[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW PERVASIVE IS MISCONDUCT AT TSA:
EXAMINING FINDINGS FROM A JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 7, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-78
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Curt Clawson, Florida Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia Norma J. Torres, California
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Ryan Consaul, Subcommittee Staff Director
Kris Carlson, Subcommittee Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mark Walker, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
Kris Carlson, Subcommittee Clerk
Cedric C. Haynes, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Witnesses
Ms. Huban Gowadia, Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Andrew Oosterbaan, Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Huban Gowadia............ 49
Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Andrew Oosterbaan........ 53
HOW PERVASIVE IS MISCONDUCT AT TSA:
EXAMINING FINDINGS FROM A JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
----------
Thursday, July 7, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency, and
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m.,
in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry
[Chairman of the Oversight and Management Efficiency
subcommittee] presiding.
Present from Subcommittee on Oversight and Management
Efficiency: Representatives Perry, Clawson, Loudermilk, Watson
Coleman, and Torres.
Present from Subcommittee on Transportation Security:
Representatives Katko, Rogers, Carter, Ratcliffe, Keating, and
Payne.
Mr. Perry. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on--the Subcommittees on Oversight and Management Efficiency
and Transportation Security will come to order. The purpose of
this hearing is to examine findings of the joint subcommittee
investigation related to misconduct at the Transportation
Security Administration, otherwise known as the TSA.
Before we begin the Chair asks unanimous consent for the
majority staff report to be included in the hearing record.
Hearing no objection, so ordered*.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred has been retained in committee files and
is also available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
114HPRT97200/pdf/CPRT-114HPRT97200.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chair now recognizes himself for an opening statement.
In May 2016, Secretary Jeh Johnson released a new mission
statement for the Department of Homeland Security. ``With honor
and integrity we will safeguard the American people, our
homeland, and our values.''
I think most Americans would agree this isn't an
unreasonable expectation. The American people expect all
Federal employees, especially those charged with protecting the
homeland to conduct themselves with integrity.
Unfortunately, a 6-month investigation conducted jointly by
this subcommittee and Chairman Katko's subcommittee has found
that TSA violates the words and spirit of this new mission
statement to a degree that is alarming and unconscionable to
most Americans.
Here are the facts of our investigation. Egregious
misconduct occurs across all levels of TSA, all levels from the
bottom to the top, and is growing. Yet, TSA's investigations
into internal misconduct and the resulting penalties have
decreased.
Specifically, we found that TSA employee misconduct grew by
almost 29 percent. Think about that, grew by almost 29 percent
from fiscal year 2013 through 2015--35 percent of airports
experienced increased numbers of allegations, some having
nearly 40 times the number of allegations, that is allegations
to be clear, than in fiscal year 2013.
In terms of the types of misconduct that are growing, we
saw significant increases in areas related to integrity and
ethics, and disruptive behavior including sexual misconduct.
Neglect of duty allegations nearly doubled during this
period. There was a 17 percent jump in the category of failing
to follow instructions. That is just failure. It is simple
stuff, 17 percent jump. There are examples of airport screeners
facilitating drug and human smuggling which we can't imagine
that coming from this dais.
Facilitating drug and human smuggling and sexually
assaulting travelers. A Federal deputy, correction, a deputy
Federal security director promoting a subordinate with whom he
had a romantic relationship among numerous others.
Every American should be outraged by these findings. I
certainly am myself. We are in the highest threat environment
since 9/11. From Orlando to San Bernardino our citizens are
under attack from radical Islamist terrorists.
Terrorist groups remain obsessed with both attacking civil
aviation and recruiting Westerners. Just last month, CIA
Director John Brennan testified that ISIS is probably exploring
a variety of means for infiltrating operatives into the West.
That is what he said.
The last thing the American people need to be concerned
with are corrupt, insolent, and often unethical airport
screeners. What is even more outrageous is that TSA's response
has been to investigate fewer, fewer allegations and use lesser
penalties as the allegations actually increase.
We found that open investigations had declined 15 percent
and closed investigations had declined 28 percent during this
very same period. Use of non-disciplinary actions, such as
counseling, jumped 80 percent while disciplinary actions
including letters of reprimand and suspension decreased by 14
percent. Adverse actions including termination declined 23
percent.
TSA has not taken--this shows, this is evidence that TSA
has not taken this conduct seriously and it is no wonder why
employee morale at DHS is among the worst in the Federal
Government. We literally had hearings on that.
When TSA employees, when employees know that people that
are engaged in adverse conduct aren't disciplined then that
reduces their pride and their incentive to do the right thing.
I think that is borne out in low employee morale. At least it
is one of the reasons.
What TSA has done is created a bloated bureaucracy without
any real substance to process misconduct issues. Multiple
offices have varying responsibilities related to misconduct,
but no one oversees misconduct across airports to identify
systemic solutions.
So, what we are saying there is that there are multiple
offices. It is not like when you think of most companies where
there is an H.R. or human capital department with somebody at
the top that oversees the whole thing.
There is a series of different offices for different styles
of management and different levels, and so on and so forth.
There is nobody at the top that seems to be working and in
control of the whole thing from top to bottom.
Airports vary in how they address misconduct. Some airports
have staff devoted to tracking misconduct issues while other
absolutely do not. Some Federal security directors are engaged
while others step in only when needed.
This disjointed approach simply, the numbers, the metrics
show, is not working. Several individuals who came forward to
us said that they were either blown off or recriminated against
for bringing issues forward. These are safety and security
issues.
So, if you imagine an employee comes forward and says, hey,
I have got this issue. They are either disregarded or literally
almost penalized. One of the penalties is you are moved with
very little notice--in some cases, we have heard as little as 3
days, across the country for bringing a salient issue. These
are big concerns.
TSA's big government, bureaucratic response has failed. It
has failed TSA employees. It has failed the American public and
the taxpayers. We recommend several common-sense actions, and I
know you have seen them in the report just released, in a
report which could have improved TSA's management of misconduct
issues, but TSA must be committed to reform, committed to the
reform.
Dr. Gowadia, I am sorry, Gowadia, Gowadia. Thank you. There
cannot be lip service, and we talked about this, to what TSA is
doing to address these findings. There needs to be a
significant, lasting, and meaningful reform from the top to the
bottom of the agency.
If there are employees unwilling to change, you must
replace them with those who will. That includes the ones at the
very top. Every minute TSA is forced to handle employee
misconduct is one less that they are safeguarding the lives of
travelers.
The American people deserve better, and they are counting
on you. They are counting on us. They are counting on you
particularly to succeed in your mission.
That ends my statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perry follows:]
Statement of Chairman Scott Perry
July 7, 2016
In May 2016, Secretary Jeh Johnson released a new mission statement
for the Department of Homeland Security: ``With honor and integrity, we
will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.'' I
think most Americans would agree that this isn't that high an
expectation; the American people expect all Federal employees,
especially those charged with protecting the homeland, to conduct
themselves with integrity. Unfortunately, a 6-month investigation
conducted jointly by my subcommittee and Chairman Katko's subcommittee
has found that TSA violates the words and spirit of this new mission
statement to a degree that is alarming and unconscionable.
Here are the facts of our investigation: Egregious misconduct
occurs across all levels of TSA and is growing, yet TSA's
investigations into internal misconduct and the resulting penalties
have decreased. Specifically, we found that TSA employee misconduct
grew by almost 29 percent from fiscal year 2013 through 2015. Thirty-
five percent of airports experienced increased numbers of allegations,
some having nearly 40 times the number of allegations than in fiscal
year 2013. In terms of the types of misconduct that are growing, we saw
significant increases in areas related to integrity and ethics and
disruptive behavior, including sexual misconduct. ``Neglect of Duty''
allegations nearly doubled during this period. There was a 17 percent
jump in the category of failing to follow instructions. There are
examples of airport screeners facilitating drug and human smuggling and
sexually assaulting travelers, and a Deputy Federal Security Director
promoting a subordinate with whom he had a romantic relationship, among
numerous others.
Every American should be outraged by these findings; I certainly
am. We are in the highest-threat environment since 9/11. From Orlando
to San Bernardino, our citizens are under attack from radical Islamist
terrorists. Terrorist groups remain obsessed with both attacking civil
aviation and recruiting Westerners. Just last month, CIA Director John
Brennan testified that ISIS is ``probably exploring a variety of means
for infiltrating operatives into the West.'' The last thing the
American people need to be concerned with are corrupt, insolent, and
unethical airport screeners. What's even more outrageous is TSA's
response has been to investigate fewer allegations and use lesser
penalties. We found that open investigations had declined 15 percent
and closed investigations had declined 28 percent during this period.
Use of non-disciplinary actions, such as counseling, jumped 80 percent
while disciplinary actions, including letters of reprimand and
suspensions, decreased by 14 percent and adverse actions, including
termination, declined 23 percent. TSA has not taken misconduct
seriously and it's no wonder why employee morale at DHS is among the
worst in the Federal Government.
What TSA has done is created a bloated bureaucracy without any real
substance to process misconduct issues. Multiple offices have varying
responsibilities related to misconduct but no one oversees misconduct
across airports to identify systemic solutions. Airports vary in how
they address misconduct. Some airports have staff devoted to tracking
misconduct issues while others do not. Some Federal Security Directors
are engaged while others step in only when needed. This disjointed
approach is not working. Several individuals who came forward to us
said that they were either blown off or recriminated against for
bringing issues forward. TSA's big government, bureaucratic response
has failed. It has failed TSA's employees and it has failed the
American public.
We recommend several common-sense actions in our report which could
improve TSA's management of misconduct issues. But TSA must be
committed to reform. Dr. Gowadia, there cannot be lip service to what
TSA is doing to address these findings--there needs to be significant,
lasting, and meaningful reform from the top to the bottom of the
agency. If there are employees unwilling to change, you must replace
them with those who will. Every minute TSA is forced to handle employee
misconduct is one less that they are safeguarding travelers. The
American people deserve better and they are counting on you to succeed
in your mission.
Mr. Perry. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, the
gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman for her
statement.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to you and to Chairman Katko for holding today's
hearing.
Just as a matter of on the record, I just want to make it
known that we are just receiving a copy of this ``Misconduct At
TSA Threatens the Security of the Flying Public,'' which I
understand was a joint report that the Majority staff did
without our input, and obviously without our opportunity to see
it. Perhaps it could have been helpful for me for today.
But, nonetheless, I am glad that we are here today. I want
to thank our witnesses for being here. Thank you for the
testimony that you are going to be giving.
The Transportation Security Administration provides
security at airports throughout the Nation, and it helps secure
our Nation's service transportation systems. TSA screens over 2
million passengers at 450 airports in the United States daily.
In fiscal year 2015 TSA employees screened over 700 million
passengers and 400 million checked bags. Travel in the United
States is on the rise, seeing a 15 percent increase from 2013
to 2015. Airports are expected to experience a significant rise
in passenger traffic this summer.
Due to increased passenger volumes, decreased
appropriations for transportation security officers, and
changing procedures due to security screening shortfalls, wait
times in the Nation's airports have increased.
Recently TSA has come under fire about the passenger wait
times and the extravagant bonuses that were paid to a former
assistant administrator who oversaw security operations while
TSA was known to have security lapses.
High-profile incidences such as these in addition to the
TSA pay scale and benefits for its front-line personnel have a
devastating effect on the transportation security officers that
serve the public on a daily basis.
The performance and morale of TSA personnel should be of
utmost importance. However, many of the front-line employees,
the transportation security officers, are short-staffed and are
often asked to work multiple shifts.
In addition, while these TSOs are Federal Government
employees, they are not subject to general civil service
provisions that include collective bargaining rights, the
ability to appeal adverse actions to the independent merit
system protection board, and whistle-blower protections.
I believe that the TSA employees, especially those engaged
in security screening, should be subject to civil service
provisions. That is why I am an original sponsor of H.R. 4488,
The Rights for Transportation Security Officers Act of 2016.
This bill authored by the Ranking Member of the full
committee provides the Transportation Security Administration
screening work force with long overdue rights, the same rights
afforded to most Federal workers under Title V.
Both the DHS office and the Inspector General and the
Government Accountability Office, GAO, have examined
allegations of misconduct by TSA personnel. Two offenses
account for more than half of all cases. One, attendance and
leave, and two, screening and security.
Based on its analysis GAO found that TSA did not have a
proper process for conducting reviews of misconduct to verify
whether TSA personnel at airports were complying with policies
and procedures.
TSA implemented the recommended changes. However,
allegations of misconduct increased by almost 30 percent from
2013 to 2015. I certainly will be interested in understanding
an explanation of that.
In fiscal year 2015 alone the DHS OIG received
approximately 1,000 complaints either from or about a TSA
employee, most of which related to allegations of misconduct.
Specific instances of misconduct included retaliation against
whistleblowers, mismanagement, and security failures.
It has also been reported that TSA personnel are afraid to
speak up about problems at the agency in fear of being unfairly
punished or reassigned to lower positions. In fact, TSA
management has been described by staff as the biggest bully in
the Federal Government.
Allegations of retaliation and mismanagement drastically
impact the workplace. Moreover, it appears that rank-and-file
personnel are disciplined at a much higher rate than
management. It seems as if management is disciplined when they
are high-profile cases or media attention that brings negative
attention to the TSA.
For the sixth year in a row DHS saw an overall drop in
employee engagement and morale according to the 2015 Federal
employee viewpoint survey. What is even more concerning is TSA
in particular is ranked one of the worst places to work in the
Federal Government, coming in 313 out of 320 in the annual
survey by the Partnership for Public Service.
Dr. Gowadia, today I look forward to hearing from you how
TSA plans on better managing its work force starting from the
top in addressing low morale. I also look forward to hearing
the changes that TSA has implemented as a result of the OIG and
GAO investigations. Particularly the mechanisms implemented to
better hold management accountable.
But I would also like to thank the TSOs who are on the
front line every day for their diligent work under such intense
responsibility and pressure during the July 4th holiday period.
Even before and even as we go into the future.
TSA screened 10.7 million travelers with average wait times
in standard security lanes less than 10 minutes. That is good
news, moving in the right direction.
Thanks to reprogrammed funding from Congress, TSA has been
able to hire additional TSOs and increase overtimes to address
staffing shortages.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time. Thank you.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
July 7, 2016
The Transportation Security Administration provides security at
airports throughout the Nation and helps secure our Nation's surface
transportation systems.
TSA screens over 2 million passengers at 450 airports in the United
States daily.
In fiscal year 2015, TSA employees screened over 700 million
passengers and 400 million checked bags.
Travel in the United States is on the rise, seeing a 15 percent
increase from 2013 to 2015.
Airports are expected to experience a significant increase in
passenger traffic this summer.
Due to increased passenger volume, decreased appropriations for
Transportation Security Officers, and changing procedures due to
security screening shortfalls, wait times in the Nation's airports have
increased.
Recently, TSA has come under fire about the passenger wait times
and the extravagant bonuses that were paid to a former Assistant
Administrator who oversaw security operations while TSA was known to
have security lapses.
High-profile incidents such as these, in addition to the TSA pay
scale and benefits for its front-line personnel, have a devastating
effect on the Transportation Security Officers that serve the public on
a daily basis.
The performance and morale of TSA personnel should be of utmost
importance. However, many of the front-line employees, the
Transportation Security Officers, are short-staffed and are often asked
to work multiple shifts.
In addition, while these TSOs are Federal Government employees,
they are not subject to general civil service provisions that include
collective bargaining rights, the ability to appeal adverse actions to
the Independent Merit Systems Protection Board, and whistleblower
protections.
I believe that the TSA employees, especially those engaged in
security screening, should be subject to civil service provisions and
that is why I am an original cosponsor of H.R. 4488, the ``Rights for
Transportation Security Officers Act of 2016''.
This bill, authored by the Ranking Member of the Full Committee,
provides the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) screening
workforce with long-overdue rights, the same rights afforded to most
Federal workers under Title 5.
Both the DHS Office of Inspector General and the Government
Accountability Office have examined allegations of misconduct by TSA
personnel.
Two offenses accounted for more than half of all cases: 1.
Attendance and Leave and 2. Screening and Security.
Based on its analysis, GAO found that TSA did not have a proper
process for conducting reviews of misconduct to verify whether TSA
personnel at airports were complying with policies and procedures.
TSA implemented the recommended changes; however, allegations of
misconduct increased by almost 30% from 2013 to 2015.
In fiscal year 2015 alone, the DHS OIG received approximately 1,000
complaints either from or about a TSA employee, most of which related
to allegations of misconduct.
Specific instances of misconduct included retaliation against
whistleblowers, mismanagement, and security failures.
It has also been reported that TSA personnel are afraid to speak up
about problems at the agency in fear of being unfairly punished or
reassigned to lower positions.
In fact, TSA management has been described by staff as ``the
biggest bullies in the Federal Government.''
Allegations of retaliation and mismanagement drastically impact the
workplace.
Moreover, it appears that rank-and-file personnel are disciplined
at a much higher rate than management.
It seems as if management is disciplined when there are high-
profile cases or media attention that brings negative attention to TSA.
For the sixth year in a row, DHS saw an overall drop in employee
engagement and morale according to the 2015 Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey.
