[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DHS PLANNING AND RESPONSE: PRELIMINARY LESSONS FROM DEEPWATER HORIZON
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2010
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Serial No. 111-80
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Pete Olson, Texas
Laura Richardson, California Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Tom Graves, Georgia
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Kevin Costner, Ocean Therapy Solutions:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Craig Paul Taffaro, Jr., St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Panel II
Mr. Richard M. Chavez, Acting Director, Operations Coordination
and Planning, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger, Deputy National Incident Commander,
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response:
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
Mr. Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 55
Prepared Statement............................................. 57
Mr. William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 60
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Richard M. Chavez.............................................. 81
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Peter Neffenger................................................ 86
Questions From Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis of Florida for Peter
Neffenger...................................................... 87
DHS PLANNING AND RESPONSE: PRELIMINARY LESSONS FROM DEEPWATER HORIZON
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Wednesday, September 22, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Norton, Jackson
Lee, Cuellar, Clarke, Richardson, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green,
Lungren, Rogers, McCaul, Bilirakis, and Cao.
Chairman Thompson. The committee will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
DHS's planning and response and preliminary lessons from
Deepwater Horizon. I want to thank the witnesses for agreeing
to testify at today's hearing.
This hearing is not the first examination of the oil spill
this committee has undertaken. On June 21, the committee
traveled to the Gulf Coast to see the effects of the oil spill.
On July 12, the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and
Oversight conducted a field hearing in New Orleans to examine
the response command structure and to take testimony about the
lines of communication between State, local, and Federal
authorities. So after we have taken those close-up shots of
this disaster, it is now time to act on the big picture.
Today, we are here to examine lessons from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. Let me be clear. This hearing is not to
examine the Coast Guard's readiness. By all accounts, the Coast
Guard has performed admirably in responding to the largest oil
spill in history. The Coast Guard was the first on the scene,
conducting search and rescue following the April 12 explosion
on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. After the success of the
final well kill procedures on September 19, the Coast Guard is
likely to remain in the area, overseeing reclamation efforts
for a very long time to come.
But as we turn the page on this episode, I want to make
sure that we do not close the chapter in this book. Instead, we
must take the opportunity to examine the Department's role in
incident management and the part it plays in coordinating other
Federal agencies in any response scenario.
Since 2003, the Department has become the Federal agency
the public turns to for leadership when a disaster occurs. Yet,
the Department's involvement and leadership in developing and
implementing disaster response plans remains unclear. The
Deepwater Horizon oil spill is an example of an instance in
which the Department was expected to provide leadership in
response to recovery activities. Yet, as we now know, the
Department did not have a role in reviewing or assessing the
plans for the response and recovery of this type of disaster.
The agency that regulated the industry reviewed the response
plan.
In the course of preparing for this hearing, we have
discovered other instances in which the Department will likely
be expected to play a role in response but has been given no
role in planning. For instance, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission requires each nuclear power plant to develop and
periodically test a detailed emergency response plan. While it
appears that FEMA plays some role in reviewing certain aspects
of those plans, it is not clear whether FEMA can or should work
with the NRC, the private-sector owners, or local authorities
in fine-tuning those emergency response plans.
In another instance, under the Clean Air Act, the
Environmental Protection Agency has oversight of risk
management planning at facilities that handle hazardous
substances. The owners and operators of those facilities
prepare risk management plans. Those plans are submitted to
EPA.
The first lesson from the oil spill is that the agency that
regulates should not review the disaster response plan, as it
seems that the law could be interpreted to ensure that the
Department of Homeland Security is involved in those reviews.
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive, HSPD-8, the
Secretary of Homeland Security is a principal Federal official
for coordinating the implementation of all-hazard preparedness
in the United States. FEMA, reporting to the Secretary, has
responsibility for emergency planning. Yet, in February, the
Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General released a
report which found that DHS had not completed a full set of
plans for any single disaster scenario.
The Department has said that the failure to create those
plans is a result of a shortage of Federal planners. The
Department has also indicated that it does not have authority
to oversee Federal agency operation plans or require any agency
to coordinate its plans with DHS or other agencies.
So we are here today to examine a very simple proposition:
If you fail to plan, do you plan to fail? I hope that we can
all agree that failure is not an option.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today
and look forward to their testimony. I now recognize the acting
Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Cao, for an opening statement.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank you for this hearing and for your continued attention to
this spill that has impacted our district and the districts of
many numbers of Members of this committee.
Unfortunately, due to a scheduling conflict, Ranking Member
King is not able to be here today. So, on his behalf, I would
like to welcome the witnesses and to thank them for taking the
time to be here today.
I also owe gratitude to Ranking Member King and the
Republican staff for this opportunity and for their help in
preparing today.
I look forward to working with my committee colleagues on
conducting a thorough analysis of the response such that we are
able to walk away with an honest assessment of any missteps as
well as a set of best practices that we can use in the future.
With thousands of active and inactive wells and critical
infrastructure in the Gulf, it is inevitable that we will find
ourselves needing to respond to another disaster, security
crisis, or, even worse, a terror attack. How we respond and
mitigate will determine whether any new incident has the
detrimental impact of the Deepwater Horizon. My plan is to make
sure that none does.
The Joint Command did work with BP to align a combination
of containment vessels, booming, and controlled burns to
mitigate the oil flow while overseeing a permanent solution.
The command, under Admiral Allen's watch, did see the well
successfully capped and the oil flow stopped.
We seem to be poised for a smooth transition into the
recovery phase of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. However,
there are questions about the chain of command and creating a
clear mission for the Department in light of the legal burden
on the responsible party, BP. There are questions about
transparency and access to the spill site. Additionally, this
spill highlighted an on-going need to focus on the Gulf Coast's
vulnerable energy infrastructure and what it means in terms of
homeland security issues.
It is also my understanding that around 1,700 Active duty
and Reserve personnel are still deployed to the Gulf region. I
have heard concerns that the Coast Guard's redeployment of
assets to the Gulf may be leaving other parts of the country
potentially vulnerable. I am curious as to how the search
operations are funded, where the Coast Guard personnel came
from, and how the Coast Guard is back-filling to ensure
missions are not suffering as a result of these deployments.
To improve a variety of elements related to the oil spill,
Republican Members of the committee have introduced legislation
which addresses many of the administration's shortcomings. For
example, I have recently introduced H.R. 5684, the Maritime
Infrastructure Security and Counterterrorism Act, which was
referred to this committee and would require the Secretary to
commission an independent review of the risk of a terrorist
attack on offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico.
It is my hope that this committee follow up on this hearing by
acting on legislation referred to it that addresses the
homeland security elements of this disaster.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses especially
regarding any lessons learned by the Department that can be
applied in future disaster planning and recovery operations and
whether the organizational framework and authorities for
responding to disasters is sufficient going forward. I also
look forward to hearing from our local witnesses, Mr. Craig
Taffaro, and others. He, like me, has been on the front lines
of this disaster from Day 1 and has a lot to say about how the
administration and the Department handled things.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you personally for
this hearing, and I yield back.
[The statement of Hon. Cao follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Anh ``Joseph'' Cao
I would like to thank Chairman Thompson for this hearing and the
continued attention to the spill that has impacted our districts and
the districts of a number of Members of this committee. Unfortunately,
due to a scheduling conflict Ranking Member King is not able to be here
today. So on his behalf I would like to welcome the witnesses and thank
them for taking the time to be here today. I also owe gratitude to
Ranking Member King and the Republican staff for this opportunity and
their help preparing today.
I look forward to working with my committee colleagues on
conducting a thorough analysis of the response such that we are able to
walk away with an honest assessment of any missteps as well as a set of
best practices that we can use in the future.
With thousands of active and inactive wells and critical
infrastructure in the Gulf, it is inevitable that we will find
ourselves needed to respond to another disaster, security crisis, or
even worse a terror attack. How we respond and mitigate will determine
whether any new incident has the detrimental impact of the Deepwater
Horizon explosion. My plan is to make sure that none does.
RESPONSE
The Joint Command did work with BP to align a combination of
containment vessels, booming, and controlled burns to mitigate the oil
flow while overseeing a permanent solution.
The command, under Admiral Allen's watch, did see the well
successfully capped and the oil flow stopped.
We seem to be poised for a smooth transition into the recovery
phase of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
There are questions about chain of command and creating a clear
mission for the Department in light of the legal burden on the
responsible party, BP.
There are questions about transparency and access to the spill
site.
Additionally, this spill highlighted an on-going need to focus on
the Gulf Coast's vulnerable energy infrastructure and what it means in
terms of homeland security.
YOUR BILL
To improve a variety of elements related to the oil spill,
Republican Members of the committee have introduced legislation which
addresses many of the administration's shortcomings.
For example, I recently introduced H.R. 5684, the Maritime
Infrastructure Security and Counterterrorism Act, which was referred to
this committee and would require the Secretary to commission an
independent review of the risk of a terrorist attack on offshore energy
infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico. It is my hope that this committee
follow up on this hearing by acting on legislation referred to it that
addresses the Homeland Security elements of this disaster.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, especially regarding
any lessons learned by the Department that can be applied in future
disaster planning and recovery operations and whether the
organizational framework and authorities for responding to disasters is
sufficient going forward.
I also look forward to hearing from our local witness, Mr. Craig
Taffaro, President of Saint Bernard Parish. He, like me, has been on
the front lines of this disaster from Day 1 and has a lot to say about
how the administration and Department handle things.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
September 22, 2010
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today focusing
on the Department of Homeland Security's role in planning the disaster
response related to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, which the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deemed a Spill
of National Significance. I extend a special welcome to the witnesses.
On April 20, 2010, an explosion and fire occurred on the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig, located approximately 72 miles southeast of Venice,
Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. Several days after the explosion, the
well was reported to be leaking oil at an estimated 60,000 barrels per
day. The leak continued for nearly 2 months until June 15, 2010, when
the leak was successfully capped and oil stopped leaking from the well.
However, even after the oil was originally capped, the ultimate
effects that the oil spill had on the Gulf Coast were staggering. In
Louisiana and Mississippi alone, the oil spill affected nearly 700
miles of the total tidal shoreline. It also closed approximately 83,927
square miles of Federal waters, severely damaged the Gulf's delicate
ecosystem, and ruined hundreds, if not thousands, of businesses along
the coast.
In total, 4.9 million barrels of crude, or 206 million gallons
leaked from the Deepwater Horizon well, nearly half the amount of crude
oil imported by the United States daily. At current market prices
($81.17 per barrel on September 10, 2010), the value of the crude oil
spilled into the Gulf of Mexico exceeds $397 million. The direct and
indirect economic damage and social costs of the Deepwater Horizon Gulf
oil spill are unprecedented and will be felt for years.
As Chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response, I visited the Gulf twice,
on June 21 and then again from July 11-13, to observe first-hand the
impact of the worst oil spill in our Nation's history on the local
economy, environment, and quality of life of the people of the Gulf
region. Based on my observations and on numerous discussions with
Federal officials and local officials and stakeholders, it was and is
apparent that new remedial legislation is needed to address the complex
problems that have arisen as a result of this tragic incident.
Upon my return from the Gulf, I reported my observations and
recommendations to the House in a Special Order on July 21, 2010 and
subsequently documented them in my report to the administration, the
House leadership, and Chairman Thompson. I ask unanimous consent that
the attached copy of my report be included in the record of this
hearing.*
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* The document has been retained in committee files.
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As the representative of California's 37th district, I also
represent THUMS islands, which contain a number of offshore drilling
platforms located less than a mile offshore from the district's coast.
Although these drilling platforms are different in nature from the
Deepwater Horizon, there is always the potential risk of an oil spill.
Considering its proximity to the shores of Long Beach, any major oil
spillage could severely impact the region's beaches, ports, and
livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of persons living or working in
the adjacent communities.
Thus, it is incredibly important for us to evaluate the response to
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in order to make sure the Department of
Homeland Security is fully prepared and equipped to respond to any
future incidents swiftly, effectively, and in manner that minimizes
damage and danger to persons, property, and the environment. That is
the purpose of today's hearing.
I will soon introduce two bills: H.R. ------, the Oil Spill
Prevention and Return to Yesterday Act of 2010 (``OSPREY Act''), and
H.R. ------, the Securing Health for Ocean Resources and Environment
Act of 2010 the (``SHORE Act''), the latter the House companion to S.
3597 introduced in the Senate by Senator Rockefeller of West Virginia.
H.R. ------, the Oil Spill Prevention and Return to Yesterday Act
of 2010 (``OSPREY Act'') has three key features. First, it requires
that any applicant or a permit to drill for oil and gas on the outer
Continental Shelf must submit and have approved by the Secretary of
Interior an oil spill response and restoration plan.
Second, the response plan required to be submitted and approved
must provide for effective and prompt response to and clean-up of any
discharge of oil occurring in the course of operations under the
authorization, including a detailed description of the containment boom
and other equipment that is required to implement the rapid response
plan, how it will be made available, and where it will be stored.
Third, the environmental restoration plan required to be submitted
must provide for restoration of the environment following such a
discharge to the condition that existed before the discharge.
The other legislative proposal I intend to introduce, H.R. ------,
the Securing Health for Ocean Resources and Environment Act of 2010 the
(``SHORE Act'') will enhance at the Federal and local level
governmental communication, preparedness, and response to oil spills.
Specifically, the SHORE Act will:
1. Improve NOAA's spill response, containment, and prevention
capacity;
2. Better define coordination between Federal and State response
activities;
3. Better define coordination between NOAA, the Coast Guard, and
the Department of Interior;
4. Clarify existing authority for NOAA to receive funds from the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) for its mandates under
the Oil Pollution Act (OPA);
5. Double the amount the Coast Guard may receive from the OSLTF
each year, with a percentage dedicated toward oil spill
research and development;
6. Invest in a damage assessment and restoration revolving fund;
7. Mandate improvements in the frequency and quality of Coast Guard
safety inspections and certification requirements;
8. Require prompt posting by Coast Guard Unified Command of oil
spill Incident Action Plans on a publicly accessible website;
9. Provide new authority to promote prompt decision making with
regard to fisheries re-openings and closures in a coastal oil
spill response;
10. Strengthen coastal State oil spill planning and response; and
11. Direct NOAA to develop a long-term monitoring and research
program for the Gulf of Mexico.
I believe these bills will help remedy some of the emergency
planning and response problems that were revealed by the Deepwater
Horizon disaster.
Thank you again Chairman Thompson for convening this hearing. I
very much look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel of
witnesses.
Thank you. I yield back my time.
Chairman Thompson. I now welcome our first panel of
witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Kevin Costner. Since 1993, Mr.
Costner is both an actor and an entrepreneur in oil spill
cleanup and oil water separator technologies. In the last 15
years, he has founded Costner Industries, cofounded Ocean
Therapy Solutions, and has committed over $20 million towards
research and development in oil spill cleanup and recovery.
Welcome.
Our second witness is Mr. Craig Taffaro, Jr. Mr. Taffaro is
the President of St. Bernard Parish in Louisiana and has been
since 2008. Before that, he served for 8 years as District D
parish councilman.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now recognize Mr. Costner to
summarize his statement in as reasonable an amount of time as
possible.
Mr. Costner.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN COSTNER, OCEAN THERAPY SOLUTIONS
Mr. Costner. So I guess you have seen my movies.
Chairman Thompson. Well, the good and the bad.
Mr. Costner. I guess that list can be pretty long on both
sides, probably.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the lessons
learned from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Unfortunately, it continues to remain a critical issue for
our country and, in fact, the world. But it also poses two
giant questions: No. 1, do we have the capacity today to
protect our environment from oil spills, large or small; and,
if we do, then why didn't we perform better? No. 2, if we
don't, then how quickly can we put in place a credible plan for
spills that we know are going to continue now and into the
future, man-made or otherwise? I say ``otherwise'' because I
know this body has no greater task than to anticipate the
nature of all attacks that can take American lives and disrupt
our economic way of life.
Americans and the world need to demand that the oil
industry put this on-going problem front and center; to demand
that the same energy and the same financial resources that send
this industry around the world in pursuit of oil be brought to
bear to address the safety of America; that the same appetite
that drives them to drill in conditions and depths that boggle
the mind, where no cost seems too great, we need to demand that
the same will, that that same mindset be brought to the defense
of an ecosytem that cannot speak for itself.
Americans demand that this nightmare that continues to
chase us into the 21st Century be solved with real solutions,
solutions that don't depend on dispersants, burning, and public
relations. What we don't need is a cosmetic show of force or a
500-page report that is obsolete.
This plan was strategically and economically formed to take
advantage of existing vessels that are currently working in the
Gulf. The plan we propose begins on page 4 of the booklet in
front of you. It consists of three tiers: A first response,
followed by an overwhelming response, and backed up by a
shallow water last line of defense. It consists of 190 vessels;
and it incorporates state-of-the-art booming, skimming,
separation, and storage capacity.
The plan is simple, and it is easy to understand. It is
backed up by logistics, science, and engineering. It is an
aggressive strategy built around rapid deployment, overwhelming
response, and a mechanical recovery of oil from water.
As we examine the plan going forward, you will see a
graphic on page 6 of these 33 deepwater rigs that were being
drilled at the time of the Macondo accident. These rigs are
serviced by 40 deepwater platform vessels that operate through
the Gulf on a 24-hour basis. Our plan takes advantage of these
existing assets and will retrofit them with state-of-the-art
oil spill recovery technology, giving them a dual purpose,
should they be called upon.
They have a storage capacity of approximately 12,000
barrels. In the event of an accident of the magnitude of the
Deepwater Horizon, we would be able to deploy six of these
vessels to the accident within 2 to 3 hours.
Page 7 shows the overwhelming response that would follow,
with 30 offshore supply vessels making their way back to the
shore to predetermined coastal response facilities where they
will be loaded with dedicated oil recovery equipment that has
been pre-fitted for the vessels. They will have a storage
capacity of 6,000 barrels and can be deployed within 48 hours.
At the same time, 10 deepwater barges with an average capacity
of over 100,000 barrels will be moving simultaneously and on
site within 96 hours.
If this was the Deepwater Horizon and we elected to throw
this fleet of 80 ships at it--our own kitchen sink, if you
will--we would have the storage and processing capacity of over
1.5 million barrels.
It is also important to understand that our plan does not
consider the Deepwater Horizon as a worst-case scenario. Given
the dangerous world that we live in, we have anticipated a
situation where five Deepwater Horizons could simultaneously
occur. On page 8, you will see that we would handle this
situation, should it develop, by deploying and dividing our 70
offshore vessels and 10 deepwater barges to the multiple spill
sites. The storage and processing capacity would be over
300,000 barrels for each site.
Our last line of defense, on page 9, is made up of 100
shallow water skimming vessels and 10 shallow water barges.
They have been designed to work in water as shallow as 2 feet
and travel up to 20 knots, with the ability to work in seas of
up to 6 feet. They range in size from 35 feet to 56 and are
designed specifically to be transported by trucks anywhere
along the Gulf. The significance of this last line of defense
is not only in its mobility but in its psychological impact, as
Americans can finally begin to put away their rubber boots.
On page 10 you can see how Americans and the rest of the
world have come to picture the Gulf. But when you turn the page
and you begin to see a truer picture, these three graphics
begin to paint the reality of what really exists. Over 5,000
platforms, 27,000 wells, and, below it all, sitting on the
ocean floor, out of sight, is an infrastructure--a network, if
you will--of pipelines that stretch over 31,000 miles, taking
gas and oil to our mainland.
This is what our end of the Gulf looks like to our
neighbors. But what do we see when we reverse the picture? When
we when look off the Coast of Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil, it
begs the question: How good is their spill response plan? Do
they even have one? Is it possible that we think the Gulf is so
big, so vast, that what happens somewhere else doesn't matter,
that it is not our problem?
I don't believe for a second that this committee feels that
way. But if there is someone out there that does, then I would
ask them to look at Cuba and this committee to look at page 12.
For, as beautiful as Cuba is, it still only sits 90 miles off
the coast of Florida. Seven deepwater wells have been slated
for exploration in 2011 and 2012.
If you turn to page 13, you will see an even more startling
graphic, a grid of the 59 available leases being offered by
Cuba. Twenty-nine out of the 59 have already been leased off
Cuba's northwest shore. What will their response be if
something goes wrong? Is it too big a leap to think that we
could have oil on the level of a Deepwater Horizon moving
uncontrollably towards Florida and up our eastern seaboard? How
could anyone think when we are looking at the Gulf that our
plan is too ambitious, that we don't need that much capability,
storage, or capacity? I could make the case that our plan is
just the opposite, that it is too light.
Our choices are clear. We can choose to enlist a fleet of
6,000 vessels that are hampered by their lack of training and
preparedness, or we can create a dedicated fleet of 190 state-
of-the-art vessels. We can choose to let oil come to the
surface and mechanically recover it as a saleable asset, or we
can burn it. We can choose to separate oil from water at high
speeds with outputs that exceed the EPA standards and improve
the efficiency of every boat on the water, or we can use
dispersants and sink it to the bottom. We can choose to recover
oil, or we can choose to cover it up.
The opportunity for us today is to move forward. We have a
choice in all things. But what we cannot accept is a return to
the status quo. America deserves a no-nonsense approach to
spills that are certain to happen now and into the future. We
believe this plan strikes the heart of the problem. It is
efficient, it is streamlined, and it is robust. It is easy to
understand and implement. It simply requires a commitment to
being prepared. It stands as a turn-key operation that can be
implemented today. The American people and the Gulf deserve
nothing less.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Costner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin Costner
September 22, 2010
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss lessons learned from
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Unfortunately it continues to
remain a critical issue for our country and in fact the world. But it
also poses two giant questions.
One--do we have the capacity today to protect our environment from
oil spills large and small? And if we do, then why didn't we perform
better?
And two--if we don't, then how quickly can we put into place a
credible plan for spills that we know are going to continue now and
into the future, man-made or otherwise. I say otherwise because I know
this body has no greater task than to anticipate the nature of all
attacks that could take American lives and disrupt our economic way of
life.
Americans and the world need to demand that the oil industry put
this on-going problem front and center. To demand that the same energy
and the same financial resources that send this industry around the
world in the pursuit of oil be brought to bare, to address the safety
of America. That the same appetite that drives them to drill in
conditions in depths that boggle the mind, where no cost is too great.
We need to demand that that same will, that same mindset, be brought to
the defense of an ecosystem that cannot speak for itself. Americans
demand that this nightmare that continues to chase us into the 21st
Century be solved with real solutions. Solutions that don't depend on
dispersants, burning, and public relations. What we don't need is a
cosmetic show of force or a 500-page report that's obsolete.
This plan was strategically and economically formed to take
advantage of existing vessels that are currently working in the Gulf.
The plan we propose begins on page 4 of the booklet in front of you.*
It consists of three tiers, a first response, followed by an
overwhelming response and backed up by a shallow water last line of
defense. It consists of 190 vessels. And it incorporates state-of-the-
art booming, skimming, separation, and storage capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Document was retained in committee files.
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The plan is simple and easy to understand. It is backed up by
logistics, science, and engineering. It is an aggressive strategy built
around rapid deployment . . . overwhelming response . . . and the
mechanical recovery of oil from water.
As we examine the plan going forward, you will see a graphic on
page 6 . . . these 33 deepwater rigs that were being drilled at the
time of the Macondo accident. These rigs are serviced by 40 Deep Water
Platform Vessels that operate throughout the Gulf on a 24-hour basis.
Our plan takes advantage of these existing assets and will retrofit
them with state-of-the-art oil spill recovery technology, giving them a
dual purpose, should they be called upon. They have the storage
capacity of approximately 12,000 barrels. In the event of an accident
of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon, we would be able to deploy 6
of these vessels to the accident within 2 to 3 hours.
Page 7 shows the overwhelming response that would follow with 30
Offshore Supply Vessels making their way back to shore to predetermined
Coastal Response Facilities where they will loaded with dedicated oil
recovery equipment that has been prefitted for the vessels. They will
have a storage capacity of 6,000 barrels and can be deployed within 48
hours. At the same time 10 Deep Water Barges with an average capacity
of over 100,000 barrels will be moving simultaneously and on-site
within 96 hours. If this was the Deepwater Horizon and we elected to
throw this fleet of 80 ships at it. Our own kitchen sink if you will,
we would have the storage and processing capacity of over 1.5 million
barrels.
It is also important to understand that our plan does not consider
the Deepwater Horizon a worst-case scenario. Given the dangerous world
that we live in, we have anticipated a situation where 5 Deep Water
Horizons could occur simultaneously.
On page 8 you can see that we would handle this situation, should
it develop, by deploying and dividing our 70 Offshore Supply Vessels
and 10 Deep Water Barges to the multiple spill sites. The storage and
processing capacity would be over 300,000 barrels for each spill site.
Our last line of defense on page 9 is made up of 100 Shallow Water
Skimming Vessels and 10 Shallow Water Barges. They have been designed
to work in water as shallow as 2 feet and travel up to 20 knots with
the ability to work in seas up to 6 feet. They range in size from 35
feet to 56 feet and are designed specifically to be transported by
trucks anywhere along the Gulf. The significance of this last line of
defense is not only in it's mobility but in it's psychological impact,
as Americans can finally begin to put away their rubber boots.
On page 10, you can see how Americans and the rest of the world
have come to picture the Gulf. But when you turn the page you begin to
see a truer picture. These 3 graphics begin to paint the reality of
what really exists . . . Over 5,000 platforms, over 27,000 wells.
And below it all, sitting on the ocean floor, out of site, is an
infrastructure, a network if you will, of pipelines that stretch over
31,000 miles connecting oil and gas to the mainland.
This is what our end of the Gulf looks like to our neighbors. But
what do we see when we reverse the picture? When we look off the coasts
of Mexico . . . Venezuela . . . Brazil.
It begs the question--How good is their spill response plan? Do
they even have one?
Is it possible that we think the Gulf is so big, so vast that what
happens somewhere else doesn't matter? That it is not our problem? I
don't believe for a second that this committee feels that way. But if
there is someone out there that does, then I would ask them to look at
Cuba, and this committee to look at page 12.
For as beautiful as it is, Cuba still only sits 90 miles of the
coast of Florida. Seven deep water wells have been slated for
exploration in 2011 and 2012. If you turn to page 13, you will see an
even more startling graphic. A grid of the 59 available leases being
offered by Cuba.
Twenty-nine out of the 59 have already been leased, off of Cuba's
northwest shore. What will be their response if something goes wrong?
Is it too big a leap to think that we could have oil on the level of a
Deepwater Horizon moving uncontrollably toward Florida and up our
eastern seaboard?
How could anyone think when looking at the Gulf that our plan now
is too ambitious, that we don't need that much capability, storage, or
capacity? I could make the case that our plan is just the opposite.
That it is too light.
Our choices are clear. We can choose to enlist a fleet of 6,000
vessels that are hampered by their lack of training and preparedness or
we can create a dedicated fleet of 190 state-of-the-art vessels.
We can choose to let oil come to the surface and mechanically
recover it as a saleable asset, or we can burn it.
We can choose to separate oil from water at high speeds with
outputs that exceed current EPA standards and improve the efficiency of
every boat on the water, or we can use dispersants and sink it to the
bottom.
We can choose to recover oil or we can choose to cover it up.
The opportunity for us today is to move forward. We have a choice
in all things, but what we cannot accept is a return to the status quo.
America deserves a no-nonsense approach to spills that are certain
to happen now and into the future. We believe this plan strikes to the
heart of the problem. It is efficient, streamlined, and robust. It is
easy to understand and implement, it simply requires a commitment to
being prepared.
It stands as a turn key operation that can be implemented today.
The American people and the Gulf deserve nothing less.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Taffaro to summarize his statement.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG PAUL TAFFARO, JR., ST. BERNARD PARISH,
LOUISIANA
Mr. Taffaro. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Acting
Ranking Member Cao, for having me. I appreciate you allowing
Mr. Costner to go first. I didn't want to overshadow him in the
hearings today.
Chairman Thompson. Noted.
Mr. Taffaro. Thank you.
Of significant importance, I believe, was the clear
indication that the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
crisis started from a position of catch-up. What may be unknown
is that St. Bernard Parish and the New Orleans metropolitan
area are rather robust in preparing for and being ready for
disasters. In the last 5 years, we have experienced five Type 1
disasters in our parish alone. Many communities across the
country never experience a Type 1 disaster, and we have had
five.
In retrospect, the information flow relative to the
Deepwater oil spill crisis had similar markings as several of
the other disasters experienced in the St. Bernard community:
Namely, poor factual information about the event; a downplaying
of available resources and the mechanism to obtain such; and a
lack of local engagement to the response coordination.
Complicating this event was the differing authorizing
legislation for Louisiana versus other coastal States.
