

# NOMINATION

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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MARCH 26, 2009  
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## NOMINATION

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THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2009

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

Karl W. Eikenberry to be Ambassador to Afghanistan

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The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Members present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Casey, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Isakson, and DeMint.

Also present: Senator Inouye and John Warner.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order.

Senator Warner, we kind of let our Ambassador—this is the first hurdle is getting by you. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Get him the rest of the way here.

Well, it is a great delight to welcome our colleague Senator John Warner back. Sir John Warner—we are not allowed to use those titles over here. But he and my colleague Sir Edward have joined in an august group now of honorarily knighted public servants, and we are really delighted to recognize that honor, among many others, John. And it is great to have you back here.

General Eikenberry, welcome. We are glad to have you here and look forward to a change in title, though I know a retired general never wants to be anything but a general, but you can wear the title of Ambassador, we hope, for a number of years here.

All of us agree that Afghanistan, along with its neighbor Pakistan, represents the central front in the global campaign against terrorism. And in the coming days, this new administration is sending a new Ambassador to Afghanistan to implement a new strategy.

At this crucial moment, after too many years of drift in the place where al Qaeda plotted 9/11, we need to get our policy right. In LTG Karl Eikenberry, the President has chosen an exceptionally skilled and deeply knowledgeable public servant to represent the United States in Afghanistan.

General Eikenberry has already served two tours in Afghanistan, most recently as the top United States commander there from 2005 to 2007. He knows the local terrain. He knows the military side of

the equation as well as anyone can. And I believe he is uniquely placed to get the civil-military balance right as Ambassador.

It is clear that General Eikenberry is well equipped to hit the ground running, and this is absolutely vital because the situation is deteriorating at an alarming rate. The Taliban has been resurgent. Attacks are up. U.S. casualties have been increasing, and confidence in the Afghan Government's ability to deliver for its people has been waning.

In a region of suspicion—of historically long-term suspicion about foreign footprints, we don't have a lot of time to waste in order to turn the tide. The President has pledged to recommit to Afghanistan, beginning with the deployment of 17,000 additional U.S. troops and a significant effort to increase the size and the capacity of the security forces.

In 2006, I argued that more U.S. troops were needed. I believe that, but I also believe they have to be very carefully tasked. The footprint has to be very carefully managed, and I emphasize troops alone are not going to bring victory.

Later today, I really look forward to hearing from the administration about the results of the strategic review, and we have been briefed, to some degree, up until this point. But one thing is clear. Our military commitment has to be matched by a comprehensive, bottom-up strategy that acknowledges Afghanistan's history of decentralized governance and recognizes the capability of our international and Afghan allies.

I agree with the President that our primary goal in Afghanistan is a simple one. It is to make sure that Afghanistan does not once again become a launching ground for terrorist attacks against America or our allies. That is our goal. Achieving this goal will involve improving governance at all levels and helping the Afghan Government to deliver better security and better services to the Afghan people.

At next week's NATO summit, the President will ask our allies to do more to shoulder this burden. We have to persuade those countries unwilling to take on expanded combat roles to deepen their involvement in other aspects of the mission, including police training and development assistance.

More will also be required from the Afghan Government. Corruption remains a powerful obstacle to progress. Too often the judicial system and police force drive Afghans to the Taliban. That is unacceptable.

President Hamid Karzai has promised to address this chronic problem, but as we devote more resources and put more soldiers into harm's way, we have to insist on more in return.

Afghanistan's Presidential elections this August will be crucial in restoring faith in the Afghan Government. We will watch closely, and we will work closely with the Afghans in order to make sure that that election is open and fair. We will not pick any winners. We will not back candidates. We want this to be a playing field where the Afghans freely and fairly choose their leadership.

Even as we work to strengthen the performance of the central government, we must redouble our efforts to expand their ability to reach beyond Kabul, empowering women and working more closely with trusted provincial leaders to ensure that development funds reach the Afghan people.

One promising model for success at the local level is the National Solidarity Program, which employs Afghans in reconstruction projects that have actually been requested by the village elders.

One of the most vexing governance challenges is the flourishing narcotics trade, which provides a major source of funding for the Taliban. We need to provide greater subsidies and technical assistance for farmers who abandon poppy cultivation, as we have done in Nangarhar province, but we also must crack down on drug lords and reduce production, employing sustained force when necessary particularly in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand province.

Our strategy must also reflect the interconnectedness of the region's challenges, and this requires redoubling our efforts to strengthen Pakistan's civilian government and support its activities against militants in the tribal belt. That is why Senator Lugar and I will shortly be reintroducing the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which seeks to triple nonmilitary aid to the people of Pakistan while holding its security forces more accountable for assistance provided in their fight against the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda.

We also need to reach out to Afghanistan's other neighbors, including India, China, and Iran. In 2001 and 2002, we should not forget Iran provided critical assistance to helping us stabilize Afghanistan, and the administration is absolutely correct to explore how our interests might again coincide on this issue, beginning at The Hague conference next week.

We went into Afghanistan to hunt down al Qaeda and to replace the Taliban rulers because they refused, at that time, to break with al Qaeda and because they harbored those al Qaeda leaders with a legitimate government strong enough—our purpose in going in was to create a government strong enough to avoid the destabilization of a vital and volatile area.

Today, that goal demands a more robust commitment of coalition troops and reconstruction aid. It is not too late to turn the tide in Afghanistan, as complicated as it may be. But only a comprehensive strategy, only sufficient resources and strong national resolve, and only competent leadership on the ground is going to lead us to that success.

I thank General Eikenberry for joining us here today. I look forward to hearing his views on the way forward in Afghanistan.

And again, we are delighted to also welcome one of our most distinguished and senior members of the Senate, Senator Inouye. I think, General, you couldn't have picked two more capable or respected members to introduce you here today.

Maybe we will just have them introduce you, and we will forget the rest of the hearing. [Laughter.]

But just about works that way, I promise.  
Senator Lugar.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think you made an excellent suggestion with our colleagues John Warner and Dan Inouye. Just wonderful to have both of you here.

I would just say, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, among the many important decisions being made in the first months of the new administration, certainly those with relationship to our engagement in Afghanistan and the surrounding region are among the most important.

And I welcome Karl Eikenberry, who has been nominated to be our Ambassador to Afghanistan. General Eikenberry has served in numerous positions as a career military officer, including two stints in command of military forces in Afghanistan. He demonstrated exceptional diplomatic skill in these commands as well as in his current assignment as deputy chairman of NATO's Military Committee.

As our Ambassador to Afghanistan, General Eikenberry will be able to draw upon extensive experience in engaging international partners and facilitating a more collaborative effort with the Afghans. I am encouraged by the renewed emphasis on Afghanistan as reflected in the appointment of Ambassador Holbrooke and the President's own statements about our policy.

Nonetheless, many details need to be fleshed out as more resources and troops enter Afghanistan, and I look forward to hearing the nominee's impressions of the Obama administration's strategic review and of how we can improve Afghanistan's capacity to govern itself.

For the last several years, our Government has struggled to gain greater European participation in Afghanistan. We are unlikely to succeed if military and political efforts in that country trend toward greater U.S. domination. Europe has strong incentives to cooperate closely with us to make the NATO mission a success.

The September 11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda still operates there. The fate of the country remains both strategic and symbolic.

The drug trade emanating from Afghanistan impacts European society, and the instability in Afghanistan poses a threat to other states in the region. There should be no doubt that Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO. Alliance commanders must have the resources to provide security. They must have the flexibility to use troops to meet Afghanistan's most critical needs.

President Obama's election was greeted enthusiastically by most Europeans. During his campaign, he made no secret of his intention to elevate the priority of the Afghanistan mission. It is essential the President and European leaders work together to finalize a plan for greater European commitment in Afghanistan.

The appointment of a general to be our Ambassador in Afghanistan effectively highlights the importance of interagency coordination between our civilian and military institutions. In this regard, I hope to hear from the nominee today how he intends to employ the experience of senior diplomats in his country team. I also hope



the President will soon announce his choice of an experienced and proven USAID mission director.

In 2003, then-Senator Joe Biden and I introduced legislation to improve the capacity of civilian agencies to respond to national security crises. Since then, this committee has frequently emphasized and authorized greater civilian response capacity as a partner to our overtasked military.

Defense Department leaders, led by Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and General Petraeus, have recognized the necessity of such a civilian partner. Multiple reviews of our policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have concluded that up to 80 percent of activities necessary in post conflict and counterinsurgency situations are civilian tasks. Success in Afghanistan may depend on the attitudes of the people, the progress of reconstruction, and the development of the economy as much as it depends on battlefield victories.

Last year, the Bush administration submitted a substantial fiscal year 2009 budget request to fund the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department. I understand that this office is now fully participating in our interagency planning and deploying civilians to the region.

The emergent Afghan strategy appears to direct the deployment of substantial additional civilian capacity alongside the military. I hope the forthcoming budget requests include at least as much as last year for the critical tasks of identifying, training, and deploying civilian experts, which would sustain the efforts to unify such interagency coordination in the current Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization rather than build inefficient redundancies elsewhere.

I appreciate very much General Eikenberry's willingness to take on an extremely difficult mission, and I look forward to his testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Senator Inouye, thanks so much for being here with us. We appreciate it.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUE,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII**

Senator INOUE. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to be here this morning with Senator Warner to introduce LTG Karl Eikenberry, the President's nominee for Ambassador to Afghanistan.

General Eikenberry's decorated career in the Army has given him myriad experiences that I believe will serve the new administration and our country superbly as United States Ambassador to Afghanistan.

Throughout his military career, he has served in a number of positions that involve policy, strategy, and political and military skills. A number of these experiences occurred during the General's time as director of the strategic planning and policy at the United States Pacific Command at Camp Smith in Hawaii, where he interfaced with our neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region.

Following his experiences at the U.S. Pacific Command, his focus was placed on Operation Enduring Freedom. This is when General

Eikenberry began to establish his working relations with the Afghan Government and our allies in the theater. Mr. Chairman and members, he possesses a thorough understanding of Afghanistan, its history, culture, and people. And on several occasions, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee called upon General Eikenberry to discuss events in East Asia and Afghanistan because of his expertise in this area.

General Eikenberry's knowledge of both the military and diplomatic perspectives will be of great benefit as the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan. The challenges that face the new administration and the Department of State, as noted by you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, are immense. If General Eikenberry is confirmed—and I hope he is—the Department of State will gain from his expertise, the established relationship he has in Afghanistan, and the expeditious transition his nomination affords.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I request that a letter of support from the president of the Hawaii State Senate, the Honorable Colleen Hanabusa, be made part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be.

[The letter from Hon. Colleen Hanabusa follows:]

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,  
THE STATE SENATE OF HAWAII,  
*Honolulu, Hawaii.*

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, members of the committee.

I write in strong support of Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who has been nominated to be the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan.

As one of our country's most sensitive and delicate diplomatic assignment, it is critically important that our Ambassador to Afghanistan understands the culture, history and political landscape of the post. I can think of no better nominee for this position than Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry. He served in Afghanistan twice, including an 18 month command tour that ended in 2007. He knows and has good relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He recognizes, and is able to balance the political, social and economic challenges that confront Afghanistan, and I believe will do more to further our security interest in region than anyone before him.

