared to respond
to a range of contingencies similar to what we have faced over the past
8 years. In contrast, we've heard testimony over the past 2 years from
the Chief of Staff of the Army that: ``The Army is out of balance. . .
. Overall, we are consuming readiness as fast as we can build it. These
conditions must change. Institutional and operational risks are
accumulating over time and must be reduced in the coming years.'' In
your opinion, does the QDR adequately address the issue of restoring
the current unit combat readiness in the Army?
General Chiarelli. Yes, it does adequately address the issue of
restoring current unit combat readiness in the Army. A priority
objective of the defense strategy articulated during the QDR is to
prevail in today's wars. The 2010 QDR recognizes that years of war have
significantly stressed our military personnel and their families,
especially our ground forces. The 2010 QDR notes that, ``As we finish
well in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, we have the
opportunity to begin resetting and reconstituting our units and, as
dwell time increases, reduce stress on our servicemembers and their
families.'' The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his
assessment of the 2010 QDR, notes that, ``Now and for several years
upon completion of operations we must reset equipment lost through
combat and the strain of today's wars. Our success in these and other
missions depends upon obtaining sufficient, timely funding to reset the
force and restore readiness and a responsible withdrawal from Iraq.''
We concur with the assessments of the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman. Within the Army, as time between deployments increases,
soldiers and units will begin to restore their readiness and capability
for the full-spectrum of challenges envisioned by the defense strategy.
For the past several years, the demand for Army forces has exceeded the
sustainable supply of those forces, limiting soldiers and units to
prepare only for their next assigned mission in Afghanistan or Iraq, at
the expense of the broader range of capabilities for which their
specific unit was designed. As we reestablish balance between
operational demands and our sustainable supply of trained and ready
soldiers and units, we also intend to limit deployment duration to not
more than 9 months and increase time between deployments to at least 27
months to permit soldiers, units, and families adequate time to recover
and reset from challenging deployments, and more fully prepare for an
uncertain and dynamic future.
53. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, can the Army achieve its dwell
times goals with the current force structure assuming similar demands
on the force?
General Chiarelli. The global demand for Army forces exceeds
available resources. The Army is out of balance and is consuming
readiness as fast as it can be built. This imbalance is driven by the
need to respond to current demands at the expense of preparing for
future conflicts. This limits the Army's strategic depth in terms of
capabilities and in the quantity of forces available to respond to
unexpected contingencies. The Army's plan to reduce risk to the force
and achieve its dwell time goal assumes a reduction in demand for Army
forces.
equipment in theater
54. Senator Burr. General Amos, MV-22 mission capable rates in
Afghanistan have been about 70 percent despite extraordinary efforts to
provide parts and maintenance capability in excess of the requirements
for routine deployment of the aircraft. Despite the hostile environment
of Afghanistan that contributes to lower mission capable rates, such a
relatively low mission capable rate for a new platform raises questions
about the sustainability of the MV-22 over its life cycle. What are the
Marine Corps and the contractors involved doing to improve the mission
capable rate of the MV-22?
General Amos. The V-22 readiness challenges are being met by
addressing the three readiness elements: reliability, maintainability,
and supply support.
The core reliability of some components has already been fixed and
programmed or implemented on the production line. The Marine Corps,
AFSOC, and NAVAIR have reprioritized existing funding to retrofit those
changes that affect the highest degraders. NAVICP is funding redesign
of several other degraders. Future funding through HQMC Aviation is
planned to bring these and other redesigns to the fleet.
Significant improvement to maintenance procedures, troubleshooting
tools, and organic repair capabilities are keeping components on the
aircraft longer or closer to the flightline for repair.
Some of these improvements have a direct impact on supply support
and operating costs. In addition, NAVICP and DLA continue to work
closely with industry to shift high-cost consumable parts to low-cost
repairs (over 400 items to date). Refinement of contracting vehicles by
NAVICP, investment in parts procurement, and closer management by the
prime contractors of their suppliers are expected to have a telling
impact in the near future.
Most of these adjustments and direct improvements have been
implemented recently, and are just beginning to yield. As the more
prevalent supply support improvements take hold, we expect to see a
wider and more dramatic impact.
In summary, the aircraft continues to prove itself exceptionally
effective and survivable. The Marine Corps, AFSOC, the naval supporting
commands, and industry are committed to bringing the readiness and
operating cost in line.
access to health and mental health care
55. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, I am very concerned about the
adequacy of TRICARE networks to meet the health and mental health needs
of our servicemembers and their families, especially in light of the
stress of deployments and exposure to combat. In January this year the
New England Journal of Medicine reported that ``prolonged deployment
was associated with more mental health diagnoses among U.S. Army
wives.''
A new GAO report describes several factors of continuing concern
regarding access to care: instances of lack of willingness by providers
to accept new TRICARE patients; a lack of awareness and acceptance by
providers of the TRICARE program; and low reimbursement rates. How
confident are you that the TRICARE networks are attracting sufficient
numbers of health and mental health care providers to provide the
services that soldiers and their families need?
General Chiarelli. The Army is confident that TRICARE Management
Activity (TMA) will continue traditional and creative efforts to
attract network health and mental health providers. The Army works
closely with TMA in their efforts to provide the services necessary to
meet the needs of soldiers and their families. As required by law, TMA
regularly monitors both network provider acceptance of TRICARE and
beneficiaries' access to care.
TMA has developed and expanded behavioral health (BH) services that
include two new online video behavioral health programs to help
eliminate obstacles to seeking BH treatment. The two programs, TRICARE
Assistance Program (TRIAP) and Tele-behavioral Health, are available to
Active Duty servicemembers and their families. Through these programs
soldiers and families can access licensed BH counselors for short-term,
real-time, face-to-face confidential counseling utilizing video
technology, and software such as Skype or iChat.
TRIAP expands access to existing BH services by using audiovisual
telecommunications systems such as video chat and instant messaging to
access existing BH centers within the TRICARE region. It also expands
access to the BH call centers and counseling services. It is available
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with no limits to usage. No notification
about those seeking counseling will be made to their primary care
managers or others, unless required by the counselor's licensure
(spouse abuse, et cetera). Beneficiaries may access TRIAP from any
location provided they have the necessary hardware and software.
Telebehavioral health is also available throughout the United States.
This program involves medically supervised, secure audio-visual
conferencing between beneficiaries and an offsite licensed BH provider.
Additional opportunities to expand TRICARE BH exist with the use of
virtual technologies, but require legislative relief to State licensure
restrictions on TRICARE certified providers. Under current statutory
restrictions, TRICARE network providers cannot conduct virtual BH
interviews and counseling across State borders unless they are located
at a Federal installation (DOD, VA, et cetera). This severely limits
our ability to fully utilize these BH professionals. Legislative relief
authorizing TRICARE certified providers to connect with our
beneficiaries/patients from their private practice offices will
increase assets available to meet the BH needs of soldiers and their
families.
operational impact of traumatic brain injury
56. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, according to a recent study by
the Institute of Medicine, an estimated 10 to 20 percent of OEF and OIF
Army and Marine Corps servicemembers have sustained mild traumatic
brain injury (TBI) that has been associated with various long-term
health outcomes. What are the operational and readiness impacts of mild
TBI and concussion among deploying forces?
General Chiarelli. Many of the recommendations made in the 2008
report by the Institute of Medicine, Gulf War and Health: Volume 7,
Long-term Consequences of Traumatic Brain Injury, have already been
adopted by DOD. The Institute of Medicine's (IOM) recommendations are
consistent with reports by the Defense Health Board and the Army TBI
Task Force. Currently, approximately 87 to 90 percent of TBI cases in
the Armed Forces involve mild TBI, also known as a concussion. The
majority of these servicemembers return to full duty when their
symptoms resolve with minimal operational impact. Some of the health
outcomes mentioned in the IOM study such as depression and memory
problems could impact operational readiness either within the few
months following the injury or in some cases a few years later while
the servicemember is still on Active Duty. Studies are underway.
However, we currently do not have sufficient scientific information to
quantify the full impact of this issue. To address more immediate
concerns of our soldiers, the Army has taken action to protect the
force. In late 2009, we implemented our ``Educate, Train, Treat &
Track'' TBI management strategy to improve early recognition of signs
and symptoms for these injuries. Efforts are underway to adopt this
strategy across DOD for all deployed forces.
Many of the long-term health outcomes cited in the IOM report such
as dementia, Parkinson's, and Alzheimer's disease may not manifest
until possibly decades after the injury. Understanding the long-term
impact requires longitudinal studies including the one currently
underway that will evaluate 1,600 servicemembers with TBI over the next
15 years. We are taking steps to ensure that soldiers involved in
events that may cause mild TBI are well-documented, even if they are
not experiencing any immediate symptoms. Emerging knowledge regarding
the long-term health outcomes associated with mild TBI will continue to
be reported as scientific literature advances in this area.
57. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how effectively have the
resources provided by Congress been used to mitigate the effects of
mild TBI?
General Chiarelli. The funds provided by Congress have been highly
effective in mitigating the effects of mild TBI both through equipment
and material solutions designed to prevent injury and through medical
advances to improve our diagnostic and treatment capabilities. Since
September 2007, these resources have funded more than 350 staff members
dispersed among 52 programs across the U.S. Army Medical Command to
address the effects of TBI. This funding has ensured the development
and fielding of the latest protective equipment to mitigate the effects
of blasts and other injuries that may result in a mild TBI. Quality of
care has been improved by developing clinical practice guidelines,
obtaining state-of-the-art equipment for TBI care, funding basic and
applied research to advance medical practices, and improving education
and training for providers treating mild TBI. Additionally, these
resources have enabled the Army to lead the way in developing TBI
management protocols for our deploying soldiers. Efforts are underway
to codify these protocols into a DOD Directive Type Memorandum for all
deployed forces.
58. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, what is the way forward to
ensure that soldiers in the field are adequately screened and, if
necessary, removed from combat roles in order to recover from mild TBI
or concussion?
General Chiarelli. The new DOD policy being worked will mandate
that all servicemembers who are exposed to concussive events be removed
from combat roles for a minimum of 24 hours and undergo immediate
medical screening. This will improve clinical management of concussed
patients through detailed care algorithms which will assist healthcare
providers by guiding medical evaluations and referrals to the next
echelon of care. This pending policy will mandate rest periods,
prohibit all sports and activities with risk of concussion until
medically cleared, direct the use of standardized educational sheets,
and implement a protocol to manage recurrent concussion.
Deployed medical providers are using new screening resources while
researchers are developing more promising neurocognitive assessment
tools. One of the most commonly-used screening tools, the Military
Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE) has recently been improved. In
addition, 43 Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM)
computer systems have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, outfitted
with additional commercial assessment software to extend their
capability. Test administration has been improved, with training
products that focus on accuracy and effectiveness of both the MACE and
the ANAM. Emerging technologies such as teleneurology,
teleneuropsychology, brain imaging, biomarker detection, and automated
quantitative electroencephalography promise to dramatically improve
future mild TBI screening, detection, and treatment capabilities.
59. Senator Burr. General Amos, how will the Marine Corps be able
to meet these extensive and costly war-related funding needs within the
normal DOD budget which is only projected to grow about 4 percent in
fiscal year 2010?
General Amos. TBI is a defense-wide funded program and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has the lead for all war-related
funding requirements and research as it pertains to TBI. The Marine
Corps funding for any medical treatment is through Navy medicine and is
not part of the Marine Corps budget.
increase in suicides
60. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, another tragic consequence of
the OIF and OEF deployments is an increase in suicide. Yesterday, the
Army released suicide figures for the month of March: 13 potential
suicides among Active Duty soldiers, and 8 potential suicides among
Reserve component soldiers not on Active Duty. How do these numbers
compare with previous years?
General Chiarelli. From calendar year 2005 through calendar year
2010, Active Duty soldiers averaged 10 suicides in the month of March;
7 soldiers died by suicide in March 2005; followed by a slight decrease
in March 2006 to 5 suicides. For March 2007, the number nearly doubled
to 9 suicides, followed by an incremental increase to 11 suicides in
March 2008. There were 13 suicides in both March 2009 and March 2010.
For Reserve component soldiers not on Active Duty, there was an
average of 5 suicides in the month of March during the period calendar
year 2005 through calendar year 2010. Only 1 Reserve component soldier
not on Active Duty died by suicide in March 2005. Incremental increases
occurred in March 2006, with 3 suicides and March 2007, with 5
suicides. March 2008 experienced a decline to 3 suicides. For March
2009 and March 2010, 7 and 8 soldiers died by suicide, respectively.
reset costs and the shift of war funding to the base budget
61. Senator Burr. General Amos, I have a question about estimated
costs to reset combat units in the Marine Corps. In your written
testimony, you state: ``we estimate the cost of reset for the Marine
Corps to be $8 billion, of which $3 billion is requested in the fiscal
year 2011 OCOs and an additional $5 billion reset liability will be
addressed upon termination of the conflict.'' In last year's hearing,
you estimated approximately $20 billion for replacing, repairing, or
rebuilding equipment to reset the Marine Corps equipment stocks to
acceptable readiness levels. Please give an update on the dramatic
decrease in the estimate.
General Amos. The Marine Corps' reset estimate did not decrease.
The $20 billion mentioned in last year's testimony was an overall
snapshot of the total reset requirement, to include what has been
appropriated from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2009 and what was
required in fiscal year 2010 and beyond. Since testifying last year,
combat operations have continued and our overall reset estimate has
grown to $24 billion. This number includes $16 billion received through
fiscal year 2010, a $3 billion fiscal year 2011 request, and a $5
billion future years reset liability.
62. Senator Burr. General Amos, is the Marine Corps being asked to
scale back its requirements for reset based on budget realities, or is
there another explanation?
General Amos. No, the Marine Corps is not being asked to scale back
its requirements for reset based on budget realities.
63. Senator Burr. General Amos, in your opinion, will the Marine
Corps be able to continue funding reset from the OCO account?
General Amos. Yes, as long as the Marine Corps is engaged in combat
operations, and under the current rule set, there will be a requirement
to fund the repair and replace of equipment directly used in combat
through the OCO account.
64. Senator Burr. General Amos, you also mention in your testimony
that the Marine Corps has revised its unit tables of equipment (T/Es)
to accurately reflect the challenges and realities of the 21st century
dispersed battlefield and estimated the cost associated with the
revised T/Es to be $5 billion. Is this amount in addition to the reset
costs?
General Amos. Yes, this estimate is in addition to reset costs. The
Marine Corps' equipment sets have been modified based on the lessons we
learned in OIF and OEF about what we need to be ready for future
operations. The cost to make these necessary changes to our equipment
sets is currently estimated to be $5 billion.
65. Senator Burr. General Amos, will the Marine Corps fund this
from base budgets or the OCO account?
General Amos. The Marine Corps will have to fund the shortfalls for
operational units in dwell through the base budget as this requirement
does not meet the criteria to be included in the OCO budget.
66. Senator Burr. General Amos, how quickly do you need to have
this funding in place to ensure marines have the updated list of
equipment to be able to use in Afghanistan?
General Amos. Marines next to deploy and those already in
Afghanistan have the equipment they need to be successful. However,
operational units in dwell have suffered because their equipment sets
and training gear has been pushed to Afghanistan. These units in dwell
currently have limited training capabilities until they are back in the
predeployment training cycle.
reset for the reserve component
67. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, in your written testimony, you
state that in order to restore the Army's full operational depth by
fiscal year 2012, the Reserve component, that is our National Guard and
Reserve Forces, must continue a transition from a Strategic Reserve to
an Operational Force, thus allowing the Army ``recurrent, assured, and
predictable'' access to the Reserve component to meet operational
requirements. Since the Army expects the National Guard to be a full
partner in the ARFORGEN model, do Guard and Reserve units get the same
priority for equipment reset and resourcing?
General Chiarelli. Yes, the Reserve component units redeploying
from contingency operations are given the same priority as they move
through the ARFORGEN Model as Active component formations. The process
for reset is the same except that the timeline for Reserve component
units to complete reset operations is 365 days as opposed to 180 days
for an Active component organization. The difference in reset timelines
is based on Reserve component organizations having a longer programmed
dwell time between deployments (4 years) versus only 2 years between
deployments of Active component formations.
68. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, given the dedicated call to
duty of National Guard units across the country for service in Iraq and
Afghanistan, are the historic complaints of the National Guard getting
the hand-me-down or older equipment from the Active Army a vestige of
the past?
General Chiarelli. Yes. Modernizing the Army National Guard (ARNG)
is critical for transformation to an Operational Reserve. The ARNG
equipment funding averaged $5.7 billion per year for fiscal years 2006
to 2010, a 256 percent increase over the $1.6 billion the ARNG received
in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal years 2011 to 2015, the Army programmed
an additional $12.4 billion for the ARNG, which will significantly
increase its capabilities. At the end of March 2009, the ARNG EOH was
77 percent, with a projected growth based on current procurement plans
to 83 percent by the end of 2017. The EOH rate for Critical Dual Use
equipment will increase from 83 percent in 2009 to 87 percent by March
2011.
69. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, in your constant review of
readiness rates, do you see any glaring discrepancies in the relative
readiness of Active units versus Guard and Reserve units? If so, what
are they and how can they be mitigated?
General Chiarelli. There are differences between the primary
readiness drivers for Active and Reserve components. Active units
report equipment availability as their primary readiness driver,
followed by soldier availability. Conversely, Reserve component units
cite soldier availability (availability of qualified and trained
soldiers) as the primary driver, while equipment availability is cited
infrequently. Over time, the trends for these drivers have remained
essentially stable.
