[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INFORMATION SHARING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 8, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-84
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
John L. Dickhaus, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Richard Beary, Immediate Past President, International
Association of Chiefs of Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Mike Sena, President, National Fusion Center Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Cedric Alexander, National President, National Organization
of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE):
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
STATE AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INFORMATION SHARING
----------
Thursday, September 8, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Katko, Hurd, Higgins, and
Keating.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from 3
National law enforcement associations regarding the importance
of information sharing and on-going challenges. I would like to
personally welcome the Members of the subcommittee, express my
appreciation to the witnesses who traveled here today. I really
appreciate you taking the time to be here. Now I recognize
myself for an opening statement.
Nearly 19 months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing
entitled ``Addressing the Remaining Gaps in Federal, State, and
Local Information Sharing.'' We heard from the same impressive
panel that is before us again today, and a lot has happened
since then.
During the initial hearing, the witnesses raised a number
of important issues, including the need for cyber expertise
within State and local law enforcement, providing fusion
centers with greater access to FBI terrorism-related data, and
concerns about the impact of encrypted communications platforms
for law enforcement and counterterrorism investigations.
A number of specific recommendations for the Department of
Homeland Security were also raised, such as providing greater
access to security clearances, empowering I&A field personnel,
and expanding the homeland security information network, just
to name a few.
A number of the recommendations became legislative
proposals that passed the House last year and are pending
before the Senate. We have asked the witnesses to reconvene to
provide an update on the status of these issues and highlight
any additional challenges that need continued attention,
especially in light of the administration transition next year.
A cop or sheriff's deputy on patrol, an analyst reviewing a
suspicious activity report, or a first responder interacting
with the public carrying out their daily responsibilities are
most likely going to be the first to identify a possible
threat. In the event of a terrorist attack, they will be the
first to respond.
While carrying out critical security and public safety
missions, U.S. law enforcement is facing an increased threat
environment. Since September 11, 2001, there have been 166
plots within the United States linked to Islamist terror
groups, with the vast majority occurring since 2009.
In May, FBI Director Comey stated that the Bureau has over
800 open cases related to individuals in the United States with
links to ISIS, and I believe he said they are in all 50 States.
So that is 800 open cases in 50 States of U.S. individuals
linked to ISIS.
The terror group has called for attacks against law
enforcement directly. In January 2015, a statement from the
ISIS spokesman called on supporters to, ``rise up and kill
intelligence officers, police officers, soldiers, and
civilians.''
In March 2016, the Caliphate Cyber Army, CCA, a cyber group
believed to be the ISIS hacking division, released a ``kill
list'' with names and information on 32 police officers from
across Minnesota. During the same time period, CCA published
personal information of 55 New Jersey Transit officers and
encouraged lone-wolf attacks against the officers.
Also troubling is the increase in domestic threats against
law enforcement. In some tragic instances, these threats have
turned into violence. The National Law Enforcement Memorial
Fund website reports there have been 11 shooting ambush attacks
on law enforcement in 2016 to date.
On July 7, 2016, a gunman killed 5 police officers in
Dallas and 7 other individuals while on duty providing security
at a protest rally. Three police officers were killed in an
ambush attack on Sunday, July 17, 2016, in Baton Rouge. The
attacker had made statements supporting attacks against law
enforcement on his social media accounts.
In the past several months, there have been recurring open-
source media reports that suggest multiple police departments
must respond to social media threats against law enforcement
officials in hundreds of jurisdictions across the United
States.
I am concerned about this anti-law enforcement climate, and
it adds to the dangerous nature of your jobs. Also, it involves
going after terrorism and providing counterterrorism service.
I want to offer my personal appreciation, admiration, and
support to the law enforcement, intelligence analysts, and
first responders represented by your associations for the vital
work they carry out every day, and I look forward to your
update.
I want to especially thank Mr. Sena, Chief Beary, and Dr.
Alexander for being here today. The input from your respective
associations is critical to our understanding of what has to be
done. You have been there, you know what it is about, and your
testimony will be extremely valuable to us.
Now I recognize my good friend, the Ranking Minority Member
from New York. For you who worked in Rochester and Albany, he
is from Buffalo, he is a little closer to the part of New York
that you are familiar with.
Mr. Higgins.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Chairman Peter T. King
September 8, 2016
Nearly 19 months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing entitled
``Addressing Remaining Gaps in Federal, State, and Local Information
Sharing.'' We heard from the same impressive panel before us again
today.
During the initial hearing, the witnesses raised a number of
important issues, including the need for cyber expertise within State
and local law enforcement, providing fusion centers with greater access
to FBI terrorism-related data, and concerns about the impact of
encrypted communications platforms for law enforcement and
counterterrorism investigations.
A number of specific recommendations for the Department of Homeland
Security were also raised, such as providing greater access to security
clearances, empowering I&A field personnel, and expanding the Homeland
Security Information Network, just to name a few. A number of the
recommendations became legislative proposals that passed the House late
last year and are pending before the Senate.
We've asked the witnesses to reconvene to provide an update on the
status of these issues and highlight any additional challenges that
need continued attention, especially in light of the administration
transition next year.
A cop or sheriff's deputy on the patrol, an analyst reviewing a
suspicious activity report, or a first responder interacting with the
public carrying out their daily responsibilities are most likely going
to be the first to identify a possible threat. In the event of a
terrorist attack, they will be the first to respond.
While carrying out critical security and public safety missions,
U.S. law enforcement is facing an increased threat environment. Since
September 11, 2001, there have been 166 plots within the United States
linked to Islamist terror groups with the vast majority occurring since
2009. In May, FBI Director Comey stated that the Bureau has over 800
open cases related to individuals in the United States with links to
ISIS.
The terror group has called for attacks against law enforcement
directly. In January 2015, a statement from the now-deceased spokesman
for ISIS, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, called on supporters to ``rise up and
kill intelligence officers, police officers, soldiers, and civilians.''
In March 2016, the Caliphate Cyber Army (CCA), a cyber group
believed to be the ISIS hacking division, released a ``kill list'' with
names and information on 32 police officers from across Minnesota.
During the same time period, CCA published personal information of 55
New Jersey Transit officers and encouraged lone-wolf attacks against
the officers.
Also troubling is the increase in domestic threats against law
enforcement. In some tragic instances, these threats have turned into
violence. The National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund website reports
there have been 11 shooting ambush attacks on law enforcement in 2016
to date. On July 7, 2016 a gunman killed 5 police officers in Dallas
and 7 other individuals while on-duty providing security at a protest
rally. Three police officers were killed in an ambush attack on Sunday,
July 17, 2016 in Baton Rouge. The attacker had made statements
supporting attacks against law enforcement on his social media
accounts.
In the last several months, there have been recurring open-source
media reports that suggest multiple police departments have had social
media threats against law enforcement officers in hundreds of
jurisdictions across the United States.
I am gravely concerned that the anti-law enforcement climate. The
lack of support shown by many politicians and public figures is further
enflaming tensions across the United States. Not only does this
situation threaten law enforcement lives, I'm concerned it may impact
their ability to operate, provide needed services, and participate in
the National counterterrorism mission.
I want to offer my personal appreciation, admiration, and support
to the law enforcement, intelligence analysts, and first responders
represented by your associations for the vital work they carry out
every day.
I look forward to the panel's update and would like to thank Mr.
Sena, Chief Beary, and Dr. Alexander for being here today. The input
from your respective associations is critical to the subcommittee's
understanding of the threat and progress made to improve the amount and
quality of information shared between Federal, State, and local law
enforcement.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing
and for his leadership on this issue. It is a follow-up to the
hearing first held in the 114th Congress. I would also like to
thank the witnesses for traveling here to be with us again
today.
Today, only a few days from the 15th anniversary of the
attacks on September 11, 2001, we know now, unfortunately, that
information sharing is an integral part of our Nation's
security. The idea and the practice of information sharing
between Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials has
been firmly ingrained in our homeland security policies since
9/11.
Our lessons learned have pushed the Federal Government to
develop many initiatives expanding efforts at information
sharing with State and local partners. Today, we have many
examples of successful partnerships, such as the fusion centers
and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force.
However, our work in this area is not complete. The primary
intelligence mission remains collecting information and
providing accurate analysis in a timely manner. The challenge
becomes balancing the environment where competitive information
sharing thrives while eliminating unnecessary duplication. That
has and remains the challenge for law enforcement officials and
its partners.
As Members of Congress, we have an important role today.
When we met here in February 2015, we were recovering from a
historic Government shutdown. Now, 1\1/2\ years later, we are
days away from another Government shutdown with Department of
Homeland Security funding and ultimately funding for our State
and locals looming in the balance. So while I applaud the open
and candid dialog, funding uncertainty trickles down and
impacts all of the issues we have gathered here to discuss.
Moreover, the recent and on-going attacks against law
enforcement highlight the fact that the true value of
information sharing will never be realized if State and local
law enforcement officials cannot respond and protect their own
communities. At our last meeting, I encouraged intelligence and
law enforcement officers to integrate themselves into
jurisdictions and communities that they are assigned and in
order to know and understand geographical and cultural
sensitivities. Today, I would again encourage the same thing.
So while today's hearing topics are not new, they present
issues that we cannot afford to ignore. This type of open
dialog is beneficial to all parties involved and helps to
inform the decisions that we make as a collective body.
Again, I welcome you back here before this committee, and I
look forward to your testimony.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
September 8, 2016
Today, only a few days from the fifteenth anniversary of the
attacks on September 11, 2001, we now know, unfortunately, that
information sharing is an integral part of our Nation's security.
The idea and the practice of information sharing between Federal,
State, and local law enforcement have been firmly engrained in our
homeland security policies since 9/11. Our lessons learned have pushed
the Federal Government to develop many initiatives expanding efforts at
information sharing with State and local partners.
Today, we have many examples of successful partnerships, such as
Fusion Centers and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force; however,
our work in this area is not complete. The primary intelligence mission
remains collecting information and providing accurate analyses in a
timely manner.
The challenge becomes balancing an environment where competitive
information sharing thrives while eliminating unnecessary duplication.
That has and remains the challenge for law enforcement officials and
its partners.
As Members of Congress we have an important role today. When we met
here in February 2015, we were recovering from a historical Government
shutdown. Now, one-and-a-half years later we are days away from another
Government shutdown with DHS funding and ultimately the funding of our
State and locals looming in the balance.
So while I applaud an open and candid dialogue, funding uncertainty
trickles down and impacts all of the issues we have gathered to discuss
today.
More, the recent and on-going attacks against law enforcement
highlight the fact that the true value of information sharing will
never be realized if State and local law enforcement cannot respond and
protect their own communities.
At our last meeting I encouraged intelligence and law enforcement
officers to integrate themselves into the jurisdictions and communities
they are assigned, in order to know and understand geographical and
cultural sensitivities. Today I would again encourage the same thing.
So while today's hearing topics are not new, they present issues we
cannot afford to ignore. This type of open dialogue is beneficial to
all parties involved and helps to inform the decisions that we make as
a collective body.
Mr. King. Thank you. The Ranking Member yields back.
I want to welcome our witnesses. Just to remind Mr. Katko,
if he has a statement to make for the record, he can submit it.
Other Members may submit statements for the record as well.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 8, 2016
Information sharing is critical to our Nation's security. On
Sunday, we will commemorate the fifteenth year since the September 11
attacks of 2001. I cannot help but to reflect on how successful we have
been when it comes to piecing the puzzle pieces together to create
better information sharing within the intelligence community and the
law enforcement community.
While the puzzle is still evolving, the final picture is much
clearer today than it was 15 years ago. Officials have become better at
not only gathering information, but also analyzing these pieces of
diverse and sometimes inconsistent information to create a single
coherent picture. That picture is then shared with other officials, all
of whom are working to keep our Nation safe.
The progress that has been made in both Congress and the Executive
branch have strategically addressed systematic problems caused by both
the failure to analyze and the failure to share information between law
enforcement officials and first responders. Some of those failures have
been remedied by simply requiring agencies to talk to each other and
their colleagues within State, local, and Tribal governments.
