[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INNOVATION AT TSA: EXAMINING THREAT MITIGATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISTIONS REFORM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 18, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-46
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-192 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, Deputy General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Clay Higgins, Louisiana William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Ron Estes, Kansas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witness
Mr. David P. Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Appendix
Questions From Chairman John Katko for David P. Pekoske.......... 31
Question From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for David P. Pekoske.... 40
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for David P.
Pekoske........................................................ 40
INNOVATION AT TSA: EXAMINING THREAT MITIGATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISTIONS REFORM
----------
Thursday, January 18, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Protective Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. John Katko (Chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Rogers, Higgins,
Fitzpatrick, Estes, Watson Coleman, and Payne.
Also present: Representative McCaul.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation and Protective Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss how TSA is
working to mitigate threats to transportation security through
reforming the agency's broken acquisitions system. In
particular, the subcommittee will examine TSA's statutorily
required 5-year investment plan that was recently submitted to
Congress, as well as the agency's Innovation Task Force and
overall procurement practices.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement. During my
tenure as Chairman of the subcommittee, I have watched the
threat environment grow ever more startling. I, along with my
colleagues on the committee on both sides of the aisle, have
been continuously briefed on changing security threats and
TSA's threat mitigation efforts.
Unfortunately, TSA continues to be plagued by a reactive
rather than proactive posture when it comes to technology
development and deployment. While terrorists continue to
develop better ways to try and defeat our security screening,
TSA struggles to quickly and effectively deploy cutting-edge
technology to the front lines.
This has been a constant oversight issue for this
subcommittee due to a lack of serious change within the agency.
My predecessor on this subcommittee, Richard Hudson, passed
legislation in the 113th Congress requiring TSA to submit the
5-year investment plan, a legacy we have sought to build upon
by introducing legislation to make the plan annual rather than
biannual.
Recently, while reviewing the history of this
subcommittee's oversight on this topic, I came across a
question stemming from a hearing in June 2012 asking why
credential authentication technology had been delayed for a
third time.
As we sit here today, in 2018, this technology still has
yet to be deployed at airports. That is truly amazing.
Bureaucratic bottlenecks and understaffing at the TSA Systems
Integration Facility, or TSIF, have led to years of delays for
technologies that other countries have been using in their
airports for quite some time.
Mrs. Watson Coleman, myself and others saw that for
ourselves with our own eyes in a recent Congressional
Delegation we took to the Middle East and Europe. On a recent
bipartisan Congressional Delegation we saw that, as I mentioned
to you. Excuse me, got ahead of myself.
Specifically at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, screening
checkpoints utilize advanced Computer Tomography Systems or CT,
which offer screeners better picture quality and more advanced
threat detection capabilities.
While Schiphol was able to deploy this American technology
in a matter of months, TSA continues to be bogged down in a
lengthy process for testing systems and developing algorithms.
In TSA's own 5-year investment plan, which was submitted to
Congress nearly 6 months after the statutory deadline, let me
say that again, 6 months after the statutorily-imposed
deadline, we finally got this watered-down plan.
The agency states it only plans to procure two CT systems a
year for the next 3 fiscal years. That is a total of 6. There
are 12 at Schiphol airport alone and there are 450 airports in
the United States.
However, the same plan estimates it would need well over
2,000 CT machines and $224 million for full deployment. While
TSA has indicated to the committee that it intends to procure
and deploy more of these machines, all estimates still fall
woefully short of what is needed.
With all the airports in the United States, goals and
requests for CT machines should be measured in the hundreds or
thousands rather than single digits. The good news is this, Mr.
Pekoske: You, in your new role as administrator of TSA, have
the opportunity to use the $7.4 billion budget Congress has
provided you to fix this broken system and give the American
people the type of security they demand and deserve for their
tax dollars.
Additionally, this subcommittee stands ready to work in a
bipartisan manner to help you accomplish this monumental task
through oversight and legislation. In order to be successful,
however, we need TSA to come to the table with honest and
timely answers and real solutions with a sense of genuine
partnership.
I look forward to hearing your vision for reforming the TSA
acquisitions process and how Congress can help.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
January 18, 2018
The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss how TSA is working to
mitigate threats to transportation security through reforming the
agency's broken acquisitions system.
In particular, the subcommittee will examine TSA's statutorily-
required 5-year investment plan which was recently submitted to
Congress, as well as the agency's Innovation Task Force and overall
procurement practices.
During my tenure as Chairman of this subcommittee, I have watched
the threat environment grow ever more startling. I, along with my
colleagues on the committee, have been continuously briefed on changing
security threats and TSA's threat mitigation efforts.
Unfortunately, TSA continues to be plagued by a reactive--rather
than proactive--posture when it comes to technology development and
deployment.
While terrorists continue to develop better ways to try and defeat
our security screening, TSA struggles to quickly and effectively deploy
cutting-edge technology to the front lines. This has been a constant
oversight issue for this subcommittee, due to a lack of serious change
within the agency.
My predecessor on this subcommittee, Congressman Hudson, passed the
legislation in the 113th Congress requiring TSA to submit the 5-year
investment plan--a legacy we have sought to build upon by introducing
legislation to make the plan annual rather than biannual.
Recently, while reviewing the history of this subcommittee's
oversight on this topic, I came across a question stemming from a
hearing in June 2012 asking why Credential Authentication Technology
had been delayed for a third time. As we sit here today, this
technology still has yet to be deployed at airports.
Bureaucratic bottlenecks and understaffing at the Transportation
Systems Integration Facility, or TSIF, have led to years of delays for
technologies that other countries have been using in their airports for
quite some time.
On a recent bipartisan Congressional Delegation to airports in the
Middle East and Europe, my colleagues and I were amazed at the level of
advanced security equipment utilized by several nations to screen both
aviation passengers and employees.
Specifically at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, screening
checkpoints utilize advanced Computed Tomography Systems--or CT--which
offer screeners better picture quality and more advanced threat
detection capabilities.
While Schiphol was able to deploy these technologies in a matter of
months, TSA continues to be bogged down in a lengthy process for
testing systems and developing algorithms.
In TSA's own 5-year investment plan, which was submitted to
Congress nearly 6 months after the statutory deadline, the agency
states it only plans to procure two CT systems a year for the next 3
fiscal years. However, the same plan estimates it would need well over
2,000 CT machines and $224 million for full deployment.
While TSA has indicated to the committee it intends to procure and
deploy more CT machines, all estimates still fall woefully short of
what is needed. With 435 airports in the United States, goals and
requests for CT machines should be measured in the hundreds or
thousands rather than single digits.
The good news is this, Mr. Pekoske: You, in your new role as
administrator of TSA, have the opportunity to use the $7.4 billion
budget Congress has provided you to fix this broken system and give the
American people the type of security they demand and deserve for their
tax dollars.
Additionally, this subcommittee stands ready to work in a
bipartisan manner to help you accomplish this monumental task through
oversight and legislation. In order to be successful, however, we need
TSA to come to the table with honest answers, real solutions, and with
a sense of genuine partnership.
I look forward to hearing your vision for reforming the TSA
acquisitions process and how Congress can help.
Mr. Katko. I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson
Coleman for her opening statement.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you
for convening this hearing.
Mr. Administrator, thank you for appearing before our
subcommittee. Today it seems like I haven't seen you in a very
long time. Funny, we saw each other earlier today. The
Transportation Security Administration is essential to our
Nation's security.
Americans rely on the work of TSA employees to keep us safe
from a long and growing list of terrorist threats. Over the
last year, we have seen the threat landscape changed and
watched TSA work to adapt.
In March, we watched TSA grapple with the question of
whether to ban electronic devices larger than the smart phone
from all U.S.-bound passenger planes in response to the threat
landscape.
Since last summer, TSA has had to reevaluate the level of
transportation security on a number of occasions. In August, a
serious ISIS-connected cargo-based explosive plot came to light
which was to be carried out on an international flight.
Then in December, a would-be terrorist attempted an attack
on the New York City subway system. Even though the terrorist
threat picture evolves at an uncomfortably quick pace, the
number of travelers who rely on TSA security operations has
increased.
During the holiday season, TSA screened a record of 42
million passengers and 31 million checked bags at airports
across the country. TSA's plate is close to full. Still, we
need the agency to do more.
We need TSA to continue to be a leader in aviation security
and invest in leading technologies that would keep our
transportation system safe. For me, today is an opportunity to
look beyond the 5-year technology investment plan that appears
to be the impetus for the hearing and to focus on the bigger
picture. When is TSA going to fully realize its mission of
effectively securing all modes of transportation against
terrorism?
As such today, I want to hear from you, Mr. Administrator,
about your plans to address the growing threat to soft targets
in surface transportation, on-going work force challenges, air
cargo security, and behavior detection screening.
Additionally, we need to discuss the passenger security fee
diversion. It is unconscionable that at a time when the treats
to aviation and surface transportation systems are so
sophisticated and diverse, that TSA is forced on an annual
basis to hand over $1.28 billion in aviation security fees it
collects to the Treasury for the deficit reduction.
The truth of the matter is that we cannot continue to have
conversations on how TSA should do better or move faster to
deploy innovative security screening equipment without having
an honest conversation about TSA's resource needs.
As Members of this subcommittee, we are best positioned to
know what TSA needs, and without question TSA needs us to enact
H.R. 2514, Funding for Aviation Screeners and Threat
Elimination Restoration Act, so that it can receive the funds
necessary to procure security screening technology.
We know the President's budget will be released soon. Mr.
Administrator, I would ask that you would work really hard to
ensure that this time around, in contrast to last year's
submission, what we receive actually reflects your operational
needs.
Given everything that we are going to discuss today,
following this hearing with a tone-deaf budget proposal would
be unacceptable. Thank you, again, Mr. Administrator, for your
time today. I hope today's hearing will be productive and look
forward to hearing your answers to the myriad of transportation
security issues facing our Nation.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman
January 18, 2018
The Transportation Security Administration is essential to our
Nation's security. Americans rely on the work of TSA employees to keep
us safe from a long and growing list of terrorist threats. Over the
last year, we have seen the threat landscape change and watched TSA
work to adapt.
In March, we watched TSA grapple with the question of whether to
ban electronic devices larger than a smart phone from all U.S.-bound
passenger planes in response to the threat landscape. And since last
summer, TSA has had to reevaluate the level of transportation security
on a number of occasions. In August, a serious ISIS-connected cargo-
based explosives plot came to light, which was to be carried out on an
international flight. Then in December, a would-be terrorist attempted
an attack on the New York City subway system.
Even though the terrorist threat picture evolves at an
uncomfortably quick pace, the number of travelers who rely on TSA
security operations has increased. During the holiday season, TSA
screened a record 42 million passengers and 31 million checked bags at
airports across the country.
TSA's plate is close to full. Still, we need the agency to do more.
We need TSA to continue to be a leader in aviation security and invest
in leading technologies that will keep our transportations systems
safe.
For me, today's is an opportunity to look beyond the 5-year
technology investment plan that appears to be the impetus for the
hearing and to focus on the bigger picture--when is TSA going to fully
realize its mission of effectively securing all modes of transportation
against terrorism?
As such, today, I want to hear from Administrator Pekoske about his
plans to address the growing threat to soft targets in surface
transportation, on-going workforce challenges, air cargo security, and
behavior detection screening.
Additionally, we need to discuss the passenger security fee
diversion. It is unconscionable that at a time when the threats to
aviation and surface transportation systems are so sophisticated and
diverse, TSA is forced, on an annual basis, to hand over $1.28 billion
in aviation security fees it collects to the U.S. Treasury for deficit
reduction.
The truth of the matter is that we cannot continue to have
conversations on how TSA should do better or move faster to deploy
innovative security screening equipment without having an honest
conversation about TSA's resource needs.
As Members of this subcommittee, we are best positioned to know
what TSA needs and, without question, TSA needs us to enact H.R. 2514,
``Funding for Aviation Screeners and Threat Elimination Restoration
(FASTER) Act'' so that it can receive the funds necessary to procure
security screening technology.
We know the President's budget will be released soon. Mr.
Administrator, I would ask that you work really hard to ensure that
this time around, in contrast to last year's submission, what we
receive actually reflects your operational needs. Given everything that
we are going to discuss today, following this hearing with a tone-deaf
budget proposal would be unacceptable.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Other Members
are reminded that statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
January 18, 2018
A little more than 2 months ago, Administrator Pekoske testified
before the full committee that ``the threat to international aviation
is high and multiple terrorist groups remain intent on attacking our
surface transportation systems.''
Members of the committee on both sides of the aisle agree that
countering such threats demands enhancements to current security
systems, including the deployment of innovative technologies such as
computed tomography, or ``CT'' machines. Unfortunately, deploying
advanced technologies to the Nation's TSA checkpoints is easier said
than done.
While TSA has taken some positive steps such as establishing the
Innovation Task Force, piloting CT machines, and publishing a refresh
of its Strategic Five-Year Technology Plan, TSA can and should do more
to reduce the time line for deploying new technologies to the field.
Congress must do its part as well. We can start by passing H.R.
2514, the ``FASTER Act''--a bill every Democrat on this committee
supports--to return $1.28 billion in fees collected by TSA from the
flying public for security that is currently being diverted away from
TSA.
It defies logic to call out TSA for failing to invest in new
technologies while refusing to support the FASTER Act, which could
provide TSA with the funding needed to realize the promise of
integrating new technology in our aviation security system.
Further, I am not sure it is fair to demand that TSA set out in
great detail its plans for technology investments for the next 5 years
at a time when the agency is funded on a stop-gap basis.
Nevertheless, enhancing our transportation security efforts remains
imperative. In addition to securing aviation systems, TSA must work
with transit agencies and stakeholders across the country to secure
subways, railroads, buses, and other surface transportation systems. I
look forward to hearing about the TSA's efforts to develop and deploy
technologies to secure surface transportation systems used daily by
millions of Americans.
Finally, I want to emphasize that technology alone will not provide
security. Such solutions must be staffed and operated by well-trained,
capable officers. We must do more to support TSA officers and work to
improve their morale--starting by providing them with workplace
protections in place for other Federal workers. Democrats remain
committed to doing just that.
Administrator Pekoske, you have a difficult job and I thank you
again for joining us today.
Mr. Katko. The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. McCaul,
is going to make an opening statement. But he is on his way
over, so in the interest of keeping in time here, we will go
with Mr. Pekoske first and then come back to Mr. McCaul.
Mr. Pekoske, welcome. You are the seventh administrator of
the TSA, here to testify before us today in this critical
topic. I believe you are the sixth either acting or actual
administrator that I have seen at TSA in 3 years, which is
unacceptable and that is why we had a bill passed that is
sitting in the Senate, hopefully to give you a 5-year term to
have some stability with TSA.
In your role as administrator, Mr. Pekoske is responsible
for securing the Nation's civil aviation system and surface
transportation modes. He leads a work force for approximately
60,000 employees who work to protect the Nation's
transportation systems while ensuring freedom of movement for
people and commerce.
Prior to joining TSA, Mr. Pekoske served as the 26th vice
commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and we thank you for your
service.
Let me remind the witness that their entire written
statement will appear in the record. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Pekoske for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DAVID P. PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pekoske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Katko,
Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you this afternoon.
Innovation is a key priority of mine and I am looking
forward to obtaining your perspective as we work together to
mitigate threats to transportation security.
First, I want to acknowledge the outstanding men and women
of TSA. It is my privilege to serve as administrator to the
over 60,000 dedicated professionals that provide security for
millions of Americans who use our transportation systems each
and every day.
I am proud to highlight that we have made measurable
improvements to our aviation security effectiveness over the
past few months through training and procedural changes. This
was accomplished as passenger volumes continued to increase. I
am pleased to report passenger wait times remain on average
well within TSA standards.