What is even more concerning is TSA in particular is ranked one of
the worst places to work in the Federal Government, coming in 313 out
of 320 in the annual survey by the Partnership for Public Service.
Dr. Gowadia, today, I look forward to hearing from you how TSA
plans on better managing its workforce, starting from the top, and
addressing low morale.
I also look forward to hearing the changes TSA has implemented as a
result of the OIG and GAO investigations, particularly the mechanisms
implemented to better hold senior management accountable.
I would like to thank the TSO's for their diligent work under such
intense responsibility and pressure--during the July 4 holiday travel
period, TSA screened 10.7 million travelers, with average wait times in
standard security lanes less than 10 minutes.
Thanks to reprogrammed funding from Congress, TSA has been able to
hire additional TSOs and increase overtime to address staffing
shortages.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. The Chair now
recognizes Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation
Security, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to echo Mrs. Watson Coleman's sentiments that I
do applaud the efforts of the TSA front-line workers, the
officers. But, you know, of course, we cannot stand--good
performance then can be better. So, that is why we are here.
That is why we always must strive to be the greatest that we
can do in our jobs, and provide the greatest security we can
for our country in an ever-evolving threat environment.
Since the creation of the TSA after the terror attacks of
September 11, Congress has had to step in numerous times when
the agency has failed to appropriately manage its personnel.
These instances have included countless allegations of
misconduct from TSA from the top to bottom.
As Chairman of the Transportation Security Subcommittee, I
am particularly invested in and concerned about ensuring that
the good men and women who protect our Nation's critical
transportation systems every day are not only provided with the
resources they need, but are also surrounded by an ethical and
positive work culture.
Such a culture currently does not exist within TSA. In
fact, in recent months a number of disturbing accounts of
misconduct and just poor conduct on the part of high-ranking
TSA officials as well as front-line workers at airports, and
Federal air marshals, have contributed to a discouraging
picture of a bureaucracy struggling to meet the demands of an
increased threat environment and spiking passenger volume.
All of this at a time at which we are facing unprecedented
threats to our National security. In the last several months,
terrorists have bombed 2 and potentially 3 commercial aircraft,
and 2 of which were likely inside jobs of employees at
airports, and have orchestrated devastating attacks against
transportation modes in Brussels and Istanbul.
Frankly, this is not the time to be dealing with misconduct
or corruption in our own ranks. The risk is simply too great.
Administrator Neffenger, for his part, has instituted a number
of reforms to right the ship. One of which I very much applaud
was a ludicrous practice of having subordinates recommending
bonuses for their superiors.
Absolute definition of insanity. How that ever happened in
a Federal agency is beyond me. I am glad you stopped it. I want
to be assured through our questions a little later today,
Doctor, that that has in fact stopped and will not happen
again.
Despite these efforts, however, much more needs to be done
to give the American people the security they need from a TSA
that is responsive to reforms and ethical in its operations.
As public servants, TSA personnel must be held to the
highest ethical standards. We must be training up workers of
the highest moral caliber if we are entrusting them with the
lives of traveling Americans.
But unfortunately, TSA management has often sought punitive
actions against responsible employees who attempted to speak
out against problems plaguing the agency, the whistleblowers,
rather than taking their concerns seriously. This is
unacceptable.
Covering up or discouraging individuals from speaking out
only perpetuates a negative culture and serves as a direct
result and assault on employee morale. Employee misconduct,
particularly the sort that compromises security and wastes the
taxpayer dollars must not permitted to continue.
It is because of this that our two subcommittees have
conducted a joint investigation to assess the scope and depth
of misconduct across the TSA work force. Resulting from this
investigation, we are releasing a telling report on the
challenges facing TSA and the actions needed to rectify years
of baked-in mismanagement.
Much has been written and discussed surrounding the
abysmally low morale at TSA, of which Mrs. Watson Coleman just
mentioned, which suffers the lowest employee satisfaction
levels of any agency in the Federal Government.
Rampant allegations of misconduct plaguing the agency in
the news media and through word of mouth no doubt serve as a
contributing factor to lower employee morale within TSA.
The efforts to improve the culture at TSA must start with
addressing the issue of employee misconduct. As my subcommittee
has continued to investigate the insider threat to aviation
security over the last year, I have become thoroughly convinced
that stemming this conduct among TSA personnel and individuals
with access to secure areas of airports is directly tied to
mitigating insider treats to the security of the traveling
public.
The ease with which certain individuals have had accepted
bribes and smuggled drugs and weapons through our Nation's
airport terminals is of serious concern. While the issue
certainly extends beyond just TSA personnel, TSA is on the
front lines of improving access controls, detecting insider
threats, and ensuring that its own house is in order, being
held to the highest standards.
I want to commend Chairman Perry's dedication to this issue
and to developing this report. I look forward to continued work
together to reform TSA into an efficient, effective, and an
accountable organization.
Oversight work like what we are doing today is what the
American people expect and demand of the representatives in
Congress. I am optimistic that we on this committee and
together with TSA can create a better culture within the agency
and ultimately improve the security of the traveling public.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
July 7, 2016
Since the creation of the Transportation Security Administration
after the terror attacks of September 11, Congress has had to step in
numerous times when the agency has failed to appropriately manage its
personnel. These instances have included countless allegations of
misconduct throughout TSA from top to bottom. As Chairman of the
Transportation Security Subcommittee, I am particularly invested in,
and concerned about, ensuring that the good men and women who protect
our Nation's critical transportation systems everyday are not only
provided with the resources they need, but are also surrounded by an
ethical and positive work culture.
Such a culture currently does not exist within TSA. In fact, in
recent months, a number of disturbing accounts of misconduct on the
part of high-ranking TSA officials, as well as front-line workers at
airports and Federal Air Marshals, have contributed to a discouraging
picture of a bureaucracy struggling to meet the demands of an increased
threat environment and spiking passenger volume. All of this at a time
in which we are facing unprecedented threats to our security. In the
last several months, terrorists have bombed two--and potentially
three--commercial aircraft, and have orchestrated devastating attacks
against transportation modes in Brussels and Istanbul. Frankly, this is
not the time to be dealing with misconduct or corruption within our own
ranks. The risk is simply too great.
Administrator Neffenger, for his part, has instituted a number of
reforms to right the ship. Despite these efforts, however, much more
needs to be done to give the American people the security they need
from a TSA that is responsive to reforms and ethical in its operations.
As public servants, TSA personnel must be held to the highest ethical
standards and we must be training up workers of the highest moral
caliber if we are entrusting them with the lives of traveling
Americans. Unfortunately, TSA management has often sought punitive
actions against responsible employees who have attempted to speak out
against the problems plaguing the agency, rather than taking their
concerns seriously. This is unacceptable. Covering up or discouraging
individuals from speaking out only perpetuates a negative culture and
serves as a direct assault on employee morale. Employee misconduct,
particularly the sort that compromises security and wastes taxpayer
dollars, must not be permitted to continue. It is because of this that
our two subcommittees have conducted a joint investigation to assess
the scope and depth of misconduct across the TSA workforce. Resulting
from this investigation, we are releasing a telling report on the
challenges facing TSA and the actions needed to rectify years of
mismanagement.
Much has been written and discussed surrounding the abysmally low
morale at TSA, which suffers the lowest employee satisfaction levels of
any agency in the Federal Government. Rampant allegations of misconduct
plaguing the agency in the news media and through word of mouth no
doubt serve as a contributing factor to low employee moral within TSA.
Any efforts to improve the culture at TSA must start with addressing
the issue of employee misconduct. As my subcommittee has continued to
investigate the insider threat to aviation security over the last year,
I have become thoroughly convinced that stemming misconduct among TSA
personnel and individuals with access to secure areas of airports is
directly tied to mitigating insider threats to the security of the
traveling public. The ease with which certain individuals have accepted
bribes and smuggled drugs and weapons through our Nation's airport
terminals is of serious concern. While the issue certainly extends
beyond just TSA personnel, TSA is on the front lines of improving
access controls, detecting insider threats, and ensuring that its own
house is in order and being held to the highest standards.
I commend Chairman Perry's dedication to this issue and to
developing this report, and I look forward to continuing to work
together to reform TSA into an efficient, effective, and accountable
organization. Oversight work like what we are doing today is what the
American people expect of their representatives in Congress, and I am
optimistic that we on this committee and together with TSA can create a
better culture within the agency and ultimately improve the security of
the traveling public.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from New York.
The Chair now acknowledges the absence of the Ranking
Member of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, the
gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice. She cannot be with us at
this time. Should she be able to attend we will defer to her at
that time.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statements of Ranking Members Rice and Thompson
follow:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen Rice
July 7, 2016
In light of the recent attacks at airports in Istanbul and
Brussels, I think we are all more cognizant than ever of the importance
of TSA's mission. I think those attacks have also made us more aware of
the increasing complexity of that mission, as TSA must confront not
only the threat of terrorists trying to sneak weapons or explosives
past checkpoints and on to planes, but also the threat of attacks on
soft targets like the public areas of airports.
Right now, I think TSA is in the midst of sort of a perfect storm.
On the one side, we have the constant and evolving threat of terrorism.
On the other, we have record numbers of travelers passing through
American airports, and an ever-increasing demand for speed and
efficiency. And in the middle of it all, we have an administration that
has struggled to recruit and retain the highly-skilled workforce that
it needs to carry out its mission and achieve the right balance between
security and efficiency.
So as we assess allegations of misconduct and mismanagement within
TSA, we have to be aware of the fact that such behavior has real and
direct implications for our National security.
In 2013, GAO examined how TSA investigates and adjudicates cases of
employee misconduct, and issued a report with four recommendations for
how TSA can strengthen these processes.
I understand that TSA concurred with and has implemented all four
recommendations. But I'm concerned about the fact that the process for
adjudicating misconduct by Transportation Security Officers remains
different than that for other TSA employees--and I hope that our
witnesses can shed some light on why that is, and whether a more
uniform adjudication process would better serve TSA's mission.
In April and May of this year, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform held hearings on mismanagement and misconduct at TSA.
During their first hearing, OGR heard testimony from TSA employees
who recounted instances of intimidation, retribution, and improper
reassignments.
Following that hearing, the same panel questioned Administrator
Neffenger on bonuses given to senior officials, and we learned that
over the course of several months, one individual who was responsible
for overseeing the TSA's Office of Security Operations had been given a
bonus of $90,000. Ms. Gowadia, I hope that you can tell us what changes
TSA has made to prevent such actions and better protect taxpayer
resources.
I mentioned earlier that one of the problems facing TSA--and one
that I know Admiral Neffinger is working hard to address--is the low
morale within TSA. According to the Best Places to Work in the Federal
Government, TSA ranked 313 out of 320 Federal agencies--and that
certainly adds to the administration's problems with recruitment and
retention.
But at the same time, TSA's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has
been ranked among the best places to work in the Federal Government--so
I'm eager to hear how TSA is working to replicate practices from that
office within the broader workforce.
TSA's workforce is tasked with a tremendous responsibility, and
Transportation Security Officers, who make up the majority of that
workforce, perform what is often a thankless job.
They are on the front line of our aviation security efforts,
ensuring that prohibited items are not able to be brought on board an
aircraft, while also evolving to better confront the threat of attacks
on soft targets within airports.
This time last year, a leaked OIG report caused them to refocus and
tailor their efforts to ensure that they do not miss threat items at
checkpoints. Security effectiveness was the top priority.
Recently, not even a year later, TSOs were facing criticism for
long lines at airports, even though the issues causing wait times were
systemic and not necessarily tied to their performance. The priority
shifted to efficiency.
So I hope that Deputy Administrator Gowadia can talk about to what
extent those challenges may be related to some allegations against
these officers, as well as how many allegations of misconduct are
adjudicated and found to be valid versus those where no instance of
wrongdoing is found.
Again, I think it's important to remain aware of the fact that with
TSA, even more so than many other agencies and departments,
mismanagement and misconduct have direct National security consequences
and cannot be tolerated. So I hope that our conversation today will
give us a more complete understanding of how prevalent such behavior is
within TSA and how it is being addressed, so that we can focus on how
we can better combat perhaps the most pressing threat facing TSA and
the American aviation industry--that of attacks on soft targets like
the public areas of airports.
______
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 7, 2016
In light of the recent attacks at airports in Istanbul and
Brussels, I think we are all more cognizant than ever of the importance
of TSA's mission. I think those attacks have also made us more aware of
the increasing complexity of that mission, as TSA must confront not
only the threat of terrorists trying to sneak weapons or explosives
past checkpoints and onto planes, but also the threat of attacks on
soft targets like the public areas of airports.
Right now, I think TSA is in the midst of sort of a perfect storm.
On the one side, we have the constant and evolving threat of terrorism.
On the other, we have record numbers of travelers passing through
American airports, and an ever-increasing demand for speed and
efficiency. And in the middle of it all, we have an administration that
has struggled to recruit and retain the highly-skilled workforce that
it needs to carry out its mission and achieve the right balance between
security and efficiency.
So as we assess allegations of misconduct and mismanagement within
TSA, we have to be aware of the fact that such behavior has real and
direct implications for our National security. In 2013, GAO examined
how TSA investigates and adjudicates cases of employee misconduct, and
issued a report with four recommendations for how TSA can strengthen
these processes.
I understand that TSA concurred with and has implemented all four
recommendations. But I'm concerned about the fact that the process for
adjudicating misconduct by Transportation Security Officers remains
different than that for other TSA employees--and I hope that our
witnesses can shed some light on why that is, and whether a more
uniform adjudication process would better serve TSA's mission.
In April and May of this year, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform held hearings on mismanagement and misconduct at TSA.
During their first hearing, OGR heard testimony from TSA employees who
recounted instances of intimidation, retribution, and improper
reassignments.
Following that hearing, the same panel questioned Administrator
Neffenger on bonuses given to senior officials, and we learned that
over the course of several months, one individual who was responsible
for overseeing the TSA's Office of Security Operations had been given a
bonus of $90,000.
Ms. Gowadia, I hope that you can tell us what changes TSA has made
to prevent such actions and better protect taxpayer resources.
I mentioned earlier that one of the problems facing TSA--and one
that I know Admiral Neffinger is working hard to address--is the low
morale within TSA. According to the Best Places to Work in the Federal
Government, TSA ranked 313 out of 320 Federal agencies--and that
certainly adds to the administration's problems with recruitment and
retention.
But at the same time, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has
been ranked among the best places to work in the Federal Government--so
I'm eager to hear how TSA is working to replicate practices from that
office within the broader workforce.
TSA's workforce is tasked with a tremendous responsibility, and
Transportation Security Officers, who make up the majority of that
workforce, perform what is often a thankless job.
They are on the front line of our aviation security efforts,
ensuring that prohibited items are not able to be brought on board an
aircraft, while also evolving to better confront the threat of attacks
on soft targets within airports.
This time last year, a leaked OIG report caused them to refocus and
tailor their efforts to ensure that they do not miss threat items at
checkpoints. Security effectiveness was the top priority.
Recently, not even a year later, TSOs were facing criticism for
long lines at airports, even though the issues causing wait times were
systemic and not necessarily tied to their performance. The priority
shifted to efficiency.
So I hope that Deputy Administrator Gowadia can talk about to what
extent those challenges may be related to some allegations against
these officers, as well as how many allegations of misconduct are
adjudicated and found to be valid versus those where no instance of
wrongdoing is found.
Again, I think it's important to remain aware of the fact that with
TSA, even more so than many other agencies and departments,
mismanagement and misconduct have direct National security consequences
and cannot be tolerated. So I hope that our conversation today will
give us a more complete understanding of how prevalent such behavior is
within TSA and how it is being addressed, so that we can focus on how
we can better combat perhaps the most pressing threat facing TSA and
the American aviation industry--that of attacks on soft targets like
the public areas of airports.
Mr. Perry. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today. The witnesses' entire written
statement will appear in the record.
The Chair will introduce all of the witnesses first, or
both of them, and then recognize each of you for your
testimony.
Dr. Huban Gowadia, yes, is TSA's deputy administrator.
Prior to her appointment to this position in May 2016, so it is
roughly 2 months ago, she was director of Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office where she led DHS's efforts related to
radiological and nuclear detection.
She began her Federal career with the Federal Aviation
Administration in 2000, working on aviation security
technologies and policy. She is a graduate of the University of
Alabama, and has a PhD from the Pennsylvania State University.
Congratulations. Welcome to the committee, once again.
Mr. Andrew Oosterbaan is the assistant inspector general
for investigation at the DHS Office of Inspector General. His
office investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and
administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors,
grantees, and programs.
Previously, Mr. Oosterbaan served at the Department of
Justice's Criminal Division as a chief of child exploitation
section and was an assistant United States attorney for the
Southern District of Florida.
We thank you for your service, sir, and welcome to the
committee.
Thank you all for being here today.
The Chair recognizes Dr. Gowadia for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HUBAN GOWADIA, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Gowadia. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Chairman Katko,
and the Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. My colleagues at TSA and I appreciate
your support in ensuring that we maintain the highest
professional standards for our work force.