Mr. Chairman, as you have said yourself:

At this crucial moment, after too many years of policy drift, we simply must get our Afghanistan strategy right. With the Taliban resurgent and U.S. troops increasingly at risk, we cannot afford a continuation of the status quo. At such a time, Karl Eikenberry brings exceptionally valuable skills to the table. After two much-lauded tours of duty there, he knows the military side of the equation as well as anyone can. In his new civilian capacity, he is uniquely placed to get the civil-military balance right.

Simply stated, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, is the right man for the job.

Sincerely,

COLLEEN HANABUSA,  
*President, Hawaii State Senate.*

Senator INOUE. I thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Senator Inouye. We know how busy you are with the budget and everything right now. We really appreciate you taking time.

Thank you.

Senator INOUE. He is a good man. I hope you will pass him out today.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as soon as Senator Warner stops talking, we are going to take a vote. [Laughter.]

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would first say how pleased I am to be with you, Senator Inouye, and you are free to go now. I will take charge. You can go on about more important matters. [Laughter.]

Senator INOUE. Seriously, may I be excused?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we did. And I completely understand. You are in the middle of very important budget issues. So thank you. Senator Warner, is your mike on?

Senator WARNER. I do see this red light.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Great.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER,  
FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA**

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my dear friend, Senator Lugar. Both of you have been dear friends of many, many years, and other colleagues here.

I think I will ask unanimous consent that my statement be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, in full in the record.

Senator WARNER. And I listened carefully to two very well drafted and delivered opening statements, and much of that material is in my text, but I think, Senator Kerry, you hit on it. It is the need to get the right balance in Afghanistan between all parties involved in that area.

And Senator Lugar, I am so glad you touched on the need for the interagency cooperation. When I was privileged to chair the Armed Services Committee, hearing after hearing, pleading with the various agencies and departments of the Government to make their contributions because, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, it cannot be a military operation alone. It is a coordinated effort.

And if I could just say a few personal things? As you know, I have been privileged—I was just sitting here and made a little note. Thirty-seven years ago, I went into the Pentagon, and you, Senator Kerry, went right on the front lines in Vietnam in those days when I was Secretary of the Navy.

I only point that out that all those 5 years in the Navy Department, I really saw and worked with many, many fine flag officers and general officers, and then continuing in the Armed Services Committee those 30 years, again, many, many hearings such as this involving the confirmation of our wonderful people who attain the ranks of flag and general officer. This man is simply one of the most outstanding I have ever met, and that is where I was pleased to be invited to come today.

As each of you said, we should commend our President for having made this nomination. And I am sure he did it with the advice of the distinguished Secretary of State, our former colleague.

That was a bold decision by Secretary Clinton to reach down to an Active-Duty officer, and then for that officer to express the willingness to resign that commission subject to confirmation by the Senate. That is the type of bold initiatives that I hope this administration continues to take.

I have great respect—of course, all of us do—for the professional corps who serve in the Department of State. But every now and then, there comes such a unique situation as this that you reach

out and find wherever you can that one individual who combines all of the complex issues that are facing this theater.

As you pointed out, not just military, but it is diplomatic. Afghanistan is flanked by Iran and Pakistan, and the pressures and problems there are brought to bear in his work in Afghanistan.

But this gentleman, I just would like to add one thing about all of the things that he has done. He is a soldier first, but he is a scholar, an extraordinary scholar in his attainments in the academic world.

He is a graduate of the academy. He has earned his master's degree from Harvard University in East Asian studies, from Stanford University in political science. He was a national security fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

He earned an interpreter's certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office while studying at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense Chinese Language School. And he has an advanced degree in Chinese history.

A rare combination of soldier, scholar, and, subject to the wisdom of this wonderful body, the United States Senate, he can add a third title—after a period of time earning it—of statesman. But he has done that in many respects already.

But I mention, having looked at so many confirmation processes involving, this truly was a remarkable individual for this administration to find. And with his lovely wife, who is going to be introduced momentarily, they will take on this heavy responsibility, as each of you pointed out.

So, with that, I would conclude my remarks and thank you, General, first for the privilege of being with you today and saying a few words. And second, as simply a citizen of this country, we are all grateful for your public service to date and your next chapter, which is about as important as any that you have undertaken thus far, if not the most important.

Good luck to you.

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, thank you for those very kind words.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. I thank the chair.

The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER,  
FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, it is my privilege today to join Chairman Inouye to introduce Karl Eikenberry, the nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to Afghanistan. I commend the President and the Secretary of State for this outstanding nomination.

In anticipation of the administration's formulating, in consultation with NATO, a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan, the nomination of Karl Eikenberry for this post comes at a challenging moment. Lieutenant General Eikenberry is a gifted military officer whose intellect, experience, and character will serve our Nation well in this critical posting.

Karl Eikenberry comes to this nomination with a military career of remarkable accomplishment that began nearly 40 years ago when he entered the United States Military Academy as a cadet in 1969.

General Eikenberry currently serves as the Deputy Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Committee in Belgium. He has had two tours in Afghanistan. First, as U.S. Security Coordinator and Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in Kabul from 2002 to 2003 and later as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007.

It is during these three postings that I had the opportunity on numerous occasions to visit and consult with him. He knows Afghanistan like few Americans. He knows many in the Afghan leadership. He knows many in the military leadership of U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces. He knows and understands the important role played by our allies. He knows the regional context through which we must increasingly view the complex nature of the mission in Afghanistan, many components of which are joint and combined.

At this pivotal moment in our mission in Afghanistan, we are fortunate to have a public servant who possesses this unique and exceptional record of experience.

General Eikenberry won my respect and admiration during my earliest visits to Afghanistan. I always appreciated the extensive time he spent with our congressional delegations and especially appreciated the time he would spend meeting with members of the Armed Services Committee when he was in Washington. His observations were always candid and frank.

As I came to know General Eikenberry and learned more of his background, I came to appreciate more fully his exceptional and unique skills.

Lieutenant General Eikenberry is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He has earned master's degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and from Stanford University in Political Science, and was a National Security Fellow at the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He earned an Interpreter's Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office while studying at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Chinese Language School in Hong Kong and he has an Advanced Degree in Chinese History from Nanjing University in the People's Republic of China.

Lieutenant General Eikenberry has served as commander and staff officer with mechanized, light, airborne, and ranger infantry units in Hawaii, Korea, and Italy. In addition, he has served in various strategy, policy, and political-military positions, including: Director for Strategic Planning and Policy for U.S. Pacific Command; Assistant Army Attaché and later Defense Attaché at the United States Embassy in China; and Senior Country Director for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mongolia in the Pentagon.

In addition to numerous and significant military awards, General Eikenberry has received the Department of State Meritorious and Superior Honor Awards, Director of Central Intelligence Award, and decorations from the Governments of Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, France, and Afghanistan.

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, members of this committee, our Nation has benefited greatly from his professionalism since 1969 and I am confident that, subject to Senate confirmation, he will bring to this position that same professionalism, experience, and expertise that are especially crucial during this challenging period. I am honored to present General Eikenberry to this distinguished committee and I strongly and unreservedly endorse his nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Warner, let me say in all seriousness that we joked around a few moments ago about the importance of your two testimonies. But I must say to you, General, in the years that I have been here—and it is about 26 on this committee—and Senator Lugar, listening to Senator Warner describe you and his rationale for supporting this really does underscore the value of your nomination.

And I think I have heard Senator Warner give introductions before through the years, and when he refers to 37 years and puts you at the top of the list, as he just did, that is high praise, indeed.

So, Senator Warner, thank you for taking the time to be with us.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And once again, we thank you for your remarkable years of service here. We miss you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. I wish you all well. These are unique times in the history of this great Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, John, very much.

General, the floors is yours. We look forward to your testimony, and we would like you to introduce any family members that are here with you and welcome them here.

**STATEMENT OF LTG KARL W. EIKENBERRY  
TO BE AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN**

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee.

I am honored to appear before you as the nominee for the office of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I would like to thank President Obama, Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me.

If confirmed, I would be very proud and honored to join the ranks of the United States Government personnel who are serving in Afghanistan, and I would look forward to consulting with you regularly and hosting you often in Kabul.

I wanted to thank Senator Inouye and Senator Warner for their very generous words of introduction.

And in turn now, I would like to introduce my spouse, Ching, seated behind me.

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome. Glad to have you.

General EIKENBERRY. Her support, as well as that of my entire family, has allowed me to pursue a career of national service.

And I would also wish to mention my mother, Mary Drucilla, whose health restricts her to bed, but she is keeping watch on me today from her care center in Raleigh, North Carolina, courtesy of television. This is a very big moment for her, and it is a very humbling one for me.

Last, if I could introduce Ambassador Frank Ricciardone, a very great diplomat and statesman who many of you know well. Ambassador Ricciardone led the missions in the Philippines and Egypt and, with great selfless service and setting an absolutely superb example, has now volunteered to go into Afghanistan to serve as the deputy.

And if I am confirmed, I would look forward to forming a great team with Ambassador Ricciardone. Thanks, Frank.

If I am confirmed, I will assume this great responsibility conscious that success in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan is in America's vital national security interest. Afghanistan is where the cold-blooded September 11, 2001, attacks upon the United States were conceived and they were directed.

Even as we speak, al Qaeda and their allies operate inside of Afghanistan and from across the border in Pakistan. They seek to create fear and chaos inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to regain the territorial control that allowed them to so horrifically overturn the peace and tranquility of our homeland 7 years ago.

I am proud of my 40 years of service to my country, and Afghanistan has been at the center of my career since 9/11, when the terrorists' commandeered aircraft crashed into the Pentagon just below the office in which I was working. My professional experience inside of Afghanistan has reinforced what I have learned throughout my career, that lasting security can only be delivered through coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military means.

The situation in Afghanistan is increasingly difficult, and time is of the essence. There will be no substitute for more resources and sacrifice. However, I believe with the President's leadership and direction and with the support of the United States Congress, we can

and must foster the conditions for sustained success inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

If confirmed, I will work closely with NATO and with U.S. military commanders, United States Government agencies, and our international partners to ensure that all elements of national power are brought to bear in mutually reinforcing ways. I will ask for your support to provide the resources needed to make such an effort possible.

Our national efforts inside of Afghanistan require the wide range commitment of civilian expertise. In order to attract the best and the brightest, we must recognize their service and support their professional development with greater vigor.

And while success in Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital to U.S. national security interests, it is also a global security concern, and accordingly, we must redouble our efforts to gain additional contributions from our allies and from the international community.

Critical to our collective progress is helping the Afghans strengthen and expand their national army and police so that they have the essential capability to secure their own country. The way ahead is clear, but the resources to date have, regrettably, been insufficient.

The United States, our international partners, and most importantly, the Afghans must work together to reduce corruption and strengthen the rule of law. Without real progress on these issues, success will be very difficult to achieve.

Today's sobering reality is that Afghanistan supplies more than 90 percent of the world's illicit opiates. It fuels the insurgency, and it undermines our efforts to develop governance. With special representative Richard Holbrooke and other key players, I will review our counternarcotics policy as a matter of urgency.

More development and more aid must be channeled to those areas where the insurgency is rife. Even more important, assistance must be directly targeted to the Afghan people. Currently, too much development money is spent on costly overheads, namely, foreign consultants, multiple contracts, and security.