Transportation security is an all-hands effort. Our
aviation security checkpoint personnel are clearly the most
visible part of TSA. But there are thousands of other TSA
employees working behind the scenes or in the air or with the
owners and operators of our Nation's surface transportation
systems. They are also key elements of TSA's success.
On behalf of this team, I thank you for your support,
enabling TSA to accomplish a mission so critical for the
safety, security, and economic well-being of the American
people.
Mr. Chairman, I have tremendous respect for the oversight
role that this subcommittee performs with respect to TSA. I
highly value your perspectives and opinions. You have made us
stronger and America safer. I know that TSA needs to be much
more responsive to requests for information required by statute
or otherwise requested by any Member of this subcommittee.
I have looked into our responsiveness over calendar year
2017. Simply put, we need to do better, much better. I give you
my personal pledge to address this issue head-on and provide
timely and complete delivery of information you seek going
forward.
Since becoming administrator, I have spent the majority of
my time intentionally at the front lines of TSA. I have engaged
with TSA employees at all levels of the organization and I have
met with many of our partners to include the airlines,
airports, law enforcement, and public safety professionals at
the State and local level, owners and operators of surface
transportation systems and international partners as well as
industry groups and union leaders.
Everywhere I visited, I found a deep commitment to the
mission. It has also become very clear to me that we need to
focus on three major lines of effort. The first is leading
transportation security by strengthening the effectiveness of
our operations.
Second, is to accelerate action by deploying technology
faster and third, committing to our people because they are the
most valuable resource in our key line of defense against the
threat.
As I testified before the full committee in early November,
the area that will yield the greatest impact on mitigating
threats to aviation is improvement to the technology employed
at the checkpoint.
To this end, I am developing a TSA strategy,
administrator's intent, and a capital investment plan. These
will guide TSA's implementation of future technology
development as part of a larger systems approach.
I will ask for time in your calendars to obtain the
subcommittee's input on these important documents. We are
moving very rapidly to deploy CT X-ray technology at the
checkpoints. This is my top priority.
During this current fiscal year, we will field almost 40
units for developmental and operational testing, 28 of those at
airports. We are planning a much larger deployment in fiscal
year 2019. Details of this will be provided in the President's
budget when it is released in a few weeks.
We are employing a flexible approach to test, procure,
deploy CT systems while concurrently working to improve
automation and achieve substantially enhanced levels of threat
detection.
We are enhancing our canine program. We will be at our
budget allocation level in September. To ensure we maintain
this level and position the program for continued growth, we
have increased the capacity of our canine training center to
maintain a robust pipeline of trained canines.
I fully support the Domestic Canine Capability Building Act
recently passed by this committee and the full House. We are
deploying Credential Authentication Technology or CAT to be
used at the first position on our security checkpoints.
It will provide improved passenger identification, real-
time verification of ticketing status, real-time verification
of secure flight vetting status, that will reduce fraudulent ID
vulnerabilities and provide real-time vetting information at
the checkpoint. That is a significant enhancement.
Currently, there are 33 CAT systems deployed for testing in
TSA PreCheck lines at 10 airports. Both DHS and TSA are
evaluating existing rapid acquisition processes across the
Government to leverage known experience and best practices.
This will be very valuable for future acquisition projects
so that our technology stays ahead of the threats posed by our
adversary. Our relatively new innovation task force provides
industry with a better way to interface with TSA.
Our partnerships with industry, both small and large
businesses, are very important to successful deployment of
technology. I have strived to engage personally with industry
on a regular basis and fully engage the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee for their advice and perspective as well.
In closing, I am deeply committed to strengthening our
security posture and will do everything in my power to put the
proper technology tools in the hands of the dedicated men and
women of TSA.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, Sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pekoske follows:]
Prepared Statement of David P. Pekoske
January 18, 2018
Good afternoon Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you to discuss the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) technology initiatives.
First and foremost, I would like to recognize the Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) on their success in providing security to over
44 million airline passengers during the December holiday travel
period. They did so professionally and adapted to accommodate daily
screening challenges. Over the past 6 months, we have seen 5 of the top
15 total passenger volume days in TSA's history. On average, TSA
screens 2.2 million passengers each day. During this past holiday
season, the daily rate grew as high as 2.4 million. Keeping up with
this challenge would not be possible without our outstanding workforce.
Additionally, I would like to thank Chairman Katko and Ranking
Member Watson Coleman for taking the time to visit TSA headquarters
last month for a discussion on transportation security. I look forward
to continuing to work with you and your staff to advance TSA's critical
mission.
Today's hearing is timely, as technology deployment will be
critical to TSA's success in 2018 and beyond. Terrorists continue to
target commercial aviation, including cargo, and we must strive each
and every day to stay ahead of the myriad threats. In the 5 months
since I have been on board at TSA, we have seen scores of threats
against aviation. I am committed to ensuring TSA remains as successful
as it has been in the 16 years since the agency's founding to protect
our transportation systems, especially aviation. Since I have been TSA
administrator, we have improved training, deployed enhanced screening
procedures, and have aggressively pursued new technologies. We are
continually increasing our ability to detect threat items throughout
the aviation security system, and improving technology at the
checkpoint will be the focus of my remarks today.
checkpoint system
One of the most significant initiatives at the checkpoint is the
introduction of Computed Tomography technology, or ``CT,'' as it is
commonly referred. I know some of you have seen CT being tested
overseas at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport and domestically at Boston
Logan International Airport and Phoenix Sky Harbor International
Airport. CT is not new technology. The idea for CT was conceived in the
1960's and first employed for medical applications in the early 1970's;
however, it has evolved and is now used in other arenas, such as in
aviation security. In fact, TSA has been using CT scanners to screen
checked baggage since the agency's inception in 2001. Over the past few
years, industry has been aggressively working to reduce the technology
equipment's size and adjust its configuration to make it a viable
option for deployment at most airport checkpoints. TSA continues to
work closely and expeditiously with CT equipment manufacturers to
improve detection algorithms, optimize throughput, and automate the
detection of prohibited items so that CT technology can deliver the
full host of capabilities needed to address checkpoint vulnerabilities
into the future.
Once fully developed for the aviation environment, checkpoint CT
technology will deliver a significant advancement over today's two-
dimensional X-ray technology platforms. Checkpoint CT screening
technology provides a three-dimensional view of the bag and enables the
TSA officer to rotate the bag 360 degrees to show the contents at every
angle. CT features allow officers to virtually remove unwanted clutter,
and greatly enhances their ability to visually inspect the contents of
carry-on bags for explosives and prohibited items. In these ways, CT
offers substantially improved detection capability by more effectively
detecting smaller and artfully concealed threats, thereby increasing
our overall security effectiveness while enabling passengers to leave
electronics in their carry-on bags. Ultimately, we hope to refine
checkpoint CT technology to the point where, similar to the checked
baggage process, we have automated the carry-on baggage screening
process and reduced the need for officers to review all images.
In order to further our efforts and capabilities, TSA is working
closely with industry partners, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, and international
counterparts. Together, we are exchanging information and best
practices related to operational and laboratory testing, explosives
characterization, CT platform enhancements, and image library
development. TSA is working closely with the European Commission,
European Civil Aviation Conference, and bilaterally with the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands to share test results
with the goal of aligning detection requirements and testing
methodologies. The Netherlands, Turkey, Japan, Singapore, and South
Africa are currently testing CT technology at their checkpoints, which
allows for robust information sharing and ultimately guides the
successful deployment of this technology.
We are also leveraging academia to develop innovative software
algorithms to more accurately identify prohibited items. Through our
own Innovation Task Force, TSA is providing CT vendors with end-user
feedback and real-world operational data to further operational
development, effectiveness, and efficiencies. In short, checkpoint CT
development is a world-wide effort to achieve the best screening
solution that is technologically possible today. Deployment of this
technology, both here at home and abroad, is a critical component of
raising the global aviation security baseline.
My team has developed an aggressive plan to deploy checkpoint CT
technology. We are currently pursuing a flexible approach to test,
procure, and deploy CT systems, while concurrently developing CT system
algorithms to significantly improve automated threat detection
capabilities. This approach employs the concepts of modularity and
iterative design to support deployment of specific capabilities as part
of a larger solution, while progressively expanding functionality until
the full CT capability is realized.
Deployment of CT technology at checkpoints is one of my top
priorities, and a priority for DHS leadership as well. In fiscal year
2018, we will field almost 40 units for developmental and operational
testing, with the goal of pursuing broader deployment and continued
algorithm development in the first half of fiscal year 2019, dependent
on funding availability. Such efforts for the acquisition of this
technology and others will be reflected in the Capital Investment Plan
and TSA Strategy and Intent that I am currently developing to guide our
investment approach moving forward.
Concurrent with our CT efforts, we are also pursuing other
technologies to increase security at checkpoints. Two such technologies
are enhanced Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and Credential
Authentication Technology (CAT). TSA continues to improve our current
AIT capabilities. As you may know, AIT uses imaging technology to scan
individuals and analyze the images for the presence of anomalies
beneath clothes, and in obscured areas. There are currently 945 AIT
units deployed at 340 airports system-wide. Upgrades to this technology
include greater detection capabilities in response to some of the
vulnerabilities identified by the DHS Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) in 2015 and in 2017. Other changes include software that will
allow TSOs to process passengers through the AIT more expeditiously,
thereby improving passenger flow through the checkpoint. In addition to
these upgrades to currently fielded AIT units, TSA is working with
other vendors to ensure we are testing every passenger screening
technology available to provide our TSOs with better tools to assist
them in performing their duties. TSA will be demonstrating an enhanced
AIT capability in the field later this quarter, gaining critical
insights into potential technology improvements that will move us
closer to the future checkpoint vision.
Another key technology under development for our checkpoints is
CAT; which will greatly enhance the vital role that the Travel Document
Checker (TDC) plays in ID verification, boarding pass validation, and
screening status determination. Specifically, CAT will improve the
TDC's ability to accurately authenticate passenger identification
documents, passenger ticketing status, and Secure Flight passenger
vetting status, thereby addressing vulnerabilities associated with ID
fraud and providing real-time vetting information at the checkpoint on
passengers. There are 33 CAT systems currently deployed for technical
testing in TSA PreCheck lanes at 10 airports, including both Reagan
National and Dulles airports, to optimize system functionality and
associated Concept of Operations (CONOPS.)
TSA is currently assessing another technology known as Automated
Screening Lanes (ASLs). ASLs are already proving their worth and
currently 111 ASLs are deployed at 12 airports including Newark, JFK,
LaGuardia, Boston, and Atlanta. These lanes are not only designed to
increase throughput, they also provide better security by offering
capabilities such as automated pulls of bags needing further
inspection, automated tracking of bins linking to the X-ray and picture
images, and automated bin return allowing officers to focus on
security, instead of moving bins from the end of the lane to the
beginning. I envision that integrating CTs with ASLs will provide
significant technological and screening process improvements at our
checkpoints, and we plan on testing this integration in the near
future. I appreciate the great partnerships with airlines and airports
for their role in the procurement and deployment of ASLs.
acquisition process
Critical to the success of TSA's technology strategy and our
ability to stay ahead of the threat is the capability to acquire,
procure, develop, test, and field new technologies in a timely manner.
As the Chairman has noted, this is an area that needs improvement and I
want to assure you we are evaluating ways to accelerate the acquisition
process. In an effort to further identify ways to improve efficiencies
in the process, DHS and TSA are evaluating existing rapid acquisition
processes across the U.S. Government to leverage known experience and
best practices as we develop a model to accelerate acquisition efforts
and the ultimate deployment of effective solutions within a dynamic
operational environment. With your support, we are confident that we
will be able to create an acquisition paradigm that ensures accelerated
deployment and preserves the integrity needed to deploy effective and
cost-efficient capabilities.
conclusion
TSA is committed to securing the Nation's transportation systems
from terrorist activities and attacks. This year, we are focused on
maturing and deploying additional CT-based systems and working closely
with our domestic and international partners to raise the global
baseline for aviation security. In addition, I'm developing a Capital
Investment Plan, coupled with the TSA Strategy and Intent, which will
chart the future course for improvements in checkpoints and checked
baggage systems. I look forward to working with you on these efforts to
secure our robust transportation sector. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss these important issues. I look forward to the subcommittee's
questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Pekoske.
Perfect timing, the Chairman of the full committee, Mr.
McCaul, is here and he is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you Chairman Katko.
Administrator, thank you so much for being here and I
appreciate your openness and our conversations, both publicly
and privately.
When you appeared before our committee in early November,
we--briefed by yourself and the DHS inspector general in a
Classified setting about specific vulnerabilities at our
airports. In the hearing that followed, I said that I found the
briefing to be disturbing. I think you would probably agree
with that. I know my colleagues on both sides of the aisle feel
the same way.
As we have seen across Europe and in New York, many of the
most recent terror attacks have been carried out with vehicles
and other low-tech means. However, with millions of Americans
traveling annually by airplane, our aviation sector still
remains in my judgment the crown jewel of the terrorist.
Even though there are 60,000 TSA employees working hard and
we are very proud of them, to protect nearly 450 airports
across the country, I believe we still need the most innovative
and cutting-edge technology to keep our planes and passengers
safe.
As I stated at our full committee hearing in November,
``America's enemies only have to be right once, but we have to
be right 100 percent.'' They are just one airplane flight away.
That is why I remain concerned by the agency's inability to
deploy Computed Tomography or CT and Credential Authentication,
which would greatly enhance detection of threatening objects.
You and I talked very productively about this. This concern
was also made clear in a November 9 letter to Acting Secretary
Duke from myself and Chairman Katko, urging TSA to reform the
acquisition and procurement process for screening technologies.
Our letter also contained nine questions about what actions
DHS and TSA are taking to improve the overall screening system.
We appreciate your efforts to get a response to our committee.
I must say we were a bit underwhelmed by the lack of details.
In particular, one of the responses stated that CT systems
beyond the prototype phase would not be deployed until early to
mid-2019. There is an airport in Amsterdam that already uses
American-made CT to screen bags. Not having this kind of
enhanced security at our own airports I believe is
unacceptable.
It is also important that TSA work with our international
partners to install CT scanners at airports overseas,
particularly those in the high-threat areas from last point of
departure which serve for in-bound flights.
This is something I have expressed to you in our most
recent conversations as recent as today, and I am hopeful that
you and I can work together to come through a resolution to
protect the American people.
To keep our homeland safe, we must have the best technology
efficiently and effectively deployed without further delay.
Today, I am hoping we can have a detailed discussion on how
to get that done so that the American people are better
protected. With that, sir, I want to thank you for your service
and thank you for being here today. I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
January 18, 2018
Before we begin I would like to welcome and thank Administrator
Pekoske for joining us this morning to once again discuss how we can
strengthen our aviation security.
Administrator, when you appeared before our full committee in early
November, we had just been briefed by yourself and the DHS inspector
general in a Classified setting about specific vulnerabilities at our
airports. In the hearing that followed, I said that I found the
briefing to be ``disturbing.'' And I know my colleagues felt the same
way.
As we have seen across Europe and in New York City, many of the
most recent terror attacks have been carried out with vehicles and
other low-tech means. However, with millions of Americans traveling
annually by airplane, our aviation sector still remains the ``crown
jewel'' of targets.
Even though there are 60,000 TSA employees working hard to protect
nearly 450 airports across the country, we still need the most
innovative and cutting-edge technology to keep our planes and
passengers safe.
As I stated at our full committee hearing in November, ``America's
enemies only have to be right once, but we have to be right 100 percent
of the time.'' That is why I remain concerned by the agency's inability
to deploy Computed Tomography (CT) and Credential Authentication, which
would greatly enhance detection of threatening objects.
This concern was made clear in a November 9 letter to Acting
Secretary Duke from myself and Chairman Katko, urging TSA to reform the
acquisition and procurement processes for screening technologies. Our
letter also contained 9 questions about what actions DHS and TSA are
taking to improve the overall screening system. We appreciate TSA's
efforts to get a response to our committee, however, we were
underwhelmed by the lack of details.
