[Senate Hearing 111-400]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-400
THE NEW AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY: THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 9, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Eikenberry, Hon. Karl, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Department
of State, Kabul, Afghanistan................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
John F. Kerry............................................ 62
Richard G. Lugar......................................... 67
Barbara Boxer............................................ 77
Kirsten Gillibrand....................................... 80
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lew, Hon. Jacob J., Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources, Department of State, Washington, DC................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
John F. Kerry............................................ 63
Kirsten Gillibrand....................................... 80
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Petraeus, GEN David H., Commander, U.S. Central Command, Tampa,
FL............................................................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
John F. Kerry............................................ 60
Richard G. Lugar......................................... 66
Barbara Boxer............................................ 75
Roger F. Wicker.......................................... 78
Kirsten E. Gillibrand.................................... 79
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 36
Response of Deputy Secretary James Lew and Ambassador Karl
Eikenberry to question submitted by Senator John F. Kerry...... 65
(iii)
THE NEW AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY:
THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez,
Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar,
Corker, Isakson, Risch, Barrasso, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
We're delighted to welcome today Under Secretary Jack Lew,
GEN David Petraeus, and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry from
Afghanistan. We're very, very pleased that you could take time
to be with us today.
As we all know, 8 days ago the President announced his
decision regarding a new phase in our Afghan mission, including
the important decision to send an additional 30,000 troops. And
for all of the answers that the President offered--and there
were many, certainly explanations of his strategy and reasons
for his decision--a lot of questions remain and are
appropriately being asked by various committees on the Hill,
and we appreciate, obviously, the administration's cooperation
in making themselves available so those questions can be
answered. It is important, needless to say, for the American
people to understand the strategy and the stakes, the details
of our civilian strategy, particularly how Afghan governance at
all levels will improve and, above all, how we will strengthen
our partnership with Pakistan.
As I've said a number of times, I believe that there are
just some commonsense conditions, based on the judgments that
we have been hearing from commanders in the field and from our
ambassadors, that ought to narrow and guide the deployment--ask
the, sort of, mission tasking, if you will, of our additional
troops. And I think those are, are there reliable Afghan
partners--are there reliable Afghan forces to partner with?
Because the object of this exercise is to transfer the
responsibility to them. Second, are there local Afghan leaders
to work with on the ground? Because we want them to be invested
and to come in quickly underneath the ``clear'' and ``hold.''
And third, is the civilian capacity in place to make the
military gains sustainable?
I was very pleased to hear General McCrystal say,
yesterday, that as we plan new operations, we're going to take
great care to ensure that the civilian and development elements
are in place to immediately follow our troops. I think that is
critical, and it is very reassuring to hear that that judgment
will be made.
Ultimately, our success depends on having a robust civilian
effort to build on our military gains. And General Petraeus has
consistently argued when he was General Eikenberry, now
Ambassador Eikenberry, consistently argued that there is no
military solution, ultimately. And so, that needs to remain
front and center.
Importantly, each of the challenges that I've mentioned
demand not only that America improve our past performance, but
also our partners, all of them, must improve theirs. And this
challenge is especially crucial when it comes to Pakistan. I am
convinced that what happens in Pakistan, particularly near the
Afghan border, will do more to determine the outcome in
Afghanistan than any increase in troops or shift in strategy.
Pakistan is, in many ways, the core of our challenge.
From the Haqqani network to the Quetta shura, the
interconnected extremist groups that we face don't stop at the
Afghan border. And so, our strategy cannot stop there, either.
It must extend to Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda's leaders are there, most likely including Osama
bin Laden; homegrown militants like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba are
there; and so are the individuals directing the Taliban
insurgency in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is a sovereign nation, and obviously we need to
respect that; but, we must convince its government to tackle
all of the extremist groups threatening regional and
international security, for Pakistan's sake as well as the
region's and for all of those who have a stake in this effort.
The Pakistani military should be congratulated. It has
demonstrated firm resolve with its offensive against the
Pakistan Taliban in the Malakand Division of the North West
Frontier Province in South Waziristan, and its commanders and
its soldiers deserve great credit. They have sacrificed.
Now we are looking to Pakistan to also take on the Afghan
Taliban, the Haqqani network, and al-Qaeda strongholds, and
this will be crucial to our success in Afghanistan.
Today, we are prepared to provide Pakistan with additional
equipment and other military assistance to help its people and
its government to prevail against these extremists, but we have
to know that we are building a new and a lasting partnership.
Many Pakistanis believe that America will once again
abandon the region, as we did after the fall of the Soviet
Union, one reason why Pakistan has often hedged its bets and
used the Taliban for strategic depth. So, let me be clear, and
I think I speak for the committee in this, and for the
Congress, because it would be a mistake for anyone in Pakistan
or elsewhere to believe that the President's words about
drawing down troops from Afghanistan somehow mean an end to our
involvement or engagement in the region. It does not. Our
challenge today is to persuade Pakistan that it cannot, and
does not need to, hedge its bets. Our troop deployments will
eventually decrease, but the conditions that will permit them
to decrease will be beneficial to Pakistan, and America remains
committed to the people of the region for the long haul, as our
$7.5 billion civilian commitment demonstrates.
This also reflects our recognition that Pakistan's
civilian, military, and intelligence leaders face serious
challenges. All of us are engaged in a difficult balancing act
between the tougher measures we believe must be taken and the
anti-American blowback that such measures can bring to
Pakistan's fragile democratic institutions. It should help our
efforts that no country has suffered more than Pakistan at the
hands of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist
groups. Some 2,600 people have been killed in terrorist attacks
in Pakistan in the last 2\1/2\ years. And yet, when so many
Pakistanis view the United States as a problem, we have to
admit that we have simply not fought for our reputation enough.
We must do more to make the case that, fundamentally,
America and Pakistan are fighting for the same things. We need
to make clear to the people of Pakistan that we will be full
partners in their fight against extremist elements, which is
why, in 2009 alone, the United States has given about $300
million for conflict-affected populations in Pakistan. As we
know all nations are threatened by extremism, whether it takes
place in New York City or in Mumbai or in Peshawar. We must
work together in stopping people throwing bombs and killing
innocent people. That is the world's challenge, and it means
that Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India must cooperate to reduce
the violence and eliminate the tensions.
Our troops are defending the right of Afghanistan to
develop its own government. They are risking their lives to
chase down international criminals who threaten not just the
United States, but Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond.
There will come an inevitable moment in this fight where
our partners in Pakistan must take up the fight with an equal
vigor so that we don't have to take matters into our own hands.
I believe we can build a significantly stronger relationship
with Pakistan. And I also believe that, in the long run,
Pakistan will strengthen its own democracy, institutions, and
security by engaging in a comprehensive and unfettered fight
against the extremists within its own borders.
Here in Washington, our domestic debate has focused a great
deal of energy on the question of how many troops we will send
to Afghanistan. I believe that other strategic questions--
civilian capacity, improved governance, standing up Afghan
security forces, and especially greater cooperation with
Pakistan, greater partnership, if you will--that those are the
crucial determinants of success, not the numbers of troops.
As CENTCOM commander, Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the
State Department official responsible for the management, the
members of this panel are, all of them, well equipped to talk
the details of these vital efforts today, and I look forward to
their testimony.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
Secretary Lew, Ambassador Eikenberry, and General Petraeus. We
appreciate very much that you have come to the Foreign
Relations Committee today.
This hearing provides an opportunity to build on the
hearing we held last week with Secretaries Clinton and Gates
and Admiral Mullen. We explored with them, not only the
prospects for success of the civil-military campaign in
Afghanistan, but also how the President's plan fits into our
broader strategic objectives of preventing terrorist attacks
and stabilizing the Middle East and South Asia.
Much of the debate in Congress has focused on the
President's stated intention to begin withdrawing some U.S.
troops by July 2011. Some members have voiced the concern that
such a date undercuts impressions of U.S. resolve, gives the
Taliban and al-Qaeda a target beyond which they can wait us
out. Other members, with a very different view of the war,
worry that July 2011 date is so flexible it offers no assurance
that troops will be withdrawn. This is a legitimate item for
debate, but I'm doubtful that success or failure hinges on this
point nearly as much as it does on the counterinsurgency
strategy employed by allied troops, the viability of the Afghan
security forces, and, most importantly, how the United States
engages with Pakistan.
I have confidence that the addition of tens of thousands of
United States and allied troops under the direction of Generals
Petraeus and McChrystal will improve the security situation on
the ground in Afghanistan. More uncertain is whether the
training mission will succeed sufficiently to allow U.S. forces
to disengage from combat duties in a reasonable time period.
The most salient question, however, is whether improvements on
the ground in Afghanistan will mean much if Taliban and al-
Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan remain or if instability within
Pakistan intensifies.
As hearings in our committee have underscored, the
potential global impact of instability in a nuclear-armed
Pakistan dwarfs anything that is likely to happen in
Afghanistan. The future direction of governance in Pakistan
will have consequences for nonproliferation efforts, global
economic stability, our relationships with India and China, and
security in both the Middle East and South Asia regions, among
other major issues.
Last week, Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen
acknowledged the importance of Pakistan in the President's
calculation. They underscored that the administration is
executing a regional strategy. And I'm encouraged by press
reports that have described the intense diplomatic efforts with
the Pakistani Government aimed at securing much greater
cooperation.
But we should remain cognizant the focus of policy tends to
follow resources. By that measure, Afghanistan will still be at
the core of our regional effort. The President and his team
must justify their plan not only on the basis of how it will
affect Afghanistan, but also on how it will impact our efforts
to promote a much stronger alliance with Pakistan that embraces
vital common objectives.
The President has said that the United States did not
choose this war, and he is correct. But with these troop
deployments to Afghanistan, we are choosing the battlefield
where we will concentrate most of our available military
resources. The Afghanistan battlefield has the inherent
disadvantage of sitting astride a border with Pakistan that is
a porous line for the militants, but a strategic obstacle for
coalition forces. As long as this border provides the enemy
with an avenue of retreat for resupply and sanctuary, our
prospects for destroying or incapacitating the insurgency are
negligible.
The risk is that we will expend tens of billions of dollars
fighting in a strategically less important Afghanistan while
Taliban and
al-Qaeda leaders become increasingly secure in Pakistan. If
they are able to sit safely across the border, directing a hit-
and-run war against us in Afghanistan, plotting catastrophic
terrorist attacks abroad, and working to destabilize Pakistan
from within, our strategic goals in the region will be
threatened, despite progress on the ground in Afghanistan.
Some reports indicate that Taliban leaders, aware of the
threat from U.S.-operated predator drones, are moving out of
remote areas into the crowded cities, including Karachi. If
such reports are true, the United States will have even fewer
options of pursuing Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan,
absent the active help of Pakistani authorities. Specifically,
will Pakistan work with us to eliminate the leadership of Osama
bin Laden and other major
al-Qaeda officials?
In addition to improving the cooperation of the Pakistani
authorities, the United States and our allies will have to
become more creative in how we engage with the Afghan and
Pakistani people. We should understand that, as a matter of
survival, people in dangerous areas on both sides of the border
will tend to side with whoever is seen as having the best
chance of winning. We should also recognize that tribal
loyalties--most notably, Pashtun loyalties--are at odds with a
strong central government and with acquiescence to external
military power.
As Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation has observed: ``The
objective should be to do what Afghanistan's most effective
historical governments have done: help Pashtun tribes,
subtribes, and clans provide security and justice in their
areas, and manage the process.'' Meaningful progress in
Afghanistan is likely to require tolerance or even
encouragement of tribal administration in many areas, as well
as convincing tribal leaders that opposing the Taliban is in
their interest.
In these circumstances, we should explore how cell phones
and other communication technologies can be used more
effectively, both as an avenue for public diplomacy to the
Afghan people and as a means for gathering intelligence from
them. Already, 7 million cell phones are in Afghanistan, one
for every four inhabitants. The Taliban's reported priority on
destroying communications towers underscores their
understanding of the threat posed by these technologies. For
example, cell phones could be used by sympathetic Afghans to
produce real-time intelligence, including photographs of IEDs
being prepared or calls alerting coalition troops to movements
of the Taliban. Phones eliminate the need for informants to
take the risks of visiting a police station in person or of
conversing openly with U.S. troops.
Similarly, expanding the use of credit card transactions
could prove revolutionary in addressing some vexing problems in
a country that lacks an effective banking system. They can
provide a way to reduce corruption, improve accounting within
the Afghan Government and security forces, and relieve soldiers
from the need to go AWOL to deliver pay safely to their
families.
I appreciate the innovation and dedication that our
witnesses have displayed in the past, and their willingness to
take on extremely difficult missions. I noted last week that
the President deserves credit for accepting the responsibility
for this difficult problem as we go forward, and that is
equally true for our distinguished panel.
I look forward to our discussions and I appreciate their
service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
We're going to start with the testimony from Secretary Lew,
and we're grateful for you taking on the task on the civilian
side of this, so thank you for coming to share thoughts today.
General Petraeus will follow. And, General, you've had
about as interesting a set of challenges as any commanding
general could have in succession, and we're pleased and
delighted to have you here, and very respectful of your
leadership in all of this.
And finally, Ambassador Eikenberry, let me just thank you.
I had occasion to spend about 5 days with you, and I saw what
an outstanding team you have there working with you and what a
terrific job you, yourself, are doing. I want to thank you for
that. I wish you would extend to them our gratitude, because
the competence level was extraordinary. And I know that
President Karzai and others there have great respect for that
team and for the work you're doing. So, we're very grateful to
you. Thank you.
Secretary Lew.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACOB LEW, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, members of the committee,
I'm honored to be here with Ambassador Eikenberry and General
Petraeus, who have a deep understanding of Afghanistan, an
appreciation of the challenges we face there, and clear ideas
on how to move forward. Their leadership has been exemplary,
their commitment to truly joint civilian-military efforts are
absolute. Over the past week, Secretaries Clinton and Gates and
Chairman Mullen have testified on the importance of the
President's strategy for our national security. Today I'd like
to discuss some of the key civilian components of that
strategy, which, as the President and Secretary Clinton have
emphasized, are central to the success of that mission.
Our troop increase must be matched by strong civilian
deployment and foreign assistance that reaches the regions and
functions targeted by the civilian-military plan. We're working
with OMB to ensure the civilian programs are fully resourced,
and look forward to working with the Congress on funding levels
that meet these requirements.
The State Department, USAID, USDA, and other civilian
agencies are working with our Afghan partners to bolster
institutions at the national and subnational levels so they'll
be ready to ramp up their own responsibility when our combat
troops begin to depart.
The President's timeframe gives the Afghan Government and
President Karzai a sense of urgency to make the reforms needed
for better governance and stronger institutions. The civilian
effort will continue long after our combat troops begin to
drawdown, and they're key to our enduring commitment to
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region. But, it's critical that
Afghans take increasing responsibility for their own long-term
welfare and security when our combat troops begin to depart.
On my visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, I've seen the
challenging working conditions at our Embassies, in the field
at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, and in
our consulate in Peshawar. Each visit leaves me with growing
appreciation for our brave men and women, both civilian and
military, who carry out our Nation's policy and make
extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security. As
Secretary Clinton said last week, and Ambassador Eikenberry
will elaborate, we really do have the best people in these
jobs.
The civilian effort is a reason to be hopeful, despite the
serious situation in Afghanistan. Civilian experts are helping
to build Afghan Government capacity in the national ministries
and at the provincial and district levels. They're providing
development assistance in the field and working on scores of
other roles.
As I will discuss in a few minutes, our civilians in
Pakistan are making similar contributions. In the revised
strategy, we will focus our resources at the provincial and
district levels, partnering with local officials and Afghan
citizens to deliver high-impact economic assistance. We'll
expand programs that bolster Afghans' agricultural sector, the
traditional core of the Afghan economy. We'll focus on
increasing farmer productivity and helping farmers enter higher
value markets, rehabilitating degraded watersheds and
irrigation infrastructure, and expanding the Ministry of
Agriculture's capacity to deliver critical services, like
extension programs. This will create jobs, reduce the flow of
funding to the Taliban from poppy cultivation, and draw
insurgents off the battlefield.
Alongside our efforts to help the Afghan National Police
recruit and train capable police, we are concentrating on rule-
of-law programs to help the Afghan Government and local
communities develop responsive and predictable dispute
resolution mechanisms as an alternative to brutal Taliban
justice. And we're launching a comprehensive communications
effort to empower Afghans to challenge the threatening
narrative that extremists use to assert control.
We will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to
former Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate
into society. We understand that some who fight with the
insurgency do not do so out of conviction, but because of
economic pressure, which is a powerful form of coercion. Our
efforts will help Afghans have a chance to pursue a better
future if they do so peacefully, respect the basic human rights
of their fellow citizens, and renounce
al-Qaeda.
It is also critically important that the Afghan Government
make progress on controlling corruption. In his inaugural
speech last month, President Karzai pledged to combat
corruption, improve governance, and deliver for the people of
his country. The Afghan people, the United States, and the
international community will hold the Afghan Government
accountable for continuing to make good on these commitments.
We have seen some promising first steps. The attorney
general's office is investing several Cabinet-level officials,
which, for legal reasons, the names are not disclosed until
there's a conviction. A major crimes task force is expected to
be fully operational by the first of the year. And the Afghan
Government announced that it will establish a National
Anticorruption Court. Even today, the Afghan High Office of
Oversight is scheduled to hold a press conference to discuss
efforts to combat corruption and share more details of actions
that are underway.
I'd like to say a few words on our staffing and training.
We're on track to triple the number of civilians in
Afghanistan, to 974, by early next year. We anticipate that we
will further increase our civilian staffing in 2010 by another
20 to 30 percent, concentrating on positions in the field and
key ministries that deliver vital services to the Afghan
people.
It's very important to remember the multiplier effect that
civilian personnel provide. On average, each civilian leverages
10 partners, ranging from locally employed Afghan staff to
experts who work with United States-funded NGOs. Since it is
essential to recruit civilians with the right skills, we have
enhanced both our recruiting and our training to make sure that
we get the right people to the right place at the right time.
For example, we conduct a weeklong civilian-military training
exercise at Camp Atterbury, in Indiana, for civilians who are
about to deploy to field positions from State, USAID, USDA, and
other civilian agencies. I visited, a few weeks ago, and saw
firsthand how this training immerses civilians and military in
real-life exercises. They train side by side with Afghan-
Americans who quite convincingly play the role of
interlocutors. They plan projects, hold meetings with local
officials, and practice safety and security with their military
partners. Civilian experts who recently returned from the PRTs
are contributing to the training as subject-matter experts, and
they share their real-life experiences to civilians who are
about to go abroad to take their place so that they can be more
prepared and do their jobs more safely.
I want to assure this committee that we will do everything
we can to make sure that our men and women are well prepared
and well supported, both from Kabul and Washington, so that
they can succeed in their efforts and make our Nation more
secure.
We're building a core of Afghan and Pakistan experts who
continue to contribute to the mission even after they return.
Foreign Service officers with Pakistan and Afghanistan
experience now serve in key positions at the desks here in
Washington, at the Foreign Service Institute, on training, in
Ambassador Holbrooke's office at NATO, and in other posts.
When Secretary Clinton was in Kabul in November, she heard
from a U.S. Army colonel, that, while he had thousands of
outstanding soldiers under his command, none had 40 years of
agricultural, rule-of-law, or governance expertise like the
USDA, USAID, State Department civilian experts serving
alongside his battalion. He told her that he was happy to
supply whatever support these valuable civilians need, and he
said, ``We need more of them.'' The President's strategy, with
congressional support, will make that possible.
Now, I'd like to take a few moments to address how the
recently completed strategic review impacts United States-
Pakistan relations. As the President made clear in his speech
last week, our partnership with Pakistan is inextricably linked
to our efforts in Afghanistan. We're committed to a partnership
with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest,
mutual respect, and mutual trust.
We're not only strengthening Pakistan's capacity to target
those groups that threaten our countries, we're also providing
substantial resources to support democracy and development in
Pakistan. As the President said, ``Going forward, the Pakistani
people must know America will remain a strong supporter of
Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have
fallen silent so the great potential of its people can be
unleashed.''
The United States is committed to security assistance
programs that strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target violent
extremists that threaten both of our countries. To that end,
the State Department working closely with our military
partners, manages two complementary programs: Foreign Military
Financing and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.
FMF assists Pakistan in the sustainable development of
Pakistan's military services, building a long-term security
relationship, and reinforcing the United States commitment to a
strategic partnership. PCCF provides Pakistan with the military
equipment and training necessary for Pakistan to wage the
immediate battle against insurgents in its border regions.
We're committed to deepening our relationship with Pakistan to
foster a stable civilian-led, democratic government. Such a
government can be a partner in regional stability and support
the United States efforts in Afghanistan.
This committee, under the leadership of Chairman Kerry and
Senator Lugar, has taken the lead in passing legislation to
dramatically increase civilian assistance to Pakistan through
the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, which authorizes $7\1/2\
billion, over 5 years, of assistance. These funds will make it
possible for us to support economic development in Pakistan and
provide assistance in the critical areas of energy, education,
water, agriculture, and governance. We're developing a civilian
assistance strategy to reduce poverty and the vulnerability to
terrorist recruitment that poverty breeds. We will help
Pakistan address profound infrastructure needs with significant
and highly visible projects in energy and agriculture.
We hear repeatedly from Pakistanis who want to be more
involved in the design and implementation of these projects.
Under the leadership of Ambassador Anne Patterson, our Embassy
is working closely with Pakistani partners to develop a program
that reflects their needs. We will work through Pakistani
institutions to develop programs, wherever possible, with the
goal of enabling and expanding Pakistani capacity at both the
national and provincial levels and through nongovernmental
organizations.
Just as we need strong local partners for our assistance
programs to succeed, we need our international partners to join
in supporting Pakistan's development and democracy, helping
Pakistan build on its success against militants. We're working
closely with the Government of Pakistan and the international
community to meet the relief and reconstruction needs in the
Malakand Division, where military operations early in the year
were effective, but left considerable need for reconstruction.
We're supporting the U.N. Special Envoy for Assistance to
Pakistan's efforts to coordinate assistance in vulnerable
areas. We're also encouraging other countries to follow through
on their Tokyo Donor Conference pledges.
As we strengthen our partnership with Pakistan, we're
forging trust and cooperation on a broad government-to-
government basis that emphasizes institutions, not individuals.
In addition to the President, Prime Minister, and other ruling
party officials, we're reaching out to provincial and local
officials and have developed strong working relationships with
parties and civil society leaders across the political
spectrum.
Building on the Secretary's personal direct engagement with
the people of Pakistan during her October trip, our efforts in
Pakistan are being supported by new public diplomacy efforts to
redefine the United States-Pakistan relationship as one that
goes beyond our shared security objectives. This communications
effort will expand people-to-people contacts and provide an
alternative to the narrative of fear and hate that extremists
rely on.
We're also pursuing high-level policy dialogues to
encourage the Government of Pakistan to undertake essential
policy reforms that will lead to long-term economic growth and
development. Sustained diplomacy on energy issues, for example,
backed by our commitment to invest in significant energy
infrastructure projects that will improve the lives of the
Pakistani people, has reinforced Pakistan's resolve to
implement critical electricity pricing reforms. These measures
are essential for Pakistan to meet the electric utility demand
necessary to support economic growth.
Our discussions with the President, Prime Minister, Finance
Minister, and many others in the Pakistani Government, have
stressed the importance of moving forward with reforms that
will put Pakistan on a path to economic prosperity.
Creating new economic opportunities in Pakistan and
Afghanistan is a core component of combating violent extremism.
That's why we're continuing to work with Congress to create
economic opportunities in the region, including initiatives
such as the proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, a trade
preference program that is essential to our national security
objectives in the region. ROZs would provide duty-free
treatment to certain goods produced in all of Afghanistan and
parts of Pakistan, to help create much needed employment
opportunities.
We're also supporting Pakistani and Afghan negotiations to
finalize a transit trade agreement that will allow goods
produced in either country to move quickly between markets
through Pakistan's ports or across Afghanistan's Ring Road to
Central Asia.
Our efforts to build a more stable Pakistan are in our
national interest and in the interest of Pakistan. The most
recent series of violent attacks, killing hundreds, including
woman and children, underscores the importance of countering
the insurgency on the security and stability of Pakistan. There
will be ongoing humanitarian needs in Pakistan as the
government continues to take military action against extremist
groups. We're proud of our successful contributions to this
humanitarian effort.
The responsibilities and interests I've described are
shared by governments around the world. Our NATO allies and
other international community partners have already made
significant contributions of their own in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Most recently, at the NATO ministerial last week in
Brussels, allies and ISAF partners pledged to contribute
approximately 7,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. In all,
25 countries pledged to do more, in terms of troops, trainers,
and trust fund moneys.
The task we face is as complex as any national security
challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if this effort
is viewed as the responsibility of a single party, a single
agency, or a single country. We owe it to our troops and the
civilians who face these dangers to come together as Americans
and with our allies and partners to help them accomplish this
critical mission.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lew follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jacob J. Lew, Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today. I am honored to be here with
Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus.
Over the past week, Secretaries Clinton and Gates, Chairman Mullen,
and National Security Advisor Jones have testified on the importance of
the President's strategy to our national security. Today, I want to
focus on the civilian components of that strategy--which, as President
Obama and Secretary Clinton have emphasized, will be essential to long-
term security in Afghanistan. For truly sustainable progress, our troop
increase must be matched by a stronger civilian effort and additional
foreign assistance. We are working with OMB to ensure that our civilian
programs are fully resourced, and we will work with the Congress to
ensure that our funding levels match the requirements identified in the
President's strategy.
The State Department, USAID, USDA, and other civilian agencies are
working with our Afghan partners to bolster institutions at every level
so that they are ready to take more responsibility when our combat
troops begin to depart. The President's timeframe for transition to
Afghan responsibility gives the Afghan Government and President Karzai
a sense of urgency in making necessary reforms. Better governance and
stronger institutions will enable the Afghans to guarantee their own
long-term welfare and security when our combat troops begin to depart.
Our civilian effort will continue long after our combat forces have
begun to drawdown, as a key part of our enduring commitment to
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region.
In the past 8 months, I have made two trips to Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and I am planning a third in January. I have seen the
challenging work situations at our Embassies, out in the field at the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, and at our
consulate in Peshawar in Pakistan. My appreciation for our men and
women, both civilian and military, who are carrying out our Nation's
policy and making extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security,
has grown with each visit. As Secretary Clinton said last week, and
Karl just reiterated, we really do have our best people in these jobs.
Our civilian effort is one important reason why we can be hopeful,
despite the serious situation in Afghanistan. The same is true with
reference to Pakistan, about which I will speak more in a moment.
Civilian experts are helping build Afghan Government capacity, in the
ministries as well as at the provincial and district levels. They are
also providing development assistance in the field and working in
scores of other roles.
In the revised strategy, we will increasingly focus our resources
at the provincial and district levels, partnering with local officials
and Afghan citizens to deliver high-impact economic assistance. We will
continue to expand our programs to bolster Afghanistan's agricultural
sector--the traditional core of the Afghan economy--focusing on
increasing farmers' productivity and ability to enter higher value
markets, rehabilitating degraded watersheds and irrigation
infrastructure, and greatly building the Ministry of Agriculture's
capacity to deliver extension and other services. This will create
jobs, reduce funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation,
and draw insurgents off of the battlefield.
Alongside our efforts to train more capable police, we are also
focusing our rule-of-law programs on helping the Afghan Government and
local communities develop responsive and predictable dispute resolution
mechanisms that offer an alternative to the brutal Taliban justice. And
we are launching a comprehensive communications effort to empower
Afghans to challenge the extremists' narrative and offer their own
vision for Afghanistan's future.
We will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to Taliban
who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into society. We
understand that some who fight with the insurgency do so not out of
conviction, but due to coercion or money. All Afghans should have the
choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully, respect
basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and renounce al-Qaeda.
It is, of course, also critically important that the Afghan
Government makes progress on addressing corruption. In his inauguration
speech last month, President Karzai pledged to combat corruption,
improve governance, and deliver for the people of his country. The
Afghan people, the United States, and the international community will
hold the Afghan Government accountable for continuing to make good on
these commitments. We have seen some promising first steps. We have
also been told that that Attorney General's office is currently
investigating several Cabinet-level officials--for legal reasons
neither the names nor the charges can be disclosed until there is a
conviction. In addition, a Major Crimes Task Force is expected to be
fully operational by the first of the year and the Afghan Government
announced that it will establish a national anticorruption court. We
will know more on December 9 when the Afghan High Office of Oversight
will hold a press conference to announce past and future efforts to
combat corruption.
I would like to say a few words now on our staffing and training.
As Karl described, we are on track to triple the number of civilians in
Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. We anticipate that we will need
to further increase our civilian staffing in 2010 by another 20 to 30
percent, again concentrating on positions in the field and at key
ministries that deliver vital services to the Afghan people. It is
important to remember the multiplier effect that civilian personnel
have. On average, each civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from
locally employed Afghan staff to experts with United States-funded
NGOs.