Louisiana law specifically states and grants emergency powers
to the local authorities, primarily parish presidents and
mayors, during times of declared disasters. This construct
seemed to create a bureaucratic obstacle that has plagued the
coordination throughout. Instead of embracing the local
authorities' involvement in resource capacity, local
authorities were met with resistance, exclusion, and power
struggles.
The immediate perception and experience of the local
parishes was the very agency, representing in the United States
Coast Guard, that was to have ultimate authority, according to
OPA and the Clean Water Act, had partnered itself in a position
of protection rather than enforcement. BP, as the responsible
party, enjoyed that protection. While the description that the
oil spill was analogous to fighting a war, the soldiers in the
field and on the battleground were met with consistent
resistance of resource supply, restricted procurement
processes, and the lack of follow-through. While operational
discussions and decisions were being made in Houma, some 90
minutes away and beyond from most of the impacted areas,
inputting coordination from the local communities was ignored
in many cases and patronizingly accepted in others.
A buildup of OSRO [Oil Spill Removal Organization]
resources and assets was clearly under way. The request to use
local commercial fishing fleet involvement was fought; and
these commercial fishermen, who were at the heart of the
impacted area, had to fight their way into the response. The
local vessels were eventually placed into a rotation and side
by side with the OSRO vessels, were utilized in the response
effort and given daily assignments in boom deployment, oil
detection, and recovery support activity, rapid assessment, and
other activities. The local fleet provided a critical asset in
the mission response, sharing valuable information of tidal
activity, strength of currents, and marsh detection and impact.
Very early on in the response, St. Bernard Parish requested
BP to allow for and support the establishment of a local
environmental planning and assessment team. This was disallowed
by BP, only to be told some 3\1/2\ months later by a visiting
Coast Guard authority that St. Bernard should have been
involved in environmental assessment from the start. This lack
of continuity was addressed by the local community by
establishing a deputy or lead in all ICS [Incident Command
System] sections. These sections were sought to be replaced and
undermined throughout the process.
Simply balancing the rather contentious dynamics that have
existed in many local branches became a major endeavor, as
relationships that were established and boundaries understood
were changed with the starting of each new rotation. The
issuing of Executive Orders, which created power struggles over
resources, hurricane planning, and local authority, tainted the
trust level in the joint command structure and often left the
local parish on the outside of a BP-USCG partnership.
During these operational disputes, the U.S. Coast Guard
chose to sit on the fence, claiming that business, contractual
arrangements, and engaging in directives on such topics were
outside their legal purview and authority. The dynamic only
strengthened the uncontested authority of BP as the perpetrator
of the disaster and the responsible party which was able to
usurp the 51 percent authority of the Coast Guard. If BP
disagreed with the decision, they simply chose not to pay, in
essence daring the Coast Guard to use its ability to reach into
the Oil Spill Fund.
Because most of these decisions were reflective of a
disconnect between the multiple layers of the operational ICS
structure, enough doubt was cast or enough time had passed that
an argument be made that BP had the right to use their
discretion in paying for services, personnel, or equipment
which had already been engaged and used. If the immediate
operational need had ceased by the time the dispute was brought
to awareness, the Coast Guard simply bowed out of the dispute,
attributing it to a business or contractual issue.
In the immediate past, there was a constant discussion over
the appropriate level of demobilization and the pace of such as
it related to an agreed-to and established transition plan.
Every oil spill has a response phase and a recovery phase.
Although these vary from incident to incident, the basic
framework exists.
Within the communication of the well being capped, it was
clearly the start of a different focus by BP and the United
States Coast Guard, at least providing complicit support if not
active leadership in this shift. Requests immediately became
rejected or denied at a higher pace. Payments to vendors became
slow. Sightings of oil became more and more unrecoverable. The
constant debate over the need for continued operations
commenced.
While the discussion relative to these topics is
appropriate throughout the response, arbitrary decisions to
demobilize or attempt to demobilize basic features of the
response began in earnest. In the midst of the activation
investigation of the transition plan, it was an apparent
expectation that each branch would lean forward in the
transition, despite certain triggers not to do so being
reached. This push was indicative of a common belief that the
incident was all but over and the focus on long-term recovery
was the order of the day.
The beliefs of such seemed to undermine the enthusiastic
support to find and treat oil-impacted areas. Sightings were
now limited on the water surface, but signs of the water
bottom's being impacted and the marsh literally washing away
were largely ignored and referred to the NRDA [Natural Resource
Damage Assessment] process.
The gap between response and NRDA has proven to be a
difficult crevasse to cross. The United States Coast Guard does
not recognize their role in the NRDA process and has a
difficult time asserting itself and its authority to go beyond
the established shoreline treatment recommendations. This gap
in responsible party identification has resulted in acres of
lost marshland that is so critical to the coastal protection of
St. Bernard Parish and the surrounding areas, including the
city of New Orleans. Further intervention is necessary, in
addition to the identification of the critically damaged sites,
but funding to accomplish this task has been rejected.
It is noted that the interaction between the St. Bernard
Parish branch and the Department of Homeland Security was
nonexistent. Parish leadership did have the opportunity to
communicate with an assigned parish president liaison officer
from the Coast Guard, who did participate in the daily
conference call with the Secretary's staff. The Department of
the Interior [DOI] was referenced throughout the response,
primarily in conjunction with the focus on the barrier islands
of the coast of Louisiana. Interestingly enough, these are the
same islands that have been neglected for some 25 years and
receive now intense protection in the objection to build berms
to assist in capturing oil.
The Department representative communicated directly with BP
representatives regularly, but as parish president I did not
have one single conversation with any DOI representative.
The exterior input to the branch action plan was responded
to without question and created confusion in who actually was
coordinating the response. This type of disjointed influence
was not limited to DOI but it also included other agencies
which often operated without coordination or notification to
the branch, including NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration], FDA [Food and Drug Administration], and, many
times, EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]. What worked for
one community may not have worked for others.
I am wrapping up, Mr. Chairman. I was taking the lead from
Mr. Costner.
The challenge to share information operationally,
logistically, or resource assignment was never conquered.
Having the ability to use best practices seemed to be lost, as
the resources reviewing information from branch to branch often
did not return calls for clarification or direction.
It is most important to recognize that the Federal
legislation as interpreted and applied leaves the very
community and citizenry impacted by such an event to be
continually victimized throughout the response by allowing the
responsible party to be the gatekeeper of funds for a response
effort. Despite a 51 percent role, the Coast Guard continually
referenced legal limitations that forced their command to stop
short of implementing operational decisions that would have
been beneficial or could not identify clear authority to do so.
At some point, the responsible party has to be redefined to
mean financially responsible and be prohibited from having
operational veto authority in the response effort. This change
in application of the existing legislation would allow the U.S.
Coast Guard to partner with the local community and our State
in which an incident occurs, instead of partnering as an
operational partner with the responsible party.
Thank you for allowing me to speak, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Taffaro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Craig Paul Taffaro, Jr.
The following testimony is offered at Day 152 following the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill crisis. The testimony offered herewith is
done so from a perspective of the local community of St. Bernard
Parish, Louisiana as both an individual parish which experienced
significant impact from the BP Oil Spill as well as a member of the
Louisiana coastal parishes working as a coastal group. The statements
and comments contained herein are limited to the scope of information
that was requested relative to perceived areas which are in need of
improvement and/or further procedural or operational adjustment. While
the request to identify this information guided this submission, it
should be noted that in many aspects of branch functioning, the St.
Bernard Branch was noted as implementing response ``best practices''
and upon evaluation of the branch operations, it was revealed that
several functions were actually setting region standards.
PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED
Of significant importance was the clear indication that the
response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill crisis started from a
position of playing catch-up. From the breaking notice that an
explosion had occurred to even today, the information flow to the local
branch has been wrought with inconsistency, fragmented messaging, and
stove-piped communication patterns. Both the United States Coast Guard
and BP were at a distinct disadvantage in the Gulf Coast Region of
Louisiana as the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness together with the individual parishes have been
operating at a higher state of readiness than most other local
municipalities throughout the United States. This increased level of
readiness to respond comes with being engaged on a daily basis in the
long-term recovery process and annual preparation activities following
the overwhelming experiences of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and
Ike. Additionally, the region has experienced the largest domestic land
oil spill in United States history with the Murphy Oil, USA spill in
conjunction with Hurricane Katrina and an additional Mississippi River
Oil Spill in 2009 which impacted the St. Bernard community as well.
When totaled, St. Bernard Parish has been directly engaged in five Type
1 disasters in the last 5 years, a statistic that has produced a rather
robust appetite for response management.
In retrospect, the information flow relative to the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill crisis had similar markings as several of the other
disasters experienced in the St. Bernard community, namely poor factual
information about the event, a downplaying of available resources and
the mechanism to obtain such, and a lack of local engagement to the
response coordination. Complicating this event was the differing
authorizing legislation for Louisiana verses the other coastal States
involved. Louisiana law specifically states and grants emergency powers
to the local authorities (primarily the parish president/mayor) during
times of declared disasters. This construct seemed to create a
bureaucratic obstacle that has plagued the coordination of the response
effort throughout. Instead of embracing the local authorities'
involvement and resource capacity, local authority was met with
resistance, exclusion, and power struggles. This decision, whether
contemplated or not, resulted in adversarial relationships between the
local agencies, the State and Governor's office, and BP and the United
States Coast Guard. The immediate perception and experience of the
local parishes was that the very agency, the United States Coast Guard,
that was to have ultimate authority according to OPA 90 and the Clean
Water Act legislation had partnered with the responsible party, BP, in
a protective role rather than an enforcement role to oversee that every
resource and activity needed was brought to bear. While the description
that the Oil Spill was analogous to fighting a war was pronounced, the
soldiers in the field and on the battle grounds were met with
consistent resistance of resource supply, restrictive procurement
processes, and a lack of follow-through. While operational discussions
and decisions were being made in Houma, LA, some 90 minutes or more
from most of the impacted areas, input, and coordination from the local
communities was ignored in many cases and patronizingly accepted in
others. The responsible party operations lead either interpreted
directives or was instructed to actually hide information from the
local incident command personnel by covering up maps, information, and
assignments when local personnel entered the separate command post
established by BP. For the first 6 weeks of the response, despite an
approved joint command and incident command team being built, a
separate and uncoordinated effort was the norm. A build up of OSRO (Oil
Spill Response Organizations) assets was clearly underway and the
request to use the local commercial fishing fleet, the very industry
that was under siege in this ``war'' had to fight their way into the
response. BP created a Vessel of Opportunity program which was
mismanaged in fulfilling the goal of putting local vessels in local
waters to assist in the local response efforts. St. Bernard Parish
established a modified version of the Vessels of Opportunity program,
that to BP's credit was funded. The local vessels were eventually
placed into a rotation and, side-by-side with the OSRO vessels, were
utilized in the response effort and given daily assignments in boom
deployment, oil detection and recovery, support activity, rapid
assessment, etc. The local fleet proved to be a critical asset in the
mission response sharing invaluable information of tidal activity,
strength of currents, and marsh detection and impact.
Very early on in the response, St. Bernard Parish requested BP to
allow for and support the establishment of a local environmental
planning and assessment team. This was disallowed by BP only to be told
some 3\1/2\ months later by a visiting Coast Guard authority that St.
Bernard should have been involved in environmental assessment from the
start.
This lack of continuity was addressed by the local community by
establishing a deputy or lead in all ICS sections, which was also
attempted to be undone at various times throughout the rotation of BP
and USCG personnel. As branch directors, deputies, PPLOs, and other
subject matter experts from the USCG and/or BP contractors rotated into
the St. Bernard Parish Branch a constant learning curve was experienced
and a re-tooling of operational, logistical, planning, and resourcing
activities became the norm. While individuals who were deployed to St.
Bernard varied in his/her level of oil spill expertise, the
discontinuity between those leaving and those arriving continues, even
today, to be an issue.
Simply balancing the rather contentious dynamics that have existed
in many local branches became a major endeavor as relationships that
were established and boundaries understood were changed with the
starting of each new relationship. Local frustrations certainly added
to the contentious atmosphere between local leadership and the USCG and
BP. The issuing of Executive Orders, which created power struggles over
resources, hurricane planning, and local authority tainted the trust
level in the joint command structure and often left the local parish on
the outside of the BP/USCG dyad.
This contention often was the result of an Incident Command in
Houma not recognizing the operational input and planning of the local
branch in St. Bernard Parish. Despite the use of local experts, BP
personnel, and deployed USCG personnel, and despite Branch Action Plans
being submitted and no objection being communicated activities and
implemented assignments were often criticized and rejected after the
fact. Most disturbing in this pattern of retroactively rejecting sound
operational practices was and is BP's financial hostage program. After
services have been rendered, resources used and expended, equipment
activated, and often after successful completion of tasks, BP has
undertaken a program to disallow costs, reject approval of previously
approved processes, and financially strangle the local small businesses
which have acted in good faith efforts in the oil spill response, many
times financing the activity themselves. It is not lost in this
discourse the fact that local companies and brokers were positioning
themselves to make a profit within this structure, but agreed upon
transactions should be supported, not cancelled. Modifications of
agreements, a review of reasonable costs, and the elimination of
unneeded resources have been and continue to be supported by the local
branch. However, leaving unpaid vendors to scramble to stay afloat with
millions of dollars in unpaid bills because BP has changed their rules
multiple times over the course of 5 months is unacceptable.
Underscoring the contentions that existed as BP attempted to paint the
St. Bernard Branch as a rogue operation and that their personnel needed
to be protected from intimidation and influence from the local
leadership, BP personnel who have multi-million dollar signature
authority in their non-oil spill positions were reduced to having
absolutely no authority at all. This action significantly stifled the
ability of the branch to operate efficiently.
During these operational disputes, the USCG chose to sit on the
fence, claiming that business contractual arrangements and engaging in
directives on such topics were outside of their legal purview and
authority. This dynamic only strengthened the uncontested authority of
BP as the perpetrator of the disaster and the responsible party which
was able to usurp the 51% authority of the USCG. If BP disagreed with a
decision, they simply would choose not to pay, in essence daring the
USCG to use its ability to reach into the oil spill fund. Because most
of these decisions were reflective of a disconnect between the multiple
layers of the operational ICS structure, enough doubt was cast or
enough time had passed that an argument be made that BP had the right
to use their discretion in paying for services, personnel, or equipment
which had already been engaged and used. If the immediate operational
need had ceased by the time the dispute was brought to awareness, the
USCG simply bowed out of the dispute, attributing it to a business/
contractual issue.
In the immediate past, there was a constant discussion over the
appropriate level of demobilization and the pace of such as it related
to an agreed to and established Transition Plan. Every oil spill has a
response phase and a recovery phase. Although these vary from incident
to incident, the basic framework exists. Within the communication of
the well being capped, it was clearly the start of a different focus by
BP with the USCG at least providing complicit support, if not active
leadership in this shift. Requests immediately became rejected or
denied at a higher rate, payments to vendors began to slow, sightings
became more and more unrecoverable, and the constant debate over the
need for continued operations commenced. While the discussion relative
to these topics is appropriate throughout the response, arbitrary
decisions to demobilize or attempt to demobilize basic features of the
response began in earnest. In the midst of the activation of the
Transition Plan, it was an apparent expectation that each branch would
lean forward in the Transition Plan, despite certain triggers to do so
not being reached.
This push was indicative of a common belief that the incident was
all but over and that the focus on long-term recovery was the order of
the day. The belief of such seemed to undermine the enthusiastic
support to find and treat oil-impacted areas. Sightings were now
limited on the water surface, but signs of the water bottoms being
impacted and the marsh literally washing away were largely ignored and
referred to the NRDA (Natural Resources Damage Assessment) process. The
gap between response and NRDA has proven to be a difficult crevasse to
cross. The USCG does not recognize their role in the NRDA process and
has a difficult time asserting itself as an authority to go beyond
established STRs (Shoreline Treatment Recommendations). This gap in
responsible party identification has resulted in acres of lost marsh
land that is so critical to the coastal protection of St. Bernard
Parish and the surrounding areas, including the city of New Orleans.
Further intervention is necessary in addition to the identification of
the critically damaged sights, but funding to accomplish this task has
been rejected.
It is noted that the interaction between the St. Bernard Branch and
the Department of Homeland Security was non-existent. Parish leadership
did have the opportunity to communicate with an assigned PPLO (Parish
President Liaison Officer) who did participate in a daily conference
call with the Secretary's staff. The Department of the Interior was
referenced throughout the response, primarily in conjunction with the
focus on the barrier islands of the coast of Louisiana. Interestingly
enough, these are the same islands that had been neglected for some 25
years and received intense ``protection'' in the objection to build
berms to assist in capturing oil. The Department representative
communicated directly with BP representatives regularly but as the
Parish President, I did not have one conversation with any DOI
representative. This exterior input to the Branch Action Plan was
responded to without question and created confusion in who was actually
coordinating the response. This type of disjointed influence was not
limited to the DOI but it also included other agencies which often
operated without coordination or notification to the local Branch.
NOAA, FDA, EPA, and specialized response teams within the incident
command would regularly engage in the St. Bernard Area of Operation
unbeknownst to the local command. This was indicative of the
disconnected response efforts at all levels. There were literally
multiple layers of responders who never coordinated with each other,
nor shared data of their respective activities.
What worked for one community may or may not have worked in another
community. The challenge to share information operationally,
logistically, or resource assignment was never conquered. Having the
ability to use best practices seemed to be lost as the resources
reviewing information from branch to branch often did not return calls
for clarification or direction. Branch to branch discussion was more
apt to occur and often did, but did not result in the adoption of
similar interventions, even when sought to do so.
COMMUNICATION
The flow of information was poor. The information presented by BP
in print and broadcast media often erupted into episodes of frustration
and disbelief as the disconnect between the reality of a local
experience and the stated information was clearly displayed. The local
chastisement of the response seemed to serve as an obstacle to
adjustment as the focus continued to be on correcting media releases
rather than hearing and adjusting the problem that may have been
referenced. It became evident that a negative response in the media
would be met with a slowed response and additional power struggles.
The local branch was rarely forwarded information that was
collected and used in decision making by higher authorities. This
continued to create a sense of distrust as the experience at the local
level was often inconsistent with the information released by higher
authorities. Requests to integrate the various scientific communities
with local authorities and the local fleet who held significant
historical knowledge was met with dismissal and a lack of interest.
This resulted in the scientific community losing critical credibility
within the local populations that needed to buy in for the overall
success of this response. NOAA couched their information so as not to
contraindicate the decision to follow the methods and approach of
dispersant but frequently offered limited valid scientific specifics to
this spill and its related activities. Instead of revealing that there
would be significant amounts of follow-up testing that would be
required to document the effects of the approach used, the information
was released in manners to suggest conclusions that could not be
supported. Predicting conclusions of future and untested protocols only
exacerbated the lack of trust between the scientific community and the
commercial fishing industry.
Understanding that BP has a business need to promote a positive
image of the company and the shareholders of the company do enter into
the equation of the response, marketing efforts to manage expectations
must be a focus of the communication strategy. Again, pushing out
images that are inconsistent with the actual experience of the local
community only serves to widen the disconnect between the responsible
party and those affected by the incident.
Overall, there were significant positives interspersed within the
response. As mentioned, the use of the local commercial fishing fleet
was a major positive impact for the St. Bernard Parish community.
While now outside the direct control of BP, the claims process has
created unnecessary anxiety and distress within the community that was
most directly impacted by the spill itself. The members of the
commercial fishing fleet find themselves being matriculated out of the
response activities with no market to fish their respective products
and little assurances that their future is any more promising than
their last 5 months. While there is no argument that there is some
product to be harvested, the on-going need for longer-term and more
comprehensive testing to promote the industry continues to be unmet.
Furthermore, incentive programs and shared liability programs for the
product that is caught have not gotten any traction. Questions of BP
using earned money by the fishing community to reduce damages continues
to be a point of contention, leaving the local community with the
belief that they were duped into working for the enemy and cleaned up
the mess for free.
It is most important to recognize that the Federal legislation as
interpreted and applied leaves the very community and citizenry
impacted by such an event to be continuously victimized throughout the
response by allowing the ``responsible party'' the gatekeeper of funds
for the response effort. Despite a 51% role, the USCG continuously
referenced legal limitations that forced their command to stop short of
implementing operational decisions that would have been beneficial but
could not identify a clear authority to do so.
At some point, responsible party has to be redefined to mean
financially responsible and be prohibited from having operational input
to the response effort. This change in application of the existing
legislation would allow the USCG to partner with the local community
and/or State in which an incident occurs instead of partnering as an
operational partner with the responsible partner. The current situation
is likened to putting a rape victim in counseling with her perpetrator.
It must be recognized that any incident will create competing
interests by the parties involved in the response. The responsible
party will obviously have a much different commitment than the
objective enforcer of the spill response. Additionally, in this
situation, the USCG in its role as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator
must have the latitude to act and enforce without financial
repercussions. Current legislation allows for reimbursement by the USCG
and local municipalities for their expenses in the response. When the
responsible party is at the decision-making table with financial veto
authority it sets up a significant potential for a conflict of
interest. This is further underscored in our current situation both on
the National level with recent cuts to the USCG and at a time when
local revenues are struggling to keep pace with service needs and
operational expenses.
SUMMARY
In delivering a concise review of the response to date to the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the following summary points are offered.
Recognize that current legislation generally is crafted
based on the most recent experiences. Reactive legislation
without expansive application of industry experiences and in-
depth analysis of real ``worst-case'' scenarios is negligent.
Just as we learned in the Hurricane Katrina response, there
must be legislation that allows for flexible response decisions
in the face of disasters which transcend the boundaries of
existing legislation.
Recognize that a basic tenet of disaster response is that
disasters are local. To exclude local engagement curtails
critical information and hinders the process of an expedited
response. While following a National Contingency Plan may set
the specific command parameters and structure, if implemented
without local buy-in initiates significant but unnecessary
power struggles, stifles valuable information exchange, breeds
distrust, and ultimately interferes with the effective
completion of the mission at hand via distractions which focus
on personality and authority dynamics.
Establish a National downstream logistics program which
accounts for real-time resource availability and a pre-event
awareness of potential shortfalls and pre-planned alternatives
to address such shortfalls.
Redefine the role of ``responsible party'' from the manager
of the disaster to the required financier of reasonable
response efforts. Require the participation of all operating
oil and gas companies to contribute to the oil spill fund at a
level that allows the ability to cover costs of a response. In
times of a specific incident, create a pre-established
evaluation team to provide a cost estimate for the response
associated with a specific disaster and require those funds to
be deposited into escrow to be drawn on for response costs.
Oversight of the escrow should be administered by an
independent agency that will account for cost reasonableness
and response vendor payments.
Eliminate the operational practice that isolates data used
for decision making at all levels of the response from the
local branches and establish a network of information sharing
and concurrence that integrates actual ``on the ground''
experiences with scientific theory and data interpretation.
In recognition of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
crisis, the after-action reporting process will be on-going for some
years to come. Reviewing processes along the way is certainly a
necessary step in improving efficiency.
There must be a recognition that the driving force in the current
structure is funding. From a litigious-minded management approach to a
legislatively restricted enforcement capability, the common denominator
in the decision-making model has been who pays for what. As long as
this dichotomous structure is in place the actual response and focus to
cleaning any environmental crisis governed by OPA 90 and the Clean
Water Act will twist upon itself. The establishment of partnerships is
extremely important, but there must be a clear and decisive
understanding of who has the ability to turn processes on and who has
the ability to shut operations down. As long as the checkbook governs
the decision-makers, there will be a less than optimum response
achieved.
Thank you for your attention and interest in this matter. It
certainly has been an incident that no one has enjoyed. The
responsibility of all involved is to identify how to improve the system
in the next disaster.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Costner, when you originally contacted Federal agencies
over 15 years ago to promote your oil spill clean-up
technology, what was the response?
Mr. Costner. Well, the list of whom I contacted read pretty
much like a who's who--all the initials, very difficult to keep
up with. But, really, we are talking about the Coast Guard, MMS
[Minerals Management Service]. Really, I went to everyone in
the Government side of things. I equally went to industry,
volunteered my machines spill after spill, to put them on the
spills at my own cost. I had my machines tested at the Coast
Guard facility in New Jersey.
The EPA we contacted. Really, everybody was contacted,
multiple times, trying to let them understand that this
capability existed to create efficiencies where efficiencies
were not.
Chairman Thompson. The question is, after 15 years, it took
an oil spill for somebody to say, well, this guy, Costner,
might have a good idea. Explain how EPA or whomever----
Mr. Costner. It came from a local--Billy Nungesser was made
aware that there might be a machine--a magic machine from an
actor. When it was presented to Billy, before they could even
make the explanation, Billy Nungesser said, stop, wait a
second. Before I was a politician, I was in the oil business,
and I saw this machine work in Houston at an exposition. It
does work. Please call him. At that point I was invited down to
the Gulf and began this long, 4-month journey of having it
tested by BP out on the water.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Taffaro, your testimony in terms of
the lack of coordination between Federal agencies and local is
quite troubling. I would say this from a step-by-step
standpoint. Do you have any knowledge of any training that has
been provided at the Federal level to State and locals dealing
with oil spill response?
Mr. Taffaro. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of any of that
type of training being offered. That discussion has begun. I
can tell you that both the Governor's Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness and the local communities
that have been impacted are now in discussions in terms of
preparing for and creating another level of expertise at the
local level to deal with this type of a crisis. But prior, no,
that had not been done.
Chairman Thompson. So the plan that BP had submitted in
furtherance of getting a permit, you were not privy to seeing
it.
Mr. Taffaro. Not at all. Not at all.
Chairman Thompson. So, as best you can, can you just
describe for the committee, once the spill occurred, what
communication was like the first 2, 3 days of the spill with
you and the Federal agencies?
Mr. Taffaro. Mr. Chairman, it was actually rather strange
to have experienced the same situation that we experienced
during Hurricane Katrina. Having been in office at the time as
a council member, the coordination and communication was
virtually nonexistent, which is what created the gap to begin
with. Because we were prepared to respond to a disaster--any
disaster--in terms of management capabilities, we began
standing up a disaster response branch long before anyone
showed up to say we are here to manage this disaster with you,
for you, or to get out of the way.
So, again, there were several days before any coordination
became even apparent that there would be an incident command
branch or an outpost or any type of coordination with a higher-
level authority.
Chairman Thompson. The last question is: We were told
during our visit that there was one person in charge. That if
your parish needed an answer, there was one person for you to
contact to get that answer. Did you find that to be true?
Mr. Taffaro. I still don't know who that person is today,
other than Admiral Allen. Now, obviously, the incident
command--the National incident commander has designated an area
commander in terms of Admiral Zee, Captain Perry now within the
structure.
Chairman Thompson. We were told a number of times that
there was one person who resolved any issue for local
government the minute it came in.
Mr. Taffaro. I never received that memo or introduction to
that individual.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I yield to the gentleman from New Orleans, Mr. Cao.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is to Mr. Costner. First of all, I want
to say how impressed I am with the plans that you have put
together. My first question to you here is: According to your
plan, what kind of contingencies have you put in place, for
example, to redeploy the vessels as well as to redeploy the
resources and whether or not the resources are adequate in the
event of disruption such as hurricanes, storms, or so forth?
It seems to me that the plan you put forward--tier 1, tier
2, tier 3 based on the presupposition that it would be a smooth
transition from different tiers. I am wondering whether or not
you put into your plan, for example, interruptions by
hurricanes, by storms, tornados, or what have you.
Mr. Costner. Well, I think that when you are dealing with
an act of God, whenever people are fighting for life and limb,
the ability to exercise some kind of clean-up is going to be
limited. So our plan, we don't have vessels that can operate in
hurricane-type weather--or booms. So when that happens we are
really at the mercy of what is going on.
In short, when we saw exactly what happened with the
Deepwater Horizon, we had perfect weather conditions. What this
plan takes advantage of is we know that at any one point in
time these 40 vessels that I talked about, they are operating,
day and night. So what we have elected to do is to outfit them
so that they can be first responders, so that they can get
there within 2 to 3 hours. Make no mistake, 34 can also be on
their way. We can have what we call an overwhelming response.
But we need the ability to have a first response. So the plan
was designed to take advantage of vessels that were already out
there.
Your question was kind of long, so perhaps there is
something I have missed.
Mr. Cao. I was just thinking whether or not this plan put
into place certain contingencies such as hurricanes and things
that can disrupt.
Mr. Costner. No. We don't have. I am sure this plan could
be improved. I said so as much.
What I don't think it can be is reduced. I think that it
probably would make sense to have a boat at the site of a well
that is being drilled, because we know that is a very delicate
moment in the life of a well. I think it would be responsible
to have something sitting out there 24/7 during the life of a
well being drilled. I think that--that is not in the plan, and
I think it actually should be.
This is an initial response. We think that it is very
significant, and it could be incorporated beginning today.
There is a time schedule in the booklet in front of you that
examines how quickly these assets could be brought to bear and
put into place.