The ARFORGEN process is how the Army mitigates these issues. Active
component units essentially migrate equipment from units in the reset
phase to support immediate warfighting requirements. Meanwhile the
Reserve components cross-level personnel from nondeployed or reset
units to support immediate operational requirements. Additionally,
implementation of the 180-day TRICARE Early Eligibility program and
modifications to the Reserve Health Readiness Program have improved
Reserve component personnel readiness.
70. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, of the $13 to $14 billion per
year you have suggested for additional funding provided for reset, how
will that amount be equitably distributed among the Active and Reserve
components?
General Chiarelli. OCOs funding for equipment reset is determined
by the number and types of units scheduled to redeploy each year. The
Army National Guard receives direct distribution of funding from the
Army Budget Office to complete their reset mission. Army Reserve units
complete their reset mission at the appropriate demobilization sites
and funded accordingly. Army equipment reset requirements are
historically made up of 20 to 25 percent Reserve unit requirements.
Based on current ARFORGEN projections, the Army estimates that 20
percent of equipment reset funding will go to Guard and Reserve
equipment in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. The Army will
continue to support all components to ensure equipment readiness is
restored and ready for the next contingency.
aircraft maintenance challenges for the air force
71. Senator Burr. General Chandler, your written statement
identified concerns with the availability rates of certain types of
aircraft. Specifically, you stated: ``the B-1, B-52, and F-15E did not
meet aircraft availability standards due to maintenance and depot-
related issues.'' Please describe what types of maintenance and depot
issues are affecting availability rates.
General Chandler. The B-1 not mission capable maintenance rate is
well above projections due to manpower shortages and inexperienced
technicians. A primary driver is preparing and recovering aircraft
going to and coming from the area of responsibility. In addition, many
mid-level maintenance NCOs have left the B-1 over the past 4 years due
to manning cuts and ops tempo challenges and that expertise is not
easily replaced. Depot possessed aircraft rates are high because the
Air Force opted to give combatant commanders greater capability by
modernizing systems like the radar, the engine digital controller, and
the inertial navigation system. These modernization efforts sacrifice
short-term aircraft availability so the warfighter gains enhanced
capability.
The B-52 aircraft availability standards are lower than projections
because of the number of aircraft in depot possessed status. The NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2008 prohibited reductions in the B-52 fleet. As a
result, there was a bow wave of aircraft requiring programmed depot
maintenance. Depot rates have been at 20 percent since the first
quarter of fiscal year 2009. In addition, future capability
modifications and normal weapon system depot overhaul requirements will
continue to impact aircraft availability through the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP).
The F-15E aircraft availability standards were affected because of
higher depot possessed time due to ongoing major depot-level upgrades
to systems like the Satellite Communication Radio, Joint Helmet Mounted
Cueing System, and Advanced Display Core Processor. The associated pre-
and post-depot maintenance activities supporting these modifications
have also contributed to the lower aircraft availability. As with the
B-1, the Air Force capability enhancements decision was made to
sacrifice short-term availability for increases in capability and
lethality.
72. Senator Burr. General Chandler, what are the current mission
capable rates for each of those aircraft?
General Chandler. The current mission capable rates for the B-1, B-
52, and F-15E for fiscal year 2010 (October 2009 through 31 July 2010)
are 49.6 percent, 72.75 percent, and 74.44 percent, respectively.
73. Senator Burr. General Chandler, please explain what the Air
Force is doing to overcome these challenges.
General Chandler. Although the B-1 is currently not meeting the
aircraft availability goal, we expect to see modest improvements in
aircraft availability across the FYDP. Improvements are anticipated in
a number of ways. First, as aircraft return from depot status; second,
as high velocity maintenance process improvements are implemented at
the bases; and third, as surplus fighter manpower is moved into the
bomber career field.
For the B-52, we expect the depot rate to decrease as the program
office collaborates schedules and repair requirements with the depot to
expedite the burn down of the programmed depot maintenance backlog. We
expect the B-52 to meet its availability standard in fiscal year 2011.
For the F-15E, depot rates will improve as modifications are
completed. We are aggressively working a mitigation strategy to reduce
not mission capable maintenance time in several ways. First, we are
taking an enterprise view to implement common F-15E inspections in an
effort to relieve maintenance man-hours due to duplicate scheduled
inspections. Second, we are leveraging availability improvement
initiatives with emphasis on system enhancement, sustaining
engineering, reliability centered maintenance, and engine component
improvement. Third, we are conducting a quarterly Commodity Supply
Supportability Review to address commodities shortfall and long-term
system reliability issues impacting mission capability rates.
74. Senator Burr. General Chandler, you also go on to state: ``the
F-22 fell short of the projected availability due to low observable
maintenance requirements. Recent improvements in many F-22 system
components and increased durability of low observable materials
resulted in a 32 percent reduction in maintenance man-hours per flying
hour.'' Please explain the extent to which the F-22 fell short of the
projected availability.
General Chandler. F-22 aircraft availability was 53.6 percent for
fiscal year 2009, slightly below the program's original projection of
55.7 percent. The fiscal year 2009 shortfall was primarily due to
unexpected wet weather-related reliability issues while deployed to
Andersen Air Force Base Guam. Several avionics components experienced
water intrusion and humidity problems but we've improved water drainage
and already fielded some modified, humidity-resistant components. For
fiscal year 2010, the fleet's aircraft availability is currently
averaging 54.5 percent versus the 57.1 percent projection. The newly
identified damage limits for low observable coatings in the engine
exhaust cavity have also caused an approximate 3 percent decrease in
aircraft availability as suppliers work to meet the new parts demand.
However, it should be noted that this issue does not prevent affected
aircraft from flying training missions.
75. Senator Burr. General Chandler, please provide an update on the
current mission availability rates for the F-22 from the past 2 years
to the present.
General Chandler. The mission capable rates for the F-22 were 51.05
percent in fiscal year 2008, 53.14 percent in fiscal year 2009, and
53.64 percent in fiscal year 2010 (current as of 31 Jul 2010).
76. Senator Burr. General Chandler, what maintenance challenges
other that low observable surfaces is the Air Force facing to maintain
the readiness of the F-22 fleet?
General Chandler. Our biggest current challenge is water intrusion
and humidity-related reliability of the avionics systems. In addition
to improving water drainage, we have already fielded some modified,
humidity-resistant components. Recent results from our deployment to
Andersen Air Force Base Guam indicate that the fixes we incorporated
were successful.
Another priority has been to improve sub-system reliability. To
gain access to failed parts, maintenance personnel often have to remove
low observable panels creating the requirement to repair the low
observable coatings after replacement of the failed part. By improving
sub-system reliability, we can improve the overall weapon system
availability rate. The newest aircraft (lot 8) that include the latest
reliability improvements are demonstrating significantly better mean
time between maintenance rates. The older aircraft (lot 7 and below)
are being retrofitted with the more reliable parts and will also
benefit from an increase in reliability.
77. Senator Burr. General Chandler, are maintenance man-hours
affected by where the F-22 is stationed? If so, is the Air Force
looking at restationing F-22s?
General Chandler. There is no apparent correlation between
maintenance man-hours and where F-22s are currently stationed. As a
result, the Air Force is not looking at restationing F-22s for
maintenance reasons.
m-4 carbine replacement
78. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, a vital component of
maintaining the readiness of our Armed Forces is ensuring our men and
women in uniform are provided the best equipment available. Following
reports of malfunctions and reliability concerns from the field, the
Army has begun a process to determine whether the currently fielded M-4
carbine is the best weapon available to our soldiers, whether it needs
modifications, or whether an entirely new carbine is required. Please
provide an update as to where this process stands.
General Chiarelli. The Army has a dual path strategy to improve the
carbine for our soldiers. The Army recently approved a new requirement
for a carbine that will be the basis for a carbine competition in the
near future.
Concurrently, the Army has approved enhancements to the M4 carbines
that are currently being produced and we are working towards
retrofitting improvements to all M4 carbines that have already been
fielded. This is an ongoing process. The Army has continued to test and
upgrade the carbine since its adoption. For example, since 1991 more
than 8 million rounds have been fired in product improvement testing.
As a result of this testing, over 62 performance enhancing improvements
have been incorporated into the carbine design to include the trigger
assembly, extractor spring, recoil buffer, barrel, chamber, and bolt.
These improvements have made a significant increase to the reliability
of the weapon. The Army recently approved a heavier barrel, a full auto
trigger mechanism, and an ambidextrous fire control selector to
incorporate into the current M4 series production.
demand for civil affairs and psychological operations units
79. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, given the environment in which
our forces are operating today, there is increasing demand on the
unique capabilities brought to bear by civil affairs (CA) and
psychological operations (PSYOP) teams. Originally composed primarily
of Reserve component forces, the Army has begun growing the first
Active Duty CA brigade to support general purpose forces and plans
continued growth in organic CA support to SOCOM. What is your
assessment of the progress in the growth in CA?
General Chiarelli. The Army is on track to meet OSD-directed growth
for CA. During its most recent force structure analysis, the Army
approved an increase in CA capacity for the general purpose force and
Special Operations Force. For the general purpose force, the Army will
activate its first Active component brigade headquarters and one Active
component CA battalion in fiscal year 2011. By fiscal year 2015, the
Army will activate a total of five Active component CA battalions into
a fully operational brigade.
The current force structure of Special Operations CA units consists
of one brigade headquarters and four battalions comprised of four
companies each. The Army plans on adding a fifth battalion in fiscal
year 2012, a company to each of the five battalions, and a sixth team
to each company. When programmed growth is completed, the brigade will
consist of one brigade headquarters and five battalions composed of six
companies with six teams each.
Additionally, the Army is adding a ninth CA brigade to the Army
Reserve effective fiscal year 2011 which will increase rotational depth
to the general purpose force.
To facilitate growth in the total CA force, the Army is addressing
CA training capacity as well as the size of the proponent office for
CA. These adjustments to the generating force will increase student
throughput and provide more robust oversight over Army CA training and
education.
80. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, has the Army encountered any
issues in meeting the demand for CA and PSYOP units?
General Chiarelli. Yes, there have been issues meeting the overseas
contingency operations demands for CA and PSYOP units. Currently, 100
percent of the general purpose forces CA and PSYOP assets are in the
Army Reserve. The demand for both types of units grew quickly and put
major strains upon the U.S. Army CA and PSYOP Command. This command
routinely mobilized CA units with less than 36 months dwell, and on
occasion with less than 24 months dwell. PSYOP units dwell ratio was
even lower, with many being under 24 months. Occasionally the Army used
``in lieu of'' sourcing solutions to fulfill CA requirements. For
example, seven Army Reserve chemical companies were mobilized and
deployed in lieu of CA companies to meet CA force requirements.
81. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, do you foresee a need to grow
CA and PSYOP forces beyond currently programmed levels?
General Chiarelli. There is no anticipated growth for CA or PSYOP
forces beyond the current programmed levels, which are scheduled
through fiscal year 2015. When programmed growth levels for CA and
PSYOP are completed in fiscal year 2015, the requirements to either
increase or sustain CA and PSYOP capabilities will be in accordance
with the strategic guidance given by the Secretary of Defense to meet
operational demands. We will continue to track and assess operational
demands ensuring the Army has the right CA and PSYOP mix for the
future.
rotary lift shortfalls
82. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, the demands of nearly 8 years
of sustained combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed an
enormous burden on airlift assets, particularly rotary lift. Given the
remote locations in which our forces often operate, the availability of
these aircraft is vital to moving personnel, providing logistics, and
for the replenishment of supplies. DOD is aware that current demand far
exceeds supply. The 2010 QDR calls for a substantial increase in key
enabling assets for general purpose forces and special operations
forces, including an expansion of Army pilot training, the creation of
a 13th Active component combat aviation brigade, as well as growth of
the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. While these are welcome
steps and will provide long-term relief, what steps, if any, can be
taken in the near- to mid-term to mitigate the shortfall of rotary lift
assets in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Currently, the three Combat Aviation Brigades
(CAB), additional aviation formations, and a limited number of
Operational Readiness Float (ORF) aircraft deployed in Afghanistan are
meeting operational demands. We began increasing aviation capability in
2009 with the deployment of a second CAB to Afghanistan. This summer we
will deploy a third CAB to Afghanistan, along with additional medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC) and CH-47 heavy lift assets.
83. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, if our withdrawal from Iraq
continues as planned, what is the estimated lag time before we see an
increase in airlift capacity in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Currently the Army is not planning on
transferring aviation capability from Iraq to Afghanistan. We
significantly increased rotary wing capability in Afghanistan over the
past 18 months. This summer we will have a total of three CABs plus
additional MEDEVAC and CH-47 heavy lift assets in Afghanistan to meet
combatant commander requirements.
84. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, given the enormous demand in
theater, are there sufficient aircraft at home station to fulfill the
requirements of the nearly 1,400 pilots trained annually by the Army?
General Chiarelli. Yes. The ARFORGEN process allows the Army to
cross level aircraft throughout its institutional training posts/sites
and installations to meet requirements. A fine balance has been struck
in the distribution of aircraft between the institutional and the
operational force. The Army will continue to reset and reposition
aircraft as required to meet our training and operational needs.
85. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, is the Army experiencing any
problems recruiting or retaining pilots?
General Chiarelli. No. The Army continues to have more officer and
warrant officer candidates than there are requirements or opportunity
for training. Additionally, we have experienced a general increase in
aviator retention over the past several years.
navy strike fighter gap
86. Senator Burr. General Amos and Admiral Greenert, the Strike
Fighter gap is also a readiness issue. The Navy has testified that the
so-called fighter gap or shortfall of Strike Fighter aircraft on
aircraft carriers and expeditionary squadrons for the Marine Corps rose
from 146 to 177 aircraft--primarily due to the F-35 delivery ramp
reduction of 55 aircraft and removing the assumption of aircraft
reaching 10,000 flight hours. Is the Navy taking appropriate action to
mitigate the gap and the operational implications of that gap?
General Amos. The Department of the Navy is today projecting a
shortfall of about 100 Strike Fighters in the 2018 timeframe which
includes some aircraft service life extension (SLEP) to 10,000 flight
hours. This projection is based on an excursion from the Inventory
Forecasting Tool (IFT) Version 18. Based on the projected shortfall,
the Navy continues to identify further opportunities to reduce its
impact. It is possible to manage the Strike Fighter shortfall through
the application of management levers both in the near- and long-term.
Examples of management levers are the Marine Corps modifying it's F-35
transition plan by transitioning some Hornet squadrons earlier and
leveraging the service life remaining in the AV-8B fleet, the Navy
accelerating the transition of five legacy F/A-18C squadrons to
F/A-18 E/F, and transitioning two additional F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-
18 E/F using the remaining attrition F/A-18 E/F Reserve aircraft, and
reducing the Navy Unit Deployment Program (UDP) and USMC Expeditionary
F/A-18 A+/C/D squadrons from 12 to 10 aircraft per squadron. Although
global demand may not allow for implementation of some of these levers
in the near-term, changes in the operational environment in the future
may allow additional flexibility in their implementation. As we go
forward, we are considering all options to manage our inventory and
balance risk, including SLEP to some number of F/A-18 A-D aircraft to
extend their service life to 10,000 flight hours and optimizing depot
efficiencies. SLEP analysis continues and will be introduced in the
fiscal year 2012 President's budget request.
The Navy continues to rigorously manage the service life and
warfighting effectiveness of each of our legacy Hornets, Harriers, and
Super Hornets to ensure the maximum contribution to the Nation's
security for the taxpayer dollars invested.
Admiral Greenert. The Navy anticipates a decrease in our Strike
Fighter inventory of about 100 aircraft that will peak at the end of
this decade. We are addressing this inventory decrease through
aggressive and precise management strategies that include service-life
extension programs to prolong the use of existing F/A-18 A-D aircraft,
reducing the number of aircraft available in our nondeployed squadrons
to the minimum required, accelerating the transition of seven legacy
squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets (using F/A-18 E/F attrition
aircraft in two cases), and maximizing depot level throughput to return
legacy Strike Fighter aircraft to the fleet more quickly. Collectively,
these measures will extend the service life of our legacy aircraft and
make the projected inventory decrease manageable.
87. Senator Burr. General Amos and Admiral Greenert, is the Marine
Corps taking appropriate action to mitigate the gap and the operational
implications of that gap?
General Amos. The Marine Corps is closely managing the flight hours
and fatigue life of our tactical aircraft. Since 2004, we have provided
guidance and actions to optimize aircraft utilization rates while
maximizing training and operational opportunities. The F/A-18 A-D
Inventory Management Forecasting Tool is used to project the combined
effects of TACAIR transition plans, retirements, attrition, and
pipeline requirements on the total F/A-18 A-D aircraft inventory. The
model is updated with the most recent data and forecasts the Strike
Fighter inventory compared to the existing requirements. Critical model
variables include JSF deliveries, force structure, usage rates, life
limits, depot turnaround time, Fatigue Life Expended (FLE), catapult
launches and arrested landings, and field landings.