In particular, one of the responses stated that CT systems beyond
the prototype phase, would not be deployed until early to mid-2019.
There is an airport in Amsterdam (Schiphol) that already uses
American-made CT to screen bags. Not having this kind of enhanced
security at our own airports is just unacceptable.
It is also important that TSA work with our international partners
to install CT scanners at airports overseas which serve as the last
point of departure for in-bound flights. This is something I have
expressed to you in our most recent conversation and I am hopeful we
can begin to make progress on that very soon.
To keep our homeland safe, we must have the best technology
efficiently and effectively deployed without further delay.
Today, I am hoping we can have a detailed discussion on how we can
get that done so that the American people are better protected.
Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes of questions.
I want to say at the outset that we have to begin the line of
question here that I gave you a heads-up on and that was the
really terrible delinquencies that this agency has routinely
engaged in responding to requests from Congress.
You know, I know, the agency knows, that our request are
not optional, particularly when they are in statute and when
there is a deadline set. We don't set those deadlines
arbitrarily or to make your lives miserable. But, in fact, we
set them because we need the information. If you look back on
the information we have requested, it has to do as keeping
America safe, keeping our airlines safe, having a better
procurement system and what-have-you at TSA.
So, it is deeply disturbing that we have to talk about this
stuff again and again. But and you and your predecessors have a
pretty dismal track record of responding to us in a timely
manner to things.
I want to put a graphic up. You see it up on the screens
here and you turn on your monitors in front of you as well. If
I was a prosecutor, cross-examining someone, I love these types
of graphics, but I am not a prosecutor and you are not my
adversary.
That is why I don't like this graphic. This graphic shows
that of the--in the 115th Congress, 82 percent of the time you
have had delinquent or very delinquent responses to inquiries
from us, either oral or writing or from statutorily-missed
deadlines, the 5-year plan of which was probably the worst.
The content of what was in the 5-year plan to me was at
best watered down and not very helpful. That 5-year plan is
there and was designed years ago to try and get TSA to look
forward and look ahead and it seems like we are beating our
heads against the wall with that.
There is just, for the record, so it is clear that out of
the 17 requests you had from Congress this year, 14 of them
were late or very, very late. We are not talking by a couple of
hours. We are talking by days, weeks, and months. That is
something that is absolutely unacceptable.
We can provide to you after the hearing today or at any
time a copy of each individual request, when it was done, when
the deadline was and when the date of response was. It is
routine like I said for it to be multiple months late and that
is very difficult.
Now, I want to talk about the biannual 5-year technology
investment plan, which was submitted to the committee nearly 2
months late. First of all, I guess I would ask why that was?
Any reason for that, any justification for that? I understand
part of this before you answer that question is that you came
in the middle of this. That I understand.
But you also have a professional staff who does a very good
job and works very hard. I am just at a loss as to why it would
be so late and you would just ignore a statutorily-mandated
deadline.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We don't intentionally ignore
deadlines whatsoever and as I said in my opening statement,
this is a key priority of mine. I pride myself on being
responsive to others' requests for information.
I will take a personal interest in this to make sure that
going forward we meet the deadlines that we have established to
respond to this committee's--every Member of this committee.
The reason that report was delayed and this is just a
reason, it is not--the report should have been on time is the
bottom line. The reason it was delayed is I got into office. I
looked at the report. It already has been through staff
clearance. It is not just staff clearance within TSA, it is
staff clearance within the administration as well.
There were some significant things that weren't in that
report, for example, CT. You commented that even the report
that you have today shows two CT systems being acquired.
That is because we can only report what is in the budget
request. That doesn't reflect our current thinking on CT as I
just mentioned in my opening statement. So that report needed
to be revised to at least bring it up to the more current
information that was subsequently provided to the committee.
But bottom line is that it shouldn't be late. I will take a
personal interest in making sure that we are responsive to the
committee's concerns. Like I said we very much appreciate your
oversight. We want this to be a strong partnership.
I think it already is a strong partnership but it can be
even stronger. Every time I have talked to any Member of this
committee, the first question they ask me after I brief them on
whatever information I brief is: How can we help? I really
appreciate that and I want to make sure that I do everything I
can to provide you the information that you need going forward.
The second thing I would mention, sir, is that I firmly
believe in a long view. One of the things that TSA does not
have is a long-term capital investment plan. So that is why we
do fits-and-starts if you will on some of these projects. What
I want to do is to be able to take a little bit longer view, a
5-year look at what our capital requirements are and actually
plan that out so that we see it and we can plan to it early
enough on so that things go much smoother than what they have
in the past.
Mr. Katko. That is part of the reason why you have the 5-
year plans. We can help you looking forward. I mean, we have
tried to force you--the agency to look forward. That is
something you shouldn't have to start anew. It is something
that is already there for you.
I will note just for record that with respect to the letter
we sent out on November 9, 2017 with Mr. Chairman to my right,
it was a very pressing matter, a very serious matter. We got it
Tuesday of just last week, which is almost a couple of months
late.
We are trying to help keep the country safe too and we have
a job to make sure that oversight is done appropriately. We
can't help you, which we want to do, if you don't give us
information to help you with.
If you haven't noticed, this is one of the most
legislatively active committees probably in the history of
Congress, under Mr. McCaul's leadership, and we churn out so
many bills that are so important to keeping our country safe.
We can't do the legislation unless we know what the problem
is. For example, I am contemplating something to expand the
resources for TSIF, which I know is a bottleneck for technology
and we want to help with that. But we can't if we don't get the
information, especially if we don't get the information in a
timely manner, so I am confident you got the message.
So with that I will recognize Mrs. Watson Coleman for 5
minutes of questioning.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. I wanted
to get some clarity. You said that you were--you mentioned that
you are going to be deploying 40 CTs through 20 airports and 20
of them are going to go to airports. Is that right?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So where are the other 20 going?
Mr. Pekoske. The other 12 are going to our labs, our
testing facilities. So we are using three testing facilities
and there will be four in each one of the testing facilities.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Now, how far away do you think you are
of actually deploying these to the 440 airports Nation-wide?
Mr. Pekoske. The testing articles that we deployed to 28
airports in fiscal year 2018, we are very close to starting
that deployment, so I would say in the next 3 or 4 months we
will start to deploying those and testing those in a real
environment.
With respect to the full deployment, starting to spread out
to the 450 airports, that begins in fiscal year 2019. The
President's budget when that gets released, I will be able to
discuss more fully what our plan is for fiscal 2019. But I can
assure that there is a deployment plan in fiscal 2019.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I want to talk to you a little bit
about surface transportation issues because I am always very
concerned about that. Since the last time we talked in November
there was an attempted terrorist attack in New York City's
subway. What is the security technology plan for surface
transportation security?
Mr. Pekoske. We work with the owners and operators of
surface transportation systems and TSA's role is to test
technologies that might enable or enhanced surface
transportation security. A good example is with that IED,
person-borne IED up in New York, we are testing a technology
that can detect at a distance if a person has something that is
anomalous on their body.
Essentially the technology reads millimeter waves that your
body emits. It doesn't send any energy toward the person. It
just reads what the person's body is emitting. It can tell at a
pretty good distance like from, almost from me to you, Ma'am,
whether or not there is an anomaly on your body that we might
want to look at further.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So where would we be? Where are we in
that process? How far away are we actually into being able to
use this?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. The TSIF, Transportation Security
Integration Facility has been testing this. They should
complete their testing this summer. That will be tested by TSA,
the owners and operators of surface transportation systems will
know it meets the testing regimen. They will have access to the
data and they are able to purchase it knowing that, hey, this
has already been tested. They don't have to make the investment
in that testing technology.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So they actually have to purchase the
whatever it is that is going to be able to detect this.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes. We estimate the cost is about $100,000
per machine.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Oh my. OK. I also wanted to know about
whether or not in any way, shape, or form there are regulations
that you are waiting to, sort-of, bring up that will enhance
the surface transportation security issues and if you are in
any way hampered by this administration's policies with regard
to having to eliminate two in order to bring one up. That
concerns me particularly in surface transportation because I
just don't think we are up to snuff anyway on any level as it
relates to surface transportation issues.
So where are we? Do you have any problems with getting out
the regulations that you need to get out?
Mr. Pekoske. We have three such regulations that required
by the 9/11 Act. Two of those three regulations are in the--we
are all in the process of being put forward. The other one is
still being developed. But we hope to have the first.
The topics they cover are training for surface
transportation, vetting for surface transportation employees,
and then security plans for surface transportation systems. We
expect the first regulation to come out some time this year and
the next one the year following that. Then the third one is
still in development.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So are you compelled to have to
eliminate two in order to bring one forward? So----
Mr. Pekoske. We are still working. Yes, ma'am. We are still
working the implementation of that Executive Order inside the
administration, so that process is still going on back and
forth between the agencies.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. OK. I want to talk to you a little
bit more about the TSOs because I think that whole issue with
regard to their salary, the conditions under which they are
employed. Their ability to make complaints and have those
complaints dealt with by independent third parties, that kind
of thing, I wanted to know what you have done personally to
sort-of advance, not only this career path, but to ensure that
they are more fairly compensated and more a part of a
predictable system?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. That is a key focus of mine. I
spend a lot of time at the front line of TSA, meeting with our
transportation security officers and understanding the work
that they perform and the conditions under which they work.
We have put together a career progression plan for our TSOs
that we are still putting the final touches on, but we should
have that done very, very shortly. Essentially what that does
is it lays out for an employee when you come into TSA, here is
your pay level. Here is the training that you are going to be
provided at each step along the way of your career. This is
provided by TSA. The training would be both resident training,
in other words, we will send you to a school, most likely the
TSA Academy at Glynco, Georgia for training or training is
provided on-site for you.
Then once you meet those training requirements, we have
established pay increases for those employees. So you can
really, as a new employee look at that map and say, ``If I get
this training, and if I perform well, in X number of years, I
can be at this level in the organization.'' Assuming there are
vacancies there, of course.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. It was anticipated that there would be
a coming together of the union and the TSA and discuss, sort
of, more formally, routinely what TSOs need and should have.
OK. I will shut up in a second.
Mr. Katko. Yes, it's all right.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So I know that the legislation hasn't
passed but I do wonder whether or not those kinds of meetings
are taking place. With that, actually, after you answer that I
will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Pekoske. Whenever I travel to an airport or a Federal
air marshal service office in the field, I always do an all-
hands session with our employees. I use that opportunity to
share with them my vision for the organization, some of the
observations that I have made about TSA, where I want to take
it, but the vast majority of the time is answering their
questions and getting their feedback.
Oftentimes what I will do is, for example, with this career
progression, I will test drive it in some of those meetings and
say, ``Hey, we are thinking about this. Give me some
feedback.'' In almost every case, the union representatives
have been part of that discussion.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes
of questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know votes have been called and I know you know I will be
visiting after.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. So, I will keep my questions very brief for the
other Members, but I think this threat is getting worse, not
better, without getting into a different room and space. I have
been a big advocate for full deployment of the CT machines.
Mr. Rogers has been a huge advocate for deployment of
canines. Mr. Katko has been a real leader in terms of aviation
security. I just want to ask you a very simply. As I understand
it, you requested 300 CT machines to be deployed, is that
correct?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. In our hearing, the full committee
hearing on November 8 that was the number we have been using
was 300. And I----
Mr. McCaul. I think at a minimum.
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Mr. McCaul. As I understand it, is it correct that OMB, did
they deny that request or just lower it to a 150 which would be
half that amount?
Mr. Pekoske. Whenever an agency requests a budget item from
the Department of OMB, it goes through a review process and OMB
and the Department have topline constraints. So they only have
a certain amount of money they need to--they can allocate and
they need to stick to that.
Mr. McCaul. I understand that, but I mean this is dollars
and cents, we are talking about American-wise. One hundred-
fifty million dollars, when we are talking about billions of
dollars for a lot of other things, $150 million doesn't sound
like a whole lot to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
To cut that in half, when I think, quite frankly, we need
more than 300 of these machines fully deployed, particularly in
these dangerous countries that are last-point-of-departure
airports. I flew back from Africa and Paris and Istanbul is--
Cairo is frightening when we inspected those airports.
I will just close in saying this and I think speak for all
Members on both sides of the aisle, I want to work with you to
do two things, to reprogram monies for the request that you
made for 300 machines.
If we need an additional appropriation and I understand the
confines here within the OMB and the White House, but I think
we in Congress can make the case for you because I know what
you want and we want to give you want you need to protect the
traveling public.
So, let me just end with that I think we all want to work
with you to get to that number and I think anything less than
that is unacceptable for the American people. So, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree with you more and
I don't think anyone on the committee disagrees with you at all
on that. So, with that, we do have votes. We will stand
adjourned until 5 minutes after votes conclude and we will
resume at that time.
[Recess.]
Mr. Katko. The subcommittee is now back in session.
I will turn to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne,
for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
OK, one sec. Let us see, last year, Newark Airport became
one of the first airports in the New York City region to have
high-tech security checkpoints with the automated screening
lanes. However, the strategic plan Refresh mentions that
procurements are not anticipated until fiscal year 2020.
To address these concerns and thus the Nation about
screening checkpoint delays, does TSA intend to work with
industry to accommodate non-Federal investment in ASLs
potentially from the airlines or airports?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Mr. Payne. We have 111 automated
screening lanes deployed throughout the system. Every single
one of those are automatic screening lanes was funded either by
an airline or an airport, so they have provided the funding for
those to let us do some developmental and some operational
testing.
There are no resources in the budget as it currently stands
in fiscal 2018 for automated screening lanes, but we are
standing up an acquisition project. This is one of the issues
with how we proceed without a capital investment plan: Ideally,
you would already have an automated screening lane project on
the Government side so that when the industry-funded prototypes
ran their course, that you had a project to come in behind
that. We may see a little bit of a delay because that project
wasn't stood up.
Mr. Payne. OK. Now, we expect the President's budget to be
out next month. Can you tell us in general terms about some of
the TSA priorities in the budget?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I can't go into any specifics, but in
general, the President's budget reflects a resource-constrained
approach because we just do not have unlimited resources to
apply to any particular agency. I can share with you that----
Mr. Payne. You don't sound too sure.
Mr. Pekoske. Well, I know, I just cannot reveal what is in
there at this point until the President releases the budget.
Then I would be happy to sit down with you one on one to go
over the particulars in that budget. But that should be the
first or second week of February.
Mr. Payne. So, there is something in it, though?
Mr. Pekoske. Oh, there is.
Mr. Payne. Oh, OK.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes.
Mr. Payne. All right, very good.
As I am sure you are aware, TSA has consistently struggled
with low morale across the work force. In 2016, TSA ranked
303rd out of 305 Government agencies for morale, there is also
an immediate need for improvements to the TSO pay and
performance system as well as other work force priorities so we
can improve the morale and reduce turnover.
I understand that AFGE which represents front-line
transportation security officers has reached out to you on
issues of importance to the work force. Are you planning to
work with those labor representatives to try to rectify some of
these issues?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We are working with labor
representatives. In fact, I met with the AFGE president already
as one of my initial visits as the new administrator.
Additionally, when I travel to airports around the country, the
union representatives are always in those meetings, so I think
we have a good dialog back and forth.
Mr. Payne. How do you see addressing some of these issues
from your standpoint?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, in my opening statement, I mentioned
three key areas of priority for TSA. A key area, one of those
three was a commitment to people. There are a number of
subtasks underneath that that go to the very issue of
increasing job satisfaction, by increasing retention within our
work force.
In my travels around TSA, actually my personal interactions
with TSA, men and women at the checkpoints or the folks that
are in checked baggage or behind the scenes doing inspections
and things like that, I found very high morale and very strong
mission focus. So, I am trying to reconcile the survey results
with what I see personally.
