

# VARIOUS MEASURES

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## MARKUP

BEFORE THE

### COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

**H. Res. 634, H. Res. 660, H. Res. 728, H. Res. 729,  
H. Res. 750, H. Res. 780, H. Res. 808, H. Res. 810,  
H. Res. 821, H.R. 4481, H.R. 5537, H.R. 5732,  
and H.R. 5094**

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JULY 14, 2016

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## VARIOUS MEASURES

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THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ROYCE. This committee will come to order.

Pursuant to notice, we meet today to mark up 13 bipartisan measures. And without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements or extraneous materials on today's business.

As members were notified yesterday, we intend to consider 12 of today's 13 bipartisan measures en bloc, and then we will consider the Ukraine bill.

And so without objection, the following items previously provided to members and in your packets will be considered en bloc and are considered as read.

House Resolution 634, the Salmon amendment 146 in the nature of a substitute to House Resolution 634; House Resolution 660; House Resolution 728, with the Lowenthal amendment 78 in the nature of a substitute; House Resolution 729; House Resolution 750; House Resolution 780, with Royce amendment 131 and Smith amendment to House Resolution 780; House Resolution 808; House Resolution 810, with Royce amendment 139; House Resolution 821, with the Meeks amendment to House Resolution 821; H.R. 4481, with the Royce amendment 130 in the nature of a substitute; H.R. 5537, with a Royce amendment to that H.R. 5537; H.R. 5732, with Meadows amendment 286, Ros-Lehtinen amendment 53, Ros-Lehtinen amendment 54, and the Yoho amendment 104.

[The information referred to follows:]



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. RES. 634

Recognizing the importance of the United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral relationship to counter North Korean threats and nuclear proliferation, and to ensure regional security and human rights.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 2, 2016

Mr. SALMON (for himself, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. CASTRO of Texas, Mr. BERA, Mr. DESJARLAIS, Mr. KELLY of Pennsylvania, Mr. CICILLINE, and Mr. ROHRBACHLER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## RESOLUTION

Recognizing the importance of the United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral relationship to counter North Korean threats and nuclear proliferation, and to ensure regional security and human rights.

Whereas, on January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and on February 6, 2016, North Korea conducted an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile technology test, both constituting direct and egregious violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions;

Whereas each of the governments of the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan have condemned the recent tests, underscoring the importance of a strong and united international response;



Whereas the ROK President Park Geun-hye and Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have agreed to work with the United States both to institute strong measures in reaction to North Korean provocations, and to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear weapons state;

Whereas the United States, ROK, and Japan have signed a framework to enhance information sharing called the “Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea”;

Whereas Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea (ROK), is 35 miles from the Demilitarized Zone, and Japan is 650 miles from North Korea, both within reach of North Korea’s weapons;

Whereas North Korea already has an estimated stockpile of nuclear material that could be converted into 10–16 nuclear weapons, with clear intentions to continue nuclear proliferation activities;

Whereas North Korea consistently conducts destabilizing domestic military drills, including firing short range missiles into the territorial waters of its neighbors;

Whereas United States Northern Command Admiral William Gortney has assessed on October 5, 2015, that the North Koreans “have the capability to reach the [U.S.] homeland with a nuclear weapon from a rocket” and U.S. Forces Korea Commander General Curtis M. Scaparrotti said on October 24, 2014, that North Koreans “have the capability to have miniaturized the device [a nuclear warhead] at this point, and they have the technology to potentially deliver what they say they have.”;

Whereas the ROK’s indigenous missile defense capabilities are limited in their ability to deter North Korea’s threats,



and would be greatly improved with the United States deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system;

Whereas the Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea highlights that North Korea's own citizens are starved of life's basic necessities and basic human rights;

Whereas the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has established a field-based structure for assessing continued North Korean human rights violations in Seoul, with the strong support of all three governments; and

Whereas a strong United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral relationship is a stabilizing force for peace and security in the region, with capabilities to combat future provocations from North Korea: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2               (1) strongly condemns North Korea's nuclear  
3       tests, missile launches, and continued provocations;

4               (2) reaffirms the importance of the United  
5       States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral relation-  
6       ship to counter North Korea's destabilizing activities  
7       and nuclear proliferation, and to bolster regional se-  
8       curity;

9               (3) supports joint military exercises and other  
10      efforts to strengthen cooperation, improve defense  
11      capabilities, and oppose regional threats like North  
12      Korea;



1           (4) encourages the deployment and coordination  
2       of regional advanced ballistic missile defense sys-  
3       tems;

4           (5) calls for the expansion of information and  
5       intelligence sharing and sustained diplomatic co-  
6       operation between the United States, ROK, and  
7       Japan; and

8           (6) underscores the importance of the trilateral  
9       relationship in tracking North Korea human rights  
10      violations and holding it accountable for its abuses  
11      against its citizens and the citizens of other coun-  
12      tries.



**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE  
TO H. RES. 634  
OFFERED BY MR. SALMON OF ARIZONA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas, on January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and on February 6, 2016, North Korea conducted an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile technology test, both constituting direct and egregious violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions;

Whereas each of the governments of the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan have condemned the tests, underscoring the importance of a strong and united international response;

Whereas the ROK President Park Geun-hye and Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have agreed to work with the United States both to institute strong measures in reaction to North Korean provocations, and to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear weapons state;

Whereas the United States, ROK, and Japan have signed a framework to enhance information sharing called the “Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea”;

Whereas Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea (ROK), is 35 miles from the Demilitarized Zone, and Japan is 650 miles from North Korea, both within reach of North Korea’s weapons;



Whereas North Korea already has an estimated stockpile of nuclear material that could be converted into 13-21 nuclear weapons, with clear intentions to continue building its nuclear arsenal;

Whereas North Korea consistently conducts destabilizing domestic military drills, including firing short range missiles into the territorial waters of its neighbors;

Whereas Admiral William Gortney, Commander of the United States Northern Command has assessed on October 5, 2015, that the North Koreans “have the capability to reach the [U.S.] homeland with a nuclear weapon from a rocket” and U.S. Forces Korea Commander General Curtis M. Scaparrotti said on October 24, 2014, that North Koreans “have the capability to have miniaturized the device [a nuclear warhead] at this point, and they have the technology to potentially deliver what they say they have.”;

Whereas the United States’ deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system would greatly improve the ROK’s missile defense capabilities and the ability of the United States-ROK-Japan cooperative efforts to deter North Korea’s threats and provocations;

Whereas from June 20, 2016, through June 28, 2016, the United States Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and the Republic of Korea Navy conducted their third biennial Pacific Dragon exercise, a trilateral event focusing on ballistic missile defense;

Whereas the Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea highlights that North Korea’s own citizens are starved of life’s basic necessities and basic human rights;



Whereas the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has established a field-based structure for assessing continued North Korean human rights violations in Seoul, with the strong support of the Governments of the United States, ROK, and Japanese governments; and

Whereas a strong United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral relationship is a stabilizing force for peace and security in the region, with capabilities to combat future provocations from North Korea: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

That the House of Representatives—

- 1           (1) strongly condemns North Korea's nuclear
- 2       tests, missile launches, and continued provocations;
- 3           (2) reaffirms the importance of the United
- 4       States-Republic of Korea (ROK)-Japan trilateral re-
- 5       lationship to counter North Korea's destabilizing ac-
- 6       tivities and nuclear proliferation, and to bolster re-
- 7       gional security;
- 8           (3) supports joint military exercises and other
- 9       efforts to strengthen cooperation, improve defense
- 10      capabilities, and oppose regional threats like North
- 11      Korea;
- 12           (4) encourages the deployment and United
- 13      States-ROK-Japan coordination of regional ad-



1       vanced ballistic missile defense systems against  
2       North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and  
3       provocations;

4           (5) calls for the expansion of information and  
5       intelligence sharing and sustained diplomatic co-  
6       operation between the United States, ROK, and  
7       Japan; and

8           (6) underscores the importance of the trilateral  
9       relationship in tracking North Korea human rights  
10      violations and holding it accountable for its abuses  
11      against its citizens and the citizens of other coun-  
12      tries.





114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. RES. 660

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to support the territorial integrity of Georgia.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 23, 2016

Mr. POE of Texas (for himself and Mr. CONNOLLY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

---

## RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to support the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Whereas since 1993, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia have been reaffirmed by the international community in all United Nations Security Council resolutions on Georgia;

Whereas the Government of Georgia has pursued a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Russia over Georgia's territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia;

Whereas principle IV of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 states that, "The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-



tions against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force . . . and participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation.”;

Whereas the Charter of the United Nations states that, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”;

Whereas the recognition by the Government of the Russian Federation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia on August 26, 2008, was in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and contradicting principles of Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Charter of the United Nations as well as the August 12, 2008, Ceasefire Agreement;

Whereas the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed on January 9, 2009, underscores that “support for each other's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders constitutes the foundation of our bilateral relations.”;

Whereas according to the Government of Georgia's “State Strategy on Occupied Territories”, the Government of Georgia has committed itself to a policy of peaceful engagement, the protection of economic and human rights, freedom of movement, and the preservation of cultural heritage, language, and identity for the people of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia;

Whereas the August 2008 war between the Russian Federation and Georgia resulted in civilian and military casual-



ties, the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, and large numbers of internally displaced persons;

Whereas the annual United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the “Status of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia”, recognizes the right of return of all internally displaced persons and refugees and their descendants, regardless of ethnicity, as well as their property rights, remains unfulfilled;

Whereas the Russian Federation is building barbed wire fences and installing, so-called “border signs” and other artificial barriers along the occupation line and depriving the people residing within the occupied regions and in the adjacent areas of their fundamental rights and freedoms, including, but not limited to the freedom of movement, family life, education in their native language, and other civil and economic rights;

Whereas the August 12, 2008, Ceasefire Agreement, agreed to by the Governments of the Russian Federation and Georgia—

(1) provides that all troops of the Russian Federation shall be withdrawn to pre-war positions;

(2) provides that free access shall be granted to organizations providing humanitarian assistance in regions affected by the violence in August 2008; and

(3) launched the Geneva International Discussions between Georgia and the Russian Federation;

Whereas, on November 23, 2010, Georgian President Saakashvili declared before the European Parliament that “Georgia will never use force to restore its territorial integrity and sovereignty.”;



Whereas, on March 7, 2013, the bipartisan Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on Basic Directions of Georgia's Foreign Policy confirmed "Georgia's commitment for the non-use of force, pledged by the President of Georgia in his address to the international community from the European Parliament in Strasburg on November 23, 2010.";

Whereas, on June 27, 2014, in the Association Agreement between Georgia and the European Union, Georgia reaffirmed its commitment "to restore its territorial integrity in pursuit of a peaceful and lasting conflict resolution, of pursuing the full implementation of" the August 12, 2008, ceasefire agreement;

Whereas despite the unilateral legally binding commitment to the non-use of force pledged by the Georgian Government, the Russian Federation still refuses to reciprocate with its own legally binding non-use of force pledge;

Whereas the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is still denied access to the occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, despite the fact that its mandate covers the whole territory of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders;

Whereas the Russian Federation continues to enhance its military bases illegally stationed in occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia without the consent of the Government of Georgia or a mandate from the United Nations or other multilateral organizations;

Whereas the Russian Federation continues the process of aggression carried out against Georgia since the early



1990s and occupation of Georgia's territories following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia War;

Whereas the Russian Federation's policy vis-à-vis Georgia and the alarming developments in the region illustrate that Moscow does not accept the independent choice of sovereign states and strives for the restoration of zones of influence in the region, including through the use of force, occupation, factual annexation, and other aggressive acts; and

Whereas the United States applied the doctrine of non-recognition in 1940 to the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and every Presidential administration of the United States honored this doctrine until independence was restored to those countries in 1991: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2               (1) supports the policy, popularly known as the  
3       “Stimson Doctrine”, of the United States to not rec-  
4       ognize territorial changes effected by force, and af-  
5       firms that this policy should continue to guide the  
6       foreign policy of the United States;

7               (2) condemns the military intervention and oc-  
8       cupation of Georgia by the Russian Federation and  
9       its continuous illegal activities along the occupation  
10      line in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South  
11      Ossetia;

12              (3) calls upon the Russian Federation to with-  
13      draw its recognition of Georgia's territories of



1 Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia as  
2 independent countries, to refrain from acts and poli-  
3 cies that undermine the sovereignty and territorial  
4 integrity of Georgia, and to take steps to fulfill all  
5 the terms and conditions of the August 12, 2008,  
6 Ceasefire Agreement between Georgia and the Rus-  
7 sian Federation;

8 (4) stresses the necessity of progress on core  
9 issues within the Geneva International Discussions,  
10 including a legally binding pledge from Russia on  
11 the non-use of force, the establishment of inter-  
12 national security arrangements in the occupied re-  
13 gions of Georgia, and the safe and dignified return  
14 of internally displaced persons and refugees to the  
15 places of their origin;

16 (5) urges the United States Government to de-  
17 clare unequivocally that the United States will not  
18 recognize the de jure or de facto sovereignty of the  
19 Russian Federation over any part of Georgia, its air-  
20 space, or its territorial waters, including Abkhazia  
21 and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia under any  
22 circumstances;

23 (6) urges the United States Administration to  
24 deepen cooperation with Georgia in all areas of the  
25 United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partner-



1 ship, including Georgia's advancement towards  
2 Euro-Atlantic integration;

3 (7) urges the United States Administration to  
4 place emphasis on enhancing Georgia's security  
5 through joint military trainings and providing self-  
6 defensive capabilities in order to enhance Georgia's  
7 independent statehood and national sovereignty; and

8 (8) affirms that a free, united, democratic, and  
9 sovereign Georgia is in the long-term interest of the  
10 United States as it promotes peace and stability in  
11 the region.



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## H. RES. 728

Supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Cambodia.

---

### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 12, 2016

Mr. LOWENTHAL (for himself, Mr. SALMON, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. ENGEL, and Ms. TSONGAS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

---

## RESOLUTION

Supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law  
in Cambodia.

Whereas since the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, Cambodia has undergone a gradual, partial, and unsteady transition to democracy, including elections and multiparty government;

Whereas Prime Minister Hun Sen has been in power in Cambodia uninterrupted since 1985 and is the longest-serving leader in Southeast Asia;

Whereas Freedom House rated Cambodia as “Not Free” in its “Freedom in the World 2015” report, noting that “political opposition is restricted”, “harassment or threats against opposition supporters are not uncommon”, “freedom of speech is not fully protected”, and



“the government’s tolerance for freedoms of association and assembly has declined in recent years”;

Whereas Cambodia held a general election on July 28, 2013, though widespread reports of irregularities largely related to the voter lists bring into question the integrity of the election;

Whereas a coalition of election monitors, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Transparency International Cambodia, and other domestic and international organizations, in a joint report on the 2013 election found “significant challenges that undermined the credibility of the process”;

Whereas Transparency International Cambodia, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, conducted a survey during the 2013 election that found at 60 percent of polling stations, citizens with proper identification were not allowed to vote;

Whereas the Cambodian National Election Committee (NEC) was accused of lack of independence and pro-government bias during its oversight of the 2013 election;

Whereas the composition of the NEC was changed after the 2013 election to include equal membership from both political parties, and the NEC’s continued independence is essential to free and fair elections;

Whereas the United States Congress has taken steps to protect democracy and human rights in Cambodia, making certain 2014 foreign aid funds intended to Cambodia conditioned upon the Government of Cambodia conducting an independent and credible investigation into the irregularities associated with the July 28, 2013, parliamentary elections and reforming the NEC or when all



parties have agreed to join the National Assembly to conduct business;

Whereas United States aid to Cambodia has funded work in areas including development assistance, civil society, global health, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, largely via nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);

Whereas both NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI) operate in Cambodia, engaging local partners and building capacity for civil society, democracy, and good governance;

Whereas the Government of Cambodia has acted to restrict the right to freely assemble and protest, including the following instances;

Whereas, on January 3, 2014, Cambodian security forces violently cracked down on protests of garment workers, killing 4 people in Phnom Penh;

Whereas, on March 31, 2014, Cambodian police beat protestors with batons and clubs during a protest calling for a license for the independent Beehive Radio to establish a television channel;

Whereas in August 2015, the Government of Cambodia passed the “Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations” which threatens to restrict the development of civil society by requiring registration and government approval of both domestic and international NGOs;

Whereas, on October 26, 2015, 2 opposition lawmakers, including dual United States citizen Nhay Chamreoun, were violently attacked by pro-government protestors in front of the National Assembly;

Whereas, on November 16, 2015, the standing committee of the National Assembly expelled leader of the parliament-



tary opposition and President of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) Sam Rainsy and revoked his parliamentary immunity;

Whereas Mr. Rainsy is the subject of a Government of Cambodia investigation of 7-year-old defamation charges against him which is widely believed to be politically motivated;

Whereas the United States Embassy in Cambodia has publicly called on the Government of Cambodia to revoke the arrest warrant issued against Mr. Rainsy, allow all opposition lawmakers to “return to Cambodia without fear of arrest and persecution”, and “to take immediate steps to guarantee a political space free from threats or intimidation in Cambodia”; and

Whereas national elections in 2018 will be closely watched to ensure openness and fairness, and to monitor whether all political parties and civil society are allowed to freely participate: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2               (1) reaffirms the commitment of the United  
3       States to promoting democracy, human rights, and  
4       the rule of law in Cambodia;

5               (2) condemns all forms of political violence in  
6       Cambodia and urges the cessation of ongoing human  
7       rights violations;

8               (3) calls on the Government of Cambodia to re-  
9       spect freedom of the press and the rights of its citi-  
10      zens to freely assemble, protest, and speak out  
11      against the government;



1           (4) supports electoral reform efforts in Cam-  
2       bodia and free and fair elections in 2018 monitored  
3       by international observers; and

4           (5) urges Prime Minister Hun Sen and the  
5       Cambodian People's Party to—

6           (A) end all harassment and intimidation of  
7       Cambodia's opposition;

8           (B) drop all politically motivated charges  
9       against opposition lawmakers;

10          (C) allow them to return to Cambodia and  
11       freely participate in the political process; and

12          (D) foster an environment where democ-  
13       racy can thrive and flourish.



**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE  
TO H. RES. 728  
OFFERED BY MR. LOWENTHAL OF CALIFORNIA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas since the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, Cambodia has undergone a gradual, partial, and unsteady transition to democracy, including elections and multiparty government;

Whereas Prime Minister Hun Sen has been in power in Cambodia uninterrupted since 1985 and is the longest-serving leader in Southeast Asia;

Whereas Freedom House rated Cambodia as “Not Free” in its “Freedom in the World 2015” report, noting that “political opposition is restricted”, “harassment or threats against opposition supporters are not uncommon”, “freedom of speech is not fully protected”, and “the government’s tolerance for freedoms of association and assembly has declined in recent years”;

Whereas Cambodia held a general election on July 28, 2013, though widespread reports of irregularities largely related to the voter lists bring into question the integrity of the election;

Whereas a coalition of election monitors, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Transparency International Cambodia, and other domestic and international organizations, in a joint report on the 2013 election



found “significant challenges that undermined the credibility of the process”;

Whereas Transparency International Cambodia, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, conducted a survey during the 2013 election that found at 60 percent of polling stations, citizens with proper identification were not allowed to vote;

Whereas the Cambodian National Election Committee (NEC) was accused of lack of independence and pro-government bias during its oversight of the 2013 election;

Whereas the composition of the NEC was changed after the 2013 election to include equal membership from both political parties, and the NEC’s continued independence is essential to free and fair elections;

Whereas the United States Congress has taken steps to protect democracy and human rights in Cambodia, making certain 2014 foreign aid funds intended to Cambodia conditioned upon the Government of Cambodia conducting an independent and credible investigation into the irregularities associated with the July 28, 2013, parliamentary elections and reforming the NEC or when all parties have agreed to join the National Assembly to conduct business;

Whereas United States aid to Cambodia has funded work in areas including development assistance, civil society, global health, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, largely via nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);

Whereas both NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI) operate in Cambodia, engaging local partners and building capacity for civil society, democracy, and good governance;



Whereas the Government of Cambodia has acted to restrict the right to freely assemble and protest;

Whereas, on January 3, 2014, Cambodian security forces violently cracked down on protests of garment workers, killing 4 people in Phnom Penh;

Whereas, on March 31, 2014, Cambodian police beat protestors with batons and clubs during a protest calling for a license for the independent Beehive Radio to establish a television channel;

Whereas in August 2015, the Government of Cambodia passed the “Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations” which threatens to restrict the development of civil society by requiring registration and government approval of both domestic and international NGOs;

Whereas, on October 26, 2015, 2 opposition lawmakers, including dual United States citizen Nhay Chamreoun, were violently attacked by pro-government protestors in front of the National Assembly;

Whereas, on November 16, 2015, the standing committee of the National Assembly expelled leader of the parliamentary opposition and President of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) Sam Rainsy and revoked his parliamentary immunity;

Whereas Mr. Rainsy is the subject of a Government of Cambodia investigation of 7-year-old defamation charges against him which is widely believed to be politically motivated;

Whereas the United States Embassy in Cambodia has publicly called on the Government of Cambodia to revoke the arrest warrant issued against Mr. Rainsy, allow all opposition lawmakers to “return to Cambodia without fear of



arrest and persecution”, and “to take immediate steps to guarantee a political space free from threats or intimidation in Cambodia”;

Whereas Mr. Rainsy has been in self-imposed exile from Cambodia since November 2015;

Whereas in April 2016, the Government of Cambodia passed the “Law on Trade Unions” restricting workers’ right to free association and adding burdensome registration and operating requirements for labor groups;

Whereas on May 2, 2016, politically-motivated charges were brought against Ny Chakrya, deputy secretary-general of the National Election Committee, 4 human rights advocates from the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), and an official from the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR);

Whereas, on May 26, 2016, Cambodian police and armed forces raided CNRP headquarters in an attempt to arrest CNRP Vice President and acting leader of the opposition Kem Sokha;

Whereas Mr. Sokha remains under de facto house arrest in Phnom Penh, unable to carry out his duties as acting party leader; and

Whereas local elections in 2017 and national elections in 2018 will be closely watched to ensure openness and fairness, and to monitor whether all political parties and civil society are allowed to freely participate: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:



That the House of Representatives—

1           (1) reaffirms the commitment of the United  
2       States to promoting democracy, human rights, and  
3       the rule of law in Cambodia;

4           (2) condemns all forms of political violence in  
5       Cambodia and urges the cessation of ongoing human  
6       rights violations;

7           (3) calls on the Government of Cambodia to re-  
8       spect freedom of the press and the rights of its citi-  
9       zens to freely assemble, protest, and speak out  
10      against the government;

11          (4) supports electoral reform efforts in Cam-  
12      bodia and free and fair elections in 2018 monitored  
13      by international observers;

14          (5) declares that progress with respect to  
15      human rights and democracy will be an important  
16      factor in improving diplomatic and economic ties be-  
17      tween the United States and Cambodia; and

18          (6) urges Prime Minister Hun Sen and the  
19      Cambodian People's Party to—

20              (A) end all harassment and intimidation of  
21          Cambodia's opposition;

22              (B) drop all politically motivated charges  
23          against opposition lawmakers;



1           (C) allow them to return to Cambodia and  
2           freely participate in the political process;

3           (D) reform its criminal defamation law  
4           and enact meaningful protections for parliamen-  
5           tarians and citizens to engage in open debate;  
6           and

7           (E) foster an environment where democ-  
8           racy can thrive and flourish.





114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## H. RES. 729

Expressing support for the expeditious consideration and finalization of a new, robust, and long-term Memorandum of Understanding on military assistance to Israel between the United States Government and the Government of Israel.

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### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 13, 2016

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. DEUTCH, Ms. GRANGER, and Mrs. LOWEY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## RESOLUTION

Expressing support for the expeditious consideration and finalization of a new, robust, and long-term Memorandum of Understanding on military assistance to Israel between the United States Government and the Government of Israel.

Whereas in April 1998 the United States designated Israel as a “major non-NATO ally”;

Whereas, on August 16, 2007, the United States and Israel signed a 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on United States military assistance to Israel, the total assistance over the course of this understanding would equal \$30,000,000,000;



Whereas since the signing of the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding, intelligence and defense cooperation has continued to grow;

Whereas, on October 15, 2008, the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 was signed into law (Public Law 110–429) and defined Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors”;

Whereas, on July 27, 2012, the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–150) declared it to be the policy of the United States “to help the Government of Israel preserve its qualitative military edge amid rapid and uncertain regional political transformation”;

Whereas Israel faces immediate threats to its security from the United States designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, Hezbollah, and its missile and rocket stockpile estimated to number around 150,000, and from the United States designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, Hamas, that continues to attempt to rebuild its tunnel network to infiltrate Israel and restock its own missile and rocket stockpiles;

Whereas Israel also faces immediate threats to its security from the ongoing regional instability in the Middle East,



especially from the ongoing conflict in Syria and from militant groups in the Sinai;

Whereas Iran remains a threat to Israel, as demonstrated by Iran’s continued bellicosity, including several illegal tests of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, even reportedly marking several of these weapons with Hebrew words declaring “Israel must be wiped out”;

Whereas the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 authorized funds to be appropriated for Israeli cooperative missile defense program codevelopment and coproduction, including funds to be provided to the Government of Israel to procure the David’s Sling weapon system as well as the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program; and

Whereas, on December 19, 2014, the President signed into law the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–296) which stated the sense of Congress that Israel is a major strategic partner of the United States and declared it to be the policy of the United States “to continue to provide Israel with robust security assistance, including for the procurement of the Iron Dome Missile Defense System”: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2               (1) reaffirms that Israel is a major strategic  
3       partner of the United States;

4               (2) reaffirms that it is the policy and law of the  
5       United States to ensure that Israel maintains its  
6       qualitative military edge and has the capacity and  
7       capability to defend itself from all threats;



1           (3) reaffirms United States support of a robust  
2 Israeli tiered missile defense program;

3           (4) supports continued discussions between the  
4 Government of the United States and the Govern-  
5 ment of Israel for a robust and long-term Memo-  
6 randum of Understanding on United States military  
7 assistance to Israel;

8           (5) urges the expeditious finalization of a new  
9 Memorandum of Understanding between the Govern-  
10 ment of the United States and the Government of  
11 Israel; and

12          (6) supports a robust and long-term Memo-  
13 randum of Understanding negotiated between the  
14 United States and Israel regarding military assist-  
15 ance which increases the amount of aid from pre-  
16 vious agreements and significantly enhances Israel's  
17 military capabilities.



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## H. RES. 750

Urging the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and increase pressure on it and its members.

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### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 25, 2016

Mr. DEUTCH (for himself, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. ISRAEL, Mr. KELLY of Pennsylvania, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois, Mr. JEFFRIES, Mr. ZELDIN, and Mrs. DAVIS of California) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## RESOLUTION

Urging the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and increase pressure on it and its members.

Whereas in July 2012 a Hizballah terror attack in Bulgaria killed five Israeli tourists and one Bulgarian;

Whereas in March 2013 a Hizballah operative in Cyprus was convicted of planning terror attacks after admitting he was a member of Hizballah, was trained in the use of weapons and used a dual Swedish-Lebanese passport to travel around Europe on missions as a courier and scout for Hizballah;

Whereas though such Hizballah operative was convicted on criminal-related charges, authorities had to drop ter-



rorism charges against him because Hizballah was not listed as a terrorist organization;

Whereas the European Union (EU) in July 2013 designated Hizballah’s so-called “military wing”—but not the organization as a whole—as a terrorist organization;

Whereas despite restrictions put on Hizballah since the designation of its military wing, the group continues to conduct illicit narco-trafficking, money laundering, and weapons trafficking throughout Europe;

Whereas EU designation of Hizballah’s military wing has enabled substantial and important cooperation between United States and European authorities aimed at uncovering and thwarting Hizballah’s international criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and money laundering, the proceeds of which are used to purchase weapons and advance Hizballah’s terrorist aims;

Whereas in December 2015, the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–102) was signed into law in the United States, broadening financial sector sanctions against Hizballah to compel foreign financial institutions to refrain from supporting the terrorist group;

Whereas according to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in February 2016, the DEA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection partnered with counterparts in France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium to arrest top leaders of the European cell of Hizballah’s External Security Organization Business Affairs Component—a cell that engages in international money laundering and drug trafficking to support Hizballah’s terror activities;



Whereas for many years, Iran and Syria have been the prime sponsors of Hizballah, harboring, financing, training, and arming the group;

Whereas Department of Defense officials estimate that Iran provides \$100 to \$200 million per year to Hizballah in the form of financial and logistical support, weapons, and training;

Whereas Hizballah now has an arsenal of approximately 150,000 missiles and rockets, many of which can reach deep into Israel, at a time when Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is threatening to invade the Galilee or attack civilian Israeli chemical plants to generate mass destruction;

Whereas while the EU reels from the migrant crisis sparked by violence in Syria, some 6,000 to 8,000 Hizballah fighters have been on the ground in Syria aiding the Assad regime in its slaughter of innocent Syrians;

Whereas Lebanon continues to be plagued by instability and violence;

Whereas due to Hizballah's actions in Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has carried out retaliatory terrorist attacks in Beirut;

Whereas the Lebanese Armed Forces, the legitimate security establishment of the country as set forth in United Nations Resolution 1701, are struggling to control the flow of weapons and Hizballah fighters at its borders;

Whereas Hizballah trains and provides weapons for Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemen, further destabilizing the region and perpetuating violence in those countries;

Whereas in October 2012, Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated that "[Hizballah does not] have



a military wing and a political one . . . Every element of Hizballah, from commanders to members as well as our various capabilities, are in the service of the resistance”;

Whereas the United States, Canada, Israel, and the Netherlands have designated Hizballah in its entirety as a terror organization, while Australia and New Zealand have applied the designation to the organization’s so-called military wing;

Whereas in March 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the bloc of six Gulf Arab nations, formally branded Hizballah, in its entirety, a terrorist organization, and the League of Arab States shortly thereafter adopted the same designation; and

Whereas in April 2016, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, denounced Hizballah’s “terrorist acts” in the Middle East: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2               (1) expresses appreciation to the European  
3       Union (EU) for the progress made in countering  
4       Hizballah since the EU designated Hizballah’s mili-  
5       tary wing as a terrorist organization;

6               (2) applauds and expresses support for the con-  
7       tinued, increased cooperation between the United  
8       States and the EU in thwarting Hizballah’s criminal  
9       and terrorist activities; and



1           (3) urges the EU to designate Hizballah in its  
2           entirety as a terrorist organization and increase  
3           pressure on the group, including through—

4                 (A) facilitating better cross-border coopera-  
5                 tion between EU members in combating  
6                 Hizballah;

7                 (B) issuing arrest warrants against mem-  
8                 bers and active supporters of Hizballah;

9                 (C) freezing Hizballah's assets in Europe,  
10                including those masquerading as charities; and

11                (D) prohibiting fundraising activities in  
12                support of Hizballah.



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## H. RES. 780

Urging respect for the constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
in the democratic transition of power in 2016.

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### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 13, 2016

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Ms. BASS, Mr. ROYCE, and Mr. ENGEL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## RESOLUTION

Urging respect for the constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the democratic transition of power in 2016.