However, this has not been an easy process. As Members of Congress,
we have pushed to eliminate cultures, which promoted stove-piped
information and prevented external sharing. Our goal has become
shifting away from a need-to-know culture to a need-to-share
environment. Our insistence must be shown by not only pushing for
better information sharing, but also by providing the tools and funding
necessary to achieve a high and concise level of sharing.
Congress and the Federal Government must do more to assure that
State and local fusion centers can fully assist in the homeland
security mission. These centers remain our most useful piece of
information-sharing infrastructure.
While DHS and FBI are helping fusion centers to build analytical
and operational capabilities, they must also help these centers measure
and increase their homeland security value.
However, as we convene here today, the funding of our Federal
Government, including the Department of Homeland Security, is unknown
beyond the end of this month. The end of fiscal year 2016 will be here
on September 30. Unless Congress acts, our law enforcement agencies
will lose their ability to fund many of the operations that we need to
ensure that our country is safe.
So this hearing cannot be held in a vacuum. The needs of our State
and local law enforcement groups cannot be balanced on the divides of
political party lines. Continuous breaks in funding and the anxiety
created from ``not knowing'' until hours before or after a deadline are
not appropriate ways to run our Government and protect our country.
So it is irresponsible for us to charge our witnesses today, all of
whom are partners within DHS, to continue fighting the good fight if we
are not even willing to provide continuous funding.
While I look forward to revisiting the challenges that our State,
local, and Tribal law enforcements groups face in sharing and receiving
information with the Federal Government, I also look forward to hearing
an honest assessment from each of our witnesses about the information-
sharing challenges that continue to persist in this uncertain budgetary
environment.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Mr. King. OK.
Our first witness today will be Chief Beary. Chief Richard
Beary is the immediate past president of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police and served as the president
during the first subcommittee hearing in February 2015. He
served for 30 years as a law enforcement officer in Florida,
including as chief of police for the city of Lake Mary. In
2007, he was appointed chief of police for the University of
Central Florida.
Throughout his years of service, he has twice been awarded
the Medal of Valor for performance undertaken at great personal
hazard. Obviously, he had the Orlando tragedy occurred within
his jurisdiction, and look forward to anything you have to say
about that.
But, again, thank you for your testimony when you were here
in the past, look forward to your testimony again this morning.
Thank you for your service. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD BEARY, IMMEDIATE PAST PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
Chief Beary. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman King, and
Members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify back in
front of you again. As you know, I was here on February 26,
2015, and I sat before many of you in this room, and we talked
about some very important issues. I appreciate you reconvening
so that we can follow up on those issues.
Over a year ago, I spoke about issues such as going dark,
the encryption that the Chairman spoke about, which is only
going worse, the integral role of the National Fusion Center
Network, which is critical to how we do business, and how
things have advanced since 9/11 in information sharing, because
we have had some incredible gains and we can never forget that.
While there is no doubt that our fusion centers remain
absolutely essential and law enforcement still faces great
challenges, even with legal authority on gaining access to
electronic communication pursuant to a court order, I would
like to focus on a few other issues today. Those issues are
terrorist attacks and information sharing around incidents like
the Pulse nightclub shooting, cyber threats, and Federal
funding.
During my career, 39 years, I have watched the threats to
our communities evolve. While we are still dealing with the
problems of violent crime, drugs, prostitution, smuggling,
trafficking, and gangs, we now face additional challenges.
Those challenges include violent extremism, terrorism, cyber
threats, and highly organized criminals with access to
specialized equipment to aid them in their mission to harm
others and devastate our communities.
June 12, 2016, 2:03 a.m., it is a day I will not forget. It
was in the early hours of June 12 that Omar Mateen--which
normally I don't identify the shooters, but I will in this
case--killed 49 people and wounded countless others inside the
Pulse nightclub in downtown Orlando. Forty-nine people lost
their lives and 53 others were wounded. Quite frankly, if it
wasn't for incredible medical care that was close by, those
numbers would have been even higher.
Members of my agency were first responders to this horrific
scene, and our victim advocates assisted family members at 3
local hospitals.
Now, 3 months later, we continue to provide counseling
services to victims and their families as they work to restore
some type of normalcy to their lives while the FBI and the
Joint Terrorism Task Force continue the criminal investigation.
This Pulse incident highlights how one heavily-armed
individual can inflict numerous casualties with weapons
purchased legally here in the United States.
As law enforcement continues to deal with radicalized
people and groups, there is growing concern about refugees from
war-torn countries coming to our country. Thus far, we have not
been informed how they will be vetted or where they will be
located. Our need to know is not about targeting or
trafficking, but more in line with assistance during
assimilation and protecting these individuals from people in
communities with ill intent.
Another issue of significance is cyber threats. The cyber
threat confronting the United States has never been greater.
The cyber threat is real, it is here, and it is now. It seems
as though we read or hear about cyber crime and cyber attacks
against Government agencies, businesses, and critical
infrastructure every single week in the media. However,
cybersecurity is not just a National-level challenge. It
affects State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement
agencies every day.
These agencies encounter issues ranging from cyber-enabled
crime committed against local individuals and businesses to
forensic cyber investigations to protecting against and
responding to cyber crime, cyber attack, and intrusions. Police
departments themselves have become the targets of ransomware
attacks which threatens our operation and the security of our
information systems and data.
Please keep in mind that nearly three-quarters of the
18,000 law enforcement agencies in this country are small with
fewer than 25 sworn officers. This means many of the Nation's
law enforcement agencies do not have robust IT systems, and
protecting their systems from intrusions is a challenge.
Therefore, we cannot and must not overlook the importance of
fully engaging smaller agencies and non-urban agencies in
cybersecurity exercises, training, and threats.
I would also recommend that the FBI consider adding cyber
crime reporting to the Uniform Crime Reporting system. During
my 39 years in Government experience, it has shown me that for
something to become a priority, we have to you count it first,
and if we don't count it, it is not important to us.
It should come as no surprise to Members of this committee
that Federal funding is essential to our efforts, from high-
intensity drug trafficking to the fusion centers and all of the
resources that connect the dots so that law enforcement can be
effective.
On behalf of the IACP and our more than 27,000 members in
132 countries, Chairman, thank you for allowing me to be here
again, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Chief Beary follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Beary
September 8, 2016
Good morning Chairman King and Members of the subcommittee: Thank
you for inviting me to testify today on State and local perspectives on
Federal information sharing. I am currently the chief of police for the
University of Central Florida, the largest university in the State. I
am also the immediate past president of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police (IACP).
On February 26, 2015, I sat before Members of this subcommittee and
testified on this very same topic. I would like to thank this committee
and subcommittee for reconvening a hearing on this very important issue
and for the support it has demonstrated over the years for the law
enforcement field and our communities.
Over a year ago, I spoke about issues such as ``going dark,'' the
integral role of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and how things
had advanced since 9/11. While there is no doubt that our fusion
centers remain absolutely essential, and law enforcement still faces
great challenges, even with the legal authority, to gaining access to
electronic communications information pursuant to a court order, I
would like to focus on a few other issues today. Those issues are
terrorist attacks and information sharing around incidents like the
Pulse nightclub shooting, cyber threats, and Federal funding.
During my career, I have watched the threats to our communities
evolve. While we are still dealing with the problems of violent crime,
drugs, prostitution, smuggling/trafficking, and gangs, we now face
additional challenges. Those challenges include violent extremism,
terrorism, cyber threats, and highly-organized criminals with access to
specialized equipment to aid them in their mission to harm others and
devastate our communities.
June 12, 2016. I will never forget this day. It was in the early
hours of June 12 that Omar Mateen killed 49 people and wounded
countless others inside Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida.
Members of my agency were first responders to this horrific scene,
and our victim advocates assisted family members at 3 local hospitals.
Now, 3 months later, we continue to provide counseling services to
victims and their families as they work to restore some type of
normalcy to their lives while the FBI and our Joint Terrorism Task
Force continues the criminal investigation. This incident highlights
how one heavily-armed individual can inflict numerous casualties with
weapons purchased legally here in the United States.
As law enforcement continues to deal with radicalized people and
groups, there is growing concern about refugees from war-torn countries
coming to our country. Thus far, we have not been informed how they
will be vetted or where they will be located. Our need to know is not
about targeting or tracking, but more in line with assistance during
assimilation and protecting them from individuals with ill intent.
Another issue of significance is cyber threats. The cyber threat
confronting the United States has never been greater. The cyber threat
is real, and it is here and now.
It seems like we read or hear about cyber crime and cyber attacks
against Government agencies, businesses, and critical infrastructure
every week in the media. However, cybersecurity is not just a National-
level challenge--it affects State, local, Tribal, and territorial law
enforcement agencies every day. These agencies encounter issues ranging
from cyber-enabled crime committed against local individuals and
businesses, to forensic cyber investigations, to protecting against and
responding to cyber crime, cyber attacks, and intrusions.
Police departments themselves have become the targets of ransomware
attacks, which threatens our operations and the security of our
information systems and data.
Nearly three-quarters of the 18,000 law enforcement agencies
throughout the United States have fewer than 25 sworn officers; nearly
half have fewer than 10 sworn officers. This means that many of our
Nation's law enforcement agencies do not have robust IT capabilities
and protecting their systems from intrusions is a challenge.
Therefore, we cannot, and must not overlook the importance of fully
engaging smaller agencies and agencies in non-urban areas in
cybersecurity threat assessments as well as including them in cyber
attack exercises and training. Fully engaging all law enforcement
agencies in this increasingly growing threat is the only way we will be
able to prepare for and prevent future attacks that threaten the
security of our agencies and the United States.
I would also recommend that the FBI consider adding cyber crime
reporting to the Uniform Crime Reporting system. My 39 years of
Government experience has shown me that something can only become a
priority for action when we begin to officially count it.
This should come as no surprise to members of this subcommittee,
but Federal funding to support Federal, State, local, and Tribal agency
efforts is essential. This includes Federal funding to support fusion
centers, crime analysis centers, Regional Information Sharing System
(RISS) Centers, and High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA).
These have proven to be very effective platforms for integrating
Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement criminal information
and intelligence, and they need to be maintained in order to insure the
protection of the homeland. As these platforms continue to mature,
their immense value in helping investigative agencies to ``connect the
dots'' has been demonstrated. As part of this maturity process, de-
confliction of both targets and events between these platforms is
becoming an increasingly important area that needs attention and
support from Congress moving forward.
On behalf of the IACP and our more than 27,000 members in 132
countries, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. King. Chief Beary, thank you for your testimony. Again,
thank you for being here once more and for your service over
the years.
Our next witness is Mike Sena, who is the director of
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the fusion
center for the San Francisco Bay area. He also currently serves
as the president of the National Fusion Center Association,
representing 77 State and local fusion centers that comprise
the National Network of Fusion Centers.
Mr. Sena also has testified before this committee on
numerous occasions and continues to be a great resource to the
committee.
We thank you for that, and we appreciate you being here
today, and now you are recognized. You have been here enough. I
don't have to tell you how to do it. You are the pro.
STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FUSION CENTER
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Sena. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking
Member Higgins. I would like to thank you for inviting me to
testify again on this important topic.
I am proud to represent the professionals across the
National Network of Fusion Centers. Since we met in February
2015, we have seen good information-sharing progress. But we
have also been reminded that gaps still exist. At the end of
the day, it is about meeting the needs and expectations of the
American people and also that we keep them safe while
respecting their rights.
Fusion centers are at the forefront of removing barriers,
developing better pathways, and maintaining relationships that
help analysis and sharing happen faster. The role of fusion
centers in the aftermath of attacks in San Bernardino, Orlando,
Baton Rouge, and other places are clear examples of that.
Fusion centers are routinely deconflicting investigative cases
today thanks to support of DHS, the PM-ISE, and our partners at
the risk watch centers, and HIDTAs across the country.