Faced with a forecast based on current assumptions that indicates
an increased shortfall, the Navy has continued to identify further
opportunities to reduce its impact. The Marine Corps has modified its
F-35 transition plan by transitioning some Hornet squadrons earlier and
leveraging the service life remaining in the AV-8B fleet. Management
levers have been identified: accelerating the transition of five legacy
F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18 E/F; transitioning two additional F/A-18 C
squadrons to F/A-18 E/F using the remaining attrition F/A-18 E/F
Reserve aircraft; and reducing the Navy UDP and Marine Corps
Expeditionary F/A-18 A+/C/D squadrons from 12 to 10 aircraft per
squadron. Some of these measures are dependent on reduced demand in
Global Force Management (GFM) requirements.
Admiral Greenert. The Navy and the Marine Corps are working closely
together to address the Navy Strike Fighter gap. I believe the Marine
Corps is closely managing the flight hours and fatigue life of our
tactical aircraft. Since 2004, they have provided guidance and actions
to optimize aircraft utilization rates while maximizing training and
operational opportunities. The F/A-18 A-D Inventory Management
Forecasting Tool is used to project the combined effects of TACAIR
transition plans, retirements, attrition, and pipeline requirements on
the total F/A-18 A-D aircraft inventory. The model is updated with the
most recent data and forecasts the Strike Fighter inventory compared to
the existing requirements. Critical model variables include JSF
deliveries, force structure, usage rates, life limits, depot turnaround
time, FLE, catapult launches and arrested landings, and field landings.
Faced with a forecast based on current assumptions that indicates
an increased shortfall, the Navy has continued to identify further
opportunities to reduce its impact. The Marine Corps has modified its
F-35 transition plan by transitioning some Hornet squadrons earlier and
leveraging the service life remaining in the AV-8B fleet. Management
levers have been identified: accelerating the transition of 5 legacy F/
A-18C squadrons to F/A-18 E/F; transitioning 2 additional F/A-18C
squadrons to F/A-18 E/F using the remaining attrition F/A-18E/F Reserve
aircraft; and reducing the Navy UDP and Marine Corps Expeditionary F/A-
18 A+/C/D squadrons from 12 to 10 aircraft per squadron. Some of these
measures are dependent on reduced demand in Global Force Management
(GFM) requirements.
88. Senator Burr. General Amos and Admiral Greenert, does the Navy
have the adequate carrier air wings to satisfy the needs of 11 aircraft
carriers?
General Amos. The Marine Corps provides Marine Fighter/Attack
squadrons in compliance with the Tactical Air Integration MOA, and we
defer to the Navy for sufficiency of the number of Carrier Air Wings.
Admiral Greenert. Yes. Our Carrier Air Wings Fleet Readiness and
Training Plan is tailored to complement the training and maintenance
requirements for our 11 Carrier Air Wings. We will manage our tactical
aviation inventory to ensure we have the number of aircraft required to
support our deployable Carrier Air Wings.
impact of force structure caps in afghanistan
89. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, I've been told that, as a
result of the cap of 30,000 troops placed by the President on General
McChrystal's plan for surge operations in Afghanistan, many of the
requests for forces currently being received by the Army from field
commanders are for individual augmentees versus major units. The
ARFORGEN model was not created to manage the dwell time and
availability of individual soldiers. What is the long-term impact to
Army unit readiness of having to satisfy requests for small units and
individual augmentees for deployment to Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Requests for small units and individual
augmentees exacerbate manning challenges, forcing the Generating Force
and other nondeploying units to be billpayers for deployed manning
requirements. The Army continues to focus on force structure, ensuring
that units are designed to meet current needs and are manned and
equipped to accomplish those missions. Most importantly, the Army is
building a supply-based force that provides a constant supply of
organizations with organic capabilities to operate in a joint and
expeditionary role and meet combatant commander requirements.
90. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, since the Army has
traditionally trained as large units, and a commander assesses the
readiness of an unit as a whole, how is the training of individual
augmentees accomplished to ensure mission success?
General Chiarelli. Once selected for either an individual manning
requirement on a Joint Manning Document or an ad hoc requirement, an
individual soldier is provided the requisite training as specified by
either military occupational skill proficiency standards or by
requirements specified in the request for forces (ad hoc requirement).
In the case of a Joint Manning Document, an individual soldier selected
for the requirement is assumed to be competent in his duty position and
military occupational skill. The soldier then processes through the
Fort Benning Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Center,
which provides a program of instruction based upon theater-specific
individual required training requirements. In the case of an ad hoc
requirement, an individual soldier may get paired with a team for the
full requirement and the training received would be accomplished per
the training specified in the corresponding request for forces. For
example, training team members (comprised of individual soldiers) which
support nearly all of the security force assistance requirements in the
CENTCOM area of responsibility would go to an Army-designated training
location to receive their theater-specific individual required training
and also their request for forces specified training. Once the training
is completed at both the replacement center and the specified training
location, the Army component that has the designated training and
readiness oversight certifies the individual and/or the ad hoc
requirement for deployment.
91. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how do requests for individual
augmentees affect the assessment of Army goals for dwell time?
General Chiarelli. While the Army has full visibility of individual
augmentation requirements as they are processed to fill either a Joint
Manning Document or an ad hoc requirement, the assessment of Army goals
for dwell time are computed based upon unit, MTOE, structure vice
providing a factor which computes a percentage of personnel loss due to
these unprogrammed shortfalls. However, current manning guidance
ensures soldiers deploying have the appropriate dwell time; exceptions
to dwell time requirements must be approved by the first General
Officer in the chain of command. The Army system for individual
augmentation conducts its analysis for specific requirements across the
entire Army Active component structure and selected commands are tasked
for individual soldiers based upon a leveling of the requirement to
mitigate a significant loss to any one unit. This system, as
structured, limits effects which would detract from Army goals for
dwell time.
manning for combat units deploying to afghanistan
92. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli and General Amos, in review of
current readiness rates, I note that both the Army and the Marine Corps
are committed to deploying units overseas which are 100 percent, or
close to 100 percent manned. While I commend this track record, I am
concerned about exactly when those new personnel are arriving into the
unit. Specifically, if they arrive too late to take part in unit
training and mission rehearsal exercises, what is the risk to them and
the unit?
General Chiarelli. Unfortunately this does occur; some personnel
turnover after mission rehearsal exercises is unavoidable. However, we
make every effort to minimize this and are establishing metrics to
ensure we monitor and limit this turbulence on the unit and
individuals. As to the risk to them and the unit, I would say it is
manageable. For example, our current manning guidance ensures that
every Active component BCT and CAB achieves at least 90 percent overall
assigned strength and a minimum of an 80 percent fill of Field Grade
Officers, Company Grade Officers, and Senior NCOs not later than 45
days prior to their Mission Rehearsal Exercise. So for the most part,
the unit is set with sufficient leadership when it conducts this
training. Additionally, units and installations conduct pre-deployment
training for all late arrivals which covers a variety of required
individual tasks, such as weapons training, first aid, combat
lifesaver, combat stress courses, and cultural and geographic
instruction. This training has become a crucial element to prepare late
arriving and replacement soldiers for deployment.
General Amos. The Marine Corps has developed extensive manpower
processes that enable us to focus our resources on deploying units.
This process allows us to conserve and staff our units 180 days prior
to deployment to support training and mission rehearsals as well as our
deployment cycles. All marines receive the required pre-deployment
training prior to deploying. We are confident that these efforts will
meet long-term operational manpower demands.
93. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli and General Amos, given our
surge operations in Afghanistan, is this phenomenon trending negative
or holding steady?
General Chiarelli. This trend is currently holding steady. The
Army's supply of forces is fixed, so a reduction in the demand for
brigades in one theater has been replaced with increased demand in
another--the result is no net change. For fiscal year 2010, we are
achieving those manning goals I previously discussed for the majority
of our deploying units. However, achieving the fill levels for specific
field grade officers and some low density skilled soldiers remains a
challenge. Until the global demand for forces reaches a sustainable
level, we will continue to be challenged to synchronize all the
critical readiness resources early enough to allow the necessary time
to collectively train prior to deployment.
General Amos. Due to our improvements in manpower processes, we
have not trended negatively, but have achieved a holding steady status.
94. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli and General Amos, do each of
your Services have goals for certain manning levels prior to unit
deployment to ensure unit integrity and performance? If so, what are
they?
General Chiarelli. Yes, currently the Army, utilizing the ARFORGEN
model, focuses human and material resources on those deployed and/or
deploying Army units to resource them to the highest readiness levels
before they deploy. This ARFORGEN focused manning is event-driven and
applies to all brigade-sized units. Units will be manned and
prioritized based on major readiness exercises and deployment latest
arrival dates.
The Army goal is for every Active component BCT and CAB to achieve
95 percent deployable strength by the latest arrival date, with a
minimum acceptable deployed strength of 90 percent. In order to achieve
this goal, the Army must overman BCTs to a minimum of 105 percent and
CABs to a minimum of 100 percent assigned strength not later than 90
days prior to their latest arrival date. This overmanning compensates
for the increasing nondeployable population and ensures units can meet
the deployed strength benchmarks. Additionally, there are also specific
goals for the manning levels of Field Grade Officers, Company Grade
Officers, and Senior NCOs that vary by unit type. The Army goal is for
every Active component BCT and CAB to achieve a minimum of 80 percent
fill of field grade officers, company grade officers, and senior NCOs
45 days prior to their Major Readiness Exercise.
General Amos. The Marine Corps has established staffing levels to
support deploying units with a primary focus on unit integrity to
positively impact combat performance. We have achieved this by
developing a holistic implementation process that assigns not only
staffing allocations by unit, but also by grade and primary
occupational specialty. Our combat units are staffed to deploy with
their manning document combat allocations thereby ensuring appropriate
levels of combat power.
95. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli and General Amos, are these
goals being met?
General Chiarelli. During fiscal year 2010 year-to-date, 11 of the
13 BCTs met the minimum 90 percent deployed strength requirement at the
latest arrival date. The two that missed that benchmark achieved the
minimum 90 percent deployed strength requirement within 30 days after
the latest arrival date. Additionally, during this timeframe, all four
of the CABs exceeded the minimum 90 percent deployed strength
requirement at the latest arrival date.
General Amos. Yes, the staffing of our combat units is one of our
primary concerns. We are committed to meeting our manning and staffing
goals to ensure unit combat effectiveness.
marine corps training for full spectrum operations
96. Senator Burr. General Amos, during last year's hearing in
response to a question on the focus of training on preparing for
ongoing operations, specifically, the extent of skill degradation given
the shift in focus, you responded that Marine Corps Training and
Education Command is sponsoring a Training Reset Study, which would
provide a recommended training posture for the future. Is this study
completed? If so, please provide a summary of its conclusions and
recommendations.
General Amos. The Training Reset Study provides the Marine Corps
survey and interview-based data in determining the appropriate balance
between the skills that are being trained in support of OEF and
required core competency training. The study identifies this balance
through its response to questions contained in the study objective and
the development of a draft training reset posture.
From a training perspective, what constitutes resetting the force?
Broad consensus that resetting the force is a function
of standards-based training built around core METLs, Training
and Readiness Manuals, and application of the Systems Approach
to Training and Unit Training Management.
What do the operating forces think the Marine Corps should focus
on?
Surveys point to a need to refocus on unit and
individual skills in combined arms and amphibious operations
while continuing to train COIN skills.
What should be done at the Service level to make this happen?
Rigorous application of the existing Marine Corps
training system to refocus on core skills and provide
appropriate focus on COIN.
Continue to conduct Enhanced Mojave Viper or an
appropriately modified version of the exercise based on current
threats. Enhanced Mojave Viper is described as ``striking a
good balance between irregular and conventional tactics,'' and
has value beyond current operations.
The draft Force Generation Order (FGO) provides a
structured approach ``to improve both the efficiency and the
effectiveness by which units are prepared for deployment.''
Limitations to resetting the force are:
Time to train (dwell)
Requirements to train for current operations
Inter-Service coordination to refocus skills
in amphibious operations
What should be done at the unit training level?
Reinforce and expand as required the training systems
outlined per existing Marine Corps Orders and the draft FGO.
Focus on resetting individual skills in unit training
management.
The Draft Training Reset Posture Statement captures the key
elements for successful training reset:
The Marine Corps will reset training, consistent with the
Commandant's Vision and Strategy 2025, to optimize the MAGTF
for operations against hybrid threats in complex environments
without sacrificing conventional capabilities. Training reset
will be accomplished through the rigorous application of the
Marine Corps training system.
remotely piloted aircraft squadron manning
97. Senator Burr. General Chandler, regarding remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA) operations, I noticed in your written testimony that you
state: ``Remotely piloted aircraft currently provide 41 continuous
combat air patrols to U.S. CENTCOM. This number will grow to 50 by the
end of fiscal year 2011, and to 65 by the end of fiscal year 2013.'' I
have heard that these growing requirements are taking its toll on
aircrew readiness, data collection, and maintenance personnel that
support the CAPs. Is the Air Force in the process of assessing the
right size of a RPA squadron to result in an OPTEMPO that is sustained
over the long-term?
General Chandler. In order to sustain the OPTEMPO over the long-
term, the Air Force has assessed the right size of an active duty RPA
squadron to be five CAPs worth of personnel, aircraft, and equipment.
Additionally, the required crew ratio is 10 pilots and 10 sensor
operators for each MQ-1 or MQ-9 combat air patrol.
98. Senator Burr. General Chandler, when will these assessment be
completed and subsequently RPA squadron manning adjusted?
General Chandler. Since the assessment was completed, the Air Force
has been training aircrew at a sustainable rate in order to grow RPA
squadrons to the 10:1 crew ratio. The Air Force will steadily improve
the crew ratio, while meeting all operational combat air patrol
requirements and balancing the need to assign RPA aircrew to various
overhead requirements, such as rated staff positions.
99. Senator Burr. General Chandler, will additional RPA squadrons
be required?
General Chandler. Additional RPA squadrons will be required to meet
operational combat air patrol requirements. The Air Force plans to
create three new RPA squadrons at bases to be announced. Also, two
existing RPA squadrons at Creech AFB will move to other bases in the
future. Finally, the Air National Guard plans to stand up RPA squadrons
at up to five additional locations.
amphibious fleet affordability and readiness
100. Senator Burr. General Amos and Admiral Greenert, the Navy's
plan for a 33-ship amphibious fleet, according to the Navy's budget
proposal, represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the
requirement to deliver two Marine expeditionary brigades in a forcible-
entry operation. Is the Marine Corps' desire for 38 ships affordable
and are there ways to mitigate that risk when considering the entire
shipbuilding plan?
General Amos. Without a top line increase and/or a reprioritization
of missions and capabilities that form the basis of the Navy's
shipbuilding plan, the requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships
outlined in our February 2010 report to Congress is unaffordable. The
Navy and Marine Corps have determined a minimum force of 33 ships
represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship
amphibious force requirement for the Assault Echelon in a 2 Marine
Expeditionary Brigade forcible entry operation. A 33-ship force
comprised of 11 LHA/D amphibious assault ships and a mix of 11 LPD 17
amphibious transport docks and 11 LSD(X) dock landing ships would be
sufficient to support forcible entry operations with acceptable risk in
the speed of arrival of combat support elements of the MEB. We have
examined ways to mitigate risk within the context of the entire
shipbuilding plan and determined that sustaining a minimum of 33
amphibious ships is adequate within today's fiscal limitations.
Admiral Greenert. The 38-ship force identified by the Marine Corps
represents the lift capacity necessary to support 2.0 MEB operations
including all of their Combat Support and Combat Service Support needs
across their full range of expected missions. This risk/force level is
inconsistent with the risk levels accepted by the remaining naval
forces. Therefore, the Commandant and CNO reached an agreement to
benchmark the amphibious force at 33 ships and accept a modicum of risk
in the extent of combat support equipment available within the Assault
Echelon (AE) forces and to move that equipment in conjunction with
follow-on force equipment. Specific decisions made in support of this
agreement are:
The Navy plans to procure an LHA 6 class ship in
fiscal year 2011 and its 11th LPD 17 class amphibious transport
dock in fiscal year 2012. LSD(X), replacement for the existing
LSD 41 class, will begin in fiscal year 2017.
The Navy determined the LHA 6 class amphibious
assault ships previously designated for the MPF
(Future) (MPF(F)) would serve more effectively in the
AE force where they could be employed in Marine
forcible-entry operations. Within the context of the
30-year Shipbuilding Plan, these AE amphibious ships
will be procured in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2016,
and fiscal year 2021.
The Navy begins procurement of LSD 41 class
replacement, LSD(X), in fiscal year 2017, on a 2-year
build cycle.
The Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP)
provides additional lift capacity, but does not factor in
meeting the Marine Corps' 2.0 MEB AE requirement.
ALEP is designed to fill the gap in vehicle
square feet stowage.
The Navy plans to procure three Mobile Landing
Platforms (MLP) as well as the three previously appropriated T-
AKEs. These augmented Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS)
enhance the afloat prepositioning capacity and will support the
Marine Corps 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a reinforcing
MEB to ``marry up'' ashore with its equipment from one of the
three MPS squadrons. The augmented MPS facilitate the routine
employment of prepositioned equipment in a variety of
activities across the range of military operations (ROMO) and
mitigate the risk of lower than desired amphibious ship
inventory levels.
101. Senator Burr. General Amos and Admiral Greenert, are the
requirements for more amphibious ships greater because at least 15 to
20 percent of the amphibious fleet is not deployable because they are
in shipyards undergoing maintenance and repair?