Mr. Cao. Now are you assuming that these 40 existing
platform sort of vessels, all Coast Guard vessels, are they
working in conjunction with Coast Guard and private
corporations, private entities?
Mr. Costner. Well, they would be taken over by the Coast
Guard. Because the minute a spill happens, the Coast Guard
takes command. But what would happen is, since they have been
predesignated, it would be a very turn-key operation for the
Coast Guard to actually understand. The problems that have been
outlined here is that there seems to be a disconnect in how to
coordinate what goes on.
These 190 vessels would be dedicated to this particular
idea versus 6,000. I mean, if we were to extrapolate that
particular response--if we had five disasters happen at once,
if you extrapolated the current plan, there would be over
30,000 vessels out there trying to collect oil. we know at the
end of the day that they collected about 3 percent. We know
they are also limited.
One of the problems that occurred with 6,000 vessels is
that there is too many. The sheer volume makes it dangerous.
They can't operate at night. We also know that oil doesn't stop
leaking throughout the night. So technology needs to catch up
with what the problem is going on out there. This program is
designed to do that, to work 24/7.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taffaro, I know that one of the biggest problems that
we had down in the Gulf Coast was a lack of a clear command-
and-control structure. What was your experience with respect to
this perception or this problem?
Mr. Taffaro. Congressman, I guess the largest challenge for
us in trying to determine the answer to that question was we
interpreted the law to mean that the Coast Guard, by
legislative authority, would be running and managing the
command. But oftentimes in the structure the responsible party
had equal authority and oftentimes veto authority, whether it
was directly through objections to operations or through a
financing leverage where if they chose not to authorize
payment----
Mr. Costner's technology was there. We all saw it. We were
exposed to it and actually requested to be allowed to utilize
it. If it didn't work, then we would discard it. But because BP
said no, that is what generally held up the entire process on
many cases.
So if the Coast Guard is truly the command in this type of
an incident, then let the responsible party financially support
that command, rather than have veto authority in operations.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both
of the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Taffaro, let me ask you a question. I am looking at
your testimony, and in particular I am looking at pages 6 and
7, where you go in very specific suggestions as to where there
was a problem working with the Federal Government. The main
thing is, without local buy-in initiatives, it is kind of hard
to get some of these issues addressed.
I have looked at the testimony that Mr. Chavez and Rear
Admiral Neffenger--and it is day and night, what they are going
to present; and I hope you stay here to listen to their
testimony. But it is totally day and night.
I want to know, just follow up with what the Chairman
talked about. Why is there such a disconnect? What are we
missing here? Because I am one of those. Without the local buy-
in, I don't care if you have the best plan out there, why do
you think--I mean, there is a disconnect here, totally.
Mr. Taffaro. I believe we can't ignore the massive nature
of this incident, obviously, and the multiple layers of
command. Oftentimes, if there was a command that we were told
that Admiral Allen--and, in many cases, during a meeting with
the parish presidents and the Governor--that Admiral Allen or
his deputy would support, by the time it got to the local level
it had changed dramatically and significantly. It is indicated
in our experiences, even as recently as yesterday, we have a
transition plan that the Coast Guard has signed off on, the
State signed off on, BP signed off on, but to implement that
transition plan is different in every single parish that is
impacted right now. That shouldn't be the case. The transition
plan was meant to be a standard, but it is implemented
differently across the board.
Mr. Cuellar. I hope, Mr. Chairman, the two witnesses will
stay here and follow up on the specific problems of Mr.
Taffaro. I don't care if you have the best plan, but if you
don't get down to the locals, we have got a problem. I hope our
two witnesses will take a look at that and spend a little bit
of time with Mr. Taffaro.
To Mr. Costner, thank you very much. Let me ask you another
question I have with Homeland Security. I know that Homeland
usually brings up, well, look, we have just been in existence 8
years, and we are still working at it. We still are trying to
work this out. My response is, we won World War II in 4 years.
So that response doesn't buy me out.
One of the issues, following up on what the Chairman talked
about, was this issue about how do you get the ideas from the
private sector so Government can say, you know, here's a good
idea. I can understand there are some ideas out there that
might not be the best, but if you have a good idea like you
have, and I certainly want to thank you, but let's say the same
thing in Texas. I know you know some of my friends, Paul
Sadler, Auggie Corito, and some of those folks from Austin. But
even in Texas, for example, the former Governor Mark White had
an idea, and he just couldn't get through the Government.
Apparently, you have the same situation. You go in, you
present an idea. What suggestions do you have where Homeland
can look at an idea and say: Let's move through this idea. At
the same time, there are some people who come up with some of
the craziest ideas. But yours was a good idea. How do we get
Government to get those good ideas from the private sector like
you had? Because you had a little difficult time in trying to
get past the bureaucracy.
Mr. Costner. I still don't know that answer. We have an
interesting system in America, and thank God we actually have
it, because it gives us this forum, for as frustrating as it
may be for everyone, but we are here. In my instance, I am kind
of a brick-and-mortar person. I wanted to come and offer this
committee an actual plan.
So what I have attempted to do as a citizen is to do kind
of the heavy lifting, put over $20 million into technology. You
should understand also that this technology came out of the DOE
[Department of Energy]. So this actually had a potential to be
a great story in technology that the Government paid for, I
bought, I extrapolated it into something that could work around
the world just as well as here on our own Coast.
So I have attempted do the things. I have called the
Governors. I have come to Capitol Hill three times to testify,
to not just bring awareness, because we are all aware of what
has happened.
I think what this body is in need of, what the American
people are in need of, is a plan. That plan, make no mistake,
didn't need to come from the Government. It should have come
from industry. Industry should have had a plan in place that
was not just adequate. Adequate is a word that we use when we
are a child. We just do the bare minimum. What we needed is a
plan that is overwhelming. To that extent I have gone out of my
way to talk to the oil companies and present this plan to them,
with the idea that this is a plan that they should have in
place.
Short of that, I guess we come back to our system of
Government where we have to mandate, where we have to
legislate. But, in this case, that doesn't have to happen. I
think a heavy influence from this particular committee, from
the Department of the Interior, I think from the Coast Guard, I
think a heavy influence can be brought to bear on the oil
companies; and I think they would accept a plan that has this
type of science, this type of logistics, this kind of response.
It exists, like I say, today. It is a turn-key operation
that can be passed over to the Coast Guard and we can begin to
get rid of some of the frustrations. Because at the point of
something going wrong there is an overwhelming response to
something that seems practical, something that seems adult. We
need an adult response to a problem, and a mature industry like
the oil industry should have one.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
By the way, ``For Love of the Game,'' great movie.
Mr. Costner. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes,
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
witnesses for being here.
Mr. Costner, thank you for your leadership and your role in
this response effort. I know you testified before the Science
and Technology Committee previously, so we had a chance to
visit at that time. It is really an astounding story that the
two of you have to tell here today about the Federal
Government, and sometimes the Federal Government is its own
worst enemy.
This technology, Mr. Costner, as you mentioned in your
report, was developed over 30 years ago by scientists at the
Idaho National Lab. The patent was applied for in 1990. You
purchased it in 1993. For 15 years, you tried to get the
Federal Government to take notice of this technology to prevent
the very disaster we saw happen in the Deepwater Horizon spill.
I think the Chairman has already gone through your
testimony in terms of who you contacted to try to get
attention. But even after the spill occurred, what is even more
incredible to me is the lack of interest or lack of response by
the Federal Government.
Can you tell me a little bit about the obstacles and the
challenges you encountered, even after the spill, trying to get
the attention of the Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Costner. Well, not so frustrated. You have to
understand that I don't know the waters myself, how to navigate
in Government. I am a citizen. I think most of the people
behind me--well, maybe not. This is an interesting place to
work. So I try to educate myself.
I have never tried to lean on my celebrity to bring
attention to this. I always thought that the technology would
speak for itself. But it hasn't.
Listen, America's story is pretty long in all things, in
all things that we have accomplished. Maybe we have come to a
seminal point where we can put our thumb down, we can put our
fist down and say this is what we need to be about.
So I feel privileged that I have this audience. I feel like
this group has the weight, has the interest of the American
people at heart and could influence the oil industries to take
this plan.
As you can see, my emphasis has kind of shifted. I have
gone from technology that I was willing to offer up--a machine
that would create efficiencies on the water where no
efficiencies existed--and we have moved--my experience down in
the Gulf the last 5 months has led me to bring forth a plan.
I want to be really clear about this plan. This plan was
not made by myself. It was made up of locals who have
experience--considerable experience both nationally and
internationally. It is made up by men who have made their own
companies in the oil service business who have really made a
thoughtful plan that we believe is overwhelming in its ability
to respond to oil spills, big and small.
Mr. McCaul. I think it is the role of this committee, Mr.
Chairman, to get attention to your plan and get the Department
of Homeland Security to consider this plan--and the Federal
Government.
Eventually, BP did end up buying some of your machines, is
that correct?
Mr. Costner. That is correct.
Mr. McCaul. How many?
Mr. Costner. They bought 32. Twenty-one of them were
deployed.
Mr. McCaul. And they worked----
Mr. Costner. They worked very well. But pointing out to the
frustration that everyone has experienced, there were times
when our machine sat out there waiting for oil to be brought to
them from these 6,000 boats. It never came. There was no
logistics that could direct these boats to where this oil could
be offloaded and they could continue to gather more.
So why my plan is simple is because it needs to be simple.
We need to have one in place. It needs to be mobile. It needs
to be very robust. But it needs to be passed off. The only plan
that can be passed off is one that has been carefully thought
out, where training has followed suit, and it can pass over to
the Coast Guard. We need to simplify this, and we can do it.
Mr. McCaul. One hundred ninety vessels with 190 of these
machines?
Mr. Costner. Well, no, there would be multiple machines
sitting on these boats to process this oil.
Mr. McCaul. I would be interested to get the cost for that
plan. I know you don't have that figure.
Mr. Costner. Well, I have had to do estimates, because I
think that is important. There is a price tag with everything.
But I think it is important to know that as we designed this
plan we didn't just act like we had a blank check and throw it
at the oil industry. I don't want to be that cavalier. What we
decided to do was to take existing assets. Of these 190 boats,
90 of them already exist. What we have proposed is to retrofit
them. So, in a way, we are not trying to stuff a bitter pill
down them. We are trying to use existing assets.
The 100 shallow water boats were something that we don't
have. We are too accustomed to seeing our own citizens on the
beach standing heroically with rubber boots and pitchforks and
hay. These shallow water boats, as I described, can move in a
very rapid mobile place. They can move from Texas to Florida
overnight. So, finally, we can have some highly technical
pieces of equipment working as oil moves its way towards our
shore, should it get by this plan.
Mr. McCaul. In the limited time, just one question, Mr.
Taffaro. You testified that the parish interaction with DHS was
nonexistent, is that correct?
Mr. Taffaro. That is correct. The link between myself as
the parish representative and DHS occurred through the Coast
Guard's PPLO, the liaison officer supplied by the Coast Guard.
Mr. McCaul. So you did not have a seat at the unified
command.
Mr. Taffaro. We had our branch in St. Bernard. So there was
no DHS direct interaction.
What I wanted to add to that if I can, quickly, is that the
characterization here is that every individual who came to
assist, whether they were rotating in or rotating out, had a
clear dedication to the mission, but the system that they
operated in did not provide the appropriate support to carry
the message from the highest levels of authority to the ground
level.
Mr. McCaul. Just closing, Mr. Chairman. I think you
testified, Mr. Taffaro, about legislation needed to have more
flexible response decisions to be made. I think we should take
a look at that on this committee.
Thank you for the testimony.
Mr. Taffaro. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you, and that has been duly noted.
We were told on our visits just the opposite. Part of what
we are trying to do with this after-action review is that, if
we have to legislatively require it, we will do that, because
we understand that has to be the connection.
We now recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Richardson, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taffaro, how long have you been the president or
involved in government in an elected official position at your
parish?
Mr. Taffaro. I served as a council member for 8 years; and
I have been the parish president since January, 2008.
Ms. Richardson. Did you participate--back in 2005, there
was a National level exercise regarding a potential oil spill.
Did you participate in that in any way or were you aware of it?
Mr. Taffaro. No, I did not participate.
Ms. Richardson. You said in your questions and answers in
response to Mr. Chairman that you did not have a point of
contact. But yet in your testimony you reflected on the fact
that you did have a liaison that you were involved with. I
think, if you notice, several Members are asking the same
question. Can you be clear on whether in fact there was a
liaison with the Coast Guard that you were interacting with?
Because we were specifically told that each parish had a
liaison. Maybe you didn't feel the liaison did enough, but was
there a liaison available for you to interact with at your
parish?
Mr. Taffaro. Sure. Let me clear that up. The question that
I answered was whether or not there was a person who had
ultimate authority within the Coast Guard that I was introduced
to. No, that was not the case, outside of Admiral Allen.
The liaison officer program actually started during the
response in response to that disconnect, as well as the
function of the liaison officer, and I don't want to be curt
about this, but part of that came about because of the negative
media attention that many of the local parish officials were
bringing to light about the disconnect that was happening.
Ms. Richardson. Right, but the question is, and I only have
3 minutes, and I need to ask some questions to Mr. Costner, the
question is: Did you have a liaison? Yes or no?
Mr. Taffaro. Yes.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. So you were introduced to someone.
Did you participate on any of the calls?
Mr. Taffaro. I participated with my liaison officer. I was
not invited to participate on the calls. In fact, I was told
that the call was for the liaison officer and DHS's offices,
not for the parish president to sit in on.
Ms. Richardson. So you have no idea whether the questions
you asked or the concerns that you had were elevated on the
call through the liaison officer.
Mr. Taffaro. I believe that the liaison officers assigned
to me, I thought, did due diligence in conveying whatever
concerns that were necessary or conveyed to him.
Ms. Richardson. By you.
Mr. Taffaro. Up to DHS.
Ms. Richardson. Did you receive responses from him based
upon the things you were asking?
Mr. Taffaro. Sometimes, not always. Oftentimes, there was a
single direction of communication.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, one of the things that I have an interest in
as being Subcommittee Chair of Emergency Communications
Preparedness and Response is that I think a huge weak link that
we have is the lack of continuity of Government.
I would look forward to working with you, especially the
excellent testimony that we have that you initiated through
this hearing, because, as I said, and I am going to say it
publicly again, my 6 years on a city council, 8 months in the
State legislature and even now, 3 years in Congress, no one has
ever told me what do I need to do if something happens. That is
a scary point. If I don't know, and it sounds like, through
your experience, there wasn't, still, we haven't gotten to that
point.
I think continuity of Government, inter agencies are now
working well together, but connecting the dots, local
officials, State officials, Federal officials, with those
agencies to maximize where we need to be is still not there. So
I appreciate you having this hearing. I appreciate you coming,
sir, to testify, because I think it further accentuates that
this is a huge problem that needs to be addressed, and I am
very appreciative that you brought this forward.
Mr. Costner, in the remaining time that I have, which is
about a minute and 4 seconds, when the Deepwater Horizon spill
occurred, did you ever receive a call from anyone saying, we
hear you have something----
Mr. Costner. No, I did not. I was on my way to Canada to
look at the oil tailing problems that they have up there in
Canada. I was invited down. So I wasn't immediately called. I
was invited down by a group of local businessmen to see if this
machine really could work.
Ms. Richardson. When it was tested on the water, what
happened? Did they use it?
Mr. Costner. Well, when it was first tested I felt that I
was, I thought perhaps the game was rigged, because I thought I
was going out to test oil and water, and the sample that was
brought to me was thicker than peanut butter. I was a little
frustrated, as you can imagine, because it was designed to
separate oil and water. But the machine, through some
engineering, through about 2 to 3 or 4 days, we figured out how
to do that.
I was then brought oil that had dispersants in it, and the
machine was able to separate that. It is interesting to note
that we were able to come under the EPA standards of an output
that was below 15 parts per million, and, of course, we are
obviously able to separate oil and water. In fact, we prefer
that it come to the top, that it not have dispersants, so that
we can gather it.
Ms. Richardson. So was it ever used at any point in the
process?
Mr. Costner. Pardon me?
Ms. Richardson. Was your equipment ever used?
Mr. Costner. It was. When BP finally put it through the
entire gauntlet of works, something that I don't think has ever
been done before on the water, it was successful, and BP, at
that point, chose to buy 32 of the machines and place them on
vessels.
Ms. Richardson. Did you witness some being used?
Mr. Costner. Pardon me?
Ms. Richardson. Did you witness some being used?
Mr. Costner. No, I didn't witness them being used. I had
all the faith in the world that they would work and the reports
came back to me. In the white paper, you can see that they did
work, and BP did understand the value of these particular
machines.
Ms. Richardson. How long did it take from the time--and if
I could just have an additional 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman?
How long did it take from the testing to the equipment
actually being purchased and being used?
Mr. Costner. It took quite a while. We came to the fight
late, so I don't have that; probably 2\1/2\ months.
Ms. Richardson. I didn't hear you answer the question of my
Republican colleague. What----
Mr. Costner. Yeah, it was pretty long.
Ms. Richardson. What is the estimated cost of your plan?
Mr. Costner. The cost. It is interesting to note that the
plan that is being put forth by industry right now, there is a
consortium of the oil companies, and a number, a billion
dollars, is being tossed around. It is a pretty sexy number. I
think everybody behind me would go, a billion dollars? I mean,
that gets your attention.
But it is important to know that that is designed for
prevention and containment at the well site. What that plan
does not include--and I think the committee, I hope, takes this
really to heart--what that plan does not include is surface
oil, the problem that we are talking about today, the one that
came on to the beaches of the parishes, the one that comes up.
It seems like they fail to anticipate that something could go
wrong, and so their plan is a billion dollars.
I would estimate our plan is somewhere around $850 million
to a billion dollars itself, with an on-going cost of about
$150 million to maintain it.
Now, those are guesses. But I have outlined before that we
have tried to use existing assets to not drive that cost. But
like I said before, I don't think there is any cost that is too
great that they are willing to pay. I think in the service of
safety, I think this plan is the right one.
So the plan that is being offered right now by industry
does not include surface oil, and that is what this plan is all
about.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much.
Thank you for your testimony, gentlemen.
Mr. Costner, again, thank you for sticking with this. It
has got to be very frustrating after 15 years.
I have been concerned, regarding your plan, I have been
just concerned about the dispersants and their effect on the
ecosystem.
Does your plan avoid using dispersants or minimize using
dispersants?
Mr. Costner. It doesn't require using dispersants. We want
the oil to come to the surface.
I think if dispersants are used, and we don't include that
in our plan, it should be as a last line. That call should be a
difficult one to make.
But if we create a rapid response, an overwhelming
response, we should be able to recover a majority of that oil.
That is another reason why we created a last line of defense
that is sitting on the shore waiting, really effective boats.
So, yeah, when you disperse, you are not getting rid of the
toxicity of the oil. The only thing you are doing is breaking
it up and allowing it to spread into the ecosystem a lot
quicker. The point of dispersants has always been almost a--No.
1, it gets it out of mind and out of sight really quickly, so
there is that aspect.
But the other reason they talk about dispersants, and the
reason why I think they have been effective in having them work
is because the claim is, if we don't disperse, it will travel
along the surface of the ocean quicker and get to your beaches
quicker. That scares everyone. So everyone naturally goes, yes,
well then, disperse.
But we do not require dispersant. We do not require burning
because burning does nothing to get rid of the toxicity either.
It simply creates a more airborne pollution.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taffaro, your testimony echoed many of the sentiments,
particularly in the area as to the information sharing and
exchange by the Unified Command with local governments. I have
heard these same sentiments in the State of Florida. Based on
your experiences, what recommendations would you make to
enhance communications, resource allocation and overall
responsiveness in the event another disaster of this magnitude
occurs?
Mr. Taffaro. Well, one recommendation that I would put
forth for consideration is to have a National logistical
program that identified resources ahead of time and had those
resources in a logistical downstream chain, instead of having
to then scurry through in response to an incident to find
resources and to allocate them accordingly.
That should be a paramount preparation issue or item for
any agenda for any operational oil and gas company, as well as
combining with all of the Federal agencies that have oversight
to and regulatory authority over those industries.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
As a follow-up, in addition to looking back after disaster
response to make changes to plans and procedures going forward,
I believe that it is necessary to use lessons learned as they
are happening to correct deficiencies in response while it is
on-going. In your experience, as you raised issues about the
lack of responsiveness or unavailability of resources with
Unified Command, were they capable of changing the way they
operate to address your concerns and to be more responsive?
Mr. Taffaro. In our experience, they were not. Oftentimes
we sat across from a Coast Guard command individual who stated
they would like to go further, but they were legislatively
restricted. I think one of the issues that we have learned at
the local level and try to promote that to the National level
is that, in after-action reports, we oftentimes promote
legislation based on the most current scenario, and that leaves
us short for the next disaster that transcends the previous
one.
So if we are not proactive in looking at, as Mr. Costner
said, well, if you had one Deepwater Horizon issue, do we have
capacity to respond? What if we have five? Can we do that?
So overplaying--within the legislation, if I can, one of
the things that, again, we borrowed the lessons learned from
Katrina is that there has to be, because in my estimation, we,
as individuals, are hard-pressed to come up with legislation
that fits every disaster that we may have. But there should be
a way for legislation to grant authority when we come up
against a disaster that transcends the current legislation's
parameters to act reasonably and to act responsibly.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Thanks for your testimony, gentlemen.
Chairman Thompson. That really is the reason we are here
today, to talk about lessons learned from this situation and,
hopefully, at some point, we will provide the legislation so it
won't repeat itself.
We will now--the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, this reminds me of many hearings that go on
in the Congress that deal with many different agencies of the
Federal Government. The relationship between any particular
industry and the Federal agency designated for specific
oversight is really biblical in itself.
Although the Minerals Management Service, when I hear that
term, Mr. Costner and Mr. Taffaro, you know, it is like Niagara
Falls, suddenly I turn, with Lou Costello and Bud Abbott. It's
a nomenclature, and I don't feel very comfortable when I hear
it.
On the other hand, shortcuts imply a conscious effort, if
not a criminal intent, as far as I am concerned, but you point
out in your testimony, Mr. Costner, that we are not simply
talking about what you can't see, don't worry about.
On page 16, in your testimony, ``What is the Difference
Between Separating Water and Oil,'' I find very simple and
right on target. We have been given the all-clear sign. The
hole has been plugged. We are trying to work backwards now to
find out and hold people culpable, not only in the private
sector but in the Federal sector. Firing people is not enough,
as far as I am concerned.
So, Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Commission told us the most
important failure concerning the 9/11 attacks was one of
imagination. So this is what your struggle is, let's face it,
for 15 years; people who have imagination, people who have
none.
It seems that some imagination failed us when it came to
planning for Hurricane Katrina, despite the fact that a large-
scale natural disaster in a coastal city like New Orleans
should have been entirely predictable.
Now we have the Deepwater Horizon, a massive oil spill in
the Gulf. It seems we still fail to have the imagination to
think that if we are drilling for oil thousands of feet below
the earth's surface with immense pressure in ever-changing
conditions, that maybe, just maybe, we might be terribly wrong.
Mr. Chairman, I find it hard to believe that it requires a
real active imagination to not consider that a distinct
possibility. The simple undisputed facts of this entire
disaster is that there was no real contingency plan. I blame
the Federal Government. I blame BP, and I blame those private
folks who dig into the ocean and say, all is clear, because you
can't see anything on the surface, not from private industry
nor from the local and State and Federal Governments, which is
exactly why our response to this disaster was made on the fly
and took so long to coordinate properly.
So here we are once again in this committee considering a
threat after it has occurred. We are good at it. We have
written the protocol, the model. I hope you are watching. Once
again, we are stuck being reactionary instead of proactive.
So, Mr. Costner, let me ask you this question. Do you feel
as if you have been heard, or do you have to create a spectacle
just to get attention of decision-makers on the ground? I am
trying to make it as simple and direct as possible, sir.
Mr. Costner. I feel I have been heard and now, you know,
what I am dependent on, as every other citizen is, is the
collective will of our Government to move.
My hope would be that industry would take this plan and the
influence that this committee could be brought to bear and do
this without being made to do it; that they could see that this
is a responsible act.
But I have been heard. Now I am in the hands of people who
have gone into public service.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Mr. Taffaro, thank you for your candidness.
Mr. Costner, thank you for your candidness.
Let me ask you this: Was your office consulted on a regular
basis on the oil spill response efforts? Yes or no.
Mr. Taffaro. I am going to answer based on the definition
of regular.
Mr. Pascrell. That is not a yes or no.
Mr. Taffaro. I have to say yes, but defining regular is a
tough issue.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, let's go into the answer to your
question then. Were you humored in the process?
Mr. Taffaro. Yes. One of the things that we forced into
operation at the St. Bernard branch was: I wasn't going away,
despite, at the front end and even all the way 'til last 2
weeks, not being recognized as a legitimate seat at the table
of command at the branch.
Mr. Pascrell. What do you expect from us, Mr. Taffaro? What
do you want us to do? Tell me what you want me to do.
Mr. Taffaro. If this committee can address the link between
the National Incident Command and the National Contingency Plan
and make sure that those dots are connected, all the way to the
ground-level forces that are on the front line of any disaster,
then I think we have accomplished something in the process,
because there is so much valuable information that comes from
the people who are dealing on the front lines of a disaster
that rarely make its way back to the decision-makers at higher
levels of authority.
Had we had that flexibility when Mr. Costner showed up in
New Orleans with his machines, we would have had them on the
water the very next day. We asked for that. But that was not
the case.
Mr. Pascrell. Why?
Mr. Taffaro. Because the bureaucratic system didn't allow
for that.
Mr. Pascrell. What is the heart of the bureaucratic system
that we are referring to specifically today? Where is the
heart? Where is the soul? Where is the centerpiece of it?
Mr. Taffaro. In this incident, the heart and soul is the
definition of responsible party.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, who is the most responsible party--
forget about BP for a second--on this side of the table?
Mr. Taffaro. Current legislation hands that to the United
States Coast Guard.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Taffaro, let me ask you this, if I may,
Mr. Chairman, do you primarily receive information from the
Coast Guard or some other Federal agency?
Mr. Taffaro. In this incident, the Coast Guard.
Mr. Pascrell. The Coast Guard.
One more question? Quick.
Chairman Thompson. One more question.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Did you receive any
information from BP or its contractors?
Mr. Taffaro. Throughout the course of this incident?
Mr. Pascrell. Yes.
Mr. Taffaro. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. You did.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The Chairman now recognizes the
gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to direct some questions to Mr. Taffaro. My
experience for 8 years as Attorney General of California, when
we had earthquakes, mud slides, floods, fires, riots, was that
the chain of command was extremely important, and even though
we don't do things perfectly, and there are always after-action
reports and so forth, the lines of authority were fairly clear.
If we have a disaster, man-made or otherwise in a county in
the State of California the sheriff is the chief law
enforcement officer. He is the one they all respond to. When we
have assistance from other outside agencies and departments,
they go to him. They understand that sort of command structure.
People swallow their pride and understand that is the command
structure. The State comes in, and there is an overall decision
making by the Governor and other State-wide authorities. When
the Feds come in, they assist with us.
But we never had a problem, as I can recall, that after the
fact, we were talking about people not knowing what the lines
of authority were, or there was an inability to get a response.
So that is what puzzles me here and particularly when, at least
out of Katrina, it appeared to me that the jewel of the Federal
response was the Coast Guard. We didn't hear complaints about
the Coast Guard in that regard.
So, Mr. Taffaro, my question to you is, is it, in your
mind, from your experience, some bureaucratic snafu or
difficulty in operation in the Coast Guard, or is it this lack
of legal authority that the Coast Guard had to make decisions?
Mr. Taffaro. Well, in Louisiana, one of the things that I
believe created some confusion is Louisiana law is very
specific in a declared state of emergency.
Mr. Lungren. Yes.
Mr. Taffaro. That grants the authority to the local
authorities at that point.
The Clean Water Act and OPA 90 clearly does not recognize
the law of that State that is stated in Louisiana. So, as a
former Attorney General, you would easily see how that conflict
begins to arise when a Federal agency does not recognize a
State legislative authorized authority for a local
municipality.
Mr. Lungren. That occasionally occurs, yes. I do recall
that.
Mr. Taffaro. But I don't believe that hurdle was something
that could not be overcome. I believe the challenge came and
what made it difficult was a lack of recognition on both sides,
because as the parish president, I dug my heels in when I was
told, you have no authority in this response. The Coast Guard
dug their heels in and said, we have all the authority in this
response. In essence, we undermined the process of efficiency.
Mr. Lungren. I always found it worked out best in terms of
concurrent legal jurisdiction or law enforcement jurisdiction,
when the FBI and Federal authorities recognized that there were
more boots on the ground with respect to local law enforcement
and that they generally knew the issue better in terms of
street crime and so forth because they were working it, and
even though they had Federal jurisdiction, it was respecting
and taking into account the information base that they could
get from local law enforcement. It sounds like that kind of
analogy didn't work in your instance.