To ensure we get the right personnel with the right skills, we have
expanded and improved our recruiting and training efforts, from
language skills to civ-mil integration. We are now conducting a 1-week,
joint civ-mil training exercise every month at Camp Atterbury in
Indiana. All civilians, from across the interagency, who are deploying
to field positions or who regularly travel to the field as part of
their duties must attend the course. I visited it a few weeks back and
saw firsthand how this training immerses civilians and military in
real-life exercises. They train side by side--with Afghan Americans
playing the roles of local interlocutors--to plan projects, hold
meetings with local officials, and, importantly, practice safety and
security. State, USAID, and USDA experts who recently returned from
serving at PRTs contribute to the training as subject matter experts
and bring their real-life experiences.
We are building a cadre of Afghanistan and Pakistan experts who
will continue to contribute to the mission even after they have
returned. Besides the PRTers who help train at Atterbury, we have also
recruited numerous State Foreign Service officers with Afghanistan and
Pakistan experience to positions in the Department on the desks, at the
Foreign Service Institute, and in Ambassador Holbrooke's office, as
well as at USNATO and other posts. I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman,
that we will do everything we can to make sure that our men and women
are well prepared and supported--both from Kabul and Washington--so
that they can succeed in their efforts to make our Nation safer.
When the Secretary was in Kabul in November, she heard from an
American colonel that while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers
under his command, none had 40 years of agricultural experience or rule
of law and governance expertise like the USDA and State Department
civilian experts serving alongside his battalion. He told her that he
was happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need.
And, he said we need more of them. The President's strategy--with
congressional support--will make that possible.
I would also like to take a few moments to address how the recently
completed strategy review impacts United States-Pakistani relations. As
the President made clear in his December 1 speech, our partnership with
Pakistan is inextricably linked to our efforts in Afghanistan. We are
committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation
of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We are not only
strengthening Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten
our countries, we are also providing substantial resources to support
Pakistan's democracy and development. As the President said, ``. . .
going forward, the Pakistani people must know America will remain a
strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the
guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can
be unleashed.''
The United States is committed to security assistance programs that
strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target violent extremists that
threaten both of our countries. To that end, the State Department
manages two complementary programs: Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). FMF assists
Pakistan with long-range strategic development of Pakistan's military
services, building a long-term security relationship and reinforcing
the U.S. commitment to a strategic partnership; PCCF provides Pakistan
with the military equipment and training necessary now for Pakistani
forces to win the current fight against insurgency in its border
regions.
We are also committed to deepening our relationship with Pakistan
to foster a stable, civilian-led democratic government that is
supportive of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and is a partner in
regional stability. We have affirmed this commitment through the Kerry-
Lugar-Berman authorization of $7.5 billion ($1.5 billion annually over
5 years) in civilian assistance to Pakistan--funds that will support
Pakistan's economic development, energy, education, water, agriculture,
and governance. We have developed a civilian assistance strategy to
reduce poverty and the susceptibility to terrorist recruitment that
poverty breeds. We will assist Pakistan to address the country's
profound infrastructure needs with highly visible projects in energy
and agriculture.
On my trips, I heard repeatedly from Pakistanis their desire to be
more involved in the design and implementation of projects. I spoke
with our personnel at the Embassy about how this would be feasible. We
will work through Pakistani institutions to implement programs wherever
possible, with the goal of enabling and expanding Pakistani capacity. I
was also impressed by the drive and capacity of Pakistani
organizations; I am confident that there are skilled and eager local
NGOs with whom we can productively partner.
Just as we need strong local partners for our assistance programs
to succeed, so too we need our international partners to join us in
supporting Pakistan's development and democracy, and helping Pakistan
build on its success against militants. We are working closely with the
Government of Pakistan and the international community to meet the
relief and reconstruction needs in Malakand, impacted by military
operations earlier in the year, and we are supporting the U.N. Special
Envoy for Assistance to Pakistan's efforts to coordinate assistance in
vulnerable areas. We are also encouraging other countries to follow
through on their Tokyo Donor Conference pledges.
As we strengthen our partnership with Pakistan, we are forging
trust and cooperation on a broad, government-to-government basis that
emphasizes institutions, not individuals. In addition to the President,
Prime Minister, and other ruling party federal officials, we are
reaching out to provincial and local officials and have developed
strong working relationship with parties and civil society leaders
across the political spectrum.
Building on the Secretary's personal and direct engagement with the
people of Pakistan during her October trip, our efforts in Pakistan
will be supported by a new public diplomacy effort to redefine the
United States-Pakistan relationship as one that goes beyond our shared
security objectives. This communications effort will expand people-to-
people contacts and challenge the extremists' narrative. It will
involve greater engagement with Pakistani media, academic and business
exchanges, and reaching out to the Pakistani-American community.
We are also pursuing high-level policy dialogues to encourage the
Government of Pakistan to undertake the necessary policy reforms that
will lead to long-term economic growth and development. For instance,
our consistent diplomacy on energy issues, backed by our commitment to
invest in energy infrastructure projects that will improve the lives of
the Pakistani people, will reinforce Pakistan's resolve to implement
critical electricity pricing reforms. I have also had multiple meetings
with Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin, and we have talked about the
importance of moving forward with government reforms that will put
Pakistan on a path to economic prosperity.
Creating new economic opportunities in Pakistan and Afghanistan is
a core component of combating violent extremism there. That is why we
continue to work with Congress to pass legislation to create economic
opportunities in this region, including through initiatives such as the
proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), a trade preference
program that is essential to our national security objectives in the
region. ROZs would provide duty free treatment to certain goods
produced in all of Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. Such initiatives
can create much-needed employment opportunities. We are also supporting
Pakistani and Afghan negotiations to finalize a transit trade agreement
that will allow goods produced in either country to more quickly reach
markets through Pakistan's ports or via Afghanistan's ring road to
Central Asia.
As we consider how to best support Pakistan, we should remember the
enormous costs that the Pakistani people are bearing as they
courageously confront the threat of violent extremism. In response to
the government taking military action against extremist groups, these
groups have launched a string of violent attacks against women and
children in markets, and families worshipping in mosques. In recent
months, hundreds have been killed and many more injured.
We recognize that there will be ongoing humanitarian needs in
Pakistan. As the government takes military action against extremist
groups that threaten not only Pakistan but also the region and the
world, it is in the U.S. interest to support Pakistan's efforts on the
basis of the long-term partnership that the President described.
In closing, I would only add that we share these responsibilities
with governments around the world. Our NATO allies and other
international community partners have already made significant
contributions of their own in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the NATO
Ministerial last week in Brussels, allies and ISAF partners pledged to
contribute approximately 7,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. In
all, 25 countries pledged to do more in terms of troops, trainers, and
trust fund moneys.
The task we face is as complex as any national security challenge
in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if this effort is viewed as the
responsibility of a single party, a single agency, or a single country.
We owe it to the troops and civilians who face these dangers to come
together as Americans--and with our allies and partners--to help them
accomplish this mission.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Lew.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, TAMPA, FL
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
situation in Afghanistan together with Deputy Secretary Lew and
Ambassador Eikenberry, two great partners in this effort.
As you know, I had the honor of coming before this
committee to provide my assessment of the situation in Iraq
when I was the Commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq,
and I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the way ahead in
Afghanistan.
Let me state up front that I fully support the policy
President Obama announced at West Point last week. Success in
Afghanistan is necessary and attainable, but the challenges are
great. The United States and its ISAF and Afghan partners can
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and set conditions in
Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of the sanctuaries it
enjoyed there prior to 9/11, and we can degrade the
capabilities of the Afghan Taliban and other extremist elements
while building Afghan security forces that can increasingly
lead the fight against the Taliban, allowing international
forces to redeploy over time. But, none of this will be easy.
Improving the capacity of the Afghan Government will also
be difficult, as Ambassador Eikenberry forthrightly observed
during the deliberations of the President's national security
team. Nonetheless, while certainly difficult or different and,
in some ways tougher than Iraq, Afghanistan is no more hopeless
than Iraq was when I took command there in February 2007.
Indeed, the level of violence and number of violent civilian
deaths in Iraq were vastly higher than we have seen in
Afghanistan. But, achieving progress in Afghanistan will be
hard, and the progress there likely will be slower in
developing than was the progress achieved in Iraq.
As President Obama has observed, success in Afghanistan is
vital for America's security. Reversing the Taliban's momentum
is essential to the effort to degrade and defeat al-Qaeda. The
Taliban we are fighting in Afghanistan today is the same
organization that sheltered and supported Osama bin Laden and
al-Qaeda as they planned the 9/11 attacks. The relationship
between these groups remains strong. As Secretary Gates
observed last week, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become
symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of
the other.
The Afghan Taliban are, to be sure, distinct from the
Pakistani Taliban and their partner groups, which also have
close relationships with al-Qaeda. The Pakistani Taliban are
part of a syndicate of extremist groups that includes, as the
chairman noted earlier, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the group that
carried out the Mumbai attacks, and the Haqqani network, among
others. That syndicate threatens the stability of Pakistan and
Afghanistan and, indeed, the entire subcontinent.
Although most Taliban fighters confronting our forces are
local Afghans motivated by local circumstances, the Afghan
Taliban leadership is organized, ideologically motivated, and a
beacon and symbol for other dangerous extremist elements. As
Secretary Gates noted, defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan
security are mutually reinforcing missions; they cannot be
untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to
be the case.
Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan, thus, will not be
easy. The Taliban has in recent years been gaining strength and
expanding the extent of its control of parts of Afghanistan. It
is important to remember, nevertheless, that the Taliban
commands significantly less support among Pashtuns than either
Sunni or Shia extremist groups in Iraq had in their communities
in 2007, and it commands virtually no support among
Afghanistan's other ethnic groups.
Beyond the insurgent challenge, corruption within the
Afghan Government, particularly the serious abuse of power by
some individual leaders and their associates, has eroded the
government's legitimacy. Flaws in the recent Presidential
election further undermined confidence in the government.
And, of course, Taliban sanctuaries in the Afghan-Pakistan
border area remain a major challenge to security in
Afghanistan, although we have been making progress in
coordinating with our Pakistani partners in addressing this
issue.
Meanwhile, Iran has played a mixed role in Afghanistan,
helping with the country's development, but also providing some
lethal support to the insurgents, albeit on a more limited
scale than it provided to militants in Iraq.
Our Armed Forces and civilians, and those of our NATO
allies and ISAF partners, will therefore face tremendous
challenges in the months ahead. As in Iraq, our troopers and
their partners in Afghanistan will have to fight their way into
enemy strongholds and clear enemy-controlled population
centers. As in Iraq, the situation is likely to get harder
before it gets easier. Violence likely will increase initially,
particularly in the spring, as the weather improves. Moreover,
as the Afghan Government, with international encouragement and
assistance, moves to combat corruption and abuses of power, the
result likely will be increased reporting on those problems,
and greater turmoil within the government, as malign actors are
identified and replaced.
These factors and the seasonal nature of violence in
Afghanistan will undoubtedly result in an increase in security
incidents in the summer of 2010. It will be important,
therefore, to withhold judgment on the success or failure of
the strategy in Afghanistan until next December, as the
President has counseled. That will be the right time to
evaluate progress, consider the way forward, and begin
discussing the nature and pace of the transition of security
tasks to Afghan forces and initial reductions of United States
forces in Afghanistan that will begin in July 2011, transitions
and reductions that will, as the President explained, be based
upon conditions on the ground.
To address the challenges in Afghanistan, we have already
implemented important changes that have improved our prospects
for progress as General McChrystal works with the 43 ISAF
member nations and our Afghan partners in waging a joint
campaign. We have fundamentally restructured ISAF to create
increased unity of effort. General McChrystal is dual-hatted as
ISAF commander and commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, giving
him control over the operations of all United States and ISAF
forces in that country. LTG Dave Rodriguez is commanding the
first-ever three-star operational command in Afghanistan, which
frees up General McChrystal to focus on strategic and coalition
aspects of the war.
The critically important training command has moved from
being a United States-led coalition effort to one augmented by
the new NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. And its new
commander, LTG Bill Caldwell, is setting conditions to
accelerate the critically important expansion and improvement
of Afghan security forces.
United States combat forces will actively assist in the
development of Afghan security forces by training and
partnering directly with Afghan units at all levels, a concept
that has been effective in Iraq, but that was only recently
implemented in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, we're now working, not just to secure the
Afghan population, but also to mobilize and enable local
citizens, engaging them in community defense initiatives so
that they can help defend themselves against the extremist
elements trying to establish control in various areas.
We have also worked to improve coordination between the
military and all other agencies of government. Wearing his U.S.
hat, General McChrystal has worked with Ambassador Eikenberry
and the U.S. Embassy in developing a U.S. civil-military
campaign plan.
Further, we have established a Joint Task Force for
Detainee Operations, an Afghan Threat Finance Cell, an
Information Operations Task Force, a Counternarcotics Task
Force, and a coordination cell to oversee reconciliation and
reintegration efforts, and each will partner with Embassy,
USAID, and other interagency officials, as did similar elements
in Iraq.
U.S. forces have also established partnerships between
battlespace owners and senior civilian representatives at
several echelons in Regional Commands East and South, and
launched other initiatives to improve unity of effort in the
North and West, as well.
General McChrystal has also transformed the way our forces
operate. He has developed a coherent and focused campaign plan
for the entire theater, assisted in this effort by General
Rodriguez and by General Rodriguez's two-star French deputy.
General McChrystal has issued new counterinsurgency
guidance to ensure appropriate focus on the critical task of
securing the population in order to help facilitate Afghan-led
reintegration of reconcilables, a core objective of any
counterinsurgency effort. And he has updated the ISAF Tactical
Directive and taken a number of other steps to reduce civilian
casualties without compromising the ability of our forces to
operate.
As we focus on the U.S. civil-military effort, we also
recognize that we are not fighting this war alone. In addition
to our Afghan partners, United States forces are part of an
international coalition that includes elements from 43
countries. Our ISAF partners have recently committed some 7,000
additional soldiers, and more are likely to be pledged in
advance of the international conference planned for January in
London.
Allied forces have been fighting skillfully and bravely,
and taking casualties from Herat to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to
the Pakistani border. And while there are concerns that some
partners have declared end dates for their combat
participation, there is hope they will be able to continue to
contribute in other roles.
One of the most important developments over the past year
has been the impressive determination of Pakistan's efforts
against extremists that threaten the stability of the Pakistani
state. And the chairman noted this earlier. Pakistani
operations in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Swat, Buner, Lower Dir,
and now South Waziristan have significantly degraded Pakistani
Taliban groups. These are the largest and most successful
operations Pakistan has conducted against internal extremists,
and we should acknowledge the losses the Pakistani military,
Frontier Corps, and police have sustained in the course of
these operations.
To be sure, these operations have not directly engaged the
sanctuaries of the Afghan Taliban groups in Pakistan, nor those
of some of the extremist syndicate I described earlier.
However, the determination of Pakistan's civilian and military
leaders to fight elements of the extremist nexus is an
important step forward and does facilitate our efforts to
degrade the extremist groups in the border region and to defeat
al-Qaeda.
In short, success in Afghanistan is, again, of enormous
importance, and it is attainable, but achieving our objectives
will not be easy. To paraphrase what the great Ambassador
Crocker used to say about Iraq, everything in Afghanistan is
hard, and it's hard all the time. Nonetheless, I do believe
that the policy the President announced last week, and the
additional resources being committed, will, over the next 18
months, enable us to make important progress in several
critical tasks: to reverse the Taliban momentum; to improve the
security of the Afghan people; to increase the capabilities of
Afghan security forces; to help improve Afghan governance; and
to set conditions for the start of the reduction in United
States combat forces in a way that does not jeopardize the
progress that has been achieved.
The American military has been at war or had forces
deployed on robust contingency operations continuously since
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. And for the past
8 years, we have fought terrorists and insurgents in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The All-Volunteer Force has been tested
during this period as never before, but it has also performed
as never before. It is, without question, the finest fighting
force, and, in particular, the finest counterinsurgency force,
our Nation has ever fielded. The determination, skill,
initiative, and courage of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, and Coast Guardsmen are awe-inspiring. So are the
sacrifices they and their families make every day. It continues
to be the greatest of privileges to serve with them, and with
our civilian and coalition partners, in such important missions
as those we are undertaking in the Central Command Area of
Responsibility. And I want to thank you and your colleagues for
the continued great support that you provide to our wonderful
men and women in uniform and their civilian partners.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN David H. Petraeus, Commander,
U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the situation in Afghanistan and our
strategy and prospects going forward in that critical theater. As you
know, I had the honor of coming before this committee to provide my
assessment of the situation in Iraq when I was the Commander of the
Multi-National Force in Iraq and I appreciate this opportunity to
discuss the way ahead in Afghanistan.
Let me state upfront that I fully support the policy President
Obama announced at West Point last week. Success in Afghanistan is
necessary and attainable, but the challenges are great. The United
States and its ISAF and Afghan partners can disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al-Qaeda and set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent
reestablishment of the sanctuaries it enjoyed there prior to 9/11. And
we can degrade the capabilities of the Afghan Taliban and other
extremist elements while building Afghan security forces that can
increasingly lead the fight against the Taliban, allowing international
forces to redeploy over time. But none of this will be easy.
Improving the capacity of the Afghan Government will also be
difficult, as Ambassador Eikenberry forthrightly observed during the
deliberations of the President's national security team.
Nonetheless, while certainly different and, in some ways tougher
than Iraq, Afghanistan is no more hopeless than Iraq was when I took
command there in February 2007. Indeed, the level of violence and
number of violent civilian deaths in Iraq were vastly higher than we
have seen in Afghanistan. But, achieving progress in Afghanistan will
be hard and the progress there likely will be slower in developing than
was the progress achieved in Iraq. Nonetheless, as with Iraq, in
Afghanistan, hard is not hopeless.
As President Obama has observed, success in Afghanistan is vital
for America's security. Reversing the Taliban's momentum is essential
to the effort to degrade and defeat al-Qaeda. The Taliban we are
fighting in Afghanistan today is the same organization that sheltered
and supported Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as they planned the 9/11
attacks. The relationship between these groups remains strong. As
Secretary Gates observed last week, ``the Taliban and al-Qaeda have
become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the
other.''
The Afghan Taliban are, to be sure, distinct from the Pakistani
Taliban and their partner groups, which also have close relations with
al-Qaeda. The Pakistani Taliban are part of a syndicate of extremist
groups that includes Lashkar-e-Tayyiba--the group that carried out the
Mumbai attacks--and the Haqqani network, among others. That syndicate
threatens the stability of Pakistan and, indeed, the entire
subcontinent. Although most Taliban fighters confronting our forces are
local Afghans motivated by local circumstances, the Afghan Taliban
leadership is organized, is ideologically motivated, and has become a
beacon and symbol for other dangerous extremist elements. As Secretary
Gates noted, ``Defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are
mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one
another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.''
Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan thus will not be easy. The
Taliban has, in recent years, been gaining strength and expanding the
extent of its control of parts of Afghanistan. It is important to
remember nevertheless that the Taliban commands significantly less
support among Pashtuns than either Sunni or Shiite extremists groups in
Iraq had in 2007, and it commands virtually no support among
Afghanistan's other ethnic groups.
Beyond that, corruption within the Afghan Government--particularly
the serious abuse of power by some individual leaders and their
associates--has eroded the government's legitimacy. Flaws in the recent
Presidential election further undermined confidence in the government.
Taliban sanctuaries in the Afghan-Pakistan border area remain a major
challenge to security in Afghanistan, although we have been making
progress in coordinating with our Pakistani partners in addressing this
issue.
Meanwhile, Iran has played a mixed role in Afghanistan, helping
with the country's development but also providing some lethal support
to the insurgents, albeit on a more limited scale than it provided to
militants in Iraq.
Our Armed Forces and civilians--and those of our NATO allies and
ISAF partners--will therefore face tremendous challenges in the months
ahead. As in Iraq, our troopers and their partners in Afghanistan will
have to fight their way into enemy strongholds and clear enemy-
controlled population centers. As in Iraq, the situation is likely to
get harder before it gets easier. Violence likely will increase
initially, particularly in the spring as the weather improves.
Moreover, as the Afghan Government, with international encouragement
and assistance, moves to combat corruption and abuses of power, the
result likely will be increased reporting on those problems and greater
turmoil within the government as malign actors are identified and
replaced. These factors and the seasonal nature of violence in
Afghanistan, will undoubtedly result in an increase in security
incidents in the summer of 2010. It will be important, therefore, to
withhold judgment on the success or failure of the strategy in
Afghanistan until next December, as the President has counseled. That
will be the right time to evaluate progress, consider the way forward,
and begin discussing the nature and pace of the transition of security
tasks to Afghan forces and initial reductions of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan that will begin in July 2011--transitions and reductions
that will, as the President explained, be based upon the conditions on
the ground.
To address the challenges in Afghanistan, we have already
implemented important changes that have improved our prospects for
progress as General McChrystal works with the 43 ISAF member nations
and our Afghan partners in waging our joint campaign. We have
fundamentally restructured ISAF to create increased unity-of-effort.
General McChrystal is dual-hatted as ISAF commander and commander
of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, giving him control over the operations of
all U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. LTG Dave Rodriguez is
commanding the first-ever 3-star operational command in Afghanistan,
which frees up General McChrystal to focus on strategic and coalition
aspects of the war. The critically important training command has moved
from being a U.S.-led coalition effort to one augmented by the new NATO
Training Mission in Afghanistan. And its new commander, LTG Bill
Caldwell, is setting conditions to accelerate the critically important
expansion and improvement of Afghan security forces. U.S. combat forces
will actively assist in the development of Afghan security forces by
training and partnering directly with Afghan units at all levels, a
concept that has been effective in Iraq but was only recently
implemented in Afghanistan. Furthermore, we're working not just to
secure the Afghan population but also to mobilize and enable local
citizens--engaging them in community defense initiatives so that they
can help defend themselves against the extremist elements trying to
establish control in various areas.
We have also worked to improve coordination between the military
and all other agencies of government. Wearing his U.S. hat, General
McChrystal has worked with Ambassador Eikenberry and the U.S. Embassy
in developing a U.S. civil-military campaign plan. Further, we have
established a Joint Task Force for Detainee operations, an Afghan
Threat Finance Cell, an Information Operations Task Force, and a
coordination cell to oversee reconciliation and reintegration efforts--
and each will partner with Embassy, USAID, and other interagency
officials, as did similar elements in Iraq. U.S. forces have also
established partnerships between battlespace owners and senior civilian
representatives at several echelons in Regional Commands East and
South, and launched other initiatives to improve unity of effort in the
north and west, as well.
General McChrystal has also transformed the way our forces operate.
He has developed a coherent and focused campaign plan for the entire
theater, assisted in this effort by LTG Rodriguez and General
Rodriguez's two-star French deputy. General McChrystal has issued new
counterinsurgency guidance to ensure appropriate focus on the critical
task of securing the population in order to help facilitate Afghan-led
reintegration of reconcilables--a core objective of any
counterinsurgency effort. And he has updated the ISAF Tactical
Directive and taken a number of other steps to reduce civilian
casualties without compromising the ability of our forces to operate.
As we focus on the U.S. civil-military effort, we must also
remember that we are not fighting this war alone. In addition to our
Afghan partners, U.S. forces are part of an international coalition
that includes elements from 43 countries. Our ISAF partners have
recently committed some 7,000 additional soldiers and more are likely
to be pledged in advance of the international conference planned for
January 28 in London. Allied forces have been fighting skillfully and
bravely--and taking casualties--from Herat to Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif
to the Pakistan border. And while there are concerns that some partners
have declared end-dates for their combat participation, there is hope
they will be able to continue to contribute in other roles.
One of the most important developments over the past year has been
the impressive determination of Pakistan's efforts against extremists
that threaten the stability of the Pakistani state. Pakistani
operations in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Swat, Buner, Lower Dir, and now
South Waziristan have significantly degraded Pakistani Taliban groups.
These are the largest and most successful operations Pakistan has
conducted against internal extremists--and we should recognize the
losses the Pakistani military, Frontier Corps, and police have
sustained in the course of these operations.
To be sure, these operations have not directly engaged the
sanctuaries of the Afghan Taliban groups in Pakistan, nor those of some
of the extremist syndicate I described earlier; however, the
determination of Pakistan's civilian and military leaders to fight
elements of the extremist nexus is an important step forward, and does
facilitate our efforts to degrade the extremist groups in the border
region and to defeat al-Qaeda.
In short, success in Afghanistan is, again, of enormous importance
and it is attainable, but achieving our objectives will not be easy. To
paraphrase what the great Ambassador Crocker used to say about Iraq,
everything in Afghanistan is hard, and it's hard all the time.
Nonetheless, I do believe that the policy the President announced last
week and the additional resources being committed will, over the next
18 months, enable us to make important progress in several critical
areas: To reverse the Taliban momentum; to improve the security of the
Afghan people; to increase the capabilities of the Afghan security
forces; to help improve Afghan governance; and to set conditions for
the start of the reduction in U.S. combat forces in a way that does not
jeopardize the progress that has been achieved.
The American military has been at war or had forces deployed on
robust contingency operations continuously since Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait in August 1990. And for the past 8 years, we have fought
terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. The All-Volunteer
Force has been tested during this period as never before. But, it has
also performed as never before. It is, without question, the finest
fighting force and, in particular, the finest counterinsurgency force,
our Nation has ever fielded. The determination, skill, initiative, and
courage of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen
are awe-inspiring. So are the sacrifices they and their families make
every day. It continues to be the greatest of privileges to serve with
them--and with our civilian and coalition partners--in such important
missions as those we are undertaking in the Central Command Area of
Responsibility. And I want to thank you and your colleagues for the
continued great support that you provide to our wonderful men and women
in uniform and their civilian partners.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL EIKENBERRY, AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
Ambassador Eikenberry. Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan today.
I'd like to ask that my full statement be submitted for the
record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Last week, in his speech at the
United States Military Academy at West Point, President Obama
presented the administration's strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. His decision came after an intensive, deliberative,
and a far-reaching review. I'm honored to have been part of
that process.
I believe the course the President outlined offers the best
path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure al-Qaeda cannot
regain a foothold to plan new attacks against us. I can say,
without equivocation, that I fully support this approach.
I consider myself privileged to serve as a United States
Ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats,
development specialists, and civilian experts who form the most
capable and dedicated United States Embassy anywhere in the
world today. I'm extraordinarily proud of them.
I'm also honored to testify alongside my very close
professional colleague, Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew, as
well as my old friend, GEN David Petraeus. Yesterday, I also
had the honor of testifying with GEN Stan McChrystal, my
professional colleague and friend of many years. And I want to
say from the outset that General McChrystal and I are united in
a joint effort, where civilian and military personnel work
together every day side by side with our Afghan partners and
our allies. And we could not accomplish our objectives without
this kind of cooperation.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the United States is at a
critical juncture in our involvement in Afghanistan. On
December the 1st, the President ordered 30,000 additional
troops to deploy to Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable,
with the goal of breaking the insurgency's momentum, hastening
and improving the training of the Afghan National Security
Forces, and establishing security in key parts of the country.
On the civilian side, we aim to increase employment and
provide essential services in areas of greatest insecurity
while improving critical ministries and the economy at the
national level. These steps, taken together, we believe will
help remove the insurgents from the battlefield and build
support for the Afghan Government.
As the President said, we will be clear about what we
expect from those who receive our assistance. After a difficult
election, the Afghan Government does show signs of recognizing
the need to deliver better service, governance, and security.
We await urgent, concrete steps, though, in a number of areas.
We'd like to briefly discuss the three main pillars of our
effort in Afghanistan: security, governance, and development.
In his testimony yesterday, General McChrystal addressed
our plans for improving security and building the Afghan
National Security Forces. And since assuming my post, I've made
a special point of getting outside of Kabul to see conditions
firsthand, and I fully concur with General McChrystal's
assessment that the security situation remains serious. Sending
additional United States and NATO/ISAF forces to Afghanistan is
critical to regaining the initiative, and I'm confident that,
as these troops arrive, the situation will stabilize and will
turn in our favor. Additional troops will also permit us to
expand our work with the Afghan army and the police so that
they can take a larger role in providing for the security of
their own people. As President Obama said, the transition to
Afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011, when we
expect Afghan security forces to assume lead responsibility for
defending their country.
Moving on from security, the second pillar of our
comprehensive strategy focuses on governance at the national
and the subnational levels. Our overarching goal is to
encourage improved governance so Afghans see the benefit of
supporting the legitimate government and the insurgency loses
support.
As General McChrystal has pointed out, one of the major
impediments our strategy faces is the Afghan Government's lack
of credibility with its own people. To strengthen its
legitimacy, our approach at the national level is on improving
key ministries by increasing the number of civilian technical
advisers and providing more development assistance directly
through these ministries' budgets. By focusing on ministries
that deliver essential services and security, we can accelerate
the building of the Afghan Government so that it is
sufficiently visible, effective, and accountable.
At the provincial and in the district level, we're working
jointly with the military through our Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, District Development Working Groups, and District
Support Teams, which help build Afghan capacity, particularly
in the areas of greatest insecurity, in southern and in eastern
Afghanistan.