As evidenced by the recent attacks in Istanbul and
Brussels, terrorists continue to plot and execute attacks
against the global transportation system. The United States
faces persistent threats from terrorist groups around the
world, as well as from home-grown violent extremist inspired by
messages of hatred.
These threats pose a challenging dynamic environment that
demands the utmost dedication and professionalism for my
employees, from front-line officers to senior leaders. TSA's
greatest strength is its committed, professional work force.
Administrative Neffenger and I are dedicated to providing a
supportive environment for all our employees with an emphasis
on values, standards, and accountability. Central to our
success is a commitment to a common set of values focused on
integrity, innovation, and team spirit, and to our agency's
core principals which are to focus on mission, invest in
people, and commit to excellence.
To protect the Nation's transportation networks, we recruit
and retrain highly capable individuals, reflective of the
diverse public we serve. We invest in their training, provide
them career paths for growth and development, ensure fair
personnel practices at all levels of the agency, and identify
and hold accountable those who engage in misconduct.
TSA's recruitment and hiring strategy is focused on
selecting the best individuals. All of our employees have
successfully cleared an assessment program. This includes a
thorough background check, and vetting against terrorist watch
lists, as well as a criminal history records check.
To ensure our work force continues to accomplish our
security mission and to strengthen TSA's professional
foundation by building future leaders, we have increased our
investments in training and education programs.
A common foundation of training will connect our work force
to a unified culture and strengthen our focus on mission.
We have expanded our leadership development opportunities
with offerings that range from the rising leaders' development
program for entry-level employees to the executive leadership
program for transportation security executive service
employees.
Since January 2016, our newly-hired officers receive basic
training at the TSA Academy which is located at FLETC. At the
Academy, officers are immersed in our mission, our history and
values, and high ethical standards.
They undergo realistic training that prepares them for the
demands of the screening mission. Each of our training and
professional development programs reinforces integrity, duty to
mission, and a commitment to excellence.
We are delivering the professional TSA that the American
public deserves. Integrity is a core value at TSA. Appropriate
conduct is the responsibility of every employee. All employees
are responsible for reporting any known or suspected violation
of the law, rule, regulation, or policy.
In concert with our colleagues at the office of Inspector
General we investigate all allegations of employee misconduct
and ensure appropriate disposition. Our disciplinary policies
hold accountable individuals who engage in misconduct while
upholding due process rights and ensuring equitable treatment
for employees across the agency.
As part of our continuing evolution we are exploring ways
to improve our human capital practices. We are reviewing our
bonus payment procedures for our front-line officers, and have
imposed new strict controls on bonuses for senior executives.
Our approach to leadership is driven by our dedication to
our security mission. We are holding ourselves accountable to
high standards of effectiveness and are supporting our front-
line officers in their critical counterterrorism mission.
Every day the men and women of TSA display passion,
patriotism, and a sense of duty while performing demanding
tasks under very difficult circumstances.
I thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you
today. If I may close on a personal request, I would like to
recognize Mrs. Watson Coleman's shout-out to our TSOs. If you
are so inclined the next time you encounter one, would you
please stop and say thank you? I know your kindness will be
deeply appreciated. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gowadia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Huban Gowadia
July 7, 2016
Good morning, Chairmen Perry and Katko, Ranking Members Watson
Coleman and Rice, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) counterterrorism
workforce, which safeguards the traveling public and secures our
Nation's transportation systems. We appreciate the committee's support
in ensuring TSA maintains the highest professional standards for our
workforce.
Both in the field and at headquarters, the TSA workforce is
vigilant in ensuring the security of people and commerce that flow
through our Nation's vast transportation networks. TSA employs risk-
based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks and
to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's transportation system to
terrorism. At all times, our goal is to maximize transportation
security to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting
privacy and facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce.
It is critical that we employ a culture of operational evolution
that constantly reevaluates assumptions, plans, and processes to
achieve the highest level of mission excellence to counter the plans of
our determined adversaries. The United States continues to face
persistent threats from terrorist groups around the world, as well as
from home-grown violent extremists inspired by messages of hatred to
harm the American traveling public. These threats are complex and
diffuse, and pose a challenging, dynamic environment that demand our
utmost dedication and professionalism. To address these complex
threats, the TSA employs Transportation Security Officers (TSO) across
more than 430 airports and deploys Federal Air Marshals (FAM) both for
flight coverage as well as ground-based assignments, such as Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams. TSA's inspectors
ensure compliance with Federal statutes and regulations. TSA's
personnel are committed to reducing the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation system to terrorism. These dedicated employees occupy
the front line in executing the agency's transportation security duties
in support of our Nation's counterterrorism efforts.
administrator's intent
Mission success depends on a shared understanding of objectives,
unity of purpose, and alignment of values and principles. In January
2016, Administrator Peter Neffenger published TSA's first
Administrator's Intent to articulate those objectives, the approach we
will pursue in accomplishing our essential counterterrorism mission,
and the values and principles that define TSA.
Central to our success is a commitment to a common set of values:
Integrity, innovation, and team spirit. Building on these, the
Administrator's Intent outlines the principles we care about as an
agency, which are: Focus on Mission, Invest in People, and Commit to
Excellence.
Focus on Mission.--Focusing on our mission prioritizes our
resources and operations to meet the threat. It also informs
how we must invest in our workforce to achieve mission success.
Invest in People.--Our culture, effectiveness, and mission-
readiness are a direct result of consistent and career-long
investment in people and set the foundation for agency success.
Value-based leadership, a foundation of training, recruiting
and retaining talent, and appropriate recognition are core
elements of our approach.
Commit to Excellence.--Our standard is excellence in all
mission areas. We operate in a global environment where the
threat remains persistent and evolving. As we pursue our
counterterrorism mission, we will relentlessly pursue
excellence through a culture of constant improvement,
organizational adaptation, and discipline.
workforce training and development
On a daily basis, the men and women of TSA display passion,
patriotism, and sense of duty while performing demanding tasks under
difficult circumstances. In order to ensure our workforce is able to
continue accomplishing its vital mission, Administrator Neffenger and I
are committed to providing a supportive working environment for all TSA
employees with an emphasis on standards, values, and accountability. To
this end, we have increased our investments in training and education
programs to strengthen TSA's professional foundation and build future
leaders. A common foundation of training will connect our workforce to
a unified culture, strengthen the focus on mission, and build esprit de
corps. As a result, TSA has expanded its leadership development
opportunities with offerings that range from the Rising Leaders
Development Program for entry-level employees, to the Executive
Leadership Program for Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES)
employees, which is designed to inspire ethical leadership in a complex
and demanding homeland security environment. In early 2017, we will be
launching mandatory leadership training for all newly-promoted senior-
level TSA employees. Additionally, in January 2016, TSA began sending
newly-hired officers to basic training at the TSA Academy, located at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. While
at the Academy, new hires are immersed in our mission, history, values,
and high ethical standards. All of these vital training and
professional development programs reinforce professional integrity,
duty to mission, and commitment to excellence.
disciplinary processes
Integrity is a core value at TSA, and as the Deputy Administrator I
strive to motivate our employees to fulfill their duties while
upholding TSA's high standards of professionalism. TSA employees are
responsible for reporting any known or suspected violation of law,
rule, regulation, policy, or Standard Operating Procedure to any
manager and/or to the TSA Office of Inspection (OOI). Allegations of
employee misconduct are investigated and, in some cases, OOI
investigators work with other law enforcement agencies.
OOI refers allegations to the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) for right of first refusal to
investigate. If the OIG does not accept the case for investigation, the
matter is referred back to OOI or local management for an
administrative inquiry. After the completion of an investigation of
alleged misconduct, OIG or OOI investigators produce a Report of
Investigation, which generally contains witness statements, relevant
documents, and other evidence as well as an agent's summary of
investigative activities.
Completed reports and administrative inquiries are referred to
TSA's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) or the appropriate
management official for adjudication. TSA's OPR provides consistency in
misconduct penalty determinations and facilitates an expeditious,
standardized adjudication process. OPR adjudicates all allegations of
misconduct investigated by the DHS OIG or involving senior-level
employees or law enforcement officers. OPR may also exercise
jurisdiction over any matter the assistant administrator for OPR
determines should be reviewed and adjudicated by OPR. Cases that fall
outside of OPR's jurisdiction are handled at the supervisory level.
TSA's Table of Offenses and Penalties provides guidance for
determining appropriate corrective, disciplinary, or adverse actions
for common offenses. Disciplinary penalties range from a letter of
reprimand to removal. With respect to screening workforce employees,
TSA requires removal for certain offenses, including failed drug or
alcohol testing, sleeping on duty while assigned to a security
activity, intentional serious security breaches, and cases involving
theft. When removal is not required, the Table includes a recommended
penalty range, as well as aggravated and mitigated penalty ranges.
TSA employs an important accountability tool for rapidly removing
TSOs when egregious or serious misconduct is substantiated. The one-
step removal process allows management officials to expeditiously
remove an employee while ensuring due process. In the one-step removal
process, a TSO may be issued a removal action after a management
official has a meeting with the employee to discuss the incident or
allegation, advise the employee of the possible consequences, and allow
the employee an opportunity to respond to the allegations. The offenses
for which the one-step removal process may be used include cases
involving theft, illegal drugs, on-duty alcohol use, intentional
serious security breaches, sleeping on duty while assigned to a
security activity, and arrests for specific serious offenses set forth
under 49 C.F.R. 1542.209(d).
Most disciplinary and adverse actions are handled through a two-
step process. Pursuant to the two-step process, a TSA management
official will first issue a notice of the proposed action and provide
the employee with the opportunity to review the evidence supporting the
charge(s) and to respond orally and/or in writing. Second, another
management official will consider the entire record, including the
input from the affected employee, and will issue a written decision.
OPR issues the proposal and decision notices in the matters it
adjudicates.
TSA's disciplinary policies and processes are designed to hold
accountable individuals who engage in misconduct while upholding due
process rights and ensuring equitable treatment for employees at all
levels of the agency. TSA empowers its employees through training and
professional development opportunities, but also takes prompt and
appropriate action to investigate and adjudicate misconduct if an
employee falls short of our high standards.
conclusion
TSA's greatest strength is its committed, professional workforce.
We must continue to recruit and retain highly-capable individuals
dedicated to, and focused on, our core mission. We are committed to
maintaining an environment where employees and leaders can develop,
employees have the tools to be successful, and the workforce is
motivated by TSA's mission, vision, and strategic imperatives. To
provide the most effective transportation security, the workforce must
constantly be training and improving.
Our workforce places a strong emphasis on values, performance, and
accountability. The traveling public expects efficient and effective
screening and to be treated with dignity and respect, and we will
uphold these principles by continually reinforcing this message of
dignity and respect in training for our front-line workforce and
management alike. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for the committee's support of TSA's important mission.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Dr. Gowadia.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Oosterbaan for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW OOSTERBAAN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Oosterbaan. Good morning. Chairman Perry, Chairman
Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me to
testify about TSA misconduct.
My testimony today will focus on the Office of Inspector
General's role in investigating misconduct at TSA. I will
discuss briefly some examples of our TSA misconduct
investigations, and I will highlight the importance of
whistleblowers to our mission.
Our office is charged by Congress with preventing and
detecting fraud and abuse in agency programs and activities,
conducting investigations and audits, and recommending policies
to promote efficiency, economy, and effectiveness.
We play a critical role in ensuring transparent, honest,
effective, and accountable Government. The personal and
organizational independence of OIG investigators free to carry
out their work without interference by agency officials is
essential to maintaining the public trust, not only in the
I.G.'s work, but in the work force of DHS as a whole.
The American public must fundamentally trust the Government
employees will be held accountable for crimes or serious
misconduct by independent fact finding.
As the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, I
lead more than 200 criminal investigators in our Office of
Investigations. We investigate acts of criminal, civil, and
administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors,
grantees, and programs.
These investigations can result in criminal prosecutions,
fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and
personnel actions. We also provide oversight and monitor the
investigative activity of DHS's various internal affairs
offices.
We typically receive allegations of misconduct through our
hotline or website, or from another DHS component. After
assessing an allegation, we decide whether to investigate the
allegation or refer it to the component's internal affairs
office or another agency for their decision whether to
investigate or take no action.
If we decide to investigate, we develop evidence seeking to
substantiate or not substantiate the allegation and then write
a report of investigation. For administrative or noncriminal
misconduct, we provide our investigative findings to the
effective component to inform its decision regarding
disciplinary action, but we are not involved in that decision.
For criminal matters OIG presents its investigative
findings to the Department of Justice for determination of
whether judicial action will be pursued.
In fiscal year 2015, we received almost 18,000 complaints,
and we initiated 664 investigations. Our investigations
resulted in 104 criminal convictions and about 37 personnel
actions. We are on pace to exceed these numbers in fiscal year
2016.
The OIG has an important role in addressing misconduct at
the TSA. The integrity of TSA's work force is an important
factor in the safety of our airports, and any acts of
wrongdoing can diminish the public's confidence in their
safety.
In fiscal year 2015, we received nearly 1,000 complaints
related to TSA. And we decided to investigate about 40 of those
complaints based on the seriousness of the allegation, the rank
or grade of the individual involved, and whether OIG's uniquely
independent role was necessary to ensure that the case was
handled appropriately.
Let me give you some examples of our TSA-related
investigations. As Chairman Katko had mentioned, in 2015 we
initiated an investigation on a complaint that former TSA
Assistant Administrator Kelly Hoggan improperly received
excessive cash awards recommended by a subordinate.
Our investigation confirmed that between November 2013 and
November 2014 Mr. Hoggan was given 6 $10,000 special act awards
and a seventh $8,000 special act award. These awards were an
addition to annual performance awards of over $12,000 each for
2013 and 2014.
While our investigation did not uncover any criminal or
administrative wrongdoing, it did reveal that TSA had
inadequate internal controls over the awards process, and that
TSA's internal written policy was unclear.
As a result of our investigation, TSA has tightened and
clarified its written policies and practices. Some of OIG's
investigations of TSA personnel do involve serious crimes.
For instance, we investigated a transportation security
officer who conspired with others outside of TSA to smuggle
undocumented aliens through an international airport. The TSO
was prosecuted and sentenced to 10 months' incarceration.
In another case, the supervisory TSO was convicted for
helping a drug-trafficking organization to smuggle large
quantities of narcotics through an airport in the Caribbean.
The TSO was prosecuted and sentenced to 87 months of
imprisonment.
We also investigated a supervisory TSO and a lead TSO for
using cocaine while on duty. Both employees were convicted in
State court.
We investigated a TSO for transporting a 14-year-old with
intent to commit sexual acts. He was sentenced to 188 months of
imprisonment.
I want to end by noting the critically important role that
whistleblowers play in ensuring transparent, honest, effective,
and accountable Government. The DHS employees who step forward
to disclose fraud, waste, and abuse or other wrong-doing are
invaluable to our mission, as are the Federal laws providing
the protection from retaliation.
In the TSA context, for example, we investigated a TSO's
whistleblower report that he had been prevented by a supervisor
from stopping a former member of a domestic terrorist group and
notorious convicted felon from using PreCheck's expedited
screening, for which he should have been ineligible.
As a result of the TSO's disclosure and the resulting
inspection, standard procedures now allow TSOs to use
discretion to deny expedited screening in such circumstances
and TSA is in the process of changing the program which had
inappropriately granted PreCheck to this traveler.
Over the last 2 years our office has made changes to our
whistleblower protection program designed to raise our profile
within DHS to encourage reporting of fraud, waste, and abuse,
and to ensure that we have a program that is as good as or
better than any other.
To accomplish this, we have taken some important steps. We
imported an OIG senior executive to be the DHS whistleblower
ombudsman. We vastly improved the intake and investigative
process for whistleblower allegations. We have specially-
trained investigators and we obtained official certification
from the Office of Special Counsel that our program meets
statutory requirements.
We are confident that these changes will greatly enhance
our whistleblower program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oosterbaan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew Oosterbaan
July 7, 2016
Chairman Katko, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Rice, Ranking Member
Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittees: Thank you for
inviting me to testify on TSA misconduct.
My testimony will focus on the Office of Inspector General's (OIG)
role in investigating misconduct at TSA and the important role that
whistleblowers play in bringing waste, fraud, and abuse to the
attention of our office. In addition, I will address a particular OIG
investigation regarding the award of TSA bonuses that has been of
interest to this panel and mention a few other investigations as
examples of our work related to TSA.
oig's role in investigating misconduct at tsa
Through the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), Congress
established Inspectors General, in part, in response to concerns about
integrity and accountability and failures of other forms of Government
oversight. The IG Act charged Inspectors General, among other tasks,
with preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in agency programs and
activities; conducting investigations and audits; and recommending
policies to promote efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. The
position of Inspector General was strengthened by provisions in the IG
Act establishing independence from Department officials, providing
powers of investigation and subpoena, and reporting to the Secretary as
well as Congress.
Inspectors General play a critical role in ensuring transparent,
honest, effective, and accountable Government. The personal and
organizational independence of OIG investigators, free to carry out
their work without interference by agency officials, is essential to
maintaining the public trust not only in OIG's work, but in the DHS
workforce as a whole. The American public must fundamentally trust that
Government employees will be held accountable for crimes or serious
misconduct by an independent fact finder.