Whereas given its size, location, and diverse economy, the United States has deep interests in the democratic stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

Whereas from 1996–2006, more than 3,000,000 people died in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a result of internal and regional wars, and significant violence persists in the Eastern Congo;



Whereas a root cause of these conflicts was the decay of the undemocratic and corrupt regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko;

Whereas in 2002 the United States, working with African and European partners, helped facilitate a Congo peace accord that included a democratic transition and free elections under a new constitution limiting the President to two terms by an unamendable provision and providing for the President of the Senate to assume power temporarily until elections can be held once a Presidential vacancy is declared;

Whereas in 2006 Joseph Kabila was elected President in what was widely viewed as a free and fair election, but many respected international observers concluded that his 2011 election “victory” was “not credible”;

Whereas President Kabila’s second term will end December 19, 2016, after which his government can no longer be considered the constitutionally legitimate representative of the Congolese people;

Whereas President Kabila has yet to declare unequivocally and publicly that he will step down at the end of his term, as required by the constitution, causing growing political tension, unrest and violence across the country;

Whereas during the summer of 2014, President Kabila tried unsuccessfully to persuade parliament to change the constitution to open the way for his continuation in power after his term expires on December 19, 2016, and subsequently attempted to pass a law requiring a multiyear census in advance of the Presidential election—an effort that was dropped in January 2015 after mass dem-



onstrations in which Kabila's security forces killed at least 42 people and arbitrarily jailed hundreds;

Whereas since January 2015, in further steps to undermine democratic processes and institutions, Congolese security and intelligence officials have clamped down on peaceful activists, political leaders and others who oppose President Kabila's effort to stay in power past his constitutionally mandated two-term limit;

Whereas since January 2015 President Kabila has continually used administrative and technical means to try to delay the Presidential election (including an overloaded, unfeasible multielection calendar, failure to pass timely election laws and release authorized election budgets, abruptly implementing the division of the country's provinces, and having his "Independent National Election Commission" recently declare that it will take 16 months to update the voter roll);

Whereas President Obama spoke with President Kabila on March 15, 2015, and "emphasized the importance of timely, credible, and peaceful elections that respect the DRC's constitution and protect the rights of all DRC citizens";

Whereas President Kabila is calling for a broad national dialogue that could be used to confuse the election issue and serve as yet another means of delaying the scheduled November elections;

Whereas international and domestic human rights groups continually report on the worsening of the situation with regard to human rights in the DRC, including the use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators and an increase in politically motivated trials and whereas the



United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has registered more than 260 human rights violations, mainly against political opponents, civil society and journalists during the past year;

Whereas the DRC retains a relatively vibrant civil society that is exerting pressure on the government, and is at risk of being stamped out due to government repression consistent with President Kabila's attempt to remain in power;

Whereas leaders of Congo's main opposition parties, non-governmental organizations and prodemocracy youth movements called on Congolese citizens to stay home from work and school on February 16, 2016, for "Ville Morte (Dead City Day)" largely to protest against delays in organizing Presidential elections; and whereas the strike was largely successful in major Congolese cities despite government detentions and threats;

Whereas, on March 10, 2016, the European Union Parliament adopted a resolution that urged the EU to "use all its diplomatic and economic tools" in favor of "compliance with the constitution of the DRC" and invited African Union member states to also become engaged in the effort to advance this goal; whereas the resolution also called upon the EU "to consider imposing targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, so as to help prevent further violence"; and

Whereas, on March 30, 2016, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2277 expressing "deep concern" about "delays in the Presidential election" and "increased restriction of the political space in the DRC" and calling for "ensuring the successful and



timely holding” of Presidential and legislative elections  
“in accordance with the Constitution”: Now, therefore, be  
it

1       *Resolved*, That—

2           (1) under Executive Order 13413, as amended  
3       by Executive Order 13671, in coordination to the  
4       maximum extent possible with its African and Euro-  
5       pean partners, the United States should impose  
6       sanctions on government officials who impede  
7       progress toward a peaceful democratic transition  
8       through credible elections that respect the will of the  
9       Congolese;

10          (2) sanctions should target core figures in the  
11       government of President Kabila for visa denials and  
12       for asset freezes because of actions that “undermine  
13       democratic processes or institutions”;

14          (3) economic and security assistance provided  
15       to the DRC government should be reviewed for pos-  
16       sible termination, while preserving other, particularly  
17       humanitarian, assistance through nongovernmental  
18       and international organizations, and review future  
19       international financial institution assistance to the  
20       DRC until the election crisis is resolved;

21          (4) the President should lift sanctions only  
22       when the President determines that—



1           (A) President Kabila has unequivocally  
2           and publicly declared that, in accordance with  
3           the constitution, he will not remain in power  
4           once his term ends on December 19, 2016, has  
5           made verifiable progress on the ground towards  
6           holding timely free and fair national elections in  
7           accordance with the constitution, and has de-  
8           monstrably opened the necessary political space  
9           for the opposition and civil society; or

10          (B) the DRC has held a free and fair Pres-  
11          idential election as provided by the constitution  
12          and a new President has been sworn in;

13          (5) if President Kabila's government meets the  
14          condition specified in paragraph (4)(A), the United  
15          States should join other donors in helping to support  
16          election preparedness, including voter registration  
17          and supporting a level playing field for campaign ac-  
18          tivities by diverse political parties;

19          (6) the United States Government should sup-  
20          port independent DRC civil society organizations  
21          and media to more effectively monitor efforts to un-  
22          dermine democracy and governance;

23          (7) the United States Government should use  
24          authorities under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title  
25          31, United States Code, chapter X of title 31, Code



1 of Federal Regulations, and the Patriot Act (18  
2 U.S.C. 1956) to investigate and target money laun-  
3 dering activities, specifically related to the diversion  
4 of proceeds of corruption, by key figures close to  
5 President Kabila;

6 (8) these authorities should be employed to tar-  
7 get the financial institutions facilitating money laun-  
8 dering by these figures as well as to pressure the ju-  
9 risdictions in which they are located to monitor this  
10 activity and take enforcement action as appropriate;  
11 and

12 (9) the United States should coordinate these  
13 efforts with key Western and African partners, in-  
14 cluding through other financial intelligence units.



**AMENDMENT TO H. RES. 780**  
**OFFERED BY MR. ROYCE OF CALIFORNIA**

In the second clause of the preamble—

- (1) strike “1996” and insert “1998”; and
- (2) strike “a result” and insert “an indirect or direct result”.

In the fourth clause of the preamble, after “two” insert “, 5 year”.

In the 12th clause of the preamble, strike “a broad” and insert “an overly broad”.

Amend the 13th clause of the preamble to read as follows:

Whereas international and domestic human rights groups continually report on the deterioration of human rights in the DRC, including the use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators and an increase in politically motivated trials and whereas the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has registered more than 130 electoral related human rights violations, mainly against political opponents, civil society and journalists from January 2015 to September 2015;

Page 5, line 10, after “should” insert “include visa denials and asset freezes and”.



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2

Page 5, beginning on line 11, strike “for visa denials  
and for asset freezes because of actions”.





**AMENDMENT TO H. RES. 780**  
**OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY**

Page 5, line 6, strike “government officials who impede” and insert “any individual who impedes”



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## H. RES. 808

Calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release Iranian-Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi.

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### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 6, 2016

Mr. ROYCE (for himself, Mr. CONNOLLY, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. HONDA, Mr. ISSA, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. DESANTIS, Mr. CAPUANO, and Mr. MICA) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## RESOLUTION

Calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release Iranian-Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi.

Whereas dual citizen of the United States and Iran Siamak Namazi studied international relations at Tufts University and urban planning at Rutgers University;

Whereas Siamak Namazi was named as a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum in 2007;

Whereas Siamak Namazi was a former Public Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, was a business consultant, and most recently worked in the petroleum industry for a company based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates;



Whereas Siamak Namazi traveled from Dubai to Tehran to visit relatives in July 2015;

Whereas when departing, Siamak Namazi was denied exit in mid-July 2015;

Whereas Siamak Namazi was interrogated for 3 months before he was detained on October 15, 2015, without any charges;

Whereas Siamak Namazi remains under arrest in Evin Prison and no charges have been filed against him;

Whereas dual citizen of the United States and Iran, Baquer Namazi, father of Siamak Namazi was detained on February 22, 2016, and is also being held in Evin Prison;

Whereas Baquer Namazi worked for UNICEF in New York and served as the UNICEF Representative to Somalia, Kenya, and Egypt;

Whereas Baquer Namazi is a recognized leader of humanitarian causes, especially poverty eradication, through his United Nations work and his post-retirement civil society activities;

Whereas Secretary of State John Kerry responded on February 25, 2016, to a question about the detention of Siamak Namazi, “I am very familiar with this and I am engaged on it specifically”; and

Whereas on January 16, 2016, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran released 5 United States citizens, Jason Rezaian of California, Saeed Abedini of Idaho, Amir Mirzaei Hekmati of Michigan, Matthew Trevithick of Massachusetts, and Nosratollah Khosravi-Roodsari: Now, therefore, be it

1        *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—



1           (1) calls on the Government of the Islamic Re-  
2 public of Iran to unconditionally release Siamak and  
3 Baquer Namazi immediately;

4           (2) urges the President, the allies of the United  
5 States, and the United Nations to raise the cases of  
6 Siamak and Baquer Namazi with officials of the  
7 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran at every  
8 opportunity and undertake efforts to secure their  
9 immediate release;

10          (3) encourages the President to utilize appro-  
11 priate measures against the Government of the Is-  
12 lamic Republic of Iran if Siamak and Baquer  
13 Namazi are not released; and

14          (4) expresses sympathy to the family of Siamak  
15 and Baquer Namazi for their anguish and expresses  
16 hope that their ordeal can be brought to an end in  
17 the near future.



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## H. RES. 810

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the life and work of Elie Wiesel in promoting human rights, peace, and Holocaust remembrance.

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### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 7, 2016

Mr. ISRAEL (for himself, Mr. ASHFORD, Mrs. BEATTY, Mr. BECERRA, Mr. BEYER, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, Mr. BLUM, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Ms. BONAMICI, Ms. BORDALLO, Mr. BRENDAN F. BOYLE of Pennsylvania, Ms. BROWNLEY of California, Mrs. BUSTOS, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. CÁRDENAS, Mr. CARTWRIGHT, Ms. JUDY CHU of California, Mr. CICILLINE, Ms. CLARK of Massachusetts, Ms. CLARKE of New York, Mr. CLEAVER, Mr. COFFMAN, Mr. COHEN, Mrs. COMSTOCK, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. COSTA, Mr. CRENSHAW, Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. CURBELO of Florida, Mrs. DAVIS of California, Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. DEFazio, Mr. DEUTCH, Mrs. DINGELL, Mr. DOLD, Mr. DONOVAN, Mr. MICHAEL F. DOYLE of Pennsylvania, Ms. DUCKWORTH, Mr. ENGEL, Ms. ESHOO, Ms. ESTY, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, Mr. FOSTER, Ms. FRANKEL of Florida, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, Mr. GALLEGO, Mr. GIBSON, Mr. GOMMERT, Ms. GRAHAM, Mr. GRAYSON, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. GUTIÉRREZ, Ms. HAHN, Mr. HANNA, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. HIGGINS, Ms. NORTON, Mr. HONDA, Mr. ISSA, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. JEFFRIES, Mr. JOYCE, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KILMER, Mr. KING of New York, Mrs. KIRKPATRICK, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. LANGEVIN, Mr. LARSEN of Washington, Mr. LARSON of Connecticut, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LEWIS, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. LOEBACK, Mr. LOBIONDO, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Mrs. LOWEY, Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York, Ms. MCCOLLUM, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. MEEKS, Mr. MEEHAN, Ms. MENG, Mr. MICA, Ms. MOORE, Mr. MOULTON, Mr. MURPHY of Florida, Mr. NADLER, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Mr. O'ROURKE, Mr. PASCRELL, Mr. PERLMUTTER, Mr. PETERS, Ms. PINGREE, Mr. POLIS, Mr. PRICE of North Carolina, Mr. QUIGLEY, Mr. REED, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, Mr. RYAN of Ohio, Ms. LINDA T. SÁNCHEZ of California, Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California, Mr. SARBANES, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. SCHRADER, Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, Mr. SERRANO, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. SHIMKUS, Mr. SIRES, Ms. SLAUGHTER, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Ms. STEFANIK, Mr.



TAKANO, Ms. TITUS, Mr. TONKO, Mrs. TORRES, Ms. TSONGAS, Mr. VARGAS, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Ms. VELÁZQUEZ, Ms. WASSEMAN SCHULTZ, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. WELCH, Ms. WILSON of Florida, Mr. YARMUTH, Mr. ZELDIN, Mrs. CAPPS, Mr. CARSON of Indiana, Mr. CLAY, Ms. DELBENE, Mr. DOGGETT, Mr. FARR, Mr. KILDEE, Ms. LOFGREN, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. NEAL, Mr. NORCROSS, Mr. PALLONE, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. SMITH of Washington, Mr. TAKAI, and Mr. THOMPSON of California) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the life and work of Elie Wiesel in promoting human rights, peace, and Holocaust remembrance.

Whereas Elie Wiesel was born in Sighet, Romania, on September 30, 1928, to Sarah Feig and Shlomo Wiesel;

Whereas in 1944, the Wiesel family was deported to the Auschwitz concentration camp in German-occupied Poland;

Whereas in 1945, Wiesel was moved to the Buchenwald concentration camp in Germany, where he was eventually liberated;

Whereas Wiesel's mother and younger sister, Tzipora, died in the gas chamber at Auschwitz and his father died at Buchenwald;

Whereas Wiesel and his two older sisters, Beatrice and Hilda, survived the horrors of the Holocaust;

Whereas after World War II Wiesel studied in France, worked as a journalist, and subsequently became a United States citizen in 1963;



Whereas Wiesel's first book "Night", published in 1958, told the story of his family's deportation to Nazi concentration camps during the Holocaust and has been translated into more than 30 languages and reached millions across the globe;

Whereas Wiesel would go on to author more than 60 books, plays, and essays imparting much knowledge and lessons of history on his readers;

Whereas in 1978, Wiesel was appointed to chair the President's Commission on the Holocaust, which was tasked with submitting a report regarding a suitable means by which to remember the Holocaust and those who perished;

Whereas in 1979, the Commission submitted its report and included a recommendation for the creation of a Holocaust Memorial/Museum, education foundation, and Committee on Conscience;

Whereas in 1980, Wiesel became the Founding Chairman of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council and helped lead the effort for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum to open its doors in 1993;

Whereas in 1986, Wiesel and his wife, Marion, created The Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity in order to fight indifference, intolerance, and injustice;

Whereas Wiesel, dedicated to teaching, served as a Visiting Scholar at Yale University from 1972 to 1976, professor at the City University of New York from 1972 to 1976, and Boston University from 1976 until his passing;

Whereas Wiesel has received several awards for his work to promote human rights, peace, and Holocaust remembrance, including the Nobel Peace Prize, Presidential



Medal of Freedom, the United States Congressional Gold Medal, the National Humanities Medal, the Medal of Liberty, the rank of Grand-Croix in the French Legion of Honor, and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Award; and

Whereas, on July 2, 2016, at the age of 87, Elie Wiesel passed away, leaving behind a legacy of ensuring a voice for the voiceless, promotion of peace and tolerance, and combating indifference, intolerance, and genocide: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2               (1) honors the life, work, and legacy of Elie  
3       Wiesel;

4               (2) extends its deepest sympathies to the mem-  
5       bers of Elie Wiesel's family; and

6               (3) reaffirms Elie Wiesel's efforts to preserve  
7       the memory of those who perished and prevent the  
8       recurrence of another Holocaust, to combat hate and  
9       intolerance in any manifestation, and to never forget  
10      and also learn from the lessons of history.



**AMENDMENT TO H. RES. 810**  
**OFFERED BY MR. ROYCE OF CALIFORNIA**

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

That the House of Representatives—

- 1           (1) extends its deepest sympathies to the mem-
- 2       bers of the family of Elie Wiesel in their bereave-
- 3       ment; and
- 4           (2) urges the continuation of the monumental
- 5       work and legacy of Elie Wiesel to preserve the mem-
- 6       ory of those individuals who perished and prevent
- 7       the recurrence of another Holocaust, to combat hate
- 8       and intolerance in any manifestation, and to never
- 9       forget and to learn from the lessons of history.





114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## H. RES. 821

Urging the Government of Gabon to respect democratic principles during the August 2016 presidential elections.

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### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 12, 2016

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. ROYCE, and Mr. MEEKS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## RESOLUTION

Urging the Government of Gabon to respect democratic principles during the August 2016 presidential elections.

Whereas the United States has deep interests in the political freedom, democratic stability, and regional leadership of Gabon;

Whereas Gabon boasts a per capita income four times that of most sub-Saharan African nations, but because of high income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor;

Whereas despite constrained political conditions, Gabon's small population, abundant natural resources, and considerable foreign support have helped make it one of the more stable African countries;



Whereas Gabon gained independence from France in 1960 and Omar Bongo Ondimba became president in 1967, solidifying the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) dominance of power ever since;

Whereas Gabon adopted a constitution in 1991 that formalized a multiparty system and imposed a two-term presidential term limit;

Whereas the constitution was amended to remove presidential term limits in 2003;

Whereas President Omar Bongo Ondimba died in June 2009 after more than 40 years in power, making him one of Africa's longest serving heads of state;

Whereas following the death of President Omar Bongo Ondimba, elections were hastily organized in August 2009 in which the son of the former president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was elected with 41 percent of the vote;

Whereas the legitimacy of the 2009 election results was largely disputed by opposition parties and civil society, and greatly increased political tensions in the country since;

Whereas the Department of State reported that the 2009 elections were plagued with instances of destructive demonstrations, human rights abuses, irregularities of voter registration lists, improperly guarded polls, unfair censorship of news coverage, and post-election violence;

Whereas Gabon is scheduled to hold presidential elections in August 2016;

Whereas a free and fair election in Gabon holds regional significance as an example for other African countries that have elections scheduled in the near future;



Whereas the citizens of Gabon have demonstrated their support for the democratic process and have actively participated in political parties and elections;

Whereas tensions in Gabon are growing from grievances about the legal framework of elections, including respect of the constitution and current laws, independence of institutions within the electoral system, terms limits, and the lack of representation of civil society on election management bodies;

Whereas since the 2009 presidential election, some political demonstrations have been met with tension and violence, which have only been exacerbated by the lack of equal access to public and private media by opposition parties and civil society organizations;

Whereas certain innovative institutions in Gabon, such as the National Council for Democracy (CND) and the office of the Mediator of the Republic, can potentially play a positive role in fostering citizen participation in elections and advance democratic principles; and

Whereas there is concern for misconduct in the upcoming elections, including the mishandling of voter registration, creating barriers to election day polling, and the integrity of the election results: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2               (1) calls on the Gabonese Government to—

3                       (A) hold orderly, peaceful, free, and fair  
4               presidential elections in August 2016 in order  
5               to ensure stability and long-term growth of  
6               Gabon;



1 (B) guarantee fair and open participation  
2 of opposition parties; and

3 (C) guarantee the freedom of speech and  
4 assembly of all Gabonese citizens;

5 (2) encourages continued efforts toward the  
6 consolidation of democracy through increased dia-  
7 logue and concrete actions to address constitutional  
8 and legal framework of electoral systems and sup-  
9 ports Gabonese organizations that work to further  
10 strengthen democratic processes;

11 (3) calls on the citizens of Gabon to fully and  
12 peacefully participate in the presidential elections;  
13 and

14 (4) calls on the United States and other inter-  
15 national partners, especially electoral focused non-  
16 governmental organizations, to help create an envi-  
17 ronment which facilitates open communication, guar-  
18 antees free and fair elections, encourages voter par-  
19 ticipation, and fosters a robust civil society.



**AMENDMENT TO H. RES. 821**  
**OFFERED BY MR. MEEKS OF NEW YORK**

In the 16<sup>th</sup> clause of the preamble strike the second “and”.

Immediately after the 16<sup>th</sup> clause of the preamble insert the following new paragraph:

“Whereas the Government of Gabon has accepted a European Union Commission Election Observation Mission to assist Gabon in the monitoring of the presidential elections; and”



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 4481

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide assistance for developing countries to promote quality basic education and to establish the goal of all children in school and learning as an objective of the United States foreign assistance policy, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 4, 2016

Mrs. LOWEY (for herself and Mr. REICHERT) introduced the following bill;  
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## A BILL

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide assistance for developing countries to promote quality basic education and to establish the goal of all children in school and learning as an objective of the United States foreign assistance policy, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

### 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the  
5 “Education for All Act of 2016”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
7 this Act is as follows:



Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.  
 Sec. 2. Findings.  
 Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.  
 Sec. 4. Clarification of assistance to achieve quality universal basic education.  
 Sec. 5. Comprehensive integrated United States strategy to promote universal basic education.  
 Sec. 6. Improving coordination and oversight.  
 Sec. 7. Monitoring and evaluation of programs.  
 Sec. 8. Transparency and reporting to Congress.  
 Sec. 9. Definitions.

## 1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) No country has reached sustained economic  
 4 growth without achieving near universal primary  
 5 education. Quality education reduces poverty and in-  
 6 equality, lays the foundation for sound governance,  
 7 civic participation, strong institutions, and equips  
 8 people with the knowledge, skills, and self-reliance  
 9 they need to increase income and expand their op-  
 10 portunities for employment.

11 (2) Approximately 59,000,000 primary-school-  
 12 aged children and 65,000,000 adolescents are out of  
 13 school. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, the number of  
 14 primary-age children out of school has remained at  
 15 approximately 30,000,000 over the past five years.  
 16 Half of the children in the world do not have access  
 17 to preschool and more than 200,000,000 children  
 18 under five years old are not reaching their full devel-  
 19 opment potential due to the absence of early child-  
 20 hood care and development.



1           (3) Millions of children are not learning in  
2       school. Among the world's 650,000,000 children of  
3       primary school age, an estimated 250,000,000 chil-  
4       dren are not learning basic skills in reading, writing,  
5       and math or are dropping out before the fourth  
6       grade. In addition, an estimated 103,000,000 youth  
7       cannot read or write.

8           (4) Of the 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 children  
9       with disabilities under the age of 18 around the  
10      world, an estimated 98 percent do not attend school.

11          (5) Gender discrimination continues to be a  
12      barrier to girls' education in many parts of the  
13      world, and on average, girls in developing countries  
14      still receive significantly less schooling than boys.  
15      Nearly two-thirds of the world's 751,000,000 illit-  
16      erate adults are women. Global attacks on girls at  
17      school have increased, including the 2012 attack on  
18      education activist Malala Yousafzai by the Taliban  
19      in Pakistan and the kidnapping of hundreds of Nige-  
20      rian girls by the terrorist organization Boko Haram  
21      in April 2014.

22          (6) Roughly half, or 28,500,000, of the world's  
23      out-of-school children live in countries affected by  
24      conflict and crisis. The proportion of children who  
25      are denied an education in conflict affected countries



1 has increased from 42 percent in 2008 to 50 percent  
2 in 2015.

3 (7) In areas of conflict and fragility, education  
4 is often under attack. Attacks on education include  
5 damage or destruction of schools by arson, grenades,  
6 mines, and rockets, threats to teachers and officials,  
7 looting, and the killing of children and staff. In  
8 2014, the Taliban ambushed a school in Pakistan,  
9 killing 145 children and teachers. In Syria, militants  
10 waged at least 68 separate attacks on schools, killing  
11 over 160 children in 2014. The use of schools and  
12 universities for military purposes by armed groups  
13 or armed forces is one of the key factors that re-  
14 duces enrollment and lowers rates of transition to  
15 higher levels of education.

16 (8) In 2011, the United States Agency for  
17 International Development (USAID) announced the  
18 first 5-year strategy to strengthen United States  
19 basic education programming, centered around three  
20 goals—

21 (A) improved reading skills for  
22 100,000,000 children in primary grades;

23 (B) improved ability of tertiary and work-  
24 force development programs to generate work-



1 force skills relevant to a country's development  
2 goals; and

3 (C) increased equitable access to education  
4 in crisis and conflict environments for  
5 15,000,000 learners.

6 (9) The United States partners with other  
7 major donors, nongovernmental organizations, the  
8 private sector and multilateral organizations, includ-  
9 ing the Global Partnership for Education to help le-  
10 verage success. The Global Partnership for Edu-  
11 cation is the only multilateral partnership dedicated  
12 to getting all children into school and learning,  
13 working with developing country partners to develop  
14 and implement national education plans.

15 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

16 It is the sense of Congress that—

17 (1) it is in the national security interest of the  
18 United States to promote universal basic education  
19 in developing countries;

20 (2) an educated citizenry contributes to sus-  
21 tained economic growth, strengthened democratic in-  
22 stitutions, the empowerment of women and girls,  
23 and decreased extremism; and

24 (3) United States resources and leadership  
25 should be utilized in a way to best ensure a success-



1       ful international effort to provide children in devel-  
2       oping countries with a quality basic education in  
3       order to achieve the goal of quality universal basic  
4       education.

5   **SEC. 4. CLARIFICATION OF ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE QUAL-**  
6       **ITY UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION.**

7       Chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act  
8   of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) is amended by inserting  
9   after section 105 the following new section:

10   **“SEC. 105A. CLARIFICATION OF ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE**  
11       **QUALITY UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION.**

12       “(a) POLICY.—In carrying out section 105, it is the  
13   policy of the United States to work with other countries,  
14   multilateral organizations, international and local civil so-  
15   ciety organizations, and other major donors in order to  
16   achieve sustainable quality universal basic education in  
17   order to—

18       “(1) work with other countries, multilateral or-  
19       ganizations, international and local civil society orga-  
20       nizations, and other major donors in order to  
21       achieve sustainable quality universal basic education;

22       “(2) assist developing countries in ensuring all  
23       children have access to quality basic education, in-  
24       cluding through strengthening developing countries’  
25       educational systems;



1           “(3) improve the quality of basic education,  
2           which may include a focus on measurably improving  
3           learning outcomes and foundational skills in such  
4           areas as literacy and numeracy, critical thinking,  
5           and civic education, in order to increase the number  
6           of children completing and benefiting from a basic  
7           education;

8           “(4) seek to expand access to quality schools  
9           and teachers, particularly for marginalized children  
10          and vulnerable groups;

11          “(5) promote education as the foundation for  
12          communities’ development, leading to conflict and vi-  
13          olence prevention and mitigation, improved health  
14          and disease prevention and treatment, greater gen-  
15          der parity, increased economic growth and improved  
16          agricultural activities, early childhood development,  
17          improved entrepreneurial and leadership opportuni-  
18          ties, disaster preparedness, democracy promotion,  
19          and holistic assistance programs; and

20          “(6) monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and  
21          quality of basic education programs.

22          “(b) PRINCIPLES.—In developing the policy referred  
23          to in subsection (a), the United States shall be guided by  
24          the following principles of coordination, sustainability, and  
25          aid effectiveness:



1           “(1) UNITED STATES RESOURCES.—United  
2 States resources shall be used to effectively engage  
3 in a global commitment to achieving quality uni-  
4 versal basic education in developing countries, in-  
5 cluding in countries affected by or emerging from  
6 armed conflict or humanitarian crises.

7           “(2) INTEGRATED BILATERAL AND MULTILAT-  
8 ERAL APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.—  
9 United States assistance should integrate bilateral  
10 and multilateral assistance modalities within the  
11 strategy developed pursuant to section 5 of the Edu-  
12 cation for All Act of 2016, to be directly responsive  
13 to recipient country needs, capacity, and commit-  
14 ment, and lead to sustainable development. The  
15 United States shall engage on a multilateral basis in  
16 a manner that leverages overall impact and best re-  
17 inforces United States bilateral aid efforts, which  
18 are central to United States efforts in basic edu-  
19 cation. Bilateral and multilateral assistance should  
20 be undertaken in close partnership with nongovern-  
21 mental organizations and other development part-  
22 ners, including women-led groups.

23           “(3) UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO MULTI-  
24 LATERAL EDUCATION INITIATIVES.—The United  
25 States should support multilateral coordination and



1 financing education initiatives, including the Global  
2 Partnership for Education. United States assistance  
3 should build upon its comparative advantages and  
4 proficiencies in basic education programs, while  
5 leveraging the efforts of existing country-level devel-  
6 opment partnerships. Multilateral mechanisms  
7 should be aligned with globally established aid effec-  
8 tiveness principles, in coordination with recipient  
9 country priorities, and in a transparent manner that  
10 achieves measurable results in access, quality, and  
11 learning.

12 “(4) COORDINATION AND MOBILIZATION OF RE-  
13 SOURCES.—United States efforts should coordinate  
14 with other donors, the local and international private  
15 sector, local governments, and civil society, including  
16 organizations that represent teachers, students, and  
17 parents, interested in supporting quality universal  
18 basic education efforts. The United States should  
19 seek to mobilize and leverage resources from such  
20 parties in support of basic education.

21 “(5) COORDINATION WITHIN THE UNITED  
22 STATES GOVERNMENT.—The United States Govern-  
23 ment, led by the United States Agency for Inter-  
24 national Development, shall support improved co-  
25 ordination and collaboration among all relevant exec-



1       utive branch agencies and officials to efficiently and  
2       effectively use resources, including efforts to provide  
3       a continuity of assistance for basic education in hu-  
4       manitarian and other emergency situations.

5               “(6) COORDINATION WITH NATIONAL EDU-  
6       CATION PLANS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRO-  
7       GRAMS.—United States assistance for basic edu-  
8       cation in developing countries shall be provided in  
9       collaboration and coordination with, where possible,  
10      national education plans that promote the value of  
11      education, and increase community and family  
12      awareness of the positive impact of education to re-  
13      ducing poverty and spurring sustained economic  
14      growth. The United States should seek to encourage  
15      developing countries to utilize schools as platforms  
16      for the development of communities. Such assistance  
17      should support programs and activities that are ap-  
18      propriate for and meet the needs of the local and in-  
19      digenous cultures and carry out programs and ac-  
20      tivities through implementation by country-based  
21      civil society organizations that support national edu-  
22      cation plans.

23               “(c) DEFINITIONS.—

24               “(1) BASIC EDUCATION.—The term ‘basic edu-  
25      cation’ includes—



1           “(A) all program and policy efforts aimed  
2           at improving early childhood, preprimary edu-  
3           cation, primary education, and secondary edu-  
4           cation, which can be delivered in formal and  
5           nonformal education settings, and in programs  
6           promoting learning for out-of-school youth and  
7           adults;

8           “(B) capacity building for teachers, admin-  
9           istrators, counselors, and youth workers; and

10          “(C) literacy, numeracy, and other basic  
11          skills development that prepare an individual to  
12          be an active, productive member of society and  
13          the workforce.

14          “(2) RELEVANT EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES  
15          AND OFFICIALS.—The term ‘relevant executive  
16          branch agencies and officials’ means—

17               “(A) the Department of State, the United  
18               States Agency for International Development,  
19               the Department of the Treasury, the Depart-  
20               ment of Labor, the Department of Education,  
21               the Department of Health and Human Services,  
22               the Department of Agriculture, and the Depart-  
23               ment of Defense;

24               “(B) the Chief Executive Officer of the  
25               Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Coordi-



1 nator of United States Government Activities to  
2 Combat HIV/AIDS Globally, the National Security  
3 Advisor, the Director of the Peace Corps,  
4 and the National Economic Advisor; and

5 “(C) any other department, agency, or official  
6 of the United States Government that participates  
7 in activities to promote quality universal  
8 basic education pursuant to the authorities  
9 of such department, agency, or official or  
10 pursuant to this Act.

11 “(3) NATIONAL EDUCATION PLAN.—The term  
12 ‘national education plan’ means a comprehensive national  
13 education plan developed by recipient country  
14 governments in consultation with other stakeholders  
15 as a means for wide-scale improvement of the country’s  
16 education system, including explicit, credible  
17 strategies informed by effective practices and standards  
18 to achieve quality universal basic education.

19 “(4) HIV/AIDS.—The term ‘HIV/AIDS’ has  
20 the meaning given that term in section 104A(h).

21 “(5) MARGINALIZED CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE  
22 GROUPS.—The term ‘marginalized children  
23 and vulnerable groups’ includes girls, children affected  
24 by or emerging from armed conflict or humanitarian  
25 crises, children with disabilities, children



1 in remote or rural areas (including those who lack  
2 access to safe water and sanitation), religious or eth-  
3 nic minorities, indigenous peoples, orphans and chil-  
4 dren affected by HIV/AIDS, child laborers, married  
5 adolescents, and victims of trafficking.

6 “(6) NONFORMAL EDUCATION.—The term ‘non-  
7 formal education’—

8 “(A) means organized educational activi-  
9 ties outside the established formal system,  
10 whether operating separately or as an impor-  
11 tant feature of a broader activity, that are in-  
12 tended to serve identifiable learning clienteles  
13 and learning objectives; and

14 “(B) includes youth programs and commu-  
15 nity training offered by community groups and  
16 organizations.

17 “(7) SUSTAINABILITY.—The term ‘sustain-  
18 ability’ means, with respect to any basic education  
19 program that receives funding pursuant to section  
20 105, the ability of a service delivery system, commu-  
21 nity, partner, or beneficiary to maintain, over time,  
22 such basic education program.”.



1 **SEC. 5. COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATED UNITED STATES**  
2 **STRATEGY TO PROMOTE UNIVERSAL BASIC**  
3 **EDUCATION.**

4 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than October  
5 1, 2016, October 1, 2021, and October 1, 2026, the Presi-  
6 dent, acting through the Administrator of the United  
7 States Agency for International Development and in co-  
8 ordination with other relevant executive branch agencies  
9 and officials, shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
10 committees a comprehensive integrated United States  
11 strategy to promote quality universal basic education by—

12 (1) seeking to equitably expand access to basic  
13 education for all children, particularly marginalized  
14 children and vulnerable groups; and

15 (2) improving the quality of basic education,  
16 particularly as reflected in measurable learning out-  
17 comes, as appropriate.

18 (b) REQUIREMENT TO CONSULT.—In developing the  
19 strategy required by subsection (a), the President shall  
20 consult with—

21 (1) the appropriate congressional committees;

22 (2) relevant executive branch agencies and offi-  
23 cials;

24 (3) recipient country governments; and

25 (4) local and international nongovernmental or-  
26 ganizations, including organizations representing



1 students, teachers, and parents, and other develop-  
2 ment partners and individuals who are involved in  
3 the promotion and implementation of education as-  
4 sistance programs in developing countries.

5 (c) PUBLIC COMMENT.—The President shall provide  
6 an opportunity for public comment on the strategy re-  
7 quired by subsection (a).

8 (d) INITIAL STRATEGY.—For the purposes of this  
9 section, the strategy entitled “USAID education strat-  
10 egy”, as in effect on the day before the date of the enact-  
11 ment of this Act, shall be deemed to fulfill the initial re-  
12 quirements of subsection (a).

13 (e) PRIORITY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—In pro-  
14 viding assistance under section 105 of the Foreign Assist-  
15 ance Act of 1961, the President shall give priority to for-  
16 eign countries in which there is the greatest need and op-  
17 portunity to expand universal access and to improve learn-  
18 ing outcomes, and in which the assistance can produce a  
19 substantial, measurable impact on children and edu-  
20 cational systems. Priority should also be considered in  
21 countries where there are chronically underserved and  
22 marginalized populations, or populations affected by con-  
23 flict or crisis, which must be reached in order to achieve  
24 universal basic education.



1 (f) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection  
2 (a) shall be formulated and implemented in consideration  
3 of the principles set forth in section 105A(b) of the For-  
4 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 4 of this  
5 Act) and shall seek to—

6 (1) support and coordinate with national edu-  
7 cation plans and work to build capacity within devel-  
8 oping countries, including governments and civil so-  
9 ciety organizations, on public basic education sys-  
10 tems;

11 (2) identify and replicate successful interven-  
12 tions that improve access to and quality of edu-  
13 cation;

14 (3) include specific objectives, and indicators,  
15 including indicators to measure learning outcomes,  
16 and approaches to increase access and quality of  
17 basic education in developing countries, and ensure  
18 such objectives have clear actionable targets, goals,  
19 and metrics, including annual interim targets in  
20 order to measure and show progress toward the  
21 overall goal as well as consistent metrics across  
22 agencies, toward the goal of all children in school  
23 and learning, as well as benchmarks and timeframes;

24 (4) project general levels of resources needed to  
25 achieve the stated program objectives;



1           (5) leverage United States capabilities, includ-  
2     ing through technical assistance, training, and re-  
3     search;

4           (6) improve coordination and reduce duplication  
5     among relevant executive branch agencies and offi-  
6     cials, foreign donor governments, and international  
7     organizations at the global and country levels;

8           (7) target the activities of the United States to  
9     leverage contributions from other bilateral donors to  
10    provide quality universal basic education;

11          (8) focus on the marginalized and hardest-to-  
12    reach children who remain out of school, including  
13    those in conflict and crisis situations;

14          (9) outline how the United States Government  
15    will ensure a transition and continuity of educational  
16    activities in countries affected by or emerging from  
17    armed conflict or humanitarian crises; and

18          (10) adopt a “communities of learning” ap-  
19    proach that integrates, where appropriate and to the  
20    extent practicable, school and educational programs  
21    with health and development programs, nutrition  
22    and school feeding programs, sanitation and hygiene  
23    education, adult literacy, leadership development,  
24    prevention of school-related violence, entrepreneurial



1 training, agricultural extension work, civic edu-  
2 cation, and housing programs.