That means that we have better visibility into active
investigations around the country, and it means our officers
are safer. We are working to standardize the process for
exchanging requests for information, or RFIs, among fusion
centers and our partners through HSIN exchange. This will help
the flow of information and help track the responses.
In the wake of high-profile attacks in recent months,
suspicious activity reports, SARs, forwarded to fusion centers
rose sharply. Some people sent information directly to the FBI.
Most people called 9-1-1 or their local law enforcement
agencies. Thanks to the ever-growing network of liaison
officers, those reports are routinely forwarded to fusion
centers. Our analysts work with DHS and FBI partners to vet
those reports, provide local context around the information,
and submit them to the FBI's eGuardian system as appropriate.
Since the beginning of fiscal year 2016, through the end of
July, fusion centers have received thousands of SARs from the
public. We saw a massive uptick in November and December after
the Paris and San Bernardino attacks. So far for fiscal year
2016, more than 100 of those SARs have contributed to existing
FBI investigations or resulted in the initiation of a new
investigation, and many of those were connected to individuals
on the terror watch list. That is a clear indication of the
enhanced reporting, analysis, and sharing that happens through
fusion centers.
You can also find encouraging evidence of the progress in
the newly published 2016 annual report from the program manager
for the Information Sharing Environment, or PM-ISE. If Members
of this committee have not yet reviewed that report, I strongly
encourage you to do so. It is available on-line at ISE.gov, and
I would like to submit it for the record.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to has been retained in committee files
and may also be available at https://www.ise.gov/resources/document-
library.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sena. In my written statement, I lay out in more detail
the challenges we are facing, but I want to highlight some of
them here.
We have consistently called for more TS/SCI clearances for
appropriate fusion center personnel. Without those clearances,
the types of information our people are able to factor into
their analysis can be inadequate and sensitive information that
should be shared is not shared.
We have strong concerns about the impact of Federal FOIA
interpretations on the legal ability of State and local law
enforcement to share our information and intelligence with our
Federal partners. We need better standards around law
enforcement sensitive information, or LES information.
Currently, there is no clear definition of LES information
and no penalties for unauthorized release of that data. We have
to share most information at the FOUO-LES level so it gets to
the people who need it, which can still reveal sensitive
information about on-going investigations, jeopardize cases and
the lives of law enforcement personnel, yet there is no way to
enforce or penalize violations.
We also believe that the FBI should explore the inclusion
of fusion centers in its threat review prioritization process
to ensure more complete understanding of the threats facing our
Nation. Right now, several fusion centers are unable to begin
to assess criminal justice information databases through CJIS.
We are also unable to gain access to the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, FinCEN, and that challenge also exists
with our other partners at risk centers and HIDTAs. I am very
concerned that some of our Federally-funded programs, whose
mission clearly includes providing investigative support,
cannot get access to data that is fundamental to good
analytical work. It is a clear obstacle to information sharing
and analysis, and we need to address it.
Finally, we are working with the FBI on an ``enhanced
engagement initiative'' to ensure the FBI continues to improve
its sharing of relevant counterterrorism information with
fusion centers. It will also improve coordination among fusion
centers to address the growing terrorism threat. We are working
closely with our partners at DHS, PM-ISE, and the Criminal
Intelligence Coordinating Council on this project.
I want to congratulate and thank this committee for its
productive legislation during the 114th Congress. You have
moved several pieces of legislation that would make a positive
difference to fusion centers and the American public. We
strongly encourage the Senate to consider those bills.
Next month, we will hold our fusion center training
conference in Alexandria, Virginia. I would like to invite
Members and staff of this committee to attend the conference to
see up close the challenges we are addressing and the level of
corroboration that has become routine.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sena follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Sena
September 8, 2016
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify on this
important topic. My name is Mike Sena and I am testifying today in my
capacity as president of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA).
I am currently the director of the Northern California High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and Northern California Regional
Intelligence Center (NCRIC), one of the 78 fusion centers in the
National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network). Fusion centers
bring together law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency
response, public health, protection of critical infrastructure and key
resources (CIKR), and private-sector security personnel to understand
local implications of National intelligence, and add State and local
information and context to Federal intelligence, thus enabling local,
State, and Federal officials to better protect our communities.
Since we last met in February of 2015, we have seen progress in the
analysis and sharing of information related to threats to the homeland.
We have also seen demonstrations of gaps that still exist. As I stated
in my testimony last year, our public safety, law enforcement, and
intelligence communities have made dramatic progress since September
11, 2001. This progress has not come without its roadblocks. As we
continue to work through those challenges with help from this
committee, we believe that we are on the right path and making steady
improvement. At the end of the day, it's about meeting the needs and
expectations of the American people that we keep them safe while
respecting their rights.
At a high level, I believe we should be working toward the
following four priorities to improve our ability to do that:
1. Strong Federal support for fusion centers through SHSGP and UASI
grant funding, and accountability behind the Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention (LETP) requirement in current law.
2. Strong engagement by DHS, FBI, and other Federal partners
directly with fusion centers including the forward deployment
of intelligence officers and analysts at fusion centers.
3. Strong training and network development between fusion centers,
police chiefs, sheriffs, fire chiefs, rank and file, emergency
management and other public safety partners at all levels of
government and across all geographies to ensure tips, leads,
suspicious activity, and criminal intelligence data are flowing
efficiently for analysis and sharing.
4. Strong connectivity and direct engagement between Federal,
State, and local investigative and analytical entities with
responsibility for cybersecurity.
Over the past year, we have seen the important role the National
Network of Fusion Centers plays in supporting lead investigative
agencies in the aftermath of horrific tragedies--both terror attacks
and criminal activity--in Orlando, San Bernardino, Baton Rouge, and
elsewhere. Immediately after the San Bernardino terrorist attack,
analysts at the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) were
developing intelligence on suspects and sharing it directly with the
San Bernardino Police Department, San Bernardino Sheriffs Office, and
the FBI.
An alert sheriff's deputy who had recently received training at the
JRIC called the fusion center to report that an individual matching the
description of the person wanted in connection with providing weapons
to the shooters was about to check out of an area hospital. The fusion
center immediately passed the information to the task force that was
about to launch a manhunt for the individual, enabling them to call it
off before it even started. It may seem simple, but the fast and
efficient flow of tips, leads, and intelligence products is challenging
in practice. Fusion centers are at the forefront of removing barriers,
developing better pathways, and maintaining relationships that help
information analysis and sharing happen faster. The JRIC's role after
the San Bernardino attack is one clear example of that.
We have found after many of the recent high-profile terror attacks
over the past year (San Bernardino, Paris, Orlando) that reporting of
suspicious activity by public safety personnel and by citizens rose
sharply immediately after the events. Some people send information
directly to the FBI. Others don't know who to call, and naturally look
to their local police agency or call 9-1-1. Thanks to an ever-growing
network of liaison officers, those reports are routinely forwarded to
fusion centers. Analysts vet those reports, provide local context
around the information reported, and share information directly with
the FBI via eGuardian.
I am still often asked whether fusion centers duplicate the FBI's
JTTFs. This committee knows the difference, but many people are still
not fully aware that JTTFs are Federally-run investigative bodies that
support the FBI's unique mission to investigate terrorism threats in
this country. Fusion centers play a much different role; they're not
only information-sharing hubs in States and metropolitan regions.
Fusion centers are where we train a cadre of terrorism liaison officers
(TLOs), including police officers, firefighters, EMS workers, and our
private-sector partners on indicators and warnings of terrorism. Fusion
centers have the ability to catalogue critical infrastructure in each
State and region and analyze incoming suspicious activity reports
(SARs) against the National threat picture and against what we know
about our critical infrastructure. We have the ability to rapidly share
information and intelligence among the entire National Network and with
the FBI. But often that SAR information has no nexus to terrorism. It's
about drug dealing or gang activity or firearms trafficking or mortgage
fraud. So the all-crimes approach mentioned above gives us the ability
to analyze that information and funnel it to the right place. And we
know that, sometimes, information that at first blush appears to be
criminal in nature actually is linked to terrorist activity.
In the wake of serious ISIL-inspired threats to law enforcement and
other public safety officers around the country, the NFCA worked
closely with the FBI to prepare a ``Duty to Warn'' memorandum to fusion
center directors and FBI field office executive management to advise
them of certain protocols and assistance for identifying and warning
individuals that are the targets of threats. We also worked with the
FBI to produce additional guidance on deconfliction efforts between
State and Federal partners on the Duty to Warn documents.
An essential part of continued improvement is the Federal support
provided to fusion centers. That Federal support includes assignment of
intelligence officers and analysts, technical assistance, training and
exercises, linkage to key information systems, grant funding, and
security clearances. For example, the FBI has assigned 94 personnel
either full-time or part-time to 63 out the 78 fusion centers across
the country. DHS has assigned 103 personnel to the fusion centers,
including intelligence officers, regional directors, and reports
officers.
The support of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment (PM-ISE) and his office has been critical to some of the
progress we have made since the last hearing. From continuing to
coordinate the development of standards for sharing information across
sectors, to enabling a single sign-on capability for personnel in
fusion centers and other field-based information sharing entities to
access multiple criminal intelligence databases, to paving the way for
coordinated deconfliction of law enforcement operational events across
multiple systems, the PM-ISE and his staff have been essential partners
of ours. Another PM-ISE supported project is currently under way with
the Northeast Regional Intelligence Group (including all of the fusion
centers in the Northeast region) that will result in deeper cooperation
and coordination among information-sharing entities and a wider set of
public safety partners in the region. The ISE annual report for 2016
was just published, and I strongly encourage Members of this committee
to visit the ISE website and review that report for more background on
the progress we are all making together.
These resources add critical value to the resources committed by
State and local governments to make the National Network a foundation
of homeland security information sharing. Over the past several years,
the State and local share of budget resources allocated to fusion
centers has grown substantially. State and local governments provided
well over half of all funding for fusion centers in fiscal year 2015.
In addition to concrete personnel and financial resources, the
dedication of time and deliberate effort to continually deepen
engagement with our Federal partners has been critical. One recent
example of this was past month when personnel from 14 fusion centers
participated in a week-long forum at FBI headquarters to exchange
information regarding best practices in analytical collaboration and
information sharing between the FBI, other Federal partners, and the
National Network of Fusion Centers.
addressing on-going challenges
Since fusion centers are separately owned and operated by State and
local entities, there is variation among the centers in terms of budget
and capabilities. That variation in capabilities has an impact on the
expectations of our local, county, State, and Federal public safety
partners and customers. To address this, the NFCA has initiated an
effort to formalize a standard process for collection of analytical
tradecraft best practices and operational success stories. We are also
working to establish a single virtual location for these best practices
so that anyone who is part of the National Network of Fusion Centers--
from new directors to analysts--has a ``one-stop shop'' for resources
to help improve their capabilities and understand what is happening
across the National Network. We are creating new opportunities for
advanced training for fusion center analysts, including collaborating
with our Federal partners on advanced analyst training. There is
currently no broadly-accepted method for exchanging requests for
information (RFIs) across the National Network of Fusion Centers and
among our law enforcement partners at all levels. So we are working to
standardize that process for exchanging RFIs through HSIN. Next month
we will hold our annual conference in Alexandria, Virginia and will
have representatives from nearly all fusion centers, all of our Federal
partners, and personnel from police departments, sheriffs offices, and
other public safety entities around the country. We encourage Members
and staff from this committee to attend that conference to see up-close
the challenges we are addressing and the level of collaboration that
has become routine.