OIG and DHS Internal Affairs Offices
DHS Management Directive (MD) 0810.1 implements the authorities of
the Inspector General Act in DHS. MD 0810.1 establishes OIG's right of
first refusal to conduct investigations of criminal misconduct by DHS
employees and the right to supervise any such investigations conducted
by DHS internal affairs offices. The MD requires that all allegations
of criminal misconduct by DHS employees and certain other allegations
received by the components--generally those against higher-ranking DHS
employees--be referred to OIG immediately upon receipt of the
allegations.
Many DHS components, including TSA, have an internal affairs office
that conducts investigations. Under the authority of the IG Act, OIG
has oversight responsibility for those internal affairs offices. This
oversight responsibility generally takes three forms.
First, we determine upon receipt of the complaint whether
the allegations are the type that should be investigated by OIG
rather than the component's internal affairs office. We have
the absolute right under the Inspector General Act to conduct
any investigation without interference. Except for a few narrow
categories of matters (which must be reported to Congress), not
even the Secretary can prevent the OIG from conducting an
investigation.
Second, for those investigations the internal affairs
offices conduct, we have the authority to receive reports on
and monitor the status of investigations.
Lastly, we conduct oversight reviews of DHS component
internal affairs offices to ensure compliance with applicable
policies, reporting requirements, and accepted law enforcement
practices. Our reviews are conducted on a 3-year cycle and our
findings are published on our website. In this fiscal year, we
have reviewed two component internal affairs offices and made
more than 45 recommendations for improvement. In 2015 and the
first half of 2016, we reviewed three component internal
affairs offices and made 70 recommendations for improvement.
Our recommendations ranged from suggestions for improving the
processing of allegations to counseling a component to seek the
proper investigative authority for its internal affairs office.
These reviews are critical to ensuring that misconduct
allegations, whistleblowers, and those reporting allegations of
wrongdoing by DHS employees are treated with the seriousness
they deserve.
Our process for addressing allegations of misconduct generally
follows these steps:
1. An allegation of misconduct is reported to OIG or other
appropriate office; if reported to an office other than OIG and
several criteria for seriousness are met, the component must
report the allegation to OIG.
2. Whether the allegation was reported directly to OIG or through a
component, OIG will decide to investigate the allegation or
refer it to the component's internal affairs office; if
referred, the component can decide to investigate the
allegation or take no action.
3. If OIG decides to investigate, we develop sufficient evidence to
substantiate or not substantiate an allegation and write a
report of investigation.
4. For administrative or non-criminal misconduct, OIG provides its
investigative findings to the affected component, which uses
this information to decide whether discipline is warranted. We
are not involved in decisions regarding discipline after we
provide our investigative findings.
5. For criminal matters, OIG presents its investigative findings to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) for a determination of whether
DOJ will pursue judicial action.
The Department employs more than 240,000 employees (and nearly an
equal number of contract personnel), including a large number of law
enforcement officers and agents in U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Secret Service, and the
TSA. These officers and agents protect the President, our borders,
travel, trade, and financial and immigration systems.
In fiscal year 2015, we received almost 18,000 complaints. A
substantial number of the complaints alleged that DHS personnel engaged
in misconduct. We initiated 664 investigations; the remainder were
referred to component internal affairs officers, other agencies, or
were administratively closed. In fiscal year 2015, our investigations
resulted in 104 criminal convictions and 37 personnel actions.
Investigations against TSA personnel comprise a portion of our
overall work. In the last fiscal year, we received about 1,000
complaints either from or about TSA employees. We typically accept for
investigation about 40 of those cases per year. Our criteria for case
selection generally involves an assessment of the seriousness of the
allegation, the rank or grade of the individual involved, and whether
OIG's uniquely independent role is necessary to ensure that the case is
handled appropriately.
tsa bonuses
In March 2015, we initiated an investigation after receiving a
complaint advising that former TSA Assistant Administrator Kelly Hoggan
received six $10,000 cash awards during the period of approximately 1
year. It was further alleged that the approving official and Mr. Hoggan
were related and that nepotism was therefore motivating the awards.
To address these allegations, our office reviewed pertinent records
and interviewed TSA personnel involved in the award process. We
confirmed that Mr. Hoggan was awarded six $10,000 Special Act Awards
and a seventh $8,000 Special Act Award between November 2013 and
November 2014. These Special Act Awards were in addition to annual
Performance Awards for 2013 and 2014.
We concluded that these cash awards did not violate law or TSA
policy, and that there was no criminal conspiracy between Mr. Hoggan
and others to personally enrich themselves by abusing the TSA awards
system. We also found no evidence indicating that Mr. Hoggan was
related to anyone within his chain of command.
However, while this investigation did not uncover any criminal or
administrative wrongdoing, it did reveal that TSA had inadequate
internal oversight of the awards process and that TSA's internal
written policy regarding cash awards contained unclear language. As the
result of our investigation, TSA has tightened and clarified its
written policies and practices to address these problems.
examples of oig investigations of tsa misconduct
The integrity of TSA's workforce is an important factor in the
safety of our airports. And, while the percentage of TSA employees
involved in crimes or serious misconduct may be small, any acts of
wrongdoing can diminish the public's confidence in air safety.
Some of the OIG's investigations of TSA personnel involve serious
crimes. For instance, in 2012 we investigated a Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) who conspired with others outside of TSA to smuggle
Brazilian nationals through an international airport. For his role in
the crime, the TSO was sentenced to 10 months' incarceration, followed
by 36 months of supervised release.
In a 2014 case, a supervisory TSO was convicted for assisting a
drug trafficking organization responsible for smuggling large
quantities of narcotics through an airport in the Caribbean. With the
supervisory TSO's assistance, the organization was able to bypass
airport security and smuggle the narcotics to couriers on the secure
side of the airport for transport to the United States. The TSA was
sentenced to 87 months of imprisonment and 2 years supervised release.
Also in 2012, we investigated a supervisory TSO and a Lead TSO for
using cocaine while on duty. Both employees were arrested, charged, and
pled guilty in State court.
Finally, in 2015 we investigated a TSO for transporting a 14-year-
old with the intent to commit sexual acts. He was sentenced to 188
months' imprisonment followed by 120 months of supervised release.
whistleblower protection
It is important to note the critically important role that
whistleblowers play in ensuring transparent, honest, effective, and
accountable Government. The DHS employees who step forward to disclose
fraud, waste, abuse, and other wrongdoing are invaluable to our
mission, as are the Federal laws providing them protection. Under these
laws, managers are prohibited from retaliating against whistleblowers
by taking or threatening to take any adverse personnel actions because
they report misconduct. The IG Act also gives us the absolute right to
protect the identity of our witnesses, who we depend on to expose
fraud, waste, and abuse.
DHS employees' contributions to the integrity and effectiveness of
DHS by exposing poor management practices and wrongdoing have been well
documented. In the TSA context, for example, we investigated a
whistleblower's allegation that a notorious felon was granted expedited
screening through PreCheck in 2014. The traveler was a former member of
a domestic terrorist group and, while a member, was involved in
numerous felonious criminal activities that led to arrest and
conviction. After serving a multiple-year sentence, the traveler was
released from prison.
The traveler was sufficiently notorious through media coverage that
a TSO recognized the traveler. Concerned, the TSO reviewed the
traveler's boarding pass and realized that the traveler was PreCheck-
eligible. The TSO, aware of the traveler's disqualifying criminal
convictions, notified his supervisor who directed him to take no
further action and allow the traveler to proceed through the PreCheck
lane.
As a result of the TSO's subsequent disclosure and our report, TSA
ultimately agreed to modify its standard operating procedures to
clarify TSOs' and supervisory TSOs' authority in referring passengers
with PreCheck boarding passes to standard screening lanes when they
believe it is warranted. This change came after TSA initially disagreed
with our recommendation regarding the Secure Flight program, however.
(Allegation of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck
Improperly (Redacted) OIG-15-45)
Over the last 2 years, our office has made changes to our
Whistleblower Protection Program. These changes were intended to raise
our profile within DHS as the entity to which allegations of fraud,
waste, and abuse are reported, and with effective results. Our goal is
to make sure that we have a proactive whistleblower program that is as
good or better than any OIG in the Federal Government. To accomplish
this, we have:
Appointed a senior executive at the OIG to be the
statutorily-mandated DHS Whistleblower Ombudsman. He is
spearheading the efforts to ensure that all DHS personnel and
contractors, in every component, understand their rights to
report fraud, waste, and abuse, and to be protected from
retaliation for doing so.
Vastly improved the intake process for allegations of
whistleblower retaliation. Now, each claim will be examined by
a specially-trained group of investigators within our
Whistleblower Protection Office, being assisted and supported
by our lawyers in the Office of Counsel.
Obtained, for the first time in our history, official
certification from the Office of Special Counsel that our
whistleblower protection program met the whistleblower
protection requirements of 5 U.S.C. 2302(c).
Begun the process of hiring specially-trained investigators
who will be exclusively dedicated to whistleblower retaliation
investigations.
While we are confident that these changes will make us more
effective, we also understand that it will take constant vigilance and
dedicated effort to ensure that whistleblowers who have claims of
retaliation are listened to and that their claims are fairly and
independently investigated.
Mr. Chairmen, this concludes my testimony. I welcome any questions
you or other Members of the committee may have.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Oosterbaan.
The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes of
questioning. I am going to say that, you know, much of your
testimony, Mr. Oosterbaan, is troubling indeed. But I would
hope it is not indicative of, and we don't think it is
indicative of the vast majority of TSOs and employees at the
TSA.
But it does show the egregiousness of some of the
infractions that concern all of us here, and we must do
absolutely everything we can to make sure that they are dealt
with correctly, judiciously, speedily and at that they are
minimized.
With that, Dr. Gowadia, the work force, nearly 60,000
employees, right? At the TSA? Four hundred fifty airports, and
we are talking about a work force that allegedly, there is
alleged committed misconduct of almost half the numbers of
those employees, nearly 27,000.
Now, they are allegations, grant you. They are allegations.
But, you know, a lot of folks, and myself included, you know,
we kind of believe that where there is smoke, there is fire.
Right? You know, and then you have the case where 14, 16, and
18 allegations on one or more employees. In fact, 1,270
employees have had 5 or more misconduct allegations filed
against them.
I just wonder, in a general sense, I don't know what your
private sector of experience is. You are obviously a person of
high intellect, well-accomplished. But it seems to me when I
read the report that there should be one person at the top of
TSA's human capital, their H.R. department.
Of course, there is a series of direct reports, whether it
is somebody that deals with investigations or benefits and so
on and so forth. That cascades down through 60,000 employees so
that there is a chain of command. That there is accountability.
At some point the buck stops somewhere.
I don't see that. I know you have been on the job for 2
months. We appreciate you being here. But like I said, you are
a person of high intellect. So we have high expectations of
you. Does that seem incongruent with common sense, the rest of
the real world, or does that seem somehow that it is
appropriate for TSA to have this structure of a non-structure,
if you will?
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you for that question, Mr. Perry. I
would like to thank you for acknowledging that the large
numbers are allegations, not substantiated cases of misconduct.
I think that is an important distinction. I appreciate you
making it.
Now, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the
administrator and I are responsible for our entire work force,
but every employee is responsible for his or her own conduct
and performance.
When it comes to allegations of misconduct or even
attendance and leave issues, performance issues, it is
important that we have a set of people who investigate the
allegations, a set of people who will adjudicate the findings,
and then a set of people who will implement the recommended
discipline and penalties.
Of course, all of that does not preclude us from having a
central focal point for the implementation of policies for
making sure that there is consistent application of those
policies, affording oversight of that role across the
enterprise, and you will be heartened to know that the
administrator has actually asked me to take a look at human
capital management on an enterprise-wide basis.
One of the first steps we will take in that regard will
happen very shortly here. We will be bringing together the
management of the human capital of all our work force under the
Office of the Human Capital Office.
So, we are beginning to take steps much in concert with
what you just said.
Mr. Perry. I am glad that you are. We will look forward--we
will try and establish some off-line, post this hearing,
directly with dialog to determine when we can get together
again and see what that looks like. Because, I think, we are
very interested to know what the solution set that you glean
from that is.
But I want to move on a little bit and just drill down on
this multiple infractions problem. Our investigation found that
some employees had over a dozen allegations of misconduct. For
the egregious repeat offenders what do you know about them?
What positions do they hold, or did they hold?
What types of misconduct are they allegedly involved with?
What risk do they pose to, you know, regarding insider threats?
I mean, this is a great concern to the flying public. We want
to know these things. So what can you tell us about, you know,
who is looking into these things, and so on and so forth about
these repeat offenders so to speak?
Ms. Gowadia. Chairman Perry, when it comes to the repeat
offenders, I do not have all of the details in the individual
cases. What I will tell you is with every allegation, the
totality of your service is considered in meting out the
discipline or the penalty.
As I mentioned earlier, we are bringing a lot of this to a
centralized location. All the data that we now collect, we will
be able to mine, look for trends, looks for opportunities to
improve, opportunities to provide remedial training, et cetera.
Certainly, we will work with you as you requested to share
with you what we are finding, and what we intend to do to make
it so that we do manage our entire work force to the high
standards that you expect of us.
Mr. Perry. Dr. Gowadia, my time is expired. I think we will
do at least one more round. I think it would be interesting to
note that the data that you are talking about, it is my
understanding that the Department really didn't know much about
the data even though they collect the data until our team went
in and started asking questions, they weren't really aware of
using the data, so to speak, in judicial actions and in
punishments, and so on and so forth.
So, that is a great concern as well.
But with that, I want to recognize other Members as well.
So, I will recognize Mrs. Watson Coleman for questions. Thank
you.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Doctor, for your information that you are
sharing.
To you, Mr. Oosterbaan. Mr. Oosterbaan, you work for Mr.
Roth. To whom does Mr. Roth report?
Mr. Oosterbaan. The I.G.s are independent. So, the word
report is a little different than it is in some context.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Well, who are you accountable to?
Mr. Oosterbaan. We work for the Department of Homeland
Security and therefore the Secretary. Although there is, you
know, a different kind of reporting that is done for the I.G.
Ms. Watson Coleman. What does that mean?
Mr. Oosterbaan. That means that our independence is
critically important, and there is a limited amount of control
that the Secretary has over the I.G.
Ms. Watson Coleman. OK. Thank you very much. So, there were
1,000 complaints that were referred to you with regard to TSA
of which your office chose to take on 40 of those complaints,
allegations?
Mr. Oosterbaan. That is correct.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Of those 40 allegations, how many
resulted in action?
Mr. Oosterbaan. I don't have that specific information, I
regret, but we generally were not involved in that. So, we
generally do not track that information.
Ms. Watson Coleman. All righty. So there were 1,000. So,
there were 960 other allegations of misconduct that are
referred someplace else. That includes things like--does that
include tardiness, taking leave without permission?
Mr. Oosterbaan. Correct.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Doctor, I am sorry, Dr. Gowadia, right?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson Coleman. So those issues are addressed to you
all to evaluate?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson Coleman. All righty. I understand that you are
significantly understaffed, and that there have been instances
where people have had to work back-to-back shifts.
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Do you find that there is any
correlation between that phenomenon, that understaffing, or
inadequate, and these tardiness or these AWOL, or these leave
without permission?
Ms. Gowadia. First, ma'am, I would like very much to thank
Congress for the reprogramming actions that have allowed us to
hire new officers, convert more from part-time to full-time
status, and give us a significant bank of overtime hours so
that we are able to mitigate some of the impact on our front-
line officers.
While we have not studied the data sufficiently to give you
a definite one-for-one correlation, I will tell you that the
informed opinion of our leadership is, that the fact that we
have shift work, some shifts start at 3:30 in the morning. Some
officers have to stay late because an airport stays well beyond
its usual operating time.
All of these conditions do impact some of the attendance
and leave--the large number of attendance and leave----
Ms. Watson Coleman. So, I looked over----
Ms. Gowadia [continuing]. Numbers you see.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I looked over your, sort-of,
guidelines for disciplinary action which are quite exhaustive
actually.
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson Coleman. I recognize that there are certain
categories, and there are certain circumstances under which you
can do A to a person who is 3 minutes late chronically, versus
B to a person. I am wondering if this new, sort-of, first-line
supervisory training that you all are engaging in is going to
be helpful in helping first-line supervisors to kind of make
that distinction better.
Do you think that would result in less, sort-of, I think
loosens allegation of people who are 3 minutes late under those
circumstances that we think are very stressful anyway?
Ms. Gowadia. I certainly think that that training will help
them. I also know that penalty table that you mentioned is a
guideline.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Yes, it is.
Ms. Gowadia. It allows us to----
Ms. Watson Coleman. Let me just ask one question----
Ms. Gowadia. Yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman [continuing]. Because what do you think
we need to do to improve the morale?
Ms. Gowadia. So, I think morale improves in many different
ways. First, you provide a rallying cry for a work force. I
think our Administrator's Intent gives it to us. We are
committed to our security mission. We are committed to
ourselves. We invest in our work force. In everything we do we
strive for excellence.
