[Senate Hearing 112-11]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-11
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TRAGEDY IN JAPAN
=======================================================================
BRIEFING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TO
PROVIDE AN UPDATE FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFF ON THE RECENT
EVENTS AT THE TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY'S FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI REACTOR
COMPLEX DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI THAT OCCURRED ON MARCH 11,
2011
__________
MARCH 29, 2011
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Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman
RON WYDEN, Oregon LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont MIKE LEE, Utah
DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK UDALL, Colorado DANIEL COATS, Indiana
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN, III, West Virginia BOB CORKER, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
Robert M. Simon, Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Chief Counsel
McKie Campbell, Republican Staff Director
Karen K. Billups, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS
Page
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator From New Mexico................ 1
Borchardt, R. William, Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.......................................... 4
Lochbaum, David, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of
Concerned Scientists........................................... 24
Lyons, Peter, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Nuclear
Energy, Department of Energy................................... 2
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska................... 1
Pietrangelo, Anthony R., Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute.............................. 28
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TRAGEDY IN JAPAN
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in
room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff
Bingaman, chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
MEXICO
The Chairman. OK, why don't we get started?
Thank you all for being here. This is a briefing. This is
not a hearing as such. I think the reason we tried to do it as
a briefing is so that people wouldn't have to file written
testimony 72 hours ahead of time and all of that. Things are
changing very quickly with regard to the evolving situation at
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
While this committee does not have direct oversight on the
safety of U.S. nuclear plants, we do have to consider how
events such as those at Fukushima affect the ability of our
nation's nuclear fleet of 104 reactors to supply electricity.
This, of course, these 104 reactors currently account for about
20 percent of the electricity that we use. What the future of
nuclear energy will be as part of our nation's energy mix.
The events at Fukushima are changing by the hour. They're
serious. We are watching those events unfold on the other side
of the world.
Our knowledge at best is incomplete. As we look forward to
these experts informing the committee on what they see
occurring at the plant. How it impacts on our nation's existing
fleet of reactors and answer questions that the Committee
members might have.
Before I introduce our first panel, we've got 4 witnesses,
2 on this first panel and then 2 on the second panel. Before I
introduce the first panel let me call on Senator Murkowski for
her comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR
FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning
and welcome to those who will be presenting today. I do
appreciate the timeliness of this hearing this morning or this
oversight this morning as we try to better understand what is
unfolding at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan.
As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, it's probably too
early for us to say that this situation is under control. I
think it is important to recognize though that the workers who
are there on a daily basis. The progress that they--are being
made, hopefully positive steps being achieved there.
But I think it is important to recognize. To really praise
the very courageous efforts of those workers that are on the
ground trying to stabilize the situation. They have been going
round the clock for over 2 weeks now.
Probably no doubt exhausted at the same time they're
dealing with personal stress issues brought about by loss of
loved ones, loss of their homes. It's perhaps easy for us in
this country to be sitting back looking at the situation,
picking at the issue. But we do need to keep in mind the very
selfless acts that these individuals are embarking on everyday
as they work to prevent further damage and to protect their
fellow countrymen.
Mr. Chairman, I do hope that this is an opportunity for us
as a committee as well as other committees here in the Congress
to really take away some lessons learned here. So I'll be
listening with great interest this morning. As we continue in
the weeks ahead to understand more of what has happened with
this disaster in Japan.
With that, I look forward to the testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Our first panel is Dr. Peter Lyons, who, of course, is the
Acting Assistant Secretary. We hope soon to be the Assistant
Secretary of the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of
Energy.
Mr. Bill Borchardt, who is the Executive Director for
Operations at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
So why don't we go in that order unless you have a reason
to go in a different order?
Dr. Lyons, why don't you go right ahead and give us your
perspective? Then Mr. Borchardt. Then we'll undoubtedly have
some questions.
STATEMENT OF PETER LYONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Lyons. Thank you.
Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski and members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the nuclear accident situation in Japan.
The Department of Energy's response to that situation.
Relevant research development and deployment programs
within my office of Nuclear Energy.
Let me briefly recap our current understanding of the still
evolving events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
with its 6 nuclear reactors, albeit with many gaps in our
knowledge. When the earthquake on March 11 struck, the 3
operating reactors shut down in accordance with operating
procedures. Back up diesel generators started but were damaged
by the tsunami. The operating units used battery power to
continue to run their cooling pumps until the batteries were
drained or the pumps failed.
As the reactor cores heated from radioactive decay steam
was produced. The pressure build up from that steam required
venting which released some radioactive materials. It also
lowered the water level in the three reactor pressure vessels,
reducing the cooling of the core. It appears that all three
reactor cores are damaged to unknown extents.
Additionally as the fuel temperature increased, a reaction
took place between the zirconium fuel cladding and the steam or
water in the pressure vessel producing hydrogen. This hydrogen
was vented along with the steam and may have ignited at all
three reactors. Vision products have been released through
these processes.
Once pumper units were brought in sea water cooling was
used for many days until fresh water supplies were available.
Water levels at the spent fuel pools also have concern with
some reports that at least one of them was empty for some time.
Sea water is being used to cool those spent fuel pools until
fresh water supplies are obtained.
Current information suggests that the plants are in a slow
recovery from the accident. However, long term cooling of the
reactors and pools is essential during this period and has not
been adequately restored to date to the best of my knowledge. A
massive cleanup operation obviously remains for the future.
To assist in our country's response the Nuclear Incident
Team Operations Center at the Department of Energy was promptly
activated and has been continuously staffed by NNSA and Office
of Nuclear Energy personnel since the accident. The focus of
all DOE activities led by the Operations Center has been to
understand the accident progression and offer advice and
assistance to the Japanese officials, who have the direct
responsibility to manage the accident recovery. The Department
of Energy has deployed about 40 people and more than 17,000
pounds of equipment including NNSA's aerial measurement system
and several so called Consequence Management Response Teams.
The National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability at the
Livermore Laboratory has been modeling transport, potential
transport of radioactive materials. The Office of Nuclear
Energy has established a Nuclear Energy Response Team that is
utilizing our national lab capabilities to analyze the
situation and suggest approaches and industry teams providing
important support both in Japan and here. In addition Secretary
Chu and White House Science and Tech Advisor John Holdren have
reached out to Laboratory Directors and other imminent
scientists for technical advice.
Beyond our response to the accident the research
development and deployment programs of the Office of Nuclear
Energy are highly relevant to future decisions about the
potential options for nuclear power in the United States. As
examples, our proposed small modular reactor program will
explore designs that offer safety advantages through extensive
use of passive systems. We're also conducting research and
development at a high temperature gas reactor designs that
offer inherent safety features. Our light water reactor
sustainability program is exploring whether the lifetime of our
operating reactors can be extended with no compromise in
safety.
Research in fuel cycles is also within the Office of
Nuclear Energy. While we await guidance from the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future, we're conducting
research and development into a broad range of options for the
nation's fuel cycle with careful attention to safety,
environmental protection and non-proliferation. Safety of
future systems is key to all of the DOE programs.
Selected research areas like work on fuel claddings that
cannot generate hydrogen in an accident or fuels that are
virtually impossible to melt have various, obvious relevance.
The new modeling and simulation hub based at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory will be providing important new capabilities to the
nuclear industry, capabilities that can be used to assess and
improve the safety of existing and future reactors.
I fully concur with the recent statement made by Deputy
Secretary Dan Poneman. That we view nuclear energy as a very
important component for the overall portfolio we are trying to
build for a clean energy future. The programs of the Office of
Nuclear Energy are focused on assuring that the option for safe
nuclear power remains open to the nation.
By way of concluding these brief comments the earthquake
and the resulting tsunami brought tremendous devastation on
Japan. At the Department of Energy and indeed throughout the
Administration, we are making every effort to assist the
Japanese people in their time of need. Thank you. I'll try to
answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Borchardt, go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF R. WILLIAM BORCHARDT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Borchardt. Chairman Bingaman, Senator Murkowski,
members of the committee, good morning. The staff of the NRC is
deeply saddened by the tragedy in Japan. I and many of my
colleagues on the NRC staff have had many years of very close
professional and personal interaction with our regulatory
counterparts in Japan. We would like to extend our condolences
to them.
The NRC is mindful that our primary responsibility is to
ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety
of the American people. We have been very closely monitoring
the activities in Japan and reviewing all available
information. Review of this information combined with our
ongoing inspection and licensing oversight allow us to say with
confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely.
There has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight
function of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S. licensees.
Notwithstanding the very high level of support being provided
as a result of the events in Japan, we continue to maintain our
focus on our domestic responsibilities.
On Friday, March 11, an earthquake hit Japan resulting in
the shutdown of more than ten reactors. From what we know now
it appears that the reactor's response to the earthquake went
according to design. The ensuing tsunami, however, appears to
have caused the loss of normal and emergency alternating
current power to 6 units at the Fukushima Daiichi site. It is
those 6 units that have received the majority of our attention
since that time.
It's our assessment at this time that units 1, 2 and 3 have
experienced some degree of core damage, but that they are
currently stable and being cooled with fresh water. Units 2 and
3 appear to have some primary containment damage. There have
been releases of radioactivity that are a continuing
significant concern, including significant contamination in the
lower levels of the unit 2 and unit 3 turbine buildings.
The spent fuel pools on units one through four have
experienced varying water levels, but also have been receiving
sea water from helicopter and spray systems. The unit 2 spent
fuel pool has now started receiving fresh water. They are
trying to change all of the units from fire trucks to normal
pumping in the next few days. Tokyo Electric Power Company has
restored electric power to the site and to the 6 reactor
control rooms. The situation in general continues to further
stabilize although there are many hurdles that remain.
Shortly after four o'clock in the morning on Friday, March
11, the NRC Emergency Operations Center made the first call to
inform NRC management of the earthquake. We went into the
monitoring mode at the Op Center as the first concern was for
possible tsunami impacts on U.S. plants and radioactive
materials on the West Coast and in Hawaii, Alaska and the U.S.
territories in the Pacific. On that same day we began
interactions with our Japanese regulatory counterparts and
dispatched 2 experts to Japan to help at the U.S. Embassy. By
Monday, March 14, we dispatched a total of 11 staff to Japan.
We subsequently rotated in additional staff to continue our on
the ground activities.
The areas of focus for the NRC team in Japan are to assist
the Japanese government with technical support as part of the
USAID response and to support the U.S. Ambassador.
While our focus now is on helping Japan in any way we can,
the experience will also help us to assess the implications for
U.S. citizens and the U.S. reactor fleet in as timely a manner
as possible. Let me also just note here in concluding this
section of my remarks that the U.S. Government has an extensive
network of radiation monitors across the country. We feel
confident, based on the current data for monitoring at nuclear
power plants and through the Environmental Protection Agency's
system, that there is no reason for concern in the U.S.
regarding radioactive releases from Japan.