Underpinning all efforts is the need to combat corruption
and promote the rule of law. With our assistance, the Afghan
Government is steadily building law enforcement institutions to
fight corruption, organized crime, and drug trafficking. In his
inaugural address, President Karzai stated his intention to
make merit-based appointments in his new Cabinet and to
implement an anticorruption strategy, and we're encouraged by
his statements.
The cultivation of poppy and trafficking in opium also
continue to have a very debilitating effect on Afghan society.
Our strategy is multipronged, involving demand reduction,
efforts by law enforcement agencies and the military to detain
traffickers and interdict drug shipments, and support for licit
agricultural development.
The narcotics problem, of course, will never have a
solution without economic development. And this leads to the
third pillar of our effort, which is development. In recent
months, we've adjusted our approach to focus on building key
elements of Afghanistan's private sector economy, increasing
our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government revenue
collection, and improving the coordination of assistance within
the United States Government and the international community.
And these steps were taken to produce improvements in the lives
of ordinary Afghans and to contribute directly to more
effective government and lessened support for the insurgency.
Rebuilding the farm sector, in particular, is essential for
the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men, who
form the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that
some 80 percent of the Afghan population derives their income
either directly or indirectly from agriculture.
And, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize, we're concentrating
on what is essential and attainable. The President's strategy
is based upon a pragmatic assessment of the security interests
of the United States of America and our belief that
sustainable, representative governance and a sustainable
economy are essential to success. We do need a viable Afghan
Government so our forces can drawdown and the investment of
United States taxpayer dollars can be reduced.
In closing, I'd like to mention two important risks that we
face in carrying out our strategy. The first is that, in spite
of everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the
essential task of governance and security on a timely basis.
The second is our partnership with Pakistan.
The effort we're undertaking in Afghanistan is likely to
fall short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress
at eliminating sanctuaries used by the Afghan Taliban and their
associates inside of Pakistan.
If the main elements of the President's plan are executed,
and if our Afghan partners and our allies do their part, I'm
confident we can achieve our strategic objectives. I say this
with conviction, because, for the first time in my three tours
of duty in Afghanistan, all elements of our national power are
employed with the full support of the President, and,
increasingly, of our allies.
Achieving our goals in Afghanistan will not be easy, but
I'm optimistic that we can succeed, with the support of
Congress. Our mission was underresourced for many years, but it
is now one of our government's highest priorities, with
substantial development funds and hundreds more civilian
personnel available. We will soon have increased our civilian
presence in Kabul threefold, and in the field, sixfold, just
over this past year. We will, of course, need more.
U.S. foreign assistance is also comparatively small, but an
essential fraction of the total spent in Afghanistan over the
past 8 years. Additional resources will be necessary, and we
look forward to sharing more details on our anticipated need,
with Congress in the coming days and weeks.
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan represents a daunting challenge.
Success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the
additional troops and the other resources provided by the
President and with the help of the United States Congress, we
will work tirelessly to ensure al-Qaeda never again finds
refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. We look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eikenberry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Karl Eikenberry, Ambassador to Afghanistan,
Department of State, Kabul, Afghanistan
introduction
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to present my views on
Afghanistan today. Last week, in his speech at West Point, President
Obama presented the administration's strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. His decision came after an intensive, deliberate and far-
reaching review of conditions, risks and options available. The course
he outlined offers the best path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure
al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups cannot regain a foothold to plan
new attacks against our country or our allies. I fully support this
approach. It has been welcomed by the Afghan Government, which said it
will spare no effort to achieve the strategy's key objectives. I hope
it will be welcomed here in Congress.
I consider myself privileged to serve in Kabul and to represent an
extraordinary team of diplomats, development specialists and civilian
experts from many fields and multiple agencies who form the most
capable and dedicated U.S. mission anywhere. Our civilian presence will
have tripled by early 2010 and, with the support of the Congress, we
anticipate it will expand further next year. More important than the
numbers of people are the skills that these men and women possess, and
their willingness to work tirelessly under the most difficult
conditions. Many of them are out in the field with our military at the
forefront of our Nation's effort to stabilize Afghanistan and the
region. I am extraordinarily proud of them.
I am honored to testify today alongside my close professional
colleague, Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew, and my old friend, GEN
David Petraeus. Yesterday, I also had the honor of testifying with GEN
Stan McChrystal, my professional colleague and friend of many years, to
describe how we will carry out the President's strategy for
Afghanistan. My testimony today will focus on the civilian role in that
strategy, but I want to underscore at the outset that General
McChrystal and I are united in a joint effort in which civilian and
military personnel work together every day, often literally side by
side with our Afghan partners and allies. We could not accomplish our
objectives without such a combined effort, and I am proud that we have
forged a close working relationship at the top and throughout our
organizations, one that will deepen in coming months as additional
troops and civilians arrive.
Our Nation is at a critical juncture in our involvement in
Afghanistan, and my testimony today represents my assessment of the
situation and prospects for achieving our goals.
A mission that in past years was poorly defined and underresourced
is now clear and, thanks to the Congress, better resourced. As you
know, the President on December 1 authorized 30,000 additional troops
to deploy to Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable, with the goal of
breaking the insurgency's momentum, hastening and improving the
training of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and restoring
security in key areas of the country. I joined Secretary Clinton and
General McChrystal in Brussels last week to present the
administration's decisions to the allies, and we anticipate our troops
will be joined by a substantial increase of other NATO/ISAF forces. Our
military effort and civilian assistance will be closely coordinated. On
the civilian side, we aim to increase employment and provide essential
services in areas of greatest insecurity, and to improve critical
ministries and the economy at the national level. These steps will, I
believe, help to remove insurgents from the battlefield and build
support for the Afghan Government.
As the President said, ``we will be clear about what we expect from
those who receive our assistance.'' We expect the Afghan Government to
take specific actions in the key areas of security, governance, and
economic development on an urgent basis. In the eighth year of our
involvement, Afghans must progressively take greater responsibility for
their own affairs. As we reduce our combat role, we will be
transforming our diplomatic, security, and economic relations to
reflect a more fully sovereign Afghanistan.
I firmly believe these adjustments to our course provide the best
possible chance of achieving success on a reasonable timetable, but I
will also give you my honest appraisal of the challenges as I see them.
No way forward is without risk. Eight years after the terrorist
attacks of September 11 and the removal of the Taliban from power,
Afghanistan remains a disconnected society, divided by factionalism,
plagued by corruption and illegal narcotics, and challenged by
insecurity. These problems are in large measure the product of nearly
three decades of war, which broke down the fabric of Afghanistan's
centuries-old society and contributed to deep poverty, illiteracy, drug
addiction, and unemployment. This has been compounded in recent years
by a growing disillusionment among Afghans, both with their own
government and with the uneven results of the assistance delivered by
the international community. The United States must approach the
daunting complexities of Afghanistan with an awareness of our
limitations. Our forces and our civilians are trying to help a society
that simultaneously wants and rejects outside intervention. Afghans
yearn for the peace and stability that has been denied them for too
long. We will not fully heal their society's deep-seated problems, but
we can help them along a path to normalcy and stability that is key to
protecting our own vital interests. We are, simply put, helping
Afghanistan build security forces and other basic institutions of
government to prevent a return to the conditions that it endured before
September 11, 2001.
Let me mention two challenges we face. The first is that, in spite
of everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the
essential tasks of governance; the second is our partnership with
Pakistan, which the President has stated is inextricably linked to our
success in Afghanistan. Though these risks cannot be discounted, if the
main elements of the President's plan are executed, and if our Afghan
partners and our allies do their part, I am confident we can achieve
our strategic objectives.
I say this with conviction, because for the first time in my three
tours in Afghanistan--two while in uniform and now as Ambassador--all
the elements of our national power are employed with the full support
of the President and, increasingly, of our allies. We have made great
strides over the last 6 months in improving interagency coordination
and civil-military collaboration. Our military and civilian teams on
the ground are the best ever fielded. More important, after a difficult
election, the Afghan Government shows signs of recognizing the need to
deliver better governance and security, though we await concrete steps
in many areas.
Achieving our objectives on an accelerated timetable will almost
certainly take additional resources--more troops, but also more
development aid and additional civilian personnel to assist the Afghan
Government and people, so they can assume control of their own affairs.
The administration will be working with Congress in coming days and
weeks to define our request.
I would like to now discuss the three main pillars of our effort in
Afghanistan--security, governance, and development--and then say a few
words about the organization of our mission and about the wider region.
SECURITY
In his testimony yesterday, General McChrystal addressed our plans
for improving security and building the Afghan National Security
Forces. The civilian role in this effort at the local level is to
partner with the military and with the Afghan Government in restoring
basic services and economic opportunity in cleared areas. I will return
to this partnership and our role in it shortly. First, though, let me
give you my perspective as Ambassador on the security situation.
Since assuming my post in May, I have made a special point of
getting outside Kabul as frequently as possible to see conditions
around the country firsthand and to consult with Afghans, allies, and
our own civilian and military personnel. I fully concur with General
McChrystal's assessment that the security situation, which worsened
dramatically this past year, remains serious. The Taliban and other
extremists groups exercise increasing influence in many areas of the
south and east, and attacks and instability are rising in parts of the
north and west as well, which long have been relatively stable. The
insurgents are loosely organized, yet resilient and effective in many
areas.
Augmenting U.S. and NATO/ISAF forces is critical to regain the
initiative. I am confident that, as the additional U.S. troops arrive
in coming months, the situation will stabilize and turn in our favor.
Most Afghans have little interest in a future under the Taliban's
brutal and arbitrary rule, and the troops now deploying will reassure
them that they have the opportunity for a secure and better future. Our
troops will serve as a bridge, improving security in key areas, just as
the Marine and Army units sent earlier this year are doing with great
skill in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.
Additional troops will also permit us to expand our partnering
with, and training of, the Afghan army and police, so they can take on
a progressively larger role in providing security. We all recognize the
extraordinary challenges of building competent security forces.
Afghanistan has not had a national army recruited from all ethnic
groups and regions for many years, and low literacy, high attrition,
and the lack of resources and expertise pose continuing problems.
However, our forces are highly skilled at this training and partnering
mission, which they have performed ably under the most difficult
circumstances in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan. I am confident that
deployment of additional U.S. troops will yield improvements in the
ANSF.
On the civilian side, we are supporting our military's efforts. Our
Drug Enforcement Administration provides specialized training to the
Afghan Counternarcotics Police. Our Federal Bureau of Investigation
assists the Afghan Ministry of Interior in improving law enforcement
capabilities. And, lastly, our Border Management Task Force, which
includes U.S. Central Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and
its Customs and Border Protection Agency, assists both the Afghan
Border Police and the Customs Department.
As part of assuming the sovereign responsibility of protecting its
people, the Afghan Government must build the ministerial capacity to
recruit, train, and sustain the army and police, so that when our
support begins to diminish Afghan forces are capable of protecting the
country on their own. Simply put, the Afghan army and police need the
full commitment of their political leadership. As President Obama said,
the transition to Afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of
2011, when we expect Afghan security forces and the entire Afghan
Government can begin assuming lead responsibility for defending their
country.
We should recognize that one reason Afghanistan has been slow to
assume a larger role in providing for its own security is the
widespread concern among the populace that it will be abandoned by the
international community, as happened after the withdrawal of the Soviet
Union in 1989. For more than a decade afterward, Afghanistan endured
brutal civil war, anarchy and later, the repressive Taliban regime that
harbored and enabled al-Qaeda. The fear of once again having to fend
for itself again is deeply felt in the country, which lies in a
volatile region where many of its neighbors have competed to control
events inside Afghan borders.
While the United States does not intend to continue our high level
of deployed forces indefinitely, we are fully committed to assisting
Afghanistan. To give Afghans confidence that they will not be abandoned
again, the United States is committed to engaging in a strategic
dialogue to define our long-term relationship on the basis of shared
interests and values, just as we do with other nations. We will
continue to assist and advise the ANSF to ensure they succeed over the
long term. Though our relations are today dominated by questions about
security, we have no territorial ambitions and do not seek permanent
military bases. Afghans should be confident the United States is a
trustworthy friend on whom they can rely after our combat forces begin
to go home. Afghanistan's place in Central and South Asia must be
secure.
GOVERNANCE
The second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on
improving Afghan governance. I would like to describe the civilian role
in this effort, first at the national level and then in the provinces
and districts. At both levels, our overarching goal is to encourage
good governance, free from corruption, so Afghans see the benefits of
supporting the legitimate government, and the insurgency loses support.
As General McChrystal points out, one of the major impediments our
strategy faces is the Afghan Government's lack of credibility with its
own people. To build its legitimacy, our approach at the national level
is on improving key ministries, both by increasing the number of
civilian technical advisers and by providing more development
assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. By focusing on
key ministries that deliver essential services and security, we can
accelerate the building of an Afghan Government that is visible,
effective, and accountable.
We must support the government's ability to deliver for the Afghan
people. Afghan ministers say that too much of the development
assistance provided is spent outside their national budget, often on
programs that are not their priorities. We agree, and as part of the
President's new emphasis we are committed to providing more direct
assistance. We are reviewing the financial management systems of these
key ministries and, if their financial system can be certified as
accountable and transparent, we provide direct funding to be used for
basic services, such as health, education, and agriculture. Similarly,
to extend the government's reach around the country, Afghanistan needs
educated, trained, and honest civil servants. To accomplish this, the
United States and international partners will train current government
employees in public administration and help build a pool of
administrators and technical managers.
Cutting across this entire effort to improve Afghans' confidence in
their government is the need to combat corruption and promote the rule
of law. Without institutions that serve the needs of ordinary Afghans
and government officials who are accountable and honest, Afghanistan
will always be in danger of returning to the conditions that made it a
haven for violent extremists.
With our assistance and that of our allies, the Afghan Government
is steadily building law enforcement institutions to fight corruption,
organized crime, and drug trafficking. With the support of the FBI, the
DEA, and our military, the Ministries of Interior and Counter
Narcotics, and the Afghan National Directorate of Security recently
created the Major Crimes Task Force, which is responsible for
investigating major corruption, kidnapping, and organized crimes cases.
Similarly, Afghanistan's Attorney General recently established a
special Anti-Corruption Unit, aimed at prosecuting misconduct by mid-
and high-level government officials. In addition, a specialized Anti-
Corruption Tribunal is being created to handle significant corruption
cases, including prosecutions involving provincial officials. Our
mission's Department of Justice team is also providing support.
In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated his intention to
make merit-based appointments in his new Cabinet and to implement an
anticorruption strategy, including by expanding the powers of the
existing High Office of Oversight. We are encouraged by his statements,
but we need to work together to aggressively implement this goal and
produce results. In addition to his Cabinet, it is important that
qualified appointments are made at the vice minister, provincial, and
district levels, which would give the Afghan Government greater
credibility with its people and permit more rapid reforms. Secretary
Clinton last month discussed with President Karzai the necessity of
moving swiftly to develop concrete plans to implement this agenda to
improve government accountability and performance.
Beyond the national level, I would like to address our efforts to
promote governance at the provincial and district levels. We are
working jointly with the military through our Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, District Development Working Groups, and District Support Teams,
which help build Afghan capacity in key areas, particularly in areas of
greatest insecurity in southern and eastern Afghanistan. We are
improving governance beyond Kabul through rule-of-law programs and
other mechanisms that have proven effective in giving Afghans a greater
stake in their government, including through the National Solidarity
Program. We have expanded our support for the Afghan Social Outreach
Program to create provincial and district councils and build citizen
involvement. We are working with the Afghan Government to provide
incentives for subnational leaders to improve performance. I would like
to emphasize that we are concentrating on what is essential and
attainable. In all of these efforts, we must not wait too long to
create an Afghan autonomous capability, or we risk building a
dependency that will be that much harder to break.
Some might argue that we are reaching too high--that Afghanistan
has rarely in its history had a central government capable of carrying
out these tasks and that to expect a coherent state to emerge now is
unrealistic and a waste of resources. I disagree with that argument on
several levels. First, while the Afghan state has never been
particularly strong, Afghanistan has had functioning governments in
Kabul that were widely viewed as legitimate. Second, the government
structure we are helping to develop is one with the minimum set of
capabilities that any state must possess to serve its people.
Our goal is not nation-building, nor are we attempting to impose a
Western model of governance. Afghanistan is a poor country that will
remain dependent on international aid for years to come. This strategy
for improving governance is based on a pragmatic assessment of the
national security interests of the United States, and our belief that
sustainable representative government is essential to success.
Afghanistan needs a viable government so our forces can drawdown and
the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars can be reduced. Achieving those
goals will prevent the need for the United States and its allies to
intervene to protect ourselves from extremists who, unless we succeed,
might once again find refuge in Afghanistan.
The cultivation of poppy and the trafficking in opium without a
doubt has the most debilitating effect on Afghan society, feeding
corruption and undermining the legal economy, while generating funds
for the insurgency. Our strategy for combating the pervasive impact of
illegal narcotics is multipronged, involving demand reduction, efforts
by law enforcement and the military to detain major traffickers and
interdict drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural
development. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration works closely
with Afghan partners to investigate and prosecute major traffickers.
With our support, the Counter-Narcotics Justice Task Force has become
the most effective judicial organization in Afghanistan today, with
successful investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of hundreds of
drug traffickers. But the narcotics problem will never have a
satisfactory solution without economic development in this still
desperately poor country.
DEVELOPMENT
Along with security and governance, the third pillar of our effort
is development assistance. In recent months, we have adjusted our
approach to focus on building key elements of Afghanistan's private-
sector economy, increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing
government revenue collection, and improving the coordination of
assistance delivery within the U.S. Government and across the
international community. These refinements are designed to produce
measurable improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans--and thus to
contribute directly to more effective government and to lessened
support for the insurgency.
We are targeting much of our assistance where violence is worst and
shifting to more flexible and faster contract and grant mechanisms, to
ensure our dollars are effectively supporting our efforts in the
provinces. Development specialists at USAID, joined by experts from
multiple departments and agencies of our government, are focusing on
key sectors, such as agriculture. Rebuilding the farm sector is
essential for the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed
men who form the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that
at least 80 percent of the Afghan population derives their income,
either directly or indirectly, from agriculture. Our agriculture
efforts also seek to reinforce our governance strategy, so that the
Agriculture Ministry will increasingly be--and be seen as--a tangible
example of a more effective government.
At the same time, we are encouraging long-term investment,
specifically by funding water management and electrification projects
that deliver power and large-scale irrigation, and we promote mining
and light industry that leverage Afghanistan's agricultural products
and natural resources.
We are also helping Afghanistan's Government increase revenue
collection. Without improvements in its ability to collect taxes and
customs receipts, Afghanistan will always remain overly dependent on
the international community and will struggle to meet the needs of its
people. The Afghan Government has made progress in recent years in
increasing domestic revenue collection, which has risen from 3.3
percent of gross domestic product to 7.7 percent. That is still too
low. Most low-income countries collect 11 to 12 percent of their GDP on
average, and we and our other partners are working with the Ministry of
Finance on reforms that will further increase revenue. The biggest
problem remains corruption, however. The current rough estimate is that
only half of the revenue collected actually makes it into the treasury.
Low domestic revenue undermines the Afghan Government's ability to
provide services, while graft and bribery diminishes confidence in, and
support for, the government. Representatives from the U.S. Treasury
Department are working with the Afghan Finance Ministry and other
essential ministries to build fiduciary systems that will permit us to
provide them more direct funding.
Additionally, our Department of State and Commerce experts are
assisting the Afghans to promote regional trade to help their economy.
We expect that Afghanistan and Pakistan will shortly conclude a Transit
Trade Agreement that will open new opportunities for commerce between
the two countries. Finally, we also seek congressional support to soon
pass Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation to create long-
term and sustainable employment opportunities. Improving official
commercial and trade relations will also contribute to an improved
Afghanistan-Pakistan security relationship.
OUR CIVILIAN EFFORT
Achieving our goals for Afghanistan will not be easy, but I am
optimistic that we can succeed with the support of the Congress.
Underresourced for years, our mission is now one of our government's
highest priorities, with substantial additional development funds and
hundreds of additional personnel. By early 2010, we will have almost
1,000 civilians from numerous government departments and agencies on
the ground in Afghanistan, tripling the total from the beginning of
2009. Of these, nearly 400 will serve out in the field with the
military at Provincial Reconstruction Teams or at the brigade-level and
on forward operating bases. By comparison, one year ago there were only
67 U.S. civilians serving outside Kabul. The hundreds of dedicated
Americans who have taken on this assignment voluntarily accept hardship
and risk and deserve our recognition and appreciation for the exemplary
work they are performing under very difficult conditions. They are an
extraordinarily skilled group, chosen because they have the proper
skills and experience to achieve the results we seek.
In coming months, as our troops conduct operations to stabilize new
areas, they will be joined by additional civilian personnel to work
with our Afghan partners to strengthen governance and provide basic
services as rapidly as possible. The integration of civilian and
military effort has greatly improved over the last year, a process that
will deepen as additional troops arrive and our civilian effort
expands. We have designated Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) as
counterparts to NATO/ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands.
These SCRs are senior professionals, experienced in conflict
environments. They direct the work of U.S. Government civilians within
their regions, subject to my overall guidance. This organizational
structure has two important features: First, it ensures that our
civilian efforts are fully integrated with the military's in the field.
Second, it is decentralized, enabling quick response to local needs,
which is essential to deal with the varying conditions in Afghanistan.
To maximize our impact in priority areas, we have created District
Support Teams, which allow civilians in the field to collaborate with
the military to build Afghan capacity in assigned districts.
U.S. foreign assistance is a comparatively small but essential
fraction of the total dollars spent in Afghanistan over the last 8
years. Our increased civilian presence has enabled us to more
effectively and more rapidly invest our assistance in the areas of
agriculture, job creation, education, health care, and infrastructure
projects. Additional resources will be necessary for our effort to keep
pace with the military's expansion, to carry out the President's
strategy on a rapid timetable. We look forward to sharing additional
details on our anticipated needs with Congress in the coming days and
weeks.
We have also improved our contracting to enhance performance and
increase the effectiveness of our development aid programs. In a
conflict zone, a degree of program risk is unavoidable, but U.S.
Government agencies in the mission remain accountable to Congress for
every dollar they spend. Given the great amount of resources and
emphasis devoted to Afghanistan, our programs receive extraordinary
oversight, including by a Kabul-based Special Inspector General for
Afghan Reconstruction, multiple audits of USAID and International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs, and a hotline to report fraud,
waste, and abuse.
PAKISTAN
Finally, let me say a few words about Pakistan and the critical
impact that developments in that country will have on our efforts over
the next year. The expanded military and civilian effort we are
undertaking in Afghanistan is likely to produce measurable improvements
in security and in Afghanistan's governance capacity, but we will
likely fall short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress
at eliminating the sanctuaries used by Afghan Taliban and their allied
militant extremists in Pakistan. The vast majority of enemy fighters
our troops face on the battlefield are local Afghans, fighting in their
home provinces or regions. But the Afghan Taliban and other insurgents
receive significant aid and direction from senior leaders operating
outside Afghanistan's borders. The Afghan Taliban's leadership may
employ those sanctuaries, as they have in the past, to simply wait us
out and renew their attacks once our troops begin to go home.
Recognizing this, the administration has emphasized the need for a
regional approach that deals with the interrelated problems of
Afghanistan and Pakistan and seeks to improve relations between the two
governments.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a daunting challenge. I have tried to
describe how our mission, as part of an integrated civil-military team,
will pursue the President's goals and our country's interests. I have
also given you my best assessment of the risks we face. Let me, in
closing, once again thank the men and women of the U.S. mission in
Afghanistan and our Armed Forces. Together with the members of other
NATO/ISAF Armed Forces, the international community, and our Afghan
allies, they do exemplary work on a daily basis that helps to protect
the American people. They are prepared to work even harder to help the
Afghan Government to stand on its own and handle the threats it faces.
They believe firmly that our mission is necessary and achievable, and
so do I. Success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the
additional troops and other resources provided by the President--and
with the help of Congress--we can ensure al-Qaeda never again finds
refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Let me just say, to my colleagues on the committee, there's
a balance, as everybody knows, and I've always tried to give
everybody, the longer period of time to question, because then
you can develop sort of a train of thought. But, we have a lot
of members, and everybody wants to have a chance, here, and I
think we have limited time, so I'm just going to cut it down.
And I hate to do that. I hope everybody is agreeable to that.
And we'll go with a 6-minute round, under the circumstances.
General, let me thank you for your comments about the
troops. Every one of us here, every time we go over there, we
are struck by how extraordinary they are, the contributions
they're making. And this time of the year, it's a tough time to
be away from home, and our thoughts are very, very much with
them. And we are very grateful to you and to all of the
leadership and to all of them.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I mentioned Pakistan in the opening comments,
and it seems as if, for the moment at least, this question of
hedging the bet is very much on the table with respect to
Pakistan's leadership. And I wonder if you could, General, and
perhaps Jack Lew, very quickly share with us--the recent
Pakistani military offensives have gone after the Baitullah
Mehsud in South Waziristan, and yet we have yet to see their
operations directed at the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network,
or some of the al-Qaeda strongholds. And during that time, the
military has continued to work with rival Taliban factions,
including those led by Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir, who are
believed to be involved in the Afghan insurgency and linked to
al-Qaeda and Haqqani. So, could you share with us your
strategy, General, and what the administration's strategy is,
Mr. Secretary, vis-a-vis the Pakistan military, how to convince
them that we have a long-term commitment to the region, we're
not about to leave that, and we need them to focus on these
other networks and groups?
General Petraeus. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, as we
were discussing before the session, the developments of the
last 10 months really are quite significant, because the
Pakistani leadership, all the political leaders, the civilian
populists, the clerics, and the military have all united in
recognizing that the internal extremists represent the most
pressing existential threat to their country, more pressing
than the traditional threat to the east. And they have taken
action in response to that recognition, as you noted, in the
Malakand Division, Swat, North West Frontier Province--did
quite good work there, I might add, as well. They did not just
clear and leave, they have cleared, they have held onto it,
they are working the rebuilding piece, and they're already
looking forward to ultimate transition.
They then have shifted; they've conducted operations in
Mohmand, Bajaur, and Khyber against extremist elements there
related to those in Swat, and, as you noted, gone after the
group that was held by the late Baitullah Mehsud. That
operation is now drawing to a close, both because of having
achieved their objectives and winner, but they have moved
further north and begun operations in other agencies--Kurram
and Orakzai to go after some of those that got away.
Now, in these operations, they are encountering, and
actually conducting, some fighting against those that are part
of that extremist syndicate that I described, that does do
fighting in eastern Afghanistan, certainly not the Afghan
Taliban, which, of course, is based down--its sanctuary is down
in Baluchistan.
With respect to, How do they eventually take those on? I
think, frankly, that the effort to demonstrate a sustained
substantial commitment to Pakistan--frankly, the Kerry-Lugar
bill is a hugely important manifestation of the level of
security assistance, foreign military financing, Pakistani
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, and so forth--also very
important, given the history that we have with that country,
and having left it, as you well know, a couple of times before.
So, this is a process of building trust, building mutual
confidence, and building a relationship in which the mutual
threats that we face are addressed by those who are on the
ground. And again, as I mentioned and as you mentioned, we have
to recognize the enormous sacrifices that the Pakistani
military, Frontier Corps, and police have made in these
operations recently, and also the losses that their civilians
have sustained.
But, it's about building a partnership that can transcend
these issues that we have had before, where we have left after
supporting one operation or the other.
The Chairman. Secretary Lew, as you answer it, because
otherwise we'll run out of time, could you also tie into it the
question of the political reforms with respect to the FATA?
Because, as you know, in order to sustain stability out there,
you've got to have some political reform. And fundamentally,
the Pakistani military has been averse to changing that,
because they've always, historically, used the region to
promote the perceived interests in Afghanistan. And those
relate to the perceived interests of India. So, if you could
perhaps share with us, as you talk about how we establish the
long-term relationship--I think there are some linkages to the
other issue.
Mr. Lew. Senator, I think--just to pick up where General
Petraeus ended, the relationship between the multiyear
commitment and Kerry-Lugar-Berman, the relationship between
our--maintaining long-term security assistance through the FMF
program while we ramp up counterinsurgency training, is
critical. It's clear, this year, that we have a common interest
in an immediate threat. The actions the Pakistani military is
taking are in the interests of Pakistan and the United States.
Where there is the question, Are we there for the long-term
relationship? Our ongoing long-term security assistance speaks
to the long-term in a way that counterinsurgency does not. So,
it's critical that we maintain a balance there.
In terms of the activities in the FATA and the NWFP, it's
not just what they do in the military maneuvers that's
important, it's, Are we with them there in the post-military
periods to help with the reconstruction, not just the
humanitarian assistance, but with the rebuilding? I think that
gets to the question you're asking about the local provincial
leadership in the territories.
There is the capacity to work with local leaders on
projects, for us to use the funding that we bring in, to
rebuild, to do economic development, to support local
decisionmaking, local institutions. And we've been having
conversations, with the Government of Pakistan, where it's
clear that we're going to work with the national ministries and
with the local leadership. I think it's important that we not
make it either/or. You know, there is a tendency to hear it in
a--that we're ``turning off'' assistance. We're very much
working with the national government of--the ministries--of
Pakistan. But, what we haven't done in the past is develop
those relationships at a deep level, at a provincial level. I
think that it's critical that we do both as we work in the
coming months and years.
