[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE SCOURGE OF
RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2017
__________
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE
SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHIELA JACKSON LEE, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Vacant, Department of State
Vacant, Department of Commerce
Vacant, Department of Defense
[ii]
THE SCOURGE OF
RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION
----------
SEPTEMBER 14, 2017
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Cory Gardner, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe...................................... 3
Hon. Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 4
Hon. Gwen Moore, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 17
Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 20
Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 24
WITNESSES
John F. Lansing, Chief Executive Officer and Director,
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).......................... 6
Molly K. McKew, CEO, Fianna Strategies........................... 8
Melissa Hooper, Director of Human Rights and Civil Society
Programs, Human Rights First................................... 11
APPENDICES
Prepared statement of Hon. Cory Gardner.......................... 41
Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Smith..................... 43
Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 44
Prepared statement of Hon. Michael Burgess....................... 45
Prepared statement of John F. Lansing............................ 47
Prepared statement of Molly K. McKew............................. 52
Prepared statement of Melissa Hooper............................. 65
[iii]
THE SCOURGE OF
RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION
----------
September 14, 2017
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 9:34 a.m. in Room 562, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Cory Gardner,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Cory Gardner, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon.
Christopher Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Gwen
Moore, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe; Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Sheldon
Whitehouse, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: John F. Lansing, Chief Executive
Officer and Director, Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG);
Molly K. McKew, CEO, Fianna Strategies; and Melissa Hooper,
Director of Human Rights and Civil Society Programs, Human
Rights First.
HON. CORY GARDNER, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Gardner. This hearing of the Helsinki Commission will
come to order. Welcome, and good morning everyone. I'm honored
to speak and be here on behalf of Senator Wicker, the
Commission's Chairman, and to preside over this morning's
hearing.
The Commission is mandated to monitor the compliance of
participating states with consensus-based commitments of the
OSCE. Today's hearing focuses on the pressing issue of Russian
disinformation, and how it undermines the security and human
rights of people in the OSCE region.
Disinformation is an essential part of Russia's hybrid
warfare against the United States and the liberal world order.
As one of our distinguished panel witnesses today wrote in her
recent article, ``The Russian security state defines America as
the primary adversary. The Russians know they cannot compete
head to head with us economically, militarily, technologically,
so they create new battlefields. They are not aiming to become
stronger than us, but to weaken us until we are equivalent.''
Through its active-measures campaign that includes
aggressive interference in Western elections, Russia aims to
sow fear, discord, and paralysis that undermines democratic
institutions and weakens critical Western alliances such as
NATO and the EU.
Russia's ultimate goal is to replace the Western-led world
order of laws and institutions with an authoritarian-led order
that recognizes only masters and vassals. Our feeble response
to Russian aggression in Ukraine and their interference in our
elections has emboldened the Kremlin to think that such a new
world order is not only possible, but imminent.
We must not let Russian activities go with impunity. We
must identify and combat them utilizing every tool at our
disposal.
I am proud that my home state of Colorado is home to Fort
Carson and the 10th Special Forces Group, an elite unit that
has been at the tip of the spear in identifying and combating
some of these malign Russian activities in the European
frontline states. I thank them for their important work and for
keeping our nation safe.
To help us lead our discussion today, I am pleased to
introduce three distinguished witnesses.
Mr. John F. Lansing is the chief executive officer and the
director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. He joined the
BBG as CEO--that's a lot of acronyms--and director in September
2015. Previously, he was the president of Scripps Network,
where he is credited with guiding the company to becoming a
leading developer of unique content across various media
platforms.
Ms. Melissa Hooper is the current director of Human Rights
and Civil Society Programs at Human Rights First. Ms. Hooper's
research focuses on Russia's foreign policy strategies of
spreading Russian influence and undermining democratic
institutions in Eastern Europe, and how these strategies
intersect with existing autocratic trends.
Ms. Molly McKew is an expert on information warfare and
Russian disinformation policies. She currently heads an
independent consulting firm, Fianna Strategies, advising
governments and political parties on foreign policy and
strategic communication. She also has extensive regional
experience advising both Georgian and Moldovan governments. She
also writes extensively on issues pertaining to Russian
information warfare.
We'll begin with Mr. Lansing, who will offer his testimony
and inform us what the BBG is doing to counter Russian
disinformation in the OSCE region. We'll then move on to Ms.
McKew's testimony, where she will discuss information warfare
and Russia's activities in this space. And finally, Ms. Hooper
will present her analysis of Russian disinformation's influence
over the German elections and its potential influence over
future elections in Europe.
So thank you very much for your testimony today. I look
forward to hearing your discussion as we strive to better
understand these serious threats.
Before we begin, though, I will now turn to my colleagues
on the Commission--Senator Cardin, Congressman Smith--for their
comments.
HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Well, Chairman Gardner, first of all, it's a
pleasure to have you here. I miss Senator Wicker, so I----
[laughter]
Mr. Gardner. I'll do my best with Mississippi accents.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cardin. Senator Wicker is just a great leader on the
Helsinki Commission.
But it's great to be here with Senator Gardner. You should
all know that I serve with Senator Gardner on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and he is a passionate leader on
so many issues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So
his help here on the Helsinki Commission today is very much
appreciated. So thank you for chairing today's hearing.
It's good to be here with Congressman Smith. Congressman
Smith is not only the longest-serving member of the Helsinki
Commission, but he has been a champion of the Helsinki
Commission for longer than I've been in Congress, and I've been
in Congress a long time. [Laughter.] So, Chairman Smith, it's
good to be here with you.
And today you truly have a distinguished panel of
witnesses. We have three witnesses who are truly expert on the
subject that we are dealing with today, and that is what
Russia's misinformation campaign is all about, the risk factors
to the United States and to our values and to our partners, and
what we can do to counter that.
I've repeatedly stated that Russia is violating each and
every principle of the Helsinki Final Act's guiding principles.
Central to Russia's strategy to undermine democratic
institutions is a long-running effort to now sow instability
through disinformation campaigns. So I hope that we can truly
try to understand a little bit more about what they're doing,
what Russia's all about, and the impact it has on the United
States and our allies, and what we can do with the
participating states of the OSCE in order to try to counter
these activities.
In a world of rapid technological and social change and
upheaval, Russia has not merely grasped the basic applications
of the new technology, it has exploited it, and used this
openness of our democratic institutions to work against us. I
must tell you, we have to admire how Russia has understood the
means of communications today, and how they understand our
democratic institutions, and how they've used our democratic
institutions to advance their own agenda.
We have seen the impact of this disinformation at home and
abroad. Russia's disinformation has spread throughout Ukraine,
and especially impacted the Ukrainian state's response during
the invasion of Crimea and the war in Donbas. We've also seen
now the impact of Russia's disinformation in the United States
itself. Russia's Facebook users created thousands of fake
accounts and flooded the internet with propaganda and lies
during the 2016 election period.
This week, as the OSCE convenes Europe's largest annual
human rights meeting in Warsaw, Poland, a longtime participant
and leading voice in monitoring hate crimes, xenophobia and
extreme violence in Russia is under threat. The SOVA Center is
now being investigated as ``undesirable.'' This is a painful
reminder that Russia's foreign agent law, used to target human
rights groups and civil societies in general, is one of
Moscow's most insidious global exports.
Russia's disinformation strategy is well funded and it is
sophisticated. As we need to be doing a better job in response,
the State Department's Global Engagement Center has been tasked
in statute with assuming a larger part of this responsibility.
I'm glad to see that the State Department has released
resources to the Global Engagement Center. This is something
that we had pushed very hard. I want to acknowledge Senator
Corker and Senator Graham's efforts in helping us on the Senate
side in getting that done. We now need to deal with rigorous
oversight of this
effort.
The recent Russia sanction bill which was signed into law
on August the 2nd included funding authorization to bolster the
resiliency of democratic institutions across Europe. I was
proud of the role that our committee played with getting that
done. It now is important for us to see that it's implemented
and oversighted
properly.
I must note that this is the Helsinki Commission's third
hearing on Russia this year. The Commission has investigated
the extensive human rights abuses in Russia and the growing
military threat that the Russian state poses.
The scourge of disinformation is a serious and ongoing
challenge Russia poses against the global community in spite of
its international treaties and commitments. This hearing is
extremely important, and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Congressman Smith.
HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Gardner, and thank
you for your leadership. And it's just great to see you.
And Ben Cardin and I, we do go back a whole lot of years
working on the Helsinki Commission, particularly working
against the nefarious Russian enterprises--not just the KGB,
but others who have perpetrated horrific human rights abuses
over the many years. And so it's great to be with Ben. And I
thank him for those sanctions. He and the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee crafted a very important piece of
legislation, which is now law. So thank you, Ben.
The most alarming thing about the Russian media's promotion
of untruths and fake news is the extent to which it is
coordinated by the Russian Government and put in the service of
a doctrine of war, the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine of hybrid
war.
Fake news is far from unknown within our society. We deal
with it through freedom of speech, which allows it to be
disproven, as well as through laws against libel and
incitement. Yet, the case is totally different when a foreign
government coordinates the production of fake news campaigns as
part of a hybrid war against us and our allies.
I'd like to hear from our witnesses today how they think
our government can work with our allies to respond to the
threat of Russian disinformation and the threat that it poses
against Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia in
particular. These are countries where disinformation is most
fully part and put in service of this hybrid war. How are we
responding and how should we respond? And I'm sure we'll get
some very good answers from our distinguished panel.
Most importantly, if Russian disinformation is hybrid war
against these frontline allies, is our military and the NATO
alliance making counter-disinformation part of a hybrid defense
against this hybrid war? Over the years--and I mention this
because I've done so with Ben on many occasions--we've traveled
to Russia many times, including during some of the worst years
of the Soviet times. In 1982, my first trip as a congressman
was to meet with Jewish refuseniks for a full 10 days in Moscow
and in Leningrad. I went back a few years later, then went back
again and actually visited Perm Camp 35, where Sharansky and so
many other dissidents were held--he [Sharansky] had just left,
but others were still there.
We videotaped more than two dozen political prisoners. I'll
never forget one of those prisoners said, ``Tell Scowcroft I'm
here!'' He was fingered by Aldrich Ames, and was there and
probably would have been killed, and an exchange got him out.
But many others were there, and they told their stories. It was
the beginning of glasnost and perestroika at the time. But that
was still under Soviet times.
Now, I say that because in 2013 I sought to go to Russia
after the adoptions were shut down pursuant to a retaliation
for the Magnitsky Act, which was absolutely well written and
has been put into place. And under Putin, many of us have been
not allowed even to travel to Moscow, and I have not been able
to get a visa ever since. We could get there during the Soviet
times, can't get there now. What does that tell you about the
state of Putin's
Russia?
And, of course, to punish children, many of whom were
already in the pipeline to find homes here in the United
States, who would have been well loved, and out of an orphanage
in many cases, and well taken care of, and yet that was a
shutdown on the part of the Russian Government in retaliation
against the Magnitsky Act.
So we really are in a really bad situation with Russia. And
I think a hearing like this helps to bring additional light and
scrutiny, and most importantly from our witnesses some
recommendations on what we could do and do better to combat
Putin's
aggression.
Thank you.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Congressman Smith.
We've been joined by Senator Shaheen and Congresswoman
Moore. Thank you very much for being here today. And if you
would like to make additional statements now, please feel free
to do so. Otherwise, we'll begin with the testimony and reserve
time for opening statements during our question period. Thank
you very much.
Ms. Moore. Thank you, but I'll pass.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you.
Mr. Lansing, if you'd like to begin.
JOHN F. LANSING, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR,
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BBG)
Mr. Lansing. Thank you, Chairman Gardner, Co-Chairman
Smith, and members of the Commission. Thanks for inviting me to
speak today about the Broadcasting Board of Governors' efforts
to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation.
I currently serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the
BBG, where I oversee all operational aspects of U.S.
international media, including five networks. And those
networks are the Voice of America; the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, Radio and TV Martis; Radio Free Asia; Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty; and the Middle East Broadcasting
Networks, which include Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa.
The BBG's mission is to inform, engage, and connect people
around the world in support of freedom and democracy. We
produce news on all media platforms, and our programs reach 278
million people, unduplicated, on a weekly basis in more than
100 countries and in 61 languages. We increased our audience by
52 million from 2015 to 2016. The BBG provides consistently
accurate and compelling journalism that reflects the values of
our society: freedom, openness, democracy, and hope.
Today we are encountering a global explosion of
disinformation, propaganda, and, frankly, lies by multiple
authoritarian regimes and non-state actors such as ISIS. House
Foreign Affairs Chairman Ed Royce, referring to Russian
propaganda specifically, terms it ``the weaponization of
information,'' and I believe that captures the severity quite
well.
In Russia, the Kremlin propaganda machine is breathing new
digital life into a decades-old strategy of disinformation to
influence opinions about the United States and its allies.
State-sponsored Russian broadcasters such as RT and Sputnik are
expanding their global operations. In fact, earlier this year,
a bluegrass radio station on 105.5 FM was replaced by Sputnik,
right here in Washington, D.C. The Russian strategy seeks to
destroy the very idea of an objective, verifiable set of facts.
The BBG is adapting to meet this challenge head on by
offering audiences an alternative to Russian disinformation in
the form of objective, independent, professional news and
information. I'd like to detail some of our key initiatives for
you today.
Since 2014, the BBG has added or expanded more than 35 new
programs in Russian and other languages in the former Soviet
space. The flagship of this effort is Current Time, a 24/7
Russian-language digital network that we launched in February
of this year. Current Time aims to reach Russian speakers in
Russia, the Russian periphery, and around the world. For
example, in Stockholm or Jerusalem or Istanbul, Russian
travelers can now turn on the TV in their hotel room and find
Current Time as an alternative to RT.
If they did, here's what they might see:
[A video presentation begins.]
Narrator. In a complicated world, it can be difficult to
tell what's real. But Current Time tells it like it is. It's
television for Russian speakers worldwide, delivering news our
viewers care about, information that stands up to scrutiny.
Current Time brings together top journalists from throughout
the Russian-speaking world, delivering a fresh alternative to
Kremlin-controlled media. With headquarters in Prague and
Washington, and more than 100 reporters on the ground in
Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the Baltics, the United States
and Europe, Current Time serves as a reality check with no fake
news or spin. Current Time is on the air 24 hours a day, seven
days a week, with news shows for our European and Central Asian
audiences; top-of-the-hour headlines; a daily news digest from
Washington and New York; a nightly political talk show, ``The
Timur Olevsky Hour''; weekend wrap-ups from Washington and
Prague; and a weekly analysis, ``See Both Sides,'' that helps
viewers tell fact from fiction. Available through cable,
satellite, IPTV and online streaming, Current Time reaches a
potential audience of 240 million Russian speakers across the
globe.
And Current Time isn't just TV. Its digital platforms draw
more than 160 million views on social media, with more than a
quarter coming from inside Russia itself. Current Time is
always on the road with shows that bring our viewers new
sensations, sights and ideas; rarely seen documentaries;
unexplored places; and ordinary people standing up to
extraordinary circumstances, risk-takers and entrepreneurs
building a future for themselves and their communities.
This is Current Time's mission: real news, ``nastoyashchiye
novosti''; real people, ``nastoyashchiye lyudi''; in real time,
``nastoyashchiye vremya.'' That's Current Time Television.
[The video presentation ends.]
Mr. Lansing. Current Time is a first-ever, unique
partnership led by Radio Free Europe in Prague along with the
Voice of America here in Washington. It's distributed in over
23 countries, having just launched in February, on 59
satellite, cable, and digital distribution outfits. The Current
Time network produces daily news shows on the United States and
global events, including within Russia, and features reports on
business, entrepreneurship, civil society, culture, and
corruption, and is the leading distributor of Russian-language
documentaries from independent Russian documentary film
producers. In essence, it provides a Russian-language truthful
alternative to the Kremlin's disinformation distortions and
lies.
Digital statistics indicate that the Current Time network
is yielding results already. From January to July of this year,
Current Time short-form Russian-language videos which are seen
on social media within Russia and around the Russian periphery
were viewed more than 300 million times, nearly three times the
number of views during that same period a year ago. And of
those 300 million views, half of those are coming from
audiences inside
Russia.
Russian disinformation campaigns are truly a global effort,
and the BBG recognizes this. Our programming in Russia and the
Russian periphery is consumed by over 24 million adults on a
weekly basis in 20 languages, including, of course, Russian. We
have also deployed a new brand called Polygraph, a joint Radio
Free Europe and VOA website that is, in essence, a fact-checker
to call out Kremlin distortions and educate global audiences on
media literacy and how to spot fake news.
Russia has jumped to criticize these and other BBG efforts.
A Russian state news organization charged that these programs
are all produced by ``Russian people who put the interests of
America above the interests of Russia.'' Our journalists have
also come under attack and are under increasing pressure and
intimidation in Moscow.
In addition to the nearly half-billion-dollar combined
budgets of RT and Sputnik and other Russian international
media, the Russian Government also targets Russian speakers
around the world with its vast resources of its domestic state-
controlled news and entertainment networks. By contrast, the
BBG's FY 2017 budget is $786 million, but spread across 61
languages.
Make no mistake, the United States is confronted by
information warfare, and I don't use that term lightly. The
good work of our journalists around the world is an essential
element of the national security toolkit through the export of
objective, independent, and professional journalism, and the
universal values of free media and free speech.
There's one thing we won't do, and that's propaganda. Our
content is protected by a legislative firewall that prevents
the U.S. Government interfering in our editorial decision
making. Now, that's important to understand.
I'll close with a quote from Edward R. Murrow, who served
as the director of U.S. Information Agency from 1961 to 1964,
the predecessor of the BBG. He testified before Congress and
said: ``To be persuasive we must be believable; to be
believable we must be credible; and to be credible we must be
truthful.''
His words ring true today, more than ever.
Thank you.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Lansing.
Ms. McKew.
MOLLY K. McKEW, CEO, FIANNA STRATEGIES
Ms. McKew. Good morning. Thank you, Senator Gardner,
commissioners. I am grateful to have the opportunity to share
some of my experiences countering Russian information warfare
in the past decade.
It's been 10 months since we were informed that an
information war is being waged against the American people. Our
actions say that we're still trying to decide if this is a real
threat or not. We must be clear about what these measures aim
to achieve.
First, Russian disinformation is a means of warfare. It's
the core component of a war being waged by the Russian state
against the West, and against the United States in particular.
As I outline further in my written testimony, Russian doctrine
is quite clear about the importance, primacy, and aims of
information warfare. The Kremlin is operationalizing a
fundamentally guerilla approach to total warfare in order to
achieve strategic political objectives in a kind of global
imperialist insurgency. Within this, the smoke and mirrors of
information operations are a primary means of power projection.
Second, the main line of effort in this war is conducted in
English. We have failed to secure our information space,
allowing our self-defined primary adversary to shape and
sometimes control it at will.
Third, we have failed to understand the importance the
Kremlin ascribes to these efforts and the resources, formal and
informal, that it devotes to them. The Kremlin has built
sophisticated information architecture inside our information
space. It is constantly reinforced and expanded by the creation
and dissemination of considerable amounts of content. It
increasingly relies on computational propaganda--artificial
intelligence, botnets, and other means of automation, as well
as data-driven targeting.