I'll now turn to the factors that assure us of ongoing
domestic reactor safety. We have since the beginning of the
regulatory program in the United States, used the philosophy of
defense-in-depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors
require the highest standards of design, construction,
oversight and operation, and safety does not rely on any single
level in order to protect the public health and safety. There
are multiple physical barriers to fission product release at
every reactor design. Beyond that, there are both diverse and
redundant systems that are required to be maintained and in
operable condition. They are frequently tested to ensure that
the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any
scenario.
Beyond this we've taken advantages of lessons learned from
previous operating experience to implement a program of
continuous improvement. We've learned from the experiences
across a wide range of situations including the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned
we significantly revised emergency planning requirements and
emergency operating procedures.
We've addressed many human factor issues regarding how
control room employees operate the plant. We've added new
requirements for hydrogen control to prevent explosions inside
containment. We've also created requirements for enhanced
control room displays showing the status of pumps and valves.
We have a post accident sampling system that enables the
monitoring of radioactive material release and possible fuel
degradation. One of the most significant changes we made after
Three Mile Island was the expansion of the Resident Inspector
Program, which has at least 2 full time NRC employees on each
and every site with unfettered access to all licensee
activities, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
As a result of the operating experience and ongoing
research programs, we've developed requirements for severe
accident management guidelines. Our program of continuous
improvement based on this operating experience will now include
evaluation of the significant events in Japan. We've already
begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary
instructions to our inspection staff to look at the licensee's
readiness to deal with both design basis accidents and beyond
design basis accidents. We've also issued an information notice
to licensees to make them aware of events in Japan and advising
them to verify their capabilities to mitigate the conditions
that result from severe accidents.
Over the past 20 years there have been a number of new
rulemakings that have enhanced the domestic fleet's
preparedness against some of the problems we're seeing in
Japan. For example, the station blackout rule requires every
plant in the country to have analyzed what the plant response
would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it
could respond using batteries for a period of time. Then have
procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site.
The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the
impact of hydrogen generated for beyond design basis events.
Regarding the type of containment design used by most of
the heavily damaged plants in Japan, we've had a boiling water
reactor, Mark 1, containment improvement program since the late
1980s. This has required the installation of hardened vent
systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced
reliability of the automatic depressurization system.
Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from
Japan, the Chairman of the NRC with the full support of the
Commission has directed the NRC staff to establish a Senior
Level Agency Task Force to conduct a methodical and systematic
review of our processes and regulations to determine whether
the agency should make additional improvements to our
regulatory system and make recommendations to the Commission
for its policy direction. This activity will have both near
term and longer term objectives.
For the near term we're beginning a 90-day review. This
review will evaluate all of the currently available information
from the Japanese event to identify immediate or near term
operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting any of
the 104 operating reactors including the spent fuel pools.
Areas of investigation will include the ability to protect
against natural disasters, response to station blackouts,
severe accidents, spent fuel accident progression, radiological
consequence analysis, and severe accident management. Over this
90-day period we will develop recommendations, as appropriate,
for changes to the inspection procedures and licensing
guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders,
or other regulatory requirements are needed.
The Task Force's longer term review will begin as soon as
the NRC has sufficient information from the events in Japan.
The Task Force will evaluate all the technical and policy
issues related to the event to identify additional potential
research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight
program, rulemakings, or adjustments to the regulatory
framework. A report with the appropriate recommendations will
be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of
this evaluation. Both the 90-day report and the final report
will be made publicly available in accordance with normal
Commission procedures.
In conclusion I want to reiterate that we continue to make
our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of
the U.S. fleet our top priority and that the U.S. plants
continue to operate safely. At the same time, we are
undertaking a thorough look at the events in Japan and their
lessons for us. Based on these efforts we will take all
appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety
of U.S. nuclear power plants.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Borchardt follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. William Borchardt, Executive Director for
Operations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is deeply
saddened by the tragedy in Japan. I and many of my colleagues on the
NRC staff have had many years of very close and personal interaction
with our regulatory counterparts and we would like to extend our
condolences to them.
introduction
The NRC is mindful that our primary responsibility is to ensure the
adequate protection of the public health and safety of the American
people. We have been very closely monitoring the activities in Japan
and reviewing all currently available information. Review of this
information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing
oversight, allows us to say with confidence that the U.S. plants
continue to operate safely. There has been no reduction in the
licensing or oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the
U.S. licensees.
We have a long history of conservative regulatory decision-making.
We have been using risk insights to help inform our regulatory process,
and, over more than 35 years of civilian nuclear power in this country,
we have never stopped making improvements to our regulatory framework
as we learn from operating experience.
Notwithstanding the very high level of support being provided to
respond to events in Japan, we continue to maintain our focus on our
domestic responsibilities.
I'd like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and
continuing response. I then want to spend the bulk of my time
discussing the reasons for our confidence in the safety of the U. S.
commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward that we will
take to ensure we learn any lessons we need to from events in Japan.
the nrc's immediate and continuing response to events in japan
On Friday, March 11th an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the
shutdown of more than 10 reactors. From what we know now, it appears
possible that the reactors' response to the earthquake went according
to design. The ensuing tsunami, however, appears to have caused the
loss of normal and emergency AC power to the six units at the Fukushima
Daiichi site; it is those six units that have received the majority of
our attention since that time. Units One, Two, and Three at the site
were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four, Five, and
Six were in previously scheduled outages.
Shortly after 4:00 AM EDT on Friday, March 11th, the NRC Emergency
Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the
earthquake and the potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into the
monitoring mode at the Emergency Operations Center and the first
concern for the NRC was possible impacts of the tsunami on U.S. plants
and radioactive materials on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, Alaska, and
U.S. Territories in the Pacific.
On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese
regulatory counterparts and dispatched two experts to help at the U.S.
embassy in Japan. By Monday, we had dispatched a total of 11 staff to
Japan. We have subsequently rotated in additional staff to continue our
on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The areas of focus for this team
are: 1) to assist the Japanese government with technical support as
part of the USAID response; and 2) to support the U.S. ambassador.
While our focus now is on helping Japan in any way that we can, the
experience will also help us assess the implications for U.S. citizens
and the U.S. reactor fleet in as timely a manner as possible.
We have an extensive range of stakeholders with whom we have
ongoing interaction, including the White House, Congressional staff,
our state regulatory counterparts, a number of other federal agencies,
and international regulatory bodies around the world.
The NRC response in Japan and our Emergency Operations Center
continue with the dedicated efforts of over 250 NRC staff on a rotating
basis. The entire agency is coordinating and pulling together in
response to this event so that we can provide assistance to Japan while
continuing the normal activities necessary to fulfill our domestic
responsibilities.
Let me also just note here in concluding this section of my remarks
that the U.S. government has an extensive network of radiation monitors
across this country. Monitoring equipment at nuclear power plants and
in the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) system has not
identified any radiation levels of concern in this country. In fact,
natural background radiation from sources such as rocks, the sun, and
buildings, is 100,000 times more than doses attributed to any level of
the radiation from this event that has been detected in the U.S. to
date. Therefore, we feel confident, based on current data, that there
is no reason for concern in the United States regarding radioactive
releases from Japan.
continuing confidence in the safety of u.s. nuclear power plants
I will now turn to the factors that assure us of ongoing domestic
reactor safety. We have, since the beginning of the regulatory program
in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which
recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of
design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not rely on
any single layer for protection of public health and safety. We begin
with designs for every individual reactor in this country that take
into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation
for any natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes,
floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site.
There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor
design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety
systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and
frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of
readiness to respond to any scenario.
We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous
operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement
for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a
wide range of situations, including most significantly, the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we have
significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency
operating procedures. We have addressed many human factors issues
regarding how control room employees operate the plant, added new
requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of
containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room
displays of the status of pumps and valves.
The NRC has a post-accident sampling system that enables the
monitoring of radioactive material release and possible fuel
degradation. One of the most significant changes after Three Mile
Island was expansion of the Resident Inspector Program, which has at
least two full-time NRC inspectors on site at each nuclear power plant.
These inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities.
As a result of operating experience and ongoing research programs,
we have developed requirements for severe accident management
guidelines. These are components and procedures developed to ensure
that, in the event all of the above precautions failed and a severe
accident occurred, the plant would still protect public health and
safety. The requirements for severe accident management have been in
effect for many years and are frequently evaluated by the NRC
inspection program.
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified
important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a
significant fire or explosion at a plant, we want licensees to have
available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures, training
requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe
situation.
Our program of continuous improvement based on operating experience
will now include evaluation of the significant events in Japan as well
as what we can learn from them. We already have begun enhancing
inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection
staff, including the resident inspectors and the region-based
inspectors in our four Regional offices, to look at licensees'
readiness to deal with both the design basis accidents and the beyond-
design basis accidents. The information that we gather will be used to
evaluate the industry's readiness for similar events, and will aid in
our understanding of whether additional regulatory actions need to be
taken in the immediate term.
We have also issued an information notice to the licensees to make
them aware of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities we
believe they should be engaged in to verify their readiness.
Specifically, we have requested them to verify that their capabilities
to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the
loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and
operational. Licensees are verifying the capability to mitigate a total
loss of electric power to the nuclear plant. They also are verifying
the capability to mitigate problems associated with flooding and the
resulting impact on systems both inside and outside of the plant. Also,
licensees are confirming the equipment that is needed is in place for
the potential loss of equipment due to seismic events appropriate for
the site, because each site has its own unique seismic profiles.
During the past 20 years, there have been a number of new
rulemakings that have enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness
against some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. The ``station
blackout'' rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what
the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current
so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then
have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and
provide cooling to the core.
The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of
hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage.
There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment,
including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of
environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see
under a design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment
design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has
had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program
since the late 1980s, which has required installation of hardened vent
systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced
reliability of the automatic depressurization system.
The final factor I want to mention with regard to our belief in the
ongoing safety of the U.S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and
planning requirements in place that provide ongoing training, testing,
and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In
coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management
Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction
with state and local governments, as those programs are evaluated and
tested on a periodic basis.
the path ahead
Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from the events
in Japan, the Chairman, with the full support of the Commission,
directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to
conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and
regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional
improvements to our regulatory system and make recommendations to the
Commission for its policy direction. This activity will have both near-
term and longer-term objectives.
For the near term effort, we are beginning a 90-day review. This
review will evaluate all of the currently available information from
the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or
regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in
the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will
include the ability to protect against natural disasters, response to
station blackouts, severe accidents and spent fuel accident
progression, radiological consequence analysis, and severe accident
management issues regarding equipment. Over this 90-day period, we will
develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection
procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend whether generic
communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed.