On August the 20, Afghanistan will hold its second presidential and provincial council elections. The United States is committed to supporting the Afghans in pursuit of elections that are fair and free of intimidation.

The administration is emphasizing a regional approach to the security challenges in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. And if I am appointed as Ambassador, I will work closely with Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Patterson in Islamabad to achieve this goal.

If you would permit me, Chairman, I would like now to close with a few words directed directly to the people of Afghanistan.

It is evident to me, after having the privilege of serving in your country, that you share with Americans an overwhelming desire to live in peace with dignity. With our support, you will further develop accountable governance, a patriotic army and police that serves to protect you, access to health care and education, and employment opportunities to provide for the livelihoods of your families.

When you achieve your goals, international terrorists will find no refuge inside of Afghanistan, and this is precisely where your interests, America's interests, and, indeed, the interests of the entire world come together. Your success is our success.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will be deeply grateful for your continued support and for your advice. I fully understand the challenges that I now face and would face in the years to come. I am committed to working with the U.S. Congress to ensure effective communication and coordination of our policies and our programs.

I again thank the President, Secretary Clinton, and the United States Senate for this opportunity. I would be greatly honored and very humbled to serve.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Eikenberry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LTG KARL W. EIKENBERRY, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE  
FOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you as the nominee for the office of Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I'd like to thank President Obama and Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I would be proud and honored to join the ranks of United States Government personnel serving throughout Afghanistan. And I will look forward to consulting you regularly and hosting you in Afghanistan often.

I would like to thank Senator John Warner and Senator Daniel Inouye for their generous words of introduction.

In turn, I would like to introduce my spouse, Ching, seated behind me. Her unwavering support, as well as that of my entire family, has allowed me to pursue a career of national service. I would also like to mention my mother, Mary Drucilla, whose health restricts her to bed, but is keeping watch on me today from her care center in Raleigh, North Carolina, courtesy of television. This is a big moment for her and a humbling one for me.

If confirmed, I will assume with respect this great responsibility, conscious that success in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is in America's vital national security interest. Afghanistan is where the cold-blooded September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States were conceived and directed. Even as we speak, al Qaeda and their allies operate inside Afghanistan and from across the border in Pakistan, where they daily plan mass attacks against the United States, Europe, South Asia, the Afghan state and people, and Pakistan itself. They seek to create fear and chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to regain the territorial control that allowed them to so horrifically overturn the peace and tranquility of our Homeland 7 years ago. The collective purpose and unswerving mission of our Nation, the Afghan people, our NATO allies, and indeed the international community, are to act decisively, so that our children and our grandchildren will never endure such acts of terrorism in their lifetimes.

I am proud of the almost 40 years of service to my country that has taken me from West Point to infantry and political-military assignments in the United States, Asia, and Europe. Afghanistan has been at the center of my career since 9/11 when the terrorist-commandeered aircraft crashed into the Pentagon just below the office in which I was working. You have the records of my subsequent service during two different assignments in Afghanistan from 2002-03 and again from 2005-07. During the past 2 years, serving at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, I have remained deeply engaged in the Afghanistan mission. Throughout my time in Afghanistan, I led and worked with courageous American civilians and servicemen totally committed to defending our Nation under the most difficult and dangerous conditions. My professional experiences in Afghanistan have reinforced what I have learned throughout my career—that it is the coordinated application of diplomatic, economic, and military means, anchored by effective strategic communication, that delivers lasting success when dealing with international security threats and challenges.

The situation in Afghanistan is increasingly difficult. Time is of the essence. There are areas of instability and poor governance inside the country and threatening dangerous terrorist sanctuaries beyond its borders. Within these spaces, extremists try to exploit the weakness of the existing political system to impose their own vision of social order characterized by brutality and barbarism. There is no sil-



ver bullet and no quick, cheap, or easy solutions. There is no substitute for more resources and sacrifice. Nevertheless, I believe with the President's leadership and direction, and the support of the Congress, we can and must foster conditions for sustained success in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There is no exclusively military solution to the issues we and our partners confront in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will work closely with military commanders and relevant government departments and agencies to ensure that all elements of national power are brought to bear. I will ask for your support to provide the resources that will make such an effort possible.

One of my primary goals will be to integrate civilian and military strategies, capabilities and activities on the ground, working closely with the NATO International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) command. Our clear, hold, build, and sustain strategy depends upon protecting the Afghan people. At a minimum, this includes providing continuous security, enhanced governance and rule of law, and a sustainable legitimate economy. It requires delivering the comprehensive approach that effectively combines military and civilian capabilities.

Our national efforts in Afghanistan require the commitment of a wide range of civilian expertise to mentor judicial branch professionals, train school administrators and teachers, develop an agricultural system, and facilitate the growth of small and medium business enterprises to reduce the numbers of unemployed who are easy recruitment targets to the ranks of violent nihilistic extremism. In order to attract the best and brightest civilian personnel, we must recognize their service and support their professional development with greater vigor.

It is important to remember that while success in Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital to U.S. national security interests, it is also an urgent global security concern, with associated international commitments and obligations. The United Nations has a significant and comprehensive development mandate in Afghanistan, which has just been renewed unanimously by the U.N. Security Council. NATO leads the U.N.-mandated ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Many international organizations and actors—the European Union, the World Bank, and numerous superb NGOs—to mention only a few—are also present. We expect that our partners will join our Dutch hosts and the Afghan Government in The Hague on March 31 to reinvigorate our shared commitment to Afghanistan. We will redouble our efforts to gain additional contributions from our allies and the international community in areas where it is reasonable and essential for them to do more.

Critical to our collective progress is helping the Afghans strengthen and expand both their National Army and Police so that they have the essential capability to secure their own country.

The Focused District Development (FDD) program is the centerpiece of our efforts to develop a reliable and capable Afghan police force in troubled and insecure districts. Such measures, coupled with commensurate governance, rule of law, and rural development initiatives, show promise. However, in the absence of sufficient international and Afghan Army forces, police mentors, and complementary aid measures, there will be no lasting success. The way ahead is clear, but the resources to date have been regrettably insufficient.

It is well understood that we must strongly encourage and support the Afghan people to establish accountable, sustainable, and effective governance. This includes helping them build the capacity to deliver essential government services and rule of law, including continued development of traditional forms of dispute resolution to ensure protection for the rights of the Afghan people, especially women. Security against terrorists and criminals is essential, but so too are justice and equity for all. Afghans must feel a beneficial and protective presence from a legitimate government from urban centers to the remotest villages.

The United States, our international partners, and most importantly, the Afghans, must work to reduce corruption and strengthen the rule of law. Without real progress on these issues, success will be very difficult to achieve. We need to expand training and education for Afghan judicial and law enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving their people's access to justice and protection.

Today's sobering reality is that Afghanistan supplies more than 90 percent of the world's illicit opiates. The corrupting effect of drugs and the steady revenue stream provided by the narcotics trade fuel the insurgency and are a scourge, eroding Afghan aspirations for security, government probity, and economic development. We must acknowledge that the drug trade also affects Afghanistan's neighbors, who suffer from high rates of addiction and narcotrafficking associated crime and violence. Accordingly, a coordinated and cooperative regional approach is essential to counter this growing threat.

With Special Representative Richard Holbrooke and other key players, if confirmed, I will review our counternarcotics policy as a matter of the highest urgency.

Afghanistan's low revenue base, excessive corruption, high poverty, and lack of economic and social services infrastructure present formidable challenges, yet they are not insurmountable. Our foreign assistance has supported gains in Afghan society. To illustrate, infant mortality has dropped 22 percent, there is increased access to quality health care for Afghans living in rural areas, an impressive 5.8 million children have been enrolled in schools since the ousting of the Taliban, and power generation is increasing with hope for the provision of continuous electricity in Kabul later this year.

However, there must be better coordination between the various international donors to avoid duplication of efforts, there must be better prioritization of initiatives, and more aid must be channeled to the eastern and southern provinces where insurgency, narcotrafficking, and corruption are rife. Even more important, assistance must be directly targeted to the Afghan people, fostering the capacity for civic society development and enhancing their standards of living. Currently, far too much development money is being spent on costly overheads—namely foreign consultants, contracts, and security expenditures.

On August 20, Afghanistan will hold its second Presidential and provincial council elections. For the first time in their history, the Afghans are leading the preparations for the elections. It is important that these elections be fair and free of intimidation, demonstrating to the Afghan people and the world that they are fully capable of exercising their electoral rights of choosing those who will govern them. The United States is committed to supporting the Afghans in pursuit of this goal.

Much has been said recently regarding the potential for reconciliation between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban. The United States will continue to support an Afghan-led process, seeking to encourage Taliban and other insurgent groups to lay down their arms, commit to supporting the Afghan Constitution and cut all ties to al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups.

The administration is emphasizing a regional approach to the security challenges in both Afghanistan and Pakistan based upon their obvious linkages. This has been highlighted with the appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. If I am appointed as Ambassador, I will work closely with him and colleagues within the region to support related diplomacy.

I will close with a few words directly to the people of Afghanistan. It is evident to me after having the privilege of serving in your country that you share with Americans and all peoples of the world an overwhelming desire to live in peace with dignity. With our support, you strive with your own unique talents and steady determination, to create accountable governance, a patriotic and responsive army and police that serve to protect you, access to justice, health care and education, and growing opportunities to provide for the livelihood of your families and proud nation in honorable ways. After three decades of war and turmoil, you desire to fully reclaim your nation. When you achieve your goals, international terrorists, narcotrafficking criminal gangs, and militant extremists will find no witting safe haven. This is where your interests, America's interests, and indeed those of the region and the world come together. Your success is our success, and you are worthy allies.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will be deeply grateful for your continued support and advice. I fully understand the challenges I face now and in the years to come. I am committed to working with Congress to ensure effective communication and coordination of our policies and programs.

I again thank the President, Secretary Clinton, and the Senate for this opportunity. I would be greatly honored and humbled to serve.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. We appreciate it.

And let me comment myself on your very distinguished academic career, as well as the many different kinds of posts that you have held. I think it is a great asset, and you bring a lot of different skills to this, not the least of which having survived being a student at Harvard. We think that is great.

Share with us—one of the questions, I think, on the minds of the committee and some people is you did put in two tours there. And so, while you have the experience, you have also been there during a period of time when things have gotten worse. And I think people want to have an understanding of what your interpretation of that is.

I mean, why have the Taliban been able to resurge? And what have been the most critical missing elements of our strategy, and what will be different, in your judgment, going forward?

General EIKENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, looking back, to 2001 and 2002 to assess why are we where we are now, why it is increasingly dangerous and difficult in Afghanistan, first and foremost is the problem of Taliban sanctuary inside of Pakistan. When we went into Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, we did quickly defeat the Taliban. We did quickly dismantle al Qaeda.

We pushed them into of Pakistan. However, over the years, they increased of their capabilities and not only caused chaos and insecurity in Pakistan, but also undermined our efforts in Afghanistan.

But that is not the entire problem, as well. We have not had sufficient military forces on the ground inside of Afghanistan, which has led then to an inability to provide sufficient security, especially in eastern and southern Afghanistan. There has been insufficient efforts to build the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. We are doing better with the army, but still falling short with the police.

And then, most important, as you said during your own opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, an inadequate effort on the nonmilitary side. Insufficient civilian expertise to help the Afghans build their institutions of the state, insufficient nonmilitary resources, especially reconstruction aid and programs focused in rural areas, focused in critical institution building.