We don't compete offensively or defensively in that war.
Yet, in many respects, it is the war that matters most.
Information tools are the new super weapons, shifting the
fundamental balance of power between adversarial forces.
The Kremlin believes that people are the most exploitable
weakness in any system. What the Kremlin sees, for example, is
that Facebook is a means of collection and a means of
operationalizing information operations effectively and
inexpensively: a real-life, free-market, big-brother platform
for surveillance and computational propaganda available to any
power that is willing to pay for it. Russian information
operations have come of age with social media.
Information warfare now plays a significant role in shaping
the information environment of our elections and other
political discourse in Europe and in the United States. I
detail some examples of this in my written testimony, including
how Russian-backed information operations in Georgia and
Moldova have helped to alter the political landscape.
I want to emphasize this is not about information, but
about eliciting behavioral change and about action.
Disinformation has purpose. ``What did it aim to achieve'' is
often a more important question than if it is true. Russian
information operations are used to activate people and groups
in different ways when information is applied on prepared
networks. They are integrated into the operational footprint of
Russia in Europe and beyond, combining intelligence resources
with access to technology and information capabilities,
operating with few creative limitations and backed by
considerable state resources.
There are a few examples of these from recent news. During
the 2016 United States elections, Russian Facebook pages were
used to organize anti-immigration protests in the United
States. In January, a Russian information campaign sparked
protests in Germany about the so-called Lisa case, a false
story about a young girl brutalized by refugees. In June,
Russian hackers planted a false story in Qatar's news agency
which spread and contributed to a major diplomatic rift in Gulf
Arab nations. And this year, Russian information operations
have aimed to inflame a rift between Poland and Ukraine based
on historical debates.
These examples show that Russian information operations aim
to deepen divides and amplify unrest, to achieve political
outcomes, and to identify enemies for us, internal and
external. The Kremlin would rather that we fight ourselves and
fight each other than be unified against Russian ambitions and
against their interference.
These manipulations don't create tendencies or traits in
our societies. They elevate, exploit, and distort divides and
grievances that already are present, and they amplify fringe
views. Russian information operations are a dark mirror of our
weaknesses in which no one really wants to see themselves.
Russia likes to position their doctrine as a response to
American actions. It's more helpful to understand that the
tools they deploy against us they have used against the Russian
people first. They forcibly secured their information space
before they attacked ours.
We, as Americans, want to believe this warfare doesn't work
on us, that oceans are still a barrier to foreign invasion. But
we really have no basis in fact for remaining comfortable with
that belief. We do need a new kind of star chamber coordinating
our best assets--diplomatic, military, intelligence, industry,
nongovernmental, and informal--to counter the information war
launched by the Kremlin's power vertical.
I highlight additional measures for securing our
information space in my written testimony, but I would like to
highlight a few in brief.
First, we need a whole-of-government response driven by a
unity of mission. Clear leadership amplifies results. If our
government is more open about the threat and the results, media
and civil society actors, for example, can follow along and
take more action.
Second, we also need an integrated whole-of-alliance
approach with our NATO and EU allies. Some, especially Estonia
and Lithuania and Ukraine, bring critical capabilities, insight
and experience that we need.
Third, irregular warfare, including information warfare,
will be fought within our borders. This means we need to
rethink authorities. Our most experienced assets shouldn't be
boxed out of defending the American people. We need sanctioned
irregulars to build defensive and retaliatory capacity in
information operations, and a good place to start would be a
combination of U.S. Special Forces--who are, by mission,
trained to fight unconventional wars--with counterintelligence
and independent actors. We must also work with our trusted
allies on the geographic front lines of NATO using--as you
noted, Senator Gardner--the 10th Special Forces Group, our
Europe-aligned group, which brings a range of knowledge and
experience in countering Russia to the table.
Fourth, Americans need to be armed with defensive tools.
One of these is stronger data and privacy protections that will
limit the coercive applications of big data.
Fifth, we need to evaluate how to restrict tools of
computational propaganda on social media and whether that is
something that we can do.
Finally, we must be far more aware of how the export of
Russian capital into our system is influencing critical
industries, including tech and big data.
We should never emulate the Russian information-control
model. Disinformation has purpose, but fighting it must also
have purpose. If we aren't clear about what that purpose is,
what we are fighting for and what we believe, then we can't
win. But this has been an open battlefield for the Kremlin for
more than a decade, and it's not a war we can afford to lose.
Thank you.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Ms. McKew.
Ms. Hooper.
MELISSA HOOPER, DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
PROGRAMS, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
Ms. Hooper. Senator Gardner, Co-Chair Smith, members of the
Helsinki Commission, I want to thank you and Chairman Wicker
for giving me the opportunity to testify regarding the damage
caused to democracy and human rights by Russian disinformation
efforts in the United States and Europe, and efforts to combat
them.
I've submitted a longer statement. I will highlight a few
points here.
Since the election, Congress and other policymakers have
become increasingly sensitized to the Russian Government's use
of various forms of disinformation. However, I should emphasize
that the use of disinformation is not the Russian Government's
sole strategy. It is part of a coordinated effort to disrupt
and attack liberal norms wherever the opportunity arises, using
economic influence, electoral disruption, and the weakening of
multilateral institutions, among other strategies.
At Human Rights First, we've documented the effectiveness
of these threats in Eastern Europe, including how Russia has
contributed to significant backsliding on democracy and human
rights in Poland and Hungary, each a NATO ally. Importantly,
Hungarian and Polish publics largely disagree with anti-EU and
anti-
democracy messaging. Nearly 80 percent want to stay in the EU
and NATO despite propaganda attacking these institutions. Thus,
investments in Eastern Europe that shore up democratic
institutions are likely to yield positive results.
In addition to media propagation of disinformation, Russia
sponsors government-organized NGOs, or GONGOs, across Europe
that contribute their own false and misleading analyses and
expert statements. Two Berlin-based Russian-funded
organizations are Boris Yakunin's Dialogue of Civilizations and
the German Center for Eurasian Studies.
Recently, I conducted research into Russia's use of these
think tanks, their contributions to disinformation, and
possible links to the far right and ultranationalist
Alternative for Deutschland and National Democratic Party in
the run-up to Germany's election. What I found was that the
Russian-funded think tanks and German far-right parties were
putting out similar messages on a number of key topics,
including the EU, NATO, the United States, Western democracy,
and Western media.
In general, these included attacks on multilateral
institutions built on liberal democratic values and indictments
of these institutions as serving only elites. Specifically,
both argue that Western democracy has been degraded by
multiculturalism and Western media is untrustworthy, as well as
that the EU and the U.S. are not truly free or democratic.
It bears noting that the reach of these campaigns is at
present quite small. Germany seems to be prepared to fend off
interference around its upcoming election. German leaders have
issued public warnings about potential Russian cyberattacks and
disinformation and developed working groups and contingency
plans. The German public has therefore been sensitized to the
possibility of interference. However, about 3 million Russian
speakers in Germany continue to be targeted daily with
disinformation about refugees, same-sex marriage, terrorism and
defense issues.
Germany has also made some missteps in responding to
disinformation. The Network Enforcement Act passed in June
essentially forces social-media companies to be the arbiters of
what constitutes free speech and what violates German law. This
is a dangerous, shortsighted approach and will inevitably force
these corporations to rely heavily on censorship.
In January, then-Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper said that the attacks that occurred around the U.S.
election were a ``clarion call for action against a threat to
the very foundation of our democratic political system.'' This
threat is not confined to the immediate run-up to elections.
Challenges to our democracy are occurring right now, and the
U.S. has been slow to respond.
So what do we do? First, I agree with Ms. McKew that the
U.S. Government needs to unify around the conviction that
Russia used disinformation in the United States. By no means is
it the only purveyor of false and misleading information, but
it remains a leader in pursuing this phenomenon for political
ends.
The U.S. Government needs to present a unified front to
European allies, partner with them in combating this threat,
and also take a leadership role in crafting a thorough and
methodological response.
Second, Congress needs to work with other government
bodies, tech companies and civil society to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of how disinformation works and can
be combated to ensure that all bodies are on the same page and
there is a comprehensive plan and approach. It shouldn't rely
on shortsighted responses similar to the German law.
Third, much of the U.S. Government's focus has been on
messaging and public diplomacy, but we also need mid- and long-
term strategies to support democratic institutions and values
overseas. For example, funding for the Global Engagement Center
is important, but its focus on messaging is only one tool. It
isn't by itself a comprehensive response. The best
advertisement for democracy and human rights is the
demonstration of strong, well-functioning democratic
institutions. We need to show people, not just tell them.
On the part of Congress, this means adequately funding
democracy and governance programming, including in Eastern
Europe, a region we formerly thought had graduated from
authoritarianism. For example, the European and Eurasian
Democracy and Anti-
Corruption Initiative, introduced by a bipartisan coalition,
including some from this Commission, would commit $157 million
for innovative projects to combat Russian disinformation and
influence in Europe, like those that we believe are helping
Germany fend off interference in its election.
At a time in which democratic values and institutions are
being undermined and challenged directly, we need to invest
resources in these mainstays of sustainable security and
prosperity. Nations are looking to us for guidance in dealing
with this new type of threat. We need to step up and lead.
Thank you.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Ms. Hooper.
I thank you all for your testimony. It's intriguing,
fascinating and frightening at the same time. There's a saying
in politics that politics is the only place where sound travels
faster than light. I didn't come up with that. It's actually
printed on the wall in one of the restaurants here in town. But
I think it has great meaning, because we're dealing with
information here that, once out there, can't be pulled back.
And as children we were taught that if you're on the
playground and somebody hits you, it's always the one throwing
the second punch who gets caught. But in this case, it's the
first one that matters and the second one that no one pays any
attention to.
So tell me, Ms. Hooper, Mr. Lansing, Ms. McKew: How do we
respond to misinformation in a way that is elevated to the
level of that first attention grab of the actual disinformation
itself?
Ms. Hooper. I think you pointed out correctly, Senator
Gardner, that just correcting facts after the fact, which is
important, is not going to have the same punch. It doesn't have
the same breadth and reach. We find in studies that often a
correction makes the initial statement more viral, because
there is some attempt at censorship. So correcting can be
sometimes harmful.
I think there are a couple of ways that we can have that
kind of impact. One is something called counter speech. At
Human Rights First, we have studied narratives about certain
communities, like the Lisa case, and narratives about
immigrants and refugees. Putting out stories and narratives by
these communities, about these communities, is important.
Initiating that communication and putting out information that
counters the information we think is going to be falsely
presented is helpful.
And then I think that what Mr. Lansing has discussed is
media literacy, educating people about being critical of
information that could be put out. I think the German
Government has done a really good job of that around the
election, coming together and communicating to their population
to be on the lookout for this. That helps a lot.
Mr. Gardner. Mr. Lansing or Ms. McKew, would you like to
add to that?
Mr. Lansing. Senator Gardner, your point is very well
taken. And I think, in terms of the BBG's perspective, it's
both an offensive and a defensive strategy. We've really taken
to the offensive. You saw the example of Current Time, of
telling stories and showing documentaries that Russian language
speakers, within Russia and outside of Russia, just never see,
that they're blocked from seeing. So offensively, we're
bringing information and content to audiences that, by the very
existence of that content, indicate that they're being blocked
from other content.
And then, defensively, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has
done a fantastic job with investigative reporting. In fact,
they had one investigative report earlier this month that
definitively proved that there were Russian armor and tanks in
eastern Ukraine based on identifying them visually with a
camera and then matching them to tanks and armored personnel
carriers seen in Red Square during a parade.
So that kind of offensive/defensive, punch/counterpunch
helps us gain some advantage so we're not always on a tit-for-
tat trying to correct the record.
Ms. McKew. Just very briefly, to add to what was just said,
on our side, and again, focusing on English and not on
Russian--which I believe is an important but very separate
problem--being clear on the threat and the goals and the
purpose of what Russia is doing, especially to the United
States, but in our information space more broadly, is extremely
important.
Based on polling and other surveys, many Americans don't
believe it is happening and don't believe it would have any
impact on them. The core of this, which is what's so unnerving,
especially if you sit with some of the information--warfare
experts in countries that pay a lot of attention to this, is
that none of this is the ``secret sauce'' they all want us to
believe it is. It's marketing. It's basic human psychology
utilized in new technological ways. But it's very effective in
the ways it's being applied, because it's encountering open
space to move into. There's nothing coming from our side.
Open-source intelligence projects and investigative
journalism and exposing disinformation are very important
initiatives, but none of them fill the most critical space,
which is narrative and which is storytelling; what is the
purpose of what we are doing and how we are delivering that to
people. That's an open space right now in which there is very
little leadership. For me this is the first step in
coordinating what our response needs to be in a way that will
be noticed by people, because we've been very absent from it in
the past decade.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you.
And the Co-Chair of the Commission, Congressman Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Chairman.
A couple of questions. First, as you know, recently the
news broke that the FBI is investigating Sputnik for a possible
FARA violation and that the U.S. associate of RT has been
ordered to register with DOJ as an agent of a foreign
government. I'm wondering if you thought that was a good step.
Will it have positive consequences?
Mr. Lansing. Congressman Smith, I'm aware of that
information. It's in the press. There are consequences to
anything that would look like an attempt by the U.S. Government
to limit or block Russian media in the United States. That's
not to say it's not a good idea, but I would suggest that there
would be consequences.
We currently have a bureau in Moscow with approximately 50
journalists, mostly RFE/RL and some Voice of America and I
worry about a reciprocal response. But at the same time, I
think it is a complicated problem, because you have the
activities of RT and Sputnik that clearly appear to require
some investigation.
Mr. Smith. OK.
Ms. McKew. I might just add to that quickly, amplifying a
point that Senator Cardin made in his opening remarks about the
information warfare tactics that were applied in eastern
Ukraine before the invasion--I think something we really need
to look at is what are these organizations, because they're not
just media. They're not just reporters.
Starting as far back as the Georgian war in 2008, certainly
in Ukraine and in Crimea, the first wave of the war was the
arrival of Russian journalists and the establishment of
communications from those areas, including completely false
video, a narrative that was being established to justify the
means of invasion.
So I think it's a very complicated area, the free speech,
how-do-we-not-become-Russia-while-responding-to-Russia problem.
But these are not standard media organizations, and they are
worthy of separate consideration from other things, like BBC,
NHK, other state media, which are not at all similar to what
Russia does with their state media resources.
Mr. Smith. One of the concerns that I have--Mr. Lansing,
you might want to take this--is there a thought of creating a
Current Time for China? I co-chair the China Commission with
Senator Marco Rubio. My committee, the Human Rights Committee
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that and with the China
Commission, I've chaired 62 hearings on China and Chinese human
rights abuses.
There are threats to human rights all over the world.
Russia and China pose among the most egregious threats to human
rights and freedom the world has ever known. And taken
together--and they do work increasingly together--I think we
are in a very precarious time in our history.
My question would be--especially at a time when CCTV is on
a tear, just like the Russians are, to propagandize not just
Americans but the world, with the narrative about Xi Jinping's
benign benevolence and everything else--I watch CCTV just to
stay abreast of what they're doing, their hatred towards Japan
and the harkening back to the atrocities committed by the
Japanese is a regular feature on that television network--and
yet we have been cutting Radio Free Asia slots at the precise
time when we should be tripling it.
So my question would be, there seems to be a sense in our
government and elsewhere that we give China a pass while we
focus on Russia. Now, we should enhance our work against
Russia. And I think the work that Current Time is doing, I
think that's a very, very responsible and responsive attempt to
really get the truth out.
But, that said, we are diminishing our capacity to get the
truth out in China. As a matter of fact, it is demonstrable. I
meet with the folks that run the Radio Free Asia efforts, and
VOA has got a similar problem, and they are aghast. They're
appalled that we are lessening our ability to tell the truth in
that dictatorship. And again, they operate unfettered here in
the United States through CCTV and other means. They're even
buying Hollywood, as we all know, so that there will not be a
criticism leveled against the Chinese dictatorship, because if
you want to get your movie, if you want to get your screenplay
approved, it will be censored.
And we saw that all happen some years ago--and I had the
first hearings, and then several more over the years--on global
online freedom, or the lack thereof, where Google and others
would voluntarily censor, as the price of admission to that
market, what happened at Tiananmen Square. And Google, I swore
at them, and Yahoo, Microsoft and others, and I was sickened by
the complicity of U.S. corporations to kowtow to Beijing. While
the economic interests are nowhere near as robust with Moscow
as they are with Beijing, we have enabled dictatorship through
these actions.
So Current Time--is there something similar planned for
China? And again, there seems to be a double standard when it
comes to China and our lack of robust broadcasting there and
right now, as we meet, the downgrading of Radio Free Asia. I'm
the one who offered the amendment to make it 24 hours a day
when it was a part time because there's much more that we could
be doing in that.
And let me just ask one final question. I have many, but
time doesn't permit it. How would all of you assess the
European governments' efforts to counter Russian
disinformation? Are we working as collaboratively as we could?
Estonia, as we know, has made a valiant effort to step up a new
Russian-language television station, ETV+, to counter Russian
propaganda. But one country alone can't do it. What can be done
to coordinate those efforts with our European friends and
allies?
Mr. Lansing. Congressman Smith, thank you. I agree with
everything you said there.
As far as China, we consider China and Southeast Asia and
the China periphery to be on a par with Russia as the top two
information battlefields that we're dealing with. Thanks to the
successful and positive mark we have from the U.S. Senate for
FY 2018, I think we'll be able to enhance and not reduce our
RFA coverage, as a matter of fact. And, in fact, we had a
special appropriation from FY 2017 that allowed us to develop
programming with Radio Free Asia and Voice of America for the
first time to create television content for North Korea.
I think we'd all agree that the North Korea situation and
the connection with China right now is a key foreign-policy
issue for the United States, and we're focusing on that right
now. And we've already developed some very interesting
programming that counters the narrative in North Korea about
what it's like for Koreans living in the United States or for
those in South Korea as well.
We're investing in China and its periphery. As with Russia,
it's difficult to get television into China and parts of
Southeast Asia. We just yesterday went through a situation
where we were shut down. Radio Free Asia was shut down in
Cambodia by President Hun and we're evacuating our people from
Cambodia today. So it's a tinderbox of information complexities
and we're facing it head on.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate it.
Just one final thought, if you could answer those other
questions as well. Are you thinking of a Current Time-type of
effort for China? And again, RFA Mandarin Service is facing a
94 percent cut. I'm encouraged that you're happy with the
appropriation.
Mr. Lansing. Yes, the mark will allow us not to have to do
that.
Mr. Smith. Great. Completely not to do it?
Mr. Lansing. Yes. Correct.
Mr. Smith. That's great.
Mr. Lansing. And the Current Time approach is, in essence,
the approach we've taken in the last two years that I've been
in this chair. To take our five networks and use them together
for a greater impact. That's what we're doing, for instance,
with the North Korea programming. It's the Voice of America and
Radio Free Asia working together, one telling America's story
through the Korean diaspora and one telling the story of
Koreans in South Korea.