I think that forms the core basis of how we train, how we
prepare to do our work, how we arrive at work, what we do every
day. In building that esprit de corps, in affording
opportunities for training, for career path progression,
leadership training from the most junior employees all the way
up to making that sure that even our senior employees receive
the adequate leadership training.
I think you build and support a work force by making it an
environment in which they can grow. I think we are well on our
way with that, with the establishment of our TSA Academy at
Glynco.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
My time is up. I think that as we have an opportunity to
revisit some of this discussion with you and see how you are
moving in that direction, and how successful you are becoming
in creating this esprit de corps, which will improve the morale
issue and the efficiency issue and the performance issue.
Some would be very much interested in exploring it later.
Thank you. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Katko.
Mr. Katko. Just to follow up on the last question, Mrs.
Watson Coleman asked, it is fair to say also that how the
front-line workers perceive upper management and how they are
treated compared to how they are treated in the front lines is
important as well. Is it not?
Ms. Gowadia. Undoubtedly so.
Mr. Katko. OK. So, when someone is getting $60- or $70,000
in bonuses for poor performance, that is not a good signal to
send.
Ms. Gowadia. It isn't, which is why it is a practice that
has been discontinued at TSA, sir.
Mr. Katko. Yes, I just want to get into that a little bit.
I am sorry to say sometimes, but the upper management at TSA,
there have been some problems. When the front-line people see
those problems I think that impacts negatively the morale issue
as opposed to numerous other things as well?
What have you done since you have come on the job there to
address the issue of upper management proper performances, and
when they mess up making sure that they are held accountable as
well.
I mean, the bonuses are one. But can you give some other
examples?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes. So, let me dig into the bonuses issue and
the control that the Inspector General mentioned that we should
take into account.
So, first a subordinate may no longer nominate a supervisor
for an award. Only a supervisor can nominate somebody for a
special act award.
Mr. Katko. Can I just digress 1 second?
Ms. Gowadia. Please.
Mr. Katko. Where the heck did that idea ever come from to
begin with?
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, that was well before my time, and I was
in the nuclear world at that time.
Mr. Katko. OK. Figuring nuclear equations would be easier
to figure out than having to figure out why that program was
implemented in the first place. But OK, go ahead, please.
Ms. Gowadia. So, that was No. 1. No. 2, we have capped the
annual that a senior executive service employee can get at the
TSA to $10,000. So, in any fiscal year, no more than $10,000.
Third, the Office of Human Capital has to review the
package. Finally, as deputy administrator, I get to approve
those recommended bonuses.
So, bonuses will no longer happen the way it used to at
TSA.
Mr. Katko. Now, just drilling down a little farther, at
local airports the discipline for the front-line workers seems
to be more handled at a local level. Of course, TSA handles the
management, the discipline management at the headquarter level.
How is TSA working to streamline the processes and
procedures to provide some continuity or consistency across the
agency, for all levels of employees?
Ms. Gowadia. So as I mentioned earlier, sir, we have taken
our first step in that regard. We are bringing the management
and the policies and the oversight under one central person,
our Office of Human Capital.
Of course, it is important that we allow our Federal
security directors and our leaders in the field to be
sufficiently empowered to address performance issues. To
address as much as they can at the local level.
An empowered work force, a work force that works diligently
through leadership and management actually is a work force that
has higher morale. Which is why we are all going through
training at our TSA Academy, why we are affording our young
leaders, our aspiring leaders, new training. Even our most
senior leaders are going through the same training.
We are beginning to baseline and build the same values and
same integrity across the board, sir.
Mr. Katko. Does that training, first of all I applaud that
action. Does that training also include refreshers on how to
report misconduct?
Ms. Gowadia. Indeed.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Ms. Gowadia. We do recurring training on No Fear Act, et
cetera, yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. Now, you are getting more analytical with
respect to how you look at employee misconduct because you are
analyzing data more frequently. Is that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes. We will begin to do so with greater rigor
with each passing day.
Mr. Katko. OK. Now, as far as that goes, we really haven't
seen evidence that the employee misconduct cases are really
being assessed, excuse me, for trend analysis. I mean, trends
and misconduct and what is causing those trends to go in
certain areas.
What are you doing if anything to implement some sort of
trend analysis to try and nip that conduct or pervasive conduct
in certain areas?
Ms. Gowadia. So, my background as an engineer, I value
data. I do appreciate the data when carefully analyzed can help
you shape the course of an organization. I hope to bring some
of that personal touch to the analysis of the State and moving
forward.
Mr. Katko. Is the FBI Rap Back system currently in
operation?
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, I do not have details on that at this
time. But I do believe, yes.
Mr. Katko. OK. One thing I would like to know, and perhaps
you could follow up with a written answer, is the FBI Rap Back
system in effect for all of TSA employees, not just officers,
all employees, No. 1?
No. 2, how are they using that data to ensure that people
that may be breaking bad or committing crimes outside of the
work force that indicate security risk, how are they being
dealt with?
Ms. Gowadia. So, we do conduct on an annual basis a
criminal history background check on all our employees. We also
conduct random and reasonable suspicion-based drug testing. We
certainly have a lot of recurrent training for our staff.
The allegations, the data you see before you are direct
results of colleagues reporting things that they see out of
place. So, I think we have some of that in place.
Mr. Katko. The Rap Back service would----
Ms. Gowadia. Indeed.
Mr. Katko [continuing]. Certainly enhance that.
Ms. Gowadia. Indeed.
Mr. Katko. We need to get that on-line. I would like to
know when that--if it is on-line, if it is operational, No. 1.
No. 2, if it is not, when is it going to be?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes.
Mr. Katko. Then, No. 3, how are you using that information?
Ms. Gowadia. I will take that as a get-back, sir.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from New York.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me say, I will be glad to have the opportunity
to look at this report after the fact. We are just receiving it
and that is something that is a bit of a concern. But, I will
have a great opportunity to look at it later.
You know, we are here discussing allegations in terms of
TSOs and their ability to do a job properly. Let me just say
that the front-line workers in these airports have a job that
is of the utmost importance to the flying public to make sure
that no harm comes to them during their travel.
They work diligently, and they work hard. I think we need
to understand that and make sure that we let them know that we
support them. Naturally there are people that aren't doing the
job properly. Allegations of misconduct. But there is
misconduct in everything.
There is misconduct with attorneys. There is misconduct
with police. There is misconduct with Members of Congress. So,
we need to just focus on the true issues and not just blanketly
penalize the entire work force.
Most of these allegations, from what I understand, deal
with tardiness and absenteeism. But we have a work force here
that is, because of the issue around wait times, are doing
double shifts, and just really being pushed to the limit.
So, if you do two shifts and you go home and you try to
rest, you just might be 3 minutes late getting back to the job.
So, we just want to make sure that, you know, the misconduct
that we are talking about rises to a serious level.
Also, you know, there is an issue around Chicago O'Hare
Airport and contract workers, two unarmed security guards at
O'Hare were fired under the pretense that they leaked sensitive
security information to the press.
Prior to that firing, they made statements to the press
complaining about their pay, poor working conditions, and
retaliation of union organizing activities. They also said that
they had no training to deal with emergencies other than to
radio a supervisor in case an event.
What do you have in place to make sure contractors are
getting the type of training that they need in these airports?
Ms. Gowadia. Mr. Payne, when it comes to the contractor
that you are referring to, Chicago is a Federalized airport. So
the transportation security officers there are Federal
employees. So, I am not familiar with the report that you
cited. But if I had to take a stab at it, I would say that the
contractors you are probably referring to are the ones that
work for the airport in other duties.
We certainly have an insider threat program at TSA where we
work with our airport and airline partners to make it so that
we are putting into effect as many of the ASAC recommendations
as possible, reducing the number of access points to the
sterile area, and increasing the expectation for every airport
worker that they will be screened or they will be questioned if
they came through a gate that required a badge screening.
We are beginning to see some significant improvement in the
insider threat piece and we are improving our insider threat
training across the system.
But, if I may, Mr. Payne, may I just address something you
mentioned earlier in your statement? I would like to go on
record as saying that 99.7 percent of TSA officers have passed
integrity tests.
So, I would say that 99.7 percent of our tests have seen
positive results. Over 5,000 tests at over 200 airports since
2012, and to have that rate speaks to the integrity and values-
driven work force that I am very proud to be a part of.
Mr. Payne. OK.
Well, my time is up, and so I will yield back.
But just before I say that, I do reach out to TSOs when I
see them. As a matter of fact, my way back to Washington,
picking up my clothes at the cleaners, it was TSO that came in,
and I definitely thanked them for their service.
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you so much for doing that.
Mr. Payne. I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from New Jersey.
I would like to state for the record that all parties on
the committee, and, as well, you folks received the report at
the same time, which is yesterday. So, nobody was given any
deference at all. We all got it the same time. We are all going
through it, including you as well.
So, with that, the Chair will now recognize the gentleman
from Alabama, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank the witnesses for being here.
Dr. Gowadia, I want to follow up on Mr. Katko's question
about the bonus compensation. You mentioned these were all
senior executive service officials who were receiving them and
it has now been capped at $10,000.
Is there a total cap on annual compensation for SES
officials?
Ms. Gowadia. So, our program is in concert with the OPM
standards. I do not have the exact number for you though.
Mr. Rogers. But is there a total cap?
Ms. Gowadia. I do believe----
Mr. Rogers. On top of their annual base compensation, they
can possibly be paid?
Ms. Gowadia. A performance bonus? Yes, they will be paid a
performance--they are paid a performance bonus commiserate with
their performance in that year, but I do not know the exact
cap, sir. I can get back.
Mr. Rogers. My question really goes to this, if somebody is
being paid $175,000, is there a cap how much over and above
that they could possibly be given, or is there unlimited amount
that----
Ms. Gowadia. We have controls in the department. So, at a
certain level you have to pay an SES 5 percent as a bonus
level. If you decide it is 0 or 5, that is the starting level.
Beyond a certain dollar value, and I can't remember that dollar
value, we have to go through the Department. The Deputy
Secretary has to approve it.
We have a performance review board that reviews everything
across the Department. But as to the exact value or do we have
an absolute cap, I would have to get back to you on that.
Mr. Rogers. Please do. Please check and see if there is any
cap or not.
Ms. Gowadia. I will take that as a get-back, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Anyway, I wanted to ask you, 5 entities within
the TSA have responsibility for some part of the process to
address misconduct. But no one senior official has been clearly
designated to oversee it.
Despite this though, TSA has 20 direct reports to the
administrator. I find that just phenomenal that Neffenger has
20 direct reports, and nearly 3,000 headquarter employees. That
is an awfully big bureaucratic hierarchy.
Do you think that is the best structure to be used to deal
with some of these problems that have been outlined in this
report?
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, as I mentioned before, when it comes to
misconduct allegations, there are different functions that have
to work through the system. You need somebody to investigate.
You need somebody to adjudicate the findings of the
investigation. You certainly need leadership that can implement
the disciplinary process.
But all of them do come through so that policies, the
Office of Human Capital and, of course, ultimately they are
responsible to the administrator and myself. So, we do have a
structure that is actually rather in keeping with the rest of
Government when it comes to the assignment of functions.
Centralization of the work force management is under way,
as I mentioned. We are in fairly short order here, we will
begin to use our systems administrator for human capital as the
central body that will oversee the policies and the
implementation of the policies across the enterprise.
Mr. Rogers. So, I guess I am hearing you say that you don't
see a problem the administrator having 20 direct reports.
Ms. Gowadia. So, when the administrator came in he did look
at his structure. He has already consolidated many of those
direct reports under a chief operations officer.
Mr. Rogers. Good.
Ms. Gowadia. So, as we look to the future of TSA, we will
certainly absorb the findings of your report. Any best
practices available as we keep evolving TSA to be an effective
and efficient organization in the days ahead.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I would urge to look into the private
sector for some of these organizational charts as opposed to
the Government. The Government has not been the best role model
for that.
According to Administrator Neffenger, TSA vets employees on
a recurrent basis. You made reference to that earlier today.
Which includes conducting criminal history checks to identify
activity that might not be self-reported or disclosed as
required.
However, our investigation found that other agencies
identified criminal activity that TSA missed, which were
referred to the OIG for investigation.
Please reconcile these two facts. How effective can the
current vetting process be if other agencies are identifying
information that TSA is not uncovering?
Ms. Gowadia. So, I do believe it depends on what it is that
was uncovered. So, if it is recreational drug use, that would
probably not show up in a criminal history check for example.
So, in those instances, the annual criminal history check would
not catch it. But, if you were polygraphed at a different
agency, you might self-report on it.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Alabama.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Loudermilk.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today. This is extremely
important in my view. Since I have been here and looking at
TSA. TSA is definitely an important aspect of our National
security. But I also believe that it is viewed by the American
people as potentially one of the most mismanaged and
ineffective from the perspective of--if we hear about now long
wait lines.
But also, the interaction between TSA employees and the
general public and some other issues, which I will get into.
Understand, you haven't been on the job very long, so this
isn't geared toward you. You have a lot of work ahead of you if
we can turn things around.
My first question, Mr. Oosterbaan, is, and I will pose this
to both of you, of the numerous allegations of misconduct that
are made, generally who makes those allegations? Coworkers,
supervisors, the public? Who is it that makes most of the
allegations?
Mr. Oosterbaan. I don't have specific information to
provide to you an exact number. It is certainly all of the
above in terms of the allegations we get. It, of course,
depends on the nature of the allegation, you know, the
narcotics through an airport, came through a confidential
informant. So, someone that was not part of TSA at the time. It
really depends.
Mr. Loudermilk. OK.
Would you like to address that?
Ms. Gowadia. I would concur with everything the I.G. just
said.
Mr. Loudermilk. OK. One of the things I have known from
working in the military and as well as in private business, one
indication of poor morale is exactly what we are seeing here, a
lot of allegations. Which, many may end up being false. I think
that there is this morale problem we have.
Another question I have is regarding the number of
employees, there is, I think, 781 have been placed under
administrative leave between 2013 and 2015. Are generally those
employees paid while they are in administrative leave?
Ms. Gowadia. I do believe they are, sir, but I can get back
to on the specifics.
Mr. Loudermilk. OK. I would appreciate that because a
previous investigation we did through this committee showed
that during that similar time frame the Department of Homeland
Security spent over $30 million paying employees to stay at
home and not at work because they were on administrative leave,
and some of those for as much as 2 years.
Quite often our friends on the other side of the aisle say
that our biggest problem in TSA is a lack of funding. I think
there is at least $30 million that we can use there if we can
adjudicate these on a much quicker basis.
Let me address one other thing that is very important. I am
actually going to be meeting with an ambassador for a foreign
country over some issues that we have been having. Last year, a
constituent of ours was put in prison in India because when
they arrived in India to work for Habitat for Humanity it was
found that he had four live bullets in a backpack that he
carried onto the aircraft.
He didn't know they were in there. He borrowed the backpack
from his son. Went through two TSA checkpoints in the United
States. It was not found. When he arrived in India they were
found.
Right now I have a constituent in Mexico who was arrested.
He made it through a TSA checkpoint here in the United States
for the same thing, live bullets in a backpack that he didn't
realize was there. But it was caught as he was trying to return
back to the United States in Mexico. He was arrested and
imprisoned there. Self-employed, he has no income at this
point.
A friend of mine came to DCA without realizing he had a
backpack carryon, he had 12, 12-gauge shotgun shells in his
backpack that he didn't realize was there until he got to the
hotel here in Washington, DC. Made it through a TSA checkpoint.
Another one recently made it to the gate at DCA with a pair
of shears in their pocket that they forgot that was in there
until they were about to board the plane and reached in their
pocket and found the pair of shears that made it through a TSA
checkpoint.
I personally experienced getting several years ago to the
District of Columbia, had a large flathead screwdriver in my
briefcase that I did not know was there. I made it through a
TSA checkpoint.
We are talking about bonuses for performance? These issues,
we are lucky that these were people that did not have ill
intention. How is this happening? Is it a morale issue? Is it
because we have people on drugs that are working? I noticed
that a lot of the incidents are because we are not following
security procedures.
Is it the technology is not up to date and we are forcing
people to do things that they don't have the right tools? So,
if you could opine on those, please.
Ms. Gowadia. So, all of that begins with training. You have
to prepare your work force to do their mission. Which is why we
have started our TSA Academy, and why we have sent all our new
officers through there.
They receive training on the specific technologies they
will use when they hit the airports. We will continue to give
recurrent training to our officers.
Second, the technology can and will improve in the future.
I will tell that our rededication to our security mission has
resulted in an appreciable uptick of the prohibited items we
find on a daily basis at the airports.
In 2012, for example, we found about 2,200 firearms. This
year, we are on track to finding about 3,000. We continue to
work with our staff to keep them vigilant, give them better
training aids.
You may have heard of the new innovation lanes we put in in
Atlanta, for example. Not only does it speed up the flow of
people divesting themselves and moving through the checkpoint,
but it allows us to give an officer real-time feedback on tests
that are run in the system.
This helps officers learn and keep improving their skills.
Working in a checkpoint is a demanding environment. But we do
not have the luxury to fail. So, we are continuing to invest in
our people and commit to their excellent service and support of
the Nation.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Doctor.