This 90-day effort will include a 30-day ``Quick Look Report'' to
the Commission to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the
condition of the U.S. fleet based on information we have available at
that time. Preparing a ``Quick Look Report'' will also ensure that the
Commission is both kept informed of ongoing efforts and prepared to
resolve any policy recommendations that surface. I believe we will have
limited stakeholder involvement in the first 30 days to accomplish
this. However over the 90-day and longer-term efforts we will seek
additional stakeholder input. At the end of the 90-day period, a report
will be provided to the Commission and to the public. The task force's
longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has sufficient
technical information from the events in Japan.
The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues
related to the event to identify additional potential research, generic
issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and
adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the
NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, such as
emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons
learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to
seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with
appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6
months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final
reports will be made publicly available in accordance with normal
Commission processes.
conclusion
In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our
domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S.
licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate
safely. In light of the events in Japan, there is a near-term
evaluation of their relevance to the U.S. fleet underway, and we are
continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer,
more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us.
Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary
to ensure the continuing safety of the U.S. fleet.
The Chairman. Thanks to both of you for that testimony. Let
me start with questions. We'll have 5 minute round of
questions.
On the Fukushima Daiichi plant let me ask if there have
been reports about high levels of radioactive water,
radioactivity in the water that is found in the turbine
building's basements. Do we know what the source of that
radioactive water is? Do we know the extent of the problem that
that could create going forward?
Either of you?
Mr. Borchardt. Yes. We have very limited information on
this as with many other aspects. But we believe that the water
is the result of the bleed and feed process that they have been
using to keep water in the reactor cores and in the containment
of the units.
It is leaking out. The exact flow path of that leakage has
not been determined. But it is a result of the water that
they've been injected since shortly after the onset of the
event.
Mr. Lyons. I can add to that, Senator.
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Lyons. About complications. As I noted, it is essential
that they restore dependable, long term cooling to those
systems. The existence of the high backgrounds from that leak
water, whatever the source, are certainly complicating those
efforts.
The Chairman. OK.
Let me ask about the thrust to use passive safety features
and passive designs and get to a point where if power fails you
don't have this kind of potential for crisis that we've seen
occur in Japan. To what extent are we trying to ensure that
those passive type designs and systems and safety features be
put in place in our nuclear power plants?
Mr. Borchardt. In the United States there are 2 principle
reactor designs that are called passive reactor designs. The
reason they're called passive is because, as you mentioned,
they don't rely on alternating current in order to respond to
an event of this magnitude. There are no pumps that need to
start and run off of alternating current. Any valves that need
to change position change because of stored air, a pneumatic
system or off of a DC battery power supply.
Then once they're running, they rely on natural processes
like gravity in order to create a water flow to keep the core
cool. These are designs that have undergone extensive NRC
review. They are receiving approval.
In fact, there are designs that are being planned for
construction in the United States that utilize this design
concept.
The Chairman. But I'm right in thinking that none of the
104 currently operating plants have these design features in
them at the current time. Is that right?
Mr. Borchardt. That's correct.
The Chairman. Yes, Dr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Bingaman, just a comment that the small
modular reactors that are of great interest looking into the
future in our program, each of the light water, small modular
systems that has been proposed is a highly passive system.
That's certainly one of the aspects that we look toward in
terms of the potential for the future of the small modular
systems as well.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Borchardt, let me ask you on re-licensing. I gather
that there are quite a few nuclear power plants in this country
that are scheduled for re-licensing or at least are going to be
applying for re-licensing sometime in the next few years. To
what extent do you think this development in Japan will impact
on the actions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on those
re-licensing applications? Is there any way to judge that at
this point?
Mr. Borchardt. Senator, as you mentioned, over half of the
104 operating reactors in the United States have already
received a license renewal for an additional 20 years of
operation. We expect that the other half will continue with
either an in-process license renewal review or they will apply
for a license renewal in the future. It is our intent through
the lessons learned programs and our continuous operational
oversight of the operating fleet that if there was a design
change necessary in order to adapt the plants to what we're
learning from Japan, that we would take that action absent or
outside of the license renewal review process. We would take
that without hesitation.
So there's no technical reason that I'm aware of that this
would impact the license renewal process for the remaining
plants in the U.S.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
thank you.
Mr. Borchardt, you mentioned the task force and the 90-day
review that you will be undertaking here. So much of what we
need to learn, of course, we're not able to know at this point
in time because we cannot safely go into the facility. Do we
have any idea how long we are looking at to get these units
cooled down so that in fact we can enter the area, examine the
reactors, look at the spent fuel? What do you anticipate?
Mr. Borchardt. I really can't even hazard a guess on how
long that will be. But the reason that we're approaching with a
90-day lessons learned immediately is because we didn't want to
wait for whenever that time period is. We think that there are
things we can evaluate, should evaluate, immediately. That's
why we're beginning that review.
Senator Murkowski. Dr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Murkowski, just as a possible addition
to that. The Department has provided information to the
government of Japan on radiation hardened robotic capabilities
available within the country. A shipment is being readied. I
don't know if it has left yet.
But there will be radiation hardened robotics available
soon. I can't say exactly when, in Japan, which could provide
some of the information that you're asking about. Certainly not
all we need, but some.
Senator Murkowski. Do I understand correctly that Japan did
not have any of the robotics that we are making available to
them at this time?
Mr. Lyons. I can't speak to whether such capabilities are
available in Japan. I can only speak that the government of
Japan has been very, very interested in understanding the
capabilities that can be brought to bear from this country and
we have provided that information. They have identified needs.
We're moving expeditiously to ship, not only the robots, but
also operators who perhaps will be used to train Japanese
operators. We don't know yet how close it will be necessary for
the operators to be to the site.
Senator Murkowski. Let me ask a question about the
decisionmaking process at the NRC to evacuate U.S. residents.
The decision was made for evacuation with a 50-mile radius
within the reactor itself. Of course, initially the
determination from the Japanese was that it was 12 and a half
miles. Then they bumped that to 19 miles.
Can you tell me how this decision was reached? Who made it?
Was it a vote of all the Commissioners? How did you conclude
that 50 miles was the appropriate evacuation range?
Mr. Borchardt. The factors that were taken into
consideration include all the indications that we had a strong
belief that there was likely fuel damage in three reactors.
There were degraded water level conditions in at least 2 of the
spent fuel pools at the time. There were elevated radiation
releases from those plants.
Given those realities and then given the uncertainty of the
progression at that time, we ran some models to see what kind
of releases would be possible under those scenarios. Made the
conservative decision that although the conditions did not
exist at that instant to require an evacuation, we thought that
it was a conservative and prudent recommendation to make.
Senator Murkowski. You mentioned the radiation monitoring
units that we have in place. Alaska received 3 that we
understand are up. I hope that all three are up now.
But there's a lot of concern about what may end up in our
oceans, impact to the fisheries. Do we have radiation monitors
off of Honshu that are measuring anything in the ocean or is it
just monitors that are evaluating the air?
Mr. Lyons. The Department of Energy systems are, as I
mentioned, the airborne system that is monitoring ground
contamination, but not out over the ocean. It's the EPA,
through their RadNet has made the monitors that you mentioned
in Alaska. Guam, Hawaii has added several additional monitors.
I am not aware of monitoring capability within the ocean that
we have. That certainly could be added if it was deemed
necessary.
I should add that the Department of Energy through the
calculational capabilities at Livermore using the source terms
developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as being the
worse cases. We do not anticipate a significant health effect
in any of the United States areas.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to the
panelists. Thank you for being here.
I think we begin to learn that just because an event is
improbable, doesn't mean that it's impossible. In that spirit,
let me turn to the design of the spent fuel pools. It seems
like, based on what you've told us this morning, that's a key
part of the ongoing crisis there at Daiichi.
I understand that the same design is employed at almost a
quarter of our plants here in the U.S. It seems like this is a
design flaw. I'm surprised we hadn't addressed it previously.
But what are we doing now and what can we do to address it in
the months and the years ahead?
Mr. Borchardt. Even after the events of 9/11 the NRC took a
concerted review effort to look at risks to the plants
regardless of the cause. One of the issues that we looked at is
optimizing the ways that you can fill the spent fuel pool and
keep water injected into the reactor vessel to keep the core
cool. So there are a number of both procedures and pieces of
equipment that can be put into place in order to keep the spent
fuel pool full.
So that has been greatly enhanced, as well as having a
backup system and power supplies to do the same thing.
Senator Udall. Dr. Lyons, do you have thoughts both from
the point of view of the Department of Energy but I would
certainly welcome your personal opinions on ways in which we
can make spent fuel broad storage systems safer and moving
forward?
Mr. Lyons. Senator Udall, I was on the NRC as we conducted
many of those evaluations, extremely careful evaluations of the
safety of the existing spent fuel pools and dry casks. Using
the best information available at the time those both storage
systems were deemed to be safe. I look forward to the review
that will be conducted by the NRC, as Bill said, the pools will
certainly be part of that review. Whether that will lead to any
suggestions for changes, I await their review.
I do not have concerns today based on the NRC studies to
date.
Senator Udall. I know you have an official point of view,
but personally do you have any other thoughts about how we
might make spent fuel rod storage safer in the future, just
thinking creatively, thinking as the engineer that I know you
are?
Dr. Lyons. Senator Udall, I think my comments should say
that we should await the review of the NRC. We certainly
include within our program's research on the longevity of dry
cask storage that may prove to be relevant in these
discussions. But that would be the main area that I can think
of offhand that would be applicable to your question.
Senator Udall. I believe there is a design where the spent
fuel rods are stored in the basement or the lower level.
Mr. Lyons. Yes, that will be the case on the--I'm sorry.
Senator Udall. Yes, and I was just going to talk about the
engineering challenges to do so. I have to believe that it's
easiest to bring the fuel rods out of the reactor at the top.
Then you move them at that same level into these spent fuel
rods. But they're 5 or 6 stories up in the air. Gravity works
against us in that kind of situation.
Mr. Lyons. Bill can help me on this. But I believe all of
the PWR pressurized water reactors in this country utilize
ground level or near ground level storage of the spent fuel
poles. Knowing of your interest in the small modular reactors
with their underground siting, the intent there is that spent
fuel pools would be sited well underground in those designs.
Senator Udall. I appreciate your mentioning of that new
technology, that new engineering approach.
Mr. Borchardt, did you want to comment?