But, knowing that we do have some work to do there, we have
seen some improvement in results from 2016 to 2017. I am open
to see continued improvement in 2018, 2019, and 2020 for sure.
From my perspective, sir, security effectiveness is directly
related to worker satisfaction and job morale, so that is a
very high priority one.
Mr. Payne. OK. Well, I hope you are successful in that
because, you know, being 303rd out of 305 indicates that there
are obviously some issues.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Mr. Payne. I will yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here. We appreciate your service to our
country. We have a lot of threats that originate overseas at
last-point-of-departure airports. I am really curious to know
what steps, if any, you all have been taking to work with our
international partners to help them deal with deficiencies that
the AT X-ray machines have in terms of screening passengers.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have a number of people deployed
overseas that are industry representatives or TSA
representatives in countries, roughly 100 people overall. They
have direct interaction with both the carriers, the airports,
and the nations involved in the last-point-of-departure
airports.
As we have worked to raise the global bar in aviation
security, those steps that we put in place in July and the
additional measures that came into force in October, all of
those inspectors and those TSA representatives are visiting all
of, every single one of the last-point-of-departure airports
just to see how they are doing with implementing those measures
and importantly, to see where we can help them out.
Mr. Rogers. OK. Do they seem receptive to that help?
Mr. Pekoske. They do, certainly.
Mr. Rogers. According to the Refresh plan, TSA plan to
procure two CT machines a year until you found the technology
worked. I talked with the Chairman about now that you feel
comfortable with it, that you would like to have at least 300.
Down the road, what is the total number you think that you
would be able to need for across the transportation world
spectrum?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Just for planning, it would be very,
very simple and that is one for one replacement of the Advanced
Technology of the AT machines with the CAT technology. That is
roughly 2,400 machines overall. What we will find as we deploy
the CAT machines that a one for one replacement may not be
necessary. Additionally, a number of airports around the
country are doing a lot of investment in their airport
infrastructure and the way they invest may require more lanes
for us or fewer. So, it is a very exact process to go through
airport by airport and see where we can deploy the CT
technology.
Finally, there are some restrictions because the CT
machines weigh more and they are a little bit bigger and so in
some airports, we felt those infrastructure investments, they
may not be able to handle a CT machine.
Mr. Rogers. We understand if you are constrained by the
President's budget in your advocacy, but the good news is the
President proposes and we decide. So, we are going to do our
best, as the Chairman said, to try and help you get what you
need. I am curious, if you get to 300, what percentage of your
capacity will that accommodate?
Mr. Pekoske. If we get 300, I do not have the exact--
basically, it would be 300 over roughly 2,400. So, whatever
that math turns out to be. What is also important is to have
some level of predictability in the future funding stream. That
is important for the manufacturers to understand that too.
As we go through the testing process that we are in right
now, we have a number of manufacturers' machines that we are
testing. We do not know at this point how many manufacturers of
this set that we are testing are actually going to succeed in
that test and be listed on our product list. So, that will also
determine how much capacity we can put out there. Basically it
is going to be the capacity of the number of manufacturers.
Mr. Rogers. OK. I want to shift over and I appreciate the
fact that you have been full-throated in your support of the
legislation we passed last week together with the establishing
a working group for canine production and training. I hope that
it is your expectation to give the same commitment to carrying
out the report recommendations that they are going to yield as
to how we implement those, that production in training.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, absolutely. In fact, I would like to
get a start on the requirements in the legislation before the
legislation is even passed. I agree with it so much that I
think we should not waste any time. We should just get about
the business and get it done.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I know you now talked about the fact
that TSA is struggling with American vendors to get green dogs
or dogs that have the capability but haven't been trained yet.
What is the status? Is there any activity going on within TSA
to kind-of modify their procurement processes to reflect more
what DOD does?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We are constantly looking at that
because our procurement processes, as many of the other Members
have noted, they are lengthy. So my approach is to look at it
and say how can we stream--even within the existing
requirements that we have, how can we streamline that process
to get to an end solution faster?
My central effort in my strategy is going to be accelerate
action, because as I look across TSA, many things just take a
lot longer than I think they should take no matter what it is.
It takes longer than I think what it should take. So, our key
focus and certainly a focus on getting technology deployed out
to our front-line work force which would include canines,
because I firmly believe that we need to do everything we can
to get the right tools in the hands of the men and women we
have out there.
Mr. Rogers. Great. My time has expired.
I do have a couple of additional questions that I will
submit for the record and I hope you will reply to those. I
yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. I just want to note, we may do a
quick second round if warranted.
With that, I will recognize the gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pekoske, thank you for appearing before us today.
I would like to touch on a couple of subjects very quickly.
My colleague mentioned morale in TSA. Would you have not
contributed, the morale status, generally speaking at TSA be
due to consistent failures and high turnover, would you
contribute that as?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I think there are a lot of factors that
feed into the morale of our employees. Those would be two of
the factors. I think other factors are the nature of the work,
the competitive nature of the work, the stress that they are
under, certainly some of the feedback they get from customers
that might not be fair feedback and things like that.
Mr. Higgins. But we touched upon an interesting aspect of
this in mentioning a 5-year term rather than frequent turnover
at the upper administrative levels. Morale is reflective of
consistency in my experience. In 2017, just a couple of months
ago, we passed, the Department of Homeland Security
Authorization Act and it now languishes in the Senate. If our
colleagues in the Senate will act and pass that full
authorization which is for the first time, the Department of
Homeland Security was authorized since its inception which
consolidates it under the oversight of one committee and
associated subcommittees.
Would you not see that as a statement of consistency and
therefore would contribute to an improvement of morale?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I would. I think that is very
important. To your point on consistency of leadership, the
Chairman mentioned the number of leaders he has seen just since
he has been a member of this subcommittee and having some
stability at the top of the organization I think is very
important.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. I think it is very important and I
hope my Senate colleagues are listening.
I would like to jump to CT. Can you tell us why the great
disparity between the 2017 Refresh Plan that stated 2 units for
fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020 with a total of 6 and now we
are talking about 40 in 2018 which is great, we would like to
see you get them in every airport, everywhere at whatever level
you need them.
But why the great disparity between that report and you are
advising us now?
Mr. Pekoske. So the difference is that when that report was
written, we didn't have budget numbers for our fiscal 2019 and
forward. So what it reflects is the budget numbers that were
existent at that time.
Mr. Higgins. So, again, the consistency and full
authorization of the Department of Homeland Security would
assist us as a Nation to deploying this technology. Would you
agree?
Mr. Pekoske. I would in consistency of funding, I support
it.
Mr. Higgins. I hope my colleagues in the Senate are
listening.
I would like to jump to what you stated. You had stated,
sir, in your testimony that, pardon me, you have a plan to
aggressively deploy checkpoint CT technology and you are
currently pursuing a flexible approach to test, procure, and
deploy CT systems. Then you stated that you are focused on
maturing and deploying. Maturing, by that, do you mean testing
algorithms?
Why can these units not be deployed and put in use
protecting American citizens as the algorithms are tested and
tweaked and matured? Why can't we go ahead and put the systems
in place before we test them for a year or two?
Mr. Pekoske. So, again, in fact the plan is to qualify the
machines. It is just machines that work that meet a current
standard and then the additional testing and the additional
software development is for a new accessible property screening
standard which gets to a wider range of explosives detection
and----
Mr. Higgins. So, you concur that that is--is that a goal?
Mr. Pekoske. It is a goal, yes, sir. But, there are----
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Thank you, for that answer.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes. But, we will have constraints in how fast
we can deploy it just based on airport ability.
Mr. Higgins. Oh, I see. Well, thank you for that
clarification.
My final 30 seconds, please touch on ground transportation
and old technology of deployment of canines which this body has
authorized the funding for many additional canine teams, do you
not see that as an answer for our ground transportation system?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. It is part of a solution set.
Mr. Higgins. Are you aggressively pursuing that?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have 675 canine teams that we
provide to State and law enforcement for both airport and
surface transportation.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Pekoske, for being here.
My questions, I want to narrow it on cockpit safety
specifically, the flight deck officer program. How is it
working? What is working about it? What is not working? What
are the areas of improvement with regard to efficiency? It is
obviously run and overseen by the Air Marshal program.
As a former Federal agent myself, we had a lot of
interaction with that program or with those folks. I just want
an update on what is working about it and what is not?
Mr. Pekoske. I think it is working very well, sir. I have
personally observed the training that the Federal flight deck
officers go through. I think it is very rigorous, that they
volunteer for this assignment, the airlines support their
assignment. It provides an extra layer of security in aircraft
which we very much value. So, I see no downside whatsoever to
the FFDO program and see only upsides to it.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Is there anything that can be improved? Is
it a purely voluntary program? Are their targeted percentages
of the certain percentage of cockpits you want on in pilots or
are pilots actually sought out after to participate in the
program?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, it is voluntary. Really, the more
the better. I mean the more cockpit security we have, I think
the better off we are.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK, thank you, sir.
My second question also pertaining to the cockpit is the
idea of double barriers, something that has come up a lot. I
would like it, sir, if can opine on the necessity of them,
whether you think that they would make aircraft and airliners
and therefore the passengers therein safer and more secure.
Mr. Pekoske. I have looked at the overall cockpit security
issues and as you know on flights where we deploy Federal air
marshals, we generally put them in the forward part of the
aircraft to provide that additional layer of security. Then
when you consider the reinforced cockpit doors and then the
potential of Federal flight deck officers being on an aircraft,
there are several layers of security that are built in there.
The additional barrier piece, I can get back to you as a
question for the record on that. I don't have any specifics on
that at this time, but I will look into it.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK, because certainly the flight deck
officer program helps. Certainly the air marshals help,
fortified barriers on the doors themselves help. The concern,
and the reason why myself and many people think the double
barrier was necessary is during the change, when is the change
in personnel in and out of the cockpit.
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Currently, what is being used to protect
that are carts and attendants protecting the cockpit. Do you
think it is safe to say that a double barrier to protect that
change in the cockpit personnel would make the aircraft safer?
Mr. Pekoske. Well certainly, it is vulnerable when the
change is occurring. So something that could close that
vulnerability would be useful for sure.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK. Thank you, sir.
I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
We will do just a brief second round and no one is
compelled to ask questions if they are not inclined to do so. I
just have a couple of follow-ups I wanted to touch upon.
First of all, with respect to the 5-year plan and some of
the responses in there, at one point, you stated that with
respect to the CT machines that TSA, quote, expects actual
deployment of CT systems to occur in early to mid-2019. What
does that mean?
Mr. Pekoske. That means that the deployment will probably
occur about this time in 2019. Because part of the survey that
we need to look at is when do we have surge periods at
airports? Basically it is from the week before Thanksgiving all
the way through the first week of January. You probably don't
want to be deploying these systems during that week just for
throughput reasons and for training reasons.
Additionally, whenever we go through a surge period, the
transportation security officers are always on duty and they
are often working overtime. We do look for periods that are
immediately after the surge periods so give them a little bit
of time off and to conduct some training that we might not have
been able to cover when they were going through a surge.
Mr. Katko. We touched on this at the last hearing, but I
wanted to just follow up just to make sure I am clear with
this. You know that the actual machine you are contemplating is
available now and you also know that it has been deployed now
at least in other airports around the world, so the technology
is there.
There is some discussion about doing basically on-the-job
tweaking if you will of that technology. Has there been any
consideration given to just simply deploying them now as
quickly as you can and tweaking, doing some of the tweaking
that you need to do as you go, kind-of like learning as you go
with this issue?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. When we do the operational and
developmental testing that's going to occur in fiscal year
2018, so it is this fiscal year, we will pick those airports
and we do have some flexibility in terms of throughput and do
some actual real, live testing of those machines.
Mr. Katko. That is not going to be something that is wide-
spread. You are basically going to wait until 2019 after the
TCIF testing is done?
Mr. Pekoske. Two-thousand nineteen is when the first large
chunk of money will come into the program.
Mr. Katko. I see. That is when you will be able to deploy.
You are kind of waiting for the money as well, right?
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Mr. Katko. OK, all right. Also I just want to mention, you
mentioned at some point in your testimony earlier this
afternoon that the importance of consistent funding streams
with respect to Congress, and I couldn't agree more. But one of
the complaints we have received from industry routinely is that
TSA often moves the goal posts on what the agency plans to buy
and when they plan to buy it with their funding request.
I want you to comment on that if you are aware of that
issue in your short time there and what are you planning to do
as you try to address that? Because one of the concerns I have
and we have discussed these many times, there is an awful lot
of great technologies out there that never find a way to the
battlefield if you will, because of these moving of the goal
posts that has occurred in the past.
It discourages entrepreneurs and upstart companies and it
also discourages a lot of companies to invest the amount of
money they have to, to try and get these contracts. So I wonder
if you could address that issue for me.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
One of the purposes for the innovation task force was to
address that very issue, is how do we have a good, robust
dialog back and forth with the industry, both large businesses
and small businesses and really have an on-going dialog when we
are doing developmental testing, so that the industry partners
know how the developmental testing is going on? They can make
some adjustments to their equipment as it is proceeding.
Once you get into operational testing, that gets to be a
little bit of a different animal. But I do think that a
predictable funding stream is very, very valuable to the
industry. I mean they are going to know that we are planning to
invest X amount of dollars in 3 years hence. If they want to
put R&D effort to be able to compete for those projects, they
can do it early enough on, which actually at the end of the day
benefits us as well in the process.
So my goal is to have good, robust dialog with the industry
and to see if we can get to a point where in the capital
budget, we have a predictable funding stream. Right now, in
checked bags, we have a very predictable funding stream. It is
$250,000 per year and that allows us to look out. We know, in 3
years, we are going to have $250,000 adjusted for inflation.
So, airports and TSA can make plans for deploying those
systems in an orderly fashion. The rest of the capital budget
is not like that, so I really think it is very important to get
to that capital investment plan.
Mr. Katko. OK, great. I just want one last question since I
have a minute here. This is something that is just a personal
bugaboo of mine, I go to airports all over the world and mostly
international airports have automated exit lanes and in fact
Syracuse, New York of all places which is not exactly the
busiest airport in the world has automated exit lanes.
Every time I walk out an exit lane in National Airport or
elsewhere, I see they have two to four people in the exit lane
just checking IDs when they come through. No bags are being
checked or nothing like that. I just wonder, first of all about
have you looked into automated exit lane technology and whether
that could save any money for TSA and the Government, No. 1?
No. 2, given the current threat climate and I think there
was a case last year where one of the flight attendants was
trying to smuggle on a significant amount of cocaine through
the exit lane check-in procedure. Is there any concern about
the exit lanes as being a security gap that might want to be
addressed? Because I know the exit lane technology out there
now is pretty much 100 percent certainty that people aren't
going to sneak through that way. I just want to ask you about
that.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
We look at those technologies and one of my biggest
concerns in terms of resourcing overall is the number of people
TSA has at the checkpoints, because I don't think that is
enough people. It is evidenced by the fact that we are having
to use a lot of overtime to get through surge periods that we
are not able to conduct training during those surge periods and
things like that. I think it affects morale too if you are in a
job and you are tasked to work extraordinary hours on a regular
basis, I think that affects your overall perspective of that
particular position.
So my goal is to look at the resource base of TSA and see
where we can put additional resources currently existing in the
agency at the front line, because, again, my focus is on that
front line.
Mr. Katko. OK, and I would like to hear more when we get a
chance to just think about the exit lane technology, something
we addressed in some hearings a couple of years ago. I think it
is something we have to take another look at just from a
manpower standpoint, but also from a cost standpoint.
With that, the Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Pekoske, you have given us a lot of good information
today and you certainly have expressed a commitment and
understanding of the challenges and the commitment to resolve a
lot of these issues. So, I just hope you have long enough to do
that.