I see I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. I yield back, but I
am gravely concerned over the bonus issue when the performances
bonuses do not seem to be commiserate with the performance that
we are seeing. Thank you.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Georgia.
The Chair now recognizes gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Clawson.
Correction, Mr. Ratcliffe.
Mr. Clawson. You owe me now.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Chairman
Perry and Chairman Katko, for your work over the last 6 months
to put together this report and its findings.
I want to thank both witnesses for being here. Mr.
Oosterbaan, for the investigative work that your office did
here.
Dr. Gowadia, good to see you again.
For the benefit of others in the room, I have had the
chance to work with Dr. Gowadia in her prior role as the head
of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and in my role as the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies here on the Committee on
Homeland Security.
I will say that DNDO under your leadership repeatedly
received excellent marks and reviews with respect to its
morale, with respect to its efficiency, with respect to its
effectiveness. So, I think that really bodes well. I was
pleased to hear about your selection as the deputy
administrator at TSA.
So, having said that, these are challenging times. I
related the same to Administrator Neffenger when he was here a
few months ago. Because, we know that aviation traffic is up,
passenger loads are up, but at the same time, we know that
terrorists continue to make civil aviation, both airlines and
airports, the target of their twisted ideology.
That being the case, it makes some of what we have in this
report and in findings all the more troubling. I think that it
looks like, I think, TSA employs about 60,000 people. According
to this report, a total of 17,611 allegations of misconduct.
So, if I am doing my math right, that means about 29
percent of the TSA's work force has had misconduct allegations
within the past year. Given that the vast majority of those
relate to the TSOs, the Transportation Security Officers, folks
on the front line, that is even more troubling.
One thing that I have almost observed universally with
respect to all successful organizations is they can point to
one of their greatest assets being their people.
So, Dr. Gowadia, I want to start with you and say in trying
to get TSA to that place where it can champion its people as
its, as one of its greatest assets, I know you have only been
there for a short time but I would like your assessment.
So, is this a problem? Is it a need for better protocol? Is
it an issue of retraining the TSA work force? You talked about
the TSA Academy in response to Congressman Loudermilk. Is this
an issue of technology, better technology? Is it a combination
of all those?
So, I would like your candid and frank assessments given
where you are at this point.
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, I would like to reiterate something I
said to Mr. Payne earlier this morning. Since, 2012 we have
conducted almost 5,000 inspections at the airport, integrity
testing tests at airports, over 200 airports. And 99.7 percent
pass rate for our front-line officers.
That is an incredibly diligent and proficient work force, a
very professional work force. We do have some issues with
misconduct, and even one case is one too many. It starts with
training. It starts with providing them the right basics,
giving them all the tools that they can possibly have to
succeed, career path progression.
Making sure that the technology that they have enables
their ability to do their job, keep up with their skills, and
certainly I want to thank Congress for the additional resources
that you have afforded us by virtue of our reprogramming
because it allows us to bring on board the right-sized staff,
convert people from part-time to full-time, which also
increases performance and retention, and overtime hours,
precluding the shiftwork, tired officers, et cetera.
So, thanks to you guys we will have more canines. We will
have better technology. We will certainly have more people on
the front lines. All of that, all of that accompanied with the
training, the technologies, it has to be a holistic approach.
They cannot be just a single bullet that will fix
everything.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you. My time is about to expire. But
as I already said I have great confidence in you and your
abilities. I am very pleased so far with how administrator
Neffenger has approached the job in short time there.
But you and the administrator only have 6 months until the
new administration comes in. So, what are your plans with
respect to making sure the initiatives and the approaches that
you want to use to fix some of these issues and problems with
respect to employee misconduct will carry forward into the next
administration?
Ms. Gowadia. Mr. Ratcliffe, thank you for your vote of
confidence. In taking this job, I went back to the Federal
service. So, the next administration will continue to see me in
service. I hope to stay there for a good bit of my career.
But the administrator has given us a strong foundation,
virtue of the academy, virtue of his intent, constant training,
consistent training across the board. He has set us on a good
path. Whether he stays on in the next administration or not, I
think he has set us off in fine fashion, sir.
Mr. Ratcliffe. My time has expired. Again, I thank you both
for being here.
I will yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Texas.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Clawson.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you for coming. I am going to go a
little off topic, OK? I appreciate what you all do for our
Nation. My district is Fort Meyers, Naples. It is a great
district, right on the water. We live and die on tourism. We
live and die on tourism.
We don't mind being team players. Right now, the TSA checks
dogs and people out of our airports, to go to Chicago or
wherever you have got long lines and it is our down season. We
hear ya. We don't, you know, I ain't been kicking up a lot of
dust on this.
But when October and November gets here, we want our people
back, you all. You hear me now. We want our dogs back.
Ms. Gowadia. I hear you.
Mr. Clawson. We hear you all, you know, everybody is on the
record here. You all gotta give us our stuff back. We, you
know, we are always small child, you know, we are the youngest
child compared to some of the other big airports and regions
around the country.
But we already have an ecological disaster that we don't do
a lot about. If we get long lines on top of that in southwest
Florida, it is going to hurt my people. It is going to hurt my
economy. So, please, give us our people back.
We are being team players. We are not squawking. But when
our season comes, you all figure out a way in Chicago and those
other airports to handle you all's business so we can get our
dogs and our people back. Please, I am pleading with you.
Ms. Gowadia. I hear you, sir. I think----
Mr. Clawson. Home team first for me, all the way. Home team
first. We have got a lot of working class folk that depends on
that industry.
The second thing I wanted to bring up with you all this is
not, you know, bad behavior or anything like that. It is my
impression through my investigation and, you know, reading and
studying this that our dog, you know, our canine thing is kind
of helter skelter.
You know, if you looked in the past, we shut down some of
our breeding, and, you know, other internal dog development and
it kind of feels like we are a little under-staffed on canines,
particularly canines that can track that vapor scent in a
crowd.
Particularly if you look outside of TSA and the airports,
and look at DHS at a broader level, it just feels to me and
seems to me that we could spending a lot more time and a lot
more money on dogs. We could understand the genetic, you know,
we are buying dogs from Mexico and Europe for God's sakes. You
know that. We get a few out of Auburn. We send them to Texas.
We train them with their handler. Then we put them out in the
field.
You know, it kind of feels like to me I wish we had five
times more good dogs. That that would, some of these problems
that have already been talked about today wouldn't be such a
big issues if we had that line because those dogs are pretty
damn, you know, they are very good.
Machines and humans are not as good in my view on some
things. So, it feels like we should be putting a lot more into
the dog program. Are you agreeing with me on that, Doctor?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir. Which is why we are aiming to get up
to 500 passenger screening canine teams out for our airports.
To this end, again, many thanks to Congress for helping us in
the reprogramming. That is going to be one of the focus areas
for the money that is----
Mr. Clawson. Are we going to keep buying those dogs from
Belgium and from other countries? Are we going to insource more
of it so we understand? Look, if I buy a car, a used car and
somebody else has had that motor for three owners, you know
what I mean, I don't know if he has re-boarded or not. You
know?
So, I would think for, you know, the genetics of dogs is
very important in how effective they are, correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Clawson. But we are outsourcing the genetics and the
upbringing of those dogs right now. Am I right about that?
Ms. Gowadia. Mr. Clawson, I think it would be really
beneficial if we were to come sit down with you and walk you
through the full extent of our canine program. How we buy the
dogs, how we train the dogs. What it takes to train the dogs
and how we put them out into the field, the partnerships we
have domestically and internationally.
I think it would help you to see all of that. At your
convenience I would love to bring the team up and share that
information with you.
Mr. Clawson. I have been talking to some of your folks
because I sit on Homeland Security and I am worried about my
airport. I think they do a very good job. I just think we would
like to put more into it. If you all want to start training
dogs and set up a facility in southwest Florida, we would love
to have it.
I am very supportive. Thanks for coming in today.
Appreciate what you all do for our country.
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Mr. Clawson.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Florida. I
am going to go for a second round.
As long as I am sitting here it is going to be you and me.
So, with your indulgence, Doctor, TSA uses a discipline process
where repeated misconduct should result in more stringent
penalties.
So, as you incur more infractions, the penalty curve goes
up, right? Half of TSA's work force allegedly committed
misconduct from fiscal year 2013 to 2015. I say allegedly
again. Almost half of that number did so repeatedly.
So, half of the 27,000 allegations, and of those multiple
infractions. That suggests that this model of increasing
penalty is a failure because it hasn't deterred it. But it
probably also suggests that maybe that is not being
implemented, the increasing penalty with increasing
infractions.
How, can you speak to that? I know you have been here 2
months. But that is a concern for us.
Ms. Gowadia. Chairman Perry, I think it is important that
we look at the individual cases to a certain extent. Because if
you just look at the raw data, the vast majority of those
allegations, again, fall within attendance and leave, things
that can be addressed using administrative processes.
It is not so much an issue of misconduct as much as it is
an issue of performance. So, if somebody is tardy once,
somebody is tardy twice, yes, it goes from counseling, to
letter of reprimand----
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Gowadia [continuing]. Et cetera, et cetera. So, when it
comes to some of the larger numbers, I think perhaps it would
benefit us to tear the individual cases apart.
Mr. Perry. Then maybe you should have two separate
categories so that we can further determine where the bigger
problem is, and then resources can be expended there because I
tend to agree with you. If it is something criminal that is
obviously different than showing up a few minutes late for
work.
I think we all get that, but I would also say, and I think
you would agree, that the integrity of the system depends on
everybody doing the best they can at all times. While none of
us are perfect, you know, if you, as a boss used to tell me, if
you can be 3 minutes late, you can be 3 minutes early, right?
You are holding the other person up, and you are holding
the line up. These things cascade. So, we have to have that
level of expectation of excellence. We are not often, or often
enough, going to meet that. But we have to have that
expectation that we are going to strive for that at every
single time.
If our metrics don't bear that out correctly then we need
to look at something else that adequately reflects the
circumstance so we can address the problem. Would you agree
or----
Ms. Gowadia. Absolutely, Chairman Perry. Our conduct
permeates everything we do. So, to the extent that we can
separate the more egregious and devote enough time to training
and retraining, and continue to raise the professionalism of
our entire work force, we fully intend to do so.
As I mentioned, our three principals are mission focus, we
will invest in our people, and we, as a team, are committed to
excellence.
Mr. Perry. Let me turn to Mr. Oosterbaan on that. Do you
have some input regarding that last kind of discussion that the
good doctor and I were having that you would like to impart, or
do you have any thoughts?
Mr. Oosterbaan. Thank you, Chairman Perry. One thing I
would note in reviewing the report of the subcommittee is, and
it has been mentioned earlier, is the lack of consistency with
regard to discipline. Perhaps the lack of transparency, and it
sounds like TSA is addressing this.
I think that is critically important. We have talked about
morale. That has a direct impact on morale. This thought, this
notion that discipline is being applied inconsistently. Legal
precedent just kind of relies on that consistent application to
assess whether this discipline was correct.
So, I think that is an important point of your report.
Mr. Perry. Right. If we have missed the mark, and if the
administration has missed the mark, I would also say that
attendance can turn into misconduct. Attendance and leave, that
category includes AWOL, and, you know, absent without leave. As
a military guy, you know, AWOL is a very, very serious issue.
When you are expected on the line, and certainly in the
military and certainly in a combat situation, these are issues
of life and death. I don't want to diminish the military in
that regard or increase the visibility or the import of this at
TSA.
But these employees are expected to be on the line, right?
It does increase the workload for the next person, right? Or
the time spent. That leads to potential failures, and so this
can be an issue of life and death, right?
Ms. Gowadia. Undoubtedly, sir. Which is why I said that
conduct permeates everything we do. How we prepare for the
work, how we do when we show up to work, and certainly how we
have recovered and retrained along the way.
You will not get any fight from me on the notion that our
work force needs to be disciplined, needs to commit to
excellence, and maintain a good esprit de corps so that you are
not having to lean on the rest of your----
Mr. Perry. Those adjudications fairly meted out are seen by
everybody. Let me ask you, you mentioned integrity testing and
evaluation or something. I don't know if I have the terminology
correct. But I want to make sure I understand that. Is that
integrity from the standpoint of personal integrity?
You said it is somewhere in the 97 percent? Is that?
Ms. Gowadia [continuing]. Ninety-nine percent.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Ninety-nine percent. I got to tell
you, from my standpoint when you said that, so how do I
juxtapose, how do I view that in light of 27,000 allegations of
misconduct among the, nearly half, right? So, 99 percent
integrity rating. I am wondering, do you see maybe there is an
issue with that system.
Is it adequate? Is it appropriate? Because it is saying
everybody has got this great integrity, but half of the work
force is alleged to have been involved in misconduct. So, where
is the disconnect there?
Ms. Gowadia. So, your personal integrity. So, let me give
you a sample test that might happen.
Mr. Perry. Sure.
Ms. Gowadia. An inspector might walk through a checkpoint
and accidentally drop some money. In 99.7 percent of those
tests since 2012----
Mr. Perry. Somebody says, hey, I found some money. Did
anybody lose it?
Ms. Gowadia. Brings it right back to--if they see who it
was dropped, right?
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Gowadia. So, those are the kinds of tests where they
are looking at an officer's personal integrity. Again, the
allegations that you see before you range all the way from
criminal misconduct. About 1 percent of those allegations
relate to integrity and ethics, and about 50 percent of them
relate to attendance and leave.
I am not downplaying any of that. I am not saying that that
is any excuse for not having a strong, effective, professional
work force, which we do have at TSA. I came home to be a part
of a proud work force, sir.
Mr. Perry. All right.
I am going to turn to Mr. Katko at this time. But I
probably have a third round for me with his indulgence as well.
The gentleman from New York is recognized.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. Mr. Oosterbaan, you
pronounce it? Is that correct?
Mr. Oosterbaan. Oosterbaan, sir.
Mr. Katko. Oosterbaan, OK. All right. Well, a quick
question for you. In doing your report, I know the report is
not completely finished yet. I presume you looked at the access
control issue as far as employee misconduct. By access control,
I mean, the employee is getting access to secure areas of the
airports.
That is a major concern of mine, particularly in light of
what happened in Istanbul and Brussels. But, more importantly,
what happened in Mogadishu and Sharm El Sheikh where airports
were bombed, and perhaps the Egypt Air one as well.
The latter two were definitely inside jobs at airports it
looks like, where bombs were smuggled in through corrupt
employees. So, we are very concerned about the access control
issue and the sight of badge issue.
We passed legislation to that extent which is sitting in
the Senate. Hopefully, going to get some attention at some
point.
With that as a background, do you believe TSA is currently
capable of effective oversight of its own employees' access to
secure and sterile areas of airports?
Mr. Oosterbaan. In our work we have addressed that to a
certain extent. It has given us some concern. I think we have
expressed that concern previously. Your concerns with regard to
the screening that isn't currently being done at the vast
majority of airports, while we don't have a specific position
on that, it makes great sense to us.
We get screened when we came into this building. You know,
we get screened if the people come to visit us at the OIG get
screened. So, it seems to make great sense to do it at
airports.
Mr. Katko. Yes, and it is one of the things that is
particularly concerning to me is that a visitor to an airport
gets screened at an exponentially higher degree of intrusion
that individuals that are entrusted with access to the secure
areas of airports. We saw what happened with a drug trafficking
case in Dallas Fort Worth as an example of how they exploit
that.
I am concerned about that going forward. So, to the extent
your report can address that to some extent going forward, I
would really very much appreciate that.
Now, the last thing I will note is a little off-topic, but
it is important. I do want it noted for the record, part of
coming in here today, Dr. Gowadia, we had a discussion in the
anteroom here about the Cuba issue.
I was just handed an email that was sent out this morning
which is celebrating the fact that, from the Department of
Transportation, that multiple airlines are now giving multiple
daily flights from the United from Cuba and that the process is
on-going, and it looks like it is going full speed ahead.
It is going full speed ahead despite the fact that my
committee was denied access to even look at the airports in
Cuba, my committee being the Transportation Security
Subcommittee. That trip to Cuba was necessitated on the fact
that we believed some of the conduct at the hearing about Cuba
led to basically stonewalling us while trying to get that
information.
So, we were compelled to go to Cuba ourselves. Now, we are
talking about opening up the airways, airports, ten airports in
Cuba with direct flights to the United States that we have no
idea what the security levels are.
I know you told me that there are charter airlines that
have been operating out there for quite a while. So, quite a
different thing from a charter airline who has an occasional
stop in Cuba to multiple flights with direct flights to the
United States.
Also I will note that the main security concerns about
that, and that is on the heels of what has happened with
bombings and other airports world-wide, which I just mentioned.
So, I am very concerned about this.
I am very concerned about the lack of transparency coming
from TSA on this issue. I am concerned about the fact that we
were prohibited from going to Cuba to go and make sure the
airports are safe enough for people to fly from those airports
to the United States.
I am very concerned about that. I wanna make sure and
reiterate that concern on the record because this seems like,
with this administration, it is a runaway train. No one is
going to be able to stop them from doing this. But we are going
to try our hardest to make sure at least its American people
are safe when they fly to and from those airports.