We are continuing to address obstacles to progress in information
sharing and analytical capabilities. For example, we have consistently
called for more TS/SCI clearances for appropriate fusion center
personnel. Without those clearances, the types of information our
people are able to factor into their analysis can be inadequate. In
some cases, sensitive information that should be shared by Federal
partners is not shared. We also believe that the FBI should explore the
inclusion of fusion centers in its threat review and prioritization
(TRP) process to ensure a more complete understanding of the threats
facing our Nation. In addition, we have voiced strong concerns about
the chilling impact of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
interpretations on the willingness and legal ability of State and local
law enforcement entities to share certain State and locally-derived
information and intelligence with our Federal partners. Also, we need
to create standards related to ``law enforcement sensitive'' (LES)
information. Currently there is no official designation of LES as a
classification category and no penalties for unauthorized release of
LES information. If we want to share certain types of threat
information with a broader public safety audience for their situational
awareness and security resource decision making, it cannot be at the
``Secret'' level. It has to be FOUO/LES, which can still reveal
sensitive information about on-going investigations and jeopardize
those cases. Yet there is no way to enforce or penalize violations.
Finally, we have been working hard over the past several months to
address the current inability of several fusion centers to obtain
access to certain Federal criminal justice information databases
through FBI CJIS. In my mind it is unacceptable that some State and
local entities whose mission clearly includes providing support to
investigative agencies on criminal threats cannot get access to data
sets that are fundamental to good analytical work. It is a clear
obstacle to information sharing and analysis up and down the chain, it
is a glaring gap, and it should be remedied as soon as possible.
We are working with the FBI on an ``enhanced engagement
initiative'' to ensure the FBI continues to improve its sharing of
relevant counterterrorism information with fusion centers, while also
enhancing the contribution of information and analysis from fusion
centers in a coordinated and efficient manner to address the growing
terrorism threat. We are working closely with our partners at DHS, the
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), and
the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) on this project.
To facilitate situational awareness and share information across
agencies about cyber threats, the NFCA Cyber Intelligence Network
(CIN), which is a relatively new network of fusion center cyber
analysts, tries to ascertain whether the intelligence developed in
various States may be part of a broader trend. The CIN is comprised of
over 250 Federal, State, and local law enforcement members who focus on
cyber crimes. These members come together and act as a Virtual Fusion
Center utilizing a cloud service provided by the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) to share real-time cyber threat intelligence
in support of an incident, event, or mission. This level of cyber
threat information sharing was impossible only a few years ago, yet now
is becoming routine. Testimony by Lt. Col. Dan Cooney of the New York
State Police before this committee back in May laid out several
examples of how fusion centers are part of this effort. In May of 2015,
the ``Cyber Integration for Fusion Centers'' Appendix was added to the
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers
guidance. Clearly, good progress has been made. But we are nowhere near
where we need to be on cyber analysis and information sharing across
all public safety jurisdictions. It should be a priority in the next
Presidential administration and in the next Congress to focus on this
challenge.
We appreciate the work that this committee has done during the
114th Congress to ensure that fusion centers have the necessary
resources to carry out their missions. The House of Representatives has
approved multiple bills that originated in this committee to strengthen
information-sharing practices and more clearly define roles and
responsibilities. We strongly encourage the Senate to consider those
bills and act as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association,
thank you for inviting me to testify today. I commend you for your
focus on this topic. It should continue to be a high priority for this
committee and for all of Congress--especially in this dynamic threat
environment. We look forward to continuing to work closely with the
committee.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Sena. I will certainly pass on
your comments regarding the legislation to Chairman McCaul and
Ranking Member Thompson. This is a bipartisan committee, and,
again, they will certainly appreciate, as I do, the comments
you made. I know the Ranking Member does, and also Chairman
Katko, who is Chairman of the subcommittee as well.
Our next witness is a true expert in law enforcement, Dr.
Cedric Alexander. He is the national president for the National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives. He also
serves as chief of police for DeKalb County.
Previously, Dr. Alexander was the Federal security director
for the Transportation Security Administration at Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport. He also served--now we have a New
York issue--as deputy commissioner of the New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services, chief of police in the
Rochester Police Department, one of the outstanding departments
in the State, and held several leadership roles at the
University of Rochester, Department of Psychiatry in New York.
Dr. Alexander began his law enforcement career in 1977 and
also served with the Miami-Dade Police Department and was a law
enforcement police officer in Florida for 15 years.
Dr. Alexander, thank you for being here again. Thank you
for your career of service. We now recognize you for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF CEDRIC ALEXANDER, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF BLACK LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES (NOBLE)
Chief Alexander. Thank you very much as well, Chairman.
Chairman King, Ranking Members Higgins and Thompson, and
Members of the subcommittee, I bring you greetings on behalf of
the great State of Georgia and law enforcement throughout the
State of Georgia and the community in which I live as well.
I speak to you, of course, from 40 years of law enforcement
experience and have been privileged to hold a number of high
positions both in Federal, State, county, and local government
over the course of my career.
As we review the past year-and-a-half, attacks such as
those in San Bernardino, Orlando, and Dallas provide lenses by
which we as a Nation, and in particular Federal, State, and
local law enforcement, must continue efforts to improve
information sharing, understand and confront new and emerging
threats, and ask ourselves what more needs to be done.
Let me talk a little bit about the improvements that we
have seen over the last year from where I sit, sir.
Improvements in information sharing among law enforcement
agencies at the Federal, State, and local level have improved
since February 2015. Efforts to declassify intelligence has
helped Federal authorities share pertinent information more
readily, which assists State and local law enforcement to
prepare and respond to emerging threats.
Colocating the Georgia information sharing and analysis
center with FBI staff encourages more efficient sharing and
fusion of information and intelligence. As noted in February
2015, this fusion center and other local partnerships, task
forces, and meetings with State and Federal agencies facilitate
information flow but are still relationship-driven and systems
remain decentralized.
Cooperation and information sharing between Federal and
State law enforcement, as well as other private-sector
partners, are supported through several strategic plans and
directives, which are the ``2014 to 2017 National Strategy for
the National Network of Fusion Centers,'' and seek to connect
with the intelligence community leveraging the strengths and
resources of all partners.
Executive Order 13691, Promoting Private Sector
Cybersecurity Information Sharing, by President Barack Obama on
February 13, 2015, lays the framework for partnerships and
systems development for law enforcement, Government entities,
and the private sector to collaborate in the security of the
Nation's cyber systems. Further support includes the FBI Law
Enforcement Enterprise Portal, LEEP, which centralizes many
tools, resources, and training.
Now, new and emerging threats. Even though strides have
been made, information-sharing and counterterrorism efforts are
still hampered by systems that are largely decentralized and
not standardized, unfunded mandates and budgetary restraints,
personnel gaps, and classification of information and
intelligence. Furthermore, cyber attacks, exploitation of
social media platforms, and legal issues challenge law
enforcement capabilities.
Decentralized. Albeit there are many tools, public and
private sector, whereby law enforcement may collect, analyze,
develop, and share information and intelligence, but they
remain relatively decentralized. Fusion centers across the
country are working hard to bridge this gap, but the
intelligence community mission still requires accessing several
websites, software, and databases.
Furthermore, there is so much data and information
available that investigators oftentimes find it difficult to
identify that which is relevant and actionable intelligence.
One intelligence professional discussed how many of the
intelligence bulletins entail several pages with limited new
and actionable intelligence and stated that these need to be
condensed to critical information to avoid being overlooked.
Many agencies have turned to varying systems offered from
the private sector, which have great potential, yet do not
interface with one another. These challenges slow State and
local law enforcement identifying and responding to threats.
Funding and personnel. I am going to move through this very
quickly due to time.
Counterterrorism and intelligence capability require
funding and personnel to keep pace with current and emerging
threats. While the strategic plan is to develop, encourage, and
use public-private partnerships to counter threats and share
information, the systems still require funding.
Data, information, and intelligence in many cases require
security clearances. Although numerous departments across the
country are able to assign officers to task forces, such as the
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, others do not have the
personnel. Even with such assignments, briefings provided
contain Classified information that are limited upon how it may
be used.
I am going to go right to what more needs to be done, if I
could, Chairman, with the time that I have left.
Mr. King. Sure. Absolutely.
Chief Alexander. But I want to talk here about systems.
Intelligence, information, analytical tools, databases, and
other resources still require better centralization and
simplification. Although improvements have been realized in
collating intelligence, more is needed. My recommendation
remains that intelligence sources, tools, and resources
continue to merge and be centralized providing for a one-stop
site and dashboard where the intelligence community can access,
investigate, analyze, share, and produce actionable
intelligence.
Simplification and reducing data overload is key.
Standardizing intelligence systems to make them more
interoperable can increase the speed of gathering, analyzing,
and sharing data while simplifying the process of operators.
Human intelligence will remain no matter how robust our systems
develop, and these continue to need enhanced access to
protected and Classified information.
Moving forward, we must find new avenues to increase the
availability of protected intelligence to those of law
enforcement and the speed by which it is provided.
Declassification of materials, security clearances, and task
force liaisons play a part, but developing an access or
clearance level that would allow local departments better flow
of information is needed.
Training and educating State and local law enforcement to
operate in cyber and high technology fields has increased,
including Web-based suites of courses through the FBI. These
efforts should continue, increase, and involve a security
clearance program that supports local access to protected
material.
In summary, sir, there is no shortage of terrorist attacks
we have seen in the last year-and-a-half to drive home the
message that Federal, State, and local law enforcement must
effectively and efficiently share information and partner with
the private sector to protect our Nation. We are also
experiencing a time in our Nation where a real or perceived
divide between law enforcement and the community exists. Better
information flow and cooperation is also necessary for our
communities.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I am sorry if I
went over my time, sir. But if you have any questions, I will
be more than glad to try to entertain them for you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Alexander follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cedric Alexander
September 8, 2016
Chairman King, Ranking Members Higgins and Thompson, and Members of
the subcommittee, I bring you greetings on behalf of law enforcement
communities across America.
introduction
My name is Dr. Cedric Alexander, member of President Barack Obama's
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, and deputy chief operating officer
for public safety, DeKalb County, GA. It is an honor to be here today
to participate as a witness in the House's hearing on ``State and Local
Perspectives on Federal Information Sharing.'' I want to acknowledge
and thank Chairman King for holding this hearing and the invitation to
participate.
I speak to you from the perspective of a person who has over 39
years of law enforcement experience and who has held positions at the
highest levels of Federal, State, county, and city governments. In
addition, I hold a Ph.D. in clinical psychology.
As we review the past year-and-a-half, attacks, such as those in
San Bernardino, Orlando, and Dallas provide lenses by which we as a
Nation and, in particular, Federal, State, and local law enforcement,
must continue efforts to improve information sharing, understand and
confront new and emerging threats, and ask ourselves, ``What more needs
to be done?''
improvements experienced
Improvements in information sharing among law enforcement agencies
at the Federal, State, and local level have improved since February
2015. Efforts to declassify intelligence have helped Federal
authorities share pertinent information more readily, which assists
State and local law enforcement prepare and respond to emerging
threats. Co-locating the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (GISAC) with FBI staff, encourages more efficient sharing and
fusion of information and intelligence. As noted in February, this
fusion center and other local partnerships, task forces, and meetings
with State and Federal agencies facilitate information flow, but are
still relationship-driven and systems remain decentralized.
Cooperation and information sharing between Federal, State, and
local law enforcement, as well as with private-sector partners, are
supported through several strategic plans and directives. The 2014-2017
National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers, seeks to
connect the intelligence community, leveraging the strengths and
resources of all partners.\1\ Executive Order 13691--Promoting Private
Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing, by President Barack Obama on
February 13, 2015, lays the framework for partnerships and system
development for law enforcement, Government entities, and the private
sector to collaborate in the security of the Nation's cyber systems.\2\
Further support includes the FBI's Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal
(LEEP), which centralizes many tools, resources, and training.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers
2014-2017. Retrieved from https://nfcusa.org/html/
NationalStrategyfortheNationalNetworkofFusionCenters.pdf.
\2\ Obama, Barack, Presidential Executive Order 13691, February 20,
2015 Vol. 80, No. 34, Part III. Promoting Economic Competitiveness
While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in
Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
\3\ Johnson, Aisha, PhD, FBI Training Academy (November 2015). FBI
Investigative Technology Training: Preparing Officers for Cyber Crimes.