General Petraeus. Senator, I just wanted to directly
address the issue of the political participation, because, as
you know, I think, in recent months there have been some
unprecedented steps taken to extend certain political rights
and other rights to those who live in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, rights that they've never had
before. And I think that's an important step forward, as well.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate your saying that. I agree
with that.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Eikenberry, I just have a couple of comments,
and I'm aware the time will not permit an extensive response at
this point. But, as you're organizing the Embassy in Kabul,
staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has observed
that deputy ambassadors working in Afghanistan are faced with
considerable bureaucratic obstacles, which may stem from
Afghans, or even from ourselves. I'm hopeful that you're
cognizant of their work and that there's a free flow of
information to you as well as to them. Likewise, the regional
command senior civilian representatives need to be a responsive
partner with the regional military commanders. Our impression,
at least of staff, is that there are currently some problems
with this. They're not beyond working out, but these are our
problems, and ones that we need to be aware of; as I'm sure you
are.
I want to take my time, though, by asking a more monumental
question. We've had all sorts of estimates of how many members
of the army and police force of Afghanistan, are going to be
trained by United States personnel. What are our goals, in
terms of the number we wish to train? And I ask this because
press accounts of the estimated numer of those in the army who
will be trained have ranged from 200,000 to 400,000, which
illustrates quite a disparity.
Second, and, General Petraeus, maybe you can give us some
insight on this, keeping in mind an answer to my first question
regarding an attainable goal for the number of forces we need
to train. There are press accounts from President Karzai's
visit with Secretary Gates this morning that President Karzai
has said, ``We're going to need financial support in
Afghanistan until 2024.'' I'm not certain how the President
arrives at that time, which is 15 years away, but I am
interested in the amount of money such a commitment would
require from us. In other words, we appropriate money from year
to year, and part of our goal in doing so is to have a very
stable army and police force under the command of the Afghan
central government. Maybe a part of the response is that the
entire police force will not always be under the direct
administration of the central government, but in any case, at
some point there have to be resources in Afghanistan, either at
the central or regional level, to pay for the wages and upkeep
of these forces, regardless of whether a significant number of
our troops begin to leave in 2011. It will be essential that
the Afghans we have trained and will be paying, in large
measure, be there to maintain these forces and uphold order.
This isn't an area I have seen staked out in testimony or
in the press. That being said, will you help us a little bit
with the arithmetic, this morning, of the numbers and finance
and longevity of that obligation?
General Petraeus. Senators, I think, in previous testimony
in the past week or so, what has been identified is that we
have established goals by year, right now, for the Afghan
National Army and the Afghan National Police. To give you a
sense of that, the ANA, right now, is roughly 96,000 or so, and
the goal by the end of October next year is 134,000. The ANP is
94,000; goal by the end of October next year is 109,000.
Now, along with that, you have heard these aspirational
goals. I think General McChrystal, yesterday--others--have
stated that we could envision Afghan security forces numbering
as many as 400,000, that an army of 240,000 and a police--now,
police includes border police and a variety of other different
police elements, beyond just local police, but could ultimately
be in the 160,000. Now, again, right now what we want to do is
reach our annual goals. Certainly, there have to be some
programmatics that run beyond that, without question. But, we
want to, first, confirm that we can, in fact, meet those goals;
and to do that, by the way, we have to make significant
improvements, not just in recruiting, but also in retention,
because the losses, in some of these cases, not just to battle
loss--killed, wounded, AWOL and so forth--but all just--also
just elapsed----
Senator Lugar. And apparently also in pay----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Time in service.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Pay to these people.
General Petraeus. Well, the--and the pay has just been
increased. And again, there is, essentially, a benefits package
to work out how to, in fact, recruit and to retain more Afghans
for those security forces.
Beyond that, by the way, a shift in momentum will end up
being the best recruiting tool of all, because when you think
that the good guys are going to win, you want to be a good guy.
If you have doubts about that, then you will hedge your bets or
perhaps even tacitly support the bad guys.
Now, there's no question, as President Karzai was
highlighting yesterday, that Afghanistan will require
substantial international funding for years to come, in a whole
host of different areas, not the least of which is their
security forces. But, I would submit that it is a lot cheaper
to maintain a certain number of Afghan forces than it is to
maintain the number of United States and coalition forces
required to compensate for their absence.
Senator Lugar. Roughly, what would 243,000 people, if
that's what we're having this year----
General Petraeus. Sir, I----
Senator Lugar [continuing]. What would that cost?
General Petraeus. Well, if you get up--if you get up to the
400,000 range--and again, no guarantee that that's where we're
going; that's an aspiration--but, if we end up there, that's in
the 10--over $10 billion range per year. And that highlights
the importance of helping Afghanistan develop and really
exploit--Afghanistan exploit--its extraordinary mineral wealth.
The Ambassador can probably talk to that far better than I
could, but there is enormous potential in Afghanistan to
dramatically increase its national revenue, but if and only if
it can get the security and then the infrastructure that
enables them to extract that mineral wealth and, of course, get
it out to a market.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me welcome all three of you here this morning. I
know you've been busy testifying and meeting with Members of
Congress.
And let me underscore the comment made by Chairman Kerry,
General, again. Not only at this time of year, any time of
year, as you point out, I--sort of set me back on my heels a
little bit this morning when you mentioned 1990, that it's been
that long a time that we've been asking our men and women in
uniform to be on 24-hour watch, so to speak, in that part of
the world. That's a long time. And all of us are deeply
grateful to them. Whatever differences are about policy
questions, I think the unbounded respect we have for the men
and women in uniform, who represent our country every single
day all over the world, needs to be conveyed as often as we
possibly can. So, please continue to do that for us all.
And as I think Jack Lew pointed out, this is of utmost
importance to our national security, how we cripple al-Qaeda,
if we can, obviously, to how we secure the nuclear arsenals in
Pakistan, that I'd put almost on an equal footing--maybe I
should have mentioned that first, in terms of priorities, and
obviously dealing with violent extremism. And so, all of us up
here have a lot of questions about this. I respect, on one
hand, the desire to have some sort of an end-date strategy
here, but almost--there's an inherent problem with that as you
look at the massive difficulty in confronting the issues in
Afghanistan, the goal of training and having the Afghan people
assume the greatest responsibility for their own long-term
security.
So, I'll ask, Chairman, for a full statement of my
comments--opening comments--to be put in the record.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Senator Dodd. Let me, if I can--and I'll raise this with
all three of you, and you decide which of the three of you is
best able to respond to this.
Again, the Pakistan part of this equation is most troubling
to me in the short term, because obviously if we don't secure
the nuclear arsenals in Pakistan, and you end up with a
fundamental change of order, political order in that country,
all of these efforts, of course, would seem to pale by
comparison.
President Zardari has been under increasing pressure from
both the members of the military in his own country as well as
those opposed to his close relationship with us. And the threat
of impeachment continues to loom. I'm told that that was the
case.
Give us some sense, if you will here this morning--and
maybe I ought to start with you, Ambassador--what you think the
current political tensions of Pakistan--whether or not they
imperil civilian rule of that country. How serious are those
threats to President Zardari?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, if I could, let me turn it
to Jack Lew, who's the Ambassador to Afghanistan. I'm probably
not the best to talk on the situation inside of Pakistan.
Mr. Lew. Let me answer briefly and then, on the, kind of,
core security question, turn to General Petraeus.
You know, the difficulties of maintaining a stable civilian
government in Pakistan are not new. You know, we've been
working with the current government to try and help build the
institutions, not just the people, so that there's the ability
to rely on ongoing relationships, regardless of the leadership.
Without addressing the kind of day-to-day risks that the
current administration faces, I think that, you know, we do see
signs of improvement and strength and governmental capacity in
a number of areas. There's still a lot of progress that needs
to be made. You know, the tension--constant tension between the
civilian concerns and the military concerns is one that is
publicly debated.
You know, the support that we've shown over the last year,
that your leadership in this committee has shown, in terms of
mapping out a 5-year strategy of support for civilian
leadership, is really central to what we've been trying to do--
shore up the idea of the need to invest in lasting civilian
institutions.
Senator Dodd. Well, let me ask the question. I think you've
answered this already with some of the stuff that's been said,
but my understanding, the success of this overall program----
Mr. Lew. Yes.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. In no small measure depends upon
a very willing partner in Pakistan. Is that agree--do you agree
with that?
Mr. Lew. I think we do agree with that. And I think,
because the actions being taken are--under the leadership of
the civilian government, but carried out by the military--it
might be helpful to have General Petraeus comment a little bit
on the relationships we've had--military-military
relationships--over the last year, as well.
General Petraeus. Senator, as one who's been in Pakistan,
in fact, about four or five times in the last 6 months, and had
a lot of conversations with military leaders as well as the
civilian leadership, I actually don't think that the current
challenges imperil civilian rule. There clearly are challenges
to--potential challenges to President Zardari. But, again, I
don't see the prospect or the desire for anyone to change
civilian rule.
We've worked very hard to establish relationships of trust
and confidence with the Pakistani military, and especially the
Pakistani army, and again, against this backdrop of history
that we discussed earlier, and a realization that there was a
period of a decade or so during which no Pakistani students
came to the United States, and all the rest. So, we're making
up for the lost generation.
But, I think we have built those relationships, patiently
and stronger. Chairman Mullen has done a great deal of that, as
well. We've substantially augmented the number of individuals
in the Office of Defense Representative Pakistan--by the way,
he was promoted to three stars yesterday--as a sign, again, of
the importance of that position.
And again, I think what we're trying to do, as the
Secretary mentioned, is to build these relationships to where
they become a partnership in confronting what clearly are
shared threats, not just to Pakistan and the region, but also
to our own country.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senator From Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
General Petraeus, Ambassador Eikenberry, thank you for being here,
and for your tremendous leadership and service to this country.
As I said last week, when this committee met to discuss Afghanistan
with Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen, the decision
regarding how to move forward represents an incredibly difficult moment
for our Nation.
Our strategic imperatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan--crippling
al-Qaeda, safeguarding Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and combating
violent extremism--are of the utmost importance to our national
security.
And today, we continue our consideration of the President's
proposal for achieving those critical goals.
President Obama has carefully and conscientiously weighed our
military and policy options. And he has laid out a serious proposal
that merits close consideration.
It is our job, however, to subject the President's proposed
strategy to tough and pointed scrutiny. And, frankly, as we meet today,
I remain skeptical about the likelihood that this new mission will meet
our goals.
I have great respect for our President and his team of advisers. I
have great confidence in our military and its leadership.
But I also have great concern about the prospect of sending more
young Americans into Afghanistan, because simply escalating our
presence, in my view, won't achieve our objectives. And we must only
assign our troops missions that are necessary and sufficient to support
our interests.
We need to know more about the President's strategy--not just his
military strategy, but the economic and diplomatic initiatives that
will be necessary to make it work.
We need to know more about what our civilian surge will look like,
who will run it, and whether our development experts at USAID have a
meaningful seat at the table to help develop and implement it.
We need to know more about the President's plans to protect key
population centers, provide for targeted and limited economic
development, and crack down on rampant corruption.
We need to know more about the administration's thoughts on
governance, a key pillar of counterinsurgency strategy, and its
proposed efforts to bolster the Afghan Government's ability to meet the
basic needs of its people.
We need to know more about whether we have a reliable partner in
the Karzai government.
We need to know more about whether we have a reliable partner in
Pakistan, and whether that government is taking the necessary steps to
combat violent extremism, including the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and
extend law and order to the tribal areas.
We need to know more about how the President views the relationship
between our efforts in Afghanistan and our national security interests
in Pakistan
We need to know more about whether our allies are prepared to share
the burden of this effort, whether NATO is ready not just to send more
troops, but to aid in the other parts of our strategy.
And most of all, we need to know more, much more, about how and
when our work in Afghanistan will come to an end, so that we can bring
our troops home.
We have before us today a wealth of foreign policy and national
security experience. I hope that we can call upon that experience to
help us further evaluate the President's proposal.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And certainly, thank each of you for your service, and I
very much appreciate you coming and being with us today. I know
this is somewhat painful, and we appreciate it.
General Petraeus, when you came up and talked with us about
the surge in Iraq, there was a sense of a really strong
commitment that really encompassed the whole country. And I
know that, in March, there was an announcement about what we
were doing in Afghanistan, that, while it was spoken that it
was narrowed, it was actually pretty expanded, from the
standpoint of how we looked at what we were going to do in
Afghanistan. If you looked at all the metrics that General
Jones presented in September, I mean, it was an all-out effort
throughout the country.
I know Secretary Gates mentioned, last week, he realized
that this was becoming a full-out nation-building effort, for
lack of a better description. And now that's been narrowed
some. And so, we hear sort of a partial effort taking place as
it relates to the country itself, and sort of our leaving a
country that's a little different than the type of country
we're trying to leave in Iraq. And I guess what would be good
for me, clarificationwise, would be to understand what you see
Afghanistan being when we begin to drawdown troops, whenever
that is, and its ability to actually maintain itself
successfully. I know we're talking about pulling back away from
rural areas into population centers. And what I see is a
country that's, candidly, not unlike I guess what we're
discussing in Pakistan, where you've got a lot of areas out
there that are not administered, not really governed, if you
will. So, if you could describe fully what you see us having
there, what the world would have there, when we begin
withdrawing, that--I think that would be very helpful. Because
I think it has been confusing as to what we're actually doing
there.
General Petraeus. Thanks, Senator. And thanks, as always,
for looking after the great 101st Airborne Division.
Senator Corker. Yes, sir.
General Petraeus. Sir, I think it would be worth reviewing
the objectives of the policy, because they were, indeed,
sharpened as a result of the deliberations that took place with
President Obama and the national security team. And they're
pretty straightforward. They are to reverse the Taliban
momentum; to deny the Taliban access to, and control of,
population centers and lines of communication; disrupt the
Taliban outside the secured areas, and prevent al-Qaeda from
regaining sanctuaries in Afghanistan; degrade the Taliban to
levels manageable by the Afghan security forces; increase the
size and capability of those security forces and other local
forces to begin transitioning security responsibility to the
government within 18 months; and selectively build capacity of
the Afghan Government, particularly in key ministries.
What this produces, I think, is a country that can
basically secure itself and see to the needs of its citizens,
using traditional local organizing structures at local levels,
and then tying in to a central government that is seen
increasingly as serving the people rather than preying on them.
As those conditions begin to appear in different areas, we
can then thin out our forces. Again, I want to be very clear
that Afghanistan is not Iraq; it's also, by the way, not
Vietnam; it's not a lot of other places. It's Afghanistan, and
it has plenty of its own challenges. But, we have to look at
that.
But, the fact is, the way we thinned out in Iraq, as we
were able to get Iraqi security forces and Iraqi officials
capable of taking over local responsibilities, is somewhat
similar to what it is that we want to do in Afghanistan. And
you keep certain capabilities there longer than others--again,
as in Iraq. What we are doing in Iraq right now, for example,
is working to enable the Iraqi security forces, with a variety
of assets that they just don't have, so that they can keep the
heat on al-Qaeda and reduce at least the frequency of the kinds
of horrific attacks that we saw yesterday. And prior to that,
as you probably know, the month of November, for example, saw
the lowest level of security incidents and the lowest number of
violent civilian deaths in Iraq since we got good data, post-
liberation.
So, that would be the concept, I think. That's sort of the
vision of how this would go.
Senator Corker. I know we have a briefing later today, in a
secure setting----
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Corker [continuing]. With McChrystal, and I will
talk through a lot of that at that time, but--and I know our
time's very short today. I think the--and none of us like being
where we are. And I know all of this is complex, and we, I
think, are all glad that we have people of your caliber, each
of you, doing what you're doing. But, as we look at this whole
issue of the Taliban, and maybe it becoming almost a sort of a
brand of--type of activity that's occurring around the world
when people are unhappy with what's happening within the
country. I think that's a concern that you've expressed. I know
that's been a--you know, expressed at the State Department. I
think that the difficulty that we have is envisioning that, in
each of the countries that have these issues, we end up with a
sort of all-out building of a country, because these countries
are poor, and there's no economic development, and it's easy to
pay somebody to take up weaponry against a government. Looking
into the future--not Afghanistan, but in future efforts--are we
developing different types of strategies that don't end up
being nation-building?
General Petraeus. I think it would be accurate to say we
are developing strategies that are appropriate to the countries
we're trying to help, and they involve greater or lesser
amounts of nation-building, depending on the problems that
afflict those countries.
But, I think you've raised a very important point, and that
is trying to figure out how we can, without, again, conducting
complete all-out nation-building levels of assistance, keep
countries from becoming failed states and perhaps being
sanctuaries for transnational extremist groups. And Central
Command has a couple of candidates for that, as you know,
within its area of responsibility, and we are working in those
other areas, as well.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Lew and General Petraeus, Ambassador Eikenberry,
thank you all for being here today, and for your selfless
service to our Nation. We are all indebted to each of you.
And I'd like to ask a question of General Petraeus first.
Special Envoy Holbrooke and Admiral Mullen have both
acknowledged in testimony before this committee that there is a
danger that sending additional troops to Afghanistan could push
militants into Pakistan and further destabilize that nuclear-
armed nation. Do you agree that there is a risk that sending
more troops could just push militants over the border?
General Petraeus. There is, indeed, a risk that our
operations could lead some of these elements to seek sanctuary
in Afghanistan, particularly, frankly, the leaders, those that
have the resources to do that.
Senator Feingold. In Pakistan.
General Petraeus. I'm sorry, in Pakistan. And that is why
we're working very hard to coordinate our operations more
effectively with our Pakistani partners, so that they know what
our operational campaign plan is and can anticipate and be
there with a catcher's mitt or an anvil, whatever it may be, to
greet these individuals. We have actually conducted some
operations of medium scale in Regional Command East, where that
kind of coordination was conducted. And before we launched the
operations with the Marines in Helmand province, we also
briefed our Pakistani partners. So, that effort--and we have,
in fact, begun, just recently--literally in the last several
weeks--an effort to lay out, in real detail, our operational
campaign plan, and then to coordinate that with the actions of
the Pakistani----
Senator Feingold. Well, I----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Elements.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Appreciate, General, your
description of what we're doing and what we're laying out to
the Pakistanis, but isn't the case that they're going to have
to move against all of the militants in that area if this is
really going to work?
General Petraeus. Well, they're going to have to move
against enough of them so that, obviously, their capability is
sufficiently degraded. Again, I don't see any of these kinds of
efforts as, you know, unconditional surrender, planting the
flag on a hilltop, and going home to a victory parade. These
are long, tough slogs, if you will. But, what we need to do is
beat them down to a level to where they don't threaten. And
that was the point about degrading the Taliban, for example, to
levels manageable by the Afghan security forces.
Senator Feingold. I understand that. But, I guess my only
point would be, not so much that we can get rid of every
militant in Pakistan, but that they do move against all the
different pockets that exist----
General Petraeus. Over time, no question that they have to,
again, deal with these, because, of course, they present an
internal extremist threat to Pakistan----
Senator Feingold. And, in particular----
General Petraeus [continuing]. As well.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Not necessarily ``over
time,'' but now, because we are going to be pushing now----
General Petraeus. We----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. And we're going to be
potentially pushing these militants into Pakistan.
General Petraeus. As we----
Senator Feingold. So, they need to be able to do this now.
General Petraeus. As we conduct operations, Senator--again,
we've got to coordinate what we're going to do with them, so
that they're not surprised by what is happening. I should note,
though, that they're--we need to also be realistic that there's
a limit--you know, they're--they'll say--you can only stick so
many short sticks into so many hornets' nests at one time. And
they have a very impressive military and an increasingly
impressive Frontier Corps. But, again, there are limits on
their capacity. And that's the challenge that they're working
with. And, by the way, that's why the Pakistani
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund that you've provided for us,
and the Foreign Military Financing, has been so important, to
help them with that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
Ambassador Eikenberry, there's a myth that the Pakistanis
fear that we will ``abandon'' them, and that we must send more
troops to persuade them otherwise. However, the Pakistani's do
not support military escalation, have expressed concern that it
will further destabilize the situation on both sides of the
border. If we were to reduce our troop levels in Afghanistan,
but maintain an ability to carry out counterterrorism
operations in the region while continuing to provide the
Pakistanis' robust financial support, wouldn't that communicate
our commitment to Pakistan and actually be more responsive to
their concerns about the instability caused by our massive
military presence in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I'm not--again, I'm not the
Ambassador to Pakistan, but I will comment on this, from my
long time in the region. And with a reduction of U.S. military
support at this juncture inside of Afghanistan, the security
situation in Afghanistan would decline. I think it would
decline, over time, with the lack of U.S. commitment--
dramatically. Insecurity in Afghanistan will breed insecurity
within Pakistan.
Senator Feingold. General, there's no doubt that al-Qaeda
has found safe haven among militant groups in the region, but
is it fair to say that there are continuing differences between
the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda over their strategic goals that
intermittently provoke tensions between the two groups?
General Petraeus. There are, indeed, periodic tensions, and
then there are, indeed, periodic reconciliations, if you will.
Again, as Secretary Gates explained, I thought, quite
effectively, in his testimony last week, some of which I
summarized today, there is this symbiotic relationship, really,
between all of these groups. And sometimes the Taliban are up
and the al-Qaeda is not quite as much in the forefront; and
other times, it's reversed.
Senator Feingold. Well, I understand that, but the
description of it as ``symbiotic'' is a little surprising to
me. General McChrystal, in his nomination process, told the
Senate Armed Services Committee that, ``continuing differences
over strategic goals could persist and intermittently provoke
tensions between the two groups.'' So, maybe it's just
semantics, but it strikes me that it may not really be at a
level of symbiosis.
But, I thank you all.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And best of the holiday season to all of you. We'll enjoy
it with our families while you and your men and women will be
deployed all over the world, keeping us safe, and we appreciate
that very much.
The Chairman. We hope to enjoy it with our families.
Senator Isakson. We hope to enjoy. I wasn't going to throw
that in there. I'll let you do that, Mr. Chairman. We'll get
there.
Ambassador Eikenberry, you, with a twinkle in your eye, I
might add, acknowledged that we were encouraged by President
Karzai's statement about reducing corruption, improving the
government, et cetera, but you also said, in your nonprinted
remarks, that you were very impressed that finally all elements
of our national power are deployed, and our biggest challenge
is the lack of credibility of the Afghan Government. You
followed that with a statement, ``We should work with the
ministries and work to help improve the ministries and the
confidence level of the Afghan people.'' Do we have to work
around President Karzai to improve the ministries of the Afghan
Government? Are we impressed, but not yet certain, that his
words of corruption reduction and things like that are just a
statement, or is he committed to it.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, we work in partnership with
the Government of Afghanistan, and President Karzai is the duly
elected, legitimate President of the country; he is our
partner. We have four areas, Senator, that we need to
concentrate in partnership with the Afghans. The first is in
the area of law enforcement. We're making progress in that
area. Second, it's going to be essential that we improve the
financial accountability, which you've referred to, working
with competent ministries. We have a good program, that's been
underway now for over a year, of ministry certification, taking
the essential ministries of Afghanistan, working with them to
improve their procedures in which they reach a level, then, of
competency. We put funds directly in through them. We have a
more expansive program, this year, planned, working with the
international community, more effort in trying to train civil
administration. Understandably, after three decades of
conflict, low literacy rates, and a disrupted society, we don't
have it. We did not, in 2002, begin with a strong base. We're
making progress in that area. And fourth, in the way that we
deliver our aid programs.
In fairness to the Government of Afghanistan, currently,
for the international community, 80 percent of aid funds don't
go through the Government of Afghanistan. The United States
Government is really the leading element right now in trying to
change that. So, when we talk about the accountability of the
Government of Afghanistan, it really does require a partnered
approach.
Behind all of that, though, Senator, as you're asking in
your question, leadership at the top, and commitment, is
absolutely vital. We are encouraged by President Karzai's
inaugural address, and what he has said will be his plan of
action, but it will wait deeds over the next year.
Senator Isakson. You mentioned the High Office of
Oversight. Is that an office set up by President Karzai?
Ambassador Eikenberry. It's an office set up by the
Government of Afghanistan. It was set up 1 year ago, Senator,
to deal with corruption. There is my understanding that there
was a press conference today in Kabul. I'll have to check on
that. But I know that President Karzai's administration intent
is to try to give that High Office of Oversight, which is now
an administrative organization, trying to give it more teeth.
Senator Isakson. So, their legislative branch created that,
not President Karzai? Or----
Ambassador Eikenberry. This was--I'll have to go back and--
for the record.
But, the High Office of Oversight, at least the manning of
the High Office of Oversight, comes from the executive branch,
Senator. I don't know what the legislative base of it is,
though. But, our intent is, if President Karzai decides to put
more emphasis in that, we're prepared to work in partnership
and offer support.
Senator Isakson. Well, from everything I have seen when
I've been to Afghanistan, as well as what some Georgia soldiers
have told me who have been deployed and come back, if we
reverse the Taliban, if we disrupt the Taliban, and we degrade
the Taliban, we still won't be successful if we don't improve
the government and the image of the government with the people,
in addition to improving the security situation in Afghanistan.
Is that right?
Ambassador Eikenberry. That's absolutely correct, Senator.
We have the two efforts. At the national level, we're working--
I already articulated what some of those programs are. They're
more comprehensive. But really the lynchpin of this is going to
be at the district level, at the local level. We're working
closely with our military, we're working closely with the
Government of Afghanistan to innovate and try to figure out the
best combinations of the delivery of very basic government,
security, justice, and those essential services, like health
and education, in rural areas, in areas where, right now, our
troops are operating, where the insurgency is, in the south and
the east, in order to achieve that end that you've articulated,
the need for governance to follow in behind combat operations.
Senator Isakson. Well, the success of the surge in Iraq,
and the example that's been set by Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki and the government there, to be able to take over
responsibilities once the insurgency was reversed, is evidence
of the same thing we have to accomplish in Afghanistan,
although in a much different way, because of the history and
the nature of that country. And I commend you all on what your
effort is. I'll pledge to give you all the support I personally
can to accomplish that goal.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, if I could, just a
clarification on the High Office of Oversight, it was
established by Presidential decree, so it doesn't have a
legislative base.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank you all for your service, and, through you,
the people who serve underneath you and make very significant
sacrifices. And, particularly, General Petraeus, I am one of
those who understand that never have so few been asked to bear
so much of the sacrifice, and it's because of that that I ask
the questions that I do.
And I want to start with you, General. Let me get this
straight. From everybody's testimony here, when we had the
Secretary of State and Defense, the essence of what I get is
that we have defined our national security, in the context of
Afghanistan, as having stability and security in Afghanistan in
our own national interests, is that correct?
General Petraeus. Well, our overriding objective, of
course, is to ensure that al-Qaeda and other transnational
extremists don't reestablish a sanctuary in Afghanistan such
as----
Senator Menendez. And as such----
General Petraeus [continuing]. What they had----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. We want to have----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Prior to 9/11, and----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. We want to have safety and
security there so that they don't have the ability to----
General Petraeus. And the way to ensure that overriding
interest is to have a country that is not a failed state and
allows that to happen.
Senator Menendez. So, if that is the case, and if we accept
that as our national security interest, then what follows is
that, while we are aspirational as to whether President Karzai
will meet the standards of eliminating the corruption and what
goes on right now in Afghanistan, whether or not he succeeds in
our aspirations--and I understand, Ambassador Eikenberry, that
you may have written sections of what we now praise as his
commitment--we will still be in the same national security
paradigm. If he fails to have the good governance we want, if
he fails to support the creation of the level of Afghan troops
and police, and the quality of them, to carry out missions, we
will still be in the position that it will be our national
security interest to have security and stability in Afghanistan
because we don't want it to be a safe haven for
al-Qaeda. Is that fair to say?
General Petraeus. Yes; it is.
Senator Menendez. So, therefore, the problem seems to me
that--part of the question here is that that dictates that we
have a long-term obligation to Afghanistan, because, you know,
we hope that Karzai will do everything that's right, but, you
know, again--and we may prod and poke and, you know, maybe try
to direct money in different ways, but, at the end of the day,
this depends upon an Afghan Government that can ultimately
sustain itself. And my view of that, therefore, is skepticism
on that goal, based on what I've seen.
So, let me ask you, then, Do we agree with the comments
made by President Karzai, that it may be as much as 5 years
before his troops can take on insurgents, and 2024 before the
Afghans will be able to pay for their own security? Is his
statement a fair one?
General Petraeus. Well, Senator, I think, again, it's not a
light switch that takes place in a situation like this.
Senator Menendez. But, is that a reasonable timeframe?
General Petraeus. I can't talk about the long-term
timeframe. Again, that depends on how rapidly, obviously, they
can generate much greater revenue, and that depends, to a
degree, on security and infrastructure and so forth. But,
certainly it is going to be years before they can handle the
bulk of the security tasks and allow the bulk of our troopers
to redeploy. What our goal is, of course, is to get that
process going, to create the conditions where they can handle
the security situation because of the capability they have and
because of the degradation of the Taliban in those particular
areas.