So the answer is ``yes,'' philosophically, to the approach
of Current Time, which is to use multiple networks to have
maximum impact and use taxpayer dollars more efficiently by
doing it that way.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Coordination?
Ms. McKew. Just two quick points on that. I think that
there's a range of European efforts that are under way--some
are in Russian, some are in other languages--focused in these
same areas of investigative journalism countering Russian
disinformation. But again, English language resources are
absent.
The Baltic example that you mentioned is a good one, where,
yes, they're doing more Russian-language broadcasting, but
English-language news from the Baltics is still very much
controlled by Russia. The primary news sources in English are
RT and Sputnik coming out of the Baltics. There needs to be
more English-language resources that are not driven by Russian
content from a variety of regions in the world.
I think the beginning of how we coordinate that response,
something we need to look at more closely is using our
military-to-
military relationships as the core of this effort. Those are
really the steel in our alliance, especially in NATO. In times
of political shifts in many countries, and other uncertainties,
those really anchor the direction of where we're going. There
are tremendous capabilities there that I think we--especially
sometimes our diplomatic core--tend to sideline and want to
keep out of non-conflict areas, but there's tremendous
capability there that can be used in fighting these types of
hybrid warfare that we need to utilize more efficiently. Also,
I think how do we coordinate everything else is, the United
States of America as a full unified government needs to make
clear that we're in this fight and that we stand with our
European allies on countering Russian aggression in the
information space and elsewhere. Right now that is not
necessarily clear to our allies in Europe.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Congressman. Thanks.
And for those of you who haven't seen it, some of the
content that they have directed toward North Korea is very
good, and I would encourage you to have a chance to see that
because we're starting to do some very unique things, thanks to
the bill that both the chambers passed last Congress that
authorized significant funding for some of those new programs.
That was one of the good things we did in bipartisan fashion
here as it relates to North Korea.
Congresswoman Moore.
HON. GWEN MOORE, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank this distinguished panel. I do look
forward to having the opportunity to really read your written
testimony thoroughly and continue to engage with you on these
issues.
I'm going to try not to be as long as my good friend Chris
Smith in asking this question. I'm going to work on this. I'm
going to try hard. [Laughs.] I'll try hard not to make my
question as long as yours, but this is a very, very complicated
issue.
I once asked James Clapper, the former director of national
intelligence, whether or not he thought that some of the stuff,
Ms. McKew, that you say is not secret sauce. It's just basic
human psychology and knowing how to manipulate people that has
shown that it's effective--asking him if he thought that absent
proof that there was actual manipulation of votes or voter
rolls and so on, whether or not these sort of psychological
messages had an impact on voter turnout or voter choices. He
said that the intelligence agencies really weren't equipped or
they just really didn't or couldn't make that kind of
assessment. I found that very distressing. I can't remember
whether it was you, Ms. McKew, or Ms. Hooper that made the
point that it's not just diplomacy that we've got to do, but we
have to build out our technological infrastructure. I do know
that, Ms. McKew, you are the one that made the point that until
we all get on the same page and admit that the Russians
interfered in our election, that we aren't going to be able to
move forward.
So here's my question: Like climate change deniers, is
there some sort of drop-dead date that we better come up with
in terms of getting our act together, getting on the same page
with the Europeans, putting the appropriate assets in the State
Department to build out infrastructure and capacity before it's
going to be too late and they are really going to infiltrate
this space and have it become a virus or germ that we won't be
able to reverse it?
Ms. McKew. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the thoughts and
the question.
I think there's never a ``too late,'' but I think we're
really late in responding, and I think for a variety of
reasons, policy driven and otherwise, we've been late coming to
this fight.
And at this point, I think it's hard not to argue that
there have been significant shifts. The erosion of belief that
institutional democracy can deliver for representative
populations, the erosion of belief that institutions matter in
many Western societies, certainly the erosion of the belief
that this is something other countries want to pursue, are
things that have very much developed over the last decade in
parallel with Russian disinformation operations. So interpret
that how you will, but I think that our voice needs to be in
that space in a way that actually celebrates and represents our
values in ways that we haven't seemed to be willing to do in
quite some time.
I think that if you're looking at the evaluation of proof
of manipulation based on information operations, it's very hard
to do, as Clapper suggested. But if you look at shifts in
opinion during that same period of time--in particular the
period between summer 2015, when we know there was an
escalation in Russian activity in our information space--and at
parallel shifts in opinion on key issues in certain voting
populations in the United States--on issues like free trade
there were significant shifts in opinion. I think it's hard to
say that what they were doing didn't have an impact. And what
we have seen them do in other countries, particularly in
countries like Georgia and Moldova and in Ukraine, is focus
very much on voter suppression or mobilization, on how to get
people to vote or not vote based on who they are.
Ms. Moore. And to that point, I received several robocalls
based on these algorithms and, you know, targeting African-
American women, and so on, to suppress the vote. I got a call,
clearly a Slavic voice--and they knew that I hadn't voted
early--saying it's not too late, you haven't voted, but if you
vote for Hillary Clinton, she will deliberately start World War
III. Now, you know, being sort of a peacenik-type person, I
mean, it's easy to determine from my social footprint that I
would be vulnerable to such a message.
And in terms of the whole Facebook thing, targeting its
users, we are hearing that they targeted Facebook folks, and
anybody who talked about mass incarceration or racial
injustice, people were targeted for the super predatory message
about Hillary Clinton and news of that fashion. And so I am
wondering, is there an opportunity for us--since James Clapper
says that our intelligence agencies are not doing it--is there
some technology that we have to counter these psychological
messages? Is there something you can point to that we could do?
Ms. McKew. Absolutely. And I think the points you raise are
really good ones. And your point about the campaign targeting
and messaging targeting is really important to me, because I
think people believe these things aren't happening, because we
don't see the same information anymore. The stuff that would
have been targeting you on Facebook or in person is not the
same things that I would have been getting.
And the first time we saw that used in that specific way,
it was in the Georgian elections in 2012, where there were
these totally separate information universes created on
Facebook to mobilize or demobilize parts of the population in
very different ways. So I think the solution to that, there is
a technological piece of this.
But the problem is, who's motivated to find it? Industry--
that being social media companies and data and technology
firms--make a lot of money off of this. They are not interested
in shutting this down. And the solution, they seem to be
suggesting, is the best way to fight automated content online
is to create more automated content online so we can get double
the advertising revenue--which I don't think is the best
solution when we're talking about persuasive views and people's
opinions in between.
But there is certainly an industry role to be played in
this, an evaluative role, especially from the Congress, to be
played in what can be done to limit the ability of social media
to use computational propaganda, and for foreign adversaries in
particular to use this for these types of information
operations and not just advertising, it's not just selling
shoes. This is about aggressively changing the views of
individuals, and we need to be aware of that.
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much.
And thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you.
Ms. Moore. Well, I have to go back to the ``House of the
People'' to vote. [Laughter.]
Mr. Gardner. Well, several of us are housebroken already!
[Laughter.] Ben and I are housebroken. [Laughter.] Thank you,
Congresswoman, for being here.
Senator Shaheen.
HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mrs. Shaheen. There are some of us that think that's the
problem with the Senate. [Laughter.]
Let me begin by thanking each of you for being here, for
your testimony and for the work that you're doing in this
space. I believe that this disinformation is one of the biggest
threats that our democracy faces today. And I think that one of
the reasons that we have had trouble developing a whole-of-
government approach is because the first thing that really got
the attention of the American people was the Russian
interference in our elections in 2016, and that was viewed
through a partisan lens as opposed to being viewed through an
understanding that this is a threat to the foundations of
American democracy. It has nothing to do with Republicans and
Democrats. It's all about how do we undermine democracy in
America and in the West. So I especially appreciate what all of
you are doing.
I want to go back to the whole-of-government approach,
though, because on the one hand, Mr. Lansing, you talked about
the importance of keeping all of the work of the BBG separate
from government so it's not viewed as propaganda, which I
appreciate and I agree that that's important. But it also makes
it difficult, then, to develop a whole-of-government approach.
I've had a chance to ask members of the military about
whether we should have a unit in our military that deals with
disinformation, and they punted to the State Department.
Russia, on the other hand, does have that kind of unit in their
military. So the question is, how do we develop that whole-of-
government approach given the various interests that we have
within our government and the partisan challenges that we still
face in terms of dealing with this issue?
Mr. Lansing. Senator Shaheen, I'll start and then defer to
the other panelists.
I would just say that I appreciate, and the BGG
appreciates, your leadership on the issue of disinformation in
the Senate and you keeping it highlighted the way you have. As
we think about the BBG--and I discussed earlier the firewall
that protects the independence, as you said, so that the
content is not viewed as propaganda--that doesn't mean that
we're not connected to the Federal Government. We're very much
connected. In fact, on our board there are nine board members.
It's a bipartisan board, but the Secretary of State, or his
designee, serves on our board. And we have regular contact with
the State Department. So when we make decisions about where
we're going to deploy assets around the world, the decisions
are made based on the information that we learn and understand
through our colleagues at State and sometimes other agencies.
So it's no mistake that we're emphasizing Russia and the
Russian periphery, and China and the China periphery, and ISIS
in the Middle East as our top three priorities. Because we
understand that, because we stay connected with the U.S.
Government. So we can still be involved in a whole-of-
government solution. We just have a very unique lane that we
operate in. Others could do information programming that would
not be in our lane. They could do any number of things.
Mrs. Shaheen. Ms. McKew.
Ms. McKew. Thank you, Senator. And I would also thank you
for your leadership on the Kaspersky issue, which is something
that has driven many of us crazy for a long time. I'm glad to
see we're finally moving forward on getting that out of our
government infrastructure, and hopefully the rest of the
country as well.
It is a complicated issue. However, I think the one thing
we can really look at, right now no single part of our
government and no single part of our civil society or industry
or anything else wants to take leadership on this because there
isn't that center to activity. And when it's created and
everybody has to be in the room, suddenly, good things happen.
I think the one thing from the Russian side we really can seek
to emulate is the informality and creativity that comes from
throwing various parts of a mechanism into a room together and
seeing what comes out the other side, where you have
intelligence talking to industry, where you have military
talking to diplomacy in a much more integrated way on the
threats, how to respond to them, what to do if you're thinking
offensively, certainly.
Mrs. Shaheen. But let me just interrupt you for a minute.
Ms. McKew. Yes.
Mrs. Shaheen. Because I think you hit on one of the things
that's the real challenge, and that is we don't currently have
anybody in charge.
Ms. McKew. Correct.
Mrs. Shaheen. So, again, I've asked the State Department
about this. They have not moved forward very rapidly with the
funding on their Global Engagement Center, and they were not
excited about being the point person on this issue. So who
should be in charge? Where should the leadership for this
reside, and the
direction?
Ms. McKew. I think until it's clear that the White House
believes this issue is something we need to address forcefully,
that is a very difficult question. But it needs to be something
that's assigned to an individual within our government
somewhere to lead this effort.
I think you see a lot of things sitting out there waiting
to be used. The GEC is a good example, where Congress has been
forcefully saying create this, use this, here's some money. Why
aren't you doing anything with it? It's still sitting there. In
the Pentagon, there's an entire part of the Pentagon that deals
with information operations. What are we doing with them right
now? The Marine Corps just created a new directorate of
information operations. Why aren't they coordinating with the
other military branches that work on these things? Again,
special forces have great capacity in Military Information
Support Operations, and none of these are coordinated. They're
all sort of drifting around. And again, none of these things
have any mandate to look at what is happening inside the United
States, coordinate with counterintelligence.
And there was a really good piece in Politico last week by
Asha Rangappa talking about this, that there's no authorities
for counterintelligence to look at social media or counter, you
know, sort of aggressive, hostile information operations within
the American information space. There's just a lot of
rethinking that needs to be done in terms of authorities and
how we respond. And until there is some sort of coordination
body, I just don't know how we get to that answer.
But certainly, the Senate and the Congress can provide
leadership on this by sort of forcefully mandating that we move
in this direction and that there is somebody within the U.S.
Government looking at legal authorities, sort of organizational
authorities, structure of political will. And even if everybody
doesn't show up, maybe you get enough people in a room to have
a critical mass to move forward, or at least to use what is
already there that we are currently not coordinating and not
utilizing well.
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you. I know I'm out of time, but can I
just get Ms. Hooper to respond to this as well?
Ms. Hooper. Sure, very quickly. I think that we have seen
some leadership coming from Congress where the White House and
the Secretary of State have left a gap, and I would encourage
more of that leadership in this space, in terms of looking at
the funding for democracy programming in the State Department.
And again, holding hearings and raising this issue repeatedly,
I think that's where we are seeing leadership. We're going to
need more of that, but it's going to also need to coordinate
with technology companies, for example, and also civil society,
where there's expertise as well.
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Mr. Cardin. I think Senator Shaheen is raising some
extremely important points. The Congress has tried to intercede
to focus on this issue, to coordinate the activities of various
agencies. I must tell you, I've been extremely impressed by the
work in our intelligence community in this area. They've been
very active, and they have shared that information not just
with the Congress but with our friends around the world. So
there's been some strong coordination on the intelligence front
as to what is happening.
Where we haven't seen the attention is on how you counter
it, how you protect and counter. That's where I think we have
really not seen the work. I've had some meetings with our
colleagues in NATO and the EU to try to energize better
cooperation. Congress has authorized funds for international
efforts. Those funds were just recently released. There's
also--and Senator Gardner and I have talked about it--in our
oversight functions there really hasn't been a clear
responsibility. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has, I
think, the principal responsibility here. There are other
committees involved. But we haven't really focused on that
aspect of it. And we're talking about perhaps a way of
reorganizing some of the work in our permanent committees to
deal with this.
The OSCE is the largest regional organization in the world.
It has an overwhelming majority of its members who are of like
mind as to what Russia is doing and that it is dangerous to our
security, and we need to be better defended and have an
offensive way to counter their misinformation. We all
understand--well, at least those of us that have been on the
Helsinki Commission understand--the bureaucratic challenges of
the OSCE, particularly Vienna. But we also know about the hope
within the Parliamentary Assembly that we are able to get
pretty direct action against perpetrators that are against the
principles of the Helsinki Final Act.
So my question is, is there an avenue within the OSCE,
within the Helsinki Commission, where we can organize countries
of like mind to more effectively deal with the preparation for
what Russia is doing, but also how we can have platforms to
counter that misinformation. I appreciate, Mr. Lansing, what
you're doing, but I would think that it would be more helpful
if we also had the input and cooperation of more and more
countries that recognize the danger of this disinformation
campaign. How could we more effectively utilize the U.S.
Helsinki Commission and the OSCE?
Mr. Lansing. We would be very open to working with our
friends and allies in this. We do have an organization called
the DG7, which brings together the state broadcasters of many
of our allies--Japan, Australia, Germany, France, the U.K.--and
we meet once annually to compare research and goals and see how
we can help one another in various parts of the world. But I
think that type of approach is something that we'd be very
favorable towards.
Mr. Cardin. Any other suggestions on how we can get other
countries working with us more effectively to recognize the
threat--and the intelligence information is there. They know
what's going on. But what I have not seen, is a coordinated
effort among countries to affirmatively defend ourselves and to
counter what Russia is doing.
Ms. McKew. I would agree with you on that, and I think that
the OSCE can potentially play a role. Sometimes the issue tends
to be that the Russians can mess up what is happening within
the OSCE, but if there is the ability to build a like-minded
group, particularly one that can bring together the people we
think of as donors in this space--the U.S., the U.K., Swedes,
others who have been forthcoming with resources to fight
Russian disinformation in a variety of projects--with the
countries that are sort of frontline partners who don't really
have the resources to contribute to this fight but they have
the expertise and the experience and the manpower and the
history to understand what is happening in more clear ways,
that could be extremely useful. I think that would be a very
useful effort.
Ms. Hooper. Can I just echo? I know that Dunja Mijatovic,
who was the former special representative on freedom of the
media in the OSCE, did put out a paper on combatting
disinformation and was pulling together groups of journalists,
for example, to develop strategies and talk about strategies
within the OSCE space, and I think that's pulling on what Ms.
McKew noted, that there's a lot of expertise in the OSCE among
countries that had been affected by Russian disinformation in
various ways that are on the frontlines. But you'll note that,
then, Ms. Mijatovic's term was cut short because there were
political reasons that the Russian Government was involved in
trying to cut short her term. So I think that there is of
course that risk, but there is the opportunity as well because
there are many like-minded countries within the OSCE.
Mr. Cardin. Well, a consensus organization is always
restricted as to taking formal action, but the OSCE has a long
history on freedom of the press and opportunities, and where we
can use that in human rights, where we can showcase what's
going on as far as misinformation. I would just urge us to use
those opportunities.
I mentioned the human rights meeting that takes place
annually in Poland. We'll have our winter meetings in Vienna,
of the Parliamentary Assembly. Our annual meeting in July is in
Berlin. There are opportunities for sidebar meetings. There are
opportunities for action. The Parliamentary Assembly works by
majority--it's more democratic than how Vienna works--we could
get some things and we could put a spotlight on what's going on
and we could have a forum to recognize that we must be more
effective in sharing strategies to defend against Russian
disinformation. I just think there are ways that we can do
this, and I think you all can be very helpful to us in putting
that together.
Mr. Lansing. Senator Cardin, I think that's a really
terrific suggestion. We're actually hosting the DG7 meetings
here in Washington in December. That will include the French,
the British, the Germans, the Dutch, Japanese, Australian, and
we'll put this on the agenda for that meeting.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Whitehouse.
HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you to all
the witnesses.
Just to be clear, is everybody in agreement that the
Russians interfered in the last election?
Mr. Lansing. Yes.
Mr. Whitehouse. Yes, yes. Three for three. OK. Are all of
you familiar with the publication ``The Kremlin Playbook,'' and
the publication ``The Kremlin's Trojan Horses,'' by CSIS and
the Atlantic Council, respectively? Yes, yes, yes?
Mr. Lansing. I am not.
Mr. Whitehouse. You're not. OK. Are the two of you that are
familiar with those two publications, what's your opinion of
them? Are they reliable, complete, trustworthy? Do you agree
generally with the findings that they made?
Ms. Hooper. Yes, I think that they lay out a large number
of the strategies that we've referenced today that Russia is
using throughout Europe, also in the United States.
Mr. Whitehouse. Ms. McKew?
Ms. McKew. I would agree with that. I think they do show
partial strategies very effectively. I think the Kremlin has a
wide range of tools that they use. And I think one of the
narratives that we don't pay enough attention to, and in
particular in the political parties that the Kremlin is sort of
cultivating relationships within Europe and elsewhere, it's no
longer the Marine Le Pen model as much as it is the ``soft on
Russia'' model. And I think we need to be far more aware of
this.