3 (g) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Assistance provided  
4 under section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961  
5 should be prioritized based on the goals articulated in the  
6 strategy required by subsection (a) and may be used to  
7 support efforts to expand access to and improve the qual-  
8 ity of basic education, including to—

9 (1) ensure an adequate supply of trained, effec-  
10 tive teachers and to build systems to provide con-  
11 tinuing support, training, and professional develop-  
12 ment for all educators;

13 (2) support the design and implementation of  
14 relevant curricula, standards, and sufficient teaching  
15 and learning materials;

16 (3) support country systems, including to—

17 (A) build systems to ensure continuing in-  
18 formation collection, monitoring, and evaluation  
19 of education services and financing;

20 (B) assist education authorities to improve  
21 education management practices and systems,  
22 including at the community, school, sub-  
23 national, and national levels; and

24 (C) promote the development and effective  
25 use of partner countries' assessment systems



- 1           for monitoring and evaluating student-learning
- 2           outcomes;
- 3           (4) mobilize domestic resources to eliminate
- 4           fees for public educational services, including fees
- 5           for tuition, uniforms, and materials;
- 6           (5) ensure that schools are not incubators for
- 7           violent extremism;
- 8           (6) provide human rights, gender parity, and
- 9           conflict-resolution education;
- 10          (7) work with communities to achieve parity in
- 11          schools and build support for girls' education;
- 12          (8) provide adequate school and system infra-
- 13          structure, including constructing separate latrines
- 14          for boys and girls;
- 15          (9) ensure access to school and relevant learn-
- 16          ing outcomes for children with disabilities, including
- 17          adequate teacher training, and infrastructure;
- 18          (10) provide programs that enable schools to
- 19          continue providing education for the most poor or
- 20          marginalized children, particularly adolescent girls,
- 21          which includes flexible learning opportunities, accel-
- 22          erated and second-chance classes, and opportunities
- 23          that support leadership development;
- 24          (11) take steps to make schools safe and secure
- 25          learning environments without physical, psycho-



1 logical, and sexual violence such as bullying, corporal  
2 punishment, sexual harassment, or exploitation, in-  
3 cluding working to ensure the safe passage to and  
4 from schools and on school grounds, adopt and sup-  
5 port community-owned protective measures, pro-  
6 moting efforts to establish and enforce strong laws  
7 and policies against school-related gender-based vio-  
8 lence and providing counseling and support systems  
9 for students affected by school-related, gender-based  
10 violence; and

11 (12) support other initiatives that have dem-  
12 onstrated success in increasing access, improving  
13 learning outcomes, and increasing educational oppor-  
14 tunities for the most marginalized children and vul-  
15 nerable groups.

16 (h) ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED FOR COUN-  
17 TRIES AFFECTED BY CONFLICT AND CRISES.—In addi-  
18 tion to the activities supported under subsection (g), as-  
19 sistance provided under section 105 of the Foreign Assist-  
20 ance Act of 1961 to foreign countries or those parts of  
21 the territories of foreign countries that are affected by or  
22 emerging from armed conflict, humanitarian crises, or  
23 other emergency situations may be used to support ef-  
24 forts—



1           (1) to ensure a continuity of educational activi-  
2       ties for all children as an essential humanitarian  
3       need and that all relevant executive branch agencies  
4       and officials collaborate and coordinate to help pro-  
5       vide this continuity;

6           (2) to ensure that education assistance of the  
7       United States to countries in emergency settings, in-  
8       cluding countries affected by or emerging from  
9       armed conflict or humanitarian crises, shall be in-  
10      formed by the Minimum Standards of the Inter-  
11      Agency Network for Education in Emergencies  
12      ("INEE Minimum Standards");

13          (3) wherever possible, to establish formal or  
14      provide support for formal and nonformal education  
15      services, or to complement services that are available  
16      to ensure that children are able to continue their  
17      education and to protect children from physical  
18      harm, psychological and social distress, recruitment  
19      into armed groups, family separation, and abuses re-  
20      lated to their displacement;

21          (4) to provide assistance for temporary and per-  
22      manent education facility construction and minor re-  
23      habilitation and equipping of educational structures;

24          (5) to provide essential educational services and  
25      materials that assist in building systems to support,



1 train, and provide professional development for edu-  
2 cators;

3 (6) to build national capacity to coordinate and  
4 manage education during emergency response and  
5 through recovery;

6 (7) to promote efforts to ensure the reintegra-  
7 tion of teachers and students affected by conflict,  
8 whether refugees or internally displaced, into edu-  
9 cational systems, including regional approaches  
10 where appropriate to coordinate and recognize the  
11 educational efforts of these teachers and students  
12 and other school systems; and

13 (8) to promote efforts to ensure the safety of  
14 children in school, including—

15 (A) safe learning environments, especially  
16 for girls, with such facilities providing access to  
17 water, sanitation, health-related education, psy-  
18 chosocial support (as defined in section  
19 135(b)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of  
20 1961), and landmine awareness;

21 (B) safe passage to and from school, des-  
22 ignate schools as conflict-free zones respected  
23 by all parties, protect schools and universities  
24 from military use during armed conflict and  
25 adopt and support community-owned protective



1 measures to reduce the incidence of attack on  
2 education by local actors, armed groups, and  
3 armed forces;

4 (C) out-of-school programs and flexible-  
5 hour schooling in areas in which security pre-  
6 vents students from attending regular schools;

7 (D) community-based initiatives for safe  
8 schools, including community watch programs,  
9 religious leader engagement and community  
10 education committees;

11 (E) safety plans in case of emergency with  
12 clearly defined roles for school personnel; and

13 (F) adequate infrastructure, including  
14 emergency communication systems and access  
15 to mobile telecommunications with local police  
16 and security personnel.

17 **SEC. 6. IMPROVING COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT.**

18 (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF COORDINATOR POSITION.—  
19 The Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-  
20 national Development shall designate an individual to  
21 serve as the Senior Coordinator of United States Govern-  
22 ment Actions to Provide Basic Education Assistance  
23 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Senior Co-  
24 ordinator”). The Senior Coordinator shall be an employee  
25 of the United States Agency for International Develop-



1 ment and serving in a career or noncareer position in the  
2 Senior Executive Service, or Senior Foreign Service, or at  
3 the level of a Deputy Assistant Administrator or higher.

4 (b) GENERAL AUTHORITIES.—The Senior Coordi-  
5 nator shall coordinate the development and implementa-  
6 tion of this Act and the amendments made by this Act,  
7 in consultation with such nongovernmental organizations  
8 (including organizations representing parents, teachers,  
9 and students, faith-based and community-based organiza-  
10 tions) and relevant executive branch agencies and officials  
11 as may be necessary and appropriate to affect the pur-  
12 poses of this section, and is authorized to coordinate the  
13 promotion of quality universal basic education.

14 (c) DUTIES.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Senior Coordinator  
16 shall have primary responsibility for the oversight  
17 and coordination of all resources and international  
18 activities of the United States Government to pro-  
19 mote quality universal basic education under section  
20 105A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as  
21 added by section 4 of this Act) or any other provi-  
22 sion of law.

23 (2) SPECIFIC DUTIES.—The duties of the Sen-  
24 ior Coordinator should specifically include the fol-  
25 lowing:



1           (A) Ensuring program and policy coordina-  
2           tion among relevant executive branch agencies  
3           and officials and nongovernmental organiza-  
4           tions.

5           (B) Ensuring, through the strategy out-  
6           lined in section 5, that relevant executive  
7           branch agencies and officials undertake pro-  
8           grams primarily in those areas in which the  
9           agencies and officials have the greatest exper-  
10          tise, technical capabilities, and potential for  
11          success.

12          (C) Ensuring coordination of activities of  
13          relevant executive branch agencies and officials  
14          in the field in order to eliminate duplication.

15          (D) Pursuing coordination with other  
16          countries and multilateral and international or-  
17          ganizations.

18          (E) Convening meetings, as appropriate, of  
19          relevant executive branch agencies and officials  
20          to evaluate progress in carrying out the United  
21          States strategy developed pursuant to section 5  
22          and recommend future changes to the strategy  
23          based upon such evaluation.



1 **SEC. 7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS.**

2 The President, acting through the Administrator of  
3 the United States Agency for International Development,  
4 the Senior Coordinator, and relevant executive branch  
5 agencies and officials, as appropriate, shall seek to ensure  
6 that programs carried out under the strategy required  
7 under section 5 shall—

8 (1) apply rigorous monitoring and evaluation  
9 methodologies to focus on learning and account-  
10 ability;

11 (2) when feasible and appropriate, include  
12 methodological guidance in the implementation plan,  
13 disaggregate data by age, disability, and gender, and  
14 support systemic data collection using internation-  
15 ally comparable indicators, norms, and methodolo-  
16 gies;

17 (3) be planned and budgeted to include funding  
18 for both short- and long-term monitoring and eval-  
19 uation to enable assessment of the sustainability and  
20 scalability of assistance programs; and

21 (4) support the increased use and public avail-  
22 ability of education data for improved decision-  
23 making, program effectiveness, and monitoring of  
24 global progress.



1 **SEC. 8. TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING TO CONGRESS.**

2 (a) ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
3 STRATEGY.—Not later than March 31 of each year  
4 through 2031, the President, acting through the Adminis-  
5 trator of the United States Agency for International De-  
6 velopment, the Senior Coordinator, and the relevant execu-  
7 tive branch agencies and officials, as appropriate, shall  
8 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-  
9 port on the implementation of the strategy and make the  
10 report available to the public.

11 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-  
12 quired under subsection (a) shall include—

13 (1) a description of efforts made by relevant ex-  
14 ecutive branch agencies and officials to implement  
15 the strategy developed pursuant to section 5 with a  
16 particular focus on the activities carried out;

17 (2) a description of the programs established to  
18 implement the strategy developed pursuant to sec-  
19 tion 5 that provides a detailed explanation of the ex-  
20 tent to which the strategy is contributing to the goal  
21 of quality universal basic education;

22 (3) a description of the extent to which each  
23 foreign country selected to receive assistance for  
24 basic education meets the priority criteria specified  
25 in subsection (c); and



1           (4) a description of progress on the quantitative  
2           and qualitative indicators and interim targets used  
3           to evaluate the progress toward meeting the goals  
4           and objectives, benchmarks, and timeframes speci-  
5           fied in the strategy developed pursuant to section 5  
6           at the program level as developed pursuant to moni-  
7           toring and evaluation specified in section 6.

8   **SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.**

9           (a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—  
10          In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional commit-  
11          tees” means—

12               (1) the Committee on Appropriations and the  
13               Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

14               (2) the Committee on Appropriations and the  
15               Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-  
16               resentatives.

17           (b) OTHER DEFINITIONS.—In this Act, the terms  
18           “basic education”, “relevant executive branch agencies  
19           and officials”, “national education plan”, and  
20           “marginalized children and vulnerable groups” have the  
21           meanings given such terms in section 105A(d) of the For-  
22           eign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 4 of this  
23           Act).



**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE  
TO H.R. 4481  
OFFERED BY MR. ROYCE OF CALIFORNIA**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

**1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the  
3 “Education for All Act of 2016”.

4 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
5 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 3. Assistance to promote sustainable, quality basic education.
- Sec. 4. Comprehensive integrated United States strategy to promote basic education.
- Sec. 5. Improving coordination and oversight.
- Sec. 6. Monitoring and evaluation of programs.
- Sec. 7. Transparency and reporting to Congress.
- Sec. 8. Definitions.

**6 SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that—

8 (1) education lays the foundation for increased  
9 civic participation, democratic governance, sustained  
10 economic growth, and healthier, more stable soci-  
11 eties;



1           (2) it is in the national interest of the United  
2       States to promote access to sustainable, quality uni-  
3       versal basic education in developing countries;

4           (3) United States resources and leadership  
5       should be utilized in a manner that best ensures a  
6       successful international effort to provide children in  
7       developing countries with a quality basic education  
8       in order to achieve the goal of quality universal basic  
9       education; and

10          (4) promoting gender parity in basic education  
11       from childhood through adolescence serves United  
12       States diplomatic, economic, and security interests  
13       worldwide.

14 **SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE, QUALITY**  
15 **BASIC EDUCATION.**

16       Section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961  
17       (22 U.S.C. 2151c) is amended by adding at the end the  
18       following:

19       “(c) ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE, QUAL-  
20       ITY BASIC EDUCATION.—

21           “(1) POLICY.—In carrying out this section, it  
22       shall be the policy of the United States to work with  
23       partner countries, other donors, multilateral institu-  
24       tions, the private sector, and nongovernmental and  
25       civil society organizations, including faith-based or-



1 organizations and organizations that represent teach-  
2 ers, students, and parents, to promote sustainable,  
3 quality basic education through programs and activi-  
4 ties that, consistent with Article 26 of the Universal  
5 Declaration of Human Rights—

6 “(A) align with and respond to the needs,  
7 capacities, and commitment of developing coun-  
8 tries to strengthen educational systems, expand  
9 access to safe learning environments, ensure  
10 continuity of education, measurably improve  
11 teacher skills and learning outcomes, and sup-  
12 port the engagement of parents in the edu-  
13 cation of their children, so that all children, in-  
14 cluding marginalized children and other vulner-  
15 able groups, may have access to and benefit  
16 from quality basic education; and

17 “(B) promote education as a foundation  
18 for sustained economic growth and development  
19 within a holistic assistance strategy that places  
20 partner countries on a trajectory toward grad-  
21 uation from assistance provided under this sec-  
22 tion and contributes to improved—

23 “(i) early childhood development;

24 “(ii) life skills and workforce develop-  
25 ment;



1 “(iii) economic opportunity;  
2 “(iv) gender parity;  
3 “(v) food and nutrition security;  
4 “(vi) water, sanitation, and hygiene;  
5 “(vii) health and disease prevention  
6 and treatment;  
7 “(viii) disaster preparedness;  
8 “(ix) conflict and violence reduction,  
9 mitigation, and prevention; and  
10 “(x) democracy and governance; and  
11 “(C) monitor and evaluate the effectiveness  
12 and quality of basic education programs.  
13 “(2) PRINCIPLES.—In carrying out the policy  
14 referred to in paragraph (1), the United States shall  
15 be guided by the following principles of aid effective-  
16 ness:  
17 “(A) ALIGNMENT.—Assistance provided  
18 under this section to support programs and ac-  
19 tivities under this subsection shall be aligned  
20 with and advance United States diplomatic, de-  
21 velopment, and national security interests.  
22 “(B) COUNTRY OWNERSHIP.—To the  
23 greatest extent practicable, assistance provided  
24 under this section to support programs and ac-  
25 tivities under this subsection should be aligned



1 with and support the national education plans  
2 and country development strategies of partner  
3 countries, including activities that are appro-  
4 priate for and meet the needs of local and in-  
5 digenous cultures.

6 “(C) COORDINATION.—

7 “(i) IN GENERAL.—Assistance pro-  
8 vided under this section to support pro-  
9 grams and activities under this subsection  
10 should be coordinated with and leverage  
11 the unique capabilities and resources of  
12 local and national governments in partner  
13 countries, other donors, multilateral insti-  
14 tutions, the private sector, and nongovern-  
15 mental and civil society organizations, in-  
16 cluding faith-based organizations and orga-  
17 nizations that represent teachers, students,  
18 and parents.

19 “(ii) MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS AND  
20 INITIATIVES.—Assistance provided under  
21 this section to support programs and ac-  
22 tivities under this subsection should be co-  
23 ordinated with and support proven multi-  
24 lateral education programs and financing  
25 mechanisms, which may include the Global



1 Partnership for Education, that dem-  
2 onstrate commitment to efficiency, effec-  
3 tiveness, transparency, and accountability.

4 “(D) EFFICIENCY.—The President shall  
5 seek to improve the efficiency and effectiveness  
6 of assistance provided under this section to sup-  
7 port programs and activities under this sub-  
8 section by coordinating the related efforts of  
9 relevant Executive branch agencies and offi-  
10 cials, including efforts to increase gender parity  
11 and to provide a continuity of basic education  
12 activities in humanitarian responses and other  
13 emergency settings.

14 “(E) EFFECTIVENESS.—Programs and ac-  
15 tivities supported under this subsection shall be  
16 designed to achieve specific, measurable goals  
17 and objectives and shall include appropriate tar-  
18 gets, metrics and indicators that can be applied  
19 with reasonable consistency across such pro-  
20 grams and activities to measure progress and  
21 outcomes.

22 “(F) TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNT-  
23 ABILITY.—Programs and activities supported  
24 under this subsection shall be subject to rig-  
25 orous monitoring and evaluation, which may in-



1           clude impact evaluations, the results of which  
2           shall be made publically available in a fully  
3           searchable, electronic format.

4           “(3) PRIORITY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—  
5       The President shall ensure that assistance provided  
6       under this section to support programs and activities  
7       under this subsection is aligned with the diplomatic,  
8       economic, and national security interests of the  
9       United States and that priority is given to devel-  
10      oping countries in which—

11           “(A) there is the greatest need and oppor-  
12           tunity to expand access to basic education and  
13           to improve learning outcomes, including for  
14           marginalized and vulnerable groups, particu-  
15           larly women and girls, or populations affected  
16           by conflict or crisis; and

17           “(B) such assistance can produce a sub-  
18           stantial, measurable impact on children and  
19           educational systems.

20           “(4) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

21           “(A) BASIC EDUCATION.—The term ‘basic  
22           education’ includes—

23           “(i) all program and policy efforts  
24           aimed at improving early childhood,  
25           preprimary education, primary education,



1 and secondary education, which can be de-  
2 livered in formal and nonformal education  
3 settings, and in programs promoting learn-  
4 ing for out-of-school youth and adults;

5 “(ii) capacity building for teachers,  
6 administrators, counselors, and youth  
7 workers;

8 “(iii) literacy, numeracy, and other  
9 basic skills development that prepare an  
10 individual to be an active, productive mem-  
11 ber of society and the workforce; and

12 “(iv) workforce development, voca-  
13 tional training, and digital literacy that is  
14 informed by real market needs and oppor-  
15 tunities.

16 “(B) PARTNER COUNTRY.—The term  
17 ‘partner country’ means a developing country  
18 that participates in or benefits from basic edu-  
19 cation programs under this subsection pursuant  
20 to the prioritization criteria described in para-  
21 graph (3), including level of need, opportunity  
22 for impact, and the availability of resources.

23 “(C) RELEVANT EXECUTIVE BRANCH  
24 AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS.—The term ‘relevant



1 Executive branch agencies and officials’  
2 means—

3 “(i) the Department of State, the  
4 United States Agency for International  
5 Development, the Department of the  
6 Treasury, the Department of Labor, the  
7 Department of Education, the Department  
8 of Health and Human Services, the De-  
9 partment of Agriculture, and the Depart-  
10 ment of Defense;

11 “(ii) the Chief Executive Officer of  
12 the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the  
13 Coordinator of United States Government  
14 Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally,  
15 the National Security Advisor, the Director  
16 of the Peace Corps, and the National Eco-  
17 nomic Advisor; and

18 “(iii) any other department, agency,  
19 or official of the United States Govern-  
20 ment that participates in activities to pro-  
21 mote quality basic education pursuant to  
22 the authorities of such department, agency,  
23 or official or pursuant to this Act.

24 “(D) NATIONAL EDUCATION PLAN.—The  
25 term ‘national education plan’ means a com-



1       prehensive national education plan developed by  
2       partner country governments in consultation  
3       with other stakeholders as a means for wide-  
4       scale improvement of the country's education  
5       system, including explicit, credible strategies in-  
6       formed by effective practices and standards to  
7       achieve quality universal basic education.

8       “(E) HIV/AIDS.—The term ‘HIV/AIDS’  
9       has the meaning given that term in section  
10      104A(h).

11      “(F) MARGINALIZED CHILDREN AND VUL-  
12      NERABLE GROUPS.—The term ‘marginalized  
13      children and vulnerable groups’ includes girls,  
14      children affected by or emerging from armed  
15      conflict or humanitarian crises, children with  
16      disabilities, children in remote or rural areas  
17      (including those who lack access to safe water  
18      and sanitation), religious or ethnic minorities,  
19      indigenous peoples, orphans and children af-  
20      fected by HIV/AIDS, child laborers, married  
21      adolescents, and victims of trafficking.

22      “(G) GENDER PARITY IN BASIC EDU-  
23      CATION.—The term ‘gender parity in basic edu-  
24      cation’ means that girls and boys have equal ac-  
25      cess to quality basic education.



1 “(H) NONFORMAL EDUCATION.—The term  
2 ‘nonformal education’—

3 “(i) means organized educational ac-  
4 tivities outside the established formal sys-  
5 tem, whether operating separately or as an  
6 important feature of a broader activity,  
7 that are intended to serve identifiable  
8 learning clienteles and learning objectives;  
9 and

10 “(ii) includes youth programs and  
11 community training offered by community  
12 groups and organizations.

13 “(I) SUSTAINABILITY.—The term ‘sustain-  
14 ability’ means, with respect to any basic edu-  
15 cation program that receives funding pursuant  
16 to this section, the ability of a service delivery  
17 system, community, partner, or beneficiary to  
18 maintain, over time, such basic education pro-  
19 gram.”.

20 **SEC. 4. COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATED UNITED STATES**  
21 **STRATEGY TO PROMOTE BASIC EDUCATION.**

22 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than October  
23 1, 2016, October 1, 2021, and October 1, 2026, the Presi-  
24 dent shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-



1 mittees a comprehensive United States strategy to pro-  
2 mote quality basic education in partner countries by—

3 (1) seeking to equitably expand access to basic  
4 education for all children, particularly marginalized  
5 children and vulnerable groups; and

6 (2) measurably improving the quality of basic  
7 education and learning outcomes.

8 (b) REQUIREMENT TO CONSULT.—In developing the  
9 strategy required by subsection (a), the President shall  
10 consult with—

11 (1) the appropriate congressional committees;

12 (2) relevant Executive branch agencies and offi-  
13 cials;

14 (3) partner country governments; and

15 (4) local and international nongovernmental or-  
16 ganizations, including faith-based organizations and  
17 organizations representing students, teachers, and  
18 parents, and other development partners engaged in  
19 basic education assistance programs in developing  
20 countries.

21 (c) PUBLIC COMMENT.—The President shall provide  
22 an opportunity for public comment on the strategy re-  
23 quired by subsection (a).

24 (d) INITIAL STRATEGY.—For the purposes of this  
25 section, the strategy entitled “USAID education strat-



1 egy”, as in effect on the day before the date of the enact-  
2 ment of this Act, shall be deemed to fulfill the initial re-  
3 quirements of subsection (a) for 2016.

4 (e) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection  
5 (a) shall be developed and implemented consistent with the  
6 principles set forth in subsection (e) of section 105 of the  
7 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended by section  
8 3 of this Act) and shall seek to—

9 (1) build the capacity of relevant actors in part-  
10 ner countries, including in government and in civil  
11 society, to develop and implement national education  
12 plans that are aligned with and advance country de-  
13 velopment strategies;

14 (2) identify and replicate successful interven-  
15 tions that improve access to and quality of edu-  
16 cation;

17 (3) project general levels of resources needed to  
18 achieve stated program objectives;

19 (4) leverage United States capabilities, includ-  
20 ing through technical assistance, training and re-  
21 search; and

22 (5) improve coordination and reduce duplication  
23 among relevant Executive branch agencies and offi-  
24 cials, other donors, multilateral institutions, non-



1 governmental organizations, and governments in  
2 partner countries.

3 (f) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Assistance provided  
4 under section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961  
5 (as amended by section 3 of this Act) should advance the  
6 strategy required by subsection (a), including through ef-  
7 forts to—

8 (1) ensure an adequate supply and continued  
9 support for trained, effective teachers;

10 (2) design and deliver relevant curricula, uphold  
11 quality standards, and supply appropriate teaching  
12 and learning materials;

13 (3) build the capacity of basic education sys-  
14 tems in partner countries by improving management  
15 practices and supporting their ability to collect rel-  
16 evant data and monitor, evaluate, and report on the  
17 status and quality of education services, financing,  
18 and student-learning outcomes;

19 (4) help mobilize domestic resources to elimi-  
20 nate fees for public educational services, including  
21 fees for tuition, uniforms, and materials;

22 (5) support education on human rights and  
23 conflict-resolution while ensuring that schools are  
24 not incubators for violent extremism;



1           (6) work with communities to help girls over-  
2 come relevant barriers to their receiving a safe, qual-  
3 ity basic education, including by improving girls'  
4 safety in education settings, helping girls to obtain  
5 the skills needed to find safe and legal employment  
6 upon conclusion of their education, and countering  
7 harmful practices such as child, early, and forced  
8 marriage and gender-based violence;

9           (7) ensure access to education for the most  
10 marginalized children and vulnerable groups, includ-  
11 ing through the provision of appropriate infrastruc-  
12 ture, flexible learning opportunities, accelerated and  
13 second-chance classes, and opportunities that sup-  
14 port leadership development;

15           (8) make schools safe and secure learning envi-  
16 ronments without threat of physical, psychological,  
17 and sexual violence, including by supporting safe  
18 passage to and from schools and constructing sepa-  
19 rate latrines for boys and girls; and

20           (9) support a communities-of-learning approach  
21 that utilizes schools as centers of learning and devel-  
22 opment for an entire community, to leverage and  
23 maximize the impact of other development efforts,  
24 and reduce duplication and waste.



1 (g) ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED FOR COUN-  
2 TRIES AFFECTED BY CONFLICT AND CRISES.—In addi-  
3 tion to the activities supported under subsection (f), as-  
4 sistance provided under section 105 of the Foreign Assist-  
5 ance Act of 1961 (as amended by section 3 of this Act)  
6 to foreign countries or those parts of the territories of for-  
7 eign countries that are affected by or emerging from  
8 armed conflict, humanitarian crises, or other emergency  
9 situations may be used to support efforts to—

10 (1) ensure a continuity of basic education for  
11 all children through appropriate formal and non-  
12 formal education programs and services;

13 (2) ensure that basic education assistance of  
14 the United States to countries in emergency settings  
15 shall be informed by the Minimum Standards of the  
16 Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies  
17 (“INEE Minimum Standards”);

18 (3) coordinate basic education programs with  
19 complementary services to protect children from  
20 physical harm, psychological and social distress, re-  
21 cruitment into armed groups, family separation, and  
22 abuses related to their displacement;

23 (4) support, train, and provide professional de-  
24 velopment for educators working in emergency set-  
25 tings;



1           (5) help build national capacity to coordinate  
2           and manage basic education during emergency re-  
3           sponse and through recovery;

4           (6) promote the reintegration of teachers and  
5           students affected by conflict, whether refugees or in-  
6           ternally displaced, into educational systems; and

7           (7) ensure the safety of children in school, in-  
8           cluding through support for—

9                   (A) the provision of safe learning environ-  
10                  ments with appropriate facilities, especially for  
11                  girls;

12                  (B) safe passage to and from school, in-  
13                  cluding landmine awareness, the designation of  
14                  schools as conflict-free zones, the adoption and  
15                  support of community-owned protective meas-  
16                  ures to reduce the incidence of attacks on edu-  
17                  cational facilities and personnel by local actors,  
18                  armed groups, and armed forces;

19                  (C) out-of-school and flexible-hour edu-  
20                  cation programs in areas where security condi-  
21                  tions are prohibitive;

22                  (D) safety plans in case of emergency with  
23                  clearly defined roles for school personnel; and

24                  (E) appropriate infrastructure, including  
25                  emergency communication systems and access



1 to mobile telecommunications with local police  
2 and security personnel.

3 **SEC. 5. IMPROVING COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT.**

4 (a) SENIOR COORDINATOR OF UNITED STATES  
5 INTERNATIONAL BASIC EDUCATION ASSISTANCE.—There  
6 is established within the United States Agency for Inter-  
7 national Development a Senior Coordinator of United  
8 States International Basic Education Assistance (referred  
9 to in this Act as the “Senior Coordinator”), who shall be  
10 appointed by the President.

11 (b) DUTIES.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Senior Coordinator  
13 shall have primary responsibility for the oversight  
14 and coordination of all resources and activities of the  
15 United States Government relating to the promotion  
16 of international basic education programs and activi-  
17 ties.

18 (2) SPECIFIC DUTIES.—The Senior Coordinator  
19 shall—

20 (A) facilitate program and policy coordina-  
21 tion of international basic education programs  
22 and activities among relevant Executive branch  
23 agencies and officials, partner governments,  
24 multilateral institutions, the private sector, and  
25 nongovernmental and civil society organizations;



1 (B) develop and revise the strategy re-  
2 quired under section 4;

3 (C) monitor, evaluate, and report on activi-  
4 ties undertaken pursuant to the strategy re-  
5 quired under section 4; and

6 (D) establish due diligence criteria for all  
7 recipients of funds provided by the United  
8 States to carry out activities under this Act and  
9 the amendments made by this Act.

10 (c) OFFSET.—To offset any costs incurred by the  
11 United States Agency for International Development to  
12 carry out the establishment and appointment of a Senior  
13 Coordinator of United States International Basic Edu-  
14 cation Assistance in accordance with subsection (a), the  
15 President shall eliminate such positions within the United  
16 States Agency for International Development, unless oth-  
17 erwise authorized or required by law, as the President de-  
18 termines to be necessary to fully offset such costs.

19 **SEC. 6. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS.**

20 The President shall seek to ensure that programs car-  
21 ried out under the strategy required under section 4  
22 shall—

23 (1) apply rigorous monitoring and evaluation  
24 methodologies to focus on learning and account-  
25 ability;



(2) include methodological guidance in the implementation plan and support systemic data collection using internationally comparable indicators, norms, and methodologies, to the extent practicable and appropriate;

(3) disaggregate all data collected and reported by age, gender, marital status, disability, and location, to the extent practicable and appropriate;

(4) be planned and budgeted to include funding for both short- and long-term monitoring and evaluation to enable assessment of the sustainability and scalability of assistance programs; and

(5) support the increased use and public availability of education data for improved decision making, program effectiveness, and monitoring of global progress.

**SEC. 7. TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING TO CONGRESS.**

(a) ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY.—Not later than March 31 of each year through 2031, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of the strategy developed pursuant to section 4 and make the report available to the public.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include—



1           (1) a description of the efforts made by relevant  
2     Executive branch agencies and officials to implement  
3     the strategy developed pursuant to section 4 with a  
4     particular focus on the activities carried out;

5           (2) a description of the extent to which each  
6     partner country selected to receive assistance for  
7     basic education meets the priority criteria specified  
8     in subsection (d) of section 105 of the Foreign As-  
9     sistance Act (as added by section 3 of this Act); and

10          (3) a description of the progress achieved over  
11     the reporting period toward meeting the goals, objec-  
12     tives, benchmarks, and timeframes specified in the  
13     strategy developed pursuant to section 4 at the pro-  
14     gram level, as developed pursuant to monitoring and  
15     evaluation specified in section 6.

16 **SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.**

17       (a) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—  
18 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional commit-  
19 tees” means—

20           (1) the Committee on Appropriations and the  
21     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

22           (2) the Committee on Appropriations and the  
23     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-  
24     resentatives.



1 (b) OTHER DEFINITIONS.—In this Act, the terms  
2 “basic education”, “partner country”, “relevant Executive  
3 branch agencies and officials”, “national education plan”,  
4 “marginalized children and vulnerable groups”, and “gen-  
5 der parity in basic education” have the meanings given  
6 such terms in subsection (c) of section 105 of the Foreign  
7 Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 3 of this Act).





114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 5537

To promote internet access in developing countries and update foreign policy toward the internet, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 21, 2016

Mr. ROYCE (for himself, Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, Mr. ENGEL, and Ms. MENG) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## A BILL

To promote internet access in developing countries and update foreign policy toward the internet, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Digital Global Access  
5 Policy Act of 2016” or the “Digital GAP Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. PURPOSE.**

7 The purpose of this Act is to encourage the efforts  
8 of developing countries to improve mobile and fixed access  
9 to the internet in order to spur economic growth and job



1 creation, improve health, education, and financial services,  
2 reduce poverty and gender inequality, mitigate disasters,  
3 promote democracy and good governance, strengthen cy-  
4 bersecurity, and update the Department of State's struc-  
5 ture to address cyberspace policy.

6 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Since 2005, the number of internet users  
9 has more than tripled from 1,000,000,000 to  
10 3,200,000,000.

11 (2) 4.2 billion people, 60 percent of the world's  
12 population, remain offline and the growth rate of  
13 internet access is slowing. An estimated 75 percent  
14 of the offline population lives in just 20 countries  
15 and is largely rural, female, elderly, illiterate, and  
16 low-income.

17 (3) Studies suggest that across the developing  
18 world, women are nearly 50 percent less likely to ac-  
19 cess the internet than men living within the same  
20 communities, and that this digital gender divide car-  
21 ries with it a great economic cost. According to a  
22 study, "Women and the Web", bringing an addi-  
23 tional 600,000,000 women online would contribute  
24 \$13,000,000,000–\$18,000,000,000 to annual GDP  
25 across 144 developing countries.