Mr. Pekoske. Thank you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Try not going anywhere for a while.
Mr. Katko. I will second that.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Last week, there was this report about
a potential conflict of interest between staff at the
Department of Homeland Security and a computed tomography
contract that was awarded. I think we should all agree that
contracts should be awarded fairly.
One article mentioned that the staff was recused from all
matters involving the contractor. I am concerned about other
potential conflicts at TSA. Would you be able to speak to the
sort-of regularity of how this has been happening and would you
also be able to provide our staff with the list of the
individuals and the reasons for their recusals?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. I will definitely take a look into
that. I am not familiar with the particulars of that particular
case, but I know in my own example, I have recusals from a
number of items based on my business relationships before I
came into this position, and we are very, very, very careful
about making sure that every aspect of that is complied with.
I think that the competition needs to be fair, open, and
transparent and if there is any break in that particular model,
I want to take a look at it.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Just to follow up on that, do you find
the rate of recusal more now than, let us say, in sort-of the
last terms?
Mr. Pekoske. I would not have a good basis to make that
comparison.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Can you?
Mr. Pekoske. I can get the data. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Would you share that with us?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thanks. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for questioning.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pekoske, I would just like to state that I echo the
sentiments of my colleagues that we certainly hope you stay on
the job, extremely squared away and your testimony today has
been uplifting.
I would like to jump back into canines for a moment
regarding cargo and airport employee areas, restricted areas.
We expend a great deal of energy and technology to screen our
passengers to the extent that the deterrent factor is largely
in place. I personally believe that if an airplane is to be
hijacked by firearm, it is going to come from the cargo area or
the airport employee restricted access area.
So, regarding the use of canines and more specifically
American-bred canine teams, what is your vision on using old
technology, given what you stated as, I think you used a term
called budget-restrained environment, old technology being
certainly less expensive than new and canine team technology
and capabilities being very, very adequate regarding detection
of explosives, how do you envision the cargo areas and
restricted access areas of airports and using canine teams?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Canine teams are effective in that
environment. Not only to detect potential issues of concern,
but also to provide that deterrent effect as you mentioned. The
Aviation Security Advisory Council has a subcommittee on
insider threat and I have asked that subcommittee to take
another look at that overall issue because I think it is
something that we just need to keep a constant stare on and we
should not look at it two or 3 years ago and say, OK, we have
got adequate procedures in place, I think we need to constantly
review that.
I would also add, sir, that in our global efforts to raise
the bar in aviation security, that second phase that began to
be implemented on October 26 contains security around aircraft
that are destined for the United States in foreign airports.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir. Thank you for that answer. Thank you
for your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Payne, if he has any questions.
Mr. Payne. No questions at this time. Thank you for your
service to this country.
Mr. Katko. OK, thank you very much, Mr. Payne.
Before we close, I do want to note that, listen, we had to
get into some tough stuff here. That is part of our job at
oversight. We would not be dispatching our duties if we did not
do so. But that doesn't take away from the fact that we view
what TSA is doing in the front line everyday keeping America
safe and keeping the skies guys safe and terror-free is
really--they are doing a great job and we appreciate
everything.
So yes, our job is to bark at you. Our job is to point out
where you are falling down. But, it is also incumbent upon us
to point out what you are doing well. The agency is making
progress. It has a long way to go, but I am confident that your
leadership and your team that is there and even the young lady
that would be going there next week with you, that you are
going to be all right.
I just hope that you understand that this is an interactive
relationship and that when you need things, you have to let
this committee know and we will respond. We will respond
legislatively. We will respond in any way we can to help you,
because I think it is in all of our interests to keep this
country safe and we know from our briefings that the bad guys
are still trying to get us in any way they can and their
technologies are getting more advanced. We have to advance with
them. That is why we spend so much time on the acquisitions
process and trying to help streamline that process. We have to
get the best tools available to the front lines.
I think the same way about my son who has just graduated
Fort Benning, Georgia, officer training and could be put in
harms' way tomorrow and it is incumbent upon us to make sure
that he has every weapon at his disposal to both protect
himself and to get the enemy. I view it the same way here.
So, while we point out the tough stuff, we also want to say
thank you to each and everybody, each and every person that
works at TSA. You can obviously do a lot of other things
elsewhere and a lot of you could be making a lot more money
elsewhere, but you do that because you want to keep your
country safe and that is a very commendable thing.
Before I close, I do want to note that after several years
with us, Krista Harvey would be going over to your shop. While
we are sad to see her go, we are glad to see her going to your
place. I encourage you to use her experience here because she
is going to be very helpful for you. Don't figure out how to
get me over, Krista, OK, all right?
So, thank you all very much. With that, let me see if I can
find my closing notes here, here we go. I want to thank
everybody for their questions today. It was great as usual. I
want to thank Bonnie Watson Coleman, my colleague and friend
for her usual great work.
The Members of the committee have 5 additional days to
submit questions and for the witness to respond in writing.
Pursuant to committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will be
held open for 10 days. Without objection, this subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman John Katko for David P. Pekoske
Question 1a. Last spring, we saw the emergence of a serious new
threat to the aviation system relating to personal electronic devices
(PEDs). The threat had a significant, rippling effect on the
international aviation system, with last-point-of-departure airports
required to take drastic steps to increase security and passengers in
the United States are now required to take PEDs out of their carry-on
bags. The latest intelligence indicates that we are in a very dynamic
and evolving threat landscape that could have significant implications
on aviation security and the international economy.
Will the investments outlined in the Refresh Plan for
transportation security equipment keep pace with the evolving threats
to aviation?
Answer. TSA operates within a complex and evolving threat
environment, and technology acquisition programs must proactively
respond to emerging threats to protect transportation security. To
address threats and increase security effectiveness, TSA is focused on
deploying an effective, adaptive, and flexible system of security
capabilities. TSA pursues enhanced capability development to address
capability gaps, optimize existing technologies, and develop future
technologies. It is our intent that the investment detailed in the
Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh Plan
will meet current and future threats to aviation.
Question 1b. Can you describe in detail how the TSA's Refresh Plan
will accelerate significant advancements in security technology
capabilities and deployment of these systems at the Nation's
checkpoints and checked baggage systems?
Answer. TSA's acquisition strategies will continue to transform to
address threats within the transportation security environment, and
reflect the goals outlined in the Strategic Five-Year Technology
Investment Plan Biennial Refresh, which provides industry and other
stakeholders with the Agency's strategic direction in order to align
investments accordingly. The Refresh provides information regarding
planned purchases within established acquisition programs as well as
focusing on emerging capability areas. For example, TSA provides its
detailed acquisition plan to rapidly test, procure, and deploy
available Computed Tomography systems, which TSA believes will
significantly increase security effectiveness at the checkpoint. In
addition, the on-going technology initiatives and innovative concepts
outlined in the Refresh Plan detail TSA's continued progress in its
pursuit to address capability gaps, optimize existing technologies, and
develop future technologies. Last, the Refresh Plan details how the
Innovation Task Force is demonstrating innovative and emerging
capabilities. These demonstrations provide stakeholders within the
security technology industry real-life operational experience and data,
which in turn may reduce technology transition time and cost, and
better inform TSA requirements. The Strategic Five-Year Technology
Investment Plan Biennial Refresh is one of many avenues that TSA uses
to foster dialog and collaboration with its stakeholders and to provide
transparency. TSA will continue to work with industry to develop
capabilities that meet requirements and will work internally to shorten
acquisition time lines to accelerate the deployment of capabilities to
checkpoints and checked baggage across the Nation.
Question 1c. Can you describe how the Refresh Plan fosters a robust
domestic security manufacturing base and enhances competition to drive
innovation in aviation security?
Answer. Within the Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan
Biennial Refresh, TSA provides industry and other stakeholders an
understanding of where it intends to invest to elevate checkpoint
screening capabilities. The Refresh provides information regarding
planned purchases within established acquisition programs, as well as
focusing on emerging technologies. TSA will continue to collaborate
with and inform the domestic security manufacturing base to ensure it
has an understanding of TSA's direction, which should foster both
competition and innovation.
Question 2a. Last year the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
(ASAC) undertook a comprehensive effort to assess the effectiveness of
checkpoints at U.S. airports, and presented to TSA 35 specific
recommendations in a report titled Improving Checkpoints at U.S.
Airports. This report sets the vision for checkpoints of the future,
which includes the fielding of next-generation technologies that will
significantly increase security and improve the passenger experience.
Will the TSA's Refresh Plan meet the vision outlined in the ASAC
report?
Answer. TSA continues to work with the ASAC to implement the
recommendations within the ASAC report.
TSA concurred with all recommendations within the ASAC report and
responded to the subcommittee with detailed implementation plans for
each one, including milestones to full implementation. The status of
these recommendations are discussed at ASAC subcommittee meetings. In
addition, TSA will ensure that future reports to refresh TSA's
Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan consider these
recommendations, as applicable to security technology.
The Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh
was considered in the development of the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC) Report. TSA believes that the efforts detailed within
the Refresh Plan show TSA's continued progress to address threats and
increase security effectiveness at checkpoints at U.S. Airports.
Question 2b. Does TSA have the funding necessary to accelerate the
development and deployment of increased capabilities and next-
generation technologies as soon as possible to meet the evolving
threats?
Answer. Yes, TSA has been able to work with its allocated funding
to best support the development of capabilities to address evolving
threats and to develop strategies to test and deploy technologies
faster. TSA will continue to use the established processes to request
any additional funding if necessary to further accelerate increased
capabilities.
Question 2c. Notwithstanding current or anticipated budgets, has
the TSA identified the funding requirements needed to accomplish the
mission and meet the evolving threats, as the ASAC has recommended?
Answer. Yes, TSA has identified the requirements and will continue
to fund those requirements within existing resources. Within a budget-
constrained environment, TSA prioritizes and makes difficult decisions
of what to resource and what not to resource. TSA will continue to look
for funding opportunities to best accomplish its mission to include
addressing known and evolving threats and will continue to follow the
established acquisition life-cycle process and the established
processes to request additional funding if necessary to accelerate
increased capabilities.
Question 2d. TSA's Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) has
a $250 million capital fund each year, which provides multi-year
funding for screening equipment upgrades and replacement. This provides
some consistency and certainty in making future investment decisions
for checked baggage system projects. Would the establishment of a
capital fund for the Passenger Screening Program (PSP) help the TSA
improve the checkpoint equipment?
Answer. The administration has proposed that the traveling public
pay a greater share of aviation security costs through higher fees.
While the establishment of a capital fund to resource capabilities
within the checkpoint would provide a more stable planning,
programming, and budgeting process, any additional funds should not
increase deficit spending.
Question 3a. The ASAC Checkpoint Report also contains a number of
specific recommendations for the TSA to vastly improve the long and
expensive security equipment development and acquisitions process. In
particular, the TSA test and evaluation process takes many years with
high costs to Government and industry. The Refresh Plan provides
additional details on the recent TSA reorganization and how it will
enhance the process.
Does TSA have examples of any efficiencies or time saved in the
development and acquisitions process since the reorganization?
Answer. The TSA reorganization addressed a need to create an
organizational structure that centralizes acquisition programs in a
single chain of command, establishes a dedicated requirements
organization to enhance acquisition life-cycle processes, and separates
contracting functions from broader acquisition management. One of the
significant efforts that TSA is driving under the new organization is
the rapid development, qualification, procurement, and deployment of
Computed Tomography (CT) technology for checkpoints. The development of
the acquisition strategy to aggressively deploy CT demonstrates how we
are working to assess, develop, and deploy technologies faster and
marshaling the focus of the entire agency. We are currently using
existing processes such as field demonstrations, operational
assessments, and developmental testing to develop screening
capabilities in a time-constrained manner.
Question 3b. Has the TSA set specific metrics or goals to measure
reduced times for equipment development and qualification? Has the TSA
established any specific metrics or goals to reduce the T&E time frame,
as a means to measure progress?
Answer. TSA monitors the time it takes for equipment to move
through the qualification process (also referred to as the test and
evaluation process), but much of that time line is dependent on the
maturity and readiness of the technology to meet TSA requirements. Some
Transportation Security Equipment failures during Qualification and
Operational Tests have unfortunately created an iterative cycle of
test, fix, and re-test that extends acquisition time lines and drives
up test and evaluation costs.
One of the goals of the Innovation Task Force (ITF) is to provide
more immediate feedback to vendors on the performance of their
technologies in the transportation security environment. One metric
that ITF uses to assess the success of its Broad Agency Announcement
(BAA) is looking at the number of small technology companies,
international companies, and/or first-time TSA companies that apply and
are accepted for a capability demonstration and comparing it to
historical industry demographics. The goal is to increase TSA's
industry footprint to help identify innovative and effective security
solutions.
Also, TSA is working on opportunities to enhance test and
evaluation practices such as expediting and supplementing testing by
accepting vendor and/or third-party agent test data; avoiding
duplication by leveraging existing test data through the creation of
data-sharing agreements with international government entities; looking
into using accredited Modeling & Simulation to augment live testing and
support evaluations that cannot be assessed in a live environment; and
looking into flexible testing processes that allow for a better
understanding of system capabilities prior to entering formal
Operational Tests. While the goal is to reduce the burden of excessive,
timely, and costly testing, TSA is still in the planning process of
this shift and has not established specific metrics for success to
date.
Question 3c. TSA is exploring third-party testing to gain
efficiencies in the testing process. Will the third-party testing
policy ensure that determinations made by the third party will be
accepted by the TSA, so the testing process does not have to be
replicated?
Answer. The acceptance of data will be based on a thorough data
source assessment of risk and a review of the test plans and data
provided. Vendor-provided documentation demonstrating a robust test
organization, sound test plan, and successful results executed will be
accepted on a case-by-case basis specific to the technology and extent
of third-party testing. TSA testing will be reduced when vendor-
provided third-party testing demonstrates the necessary rigor to
replace Government-conducted testing.
The TSA Acquisition Qualification Policy and TSA Test and
Evaluation (T&E) Guidebook established a consistent acquisition
approach that is compliant with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Instruction 102-01-001 Acquisition Management Instruction
(series). Application of these published documents, allows TSA to
ensure vendor-provided information (e.g., third-party test data) is
sufficient to demonstrate system readiness to enter the TSA T&E
process. As TSA considers third-party data, it may reduce test and
evaluation time lines by increasing the maturity of systems thereby
decreasing the probability of retests and possible reduction of TSA
Qualification Testing and help validate and/or supplement TSA T&E
results.
Question 3d. TSA has indicated to the vendor community it will open
up a notional, ``checkpoint of the future'' in Las Vegas McCarran
International Airport to test and evaluate multiple types of technology
including biometrics, Advanced Imaging Technologies, and CT systems.
TSA has also indicated they may test different configurations of AT/CT
and ASL configurations due to the lack of space at the TSA Integration
Facility located adjacent to Washington Reagan National Airport. Given
a shortage of engineering and testing personnel, the existing backlog
at the TSIF, and geographic challenges, what new assets and resources
will be deployed for the effort at Las Vegas McCarran? Do you
anticipate reducing the workforce at the TSIF to accommodate this
effort? Were alternative locations closer to TSA testing personnel or
manufacturers' facilities considered? Will TSA be funding procurement
and installation of various ASL configurations as part of this
demonstration?
Answer. TSA does not have a shortage of engineering or testing
personnel or a backlog at the TSA System Integration Facility (TSIF).
TSA does have a need for additional opportunities to collect live
operational data. Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (LAS) has
offered to provide TSA with checkpoint space that is not currently
being utilized by the airport for standard operations. The use of this
space will allow TSA the flexibility to run parallel tracks at TSIF and
in the field. It will also enable TSA to assess new designs,
technologies, and procedures in an operational environment and inform
requirements as the agency continues to drive a future security
screening strategy. The focus will be reducing the time it will take to
assess and deploy systems in specific configurations for demonstration.