The Police Chief, pp 30-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
new and emerging threats
Even though strides have been made, information sharing and
counterterrorism efforts are still hampered by systems that are largely
decentralized and not standardized, unfunded mandates and budgetary
constraints, personnel gaps, and classification of information and
intelligence. Furthermore, cyber attacks, exploitation of social media
platforms, and legal issues challenge law enforcement capabilities.
Decentralized.--Albeit, there are many tools, public and private
sector, whereby, law enforcement may collect, analyze, develop, and
share information and intelligence, but they remain relatively
decentralized. Fusion centers are working to bridge this gap, but the
intelligence community mission still requires accessing several
websites, software, and databases. Furthermore, there is so much data
and information available that investigators find it difficult to
identify that which is relevant and actionable intelligence. One
intelligence professional discussed how many of the intelligence
bulletins entail several pages, with limited new and actionable
intelligence, and stated that these need to condensed to critical
information, to avoid being overlooked.\4\ Many agencies have turned to
varying systems offered from the private sector, which have great
potential, yet, do not interface with one another. These challenges
slow State and local law enforcement from identifying and responding to
threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Donahue, Lt. T.P. Intelligence Led Police Unit, DeKalb County
Police Department (personal conversation) August 26, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding and personnel.--Counterterrorism and intelligence
capabilities require funding and personnel to keep pace with current
and emerging threats. While the strategic plan is to develop,
encourage, and use public-private partnerships to counter threats and
share information, the systems require funding. In many cases, agencies
must use open market software and applications due to budget
constraints. As an example, I discussed in February 2015 that funding
for the Georgia Terrorism Intelligence Project (GTIP) was reduced to
$90,000, down from a $2.5 million DHS grant in 2007 and these cuts
remain today.
Law enforcement across the country have seen reductions in staffing
and the ability to hire and retain quality and experienced personnel.
These staffing deficiencies threaten our ability to respond to
traditional crime problems, as well as, those of terrorism and cyber
space.
Classified information.--Data, information, and intelligence, in
many cases, require security clearances. Although, numerous departments
across the country are able to assign officers to task forces, such as,
the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), others do not have the
personnel. Even with such assignments, briefings provided contain
Classified information and are limited upon how it may be used.
Furthering the problem is cost and timeliness of the clearance process.
Understanding that this information must be protected, the process
limits the flow of information and delays action.
Cyber attacks, Social media, and Legal issues.--Cyberspace threats,
social media exploitation, and navigating the legal issues are ever-
increasing concerns. Cyber attacks against law enforcement agencies
have drastically increased in 2015 and are higher than those against
other Government organizations.\5\ Social media is used to recruit
terrorists and other criminal actors, plan attacks, and muster large
crowds to protest events. These activities are difficult for law
enforcement to identify, track, and prepare a timely response, as the
speed of cyber technology and ease of maneuverability is generally
outpacing our efforts. Further exasperating the issue, are legal
hurdles and privacy concerns. Striking the balance between public
safety and privacy is a daunting task. ``Going dark'' which denotes the
reduced ability of law enforcement to address cyber challenges, crimes,
and terrorism due to technical and legal barriers, continues to be a
problem.\6\ Yet, these barriers are those that protect our freedoms and
privacy. There are no easy solutions to these threats and challenges,
but we must continue to work collectively to solve them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Emerson, James J. and Kelepecz, Betty J. (February 2016) Cyber
Attacks: The Contemporary Terrorist Threat. The Police Chief, pp. 34-
37.
\6\ Guy, Sarah (January 2016) IACP Advocacy's Efforts to Address
Going Dark and the Prevention of Terrorism. The Police Chief, pp. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what more needs to be done: moving forward to recommendations to
address the gaps in accessing quality intelligence shared among local,
state, and federal law enforcement agencies
Moving forward, still more must be done to improve information
sharing and counterterrorism efforts within Federal, State, and Local
law enforcement. My recommendations include and build upon those made
in February 2015.
Systems.--Intelligence information, analytical tools, databases,
and other resources, still require better centralization and
simplification. Although, improvements have been realized in collating
intelligence, more is needed. My recommendation remains that
intelligence sources, tools and resources continue to merge and be
centralized, providing for a one-stop site and dashboard, where the
intelligence community can access, investigate, analyze, share, and
produce actionable intelligence. Simplification and reducing data-
overload is key. Standardizing intelligence systems to make them more
interoperable can increase the speed of gathering, analyzing, and
sharing data, while simplifying the process for operators.
Protected/Classified Materials.--Human intelligence will remain no
matter how robust our systems develop, and these continue to need
enhanced access to protected and Classified information. Moving
forward, we still must find avenues to increase the availability of
protected intelligence to those in law enforcement and the speed by
which it is provided. Declassification of materials, security
clearances, and task force liaisons play a part, but developing an
access or clearance level that will allow local departments better flow
of information is needed.
Training and educating State and local law enforcement to operate
in cyber and high-technology fields has increased, including web-based
suite of courses through the FBI.\7\ These efforts should continue,
increase, and involve a security clearance program that supports local
access to protected materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Johnson, Aisha, PhD, FBI Training Academy (November 2015). FBI
Investigative Technology Training: Preparing Officers for Cyber Crimes.
The Police Chief, pp. 30-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding.--Lastly, funding these and other initiatives remains a
need across local, State, and Federal law enforcement. Detecting,
deterring, mitigating, and responding to threats requires the
personnel, resources, and systems to be successful and funding is
necessary to ensure we are ready.
summary
There is no shortage of terrorist attacks in the last year-and-a-
half to drive home the message that Federal, State, and local law
enforcement must effectively and efficiently share information and
partner with the private sector to protect our Nation. We are also
experiencing a time in our Nation where a real or perceived divide
between law enforcement and the community exists. Better information
flow and cooperation is also necessary with our communities.
So we ask today, ``Where do we go from here?'' The answer remains
to continue on our course of improving information sharing and
counterterrorism efforts through centralized and simplified systems,
improved classification and security protocols, increased training, and
focusing funding toward these objectives. I thank the subcommittee for
the opportunity to testify and I would be happy to answer any
questions.
examples of sources of law enforcement intelligence information
HSIN.--Homeland Security Information Network (DHS managed National
information)
TRIPwire.--Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (Bomb-
related)
Infragard.--Information from private sector and FBI for protecting
critical infrastructure
RISSNET.--Regional Information Sharing System (for law enforcement)
LEO.--Law Enforcement Online, which is an FBI program administered
by FBI/DOJ
examples of software used for intelligence and investigations
LexisNexis.--A locate and research tool for persons
Accurint.--A locate and research tool for persons
TLO.--A locate and research tool for persons
Clear.--A locate and research tool for persons
SnapTrends.--A social media analytics and intelligence tool
Analysts' Notebook.--A tool that collates, analyzes and visualizes
data
Pen-Link.--A tool for collection, storage, and analysis of
telephonic and IP-based communications
Intelligence RMS.--An intelligence records management system
database
examples of technology used for intelligence and investigations
Computers.--Desktops, laptops
Accessories.--Printers, scanners, fax machines
Networked.--Servers, plotters, laminators, color printers
Presentation.--Conference communications, display screens
examples of training
Criminal Intelligence Analysis
Financial Manipulation Analysis
Software and Analytics Training
Homeland Security and Terrorism Analysis
Writing and Presenting Intelligence Reports
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Alexander. I wouldn't have even
thought of interrupting you. My wife is from Georgia, and she
wouldn't have spoken to me again if I had interrupted someone
from Georgia. So thank you.
Let me ask the question, and I don't ask this from the
vantage point of Monday morning quarterbacking, but
specifically to Chief Beary and generally to the entire panel,
using Orlando as an example, I understand the FBI closed out
the investigation initially. Whether they should have or not,
that is a judgment call. I am not going to question their
judgment. The reality is, though, that the FBI would not have
the personnel to continue to monitor every individual that a
case is opened on in the country.
Do you believe that the JTTFs, though, should stay more in
contact with local police so they could at least keep some
general surveillance or monitoring of someone that a case was
opened on, or at least an investigation was begun on, not
enough to continue to keep the case going, but also there is
still some smoke--there may not be fire, but there may be
smoke--so that local police could still continue to monitor to
the extent they thought advisory?
Also, is there sufficient cooperation between the JTTFs?
Because you could have a large State with large populations,
several JTTFs, and you could have suspects or individuals,
obviously, crossing JTTF lines. Are the local police informed
of those individuals?
So I will start with Chief Beary as far as Orlando, and
then open it up to the other two witnesses.
Chief Beary.
Chief Beary. Thank you, Chairman King.
The answer to your question is, first, I have to say this,
and I didn't put it in my testimony. I still haven't gotten my
head around the fact that my hometown is the mass murder
capital of the United States. I cannot believe that as I sit
here in front of you in Washington, DC, today that my hometown
has that dubious honor. We hope that nobody else has to
experience that.
Our commitment is every one of our patrol cars now has this
sticker on it, because 49 people died, and the American public
has already forgotten the number of people that died.
Now I will answer your question. I had to say that, because
it is important for our community.
Mr. King. Absolutely.
Chief Beary. The FBI officers, I can tell you in Orlando,
where I am a member of the JTTF and I have personnel assigned,
does a great job of sharing information. They keep us in the
loop. We have meetings; we are invited to their weekly
meetings. So we have great intelligence sharing.
I can't answer if that information was shared at the other
office, because that investigation of the shooter in Orlando
was done by the Miami office. I don't know if that was shared
with those local police agencies or not. So it would not being
appropriate for me to speculate.
However, I would say this. Hopefully, if it didn't happen,
certainly going forward, I would hope that if the FBI closes
out a couple of investigations, they would at least make those
locals aware of that.
I think the other missing gap here is when people start
buying weapons and they are on that list, we certainly should
know that that is happening. I know there are a whole bunch of
issues when it comes to guns, but if you have somebody that has
been investigated as a possible terrorist and they are buying
weapons, somebody needs to tell the cops, and then we will take
it from there.
So thank you, and I look forward to other questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Sena.
Mr. Sena. You know, as far as the JTTF relationship with
not just the fusion centers, but the local and State law
enforcement, I think that it has expanded to the point where we
have got really good relationships in many parts of the
country. Other parts, it is not as strong. As Dr. Alexander
said, oftentimes it is based on relationships, relationships
that people have in the local community with the FBI, with the
State law enforcement, with the local law enforcement, and the
fusion center. All of that has to work together closely.
In my area, twice a week we send out those suspicious
activity reports where, if we are able to, the details to
13,000 law enforcement officers of who we are looking at, and
that way they have context of what we are doing. They know what
the subjects may be. But there are also privacy concerns that
we also have to look at as well, because oftentimes with
suspicious activity, people have not committed a crime. We also
have to be cognizant of making sure that people understand
that.
But at least giving them the ability to have visibility is
key. We are doing across the country a lot better at that. Can
we do better across the entire network? Yes. It is mainly, we
have got to move away from personality-based operations to a
standard function that this is the way we do business.
Unfortunately, it has taken us 15 years to get to this
point. I actually think there needs to be policies and there
needs to be legislation that encourages that level of
cooperation and exchange of information.
But on the backside of that, we also have to have
responsibility that people protect the data and not disseminate
it inappropriately, which can cause a lot of damage to the
ability to investigate, collect intelligence, and also the
ability for law enforcement officers to do their job.
Mr. King. Other police officials have mentioned that to me
about legislation. Any thoughts you have on legislation,
because that could be tricky. But on the other hand, again, I
don't know if that gets us into telling the FBI director how to
do his job or not. But if you could give us some ideas on
proposed legislation on that too and will greatly encourage
that type of cooperation.
Mr. Sena. Dr. Alexander, you want to take that first and I
can comment?
Chief Alexander. No, no, you can go ahead.
Mr. Sena. OK.