Mr. Borchardt. Yes, Senator, I'll just mention that it was
really the difference between the boiling water reactors that
are above grade and the pressurized water reactors that are
near ground level is really just one of the original design
philosophy during the early development of those designs,
probably in the 1950s and 1960s. So there isn't really a
technical barrier that would prevent changing that
configuration for a new design.
Senator Udall. Thank you, gentlemen. My time is about to
expire. But again this is obviously a very timely topic.
I look forward to working with you as we move forward to
understanding what's happened. I think we're all frustrated
with the various kinds of information, that's often
contradictory, coming out of Japan. For the record I will ask
you both to comment on how we could do a better job given a
situation developing in our own country. I think that's added
to the sense that this is out of control and the improbable has
become actually the possible. So thank you for being here
today.
Mr. Lyons. Certainly.
Mr. Borchardt. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having this briefing and the 2 of you for being here. Obviously
working together to try to deal with this issue in the best way
that we can.
Senator Udall actually went down a line of questioning that
is similar to mine. On the quarter of the reactors that we have
that are boiling water reactors here in our country. Is it your
sense that over the course of time we've done things to
alleviate the same type of risk in our own country?
Mr. Borchardt. Yes, sir. As I mentioned we've done a number
of improvements to the design. Some were not specific to the
boiling water reactors, but included both pressurized and
boiling water reactors like the station blackout rule, which
looks at the loss of alternating current, complete loss at a
site.
There are things that are specific to boiling water
reactors, which is the hardened vent that's the way to relieve
pressure from inside the containment. That is a design
improvement. We've required the inerting inside the containment
that's to prevent the possibility of an explosion by having the
containment inerted with nitrogen.
Again, generically for all reactor designs, we've looked at
severe accident mitigation guidelines. These are programs and
procedures, pieces of equipment that exist in the plants. That
say even with all the careful design, all the design
requirements we've imposed, what if the unthinkable still
happens? We should have systems in place to adapt to that. So
we've done those at all of the plants in the country.
Senator Corker. So I'll knock on wood as I ask this
question. I mean, your sense is that you've seen nothing that's
occurred in Japan thus far that you haven't already tried to
engineer or change in our own existing facilities of that
nature?
Mr. Borchardt. I would say that's true. But that's why
we're doing this extensive, both short term and longer term
review. So that we can do a thorough analysis and make sure
that we're not missing something.
Senator Corker. You know, Senator Udall asked a little bit
about the storage situations. I know we've had a debate in this
country that is sort of stalled out at present. But we've
looked at a national repository. I mean one of the reasons we
have these spent fuel rods onsite as we do in this country is
we never came to an agreement about what we might do with them
over the long haul.
Are there any editorial comments you all might make about
regional or national repositories or?
Mr. Lyons. Senator Corker, I think the main comment I'd
make is that the Secretary created the Blue Ribbon Commission
to look at the back end of the fuel cycle to include
repository, possible reprocessing issues. That Commission which
certainly includes a number of technical and other leaders from
around the country is fairly close to their interim report
anticipated in July. Personally I'm very hopeful that that
report will provide some important suggestions and perhaps
guidelines as the Nation moves forward with this challenge.
Senator Corker. But you don't want to state what you hope
those guidelines say, I guess. You'll wait.
It will be interesting to see. It certainly at some point
would love to hear comments about a catastrophe of this nature
happening and how that might have affected things if they had
had a different type of storage mechanism.
Back to the SMUs, the small modular reactors. They utilize
a more of a natural cooling process. I too am very interested
in that technology. I'm hoping we're getting ready to move
ahead. You know, these are reactors where U.S. you know, U.S.
engineering can be more greatly deployed and certainly at
lesser capital up front.
That more natural cooling process that occurs, is there
anything about this recent disaster that makes you feel those
are going to be even more useful to us or more safe or less
safe? Have you learned anything from the Japanese incident
regarding them?
Mr. Lyons. Senator Corker, I don't know specific from the
Japanese incident but in general as we discussed earlier those
small modular reactors that we're interested in would have
highly passive systems. They would rely as Bill Borchardt
already noted, on natural forces, on gravity, on convection.
They would not require pumps.
At least one obvious concern in Japan has been the loss of
AC power, the loss of the pumping capability. That would not be
an issue for a highly passive system such as we're exploring
for the SMRs.
Senator Corker. I assume what you're saying is that some of
the failures that have occurred recently in Japan likely would
not occur with these SMUs.
Mr. Lyons. At least the small modular reactors would not
depend on the use of pumps in an accident situation. So that is
one very, very major difference. The designs in Japan are very
much dependent on such pumping capability.
Senator Corker. Now I know my time is up. This is a yes/no.
I'll move quickly.
The Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade sort of does
what--they sort of do both sides of the equation. They promote
nuclear, Japanese nuclear products. They also regulate them.
Have you seen any issue there as it relates to lack of
oversight because of that dual mandate?
Mr. Borchardt. Senator, no, we're not aware of any
interference. There is a very strong focus internationally
about independence of the regulator. There has recently been an
IAEA review done of the Japanese regulator and they did not
identify any of that kind of interference concern that I think
you're referring to.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Franken.
Senator Franken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Gentlemen for your testimony.
In the 2006 report published by the National Academies,
they recommended that the spent fuel rods stored in pools
onsite should be arranged to place old, cool fuel rods next to
newer hotter rods to prevent hot spots and fires in the event
that the pools lost enough water to cover the rods. In an
editorial in the Washington Post on March 24, Matthew Bunn
wrote that despite these recommendations ``no such action has
been taken either in the United States or in Japan.'' Mr.
Borchardt, does the National Regulatory Commission have plans
to review these recommendations and possibly implement them?
Mr. Borchardt. Senator I believe, and you can ask perhaps
the next panel, but I believe it's a common practice to do such
a thing at the plants in the United States that there is a
movement of fuel in order to optimize the storage conditions in
the spent fuel pool. But we would certainly----
Senator Franken. That's at odds with what was written in
the Post. But we'll ask the next panel.
Mr. Borchardt. Sir.
Senator Franken. We have a nuclear plant in Monticello,
Minnesota that basically is the same design as the Fukushima
reactors. You know, we're not going to have, probably an
earthquake in Minnesota and we're probably if we have a tsunami
there we probably got bigger problems.
[Laughter.]
Senator Franken. But we do have floods. Is there any chance
that the backup generation of places like Prairie Island in
Minnesota or Monticello could be overwhelmed by unforeseen
levels of flooding?
Mr. Borchardt. Monticello and every other plant in the
country has an extensive review done before original licensing
that looks at that specific site and looks at the historical
record for things like flooding, tornados, hurricanes,
tsunamis, earthquakes, and does a review using that historical
record to make sure that that plant can respond to all of the
kinds of natural events that happen.
Senator Franken. Do they do those kinds of reviews in
Japan?
Mr. Borchardt. I can't really speak to that. I know they
do----
Senator Franken. Wouldn't that be----
Mr. Borchardt. Some part of design basis--they consider
some of those factors, but the specifics of how Japan did their
licensing site reviews, I don't know.
Senator Franken. Wouldn't that be a good thing to know?
Mr. Borchardt. Certainly. Yes, sir.
Senator Franken. OK. I would suggest hopping right on that.
On terms of the cost of nuclear power has the events in
Fukushima changed any sense of what the costs of nuclear power
is vis-a-vis other sources of electricity? Either of you?
Mr. Lyons. At least the way I would respond, Senator, would
be that that remains for the results of the NRC evaluation.
Senator Franken. OK.
Mr. Lyons. To the extent that they identify needed changes
then that might change the cost equation. But I couldn't
speculate for now.
Senator Franken. OK. Fine.
Let's say that we have a few reactors--what happened here
is we had a very large earthquake and then a tsunami. Are there
any reactors in the United States, say in California, that are
built near faults and oceans or just one ocean?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Borchardt. Of course there are and, as I mentioned in
my previous answer, what we do is we look at the earthquake
history for the plants in California, for example, and do an
evaluation of the distance and the conditions that would be
felt on the site. So you have to consider what kind of soil and
formations exist between the fault line and the plant. That
distills down to how much motion you will see at the plant.
The systems have to be designed to withstand that motion
plus a little bit more. There's always margins that are built
into the reviews. The same is done looking at flooding or
tsunamis and other natural events.
So that's part of the design basis. Every plant therefore
has its own design basis and will have its own requirements
based upon its specific geographic location.
Senator Franken. I see. Again, your testimony is you're not
aware of whether or not they did that same kind of analysis in
Japan?
Mr. Borchardt. That's right. I can't speak to the Japanese
design criteria.
Senator Franken. OK. Because my feeling is they didn't
expect this. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here today.
There are going to be ongoing lessons learned from this
tragedy. That's going to continue the situation on the ground
actually, still is evolving. Our focus is clearly helping the
Japanese people get through this disaster. I was happy to see
Secretary Chu publicly assuring Americans that the people in
the United States are in no danger from the tragedy in Japan.
He's also indicated that the Administration supports building
additional nuclear power plants.
Senator Corker talked about needs to finalize a long term
solution for storage of nuclear waste. The Administration has
stopped the long term nuclear storage facility and has created
the Blue Ribbon Commission to look at the problem. As you
discussed, you said we'd have a report possibly in July.
Fundamentally is it safer to store nuclear waste in
temporary storage facilities around the country or at a
permanent disposal site?
Dr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Barrasso, the way I would respond is
that the NRC would evaluate both. Both can be made safe and
their requirements would assure that safety.
Senator Barrasso. Mr. Borchardt.
Mr. Borchardt. I agree with Dr. Lyons.
Senator Barrasso. When you talk about the report and I
think you said, hopefully soon, perhaps July. You think that
that Commission will have an opportunity then to really learn
the lessons of what we've seen happening in Japan to apply
those or will we have a report they've been working on and
they're kind of ready to put out from preparation prior to the
current disaster that we're studying?
Mr. Lyons. Senator Barrasso, I don't have any detailed
information of what they will have in that report. That should
be left up to them. But the report in July is their so-called
interim report. It is due July 29.
The plan after that interim was to allow 6 months for
public comment, further refinement and the final report in
January of next year. In response then to your question I think
there's very adequate time for the BRC to take whatever lessons
may be necessary from Japan and at least incorporate it in the
final, if not the interim.
Senator Barrasso. The more recent news, Reuters reported
this morning that plutonium has been found in the soil at the
nuclear complex. I mean, it was the reactor No. 3 was the only
one to use plutonium in the fuel mix, may indicate a breach in
the containment mechanism. Could you speak to that?
Mr. Lyons. At least the reports that I saw were reporting
trace levels of plutonium. The report I saw was that it was
still debatable exactly what those levels were derived from.
All operating reactors whether they start with any plutonium in
the fuel or not, build up plutonium in the course of operation.