You especially see it on social media, the sort of middle
rank of sort of Western journalists hanging out in Moscow, and
others who propagate this narrative of, OK, Russia is bad, but
America is worse, and America should know better, so it is much
worse. And anything you do to respond to Putin means you're a
Russophobe and it just makes them stronger and proves his
point. This is very effective in integrating its way into the
American media environment, particularly in graduate students,
it turns out, and we just need to be aware of that and be very
aware that what they're cultivating now is not pro-Russian
views as much as, ``don't look over here, don't look at the man
behind the curtain.''
Mr. Whitehouse. So as we try to prepare ourselves to defend
against Russian interference in the 2018 and 2020 elections,
I'd like you to comment on two potential vectors for Russian
interference. One is the ability of people who seek to
influence elections to spend money--indeed, very significant
amounts of money--in American elections without attribution,
while remaining anonymous. Presumably, we all agree that that's
not a good thing in terms of defending against foreign
interference in American elections. How serious a vulnerability
is it, on a scale of 1 to 10? Let me just go down the row.
Ms. Hooper. I think that is a serious vulnerability. There
might be something that may be more serious, so I'll give
myself a little bit of room and say eight or nine.
Mr. Whitehouse. OK. But very serious?
Ms. Hooper. But yes, quite serious.
Because that is precisely how you see Russian funding going
to far-right and far-left disruptive parties throughout Europe.
I can speculate to other places, but I know that there is quite
a bit of funding in Europe. You have gatherings of disruptive
parties going to St. Petersburg to meet. It's Russian money
that is making this happen. And so I think that we need to
guard against that here.
Mr. Whitehouse. Mr. Lansing, you don't need to give a
number. Perhaps that was asking too much. But slightly, very,
extremely? How serious is that as a vulnerability?
Mr. Lansing. Having been in the media business for four
decades, it's clear that money is what drives results on any
platform, so I'd say extremely.
Mr. Whitehouse. Ms. McKew?
Ms. McKew. And I would agree with that. Just briefly, the
new ideology of export from the Kremlin is kleptocracy, and
money is the means of recruitment. It is the means of influence
and infiltration. We're not paying enough attention to that.
I'm pretty hardline about this, but there is very little money
coming from Russia that is clean or not connected to Kremlin
interests and motivations, and we need to be far more aware of
how that works in our societies.
Mr. Whitehouse. One of the things that is happening around
the world--and this will be the second part of my question--is
that companies are cleaning up the corporate transparency
problem. Unfortunately, that leaves the United States of
America in very bad company of misbehaving countries who have
not cleaned up corporate transparency.
And in that light, could you comment on the nature of shell
corporations that you can't see who is truly behind as a danger
or a vulnerability in our elections to Russian influence? Same
question as the last one, but instead of unattributed money
this is corporations who you don't know who is behind the
shell.
Ms. Hooper. I am grateful that you mentioned that because I
think that is an area where the U.S. has allowed Russian money,
allowed other types of corrupt kleptocratic funds to come into
the U.S. And this not only harms our own system, it harms our
reputation as we try to portray our values as democratic values
overseas. I think that that is precisely where the U.S. needs
to be putting attention when it is thinking about things like
Russian disinformation and Russian influence.
How are our laws allowing this to happen? Shell
corporations is definitely one area where I think that there's
a great vulnerability.
Mr. Whitehouse. Mr. Lansing, agree or disagree?
Mr. Lansing. I agree with Ms. Hooper and have nothing to
add.
Mr. Whitehouse. Ms. McKew?
Ms. McKew. The anonymous movement of money through various
financial systems is an extreme challenge to us. And I think in
particular looking at the United States, the movement of
Russian money into our system is not about buying real estate
and yachts. It's about buying us. And we need to be very clear
about that.
Mr. Whitehouse. Final question--and this takes, Ms. Hooper,
your point. Let me posit a hypothesis--and it's obviously going
to be not accurate specifically--but posit that there is a
corrupt world in which Russia is a very prominent player,
basically a criminal enterprise that happens to also enjoy
nativist sentiment and nuclear weapons, and has occupied a
country, and on the other side, ``rule-of-law land.'' So if you
generally were to divide the world between ``corrupt land'' and
``rule-of-law land,'' what are the ways in which ``rule-of-law
land'' is actually facilitating corruption and kleptocracy in
``corrupt land?'' And how important is it for us to try to
clean that up? And is that a sensible way to be thinking about
this international rivalry, or contest?
Ms. Hooper, you first.
Ms. Hooper. Yes, it is a sensible way. As was mentioned
earlier, I think corruption and the flow of Russian corrupt
money is the main way that Russian influence leaks into other
countries, and that is through buying individuals, buying
corporations, buying property. Here, it's also through sending
children to universities, or allowing corrupt officials to
vacation in the United States, sometimes. There are so many
ways that we see corrupt money flowing freely.
Mr. Whitehouse. Is there an incentive for people who've
stolen a lot of money in ``corrupt land'' to move their money
into ``rule-of-law land'' so that they're not in turn robbed by
the next bigger thief?
Ms. Hooper. Yes, of course, because there are rules to
protect it.
Mr. Whitehouse. That's how they protect themselves from
being robbed by the next bigger thief in ``corrupt land,''
correct?
Ms. Hooper. Yes, that's right. And I believe that a recent
statistic said that more than half of Russian corrupt money is
not in Russia.
Mr. Whitehouse. And what role do American law firms,
accounting firms, advisers, and other entities play in
facilitating that?
Ms. Hooper. Law firms, accounting firms, lobbying firms are
all advising kleptocrats on how best to take advantage of the
rule-of-law system we have here.
Mr. Whitehouse. OK. I think my time is probably expired,
but I appreciate the witnesses being here and I appreciate the
theme of this hearing. Very well done.
Thank you.
Mr. Gardner. Thanks, Senator Whitehouse.
Ms. McKew, you had experience with people who witnessed
this firsthand. It was about them. They went through it. Could
you talk about some of the effects it had on the thought
process of individuals that said this misinformation was aimed
at in Georgia and other places that you've had experience in--
what it was like to go through that, the pressures it created,
how they dealt with it, and the experiences that you glean from
that that we should learn from?
Ms. McKew. It's a really interesting question, and I think
it gets back to this point that it's very difficult for
disinformation, but in particular Russian operations, to create
new divides or a new part of the landscape, but it's very easy
for them to exacerbate and exploit what's already there. And in
Georgia in 2012, that space was very much the halted reforms in
the justice sector, the concerns about what was happening in
the expansion of rule of law in the country, and that was the
sort of wiggle room to get into in terms of creating this black
PR narrative of the ``bloody nine years of the rule of
Saakashvili,'' which I think most people would disagree is
truth. Certainly, there were issues with the Saakashvili
government, but ``bloody nine years'' is not a valid
representation of what happened during that time when
significant things transformed toward democracy in the country.
But it was this targeting. The government didn't know any
of this was happening. Anybody who on Facebook or other social
media had sort of liked anything from that side would be
excluded from the operations that were going on. So there was
this very divided view of the country that evolved over the
year when these operations were applied. Toward the end, when
you had not just a narrative of what way do we want the country
to go, what didn't you like, are you disadvantaged compared to
others, but the things right before the election, the supposed
prison rape tapes that were put out, and the night of the
election when there was this fake story, which was much later
debunked, about this dead baby that had been found in a well
that they claimed the government or the ruling party had
killed--but all of this was playing out in real time across the
information network that had been built by Bidzina Ivanishvili,
whose money is Russian, and very much backed by Russian
information enterprises.
And I think that the effect this had on people--on
Georgians in particular, who after the war in 2008, there was
this sense of the existential threat in the country. And it's
exhausting. It's exhausting for any country to have to think
all the time about invasion, turmoil, takeover. And all of this
sort of exploited that sense of, ``wouldn't it be great if
things could just be normal again,'' but it created this
environment of fear and the potential for violence that really
suppressed part of the vote, and elevated another part of the
vote in ways that I think really shifted the outcome of what
that election was. And I think that's fairly easy to pull out.
In Moldova, it's a little bit different. It's a very
divided country, the Russian-speaking part versus the Romanian-
speaking part. But it is such a terrible information
environment, where four or five national channels are
controlled by the oligarch who controls the country, who is
nominally pro-European, but his channels are the ones that
promote all the pro-Russian propaganda in the country. The
courts that he controls are the ones that have laundered the
$40 billion of Russian money through Moldova into the EU.
Within that environment, the way that they control the country
is through division, through saying you have no choice but
maintaining these divisions, or the Russian-speaking population
would be disadvantaged anywhere else, the Romanian-speaking
population would be disadvantaged with any other thing going
on. And it's this constant churn that is used to control what
people think their options are, and that's why everybody's
leaving the country. But that constant maintenance of these
narratives is very difficult, it's all about information, and
it's information used to mobilize people in specific ways.
Mr. Gardner. But when you look around the globe and you
look at Europe, you look at Germany, look at France, the United
States, our efforts, is somebody doing this better than we are?
Is somebody getting it right? Is there more policy in place
somewhere that's having a better effect than we are? France,
during their election, was able to fight back a little bit. Can
you explain how--and let me hear from all three of you.
Ms. McKew. I think that there are countries that watch and
assess this problem better than we do. But in terms of
response, I'm not sure that anybody really has anything yet,
other than happenstance. I think part of what happened in the
French election, there's sort of a cultural resilience to
slander and scandal that we don't have as Americans.
There's a big language issue. The way the Russians talk
about this constantly is the ``linguistic hegemony of
English,'' which is the thing they're trying to break with RT
and Sputnik. But they're not wrong about that, which is English
is the language of the internet. So when they do these
operations, in terms of the information space, in English, we
are the echo chamber they're pointing at, and everything just
kind of bounces around. They don't do that much in French.
There's not as much effort applied. Same in German, although
mostly what their avenue of disruption is right now is they're
targeting the Russian population, the Russian-descended
population within Germany, and then other things. But it works
better in English, and that is why I think you've seen the
results that are Russian connected on Brexit, on the American
election, where there just feels like there's more going on
that we haven't seen.
Ms. Hooper. I wanted to add a quick point. I think that
both France and Germany have done better in one respect: French
media was able to agree that they would not cover the hacked
information that was released. And so the media there agreed
not to do that, and I think that that was a significant step
there. In Germany, you have Angela Merkel meeting with experts
on disinformation right after the U.S. election, saying what is
this, what do we do with it, and then there's a coordinated
government-wide task force that has developed contingency plans
around this election. If there's a drop of disinformation on a
campaign that occurs, what do we do, how are we going to
respond? They all know. And there's even a secondary voting
computerized system that's been set up in case their primary
computerized system is attacked. There are contingency plans.
In addition to informing the public this might happen, they're
specifically informing themselves and taking action.
Mr. Gardner. And I thank you for that.
Senator Shaheen.
Mrs. Shaheen. Yes, I'll do a third round with you.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you. [Laughter.]
Mrs. Shaheen. Lest someone think that Americans are immune
to this kind of disinformation, I can tell you that in the
public forums that I have done in New Hampshire, I have had in
each one someone speak up with the exact Russian narrative on
the issue that's being raised, whether it's Syria, whether it's
the elections, whatever it is. And most of the people who have
done that have been people who have been educated. They have
been people who you think, gee, they ought to be able to
recognize the difference. So the question of media literacy is
the one that I really wanted to get at. What responsibility
does the media here have to point out, as opposed to just
repeating some of these narratives, and what more can we do to
address that issue so that there's--among responsible media in
the country, an effort to really take a look at this?
That's you, Ms. Hooper.
Ms. Hooper. I don't want to say that the media is the
problem, because I believe that media in the U.S. is really a
symbol of who we are and what we are, and the fact that----
Mrs. Shaheen. I agree, and I'm not suggesting that the
media's the problem.
Ms. Hooper. I understand. But I agree with you that there
seems to be a tendency in the U.S. for us to go to the shiny
object, and that includes with our media. And sometimes the
shiny object is something that has nothing to do with substance
or with facts. I do feel like media has a responsibility, and a
raising of that issue and a highlighting of the ethics
responsibility of journalists and of media, I think, would be
helpful and important for us now.
Mrs. Shaheen. Mr. Lansing, as someone who's come out of
that world?
Mr. Lansing. Yes, not speaking as the BBG CEO but just in
my experience having been a journalist myself and a news
director, I thought it--first of all, I take your point very
much, and I thought it was interesting to watch the evolution
of the coverage last year. When you'd be watching one of the
cable television networks and you'd hear something said that
was empirically untrue, and the moderator would just let it go
right by. And then after a while--and I think CNN was a leader
in this, and the others came along--you saw them becoming a
little more aggressive to call something out as being untrue,
or even to say that's empirically false. So I think it took the
media a little bit of time to catch up with what was a blast of
disinformation that seemed to come out of nowhere.
And to your point, I think the media has a responsibility
in the best tradition of media to offer perspective and
context. And part of perspective and context is helping an
audience understand, or a media consumer understand, how to be
a smart consumer of media. And I think more could be done to do
that.
Mrs. Shaheen. So how do we encourage that among the media?
One of the examples that I use that I'm sure you all heard was
the story on social media that got picked up by Fox News and
repeated and then got repeated by the President, and then
finally they had to debunk it and say, oh, no, that was a
Russian-planted story. But how do we get the media to police
itself on these issues?
Ms. McKew?
Ms. McKew. It's an interesting question, and I think part
of this gets back to the post-2016 election in particular. Now
everyone is a Russia expert. And people commenting on Russia
and the purpose of Russian information operations on the news
are often the person who just commented on whether or not the
next Supreme Court justice is going to be good for the country.
And I have no commentary on the next Supreme Court justice, but
I do think that we need to be careful about how we are applying
expertise in media, absolutely.
But part of it is raising awareness of this narrative
issue. What is the Russian narrative here trying to achieve?
How does it do that? How does it work? And part of it is
building awareness in the commentariat but also in journalists
about those things. I have had more than one argument in the
past two years with good friends of mine who are good,
extremely good aggressive credible journalists who have written
a story that is clearly Russian disinformation. And if you poke
at them and say, what is this story that is demonizing Ukraine,
amplifying some bit of Russian narrative from the Middle East,
whatever it is, and you can finally get back to whatever the
source was, it's just, ``it seemed like a good story, so we're
going to write it.''
But the Russians are very sophisticated about how they get
information in front of us. They use proxies, they use
secondhand people, they use pass throughs, they use people
who've been in the United States for a long time. The outreach
to journalists and to others, to think tank experts, to
academics in particular is a long-term effort. They're very
good at introducing information into our systems, in
journalism, in intelligence in other countries, and we need to
be more aware of how that information moves and what it aims to
achieve.
I think there's also another piece of this in the media
space, particularly on social media which is sort of algorithm
based, and the financial models of these companies is, on
basically creating an infinite confirmation bias system. I had
this amazing conversation with a Facebook guy a couple years
ago when he was lamenting that he doesn't understand Washington
or how divided our information spaces have become. Why do we
think this is so bad? And I looked at him and said, maybe
because everybody's reality is curated for them on Facebook.
And it had never occurred to him that this was a problem at
all. The model where social media decides you want to see this,
so we're going to show it to you--if you and I searched
something on Google right now too, we would get totally
different results sitting 10 feet apart in the same room. This
needs to be something we're looking at, because it's giving us
inaccurate views of the world as a means of selling things
sometimes, but it's not helping us in terms of building sort of
cognitive resistance against disinformation.
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gardner. Senator Whitehouse, if you care.
Mr. Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. McKew, I left off with a question to Ms. Hooper about
the role of U.S. lawyers and accountants and lobbyists and
advisers and banks in facilitating the protection of resources
stolen in ``corrupt land'' so that they can find sanctuary in
the safety of ``rule-of-law land.'' And I'd like to have you
comment on the same question, if you recall that.
Ms. McKew. Yes, absolutely. I think the point you hit on is
the right one, which is it's the exploitation of our system
that is the thing the Russians are really great at in many
regards, particularly in finance. I think the initial way--the
first round of accountants and others who became engaged in
this are the same guys who are laundering money for people
getting divorced and, you know, it's the normal movement of--or
hiding of--corporate assets, hiding of personal assets that
regular non-kleptocratic individuals and companies engage in.
That is the infrastructure into which kleptocratic money is
moving in Russia and other places.
Mr. Whitehouse. And that's in part because if you leave the
money in ``corrupt land,'' the next bigger thief can steal it.
Ms. McKew. It's totally vulnerable, absolutely. And you
can't use it.
Mr. Whitehouse. And you can't use it.
Ms. McKew. It's not good for anything. You have to get into
legitimate banking systems, yes.
Mr. Whitehouse. So you've got to move it over.
Ms. McKew. Yes.
Mr. Whitehouse. And in that sense, how important is that
network of ``rule-of-law land'' support entities--the lawyers,
the bankers, the accountants--in actually making the corruption
in ``corrupt land'' pay off for the people who engage in it?
Ms. McKew. They are allowing corruption to be profitable
and allowing it to bleed into our systems in ways that we are
not aware of.
Mr. Whitehouse. And the final question on this takes us
back to a point that presidents have made about our country,
that we are a little bit different than other countries. We are
an exemplary nation that, as one said, the power of our example
has always mattered more than any example of our power. And
from Jonathan Winthrop to Ronald Reagan, we have talked about
the United States of America as being a city on a hill. And in
our national hymn we talk about that alabaster city is supposed
to gleam. So what are the costs? A, do we get value in this
world, in your view, out of being that exemplary nation? And,
B, what is the effect on that value of allowing ourselves to
become the functionaries of kleptocrats in ``corrupt land?''
Ms. Hooper?
Ms. Hooper. Yes, there is value. I can tell you, having
worked for years overseas, in Russia, in Central Asia, in the
Caucasus, everywhere I work, even when I express concern about
our criminal justice system or something that's happening in
the United States, my colleagues would tell me no, your system
works, but, no, we are looking to your system. This is what
I've heard everywhere. So, yes, there is of course value in
this.
Mr. Whitehouse. Ms. McKew.
Ms. McKew. Of course I would agree that there is tremendous
benefit to the ``city on the hill'' remaining the city on the
hill. I think that the construction of the post-World War II
architecture, in terms of security and economic integration
with Europe, the transatlantic alliance is what has made us an
enormously prosperous, secure and influential nation in the
world. So the idea that this is not something we benefit from
is----
Mr. Whitehouse. It's not just that we have more rockets and
missiles than other people. The power of our example matters.
Ms. McKew. The power of our example is enormously
important. And if you ask any of our allies, especially the
newly freed states from the post-Soviet space, they still don't
get why we don't understand this and why we're not fighting for
it in the way that they did and that they have.
Mr. Whitehouse. In the battle of ideas and ideologies that
make up our world, how does that power of our example fare when
we are engaged in systematic support for the kleptocrats of
corrupt land?
Ms. McKew. I think one of the arguments I've tried to make
the most in the past year in particular, but also before, is
the ways in which Russian money influences us. I'm sure other
countries have the same issues. But it's not always----
Mr. Whitehouse. I mean, my question is in terms of
reputation.
Ms. McKew. Yes, absolutely. But it's not always--it's the
way in which we silence ourselves to keep the flow of money
open. At a conference in Tallinn earlier this year, there was a
great panel of European bureaucrats talking about the problems
of Russian blah blah and I asked them: if we know this is what
the money is achieving in our systems, in our politics, in our
media, et cetera, why don't we do anything about it? And the
answer was, ``We're all making too much money and nobody's
going to take the hit.''