TSA has an application process for airports interested in
participating as Innovation Sites. Las Vegas McCarran International
Airport (LAS) submitted an application and was selected for this
opportunity. None of the National Capital Region airports (DCA, IAD, or
BWI) have applied to be an Innovation Airport.
TSA is currently identifying requirements surrounding staff
availability, local operational impact, benefits to our public-private
partnerships and benefits for industry. At this time, TSA is planning
to use current resources to conduct its testing and assessment
requirements both at its facilities and alternate locations.
In order to fully demonstrate the Computed Tomography (CT)
operational capability, TSA intends to demonstrate CT integration with
Automated Screening Lanes (ASL) and/or an automated ingress/egress belt
system to understand impacts in effectiveness and efficiency. LAS
provides an opportunity to rapidly obtain data in a live operational
environment, while the TSIF maintains its focus on laboratory
functional and developmental testing. Additionally, the number of
hardware configurations, between CT and ASL equipment, require
significant space.
Question 3e. Figure 2 is an Overview of the Acquisition Lifecycle
for Security Technology. The ability to meet evolving threats in the
future will be heavily reliant on algorithm development. Will new
algorithm acquisition/deployment also proceed under a similar
acquisition framework? If not, has that process been defined? Can it be
provided to the committee?
Answer. In general, the development and deployment of new
algorithms to meet new threats are required to comply with the
acquisition framework depicted in Figure 2 of the Refresh Plan and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Instruction 102-01-001
Acquisition Management Instruction. When algorithm enhancements are
already associated with a technology that has approved requirements,
TSA, in coordination with DHS, performs an analysis to determine where,
within the framework, TSA can initiate the process to support the
development and deployment of new algorithms. In addition, TSA is able
to tailor the existing acquisition processes and look to delegate
authorities as necessary and appropriate.
Question 3f. Does TSA possess rapid procurement authorities to
purchase and install significant quantities of TSE post-Innovation Task
Force, bypassing the process outlined in Appendix F? For example, has
TSA considered the use of innovative contracting methods to greatly
accelerate the prototyping and procurements of new equipment, including
executing Urgent Operational Needs (UONs) or Other Transaction
Authority (OTAs)? If not, can you please recommend a rapid acquisition
authority that would be feasible with TSA's acquisition framework?
Answer. TSA has used rapid acquisition authorities in the past. In
September 2016, DHS approved an Urgent Operational Need (UON)
justification authorizing the deployment of Automated Screening Lanes
at specified airports. This deployment was dependent upon TSA's
partnerships with stakeholders. Two of our largest ASL deployments
include 22 lanes at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport
and 17 lanes at Newark Liberty International Airport.
TSA is working closely with the Department to help draft policy
which would help DHS components achieve a more rapid acquisition life
cycle when needed. Additionally, TSA is exploring whether it could
adopt an emergent acquisition process similar to DOD's Joint
Improvised-threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Joint Emergent Operational
Need (JEON) to gain flexibility in responding to non-urgent, but
pressing threats. TSA would be glad to brief the committee on its
findings from this assessment.
Question 4a. Around 50 percent of all passenger airline travel has
cargo in the bay of the aircraft, yet TSA's Refresh Plan makes no
reference to cargo security. This omission greatly concerns the
committee. We understand that, while TSA delegates responsibility for
cargo screening to freight forwarders and therefore does not itself
purchase cargo screening equipment, the cargo security threat is
recognized and there is work being done within DHS S&T to advance
screening technology in this area.
Does TSA accept the findings of such organizations as the GAO and
CRS and view air cargo as a serious security concern and, if so, what
are TSA's specific plans for incorporating advanced, non-intrusive
cargo screening technologies into TSA's R&D and materiel acquisition
planning?
Question 4b. Is it possible to tie in the Air Cargo requirements
with the requirements of other agencies, such as the CBP Non-Intrusive
Inspection organization?
Answer. TSA agrees with GAO and CRS's view of air cargo as a
serious security concern, and has had programs addressing air cargo
threats since at least 2004. In response to the increased threat of a
bomb being smuggled on-board an aircraft bound for the United States,
and working in close coordination with CBP, TSA recently issued
emergency directives requiring stricter scrutiny of air cargo being
loaded onto flights at last-point-of-departure airports in 6
countries--Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United
Arab Emirates. These new requirements include required electronic
submission of additional data elements for the cargo before any cargo
is laden onto an aircraft bound for the United States. TSA is also
required by public law and regulation to assess and qualify
technologies for screening air cargo. The agency's goal is to stimulate
and support a robust air cargo security technology marketplace. TSA has
the ability to continuously receive vendor requests for qualification
of prospective technologies, and works collaboratively with vendors to
refine the technologies they propose.
TSA is also partnering with the Air Cargo Associations and canine
companies to initiate a Third-Party Canine Cargo program. This new
program will provide the capability for private industry to screen
cargo utilizing private canine companies certified to TSA standards.
TSA actively collaborates with CBP and other Government agencies
(for example, DOD and DOT) to harmonize requirements. The DHS Joint
Requirements Council architecture is also very helpful in this regard.
The threat characteristics associated with air cargo on both passenger
and all-cargo aircraft are significantly different than those generally
associated with cargo transported on other means. Accordingly, not all
technologies used by other agencies are effective for air cargo
transported in flight.
Question 5a. TSA's Refresh Plan contains an update on the state of
hardening the aviation security system against cybersecurity threats
and attacks.
Can you describe specifically the status of the cybersecurity
elements of the Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP) and any
on-going challenges?
Answer. The Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP) comprises
a platform of technology that provides secure connectivity to
Transportation Security Equipment (TSE) endpoints that are deployed in
the field. Currently, and because of DHS internal policies 4300A, DHS
4300B, and NIST cyber controls, most of the TSEs are not connected to
the network. In support of generating connectivity for TSE endpoints,
DHS/TSA mandated 9 cybersecurity requirements, (OS Currency/Security
Patching; OS hardening; AV Updates; PIV Compatibility; Security
Scanning Support; Technical Obsolescence; SOC Monitoring; POAM Support
and Vendor ISSO Designation) which were established following the OPM
breaches in 2015, and are subsequently required to be implemented on
TSE devices. Facilitating this secure connectivity establishes a
centralized enterprise-wide data management system, which facilitates
the exchange of information between the TSE and data center.
STIP is active in multiple activities to further enhance
cybersecurity elements. Specifically, STIP is engaging with the
security technology acquisition programs to inform them of implementing
the 9 DHS/TSA mandated cybersecurity requirements, as well as
additional security requirements (e.g., mandated by DHS 4300A policy,
NIST standards, etc.) so that programs can achieve an Authority to
Operate (ATO), and maintain cybersecurity compliance. The technology
acquisition programs are in the initial stages of evaluating its
technology for cybersecurity compliance and determining implementation
time lines. The Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) program is
an exception, as the system has met the 9 DHS/TSA mandated
cybersecurity requirements. TSA is working toward deployment of CAT
systems in fiscal year 2019. Starting in fiscal year 2018, TSA intends
to begin development of technical solutions for security at the
endpoints and for the STIP application, which will facilitate all other
security technology meeting cybersecurity requirements and enabling the
TSA to connect TSE to the network in a phased approach over the next 6
years.
Question 5b. How does TSA ensure the cybersecurity of security
technology deployed in the field?
Answer. As part of TSA's plan for continuous monitoring of the
field equipment, TSA will be creating multiple systems associated with
each type of transportation security equipment (TSE) to meet the
requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA). Each identified FISMA system will be required to go through
the Security Authorization process which will allow TSA to continuously
assess the risks associated with the field TSEs on an on-going basis as
well as identify security controls that can be put in place to secure
the TSE.
Currently, no additional deployed TSE equipment, with the
exceptions of Credential Authentication Technology and Walk-Through
Metal Detectors, are connected to the TSA network. TSA has made a
determination that for TSE to connect to the TSA Network, the system
must meet 9 minimum cybersecurity requirements. Any potential
connectivity solution must meet 2 specific security needs. No. 1, it
must be able to protect the TSA network and STIP backend
infrastructure. In other words, it must be able to secure the larger
TSANet from malware and cyber attacks originating from the TSE. No. 2,
it must be able to protect the TSE itself from compromise or attack.
Question 5c. To what extent has TSA conducted penetration tests of
this security technology to understand how an adversary might gain
unauthorized access to the technology?
Answer. TSA recently conducted a penetration test against STIP in
the Test and Production environments and on the Credential
Authentication Technology. TSA conducted the test based on known
exploits that have been previously identified and approved. The
testing, done in concert with other compliance and vulnerability
testing, identified several opportunities to increase the security
posture of these systems. The testing results have been added to the
current system-level patching and deployment schedule.
Question 5d. Could you describe the level of coordination between
TSA and the DHS Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) on
cybersecurity matters? Has TSA ever requested an independent
cybersecurity assessment from DHS CS&C?
Answer. TSA has been actively coordinating with CS&C on multiple
occasions to include participation in the High-Value Asset Security
Assessment Review (SAR) and Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA)
which includes penetration testing for TSA's Mission Essential and
High-Value Asset Systems. In 2017, CS&C conducted these assessments
against the Secure Flight system. The Technology Information
Modernization (TIM) will be assessed in April 2018 and the
Transportation Vetting System (TVS) is scheduled to be assessed in
August 2018.
Question 5e. Does TSA have specific resource constraints associated
with delivering on its cybersecurity objectives?
Answer. Once a solution has been approved to implement on TSE
equipment, this is an additional 15,000 endpoints that will be on the
TSA network. Each endpoint requires incident monitoring, log reviews,
as well as forensics investigation support if an incident does occur.
On-going Security Authorization and continuous monitoring to ensure
each TSE is adhering to DHS policies and guidelines, is required for
the FISMA systems that will be defined through the separations of the
TSEs boundary. Considering these additional monitoring requirements,
TSA will need to assess the requirement for additional financial and
human capital resources, to include possible re-prioritization and/or
realignment of current resources to address any resource shortfall.
Question 5f. What assistance from industry does TSA need in meeting
its cybersecurity objectives?
Answer. As industry continues to design and develop new aviation
and screening technologies to meet an evolving threat landscape and TSA
requirements, companies need to embrace the idea that new systems and
capabilities must be cyber-ready when presented to TSA for
consideration.
Question 6a. TSA's Refresh Plan incorporates outdated data and
lacks a Classified appendix.
Can you please update Figure 3 to reflect actual TSA TSE procured
between August 2015 and August 2017? Please include an update of
equipment procured August 2017-January 2018.
Answer.
FIGURE 3.--TSA TRANSPORTATION SECURITY EQUIPMENT AWARDS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aug 2015-
Aug 2015- Aug 2017
Aug 2017 (actual/ Sept 2017-
TSE (includes no Feb 2018
options) options)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)...... 161 162 0
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray......... 70 69 66
Boarding Pass Scanner (BPS)............ 250 250 500
Explosives Detection System (EDS)...... 115 118 59
Explosives Trace Detector (ETD)........ 3,426 1,353 0
Credential Authentication Technology 30 30 0
(CAT).................................
Computed Tomography (CT)............... 0 0 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 6b. Figure 4 depicts projected useful life for deployed
TSE. For AT systems, can you please provide the initial deployment year
and number of systems constituting 2170 as of 5/30/2017?
Answer. Figure 4 provides the initial deployment of Advanced
Technology (AT) systems from 2008 through May 30, 2017. The total
number does not represent the exact number of AT systems deployed to
airports as this list includes 46 systems that were decommissioned,
four systems in temporary storage, and the remaining in transit or with
the original equipment manufacturer for repairs/upgrades.
FIGURE 4.--DEPLOYMENT OF AT BY YEAR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial AT Deployment by Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008....................................................... 504
2009....................................................... 407
2010....................................................... 14
2011....................................................... 205
2012....................................................... 434
2013....................................................... 36
2014....................................................... 499
2015....................................................... 53
2016....................................................... 68
2017....................................................... 5
Total................................................ 2,225
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 6c. Figure 5 is current as of August 2017. Can you please
update as of January 2018?
Answer.
FIGURE 5.--APPROVED PSP AND EBSP PLANNED PROCUREMENTS AS OF FEBRUARY 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation Security Equipment FOC \1\ FY17 \2\ FY18 FY19 FY20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives Detection System (EDS)............................... ......... 106 190 83 73
Explosives Trace Detector (ETD) \3\............................. 5,860 0 1,898 159 10
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)............................... 962 1 ....... ....... .......
Advanced Technology (AT)........................................ 2,213 66 ....... ....... .......
Bottled Liquid Scanner (BLS).................................... 1,530 ........ ....... ....... .......
Credential Authentication Technology (CAT)...................... 1,520 30 ....... 294 295
Computed Tomography (CT)........................................ ......... 8 \4\ 30 \3\ 145 \5\ 120
Enhanced Metal Detector (EMD)................................... 960 ........ ....... ....... .......
Boarding Pass Scanner (BPS)..................................... ......... 500 ....... ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Full Operational Capability (FOC).
\2\ Quantities provided for fiscal year 2017 are now considered actual TSA TSE procured. Quantities provided for
fiscal year 2018 and beyond are considered planned procurements.
\3\ Includes both Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) and Passenger Screening Program (PSP).
\4\ TSA reprogrammed funding for initial CT development activities and the procurement, testing, and deployment
of 42 checkpoint CT prototypes.
\5\ These are for the Passenger Screening Program.
Question 6d. What is the anticipated average cost of an Automated
Security Lane? Figure 6 projects 125 ASLs in fiscal year 2020. Can you
please inform the committee the basis for this number and the assigned
security value of ASLs as compared to other TSE? What are the plans for
deploying ASLs, and of the 2,170 Checkpoints, how many ASLs are planned
to be deployed? Will TSA or airports be the purchasers and what is the
site criteria for these deployments?
Answer.
The anticipated average cost of an Automated Security Lane
(ASL) is $280,000 which includes estimated procurement and
deployment costs. ASL systems will be procured with a 2-year
warranty. Therefore, annual maintenance costs of approximately
$25,000 per system will be incurred beginning in fiscal year
2020, upon conclusion of initial system warranty.
Below provides TSA's deployment plan through fiscal year
2019. Quantities for future years will be determined by the
budget process.
Quantities
Fiscal Year 2016.--2
Fiscal Year 2017.--84
Fiscal Year 2018.--114
Fiscal Year 2019.--0
Fiscal Year 2020.--200
Fiscal Year 2021.--200
Fiscal Year 2022.--200
Fiscal Year 2023.--200
Fiscal Year 2024.--200
Security value of ASLs will be determined as requirements
are defined, performance data is collected, and an ASL Program
of Record (POR) is established.
The ASL systems deployed in fiscal year 2016, fiscal year
2017, and fiscal year 2018 represent systems purchased by
private entities and deployed under the 2016 Urgent Operational
Need by the TSA Innovation Task Force. Those systems to be
deployed during fiscal year 2020 and beyond will be systems
purchased and deployed under an ASL POR. During fiscal year
2018 and fiscal year 2019, TSA will be finalizing ASL
requirements, completing documentation to establish the POR,
testing systems against established requirements, and holding a
Department of Homeland Security Acquisition Decision Event for
approval to purchase and deploy qualified systems.
Based on space constraints at checkpoints, up to half of all
deployed CT systems could be integrated with an ASL system,
which would result in a total of 1,376 ASL systems being
deployed to the field. Funding for systems integration work to
validate this assumption was provided in the 2018
Appropriations Act.
TSA will continue to work with our industry partners to
determine whether there is an opportunity to procure ASL
systems under the public-private partnerships strategy under
the POR. Under the POR it will be incumbent that any
partnership includes the procurement of qualified technologies
to ensure screening operations are not negatively impacted,
coordination with TSA on logistics, and prioritization of
technology placement.