Mr. Costner, you said in your testimony before the House
Science and Technology Committee in June that you had come
across several ``regulatory roadblocks'' including various
Government regulations. You also mentioned an overall
``ineptness'' on the part of numerous Government agencies. I am
not looking to point fingers; I am just trying to find out
where you found difficulties and where you think--well, let me
put it this way. Do you think your celebrity came in the way of
having your solution seriously considered through the process?
Mr. Costner. No, I think it is business and business as
usual. People don't want to pay the cost because safety isn't
sexy.
Mr. Lungren. Well, let me put it this way. You had a
particular patent that you had that went through a particular
process that would be needed in certain circumstances.
Mr. Costner. That is right.
Mr. Lungren. Yet it seemed that you had difficulty getting
that accepted over a 15-year period of time. I am always
recalling something President Eisenhower said about World War
II. He said the real hero of World War II was Higgins, who
built the Higgins boats, which were the landing craft out of
Louisiana. Yet Higgins was relatively a small operator compared
to all the big ``military industrial complex,'' and if we had
waited for them to build those landing crafts, we might not
have landed on Normandy.
So it has always brought in my mind, how do we make sure
that the good people in the Federal Government make sure that
they recognize, perhaps, ideas coming from unconventional
sources or not from the big guys, and in this circumstance when
we are working with our oversight and Homeland Security, one of
our responsibilities is to see that science and technology
advances are utilized.
So I guess, out of your experience, could you give us any
insight into the roadblocks you saw that you think ought not to
be there? Or are there constructs we could create to make sure
that if you can't go through the front door, there is a side
door or something that would consider the unconventional, if I
can call you that?
Mr. Costner. Right. Well, I think right now you have a
group called the MSRC [Marine Spill Response Corporation] that
represents the oil industry. It is funded by the oil industry.
The people who run it came out of the oil industry, and they do
the bidding of the oil industry. It would be up to them to, you
would think, to stay on top of the latest technology.
They were privy to this machine. Like I said, it was tested
with the Coast Guard in New Jersey. It was demonstrated
multiple times in my own back yard in Santa Barbara where the
MSRC was invited to. Right now, that group, if you look past
the oil companies, the group that was responsible, that we were
led to believe was responsible for handling this oil spill, was
the MSRC.
So I would leave it to you to decide how good a job you
think they have done or how big the door is open to someone
like myself, who is offering what we consider the latest, the
best technology available.
You know, they had 6,000 boats out there, and we believe
that only 3 percent of the oil was collected at the end of the
day. But the eye of the needle that I have to go through, there
is a Catch-22. I volunteered to go on a variety of spills.
Well, if it hasn't been tested, it can't go out on the water.
You know, well, how do you get it tested? How do you get it out
on the water? It is a very difficult hill to negotiate. I have
managed to 15 years later, we got out on the water. But you can
see the journey was very, very tough.
But we have to make sure that if there is an organization
in place that was responsible for the spill, how well did they
do? What did they do? Why do we feel that we didn't really
respond, that there wasn't a plan at all?
I mean, there can be a chain of command. I understand what
this committee's talking about. A chain of command is very
important. But without an army to direct it, without the brick
and mortar, and that is what I offer up in the fleet of 190 is
a brick-and-mortar, a push-button situation where then you can
figure out the chain of command.
But somebody has to go do the heavy lifting, the dirty
work, long before it even reaches the beaches or the parish.
There is someone that has to be out there. That is what we
really need is a robust plan, and that is what we do not have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Costner, one thing I want to try to get a time line. We
know about the 15 years that you have been working on it. At
what point was it the Coast Guard that contacted you about your
equipment, or were you still pursuing the Coast Guard? Or did
you go to the local----
Mr. Costner. No, this came through the local businessmen in
New Orleans.
Chairman Thompson. So the Feds nor anybody else actually
gave you the time of day on this issue?
Mr. Costner. Well, they didn't think to bring it up because
I think it was, you know, it just has never been on their
radar. They have never thought it important.
But I think the industry, you know, never adopted it. The
interesting thing about the machine is the ability to actually
reclaim the assets. So it is not just cleaning it up. You would
think that--I thought gravity would have come to my door. If
you thought you were going to lose a valuable asset, could you
not only clean up it, but could you resale it?
So I really can't explain the journey. I guess, if you are
not mandated to clean something up, I guess it takes a very
evolved person who is willing to do it. If you run a public
company, if you decide that we are going to spend $2 billion of
our dollars to clean up a mess, I think your stockholders will
come and say, why did you spend that $2 billion? You say, well,
we thought it would be a responsible thing to clean up this
mess. I think those stockholders would say, and this is where
human nature comes into bear, nobody told you to do that. That
was my dividend. You just spent $2 billion of my dividend to
clean up something that no one has made you do.
So we realize that we actually need a very evolved person
who is going to work in a public job, just like, and if it was
a private situation, it would be looking at somebody who would
look at $2 billion of their profits and say: Do I want to put
this into protection? It goes against our human nature. We want
our pile to grow bigger.
So who speaks for the ecosystem that can't speak for
itself?
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
To the witnesses that are here, I want you to know that you
have come to the right place. The Chairman of this committee
recognizes, even as we have lived in this skin since 9/11, that
we were long overdue for having a Department that really has
the full responsibility for natural and man-made disasters.
I would not want to put words in your mouth, but what I
would suggest is that we come to a conclusion in this
Government that there needs to be one captain of the ship; that
jurisdiction for issues of which you are facing need to be
holed up, held up in one place where you can get an answer.
I want to pose this sort of query to you, building on what
we have heard. I want to also commend you to a bill that is
named the REMEDIES Act that I will highlight some sections out
of it that I think speak to your area.
Forgive my raspy voice. First of all, I capture the words,
Mr. Costner, that you said, do we have, does this Nation have
the capacity to protect the environment from oil spills? As I
listened to you and listened to your technology, I think you
understand and seem to accept the fact that we will be engaged
in deepwater exploration, whether it is in the United States or
whether it is the newly found oil reserves off the coast of
Africa now that all those nations are getting excited about;
and at the same time, that we have a responsibility to protect
these folk who are vulnerable.
To the president of the parish, let me say to you, having
been a member of the Houston City Council, I can understand
what you said about resistance, exclusion, and power struggles,
the worst formula for helping your constituents.
So I would like to raise this question. As I do so, I would
like to put into the record a letter from the president of
Plaquemines parish,* I think one of your colleagues who you may
know, Billy, and we all know him as Billy, but Nungesser, who
says we respectfully ask that BP consider our request for this
equipment to aid in the protection of our vulnerable coastal
wetlands.
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* The information was not provided at the time of publication.
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They are asking for some equipment that is being moved from
Grand Isle and being disposed of that deals with some of the
issues, Mr. Costner, that you have talked about, to be placed
there. This letter is dated September 17, so this is not
something in August. The difficulty, of course, is to get a
response, and that is where I would like to pose my line of
questions.
Mr. Costner, I think you have been very generous and kind
in your remarks.
I guess, before I say that, let me express my appreciation
for the Coast Guard. I think we need to do so because they are
the organization that we saw pick up 22,000 in Hurricane
Katrina, and they did the best they could when they got the
call for this oil spill.
But would you reflect quickly on the fact that I recall you
being at a Senate hearing and CNN coverage, before specifically
the Government reached you. Was it before that? Or were you
before that hearing when you asked the question, why do you
have to keep doing this over and over again before someone
listens? Was that where someone finally picked up the phone and
called you from Government, or where you got hooked into the
response?
Mr. Costner. I think that occurred before I got hooked into
the Government. The Government really never called me, but I
didn't expect that.
I realized that I could bring this to the Government, and
so I started, you know, and trying to navigate these waters is
not easy. You don't really know. But I came to friends that had
had experience here, and so I began my journey.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But that highlighted the dilemma because
that was right in the middle of the spill and you had still not
been reached out to; is that correct?
Mr. Costner. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you believe today that we still have
need for that oil separation equipment? Because the information
or the letter that Mr. Nungesser is speaking about is still
requiring or asking for that equipment? He is asking for
specific companies.
Mr. Costner. Yes. The Gulf desperately needs the shallow
water boats that I outlined. Again, I talk in terms of brick
and mortar, I really do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But do you believe there is still a need
for clean up even now?
Mr. Costner. Well, I would imagine that oil is going to
continue to roll up on the beach in some way, but I can't
actually speak to that to know that we do. I know that a spill
could occur tomorrow, so we should have this equipment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On call.
Mr. Costner. I think they would appreciate having 20 of
these shallow water boats sitting in front of their parish.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Or other equipment that may clean up
Plaquemines parish, as this particular individual needs.
Mr. Costner. That is correct.
I think something that we have never mentioned is that this
same opportunity exists for us on our freshwater bodies, our
great lakes, our great rivers. We have the potential. That
happens every day. So while we are talking about the Gulf, it
is important to understand that this happens on a daily basis
and that we have to protect our fresh water in exactly the same
way.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you believe that the Homeland Security
Department should be able to define a scheme, if you will, for
immediately grappling with natural disasters and man-made
disasters, the appropriate framework?
Mr. Costner. I think so. But I think what the committee
needs is, you do your job; I do mine. You do need to be able to
do that. But you also need to be armed with someone who is
given you the tools to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But if I might, in giving you the tools,
having at least one place you can go to, would that be helpful?
Mr. Costner. It absolutely would be.
I mean, something happens on the West Coast, you know, who
starts that ball? I would say the Coast Guard. I think the
Coast Guard has to have a designated fleet that they know how
to operate. If something happens in Lake Tahoe, you have some
system you call, and quickly somebody is going there.
Now, do these assets exist at our fire stations? Can we use
existing infrastructure? I think it is important to streamline
everything and to understand that everything that we have
requires training, so that when it goes out there, it actually
works; it does what it is supposed to do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Taffaro, from the local government perspective and your
issue of command and connection, I think those are two themes,
if you had one house that was responsible for the natural
disaster, homeland security, you know the levels where you are
supposed to go to, the Coast Guard was commanded under that
structure, there was a structure where they had to work with
local governments, how much better would that be for you?
Mr. Taffaro. It would be better for everyone involved, not
only for the local communities impacted by the disaster, but it
would enhance the response by the command structure itself. I
am a believer, having lived now through five type 1 disasters
in the last 5 years, that the National agency or Federal agency
that is responsible ultimately for commanding or managing a
disaster is much more effective when the local knowledge and
the local resources are brought to bear. That is just, over and
over, an experience that continues to bear truth in every
response that has been involved, at least in St. Bernard.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, in conclusion, the payor, in this
instance, the oil industry, should be responsive to the local
government and the Federal Government impacted. Maybe if we had
one Achilles heel, I saw too much dominance by the private
sector.
I would like to see us developing in-house expertise on oil
spills, floods, hurricanes, volcanos. Do you see that to be the
right way so that the payor pays, because they are responsible,
but the people who are responsible for the lives of those we
represent need to be in charge?
Mr. Taffaro. I can't agree with you more.
To use a cliche, the fox should not watch the henhouse in
the midst of a disaster response.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you and I look forward to
legislation that I would like to share with both of you on how
we can move forward in the research and making that come to
bear. Thank you so very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for appearing.
For fear that I will forget, I would like to also thank all
of the persons who were involved in the response, from the very
top to the very bottom; every person played a role and every
role was important.
I would also like to recognize the fact that 11 persons
lost their lives. I know that it has to be exceedingly
difficult for the family members to witness hearings such as
this, and I want to make it clear to them that we are still
sensitive to the fact that they lost their lives, the 11
persons that are no longer with us.
I am concerned about a number of things, but today I shall
talk about the perception of leadership and the perfection of
leadership, two important concepts. It is exceedingly
important, I believe, that on Day 1, or as near to Day 1 as
possible, some one person walks up to a microphone and says, I
am in charge, or words that are the equivalent.
The perception of leadership made a difference in Louisiana
after Katrina. When that general came to town and he said: I am
in charge, and he started barking orders, it made a real
difference in terms of what the public thought would happen in
terms of a response.
But the perception is not enough. There has to actually be
a perfection of leadership. Somebody has to have the authority
to say do this and understand that it will be done.
The question is this: First, do you perceive that the
public will benefit from some person stepping up and saying I
am in charge on day one or as near to day one as possible?
Mr. Costner, thank you for your time and your energy and
your service to your country as a citizen who cares about
people. So I will start with you in terms of someone stepping
up as near to Day 1 as possible.
Mr. Costner. Well, I think the American public, I think you
all were underwhelmed by the response. I think--and you are
underwhelmed because, in 1990, the Federal Government took
quick action, tried to muster a lot of resources to close the
gap here and to take these resources and put them towards oil-
response technology. So the question that gets asked is, 20
years later, what happened? Were those 20 years wasted?
Mr. Green. Is it important, Mr. Costner, that someone step
forward immediately who is in charge?
Mr. Costner. Yes. But they have to have--yes, it is, and
they have to have the resources to be able to--because one
general standing up and have no army----
Mr. Green. Exactly, which is why, Mr. Costner, I pointed
out that you have the perception as well as the perfection of
leadership. It is one thing to have a perception, but you have
got to have somebody who actually has not only the apparent
power but the actual power to get things done. Do you follow
the distinction?
Mr. Costner. I do, absolutely.
Mr. Green. Okay. I will go to the honorable parish council
person.
Mr. Taffaro. I couldn't have said that better myself. The
perception and perfection of leadership is enormously
important.
What I do not have is information that sheds light on what
information came from the immediate explosion of the well,
because, if we recall, as an after-action item, we look at the
delay of, was there a perception of leadership based on
information that had trickled out?
If you recall, the National media was reporting there was
an explosion; there was no real threat. Then it became a little
bit more of a threat. Then it became a National emergency.
In that delay, there was a lack of perceived ultimate
authority because in the beginning, it would run its course as
an NRC [National Response Center] response. But that is not
where it ended. If we are going to respond to disasters, in my
estimation, it is much better to overwhelm the response at the
front end than play catch up at the back end.
Mr. Green. I agree with you. I think that we have to move
to a point of not allowing the perception to a exist that this
is being managed by a committee. While you have to have input
from the multitudes to make good decisions, you still have to
have a person who has the perception of power and the ability
to get things done. It makes a difference when you have someone
to step up immediately and say: I am in charge, and here is
what we are going to do.
One of the levels of frustration that I had visited upon me
quite regularly from constituents was the notion that, is it BP
that is in charge, simply because of the way BP was out front,
or is the Government in charge? At some point, those issues
have to be resolved expeditiously so that the public
understands that we really do intend to mitigate and eliminate
the problem to whatever extent that we can as quickly as we
can. That is why I pose this.
I think that that is what this hearing is about, trying to
find a way for us to project leadership that is actually there
to make a difference.
I thank both of you for your comments. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri for
5 minutes, Mr. Cleaver.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the witnesses.
My question, one question, centers on the Exxon Valdez oil
spill. It is generally accepted that there were about 11
million gallons of oil spilled in the Prince William Sound. I
am not sure what that environment is like today. Do either of
you?
My question is: Will the oil spill device that you have
brought forth, is that something that needs to be widespread in
every part of the U.S. waters where we are drilling? Is it
something that has to be in place when there is an oil spill,
or is it something that needs to be brought in after the oil
spill?
Mr. Costner. Yes, it is important to point out that the
machine and the technology that we created is only part of the
puzzle. It sits on other assets.
So what you are saying is that--it is absolutely important;
I see that those assets have to be able to be ready to deploy.
That is what this plan is about. This plan should be replicated
on the West Coast, in Alaska, on the East Coast if we decide to
drill. I am not debating that.
If we do drill, though, we have to have these protections
in place. The way I look at the machine and the way I truly,
truly look at it is, this body, not particularly this body, but
your predecessors, a long time ago decided if you are going to
operate on the water, you are going to have to have life
preservers for the people that are on your boat. You are going
to have to have a fire extinguisher. If you are on a large
cruise ship, you better have enough life boats to save
everybody, not just first-class passengers.
So we have evolved to things that we know are safe. I think
the oil-water separator is actually almost a mandated idea,
whether it is mine or somebody else's, which is, if you have a
spill anywhere, then you have the obligation, if you are not
fighting for life and limb, to be the first responder on that
space.
So whether the oil tankers that are moving around the world
coming into our ports, into our rivers, into our great lakes,
into our bodies of water, if they don't have that capacity,
that is a mistake. I think that is where we have come to.
Mr. Cleaver. One final question, Mr. Chairman.
One of the problems we have, we haven't built a new nuclear
facility in the United States in a quarter of a century or
more. One of the problems is the waste, you know, what do we do
with the waste? Do we put it in Yucca Mountains in Nevada? No,
they are going to fight it.
The other issue is can we develop another use of that
waste? The same question would be raised of recaptured oil. I
mean: Is there anything that we can technologically do today
with the water that has been recaptured?
Mr. Costner. Yes, there is. The machine is a highly
engineered piece. It spews out water and oil at 99.9 percent
purity. So if it hasn't been interfered with dispersants, its
saleability--I wouldn't say at this point that it is 100
percent saleability, but it has a--it becomes--you don't have
to take it off the books anymore. We don't have to sink it to
the bottom. It has a value.
Probably from a technological standpoint, I think that it
would be wise for us to engineer it even more to bring it back
to 100 percent of its value. So we don't have to sink it. We
can collect it.
The dirty secret is the oil and water that is being pulled
off the ocean right now, where is it going? Is it going into
holding tanks? Is it being injected back into dry holes on land
somewhere to somehow find its way into our water system? Where
is that oil, all this oil and water that is going? Because
really what has happened out there was ships were picking up 90
percent oil--or 90 percent water, 10 percent oil; 80 percent
water, 20 percent oil.
The machine that I am talking about would allow those ships
to come back into shore with 100 percent oil, a bigger payload.
But the water that was hauled off in oil, where did it go? Was
someone paid for that?
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from New York
for 5 minutes, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding this very extremely important hearing regarding the
lessons of the Department of Homeland Security and what we have
learned from the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster.
I would like to add my voice to those of my colleagues and
folks around the Nation in extending my continued condolences
to the families of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig workers who
lost their lives as a result of the April 29 explosion and
fire.
Second, I would like to express to sisters and brothers of
the Gulf Coast region how saddened I am that such an event of
epic proportions has occurred in such a short time after the
tragic events of Hurricanes Katrina, Ike, and Gustav. You are
truly in my thoughts and prayers.
Although my district, the 11th Congressional District of
New York was not directly affected by the spill, the aftermath
and future implications of the disaster are alarming enough to
grab and hold our attention. Additionally, as a native New
Yorker and the Chairperson of the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, I am deeply
concerned about DHS's role in the planning and implementation
of National Response Framework and the technologies required
and deployed in response to disaster.
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate must be stood up
and be required to interact and understand new technology
solutions that may not necessarily be on their radar. We can
see from the five Type 1 disasters that have hit the Gulf Coast
in the past 5 years that our National disaster response must be
improved.
If we cannot properly respond to natural disasters in the
Gulf Coast, how are we going to properly respond to disasters
that may hit the rest of the country?
It is clear to me that DHS's leadership role must not only
be clearly defined within the response and recovery of a
disaster, its role should be central to the reviewing and
assessment of disaster plans as well.
Mr. Costner, my first question is to you and whether you
were aware or made aware at any point in time about the fact
that there is a Science and Technology Directorate within DHS?
Mr. Costner. I wasn't. I probably should have been. I
probably experienced my own fatigue over the years.
The thing that has been the most illusive for us is that
there is a thing called Best-Available Technology. But it seems
like it is almost a mythical group. No one can tell me who is
in charge of that group. But yet it is what keeps equipment
from being on the spot. The Coast Guard can't give an answer;
MMS can't give a specific answer. So many groups can't give an
answer, and so, you know, you feel like you are trick or
treating, going to every door. What does this mean?
In the mean time, the real loss is the loss of time. In the
mean time, we don't move ahead, and technology has not been
placed front and center.
Ms. Clarke. I think, Mr. Chairman, this is a very important
point. If DHS's role is to coordinate efforts, and we have a
Science and Technology Directorate resident in that agency,
they need to be stood up as soon as an event occurs and be just
as aggressive as the rest of the agency in seeking solutions
and reaching out to individuals, such as Mr. Costner, to
examine exactly what they have in terms of technologies. Then
that would help to avoid the scramble that, unfortunately, he
was subjected to.
Mr. Taffaro, president of St. Bernard Parish, I want to
thank you for your presentation here today. In your testimony,
you stated that, within your disaster experiences, you have
seen the exchange of ``poor factual information'' about the
event, a downplaying of available resources and the mechanisms
to obtain such, and a lack of local engagement to the response
coordination. Can you give me specific examples of what you are
referencing?
Mr. Taffaro. Sure. The factual information actually started
from the start, at the very origin of the event, as stated,
just having a true picture of what was occurring as a result of
that explosion.
Certainly, and appropriately, the Nation focused on and
mourned the passing of those 11 individuals who lost their
lives.
But in addition to that, there was an entire disaster that
was unfolding in front of us, and we could not get that
specific information. I think that caused the response to,
again, be delayed and have to play catch up. Even, to put it in
perspective, even in if this committee were to move forward and
to the full Congress or to DHS and adopt a plan, such as Mr.
Costner's plan, without actual and accurate factual
information, that response would never be pulled. So the
trigger would have to be pulled based on actual information
that is necessary.
In terms of the resources, it has been well documented,
because of not having a predetermined and pre-planned
identification and downstream logistical resource and supply
program, scattering for resources and having five States all
vie for the same amount of resources became as much of a
political activity as a response activity.
So those two points obviously are extremely important.
We have covered the local engagement of not being
recognized as a seat at the table from the start. We are now,
and the transition plan that was signed forces that issue. But
even after it was signed, it was disclaimed to us that that was
a mistake, and it shouldn't have been signed.
Ms. Clarke. Let me touch upon that point again because I
wholeheartedly agree with you that consulting with local
communities and assessing their needs, their wants, are
critical to adequately addressing a disaster area and its
recovery.
In your opinion, what would be the best way to garner the
buy-in of the local community within a National contingency
plan?
Mr. Taffaro. By making sure that it is written in both
legislatively and procedurally, that there is a seat at the
table for the local authority, whoever that may be, whether it
is a mayor, a parish president, or a county administrator,
whoever that is in a given municipality, so there is no
question and there is no ambiguity about whether or not there
is local involvement in a National event.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Chairman, these are truly important lessons
learned.
I want to thank you, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I would like to thank our first panel of witnesses for
their very valuable testimony and the Members for their
questions.
Before being dismissed, however, I would remind our first
panel of witnesses that the Members of the committee may have
additional questions for you. We will ask you to respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Again, I would like to thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Taffaro.
Mr. Taffaro. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me for one
moment. I would like to go on the record and state that the
hundreds of people who have come through the St. Bernard
branch, that I don't want this testimony to taint their
personal involvement or their personal efforts in any way; that
the questions and responses that I have offered are indicative
of a systematic issue. Almost to a person, those members of the
United States Coast Guard as well as those contractors employed
by and sent to us through the BP organization, when they
arrived in St. Bernard Parish, they may not have known what
they were there to protect; but by and large, they knew by the
time they left or while they were there how important their
mission was. They adopted it wholeheartedly.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I don't think there is any
question.
The point is it should not have been on-the-job training.
They should have been prepared before the incident occurred.
That is what we are trying to get to.
But there is no question of the heroic efforts on the part
of the men and women after the spill.
So I, again, thank both of you for your testimony.
I would like to ask the clerk to prepare the witness table
for our second panel of witnesses. We will recess while that is
being done.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. We would like to reconvene the hearing
for the second panel.
I now welcome our second panel of witnesses.
Our first witness on the panel is Mr. Richard Chavez. Mr.
Chavez is the acting director of Operations Coordination and
Planning at the Department of Homeland Security.
Our second witness is Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger. Rear
Admiral Neffenger served as the Deputy National Incident
Commander for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response. Before
this, he was Commander of the Ninth Coast Guard District,
responsible for operations throughout the five Great Lakes and
the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Our third witness is Mr. Richard Skinner. Mr. Skinner
serves as the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland
Security. Prior to his arrival at the Department, Mr. Skinner
was Acting Inspector General with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
Our fourth and final witness on the panel is Mr. William
Jenkins, Jr. Mr. Jenkins is director of Homeland Security and
Justice at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. He is
responsible for leading GAO's work on emergency preparedness
and response to Federal judiciary and elections.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection, the witnesses' full
statements will be inserted in the report.
I now recognize Mr. Chavez to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. CHAVEZ, ACTING DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS
COORDINATION AND PLANNING, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Chavez. Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, good
afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
the Department of Homeland Security's activities related to the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response.
As the acting director of Operations Coordination and
Planning, or OPS, I am responsible for providing situational
awareness and developing a common operating picture for all
domestic incidents that affect our Nation.
Additionally, I am responsible for coordinating the
development of internal DHS and other Department and agency or
interagency strategic plans as directed by the Secretary of
Homeland Security. These plans enable DHS and our partners to
effectively conduct homeland security operations across all
mission areas.
This morning, I will provide a general overview of the
roles and responsibilities of OPS and our role in the BP
Deepwater Horizon response.
OPS was created to assist the Secretary of Homeland
Security in coordinating operations and planning during routine
and crisis situations. Within my office, the National
Operations Center, also known as the NOC, continuously
monitors, collects, and reports on actual or potential domestic
incidences, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. The
NOC is the primary National-level hub providing situational
awareness and developing a common operating picture for
domestic incident management. In plain terms, situational
awareness and common operating picture means collecting
information from any sources, synthesizing that information
into one story for senior decisionmakers.
Additionally, the NOC serves as the primary center for
collecting and distributing response information to other
Federal operation centers focused on homeland security.
Similarly, OPS coordinates with DHS components and
interagency partners to develop strategic level plans. These
plans clarify roles and responsibilities, determine
requirements, and establish long-range goals, priorities, and
objectives. Based on these strategic plans, DHS components and
our interagency partners can develop their operational level
plans.
Furthermore, OPS supports DHS components by providing
planning augmentation and expertise during events.
On the day of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion, the NOC
began to collect information on the incident and distribute it
to senior leadership to facilitate situational awareness and
decision support. In the hours and days following the
explosion, OPS, DHS components, and our interagency partners
supported the Secretary in responding to the dynamic incident
environment.
OPS disseminated incident information to all the Homeland
Security partners. Anticipating the worst-case scenario,
information was passed through an established process for
interagency blast calls. The blast call connects the NOC with
all the other Federal operation centers.
OPS actions during the BP Deepwater Horizon response, with
support from our partners, included coordinating responses to
requests for information on a daily basis; creating three daily
senior leadership briefs; developing decision support products
for the Secretary and DHS senior leadership; and coordinating
calls, teleconferences, and other briefings in support of the
Secretary.
OPS provided strategic-level support in accordance with
existing plans and standard operating procedures for the
National Incident Commander and the Secretary of Homeland
Security. We remain committed to providing real- and near real-
time situational awareness and developing the National common
operating picture for any and all domestic events.
Additionally, OPS is committed to developing three strategic
plans as appropriate to maximize our readiness to respond.
Thanks again for the opportunity to testify. It will be a
pleasure for me to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Chavez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard M. Chavez
September 22, 2010
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) activities related to the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill response. As the Acting Director of Operations
Coordination and Planning (OPS), I am responsible for integrating
Departmental and strategic level interagency planning and enabling the
coordination of DHS operations to effectively conduct joint homeland
security operations across Components and mission areas. This morning,
I will provide a general overview of the purpose and structure of OPS
and discuss our functions and our role in the administration-wide oil
spill response.
OPS OVERVIEW
As articulated in Section 101 of the Homeland Security Act and
various Presidential Directives, the Secretary of Homeland Security is
``the focal point regarding natural and man-made crises and emergency
planning.''
To support the Secretary in this role, OPS ensures that the
Department has collaborative operations coordination and planning
capabilities at the strategic level. OPS provides support to
Departmental leadership by facilitating internal DHS operational
decision-making and the Department's involvement in interagency
operations.
Operations Coordination Across DHS
The National Operations Center (NOC)--which is the primary
National-level hub for situational awareness and operations
coordination across the Federal Government for domestic incident
management--is central to our ability to maintain situational awareness
for the Secretary and Department leadership. The NOC collects and
synthesizes all-source information across all threats and all hazards,
covering the full spectrum of homeland security missions and partners,
sharing event-related and operational information with Federal, State,
local, territorial, Tribal, and nongovernmental partners. Additionally,
the NOC serves as the primary coordinating center for other Federal
operations centers focused on homeland security operations. In
performing these functions, the NOC ensures that critical information
related to terrorism, disasters, and other threats reaches Government
decision-makers in a timely manner.