General Amos. The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in our
7 January 2009 report to Congress assumes that amphibious ships are not
operationally available due to maintenance approximately 10 percent of
the time. Due to the current maintenance challenges faced by the San
Antonio class, amphibious shipping is trending near 75 percent
availability vice the 90 percent planned. We would work to improve
operational availability to close to the 90 percent level instead of
increasing our force structure requirement to offset a significantly
lower operational availability. This will require increased resources
specifically maintenance funding for the upkeep of amphibious ships.
Admiral Greenert. No. Under normal circumstances, no more than
about 10 percent of the amphibious fleet is undergoing significant
maintenance and repair that would preclude operational availability in
the event of a national crisis. While there may be instances when
greater than 10 percent of the force is undergoing maintenance, we are
confident this assumption is consistent with the long-term availability
of amphibious ships for contingency operations.
The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in the January 7,
2009, Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure and the
Annual Report to Congress on the Long Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels for fiscal year 2011, calls for a force of 33 total ships
(11 LHA/LHD, 11 LPD, and 11 LSD). Under normal circumstances, 29 to 30
are available for tasking, enough to support MEBs while accepting risk
in the arrival of combat support and combat service support elements of
the MEB.
Without accepting this risk, the full requirement would be 38
ships. However SECNAV, CNO, and CMC agree that the 33-ship force
equates to an acceptable level of risk, as stated in the January 7,
2009, Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure.
102. Senator Burr. General Amos and Admiral Greenert, the serious
engineering problems on LPD-17 class ships gives rise for a concern
about a broader readiness problem. While the recent commissioning of
the USS New York in New York City harbor was great for the Navy, the
ship cannot get underway because of mechanical failures in the main
propulsion engines, generators, and failing piping welds that make the
ship unsafe to operate. The LPD-17 amphibious ship program has more
challenges than we had hoped. Are we seeing a systemic problem with the
readiness of the Navy's amphibious ships?
General Amos. No deployments have been missed. However, there has
been multiple negative impacts due to unscheduled maintenance
requirements during work ups and more importantly, during deployments.
26th MEU: (LF5th Flt 2010-01)
- San Antonio had to be swapped with Ponce due to San Antonio
non-mission capable and unscheduled maintenance. Loss of C2 and
cargo space.
15th MEU (Westpac 2010)
- Peleliu main feed pump repair caused a 2-day delay in
deployment.
- Dubuque had to return to port 2 days early during PTP due to
engineering casualty. Potential impact on availability to
Certex.
31st MEU (Spring Patrol 2010)
- MEU deployed aboard two-ship ARG (Essex and Tortuga) due to
maintenance availability. MEU CDR reports ``the MEU will not be
immediately capable of performing all METs and core
capabilities due to significant remain behind equipment and
personnel.'' RBE includes: Artillery Battery detachment, al
CBRN gear, 21 HMMWVs, 14 MTVRs. Degraded TSC capability and
risk to USPACOM contingency response. Denver is undergoing
scheduled maintenance and Harpers Ferry is conducting a PACFLT
directed TSC event.
24th MEU (LF5th Flt 2010)
- Nassau: Failure to install full GIG-E backbone. Significantly
degraded C2 infrastructure: limited bandwidth, outdated
switches, minimal VTC capability, and extremely limited VOSIP
capability. Intermittent connectivity has significantly
impacted and degraded execution of several missions.
- Wasp: Degraded combat systems. NASSAU substitution requiring
MEU and reduced C2 capability (LHA vs. LHD).
- Mesa Verde: Outdated VTC capability. Installed VTC
incompatible with current systems. Mission degradation.
11th MEU (WESTPAC 2009-02)
- Bon Homme Richard: Mechanical failure that caused a 6-day
delay in deployment.
31st MEU (Fall Patrol 2009)
- MEU deployed without Essex due to scheduled maintenance.
Degraded TSC capability and risk to USPACOM contingency
operations.
13th MEU (WESTPAC 2009)
- Boxer experienced 40 days of degraded or no fixed wing
capability due to flight deck surfacing issues that were
deferred due to budget constraints. Flight deck was shut down
while in CENTCOM AOR.
- Comstock missed 12 days of work up at sea days, unreliable
for 50+ days of PACOM transit resulted in 19 day extended in-
port maintenance call while in theater, totally of 81 days out
of action.
15th MEU (WESTPAC 2009-02)
- Dubuque experienced ruptured boiler. Required 3 to 4 weeks of
repair in Bahrain. Limited MEU participation in Exercise
Infinite Moonlight and impact on capability to back load in
case of contingency.
26th MEU (LF5th Flt 2008-01)
- San Antonio experience engineering lube oil system failure.
San Antonio was pier side at Bahrain non-mission capable for 1
month.
- San Antonio experienced a stern gate casualty causing a 2- to
3-day delay in deployment.
- San Antonio missed a total of 30 days of PTP/operational
employment in support of embarked forces.
Admiral Greenert. No. While we have seen some recurring material
issues in LPD 17 class ships, the problems associated with a new
construction ship are not indicative of a systemic problem with the
amphibious ship readiness of the existing fleet.
mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
103. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, in response to the increasing
threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq, DOD
initiated a rapid acquisition strategy to field a more survivable, mine
resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle. As a result, DOD has
purchased approximately 12,000 MRAPs saving countless American lives.
Now the question is how the Army plans to integrate a platform designed
to meet an urgent wartime requirement into its long-term modernization
and sustainment strategy. What is the Army's plan for the integrating
MRAP vehicles into its ground vehicle strategy, particularly with
regard to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)?
General Chiarelli. The Army's 2010 draft TWV Strategy is informing
the MRAP Study II, in conjunction with the TWV Study III. MRAP Study II
acknowledges changes since the original 2009 MRAP Study I results and
DP 147 and will seek to place more MRAPs on Tables of Organization and
Equipment, use more MRAPs as substitutes for LTV/JLTV mission roles,
and examine the use of MRAP as Data Interchange platforms. Preliminary
analysis indicates the likelihood that MRAP re-use goals will be
achieved and has also identified the value of implementing certain MRAP
upgrades that will result in greater capability. Initial results are
expected in October 2010, and final results no later than 31 Dec 2010.
We expect to meet the Army's TWV Strategy goals with a mixed fleet of
vehicles capable of meeting the spectrum of DOD contingency plans.
104. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, does the Army plan to
integrate all 12,000 vehicles into its long-term inventory? If so, how
will this affect inventory issues such as APS and motor pool space
constraints?
General Chiarelli. The Army's 2010 draft TWV Strategy is informing
the MRAP Study II, in conjunction with the TWV Study III. MRAP Study II
acknowledges changes since the original 2009 MRAP Study I results and
DP 147 and will seek to place more MRAPs on Tables of Organization and
Equipment and into the APS and have others reserved for sustainment
stocks. APS as a program will also receive some additional vehicles
which must be reviewed to ensure they are supportable within the
current global APS infrastructure, and any improvements required to
meet that supportability are identified and resolved. Those platforms
that go into units may require a change to current motor pools and some
maintenance procedures.
105. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, the MRAP program was
initiated as a joint program but will shift to the individual Services
in fiscal year 2012, where the Army will assume budgetary control over
its MRAP fleet, including its significant sustainment costs. Do you
have any estimates on future costs associated with sustaining the MRAP
fleet?
General Chiarelli. A final decision on when to transfer the MRAP
program to individual Service control has not been made. The Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) will
select a path forward for transitioning the joint program to another
program management construct based on events rather than purely time.
Given the rapid acquisition and fielding of MRAP vehicles to meet
urgent warfighter requirements, long-term sustainment costs are also
unknown at this time. The Army will have more clarity on long-term
sustainment costs upon approval of Army Campaign Plan (ACP), which
allocates 15,000 enduring force MRAP vehicles between APS, Army
organizations, and training/war reserve stocks. The final allocation
will significantly impact future sustainment cost estimates since
vehicles stored in APS have a significantly lower operational tempo and
sustainment costs compared to vehicles used on a regular basis in
units. The Army will also conduct a fiscal year 2011 Sustainment
Readiness Review (SRR), which is a post deployment review to assess the
performance of the MRAP support system. The SRR will evaluate the
actual performance against predicted parameters and thus provide better
insight on the path forward for future MRAP sustainment, to include
costs.
106. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how does the Army plan to
absorb these costs, particularly as we transition from OCO dollars to
base budget dollars?
General Chiarelli. Given the rapid acquisition and fielding of MRAP
vehicles, long-term sustainment costs are unknown at this time. Until
we have clarity on future MRAP sustainment, to include funding
requirements, we cannot provide a feasible plan to absorb the costs. We
expect to know more after the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(ATL)) selects a path
forward for transitioning the joint program.
107. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how will this affect other
Army priorities, such as its modernization efforts?
General Chiarelli. The Army will develop and field an affordable
and interoperable mix of the best equipment available to allow soldiers
and units to succeed in both today's and tomorrow's full-spectrum
military operations. We will continuously modernize a balanced set of
equipment--including MRAPs--to meet current and future capability needs
through a combination of upgrade, recapitalization, refurbishment, and
technology insertion. As 21st century threats emerge and adjust, and
force requirements evolve in response to that future operational
environment, the Army will fund, field, and distribute capabilities--
using the ARFORGEN model--in accordance with the Army Resourcing
Priorities List to ensure that deployed soldiers have the best possible
equipment.
nondeployable soldiers
108. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, you mentioned in your
statement that the nondeployable rate for our soldiers increased from
9.92 percent in fiscal year 2007 to 12 percent in fiscal year 2009.
What is the current level of nondeployable soldiers?
General Chiarelli. For fiscal year 2010 year-to-date, the current
level of nondeployable soldiers is 14.11 percent.
109. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, do you see this level
decreasing?
General Chiarelli. Based on past and current trends, I do not
anticipate nondeployable levels to decrease in the near-term. A key
factor in the recent increases in nondeployable rates has been the
sustained high levels of demand. Additionally, the reduction of Stop
Loss has caused a corresponding increase in nondeployables based on
voluntary separations and retirements. As demand decreases, we would
expect to see an eventual stabilization and ultimate decrease in
nondeployable rates over the long-term.
110. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, in addition to the temporary
increase in end strength of 22,000, what steps are being taken to
address the nondeployable levels?
General Chiarelli. After 9 years of war, the health of our All-
Volunteer Force is showing signs of stress. From a tactical
perspective, commanders at all levels are actively engaged in
identifying nondeployable soldiers and, in the case of temporary
nondeployable conditions, linking the soldier with the requisite
resources necessary to resolve the nondeployable condition. From a
strategic perspective, the Army staff is focused on policy and
implementation decisions necessary to dampen the nondeployer rates in
our units and to gain better visibility on the health of the force.
Specifically with regard to medical nondeployers, my staff is
engaged in numerous efforts to improve medical readiness policies and
processes. These efforts are synchronized across four lines of
operations (Systems, Training, Policy, and Processes) and focused on
our desired end-state to man an expeditionary Army with soldiers who
are medically deployable while preserving the All-Volunteer Force. Our
actions in this realm are built upon four primary objectives: to
develop a medical Common Operating Picture; to train our leaders and
medical professionals on medical readiness policies and procedures; to
determine what impact worldwide deployability should have on soldier
retainability; and to standardize and streamline medical board
processes across all components. Over time, increased visibility
combined with improved policy and streamlined processes will combine to
decrease nondeployer rates.
111. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, what effect has the temporary
increase in end-strength had on ensuring units are capable of
deploying?
General Chiarelli. The Temporary End Strength Increase (TESI) has
provided us with the operational flexibility to over-man units and
achieve deployed strength benchmarks, compensating for nondeployable
soldiers and the reduction of Stop Loss. During fiscal year 2010 year-
to-date, 11 of the 13 BCTs and all 4 of the CABs met the minimum 90
percent deployed strength requirement at the latest arrival date. The
two BCTs that missed that benchmark achieved the minimum 90 percent
deployed strength requirement within 30 days after the latest arrival
date.
112. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, do you see a need to make the
temporary increase of end-strength permanent?
General Chiarelli. No. The TESI is a temporary solution to a
temporary problem. TESI was designed to improve the fill of deploying
units by mitigating the effects of the increase in nondeployable
soldiers, Stop Loss elimination, and wounded warriors, which were a
result of the operational demand for forces in support of OIF and OEF.
Our vision of the future manning environment is predicated on the
projected reduction in demand in fiscal year 2012 and the plan to
completely eliminate Stop Loss by March 2011. Any significant changes
in demand or other key variables may affect our end-strength
requirements.
marine corps training on guam
113. Senator Burr. General Amos, the Marine Corps has indentified
the ability to train on Guam, or nearby islands, at the unit level as a
major requirement to support the relocation of Marine forces to Guam.
Will the Marines require small arms training sites on Guam, or can this
training be accomplished solely on Tinian?
General Amos. Yes, the Marines will require small arms training
sites on Guam to sustain core competencies in order to meet the
operational requirements of the combatant commander. This training
cannot be accomplished solely on Tinian as it is the type of training
that marines will conduct on a daily/near-continuous basis. The types
of ranges being planned for on Guam support basic, individual skills--
those essential warfighting skills that make us marines--that all
marines are required to use on an annual basis, at a minimum, for
readiness sustainment. Additionally, the ranges currently planned on
Tinian under the current environmental impact statement (EIS) do not
support medium or heavy caliber ammunition as required for the multi-
purpose machine gun range. Based on the frequency of range use, the
number of Marines relying on these ranges for annual qualifications,
and the enduring presence the Marine Corps intends to have on Guam, we
have determined that it is critical to build these ranges at the
location where marines live and work.
114. Senator Burr. General Amos, what level of training and arms
can be used? In other words, will Marines have to travel off Guam to
train in order to deploy? If so, where would the Marines have to go to
train?
General Amos. On Guam, the marines will primarily conduct live-fire
qualification and sustainment training with individual weapons and
crew-served weapons. Those Marine Corps forces relocating from Okinawa
to Guam will have to travel off-island to accomplish requisite core
competency training. This is because the current EIS does not provide
for a high explosive, dud-producing impact area, amphibious landing
beach or higher level collective training ranges the Marine Corps
forces need to sustain core competencies. The Marine Corps ultimately
desires to conduct core competency training in areas that minimize
travel time and reduce operational non-availability. Commonwealth of
the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI) provides land space reasonably
close enough to ensure Guam-based marines sustain the core competencies
that cannot be met on Guam on a regular basis.
115. Senator Burr. General Amos, how is this pre-deployment
training requirement met for those marines assigned to Okinawa now?
General Amos. The Marine Corps' Pre-Deployment Training Program
consists of four blocks of training. Blocks I and II are conducted by
unit commanders at home station and are designed for individuals and
small units. Blocks III and IV are progressive training for entire
units culminating in a final exercise testing the unit's capability to
function as a cohesive team.
The Marine Corps does deploy complete units from ground, aviation,
and logistics combat elements from Okinawa, as well as smaller enabler
detachments, to Afghanistan in support of OEF. These units complete
pre-deployment training in the same manner as CONUS-based units,
including block IV mission rehearsals and assessments at Twentynine
Palms, CA, or at approved alternate training venues.
The Marine Corps also deploys marines from Okinawa to serve as
Afghanistan and Iraqi training teams who also conduct pre-deployment
progressive Block training that finishes with either a home station or
CONUS based mission rehearsal and assessment.
Units rotating to Okinawa on the UDP complete Blocks I and II prior
to arrival in the same manner as CONUS-based units. Units rotating to
Okinawa as part of the 31st MEU also complete individual and small unit
training. Additionally, designated units complete specialized training
with the first Special Operations Training Group (SOTG), Camp
Pendleton, CA, prior to arrival in Okinawa. The Maritime Reaction Force
(MRF) platoon training is one example.
116. Senator Burr. General Amos, what steps, including an EIS and
military construction (MILCON), would be needed to improve training on
and near Guam?
General Amos. The May 2006 Realignment Roadmap delineates specific
Marine Corps units to permanently relocate from Okinawa to Guam. The
Guam realignment EIS, conducted by the Joint Guam Program Office,
includes analysis of live-fire and non-fire training activities to
support limited individual and collective training. The DOD considers
Marine Corps training requirements in the Pacific beyond what is being
analyzed in the Guam realignment EIS to be part of a much broader
picture that must take into account DOD's global posture. The Marine
Corps considers training of the MAGTF elements relocating to Guam tied
to the movement of those forces: development of training capacity must
align with force flow in order to sustain readiness for relocating
units. MILCON for ranges will need to be synchronized with force flow
such that units arriving on Guam will have ranges available to sustain
readiness.
PACOM has determined that there is an ongoing need to reassess
current training locations and to develop additional training capacity
for higher-level core competency training in the Western Pacific. PACOM
will conduct a joint training review to address longstanding training
deficiencies in the Pacific. This review will specifically evaluate the
needs for additional training facilities in the CNMI and other
locations in the Western Pacific to address individual, collective, and
MAGTF training requirements for Marine Corps and joint forces in the
area. Initial analysis has identified Tinian and Pagan as potentially
suitable for training forces aboard Guam for individual, collective,
and MAGTF-level training requirements. However, the full environmental
impact analysis must be completed in order to accurately determine
Tinian and Pagan's suitability to meet these training requirements.
117. Senator Burr. General Amos, what is the timeline for
establishing these improved training facilities?