As far as the legislation encouraging, throughout the
country people receive grant funding or funding is delivered
based on expectations that you will do some type of activity.
Every time that we throw a hook out there that in order to
receive your funding levels you have to accomplish X, Y, Z,
that is the mechanism, whether it be suspicious activity
reporting, whether it be a willingness to share data, whether
it be a process to so many clearances or so much access
permissions, something along those lines that if you want to
receive your Federal funding or your grants or whatever it may
be, that there is a requirement that you have a duty to share
information, that you have a duty as a fusion center to get
that information out to those people in the field, and that
people in the field have an expectation that they should ask
their centers, that they should ask the FBI for data, and that
in return, when they ask for it, they should get it.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Dr. Alexander.
Chief Alexander. There is one piece here that I did not get
a chance to share in my opening statements. If I could, sir, I
would like to read it.
Mr. King. Absolutely.
Chief Alexander. It is under funding and personnel.
Counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities require funding
and personnel to keep pace with current and emerging threats.
While the strategic plan is to develop, encourage, and use
public-private partnerships to counter threats and share
information, the systems require funding. I will give you an
example.
As we discussed in February 2015, the funding for the
Georgia Terrorism Intelligence Project, GTIP, which we refer to
it as, was reduced to $90,000, down from a $2.5 million DHS
grant in 2007, and these cuts still remain today.
One of the biggest challenges I think my two colleagues
here would agree with me on, Chairman, is that with all the
emerging threats certainly that we have seen over the last
couple of years, with the threats that we know that are still
relevant that are out there today, with the amount of
information that we are receiving and yet probably missing as
well, it is going to be critical, I believe, to the
infrastructure and public safety of our communities,
particularly all our communities, but certainly to local
communities in which myself, like Chief Beary, serve.
The more information that we are able to ascertain that is
relevant to what may be pertinent to our communities,
understanding that there are different levels of secrecy, but
for us at very much of a local level, it becomes incumbent to
have as much information as we have so that we can at least try
to forecast, predict, prepare ourselves for what may be
potentially be the next threat. We have to have funding to do
that.
Even though we struggle with this whole decentralized piece
of information sharing, I think that is a challenge in and of
itself. But JTTF and the FBI and others really have done a
tremendous job in supporting local law enforcement. But at the
end of the day, sir, it certainly does come down to funding,
and it comes down to having the ability to keep up with all the
latest technology that is continually evolving each and every
day.
Because one thing we know about the bad guys, whether they
are domestic or foreign, many of them have the same
technological advantages sometimes that we do. They look at
some of the same information that we do, and they prepare
oftentimes as we do.
So for us, it becomes critically important to have as much
access to intelligence information, and that is guided, quite
frankly, through being able to be funded so that we can work on
some of these challenges that we know are constantly emerging
in front of us, sir.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Alexander.
Ranking Member.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for the work that you do. The fusion
centers, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, it is always a
question of resources, and it can never be enough. The more
people that need to be investigated, the more people you need
to fund relative to our law enforcement activities.
When you get into these kinds of issues, in
counterterrorism intelligence you never get credit for what
didn't happen. The whole emphasis is about preventing things
from happening. So you do great work, and they do great work
throughout our communities to keep everybody safe.
But I just can't help but conclude our big problem is guns.
You look at Orlando, you had an individual for a time was on
the FBI watch list, 49 people dead, 53 people wounded, one
shooter, one shooter. Semiautomatic rifle, semiautomatic
pistol, legally purchased.
Newtown, Connecticut, 20 kids dead between the ages of 6
and 7, first grade. Most of those kids had multiple wounds. Six
adults. Those adults were throwing themselves in front of the
kids to try to protect them. The shooter also shot and killed
his mother.
The kid was thought to have very significant mental health
issues. Sixteen mass shootings, 8 of the gunmen involved in
those had criminal histories and documented mental health
problems that did not prevent them from buying a gun.
Why would any law-abiding citizen that invokes a
Constitutional right to bear arms as a responsible citizen, and
the vast majority of gun owners in this country I believe are,
why would they defend someone that has terrorist activity in
their history to purchase a gun legally?
I understand the Second Amendment, but the Framers of the
Constitution could never have anticipated the kind of hell that
was inflicted on innocent people in Orlando, in Newtown, in
these other places where we have had gun violence.
I would ask you to comment. I mean, you represent, at least
two of you, you represent chiefs of police. We are allowing
terrorists, people with mental health issues, they outgun the
very police officers that take an oath to protect us.
Now, I heard one response in the so-called defense of the
Second Amendment when the Newtown shooting occurred, that we
should allow more guns in the school. That would have created a
mass shootout.
In terms of our law enforcement officials, again, they take
an oath to protect all of us. Don't we at least have an
obligation to them to ensure that they at least have a fighting
chance in a situation where there is going to be a
confrontation with some lunatic that legally buys a gun in this
country? That is anti-American. That is anti-American.
I would ask you to comment.
Chief Beary. Thank you, Congressman.
On behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, we have taken a very strong position on this through
the years. We absolutely support expanded background checks. We
support closing the gun show loophole.
Just to put this in perspective, my wife recently just got
married, and she had to get a new driver's license. To get a
new driver's license, she had to show her birth certificate,
she had to get two utility bills and a lease to get a driver's
license. But somebody can get out of prison, go to a gun show,
show no identification at all, and buy as many weapons as they
want. Something is wrong with that, OK? Then it is the men and
women that we represent that have to deal with that threat, OK?
So our association supports closing those loopholes and
background checks.
The other thing that I have to tell you as a law
enforcement officer, that we are seeing about the incredible
increases about violent crime, we are seeing more weapons than
we have ever seen before, and the shootouts are going to
continue. The only reason the homicide rate is not double what
it is right now in this country is because of incredible
medical care. If not, the homicide rate would be comparable to
the 1970's, which people like to talk about.
That is a fact that I am willing to stand on right here in
front of you or anybody else. We have to do a better job.
Mr. Higgins. Well said.
Chief Alexander. Yes, sir. Certainly, I do wholeheartedly
agree with my colleague, Chief Beary.
But let me say this a little. Over a year ago, I had two
police officers respond to a call for service. Upon arrival to
the scene, there were two bad guys that opened fire on them
with long rifles. They engaged in a shootout that lasted
probably for about 3 or 4 minutes, and that is a very long
time. They were armed at that time, our officers, were armed
with .40 caliber handguns. One of the subjects had an AK-47,
another one with an extended magazine on a handgun.
Both officers were hit. One was severely hit in the thigh,
the other one was hit in the lower leg. But they found each
other and they stayed in the fight until backup officers got
there.
I can't tell you how angry that makes me, how scary that
was for all of us, because we almost lost an officer who almost
bled out and who almost lost his leg. But thanks to medical
science and Grady Hospital there, which is our trauma center
there in Atlanta, they were able to save both of those
officers.
This is a real serious issue when we start talking about
gun control. I think most of us as Americans certainly do
support the Second Amendment. I do. It is a Constitutional
right that we all have. But this whole idea of our right is
somewhat going amok in many cases, because oftentimes, when I
hear people talk about it, they usually talk out of both sides
of their mouth. On one hand, they want gun control, but yet on
the other hand they don't. So I don't know which is which. I
understand the strong lobbying of the NRA and the impact that
it has on this country as it relates to gun control.
But this is a real serious problem for us. Quite frankly,
if we go back and look at some of the prior shootings across
this country, people who had no history of any involvement in
any type of terrorist group, who just came out of nowhere,
whether they were a college student or whomever they may have
been, there were no signs, because the accessibility, quite
frankly, of weapons is so easy in this country.
The greatest majority of people, you are right, Chairman,
that own firearms in this country are law-abiding citizens. But
we also know that at any given moment, any law-abiding citizen,
because of stressors that may be imposed on his or her life, or
life takes a different course and people lose themselves, and
if they have accessibility to a weapon they could use it in a
deadly way.
But it is not those who rightfully own these weapons that I
am concerned about, it is the millions of weapons that are
stolen from cars and homes every year that go reported, and
oftentimes not reported, and find themselves on the streets of
American cities.
You can take a city like Chicago, Illinois, for an example,
and I think is a perfect example. There are a number of guns
that they take off the street on a daily basis, but yet the
number of killings that take place is just unimaginable. But
yet, we as a Nation, quite frankly, still have not done
anything, I don't think, wholly, to really address this whole
gun issue.
So we are going to have to decide which way do we want
this. We want to exercise our Second Amendment rights, but at
the same time too there are going to have to be some real hard
decisions and legislation made. Maybe it will be under the next
Presidential administration. I don't know. But we keep talking
about it and talking about it and talking about it.
When I think about Connecticut and I think about those
small babies that lost their lives, I mean, it almost brings
tears to my eyes, even to this moment, because it is sad and it
is shameful. But it goes on every day in this country still. It
just doesn't happen in one place in a schoolhouse. It happens
across communities, across cities, and across the country.
So I don't know the answer to that question, and I think we
all can talk about it ad nauseam, but the reality of it is that
as a Nation we are going to have to find a way to even hold
those that are responsible gun owners, and that is me and a
whole bunch of us.
But we have got to make sure that we keep the possessions
of those weapons somewhere that is secure, that is locked,
whether in our homes, in our cars, or whatever, and try to
minimize the likelihood of those weapons being stolen.
Because those are the weapons that are hurting people,
those that are being stolen, not from the guy who lives in my
neighborhood or your neighborhood who goes down to the local
gun shop and shows his identification and purchases a weapon
either for protection or for recreation. It is those weapons
that get away from us oftentimes and get into the wrong hands.
Mr. Sena. The comments I would like to add from the fusion
center perspective.
Four years ago, when I started talking with the Terrorist
Screening Center about the issue of known or suspected
terrorist encounters that we were not being notified about,
that was one of those encounters, groups. Reason being, they
said, was the attorneys from TSC and the folks representing
them.
They are fantastic partners, but they said, we can't share
this with you, because the Second Amendment right that they can
buy these, even if we know they have a belief from the law
enforcement perspective that this person is a terrorist. I was
just shocked, just dumbfounded.
Not having that information from a local officer or State
officer that a person that we believe is engaged in criminal
activity and under investigation and not know about it, it puts
us in a bad position. Especially when we are talking about long
guns. A long gun to a handgun is not a fair fight. Most law
enforcement officers in America have handguns. They can't
defend themselves against that.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, just in closing, I would just
say, first, thank you for your leadership. Thank you for your
professionalism, your perspective on this issue. To me, it has
massive street credibility.
We give fast track authority for trade deals; we should
give law enforcement professionals and leaders fast track
authority in developing common-sense, common-sense gun control,
gun safety measures, because unless and until we do that, we
are going to be back here year after year, and we are just
going to be talking about the most recent mass shooting that
occurred. Unfortunately, the further away you get from these
incidents, these victims are forgotten.
So I will yield back.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from New York, Chairman Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your comments, gentlemen.
For 20 years I was a Federal prosecutor, and I had the
great pleasure of working with State and local law enforcement
on a regular basis in El Paso and in Puerto Rico and in up-
State New York. I was always struck by the importance of having
the State and local components on the Federal task forces.
Maybe the FBI didn't always agree with me, but I really
felt that they were critically important. They brought a level
of investigatory expertise that you don't always have. I mean,
sometimes the local guys can just find that informant you need
on the street or whatever to make your gang case or make your
organized crime case. It is critically important.
So I have a fundamental understanding of task forces and
the good and bad of them.
It is troubling to me to hear you say, Mr. Sena, that we
still have this TS, Top Secret-think security clearance issue.
So I wonder if you can expound on that for a minute.
Because it is frustrating to me, if you have State and
local law enforcement that are willing to augment these task
forces and are willing to put up bodies in this time of great
budgetary constraints and in a time of a great pressure on the
Federal law enforcement through the expansion of these ISIS
investigations tenfold, maybe multi-times more than that, why
has it taken so long, in your opinion, to get these clearances
done? It makes no sense to me.