Senator Menendez. Well, if I factor out your previous
answer to ``assuming that the Afghans got to certain levels of
both police and troop strength, and what it would cost,'' and
if it's true that his statement that it'd be 2024 before they'd
be able to handle the bill on themselves, we're talking about
$150 billion just on the security side before we get to the
development side. So, you know, at some point we need to get
the pricetag, here, to be part of the equation so we understand
what we're spending in our security context.
And that brings me to the questions of, you know--Secretary
Lew, I think we've spent $13 billion in development assistance
to date in Afghanistan. Is that correct?
Mr. Lew. Roughly, correct.
Senator Menendez. Roughly, OK. But, all the testimony I
hear leads me to believe that after $13 billion, we are
basically starting from scratch as it relates to development
efforts, which is pretty alarming. So, you know, I want to get
a sense of how we are going to, you know, go from, right now, a
clearly overwhelmingly military context to all of the
statements that we need a government that can sustain itself
and operate, and then, do that, $13 billion later, without
virtually any success, and think about--you're going to triple,
you say, your civilian corps, which--to 900-some-odd--which
means we only have 300-some-odd. And I'm looking at all of this
in the timeframe and the money that has been spent, and we
haven't quantified what we're going to be looking, on the
civilian side, and, you know, I get rather anxious.
Mr. Lew. Well, Senator, first, I think it's not correct to
say that there's nothing to show for the past development
program.
Senator Menendez. Tell me what we----
Mr. Lew. I think that----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Show for the $13 billion.
Mr. Lew [continuing]. Before the development assistance
that you're describing, there was virtually no access to health
care in Afghanistan. There's very substantial access to health
care in Afghanistan, in the 80-percent range. There were
virtually no girls enrolled in schools, there are now a lot of
girls enrolled in schools, and more every week, every month. I
think that it's fair to say that we have an awful lot of work
ahead of us, that the institution-building, particularly, at
the governmental level, and outside of Kabul, at the
subnational level, is a substantial challenge.
I don't think it's quite the same as starting from scratch.
I think if you look at the government that President Karzai
has, with all the problems that we spend a lot of time
discussing, there are a lot of ministries and ministers who
have been doing quite a good job. If you look at their
agriculture program, and where we're coming in to support their
agriculture program--there's an Agriculture Minister who has a
5-year plan that's a good plan. He is relying on the
international community, and, in our case, USAID and USDA, to
be supporting their plan. That's not to say that it's easy, but
the work is building on a foundation that is an Afghan-driven
agriculture plan. That's true in other ministries, as well.
It's not true in every ministry.
In terms of the level of U.S. civilian presence, when we
started, at the beginning of the year, there were roughly 300,
320 civilians on the ground. By the end of January, we're going
to be close to 1,000. That's a very big difference, in terms of
the amount of programming that we have going on, not just in
Kabul, but in all of the provincial areas, the district areas,
where we'll be teaming on a day-to-day basis. And I think that
you're going to see very substantial change in the progress
made, and it's all tightly coordinated in a civilian-military
plan, where the civilians are going in right when the military
is--created the space for them to work.
The Chairman. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, Senator Isakson was just pursuing a line of
questioning with regard to corruption. Let me follow along.
President Karzai was expected, yesterday, to release his
list of 25 Cabinet members. I understand, now, that decision
has been postponed until Saturday. This issue has a lot to do
with corruption. The President's under pressure to exclude
corrupt ministers from his government. At the same time, it's
reported that some powerful Afghans, who feel that they were
instrumental in bringing about a tainted election victory, feel
that they should participate in this government. And other
Members of Parliament see this list as Karzai's first step to
clean up his government. In other news reports, I hear that,
with regard to some Afghans, heavyhanded though the Taliban may
be, and violent and repressive as they may be, some Afghans
prefer to see their form of order and certainty in
decisionmaking over the endless process of having to grease the
palms of official Afghan governmental bureaucrats.
General Petraeus, do you--do your people in the field see
this? And, Mr. Ambassador, would you comment about this? We
have reports of Afghan Mines Minister Mohammad Ibrahim Adel,
receiving a $30 million bribe from the Chinese for making
decisions favorable to the Chinese.
Mr. Ambassador, would you comment as to the credence of
that as part of your answer. And then, of course, we know the
allegations about the first Vice-President-elect, Mohammad
Fahim, reportedly being involved in the Afghan narcotics trade.
I view the corruption issue as a major factor in
determining whether the Afghan people are going to come around
to supporting the government and getting rid of a regime--a
Taliban regime, which, admittedly, has every reason to be
unpopular on the surface.
So, Mr. Ambassador, and then, General, if you'd like to
follow up.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Great, thanks, Senator.
The report about the naming of the Cabinet, yes, we had
anticipated it was going to be announced on Tuesday, and now we
understand it's been postponed several days. I've heard that
President Karzai is working with the Parliament to make a
decision whether or not the entire package of ministers should
be named in one setting, or should part be named and then the
Parliament will go on recess and the rest will be named
afterward. They do need parliamentary confirmation.
I'd emphasize what--following on what Secretary Lew had
said--the quality of the Afghan ministries and the leadership
of the ministries--indeed, it's--Senator, it's very impressive
in many areas. The Ministers of Education, Health, Agriculture,
Rural Reconstruction and Development, Commerce, Finance,
Interior, Defense, the Director of the National Security--
Director of Intelligence--these are world-class ministers who
could do well in Europe or North America. They're challenged
within their ministries, as, of course, they would be after
three decades of war, such low literacy rates in the country,
the absolute destruction of bureaucracy and organizations over
the course of three decades. These are difficult tasks, to try
to run these ministries. But, I have confidence, at the
national level--I don't want to prejudge what ministers will be
named, but I think, in the main, we'll see a reinforcement of
what's a pretty good list. Improvements have to be made,
though.
Second point, about Taliban justice, you're absolutely
correct. In areas where there is absolute corruption in the
countryside, there is no legitimate Government of Afghanistan,
Taliban can deliver a very predictable justice. But, it's a
feudal, brutal justice that includes the chopping off of heads
and the hanging of the so-called ``defenders'' in the market
squares. That is not a brand of justice that the Afghan people
aspire to see return to their country. Every poll that's been
taken, still, since 2002, when Afghanistan was liberated by
United States military forces and our allies--every poll still
shows the Taliban to be deeply unpopular. But, when you reach a
point in parts of Afghanistan, where the alternative is an
absolutely rapacious or brutal government alternative, then, of
course, the Taliban will find an opening.
So, our challenge--and, indeed, the Government of
Afghanistan's challenge--is to construct legitimate
alternatives to what is a very brutal Taliban way of life and
governance.
Senator Wicker. All right. Let me ask you, then--General, I
think I'll ask you to take my question for the record, and let
me see if I can squeeze in one more.
Of the 7,000 additional allied troops that have been
promised, my understanding is that approximately 2,000 of them
are already there; they were there to help with the elections.
We're really only talking about an additional 5,000 troops.
It's been well documented that restrictions placed by many
countries on their troops in Afghanistan will impact their
mission there. So, I'd like to ask you to comment about that.
Will they be primarily trainers? Will they primarily serve in
support functions? Or will they be combat troops? And if a
large portion of our allied--of the additional 7,000 allied
troops are restricted in their military activities, how will
that impact their ability to provide assistance to our mission
and to ensure victory in this effort?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, the additional
7,000 or so really are additional, because the election forces
were supposed to go home. And if a country, obviously, commits
to extend them or to replace them, obviously that is in
addition to their projection.
They really are a mix, across the board, of combat forces,
trainers--in some cases, PRT element support, the so-called
OMLTs, the military transition teams, and so forth. And
certainly some of those will be restricted by caveats, there's
no question. This is not something new to Afghanistan, though,
candidly. When I was in Bosnia as the chief of operations, I
had a matrix on my desk that had all the countries down the
left, a list of tasks across the top, and an X mark that filled
the block as to whether that country could do that task in a
certain location. I had the same thing----
Senator Wicker. Some of them?
General Petraeus [continuing]. Same thing in Iraq. And
again, we had to--you know, so General McChrystal's challenge,
as was the challenge for the commander in Iraq, is to
understand who can do what, employ them to the fullest extent
possible, and then figure out how to complement what it is that
they can contribute with the actions of other forces that can
truly do everything, everywhere----
Senator Wicker. What do you mean by ``some''----
The Chairman. Senator, I've got to interrupt----
Senator Wicker. I know. I just wondered if the----
The Chairman [continuing]. Out of fairness to the other
colleagues.
Senator Wicker [continuing]. If the General could clarify
whether ``some'' means a majority or----
The Chairman. Well, he could clarify it, but it would mean
you have about 3 minutes more than anybody else. So, maybe you
could clarify for the record or in the course of another
answer.
General Petraeus. I'd be happy to do that, sir.
[The written information referred to follows:]
Approximately 3,043 of the 7,000 troops will be restricted by
caveats. To keep the response unclassified, caveats affiliated with
specific countries must be excluded. Some examples of caveats and
associated number of troops affected are:
(1) 700 troops are restricted to operations within their assigned
Regional Commands. Any operations outside these areas must be approved
by that country's higher authority. An exception exists for ``in
extremis'' operations declared by COMISAF and are considered on a case-
by-case basis.
(2) 330 troops are forbidden from undertaking direct military
action against narcotics producers.
(3) 250 troops may not operate outside Afghanistan, and require
higher authority approval to participate in counternarcotics activity.
(4) 232 troops can only operate outside their assigned AOR after
consultation with higher authority.
(5) 202 troops are not allowed to operate outside their assigned
AOR.
(6) 175 troops are restricted from military actions that do not
threaten ISAF and could inflict collateral damage to the civilian
population.
Examples of other generic caveats include:
(1) Forces may not be used to destroy bridges, tunnels, dams, dikes
and infrastructure of specific significance to the region.
(2) Forces may not be used in a territory where there is a
possibility for the presence of nuclear, biological or chemical agents.
(3) Forces may not be used to conduct operations in religious
facilities, museums or cultural and/or archaeological heritage.
(4) Forces will not be used to conduct riot control operations.
(5) Forces will not be used to execute an order, the execution of
which represents a criminal act according to national legislation or
conflicts with international conventions on human rights protection or
the laws on armed conflict.
Voice. Yes, thanks.
The Chairman. I just need--I want to try--because we can do
another round; there's no problem in that. I just want to be
fair to everybody here, if we can.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
First, let me thank Deputy Secretary Lew and Ambassador
Eikenberry and General Petraeus for your service. You are
providing extraordinary talent to our Nation, and we thank you
very much.
General Petraeus, I want to concur in your assessment of
our military. The men and women who are serving under extremely
difficult circumstances are the best in the history of America,
and I appreciate the leadership. Just to give you one example,
I had a chance to talk to a Maryland serviceman who is in
Afghanistan, and he gave testimony to your assessments. It was
a wonderful opportunity to see the spirit and the commitment
and the difference that our servicepeople are making.
So, during the holiday time, particularly, we can never
express our appreciation enough. Sacrifices are tough any time
of the year, but during the holidays, they're even more
remarkable. I just really want to express that at this hearing.
It's amazing how many of our Senators have talked about the
Karzai government and corruption. And it has to do with all
three of the objectives. If we're going to be able to achieve
security in Afghanistan, if we're going to be able to have
governance in Afghanistan, if we're going to be able to have
economic progress in Afghanistan, it all depends upon having a
partner that can work with us. We've got to transition the
security, we've got to have a government in the country that
respects the rights of its people, and we have to deal with
economic development. If there are moneys being taken through
corruption, it's going to cost the American taxpayer and the
international community and Afghans themselves more than it
should.
So, Deputy Secretary Lew, I just really want to challenge a
statement you made. First you said, ``We're going to have a
policy against corruption, and we're going to hold the Afghan
Government accountable.'' How do you hold them accountable?
What do you do if you find corruption? Do you pull our soldiers
out? Do you cut off the money? How do you hold them
accountable?
Mr. Lew. Well, I think, as Secretary Clinton testified last
week, it's going to be a long-term challenge to end corruption
in Afghanistan, and we have to have realistic expectations. And
I think--when we talk about holding them accountable, it means
that we have to see where our money is going, and, if it's not
going to the right place, we move our money and put it through
other channels. It means we have to have our auditors come in
and--not after we're done, but while we're implementing the
program, be there, side by side, so we can catch things early.
It means that when the----
Senator Cardin. That may work for particular projects, and
I think that plan needs to be implemented. But, if you find
corruption at the highest levels that is not being dealt with,
how do you hold the government accountable?
Mr. Lew. I think that the conversations prior to the
inaugural, and the statements that were made and the actions
taken after President Karzai's inaugural, reflect the kind of
influence----
Senator Cardin. But, if there's backtracking, if it doesn't
work----
Mr. Lew. Well, I think we have to maintain the pressure.
You know, we clearly have an interest in Afghanistan that can't
be achieved if we don't--if progress is not made on this
corruption issue. The--you know, we've seen promising signs,
though there's more progress to be made.
Holding them accountable does not mean that, a year from
now or 5 years from now, there'll be zero corruption in
Afghanistan.
Senator Cardin. There's not zero corruption in any country.
Mr. Lew. Right.
Senator Cardin. But, we know that at the highest levels
there is major reason for concern, that's compromising our
ability to get our mission done. And I guess what concerns me
is that I agree with your statements. I just don't know how you
hold President Karzai and his top officials accountable if,
after all the efforts we make, we still find that there is
corruption encouraged at the highest levels.
Mr. Lew. To the extent that there are investigations--and,
ultimately, indictments--at the highest level, it will do a lot
to change----
Senator Cardin. But, if they don't happen.
Mr. Lew [continuing]. What has been a culture of impunity.
We have to work with them, and we have to make--``hold them
accountable'' means driving it toward having it happen, not
having it not happen.
Senator Cardin. General Petraeus, you, in response to
Senator Corker, talked about the objectives that we're trying
to achieve. I appreciate the way that you listed that. Then you
talked about having a matrix, as far as other countries' help.
Do we have a matrix? Do we have specific objectives,
benchmarks, whatever you want to call them, that we will be
using to determine where we are next summer, as to whether we
are prepared to withdraw, and how many soldiers are able to be
redeployed? Do we have specific expectations that are at least
well known between the Afghans and the Americans and our
allies?
General Petraeus. We don't have specifics, Senator, in
terms of, ``We want to do this number of troops by this time,''
or something like that. Again, the President was quite clear
that this is conditions-based, and so, as we get closer,
obviously----
Senator Cardin. Oh, I know that, but do we have----
General Petraeus [continuing]. To that time----
Senator Cardin [continuing]. Specifics as to what we're
trying to achieve, and what triggers the ability to reduce our
numbers.
General Petraeus. We have specifics in what we're trying to
achieve. We have an operational campaign plan, to give you
one--one measure will be the increase of security, something
that we'll track by district, not just by province. And there
is an operational campaign plan, and we can track that. And you
should ask, certainly General McChrystal--in the closed session
today, I think, would be a great opportunity to get a layout of
what it is--how he's thinking through the operational piece of
that.
Senator Cardin. Well, I'll tell----
General Petraeus. And the----
Senator Cardin [continuing]. General McChrystal that you
told him it's OK for him to give us the specifics.
General Petraeus. And tell him I--class--actually, I didn't
classmate him, because he's a couple of years behind me.
[Laughter.]
I buddied him.
He--then, also, of course, we will have specific goals for
the Afghan National Security Force growth over time. Again,
that is yet another metric.
And there are a number of other metrics that will enable us
to have a sense as to whether we can transition as we approach
that time. And again, these will be somewhat similar to the
kinds of analysis that we did in Iraq, where you look at a host
of different factors in a district's area, including local
governance, including the economic situation, political
situation, in addition to the security situation, because
they're all, of course, related. As you know, you're either
spiraling upward or you're spiraling downward. And the spiral
is not just all security factors, it's also local markets
coming back to life; it might be the traditional less-extreme
tribal leader returns and is more solidified, and that kind of
thing.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
And I make this comment--any one of the three of you can
comment on it, but I've been rather hoping, after the President
thought about this for some time, that we would have a clearer
picture than what we have. And with all due respect, I'm just
not getting a clear picture. I listened to the President very
carefully, and he told us we were going to start leaving in
July 2011. Then I asked Gates about it the next day, and he
said it was a target. I don't know where we are. You know, are
we in or are we out? And then they talk about reviewing at this
time or another time.
Then, the thing that really bothered me was, I listened to
Karzai yesterday, and he was standing alongside Gates, and he
starts talking about 15 years. Now, I don't know whether he
wasn't listening to the President, or what. The President said,
``Well, we're not going to give an open-ended commitment
there.'' Well, probably, to Karzai, 15 years isn't an open-
ended commitment, but, I've got to tell you, to the people of
the United States, 15 years is an open-ended commitment. I
don't know whose job it is to sit down with him and look him in
the eye and say, ``Look, you're dreaming, this is not going to
happen,'' but we just need a lot more clarity than what we're
getting. And I don't--I have every confidence that our United
States military, if given a mission, they will go in, they will
accomplish that mission, but our--unfortunately, it seems like,
always, the military mission gets mixed with what our overall
goals are there. And I'm just not happy about what's come out
of the last--about what's come out of the last week. And I was
sincerely hoping that we would get there.
So, have at it, whoever wants to comment on it.
Mr. Lew. Why don't I start, Senator, and--just to talk
about the difference between, you know, July 2011 and the
nature of our long-term commitment to Afghanistan.
The President did not say that, in July 2011, our
relationship with Afghanistan would end; it would be the
beginning of Afghanistan taking over areas, it would give the
military--our military the ability to begin to drawdown.
I think that all of us see a long-term relationship with
Afghanistan, particularly on the civilian side, that's going to
have to go on for many years. The questions that have been
raised about the magnitude of the commitments, those are very
serious questions. We take them very seriously. We're not in
this alone; it's an international effort, where we have to work
with international partners to take this responsibility, not
just on the United States.
I think that the signal that we're sending is very clear,
that the buildup of troops is headed toward a crescendo and
then will start to come down. There will be other parts--if you
look at Iraq, we're building up certain civilian capacities in
Iraq right now, as our military withdraws. You know, so we're
taking over certain responsibilities. I think we have to look
at the different parts of it separately, and they're not--they
shouldn't be a source of confusion. It's progress when the
military is able to leave and civilian programs can step in and
have a more normal relationship.
Senator Risch. Well, I couldn't agree with you more. The
difficulty is, I really question whether you're going to have
the same security situation in Afghanistan that you have in
Iraq right now, looking forward to July 2011. I hope I'm wrong.
Mr. Lew. Well----
Senator Risch. But, in addition to that, the financial
commitment to stand up their army and police, particularly over
the period of time that Karzai's talking about it, I don't
think the American people are going to accept that.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, if I could just augment
what Secretary Lew had said, our goal is--we all agree, is on,
as rapidly as possible, have an Afghan Government that can
provide for their security of their own people and deny
sanctuary for al-Qaeda. The July 2011 date is very important in
one regard. The Afghan people, they're a very insecure people,
given their history, given the neighborhood that they live in.
But, at the same time, 8 years after our arrival, there's a
growing sense among the Afghans, they want to take charge, they
want to take control of their sovereignty. There is a desire
among the Afghans to lead with security, to develop their
police and their army. President Karzai, in his inaugural
address, was very clear when he said a goal--5 years from now,
he wants Afghanistan security forces to be in charge throughout
the country. That's a good goal, that we should be reinforcing.
This July 2011 date is, in a sense, a good forcing function
for the Afghans, now in partnership with us, to stand up and
accelerate the development of their army and police so, at that
point in time, they're ready to transition, start taking lead
for security in certain parts of the country.
The final point I'd make here, Senator, longer term--What
does this all mean? And we saw President Karzai's remark.
What--we don't know how long and what type of security
assistance program we're going to need in Afghanistan. We know
it's going to have to be a long-term program; we don't know the
level. As time moves on, we'll have a better understanding of
what is their exact requirements. But, what we also know, as
well, is that, for every one U.S. Army soldier or marine that's
deployed to Afghanistan right now, the cost ratio of that
versus Afghan police and army on the ground, it must be on the
order of 20, 30, or 40 to 1, so a pretty good investment.
Senator Risch. But, again, I come back to--the President
talked about July 2011. Karzai's talking about 5 years before
they're ready to take it over. Who's going to take it over
between July 2011 and the 5 years that President Karzai's
talking about?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Well, I don't want to--I think
President Karzai's inaugural address had said ``security
throughout the country,'' a very comprehensive control of the
security throughout their country----
The Chairman. General Petraeus----
Ambassador Eikenberry [continuing]. The army, police----
The Chairman [continuing]. You wanted to add to that, I
think.
General Petraeus. Well, I was really going to state the
same thing, Senator, again, that what's envisioned in July 2011
is the beginning of transition. What President Karzai is
talking about is something that's much more comprehensive.
And if I could also just say, Senator, again, I hope that
you'll be able to attend the session with General McChrystal
this afternoon, because I think you'll----
Senator Risch. I intend to.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Get some--out of that some
clarity. We know what the operational campaign plan is, and we
also know what the plan is to work with our civilian partners,
from Ambassador Eikenberry's Embassy, in carrying that out.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you first, General Petraeus, for your
extraordinary service and sacrifice. And I know you must be a
proud father, as well as of your son's commission. We're
grateful to know about that.
And, Secretary Lew, we appreciate your service and your
availability. I know we tend to call a lot from over here.
We're grateful for that.
And, Ambassador Eikenberry, I want to thank you for your
service and also the way you make time for us when we travel to
Afghanistan. You work us pretty hard when we're there, as well,
so I want people to know that.
I was going to ask a series of questions about President
Karzai and governance, because we try to think about this
challenge in three ways: security, governance, and development.
And I know that's helpful to us, to keep our focus on three
major challenges to get this strategy, and implement it
correctly. But, I'll leave that for another day and will submit
questions about concerns I have about the way he's conducted
himself.
And we talked about this when I was in Afghanistan in
August.
But, I wanted to focus on two areas. One is the buildup of
the Afghan police and the local tribal militias.
In particular, with regard to the police--and I know this
may be a question for one of you, or all three of you--but in
Washington, numbers get attached to issues, and we keep hearing
over and over again--and now I doubt the accuracy of this
number; that's why I bring it up--92,000 Afghan police as a
number--and General McChrystal, hopefully, can get that to
160,000--that we have been hearing a lot about lately. We are
hearing that the 92 being way, way off, in terms of the police
that are ready to train now. By one estimate, only 24,000 have
completed formal training, and the attrition rate is 25
percent. If either of those statements are true, it creates all
kinds of challenges and big problems.
General, I'd ask you or Ambassador Eikenberry, what can you
tell us about the accuracy of those numbers, No. 1. And, No. 2,
what's the plan--and I guess if General McChrystal has a--or,
if General Petraeus has a couple of moments, if he can tell us
anything that we learned in Iraq about training police or law
enforcement in Iraq that can be applied here, or not. Maybe
it's a different challenge.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Yes, just, Senator, two points, and
then I'll turn to General Petraeus. I know that General
McChrystal will have clarity on those numbers when he talks to
you this afternoon. But, attrition is a problem with the
police. There are problems of discipline with the police. We
don't want to understate the challenges that we have ahead of
us right now.
Against that, though, General McChrystal does have a very
aggressive program for partnering with the police. One of the
keys we've seen with the police, as we've seen with the army,
wherever you provide good mentors or partners on the ground,
good things start to happen. But, they have to sustain that
presence. It doesn't happen over a 24-hour period. And I have a
lot of confidence in the plan that he's laid out, where he's
going to, wherever possible, expand out the amount of partners
that we've got out there with the police forces. We'll
certainly welcome a lot of help from our NATO allies to expand
that kind of capability.
General Petraeus. Senator, I agree with everything that
Ambassador said. Beyond that, we're actually conducting a 100-
percent personnel asset inventory, and getting biometric data
and everything. We're trying to nail this down so that we can
tell you, tell ourselves, tell our Afghan partners, what ground
truth really is.
Beyond that, Central Command also, at General McChrystal's
request, hired a team from RAND to look at, in fact, the
overall effort of Afghan security forces, and hired some
individuals that have had some very good experience in this.
Speaking of that, I mean, the lessons--a couple of lessons
from Iraq. One is--and I don't want to, you know, sound sort of
flippant here, but it's a lot easier when you're winning than
when you're losing. The fact is, in Iraq, that, during that
escalation of sectarian violence that took place in 2006,
particularly after the bombing of the Askari Shrine in Samarra,
there were whole units that were hijacked by sectarian
militias, for example, because the situation got so bad--and,
in fact, the police are the most vulnerable, and so we have to
be very careful--another lesson is that you have to get the
organizational construct right; you cannot train police and put
them into an area that is an active area with the insurgency,
and expect them to survive, because they're--not only are they
vulnerable, but their families are vulnerable, they live in the
neighborhood, their kids have to go to school--get kidnapped,
and all the rest of that. So, we have to get that construct
right, actually, intellectually. And then, beyond that, the
partnering piece really is hugely important.
So, if you can get the construct right, get the right
forces in--and that may mean that you end up using more--in
Afghanistan, they're called the Civil Order Police, which are
actual units, as a--they're really a paramilitary force, rather
than just a local police force, but that's a much more
appropriate construct for real conflict zones than are local
police. At some point, you have to bring in the army. In Iraq,
we had areas where there were no security forces left at all,
and we literally had to bring in our forces and then Iraqi army
forces, then to get back to the point that you could get to
local police going again.
Senator Casey. I'll either ask in the next round or submit
for the record on the local travel militias. We'll get to that.
Thank you.
General Petraeus. It's a very important element of this, by
the way. And, first of all, making sure the warlords don't come
back, as this--we don't enable warlords, but do enable and
empower, actually, local security forces in what's called the
Community Defense Initiative. We won't have something akin to
the Anbar Awakening of all of--you know, tribal linking as this
reaches critical mass and takes off in rejecting, in this case,
the Taliban, but what we can do is help--it's a village-by-
village, valley-by-valley effort, and we are using some of our
best Special Forces teams--right now really to experiment with
this, but we think it is something that has good potential.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, to each of you, for your commitment and for
being here today.
Thank you, Ambassador Eikenberry, for your hospitality when
I visited Afghanistan with a number of other Senators, and--you
were very new there; we appreciated very much your hospitality
and your direction.
A lot of the discussion this morning has focused on what's
happening on the governance and development side, as well as
what's happening with security. There has been discussion about
a civilian coordinator for Afghanistan, a civilian counterpart
to General McChrystal. Can you give us your assessment of how
important you think that position and person might be, and then
where we are in the attempt to find someone to fill that
position?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Well, coordination, Senator, at
the--international coordination at the United Nations level,
that's essential to our success, and, as well, within NATO/
ISAF. Within that command, the civil-military coordination
aspects are also fundamental, in terms of just trying to
rationalize our developmental assistance and ensure that we're
making the most of our resources.
Some ideas have been now developed, both for UNAMA, trying
to improve the efficiency there, and within NATO/ISAF itself.
And those are being looked at.
Senator Shaheen. Given the urgency of that position, do you
have any sense of what the timeline will be for having somebody
in that role?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I know that Secretary Clinton, at
the recent Foreign Ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in
Brussels, she discussed this with her fellow Foreign Ministers,
and I believe it's going to be on their agenda for the month of
January.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Lew, can you give us any more insight
on that?
Mr. Lew. I would just make two points. First, there is some
natural turnover at UNAMA, and it's part of the discussion
there, as well, in terms of choosing a new head of the U.N.
mission. And a point that Secretary Clinton made last week
which is important to remember is that, while ISAF is a very
useful and critical coordinating mechanism at the military
level, at the civilian level we have many non-NATO countries
that are making significant contributions, and we have to make
sure that, in getting civilian coordination, we don't
coordinate out some major partners. So, just a little bit more
complicated, and that's the kinds of conversations that are
going on right now.
Senator Shaheen. Certainly recognizing the sensitivity of
that person, and who might fill it, I would urge, given what
everyone is testified to about the importance of the civilian
efforts, that we move as fast as possible in that direction.
General Petraeus, I want to follow up a little bit on
Senator Casey's questions about what's happening with the local
militia and efforts at reconciliation with some of the Taliban.
I think I understood you to say that some of those
discussions have begun and--or negotiations, I guess is a
better way to put it. I think that's the first time I've heard
that from anyone. And so, I just wanted to clarify that that is
what you said. And how do you envision that, going forward?
Who's going to do those negotiations? What--if you could
explain that a little more.
General Petraeus. There's--I was actually talking more
about the Community Defense Initiative, which is----
Senator Shaheen. Ah, OK.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Again, a local--but I'd be
happy to talk about reintegration----
Senator Shaheen. Please.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Because it's used--and the
term is ``reintegration of''----
Senator Shaheen. OK.
General Petraeus [continuing]. ``Reconcilables'' in
Afghanistan, as----
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Petraeus [continuing]. General McChrystal and
others remind me all the time.
But, recognizing that, again, you can't kill or capture
every bad guy out there, you need to take as many of them as
you can, as we did in Iraq, and take them from either actively
or tacitly supporting the insurgency and, in our view right
now, at low and mid-level, try to break them away. And that
involves, again, isolating them, securing them from the
irreconcilables, separating the irreconcilables who, make no
mistake about it, do have to be----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Killed, captured, or run
out--and then, helping to reestablish local structures, many of
them tribally based--the Maliks, the tribal elders, local
imams, and so forth.