General Amos. Programming for training ranges and areas under the
Guam EIS are budgeted to begin with potential land acquisition in
fiscal year 2012 and construction to begin thereafter. PACOM is
budgeted to receive $30 million in fiscal year 2011 to conduct the
Pacific Training Study that will examine training potentialities in the
CNMI.
impact to readiness from off-shore drilling
118. Senator Burr. General Chandler, the President recently
announced his support for new off-shore drilling initiatives. As you
may know, the issue of drilling in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico has
raised concerned within DOD over potential impacts to the test and
training air ranges in that area. Some of this concern has been
addressed with recent negotiations with the Department of the Interior
(DOI) about acceptable methods of drilling. What is the current
position of the Air Force concerning the issuance of additional leases
in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico to support off-shore drilling operations?
General Chandler. The Air Force has participated in the DOD's
efforts to identify compatibility issues with drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico. Our most recent initiative assessed the Gulf for potential
operational impacts from energy development. The Air Force did not
designate any areas as completely incompatible with oil exploration and
drilling. However, we noted stipulations that should be included in any
DOI lease that would protect the military mission. These stipulations
include periodic evacuations and hold-harmless agreements, similar to
those employed near space launch ranges.
In our operational impact findings, we noted that while no single
area is incompatible with drilling, that could change as development
ensues. The nature of current Air Force operations in the Gulf allows
for some geographic flexibility in the scheduling of missions. The
effect of pinning missions into smaller areas is: (a) more missions in
the remaining areas, and (b) potential ``incompatible'' designations in
the remaining areas. The Air Force will remain engaged with DOD and its
partners to ensure that current and future operational impacts, both
specific and cumulative, are taken into consideration during energy
siting decisions.
119. Senator Burr. General Chandler, what are the current concerns
about the impact to military readiness?
General Chandler. The Air Force has participated in DOD's recent
initiatives to identify operational compatibility issues with
development on the Outer-Continental Shelf. Our concerns in the Gulf of
Mexico are primarily related to the potential restrictions on current
and future operations, test, and training resulting from development.
The Air Force identified lease stipulations that could overcome these
concerns. The stipulations were: (1) some restrictions on permanent
above-surface structures; (2) periodic evacuations with proper
notification; and (3) hold-harmless agreements for property damage.
These stipulations have been used near launch facilities on both
coasts. While damage from debris is unlikely, our commitment to safety
requires that certain areas remain free of bystanders during certain
missions.
In short, the physical presence of a drilling structure in the Gulf
of Mexico is unlikely to be incompatible with Air Force operations as
long as that structure does not result in new restrictions on our
current and future operations.
av-8b harrier aircraft sustainment
120. Senator Burr. General Amos, it is my understanding that the
current pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has significantly
increased the utilization of the Marine Corps AV-8B aircraft above the
planned usage. Because of the need to keep the AV-8B in service until
we transition to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), various levels
maintenance are needed to keep this aircraft flying. How would you
recommend the current AV-6B sustainment strategy be improved in order
to reduce maintenance turnaround time and enhance readiness?
General Amos. In contrast to other legacy platforms, the life
limits of AV-8B major airframe components are now being defined by FLE
rather than flight hours. This means the Harrier's airframe can be in
service significantly beyond the projected out-of-service date of
fiscal year 2022. Emergent avionics obsolescence and subsystem issues,
engine, and engine accessory supportability, all of which are addressed
by the Readiness Management Program and Engine Life Management Program,
will have the greatest impact on AV-8B long-term sustainment.
The Harrier Fleet is currently inventory-constrained. Ongoing
efforts to streamline the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) process
are a key element to reducing depot turnaround time, thereby limiting
the number of aircraft out of service and mitigating inventory
shortfalls. PMA-257 and Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) East and
Southwest signed a Performance Based Agreement that assigns FRC-E as
the PMI-2/3 Single Process Owner starting in fiscal year 2011.
Additional efforts to reduce turnaround time involve improving existing
processes and awarding a long-term Performance Based Logistics contract
through DLA to improve material availability.
readiness risk for combat air forces
121. Senator Burr. General Chandler, you state in your written
testimony for this hearing the following: ``By accelerating the planned
retirement of 257 legacy fighter aircraft, we are committed to a
smaller, but more capable fifth-generation fighter force. These
retirements freed more than 4,000 personnel to operate RPA and to
process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence. This shift accepts a
moderate amount of warfighting risk due to decreased capacity, but is
necessary to move forward to more capable and survivable next
generation platforms.'' Can you explain what you mean by a moderate
amount of warfighting risk?
General Chandler. Risk definitions are derived from the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Risk Assessment process. The broad definition
of moderate risk is that forces, capabilities, and effects, required or
implied, will likely be provided in an effective and timely manner; but
may be delayed, are less than optimally configured, or could entail
increased tactical losses than if fully funded. This will not
jeopardize operational or strategic success. Aircraft inventories will
need to be aggressively managed to maintain primary mission aircraft
inventories and timelines may require an extension, but strategic
objectives are likely to be met.
122. Senator Burr. General Chandler, is the Air Force working with
the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders to mitigate the risk of
decreased capacity?
General Chandler. When preparing the fiscal year 2010 President's
budget, the Secretary of Defense provided guidance to the Services to
assess, balance, and adjust manned, short-range fixed-wing capacity.
After conducting a thorough examination of the current and future
strategic environment, the Air Force determined that a window of
opportunity existed in the near-term to accelerate the retirement of
approximately 250 of its oldest legacy fighters. The Air Force
coordinated this plan across all major commands in the Active Duty as
well as the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. This plan was
briefed to the Joint Staff and the Unified Combatant Commanders or
their designated representatives, and their concerns about the plan
were either directly addressed with Air Force leadership or with the
Secretary of Defense.
123. Senator Burr. General Chandler, how long do you expect the Air
Force to assume this risk?
General Chandler. As stated in the Combat Air Forces Restructuring
Congressional Report submitted in February 2010, the Air Force
increased the level of risk to achieve National Defense Strategy (NDS)
objectives in the 2010 to 2020 timeframe to build a smaller, but more
capable force. This revised force structure along with investments to
modifications, preferred munitions, and key enablers will serve as a
capabilities-based bridge to an increasingly fifth generation fighter
force structure. These actions will posture the Air Force fighter fleet
to better enable the joint force in pursuit of NDS objectives in the
2020 to 2030 timeframe and beyond--coincident with an increasingly
dangerous MCO environment.
124. Senator Burr. General Chandler, what are Air Force plans in
the long term to reduce or eliminate this warfighting risk?
General Chandler. The Air Force will aggressively manage its budget
to comply with the DOD fiscal year 2011 President's budget guidance to
procure F-35 aircraft at a rate of 80 per year starting in fiscal year
2016. The Air Force is also investigating modernization and SLEPs for
its legacy fighter fleet to increase capability and maintain capacity.
Additionally, the Air Force is reviewing options to field survivable,
long-range surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive,
phased plan to modernize the bomber force. These risk reduction efforts
are part of an enterprise-wide Total Force effort to ensure the Air
Force meets current and future emerging missions. The Air Force is
ready to execute the President's guidance to make the most of our
allocated resources and to work as a member of the joint team to
accomplish our Nation's military objectives.
army requirements for the closure of guantanamo bay
125. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, I have a question about
pending Army requirements related to Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). As you
probably know, I do not support bringing suspected terrorists to the
United States, let alone spending this kind of money to attempt to
recreate the state-of-the-art detention facility we already have in
GTMO. But the OCO portion of the President's budget request for fiscal
year 2011 includes $350 million in a transfer fund for the detention
facilities at GTMO, provides funding to make improvements at the
Illinois State Prison at Thomson, IL, in the amount of $150 million,
and includes another $158 million for information technology
improvements at the Rock Island Arsenal, IL, to support DOD detainee
operations at Thomson. The Army will be the executive agent for this
operation. Has the Army determined how many military personnel will be
assigned to Thomson and where will they be housed?
General Chiarelli. The Army participated in several preliminary
planning sessions and developed a very tentative plan for manning the
Thomson facility should the decision be made to use that facility to
house Guantanamo Bay detainees. Our basic planning figures include
approximately 1,000 military and civilian personnel at Thomson, and up
to 500 military and civilian personnel at Rock Island Arsenal, to
support the detainee operations mission.
A plan to house military personnel and their families will be
developed based on housing market analyses in the vicinity of Thomson
and Rock Island. If military housing is required, it will be
constructed at a later date.
126. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, has the Army planned for the
commitment of manpower and resources to support the mission at
Thompson?
General Chiarelli. Yes, the Army conducted planning with OSD, but
no commitment for manpower and resources were allocated to support the
mission at Thomson.
127. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, does the request for funding
include funding for military housing and other base support facilities
at Thomson and Rock Island for the Army personnel that will be
stationed to support the new facility?
General Chiarelli. The funding request associated with the
potential relocation of Guantanamo Bay facilities was developed by OSD.
I am not able to provide any information with regard to that request.
army green ammunition
128. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, the Army has been developing
a more effective and lead-free bullet to replace the currently fielded
M855 5.56mm round for several years, commonly referred to as green
ammunition. The initial plan was to field the first installment of 20
million green rounds late last summer but this was delayed as a result
of significant testing failures, particularly when the rounds were
exposed to high temperatures. Are you confident this ammunition will be
ready for combat by June of this year, as earlier stated by the Army?
General Chiarelli. The temperature issue experienced with the
M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round (EPR) has been corrected. The Army
has begun to issue the M855A1 to our soldiers in Afghanistan, packaged
for use with the M16 rifle and M4 carbine. Early reports we have
received about the cartridge's performance have been very favorable.
The Army has produced and accepted over 45 million M855A1 EPR
cartridges and 1.1 million EPR cartridges have been airlifted through
Kuwait and are now in Afghanistan. Additionally, 4.6 million EPR
cartridges have arrived via sealift to the CENTCOM area of operations
(AO); 14.5 million cartridges are scheduled to arrive in the CENTCOM AO
by October 12 and another 7 million are now planned for delivery in
late December.
129. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, are you confident that the
green ammo provides a comparable performance to other rounds currently
being fielded by other Services, including the SOST round being
acquired by the Marine Corps and SOCOM?
General Chiarelli. The M855A1 EPR cartridge is an improved version
of the M855 cartridge that is fired from the M4 carbine and M16 rifle.
The M855A1 incorporates a product improved projectile and improved
propellant which provides significantly enhanced performance against a
wide variety of targets. The M855A1 provides improved hard target
capability, more consistent performance against soft targets, improved
accuracy, and reduced muzzle flash. These performance improvements were
incorporated without an increase to cartridge weight or size. Approval
of the M855A1 for fielding for use in the M4 carbine and M16 rifle has
been requested. The M855A1 outperforms the Special Operations Science
and Technology cartridge (SOST) in accuracy, and terminal consistency
against soft targets. The M855A1 meets the Army requirements of
perforating 3/8 inch steel and matches the 5.56 mm M856 trace whereas
the SOST does not. The M855A1 also has better performance against
Kevlar, and against concrete masonry than does the SOST.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
personnel readiness and servicemember health
130. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli and General Amos, the
military's strength is in its soldiers, the families, and the Army
civilians who support them. With over 2 million service men and women
having deployed to support the war on terror, indicators of that strain
or stress on the force have begun to surface such as increase in
suicide rates and divorces, retention, and recruiting challenges. What
is your assessment of the health and quality of the Army and Marine
Corps?
General Chiarelli. Our soldiers, families, and civilians are
clearly stressed and fatigued by nearly 9 years of combat. The Army is
out of balance, and that balance needs to be restored to sustain this
All-Volunteer Force for the long haul. Yet, through it all, our Army
remains amazingly resilient, determined, and extraordinarily effective.
Today, our soldiers have more expertise, education, training, and
capabilities than ever before, and in fiscal year 2009, our incoming
Active component soldiers had the highest high school diploma rates
since fiscal year 2003.
General Amos. As a Force, our Marines Corps units in the field are
performing brilliantly and are consistently proving that they can
absorb the stress and accomplish the mission. However, I am concerned
about the impact of stress on the individual marine and his/her family.
Each month, we monitor behavioral factors, such as divorce and suicide
for signs of increased stress on marines and their families, and
although there was a slight decrease in the divorce rate--from 3.7
percent in fiscal year 2008 to 3.6 percent in fiscal year 2009--our
suicide numbers are up. These stress factors have my attention and that
of senior leadership at the highest level as we refocus our efforts to
improve the quality of our prevention and lifeskills training to
strengthen the resiliency and coping skills of our marines and their
families.
131. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli and General Amos, what new
initiatives are the Army and Marine Corps implementing to address these
stress indicators?
General Chiarelli. The U.S. Army Medical Command developed the
Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care Campaign Plan to
emphasize identifying, preventing, treating, and tracking behavioral
health issues affecting soldiers and families. This campaign
establishes an integrated, coordinated, and synchronized comprehensive
behavioral health system of care supporting the ARFORGEN model in each
of its phases in order to reduce the incidence of behavioral health
issues and mitigate the impact of the normal stresses of Army life,
deployment, and combat.
The Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care Campaign Plan
focuses on the standardization and implementation of key soldier/family
and civilian support models incorporating screening points, assessment,
provider education and self care, tele-behavioral health, and a common
information technology platform. Specific components of this campaign
plan include Child and Family Assistance Centers that execute a
comprehensive plan on the installation that provides direct behavioral
health support for Army families and their children. This plan
integrates all behavioral health resources under a single umbrella
organization to facilitate coordination, and increase capacity and
flexibility in delivery of these services. Another central support
program is School Behavioral Health Programs that will implement a
cost-effective comprehensive array of school behavioral health programs
and services to support military children, their families, and the Army
community in schools and Child Development Centers. Other key
components to this overarching campaign plan include the Army Substance
Abuse Program and the self-referral pilot Confidential Alcohol
Treatment Education Program now underway at multiple locations.
General Amos. We are committed to developing resiliency and coping
skills in individual marines and their families and have taken the
following actions:
- Broadened the scope of our Executive Force Preservation Board
that I chair to focus on all behavioral health concerns--such
as combat and operational stress; suicide; domestic violence;
substance abuse, and sexual assault.
- Initiated the development of a systematic standardized family
readiness support system, through the Unit, Personal, and
Family Readiness Program, which is designed to work across
functional lines to build and sustain the capacity of military
families to care for themselves and mutually support one
another within the Marine Corps Community. As part of this
program, we established over 400 full-time, primary-duty
civilian Family Readiness Officers (FRO) to support commanders
at the unit level.
- Developed an inventory of LifeSkills training courses that
specifically address the challenges of military life, as well
as personal and family life to initiate and foster a strong
foundation of readiness among our marines and their families.
- To address the increased demands and potential impact of
multiple, sustained deployments on both our Active and Reserve
component marines and their families we have:
Expanded and enhanced our pre-, during-, and
post-deployment training to focus on the needs of our
constituency;
Implemented the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration
Program to ensure our Reserve Marines are afforded
access to comparable deployed support services as their
Active Duty counterparts;
Broadened the scope of our Lifestyle Insights,
Networking, Knowledge, and Skills (L.I.N.K.S.) training
to include marines, children, and extended family
members;
Incorporated Combat and Operational Stress
Control (COSC) into our deployment training cycles.
- Established COSC and Operational Stress Control and Readiness
(OSCAR) training as a primary prevention tool to help marines
identify and mitigate early signs of stress and to encourage
them to seek help within the unit setting. In addition, senior
and junior marines are trained and function as OSCAR Mentors.
They actively engage marines who evidence stress reactions,
liaison with OSCAR Extenders (Navy Corpsmen, Chaplains, and
Medical Officers) which provide additional services or
referral, if necessary, to a mental health team regarding
stress problems. These personnel watch over the marines in
their units, identify and refer them for help with stress
problems, when required, and provide the support needed to get
them back to full readiness as quickly as possible. OSCAR
Mentors greatly decrease the stigma associated with stress
reactions, and help marines take care of their own.
- Engaged on multiple fronts on suicide prevention:
Creating new, dynamic training programs that
are targeted toward our marines, NCOs, SNCOs, officers,
and family members.
Working closer than ever before with the other
Services, the DOD, and civilian and Federal agencies to
build our programs, share our information, and put our
best practices forward.
Committed to developing resiliency and coping
skills in individual marines.
With peer and senior leadership, we are
sending the message to every marine that getting help
for distress is a duty not an option, and it is
consistent with our culture and our ethos to do so.
Disseminating lessons learned from all death briefs and building
knowledge and awareness of senior leaders at forums and symposiums.
132. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli and General Amos, we have
significantly improved the care for our wounded warriors yet we still
suffer a significant shortfall in mental health care specialists or
providers. What is being done to address the mental health care
provider issue?
General Chiarelli. The Army is using numerous mechanisms to recruit
and retain both civilian and uniformed behavioral health (BH) providers
including bonuses, scholarships, and an expansion in training programs.
The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) has increased funding for
scholarships and bonuses to support expansion of our provider
inventory. The Secretary of the Army is conducting a comprehensive
review of recruiting and retention efforts for mental health providers.
This review is nearly complete and will offer additional insights and
recommendations to enhance our abilities to attract and keep these
professionals within the Military Health System.
Efforts to improve recruitment and retention of military behavioral
health providers include the expanded use of the Active Duty Health
Professions Loan Repayment Program and a $20,000 accessions bonus for
Medical and Dental Corps health professions scholarship applicants.