1           (4) Without increased internet access, the devel-  
2       oping world risks falling behind.

3           (5) Internet access in developing countries is  
4       hampered by a lack of infrastructure and a poor reg-  
5       ulatory environment for investment.

6           (6) Build-once policies and approaches are poli-  
7       cies or practices that minimize the number and scale  
8       of excavation and construction activities when in-  
9       stalling telecommunications infrastructure in rights-  
10      of-way, thereby lowering the installation costs for  
11      high-speed internet networks and serve as a develop-  
12      ment best practice.

13   **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

14       Congress declares that it is the policy of the United  
15   States to partner, consult, and coordinate with the govern-  
16   ments of foreign countries, international organizations, re-  
17   gional economic communities, businesses, civil society, and  
18   other stakeholders in a concerted effort to—

19           (1) promote first-time internet access to mobile  
20      or broadband internet for at least 1.5 billion people  
21      in developing countries by 2020 in both urban and  
22      rural areas;

23           (2) promote internet deployment and related co-  
24      ordination, capacity building, and build-once policies



1 and approaches in developing countries, including  
2 actions to encourage—

3 (A) a build-once approach by standardizing  
4 the inclusion of broadband conduit pipes which  
5 house fiber optic communications cable that  
6 support broadband or wireless facilities for  
7 broadband service as part of rights-of-way  
8 projects, including sewers, power transmission  
9 facilities, rail, pipelines, bridges, tunnels, and  
10 roads, that are funded, co-funded, or partially  
11 financed by the United States or any inter-  
12 national organization that includes the United  
13 States as a member, in consultation with tele-  
14 communications providers, unless a cost-benefit  
15 analysis determines that the cost of such ap-  
16 proach outweighs the benefits;

17 (B) national and local government agencies  
18 of developing countries and donor governments  
19 and organizations to coordinate road building,  
20 pipe laying, and major infrastructure with the  
21 private sector so that, for example, fiber optic  
22 cable could be laid below roads at the time such  
23 roads are built; and

24 (C) international organizations to increase  
25 their financial support, including grants and



1 loans, and technical assistance to expand infor-  
2 mation and communications access and internet  
3 connectivity;

4 (3) promote policy changes that encourage first-  
5 time affordable access to the internet in developing  
6 countries, including actions to encourage—

7 (A) integration of universal and gender-eq-  
8 uitable internet access goals, to be informed by  
9 the collection of related gender disaggregated  
10 data, and internet tools into national develop-  
11 ment plans and United States Government  
12 country-level strategies;

13 (B) reforms of competition laws and spec-  
14 trum allocation processes that may impede the  
15 ability of companies to provide internet services;  
16 and

17 (C) efforts to improve procurement proe-  
18 cesses to help attract and incentivize investment  
19 in internet infrastructure;

20 (4) promote the removal of tax and regulatory  
21 barriers to internet access;

22 (5) promote the use of the internet to increase  
23 economic growth and trade, including—



1 (A) policies and strategies to remove re-  
2 strictions to e-commerce, cross-border informa-  
3 tion flows, and competitive marketplaces; and

4 (B) entrepreneurship and distance learning  
5 enabled by access to technology;

6 (6) promote the use of the internet to bolster  
7 democracy, government accountability, transparency,  
8 and human rights, including—

9 (A) policies, initiatives, and investments,  
10 including the development of national internet  
11 plans, that are consistent with United States  
12 human rights goals, including freedom of ex-  
13 pression, religion, and association;

14 (B) policies and initiatives aimed at pro-  
15 moting the multistakeholder model of internet  
16 governance; and

17 (C) policies and support programs, re-  
18 search, and technologies that safeguard human  
19 rights and fundamental freedoms online, and  
20 enable political organizing and activism, free  
21 speech, and religious expression that are in  
22 compliance with international human rights  
23 standards;

24 (7) promote internet access and inclusion into  
25 internet policymaking for women, people with dis-



1 abilities, minorities, low-income and marginalized  
2 groups, and underserved populations; and

3 (8) promote cybersecurity and data protection,  
4 including international adoption of the National In-  
5 stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Frame-  
6 work for Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity that  
7 are industry-led, globally recognized cybersecurity  
8 standards and best practices.

9 **SEC. 5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ORGANIZATION.**

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
11 gress that—

12 (1) the title of the Under Secretary for Eco-  
13 nomic Growth, Energy, and the Environment should  
14 be changed to the Under Secretary for Economics,  
15 Energy, the Environment, and Cyberspace;

16 (2) the Secretary of State should redesignate an  
17 existing Assistant Secretary position to be the As-  
18 sistant Secretary for Technology, International Com-  
19 munications, and Cyberspace to lead the Depart-  
20 ment of States's diplomatic technology policy gen-  
21 erally, including for internet access, internet govern-  
22 ance, internet freedom, telecommunications net-  
23 works, information and communications technology  
24 infrastructures, and cybersecurity; and



1           (3) such Assistant Secretary for Technology,  
2       International Communications, and Cyberspace  
3       should report to the Under Secretary for Economic  
4       Growth, Energy, the Environment, and Cyberspace  
5       referred to in paragraph (1).

6       (b) ACTIVITIES.—In recognition of the added value  
7       of technical knowledge and expertise in the policymaking  
8       and diplomatic channels, the Secretary of State should—

9           (1) update existing training programs relevant  
10      to policy discussions, particularly for individuals em-  
11      ployed under the Under Secretary referred to in sub-  
12      section (a)(1); and

13          (2) promote the recruitment of candidates with  
14      technical expertise into the Civil Service and the  
15      Foreign Service.

16      (c) OFFSET.—To offset any costs incurred by the De-  
17      partment of State to carry out the designation of an As-  
18      sistant Secretary for Technology, International Commu-  
19      nications and Cyberspace in accordance with subsection  
20      (a), the Secretary of State shall eliminate such positions  
21      within the Department of State, unless otherwise author-  
22      ized or required by law, as the Secretary determines to  
23      be necessary to fully offset such costs.

24      (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The redesignation of  
25      the Assistant Secretary position described in subsection



1 (a)(2) may not be construed as increasing the number of  
2 Assistant Secretary positions at the Department of State  
3 above the current level of 24 as authorized in section  
4 1(c)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of  
5 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)(1)).

6 **SEC. 6. USAID.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that the Administrator  
8 of the United States Agency for International Develop-  
9 ment should—

10 (1) integrate efforts to expand internet access,  
11 develop appropriate technologies, and enhance digital  
12 literacy into the education, development, and eco-  
13 nomic growth programs of the agency, where appro-  
14 priate;

15 (2) expand the utilization of information and  
16 communications technologies in humanitarian aid  
17 and disaster relief responses and United States oper-  
18 ations involving stabilization and security to improve  
19 donor coordination, reduce duplication and waste,  
20 capture and share lessons learned, and augment dis-  
21 aster preparedness and risk mitigation strategies;  
22 and

23 (3) establish and promote guidelines for the  
24 protection of personal information of individuals  
25 served by humanitarian, disaster, and development



1 programs directly through the United States Gov-  
2 ernment, through contracts funded by the United  
3 States Government and by international organiza-  
4 tions.

5 **SEC. 7. PEACE CORPS.**

6 Section 3 of the Peace Corps Act (22 U.S.C. 2502)  
7 is amended by—

8 (1) redesignating subsection (h) as subsection  
9 (e); and

10 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub-  
11 sections:

12 “(f) It is the sense of Congress that access to tech-  
13 nology can transform agriculture, community economic de-  
14 velopment, education, environment, health, and youth de-  
15 velopment which are the sectors in which Peace Corps cur-  
16 rently develops positions for Volunteers.

17 “(g) In giving attention to the programs, projects,  
18 training, and other activities referred to in subsection (f),  
19 the Peace Corps should develop positions for Volunteers  
20 that are focused on leveraging technology for development,  
21 education, and social and economic mobility.”.

22 **SEC. 8. LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.**

23 In pursuing the policy described in section 4, the  
24 President should direct United States representatives to  
25 appropriate international bodies to use the influence of the



1 United States, consistent with the broad development  
2 goals of the United States, to advocate that each such  
3 body—

4 (1) commit to increase efforts to promote gen-  
5 der-equitable internet access, in partnership with  
6 stakeholders and consistent with host countries' ab-  
7 sorptive capacity;

8 (2) enhance coordination with stakeholders in  
9 increasing affordable and gender-equitable access to  
10 the internet;

11 (3) integrate gender-equitable affordable inter-  
12 net access into existing economic and business as-  
13 sessments, evaluations, and indexes such as the Mil-  
14 lennium Challenge Corporation constraints analysis,  
15 the Doing Business Report, International Monetary  
16 Fund Article IV assessments and country reports,  
17 the Open Data Barometer, and the Affordability  
18 Drivers Index;

19 (4) standardize inclusion of broadband con-  
20 duit—fiber optic cables that support broadband or  
21 wireless facilities for broadband service—as part of  
22 highway or highway-comparable construction  
23 projects in developing countries, in consultation with  
24 telecommunications providers, unless such inclusion  
25 would create an undue burden, is not necessary



1 based on the availability of existing broadband infra-  
2 structure, or a cost-benefit analysis determines that  
3 the cost outweighs the benefits;

4 (5) provide technical assistance to the regu-  
5 latory authorities in developing countries to remove  
6 unnecessary barriers to investment in otherwise com-  
7 mercially viable projects and strengthen weak regu-  
8 lations or develop new ones to support market  
9 growth and development;

10 (6) utilize clear, accountable, and metric-based  
11 targets, including targets with gender-disaggregated  
12 metrics, to measure the effectiveness of efforts to  
13 promote internet access; and

14 (7) promote and protect human rights online,  
15 such as the freedoms of speech, assembly, associa-  
16 tion, religion, and belief, through resolutions, public  
17 statements, projects, and initiatives, and advocating  
18 that other member states of such bodies are held ac-  
19 countable when major violations are uncovered.

20 **SEC. 9. PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK.**

21 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-  
22 ment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Com-  
23 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives  
24 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate  
25 plans to promote partnerships by United States develop-



1 ment agencies, including the United States Agency for  
2 International Development and the Millennium Challenge  
3 Corporation, as well as international agencies funded by  
4 the United States Government for partnership with stake-  
5 holders, that contain the following elements:

6 (1) Methods for stakeholders to partner with  
7 such agencies in order to provide internet access or  
8 internet infrastructure in developing countries.

9 (2) Methods of outreach to stakeholders to ex-  
10 plore partnership opportunities for expanding inter-  
11 net access or internet infrastructure, including co-  
12 ordination with the private sector, when financing  
13 roads and telecommunications infrastructure.

14 (3) Methods for early consultation with stake-  
15 holders concerning projects in telecommunications  
16 and road construction to provide internet access or  
17 internet infrastructure.

18 **SEC. 10. REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION**  
19 **EFFORTS.**

20 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-  
21 ment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Com-  
22 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives  
23 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate  
24 a report on efforts to implement the policy specified in  
25 section 4 and a discussion of the plans and existing efforts



1 by the United States Government in developing countries  
2 to accomplish the following:

3 (1) Develop a technical and regulatory road  
4 map for promoting internet access in developing  
5 countries and a path to implementing such road  
6 map.

7 (2) Identify the regulatory barriers that may  
8 unduly impede internet access, including regulation  
9 of wireline broadband deployment or the infrastruc-  
10 ture to augment wireless broadband deployment.

11 (3) Strengthen and support development of reg-  
12 ulations that incentivize market growth and sector  
13 development.

14 (4) Encourage further public and private in-  
15 vestment in internet infrastructure, including  
16 broadband networks and services.

17 (5) Increase gender-equitable internet access  
18 and otherwise encourage or support internet deploy-  
19 ment, competition, and adoption.

20 (6) Improve the affordability of internet access.

21 (7) Promote technology and cybersecurity ca-  
22 pacity building efforts and consult technical experts  
23 for advice regarding options to accelerate the ad-  
24 vancement of internet deployment, adoption, and  
25 usage.



1           (8) Promote internet freedom globally and in-  
2       clude civil society and the private sector in the for-  
3       mulation of policies, projects, and advocacy efforts  
4       to protect human rights online.

5           (9) Promote and strengthen the multistake-  
6       holder model of internet governance and actively  
7       participate in multistakeholder international fora,  
8       such as the Internet Governance Forum.

9   **SEC. 11. CYBERSPACE STRATEGY.**

10       The President should include in the next White  
11   House Cyberspace Strategy information relating to the  
12   following:

13           (1) Methods to promote internet access in de-  
14       veloping countries.

15           (2) Methods to globally promote cybersecurity  
16       policy consistent with the National Institute of  
17       Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework for  
18       Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.

19           (3) Methods to promote global internet freedom  
20       principles, such as the freedoms of expression, as-  
21       sembly, association, and religion, while combating ef-  
22       forts to impose restrictions on such freedoms.

23   **SEC. 12. DEFINITION.**

24       In this Act—



1           (1) BUILD ONCE POLICIES AND APPROACHES.—

2       The term “build once policies and approaches”  
3       means policies or practices that minimize the num-  
4       ber and scale of excavation and construction activi-  
5       ties when installing telecommunications infrastruc-  
6       ture in rights-of-way.

7           (2) CYBERSPACE.—The term “cyberspace”

8       means the interdependent network of information  
9       technology infrastructures, and includes the internet,  
10      telecommunications networks, computer systems,  
11      and embedded processors and controllers in critical  
12      industries, and includes the virtual environment of  
13      information and interactions between people.

14          (3) STAKEHOLDERS.—The term “stakeholders”

15      means the private sector, the public sector, coopera-  
16      tives, civil society, the technical community that de-  
17      velops internet technologies, standards, implementa-  
18      tion, operations, and applications, and other groups  
19      that are working to increase internet access or are  
20      impacted by the lack of internet access in their com-  
21      munities.



**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5537**  
**OFFERED BY MR. ROYCE OF CALIFORNIA**

Page 7, line 4, strike “adoption” and insert “use”.

Page 7, line 6, insert “Improving” before “Critical”.

Page 7, line 11, strike “that—” and all that follows through “the Secretary” on line 16 and insert “that the Secretary” (and adjust the margins accordingly).

Page 7, line 18, strike “Technology, International Communications, and”

Page 7, line 20, strike “States’s” and insert “State’s”.

Page 7, line 20, strike “technology” and insert “cyberspace”

Page 7, line 21, insert “cybersecurity” before “internet access” and strike “internet governance”

Page 7, line 22, strike “telecommunications networks” and insert “and to promote an open, secure, and reliable”

Page 7, line 24, strike “infrastructures, and cybersecurity; and” and insert “infrastructure.”

Page 8, strike lines 1 through 5.

Page 8, line 11, strike “under the Under Secretary referred to in subsection (a)(1),”

Page 8, line 18, strike “Technology, International Communications and”



.....  
(Original Signature of Member)

114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

**H. R.** \_\_\_\_\_

To halt the wholesale slaughter of the Syrian people, encourage a negotiated political settlement, and hold Syrian human rights abusers accountable for their crimes.

\_\_\_\_\_  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. ENGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee  
on \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
**A BILL**

To halt the wholesale slaughter of the Syrian people, encourage a negotiated political settlement, and hold Syrian human rights abusers accountable for their crimes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4       (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the  
5       “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2016”.

6       (b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents for  
7       this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.



- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 4. Statement of policy.

#### TITLE I—ADDITIONAL ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA

- Sec. 101. Sanctions with respect to Central Bank of Syria and foreign persons that engage in certain transactions.
- Sec. 102. Prohibitions with respect to the transfer of arms and related materials to Syria.
- Sec. 103. Rule of construction.

#### TITLE II—AMENDMENTS TO SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2012

- Sec. 201. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against citizens of Syria or their family members.
- Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods or technologies to Syria that are likely to be used to commit human rights abuses.

#### TITLE III—REPORTS AND WAIVER FOR HUMANITARIAN-RELATED ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA

- Sec. 301. Report on monitoring and evaluating of ongoing assistance programs in Syria and to the Syrian people.
- Sec. 302. Updated list of persons who are responsible for human rights violations in Syria.
- Sec. 303. Assessment of potential effectiveness of and requirements for the establishment of safe zones or a no-fly zone in Syria.
- Sec. 304. Assistance to support entities taking actions relating to gathering evidence for investigations into war crimes or crimes against humanity in Syria since March 2011.

#### TITLE IV—SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA

- Sec. 401. Suspension of sanctions with respect to Syria.
- Sec. 402. Waivers and exemptions.

#### TITLE V—REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND SUNSET

- Sec. 501. Regulatory authority.
- Sec. 502. Sunset.

### 1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

- 3 (1) Over 14,000,000 Syrians have become refu-
- 4 gees or internally displaced persons over the last five
- 5 years.



1           (2) The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights  
2       has reported that since 2012, over 60,000 Syrians,  
3       including children, have died in Syrian prisons.

4           (3) In July 2014, the Committee on Foreign  
5       Affairs of the House of Representatives heard testi-  
6       mony from a former Syrian military photographer,  
7       alias “Caesar”, who fled Syria and smuggled out  
8       thousands of photos of tortured bodies. In testi-  
9       mony, Caesar said, “I have seen horrendous pictures  
10      of bodies of people who had tremendous amounts of  
11      torture, deep wounds and burns and strangulation.”.

12          (4) The Assad regime has repeatedly blocked ci-  
13      vilian access to or diverted humanitarian assistance,  
14      including medical supplies, to besieged and hard-to-  
15      reach areas, in violation of United Nations Security  
16      Council resolutions.

17          (5) The course of the Syrian transition and its  
18      future leadership may depend on what the United  
19      States and its partners do now to save Syrian lives,  
20      alleviate suffering, and help Syrians determine their  
21      own future.

22   **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

23       It is the sense of Congress that—

24           (1) Bashar al-Assad’s murderous actions  
25      against the people of Syria have caused the deaths



1 of more than 400,000 civilians, led to the destruc-  
2 tion of more than 50 percent of Syria's critical in-  
3 frastructure, and forced the displacement of more  
4 than 14,000,000 people, precipitating the worst hu-  
5 manitarian crisis in more than 60 years;

6 (2) international actions to date have been in-  
7 sufficient in protecting vulnerable populations from  
8 being attacked by uniformed and irregular forces, in-  
9 cluding Hezbollah, associated with the Assad regime,  
10 on land and from the air, through the use of barrel  
11 bombs, chemical weapons, mass starvation cam-  
12 paigns, industrial-scale torture and execution of po-  
13 litical dissidents, sniper attacks on pregnant women,  
14 and the deliberate targeting of medical facilities,  
15 schools, residential areas, and community gathering  
16 places, including markets; and

17 (3) Assad's continued claim of leadership and  
18 actions in Syria are a rallying point for the extrem-  
19 ist ideology of the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra,  
20 and other terrorist organizations.

21 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

22 It is the policy of the United States that all diplo-  
23 matic and coercive economic means should be utilized to  
24 compel the government of Bashir al-Assad to immediately  
25 halt the wholesale slaughter of the Syrian people and ac-



1 tively work towards transition to a democratic government  
2 in Syria, existing in peace and security with its neighbors.

3 **TITLE I—ADDITIONAL ACTIONS**  
4 **IN CONNECTION WITH THE**  
5 **NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH**  
6 **RESPECT TO SYRIA**

7 **SEC. 101. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL BANK**  
8 **OF SYRIA AND FOREIGN PERSONS THAT EN-**  
9 **GAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.**

10 (a) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN MEASURES TO CEN-  
11 TRAL BANK OF SYRIA.—Except as provided in subsections  
12 (a) and (b) of section 402, the President shall apply the  
13 measures described in section 5318A(b)(5) of title 31,  
14 United States Code, to the Central Bank of Syria.

15 (b) BLOCKING PROPERTY OF FOREIGN PERSONS  
16 THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after  
18 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President  
19 shall impose on a foreign person the sanctions de-  
20 scribed in subsection (c) if the foreign person has  
21 knowingly engaged in an activity described in para-  
22 graph (2).

23 (2) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person  
24 engages in an activity described in this paragraph if  
25 the foreign person—



1 (A) knowingly provides significant finan-  
2 cial, material or technological support to, in-  
3 cluding engaging in or facilitating a significant  
4 transaction or transactions with, or provides  
5 significant financial services for—

6 (i) the Government of Syria (including  
7 government entities operating as a busi-  
8 ness enterprise) and the Central Bank of  
9 Syria, including Syria's intelligence and se-  
10 curity services or its armed forces, or any  
11 of its agents or affiliates; or

12 (ii) a foreign person subject to finan-  
13 cial sanctions pursuant to—

14 (I) the International Emergency  
15 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.  
16 1701 et seq.) with respect to Syria or  
17 any other provision of law that im-  
18 poses sanctions with respect to Syria;  
19 or

20 (II) a resolution that is agreed to  
21 by the United Nations Security Coun-  
22 cil that imposes sanctions with respect  
23 to Syria;

24 (B) knowingly—



1 (i) sells or provides significant goods,  
2 services, technology, information, or sup-  
3 port that could directly and significantly  
4 facilitate the maintenance or expansion of  
5 Syria's domestic production of natural gas  
6 or petroleum or petroleum products of Syr-  
7 ian origin;

8 (ii) sells or provides to Syria crude oil  
9 or condensate, refined petroleum products,  
10 liquefied natural gas, or petrochemical  
11 products that have a fair market value of  
12 \$500,000 or more or that during a 12-  
13 month period have an aggregate fair mar-  
14 ket value of \$2,000,000 or more;

15 (iii) sells or otherwise provides civilian  
16 aircraft or spare parts, or provides signifi-  
17 cant goods, services, or technologies associ-  
18 ated with the operation of aircraft or air-  
19 lines to any foreign person operating in the  
20 areas controlled by the Government of  
21 Syria; or

22 (iv) sells or otherwise provides signifi-  
23 cant goods, services, or technology to a for-  
24 eign person operating in the shipping (in-  
25 cluding ports and free trade zones), trans-



1                   portation, or telecommunications sectors in  
2                   areas controlled by the Government of  
3                   Syria;

4                   (C) knowingly engages in money laun-  
5                   dering to carry out an activity described in sub-  
6                   paragraph (A) or (B);

7                   (D) knowingly facilitates efforts by a for-  
8                   eign person to carry out an activity described in  
9                   subparagraph (A) or (B);

10                  (E) knowingly provides loans, credits, in-  
11                  cluding export credits, or financing to carry out  
12                  an activity described in subparagraph (A) or  
13                  (B); and

14                  (F) is owned or controlled by a foreign  
15                  person that engages in the activities described  
16                  in subparagraphs (A) through (D).

17       (c) SANCTIONS AGAINST A FOREIGN PERSON.—The  
18       sanctions to be imposed on a foreign person described in  
19       subsection (b) are the following:

20               (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall exercise  
21               all powers granted by the International Emergency  
22               Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (ex-  
23               cept that the requirements of section 202 of such  
24               Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent  
25               necessary to freeze and prohibit all transactions in



1 all property and interests in property of the foreign  
2 person if such property and interests in property are  
3 in the United States, come within the United States,  
4 or are or come within the possession or control of a  
5 United States person.

6 (2) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION,  
7 OR PAROLE.—

8 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An  
9 alien who the Secretary of State or the Sec-  
10 retary of Homeland Security (or a designee of  
11 one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reason  
12 to believe, meets any of the criteria described in  
13 subsection (a) is—

14 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

15 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other  
16 documentation to enter the United States;  
17 and

18 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted  
19 or paroled into the United States or to re-  
20 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-  
21 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et  
22 seq.).

23 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

24 (i) IN GENERAL.—The issuing con-  
25 sular officer, the Secretary of State, or the



1 Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-  
2 ignee of one of such Secretaries) shall re-  
3 voke any visa or other entry documentation  
4 issued to an alien who meets any of the  
5 criteria described in subsection (a) regard-  
6 less of when issued.

7 (ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A rev-  
8 ocation under clause (i)—

9 (I) shall take effect immediately;

10 and

11 (II) shall automatically cancel  
12 any other valid visa or entry docu-  
13 mentation that is in the alien's pos-  
14 session.

15 (3) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-  
16 TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions  
17 under paragraph (2) shall not apply to an alien if  
18 admitting the alien into the United States is nec-  
19 essary to permit the United States to comply with  
20 the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the  
21 United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,  
22 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,  
23 between the United Nations and the United States,  
24 or other applicable international obligations.



1           (4) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in  
2       subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-  
3       national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
4       U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that knowingly  
5       violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or  
6       causes a violation of regulations promulgated under  
7       section 501(a) to carry out paragraph (1) of this  
8       subsection to the same extent that such penalties  
9       apply to a person that knowingly commits an unlaw-  
10      ful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.

11      (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

12           (1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admitted”  
13      and “alien” have the meanings given such terms in  
14      section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act  
15      (8 U.S.C. 1101).

16           (2) FINANCIAL, MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGICAL  
17      SUPPORT.—The term “financial, material, or techno-  
18      logical support” has the meaning given such term in  
19      section 542.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regula-  
20      tions.

21           (3) GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA.—The term “Gov-  
22      ernment of Syria” has the meaning given such term  
23      section 542.305 of title 31, Code of Federal Regula-  
24      tions.



1           (4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” has  
2           the meaning given such term in section 566.312 of  
3           title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

4           (5) MONEY LAUNDERING.—The term “money  
5           laundering” means the movement of illicit cash or  
6           cash equivalent proceeds into, out of, or through a  
7           country, or into, out of, or through a financial insti-  
8           tution.

9           (6) PETROLEUM OR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS OF  
10          SYRIAN ORIGIN.—The term “petroleum or petroleum  
11          products of Syrian origin” has the meaning given  
12          such term in section 542.314 of title 31, Code of  
13          Federal Regulations.

14          (7) SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTION OR TRANS-  
15          ACTIONS; SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL SERVICES.—A  
16          transaction or transactions or financial services shall  
17          be determined to be a significant for purposes of this  
18          section in accordance with section 566.404 of title  
19          31, Code of Federal Regulations.

20          (8) SYRIA.—The term “Syria” has the meaning  
21          given such term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code  
22          of Federal Regulations.



1 **SEC. 102. PROHIBITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER**  
2 **OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIALS TO**  
3 **SYRIA.**

4 (a) SANCTIONS.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose  
6 on a foreign person the sanctions described in sub-  
7 section (b) if the President determines that such for-  
8 eign person has, on or after the date of the enact-  
9 ment of this Act, knowingly exported, transferred, or  
10 otherwise provided to Syria significant financial, ma-  
11 terial, or technological support that contributes ma-  
12 terially to the ability of Government of Syria to—

13 (A) acquire or develop chemical, biological,  
14 or nuclear weapons or related technologies;

15 (B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise  
16 missile capabilities;

17 (C) acquire or develop destabilizing num-  
18 bers and types of advanced conventional weap-  
19 ons;

20 (D) acquire defense articles, defense serv-  
21 ices, or defense information (as such terms are  
22 defined under the Arms Export Control Act (22  
23 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or

24 (E) acquire items designated by the Presi-  
25 dent for purposes of the United States Muni-



1           tions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms  
2           Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

3           (2) APPLICABILITY TO OTHER FOREIGN PER-  
4           SONS.—The sanctions described in subsection (b)  
5           shall also be imposed on any foreign person that—

6                   (A) is a successor entity to a foreign per-  
7                   son described in paragraph (1); or

8                   (B) is owned or controlled by a foreign  
9                   person described in paragraph (1).

10          (b) SANCTIONS AGAINST A FOREIGN PERSON.—The  
11          sanctions to be imposed on a foreign person described in  
12          subsection (a) are the following:

13               (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall exercise  
14               all powers granted by the International Emergency  
15               Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (ex-  
16               cept that the requirements of section 202 of such  
17               Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent  
18               necessary to freeze and prohibit all transactions in  
19               all property and interests in property of the foreign  
20               person if such property and interests in property are  
21               in the United States, come within the United States,  
22               or are or come within the possession or control of a  
23               United States person.

24               (2) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION,  
25               OR PAROLE.—



1 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An  
2 alien who the Secretary of State or the Sec-  
3 retary of Homeland Security (or a designee of  
4 one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reason  
5 to believe, meets any of the criteria described in  
6 subsection (a) is—

7 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

8 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other  
9 documentation to enter the United States;  
10 and

11 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted  
12 or paroled into the United States or to re-  
13 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-  
14 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et  
15 seq.).

16 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

17 (i) IN GENERAL.—The issuing con-  
18 sular officer, the Secretary of State, or the  
19 Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-  
20 ignee of one of such Secretaries) shall re-  
21 voke any visa or other entry documentation  
22 issued to an alien who meets any of the  
23 criteria described in subsection (a) regard-  
24 less of when issued.



1 (ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A rev-  
2 ocation under clause (i)—

3 (I) shall take effect immediately;  
4 and

5 (II) shall automatically cancel  
6 any other valid visa or entry docu-  
7 mentation that is in the alien's pos-  
8 session.

9 (3) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-  
10 TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions  
11 under paragraph (2) shall not apply to an alien if  
12 admitting the alien into the United States is nec-  
13 essary to permit the United States to comply with  
14 the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the  
15 United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,  
16 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,  
17 between the United Nations and the United States,  
18 or other applicable international obligations.

19 (4) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-  
20 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a  
21 violation of any regulation, license, or order issued  
22 to carry out this section shall be subject to the pen-  
23 alties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section  
24 206 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-  
25 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a



1 person that commits an unlawful act described in  
2 subsection (a) of that section.

3 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

4 (1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admitted”  
5 and “alien” have the meanings given such terms in  
6 section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act  
7 (8 U.S.C. 1101).

8 (2) FINANCIAL, MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGICAL  
9 SUPPORT.—The term “financial, material, or techno-  
10 logical support” has the meaning given such term in  
11 section 542.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regula-  
12 tions.

13 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-  
14 son” has the meaning given such term in section  
15 594.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

16 (4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” has  
17 the meaning given such term in section 566.312 of  
18 title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

19 (5) SYRIA.—The term “Syria” has the meaning  
20 given such term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code  
21 of Federal Regulations.

22 (6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
23 “United States person” has the meaning given such  
24 term in section 542.319 of title 31, Code of Federal  
25 Regulations.



1 **SEC. 103. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**

2       The sanctions that are required to be imposed under  
3 this title are in addition to other similar or related sanc-  
4 tions that are required to be imposed under any other pro-  
5 vision of law.

6 **TITLE II—AMENDMENTS TO**  
7 **SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS AC-**  
8 **COUNTABILITY ACT OF 2012**

9 **SEC. 201. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**  
10 **CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE**  
11 **FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS**  
12 **ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF**  
13 **SYRIA OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.**

14       (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 702(c) of the Syria  
15 Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C.  
16 8791(c)) is amended to read as follows:

17       “(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

18               “(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall exer-  
19 cise all powers granted by the International Emer-  
20 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et  
21 seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of  
22 such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the  
23 extent necessary to freeze and prohibit all trans-  
24 actions in all property and interests in property of  
25 a person on the list required by subsection (b) if  
26 such property and interests in property are in the



1 United States, come within the United States, or are  
2 or come within the possession or control of a United  
3 States person.

4 “(2) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMIS-  
5 SION, OR PAROLE.—

6 “(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An  
7 alien who the Secretary of State or the Sec-  
8 retary of Homeland Security (or a designee of  
9 one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reason  
10 to believe, meets any of the criteria described in  
11 subsection (b) is—

12 “(i) inadmissible to the United States;

13 “(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or  
14 other documentation to enter the United  
15 States; and

16 “(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admit-  
17 ted or paroled into the United States or to  
18 receive any other benefit under the Immi-  
19 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.  
20 1101 et seq.).

21 “(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

22 “(i) IN GENERAL.—The issuing con-  
23 sular officer, the Secretary of State, or the  
24 Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-  
25 ignee of one of such Secretaries) shall re-



1           voke any visa or other entry documentation  
2           issued to an alien who meets any of the  
3           criteria described in subsection (b) regard-  
4           less of when issued.

5           “(ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A  
6           revocation under clause (i)—

7                   “(I) shall take effect imme-  
8                   diately; and

9                   “(II) shall automatically cancel  
10           any other valid visa or entry docu-  
11           mentation that is in the alien’s pos-  
12           session.

13           “(3) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-  
14           tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a  
15           violation of this section or any regulation, license, or  
16           order issued to carry out this section shall be subject  
17           to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)  
18           of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-  
19           nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-  
20           tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
21           scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

22           “(4) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President  
23           shall, not later than 90 days after the date of the  
24           enactment of this section, promulgate regulations as  
25           necessary for the implementation of this section.



1           “(5) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-  
2       TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions  
3       under paragraph (2) shall not apply to an alien if  
4       admitting the alien into the United States is nec-  
5       essary to permit the United States to comply with  
6       the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the  
7       United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,  
8       1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,  
9       between the United Nations and the United States,  
10      or other applicable international obligations.

11          “(6) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in  
12      this section shall be construed to limit the authority  
13      of the President to impose additional sanctions pur-  
14      suant to the International Emergency Economic  
15      Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), relevant execu-  
16      tive orders, regulations, or other provisions of law.”.

17      (b) SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DESCRIBED.—  
18      Section 702 of the Syria Human Rights Accountability  
19      Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8791) is amended by adding at  
20      the end the following:

21          “(d) SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DE-  
22      SCRIBED.—In subsection (b), the term ‘serious human  
23      rights abuses’ includes the deliberate targeting of civilian  
24      infrastructure to include schools, hospitals, and markets.”.



1 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by  
2 subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect on the date of  
3 the enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to  
4 the imposition of sanctions under section 702(a) of the  
5 Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012 on after  
6 such date of enactment.