The CHAIRMAN. At what stage would you say the insurgency is at this point, and how complicated is it going to be to unravel the gains that they have made, particularly in the south?

General EIKENBERRY. It is going to require, Mr. Chairman, additional commitment of U.S. and, importantly, NATO forces into eastern and southern Afghanistan to get a more lasting presence throughout the rural areas.

It is going to require additional efforts to more rapidly develop the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army.

It is going to require also more effective aid programs in eastern and southern Afghanistan in order to develop the economy so that the people have alternatives to the Taliban and to extremism.

And then, very importantly will be a coordinated regional approach with Pakistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that you felt these—the frustration of not being able to fill these gaps while you were there and even expressed the requirements for additional resources?

General EIKENBERRY. Chairman, it became evident in—by 2006 that the security situation was beginning to slip inside of Afghanistan, and at that time, together with Ambassador Ron Neumann, requested additional forces. And in 2006, we reversed the steady decline in U.S. military forces that began in 2005.

It was also evident at that time in 2006 that more assistance was needed for the Afghan National Army. We requested a significant increase in the size of our training program for the army, and we also made proposals for the buildup of the police. But even this was insufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that the doubling of the Afghan army as a goal will be sufficient, and is it doable?

General EIKENBERRY. It is necessary, Mr. Chairman. The previous goal for the size of the Afghan National Army was 80,000, and it is now 134,000. I think we have confidence that the Afghan National Army is at a point where they can move forward and build a force of 134,000.

But this will be very contingent ultimately on our ability to deliver a sufficient number of trainers and the equipment that the Afghan National Army needs to get to that target. And this is a requirement not only for the United States, but for our NATO allies and our partners.

The CHAIRMAN. There is an article today on the front page of the New York Times talking about ISI, the Pakistani intelligence's involvement in supporting the Taliban and facilitating some of what they have been able to achieve. Would you comment on that?

General EIKENBERRY. Pakistan has a very unclear and ambiguous relationship, and the Pakistan Army, and ISI in particular have had a very unclear and ambiguous relationship with the Taliban over the last 15 years. Pakistan, of course, and its security forces and the ISI are the ones that facilitated the rise of the Taliban when it first advanced into Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. And since that time, it has been unclear if all elements of ISI have dropped their support for Taliban and their extremist allies.

The ongoing discussions that we have right now with Pakistan, and with Afghanistan, are focusing on this problem. I know that the trilateral initiatives that have begun under the administration led by Secretary of State Clinton have appeared promising. I know that in early May, there are another set of talks between Afghan, Pakistan, and United States leaders, which will include intelligence exchanges.

We must continue to promote cooperation and collaboration between the United States, Pakistan, and with Afghanistan as well.

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me just say, as I turn it over to Senator Lugar, it is my understanding that you are hoping—up until now, the post of Ambassador in Afghanistan has been an unaccompanied post, as we call it. I know you are hoping to take your wife there with you, and I think I certainly and I think the committee are entirely supportive.

I think it would be a terrific message and strong boost of morale for the Embassy. And obviously, wherever possible, we should try to encourage that. So I hope that that will be facilitated.

General EIKENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that support.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, if you could discuss a little bit from your background in Afghanistan the conflicting theories there are with regard to why the people of Afghanistan, starting with their government and their military, but likewise the people, will be cooperative in rejecting al Qaeda. But then, even more complex, rejecting leadership by the Taliban.

I mean, we have had discussions, at least in the press, of different kinds of Taliban. Those that seem to be of the insurgent variety and prepared, really, to take steps with arms to disrupt af-

fairs as opposed to others who simply have a theological point of governance that may be coincident with many citizens of Afghanistan.

And it has not ever been clear to many of us as to how, as you take a look at opinion polls in Afghanistan and their feelings about Americans or about Europeans—NATO and so forth—clearly an ambivalence as to what they feel sometimes or the destruction caused by the troops, albeit as they are searching for insurgents or al Qaeda, but losses of life in Afghanistan to people that claim to be innocent civilians or to their property.

And so, as a result, although we have plans for sending more troops there, we are encouraging our European allies to do so. But at the same time, we are encouraging civilian components that may be working on commerce and agriculture and education and so forth. How diplomatically can this fit together?

I ask this because there will be debates in the Congress—there have been, I foresee more in the future—not only on the chairman's question of how many soldiers are required in the Afghan army, but likewise, how competent will the police ever become, given all the charges of corruption?

And after it is all said and done, what will be the general judgment of the Afghan people about this governance? Their own—that is the army, the police, President Karzai or his successor, as the case may be—accompanied by our aims as Americans and our aims as NATO allies to suppress the Taliban, suppress the threat to us that might occur in European capitals or in Washington, DC.

Can you sort of give from your experience how this works out into a situation where the plans we have may be acceptable as opposed to resisted by the Afghan people? And why we would be any more successful with more troops coming in now from any source than we have been in the past?

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, the starting point is the Afghan people's opinion of the Taliban. Every poll today shows that over 90 percent of the Afghan people firmly reject Taliban. They reject the dark Taliban primitive ideology and barbarous rule.

The challenge for the Afghan people is that while they totally reject Taliban, they need a secure alternative provided for them. If coerced, without any alternatives, then they will go to the side of the Taliban.

How do we provide that alternative? We need to create three candidates to change things in parts of Afghanistan where the Taliban has control. First of all, we have to be able to secure the Afghan people. The hearts and minds of the Afghan people may be with us during the daytime, but if in the nighttime the Taliban comes into their village, then their mind is with the Taliban.

So we have to be able to provide more security. That gets back, Senator, to the question about how many troops are needed? And it is not a question necessarily of how many troops, it is a question of what are those troops doing? Are they out and about? Are they mixed with the Afghan people? Are they partnered with the Afghan national security forces?

Second, we need to help the Afghans improve the rule of law. Without that, security does not rest on a foundation.

And then third, and very importantly, and the point that you had made, Senator, when we were together earlier this week, the need to think very clearly through the reconstruction development programs, trying to get rural economies developed, trying to create a sustainable system of commerce so the Afghans then are able to build a middle ground of civil society that they can stand upon. And when that is established, they will defend that.

With regard then to the growth of the Afghan national security forces, Senator, I think that the numbers that are being discussed right now are about right. It may have to be reviewed in the future. If I were confirmed, of course, I would look forward to working closely with the military commands in trying to make joint assessments.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much. That is a very concise and comprehensive statement.

Let me ask, we have all talked now about the integration of the civilian persons. How is that likely to work more effectively than it has in the past? Civilians from America or from Europe.

General EIKENBERRY. I think we need a combination, Senator, of more civilian capacity inside of Kabul to help build key institutions, such as the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Interior.

But we need even more civilian expertise out in the regions. And that will require more agricultural experts, more justice experts, more small city managers to help governors develop their provinces and districts.

We will have to be well partnered with the military—with the NATO and U.S. military—which will have to provide some assistance in terms of logistics and security to support the increase of civilian personnel and diplomats.

Senator LUGAR. Well, you are ideally qualified to integrate all these personnel. We wish you well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Kaufman.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, and thank you for doing this, taking on this heavy responsibility.

To follow up on Senator Lugar's question, clearly there are a lot of people in Afghanistan, most people feel that way about the Taliban. They don't like the Taliban. And clearly, it stops at 7 o'clock.

But isn't there beginning to develop in Afghanistan a feeling that they also don't like this war? They don't like the battle not just at night, but during the day? And that doesn't that kind of constrain how much time we have to kind of straighten this problem out?

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, those are important points. I think that the Afghans have two frustrations. One is that they are aware of the threat that comes from Pakistan. They suffer greatly from that threat. There is a degree of impatience that comes with that awareness.

The second is a growing concern with the lack of development of their government.

So, yes, we don't have an unlimited amount of time here, Senator Kaufman. Time is not necessarily with us, unless we develop and implement a more effective strategy.

Senator KAUFMAN. I know you said it several times, and I know people are interested. You explained kind of the moderate Taliban. I mean, I think to a lot of people there is only one kind of Taliban, and I think you explained very well what it is we are shooting for in terms of working with maybe the moderate Taliban.

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, there are all kinds of Taliban, as you know. I remember attending a meeting with Afghan government leaders in 2004. One of the leaders stooped up and said, "You will recall that at one time, most of us here were Taliban." There are former Taliban who serve in the parliament of Afghanistan. There was a very capable former Taliban who served as the Governor of Uruzgan.

So it is critical that we make a distinction between who is the irreconcilable enemies of Afghanistan and those, through a process of reconciliation, who can be brought on side.

Senator KAUFMAN. Obviously, there is no one better suited to deal with coordination between State and Defense, having held the Defense post there and now going into the State post. Can you talk a little bit about your ideas on how to better integrate how State and Defense work in Afghanistan?

General EIKENBERRY. Well, first and foremost, Senator, is the example that gets set at the very top between the Chief of Mission, between the United States Ambassador, and between the senior U.S. military commander. We have seen that, generally, people down the chain will follow that example.

Beyond this, we must integrate planning efforts between the U.S. Embassy and U.S. military command, of the NATO command, the United Nations mission and the entire international community.

And, finally, we must increase our presence in the regions and provinces.

And I am confident that the military in Afghanistan will welcome that increased presence.

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Kind of follow up on that. What do you see the state of developmental aid in Afghanistan right now?

General EIKENBERRY. There has been—over the past 6 or 7 years, there has been, Senator, some remarkable progress that you are aware that we can point to—roads being built, many schools being opened.

A great example, in 2001, there were in Afghanistan, some 900,000 boys going to Taliban schools. Today, there are 7 million children in school, and about 35 percent of those are females.

What is needed, though, is more assistance provided to those ministries critical to central government control over the country. And then we need, as I had said earlier, to shift more resources to efforts at the district level.

The distance between the Government of Afghanistan in Kabul and the districts is too great. We still today need to help the Afghans provide more aid and assistance to the rural areas, which are the most troubled and the most vulnerable to Taliban extremists and narco-traffickers.

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you talk just a few minutes about the opium trade, what your thoughts are?

General EIKENBERRY. As I had said during my opening remarks, 90 percent of the world's opiates come from Afghanistan. Much work has been done to try to combat that problem, but there are two key metrics that we must consider.

One metric of success, have we cut the connection of revenue from the opiate production to the terrorists and the insurgency? And the answer to that is no.

The second metric for success is, have we been able to reduce significantly the degree to which the revenue of opiate production is undermining the Government of Afghanistan? And the answer to that question is also no.

So in spite of gains that we have made, in the main we would have to look at our policies and the results that we have on the ground right now as falling far short of success.

Efforts have to be made to try to develop a more coordinated strategy. It is complex. It has to do with law enforcement, building judicial systems. It has to do with education. It has to do with developing alternative economies, What is the right mix.

But I would also ask if more authority be given to those in the ground to more agilely move funds from one area to another because it is an interlinked problem. And second, I firmly believe that we have to think through our agricultural programs, our agricultural development and subsistence programs. Those are key to develop alternative economies so that we can give Afghan farmers a real choice.

All of this is, of course, underpinned by security. Wherever the highest amount of poppy is being cultivated, are areas which are the most insecure.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.