Additionally, the Army implemented an officer accessions pilot program
that allows older healthcare providers to enter the Army, serve 2
years, and return to their communities. To improve retention, the Army
used a onetime Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) for social
workers and BH nurses and the AMEDD CSRB for clinical psychologists.
For our critical civilian workforce, the Army provides centrally funded
reimbursement of recruiting, relocation, and retention bonuses for
civilian behavioral health providers to enhance recruitment of
potential candidates and retention of staff.
Expanding training opportunities has been a significant part of the
Army's strategy as well. In partnership with Fayetteville State
University, the U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) developed a Masters
of Social Work program which graduated 19 in the first class in 2009.
The program has a current capacity of 30 candidates. Additionally,
MEDCOM increased the number of Health Professions Scholarship
Allocations dedicated to Clinical Psychology and the number of seats
available in the Clinical Psychology Internship Program. Prior to 2004
the Army historically trained 12 interns per year and has progressively
increased that number, admitting 33 interns in 2009.
General Amos. To further assist leaders with prevention, rapid
identification, and early treatment of combat operational stress, we
are expanding our program of embedding mental health professionals in
operational units--the OSCAR program--to directly support all Active
and Reserve ground combat elements. This is being achieved through
realignment of existing Navy structure supporting the operating forces,
and increases in the Navy mental health provider inventory. Currently
there are six authorized permanent billets, two at each active
division. In fiscal year 2011, 23 additional permanent billets will be
authorized in the Active and Reserve divisions. Ultimately, each active
division will have three mental health providers, and each regiment
will have two. In the Reserves, the division will have four providers.
OSCAR capability is also being extended to all deploying units by
providing additional training to existing medical providers, corpsmen,
chaplains, and religious program specialists where available (OSCAR
Extenders) as well as to marines and leaders (OSCAR Mentors). These
personnel watch over the marines in their units, identify and refer
them for help with stress problems, when required, and provide the
support needed to get them back to full readiness as quickly as
possible. OSCAR Mentors, who have the lead in this process, greatly
decrease the stigma associated with stress reacgreeions, and help
marines take care of their own. As of 10 Sep, over 400 marines have
received training as OSCAR mentors. Training has already been conducted
at I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Camp Pendleton and The Basic
School, Quantico, VA. In September, II MEF and III MEF will receive
OSCAR training. MARFORRES is scheduled to receive training in November.
133. Senator Inhofe. General Amos, both the Army and the Marine
Corps are suffering significant OPTEMPOs, though the Army is by far
suffering more with 12-month deployments followed by 12- to 15-month
dwell times. I have been told that even with the marines on a 7-month
deployed, 12-month dwell cycle, that units are still suffering a
compressed timeline. What are the issues associated with the 12-month
dwell cycle for your marines?
General Amos. Regarding current deployments, our goal is to achieve
a 1:2 deployment to dwell ration for Active-Duty Forces and 1:4 for
Reserve Forces. In peace, our goals are 1:3 and 1:5 respectively. The
drawdown in Iraq and our current end strength of 202,000 personnel is
allowing us to get close to our goal with the current level of marines
in Afghanistan. Dwell time is one of the key factors to ensure that
unit readiness, recruiting, retention, morale, and family readiness are
not adversely affected. Our heavy training focus on counterinsurgency,
coupled with short dwell time, limited the ability of the Marine Corps
to develop and maintain proficiency in core competencies such as
combined arms and amphibious operations. This training deficiency
presents significant risk in our ability to support other OPLANs and
contingencies, where full spectrum capabilities would be required.
134. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, is the Army Forces
Regeneration model working to get us greater dwell times?
General Chiarelli. ARFORGEN provides an enterprise framework to
provide predictable periods of unit availability to manage equipment,
and most importantly to manage our soldiers to ensure each unit is
manned, equipped, and trained for its assigned mission. Dwell time is
primarily a function of supply and demand for forces. As long as demand
exceeds sustainable supply, we will experience issues with dwell time.
The reduction of the global demand for forces as we move from a surge
condition to a steady state condition in this era of persistent
conflict will create greater time between deployments. This results in
more opportunities for Professional Military Education (PME) and
training, maintenance, and to enhance the quality of life for soldiers
and their families.
The overarching purpose of ARFORGEN is to provide combatant
commanders and civil authorities with a steady supply of trained and
ready units to meet operational requirements. These operational
requirements focus the prioritization and synchronization of
institutional functions to recruit, organize, man, equip, train,
sustain, mobilize, and deploy units on a cyclic basis. ARFORGEN's
adaptability addresses both emerging and enduring requirements.
Simultaneously, Army institutional adaptations to ARFORGEN maximize
potential efficiencies while ensuring effective capabilities are built
to support operational requirements.
135. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, where do we stand with
getting all BCTs to a greater than 12-month dwell time?
General Chiarelli. As of April 2010, Active component BCTs are
operating on a BOG:dwell ratio of approximately 1:1.43 (12 months BOG:
17 months dwell). In fiscal year 2012, the Army anticipates beginning a
1:2 Active component/1:4 Reserve component BOG:dwell and by fiscal year
2014, a soldier will spend 2 years at homestation prior to a
deployment. Dwell time for BCTs will improve because of the moderated
demand for BCTs.
end strength
136. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli and General Amos, I was
pleased to see that both the Army and the Marine Corps have reached
their permanent end strength goals, 547,000 and 202,000 respectively. I
see the positive effects the temporary increase up to 22,000 is having
on the Army but I am concerned that this temporary increase may not be
enough. I am concerned because we don't have enough BCTs and Reserve
combat teams to meet the demands of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
unforeseen requirements for our military forces. Our forces are
stretched thin, yet when disaster occurs, they get the job done as they
did in Haiti despite the toll the additional deployments took on our
servicemembers and their families. Are your Services' current end
strength goals adequate to meet the current and forecasted operational
needs?
General Chiarelli. Army end strength goals are adequate to meet
current and forecasted operational needs. The TESI authority provided
by Congress has enabled the Army to deploy units at acceptable manning
strength levels. TESI provides the Army increased operational
flexibility, reduction in personnel and unit turbulence, and the
predictability for soldiers and their families required to maintain the
All-Volunteer Force.
General Amos. Yes, we believe 202,000 Active-Duty personnel are
sufficient to meet our current and forecasted operational needs. Such a
force level (i.e., three balanced MEFs) enables the Corps to meet
current and future challenges in an increasingly demanding operational
environment. It also gives the Marine Corps the capacity to deploy
forces in response to contingencies and to support security cooperation
efforts with our partners across all theaters.
We believe that 202,000 is the right sized force to achieve our
goal of a 1:2 dwell given our current level of commitment to
Afghanistan.
Prior to 202,000, Marine Corps infantry battalions
were at a 1:1.1 dwell time. Currently, we are at 1:1.8 dwell
for infantry battalions. Factoring in a current steady state
commitment of 9 infantry battalions (6 x OEF and 3 x MEU) we
expect to achieve a 1:1.9 steady state (RIP TOA period, when
battalions overlap, prevents us from getting to 1:2).
Marine Corps forces are multi-capable, transitioning seamlessly
from fighting conventional and hybrid threats to promoting stability
and mitigating conditions that lead to conflict. By maintaining a
202,000 force, we will continue to improve training, upgrade readiness,
and enhance the quality of life for all our marines and their families
by allowing them more recovery time between deployments.
This fall, the Marine Corps will be conducting a thorough force
structure review to inform decisions about what the Marine Corps will
look like in the future. Any recommended adjustments to the force will
undergo a thorough vetting and analysis to ensure the Nation's Marine
Corps remain ready. Such adjustments will be brought to your attention
through Defense Department leadership as situations and events dictate.
137. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli and General Amos, despite
experiencing exceptional recruiting and retention results, our soldiers
and marines continue to show signs of stress due to the tremendous
amount of time and sacrifice that has been asked of them. How have we
managed to meet or exceed our recruiting and retention goals despite
the tremendous stress and burdens shouldered by our troops?
General Chiarelli. Despite the rigors of serving as soldiers, our
Nation's young men and women step forward repeatedly and pledge to
serve. They recognize the challenges facing our Nation, answer the
call, and continue to become part of something larger than themselves.
In addition, the Army has met or exceeded its recruiting and retention
goals for several years. This reflects historical trends that show
rising unemployment and unfavorable economic conditions lead to
improved enlistments and retention. The shift in the economy has also
allowed us to raise quality metrics and begin to address other
important goals. For example, we were able to decrease and eliminate
some key waivers for enlistment and officer program entry. As economic
conditions improve, we will monitor trends and make adjustments as
required to continue to recruit and retain America's best.
General Amos. The key to the Marine Corps' recruiting success is
its continued focus on finding highly-qualified young men and women who
are seeking the challenge of serving their Nation. Continued access to
high schools and colleges not only assures that we have access to a
quality market that reflects the face of the Nation, but also a market
that has the mental abilities to serve in our technically challenging
fields such as linguistics, aircraft and electronic maintenance, and
intelligence. The catalyst to our recruiting success is a commitment to
maintaining a sufficient number of recruiting personnel and adequate
advertising funding.
Quality metrics and standards are continuously assessed to ensure
that we are meeting our manpower skill level needs. We know through
studies that a high school graduate is more likely to complete recruit
training. The DOD education tier divisions are appropriately grouped
and adequately serve as attrition predictors. Applicants who score in
the upper mental categories on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery have the intellect and mental agility needed to work with
today's technology. So far this year, 99.7 percent of our enlisted
accessions have been high school graduates and 72 percent have scored
in the I-IIIA range, both far exceeding DOD standards of 90 percent
Tier I (high school graduates) and 60 percent Mental Group I-IIIA
(upper mental categories) respectively.
The Marine Corps achieved unprecedented levels of enlisted and
officer retention during fiscal year 2009 and continues to do so in
fiscal year 2010. This effort is critical to the proper grade shaping
of the Marine Corps. Enlisted retention provides the Marine Corps
essential NCO and staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) experience and
leadership. Increased end strength requirements, properly shaped at the
NCO and SNCO ranks, will continue to place significant demands on our
retention efforts and will require sustained congressional funding to
retain quality marines. Robust Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB)
will continue to be critical to sustaining the Marine Corps' success in
retaining the leadership and experience needed in a 202,000 Marine
Corps.
138. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli and General Amos, given that
fact that this global war on terror will continue and we will be in
Afghanistan for at least the near term, what is the outlook on Marine
Corps and Army recruiting and retention?
General Chiarelli. Since the economic downturn began in December
2007, the Army has met or exceeded its recruiting and retention goals
and this trend appears to continue for the near term, reflecting
historical trends. The economic environment allows us to reduce
incentive amounts and the number of occupation offered bonuses or
education incentives. However, we must retain the flexibility to apply
incentives as necessary to retain soldiers with critical or specialized
skills. The continued authorities and funding of these programs by
Congress remain critical to the sustainment of the Army.
General Amos. A key component of our recruiting success is the
Marine Corps' image of smart, tough, elite warriors. The time-proven
intangible benefits of service, pride of belonging, leadership,
challenge, and discipline are what we offer. The Nation's young people
continue to answer the call of duty, responding to these intangibles,
even during this time of war. Ample funding to sufficiently engage in
targeted recruiting advertising efforts is essential to portraying this
image and conveying this message.
As it relates to operational requirements and tempo, one of the key
factors to ensure that readiness, recruiting, retention, and morale are
not affected is to maintain our goal of a 1:2 or better dwell time
throughout the force. We also need to weigh competing operational
demands and requirements (e.g. exercise support, expeditionary
missions, theater security cooperation, combat operations, et cetera)
throughout the total Marine Corps force to ensure there is proper
balance.
We continue to experience keen competition from the civilian
employment sector. Our enlisted marines develop valuable leadership and
technical skills that are highly sought by the private sector.
Retaining the proper skills and high quality in our ranks requires a
robust SRB program and is essential to our mission accomplishment.
Although overall officer retention is excellent, shortages do exist
in certain grades and skills, requiring careful management and
innovative solutions. To this end, the Marine Corps has active programs
in place, both monetary and non-monetary, to ensure officer retention
remains high, e.g. Aviation Continuation Pay and Law School Education
Debt Subsidy. Non-monetary programs include voluntary lateral moves,
inter-service transfers to the Marine Corps, and the Return to Active
Duty program. All of these programs provide incentives to officers for
continued service, even in the face of significant operational tempo
while giving flexibility to manpower planners to meet requirements
across the Marine Corps Total Force.
139. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli and General Amos, what is
the breakout of the nondeployables and what is the plan to reduce the
current rates, specifically in the Army and the Marine Corps?
General Chiarelli. For fiscal year 2010 year-to-date, the average
percentage of a unit's assigned population not deploying at latest
arrival date is 14.11 percent. This includes late deployers and
soldiers who will not deploy. Medical nondeployers account for one-
third of the total nondeployer population--by far the largest single
category of nondeployers. For fiscal year 2010 year-to-date, the
average nondeployer population includes: 35.2 percent medical; 12.7
percent administrative separations (e.g. unsatisfactory performance,
misconduct, hardship); 11.2 percent training; 9.4 percent rear
detachment cadre; 5.1 percent dwell time; 2.8 percent parenthood; and
23.6 percent other. Other categories include legal processing,
retirement, enlisted expiration term of service (ETS), officer release
from Active Duty or unqualified resignation, temporary duty, emergency
leave, sole survivor, conscientious objector, and reassignments. The
training category applies to soldiers who have not completed required
predeployment training. Approximately one-fourth to one-third of the
nondeployers at latest arrival date will eventually deploy and join the
unit in theater; this includes all of the training category and the
dwell time category, as well as a portion of the temporary medical and
other categories.
From a tactical perspective, commanders at all levels are actively
engaged in identifying nondeployable soldiers and, in the case of
temporary nondeployable conditions, linking the soldier with the
requisite resources necessary to resolve the nondeployable condition.
From a strategic perspective, the Army staff is focused on policy and
implementation decisions necessary to dampen the nondeployer rates in
our units and to gain better visibility on the health of the force.
Specifically with regard to medical nondeployers, my staff is engaged
in numerous efforts to improve medical readiness policies and
processes. These efforts are synchronized across four lines of
operations (Systems, Training, Policy, and Processes) and focused on
our desired end-state to man an expeditionary Army with soldiers who
are medically deployable while preserving the All-Volunteer Force. Our
actions in this realm are built upon four primary objectives: to
develop a medical common operating picture; to train our leaders and
medical professionals on medical readiness policies and procedures; to
determine what impact worldwide deployability should have on soldier
retainability; and to standardize and streamline medical board
processes across all components. Over time, increased visibility
combined with improved policy and streamlined processes will combine to
decrease nondeployer rates.
General Amos. From the Marine Corps' perspective, nondeployables
are marines that are captured as fleet patients, prisoners, and
trainees (schools 20 weeks or longer). As of 29 August 2010, the above
categories comprised 874 marines. The assignable enlisted population on
the above date was 160,593 which reflect a 0.05 percent nondeployable
population. This headquarters has established manpower procedures that
effectively reduce the amount of nondeployable marines to current
minimum levels.
equipment readiness
140. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, General Amos, Admiral
Greenert, and General Chandler, equipment readiness is becoming more
and more of a significant issue across all of the Services. The number
one comment that resonates with me is that we are flying, driving, and
sailing our equipment well beyond what was originally planned. Our
fleets are significantly older, based on when they were first designed
and fielded with some dating back to the 1950s. The Marines now have a
unique situation where they have to deploy home station equipment to
Afghanistan and leave it there for replacing units. The inventory of
Abrams, Paladins, and Bradleys, designed some 30 years ago, are on
their fourth and fifth modernization program. Marine Corps aviation
average an age of 22 years old, bombers 34 years old, Air Force
fighters 27 years old, tankers 46 years old, et cetera. While equipment
readiness is significantly impacting our operations down range, it will
have a larger impact in the out-years, once Iraq and Afghanistan go
away. I am convinced that we are going to have a capabilities gap due
to our inability to repair and modernize current fleets while
simultaneously working on future development and our inability to fund
all of this. We are headed down the same road we travel down after
every other period of conflict where political focus shifts away from
the military and national security, leaving a severely depleted force.
What are we doing now to hedge the cost of refitting the force in the
next several years?
General Chiarelli. Congress and OSD have been very supportive of
Army reset requirements. The Army is executing deliberate reset plans
and is including Lean Six Sigma improvements in its national level
reset processes to ensure efficiency and a greater return on
investment. Reset is a series of maintenance actions taken to restore
equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with a
unit's future mission. The Army utilizes reset activities to mitigate
the long-term impacts of combat operations to equipment in our
inventory. Our national and installation maintenance activities reset
approximately 100,000 pieces of equipment and 25 brigades annually.
Also, as part of reset, selected systems returning from combat have
been recapitalized. Recapitalization is the rebuild or upgrade of
currently fielded systems to ensure operational readiness and a near
zero-time and zero-mile system. The Army has taken the opportunity to
recapitalize selected systems while the system is undergoing reset.
Specifically, in fiscal year 2009, returning Apache helicopters, Abrams
tanks, and Bradley fighting vehicles were recapitalized.
Nevertheless, the Army will require reset funding for 2 to 3 years
after the completion of OCOs.
General Amos. The timeline for getting the Marine Corps on track
with needed equipment is dependent on the length of time the Marine
Corps will be engaged in combat, as well as the amount of procurement
funds available through both reset and baseline funding sources.