The NOC operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, to
support the Secretary and the Department's mission.
Department Planning Across DHS
OPS coordinates with DHS Components and interagency partners to
develop strategic-level plans to support the effective execution of the
Secretary's incident coordination responsibilities, as defined in the
Homeland Security Act and Presidential Directives. OPS works with
representatives from DHS Components and other Federal, State, and local
partners to develop strategic plans and guidance. OPS also supports the
Secretary by providing operational planning expertise during crises.
OPS, along with other interagency partners, is currently conducting
numerous planning efforts. OPS remains focused on developing DHS plans
for primary Departmental missions and for DHS support to other
departments. For instance, OPS provided its substantial planning
expertise in interagency coordination and support planning for H1N1
planning and the Haitian earthquake response planning.
Continuity Coordination
As DHS Continuity Coordinator, I am responsible for ensuring the
effectiveness and survivability of all DHS Primary Mission Essential
Functions (PMEFs). OPS works with Component leadership to ensure that
PMEFs will be sustained even during emergencies that could
significantly hamper personnel, facilities, or operations for homeland
security missions.
operations coordination during the bp deepwater horizon response
Prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Department was
preparing for a Spill of National Significance (SONS). From 22-25 March
2010, OPS, along with many other Federal, State, and private
organizations, participated in the U.S. Coast Guard-sponsored SONS
Exercise 2010. OPS leadership and the NOC participated in a simulated
response to an oil spill affecting the Northeastern United States to
refine our plans and procedures related to a SONS response. The
proximity of this exercise did help inform our efforts in support of
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded on 20 April 2010. In the
hours and days following the explosion, OPS, the NOC, DHS Components,
and our partners supported the Secretary, the Department, and the
interagency community in responding to what began as a search and
rescue event. Concurrently, we began to establish an integrated
interagency framework to address the potential environmental impact of
the event and to coordinate with all State and local governments,
anticipating and planning for a worst-case scenario.
On 21 April 2010, OPS initiated the crisis action process, which
allows us to dedicate staff that can provide detailed information and
decision support for a specific incident, while minimizing the impact
to our on-going missions. On 29 April 2010, a SONS was declared and OPS
activated the full Crisis Action Team (CAT) to support the Secretary
and the National Incident Commander, who would be later named, in
directing response efforts. The CAT stood down on 6 August 2010, after
99 days of continuous operation.
OPS actions during the BP Deepwater Horizon response, with support
from our partners, included the following:
Coordinating responses to Requests for Information (RFIs) on
a nearly daily basis;
Creating hundreds of Senior Leadership Briefs (SLBs);
Developing decision support products for the Secretary and
other DHS leadership; and
Contributing to a robust interagency response effort through
regular coordination calls, teleconferences, and other
briefings.
In response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, OPS provided
strategic level support, in accordance with a predefined set of plans
and standard operating procedures, for the National Incident Commander,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the President of the United
States. The response to this environmental catastrophe was the largest
oil spill response in U.S. history, and at its peak encompassed more
than 7,000 vessels, nearly 50,000 personnel, and dozens of Federal,
State, and local government and private sector agencies and entities.
Like other incidents, after-action and lessons learned reviews are on-
going.
OPS remains committed to providing professional expertise in the
areas of operations coordination and operational planning in order to
prepare for, prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from natural and
man-made disasters affecting the people of the United States.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Rear Admiral Neffenger to summarize your
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PETER NEFFENGER, DEPUTY NATIONAL
INCIDENT COMMANDER, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL RESPONSE
Admiral Neffenger. Good afternoon, Chairman Thompson and
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
As noted, I am the Deputy National Incident Commander for
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response.
On the evening of April 20 of this year, the Mobile
Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, which carried an
estimated 700,000 gallons of diesel fuel suffered a
catastrophic fire and explosion while in the final stage of
completing the Macondo Well 45 miles southeast of Venice,
Louisiana, on the Outer Continental Shelf. It was owned by
Transocean, chartered by BP, and under the Marshall Islands
flag.
As nearby boats fought the ensuing fire, others took
courageous action to recognize 115 of 126 crew members.
Tragically, and despite extensive search and rescue efforts
that continued for over 3 days, 11 crew members were never
found and died in the incident.
On April 22, after the Deepwater Horizon sank, the Coast
Guard established an incident command post and began to
mobilize all available response resources to respond to what we
expected could be a major oil spill. As part of this, the
incident commanders also activated preexisting area contingency
plans, which are plans developed in concert with State
governments, other Federal agencies, as well as Tribal
entities, where they exist.
As the Commandant of the Coast Guard at the time, Admiral
Allen activated the National Response Team to begin the process
of bringing the whole of Government efforts to bear. The
National Response Team is an entity consisting of 16 Federal
Departments and Agencies, and they are charged with
responsibility for coordinating emergency preparedness and
response to oil and hazardous pollution events, especially of
great magnitude.
On April 29, Homeland Secretary, Janet Napolitano,
designated the event a Spill of National Significance and
appointed Admiral Thad Allen, who at the time, as I said, was
the Commandant of the Coast Guard, as the National Incident
Commander for the response. He in turn appointed me his deputy
on that date.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill has been unprecedented in
both scope and duration. It is the largest and most complex our
Nation has ever confronted. As Admiral Allen has said, it
presented challenges at the wellhead more analogous to Apollo
13 than the Exxon Valdez spill. There was no human access to
the damaged wellhead located 5,000 feet below the ocean
surface. Consequently, we were fully dependent on remotely-
operated vehicles for access to the site, for actions necessary
to control and monitor the discharge of oil, and for installing
and operating equipment ultimately used to stop the flow of
oil.
Further complicating was the continuous discharge from
April 22 until July 15 that did not result in a single spill
but rather thousands of smaller disconnected spills that
repeatedly threatened the coastlines of all five Gulf States.
At its peak, we deployed more than 47,000 responders, over
3,000 of which were Coast Guard members; 4 million feet of
boom; more than 7,000 vessels, including 835 specialized
skimmers; and over 3,000 vessels of opportunity; 120 aircraft,
and hundreds of public and private organizations and
volunteers.
As the Deputy National Incident Commander, my primary goal
and duty has been to ensure a coordinated, unified, whole-of-
Government effort to address National-level policy issues and
to ensure a tight linkage among the various Federal, State, and
local partners to gain effective command and control. Since the
early days of this response, I was personally briefed on daily
conference calls with each of the Governors from each of the
affected States, and during these calls, I received valuable
and frank feedback alerting us to areas where we needed to
adjust operations, expand efforts, and incorporate greater
State and local participation, and that feedback lays the
groundwork for many follow-on assessments and some of the
lessons learned that we will be generating.
Although there are a number of efforts currently underway
to determine those lessons learned, I do have a few immediate
observations. Clearly, we need tighter linkage between the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and Regulatory Enforcement
and the Coast Guard with respect to Outer Continental Shelf
response plans. As the agency tasked with responsibility for
responding to on-water spills, I think it is imperative to be
part of the planning process associated with that.
We also learned that there are a number of immediate and
long-term public health issues that would not normally surface
in an oil spill but that surfaced in this oil spill because of
its scope and duration. These included seafood testing, social
and economic impacts, and overall worker safety, both for the
spill workers as well as the people of the Gulf.
Throughout the response, we were also evaluating and
testing alternative technologies through our Interagency
Alternative Technologies Assessment Program. I will say that it
proves challenging to do this during a response, but several
promising technologies surfaced that we will continue to
evaluate and consider as we move forward.
As Mr. Taffaro has noted, all oil spills really are local.
Although we have a very mature oil spill planning and
exercise program, which has over the decade since the oil
spill--the Exxon oil spill--has engendered close coordination
with the State, with area committees that are put together with
State and Federal partners, we learned in the early weeks of
the importance of bringing local mayors, local city councils,
and local parish presidents into the effort and addressed this
through such efforts as our parish president liaison program.
As you know, the Unified Area Command has announced a
consolidation of incident command posts as the emergency phase
begins to wind down. This transition will better support day-
to-day operation of on-going response while not affecting
frontline responders who continue to clean shoreline, sample
Gulf waters, and respond to additional recoverable oil found.
We still have over 22,000 workers conducting clean-up
operations along 600 miles of shoreline, and this consolidation
allows us to sufficiently support those operations.
As those efforts shift from immediate emergency response to
long-term environmental and economic restoration, we will
continue to work diligently through the Unified Area Command to
ensure we address on-going impacts and to address and learn the
valuable lessons that we know will come out of this.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity, and welcome
any questions you may have.
[The statement of Admiral Neffenger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Neffenger
September 22, 2010
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
preliminary lessons learned from the Federal Government's response to
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
INITIAL RESPONSE
On the evening of April 20, 2010, the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
(MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON, which contained an estimated 700,000 gallons
of diesel fuel, exploded 45 miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana. It
was owned by Transocean, chartered by BP, and flagged in Marshall
Islands.
As nearby boats fought the ensuing fire, others took courageous
action to rescue 115 of 126 crew members from the water within a few
hours. Though searches by public and private sector aircraft and boats
continued through April 23, the remaining 11 crew members were never
found.
The U.S. Coast Guard played a led role in the Federal Government's
all-hands-on-deck response to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster from
the moment the explosion occurred on April 20. The Coast Guard lead a
massive search and rescue operation, initiated spill response for a
major environmental disaster and coordinated with State and local
governments officials. Within the first 24 hours, the Coast Guard
Federal on Scene Coordinator (FOSC) confirmed that Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund (OSLTF) funds were available to speed the Federal response
to the threat of an oil spill.
On April 22, the MODU sank to the seafloor, roughly a mile beneath
the surface. The following day, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs)
located the MODU on the seafloor, and on April 24, as part of an
extensive assessment, ROVs spotted two leaks in the riser pipe.
On April 22, following the sinking of the MODU, the Coast Guard
activated the National Response Team (NRT). The NRT, led by the
Secretary of Homeland Security, consists of 16 Federal departments and
agencies responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and
response to oil and hazardous substance pollution events--including the
Coast Guard, DHS, the departments of Defense, Commerce, Interior, and
the Environmental Protection Agency, among others.
On April 23, the Coast Guard established a robust Incident Command
System (ICS) response in accordance with the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). ICS provides a common
command-and-control framework to develop and implement tactical plans
to effectively manage a multi-agency response to emergencies. The ICS
organization for this response included Incident Command Posts and
Unified Commands at the local level and a Unified Area Command at the
regional level, and consisted of representatives from the Coast Guard
(the FOSC), other Federal, State, and local agencies, as well as BP as
the primary responsible party.
As part of this historic response, the Unified Area Command--with
support from the National Incident Command and State Department--also
leveraged assets, skills, and offers of assistance from foreign
countries and international organizations. The first of these offers
was from Mexico in May. Others included: Argentina, Belgium, Canada,
China, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mexico,
Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, the United Nations' International
Maritime Organization, the European Union's Monitoring and Information
Centre, and the European Maritime Safety Agency. All offers of
assistance were considered.
SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE (SONS) DESIGNATION
On April 29, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano
designated the event a Spill of National Significance (SONS) and
appointed Admiral Thad Allen as the National Incident Commander (NIC)
to coordinate the response on May 1. The SONS and NIC designations
enabled and enhanced operational and policy coordination at the
National level. The NIC helped to coordinate strategic communications,
National policy and resource support, and to facilitate collaboration
with key parts of Federal, State, and local governments.
The NIC staff consists of subject matter experts from across the
Federal Government, allowing for immediate interagency collaboration,
approval, and coordination. While the FOSC maintains authorities for
response operations as directed in the National Contingency Plan, the
NIC provides National-level support to the operational response--from
resources to policy decisions--to secure the source and mitigate the
impact of the spill.
On the day that DHS announced the SONS designation, there were
already more than 70 vessels in the Gulf of Mexico responding to the
spill and approximately 1,100 personnel deployed and on scene to
assist.
CHAIN OF COMMAND
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive--5 and the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of Homeland Security is ``the focal
point regarding natural and man-made crises and emergency planning.''
These authorities designate her as the ``principal Federal official''
for all domestic incidents with overall responsibility for coordinating
the Federal Government's resources in response to, and recovery from, a
SONS. During the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response these
responsibilities included oversight and coordination of the NRT and all
elements of the National Response System.
The National Contingency Plan (NCP) set forth the underlying
framework and organizational structure for the Federal response to this
oil spill. The National Response Framework (NRF), its Annexes, and
National Incident Management System (NIMS) are complementary and
provide flexible and adaptable response frameworks for addressing
issues not expressly addressed in the NCP that may arise during the
response.
Under the NCP, the 16 Federal partners comprising the NRT monitor
and evaluate reports from the FOSC. They also: (1) Recommend actions to
respond to the discharge or release of hydrocarbons; (2) Request from
other Federal, State, and local governments, or private agencies,
resources under their existing authorities to respond to a discharge or
release, or to monitor response operations; and (3) Coordinate the
deployment of equipment, personnel, or technical advice to the affected
region from other regions or districts.
Under the NCP, the FOSC is the incident commander within the
Unified Command, which includes representatives from the responsible
party as well as Federal, State, and local governments. The Unified
Command coordinates and directs the operational response in
coordination with State and local partners in the affected areas. This
system implements the requirements of Federal law and Executive Orders
relating to the NRF and NIMS.
A critical lesson learned from EXXON VALDEZ articulated in the NCP
is that the FOSC is the incident commander. The incident management
structure is designed to support the FOSC in carrying out response
priorities.
During a SONS incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Commandant of the Coast Guard may name a National Incident Commander
(NIC). As mentioned above, the Secretary named Admiral Thad Allen as
the NIC. Admiral Allen assumed the FOSC's responsibilities for
communicating with affected parties and the public at the National
level, and coordinating Federal, State, local, and international
resources at the National level. The FOSC at the Unified Area Command
maintains all other authorities for response operations as directed in
the NCP.
BP and the other responsible parties have been and will continue to
be responsible for the costs associated with the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill. Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, BP and the other
responsible parties are required to reimburse the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund for expenses incurred. Regular invoices are a proactive step
to hold BP accountable for obligations related to response and recovery
activities to date and ensure American taxpayers are not held
responsible for the costs associated with the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill. To date, six bills have been sent by the Federal Government to
BP and the other responsible parties. These bills provide an important
mechanism by which BP reimburses the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
UNIFIED RESPONSE EFFORTS
Throughout the response, a variety of systems, technologies,
assets, and personnel were employed as part of the largest response to
an oil spill catastrophe in U.S. history. This included:
Roughly 4 million feet of deployed hard boom.
More than 40,000 Federal, State, local responders including
over 6,600 active and reserve Coast Guard members. The
Secretary of Defense authorized 17,500 National Guard troops
from Gulf Coast States to join the response.
Four incident command posts across Gulf Coast States.
A standing Interagency Solutions Group at NIC Headquarters
consisting of more than 18 Federal agencies determining real-
time solutions to far-reaching strategic issues.
411 controlled burns have eradicated more than 11 million
gallons of oil from the open water.
835 oil skimmers operating throughout the Gulf.
More than 7,000 response vessels including 60 Coast Guard
Cutters and more than 3,000 vessels of opportunity.
More than 120 aircraft, including 22 Coast Guard aircraft.
Offers of assistance received from nearly two dozen
countries. All offers were considered and cataloged for future
use.
As of this week:
After months of extensive operations planning and execution
under the direction and authority of the U.S. Government
science and engineering teams, BP has successfully completed
the relief well by intersecting and cementing the well nearly
18,000 feet below the surface.
More than 3,000 vessels are still on-site, including
skimmers, tugs, barges, and recovery vessels to assist in
clean-up efforts and sub-surface monitoring--in addition to
dozens of aircraft, remotely operated vehicles, and multiple
mobile off-shore drilling units.
The Unified Command, with partners from NOAA, EPA, and other
agencies, are engaged in a comprehensive collaborative effort
to monitor the fate of the oil and the disbursement sub
surface. The subsea monitoring program, conducted under the
direction of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, has produced
more than 30,000 samples in near- and offshore waters to date.
Approximately 25,200 personnel remain engaged in the
response to protect the shoreline and wildlife and clean up
vital coastlines.
Approximately 87 percent of Gulf of Mexico Federal waters
are now open to fishing.
More than 34.7 million gallons of oily-water mix have been
recovered through skimming.
15 staging areas remain to protect sensitive shorelines.
Roughly 500 miles of shoreline had light to trace amounts of
oil; including 231 miles in Louisiana, 90 miles in Mississippi,
62 miles in Alabama, and 114 miles in Florida. An additional
112 miles of shoreline had heavier oil, including 101 miles in
Louisiana, 9 miles in Mississippi and 2 miles in Florida.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST RESPONSES
Although the Coast Guard has been combating oil and hazardous
materials spills long before the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90), the most recent experience with a spill approaching the
magnitude of DEEPWATER HORIZON involved the EXXON VALDEZ. The EXXON
VALDEZ spill triggered significant legislation regarding National
pollution preparedness and response.
Prevention, Research & Development
Annual oil spill totals from tanker spills have dropped
dramatically since the passage of OPA 90. New prevention technologies
have been developed and implemented, such as double-hulled tankers. The
EXXON VALDEZ incident prompted the establishment of major research
areas--including controlled burning, dispersants, vessel of opportunity
skimming systems, and spill fate and behavior modeling--for the 1997
Interagency Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan. Research
conducted in these areas over the past decade has advanced oil spill
clean-up techniques and strategies--advances that have informed and
continue to inform the Deepwater Horizon response. Consequently, the
1997 Interagency Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan has proven
to be an important strategic guidance document for oil pollution
research.
Section 7001 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) established
the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research
(ICCOPR). The purpose of the Interagency Committee is twofold: (1) To
prepare a comprehensive, coordinated Federal oil pollution research and
development (R&D) plan; and (2) to promote cooperation with industry,
universities, research institutions, State governments, and other
nations through information sharing, coordinated planning, and joint
funding of projects. The Interagency Committee reports its activities
to Congress biennially.
The first Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan was completed
on April 24, 1992 and submitted to Congress and the Marine Board of the
National Research Council for their review and comment. The second
edition of the Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan was submitted
to Congress on April 1, 1997. The current plan documents the role that
oil pollution research plays in reducing the environmental and economic
threats posed by oil production and transport. It emphasizes
prevention, focuses on the high-risk components of the oil production
and transportation systems, and advocates continuation of a Federal oil
spill research and development program. The Interagency Committee has
been working on the third revision of the Oil Pollution Research and
Technology Plan. The third revision will include concerns related to
Arctic oil pollution prevention and response as well as lessons learned
from the Deepwater Horizon Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit accident in
the Gulf of Mexico.
Prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Interagency
Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research (ICCOPR) had begun the
process of revising the 1997 Interagency Oil Pollution Research and
Technology Plan. The ICCOPR will need to closely examine the lessons
learned from the current spill to better update the research strategies
needed for the next decade. Just as the EXXON VALDEZ pointed to needed
research, the BP oil spill will identify new focus areas and response
challenges that will guide research and response communities in the
future.
The ICCOPR recognizes that progress in oil pollution research
occurs best through continued collaboration among academia, industry,
and government. Although funding was initially authorized and
appropriated in the early 1990's for the ICCOPR to award research
grants to universities, this is currently not the case. The ICCOPR will
continue to develop strategies to promote common awareness and
collaboration among universities, industry, and the Government
concerning on-going research.
Exercises
The response protocols used during response to the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill were also informed by the exercise regimen the Coast
Guard maintains.
Since 2001, the Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service
(MMS), the predecessor to Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulations
and Enforcement (BOEM), have held nine offshore-related exercises and
responded to one actual event. All featured Coast Guard and MMS
participation, as well as State and local officials where applicable,
and involved offshore oil platforms, pipelines, or MODUs.
In the 20 years since the EXXON VALDEZ spill, the Coast Guard has
also conducted SONS exercises every 3 years. In 2002, the SONS Exercise
was held in New Orleans to address the implications of a loss of well
control event in the Gulf of Mexico. In that exercise, the SONS team
created a vertically integrated organization to link local response
requirements to an RRT. The requirements of the RRT were then passed to
the NRT in Washington, DC in order to test the integration of the spill
management and decision processes across the Federal Government.
These functions were tested again during a SONS exercise this past
March in the Northeast. Nearly 600 people from 37 agencies participated
in this exercise, the scenario for which was a catastrophic oil spill
from a collision between an oil tanker and a car carrier off the coast
of Portland, ME. The exercise involved response preparedness activities
in Portland, ME, Boston, MA, Portsmouth, NH, Portsmouth, VA, and
Washington, DC. The response to the scenario involved the
implementation of oil spill response plans, and response organizational
elements including two Unified Commands, a Unified Area Command, and
the NIC in accordance with the National Contingency Plan and NRF. The
exercise focused on three National-level strategic objectives:
1. Implement response organizations in applicable oil spill
response plans;
2. Test the organization's ability to address multi-regional
coordination issues using planned response organizations;
3. Communicate with the public and stakeholders outside the
response organization using applicable organizational
components.
The SONS 2010 exercise demonstrated a maturing of oil spill
response capabilities, and the importance of National-level
interactions to ensure optimal information flow and situational
awareness. But we also learned that in future exercises we should
expand participation to account for the wide variety of issues that
emerged as a result of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For example,
to date our exercise plans had not anticipated the seafood safety and
human health impact concerns that have been so clear in this disaster.
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill was the first real-world spill
designated as a SONS, and the first to activate a National Incident
Commander. Within the NIC organization, several elements--including the
Interagency Solutions Group--were established to ensure the integrity
of communications among the field, the interagency, and the FOSC. These
organizational structures were a significant improvement over the
response used during the EXXON VALDEZ.
Access and Use of the Fund
Although the EXXON VALDEZ spill and subsequent OPA 90 legislation
shaped many of the preparedness and response requirements and
legislation followed to this day, lessons learned from other
significant events since 1989 have also shaped our response strategies.
Coast Guard and EPA FOSCs have accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund to respond to over 11,000 oil spills or significant threats of an
oil spill in the 19 years since the establishment of the Fund. The
liability and compensation regime contained in Title I to the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 is well-rehearsed and integrated into the FOSC's
daily operations. Title I of OPA established new and higher liability
limits for oil spills, with commensurate changes to financial
responsibility requirements. It substantially broadened the scope of
damages, including natural resource damages (NRDs), for which polluters
are liable. It also authorized the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
(OSLTF) up to $1 billion to pay for expeditious oil removal and
uncompensated damages. (The Energy Policy Act of 2005 later raised the
limit of the Fund to $2.7 billion; and the Delaware River Protection
Act of 2006, title VI of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Act of 2006, increased the limits of liability.) Use of the Fund,
oversight of responsible parties' obligation to advertise for and
receive claims from those damaged by oil pollution, and cost recovery
from the responsible party of all Federal funds expended are all part
of the pollution response cycle.
preliminary lessons learned from the deepwater horizon oil spill
Throughout this unprecedented and evolving event, we have marshaled
the largest response to an oil spill in our Nation's history and we
have continued to adapt and evolve this response at every turn as the
disaster itself has unfolded. We have created redundancy wherever
appropriate--from directing BP to employ additional methods to contain
its leaking oil, to finding new ways to keep the oil off our vital
shores, to using multiple scientific methodologies to gauge the size of
this catastrophe. Now that the relief well has been cemented, we will
continue to tailor our ever-expanding response to each new challenge
that arises until the Gulf is restored.
As with any incident, we must review the lessons learned from the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response to inform equipment standards,
technology, and preparedness to respond in the future.
These lessons learned will be captured in several on-going
assessments and reviews, including the President's National Commission
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling and a Coast
Guard-chartered workgroup to evaluate interagency planning,
preparedness, and response efforts related to Deepwater Horizon, in
addition to the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation by the Coast
Guard and BOEM.
Notwithstanding the fact that on-going recovery efforts and
assessment of the spill response make it difficult to reach definitive
conclusions at this stage, we are beginning to identify areas for
improvement.
It became clear early in the spill response that there was a need
for a better process to manage and channel an abundance of ideas,
creativity, and suggestions of citizens and industry for spill response
and clean-up technologies. To meet this challenge, the Coast Guard, in
collaboration with interagency partners, established the Interagency
Alternative Technology Assessment Program (IATAP) to collect and review
oil spill response solutions from scientists and vendors on topics such
as oil sensing improvements to response and detection, oil wellhead
control and submerged oil response, traditional oil spill response
technologies, alternative oil spill response technologies, and oil
spill damage assessment and restoration. The IATAP provides a useful
model to garner and incorporate innovative solutions in future
responses. These assets and technologies were evaluated to test their
effectiveness and ensure that any resources that were deployed could be
done so quickly and effectively. A number of concepts were sent to the
Gulf region for consideration in the response effort.
Whereas funds are made available from the OSLTF into an Emergency
Fund to carry out removal actions for oil spills under Section 311(c)
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the magnitude of
the DEEPWATER HORIZON spill required legislative relief to permit
additional advances from the Emergency Fund to support removal
activities for the response. This legislative relief pertains only to
the DEEPWATER HORIZON response and could be required for future
response efforts.
Other initiatives and efforts that proved beneficial during the
response included establishment of the Interagency Solutions Team
within the NIC staff, a unit that consisted of more than 18 Federal
agencies and organizations working together on solutions embodying a
whole-of-Government response. Typically, this arrangement produced
near-final solutions within hours for what might have otherwise taken
days or weeks. The BP Deepwater Horizon spill response reinforced the
importance of involving local-level government officials early in a
response to the maximum extent possible.
State and local emergency management and environmental management
personnel are members of Coast Guard Area Committees, and States are
members of RRTs under the NCP. Continuous engagement with States and
local communities in preparedness planning and exercises is paramount,
because it accounts for differences in approach among States and
properly supports integration of State and local entities in incident
response. We continue to actively encourage participation and
prioritize inclusion by local leaders as part of this historic response
so that we can respond as quickly and effectively as possible to
problems that arise on the ground. Going forward, we must continue to
engage local government officials in response planning and exercise.
Other mechanisms by which the State and local emergency management
systems coordinated with the incident response organization include
local emergency operation centers (EOCs), which coordinate with the
Unified Incident Command overseeing local operations through the State
On-Scene Coordinator (a standing member of the Unified Incident
Command) and the incident liaison officer. Moreover, for the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, State EOCs coordinated with the Unified
Area Command in New Orleans, LA through the State On-Scene Coordinator
and the Unified Area Command liaison officer. Each State also
coordinated with the NIC through the inter/intra-governmental affairs
liaison and during daily Governors' conference calls with the National
Incident Commander.
In addition to mechanisms described above, the Coast Guard embedded
liaison officers with Parish Presidents in Louisiana, assigned Deputy
Incident Commanders at Incident Command Posts, and held daily calls
with local officials. These efforts were vital to coordinating efforts
from the local level to the Governors and Congressional delegations.
CONCLUSION
In closing, through the National Incident Command, the Coast Guard
has worked to ensure that all capabilities and resources--including
Government, private, and commercial--are being leveraged to protect the
environment and facilitate a rapid, robust clean-up effort.
Moving forward, the Coast Guard will:
Assist in transitioning NIC spill response efforts to
recovery by those agencies and entities involved in the Post-
Spill Restoration and Natural Resources Damage Assessments;
Work with the interagency to review the NCP and NRF to
identify National-level issues to enhance our ability to
provide a coordinated, whole-of-Government response to major
incidents; and
Capture lessons learned; identify potential areas for
improvement; and implement recommendations to more effectively
respond to future spills.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony, Admiral.
I now recognize someone who is no stranger to this
committee, Inspector General Skinner, to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. SKINNER, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Skinner. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Members of
the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss our report
on the Department of Homeland Security's progress in Federal
incident management planning. I would also like to discuss what
my office is doing with regard to oversight of the Department's
response to the spill.
The National Response Framework, which is the Federal
Government's guide for responding to all types of disasters,
describes planning as the cornerstone of disaster preparedness
and response. Planning provides three principled benefits: It
allows jurisdictions to determine in advance the protocols that
will be followed, and it guides other preparedness activities,
and it contributes to unity of effort of providing a common
blueprint for disaster response activities.
Incident management planning is vital because it identifies
detailed resources and responsibilities for each agency
responding to an emergency. Integrating plans among all public
and private sectors is imperative for a coordinated response.
This was evident in Hurricane Katrina, and it was underscored
in the subsequent White House report which recommended that DHS
lead the effort to develop an integrated Federal planning
system to meet the requirements of the National Response
Framework.
In response to the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive--8, DHS published the National preparedness
guideline. The National Preparedness Guidelines defines what it
means for the Nation to be prepared for all disasters, all
hazards. One of the four critical elements of the guidelines
involves National planning scenarios, which depict a diverse
set of high-consequence terrorist threats and natural
disasters.