And you know I am a big believer in the right person in the right place at the right time. And I think, because of your background, experience, and who are you, you are the right person at the right time. And I look forward to your working in Afghanistan, and I feel much better about our situation there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Eikenberry, I have to say I have had concern that we had the potential for a perfect storm in the months ahead due to a deteriorating situation in Pakistan on one hand, and a failure of NATO to help us more in Afghanistan on the other. And when I met with you the other day, and you were kind enough to come to my office, I realized we had found the perfect nominee to face this perfect storm.

I mean, you are coming from Brussels and NATO and going to Afghanistan. And given the fact you have been in 31 of 34 provinces of Afghanistan and served in the military there, I join the chairman and the others to commend the administration on your nomination.



Also, one of my dearest friend's son, CPT Hunter Hill, was called up to go to Afghanistan, and his specific charge was to lead some of the training of the Afghan police forces.

When CPT Hill returned, we had a number of conversations, and from what he told me, and from what I heard during your testimony, one of the key things we have got to do is law enforcement and civilian rule of law training because it is something that is not a part of the Afghani culture. And that it is not just training police officers. It is actually talking about the rule of law and training the civilian population to respect the rule of law and its enforcement.

So you had mentioned in your printed, prepared statement, the FDD program? The Focused District Development, which is focused directly, I think, on training military. Can you expand a little bit on that?

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, the Focused District Development program was an initiative that was begun about a year ago, and the genesis of the program was the recognition that we could train an unlimited amount of Afghan national policemen, but unless they were properly mentored over a longer period of time, that anything achieved during the training—any technical competencies, but more important, ethical values training—could not be sustained. And that gets back to the culture you are talking about.

So the Focused District Development program calls for the policemen from a troubled district at risk from the insurgency, to be temporarily relieved by a highly trained replacement force. And then over about an 8-week period, these policemen are trained in an area outside of the district. They then return with better leadership, and there is permanent mentoring maintained with them.

The results to date have not been 100 percent successful. Very little is in a very difficult environment like Afghanistan. But they continue to get positive reviews. But, what is impudent here—with all the of the institutions in Afghanistan—is that it is not only about initial training, but it is also about sustained mentoring over time.

And this is really a very important shortfall that we still have with the police program. We don't have an adequate number of police mentors. We should really expect our European allies to do more in this particular area.

Senator ISAKSON. Yes, it seems like to me that when the Awakening took place in Anbar province in Iraq, it kind of was the sea change of difference when they came over and started helping enforce civilian law in Iraq. And if we can get the same type of thing, although it might not be an awakening in Afghanistan, we might have some military success. Maintaining it is going to depend on that police force.

On NATO, since you are coming from NATO, I have two concerns. One, will they be willing to put the troops in necessary to complement what we are doing in our additional deployment, No. 1? And No. 2, if they do, will the rules of engagement be sufficient that they can be effective?

Because I know in certain cases, even though troops have been committed from NATO countries, there have been rules of engagement that were restrictive in terms of the activities that could take

place in Afghanistan. Any comments you would have on that I would like to hear.

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, I think that NATO will send additional forces into Afghanistan to support the 20 August Presidential and provincial council elections. That will be important. Over time, what may be even more important for NATO is to provide more mentors, trainers, equipment, and money for the development of the Afghan national security forces.

And then, as we have talked today, there is a need for more intellectual civilian expertise of all kinds inside of Afghanistan, more resources, more money for reconstruction and development, more money for justice programs and rule of law programs. I think in that particular area not only NATO, but the entire international community not only needs to do more, but they should really be expected to do more.

Senator ISAKSON. I guess my last question is focused on the border with Pakistan and the special operations there, but I have come to understand from listening to you and others that our military success in the long run is going to depend on more troops in the rural area and in the south part of Afghanistan. Is that correct?

General EIKENBERRY. It is, Senator.

Senator ISAKSON. OK. And that is where the Taliban, we anticipate, may make their next initiative?

General EIKENBERRY. That is where—over the last 4 or 5 years, that is where they have been trying to expand their presence. They have sanctuaries inside of Pakistan, and from those sanctuaries, they have continued to build up strength and influence inside of areas of Afghanistan. And those areas are not only along the borders of eastern Afghanistan and southeastern Afghanistan, but they have extended into the interior parts of the country of Afghanistan.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I thank you for your testimony, and particularly I thank you for your willingness to serve. I think you are a terrific nominee for a very difficult post, but exactly the right time.

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Isakson.

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General, we welcome you here, and we appreciate your service, what you have done for this country in the past and what I know you will do for this country with this particular challenge that we have in Afghanistan.

I have to say, we have a lot of nominees that come before us, and they are introduced by distinguished Americans, and their qualifications are reviewed and commended. But to have Senator Inouye and Senator Warner give you that kind of recommendation is high praise, indeed.

In fact, I had to leave here to give a speech about the budget, and I was in the elevator with Senator Inouye. And he told me to make sure that we move this quickly. So we have another directive beyond what he said here. But we are grateful for what you have done.

I wanted to talk about something that has been bothering me lately because of the experience in Iraq, the sense that often the American people weren't sure or we didn't do a very good job telling them what the goals were, what the objectives are in Iraq. And I really worry that we are—we could be headed down the same path unless we are careful.

The President has made a determination, based upon a review of what is happening in Afghanistan and based upon consultation with our military leaders and others on the ground, that we need an increase in our troop levels by an additional 17,000 troops. But I am very concerned and I think it is incumbent upon not only the President and his administration, but those of us in Congress to be very clear about why we are there, what the objective is, what the exit strategy is.

And once we articulate that to the American people, once he does it and others amplify it, we have to keep saying it over and over and over again. Because unless we do that, all of the troop commitments, all of the resources, all of the good intentions won't matter because when the going gets tough and the sacrifices get even greater, we have to be able to sustain support for this mission.

So the objectives are very important, and also I think the language is very important. When I was in Iraq in the summer of 2007, I said to both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, I said the President, then-President Bush, was using terminology like "victory" and "defeat," which I thought was misleading. I thought it was misleading and inaccurate about what was going to happen in Iraq, no matter what the result was.

So using that language is—even in this context I think is dangerous. Now maybe the word "success" is more accurate. So I really believe that we have a long way to go in articulating to the American people these basic points, the objectives of why we are there.

The problem is we haven't spent a lot of time talking to them about this war. We have talked a lot about Iraq, and we have had debates for years about Iraq. The American people have not heard enough from their Government about this conflict, and I know you have a concern about that as well.

So can you talk to me about that in terms of how, as someone who has had a distinguished military career, who has been a diplomat as well and understands the difficulty of communicating a message and sustaining support for a difficult engagement? Talk to me about that in terms of the leadership you can bring to those set of questions.

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, I tried to articulate our goals, our objectives, and the stakes in Afghanistan, in my opening remarks. Our strategic objective inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt and eventually defeat the international terrorist networks that still threaten our homeland.

On the Afghanistan side, we must help the Afghans create the conditions so that international terrorism will never regain a sanctuary there. We can see what the outlines of that program look like.

It is helping develop Afghan national security forces that increasingly can secure their own people. It is helping develop governance in Afghanistan and a rule of law system so that those security

forces operate in a foundation of good governance. It is also helping develop an economy so the Afghans can sustain themselves. All of this nested within a regional optimistic approach.

It would be premature for me to talk about the strategic assessment. The President will very soon, I know, be talking to the public about his decisions with regard to that strategic assessment.

What I would pledge, if confirmed as the Ambassador, Senator, is to work hard to communicate effectively to the American public and, of course, keep close contact with you. As I said, also in my opening remarks, I would welcome frequent trips of the United States Congress to Afghanistan in order for you to take stock of the situation firsthand, to make your own and, of course, to communicate your views to your constituents.

Senator CASEY. I appreciate that. I think it is critically important.

I have about a half a minute left. One of the difficult assignments you will have is bridging the gap between the military, military officials and our civilians serving in Afghanistan. I just wanted to have you comment about that. You obviously have a lot of experience in this area and that it is important.

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, it is vital. In the course of my career I have served as a member of country teams in China and in Kabul. I know the importance of the close cooperation between the military and the civilian sides.

As I said earlier, I pledge to set a good example and a very positive example by showing close collaboration with General David McKiernan, the commander of NATO ISAF and the commander of U.S. forces. I will also try to set the best example as a team player within the international community.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Casey.

Senator DeMint.

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar.

General, thank you so much for your testimony today, and thank you for the courtesy visit to my office. I enjoyed getting to know you, and I do want to thank you for your honorable and selfless service to our Nation, as a soldier, as a commander. And you have taken on some significant challenges, and this may be the biggest one of all.

In your previous tours in Afghanistan, you have got a lot of experience and a lot of relationships to build on, and that gives us a lot of confidence in your ability to take on this challenge. The fact remains that Afghanistan is a critical front in what will continue to be a global war on terror, despite what some might want to call it these days.

But I seriously doubt that our troops consider this a run-of-the-mill overseas contingency deployment. You know that it is so much more than that, and they are taking the fight to terrorists on their turf instead of here in America.

And as you know, until 2001, Afghanistan was an internationally neglected breeding ground for terrorist training and financing, and today, our brave men and women, along with our NATO partners and our other allies, battle terrorists who have been forced into the mountains and across into Pakistan.

While I applaud the renewed focus that we are now hearing on Afghanistan and the efforts to update our strategy, I still have a lot of concerns, and you have covered many of them already. But my trips and my staff trips to Afghanistan, one of the challenges I don't think we have talked about much this morning really comes in the concern about United States assistance and the billions of dollars that we are spending in Afghanistan.

With multiple campaign plans and 26 reconstruction teams acting kind of semi-independently, there doesn't appear to be a comprehensive, coordinated vision of what we need to do. So I am really concerned about the coordination, the oversight of reconstruction activities.

When I was there and what I have heard from a number of folks who have been there, there is more emphasis on competing for U.S. assistance money and actually more interest in spending money than actually making it effective. And the reports now are showing as high as 70 percent of what we direct toward Afghanistan never gets there.

And so, in your role as Ambassador, I would just like you to talk for a moment about how we are going to deal with a lack of coordination, the duplication of effort across Afghanistan? How can we get a coordinated approach, which I think is going to be more the emphasis now than fighting and troops, it is going to be training and building. And it is that infrastructure that is going to be important.

So if you would just take a few minutes of our time here and comment on how we can coordinate the money we are spending?

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Senator. These are very important questions.

I would make three points on the reconstruction and development aid and assistance. As I said and as you are aware, we have had some good results on the ground. But there are three very important challenges that we have.

Right now, we have many donors and aid programs directly from nations through the United Nations, and from very excellent NGOs. But the overall results are not efficient. In fact, we often fail to avoid duplication and identify gaps, and the result then is wastage.

The second problem that we have is that about 70 percent of money being allocated is not getting to the Afghan people. It is not getting to the real targets of the aid, the Afghan people. This has to be looked at very carefully: Multiple contracts, too many subcontractors, and too few Afghan subcontractors.

The third problem is at the provincial level. Inside the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the military had a fairly large pot of money—the Commander's Emergency Response Program—but USAID and the Department of State do not have commensurate funds that can be flexibly disbursed.

So perhaps we need to take a look at the mix of funds and authorities we provide at the provincial level. Senator, if confirmed, upon arriving in Afghanistan, I will assess these issues with the country team.