Resetting the Marine Corps under current OCO guidelines is challenging
since much of the equipment in the retrograde pipeline is legacy
equipment that no longer meets operational requirements. Additionally,
we have been unable to procure sufficient equipment to meet table of
equipment shortfalls and this negatively impacts readiness. The
fiscally constrained baseline budget limits the Marine Corps ability to
modernize.
Baseline funding levels and procurement timelines have not kept
pace with our increased requirements for additional and updated
equipment. Our current equipment posture is particularly vulnerable due
to the convergence of our equipment modernization due to changing
battlefield requirements, along with the need to rapidly buildup forces
in Afghanistan as we simultaneously executed a retrograde from Iraq.
Accelerating equipment procurement where feasible and directing OCO
funding to a broader enterprise approach gives the Marine Corps greater
latitude to realign resources to meet equipment requirements.
It is difficult to predict what the exact Marine Corps reset costs
will be since it is unknown how long the Marine Corps will be engaged
in combat. The most important thing is that our marines are equipped
with the best gear. To do this, additional funding will be required as
new threats arise on the battlefield. We know in the near term that we
need funding in order to continue to reset equipment that is currently
deployed. However, as long as the war continues, our costs will
continue to grow.
For Marine tactical aviation assets, the O&S costs on our legacy
aircraft across DOD have been increasing an average of 7.8 percent per
year since 2000. The operational lifetimes of legacy aircraft are being
extended well beyond their original design limits. As a result, we face
a daily challenge to maintain operational readiness of our legacy
aircraft due largely to the increasing age of the aircraft fleet. Early
on it was primarily attributed to the aging avionics systems; lately it
is maintenance of the airframe and hardware components that are
becoming the O&S cost drivers. Extending the life of an airframe has
proven challenging and costly.
The Marine Corps strategy for the last 11 years has been to forgo
the continuation of procuring new variants of legacy aircraft and
continuing a process of trying to sustain old designs that inherit the
obsolescence and fatigue life issues of their predecessors. Instead we
opted to transition to a new fifth generation aircraft that takes
advantage of technology improvements which generates substantial
savings in ownership cost. The capabilities of the F-35B enable the
Marine Corps to replace three legacy aircraft types and retain the
capability of executing all our missions. This results optimizing and
avoiding unnecessary retrofit and reap tangible O&S cost savings.
The Marine Corps will preserve our legacy fleets of Harriers and
Hornets with sufficient funding while transitioning to the fifth
generation STOVL F-35B. This is the best option to balance the
requirement to fulfill operational commitments with legacy aircraft,
while funding the development and procurement of new production JSF. We
are taking proactive steps today to preserve the legacy fleets,
maintain their operational relevance, and continue these efforts until
the production of the F-35B is sufficient to fully transition our
Harriers and Hornets.
Admiral Greenert. Reset in stride is how our Navy prepares the
fleet to deploy again. Lifecycle maintenance and training between
deployments is essential for reset and the ability of our ships,
aircraft, and submarines to reach their expected service lives.
Although we are on pace to grow our fleet for the next 10 years, the
past decade has seen a reduction in our overall fleet size. At the same
time, we continue to maintain similar numbers of ships at sea assigned
to combatant commanders, which we are servicing with historically low
numbers of ships available for at-sea training, exercises, and surge
operations. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request balances the need to
meet increasing operational requirements, sustain our sailors'
proficiency, and conduct the maintenance required to ensure our ships,
aircraft, and submarines reach their full service lives.
There are several programs in place to ensure the Navy remains
combat effective through the foreseeable future. For instance, the
Department continues to rigorously manage the service life and
warfighting effectiveness of our legacy Hornets, Harriers, Super
Hornets, and Prowlers to ensure maximum contribution to the Nation's
security. We are actively pursuing all options to manage our inventory
and balance risk, including a SLEP for a number of F/A-18 A-D aircraft
to extend their service life to 10,000 flight hours and optimizing
depot efficiencies. Additionally, the Navy is redesigning obsolete
components to provide for future combat capability growth for all
strike aircraft and weapons programs.
Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aviation (MPRA) has taken a two-
pronged approach to refitting the force while we transition from the P-
3C to P-8A. The first is sustaining modernization of the legacy P-3
forces to ensure aircrew safety. In addition, the P-3 is managed
through the Global Force Management process to meter remaining fatigue
life. The second effort is the prioritization of the P-8A program to
bring its significant warfighting capability to the fleet as early as
possible. P-8A plans include capability improvements that deliver
additional and critical ASW, ASUW and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) to forward bases over the next 10 years.
In our shipbuilding programs, we plan to conduct Destroyer
modernization in two 6-month availabilities. The first availability is
focused on hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) modifications, while
the second availability, conducted 2 years later, is focused on combat
systems modernization. The program commenced this year and focuses on
the Flight I and II DDG 51 ships (hulls 51-78). All ships of the class
will be modernized at midlife. Key components of the DDG modernization
program include: an upgrade of the Aegis Weapons System to include an
Open Architecture (OA) computing environment, an upgrade of the SPY
radar signal processor, the addition of BMD capability, installation of
the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), an upgraded SQQ-89A(V)15
antisubmarine warfare system, integration with the SM-6 Missile, and
improved air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated
Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) capability.
There are similar efforts underway in every facet of our programs.
The investments we make today, the recapitalization efforts of
tomorrow, and the maintenance of our existing fleet will ensure the
Navy has no peer as we move through the future.
General Chandler. The Air Force portion of the fiscal year 2011
President's budget reflects tough and thoughtful decisions to carry out
the Air Force's mission to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and
cyberspace. The proposal reflects our continued commitment to fully
fund and support today's global operations while ensuring we are
prepared to face the likely challenges and opportunities of the future.
This budget continues efforts begun last year to rebalance the force
and reform how and what we buy.
The KC-135 comprises almost 90 percent of the tanker fleet and
their replacement remains the Air Force's number one acquisition
priority. The Air Force released the Request for Proposal for the KC-X
in February 2010 and is aggressively working toward awarding a contract
later this year.
The Air Force also remains committed to the Joint Strike Fighter
program, an essential element of our national security strategy, and a
capability needed to defeat 21st century threats. In fiscal year 2011,
the Air Force will procure 22 F-35 airframes and is on track to achieve
F-35 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2016.
Building upon insights developed during the QDR, the Air Force is
reviewing options for fielding survivable, long-range surveillance and
strike platform as part of a comprehensive, phased plan to modernize
the bomber force. Additionally, funding is provided for the B-1, B-2,
and B-52 fleets to sustain and modernize the capabilities of these
aircraft while maintaining the viability of long-range strike
capabilities.
The budget request includes procurement for 36 MQ-9 Reaper aircraft
in the baseline budget and requests 12 additional MQ-9 aircraft in OCO
funding. This will increase our ISR Combat Air Patrols (CAP) to 50
surge CAPs by the end of fiscal year 2011 and by the end of fiscal year
2013 we'll be at 65 surge CAPs. The budget also requests four
additional RQ-4 Global Hawks and seeks to normalize training and basing
posture for the MC-12 Project Liberty.
The Air Force is continuing the development and
institutionalization of building partnerships and cyberspace
capabilities and integration into the joint structure. The fiscal year
2011 budget request reflects a commitment to cyberspace superiority by
expanding rapid cyber acquisition capabilities to keep pace with
dynamic adversaries and fast-paced advances in technology. It also
reflects our effort to field light mobility and light attack aircraft
to increase our ability to work effectively with a wider range of
partner air forces.
Finally, the budget proposal also includes enhancements to legacy
weapons systems to ensure today's capability will continue to be viable
and also compatible with future fifth-generation fighters and
developing weapon systems. These enhancements include F-15 fleet
modernization and radar upgrades, F-22 common configuration upgrades,
and the conversion of one WC-130 to an EC-130 Compass Call. The A-10
Wing Replacement Program (WRP) procures 40 new thick-skin wings as part
of a program to modify 233 A-10 aircraft with older thin-skin wings. F-
16 aircraft have multiple initiatives to mitigate the cost of
retrofitting and ensure viability. The first initiative is the repair/
replacement of lower wing skins on Block 30 aircraft, as required. The
second F-16 initiative is Full-Scale Fatigue Testing which tests the
durability of Block 40/50 airframes to extend the airworthiness
certification beyond the 8,000 equivalent flight hour design. The Air
Force will also continue to modernize the C-5 Galaxy, C-130 Hercules,
and C-17 Globemaster III fleet through programs such as avionics
modernization; reliability, enhancement, and reengining; and large
aircraft infrared countermeasures. Upgrades to Air Force Command and
Control platforms such as the E-3 AWACS will modernize a 1970s-era
computer network, eliminate discontinued and obsolete components, and
add avionics to comply with Global Air Traffic Management standards.
The last two decades of sustained operations have strained our
weapons systems. The Air Force will continue to determine which
aircraft it will modernize and sustain and which weapon systems must be
retired and recapitalized. These decisions require tough choices, as
well as the ability to quickly field systems to meet warfighter needs
at an affordable price. The fiscal year 2011 budget helps us achieve
the right balance to meet today's commitments while shaping the Air
Force for future challenges.
141. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, General Amos, Admiral
Greenert, and General Chandler, what is needed from Congress to prevent
our rapidly aging planes, helicopters, vehicles, and ships from
becoming obsolete?
General Chiarelli. Army aircraft and vehicles of all types have
benefitted from strong support and stable funding from Congress. This
strong funding support has allowed the Army to invest in the
modernization of our fleets via new production, recapitalization, and
program upgrades while keeping an eye on the future by funding research
and development efforts.
Examples of incremental modernization of core Army programs include
the Stryker combat vehicle, Apache Block III helicopter, and TWV
programs. The Stryker was fielded with limited blast and underbelly
protection. The Army followed with an applique solution (i.e., bolt-on
plates) against blast threats, and is currently pursuing an integrated
survivability solution effort, including an improved lower hull,
crumple zones, welded supports, and energy attenuated seats. To this
end, the Army is developing and testing the Stryker Double V Hull
survivability initiative which, if proven, will provide improved
soldier protection against underbelly IED threats.
Another incremental modernization initiative includes the Apache
Block III program. The Longbow Block III will begin inductions in 2010
and field the first unit in 2013, providing significant increases in
performance and capability at higher altitudes and temperatures with a
full combat load. Advances in technology will provide the Block III
with improved manned-unmanned interoperability, weight reduction
initiatives, open system architecture, and reduced pilot workload via
cognitive decision aiding technologies. It will also provide a net-
ready capability that maintains Army interoperability for joint
operations and future requirements.
Additionally, the Army will shape its TWV fleet size and mix to
ensure long-term affordability through new procurement,
recapitalization, divestment, and will leverage existing assets to the
greatest extent possible to improve overall fleet capability, while
reducing fleet age and operating costs. The JLTV program is an
excellent example of such an initiative as it promises game-changing
technology for our light TWV fleet and is a critical enabler for the
Army to replace a substantive quantity of the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle fleet starting in fiscal year 2014.
Continued timely funding and support from Congress will ensure our
equipment is ready for future missions.
General Amos. In particular to Marine Corps aviation: We are at a
crucial point in Marine Corps aviation as we have embarked on the most
aggressive modernization and transition plan in our history. By the
mid-2020s, every single aircraft in the Marine Corps will have been
replaced with a new model or a new airframe. Everything we are bringing
online will fly higher, faster, farther, and longer; carry more than
the aircraft it replaces; and operate as a node within a network of
fused data which will make us all better warfighters. It is the Marine
Corps' desire is to acquire these newer aircraft in accordance with the
program of record at the programmed ramp to stand up squadrons in the
most efficient manner possible
In particular to Marine Corps ground equipment: Congress has
generously supported the Marine Corps' reset efforts in the past to
ensure marines have equipment resources necessary to succeed. We are
committed to managing these resources wisely as we reset and modernize
for the future. As a result of shifting forces to the harsher operating
environment of Afghanistan, costs are expected to rise, and continued
congressional support of future funding requests will be necessary to
improve readiness levels across the Corps. Maintaining our vehicle
fleet, in particular, will be challenging as we rebalance resources to
support ongoing operations, re-arm, and reposition forces around the
world. While it is difficult to predict precisely what future costs
will be since it is unknown how long the Corps will be engaged in
combat, costs will rise the longer we are at war. We are mindful that
the Marine Corps cannot rely on supplemental appropriations for
baseline operations. Sufficient funding for the Marine Corps' vehicle
fleet is critically important in order to restore our operating forces
to a level of combat capability commensurate with future missions.
Admiral Greenert. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request identifies
the resources required to increase fleet capacity, maintain our
warfighting readiness, and develop and enhance the Navy Total Force. To
appropriately provide a deployed naval force, continued congressional
support is required to maintain the current fleet and to ensure
existing ships/aircraft reach their expected service lives. Further, we
must ensure our recapitalization plans are robust and effective in
replacing aging ships and aircraft with more efficient, modernized
equipment.
Adequate, sustained funding of the Navy's Maintenance and
Modernization Program is necessary to provide for the safe and reliable
operation while also ensuring we achieve the expected service life of
our aircraft, ships, and submarines, and to efficiently deliver combat
ready forces to meet current and future operational requirements.
The Navy remains committed to building a 313-ship fleet by 2020, as
detailed in our Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
fiscal year 2011. Our current and future fleet enables us to respond
rapidly, decisively, and globally to project power, as we have done in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and to deliver humanitarian assistance, as we
have done in Haiti, while operating from a small, yet persistent,
footprint that does not impose unnecessary political or logistic
burdens on other nations. To ensure continued execution of the Maritime
Strategy, annual support of the President's budget is paramount.
General Chandler. The Air Force's budget proposal reflects a
continued commitment to fully fund and support today's global
operations while ensuring we are prepared to face the likely challenges
and opportunities of the future. Balancing requirements for today and
tomorrow determined our recapitalization strategy. The Air Force chose
to improve existing capabilities whenever possible and to pursue new
systems when required. This recapitalization approach attempts to keep
pace with threat developments and required capabilities, while ensuring
stewardship of national resources. To ensure our ability to prevent our
rapidly aging aircraft from becoming obsolete, we ask that you support
the fiscal year 2011 President's budget that requests the resources to
accomplish this goal. To point out just a few of these critical
programs:
The budget includes enhancements for F-15 fleet modernization and
radar upgrades, and F-22 common configuration upgrades to enhance their
interoperability and long-term viability. The conversion of one WC-130
to an EC-130 Compass Call helps meet current demand for the Compass
Call mission; their utilization rates are currently 2.3 times higher
than the C-130 fleet average. The A-10 WRP procures 40 new thick-skin
wings as part of a program to modify 233 A-10 aircraft with older thin-
skin wings. F-16 Block 40/50 aircraft will undergo Full-Scale Fatigue
Testing and F-16 Block 30 lower wing-skin repair will be managed under
Consolidated Aircraft Management. Our goal is to extend our fourth
generation fighter aircraft service life and capability many years
beyond the original service life of the aircraft; this is projected to
be at a cost of 10 to 15 percent of a new aircraft. The Air Force will
also continue to modernize the C-5 Galaxy, C-130 Hercules, and C-17
Globemaster III fleet through programs such as avionics modernization;
reliability, enhancement, and reengining; and large aircraft infrared
countermeasures. The Air Force solicits the continued support of
Congress as we continue with the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program
(AMP). This effort increases reliability, maintainability, and
sustainability for the Air Force's 222 C-130H2, H2.5, and H3 Combat
Delivery aircraft by installing a common avionics suite and
standardized cockpit configuration. Additionally, funding is provided
for the B-1, B-2, and B-52 fleets that will sustain and modernize the
capabilities of these aircraft maintaining the viability of legacy
long-range strike capabilities over the short- to mid-term. Programs
include modernizing the B-2 Defensive Management System, a new radar
and data link system for the B-52, and an Advanced Extremely High
Frequency satellite communications system for the B-2 and B-52.
Upgrades to Air Force command and control platforms such as the E-3
AWACS will modernize a 1970s-era computer network, eliminate
discontinued and obsolete components, and add avionics to comply with
Global Air Traffic Management standards.
The Air Force's proposed fiscal year 2011 budget achieves the right
balance between providing capabilities for today's commitments and
posturing for future challenges. We respectfully ask that Congress
support this budget request to help the Air Force make the most of our
allocated resources and to work as a member of the joint team to
accomplish our Nation's military objectives.
142. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, General Amos, Admiral
Greenert, and General Chandler, the QDR presented the historical
standard requirement to be able to contend with two major theaters of
war simultaneously. I have heard all of you state that the near-term
fight and requirements are impacting our ability to maintain a
strategic focus. We no longer maintain a readiness force in the same
standard that we did prior to September 11. We are taking equipment
from nondeployed units to ensure deployed units are fully equipped,
leaving training shortages back home and raising concerns that, once in
the area of responsibility, equipment promised will be available and
mission ready. In some instances, we have depleted our preposition
stockpiles. What is the status for both Army and Marine Corps
preposition stocks?
General Chiarelli. The Army is restoring its prepositioned stock
capabilities in accordance with the approved APS 2015 Strategy.
Detailed readiness status reports are classified but projected status
of fill for APS-3, APS-4, and APS-5 unit equipment sets are as follows:
(1) APS-3 Afloat Theater Opening/Port Opening Package: uploaded on
the USNS Watson and is currently in the Pacific area of operations
after completing a cargo maintenance cycle at Charleston, SC. The TO/PO
Package has 97 percent EOH level of fill.