We see the impact that this has had in the U.K. in
particular. In London, there's a huge bastion of keeping
illicit Russian funds in place, and in other places as well.
You see in Europe the ease with which politicians move straight
from politics into Russian business. We should not believe that
there is any less influence with Russian money in Washington.
The number of advisers around political campaigns, around
political parties in general who are taking Russian money,
representing Russian interests--and even if they're not
advocating for Putin, they're not going to say anything
critical because they want to keep getting that check--is an
enormous problem, and one I find very disheartening. There is a
lot of Russian money, and the way that it works here and
influences Washington in particular is something we don't pay
attention to very much.
Mr. Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse.
The Zapad exercises are starting in Belarus today. A
hundred thousand Russian troops, it's estimated, will be in
Belarus as a part of this exercise. Are you seeing anything,
hearing anything in regards to disinformation surrounding this,
and what have you seen, and how is it being countered?
Ms. McKew. I think, from the Russian side, they're doing
their usual ``it shows our tremendous military might, and yet
it's a nothing-burger, don't pay any attention to what's going
on over here'' routine. They claim it's far smaller, 13,000
troops.
Mr. Gardner. And it is a hundred thousand or--yeah, right.
Ms. McKew. For our Baltic allies, it's an enormous
mobilization with a tremendous amount of forward-deployed
equipment moving into Belarus in advance of the exercises, all
of which was documented by rail schedules. In particular,
there's a lot of anxiety about what this means. In the U.S.
operational mindset, we have this challenge of divided
geographic commands. If you're sitting in Moscow and looking
out, the Baltics, Ukraine, the Middle East, and North Korea are
kind of all in the same ring of operation. There's a lot of
anxiety that as tensions in North Korea escalate, that creates
more opportunity for Russia to move in the West if they decide
to try to test NATO or challenge other security infrastructure.
This year feels different. There's real anxiety about what's
happening in terms of whether this just means that Russian
equipment is never moving back out of Belarus, like maybe the
men leave but the stuff stays.
Maybe they move some of it to Kaliningrad. Nobody's really
sure. But it definitely has more of that pre-2008, pre-2013
sentiment than not, I would say.
Mr. Gardner. One of you talked a little bit about education
and being taught what to look out for. Journalism school,
reporters, you're looking at this kind of a campaign out of
Russia. Is this taught in class? Is this something that you can
teach? How do we provide this education? Is this something that
needs to happen as part of professional development going
forward? How does this work?
Mr. Lansing. I'm privileged to be on the National Advisory
Board for The George Washington University School of Media and
Public Affairs, and their leader, Frank Sesno, immediately,
within a week after the election last year, started conducting
forums that brought all the students together with people like
Sean Spicer and others that were heavily involved, and there
were really rich and deep conversations going on at the GW
campus about what happened and how to think about journalism
after the 2016 election. So I'm seeing, at least at GW--and I'm
sure they're not alone--a push in academia, in terms of
journalism schools, to make sure there are lessons learned,
particularly just going back to the point of the context that's
missing, to Senator Shaheen's point, about understanding how to
be a better consumer of news, and also how to be a better
journalist to help people be a better consumer of news.
Mr. Gardner. Yes, and by then, though, the vast number of
consumers of that information are going through college and
they're not receiving that in class. So they've gone through
high school, how do we make sure that we have critical reading,
critical thinking skills that are appropriate in this new world
of 24-hour/7-day-a-week access to information, so that we are
making sure that people need to question what they read, and
make sure they know where the information is coming from and
make their opinions on their own and have not somebody else's
being fed to them?
Mr. Lansing. Completely agree that it would need to expand
beyond just the journalism schools and really just anyone who's
going to be a consumer of media needs to have a more astute
method for understanding what they're hearing or seeing or
reading, and where it's coming from.
Mr. Gardner. Senator Shaheen.
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you.
Well, I would argue that media should include social media
as well.
Mr. Lansing. I agree.
Mrs. Shaheen. Because one of the reasons that we're in this
place is because we have this whole new technology that's
social media.
Mr. Lansing. Yes.
Mrs. Shaheen. I want to go back--Ms. Hooper, you talked
about Russian support for right-wing organizations in Germany,
and you all referenced their support for parties, different
political parties, right-wing. Do we have any evidence that
Russia has supported right-wing groups in the United States,
and white supremacist groups, neo-Nazi groups here?
Ms. Hooper. I don't have any evidence. There is a
researcher, Casey Michel, who focuses primarily on this issue.
Russia has gathered separatist groups--for example, California
separatists, Texas separatists--and there is evidence that the
websites of California separatists and Texas separatists are
supported by Russian institutions. But for general political
parties, I can't say that I have evidence. You have a lot of
similar argumentation, but, again, I want to make evidence-
based arguments, and I don't have evidence for that.
Mrs. Shaheen. Sure, yeah--no, that's what I'm asking.
Ms. McKew, have you seen anything?
Ms. McKew. Yes, is the answer. And, you know, it's not that
anybody can prove financial connections or anything else, but
in terms of rhetoric and overlap of operations, there's a lot
of integration between the Russian information architecture in
some of these actors who have been represented on Russian state
media.
Russia hosts a lot of conferences. Some are these
separatist groups in which the Texas, Alaska and California
separatist movements have attended in the past, in Crimea and
other exciting places. But on the idea of the white supremacist
groups, ultranationalist groups, the traditional values groups,
Russia's been very aggressive in cultivating relationships with
these groups--sometimes in very tactical ways that disagree
with other pieces of their narrative that we think are
important. But in the U.S. far-right in particular, if you go
down the list of the groups that were active in
Charlottesville, they've all attended Russian conferences or
been connected to Russian information architecture or received
amplification from the Russian networks. I think that really
points to a subject of interest from the Russian side that we
need to be aware of. I and several of my colleagues, including
Jim Ludes from Salve Regina University, were writing on Twitter
about this after Charlottesville, and the bot attacks in
response from both the Russian-crafted Bernie bots and the
Russian-crafted far-right bots were intense and aggressive. So
this is clearly something they don't really want discussed.
Mrs. Shaheen. Mr. Lansing, you talked about, in response to
Congressman Smith's question about RT and Sputnik and efforts
to address what they're doing in terms of presenting Russian
propaganda, that you were concerned about retaliation. Do you
believe that those two outlets are directly supported from
Moscow, from Putin's government?
Mr. Lansing. Yes, I do.
Mrs. Shaheen. Do you, Ms. Hooper? Do you, Ms. McKew? [No
audible response.]
And I have legislation that I introduced back earlier this
year which would modernize our Foreign Agents Registration Act
in a way that would give some teeth to the Justice Department,
because it seems to me that they are dramatically exploiting a
loophole. I would agree that under our system, they should be
allowed to broadcast, but people need to understand what
they're watching and that--because they claim that they are not
directly connected to Putin's government and Moscow--Americans
really are not as aware as we should be of what they represent.
So that's really more of a statement than a question, but would
you all support providing more teeth to FARA to allow us to
close that
loophole?
Ms. McKew. As you know, Senator, I have been a foreign
agent for different causes in the past, ones that I was happy
to represent and fully disclosed and registered every contact
and meeting and email to your office and others.
I do believe that right now FARA is basically voluntary. It
was four, and now I think six, guys in one office. That's a
good expansion. But there's a lot of belief that there are
loopholes--there are really not--but it is not enforceable in
its current form. There are some loopholes in the sense that
think tanks aren't covered. There is foreign money that is
being used to influence the Hill as well. That should be
covered. There are lawyers who are happy to interpret for you
how FARA does not apply. I do not have that lawyer, obviously,
but others are happy to find them. And I think that, for that
reason, the Justice Department needs to be clear about what the
law actually says.
I think one particular point that needs to be more
explicitly detailed--and I've had this conversation with many
of my friends leaving government who I think have gotten the
``don't worry, FARA doesn't apply to you'' speech from others--
if you read the statute the way I believe it was intended, if
you are providing advice to a foreign government, political
entity, state enterprise, et cetera on how to influence U.S.
policy, even if you yourself are not making phone calls,
sending emails, representing them actively in Congress or in
the administration, you have to register. Many people don't.
They sort of use this adviser label, claiming they have no
responsibility. That, I think, really needs to be clarified and
closed, because it's the space in which many people try to
remain clean by not registering, but it is giving tremendous
tools of influence to people who are willing to pay, because
obviously most foreign interests are always going to encourage
you not to register because, you know, who wants transparency?
Mrs. Shaheen. Sure, right.
Ms. McKew. But the transparency point on RT and Sputnik, I
think, is the right one. We do need to be careful about freedom
of speech and information.
Mrs. Shaheen. Right.
Ms. McKew. However, there should be disclaimers on the
purpose of what this is.
Mrs. Shaheen. Absolutely. Do either of you want to comment?
Mr. Lansing. Sure. I will comment, Senator Shaheen. I'm not
an expert on FARA. As a citizen, I would support the idea of
strengthening FARA. As the CEO of the BBG, I would just make
sure that you understand that there could be some reciprocal
outcomes, depending on what happens as we strengthen FARA as it
relates to Sputnik and RT.
Mrs. Shaheen. Sure.
Mr. Lansing. But that's just information for you to know.
And the last point I would make is the expression of what
the networks of the BBG do around the world--Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe--is really an expression of the value of free
speech. And so I would put that into the mix as well, those two
components, as you consider how to move forward.
Mrs. Shaheen. Well, thank you. I'm well aware of what the
potential ramifications are. I've already been compared to
McCarthy, my actions to McCarthyism. So----
Mr. Lansing. Hardly.
Mrs. Shaheen. Ms. Hooper.
Ms. Hooper. I wanted to echo Mr. Lansing's concerns, that I
know you're fully aware of. I think that it's important to
perhaps not become too distracted by just RT and Sputnik.
Mrs. Shaheen. Absolutely.
Ms. Hooper. I think in two ways, both in making FARA
stronger, think about application across the board, what this
is going to look like, and then in another way looking fully at
other methods of influence and other influences on our media
that is not just RT and Sputnik.
Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you. Well said.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very much for a
really very informative and important hearing.
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
And thanks to all of our colleagues on the Commission, the
Helsinki Commission, who participated in today's hearing.
Thanks to the witnesses for your testimony, and I'm sure
there will be follow up from a number of us on the Commission
and with the Commission, work for additional questions, and I
would ask you to respond as quickly as possible to anything on
that front. But more than anything, grateful thanks to the
Commission. And to everyone who participated in the hearing,
thank you for attending. Thank you for listening online. I
truly appreciate the participation.
And with that, this Helsinki Commission hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing ended.]
A P P E N D I C E S
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Cory Gardner, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
This hearing of the Helsinki Commission will come to order.
Welcome, and good morning to everyone. I am honored to speak on
behalf of Senator Wicker, the Commission's Chairman, and to
preside over this hearing.
The Commission is mandated to monitor the compliance of
participating states with consensus-based commitments of the
OSCE. Today's hearing focuses on the pressing issue of Russian
disinformation and how it undermines the security and human
rights of people in the OSCE region.
Disinformation is an essential part of Russia's hybrid
warfare against the United States and the liberal world order.
As one of our distinguished panel witnesses today wrote in her
recent article: ``The Russian security state defines America as
the primary adversary. The Russians know they cannot compete
head-to-head with us--economically, militarily,
technologically--so they create new battlefields. They are not
aiming to become stronger than us, but to weaken us until we
are equivalent.''
Through its active measures campaign that includes
aggressive interference in Western elections, Russia aims to
sow fear, discord, and paralysis that undermines democratic
institutions and weakens critical Western alliances, such as
NATO and the EU.
Russia's ultimate goal is to replace the Western-led world
order of laws and institutions with an authoritarian-led order
that recognizes only masters and vassals. Our feeble response
to Russian aggression in Ukraine and their interference in our
elections has only emboldened the Kremlin to think that such a
new world order is not only possible, but imminent.
We must not let Russian activities go with impunity. We
must identify and combat them, utilizing every tool in our
arsenal.
I am proud that my home state of Colorado is home to Fort
Carson and the 10th Special Forces Group, an elite unit that
has been at the tip of the spear in identifying and combating
some of these malign Russian activities in European frontline
states. I thank them for their important work, and for keeping
our nation safe.
To help us lead our discussion today, I am pleased to
introduce three distinguished witnesses.
Mr. John F. Lansing is the Chief Executive Officer and
Director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). He
joined the BBG as CEO and Director in September 2015.
Previously he was the President of Scripps Networks, where he
is credited with guiding the company to become a leading
developer of unique content across various media platforms.
Ms. Melissa Hooper is the current Director of Human Rights
and Civil Society programs at Human Rights First. Ms. Hooper's
research focuses on Russia's foreign policy strategies of
spreading Russian influence and undermining democratic
institutions in Eastern Europe, and how these strategies
intersect with existing autocratic trends.
Ms. Molly McKew is an expert on information warfare and
Russian disinformation policies. She currently heads an
independent consulting firm, Fianna Strategies, advising
governments and political parties on foreign policy and
strategic communications. She has extensive regional
experience, advising both Georgian and Moldovan governments.
She also writes extensively on issues pertaining to Russian
information warfare.
We will begin with Mr. Lansing who will offer his testimony
and inform us what the BBG is doing to counter Russian
disinformation in the OSCE region. We will then move onto to
Ms. McKew's testimony where she will discuss information
warfare and Russia's activity in this space. Finally, Ms.
Hooper will present her analysis of Russian disinformation's
influence over the German elections and its potential influence
over future elections in Europe.
So, thank you to these distinguished members of today's
expert panel for joining us today, and I look forward to our
discussion as we strive to better understand this serious
threat.
We may now begin with testimony by Mr. Lansing.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chaiman, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for leading our inquiry into
Russian disinformation--a serious threat to democracy on both
sides of the Atlantic
The most alarming thing about the Russian media's promotion
of untruths and `fake news' is the extent to which it is
coordinated by the Russian government, and put in the service
of a doctrine of war--the so-called ``Gerasimov doctrine'' of
``hybrid war.''
``Fake news'' is far from unknown within our own society.
We deal with it through freedom of speech, which allows it to
be disproven, as well as through laws against libel and
incitement.
Yet the case is totally different when a foreign government
coordinates the production of ``fake news'' campaigns as part
of hybrid war against us and our allies. I'd like to hear from
our witnesses how they think our government can work with our
allies to respond to the threat the Russian disinformation war
poses against Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia.
These are countries where disinformation is most fully put in
service of ``hybrid war.''
How are we responding--and how should we? Most importantly,
if Russian disinformation is hybrid war against these front-
line allies, is our military and the NATO alliance making
``counter-disinformation'' part of a ``hybrid defense'' against
this hybrid war?
Over the years, I've travelled to Russian many times on
human rights missions--in the 1982 my first trip as a
Congressman was to meet with Jewish `refuseniks', in 1987 Frank
Wolf and I visited Perm Camp 37 right before it closed. In the
1990s and early 2000s the meetings became friendlier, and I
developed relationships with Russian legislators. Then came the
Putin freeze. My last encounter with the Russian government
came in February 2013. At that time, in response to
congressional passage of the Magnitsky legislation denying U.S.
visas to Russian officials responsible for the death of Sergei
Magnitsky, the Russian government shut off all international
adoptions to the U.S., including adoptions then already in the
``pipeline.'' It was a heartless action. It punished Russian
kids languishing in orphanages, preventing them from being
united with loving families. Many of these kids had already
established relationships with the adoptees.
At that time I requested a visa to travel to Russia to meet
legislators, hoping to at least keep the adoptions that were
already in process moving forward. I was an original cosponsor
of the Magnitsky legislation and my request was denied--a State
Department official told me that it was the first Russian visa
denial to a U.S. Congressman in living memory. So I'm afraid
that, being on a Russian visa-ban list, I don't have any recent
experience in that country to bring to bear on our
conversation. But the only other countries that have denied me
visas are China and Cuba, two of the world's most repressive
dictatorships. It's not a nice club to be in.
I look forward to our discussion today of this topic, so
immediately relevant to the defense of some of our country's
closest allies.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Senator Gardner, thank you for presiding over this hearing
today on behalf of Senator Wicker and discussing Russia and
this most pressing and vital of concerns, Russian
disinformation.
I have repeatedly stated that Russia is violating all of
the Helsinki Final Act's Guiding Principles and now
disinformation is the Russian State's latest strategy to
undermine those guiding principles. Senator Gardner, I hope
that today we can truly improve our understanding of the nature
of Russian disinformation and the threat that it currently
poses to the United States and other participating states of
the OSCE.
In a world of rapid technological and social change and
upheaval, Russia has not merely grasped the basic applications
of new technology, but exploited it to introduce confusion and
chaos in the media. This has culminated in the creation of the
Gerasimov Doctrine, by Russian General Valery Gerasimov, which
is the foundational document on the spread of disinformation
and about which we will hear more today from one of our
witnesses, Ms. Molly McKew.
As my colleague previously stated, we have seen the impact
of this disinformation at home and abroad. Russian
disinformation has spread throughout Ukraine, and especially
impacted the Ukrainian state's response during the invasion of
Crimea and the War in the Donbas. We have also seen the impact
of Russian disinformation in the United States itself, with
Russian Facebook users creating thousands of impersonation
accounts and sharing pro-Kremlin information to the American
public online during the 2016 election period.
This week--as the OSCE convenes Europe's largest annual
human rights meeting in Warsaw, Poland--a long-time participant
and leading voice in monitoring hate crimes, xenophobia and
extremist violence in Russia is under threat. The SOVA Center
is now being investigated as ``undesirable.'' This is a painful
reminder that Russia's ``foreign agent law,'' used to target
human rights groups and civil society in general, is one of
Moscow's biggest global exports now, along with its
disinformation.
I must note that this is the Helsinki Commission's third
hearing on Russia this year. The Commission has investigated
the extensive human rights abuses in Russia and the growing
military threat that the Russian State poses. The scourge of
disinformation is a serious and ongoing challenge Russia poses
against the global community, in spite of its international
treaties and commitments.
Senator Gardner, I hope that during this hearing we can
grasp hold of how Russian disinformation threatens the United
States and its allies; how well the United States is currently
prepared to tackle this issue; and how capable we are, as a
nation, to prevent and combat Russian disinformation in the
future.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Commissioner, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
I want to thank the Chairman and Co-Chairman of the
Helsinki Commission for convening this hearing today on such a
timely and crucial topic.
Information warfare is the use of information, whether
factual or false, to influence opinions, disrupt lines of
communication, and undermine the values of a target for
political advantage. This is exactly the behavior promulgated
by the Russian government and its proxies during the 2016
Presidential election. Our intelligence community assessed that
Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign aimed at the
election in order to undermine faith in the democratic process
by conducting covert intelligence operations and overtly
disseminate false information.
Russia's attempt to influence our election was not the only
goal; Russia is conducting a long-term campaign to undermine
the U.S.-led liberal democratic order. Previously, Russia
conducted campaigns against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. In
addition to disinformation efforts in the U.S., Russia is
aiming to disrupt the European Union and sow distrust of NATO
to accelerate its dissolution.