And there is an element that has now been formed--in fact,
it--the--one of the individuals helping General McChrystal to
do this is an individual that General McChrystal and I knew
very, very well from Iraq. He helped us do the reconciliation
piece there. He was my deputy, the first British deputy that I
had as a Multinational Force Iraq commander, General (Retired)
Sir Graham Lamb. He is a special adviser to General McChrystal.
They have now established an organization called the Force
Reintegration Cell. It has a two-star British officer. There's
some diplomatic component to it now, as we had in Iraq. We
still haven't fleshed it out as fully as we need to; that is
ongoing, as is the development of the kind of robust
intelligence element that we learned in Iraq you have to have
dedicated on nothing but figuring out, again--because this is a
pretty big question, you know, Is this individual----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Reconcilable or not? And if
not, again, they have to be killed, captured, or run off. But,
if they can be, then, of course, you can make them part of the
solution instead of part of the problem.
And then there have to be certain incentives. And there
are--you all gave us the authority, with CERP, to use some of
that for reintegration purposes. Obviously, we can also do
local projects. NAID is tied into this again, as well, and
especially now, as we have more closely knit the civilian
components together with the military.
Just one quick note, for example, an AI---great AID
official, named Dawn Liberi, is literally the equivalent of the
division commander of the great 82d Airborne Division, Regional
Command East, and they are partners. And we've tried to
establish what is not necessarily a civilian chain of command,
if you will, but there's at least a--What do you call it?--it's
a line, anyway, of civilians.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Oh, the ``unity of civilian
effort.''
General Petraeus. That's it. And that helps to achieve
unity of overall effort. So--but, that's the effort in the
reintegration arena. And then, separate from that is this
Community Defense Initiative, where we're putting small Special
Forces units literally in the villages, and then helping to
develop conditions that enable the local individuals to defend
themselves and be linked to a district of subdistrict quick-
reaction force, and then on up the line.
The Chairman. Senator----
Senator Shaheen. Thank you----
The Chairman [continuing]. Kaufman.
Senator Shaheen [continuing]. Very much.
The Chairman. Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo everybody else's comments about thanking you
for your service. And I've been to Iraq and Afghanistan twice
this year, and I am totally inarticulate to express the
courage, the intelligence, and the motivation of the troops
over there. I wish everybody in America could have an
opportunity--I really mean this--I wish everybody in America
could go over there and drop in randomly anywhere in Iraq,
Afghanistan. They would be so proud of our forces over there.
And I also think that--we had Petraeus and Crocker in Iraq,
we're going to have Eikenberry and McChrystal in Afghanistan,
and I think you can fill those big shoes.
Mr. Ambassador, can you talk about what's happened--how the
18-month deadline has helped motivate the Afghan Government,
both on the area of training troops and also in dealing with
corruption?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Yes. Let me speak on the first one,
Senator.
We know that, after the announcement that President Obama
made about the importance of July 2011, that the Ministry of
the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, with us, together, sat
down and rolled up their sleeves and said, ``OK, what does this
mean? How can we get behind this?'' So, I think it will have a
very good galvanizing effect, but that will be in full
partnership and with support of us.
And I know that Secretary Gates had very positive talks
with President Karzai, just yesterday in Kabul. This was one of
the items of discussion, President Karzai showing his
commitment, as he has publicly, for this date, and getting
behind his role as Commander in Chief, which will be important,
his support for this being, of course, important in the
development of the army and the police forces.
Our efforts that we have against trying to improve
government accountability, these are long-going efforts,
Senator, as we talked about when you visited me in Kabul.
President Karzai's inaugural address, as I said earlier, we
found helpful, we found encouraging. We do have programs that
have been underway for several years.
I'll give you one example of the progress that we're making
in this area. They have something called the Major Crimes Task
Force of Afghanistan, just announced several months ago, but a
lot of preliminary work had been put into it. This is going to
be, hopefully the Afghan FBI. And we have 10 FBI agents on the
ground right now, DEA agents on the ground. We have military
partners with us. We have the British working this element. I
could go on. We've got a lot of different initiatives that are
out there. They aren't seen right now, they're not visible. We
tend to spend all of our time talking about one individual or
one particular case, but, at the end of the day, it's the
spadework that's going out there steadily, training of civil
servants, training of law enforcement agencies, things as
simple as trying to improve procedures.
The Minister of Finance recently told Secretary Clinton at
a dinner, very proudly, that he had overseen an effort in Kabul
to reduce the steps required to get a license for a car from 54
steps in 1 month to three steps in a couple of hours. That's
not a headline story in the New York Times, but that probably
has more to--that will give us bigger results in a fight
against corruption than one middle-level criminal put behind
bars.
So, just steady work.
Senator Kaufman. General Petraeus, just help me through
this. We've talked in the past, and Secretary Gates, when he
was here, talked about how the Taliban reconstituted themselves
in ungoverned areas. In the strategy we're talking about, we're
going to be mainly in the populous areas, leaving large swaths
of Afghanistan without any real involvement. What----
General Petraeus. But----
Senator Kaufman. Do we have a----
General Petraeus. But, the difference is that, of course--
--
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
General Petraeus [continuing]. In Afghanistan, we can go
into those areas. We----
Senator Kaufman. No, no, I understand. So, is the----
General Petraeus. We can't keep them disrupted. And, in
fact, the Taliban really reconstituted as much in remote areas
of Pakistan as they did actually in Afghanistan. There was a
great article, by the way, in Newsweek, I think about a month
about, cover story, that talked about how the Taliban came
back. And I commend that to you, if your folks haven't shown it
to you.
Senator Kaufman. So, the idea would be, concentrate on the
populated areas, but having forces available to go into the
less populated areas to dismantle and----
General Petraeus. That's correct, sir. In fact, we actually
will be increasing our counterterrorist component of the
overall strategy, as well. And General McChrystal may want to
talk to you a little bit about that during the closed session,
as well.
But, there's no question, you've got to--again, you've got
to kill or capture those bad guys that are not reconcilable,
and we are intending to do that, and we will have additional
national mission force elements to do that when the spring
rolls around.
Senator Kaufman. I ask you and Ambassador Eikenberry, have
you guys thought about a Strategic Forces Agreement with
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry. We have an agreement, which covers
the status of our forces, not formally, called the Status of
Forces Agreement. And, at this time, Senator, we're comfortable
with the arrangements that we have.
Senator Kaufman. Secretary Lew, 388 civilians outside of
Kabul by the end of the year. I know you talk about a 10 to 1
ratio, but is that enough, considering the number of forces--
military forces we have, to really implement a COIN strategy?
Mr. Lew. The people--the civilians that are out there are
being deployed in a civilian-military plan where--if you look
at the map, there's two dots at each spot; there's a military
assignment and there's a civilian assignment. The numbers are
very different. You put one agricultural specialist in a town
surrounded by the appropriate Afghan, you know, support, that's
a program. You don't need a battalion of U.S. agricultural
experts in a town.
I think that, with the increased coverage that we will get
with the additional troops, there will likely be an increase in
the number of civilians that we need. That's why we're
referring to--the number is likely to go up in the order of 20
to 30 percent.
The goal is to fully resource the civilian requirement so
that, as we go through the civ-mil plan, we have the right
number of civilians.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, if I could add to that,
just quickly, to give you orders of magnitude, right now in
part of southern Afghanistan we have five U.S. agricultural
experts. They, in turn, are creating a network of some 500
Afghans, who, in turn, are administering an agricultural
program that, over time, will reach out to tens of thousands of
farmers. So, it's not necessarily how many, it's how are they
employed? What effects are they getting? But, as Secretary Lew
said, I'm certain that, over the next several months, as we
work with General McChrystal and better analyze the
implications of his campaign, that we will have to come back
with a request for additional U.S. civilians to be deployed.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.
We thank all of you. We're going to leave the record open
for--just until the end of the week, in case there are some
additional questions.
Senator Wicker did have that last-minute question. Do you
want to put that on the record now, just so we can honor his
question and--do you recall it? I thought I saw you writing
notes at the time.
Voice. Was it on militias?
General Petraeus. The question on the militias?
Voice. Yes.
General Petraeus. And--I'm not sure if it was the national
caveats or the militias, actually.
Ambassador Eikenberry. I thought he had one question----
General Petraeus. I thought I actually answered that one
right before he----
The Chairman. Yes.
General Petraeus. I thought I answered that when I----
The Chairman. We're fine. We're fine.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And, Senator Kaufman asked the last question.
I wanted to ask you, Secretary Lew--needless to say, we
scratched the surface of a lot of these questions, and there
are a lot remain outstanding. We look forward to meeting with
General McChrystal, and we'll have a chance to be able to
follow up on the military side, so I appreciate that.
And I know, Secretary Lew, you're always available to us,
so we appreciate it.
Yes, Ambassador.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Chairman, I wonder if I could also
say one--make one other point, here, if we're getting ready to
close out.
The Chairman. Please, yes.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Earlier in the hearing, you said
there were concerns raised about bureaucracy within the
Embassy. And I'd be the first to say that we operate in an
environment right now with our challenges on the ground, with
the Government of Afghanistan, our allies, the friction of
bureaucracy that goes with working with our own headquarters.
We have a surfeit of bureaucracy.
I would say, though, within the Embassy, that we don't
create additional impediments out there, in terms of
bureaucracy. I'd highlight that, over the last 12 months, our
Embassy strength has increased threefold, sixfold out in the
field. During the months of August and September, we had a 100-
percent turnover of our Embassy personnel. As General Petraeus
has said, we have reorganized, not only ourselves out in the
field, but we had a significant reorganization within the
Embassy, which brings the interagency teams together
efficiently and works with our partners in the military in a
very comprehensive, indeed unprecedented, way.
I want to emphasize, Chairman, that the leadership that
we've got in the United States Embassy, starting with the--
starting with my deputy, it's an absolutely superb leadership,
the very best in the world. It goes down to sections, down to
the last staff person. So, if there are concerns about
bureaucracy, I'd welcome the opportunity, of course offline, to
talk to anybody that has those concerns.
The Chairman. Well, that's fair. And I'm sure--there, I
think, are some concerns, but I think it's an important thing
to work through.
The key here, needless to say, is going to be the ability
of these folks out in the hinterland to do their jobs, and
that's going to depend on the local security, local leadership,
politically partnering, so to speak. It's a tall task, which,
again, I repeat, will be so positively impacted by getting
something going in the western part of Pakistan. That'll make
the job so much easier.
So, that said, we are very, very grateful to you. Thank
you, again, each of you, for your service, which is exemplary.
And we look forward to seeing you along the trail here.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted by
Senator John F. Kerry
Question. While the President committed an additional 30,000 troops
to Afghanistan, his West Point speech noticeably did not mention the
word ``counterinsurgency'' once. The closest the speech came to
mentioning COIN was a statement that additional troops will ``target
the insurgency and secure key population centers,'' although the brief
timeframe of the surge stands in direct contrast to standard COIN
doctrine which deploys troops for years, not months. While the
administration appears to have backtracked away from a COIN approach,
General McChrystal is still describing the strategy in those terms.
Are we still pursuing a COIN strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. The situation in Afghanistan is complex and requires a
comprehensive strategy. A COIN strategy is an element of our strategy
in Afghanistan, but since the population is the key objective, more
than COIN is required. This comprehensive strategy includes protecting
the population from insurgents while expanding government services
throughout the country, building infrastructure that aids the
Afghanistan population, and expanding and training the Afghanistan
National Security Force and Afghanistan National Police.
Question. The key question isn't the number of troops, it's how
they're used: It's one thing to reinforce our current forces in order
to fulfill promises we've already made--but it's quite another thing to
escalate the conflict by making new commitments that will require years
of followthrough. Shortly after returning from Kabul in October, I
suggested that any deployment of troops to clear an area we don't
currently control should be premised on three conditions that we have a
sufficient number of reliable ANSF, we can partner with local leaders,
and the civilian side can move in to build.
Will we proceed with a geographic expansion of our footprint
before such conditions are met? Where will the new troops be
deployed? What will their mission be?
Answer. U.S. and coalition forces continue to pursue a clear, hold,
build, and transfer strategy in Afghanistan. As forces become available
in theatre, we will expand our geographic footprint while
simultaneously partnering with Afghanistan National Security Force
units, local leaders, and the civilian population. In order to build,
we must be able to provide security for the population and to the
forces conducting the build. New troops will be deployed to all areas
of Afghanistan in accordance with this strategy. Their mission will be
to protect the population from insurgents, partner with Afghan units,
and conduct counterinsurgency operations.
Question. Last week, Secretary Gates said the administration would
evaluate conditions in December 2010 in deciding how to drawdown troops
starting in July 2011.
What benchmarks will the administration use to evaluate the
success of the strategy? How will we know the tide has turned?
Answer. In December 2010, success will be judged, in part, on
demonstrating progress in: (1) expanding security to 30-36 percent of
the population in key areas through effective COIN operations; (2)
building an increasingly capable and self-sufficient ANSF, on track to
a total strength of approximately 305K by 31 October 2011 with a
majority of fielded forces capable of planning and executing
independent or partnered operations; and (3) instituting Afghan
Government capacity to provide for basic services, rule of law, and
economic opportunity to an expanding percent of the population in key
areas. Key indicators that will inform when the ``tide has turned'' are
the decrease in violence, kinetic activity and number of civilian
casualties. Correspondingly, we will see an increase in the number of
districts with favorably rated governance, development, and security
conditions outnumbering those rated poorly; the ANSF will have a
permanent and effective presence in the designated key areas and major
population centers; effective and enduring government control and
services will be established in key areas and major population centers;
and the majority of Afghan people will recognize GIRoA as a culturally
and ideological acceptable government.
Question. Our efforts to train the Afghan National Security Forces
over the past 8 years have had mixed results at best. About a third of
the army battalions are judged capable of operating independently and
the figure is far lower for the police.
Given the very real challenges of training the Afghans, and
some of the structural weaknesses in their command structures,
can you please outline the concrete steps that will be taken to
stand up credible Afghan forces over the next 18 months?
What is a realistic goal for how many Afghan soldiers we can
train in a year? What are the barriers to reaching those goals?
How many Afghan brigades are now capable of operating on their
own and taking control of a real fight? The police lag far
behind in training. Is it realistic to include them in the
equation?
Answer. For Afghan National Army, the capacity to train and mentor
soldiers has been expanded to increase the force to 134K soldiers for
October 2010 and 171.6K soldiers for October 2011. We are less than
40,000 from the goal for 2010. We currently have the training capacity
to train 73K soldiers annually in basic warrior training skills. We are
making some progress in holding the Afghan leadership accountable.
Coalition units are partnering and mentoring with their ANSF
counterparts to ensure continuous training. Afghan soldiers are
participating in missions with coalition forces all over Afghanistan.
There are currently 29 Afghan National Army Battalions capable of
conducting operations on their own. There has been significant progress
in assisting the Afghans developing personnel management systems and
they have begun moving toward merit-based selections and promotions.
This is evidenced by the first central selection board for senior
noncommissioned officers. To reach the Army goals, we need to work on
getting the right leaders in the right place; filling the requirements
for Afghan trainers; moving both the personnel and logistic system
forward. Finally, the Afghans must continue to make recruiting numbers,
during the spring and summer time periods, which have historically been
a difficult recruiting period.
For Afghan National Police, the capacity to train and mentor police
is being expanded to increase the force to 109K police for October 2010
and 134K police for October 2011. The Minister of Interior and NTM-A/
CSTC-A are working now to create two very important units: the Afghan
National Police Training Command and the Afghan National Police
Recruiting Command. These two organizations will directly increase the
training level of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The Police Training
sites have capacity to train 28,700 students in 2010. Only the Afghan
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is task organized in Brigades. All
four ANCOP Brigades are fully trained and fielded. The Afghan Uniformed
Police (AUP) is organized into Districts and in some cases Precincts.
The ANP is fully engaged in fighting the insurgency. Current operations
involving coalition forces could not happen without ANP support. NTM-A/
CSTC-A fully includes the ANP as a critical force in planning the
future development and growth of the Afghan National Security Forces.
______
Responses of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator John Kerry
Question. A key feature that enabled the success of the ``surge''
in Iraq was near-seamless civil-military cooperation under Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus. Their unusually close personal
collaboration was backed by a joint civil-military campaign plan that
enumerated the roles and responsibilities of the military and civilian
efforts there. In Afghanistan, 8 years into the war effort, civilian
efforts to improve governance and stimulate the Afghan economy are not
fully coordinated or resourced.
Does the administration support an international civilian
coordinator for Afghanistan? Why or why not?
Does the United Nations in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have the
capacity and credibility to exercise sufficient leadership over
international donors?
In November, the United Nations temporarily relocated about
600 of its 1,100 international staff for security reasons. How
is this affecting our civilian operations?
Answer. To date, UNAMA has suffered from insufficient staff and
resources, which have prevented it from fulfilling its mandate as the
international lead for civilian assistance coordination. There is broad
consensus in the international community on the need to improve
civilian assistance coordination. This requires strengthening UNAMA's
ability to perform this task. To that end, the administration supports
UNAMA continuing in its international civilian assistance coordination
role, with a clear mandate and a strong Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG). We intend to support the request from the
SRSG that the international community supply his office with experts in
priority areas to help ensure the SRSG has a secretariat capable of
following up on coordination efforts. By strengthening UNAMA centrally
and in the provinces, coordination of civilian assistance should
improve at the national and subnational levels, between the
international donors, and between the donors and the Afghan Government.
UNAMA's ability to fulfill its mandate will be determined in part
by the security situation in Afghanistan. We support ongoing efforts by
the U.N. to improve the security of UNAMA personnel in the wake of the
October 2009 guesthouse attack. We also support an expanded UNAMA
presence in the provinces. Eight regional and 12 provincial UNAMA
offices are currently operational, and three additional provincial
offices are expected to open soon. We understand that UNAMA is
considering adding new civilian positions in the near future--many of
them in the provinces. This will greatly enhance UNAMA's ability to
observe and coordinate civilian assistance in the field.
We continue to work closely with UNAMA officials. Our civilian
assistance efforts have been largely unaffected by the U.N.'s decision
to temporarily relocate UNAMA personnel.
Question. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned in
congressional testimony on March 10, 2009, that growing challenges to
Central Asia's stability ultimately ``could threaten the security of
critical U.S. and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan through
Central Asia.'' He stated that the ``highly personalized politics, weak
institutions, and growing inequalities'' in the Central Asian countries
make them ``ill-equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic
violent extremism, poor economic development, and problems associated
with energy, water, and food distribution.''
Please describe the level of coordination and cooperation between
Embassy Kabul and our U.S. Embassies in Central Asia. Who in Embassy
Kabul is responsible for coordination with our Central Asian Embassies
on Afghanistan policy? What are Embassy Kabul's biggest priorities in
northern Afghanistan, and how does the Embassy view cooperation from
the Central Asian states?
Answer. Cooperation and coordination between our Embassies in the
region happens routinely, at working and senior levels. The contacts
facilitate cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors on
security issues, political dialogue, and economic cooperation. Inter-
Embassy coordination and cooperation occurs primarily between our
Political and Economic Sections, and INL; in addition, our Political-
Military Sections maintain close contact.
In northern Afghanistan, we are focused on working with the
Government of Afghanistan and other partners to improve security,
foster national unity, and expand economic opportunities, especially in
agriculture and related activities. The opening in 2010 of the new U.S.
Consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif sends a powerful signal of our enduring
commitment to Afghanistan. Officers working out of our consulate will
facilitate coordination of a comprehensive approach to the North and
drive resources to key areas, conduct outreach, and partner with Afghan
ministries.
We are grateful to all the Central Asian states for contributing to
coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Their significant assistance ranges
from supplying much-needed electricity to Kabul, to providing food and
medicine, to building schools and hospitals. We also rely on all our
Central Asian partners to move coalition military supplies through the
region into Afghanistan. There is great potential for the expansion of
the existing Northern Distribution Network to improve transportation
infrastructure and stimulate trade routes connecting Central to South
Asia, which will have a lasting, beneficial economic impact for the
region. This will also reduce our reliance on the more risky Pakistani
ground line of communication where convoys are attacked by militants.
______
Responses of Deputy Secretary James Lew to Questions Submitted by
Senator John F. Kerry
Question. Success in Afghanistan depends largely on what happens in
Pakistan, particularly in the west. At West Point, the President said,
``In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan
narrowly. Those days are over.'' Presumably, he was referring to a
transactional relationship dominated by military aid: for that reason,
Congress has authorized $7.5 billion in nonmilitary aid over the next 5
years. During her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on December 3, 2009, Secretary Clinton said the
administration fully supported S. 1707, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill on
Pakistan and would seek full funding.
Please explain why the administration requested less than
$1.5 billion for FY 2010 for civilian assistance for Pakistan
as authorized by S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act. Why did the administration not seek a budget
amendment increasing its FY 2010 request for civilian
assistance for Pakistan to levels set forth in S. 1707? Will
the administration seek further funding for civilian assistance
for Pakistan--excluding Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) in a
supplemental bill, and if so, how much?
How will the administration leverage the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
bill to build greater trust with Pakistanis, especially if
funding levels for civilian assistance (excluding security
assistance) are lower than the authorized levels of $1.5
billion per fiscal year?
Answer. The President's request for foreign assistance in the FY
2010 budget included $1.3 billion for nonmilitary assistance to
Pakistan, of which Congress appropriated $1.2 billion. With available
funds from FY 2009 and the FY 2010 appropriation, we are on the path
toward funding our foreign assistance programs in Pakistan at Kerry-
Lugar-Berman levels. We will continue a conversation within the
administration and with Congress concerning FY 2010 funding as we work
closely with the Government of Pakistan to expand existing programs,
work more closely with Pakistani partners to implement programs, help
the government provide basic services to the Pakistani people,
particularly in vulnerable areas, and identify high impact, high
visibility projects.
As outlined in the December 14 report to Congress on the
administration's strategy for civilian assistance to Pakistan, U.S.
assistance will be used to establish greater trust with Pakistan in
several ways.
First, U.S. assistance will fund investments in Pakistan's
economic infrastructure, particularly in energy and
agriculture, to reinforce Pakistan's efforts to address chronic
energy and water shortfalls, improve the daily lives of the
Pakistani people, and increase opportunities for economic
growth. These high impact, high visibility programs will be
tied to a strong communications strategy to demonstrate to the
Pakistani people that the United States has a long-term
commitment to help bring stability and prosperity to Pakistan.
Second, U.S. assistance will continue to help the Government
of Pakistan improve services to poor and vulnerable
communities, which extremists often target for recruitment and
to build popular support for their causes. This effort will
help achieve U.S. and Pakistani mutual interests of building
Pakistani stability by increasing access to health, education,
infrastructure and rule of law for Pakistanis, and building the
Pakistani people's trust in their government.
Third, the United States, together with other donors, will
invest more heavily in technical assistance to the Pakistani
executive, legislative, and judicial branches to strengthen the
Pakistani Government's capacity to achieve economic and
political reforms that will bolster Pakistan's future
stability.
Finally, by providing more U.S. assistance through
accountable Pakistani institutions at the national, provincial,
and local levels to implement Pakistani-identified priority
programs, U.S. assistance will enhance Pakistanis' stake in the
long-term sustainability of programs funded by international
assistance. Through this effort, the United States, and other
donors will help Pakistan develop accountable and transparent
resource management structures that will lead to greater trust
between Pakistan and the United States.
Question. Since 2001, the United States has spent over $20 billion
dollars on development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Today, only
a fraction of that money--roughly 10 percent--goes directly to the
Afghan Government, even though we have identified some competent line
ministries and decent governors at the federal and provincial levels.
While corruption and limited capacity within the Afghan Government are
huge problems, the international community is hardly free of blame.
Many Afghans see Western consultants drawing hefty salaries and riding
around in SUVs, and they draw the conclusion that too much of the
development aid is geared toward the development industry itself.
By directly funding capable Afghan ministries or governors (in
those cases where they can be found), we could help build the basic
capacity of the government to function and thereby empower it. We could
also create powerful incentives for competent Afghans to work with us
because they can see the rewards.
Do we have a specific, concrete plan to transfer a larger
percentage of U.S. funding to the capable Afghan Government
entities as a way to better leverage U.S. assistance, build the
basic capacity of the government, and create incentives to
partner with us?
Answer. We are committed to transferring a larger percentage of
assistance and responsibility to capable Afghan Government entities.
The effort emphasizes Afghan leadership and Afghan skill-building
efforts at all levels. Direct assistance enables the Afghan Government
to deliver services and to build the trust of its people. As part of
our effort to support the Afghan Government's ability to deliver
services for the Afghan people, USAID is reviewing the financial,
management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries
regarding their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. Assessments
(financial and procurement) are conducted for ministries that USAID
intends to fund with direct assistance. If the assessments determine
that the management, procurement, financial, and expenditure systems
can be certified as accountable, the USAID mission in Afghanistan will
certify the ministry as having the capacity to accept direct funding.
If the assessments determine that additional specific technical
assistance is required, USAID will provide it. As of December 2009, the
Ministries of Public Health; Communications and Information Technology;
and Finance have been assessed and certified to directly accept U.S.
Government funds. USAID is planning to conduct assessments on the
Ministries of Education; Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; and
Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
The USG is implementing a three-pronged approach to channel more
funds directly through the Afghan Government: (1) Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF); (2) Host Country Contracts; and (3)
Direct Budget Support in partnership with the Afghan Government and the
international community. The goal is to move from 12 percent provided
through direct assistance in FY 2009 to around 40 percent in FY 2011,
more than tripling the percentage of direct assistance in 3 years,
while concurrently putting into place mechanisms for countering
corruption and increasing accountability.
Question. Can you please provide specific staffing and resource
figures related to the increase in civilians in support of the
administration's Afghanistan strategy? In particular:
a. Ambassador Holbrooke and the State Department have
announced that the number of civilians in Afghanistan would be
at 974 by the end of the year. As of October 2009 it was
reported that 575 civilians were on the ground. Is the USG on
track to reach 974 civilians in Afghanistan by the end of the
year? If not, by what date?
b. How many civilians are currently operating in
Afghanistan? Please provide a breakdown by department and
agency of the number of staff from each department and agency
currently deployed as part of the civilian effort in
Afghanistan.
c. What number of civilians beyond the 974-person level is
the administration planning to send to Afghanistan in support
of the broader strategy in 2010? What is the timeframe for this
increase?
d. From which departments and agencies does the
administration anticipate the additional staff will come from?
e. Where will State and USAID find additional staff to
support the further civilian increase? What programs or
activities in other countries will have to be minimized or
reduced in order to allow for the increase in civilians?
f. Of the posts in Afghanistan that were originally intended
to be staffed by civilians, are any actually being staffed by
military Reservists instead?
Answer.
a. We started with less than 320 civilians on the ground in January
2009. We will have 920 civilians on the ground by the end of January.
Those not already there have fixed start dates, and we have identified
individuals who are in final clearance or training for all but a small
handful of the remaining positions.
b. Our Government civilian presence in Afghanistan is being staffed
by 8 different agencies: State, USAID, USDA, DHS, Justice, Treasury,
Transportation, and HHS. In July 2009, the Deputies' Committee approved
the target of 974 direct hire positions which break down as follows:
State--423; USAID--333; USDA--64; DHS--11; Justice--128; Treasury--8;
Transportation--2; HHS--2. By the end of February, we will have 920
civilians on the ground, with the remainder of the 974 to follow soon
thereafter.
c. Following decisions taken in the strategic review, we anticipate
moving toward a larger civilian force of well over 1,000 during the
course of 2010--timely funding permitting. We are working with post now
to elaborate timing and positions needed. As we deploy our personnel to
the field, we are focusing on ensuring that they have the mobility and
security that they need to be effective, on our military platforms and
coalition PRTs.
d. We anticipate that the additional staffing request will be
largely for field positions and will be primarily staffed by State,
USAID, and USDA.
e. We do not anticipate minimizing or reducing programs or
activities in other countries to staff the additional increase. Many of
the field positions will be filled with temporary direct hire employees
(3,161 employees for State and Foreign Service Limited and Personal
Service Contract employees for USAID).
f. We have not yet deployed any military Reservists to fill
civilian positions in Afghanistan.
______
Response of Deputy Secretary of State James Lew and Ambassador Karl
Eikenberry to Question Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. Secretary Lew's written testimony states that the
administration intends to triple the number of civilians to 974 by
early next year.
Even with this surge, we'd still have fewer than U.S. 1,000
civilians compared with American 100,000 troops. Is that ratio
1 civilian per 100 troops--truly sufficient when both General
Petraeus and General McChrystal assert that a civilian pillar
is of equal importance to the military pillar for any
successful strategy?
The number of civilians actually deployed on the ground,
outside the Embassy compound, will certainly be far fewer than
1,000. Ambassador Eikenberry testified that fewer than 400 will
be posted outside of Kabul early next year. What sort of impact
can 400 U.S. civilians make in changing the governance of a
nation of 30 million?