(2) APS-3 Afloat Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with
motorized augmentation set: projected to upload on two Large Medium
Speed Roll-on Roll-off ships in September and November 2010 with a
projected >90 percent EOH level of fill. The Army will continue to
increase the level of fill prior to upload through available equipment
from reset and new production.
(3) APS-3 IBCT with motorized augmentation set: currently located
in Kuwait with a 94 percent EOH level of fill; the motorized
augmentation set has 99 percent EOH fill. The Army issued medium and
heavy TWVs and container handlers in support of the force plus-up in
Afghanistan, and will backfill those vehicles with retrograde from the
drawdown in Iraq, as well as new production. This IBCT will eventually
be uploaded on ships and become the Army's second IBCT afloat, when
CENTCOM no longer requires it in Southwest Asia.
(4) APS-4 Korea/Japan HBCT and Sustainment Brigade: this set is
fully operational with the HBCT at 98 percent EOH and the Sustainment
Brigade at 93 percent EOH.
(5) APS-5 Southwest Asia HBCT with motorized augmentation set
currently located in Kuwait: The Army delayed the original fully
operational date for 31 March 2010 to March 2011 because of a need to
issue medium and heavy TWVs, material handling equipment, and SINCGARS
radios in support of the plus-up in Afghanistan. This HBCT currently
has an 87 percent EOH level of fill, which includes the Army's most
modern tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The motorized augmentation
set has 83 percent EOH fill. The Army plans to fill equipment shortages
over the next year from repaired and reset OIF retrograded equipment,
depot production, and new procurement.
(6) The APS-5 Infantry Battalion with Forward Support Company and
motorized augmentation set: currently located in Afghanistan with 74
percent EOH fill and is planned to be fully mission capable by
September 2011, in accordance with the approved APS 2015 Strategy.
General Amos. The MPF and MCPP-N are currently in a high state of
readiness. As of 31 August 2010, MPSRON-1 is currently at 88 percent of
its full significant military equipment set; MPSRON-2 is at 77 percent
and MPSRON-3 is at 88 percent. MCPP-N is at 60 percent of its equipment
set. The MPSRONs are at 100 percent for tanks, assault amphibian
vehicles, light armored reconnaissance vehicles and ammunition.
Admiral Greenert. I defer to the Army and Marine Corps with regard
to the status of their preposition stocks.
General Chandler. [Deleted.]
143. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, General Amos, Admiral
Greenert, and General Chandler, what is the plan to get preposition
stockages back to the proper levels?
General Chiarelli. With full support of our fiscal year 2011 to
2015 Base and OCOs funding requests ( $2.7 billion Other Procurement,
Army and $4.9 billion Operations and Maintenance, Army), Army
Prepositioned Stocks can be restored to full levels by 2015. This
assessment includes the future integration of MRAP vehicles and the
MRAP-all terrain vehicles into our prepositioned stocks.
General Amos. Our MPSRONs will be reset with the most capable
equipment possible.
The MPSRONs are currently rotating through Maritime Prepositioning
Force Maintenance Cycle-10 (MMC-10), with the offload of MPSRON-1
beginning in March 2010. Equipment from MPSRON-1 had been used to
support new units being established in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year
2008 as part of our end strength increase to 202,000. MPSRON-1 has 88
percent of its full significant military equipment set and has one ship
of equipment downloaded at Blount Island Command.
MPSRON-2 is expected to be fully reset upon completion of its MMC-
10 rotation in fiscal year 2012. Its readiness spiked dramatically--
from 49 percent to its current 77 percent--during its rotation through
MMC-9.
Admiral Greenert. I defer to the Army and Marine Corps with regard
to the status of their preposition stock levels.
General Chandler. [Deleted.]
144. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, General Amos, Admiral
Greenert, and General Chandler, after the Vietnam war, we had a hollow
force--a force that was not resourced to ensure our military was
trained and ready . . . it had equipment but the force itself was not
prepared for combat. Today we are beginning to see opposite--we have
the best trained force in the world, the best warfighters in the world,
but we are fracturing that force by not providing them with the
equipment to sustain that capability in the short- and long-term. I
have started to key in on the words you have used like `mitigate',
`workarounds', `risk management', `well above programmed rates', and
`productive ration'. We have not had significant discussion on the
operational risk as it relates to meeting combatant commander
warfighting requirements and the NDS. All the Services are wrestling
with significant budget affordability issues, equipment, personnel,
operations, and maintenance. In terms of overall risk, from each of
your perspectives, how are we going to be able to meet the near-term
readiness demands associated with the global war on terrorism while
still mitigating the risk associated with threats in the future?
General Chiarelli. The Army has outlined two major priorities:
Restoring Balance and Setting Conditions for the Future. To restore
balance, we are targeting the four imperatives of Sustain, Prepare,
Reset, and Transform. To prepare for the future, the Army is building a
versatile force with a balanced mix of multipurpose capabilities and
sufficient capacity to execute our doctrine of Full Spectrum
Operations, from peacetime engagement to major combat.
At the unit level, our ARFORGEN model progresses units through
Reset and Train/Ready phases prior to entering an available (for
deployment) phase. This provides the time to recover from the previous
deployment and to prepare for the upcoming deployment. As we continue
to align our institutional processes and modernization strategy to
ARFORGEN, we are enhancing our ability to field the latest equipment,
maximize training time, and man units in a timely manner. This model
also allows the Army to tailor capabilities and structure of the
deploying force to best meet the needs of expected scenarios.
However, the high deployment-to-dwell ratios reduce the available
training time for units to train for Full Spectrum Operations, forcing
a focus on the needs of the current fight. In order to best prepare for
future contingencies, we must increase our dwell time which will
enhance our ability to train for a wider range of operations in future
deployments. This requires us to fully implement our ARFORGEN model and
retain assured access to the Reserve component, which has proven
invaluable this past decade.
Continued implementation of our Army Modernization Strategy (AMS)
will ensure our force is provided with the best capabilities for
meeting the variety of future challenges. The AMS articulates three
lines of effort to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of
the best equipment available. First, we will develop and field new
capabilities to maintain our advantage over current, emerging, and
future threats. Second, we will continuously modernize equipment to
meet current and future capability needs through procurement of
upgraded capabilities, recapitalization, and divestment of obsolete
items. Third, we will align our modernization effort with ARFORGEN to
prioritize support to the units in preparation to deploy. This strategy
will best prepare us for future threats.
General Amos. The Marine Corps is able to meet the near-term
readiness demands associated with the current conflict and is sourcing
its best-trained, most ready forces to meet combatant commander
requirements around the globe. The Marine Corps is also posturing
itself for the future security environment through a number of
important initiatives contained in the Marine Corps Service Campaign
Plan. First drafted in 2009 to specifically mitigate future operational
risk, the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan directs commanders to
regain/maintain core competency in high-end combat operations, given
the current focus on Afghanistan. It also directs reset and
modernization efforts as well as closer coordination with the Navy
through the establishment of the Naval Engagement Board.
The Marine Corps is also currently engaged in a comprehensive post-
OEF posture operational planning effort to define risk to the Service
and associated decision points to ultimately allow the Marine Corps to
optimally posture itself for the future security environment with
adaptive forces that can operate across the range of military
operations, given a fiscally-constrained environment.
Admiral Greenert. Despite the existing fiscally constrained
environment, the Navy strives to achieve balance in meeting near-term
demands for ensuring the readiness of today's force structure, while
concurrently fielding capabilities needed to counter future threats.
This balance is achieved by prioritizing Service objectives that are
aligned to those directed by the Secretary of Defense. Specifically,
the Navy's top priority is to ensure that deployed forces are fully
trained, ready to deploy, and supported while on deployment in
addressing today's contingencies. This is accomplished by the
meticulous management of readiness accounts, resulting in the
sufficiency of steaming days, flying hours, and depot level repairs
necessary to provide combat-capable units that meet combatant
commanders' demands. Additionally, investments for future modernization
and procurement are rescoped to field only those capabilities which are
associated with the most likely threat scenarios. All of this is
enabled by the implementation of improved business practices which
result in more effective operation at reduced cost. For example, the
Navy Enterprise Resource Planning program will standardize key business
practices and achieve cost savings by retiring redundant IT systems;
reducing supply inventories; and streamlining business processes.
Ultimately, the Navy will meet demands for current readiness and
counter future threats by focusing on current operations; addressing
the most likely future threats; and obtaining savings from process
improvements.
General Chandler. Your Air Force is dedicated to maintaining its
position as the premier global air power. Over 7 years ago, the Air
Force began to take a capabilities-based approach to our force
structure. Focused on managing risk and capabilities across the range
of military operations, our primary vehicle for assessing capabilities
and risk is the Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment. It analyzes
our force structure capabilities against the OSD-approved scenarios and
cases to identify gaps and shortfalls. We use advanced modeling tools
to address sufficiency questions and develop consequence metrics in
consultation with the combatant commanders. With this information, we
are able to measure operational risk and address investment and force
structure decisions. This will ensure our force structure is balanced
and effective in all our Nation's potential conflicts in the near- and
far-term. However, no amount of cultivation of our forces and
capabilities can offset a lack of capital investment. Capital
investment will be the primary driver as to how well future risk is
mitigated. Specific investment is needed in fifth generation fighters,
long-range precision strike systems, and preferred munitions. We also
need outlays in ISR and electronic combat capabilities in hostile
environments. Finally, investment in bases and hardening and building
partnerships with our global friends will help ensure operational risk
is mitigated. The challenge will be to accomplish all of this while
recapitalizing our aging fleet despite constrained resources. The Air
Force's aircraft recapitalization plan is contained in the February
2010 ``DOD Aircraft Investment Plan.''
145. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, General Amos, Admiral
Greenert, and General Chandler, what factor or factors are driving
these gaps in our force structure and capabilities?
General Chiarelli. Today, the Nation faces a wider variety of
threats in the contemporary security environment. These threats include
not only traditional nation-states, but also transnational violent
extremists and terrorists, cyber-threats, WMD proliferation, and hybrid
threats. This environment is complicated by our ongoing operations in
several theaters which require full-time attention. The nature of
conflict today requires a flexible approach to meet these diverse
threats and anticipate force requirements. Therefore, the Army's
greatest emphasis in preparation for the future is to create a
versatile force.
Prevailing in the current fight remains our first priority. Our
force generation model, along with modular forces, allows us to tailor
our force to the needs of the current fight as units prepare for
deployment in the near-term with the resources available. During the
training phase, units prepare for full spectrum operations as time
allows, building depth for the ability to respond to contingencies. The
current methods of assessment, such as the QDR, provide the ability to
evaluate our force structure and capabilities as the environment and
threat evolve.
General Amos. From a capabilities development perspective, factors
such as lack of adequate funding for sustainment and modernization on
aging equipment have created unacceptable risk in operational
readiness. This lack of adequate funding has caused a ripple effect in
our ability to pursue new initiatives to modernize the force to ensure
future required capabilities are in place when needed.
Admiral Greenert. Gaps in force structure and capabilities are
caused by the Nation's need to prioritize winning the current fight,
and the need to prepare for current and future challenges within fiscal
realities. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request addresses
these gaps, ensuring our ability to remain the most ready, dominant,
and influential naval force globally, providing a fiscally sustainable
force that balances the level of risk across the fleet. The Navy is
focusing investment in multi-mission platforms and technologies that
perform vital missions, such as cruise and BMD, undersea warfare, and
intelligence collection, and has positioned our Navy to counter both
current and future naval threats.
General Chandler. The two primary factors are insufficient
recapitalization of our force structure over the last two decades and
the continued rapid improvements by our potential adversaries. Our
fighter and bomber forces (with the exception of the F-22 and B-2) are
all fourth generation capabilities aligned against increasingly lethal
anti-access environments. Our potential adversaries have learned
valuable lessons from Operation Desert Storm, Operation Allied Force,
OIF, and OEF about how our forces operate and developed impressive
asymmetric capabilities in response. Specifically, they have developed
and, in some cases, fielded: mobile, long-range, integrated and highly
capable Surface-to-Air Missile systems; mobile, precise short-, medium-
, and long-range ballistic missiles; Digital Radio Frequency Memory
jammer-equipped aircraft; extensive GPS and communications jamming
capabilities; and recently demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities,
all designed with our force structure in mind. Our fifth generation
capabilities and our current and planned capacity, while highly
capable, are steadily losing their asymmetric advantage to our
potential adversaries' military advances. We are highly dependent on
the F-35 being produced as scheduled. We need to develop a long-range
precision strike system as soon as possible. We need to analyze how we
base and deploy our strike and bomber assets. Networking and
communications threats to the cyber domain have a definite impact on
our ability to command and control the battlespace, a capability once
nearly uncontested.
Our limitations in the electronic warfare environment are directly
tied to responsible retirement of Air Force and joint legacy systems,
technology propagation and distribution across international
boundaries, and an acquisition system in which timeline and cost are
often outpaced by an adversary that rapidly acquires inexpensive
commercial off-the-shelf technology. Robust electronic warfare
capabilities are critical to maintaining our air superiority asymmetric
advantage over any potential adversary. The Air Force has made critical
investments to support our motivated contingent of airmen dedicated to
winning the current fight as part of the joint team. While important to
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, some of these capabilities will have
less utility against a near-peer adversary's employment of airpower.
146. Senator Inhofe. General Chiarelli, General Amos, Admiral
Greenert, and General Chandler, what is your risk assessment (near-,
mid-, and long-term) associated with these reduced force structures?
General Chiarelli. The Army continues to be exposed to risk in the
near-term as the demand for forces exceeds sustainable supply. The need
to respond to the current conflict has degraded our ability to prepare
for future or unforeseen conflicts. This limits the Nation's strategic
depth in terms of capabilities and in the quantity of forces available
to respond to unexpected contingencies.
The Army's ability to restore balance in the short-term is
contingent upon achieving sustainable BOG:dwell ratios of 1:2 for the
Active component and 1:4 for the Reserve component. Essential to
achieving this are: first, maintaining the TESI implemented this year,
which increases the forces available to fully man deploying units, and
second, maintaining operational access to the Reserve component.
Continued high demand prevents units from receiving all required
personnel and equipment early enough in their training cycle to meet
readiness gates.
In the mid-term, the Army will need to implement a more sustainable
BOG:dwell ratio of 1:3 for the Active component and 1:5 for the Reserve
component. This ratio is optimal to balance the demand for forces with
the need to reset, retrain, and recover. Additionally, the Army will
require reset for a minimum of 2 years after completion of combat
operations. Finally, we will need to ensure continued programs that
support a quality of life for soldiers and families that is
commensurate with their quality of service. These programs are
essential to honor the commitments we have to our wounded warriors and
families of deployed soldiers, and also to ensure we retain the high
quality people we now have in our ranks.
In the long-term, we require continued support for our
modernization strategy, to ensure we are prepared to meet the wide
variety of challenges we will face.
The Army's plan to reduce risk to the force is contingent upon
achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios, adequately providing for
soldiers, civilians, and families, and securing reliable, timely, and
consistent funding. In the absence of these needs, risk to the force
will remain unacceptably high and compromise our ability to support the
joint force.
General Amos. The Marine Corps will be conducting a force structure
review from 14 September to 17 December that will assess the risk and
capabilities associated with operating under reduced force structure.
Admiral Greenert. The Navy has balanced the anticipated risk in the
period with the uncertainties of the future to achieve the best balance
of missions, resources, and requirements possible. The Navy maintains
its ability to win in any conventional campaign in any future scenario.
In the near- and mid-term, the Navy is able to meet priority presence
requirements and fulfill missions such as BMD, as well. In the long-
term, the increased risk brought about from the reduced force structure
is acceptable for the force and does not unnecessarily place sailors,
marines, or airmen in jeopardy.
The Navy's force structure sustains a day-to-day forward presence
in each theater and ensures a credible capability to support related
theater campaign plans and to deter or respond to MCOs, consistent with
force-sizing guidance in the QDR. It reflects the naval capabilities
needed to meet the challenges the Nation faces over the next three
decades. The Navy will continue to revisit its force structure, and
adjust as necessary, to ensure we are prepared to address current and
future threats.
General Chandler. In the near-term, the readiness of our Combat Air
Forces aircraft is adequate despite challenges from accumulating hours
on our fleet faster than envisioned when these aircraft were fielded.
The readiness of our Mobility Air Forces remains high while meeting
robust and dynamic operational requirements. We continue to strengthen
our nuclear enterprise, which remains the number one priority of our
Service. Despite 20+ years of sustained Air Force deployments, the
personnel and aircraft of the U.S. Air Force are ready to face any
challenge with precision and reliability.
In the mid- and long-term we are facing very serious challenges in
the Combat Air Forces at the high end of the range of military
operations. That is why we chose to accelerate the retirement of
approximately 250 legacy fighter aircraft in order to allow us to
upgrade remaining legacy aircraft, free manpower to support our growing
ISR capabilities, and to bridge to the fifth generation fighter force.
This shift accepts a moderate amount of operational risk due to
decreased capacity, but is necessary to move forward to more capable
and survivable next generation platforms. We also need investment in a
long-range precision strike system, preferred munitions, ISR, and
electronic combat capabilities that are survivable in a hostile
environment. We need investment in forward basing options to help
counter growing anti-access threats and we need to build partnerships
with our allies to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with a
smaller, but more capable force structure.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]