HSPD-8 also directed DHS to lead the effort to develop, in
cooperation with other Federal agencies, an integrative
planning system followed by a series of planning documents for
each National planning scenario. The Homeland Security Council,
in partnership with DHS, other Federal agencies, and State and
local governments, developed 15 National planning scenarios.
Collectively, the scenarios are designed to focus
contingency planning on all levels of government and with the
private sector. The scenarios form the basis for coordinated
Federal planning, training, exercise, and grant investments. A
complete set of plans for each scenario includes a strategic
guidance statement, a strategic plan, a concept of operation
plan, and individual agency operation plans.
DHS was working to develop the plans, but in July 2009, the
White House National Security Staff began a review of HSPD-8
and put on hold those efforts. To date, a full set of plans has
not been completed for any single scenario.
That is not to say, however, that planning is not on-going
at Federal agencies outside the National planning scenario
framework. Federal agencies have long been involved in
contingency planning for their own mission-essential functions.
The bigger challenge is when an incident involves multiple
agencies whose efforts must be integrated. The Deepwater
Horizon incident provides an excellent example of this
challenge. No less than a dozen Federal agencies, in addition
to several States, local parishes, and counties and townships
throughout the Gulf Coast and private entities as well were
involved in the Gulf Coast oil spill response. It is vital that
those agencies coordinate their planning efforts and provide a
unified response if we are going to be successful.
Bringing all this together under one Federal umbrella,
however, continues to be a daunting task. DHS has faced
challenges leading the effort to develop incident management
plans. There is a diverse group of interagency and
intergovernmental planners, subject matter experts, and
contractors involved in the process, and reaching a consensus
is not always easy.
Furthermore, there are a limited number of emergency
management planners in government, at all levels, and this has
presented a challenge with developing incident management
planning and guidelines.
It would be premature for me to comment at this time on the
Deepwater Horizon response efforts. Our work is on-going, and
we are not ready yet to draw conclusions on our efforts. We
have three audits underway, and we plan to start a fourth in
the next few months.
Our first audit will determine whether Coast Guard has
controls in place to recover from BP all Federal taxpayer costs
associated with the oil spill.
The second audit is reviewing Coast Guard and Marines
Safety Performance Plans.
The third audit is looking at whether it has the resources
to conduct safety inspections in marine offshore drilling
units, such as the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig.
The fourth audit planned for later this year will look at
the effectiveness of the Coast Guard's Unified Area Command,
which was formed in response to the oil spill. The Unified
Command structure provides shared management of the incident
among Federal, State, local, and private sectors. Our work will
address the effectiveness of the Coast Guard's internal and
external communications to stakeholders, its management and
coordination of resources, and the quality of the National
Contingency Plan as it was implemented during this disaster.
The National Contingency Plan, as you know, is the
Government's blueprint for responding to oil disasters--or oil
spills, that is. It was under this framework that DHS led the
Federal response to the Gulf oil spill. I look forward to
sharing the results of our work with this committee.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome
any questions that you or the Members may have. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Skinner
September 22, 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress in Federal incident
management planning and the Deepwater Horizon oil incident.
The first part of my testimony today will address incident
management planning at the Federal level, particularly the role of DHS.
The information provided is primarily contained in our February 2010
report, ``DHS' Progress in Federal Incident Management Planning'' (OIG-
10-58). I will then address what my office is doing with regard to
oversight of the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil incident.
FEDERAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PLANNING
The National Response Framework (NRF), the guide to how the Nation
conducts all-hazards response, describes planning as the cornerstone of
National preparedness and a critical element to respond to a disaster
or emergency. Planning provides three principal benefits: (1) It allows
jurisdictions to influence the course of events in an emergency by
determining in advance the actions, policies, and processes that will
be followed, (2) it guides other preparedness activities, and (3) it
contributes to unity of effort by providing a common blueprint for
activity in the event of an emergency. Planning is a foundational
element of both preparedness and response and thus is an essential
homeland security activity.
Incident management planning is vital because it identifies
detailed resources, personnel, and assets, and specific roles,
responsibilities, and actions for each Department and agency responding
to an incident or emergency. Integrating and synchronizing Federal
policies, strategies, and plans among all Federal, State, local,
private sector, and community efforts is imperative for a coordinated
response. This was realized during the examination of the failed
Federal response to Hurricane Katrina and was underscored in the
subsequent White House report. The report concluded, ``Insufficient
planning, training, and interagency coordination are not problems that
began and ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demonstrated the need
for greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts,
not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State and
local governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well.'' The
White House report recommended that the Department of Homeland Security
lead an interagency effort to develop and resource a deliberative,
integrated Federal planning and execution system to meet the
requirements of the revised National Response Plan (now referred to as
the National Response Framework). It also put in motion a number of
Government actions meant to improve response planning, including the
advancement of credible planning scenarios depicting a range of
potential terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and related impacts
facing our Nation.
The President had kicked off a new framework for planning with the
issuance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive--8 (HSPD-8) in
December 2003. HSPD-8 directed the DHS Secretary to develop a National
domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. In furtherance of HSPD-8, DHS
released the National Preparedness Guidelines in September 2007. The
National Preparedness Guidelines define what it means for the Nation to
be prepared for all hazards. One of the four critical elements of the
National Preparedness Guidelines involves National Planning Scenarios,
which depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of both
potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters. According to the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA), the
Scenarios are ``to reflect the relative risk requirements presented by
all hazards . . . in order to provide the foundation for the flexible
and adaptive development of target capabilities . . . to meet the
national preparedness goal.''
The President approved Annex 1 to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive--8 in December 2007, formally establishing a standard and
comprehensive approach to National planning. It directed the DHS
Secretary to lead the effort to develop, in coordination with the heads
of Federal agencies with a role in homeland security, an Integrated
Planning System followed by a series of related planning documents for
each National planning scenario.
The Homeland Security Council, in partnership with DHS, other
Federal departments and agencies, and State, local, Tribal, and
territorial governments, developed 15 National Planning Scenarios.
Collectively, the scenarios are designed to focus contingency planning
for homeland security preparedness work at all levels of government and
with the private sector. The scenarios form the basis for coordinated
Federal planning, training, exercises, and grant investments needed to
prepare for all types of emergencies. The Homeland Security Council
compressed the 15 National Planning Scenarios into 8 key scenario sets
in October 2007 to integrate planning for like events and to conduct
cross-cutting capability development.
A complete set of plans for each planning scenario includes: (1) A
strategic guidance statement, (2) a strategic plan, (3) a concept of
operations plan, and (4) individual operations plans from every
department and agency with responsibilities enumerated in the concept
of operations plan. DHS' Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
led the effort to develop strategic guidance statements and strategic
plans, while FEMA's Operational Planning Branch led the development of
concept of operation plans. At the time of our fieldwork, the
development of Federal incident management plans was progressing, but a
full set of plans had not yet been completed for any single scenario.
Thus far, five of the eight key scenario sets have approved strategic
guidance statements, while four have approved strategic plans. One
concept of operations plan has been approved by the DHS Secretary.
DHS and FEMA have faced challenges leading the effort to develop
incident management plans. There is a diverse group of interagency
planners, subject matter experts, and contractors that assist DHS and
FEMA with planning. However, according to DHS officials, there are a
limited number of planners available in Federal agencies, and this has
presented a challenge with developing incident management plans.
Additionally, because of aggressive deadlines to complete some of the
incident management plans, planners were required to work on multiple
plans at the same time, and they often had to choose between incident
management planning meetings that were scheduled concurrently.
According to DHS officials, efforts are on-going to address the
shortage of Federal planners to assist with developing incident
management plans.
As I said before, DHS and FEMA were making progress on the National
Planning Scenarios; however, in July 2009, the White House National
Security Staff (NSS) began a review of HSPD-8 and temporarily put on
hold efforts to complete the remaining plans.
This is not to say that planning is not on-going at Federal
agencies outside of this framework. Federal departments and agencies
have long been involved in contingency planning for their own personnel
and mission-essential functions. The bigger challenge is when an
incident involves multiple agencies, whose efforts must be integrated
for a successful response. The Deepwater Horizon incident provided our
most recent example of this challenge.
No less than a dozen Federal departments and agencies were involved
in the Deepwater Horizon response effort. Primary players included the
Department of Homeland Security and Coast Guard; the Department of the
Interior; and the Environmental Protection Agency. The response also
included the Department of Defense; the Department of Labor; the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; the Small Business
Administration; the Fish and Wildlife Service; the National Park
Service; and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
The Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
is the primary Federal statute governing the Federal response to oil
spills. The act authorized the President to develop the National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, more commonly
called the National Contingency Plan (NCP). The National Contingency
Plan is the Federal Government's blueprint for responding to oil spills
and hazardous substance releases and establishes the National Response
Team and its roles and responsibilities. It was under this framework
that DHS and the Coast Guard led the Federal response to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. Although the NCP is the operative framework for oil
spill response, other frameworks and authorities may play a role in the
Deepwater Horizon spill response. For example, there are also
provisions for responding to oil spills in the Emergency Support
Function--10 (ESF-10) annex to the National Response Framework. I'll
briefly use this to illustrate the complexity and challenges of
interagency planning.
The Emergency Support Functions provide the structure for
coordinating Federal interagency support for a Federal response to an
incident. They are mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently
used to provide Federal support to States and Federal-to-Federal
support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford
Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents. ESF-10 is the Oil and Hazardous
Materials Response Annex to the NRF. The ESF-10 Coordinating Agency is
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Primary agencies are EPA and
the Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard. There are 13
support agencies, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense,
Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Interior,
Justice, Labor, State, and Transportation, and the General Services
Administration, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as numerous
sub-agencies. It is vital that these agencies coordinate their planning
efforts and provide a unified response, but authorities, funding and
personnel reside in the individual agencies. Bringing all of this
together under one Federal umbrella continues to be a challenge.
It would be premature for me to comment on the actual response
effort. My office began planning oversight work immediately, but we did
not want to deploy staff that might in any way disrupt the response
effort. Having said that, we have initiated three audits, and we plan
to initiate a fourth during fiscal year 2011.
One on-going audit is an evaluation of Coast Guard's Internal
Controls for Identifying Costs Associated with the Deepwater Horizon
Oil Incident. The Coast Guard's response to this incident imposed
extraordinary costs on the service. In oil spill events, the Coast
Guard must recover costs from the ``responsible party'' (in this case,
British Petroleum, or BP). Our audit will determine whether the Coast
Guard has adequate policies, procedures, and internal controls in place
to capture all direct and indirect Federal costs associated with the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Incident.
The two other on-going audits are reviewing various aspects of
Coast Guard's Marine Safety Program. One audit is reviewing Coast
Guard's Marine Safety Performance Plan. This plan includes six
initiatives focused on increasing the competency of its marine safety
workforce, delivering improved service to the marine industry,
improving management practices, and increasing the safety of
recreational boats, towing vessels, and fishing vessels. Our audit will
determine whether improvements to the Plan are needed for it to be an
effective tool for managing the Marine Safety Program. The other audit
is looking at whether Coast Guard has the capabilities and resources to
conduct safety inspections on domestic and foreign-flagged offshore
vessels, including Marine Offshore Drilling Units such as the Deepwater
Horizon. The Coast Guard oversees 20,000 U.S. and foreign-flagged
vessels by conducting 80,000 inspections annually and 14,000
investigations. The outcomes of these inspections often serve as a
basis for improving safety through regulatory and policy changes.
The audit planned for fiscal year 2011 will look into the
effectiveness of the Unified Command response in relation to the
Deepwater Horizon Incident. Under the provisions of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive--5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents,
all levels of Government must be capable of working together to
efficiently and effectively manage a domestic incident. According to
HSPD-5, the Government treats crisis management and consequence
management as a single, integrated function. The Unified Command
structure provides shared management of the incident among Federal,
State, and private sectors--the Federal On-Scene Commander, the State
On-Scene Commander, and the Responsible Party, respectively. The work
we will conduct is designed to determine the efficacy of the Unified
Command in its internal and external communications to stakeholders,
management, and coordination of resources, in response to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. We will also look at the quality of the National
Contingency Plan as it was implemented during this disaster. I look
forward to sharing the results of this work with the committee.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any
questions that you or the Members may have. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Jenkins for his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR., DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I
am not going to repeat other things that Mr. Skinner said.
Instead, I would like to supplement his comments and talk today
about criteria for developing and testing disaster response
plans.
As you know, disasters come in all sizes and can be the
result of many causes, including deliberate actions. A disaster
may occur suddenly, such as an earthquake or a bomb blast or
Deepwater Horizon; or it may occur with some forewarning and
continue for days or weeks, such as the flooding we saw in
various parts of the country this year or a flu pandemic. An
effective response to major disasters requires the resources
and coordinated action of many players, Government and non-
Government. To do that requires planning and forethought.
The development of detailed disaster response operations
plans and the validation of those plans through testing and
exercising is a key component of effective disaster response
planning.
The January 2008 National Response Framework describes
planning as the cornerstone of National preparedness. Response
plans define the roles and responsibilities of all those who
have a role in the response; and the resources and capabilities
each will contribute to the response; and the plans also
provide a blueprint for how the response will be directed,
managed, and coordinated.
In June 2010, FEMA adopted three private-sector standards
for use by U.S. companies in emergency planning and response.
Those standards provide that organizations should test and
evaluate the appropriateness and efficacy of their emergency
response plan.
The National Response Framework identifies seven criteria
for effective response planning: Acceptability; adequacy;
completeness; consistency and standardization of products;
feasibility; flexibility; interoperability and collaboration.
Although all are important, I would like to focus on a few of
these and the criteria of whether or not they are met.
Adequacy. To be adequate, a plan should be based on valid
and relevant planning assumptions and the concept of operation
should identify critical tasks specific to the plan's
objectives.
The completeness of plan is complete if it incorporates
major actions, objectives, and tasks to be accomplished. The
plan should address the personnel and resources required, sound
concepts for how those resources will be deployed, used,
sustained, and mobilized. Including all those who would have
responsibilities under the plan and developing the plan helps
ensure the plan is complete.
Feasibility. Can critical tasks identified in the plan be
accomplished within available resources, including those from
mutual aid or other resources? Procedures for drawing on
available resources, such as EMAC, and integrating and
employing all resources effectively need to be in place before
the disaster.
Interoperability and collaboration is particularly
important in planning because of the number of people that
would be involved in responding to a major disaster. The plan's
other stakeholders and participants should be complementary in
their objectives in collaboration and focused on integrating
the efforts of all stakeholders.
It is critically important that the assumptions embedded in
emergency plans are validated. These include assumptions about
the type and probability of events, such as a blow-out, and any
assumptions about the capability to effectively to respond to
the consequences of that event.
As we and the DHS Inspector General have noted, robust
operational planning and validation of those operational plans
are key components of disaster preparedness. As Hurricane
Katrina and Deepwater Horizon have so vividly demonstrated,
shortcomings in such planning can complicate the ability to
marshal needed resources and effectively coordinate their use.
DHS also faces the challenge, continuing challenge, in
measuring, developing measures for assessing preparedness and
capabilities, and has created a task force on preparedness to
this response. The report is due at the end of this month to
make recommendations with regard to how we can improve
preparedness and particularly measure our success in being
prepared.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the
committee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.
September 22, 2010
GAO-10-969T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: I am pleased to be here
this morning to discuss the importance of preparing, validating, and
testing emergency operations plans for disaster response. Among the
lessons learned from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was that
effective disaster response requires planning followed by the execution
of training and exercises to validate those plans. The development of
detailed emergency operations plans and the validation of those plans
through testing and exercising is a key component of effective disaster
response planning. These plans are part of a broader cycle of emergency
preparedness that includes policy development, planning, and resource
allocation, exercising and testing operational plans, and assessment
and reporting.\1\
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\1\ The elements of the emergency management framework are
discussed in detail in our April 2009 report on the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's efforts to lead the development of a National
preparedness system. See GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made
Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and
Assessment Efforts, GAO-09-369 (Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2009).
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To help guide Federal emergency response planning, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the National Response
Framework, in conjunction with a variety of stakeholders, as a
blueprint for how the Nation conducts response to hazards of any type,
regardless of cause. The National Response Framework, which was issued
in January 2008, describes planning as the cornerstone of National
preparedness and a critical element for response to a disaster or
emergency. Response plans define the roles and responsibilities of all
those who will have a role in the response and the capabilities they
will contribute to the effort and provide a blueprint for how the
response will be directed, managed, and coordinated. In addition, in
June 2010, as part of its Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness
Accreditation and Certification Program, FEMA adopted three private
sector standards for use by U.S. companies in emergency planning and
response. These standards provide that organizations should test and
evaluate the appropriateness and efficacy of their emergency response
plans.\2\
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\2\ American National Standards Institute, Organizational
Resilience: Security, Preparedness, and Continuity Management Systems-
Requirements with Guidance for Use ASIS SPC.12009 (Mar. 12, 2009).
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My comments are based on our previously issued work on emergency
planning and response over the last several years, including our April
2009 report on FEMA's efforts to lead the development of a National
preparedness system.\3\ Specifically, my testimony today focuses on:
(1) The criteria for effective disaster response planning established
in FEMA's National Response Framework, (2) additional guidance for
disaster response planning, (3) the status of National disaster
response planning efforts, and (4) the special circumstances related to
operational response planning for oil spills.
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\3\ See for example, GAO-09-369, GAO, Actions Taken to Implement
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, GAO-09-95R
(Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2008), National Response Framework: FEMA
Needs Policies and Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal
Stakeholders in the Revision Process, GAO-08-768 (Washington, DC: June
11, 2008), and Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership,
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, DC: Sept. 6, 2006).
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To address these objectives, we reviewed the policies and plans
that form the basis of the preparedness system. These policies and
plans include, among others, the National Response Framework and
National Preparedness Guidelines, as well as the National integrated
planning system and preliminary versions of related guidance to develop
and integrate plans across Federal, State, Tribal, and local
governments. We also reviewed the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Office of Inspector General report on the status of FEMA's
disaster response planning efforts. For the purposes of this testimony,
we did not assess any criteria used or the operational planning for the
Deepwater Horizon response. More detailed information about our scope
and methodology is included in our April 2009 report. We conducted this
work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards.
NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK'S CRITERIA FOR RESPONSE PLANNING
The National Response Framework discusses several elements of
effective response and response planning. The term response, as used in
the National Response Framework, includes the immediate actions to save
lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human
needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency plans and
actions to support short-term recovery. An effective, unified National
response--including the response to any large-scale incident--requires
layered, mutually supporting capabilities--governmental and
nongovernmental. Indispensable to effective response is an effective
unified command, which requires a clear understanding of the roles and
responsibilities of each participating organization.
The National Response Framework employs the following criteria to
measure key aspects of response planning:
Acceptability.--A plan is acceptable if it can meet the
requirements of anticipated scenarios, can be implemented
within the costs and time frames that senior officials and the
public can support, and is consistent with applicable laws.
Adequacy.--A plan is adequate if it complies with applicable
planning guidance, planning assumptions are valid and relevant,
and the concept of operations identifies and addresses critical
tasks specific to the plan's objectives.\4\
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\4\ A concept plan describes how capabilities are integrated and
synchronized to accomplish critical tasks to meet objectives.
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Completeness.--A plan is complete if it incorporates major
actions, objectives, and tasks to be accomplished. The complete
plan addresses the personnel and resources required and sound
concepts for how those will be deployed, employed, sustained,
and demobilized. It also addresses time lines and criteria for
measuring success in achieving objectives and the desired end
state. Including all those who could be affected in the
planning process can help ensure that a plan is complete.
Consistency and standardization of products.--Standardized
planning processes and products foster consistency,
interoperability, and collaboration; therefore, emergency
operations plans for disaster response should be consistent
with all other related planning documents.
Feasibility.--A plan is considered feasible if the critical
tasks can be accomplished with the resources available
internally or through mutual aid, immediate need for additional
resources from other sources (in the case of a local plan, from
State or Federal partners) are identified in detail and
coordinated in advance, and procedures are in place to
integrate and employ resources effectively from all potential
providers.
Flexibility.--Flexibility and adaptability are promoted by
decentralized decisionmaking and by accommodating all hazards
ranging from smaller-scale incidents to wider National
contingencies.
Interoperability and collaboration.--A plan is interoperable
and collaborative if it identifies other stakeholders in the
planning process with similar and complementary plans and
objectives, and supports regular collaboration focused on
integrating with those stakeholders' plans to optimize
achievement of individual and collective goals and objectives
in an incident.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AND POLICY REGARDING OPERATIONAL PLANS AND TESTING
Under the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, FEMA has
responsibility for leading the Nation in developing a National
preparedness system.\5\ FEMA has developed standards--the Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101--that call for validation, review, and testing
of emergency operations plans (EOP).\6\ According to the Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101, plans should be reviewed for conformity to
applicable regulatory requirements and the standards of Federal or
State agencies (as appropriate) and for their usefulness in practice.
Exercises offer the best way, short of emergencies, to determine if an
EOP is understood and ``works.'' Further, conducting a ``tabletop''
exercise involving the key representatives of each tasked organization
can serve as a practical and useful means to help validate the plan.
FEMA's guidance also suggests that officials use functional and full-
scale emergency management exercises to evaluate EOPs. Plan reviews by
stakeholders also allow responsible agencies to suggest improvements in
an EOP based on their accumulated experience.\7\
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\5\ Pub. L. No. 109-295, 644, 120 Stat. 1355, 1425 (2006).
\6\ Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101: Developing and
Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency
Plans. Mar. 2009.
\7\ For example, States may review local plans.
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We also identified the need for validated operational planning in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, noting that to be effective,
National response policies must be supported by robust operational
plans. In September 2006, we recommended, among other things, that DHS
take the lead in monitoring Federal agencies' efforts to meet their
responsibilities under the National Response Plan (now the National
Response Framework) and the National Preparedness Goal (now the
National Preparedness Guidelines), including the development, testing,
and exercising of agency operational plans to implement their
responsibilities.\8\ DHS concurred with our recommendation. The Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act transferred preparedness
responsibilities to FEMA,\9\ and we recommended in April 2009 that FEMA
should improve its approach to developing policies and plans that
define roles and responsibilities and planning processes by developing
a program management plan, in coordination with DHS and other Federal
entities, to ensure the completion of the key National preparedness
policies and plans called for in legislation, Presidential directives,
and existing policy and doctrine; to define roles and responsibilities
and planning processes; as well as to fully integrate such policies and
plans into other elements of the National preparedness system.\10\ FEMA
concurred with our recommendation and is currently working to address
this recommendation.
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\8\ GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, DC: Sept. 6, 2006.).
\9\ 6 U.S.C. 315.
\10\ GAO-09-369.
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Other National standards reflect these practices as well. For
example, according to Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP)
standards, the development, coordination, and implementation of
operational plans and procedures are fundamental to effective disaster
response and recovery.\11\ EOPs should identify and assign specific
areas of responsibility for performing essential functions in response
to an emergency or disaster. Areas of responsibility to be addressed in
EOPs include such things as evacuation, mass care, sheltering, needs
and damage assessment, mutual aid, and military support. EMAP standards
call for a program of regularly scheduled drills, exercises, and
appropriate follow-through activities--designed for assessment and
evaluation of emergency plans and capabilities--as a critical component
of a State, territorial, Tribal, or local emergency management program.
The documented exercise program should regularly test the skills,
abilities, and experience of emergency personnel as well as the plans,
policies, procedures, equipment, and facilities of the jurisdiction.
The exercise program should be tailored to the range of hazards that
confronts the jurisdiction.
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\11\ The EMAP standards are the voluntary National accreditation
process for State, territorial, Tribal, and local emergency management
programs. Using collaboratively developed, recognized standards and
independent assessment, EMAP provides a means for strategic improvement
of emergency management programs, culminating in accreditation.
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STATUS OF NATIONAL DISASTER PLANNING EFFORTS
We reported in April 2009 that FEMA lacked a comprehensive approach
to managing the development of emergency preparedness policies and
plans.\12\ Specifically, we reported that FEMA had completed many
policy and planning documents, but a number of others were not yet
completed. For example, while DHS, FEMA, and other Federal entities
with a role in National preparedness have taken action to develop and
complete some plans that detail and operationalize roles and
responsibilities for Federal and non-Federal entities, these entities
had not completed 68 percent of the plans required by existing
legislation, Presidential directives, and policy documents as of April
2009.
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\12\ GAO-09-369.
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Specifically, of the 72 plans we identified, 20 had been completed
(28 percent), 3 had been partially completed (that is, an interim or
draft plan has been produced--4 percent), and 49 (68 percent) had not
been completed. Among the plans that have been completed, FEMA
published the Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment Catalog in 2008, which
defines roles and responsibilities for 236 mission assignment
activities to be performed by Federal Government entities, at the
direction of FEMA, to aid State and local jurisdictions during a
response to a major disaster or an emergency. Among the 49 plans that
had not been completed were the National Response Framework incident
annexes for terrorism and cyber incidents as well as the National
Response Framework's incident annex supplements for catastrophic
disasters and mass evacuations. In addition, operational plans for
responding to the consolidated National planning scenarios, as called
for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1, remained
outstanding.
In February 2010, DHS's Office of Inspector General reviewed the
status of these planning efforts and reported that the full set of
plans for any single scenario had not yet been completed partly because
of the time required to develop and implement the Integrated Planning
System.\13\ The Integrated Planning System, required by Annex 1 to
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (December 2007), is intended
to be a standard and comprehensive approach to National planning. The
Directive calls for the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead the
effort to develop, in coordination with the heads of Federal agencies
with a role in homeland security, the Integrated Planning System
followed by a series of related planning documents for each National
planning scenario. The Homeland Security Council compressed the 15
National Planning Scenarios into 8 key scenario sets in October 2007 to
integrate planning for like events and to conduct crosscutting
capability development.\14\ The redacted version of the Inspector
General's report noted that DHS had completed integrated operations
planning for 1 of the 8 consolidated National planning scenarios \15\--
the terrorist use of explosives scenario.\16\ FEMA officials reported
earlier this month that the agency's efforts to complete National
preparedness planning will be significantly impacted by the
administration's pending revision to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive--8. Once the new directive is issued, agency officials plan
to conduct a comprehensive review and update to FEMA's approach to
National preparedness planning.
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\13\ Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
DHS' Progress in Federal Incident Management Planning (Redacted), OIG-
10-58 (Washington, DC, Feb. 22, 2010.)
\14\ The eight scenarios are: (1) Explosives attack (terrorist use
of explosives); (2) nuclear attack (improvised nuclear device); (3)
biological attack (aerosol anthrax, plague, food contamination, foreign
animal disease); (4) radiological attack (radiological dispersal
devices); (5) chemical attack (blister agent, toxic industrial
chemicals, nerve agent, chlorine tank explosion); (6) natural disaster
(major earthquake, major hurricane); (7) cyberattack; and (8) pandemic
influenza.
\15\ The DHS IG's report noted that DHS had completed five of the
eight strategic guidance statements and four strategic plans. See DHS
OIG-10-58.
\16\ To align with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19, in
July 2008 the improvised explosive device scenario was renamed the
Terrorist Use of Explosives scenario.
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In addition to FEMA's planning efforts, FEMA has assessed the
status of catastrophic planning in all 50 States and the 75 largest
urban areas as part of its Nationwide Plan Review. The 2010 Nationwide
Plan Review was based on the 2006 Nationwide Plan Review, which
responded to the need both by Congress and the President to ascertain
the status of the Nation's emergency preparedness planning in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The 2010 Nationwide Plan Review
compares the results of the 2006 review of States and urban areas'
plans, functional appendices and hazard-specific annexes, on the basis
of:
Consistency with Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101,
Date of last plan update,
Date of last exercise, and
A self-evaluation of the jurisdiction's confidence in each
planning document's adequacy, feasibility, and completeness to
manage a catastrophic event.
FEMA reported in July 2010 that more than 75 percent of States and
more than 80 percent of urban areas report confidence that their
overall basic emergency operations plans are well-suited to meet the
challenges presented during a large-scale or catastrophic event.
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE PLANS FOR OIL SPILL RESPONSES
Oil spills are a special case with regard to response. For most
major disasters, such as floods or earthquakes, a major disaster
declaration activates Federal response activities under the provisions
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act.\17\ However, for oil spills, Federal agencies may have direct
authority to respond under specific statutes. Response to an oil spill
is generally carried out in accordance with the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.\18\ The National
Response Framework has 15 functional annexes, such as search and
rescue, which provide the structure for coordinating Federal
interagency support for a Federal response to an incident. Emergency
Support Function No. 10, the Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
Annex, governs oil spills. As described in Emergency Support Function
No. 10, in general, the Environmental Protection Agency is the lead for
incidents in the inland zone, and the U.S. Coast Guard, within DHS, is
the lead for incidents in the coastal zone. The difference in
responding to oil spills and the shared responsibility across multiple
Federal agencies underscores the importance of including clear roles,
responsibilities, and legal authorities in developing operational
response plans.