Senator DEMINT. Well, thank you.

I know I have heard stories, for instance of—and this actually came from a missionary who got beyond where most of us are allowed to go when we were there—of money that was used to build a hospital. And so, they constructed it, but there were no plans to staff it or actually maintain it, but we spent the money for construction. So the part of the mission was accomplished, but it was not coordinated with the goal of actually operating a hospital and helping deliver healthcare.

So you know that all better than I do, and you seem to have a grasp of what we need to do. But I think it is an incredible amount of money we are spending that maybe job two after winning the fighting part of the battle is making sure our money is spent well there.

But thank you so much, and again, I appreciate your service to our country.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator DeMint. Appreciate that.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased that we will soon be receiving the much-needed review of our policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan that President Obama has ordered. It is my hope that this strategy will address the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan with a comprehensive and regional approach, recognizing the critical role that Pakistan plays when it comes to our Nation's security and, of course, to Afghanistan's stability.

Pakistan has been the home to a strengthened and reconstituted al Qaeda for many years now. And so, I think we have to ensure that our actions in Afghanistan, including sending additional U.S. troops, do not make the situation worse in either country. We cannot afford to take an overly Afghan-centric approach to a much broader problem.

We also need to scale up our diplomatic engagement and redouble our commitment to reconstruction in order to help build a secure, stable Afghanistan in which insurgents and terrorists have no room to operate. We also need to keep in mind where the insurgents, along with al Qaeda, have found a safe haven—and obviously, as the witness knows very well, that is Pakistan—as we address a very complex and very serious threat to our national security.

As we begin to shift to a new strategy, we will need an Ambassador who has a strong command of dynamics on the ground and in the region and can coordinate with many different actors, and I am pleased that General Eikenberry has been nominated to this post. I look forward to our discussion today.

With the President's policy review expected to be rolled out later today, there has been a lot of discussion about the role of our military in Afghanistan and how we can address the significantly increased insecurity when much of that insecurity, again, is coming from across the border in Pakistan. If the goal of our Afghan mission is to make sure "al Qaeda cannot attack the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, and our allies," as the President recently stated on 60 Minutes, how does Pakistan fit into that picture?

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, the administration, the President, the Secretary of State have put great emphasis on a regional approach. They have stressed the interdependencies between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, a good part of the problem of the security situation in Afghanistan has to do with the al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries that existed and do exist inside of Pakistan.

I think the administration will be continuing to emphasize a collaborative, combined regional diplomatic approach. With the appointment of Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, it's clear the emphasis that the administration is placing on the Afghanistan-Pakistan combined approach.

Some progress has been made. On the 24th and 25th of February, the administration invited leaders from the Afghan and the Pakistan Government to come to Washington, DC, for trilateral talks. The next round of those talks will be in early May.

Very importantly, Senator, those talks will include not only economics, political issues, but they will specifically include intelligence. The way forward is clear, we will try to further intelligence collaboration between Afghanistan, the United States, NATO, Pakistan, and also to try to develop more collaborative security approaches. But this will not be easy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Absolutely not, and I appreciate your response. But I just hearken back to what I think was one of the real low points in the last administration. I think I heard it in this room when a witness said that with regard to Iraq, we do what we must, and with Afghanistan, we do what we can.

This policy better not end up being we do what we must with regard to Afghanistan and what we can with regard to Pakistan because that is not going to work. And your comments obviously suggest that you understand that well.

For the most part, conventional wisdom has been and continues to be that an increase of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is the right course of action. I have, as you know, been asking some questions about this decision, as well as the logic of deciding to send more troops to Afghanistan before the comprehensive review has been completed.

I am also concerned that there is not a sufficient increase in political engagement or development or, again, an adequate focus on Pakistan. So, your comments on that?

General EIKENBERRY. The troops that—the 17,000 troops, Senator, that President Obama has committed to and which are currently being deployed will be deployed, will be sent to the eastern and southern Afghanistan and provide more security, along with Afghan National Army and Police, to the rural areas, where Taliban has gained control.

They will be committed to training Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police and to partnering with them to develop further capacities. The decision was a timely decision, a decision that had to be made.

The President still has to make his public announcements about his decisions. But after those have been made, I look forward to working with the administration and consulting with you about the implementation of that strategy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, can you lay out for me what you think is most urgently needed in terms of supporting the Afghan Government while also ensuring that we maintain our credibility among the Afghan people?

General EIKENBERRY. Two areas, Senator. First, more effort for building the Afghan national security forces and, secondly, more effort needed to build accountability and rule of law within Afghanistan, which is absolutely critical if the people of Afghanistan are going to stay on side with the government.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I have finished my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Eikenberry, I apologize for missing your opening statement and much of this hearing. I had another commitment. But I do appreciate the critical nature of your nomination and the need to move forward as quickly as possible.

I got a very personal reminder yesterday of just how critical our actions in Afghanistan are, when I talked to the parents of a 29-year-old Marine corporal from New Hampshire who was killed over the weekend in southern Afghanistan. And it was a very important reminder of making sure that our strategy in Afghanistan is worthy of the great sacrifices that men and women have made already in Afghanistan.

So I do echo Senator Casey's comments about the importance of being clear with the American people about what our strategy is there and what we hope to accomplish.

We had an interesting panel—it was really a roundtable discussion—before this committee about a month ago on Afghanistan, and one of the participants was a woman named Sarah Chayes, who I am sure you are familiar with. And she made a very important point, as did several of the other members of the panel, about the importance not of our military activities in Afghanistan, but about the other actions that we take to support those that can win over the Afghani people, and spoke to the importance of agriculture in doing that and also about addressing the poppy trade.

And I wonder if you could speak to both of those? And particularly when you talk about the poppy trade, if you could talk about whether you think the eradication efforts are working, and if they are not, what alternatives do we have?

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Senator.

I do know Sarah Chayes, and I have immense respect for her insights based upon firsthand experience inside of Afghanistan.

With regard, Senator, to the poppy trade, and it actually relates strongly to agriculture. I had said earlier that getting a handle on this is indispensable to our overall success inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are ceding increasing areas to Taliban and to narcotraffickers, which stand against the legitimate Government of Afghanistan, and it increases the threat to all of us.

Not all of the narcotrafficking money, of course, is going to the Taliban. Some of that money is going to what should be the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. So it is a very severe problem, and we need a multi-pronged approach to what is a very complex problem.



We have to have better law enforcement, better justice systems, better education, the opportunity to produce alternative economies. And within that mix, eradication does play a role. There have been successful eradication programs. Interestingly, though, the most successful have been led by Afghan Governors and by the Afghans themselves.

But I think the way forward will require, projecting the legitimate Government of Afghanistan's influence throughout the troubled places of Afghanistan where poppy production is highest. There is a very direct correlation between where is the most poppy being grown and the absence of the Government of Afghanistan and its security forces. So this is critical.

Second, it is essential that some of the big drug barons of Afghanistan are brought to justice. There has to be accountability.

And third, the need to develop functioning agricultural economies is really going to be essential here. It is not necessarily true that it is only in the areas of Afghanistan where there is no agricultural potential that poppy flourishes. Indeed, Helmand province, where a lot of poppy is being grown, is potentially a rich agricultural area.

But delivering a comprehensive approach to help train farmers, develop rural roads that allow farmers to get their crops to market, and microfinancing is going to require much more effort on our part, and from the international community. I think that we should be and are exploring initiatives which will enable us to do this.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

I know there has been some discussion about Pakistan, a lot of discussion about the role of Pakistan and what happens in Afghanistan. But can you also talk about efforts to also try and engage India? Obviously, what happens between India and Pakistan is going to be important to get Pakistani attention to what is happening in the tribal areas.

But can you talk about how important you think it is to engage India in supporting our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, India makes a very positive contribution toward Afghanistan's development. It provides good agricultural programs. It has been a generous aid donor. It also has good capabilities for developing the Afghan civil service.

So, India has a very important role to play, as do all of Afghanistan's neighbors.

Senator SHAHEEN. And does that role create any tension with Pakistan?

General EIKENBERRY. Pakistan and India have had a very difficult relationship at times, which—over the years—has seen points of severe tension and points of rapprochement. It is critical that the United States and other nations within the region find ways to have cooperative approaches made toward Afghanistan. It must not become a location of competition, but instead a location for cooperation.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

General, we are almost wrapped up here, but I do want to probe a little bit a couple of areas that concern me. And particularly one based on the answer that you gave to Senator Casey's question.

Senator Casey asked you sort of about the general mission, et cetera, and keeping the support of folks. And you started to run down a list of things that we need to do, and I think I heard you say developing a system of government, developing an economy, et cetera. I began to get worried when I hear you saying all that. That is not what I certainly defined—I mean, there is some component of that, but that is, in my judgment, not our mission.

And I want to hear with clarity what you are saying the mission is or what you understand it to be as we come out of this review because there are just going to be some limits, I think, speaking realistically. I think you have a sense of that.

So, yes, we have to help them develop a system. But that is very—I mean, that is sort of what President Bush described, and that is not what I view as the current definition of the mission as we are thinking about it. We have to help them to help themselves. It is not up to us to develop a system of government. We have to help them to develop their economy, and it is up to the Europeans and a lot of people to be part of that.

So I would like to hear you sort of reiterate with a clarity sort of how we are approaching this mission.

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Success in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, is defeating al Qaeda and international terrorism that threatens our country. In order to achieve that, creating the conditions in Afghanistan so that we don't have the environment of the 1990s, which allowed al Qaeda and international terrorism to have open sanctuary, and safe haven in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. But al Qaeda is fundamentally not in Afghanistan today?

General EIKENBERRY. Their presence inside of Pakistan, of course, fuels the insurgency and fuels attacks of terror inside of Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. But the mission of Afghanistan with respect to al Qaeda is to keep them from coming back. Correct?

General EIKENBERRY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, they have been driven out. They are not there.

So with respect to al Qaeda—I mean, the quandary here is that the place where al Qaeda is, we aren't, and the difficulty is nor are the Pakistani Army or Government. There is some frontier corps that has the ability to penetrate here and there, but events in the northwest province in Swat seem to indicate an enormous challenge in that part of the area that none of this that we have talked about on Afghanistan is going to impact.

I guess I should rephrase that. Success, if we are successful in reducing their capacity to penetrate Afghanistan, I think that will embolden our capacity in Pakistan.

General EIKENBERRY. I believe also, Mr. Chairman, that your characterization is correct. If I was characterizing it as "we will develop" as opposed to "we will assist the Afghans develop," then I would like to stand corrected because this is about enabling the Afghans to develop governance and rule of law, enabling the Afghans to develop their own security forces, enabling the Afghans to develop a sustainable economy.

Those are the three critical components. When they come together, success would be defined then as an Afghan state strong enough to deny safe haven for international terrorism. We can succeed in Afghanistan, it is true. But if we don't address the problem, the linked problems in Pakistan, then we will have no lasting solution.

But I would also say, Mr. Chairman, that if we don't move forward to try to achieve the success in Afghanistan as just outlined, then al Qaeda and their confederates will move into ungoverned space in Afghanistan as they did before, and they will set up shop there again.

The CHAIRMAN. I concur with that, and I think that is the most significant rationale for why we have to find a footprint that works to prevent them from doing that. I know the President has three different sort of tiered alternatives in front of him as to how we might do that.