There is a lot of work to be done. There are concerns about
whether or not air marshals are even going to be allowed on the
flights. There is concerns about the integrity of the
employees. There are concerns about whether the equipment there
is sufficient or existent at all.
Those are all things that we need to have answered and
vetted, not just in a secure setting but in a public setting.
So, the American people can make informed decisions on whether
or not they want to go to Cuba based on the security concerns.
You overlie that with the fact that the communist
government of Cuba is not letting us in, is not working with
us, is still subject to sanctions from the United States which
I don't think any of the last point of departure airport in the
world has.
You overlie that on the fact that Cuban passports are
showing up all over the Middle East, especially in Afghanistan.
Some people are speculating that we may be looking at Cuba as a
new gateway into the United States for terrorists.
You overlie that with the fact that 60 years of hostile
relations between the United States and Cuba lend to the
logical conclusion that one or two people in Cuba might be
really pissed off at us still. Might be so mad at us that they
might do something stupid.
So, all those things are of a high concern. I would ask
that you, again, convey them to the appropriate people, and
tell them that we need to have access to those airports. So, we
can see for ourselves whether or not they are in proper shape
to allow American travelers to come.
Last, I will note it is our job as oversight. We feel like
we are not doing our job if we don't get that. So, I ask in the
strongest words possible that you convey that to the folks at
TSA, and at Homeland Security.
Ms. Gowadia. I certainly will, sir.
Mr. Katko. The last thing I will say, and I am sorry, just
1 minute, the other thing I want to ask about and perhaps I
will wait until next round, is the overuse of security
classifications by TSA to shield themselves from discussing
unfavorable topics in public. I want to talk about that perhaps
if I have another round.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair would like to follow up on one of his line of
questions regarding, and it was also the good gentleman from
Alabama, Mr. Rogers, regarding recurrent investigations or
vetting, screening, testing, et cetera, and the fact that other
agencies identified criminal activity that TSA had missed.
I just want to make sure I understand how that is done. So,
there is concurrent testing of current employees. So, it is not
just incoming employees, but as your employed by TSA you
undergo a battery of testing on some basis, annually, what have
you. Is that correct?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perry. So, is there a variation in that? Not only in
time, but say, different paradigms, the whole panoply. So, this
year you might have been tested. Let us say you are a 2-year
TSA employee, and you think you are going to have another check
in, say, June.
That check happens in September. So, you can't predict
when. That test didn't include a polygraph this year, but it
includes a polygraph next year. That test didn't include a
State police background check last time. But I just want to get
a flavor for the variations of that so that there is an
unpredictability at the point of TSA employees to be able to
thwart that system.
Specifically, regarding the insider threat we are all
concerned about. Yes, ma'am?
Ms. Gowadia. So, let me clarify, sir. The annual and
recurrent piece is a vetting.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Gowadia. Vetting against your criminal history.
Mr. Perry. OK.
Ms. Gowadia. The testing happens, for drug testing, for
example, it happens on a reasonable suspicion basis, or a
random basis.
Mr. Perry. Or a what basis?
Ms. Gowadia. Random basis.
Mr. Perry. Random basis. But regularly occurring. So, in
the military, if you are in the military, there is going to be
a random drug test. You might show up 2 times in a row, you
might not show up for 6 times in a row. It might happen a
couple months in a row, it might not happen for 8 months at a
time. Is that similar to TSA?
Ms. Gowadia. So, I do not know the full details of this
program, yet, but I imagine that random translates just as you
mentioned.
Mr. Perry. Can you confirm that for me?
Ms. Gowadia. Would you allow me to take it as a get-back,
please?
Mr. Perry. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you.
Mr. Perry. On the other paradigms, I would like you to
delve into that if you could because it seems to me that once
you get in, look, people are people. We have people that are
radicalized. We have people that are influenced by different
things.
They become dejected, what have you, influenced by maybe
blackmail. It seems to me that there needs to be--this is
critical. This infrastructure that would protect the American
flying public that there should be a pretty robust paradigm in
this regard that is random, as is varied, and covers the full
panoply so that we keep honest people honest.
I don't know how else to put that, but I would like your
thoughts. If you could get back to me on that as well.
Let me move on to another question that I have. According
to individuals who came forward to the committee, senior
managers at TSA have used directed reassignments, that is the
terminology I am familiar with it, but I just want to make sure
I am clear here, to at times punish those who elevate security
concerns.
This practice potentially poses a significant cost to
taxpayers. The administrator, Neffenger, previously testified
that this practice is no longer occurring. However, just last
week our staff received allegations, and they are allegations,
that in June TSA directly reassigned an FSD requiring her to
report to work from across the country in just 3 days. Are you
familiar? If you can, please explain if this is occurring, how
it can occur.
Ms. Gowadia. All right. I would like to reiterate what the
administrator said at the hearing that you have referenced. An
operating agency does need the ability to move its people
periodically, exigent circumstances, mission-driven, full
controls applied, well-vetted, because it goes through the
Office of Human Capital.
Is it financially sustainable, etcetera? When it comes to
individual cases, in the interest of the privacy of the
employee, sir, it is a discussion we should probably have in a
different environment. I would like to present to you, again,
off-line, all the details that we have on that particular case
that you mentioned.
Mr. Perry. So that I fully understand, are these permanent
reassignments? Are they temporary? Are they both? You know, 3
days to relocate across the country, I am thinking, if I had to
relocate in 3 days across the country it would, you know, I
have got a family, to get a house.
Most people do. So that is a hardship. We understand that
usually like a military TDY move or some other Government move,
there is a fairly robust period of time with the expectation of
selling your home and setting up your new home and all that
stuff.
So, what is the circumstance there? Is there, if you would,
do you have any knowledge of it being used as a point of
reprisal? Has that been done in the past? How do you gauge, how
do you monitor so that that doesn't happen in the future?
So, again, in this particular instance we can discuss it,
all the details in a different environment. We do use details,
TDYs. We do ask, on occasion, for permanent reassignments.
Sometimes employees themselves ask for reassignments to be
directed to new assignments.
However, the case comes about, it is presented to the
executive resources counsel. We work through the Human Capital
Office. We work through the CFO and make sure that the decision
is being made in the best interest of the mission while keeping
the employees, the employee in mind.
Mr. Perry. I do appreciate your mission-focused attitude.
It has to be mission-focused, but I think maybe what we will do
is set up a time where we can have a further discussion because
if it doesn't involve a particular employee information that
that would be appropriate, but I do want to do that.
Ms. Gowadia. Right. I would like to underline, sir, that
this practice does not occur as a retaliatory measure under
Admiral Neffenger's watch. He has absolutely discontinued that
practice.
Mr. Perry. Do you----
Ms. Gowadia. Put good controls on it.
Mr. Perry. Since you brought that back up, which I do, and
if you can in this setting, because I don't know if we are
divulging--we don't want to divulge operational issues here.
But, how do you monitor whether it is being used in a--what is
the safeguard to make sure it is not being used in retaliatory
fashion.
Ms. Gowadia. It can no longer be done as a unilateral
action. There are controls in place.
Mr. Perry. So it comes up to various agents, various----
Ms. Gowadia. Absolutely. It comes up the agency.
Mr. Perry. OK. All right.
Ms. Gowadia. There are deliberations involved.
Mr. Perry. Is there a process for redress for the employee
if they feel that it has not been correctly adjudicated as it
moves up the chain? Is there a process for redress?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Maybe the I.G. knows. Are you familiar? Any----
Mr. Oosterbaan. Certainly. We would address that if the
allegation is raised to us that would be a kind of classic
retaliation case that we would investigate.
Mr. Perry. Do you have a familiar area with this case or
any others?
Mr. Oosterbaan. I am not sure which case we are talking
about. So----
Mr. Perry. OK. Fair enough. All right.
At this time, I will yield to the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
As we alluded to earlier there was a hearing a while back
about the whole Cuba issue. Prior to the hearing, many of us,
staffers, Congressmen and women, many individuals met with
folks from TSA to get briefed on what was going on in Cuba.
Based on that briefing, we became very concerned about the
security issues with respect to the Cuban airports. At no time
during that hearing, at no time during that meeting rather, did
anyone from TSA raise any concerns about any of the information
that they were discussing being of a Sensitive, Secure,
Confidential, Secret nature. No security classification
whatsoever.
It wasn't even discussed. It was never discussed. We would
come to the hearing to discuss the very same matter so we could
have a public discourse on it. Immediately that information was
designated by the same witness who spoke to us in the meeting
as being Secure, Sensitive Information which we could not
discuss in public.
It raised a specter that we have heard again and again,
about TSA continually using security classifications to avoid
having public discussions about certain things that may be
unpleasant for them to discuss in public.
So, that is the background. Now, let me ask you, Mr.
Oosterbaan, did your report look at this issue at all about
them over the use of security classifications with respect to
employee misconduct?
Mr. Oosterbaan. We have just begun an audit on this. So, we
do not have a current report on it. We are very concerned about
it. While it is just starting, and I don't have a date yet. It
should be relatively soon.
Mr. Katko. Well, I am very glad to hear that that has
started because it was requested--I made a request to the
Inspector General's Office after that hearing. So, let me ask
you, Dr. Gowadia, I know that you have only been there a few
months, and you have been very patient with some of my
questions today, but let me just ask you this last question.
Since that hearing, and since I raised the issue with
Admiral Neffenger, has there been any internal reviews or
discussions about this issue at TSA?
Ms. Gowadia. So, we have definitely spoken to all our staff
to be more deliberate, be more up front when they are
discussing material that could expose vulnerabilities, et
cetera, in a closed setting to make it very clear to our
partners with whom we are sharing that information that that is
Security Sensitive Information, and apply the right wrappers to
it.
So that you know ahead of time what can and can't be
discussed in----
Mr. Katko. Now, on top of that, not just with respect to
this issue but with respect to other security issues where you
basically overuse it, what the allegation is, in order to not
have to talk about unpleasant things with respect to TSA.
Have you looked at the larger issue?
Ms. Gowadia. We have not started that, sir. But we will
certainly take that under advisement. We will wait for the
findings of the Inspector General, and absolutely act on what
we see. I would like to stress, and I know you feel the same
way about this matter, discussing vulnerabilities, aiding and
abetting the enemies is certainly not in the interest of the
American public.
I do appreciate your support in that regard.
Mr. Katko. Of course, no one wants to do that, but we also
have a solemn responsibility to protect the American public.
When you have memos like we got today saying that they are
going headstrong in with opening up airports all over Cuba.
We still don't have any of these things answered. They may
be opening up as soon as the next few months. The American
Airlines I believe is one that is already selling seats for
September for those flights. We have no answers.
Understand why we are concerned about this, and understand
why there needs to be a public dialog, and understand why we,
as a committee, may be skeptical about some of the security
designations because anybody that walks through the airports in
Cuba can see the same thing.
So, I don't understand how they are considered to be
Classified. So, with that being said I want to thank you for
your patience. I wanna thank you. I know some of the questions
were tough. They weren't aimed at you personally because you
just started on the job.
I have great faith that TSA is going in the right direction
with your leadership and with Admiral Neffenger's, but there is
also a lot of tough questions. Like I said to you in the other
room. The tenor and the relationship between the committee, my
committee at least, and TSA is going to be dictated by how some
of these questions are answered.
We have had a very good relationship going so far. That
relationship has been tinged by the last hearing. I am hoping
that it gets repaired and we move forward together because the
security of airports is what our job is to make sure we do as
best we can.
I am not at all confident that that is the case with
respect to Cuba.
Ms. Gowadia. You have my support in that partnership, sir.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Let me wrap up
with just a couple final questions and thoughts. And Mr.
Oosterbaan, and Dr. Gowadia, do you know as well?
Do you conduct what I normally consider a climate survey?
Is that a normal issue for TSA where you survey the employees
on a battery of questions that is ever-changing about their
perceptions of management? Their, you know, their upper
management, lower management, punishment, all that stuff of
what I would call a climate survey?
Are you aware and familiar? Is that something that you
institute in the performance of personnel management?
Ms. Gowadia. Well, I know that we take the Federal employee
viewpoint survey which in some aspects is a climate survey,
sir. I know we take that annually just like the rest of the
Federal Government. I do not know if we add onto to that other
climate surveys.
Mr. Perry. Mr. Oosterbaan, thoughts?
Mr. Oosterbaan. We do, sir. Actually, we conduct regular
inspections of ourselves, and as part of that we do a morale or
viewpoint survey that addresses all the issues that you
mentioned.
Mr. Perry. So let me delve into that a little bit with the
morale issue as it relates maybe to employee misconduct. What
kind of things do you glean from the survey that then you can
put into action or some actionable item to address an issue?
Can you give me any examples of either one, issues, or
actions, or solution sets?
Mr. Oosterbaan. If the surveys are done correctly, you are
going to get a lot of information running the gamut.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Oosterbaan. But an example would inconsistent
application of disciplinary rules, favoritism.
Mr. Perry. Are those issues that you have seen in TSA
because you mentioned them? I don't know if you are just giving
me potential data, or these are things that you are familiar
with because you have seen them and there is an increased
occurrence of those items.
Mr. Oosterbaan. I was speaking more generally.
Mr. Perry. OK.
Mr. Oosterbaan. But I think your report points to these
things very directly.
Mr. Perry. OK. Is that something that is done, how often?
The climate survey, or the employee survey? How often does that
occur?
Mr. Oosterbaan. I was referring to our internal----
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Oosterbaan [continuing]. Surveys and we do those
somewhat independently, in other words, not on an exact----
Mr. Perry. OK.
Mr. Oosterbaan [continuing]. Recurrent basis, but we also
have every one of our field offices and therefore all of our
people on a regular schedule of inspection and service.
Mr. Perry. OK, Doctor, do you know?
Ms. Gowadia. So, I can speak to the Federal Employee
Viewpoint survey which we do take every year. There are
certainly questions very similar to what my colleague
mentioned. I will tell you that my experience with the survey
is they have very good data.
First, you have to encourage your staff.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Gowadia [continuing]. To take the survey.
Mr. Perry. OK.
Ms. Gowadia. Right? So, the first thing is to increase the
response.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Gowadia. Because when your soldiers are talking to you,
you can lead them, right? But you have to inspire that
response. So, some of the things we did at the NDO back in the
day was we took the data. We analyzed it carefully. We found a
couple of places where we could make immediate improvement.
In doing so we established a basis of trust with our staff.
Now, the solution sets don't always come from management. In
fact, they usually come from people who know what is broken and
know how to fix it.
So, relying on employee teams to help solve things is
critical. A lot of these experiences that I did have at the NDO
I hope to bring to TSA, acknowledging that they are completely
different work forces in size and scale and mission.
I will stress to you, in Federal employee viewpoint survey,
question 43, my supervisor treats me with respect. I find that
to be a tremendously powerful question. Because if you are
treated with respect, you are more likely to over-perform. You
are more likely to feel that you work in a safe and secure
environment.
So, this is the one question that I will continue to pay
attention to. I have seen supervisors peg out at 100 percent on
that question. Deservedly so. I will throw a shout out to TSA
supervisors. They do rather well in this area, so.
Mr. Perry. OK. Thank you. I appreciate that. Let me kind-of
wind this down. Just a couple thoughts. You need to know, and I
don't know if you do, that the gamut that misconduct runs from
the very bottom to your first line brand new employee to the
very top.
I just want to make sure if you are not aware that OIG has
investigated senior leaders, including the former
administrators, former administrator, for alleged misconduct. I
just want you to be aware of that.
I also don't know. I received information recently that
some of your folks in management, not the TSOs but in
management, were asked to be deposed, and had to be asked some
questions. They declined.
Agency counsel, because they have no confidence in the
chief counsel. You need to know that. Now, this might be a
personality issue. But, you know, chief counsel is known to me,
and is known to me from the Madison Guarantee issue where the
chief counsel was then an object of investigation as purported
to provide information of the investigation to other people
that were objects of the investigation.
I tell you this because, in this context of low morale, or
not optimal morale, at the same time we see this issue of
misconduct. Those issues are important to people and how they
react to them, and how you, in this new job of yours, and you
have very little time to make a first impression. You know
this. You are a smart lady.
Set that standard and that circumstance where justice is
blind, and there is a standard that everybody from the top to
the bottom has to adhere to, and will be judged on accordingly.
You are the person to do that. All right? I just wanted to
outline that.
We appreciate your time here today. We thank you very much
for it. I thank you for your--I thank the witnesses. Your
testimony has been valuable. I thank the Members for their
questions.
Members may have some additional questions for the
witnesses. We will ask you to respond to those in writing
pursuant to the committee rule, VII(E) the hearing record will
remain open for 10 days.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Huban Gowadia
Question 1. Of the 1,270 TSA employees who received more than 5
misconduct allegations from fiscal year 2013 to 2015, how many received
promotions, bonuses, or awards during that same time period?
Answer. Please see the chart below for the requested data. Please
note: The 1,270 figure represents the number of employees who received
5 or more allegations of misconduct. Not all allegations were found
either to have merit or resulted in discipline or adverse action.