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\17\ 42 U.S.C. 5121-5206.
\18\ The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, more commonly called the National Contingency Plan or
NCP, is the Federal Government's blueprint for responding to both oil
spills and hazardous substance releases.
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In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, emergency preparedness is a never-
ending effort as threats evolve and the capabilities needed to respond
to those threats changes as well. Realistic, validated, and tested
operational response plans are key to the effective response to a major
disaster of whatever type. Conducting exercises of these plans as
realistically as possible is a key component of response preparedness
because exercises help to identify what ``works'' (validates and tests)
and what does not. This concludes my statement. I will be pleased to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the committee may
have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I would remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel. I will now recognize myself for
questions.
Mr. Jenkins, this National planning scenario that has not
been completed, whose responsibility is it to complete it?
Mr. Jenkins. There is a responsibility between both FEMA
and DHS operations to complete those, working with other
agencies, as Mr. Skinner has pointed out in his report.
Chairman Thompson. Okay.
Mr. Skinner, help us out with that.
Mr. Skinner. Yes, DHS most certainly has the lead to do
this, and the Secretary is in charge of that program. DHS
relies very, very heavily on its Federal partners, however.
FEMA, for example, is responsible for developing the concept of
operation plans. They rely heavily on the other Federal
agencies to contribute staff to prepare plans to provide the
input in those areas where they have the expertise.
At the Departmental level, the Department has received
people from other--from the other departments and agencies
that, again, have expertise in their areas to contribute to the
strategic plan, strategic guidance.
Problems that we are having is, No. 1, there is not enough
of these people to go around. They are being spread very, very
thinly. We got off to a late start. As a matter of fact, I
don't think the Department got started until a year after it
was supposed to get started. Secondly, people were being called
to do other duties because of the, for example, the election;
the issues that we are dealing with border security down in the
Southwest. This caused problems in putting this together.
Chairman Thompson. But do you see the Department not having
the benefit of the scenario results and still being able to
adequately plan going forward?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, this can hinder our ability to move
forward. Like I said, the individual departments are preparing
their individual operational plans. However, those plans have
never been reviewed. FEMA doesn't have the authority to mandate
that they be reviewed. So, therefore, we do not know if they in
fact are adequate plans, whether those plans fit into the
concept of operations or with the strategic plans. So we have a
long way to go. There was progress being made. It has been
slowed. But we do have a very, very long way to go.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Admiral, you referenced some comments about the Coast Guard
being involved in the planning process and that you had hoped
for tighter linkages in that. Can you expound on that?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, Mr. Chairman. What I was referring
to is the response plans that are generated for--well, I will
start with this. We require response plans for all vessels
which pose a potential pollution hazard to the Federal waters
of the United States. This includes tankers and certain other
types of vessels. What was the Minerals Management Service, now
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and Regulatory
Enforcement, also has response plan requirements for Outer
Continental Shelf activities. There is an existing memorandum
of agreement between our two agencies that provides for the
option to review response plans but doesn't mandate the review
of response plans.
I think, moving forward, one of the earlier lessons learned
for us is that as the Federal on-scene coordinator responsible
for cleaning up and responding to oil spills in the maritime
environment, we should be reviewing all potential sources of
pollution in the--response plans for all potential sources of
pollution in the maritime environment.
Chairman Thompson. I agree with you. If you had the
responsibility to review a plan for the Gulf Coast, the Gulf of
Mexico, and saw where it referenced seals and walruses in the
plans, would you have noted that that probably didn't have
anything to do with the Gulf of Mexico?
Admiral Neffenger. I think the good thing about a review
process is that they surface those kinds of issues that may
need to be addressed.
I think what we would have been interested in most
importantly is how a worst-case discharge is defined, because
that is what really we are talking about when you are looking
at planning, is how do you define worst case and what types of
efforts then will be brought to bear and what equipment will be
available to deal when that?
Chairman Thompson. I understand. But I asked, if you saw
seals and walruses in a Gulf of Mexico response plan, would
that not have raised a flag?
Admiral Neffenger. I probably would have asked a few
questions, yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Here is the BP part of the plan. Did the
Coast Guard, to your knowledge, have any opportunity to review
it?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, as I said, we have a memorandum
which would allow for review. But to my knowledge, we did not
review that plan, no, sir.
Chairman Thompson. So, basically, you were left to the
mercy of BP to advise the Coast Guard on what they needed to do
as overseer to correct it.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, what I would say is that it is not
that we were without resources and capability. We did assume
from the outset that we were going to be dealing with a major
oil spill, if for no other reason than that there were 700,000
gallons of diesel fuel on-board the Deepwater Horizon. And we
also made the assumption that we would have leakage from the
well, although, as noted, it was beyond the scope and
unprecedented that we would have had as much leakage as we had
over the extended period of time that we did.
But we did immediately put response resources out to bear
on the site and did turn to BP as a responsible party to
activate not only their existing oil spill response or removal
organization contracts, but to bring all possible resources to
the site.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
You referenced an MOA that has been agreed to. Has it been
signed?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir. I think that is longstanding.
I will have to get you--I can get you a copy for the record.
Chairman Thompson. Please.*
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* Due to legibility, the information was retained in committee
files.
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Admiral Neffenger. That will include the date. I don't off
the top of my head know on what date it was signed. But it was
signed previously with the Minerals Management Service.
Chairman Thompson. But, even with that, to your knowledge,
the Coast Guard had nothing to do with the review of BP's
response plans should a spill occur.
Admiral Neffenger. For this particular well, I don't
believe that we did review this particular response plan.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. I yield to the gentleman from
New Orleans, Mr. Cao.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is to Mr. Skinner because I am still a
little bit confused with respect to your answers to the
National planning scenarios that the Chairman alluded to
earlier.
In your statement, you said that in July 2009, the White
House National Security Staff began a review of HSPD-8 and
temporarily put a hold on efforts to complete the remaining
plans. My question contains three parts: No. 1, why did they
put a hold in the first place? No. 2, is the NSS still
preventing the completion of these plans? If they are still
preventing the completion of these plans, the question is why?
If not, where is the status of the plans?
Mr. Skinner. First, in response to your first question, I
am not sure why they put a hold. It is our understanding, my
office's understanding, that we wanted to review that directive
to see if it can be streamlined and improved.
Second, yes, we have been told that the strategic planning
concept of operations planning and strategic guidance has been
put on hold pending the results of the White House review of
the directive.
Third, and the last question, Congressman? You had three
parts.
Mr. Cao. Right. I asked you if the White House National
Security Staff still puts a hold on the remaining plans. If the
answer is yes, they still put a hold, the question is, why? If
no, they are no longer putting a hold, then where is the status
of the planning?
Mr. Skinner. It is my understanding that there is still a
continuing hold on future planning pending the results of a new
directive.
Mr. Cao. Do you know why it is taking so long to review
these directives?
Mr. Skinner. No, I don't. It is my understanding it might
be some differences in how we want to approach our National
strategic planning.
Mr. Cao. Now you also said that the National planning
scenarios were making progress. Can you explain to me what kind
of progress we were making?
Mr. Skinner. Originally, it was our understanding that the
Department wanted to start this process back in 2008--early
2008--but we were not able to start developing or issuing
guidance until late 2008. We saw progress in four of the
scenarios where we had strategic guidance, we had strategic
plans, we had operational plans or concept of operations plans.
But that all came to a halt in July 2009.
Mr. Cao. As of today, we don't really know where these--
what is the process, where we are in the process.
Mr. Skinner. That is correct. I understand it is all on
hold. In January of this year, we speculated that, at the pace
that we were moving, that we could have a complete set of plans
by February 2011. But I think--I doubt very seriously if that
can happen.
Mr. Cao. Based on your understanding of these planning
scenarios, how urgent is it that we complete these plans?
Mr. Skinner. I think it is extremely urgent that we
complete these plans. If you look at the scenarios that were
developed and identified, everyone was in agreement that these
are issues that need to be addressed. We need to have a Nation-
wide plan at all levels--at the Federal level all the way,
vertically and horizontally, down to the State and locals, the
private sector.
We saw what happened in Katrina. We saw what happened in
Deepwater Horizon. I think it is very important that we have
plans in place that people understand what their organizational
responsibilities are, what the resources are available to
address certain scenarios--a chemical attack, a nuclear attack.
I think it is extremely important. I think the administration
recognizes it is important. I am confident they will get back
on track.
Mr. Cao. So, based on the answers I have received, can I
assume that what you are trying to say is the White House
National Security Staff, they are not acting with a sense of
urgency?
Mr. Skinner. I don't want to draw that conclusion. I
believe they are actively engaged. It is just you would have to
ask--I have not been--our office has not been privy to what the
issues that are being raised between the White House and the
Department.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Pascrell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. I want to continue, if I may, Mr. Chairman,
on the path that Mr. Cao has laid out very astutely.
I would like to ask Mr. Skinner, who I have a great, great
affection for, and Mr. Jenkins, from the Government
Accountability Office, this question. Upon your examination
from your each different specific points of perception, how
would you explain--how would you describe the relationship
between BP and the Minerals Management Service?
Mr. Skinner. Congressman, we are in a process currently of
looking at the Department of Homeland Security's response and
the Coast Guard's response to the Deepwater Horizon incident.
Mr. Pascrell. But the Minerals Management Service is under
the Interior Department.
Mr. Skinner. That is correct.
Mr. Pascrell. Have you had any review?
Mr. Skinner. No.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me ask it this way. Have you looked with
the Interior Department at the relationship BP had with the
Government?
Mr. Skinner. Yes. We are coordinating our reviews.
Mr. Pascrell. What did you conclude?
Mr. Skinner. We have not drawn any conclusions.
Mr. Pascrell. When will we get those conclusions?
Mr. Skinner. Our first three reviews we hope to have
something by the end of this calendar year. Our review of
National Contingency Plan and its relationship to the former
MMS we are looking at early next spring.
Mr. Pascrell. So if I would have asked you this before this
disaster, you would have said we are going to put a committee
together or we are going to refer this to a panel of some sort
that will examine whatever the relationship was with BP and any
Federal agency that has oversight. You would be answering me
the same thing.
Mr. Skinner. No. Let me say this, that, based on my
conversations with the Acting IG or the IG at the Department of
Interior, they are actively engaged in studying this subject as
we speak. They may draw conclusions and issue reports a lot
sooner than our ability to draw conclusions on the adequacy of
the Coast Guard's and the Department of Homeland Security's
response.
Mr. Pascrell. So the Department of Interior is looking into
this relationship as well. Is that what you are telling me?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. That doesn't seem to me to be a healthy
situation at first blush, but maybe I am wrong----
Mr. Skinner. It is the Department of Interior Inspector
General, who is independent of the Management in that
relationship.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me ask you, Mr. Jenkins, the same
questions. How would you answer them?
Mr. Jenkins. I can't answer them only because we have done
absolutely no work on that topic at all. So we don't have any
information on that.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, here's my dilemma then with that, Mr.
Skinner--Mr. Jenkins, I am not blaming you personally. We have
a situation--I will repeat what I said earlier. You have
oversight. We don't need a disaster to look into if that
oversight is paying us dividends or there is no oversight;
simply by name we have oversight.
I don't accept this. I want to tell you this right now. I
do not accept what you are just telling me, that you can't tell
me right now what was the relationship between what really was
a flunky organization by everyone's measure, this Minerals
Management Service. Again, slowly, I turned. You can't tell me
what the relationship was with that agency or any oil company,
could you?
Mr. Jenkins. No, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Who would know that?
Mr. Jenkins. I think it would be--we have----
Mr. Pascrell. Who would know that, Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, as Mr. Skinner said, the Interior
Inspector General would be the best source.
Mr. Pascrell. He is going to be inspecting an agency which
is in the Interior Department. Thank you.
Let me ask you this. The Homeland Security Act of 2002
vested the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
with responsibility for emergency planning for natural and man-
made crises on behalf of the United States. Under the Act, the
Department acts as a focal point regarding natural and man-made
crises and emergency planning.
So the law is clear in saying that the DHS is primarily
responsible for emergency planning in a man-made crisis, which
this certainly was. Yet, as I said before, it is abundantly
clear that no such emergency plan existed.
Furthermore, it seems clear to me that the DHS had
absolutely no role in emergency planning before this disaster
occurred. I don't care what I have read; I have come to that
conclusion. Maybe you could give me other information and
change my mind. I have changed my mind on some things, that the
weather is too cold; it is too hot. I have changed my mind on a
lot of things in my life, whether my kids were listening to me
or they weren't listening to me.
So let me ask all the witnesses this question. Do you agree
that the Department of Homeland Security and its various
components, including the Coast Guard, had no role in emergency
planning before this disaster occurred? A simple yes or no to
that particular question.
Then I have one more final question, if I may, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Chavez.
Mr. Chavez. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. Rear Admiral.
Admiral Neffenger. Let me just clarify. You are asking if I
agree with you that DHS had no role in emergency planning?
Mr. Pascrell. That is correct.
Admiral Neffenger. From my perspective, no, sir. In fact,
we have been involved in, particularly with respect to oil
spills, planning for 20 some years since the passage of the Oil
Pollution Act.
Mr. Pascrell. You have been. That is interesting.
Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. I do agree with Rear Admiral Neffenger that
the Department and FEMA have been actively engaged in many
areas.
The question is how well those plans have been implemented
and how well they have been exercised; how well have people
been trained to understand what is in those plans? I think
therein lies one of our biggest problems.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. I agree with Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, you all agree with one another.
Let me tell you my take. This is another case of turf
battles when it comes to Homeland Security, Mr. Chairman.
Is it the reason why DHS had no role, really, in emergency
planning because the existing Federal regulator with the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, better
known as BOEMRE--you learned something today, I did, too--
formally known as the Minerals Management Service, did not want
them involved. Can anybody on the panel answer that question?
Mr. Chairman, I conclude, and thank you for allowing me to
go over.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As
witnesses know, as you build on the genius of each of you and
your staff, we build on the genius of our colleagues.
Allow me to build on the genius of our Chairman. I think
this is a very important hearing.
Let me publicly state, Mr. Chairman, that, interestingly
enough, you have several committees that, frankly, overlap what
happened in this great episode of our history, this great
tragedy, from Emergency Preparedness to Cybersecurity. I chair
the Subcommittee on Infrastructure Protection. There is no
doubt that our energy system of pipelines and oil rigs are part
of the infrastructure of America.
Then my dear friend from New Jersey has just opened an
expanded can of worms that talks about how we host disaster
recovery in one entity. I know that each of the gentlemen
sitting here are enormously polite. I may give a yield to the
Inspector General and the GAO. They are often coming and being
impolite because they have to bring truth to the table.
But we have a problem in the system of Government.
Before I pose these questions, let me also join the genius
of my colleague from Texas, as I have joined the genius of the
gentlelady from New York, and indicate that it is important to
note that lives were lost.
We sat here after 9/11 expressing the dismay in that
horrific tragedy that lives were lost, lives were lost, and
when reviewed, we looked at information that had not been
translated, phones that didn't work, and we felt sad.
Let me also note, as we did in 9/11, of the heroic acts of
so many people. Again, the energy industry, the folks that just
work, we have to thank them. As I visited the command center in
Houma, and just over and over again, let me thank the command
center leadership and thank the Coast Guard.
I want to express my appreciation to Admiral Allen and all
of you who moved expeditiously when the call came. Let no one
diminish the time spent away from family and the heroic efforts
that were there.
Going on that, I am going to be the unpleasant person at
the party and say it is atrocious. I have to tell my colleagues
it is atrocious. They are not going to listen. But there is no
reason to scatter jurisdiction on disaster. If you need
someone, you can call them up. But the anchor of disaster
should be Homeland Security. Natural disaster, man-made
disaster: Homeland security.
There is a phrase in the Bible when someone asks about who
is going to do a certain act, and you stand and say: Send me. I
don't mind taking the responsibility.
So my concern is, we need some people, whether it is a
Republican administration, a Democratic administration, we need
somebody to stand up and say, this is not working; I have got
too many bosses.
Now I would like the Department of Interior, and they might
be good when things are going well, to make sure that they are
reviewing what is going on, on the rig. They admit that they
failed by not going to that rig as often as they should because
it is well known that some on the rig absconded--I use that
terminology--left the rig days out because they felt something
was not right. So the question has to be: When are we all going
to own up to this?
Let me just ask this question, Mr. Chavez. When the oil
spill was designated a National Significance, a SONS--look at
that acronym--and Admiral Thad Allen was appointed National
incident commander, what role does Secretary Napolitano have?
Mr. Chavez. She was the incident manager.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Was she flown out to the site 24 hours a
day, standing, giving orders or working in conjunction? How did
that work, sir?
Mr. Chavez. She was working through Admiral Allen, again,
as the incident commander as per the plan.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. So she was getting measured
information or delayed information. When I say she, let me just
say the Secretary of Homeland Security, because this goes on
from how many years back. We are not pointing out to the
Secretary. We know she is at another hearing today. We are just
trying to get the structure.
So what you are saying is she was getting information 4
hours, 24 hours, et cetera, later.
Mr. Chavez. As it came in.
Ms. Jackson Lee. As it came in, you believe.
Mr. Chavez. I know. That is what the responsibility as the
National Operations Center.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But we don't have any documentation,
having that position not necessarily being on site, that it was
first knowledge. You are saying, under the procedures, you
think that is what happened.
Mr. Chavez. Agree.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me move to Admiral Neffenger.
When you had this responsibility and you worked with the
Secretary, who is considered ultimately in charge, the Admiral
or the Secretary of Homeland Security, whoever that might be?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, for this incident the Secretary
named Admiral Allen the National incident commander and vested
ultimate decision-making authority in him; however, maintained
her role as the principal Federal official under HSPD-5 through
daily interaction with him. I personally witnessed their daily
interaction.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is positive.
But let me probe this. The Chairman said we will have
additional questions. I am going to put this question on the
record and ask you to give this to me in writing, how we can
enhance that relationship.
Since you were involved in Katrina, don't let your mind
focus only on the oil spill. I, frankly, believe that it should
be in tandem, so that we can concretely reinforce that Homeland
Security and the Secretary of Homeland Security, reporting to
the President, reporting to this Congress, is right there on
the action.
So let me just ask you in this question, and I have got two
more quickly, Mr. Chairman: Did you develop your expertise on
the job, on this oil spill? Did you gather some industry people
right to you real quick? How did you move quickly on this
issue?
Admiral Neffenger. Actually, there is a number of pieces to
that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Excuse my voice.
Admiral Neffenger. Let me quickly outline the process. As I
mentioned earlier, there is a robust planning process that was
put in place by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. That, among
other things, included development of area contingency plans,
which are coordinated through the State government and State
agencies, as well as the Federal Government, and responsible
parties--potential responsibility parties. That generates
something called an Area Contingency Plan, which is the first
step in knowing what you might need in the event of a major oil
spill or even a minor oil spill response. That is the first
piece that is in place, is the pre-need relationships amongst
those folks.
When an event actually happens, the plan is a guideline
only, and then you have to adjust it on the fly, as you know,
because in the case of this event, things happened that we
hadn't ever seen before. So, in this case, we knew that we
needed--the Oil Pollution Act of 1990's fundamental principle
was that the American taxpayer shouldn't bear the burden of
cleaning up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can you get with how you got the
expertise, quickly? I need to ask----
Admiral Neffenger. We drew on the industry for the
expertise, not just the responsible party, but other members,
and we took experts within the Coast Guard and within the
Federal Government.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me quickly ask the two gentlemen this
last question, the Inspector General and GAO. You are doing a
study, Inspector General, after the fact. You did a study after
Katrina. Can you imagine lives lost are just kind of having
their cup overwhelmed about inspector reviews after the fact?
My question to you, can we do better by lodging--and don't tell
me that you are going to give us a report in 2011--disaster
responsibilities in one Government entity? Do we need to have
the true expertise, spend money on the expertise that helps us
in conspicuous potential obvious nuclear situation, oil spill,
flood, et cetera? I would ask the GAO on that. You are going to
be studying after the fact. There is a frustration for us
studying everything after the fact.
Mr. Skinner. Let me say, I don't believe that all expertise
can rest within the Department of Homeland Security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I don't either, but I am saying----
Mr. Skinner. I am sorry.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Sufficient. Should the Homeland Security
Department be a major responsible key focus for disasters in
the United States with a certain amount of expertise?
Mr. Skinner. Absolutely. We should be the lead.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is what I am trying to understand.
Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, absolutely they should be the lead and
not only have at least some basic level of expertise, but they
need to be able to know where they can draw on that expertise
expeditiously when needed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, witnesses, for appearing.
It is important that we have leadership, and it is
important that that leadership be perceived as taking the lead.
Somehow in this scenario with Deepwater Horizon, the
perception existed that BP was in charge. That perception
became a reality for a lot of people. They literally thought
that this was something that BP was not only responsible for
but was taking the lead on and was going to dictate how and
when and to what extent actions would be taken. The question
becomes: How do we resolve that kind of perception that can
cloud the minds of the public?
Admiral, your thoughts, please.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I understand the angst that
develops when people see the entity that they think is
responsible for causing something playing a role in somehow
cleaning it up.
But I would suggest that that is exactly what we need to
have happen. We want the polluter to pay, and we want the
spiller to be responsible.
In order to ensure that they do clean it up, you have to
have them close by. If you are going to be ordering them to
write the checks and to pay for the equipment and the
requirements and to bring the resources to bear, which is what
we expect, not at the taxpayer's expense but at their expense,
then you need them close by to make that happen.
I think that where we have to deal with the perception, we
need to explain that. We need to explain, why did BP have a
role in the Incident Command? It is because the incident
commander, who at all times was in charge of this, the Federal
on-scene coordinator, currently Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft,
needs them there so that when he issues a directive or an order
to them, he can see that it is carried out and he can ensure
that it is carried out.
Chairman Thompson. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Green. Yes, I will.
Chairman Thompson. Admiral, one of the earlier witnesses
said that BP had the authority to veto certain decisions in
this process. Did we give BP the veto authority?
Admiral Neffenger. No, sir.
At no time did they have veto authority.
They did, however, sometimes suggest different ways of
doing things that we then reviewed, in particular with respect
to securing the source at the wellhead.
They had expertise. So it is not unusual to have them
suggest an alternative means of doing it, to then review that
within the Federal Government, and we had technical teams and
scientific teams that would do that, engineering teams that
would do that.
There were many times discussions that took place and
meetings that took place, but ultimately, the authority always
and still rests with the Federal Government in the Federal on-
scene coordinator.
Chairman Thompson. Well, we will provide you with some
information to the contrary relative to the testimony from a
previous witness and ask you to respond on it.
[The information follows:]
Question. Did BP have the power to veto any decisions made by the
National Incident Command (NIC), and if so, under what circumstances
and authority; Did BP, in fact, veto any of the NIC's decisions stating
the particular circumstances of any veto; and If BP did not have the
power to veto decisions made by the NIC, then what authority or input
did BP have regarding response measures to be carried out through the
NIC?
Answer. BP did not have the power to veto decisions of the National
Incident Command and therefore did not. BP does have membership on the
Unified Area Command (UAC). This allows BP to provide expertise and
useful information in determining response priorities and actions. It
also allows BP to best support the response efforts. Final decision
authority within the UAC resides with the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.
BP also had access to directly discuss response measures and decisions
with the National Incident Command.
Chairman Thompson. The other issue--and I will give you
plenty of time, Mr. Green. You are the last questioner.
With respect to dispersants, did the Coast Guard approve BP
using the amount of dispersants that was used, or was that a BP
decision?
Admiral Neffenger. No. It starts with the pre-approval of
the Regional Response Team, that is the collection of agencies
at the Federal level and that handle all those pre-approval
processes. So the dispersant that was used was already on a
pre-approved dispersant use list.
On a daily basis BP had to request permission from the
Federal on-scene coordinator, from the Coast Guard, in order to
use dispersants. Any use of dispersants was approved by the
Federal on-scene coordinator.
Chairman Thompson. So the volume, i.e. the amount, of
dispersant, was approved by the Coast Guard.
Admiral Neffenger. On a daily basis, yes, sir.
But if I could add to that. The use of dispersants is
always a tradeoff. The tradeoff is this: You know that when you
have a spill of this magnitude--and, as I said, every day it
was a major new oil spill--you want to avoid as much shoreline
impact as possible because we know how sensitive those marsh
areas are and how many natural resources are at risk in the
event oil comes ashore. So dispersants are one way you can
mitigate that amount coming to shore and hopefully break it up
enough so that natural processes can act on it.
Second, those individuals working at the site, there is a
tremendous amount of oil, as you know, coming right up at the
well site, and that generated a lot of what are called volatile
organic compounds. These are just the aromatics that come off
the top. They are very hazardous and dangerous to your health.
So the dispersants were used on the surface to knock those down
for the safety of workers at the site.
So those were the two primary reason dispersants were used.
The amount that was used in any given day, while we attempted
to minimize as much as possible, was used based upon those two
considerations.
Chairman Thompson. I yield back to the gentleman from
Texas. Thank you for being so kind.
Mr. Green. I thank you for your questions. I welcome that
type of inquiry. Thank you very much.
With reference to the perception of leadership and
perception of who is in charge, somehow, at the genesis of
this, BP stepped up to the microphone, stepped up to the world
stage, and presented an image of being not only in charge to
the extent that they were rendering technical expertise, but
that this was their, for better want of terminology, it was
their operation to manage in total.
Now am I to understand that while BP provided expertise, it
was actually the Federal Government that was literally in
charge of the incident?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir. That is in accordance with the
law.
Mr. Green. If that is the case, and that is the way I
understand it, a litigator in a courtroom brings in experts,
but at no time does a litigator allow the appearance, the
perception to exist that the expert is in charge of the
litigation. Somehow we have to come--we have to look at this
carefully now, because it can happen again.
Somehow we allowed BP to seize this perception of being in
charge and, in so doing, gave the public some degree of
discomfort because of what you said about being responsible for
what happened and then for the clean-up and the mitigation
effort.
So I am bringing this up because when this happens again--
and I pray that it never does; 11 lives were too many. One life
is too many. It hurts my heart to talk about this because I can
never talk about it without talking about those lives that were
lost. But somehow BP or the next BP must not seize the moment
such that the ultimate authority appears to be secondary or
perhaps even tertiary to the primary authority--actually, the
assumed primary authority, which was BP.
Am I making this clear to you, Admiral? If not, I can say
it in different words. I do have the ability to speak such that
people can understand me. So if that is not clear, I would like
to say it in different words. But do you follow what I am
saying?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir. I do.
Let me add, I think what we really noticed in an incidence
of this magnitude is, and it goes back to the early comment
about the local nature of oil spills of this magnitude, if you
look back over the 11,000-plus oil spills that the Federal
Government has responded to in the water--the Coast Guard is
the Federal entity and coordinator since the Exxon spill, and
they are of all sizes. I mean, some of are very, very small,
anything from a quart of an oil to a few hundred gallons into
something as large as this--what you normally find, the average
citizen normally doesn't see any of that response.
So you work closely with the person responsible. You act
out to enforce the requirement to have them clean it up, to
bring the resources to the scene and to move forward, and then
you go from there.
This response, however, looked a lot more like a natural, a
major natural disaster than it did--it looked a lot like, and
particularly considering where it happened, along the Gulf
Coast, you know, a population that has suffered considerably
over the past 5 years or so from natural disasters. This felt
very local. It threatened the livelihoods of the people down
there. It threatened their fishing grounds, and it became this
on-going threat without a perceived end for some period of
time. That dramatically changes the nature of it.
I think you have to account for that, going forward, being
the case. This is a world in which the availability of
information, the interest on the part of the public is
significant. I think that is good because it brings a lot of
people to bear; it brings a lot of people forward that say, I
want to help, I want to do something. But it also gets to that
question, I think, you have with regard to perception.
So moving forward, one of the things that you want to look
at in judging the lessons of this is: How do we better involve
the populace from the beginning? How do we address their
concerns and their needs in a way that helps to explain why
they might see something like a BP representative talking about
what they are doing to stop the oil flow, but that doesn't mean
that the BP representative is running the show. I don't know if
that's responsive to your question, sir.
Mr. Green. It is, and I will leave with this, and I thank
you for your response.
Here is the circumstance that we now have to negotiate: We
had one strike with Katrina, because we didn't have someone to
immediately step forward and say: I am in charge. The Governor
equivocated. The mayor was involved. But we didn't have someone
to immediately step up and say: I am in charge.
With this incident, there was some question as to who was
in charge. At some point, when these things happen, at or near
Day 1, someone has to step up and say: I am in charge. It
really, it is a simple concept, but it is something that has to
happen, so that the public can acquire that degree of comfort
necessary to allow us to move forward and do the things that we
have to do, because we are continually being questioned about
who really was in charge, even though we know the hierarchy
associated with this concern.
So I thank you, and I just wanted to have that moment to
let you know that we have a concern that has to be addressed.
Thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman for the additional time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
But I also appreciate you raising the issue.
President Taffaro was clear in his testimony that when his
parish made a request to the Coast Guard, BP disagreed with the
request. I am trying to figure out, how does BP get into a
response scenario to do anything other than--can you kind of
explain?
I understand that they were there for advice or whatever.
But when they get to the point where they become part of the
decision-making process, to that local official, it is almost
like the person who caused the problem is now determining what
solution is applied to the problem they created.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I don't know the specific incident
of which you are speaking, but I can say, in general terms, as
I noted before, BP would often, throughout the course of this
response, make recommendations as to how to go about
implementing something that we ordered them to do from the
Federal on-scene coordinator, anything from, with respect to
how you might deploy resources to the types of resources that
might be available.
That doesn't necessarily mean that they got to choose which
one it was, but because they are paying for it and we are
asking them to order it and they might come back and say, look,
I can't get this type of equipment, but I can get this; do you
think that might work?
With respect to their participation in direct requests from
parish presidents back to the Coast Guard, I just don't have
any direct knowledge of that, sir. But I would be happy to take
any of those incidents for the record and respond to them.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Skinner, did your review indicate
any problems along this line? Or you haven't looked at it?
Mr. Skinner. We are currently in the middle of our review
right now, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I think part of this after-action
or lessons-learned effort on behalf of the committee is to, as
the gentleman from Texas indicated, you want to be very clear
who is in charge.
But for that local elected official, who, for the most
part, is the individual being contacted by local citizens, they
need to have a very clear line.
But the process also should be one that involves training
of local personnel and others, and I think we can do plans. We
can do all those other things that Katrina taught us. Plans are
on the shelf, and they are no better than the people who are
tasked with the responsibility of carrying them out.
I guess the question, last question for me, Admiral, if a
comparable spill occurred tomorrow, what have we learned from
the Horizon spill that would be beneficial for that spill?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I think, as you have noted, sir,
what we learned immediately is you have to involve local
mayors, local councils, local parish presidents immediately in
the response and provide an active space for them in the
response structure.
We have always worked with the States, but you can't make
the assumption that the State can speak for the needs of local
populace. That is, to me, one of the early and most positive
lessons that we learned out of this and we addressed during the
course of the response.
The parish president liaisons, for example, were put in
place in the third week of May, so just a month into the
response, to address specifically some of those very real and
vocal concerns that came up. So that is one immediate thing you
would do differently is immediately involve them.
Some other things that we learned were how to do just-in-
time training for people who hadn't otherwise been trained. By
the end of this response, we were moving people through on-
site, just-in-time training for hazardous materials handling,
for basic understanding of oil spill hazards and so forth.
Chairman Thompson. Do we have personnel available to us to
handle a comparable response like the Horizon from the Coast
Guard standpoint?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, a response of this magnitude
stresses any organization, particularly as it goes over time. I
am not sure that you ever want to just have on the shelf enough
to respond to something of this magnitude.
What you really need to do is ensure that you have
expertise, that you take the expertise we learned from this,
you distribute it throughout the organization so that you have
a base of trained people within your organization, and then you
know how to reach out to all those resources that are available
to you across the Government.
Chairman Thompson. So do we have the expertise?
Admiral Neffenger. I believe we do, yes, sir. I believe
that this spill has given us even more of that expertise.
Chairman Thompson. So, how do we resolve the perception
question if we have the expertise now?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I think it goes back to a better
connection early on in a response with the local population,
with the local mayors, the local parish presidents and helping
them to understand, you know, that the process that is here--
you know, some of this is the tension between expectations of
Federal response in a disaster. You know the Stafford Act is a
Federal support to local authorities, and local authorities
implement the response.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 establishes a very different
structure. It is a Federally-directed structure that puts the
Federal Government in charge with assistance from the State and
local entities, but the money doesn't go to the State and local
entities from the Federal Government.
So that is a natural tension that develops, particularly
among a geographic region that is probably more familiar with a
FEMA-like Stafford Act response.
So, I think some of it is just understanding the
difference, and then allowing for a Federally-directed
response, because you want that unity of effort, particularly
when you have something of this geographic scope. I mean, it
crossed five States and multiple geographic and jurisdictional
boundaries. So I think that it is a good thing to have a
Federal entity ensuring that unity of effort.
But then you have to have a way to tie in the very real
needs and demands of the local populations, because the effect
of that oil spill is very different depending upon where you
stand on the Gulf Coast.
Chairman Thompson. It is clear that the purpose of this
hearing was to kind of come up with going forward and the
review. Obviously, there are a lot of questions yet to be
answered. But let me thank you for your patience and indulgence
as witnesses and your valuable testimony.
I would again like to remind you that Members of the
committee may have additional questions for you, and we will
ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those
questions. There being no further business, the committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Richard
M. Chavez
Question 1. According to the National Contingency Plan, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard appoints the National Incident Commander
(NIC) and determines whether a spill is a Spill of National
Significance (SONS). However, the Secretary of Homeland Security
declared the SONS and appointed the NIC. Why was this the case? Will
the administration revise the National Contingency Plan to formally
grant the Secretary these authorities?
Answer. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security is ``the [Federal] focal point
regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.'' Under
that Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the
Secretary serves as the principal Federal official for all domestic
incidents, and therefore has overall responsibility for coordinating
the Federal Government's resources in response to and recovery from
incidents like a Spill of National Significance (SONS). The National
Contingency Plan sets forth the framework and organizational structure
for the Federal response to oil spills, including the designation of a
National Incident Commander, if one is necessary. Thus, for a SONS
incident in the coastal zones, the Secretary of Homeland Security or
the Commandant of the Coast Guard may name the National Incident
Commander. In the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Secretary named the
Commandant of the Coast Guard as the National Incident Commander.
Question 2. According to HSPD-8, the head of each Federal
department or agency is required to undertake actions to support the
National preparedness goal, including adoption of quantifiable
performance measurements in the areas of training, planning, equipment,
and exercises for Federal incident management and asset preparedness.
Does DHS review these performance measurements? If not, who has
oversight over these Federal departments or agencies to ensure that
they are meeting the Secretary's National preparedness goal?
Answer. As an operational component of DHS, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is the Department's lead agency for
preparedness. Specifically, FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate
(NPD) within Protection and National Preparedness is responsible for
leading the Nation's efforts to enhance preparedness to prevent,
protect from, respond to, and recover from disasters, natural and
manmade. NPD strives to achieve a Nation prepared through a
comprehensive cycle of planning, organizing and equipping, training,
exercising, evaluating, and improvement planning.
In 2007, FEMA published the National Preparedness Guidelines which
finalized the development of the National Preparedness Goal and its
related preparedness tools. The Guidelines, including the supporting
Target Capabilities List, defines what it means for the Nation to be
prepared for all hazards. There are four critical elements of the
Guidelines:
(1) The National Preparedness Vision, which provides a concise
statement of the core preparedness goal for the Nation.
(2) The National Planning Scenarios, which depict a diverse set of
high-consequence threat scenarios of both potential terrorist
attacks and natural disasters.
(3) The Universal Task List (UTL), which is a menu of some 1,600
unique tasks that can facilitate efforts to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from the major events that are
represented by the National Planning Scenarios.
(4) The Target Capabilities List (TCL), which defines 37 specific
capabilities that communities, the private sector, and all
levels of government should collectively possess in order to
respond effectively to disasters.
To support the Federal role in implementing the preparedness
framework outlined in the Guidelines, Federal departments and agencies
were directed to do the following:
(1) Support and participate in the management and maintenance
structure and process developed for the Guidelines, associated
tools, and Capabilities-Based Preparedness process; and
(2) Initiate or re-orient programs and initiatives to implement the
Guidelines.
Additionally, in the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act,
Congress tasked FEMA with producing a series of reports, including a
Federal Preparedness Report, to address preparedness questions. FEMA
subsequently worked with Congress to consolidate this series of reports
into one National Preparedness Report. This report is still underway,
but should be entered into the interagency process soon.
Question 3a. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Office
of Operations Coordination and Planning?
How was your office contributing to the incident management for the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill?
Question 3b. Does your office have any responsibilities under the
National Response Framework? If so, please describe these duties.
Answer. The Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS)
supports the Secretary by ensuring that the Department has
collaborative operations coordination and planning capabilities at the
strategic level. OPS provides support to Departmental leadership by
facilitating internal DHS operational decision-making and the
Department's involvement in interagency operations.
The National Operations Center (NOC), one of the divisions of OPS,
serves as the primary National-level hub for domestic situational
awareness and operations coordination across the Federal Government
pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and for domestic
incident management. The NOC is central to our ability to maintain
situational awareness for the Secretary and Department leadership. It
collects and synthesizes all-source information across all threats and
all hazards, covering the full spectrum of homeland security missions
and partners, sharing event-related and operational information with
Federal, State, local, territorial, Tribal, and non-governmental
partners. Additionally, the NOC serves as the primary coordinating
center for other Federal operations centers focused on homeland
security operations. In performing these functions, the NOC ensures
that critical information related to terrorism, disasters, and other
threats reaches Government decision-makers in a timely manner.
The NOC operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, to
support the Secretary and the Department's mission.
OPS coordinates with DHS Components and interagency partners to
develop strategic-level plans to support the effective execution of the
Secretary's incident coordination responsibilities, as defined in the
Homeland Security Act and Presidential Directives. OPS works with
representatives from DHS Components and other Federal, State, and local
partners to develop strategic plans and guidance. OPS also supports the
Secretary by providing operational planning expertise during crises.
As DHS Continuity Coordinator, OPS is responsible for ensuring the
effectiveness and survivability of all DHS Primary Mission Essential
Functions (PMEFs). OPS works with Component leadership to ensure that
PMEFs will be sustained even during emergencies that could
significantly hamper personnel, facilities, or operations for homeland
security missions.
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded on 20 April 2010. In the
hours and days following the explosion, OPS, the NOC, DHS Components,
and our partners supported the Secretary, the Department, and the
interagency community in responding to what began as a search and
rescue event.
On 21 April 2010, OPS initiated the crisis action process, which
uses a dedicated staff that can provide detailed information and
decision support for a specific incident, while minimizing the impact
to our on-going missions. On 29 April 2010, a Spill of National
Significance (SONS) was declared and OPS activated the full Crisis
Action Team (CAT) to support the Secretary and the National Incident
Commander, who would be later named, in directing response efforts. The
CAT stood down on 6 August 2010, after 99 days of continuous operation.
OPS actions during the BP Deepwater Horizon response, with support
from our partners, included the following:
Coordinating responses to Requests for Information (RFIs) on
a nearly daily basis;
Preparing Senior Leadership Briefs (SLBs);
Developing decision support products for the Secretary and
other DHS leadership; and
Contributing to a robust interagency response effort through
regular coordination calls, teleconferences, and other
briefings.
In response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, OPS provided
strategic level support, in accordance with a predefined set of plans
and standard operating procedures, for the National Incident Commander,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the President of the United
States.
The NRF highlights the NOC responsibilities/actions. It states that
the NOC serves as the National fusion center, collecting and
synthesizing all-source information, including information from State
fusion centers, across all-threats and all-hazards information covering
the spectrum of homeland security partners. Federal departments and
agencies should report information regarding actual or potential
incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response to the NOC.
Question 4. The Macondo well was 5,067 feet deep, and it leaked
over 200 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico when the
blowout preventer failed. There are at least three other wells that
have been drilled in the Gulf at depths of up to 9,627 feet, and could
do even more damage in a major spill.
What steps is the Department taking to ensure that the Government
has access to the necessary equipment, technology, and expertise to
respond to a spill at these depths?
Answer. The Coast Guard is working with other Government agencies,
National Response Team members, States and local governments, the oil
industry and the oil spill removal organizations (OSROs) at the local,
regional, and National levels to review existing industry and
Government plans. These reviews are intended to validate and revise
when appropriate the stakeholder communities involved in planning worst
case discharge planning assumptions, the completeness of strategies and
assumptions in place to address the worst case discharge, and the
equipment and personnel availability to carry out those strategies.
These reviews will include review of pre-authorization agreements for
dispersant, in-situ burning and any other innovative response
techniques that may be considered for use in spill response.
At the National level, both industry and Government are in the
process of re-examining the efficacy of planning standards contained in
the regulations relative to ``estimated daily recovery capacity'' for
mechanical recovery equipment as well as efficiency estimates for both
in-situ burning and dispersion. To improve awareness and mobilization
of resources from around the country, we are working with the OSROs to
enhance the National Response Resource Inventory. We have also
initiated efforts through the Department of State to engage
internationally in sharing information about and access to response
resources world-wide.
Question 5a. The Coast Guard does not have direct authority to
review disaster plans for underwater sub-platform drilling systems.
That authority rests with the Department of Interior. In the case of
the Deepwater Horizon, BP's plan was a cookie-cutter plan that listed
seals and walruses as animals dwelling in the Gulf.
Did anyone in the Department review this plan?
Question 5b. Has anyone at the Department reviewed the sub-platform
disaster plans for any deepwater wells? If not, why not?
Question 5c. Has the Department performed a review to identify gaps
in DHS disaster planning authority?
Question 5d. What is the Department's strategy for ensuring
effective disaster planning where other Federal agencies control
disaster planning, or for unregulated industries?
Question 5e. Does the Department need new authorities so that it
can review these plans in the future?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not review
BP's plan before the oil spill and has not reviewed sub-platform
disaster plans for any deepwater wells. There is no statutory authority
for DHS to review or approve the disaster plan for the underwater sub-
platform drilling system for the Deepwater Horizon rig or for any other
rigs operating on the Outer Continental Shelf. That is the
responsibility of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE), formerly the Minerals Management Service (MMS).
DHS is constantly capturing after-action items from exercises and
real-world events such as the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. These after-
action items are taken for future corrective actions, as necessary.
DHS/FEMA is leading the development of multiple interagency
disaster planning activities, including catastrophic planning for
responding to hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, Improvised Nuclear
Devices, and other natural and man-made disasters, including terrorism.
DHS is still in the after-action review process for the Deepwater
Horizon disaster and is working with other Federal, State, and local
partners as well as private industry to identify needed corrective
actions. This process will yield any recommendations for expanded
authorities for the Department, and will be presented to Congress at
that time.
Question 6a. DHS is not mentioned in the National Contingency Plan
addressing Federal Government oil spill response.
Has this caused confusion or posed any challenges for DHS in
leading Deepwater Horizon response efforts?
Question 6b. How should these issues be addressed going forward?
Answer. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5), the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security is the Federal focal point regarding
natural and man-made crises and serves as the principal Federal
official for all domestic incidents. The National Contingency Plan
(NCP) sets forth the framework and organizational structure for the
Federal response to oil spills--a type of domestic incident. The NCP
names the Coast Guard as the response lead for oil spills in coastal
zones. Once the Secretary designated the Deepwater Horizon oil spill a
Spill of National Significance, the Secretary led the multi-agency
Federal response to the oil spill with the Coast Guard leading the
operational response on the ground. We are not aware of any confusion
in DHS' role in the Deepwater Horizon response.
Question 7a. Who in the Department is responsible for establishing
policy and overall strategy for fulfilling the obligation to
collaborate Federal disaster planning efforts? Where is this policy or
strategy documented?
Who is responsible for oversight of DHS components' disaster
planning activities? Describe these internal oversight efforts.
Question 7b. What accountability measures are in place to ensure
that appropriate disaster planning is being done within DHS and
throughout the Federal Government?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Office of Policy establish policy and strategy for collaborating on
Federal disaster planning efforts. FEMA's role in establishing policy
and strategy for Federal disaster planning efforts is described in the
National Response Framework (NRF) and the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act. FEMA is currently leading the development of
multiple inter-agency disaster planning activities, including
catastrophic planning for responding to hurricanes, earthquakes,
tsunamis, Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND), and other natural and
manmade disasters including terrorism. FEMA also coordinates Emergency
Support Function (ESF) emergency management resources and has invested
substantial time in meeting with the ESFs through the auspices of the
Emergency Support Functions Leadership Group (ESFLG). Under the NRF,
Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross are grouped
by capabilities and types of expertise, into ESFs to provide the
planning, support, resources, program implementation, and emergency
services that are most likely to be needed during a disaster response.
As established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive--5, the
Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for
domestic incident management. The Secretary employs the DHS Office of
Policy to strengthen homeland security by developing and integrating
Department-wide policies, planning, and programs in order to better
coordinate the Department's response and recovery missions. The DHS
strategy for policy and planning is documented in the DHS Strategic
Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2013. DHS Office of Policy represents the
Department at interagency policy committee meetings of the National
Security Staff's Domestic Resilience Group (DRG). FEMA also
participates in and is represented on the DRG, which coordinates policy
development and implementation by multiple agencies of the United
States Government for National security policies related to domestic
emergency management preparedness policy, response, and incident
management for all hazards. The DHS Office of Policy also leads
development of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which includes
a strategic framework for ensuring resilience to disasters.
Pursuant to statute and Secretarial direction, the responsibility
to lead the collaboration of overall Federal disaster planning efforts
rests with FEMA. Within that responsibility, FEMA coordinates specific
disaster response planning with those agencies responsible for certain
types of disasters.
Each DHS component is responsible for developing appropriate
disaster planning and associated activities for its organization based
on requirements set out in statute or at the direction of the component
head, the Secretary, or the White House. The Office of Operations
Coordination and Planning (OPS) is responsible for coordinating the
development of plans specific to Department operations. OPS does this
by establishing intra-departmental planning teams for developing
threat-specific plans; facilitating and coordinating the planning,
review, and approval process; and distribution of approved plans. In
addition, if requested, OPS supports components in development of their
component-specific plans and reviews component-specific plans, as
appropriate. However, OPS does not have actual oversight of individual
components' disaster-planning activities.
DHS is not aware of any formal accountability measures in place to
ensure appropriate disaster planning is being done within DHS or
throughout the Federal Government. However, when the Secretary, the
President, or the National Security Staff order the development of a
threat-specific plan or set of plans, such as in response to the
anthrax threat, DHS tracks the development of each required plan. OPS
is responsible for tracking DHS-specific planning efforts. FEMA is
responsible for tracking Federal interagency planning efforts.
Question 8a. What authority does the Department have to corral the
resources of other Federal agencies in response to a major disaster?
What mechanism or authority was used to access Federal resources
outside of DHS during the Deepwater Horizon response?
Question 8b. What lessons were learned from these efforts that
would improve future response efforts where multiple Federal agencies
are involved in the response?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Office of Policy establish policy and strategy for collaborating on
Federal disaster planning efforts. FEMA's role in establishing policy
and strategy for Federal disaster planning efforts is described in the
National Response Framework (NRF) and the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act. In addition, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act describes the programs and
processes by which the Federal Government provides disaster and
emergency assistance to State and local governments, Tribal nations,
eligible private nonprofit organizations, and individuals affected by a
declared major disaster or emergency. FEMA is currently leading the
development of multiple inter-agency disaster planning activities,
including catastrophic planning for responding to hurricanes,
earthquakes, tsunamis, Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND), and other
natural and man-made disasters including terrorism. FEMA also
coordinates Emergency Support Function (ESF) emergency management
resources and has invested substantial time in meeting with the ESFs
through the auspices of the Emergency Support Functions Leadership
Group (ESFLG). Under the NRF, Federal departments and agencies and the
American Red Cross are grouped by capabilities and types of expertise,
into ESFs to provide the planning, support, resources, program
implementation, and emergency services that are most likely to be
needed during a disaster response.
HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, establishes a single,
comprehensive National incident management system. Pursuant to HSPD-5,
the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official
for domestic incident management, and is responsible for coordinating
Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. The Secretary is also responsible for coordinating the
Federal Government's resources utilized in response to or recovery from
terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies under any one
of the following circumstances: (1) A Federal department or agency
acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the
Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local authorities are
overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the
appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal
department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to
the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume
responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.
Additionally, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
(PKEMRA) establishes the FEMA Administrator as the principal advisor to
the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary for all
matters relating to emergency management in the United States and
responsible for providing the Federal leadership necessary to prepare
for, protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against
natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters.
With regard to oil spills, in particular, the Oil Pollution Act
authorizes the President to direct Federal, State, and private actions
to remove discharged oil in oil spills. Through the Oil Pollution Act,
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive--5 (HSPD-5), the Department of Homeland Security
was able to access and direct Federal resources outside of the
Department of Homeland Security during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
For instance, DHS leveraged the Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination
Cell (IRSCC), which comprises 18 Federal organizations (NOAA, USGS,
USDA, NASA, EPA, USCG, and seven DHS component organizations, and five
Department of Defense organizations).
Collectively, the IRSCC was established to coordinate, synchronize,
collaborate, and track remote sensing data acquisition activities and
capabilities; to ensure information needs of first responders, State
emergency managers, and Federal managers are established and addressed;
to establish an environment to facilitate awareness and sharing of
remote sensing data; and to improve the governance of Federal remote
sensing operations by minimizing duplication of effort and unnecessary
tasking, and reducing operational costs.
The IRSCC provided the NIC a mechanism for obtaining remotely
sensed data regarding all aspects of the SONS response. The NIC
provided the IRSCC with six detailed information requirements related
to the threat posed to the United States by the oil spill. The IRSCC
used remotely sensed data on a daily basis to determine the extent of
the oil spill, measure its growth/shrinkage, and direct skimming
vessels into the appropriate portions of the spill. The IRSCC also used
this data to track the many miles of boom placed along the coastline to
protect estuaries and other sensitive areas along the coast.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Peter
Neffenger
Question 1. Did the Coast Guard review BP's spill response plan or
its lease exploration plan for the Macondo project? If not, why not?
Does the Coast Guard need new authorities to ensure that it is able to
review relevant plans in the future?
Answer. No, the Coast Guard did not review BP's spill response plan
or its lease exploration plan for the Macondo project. There is no
statutory requirement for the Coast Guard to review or approve Oil
Spill Response Plans (OSRP) for facilities operating on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS). That is the responsibility of the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), formerly
the Minerals Management Service. If the Coast Guard is to be tasked
with review of OSRP's, new authorities and resources would be required.
Question 2. Was any aspect of the Federal response to the Deepwater
Horizon spill hampered by limitations in the Coast Guard's authority?
What authority did the Coast Guard have to direct the activities of
other Federal players involved in the response? Has the Coast Guard
identified gaps in its authorities that should be addressed going
forward?
Answer. No aspects of the Federal response were hampered by
limitations in the Coast Guard's authority. In accordance with the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP/
40 CFR 300.120) the Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC)
directs response efforts and coordinates all other efforts at the scene
of a discharge or release. As part of the planning and preparedness for
response, FOSCs are required to be pre-designated by the Regional or
District head of the lead agency. The Coast Guard is required to
provide FOSCs for oil discharges, including discharges from facilities
and vessels under the jurisdiction of another Federal agency, within or
threatening the coastal zone.
Currently, there are a series of after-action reports being
generated that will identify lessons learned and recommendations
regarding many issues, including National response to oil spills that
occur as a result of offshore continental shelf activities. We will not
have a definitive list of issues and recommendations regarding Coast
Guard authorities until these reports are completed and the lessons
learned and recommendations are fully evaluated.
Question 3. The Coast Guard has extensive experience in surface
spill clean-up and response, but what in-house expertise and equipment
was available to deal with this deepwater spill? How can this capacity
be improved?
Answer. A variety of Coast Guard resources that included equipment
and experienced personnel were used during the DEEPWATER HORIZON (DWH)
response. For example, hundreds of fully qualified Pollution
Investigators and Federal On-Scene Coordinator Representatives were
used to oversee the surface oil spill clean-up activities for the
duration of the response. Additionally, personnel that possessed
specialized oil and HAZMAT skills and experience from the Coast Guard's
three strike teams (Gulf, Atlantic, and Pacific) played key roles in
the DWH response.
The Coast Guard also employed its fleet of buoy tenders, deploying
their Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems and Spilled Oil Recovery
Systems in the response.
Currently, there are a series of DWH after-action reports in
development that will review all aspects of the response and inform
improvements in Coast Guard capabilities.
Question 4. What after-action reporting is the Coast Guard
planning? What is the time frame for completion of this reporting? Will
you commit to providing the committee with an update on after-action
reporting efforts in 30 days, and to provide us these documents once
they are completed?
Answer. The Coast Guard has multiple after-action reports either
completed or in progress. The National Incident Command (NIC) report
was released on October 1, 2010. In December 2010, the Presidential
Commission's Preparedness and Response Workgroup expects to release its
findings. A Search and Rescue case study is anticipated to be completed
in November. The Coast Guard will continue to update the committee on
our efforts.
Question 5. Due to the magnitude of this oil spill, what additional
responsibilities have the National Incident Commander and the On-Scene
Federal Coordinator taken on that were unforeseen when the National
Contingency Plan was developed?
What changes in roles and responsibilities do you foresee will be
made to these positions under the National Contingency Plan?
Answer. This was the first oil spill declared a SONS and therefore,
the first oil spill where a NIC was designated. Section 300.323 of the
National Contingency Plan (NCP) addresses the roles and
responsibilities of the NIC. This section states, ``a National Incident
Commander (NIC) . . . will assume the role of the OSC in communicating
with affected parties and the public, and coordinating Federal, State,
local, and international resources at the National level.''
The magnitude of this spill required the NIC to undertake
responsibilities to ensure a whole-of-Government approach to the
response that is not described in this NCP citation. This included
coordination of claims and coordination with the agencies responsible
for public health activities, including coordination of closures to and
reopening of fisheries. Since various investigations and reports
examining the Deepwater Horizon response are still in progress, it is
too soon to state specifically what changes may be made to this
position under the NCP. With respect to the Federal On-Scene
Coordinator (FOSC), we have yet to identify any responsibilities that
the FOSC performed in this response that are not identified in the NCP.
Questions From Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis of Florida for Peter
Neffenger
Question 1. Admiral, constituents of mine in both local government
and the private sector have expressed their concerns about the lack of
information sharing and exchange with Unified Command, especially at
the outset of the response.
What lessons have you learned from this response thus far with
respect to communications and information sharing and how will these
lessons shape plans for communicating with stakeholders in State and
local governments and the private sector in future response efforts?
Answer. From the outset of the Deepwater Horizon spill, the
Governors of all affected Gulf States were intimately involved in the
response efforts. To provide the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, and Texas with the most up-to-date information on
response efforts, the White House instituted and moderated a daily
conference call where the National Incident Commander (NIC) and the
Federal on Scene Coordinator (FOSC) along with other Federal agencies
briefed. The daily conference call was not only to impart information,
but to provide the Governors a venue to ask questions, communicate
concerns, and share their priorities and assessments of the response.
In return, their candid feedback allowed us to align our efforts and
tailor response strategies with each of the States. The daily
conference call also allowed the Governors to raise many social and
economic issues such as seafood testing to promote consumer confidence
in Gulf seafood and behavioral and mental health concerns for their
affected constituents. This daily conference call proved an effective
communication forum for a multi-jurisdiction response.
Local elected officials also played a significant role in the
response from the start. There were some challenges in working with
some officials due to their unfamiliarity with the oil spill response
strategies outlined in the Area Contingency Plans (ACPs). To better
promote unity of effort, in late May, we assigned more senior liaison
officers to many of the local elected officials across all of the
affected Gulf States. These liaison officers were created to ensure
their concerns were relayed to the Incident Commanders and that
response actions were coordinated to maximize effects.
The communications and information-sharing mechanisms employed
during the Deepwater Horizon contributed to effective sharing of real-
time information and continuous feedback across all appropriate
Federal, State, local, and Tribal government authorities, response
structures, and industry stakeholders. These mechanisms should be
incorporated into regional planning guidance, included in future Area
Contingency Plan revisions and oil spill response exercises, as
appropriate.
Question 2. Admiral, as we discussed at the Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight's July field hearing in New
Orleans, to meet the needs of the response the Coast Guard redeployed
assets from around the country. You noted that surging for this length
of time has been a challenge for the Coast Guard and that we have been
fortunate to not have experienced any other major incidents that would
have further stretched Coast Guard resources.
Seeing how this spill impacted Coast Guard operations, what
additional resources and/or authorities do you believe would be
necessary should the Coast Guard need to respond to a similar incident
in the future while also maintaining its other vital missions?
Answer. During the past year the Coast Guard surged forces to meet
the Nation's disaster response mission needs, including Haitian
earthquake relief efforts, flooding on the Western Rivers, and the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Throughout these surge operations, the
Coast Guard continued to serve the American people by performing its
everyday missions, including search and rescue, enforcing migrant laws,
interdicting illegal drugs, protecting living marine resources, and
ensuring resiliency of the Marine Transportation System. While 2010 was
an exceptional operational year, these demanding operations highlighted
the continuing decline of fleet readiness and reinforced that
recapitalization of aged and obsolete cutters, boats, aircraft, and
support infrastructure is Coast Guard's key strategic imperative.