Today, Russia begins a weeklong series of military drills
known as Zapad, or West, with Belarus that will place thousands
of troops along the border with the Baltic States and Poland.
This exercise is expected to be much bigger than previous
iterations. While Russia insists Zapad poses no threat, it is
clearly part of Vladimir Putin's strategy to expand Russia's
sphere of influence and increase military capacity along NATO
borders. In response, the United States sent 600 American
paratroopers to the area for the duration of the exercise.
In 2009, President Obama reversed a plan to build missile
interceptors and a radar station in Poland. As a result, Russia
is no longer deterred from aggressive behavior on NATO's
periphery. The strength of NATO, largely based on U.S. backing,
is a direct threat to Russia and Vladimir Putin's strategy of
expansion. We must be prepared to respond to this threatening
activity.
Executing Russia's long-term expansion strategy is much
easier when the countries and institutions that can prevent
Russian expansion may be fighting a disinformation campaign at
home. Unfortunately, Russia has perfected the control of
information by first imposing strict limits on its citizens.
This problem is two-fold; it allows Russia to control what its
citizens know about their own country, and it prevents Russian
citizens from learning the truth about foreign government
actions, particularly from the United States. This is why many
Russians are reported to blame the United States for hardships
resulting from sanctions rather than blaming the Russian
government for behaving in a way that incurs sanctions in the
first place.
This type of censorship is absent in the United States
because we support freedom of speech and the pursuit of
knowledge. Our citizens have always trusted our news
organizations to report what is going on in our country and
around the world. When reporting is undermined by false
information, it is difficult to determine what is real because
the news becomes a game of ``he said, she said,'' or rather
``he reported, she reported.'' How are our citizens to know
what is accurate and what is false?
There is no evidence that Russian interference in our
election amounted to the actual changing of votes. With the
German election coming up in a couple of weeks, we must
continue to fight Russia's attempt to meddle in foreign
elections and threaten our NATO allies. It is paramount that
the United States engages with the American public and our
allies to ensure that Russia's information war does not
succeed.
Prepared Statement of John Lansing, Chief Executive Officer and
Director, Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
Senator Gardner, Co-Chair Smith, Ranking Member Cardin, and
Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to speak
today about the Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG) and U.S.
International Media efforts to counter Russian propaganda and
disinformation.
Background
I currently serve as the Chief Executive Officer and
Director of BBG, where I oversee all operational aspects of
U.S. international media comprising five networks:
The Voice of America, Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV
Marti), Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and
the Middle East Broadcasting Networks including Alhurra TV and
Radio Sawa.
As U.S. international media, the BBG's mission is to
inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support
of freedom and democracy. We produce news on all media
platforms including radio, television, online, and mobile
digital and social media. Collectively, our programs reach 278
million people on a weekly basis in more than 100 countries and
61 languages. According to Gallup data, our audience increased
by 52 million from 2015. The fastest growing segment of that
audience is our newly expanded commitment to digital
distribution which helps us target younger future leaders.
The BBG provides consistently accurate and compelling
journalism that opens minds and stimulates debate. We
demonstrate values that reflect our society: freedom, openness,
democracy, and hope.
This advances U.S. national interests by fostering
societies that enjoy greater stability and prosperity, live in
peace with their neighbors, value universal human rights and
reject terrorism and extremism. Such societies make better
political allies and trade partners for the United States.
This mission, granted by Congress at the end of World War
II, remains vitally important. During World War II, the Voice
of America fought against Nazi propaganda and the absence of
information by beaming accurate and unbiased news and
information into shuttered societies. RFE/RL was founded during
the Cold War to break through the Kremlin's wall of tightly
controlled media in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe with
truthful professional journalism and by documenting the anti-
Soviet sentiment of the citizens under the authoritarian
regime.
Current Media Environment
Today we are encountering a global explosion of
disinformation, propaganda and lies fed by multiple
authoritarian regimes and non-state actors like ISIS, as they
deploy digital media and social media platforms to target
vulnerable citizens with false narratives. House Foreign
Affairs Chairman Ed Royce, referring to Russian propaganda
specifically, terms it ``the weaponization of information,''
and I believe that captures the severity of the negative impact
quite well.
From Russia and its periphery, to China and East Asia, Iran
and the Middle East, to Cuba, Venezuela and large parts of
Latin America--audiences are under a disinformation assault
from authoritarian regimes and are desperate for credible
information. The five U.S. International Media Networks of the
BBG fill that void.
To meet the challenge head-on, all five BBG networks are
rapidly expanding our traditional radio and television
distribution to digital, mobile and social networks so we are
on the same playing field as our adversaries.
Importantly, over 80 percent of our weekly audience on all
platforms considers our content to be trustworthy, based on
data compiled by Gallup, and we highly value the trust our
audience has placed in us.
At the same time, global press freedom is at its lowest
point in over a decade. According to the 2017 Freedom House
report on Freedom of the Press, only 13 percent of the world's
population live in countries with a fully free press. Of the
ten worst offenders--which include Cuba, Iran, North Korea and
Syria--all are covered by one or more of the BBG's networks. In
each of these countries, BBG networks challenge limitations on
the press and provide alternative sources of news against
state- or extremist-sponsored accounts.
Russian Actions
In Russia, the Kremlin propaganda machine is breathing new
life into a strategy of dezinformatsiya, or disinformation,
operations to influence opinions about the United States and
its allies and partners. Essentially, it's the weaponization of
information that Chairman Royce describes. For example, Russian
disinformation campaigns claim that the United States is
covertly testing chemical warfare in Ukraine and that the U.S.
has more than 400 laboratories around the world for biological
weapons.
State-sponsored broadcasters such as Russia Today (RT) and
Sputnik are expanding their global operations, opening new
bureaus and developing new programming. Earlier this year in
Washington, DC, a Bluegrass radio station sponsored by NPR on
105.5 FM was replaced by Sputnik radio offering listeners the
Kremlin spin on U.S. news and politics. Outside these
organizations, Twitter trolls and social media bots magnify the
Kremlin-supported message.
Unlike Cold War propaganda, Russian disinformation
campaigns do not seek to sway listeners to the Russian point of
view; rather they strive to undermine the notion of objective
truth and foster social divisions--delegitimizing Western
democracies while drawing negative attention away from Russia.
In essence the Russian strategy is to destroy the very idea
of an objective, verifiable set of facts. In their world the
death of facts is the first step towards creating the
alternative reality that helps them gain and keep authority
with no accountability. If everything is a lie, then the
biggest liar wins. That is what we are up against.
BBG Response
While the threat is not new, the battlespace is changing,
and the BBG is adapting to meet this challenge head on. We are
one part of the overall government effort taking a global
approach to countering Russian disinformation across a variety
of platforms. I'd like to detail some of these key initiatives:
1) Current Time
Since Russian aggression against Crimea and eastern Ukraine
started in early 2014, BBG language services at VOA and RFE/RL
have added or expanded more than 35 new programs in Russian and
other languages of the former Soviet space. The flagship of
this effort is a 24/7 television and digital news network that
BBG launched in February 2017 called Current Time , or
``Nastoyashchee Vremya.'' In Russian, the name has a double
meaning: ``right now'' or the current time; and ``the real
deal,'' which plays off the name of Russia's traditional
nightly newscast ``Vremya,'' meaning ``time.''
The Current Time mission is to provide a constant stream of
accurate, professional, independent, unbiased news to Russian
speakers in Russia, the Russian periphery, and around the world
including major capitals such as Berlin, Jerusalem, and London.
For example, in Stockholm or Istanbul, Russian travelers may
turn on the television in their hotel room to find Current Time
next to CNN on the channel list.
Produced by RFE/RL in a first-ever, unique partnership with
VOA--another BBG network-- Current Time represents the next
generation of digital news for BBG. Viewers access programming
throughout the region on the Current Time website. Individual
Current Time programs play on 39 affiliates in 14 countries,
but the full 24/7 channel is distributed to over 23 countries
on 59 satellite, cable, and digital distributors. The network
also develops social media videos and other content, expanding
the reach of Current Time and offering alternative sources of
information in a Kremlin-controlled environment.
The level of access to Current Time programming varies. In
Russia, Current Time TV and radio broadcasts are not permitted
on domestic television and radio airwaves, but audience members
can access content through the website and YouTube. In
Lithuania--a key Kremlin propaganda target and currently
Current Time 's largest market--programming airs on two public
broadcasting stations and is viewed by 8.2 percent of the adult
population each week. Additionally, the BBG is finalizing
negotiations with Lithuania Radio & Television to place Current
Time on their nationwide Terrestrial Digital TV system--with
signals covering 98 percent of the Lithuanian population and
reaching into Belarus, Poland, and Kaliningrad.
The Current Time network produces daily news shows on the
United States and global events. It also features reports on
business, entrepreneurship, civil society, culture, and
corruption. Because Current Time is its own branded network on
its own platform, BBG also has the flexibility to interrupt
programming to bring late-breaking news and analysis or
unfiltered, simultaneously translated broadcasting of major
events. For example, during the 2016 U.S. election, VOA and
RFE/RL provided a 5-hour marathon of live television
programming with reports from around the country and live
results and analysis.
Digital statistics--such as the number of video views,
comments, and shares--indicate that the Current Time network is
yielding results online. From January to July 2017, Current
Time social videos were viewed more than 300 million times on
various digital platforms--nearly three times the number of
views during the same period in 2016. Half of these views came
from Russia. Further, in May alone, Current Time achieved a
record 40 million video views across social media platforms.
This impressive start is just the beginning, and as time goes
on, we will have the opportunity to add to this digital data
through our traditional media surveys that measure both reach
and influence.
2) Targeting the Russian periphery
Current Time is only the latest BBG effort in the Russian
periphery and Eastern Europe. VOA and RFE/RL programming in
Russia and the Russian periphery targets audiences in 23 media
markets and is consumed by over 24 million adults on a weekly
basis in 20 languages. In Kosovo and Albania, over 60 percent
of the adult population tunes in on a weekly basis.
3) Meeting Russia on a global stage
If we discuss the Russian disinformation campaign only in
terms of Russian language efforts, we are missing the global
context of what is truly a world-wide campaign. Russian-
sponsored programming is available in Latin America, Africa,
the Middle East, and across Europe in Arabic, Spanish, French,
English, and other languages.
In Latin America, for example, VOA has strong relationships
with hundreds of TV and radio affiliates. Every day our
reporters offer live VOA feeds from DC into local news programs
in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and other countries. They cover
and explain developments in the United States and U.S. foreign
policy and also develop special programs in partnership with
local stations. For example, in Nicaragua, VOA and local
partners are developing a series on the Russian presence in
that country.
If VOA content were no longer available, Russian media and
other state-sponsored broadcasters (including China's CCTV and
Iran's HispanTV) would be more than willing to provide their
own slanted content replacing the VOA. Some affiliates have
reported that they have been offered payment to air
programming, which VOA does not provide in that region.
Instead, VOA offers cogent programming and a brand trusted by
Latin American audiences.
We have also deployed a new brand called Polygraph, a joint
RFE/RL and VOA website in English to call out Russian lies and
educate global audiences on media literacy and how to spot fake
news. Within the next few weeks, BBG will launch a Russian
language version of this website.
Russia has jumped to criticize these and other BBG efforts.
On Current Time and other content aimed at the Russian
periphery, a Russian state news organization charged that these
programs are all produced by ``Russian people who put the
interests of America above the interests of Russia.'' Our
journalists have also come under attack. For example, RFE/RL
contributor Mykola Semena was indicted on criminal charges in
Crimea for so-called separatist activities, or rather
professional journalism and telling the truth. His most recent
hearing occurred on August 31. We take the safety and security
our journalists very seriously, and believe that this and other
incidents demonstrate the Kremlin is clearly irritated by our
efforts.
BBG Challenges
With the support of Congress and the generosity of the
American taxpayers, BBG's budget has expanded over the last few
years.
In addition to nearly half-billion-dollar combined budgets
of RT, Sputnik, and other Russian international media, the
Russian government also targets Russian speakers around the
world with the vast resources of its domestic state-controlled
news and entertainment networks.
The BBG's mission is to broadcast internationally; thus,
BBG is constrained by law from programming in the United
States, although we are now allowed to share content with U.S.
media outlets upon their request. RT, Sputnik and others are
free to broadcast in the U.S.--because the U.S. values free
speech and freedom of the press, and we extend those rights to
all. Russian speakers in the United States are free to choose
not only from RT and Sputnik, but from dozens of Russian
language stations whose scope is the equivalent of CNN, Fox,
CBS, ABC, NBC, Bloomberg and other entertainment channels. We
would welcome access to the Russian market to allow our
networks to broadcast freely there in the spirit of
reciprocity.
Make no mistake--the United States is facing information
warfare, and I don't use that term lightly. The BBG is an
essential element of the national security response. The export
of U.S. journalism and the values of free media and free speech
speak to the world as much as U.S. boots on the ground. Like
defense, development, and diplomacy, U.S. international media--
accurate, balanced and true--is an essential part of our
standing on the world stage.
I'll close with a quote from Edward R. Murrow, former
director of the U.S. Information Agency and a much-respected
journalist of the 20th Century, when he testified before
Congress in 1963:
To be persuasive we must be believable;
to be believable we must be credible;
to be credible we must be truthful.
His words ring true today, more than ever.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Molly M. McKew, CEO, Fianna Strategies
I am grateful for the opportunity to share some of my
experiences countering Russian information warfare. I've spent
the past decade watching the deployment of Russian information
operations across the European frontier, including in Georgia,
Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. I have done this
primarily as a partisan, working for political actors and other
groups being attacked by these Russian initiatives, so I tend
to come at this from a different perspective than others.
Russia is constantly acting, assessing, and refining their
information capabilities, which have become an embedded and
normalized part of our information landscape. We must be clear
about what these measures aim to achieve and their impact, and
bring a renewed sense of urgency to defending our nation.
Overview of Russia's information war against Western societies
It is essential that we evaluate the challenge of `Russian
propaganda' from the right perspective in order to develop
effective counter measures.
First, disinformation is a means of warfare. It is the core
component of a war being waged by the Russian state against the
West, and against the United States in particular.
Second, the primary line of effort in this war is conducted
in English. We have failed to secure our information space,
allowing our self-defined 'primary adversary' to shape and in
some cases control it at will, often blind to what they aim to
achieve. This provides the Kremlin a significant strategic
advantage.
Third, we have only just begun to understand the scope and
scale of resources, formal and informal, that Russia devotes to
information warfare--which means we have failed to understand
the importance the Kremlin ascribes to these efforts. Some
resources are devoted to forms we know--RT, Sputnik, etc--and
others to forms we are coming to know--automated actors like
botnets, and amplifiers like trolls--but far more of these
measures are still deep within the shadow space, acting along
parallel lines of effort.
It bears repeating: it's not propaganda; it's information
warfare. It is, in many respects, the war that matters most. In
our strategic thinking, information operations of this kind are
meant to amplify military operations. In Russian doctrine, it
is the other way around: military operations amplify
information operations. The `smoke and mirrors' are a primary
means of power projection.
The information warfare being used against us aims to erode
political will, in ourselves and our allies, to defend what
defines us; to sow doubt and division, discord and chaos, in
order to reshape an environment where American power is less
effective; to target the minds of our soldiers and leaders,
activists and influencers, voters and citizens, using
subversive means; to spark political unrest, and make us
question that democracy can provide just, free, equitable,
secure, and prosperous societies.
And it is working.
We have seen this type of information warfare deployed
against other nations. There is ample evidence of the extent to
which Russia will go to shape demographics, politics, and
social structures in its near abroad, using military, economic,
political, and cultural coercion. But we, as Americans, want to
believe it doesn't work on us--that oceans are still a barrier
to foreign invasion, that we are immune to these manipulations,
particularly from an opponent far weaker, militarily and
economically.
In their weakness, the Kremlin bets big. So far, the gamble
has paid off--because for years they have been strolling across
an open battlefield.
To secure our information space, we need an integrated
understanding of the threat, and an integrated set of measures
that can be taken to counter it, including:
LEnhanced clarity of the threat and its impact: We
must clearly identify the tools and tactics being used against
us in the information space, and effective means of disrupting
them.
LWhole-of-government response: We need unity of
mission to secure the American information space, including
organizing our diplomatic, military, and intelligence assets to
counter information warfare via a whole-of-government approach.
Nongovernmental assets and actors also play a vital part in any
effective response, and should be creatively engaged.
LRethinking authorities: We must reevaluate the
role of US military/counterintelligence actors in securing our
information space during this time of rapidly escalating
threats. Our most experienced assets should not be boxed-out of
defending the American people.
LDevelop rapid response capability for irregular
information warfare: Build capacity to execute local rapid
information operations (positive and interceptive) manned by
sanctioned irregulars (US Special Forces and
counterintelligence assets, plus independent actors).
LGive Americans defensive tools: This occurs via
three strands. First, speaking clearly to the public about the
threat. Second, developing practices for enhancing national
`cognitive resistance,' particularly in groups being targeted
by Russian operations. Third, building stronger data/privacy
protections for Americans to limit the coercive applications of
`big data.'
LMotivate/activate the American populace: We need
political leaders with the will to speak clearly to our people
about our principles and values--the narratives and truths that
matter.
LWhole-of-alliance approach to securing the
information space: A better-coordinated US response mechanism
will be better positioned to collaborate with and lead our
NATO/EU allies in countering Russian information operations. A
range of different mechanisms have been developed by certain
European military, government, and civil society actors that
would be greatly enhanced by clear strategic goals and
supporting resources.
LSocial media evaluation/regulation: Adversarial
forces are using social media platforms to attack our
societies. We need to consider applying rules to how paid and
automated content can be spread through social media. This is
not about limiting the free flow of information and ideas--we
should never seek to emulate Russian control tactics or the
means used by other authoritarian states--but restricting the
ability for coercive targeting and the simulation of human
supporters/movements to promote coercive propaganda.
LEnhanced understanding of aims of Russian
financial flows: Russian disinformation has purpose. So does
the export of its capital. We must be far more aware of the
aims of this financial flow, especially investments into/
partnerships with American technology companies.
These measures will be discussed further in the final
section.
There is an urgent need for effective counter measures.
Russian efforts fuel conflict and chaos in Europe, the Middle
East, Afghanistan, Asia, and the Arctic. While our attention is
elsewhere, spread thin across crises and putting out fires, the
other tools in Russia's guerrilla arsenal have time to gain
vantage. This arsenal is backed by considerable state financial
resources. We have a tendency to see Russian kleptocracy as a
means of buying super-yachts and penthouses. It isn't. It's
about buying us. The range of tools this money supports is
unnerving in its informality, depth, and potential.