FISCAL YEAR 2013-2015 AWARDS, BONUSES AND PROMOTIONS FOR 1,270 EMPLOYEES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received Awards, Bonuses, or Promotions...................... 1,151
No Awards, Bonuses, or Promotions............................ 119
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data Notations:
Awards include Special Achievement Awards, Spot Awards, and
Group Cash Awards.
The term bonus represents performance-related bonuses.
Question 2a. Dr. Gowadia testified that Administrator Neffenger
requested her to examine human capital functions enterprise-wide, which
included bringing the entire workforce under the Office of Human
Capital.
What specific steps have been taken to date?
Answer. The Office of Human Capital (OHC) is designing a phased
approach to an enterprise-wide Human Resources (HR) solution. The plan
will include the phased milestones necessary to achieve the centralized
oversight of human capital positions at headquarters and field
locations. The plan will be designed so that organizational levels
understand and comply with guidance, policy, and merit system
principles; provide local management and other program staff with
advice; and continue to meet standards and competency requirements
established by OHC for their positions.
Question 2b. What specific aspects of human capital management will
be under the jurisdiction of the Office of Human Capital?
Answer. Administrative employment and personnel management
functions will align under the jurisdiction of OHC to include:
Benefits, employee relations, discipline, hiring, hours of duty, leave,
compensation/pay, performance management, personnel and payroll,
position classification, position management, workers' compensation,
employee engagement, and workforce development.
Question 2c. Will the Office of Human Capital ensure that the
policies it generates are followed? If so, what specific steps will be
taken?
Answer. OHC will implement an engagement plan to ensure that the
policies it generates are followed. OHC engages with headquarters and
field offices on those policies. OHC also has reinforced communication
with human capital staff. Further, OHC is developing a training program
to improve operational effectiveness and handling of employee relations
and HR-related workforce issues.
Question 3a. Dr. Gowadia testified that all TSA employees,
including senior leaders, were going through training at the TSA
Academy.
To date, how many TSA employees have completed this training?
Question 3b. Of these, how many senior managers have completed this
training?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) created
the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
(FLETC). To date, approximately 4,200 Transportation Security Officers
have completed basic training at the TSA Academy. TSA's members of the
Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES) also receive training.
They attend the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative Course at
Harvard University. To date, 75 of 133 TSES leaders have completed the
National Preparedness Leadership Initiative Course. In addition,
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) go through extensive training at FLETC in
Artesia, New Mexico and the TSA Training Center near Atlantic City, New
Jersey.
In January 2017, TSA will begin Management and Administrative
Professional training at the TSA Training Center. This training will be
for employees hired at TSA who are not Officers, FAMs, or members of
the TSES.
Question 4. In July 2013, GAO recommended that TSA establish a
process to review misconduct cases to ensure that airport-level
officials responsible for adjudicating employee misconduct were
complying with TSA's policies and procedures (GAO-13-624). According to
GAO, TSA implemented this recommendation because its Audits and
Inspections Division audited disciplinary actions at airports in
November 2014 and developed an inspection checklist that included items
related to disciplinary files. How many audits have been conducted
since that single audit in November 2014?
Answer. Since the initial Office of Inspection (OOI) Audit of
disciplinary actions in 2014, OOI's Audits and Inspections Division has
incorporated reviews of disciplinary actions into the standard
inspection process. These reviews are typically assisted by
representatives from OHC. Any deficiency is captured as a Corrective
Action Plan (CAP), which articulates the actions needed to improve
performance, along with time lines for implementation.
Since incorporating disciplinary actions as a standard inspection
item, OOI's Inspections Branch has conducted 15 airport inspections, 3
Federal Air Marshal Service inspections, and 3 inspections at TSA's
Office of Global Strategies (OGS), all of which included an examination
of disciplinary actions. Of the 21 inspections, OOI has issued a total
of 7 CAPs (6 at airports; and 1 at an OGS location) relating to
disciplinary actions, all of which have been closed in the OOI follow-
up process.
Question 5a. TSA's Employee Code of Conduct requires managers and
supervisors to ensure that all employees review the code of conduct
policy and accompanying handbook each year.
What percentage of TSA employees completed this requirement in
fiscal year 2015?
Answer. Total accounts: 63,095.
Total Fiscal Year 2015 Completions: 62,706.
Completion Percent: 99.4%.
Question 5b. How does TSA headquarters ensure that managers and
supervisors are enforcing this requirement?
Answer. In accordance with TSA Management Directive (MD) No.
1100.73-5, Employee Responsibilities and Code of Conduct, managers and
supervisors are responsible for ensuring all new employees participate
in new employee orientation. During the orientation, new employees
receive a copy of the directive, the accompanying handbook, and either
the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch
(5 C.F.R. Part 2635) (``Standards'') or a comprehensive summary of the
Standards. In addition, managers and supervisors are responsible for
ensuring employees sign TSA Form 1149, Employee Responsibilities and
Code of Conduct Acknowledgement, or review the materials on the On-line
Learning Center (OLC) and complete the associated certificate. This
form/certificate acts both as acknowledgment of receipt of the Code of
Conduct and acknowledgment of the employee's understanding of the
content.
Throughout their employment with TSA, employees are expected to
review and acknowledge their understanding of the MD, Handbook, and the
Standards on an annual basis. Additionally, employees are expected to
review and acknowledge their understanding of the MD, Handbook, and/or
Standards after each revision within 45 calendar days of the effective
date of the revision. Employees are provided up to 1 hour of official
duty time per year to complete the review. The Headquarters OLC office
provides training managers the ability to create reports locally to
verify completion. The OLC office provides larger reports on an ``as
requested'' basis.
Question 6. According to TSA, all directed reassignments must now
be reviewed by the chief human capital officer, chief financial
officer, the Executive Resources Council and, ultimately, by the
administrator. However, the Executive Resources Council is made up of
the very officials who may request the directed reassignments they are
in charge of approving. Given that individuals who came forward to the
committee have asserted that directed reassignments have been abused by
senior leadership, what specific controls are in place to ensure that
the Executive Resources Council fairly reviews and approves directed
reassignments?
Answer. The Executive Resources Council (ERC) is a committee of
TSES members that are expected to be role models for Government
integrity and set the workforce standards for ethical behavior and
conduct. The deputy administrator is a permanent member of the ERC and
serves as its designated chair. The assistant administrator for the
Office of Civil Rights and Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement
and the deputy assistant administrator for OHC serve as advisors to the
ERC. As such, these advisors ensure that business conducted by the ERC
is fair and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and
policies regarding merit staffing procedures, equal employment
opportunity, the TSES Interchange Agreement with the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, and Department of Homeland Security and TSA
workforce diversity goals. Voting members of the ERC must recuse
themselves and abstain from voting on any decisions directly affecting
their respective offices, including directed reassignments. The Chair
only votes on decisions that result in a tie.
Question 7a. Dr. Gowadia testified that 99.7% of TSA officers have
passed integrity tests and Administrator Neffenger stated in a letter
to Chairman Michael McCaul that this ``anti-theft program uses a wide
array of `bait' items that are sent through both the checkpoint and
baggage screening operations to verify the integrity of the screening
workforce.''
Please list in full the bait items that are included in integrity
tests.
Answer. The bait items used in integrity testing are based on TSA
claims management data indicating which types of items are often
reported as lost or stolen. They include cash, jewelry, watches,
physical fitness monitors, iPads, laptop computers, handheld gaming
devices, headphones, earbuds, and other designer items.
Question 7b. What steps does TSA take when an employee fails an
integrity test?
Answer. When TSA's OOI has determined that an employee has failed
an integrity test due to potential criminal activity, OOI will initiate
a criminal case, which includes referring matters involving over $2,000
to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector
General (OIG) for first right of refusal. If OIG chooses not to accept
the case for investigation, the matter is referred back to OOI for
investigation.
Question 7c. On what research or scientific basis did TSA base
these integrity tests?
Answer. OOI analysts review TSA claims management data for trends
and hotspots to determine locations for testing, as well as what types
of items to use. OOI also receives information from various other
sources, including Federal Security Directors concerned about theft at
their airports. In addition to this targeted testing, OOI also selects
airports at random for inclusion in integrity testing.
Question 8a. According to TSA policy, ``TSES members may only
receive one pay adjustment to their salary in a 12-month period unless
approved by the Under Secretary for Management.''
How many of these types of adjustments occurred from fiscal year
2013 through 2015?
Question 8b. During that time period, how many TSES members
received more than one pay adjustment to their salary in a 12-month
period?
Question 8c. Of those, how many were approved by the DHS Under
Secretary for Management?
Answer. Between fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2015, TSA
processed 196 performance-based pay adjustments for TSES employees; 102
during fiscal year 2014 and 94 during fiscal year 2015. TSA processed
no adjustments during fiscal year 2013 due to the Federal Government-
wide pay freeze for Senior Executives that was in effect during
calendar years 2010 through 2013.
During fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, there were 29 TSES
employees who received more than one increase during a 12-month period.
The following is the breakdown for the 29 TSES employees:
Twenty-five TSES employees received reassignments resulting
in moving into a position with greater responsibility and
complexity. Reassignments are exceptions to the 12-month pay
adjustment rule and do not require approval by the DHS Under
Secretary for Management.
One TSES employee received an additional pay adjustment to
raise the employee's salary to the minimum of the SES/TSES pay
range because the employee's current salary was below the
minimum TSES pay band at the time that the new year pay rates
went into effect. This pay increase is an exception to the 12-
month pay adjustment rule and does not require approval by the
DHS Under Secretary for Management.
TSA and the DHS Under Secretary for Management approved pay
adjustments for three TSES employees as part of their annual
Performance Review Board process, and each adjustment was
scheduled to be processed on the 12-month anniversary date.
However, due to an administrative error, these were processed
ahead of schedule and thus these 3 TSES employees received an
additional increase within a 12-month period.
Question 9a. TSA conducts several types of testing related to
deterring and detecting misconduct.
How often does TSA's recurrent vetting against criminal history
records to detect criminal activity that may not have been self-
reported?
Answer. On September 1, 2013, TSA implemented an annual Recurrent
Vetting Program, which includes a review of all TSA employees'
fingerprint-based criminal history records check. The purpose of
recurrent vetting is to identify any unreported criminal activity
between the current re-investigation cycles that may not have been
self-reported, disclosed, or developed. This does not replace the 5-
and 10-year re-investigative process, but rather enhances it by
requiring a more frequent review of an employee's criminal history
records.
2013/14 TSA Employee Recurrent Vetting
Total population equates to approximately 51,643 or (99%)
Total number of unreported issues 220 or (1%) of the
population
Top 3 Offenses: DUI, Miscellaneous Traffic, Assault/Battery
Question 9b. For fiscal years 2013 through 2015, how often did TSA
conduct random drug testing?
Answer. TSA conducted random drug testing 228 days in fiscal year
2015, 265 days in fiscal year 2014 and 254 days in fiscal year 2013.
Question 9c. What specific types of testing does TSA conduct to
identify behavior indicative of insider threats?
Answer. TSA's Insider Threat Unit (ITU) within the Office of Law
Enforcement conducts Insider Threat Assessments (ITAs) at high-risk
U.S. airports and TSA facilities. These ITAs are coordinated with Joint
Vulnerability Assessment (JVA) deployments and are designed to:
Educate internal and external stakeholders on insider-
threat-related motivators, factors, and observable behavioral
indicators;
Promote a culture of integrity and an environment of
acceptance for reporting insider-threat-related factors and
indicators;
Increase awareness and provide tips for recognizing
behaviors and/or situations that may indicate an employee is a
risk of an insider threat.
Airports also receive the Self-Vulnerability Assessment Tool for
yearly self-testing and JVA Best Practices Guide summarizing common
vulnerabilities and suggested mitigation strategies.
The ITU's Focused Operations branch maintains highly-skilled
personnel who possess capabilities/skillsets which include digital
forensics, e-discovery, data analysis, and Open Source data correlation
which allow for the gathering of evidentiary data for high-risk user
monitoring cases. This branch provides technical support and detects
and responds to high-risk user malicious, anomalous, and/or
unauthorized cyber activity in the environment. This detection is
accomplished using a software tool where defined user activities on a
TSA IT system, indicative of potential misconduct or malicious
behavior, are used as alerts. Examples of these types of end-user
activities include:
Unauthorized Removable Media use (USB Thumb Drive, External
Hard Drives, digital cameras)
Excessive data alteration and deletion/wiping, especially by
high-risk groups (e.g. administrators)
Use of non-approved tools
Attempts to access segregated/escalated systems/file shares/
databases
Business logic triggers that would capture misuse of access
and rights
Sensitive keyword searching of confidential or sensitive
keywords or data
Excessive printing, for example 200 pages/day
Abnormal work hours (IT Access/physical access)
Lastly, TSA's Office of Inspection conducts proactive operations to
detect employees who may be involved in corruption or other insider
activities, solicit assistance from trusted employees, and collect
criminal intelligence information that may identify those who are
exploiting their insider access with nefarious intent.
Question 10. Beyond the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, does TSA
administer any other surveys to assess employee morale? If so, please
describe such surveys and how often they have been administered.
Answer. In addition to the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
(FEVS), which is administered by the Office of Personnel Management to
a sample of Federal Government employees, TSA also administers an
Employee Engagement Survey (EES) and a National Exit Survey (NES) to
assess employee morale.
The EES was first administered in 2015 and is designed to address
TSA's unique needs and characteristics. This survey allows TSA to
assess the entire workforce and collect agency-specific information on
employee engagement, organizational climate, culture, and environment,
set initial benchmarks to compare with future studies, link to other
organizational metrics, and drive organizational change. Like the FEVS,
results are compiled and distributed at the local (i.e., office/
airport) and corporate (i.e., TSA-wide) levels. The EES is conducted on
a bi-annual cycle, with the next administration scheduled for 2017.
The NES began in 2005 and was updated in 2009 to an on-line-only
process and to include Federal Air Marshal Service employees. The NES
covers all TSA employees who voluntarily leave TSA. They are asked to
describe how they viewed the job at TSA at the time of hiring, provide
the reason(s) for leaving TSA and respond to follow-up questions on
their reason(s) for leaving. Additionally, they are asked to identify
one or two things TSA could do to retain talented employees in the
future. Results from the NES are compiled semi-annually and distributed
to TSA senior leadership with an analysis of the most frequent reasons
for departing during the reporting period and cumulatively since survey
inception.
The EES and NES supplement the FEVS to assess morale at TSA.
Results from the three surveys help TSA understand the drivers of
satisfaction and engagement at the local (i.e., office/airport) and
corporate (i.e., TSA-wide) levels, as well as reasons why employees
choose to leave and how TSA can improve retention.
Question 11. In January 2016, the DHS OIG reported that TSA's
oversight of its $1.2 billion human capital services contract needed
more effective oversight, particularly related to holding the
contractor accountable for poor performance. Despite TSA agreeing with
OIG's four recommendations, the OIG reported that TSA's planned actions
to address two of these recommendations did not fully address the OIG's
intent. As such, two of these recommendations are considered open and
unresolved. To what extent has TSA implemented all four of these
recommendations?
Answer. The DHS OIG January 2016 report contained 5
recommendations. TSA concurred with all 5 recommendations. As noted in
the attached May 18, 2016 OIG memorandum: Recommendation 3 was
previously closed; recommendations 2 and 4 were resolved and closed;
recommendation 5 was resolved and open; and recommendation 1 remained
unresolved and open.
TSA submitted a Corrective Action Plan Update to the OIG in July
2016 (attached)* with an update on the open recommendations 1 and 5.
The Corrective Action Plan Update also requests closure of
recommendation 5 and a change in the status of recommendation 1 from
unresolved and open to resolved and open. Among other things, the
Corrective Action Plan Update outlines the steps TSA is taking to
address and implement recommendation 1.
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Andrew Oosterbaan
Question 1a. According to TSA, employees are vetted on a recurrent
basis, which includes TSA conducting criminal history checks to
identify activity that might not have been self-reported or disclosed
as required.
How does TSA's process for vetting employees compare to other DHS
components?
Question 1b. How does it compare with best practices?
Answer. The OIG has not conducted audit or inspection work
regarding TSA's employee vetting process or comparing the process for
vetting employees across DHS components. While we published a report in
2015, ``TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting,'' that report did not
analyze TSA's process for vetting its own employees, but rather vetting
airport workers with access to secure airport areas. If you would like
us to review DHS employee vetting policies and best practices, we would
be happy to consider your request as part of our fiscal year 2017 or
fiscal year 2018 work plan.
Question 2a. According to TSA, all directed reassignments must now
be reviewed by the chief human capital officer, chief financial
officer, the Executive Resources Council and then, ultimately, by the
administrator himself. However, the Executive Resources Council is made
up of the very officials who may request the very directed
reassignments they are in charge of approving.
Does this current construct appear to have a conflict of interest?
Question 2b. What controls should be implemented to ensure that
directed reassignments are used only when necessary and not as
retribution?
Answer. TSA appears to have implemented a new process designed to
ensure that directed reassignments are used appropriately, which
includes review by the administrator. It is too early to tell whether
this will correct the reported abuses of the process, but we will
monitor TSA's implementation and report problems or improprieties if we
find any.
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