Site criteria will not be finalized until requirements are
established and ASL performance data is collected.
Question 6e. Pg. 25 TSA identifies non-prioritized capability gaps.
Can you please provide for the committee a Classified prioritization
and fiscal year 2017 and projected fiscal year 2018 funding toward
achievement/fulfillment?
Answer. We are in the process of scheduling a Classified briefing
with the committee to discuss TSA's screening equipment detection
requirements and capabilities, which are written at the SECRET level.
Question 7a. One of your key responsibilities as administrator is
ensuring TSA has the information technology tools it needs to
accomplish its zero-fail mission. To that end, the IMPACT procurement,
which will select a contractor to run all of TSA's IT infrastructure,
is essential to the security of the traveling public. How does the
IMPACT procurement reflect the latest cybersecurity best practices,
including requirements of President Trump's recent cybersecurity
Executive Order?
Answer. IT Management, Performance and Analysis, and Collaborative
Technologies (IMPACT) procurement of IT support services for the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) IT environment reflects
cybersecurity best practices as outlined by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
their cybersecurity and information assurance requirements and mandate.
For example:
the IMPACT Task Order Request for Proposal (TORP) specifies
the overarching information assurance/cybersecurity
requirements of the solicitation; and
the IMPACT statement of objectives specifies the objectives
for the information assurance and cybersecurity support
services required of the IMPACT contractor.
Following the issuance of President Trump's recent cybersecurity
Executive Order (EO), DHS and TSA seamlessly mapped the requirements of
the EO and other relevant sources to the IMPACT TORP. TSA determined
that the existing structure and cybersecurity provisions of the IMPACT
TORP and its attachments already satisfied these requirements.
Question 7b. How does this take into account priorities surrounding
cloud deployment and shared services?
Answer. IMPACT prioritized cloud deployment and shared services
throughout its TORP. The IMPACT TORP released in May 2016 identified
cloud deployment in Objective No. 2: ``Manage and maintain on-going
relationships with TSA's technology providers for services such as,
data center, network, anything as a Service (XaaS), application
development, and cloud services to ensure service availability and
continuity across the TSA IT enterprise, without a break in service.''
Cloud deployment was further identified as Priority No. 4:
``Utilize the cloud to provide on-demand scalability, increased access,
and higher security for all TSA users thereby delivering information
more rapidly and enabling more informed decisions and actions. In an
effort to reduce future recapitalization expenses, TSA's strategic
plans include migration of infrastructure of some or all services
covered under IMPACT to a cloud environment.''
TSA identified it would need support with the following with
respect to cloud deployment:
1. Provide enterprise systems management services for all TSA
environments (e.g., Production, Development and Test, etc.,) to
meet TSA and DHS policies and guidelines, in close coordination
with the data center, XaaS, and cloud services providers.
2. Provide migration-related operations and maintenance support for
the movement of systems to other platforms, data centers, and
cloud services.
The IMPACT TORP also provided notice that TSA's strategic plans
included the migration of e-mail services infrastructure to a
commercial cloud.
TSA already utilizes several shared services, including Time and
Attendance from U.S. Department of Agriculture; Financials from the
U.S. Coast Guard; and Workplace as a Service (WPaaS) from DHS. When
replacing an old capability or obtaining a new one, TSA determines the
feasibility of adopting an existing shared service/system. The IMPACT
contractor's only responsibility for access to these systems is the TSA
infrastructure specified for support under the IMPACT solicitation,
thus shared services are not mentioned under IMPACT.
Below are some of the policies, directives, SOPs, and standards TSA
included in the Virtual Reading Room (VRR), to which all IMPACT
Offerors were provided access.
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
DHS Policy Directive 034-03--Continuous Improvement of DHS
Cyber Defenses
DHS USM Memo--Strengthening DHS Cyber Defenses
DHS Policy Directive 4300A--DHS Sensitive Systems
TSA Management Directive (MD) 1400.3--Information Technology
Security
TSA MD 1400.3 Attachment 1--TSA Information Assurance
Handbook
TSA Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1444--Information
Security Vulnerability Management
TSA SOP 1426--Security Event Testing
TSA SOP 1410--On-going Authorization (On-going assessments
of systems)
TSA SOP 1402--Security Authorization (Tailoring security
authorization process outlined in NIST SP 800-37)
TSA SOP 1444--Information Security Vulnerability Management
TSA SOP 1404--Incident Response for Computer Security
Incidents
TSA SOP 1431--Automated IT Security Scanning
TSA Technical Standard (TS) TS-003--Wi-Fi (802.11)
TSA TS-006--Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems
TSA TS-007--Host Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
TSA TS-012--Port Security
TSA TS-018--Wide Area Network (WAN) Security
TSA TS-010--Network Interconnections
TSA TS-072--Cloud Computing and Virtualization
TSA TS-016--Remote Access
TSA TS-028--Web Applications
TSA TS-037--Server Security
TSA TS-041--Switch Security
TSA TS-015--Network Logical Access Control
TSA TS-025--Virtual Private Networks
TSA TS-022--Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-137--Information Security
Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations
NIST SP 800-39--Managing Information Security Risk
NIST SP 800-37--Guide for Applying the Risk Management
Framework to Federal Information Systems
NIST SP 800-53--Security and Privacy Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations
NIST SP 800-18--Guide for Developing Security Plans for
Federal Information Systems
OMB Memorandum M-14-03--Enhancing the Security of Federal
Information Systems
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
(PUB) 199--Standards for Security Categorization of Federal
Information and Information Systems
FIPS PUB 200--Minimum Security Requirements for Federal
Information and Information Systems
Question From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for David P. Pekoske
Question. Why did TSA's Technology Investment Plan Biannual Refresh
pay little attention to the security of Air Cargo, given the current
threat landscape and recent plots against aviation security?
Answer. The Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial
Refresh intends to provide an update to the original Strategic Five-
Year Technology Investment Plan and discusses TSA's acquisition
programs and technology initiatives. TSA's regulatory role in the air
cargo environment is supplemented by outreach and industry/association
engagement to ensure carriers have the capability to properly screen
air cargo before it is loaded onto an aircraft. TSA does not currently
procure or invest in supplying equipment to carriers under an air cargo
program and, at this time, there is no plan to establish a program. The
carriers themselves own the technology systems or contract with third
parties to ensure the strict security requirements for air cargo are
implemented.
However, the agency's goal is to stimulate and support the air
cargo security technology marketplace. TSA has the ability to
continuously receive vendor requests for qualification of prospective
technologies, works collaboratively with vendors to refine the
technologies they propose, and publishes the TSA Air Cargo Screening
Technology List (ACSTL) on our website. TSA also works with industry
annually to develop needs and capability gaps that are submitted to DHS
S&T, which form the basis for S&T's air cargo R&D programs.
TSA is also partnering with the Air Cargo Associations and canine
companies to initiate a Third-Party Canine Cargo program. This new
program will provide the capability for private industry to screen
cargo utilizing private canine companies certified to TSA standards.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for David P. Pekoske
Question 1a. Last spring, we saw the emergence of a serious new
threat to the aviation system relating to personal electronic devices
(PEDs). The threat had a signifcant, rippling effect on the
international aviation sytem, with last-point-of-departure airports
required to take drastic steps to increase security and passengers here
in the United States now required to take PEDs out of their carry-on
bags. The latest intelligence indicates that we are in a very dynamic
and evolving threat landscape that could have significant implications
on aviation and the international economy. Will the investments
outlined in the Refresh Plan for transportation security equipment keep
pace with the evolving threats to aviation?
Cen you describe in detail how the TSA's Refresh Plan will
accelerate significant advancements in security technology capabilities
and deployment of these systems at the Nation's checkpoints and checked
baggage sytems?
Question 1b. Can you describe how the Refresh Plan fosters a robust
domestic security manufacturing base and enhances competition to drive
innovation in aviation security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Around 50% of all passenger airline flights carry cargo
in the bay of the aircraft, yet the Refresh Plan makes no reference to
cargo security. This omission is of great concern. We understand that
while TSA delegates responsibility for cargo screening to freight
forwarders and therefore does not itself purchase cargo screening
equipment, the cargo security threat is recognized and there is work
being done within DHS S&T to advance screening technology in this area.
Does TSA accept the findings of such organizations as the GAO and CRS
and view air cargo as a serious security concern and, if so, what are
TSA's specific plans on incorporating advanced, non-intrusive cargo
screening technologies into TSA's R&D and materiel acquisition
planning?
Are there opportunities to consolidate Air Cargo requirements with
the requirements of other agencies, such as the CBP Non-Intrusive
Inspection system?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The Refresh plan is nearly 50 pages long. Throughout
the entire Refresh Plan, there is only one paragraph dedicated to small
businesses. That is not good enough. In greater detail than the portion
in the Refresh Plan, will you describe how TSA is planning to better
integrate small businesses into the security technology development
pipeline?
Answer. TSA has an excellent record of working with small
businesses, and in fiscal year 2017 exceeded its overall small business
goal, awarding 24.8 percent of its contracts to small businesses.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Achievement
Goal (Percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Business--24 percent................................. 24.8
Small Disadvantaged--5 percent............................. 12.3
Woman-Owned SB--5 percent.................................. 9.0
Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned SB--3 percent............... 3.5
Hub Zone--3 percent........................................ 2.92
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, in fiscal year 2017, TSA awarded contracts to four
Computed Tomography (CT) contractors for CT prototype units. This
contracting opportunity was open to all of industry. One of the four
contractors that was awarded a CT prototype contract is a small
business, Integrated Defense and Security Solutions (IDSS) Holdings,
Inc. In fiscal year 2018, TSA has conducted several industry
engagements related to CT. These industry engagements include an
informational conference that was held on November 8, 2017, an industry
day that was held on November 17, 2017, and a notice that was posted on
the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) website inviting vendors to
submit their Advanced Technology (AT)/CT system for potential
qualification.
Further, the Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis
(ORCA) is working in partnership with the S&T Silicon Valley Innovation
Program (SVIP) on technical calls to start-up companies with solutions
to transportation security issues. DHS established the SVIP to keep
pace with the innovation community and tackle the hardest problems
faced by DHS's operational missions. The SVIP is expanding DHS's reach
to find new technologies that strengthen National security with the
goal of reshaping how Government, entrepreneurs, and industry work
together to find cutting-edge solutions. DHS is reaching out to Silicon
Valley and all of the innovation communities across the Nation to
harness the commercial R&D ecosystem for Government applications, co-
invest in ideas, and accelerate transition-to-market.
Recognizing the value that collaboration, of various perspectives,
and early/often engagement brings, TSA does a mix of large and small
engagement events across the enterprise. TSA regularly posts Requests
for Proposals, Requests for Information, Industry Day Announcements,
Pre-Proposal Conferences, as well as Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs)
on the Federal Business Opportunities website for known and future
requirements. There is currently an open BAA for Transportation
Security Innovative Concepts (TSIC) that all vendors, small and large,
are available to submit ideas to. TSA seeks research across broad
strategic areas which offer potential for advancement and improvement
of TSA security operations, technologies, processes, human-factors, and
capabilities. TSA is specifically interested in research that will
provide for near-term improvement of current security operations and
capabilities. TSA reviews all submittals against this BAA, and may or
may not fund depending on various factors.
Small businesses may have concerns that, due to the cost burdens of
sending employees to the demonstration site or developing interim
training, they may not be able to participate in demonstrations. ITF
BAAs provide the option for small businesses to receive incidental
funding to support demonstration activities on a case-by-case basis. Of
the 96 vendors who submitted to the most recent ITF BAA, IDEA, 40 self-
identified as a small business. Additionally, 61 percent of respondents
had never contracted with TSA before, and 33 percent had never
contracted with the Federal Government. ITF is also working to reduce
the level of background information on specific TSA processes and
activities necessary for a vendor to successfully respond to solution
solicitations.
The unsolicited proposal is a valuable means by which unique or
novel ideas, concepts, methods, or approaches, which have been
developed outside the Government, can be made available to the TSA for
use in the accomplishment of its mission. The unsolicited proposal when
received would be considered against Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) criteria and evaluated accordingly. TSA has created an
Unsolicited Proposal Manual available at www.tsa.gov that can help
small businesses submit ideas to TSA.
Last, TSA has a robust industry engagement program. An experienced,
senior management official in the Office of Contracting and Procurement
is the TSA Industry Liaison and is an excellent source of information
for small businesses and other entities looking to engage TSA. As part
of the DHS-wide industry liaison program to establish strategic
relationships with suppliers and stakeholders, serves as an information
provider for firms seeking to do business with TSA and connects firms
with program offices in support of our mission. There is also a
Director, Small Business Programs that helps acquisition officials
understand various small business programs, conduct market research,
and make decisions that affect small business. Both the Industry
Liaison and Small Business Advocate work directly with numerous
Industry Councils, individual firms, TSA program offices, and DHS to
increase transparency and knowledge of business opportunities and
processes.
Question 4a. With regard to Automated Screening Lanes (ASLs), the
strategic plan refresh indicates that planned procurements are not
anticipated until fiscal year 2020. Does TSA intend to work with
industry to accommodate possible future non-Federal investment in ASL,
potentially from airlines and airports, in the interim, as was done a
few years ago to address concerns over screening checkpoint delays?
Question 4b. Are there any particular challenges or concerns
regarding the use of non-Federal investments to fund screening
checkpoint technologies and infrastructure?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to work with our industry partners to demonstrate emerging technology
and explore public-private partnerships. At this time TSA has completed
the final deployments authorized by DHS under the approved Urgent
Operational Need and is transitioning to the Office of Acquisition
Program Management to ensure the sustainment of current capabilities
and initiate a formal program.
TSA has not experienced any particular challenges with the use of
non-Federal funding, but long-term it will be incumbent that any
partnership includes the procurement of qualified technologies to
ensure screening operations are not negatively impacted, as well as on-
going coordination with TSA on logistics and prioritization of
technology placement. There is also the question of maintenance and
future upgrades; if the non-Federal investment only covers the initial
capital expenditure, then TSA will need to receive Federal funding for
equipment maintenance, upon warranty expiration, and any required
upgrades of these systems.
Question 5a. On January 15, the DHS Office of Inspector General
issued a report (OIG-18-35) which found that ``TSA's handling of the
Transportation Security Executive Service Employee's disciplinary
matter uncovered significant deviations from policy and standard
practice indicating that the TSES employee received unusually favorable
treatment.'' The Office of Inspector General recommended that TSA
``address the irregularities . . . advise TSA employees to comply with
existing policies.'' Have you had a chance to review the report?
Question 5b. Have you or do you have plans to advise employees to
comply with existing policies?
Answer. I have read the report. I am committed to ensuring TSA's
core values, of which integrity is part, and all TSA policies are
adhered to throughout all levels of the organization.
TSA policy is reviewed and updated on an on-going basis. Upon
review of the OIG reports, our processes for disciplinary matters
involving members of the Transportation Security Executive Service
(TSES) have been revised with great emphasis on oversight and
collaboration for decision making. Specifically, effective March 13,
2018, any proposed settlement agreement involving any member of the
TSES or Executive-level positions must be coordinated with the TSA
Deputy Administrator (DA), the Chiefs of Operations and Mission
Support, and the Assistant Administrators of Security Operations, and
Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, before being finalized.
In addition, as mentioned in the OIG report, during the time of the
OIG investigation, TSA was considering modifying the structure of the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). TSA has since done so,
ensuring that an employee's supervisory chain is involved in the
disciplinary decision-making process regarding that employee. To
facilitate and ensure compliance with these policy changes, training is
being planned for deciding officials regarding their roles and
responsibilities. Additionally, an Executive Discipline Review Board
administered by OPR will serve as the proposing official for employees
in the Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES).