So finding plutonium, it was derived from either the
operating reactors or the spent fuel pools, would not be
regarded as a major surprise. Certainly it would be a concern
if it were in significant levels. At least anything I've seen
was it's not significant at this point.
Senator Barrasso. Then the New York Times today reported
that highly contaminated water, I think Senator Bingaman
commented on this, could actually leak into the ocean. What are
the implications of that?
Mr. Lyons. Certainly that has to be monitored from the
standpoint of fisheries from food products. There are other
agencies in our government that would be tracking whether there
were any concerns from a U.S. perspective on that. Certainly
the Japanese have adequate resources to be verifying that from
their own standpoint.
I think it's fair, certainly from the Department of
Energy's standpoint and I would guess from the NRC's
standpoint, our focus now very, very much is on controlling the
accident, stabilizing the accident and trying to move toward a
situation where we can see a long term path toward eventual
resolution, whatever that may be. So our focus now has not been
on that particular issue, but that may well be for other
agencies and the Japanese government.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thanks for the
testimony.
Help me out a little bit here because I'm somewhat new to
all of this. I don't tend to begin to be an expert in any sense
of the word. But we see these news reports that keep coming
out. The public reacts in a way that, potentially I think,
could undermine any kind of consensus building for the place of
nuclear energy in addressing energy needs in the future whether
it's here in the United States or elsewhere in the world.
Obviously the carbon footprint of a nuclear plant is
extraordinarily less if virtually nothing compared to other
sources of energy. So a wrong perception or a wrong conclusion
in terms of how we should go forward with nuclear energy
possibilities for our country and others could lead to some
very significant consequences in a whole number of ways. So I'm
trying to get my head around a little bit about what we see in
the paper everyday or see on TV every day.
Every time a plume of steam escapes it's immediately on the
networks. The headlines talk about and things that have just
been mentioned here, plutonium potentially leaking into the
seawater and so forth and so on. Then we read about news that
has come out about babies should not be drinking milk in Tokyo.
Vegetables may be contaminated.
Give me some perspective in terms of levels of radiation
where we need to be concerned as opposed to those where it's
something that is not at such a serious nature. For instance in
your testimony, Dr. Lyons I believe it was, basically stated
that some of the levels of detection here in the United States
emanating from the Japanese coast line. We get 100,000 more
radiation, units of radiation or however measures you do, just
simply from natural causes, rocks, sun, buildings, etcetera,
etcetera.
So I'm trying to put all this in perspective because when
you look at the paper the average person doesn't pay any
attention to this 100,000 times more. That was what was
recorded in Tokyo relative to vegetables or so forth. I mean,
is this something that should cause us the kind of concern that
we're having or--I'm just trying to put it in better
perspective.
Mr. Lyons. There have been several press releases from the
Department of Energy trying to assist with the general point
that you're making, Senator. You're indeed right that we
essentially live in a sea of radiation. We all have natural
exposures of the order of 300 milligram to natural causes in a
year. A milligram happens to be a convenient unit.
To put that somewhat into perspective a flight across the
country, you pick up about three millirem simply from that
flight. Cosmic rays as you went up in altitude. But radiation
is everywhere. It's important. We have certainly tried and we
will continue to try to put in perspective the radiation levels
that are measured.
I don't mean to suggest that there are not harmful levels
where the EPA and others have defined so called protection
action guidelines. We pay careful attention to those guidelines
to assure that levels are far below. Levels in the United
States are many, many orders of magnitude below anything close
to a protective action guideline.
Senator Coats. What I'm----
Mr. Lyons. In some areas in Japan they are going to have to
be much more careful with attention to at least their version
of protection action guidelines.
Mr. Borchardt. Senator, if I could just add. The EPA
monitoring sites and all of the operating reactors in the
country are continuing to take samples and readings. We haven't
seen any readings that would be of any concern whatsoever to
public health and safety.
Mr. Lyons. To quantify that slightly more, we have the
aerial monitoring system which is taking countless measurements
around the site. Just to give you one figure, the highest
within two and a half miles of the site. They haven't gone any
closer. Within two and a half miles of the site there has been
no level detected greater than 30 millirem back to that unit
per hour.
As the flights have continued those levels have gone down.
But they are seeing--they are measuring levels of radiation
well above background. That information is available on DOE's
website, available to the Japanese. We're trying to share that
information as much as possible.
Senator Coats. Yes. I don't think that really has been
understood or maybe even shared. So 30 millirem within what
circumference?
Mr. Lyons. That was the highest level observed for flights
that came within two and a half miles of the site. There
certainly are higher levels closer than that.
Senator Coats. Right.
Mr. Lyons. But our crews and our planes are not going any
closer--30 millirem per hour.
Senator Coats. Put that 30 millirem in perspective to the
danger level of that.
Mr. Lyons. The level to which the NRC, the EPA recommend
the public stay below in a year is 100 millirem. So that would
be, if it was 30 millirem per hour that would be of the order
of 3 hours would be the maximum you should spend at that.
Again, that is the highest dose observed. It's gone down every
day that they've flown since.
Senator Coats. Within two and a half miles?
Mr. Lyons. Within two and a half miles.
Senator Coats. OK.
Mr. Lyons. But levels on the site are much higher.
Senator Coats. Of course, but I think the perspective is is
that these types of levels are floating across the Nation of
Japan, hanging over Tokyo, reaching the West Coast and so
forth. So I think it's important that you put that in that
perspective.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Bingaman. Thank you to
the panel for your informative and helpful testimony today.
I'll simply reaffirm what Senator Coats was just asking
about. I do think there is broad concern in the general public
about radiation and dosages. As I'm sure you're both far more
familiar even than I am, general confusion about orders of
magnitude, about consequence and about possible impact on the
public health. I happen to represent a state that has no
nuclear facilities within it but is within 50 miles of four
others that are currently operating, one of which is of the
design of the reactors of question.
As I understand the incident and reading and listening to
your testimony today, one of the core areas of concern and
potential future action has to do with backup power with spent
fuel rod pools and in particular with battery power. The unique
circumstances that occurred in Japan may not occur in the
United States. But there are other circumstances that might
give rise to the need for a more than four or 8 hour backup
power scenario.
What are you doing to look at safety training and backup
power generation and in particular battery capacity to focus on
the issue of the spent fuel rod pools. Particularly given the
lack of a clear path forward for the long term for managing
spent fuel rods in the United States?
Mr. Borchardt. Senator, the types of issues that you raise
are exactly why we're putting together this lessons learned.
We're going to look at both the station blackout rule that
required a review of the coping capability of all the U.S.
reactors to deal with the loss of all alternating current, and
then look at what conditions, capabilities exist at all of the
104 reactors to see if we need to strengthen regulatory
requirements.
I mean one of the obvious questions we'll be asking
ourselves is do we need an enhanced battery supply, a battery
supply that can last longer? We already have safety related,
well protected, constantly tested diesel generators that are
onsite. There is a day tank that provides fuel oil to those
diesel generators that's also protected. So there is a robust
capability that exists already.
But given what we've learned in Japan, it's obvious the
question that we need to ask ourselves. Do we need to make it
even more robust and stronger? So that will be part of the
review we'll be doing.
Senator Coons. Thank you. I'm glad to hear that is a part
of the review. I was pleased to see that there was a prompt
move toward a top to bottom review nationally.
My closing concern would be to simply urge you to then
implement whatever the outcome is of that review. I understand
this is an industry that already is subject to stringent,
regulatory review to significant safety and backup procedures.
But I think this particular incidence in order to address
legitimate concerns of the broad American public we need to
focus on the specific failure mechanisms here. On making sure,
particularly for the longer term, that we've dealt with spent
fuel and exactly how it's being stored and maintained in ways
that couldn't lead to a reoccurrence of this sort of an
accident in the United States, so.
Mr. Borchardt. On the subject of spent fuel I mean, let me
just say, that we've done a thorough evaluation of that
storage, in either the wet spent fuel pool or in dry cask
storage; which many of the plants in the country are currently
using, and both provide adequate protection and safety.
Senator Coons. Are spent fuel pools subject to also in the
event of the loss of power they have lower backup power
standards currently is that accurate?
Mr. Borchardt. They require, over the long term, to have a
circulating pump if you will, that provides cooling to the
pool. But it would be many days as long as that there's no
damage to the spent fuel pool and no leakage of water out. It
would take many days for it to heat up to a point where it
began to boil off and you would lose water level.
What the industry has done in coordination with some of the
regulatory requirements we imposed after 9/11 was came up with
other backup ways to put water into the pool. I mean, using
fire hoses and other things that aren't even hard height to the
spent fuel pool because it's really a simple issue. All you
need to do is keep the pool full and you protect the integrity
of that fuel.
Senator Coons. Thank you both. We look forward to the
outcome of the 90-day review.
The Chairman. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. I thank you both for your testimony. Dr. Lyons
I wanted to start out with a question to you. I know much of
your career has been devoted to nuclear safety issues. I
suspect you would agree that the people in Japan are doing
everything they can, doing the best job they can to deal with
the situation.
But I was wondering as you look at it, if you had been in
charge of this from the outset, knowing what you know now, is
there anything different that you might have done than was done
in Japan to deal with this disaster?
Mr. Lyons. Senator Lee, as part of the standard procedures
that the NRC would go through to say nothing of the special
review, it would be a very careful lessons learned study of any
event whether it's Three Mile Island, whether it's 9/11,
whether it's the Davis-Besse events recently. There's always
lessons learned and careful study of what transpired.
That needs to be done in this case as well. As was stated
earlier we do not have enough detail now to really do that. But
as that detail becomes available it will be very important, as
I think you're suggesting, to understand in detail the steps
that were taken and to understand whether an alternative
sequence of steps, different timing of steps, could have been
more effective.
But for now, that's a little premature. We're very much
focused on trying to help them with restoring the cooling which
almost independent of the accident sequence that got us here.
They need to restore that cooling.
Senator Lee. OK. Are you fairly confident that once we've
reviewed all of that and had the opportunity to conduct the
post mortem of what happened that you'll be in a position to be
able to evaluate whether if the same thing, the exact same set
of environmental conditions that occurred there, if those were
presented here in the United States, whether or not we'd be
able to withstand them without a meltdown or without the
release of radiation that occurred there?
Mr. Lyons. I guess I'd perhaps word it just--I mean, in
general, yes, sir. But slightly differently because as Bill
indicated for each of our plants there is an assessment of what
can happen from a natural disaster perspective. Depending on
the location of the plant one will evaluate different natural
phenomenon.
But as part of the review that the NRC must undertake there
has to be another check of whether there has been a
sufficiently robust estimate of what those maximum cases could
be.
Senator Lee. OK. Then I've got a couple of questions for
either or both of you just dealing with spent fuel following up
on what some of my colleagues have asked.