What I am concerned about, and I think we have to be really careful of it, is—and you are an expert at this, and that is one of the reasons why we are glad you are going there. But finding that balance and the right level of that footprint where it is not so great that or incompetent that we are inviting people to push us out, that we invite an unwelcome departure, is critical. At the same time, we don't want to have such a level of military engagement and footprint that we are also inviting an unwelcome departure.

So this is a very delicate balance, and I think in the process we want to be careful of how much we raise the stakes ourselves, on ourselves. The mission is to keep al Qaeda from coming back. It may take the Afghans a little longer to develop their government, but they haven't proven in the last 6 years a particular disposition to want to do that, frankly, and that is one of the reasons why the Taliban have been able to move back in because of the absence of governance.

So I don't have a lot of—I mean, we want the government to succeed, but I think our strategy, as I think it is, is beginning to focus on how we empower people locally and provincially and otherwise and play to some of the tribal realities historically that would re-empower people locally to be able to take control of their lives and reject the Taliban. Is that a fair statement of the balance here?

General EIKENBERRY. Senator, without the President having made his public announcements on the strategic assessment, I would be premature in commenting. The particular balance, though, that you are talking about is certainly part of the equation.

After the assessment has been decided upon, if I am confirmed, I would look forward then to implementing that strategy and to staying in close consultation with you—

The CHAIRMAN. Are you confident—are you confident, General, of the ability of the level of forces that we are talking about to maintain a sufficient level of security that we can actually enforce this transformation at the local level?

General EIKENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask for time to look at the assessment, and look at the numbers that are being discussed. What I know is that regarding the Afghan National Army, their growing competence provides a real opportunity, and there are more possibilities with the police.

And this gets back to your point about making sure that this is Afghan led and enabled and is not all about our own forces.

The CHAIRMAN. And just a final question. With respect to Pakistan, do you have any recommendations to the committee as to what steps you think are feasible, immediately tangible, that could make a difference with respect to the border and the FATAH and what has happened in the northwest province? What is your sense of the ideal of what would make a difference?

General EIKENBERRY. Chairman, trying to get immediate gains, as you know, is very difficult in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But what will be important is more honest collaborative exchanges of intelligence and a willingness to conduct combined operations between the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Second, focused aid and assistance programs to the Pakistan military that can give them the capabilities and the wherewithal to attack al Qaeda and the extremists that are along the border areas and in the northwest frontier province.

And third, helping the Pakistanis develop effective aid programs, just as you have talked about Afghan development, it is important that the Pakistani authorities adopt the same approach on their own side of the border and find ways to collaborate with Afghanistan to create combined win-win economic programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Senator Lugar, are you all set?

Senator Shaheen, do you have any more questions?

Well, General, we really appreciate your willingness to take this very complicated task on, and we wish you well in it.

We are going to meet next Tuesday. The record will stay open just for 24 hours in case anybody has any written question they want to submit. I don't think there will be. But we will try to expedite this out next week, and hopefully, your bags are packed, and you are ready to go.

Thank you, sir.

General EIKENBERRY. Thank you very much, Chairman.

My wife has told me that our bags are packed.

The CHAIRMAN. Good to hear. Thanks.

We stand adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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#### ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing today. General Eikenberry, congratulations on your nomination, and thank you for your tremendous service to our Nation. I have no doubt that your professionalism, wisdom, and vast experience—including service in key positions in Afghanistan and Brussels—will be tremendous assets to the administration as it formulates, coordinates with our NATO allies, and implements its policies in Afghanistan.

It has been nearly 8 years since the U.S. began military operations in Afghanistan. It should come as no surprise to anyone that, while coalition and Afghan forces have made gains against Taliban and al Qaeda operations, these gains have too often been fragile and reversible. Within the paradigm of a “clear and hold” strategy, our forces have demonstrated the former but our policy has, frankly, lacked a cohesive, sustainable approach to the latter. Throughout much of the country, the strength of the Afghan central government is tenuous at best, and the Taliban and

al Qaeda continue to operate with impunity in large expanses of Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. The violence, terrorism, weak governance and burgeoning drug trade in those areas represent a great challenge to American security and interests and those of our European allies.

What's long been missing, in my view, is a coherent U.S. national policy—a clear statement of our objectives and a clear plan for achieving them. The previous administration took its eye off the ball, with catastrophic consequences, and it is our obligation to put things on track. We need to work with our NATO allies—to consult with them and listen to them—and agree on a strategy to which each of us can bring our strengths. I'm among those who have chafed at our allies' "caveats" on their participation, but I'm also among those who have chafed at our failure to develop a strategy that maximizes what each can bring to the battle. In this regard, I welcome France's return to full and active NATO membership.

The challenges we face in Afghanistan must be approached holistically. Just throwing more troops onto the battlefield is not a solution. We must recognize that military force alone cannot overcome the challenge. We need a strategy for civilian government to "hold" what coalition military forces "clear"—a strategy that builds the political and civilian capacity of the Afghan Government. Such a strategy must also include a renewed focus on humanitarian and economic development, particularly in remote rural areas in which the drug trade, the Taliban and al Qaeda exploit the lack of any government presence.

General Eikenberry, as the President's personal representative and our country's senior diplomat in Kabul, you will be an important partner in the rigorous examination of our military strategy and tactics in Afghanistan. I do not doubt for a moment the immense difficulty of conducting combat operations in Afghanistan, or the bravery of our soldiers and those of our NATO allies. But we run a risk of alienating the Afghan population if we can't convince them that we are taking every possible step, as I know we do, to avoid accidental civilian casualties. We must win the support of Afghans across the country in order to help them build a safe, stable, and secure country.

In addition to rethinking our civil-military strategies inside Afghanistan, I believe that we must recognize the broader regional challenges we face, and in that regard I applaud the appointment of Ambassador Holbrooke as Special Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan as an important step forward. The instability in Afghanistan is inextricably linked with security problems in Pakistan. It is only through a combined diplomatic, political, and military effort involving Afghanistan's neighbors that we can adequately address this conflict. When appropriate, this should include better sharing of intelligence, improved coordination, and most important, better bilateral cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The tasks ahead are challenging but not impossible. The Obama administration has already taken a number of positive steps—and your nomination is among the most significant—and I am optimistic of major progress. Thank you again for your service, and I look forward to working with you in your new capacity.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

I am very pleased that we will soon be receiving the much-needed review of our policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan that President Obama ordered. It is my hope that this strategy will address the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan with a comprehensive and regional approach, recognizing the critical role Pakistan plays when it comes to our national security and, of course, to Afghanistan's stability. Pakistan has been the home to a strengthened and reconstituted al Qaeda for many years now, and we must ensure that our actions in Afghanistan—including sending additional U.S. troops—do not make the situation worse in either country. We cannot afford to take an Afghan-centric approach to a much broader problem.

We also need to scale up our diplomatic engagement and redouble our commitment to reconstruction in order to help build a secure, stable Afghanistan in which insurgents and terrorists have no room to operate. But we also need to keep in mind where the insurgents, along with al Qaeda, have found a safe haven—Pakistan—as we address a very complex and very serious threat to our national security.

As we begin to shift to a new strategy, we will need an ambassador who has a strong command of dynamics on the ground and in the region, and can coordinate with the many different actors. I am pleased that General Eikenberry has been nominated to this post and look forward to our discussion today.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE KARL EIKENBERRY TO  
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

*Question.* How does the Obama administration define the mission in Afghanistan (e.g., our specific goals)?

*Answer.* On March 27, the President said the goal of our mission in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. Our mission in Afghanistan is focused on confronting a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists.

*Question.* How—specifically—will the administration's strategy toward Afghanistan differ from that of its predecessor?

*Answer.* On March 27, the President said the goal of our mission in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. The administration has also indicated its new approach by appointing Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to serve as Special Representative for both countries and to work with GEN David Petraeus to integrate our civilian and military efforts. As the President stated on March 27, the administration's goal is to enhance the military, governance, and economic capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and defeat an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war.

*Question.* As Ambassador, would you report through the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs—or both? If both, please explain how you see this coordination working in practice.

*Answer.* I envision a strong working relationship with all senior policy members of the administration, if confirmed as Ambassador. As Ambassador, I would be the President's personal representative reporting to him through the Secretary of State and the Special Representative. I would also expect to coordinate closely with other senior officials.

*Question.* We have heard for a number of years that greater civil-military coordination is required—both within the U.S. Government, and among the military and civilian branches of our allies. What lessons would you bring to the civilian effort based on your two tours of military service in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* My professional experience in Afghanistan has reinforced my belief that to achieve greater success in Afghanistan, full civilian-military capabilities must be completely integrated and mutually supportive. My staff and I would meet regularly with our military counterparts to ensure coordination of our efforts to strengthen Afghan capacity in governance, security, and development.

*Question.* What specific steps do you envision taking to improve coordination between the U.S. Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad to make sure our activities along the border are coordinated?

*Answer.* I envision strong coordination with our Embassy colleagues in Pakistan. To ensure our activities along the border are coordinated, I believe frequent conversations with Ambassador Patterson and integration of our country teams through constant information exchange is integral to defeating enemy safe havens in the border region. Both Embassies have border coordination officers who are in close touch and we would use those officers as well as new mechanisms such as interagency trilateral meetings to ensure better coordination.

*Question.* The August elections will be an important opportunity for the central government in Kabul to respond to growing local concerns over governance. How will you and your staff work to ensure elections are free and fair and not marred by security, logistics, and budget concerns?

*Answer.* The U.S. Government and the international community are providing expertise and financial support in coordination with the Afghan Independent Election Commission and the United Nations to ensure legitimate and secure elections in August. I would ensure that joint planning between Afghan officials and international representatives is cohesive and focused on ensuring that Afghan voters will be able to make their choices freely and fairly.

*Question.* As the current Deputy Chairman of NATO's Military Committee and the Commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, you have had considerable experience working with our allies. What will be your advice to President

Obama on this front before the 60th anniversary NATO summit scheduled for April 3–4, 2009?

*Answer.* Our allies have a critical role to play in Afghanistan. I would note that many of our allies have indicated a strong desire to be more effective in Afghanistan and specifically to support this administration's new strategy, including through the appointment of Special Representatives and the provision of more civilian and military resources. We will need to focus on areas of strength for our allies as we consult with them on what more they can do to work with us and the Afghans.

*Question.* Earlier this month, President Obama discussed the idea of negotiations with some Pashtun leaders who had previously supported the Taliban—presumably groups who are willing to renounce violence and join the political process. Who do you identify as reconcilable elements in Afghanistan with whom we might be able to reach a political settlement?

*Answer.* Integration of reconcilable elements into Afghan society must be Afghan-led and we will support the Afghan Government in developing a reconciliation effort led by provincial governors.

*Question.* How do you characterize Iran's current and potential future role(s) in Afghanistan? What type of interaction, if any, will U.S. diplomats have with Iranian representatives at the upcoming Hague Conference on Afghanistan?

*Answer.* The President stated on March 27 his intent to forge a new contact group, together with the United Nations, for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who have a stake in the security of the region, including Iran. We welcome the participation of Iran in the Hague Conference, which will be an opportunity for all to reiterate their interest in a secure and stable Afghanistan.

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RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTIONS  
SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.

CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

*Question.* General Eikenberry, you are one of a few senior military officers to be nominated as a United States Ambassador. You will be our most senior diplomat in Afghanistan, but you also have a long and distinguished military career which will shape your perspective. You are uniquely positioned to bridge the gap between our civilian and military officials serving in Afghanistan, a challenge cited by several experts as the U.S. enters a critical phase in the war. The Obama administration rightly focuses on our military priorities, but it should also be concentrating on post-conflict and long-term development strategies—missions our civilian agencies, like the Department of State, Agency of International Development, and Department of Agriculture, are highly proficient at executing.

The Obama administration has emphasized that, for too long, U.S. national security has over-relied on our military instruments of power at the expense of civilian instruments like diplomacy and development. The President and Secretary of State have made clear that they intend to change that skewed balance.

Are you concerned that the nomination of a career military officer to one of our most critical diplomatic posts undercuts that message of change?

As the head of our country team in Afghanistan, how will you attempt to foster improved coordination between our military and civilian officers? How will you balance the competing priorities of our services and other government agencies?

Did your tour as Commander of Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan prepare you at all for the challenge of facilitating civil-military operations?

*Answer.* I believe that my professional experience has prepared me well for the position as the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan. My professional experience in Afghanistan has reinforced what I have learned throughout my career—lasting security can only be delivered through coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military means. Secretary Clinton has identified the same priority objective of integrating civilian and military capabilities in support of the mission identified by the President. She has assigned exceptionally capable and experienced senior Foreign Service officers to the Kabul mission leadership team for this specific purpose. If confirmed, I look forward to working with all members of the country team to enhance civilian and military coordination for a unified effort.

NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND THE WRIT OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

*Question.* In August, Afghanistan will hold national elections, and President Karzai could face serious challengers. He has long been depicted as “America’s guy,”

but blanket American support for Karzai appears to be waning. The administration did not react positively to Karzai's insistence that elections be held in the spring, which contradicted the Afghan Election Commission's view that security conditions would be more favorable in August. I also have particular concerns about the magnitude of corruption that has plagued Karzai's government the past couple of years, and I am unsure he has the mandate of authority outside Kabul to convince provincial Afghans to support the central government instead of the Taliban.

You already have a relationship with President Karzai from your tour in Afghanistan; what type of influence can you exert on the President to deal with corruption more effectively? Can you assess Karzai's chances in the August election? Does the Obama administration intend to support Karzai, or any candidate, in this year's elections, or should the U.S. stay neutral?

How prevalent is support for the Taliban right now? Has Karzai's inability to extend the mandate of the government into the provinces and tackle corruption increased support for the Taliban?

What role do Provincial Reconstruction Teams play in building local governmental capacity in order to attract Afghans away from the Taliban?

Answer. August elections will be an Afghan-led process offering the people of Afghanistan the opportunity to choose their own leadership. The United States supports a free, fair, and open process for elections without a preference for any candidate.

The Afghan Government has taken initial steps to tackle the problem of corruption, but a culture of impunity continues to thrive. The United States will continue to work with the Government of Afghanistan and the donor community to reduce corruption and promote government legitimacy. We judge that overall support for the Taliban is not high and that there is little ideological support.

Provincial Reconstructions teams will work with local representatives of the Independent Electoral Commission and other Afghan and U.N. officials to facilitate holding legitimate and secure elections. This work will be a key element of their overall mission to develop Afghan civilian expertise at the provincial and district levels. The teams will also coordinate their efforts with any international elections monitors who will be important in ensuring the legitimacy of the elections.

*Question.* President Karzai's term ends in May, but elections are not planned until August. If the United States supports Karzai staying in his capacity as President until the elections, it could be viewed by Afghans as implicit U.S. support for Karzai's candidacy, should he seek reelection.

How will the administration handle the potential power vacuum between the end of Karzai's term in May and elections in August? Do you agree that if Karzai holds office between May and August, Afghans will perceive this as American endorsement of his candidacy?

Answer. The United States had called upon Afghanistan's leaders to find a formula within the constitutional framework for ensuring the continuity, legitimacy, and stability of government through the election period from May to August. On March 29, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan determined that President Karzai should remain in office until a new leader is chosen. The United States strongly supports the decision of the Supreme Court and urges all Afghans to support this ruling. The United States has no preference for any particular candidate.

#### AFGHAN REFUGEES

*Question.* Since 2002, nearly 5 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan and Iran. This is indeed an accomplishment for the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. Yet, UNHCR estimates that roughly 3 million Afghan refugees continue to live in camps in Pakistan and Iran. Not only is this a serious humanitarian concern, but I also believe the refugee crisis has the ability to be a destabilizing force in Afghanistan and along its borders.

What steps will the U.S. Embassy take to work with UNHCR and the Afghan Government on the resettlement of Afghan refugees?

President Obama will dispatch Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Moon to Moscow to engage Iran on Afghanistan; would you recommend to the President that the U.S. put the refugee crisis on the United States-Iranian agenda?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Refugee Coordinator's office within the Embassy, UNHCR, and the Afghan Government on the best approach to refugee returns to ensure long-term success of the overall return effort. Building capacity will be key to ensuring implementation of the Afghan Government's initiatives for refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons.



The United States and Iran share a common interest in ensuring protection for refugees. I look forward to strengthening further and supporting multilateral mechanisms for finding solutions to this humanitarian challenge.

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RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTIONS  
SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

USAID CASUALTIES IN AFGHANISTAN

*Question.* USAID and the Government Accountability Office have reported that a total of 407 persons employed on USAID-funded projects in Afghanistan were killed during the period 2002–October 31, 2008. This figure includes USAID contractors, subcontractors, direct hire employees, and locally hired employees.

Afghanistan presents a risky environment for conducting development work, but carrying out such work, in the areas that are most vulnerable to insurgent attacks, is a critical component of our mission there. If the administration's plans for Afghanistan include a substantial increase in the number of civilians working at the provincial and district levels, it is likely there will be a corresponding increase in the number of USAID and other civilian employees who will be injured or killed.

Based on your prior experience in Afghanistan, do you feel the U.S. Government has done an adequate job in protecting civilian employees who are working on development and reconstruction projects?

*Answer.* Parts of Afghanistan pose extremely dangerous environments. The situation on the ground varies significantly across parts of the country and has changed over time. The anticipated increase in the presence of USAID contractors, subcontractors, direct and locally hired employees in the coming year will pose security challenges. If confirmed, I will make the protection of the lives of American civilians and the local citizens we employ in support of our mission a top priority.

*Question.* As Chief of Mission, how would you strike a balance between the need to adequately protect civilian employees from harm, and the need for civilians to engage with Afghans on a local level?

*Answer.* The security situation in Afghanistan is increasingly difficult. If confirmed, I will review and assess our security guidelines and procedures in Afghanistan to ensure we afford the best protection to all U.S. and local civilian employees, as we execute our mission. Key areas of emphasis are the best use of all sources of intelligence, the utilization of the most effective technologies and equipment, and the adoption of the best procedures and risk assessment methodologies. Maintaining excellent working relationships with NATO–ISAF, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, and the Afghan National Security Forces is also important. Last, I will ensure that the Embassy's Regional Security Office strikes a proper balance between the need to adequately protect civilian employees from harm, and the need for civilians to engage with Afghans on a local level.

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS

*Question.* The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the Afghan Government and ministries are seeking to be more involved in planning and contracting for reconstruction projects.

Based on your experience in Afghanistan, what role do you think Afghan ministries should play in planning and contracting for U.S.-funded reconstruction projects?

*Answer.* Building the capacity of the Afghan Government is a priority of the international community. There are several excellent examples in Afghanistan of capable ministers and ministries competently planning and implementing nationwide programs. I intend to build upon these successes and wherever possible ensure that money allocated for the development of Afghanistan is used in Afghanistan and not dispersed through unnecessary layers of expensive contractors. In all cases, our assistance could aim to accomplish the purpose of the project through building Afghan capacity.

*Question.* If confirmed, what would you consider your responsibilities to be as Chief of Mission in overseeing the expenditure of U.S. reconstruction funds in Afghanistan, and mitigating waste?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will consider overseeing the effective expenditures of all U.S. reconstruction funds one of my top priorities. I have a responsibility to the President, the Congress, and the American people to accurately account for U.S.

spending in Afghanistan and aggressively seek to mitigate waste. In this regard, I believe the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) plays an important and positive role. I look forward to working closely with the Special Inspector General to achieve our shared goals.

#### CORRUPTION

*Question.* Transparency International has ranked Afghanistan as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and U.N. Special Envoy Kai Eide describes corruption in Afghanistan as being “endemic.” Corruption at the highest levels of the national government has contributed to a general loss of confidence in government officials, a situation that has been exploited by the Taliban.

As Ambassador, what steps would you take to confront the culture of corruption that has so weakened the Afghan national government?

*Answer.* Corruption is endemic in Afghanistan and one of the greatest challenges to establishing the rule of law. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Afghan Government UNAMA and the donor community to seek concrete, achievable benchmarks to fight corruption. We must help train and mentor our Afghan partners to develop necessary fiscal planning and delivery skills, and ensure accountability through transparency underpinned by a functioning legal framework.

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#### RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR JIM DEMINT

#### COUNTER NARCOTICS

*Question.* General, I understand there are some very successful training programs right now in Afghanistan. Among them, the Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit, which I understand made the biggest drug bust in history last June—confiscating more than 261 tons of hashish, with a street value of \$400 million.

Can you comment on the success of the Narcotics Interdiction Unit? It appears that this training program has been much more effective than the INL Civilian Police Training program. As Ambassador what will you do to support effective counternarcotics programs?

*Answer.* The National Interdiction Unit has established a positive track record. It is one of three small, specialized vetted units within the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. The success of the unit demonstrates progress that can be made with focused training and mentoring. We have seen some progress within the Civilian Police Training program realized through the ongoing implementation of the Focused District Development Program. However, there exists today very serious problems of leadership accountability, corruption, inadequate material resources, severe shortage of international police trainers, and the lack of a comprehensive approach to the development of an Afghan justice system. If confirmed, I look forward to close coordination with all U.S. Government agencies and in support of the President’s strategy for effective counternarcotics programs, and close collaboration with key international organizations.

#### AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING

*Question.* General, we continue to hear that there is a need to train police at the local level—and that funds to the central government in Kabul are simply not filtering down to small villages across the country to build security and safety for the Afghan people. I understand there has been a requirement for 2,500 police mentors to be deployed across Afghanistan at the local level, and this requirement has remained unfilled since 2006.

Do you believe these mentor teams are vital to provide security and build the trust of the Afghan people in the villages? Do you support filling the requirement for Police Mentor Teams?

*Answer.* Pairing Police Mentor Teams (PMTs) with the Afghan National Police has increased ability of the police to perform patrols, conduct checkpoints and manage the daily requirements of policing and community outreach at the local and district level. An essential element for a police unit to reach operational independence is its ability to provide security and to be a trusted resource for the local population.

Through outreach to local leaders and a more visible and established presence, Afghan National Police are developing the necessary skills to develop trusted relationships with local populations. The deployment of an additional 4,000 troops for mentoring and training the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army, as recently announced by the President, will assist overall efforts, but the international community must also do much more. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of the Department of State and Defense Department to provide additional civilian police personnel and then ask our allies to assist in this critical effort.