7 **SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**  
8 **THE TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECH-**  
9 **NOLOGIES TO SYRIA THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE**  
10 **USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.**

11 Section 703(b)(2)(C) of the Syria Human Rights Ac-  
12 countability Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8792(b)(2)(C)) is  
13 amended—

14 (1) in clause (i), by striking “or” at the end;

15 (2) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the  
16 end and inserting a semicolon; and

17 (3) by adding at the end the following:

18 “(iii) any article designated by the  
19 President for purposes of the United  
20 States Munitions List under section  
21 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act  
22 (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); or

23 “(iv) other goods or technologies that  
24 the President determines may be used by



1 the Government of Syria to commit human  
2 rights abuses against the people of Syria.”.

3 **TITLE III—REPORTS AND WAIV-**  
4 **ER FOR HUMANITARIAN-RE-**  
5 **LATED ACTIVITIES WITH RE-**  
6 **SPECT TO SYRIA**

7 **SEC. 301. REPORT ON MONITORING AND EVALUATING OF**  
8 **ONGOING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SYRIA**  
9 **AND TO THE SYRIAN PEOPLE.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
11 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
12 and the Administrator of the United States Agency for  
13 International Development shall submit to the appropriate  
14 congressional committees a report on the monitoring and  
15 evaluation of ongoing assistance programs in Syria and  
16 to the Syrian people.

17 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-  
18 quired by subsection (a) shall include—

19 (1) the specific project monitoring and evalua-  
20 tion plans, including measurable goals and perform-  
21 ance metrics for cross-border assistance in Syria;  
22 and

23 (2) the major challenges to monitoring and  
24 evaluating programs in Syria.



1 **SEC. 302. UPDATED LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE RESPON-**  
2 **SIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN**  
3 **SYRIA.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the  
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-  
6 mit to the appropriate congressional committees an up-  
7 dated list of persons required under section 702 of the  
8 Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012 (22  
9 U.S.C. 8791).

10 (b) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

11 (1) FORM.—The list required by subsection (a)  
12 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may  
13 contain a classified annex if necessary.

14 (2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified  
15 portion of the list required by paragraph (1) shall be  
16 made available to the public and posted on the Web  
17 sites of the Department of the Treasury and the De-  
18 partment of State.

19 **SEC. 303. ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF**  
20 **AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISH-**  
21 **MENT OF SAFE ZONES OR A NO-FLY ZONE IN**  
22 **SYRIA.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-  
25 mit to the appropriate congressional committee a report  
26 that—



1           (1) assesses the potential effectiveness, risks,  
2           and operational requirements of the establishment  
3           and maintenance of a no-fly zone over part or all of  
4           Syria, including—

5                 (A) the operational and legal requirements  
6                 for United States and coalition air power to es-  
7                 tablish a no-fly zone in Syria;

8                 (B) the impact a no-fly zone in Syria  
9                 would have on humanitarian and counterter-  
10                rorism efforts in Syria and the surrounding re-  
11                gion; and

12                (C) the potential for force contributions  
13                from other countries to establish a no-fly zone  
14                in Syria; and

15           (2) assesses the potential effectiveness, risks,  
16           and operational requirements for the establishment  
17           of one or more safe zones in Syria for internally dis-  
18           placed persons or for the facilitation of humani-  
19           tarian assistance, including—

20                 (A) the operational and legal requirements  
21                 for United States and coalition forces to estab-  
22                 lish one or more safe zones in Syria;

23                 (B) the impact one or more safe zones in  
24                 Syria would have on humanitarian and counter-



1 terrorism efforts in Syria and the surrounding  
2 region; and

3 (C) the potential for contributions from  
4 other countries and vetted non-state actor part-  
5 ners to establish and maintain one or more safe  
6 zones in Syria.

7 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)  
8 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
9 a classified annex if necessary.

10 **SEC. 304. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT ENTITIES TAKING AC-**  
11 **TIONS RELATING TO GATHERING EVIDENCE**  
12 **FOR INVESTIGATIONS INTO WAR CRIMES OR**  
13 **CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN SYRIA SINCE**  
14 **MARCH 2011.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting  
16 through the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human  
17 Rights and Labor and the Assistant Secretary for Inter-  
18 national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, is au-  
19 thorized to provide assistance to support entities that are  
20 conducting criminal investigations, building Syrian inves-  
21 tigative capacity, supporting prosecutions in national  
22 courts, collecting evidence and preserving the chain of evi-  
23 dence for eventual prosecution against those who have  
24 committed war crimes or crimes against humanity in Syria  
25 since March 2011.



1 (b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date  
2 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall  
3 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a de-  
4 tailed report on assistance provided under subsection (a).

5 **TITLE IV—SUSPENSION OF**  
6 **SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT**  
7 **TO SYRIA**

8 **SEC. 401. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**  
9 **SYRIA.**

10 (a) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.—

11 (1) NEGOTIATIONS NOT CONCLUDING IN  
12 AGREEMENT.—If the President determines that  
13 internationally-recognized negotiations to resolve the  
14 violence in Syria have not concluded in an agree-  
15 ment or are likely not to conclude in an agreement,  
16 the President may suspend, as appropriate, in whole  
17 or in part, the imposition of sanctions otherwise re-  
18 quired under this Act or any amendment made by  
19 this Act for a period not to exceed 120 days, and re-  
20 newable for additional periods not to exceed 120  
21 days, if the President submits to the appropriate  
22 congressional committees in writing a determination  
23 and certification that the Government of Syria has  
24 ended military attacks against and gross violations



1 of the human rights of the Syrian people, specifi-  
2 cally—

3 (A) the air space over Syria is no longer  
4 being utilized by the Government of Syria and  
5 associated forces to target civilian populations  
6 through the use of incendiary devices, including  
7 barrel bombs, chemical weapons, and conven-  
8 tional arms, including air-delivered missiles and  
9 explosives;

10 (B) areas besieged by the Assad regime  
11 and associated forces, including Hezbollah and  
12 irregular Iranian forces, are no longer cut off  
13 from international aid and have regular access  
14 to humanitarian assistance, freedom of travel,  
15 and medical care;

16 (C) the Government of Syria is releasing  
17 all political prisoners forcibly held within the  
18 Assad regime prison system, including the fa-  
19 cilities maintained by various security, intel-  
20 ligence, and military elements associated with  
21 the Government of Syria and allowed full access  
22 to the same facilities for investigations by ap-  
23 propriate international human rights organiza-  
24 tions; and



1 (D) the forces of the Government of Syria  
2 and associated forces, including Hezbollah, ir-  
3 regular Iranian forces, and Russian government  
4 air assets, are no longer engaged in deliberate  
5 targeting of medical facilities, schools, residen-  
6 tial areas, and community gathering places, in-  
7 cluding markets, in flagrant violation of inter-  
8 national norms.

9 (2) NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDING IN AGREE-  
10 MENT.—

11 (A) INITIAL SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.—

12 If the President determines that internationally-  
13 recognized negotiations to resolve the violence  
14 in Syria have concluded in an agreement or are  
15 likely to conclude in an agreement, the Presi-  
16 dent may suspend, as appropriate, in whole or  
17 in part, the imposition of sanctions otherwise  
18 required under this Act or any amendment  
19 made by this Act for a period not to exceed 120  
20 days if the President submits to the appropriate  
21 congressional committees in writing a deter-  
22 mination and certification that—

23 (i) in the case in which the negotia-  
24 tions are likely to conclude in an agree-  
25 ment—



1 (I) the Government of Syria, the  
2 Syrian High Negotiations Committee  
3 or its successor, and appropriate  
4 international parties are participating  
5 in direct, face-to-face negotiations;  
6 and

7 (II) the suspension of sanctions  
8 under this Act or any amendment  
9 made by this Act is essential to the  
10 advancement of such negotiations; and

11 (ii) the Government of Syria has dem-  
12 onstrated a commitment to a significant  
13 and substantial reduction in attacks on  
14 and violence against the Syrian people by  
15 the Government of Syria and associated  
16 forces.

17 (B) RENEWAL OF SUSPENSION OF SANC-  
18 TIONS.—The President may renew a suspension  
19 of sanctions under subparagraph (A) for addi-  
20 tional periods not to exceed 120 days if, for  
21 each such additional period, the President sub-  
22 mits to the appropriate congressional commit-  
23 tees in writing a determination and certification  
24 that—



1 (i) the conditions described in clauses  
2 (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) are con-  
3 tinuing to be met;

4 (ii) the renewal of the suspension of  
5 sanctions is essential to implementing an  
6 agreement described in subparagraph (A)  
7 or making progress toward concluding an  
8 agreement described in subparagraph (A);

9 (iii) the Government of Syria and as-  
10 sociated forces have ceased attacks against  
11 Syrian civilians; and

12 (iv) the Government of Syria has pub-  
13 lically committed to negotiations for a  
14 transitional government in Syria and con-  
15 tinues to demonstrate that commitment  
16 through sustained engagement in talks and  
17 substantive and verifiable progress towards  
18 the implementation of such an agreement.

19 (3) BRIEFING AND REIMPOSITION OF SANC-  
20 TIONS.—

21 (A) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days  
22 after the President submits to the appropriate  
23 congressional committees a determination and  
24 certification in the case of a renewal of suspen-  
25 sion of sanctions under paragraph (2)(B), and



1 every 30 days thereafter, the President shall  
2 provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional  
3 committees on the status and frequency  
4 of negotiations described in paragraph (2).

5 (B) RE-IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—If  
6 the President provides a briefing to the appropriate  
7 congressional committees under subparagraph  
8 (A) with respect to which the President  
9 indicates a lapse in negotiations described in  
10 paragraph (2) for a period that equals or exceeds  
11 90 days, the sanctions that were suspended  
12 under paragraph (2)(B) shall be re-imposed  
13 and any further suspension of such sanctions  
14 is prohibited.

15 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR  
16 DETERMINING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN  
17 SYRIA.—It is the sense of Congress that a transitional  
18 government in Syria is a government that—

19 (1) is taking verifiable steps to release all political  
20 prisoners and provided full access to Syrian  
21 prisons for investigations by appropriate international  
22 human rights organizations;

23 (2) is taking verifiable steps to remove former  
24 senior Syrian Government officials who are complicit  
25 in the conception, implementation, or cover up of



1 war crimes, crimes against humanity, or human  
2 rights abuses from government positions and any  
3 person subject to sanctions under any provision of  
4 law;

5 (3) is in the process of organizing free and fair  
6 elections for a new government—

7 (A) to be held in a timely manner and  
8 scheduled while the suspension of sanctions or  
9 the renewal of the suspension of sanctions  
10 under this section is in effect; and

11 (B) to be conducted under the supervision  
12 of internationally-recognized observers;

13 (4) is making tangible progress toward estab-  
14 lishing an independent judiciary;

15 (5) is demonstrating respect for and compliance  
16 with internationally-recognized human rights and  
17 basic freedoms as specified in the Universal Declara-  
18 tion of Human Rights;

19 (6) is taking steps to verifiably fulfill its com-  
20 mitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention  
21 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  
22 Weapons and is making tangible progress toward be-  
23 coming a signatory to Convention on the Prohibition  
24 of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of  
25 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and



1 on their Destruction, entered into force March 26,  
2 1975, and adhering to the Missile Technology Con-  
3 trol Regime and other control lists, as necessary;

4 (7) has halted the development and deployment  
5 of ballistic and cruise missiles; and

6 (8) is taking verifiable steps to remove from po-  
7 sitions of authority within the intelligence and secu-  
8 rity services as well as the military those who were  
9 in a position of authority or responsibility during the  
10 conflict and who under the authority of their posi-  
11 tion were implicated in or implicit in the torture,  
12 extrajudicial killing, or execution of civilians, to in-  
13 clude those who were involved in decision making or  
14 execution of plans to use chemical weapons.

15 **SEC. 402. WAIVERS AND EXEMPTIONS.**

16 (a) EXEMPTIONS.—The following activities and  
17 transactions shall be exempt from sanctions authorized  
18 under this Act:

19 (1) Any activity subject to the reporting re-  
20 quirements under title V of the National Security  
21 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), or to any au-  
22 thorized intelligence activities of the United States.

23 (2) Any transaction necessary to comply with  
24 United States obligations under—



1 (A) the Agreement between the United Na-  
2 tions and the United States of America regard-  
3 ing the Headquarters of the United Nations,  
4 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and en-  
5 tered into force November 21, 1947; or

6 (B) the Convention on Consular Relations,  
7 done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered  
8 into force March 19, 1967.

9 (b) HUMANITARIAN AND DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE  
10 WAIVER.—

11 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the  
12 policy of the United States to fully utilize the waiver  
13 authority under this subsection to ensure that ade-  
14 quate humanitarian relief or support for democracy  
15 promotion is provided to the Syrian people.

16 (2) WAIVER.—The President may waive, on a  
17 case-by-case basis, for a period not to exceed 120  
18 days, and renewable for additional periods not to ex-  
19 ceed 120 days, the application of sanctions author-  
20 ized under this Act if the President submits to the  
21 appropriate congressional committees a written de-  
22 termination that the waiver is necessary for pur-  
23 poses of providing humanitarian assistance or sup-  
24 port for democracy promotion to the people of Syria.



1           (3) CONTENT OF WRITTEN DETERMINATION.—

2       A written determination submitted under paragraph  
3       (1) with respect to a waiver shall include a descrip-  
4       tion of all notification and accountability controls  
5       that have been employed in order to ensure that the  
6       activities covered by the waiver are humanitarian as-  
7       sistance or support for democracy promotion and do  
8       not entail any activities in Syria or dealings with the  
9       Government of Syria not reasonably related to hu-  
10      manitarian assistance or support for democracy pro-  
11      motion.

12           (4) CLARIFICATION OF PERMITTED ACTIVITIES  
13      UNDER WAIVER.—The President may not impose  
14      sanctions authorized under this Act against an inter-  
15      nationally-recognized humanitarian organization  
16      for—

17           (A) engaging in a financial transaction re-  
18           lating to humanitarian assistance or for human-  
19           itarian purposes pursuant to a waiver issued  
20           under paragraph (1);

21           (B) transporting goods or services that are  
22           necessary to carry out operations relating to  
23           humanitarian assistance or humanitarian pur-  
24           poses pursuant to such a waiver; or



1           (C) having incidental contact, in the course  
2           of providing humanitarian assistance or aid for  
3           humanitarian purposes pursuant to such a  
4           waiver, with individuals who are under the con-  
5           trol of a foreign person subject to sanctions  
6           under this Act or any amendment made by this  
7           Act.

8       (e) WAIVER.—

9           (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may, on a  
10          case-by-case basis and for periods not to exceed 120  
11          days, waive the application of sanctions under this  
12          Act with respect to a foreign person if the President  
13          certifies to the appropriate congressional committees  
14          that such waiver is vital to the national security in-  
15          terests of the United States.

16          (2) CONSULTATION.—

17               (A) BEFORE WAIVER ISSUED.—Not later  
18               than 5 days before the issuance of a waiver  
19               under paragraph (1) is to take effect, the Presi-  
20               dent shall notify and brief the appropriate con-  
21               gressional committees on the status of the for-  
22               eign person involvement in activities described  
23               in this Act.

24               (B) AFTER WAIVER ISSUED.—Not later  
25               than 90 days after the issuance of a waiver



1 under paragraph (1), and every 120 days there-  
2 after if the waiver remains in effect, the Presi-  
3 dent shall brief the appropriate congressional  
4 committees on the status of the foreign person's  
5 involvement in activities described in this Act.

6 **TITLE V—REGULATORY**  
7 **AUTHORITY AND SUNSET**

8 **SEC. 501. REGULATORY AUTHORITY.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, not later  
10 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,  
11 promulgate regulations as necessary for the implementa-  
12 tion of this Act and the amendments made by this Act.

13 (b) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—Not less than 10  
14 days before the promulgation of regulations under sub-  
15 section (a), the President shall notify and provide to the  
16 appropriate congressional committees the proposed regula-  
17 tions and the provisions of this Act and the amendments  
18 made by this Act that the regulations are implementing.

19 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
20 priate congressional committees” means—

21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the  
22 Committee on Financial Services of the House of  
23 Representatives; and



1           (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and  
2       the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-  
3       fairs of the Senate.

4 **SEC. 502. SUNSET.**

5       This Act shall cease to be effective beginning on De-  
6       cember 31, 2021.



**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5132**  
**OFFERED BY MR. MEADOWS OF NORTH**  
**CAROLINA**

Strike section 302 (relating to updated list of persons who are responsible for human rights violations in Syria) and insert the following:

**1 SEC. 302. REPORT ON CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE RE-**  
**2 SPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN CERTAIN**  
**3 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA.**

**4 (a) IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 120 days after the  
**5 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-**  
**6 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed**  
**7 report with respect to whether each person described in**  
**8 subsection (b) is a person that meets the requirements de-**  
**9 scribed in section 702(b) of the Syria Human Rights Ac-**  
**10 countability Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8791(b) for purposes**  
**11 of inclusion on the list of persons who are responsible for**  
**12 or complicit in certain human rights abuses under such**  
**13 section. For any such person who is not included in such**  
**14 report, the President should include in the report a de-**  
**15 scription of the reasons why the person was not included,**  
**16 including information on whether sufficient credible evi-**  
**17 dence of responsibility for such abuses was found.**



1 (b) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—The persons described in  
2 this subsection are the following:

- 3 (1) Bashar Al-Assad.
- 4 (2) Asma Al-Assad.
- 5 (3) Rami Makhlouf.
- 6 (4) Bouthayna Shaaban.
- 7 (5) Walid Moallem.
- 8 (6) Ali Al-Salim.
- 9 (7) Wael Nader Al-Halqi.
- 10 (8) Jamil Hassan.
- 11 (9) Suhail Hassan.
- 12 (10) Ali Mamluk.
- 13 (11) Muhammed Khadour, Deir Ez Zor Mili-  
14 tary and Security.
- 15 (12) Jamal Razzouq, Security Branch 243.
- 16 (13) Munzer Ghanam, Air Force Intelligence.
- 17 (14) Daas Hasan Ali, Branch 327.
- 18 (15) Jassem Ali Jassem Hamad, Political Secu-  
19 rity.
- 20 (16) Samir Muhammad Youssef, Military Intel-  
21 ligence.
- 22 (17) Ali Ahmad Dayoub, Air Force Intelligence.
- 23 (18) Khaled Muhsen Al-Halabi, Security  
24 Branch 335.
- 25 (19) Mahmoud Kahila, Political Security.



- 1 (20) Zuhair Ahmad Hamad, Provincial Security.
- 2
- 3 (21) Wafiq Nasser, Security Branch 245.
- 4 (22) Qussay Mayoub, Air Force Intelligence.
- 5 (23) Muhammad Ammar Sardini, Political Security.
- 6
- 7 (24) Fouad Hammouda, Military Security.
- 8 (25) Hasan Daaboul, Branch 261.
- 9 (26) Yahia Wahbi, Air Force Intelligence.
- 10 (27) Okab Saqer, Security Branch 318.
- 11 (28) Husam Luqa, Political Security.
- 12 (29) Sami Al-Hasan, Security Branch 219.
- 13 (30) Yassir Deeb, Political Security.
- 14 (31) Ibrahim Darwish, Security Branch 220.
- 15 (32) Nasser Deeb, Political Security.
- 16 (33) Abdullatif Al-Fahed, Security Branch 290.
- 17 (34) Adeeb Namer Salamah, Air Force Intelligence.
- 18
- 19 (35) Akram Muhammed, State Security.
- 20 (36) Reyad Abbas, Political Security.
- 21 (37) Ali Abdullah Ayoub, Syrian Armed Forces.
- 22 (38) Fahd Jassem Al-Frej, Defense Ministry.
- 23 (39) Issam Halaq, Air Force.
- 24 (40) Ghassan Al-Abdullah, General Intelligence Directorate.
- 25



- 1 (41) Maher Al-Assad, Republican Guard.  
2 (42) Fahad Al-Farouch.  
3 (43) Rafiq Shahada, Military Intelligence.  
4 (44) Loay Al-Ali, Military Intelligence.  
5 (45) Nawfal Al-Husayn, Military Intelligence.  
6 (46) Muhammad Zamrini, Military Intelligence.  
7 (47) Muhammad Mahallah, Military Intel-  
8 ligence.

9 (c) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

10 (1) FORM.—The list required by subsection (a)  
11 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may  
12 contain a classified annex if necessary.

13 (2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified  
14 portion of the list required by paragraph (1) shall be  
15 made available to the public and posted on the Web  
16 sites of the Department of the Treasury and the De-  
17 partment of State.





**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5132****OFFERED BY MS. ROS-LEHTINEN OF FLORIDA**

In section 702(d) of the Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012, as proposed to be amended by section 201(b) of the bill, insert after “markets” the following: “and also includes hindering the prompt and safe access for all actors engaged in humanitarian relief activities in Syria, including across conflict lines and borders”.





**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5732**  
**OFFERED BY MS. ROS-LEHTINEN OF FLORIDA**

At the end of title II, add the following:

1 **SEC. 2xx. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**  
 2 **PERSONS WHO HINDER HUMANITARIAN AC-**  
 3 **CESS.**

4 The Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012  
 5 (22 U.S.C. 8791 et seq.) is amended—

6 (1) by redesignating sections 705 and 706 as  
 7 sections 706 and 707, respectively;

8 (2) by inserting after section 704 the following:

9 **“SEC. 705. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**  
 10 **PERSONS WHO HINDER HUMANITARIAN AC-**  
 11 **CESS.**

12 **“(a) IN GENERAL.—**The President shall impose sanc-  
 13 tions described in section 702(c) with respect to each per-  
 14 son on the list required by subsection (b).

15 **“(b) LIST OF PERSONS WHO HINDER HUMANI-**  
 16 **TARIAN ACCESS.—**

17 **“(1) IN GENERAL.—**Not later than 120 days  
 18 after the date of the enactment of the Caesar Syria  
 19 Civilian Protection Act of 2016, the President shall  
 20 submit to the appropriate congressional committees



1 a list of persons that the President determines have  
2 engaged in hindering the prompt and safe access for  
3 the United Nations, its specialized agencies and im-  
4 plementing partners, national and international non-  
5 governmental organizations, and all other actors en-  
6 gaged in humanitarian relief activities in Syria, in-  
7 cluding across conflict lines and borders.

8 “(2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall  
9 submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
10 an updated list under paragraph (1)—

11 “(A) not later than 300 days after the date  
12 of the enactment of the Caesar Syria Civilian  
13 Protection Act of 2016 and every 180 days  
14 thereafter; and

15 “(B) as new information becomes avail-  
16 able.

17 “(3) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAIL-  
18 ABILITY.—

19 “(A) FORM.—The list required by para-  
20 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified  
21 form but may contain a classified annex.

22 “(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclas-  
23 sified portion of the list required by paragraph  
24 (1) shall be made available to the public and



1 posted on the websites of the Department of the  
2 Treasury and the Department of State.”; and  
3 (3) in section 706 (as so redesignated), by  
4 striking “or 704” and inserting “704, or 705”.





**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5132**  
**OFFERED BY MR. YOHO OF FLORIDA**

In section 2, insert after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (and redesignate subsequent paragraphs accordingly):

1           (4) In a June 16, 2015, hearing of the Com-  
2       mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-  
3       resentatives, United States Permanent Representa-  
4       tive to the United Nations, Samantha Power, testi-  
5       fied that there are alarming and grave reports that  
6       the Assad regime has been turning chlorine into a  
7       chemical weapon, and on June 16, 2015, Secretary  
8       of State John Kerry stated that he was “absolutely  
9       certain” that the Assad regime has used chlorine  
10      against his people.

In section 3, insert after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (and redesignate the subsequent paragraph accordingly):

11           (3) Assad’s use of chemical weapons, including  
12       chlorine, against the Syrian people violates the  
13       Chemical Weapons Convention; and





Chairman ROYCE. Now, the ranking member is on his way. And here he is.

As a token of my appreciation for the extensive bipartisan work that went into today's business, I am going to limit to two sentences per measure my comments.

So first, I want to thank Mr. Salmon for his leadership on House Resolution 634. This expresses support for increased trilateral cooperation with our Japanese and Korean allies, and this support is critical, given North Korea's continued belligerence.

I also want to thank Judge Poe and Mr. Connolly for House Resolution 660, which urges the United States to deepen cooperation with Georgia, especially through strengthening the country's self-defense capabilities.

Next year, the current memorandum of understanding regarding U.S. military assistance to Israel will expire, so I want to thank Chairman Emeritus Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. Deutch for introducing House Resolution 729, which urges the administration to work expeditiously to finalize a new robust agreement with our key security partner.

Few threats to Israel are as great as that posed by the Iranian proxy Hezbollah. So I want to recognize the good work of Mr. Deutch on House Resolution 750, which urges the European Union to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

I also want to thank Mr. Smith and Ms. Bass for introducing House Resolution 780, urging respect for free and fair elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Elections that have been delayed by President Kabila, as he seeks to avoid a clear constitutional requirement that he step down from power.

House Resolution 821 urges Gabon to hold free and fair elections this August. Gabon is not on a good track. Election observers, including the National Democratic Institute, report the possibility of violence during the election period. If past elections are an example, voter lists and vote counting will surely be manipulated. The Gabonese people deserve better. Unfortunately, with no Presidential term limits in place, this could be the low standard.

We also consider House Resolution 808, which calls on Iran to immediately release Iranian Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi, who are being held hostage by that regime in Evin prison. The regime in Tehran has not changed its ways, and it continues to threaten the United States, threaten our allies, and threaten our citizens.

Our last resolution recognizes the great life and work of the recently deceased activist and historian, Elie Wiesel. It urges the continuation of his tremendous efforts to never forget and to ensure the tragedies of the Holocaust are never repeated.

We also consider H.R. 4481, the Education for All Act, which increases direction and accountability for U.S. efforts to improve access to basic education in developing countries, particularly for girls and children affected by conflict and crisis. And I want to thank Ranking Member Engel and Mr. Smith for their good inputs into this measure and have welcomed, in particular, the bill's emphasis on girls' access to education and the importance of parental involvement in their children's schooling.



Next, we turn to the Digital Global Access Policy Act, which will make it U.S. policy to alert the private sector to infrastructure projects in developing countries so that companies have the option of installing Internet access prior to a project's completion. This build-once policy is common sense, and it will help more people in developing countries get Internet access.

And lastly, the ongoing atrocities in Syria continue to shock the world, so I am proud to be an original cosponsor of the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2016, which should make it harder for the Assad regime to acquire the tools to keep bombing and to keep gassing and to keep killing Syrians.

And I thank our ranking member, Mr. Engel, who has long been at the forefront of Syria policy. And I now recognize the ranking member for his remarks.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your kind words, and thank you for calling this markup. We are going into our summer recess with a bang, taking up 13 measures this morning, and I want to thank our members on both sides of the aisle for all their hard work.

I am going to focus first on a bill that the chairman just mentioned that I introduced, and it is one of the measures we are considering en bloc. Earlier this week, Chairman Royce and I introduced the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act.

One of the most remarkable moments for me as ranking member took place 2 years ago when the man known as Caesar visited this committee. Our colleagues will remember that day very vividly. He was a photographer who worked for the Assad Government in Syria who defected to the opposition. He brought with him horrific photographic evidence of violence and torture and killing that the regime had inflicted upon its own people.

The need for American leadership to end this crisis has never been greater, and my bill would provide the administration with even more tools to help end the bloodshed and usher in a political transition. This bill would impose new sanctions on any parties that continue to do business with the Assad regime, but leaves flexibility for the administration so that if negotiations go forward, sanctions could be waived on a case-by-case basis to keep things moving along.

The bill also addresses war crimes and crimes against humanity that have been so obvious in this conflict by facilitating evidence collection and requiring a report to name and shame those responsible for human rights violations against the Syrian people.

Lastly, this bill strengthens oversight of our cross-border assistance going into Syria and requires a report on the potential effectiveness, risks, and requirements of a no-fly zone over or safe zone in Syria. I am grateful to the chairman for joining me to introduce this bill, and I ask that all members support it.

We have 11 other measures we are taking up en bloc, and I am glad to support all of them. Mr. Salmon's resolution, underscoring the importance of the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral relationship, enhances regional security and holds North Korea accountable on its atrocious human rights record. Mr. Poe's resolution expresses support for Georgia's territorial integrity and condemns Putin's aggression and supports the people of Georgia. Mr.



Lowenthal's resolution supports democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Cambodia, and urges Cambodia's Government, headed by the same Prime Minister since 1985, to respect the democratic aspirations of its people. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen's measure calling for a new long-term memorandum of understanding between the United States and Israel demonstrates our steadfastness in our support of Israel's ability to defend itself. Mr. Deutch's resolution appropriately calls on the European Union to designate Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization. Mr. Smith's resolution urges respect for the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in this year's transfer of power. And Chairman Royce and I were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo together just a few months ago.

The chairman's measure calling on Iran's leaders to release Iranian Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi. It is outrageous that Iran continues to detain Americans on trumped up charges, and we need to keep holding Iran's feet to the fire on these issues.

Another resolution from Mr. Smith urges Gabon's Government to respect and uphold democratic principles in the upcoming Presidential elections. The Education for All Act, sponsored by my neighbor from New York, Nita Lowey, helps ensure that expanding access to basic education remains a foreign policy priority in developing countries. A resolution from another New York colleague, Mr. Israel, honors the life and work of Elie Wiesel, a constant example of the sort of encourage needed to stand up against hatred and evil.

And lastly, the chairman's Digital GAP Act, which I am happy to cosponsor, promotes our interest in seeing more people around the world get online. And I thank the chairman for his work on this measure.

These are all good pieces of legislation I am glad to support. Again, I thank everyone for their hard work. I wish everyone a good summer break.

I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement of support for H.R. 4481, the Education for All Act, from my good friend and ranking member of the Appropriations Committee and author of the bill, Mrs. Lowey.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Rohrabacher of California.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me note that I certainly support almost all of the bills that are being presented en bloc to us, but I have an absolute deep opposition to the bill that is aimed at Georgia and the situation in Georgia.

Again, we have heard over and over again misinformation based on an irrational hostility toward Russia. We see this over and over again. We are leading the world not to a new cold war but the possibility of a real war with Russia; Russia who pulled back their military forces from a large chunk of Europe peacefully; Russia that has, yes, made some mistakes and actually done some things that are worthy of condemning.

But if we take a look at what happened in Georgia and what the situation is, Georgia had a truce with warring factions in that part of the world. And what happened is that Georgia withdrew from



the Soviet Union after the fall of Communism, which it had every right to do.

There are two provinces of Georgia that had been given to Georgia by Joseph Stalin, two provinces that did not want to be part of Georgia, traditionally, historically, were not comfortable with having the Georgians over them: Ossetia and Abkhazia. Those two provinces immediately after the withdrawal from Russia began—there was an insurgency movement for independence for those two provinces, very similar to what we saw in Kosovo and Serbia. We sided with the Kosovars, by the way, because they had a right of self-determination.

While the fighting that went on was so bloody that there was a truce that was reached with negotiations, Russia involved themselves in that truce by agreeing to have observers to that agreement. That truce lasted for years, until the United States decided that we were going to work with Georgia to bring Georgia into NATO. NATO, an armed alliance aimed specifically at Russia.

And so we decided to bring Georgia into NATO, and Russia counteracted by offering the people in Ossetia and Abkhazia Russian citizenship if they wanted it, which was then countered by Georgia in an invasion of those two provinces. We keep talking about an aggression by Russia against Georgia. The truce that lasted—the truce that was there, the peace that was there was violated by Georgia, and what we call the invasion of Georgia was a retaliation. The very next day, they did not let the Georgians get away—into Georgia.

And by the way, when the Georgians broke that truce and invaded Abkhazia and Ossetia with their army, they killed unarmed Russian observers of that truce agreement. Now, I don't know what we would do if there are American observers of a peace truce and they ended up being murdered by some people coming in, unarmed, I might add, coming in to make sure that their country took over two provinces like, I might say, just exactly like Mr. Eliot and I were very, very active making sure that the Serbians didn't get to kill everybody who got in their way, wouldn't be part of the greater Serbia after the breakup of Yugoslavia.

And the fact is that Georgia today—we keep talking about the Russian aggression on Georgia. The Russian troops that we are talking about only went into those two provinces. They are now, yes, in those two provinces. And what we should do is make an agreement for any withdrawal of those troops by letting Ossetia and Abkhazia have a vote on where they want to be. Let them have a vote that is taken by the OSCE and down there could verify that vote. Let them make that determination.

What we are doing is a hostile anti-Russian act in the name of trying to in some way make up for some act of aggression that did not take place with Russia. Russia retaliated against someone who had already broken a truce and broken the peace. And by the way, I have said that a dozen times here. It is always ignored. Condoleezza Rice was right at that table when I said exactly the same thing, and instead of denying it, she went around it.

Now, I think that if we want to have peace in the world, we have to have a good working relationship with Russia. And instead, in an irrational hostility toward Russia, based on the fact that Stalin



not only did this thing with Ossetia and Abkhazia, giving it to Georgia, but he murdered millions of people, Ukrainians. Stalin, and during the Soviet time, murdered millions of people in these subjugated areas, whether the Balkans or whether it is up in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and now those people have a historic grudge. We cannot let ourselves be pushed into a war with Russia because there is a historic grudge that is going on among those people.

And if we are going to have peace in the world, we have to be sure of what we are doing and be honest about it, and we haven't been with Russia dealing with Georgia and dealing with the Baltic States, which I have not seen any military aggression going on in the Baltic States. Yet, we have B-52 bombers—B-52 bombers—which are nuclear weapons delivery systems flying straight toward Russia and turning around as they get over the Baltic States. This is insane.

What we would do if Russian bombers were headed straight into us—I mean, we are not talking about cruising along a coastline or cruising along boundary lines, we are talking about a war-type maneuver. And we are doing that in Georgia. We are doing that in the Baltics. It is ridiculous. And I would oppose this particular part of these bills today, but I support the rest of them.

Chairman ROYCE. So now we go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and I thank the ranking member for bringing before the committee H. Res. 660, expressing support for the territorial integrity of Georgia. I also want to welcome the Ambassador of Georgia to this markup, who has joined us today.

I introduced this resolution with my friend and colleague and co-chair of the congressional caucus in Georgia, Judge Ted Poe, who unfortunately is not with us today.