Mr. Sena. It has been painful. One manager in my office
can't actually sit with the team that he manages for the past 8
months, because he is waiting for a clearance.
It makes it difficult for us to operate. Some of it is
related to the violation into the systems for background checks
that was done a few years back and their backlog. But it is a
slow process.
The other complication of this is, DHS recently has gone to
getting TS clearances for folks, but the SCI caveat has to be
done by an organization such as the FBI to give up their
information. So what we are running into, and this is the
bizarre circumstance, we started out with getting secret
clearances for our folks, and then they have to go through a
whole new process to get a TS clearance from the FBI or SCI
clearance.
It is a convoluted process. I know General Taylor over at
DHS I&A has been very proactive in moving this forward to
actually allow us for the first time for DHS to get TS
clearances. But my clearance is through the FBI, and it was,
back when it was done, a much smoother process. But we are
still this time lag. If a person can't do their job for 8
months to a year and they are assigned to a task force, you are
half a man down, basically.
Mr. Katko. No, I understand that. We had the same problem,
just my interns, in OCDETF cases, they couldn't even get access
to the OCDETF information until halfway through the summer
because they had to get a security clearances for a student
intern. It is so frustrating.
Mr. Sena. Absolutely.
Mr. Katko. Now, we understand the problem here. We did pass
some legislation to hopefully address this. But what would you
gentlemen suggest that we can do to get this going? I mean, is
it just a matter of dollars and cents to get more bodies at FBI
doing these background checks so we get them done in a more
expedited manner or what is it?
Chief Alexander. Well, I think that is a good question. I
think that is something that the FBI wants just as much as we
do, but the protocols that are set in place are set in place,
so that may require some new changes in rules and policies and
so forth.
But the criticalness of it is in the here and now, because
here is what we know about the threats that are out there and
the threats that are emerging. These are local threats, sir, as
you have indicated, that are actually coming from our
communities. Because the threats, whether it is recruitment of
young people in communities across this country, they are
coming from the streets of America.
So if kids or young people or we have threats that have
come into this country through other avenues, they are on the
streets of this country. If they are going to be noticed,
found, investigated, first someone knows. Someone is seeing
something or hearing something that is very unusual. It starts
from the local communities. It doesn't start up here. It starts
from local communities.
Mr. Katko. That is part of what we tried to address with
the countering violent extremism, getting people into the
communities to help intervene before they----
Chief Alexander. Absolutely. Right. But to Mr. Sena's
point, we have to have authorities and those in the law
enforcement community who have immediate access to information
and be able to share that information as quickly as we can,
because so much is happening so fast.
Mr. Katko. Right. That goes to my second question, really,
accessing the databases, which is really frustrating to me to
hear that. How the heck have you guys, if you get your security
clearances, why are you having a hard time accessing these
databases?
I know it is so frustrating for you, you probably want to
scream. It is maddening to me. If the information is there and
the guys with boots on the ground out on the street have those
security clearances, why don't they have access to these
databases?
Mr. Sena. Here is one of the hard issues that we have. So
we have programs like the risk program that have been around
for over 40 years for deconfliction services, watch center
service, HIDTA program since 1988, fusion centers, a lot of
them after
9/11. They are programs.
So when we go to get access to some services, they go:
Well, you are a program, you are not an agency, and because of
that, we cannot--you know, there is nothing written in CFRs, in
the Code of Federal Regulations that defines our programs as
having access to that type of data.
So they will say: Well, that one person in your
organization, because they come from that police department or
that agency, can have access, but the rest of you, if he is not
there, you are on your own. That is what we are seeing in some
locations.
Mr. Katko. That is despite the fact that they all have the
same security clearance?
Mr. Sena. Absolutely.
Mr. Katko. That is madness to me. That is absolute madness.
Mr. Sena. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. If you trust them to have the security
clearance, you trust them to have access to information. Am I
correct?
Mr. Sena. That is correct.
Mr. Katko. So how can we fix that?
Mr. Sena. The only way I can see now, because we have tried
through policy, we have tried through discussion with various
organizations about how do we make this happen, and even then
the ideas are, at best, half-baked. Well, we will get an agency
to sponsor you. We will go to the chief's department and say:
Can we get you to sponsor us?
Mr. Katko. It sounds like there is a fundamental fix that
we can do legislatively. So what I am going to do is I am going
to have my staff contact you folks and get your input, and then
let's work collaboratively to try and fix this.
Mr. Sena. That sounds great, sir.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Mr. Sena. We would really appreciate that.
Mr. Katko. All right.
Well, thank you all, gentlemen. My heart bleeds for
Orlando, and anywhere in this country of ours where things like
this are happening. But the cold, hard reality is in all 50
States in this great country, we have ISIS investigations, and
we have big investigations. We have task forces that are
getting stretched to the hilt.
To think that in this time of great stress that we can't
even share the information with people who have the security
clearances is maddening. So we have got to do our job, and we
will.
So thank you all very much. I appreciate it.
Mr. Sena. Thank you, sir.
Mr. King. Mr. Katko yields back.
Mr. Keating, the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here. This is a critical dialog that we
are having. As a former DA myself, I worked a lot with the
chiefs. In fact, I worked with your successor, Chief Beary, I
think Terry Cunningham in Massachusetts. Those dialogs at that
level were important. In fact, we met regularly.
So I would just say to all of you, at least individually
and I think for the committee, if you have information that you
think could be helpful to us, suggestions, not just after this
hearing but on an on-going basis, feel free to call my office
and share that information. It is important information.
Then we will try and unravel so many roadblocks. I mean,
how can the Federal agencies, for instance, share information,
or the FBI share information that they don't have sometimes?
After Orlando, Senator Nelson on the Senate side and myself on
the House side, we put in legislation so that the FBI, when
they are investigating terrorists, and then they have to close
the case because of the structure that is there, if that person
later tries to purchase a weapon, at least they should be
notified at the Federal level.
I would like you to comment on that legislation. Because if
they don't have the information themselves, how can they share
it?
Chief Beary. Thank you, Congressman.
You bring up one of the fallacies of the system. When it
comes to firearms purchases, that is another whole--as I talked
about, some of the challenges that are there. I can't get my
head around, as a police chief, that you can be on the
terrorist watch list and legally purchase a weapon. I mean, if
we can't fix that, I am not sure where we are going with the
rest of it.
But again, I am not sure what the fix is of that, but I
would certainly hope that there has got to be some kind of
communication on the Federal level, and then through our joint
terrorism task forces it would get down to us on the local
level. I certainly hope that happens.
But again, if we can't fix the watch list, I think that one
is glaring and we should jump on that first, and then we will
go from there.
Mr. Keating. This doesn't even stop the purchase of the
gun. It just gives the authorities the information that is
being done, information that if they had that information as
they are doing an investigation, could have made a great
difference.
Chief Beary. Correct. I think would have made an incredible
difference. Based on those people that I know at the FBI that
we work with on a daily basis and those personnel that we have
assigned to the joint terrorism task forces, I think it would
have made an incredible difference. I believe that.
Mr. Keating. I also think from the bottom up having access.
I just want to follow up regarding the clearance issue, too. I
mean, what is the expense on the local departments? How are you
getting some of the money for that as well as just the
roadblocks that are there administratively? Is that an issue
too? Do you need more resources to do that?
Mr. Sena. As far as the clearances themselves, the process
goes through, for us, mainly, FBI and Department of Homeland
Security. So they take care of the processing piece. It is just
it takes so long right now for those clearances often to come
through. You will have some that will take 90 days. You will
have some that will take a year. No real rhyme or reason. But I
always feel like it is a lack of resources and the ability to
do these clearances that need to get done.
Mr. Keating. Beyond the local and county law enforcement
people getting clearance, do you want to comment too? We have
had testimony before on the data analysts at the fusion centers
having clearance. How important is that? Because if they are
working with that data all the time, they don't have clearance.
Mr. Sena. Absolutely, that is critical. If they don't have
the clearance, we can't tell them the context that what they
are working on could potentially have. It is very painful.
The other piece of that is we have struggled over the
years, we have worked tremendously with the FBI Office of
Partner Engagement, Kerry Sleeper's team, to try to figure out,
how do we get the analysts the data from FBINet? A lot of the
holdings that are about terrorism are in that system.
So we can get a task officer, so it is a sworn law
enforcement officer, we can get him FBINet access, but we have
yet to figure out how can we get the analysts who need the data
more often than the officers, to give them the information to
do their job in the field. It has really been heartbreaking for
us to struggle so long.
We had an initiative, the National mission cell initiative,
which has actually turned into the enhanced engagement
initiative, which the primary goal of that was to figure out
how do we get access to the analysts of those systems and how
we get them the training. To date, over a year, we haven't
gotten to that point yet.
Mr. Keating. It is not a new issue.
The other thing I want to just highlight as an issue and
get your comments, I hope, is the fact that the effectiveness
of the CVE, for lack of a better term, that training, how
helpful that is. But also, I know we are trying to do this in
my home State and around the country, but just to get a sense
in terms of reaching out to communities, reaching out to the
Muslim community, reaching out and making them more empowered
to be a partner in sharing information, that is critical at the
root level. There has to be a trust that is built. But that
trust is important. Also the access is going to mostly come
from local law enforcement building those bridges.
Can you tell us of some of the progress, some of
roadblocks, how you are doing across the country? Because
without that, we are shutting off an important source of
information and a dialog that has to be continued.
Mr. Sena. Absolutely. If my colleagues don't mind me taking
that first.
Chief Beary. No, go on.
Chief Alexander. No, go right ahead.
Mr. Sena. The CVE, it starts for us with Building
Communities of Trust, which was a DHS and Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice-assisted program, where we actually
went out to the communities and start trying to build those
relationships. I have to tell you, the first meeting we had was
probably about the roughest experience I have had in my life.
Folks with no trust for law enforcement. Trust was not even
talked about. It was: We don't trust you from the start, from
the beginning of this meeting.
That has kind of flourished to the point where today, this
afternoon actually, we are doing a seminar with groups that
probably have never been given a voice in our public safety
community, from the Council on American-Islamic Relations to
the Islamic Networks Group to the Muslim public advocacy
committee. These groups are now going to do a presentation to
law enforcement on what they see CVE, what they see
Islamophobia, and what they see as ISIS from their perspective.
We do a lot of things in government from the top end. That
doesn't work. We have to engage the community and hear their
voice and what their concerns are. One of the things that they
had a concern about is hate crimes. So we added onto our
website portal and our ability on a mobile application that
they could click on ``hate crimes,'' so they can take that
application out and give it to their community so they can
report things. We tell them first make sure you call your local
law enforcement, but we are good with secondary reporting or if
you have a fear of reporting, just click on that application to
tell us.
Right next to that is our suspicious activity reporting. So
that way if someone in their community sees something that fits
the characteristics of a suspicious behavior, they can report
that too. It is a huge leap for us, enormous. But it has been
slow. It has taken us several years to do this.
But here is the problem we hear across the country. The
communities that we are trying to talk to about CVE don't want
to talk to us about CVE. They want to talk about the crimes
they see. They want to talk about the hate crimes. They want to
talk about the issues they have in their community. They want
to talk about law enforcement and violence in their community.
Those are their issues, and we need to address those in
order to get that conversation going about how to identify
violence in their communities.
Mr. Keating. That is a great point.
Doctor.
Chief Alexander. Yes, sir, it becomes hugely important,
with all the negative anti-Muslim rhetoric that we have heard
over recent years, to engage our Muslim community. In DeKalb
County, we have well over 700,000 residents, and we have an
extremely large Muslim community in and around DeKalb County.
So what we did, and what is critically important in
bridging these relationships, even though oftentimes we think
of doing them after something happens, what is really
important, that people feel a sense that you are really genuine
in what you are asking in terms of building that relationship.