First of all, can either of you tell me what's the biggest
single impediment to our using spent fuel reprocessing in the
United States as one approach to take with spent fuel rods?
Mr. Lyons. Senator, reprocessing certainly is one of the
issues that the Blue Ribbon Commission will be studying. I'm
sure it will be part of their recommendations. It's not
particularly obvious to me how reprocessing or not would have
dramatically changed at least what we've seen to date.
But again, from the U.S. perspective we need to await the
Blue Ribbon Commission and within my office we have a range of
research programs looking at different potential options or
solutions for the back end of the fuel cycle. Those, that
research, guided by the BRC, I hope will allow us to suggest
options that Congress may want to consider for the future for
used fuel management.
Senator Lee. But in the meantime you consider indefinite
onsite storage, sustainable practice between now and whenever
we get that figured out?
Mr. Lyons. I was at the NRC when we did--when they did a
number of evaluations of the safety and integrity of spent fuel
casks. I have to admit that I have never seen a spent fuel cask
until I was at the NRC and had many opportunities to see them.
These are rather impressive structures.
Yes, I have great confidence in the safety of dry cask
storage. You know, I mentioned that we do have research
programs within my office as does the NRC at trying to
understand how long a duration one should consider for the use
of dry casks. I don't think we know what that upper ground is.
We need research to establish that. But these are very
impressive structures.
Senator Lee. OK. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski, did you have other
questions of this panel or should we go to the second panel?
Senator Murkowski. I think in the interest of time, Mr.
Chairman, we should go to the second panel. Thank you.
The Chairman. We thank both of you for your excellent
testimony. We will go ahead and dismiss you and allow the
second panel to come forward.
Our second panel is Mr. David Lochbaum, who is the Director
of Nuclear Power Project with the Union of Concerned
Scientists.
Also Mr. Anthony Pietrangelo, I think I've got that
pronunciation correct, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
Officer with the Nuclear Energy Institute.
Mr. Pietrangelo, did I correctly pronounce your name?
Mr. Pietrangelo. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Why don't we go ahead? Mr. Lochbaum, if you'd like to
proceed with your testimony and then we'll hear Mr. Pietrangelo
and then we'll have a few questions.
STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY PROJECT,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Mr. Lochbaum. Sorry. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in
Japan experienced a station blackout. A station blackout occurs
when a nuclear power plant loses electrical power from all
sources except that by onsite batteries. The normal power
supply energizes all the equipment needed to operate the plant
on a daily basis as well as the emergency equipment needed
during an accident.
When a normal power supply is lost, backup power is
supplied from onsite emergency diesel generators that provide
electricity only to the smaller set of equipment needed to cool
the reactor cores and maintain the containment's integrity. At
Fukushima the earthquake caused the normal power supply to be
lost while the tsunami caused the backup power supply to be
lost. This placed the plant into a station blackout.
Batteries provided sufficient power for the steam driven
systems to cool the reactor cores on units one, 2 and 3. When
those batteries were exhausted there were no cooling systems
for the reactor cores or the spent fuel pools. Fuel in the
reactor cores and some spent fuel pools has been damaged by
overheating.
Had either normal or backup power been restored before the
batteries were depleted we would not be here today. There are
lessons that can and should be applied to lessen the
vulnerabilities at U.S. reactors. I cannot emphasize enough
that the lessons from Japan apply to all U.S. reactors not just
the boiling water reactors like those affected at Fukushima.
None are immune to station blackout problems. All must be made
less vulnerable to those problems.
As at Fukushima, U.S. reactors are designed for a station
blackout of only a short duration. Eleven U.S. reactors are
designed to cope for a station blackout lasting 8 hours as were
the reactors in Japan. Ninety-three of our reactors are
designed to cope for only 4 hours. One lesson from Fukushima is
the need to provide workers with options for dealing with a
prolonged station blackout.
In other words the moment that any U.S. reactor enters a
station blackout condition response efforts should proceed
along three parallel paths.
First, restoration of the electrical grid as soon as
possible.
Second, recovery of one or more emergency diesel generators
as soon as possible.
Third, acquisition of additional batteries and/or temporary
battery generators as soon as possible.
If either of the first 2 paths leads to success, the
station blackout ends and the re-energized safety systems can
cool the reactor core and spent fuel pool.
If the first 2 paths lead to failure, success on the third
path provides enough time for the first 2 paths to achieve
belated success.
The timeline associated with the third path should
determine whether additional batteries are required at existing
facilities. For example, the existing battery life may be
sufficient when a reactor is located near a facility where
temporary generators are readily available. Such as the San
Onofre Nuclear plant in California which is right next door to
the U.S. Marine Base at Camp Pendleton.
When a reactor is more remotely located it may be necessary
to add onsite batteries to increase the chance that the third
path leads to success when the first 2 paths do not.
A reminder from Fukushima involves vulnerability at spent
fuel pools. All U.S. reactors have more irradiated fuel in the
spent fuel pool than exists in the reactor core. All U.S.
reactors have the spent fuel pool cool by fewer and less
reliable systems than are provided for the reactor core. At all
U.S. reactors the spent fuel pool is housed in less robust
containment than surrounds the reactor core.
More irradiated fuel that is less well protected and less
well defended is an undo hazard. There are 2 simple measures
that can be taken to better manage this risk.
Accelerate the transfer of spent fuel from the spent fuel
pools to dry cask storage.
Second, upgrade the guidelines for how to address an
emergency and provide operator training for spent fuel pool
problems.
Currently the U.S. spent fuel storage strategy is to nearly
fill the spent fuel pools to capacity and then transfer fuel
into dry cask storage. This keeps the spent fuel pools filled
nearly to capacity, thus maintaining the risk as high as
possibly achievable. A better strategy would be to reduce the
inventory of irradiated fuels in the pool to only the fuel
discharged from the reactor in the last 5 years.
Less irradiated fuel in the pools generates lower heat
load. The lower heat load gives workers more time to restore
cooling or the water inventory in the spent fuel pool. If
irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool did become damaged,
having fewer assemblies in the spent fuel pool means the
radioactive cloud is much smaller.
Following the accident at Three Mile Island reactor owners
significantly upgraded emergency procedures and training that
the operators relied upon. Prior to that accident the
procedures relied on the operators diagnosing what happened and
taking steps to fix that problem. If they misdiagnosed the
accident the guidelines could lead them to taking the wrong
steps for the actual accident that they faced.
Today's procedures guide the operator's response to
abnormally high pressure or unusually low water level without
undo regard for what caused that condition. These revamped
emergency procedures represent significant improvements over
the pre-TMI days. But they only apply to reactor core
accidents. No comparable procedures would help the operators
respond to a spent fuel pool accident. It's imperative that the
comparable emergency procedures be provided for spent fuel pool
accidents as they've helped protect us against reactor pool
accidents.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lochbaum follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project,
Union of Concerned Scientists
The Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant in Japan experienced a station
blackout. A station blackout occurs when a nuclear power plant loses
electrical power from all sources except that provided by onsite banks
of batteries. The normal power supply comes from the plant's own main
generator or from the electrical grid when the reactor is shut down.
All the equipment needed to operate the plant on a daily basis as well
as the emergency equipment needed during an accident can be energized
by the normal power supply. When the normal power supply is lost,
backup power is supplied from onsite emergency diesel generators. These
generators provide electricity only to the smaller set of equipment
needed to cool the reactor cores and maintain the containments'
integrity during an accident.
At Fukushima, the earthquake caused the normal power supply to be
lost. Within an hour, the tsunami caused the backup power supply to be
lost. This placed the plant into a station blackout where the only
source of power came from batteries. These batteries provided
sufficient power for the valves and controls of the steam-driven
system--called the reactor core isolation cooling system--that provided
cooling water for the reactor cores on Units 1, 2, and 3. When those
batteries were exhausted, there were no cooling systems for the reactor
cores or the spent fuel pools. There are clear indications that the
fuel in the reactor cores of units 1, 2, and 3 and some spent fuel
pools has been damaged due to overheating.
Had either normal or backup power been restored before the
batteries were depleted, we would not be here today discussing this
matter. The prolonged station blackout resulted in the inability to
cool the reactor cores in Units 1, 2, and 3, the spent fuel pools for
all six units, and the consolidated spent fuel pool. There are lessons,
learned at high cost in Japan, that can and should be applied to lessen
the vulnerabilities at US reactors. And I cannot emphasis enough that
the lessons from Japan apply to all US reactors, not just the boiling
water reactors like those affected at Fukushima. None are immune to
station blackout problems. All must be made less vulnerable to those
problems.
As at Fukushima, US reactors are designed to cool the reactor core
during a station blackout of only a fairly short duration. It is
assumed that either the connection to an energized electrical grid or
the repair of an emergency diesel generator will occur before the
batteries are depleted. Eleven US reactors are designed to cope with a
station blackout lasting eight hours, as were the reactors in Japan.
Ninety-three of our reactors are designed to cope for only four hours.
But unless the life of the on-site batteries is long enough to
eliminate virtually any chance that the batteries would be depleted
before power from another source is restored, one lesson from Fukushima
is the need to provide workers with options for dealing with a station
blackout lasting longer than the life of the on-site batteries. In
other words, the moment that any US reactor enters a station blackout,
response efforts should proceed along three parallel paths: (1)
restoration of the electrical grid as soon as possible, (2) recovery of
one or more emergency diesel generators as soon as possible, and (3)
acquisition of additional batteries and/or temporary generators as soon
as possible. If either of the first two paths leads to success, the
station blackout ends and the reenergized safety systems can cool the
reactor core and spent fuel pool. If the first two paths lead to
failure, success on the third path will hopefully provide enough time
for the first two paths to achieve belated success.
The timeline associated with the third path should determine
whether the life of the on-site batteries is adequate or whether
additional batteries should be required.. For example, the existing
battery life may be sufficient when a reactor is located near a
facility where temporary generators are readily available, such as the
San Onofre nuclear plant in California, which is next to the US Marine
base at Camp Pendleton. When a reactor is more remotely located, it may
be necessary to add on-site batteries to increase the chance that the
third path leads to success if the first two paths do not.
The second lesson from Fukushima is the need to address the
vulnerability of spent fuel pools. At many US reactors, there is far
more irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool than in the reactor core.
At all US reactors, the spent fuel pool is cooled by fewer and less
reliable systems than are provided for the reactor core. At all US
reactors, the spent fuel pool is housed in far less robust structures
than surround the reactor core. This means that any release of
radiation from the pool will not be as well contained as radiation
released from the reactor core. It also means that spent fuel pools are
more vulnerable to terrorist attack than is the reactor itself. More
irradiated fuel that is less well protected and less well defended is
an undue hazard. There are two measures to better manage this risk: (1)
accelerate the transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry cask
storage, and (2) upgrade the guidelines for how to address an emergency
and the operator training for spent fuel pool problems.