This resolution serves as a clear and unequivocal statement in support of the sovereign territory of Georgia and reiterates the longstanding United States policy to not recognize territorial changes effected by force as dictated by the Stimson Doctrine, established in 1932—not a new idea, not an anti-Putin idea—1932, by then-Secretary of State Henry Stimson.

In Georgia and elsewhere in the region, revisionist talk notwithstanding, Russia has committed gross violations of these principles by fomenting unrest and aiding separatist movements in the countries along its periphery. Foundational, multilateral agreements reached for the purpose of maintaining a peaceful and stable international order, such as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the charter of the United Nations itself, have been willfully disregarded by Russia at Vladimir Putin's behest.

This resolution condemns strongly the forceable and illegal occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions in Georgia, and calls on Russia to withdraw its troops from those territories of another sovereign country. Phony elections with troops of a foreign power all over territory should be rejected. Those aren't Democratic instruments.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Would the gentleman yield for a question at that point that you just made?



Mr. CONNOLLY. I would.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would you say elections that—would you agree that the solution to this would be elections in those provinces under the supervision of the OSCE, let those people decide?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would argue that with Russian troops in those territories, no such election could ever be valid. And the first order of business, like in the Ukraine and the Crimea—which we are going to address separately—they must withdraw. You cannot have any confidence in an election when Russian troops are all over your territory. An election at the point of the gun? What democrat, with a small D, in America could ever consent to that? None of us can. None of us should.

This committee has an opportunity right now with this resolution and with the Ukrainian resolution to follow to make a clarion statement that can be heard in Moscow. We will be unwavering in insisting on the territorial sovereignty of sovereign states, whether Putin likes it or not, whether there was Soviet history or not. We are where we are today, and we don't solve problems in Europe at the point of a gun.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield for another question?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would happily yield to my friend.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you recognize or do you not recognize that the military action—that the initiator of the violence that you are condemning was the Georgian army that broke a long-lasting truce in that area and thus resulted in the occupation forces that you were talking about?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would say, reclaiming my time to my friend, believe it or not, there are international mechanisms for dispute resolution. They do not include the invasion and occupation for 8 long years of another country's sovereign territory. That is not how we solve disputes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The question that I had to you was do you recognize—

Mr. CONNOLLY. I yield again my time to my friend.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. That was the actual Georgians and not the Russians that initiated that violence?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Again, that is my friend's view of history, and I respect my friend, but there is another point of view about that history. And those disputes can be resolved in a peaceful manner, but they cannot be resolved so long as there are Russian troops occupying territory of another country.

Certainly, my friend would agree that this territory is Georgian. That is not in dispute. And certainly, my friend would also agree, there are Russian troops in Georgian territory. Now, whether my friend wants to aid and abet Putin in his hegemony and occupying and annexing, as he did illegally in the Crimea, this territory of Georgia is a different matter.

But I am urging my colleagues to reject my friend's argument and to wholeheartedly endorse this resolution so the statement from this committee representing the foreign affairs function of the United States Congress is as crystal clear as can be so there is no ambiguity.

With that, I yield back.



Chairman ROYCE. And we go now to Mr. Chabot of Ohio.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman.

I would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, for bringing these bills before the committee today. These are all important measures, and it is encouraging to see the hard work of our colleagues that are being considered today.

And again, the nature of this committee, for the most part, on a bipartisan manner, oftentimes the disagreements aren't necessarily between Republicans and Democrats; they are oftentimes between Republicans and Democrats and one or a few members of this committee sometimes. But—and I don't say that in a critical way.

I rise in support of H. Res. 728, a bill that reaffirms the U.S. commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Cambodia. I am an original cosponsor of the bill, and I also serve as cochair of the Congressional Cambodia Caucus, along with my colleague, Mr. Lowenthal, and I commend him for offering this bill that I am talking about.

In recent months, we have held a number of briefings and meetings with the State Department officials, with Cambodian Americans, as well as NGOs engaged in democracy building and rural law issues in Cambodia. And I have to say, I am very concerned about the situation there. Prime Minister Hun Sen continues to use bully tactics to sway the elections in his favor, and he has obviously been in control, in power in Cambodia for a long time. I believe he is the longest, at least, strong man serving in all of Asia.

Opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who I have met with many times over the years, both in Cambodia and here, and who Mr. Lowenthal and I met with just last month, has real doubts about his ability even to return to Cambodia for fear of being in prison there on trumped-up charges, or worse. And now the deputy opposition leader Kem Sokha has seen charges brought against him.

And there is reason to believe that there will be an intensifying crackdown on opposition prior to the election, which puts the election itself and its credibility in doubt, unfortunately, because Cambodia has the potential of being a truly great country and a very important part of the world. The people still should be living under much better circumstances than they are. It is obviously much better than it was when the Khmer Rouge was in power, when the killing fields occurred, and a quarter of the population was wiped out on the basis of, for example, whether you wore glasses or whether you had an education or a whole range of other issues.

So it is not nearly as bad as it was back then clearly, but it should be so much better. And, unfortunately, because of the leadership of Hun Sen, the democracy that ought to be taking place in that country right now is being to a considerable degree thwarted. And if this behavior by Hun Sen and his supporters is allowed to continue and a suppression of the opposition and coercion of the opposition, in many cases, this could deal a serious blow to the democratic process just before the upcoming 2018 election.

So I believe that this legislation will send a strong signal that the United States is paying close attention to the situation in Cambodia.



I want to, again, thank Mr. Lowenthal for his leadership on this bill and on all issues in Cambodia, and I appreciate his cooperation in working on this issue, again, in a bipartisan way. So thank you very much.

And I urge my colleagues to support it and the other legislation that we have discussed this morning and will discuss, and I yield back my time.

Chairman ROYCE. Ted Deutch of Florida.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you and Ranking Member Engel for, again, working in the spirit of bipartisanship that has marked the leadership of this committee.

I am proud to support this good slate of bills today, and I would like to thank Ranking Member Engel for his continued leadership on Syria with the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act. I am also proud to cosponsor Congressman Poe and Congressman Connolly's resolution supporting Georgia's territorial integrity.

And I would make a point of offering our thoughts and our prayers to Judge Poe as he goes home to get well.

I also want to thank Chairman Royce and Mr. Connolly for introducing H. Res. 808, calling on the Government of Iran to release American citizens Siamak and Baquer Namazi. We cannot and we must not be silent as Iran continues to unlawfully detain American citizens, and we won't stop until the Namazis are released. And we also will not stop—will not stop—until Bob Levinson returns home to his family. He has now been separated from them for 9½ years.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to just briefly talk about three of the measures before us that I am proud to have introduced. First, I would like to thank my friend and Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for working with me to introduce H.R. 729, which urges the expeditious conclusion of a new memorandum of understanding between the United States and Israel. I thank the many members of this committee who are also cosponsors. This resolution now has over 270 cosponsors, which underscores the deep bipartisan support for the U.S.-Israel relationship in this Congress.

I traveled to Israel last week to assess the current security situation, and it is clear that Israel continues to face unprecedented threats from Hamas rockets in the south to Hezbollah's more than 100,000 rocket arsenal to ISIS affiliates, both on the Syrian border and on the Sinai. And it is because of the strong support from the United States that Israel is able to defend itself against these threats, many of which threaten our own strategic interests in the region.

But the conclusion of this MOU is about more than just shared security threats. A new 10-year MOU will serve as the backbone of this relationship, and it sends a message to the entire world that the United States and Israel stand together. The administration has made clear that it wants to conclude the MOU as quickly as possible, that it is prepared to offer Israel the largest aid package to date. And I heard many encouraging things from those in Israel last week about the desire to reach an agreement.

By passing this resolution today, Congress will go on record with the overwhelming bipartisan support for the U.S.-Israel relationship, and I urge my colleagues to support it.



Second, I urge the committee to support H. Res. 750, which calls on the European Union to designate the whole of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. I thank my colleagues, Representatives Bilirakis, Israel, Kelly, Lieu, Jeffries, Zeldin, and Davis, for joining me in introducing this resolution.

In 2012, Congress passed a resolution that I authored with Congressman Kelly calling on the EU to designate Hezbollah. In 2013, the EU designated the military wing of Hezbollah. Mr. Chairman, we all know there is no distinction between the military and political wings of a terrorist organization. There is only one Hezbollah; it is a terrorist organization. This country makes no distinction. Canada makes no distinction. The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League make no distinction.

Hezbollah is responsible for terrorist attacks in Europe, Latin America, and in Asia. It has well over 100,000 rockets pointed at Israel. Its fighters are on the ground in Syria doing Iran's dirty work helping the Assad regime slaughter tens of thousands of innocent Syrians.

This organization uses the international financial system to fund its worldwide criminal enterprises, which in turn fund its terror activities. And I applaud our allies in Europe for the work they have done to crack down on Hezbollah's criminal activities. That is why they should take the next logical step of designating the entirety of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. This designation will allow the EU to work even more closely with American authorities to prevent Hezbollah from using the international banking system to fund its global terror. I urge my colleagues to support this good and timely bill.

And finally, I would like to thank the committee for moving swiftly to bring up H. Res. 810, recognizing the life and the incredible contributions of Elie Wiesel. It is difficult to truly capture the immense positive impact that Elie Wiesel had on our world.

After surviving one of humanity's darkest moments, he worked to keep alive the memories and the stories of the millions of lives that were lost. He committed himself to fighting for the voiceless. He refused to stay silent as atrocities transpired against others. He was a source of inspiration for millions of people throughout the world, and he will forever live in history as one of the greatest and most influential and the bravest figures of his time.

By passing this resolution today, particularly today, after the challenging month that our own Nation has had, we honor Elie Wiesel. And we recommit ourselves to overcoming even the most insurmountable of obstacles. We inspire ourselves to greater tolerance and to upholding the principle of never again.

I appreciate it very much, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.

We go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel, for bringing before the committee my resolution, H. Res. 729, which is simple bipartisan common sense, and, as my colleague, Congressman Deutch, pointed out, has the support of over 270 cosponsors, including almost every single member of our committee. It calls upon the administration to conclude a new robust and long-term MOU on military assistance to Israel.



I also wanted to express my support for H.R. 5732, the Caesar Syrian Civil Protection Act. In 2012, we passed in this committee a bill I authored, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, which later became law, and part of our bill before us builds upon those sanctions. And I have offered two amendments that I think add to what we are trying to accomplish.

And later today, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I will convene a hearing in our subcommittee on a GAO report that Ted Deutch, Ron DeSantis, Gerry Connolly, and I requested on undelivered humanitarian assistance into Syria. And I would also like to commend my friend, Mark Meadows, for offering his important amendment to name and shame the human rights violators in Syria. And I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Lowenthal, were you seeking time? Yes, Alan.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for working with me.

And thank you, Ranking Member Engel, for bringing up House Resolution 728 supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Cambodia.

You know, Mr. Chair, you have been a leader on human rights and the rule of law in Cambodia for years, and I was so pleased to work with you to bring this resolution forward.

I also want to thank Congressman Chabot. You have worked with me as the cochair on the Cambodia Caucus. We have brought together a bipartisan approach to democracy and the rule of law in Cambodia, and I just want to thank you as we bring this resolution forward.

And I also want to thank Chairman Matt Salmon, who has been the Republican lead on this resolution. He brought it up in the Asia Subcommittee markup last week, where it was passed, and I want to thank him for working with us and his leadership on this issue. It is very much appreciated.

Cambodia holds great promise for being one of the few open, free, and democratic societies in a region where democracy has been on the defensive. However, in recent years, the Cambodian Government, presided by the Prime Minister Hun Sen for the past 31 years, has severely cracked down on the political opposition and all forms of dissent.

This resolution outlines numerous instances of political violence since the 2013 national elections, which prolonged Hun Sen's grip on power and were marred by allegations of voting irregularities. The Cambodian Government has undertaken a comprehensive campaign to undermine the political opposition.

Last year, the Cambodian Government revived a 7-year-old defamation charge against opposition leader Sam Rainsy, expelling him from the Parliament and forcing him into self-imposed exile. Since then, the government has sought to arrest Kem Sokha, the deputy opposition leader who remains under effective house arrest.

And just this last weekend, prominent political activist and outspoken critic of the government, Kem Ley, was brutally gunned down in the streets of Phnom Penh. The true motive of his killing is not yet known, but the current unrest in Cambodia and the long



history of political assassinations have led many to suspect the government's involvement in his murder.

Just yesterday, I spoke with Mr. Kem Sokha, the deputy opposition leader. He told me now that he not only fears arrest by the government but that now he truly fears for his life. The deteriorating political situation in Cambodia demands action from the United States. That is why it is so important that we pass this resolution and show that Congress stands with the people of Cambodia and reaffirms our commitment to democracy, to human rights, and the rule of law in Cambodia.

By passing House Resolution 728 today, we will send an important signal to the Cambodian Government that political violence of any kind will not be tolerated and that the Cambodian people must be able to enjoy freedom of speech and freedom to choose their own leaders.

Again, I urge my colleagues to support the resolution and thank Chairman——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Yes, I will.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just commend Congressman Lowenthal for his unstopping energy that he puts into this effort to bring peace and democracy to Cambodia.

Over the years, I have tried to be supportive of his efforts. And I have been to Cambodia a number of times. It is time for Hun Sen to go. There was an argument that Hun Sen helped get rid of Pol Pot, who was a monster who murdered millions of his own people. Whatever happened in the past does not justify Hun Sen's continuing iron-fisted grip. And this is crony capitalism or crony communism, however you describe it in Cambodia. And we are going to have—they deserve our support for creating a more democratic society there.

And thank you, Mr. Lowenthal, for all you are doing in this regard.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE. I will just make the observation that we are going to have business on the floor at 10:05, so if any of the members here could submit their statements for the record, that would be very helpful.

We are going to go to Mr. Weber of Texas.

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman, thank the chairman.

And I am going to speak on 660. I want to thank my good friend, Congressman Poe from Texas, for his excellent work on the resolution. Seems there has been some discussion about it. I will put my good friend, Mr. Connolly from Virginia, down as a "lean yes" and our good friend from California as an "undecided."

I do want to commend the work that Congressman Poe and Mr. Connolly have done on this bill. I want to commend the work of the chairman and my colleagues on the full slate of legislation being marked up today.

From the prompting of the EU to designate Hezbollah a terrorist organization, to the honoring of a true statesman, as many have already alluded to, Mr. Elie Wiesel, to the call for the release of yet



more Iranian Americans illegally jailed, we have a block of legislation that is both timely and significant in its reach. And I appreciate the bipartisan work done on this committee.

Mr. Chairman, in 2008, Russia signed a cease-fire agreement with Georgia committing to, among other things, the withdrawal of their military troops to prewar position. Eight years later, they have instead created an entire military base and continued to expand their territory within the sovereign nation of Georgia. In fact, reports suggest that Russian military and special forces invaded a village within the District of Guria where they created roads through the gardens of 48 local residents, divided the village cemetery in two, and destroyed the stadium along with thousands of apple trees. Additionally, Russian soldiers have kidnapped a number of Georgian citizens near the administrative border line separating South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia, and the detentions are on the rise.

Russia is refusing to honor their agreement. Instead, they are signaling their desire to reclaim Georgia by the blatant attempt to co-op the upcoming October elections, as Mr. Connolly alluded to at the point of a gun perhaps, also via propaganda and the influence of Russian oligarch and billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Worth at least \$5 billion, Mr. Ivanishvili was recently exposed by the Panama Papers for his offshore financial deals, his illicit arms trades, and his continued efforts to control the Georgian Government behind the scenes.

There is no question that Moscow is mounting an attack via Mr. Ivanishvili to acquire full control over Georgia once again. New pro-Russian political parties, blocks, and coalitions are being created almost daily thanks to the funding by Mr. Ivanishvili and Russian intelligence services. Pro-Russian propaganda has taken control of the television space in Georgia with the only pro-Western TV station, Rustavi 2, now facing the threat of a shutdown, all of these efforts personally organized and funded by Mr. Ivanishvili.

Mr. Chairman, as evidenced by other resolutions on today's agenda, including those related to the countries of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon, this committee takes free elections very seriously, despite the recent revelation that our own Department of State used hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxpayers' funds to support election campaign efforts in opposition to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of one of our strongest allies in the world. That thwarts the very essence of a governing democracy. It goes against the very founding of our principles.

Mr. Chairman, we must take a stand for the national sovereignty of our allies. We must push Russia to stand by their words and remove their troops from Georgia. We must provide a better example to those around the world by demanding free and fair elections.

And in standing by those principles, in word indeed, I wholeheartedly support Congressman Poe's legislation. I thank my friend from Virginia for his part in it, and I also support the full slate of legislation today. I urge passage.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.  
Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman.



I would remind our members we still have the Ukraine bill that we need to debate, and so if we could be succinct in our comments.

Mr. Cicilline is next from Rhode Island.

Mr. CICILLINE. With that request, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my comments for the record and just say thank you to you and to Ranking Member Engel for, again, conducting this markup in a bipartisan way. I think we should all be very proud of the resolutions that are before the committee today, which I think reflect our commitment to important allies around the world and our commitment to human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and international stability and peace.

And with that, I will submit this, and thank you and yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. I deeply appreciate you submitting that for the record.

We now go to Mr. Smith of New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will submit most of my comments for the record.

Just very briefly to speak on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which I think members realize faces a perilous course as elections scheduled for November look increasingly unlikely. The mandate for President Joseph Kabila and his country's national legislature will expire in late December and unless there is some way to either speed up the process for an acceptable election or find a way to create an acceptable transition in government to manage the election process, many of us, the State Department included, fear that that country could descend into chaos.

I have met with Kabila's Special Envoy recently who tried to explain why, in the 5 years since the last election, the government couldn't make the necessary preparations to hold this election on time. His reasons did not justify the delays that have put his country on the brink of a constitutional crisis. That is why we have introduced H. Res. 780, to press the Kabila government to avoid a situation in which he remains in power indefinitely, contrary to the intent of his country's Constitution and the will of the people.

I also would point out that backing the resolution is a group of the Congolese diaspora, including an opposition party member, religious leaders, and civic society groups. Because H. Res. 780, this coalition is calling for a process by which Kabila would appoint a Prime Minister under his country's emergency provisions to take over temporarily to hold the elections that will be considered acceptable to the Congolese people.

Let me also point out the resolution on Gabon. H. Res. 821 calls for an orderly peaceful, free, and fair Presidential election in that country. The 2009 elections were plagued with election irregularities and provoked destruction demonstrations, and a repeat of such a significantly flawed process could endanger the stability of that country. Our championing of a successful election for free, fair, and violence-free election puts governments on notice that we mean what we say about democracy, we will be watching and watching carefully.

And finally, on H. Res. 660, about 10 days ago, I was in Tbilisi, Georgia. Eight years ago, I was there about 10 days after the invasion by the Russian troops, and I can tell you the scars are real. One hundred ninety-two thousand people were displaced at the



time. Several hundred were killed. I remember I had some of my own constituents trapped in South Ossetia. We got them out, thankfully, after weeks of negotiations and many other children, American children, who were in Abkhazia as well. But this is a festering sore, and the Russians took South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force. They violated the Helsinki Final Act and follow-on agreements about territorial integrity.

And I was at a checkpoint just 10 days ago, on the Georgia-South Ossetia border, and it was like the old Soviet Union. The Russian troops came to the checkpoint. They had made people wait upwards of 12 hours to cross over with food stuffs to get to people on the other side, and out came a Russian guard with a camera filming me and a few other Members who were standing there. It was the old Soviet reprise that we saw for so many years. The tensions are thick. It is important that we send this message.

So thank you, Ted Poe and Mr. Connolly, for the resolution. Those two areas, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, were taken by force. Yes, there was perhaps a provocation of sorts, but nothing that caused the counteraction by the Russians in invasion and, again, it caused large losses of life and displacement of so many people.

I thank the chairman. I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Alan Grayson.

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When I look at these resolutions regarding Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the bill regarding the Ukraine and the Crimea, what is missing to me is a sense of respect for the wishes of the people involved. Too often we find ourselves viewing those people as pawns, as puppets, and we view this as some kind of colossal battle between one government and another without any regard for what the people involved actually want.

As I indicated the last time we had a bill involving the Ukraine, the people of the Crimea voted overwhelmingly time and time again for pro-Russian parties. When they were part of the Ukraine, that is what they did. That reflected their will. There is no indication at this point, whether or not Russian troops are there, that most people in the Crimea would want to rejoin the Ukraine. Quite the contrary, the indication is that they would not, that they were not comfortable being part of that country when they were part of it, and they are not comfortable now with the idea or notion that they would be forced to rejoin the Ukraine.

With regard to Abkhazia, with regard to South Ossetia, both of these areas held elections within the past 2 years. There is no evidence that has been provided that these elections were somehow twisted or perverted by the presence of foreign troops. In fact, from the looks of things, they had multicandidate elections. The elections looked to be fair. They certainly were vigorously contested. And they reached results that seemed to reflect the local priorities. The turnout was actually very high in both cases.

So one has to wonder exactly what we think we are accomplishing by choosing sides against the will of the people in places like Abkhazia, in places like South Ossetia, in places like Crimea and so on.

One of the great battles of the later part of the 20th century was the battle for decolonization. One of the great battles that I see for



the early part of this century is the battle against internal colonization, taking large groups of people, that sometimes number in the millions, and keeping them trapped within a country they don't feel a part of against their will. It is no longer true of the Soviet Union. It still is true of Iran. Frankly, if South Ossetia and Abkhazia were returned to Georgia, it would be true of those places as well.

We show all too much regard for the concept of territorial integrity without any regard for the concept of self-determination and the concept that people have the right to be part of a country that they want to be part of. It is that simple. And too often we find large groups of people who feel trapped in the wrong country.

I agree that these matters should always be resolved without force. I think it is regrettable whenever any shot is fired over an issue of self-determination. But what we need, I think, more than anything else right now in these situations, whether it is Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, or anywhere else, we need some kind of peaceful resolution that reflects the popular will. And that is something that was never provided to the people of Crimea, never provided to people of Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, by the governments that purported to be governments covering those areas, whether we are talking about Georgia, Ukraine, or otherwise.

We need to have some kind of consensus that it is all right, it is okay for a territory that is part of a government to separate and to do so through peaceful means, as we saw an attempt to do in Scotland recently and as we will see time and time again in Western democracies and other democracies all around the world. Yes, these things should be done through democratic means, but there must be a mechanism to do them.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Meadows for 1 minute and then 1 minute to Mr. Sherman, but then we are going to have to go to the vote.

Mr. Meadows.

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My amendment basically works in very close harmony with the gentlewoman from Florida, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen's, fine work on the Syrian issue and to make actually the human rights abusers directly accountable for their crime. And so it puts in reporting language of 120 days for the President to submit a report on the 47 individuals that actually are either responsible or complicit in the human rights violation in Syria. So I would like to thank her, the Syrian Emergency Task Force, and certainly the author of the underlying bill for their work and leadership.

And with that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Meadows.

We will now go to Mr. Sherman of California.

Mr. SHERMAN. I will associate myself with Mr. Lowenthal's comments on Cambodia. And while I will vote for the Georgia resolution, we should recognize that we often support not territorial integrity but self-determination, and we are often somewhat inconsistent on this. We supported the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the division of the Republic of Serbia. We oppose the division of Croatia, Georgia, and the Ukraine.



In each case, we have taken the anti-Russian position. We should at least try to be as calm as possible with Russia, to recognize that we are not always consistent and absolute in our position, and that we should avoid pushing things to the very edge where we put military forces right up against a border when that is unnecessary. And I look forward to working with the members of this committee, even Mr. Rohrabacher, for a calmer relationship with Russia.

I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman.

Hearing no further requests for recognition, the question occurs on items considered en bloc.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it, and the measures considered en bloc are agreed to.

And without objection, the measures considered en bloc are ordered favorably reported as amended. Staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes, and the Chair is authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules.

The Chair now calls up for consideration H.R. 5094, the Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act. Without objection, Engel amendment 284 in the nature of a substitute will be considered base text, is considered read, and is open for amendment at any point.

[The information referred to follows:]



114TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 5094

To contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine, to assist Ukraine's democratic transition, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 28, 2016

Mr. ENGEL (for himself, Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. COSTA, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. DEUTCH, Mr. POMPEO, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. SHIMKUS, Mr. KEATING, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. COHEN, and Mr. RIBBLE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, the Judiciary, and Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine, to assist Ukraine's democratic transition, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

### 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the  
5 “Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act” or “STAND  
6 for Ukraine Act”.



1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
 2 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.  
 Sec. 2. Statements of policy.

#### TITLE I—CRIMEA ANNEXATION NON-RECOGNITION

Sec. 101. United States policy against recognition of territorial changes effected by force alone.  
 Sec. 102. Prohibitions against United States recognition of the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea.  
 Sec. 103. Codification of sanctions under certain Executive orders relating to Ukraine.

#### TITLE II—SANCTIONS PROVISIONS

Sec. 201. Prohibiting certain transactions with foreign sanctions evaders with respect to the Russian Federation.  
 Sec. 202. Reports on certain foreign financial institutions.  
 Sec. 203. Requirements relating to transfers of defense articles and defense services to the Russian Federation.  
 Sec. 204. Amendments to Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012.

#### TITLE III—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 301. Consortium to support increased private investment in Ukraine.  
 Sec. 302. Strategy to respond to Russian Federation-supported information and propaganda efforts directed toward Russian-speaking communities in countries bordering the Russian Federation.

### 3 SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United  
 5 States to further assist the Government of Ukraine in re-  
 6 storing its sovereignty and territorial integrity to contain,  
 7 reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine. That  
 8 policy shall be carried into effect, among other things,  
 9 through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with allies  
 10 and partners of the United States where appropriate, that  
 11 includes sanctions, diplomacy, and assistance for the peo-  
 12 ple of Ukraine intended to enhance their ability to consoli-  
 13 date a rule of law-based democracy with a free market



1 economy and to exercise their right under international  
2 law to self-defense.

3 (b) ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is fur-  
4 ther the policy of the United States—

5 (1) to use its voice, vote, and influence in inter-  
6 national fora to encourage others to provide assist-  
7 ance that is similar to assistance described in sub-  
8 section (a) to Ukraine; and

9 (2) to ensure that any relevant sanctions relief  
10 for the Russian Federation is contingent on timely,  
11 complete, and verifiable implementation of the Minsk  
12 Agreements, especially the restoration of Ukraine’s  
13 control of the entirety of its eastern border with the  
14 Russian Federation in the conflict zone.

15 **TITLE I—CRIMEA ANNEXATION**  
16 **NON-RECOGNITION**

17 **SEC. 101. UNITED STATES POLICY AGAINST RECOGNITION**  
18 **OF TERRITORIAL CHANGES EFFECTED BY**  
19 **FORCE ALONE.**

20 Between the years of 1940 and 1991, the United  
21 States did not recognize the forcible incorporation and an-  
22 nexation of the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia,  
23 and Estonia into the Soviet Union under a policy known  
24 as the “Stimson Doctrine”.



1 **SEC. 102. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES REC-**  
2 **OGNITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S**  
3 **ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with United States  
5 policy enumerated in section 101, no Federal department  
6 or agency should take any action or extend any assistance  
7 that recognizes or implies any recognition of the de jure  
8 or de facto sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Cri-  
9 mea, its airspace, or its territorial waters.

10 (b) DOCUMENTS PORTRAYING CRIMEA AS PART OF  
11 RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—In accordance with United  
12 States policy enumerated in section 101, the Government  
13 Publishing Office should not print any map, document,  
14 record, or other paper of the United States portraying or  
15 otherwise indicating Crimea as part of the territory of the  
16 Russian Federation.

17 **SEC. 103. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS UNDER CERTAIN**  
18 **EXECUTIVE ORDERS RELATING TO UKRAINE.**

19 (a) CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS.—

20 (1) EXECUTIVE ORDERS 13660, 13661, AND  
21 13662.—United States sanctions provided for in the  
22 Executive orders described in subsection (b), im-  
23 posed on or before April 6, 2014, and as in effect  
24 on the day before the date of the enactment of this  
25 Act, shall remain in effect until the date on which  
26 the President submits to the appropriate congres-



1       sional committees a certification described in sub-  
2       section (c).

3           (2) EXECUTIVE ORDER 13685.—United States  
4       sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13685  
5       (December 19, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating  
6       to blocking property of certain persons and prohib-  
7       iting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea  
8       region of Ukraine), as in effect on the day before the  
9       date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in  
10      effect until the date on which the President submits  
11      to the appropriate congressional committees a cer-  
12      tification described in subsection (c).

13      (b) EXECUTIVE ORDERS DESCRIBED.—The Execu-  
14      tive orders described in this subsection are the following:

15           (1) Executive Order 13660 (March 6, 2014; 79  
16       Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of  
17       certain persons contributing to the situation in  
18       Ukraine).

19           (2) Executive Order 13661 (March 16, 2014;  
20       79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of  
21       additional persons contributing to the situation in  
22       Ukraine).

23           (3) Executive Order 13662 (March 20, 2014;  
24       79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of



1 additional persons contributing to the situation in  
2 Ukraine).

3 (c) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this  
4 subsection is a certification of the President that—

5 (1) Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea has been  
6 restored; or

7 (2) the status of Crimea has been resolved,  
8 through an internationally supervised process, to the  
9 satisfaction of a democratically elected Government  
10 of Ukraine.

11 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-  
12 tion shall be construed to restrict the authority of the  
13 President to impose additional United States sanctions  
14 with specific respect to the Russian Federation’s occupa-  
15 tion of Crimea pursuant to the Executive orders described  
16 in subsections (a)(2) and (b).

17 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—  
18 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
19 mittees” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
21 Committee on Financial Services, and the Com-  
22 mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-  
23 resentatives; and



(2) Committee on Foreign Relations and the  
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs  
of the Senate.

## **TITLE II—SANCTIONS PROVISIONS**

### **SEC. 201. PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS WITH RE- SPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democ-  
racy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014  
(Public Law 113–95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended  
by adding at the end the following new section:

### **“SEC. 10. PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS WITH RE- SPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to  
impose with respect to a foreign person the sanctions de-  
scribed in subsection (b) if the President determines that  
the foreign person knowingly—

“(1) has materially violated, attempted to vio-  
late, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of  
any license, order, regulation, or prohibition con-  
tained in, or issued pursuant to any covered Execu-  
tive order; or



1           “(2) has facilitated significant deceptive or  
2           structured transactions for or on behalf of any per-  
3           son subject to United States sanctions concerning  
4           the Russian Federation.

5           “(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

6           “(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in  
7           this subsection are the exercise of all powers granted  
8           to the President by the International Emergency  
9           Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to  
10          the extent necessary to block and prohibit all trans-  
11          actions in all property and interests in property of  
12          a person determined by the President to be subject  
13          to subsection (a) if such property and interests in  
14          property are in the United States, come within the  
15          United States, or are or come within the possession  
16          or control of a United States person.

17          “(2) EXCEPTION.—

18                 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The authority to im-  
19                 pose sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not  
20                 include the authority to impose sanctions relat-  
21                 ing to the importation of goods.

22                 “(B) GOOD DEFINED.—In paragraph (A),  
23                 the term ‘good’ has the meaning given that  
24                 term in section 16 of the Export Administration  
25                 Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as contin-



1           ued in effect pursuant to the International  
2           Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.  
3           1701 et seq.)).

4           “(3) PENALTIES.—A person that is subject to  
5           sanctions described in paragraph (1) shall be subject  
6           to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)  
7           of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-  
8           nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-  
9           tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
10          scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

11          “(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-  
12         tion of sanctions under subsection (b) on a case-by-case  
13         for a period of not more than 120 days, and may renew  
14         that waiver for additional periods of not more than 120  
15         days with respect to a person if the President determines  
16         that such a waiver is in the national interests of the  
17         United States and on or before the date on which the waiv-  
18         er takes effect, submits to the appropriate congressional  
19         committees a notice of and justification for the waiver.

20          “(d) IMPLEMENTATION AUTHORITY.—The President  
21         may exercise all authorities provided to the President  
22         under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emer-  
23         gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704)  
24         for purposes of carrying out this section.



1 “(e) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President shall  
2 issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are nec-  
3 essary to carry out this section.

4 “(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5 “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
6 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-  
7 mittees’ means—

8 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
9 the Committee on Financial Services, and the  
10 Committee on Ways and Means of the House of  
11 Representatives; and

12 “(B) Committee on Foreign Relations and  
13 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and  
14 Urban Affairs of the Senate.

15 “(2) COVERED EXECUTIVE ORDER.—The term  
16 ‘covered Executive order’ means any of the fol-  
17 lowing:

18 “(A) Executive Order 13660 (March 6,  
19 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking  
20 property of certain persons contributing to the  
21 situation in Ukraine).

22 “(B) Executive Order 13661 (March 16,  
23 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking  
24 property of additional persons contributing to  
25 the situation in Ukraine).



1           “(C) Executive Order 13662 (March 20,  
2           2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking  
3           property of additional persons contributing to  
4           the situation in Ukraine).

5           “(D) Executive Order 13685 (December  
6           19, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to  
7           blocking property of certain persons and prohib-  
8           iting certain transactions with respect to the  
9           Crimea region of Ukraine).

10          “(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign per-  
11          son’ means—

12               “(A) an individual who is not a United  
13               States person;

14               “(B) a corporation, partnership, or other  
15               nongovernmental entity which is not a United  
16               States person;

17               “(C) any official, representative, agent, or  
18               instrumentality of, or an individual working on  
19               behalf of a foreign government; or

20               “(D) a foreign government.

21          “(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
22          ‘United States person’ means—

23               “(A) a United States citizen or an alien  
24               lawfully admitted for permanent residence to  
25               the United States; or



1           “(B) an entity organized under the laws of  
2           the United States or of any jurisdiction within  
3           the United States, including a foreign branch of  
4           such an entity, or any person in the United  
5           States.”.