Russia's war in Syria has been a giant arms expo meant to
demo and sell a new generation of Russian weaponry. The Russian
information control model is just as much on display and in
demand. President Putin recently discussed the opportunities
and perils of artificial intelligence, adding: ``We will
certainly share our technology with the rest of the world, the
way we are doing now with atomic and nuclear technology.'' \1\
We have every interest in preventing the proliferation of
effective tools and models of computational propaganda. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Putin's remarks can be read here in English: https://
sputniknews.com/russia/201709011057000758-p 1 utin-schoolchildren-
world-lord/
\2\ Computational propaganda is the use of automation--including
tools like botnets and artificial intelligence (AI), directed by
algorithms and the harvesting of data to create targeting profiles--to
influence opinion via the internet and social media.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ten years since a cyber attack on Estonia, nine years after
Russia's invasion of Georgia, almost four years since the
invasion of Ukraine, ten months since we got a red alert on the
information war being waged against the American people--and
our actions says we're still trying to decide if this is a
threat that we need to take seriously. For example: Congress
mandated the creation of the State Department's Global
Engagement Center to help counter Russian disinformation,
authorizing considerable financial resources to the cause.
These resources have neither been allocated nor spent. \3\
Other efforts have directed resources to countering Russian
narrative--in Russian. \4\ Very little has been done about the
English language disinformation targeting Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Toosi, Nahal. ``Tillerson spurns $80 million to counter ISIS,
Russian propaganda.'' Politico. Aug 2, 2017. http:// www.politico.com/
story/2017/08/02/tillerson-isis-russia-propaganda-241218 Toosi, Nahal.
``Tillerson moves toward accepting funding for fighting Russian
propaganda.'' Politico. Aug 31, 2017. http://www.politico.com/story/
2017/08/31/rex-tillerson-funding-russian-propaganda-242224
\4\ CBS News. ``U.S. launches TV network as alternative to Russian
propaganda.'' Feb 9, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.-com/news/us-current-
time-tv-network-rfe-russia-russian-propaganda-misinformation-rt/
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Russia has corrupted our information space through
countless means. Right now, there are efforts to analyze the
war; expose the war; map the war--but very little is being done
to fight the war, or to provide resources, mandate, or
authorities to those with the skill sets to do so. While we
investigate and analyze and discuss, the diverse initiatives
underway from the Kremlin have accelerated in Europe, across
the globe, and in the United States.
Understanding the aims of Russian information warfare: Examples from
the field
Information tools are the new superweapons--like chemical
weapons in WWI or the atomic bomb in WWII, they shift the
fundamental balance of power and fear. In their essence,
Russian measures aim for the complete domination of an
information landscape in order to influence the minds of a
population. These measures target, in particular, military
personnel, political leaders, and vulnerable, disenfranchised,
and unmoored elements of society--but they also target society
writ large by focusing on identity, historical memory, topics
of a divisive nature, and more. These measures aim to harden
specific aspects of identity; to radicalize elements of
society; and to build the activation potential of a population.
Disinformation can be lies or partial truth. What matters
is that it has purpose. It is targeted against specific parts
of a population using crafted narrative, and it aims to
mobilize groups of people to act in specific ways. So this is
not about words, but about achieving concrete results. Ideas
lead to decisions; once a decision is made, it will be
rationalized, entrenching the idea.
The technological tools of producing, disseminating, and
amplifying disinformation matter--but far less than the
construction of that information to be persuasive and coercive
against the audience. In this regard, two things matter:
narrative and storytelling. Narrative is the overarching
construct of the information, providing answers to questions of
who we are and why things are the way they are. Storytelling is
how you build and transmit narrative.
``What did it aim to achieve?'' is a more important
question in evaluating disinformation than what is true.
Fighting it must also have a purpose. If we aren't clear what
that purpose is--what we are fighting for, what we believe--
then we can't win. Russia goes to great pains to downplay their
role in information operations because exposing them can
restrict their freedom of movement. Some of the most effective
Russian disinformation aims to make you believe Russia is weak
and disorganized, and the Kremlin excels at finding local
actors to act as masks and passthroughs. There can be many
different lines of effort aiming to achieve different outcomes
in different audiences. But there is a pattern and a texture to
how these efforts form and coalesce, to the narrative they use,
and to the results they can yield. Below are a few examples
from my own experiences.
Shaping the Baltic information environment: During the past
year, I worked as the strategic director of a project to
enhance Baltic Russian-language media. This was a modest
initiative, primarily small grants to journalists and
producers. Nonetheless, I can document about six attempts by
Kremlin-connected actors to gain access to the project and our
work. This illustrates how deeply dominance in the Baltic
information environment is a preeminent concern of Russian
efforts.
In the Baltic states, there is a basic three-pronged
approach: rewriting history, demonizing NATO, and sewing doubt
about the efficacy of pro-Western governing forces.
Understanding the narrative of these operations is critical:
efforts to demonize occupation-era Baltic resistance movements
or deny the existence of a pact between Stalin and Hitler
sometimes seem obscure to us, for example, but the purpose is
to create justification for modern Russian state actions and
ambitions. These nations are inundated with Russian and English
language content generated by the Russians as they aim to shape
the perception of specific groups. Russia also shapes the
external narrative on the Baltics by providing English language
news from the region. A recent report found that computational
propaganda plays a significant role here: a quarter of the
accounts posting in English on Twitter in the Baltics and
Poland were likely bots/ automated, responsible for 46% of the
total English language content on NATO. \5\
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\5\ NATO Stratcom COE. Robotrolling 2017/1. http://
stratcomcoe.org/robotrolling-20171
Moldovan identity politics: Unlike the Baltic states, Moldova
does not have a strong national identity and is quite divided
as a society. It also has a terrible information environment,
with most of the national media controlled by the nominally
pro-Western oligarch whose party has captured most of the
governmental institutions. This is fertile ground for
propaganda and information operations, particularly nasty
personal attacks--but the way information moves and is used
helps to expose agendas, in many respects. In the last
presidential election, for example, which was won by the pro-
Russian candidate, the media holdings of the `pro-Western'
oligarch mentioned above amplified Russian attacks and
disinformation against the pro- European candidate in the race.
\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Jamestown Foundation. ``Moldova's De Facto Ruler Enthrones
Pro-Russia President.'' Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 196.
December 14 2016. https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/333654/461950_en.html
Vlas, Cristian. ``Old Fashioned Skulduggery Overshadows Elections in
Moldova.'' Emerging Europe. Nov 19, 2016. http://emerging-europe.com/
voices/voices-intl-relations/old-fashioned-skulduggery-overshadows-the-
elections-inmoldova/
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In Moldova, false information is also frequently introduced
via Russian information channels to create positive sentiments
about the unpopular ruling force--a phenomenon we called
`double disinfo,' disinformation meant to make another piece of
untrue information believable. A recent example of this had
pro-Russian social media accounts leak a fake letter in which
USAID complained to the ruling party that they were not doing
enough to fight Russian information in Moldova. \7\ When the
letter was exposed as a fake, the false counter-positive--that
the ruling party was fighting Russian information--is made more
believable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The source of the letter was: https://twitter.com/
Urugvayintellig/status/904633014541574144/photo/1
Voter mobilization/suppression in Georgia: Georgia's
parliamentary elections in 2012, during which I worked as an
advisor to the Georgian National Security Council, were the
first where I saw Russian-connected political forces looking to
hire Western firms who could teach them about micro-targeting
and other social media-based information tools. American teams
marketing themselves as contributors to the Obama victory were
hired by Bidzina Ivanishvili to operationalize black
information campaigns, which contributed to getting tens of
thousands of people in the streets before the election. Most of
what was happening in the social media landscape was completely
opaque to the ruling party until well after the election: the
messaging was designed not to touch anyone who was a consistent
supporter of the government.
One aspect of this overall campaign that I would highlight
as a favored Russian tactic: the use of diversion. The online
media campaigns cultivated an intense environment of fear of
the potential for violence--rumors that the government would
declare martial law instead of holding the vote; claims Russia
would invade again if the ruling party won; threats of
disruption and violence at the polls. This consumed the
attention of the government/ruling party and the diplomatic/
observer community. But this was always meant to be a
distraction from real lines of effort: black media campaigns
and traditional voter mobilization efforts. I mention this
because I believe there was a similar Russian diversion effort
during the US elections: US intelligence and the Obama White
House feared disruption of our elections via the hacking of
electoral and voting infrastructure, and significantly less
attention was paid to the information operations being run. In
both cases, the lesson we should learn: information operations
are a primary line of effort from the Kremlin.
Narrative themes during elections/referenda: While every now
and then there is a Marine Le Pen--an openly pro-Kremlin
political candidate--arguably the more dangerous new archetype
of candidates favored by the Kremlin are those who amplify
Kremlin narrative as part of their political platforms without
being so openly pro-Russian. These themes can include:
nationalism/anti-globalism/anti-integration; anti-refugee/anti-
immigration; `traditional' identity and values; anti-tolerance,
especially anti-LGBT sentiments; to name a few. Knowingly or
not, parties focusing on these themes contribute to achieving
core goals important to the Kremlin--rejecting Western liberal
democracy; weakening NATO, the EU, and the transatlantic
alliance; deepening divides inside our alliances and our
nations that can be exploited. This model is critical in many
countries, especially some former captive Soviet nations, where
pro-Russian political forces would be unable to gain
significant following. But the governing agendas of these
parties tend to be more inward looking and de facto downplay
the significance of the existential threat from Russia, on
which the basic line tends to be: ``Wouldn't it be nice if we
had a better relationship with Russia (especially
economically)?''
The degree to which Russia exploits this ideological space,
sometimes very tactically, should not be underrated. Some
groups knowingly engage the Kremlin for resources and support,
glad to have an ally; others may receive support via
amplification in Russian information architecture, whether they
asked for it or not. Anti-LGBT sentiment has been a vital
avenue for the Kremlin to cultivate a new generation of
political and cultural allies across Europe and the United
States. In elections across Europe in the past two years, anti-
refugee and anti-migrant sentiment has been used repeatedly to
galvanize nationalistic voters; this has been a core theme
deployed in the German elections which will be held later this
month, as it was used before in France and the Netherlands and
the Brexit referendum. Just this week, we have news that
Russian accounts on Facebook were used to organize anti-
immigrant rallies in the US during our election. \8\ There are
dozens of examples that could be given, but that one makes it
the most clear: this isn't just information but the hope to
elicit behavioral change.
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\8\ Collins, Ben, Kevin Poulsen, Spencer Ackerman. ``Russia Used
Facebook Events to Organize Anti-Immigrant Rallies on U.S. Soil.'' The
Daily Beast. Sept 11, 2017. http://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-
russia-used-facebook-eventsto- organize-anti-immigrant-rallies-on-us-
soil
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Assessing the state of conflict and readiness in the information war
In order to propose defensive and offensive information
warfare strategies, it helps to define the current doctrinal
and strategic landscape clearly. This starts with the
`Gerasimov Doctrine.' The Gerasimov Doctrine builds a framework
for the use of non-military tactics, including information
warfare, that are not auxiliary to the use of force but the
preferred way to conduct war. Chaos is the strategy the Kremlin
pursues, aiming to achieve an environment of permanent unrest
and conflict within enemy states and alliances where a weak
Russian state can exert outsize influence and control. \9\ But
we've been talking about the Gerasimov Doctrine like it's the
holy grail of understanding Russia since 2013. We reanalyze it
over and over. Meanwhile Russian doctrine has evolved further,
articulating how to apply these core concepts across multiple
strands of warfare.
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\9\ McKew, Molly. ``The Gerasimov Doctrine.'' Politico Magazine.
Sept/Oct 2017 ed. http://www.politico.com/magazine/ story/2017/09/05/
gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538 McKew, Molly. ``Putin's
Real Long Game.'' Politico Magazine. Jan 1, 2017. http://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 2017/01/putins-real-long-game-214589
In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward
blurring the lines between the states of war and peace.
The very ``rules of war'' have changed. The role of
nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic
goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded
the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.
All this is supplemented by military means of a
concealed character.The information space opens wide
asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting
potential of the enemy. Among such actions are the use
of special-operations forces and internal opposition to
create a permanently operating front through the entire
territory of the enemy state, as well as informational
actions, devices, and means that are constantly being
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perfected.
The Value of Science is in the Foresight--
Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Russian Chief of the General
Staff, Feb 2013
The military strategies applied by the leading nations
stipulate that dominance in information space is
essential in warfare. This task requires engagement of
media and social networks. They are complemented by
information, psychological, and technical influence..
The [Russian] Armed Forces are currently gaining their
combat experience in Syria. They have a unique
opportunity to test modern weapons and military
equipment in adverse climate conditions. It is
necessary to continue this military practice in the
Syrian campaign and draw the lessons to adapt and
improve Russian weapons. It should be noted that
victory depends not only on the material but also the
spiritual resources--the nation's cohesion and desire
to confront the aggressor at all cost.
The World on the Verge of War--Gerasimov, March 2017
The evidence points to new types of military action in
upcoming conflicts. Our 20 years of experience insist
on the importance of irregular forces (guerrillas).
They are integrated into military personnel and excel
at combat endurance. Furthermore, irregular operations
achieve the most political goals of war. If guerrilla
forces fail, defeat is imminent, regardless of
conventional and special forces superiority. Guerrillas
are capable of large-scale operations and consistent
military action pursuing tactical and strategic goals.
Coordination with guerrillas is always complicated.
Nonetheless, their actions must be coordinated with the
regular armed forces, in particular during special
operations. In other words, WWIII guerrillas must be
under the authority of a single commander. Thus, these
unique forces are vital for the Russian Armed Forces..
If provided with the information and intelligence
available to the regular armed forces, even small
numbers of irregular troops can produce immediate
results.
The Guerrilla Payees--Konstantin Sivkov, retired
General Staff officer, April 2017
What we see in these excerpts: \10\ Russia is
operationalizing a fundamentally guerrilla approach to total
warfare in order to achieve strategic political objectives--a
global imperialist insurgency.
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\10\ The Value of Science is in the Foresight--https://
inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimovdoctrine- and-
russian-non-linear-war/; The World on the Verge of War--http://vpk-
news.ru/articles/35591; The Guerrilla Payees--http://vpk-news.ru/
articles/36159
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Both the United States and Russia, for different reasons,
have made the determination that fighting and defending against
unconventional warfare is the key to future war. But we pursue
it differently. The US has shifted toward special operators and
the use of drones; training partner nations, and helping them
conduct strikes on targets; running defensive information
operations; bolstering our efforts with civilian-military
affairs projects. Russia does everything else. The nature of
their efforts is not defensive or retaliatory, but entirely
offensive.
The Kremlin is recruiting people, groups, and societies
into a dirty war.
Securing our information space is about English language information,
not Russian
When we speak of `Russian propaganda,' we don't really mean
Russian language propaganda as much as we mean Russian state
efforts to export disinformation into local languages in many
European countries, and into English in particular, which have
drastically accelerated since 2013. Russia invests heavily in
media resources; learning, creating, and adapting tools for
targeting information to specific individuals; and automating
disinformation across social media platforms in ways to reach
specific people, counter/promote specific ideas, and game
algorithms to give primacy to the Russian version of `truth.'
In many respects, our entire information space has been
corrupted by or made vulnerable to Russian information
operations. The Russian language space, in comparison, is
controlled, insular and collapsing on itself without captive
nations--as the chairman of the Duma Committee on Education and
Science recently noted, while railing against the `linguistic
hegemony of English,' the number of Russian speakers has
declined by 50 million people since 1991. \11\
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\11\ The remarks can be read here in English: https://
themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-language-losing-out-of-english-
hegemony-says-official-58779
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But the `linguistic hegemony of English' also makes us
vulnerable. Disinformation is more powerful in English because
English is the language of the internet. It's a bigger echo
chamber, and it gives more reach to target audiences vulnerable
to core parts of Russian narrative. The US also has incredibly
weak data/privacy protections, thus enabling the harvesting and
analysis of data for cognitive targeting in ways that should
make us profoundly uncomfortable.
Looking at information warfare as a map exercise: Russia
has used disinformation to project the line of conflict
forward, further from their borders--to effectively erase
borders while creating the virtual `buffer zone' they can't
have territorially. Our immediate response should seek to
mirror this--not by addressing a problem hundreds of miles
behind the line of conflict (Russian language) but by moving
the line of conflict further from our country, back toward the
aggressor. If this war has no borders, it is a fluid space that
we must constantly expand and enhance not to lose. In real
terms, there is no `defending' the information space. The only
defense is offense--illuminating and educating people on the
threat, and promoting our principles and values.
Russia likes to position all their doctrine as a `response'
to Western actions. A more helpful way to gain insight into
what the Kremlin believes they can achieve with unconventional
warfare, and with information warfare in particular, is to
understand that all the tools they deploy against us, they used
against the Russian people first. We need to secure our
information space, just as we would any other border. The
Russians did this to their own information space before
invading ours--building parallel social media, controlling
access to content, flooding the local media landscape with free
entertainment content, shutting down most of the independent
media, now using automated social media content to amplify and
bury specific views.
An integrated strategy for securing our information space
There are four key groups for crafting an effective
response to Russian information operations: government
(including military, intelligence, etc); industry (tech and
data companies); civil society; and citizenry. Government plays
an essential coordination role.
These are complicated issues, touching on freedom of speech
and expression, national security, and more. We cannot use the
same means of information control as the Kremlin to secure our
information space. Our mirror-world version of Russian
information control: not to control the internal information
environment, but ensure its integrity; not to harden views, but
to develop positive cognitive resistance efforts to build
resilience in our population; not to argue that there `is no
truth,' but to promote the values and idea that we know matter.
Securing our information space has less to do with
cybersecurity than building resilience in our citizenry, and
re-crafting the ways that information can be introduced into
and spread across our networks. I will expand on the measures
proposed in the first section below, touching briefly on the
non-governmental actors before focusing on what our government
can do.
CIVIL SOCIETY--including journalists/investigative journalists
and initiatives to track and document Russian influence
operations--plays a vital role in both bringing enhanced
clarity about the threat and giving Americans defensive tools
via enhanced awareness of Russian information operations and
what they aim to achieve; exposing Russian information
campaigns and the networks that amplify them; and tracking and
illustrating how Russian influence operations work, more
broadly. In the future they will also play a vital role in
restoring our collective resistance to hostile influence
operations. This requires creativity, and resources being
directed to civil society initiatives should tolerate some
degree of experimentation and failure.
CITIZENS need to be more aware of their information
environment. I believe this is a more complicated effort than
the promotion of media literacy and fact-checking alone.
INDUSTRY, in particular social media and tech companies, bear a
special responsibility in our efforts to respond to Russian
information warfare--to remove or contain Russian information
architecture from our system. But there are broader questions.
After the 2016 election, there was a lot of discussion about
Americans `choosing' to inhabit separate information universes.
But what isn't discussed: this is not always a choice, but
something being done to us--by targeted advertising, by
promoted content, and by algorithms that tell us what we want
to see--algorithms that Russian data scientists and information
warriors aptly know how to game.