Currently, the US spent fuel storage strategy is to nearly fill the
spent fuel pools to capacity and then to transfer fuel into dry cask
storage to provide space for the new fuel discharged from the reactor
core. This keeps the spent fuel pools nearly filled with irradiated
fuel, thus maintaining the risk level about as high as possible. Added
to that risk is the risk from dry casks stored onsite, which is less
than that from the spent fuel pools but not zero.
A better strategy would be to reduce the inventory of irradiated
fuel in the pools to the minimum amount, which would be only the fuel
discharged from the reactor core within the past five years. Reducing
the spent fuel stored in the pools would lower the risk in two ways.
First, less irradiated fuel in the pools would generate a lower heat
load. If cooling of the spent fuel pool was interrupted or water
inventory was lost from the pool, the lower heat load would give
workers more time to recover cooling and/or water inventory before
overheating caused fuel damage. And second, if irradiated fuel in a
spent fuel pool did become damaged, the amount of radioactivity
released from the smaller amount of spent fuel would be significantly
less than that released from a nearly full pool. Reducing the amount of
irradiated fuel in spent fuel pools would significantly reduce the
safety and security risks from a nuclear power plant.
Following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, reactor owners
significantly upgraded emergency procedures and operator training..
Prior to that accident, procedures and training relied on the operators
quickly and correctly diagnosing what had happened and taking steps to
mitigate the consequences. If the operators mis-diagnosed the accident
they faced, the guidelines could lead them to take the wrong steps for
the actual accident in progress. The revamped emergency procedures and
training would guide the operators' response to an abnormally high
pressure or an unusually low water level without undue regard for what
caused the abnormalities. The revamped emergency procedures and
training represent significant improvements over the pre-TMI days. But
they apply only to reactor core accidents. No comparable procedures and
training would help the operators respond to a spent fuel pool
accident. It is imperative that comparable emergency procedures and
training be provided for spent fuel pool accidents to supplement the
significant gains in addressing reactor core accidents that were made
following the TMI accident.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has announced a two-phase
response plan to Fukushima; a 90-day quick look followed by a more in-
depth review. If the past three decades have demonstrated anything,
it's that the NRC will likely come up with a solid action plan to
address problems revealed at Fukushima, but will be glacially slow in
implementing those identified safety upgrades. A comprehensive action
plan does little to protect Americans until its goals are achieved. We
urge the US Congress to force the NRC to not merely chart a course to a
safer place, but actually reach that destination as soon as possible.
The Chairman. Mr. Pietrangelo, go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY R. PIETRANGELO, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Mr. Pietrangelo. Thank you, Senator. Good morning, all.
First, on behalf of NEI and our members our thoughts are
with the Japanese, our friends and colleagues in the industry
there and in particular those workers on the ground who have
been struggling with trying to bring this plant to a safe
condition over the last couple weeks. So Senator Murkowski, I
echo your empathy for them. I can't pretend to understand what
it's like to get hit by a massive earthquake, followed by a
tsunami, followed by additional aftershocks of a very
significant magnitude. So they are doing a heroic job there to
bring that plant to a safe condition.
There have been a lot of questions thus far this morning
about could it happen here? What are the events that could
bring us to this similar condition in Japan? What I like to say
is that and Bill Borchardt and Pete went over the provisions
that go into the licensing of our plants.
But I think for the people at the stations it almost
doesn't matter what gets you in the condition, whether it's an
earthquake, tsunami, flood, hurricane, tornado, equipment
failure, operator error, manufacturing defect, all those areas
are exhaustively reviewed by the NRC before you can get a
license. If you did get some rare combination of those that
puts you in a station blackout or any other concern where you
can't get cooling to the core, that's why we prepare the way we
do at our plants. We're ready for those kinds of measures.
I want to start with the proactive steps we've taken as an
industry. Basically looking at severe accidents and what goes
into, what we prepare for in terms of beyond design basis
events. When the NRC licenses to plants originally the
demonstration had to be that you could place the plant in a
safe condition given the extreme design basis events,
earthquake, loss of offsite power, etcetera.
Since that time through both NRC regulation and other
measures we put in place we've gone beyond the design basis.
We've used probalistic risk assessment to look at
combinations of initiating events and equipment failures and
human actions that could damage the core and what we could do
to respond to those.
So we've identified vulnerabilities in the designs that
we've addressed.
We've identified accident management insights for the
operators.
I agree with David's suggestion about looking at severe
accident management for fuel pools.
We have some numbers in place, some measures in place, but
not to the extent we do for the reactors.
Also I think the President got it right on March 17. Again,
these designs have been exhaustively reviewed. But it's
incumbent upon us as an industry and NRC as a regulator and the
International Atomic Energy Agency and operators all over the
world to fully understand the lessons learned that come out of
Fukushima and apply them.
I do want to talk a little bit more about the improvements
we've put in place since the plants were licensed. I mentioned
the PRA improvements. Also after September 11, 2001, we did a
lot of work on fires and explosions related to aircraft impact.
Wiping out quadrants of the plant and seeing what contingency
measures could be put in place to deal with the loss of key
safety functions.
This even goes beyond some of the station blackout measures
that David talked about. The ability to get water into steam
generators and PWRs or water into the primary containment and
BWRs to look at backup pooling measures. We put a lot of those
measures in place. Those measures included contingency measures
for spent fuel pools including getting sprays to the pools and
connections to stand pipes or existing equipment to keep the
fuel covered.
Bill mentioned that the analysis of the spent fuel pools.
It's not quite as complicated, thankfully, as the reactors are.
Basically you have to keep water in the pool. It's a great
radiation shield and a great coolant. You can go to any spent
fuel pool in the country and look over the handrail right down
at the used fuel without any protective clothing on whatsoever.
You know, Bill mentioned that depending on the age of the
fuel and how long it's been in there it will take days, more
likely weeks before you would boil off the inventory. Typically
there's 20 to 30 feet of water above the top of those used fuel
rods. So that's a long time to be able to deal with the event
if it occurs.
One thing I can say going forward is that our industry, our
hallmark is learning from operating experience. We learned a
lot from TMI in terms of operator training as well as design
enhancements. We will enhance safety as a result of Fukushima.
We will get these lessons learned.
We started that already. But it's going to take a long time
to get a full understanding of what transpired there. But when
we do I can assure you that we will enhance safety margins
across the industry.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony.
Let me ask first, Mr. Lochbaum, what are your thoughts
this--we had testimony in the first panel about the station
blackout rule that the NRC has put in place that presumably
would build in some safety precautions against the kind of loss
of power that we've experienced or at least the consequences
from loss of power that we've seen in the case of the Japanese
plant. Could you give us your views as to the adequacy of that
station blackout rule? Whether it does what it should do or
whether there are other things it should have done that it
didn't accomplish?
Mr. Lochbaum. I think the station blackout rule was to the
NRC and the industry's credit. It did significantly reduce or
improve safety. Put it more positively.
I think what Japan showed us is that when the event lasts
longer that our assumptions either four or 8 hours, we
shouldn't leave the operators with no choices. When the station
blackout in Japan lasted longer than their assumed duration of
8 hours, they were left with no options. As a result the
reactor cores and the spent fuel pools were overheated and
damaged.
We need to do a better job of increasing the reliability
that either we restore AC power from the grid or restore AC
power from the diesel generators within the 4 to 8 hours that
we assume, and also provide the operators with something else
should those very dedicated and intense efforts fail so they're
not left without any options other than a miracle. Miracles are
great, but you can't rely on them.
So I think we need to look at that to increase the odds
that things are corrected before the station blackout duration
ends. Be prepared should that duration end without success on
the restoration of power. I think we can do that. I don't think
it's difficult.
I think Japan showed the price of not doing that. So I
think it's cheap insurance for the reactors in the United
States to go ahead and do that.
The Chairman. Mr. Pietrangelo, did you have a thought on
any of those comments?
Mr. Pietrangelo. Yes. I think that's one of the obvious
places that we'll have to look. But just looking at the event
in Japan with the earthquake and then the tsunami, destroying
all the infrastructure around that plant. What is was was a
massive common mode failure of all those backup emergency
diesel generators.
It's hard to postulate that here. It's very, very unlikely
to occur. Also destroy the entire infrastructure around the
plant such that you can't get help there soon.
We're already looking at trying to stage equipment
regionally. We've done it locally at the sites in response to
9/11 such that we can go beyond the station blackout duration
and still provide cooling. But to get the 48 hours or 72 hours,
pick a number. We're going to take a hard look at that and see
what resources would be necessary to extend the capability that
long.
But again, it's pretty remote that you'd get that kind of
common mode failure across all your systems. Really the station
blackout was predicated on giving sufficient time to either
restore AC power from the grid or get one of the emergency
diesel generators started.
The Chairman. Mr. Pietrangelo, let me ask your comment on
another statement that Mr. Lochbaum makes in his testimony. He
says a better strategy would be to reduce the inventory of
irradiated fuel in the pools to the minimum amount which would
be only the fuel discharge from the reactor core within the
past 5 years. Reducing the spent fuel stored in the pools would
lower the risk in a couple of ways. He goes into that.
Mr. Pietrangelo. Right.
The Chairman. Have you looked at that recommendation and do
you have a thought about it?
Mr. Pietrangelo. Yes. First of all it's not a new
recommendation. It's been out there for quite some time. I
think as a result of Fukushima we need to take a real hard look
at how we manage used fuel in our country. Hopefully while it's
not a crisis situation, get some momentum behind a national
policy to deal with used fuel.
The issue is with the spent fuel pools. I think, you know,
that with a lot of analyses done of what happens to used fuel
if it gets uncovered and some kind of worse case scenarios. We
don't know exactly what happened in those used fuel pools yet.
I think part of those lessons learned is going to be
specifically focused on the risk from uncovering that fuel and
what happens when it gets uncovered.
Nevertheless, while there would be some risk reduction in
unloading the pools of the fuel rods after 5 or 6 years. The
freshest old fuel is where the most heat load is and where the
most radio toxicity is. So you would still have some risk going
forward even if you unloaded all of the older old used fuel.
So the problem doesn't go away. It's really a marginal
reduction in risk when you do that.
The Chairman. Alright.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow
up on that then.
So the decay radiation in this spent fuel that we're moving
and saying OK, after 5 years we're going to move this. You're
still going to have a level of radiation there. Do we know what
kind of decay radiation we have?
Then understanding that, do we have to design some type of
a new dry cask to contain that radiation? How do we deal with
it? Either one of you.