6   **SEC. 202. REPORTS ON CERTAIN FOREIGN FINANCIAL IN-**  
7           **STITUTIONS.**

8           The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democ-  
9   racy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014  
10 (Public Law 113–95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended  
11 by inserting after section 10 (as added by section 201 of  
12 this Act) the following new section:

13 **“SEC. 11. REPORTS ON CERTAIN FOREIGN FINANCIAL IN-**  
14           **STITUTIONS.**

15           “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the  
16 date of the enactment of this section, and every 180 days  
17 thereafter for a period not to exceed 2 years, the Secretary  
18 of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly  
19 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-  
20 port on—

21           “(1) foreign financial institutions that are in di-  
22 rect control of Government of Ukraine state-owned  
23 or controlled assets in a manner determined by the  
24 Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury



1 to be in violation of the sovereignty, independence,  
2 or territorial integrity of Ukraine;

3 “(2) foreign financial institutions determined by  
4 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the  
5 Treasury to be complicit in illicit financial activity,  
6 including money laundering, terrorism and prolifera-  
7 tion financing, transnational organized crime, or  
8 misappropriation of state assets, that are—

9 “(A) organized under the laws of the Rus-  
10 sian Federation and have a capitalization of not  
11 less than \$20,000,000,000; or

12 “(B) owned or controlled by a foreign per-  
13 son whose property or interests in property  
14 have been blocked pursuant to any covered Ex-  
15 ecutive order; and

16 “(3) foreign financial institutions that are di-  
17 rectly or indirectly assisting or otherwise aiding the  
18 violation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial  
19 integrity of Ukraine.

20 “(b) FORM.—The report required to be submitted  
21 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified  
22 form but may include a classified annex.

23 “(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:



1           “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
2       TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-  
3       mittees’ means—

4           “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
5           the Committee on Financial Services, the Com-  
6           mittee on Ways and Means, and the Committee  
7           on the Judiciary of the House of Representa-  
8           tives; and

9           “(B) Committee on Foreign Relations, the  
10          Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban  
11          Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of  
12          the Senate.

13          “(2) COVERED EXECUTIVE ORDER.—The term  
14          ‘covered Executive order’ has the meaning given the  
15          term in section 10(f) of this Act.”.

16 **SEC. 203. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO TRANSFERS OF**  
17 **DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES**  
18 **TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

19       (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
20 United States to oppose the transfer of defense articles  
21 and defense services from any country that is a member  
22 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to, or  
23 on behalf of, the Russian Federation, during any period  
24 in which the Russian Federation forcibly occupies the ter-  
25 ritory of Ukraine or of a NATO member country.



1 (b) ADOPTION OF NATO POLICY.—The President  
2 shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United  
3 States in NATO to seek the adoption of a policy by NATO  
4 that is consistent with the policy of the United States  
5 specified in subsection (a).

6 (c) MONITORING AND IDENTIFICATION OF TRANS-  
7 FERS.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct  
9 the heads of the appropriate departments and agen-  
10 cies of the United States to monitor all transfers of  
11 defense articles and defense services from NATO  
12 member countries to the Russian Federation and  
13 identify those transfers that are contrary to the pol-  
14 icy of the United States specified in subsection (a).

15 (2) REPORT.—

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall  
17 submit a written report to the chairmen and  
18 ranking members of the appropriate committees  
19 of Congress within 5 days of the receipt of in-  
20 formation indicating that a transfer described  
21 in paragraph (1) has occurred.

22 (B) FORM.—The report required under  
23 subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclas-  
24 sified form but may include a classified annex.

25 (d) RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS.—



1           (1) IN GENERAL.—If a NATO member country  
2 transfers, or allows a transfer by a person subject to  
3 its national jurisdiction of, a defense article or de-  
4 fense service on or after the date of the enactment  
5 of this Act that is intended for a military end-use or  
6 end-user and which makes a significant contribution  
7 to the military capabilities of the Russian Federation  
8 in contravention of the policy of the United States  
9 specified in subsection (a) and is identified pursuant  
10 to subsection (c), an application for a license or  
11 other authorization required under the Arms Export  
12 Control Act for the transfer of any defense article or  
13 defense service to, or on behalf of, that NATO mem-  
14 ber country shall be subject to a presumption of de-  
15 nial.

16           (2) EFFECTIVE PERIOD.—A presumption of de-  
17 nial shall apply to an application for a license or  
18 other authorization under paragraph (1) only during  
19 a period in which the President determines that the  
20 Russian Federation has forcibly occupied the terri-  
21 tory of Ukraine or of a NATO member country.

22           (3) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The Presi-  
23 dent may waive the restriction on the transfer of any  
24 defense article or defense service to, or on behalf of,



1 a NATO member country in paragraph (1) if the  
2 President—

3 (A) determines that the waiver is in the  
4 national security interest of the United States;  
5 and

6 (B) submits to the appropriate committees  
7 of Congress a report on the determination and  
8 the reasons for the determination.

9 (4) AMENDMENT TO ITAR.—Not later than 30  
10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
11 Secretary of State shall amend the International  
12 Trafficking in Arms Regulations for purposes of im-  
13 plementing this subsection.

14 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

15 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-  
16 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-  
17 gress” means—

18 (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
19 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Perma-  
20 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
21 House of Representatives; and

22 (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
23 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select  
24 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.



1           (2) DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERV-  
2       ICES.—The terms “defense article” and “defense  
3       service” have the meanings given such terms in sec-  
4       tion 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.  
5       2794 note).

6       **SEC. 204. AMENDMENTS TO SERGEI MAGNITSKY RULE OF**  
7                               **LAW ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2012.**

8       (a) LIST OF PERSONS.—Section 404 of the Sergei  
9       Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (22  
10      U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

11           (1) in the section heading, by striking “**GROSS**  
12       **VIOLATIONS**” and inserting “**SERIOUS ABUSES**”;  
13       and

14           (2) in subsection (a)(2)—

15               (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph  
16               (Δ), by striking “gross violations” and inserting  
17               “serious abuses”; and

18               (B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting  
19               after “Russia” the following: “or in any terri-  
20               tory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by  
21               the Government of the Russian Federation”.

22       (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by  
23       subsection (a) take effect on the date of the enactment  
24       of this Act and apply with respect to updates of the list  
25       required to be submitted under section 404 of the Sergei



1 Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 on or  
2 after such date of enactment.

### 3 **TITLE III—OTHER MATTERS**

#### 4 **SEC. 301. CONSORTIUM TO SUPPORT INCREASED PRIVATE** 5 **INVESTMENT IN UKRAINE.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

7 (1) Private investment in Ukraine is essential  
8 for Ukraine’s long-term economic recovery, employ-  
9 ment, and fiscal stability.

10 (2) Private investment in Ukraine requires the  
11 availability of insurance to protect investors against  
12 loss due to armed conflict, political violence, expro-  
13 priation, and other risks that constitute an obstacle  
14 to private investment.

15 (3) It is in the United States national security  
16 interest to seek to establish an international consor-  
17 tium, with other national governments, multilateral  
18 organizations, and investors and insurers, to in-  
19 crease the availability of insurance to support in-  
20 creased private investment in Ukraine.

21 (4) An international consortium would be an ef-  
22 fective mechanism to spread the risk against loss  
23 among a broad group of governmental and private  
24 insurers.



1       (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State, after  
2 consultation with the Government of Ukraine, shall seek  
3 to establish an international consortium to support in-  
4 creased private investment in Ukraine and to provide for  
5 participation by the Government of the United States in  
6 such consortium.

7       (c) MEMBERSHIP.—The consortium established pur-  
8 suant to subsection (b) should be composed of the fol-  
9 lowing members:

10           (1) The Government of the United States, to  
11 include the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-  
12 tion.

13           (2) The national governments of other inter-  
14 ested countries.

15           (3) Appropriate multilateral organizations.

16           (4) Private insurance companies and other ap-  
17 propriate private sector entities.

18       (d) DUTIES.—

19           (1) IN GENERAL.—The consortium established  
20 pursuant to subsection (b) should issue insurance,  
21 upon such terms and conditions as the consortium  
22 may determine, to protect investors against the risk  
23 of loss of private investments in Ukraine.

24           (2) ADDITIONAL DUTIES.—The consortium  
25 should—



1           (A) ensure that members of the consortium  
2           share in issuing insurance and are liable for  
3           payments of claims by investors in proportion  
4           to each member's agreed-upon share;

5           (B) at a minimum, ensure that members of  
6           the consortium provide insurance against the  
7           risk of loss due to armed conflict, political vio-  
8           lence, and expropriation in Ukraine;

9           (C) provide reinsurance to entities that  
10          have issued or underwritten insurance to inves-  
11          tors in Ukraine against the risk of loss; and

12          (D) establish a procedure for processing,  
13          negotiating, and settling claims for losses in-  
14          curred and should utilize, to the maximum ex-  
15          tent possible, the resources of the members of  
16          the consortium to carry out such functions.

17       (e) ROLE OF OPIC.—Upon the request of the Sec-  
18       retary of State, the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-  
19       tion should—

20           (1) assist the Secretary of State in securing  
21           membership of private insurance companies and  
22           other appropriate private sector entities in the con-  
23           sortium;



1           (2) participate in underwriting insurance con-  
2       sistent with the statutory provisions applicable to  
3       the Corporation; and

4           (3) provide staff with relevant expertise to as-  
5       sist in establishing and administering the consor-  
6       tium, on a reimbursable basis.

7 **SEC. 302. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO RUSSIAN FEDERA-**  
8 **TION-SUPPORTED INFORMATION AND PROP-**  
9 **AGANDA EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD RUS-**  
10 **SIAN-SPEAKING COMMUNITIES IN COUN-**  
11 **TRIES BORDERING THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-**  
12 **TION.**

13       (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
14 gress that the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall es-  
15 tablish Crimean Tatar services subordinate to the Ukrain-  
16 ian language services and shall broadcast and direct Cri-  
17 mean Tatar language content into Crimea.

18       (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the  
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
20 shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to Rus-  
21 sian Federation-supported disinformation and propaganda  
22 efforts directed toward persons in countries bordering the  
23 Russian Federation.

24       (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-  
25 quired under subsection (b) should include the following:



1           (1) Development of a response to propaganda  
2           and disinformation campaigns as an element of the  
3           ongoing crisis in Ukraine, specifically—

4                 (A) assistance in building the capacity of  
5                 the Ukrainian military to document conflict  
6                 zones and disseminate information in real time;

7                 (B) assistance in enhancing broadcast ca-  
8                 pacity with terrestrial television transmitters in  
9                 Eastern Ukraine; and

10                (C) media training for officials of the Gov-  
11                ernment of Ukraine.

12           (2) Establishment of a partnership with partner  
13           governments and private-sector entities to provide  
14           Russian-language entertainment and news content to  
15           broadcasters in Russian-speaking communities bor-  
16           dering the Russian Federation.

17           (3) Assessment of the extent of Russian Fed-  
18           eration influence in political parties, financial insti-  
19           tutions, media organizations, and other entities seek-  
20           ing to exert political influence and sway public opin-  
21           ion in favor of Russian Federation policy across Eu-  
22           rope.

23           (d) REPORT.—The Secretary of State shall submit to  
24           the appropriate congressional committees a report on the



1 strategy required under subsection (b) and its implemen-  
2 tation.

3 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—

4 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
5 mittees” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the  
7 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-  
8 resentatives; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and  
10 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.



**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE  
TO H.R. 5094  
OFFERED BY MR. ENGEL OF NEW YORK**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

**1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the  
3 “Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act” or “STAND  
4 for Ukraine Act”.

5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
6 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.  
Sec. 2. Statements of policy.

**TITLE I—CRIMEA ANNEXATION NON-RECOGNITION**

Sec. 101. United States policy against recognition of territorial changes effected by force alone.  
Sec. 102. Prohibitions against United States recognition of the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea.  
Sec. 103. Determinations and codification of sanctions under Executive Order 13685.

**TITLE II—SANCTIONS PROVISIONS**

Sec. 201. Prohibiting certain transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights abusers with respect to the Russian Federation.  
Sec. 202. Report on certain foreign financial institutions.  
Sec. 203. Requirements relating to transfers of defense articles and defense services to the Russian Federation.  
Sec. 204. Amendments to Public Law 112–208.

**TITLE III—OTHER MATTERS**

Sec. 301. Support for increased private investment in Ukraine.



Sec. 302. Strategy to respond to Russian Federation-supported information and propaganda efforts directed toward Russian-speaking communities in countries bordering the Russian Federation.

Sec. 303. Sunset.

1 **SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United  
3 States to further assist the Government of Ukraine in re-  
4 storing its sovereignty and territorial integrity to contain,  
5 reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine. That  
6 policy shall be carried into effect, among other things,  
7 through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with allies  
8 and partners of the United States where appropriate, that  
9 includes sanctions, diplomacy, and assistance, including le-  
10 tal defensive weapons systems, for the people of Ukraine  
11 intended to enhance their ability to consolidate a rule of  
12 law-based democracy with a free market economy and to  
13 exercise their right under international law to self-defense.

14 (b) ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is fur-  
15 ther the policy of the United States—

16 (1) to use its voice, vote, and influence in inter-  
17 national fora to encourage others to provide assist-  
18 ance that is similar to assistance described in sub-  
19 section (a) to Ukraine; and

20 (2) to ensure that any relevant sanctions relief  
21 for the Russian Federation is contingent on timely,  
22 complete, and verifiable implementation of the Minsk  
23 Agreements, especially the restoration of Ukraine's



1 control of the entirety of its eastern border with the  
2 Russian Federation in the conflict zone.

3 **TITLE I—CRIMEA ANNEXATION**  
4 **NON-RECOGNITION**

5 **SEC. 101. UNITED STATES POLICY AGAINST RECOGNITION**  
6 **OF TERRITORIAL CHANGES EFFECTED BY**  
7 **FORCE ALONE.**

8 Between the years of 1940 and 1991, the United  
9 States did not recognize the forcible incorporation and an-  
10 nexation of the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia,  
11 and Estonia into the Soviet Union under a policy known  
12 as the “Stimson Doctrine”.

13 **SEC. 102. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES REC-**  
14 **OGNITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S**  
15 **ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with United States  
17 policy enumerated in section 101, no Federal department  
18 or agency should take any action or extend any assistance  
19 that recognizes or implies any recognition of the de jure  
20 or de facto sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Cri-  
21 mea, its airspace, or its territorial waters.

22 (b) DOCUMENTS PORTRAYING CRIMEA AS PART OF  
23 RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—In accordance with United  
24 States policy enumerated in section 101, the Government  
25 Printing Office should not print any map, document,



1 record, or other paper of the United States portraying or  
2 otherwise indicating Crimea as part of the territory of the  
3 Russian Federation.

4 **SEC. 103. DETERMINATIONS AND CODIFICATION OF SANC-**  
5 **TIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13685.**

6 (a) DETERMINATIONS.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after  
8 the date of enactment of this Act, the President  
9 shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-  
10 mittees a report that contains the assessment de-  
11 scribed in paragraph (2).

12 (2) ASSESSMENT DESCRIBED.—The assessment  
13 described in this paragraph is—

14 (A) a review of each person and entity des-  
15 ignated pursuant to Executive Order 13660  
16 (March 6, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating  
17 to blocking property of certain persons contrib-  
18 uting to the situation in Ukraine) or Executive  
19 Order 13661 (March 16, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg.  
20 15535; relating to blocking property of addi-  
21 tional persons contributing to the situation in  
22 Ukraine); and

23 (B) a determination as to whether any  
24 such person or entity meets the criteria for des-  
25 ignation pursuant to Executive Order 13685



1 (December 19, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 77357; re-  
2 lating to blocking property of certain persons  
3 and prohibiting certain transactions with re-  
4 spect to the Crimea region of Ukraine).

5 (3) FORM.—The assessment required by para-  
6 graph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form but  
7 may contain a classified annex.

8 (b) CODIFICATION.—United States sanctions pro-  
9 vided for in Executive Order 13685, as in effect on the  
10 day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall  
11 remain in effect until the date on which the President sub-  
12 mits to the appropriate congressional committees a certifi-  
13 cation described in subsection (c).

14 (c) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this  
15 subsection is a certification of the President that—

16 (1) Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea has been  
17 restored; or

18 (2) the status of Crimea has been resolved,  
19 through an internationally-supervised process, to the  
20 satisfaction of a democratically-elected Government  
21 of Ukraine.

22 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-  
23 tion shall be construed to restrict the authority of the  
24 President to impose additional United States sanctions



1 with specific respect to the Russian Federation’s occupa-  
2 tion of Crimea pursuant to Executive Order 13685.

3 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—

4 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
5 mittees” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
7 Committee on Financial Services, and the Com-  
8 mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-  
9 resentatives; and

10 (2) Committee on Foreign Relations and the  
11 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs  
12 of the Senate.

13 **TITLE II—SANCTIONS**  
14 **PROVISIONS**

15 **SEC. 201. PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH**  
16 **FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS AND SERIOUS**  
17 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS WITH RESPECT TO**  
18 **THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

19 The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democ-  
20 racy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014  
21 (Public Law 113–95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended  
22 by adding at the end the following new sections:



1 **“SEC. 10. PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH**  
2 **FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS WITH RE-**  
3 **SPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

4 “(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to  
5 impose with respect to a foreign person the sanctions de-  
6 scribed in subsection (b) if the President determines that  
7 the foreign person knowingly—

8 “(1) has materially violated, attempted to vio-  
9 late, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of  
10 any license, order, regulation, or prohibition con-  
11 tained in, or issued pursuant to any covered Execu-  
12 tive order; or

13 “(2) has facilitated significant deceptive or  
14 structured transactions for or on behalf of any per-  
15 son subject to United States sanctions concerning  
16 the Russian Federation.

17 “(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

18 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in  
19 this subsection are the exercise of all powers granted  
20 to the President by the International Emergency  
21 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to  
22 the extent necessary to block and prohibit all trans-  
23 actions in all property and interests in property of  
24 a person determined by the President to be subject  
25 to subsection (a) if such property and interests in  
26 property are in the United States, come within the



1 United States, or are or come within the possession  
2 or control of a United States person.

3 “(2) PENALTIES.—A person that is subject to  
4 sanctions described in paragraph (1) shall be subject  
5 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)  
6 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-  
7 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-  
8 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
9 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

10 “(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-  
11 tion of sanctions under subsection (b) on a case-by-case  
12 for a period of not more than 120 days, and may renew  
13 that waiver for additional periods of not more than 120  
14 days with respect to a person if the President determines  
15 that such a waiver is in the national interests of the  
16 United States and on or before the date on which the waiv-  
17 er takes effect, submits to the appropriate congressional  
18 committees a notice of and justification for the waiver.

19 “(d) IMPLEMENTATION AUTHORITY.—The President  
20 may exercise all authorities provided to the President  
21 under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emer-  
22 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704)  
23 for purposes of carrying out this section.



1       “(e) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President shall  
2 issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are nec-  
3 essary to carry out this section.

4       “(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5           “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
6 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-  
7 mittees’ means—

8           “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
9 the Committee on Financial Services, and the  
10 Committee on Ways and Means of the House of  
11 Representatives; and

12           “(B) Committee on Foreign Relations and  
13 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and  
14 Urban Affairs of the Senate.

15       “(2) COVERED EXECUTIVE ORDER.—The term  
16 ‘covered Executive order’ means any of the fol-  
17 lowing:

18           “(A) Executive Order 13660 (March 6,  
19 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking  
20 property of certain persons contributing to the  
21 situation in Ukraine).

22           “(B) Executive Order 13661 (March 16,  
23 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking  
24 property of additional persons contributing to  
25 the situation in Ukraine).



1           “(C) Executive Order 13685 (December  
2           19, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to  
3           blocking property of certain persons and prohib-  
4           iting certain transactions with respect to the  
5           Crimea region of Ukraine).

6           “(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign per-  
7           son’ has the meaning given such term in section  
8           595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as  
9           in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

10          “(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
11          ‘United States person’ has the meaning given such  
12          term in section 589.312 of title 31, Code of Federal  
13          Regulations, as in effect on the date of the enact-  
14          ment of this Act.

15   **“SEC. 11. PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS IN AREAS**  
16               **CONTROLLED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

17          “(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to  
18          impose with respect to a foreign person the sanctions de-  
19          scribed in subsection (b) if the President determines that  
20          the foreign person, based on credible information is—

21               “(1) responsible for or complicit in, or respon-  
22               sible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing,  
23               the commission of serious human rights abuses in  
24               any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise con-



1 trolled by the Government of the Russian Federa-  
2 tion;

3 “(2) has materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-  
4 vided financial, material, or technological support  
5 for, or goods or services to any foreign person de-  
6 scribed in paragraph (1); or

7 “(3) is owned or controlled by, or to have acted  
8 or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or  
9 indirectly, a foreign person described in paragraph  
10 (1).

11 “(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

12 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in  
13 this subsection are the exercise of all powers granted  
14 to the President by the International Emergency  
15 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),  
16 without regard to section 202 of such Act, to the ex-  
17 tent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions  
18 in all property and interests in property of a person  
19 determined by the President to be subject to sub-  
20 section (a) if such property and interests in property  
21 are in the United States, come within the United  
22 States, or are or come within the possession or con-  
23 trol of a United States person.

24 “(2) PENALTIES.—A person that is subject to  
25 sanctions described in paragraph (1) shall be subject



1 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)  
2 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-  
3 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-  
4 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
5 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

6 “(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-  
7 tion of sanctions under subsection (b) on a case-by-case  
8 for a period of not more than 120 days, and may renew  
9 that waiver for additional periods of not more than 120  
10 days with respect to a person if the President determines  
11 that such a waiver is in the national interests of the  
12 United States and on or before the date on which the waiv-  
13 er takes effect, submits to the appropriate congressional  
14 committees a notice of and justification for the waiver.

15 “(d) IMPLEMENTATION AUTHORITY.—The President  
16 may exercise all authorities provided to the President  
17 under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emer-  
18 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704)  
19 for purposes of carrying out this section.

20 “(e) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President shall  
21 issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are nec-  
22 essary to carry out this section.

23 “(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:



1           “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
2       TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-  
3       mittees’ means—

4           “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
5           the Committee on Financial Services, and the  
6           Committee on Ways and Means of the House of  
7           Representatives; and

8           “(B) Committee on Foreign Relations and  
9           the Committee on Banking, Housing, and  
10          Urban Affairs of the Senate.

11          “(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign per-  
12       son’ has the meaning given such term in section  
13       595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as  
14       in effect on the date of enactment of this section.

15          “(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
16       ‘United States person’ has the meaning given such  
17       term in section 589.312 of title 31, Code of Federal  
18       Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment of  
19       this section.”.

20       **SEC. 202. REPORT ON CERTAIN FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTI-**  
21               **TUTIONS.**

22       The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democ-  
23       racy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014  
24       (Public Law 113–95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended



1 by inserting after section 11 (as added by section 201 of  
2 this Act) the following new section:

3 **“SEC. 12. REPORT ON CERTAIN FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTI-**  
4 **TUTIONS.**

5 “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
6 date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of  
7 State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly sub-  
8 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report  
9 on—

10 “(1) foreign financial institutions that are in di-  
11 rect control of Government of Ukraine state-owned  
12 or controlled assets in a manner determined by the  
13 Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury  
14 to be in violation of the sovereignty, independence,  
15 or territorial integrity of Ukraine;

16 “(2) foreign financial institutions determined by  
17 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the  
18 Treasury to be complicit in illicit financial activity,  
19 including money laundering, terrorism and prolifera-  
20 tion financing, transnational organized crime, or  
21 misappropriation of state assets, that are—

22 “(A) organized under the laws of the Rus-  
23 sian Federation and have a capitalization of not  
24 less than \$20,000,000,000; or



1           “(B) owned or controlled by a foreign per-  
2           son whose property or interests in property  
3           have been blocked pursuant to any covered Ex-  
4           ecutive order; and

5           “(3) foreign financial institutions that are di-  
6           rectly or indirectly assisting or otherwise aiding the  
7           violation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial  
8           integrity of Ukraine.

9           “(b) FORM.—The report required to be submitted  
10          under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified  
11          form but may include a classified annex.

12          “(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

13           “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
14          TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-  
15          mittees’ means—

16           “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
17           the Committee on Financial Services, the Com-  
18           mittee on Ways and Means, and the Committee  
19           on the Judiciary of the House of Representa-  
20           tives; and

21           “(B) Committee on Foreign Relations, the  
22           Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban  
23           Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of  
24           the Senate.



1           “(2) COVERED EXECUTIVE ORDER.—The term  
2           ‘covered Executive order’ has the meaning given the  
3           term in section 10(f) of this Act.”.

4 **SEC. 203. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO TRANSFERS OF**  
5 **DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES**  
6 **TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

7           (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
8           United States to oppose the transfer of defense articles  
9           and defense services from any country that is a member  
10          of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to, or  
11          on behalf of, the Russian Federation, during any period  
12          in which the Russian Federation forcibly occupies the ter-  
13          ritory of Ukraine or of a NATO member country.

14          (b) ADOPTION OF NATO POLICY.—The President  
15          shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United  
16          States in NATO to seek the adoption of a policy by NATO  
17          that is consistent with the policy of the United States  
18          specified in subsection (a).

19          (c) MONITORING AND IDENTIFICATION OF TRANS-  
20          FERS.—

21                 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct  
22                 the heads of the appropriate departments and agen-  
23                 cies of the United States to identify those transfers  
24                 of defense articles and defense services described in



1 subsection (a) that are contrary to the policy of the  
2 United States specified in subsection (a).

3 (2) REPORT.—

4 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall  
5 submit a written report to the chairmen and  
6 ranking members of the appropriate committees  
7 of Congress within 5 days of the receipt of in-  
8 formation indicating that a transfer described  
9 in paragraph (1) has occurred.

10 (B) FORM.—The report required under  
11 subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclas-  
12 sified form but may include a classified annex.

13 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-  
15 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-  
16 gress” means—

17 (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
18 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Perma-  
19 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
20 House of Representatives; and

21 (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
22 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select  
23 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

24 (2) DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERV-  
25 ICES.—The terms “defense article” and “defense



1 service” have the meanings given such terms in sec-  
2 tion 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.  
3 2794 note).

4 **SEC. 204. AMENDMENTS TO PUBLIC LAW 112-208.**

5 (a) LIST OF PERSONS.—Section 404 of Public Law  
6 112-208 ( 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

7 (1) in the section heading, by striking “**GROSS**  
8 **VIOLATIONS**” and inserting “**SERIOUS ABUSES**”;  
9 and

10 (2) in subsection (a)(2), in the matter pre-  
11 ceding subparagraph (A), by striking “gross viola-  
12 tions” and inserting “serious abuses”.

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by  
14 subsection (a) take effect on the date of the enactment  
15 of this Act and apply with respect to updates of the list  
16 required to be submitted under section 404 of Public Law  
17 112-208 on or after such date of enactment.

18 **TITLE III—OTHER MATTERS**

19 **SEC. 301. SUPPORT FOR INCREASED PRIVATE INVESTMENT**  
20 **IN UKRAINE.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

22 (1) Private investment in Ukraine is essential  
23 for Ukraine’s long-term economic recovery, employ-  
24 ment, and fiscal stability.



1           (2) Private investment in Ukraine requires the  
2       availability of insurance to protect investors against  
3       loss due to armed conflict, political violence, expro-  
4       piation, and other risks that constitute an obstacle  
5       to private investment.

6           (3) It is in the United States national security  
7       interest to increase the availability of insurance to  
8       support increased private investment in Ukraine.

9           (4) The United States should encourage spread-  
10      ing the insurance against the risk of loss among a  
11      broad group of insurers.

12       (b)    INCREASED PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN  
13   UKRAINE.—The Secretary of State, after consultation  
14   with the Government of Ukraine, shall seek to support in-  
15   creased risk insurance for private investment in Ukraine  
16   by a range of groups, including—

17           (1) the Government of the United States;

18           (2) the national governments of other interested  
19      countries;

20           (3) appropriate multilateral organizations; and

21           (4) private insurance companies and other ap-  
22      propriate private sector entities.

23       (c)    SENSE OF CONGRESS.—With the goal of pro-  
24   tecting investors against the risk of loss of private invest-



1 ments in Ukraine, the groups described in subsection (b)  
2 should—

3           (1) encourage insurers to share in issuing in-  
4 surance and liability for payments of claims by in-  
5 vestors in proportion to each insurer's agreed-upon  
6 share;

7           (2) at a minimum, encourage insurers to pro-  
8 vide insurance against the risk of loss due to armed  
9 conflict, political violence, and expropriation in  
10 Ukraine;

11           (3) provide reinsurance to entities that have  
12 issued or underwritten insurance to investors in  
13 Ukraine against the risk of loss; and

14           (4) establish a procedure for processing, negoti-  
15 ating, and settling claims for losses incurred.

16       (d) ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER FEDERAL AGEN-  
17 CIES.—Upon the request of the Secretary of State, the  
18 heads of other Federal agencies with relevant expertise  
19 and resources should—

20           (1) assist the Secretary of State in securing  
21 participation of private insurance companies and  
22 other appropriate private sector entities in carrying  
23 out this section; and



1           (2) participate in underwriting insurance con-  
2       sistent with the statutory provisions applicable to  
3       the agency.

4 **SEC. 302. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO RUSSIAN FEDERA-**  
5 **TION-SUPPORTED INFORMATION AND PROP-**  
6 **AGANDA EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD RUS-**  
7 **SIAN-SPEAKING COMMUNITIES IN COUN-**  
8 **TRIES BORDERING THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-**  
9 **TION.**

10       (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the  
11 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
12 shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to Rus-  
13 sian Federation-supported dis-information and propa-  
14 ganda efforts directed toward persons in countries bor-  
15 dering the Russian Federation.

16       (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-  
17 quired under subsection (a) should include the following:

18           (1) Development of a response to propaganda  
19 and dis-information campaigns as an element of the  
20 ongoing crisis in Ukraine, specifically—

21               (A) assistance in building the capacity of  
22 the Ukrainian military to document conflict  
23 zones and disseminate information in real-time;



1 (B) assistance in enhancing broadcast ca-  
2 pacity with terrestrial television transmitters in  
3 Eastern Ukraine; and

4 (C) media training for officials of the Gov-  
5 ernment of Ukraine.

6 (2) Establishment of a partnership with partner  
7 governments and private-sector entities to provide  
8 Russian-language entertainment and news content to  
9 broadcasters in Russian-speaking communities bor-  
10 dering the Russian Federation.

11 (3) Assessment of the extent of Russian Fed-  
12 eration influence in political parties, financial insti-  
13 tutions, media organizations, and other entities seek-  
14 ing to exert political influence and sway public opin-  
15 ion in favor of Russian Federation policy across Eu-  
16 rope.

17 (c) REPORT.—The Secretary of State shall submit to  
18 the appropriate congressional committees a report on the  
19 strategy required under subsection (a) and its implemen-  
20 tation.

21 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—  
22 In this section, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
23 mittees” means—



1           (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the  
2       Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-  
3       resentatives; and

4           (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and  
5       the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

6 **SEC. 303. SUNSET.**

7       This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall  
8       cease to be effective beginning on the date that is 5 years  
9       after the date of the enactment of this Act.





Chairman ROYCE. And I want to thank the ranking member for authoring this important measure which tightens sanctions on Moscow, especially related to the forcible annexation of Crimea and includes measures to counter sanctions evasion.

I now recognize the ranking member for his remarks on the bill.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.

I am grateful that we are taking up the STAND for Ukraine Act, which I introduced in April with Mr. Kinzinger, a former member of this committee. The legislation underscores America's support for Ukraine's right to defend itself. Parts of Ukraine, as we know, are illegally occupied, so our aim with this bill is rooted in America's nonrecognition policy during the 50-year Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

This bill links any sanctions relief to Russia fulfilling its obligations under the Minsk Agreement as well as making Crimea-related sanctions permanent so long as the Russian occupation there continues. It also tightens sanctions enforcement with a new anti-evasion framework and requires regular reports on banks illegally controlling Ukrainian assets, particularly Russian banks in Crimea.

Additionally, this bill tries to drive new private sector investments in Ukraine, clamps down on Russia buying defense equipment or services from our NATO allies, targets human rights abuses in Russian-occupied areas, and calls for a strategy to push back against Russian propaganda.

I want to thank Mr. Connolly of Virginia for offering an amendment, making clear that Crimea-related sanctions should not be dropped until Ukrainian sovereignty of Crimea has been restored. Let me also thank the gentleman for his tireless work on this issue. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. He has been laser-focused on it since the first day of this crisis and this measure makes this bill stronger.

We need to send a message to the people of Ukraine that we stand with them and to Putin that his aggression and bullying won't go unanswered. I ask that all members support this bill, and I yield back.

Chairman ROYCE. On the amendment referenced by Mr. Engel that has not yet been offered but will be, and before I yield the chair or turn over the chair to Mr. Smith, I did want to speak to this issue. And I think it is an issue we should all think on before we adopt this amendment, and I will tell you why.

First, I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia for offering the amendment, although I have to oppose it, because I admire his long-established commitment to Ukraine and especially to Crimea. However, as we are all aware, the provision in the ranking member's bill that that amendment would strike allows the President of the United States to lift the existing sanctions related to Crimea if there is a resolution of the region's status that—and here is the key concept in the underlying bill—that a democratically-elected Government of Ukraine judges to be satisfactory and that has been reached through an internationally supervised process. In other words, the people of Ukraine would make that decision.

My concern is that to strike that language to prevent a situation from arising in which the Ukrainian Government concludes an agreement that it believes is good for the nation, but the U.S. nev-



ertheless says, that is not good enough for us, we would have in effect be claiming to be more Ukrainian than the Ukrainians. This amendment would potentially bind the U.S. to a position that the Ukrainian Government itself might have left behind.