Micro-targeting, hyper-targeting, and individual targeting
on social media have one primary application, in a variety of
forms: radicalization.There are some uncomfortable questions to
be asked here, about whether social media platforms are blindly
or knowingly enabling the means for mass psychological
operations to radicalize societies and deepen divisions, and
whether there are accountability measures required. Facebook in
particular has created a means of mass surveillance and
collection, and a means of operationalizing information
operations effectively and inexpensively--which it acknowledges
but downplays. \12\ Despite detailed explanations why they bear
no legal or moral responsibility for what their engineering has
created, Facebook is essentially a real-life, free-market `big
brother'--a platform for surveillance and computational
propaganda available to any power willing to pay for it.
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\12\ Shane, Scott. ``The Fake Americans Russia Created to
Influence the Election.'' New York Times. Sept 7, 2017. https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-
election.html http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/08/how-
facebook-changed-the-spy-game-215587
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The same Russian intelligence-connected company that
previously staged a test information assault against the United
States--an attack meant to instill fear and mobilize panic
\13\--was allowed to buy political advertising targeting
Americans during elections. \14\ As long as social media
platforms refuse to acknowledge the tools and tactics they are
enabling, promoting, and profiting from--and explain why they
will not take more aggressive steps to protect data privacy,
remove revenue possibilities from propagandists, and ensure
that content automation isn't gaming algorithms to subvert the
minds of human users--then we need to be more aggressive in
educating our population about how they are being attacked in
the information space and exactly what these attacks aim to
achieve. So far, Americans have been offered little clarity of
leadership in this regard.
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\13\ Smith, Rohan. ``Columbia Chemical hoax tracked to `troll
farm' dubbed the Internet Research Agency.'' news.-com.au. June 4,
2015. http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/social/columbia-
chemical-hoax-tracked-to-trollfarm-dubbed-the-internet-research-agency/
news-story/128af54a82b83888158f7430136bcdd1
\14\ Shane, Scott & Vindu Goel. ``Fake Russian Facebook Accounts
Bought $100,000 of Political Ads.'' New York Times. September 6, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russian-
political-ads.html
GOVERNMENT plays a vital role in coordinating an effective
response to Russian information warfare. This is particularly
true in two areas: political will and structural response. Both
are critical, but the importance of political will cannot be
undervalued. For example, in Europe, there have been new
institutional actors introduced--including the NATO and EU
Centres of Excellence, and the EU's East Stratcom Task Force--
as well as support given to a range of civil society
initiatives--including think tanks like European Values \15\--
but the lack of central political will to mount an effective
strategy against Russia undercuts these smart initiatives. Our
alliance would benefit from American political will galvanizing
a whole-of-alliance approach to securing the information space.
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\15\ For European Values' recommendations on how responding to
hostile disinformation operations, see: http:// www.europeanvalues.net/
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Full-Scale-Democratic-Response-to-Hostile-
Disinformation-Operations-1.pdf
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In the US, I hope political will be in abundance when
enhanced clarity of the threat and its impact are provided. To
counter what is being done to our society by a foreign
adversary, we need a whole-of-government response. The Russian
operational footprint in Europe relies on a core of SVR/FSB/GRU
resources, with access to significant technology and
information capabilities, operating in a broad lane that asks
for creativity and doesn't punish failure, backed by state
resources. We have the architecture to be able to build a more
effective task force--but we don't. Unity of mission is
critical. We need a `star chamber' coordinating our best
assets--diplomatic, military, intelligence, industry,
nongovernmental, and informal--to counter the information
warfare launched by the Kremlin's `power vertical.'
Irregular warfare--including information warfare--will need
to be fought within our borders. We should define how we do
that before the next crisis. To bridge our capabilities gap on
an accelerated timeline, we need to review our resources for
countering threats in the information space, and we need to
rethink authorities.
We have forces designed for unconventional warfare: US Army
Special Forces. In Europe, for countering Russia, that's the
10th Special Forces Group. This is a group of regionally-
aligned, culturally-astute, deep-knowledge forces with the
expertise and capabilities to work with local partners to
amplify efforts and address critical needs. But practically
speaking, they lack the resources, mandate, and technology to
act. Instead of giving 10th SFG added resources to develop a
rapid response capability for irregular information warfare,
conduct Military Information Support Operations (MISO), operate
in a wider lane in non-conflict countries alongside the State
Department in countering these aggressive threats, and
coordinate other military and defense assets in this area--this
expertise is still in a box. The Marines have recently
established a 4-star office dedicated to information
operations, led by the Deputy Commandant of Information. There
is a whole branch of the Pentagon that specializes in this
area. We need this expertise engaged in the fight, and we need
to remember that our mil-mil relationships are the steel in the
architecture of NATO, which is reinforced by the intelligence
backbone of the `Five Eyes' community.
There is a similar challenge with authorities for US
counterintelligence, especially for the FBI and especially in
the information space . The Russians have identified a giant
\16\ blind spot where they can operationalize influence with no
interference or oversight (social media). We have to change
that equation without falling into the trap of replicating
Kremlin tactics.
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\16\ Rangappa, Asha. ``How Facebook Changed the Spy Game.''
Politico Magazine. Sept 8, 2017. http://www.politico.-com/magazine/
story/2017/09/08/how-facebook-changed-the-spy-game-215587
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Clarity on the threat is one of the primary means of giving
Americans defensive tools against information operations, and
engaging them these issues will help motivate the American
populace and enhance resistance. It is vital to evaluate
whether regulatory measures can be legislated to enhance data/
privacy protections for Americans, limit coercive applications
of data driven targeting, and bring transparency to paid
content on social media platforms. Again, this is not about
limiting the free flow of information and ideas, but
restricting the ability for coercive targeting and the
simulation of human supporters/movements to promote coercive
propaganda.
Finally, government can apply its capabilities in tracking
hostile foreign financial flows to enhance understanding of how
Russian money moves in our system, and what it aims to achieve.
President Putin is not some all powerful being. But he has
certainty and seeks to build a cynical world were the only
thing that matters is money. That is the `ideology' the Kremlin
exports. And until we understand how that money is poisoning
our system of beliefs, he wins.
Our primary failures when it comes to responding to
information warfare are failures of imagination, clarity, and
coordination. We don't wargame the shadow war. We need to. This
is a war we must win.
Prepared Statement of Melissa Hooper, Director of Human Rights and
Civil Society Programs, Human Rights First
Introduction
Senator Gardner, Co-Chair Smith, Ranking Member Cardin, and
Members of the Helsinki Commission, I would like to thank you
and Chairman Wicker for giving me the opportunity to testify
today regarding the damage caused to democracy and human rights
globally by Russian disinformation efforts in the United States
and in Europe, the efforts of some European countries to
respond, and steps the United States should consider to counter
Russia's weaponization of information.
I want to address these issues from the perspective of
someone who has studied Russia's interference strategies as
they operated in Russia during my years living there, and
followed their development in Europe, especially after Russia's
invasion of Ukraine.
In the United States, we are still grappling with the
ramifications of the Russian government's meddling in the 2016
Presidential election. Just last week, Facebook revealed its
sale of $100,000 worth of ads promoting divisive social
messages to 470 fake, likely-Russian-owned sites. Since the
election, Congress and other policy-makers have become
increasingly sensitized to the Russian government's use of
various forms of disinformation, including Russian-funded media
outlets that publish false or misleading stories, automated
bots and trolls that disseminate false information to create
the appearance of a ``grassroots'' movement, the use of faux
``experts,'' foundations and think tanks that lend a veneer of
credibility to fabricated information, and other methods
intended to sow confusion and threaten the foundations of
democracy--including the concepts of truth and trust.
The use of disinformation is not the Russian government's
sole strategy, but is part of a coordinated effort to disrupt
and attack liberal policies, institutions, and norms wherever
the opportunity arises, with an overarching goal of fracturing
the European Union and the trans-Atlantic alliance. Other
strategies include economic influence, in which key figures are
offered lucrative deals that implicate them in Russian
corruption--such as has occurred in Germany, the UK, and the
Czech Republic; electoral disruption, such as funding fringe
political parties--as has occurred in Germany and France; and
the weakening of multilateral organizations such as the OSCE or
UN bodies through obstructionist policies.
At Human Rights First, we have documented the effectiveness
of these threats in Eastern Europe, including how Russia has
contributed to significant backsliding on democracy and human
rights in Poland and Hungary--each a NATO ally. We are seeing
Russia make inroads in Central and Eastern Europe through the
use of online bots and trolls in Poland, the buying off of
politicians and business leaders in Hungary and the Czech
Republic, the funding of youth military camps in Hungary and
Slovakia, and the dissemination of fabricated stories about
migrants and Muslims across Europe, but particularly in
Germany.
Contributions to Backsliding in Hungary and Poland;
Disruption in Germany
In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban's government often
rubber stamps Kremlin propaganda. The Hungarian government
frequently shares the Kremlin's interest in disrupting E.U.
policy, unity, and principles of equality and human rights,
particularly when it comes to refugee issues. Indeed, the
Hungarian government itself often generates false information
on migrants, refugees, and the E.U., messages that align with
the views of the Kremlin.
Russia has gained a foothold in Hungary through its support
for business projects such as the expansion of the PAKS nuclear
power plant, the modernization of the Budapest metro, and the
MET gas trading enterprise. Russia also funds far-right and
paramilitary groups in Hungary.
In Poland, Russophobia runs strong, given the two
countries' histories. Today, Russia sponsors around 20 sites
that self-identify as ``right-wing'' Polish websites that do
not acknowledge their Russian connections. These outlets work
with other disruptive media in Poland to source stories that
support the Russian perspective on the E.U., NATO, migrants,
and refugees. Russia also disseminates pro-Kremlin propaganda
through a network of bots and trolls. In a parallel to our own
experience, these programs seek to spread disinformation while
making certain ideas appear grassroots-supported.
Importantly, the Hungarian and Polish publics largely
disagree with anti-E.U. and anti-democracy messaging. According
to several studies, nearly 80% of these populations want to
stay in the E.U. and NATO, despite propaganda attacking these
institutions. Thus, programs in Eastern Europe that shore up
democratic institutions are likely to yield positive returns.
In addition to the propagation of disinformation, Russia
also sponsors ``Government Organized NGOs,'' or GONGOs in
Poland, Hungary, Germany, and across Europe. These groups,
which include advocacy organizations, foundations, and think
tanks, put out false or misleading analyses, studies, expert
statements, and reports on topics of interest to the Kremlin
including on sanctions, Ukraine, migration, E.U. unity, and the
efficacy of democracy. Frequently sponsored by oligarchs or
organizations with cultural or religious ties to the Kremlin,
these GONGOs provide a veneer of legitimacy to misleading data
and arguments.
A number of these organizations espouse the neo-Eurasianist
philosophy of Kremlin advisor Alexander Dugin, who argues that
democracy is waning globally. We now see Eurasian think tanks
and NGOs cropping up all over Europe, including via websites
that actively traffic in false information. Two pro-Kremlin
Eurasian organizations are particularly active putting out
information ahead of the upcoming election in Germany. The
German Center for Eurasian Studies is based in Berlin. The
other--the European Center for Geopolitical Analysis--is based
in Warsaw.
A clear example of how the Kremlin has employed
disinformation in conjunction with other strategies of
disruption is its use of false stories about migrants,
refugees, and Muslims, and the threats they allegedly present
to national security and public health. In partnership with
far-right parties in Germany, the Kremlin has weaponized these
false stories to sow fear and distrust, a wedge that it uses to
undercut support for Angela Merkel and the CDU.
As a number of studies have shown, our brains are wired to
increasingly believe a statement is true the more often we hear
it. Russia has become expert at using this brain science
against us, carefully repeating false facts--in this instance,
about Muslim immigrants.
At Human Rights First, we call the spread of social media
targeting minority communities, abetted by disinformation,
``weaponized speech.'' Next month we'll be issuing a report on
how to combat it.
One well-known example of weaponized speech is the 2016 so-
called ``Lisa F. case.'' It is the story of a 13-year old
Russian-
German girl in Germany who didn't come home one night. Russian
media spread a false narrative that she was kidnapped and raped
by Muslim migrants.
German police debunked this story soon after interviewing
the alleged victim. Yet Russian media, German far-right
parties, and Russian political leaders (including Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov), continued to promulgate the false
story. These voices urged the Russlanddeutsche, ethnic Germans
who lived for generations in Russia but have now returned to
Germany, to question whether the German police were covering up
the alleged crimes of migrants for political reasons.
As a result, thousands of Russlanddeutsche came out into
German streets to protest the alleged cover-up and Angela
Merkel's migration policy. Protests concerning a non-event are
the stuff of dreams for the Kremlin, as they cause Europeans to
question their institutions and their values of democracy and
tolerance.
The German Election: Russian-funded Think Tanks and
German Far-Right Parties
I conducted my own research into Russian disinformation in
Germany earlier this year. I was interested in Russia's use of
think tanks, particularly in the run-up to Germany's September
election, and their possible link to the far-right and ultra-
nationalist parties Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) and
National Democratic Party (NPD).
I knew that AfD's top candidate on the party slate,
Alexander Gauland, had traveled to Russia last year and met
with Alexander Dugin. He also met the head of a Berlin-based
Russian think tank, Boris Yakunin. AfD has also possibly
received funding from the Kremlin. I also knew that leaders of
the neo-Nazi NPD had attended a conference in St. Petersburg at
the invitation of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin,
and that NPD had publicly expressed support for Putin and pro-
Russian policies in Germany.
I tracked the information, statements, and papers put out
by two Berlin-based, Russian-funded organizations: the Dialogue
of Civilizations--Yakunin's organization, and the Center for
Continental Cooperation, now called the German Center for
Eurasian Studies. I also tracked the statements and policy
papers of AfD and NPD leaders.
What I found was that the Russian-funded think tanks and
German far-right parties were putting out similar messages on a
number of key topics including the E.U., NATO, the United
States, Western democracy, and Western media. In general, these
included attacks on multilateral institutions built on liberal
democratic values, and indictments of these institutions as
serving only elites. Specifically, both argued that Western
democracy had been degraded by multiculturalism, that Western
media was untrustworthy, that the E.U. and the U.S. were not
truly free or democratic, and that the U.S. used NATO and other
tools to subject the world to its hegemony.
It bears noting that the reach of these campaigns is at
present quite small. Overall, Germany seems to be prepared to
fend off interference around its upcoming election. Learning
from the experiences of the recent U.S. and French elections,
German leaders have issued public warnings about potential
Russian cyberattacks and disinformation. The German public has
therefore been sensitized to the possibility of interference.
However, success is not a foregone conclusion. About three
million Russian speakers are being targeted daily with
disinformation about refugees, same-sex marriage, terrorism,
and defense issues. Merkel's pro-U.S. stance, and support for
liberal democratic values, is being used by Russia to exploit
anti-Americanism and anti-migrant sentiment.
Germany has also made some missteps in responding to
disinformation. The Network Enforcement Act it passed in June
essentially forces social media companies to be the arbiter of
what constitutes free speech and what violates German law. This
is a dangerous, short-sighted approach that will inevitably
force corporations to rely heavily on censorship. The danger of
this approach can be seen in the fact that Russia saw fit to
pass an almost identical version of the German law. Ukraine is
also dangerously responding with a wave of censorship.
The patterns I have described are by now familiar because
we have seen them here at home: Russia's disinformation
campaigns discredit democratic institutions, such as elections
and independent media, and are accompanied by other strategies
of interference, such as the use of corruption to infiltrate
policy-making bodies, the employment of faux experts to echo
Russia's false claims, and the funding of disruptive agents
such as extreme political parties and movements.
We need to act comprehensively against these strategies.
In January, then-Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper said that the attacks that occurred around the U.S.
presidential election were a ``clarion call'' for action
``against a threat to the very foundation of our democratic
political system.'' This threat is not confined to the
immediate run-up to elections. Foreign challenges to our
democracy are occurring right now, and the U.S. has so far been
slow to respond.
How the U.S. Can Combat Russian Disinformation
So, what do we do?
First, the U.S. government needs to unify around the
conviction that Russia uses disinformation in the United
States. By no means is it the only purveyor of false and
misleading information here, but it remains a leader in
pursuing this phenomenon for political ends. The U.S.
government needs to present a united front to European allies
in combating this threat, and take a leadership role in
crafting a thorough and methodical response. The current
presidential administration has not provided leadership in this
regard. Congress should thus remind our European allies that
the U.S. stands strong in its values, and is ready to partner
with them to fight interference by foreign powers that seek to
undermine democracy.
Second, Congress needs to work with other government
bodies, tech companies, and civil society to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of how disinformation works and can
be combatted--and shouldn't rely on short-sighted responses
similar to the German law and the censorship it incentivizes.
A thoughtful approach to online disinformation will
involve: (1) combating the use of bots that robotically amplify
information and articles based on programmed algorithms, given
that the U.S. does not protect the free speech of computer
programs; (2) working with experts in civil society to examine
laws around online speech to ensure they are informed not only
by the first amendment, but also by the experiences of affected
communities; and (3) creating an appeals process whereby
consumers can contest instances of content removal, and receive
quick and efficient redress.
Third, while much of the U.S. government's focus has been
on messaging and public diplomacy, we also need long-term
strategies to support democratic institutions and values
overseas. Last year, Senators Portman and Murphy passed
legislation that allotted $80 million to the State Department's
Global Engagement Center for programs to combat disinformation,
including Russian disinformation. Secretary Tillerson has
approved the use of $60 million of these funds by the State
Department to combat disinformation put out by terrorist groups
such as the Islamic State. This funding is important. At the
same time, however, we need to recognize that putting out
better messaging about what democratic institutions can
accomplish, or responding to specific false messaging
campaigns, is an incomplete response. Doing so is like treating
the symptoms of an illness, rather than curing the disease. The
best advertisement for democracy and human rights is the
demonstration of strong, well-functioning democratic
institutions--not just more messages about what these
institutions could be. We need to show people, not just tell
them.
On the part of Congress, this means adequately funding
democracy and governance programming, including in Eastern
Europe, a region that we formerly thought had ``graduated''
from authoritarianism.
One strategy that Congress should support is the European
and Eurasian Democracy and Anti-Corruption Initiative, which
was introduced by a bipartisan coalition, including some on
this Commission. This legislation would commit $157 million for
innovative projects to combat Russian disinformation and
influence in Europe. Indeed, the Senate's current State and
Foreign Operations bill contains $120 million for Countering
Russian Influence.
With these funds, the Department of State could support
regional programs to bolster democracy and human rights,
including in countries where the U.S. does not currently have a
USAID office, such as Poland and Hungary. The funds could
support media literacy, like what we believe is helping Germany
fend off Russian influence this election, and support
independent media to counter Russian disinformation. These
programs can increase the critical eye of media consumers. They
should also support local civic leaders to hold governments
accountable when they engage in corruption, threaten the rule
of law, or flout the basic values and requirements of E.U. and
NATO membership--actions which show the strength of democratic
principles.
Conclusion
At a time in which democratic values and institutions are
being undermined and challenged directly by Russia through a
concerted, multifaceted effort, we need to invest resources in
these mainstays of sustainable security and prosperity. Now
more than ever, the United States needs to maintain the
leadership role we have held since the last World War in
supporting democratic norms and values. Nations the world over
are looking to us for guidance in dealing with this new type of
threat to our institutions and ideals. We need to step up.
Thank you.
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