Mr. Lochbaum. The reason we said 5 is that the casks that
are being used today, there are hundreds of casks at U.S.
plants around the country, are designed for fuel that's been
out of the reactor for 5 years or more. So we don't have to go
to new casks. We can use the ones that are currently certified
by the NRC and being used by the industry.
We would just like to accelerate the transfer from the
pools into those already certified casks and available casks.
Senator Murkowski. OK. So really we don't have to do that
much in terms of any new technologies. We just move it quicker.
Mr. Lochbaum. That's correct.
Senator Murkowski. Let me ask a question about the use of
the sea water to act as a coolant. I understand that we are now
in the process, the United States is now in the process of
helping ship in some fresh water. But in the meantime, the sea
water has been used. There's been some question about the
corrosive nature of the salt.
I don't know, maybe this was a question that was best asked
of either the 2 gentlemen before you, but can either one of you
speak to this as an issue whether or not the salt in the sea
water is perhaps having an impact on our ability or on the
Japanese ability to get the reactors under control?
Mr. Pietrangelo. Yes. I think the concern was as you boil
off the sea water you're left with the salt that could get
crusted in the fuel and thereby preclude the cooling of it. So
that's why as soon as they had fresh water available they've
started injection to the reactor vessels with fresh water.
Those barges from the U.S. Navy, I believe have arrived now
so they've got about a half a million gallons of fresh water
available to continue that exercise.
Senator Murkowski. But given that we've already used some
pretty substantial amounts of sea water.
Mr. Pietrangelo. Right.
Senator Murkowski. Do we know whether or not that has
proven to be an impediment or caused a delay or further
complications in getting this under control?
Mr. Pietrangelo. I don't know, Senator.
Mr. Lochbaum. I think just the opposite. It helped. They
were facing very dire situations. So the sea water helped stop
whatever fuel damage was ongoing.
So they dealt with their most immediate problem with the
use of sea water as they should have. Now as they're probably
doing. They're diluting that sea water with fresh water. So it
looks like they took the right steps for the right reasons.
Mr. Pietrangelo. Senator, even in our plants in this
country there are provisions when you lose your available
inventory of fresh water in a tank, provisions to use river
water or sea water in existing systems. So, it's not exactly
what the situation you want to get to.
Senator Murkowski. Yes.
Mr. Pietrangelo. But it's there if you need it.
Senator Murkowski. Does it, does the salt have any impact,
do we know on the spent fuel pools?
Mr. Pietrangelo. I think it's the same concern that it
would be in the reactor.
Senator Murkowski. Yes.
Mr. Pietrangelo. It could impede the cooling.
Senator Murkowski. But again, the concern about any
corrosive effect?
Mr. Lochbaum. There are stainless steel liners that help
retard more resistant to corrosion than other forms of steel. I
think the problem for the pools would be the instrumentation
and the other controls over the water flow through the reactor.
But we heard in the last couple days they've restored fresh
water supplies to the pools.
So they'll be diluting the salinity of the water in those
pools. So whatever damage has been done is getting better from
now on as long as they're able to sustain that progress.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Franken.
Senator Franken. Yes. I have couple areas I want to get
into. I'm getting some idea about how we approach assessing all
the safety factors of a nuclear plant when we site it.
Mr. Pietrangelo, you spoke in some good detail about that.
But when I asked Mr. Borchardt of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission how the Japanese system compared to ours, he said he
didn't know. Now I think that if Americans are going to get
some kind of, take some kind of comfort that our system when
everything you describe actually works. It would be nice to
know how our system compare with the Japanese system.
Because what we're seeing in Japan didn't work. So Mr.
Lochbaum, I find this disturbing that this far into this crisis
that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission doesn't know how to
compare the Japanese system of siting and looking into the
safety verses ours. Do you have any thoughts on that?
Mr. Lochbaum. I'm in an unusual role of defending the NRC,
that's typically not my role. But I think the NRC has 4,000
people. They have an International Programs Unit that probably
knows those answers, but to Mr. Borchardt's defense, he doesn't
know the combined knowledge of those 4,000 people.
I would be willing to bet this week's paycheck that the NRC
has that answer and could get it fairly quickly. So the
situation is not quite as bad as it may look on the surface.
Senator Franken. OK----
Mr. Lochbaum. By the way, it wasn't my paycheck. It was
somebody else's 1 week paycheck I'm betting.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Pietrangelo. Senator, I think going forward you're
absolutely right. We have to understand not only the
differences in the regulatory systems. But from an industry
perspective understand what design mods were made to those
plants.
What operational practices they put in place? Their
emergency planning they've done for events like this and
compare it to what we have in place. Then assess the gaps, if
you will, to see whether we would have been able to better deal
with it or that we still need to do additional things.
Senator Franken. Yes, because, you know, it's hard to take
a lot of comfort from what we do if you can't compare it to
what they do because obviously what they did wasn't sufficient,
right?
OK. Now, I quoted a Washington Post editorial by Matthew
Bunn. Did you read that?
Mr. Pietrangelo. I did, sir.
Senator Franken. Did you read that, Mr. Lochbaum?
Mr. Lochbaum. Yes.
Senator Franken. OK. In it he wrote that despite the
recommendations by the National Academies that spent fuel rods
be stored in pools onsite that they should be arranged place
old, cool fuel rods next to newer, hotter fuel rods to prevent
hot spots and fires in the event that the pools lost enough
water to uncover--to cover the rods. That despite that
recommendation in 2006 there is no such action. This is a
quote.
``No such action had been taken either in the U.S. or
Japan.''
Mr. Borchardt said they had been. So now I ask 2 questions.
One, Dr. Bunn is an expert at Harvard. Is he wrong? Is Mr.
Borchardt wrong?
Is this a good recommendation?
Mr. Pietrangelo. Mr. Bunn is wrong. There was a correction.
It was hard to see. So about 2 or 3 days later in the editorial
section in the Post from Mr. Bunn saying that there had been
measures taken to address some of the concerns he raised in his
op ed.
We refer to it as a checkerboard pattern of the fuel,
precisely what he was talking about.
Secondly, as part of the post 9/11 measures to get
additional capability to refill the pools in the event of
fires, explosions or any other event that could lose inventory
in the pools.
Senator Franken. OK. That answers that.
Mr. Pietrangelo. Yes.
Senator Franken. One last thing. I have 20 seconds left, so
but I can the question and then you can take whatever time you
want to answer it.
Evacuation. We kind are seeing, kind of, a lot of
controversy about how much area around the reactor in Fukushima
is a safe area. We see that there--if you take a 50-mile radius
from some of our reactors you have 10 and 10 of millions of
people around them. Do we have adequate evacuation plans in
case something like this would happen in the United States?
Mr. Pietrangelo. Yes. Our evacuation plans are based on
studies done in 1970s by both the NRC and other agencies. The
ten mile emergency planning zone or EPZ, as we refer to it, was
determined to be sufficient to protect public health and
safety.
There's also a 50-mile zone that looks at the ingestion
path, any contamination of food products or dairy products and
so forth that can be sampled.
I'd also note there's provisions to increase the evacuation
or protective action recommendations be it evacuation or
sheltering beyond the ten mile EPZ. Every 2 years each plant
conducts an emergency planning exercise that's overseen by both
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA. In addition we
practice those drills quarterly onsite.
So we think we've got the gold standard of emergency
planning. It was a difficult situation for the NRC 2 weeks ago
when we were in the middle of this event when they were looking
at 3 cores and 4 spent fuel pools and limited and conflicting
information. I think they do what they always do is think of,
when there's a lot of uncertainty on the ground, they make a
very conservative decision.
I think we've seen that over the years with how the agency
regulates. That's what happened here.
Senator Franken. Mr. Lochbaum, do you have any opinion
about the state of our evacuation plans?
Mr. Lochbaum. I think our plans are as good as those in
Japan on March 10.
Senator Franken. I don't know what that means.
Mr. Lochbaum. It means we would be equally in dire straits
if we were faced with that kind of disaster. We have great
plans on paper. If we put them to practice I think that we're
going to show that we're going to come up short.
Mr. Pietrangelo. But I would also add, Senator, that the
Japanese, I think responded exactly as we would with our
emergency plan. They evacuated within their, I think it's 12
\1/2\ miles or 20 kilometer radius. They put sheltering in
place later.
So they did precisely the kinds of actions and protective
action recommendations we would take to protect public health
and safety. In our country it's the state and local officials
acting on recommendations from the plant operator in the event
and overseen by the NRC, who makes that decision.
Senator Franken. But this Fukushima is not as dense an
area.
Mr. Pietrangelo. Certainly not.
Senator Franken. As many of----
Mr. Pietrangelo. Certainly not.
Senator Franken. I mean, Indian Point was brought up as an
example. Let's say you live within, I mean there's millions and
millions and millions of people living within 50 miles of that
plant. Let's say you're a parent, your kid is at school going
the opposite way of exiting, getting away from there.
Mr. Lochbaum, do you think that we need to improve on what
we're doing?
Mr. Lochbaum. Around Indian Point, for example, the local
and state officials have said they can't get their people out
if they need to. The Federal Government overruled what the
local and state government said and said, it would happen
anyway that some miracle would occur and the people would not
be harmed. I tend to trust the local and state officials. They
deal with issues on a daily basis.
If in their best judgment they can't protect those people,
I don't know why anybody else should believe that we can.
Senator Franken. Thank you. I'm way over my time. Thank
you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Just very quickly. Do you think that it
was confusing the fact that the evacuation order from the
Japanese government that it be 12 \1/2\ miles initially and
then the United States coming in and saying 50-mile radius.
What does that message say that Americans are more worried
about the radiation than the Japanese are to those that are
living there?
Was that a confusing directive?
Mr. Pietrangelo. We support what the President recommended
for American citizens in Japan. I think it's a different
decision to evacuate U.S. citizens. There's not going to be as
many living within that radius as it is for Japanese people who
have been raised there and live there now.
I can understand where some of the confusion comes. But
again, based on the information they had at the time and the
potential for it to degrade. I think they made a conservative
decision, but I understand where the confusion could come.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Lochbaum.
Mr. Lochbaum. In the United States one of the things we
learned from Three Mile Island was it's good to have one voice
to avoid confusion like you're suggesting. I think what this
accident may suggest is we need to look at an international
concept of one voice. So that there's not a discrepancy that
one side or the other could say it was either too much or too
less.
So that I think the same reason we went to a one voice
after Three Mile Island, it probably be a good idea to look at
it on an international level to see if the same factors apply.
Senator Murkowski. I appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. I think
this has been a useful hearing or useful briefing for us. We
appreciate it.
If additional issues come to your attention, please let us
know and we'll try to inform the full committee on all of those
as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Pietrangelo. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the briefing was adjourned.]