So for us, right after San Bernardino, it came to mind for
me to bring in the Muslim community in DeKalb County, to sit
down and talk with their leadership. I ended up, through one
imam, ended up having about a dozen imams throughout the whole
Atlanta metro community that showed up, along with my staff and
a number of other chiefs that are in my county as well too,
where we have a number of small cities in our county.
So it provided an opportunity to them to talk about their
fears and the threats they had been receiving, their children
had been receiving post-San Bernardino event. So it gave us an
opportunity to share with them our commitment to their safety
as we would any other American citizen, and they also committed
to us that if they hear something or see something, that they
would call us.
True to form, not long after that meeting, they began to
share information with us that we gave to the FBI for their
follow-up, and I think that is what we are trying to do here.
But it has to be done in a very genuine way, and it has to be
done in a way that people don't feel where you are just
reaching out to me being nice because this occurred and you
want to know if something happening in your back yard.
Mr. Keating. I think that, last, I am over my time, but it
is my own experience, what you are saying is so important. We
did, in our county, when I was DA, we did civil rights training
for law enforcement, but we did it regularly. We didn't do it
just after a crisis.
I want to say this, because it is my experience as well, I
come from a police family. The willingness of local police to
participate and be part of this was just so strong, and I think
it should be said publicly, given all that is occurring and the
rhetoric around the country, this is something that if it is
there and they can participate, police want to do this. It is
for their own safety, but they are committed to the safety of
their community.
So I just couldn't agree with you more that let's just not
do these things in the wake of a tragedy, let's do it on an on-
going basis. I think you have the willingness of the public and
these community groups as well as the police to make it
successful.
Thank you for what you are doing. Thank you.
Mr. Hurd [presiding]. I would like to thank my friend and
the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts for his
questions and his years of commitment to this issue.
I am now going to recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Gentlemen, good to see you all again. I think last time we
were here, we were talking about overclassification. It seems
that this issue has not been resolved. This is something that
has to be resolved to make sure we get the right information in
the right hands.
I think what your brothers and sisters in arms have to deal
with, whether it is an active shooter--we are dealing with one
possibly right now in Alpine, Texas, a small town in west Texas
that I represent--is difficult. I want to make sure that your
brothers and sisters in arms have all the information that they
need.
Earlier, in some of you all's testimony, you were talking
about a lack of cyber preparedness, and I think everybody hit
on that. I am curious, can we dig a little deeper in what
should happen, what kind of information are you all looking
for, and where do you think that can come from?
Let's start with you, Chief Beary.
Chief Beary. Thank you, sir.
What I found is good leadership delegates, and I would
delegate that to Mr. Sena. I think he is in a unique position
from the fusion center network to talk about a more global
aspect.
Mr. Hurd. Mr. Sena.
Mr. Sena. Thank you, Congressman Hurd.
When we started looking at the issues of cyber we drew back
on kind-of what we looked at in our approach to suspicious
activity reporting and how we create a unified message, that if
you see something suspicious, say something, call someone, call
local law enforcement, local law enforcement will pass that
information to the FBI and JTTF and to their fusion centers.
When we look at the world of, ``Who do you report a cyber
threat to?'', the closest thing we get has 5 different people
on it that you need to contact. That makes it a little
difficult, although there is a lot more cross-communication
between those 5 different areas that you could potentially
call, depending on what type of event it is, but we still need
to have more of a unified process around the country of how an
attack, how an incident is reported.
Mr. Hurd. Honestly, we have tried to address that issue
with the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, making the Department of
Homeland Security the bellybutton for this level of
cooperation. If you have the fortunate opportunity to be at a
fusion center you could be able to still go to the Bureau and
sometimes Secret Service, depending on the information, and we
don't want to prevent the existing lines of cooperation that
may already be happening, but where there is none, Department
of Homeland Security is supposed to be the bellybutton.
We are also working, when it comes to the reorganization of
the entity within the Department of Homeland Security that
deals with cybersecurity, making it an operational unit. It
already is, let's be frank, but we have to make sure that they
have the proper structure to do that and to ensure that there
are individuals there that are working with State and local
folks on this level of cooperation.
But we can't just talk about sharing between the Federal
Government and local law enforcement, we need to be talking
about private sector as well, because they are the ones that
are seeing a bulk of these attacks. We can be learning from
them, and these are potential analysts that local law
enforcement and State entities could be using.
So has there been talk of the integration of private-sector
entities within some of these fusion centers when it comes to
cyber information sharing?
Mr. Sena. Actually there has been. We have centers where
there are folks in the private sector that have come in with
this type of expertise. Virtual collaboration, we have a Cyber
Intelligence Network that we have created, analysts from around
the country that can get on-line, use a HSIN Cyber Intelligence
Network tool that we have, and that way they can exchange
information in real time of what threats they are seeing.
Because you are absolutely right, the people that are more
able to see the threat are oftentimes the private sector. By
the time that a law enforcement agency sees the threat, their
computer is already locked up and everything has become a
brick. At that point, it is too late.
But what we want to be able to do is, when somebody sees a
threat, share that information with others, but also the
hygiene part is incredibly important. The fact that someone
within an organization, and it just takes the weakest link,
clicks on whatever spear phishing that may be out there,
somebody send you an email going, ``Hey, I am your long lost
brother, I am going to send you some money,'' or whatever it
may be, clicks on that link and infects the entire computer.
We recently had that where it took out an entire agency,
and not a large agency, it took out their dispatch services.
That is happening across America.
Mr. Hurd. One of the things that is important for me
specifically is, when you all have specific examples where the
information sharing works and when it is a problem,
understanding those specific examples. Because if we can solve
that problem for that individual instance, then we can figure
out how to solve it in the future. But in this case, we need to
have granular understanding. I am deep in the weeds on this
issue. So you all's feedback, positive and negative, going
forward would be helpful.
There are two issues I want to address in the time I do not
have, and one is this issue about suspicious activity and
suspicious behavior. If we use the example of the Orlando
shooter--Orlando killer, excuse me--he cased a number of
locations that had private security there.
Are private-security folks, are they trained to detect
suspicious activity? Are they filling out suspicious activity
reports? If a private-sector security service has a suspicious
activity, where does it go? Does local law enforcement see
that? Because the reality is, I think, when dealing with these
lone-wolf attacks of folks that have never been on the radar
before, the way that we are going to figure it out is disrupt
them when they are doing the casing operations. Guess who is
going to disrupt it? The two of you all, the folks that you all
represent.
So is that process on-going? How does that get integrated
into the fusion center? Because I would describe these as micro
intelligence networks, that we are gathering this information
on the ground, and then how do we connect it to some of the
National intelligence?
Maybe, Dr. Alexander, have you go first, and then Chief
Beary, and then, Mr. Sena, you wrap it up.
Chief Alexander. I think that is a great question,
Congressman. Maybe Chief Beary has a different perspective on
it. My perspective is, in a lot of these establishments, such
as the Pulse nightclub for an example, we have thousands of
those across this country, hundreds of them in some communities
across this country as well, and they all have security at the
front door, if you will. So if you were to ask are they trained
to detect certain behaviors and so forth, no, they probably are
not.
So even where you have police officers who may be working
off-duty jobs at some of these establishments, they have a
little bit better insight because of the training that they
have, but if they are not careful and become very lax in that
very social kind of environment, they themselves can find
themselves very much at risk.
But to your question, I think it is something to really
think about on a National perspective, is how do we train such
establishments, if you will, how do we help them train or how
do we train, whether we do it locally through JTTF or some law
enforcement agency, to train security personnel that may be at
nightclubs. If you are going to do it for nightclubs, now you
have to do it for restaurants, you have to do it for theaters,
you have to do it for----
Mr. Hurd. Malls, grocery stores.
Chief Alexander. Yes, you have to do it everywhere. So it
has to be a training that is across the board that heightens
everyone's awareness to the environment that we live in today
that we all need to be very thoughtful, very mindful, and very
watchful of our environment, but do it in a way where we don't
hamper the democracy of people who like to move through a free
society such as we do, but do it in training in a way in which
we all are very thoughtful, because this is a new way of doing
business in this country when it comes to that.
The other piece I want to back up, if you would allow me,
sir, for a moment, you were talking about the investment of our
corporations or private industry being involved in this whole
security piece. The private sector has a huge investment in
making sure that our Nation's security remains safe. They are
the infrastructure of this Nation. Oftentimes, when we have had
to call on them in the State of Georgia, for an example, the
Southern Company, Georgia Power, we call on them for support or
for information or provide us with support so that we don't
have access to, they have been very willing to do so.
So the point is, I think, if we ask more of our private
industry partners in our communities to take part in this whole
enforcement piece, watchful eye of things that are going on,
and being able to work with us through our intelligence
gathering, and sharing what is intelligence that would be
relevant for them as civilians, I think is going to strengthen
this country as a whole. So I certainly do support that
wholeheartedly.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, sir.
Chief.
Chief Beary. Thanks, Congressman.
In particular with the Pulse killer, it is still an active
investigation, so I need to kind of dance around some of what I
am going to say. But it is very clear from what I know that
this individual had cased other locations, and it was because
of a change in a security footprint in those locations that
that individual probably moved to another target. So changing
your security stance occasionally is a good thing. Of course,
at the university setting, we do that regularly with football
and large-scale events. So we know that works.
In Orlando, we have ILOs, intelligence liaison officers,
and those ILOs are not just law enforcement officers, they are
people that work for those private corporations that are
vetted, and they feed that information into our Central Florida
Intelligence Exchange. So we do have that network. We have had
it in place for many years. It is not just private sector. It
is on the fire side. We have expanded that out.
Is there incredibly renewed interest? Absolutely. Then we
get into that whole challenge, which we have talked about
before, it is funding for our intel centers, our fusion
centers, and then those clearances that those people need.
So there are systems in place, and they do work, and we
know they work. But again, I agree with Dr. Alexander, we
probably need to come up with some kind of standard training
that is vetted so it is proper and that we don't violate
people's Constitutional rights, and share that with more
private-sector companies that are looking at enhancing their
security operations.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Sena, in your response, I am going to add another
question to you. If an outside entity is willing to pay for the
security investigation to get clearances, shouldn't that speed
the process? What is the barrier that is preventing that from
happening?
Mr. Sena. To start it off on the security question, there
is right now no real mechanism to allow the FBI or DHS to
accept money from a private entity, and that is probably one of
the bigger problems that they have. If they were going to pay
for play and I get a quicker investigation if I pay, there is
nothing like that that exists right now, and I don't even know
if it would ever be possible to do that.
Mr. Hurd. Well, there is a program called the 559 program
on the border. It is really hard, I have learned in my 20
months in Congress, it is really hard to give something for
free to the Federal Government, and there have been examples
where we do that on infrastructure along the border, and I
think there is a model for that public-private partnership.
Who is the entity, who is the person that makes that
decision?
Mr. Sena. Well, that would be FBI and DHS security that
would make that decision.
Mr. Hurd. Gotcha.
Any final thoughts?
Mr. Sena. I did want to add to that question on the liaison
officer piece and how you engage the critical infrastructure,
and it is that piece. The ILOs, give them that direction.
The one thing that we have gotten a lot of good press on, I
should say, and it is unfortunate that the way we get it is
every time there is an attack, they put it on the news, they
say, hey, this is how you submit a SAR. If you are critical
infrastructure folks, this is how you push the button, and you
can put the information in or call right away.
But that is the key. There has got to be some place, some
easy mechanism for those people in private security forces to
pass that information to us. They do daily. We have about 1,000
people.
But the other part of that is we need to be able to push
data to them as well. So there has to be the ability from the
Federal Government, from fusion centers, to send that. We are
doing that to 1,000 people that are really the directors of and
managers of the private security forces.
Mr. Hurd. Well, gentlemen, I could sit here for another 15
or 30 minutes and continue this conversation. I just want to
end with thank you all for what you do. Please thank your
Members and the people that you represent. You have an
incredibly difficult job, and thanks for keeping us safe.
Again, I appreciate your valuable testimony and the Members for
their questions.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask for you to respond
to these in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(E), the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]