Answer. Although the absolute number of civilians deployed is much
lower than the number of troops, we have found that on average each
civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to
experts with U.S.-funded NGOs to military staff. We also expect that as
our troop levels increase and our civilian presence expands into the
provinces and districts, we will need to increase our civilian
personnel as well, perhaps by another 20 to 30 percent.
Civilian experts come from a range of U.S. Government departments
and agencies and bring specific expertise. They contribute to the
mission in Kabul and increasingly out in the field--at the beginning of
2009, there were only 67 U.S. Government civilian personnel deployed in
the field working on development and governance issues. As of January
5, 311 civilians are working beyond Kabul, including civilians from the
State Department, USAID, USDA, DEA, FBI, DHS, and DOJ. We are
concentrating our efforts in the East and South, where a majority of
U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000
forces announced by President Obama will deploy. Our civilians are
partnering with Afghans to enhance the capacity of key government
institutions at the national and subnational levels, and are helping
rehabilitate Afghanistan's key economic sectors.
As you know, since announcing our strategy in March 2009, we have
embarked on an extensive transformation of U.S. civilian assistance
activities in Afghanistan. The result is a more focused and effective
effort increasingly implemented and overseen by Afghans, more tightly
bound to our civilian-military strategy in Afghanistan, and with the
dual-benefit of helping the Afghan people while also directly
contributing to achieving our core goal of defeating al-Qaeda.
One example of this is our new approach to agriculture in
Afghanistan. Our agricultural assistance strategy brings greater
coherency to the U.S. efforts through a whole-of-government approach
that supports Afghanistan in the redevelopment of its agricultural
sector. A key guiding principle of this strategy and its implementation
is that it supports the plans and objectives of the Ministry of
Agriculture, especially in achieving effects felt at the district
level. Our agriculture assistance strategy, developed with the
Ministry, will serve as the chief tool in helping us identify where
resources are needed and how they might be best applied.
We are continuing to enlist top-quality people to assist Afghans in
developing and securing their country. Alongside our diplomats and
military servicemembers, there are lawyers, agriculture specialists,
economists, law enforcement officers, and others serving in
Afghanistan.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted by
Senator Richard G. Lugar
coordination with dod
Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles
in Afghanistan, including in agriculture and business development,
police training, and capacity-building within main ministries. Is DOD
acting in coordination with the Embassy country team on matters
relating to diplomacy, development and capacity building? When was the
Embassy informed of the assignment of several DOD civilian mentors to
Afghan ministries? What authorities and resources will improve civilian
agency capacity to maintain effective engagement with DOD in the
dynamic counterinsurgency realm? If U.S. military forces will begin
departing the country in as soon as 18 months, and many
responsibilities are assumed by DOD, who will manage the programs and
sectors that DOD has been managing upon their departure? How will USG
ensure an effective transition plan is developed and implemented?
Answer. This question is best answered by Ambassador Eikenberry.
security sector reform--police training
Question. There have been challenges in training and mentoring the
Afghan National Police that have survived three distinct Security
Sector Reform organizations and now confront the latest reorganization
of our training effort entitled ``NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan''
(NTM-A). What are the primary changes in the training to be
incorporated in the Afghan National Police curriculum that will
distinguish it from the past 3 reorganizations? Why is the
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau at State being
removed from its important role as a partner with DOD in police
training? What agency will be responsible for Afghan National Police
training? How will the U.S. monitor and evaluate NATO multilateral
police training? What are the education standards for police officer
recruitment? What goals have been established to achieve basic literacy
among recruits?
Answer. Afghan National Police curriculum changes include
incorporation of practical lessons learned and embedded performance
standards measured by practical testing. In addition, NTM-A, working
with the Minister of Interior, will add more leader training, improved
``Train the Trainer'' courses, and senior leadership courses. In
addition, the instructor/candidate ratio will be increased with the
addition of international police trainers (Carabinieri, French
Gendarmerie and European Gendarmerie Force) with a wide range of
skills. INL Bureau will remain a partner, specifically controlling and
delivering Justice Sector Support Program and Corrections System
Support Program. Commander Training Assistance Group-Police, for NTM-A,
will coordinate the entire police training initiative from a
multinational perspective and thereby be better positioned to influence
the variety of bilateral and international contributions throughout the
Afghan police training environment. The Minister of Interior, with NTM-
A assistance, will be responsible for Afghan police training. NTM-A
will provide advisors, mentors, and trainers to support this effort.
NTM-A will maintain constant contact with all training agencies. The
training will be monitored and evaluated by NTM-A's Combined Training
Advisory Group-Police. Frequent visits and assessments will be the
primary mechanism to collect metrics. The education standard is being
literate in one of the Afghan languages. Recruits not meeting minimum
standards are enrolled in training to bring them up to minimum
standards. Recruits are enrolled in training to teach them the basic
skills they will need to perform their duties. If recruits do not show
improvement after a period of training, they are replaced with a new
recruit.
______
Responses of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry to Questions Submitted by
Senator Richard Lugar
Question. The position of the Senior Civilian Representative
colocated with the Regional Command military headquarters is a new
construct in Afghanistan. There are also additional civilian
representatives assigned to smaller units such as PRTs and DRTs within
each region.
What is the structure and what is the timeline for
establishing these elements within each RC?
What resources and authorities are available to the Senior
Civilian Representatives assigned to the Regional Commands?
How is this structure intended to coordinate with the
Embassy, the military, the local and regional Afghan
authorities, Afghan civil society, and NGO/Contractor partners?
What role will USAID play at all levels of the Regional
Commands?
How will the Office of Transition Initiatives efforts be
coordinated and leveraged within the Regional Command
structure?
Answer. Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) are in place at all
Regional Commands.
The SCRs report directly to the Embassy's Interagency Sub-National
Program Coordinator, and through him to Ambassador Tony Wayne, the
Coordinating Director of Development Assistance and Economic Affairs.
The SCR positions are at the Minister Counselor level, and they
coordinate and direct the work of all U.S. Government civilians under
Chief of Mission authority within their area of responsibility. They
ensure coherence of political direction and developmental efforts, and
execute U.S. policy and guidance. The SCR also serves as the U.S.
civilian counterpart to the military commander in the Regional Command,
to senior coalition civilians, and to senior local Afghan Government
officials. The SCRs also oversee subnational civilian staff engagement
in USG planning, assessment, program execution and evaluation, direct
analytical reporting and activities in the RC across all lines of
effort, engage with Afghan Government officials, international partners
and PRT-contributing countries to improve collaboration at all levels,
and contribute input to USAID priorities implemented through the USAID
Regional Program Platform. The SCR also provides foreign policy
guidance and advice about the region to the military commander, and
receive security advice from the commander.
Each SCR is supported at the Regional Command level by a team of
roughly
10-30 personnel under Chief of Mission authority, including policy,
development, and administrative support from several agencies,
including USAID, USDA, U.S. law enforcement and other agencies. The
USAID Regional Program Platforms, comprised of technical experts from
each of USAID's sectoral offices, will be led by a USAID Senior Foreign
Service officer, who serves as the Senior Development officer and
supports the SCR. In RC-South, personnel supporting the SCR include a
sub-set of officers assigned to the RC-S Civilian-Military Integration
Cell and the Counternarcotics Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF), to
connect these multinational structures working for the RC-S Commander
to Embassy senior leadership. In RC-E, civilian staff participate in
relevant planning boards and fusion cells to enhance our integrated
civilian-military effort.
The creation of the SCR positions has enabled civilian agencies to
devolve more decisionmaking authority to the field, and enabled
civilians to more quickly tailor programs to the counterinsurgency
challenges of each specific environment. The SCR leads the interagency
team to define and set priorities, and supervises team efforts to
monitor and report program effects. The SCR can elicit and provide
feedback into the development programs through the Senior Development
officer. The Senior Development officer is authorized to manage the
USAID program portfolio through the USAID Automated Directives System
(ADS).
Outside the RCs, lead U.S. Government civilian representatives are
identified for each operational level in the field, down to the
District Support Team level, to promote increased responsiveness and
accountability for U.S. policy implementation. The selection of a State
Department, USAID, or other agency lead depends on the relative
experience of the agency representatives and on the operating
environment in each specific location.
USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has embedded OTI
Deputy Country Representatives, Monitoring and Information Officers,
and regionally based response/surge staff at the RC-East and RC-South
headquarters to coordinate efforts throughout the chain of command. OTI
staff are part of the SCR's team in each regional platform. OTI has
devolved authority to Deputy Country Representatives to design
regionally/context-specific approaches to stability programming. In
this way, OTI activities are better integrated into short-term military
planning, and can be changed quickly to respond to new priorities as
they arise. Additionally, lessons learned from the field regarding
stability programming are coordinated through the Regional Commands to
higher level headquarters. The OTI representatives at
the regional platforms work within integrated CIV-MIL teams responsible
for making sure stabilization activities are coordinated and aligned
with USG strategic guidance.
At the district level, OTI field representatives are primarily
embedded with maneuver units on Forward Operating Bases and Combat
Outposts, where they work collaboratively and in strict coordination
with the other USG agencies active in the district.
All OTI activities are coordinated up the chain through the lead
Civilian Representatives at each operational level, from the District
Support Teams on up to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and
ultimately to the Task Force and Regional Command Headquarters levels.
Question. The President's strategy in Afghanistan calls for both
military and civilian activities to stabilize and rebuild the country's
economy. A formal Civilian-Military Campaign Plan was created to direct
U.S. efforts and has had a positive effect on the coordination of
normally stove-piped efforts of USG agencies.
How is the Civil Military Campaign Plan organized for review
and, if necessary, amended?
Who will serve as the arbiter on contentious interagency
issues, including military issues?
With regard to the coordination of civilian and military
development activities, what is the chain of command among the
numerous agencies engaged in some aspect of development?
How are DOD reconstruction activities, such as those of the
Agribusiness Development Teams, integrated with those of
civilian agencies?
What is the role of Ambassador Tony Wayne with regard to DOD
development activities?
Answer. The USG assesses progress on its operations in Afghanistan
via a quarterly interagency metrics review conducted by the Embassy,
ISAF and USFOR-A and submitted to the NSC. The assessment has two
purposes: (1) To provide decisionmakers in Afghanistan with the
necessary information to prioritize and direct allocation of resources
within the framework of the Civilian-Military Plan, and (2) to inform
Washington decisionmaking through integrated reporting. Quarterly
stakeholder meetings identify where progress has been made or setbacks
have been encountered, where opportunities and obstacles exist, and how
policy, activities, planning and resourcing should be adjusted.
The 14 National-Level Working Groups that were created under the
Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan (ICMCP) and work to address various
aspects of Afghanistan's reconstruction all fall under the
responsibility of Ambassador Wayne and report through him to Ambassador
Eikenberry. Each of these working groups includes representatives from
the military and civilian elements engaged in the particular issues,
such as infrastructure development, agriculture, or rule of law. Some
working groups have only USG civilian and military representatives, but
others--such as the Border Issues Working Group--have numerous
representatives from the donor community and involve Afghan Government
officials, while the U.K. cochairs the Counter Narcotics Working Group
because of their important contributions in that area. Civ-mil teams in
the ISAF regional commands have also been coordinating their strategies
and activities via similar mechanisms.
Ambassador Wayne maintains oversight over and close engagement with
the working groups and the leadership of the agencies that are part of
those groups. As the Embassy cochair, with ISAF Brigadier General
McKenzie of the Executive Working Group (EWG), Ambassador Wayne takes
strong interest in their activities to strengthen coordination and
ensure progress. He and Brigadier General McKenzie conducted a review
of the activities of the 14 civ-mil groups at the NLWG Shura in
November 2009. The EWG also feeds information and issues into the
agenda for weekly meetings between Ambassador Eikenberry and General
McChrystal. Ambassador Wayne and Brigadier General McKenzie collaborate
closely to resolve interagency differences and, as appropriate, raise
them with Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal for joint
resolution.
The U.S. Army National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs)
in Afghanistan have been active in generating agricultural activity in
RC-East, particularly in areas of small-scale agricultural production.
ADTs are stand-alone operations that are not physically linked to the
neighboring Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). When an ADT and a
PRT are operating in the same vicinity, the ADT tends to replace the
need for agricultural advisors at the local PRT, while the PRT tends to
focus on nonagricultural aspects of subnational engagement. With the
recent increase of agricultural advisors, however, civilian
agricultural experts from USDA have been working closely with ADTs in
an effort to increase civ-mil collaboration in agricultural projects in
the field. Civilian agricultural experts continue to be placed at PRTs
around the country where ADTs do not already have a presence.
Embassy Kabul and CENTCOM have been examining how to migrate the
agricultural development activities of the ADTs to the civilian PRTs as
the Army National Guard ADT units decrease over the next 24 to 30
months. A workshop in Kabul in late January with strategic planners
from CENTCOM, and representatives from USDA, USAID, ISAF, and the Army
National Guard laid out the road ahead for the transition from military
to civilian agricultural program implementation in the field.
As far as DOD development activities are concerned, the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP) remains an important tool for
advancing U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and development goals in
Afghanistan. USFOR-A and USAID coordinate all CERP infrastructure
(usually transport) projects. Proposed projects undergo a vetting
process that includes buy-in at the local and community/ministry level.
Civil-military collaboration occurs at the Regional Platform, PRT,
District Support Team (DST) or Forward Operating Base (FOB) level,
depending on the location and size of the potential undertaking. A
USAID representative is a voting member of the USFOR-A CERP Board in
Kabul. This ensures a civilian/development perspective and that CERP
activities complement those of USAID. National Level Working Groups
occasionally discuss larger CERP projects where Chief of Mission and
USFOR-A interests converge. Projects exceeding $1 million must be
authorized by CENTCOM.
Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles
in Afghanistan, including in agriculture and business development,
police training, and capacity-building within main ministries.
Is DOD acting in coordination with the Embassy country team
on matters relating to diplomacy, development, and capacity-
building?
Answer. Civil-military cooperation and coordination is a key
priority for me--a priority also shared by General McChrystal. We meet
formally and informally throughout the week to ensure that our
organizations are aligned and in synch. The Embassy country team
coordinates with DOD and NATO's International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) through a variety of mechanisms. The Embassy and ISAF
established structures and processes this past year designed around
civ-mil integration and based on the Integrated Civil-Military Campaign
Plan I signed with General McChrystal this summer. National-level
working groups have been formed around our most important lines of
effort. These groups are cochaired by Embassy and coalition military
personnel and report to an interagency Executive Working Group. The
Embassy has placed a liaison officer at ISAF Joint Command (IJC) to
better synchronize our efforts in the field. A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
liaison office represents the military in the Embassy and is involved
in all aspects of the Embassy's operations and activities. This liaison
office is headed by a USAF brigadier general who has direct access to
me and the Embassy leadership. Individual DOD personnel are assigned to
key Embassy sections to further enhance civ-mil integration and
cooperation. In matters of diplomacy, the Embassy has the lead with
respect to the U.S. Government in Afghanistan--a role fully
acknowledged and accepted by General McChrystal.
Question. When was the Embassy informed of the assignment of
several DOD civilian mentors to Afghan ministries?
Answer. For quite some time there have been U.S. military advisors
in the security-related ministries. We recently learned of plans by our
military colleagues also to place some advisors, either military or
civilian, in service delivery ministries. We are working with those
colleagues to coordinate those plans with our own ongoing initiative to
make advisors available to those ministries as part of our effort to
implement the President's call for extending government services at the
subnational level.
Question. What authorities and resources will improve civilian
agency capacity to maintain effective engagement with DOD in the
dynamic counterinsurgency realm?
Answer. The civilian agencies have the authorities needed to
maintain effective engagement with DOD. Special hiring authorities are
enabling the State Department and USAID to place highly skilled
civilian experts in the field with military operational units--enabling
us to establish critical linkages at the Provincial and District
levels. Existing authorities and the civilian uplift give us the tools
to implement the administration's plan for Afghanistan in cooperation
with our DOD and ISAF partners. The challenges we face here in
Afghanistan will require the support of Congress and the American
public for some time to come. It is important that we continue to
receive the program funding requested to build capacity and develop
institutions here in Afghanistan.
Question. If U.S. military forces will begin departing the country
in as soon as 18 months, and many responsibilities are assumed by DOD,
who will manage the programs and sectors that DOD has been managing
upon their departure?
Answer. General McChrystal and I share a commitment to a joint civ-
mil mission, and we understand the need to support each other in our
different responsibilities. The Embassy's efforts are aligned around
building capacity within Afghanistan's national, provincial, and
district governments. DOD and ISAF forces will depart as the Afghan
National Security Forces are built and trained to assume primary
security responsibilities over more and more of Afghanistan.
Ultimately, the U.S. Embassy represents U.S. Government priorities and
interests in any foreign country, including Afghanistan. The mission is
postured to accept growing responsibilities for oversight of the many
programs and activities initiated by the military. Civilian agencies
are quickly increasing the numbers of personnel in the field, which
will allow us to expand our activities. For instance, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture is expanding its presence and role in
Afghanistan and is organizing a much more robust Agriculture team and
the Department of Homeland Security is preparing to establish an
attache office. USAID is reorganizing to place more responsibilities in
the field to ensure that development officials have the tools necessary
to rapidly respond at the local level. The law enforcement community
and justice sector will continue to play vital roles--particularly in
developing rule of law institutions. These initiatives will increase
the impact of civilian activities to build capacity in the justice
sector and display the U.S. Government's long-term commitment to the
Afghan people. Core DOD missions will continue for some time to come--
including the development of the Afghan National Security Forces and
the Ministries of Defense and Interior--even while the role of combat
forces evolves from one of direct participation in stability operations
to that of supporting the Afghan National Security Forces.
Question. How will the USG ensure an effective transition plan is
developed and implemented?
Answer. Our ultimate goal is to transition security
responsibilities to the Afghans while continuing to support them in
critical areas such as logistics, training, and intelligence. The
Embassy and DOD will continue to closely coordinate all activities
through a variety of coordination mechanisms in Kabul, and at the
regional and district levels. My staff and I will continue to meet
regularly with General McChrystal and his staff to ensure our
structures and mechanisms are evolving to reflect the changing
environment and our evolving roles. The national level working groups
and the Executive Working Group coordinating team will be the primary
vehicles for ensuring continuing cooperation. The Senior Civilian
Representatives at the Regional Command level will continue to be in a
position to coordinate resources and priorities and ensure a proper
balance of military and civilian activities. We continue to be
proactive in identifying areas where additional coordination and
cooperation are required. We have established new working groups and
mechanisms as necessary to ensure that we are working as effectively as
possible and have begun incorporating Afghan participation as their
capacity improves. Eventually, our Afghan partners will lead the
efforts in transitioning activities and programs under the control of
their own agencies and organizations.
Question. There have been challenges in training and mentoring the
Afghan National Police that have survived three distinct Security
Sector Reform organizations and now confront the latest reorganization
of our training effort entitled--NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
(NTM-A).
What are the primary changes in the training to be
incorporated in the Afghan National Police curriculum that will
distinguish it from the past 3 reorganizations?
Answer. The primary changes in the Afghan National Police
curriculum will be: additional leadership training for supervisors,
including senior leadership; and improved ``Train-the-Trainer''
courses. In addition, the instructor/student ratio will be improved
with the addition of international police trainers (Italian
Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie, and the European Gendarmerie Force)
with a wide range of skills. For further information, I would refer you
to the Combined Security Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NTM-
A, which has had the lead on curriculum development.
Question. Why is the INL Bureau at State being removed from its
important role as a partner with DOD in police training?
Answer. Real improvements have been made to the Afghan National
Police (ANP) through the Afghanistan Civilian Advisor Support (ACAS)
program that the INL Bureau has administered. However, due to the ANP's
significant needs and role in Afghanistan's security environment,
combined with the need to accelerate the pace of police training, the
State Department (including Embassy Kabul) and the Department of
Defense agreed that those challenges could most effectively be met by
unifying the police training effort at CSTC-A/NTM-A. The State
Department will continue to have a policy oversight role, while INL
will continue to provide support to the training effort, including
dedicated representation within the CSTC-A/NTM-A organization.
Question. What agency will be responsible for Afghan National
Police training?
Answer. The Defense Department, through CSTC-A/NTM-A, will have the
lead responsibility for Afghan National Police training. The State
Department will continue to provide policy oversight, and the INL
Bureau will continue to provide training support.
Question. How will the United States monitor and evaluate NATO
multilateral police training?
Answer. NTM-A will monitor all NATO training, using personnel from
its Combined Training Advisory Group-Police (CTAG-P). Metrics to be
used for evaluation will be collected during frequent site visits and
assessments. For further information, I would refer you to the Combined
Security Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NTM-A, which will
have the lead on evaluation of police training.
Question. What are the education standards for police officer
recruitment?
Answer. Officers, noncommissioned officers, and members of the
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) must have had at least 6
years education. Basic recruits do not have minimum education
requirement for recruitment. For further information, I would refer you
to the Combined Security Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NTM-
A, which will have the lead on police development.
Question. What goals have been established to achieve basic
literacy among recruits?
Answer. A literacy training program has been incorporated into all
basic police training courses, incorporating 2 hours of classroom time
into each working day. In addition, a nationwide voluntary ANP literacy
program has been established at more than 160 sites around the country.
For further information, I would refer you to the Combined Security
Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NTM-A.
Question. The long effort to create an effective justice sector has
been dedicated for the most part to the high crimes of counternarcotics
trafficking in Afghanistan.
Would you describe how that has evolved and what lessons
will be applied to the Major Crimes Task Force that will now
deal directly with other significant crimes such as corruption
and kidnapping?
Answer. One of the strongest justice sector initiatives the United
States has launched in Afghanistan is the Criminal Justice Task Force,
or CJTF, dedicated to the prosecution of high-value narcotics cases.
Located in Kabul, the CJTF is completely self-contained, with a
detention center for the accused, a court where the accused are tried,
and facilities for investigators, prosecutors, and guards. Department
of Justice Assistant U.S. Attorney mentors funded by the Department of
State/INL work with Afghan investigators, prosecutors, and judges; in
addition, State/INL provides sustainment funds for the facility and
mentors the corrections staff through its corrections program. Many of
the CJTF cases originate in cases developed by the specialized units of
the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan that the U.S. DEA has
developed and continues to mentor. The CJTF is a success with over 400
counternarcotics arrests and acquittals over the past year. Morale is
high there, andits director makes a strong case that Afghans can carry
cases all the way through the legal system. This capability has been
developed through the intense, continuous, one-on-one training and
mentoring of the investigators, prosecutors, and judges by experienced
federal prosecutors, who have been serving in this role since 2005.
Advisory support and facility sustaintment are currently provided by
State/INL and the Government of Afghanistan has agreed to take over
some of these responsibilities in one year. The natural questions that
follow are, can it be sustained, and whether the Afghans, with
assistance, can replicate it elsewhere.
DEA actively synchronizes the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) operations with the U.S. military,
ISAF and other interagency partners. State/INL provides significant
financial support to these units, including operations and sustainment
costs for vehicles and facilities. DEA coordinates intelligence,
resources, targets, operations, and priorities with the U.S. military
to further stability, advance the rule of law in order to disrupt
material support for the insurgency and break the nexus between
narcotics and corruption. As a result, narcotics, and the insurgent
financing it represents, as well as insurgent leaders and fighters have
been removed from the battlefield.
The success of the SIU and NIU depends on an effective judicial
component to adjudicate cases in a fair and impartial application of
justice. Consequently, all cases are brought to the Criminal Justice
Task Force, or in some instances, to U.S. Federal District Court.
The Major Crimes Task Force, or MCTF, is a small, vetted
investigatory unit focused on general corruption and kidnapping cases.
The MCTF builds on the success of the CJTF and aims to create a more
sustainable model for effectively investigating, prosecuting, and
convicting criminals in an Afghan court. The FBI has been working
closely with the MCTF to train and mentor its staff, in the hopes of
developing the MCTF into one of the premier independent law enforcement
entities in Afghanistan. Additional support has been provided by the
United Kingdom's Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), DOD's Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and State/INL, among
others.
Question. In the context of a counternarcotics strategy in
Afghanistan, what are the respective roles of State/INL, USAID, USDEA
and DOD?
Answer. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan is a true
interagency effort, with a number of different agencies drawing on
their own strengths and resources to both reduce the cultivation and
trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan and also to build lasting
Afghan capacity to continue these efforts in the future. State provides
the overall policy guidance, and INL--a Bureau of State--implements
programs to build the capacity of the Ministry of Counternarcotics;
carry out counternarcotics public information and messaging; enhance
provincial-level capacity and commitment to combating the drug trade;
expand drug addiction prevention and treatment capacity; and support
provincial-level supply reduction through Governor-Led Eradication and
the Good Performer's Initiative. INL also engages with multilateral
partners such as the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime to consolidate
regional commitment to combating the flow of Afghan opiates and to
diversify the base of international support for enhanced CN, law
enforcement, and rule of law cooperation between Afghanistan and its
neighbors. Through its assistance programs, USAID plays an important
role in promoting and supporting alternative livelihood programs for
farmers, rule-of-law programs, and capacity-building programs that
enhance subnational governance. The DEA has played a vital role in
mentoring specialized units of the Afghan Counternarcotics Police,
which has led to increasing success in interdiction and law enforcement
operations. DOD has also helped build the capacity of Afghanistan's
National Security Forces, and has been involved in interdiction
operations and the seizure of opium stashes, weapons caches, and the
shutting down of heroin and bomb factories. Working closely with our
National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams and our USDA
representatives in the field, our colleagues from the aforementioned
agencies and our military have also helped Afghan farmers to transition
to licit livelihoods and improve their situations growing crops and
produce for markets inside and outside Afghanistan. Additionally, the
Department of Justice has provided experienced federal prosecutors to
provide one-on-one training and mentoring to the Counternarcotics
Judicial Task Force and the prosecutors assigned to the Anti-Corruption
Tribunal.
Our counternarcotics strategy reflects a civilian-military and
whole-of-government approach to assisting the Afghan Government in
waging a counterinsurgency. Capacity-building is key: Our civilian and
military agencies understand that in order to achieve lasting success,
we must help get the Afghans to a position where they play a more
effective leadership role in the fight against narcotics, drawing on
the support of the United States and other international partners.
Question. How are each agency's activities integrated into a
coherent strategy?
Answer. The administration has worked hard through 2009 to fuse our
interagency counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan into a coherent
strategy. Our counternarcotics strategy provides the overall direction
to guide interagency activities. There is also an interagency
counternarcotics working group, chaired by State, that meets at least
once a month. This working group serves as a forum for discussing and
coordinating positions on narcotics issues, and on reviewing
performance measures and other counternarcotics matters. It also played
a lead role in drafting the counternarcotics strategy. This interagency
structure is mirrored in Kabul, where an ambassador at U.S. Embassy in
Kabul also chairs a counternarcotics working group that brings together
all the agencies involved in counternarcotics (as well as ISAF and
other partners) and meets at least once a month to review and
coordinate policy priorities (with subgroups meeting on an ad hoc
basis). The strategy and these working groups ensure that the
respective agencies' activities are well coordinated.
Question. A significant increase in resources and responsibilities
has been allocated to the communications strategy for Afghanistan.
How have you organized the Embassy to effectively employ a
broad and innovative public diplomacy strategy?
How will the civilian and military responsibilities in
public diplomacy and strategic communications be divided?
What are the advantages that civilian agencies and DOD bring
to this mission?
How will this strategy extend across the border regions that
incorporate much of the Pashtun belt? Is there coordination
with Embassy Islamabad?
Answer. Our Afghanistan Communication Plan is a comprehensive
strategy that demonstrates America's long-term commitment to
Afghanistan, supports President Obama's agenda, strengthens Afghan
institutions and moderate voices, counters insurgent messaging, and
enhances America's enduring partnership with the people of Afghanistan.
This plan aims to reduce the ability of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
other extremists to influence public perceptions and attitudes;
supports Afghanistan's people and government as they establish a more
secure, moderate, just, and lasting state; demonstrates the American
commitment to Afghanistan, and strengthens the partnership between
Afghanistan and the United States. Our communication plan is explicitly
designed to complement our integrated civilian-military campaign plan.
Though different agencies and departments have different mandates
and different funding when it comes to communication, there is very
active cooperation and coordination between Embassy Kabul's Public
Affairs section, ISAF Communication Offices, our Regional Command and
PRT Public Affairs sections, and other government agencies through
regular coordination meetings and planning sessions in country. This
collaboration is not only conducted by the Embassy's Public Affairs
team, but with members from all Embassy sections--Economic, Political,
USAID, Treasury, USDA, to name a few. ISAF liaison officers work with
the Embassy team on a daily basis and help ensure close coordination.
Because it is impossible to completely separate roles and
responsibilities in information arena, we integrate and coordinate
constantly, and we follow common principles. Some of the principles
that guide all of our work, be it State or Defense, are adaptability
(fast response; targeted messages for distinct audiences); clearly
providing facts (refuting of terrorist lies); projecting strength
(showing our commitment to helping Afghans build a better future);
showing respect (fostering dialogue; building Afghan Government
institutions); and stressing the shared goals of the Afghan people and
the international community.