As the gentleman is aware, the central goal of U.S. policy toward Ukraine is to allow a sovereign and democratic Ukraine to choose its own destiny, just like the United States. So I believe that should continue to be our goal. I think the underlying bill states it very effectively. So we should be prepared to support Ukrainian's decisions of what is best for Ukrainians.

Therefore, I must oppose the amendment. I just don't see the sense of offering it in these circumstances, given how strong the underlying bill already is. But with that—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would the chairman yield?

Chairman ROYCE. You will have your own time. I have to go to the floor right now—

Mr. CONNOLLY. The chairman has preemptively attacked an amendment.

Chairman ROYCE. And if you withdraw the amendment, I will withdraw my preemptive attack.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But I kind of wanted to give my colleagues an opportunity for the counterargument.

Chairman ROYCE. I would love to have that argument, but I cannot have it today, I can't have it at this moment. But I will yield you 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I will move up. I have an amendment at the desk. I am sorry. Are you recognizing me to speak?

Chairman ROYCE. I am recognizing you to speak. I was recognizing you to speak on the underlying measure. But inasmuch as I discussed your amendment, feel free to segue into that amendment.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much.

First of all, I want to thank Mr. Engel for bringing this resolution up, and I want to thank the chairman for bringing the resolution up.

The chairman has given a point of view. And I listened carefully to my friend Mr. Weber about Georgia and the Ukraine. I have consistently insisted, since the illegal invasion and annexation of the Crimea, that we must be clear as a bell, no ambiguity, no other conditionality.

My friend Mr. Chabot and I introduced a bill this committee supported, the Crimea Annexation Non-Recognition Act. This isn't a Democratic or Republican issue.

Here is my concern, and I hope it is yours. That language looks innocent. My amendment would delete that language and leave it with silence about what the Ukrainian Government decides to do. If the Ukrainian Government decides tomorrow, "You know what, we don't need the Crimea, we are going to give it up," obviously, a President is going to come to Congress saying, "Well, that is their decision," and we would have to consider it. But why offer it on a plate by the U.S. Congress?

I have worked with my friend Mike Turner, Republican from Ohio. He heads up the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I head up the U.S. delegation. We have worked together to make sure there



is no dilution of language on this subject in NATO, and there have been attempts.

This is, without intention, I fear, to be construed as, "Well, if you don't get out of Crimea, how about you negotiate something, and we will call it a day?" We don't want to do that.

Now, contrary to what my friends have heard from Mr. Grayson, there is terrible human rights abuse going on by the Russians in Crimea today against Tartars, against political dissenters, against anybody with a different political point of view. As Mr. Weber indicated, they dominate media, and the propaganda and the harassment are quite considerable. And life for the indigenous Crimean population is very difficult. People who have family members there report that.

I am delighted to have the support of the author of this resolution, Mr. Engel, for this amendment. And I know a number of my colleagues also heard from the Ukrainian Congress in support of this amendment as well.

This isn't a Democrat or Republican issue. This isn't something designed in any way to embarrass the leadership of this committee. This is a sincerely felt policy position so that we speak with one voice and as clearly as we can, just as we just did in Georgia, on the Ukraine.

I was in the Ukraine recently. They need our support. They need to know in Kiev that we are unwavering so that they do what they have to do. If they ever change their minds, they are always free to come back. We don't need a provision to invite it. What we need is a clear, unequivocal statement that the settlement about the Crimea is a Ukrainian issue, not an issue for Russia and the rest of the world.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me just ask my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, do you sense that we actually agree on self-determination, or do we not? Meaning, if, indeed, there were no Russian troops involved and no military action taking place, that the people, as we heard from Mr. Grayson, the people do have a fundamental right, even if they are a part of another country, they are on a periphery of a country and want to be independent or part of another nation, that they have a right by majority to do so. Is that correct? And it is the occupation, it is the introduction of Russian troops at Abkhazia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah, that is like, other than the unpleasantness, how did you like the play at Ford's Theatre?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield time to respond.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend.

No, we don't agree, because you are assuming, even if Russian troops got out—a big if—which Mr. Grayson apologizes for that, he dismisses that, I don't know how any reasonable person can say there can be a free and fair election with Russian troops over all the territory.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We did.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But with respect to your question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. It is for Ukraine to make that decision.



Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Otherwise, I would say to my friend, then you would have to say those parts of Spain that have an inclination to secede, we ought to have an international election and let them do it, irrespective of the wishes of the Spanish Government in Madrid. That is interference in another sovereign state's affairs. It is up to the Ukraine, I would say to my friend from California, to decide on the disposition of its own territory, not up to us and not up to Russia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. Then you would suggest that we should be part of the British Empire. Is that correct? After all, we did forcefully declare our independence, and I guess you do, then, renounce when in the course of human events that it comes time to separate the bonds between, that doesn't—go right ahead. I yield.

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. No, the proper analogy actually is the American Civil War, Mr. Rohrabacher. It was not up to the United Kingdom and France to recognize Confederate independence. It was up to the United States of America to decide on that, and we did.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my time. Let me just note that had the South, during the Civil War, permitted women and permitted slaves and not had slavery, and it was not a slave situation, where if they had been permitted to vote, I doubt if they would have voted for secession, but had they done so and the South didn't have slavery, well, then, that would have been fine for them to secede, if we do believe in the Declaration of Independence.

Did you oppose our efforts in Kosovo, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I opposed secession, certainly, in the United States history.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are being consistent.

Let me note, I don't believe there is that big a difference between most of the members here and some of these issues that we are raising, because whether or not what the Russian action was at this point, at this point, whether or not somebody else committed, initiated a violence that ended up with the current situation, I think that what unites Americans is that we do believe that people have a right, through the ballot box, to determine their destiny. And you would suggest that they have to be part of a bigger entity, and that bigger entity has to agree to it. I think that is where we disagree.

But I think the right of people to determine through the ballot box rather than bullet box is the way we should be supporting and ending some of these conflicts. And I certainly agree with that in the Ukraine, and I certainly agree with that in Georgia, and all of these different things that we are talking about.

So I do not interpret my own position as being pro-Russian in some of these things. I really believe that local people have a right. I supported Kosovars. I supported the Scots. Even if they didn't get their vote, I would have appreciated it. And the Catalonians, if they want to be free from the rest of Spain. People have a right to their self-determination. I think that is what our Declaration of Independence was all about. And just a thought. I thought I would throw that in the air.



Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly, for that exchange.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. I think both gentlemen are right. We have been on the side of self-determination. We have been on the side of territorial integrity. We were born in a war of secession. We were baptized in a great civil war against secession. We tore asunder the British Empire in 1776 and prevented our Nation from being torn asunder fourscore and 7 years later.

I don't agree with Mr. Rohrabacher that just any group for any reason can say, "Give us a vote and we get our independence." That is only true if David Cameron is your Prime Minister.

The fact is, the San Fernando Valley would make an excellent country. I know it would have outstanding leadership. And, yet, we weren't even given a free vote to secede from the City of Los Angeles, let alone from the United States.

The fact is, these questions are answered in our Declaration of Independence, which says you shouldn't create your own country just because, well, that is how you feel that day or you think you would do a little better, only when you can lay out to the world truly extraordinary oppression from the State that is governing you and truly extraordinary reasons for your independence.

But getting back to the bill, I think this is a very strong pro-Ukrainian bill. I do not think that we need an additional amendment to be more pro-Ukraine. I think the gentleman from Virginia is right, though, in saying that this is a decision to be made in Kiev by Ukrainians. And if Ukraine, as the bill states, if Ukraine negotiates a settlement with Russia for whatever level of autonomy or whatever relationship Crimea will have to Russia or the Ukraine, that that is something that we ought to be prepared to accept.

Now, the gentleman from Virginia points out that we shouldn't invite that, but the fact is, we should invite the Ukraine to do whatever it considers best for the people of the Ukraine and the Crimea.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend yield?

Mr. SHERMAN. And to tie the President's hands and say that we have to continue these sanctions, even if a democratically-elected Ukrainian Government in Kiev is asking us to remove the sanctions, I think makes the bill more unwieldy, more permanent, more locked in, more written in stone than it needs to be.

I will make one point, then I will yield to the gentleman from Virginia, and that is he is correct in pointing out that human rights in the Crimea are not being respected. However, there were times in Ukrainian history where they did not have a democratic government, where there were levels of oppression for all of the people of Ukraine, including those of the Crimea, and particular concerns of the Russian-speaking majority in the Crimea. So I don't think we can say that Kiev always provides the highest level of human rights while Moscow always imposes oppression.

But the Crimea was made part of the Ukraine, and we should be following the Ukraine in whether to remove sanctions.

I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. I find it interesting that we are concerned about "tying the hands of the President." There are



so many other examples where we have no compunction about doing that, including my friend from California.

Mr. SHERMAN. You are absolutely correct.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But I will simply point out, there is nothing in my amendment, which has yet to be introduced, that ties anybody's hands. It simply removes this provision and is silent about it. It is a false argument to say we tie the President's hands. We most certainly do not. I am not adding language. We are subtracting language to be clear.

Secondly, the language here——

Mr. SHERMAN. Reclaiming my time. Reclaiming my time.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thanks for the courtesy.

Mr. SHERMAN. Every time a member of this committee tries to strike language that provides for a Presidential waiver, the response is that we are tying the President's hands. So the fact that you are striking language does not mean that you are not making the bill more binding, shifting, and depriving the President of an ability to act quickly. Sometimes we should and sometimes we should not provide such waivers.

And I will yield to you whatever remaining time I have. My time has expired.

Mr. SMITH. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes Chairman Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask your advice at this point in time. Mr. Connolly has not yet actually introduced the amendment. So for other members who may want to speak, and I do want to speak on this, I would be happy to wait until the amendment is introduced, or otherwise, we can all take two bites of the apple.

Mr. SMITH. Once the amendment has been introduced, obviously, we could have a debate on that.

Mr. CHABOT. Can I ask, are there any other members that wish to speak prior to the amendment being offered? Because I will wait.

Mr. SMITH. On the underlying bill, or whatever you want to speak on.

Mr. CHABOT. This was sort of like a parliamentary inquiry. So you have answered my parliamentary inquiry. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Lowenthal.

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to claim time, and I would like to yield it to my colleague from Virginia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the gentleman from California.

I will point out to my colleagues, unlike what Mr. Sherman characterized, let's read the language here. This language doesn't say, "Well, only if Ukraine initiates something and chooses a process, well, then, of course, we would respect it." It actually says the status of the Crimea has been resolved through an internationally supervised process to the satisfaction of the Ukrainian Government. That can be construed as an imposed settlement. So somebody else decides, whether Ukraine likes it or not, that this is good for them, this is the best we can get, and they have to accept it.

The other point I would make, which really troubles me about Mr. Sherman's argument, I was just in the Ukraine. They have a democratic government. They had a revolution to get it. They over-



threw the previous government because it was corrupt, it was a kleptocracy. They are struggling. They need our support.

I went with my friend Peter Roskam, a Republican, the head of the House Democracy Project, to go to the Ukraine to show support for what they are trying to do. This would dishearten them, I can assure you. This is not a signal of support. This is a retreat. It may not be intended as such, but it will be construed as such. We can be silent by eliminating this and not make the point.

I am glad to have Republican support for the amendment yet to be introduced. I am disheartened that one of my fellow Democrats feels otherwise. But I really do believe that the purpose here is to speak with one clear voice: You must withdraw from your illegal annexation and occupation of the Crimea.

And if the President ever wants, whatever President, to come to Congress with a different idea, there is nothing in here that precludes that, and there is nothing in here to preclude our consideration of it. We are silent about it. That is all I am doing, so that we were speaking clearly on this policy.

If Mr. Sherman wants me to yield, I do—with Mr. Lowenthal's permission.

Mr. SHERMAN. Just one point. Yes, the Ukrainian Government is democratic today. I was just making the point that sovereignty does not depend upon democracy. That is to say, Crimea was part of the Ukraine when they had a bad government. Crimea was part of the Ukraine when the Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union. Crimea is part of the Ukraine today. And I yield back to the gentleman.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. And I yield back to Mr. Lowenthal.

Mr. SMITH. Do you yield back?

Mr. LOWENTHAL. And I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Any other members like to be heard on the underlying bill?

Having heard no further request to speak on the bill, are there any amendments to the bill?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. SMITH. The clerk will report the bill.

Ms. MARTER. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5094 offered by Mr. Connolly of Virginia. Page 5, line 15, strike "that" and all that follows through "Ukraine's" on line 16 and insert "that Ukraine's." Page 5, line 17, strike "; or" and insert a period. Page 5, strike lines 18 through 21.

[The information referred to follows:]



**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE  
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 5094  
OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA**

Page 5, line 15, strike “that” and all that follows through “Ukraine’s” on line 16 and insert “that Ukraine’s”.

Page 5, line 17, strike “; or” and insert a period.

Page 5, strike lines 18 through 21.



Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia for 5 minutes to speak on his amendment.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend.

I think I have made it as clear as a bell what we are trying to do here. It is simple, it is uncomplicated, and it is designed to show solidarity with our democratic friends struggling in the Ukraine.

The Ukraine is losing soldiers every single day. So far, 6,000 casualties—6,000 casualties—to Russian aggression. We must do everything in our power to reverse what they are doing and to make it clear that is not how disputes are settled in modern day Europe.

And with that, I yield to my good friend, Mr. Chabot from Ohio.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It is rare that I disagree with my chairman on this committee. I have been working with Mr. Connolly on issues related to Crimea for some time now. I thank him for his leadership on this.

Our position with respect to Russia invading Ukraine and Crimea should be crystal clear, the world’s position should be crystal clear, and that is that the Russians should get the hell out of Crimea, as simple as that. I think this language just muddies up our position and the waters, and it ought to be as clear as that, Russian has to get out.

To allow additional pressure, basically, to be put on the Ukrainian Government, which I think this ultimately would do—Russia is a bully, we know that. They have threatened to cut off energy. They have invaded not just Crimea, but the eastern border of



Ukraine, and they are continuing in that. It is an off-and-on, literally, military battle going on. The Ukrainians, unfortunately, are outgunned by the Russians over and over again. And I think we have been remiss, this administration's policies have been remiss in providing additional necessary arms to allow the Ukrainians to defend themselves.

But we ought to be, as I say, crystal clear on this, and we ought not allow that aggressive behavior by the Russians to be rewarded. To accept Russian aggression in Crimea and with respect to Ukraine is just going to invite additional Russian aggression, whether it is in Lithuania, whether it is in Latvia, whether it is in Estonia, whether it is in Poland.

I think this language sends the wrong message altogether, and it does invite some international supervised process, whatever that means, to come in and just muddy the whole situation up, and it ultimately gives the Ukrainians a decision, which is kind of a take-it-or-leave-it thing. We ought not to go down that road. That is the wrong way to go. We ought to stay with our position, which is, Russia, get out of Crimea.

And I thank the gentleman for his leadership on this issue. And I yield back to Mr. Connolly.

Mr. SMITH. You still have some time remaining.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would be glad to yield to anyone or yield back, Mr. Chairman. I know we are pressed for time.

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman yields back.

I recognize myself in favor of the amendment.

Let me just say to my colleagues, I remember standing with Ronald Reagan in my first term, 35 years ago, when he proclaimed Captive Nations Week and continued a tradition that began in the late 1940s, that was through Democrat and Republican administrations, of not recognizing Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, because they were captive nations.

Our maps did not recognize that they had been annexed, conquered by the Soviet Union. And we stood firm. Half a century later, those countries are free and prospering and great friends and allies in the European Union, as well as with the United States and NATO.

Let me just say that I think this language, well-meaning as it is, to me looks like an engraved invitation to do something other than recognize Ukraine's sovereignty over the Crimea. You know, when we say, "to the satisfaction of a democratically-elected government of Ukraine," Ukraine is under tremendous pressure, both financially and militarily, with such occupiers and such acts aggression happening every single day, now outside of Crimea, in other parts of Ukraine. And they would be at a very disadvantaged position to resist international pressure to accept a solution that is not truly in their best interest.

So I support the Connolly amendment, and I do yield back my time.

I would like to go to the Democrat side next. I can't see it.

Mr. Boyle, sorry.

Mr. BOYLE. I know I am way down here. But thank you, Mr. Chairman.



I just want to speak briefly to strongly support the Connolly amendment. You know, since the end of World War II, the first time we have seen the boundaries actually jeopardized in Europe, one nation-state invading another, was Putin's invasion of Crimea.

We need to be doing far more to support Ukraine. We cannot support some process by which essentially it would be agreed that Russian aggression is being rewarded. That would be a mistake for Ukraine, it would be a mistake for the Baltics, and it would be a mistake for the rest of Europe.

Putin's actions in Crimea and actions that continue today in the eastern part of Ukraine, where people are suffering, where relatives of constituents of mine in Philadelphia and suburban Philadelphia continue to suffer, to recognize and actually award that sort of aggression would be a mistake with terrible consequences. And if we learned nothing from history, that is something that we should have learned and relearned by now.

So I strongly support the Connolly amendment, and I will take this opportunity, again, to urge our own administration to be doing more to assist Ukraine in their time of need.

I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Boyle.

I would like to yield 5 minutes to Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman from California.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And I also appreciate the fact that the chair recognized captive nations speeches by the President, because I am the one who wrote them. It seems that we are having time for a little philosophical part of the discussion. Let me share this, especially with Mr. Connolly.

When I was working on this captive nation speech for President Reagan, I remember what almost scuttled the first captive nation speech that I worked on, and that was I wanted to be fair about it, and I wanted to declare that the Russian people themselves were the first captive nation, that they themselves had been oppressed by communism, and it was communism that was the enemy, not Russian people.

And you know that the Baltic groups, especially, but the other people who were now in those occupied countries at the time were so adamant that we not include anything about the damn Russians. They hated the Russians. They did not differentiate between the Soviet Union and the Russian people. And they almost, with their hatred toward the Russian people, almost scuttled the President of the United States' solid statement on how we were opposed to the Russians occupying all of these countries in Eastern Europe.

That is the same mentality that is going on today. There is such a hatred. It is based on basically an historic hatred for the fact that Stalin and Russian people under Communist control murdered millions of people throughout Europe and these countries. They can't get rid of that hatred and that resentment toward that country which they see has caused that, when it was really communism, it was the evil of communism.

It is like right now, we shouldn't hate the people of Iran. You and I, Mr. Connolly, agree totally on Iranian policy. We don't hate the people of Iran. We don't like the mullahs and that vicious dictatorship of the mullahs that is pro-terrorist.



Well, I believe that a lot of what we are talking about dealing with whether it is Ukrainian policy or whether it is—wherever that is, it is all based on a hatred of Russia and an unwillingness, thus, to see that Saakashvili was the one who caused the crisis in Georgia. He is the one who broke a long-term truce, sent troops in, and murdered, I might add, truce observers that were unarmed, Russian truce observers.

So we don't want to recognize that as a factor. For the Russians, that was a major factor. There would not have been any Russian troops going into that area, had Saakashvili not done that.

And I will tell you, when it comes to Georgia, that is one thing. We have Ukraine. And, Mr. Connolly, I respect you, you are my friend, but I also respect your opinions. But the fact is, you just mentioned, yeah, we overthrew that former government that was a kleptocracy. That was a conspiracy from our EU members and in collusion with the United States to overthrow an elected government.

Chris Smith will tell you, he was there observing the election of Yanukovych. Yanukovych was a legally-elected President who was overthrown, and if they would have waited until the next election, there would have been none of this problem. The Russians would not have gone in if he would have lost the election. But instead, we overthrew, we participated in collusion with the overthrow of an elected government that then threatened the status quo to the detriment of Russia.

We have to expect Russia to watch out for its own interests. What would we do if that same thing happened in Mexico? We would be involved.

Well, I suggest that we need to make sure that we try to, number one, live at peace with Russia, recognizing that it is no longer the Soviet Union, but it is a country that is large and has its interests, the same way we do and other countries that are allied with us do. And we cannot just have a double standard, saying we can overthrow that government in Ukraine and the Russians have to accept it.

And we have, in terms of self-determination, I really appreciate Mr. Sherman's remarks about the Declaration of Independence. I will think about what he just said. But we may have a difference in philosophy, not with Brad, but here in this committee, as to whether or not the right of self-determination is something that should be a consideration of U.S. policy.

So with that said—

Mr. SHERMAN. If the gentleman will yield? I fully agree with—

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman is out of time.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. My time is up. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. I would just say that I may not accept Mr. Rohrabacher's views anywhere else in the world, but an independent San Fernando Valley is something I am looking forward to.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I supported that.

Mr. SMITH. Do you yield back?



Do any other members seek recognition on the Connolly amendment?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, might I just note for the record, because he is necessarily on the floor, the author of the resolution has endorsed this amendment, for the record.

Mr. RIBBLE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes Mr. Ribble.

Mr. RIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for a moment to speak on this issue, and I will be brief.

There are about 55 miles at the narrowest point that separates the United States in the State of Alaska from the Russian border. Under this self-determination argument that has been made here, if a certain percentage of Alaskans decided they want to be part of Russia, would we ever, under any circumstances—ever, under any circumstances—accept a Russian invasion of Alaska? We would not.

I support this amendment, and I encourage its adoption.

I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ribble.

Hearing no further requests for time, the question occurs on the amendment offered by Mr. Connolly.

All those in favor, say aye.

Opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it, and the amendment is agreed to.

Hearing no further requests for amendments, the Chair now moves that the committee agree to H.R. 5094, as amended.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed say, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it, and H.R. 5094, as amended, is agreed to.

Without objection, the amended bill is ordered favorably reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute. Staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes, and the chairman is authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules.

That concludes our business for today. I want to thank members on both sides of the aisle for their input.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:37 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]







## A P P E N D I X

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD



**FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128**

**Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman**

July 14, 2016

**TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov>):

**DATE:** Thursday, July 14, 2016

**TIME:** 9:00 a.m.

**MARKUP OF:** H. Res. 634, Recognizing the importance of the United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral relationship to counter North Korean threats and nuclear proliferation, and to ensure regional security and human rights;

H. Res. 660, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to support the territorial integrity of Georgia;

H. Res. 728, Supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Cambodia;

H. Res. 729, Expressing support for the expeditious consideration and finalization of a new, robust, and long-term Memorandum of Understanding on military assistance to Israel between the United States Government and the Government of Israel;

H. Res. 750, Urging the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and increase pressure on it and its members;

H. Res. 780, Urging respect for the constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the democratic transition of power in 2016;

H. Res. 808, Calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release Iranian-Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi;

H. Res. 810, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the life and work of Elie Wiesel in promoting human rights, peace, and Holocaust remembrance;

H. Res. 821, Urging the Government of Gabon to respect democratic principles during the August 2016 presidential elections;

H.R. 4481, Education for All Act of 2016;

H.R. 5094, Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act;

H.R. 5537, Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2016; and

H.R. 5732, the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2016.

**By Direction of the Chairman**

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5423 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.



**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
**MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP**

Day Thursday Date 7/14/2016 Room 2172

Starting Time 9:04 Ending Time 10:38

Recesses 0 (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_ ) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_ ) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_ ) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_ ) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_ ) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_ )

**Presiding Member(s)**

*Chairman Edward R. Royce, Rep. Chris Smith*

*Check all of the following that apply:*

Open Session ☒

Executive (closed) Session ☐

Televised ☒

Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒

Stenographic Record ☒

**BILLS FOR MARKUP:** *(Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)*

*See attached.*

**COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**

*See attached.*

**NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**

*none*

**STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD:** *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

SPR - Rep. Chris Smith  
 SPR - Rep. David Chaffetz  
 SPR - Rep. Michael McCaul  
 SPR - Rep. David Toth

**ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP:** *(Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)*

*See markup summary.*


**RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP):** *(Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)*

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>
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TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE \_\_\_\_\_

or

TIME ADJOURNED 10:38

  
**Doug Anderson, General Counsel**



## HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Edward R. Royce, CA
X	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
X	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL
X	Dana Rohrabacher, CA
X	Steve Chabot, OH
	Joe Wilson, SC
	Michael T. McCaul, TX
	Ted Poe, TX
X	Matt Salmon, AZ
	Darrell Issa, CA
	Tom Marino, PA
	Jeff Duncan, SC
X	Mo Brooks, AL
	Paul Cook, CA
X	Randy Weber, TX
	Scott Perry, PA
	Ron DeSantis, FL
X	Mark Meadows, NC
X	Ted Yoho, FL
	Curt Clawson, FL
	Scott DesJarlais, TN
X	Reid Ribble, WI
X	Dave Trott, MI
X	Lee Zeldin, NY
X	Dan Donovan, NY

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Eliot L. Engel, NY
X	Brad Sherman, CA
X	Gregory W. Meeks, NY
X	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerald E. Connolly, VA
X	Theodore E. Deutch, FL
	Brian Higgins, NY
	Karen Bass, CA
	William Keating, MA
X	David Cicilline, RI
X	Alan Grayson, FL
X	Ami Bera, CA
X	Alan S. Lowenthal, CA
X	Grace Meng, NY
	Lois Frankel, FL
	Tulsi Gabbard, HI
X	Joaquin Castro, TX
X	Robin Kelly, IL
X	Brendan Boyle, PA



**7/14/16 Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary**

By unanimous consent, the Chair called up the following measures and amendments, previously provided to Members, to be considered *en bloc*:

1. H. Res. 634 (Salmon), Recognizing the importance of the United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral relationship to counter North Korean threats and nuclear proliferation, and to ensure regional security and human rights;
  - a. Salmon 146, an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
2. H. Res. 660 (Poe), Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to support the territorial integrity of Georgia.
3. H. Res. 728 (Lowenthal), Supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Cambodia;
  - a. Lowenthal 78, an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
4. H. Res. 729 (Ros-Lehtinen), Expressing support for the expeditious consideration and finalization of a new, robust, and long-term Memorandum of Understanding on military assistance to Israel between the United States Government and the Government of Israel.
5. H. Res. 750 (Deutch), Urging the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and increase pressure on it and its members.
6. H. Res. 780 (Smith), Urging respect for the constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the democratic transition of power in 2016;
  - a. Royce 131
  - b. Smith amendment to H. Res. 780.
7. H. Res. 808 (Royce), Calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release Iranian-Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi.
8. H. Res. 810 (Israel), Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the life and work of Elie Wiesel in promoting human rights, peace, and Holocaust remembrance;
  - a. Royce 139.
9. H. Res. 821 (Smith), Urging the Government of Gabon to respect democratic principles during the August 2016 presidential elections;
  - a. Meeks 821.
10. H.R. 4481 (Lowey), Education for All Act of 2016;
  - a. Royce 130, an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
11. H.R. 5537 (Royce), Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2016;
  - a. Royce amendment to H.R. 5537.



12. H.R. 5732 (Engel), the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2016;
  - a. Meadows 286
  - b. Ros-Lehtinen 53
  - c. Ros-Lehtinen 54
  - d. Yoho 104.

The measures considered *en bloc* were agreed to by voice vote.

The Chair called up H.R. 5094 and by unanimous consent, Engel 284, an amendment in the nature of a substitute previously provided to Members, was considered base text.


13. H.R. 5094 (Engel), Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act;

- a. Engel 284, an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Rep. Connolly offered an amendment to Engel 284, which was agreed to by voice vote.

H.R. 5094, as amended by Engel 284 (amended by Connolly 84), was agreed to by voice vote.

The Committee adjourned





STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

**HFAC Mark-Up Statements  
For H. Res. 780 and H. Res 821  
July 14, 2016**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo faces a perilous course, as elections scheduled for November look increasingly unlikely. The mandate for President Joseph Kabila and his country's national legislature will expire in late December, and unless there is some way to either speed up the process for a credible election or find a way to create an acceptable transitional government to manage the election process, the State Department and other observers fear that country could descend into chaos.

I met with Kabila's special envoy recently, who tried to explain why in the five years since the last election, the government couldn't make the necessary preparations to hold this election on time. His reasons didn't justify the delays that have put his country on the brink of a constitutional crisis. This is why we have introduced H. Res. 780 – to press the Kabila government to avoid a situation in which he remains in power indefinitely, contrary to the intent of his country's constitution and the will of his people.

This resolution calls for sanction on anyone who impedes the democratic process of elections and urges a reexamination of our government's economic and security assistance to the Kabila government. They have gotten the message, but we must press on to force movement under their laws to maintain a democratic process.

Also taking note of our resolution is a group from the Congolese Diaspora, including an opposition party, religious leaders and civil society groups. Because of H. Res. 780, this coalition is calling for a process by which Kabila would appoint a Prime Minister under his country's emergency provisions to take over temporarily to hold elections that would be considered acceptable to the Congolese people and the international community.

H. Res 780 additionally has provided a path ahead for our own committee in issuing statements on other elections later this year. The next case is Gabon, which holds elections late next month. H. Res. 821 calls for "orderly, peaceful, free and fair presidential elections" in that country.

The 2009 elections in Gabon were plagued with election irregularities that provoked destructive demonstrations, and a repeat of such a significantly flawed process could endanger stability in a country that should be a model for other African nations conducting elections in the near future.

Our championing of successful elections – free, fair and violence-free – puts governments on notice that we mean what we say about democracy, and we hope it will prevent tragically flawed elections that have caused such upheaval in Africa and other areas of the world. Our admonitions about free and fair elections must always refer to the country's own laws and must be in concert with the expressed interest of their own people.

In the long run, our efforts can help people around the world to express themselves politically in a peaceful and successful manner. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for their help and support on both of these resolutions, and I call on my colleagues to support H. Res. 780 and H. Res. 821.



**Statement of David N. Cicilline**  
**HFAC Markup 7/14/2016**

Thank you Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for holding this markup today. This is a proud moment for this committee.

As always, I am pleased this Committee has come together in a spirit of bipartisanship to pass legislation that deals with a variety of important issues.

All of the measures being considered today are worthy and help advance important causes that this committee addresses on a regular basis, including:

- reaffirming our relationships with and support of key international partners, including Japan, Korea, Georgia, and Israel;
- supporting human rights, democracy, and rule of law in Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo; and Gabon;
- urging the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and increasing pressure on it and its members;
- calling on the Iranian government to release Iranian-Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi;
- expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the life and work of Elie Wiesel in promoting human rights, peace, and Holocaust remembrance. His life's work is an inspiration and should serve as a beacon to us all that we must be vigilant and take action to prevent injustice and human rights abuses around the world;
- and expressing our support for expeditious consideration of a new, long-term, robust MOU on military assistance to Israel between the United States and the Government of Israel.

I would also like to express my support for **H.R. 4481, the Education for All Act of 2016**, which seeks to ensure U.S. supports for international efforts to provide quality primary educational opportunities for all children. Promoting basic education in developing countries and promoting girls' equal access to education serves our diplomatic, economic, and security interests.

**H.R. 5094, the Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act** makes it clear that Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine carries a price by tightening sanctions on Russia and rejecting any form of recognition of Russian rule over Crimea, which was U.S. policy toward the 50-year Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. It also promotes investment in Ukraine and directs the State Department to implement a strategy to respond to Russian propaganda and disinformation.



**H.R.5537, Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2016** promotes and encourages expansion of Internet access in developing countries. Internet access can help facilitate creation of a world with greater freedom, fairness and dignity for everyone. As such, connectivity is an important part of development efforts.

**H.R. 5732, the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2016** was inspired by the former Syrian military photographer known as “Caesar,” who testified before this committee in 2014 about atrocities committed by the Assad regime against Syrian civilians. The systematic abuse of human rights, use of torture and terror against innocents has gone on for years and we must do what we can to hold Syrian government officials accountable for these heinous activities perpetrated against their own people.





**McCaul Statement for the Record**

**H.R. 5537**

**July 14, 2016**

“I would like to thank Chairman Royce and his staff for their hard work a dedication on this important issue. I would also like to thank the Chairman and his staff for working together with me and my staff to ensure this committee puts forth a responsible bill that enhances and promotes internet access around the world while also maintaining the importance of cybersecurity. This bill will go far in to helping ensure internet access reaches those who need it most and I look forward to supporting this legislation.”





**Rep. Dave Trott Statement for the Record  
House Foreign Affairs Full Committee Markup 7.14.16**

I'd like to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for bringing these measures up for consideration before the committee today.

From southwest Africa to Georgia, and from Ukraine to Israel, the bills we're considering today reach throughout the entire world, and represent the strong bi-partisan relationship we continually promote in this committee. Ranging from promoting internet access in the developing world, to promoting democracy and human rights, these bills represent America's will not just to stand with our allies, but also our commitment to stand with the world's most vulnerable. In these measures we acknowledge the life of a hero and a holocaust survivor, and also acknowledge the devastating situation in Syria—a modern day holocaust against the Syrian people.

In Congress, we're stronger when we work together, and that's certainly evident regarding our relationship with Israel. House Resolution 729 has over 270 bi-partisan co-sponsors, urging support for an expeditious finalization of a new memorandum of understanding with our ally Israel. I'm a proud co-sponsor of this bill and look forward to what needs to be a robust, long term commitment to Israel, especially in such a trying day and age.

We do what we can on this side of the Atlantic, but we always welcome help from our allies in the EU as well. It's time for our friends in the European Union to make the right choice and designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. While Hezbollah is notorious for having a strong disdain towards Israel, Hezbollah is also a cancer to the Lebanese people. They have shown time and time again that they are nothing more than an Iranian proxy that cares more about Iran and Syria than Lebanon. The European Union, like the United States did, needs to send a strong message to the world that Hezbollah's despicable behavior will not be tolerated. This committee passed legislation that became law, sanctioning Hezbollah, and I hope that the EU follows suit.

As most of you know, I have more religious minorities from the Middle East in my district than any other district in the United States. I'm proud to be their voice in Washington and I'd like to close my comments by quoting someone who dedicated his life to tolerance, humility and human rights.

As Elie Wiesel so eloquently said, "we must choose between the violence of adults and the smiles of children, between the ugliness of hate, and the will to oppose it, between inflicting suffering and humiliation on our fellow man and offering him the solidarity and hope he deserves or not. Even in darkness it is possible to create light and encourage compassion. There it is, I still believe in man, in spite of man."

I yield back my time.