Other policy changes regarding the disciplinary process are also
being considered that will provide clarity for managers. For example, a
project team consisting of senior executives and subject-matter
experts, recently completed a lengthy and in-depth review of our Table
of Offenses and Penalties for Appropriate Discipline for Common
Offenses, which is the document that provides guidelines to managers
and human resources staff on penalties for employee misconduct. The
document has been revised and, once it is formally approved, we will
plan a targeted communications campaign to supervisors and non-
supervisors, notifying them of the changes, the intended use of the
document, and the necessity for all employees to read TSA's policies on
Employee Responsibilities and Code of Conduct. All employees are
required to review the conduct policy on an annual basis. Additionally,
TSA's Office of Human Capital (OHC) has been conducting Employee
Relations ``boot camps'' at airports around the country to provide
local staff with the knowledge and skills necessary to address and
resolve employee disciplinary issues at the lowest level possible. OHC
has also been conducting similar training for offices at TSA
Headquarters.
Question 6a. I understand that the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE), which represents front-line TSOs, has
reached out to you on issues of importance to the workforce. Are you
planning to work with labor representatives?
Question 6b. I understand that you have not yet met face-to-face
with AFGE's national representation. Are you going to meet with AFGE?
Answer. As TSA is an excepted service agency with delegated
authority to establish the employment conditions of the screening
workforce, collective bargaining was established under the first
Determination issued in 2011. The Determination created the foundation
of collective bargaining within TSA and limited the scope of issues
that could be negotiated. Although the Determination has been revised
over the years (last modified in 2016), the provisions relating to
negotiable items has not changed.
TSA continues to engage AFGE on all matters covered by the
collective bargaining agreement, and works to resolve any disputes
associated with the Determination and the collective bargaining
agreement. I held an introductory call with J. David Cox on August 21,
2017, and also met with Mr. Cox on February 23, 2018.
Question 7a. The August 2016 Determination on Collective Bargaining
signed by former TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger included section
(D), requiring an independent review of the Unitary Dispute Resolution
System (UDRS), which is a grievance procedure. Section (D) states as
follows: ``Within 12 months of the date of this Determination, TSA will
identify an expert, independent, third party to evaluate the entire
UDRS. The expert, independent third party will evaluate the UDRS
processes consistent with this Determination. The exclusive
representative will participate in this evaluation. This third party
will produce a report for TSA that will be shared with the AFGE and the
workforce.''
It is my understanding that instead of following an open,
competitive process allowing human resource specialists to bid on the
contract, TSA awarded the Chickasaw Nation a $500,000 no-bid contract
to evaluate the UDRS in September 27, 2017. Did TSA use a non-
competitive process to contract for the UDRS evaluation? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. TSA sole sourced to Chickasaw as a means of developing
them within the 8(a) program and to meet TSA's small business goals
within the 8(a) small business subset category.
This method of procurement was determined by the Contracting
Officer as part of a larger Agency procurement strategy to meet the
requirements of Federal Acquisitions Regulation, part 19.800 as
follows:
``19.800 General.
``(a) Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a))
established a program that authorizes the Small Business Administration
(SBA) to enter into all types of contracts with other agencies and
award subcontracts for performing those contracts to firms eligible for
program participation. This program is the `8(a) Business Development
Program,' commonly referred to as the `8(a) program.' A small business
that is accepted into the 8(a) program is known as a `participant.'
SBA's subcontractors are referred to as `8(a) contractors.' As used in
this subpart, an 8(a) contractor is an 8(a) participant that is
currently performing on a Federal contract or order that was set aside
for 8(a) participants.
``(b) Contracts may be awarded to the SBA for performance by eligible
8(a) participants on either a sole source or competitive basis.
``(c) Acting under the authority of the program, the SBA certifies to
an agency that SBA is competent and responsible to perform a specific
contract. The contracting officer has the discretion to award the
contract to the SBA based upon mutually agreeable terms and conditions.
``(d) The contracting officer shall comply with 19.203 before deciding
to offer an acquisition to a small business concern under the 8(a)
program. For acquisitions above the simplified acquisition threshold,
the contracting officer shall consider 8(a) set-asides or sole source
awards before considering small business set-asides. (Emphasis added.)
``(e) When SBA has delegated its 8(a) program contract execution
authority to an agency, the contracting officer must refer to its
agency supplement or other policy directives for appropriate
guidance.''
Pursuant to this requirement, TSA sole sourced to Chickasaw as a
means of developing them within the 8(a) program and to meet our TSA
small business goals within the 8(a) small business subset category.
Question 7b. Has TSA previously contracted with the Chickasaw
Nation to evaluate a grievance procedure?
Answer. No. TSA's National Resolution Center has not previously
contracted with the Chickasaw Nation to evaluate a grievance procedure.
Question 7c. Did TSA work with AFGE or acknowledge their efforts to
engage in the selection of ``an expert, independent, third party'' to
evaluation the UDRS?
Answer. No, TSA did not work with AFGE regarding this selection
process. There is no requirement in the 2016 Administrator's
Determination to work with AFGE in the selection of ``an expert,
independent, third party.'' The Determination requires that ``TSA will
identify an expert independent third party to evaluate the entire
UDRS.'' The Determination further states that ``The exclusive
representative will participate in this evaluation.'' Participation in
the evaluation is a separate activity from the ``identification'' of
the third party reviewer.
The selection of ``an expert, independent, third party'' is a
procurement effort. The Contracting Officer determined the procurement
strategy for this solicitation and deemed this would meet the
requirements of a small business set-aside, meeting TSA's Small
Business Administration (SBA) goals. TSA did not work with AFGE during
the procurement process, which requires the government to control
information that is procurement sensitive.
On November 13, 2017, AFGE engaged with TSA by email to inquire
about the status of the independent review of the UDRS. The TSA
acknowledged AFGE's inquiry on the same day and referred the question
to the National Resolution Center (NRC). The NRC responded on November
15, 2017 to AFGE's email, advising AFGE that the NRC anticipated
scheduling a meeting with AFGE in early 2018, upon commencement of the
UDRS evaluation by Chickasaw Nation Industries.
Question 7d. Could negotiations with the union on a grievance
procedure eliminate the need for an expert, third-party evaluation and
save the taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars?
Answer. It is unlikely that a negotiated grievance procedure would
save money as there would be significant costs stemming from: (1) The
negotiations, (2) the resolution process for any terms not agreed upon
in the negotiations, and (3) the resulting grievance processes. These
costs would include increased official time, travel expenses, and
litigation costs. Many of the potential costs would be on-going and
related to payroll, rather than a one-time contract expenditure.
Moreover, an independent evaluation may lead to long-term cost savings
because the findings may highlight opportunities to increase efficiency
and effectiveness of the UDRS.
TSA's labor framework, including the grievance process, is intended
to preserve TSA's flexibility needed to achieve its critical security
mission in the midst of emerging threats. Consistent with the
Determination, the current grievance process incorporated input from
the union. The process also includes expedited arbitration of
disciplinary actions and other covered workplace disputes, as agreed
upon between TSA and AFGE in a 2012 Memorandum of Agreement.
Question 8a. Please provide the following information:
The number of full-time Equivalent Transportation Security Officers
(Transportation Security Officers, Lead Transportation Security
Officers, Behavioral Detection Officers, Equipment Maintenance
Technicians Officers, and Training Instructors), employed by TSA during
each calendar year from 2005-2017.
Answer. See Table 1.
Question 8b. The number of part-time employees (Transportation
Security Officers, Lead Transportation Security Officers, Behavioral
Detection Officers, Equipment Maintenance Technicians Officers, and
Training Instructors) employed by TSA during each calendar from 2005-
2017.
Answer. See Table 2.
Question 8c. The number of full-time workers and part-time workers
employed by TSA to perform screening, behavioral detection, bomb
appraisal, equipment maintenance technician, and training instructor
duties during each calendar year from 2005-2017.
Answer. See Table 3.
Question 8d. The number of employees as set forth in paragraphs (1)
and (2) hired by TSA during each calendar year from 2005-2017.
Answer. See Table 4.
Question 8e. The number of employees as set forth in paragraphs (1)
and (2) separated from TSA during each calendar year from 2005-2017.
Answer. See Table 5.
Question 8f. The annual attrition rates from 2012-2017 for MCO
(Orlando International), TPA (Tampa) and MIA (Miami) airports.
Answer. See Table 6.
TABLE 1.--FT HEADCOUNT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BDO................................ ....... 137 756 2,388 3,005 2,832 2,902 2,986 2,889 2,464 2,174 1,936
EMT................................ ....... ....... ....... ....... 4 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5
LTSO............................... 5,482 5,560 5,622 5,547 5,689 5,811 5,910 5,829 5,426 5,158 5,045 5,108 6,274
STI................................ ....... ....... ....... 465 492 577 562 570 628 601 562 548 663
TSO................................ 29,451 26,720 26,672 25,318 22,844 22,979 22,711 23,195 22,635 22,429 22,765 25,155 25,426
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total.................. 34,933 32,417 33,050 33,718 32,034 32,204 32,090 32,585 31,585 30,659 30,552 32,753 32,368
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 2.--PT HEADCOUNT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BDO................................ ....... 2 8 16 35 8 14 34 16 22 12 12 .......
LTSO............................... 135 133 179 172 205 186 209 200 137 132 154 176 145
STI................................ ....... ....... ....... 6 9 7 5 3 5 7 3 4 3
TSO................................ 5,973 9,740 10,851 12,036 10,743 11,652 14,262 13,180 11,467 9,888 9,569 9,513 8,917
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total.................. 6,108 9,875 11,038 12,230 10,992 11,853 14,490 13,417 11,625 10,049 9,738 9,705 9,065
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 3.--BAO COUNT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAO................................ ....... 17 100 263 288 379 407 427 392 398 398 396 399
FT........................... ....... 17 100 263 288 379 407 427 392 398 398 396 399
BDO................................ ....... 139 764 2,404 3,040 2,840 2,916 3,020 2,905 2,486 2,186 1,948 .......
FT........................... ....... 137 756 2,388 3,005 2,832 2,902 2,986 2,889 2,464 2,174 1,936 .......
PT........................... ....... 2 8 16 35 8 14 34 16 22 12 12 .......
EMT................................ ....... ....... ....... ....... 4 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5
FT........................... ....... ....... ....... ....... 4 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5
LTSO............................... 5,617 5,693 5,801 5,719 5,894 5,997 6,119 6,029 5,563 5,290 5,199 5,284 6,419
FT........................... 5,482 5,560 5,622 5,547 5,689 5,811 5,910 5,829 5,426 5,158 5,045 5,108 6,274
PT........................... 135 133 179 172 205 186 209 200 137 132 154 176 145
STI................................ ....... ....... ....... 471 501 584 567 573 633 608 565 552 666
FT........................... ....... ....... ....... 465 492 577 562 570 628 601 562 548 663
PT........................... ....... ....... ....... 6 9 7 5 3 5 7 3 4 3
TSO................................ 35,424 36,460 37,523 37,354 33,587 34,631 36,973 36,375 34,102 32,317 32,334 34,668 34,343
FT........................... 29,451 26,720 26,672 25,318 22,844 22,979 22,711 23,195 22,635 22,429 22,765 25,155 25,426
PT........................... 5,973 9,740 10,851 12,036 10,743 11,652 14,262 13,180 11,467 9,888 9,569 9,513 8,917
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total.................. 41,041 42,309 44,188 46,211 43,314 44,436 46,987 46,429 43,602 41,106 40,688 42,854 41,832
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Duties based on position title.
TABLE 4.--Q4--HIRES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BDO................................ ....... ....... ....... 1 ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 1 2 2 .......
LTSO............................... ....... 5 4 7 2 3 ....... 2 4 2 4 5 1
STI................................ ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 1 ....... ....... 1 .......
TSO................................ 1,406 10,771 12,775 11,278 2,608 5,679 8,069 6,357 4,847 4,854 7,276 10,761 7,938
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total.................. 1,406 10,776 12,779 11,286 2,610 5,682 8,069 6,359 4,852 4,857 7,282 10,769 7,939
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 5.--Q5--SEPARATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BDO................................ ....... 1 17 48 69 126 132 141 190 287 238 217 185
EMT................................ ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 1
LTSO............................... 213 425 429 306 198 257 286 441 420 471 436 427 456
STI................................ ....... ....... ....... 6 9 9 21 23 28 41 43 31 34
TSO................................ 3,612 8,044 8,834 7,126 3,708 3,376 4,003 5,509 5,779 5,775 5,565 6,455 6,416
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total.................. 3,825 8,470 9,280 7,486 3,984 3,768 4,442 6,114 6,417 6,574 6,282 7,130 7,092
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--In fiscal year 2017, TSA moved away from a ``stand-alone'' Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) position. TSA has since integrated the skillset into
the screening workforce.
TABLE 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 TOTAL 2013 TOTAL 2014 TOTAL 2015 TOTAL 2016 TOTAL 2017 TOTAL
Airport Code Airport Name Attrition Attrition Attrition Attrition Attrition Attrition
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MCO........................................ Orlando International Airport...... 6.7% 9.1% 11.6% 13.5% 13.7% 11.7%
MIA........................................ Miami International Airport........ 7.3% 7.4% 11.2% 9.5% 8.3% 8.1%
TPA........................................ Tampa International Airport........ 9.0% 11.6% 8.3% 12.6% 11.6% 13.0%
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Question 8g. The current distribution by pay band for all employees
described in paragraphs (1) and (2) working at the airports listed in
paragraph (9).
Answer.
Q6--COUNTS FOR MCO, MIA, TPA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airport
-----------------------------------
Grand
MCO MIA TPA Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EMT................................. ....... ....... ....... .......
F Band........................ ....... 5 ....... 5
LTSO................................ 144 199 85 428
F Band........................ 144 199 85 428
STI................................. 13 13 9 35
F Band........................ 10 9 7 26
G Band........................ 3 4 2 9
TSO................................. 782 1,041 460 2,283
D Band........................ 106 126 50 282
E Band........................ 666 900 403 1,969
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 8h. The number of full-time workers and part-time workers
employed by screening companies for each airport under the Screening
Partnership Program during each calendar year from 2005-2017.
Question 8i. The attrition rates during each calendar year from
2005-2017 by airports that participate in the Screening Partnership
Program by full-time and part-time workers.
Answer. The following table provides the attrition rate and average
annual headcount for calendar years 2016 and 2017 at Screening
Partnership Program (SPP) airports. TSA did not track vendor attrition
prior to this time frame. Additionally, TSA does not collect the
contractor full-time/part-time ratio data on performance-based
contracts, so that requested data is not available.
SPP AIRPORT CONTRACTOR ATTRITION RATES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY '16 CY '17
CY '16 Ave CY '17 Ave
CAT Region Airport Attrition Monthly Attrition Monthly
(Percent) Headcount (Percent) Headcount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X............................................. 6 SFO 16 1,208 21 1,192
I............................................. 3 MCI 32 368 32 383
II............................................ 2 EYW 58 33 43 30
II............................................ 5 JAC 35 41 18 51
II............................................ 3 FSD 63 45 70 51
IV............................................ 4 ROW 0 7 13 8
IV............................................ 5 HVR 0 5 97 6
IV............................................ 5 OLF 0 5 50 4
IV............................................ 5 GGW 78 6 76 7
IV............................................ 5 GDV 0 percent 5 14 7
percent
IV............................................ 5 SDY 0 4 11 9
I............................................. 1 ROC 33 131 31 137
IV............................................ 4 TUP 0 8 26 8
III........................................... 6 STS 66 15 16 19
II............................................ 5 BZN 39 82 54 63
III........................................... 5 FCA 46 39 40 40
IV............................................ 5 WYS 0 0 0 0
II............................................ 2 SFB 42 120 45 113
II............................................ 2 SRQ 58 85 54 80
III........................................... 1 PSM 39 23 26 23
II............................................ 2 PGD* 24 54 55 52
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* Data for PGD in 2016 starts on June 1, 2016.
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