Our new civilian strategy is under consolidated leadership at the
Embassy and follows four key avenues: Focusing and Expanding Media
Outreach, Building Afghan Communications Capacity, Countering Extremist
Messaging, and Strengthening People-to-People Ties. ISAF has also
revamped its efforts through an integrated communication team with
increased resources. Information operations and psychological
operations run by ISAF are also now better coordinated, including with
civilian partners, under a joint civil-military campaign plan. To
ensure all of our efforts are mutually supportive, the Embassy
interacts daily with all ISAF communication sections, from ISAF Public
Affairs to their Information Operations Task Force. This is true in
Kabul and in the field where senior civilian communication experts work
with Regional Commands, PRTs and Task Force commanders and their staffs
to ensure our public messaging and our information and psychological
operations all support our overall effort in Afghanistan. Finally, we
work closely with our Afghan partners at every level on both the
civilian and military side.
Additionally, we have begun to implement a comprehensive
communication strategy for countering terrorist messaging and improving
relations with the people of Pakistan. Given the nature of the shared
challenges we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan, our communication
strategies for both countries share many commonalities. But because the
United States has a very different footprint in each country in terms
of personnel and resources and because of the more developed
communications infrastructure in Pakistan, our approaches differ on
many levels between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we ensure
cooperation on our approach to communications along the Afghan-
Pakistani border through close interagency coordination in Washington
and with U.S. personnel in both countries.
Question. S/CRS has provided a number of personnel for discreet
tasks within the Embassy and country team operations, including most
recently, a 6-person tiger team to rapidly capitalize on the mission
requirements of the Public Diplomacy strategy, as well as laying the
initial groundwork for important civil-military coordination through
the ICMAG, and providing support to the elections. How would you
characterize the value and importance of the role of the office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to date?
Answer. S/CRS has been assisting Embassy Kabul since 2007 with
specialized staff and missions. Over that time, S/CRS has deployed 65
people from core staff, the Civilian Response Corps and interagency
partners in support of Embassy Kabul and ISAF. Currently, S/CRS has 18
staff deployed in specialized roles in Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar and
preparing several additional personnel for newly requested positions.
The value of S/CRS has been rapid provision of specially trained
staff and teams who have been able to fill focused needs of the mission
in that unique environment. These staff have supported the Embassy at
critical moments in the recent mission restructuring and expansion,
elections period, and strategy revision.
Roles requested by the Embassy have included: developing an
integrated civ-mil planning and assessment system at the national level
which resulted in the Embassy's first Integrated Civil-Military (Civ-
Mil) Campaign Plan as well as regional and provincial plans/
assessments; support to the design and standup of the new civ-mil
decisionmaking structure; providing civilian experts to pilot civ-mil
teams at the regional and provincial levels; representing the Embassy
in the Regional Command-South Civ-Mil cell--the first multinational
integrated planning cell of its kind; forming an Interagency Elections
Support team to reinforce the Embassy's effort to assist the Afghan-led
elections process and to develop and put mechanisms in place to
identify fraud and enhance security coordination; supporting current
work on reviewing rule of law and detentions; and assisting the
Government of Afghanistan to design and execute the next phase of the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
S/CRS has been able to draw on a wide range of skills and expertise
from other agencies as well as from within the State Department
including rule of law and detention experts from DOJ and the NSC,
economic advisors from OPIC, public affairs officers from USAID, and
planners from DOD. Many of these individuals have served in difficult
and dangerous environments, piloting the concepts underpinning the
civilian uplift while supporting the senior civilian representatives in
east and south with their specialized stabilization expertise.
Question. How can S/CRS respond more effectively to Embassy
requirements across any number of sectors?
Answer. S/CRS regularly responds to Embassy requests for assistance
with CRC and S/CRS staff to the maximum extent resources allow. As this
collaboration continues it will become faster and more regularized,
allowing for ``just in time'' deployments as needed. S/CRS is working
with S/SRAP and the Embassy to determine future needs from the CRC and
S/CRS core staff.
Question. In October of this year, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors briefed the committee on its operations worldwide, including
our programming for the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. The BBG
noted in a followup written response that, in spite of working with the
Afghan Government since the fall of 2005, ``The Ministry of Information
continues to block the contract for the operation of the Khost
facilities . . . Minister of Information Khurram continues to block
efforts to resolve this issue . . . '' The Voice of America later
reported that, also in October, the Pakistani Government reversed its
decision to allow VOA transmission from Peshawar into the border region
after only a month of operations.
What if any progress has been made since October?
Are these host country decisions isolated or are they
indicative of a lack of cooperation more broadly in this sector
and from this ministry?
Answer. The Department of State has worked closely with the
Broadcasting Board of Governors to resolve the impasse with the
Government of Afghanistan over the commissioning of the Khost
transmitter site.
On January 5, the Broadcasting Board of Governors received from the
Director of Radio Television Afghanistan a signed amendment to the BBG-
RTA agreement as it had been presented by BBG to the Afghan side in
August. This clears the way for BBG broadcasts using the Khost Tower to
begin. As of January 10, BBG was conducting technical tests. We expect
the broadcasts to begin soon.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted by
Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. I am concerned that there is an alarming disconnect
between the more targeted vision President Obama articulated in his
speech regarding U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, and statements made by
General McChrystal about how he intends to move forward.
The word ``counterinsurgency'' was notably absent from the
President's speech last Tuesday. He stated that he ``rejected goals
that were beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we
need to achieve to secure our interests.''
But according to media reports, General McChrystal gave a number of
statements the very next day in Afghanistan in which he repeatedly used
the word ``counterinsurgency.'' He even announced that he had created a
counterinsurgency advising team.
The Washington Post summed up McChrystal's comments by saying
``McChrystal has left little doubt that counterinsurgency is what he
intends to do.''
In your counterinsurgency manual, you clearly state that ``20
counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum
troop density for effective'' counterinsurgency operations. Or in other
words, we need 20 security forces for every 1,000 Afghans.
So it appears as though we would need roughly 570,000 security
forces to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations in
Afghanistan.
But as you know, our troop levels will not come close to this
target figure. According to my calculations, we would have roughly
330,000 forces--including U.S., NATO/ISAF and Afghan security forces
once the 30,000 additional Americans are deployed.
And even if we are able to train additional Afghan security forces,
we would only have a total of 370,000 forces by the end of October
2010.
This is clearly hundreds of thousands of forces short of the
minimum articulated in your manual.
This is the kind of discrepancy that leads me to question whether
increasing U.S. troop levels by 30,000 will only lead to our forces
getting bogged down in an increasing cycle of violence.
Is there a disconnect between the President and General
McChrystal? Why did President Obama omit the use of the word
``counterinsurgency'' while General McChrystal continues to use
it?
How can you reconcile the fact that the United States may be
conducting a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan with
330,000 troops when your counterinsurgency manual recommends
hundreds of thousands of additional forces for a country the
size of Afghanistan?
Answer. The situation in Afghanistan is complex and requires a
comprehensive strategy. The objective in Afghanistan is the population.
The population must be protected from intimidation and coercion by the
insurgents while creating conditions for the Government of Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan to be seen as an enduring government that can
provide basic government services. Using a strategy of clear, hold,
build, and transfer, the United States and coalition forces will
provide protection and will transfer the security mission to Afghan
forces when they are ready. This strategy will combat the insurgency
while allowing the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan the
time it needs to be able to provide basic services throughout
Afghanistan. It also allows for an expanding footprint using the
authorized troop limits set by the President and our coalition
partners. As for the word ``counterinsurgency,'' the President was
speaking to the U.S. population about a troop increase and our goals in
Afghanistan, while General McChrystal was talking about how to use the
troop increase in order to provide security from the insurgents.
Question. Last month, the Washington Post reported that Ambassador
Eikenberry sent two classified cables to President Obama expressing his
reservations about sending additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan.
The Post cited senior U.S. officials who said that the cables
conveyed the Ambassador's ``deep concerns about sending more U.S.
troops to Afghanistan until President Hamid Karzai's government
demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and
mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban's rise.''
I take this very seriously, particularly in light of Ambassador
Eikenberry's outstanding credentials, including 40 years of service in
the Army and two tours of duty in Afghanistan.
However, it is clear that Ambassador Eikenberry is not alone in his
skepticism of President Karzai's approach to governance.
In a 2007 survey conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), 60
percent of Afghans said that the Karzai government was the most corrupt
in 40 years, compared with 10 percent for the Taliban.
One tribal leader was even quoted by the Washington Post as saying
``When I see what this government is doing, it makes me want to join
the Taliban.''
After 8 years of rampant corruption and inefficiency, what
has changed in the past month since Ambassador Eikenberry sent
his cables that make you confident in the Karzai government's
ability to root out these problems?
Can you assure us that President Karzai will dramatically
change his approach to governance and make the reforms
necessary to be a credible partner?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is in full support of the
Embassy's and State Department's efforts to improve the Afghan National
Government, and supports their efforts to root out corruption. I will
support Ambassador Holbrooke's diplomatic efforts with President Karzai
to provide a legitimate government. I will lend further support to its
people by conducting counterinsurgency operations to secure the
populace and train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to
counter internal and external threats to the Afghan people.
The Afghanistan National Government will require time and continued
support from the U.S. and partner nations in order to become a
legitimate authority that can effectively lead its people and be
trusted by the international community.
Question. It appears as though the strategy proposed by General
McChrystal in August is moving forward.
There is one part of General McChrystal's report that makes me
particularly worried about the safety of our troops.
In his report, General McChrystal indicates that abandoning
important protective measures--such as the use of armored vehicles--in
the near term will save lives in the longer term.
For example, in the report he states that the use of armored
vehicles in secure areas of the country conveys ``a sense of high risk
and fear to the [Afghan] population.''
He goes on to recommend giving leaders the ability to accept ``some
risk'' and use less protective equipment, such as armored vehicles and
body armor, in order to better relate to the population.
But, he concludes that doing so ``could expose military personnel
and civilians to greater risk in the near term.''
This concerns me because the weapon of choice for our adversaries
in Afghanistan is the improvised explosive device, or IED, which allows
the enemy to target us from a distance.
These bombs have become more sophisticated, and their impact more
deadly.
The former director of the Pentagon agency established to deal with
IEDs recently said that they cause between 70 and 80 percent of all
casualties in Afghanistan.
Are you comfortable with this element of General
McChrystal's strategy? Are we asking our forces to assume an
unacceptable risk?
Answer. The strategy laid out by General McChrystal is prudent and
does not place our forces at unacceptable risk. In secure areas, the
threat from IEDs is greatly diminished and this strategy will give
commanders the flexibility to use protective measures based on the
prevalent threats in that area. Based on the mission, commanders will
have the latitude they need to determine the methods they will use to
achieve the desired results.
Question. It has become apparent over the past week that the
President's Afghanistan strategy is largely dependent on the ability of
Afghan security forces to step up in the near term and assume
responsibility for the security of their country.
But everything suggests that building credible security forces will
take a very long time.
The following description of the state of the Afghan forces by
Dexter Filkins recently appeared in the New York Times: ``While many
Afghans have demonstrated an eagerness to fight the Taliban, the Afghan
army and police have shown themselves unable to maintain themselves in
the field, to purge their ranks of corruption, to mount operations at
night or to operate any weapon more complicated than a rifle.''
He goes on to say that ``the bureaucratic skills and literacy
levels necessary to administer a large force have not materialized,
even after years of mentoring.'' Mr. Filkins adds that ``American
trainers often spend large amounts of time verifying that Afghan
rosters are accurate--that they are not padded with `ghosts' being
`paid' by Afghan commanders who quietly collect the bogus wages.''
The Associated Press also reported earlier this week that Afghan
President Hamid Karzai said that it may be 5 years before the Afghan
army is ready to take on insurgents and that it will be at least 15
years before the Afghan Government can ``bankroll a security force
strong enough to protect the country from the threat of insurgency.''
Do you disagree with Mr. Filkins' assessment?
Are you concerned by President Karzai's statements?
What happens in July 2011 if the Afghan security forces
aren't ready to step up?
Answer. Mr. Filkins' statement was based on the situation and the
training methods that were used at the time he assessed the situation
with the Afghan security forces. The training of the security forces is
a dynamic process, with changes and solutions occurring rapidly to
correct the issues that he mentioned. Since President Karzai made his
statements, the increased forces being sent to Afghanistan will have
the mission to partner and mentor with Afghan security forces. The
additional forces will ensure sufficient numbers of trainers are
available to train every unit in the Afghan security forces. This
increased focused training effort will accelerate the existing plan to
bring Afghan units up to readiness levels that will allow us to
transfer the security mission to them in time to meet the deadline
established by the President. The transfer process will be a gradual
process, as units and areas achieve readiness, they will assume
responsibility for their own security. In areas where Afghan units are
not ready, coalition forces will continue to provide security until
that responsibility is transferred to Afghan security forces.
______
Responses of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Barbara Boxer
It has become apparent over the past week that the President's
Afghanistan strategy is largely dependent on the ability of Afghan
security forces to step up in the near term and assume responsibility
for the security of their country.
But everything suggests that building credible security forces will
take a very long time.
The following description of the state of the Afghan forces by
Dexter Filkins recently appeared in the New York Times: ``While many
Afghans have demonstrated an eagerness to fight the Taliban, the Afghan
Army and police have shown themselves unable to maintain themselves in
the field, to purge their ranks of corruption, to mount operations at
night or to operate any weapon more complicated than a rifle.'' He goes
on to say that ``the bureaucratic skills and literacy levels necessary
to administer a large force have not materialized, even after years of
mentoring.'' Mr. Filkins adds that ``American trainers often spend
large amounts of time verifying that Afghan rosters are accurate--that
they are not padded with `ghosts' being `paid' by Afghan commanders who
quietly collect the bogus wages.''
The Associated Press also reported earlier this week that Afghan
President Hamid Karzai said that it may be 5 years before the Afghan
Army is ready to take on insurgents and that it will be at least 15
years before the Afghan Government can ``bankroll a security force
strong enough to protect the country from the threat of insurgency.''
Question. Do you disagree with Mr. Filkins' assessment?
Answer. Parts of Mr. Filkins' assessment generalize deficiencies
which exist in parts but may not be endemic throughout the Afghan
National Security Forces. There are units which operate independently
with little or no oversight from ISAF units. The ongoing Afghan
National Police Personnel Asset Inventory, a program asked for by the
Ministry of Interior with ISAF assistance, is addressing personnel and
weapon accountability and scientifically identifying the scale of the
drug problem in order to provide the best data possible for future
reform rather than relying upon anecdotal evidence.
Over the past year, several changes in the command and control
structure within ISAF have improved our ability to remedy some of the
deficiencies noted by Mr. Filkins. The creation of the ISAF
Intermediate Joint Command has freed General McChrystal's staff to more
fully partner with the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
Additionally, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, established in
November 2009, will provide additional capacity to partner and mentor
Afghan ministries, as well as provide needed training and oversight at
the ministry level down to police district and Afghan National Army
battalion level. Finally, the civilian uplift from the State Department
and other civilian agencies, including the Drug Enforcement
Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation, will also increase
the number of experts in Kabul and throughout the country who will also
play a key role in capacity-building, particularly with the Ministry of
Interior.
Question. Are you concerned by President Karzai's statements?
Answer. The President has repeatedly stated that it is in the long-
term interest of the United States and the international community to
support the Government of Afghanistan until it is capable of supporting
itself. This is a shared responsibility in partnership with the Afghan
Government. It is important to note that the international community
materially and financially shares this burden with the United States.
Key to reducing this burden over time is the development of the Afghan
economy and improving revenue collection so that the Afghan Government
can increasingly pay for its own needs.
Question. What happens in July 2011 if the Afghan security forces
aren't ready to step up?
Answer. The Afghans are already in the lead in several areas,
including Regional Command-Capital. Our military forces seek to conduct
all operations by, with, and through the Afghan National Security
Forces and conduct planning and leadership of these operations in the
closest partnership possible. Over time, we will assess the progress of
the Afghan National Security Forces and adjust the nature of our
mission accordingly. Areas which are secure enough, are relatively
stable, and with Afghan National Security Forces at or near requisite
levels could be transitioned when ready. More insecure areas will
obviously take longer. While conditions on the ground will dictate the
rate at which we transfer responsibility, we are committed to beginning
the transfer of areas which are ready, starting in July 2011 or sooner.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted by
Senator Roger F. Wicker
Question. What percentage of the 7,000 new NATO/International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military personnel assigned to
Afghanistan will be restricted by caveats? How does the administration
plan to engage countries with prohibitively restrictive national
caveats?
Answer. Approximately 43 percent of the planned foreign troop surge
(3,043 out of 7,000) will have at least one restriction or caveat
placed on their forces. Caveats that limit the geographic and
operational flexibility of ISAF forces remain a challenge in
Afghanistan. Despite this challenge, the trend over the last year has
been positive with several nations dropping specific caveats and a
majority of ISAF troop contingents now caveat free. Four countries
became caveat free in 2009. We continue to impress upon our allies and
partners the importance of providing the commanders on the ground the
maximum possible flexibility in the employment of ISAF forces.
Question. How confident are you that President Karzai's selection
of Cabinet ministers will result in a Cabinet comprised of honest
ministers? To what extent will domestic political considerations
require President Karzai to appoint less than credible ministers?
Answer. This question is best answered by Ambassador Eikenberry.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted by
Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
Question. You have come to speak to us about one of the most
challenging decisions facing the President, you as one of his advisors,
the Congress and the Nation. I commend President Obama and you all for
your careful deliberation. While I am reluctant to send another 30,000
troops into Afghanistan and spend billions at a time when we have so
many domestic priorities, I recognize that U.S. national security is at
stake and the President pledged to keep our military intervention
limited in time. I have a few questions to help me better understand
our military strategy. I understand from the President's speech and the
testimony we have heard from Secretary Gates and others that our goal
is to begin to pull American troops out in the summer of 2011.
How does that match up with the classic COIN
(counterinsurgency) guidance, which you published based on your
Iraq experience? Is that sufficient time to achieve the goal of
an Afghan security force buildup?
Answer. The COIN guidance of clear, hold, build, and transfer will
support the goal of pulling troops out in the summer of 2011. The troop
increase will accelerate our progress in all areas of Afghanistan's
development. Additional troops will allow for a larger footprint in
Afghanistan, which will protect more of the population, allow the
Government of the Republic of Afghanistan the ability to provide basic
services to more of the population, and allow the Afghan army and
police forces to grow and train so we can transfer security duties to
them. Coalition forces are setting the conditions under which Afghan
forces can be recruited and trained in order to expand their operations
throughout all areas of Afghanistan. The current pace of development
and operations will provide sufficient time to build up Afghan security
forces before summer 2011. More troops will also allow for every Afghan
army unit to be mentored and partnered with U.S. and coalition units,
enhancing their training and operations capabilities before U.S. forces
begin redeployment in summer 2011.
Question. President Karzai has said that 5 years are needed for the
security buildup.
Is there a discrepancy between our visions, or are we and
the Afghan Government talking about different measures?
Answer. Our vision of providing protection to the Afghan population
from the insurgency is the same as President Karzai's. The 30,000
increase in U.S. troops and the international non-U.S./ISAF troops will
allow for accelerating the growth and training of the Afghan security
forces. By partnering and mentoring with Afghan security force units,
we will be able to begin transferring security duties in time to
support a U.S. drawdown in 2011.
Question. Since the increased number of U.S. troops arrived earlier
this year, what successes have we seen that can be attributed to the
earlier troop surge?
Answer. The earlier force expansion provided greater security for
the population in more areas across Afghanistan. This accelerated the
Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's ability to provide
basic governmental services throughout Afghanistan, allowed for
partnering and training additional Afghan National Security Forces and
Afghan National Police units, and provided security for additional
infrastructure improvements at an accelerated pace.
Question. A major aspect of counterinsurgency (COIN) is to secure
and serve the civilian population, which entails a change in tactics
and may increase risk to our troops.
Are our International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
allies, which have often put significant limits on their troop
operations, on board with COIN?
Answer. Our ISAF allies are operating according to COIN and
according to their national guidance. Due to the regional and tribal
differences throughout Afghanistan, coalition forces have tailored
their COIN operations to each region. What works in one region may not
work in all regions. Each region commander has the flexibility to adapt
COIN operations to enable coalition forces to be effective at meeting
COIN objectives. Coalition forces are our partners in maintaining
security for the Afghan population. They are also involved in building
infrastructure, the expansion of the Afghanistan National Security
Forces, and they allow for the Government of Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan to provide basic government services. Our allies and U.S.
troops conduct operations to counter the insurgency and protect the
population from intimidation and coercion.
______
Response of Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew to Question Submitted
by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
Question. To what extent is the State Department's Civilian
Response Corps being used in Afghanistan? How many S/CRC staff or
stand-by personnel in country?
Answer. S/CRS has been deploying personnel to Afghanistan since
2007, with 65 core staff, Civilian Response Corps (CRC) members, and
interagency partners having deployed to date in support of Embassy
Kabul and ISAF. Currently, a total of 18 staff from S/CRS and the CRC
are deployed in specialized roles in Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar, with
additional CRC members expected to deploy over the next year.
In Afghanistan, S/CRS and CRC personnel have applied new tools
developed by S/CRS and its interagency partners to more effectively
plan, implement, and assess needs. These have included developing and
executing an integrated civ-mil planning and assessment system
including an innovative multinational cell in RC-South; piloting new
approaches to civ-mil integration at combat taskforces, provincial
teams and regional commands, which has evolved to the Senior Civilian
Representative system and civilian platforms; supporting the elections
process and increasing antifraud detection; and providing stabilization
expertise to ISAF leadership, the Detentions and Corrections taskforce,
the civilian uplift design process, implementation of a new
communications strategy, and support to the next phase of the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).
______
Responses of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry to Questions Submitted by
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
Question. This week the President spelled out the grave risk to
United States national security if Afghanistan falls to Taliban
control. After 8 years of insufficient resources and lack of focus, we
risk providing a stronghold for al-Qaeda and threatening the stability
of nuclear Pakistan. That is exactly the concern of experts in and
outside our Government if the Taliban takes control in Afghanistan
again.
We and our international partners must implement a thoughtful
civilian strategy that strengthens effective government services and
builds a stable coalition that does not depend on corrupt officials, so
that the Afghan people have a reason to support their government rather
than Taliban rule. I have no illusions of a Western-style modern state,
which has never existed in Afghanistan. What we must aim for is a
stable state that provides sufficient security and services to its
people, so that it is preferable to the Taliban alternative.
You have reportedly raised concerns about the surge strategy
because of reservations that you have about the Karzai
government. What about the strategy discussions has changed
your mind?
Answer. The review process was extraordinarily thorough and the
debate was frank and vibrant--exactly what you need to weigh decisions
of this magnitude, in a situation this complex. I was pleased to take
part and am fully supportive of the outcome. I provided my thoughts, by
video conference, phone, in person and in cables, which are routine for
ambassadors in the field. I never doubted the need for additional
troops, and fully support General McChrystal's assessment.
There are always risks and benefits of adding U.S. troops. I
expressed my views. All the President's advisers raised questions about
the various options.
I fully support the refined mission focused on south and east, on
helping build basic governance and on accelerating Afghan National
Security Forces growth.
In the end, the strategy review process was as it should be:
comprehensive, open, and deliberative. It was appropriate given the
stakes--U.S. vital national security interests and the commitment of
troops and treasure. Getting it right was more important than doing it
fast.
Question. What do you think we need to see from the Afghan
Government to make the President's strategy a success?
Answer. Much of what we need to see from the Afghan Government in
order to succeed was laid out by President Karzai himself in his
inaugural speech last November. President Karzai's agenda aligns very
closely with our priorities for the next 18 months. The Afghan National
Security Forces must continue to develop so that they can continue
taking over responsibility for security in their own country. President
Karzai must stay true to his commitment to attack corruption so that
the Afghan people can have faith in their government, demonstrating
this by appointing competent officials at all levels of government, and
removing those who are corrupt or unqualified. His approach to economic
development should focus on key sectors such as agriculture,
infrastructure and education that can provide jobs and a more capable
workforce. He must present a plan for peace and stability through the
reintegration of those former Taliban fighters who renounce terrorism
and al-Qaeda, and agree to abide by the Afghan Constitution.
And finally he should continue to pursue constructive diplomatic
engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors. Progress in these areas will
lessen our security role and provide the basis for stronger public
support for the Afghan Government.
Question. What leverage do you plan to use to achieve our goals?
Answer. Our preferred course of action is to work jointly with the
Afghan Government, set shared goals and objectives, and then work
cooperatively to achieve them. As one of the lead contributors to
international assistance designed to help the Afghan Government wage a
counterinsurgency, we have leverage in terms of our assistance--both
material and diplomatic. We also have excellent collaboration with
other key donors and missions in Afghanistan, and can also apply
leverage on a multilateral basis. Success in Afghanistan is in our
national interest, and we will use all of our tools to pursue it.
Question. You have testified about the tripling of the number of
U.S. civilians in Afghanistan to 1,000. But that is still far lower
than the number of military. How are you ensuring that our civilian
program is as robust as our military and that cooperation is solid,
given the difference in levels of personnel?
Answer. The integration of civilian and military efforts has
greatly improved over the last year, a process that will deepen as
additional troops arrive and our civilian effort continues to expand.
We have Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) counterparts to NATO-
ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands. These SCRs are senior
professionals, experienced in conflict environments. They direct the
work of all U.S. Government civilians under Chief of Mission authority
within their regions, subject to my overall guidance. This structure
has two important features: First, it ensures that our civilian efforts
are fully integrated, both across the different civilian agencies and
with the military units; second, it is decentralized, enabling quick
response to local needs, which is essential to deal with the varying
conditions in Afghanistan.
In conjunction with the arrival of U.S. military units in key
districts, we anticipate a further significant increase in our civilian
staffing in 2010. In all, we expect staffing will grow by another 20-30
percent above the 1,000 by the end of 2011. Aligning with the strategy,
the majority of these new personnel will deploy to the east and south.
We are concentrating experts in the field and at the key ministries
which deliver vital services to the Afghan people. Our increased
civilian presence has enabled us to more effectively and rapidly invest
our assistance in agriculture, job creation, education, health care,
and infrastructure. To maximize our impact in priority areas, we have
created District Support Teams, which allow civilians in the field to
collaborate with the military to build Afghan capacity in key
districts.
Although the number of civilians is considerably less than their
military counterparts, each civilian works with numerous implementing
partners, NGOs and Afghan counterparts, producing a multiplier effect
estimated to be 10 to 1. Beyond pure numbers, we are ensuring that we
have the right civilians, with the right skills and training, deployed
to the right locations in order to achieve our objectives.
Question. In outlining the U.S. strategy the President correctly
focused on both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This administration is
correctly analyzing the risk as a regional one, and crafting a strategy
accordingly. Our ability to help bring security and stability to
Afghanistan is key to the security of a nuclear Pakistan. The Taliban
network stretches across the porous Durand Line between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. So should a smart U.S. strategy. Are you and Ambassador
Patterson in Islamabad consulting on a regular basis?
Answer. Yes. Ambassador Anne Patterson and I, as well as the staff
of our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad, consult regularly and work
together under Special Representative Richard Holbrooke's direction, to
facilitate collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan on security
issues, political dialogue, and economic cooperation. I speak
frequently to Ambassador Patterson and officers of our two Embassies
travel on a regular basis to work on shared programs. Both Embassies
maintain Border Coordination offices that were established to enhance
cooperation on key issues, including the movement of critical U.S. and
NATO-ISAF supplies through Pakistan to support military operations in
Afghanistan. We have placed particular focus on a transit-trade
agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will facilitate the
movement of goods across the border, and on improving customs
procedures and facilities on both sides of the border, thereby enabling
the expansion of lawful commercial activity led by the private business
sectors of both countries.
Question. I understand that there is a pilot project, the Afghan
Public Protection Program (APPP), which supports local tribally
recruited militias. I am concerned that by building local militias, we
are repeating past mistakes and may leave behind military groups
without sufficient civilian oversight. This could continue the human
rights abuses of the past and destabilize the government after we
leave. What are we doing to address that?
Answer. The Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP or AP3) is an
Afghan-led pilot project in Wardak province that is training a public
security force. It is important to note that this is not a tribal
militia but a community-based force that is part of the Ministry of
Interior (MOI) under the Afghan National Police. The APPP is a
uniformed service with members who serve a fixed term of enlistment and
receive salary and benefits. The personnel in the APPP are drawn from
the community and are generally representative of its different ethnic
and tribal groups. Since it is a security force that is part of the
Afghanistan National Police, it is not under control of warlords but
under the command of the district police chiefs. Members sign an
enlistment contract and swear an oath to the Government of Afghanistan.
In addition to this oath, they are held accountable by local community
councils of elders that help select individuals for this program.
Overall, the APPP was developed out of experience with several
other local forces, and is grounded in the belief that community
support is essential to effective and comprehensive security. Recruits
are vetted by local councils, closely tied to other improved local
governance efforts, and are fully integrated into the MOI structure.
Special Operations Forces, Police Mentor Teams, and the Battle Force
Commander all provide oversight to the APPP during both training and
deployment. As noted earlier, the APPP is a pilot program and we are
still reviewing its performance.